SYNTHESE LIBRARY
B O S T O N S T U D I E S I N T H E P H I L O S O P H Y O F S C IE N C E E D I T E D B Y R O B E R T S. C O H E N A N D M A R X W. W A R T O F S K Y
M O N O G R A P H S ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
VO LU M E X X V I
L O G I C , M E T H O D O L O G Y , P H I L O S O P H Y OF SCI ENCE,
S O C I O L O G Y OF S C I E N C E A N D OF K N O W L E D G E ,
A N D O N THE M A T H E M A T I C A L M E T H O D S OF
S O C I A L A N D B E H A V I O R A L SCI ENCES
Managing Editor: JaakkoH intikka,
Academy o f Finland and Stanford University
THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF MEDIEVAL LEARNING P R O C E E D IN G S O F T H E F IR S T I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O L L O Q U I U M O N P H IL O S O P H Y , S C IE N C E , A N D T H E O L O G Y I N T H E M I D D L E A G E S - S E P T E M B E R 1973
Editors: R o b e r t S. C o h e n ,
D o n a ld Davidson,
Boston University
Rockefeller University and Princeton University
G a b r ië l N uchelm an s,
W e s l e y C. S a l m o n ,
Edited with an Introduction by J O H N E M E R Y M U R D O C H and E D I T H D U D L E Y S Y L L A
University o f Leydèn
University o f Arizona
D. R E I D E L P U B L I S H I N G C O M P A N Y V O L U M E 76
D O R D R E C H T - H O L L A N D / B OS T O N - U . S . A .
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data International Colloquium o f Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages, 1st, North Andover, Mass. 1973. The cultural context o f medieval learning. (Boston studies in the philosophy o f science ; v. 26) (Synthese Library) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Philosophy, Medieval—Congresses. 2. Science, Medieval—Congresses. I. Murdoch, John Emery, 1927ed. II. Sylla, Edith Dudley, ed. HI. Title. IV. Series. Q174.B67 vol. 26 [B721] 501s [189] 75-2497 ISB N 90-277-0560-7 ISB N 90-277-0587-9 pbk.
PR EFAC E
The comparative historical sociology o f science - for lack o f an adequate and more economical name - is as many-sided as it is many-syllabled. The present volume exhibits the confluence not only o f historical and sociological contexts o f science, but also o f the concrete philosophit^l, theological, political, and legal contents which investigation o f a partic ular comparative case study requires. The choice o f the particular period, its rationale, and the fruitfulness o f the results, is well described in the Introduction by the editors. Professors Murdoch and Sylla. A ll scholars will understand our admiration for the skill, intelligence, and care with which John Murdoch and Edith Sylla have brought the prepared mate rials and the reported discussions into this beautifully integrated and
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lucidly articulated book. It was John Murdoch who took on the demand
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ing task o f organizing the intellectual spectrum o f interests and compe tences that resulted in as original and rich an exploration as the conference
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afforded and this book presents. This volume shows again how wide a
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perimeter o f conceptual issues the history and philosophy o f science can
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generate, when they are conceived in the fuller contexts o f their origin,
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development, and social milieu. Appreciating as we do the editors’ note o f caution about the treatment o f social, political, and economic factors in the analysis o f medieval thought and culture, it also becomes clear to us that a rigorous and careful investigation o f the relations between mate
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rial culture and both conceptual activities and institutional forces is desired in order to enlarge and deepen these studies. Need we add that we hope to see other periods treated with equal care and penetration? We also expect that philosophers o f modern science will find here insights into their own conceptual problems, as well as some historical roots o f these problems.
Copyright © 1975 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland N o part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher Printed in The Netherlands by D . Reidel, Dordrecht
Center fo r the Philosophy and
RO B E R T
History o f Science, Boston University
M A R X W. W A R T O F S K Y
August 1974.
s. C O H E N
TA B LE OF C O N TE N TS
PREFACE
V
COLLOQUIUM P A R T IC IP A N T S
IX
AUDITORS
X
J O H N E. M U R D O C H a n d E D I T H D U D L E Y S Y L L A / I n tr o d u c t io n
1
P A R T I. I S L A M roshdirashed/
Recommencements de l’algèbre aux X le et X lle
siècles
33
Discussion
57
N A B I L SHEHABY
/ The Influence o f Stoic Logic on Al-Jassas’s
Legal Theory
61
Discussion JOSEF V A N ESS
80 / The Beginnings o f Islamic Theology
87
Discussion MUHSIN MAHDi
104 / Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Alfarabi’s
Enumeration o f the Sciences
113
Comments
146
P A R T I I. T H E T W E L F T H A N D
T H IR T E E N T H
C E N T U R IE S
IN TH E L A T IN W EST R I C H A R D MCKEON
/ The Organization o f Sciences and the
Relations o f Cultures in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries Discussion
151 184
/ La nouvelle idée de nature et de savoir scien tifique au X lle siècle
193
Discussion
212
T U L L i o GREGORY
VIII
B R I A N STOCK
T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S
/ Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard
o f Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica Discussion
219 262
C O L L O Q U IU M P A R T IC IP A N T S
P A R T III. T H E F O U R T E E N T H , F I F T E E N T H , A N D S I X T E E N T H C E N T U R IE S IN T H E L A T IN W ES T
Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, J O H N E . M U R D O C H / From
Social into Intellectual Factors: A n
Aspect o f the Unitary Character o f Late Medieval Learning Discussion
Paris, and Centre d’Études supérieures de Civihsation mediévale de 271 339
Poitiers. Guy Beaujouan, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris. Richard Frank, Department o f Semitic and Egyptian Languages and
Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William o f Ockham on the Physics o f the Eucharist
349
Jean Gagné, Institut d’Études Médiévales, Université de Montréal.
Discussion
391
Tullio Gregory, Istituto di Filosofia délia Università di Roma.
EDITH D U D L E Y s y l l a /
H E i K O A. O B E R M A N
Literature, The Catholic University o f America, Washington, D.C.
/ Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus’s
Discovery in an Era o f Change Discussion
Muhsin Mahdi, Department o f Near Eastern Languages and Civilization, 397 429
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Richard McKeon, Department o f Philosophy, University o f Chicago. John E. Murdoch, Department o f History o f Science, Harvard Univer
/ Réflexions sur les rapports entre théorie et pratique au moyen âge
437
Discussion
477
Heiko A . Oberman, Institut für Spàtmittelalter und Reformation, Univer-
tury Universities : Some Preliminary Comments
485
Roshdi Rashed, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris.
Discussion
531
Abdelhamid I. Sabra, Department o f History o f Science and Department
G U Y B E A U jo u A N
C H A R L E S B. S C H M I T T
/ Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Cen
sity, Cambridge, Massachusetts. sitat Tübingen.
o f Near Eastern Languages and CiviHzation, Harvard University, INDEX
539
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Charles B. Schmitt, The Warburg Institute, University o f London. Nabil Shehaby, The Institute o f Islamic Studies, M cG ill University, Montréal. Brian Stock, The Pontifical Institute o f Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, and Centre for Medieval Studies, University o f Toronto. Edith Dudley Sylla, Department o f History, North Carolina State Uni versity at Raleigh. Josef van Ess, Orientalisches Seminar der Universitat Tübingen.
J OHN E. M U R D O C H A N D E D I T H D U D L E Y S Y L L A
A U D IT O R S
IN T R O D U C T IO N
Caroline Bynum, The Divinity School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Joan Cadden, Department o f History o f Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Jean Christensen, Department o f History o f Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Conferences and colloquia are held and their results often published, but very rarely is any account provided o f why and how they came to be. Such an account would naturally not be as significant as the “ proceedings” or “ acts” themselves. In this instance, however, something beyond the
Myron Gilmore, Department o f History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
simple recording o f the date and circumstances o f the birth o f a colloquium,
William Graham, Department o f Near Eastern Languages and Civiliza
may help explain the purpose o f the event and the character or nature o f
tion, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
some glimpse o f the deliberations that occurred in its period o f gestation,
Jocelyn Hillgarth, Department o f History, Boston College.
the eventual offspring. The history o f the present Colloquium should begin with its concep
Stephen Victor, Division o f Natural Sciences, Monteith College, Wayne
tion, an outgrowth o f an earlier meeting at Cumberland Lodge in Windsor
State University, Detroit, Michigan.
Park, England, in the summer o f 1971 devoted to the historical sociology o f science in the large. Partly as a result o f the problems found to be in herent in a meeting whose scope was so all-encompassing, it was then decided that a more modest gathering, not in terms o f the number o f participants, but in terms o f the historical period covered, would form an appropriate and more effective sequel. The period tentatively chosen was the Middle Ages. Would not the concentration afforded by an intellectual and social history limited to medieval science prove valuable in yielding a special case o f the kind o f historical inquiry in mind? The question was thus put and arrangements to derive its answer were set in motion. Planning o f the meeting was assisted by the extraordinary generosity o f the Study Group on the Unity o f Knowledge, an organiza tion funded by the Ford Foundation under a grant to the University o f California, Davis. In addition to consultations involving both American and European medievalists in Boston, London, and Paris, the Vth Inter national Congress o f Medieval Philosophy held at Madrid, Cordoba, and Granada in September 1972 presented an especially opportune occasion for a planning discussion involving a good number o f interested scholars and prospective participants.
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 1-30. All Rights Reserved.
2
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
Quite early in these discussions and consultations it was unanimously
by each author. Selected participants were designated as “ pre-assigned
agreed that the forthcoming Colloquium should address itself to much
commentators” for each paper, but since the whole purpose o f these
more within medieval thought than the history o f science. The addition o f
“ prepared” comments was that they serve as informal catalysts setting the
philosophy and theology was viewed as indispensable; the history o f
discussion in motion and not that they provide central or definitive anal
medieval law was also considered as a valuable potential supplement,
yses and criticisms o f a given paper, the contributions o f these initial
although efforts to secure its representation were eventually unsuccessful.
commentators have not been formally distinguished from other comments
With this broader segment o f medieval thought in view, the decision was
in the discussions published in the present volume. Muhsin Mahdi’s paper
made - to quote the initial terms in which the Colloquium goals were
was circulated in advance together with the other papers, but events
envisaged - to focus upon three areas: (a) the interdisciplinary relations
prevented him from attending the Colloquium itself. Inasmuch as it was
o f philosophy, science, and theology in the Middle Ages and, where per
decided not to discuss his paper in his absence it is accompanied in what
tinent, the relations these disciplines had to other areas o f intellectual
follows simply by short written comments and his reply. Four o f the five days o f the Colloquium were spent in discussing the
endeavor; (b) the institutional and social factors that may have affected the origin, growth, and maintenance o f philosophy, science, and theology as
invited contributions and the issues they raised, the participants being
viable disciplines; and (c) cross-cultural factors that may be elicited as
joined on these occasions by a few additional scholars from the Boston
operative between Islam and the Latin West, and secondly, between
area who also had the opportunity to read the papers in advance and thus
each o f these and the Greek learning that was absorbed in the for
contribute to the discussion i f they so wished. The Colloquium opened with a single day devoted to Islamic topics, was followed by a second day
mation o f their philosophical, scientific, and theological doctrines and traditions. The Colloquium itself flourished under the four-fold sponsorship o f the
devoted to the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries in the Latin West, and concluded with two days treating the later Middle Ages.
Department o f the History o f Science, the Center for Middle Eastern
The discussions were extensive and open, unencumbered by any fear o f
Studies, and the Committee on Medieval Studies, all o f Harvard Univer
being too critical, yet always relaxed and good-humored even when
sity, and the Center for the History and Philosophy o f Science o f Boston
reaching the level o f rather heated debate. W e regret that it was not pos
University. Through the efforts o f the last-named sponsor, the meetings
sible to reproduce them in anything near their entirety, but selectivity was
were held at Osgood Hill, the Boston University Conference Center
the necessary course. Although note should be made o f the fact that those
located on a one hundred and fifty-three acre estate in North Andover,
parts o f the discussions that are included have had to be condensed con
Massachusetts. There, the Victorian mansion that forms the nucleus o f the
siderably, the principle we adopted was that o f deleting certain “ debates”
estate provided room and board for all participants and presented a com
in toto so that those that we have preserved would not suffer from an
fortable parlour in which to hold our discussions in an informal and pro ductive way.
underrepresentation o f their substance. This seemed far preferable to the
II
alternative course o f having a little, but inadequate, bit o f every point and issue raised. In reducing the whole to something roughly less than one-quarter o f its
The central purpose o f the Colloquium was intended, and turned out, to
original size, we have tried to retain something o f the live “ give and take”
be discussion and mutual interchange. The invited papers, therefore, were
o f the actual proceedings. W e have also given some priority to the inclu sion o f those segments o f the discussions that seemed to deal with points
circulated to all participants in advance, both to those who were contrib uting papers in their own right and to the invited “ commentators at large” :
or themes o f more general interest, especially when such points addressed
Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Richard Frank, Jean Gagné, and Abdelhamid
themselves to problems or ideas that appeared in the discussion o f more than one paper. Some preference was also given to those aspects o f the
Sabra. This allowed us to dispense with all but a brief introductory résumé
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTIO N
discussions that directed themselves toward the stated goals o f the Col loquium.
unity o f late medieval learning confronted most directly the general ques
The extent to which these initial goals were realized can only be mea
taining that philosophy and the greater part o f science formed a single
sured by comparing them with the papers and discussions contained in the present volume. Perhaps it will be useful here, however, to set forth
discipline within the later medieval period and that there was also a weaker unity between philosophy-science and theology. Edith Sylla’s
briefly the content o f the papers not in themselves but as related to the
paper on autonomous and handmaiden science compared the relations o f
overall goals the Colloquium was planned to serve. This will, o f course,
science and theology in the thirteenth century as represented by St. Thomas
yield an interpreted view o f the contributions, but one, we trust, that is not
Aquinas and in the fourteenth century as represented by William o f
at odds with the thrust o f each paper considered apart from the Collo
Ockham through an examination o f the two authors’ respective treat
quium and its goals and discussions.
ments o f the physics o f the Eucharist. She concluded that whereas
tion o f the medieval relations o f philosophy, science, and theology, main
The first, interdisciplinary theme o f the Colloquium was particularly
Aquinas modified his physics in the service o f theology, Ockham main
emphasized in relation to the later Middle Ages, but it was also apparent
tained the autonomy o f physics even when this meant that physics was
in the other sessions. Thus, at the very beginning o f the Islamic section,
less able to meet the needs o f religious explanation.
Roshdi Rashed’s paper on the development o f algebra in the eleventh
Heiko Oberman’s paper setting Copernicus within the larger context o f
and twelfth centuries addressed itself to the problem o f the interrelations
the era o f reformation and revolution proposed a new view o f the first
o f arithmetic and algebra during this period. Similarly, in discussing
encounter between the Protestant Reformation and Copernicanism, and
the application o f Stoic logic within the field o f Islamic law, Nabil
indicated a common background to these two sixteenth century reform
Shehaby considered how logical material might be treated differently with
movements in nominalism and in the medieval campaign contra vanam
in a legal work than within a purely logical context. Interdisciplinary rela
curiositatem. He showed how the same basic rejection o f metaphysics
tions also came out strongly in the discussion o f Josef Van Ess’s paper on
could have very different effects within theology and within science, in
the origins o f theology in Islam in the first century A .H . when a question
theology leading to a reliance on revelation and faith, while in science
was raised as to how one ought to define Islamic theology or kalâm: proposed definitions in terms o f subject matter, methodology, or attitude
leading to an emphasis on experience. Guy Beaujouan’s paper on the relations o f theory and practice in the
all seemed to have their difficulties. Touching upon the relations between
Middle Ages was directly and indissolubly related to both the interdis
disciplines in yet another way, Muhsin Mahdi’s paper on Alfarabi’s
ciplinary and the institutional and social themes o f the Colloquium.
Enumeration o f the Sciences emphasized that the coexistence in Islam o f
Addressing himself to the problem o f uncovering evidence o f the medieval
political science with jurisprudence and theology made the strict division
relations between theoretical knowledge and techniques used in everyday
o f sciences into practical and theoretical practically untenable.
life, Beaujouan argued that to examine the relation o f science and savoir
In the twelfth and thirteenth century section, Tullio Gregory’s paper
faire from a medieval point o f view it is necessary not only to think o f
on the new idea o f nature and scientific knowledge in the twelfth century demonstrated that this new conception o f nature cut across disciplinary
Renaissance architects and engineers, but also to examine such areas as music, number symbolism, alchemy, maps, the illustration o f scientific
lines, influencing theological as well as scientific and philosophical work.
manuscripts, and astronomical instruments. Discussing particular ex
Although Richard M cKeon’s paper did not specifically treat interdisci
amples taken from the areas o f architecture and building vis-à-xis prac
plinary factors, their presence was continually felt in his description and
tical geometry, and navigation vis-à-vis astronomical instruments, Beau
analysis o f the organization o f the sciences in Greek, Hebrew, Latin, and
jouan brought into sharper focus the many problems faced by the his
Islamic culture.
torian who has aspirations o f studying the medieval relations o f theory
In the session on the late Middle Ages, John Murdoch’s paper on the
and practice. On the side o f practice there were, one must assume, in
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
numerable oral traditions and trade secrets, not to mention artifacts, o f which there remain no trace, and on the side o f theory the works that do remain seem to be at variance with the presumed practice. Y et he showed how with ingenuity one can elude at least some o f these problems and find evidence where hitherto none seemed to exist. Beaujouan was joined by Gregory, McKeon, and others in the discussions in emphasizing that the utilization o f accepted twentieth century notions o f science to identify the proper theoretical sciences o f the Middle Ages can only distort the understanding o f the historical situation. Rashed insisted, however, that the more exact sciences develop differently from more diffuse intellectual enterprises. The difficulties facing the medieval historian came into view also when the problem o f the role o f institutional and social factors was discussed and suggestions were put forth as to how one might ameliorate these difficulties, even strike new ground, through the consideration o f problems and sources that have heretofore remained untreated. Rashed argued, for example, that, although the present status o f the history o f Arabic math ematics necessarily makes any evaluation o f the impact o f social factors upon its evolution at best conjectural, it would appear that eleventh and twelfth century Islamic algebra as a mature scientific discipline developed in a totally internal fashion, social factors impinging upon it only through the intermediary o f other disciplines, notably observational astronomy and arithmetic, the last named discipline itself unified - and here social influence would enter if the conjecture is correct - due to the computa tional needs o f the rising class o f commercial scribes. Again on the social factors theme. Van Ess’s paper drew attention to the possible impact o f the religious exigencies o f Islamic society upon the origins o f kalam and upon the role its practitioners had to play within this society. Y et another aspect o f the importance o f religious factors was indicated by Mahdi when he drew attention to Alfarabi’s simple juxtaposition o f political science with the traditional sciences o f jurisprudence and theology. In not troubling to explain just how these disciplines are connected, Alfarabi was most likely merely reflecting the situation in which a member o f the religious com munity found himself. The juxtaposition o f these sciences is, then, an historical accident mirroring social fact, and not at all a theoretical necessity, since philosophy and political science can and do exist in cul tures that lack a revealed religion, jurisprudence, or theology and vice versa.
INTRODUCTION
In the twelfth and thirteenth century section, an extensive and straight forward claim for the importance o f social factors was made by Brian Stock. His contribution analyzing the Sermones in cantica o f Bernard o f Clairvaux stressed the pivotal position played by Bernard’ s attitudes toward work and action as furnishing evidence o f a bridge between economic and social changes on the one hand and intellectual and cul tural changes on the other; in particular - revitalizing in a way, and ap plying to medieval society, the insight o f Max Weber’s “ work ethic” - he sketched a possible connection between the rise o f rational decision procedures rooted in material culture and the development o f a “ scien tific rationality.” Gregory’ s paper showed how the new conception o f na ture appearing in the twelfth century was reflected also in positive evalua tions o f technology and o f civil life. In the late Middle Ages section, Murdoch dealt with the question o f just what one can and cannot accomplish through attention to social factors. The institution o f the medieval university, he argued, was o f unquestionable and crucial importance in the overall establishment and support o f the unity o f late medieval learning. Faculty o f Arts materials and methods acting upon and influencing the concerns o f the Faculties o f Theology and even, though to a lesser extent, vice versa. Y et the factor o f university context as usually considered falls short o f being able to explain, he maintained, the particular intellectual developments that characterized this unity. Further appeal to the intellectual history o f the universities in terms o f the works produced under their aegis and not to statutes, acta, and other university documents as such was held forth as being likely to provide the most fruitful avenue for future investigations. In a similar vein, Sylla’s paper urged that the institutional factors most frequently considered by historians do not furnish a sufficient explanation o f the development o f the autonomy o f the sciences in later medieval thought, since Aquinas and Ockham both worked within the institutional context o f the medieval university, each spending an important part o f his time at the University o f Paris. Attention must be paid also to such factors as concepts o f intellectual integrity, proper scientific procedure, and so forth. Charles Schmitt’s paper on philosophy and science in sixteenth century universities was squarely directed to the issue o f social and institutional factors. Collecting and synthesizing evidence about philosophy and science
o
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
within universities in this later period, he examined the effects o f human
wards. Gregory’s paper indicated how the twelfth century translations
ism, the Reformation, and scientific change on the teaching o f philosophy,
from the Arabic impressed Latin scholars with the relative poverty o f
while at the same time emphasizing the hurdles to be overcome by any
their own previous scientific work. The contact with Islam, he argued,
historian who attempts to study European universities over a period o f a
helped to break down traditional symbolic modes o f thought and to pro
century or two and the consequent need to approach such a task in terms
duce a new view o f nature. In addition to Platonism, Arabic astrology
o f the diverse factors dominant in different universities at different periods
was an important factor in this transformation, nature itself being some
o f time. A more complete and complex picture o f institutional differences
times identified with planetary influences. Although as the papers themselves stand there may have been less
within medieval universities should eventually allow the consideration o f institutional factors to make a greater contribution to the understanding o f late medieval and Renaissance intellectual development.
emphasis upon cross-cultural factors than upon the other two themes o f the Colloquium, the discussions were richer in this regard. It was not pos
Concerning the third, cross-cultural theme o f the Colloquium, in the
sible to publish all o f these discussions and, consequently, much that did
Islamic section, Shehaby’s paper presented a detailed argument for the
transpire is not reflected in the present volume, but often an issue or
influence o f one particular aspect o f Greek thought, that o f Stoic logic,
point raised during the discussion o f the Islamic contributions resurfaced
upon a specific work in Islamic jurisprudence. The ensuing discussion
during the “ Latin phases” o f the debate and thus brought to the fore a
concerned itself largely with the critical examination o f the specific claim
logical comparison, i f not the actual historical contact, o f the two cul
made by Shehaby o f the impact o f one culture upon another, and in passing also raised the question o f just which criteria in general need be
tures. The final afternoon session was devoted to an evaluation o f the pre
satisfied in order to establish with reasonable clarity the influence or
vious days’ deliberations, to an assessment o f what lacunae there may
traces o f a “ foreign” doctrine or idea within a work or document be
have been in the enterprise begun at the Colloquium, and to a discussion
longing to a different culture. Shehaby’s problem was particularly in teresting because the influence he was trying to trace was both interdis
o f what questions and topics might be most deserving o f treatment at
ciplinary and intercultural. Although less central to the major burden o f his paper. Van Ess’s investigation o f the origin o f kalâm also broached
colloquium. There was need, it was felt, for a certain amount o f conceptual and
the problem o f the influence o f the Greek upon the Arabic, in this in
geographical broadening in any such future deliberations. Law and espe
stance in terms o f the religious policy o f the Byzantine Empire having a
cially medicine clearly require to be taken more into account. So also
possible effect upon the role o f the theologian in Islamic society.
astrology, alchemy, and other “ occult sciences,” the more so as the way
some future point, be it in research or within the context o f a similar
In the twelfth and thirteenth century section, M cKeon’s paper con
in which they seem to bear on other factors within medieval society differs
fronted the methodological problems o f studying the interaction o f cul
appreciably from what obtains in the cases o f philosophy and theology.
tures in the specific case o f the impact o f Islamic culture on the Latin
It would also be desirable to move the geographical center o f gravity
West. While arguing that the Latin West’s interpretation o f Arabic cul
slightly more to the south, to consider in particular the intellectual trends
ture was no more objective or reliable than any other interpretation, he
in sway at Italian and Iberian universities. One o f the primary elements that emerged from the Colloquium was
maintained that the effects o f Arabic culture on Latin culture could be viewed concretely in terms o f the changes that occurred in the Latin encyclopedia or organization o f the sciences as the result o f the contact
the repeated observation that intellectual and social factors were inevitably and inextricably connected. As a case history that might prove to be
o f the two cultures. The translation o f Arabic and Greek scientific works
especially profitable in revealing the nature o f this connection, an appre
into Latin led to a shift o f emphasis in the West from words to things, and
ciable amount o f discussion was devoted to the problem o f the translation
to the opening up o f new sciences in the thirteenth century and after
and transmission o f knowledge. Much effort has thus far been expended
10
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTIO N
by historians in sorting out just which translations o f Greek and Arabic
lished below. Among them is the problem o f correlating theory with prac
materials may have been made, and by whom and when, and even what
tice, ideas with actions. Is this a correlation - no matter how difiicult it
character these translations themselves had. But little has been done with
may be for the historian to establish - that pertains rather more exclu
the purposes and motives for making the translations, or with the com
sively to the histories o f science, theology, and law, and not especially to
plicated question o f when, why, and how a given translation came to be
the core discipline o f philosophy in the Middle Ages? Alternatively, what
used. A book translated was not a book read nor, a fortiori, a book
new kinds o f inquiries should be undertaken in order to delineate the
11
understood. These problems, however, are just those that involve the in
different modes o f applying mathematics and logic within all areas o f
terplay o f social circumstances, be these circumstances those concerned
medieval thought and is the particular mode o f application in any way
with the question o f why there was a demand for translating a given
affected or directed by the area in question? Finally, a problem that has
philosophical, scientific, or theological work in the first place, or those
been endemic to the history o f science constantly appeared as a signif
having to do with didactic or teaching requirements relevant to its even tual use.
icant issue when discussing philosophy and theology as well: What,
The concentration upon the relations between disciplines that was
In particular, is the occurrence o f such notions in what has traditionally
everywhere evident during the Colloquium drew attention to the added
been the raw material o f the history o f science in any way influenced by
work needed in the discrimination and characterization o f the disciplines
the formulation and exercise o f the same or related notions in other seg
themselves. To what extent, for example, are method, attitude, and ap
ments o f intellectual endeavor? This kind o f problem too, old as it is,
proach, and not merely content, factors that are discipline-bound? Or in
seems likely to provide profitable food for thought.
briefly put, is the importance o f observation, experience, and experiment?
what way might they be helpful in distinguishing divisions or sects within a discipline? What relations ought the historian to establish between empiricism and rationalism, or other epistemological or logical factors,
Ill
in elucidating the nature, for example, o f theology in Islam or the Latin West?
As is obvious from this brief account, the participants addressed them
The same kind o f problem occupies a rather unique position in the
attempt to calculate the overall significance o f a meeting whose papers
history o f science. How should science be related to other areas o f intel
and discussions are so varied would be a precarious undertaking at best:
lectual endeavor and how should it be distinguished from them? Perhaps
each participant in or reader o f the proceedings will have his perspective.
it makes little sense to distinguish it sharply from other areas o f thought
Perhaps, however, it is permissible at this point for the editors o f the pro
and it is far better to put our heads to sorting out the great variety o f
ceedings to set forth their own views o f the results o f the Colloquium,
things that can be called “ science” in a given period. But what difference
especially as we see these results bearing upon its original goals and upon
does the “ given period” make? How varied will our judgment be o f the
the alternatives historians might in the future adopt in their treatment o f
continuum that may exist between science, philosophy, and theology as
the whole area o f medieval learning. These views are our own, moreover, not merely insofar as they give our
we move, not just from the Middle Ages to other historical periods, but even simply within the medieval period itself?
selves to the initial goals o f the Colloquium in many and diverse ways. To
interpretation o f the possible significance o f the Colloquium, but also
Lastly, there is little doubt o f the fact that one o f the most reliable in
because they present a fair number o f our own ideas and conclusions
dicators o f just which problems and ideas will prove fruitful subjects for
concerning the historiography o f medieval science and learning. For
future examination is the frequency with which particular issues continu
some time we had already given appreciable thought to just which
ally reappeared throughout the general discussions. Many o f the points
elements this historiography should contain and to what approach it
o f recurrent interest will be apparent from reading the discussions pub
should take in order to provide the most adequate portrayal o f the status
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J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
and development o f learning in the Middle Ages. Our conclusions - some
theology. And indeed historical surveys spanning long periods o f time
o f them admittedly, still in preliminary form - have undoubtedly con
often do treat the Middle Ages as a single indivisible unit. The first impact
tributed much to the perspective from which we have viewed the results o f
o f the papers presented at the Colloquium must be, however, a recogni
the Colloquium. Y et the fact that many o f these results, we believe, in
tion o f the tremendous diversity within the Middle Ages from century to
turn served to underscore and supplement our ideas and conclusions
century, from culture to culture, and within a given century and culture
renders what follows a not inappropriate manner in which to present our assessment o f the Colloquium itself.
from discipline to discipline or school to school. A close familiarity with
O f its three original themes, the second, concerned with “ the institu
guarantee easy access to eleventh century Arabic mathematics. Some
tional and social factors that may have influenced the origin, growth, and
what less obviously, neither does a detailed knowledge o f twelfth century
maintenance o f philosophy, science, and theology as viable disciplines,”
theology in the West promise an understanding o f theological endeavor
appears prima facie to be the one most directly relevant to the Collo
in the fourteenth. Historians o f medieval philosophy, science, and theology
quium’s circumstantial origin in the historical sociology o f science. But
in a meeting similar to the present one are not at all condemned to hear
the very fact that even this second theme refers to “ philosophy, science,
repetitions o f the same, age-old topics.
twelfth century Latin theology, to cite an obvious example, does not at all
and theology” rather than to science alone indicates that even before the
Nevertheless, once one has pushed beyond the initial realization o f how
Colloquium took place there was at least a subliminal awareness on the
much one has yet to learn, a second impact o f a group o f papers like that
part o f its planners that for the historical sociology - or more appropri
before us may tend in the opposite direction. One begins to sense continu
ately, the social history - o f medieval science at any rate, the so-called
ities over time, to perceive similarities, for example, between concepts
interdisciplinary factors that lay at the center o f the first theme are
developed in Islam and, apparently quite independently, in the Latin
equally relevant. In fact, as the Colloquium assumed shape, it became
West. And one begins to wonder whether there might not be unknown
apparent that the two initial aims o f the Colloquium were more two sides
connections between diverse periods or cultures that would account for
o f a single coin than their separate statement might lead one to believe.
these similarities. A feeling o f confidence is engendered suggesting that
The interconnections o f medieval disciplines could not be understood
knowledge within one’s own special field may provide insight into prob
without understanding the development and maintaining o f these dis
lems encountered by historians with other specialities. When one’s primary
ciplines as social enterprises and vice versa. In every case it appeared
territory is the Middle Ages, this confidence may even assume the form o f
necessary to look not only at single isolated scholars or their works, but
feeUng that medieval concerns were very much like some modern con
at intellectual communities and at the cultural context in which they
cerns. Moving a step further, these initial glimpses o f apparent similarities
worked. Given this, there seemed to be hopes for a more accurate his
may be reinforced by the creation o f a suitable glossary establishing links
torical perspective, at least if the cultural context is understood in suffi
between the terms in which a problem is discussed in one language,
cient depth and detail.
period, or culture, and the terms in which it is discussed in another
Some notion o f just what profit might be reaped from this due atten
period. Indeed, since in order to understand an unfamiliar period it is
tion to context can be had by sifting out the views expressed during the
often necessary to translate the contentions o f its sources into more famil
Colloquium with respect to the problem o f what continuities and dis
iar terms, this reinforcing o f similarities is quite likely. Y et this necessity
continuities, what similarities and dissimilarities, historians ought to
“ to translate in order to understand” bears a directional asymmetry. That
elicit from the material before them. One might expect that in such a Col
is, when the translation in question is that o f an earlier source into terms
loquium as this continuity or similarity would be the keynote: the Middle
o f later material, the potential danger o f distortion is considerable.
Ages might seem “ all o f a piece,” so that it would not be difficult to make
Viewing a substantial segment o f the history o f medieval science as not
generalizations covering the whole o f medieval philosophy, science, or
much more than the history o f Galilean ideas copied in advance is a case
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J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTIO N
15
in point. On the other hand, when earlier terms or ideas seem to be re
This investigation o f “ similarities over diverse areas o f thought” is, o f
quired in order to comprehend a later source, the danger o f misinterpre tation, although surely still present, appears less. The necessity o f transla
course, a direct appeal for that consideration o f interdisciplinary factors that functioned as one o f the principal themes o f the present Colloquium.
tion may then be an accurate reflection o f the fact that the later source
Perhaps such a consideration is not in itself sufficient for an exhaustive
actually utilized or was influenced by earlier material. Even so, further
delineation o f the cultural contexts to which historians o f medieval
confirmation and testing o f the similarity thus established is always in order.
thought must address themselves, but it surely appears to be a necessary
Setting aside, however, further distinctions as to the various types o f
ingredient. In the foregoing, the “ three stages o f impact” o f the Colloquium have
similarities or continuities over time that are characteristic o f this “ second
been stated rather abstractly without benefit o f the examples the papers
impact” o f the papers and discussions, one arrives at yet a third manner in
and discussions themselves will provide. Apart from the Colloquium it
which they impinge upon one’s historical sense. It is an impact that, on
self, however, these stages reflect in miniature, as it were, episodes that
balance, seems to have been the predominant one animating the whole
the historiography o f medieval learning has gone through. The history o f
Colloquium. It finds its primary locus in the realization that the initial
medieval philosophy has, for example, moved through a pattern that has
similarities that came to the fore in “ stage two” do not in fact extend very
seen a shift from concern with dissimilarities and discontinuity with
far. History does not often repeat itself in very great detail. Thus, although
modern philosophy to emphasis upon similarities and then back again,
there may in fact exist many partial similarities, in most cases there is a
but the historiography o f medieval science presents an even clearer case
decided disequilibrium in favor o f dissimilarities. And after all, diiference
in point. Thus, the earliest histories o f science, like that o f WiUiam
in time or in cultural context almost guarantees that there will also be
Whewell, took the radical diversity o f medieval and modern science for
differences at the level o f connotations and ramifications.
granted, i f indeed the differences that existed between the vocabularies
It is here that the extreme importance o f considering and understanding
and methods o f argument o f medieval and Newtonian science were not
cultural context comes to the fore. N o t only does a diversity o f cultural
considered to be so great as to militate against taking anything medieval
context - and it must be kept in mind that a sufficient difference in time
to be “ science” at all. The second stage was entered under the tutelage o f
within a single “ culture” will frequently carry with it a different cultural
Pierre Duhem when greater familiarity with the relevant medieval sources
context - provide a warrant for the presumption o f differences, but an
enabled historians to glimpse any number o f apparent similarities between
adequate grasp o f such context will afford one a way to determine pre
medieval and modern science despite their overall divergence. Since
cisely what these differences are. I f one turns away from similarities over
Duhem, historians have tended to stress the similarities and possible
time and focuses instead upon similarities over diverse areas o f thought
historical connections between medieval and modern, without ascribing,
within a given cultural context, then the conceptions, methods, and doc
to be sure, to the rather exaggerated claims he made for the medieval in
trines operative within that context are all but bound to receive sharper
vention o f the very fundamentals o f the Scientific Revolution to be
definition and be more completely understood. Readdressing, then, the
wrought by the likes o f Galileo and Descartes. More and more, however,
question o f the relations o f such conceptions to temporally and culturally
following and extending the path marked out by Anneliese Maier, his
distinct ones that are reputed to “ resemble” them, a more adequate
torians o f medieval science are entering the third stage o f impact in which
assessment o f the measure o f this resemblance can be made. In particular,
both similarities and differences are given their proper due and in which a
a more precise account can be made o f the extent o f whatever differences
picture o f medieval science in its own right emerges, a picture not con
they may have, not only in nature and meaning, but also in the motives
tinuously colored by over-attention to the differences or similarities
behind their formulation and the purposes they were ultimately seen to serve.
between the medieval and the modem. Maier began to place medieval science into its proper philosophical context. Both as a result o f the Col
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
loquium and more generally as a result o f our own thinking, we conclude
dicate the dangers o f hmiting one’s sources too narrowly, or inversely the
16
17
that we are now at a point at which medieval science must be put more
benefits to be gained by exchanges o f information between historians o f
completely into its philosophical context and into its theological context
the same period but o f different specialties.
as well. Only then will medieval science be presented in a properly under stood, properly interpreted, way.
Another concrete form in which the problem o f thoroughly under standing and balancing similarities and differences appeared was that,
Success in such a venture demands much more than the constant dip
one might say, o f “ proper perspective.” Can one write, for instance, the
ping into theological and ostensibly philosophical sources for the raw
history o f earlier mathematics or the history o f earlier science as a history
material with which to build the history o f medieval science, something
o f only the recognizably scientific? Many would advocate, and indeed
that Duhem himself had already done with considerable expertise. It also
have taken, this approach, tied as it is to the belief common among many
demands that this “ raw material” be properly related to the philosoph
historians o f science in the essential immutability o f science itself. Or
ical and theological context from which it has been drawn, a desiderandum
does such an approach invariably, even inevitably, distort the picture? Is
that might be most effectively obtained, the present Colloquium suggests,
it not better to ignore what came later and to try to think as a medieval?
by the kind o f collaborative enterprise it represents.
This naturally has the advantage o f remaining truer to the medieval con
In general, then, the results o f a colloquium such as this recommend the
text, but does it by the same token lead one to concentrate on things with
third stage or position as that which is historically most sound and profit
in the medieval context that are so different from modern ideas that they
able, a stage that goes beyond the initial “ culture shock” to see similar
therefore are o f little interest to most historians o f science working in
ities, but one that also gives more weight to differences and to the care
other periods? Similarly, can one write the history o f medieval theology
that must be taken to come to a true recognition o f these differences. It is
without taking a particular religious stance? In order to have a result with
not, however, a recommendation that can be pursued without problems.
some historical value, must one not at least assume the ultimate impor
Simultaneously desirable and difficult, “ third stage” analysis forces the
tance o f the theological issues discussed? But perhaps in such matters the
historian to recognize similarities and differences at the same time and to
history o f science is not at one with the history o f philosophy or theology.
try to understand them in as exhaustive a fashion as possible.
It might be argued, for instance, that a more modern perspective, more
On a concrete level the problem o f recognizing diversity in similarity
determinant presuppositions, follow from the fact that science is cumula
appeared in a variety o f forms again and again during the Colloquium.
tive or progress-determinable in ways in which philosophy is not. But
One o f the most common was the problem o f translation. What entitles
then, having said that, what is to be made o f the fact that so much o f
one to assume that the substitution o f one word or concept for another is
medieval science is inextricably bound up with the likes o f “ non-cumu-
justified? Is it enough, for example, that two terms are somewhere defined
lative” philosophy? What happens to arguments for the virtue o f a
similarly in each o f two languages or must one in addition show that they
modern perspective then? In the final analysis, although some participants favored a rigorously
occur within larger contexts that are also demonstrably similar? Is it suffi cient to pay attention to the context o f but a single work or must one
medieval perspective and others favored a more retrospective approach,
consider other contemporaneous works as well? I f one looks at contem
it was at least clear that quite different perspectives can each have some
poraneous works, will it do to look merely at works by the same author in
validity and hence that, no matter how well documented, one cannot
the same field or must one take into account all the works in any field that
take a history written from one perspective and use it as established fact
an author may have written or even all contemporaneous works whatso
to rule out the possibility o f divergent histories. Nevertheless, returning
ever? The fact that, for instance, the medieval Latin and Arabic words for
again to the interdisciplinary emphasis within the Colloquium, it seems
experiment, experience, trial, or comparison appear in every corner o f
fair to claim that no perspective should be adopted for writing the medi
learning - in theology as well as in science and philosophy - seems to in-
eval history o f one discipline that would totally disregard input and results
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J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTIO N
derived from the histories o f other disciplines. T o be sure, the historian o f
well to imitate the collaborative, interdisciplinary structure o f the Collo
science, the historian o f philosophy, and the historian o f theology can take
quium itself. Perhaps not the least o f the reasons why such a recommen
the same set o f medieval documents and use them to write very different
dation should be heeded is that the present day community o f historians
histories. But, at their most successful, these different histories should not
being urged to indulge in such collaboration parallels rather neatly the
be written in complete independence from one another. They can, and
medieval intellectual community o f scholars that produced the very mate
should, be o f value to each other without being homogenized into a single
rial demanding historical treatment. In whatever sense philosophers, sci
overall picture. The history o f theology in the fourteenth century in the
entists, theologians, and lawyers were then one, so should those who today
Latin West should not be written, for instance, without due attention
address themselves to the history o f what these medievals accomplished
paid to many o f the central conceptions and methods that were operative
act as one. Indeed, we feel that the importance o f collaborative, interdis
in logic and science during the same period. Or, to return again to the
ciplinary history is so central that each historian should go beyond the
19
example o f Galileo, even when one’s perspective is the “ vertical” one
stage o f taking into account and absorbing the accomplishments o f his
whose major concern is to show just what impact medieval notions may
fellow historians working in “ sister disciplines” and proceed to engage in
have had upon his thought, a strong case can be made for the collabora
doing some history in these fields himself. T o appeal once again to the anal
tive, interdisciplinary analysis o f the development o f these notions within
ogy between the concert o f disciplines at the present Colloquium and in
their proper medieval context and within the late fifteenth and the six
the Middle Ages itself, this radical degree o f collaboration is needed
teenth century as well. For only then, the argument reads, will the his
because the very structure o f medieval learning requires it.
torian know precisely what it was that may have had an impact upon
Thus far we have drawn out but one side o f what we see as the results
GaUleo. And is such a determination not a prerequisite stage to eluci
o f the Colloquium, a side concerned primarily with the similarities and
dating exactly how he may have interpreted, altered, and added to these notions in the formulation o f his own views?
differences across diverse periods and cultures, and with the benefits to be derived when historians whose bailiwicks are neighbors but not identical
Thus, the histories o f philosophy, theology, and science jointly can
come to grips with such similarities and differences. Another major
better indicate what new sorts o f data in general can, and should, be
implication that can be drawn from the Colloquium results, we believe,
looked at. What is more, broader, interdisciplinary perspectives, and the
from the efforts made by the participants, and from the difficulties they
consequent use o f such new sorts o f data (or more intensive use o f the old
confessed in making such efforts, in addressing themselves to the second
kinds o f data) can enable the historian to avoid unhistorical excerpting o f
theme o f the meeting: the “ social factors that may have affected the
the intellectual record, excessive modernization o f such excerpts through
origin, growth, and maintenance o f philosophy, science, and theology as
translations that ignore context, and the creation o f pseudo-causal chains
viable disciplines.” There was something o f a unanimous admission o f the
based on conceptual similarity where evidence o f any historical connec
fact that, whatever arguments and problems there may be for later periods
tion is lacking. Cooperation between historians o f theology, philosophy,
concerning the validity or necessity o f the usual social explanations o f
and science can also assist in removing one o f the main difficulties o f
intellectual development, they are multiplied for the medieval period.
medievalists in these fields, namely that the modern divisions and distinc
This is true, it was felt, first o f all because the intellectual history that
tions between the fields themselves often do not fit well with the medieval
might or might not be explained by social factors has yet to be delineated
data, so that, for instance, it is far from simple to construct sensible
in adequate detail and secondly because the sorts o f data usually used to
distinctions between what should count as philosophy, science, or theol ogy in the Middle Ages itself.
build up a description o f the social factors themselves are often simply not
The implicit recommendation o f the Colloquium was, then, that the
milieu and the studia o f the various religious orders might appear to form
future histories o f medieval science, philosophy, and theology would do
a notable exception, but even there a need was felt for much further work
available for the medieval period. Material concerned with the university
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
before the precise nature and impact o f the relevant social factors could be realized.
respect to the potential value o f a social history o f medieval learning -
20
21
On the other hand, such reservations, at times outright skepticism, with
The Colloquium participants agreed, moreover, that little gain was to
and one should note that they occurred more frequently in the discussions
be derived from the repeated application o f standard theories o f social
than we have been able to indicate by those portions here published - can
influence on intellectual developments without having data in hand to support or challenge these theories. The data very likely will be, it was
be mitigated, we believe, by a further consideration. And here we speak less as interpreters o f things expressed during the Colloquium and more
suspected, incommensurable with such theories or sociologies o f knowl
as exponents o f our own views o f what should count in the Middle Ages
edge. Theories o f social influence that may work (let us assume) for
and in other segments o f intellectual history as a social factor in the first
modern science or learning, howsoever accurate and productive they
place. Among historians, the term ‘social’ appears traditionally to be taken
may be when applied to the modern period, may not work at all for things medieval.
as opposed to ‘intellectual’, a dichotomy that was accordingly almost
This general uneasiness concerning the macro-sociology o f intellectual
always in mind when the problem o f “ social factors” entered into the
phenomena in the Middle Ages should not be construed, however, to
discussions during the Colloquium. Interpreted in this sense, social ele
imply a wholesale disapproval o f the social history o f medieval learning.
ments are non-intellectual factors that are in one way or another effective
To the contrary, it is only to draw attention to the kind o f work that has
within the intellectual realm. Political and economic influences, social or
to be done if such history is to be informative and elfective. Thus, there
tribal divisions, technological or craft traditions, would here be the kind
appeared agreement to the effect that a history which simply juxtaposes
o f thing that would qualify as “ social.” Occasionally something intellec
- and many “ sociologies” o f medieval learning seem to do just that -
tual is allowed to qualify as social, but then this is almost always intellec
social factors o f the most non-intellectual sort with theoretical develop
tual material that is not “ directly relevant” to the science, or discipline,
ments cannot be expected to explain anything. As at least a partial remedy,
in question, or even to the metascience or metadiscipline involved. Var
one suggestion was that it is necessary to find intermediaries that connect
ious doctrines or dogmas within religion would be typical examples.
external factors with specific aspects o f the theoretical development in
It was this traditional sense o f ‘social’ that was involved, we feel, when
question (arithmetic functioning as an intermediary, for instance, between
Colloquium participants rightly counseled that patience was in order
commercial needs and Arabic algebra). T o generalize the argument, un
when it comes to writing the social history o f medieval learning. In par
less one establishes in some detail the existence and nature o f such inter
ticular, it was claimed that it is far too early to formulate anything like
mediaries, the amount o f illumination afforded the history o f medieval
definitive answers concerning the influence upon medieval intellectual
learning by pointing to the importance of, for example, universities, par
history o f such social factors as the economy o f feudalism, the divisions o f
ticular bureaucratic classes, or specific aspects o f material culture will be,
medieval society into social classes, or the attitudes o f these social classes
if not minimal, at least not what it can be. However, even when such in
toward learning. And the same caveat should be observed when it conies
termediaries have been determined and set forth with appropriate em
to assessing the formative role within medieval learning o f presumably
phasis, we believe that one should also recognize that, although one may
more directly relevant traditional social factors such as the institutional
thereby be successful to some extent in detecting the mutual influences
framework o f the university, membership in a specific religious order, the
o f social and intellectual factors, there will not be some single “ grand
impact o f changing techniques o f communication, and so forth. One must
scheme” concerning intermediaries by which such influences are governed,
expect to do a substantial amount o f work and to exercise great ingenuity
but instead a variety o f different means all o f which depend upon specific,
in thinking o f new ways to obtain information about such social influ ences.
local cultural factors. One is again necessarily drawn back to the crucial importance o f considering cultural context in detail.
But before this future stage can be realized, there is another aspect o f
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J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
the social history o f medieval learning to be examined. This aspect stands
hierarchy o f intellectual communities. Only some o f these, however, are
every chance in our eyes o f being more important and more instructive
likely to provide informative and fruitful input for the social history o f
than what might follow. It has to do with another way in which one can
medieval learning. Surely a substantial amount o f further research will
count social factors. In this second sense ‘social’ is opposed, not to ‘in
be required to furnish a comprehensive understanding o f the nature and
tellectual’, but rather to ‘individual’. One o f the consequents o f viewing
eflfects o f medieval intellectual communities: the problem is that any
social factors in this fashion is that the historian focuses upon intellec
number o f intellectual communities might be discriminated on the basis
tual communities and not upon isolated philosophers, scientists, or
o f common factors deriving almost automatically from the utilization o f
theologians, and does so even when there is no available evidence that
the scholastic method, from the Aristotelian base o f the material taught
these communities were also “ social” ones in the more traditional (i.e.,
and consumed in the Faculties o f Arts, or from the central role played by
social vj. intellectual) sense. How the historian might come to grips with
Lombard’ s Sentences in theological education and debate. It is not seldom
a relevant intellectual community under such circumstances needs a word
that factors such as these give a fair measure o f continuity to medieval
or two o f explanation. But as a prerequisite, something should also be
intellectual endeavors when one can show on other grounds that the
said first o f what might be seen as constituting such intellectual commu
results, and even the intents, o f these endeavors are quite opposed to one
nities, and, secondly, o f just how central a position they should occupy
another. What is more, although such factors might furnish reason for
in the labors o f the historian o f medieval learning.
speaking o f an intellectual community in a rather loose sense - o f all
As one would expect, the make-up o f the intellectual communities we
natural philosophers as Aristotelians, for example - they are not likely
have in mind follows no hard and fast rule. Basically, one has to do with
to afford evidence o f those intellectual communities that had an impact
groups o f scholars who can be connected by some definite resemblance o f
upon intellectual change. If, however, one can discriminate intellectual
intellectual factors present in their writings. These intellectual factors
communities whose members are either consciously or unconsciously
may be specific ideas, doctrines, or beliefs, or on a less immediately evi
pursuing similar intellectual goals, one would seem to be closer to the
dent plane, particular methods, attitudes, or approaches. The resem
mark. As historians, on occasion we might be able to encapsulate this
blance presumably derives from the scholars’ being directly familiar with
similarity by applying such labels as “ Scotist” or “ Thomist” or the like.
one another’s works, a familiarity arising, perhaps, from attending lec
But in most instances the relevant similarity o f intellectual goals will not
tures, reading each other’s writings, or even from some other form o f
likely prove to be so easily describable; it will, we believe, have to be
more personal contact. On the other hand, the resemblance o f intellec
excavated from the much more uncharted terrain o f a similar way o f doing
tual factors is often present when there is no evidence, perhaps even counter evidence, o f such familiarity. W e may never be able to estabhsh,
philosophy, science, or theology. What sources and what evidence it may prove profitable to tap for such
for example, that one scholar heard or read another, or that they both
future excavations will be discussed below. But before suggestions in this
studied at the same university or at one time or another belonged to some
wise are broached, something should be said o f how central a role intel
single social community (in the traditional sense o f ‘social’); yet we may,
lectual communities should play in the writing o f the history o f medieval
with caution, judge them to belong to the same intellectual community on
learning. T o be sure, it should not be taken as so central as to legislate out
the grounds o f the sorts o f resemblance o f intellectual factors o f which we have been speaking.
o f existence any treatment o f individual thinkers. One would, and should, still have articles and books on, for instance, aspects o f Ockham’s theol
In thus speaking o f medieval intellectual communities where there is
ogy or on Richard Swineshead’s Liber calculationum’, they would not have
little extant evidence o f actual social contact there is an inherent danger
to be replaced by corresponding monographs dealing with the early
o f falling prey to the temptation o f imagining such intellectual commu
fourteenth century English Franciscans or the “ Merton School.” A n “ iso
nities almost at will. One might find evidence to construct a veritable
lated” logical analysis of, say, Ockham’ s theory o f supposition or a math
24
25
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
ematical analysis o f one o f the tracts o f the Liber calculationum would
dimension o f the history o f medieval learning as a social enterprise that
still be useful, and perhaps even necessary, for the historian to have. One
will not likely be obtainable by other means. In particular, their more
cannot, however, stop there. A truly adequate historical treatment o f
intimate connection with the very substance o f intellectual endeavor
Ockham or Swineshead requires, we believe, that they be considered, not
makes them much more effective in contributing to the explanation o f
in isolation, but as very much part o f the intellectual context to which
some o f the more specific aspects o f intellectual change than social fac
they belonged. This includes first, as we have indicated above concerning
tors o f the more traditional kind. They stand a good chance, that is,
the interdisciplinary theme o f the Colloquium, that the contemporary
o f telling us things about the meaning o f particular intellectual moves,
developments in various other academic disciplines be taken into account,
about how they may have come to be and why they were taken, and
but also second that the ties o f scholars to each other be reckoned with.
not merely about the general framework or milieu in which such moves
Indeed, few medieval scholars worked in anything like total isolation. Most medieval learning was rather an activity that was developed and
transpired. The question remains, o f course, just what kind o f evidence there is
carried on at a university, within a religious community, or, less fre
that will allow one to establish the existence o f relatively well defined
quently, at a royal court. Groups o f people came together at such insti
intellectual communities if social factors o f the more traditional sort are,
tutions, wandered from one to the other, learned from each other, read or heard about each other’s work directly or through intermediaries, and
or at least can be, excluded from consideration. The point o f departure must be, we believe, the writings themselves o f
often became adherents o f or opponents to this or that doctrine or idea as
any number o f scholars flourishing in this or that period in the Middle
a result. O f course, these intellectual communities or groups o f scholars
Ages. Our research to date leads us to believe that if, and when, these
did not carry out their work as groups; almost no medieval Sentence
writings clearly exhibit common methods or languages o f analysis, com
Commentary or Questions on Aristotle was a “ joint project” in today’s
mon canons o f evidence and certitude, o f what constitutes an acceptable
sense o f the term. Y et it is most important never to lose sight o f the fact
“ fact” or doctrine, common views concerning intellectual integrity, and
that medieval scholars did interact with each other in a multitude o f
so forth, then it is likely that the authors o f these writings constituted, in
ways. I f this is so, does it not follow that the historian cannot hope to
effect, an intellectual community, a community that is likely to serve the
elicit the full and proper meaning and importance o f even those particular
historian as an effective guide in exploring that hitherto largely unchar-
fragments o f Ockham and Swineshead that we have used as examples
tered terrain we have mentioned above o f the similar way in which phi
without giving due consideration to the intellectual communities to which
losophy, science, and theology was done. A community that is so defined
these authors belong and in which they produced their works? One would think so.
or determined stands a better chance, we feel, o f revealing more about the
N ow a social history that operates with intellectual communities o f
within it, than would a community based merely on adherence to common
this sort seems a far more fertile field for the medieval historian than a
ideas or doctrines. What is more, similarity in content among works, in
social history taken in the more traditional sense. The kind o f evidence
the employment even o f all but identical arguments, appears to be not
needed for the latter is frequently either not forthcoming or only to be had
nearly so adequate evidence o f the existence o f a cohesive intellectual
after a long period o f further research, but even i f it were more plentiful,
community as are the more structural, common features just mentioned,
we believe that the social history based on intellectual communities as we
since such similarities are frequently found among authors and writings
have described them will in the final analysis prove to be the more infor
that we know on other grounds to belong to distinctly opposing camps.
“ shape” o f medieval learning and about the major changes that occurred
mative and productive. The relevant social factors in the sense o f ‘social’
Several other points might be noted. T o begin with, there is little evi
vs. ‘individual’ are not only more available, but are also more immediately
dence that the members o f an intellectual community need be working, or
related to intellectual activity, and provide the material for formulating a
even have worked, in the same discipline or that they need be tied, for
26
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
27
example, to a single university or other institutional milieu. In point o f
The kinds o f initial sources that we feel the historian should turn to in
fact, were one to restrict one’s investigations merely to scholars working
attempting to formulate this intellectual community based social history o f
in natural philosophy or to individuals teaching or studying at Paris, it
medieval learning reflect what was, on a broader scale, one o f the most
seems highly likely that one could easily demonstrate that the resulting
interesting results o f the Colloquium. This was the recognition o f the
intellectual community was “ incomplete,” that is, that one could establish
ways in which the medieval historian, faced with an almost critical lack o f
that scholars in other disciplines or at other universities indulged in in
the ordinary kinds o f social data, can find out about certain social factors
tellectual activities that reveal them to be, on grounds o f the very same
(fo r the most part those based on the opposition social vs. individual, we
criteria, just as much, perhaps even more, part o f the intellectual com
would suggest) simply on the basis o f the scientific, philosophical, or
munity in question. Secondly, the criteria we have by example suggested
theological works themselves. M ore accurately, appeal should be made not
as determinative o f a given intellectual community have by design not
merely to the works (that much will provide an excellent beginning), but
taken into account more traditional social factors. Indeed, in many in
to the manuscripts o f the works, that is, to the additional information
stances it will undoubtedly prove to be the case that such factors can
that the various copies o f a single work can provide. It has already been
never be taken into account, the only available evidence that such and
indicated that an intellectual community whose existence has initially
such a scholar belonged to this or that intellectual community being
been established on the basis o f evidence appearing within the written
solely and always o f the kind we have mentioned. Yet there will surely be
works themselves should, whenever possible, have its existence confirmed
many other instances in which “ social” evidence o f a more traditional sort
by supporting social evidence o f a more traditional sort. Yet, beyond this
is forthcoming (for example, all the members o f an intellectual community
more familiar evidence provided by the likes o f biographical and institu
being Franciscans, being English, being arts students at Padua at such
tional factors, the codicological information that can be gleaned from an
and such a time, etc.). In these cases, this supplementary evidence will
examination o f a number o f manuscript copies o f a single work furnishes
obviously function as confirmation o f the intellectual community, giving
evidence o f an important and unique sort for the medieval historian o f
it, one might say, an added “ social base” in the more traditional sense. When such “ other evidence” is not present, establishment o f an intellec
intellectual communities. Thus, although information pertinent to the existence and scope o f an
tual community on the basis o f criteria similar to those cited above will
intellectual community is often to be had from the citations (and from the
naturally tell the historian to be “ on the lookout” for such evidence.
manner o f citation) in a given work itself, the marginal expansion o f these
Those who are familiar with work in the history o f medieval philosophy
citations in various copies o f the work may well add to this information,
and theology over the past several decades will recognize that the kind o f
and even, by identifying the citation beyond a mere quidam, change its
social, intellectual community history o f which we have been speaking
significance in a most important way. Y et over and above citations, the
bears points o f resemblance with recent attempts to set up criteria to
varied manuscripts o f a given work often yield “ intellectual community”
determine who might properly be called “ nominalists,” “ terminists,” or
evidence by the way in which the codices were put together (which works
even “ modernists” in the later Middle Ages. Such attempts appear to
are to be found with which), by the manner o f their annotation, and so
have met with partial success at best, and have utilized criteria that are
forth. Given such information, one can often infer a good deal about who
more restrictive, and at times less well defined and tested, than those we
knew whom, who read or studied whom, and what influences there may
have suggested above. In many instances the criteria have been con
have been between cultures or disciplines. Since not a few o f these codices
structed largely from the works o f a single author or from a relatively
were student “ notebooks,” or at least manuscripts that were extensively
narrow selection o f works within a single discipline and hence qualify less
utilized by students, the codicological information they contain may well
as evidence for the existence o f intellectual communities than the types o f evidence that we have in mind.
tell us things about magister-discipulus relations that we can learn in no other way. And knowing o f such relations is certainly crucial to building
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J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
INTRODUCTION
up a history based on intellectual communities. Finally, these annotated
o f the present Colloquium, and in preparing the publication o f the con
copies o f works at times provide another input that is at one level o f
tributions and discussions that formed its substance, have been both con
remove from that furnished by the v^^ork itself. They may tell us, that is,
stant and considerable. The sponsorship o f Harvard and Boston Univer
not simply that there was such an intellectual community, but that certain
sities has naturally been a sine qua non for the very occurrence o f the
scholars were aware o f it as an intellectual community, aware that it
Colloquium. But personal indebtedness has been no less important.
existed and aware that they belonged to it or were partaking o f it.
29
T o Robert S. Cohen and Marx Wartofsky we owe numerous thanks for
As we trust is everywhere implicit in what we have said, the consid
their efforts in arranging and finding a locale for the Colloquium and,
eration o f intellectual communities by the medievalist is but a specific
especially, for their help in seeing its proceedings into print as a volume
response to the necessity o f taking into account the full relevance o f cul
o f the Boston Studies in the Philosophy o f Science. The whole staff o f the
tural context. As such, intellectual communities should be investigated
Osgood Hill Conference Center o f Boston University, and particularly
from an interdisciplinary point o f view. As an example o f the advantages
Betsy M cCoy Faught, who took leave o f her duties with the Center for
o f such a point o f view, it seems relevant to note that any study o f me
the History and Philosophy o f Science to join us in North Andover, did
dieval intellectual communities is sure to benefit substantially i f it can
far more than we imagined needed to be done, or even could be done, to
appeal repeatedly to the history o f theology. For we have immeasurably
make the meeting a comfortable and enjoyable one and to bring all to
more material dealing with the theological community than we do for those communities tied to the Faculties o f Arts. But the evidence is not
pass smoothly. The first step in moving the Colloquium’s discussions towards print we
only more plentiful; it is in a variety o f ways more informative in kind.
owe to John Novak, who brought the required technology into our midst
In particular, the criteria we have listed above as likely to afford evidence
and saw to its proper operation, and especially to Jean Christensen, who
for the existence o f intellectual communities are frequently more evidently
patiently tended the equipment to assure that all parts o f our Anglo-
displayed in theological works than in those concerned with artes material.
French mélange received appropriate electronic preservation. Exceeding
In any event, it seems likely that the examination o f theological works,
his role as participant, Jean Gagné has been o f more help than we can ever
central as they were within medieval learning, will give rise to questions
acknowledge in getting the French interventions from the state o f magnetic
to be asked about all intellectual communities that would not otherwise
impulses into written form, revising them, and advising us in innumer
be noted were one limited to philosophical and scientific works alone.
able extremely helpful ways with respect not merely to la partie française,
Admittedly, something o f a re-education will be necessary for the his
but to the Colloquium’s publication as a whole. Abdelhamid Sabra ren
torian to equip himself to ply his trade in a field outside his original spe
dered us similar indispensable assistance in the transcription o f Arabic
cialty. But this can be much facilitated by cooperation. The potential
and the resolution o f other problems concerning the papers and discus
benefits are well worth the effort. To be sure, the study o f medieval learn ing, especially when viewed as a social enterprise, would also be wise to
sions constituting the Islamic section o f that published here, George Molland brought the critical eye o f a fellow historian o f medi
avail itself o f the assistance to be derived from medieval social and eco
eval science to bear upon the present introduction, and Barbara Rosen-
nomic history in general. But, as in the present Colloquium, collaborative
krantz did the same from the quite different vantage point o f a scholar in
activity on behalf o f historians o f philosophy, science, and theology is not
American social history and history o f science. Their advice has proved
just a beginning. It is the required nucleus for the whole.
exceedingly valuable and welcome. Those parts o f it we have found space and energy enough to follow have unquestionably made this introductory
IV
The assistance and counsel we have received in the planning and holding
section a better product. The faults and ambiguities we have not managed to remedy are, o f course, our own. N o stage o f the Colloquium would have proceeded beyond ground level
30
J. M U R D O C H A N D E. S Y L L A
without the constant assistance o f Ruth Bartholomew. Our gratitude is
PART I
without measure: from the inception o f the very idea o f the Colloquium, through the substantial volume o f correspondence involved in its plan ning, through the innumerable versions and revisions o f the discussions, to the final draft o f this very introduction, her help has been absolutely essential. Finally, the most profound acknowledgment must go to the partic ipants and auditors themselves. Without their contributions, their un bridled efforts, interest, and enthusiasm, the Colloquium would have come nowhere near being the success we believe it was. Harvard University North Carolina State University at Raleigh
ISLAM
ROSHDIRASHED
R E C O M M E N C E M E N TS DE L ’A LG È B R E A U X X l e E T X l l e S IÈ C L E S
Parfois encore l’histoire de l’algèbre classique est relatée comme la succes sion de trois événements séparés: la constitution de la théorie des équa tions quadratiques, la résolution plus ou moins générale de l’équation cubique, l’introduction et le développement du symbolisme algébrique. Au premier événement on associe souvent le nom d’al-Khwarizmi, au second on rattache toujours ceux des mathématiciens de l’école italienne, et en particulier de Tartaglia et de Cardan, au troisième enfin sont liés les noms de Viète et de Descartes. Au X IX e siècle déjà, les travaux de Woepcke sur al-Karajï et al-Khayyâmî, et plus récemment ceux de P. Luckey sur al-Kâshï, ont montré que le précédent schéma est incomplet, voire inexact. Le premier, avec sa traduction de l’algèbre d’al-Khayyâmï révélait notamment que c’est bien avant le X V Ie siècle que la théorie des équations cubiques accomplissait un réel progrès. Tous deux, par leurs travaux sur al-Karajï et al-Kâshï, laissaient même entrevoir que l’histoire de l’algèbre ne peut être retracée indépendamment de celles du calcul algébrique abstrait. Mais en dépit de ces études, certains historiens continuent à concevoir l’histoire de l’algèbre classique selon le même schéma. Il reste que cette situation n’engage pas la seule responsabilité des historiens : elle est due, en partie au moins, au fait que les algèbres d’al-Karajï, d’al-Khayyâmï, et surtout d’al-Kàshï pouvaient paraître elles-mêmes peu intégrables dans de véritables traditions mathématiques. L ’information incomplète et partielle sur les mathématiques arabes présentaient jusqu’à une date récente, et d’une certaine manière présente encore ces travaux comme des oeuvres individuelles, faute de connaître les traditions dans lesquelles elles s’in sèrent. Dans ces conditions, l’on comprend la tentation toute naturelle pour l’historien de poser la question controversée des origines, laquelle se transforme aussi rapidement en question de l’originalité. Dans cet exposé, nous voulons revenir, brièvement, à ces traditions mathématiques elles-mêmes, pour soutenir que l’algèbre classique fut renouvelée dès la fin du X e siècle, que ce renouvellement ne se présenta
Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 33-60. ^11 Rights Reserved.
34
R. R A S H E D
R E C O M M E N C E M E N T S DE L ’ A L G È B R E
35
pas seulement comme une réactivation de l’algèbre reçue, mais comme un
Déjà manifeste dans l ’oeuvre d’al-Karaji (mort au début du X le siècle),
véritable recommencement, ou des recommencements à proprement parler.
poursuivie et perfectionnée par ses successeurs, la réalisation de ce projet
On peut en effet reconnaître deux traditions mathématiques auxquelles
(mort en 1175), l’extension du calcul algébrique abstrait et l’organisation
l’algèbre est liée. La première est celle de l’arithmétique - “ art scienti
de l’exposé algébrique autour de l’application successive des différentes
fique” disaient les mathématiciens et bibliographes arabes - théorie des
opérations de l’arithmétique. Il suffit pour s’en convaincre de parcourir
nombres et art du calcul - ou logistique - l’une et l’autre fortement liées.
al-Fakhrl d’al-Karajî, ou al-Bâhir d’al-Samaw^al. Ces traités d’algèbre
a amené, comme on peut le constater un siècle plus tard avec al-Samaw’ al
Ce développement fut l’oeuvre des arithméticiens arabes eux-mêmes, il
ont eu pour principal résultat de donner une meilleure connaissance de
eut également pour cause la traduction des Livres Arithmétiques de
la structure algébrique des nombres réels. Mais comme ce résultat et
Diophante. Pour renouveler cette discipline, al-Karajï et ses successeurs
d’autres de moindre importance obtenus par ces algébristes ont souvent
mettront à profit à la fois le développement et leur connaissance de l’al
été attribués à des mathématiciens tardifs comme Chuquet, S t i f e l , e t
gèbre telle qu’elle fut pratiquée depuis al-Khwarizmi. La deuxième tradi
comme ces résultats expriment précisément un changement de la ratio
tion est associée aux travaux de certains géomètres: surtout ceux que
nalité algébrique, qu’il nous soit permis de reprendre ici ce que nous avons
préoccupèrent les déterminations infinitésimales et de ceux qui cher
exposé ailleurs pour décrire rapidement la démarche de nos auteurs et
chaient à faire progresser l’algèbre par la géométrie. Représentant cette tradition, al-Khayyâmï et Sharaf al-Dïn al-Tùsï ont été amenés, comme
démontrer les affirmations que nous venons d’avancer. Dans al-Fakhrl, al-Karajï commence par étudier les différentes “ puis
on le verra, à l’étude algébrique des courbes; ils ont posé les fondements de la géométrie algébrique.
non symbolique, que x”*= :x^~^x pour m = 1, 2 , 9 , il note qu’ “ il en est
sances de l’inconnue” . Après avoir énoncé de manière verbale, c’est-à-dire
Pour justifier ces prétentions, cet exposé rapide ne se propose d’autre
ainsi à l’infini” et que “ lorsqu’on multiplie l’une quelconque de ces puis
tâche que de répondre aux questions suivantes: Quels sont ces commen
sances par un certain nombre de racines, le produit est l’ordre de la puis
cements? Quels furent leurs moyens et leurs raisons probables?
sance suivante” . On peut donc dire qu’ al-Karajï définit x'*=x'*~^x pour tout entier positif n. Al-Karajï essaie ensuite d’étendre la notion de puissance algébrique d’ une quantité, puissance définie en quelque sorte par récurrence, à son
ceux de la première tradition, on peut dire qu’ils eurent pour projet l’arith-
inverse, et donne quelques résultats importants tels que: (1/x")-(1/a:'") = _ l/^«+m Cette généralisation sera précisée et achevée par ses successeurs
métisation de l’algèbre, telle qu’elle avait déjà été constituée par al-Khwa-
qui, grâce à la définition de la puissance nulle x° = l pour x ^ O , ont pu
rizmi, puis développée par ses successeurs comme Abu Kâmil (850-930). Il s’agit en fait, délibérément, comme l’écrira plus tard al-Samaw*al “ d’opé
finalement énoncer une règle équivalente à: x":>^ = x ”'^"* pour tout m, n s i.
rer sur les inconnues au moyen de tous les instruments arithmétiques,
C ’est seulement par suite de la généralisation du concept de puissance
comme l’arithméticien opère sur les connues” . La tâche est claire et l’al
algébrique que l’on s’efforcera d’appliquer les opérations de l’arithmé
gèbre acquiert la signification qui est désormais la sienne: il s’agit, d’une
tique aux expressions algébriques. Cette application aura pour consé
part d’appliquer de manière systématique les opérations de l’arithmé
quence immédiate l’un des premiers exposés d’algèbre des “ polynômes” .
Si l’on veut caractériser brièvement la tâche des algébristes, au moins de
tique élémentaire aux expressions algébriques - les inconnues algébriques
En effet, dans son al-Fakhri, al-Karajï ne se contente pas d’étudier l’ad
- et, d’autre part, de considérer les expressions algébriques indépendam
dition, la soustraction, la multiplication, la division, l’extraction de la
ment de ce qu’elles peuvent représenter, pour pouvoir leur appliquer ces
racine des monômes, mais aussi celles des polynômes. Toutefois s’il énon
opérations générales qui sont appliquées aux nombres.
ce bien dans le cas des polynômes des règles générales pour +/ —, x , il
37
R. R A S H E D
R E C O M M E N C E M E N T S DE L ’ A L G È B R E
n’en va pas de même pour la division et l’extraction de la racine. En fait il
rithme d’Euclide pour la division des entiers aux expressions de forme
36
ne considère que la division d’un polynôme par un monôme; et s’il extrait la racine carrée, il se borne à celle d’un polynôme à coefficients rationnels positifs.
/=
m, « e Z +
Z k = —m
On peut d’ailleurs comprendre les difficultés d’al-Karajï à partir de sa
D ’une manière précise, il ne s’agit pas absolument de la division ordi
conception même du statut des nombres négatifs. Bien qu’il eût écrit dans
naire dans l’anneau des polynômes X [x ], K étant un corps; mais dans un
al-Fakhrî “ qu’il faut compter les quantités négatives comme des termes” ,
anneau A [x ]= [Q { x ) + Q { llx )]. Al-Samaw’ al ne s’intéresse pas d’ailleurs
il semble que la tradition ait condamné cette reconnaissance des nombres
explicitement au degré du reste. Cependant, les résultats de la division
négatifs à rester timide. S’il acceptait en effet sans réserve de soustraire un
sont exacts, puisque diviser
nombre positif d’un autre, il n’admit pas directement que jc — ( —j ) =
n' / par ^
= x + y. On comprend dans ces conditions la difficulté de donner des
n 'e Z + k = —m'
règles générales pour la division et l ’extraction de la racine carrée des polynômes à coefficients rationnels. Au X lle siècle cependant les succes
revient en fait à diviser x Y par x “g, a = sup (m, m '); on est alors amené à
seurs d’al-Karajï énonceront les règles des signes en toute généralité:
un problème de division dans ^ [x ]. Faut-il encore noter qu’on continuera à diviser la division dans l’anneau
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(6) (7)
A [x ] au moins jusqu’au X V IIe siècle? Parfois d’ailleurs, au lieu de ces éléments de l’anneau A [x], al-Samaw’ al considère des polynômes au sens ■^<0,
strict: c’est alors qu’il définit la méthode de la division avec reste. Dans
>><0 0
tous les cas - ce qui confirme en plus une conception suffisamment élabo
< 0, j ^ 0, |x| ^ |>'| => X - j ^ 0
rée de sa démarche - il représente, dans des tableaux, chacun des éléments
< 0,
< 0, |x| ^
x^0=>0 —
de la division - les éléments de l’anneau A [x] ou K [x ] - par la suite de ses
x<0=>0 —
coefficients positifs et négatifs. La théorie de la division permet en outre d’étudier un autre chapitre
ou comme l’écrit al-Samaw’al, “ le produit d’un nombre négatif - al-nàqi^
non moins important de cette algèbre: l’approximation des fractions
- par un nombre positif - al-zâHd - est négatif, et par un nombre négatif
entières par les éléments de A [x]. On a par exemple:
est positif. Si nous soustrayons un nombre négatif d’un nombre négatif supérieur, le reste est leur différence négative. Celle-ci reste positive si nous soustrayons un nombre négatif d’un autre négatif inférieur. Si d’un nombre positif nous soustrayons un nombre négatif, le reste est leur somme
/ (x )
+ 30x 6x^ + 12
10 _ 5
20
3
3x^
X
10 _ 40 _ 20 + 3x'
80 3x^
40 Zï
où al-Samaw’ al obtient une sorte de développement limité de
positive. Si d’une puissance vide {martaba khâliya) nous soustrayons un
— / {x )lg (x ). Cette approximation est valable seulement pour x suffisam
nombre positif, le reste est le même négatif, et si d’une puissance vide
ment grand, ce que l’auteur ne précise pas.
nous soustrayons un nombre négatif, le reste est le même nombre positif” .
algébristes suivent une démarche analogue pour l’extraction de la racine
Comme on a pu ainsi étendre la division ordinaire aux polynômes, nos
Munis de ces règles, les successeurs d’al-Karajï pouvaient achéver la
carrée d’un polynôme. Al-Karajï avait déjà proposé deux méthodes pour
tâche et proposer une théorie de la divisibilité des polynômes et de l’ex
l’extraction de la racine carrée d’un polynôme à coefficients dans Q +,
traction de la racine carrée d’un polynôme à coefficients rationnels. La
toutes deux fondées sur le développement ( x + j H ----- h
méthode proposée par al-Samaw’ al n’est autre que l’extension de l’algo-
-'ry)y-\----- f-(2x + 2>^H----- \-w) w. La méthode d’al-Karaji se trouve déjà
= x^ + (2x
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39
généralisée dans al-Bâhir où l’on procède à l’extraction de la racine carrée
Sans se poser fort heureusement la question de l’existence du corps des
d’un polynôme à coefficients dans Q, ou plus précisément l’extraction de
nombres réels, al-Karajï et ses successeurs partent des définitions du livre
la racine d’un élément carré de l’anneau A [;\;]. Ainsi pour extraire la
X pour se placer immédiatement à un plan général. Pour se donner les
racine carrée de:
conditions au moyen desquelles il peut reconnaître que les expressions
B = 25x® - 30x" + 9x^ - 40x^ + 84x^ - 116x + 64
Karajï procède comme Euclide, à cette différence près cependant qu’il
48 100 96 64 ------- 1--- 2------ 3 + ~4 X X X X
étend les concepts du livre X à toute quantité algébrique. Dans al-Badi\ il écrit:
au moyen de la méthode des tableaux, il écrit: B = 25x^ + (lOx^ - 3x^) ( - 3x^) + (lOx" - 6x^ - 4) ( - 4) +
obtenues par combinaison de plusieurs radicaux sont irrationnelles, al-
lOx^ - 6x^ - 8 +
“les monômes sont infinis : le premier est rationnel absolument comme cinq, le deuxième est le rationnel en puissance, comme racine de dix, le troisième est défini par rapport à son cube, comme le côté de vingt, le quatrième est la médiale définie par rapport à son carré-carré comme la racine de la racine de dix, le cinquième est le côté du quadrato-cube, ensuite le côté du cubo-cube et ainsi se divise à l’infini” .
De la même manière que les monômes, les binômes se divisent à l’infini.
4) =
A la suite de cette explication, les mathématiciens donnent des règles générales pour les différentes opérations, en particulier:
5x^ - 3x 2 _ 4 + _ _ X
d’où la racine. Al-Samaw’ al présente cet exemple comme l’illustration d’une méthode générale (tariq'^ âmm). A la suite de l’extension du calcul algébrique aux expressions ration
(^1/m + yl/m^ ^ [y K xly f^ "' ± If]^/'" et reprennent comme al-Samaw*al un bon nombre des problèmes du
nelles, al-Karajî et ses successeurs poursuivent la réalisation du même
livre X pour donner des solutions algébriques équivalentes à celles d’Euclide, ou d’autres solutions nouvelles.
projet et veulent montrer, comme il l’écrit, “ comment opérer au moyen
C ’est donc avec cette tradition que se constitue l’algèbre des polynômes
de la multiphcation, la division, l’addition, la soustraction et l’extraction
et que l ’on parvient à une meilleure connaissance de la structure algébrique
des racines” sur les quantités irrationnelles algébriques. Al-Samaw*al
des nombres réels; notons en outre un nouveau retour à la théorie des
pose la question presque dans les mêmes termes: “ comment utiliser les
nombres, lequel fournit à la discipline de ces algébristes les instruments
instruments arithmétiques dans les quantités irrationnelles (al-maqâdîr
qui lui manquaient. Ce retour est orienté: la préférence est désormais
al-?um m )T Outre les résultats proprement mathématiques que l’on obtient par
accordée aux démonstrations algébriques; c’est précisément à cette occa
cette extension, l’on s’engage dans une étude particulièrement importante pour l’histoire des mathématiques : il s’agit pour ainsi dire de l’interpré
sion que l ’on voit apparaître une forme de démonstration par induction mathématique finie. Dans un chapitre à'al-Fakhrî intitulé; “ Chapitres et théorèmes utiles
tation algébrique de la théorie contenue dans le livre X des Eléments, con
à la résolution des problèmes au moyen de l’algèbre” , de même que dans
sidéré jusque là par les mathématiciens de la tradition de Pappus, même
un texte de l’auteur qui fut conservé par son successeur al-Samaw’ al,
de l’importance d’Ibn al-Haytham, comme un livre de géométrie. Avec
al-Karajî reprend quelques-uns des problèmes de la théorie des nombres,
nos algébristes, ces concepts se rapportent désormais aux grandeurs en
tel celui de la somme de n premiers entiers naturels, de leurs carrés et de
général, numériques et géométriques, et la théorie prend sa place, par
leurs cubes; de la formule du binôme,... Si certains de ces théorèmes
l’intermédiaire de l’algèbre dans le domaine de la théorie des nombres.
restent chez al-Karajî sans démonstration véritable, s’ils se présentent
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41
encore sans démonstration dans les livres des arithméticiens comme al-
A partir de l’algèbre en effet, on engage la réflexion sur le statut de cette
Baghdâdï (mort en 1037) par exemple - dans al-Takmila - au X lle siècle,
discipline, ses rapports avec la géométrie, sa méthode, la classification des
en revanche, ils sont prouvés algébriquement. Il s’agit entre bien d’autres
problèmes et des propositions. Rappelons à ce propos qu’al-Samaw*al,
des propriétés suivantes: 2
après avoir explicitement identifié algèbre et analyse, devait ainsi modifier
» ( « + 1) (2n + 1)
fc=l
(2)
philosophie mathématique: l’analyse et la synthèse; il renvoie d’ailleurs à un ouvrage entièrement consacré à ce problème qui n’a malheureuse
n
/ n
\2
k=l
\k=l
/
toutes deux prouvées, comme nous l’avons montré ailleurs, par une forme gauche de l’induction complète appelée “ régression” . (3)
la position de ce thème qui resta essentiel pendant de longs siècles de
(a + i ) " =
ment pas été retrouvé. Chacun sait l’importance de cette identification au X V IIe siècle. Plus encore, dans le langage de la logique de son époque mais recouvrant un contenu différent, le même al-Samaw*al donne une classification des propositions mathématiques aussi importante que dif ficile à interpréter. C ’est ainsi qu’il classe les propositions en: I. Nécessaires;
i
II. Possibles;
k=l
(4)
(aby =
III. Impossibles.
a et b commutant et ne N
toutes deux prouvées par une forme d’induction complète pratiquée en
I. Les propositions nécessaires:
core d’une certaine manière, au X V IIe siècle.
a:
Mais al-Karajî et ses successeurs n’ont pas produit seulement dans les
Première sous-classe:
a-1: “ les propositions” ou “ les problèmes dont le recherché se trouve
chapitres d’algèbre que l’on vient de voir; leur oeuvre s’étend à bien
dans tous les nombres” , autrement dit les identités: exemple: si
d’autres domaines: la théorie des équations bicarrées, l’analyse indéter
z = x + y alors z jx + zjy = (z lx ) •(z/y).
minée, les systèmes d’équations linéaires. En ce dernier chapitre par
a-2: “ dont le recherché se trouve en une infinité de nombres” , autre
exemple, al-Samaw’ al résout un système de 210 équations à 10 inconnues.
ment dit proposition qui a une infinité de solutions sans être une
A part l’ensemble de ces résultats et des nouvelles méthodes liées à
identité:
l’arithmétisation de l’algèbre, relevons l’apparition d’une certaine réflexion sur les mathématiques, une philosophie non du philosophe mais du mathématicien. Même si cette réflexion ou philosophie est thématique et
exemple x + lO = a ^ x -lO = b ^ a-3 : “ dont les solutions sont nombreuses mais [en nombre] fini” beau
non systématique, même si, comparée aux systèmes métaphysiques célè
coup de problèmes indéterminés servent d’exemples.
bres du moyen âge, elle peut paraître d’architecture sommaire et d’argu
a-4: “ qui a une seule solution” : exemple xa = u^, xb = u=^u=alb^.
mentation faible, elle eut au moins l’avantage d’être provoquée par la
b:
Deuxième sous-classe : l’auteur classe une deuxième fois les proposi
pratique du mathématicien à l’oeuvre. C ’est peut-être pour cette raison
tions “ nécessaires” selon le nombre des conditions qu’elles doivent
qu’elle n’est pas mentionnée dans l’histoire de la pensée médiévale, ab
vérifier, c’est-à-dire une ou plusieurs conditions.
sorbée par la philosophie traditionnelle, le “ kalàm” , et la réaction tradi
b-1: une seule condition: exemple, soient a et b, deux nombres donnés,
tionaliste à ces tendances représentées par Ibn Taymiyya ou Ibn Hazm.
déterminer xety \ x^ -\ -y ^ = a ,xy = b \ comme condition nécessaire on trouve
Quoi qu’il en soit, même si cette pensée emprunte ses thèmes à Pappus ou éventuellement à Proclus, l’intervention de la nouvelle algèbre est mani feste; elle donne aux thèmes des contenus différents.
b-2: plusieurs conditions, exemple: un système d’équations de n équa tions à m inconnues,
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II. Les propositions possibles:
plication des opérations arithmétiques. Les résultats obtenus par ces
II s’agit de propositions dont on ne sait démontrer ni la vérité ni la faus
mathématiciens ne sont pas importants seulement par eux-mêmes, mais
seté ou, comme l’écrit al-Samaw*al: “ En toute proposition que considère
également parce qu’ils ont rendu possible un autre commencement de
l’algébriste ou le géomètre, il obtiendra inévitablement une démonstra
l’algèbre. Celui-ci n’est plus lié à l’arithmétique mais se rattache à la
tion de son existence (l’existence de ses solutions) et il l’appellera alors
géométrie. Il se présente de prime abord beaucoup moins sous le signe de
nécessaire, ou de son (leur) impossibilité, il l’appellera alors impossible,
l’extension que sous celui de la systématicité : il s’agit d’organiser l’étude
ou encore il ne trouvera de démonstration ni de son (leur) existence, ni de sa
des équations cubiques et d’en élaborer la théorie. Pour comprendre la
(leur) négation ou impossibilité ; il n’en sait rien donc et l’appellera alors
portée de cette tâche, il nous faut revenir à l’histoire de la théorie des
possible, puisqu’il n’aura pu démontrer ni son (leur) existence, ni sa (leur)
équations cubiques, et tout d’abord à l’exposé qu’en a donné al-Khay-
négation. Car ceci (si l’on démontre l’existence et la non-existence) renver
yâmî lui-même (1048-1123).
rait alors à la négation de ce qui est et à l ’impossibilité du nécessaire, ce
Dans son algèbre, al-Khayyâmï écrit:
qui est absurde.” L ’auteur ne donne malheureusement, l’on comprendra
ticien à infléchir les notions aristotéliciennes de nécessaire, possible et
Il se rencontre dans cette science (l’algèbre) des problèmes dépendant de certaines espèces très difficiles de théorèmes préliminaires, dans la solution desquels ont échoué la plupart de ceux qui s’en sont occupés. Quant aux Anciens, il ne nous est pas parvenu d’eux d’ouvrage qui en traite; peut-être, après avoir cherché les solutions et après les avoir étudiées, n’en auraient-ils pas pénétré les difficultés. Ou peut-être leurs recherches n’en exigeaient pas l’examen; ou enfin leurs ouvrages à ce sujet, s’il y en a, n’ont pas été traduits dans notre langue. Quant aux modernes, c’est al-Mâhâni qui, parmi eux, conçut l’idée de résoudre algébriquement le théorème auxiliaire employé par Archimède dans la quatrième proposition du second livre de son traité de la sphère et du cylindre; or, il fut conduit à une équation renfermant des cubes, des carrés et des nombres qu’il ne réussit pas à résoudre après en avoir fait l’objet d’une longue méditation. On déclara donc que cette solution était impossible, jusqu’à ce qu’apparut Ja‘far al-Khâzin qui résolut l’équation à l’aide des sections coniques.
impossible vers celles de calculabilité et indécidabilité sémantique. Elles
Al-Khayyâmi poursuit:
pourquoi, aucun exemple. Il rappelle seulement qu’il ne faut pas con fondre problèmes possibles et problèmes indéterminés: ces derniers, en elfet sont nécessaires. III. Les propositions impossibles: Il s’agit de propositions qui “ si l’on supposait l’existence (de ses solutions), cette existence conduirait à une absurdité” . Le moins que l’on puisse dire est que cette réflexion sur la pratique mathématique, notamment de la nouvelle algèbre, a conduit le mathéma
sont en outre mises en rapport avec la notion de résolubilité d’une équa tion et plus généralement de calculabilité. Lorsque al-Samaw*al parle d’une proposition nécessaire A, il veut dire prouver A ou non A, tandis que par proposition possible A, il entend que A est indécidable ou que l’ on n’a guère de méthode soit pour prouver A, soit pour réfuter A. On voit donc comment la nouvelle pratique du mathématicien a provo qué une réflexion de philosophie mathématique. L ’historien de la philo sophie médiévale arabe aurait tort, croyons-nous, de l’ignorer.
Après lui (al-Khâzin) tous les géomètres auraient besoin d’un certain nombre des espèces des susdits théorèmes et l’un en résolut une, l’autre une autre. Mais aucun d’e i « n’a rien émis sur l’énumération de ces espèces, ni sur l’exposition de cas de chaque espèce, ni sur leurs démonstrations, si ce n’est relativement à deux espèces, que je ne manquerai pas de faire remarquer. Moi, au contraire, je n’ai jamais cessé de désirer vivement faire connaître avec exactitude toutes ces espèces, ainsi que de distinguer par mi les cas de chaque espèce les possibles d’avec les impossibles, en me fondant sur des démonstrations.
Dans ce texte important pour l’histoire de l’algèbre, al-Khayyâmï aflirme donc que: (1)
Rien n’est parvenu des Grecs concernant la théorie des équations
II
cubiques. Si Archimède a posé un problème géométrique en mesure d’être ramené à une équation cubique, ni lui ni ses commentateurs n’ ont
L ’on vient de voir que le projet des algébristes arithméticiens se pré
toutefois pu formuler algébriquement ce problème. C ’est à al-Mâhâni qu’est revenue cette tâche et à al-Khazîn qu’ il faut attribuer la solution.
sente directement sous le signe de l’extension; celle du domaine d’ap-
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Mais ni l’un, ni l’autre, ni leurs prédécesseurs, ni leurs contemporains, n’ont essayé d’élaborer une véritable théorie des équations cubiques. (2)
L ’on doit distinguer non seulement entre un problème géométrique
R E C O M M E N C E M E N T S DE L ’ A L G È B R E
45
Or ces traductions algébriques de problèmes du 3ème degré par alMâhâni, al-Bîrüni et d’autres mathématiciens contemporains de ce der nier, comme Abu’l-Jùd ibn al-Layth, ont posé un problème jusque-là
pouvant être ramené à une équation cubique et sa traduction algébrique,
impensé: peut-on ramener ces problèmes à des équations cubiques? peut-
mais encore entre la résolution de l’un ou l’autre de ces problèmes et
on par ailleurs classer l’ensemble des problèmes du 3ème degré, sinon
l’élaboration d’une théorie des équations cubiques.
pour tenter une solution aussi élégante - par radicaux - que celle de l’équa
Le problème du statut de cette théorie se précise: l’appréciation de sa
tion du second degré, au moins pour donner des solutions systématiques?
propre oeuvre par al-Khayyânü correspond-elle à l’histoire effective, au
Ces deux questions ne pouvaient être pensées sans le développement de la
moins telle que nous la connaissons?
théorie des équations bicarrées et du calcul algébrique abstrait, c’est-à-
Chacun sait que les mathématiciens grecs avaient rencontré les problè
dire sans le premier renouvellement de l’algèbre avec al-Karajï. Pas plus
mes de duplication du cube, trisection de l’angle, tous deux problèmes du
les mathématiciens grecs que les mathématiciens arabes n’avaient, avant
Sème degré. Plus encore, les mathématiciens arabes ont connu et large
ce renouvellement, posé la question. Le problème et la démarche d’al-
ment discuté la proposition auxiliaire utilisée par Archimède, mais dont
Khayyâmï pour lui fournir une solution va constituer un autre commen
la démonstration manque au Traité sur la sphère et le cylindre. On sait
cement de l’algèbre.
également qu’elle peut être ramenée à une équation cubique de la forme
Avant d’entreprendre leur solution, al-Khayyâmï commence donc par
—e x + a ^ b = 0 qui fut résolue par Eutocius et à nouveau par des mathé
donner une classification des équations de degré inférieur ou égal à 3, On
maticiens arabes comme Ibn al-Haytham. Cette solution eut pour moyen
a parfois assimilé cette étude à une théorie géométrique des équations
l’intersection de la parabole x^ = a y et de l ’hyperbole y {c —x )= a b . A
cubiques. Si toutefois par théorie géométrique l’on entend l’utilisation de
aucun moment cependant les mathématiciens, avant al-Mâhânï, n’avaient
figures géométriques pour déterminer les racines réelles positives de ces
songé à ramener ce problème ou un autre, tel la duplication du cube { x ^ = l), à leurs expressions algébriques.
trique ne joue qu’un rôle auxiliaire dans l’algèbre d’al-Khayyâmï, et sur
Il est significatif que la tendance à traduire algébriquement les problè
tout dans celle de son successeur Sharaf al-Dïn al-Tùsî (mort en 1213 en
mes du 3ème degré se renforce au X e siècle pour deux raisons, au moins:
viron); et loin de s’astreindre à ces figures, les mathématiciens pensent
le progrès manifeste de la théorie des équations du second degré et les
fonction et étudient au moyen de leurs équations : les courbes. En effet si
besoins de l’astronomie. Le progrès de la dite théorie a donné aux al-
les solutions de ces équations sont obtenues au moyen de l’intersection de
gébristes le modèle des solutions algébriques - par radicaux - auquel ils
deux coniques, il reste que, dans chaque cas, cette intersection est démon
veulent se conformer pour les équations de degré supérieur et surtout de
trée algébriquement, c’est-à-dire au moyen des équations des courbes. Ainsi dans l’oeuvre d’al-Khayyâmî et surtout dans celle d’al-Tùsï, et sans
l’équation cubique. L ’astronomie a posé, directement, des problèmes multiples du 3ème degré. Al-Màhânî (mort en 874-884?) fut lui-même astronome. Mais c’est surtout al-Bïrûnï (973-1048) qui pour déterminer les cordes de certains angles afin de construire la table des sinus, formula explicitement les deux équations cubiques:
équations, cette assimilation est sans doute abusive. Car la figure géomé
entrer dans le détail de leur démonstration, on trouve parmi bien d’autres les exemples suivants : La méthode poursuivie pour résoudre x^ + a x = b revient à résoudre simultanément les deux équations :
— 3;c — 1 = 0 où ;c est la corde d’un angle de 80°
/1 b
— 3jc + 1 = 0 où jc est la corde d’un angle de 20°
2a
Ces deux équations ont été résolues par tâtonnements.
(équation du cercle)
x^ = y ja y (équation de la parabole)
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47
OÙ ^a\ le double du paramètre de la parabole: b = ad, d: diamètre du
Le rôle du discriminant D = b ^ l2 7 -a j4 est ainsi établi et algébriquement
cercle.
élaboré pour l’étude de l’équation cubique.
- ce qui donne l’équation; A:(x^+ûrjc—è )= 0 . En éliminant la solution triviale on obtient bien l’équation cherchée. - La méthode poursuivie pour résoudre x^ =ax-{-b revient à résoudre simultanément les deux équations : —y/a y équation de la parabole y équation de l’hyperbole équilatère
Déjà localisé, le rôle du discriminant n’est cependant pas généralisé : le discriminant n’intervient pas encore dans les solutions canoniques, c’està-dire par radicaux. C ’est pour remédier à cette difficulté que les mêmes mathématiciens ont développé une méthode de résolution des équations numériques à laquelle se rattache pour l ’essentiel la méthode dite “ de Viète” , comme je l’ai montré ailleurs. On savait en effet qu’al-Khayyâmï avait trouvé une telle méthode pour résoudre les équations x " = q. On savait aussi qu’avant al-Khayyâmî, alBirüni s’était occupé du même problème. Mais du traité d’al-Bïrünï il ne
où y/a\ le double du paramètre de la parabole, bja diamètre transversal
reste que le titre, tandis que de celui d’al-Khayyâmî on n’a qu’un résumé
de l’hyperbole.
récapitulatif, qui permettra de comprendre que cette méthode avait pour
D ’où x{x^ —a x —b)=Q . Si l’on élimine la solution triviale, on obtient
base le développement de (a+b-\— k)", n eN . Grâce au Traité des équa
notre équation. On peut encore multiplier les exemples, pour montrer qu’une histoire
tions d’al-Tûsi, on connaît maintenant non seulement l’existence d’une telle méthode pour des équations de type x" = ^, mais pour le cas général.
encore à faire de la géométrie algébrique ne peut se faire sans l’examen
Cette méthode apphquée par al-Tùsï à toutes les équations traitées, peut
de l’apport de ce courant algébrique à cette discipline.
être décrite rapidement de la manière suivante:
Aussi importantes que cette étude sont la saisie et l’expression par al-Tüsï de l’importance du discriminant dans la discussion des équations cubiques. Ainsi pour considérer l’existence des racines positives de l’équation x^ + a = bx {a, b'^0), il constate d’abord que toute solution (positive) de cette équation doit être plus petite ou égale à b^'^ ; car si Xq est une racine, on obtient: x l + a = bxQ d’où d’où
Xq ^ bxQ Xq < ô
d’autre part cette racine doit vérifier l’égalité b x —x^ = a. Al-Tüsî cherche la valeur pour laquelle y = b x —x^ atteint son maxi mum, et trouve en annulant la dérivée première : x = {bl3y^^. Ce maximum est donc:
b{bl3y/^ - {blZfi^ = 2 {b l3 fi^ . Il existe donc une racine positive si et seulement si
x ” + ûi^c"
H----- h a „ -ix = N
et posons / (:ic)= jc"+ ûtix"“ ^ H----- H _ ix. La fonction est plusieurs fois dérivable. On peut reconnaître à quel in tervalle appartient la racine, soit x e [10^ lO'’"^^], x est donc de forme p l( y + p i 10^“ ^H----- hp, et tel que r = [mjn] où m est l’ordre décimal de N, [m/n] est la partie entière de mjn. - On détermine
=polO*^ ou bien par division ou bien par la recherche
du plus grand entier de n® puissance contenu dans N. - On pose Nx = N — f (^ i) et x = x ^ + x 2 , N i = g {x 2) où g est un polynôme en X2 de degré « — 1. On obtient comme valeur approchée de X2 , x^ définie par: i V i = n x ’[ ~ ^ x 2 + a i { n — 1 ) x \ ~ ^ x 2 H------- \ - 2 a „ ^ 2 X i ^ 2 +
+ a„_iX2 On reconnaît ici la dérivée de / au point x^
( 1)
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R. R A S H E D
49
C ’est ainsi qu’al-Jusï, au moyen d’une transformation affine x ^ x + a
et
ou x - ^ a —x, réduit les équations à résoudre à d’autres équations dont il X2 =
connaît la solution. Pour résoudre ces équations, al-Tüsï étudie le maximum des expres
f 'M On opère ensuite par itérations successives.
sions algébriques. Il prend d’une manière systématique, sans toutefois la
Supposons déterminées
nommer, la dérivée première de ces expressions qu’il annule, et démontre que la racine de l’équation obtenue, substituée dans l’expression algé
x =
+ ^ 2 + ” * 4 - X f c _ i k = 2 ,...,n
Une valeur approchée de
brique, donne le maximum. Une fois qu’il a trouvé l’une des racines d’une équation cubique, il lui
est donnée par la formule:
arrive, pour déterminer l’autre racine, d’étudier une équation du second degré qui n’est autre que le quotient de la division de l ’équation cubique
Nu
(2)
par (x — r ), où r est la racine trouvée. En d’autres termes, il sait que le polynôme ax^-\-bx^+ c x + d est divisible par { x - r ) , si r est une racine
où Nk = N - f {x^ + x '2 = ^ l+ ^ 2 + -^ k -l Ainsi une valeur approchée de x sera: Xi + ^2 H----- 'r x'„
où les X- sont donnés par (2).
de l’équation a x ^ + b x + c x -V d = 0 . Enfin après avoir étudié l’équation, il essaie de déterminer une borne supérieure et une borne inférieure de ses racines réelles. Si nous avons tenu à rappeler ces résultats, ce n’est pas seulement pour présenter des faits historiques encore inconnus, mais surtout pour montrer le niveau théorique et technique de cette algèbre et la complexité des
Or si al-Tûsï n’applique cette méthode qu’à l’objet auquel il consacre
problèmes historiques qu’elle pose dès que l’on cesse de recenser les
son Traité, les équations de degré inférieur ou égal à 3, tout indique
résultats pour en comprendre l’histoire. C ’est ainsi que l’on voit apparaî
cependant qu’il l’avait conçue d’une manière générale. D ’ailleurs le
tre avec ces algébristes l’emploi de la dérivée au cours de la discussion des
résumé récapitulatif d’al-Khayyâmî exposait déjà le problème en toute
équations algébriques et au cours de la résolution des équations numéri
généralité.
ques. Chacun sait cependant que, lié à la recherche des maxima, l’usage
Méthode de résolution des équations numériques, études des courbes au
de la “ dérivée première” n’était pas nouveau. Cependant, suscité par tel
moyen des équations, localisation du rôle du discriminant dans la solution
exemple ou tel autre, il restait occasionnel, et ce n’est qu’avec ces algé
des équations cubiques, sont les chapitres de l’algèbre renouvelée. La
bristes et surtout avec al-Tüsï que la notion de dérivée deviendra partie
distance parcourue depuis l’oeuvre d’al-Khwarizmi ne se mesure donc pas
intégrante de la résolution des équations algébriques et numériques. La
seulement par rapport à la seule extension de la discipline mais aussi par
généraUsation de cet usage sera en fait obtenue à la suite de celle de la
le changement de sens de la connaissance algébrique. Si en effet l’algèbre
théorie des équations que l’on essayait alors d’élaborer, d’une part, et par
s’affirme comme la science des équations algébriques, celles-ci ne sont pas
les recherches des mathématiciens dont l’activité s’exerçait en d’autres
seulement liées à des nombres et à des segments, elles se rapportent égale
domaines, d’autre part.
ment à des courbes dans le plan, l’algèbre intègre alors des techniques
En effet, les travaux de Banü Mùsâ, d’Ibn Qurra, de son petit-fils
présentes dans la tradition qui a participé activement à son renouvelle
Ibrâhîm ibn Sinân, d’al-Qühï, d’Ibn al-Haytham et de tant d’autres non
ment: celle des infinitésimalistes. On peut citer parmi ces techniques l’usage
algébristes sur les déterminations infinitésimales ont indirectement préparé
des transformations affines par un infinitésimaliste comme Ibrâhîm ibn Sinân.
les tentatives de nos algébristes. Par leur refus d’interpréter géométrique ment les opérations algébriques, déjà manifeste chez Banù Mûsâ et réaf
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firmé par leurs successeurs, par la découverte de nouvelles lois arithméti
Déterminée par l’idéologie de l’historien, la manière de poser la ques
ques nécessaires au calcul des surfaces et des volumes, ils ont donné à ces
tion ne peut donc entraîner que des réponses contradictoires. Manifeste
algébristes des techniques éprouvées pour la recherche des maxima. Mais
au niveau de la question, cette idéologie se retrouve dans la formulation
la simple énumération et la classification des problèmes du 3ème degré,
de la réponse. Supposons pour un moment que la deuxième question soit
nécessaires pour élaborer la théorie des équations avec laquelle l’algèbre
globalement la bonne, rien n’interdit de chercher la réponse dans des direc
se confondait déjà, la recherche d’une méthode pour résoudre des équa
tions différentes. C ’est ainsi que, partis du développement incomparable
tions cubiques ont étendu le domaine d’application des techniques des
de l’algèbre par rapport aux mathématiques hellènes et médiévales latines,
infinitésimalistes et notamment de la recherche de la dérivée première.
M . Arnaldez et le regretté L. Massignon ont pensé que l’arabe comme
Présente grâce aux infinitésimalistes, étendue par les algébristes, la notion
langue sémitique “ a eu pour résultat d’infléchir les connaissances qu’elle
de “ dérivée” fut condamnée à la discrétion par suite de la faiblesse du
exprimait dans le sens d’une pensée analytique, atomistique, occasion-
symbolisme algébrique. C ’est ce qui explique, selon nous, son usage sys
naliste et apophtegmatique” . Une étude récente sur “ l’involution séman
tématique, bien qu’elle demeure sans nom ni titre.
tique de concept” expose comment les langues sémitiques tendent à la formation abrégée et abstraite, “ algébrisante” , par contraste avec la
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“ géométrisation aryenne” . Selon ces auteurs la structure linguistique est donc responsable du développement “ d’une science des constructions
Il y a un demi-siècle à peine, P. Tannery écrivait que l’algèbre arabe “ ne
algébriques” . Il est donc clair que même si c’est la bonne question qui est
s’élève d’ailleurs nullement au dessus du niveau atteint par Diophante” .
posée, rien ne défend la réponse contre une autre idéologie, qui remonte
On peut sans doute s’étonner de lire une telle appréciation, qu’elle pût
dans le précédent exemple à Ernest Renan.
encore se faire, surtout après les travaux de Woepcke. Mais en deçà de
S’interroger sur les raisons historiques de la production algébrique doit
tout étonnement, on peut voir dans cette appréciation beaucoup plus
donc passer d’abord par le rejet de l’idéologie à plus d’un niveau : celui de
l’idéologie de l’historien que les conclusions de son propre travail his
la question et celui des éléments de la réponse. Mais une condition néces
torique. D ’ailleurs si dans le cas de P. Tannery cette idéologie est appa
saire et manifestement non suffisante de neutralité idéologique serait de
rente, elle est souvent moins manifeste chez d’autres historiens comme
connaître d’abord l’état de la discipline examinée. Pour l’historien des
Zeuthen et plus récemment Bourbaki.
sciences arabes cette connaissance reste fragmentaire et imparfaite. Cette
Si j ’ai tenu à rappeler l’afiîrmation de Tannery, c’est beaucoup moins
simple constatation montre que nous sommes encore loin du but de ce
pour redresser un tort fait à l’histoire de l’algèbre que pour montrer une
colloque et qu’il est prématuré de poser à l’heure actuelle la question des
difficulté majeure de l’étude sociologique de la science dans son histoire.
conditions sociales de la production scientifique.
Pour un P. Tannery, par exemple, cette étude ne pouvait être que la
Deux autres éléments nous confirment dans notre attitude, il faut bien
réponse à la question: quelles sont les conditions culturelles à la suite
l’avouer, négative. En effet, pour l’algèbre examinée ici, un problème
desquelles l’algèbre est restée sans progrès aucun, dans l’état où elle a pu
algébrique ne peut être posé que de manière intrinsèque, et l’autonomie
se présenter chez les Anciens? Et faute de s’interroger sur les conditions
de l’algèbre est déjà recherchée et confirmée au plan de la production des
de la production algébrique, l’on se préoccupe de son absence; or le
théorèmes et de l’invention des propositions. La part des philosophies,
résumé que nous venons d’en faire montre bien que l’on est nécessaire
des idéologies, est reléguée à une seconde et lointaine instance. Cette clô
ment amené à se demander pourquoi et comment l’algèbre s’est renouve
ture épistémologique caractérise toute discipline formée et la question des
lée, non seulement par rapport aux Anciens - à supposer d’ailleurs qu’ils
conditions de la production doit, avant d’être proposée, à la fois se mé
aient eu une algèbre - mais également par rapport aux premiers algé
diatiser et se fragmenter. Sa médiatisation exige que l’on passe par toutes les disciplines - ici arithmétique, trigonométrie, astronomie d’observa-
bristes arabes : al-Khwarizmi et Abù Kâmil.
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tion... - auxquelles la discipline est liée; sa fragmentation requiert que
précise et se pose de prime abord en liaison avec les différentes branches
l’on connaisse les poids respectifs des facteurs culturels qui peuvent d’une
de l’astronomie et de l’arithmétique. Seul l’exemple de l’arithmétique
manière ou d’une autre influencer la production scientifique. A défaut de pouvoir détailler, on tombe forcément dans l’une ou l’autre de ces deux
nous préoccupe ici. Si l’on revient à l’oeuvre des arithméticiens qui ont précédé l’avène
illusions: transcendantale ou empirique. La première fait prendre les
ment de cette algèbre, algébristes eux-mêmes dans la plupart des cas, on
moyens de poser le problème pour le problème lui-même, et ainsi les
constate souvent une double préoccupation: développer leur discipline,
éléments d’une doctrine durkheimienne, weberienne ou même marxiste
lui fournir “ un domaine d’exercice” . Par “ domaine d’exercice” nous
pour l’explication elle-même. On a le plus souvent des considérations
entendons un terrain d’exemples, sans liaison nécessaire, où l’application
générales qui ne cernent pas les faits que l’on est censé expliquer. L ’illu
de l’instrument mathématique est suscitée pour rationaliser une pratique
sion empirique laisse croire que l’énumération des éléments culturels est
empirique, donc résoudre théoriquement des problèmes pratiques. On
une réponse suffisante. Ces deux illusions toutefois dominent encore les
peut alors mesurer la portée de l’instrument mathématique, indépendam
explications du phénomène de la production scientifique.
ment de l’importance de l’exemple choisi ou de l’efficacité de la solution
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Elles ne peuvent d’ailleurs que se renforcer dans le cas qui nous in téresse ici, à cause de la rareté même des études scientifiques sur l’empire
obtenue. Développement théorique et application de l’arithmétique pour ra
musulman et surtout sur son, ou ses systèmes économiques.
tionaliser une pratique empirique, telles sont les deux tâches souvent as
Mais est-on fondé de se réfugier en cette position négative, s’interdisant tout examen du problème proposé à ce colloque? Une attitude rigoriste
signées par les mathématiciens à leurs traités d’arithmétique. Elles per mettent d’identifier quelques orientations de la recherche.
ferait pencher vers cette abstention, sans doute à juste titre, mais en lais
La composition et l’étendue de l’empire ‘abbasside ont mis en présence
sant la place aux considérations les plus vagues. Je pense qu’il importe
et confronté plusieurs arithmétiques. Deux d’entre elles, digitale et in
ici de prendre ses risques en exploitant la seule possibilité qui reste:
dienne, ont posé aux mathématiciens des problèmes à la fois théoriques et
formuler des conjectures plausibles mais qui ne prétendent nullement
pratiques. SoUicités en particulier par l’administration de l’État, les
remplacer une véritable réponse, indiquer une ou plusieurs hypothèses de
mathématiciens ont essayé de développer chacune d’elles à l’aide d’autres
recherche. II faut donc s’engager à médiatiser la question des détermina
connaissances mathématiques, justifier les règles de chacune, les comparer
tions sociales de la nouvelle algèbre, et au lieu de la prendre pour poiht
plus ou moins implicitement, les composer pour parvenir à en fonder et
de départ, revenir aux disciplines qui ont le plus activement participé à
faciliter l’usage, donner une sorte de vade-mecum du fonctionnaire. Par
son avènement.
fois, d’ailleurs, un même mathématicien composait un traité pour chaque
Entre toutes, deux disciplines ont contribué à la constitution de la nou
arithmétique: al-Karajï, par exemple.
velle algèbre: l’arithmétique et les différentes branches de l’astronomie
Que les traités d’arithmétique aient été suscités, au moins en partie, par
d’observation. La première est intervenue dans la transformation de l’an
les besoins de l’administration, le fait est attesté par les auteurs euxmêmes.
cienne algèbre, nous l’avons vu, par la transposition de ses opérations à l’algèbre, une fois ces opérations dégagées et systématisées, et également
Dans son traité: Des besoins en science arithmétique des ^'kuttàb'* ( écri
par la généralisation au niveau des expressions algébriques de certaines
vains, secrétaires, fonctionnaires des bureaux de l ’administration) , “ ^ummâV*
de ses techniques telles que l’algorithme d’EucUde pour la division et
(préfets, percepteurs des impôts) et autres” , al-Bûzjanï présente ainsi son
l’extraction de la racine carrée. L ’astronomie, pour ses propres besoins,
livre comme “ un livre comprenant l’ensemble de ce dont ont besoin l’ac
a contraint l’algébriste à reprendre le problème des équations numériques
compli et le débutant, le subordonné et le chef en arithmétique, art du
et surtout étudier les courbes au moyen des équations.
fonctionnaire Qiinà ^at al-kitâba), pratique de l’impôt foncier et toutes les sortes de pratiques en cours dans les dlwâns, proportion, multiplication,
La question des déterminations sociales de la nouvelle algèbre se
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division, mensuration, taxe foncière, partage, change et autres pratiques
ture littéraire et qu’il ne traitait des sciences religieuses que selon les
utilisées par les différentes catégories des hommes pour traiter entre eux
besoins de son travail et de sa culture” . Il ajoute: “ Cette couche de fonc
de leurs affaires et dont ils ont besoin dans leurs moyens de vivre” .
tionnaires est ce qui distingue le plus l’État musulman de l’Europe au
La même préoccupation se manifeste dans le traité d’al-Karajï: alKàfi.
début du moyen âge” . En sorte que c’est l’existence de cette couche sociale qui a incité, pour
On la retrouve mais simplement indiqué dans les traités d’arithméti
la formation de ses membres, à la rédaction de traités, non seulement en
que indienne. C’est ainsi qu’Ibn Labbân (1000 environ) écrit en conclu
arithmétique, mais également en géographie économique, comme le
sion de son ouvrage: “ Ces fondements sont suffisants pour l’ensemble du
célèbre livre de Qudâma ibn Ja'far sur l’impôt foncier, de lexiques de la
calcul astronomique et des pratiques en cours entre les hommes” . Son
langue philosophique, économique, scientifique de l’époque, comme celui
élève al-Nasawi (1030 environ) qui avait commencé par composer un
d’al-Khwarizmi: Mafâtîh al-^ulûm. Or pour caractériser cette couche, l’on
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traité d’arithmétique en persan pour l’administration de Rayy, en donna
ne peut mieux dire que C. Cahen, quand il écrit: “ Une bureaucratie,
par la suite une version arabe, “ de manière à ce que les hommes en fassent
c’est-à-dire régime dominé par une armée de scribes spécialisés devenus
usage dans les différentes affaires en cours entre eux et les astronomes
une sorte de caste qui dure quand califs et vizirs passent; paperasserie,
dans leur art” .
c’est-à-dire régime dans lequel est couché par écrit en détail tout ce qui
On pourrait multiplier les exemples empruntés aux mathématiciens de
peut l’être selon des règles techniques ou stylistiques qui, connues d’eux
cette génération, c’est-à-dire dès la fin du IX e siècle. C’est en effet la pé riode de l’empire ‘abbaside où l’on assiste:
seuls, leur assurent le monopole des métiers” . Dîwàns financiers, Dlwàns
(1) à la consolidation et au développement des institutions administra tives au niveau de l’empire,
correspondances (chancellerie), et un bon nombre d’autres Dlwàns avaient
(2) à la multiplication des images réduites de ces institutions au niveau des provinces, par suite de l’affaiblissement du pouvoir des Khalifs,
de l’armée, Dlwàns des postes (des renseignements généraux), Dlwàns des tous en commun un besoin de compatibilité financière et étaient deman deurs de traités d’arithmétique sûrs et maniables pour leurs pratiques. Or, ce que l’on a convenu d’appeler “ domaine d’exercice” de l’arithmé
(3) à l’apparition d’une couche sociale, celle des “ kuttâb” ou fonction
tique est constitué précisément par ces problèmes posés aux fonction
naires, liée à la multiplication des administrations {dlwàns) et de leurs images réduites.
naires des Dlwàns, C ’est ainsi que les chapitres 4 et 5 d’Abu’l Wafâ* sont
L ’existence autonome de cette couche sociale, son poids sociologique,
concerne les questions de gestion des biens, paiement aux soldats de leurs
étonnaient déjà les historiens de l’époque: Al-Tabarï, al-Sûlï, al-Mas'üdï,
salaires, gages et soldes, les licences de passage à accorder ou à refuser
consacrés aux problèmes financiers comme tels, tandis que le chapitre 6
et surtout al-Jahshayârï, dans son livre Al-Wyzara wa’l kuttâb, en ont
aux navires de commerce voyageant sur les fleuves et aux marchands
donné une description détaillée. On sait d’ailleurs que l’arabisation des
circulant sur les routes, les envois de correspondances et courriers, et
dlwàns avait commencé relativement tôt, entre 700 et 705 selon les pro
toutes autres affaires administrées par les Dlwàns.
vinces, comme le rappellent al-Jahshayârï et al-Kindï, l’historien.
On comprend dès l’abord, par la confrontation des deux arithmétiques,
A la fin de l’empire ‘ummayade, un de ces fonctionnaires, Hârùn ibn
que facilité et rapidité du maniement sont devenues des critères de pré
‘A bd al-Hamïd, traçait déjà le type idéal de ses collègues. D ’après un texte
férence. C ’est en effet pour marquer l’importance de l’arithmétique in
conservé par al-Jahshayàrî et rapporté par Ibn Khaldûn, on sait qu’il
dienne qu’al-Uqlîdisï avançait ces valeurs pratiques et écrivait:
s’agit d’un lettré connaissant son arithmétique. Outre des qualités morales
La plupart des arithméticiens sont obligés de s’en servir dans leur pratique: pour ce qu’elle comprend de facilité et de rapidité, le peu à retenir, la brièveté du temps mis à répondre, le peu de réflexion sur ce qu’elle concerne qu’ils trouvent nécessairement entre leurs mains... Nous disons donc qu’elle est une science et une pratique, qui exigent un instrument, de même qu’en exigent un l’écrivain, le fabriquant, le chevalier dans leur
et sociales, il doit posséder des connaissances en arabe, histoire, arithmé tique et sciences religieuses, selon les besoins de son travail. C ’est en ce sens que A. Metz écrit que le fonctionnaire “ est le représentant de la cul
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pratique; car s’il manque au fabriquant, ou s’il lui est difficile de trouver ce par quoi il exerce sa pratique, il ne pourra parvenir à ce dont il a besoin dans cette pratique; pour saisir ceci, il n’est guère de difficulté, d’impossibilité ou de préparation” .
axe d’organisation des traités, les opérations sont rendues disponibles à
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d’autres applications, et c’est comme telles qu’elles se présentaient à qui se proposaient d’étendre le calcul algébrique. Celui-ci pouvait également
Il semble donc que ce soit pour répondre à deux nouveaux besoins et con
généraliser en algèbre les résultats obtenus par l’application de ces opéra
formément à ces nouvelles normes que le mathématicien est revenu à
tions en arithmétique: C ’est à al-Karajî et à ses successeurs, al-Shahrazùrï
l’arithmétique, digitale ou indienne, dont il entreprend de justifier les
et al-Samaw’ al, que revint cette tâche.
règles et d’organiser l’exposé. Ce retour, la confrontation au moins im plicite des arithmétiques, a fait apparaître beaucoup plus clairement qu’au
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Paris
paravant la généralité et la nature abstraite du concept d’opération. Vues de cette manière, et en quelque sorte systématisées, les opérations sont dès lors des moyens d’organiser l’exposé arithmétique. La présence de plusieurs arithmétiques a eu pour conséquence, en effet, de relativiser les systèmes de numération pour montrer que l’essentiel est dans le choix de la base et dans les opérations à appliquer. Al-Uqlidisï, déjà, n’hésitait pas à déclarer: “ Il est possible de remplacer ces neuf chiffres (hurüf) par d’autres chiffres, soit par des chiffres Abjad, soit par des chiffres romains, soit par des chiffres arabes” , idée devenue commune à tel point qu’alKhwarizmi al-kâtib peut écrire dans l’ouvrage cité: “ L ’on écrira à l’aide de ces chiffres (Abjad), comme les arithméticiens indiens, ce qui consiste à écrire au moyen de neuf chiffres, allant de V^alif au tà\ et ce signe sera posé dans les cases vides, à la place du zéro dans le calcul indien” . Autrement dit, une fois le choix de la base effectué, on peut substituer aux chiffres de l’arithmétique indienne n’importe quel système de signes. Mais dans ces conditions, les opérations n’épousent plus l’écriture parti culière du système de numération. C ’est d’une manière suffisamment géné rale qu’al-Karaji distingue deux classes de données: les quantités ration nelles et irrationnelles, et les opérations de multiplication, division, éléva tion des puissances, addition et soustraction. Mais ce sont précisément ces opérations qui ont permis d’organiser l’exposé de manière systématique au début de l’arithmétique indienne, et si elles jouent ce rôle dans l’arithmétique digitale, c’est de manière aussi systématique, mais moins complète. C ’est ainsi que l’exposé d’al-Uqlïdisî, Ibn-Labbân, al-Nasawï s’agence par les opérations +/ —, x/-^ et par l’extraction de la racine, tandis que dans l’arithmétique digitale, on a essentiellement x/-i-, et parfois seulement l’extraction de la racine, la loi de composition + /— étant supposée connue. Conçues de manière plus générale et plus abstraite que dans le passé,
DISCUSSION R. RASHED : L ’un des thèmes de ce Colloque est le problème du rapport entre science et société dans l’histoire de la pensée scientifique. Comme ce qui m’intéresse c’est l’algèbre, il me faut d’abord décrire le plus exactement possible l’état de cette discipline: les questions que l’on va poser sur le rapport entre science-société sont déterminées ellesmêmes par la connaissance que l’historien a de l’état de cette science. Cette difficulté est encore plus grande quand il s’agit de mathématiques en général et d’algèbre en particu lier. Je voudrais dire que l’algèbre est un terrain à la fois privilégié et contraignant. Privilégié dans la mesure où, si rapports il y a entre science et société, ils peuvent être déterminés par ce que j ’appelle une clôture épistémologique dans la production mathé matique. Par “ clôture épistémologique” , je voudrais dire simplement qu’à partir d’un certain seuil, à partir d’un certain stade de développement de la science, un théorème de l’algèbre est produit, et seulement produit, par une série d’autres théorèmes qui existaient auparavant; il n’y a pas de raisons extérieures. Cette clôture permet de rendre plus évident ce rapport science-société, de le rendre plus apparent que dans d’autres disciplines ne possédant pas la même maîtrise conceptuelle. Mais cette clôture épisté mologique est justement assez contraignante dans la mesure où, s’il y a des rapports entre science et société, ou algèbre et société, il faudrait multiplier les disciplines inter médiaires pour voir à quel niveau et comment se situent ces rapports. Je vais montrer que l’on ne peut absolument pas examiner le rapport entre algèbre et société (ou con ditions sociales) sans passer au moins par l’arithmétique et par l’astronomie, c’est-àdire sans dénombrer les différentes branches de l’arithmétique et celles de l’astronomie. J. g a g n e : Tu as affirmé tout à l’heure que la clôture épistémologique rendait le rapport que tu étudies apparent. C ’est ça que je voudrais éclairer. Tu as dit: il rend le rapport plus apparent. Je me demande si au contraire il ne le rend pas moins apparent. R. RASHED : Je préfère utiliser les mots “ privilégié et contraignant” . Si par exemple l’algèbre s’est développée à partir de la résolution de questions pratiques, à ce niveau élémentaire on peut immédiatement voir l’intervention de ces raisons pratiques et de problèmes pratiques. Si, par exemple, l’algèbre s’est développée pour la détermination ou le partage d’un héritage, ceci s’intégre dans un système économique que l’on peut déterminer. On peut voir le rapport d’une manière directe. La partage de l’héritage peut utiliser de l’algèbre, mais l’algèbre dans son développement - et c’est ce que j ’es saye de démontrer - n’a absolument pas besoin du partage de l’héritage, ce qui revient à dire qu’il n’y a pas production de théorèmes, inventés pour des raisons extrinsèques. s. VICTOR : Dès que l’algèbre se fait science, ça continue comme science indépendante ;
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là je suis complètement d’accord. Quand on invoque ces raisons pour dire qu’il n’y a jamais eu de rapport entre la répartition des héritages et le commencement de l’algèbre, je ne suis pas d’accord, parce qu’un rapport a bien existé aux débuts de l’algèbre. R. RASHED : Ceci est peut-être vrai pour l’algèbre à ses premiers commencements avec al-Khwarizmi, A bû Kâmil... etc., mais ne l’est plus aux Xle et X lle siècles. G. b e a u j o u a n : Il y a un problème du décollage et, une fois qu’une science a décollé, alors elle continue à vivre sur sa logique interne avec une beaucoup moins grande sensibilité aux stimulants externes de ses débuts. R. RASHED : Je n’ai pas dit qu’il y a une clôture épistémologique chez al-Khwarizmi ou chez Abù Kâmil. Je parle des Xle et X lle siècles. j. MURDOCH: But you have excluded only one kind of social relation, if you want to call it that. That is, you have excluded the influence of something exterior or social on the invention, discovery, or production of a given theorem. But this ignores, it seems to me, a much more frequent kind of thing and that is, once a theorem is discovered, once it is established, what are the social factors acting upon its utilization, its application? R. h a s h e d : D ’accord pour le problème des applications. Mais si l’on revient à la constitution même de l’algèbre on peut voir comment les éléments sociaux vont inter venir, c’est-à-dire non pas en algèbre en tant qu’algèbre, mais au moyen de l’arithméti que, au moyen de l’astronomie, au moyen d’autres disciplines, qui ne sont pas l’algèbre. j. mxjrdoch : But will we get a “ third man” argument here? You say that for the application of algebra to external things you have to proceed by the intermediary of arithmetic. Well, let’s take arithmetic. For the application o f arithmetic - forget alge bra for the moment - do you need another intermediary to apply arithmetic, and if so, why, and if not, why not? r . RASHED : Ça dépend de l’état de l’arithmétique. C ’est pour cela que j ’ai dit qu’il fallait savoir de quelle arithmétique il s’agit. Pour le moment, j ’essaye simplement de montrer la difficulté concernant l’algèbre: Qu’appelle-t-on donc condition privilégiée et contraignante en ces disciplines qui permettent de poser le problème des rapports entre science et société? “ Privilégié” dans la mesure où s’il y a un rapport, il sera plus déterminé, plus apparent que par exemple le rapport entre science et société pour la métaphysique, ou pour la physique du moyen âge, où un ensemble d’idéologies peuvent intervenir. Tel n’est pas le cas pour l’algèbre; nous avons une discipline qui est déjà neutre par rapport à ces idéologies. Donc on peut étudier directement les rapports entre science et société. Mais, d’autre part, nous sommes liés par le niveau même de cette discipline; par le fait même qu’elle est déjà scientifique, nous avons un peu les mains liées pour considérer l’intervention des éléments sociaux dans sa formation. J. MURDOCH: Yet you would claim that our hands are less tied when it comes to the consideration o f the impact of social factors upon arithmetic. E. s y l l a : Isn’t it just an historical fact that when you look in algebraic works you don’t see social connections, but when you look in arithmetic works you do, they tell you about applications? R. RASHED : That is an historical fact, but there is something more than this fact. You have at least three systems of arithmetic - Indian, digital, and sexagesimal - and the question arises why, at a certain moment, they tried to unify arithmetic. What does it mean, unify arithmetic? And how do they do it? And what are the constraints moving them to do it? The conjecture that I have made in answer to these questions is very simple: that it is the existence of a new social class, the class of scribes as a social organization. They ask for this unified kind of arithmetic; they need this kind of unifi cation for calculations. The development of arithmetic was produced by this kind o f
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social need as can be proved by the books written by mathematicians like Abû-1-Wafâ’, al-Karaji, al-Shahrazüri, al-Samaw’al, etc., especially for this new class, and by the kind of problems dealt with in these books. A. s a b r a : But you have to show this in a much more concrete way. That is to say, you have to show what kind of problems these people, these scribes, were working on and how and why they required this kind of unified arithmetic. Furthermore, I wonder whether in the social factors that have been proposed we have been able to go beyond considerations that are at best vague. J. MURDOCH: Yes, but Roshdi has made it less vague in the sense that he has said that a socially catalyzed cause has conditioned developments in arithmetic which were in turn only a necessary condition for the development of algebra and that the develop ment of algebra came out of this existing necessary condition in a totally internal way. A. s a b r a : Yes, all right, but what we have been discussing is algebra, not arithmetic. And what has come out of the discussion of algebra, and out of what Roshdi himself is saying, is that in the period he has been working on the development of algebra is an internal one. That makes sense. But one wonders about what happened in the period between al-Khwarizmi and A bû Kâmil. You don’t talk about that. One doesn’t know much about it and this makes treating it a bit difficult. r . RASHED : Yes, it is difficult just as all questions about origins are difficult. You cannot answer them. I even consider it mistaken to ask them now. One gets at best anecdotal history. A. s a b r a : I don’t think that looking for origins necessarily leads to a history which is just discoveries and anecdotes. In fact, I don’t see how an historian of mathematics can get away from this question of origins. I don’t think you can ignore it. After all, it gives you a research program. One might see, for example, a certain similarity between a theorem that is found in one of those authors like al-Kâshï and something in China. N o w of course it would be wrong to go on just from there and say: “ See, similar, there fore, this comes from that.” N o, this is not very interesting. But if this leads you to ask whether it is possible that such a transmission could have taken place, then it becomes fruitful. What you will then do with it as an historian is still a problem; I am not saying that history ends there. r . RASHED : II faudrait tout de même prévenir le risque de voir la question des origines, si elle peut être résolue, se transformer en une question d’originalité. G. b e a u j o u a n : Si c’est l’originalité, on retombe dans la problématique des précur seurs. A. s a b r a : That is why I was trying to protect myself by saying that what you do with the question of origins afterward is something else. That is to say, the cluster of questions that are somehow involved in this concept of originality, which is not a clear concept, still remain. Take the work of someone like Kennedy. He is interested in the questions of transmission. Yet Kennedy somewhere says in one of his articles that once you have a theorem, you are faced with something that has an intrinsic value. I was very much moved by that statement because it is true. The important thing for the historian is the intrinsic value that somehow resides in a new theorem, a new discovery. But I don’t think that this releases the historian from further research. Because by bringing in questions of origins, the problem of originality and of intrinsic value becomes more complicated. It also becomes more interesting and historically richer. Once you throw this away, it seems to me that eventually you will end up by doing, not history, but something like the philosophy of science. Thus, for the time being, I am saying that the questions o f origins and originality still remain.
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R. RASHED : Mais le problème des origines comprend au moins deux questions: une question d’attitude d’abord, c’est-à-dire poser le problème des origines sans le trans former en une question d’originalité; mais aussi cette autre question qui consiste à ne pas confondre la genèse historique et la structure logique de la théorie que l’on est en train d’étudier. Ces deux questions sont souvent confondues. Et c’est ça qui permet de trouver de l’algèbre chez Euclide, de la théorie de l’information chez Aristote et ainsi de suite. C ’est donc une question de décision et de stratégie. Mais ceci dépend égale ment de l’histoire des sciences dont il s’agit et quelle est notre connaissance de cette histoire. Par exemple, dans l’histoire des sciences arabes, on ne sait même pas qui a inventé quoi. Quand Luckey et beaucoup d’autres à sa suite parlaient, par exemple, de Kâshî, ils ne savaient pas que al-Samaw’al et al-Tûsi ont déjà une bonne partie des découvertes attribuées à Kâshi. Luckey et ses successeurs intéressés par la question des origines sont allés chercher celles-ci en Chine. Faute non seulement logique mais aussi historique. C ’est à quoi mene la question des origines, au moins au stade actuel. A. s a b r a ; What you are doing now is working in the research program o f the histo rian filling in the gaps. R. RASHED : J’ai dit simplement quelles sont les conditions nécessaires à un travail utile sur les origines. Ces conditions peuvent engager à refuser les solutions faciles de continuité. Faut-il rappeler que la continuité historique n’est pas nécessairement une continuité logique. Restituer historiquement une oeuvre c’est d’abord l’analyser, en saisir sa structure logique. Par exemple, étudier le texte de Karaji, comme algébriste, sans comprendre quelle est la contribution essentielle apportée par Karaji, engager aussitôt un travail sur les origines, comme c’est souvent le cas, c’est perdre l’essentiel, perdre l’apport de Karaji. Chercher les origines de son algèbre, c’est remonter néces sairement à al-Khwarizmi, Abû-Kâmil. Supposons même que l’on connaisse tous les prédécesseurs de Karaji, on ne comprendra plus, si l’on s’arrête là, l’essentiel de sa tâche, c’est-à-dire un nouveau départ de l’algèbre grâce à ce que j ’ai appelé arithmétisation de celle-ci. Peut-être parvient-on à bien chercher les origines quand l’on sépare genèse historique et structure logique, mais alors la question des origines sera complète ment transformée. A. s a b r a ; What you are saying is really not against this program; you are just saying that if you have to do it you should, of course, do it well. j. MURDOCH: One might say that your unhappiness with the history of mathematics has to do with the way it is usually done. That is, if one asks what the entities are between which we are trying to fill the gaps, in most histories of mathematics - Cantor, Tropfke, for example - what they’re doing is concentrating on results or on theorems or on particular kinds of examples. This is what is traced. It is extremely difficult to find someone tracing within algebra, let us say, the use of false position; not just where it occurs, but why. Or who used the theory of proportion? Where? Why? That is, tracing methods, conceptions, apart from results. N o w that kind of thing, it seems to me, is incredibly more productive.
NABILSHEHABY
TH E I N F L U E N C E OF STOIC L O G IC O N AL-JASSÀS’ S L E G A L TH E O R Y
In the Usülal-Fiqh o f Abù Bakr al-Râzï al-Jass⧠(b. 305/917-d. 370/981), not yet published,^ there is a section devoted to what is called “ the in dicant o f a discourse” and to “ that which is particularly mentioned.” Al-Jassas has this to say about them: Every discourse (khifâb) that comes from God, exalted be He, and the prophet, upon him be peace, cannot be devoid of significance (fffid a ). The meaning {m a 'm ) of some (such discourse) is sometimes grasped with the intellect {ma'qûlan) through the utter ance ilafy). Others signify {y u fid ) a judgement (fiukm) and a meaning whose explana tion (bayàn) may come in a second (significant discourse). O f the discourse whose meaning is grasped with the intellect through the utterance some signify by way of indication (min jihat al-dalala) a meaning for which the utterance is not put (laysa mawdü^an lahu), as when God, exalted be He, says; “ And don’t say u f (an expression of anger and displeasure) to them (your parents)” (Q , 17, 23). This signifies two mean ings. One is the forbiddance of this ejaculation iqawt) itself. Also it signifies by way of indication the forbiddance of what is above that - shouting at, beating, and killing them (I, 39v).
Al-Jassas then gives a few more examples all from the Qur’ an. One such example is the verse in which G od addresses the prophet saying: “ I f thou asketh pardon for them seventy times, God will not pardon them” (Q. 9, 80). “ What is intended (al-m urad)” al-Jassas says, “ is not this number itself but that, no matter how many times the prophet asks for it, it will not come” (I, 39v). Al-Jassas adds: There is plenty of this kind (of discourse) in the Qur’an, the smart (traditions), and people’s habits of speaking. This is (what is called) the indicant of a discourse whose indication of what it indicates should be attentively considered (wa hâdhà huwa dalil al-khifab al-ladhi yajibu iUibaru dalâlatihi "alà mà dalla ^alayhi) (I, 39v).
Immediately after that al-Jassâs turns to the second issue: what is partic ularly mentioned {al-makhsüs bi’l-dhikr). He dismisses as wrong the claim that anything (Jcullu shay') which has two descriptions (waffayn) one of which is particularly mentioned in that part of the judgement to which it is related, indicates that the other (description) is to be judged the opposite way (bi-khilafihi) (I, 39v-40r).
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.). The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning. 61-85. AH Ifiohtv
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He also dismisses the claim that
“ that one is allowed to kill his own children in cases other than hunger”
whatever has several descriptions, some of which are particularly mentioned, indicates that the rest are to be judged the opposite way (I, 40r).
(I, 39v-40v). Taken in themselves and in isolation from any exterior evidence these
He says that there is no evidence either in language or in the shar ‘ for such claims. The hanafï viewpoint on this he says is that that particularly mentioned... does not indicate that the others (that are not particularly mentioned) should be given the opposite judgment (I, 40r).
extracts can be said to state the following: (1) Every discourse in the Qur’ an or the sunna is significant. (2) In some o f these significant discourses the intellect can grasp the meaning through the utterance. (3) In others the meaning is explained by another significant discourse. (4) In the type o f discourse whose meaning can be grasped through the
This is true, he continues, whether we have two descriptions one of which is particularly mentioned or many descriptions some of which are particularly mentioned (I, 40r).
He then adds that this is what Abû’ l-Hasan al-Karkhï (b. 260/873-d. 340/952) used to say in claiming that it is the viewpoint o f the Hanafis. Al-Karkhi said that Abû Yûsuf al-Qâdî (d. 182/798) gave the following example in support o f this view. In the Qur’ an God says to the prophet: “ W e have made lawful for thee ... the daughters o f thy uncles paternal and aunts maternal, thy uncles maternal and aunts maternal who immi grated with thee” (Q. 33, 50). This does not indicate, Abù Yüsuf says, that the daughters o f the uncles and aunts mentioned who did not immi grate with him are unlawful. Al-Jassas then relates that he does not know the view o f the early Hanafis on this; but that he heard many hanafï masters (shuyükh) expressing the view that i f the particularization in question is given in the form o f a number, as when the prophet says “ There are five (types o f) women whom a mahram (i.e. a person in a degree o f consanguinity precluding marriage) can kill...,” the judgement in volving the others should be the opposite o f the judgement concerning those who are particularly mentioned. On the other hand, when the par ticularization does not take a numerical form, these Hanafis adopt alKarkhi’s view mentioned above. Al-Jassas himself supports al-Karkhi on this issue and says:
utterance there is a sub-class in which the utterance signifies by indication a second meaning: that which is indicated. This new meaning is not what the utterance originally gives. When the utterance signifies by indication a second meaning or “ that which is indicated,” it is called “ the indicant o f discourse.” (5) The following views are wrong and therefore unacceptable: (a) I f we have a thing that has two descriptions, and only one o f them is mentioned ( “ particularized” or “ particularly mentioned” ) in a certain judgement, then the other description should be judged the opposite way. I f one o f them is said to be A, then the other should be not-A. (b) I f we have a thing that has several descriptions, some o f which were mentioned in a certain judgement, then the rest should be judged the opposite way. (c) Only when one o f the two descriptions is particularized in a numerical form, i.e., given in the form o f a number, can we say that the other description is to be judged the opposite way. This is the view o f some o f the late hanafi masters (al-Jassas’s contempo raries). These views are wrong because we cannot regard an utterance as an indicant unless it necessitates that which we regard as indicated by it, and this is not the case in any o f the above views. Our next step will be to try to elucidate further and explain al-Jassas’s
It is not possible for something (s h a f) to be an indicant... if it does not necessitate in any way (what we regard as) that which is indicated by it (I, 40r).
laconic statements by resorting not only to other places in his text but also
He then asks the reader to look at some examples in the Qur’ an where a
dependent evidence that al-Jassas, or any o f the early Muslim jurists for
description is particularized such as when God says: “ Don’t kill your children for fear o f poverty” (Q. 17,31). “ This does not indicate,” he says,
that matter, was familiar with the works o f the Stoics in any form. Y et the
and primarily to the views o f the Stoics on logic. W e do not yet have in
similarity in terminology and views cannot escape one’ s notice. What fol
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lows would thus be a study not only o f the transference o f one culture to
simply, meaning. The third element mentioned is the existing object,
another but also o f the influence o f one discipline upon another.
TuyKàvov. The first noticeable difference between Sextus’s account and
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The background and content o f al-Jassas’ s opening sentences are fairly
the statement o f al-Jassas is the absence o f Arabic words for armaîvov
well explained in Diogenes Laertius’ s Lives o f Eminent Philosophers (V II, 57). Diogenes presents us with the following Stoic distinctions:
and CTtmaivojievov (see below). Another omission in al-Jassas’ s passage
There is a difference between
is the reference to the existing object. In other places in his book (partic ularly where he treats general and particular names) al-Jassa§ does talk about the existing object, and the words he uses for it are
( “ thing,
substance” ) or ^ayn makh$û§a ( “ particular thing” or “ substance” ), e.g., I, Ir, Iv, 3v, l l v , 34v, 35r and shakhs ( “ individual” ) or shakh§ makhsüs ( “ particular individual” ), e.g., I, Ir, 11v.^ In the above passage al-Jassas
A second report we would like to cite here is that o f Sextus Empiricus; Against the Logicians, II, 11-12:
talks o f the process o f grasping a meaning with the intellect through the utterance. Though àvxi>-a|xpàv0 (which corresponds well with ya^^qil)
The Stoics say that three things are linked together, that which is signified (armaivô^evov) that which signifies (ar^aivov) and the object (xuyKdvov); of these that which signifies is the
does exist in Sextus’ s text, Sextus says nothing o f grasping the ^.ektov
What we are told in the first passage is that a person can make sounds using
that
through the (pcovfj. The relevance o f this point will be appreciated i f seen in the fight o f what al-Jassas says next, namely that a khifab may signify a meaning and a judgement that is explained in another khifàb. Both processes, the apprehension o f the meaning through the utterance and explanation, can be better understood i f we examine another cryptic pas sage in al-Jassas’s book. In the new passage (I, 65r-66r) al-Jassas relates
the letters o f the alphabet without this utterance o f letters (lé^ iç ) signi fying anything. When an articulated utterance does signify something it is called Xôyoç. Admittedly, one can read /chitdA as either Xôyoç or Xé^iç. There are two reasons for taking ^-ôyoç as the equivalent o f khitdb, however.
an early scholar {ahl al-Hlm) said that an explanation (bayan) occurs (yaqa') through five things; speech (bi'l-qaw l), writing (b i'l-khaft), gesticulation (bi'1-ishàra), the knuckles (b V l-u q od ) - by which he means the knuckles when used for counting i'uqad al-bisâby - and the indicative signal (al-m?ba'^ al-dâlla).^
One is the strong evidence we have in support o f taking qawl as the equiv
Al-Jassâs then goes on to say that the early scholar® talked about all
alent o f X,8^iç. This will come out in the discussion o f bayan ( “ explana
this thusly: An explanation by speech is Hke all the initiated (mubtada*a)
tion” ) below. The second reason is also drawn from the same context. In
duties whose meanings are apprehended by the intellect (al-ma^qülatu
his discussion o f bayan, al-Jassas gives as an example o f an explanation
ma'^ànlhà) through the appearance or literal form o f a discourse. Both God
by means o f qawl (X,éÇiç) “ all the initiated duties whose meanings are
and the prophet initiate judgements and duties by speech. Such self-
conceived through ?ahir ( ‘the appearance’ or ‘literal meaning o f’) alkhitdb” (I, 65r). But what does a khitàb signify? A ma^nâ, meaning, we are
through speech some other statement or judgement made before either by
explanatory judgements {ahkàm) are called explanations. Both also explain
told, that we grasp with the intellect either in the same discourse through
specifying the meaning o f a statement containing general terms, and this
the utterance or in some other discourse. With obvious differences - but
is called takh$l$\ or by abrogating a previously-made statement (naskh),
still fairly clearly - some o f these views come out in the passage we have
i.e., explaining that the duty ordered before is, henceforth, not be fol
quoted above from Sextus. What the passage tells us in part is this : that
lowed. Again God and the prophet may explain using writing. This
which signifies, armaivov, is the (p©vf|, an utterance or sound; and the
happens in case they initiate a judgement or rufing or when they abrogate
thing signified, armaiv6|ievov, is the Xe k tô v , that which is meant or,
or specify the meaning o f a statement made before. The example he gives
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o f such writing in the case o f God is what is written in the Preserved Tablet {al-lawh al-mahfüz). For this is God’s written bayàn, he says. In
mentioned as a material entity on which God literally inscribed the words o f the Qur’ an is not certain. M y own impression is that a material inter
the case o f the prophet the letters he wrote to his companions are bayàn.
pretation o f qawl and khatt when ascribed to God did not seem to the
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Gesticulation, however, is a means only the prophet can use in explaining
M u ‘tazila a breach o f their well-known anti-anthropomorphic interpreta
something (e.g., when he explained that by ‘month’ he meant thirty days,
tion o f the divine attributes. It is the material qawl and khatt, I think, that
he spread his ten fingers and moved his arms three times). After this al-
al-Jassa§ is thinking o f here whether we speak o f the prophet’s qawl and
Jassas adds that the prophet can also explain certain things by performing
khatt or G od’s. This is also true o f gesticulation though in this case anthro
or doing them {bVl-fiH) in front o f others, such as his performing the
pomorphism would be unavoidable if God is said to explain by gesticu
prayer which incidentally the Qur’ an does not explain. Last o f all is the
lation. Al-Jassas was aware o f this for he regards an explanation by
explanation which we reach through al-nusba al-dalla. There are two
gesticulation as exclusively the prophet’s job.^^ Again in the case o f the
types o f explanations we reach through this means, al-Jassas explains.
knuckles used in counting, it is obvious that such a means o f explanation
One is rational proofs (al-dala^il al-^aqliyya) hke those used to prove that
cannot be but material. Unfortunately al-Jassas says nothing on this
God is One and Just and all other attributes. These are not liable to
method o f counting and its role in Islamic law and among Mushm jurists.
change and thus have a better degree o f confirmation {âkad) than the
What o f al-nusba al-dàllal For a partial explanation o f it we will resort
second, namely, verbal indicants {dalâ^il al-lafz) which are used in legal
to Sextus, Against the Logicians, II, 141-158. Sextus speaks o f a distinc
theory. Verbal indicants are employed by jurists when they exercise their
tion between pre-evident and non-evident things. The first are immediately
own judgement (ijtihàd) in order to explain divine law (al-shari^a). A l
and o f themselves presented to the senses and the intellect, while the
though we say that a bayàn may be reached by verbal indicants, it should
second are things that are not apprehensible o f themselves, the latter in
be clear that they only lead to ghàlib al-zann, “ most-likely opinion.”
turn being divided into absolutely non-evident and naturally non-evident.
W e are told that the first means o f explanation is qawl. The question
Absolutely non-evident are said “ to be those things whose nature it is
that comes to the mind is whether in the case o f God this qawl could mean
never to be presented to human apprehension, as is the fact that the stars
the articulated sound. The question is all the more relevant because al-
are even in number or odd.” The naturally non-evident “ are the things
Jassas belonged to the muHazila school o f theology, and the MuHazila are
which are everlastingly hidden away and are not capable o f presenting
known for their rejection o f any anthropomorphic interpretation o f G od’s
themselves clearly to our perception ... such as the existence ... o f an in
attributes. However, with regard to the divine Xoyoq (kalàm), it is defi
finite void outside the universe.” Then Sextus says that some, but not all,
nitely clear that they thought o f it as at least created. Al-Ash‘ari
o f these classes o f things require a signal (we follow R. G. Bury’s transla
(b. 260/873-d. 324/935) tells us that the famous M u‘tazili Ibrahim ibn
tion with slight modification) :
Sayyar al-Nazzam (d. 221/835 or 231/845) thought o f divine kalàm as a body that is an audible sound caused and created by God.^® I f we take the passage as a whole we cannot escape the conclusion that what is meant here is the material qawl, >-8^iç. The same can be said o f the second means o f explanation: writing. In the case o f the prophet it is obvious that khatt is meant in the sense o f material writing. But does this apply also to God? What we know o f the Mu*tazila allows for a material interpretation o f writing as used here. For the MuHazila did keep the traditionalist view that the Qur’ an is inscribed in the Preserved Tablet, which al-Jassas gives as an example o f divine writing. But whether the M u ‘tazila see the tablet
For obviously neither the absolutely non-evident nor the manifest things admit of a signal. But things naturally non-evident, and things temporarily so, have need of this kind of observation effected by signal __ Signal also has revealed itself as two-fold the ‘commemorative’, which appears to be chiefly of use in the case of things temporarily non-evident, and the ‘indicative’ (èvÔEiKxiKÔç), which is deemed proper for adoption in the case of things naturally non-evident - thus the commemorative signal, when observed in conjunction with the thing signified in a clear perception brings us... to a recollection of the things observed along with it and now no longer clearly perceived as in the case of smoke and fire... but the indicative is of a different kind — The soul, for instance, is one of the things naturally non-evident for such is its nature that it never presents itself to our clear perception, and being such, it is announced ‘indicatively’ by the bodily motions... .^*
N. S H E H A B Y
S T OI C L O G I C A N D A L - JA S S À §
There are, thus, two types o f signals. One leads us to connect two things
(way of) ijtihâd with regard to those (things) that He prescribed to them, by using the intellects (a l-u q û l) that He implanted (rakkaba) in them and that discriminate between things and their opposites and the signs Calâmât) that (He) erected {nasaba) for them when the sacred mosque, towards which He commanded them to turn their faces, is out of sight. For God said.... “And by signs i^alâmât) and by the stars they are guided” (Q, 16, 16).i«
68
that were previously seen together, like smoke and fire; and the other helps us to infer new information about things that are never present to our perception such as the soul whose existence is deduced from the bodily motions. It is the second signal which is called indicative. Al-Jassas
69
does not exactly say that. Among explanations that use indicative signals,
Afterwards al-Shàfi‘ï explains
he only distinguishes between rational proofs used by theologians and
are obvious similarities between al-Shâfi‘î and al-Jassas. Both talk about
that the last kind o f bayân is qiyàs. There
verbal indicants that are employed by jurists when they exercise their own
self-explanatory statements made by God and the prophet, and both refer
judgement. It is plausible to assume that by rational proofs he meant
to the process o f explanation by means o f analogy. The only difference is
logical proofs. This is probably his (or his source’s) interpretation o f the
in terminology. While al-Jassas speaks o f inferences by analogy in which
‘indicative signal’ occurring in Sextus. In the case o f ijtihâd (“ exercising
al-nusba al-dalla is used, in explaining the same method al-Shâfi‘ï tells o f
one’s own judgement” ), the method that al-Jassas could have had in mind
the *^alâma that God erected {nasaba) to his creatures like the stars.^®
for inferring new rulings is qiyâs, “ analogy” (see below). What we are not
Another text we would Uke to examine is that of Abù*al-Husayn al-Basrï
told is what al-nu$ba al-dalla is and what exactly is its role in the method
(d. 436/1044), al-Mu'-tamad. Al-Basri divided the methods (turuq) o f
o f analogy used by jurists. Is the signal he has in mind material, as we are inclined to think? This is an important question because Sextus {Against
Islamic law {fiqh) in two: dalâla and amâra ( “ sign” ).!^ In the first, valid reasoning (al-na?ar al-sahih) leads to knowledge {Him) and in the second
the Logicians, II, 177) says that Epicurus and the leaders o f his school have
it leads to most-likely opinion {ghalib al-zann).^^ In another place he
stated that the signal is sensible, while the Stoics say it is intelligible. I f I am correct in my interpretation o f al-Jassas’s words, the contrast he
says 21 that jurists call the amàrât ( “ signs” ) used in Islamic law, as in the case o f analogy, adilla (pi. o f dalil). It is clear from this that what al-
makes between rational proofs and verbal indicants may be one between,
Jassas calls nusba dalla, as used in legal theory, is the same as al-Basrï’ s
on the one hand, inferences in which Stoic logic is used and, on the other,
amâra and what, according to al-Basrî, jurists call dalil.
those logical deductions made by the philosophers. Odd as it may sound,
The third text we want to cite is that o f Abù Bakr al-Bâqillânï
this understanding o f the matter could be supported by (a) the Stoics’ well-
(d. 403/1013), al-Tamhid. Al-Bâqillânî elaborates on the meaning o f dalil
known literal approach to logic
and (b) the means through which Stoic
and says that “ it is the guide {murshid) to knowing what is absent from the
material came to Islam, namely, Graeco-Roman rhetoric.i® In any case
senses and what is not known necessarily. It is all those signs that can be
what concerns us here is the meaning o f nu$ba as used by jurists and the
erected {mâ yun§abu min al-amàrât) and all those gesticulations that can
conjectured parallelism between it and ariixeiov. For this we will examine
be supplied {mâyûradu min al-imâ* wa al-ishârât) that will lead to know
other Arabic texts. In the chapter on bayân in al-Risala o f al-Shafi'i (b. 150/767-d. 204/820)
ing what cannot be known through necessity or through the senses.” He
we read:
man^ûba) and the guiding stars {al-nujûm al-hâdiya) are called indicants, adilla. He then repeats that saying that “ an indicant is the means {asbab)
There are things that God explained (abanahu) to his creatures by a definite discourse (nof?) (in the Qur’a n ).... A second category consists of (those duties) the obligation of which He established in His Book, but the modes of which He made clear by the tongue of His prophet.... A third category, consists of that which the Apostle of God established by example or exhortation, but in regard to which there is no precisely defined rule from God (in the Qur’a n ).... A fourth category consists of what God commanded His creatures to seek through ijtihâd.... Thus (God), glorified be His praise, indicated to (men) {dallahum) - should they be at a distance from the sacred mosque - the correct
that leads to knowing what is not known by necessity or the senses such
also says that it is for this reason that the erected signs {al-*^alâmât al-
as al-amârât, al-^alâmât and al-ahLwàl^^ through which we acquire de duced knowledge {al-mustanbafât).” ^^ He finally says that this indicant is al-hujja, “ the argument.” Here we are presented with a group o f terms all o f which mean a sign or signal that leads to a type o f knowledge that we cannot get either through the senses or by necessary or logical proofs.
70
N. S H E H A B Y
STOIC L O G I C A N D AL-JASSÀS
71
Curiously, nu§ba is not among them, though the verb nasaba is coupled
signify a meaning that is grasped with the intellect through the utterance
with ^alàma as in al-Shafi‘i ’s and al-Bâqiilânï’s texts, or with amàra as in
while others signify a meaning that is explained in another discourse. The
al-Basri. Among Muslim philosophers who sometimes treat such problems in
explanation only when the meaning o f an utterance A is found in B. As
wording o f al-Jassâs’s statement may suggest that we can speak o f an
their logical works, Ibn Sïnâ (b. 370/980-d. 428/1037) puts the matter
became clear above, this is not so; and al-Jassas, to be fair, did not say
briefly in his al-Shifa* :
that that is the only kind o f explanation there is. What we learned from his account o f bayàn is that apart from the self-explanatory statements
Some people, who are called the ones who infer what is absent (from the senses) from what is present, seek all syllogisms from the sign {wa inna qawman min al-ladhina yusammawna bi 'l-mustadillina min al-shahid "ala al-ghffib yaflubHna al-qiyâsât kullahâ min al-alâma).^^
He also criticizes the use o f the word dalil in cases such as the inference o f fire from smoke.^s This is the same as the example given by Sextus for the commemorative signal. It is very likely that Ibn Sïnâ’s criticism is here levelled against the jurists. Taken together, these texts, distributed over a period o f almost three centuries, give strong support to our interpretation o f msba being the same as the Stoic signal. In the last text some support can also be found for seeing the nusba used by jurists as being identical with the commemo rative signal. T o sum up: there are two kinds o f explanations according to al-Jassas (and al-Shâfi‘î). One is non-inferential such as when God and the prophet initiate self-explanatory judgements in a definite discourse; and this can
given by God and the prophet, there are also others that are meant to specify or qualify a previous statement made by either God or the prophet or to limit its application to a certain period o f time. A ll such statements are explanations. But what about the process o f apprehending the mean ing o f a statement through the utterance? Is it necessarily non-inferential? The answer is “ no.” This we get from the sentence following that passage quoted at the outset. What it amounts to is this: in the case o f the dis courses in which the meaning is not to be sought in another discourse, one sometimes infers by indication a meaning and a judicial ruling other than what the utterance o f the discourse signifies. For example, in the impera tive “ D on’t say uf to your parents” the utterance signifies an order not to utter that particular word. But the same imperative indicates another one, e.g., not to shout at your parents. It is this second imperative which alJassas calls madlûl ( “ that which is indicated” ). As before the trouble here is with the words madlûl and dalil ( “ indicant” ). For, as became clear in the
take place either in speech, writing, or, in the case o f the prophet alone,
discussion o f bayàn, these words are connected with a process o f inference
gesticulation. The second is brought forward by drawing inferences when,
in which some signal is used. Though the information given on al-nusba
for example, signals are used. This drawing o f inferences is called ijtihâd,
is very scanty, we can still, I think, give a description o f the process in
and the method used is presumably qiyâs, “ analogy.” This, again, comes
volved in the above example using al-nu^ba. For one can treat the original
very close to what Sextus says in his critical report:
meaning signified by the imperative as a signal, nusba, to the other mean ing or meanings (don’t shout at, don’t k ill... etc.) that are given the label
In general, also, everything conceived is conceived in two main ways, either by way of clear impression or by way o f transference from things clear, and this way is threefold by similarity, or by composition, or by analogy
madlUl. O f course we still have other problems left. One is why he called the utterance dalil and not the signal itself? Presumably because in the first place the meaning that became a signal was known through and is
Then he says:
associated with the utterance; and since the utterance is something mate
For things conceived by analogy have something in common with the things wherefrom they are conceived, as for instance from the common size o f men we conceived by way o f increase the Cyclops and by way of decrease the pygmy.^s
rial, something we can point to for example, his preference was for it in
What led us to bayàn, the reader recollects, is what we read in the opening passage quoted from al-Jassâs’s book. H e there said that some discourses
naming the dalil. Another problem for which we have no answer is the absence o f equivalent Greek words for dalil and madlûl. What we have is the pair referred to before: aTmaivov-armaivo^evov {significans-significatum). Did Muslim jurists, or whoever introduced the Arabic words.
73
N. S H E H A B Y
STOI C L O G I C A N D A L - J A S S Â S
coin dalîl and madlül using aT||xaîvov and armaivôjxevov as models? Or
to treat it that way until we become certain one way or another. Al-Jassas
did they see or interpret the Greek words as conveying the stronger mean
then adds that some people claim that Abù Hanïfa (the founder o f the
ing that the Arabic words give?
hanafi school o f law to which al-Jassas belongs) was among the first
72
W e now move to the final point. It concerns particularization, takhsi^.
group, i.e., “ an advocate o f the doctrine o f waqf.'’ For those who make
The question o f particularization is an offshoot o f the division legal
such a claim say that this was Abù Hanïfa’ s view regarding sinners: that
theorists made between general (^àmm) and particular {khàss) words. T o al-
one should suspend judgement on whether they will be tortured in hell or
Jassas, when a word names an individual, e.g. Muhanmiad (the prophet
not, for God, according to him, may forgive them. (Al-Jassas refers to
that is), or a definite situation or incident, such as a particular war
this theological doctrine, usually called irja*, as waqf, except once where
between the prophet and the infidels, it is called a particular. A general
he quoted someone else on irjâ\ “ postponement.” ) Al-Jassas says that
word, on the other hand, is what one would call a class name, for example,
Abù Hanifa’s theological position is not dictated by his stand regarding
‘father’ , ‘adulterer’ , ‘man’ . The use o f particular words in a legal text
general terms. It is rather the result o f what God says in many places in
guarantees, with some exceptions (I, 56v-57r), that the statement (khabar)
the Qur’ an that He forgives all. But when al-Jassas comes to explain his
or imperative (amr)^^ in which it occurs is a definite discourse (nass).
own view on the same issue, he makes conflicting statements. He first
That is, a discourse that is to be accepted independently o f any other
flatly rejects what he again terms as the doctrine o f waqf with regard to
discourse in the established legal texts and that we know for certain is
sentences containing general terms. But later he says that a jurist who is
neither qualified nor abrogated anywhere in the mentioned texts. But the
capable o f exercising his own judgement (mujtahid) should suspend judg
existence o f a general term(s) in a sentence is more often than not a mark
ment whenever he is faced with sentences like these. But the layman
that the sentence in question is an indefinite discourse (mujmal) (I, lr-3r
i^amml) must take them as they are if he happened to come across one
and 53v-61r). For in a large number o f cases such general terms are partic
(I, lOv). Al-Jassas in my opinion seems to be in favor o f waqf in legal
ularized in some other passage either in the same text or in another
matters. But since this doctrine is somehow linked with the theological
accepted text. However, when al-Jassas came to discuss the role o f gen
doctrine o f irjà', a doctrine which as a M u‘tazilï he rejects, he, in the con
eral terms in legal decisions, his position was not clear. The point is worth
text in which that hnk is discussed, denied any connection with it.
elaborating, not only because o f its relevance to the discussion o f general
The whole discussion o f ^àmm and khàss points in one direction: that
terms in legal texts, but also because it shows the influence o f the jurist’s theological commitments on the formation o f his legal theory.
while the existence o f a term referring to a particular thing or situation in
According to al-Jassas the role o f general terms in legal decisions was a
a sentence is more often than not a reliable way o f telling that the sentence
controversial issue among Muslim jurists (I, 6vff). One (unnamed) group
in question is definite (i.e., cannot be qualified), this is not so with sen tences containing general terms. For example, God says in the Qur’ an
thought that a sentence in which a general term occurs should be suspended
that all Muslims should take part in a religious war (jihàd). But this is not
(waqf), i.e., should not be used as a basis for any legal decision unless we
definite since it is in fact qualified in the sunna stating that such participa
become certain that it is not particularized anywhere in our texts. Another
tion is not a duty. Where do we look for such a qualification? The stock-
group thought that it should be suspended only i f it is a statement {khabar)
in-trade answer is: the Qur’ an and the established sunna ( “ tradition” ).
and not if it is an imperative (amr). For a statement in their view is less
Al-Jassâ§, however, mentions another source: the intellect (al-^aql). He
important in legal matters than an imperative. The first simply states something and in most cases does not require anything from us, while an
makes it expUcitly clear that the intellect can be used to qualify sentences in the Qur’ an. God, for instance, says “ O people fear your G od” {passim),
imperative is an order that strongly suggests obedience. Y et a third group
but the intellect dictates that neither children nor the insane can be in
thought that a sentence containing general terms should be treated as
cluded under ‘people’ here. The question, o f course, is how does one
though it had already been particularized, and that we should continue
exercise such a faculty? The answer is by using the method o f analogy.
74
N. S H E H A B Y
ST OI C L O G I C A N D A L - J A S S Â S
qiyâs. Briefly put, if we have, say, two cases ;c and y, and i f the ruling
Chrysippus regarded Theon, who has only one foot, as an individually
regarding x is already established and not so with y, then we can say that
qualified entity. I f Dion, who has all his members, loses one foot, Theon
y is governed by the same ruling that governs ;c once we find a cause
will suffer destruction. Because, to Chrysippus, two individually qualified entities cannot exist in the same substrate (uTcoKeiixevov).®^
{Hlla) that a: and y share. For example, the Qur’ an forbids Muslims to
75
drink khamr. N ow if a Muslim is given some liquid other than khamr and
M y aim in writing this paper was to clarify some o f the most obscure,
he wants to know if he is allowed to drink it, then he looks for the Hlla
and at the same time crucial, passages in al-Jassas’s Usül al-Fiqh. These
( “ cause,” “ reason” ) for forbidding khamr. The cause, as jurists claim, is
passages reveal part o f the logical apparatus that Muslim legal theorists
its strong effect on one’s mind. Thus, if the liquid at hand also has that
used in building up their systems. In many instances this apparatus reflects
effect, it is to be regarded as forbidden. Applied to sentences involving
a striking resemblance to Stoic views on logic, even though there is no
particularization, one can say that a sentence y can be particularized in
p roof that Stoic writings were available to MusHms. Some o f this logic
the same manner as x, i f jc and y share the same Hlla. It is this Hlla that
was also employed by the mutakallimm (theologians) ; and it is for this
allows us to make inferences such as the above. What Hlla is and how it
reason that the above reflections may prove to have a wider significance
is related to the signal discussed above is a subject I intend to take up in a future paper.30
by helping to decipher certain methods used in kalam. What I would like
But even with the little information given here about Hlla, we are at
from the Aristotelian commentators. As I have shown in my recent The
to add here is that the Stoic material in al-Jassas’s book does not come
least able to point to some factor that allows us to infer a particulariza
Propositional Logic o f Avicenna, the Stoic material in Avicenna’s treat
tion that does not exist in the accepted texts. This is relevant because o f
ment o f conditional propositions and syllogisms in contrast bears the
the criticism al-Jassas made against other jurists when discussing partic
stamp o f the Peripatetic philosophers.
ularization. One o f the criticized views was that if we have a thing with two descriptions one o f which is particularized in a judgement, the other
M cG ill University
must be judged the opposite way. Al-Jassas’s answer, which also applies
Glossary
to the other two views listed before, is that there is nothing in the original judgement which indicates that the other description should be judged
‘âmm.
the opposite way, i.e., the proposed ruling cannot be inferred from the original one. For such an inference to take place, it is necessary to have a Hlla or signal, and that is not available in the situations mentioned in these views. Stoic fragments on this issue are not as clear and articulate as one would wish. According to Diogenes Laertius,^! Diogenes o f Babylon
amr.
defined a common name, Ttpoatiyopia (which Mates translates “ class name” ), as signifying a common quality, Koivf)
tüoiôttiç, e.g.,
man, horse;
whereas a proper name, ovo|ia, expresses a quality peculiar to an indi
*ayn.
vidual, tôia 7C01ÔTT1Ç, e.g., Diogenes, Socrates. It seems from this that the division o f names into common and proper is based on another division, made within the Stoic category “ quality,” between common quality and particular quahty. W e also find a reference in Philo ^2 to what the Stoics called individually qualified entities (îôicoç
tüoioç).
He reports that
baym.
opp. khâ?^. General, TipoaTiYopia (?). A class name like ‘man’, ‘adulterer’. Terms such as these are more often than not qualified or particularized, takhfi?. For this reason discourses in which such terms occur are in many cases and in the opinion of most jurists to be suspended, wagf. That is, the legal ruling which they reveal will not be followed until we become certain that it is not qualified anywhere else in legal texts. See pp. 69-70 and alJaççâç’s U$ûl, I, lr-3 r and 53v-61r. Cf. Diogenes, Lives, VII, 58 and Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 133, Imperative, n pôaxaKXiKÔv. According to some Muslim jurists an impera tive, unlike a statement, khabar, q.v., strongly suggests obedience and therefore is more important in legal matters than a statement. Al-Jaççâç, U?ûl, I, 6v-7r and H r. For the distinction cf. Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 71. Existing object or thing, xuYKdvov. Sometimes al-Jaççâç speaks of 'ayn makh^ü?a, “ particular object or thing” (U?ül, I, Ir-lv , 3v, llv , 34v, 35r). Used interchangeably with shakh?, “ individual” or shakhs makhsü?, “ particular individual” (I, Ir, llv ). Another word that also refers to objects is shay\ “ thing,” (I, 39v-40r) though it may have a wider sense. See Sextus, A g the Log., II, 11-12. Explanation. It is said o f (1) a definite discourse, no??, q.v., initiated by God in the Qur’an or the prophet in the sunna. (2) A discourse in which
76
dalil.
hukm.
khabar.
khas?.
khifab.
lafz.
madlûL makh^fif bVl-dhikr.
ma'nâ.
N. S H E H A B Y
God or the prophet particularizes, takhfi?, or abrogates, naskh, another judgement, hukm, q.v., in the Qur’an or suma. (3) A discourse inferred from another made in the Qur’an or the sunna by using analogy, qiyâs. This method is carried out with the help of signals, nu?ba, q.v. Al-Ja§§âç, Ufül, I, 39v, 65r-66r. Al-Shâfi‘i, Risâla (ed. cit., note 16), pp. 21-25 in particular. Cf. Sextus, Ag. the Prof., Ill, 40, 49. (1) Indicant. Correlative with madlül, “ that which is indicated.” By an indicant is meant verbal evidence in the established legal texts that leads to a new ruling. Cf. nusba. See al-Jasçâs, U^ül particularly I, 39v and 65r. In al-Bâqillâni, al~Tamhid (ed. cit., note 23), pp. 13-14, dalil is equated with the signal that leads us to know things that are neither present to the senses or capable of being known necessarily. D alil and madlül were probably translations of arinaivov and arinaivonevov and were given this new meaning by jurists or their sources. See Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 11-12. (2) dalil may also mean logical proof as in al-Jasçâ§, Usül, e.g., I, 65r where he speaks of al-dalffil al-^aqliyya, “ rational proofs.” The word is used in this sense in al-Ba?ri, al-MuUamad (ed. cit., note 19), vol. 1, pp. 9-10. AI-Baçri’s statement resembles what we find in Sextus, Ag. the Log., I, 25. The Greek word used there corresponding with dalil is àjiôSsi^iç. Judgement, à^iœna. A general term that refers to legal rulings in the Qur’an or the sunna or those rulings inferred from these sources by accepted methods. Statement, à7tô(pavaiç. It is used of statements made by God or the prophet. Regarded by some jurists as less suggestive of obedience than an imperative, amr, q.v. Al-Ja§çâç, C/sm/, 16v-7r and H r. For the distinc tion between statements and imperatives see Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 71. opp. *amm. Particular, ovona(?). A word that refers to an individual ob ject such as the prophet Muhammad. Save in a few cases, when such terms occur in a discourse we can regard that discourse as definite, na$$, q.v. Al-Jaççàç, U§ül, I, lr-3r and 53v-61r. For the cases where a particular can be qualified see I, 56v-57r. Cf. Diogenes, Lives, VII, 58 and Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 133. A discourse, X,ôyoç, made by God or the prophet that is always signifi cant. Cf. qawl and lafz. See Diogenes, Lives, VII, 57 and Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 275-76. See al-Jaççâç, U?ül, I, 39v and 65r. Utterance, (pcovfi which may include mere noise. Cf. qawl and khifab. See al-Ja§?a§,C/sw/, I, 39v. Also Diogenes, Lives, VII, 57 and Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 275-76. That which is indicated. See dalil. That which is particularly mentioned or individually qualified, 15((dç Ttoioç (?). The wording of a legal ruling in the Qur’an or sunna may have several references. When one of these references is declared in the Qur’an or surma to be the one meant by the ruling, it is said to be particularly mentioned. See al-Ja?çâç, Usûl, I, 39v-40r. Cf. Philo, On the Eternity o f the World, 48-49 and Plutarch, De communibus notitiis, 1077 CD. Meaning, X,8k t ô v . It has that meaning at least in the context of al-Jaçç৒s discussion of God’s or the prophet’s qawl, q.v., and khifab, q.v. (U$ül, I, 39v). See Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 11-12, 70 and 80.
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mujmal
na??.
rmsba.
qawl
shakhf. shay*. ya'qil.
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opp. na??, q.v., and mufassar. Indefinite discourse, i.e., one that may be qualified or abrogated, naskh, in the established legal texts such as the discourse containing general terms, ‘â/wm, q.v., or whose meaning is liable to different interpretations. Al-Jaççâç, U?ül. I, lr-3r and 53v-61r. opp. mujmal. Definite discourse. A discourse in the Qur’an or the sunna whose meaning is not liable to any interpretation other than what its literal wording reveals and which can neither be particularized or abro gated, naskh, such as the text that orders the punishment of deliberate killing. See al-Jaççâç, Usül, I, Ir-lv . Signal, arineîov. Al-Ja§sâs (U?ül, I, 65r) speaks of two uses of al-nusba al-dâlla (“ indicative signal”). One he labels rational proof and the other is employed by jurists when they exercise their own judgement, ijtihâd, and involves verbal indicants (see dalil). The example for the first is the theological proofs that God is One and Just... etc. The other is the inferences in which analogy, qiyâs, is used (see p. 63), Cf. Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 141-158. In al-Risâla (ed. cit., note 16), pp. 24 and 38-39, al-Shafi‘i speaks of the process of analogy, qiyâs, in which we, for ex ample, infer the position of the sacred mosque in Mecca using the stars that God erected as signs to His creatures (al-alâm àt al-latina§aba lahum). Here the verb nasaba is coupled with the word 'alama ( “ sign” ). Al-Baçrî in al-MuUamad also uses the verb na$aba coupled with amâra (sign) ; see, e.g., al-Mu'tamad (ed. cit., note 19), vol. 2, pp. 803-804. He also (vol. 1, pp. 10-11) distinguishes between this sign (amâra) which leads to mostlikely opinion and a proof (dalil, q.v.) which leads to knowledge. Also al-Bâqillâni, al-Tamhid (ed. cit., note 23), pp. 13-14, says that what is not present to the senses and what cannot be known necessarily is known through what is erected (yun?ab) of signs, amâra, 'alâma... etc. Al-Jaççâ$ also uses the words amâra, ‘alâma, and sima interchangeably to mean “ sign” in the above sense (II, 45v and 46v). The word al-nu?ba was also used to translate the Aristotelian category xô KeîaOai. It was also used in astrology to translate Gejia or ôiâGena. See note 7. Speech, X,é^iç, which is always articulate but not necessarily significant. Cf. khifâb and laf?. See al-Ja§?à§, C/sm/, I, 39v and 65r. See Diogenes, Lives, VII, 57 and Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 275-76. Individual, See '^ayn. Thing. See ^ayn. Grasp with the intellect, dvTiXanPctvco. Al-Jaççâ§, Ufül, I, 39v. Cf. Sextus Ag. the Log., II, 11-12. NOTES
^ In preparing this paper I relied on two separate MSS for the two volume work of alJa^a$, both of them in Dâr al-Kutub, Cairo. Volume I (M S no. 191) consists of 150 folios. Volume II (M S no. 26) of 165 folios. The references below are to the relevant folios of Volume I. * Diogenes Laertius, Lives o f Eminent Philosophers, tr. R. D. Hicks (London and Cam bridge, Massachusetts, 1965), vol. 2, p. 167. Hicks’s translation has been modified slightly. Œ Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, II, 275-76, tr. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967).
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3 William and Martha Kneale, The Development o f Logic, first ed. (Oxford, 1962), p. 140. A few changes have been made in Martha Kneale’s translation. Cf. Against the Logicians, II, 70, 80 and 264. 4 Al-Shâfi‘i in al-Risâla, ed. A . M. Shakir (Cairo, 1940), pp. 23-24 uses the word ^ayn in the same sense. 5 In the immediately succeeding passage al-Jaç?âç uses the word shay' which may have a wider meaning including material, mental, and perhaps imaginary entities. « Hisàb a l-a qd ox al-uqad (dactylonomy) is the art of expressing numbers by the posi tions of the fingers. See The Encyclopaedia o f Islam, new edition, ed. B. Lewis et a lii (Leiden and London, 1971), Vol. 3, under hisab al-aqd. ’ In Ibn Man?ür (d. 711/1311), Lisàn al-'Arab (Beirut, 1955), vol. 1, al-nasb = wa4'^ al-shay' wa raf^ihi (“ putting something and raising it”) ; al-na?iba = kullu mâ nu§iba fa juHla ^alaman (“ anything which is erected and made as a sign or a signpost” ); al-yansûb = ‘alamun yunsabu f i al-falât ( “ a sign or a signpost erected in the waterless desert or the open space” ); al-nasb and al-nusub = al-^alam al-mansub... al-sanam (“ the erected sign or signpost or the idol” ); al-nusba=^al-sàriya ( “ the mast” ). R. Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes, 3rd ed. (Leiden «&Paris, 1967) vol. 2, has an entry for nasba = “ érection, élévation.” His source for this is Hélot, Dictionnaire de Poche fr . -ar. et ar.-fr., 4e tirage, Alger. Dozy in the same entry gives a second meaning for the word as used in astrology “ thème céleste, e.g. nasb al-talV = dresser I’horoscope.” Dozy does not say why he wants to read na§ba here. Cf. C. A . Nallino, ‘Del Vocabolo Arabo N IÇ B A (Con S A D )', Rivista degli Studi Orientali, vol. 8 (1919-20), p. 643, who reads ni?ba and says that the word as used in astrology is a translation of the Greek Gé^ia or 0m08|ia. Dozy gives the version nisba as meaning “ construction, disposition,” Neither o f these derivations {nasba, nisba) is cited by Lisàn a l- Arab or al-Fayrûzabâdi (b. 729/1329-d. 817/1414), al-Qâmüs al-Muhif (Cairo, n.d.). However, Butrus al-Bustani in M uhit al-Muhit (Beirut, 1870), vol. 2, gives the derivation nisba and quotes for this al-Uariri (b. 446/1054-d. 515/1121 or 516/1122), Maqâmât (see De Sacy, Les Séances de Hariri, reprinted in Amsterdam in 1968 from the Paris ed. of 1853, vol. 2, pp. 560-561) which says fa-inkharafna ila shaykhin rakini al-nisba — “ So we hastened (or sped) to a Shaykh stoutly erect” (tr. F. Steingass, The Assemblies o f a l-ÿ a riri [London, 1898], Vol. 2, p. 124). De Sacy in his commentary on this says; al-ni?bafiUa min alintisdb. Al-Harir! is C. A . Nallino’s sole support for reading nisba in his article {pp. cit., pp. 637-646) tracing the meaning of the word in the fields o f rhetoric {balâghd), philosophy, and astrology. He is followed in this reading by G. E. von Grunebaum in his article on bayân in The Encyclopaedia o f Islam, new edition, vol. 1. Cf. Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum I V : Indices, Glossarium et Addenda et Emendanda A d Part, no /-///, M. J. De Goeje [1st éd., 1879], 2d. ed. (Leiden, 1967), p. 864, who also reads niÿba while at the same time mentioning nasba quoting Dozy for this vocalization. Nallino (p. 642) quotes M. Horten, D ie spekulative und positive Theologie des Islam nach Razi (Leipzig, 1912), p. 355, who also reads ni?ba, for the use of the word in translating the Aristotelian category xô Ksïa0ai. It seems that both De Goeje and Hor ten relied on al-Uariri in this reading, for the texts they quote are given without the short vowels. ® Cf. Abu ‘Uthmân ‘Amr ibn Bahr al-Jahi? (b. 160/776-d. 255/868), al-Bayan wa’lTabyin, 2d. ed., ed. H . Sandubi (Cairo, 1932), vol. 1, p. 78, where in a chapter entitled al-bayàn, he says that the “ indicants {dalâlât) to meanings are five things: utterance (al-laf?), gesticulation {al-ishara), knuckles {al-uqad) writing {al-khaff) and the state (al-hâl) which is called nusba.” Cf. his al-Hayawân (Cairo, A. H. 1323), vol. 1, p. 23.
9 The M S reads fa-yaqùlu ^alâ hâdhà which shows that the explanation given of the above five meanings of bayân is the early scholar’s. If so, then he could not be al-Jahi? who says nothing of this sort. It is possible, however, that the scribe supplied the dots for the first word to make it fa-yaqûlu; for in the absence o f dots it could be read (“ we then say”), meaning that what follows is al-Jaççâç’s own ex position. Maqàlât al-Islàmiyyin, 2d éd., ed. H. Ritter (Wiesbaden, 1963), pp. 191 and 587-88. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 44, 55-70. 12 I follow B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), p. 13 and his glos sary p. 135 in translating aTl^leîov by “ signal” . 13 Sextus, Against the Logicians, II, 149-155. 14 See Galeni Institutio Logica, ed. Carl Kalbfieisch (Leipzig, 1896), III, 5 and J. S. KieflFer, Galen’s Institutio Logica, English Translation, Introduction and Commentary (Baltimore, 1964), pp. 76 and 130-33. See also my The Propositional L o gic o f Avicenna (Dordrecht-Boston, 1973), pp. 8 and 14. 1® See Joseph Schacht, The Origins o f Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1967), pp. 99-100. 1* Al-Risâla, ed. A . M. Shakir (Cairo, 1940), pp. 21-25. See the English tr. Islamic Jurisprudence: ShâfiTs Risâla, translated with an Introduction. Notes and Appendices by Majid Khadduri (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 67-70. The quotations from al-Risâla here are from this translation with some changes. 1’ Al-Risâla, pp. 38-39; Eng. tr. pp. 77-78. 18 Cf. Aristotle's P rio r and Posterior Analytics, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W . D . Ross (Oxford, 1949), 70a3-b38 and 75a33 where the occurrences o f crmeîov are translated by Tadhâri (ca. 790-ca. 850) by 'alâma-, see A . Badawi, Manfiq Arisfû (Cairo, 1948), vol. 1. A bû Bishr Mattâ (ca. 870-ca. 940) in his transla tion of the Posterior Analytics gives ^alâma as a translation of crilieîov which occurs only once 99a3; see Badawi, op. cit. (Cairo, 1949), vol. 2. 19 Al-Baçri, al-MuUamad, ed. M . Hamidullah et alii (Damascus, 1964-65), 2 vols. Al-Baçri also talks of the signs erected by God na^aba al-amârât, vol. 2, pp. 803-4, 709 and 712. Cf. Sextus, Ag. the Log., 1,25 “ whereas the non-evident things are discovered by means of signs and proofs” (ànôôei^iç, R. G. Bury’s translation). 2» Op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 9-10. 21 Op. cit., vol 2, p. 690. 22 Al-Jâhi?, as said in note 8 above, identifies hâl with nusba. It is interesting to note that the word al-hâl was also used to translate the Aristotelian category xô tïoiôv; see Ishaq ibn Wahb (10th cent. A .D .), al-Burhân f i Wujüh al-Bayân, ed. A . Matlub et al. (Baghdad, 1967), p. 83. It is also worth noticing that Ibn Wahb treats analogy under what he calls al-bayân bi'1-iUibâr and says that it is the means for knowing the things which cannot be known either through the senses or necessarily (ibid., p. 73). 2» Al-Bâqillâni, al-^Tamhid, ed. R. J. McCarthy (Beirut, 1957), pp. 13-14. ^ Ibn Sina, al-Shifff: al-Qiyas, ed. S. Zayed (Cairo, 1964), p. 575. 2® Ibn Sina, op. cit., p. 573.
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2* Al-J^çâç also uses the words 'alâma, amâra and sima to mean “ sign” (II, 45v, 46v). As said in note 7 above nusba was used to translate the Aristotelian category xô KeïaOai, As far as we can see the earliest such use, quoted by Nallino, op. cit. (note 7), p. 641, is that o f Ishaq ibn ^unayn (d. 298/910 or 299/911). See also Rasffil al-Kindi al-Falsafiyya, ed. M. A . Abu Rida (Cairo, 1950), vol. 1, p. 366, which is not quoted by Nallino. The editor of al-Kindî’s text reads al-nasba.
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27 Against the Professors, tr. R, G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (London and Cam bridge, Masschusetts, 1961), III, 40. 28 Op. cit.. Ill, 49. 29 For a distinction between a statement and an imperative see Sextus, Ag. the Log., II, 71. 3° Cf. Ibn Sina, op. cit. (note 24), p. 576, who claims that the jurists call al-âlama ( “ sign” ), 'illa. Also al-Ba§ri, op. cit. (note 19), where he sometimes speaks of amâra ( “ sign” ) as being the same as Hlla (vol. 2, pp. 804,825, 831 and 833) and sometimes says that amâra indicates the Hlla (vol. 2. pp. 802-804 and 826). 31 Lives, VII, 58; see also Sextus, Against the Logicians, II, 133. ®2 On the Eternity o f the World, 48-9, in Philo, English tr. F. H. Colson, Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941) vol. 9. See J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, (Cambridge, England, 1969), pp. 160-64. 33 Cf. Plutarch, De communibus notitiis'. Moralia, vol. vi, fasc. 2, Rencensuit et emen davit M ax Pohlenz (Leipzig, 1959), 1077CD.
as you read you find yourself suddenly faced with a passage which is fu ll of, I would say, operational definitions, logical concepts, and terminology loaded with meanings. Out of nowhere! And then all of that is used or applied to those cases that we are sup posed to be discussing, such as legal points or legal questions. O f course, if you read the whole book, it isn’t Sextus Empiricus; you don’t read it that way because it isn’t an exposition of Stoic philosophy. N o, it is a book on legal theory in a special sense of the word. But when you come to a section entitled dalil al-khifab or al-makh^ü$ b i'ldhikr, then you find that the Arabic is no longer really Arabic. You find yourself with sentences loaded with definitions and meanings which are used all through that section, or succeeding sections, but applied to a topic which is completely Islamic: About hojj (“ pilgrimage”), about prayer, about this sort of thing. O f course, this is Islamic; the Stoics didn’t discuss such things. R. f r a n k : But for the terminology that you have in your text, I think you want to go back to the grammarians; it is all there from Sibawayh on, which takes you back a long way. N. SHEHABY : Well, these people were in close contact, but you can’t say who in fluenced whom. A. SABRA: You are saying that by referring these problematic features to grammar and so on, you still need an explanation. But the question is, do you need an explanation from something outside this Islamic context? This is really the question. N. SHEHABY: Definitely, otherwise you wouldn’t understand a word; you wouldn’t proceed at all. j. VAN ESS: The paper treats a difficult matter. This is to a great extent due to the lack of texts: Logic was used, but not explained. It is therefore legitimate to approach the problem from new sources, in this case from usül al fiqh. But one thing should always be kept in mind: usül al-fiqh is not logic, but hermeneutics; its aim is to build up cano nical law on the basis of the Scripture; it always has do with exegesis. It is not reflection about the laws of thinking, but about the treatment of a text. Comparing it with Stoic logic means to compare hermeneutics with epistemology. This has, I think, some con sequences for this paper. Let me proceed from the passage you quote where bayân, “ explanation,” is said to be realized in five different ways. W e are dealing here with a structure of six terms: one genus (bayân) and five species. There is no Stoic parallel for the structure as a whole nor even for the genus itself, but you suggest a Stoic origin for two of the five species: qawl = Xé^iç and nu?ba dalla = atijaeiov èvSeiKxiKÔv. N o w Xé^iç, according to the passage from Sextus Empiricus you quote, not only com prises words, but also unintelligible combinations o f sounds like pXizvpi. Qawl on the contrary is a subdivision of bayân, i.e., is supposed to “ explain” something; it is always meaningful and intelligible. Here we are confronted with the difference of intention that I pointed out in the beginning: the Stoics aimed at a theory of language and of knowledge; this is why they start with (pravfi ( = “ noise,” but also “ vowel” ), and then proceed to Xé^iç i.e., something that is composed of these noises, but does not neces sarily have a meaning, and Xôyoç, i.e., something meaningful. The u^ül al-fiqh, on the contrary, as a science of hermeneutics is from the beginning only concerned with meaningful speech. If it is therefore necessary to equate qawl with a Stoic term, I would always propose Xôyoç and not X,é^iç. N o w in your opinion Xôyoç already has an equivalent, namely, khifâb. This would leave me with the problem why two words have to be equated with the same Stoic term. O f course, the problem only exists if I accept the hypothesis that we meet Stoic influence
DISCUSSION A. sabra: What you have been doing in arguing for the influence of Stoic logic in your paper is comparing things that overlap, but do not coincide completely with one another. But to establish that something is really identifiable as Stoic, it is not enough to show that there is overlap. And when I read your text, what I feel is that, to be sure, the parallelism between what you have here and certain discussions in Stoic logic is appa rent; but what is also apparent and what impresses me perhaps even more, is the fact that the Arabic text functions independently of any reference to the Stoics. That is to say, if you read it as Arabic, it makes sense - maybe not one hundred per cent - but to a very, very large extent it is self-sufficient. One can make a distinction between this kind o f text and an early philosophical text, for example. A n early philosophical text, like one by al-Kindi, is obviously full of things which could only have existed in Arabic as a result of translation, but I don’t have the same feeling when I read a text, even an early text, in jurisprudence or in kalam. And this makes me feel a bit cautious about crossing the border and bringing in the Stoics; for the context seems to suggest that the Arabic words in such texts have a life of their own and are not to be explained by bringing in foreign elements. If one is to argue for the presence of Stoic elements, then there must be a resemblance between your text and its Stoic antecedent that is based on the consideration o f what we might call “ proper parts.” To be a proper part in two systems of thought that are being compared, a concept must function in a significantly similar manner in the two systems. It is, for example, futile to be told that in certain contexts the Arabic ma'nâ corresponds to the Greek lekton, if the two words function differently in the two conceptual systems in which they occur. Thus I think that if you construct a large number of proper parts to which you find correspondences, then one can make a case for your thesis. But with this condition, that you compare proper parts in the sense that I have specified. N. SHEHABY : But One must realize that books entitled U fûl al-fiqh are different from works on philosophy. In the former one has, if you wish, applied logic, you are intro ducing an apparatus which you intend to apply to a certain different field such as law. So what happens when you open book on Usûl al-fiqh is that you find certain prelimi nary problems - what are the sources of the law?, how do you explain legal texts? - and
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in this passage, which - to make this clear right from the beginning - I do not believe to be the case. But even then the question remains why there are two words, qawl and khifab, used for nearly the same thing. I think it is because they are used in a different context. Qawl is the normal expression, the word one would expect everywhere. Khifab, however, is typical for usùlal-fiqh: it does not mean any meaningful utterance irrespec tive of its intention, but “ allocution, address,” i.e., an intentional utterance directed to somebody and therefore apt for exegesis: the Qur’an as revelation or a tradition ihadlth) of the Prophet as relevant to his community. Khifab is qawl seen under a particular aspect, an aspect that is tied so specifically to the situation of revelation-based religion that I would be surprised to find an exact Stoic pendant for it. Concerning the nu?ba al-dàlla we have to proceed from the entire spectrum o f the term which you try to reconstruct. The question is whether the equation nusba = CTT1HSÎOV stands at the beginning from which all other examples for the usage of the word and its derivatives in similar contexts may be deduced, or whether this equation is the fortuitous result of an autonomous development of the root. After all, the verb nasaba does not imply the meaning “ sign,” but has to be accompanied by a word of this sense (amâra, ^alàma, dalîl), and it is one of these words (dalil) which you yourself afterward equate with ariiaaîvov, a term which is not very much different from armeîov in Stoic logic. This needs further investigation. N. SHEHABY : It is not, I think, quite exact to say that u?ül al-fiqh is not logic but hermeneutics. The apparatus used, for example, by al-Jaçsâs and al-Ghazâli is partly logic and partly hermeneutics. It should also be clear that the Stoics were concerned with language and grammar. In their logical studies, they made use of semantics as well as the theory of deduction. Echoes of both of these exist in works of u?ül al-fiqh. Though I have not yet been able to prove it, the word bayàn seems to me to be another Arabic word for Xôyoç, and I don’t find it strange that more than one Arabic word was used to convey the meanings of A,ôyoç. X,é^iç is the vehicle through which meanings are given. This, I think, is what Sextus wanted to say. Thus, there is nothing odd in saying that an explanation can be given through X,é^iç. It is true that in isolation the passage dealing with al-nu?ba does not reveal much. But my interpretation is nevertheless strongly supported by the constant use which you point out of the verb na?aba with words such as ^alâma or amâra (“ sign” ) by al-Shâfi‘i and other legal theorists as well as theologians. I have examined this problem in more detail in an article “ 7//a and Qiyas in Early Islamic Legal Theory” which will appear in the Journal o f the American Oriental Society. R. f r a n k : The paper seems to betray an unfamiliarity with the Arabic terminology involved. There is nothing at all “ laconic” about what al-Jaç§âç says in the texts you cite. A ll he says in your first citation, for example, is that the intended sense of some statements may be grasped immediately through the explicit terms and words Qafy) while others may require a further context of interpretation and that in some instances the sense that a statement is meant to convey through a particular phrase or expression may not be restricted simply to that which it has if taken narrowly in its most common and primary lexical meaning (mâ wudi'a lahu). Lafz is not (pcovf) but, here as in all similar contexts, means the (Arabic) words of the expression or statement as opposed to the “ meaning” (al-ma'nà or al-murad): what one is talking about or referring to (al-madlül *alayhi, if you wish); nor is al-dalil to be understood as always restricted to a reference to “ a second meaning.” One seems here to be fishing for parallels - rajman bi'l-ghayb, as it were - without close attention to usage and context. In al-Jassa$’s source, al-Jahi? is treating al-bayan, viz., how one may communicate
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something clearly to another (al-bayan is not so much “ explanation” as conveying clearly what you want to say in the first pla:e). In the passage cited he distinguishes five forms o i bayàn, two that are linguistic, viz., talking and writing, and three that are non-verbal. The last of these, al-nu?ba, is that one produces through some object or set o f objects a situation reflecting on which the intended observer will understand the meaning or message that is meant to be conveyed. In al-Jâhi?’s context this is the fur thest removed from vocal speech and the one that most plainly requires reflective inquiry {nazar) on the part of the observer (though it need not be the least clear: bayyin). The expression na?b al-adilla, as Professor Van Ess has noted, is also common in the kalâm and elsewhere. In the kalam, however the dalâ'il or 'adilla man?uba (as also the 'amàràt), in contrast to the context of al-Jahi?, may include things such as one’s intui tion of moral imperatives or may be verbal and so include, e.g., the text and content o f the Qur’an. Your parallels with the Stoa appear to be only half parallels that reflect no systematic coincidence of conception but only a partial overlap of the subject matter under con sideration, viz., the uses of language. It is to be remarked that the sciences of exegesis, law, and theology are, in Islam, closely allied to and significantly dependent upon the linguistic sciences, grammar, and lexicography. The terminology with which you are here concerned was elaborated largely in conjunction with the linguistic sciences and one should note that it is these, the earliest disciplines to achieve their full development in Islam, that seem to have been elaborated almost entirely without influence from nonMuslim sources. N. SHEHABY: I entirely agree with Professor Frank that law, theology, grammar, etc. are allied sciences. I myself tried to show this in the case of theology and legal theory. Jurists, theologians, grammarians, etc. all lived in the same intellectual milieu and in several cases collaborated with each other closely. But it is also important to say that this milieu was largely and primarily indebted to Greek thought. It is this more funda mental source which interested me particularly as I began to explore the field of legal theory. The passages quoted from al-Ja§çâç’s book contain some of the basic terms used by all Muslim jurists constantly and in diflferent contexts. My aim here was to clarify as much as I can their meaning in order to be able to explain their usages in more com plex contexts. Though these passages do help in a way, they are unfortunately less detailed and articulate than I wished. I am afraid it is Professor Frank’s unfamiliarity with legal terminology which makes him tend towards a simplistic approach in under standing terms such as nu$ba. The term dalil, innocent as it may look in the context discussed in my paper, is the key for understanding the position of Dàwüd ibn Khalaf al-?àhiri, the head of the ^a h iri (literalist) school of law, regarding analogy and textual interpretation. Al-Jaççâç has some interesting things to say about Dâwûd and his use o f dalil which cannot be understood without reference to the passage I quoted. I have dealt with this in the same paper I have just mentioned in replying to Professor Van Ess. j. VAN ess : I would like to make a small personal remark: I find myself in a very fun ny situation because I myself believe in the Stoic influence on the logic of kalâm', I tried to prove this in an article. So from that general point of view I am completely in line with Nabil, whereas I do not believe in his example. So if, by chance, the atmosphere of the discussion would have turned out to be that of beliefs in Stoic influence, then I would have tried to bring up other examples, very tentative examples. A. s a b r a : As far as such statements of belief are concerned, I think that it is not unlikely that there was some influence in one sense or another. I never wanted to say
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that there was no such thing. M y objection is, rather to the method of establishing such influence, not just to these specific examples, but to the method as such. N. SHEHABY : Let me comment on this. As I told you, I am not a reductionist. I am not trying to say that every bit of the work of al-Jaçsâç can be found to come from some particular text that we have from the Stoics or anything like that. All I am saying is that there is a huge edifice here and that part of the apparatus in it does come from Stoic sources, and without understanding that part, I can’t really deal with the rest. R. m c k e o n : I think that you have been looking to the wrong criterion by which to determine what the Stoic logic is and whether it was an influence in the case at hand. It is not necessary for the jurist to quote Stoic logic or to refer to it to establish an in fluence. Take the following example. You begin an interpretation of a text by saying: There is the symbol, there is the (pcovfi ; it is written or spoken, and it is a material thing; moreover, it denotes something, and that is a material thing too. Now, it is possible for a grammarian to deal with the semantics of this notation; consequently, up to that point, the grammarian would be suflicient. However, if you then argue about the significance, the meaning and the denotation, you employ a A,ôyoç which is immaterial; this is the XeKxôv, And so on. N o w an Arabic jurist, if he wanted to appeal to logic, could have gone to several other logics beside the Stoic. If he had gone to Aristotle’s logic, he would not have dealt with symbols, signs, cpcovfi, cttih8îov, but he would have begun with homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms. These are words which already have their meaning and denotata established and therefore you would not find this separation between the sign and what it symbolized. Alternatively, if he had gone to atomistic logic - let us say Epicurus rather than Democritus - he would have thrown away all of the verbal significances entirely and he would have had a logic which was a canonic, and therefore he would not get into this problem of signs and signified. He might also have gone to the sophistic logic, and then he would talk about antilogisms, and once more the sign would not appear because for any proposition there is more than one interpretation. It seems to me, therefore, it is not a question of whether you can under stand the text without reading in some logic or other. If you are understanding the text by picking out the words and what they are designating in an argument, then you are being Stoic. R. f r a n k : Well, I would agree perfectly with this. I suspect that there are a lot of Stoic elements. r . m c k e o n : N o, I don’t mean elements, I mean a structure of argumentation. There fore, I think, without knowing much Arabic I could fix up that vocabulary at the end o f the paper. The only thing that is wrong with that vocabulary is that it operates as if it were a lexicon in which univocal terms are being translated. Make it sufficiently broad, and you will find the same ambiguities in Greek and in Arabic. A. s a b r a : But, even if that were so, that would mean that theoretically it is possible to substitute the one for the other. But why do so? R. m c k e o n : Let me answer. I give a course at Chicago in jurisprudence. It is offered in the Philosophy Department and in the Law School. And the whole point of the course is to break the dogmatism by which lawyers know exactly what law is. Consequently, I introduce what amounts to four different logics for the law. I take particular cases and I interpret the argument according to one logic, and another logic, and then another logic. It seems to me that this is the method that was used in the paper. That is to say, you begin with a discussion of jurisprudence, jurisprudence deals with the law of God and with the customary law; they are both divine and, therefore, both authoritative. But having established them as fully authoritative, you are still stuck with what they
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mean. This is the structure of inquiry I found in the paper. That is, it would seem to me in general that one of the problems in jurisprudence would be to take a law, well estab lished, solid and divine, and give it meaning. j. MURDOCH: I don’t really wish to speak to that. But just let me ask you a question about the kind of test that you mentioned earlier for the occurrence of Stoic logic first here and then there. My knowledge of Stoic logic is not that great, but is it not correct that one of the central notions is that the X,eKxà were involved in the problem of what a proposition stands for? N ow , we know that in the Latin West - in the twelfth century on the one hand in Abelard and, on the other hand, in the fourteenth century in a number of people - this same concern comes up. But we are also reasonably certain that the Latins didn’t get it from the Stoics. Consequently, you don’t want to say that this is the influence of Stoic logic, any more than you want to maintain that the exist ence of Stoic propositional logic and medieval Latin propositional logic necessarily means the influence of one upon the other, although that there is a doctrinal, a formal, similarity, there is no question. So, could it not simply be the case that there is a formal similarity in al-Ja§sa§ with some Stoic doctrine or other, but that he somehow invented his view independently. But perhaps finding a whole pattern of argumentation, a col lection o f resemblances, in both, moves more in Nabil’s direction. R. m c k e o n : N o , you see, there is a structure which can be described in considerable detail, and I think that the paper assembles all of the elements of it. In the setting up of the logic, you can take as your basic element the single word. The single word is usually meaningless; it is an X. You can, however, put an X in a proposition, a proposition in an argument, and an argument in a system based on principles. N ow in the course of his discussion, the author of the paper separated the semantic question of the meaning of the word, or jurists who said that the meaning of a single word would be enough, from those who had set up a proposition which would be a judgment. You also have logics which depend on the semantic development of an argument. And finally there are systematic logics. N ow the peculiarity - and I give the name Stoic to it for this rea son - is that the Stoic logic is a propositional logic; it is not a logic of concepts, it is not a logic of inferences, it is not a logic of systems. Since it is a propositional logic, the determination of the meaning of the proposition requires something peculiar; therefore, the A,ektôv comes in. And if you have in the Arabic jurisprudence the emer gence of the proposition in a central place - which would be very good for the law - and also have a need for the interpretation of it which removes it from the mere designation of particular cases, then those two characteristics would be enough for me to say that it is Stoic logic. As I say, propositional logics were fairly late. I don’t think that any of the great dialecticians or logicians of Hellenic times had propositional logics. The Stoics developed a propositional logic in the Hellenistic period. Consequently, this is one of the hallmarks. As a result of it, a curious kind of materialism is connected with it, the materialism o f the (pcovfi and the materialism of the things signified. By my distant view, the mutakallimün were materialists in precisely this sense and therefore would fit in the materialistic logical structure quite naturally. Consequently, if jurists were coming along they would be materialists as no Christian jurist would be. This would be the rough answer concerning the grounds by which I would name this, with our author. Stoic. Am I wrong in this interpretation? n . SHEHABY : N o, Certainly not. I would certainly agree with you.
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Theology is not as central a phenomenon for Islam as it is for Christianity. The educational system o f the Islamic Middle Ages concentrated on law and hadith, the tradition o f the Prophet; madrasas and mosques offered chairs in jurisprudence, but not in theology. Even the famous Nizamiyya, the >va^/-endowed “ university” founded by the wazïr Nizâmalmulk some decades before the first crusade, although for a long time credited in European research with a shift towards the opposite, a “ victory” o f Ash*arite theology, did not in fact contribute much to change the situation.i And when Islam today tries to adjust to the demands o f the modern world it does so not so much through experimenting with new theological and philosophical notions, but through providing fresh interpretations for the old juridical problems o f a religion-oriented society. Nevertheless, Western orientalists usually keep to their own value systems, and under stand Muslim “ Geistesgeschichte” mainly as a history o f theology and philosophy, not as a history o f law. But if we do not want to change our idiosyncrasies we must at least provide a justification, and this justification may be found in the fact that in the earliest centuries o f Islam when intellectual life was not yet fully institutionalized, theology seems indeed to have captured minds. Theolo gians about whose juridical preoccupations we hear very little, played an important role at the court o f the first Abbasids in the newly founded capital o f Baghdad. Only later, especially after the mihna, the “ inquisi tion” initiated by the government in the first half o f the third century H., when jurisprudence turned out to be the “ safer” science in so far as there a difference o f opinion did not necessarily involve proscription and perse cution, did it start outshining the fascination o f theology, which in its turn was increasingly regarded as a dangerous game o f autocratic in tellectuals. Thus having discovered that what European Islamic studies have ac complished until now was not so meaningless after all, we may venture to vindicate a second bias o f Western scholarship which seems to be hidden
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.). The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 87-111. All Rights Reserved.
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in the formulation o f our topic: the belief that the beginnings are always
without developing any theological “ superstructure.” W e can even prove
more interesting and more important than the end, the Pre-Socratics more
the contrary: about 75 H. the caliph ‘Abdalmalik started a correspond
fascinating than Plotinus, Giotto more stimulating than Titian, young
ence with the Ibadites at Basra that is still preserved in a late Khârijite
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scholars more “ promising” than older ones. N ow , the beginnings at least
source.® And about the same time, at least not after 80 H., his Iraqian
tell us how something came into existence, and sometimes even why it did
governor al-Hajjaj, at his instigation, wrote a letter to Hasan al-Basrï
so. In history nothing is necessary in itself; it is only by hindsight that we
asking him to expound the principles and proofs o f Qadarite doctrine.
sometimes get the impression that something could not have happened
The Risala that Hasan al-Basri wrote in response is still preserved. Since
otherwise. Although there nearly always was theology in Islam we cannot
Ritter’s edition o f the text in 1933, no one has seriously questioned its
say that Islam could not have done without theology. Judaism, which is
authenticity, and taking all the arguments together I think it is really
the religion most comparable to Islam in many respects, never developed theology to such an extent, and when it did so (I am thinking o f Sa'adya,
impossible to do so.’ But two difficulties still remain to be solved. In spite o f the documents
for instance) it was only undergoing the influence o f Islam. And we have
we have cited, the textual basis is still very meager, and the stylistic form
just noticed that even in Islam itself there was, later on, an increasing
typical for Mu'tazilite theology, the dialectical structure o f answer and
number o f people who might have wished that their religion had done without theology.
response, the so-called kalam, is not yet to be found in the two testi
So why do we have theology in Islam, and how did it start? In general
that the Arabs once and for all circumscribed the nature o f theology;
monies mentioned. Characteristically enough, it is with the term ‘kalam’
one tries to find an answer by referring to the Mu'tazilites, “ premiers
theology in the realm o f Islam is not named after its contents as in Latin
penseurs de l’Islam,” as A . N . Nader called them.^ This would bring us into
or Greek, as “ knowledge about God,” but after its style o f argumenta
the second century H .: Wasil ibn ‘Atâ* died in 131, ‘Am r ibn ‘ Ubayd about 144; Dirâr ibn *Amr, the first personality o f the “ school” about
tion: one “ talks” (kallama) with the opponent by asking questions and reducing his position to meaningless alternatives.® This does not mean
whose theological conceptions we have solid and rather sufficient infor
that there was no other way o f expressing oneself, but it certainly hints at
mation, died about 200. ^ Dirâr was already a systematician, but Wasil
a marked prevalence o f this specific styhstic device; it is here that the
probably was not. W e would know more about the latter’ s original in
polemical intention o f early Mu'tazilite theology found its adequate form.
tentions if we had better knowledge o f the purpose o f his famous du'^at
In the first century H., however, the situation seems to have been differ
mentioned in a poem by Safwan al-Ansârî.^ Were they missionaries, sent
ent: the letter o f the Ibadites and that o f Hasan al-Basri are theology in
out in order to convert all the non-Muslims who still lived everywhere in
so far as they treat theological problems, but they are not kalam.
the Muslim oekumene, in the towns, but even more in the rural districts?
Should we infer from this that there was no kaldm at all at that time?
Wasil himself was engaged in apologetics; later generations still remem
This might be too hasty a conclusion, merely built upon an argumentum
bered having seen his “ Thousand questions against the Manicheans.” ^
e silentio. W e must not forget that the intentions o f the two texts we
Theology, then, would have started as an apologetic struggle against the “ unbelievers.”
mentioned do not favor the usage o f ‘kalam’ : neither Hasan al-Basri nor
However, we need not enter into further speculations about these
the Ibadites were asked to enter into an imaginary dialogue with their opponents as this is usually presupposed in later kalam texts, but simply
activities, because Wasil and the Mu'tazila are apparently not the key to
to expound their ideas, and this is what they do. And besides that, if we
our question. There was Muslim theology before the M u‘tazilites, in the first century H .; it is rather improbable that all these “ sectarian” move
really search for material that hints in the opposite direction we might come up with at least a few relevant passages. Muhammad al-Baqir, the
ments characteristic for intellectual life in the time o f the early Umayyads - the Kharijites, the Qadarites, the Murji*ites - only indulged in politics
fifth Imam o f the Shi*ites, who died in 177/735, is presented as using a kalam argument in a report preserved by Kulini in his Kàfi.^ ‘ Umar II
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who reigned from 99 until 101 is said to have emphasized his ability in
but uncultivated in all occupations o f an urban society, including theol
kalàm, especially with respect to his discussions with the Shi*ites.i® And
ogy, started their culture as it were from a vacuum and only gradually
a certain Suhar al-‘A bdï who had closer contact with Ahnaf ibn Qays and
severed their inherited predilections. W e adhere too stubbornly to the
Mu*awiya (reigned 41/661-60/680) and who is even supposed to have
conviction that literature in Umayyad times was mainly transmitted
lived “ back” in the time o f the Prophet, is quoted by the late Khàrijite
orally so that it is hard for us to accept readily the possibility o f imme
author al-Shammâkhï as having given the following advice concerning
diate theological production. W e need more source material.
the Qadarites: “ Talk with them about (divine) knowledge {k a llim û h u m
This material exists. And although it too can be questioned, it makes
f V I- Him). I f they admit it, they contradict (their doctrine) ; ^ i f they deny
the basis o f our argumentation broader and somewhat more reliable. The
it they fall into unbelief.” 12 Suhar al-*Abdi was the teacher o f the famous
Zaydï Imam al-Hàdï ila’l-haqq Yahyâ ibn al-Husayn (died 298/911),
Ibadite scholar Abû ‘Ubayda Muslim ibn A b ï Karima al-Tamimi (first
founder o f the Zaidite community in the Yaman and grandson o f the
half o f the second century H .) ;
we may suppose that he held a moderate
famous Qasim ibn Ibrahim (died 246/860) who initiated the turn o f the
predestinarian outlook similar to that o f the Ibadites. In its contents,
Zaydiyya towards the doctrine o f free will, counted among his many
then, the passage just translated corresponds more or less to what we
writings a refutation o f a treatise against the Qadariyya that he attributes
would expect from a man like Suhar. In its wording and in its structure,
to Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, grandson o f ‘A li and brother
however, it holds some surprises. I f it is authentic, it would prove that
o f the well-known Abù Hàshim, who tried to take over the heritage o f
not only the verb kallama - and perhaps also the noun kalàm - was al
Mukhtar and who is said to have finally transmitted it to the ‘Abbasids.^'^
ready used for this kind o f theological discussion, but that even one o f
The book o f al-Hadi ila’l-haqq is preserved in several manuscripts, and
the most frequent stylistic features o f later dialectics, proceeding by alter
with it a considerable number o f extensive fragments o f the text against
natives and the “ if- if not” disjunction, was not unknown to scholars o f the first century.
which it polemicizes.18 This text brings us again into the first century H. ;
But are these texts really authentic? Let us take the warning o f the
Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya died between 99/718 and 101/720, i f not earlier.
And here we meet again, together with much discussion
Mu^tazilite al-Nazzam seriously: the mere accumulation o f lies does not
about the interpretation o f relevant Qur*anic passages, the same disjunc-
amount to truth.^'* Or, slightly adapted to our situation, the mere accumu
tional structure we found in the advice o f Suhar al-‘Abdi. Now , however,
lation o f uncertainties does not establish historical facts. Doubt may be
it is not isolated and sporadic, but used prolifically as the main stylistic
expressed about the reliability o f all these quotations. The Shi*ite Imams,
device in a rather schematic way. Let me give you one or two examples ;
and especially Ja‘far al-Sadiq together with his father Muhammad al-
Tell us [Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-IJanafiyya addresses his Qadarite opponents], whether God (only) wanted the Good with them (i.e., with mankind) and then later established it (i.e.. Hell) for them, or whether He wanted the Evil with them (right from the beginning)! - If they say: “ He wanted the Good with them,” they should be ans wered: “ H ow is that, as He created it (Hell) knowing that they would not have any profit from it and that it would only do harm to them?” If they, however, assume that He created it for them in order to do harm to them, their doctrine is refuted.^®
Bâqir, are widely suspected o f merely serving as mouth-pieces o f later ideas and forms o f expression. *Umar IPs picture in history is distorted by the attempt o f later historiographers to portray him as the great reformer o f the Umayyad dynasty or even as the Mahdi o f the “ year o f the donkey” (100 H.).is And the source that gives us the report about Suhar al-‘A bdi is, as we said, rather late (Shammâkhï died in 928/1522);
The argumentation perhaps needs some comment. I f Hell was created
Ibn Sa‘d only mentions him with a few words.i® The thesis we want to defend - that Muslim civilization did not slowly develop the art o f theol
right from the beginning, the author wants to say, then G od must have preordained Evil; otherwise this act would have been meaningless. The
ogy and especially o f kalàm, but rather grew up with it - sounds too
proof is rather defective. Tw o possible objections are at least passed over
radical to be established by these isolated items. W e are too accustomed
in silence. The Qadarites could have answered that God does not preor
to the idea that the Arabs “ o f the desert,” masters o f poetry and language
dain Evil, but simply foreknows it, and that foreknowledge does not
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mean predestination; or they could have claimed that Hell does not yet
plained by the assumption that they really date from a time when theology
exist, but will be created after the Last Judgment when it turns out to be
was still primitive. There is no internal evidence in the forty excerpts
necessary. Both solutions have been proposed, the first one already by
made by al-Hâdï ila’l-haqq that would point to the inauthenticity o f the
Hasan al-Basri in his Risâla to the caliph ‘Abdalmalik,2i and the second by Dirar ibn ‘Amr, the MuHazilite mutakallim o f the second centu ry .22
text. But it is difiicult to overcome skepticism. M ay we really dare assume
The fact that they are not alluded to in our text seems to show that the
that such a book was written at so early a time that the fabrication o f
author did not know them, because his treatise could only serve as in
paper was not yet known in the Arab countries and when papyrus or
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struction for predestinarians on how to deal with Qadarite arguments if
parchment were rather expensive? Was the Qadariyya really worth such
he really mentioned in it all the possible subterfuges to be expected from
an effort and such costs in those days when in other fields the literary
them. That this was indeed his intention may be illustrated by a second paragraph:
activity was still rather limited? And besides that, wherever Hasan ibn
Could they ignore something that God made them know, or could they not do so? - If they then say; “ N o,” their doctrine is refuted. If, however, they say: “ Yes,” then go on and ask: “ Could they ignore God himself, i.e., ignore that He is the creator o f every thing and the molder of everything?” If they then say: “ (N o ), yet this is inborn ifitra ) and nobody is rewarded for it, all mankind knows that He is God,” then you should answer; “ Could they then ignore that God created day and night. Heaven and Earth, this world and the world to come, and mankind and all creatures just how and in whatever way he wanted?” If they then say; “ Yes,” they lie and all people are witness that they lie. If, however, they say: “ N o,” they join you (and give up their opinion).^»
Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya is mentioned in the biographical dictio naries his anti-Qadarite bias which we have just taken for granted is passed over in silence. W e hear that he was interested in theological questions, but his outlook seems to have been diiFerent. He is considered to have been the first Murji’ ite; hardly any source forgets to mention, or even to quote, his K. al-Irja\ the first text connected with this movement.^s But this negative evidence also possesses a positive side. I f there really was a K. al-Irjà^ by Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya we need no longer reflect about the possibility o f theological production under the early
Here the same scheme is applied over several steps, obviously in order to
Umayyads, and we are hence more prepared to believe that the same
incorporate all counterarguments known at the moment the book was
author wrote a second book on theological problems. Being a MurjiMte
written. The level o f the argumentation seems to fit the situation o f the
does not exclude one’s being a predestinarian; on the contrary, both
late first century; Ghaylan al-Dimashqi who was executed under the
positions seem to have been frequently combined. ^6
caliph al-Hisham (105/724-125/743) uses the term fitra for rather elab
Extensive quotations from the K. al-Irja ' are given by Dhahabï (died
orate speculations, and we have enough testimony to be sure that the
748/1348 or 753/1352-3) in his Ta^rîkh al-Islàm^'^ and by Ibn Hajar (died
beginnings o f this concept go back to the first century, to the Qur’ an and
852/1449) in his Tahdhîb al-Tahdhîb.^^ The text was thus known until
the famous hadlth al-fitra transmitted under the name o f Abù Hurayra.^^
the ninth/fifteenth century, although not separately but through the
The argument brought forth by Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya
medium o f earlier secondary sources. W. Madelung has recently treated
sounds rather inconclusive: no Qadarite denied that something that is
these fragments and strongly argued for their authenticity.But in the
known to someone can no longer be ignored; but they did hold that there
meantime we have been able to broaden our base. W e now possess the
are, besides the fitra, many knowable things that one could not know a
source used by Ibn Hajar, the K. al-Iman by Ibn A bi ‘Umar al-‘Adanî
priori, but which one may come to know by one’s own intellectual en
(died 243/858),3o and there we get the complete text o f the K. al-Irjà^ on
deavor. The author is not very well acquainted with the speculative pos-
approximately three folios. But the treatise does not help us in our search for examples o f kalam; it is written in the form o f a letter addressed to the
sibiUties o f the Qadarite position. He wants to write a manual on how to deal best with the “ heresy” o f free will, but the ideas he refers to and the
Shi‘ites in Iraq, and therefore, like Hasan al-Basri’s risâla to ‘Abdalmalik,
ideas he brings up himself are strangely immature. This primitiveness is
does not offer any opportunity for the occurrence o f the stylistic features
characteristic for nearly all the fragments preserved, and it is best ex
mentioned above. But it gives us rich information about the political
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Standpoint o f its author and thereby enables us to form a better judgment
killing those responsible for the murder o f Husayn, had “ reproached those
o f his theological decisions. Let me also therefore quote a short passage from it:
who had done it for their sin, but then had done it himself,” and it was he
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who had “ taken a member o f a noble Arab family (or: a member o f the ahl al-bayt) as his Im àm "’ Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya
If someone wants to ask us about our position and our opinion, we are people whose master is God, whose religion is Islam, whose guide is the Qur’an, and whose prophet is Muhammad.... Among the chiefs of our community (cûimmatîm) we approve of A bû Bakr and ‘Umar, we approve their being obeyed, and we condemn their being opposed. W e are enemies of their enemies. (But) we reserve our judgment {nurji) about those among them (i.e., the chiefs of the community) who first participated in the schism (of the community: ahl al-furqa al-uwal). W e make every effort to remain loyal to Abù Bakr and ‘Umar, because the community did not engage in fighting or dissension with respect to them nor did they doubt about anything concerning them. “ Reservation” is only due concerning those who are blamed by the people, whereas we were not present (in order to build up a judgment of our o w n ).... Among those whom we treat as our enemies are those wishful Saba’ites {al-SabaHyya al-mutamanniya) who came forward with the Qur’an (i.e., used it as a pretext) and openly slandered the Umayyads... in reproaching for their sin those who had committed it while committing it themselves (afterward) when they had an opportunity; in seeing the temptation of (sin) without knowing the way out of it. They took members o f a noble Arab family (ahla bay tin min a l-A ra b ) as their imam and made them responsible for their religious view^^ by declaring their solidarity with what they loved and their antipathy to what they hated: violators of the Qur’an and followers of the soothsayers (kuhhan). They hope for a “ reversal” that will take place in a resurrection before the “ Hour” ; they distort the Book of God and practice bribery in their jurisdiction....
implicitly declares Mukhtar’s allegiance to his father to be nothing more than intrusion and imposture. He himself, although an ‘Alid and, at that time, one o f the heads o f the clan, steers a surprisingly moderate course. He does not identify himself with any propaganda against the Umayyads and he accepts Abü Bakr and ‘Umar as righteous caliphs. Only in the case o f “ those who first participated in the schism o f the community” does he practice abstention and refrain from any judgment, i.e., upon ‘Uthman and *Ali, This sounds rather surprising, but to a certain extent it ceases to be so i f we no longer look at it with the categories o f later centuries, when the gulf between Sunnites and Shi‘ites had become unbridgeable. Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya is an ‘Alid, but not necessarily a Shi‘ite; there were many *Alids, even among the grandsons o f ‘A li, who never thought o f any opposition against the Umayyad regime and rather pre ferred to live quietly o ff their pensions. And the acknowledgement o f Abù Bakr and ‘Umar is taken over by Zayd ibn ‘A li (died 122/740) who still must have known our author, a remote uncle o f his. Our sources
There is another feature by which these Saba’ites whom we have witnessed show their enmity. They say: “ W e are guided (by God) to a (special) revelation from which (all other) people went astray, and to secret knowledge.” They claim that the Prophet concealed nine-tenths o f the Qur’an. But if the Prophet really had concealed something of what was revealed by God he would have concealed the affair o f the wife of (his adopted son) Z ayd... .3»
stress the fact that he lost his Kûfian adherents for just this reason. The zrya* in the attitude towards ‘ Uthman and ‘A li is approved and further developed by the first Mu'tazilites,®® whereas the later Murji’ a starts to understand the term in a different way.^'^ A ll this together with the special flavor o f the letter, its “ atmospheric precision,” seems to point to the
Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya dictated this letter to his client
conclusion that the document is authentic. I agree with Madelung that
‘Abdalwahid ibn Ayman who lived in Mecca and with whom he seems to
with this declaration Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya “ made his
have been on friendly terms, and he asked him to recite it publicly every but we also hear that he himself fought for his conviction in the
peace with the Umayyad regime.” But i f this really is the case, we must ask a further question. Why did
circle o f the Kûfian genealogist Abu’l-Saq‘ab Jakhdab ibn Jar‘ab.35
Hasan feel induced to betray the cause o f Mukhtar and to make such an
There seems to be hardly any doubt that the text was directed mainly
open avowal o f his anti-extremist and antirevolutionary attitude? W e may
where
against extremist Shi'ite factions in Kufa. The Saba*iyya whom he attacks
assume that some sort o f political pressure or at least persuasion stood
were adherents o f Mukhtar who, after the failure o f the revolt (in 67/687),
behind it. Hasan’ s half-brother Abù Hâshim obviously maintained close
nourished chiliastic hopes and perhaps justified them by referring to se cret parts o f the Qur*an that they claimed to have been suppressed or not
but at that time SabaMyya.^» And when Mukhtar’s situation in Iraq had
received by the rest o f the community. It had been Mukhtar who, by
become desperate, Hasan himself had still tried to join him, but only
contact with those followers o f Mukhtar who were later called Kaysaniyya,
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arrived at Kùfa after his death. After a vain attempt to create a nucleus o f
distribution o f booty is regulated. According to the text, the one-fifth o f
resistance at Nisibis he was arrested by troups o f ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr
the booty that is not given to the warriors is kept in reserve for six differ
and thrown into prison.^o The K. al-Irja* seems to have been written, as
ent recipients, among them God, the Prophet, and the “ relatives” {dhu'l-
W. Madelung has suggested with convincing arguments, shortly after
qurba, singular understood in a general sense). N ow God, obviously, was
73/692 when ‘Abdalmalik finally had succeeded in defeating Ibn al-Zubayr
always treated rather stingily; he only got a small sum destined for the
96
and tried to lump together his empire, which was torn asunder and ex
maintenance o f the K a ‘ba. But with the next two recipients one soon
hausted by the centrifugal tendencies o f the past, by means o f a cautious pohcy o f religious h arm on y. 4i In the year 73 H. Hasan’ s father Muham
encountered difficulties, with the Prophet because he had died, and with
mad ibn al-Hanafiyya acknowledged the political facts and paid alle giance to the caliph, and his son seems to have shared his realistic atti tude.
ions sprang up Hke mushrooms, most o f them, o f course, only reflecting
Something else may have come in. It is not impossible that ‘Abdalmalik
show, however, that the government did not take this exegesis seriously.
could have profited from the chronic financial weakness o f the ‘Alids.
For them the “ relatives” were the Banû Quraysh as a whole, and Qatâda
Hasan ibn ‘A li had, as is well known, been bought by Mu*awiya, and Husayn is reported to have asked Marwan for 4000 dinars.^s Zaynal‘abidin
(died 117/735 or 118/736) formulated it even more generally: dhul-qurbd
the “ relatives” because one had to define who was meant by them. Opin personal interests. The ‘Alid Zaynarâbidïn, contemporary o f Hasan, tried to identify the “ relatives” with the Banü Hâshim. Other traditions
are all those in power after the Prophet. Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn alHanafiyya now held the view that the share o f the Prophet should go to
accepted money from Mukhtar, and he was happy when ‘Abdalmalik allowed him to keep it.^® jq game way, Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya
his relatives, i.e., mainly to the Banû Hàshim, the share o f the dhu’l-qurba,
visited ‘Abdalmalik in Damascus to confess to him that he was highly
however, to the relatives o f the caliph.^e He knew that the problem had
indebted. The caliph then assumed all his obligations. Only with those o f
already been controversial in the time o f Abû Bakr and ‘ Umar ; and with
Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya’s mawàli did he show some reserve.^^ This
his solution he tried to estimate realistically the chances o f his family to
proves that the head o f the ‘Alid family had not only spoken for himself,
obtain at least some o f the money administered by the Umayyads. It does
but also for all those who felt beholden to him and for whom he regarded
not seem impossible that this fatwd was transmitted by Tabari and his
himself responsible. The chiefs o f the Banû Hàshim found themselves in
sources because for some time it really represented the practice o f dis
the same role as the chieftains o f pre-Islamic tribes; their code d’honneur
tribution applied by ‘Abdalmalik. I f this long detour has succeeded in bringing some evidence for the
sometimes demanded from them more generosity than they could afford. been rich and who grew even richer now by having access to the gover
authenticity o f the K. al-Irjà\ then we may also have gained something for Hasan’ s Radd ^alà'1-Qadariyya. ‘Abdalmalik supported predestinarian
norships and other attractive posts, from the Banù Quraysh, they had to
ideas. He wanted his subjects to believe that the power, the “ kingship”
pay a price. Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya had accomplished the bay'^a
(mulk) given to him and to his family was a possession {mulk) granted by G od and inalienable according to His divine will. The caliphate is, in the
But if they accepted the money they needed from those who had always
and, acceding to mild pressure from the side o f the caliph during his later visit in Damascus, had given away the sword o f the Prophet which at that time still was in the possession o f his f a m i l y . jt is not improbable that his son Hasan wrote his AT. al-Irja* as a token o f suggested gratitude.
words o f the poet Farazdaq, right guidance (huda). He who rebels against it goes astray {dalala).^’^On the other hand, revolutionary activities could always be justified with Qadarite ideology. This becomes obvious towards
transmitted from Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya in Tabari’s
the end o f the Umayyad epoch, in the time o f Yazid III^® and perhaps o f Hisham, but it is already alluded to in the proclamation made by ‘Amr
commentary similarly centers around a financial problem and offers a
ibn Sa‘id al-Ashdaq in Damascus when he planned his insurrection
rather pragmatic solution. Hasan comments upon Sûra 8/41 where the
against ‘Abdalmalik in 69/689.^® Here, too, Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn
It seems significant that what appears to be the only Qur*anic exegesis
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99
al-Hanafiyya thus corresponded to the caliph’s intentions and perhaps to
anyway. The state always needed documents and written records. M . Brav-
his expectations; fortunately we possess at least one testimony from a
mann has adduced some material testifying that in Medina ‘Uthman had
rather independent source that confirms that he indeed detested the
something like state archives.53 Seen under this aspect, the fact that Hasan
Qadarites.50 But in contrast to the K. al-Irja\ the text o f his refutation o f
ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya apparently wrote his books in Medina
the Qadariyya was ignored by the later biographical and bibliographical
ceases to be so astonishing. Medina was not “ the desert” ; until the
tradition. This probably happened because it was soon taken over by
end o f the time o f ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr the town had been the center
Zaydites who agreed with Hasan’s lenient attitude towards the first two
o f the Islamic empire. Papyrus and parchment were nothing new in this
caliphs and who preserved his predestinarian outlook at least for some
corner o f the world, and Hasan was rich enough to pay for them - if he
generations. When, towards the middle o f the third century, the Zaydite
did not get them free from the chancery o f the caliph. May we assume that the same chancery also provided for some theo
community changed its opinion, the text that until then had been respected had to be refuted. This is why it reached us together with the corrections o f al-Hâdî ila’l-haqq.
logical assistance? This might help us to explain the unexpectedly early usage o f kalam style. For it is this detail that remains striking; here the
This conclusion has many consequences. The questions we asked in the
historical threshold has been shifted back nearly one century. But do we
beginning and which seemed to augment our skepticism must now be
really need such an assumption? Dialectical style, proceeding by question
answered in the afiirmative. There was a written hterature in the first
and response, the fictitious dialogue, had always been famiUar to Chris
century o f Islam, and there did exist at that time a certain familiarity with the technique o f kalam, although it was still handled with a somewhat
tian theology; it was in the time o f the Umayyads that John o f Damascus wrote his AidA-e^iç XpicTTiavoO Kai SapaKrjVoO.^^ And Hasan not only
helpless rigidity. Even the term ‘kalam’ seems at least “ on the way” ;
lived in Medina; he also frequented the Iraq where Christian theology
Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya once uses ‘takallama’ as Suhar
had been flourishing for centuries. In his youth he had been in Nisibis^s
al-‘A bdï did o f ‘kallama’ , both o f them presupposing a technical meaning for the root.
which through its famous Nestorian academy for a long time had attracted
The first consequence is the easiest to accept. There were other books
W e simply mean that people went on doing what they had always done
written under the early Umayyads. In an article on this topic, R. Blachère
before, and that if they themselves had not done it before, they at least
pointed to the works o f ‘Abïd ibn Sharya and Wahb ibn Munabbih.^i
found ample opportunity to become acquainted with it in their rapidly
W e mentioned the Risala o f Hasan al-Basrï and the correspondence be
widening world. There was something like a common stock o f ideas,
tween ‘Abdalmalik and the Ibadites. W e might add the historical work o f
but there does not seem to have been any “ influence” in the sense that
Salim ibn Hutay*a (?) - frequently quoted by the Khârijite author al-
the Muslims were awakened to a certain problem by Christian counter
Barrâdï in his Jawàhir al-muntaqât - or the recently discovered letters o f
arguments and that they consciously rectified their position in order to
the Ibadite Jabir ibn Zayd al-Azdï (died 93/711).S2 We must, o f course,
avoid being molested again. Christian polemics as represented by John
always keep in mind the danger o f spuriousness; quite a lot o f “ testi
o f Damascus did not influence the Qadarite movement or bring it into
monies” o f the first century are simply the result o f antedating. But this does not mean that everything was forged or that nobody wrote anything.
existence as C. H. Becker believed; both are simply two facets o f a theological discussion that affected the Christian and Muslim milieu
Arab culture did not start from a vacuum; life went on as it had been
alike. O f course, the Christians knew what the problems were longer than
before, and Syria or Egypt had always been civilized countries. Papyrus
the MusUms, because Christianity existed before Islam. When the Qadar-
and parchment were perhaps expensive, but Greek or Syriac literature had not suffered much from this fact. It only meant that the poor could not
ticed by man, they simply repeated what the Nestorian Bâbai had said
express themselves in a written form, but they would not have done this
when he polemicized against the determinism o f Henânâ, the head o f the
the most brilliant minds.®® W e do not plead for Christian “ influence.”
ites said that God cannot be held responsible for the fornication prac
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101
school o f Nisibis (died 610).5S But they were not led to repeat it by Chris
new sect in the long series o f heresies they were accustomed to. This
tian influence. They simply profited from a common treasury o f argu ments.
turned out to be an error, but an understandable one for a period when
It is even less likely that they were influenced by John o f Damascus
just because o f this undefined status o f their reUgion, were not yet able to
himself. Although he, like his father Sergius and his grandfather, coop
Islam was not yet defined in its “ dogmatic” structure. And the Muslims, start an attack themselves. Moreover they felt superior anyway.
erated with the Muslims and for some time at least lived at their court,®®
Theology in Islam did not start as polemics against unbelievers. Even
the feeling o f superiority held by his Muslim masters certainly prevented
the kalâm style was not developed or taken over in order to refute non-
him from gaining too much - or any - influence in theological affairs. We
Muslims, especially the Manicheans, as one tended to believe when one
hear nothing about discussions between Christians and MusUms at the
saw the origin o f kalàm in the missionary activities o f the MuHazila.
court o f M u ‘awiya, ‘Abdalmalik, or Walïd, as the ‘Abbasid caliph al-
Theology started as an inner-Islamic discussion when, mainly through
Mansûr used to arrange between Muslims and Zoroastrians. John wrote
political development, the self-confident naiveté o f the early days was
his AidXs^iç only after he had retired from the Umayyad court to the
gradually eroded. The initiative for lifting these discussions to a literary
monastery o f St. Sabas. And the argument he uses concerning the problem
level seems to have been taken by the caliph ‘Abdalmalik. He was in
o f God’s responsibility for man’s fornication is rather complicated and
terested in a dialogue in order to cool down existing tensions or in order
unique.
to propagate his own theologico-political views, and he had the personnel
It is not found in this specific form in any Muslim source.
The Muslims were still living among a Christian majority, but in spite
and the financial resources to start such an enterprise.
With this attitude,
o f this the religious contacts seem to have been weak. One needed the
as with many other things, he followed the heritage that he found in the
Christians and one sometimes held them in high esteem as the example o f
country in which he decided to choose his capital: the tradition o f the
Akhtal shows. But one did not ask them for their advice in theological
Byzantine emperors whose impact had molded the Syrian milieu for cen
questions. There were enough neophytes who could solve these problems
turies.
by the experience they brought into the new religion. The Christians did the administration and collected the taxes. They even were allowed to build churches - in contrast to the famous decree wrongly ascribed to ‘ Umar I. But from the beginning one seems to have felt an antipathy to teaching them the Qur’ an.®^ We may perhaps compare the situation to what can be experienced even nowadays in a “ levantine” city like Beirut. Different communities live together, they deal with each other, they do business with each other, they do the administration and - today - even politics together, but they never talk to each other about their religion and consequently they are to an astonishing degree ignorant o f what their neighbors believe. In spite o f all loyalty, there is also distance and an unmistakable amount o f mutual contempt. Had there been religious con tacts, there would have been controversy ; but there is not one text point ing in this direction. Cl. Cahen has stressed the fact that Christian testi monies about Islam o f the first century H., rare as they are, completely lack aggressiveness.®^ They do not yet contain the usual polemical clichés known from later sources. Christians seem to have regarded Islam as a
UniversMt Tübingen NOTES ^ This has been elucidated especially by George Makdisi; cf. his articles ‘Muslim in stitutions of learning in eleventh-century Baghdad’, Bulletin o f the School o f Oriental and African Studies, 24 (1961), 1-56; ‘Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam’ in Theology and Law in Islam, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden, 1971), p. 75-88; and ‘The Madrasa as a Charitable Trust and the Univer sity as a Corporation in the Middle Ages’ in Actes Congrès International d ’Arabisants et d ’Islamisants, Bruxelles 1970 (Brussels, 1971: Correspondance d’Orient nr. 11), pp. 329-337 (especially p. 333). 2 Albert N . Nader, Le Système philosophique des MuUazila {Premiers penseurs de l ’Islam), (Beirut, 1956). ® Cf. J. van Ess, ‘Pirâr b. ‘Am r und die Cahmiya’, D er Islam 43 (1967), 241-279 and 44 (1968) 1-70; Louis Gardet, Études de philosophie et de mystique comparées (Paris, 1972) 102 flF. A fragment of one of his works may have been preserved or at least reflected in a passage in Ibn Hisham’s K. al-Tîjàn (cf. my forthcoming article in: Festschrift A. Abel, p. 108flF.). * Cf. Jâhi?, al-Bayân wa’l-tabyin, ed. ‘Abdassalâm Muhammad Hârûn, (Cairo, 1380/ 1960), 125,6; Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tobaqât al-MuUazila, ed. S. Diwald-Wilzer (WiesbadenBeirut, 1961), 32, 4 ff.
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5 a . Ibn al.Murta4a (note 4) 35,1 ff. « Cf. E. Sachau, ‘Religiose Anschauungen der Ibâ^itischen Muhammedaner’, Mitteilungen des Seminars f iir Orientalische Sprachen, II. Abt. 2 (1899), 52 flF.: R. Rubinacci, 11 califfo ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwan e gli Ibâçliti’, Annali delVlstituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli n.s. 5 (1952), 99-121 ; J. Schacht, ‘Sur l’expression “ Sunna du Prophète” Mélanges d ’Orientalisme offerts à Henri Massé (Teheran, 1963), pp. 361-365. 7 Cf. H. Ritter, ‘Studien zur islamischen Frômmigkeit I: Hasan al-Baçrî’, D er Islam 21 (1933) 1-83; J. Obermann, ‘Political theology in early Islam: al-Hasan al-Basri’s treatise on qadar’. Journal o f the American Oriental Society 55 (1935), 138-162; M. Schwarz, ‘The Letter of al-lJasan al-Ba§ri’, Oriens 20 (1967) 15-30; J. van Ess, Anfange muslimischer Theologic (Beirut, 1975). ® Cf. J. van Ess, D ie Erkenntnislehre des "Adudaddin a l-Ici (Wiesbaden, 1966), 56 fF. ; id., ‘The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology’, in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden, 1970), p. 23 f. 9 a . Kulini, Kàft, (Teheran, 1338-9) V III 318, 6 flF. Cf. Abü Zakariyyâ’ Yazid al-Azdi, Ta'rikh al-Maw?il, ed. IJabiba (Cairo, 1387/1967), 5, 5 f. Because the divine foreknowledge is supposed to preordain the actions of man. 12 Cf. Ahmad ibn Sa‘id al-Shammâkhî, K. as-Siyar (Lith., Cairo, n.d.), 81, 2 f.; bio graphical material concerning §uhâr al-*Abdi cf. my Anfange muslimischer Theologie (note 7). 13 Cf. Encyclopaedia o f Islam, 2nd ed.. I ll 649 f. (Art. ‘Ibâdiyya’). 1^ Cf. J. van Ess, Das Kitab an-Nakt des Na??àm und seine Rezeption im Kitâb al-Futyà des Gàhiz {Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften Gottingen, Phil.-Hist. lü., 3. Folge, Nr. 79: Gottingen, 1972), pp. 114 ff. 1® For the “ year o f the donkey” cf. T. Nagel, Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des abbasidischen Kalifates (Bonn, 1972), p. 55.; the concept is derived from Sura 2/259. 1® Ibn Sa‘d, fabaqdt (ed. Sachau) VII, 61f. 1’ For A bü Hâshim cf. Encyclopaedia o f Islam, 2nd ed., s.n.; for his “ testament” cf. T. Nagel, op. cit., (note 15), p. 45 ff. 18 Cf. F. Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden, 1967 ff.) vol. 1, p. 595; my edition of the text in Anfange muslimischer Theologie (note 7). 2" Fragment nr. 5 o f my edition; cf. Anfange muslimischer Theologie (note 7). 21 Cf. D er Islam 21 (1933), 77, 4 ff. and M. Schwarz in Oriens 20 (1967), 29 f. 22 Cf. ‘Abdalqâhir al-Baghdâdi, U?ûl al-din (Istanbul, 1346/1928), p. 237,-4 f.; D er Islam 43 (1967), 279 and my article in Festschrift A. Abel, p. 124ff. 23 Fragment nr. 6 o f my edition; cf. Anfange muslimischer Theologie (note 7). 24 For the development of the ^/ra-concept and the history of the hadlth al-fifra cf. my Zwischen fladit und Theologie (Berlin, 1974), p. lOlff. 25 Cf., e.g., Ibn Sa‘d, Jabaqat, V 241,19 (the report can be traced to Ayyüb al-Sakhtiyâni according to Ibn Kathir) and below notes 27 and 28. 26 The so-called “ Qadarite Murji’ites” like Ghaylân al-Dimashqi are only a seeming exception. They owe their classification among the Murji’ites only to the endeavor of Mu'tazilite heresiographers to distinguish their own school from these “forerunners” (cf. W . Madelung, Der Imam al-Qàsim ibn Ibrahim und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Berlin, 1965), p. 239). 27 Ed. IJusamaddin al-Qudsi (Cairo, 1947 ff.) Ill 359, 1 ff. 28 Haydarabad, 1325 ff., II 321, 5 ff. 29 In his Qâsim ibn Ibrahim (note 26), p. 228 f.
3® Cf. Sezgin, op. cit., (note 18), vol. 1, p. 111. 81 Literally: “ suspended their religion around their neck” (galladühum dinahum). 32 Dawla. Incidentally this is the earliest passage where the word is used in this sense. 33 Cf. my edition and commentary of the text in Arabica 21 (1974), 20 ff. especially section 5 ff; for Muhammad’s affair with the wife o f his adopted son cf. Sura 33/37 and W . M. Watt, Muhammad at Medina (Oxford, 1956) 329 ff. 34 Cf. Ibn yajar, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib II 321, 4 f. 35 Cf. Ibn ‘Asâkir, Ta'rikh Dimashq, Tahdhib by ‘Abdalqadir Badrân (Damascus, 1329/ 1911 flf.), IV 246, -7 ff. 3® Cf. my article in Arabica 21 (1974), 52. 37 Cf. Madelung, Qâsim ibn Ibrahim (note 26), p. 231 flf, 38 Cf. Madelung, op. cit., (note 26), p. 229. 39 Cf. my article in Arabica 21 (1974), 34. A bü Hâshim is said to have collected hadith in support of the “ Saba’iyya” (cf. his biography in the Ta^rlkh Dimashq by Ibn ‘Asâkir, M S Damad Ibrahim Pa§a 877, fol. 17b-19b). 4® Cf. Dhahabi, Ta'rlkh al-Islam III 359, 12 f. and Mas'ûdï, M u rü j al-dhahab, ed. C. Barbier de Meynard et Pavet de Courteille (Paris, 1861 flf.), V 176 f. 41 Cf. Madelung, Qâsim ibn Ibrahim (note 26) p. 229. 42 Cf. Ibn Sa‘d, Jabaqât V 159, 5 flf. 43 Cf. Ibn Sa‘d, Jabaqât V 158, 1 flf. 44 Cf. Ibn Sa‘d, Tabaqât V 82, 24 flf. 45 Cf. Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqât V 83, 15 flf. 4® Cf. Tabarî, Tafsir, ed. Mahmüd Muhammad Shâkir and Ahmad Muhammad Shâkir (Cairo, ca. 1960 flf.) X III 548 flf., especially 550 f., nr. 16102 f. 47 Cf. W . M. Watt, ‘God’s Caliph, Qur’ânic Interpretations and Umayyad claims’, Iran and Islam, Minorsky Memorial Volume (Edinburgh, 1971) 565-574, especially p. 568 flf.; my Zwischen Hadit und Theologie (note 4). 48 Cf. J. van Ess, ‘Les Qadarites et la Gailânïya de Yazid III’, Studia Islamica 31 (1970), 269-286. 49 Cf. Tabari, Ta'rikh II 784. 5® Cf. Ibn Batta, Ibâna, ed. H. Laoust {La profession de f o i d'Ibn Batfa; Damascus, 1958) 32, 4 f. " 51 R. Blachère, ‘Regards sur la littérature narrative en arabe au I®>^ siècle de l’Hégire (V I P s. J.C.)” , Semitica 6 (1956), 75-86. For Wahb ibn Munabbih cf. also R. G. Khoury, Wahb b. Munabbih, 1-2 (Wiesbaden, 1972). 52 Cf. R. Rubinacci in Annali dell’Is tit uto Universitario Orientale di Napoli 4 (1952), 104 flf. and Ennami in Journal o f Semitic Studies 15 (1970), 65. 53 Cf. his article in Arabica 15 (1968), 87-89. [= T h e Spiritual Background o f Early Islam (Leiden, 1972), 311 flf.]. 54 The authenticity of the dialogue presents some diflficulties; the condition of its text is rather bad, and one version is attributed to John’s pupil Theodorus Abü Qurra. Nevertheless one usually counts it among John’s works (cf., e.g., H.-G. Beck, Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich (Munich, 1953), 478, and D. J. Sahas, John o f Damascus on Islam (Leiden, 1972), p. 99 flf. where it is argued that Theodorus may have written down the treatise and transmitted it). One should avoid drawing conclusions from it that go too far concerning the degree of the development o f contemporary Muslim theology. The Christian author may have ascribed arguments to his fictitious Muslim opponent which take on dialectical value only in the context of his own argumentation, or they may have been added later on, perhaps by Theodorus
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(cf., e.g., Sahas 114 f. where a connection with the discussion concerning the createdness of the Qur’an is supposed which did not yet exist at that time). For an example of “ kalam” structure comparable to that in ^asan ibn Muhammad b. al-^anafiyya’s treatise, cf. Sahas ISl. 88 Cf. above p. 96.
that Islamic theology, in my opinion, started about the year 70 Hijra, in the second half o f the reign o f the Caliph ‘Abdalmalik. (2) Secondly, the term theology itself is not altogether precise. In the present context, I do not mean by theology religious move ments or religious parties. These religious partisan movements existed earlier (for instance, the Kharijites) and their existence implies the existence of religious discussions, but discussions that were rather more concerned with political issues. In my paper I limited theology to kalam. The two terms are not identical; there are other kinds of theology, other theological procedures, which one would not immediately call kalam. However, the theology in question in my paper is always that of kalam. A. s a b r a : So it follows immediately from what you say that to talk about the begin ning or origin of Islamic theology is not at all the same as talking about the beginning
5® Cf. A. Voobus, History o f the School o f Nisibis (Louvain, 1965). 8’ I owe this expression to a discussion with Professor A . Udovitch at Princeton. 58 Cf. Voobus, School o f Nisibis (note 56), p. 260. 89 His grandfather Mançûr b. Sarjûn had kept a high oflSce under Mu'awiya. His father, obviously the famous Sarjün o f the Arab sources, seems to have had great in fluence on ‘Abdalmalik; he was perhaps responsible for the whole tax administration of Syria and Egypt. John himself left the court and retired to the monastery o f St. Sabas near Jerusalem; the reasons and the date of this decision are not quite clear (perhaps after Hishâm’s accession to the throne and because of the deteriorating con ditions of the Christian subjects under Muslim rule). In Byzantium his family and he himself were regarded as “ Quislings.” A s the last publication on the subject (which frequently only repeats the results reached by Lammens and Nasrallah or P. Khoury), cf. D . J. Sahas, John o f Damascus on Islam (note 54), especially p. 26 fif. and 44 f. «0 Cf. Sahas (note 54), p. 145. For the history of this specific problem cf. my Zwischen Ifadit und Theologie (Berlin, 1974), p. 95 ff. Cf. A. S. Tritton, The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects^ 2nd ed., (London, 1970), pp. 6, 18 f., 43, 167. Also A.-T. Khoury, Les théologiens byzantins et l'Islam (Louvain, 1969), p. 30 If. Cf. his article in Revue de l ’histoire des Religions 166 (1964), 51-58. This brings up the question whether ‘Abdalmalik’s initiative had any consequences for the importance o f the mutakallimm for Muslim society in the following centuries and how the position of a theologian was ranked in the social hierarchy of that time. There is no doubt that the mutakallimün possessed great influence at the court o f the early Abbasids, until the milpm when the jurists started to take over; Sh. Pines has reminded us of some material which points in this direction (cf. his article in Israel Oriental Studies 1 (1971), 229ff.). I am, however, not quite convinced that Pines’s further thesis that the mutakallimün “ were a fundamental political and social institu tion of Islam” and “ indispensable” for its intellectual life already in Umayyad times {ib. 228 and 232) can, for the moment, be sufiiciently documented by the sources we have. Fârâbî (who is extensively quoted by Pines, p. 225 ff".) is no real substitute: when he stresses the apologetic outlook of kalam, he does not think of its importance for society and especially not of a definite function o f the mutakallimün at a certain given time, but uses the language of an Aristotelian for whom all thinkers who do not stick to the syllogistic method are “ dialecticians.”
D ISCUSSION J. VAN ESs; I would like to rearrange the material o f my paper in order to make it more
apt for discussion and also in order to bring it a little bit closer to the topic of our Colloquium. What I wanted to prove was that Islamic theology already existed in the first century Hijra. However, this statement is imprecise in three respects. (1) Because the first century Hijra is, of course, an arbitrary interval; I should have said, rather.
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or origin of kalam. J. v an ess: I am inquiring into the beginnings of the term ^kalam' and of kalam procedure. Theology, for instance, also occurs in the treatise, or rather the epistle, writtoi by ^asan al-Baçri to the Caliph ‘Abdalmalik concerning the question of the free will ; but this is not kalâm. He simply expounds his opinions in answer to the Caliph. It is an exposition of a doctrine, but not kalâm in the proper sense. Kalâm is something else. Kalâm in Arabic is not defined by reference to its contents as, theo-logia, something about God, a logos about God, but it is defined in terms of its stylistic form, the dia lectical method of argumentation. If you effect a “ kalâm ” you have effected a speech. Y o u proceed, for instance, by a dilemma. You say: W e have one statement; if this statement is true, then there follows either A or B ; now I can prove that A is wrong, and I can also prove that B is wrong; therefore it follows that the statement itself is also wrong. This is a kalâm. A. s a b r a : I s this a definition o f kalâml J. VAN ess : This is a kalâm, the procedure used in kalâm which is called kalâm. So kalâm, therefore, in my opinion, here means a procedure. This is what is usually meant if you have a theological text and the word ^kalâm' appears in the title. In such a case, you have discussion about a topic that usually occurs according to a certain structure, by question and response, for instance. It is often something like an imaginary trial: One knows that a given individual has such and such an opinion; then somebody else asks this person: do you believe that?, he has to answer. This question and response scheme is frequently built up into the form of dilemmas. N ow, I wanted to find out at what time this peculiar structure o f thinking occurs for the first time. This is what I wanted to do, to ask about "'kalâm" in this restricted sense. And the result, for me at least, was that one does find this peculiar structure of thinking in the first century Hijra. Finally, my initial statement is imprecise in a third sense (3) because I am only interested in theology or in kalâm in a written form. I wanted to prove in my paper that kalâm existed in a written form since the year, say, 70 Hijra. N o w let me try to enumer ate the problems and the consequences involved in all of this. First, the results for the history of Arabic literature and the history of Arabic civili^tion. The most important problem here is that of early literacy. What I am maintain ing nieans that there were written texts not from the beginning, but from a very early date in the Hijra era. This has to be opposed to the popular dogmas of the importance of the oral tradition in Islam and of the amazing memory of the Arabs. It has been claimed, for example, that there was only, or mostly, an oral tradition in the first cen tury Hijra. I think that this idea is a bit romantic. Against it, early literacy is proved by the existence of early texts. If you recall my paper, you will notice that I wanted to prove that two texts, two theological texts, date from the first century Hijra, both written
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by the same author, a man named Çasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-^anafiyya who was a grandson o f the fourth Caliph ‘Ali, and who died about the year 100. Moreover, there are yet other texts. This, then, is the result for the history of literature: A certain proof of early literacy. Secondly, the consequences for the history of theology, sub-divided into two ques tions: (1) that of the origins of Islamic theology, and (2) that of the role of the theolo gian in society. First, then, the question of the origins of Islamic theology, and now not only of “ kalam structure,” but of theological endeavors on the whole. It seems, at least in the two texts that I found, that theology emerged or came about through the instigation of the Caliph; the Caliph may have initiated religious policy in the style of a Basileus. That is, the Caliph may have acted because o f political reasons - this is what I wanted to prove, at least to make probable, in my paper. It seems that he tried to appease the revolutionary elements; at first the extreme Shi'ites, and then the upholders of free will whom he tried to refute as well as appease. Perhaps (I don’t dare say obviously) he did the latter because free will meant responsibility, and responsibility meant control by others, even control of the Caliph. W e can show by the texts, for example, that the Qadarites upheld the opinion that the Caliph must be deposed if he commits grave sins, while, on the other hand, predestination can be used in order to show that the political power is simply a token of divine guidance. Secondly, there is the problem of the role of the mutakallimün, of the theologians, in society. It is an interesting point but a very difficult one; with it we perhaps come closest to one of the topics of our Colloquium. If we can prove that from the very beginning theology was connected with politics and that the Caliph tried to support theology as polemical, to use theology against his political opponents in the style of the Byzantine Basileus, then we can assume that this situation went on in the next decades and perhaps also during the next two centuries. You know that Heraclius, the last Basileus before the Muslim invasion, brought forth monotheletism in an attempt to make theological policy in his own realm; and you also know that only the Maronites remained o f this attempt because the Muslims then inundated the Byzantine empire. N ow the question is whether the mutakallimün were connected with the empire and with the Caliphate as well. I am not yet finished with this problem and can only refer to some possible rele vant evidence. The mutakallimün had to convert people. I am not sure whether they really accompanied the armies - as Pines tried to show in his last article - but I would point to the fact that the mutakallimün were invited to the court under the Abbasids and were used as ambassadors to unbelievers. R. h a s h e d : Because they were mutakallimünl j. VAN ESs: That is the problem. I cannot prove that it is so and I am really hesitant about it. W e only have stories in the biographies of the mutakallimün where the M u‘tazilites are praised for the fact that one of them was sent by Hârün al-Rashid to India in order to discuss theology with the so-called Sumaniyya. O f course, this is a legend and one is a little bit uncomfortable with it. W e need much more material and it is very difficult to enter into such, should I say, sociological questions. As a matter of fact, they are historical ones, but our texts are not written expressly to answer such ques tions; they are not interested in them as such; for them all that is involved went without saying. So we have to build up our conclusions from marginal remarks and this is always a rather difficult business. Still, operating under such limitations, I think that in these early times the mutakallimün - let us say even the whole religious class - were not yet an independent block. On the contrary, the state tried to establish theological policy by means of the mutakallimün. Recall, for example, the famous mihna, the in-
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quisition, the persecution of the naive believing people of Bagdhad, under M a ’mun. Here, it seems to have happened that, at one and the same time, we have to do with, on the one hand, a religious critique of the state or of the political power, and, on the other hand, with a critique oîkalàm , of theology. I think that this is rather significant. For only at that time, it seems to me, did the community and the class of religious people, theologians and jurists, start to regard themselves as independent of the religious authority of the Caliphs. This would mean that the conmion dogma proffered in all of the general surveys of Islam - that there is no difference between state and church in Islamic culture - is only true for perhaps the first two, two and a half, centuries. Not afterward, because then you have the jurists on one side and the Caliphs on the other. A. s a b r a : I would like to ask you whether, on the basis of your theory or hypothesis on the origin of kalam, you would venture to speculate about the nature of kalâm or its characteristics in general? That is, would you as a result of your view necessarily take this form, this style, to be the characteristic that distinguishes kalâm from other disciplines, or would you take something else as the key characteristic? J. VAN ESs: This is a problem. Kalâm is not always the same; we have I don’t know how many centuries of kalâm. Some years ago I thought that kalâm was essentially dialectical and polemical; the mutakallimün were always on the attack, they were destructive, negative, they did not build up. Now , I have changed my opinion. But I am not a systematician, I am still an historian with respect to the problem. I think I now know what caused my mistake in holding this earlier opinion. Two things. First, I was misled by Maimonides and al-Fârâbi, by all of those Aristotelians who saw kalâm as dialectic; of course, this fitted into their scheme. This is one thing. The second is the fact that at the beginning kalâm is for the most part polemical; but this has something to do with the situation. The Muslims were a minority. They were living in the towns, and even in the towns there were many Christians, Jews, Manicheans, and so forth so that they had to convert people, they had to polemicize against them, they had to convince them. A. s a b r a : When I became involved in kalâm, I noticed that all of the authorities who propagated the view that kalâm is polemical were enemies of kalâm. For example, Ibn Khaldün; he did not like kalâm and had no use for it, and it is not at all clear whether he knew much about it. As a matter of fact, it would seem that he hadn’t seen all those books that he talks about in the Muqaddimah. And the case is similar with men like Maimonides and al-Fârâbi. R. f r a n k : ‘Abd al-Jabbàr makes a distinction at one point: There is a question raised and he says that we can take that question either bi al-fariq al-Hlmi or bi al-tariq al-Jadali, that is, either in a way that would involve the science that we are dealing with or in a dialectical way. Then he immediately says that we could use the dialectical way to show that the question at hand really isn’t pertinent to the thesis under discussion and thus be rid of it. But, on the other hand, he proceeds to deal with the question because he says that the question is important, and so we should use the fariq 'ilm i, the scientific method, if you wish, in treating the question. In a sense, therefore, he is making a distinction between what is surely a dialectical argument, what happens when you » e opposing an opponent, and what happens when you pose a question as a / question within your own framework. A. s a b r a : Yüsuf! My question is still not answered. Kalâm is not polemics, although it may have started as polemics. It is not theology, because theology is only part of it. It is not this dialectical structure, because the dialectical structure is only a form and these people were not arguing for the sake of arguing. So what is it?
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j. VAN ess : I think that our problem is that you are always arguing in an “ ontologi cal” way, and I am always arguing in a “ nominalistic” way. Y ou want to know some thing about what kalâm is. I only wanted to explain where the word ‘kalâm' comes from. A. s a b r a : Yes, but as someone who has spent some time studying kalàm, what are your feelings about it? At one time you had the view that it is polemics, and now you have given that up. Why? J. VAN Ess: It depends upon the situation. I cannot say that kalâm is this or that; kalâm is seven centuries and even more o f texts. And &rst you would have to read these texts. R. f r a n k : I think that, after A bû Hâshim, you have to call it theology. A. s a b r a : Why do you have to call it theology? If you were to translate ‘theology’ into Arabic literally and then apply this word to what a mutakallim does in the section o f his work that deals with “ physics,” he would not accept it. He would tell you that ‘theology’ denotes the section that comes at the end when one talks about God. So why should we call it theology if they didn’t? But let me try another approach by asking the following question: If you were to ask a representative Christian theologian whether he had any source for his knowledge or belief in the existence of God other than a piece of reasoning which is based on something common to all humans - that is to say, either on experience or on the prin ciples of pure reason - what would his answer be? R. m c k e o n : They would have divided into two sorts. And this is true all the way back to St. Augustine. There were those who said that theology is an architectonic science and, therefore, all sciences would get their first principles from theology. And Augustine would talk about the signs, the images, and the vestiges, of God. Then there were others who said, no, there are two kinds of science; there are the theological sciences and there are the human sciences, and theology does not furnish the first principles of human sciences. A. s a b r a : Well, the reason I am asking this question is because for me a mutakallim is a man who would answer, “ N o.” That is to say, a mutakallim is a mutakallim if and only if, apart from a process of reasoning based on principles that are common to all human beings, he has no access whatsoever to knowledge o f the existence o f God. And these principles may be either empirical or non-empirical; they use the word (farwrf, “ necessary,” and the necessary includes both, it includes something like the law of identity, a logically necessary proposition, and it would also include that which is given in experience. J. VAN ESs: That is true, at least for the Mu'tazilites. A M u‘tazilite mutakallim would never rely on Scripture because he would say that Scripture is only true if there is a God who revealed this Scripture. Therefore, we have first to prove the existence of God. But if we could prove the existence of God by Scripture, we would have a vicious circle. In order to avoid the vicious circle we must prove the existence of God by ra tional means, and we are convinced right from the beginning that our results agree perfectly with Scripture. R. m c k e o n : But this is true of the Christian too. The Christian would not take Scrip ture, but would say that we must prove the existence of God and that we can do it in one of two ways. A. s a b r a : But are they rational? And if these ways are rational, are there besides these rational ways, ways that are not rational? R. m c k e o n : There are the a priori proofs and the a posteriori proofs. Both of them are rational, but those who hold to the a priori proofs say that the a posteriori are not
rational, and those who hold to the a posteriori proofs hold that the a priori are not
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rational. E. s y l l a : Isn’t there also revelation? a . s a b r a : Yes, that’s what I wanted. A mutakallim would not base his beliefs on
revelation. Yet what 1 am saying is that if you define a mutakallim with reference to his position vis-à-vis knowledge, then I can explain why the kalâm people were very often in opposition to not only philosophers, who would be committed to another theory o f knowledge as can very easily be shown, but would also be in opposition to the jurists whose position on knowledge also differs from theirs, and even in opposition to the mystics for similar reasons. That is to say, I can see the situation more clearly, I can understand why certain things happened in the history of kalâm vdth the help of this definition. r . r a s h e d : Someone like Ibn Taymiyya, is he a mutakallim or not? The problems treated by Ibn Taymiyya are in most cases problems of the mutakallimün. Yet Ibn Taymiyya is one who thinks that the existence of God is fifra (“ native to the mind”). A. s a b r a : Right, right. That is in agreement with my definition or criterion; that is why I don’t consider him a mutakallim. And that is why I would also not consider Ghazali a mutakallim, although he wrote on kalam. Why? If you read Ghazâli on kalâm, what he says is that there are certain intelligent people whose heart is in the r i ^ t place so to speak, but who have certain doubts about God because o f their intellectual bent or, maybe because they have also been exposed to philosophy or something like that. Thus, they are troubled. For such people, kalâm would be a good thing because, he hopes, through a study of kalâm they are going to get rid of these troubles. If you are not in that situation, then leave kalâm alone. It’s not for you. From which I would deduce, again, that Ghazâli is not a mutakallim. Why? Because a mutakallim is a man who starts from a fundamental distinction between belief and knowledge', he says that true belief may be something that you start with, perhaps because of your education, upbringing, or whatever, but that is not enough. In order to be a mutakallim, you have to reach knowledge. And to reach knowledge you have to trans form your belief into knowledge. Be careful. You don’t transform belief into knowledge by producing arguments for this belief. You are in fact involved in substituting some thing else for your belief because you are going to engage in a process of reasoning which has nothing to do - save perhaps by accident - with that belief. Once you reach that something else, that stage, then what you have is no longer belief, but knowledge. T. GREGORY: Je crois qu’on doit réfléchir sur la définition proposée par M. Sabra. D a bien raison de dire qu’il n’y a pas un kalâm qu’on puisse définir en dehors de l’oeuvre des mutakallimün. Par ailleurs il ne faut pas utiliser le mot “ théologie” et parler de théologie musulmane; il faut dire kalâm, qui est une chose tout à fait différente et particulière à la civilisation de l’Islam. Ainsi, je suis toujours heurté par mes collègues historiens de la philosophie du moyen âge qui utilisent le mot “ théologie” pour définir la position de S. Augustin. Pour S. Augustin, le mot “ théologie” n’a que le sens de Varron: mythologie; aussi on doit être très prudent en parlant de la théologie de S. Augustin ou de la théologie de S. Anselme, ne serait-ce que parce que ils n’avaient pas le mot. De même, il faut dire pour la civilisation de l’Islam: “ kalâm” , pas “ théologie” . Si nous acceptons complètement la définition de M. Sabra, on doit même dire qu’il y a les kalâm - au pluriel - des mutakallimün', on ne peut pas individualiser quelquechose de méta-historique. Dans l’historiographie occidentale, par exemple, il y a longtemps une historiographie thomiste qui définissait la théologie des théologiens du
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moyen âge selon ses rapports avec la théologie de Thomas d’Aquin. Ici, nous avons une réalité plus historique; et il y a les kalâm, qui sont les fruits de la spéculation des mutakallimün. M . Sabra a posé la question: quel est le rapport entre la croyance, la foi et l’intellect? C ’est toujours un équilibre instable, et chaque mutakallîm a résolu le problème pour lui-même. Il n’y a pas une orthodoxie dans l’Islam comme dans la réligion chrétienne. C ’est plus facile d’y tenir des positions différentes. On ne peut que dire: les kalâm, ce sont l’oeuvre des mutakallimün. On doit d’ailleurs toujours tenter de faire sortir la définition d’une certaine discipline de l’oeuvre de ceux qui l’ont pratiquée. A. s a b r a : In fact, the theory of knowledge that I outlined is not only the Mu'tazilite theory, it is also the theory o f the leading Ash'arites. So it is not restricted to one school, but to these two largest schools. N. s h e h a b y : Sabra, it seems to me that we can use neither the word ‘theology’ nor the word ‘kalâm’. For you want to restrict kalâm to a particular genre of writing. You take certain characteristics that you find in certain writings that you don’t find in others such as those of Ghazâli or Ibn Taymiyya, and you say “ I call that, or that part of the corpus, kalâm." A. s a b ra : I am trying to identify the discipline and a group of people at the same time. These people existed as groups, the kalâm people, the fuqahâ' (the jurists), the philosophers (Jalâsifa) and so on; they existed as groups that had certain commitments, they subscribed to certain things that were in conflict with one another, and I feel that I have to understand this situation as well as the doctrine. It seems to me that the two go together. For it seems that, save for some residual puzzles or problems here and there, if you take knowledge as a criterion, I can distinguish between all of these groups. R. r a s h e d : Excuse me. M . Van Ess, I have a question now: D o you agree with this definition of kalâml j. VAN ESs: I am not quite sure. Yours is the systematical approach; therefore, you are concerned with defining things. Mine was the historical approach, I only wanted to know where it is that the word ‘kalâm’ is used for the first time. A. s a b r a : Perhaps so, but I take it that producing a definition or criterion is part of the attempt to understand the situation historically. Yes, it is systematic in a way, but I am interested in historical explanation, I want to understand the historical situation. And I believe the definition helps. R. r a s h e d : I should like to follow this whole debate about defining kalâm with another question and ask you if it is possible to give a social explanation, or any kind o f explanation, of the beginnings of kalâml J. VAN ess : I cannot go beyond what I have already said. The only thing that I thought I could render probable was that the earliest examples of theology we have seem to owe their existence to the political intentions of the Caliph. But this, of course, is not a sociological explanation. I am unable to say anything about the social back ground of kalâm, and of the mutakallimün, at that time. I would, perhaps, be able to find some examples for the social background in ‘Abbàsid times where we have more texts. But even then, when you read the text, you feel a certain amount of desperation. R. r a s h e d : I am more convinced now than ever that it is impossible to examine a question o f origins. J. VAN ESs: Perhaps you expect too much of an Islamicist. Islamic studies are one century behind Latin medieval studies; there are only a few Arabicists. Islamic studies means everything about Islam, not simply Islamic theology, but also philosophy, litera ture, law, even music and whatever else you may wish. It is impossible to give ready
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results about all of this. W e are at the very beginning of things, as perhaps the classical philologists were in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; we are acting like the humanists. So to ask social questions may be good, but at present you will get either no answer or only vague answers. J. MURDOCH: But I thought that I heard you say that part of the origin or the devel opment of what the mutakallimün were doing had to do with the necessity of conversion within the villages. J. VAN ess : Perhaps. This was a mere suggestion. I have but two or three texts that’s all. J. MURDOCH: But you are in better shape than the classicists. There, for the question, especially the social question, o f the origins of natural philosophy in the sixth century B.C., there are almost no texts at all. J. VAN ESS: Well, we have about two million Arabic or Persian manuscripts in the world. There are more than 500,000 in Istanbul alone. Only a small percentage of the texts - perhaps six or seven per cent - are known and printed. O f the rest, you may know a few titles if you are patient enough to go through the catalogues. But many of the titles of the works are not even known, not to speak of the contents. Therefore, Arabic studies are simple and difiicult at the same time. They are difficult because Arabic is a diflBcult language; one has to learn it. They are simple, because once you know Arabic, you need only go to Istanbul, take any manuscript, try to read it, write an article on it with the title: “ W e read for you....” And that’s it. R. r a s h e d : Things are better for you than they are for us in the history of Islamic science.
M U H SIN M A H D I
S C IE N C E , P H I L O S O P H Y , A N D R E L I G I O N I N A L F A R A B I’ S E N U M E R A T IO N O F T H E S C IE N C E S *
I. P R E L I M I N A R Y R E M A R K S
One o f the striking features o f classical Islamic philosophy is the prom inence o f political philosophy and the incorporation o f jurisprudence and theology into philosophy by subordinating them to political philosophy. During the ten centuries that separated Cicero from Alfarabi, one cannot point to a single great philosopher for whom the problem o f philosophy was inseparable from the problem o f political philosophy or in whose writings political philosophy occupies a massive, central, or decisive position. Political philosophy may not be totally absent from pagan and Christian Platonism in the Hellenistic period, but it is marginal and sub terranean, or else overwhelmed by metaphysics, theology, and mysticism.i O f Alfarabi’s political works, the fifth chapter o f the Enumeration o f the Sciences, entitled “ On Political Science, the Science o f Jurisprudence, and the Science o f Theology” (“ De scientia ciuili...., et de scientia iudicandi, et de scientia eloquendi” or “ D e scientia ciuili et scientia legis et scientia elocutionis” ), is perhaps the earliest and best known statement on political science in the Middle Ages. It was available in Arabic as well as in Hebrew and Latin translations. And it was known through summaries, para phrases, and quotations in all these languages. It was intended as an in troductory statement and forms part o f a book intended for the beginner, a contribution to general education, as it were. It is a good text with which to begin. Since Alfarabi wrote a few other introductory statements o f this sort, it is worthwhile to look first at his Introduction where he states what he intends to do in this book in particular. Alfarabi’s intention is to enumer ate the “ generally known” (mashhüra) sciences and make known their content, parts, and the content o f each part (43.4-6). The book is divided into five chapters, covering (1) the science o f language, (2) the science o f logic, (3) the sciences o f mathematics, (4) natural science and divine
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Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 113-147.
M. M A H D I
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science (metaphysics), and (5) political science, the science o f jurispru
The fourth chapter includes, not one, but two sciences (natural science
dence, and the science o f theology. The uses to which one can put the
and divine science [metaphysics]). And the fifth chapter includes three
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content o f the book are also five in number. First, the student who wants
sciences (political science, the science o f jurisprudence, and the science o f
to learn and inquire into any one o f these sciences will know to what he
theology), which are simply listed without indicating what they have in
should turn and into what he should inquire, and also the benefit o f learning or inquiring into that science. Second, one can use the book to
common. When we turn from the Introduction to the divisions and subdivisions
compare the sciences as to their excellence, utility, precision, and so on.
o f the book’s five chapters, we find the following arrangement. (1) The
Third, it can be used to test the claim o f an ignorant man who pretends to
science o f language is divided into seven “ major” parts; the seventh, the
know a science by asking him to enumerate its parts and give its content.
science o f the rules that govern poems, is subdivided into three parts. (2)
Fourth, it can be used to test someone who knows a certain science so as
The science o f logic is divided into eight parts, the first three o f which deal
to find out how much o f it he knows. Finally, the book can be used by some
with the rules o f syllogism in general and its parts, and the rest deal with
one who is after a quick education, and likes to learn the outline o f every
the rules o f the five modes o f reasoning proper. (3) The science o f mathe
science, imitate the men o f science, and be thought to belong to them.
matics, like the science o f language, is divided into seven “ major” parts,
The five uses are thus intended for different kinds o f readers. The first
o f which the second, the science o f geometry, is subdivided into two parts
two are for the student who wants to learn. He will make use o f it to know,
and the fifth, the theoretical science o f music, is subdivided into five
first, what he is about to engage in. But the book is also meant to be useful
“ major” parts. (4) Natural science, like the science o f logic, is divided
to the student who wants, not just to “ learn” a science, but to “ inquire
into eight parts, but these are eight “ major” parts; and divine science is
into” it, compare it with other sciences, and learn the relative excellence,
divided into three parts. (5) Political science, the science o f jurisprudence,
utility, precision, and so on, o f all the sciences. This seems to be the high
and the science o f theology, finally, are each divided into two parts. So,
est positive use o f the book. So far as the genuine student o f science is concerned, this book is a beginning and an end : he begins with it before
the five chapters cover a total o f eight sciences, divided into thirty-nine
he goes on to study the individual sciences, and he comes back to it after
Three o f the thirty-nine parts (the seventh, the seventeenth, and the
having studied them to learn what he should “ inquire into” and about
twentieth, all o f which are “ major” parts) are subdivided into a total o f
their relative rank and excellence. The next two uses are meant for testing
ten parts, o f which five are “ major” and five are not “ major.” In the center
others, both those who merely claim to know and those whose knowledge
o f both the thirty-nine and the forty-nine parts stands the theoretical
parts, o f which twenty-two are “ major” and seventeen are not “ major.”
is incomplete. Alfarabi does not state the qualities o f the man who will do
science o f music, the fifth part o f the book’s third or central chapter; and,
the testing. The assumption is that it will be someone who himself is
like the book as a whole, it is divided into five major parts. Finally, three
ignorant o f these sciences, but likes to test others, and will therefore read this book for that purpose. The last use, too, is somewhat problematic.
o f the eight sciences (natural science, divine science, and political science, which have a total o f thirteen parts) are set apart from the other five
Merely to learn the outline o f every science and to appear to be learned
(and their twenty-six parts or, with their subdivisions, thirty-six parts) by
do not seem particularly worthy objectives. A ll one can say is that, at this
emphasizing the substantive “ science” rather than its subject matter, with
initial stage, it is difficult to distinguish between the genuine and spurious
the consequence that one cannot easily separate the “ science” from its
student or between the potential philosopher and the potential sophist. Alfarabi’s enumeration o f the sciences is not conventional or haphaz
subject matter - one cannot, for instance, say “ natural” instead o f “ nat
ard. The book consists o f five chapters and has five uses (43-44). Atten
ural science” as one can say “ language” instead o f the “ science o f lan guage.” Even without going into fancy numerological notions, the nu
tion is drawn to the third or central chapter on the sciences o f mathematics,
merology o f the Enumeration o f the Sciences calls attention to a number
whose seven divisions are enumerated in the Introduction (43.7-9 ; cf. 75.3).
o f peculiarities for which there are no ready or conventional answers.
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Why is the science o f mathematics so central? W hy are the science o f the
is the final authority. N ow , compared with these two classifications,
rules that govern poems, the science o f geometry, and the theoretical
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science o f music emphasized by giving them subdivisions? Why is divine
Alfarabi’s classification is “ unprecedented” and follows a “ method which had not been followed by anyone else .” 2 it ignores the principle under
science (metaphysics) combined with natural science in the same chapter?
lying the classification o f the philosophic sciences into practical and theo
And why is political science combined with the science o f jurisprudence
retical as well as the principle underlying the classification o f all the sciences
and the science o f theology?
into rational or philosophic and traditional or religious. His “ generally
One way to see how Alfarabi puts his building blocks together is to
known” sciences encompass more than the philosophic sciences. They
compare their arrangement with other generally known arrangements o f
include the sciences o f language, and the science o f jurisprudence and the
the sciences. These are basically two. The first is the Aristotelian classifi
science o f theology, which no one before had classified as philosophic
cation o f the philosophic sciences into theoretical sciences (mathematics,
sciences. These traditional or religious sciences are integrated into the
physics, and metaphysics) and practical sciences (ethics, politics, and
philosophic sciences. Y et their integration is not effected on the basis o f
economics). The second is a more comprehensive classification o f all the
the principle underlying either o f the two generally known classifications.
sciences, both philosophic and non-philosophic, which existed in the Islamic community. The principle o f this latter classification is not the
II. S C I E N C E , A R T , A N D P H I L O S O P H Y
distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy or science, but rather the distinction between philosophy (or science as defined by phi
Looking again at the five chapters that make up the Enumeration o f the
losophy) and other disciplines that are not philosophic or scientific in the
Sciences one notices that in a number o f places Alfarabi departs from the
sense that they owe their principles, methods, and conclusions (but espe
program announced in the Introduction. Indeed, almost one-third o f the
cially their principles or premises), to unaided human reason. Depending
book consists o f digressions in which Alfarabi discusses subjects that fall
on how one looked at the source o f the principles or premises o f these
outside the enumeration o f the generally known sciences and their parts
sciences, they were called Arabic, traditional, legal, or Islamic sciences.
and sub-parts and content. As I see it, there are seven such digressions.
They included two main branches : the sciences o f language - that is, the
(1) The first occurs at the beginning o f the first chapter where Alfarabi
Arabic language - which were considered instrumental or propaedeutic,
defines “ rules” {qawânîn) and their relation to “ arts” (^anaH^) and “ in
and the religious sciences - that is, the Islamic religious sciences - which
strument” (aid) (45.6^6.8). The second, third, and fourth occur in the
included the Koranic sciences and the sciences o f the Tradition o f the
second chapter, whose arrangement is curious in that only a small part o f
Prophet (these being the primary sources o f religious doctrine and prac
it (70.6-72.10) enumerates the parts o f the science o f logic. It begins with
tice), and such ancillary sciences as jurisprudence and theology. A ll these
(2) a lengthy “ report” on the utility o f logic, its subject matter, and the
sciences were also considered indigenous because their subject matter was
meaning o f the title “ logic” (54.16-63.13). This is followed by (3) an ex
originally given or articulated by the convention o f a particular nation or
position o f the classes o f syllogism, syllogistic arts, syllogistic statements,
by revelation, and distinguished from the foreign sciences or the sciences
and the major and minor parts o f syllogistic statements (63.14-70.5).
o f the ancients, whose subject matter is given or articulated by nature or
And, after the enumeration o f the parts o f logic, the chapter concludes
human reason. Broadly speaking, the difference between the traditional
with (4) a defense o f the primacy o f the “ fourth part” in relation to the
or religious and the rational or philosophic sciences was understood in the following way. T o find out whether a linguistic expression or religious
other seven parts o f logic (72.11-74.13). In the enumeration o f the eight parts o f logic, this fourth part was said to contain “ the rules o f the affairs
belief is correct, one must go back to linguistic usage or the revealed texts,
that make up philosophy and everything by which its [philosophy’s] ac
which are the final authority in such matters; while to know whether a
tivities become more complete, excellent, and perfect” (71.3^). (5) The fifth occurs in the third chapter, after enumerating arithmetic and geo
mathematical or natural law is correct, one observes and thinks, and this
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metry; it comments on the principles and methods o f these two sciences
expressions and the science o f compound expressions) can be said to con
and on Euclid’s exclusive use o f synthesis in the Elements (79.5-12).
sist o f direct knowledge o f their subject matter, which is made up o f many
(6) The sixth occurs at the beginning o f the fourth chapter and consists o f
individual things (words, speeches, poems). This is not true o f the last five,
an extended discussion o f natural and artificial bodies (91.7-95.11). (7)
i.e., the science o f the rules o f simple expressions (phonetics and mor
The last occurs at the end o f the fifth chapter and details the ways in which
phology), the science o f the rules o f compound expressions (prefixes and
theologians defend their religions (108.10-113.7). I will try to show that
suffixes, and syntax), the science o f the rules o f correct writing, the science
the general purpose o f these digressions is to clarify the relation between
o f the rules o f correct reading, and the science o f the rules o f poetry
“ science,” “ art,” and “ philosophy,” and contribute to an understanding o f their ranks o f order (cf. 44.2-4 with 113.8).
(metrics, verse-endings, proper usage). Unlike the first two, these last five
In the expression “ the science o f language” the term “ science” is ini
knowledge o f the general rules that govern these expressions, arranged in
tially used in a broad sense: it includes the ability to memorize and recite and, in general, all powers and occupations that are useful or necessary
an orderly manner so as to encompass the behavior o f certain parts or aspects or groups o f expressions under certain conditions, e.g., when
conditions for possessing knowledge or perfecting it, but are not them
spoken, written, used in poems, and so on. Occasionally, Alfarabi calls
selves knowledge. Next, it is restricted to knowledge as distinguished from
what appears to be one or another o f the last five parts (e.g., writing and
these ancillary conditions. For instance, the “ science” o f simple expres
grammar) an “ art,” as when he Hsts “ writing” along with “ medicine,
sions (lexicography) may require one to memorize the simple expressions
husbandry, and carpentry” (45.14-15) or when, in Chapter II, he com
in a particular language, but in a more strict sense the lexicographer’s
pares the “ art o f logic” with the “ art o f grammar.” But in such cases
parts do not consist o f direct knowledge o f individual expressions, but o f
science is knowledge o f the meaning or signification o f each o f these ex
“ art” does not necessarily mean the same thing as “ science,” for one may
pressions (45.3-4). Further, only two parts o f the science o f language (the
have the “ science o f the rules o f correct writing” without being able to
science o f simple expressions and the science o f compound expressions)
write correctly, let alone elegantly or artistically. Alfarabi argues that the
consist o f knowledge o f the significations o f expressions. The other five
“ science o f the rules” is useful and even indispensable for the correct
parts are sciences in a still more restricted sense in that they deal with the
practice o f the art, but not sufficient for practicing it well. In any case,
“ rules” that govern these expressions. While originally and according to
Alfarabi persists in calling each one o f the last five parts o f the science o f
the ancients a rule meant any instrument or practical device used to
language the “ science o f the rules o f ” whatever these rules govern ; he does
protect the practitioner o f an art against error (e.g., the plumb line), to
not identify any o f them as “ art,” nor does he explain how it may serve or
encompass everything in his art so that nothing escapes him (e.g., arith
is related to a corresponding art. Finally, and unlike the direct knowledge
metical tables), or to facilitate an overview o f the content o f his art (e.g.,
o f the expressions o f a particular language which makes up the first two
the outline o f a long book), Alfarabi uses the term in a more general way.
parts o f the science o f language, the sciences o f the rules o f these expres
A rule is a “ universal, that is, comprehensive statement” that embraces
sions afford Alfarabi the opportunity to compare various languages and
many individual things belonging to an “ art,” It is only when a number o f such rules are formed and brought together in the mind according to a
indicate the common subject matter o f many o f these rules, even though the names given to linguistic phenomena and to linguistic habits may be
definite order that an art with a particular subject matter is formed ; it is
different in different languages. Still, the science o f language in all its parts
only through these rules and their proper ordering that an art stakes out
deals with a particular language, its expressions, and their rules. Even
a field o f its own and excludes what belongs to other arts, discovers its
where it deals with rules that are analogues in or common to a number o f
own errors, and facilitates its own learning and preservation. This is true
or all languages, it is concerned with these rules in so far as and in the
o f “ all the arts, whether practical or theoretical” (45.15). T o return to the
manner they apply to a particular language. The treatment o f what is
parts o f the science o f language, the first two parts (the science o f simple
common to the languages o f all nations belongs to logic.
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In the chapter “ On the Science o f Logic” Alfarabi speaks o f “ logic,”
form an activity, all arts are o f course practical. In Chapter II, when speak
the “ rules o f logic,” the “ science o f logic,” the “ science o f the rules o f
ing o f the innate power o f reason or speech, Alfarabi says “ it is the power
logic,” and the “ art o f logic.” Unlike the seven parts o f the science o f lan
by which man acquires the intelligibles, the sciences, and the arts, by which
guage, however, none o f the eight parts o f logic is called a “ science.”
deliberation takes place, and by which he distinguishes noble from base
Strictly speaking, none o f them is called an “ art” either. Each part is said
actions.” Here, the “ arts” are grouped together with the “ sciences” and
to be made up o f “ rules” or “ statements,” which means that the distinc
the acquired intelligibles, and separated from the deliberative and moral
tion between the two kinds o f science that obtained in Chapter I is no
- that is, the two practical - faculties. Since the aim o f logic is the correct
longer relevant; all o f logic is o f the “ science o f the rules o f ” type and no
development o f this innate power or reason or speech as a whole, the “ art”
part o f it deals with individual things. Logic deals with the rules o f in
o f logic would appear to be the overarching art, the so-called art o f arts.
telligibles. These rules, like the rules o f grammar and prosody, and such
But as we turn to consider the eight parts o f logic, we learn that none o f
instruments as balances, rulers, and the pairs o f dividers, are meant to test
them is an “ art.” Each is made up o f a set o f rules employed in what are
the intelligibles in which one is subject to error, i.e., the ones apprehended
called the “ syllogistic arts.” On first view, one may get the impression that
by reflection and inference and reasoning iqiyâs). It is argued that logic is
these arts are “ logical arts,” and that the first three parts o f logic (dealing
necessary for whoever does not wish to base his convictions on mere
with the rules o f single intelligibles, o f propositions, and o f syllogisms
opinion, but on knowledge and insight. As to the argument that logic is
common to the five syllogistic arts) contain rules that are employed by
not necessary, or that experience in dialectical arguments and discussions, experience in mathematics (geometry and arithmetic), or a perfect innate
the “ arts” o f logic, which are presumably the last five parts o f logic; demonstration, dialectic, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetics. But this impres
disposition, may be enough to insure correctness in any o f the sciences
sion is false. Each o f the last five parts o f logic, too, is said to consist o f
- this argument is said to deserve the same answer as the argument that
rules, but now they are said to be rules by which one examines or tests a
experience or a perfect innate disposition are substitutes for the rules o f
special kind o f statements, the ones that belong to the “ arts” o f demon
grammar as means for testing correct language. Unlike grammar, which
stration, dialectic, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetics, respectively. One must,
tests the correctness o f expressions in a particular language, logic tests the
then, distinguish between, e.g., the rules by which one examines dialec
correctness o f expressions in so far as they designate the intelligibles in any
tical statements and the dialectical statements themselves or the “ affairs
language ; it gives rules regarding such expressions in so far as they are com
that make up the art o f dialectic and by which its activities become more
mon to all languages. Further, it gives rules for the correctness o f the intelli
perfect, excellent, and effective” (71.6-8). Alfarabi does not say that there
gibles themselves as they are in the mind, as inner speech. In doing these
are five logical arts; what he says is that there are five “ syllogistic arts” ;
two things, logic aims at the correct development o f the innate power that
and, when he expounds the character o f each o f these arts in the third
distinguishes man as man, so that this power may perform its activity
digression, he is not speaking about the (logical) rules by which one
(inner thought and the expression o f thought) in the most correct manner
examines what makes up each o f these syllogistic arts, but about the
possible. This power can be described as the ability to make a statement
syllogistic arts themselves. The distinction between syllogistic and non-
(an inner speech or an external expression) with which one corrects or
syllogistic arts is not based on whether an art does or does not employ
verifies an opinion, which the ancients (Aristotle) call qiyàs: reasoning or
reasoning or syllogism, but on the character o f the ultimate activity
syllogism. When properly selected and compounded and arranged, the
o f the art (the activity that proceeds from it after it is perfected). Only
intelligibles and the rules that govern them form the subject matter o f the science or art o f logic.
demonstration, dialectic, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetics are arts whose
In Chapter I Alfarabi referred in passing to the distinction between
in speech or argument. Other arts, e.g., medicine, employ reasoning and syllogism too, but this is not their ultimate activity; when the art
practical and theoretical arts. In the sense that they do something or per
ultimate activity consists in the employment o f reasoning or syllogism
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o f medicine is perfected and moves on to perform its ultimate activity, it
and as it were instruments that are more or less useful for the fourth part
heals the sick. In turn, this does not mean that the arts whose ultimate activ
or whose exposition is meant to alert the one who seeks the “ certain truth”
ity is to employ reasoning or syllogism may not lead to practical activities o f
against the danger o f falling, unawares, into the use o f one o f the four
abstention from practical activities. Indeed, they all do. However, as
methods (parts 5-8). The exposition o f the latter (parts 5-8) for their own
syllogistic arts, they produce this practical activity by means o f the kind o f
sake and for the service they render the practitioners o f the art corre
reasoning or syllogism they employ rather than by doing or making any
sponding to each, is only a “ secondary intention” o f logic. According to
thing else. Two o f these arts, rhetoric and poetics, are arts in this sense as
its primary intention, logic as a whole is said to provide the “ certain
well as crafts {sinà'^a as well as san^^a), that is, arts o f making various
methods,” to aim at the “ certain science,” and to help one guard against
classes o f speeches and poems (71.13-12, 72.5-6). Finally, Alfarabi says
the use o f methods that lead to mere opinion or an image o f the truth.
that each one o f the eight parts o f logic is to be found “ in a book” and
Now , the fourth part o f logic corresponds to the first syllogistic art, the art
122
proceeds to give an account o f what is “ in” each o f these eight books (the
o f demonstration or the art that employs demonstrative statements which
traditional six books o f the Organon and the Rhetoric and the Poetics).
produce the “ certain science.” Alfarabi’s account o f this part is as follows.
This account makes it clear that while each one o f these eight books
“ In the fourth [part o f logic, or the book that contains it] are (a) the rules
includes the rules o f the respective part o f logic, it may include other
by which one examines demonstrative (burhàniyya) statements and (b) the
things as well, e.g., in the case o f the Rhetoric and the Poetics, an account
rules o f the affairs that make up philosophy and everything by which its
o f the arts o f rhetoric and poetics, an account o f the craft o f making rhe
[philosophy’s] activities become more complete, excellent, and perfect”
torical speeches and poems, and so forth. Then, all the content o f these
(71.3-4). Our first impulse is to identify “ demonstrative statements” or
eight books is identified as the subject o f the “ art” or “ science” o f logic,
the art o f demonstration with “ philosophy,” especially in view o f the fact
resulting in the kind o f ambiguity that has bedeviled historians o f logic. T o resume, each one o f the eight parts o f the “ science” or “ art” o f logic
that in at least two other (logical) works Alfarabi appears to use the expres sions “ art o f demonstration” and “ art o f philosophy” interchangeably
contains certain rules (i.e., universal statements) governing the parts o f
{Introductory ‘Risalah’ on Logic, 211, Expressions, 107-108), and o f the
the syllogism (1-2), or by which one tests the syllogisms common to the
fact that he “ translates” the titles P rior Analytics and Posterior Analytics
five syllogistic arts (3), or by which one tests only the particular kind o f
as “ Syllogism” and “ Demonstration” respectively (71.1-2,71.5). Further,
syllogism employed by the art o f demonstration (4), dialectic (5), soph
in these other two works “ philosophy” or the “ art o f philosophy” is said
istry (6), rhetoric (7), or poetics (8). They are, strictly speaking, instru
to contain certain “ parts” or “ arts” or “ sciences,” which are four in
ments o f the five arts o f reasoning. Historians o f logic need not therefore
number (the science o f mathematics, natural science, divine science, and
be puzzled about Alfarabi’s incorporation o f the “ practical arts”
of
political science; this last called also “ political philosophy” and “ practi
rhetoric and poetics into the Organon. The arts o f rhetoric and poetry
cal philosophy” ), which seems to explain the arrangement or the remain
are no more logical arts or parts o f logic than the arts o f sophistry,
ing chapters o f the Enumeration o f the Sciences. The primary intention o f logic is to provide rules for the art o f demonstration or philosophy, which
dialectic, or demonstration. Whether and to what extent any o f these traditional arrangement o f the Organon (as can be seen from the ambigu
consists o f four parts or arts or sciences, and these will be treated, in the order just enumerated, in Chapters III-V . But we must also consider the
ous status o f the arts o f sophistry and dialectic) did not answer either.
following difficulties. This view leads us to expect a “ demonstrative”
Chapter I I culminates in a digression in praise o f the fourth part o f logic as the part that is “ most emphatically prior in dignity and supe
political or practical science. Alfarabi’s account o f the fourth part o f logic is explicit about the fact that it contains two sets o f rules; and the rules by
riority” and as being the “ primary intention” o f logic, while the other
which one examines demonstrative statements are clearly separated from
parts are either preparatory or introductory to it (parts 1-3), or else aides
the “ rules o f the affairs that make up philosophy.” (W e may believe that
arts is “ practical” or “ theoretical” is an independent question which the
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125
these “ affairs” include demonstrative statements, but we have no reason to
o f theoretical and practical music among the arts and sciences invites com
assert that that is all they include. In any case, Aristotle’s Posterior Ana
parison with political science and political activity.) The names o f the
lytics will not support such an assertion.) Finally, the two other works to
remaining three parts o f mathematics do not seem to present serious
which we have just referred do not give an account o f the parts o f phi
problems. The science o f aspects (optics [3]) is a special field o f (theoret
losophy, but merely mention them. It is therefore useful to see whether
ical) geometry and is called an “ art.” And the science o f weights (6) deals
the suggestion o f a thoroughly demonstrative philosophy is born out by
with the principles governing two kinds o f instruments (balances and
Alfarabi’s account o f the sciences in the remaining parts o f the Enumera tion o f the Sciences.
lifts); while the science o f (mechanical) devices (7) deals with the applica
Like the seven “ major” parts o f the science o f language, each o f the
instruments, and in general the “ principles o f practical, political arts.”
seven “ major” parts o f the science or sciences o f mathematics (cf.75.2-3 with 43.7) is called a “ science.” In the case o f four o f them, Alfarabi ex
T o summarize. There appear to be two purely theoretical mathematical
plains “ what is [generally] understood by this name,” and it turns out
mathematical astronomy seem to be more specialized mathematical sci
that in every case the name is ambiguous. In the case o f arithmetic (1)
ences or arts. And weights and mechanical devices merely apply some o f
and geometry (2), the name “ science” covers two “ sciences,” one “ prac
the things discovered in other mathematical sciences or arts and serve
tical” and the other “ theoretical.” Only theoretical arithmetic and theo
specialized practical, political arts. Theoretical and practical music form
retical geometry, which investigate their respective subject matter as such,
a parallel structure that descends from theoretical knowledge (knowledge
bility o f mathematical knowledge to natural bodies, the production o f
sciences, theoretical arithmetic and theoretical geometry. Optics and
absolutely, or without qualification, are “ to be included among the sci
o f notes and melodies as intelligibles) to the actual production o f melodies.
ences.” Practical arithmetic and practical geometry, though generally
The generally understood name “ science” covers all o f these things; it
called “ sciences,” are not in fact sciences. They investigate their subject
covers theoretical sciences that are sciences in the genuine sense, theoret
matter as applied to bodies “ in which the multitude deals in market
ical sciences that are also arts (but not practical arts), and practical sci
transactions and political transactions” and bodies that are the materials
ences that give the principles o f the particular practical, political arts.
o f various artisans (carpenters, blacksmiths, builders, and farmers), i.e., in
This should make it clear already that the science or sciences o f math
each case the material o f a special “ practical art.” In the case o f the science
ematics cannot be a single, thoroughly demonstrative, art. Demonstration
o f the stars (4), the name “ science” covers two things, which are not dis
in the highest sense - that is, giving the causes and explaining the “ why”
tinguished by Alfarabi as practical science and theoretical science. They
- is mentioned twice only, in connection with geometry and optics, which
are (a) judgments o f the stars (astrology), which is merely a power or
is a special field o f geometry (78.8, 80.11). (When “ demonstration” is
vocation that enables man to fortell the future, and mathematical astron
mentioned again in connection with mechanical devices [88.12-13, 89.3],
omy, which is “ the one to be counted among the sciences and included in
it refers to things whose “ existence” only is demonstrated in mathemat
mathematics.” In the case o f the science o f music (5), finally, the name
ics.) Otherwise, mathematics for the most part “ inquires,” “ investigates,”
“ science” covers two sciences, one “ practical” and the other “ theoretical.”
etc., but does not demonstrate, which means that there are inquiries or
But practical music is not called an art; the theoretical, on the other hand,
investigations that are theoretical and lead to “ certain science,” but are not
is called an “ art,” but it is not said to be “ the one to be included (or
demonstrative. After enumerating theoretical arithmetic and theoretical
counted) among the sciences.” Theoretical music covers the principles
geometry, Alfarabi interrupts his enumeration to remind the reader that
and causes o f notes and melodies, their composition, adaptation to musi
geometry consists o f foundations and principles, which are limited, and
cal instruments, the manner o f their production, etc., up to, but not in
other things derived from these, which are unlimited. Then he adds:
cluding, their actual production in natural or artificial instruments, which
“ There are two methods o f inquiring into it [geometry], the method o f
is the work o f the practical musician. (The uncertainty regarding the place
analysis (tahlti) and the method o f synthesis (tarktb). The ancient prac
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titioners o f this science used to combine in their books both methods,
matics in the way that logic assumed the sciences o f language. Instead, the
except Euclid who organized the content o f his book [the Elements] ac
reader is invited to consider artificial bodies, the products o f the practical
cording to the method o f synthesis alone” (79.9-12), (In the Harmoniza
arts, as analogues o f natural bodies. Such things as “ body” (e.g., a garment)
tion, 8.20ff., the “ affair” o f division [qisma] and synthesis [tarkîb\ with
and “ attributes constituted by the body” (its smoothness), the “ agent” that
respect to giving a complete account o f definitions is compared to climbing
brings it about (the weaver), “ purpose” and “ end” (warmth), “ form”
and descending from the same ladder and the two are said to be quite
(interweave o f warp and w oof) and “ matter” (the yarn), are said to be
different.) Here, then, we have one o f the important “ affairs that make up
more apparent in artificial bodies. Most o f them can be observed directly
philosophy” - the method, indeed, that leads to the discovery o f the prin
by sense-perception, and the rest (e.g., the intoxicating power o f wine and
ciples o f theoretical science in general - that is not covered by demonstra
the healing power o f medicines) can be seen indirectly through observing
tion. In the Enumeration o f the Sciences Alfarabi confines himself to
the activities o f artificial bodies. Because the principles o f artificial bodies
126
hinting at the importance o f this method and at his view that theoretical
and o f their attributes are better known to the “ multitude” {jumhUr) than
science and philosophy includes more than demonstrative statements.
the principles o f their natural counterparts, the multitude give the names
The view o f theoretical science or philosophy that restricts it to demon
o f the principles better known to them to the natural principles and treat
strative statements is, in a sense, a generally known view o f science, too.
the two sets o f principles as though they were the same. “ It is customary
Since the Enumeration o f the Sciences enumerates the generally known
in the arts,” on the other hand, “ to transfer to the things contained in them
sciences, the structure o f each o f its chapters imitates Euclid’s Elements,
the names that the multitude apply to the likenesses o f those things”
starting, as it were, from the top o f the ladder and descending to the
(95.6-8). The principles o f natural bodies are less apparent than the prin
ground, to the principles o f the practical, political arts employed by the
ciples o f artificial bodies, most o f their forms and matters cannot be ob
multitude in the marketplace and the city.
served by sense-perception, and “ for us, their existence can only be verified by reasoning and certain demonstrations” (94.1-2). Y et Alfarabi gives no reasoning or demonstration to prove the existence o f any o f the principles
III. N A T U R A L , D I V I N E , A N D P O L I T I C A L SC I E N C E
o f natural bodies, let alone the cause o f their existence. The eight “ major”
The sixth and seventh digressions introduce the fourth chapter and con
parts o f natural science (which are arranged in a descending order, from
clude the fifth, setting the two chapters and the five sciences they include
the principles common to all natural bodies to stones, plants, and ani
apart from the rest o f the book. The exposition o f natural science has the
mals) “ inquire” and “ investigate” ; they do not “ explain,” “ make evident”
following features in common with the exposition o f the science o f logic.
or “ demonstrate” anything at all. Natural science is an exclusively “ in
Both are preceded by relatively long introductions. Both are divided into
quisitive” science. And its inquiries appear to be confined to the principles
eight parts. None o f the parts has subdivisions and none is called a sci
o f bodies as such, rather than their ultimate causes or their practical uses.
ence or an art. Logic was seen as the counterpart o f grammar; natural
Nothing is said about God or the unmoved mover, intellect, or even the
science is seen as the counterpart o f the practical arts. The subject matter
soul, although soul and intellect at least must be inquired into in the parts that deal with plants (7) and animals (8). Unlike the mathematical sciences,
o f natural science is natural bodies presented as the counterparts o f the artificial bodies produced by art and the human will, to which frequent references were made in the practical sciences o f mathematics, especially
which have so-called “ practical sciences” or practical arts as their counter
the science o f devices (mechanics), which immediately preceded the fourth
parts, and some o f which study the principles o f the practical, political arts, there is no such thing as a “ practical” science or art that corresponds
chapter. Nevertheless, the digression on natural and artificial bodies,
to any o f the parts o f natural science, and none o f these parts is said to
which is almost as long as the enumeration o f the parts o f natural science
have anything to do with any practical, political art, not even where we
and divine science taken together, does not assume the sciences o f mathe
might expect a certain relation, such as between the study o f minerals (6)
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and the art o f mining, the study o f plants (7) and the art o f agriculture, or
are a special “ kind o f being,” different from mathematical and natural
the study o f animals (8) and the art o f medicine. There is no such thing as
beings. This means that, except for Chapter I (which dealt with the science
a practical or applied natural science or art. Indeed, Alfarabi goes so far
o f language), the book has been enumerating nothing but “ theoretical”
as to avoid the terms “ practical” and “ theoretical” altogether in connec
sciences so far: three “ particular” theoretical sciences (logic, mathemat
tion with natural science and its parts.
ics, and natural science), which study the intelligibles or intelligible beings,
A ll this is true o f natural science. But it is not true o f the fourth chapter
mathematical beings, and natural beings, respectively. And now we have
as a whole; for we must still consider divine science and its three parts.
a divine science, which is not itself called a theoretical science, yet its
N ow, divine science (like political science, the science o f jurisprudence,
second (or central) part investigates the principles o f the three particular
and the science o f theology) lacks the kind o f introduction that connects
theoretical sciences. It would seem that we have covered all the theoretical
it with what has preceded and the concluding remark that indicates the
sciences. I f their subject matter is being as being, the principles o f partic
fact that the enumeration has been completed. The result is that the part
ular kinds o f being, and the particular kinds o f being themselves, we have
dealing with this science (like those dealing with the three sciences that make up the fifth chapter) becomes purely enumerative, free o f any con
accounted for all o f it. The third part o f divine science investigates “ the beings that are neither
nective tissue that may explain possible ranks o f order or the direction
bodies nor in bodies.” This last (or eleventh) part o f the fourth chapter
governing the enumeration. This is all the more strange in view o f the fact
does eleven things, which are ordered as follows. In the first five it demon
that the connection between natural science and divine science is a com
strates the existence o f these beings that are not bodies or in bodies (the
monplace in traditional introductions to divine science. Its absence in
so-called intelligences), explains that they are many, demonstrates that
dicates one o f two things. Divine science may be simply a continuation o f
their number is finite, demonstrates that they form a hierarchical order
natural inquiry under a different name. But this would imply that “ beings
and demonstrates that this order terminates in a being that is simply per
as beings” into which divine science inquires are nothing more than nat
fect, one, first, and prior, and explains that it bestows being and so on on
ural bodies and their principles. Or, there is no special connection between the two sciences, which is what Alfarabi’s exposition seems to point to,
every other being - all this without the benefit o f revelation. Then in the
but which makes one even more baffled as to why the two sciences are
the supreme being described so far is that which one ought to “ believe”
treated together in one chapter, and without any explanation.
G od - that is, presumably, the God o f revelation - to be (100.13-14). The
sixth (or central) paragraph, the third part o f divine science explains that
Divine science is divided into three parts. The first investigates beings
last five paragraphs enumerate, make known, and explain G od’s attrib
as beings and their attributes. Nothing further is said about this part. The
utes, the generation o f beings through or by God, their order, the good
second investigates “ the principles [or premises] o f the demonstrations in
ness o f G od’s activities, and finally refute all the false views about G od’s
the particular theoretical sciences,” verifies and makes known their sub
activities that impute imperfection to him and the beings created by him:
stances and special attributes, and enumerates and criticizes the corrupt opinions held about them by the “ ancients.” A “ particular” theoretical
“ it refutes them all by demonstrations that provide certain science, such that it will be impossible for man to have any misgiving or entertain a
science is defined as a science which inquires into a “ special” kind o f being.
doubt about it and impossible for him to abandon it at all” (101.8-10).
The principle o f the independence o f the particular theoretical sciences is,
Unlike the ten preceding parts o f the fourth chapter, none o f which
then, the “ particularization” o f beings into kinds or genera. Three such
demonstrated anything at all (the “ investigation” o f principles o f demon
sciences are listed: the science o f logic, the sciences o f mathematics, and
strations in the tenth part [the second part o f divine science] was o f course
natural science. Logic, which was never called a theoretical science in
not itself demonstrative), the eleventh begins and ends with demonstra
Chapter II, is now explicitly counted as one o f the three particular theo
tions; it is the most demonstrative o f all the sciences; indeed, it contains
retical sciences ; it is assumed that the “ intelligibles” with which logic deals
more demonstrations than all the sciences in the book. W e have, it would
M. M AH D I
A L F A R A B I ’ S ‘ E N U M E R A T IO N OF THE SCIENCES’
appear, finally found a science, or one part o f a science, which, i f not thor
Sciences separates divine science from political science, and yet enumer
oughly demonstrative, is at least largely demonstrative.
ates them in the same order in which they appear in Alfarabi’s political
130
131
But against this, we must weigh the evidence o f Alfarabi’s more philo
works. Even more important, perhaps, is the distinction between divine
sophic works (the commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics known as the
science and so-called revealed theology, which belongs to a separate
Book o f Letters, the short work On the Purposes o f Aristotle’s Metaphys
chapter with political science and jurisprudence. Divine science is sepa
ics, and the Philosophy o f Aristotle), where he argues directly or indirectly
rated from theology by political science and jurisprudence, which means
against the inclusion o f what corresponds to this third part o f divine sci
that, in order properly to arrive at so-called revealed theology, one must
ence in metaphysics or against the view that it has an important or central
first go through political science and jurisprudence.
place in metaphysics. (Since he also says that it is elaborated by Aristotle in book Lambda o f the Metaphysics, he indicates, in effect, that book
IV. P O L I T I C A L S C I E N C E
1AND 2
Lambda is an exoteric work and does not represent Aristotle’s doctrine o f being.) The only way to explain this discrepancy is to take seriously
Alfarabi’s political science (which he also calls political philosophy) is the
Alfarabi’s statement in the Introduction o f the Enumeration o f the Sciences
political science o f the ancients, ofFla.to’s Republic and Aristotle's Politics.
that his purpose is to enumerate the “ generally known” sciences and their
It speaks o f rulership and kingship, cities and nations, and science and
parts - that is, generally known to the multitude who understand the
philosophy, but says nothing about prophecy or divine lawgivers, religion,
principles o f natural bodies in terms o f the principles o f artificial bodies
or theology. His jurisprudence and theology, on the other hand, are de
and apply the same names to both. However this may be, Alfarabi’s enu
cidedly “ modern.” The very teTms{fiqh and kalâm) employed to designate
meration o f the theoretical sciences (logic, mathematics, and natural sci
these two sciences are specifically Islamic. They are sciences that follow in
ence) culminates in a divine science, which in turn culminates in an ac
the footsteps o f prophecy, the divine lawgiver, and divine revelation. They
count o f the universe that is orderly, hierarchical, and free o f injustice,
have to do with the opinions and actions o f a religious community. They
imperfection, conflict, disharmony, or evil o f any kind. This account o f
contain no reference to philosophy or kingship or the city. A deliberate ef
God and the universe is made into a part o f divine science, placed in the
fort is made to create two different and contrasting atmospheres : ancient
same chapter as natural science, and followed immediately by political
and modern, a pre-religious or non-religious political science, and religious
science, jurisprudence, and theology, which are placed in the next chapter.
sciences that assume revelations, divine laws, and a number o f religious
This arrangement is quite different from the arrangement that emerges
communities. The account o f political science avoids the name o f God
from Alfarabi’s more extensive accounts o f divine science and political
altogether. The account o f jurisprudence and theology is saturated with
science in which what is here called the third part o f divine science is
such expressions as God, divine things, divine revelation, divine intellects,
joined to political science. The Virtuous City and the Political Regime,
divine mysteries, and miracles. There is one apparent exception to all o f
which are clearly political works, begin abruptly with an account o f God
this. When investigating human activities and their ends, political science
and the universe (in exactly the same fashion as in the third part o f divine
“ explains that some o f them [the ends] are true happiness, while others
science in this book) and proceed without interruption to give an account
are presumed to be happiness although they are not. That which is true
o f man and o f what is produced by human will and art : human associa
happiness cannot possibly be o f this life, but o f another life after [or
tions, the principles and forms o f political life, and the particular, political
beyond] this, which is the life to come [or the other life] ; while that which
arts. The fusion o f divine science and political science can be interpreted
is presumed to be happiness consists o f such things as wealth, honor, and
in two ways. In Alfarabi’s political works, it must be interpreted as a
pleasures, when these are made the only ends in this life” (102.9-13).
“ political” theology and cosmology. In Avicenna, on the other hand, pol
This statement recalls the religious view o f happiness as the happiness o f the next life, o f paradise or the beatific vision, which is said to be true
itics becomes an appendage o f divine science. The Enumeration o f the
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133
happiness, as against the happiness o f this life, which is said to be pre
“ perfect” practitioner by knowing the general rules he learns from medi
sumed and not genuine happiness. Y et it also recalls the philosophic view
cal books and, in addition, a power acquired from long experience, ob
that man should not confine his ends in this life to such things as wealth,
servation, and practice. Thus the subject matters o f the virtuous royal craft
honor, and pleasures, but seek a higher end, such as virtue or knowl
and o f political science are not coextensive. Political science gives two
edge: he should lead “ another” life in “ this” life. Alfarabi appears to be using the Aristotelian and Platonic distinction between presumed and
things, (a) the general rules and (b) the general patterns o f their determi nation or application in particular cases and times. Like medical books
true happiness to interpret the religious distinction between this life
and medical science, political science provides only the first power or
and the other life. (Cf. Religion, 52.18, 55.7-8, where the goods [and the
faculty required by the virtuous royal craft. It leaves the actual determi
happiness] o f this world are said to be the things which are called good by
nation or application to another faculty, which cannot be acquired
the multitude - that is, they are vulgar goods.) The central theme o f political science is what Alfarabi calls “ virtuous
through science. Furthermore, according to this first account, political science and political rulership (including the “ virtuous royal craft” ) are
rulership” or the “ virtuous royal craft” - that is, the art o f the ruler who
self-sufficient and concerned exclusively with practical or political matters.
establishes, rules, and preserves the virtuous city or nation and whose end
They are not in any way dependent on, or in need of, the theoretical sci
is true happiness, which is attained by good, noble, and virtuous deeds.
ences. The horizon o f the “ virtuous royal craft” is defined by political
It is distinguished from ignorant rulerships, which establish ignorant
science or the general rules o f political life as such. It is true that the royal
cities and nations whose ends (such as wealth and honor) are only pre
craft requires “ another faculty, other than this science” (104.13), but this
sumed to be happiness. T o the question “ What constitutes the virtuous
is a faculty that can be acquired through “ long practice in political deeds”
royal craft?” Alfarabi gives two answers, which occur in two slightly dif
(104.1-2), that is, dealing with the particular cases encompassed by the
ferent accounts o f political science.
general rules given by poHtical science. In this respect, this political sci ence corresponds to the last five parts o f the science o f language and the
1. In the first account (102.4-104.15), political science performs seven functions, which cover the subject matters o f what Aristotle calls ethics
last five parts o f the science o f logic. It provides the rules necessary for the correct practice o f the art o f politics.
and politics, without explicitly distinguishing between ethics and politics. In the first four, political science investigates actions, ways o f life, and moral habits, without reference to the city or the nation. In the fifth, it
2. The occasion for giving a second account o f political science is the divi sion o f this science into two parts (104,16flf.). (A quick look at the way A l
explains that these cannot exist in man except when “ distributed in cities
farabi presents the other sciences in this book is sufficient to show that it
and nations according to a certain order and are practiced in common”
was by no means necessary for him to repeat a full-fledged account o f polit
(102.16-103.1). This leads to what political science does next, which is to
ical science just because he needed to indicate its divisions. He could have
explain the necessity o f rulership, that one becomes a ruler by virtue o f a
started his account o f political science, as he frequently does in the case o f
craft and a positive disposition, that this is called “ royal craft,” “ kingship,”
other sciences, by saying, “ this science consists o f two parts,” and then pre
or whatever one chooses to call it (103.5-6), and the divisions o f rulership.
sented the content o f the science under the two headings; or else he could
The seventh and last step is to explain what constitutes the “ virtuous royal
have finished his account with a short indication o f the way in which it
craft.” The virtuous royal craft is said to be composed o f two powers or faculties, (1) the faculty for general rules, and (2) the kind o f competence
divides itself.) According to the second account o f political science, the two parts o f this science perform four and fourteen functions respectively.
or expertise (hunka) acquired through long experience, observation, and practice in particular situations - actions, men, and cities. This is ex
The four steps in the first part correspond to the first four steps o f the first account; they are summarized and re-ordered, and the new order,
plained by the analogy o f the art o f medicine: the physician becomes a
broadly speaking, recalls Aristotle’s Ethics, even though the distinction
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135
between ethics and politics is again absent. The second part elaborates
operate. On the crucial question as to what kind o f knowledge and com
and adds substantially to the last three steps o f the first account. (It is
petence the virtuous ruler needs in order to establish and rule a virtuous
stated at this point that the matters discussed here are to be found in
city, the answer was clear: political experience and political science are
Aristotle’s Politics, but that “ this [second division o f political science] is
enough. While political experience is, o f course, one o f the requirements
[to be found] also in Plato’s Republic and in books by Plato and others”
in the second account also, it is now mentioned as a matter o f course,
[105.5-6]. Almost the entire section which follows next corresponds to
does not occupy as important a place as it did in the first account, and
parts o f Alfarabi’s Philosophy o f Plato.) There are a number o f new ele
is debunked at the end as the hallmark o f ignorant rulers. This is espe
ments in this second account which are specifically Platonic. The most
cially significant i f we remember that in a parallel work {Religion, 58.15-
important o f these is the explanation o f the things that go into making
59.1) Alfarabi says o f this experiential faculty that it is the faculty which
up the “ virtuous royal art.” These are no longer the two faculties given
“ the ancients [i.e., Aristotle] call ‘prudence.’ ” As to the higher faculty for
in the first account - that is, the faculty for general rules (given by political
the general rules given by political science, neither this faculty, nor polit
science) and the competence acquired through long practice in political
ical science, are mentioned as such. They are included in something much
deeds. Instead, their exact number is now left open; only some o f them
larger, which comprehends the theoretical and practical sciences, or theo
are mentioned; and the implication is that other things may be added.
retical and practical philosophy, as well as perhaps some other, unspec
“ They include,” he says, “ the theoretical and practical sciences” (106.1),
ified things; and the place o f political science (or o f the faculty for the
to which the faculty acquired through experience should be joined. The
general rules o f political life), which was clear and circumscribed in the
experiential faculty is the same in both accounts. But for the general rules
first account, is not specified in this larger whole. The first account o f
provided by political science alone in the first account, Alfarabi now
poUtical science or political philosophy is not criticized directly. It is
substitutes “ the theoretical and practical sciences” (both in the plural),
silently replaced by an account o f political science whose central theme
and possibly other things as well. The establishment and preservation o f
- the things which constitute the royal virtuous craft, and the selection
the “ virtuous city” are made contingent on a man who possesses this
and training o f the kings who will be able to establish and preserve the
“ virtuous royal craft” and on the uninterrupted succession o f such princes
virtuous city - cannot be provided by political science as such. And be
or kings. This political science also explains the proper selection, upbring
cause the “ regime” in this second account is constituted by the operation
ing, and education o f future kings, so that they come to possess this kind
o f the virtuous royal craft (103.6), political science cannot (either by itself
o f “ royal craft” and become “ fully” or “ completely” accomplished kings.
or in cooperation with political experience) establish or preserve the virtuous city.
Unlike these true kings, those whose rulership is ignorant should not be called kings at all; they do not need “ either theoretical or practical philos
It is time to ask why nowhere in this book is political science or political
ophy,” but can run their cities or nations by the experiential faculty alone,
philosophy called either a practical or a theoretical science. Since Alfarabi
provided they are clever or perceptive and good imitators o f earlier igno
knows o f this distinction and makes use o f it in the second account in con
rant kings. In contrast to this second account, the first account o f political science
nection with the virtuous royal craft, we can surely ask whether his polit ical science is a practical or a theoretical science. So far, we have encoun
was much more sober and “ practical.” It gave a classification o f regimes
tered the distinction between theoretical and practical arts, which was not
and rulerships, confined the task o f political science to the formulation o f
elaborated, and theoretical and practical sciences, where the theoretical
general rules o f political life and general patterns o f their application, con
were included among the sciences proper, while the practical were ex
fined the powers or faculties o f the “ virtuous royal craft” to knowledge o f these general rules and to what can be learned from experience, and did
cluded from the sciences proper and said to be practical arts or to study the principles o f the practical, political arts. Then we have been presented
not even raise the question o f the non-virtuous royal crafts or how they
with his accounts o f political “ science” or political “ philosophy,” which
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is not one o f the practical or political “ arts” mentioned previously. Finally,
retical and practical sciences” or theoretical and practical philosophy:
we are told that its central or highest theme is a “ positive disposition” or
the theoretical sciences - that is, logic, mathematics, natural science, and
“ craft” whose activity consists in the production and preservation o f the
divine science; and the practical sciences, perhaps the parts o f the first
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137
regime, the political regime, which in turn establishes and preserves all
account o f political science and the arts subordinate to it. This interpreta
the particular actions and positive dispositions and crafts in the city. This
tion is confirmed by the parallel passage in the Book o f Religion (60.6-7),
seems to be the supreme or ruling science or art, which includes and
where the full or complete operation o f this virtuous royal craft requires
transcends all the arts and sciences practiced in the virtuous city. In the
“ knowledge o f the general rules o f this art [politics], which is to be coupled
first account o f political science, on the other hand, where the royal art is
with theoretical philosophy, and to which prudence is to be joined.”
said to be made up o f two elements, the general rules o f political life
(Theoretical sciences = theoretical philosophy; practical sciences= the
provided by political science and the experience acquired in political life
general rules o f this art [given by political science]; the experiential fac
itself, we have a political science that does not deal with any o f the theo retical sciences mentioned so far, nor is any o f the themes treated by it
ulty = prudence.) It is plain that a political science whose central theme is the virtuous
constituted by these theoretical sciences. W e can, therefore, safely call this
city established and preserved by this royal craft and the education o f
first political science a practical science or art, in the sense that it deals
kings who are “ completely” kings, is not strictly a practical science or
exclusively with things done and made by man, his activities and ways o f
strictly a theoretical science. It is not any o f the theoretical or practical
life whose principles are human will and choice; and call the royal craft
arts or sciences enumerated so far. This political science must cover and
the supreme practical craft or art, since it estabUshes and preserves the
order all o f them, not as enumerated in this book, but as they must exist
regime which makes possible what the citizens do and make. This would
in the soul o f the king who is completely king - that is, in their proper
be practical science or art or philosophy as against theoretical science
“ ranks o f order.” It is thus a political science or philosophy which in
or art or philosophy (logic, mathematics, natural science, and divine science). The difficulty we encountered in the account o f true happiness
cludes, transcends, and rules all the “ theoretical and practical sciences”
(which was said to be possible in “ another” life, meaning a life beyond
this account o f political science and nowhere else in the book). In this
or higher than the life dedicated to such things as wealth, honor, and
sense, the upward movement from the science o f language to the science
pleasures, to vulgar goods or ends) can be resolved by identifying
o f logic, the science o f mathematics, and to natural science and divine
the “ other” life with the virtuous life (the life dedicated to virtue for its
science, has not as yet lost its momentum. The first account o f political
own sake) and by calling the “ other” city the “ virtuous” city, its rulership
science as a mere practical science was only an interlude that made pos
the “ virtuous” rulership, and the craft which establishes and preserves it
sible the account o f a political science that in a way includes more and is
the “ virtuous” royal craft. For all intents and purposes, this first account
therefore more comprehensive than all the theoretical and practical sci
o f political science must identify the good, the noble, and the virtuous
ences enumerated so far.
or “ theoretical and practical philosophy” (expressions that occur only in
with the moral virtues, which fall within the class o f things whose principle is human will and choice, and which are isolated from theoretical science. The “ virtue” or the “ art” o f the “ virtuous royal craft” in the second
V. J U R I S P R U D E N C E A N D T H E O L O G Y
account o f political science, in contrast, is not exclusively a practical virtue
Jurisprudence and theology are each called a “ science” and an “ art.” But
or a practical art, for it is constituted by (1) the theoretical and practical
the name “ science” occurs only in the titles o f the two sections and in the
sciences and (2) political experience. W e saw that political experience is the
remark concluding the first. The brief exposition o f the two disciplines
same in both accounts. As for the “ general rules” o f political life given by
concerns the “ art o f jurisprudence” and the “ art o f theology” exclusively. Unlike any o f the theoretical and many o f the practical sciences or arts
political science in the first account, Alfarabi now substitutes the “ theo
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139
mentioned so far, the arts o f jurisprudence and theology, about which
employed by the art o f jurisprudence, but there are indications that juris
Alfarabi speaks here, exist and are practiced in certain nations only and
prudence applies some o f the same rules o f logic.) This is the last o f the
at a certain stage in their development. There ought to have existed a
seven digressions to which I have sought to draw attention througliout this
lawgiver who had legislated a divine law {sharl'^d) or a religion {milla) for
paper. It is also the most dramatic part o f a somewhat undramatic book,
a particular nation (the city, in the singular, now disappears from view,
highUghting the proclivity o f the defenders o f religions for shining armor
cf. 107.13). Religion consists o f two broad classes o f things, which are
and sharp weapons. Its main effect, however, is to draw attention away
defined and determined by the lawgiver; opinions and actions. Opinions
from the question o f the relation between jurisprudence and theology, and political science.
are legislated about such things as God, his attributes, the universe, and so forth; and actions are legislated about such things as prayers and civic
One notices, first, that like the science o f language - and unlike logic,
transactions. So long as the lawgiver is on the scene, he will be the one
mathematics, natural and divine science, and political science - jurispru
who defines and determines what ought to be believed or done, and sup
dence and theology are not single universal sciences. There are as many
ports or defends these beliefs and actions by persuading his followers and
arts o f jurisprudence and as many arts o f theology as there are religions
others to accept them. After the lawgiver or the founder o f the religion
or divine laws. (The terms “ nation” and “ nations,” whose frequent use
leaves the scene, there will remain opinions and actions which he did not
was a hallmark o f the first chapter on the science o f language, are re
have time, or did not consider important enough, to attend to himself,
placed here by the terms “ religion” and “ religions.” ) Alfarabi states
and new issues and situations arise which will require new determinations
what all these arts do, their end, and the methods they employ to achieve
as to what one should believe or do. Also, the opinions and actions which
their end. Only in this formal sense does he speak o f the science or art o f
the lawgiver had determined will require support and defense against new
jurisprudence or theology. T o know what each does in particular, one
objectors and new objections. It is at this point that Alfarabi’s exposition
must learn the particular opinions and actions legislated by a particular
begins. The art o f jurisprudence is the “ positive disposition” {malaka) that
lawgiver and the purpose o f his religion, and then see how the jurists o f
enables man to make the new determinations, and the art o f theology is
this religion employ the methods described by Alfarabi in making new
the “ positive disposition” that enables man to defend the religion. Since
determinations or how the theologians o f this religion employ the methods
the things that need to be determined or defended in the religion are either
he describes in defending the religion’s particular opinions and actions.
opinions or actions, jurisprudence and theology each has two parts,
On the surface at least, Alfarabi seems to be resigned to the multiplicity
dealing with opinions and actions respectively. Jurisprudence proceeds
o f lawgivers and religions and juridical disciplines and theologies. M ore
as follows. It learns the “ purpose” o f the lawgiver from the religion he
over, he abstains from praising or condemning any o f them as good or
had legislated for that particular nation and the things which the lawgiver
bad, virtuous, or vicious. Religion is defined in a perfectly neutral manner,
had already determined in his religion. On the basis o f these two things,
and so are the religious sciences. Second, jurisprudence and theology are
it “ discovers” or “ infers” what determinations are to be made about
not substitutes for political science or alternative approaches to the study
things o f which the lawgiver had not spoken explicitly or things that did
o f political life. They are not religious or sacred political sciences as
not exist in his time. Theology, on the other hand, does not make new
against a “ secular” political science. They do not conduct any o f the in
determinations. It takes what the lawgiver had determined, defends them,
vestigations conducted in political science, give any o f the explanations given in it, or make any o f the distinctions made in it. Third, they are not
and refutes what disagrees with them. Alfarabi’s account o f theology is followed by an extensive exposition o f the opinions o f various theological schools as to what methods and opinions should be employed in sup
parts o f political science. The two parts o f political science were stated
porting one’ s religion, all o f which belong to the rules o f the syllogistic
either wholly or in part, to either o f those parts. Fourth, and more gen®^ally, jurisprudence and theology do not investigate the truth or false
arts enumerated in the science o f logic. (H e does not explain the methods
and explained earlier. Neither jurisprudence nor theology corresponds,
M. M A H D I
A L F A R A B I ’ S ‘ E N U M E R A T IO N OF THE SCIENCES’
hood o f the opinions given in any religion about God, his attributes, and
Alfarabi is able to present these two claimants side by side without stating
the universe. This is the function o f the theoretical sciences enumerated
the relation between them, we must realize that the above situation is
earlier, especially the third part o f divine science. N or do they investigate
neither universal nor necessary. It does not represent the condition o f man
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141
the nobility or baseness o f the actions demanded in any religion, distin
as man. Philosophy and political science can exist and did exist in nations
guish the kind o f happiness achieved by performing these actions, or
that did not possess revealed religions or jurisprudence or theology. And
judge the purpose or end the lawgiver had in view in giving this religion.
revealed religions existed and could continue to exist without philosophy
A ll this is the function o f poUtical science, which has been completed
or poUtical science. The coexistence o f these claimants can, therefore, be
already.
said to be an accident, a historical accident. Still, once they have come to
Jurists and theologians perform certain defined practical tasks within
coexist in the same community, the relation between them becomes a
an established religious community. Their success or failure is not con
problem. Y et it is not an essential theoretical problem for political sci
tingent on their ability to conduct an independent inquiry or attain direct
ence in the sense that political science as political science must necessarily
knowledge o f things, either theoretical or practical. Their knowledge, in
raise and answer the question o f revealed religion and jurisprudence and
particular, is derivative. They learn what their lawgiver had in mind (his
theology. It is, o f course, also not a problem which must or even can be
purpose) and his statements as transmitted through written or oral reports.
discussed by jurisprudence or theology. But although historically and
For the rest, the power or faculty they employ in performing their task as
theoretically the relation between political science and the religious
jurists or theologians has to do with particular cases. Should this opinion
sciences is accidental, this does not mean it should not or could not be
be accepted or that action be performed? Or, how I can best support this
understood or clarified.
opinion or defend this action, convince this man or this group o f men, or
Since the claim o f jurisprudence and theology is practically more urgent,
take care o f this objection or ward o ff that criticism? A t best, the jurist
let us begin here. This claim is not based specifically on the methods o f
makes use o f a limited kind o f experiential faculty or prudence which
these discipUnes but on the assumption that they follow in the footsteps
functions within a framework established by the lawgiver, and the theolo-
o f a divine lawgiver, understand his purpose, and supplement his activ
gian makes use o f certain dialectical and rhetorical arguments.
ities. They are admittedly subordinate arts, subordinate to the original, greater, and more comprehensive art o f the divine lawgiver. W e must,
VI. THE L A W G I V E R , R E L I G I O N , A N D P O L I T I C A L S C I E N C E
then, go back or ascend to the divine lawgiver whom the jurists and theo logians follow, and understand his art. T o do so, we must follow in the
The juxtaposition o f political science, and jurisprudence and theology,
footsteps o f the jurists and the theologians, and study all the things that
without an explicit transition from political science to the religious sci
the divine lawgiver declared or determined by speech or deed. This is the
ences and without stating explicitly the connection between them or their
divine law or the religion he legislated. (The religious sciences necessary
ranks o f order or how they form a single whole, mirrors the initial situa
for a better comprehension o f the principal sources or roots o f the divine
tion in which the student o f these sciences who is a member o f or lives in a
law, whether written or oral, are assumed by Alfarabi in this context.)
religious community finds himself. On the one hand, he finds himself
And we must try to understand the divine lawgiver’s “ purpose” or “ in
before a rational, philosophic science which claims to be the science o f
tention” in legislating his religion in the nation for which he legislated it.
practical life, to encompass the entire range o f the human ends in this and
As we look at these three things (the divine law, the purpose o f the law
the other life, and to explain what man ought to do to achieve these ends.
giver, and the nation for which he legislated this divine law), we perceive a
On the other hand, he is confronted with jurisprudence and theology,
possible link with some o f the things we learnt in political science. The
which claim that they are the sciences that determine what he must believe
divine lawgiver is a kind o f ruler or king, at least he performs some o f their functions. For instance, he defines and determines particular actions
and do to achieve what appear to be the same ends. T o understand why
M. M A H D I
A L F A R A B I ’ S ‘ E N U M E R A T IO N OF THE SCIENCES’
which he asks a particular nation to perform in common so as to attain a
all the sciences, but only the “ generally known” sciences (43.4). Unlike
certain end. He is not necessarily a theoretical man or a poUtical scientist,
poUtical science, jurisprudence, and theology, the science or the division
but a leader o f men. He decides what this particular group o f men must
o f the science which is omitted here, and which we may call the philo
do or believe in, here and now, so as to achieve a designated end in this
sophic and poUtical science o f divine laws and revealed religions, was
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143
life and/or the next. Minimally, then, he is a ruler who possesses what
surely not generally known to Alfarabi’s readers. It was in many ways a
Alfarabi called the experiential faculty (or prudence). But the fact that he
new science invented or estabUshed by Alfarabi himself.
possesses this faculty does not, by itself, prove that his purpose is to lead men to genuine happiness rather than some spurious kind o f happiness,
VII. THE P H I L O S O P H I C S C I E N C E OF R E L I G I O N
or whether he does or does not possess what Alfarabi called the virtuous royal craft. The fact that divine lawgivers establish religions does not in
The origins or the germs o f the new science, however, are contained in the
itself prove that their religion is good or bad, true or false. The multipli
“ ancient” science o f politics, especially in the second account o f poUtical
city o f religions that claim divine origin, their conflicting claims, and
science given by Alfarabi in this book. What distinguishes divine laws is
inter-religious theological controversies, point in the same direction.
the fact that they include both opinions about God, his attributes, and the
The question, then, is whether one must be satisfied with learning the
universe, as weU as actions. What Alfarabi called the virtuous royal craft
purpose o f the divine lawgiver and the divine lawgiver’ s particular deter
in the first account included, besides the experiential faculty, only the
minations, which is what jurists and theologians do; or whether one can
faculty for the general rules given by a poUtical science that had nothing
go further and judge the character o f the divine lawgiver’s purpose. Juris
to do with the theoretical sciences. This means that this ruling craft can
prudence and theology are constitutionally unfit either to raise or answer
establish and preserve a regime which contains only actions, not opinions.
this question. PoUtical science, on the other hand, while it does not claim
This limited kind o f poUtical science wiU not, obviously, be able to inves
right here in this chapter that it can raise and answer this question with
tigate divine laws. Y ou recall, however, that in the second account, this
respect to divine laws and the communities based on them, does in fact claim that it can give an account o f all classes o f ends, actions, regimes,
faculty, by the “ theoretical and practical sciences.” Unlike the former, this
rulerships, and purposes, and distinguish between the true and the false,
ruUng craft is prepared, therefore, to establish and preserve regimes which
same virtuous ruling craft was constituted, in addition to the experiential
virtuous and nonvirtuous, among them - that it provides a standard and
contain actions as well as the opinions contained in divine laws. That is,
measure by which all past and present and future regimes and their
this ruler possesses the craft which includes both the theoretical sciences
founders can be investigated and judged. It is not, then, necessary to repeat
(including the third part o f divine science which deals with God and his
this claim in connection with any particular kind o f polity.
attributes) and the practical sciences, and possesses the experiential
The only difl&culty is this. Political science as presented in this book
faculty through which he can discover, or define and determine, the spe
says nothing about lawgivers and laws, o f which divine lawgivers and
cific form in which both knowledge and action can be presented to a
divine laws are one species; or about the relation between the art or
particular group o f men under given conditions. It is true that Alfarabi does not say aU this in so many words. But his silence here (106.1-4) is
craft o f the lawgiver and the art or craft o f rulers who are not lawgivers; or about the relation between the regimes based on laws and the regimes not based on laws. This serious omission can be shown, however, to be
more telling than his explicit speech. He says that the experiental faculty
intentional and deliberate. It has the practical consequence that the book
must be joined to both the theoretical and practical sciences, and proceeds to say that the experiential faculty determines the particular “ actions,
avoids the necessity o f even enumerating certain delicate and controver
ways o f life, and positive dispositions.” N ow “ positive dispositions” can,
sial problems, which is perhaps not incompatible with the introductory
o f course, include knowledge and opinions. In fact it must, for otherwise it would be hard to understand why the experiential faculty should be
character o f the book or with the fact that it did not promise to enumerate
144
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joined, not only to the practical sciences, but to the theoretical sciences as well.
are related to theoretical things. This practical political science on the
But now comes the difïïculty. For Alfarabi also says that the regime
way this practical political science can preserve its independence and
145
other hand, deals with a special kind or one division o f actions. The only
founded by such a ruler cannot be preserved unless there is an uninter
superior claim over its companions is to show that all these so-called
rupted line o f rulers who possess the very same qualifications as those o f
theoretical opinions, and all these actions which are related to so-called
the founder, which is why the question o f the education o f future rulers
theoretical opinions, are in fact practical. But then this practical political
who are “ completely” kings becomes an important theme. This is so
science will have to do two things. First, it has to prove this claim, which
because a regime will inevitably degenerate in the absence o f such a ruler.
it cannot do i f it remains a purely practical science. It must broaden
Y et one o f the main reasons for laying down laws is that they be followed
its concern and somehow encompass all the theoretical sciences. It will
after the death o f the lawgiver, when the community is no longer ruled by
need a theoretical dimension. Second, it must develop a new branch or
a man who possesses his qualifications. And we know by now that the
part o f political science to deal with these theoretical opinions and with
main reason for the existence o f jurisprudence and theology is to preserve
theoretically-oriented actions. This will be a “ practical” or political divine
the regime o f the divine lawgiver after his death, when the religious com
science or theology which keeps one eye on the theoretical sciences and
munity no longer has a divine lawgiver at its head. During his lifetime, in
another on human ends and actions. In this way, it will broaden its scope
fact, there was no law in the sense that jurists and theologians understand
and deal with opinions as well as actions. This is now demanded by the
and practice it. What the divine lawgiver said or did was the living law, and he could change or abrogate it to meet new circumstances as they
facts o f political life. Alfarabi will do this in the Book o f Religion, which is the counterpart o f Chapter V o f the Enumeration o f the Sciences. What
arose. N o follower o f a divine law or a revealed religion would take excep
the Enumeration o f the Sciences has done is to show that the strict division
tion to the proposition that the best time was the lifetime o f the divine
o f sciences into practical and theoretical is no longer practically tenable.
“ lawgiver,” or that the best arrangement would be to have an uninter
In the second account o f political science there are two kinds o f rulers:
rupted line o f divine “ lawgivers.” There is, then, no disagreement regard
those who possess the “ theoretical
ing the desirability o f a state o f affairs in which men do not follow the
who “ do not need ... theoretical or practical philosophy” (106.16).
practical sciences” (106.1) and those
law, even the divine law, o f a dead legislator, but are ruled continuously by Uving philosopher-kings or divine lawgivers. Nor, I believe, is there disagreement that this is a state o f affairs that is unlikely to obtain because
Harvard University NOTES
such men are very rare; or that, in their absence, the best alternative is to follow their intention as embodied in what they said and did. So the question o f the laws or o f the regime ruled by laws remains an important theme o f political science. Alfarabi leads the reader to this theme in the Enumeration o f the Sciences without discussing it explicitly. What the Enumeration o f the Sciences does, however, is to pose the problem and express an intention. Political science now coexists with jurisprudence and theology: this is a massive historical fact which it cannot ignore. The first account o f political science, which is strictly prac tical, cannot coexist with jurisprudence and theology without being sub ordinated to or absorbed by them. Their subject matter is wider. It in cludes opinions about theoretical things and actions (e.g., prayers) which
* Unless some other title is mentioned, all references in the text are to the pages and lines of Alfarabi’s Enumeration o f the Sciences (Ihsff a l-U lu m ), ed. Osman Amine (2nd ed.; Cairo: Dâr al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1949). Two Latin versions of the work, one a translation, the other an adaptation, together with the Arabic text and a Spanish translation, can be consulted in Ângel Gonzalez Palencia, Al-Fàrâbî: Catàlogo de las ciendas (2nd ed. ; Madrid, 1953). The Latin translation (pp. 117-76), literal and general ly accurate, is by Gerard of Cremona. The adaptation (pp. 83-115), first published by Camerarius, is ascribed on reasonable grounds to Gundissalinus (who made use of Alfarabi’s classification of the sciences in his own work, ‘De divisione scientiarum’) and was edited under his name by Manuel Alonso Alonso, S. J., Domingo Gundisalvo: De scientiis (Madrid, 1954). ^ If we had more time at our disposal, we could have spoken profitably, perhaps, about the so-called Hellenistic background of Alfarabi or the external history of the transminion o f Greek learning through Syriac into Arabic, the early history of Islamic philosophy, Alfarabi’s account of his philosophic genealogy, and his critique of his
M. M A H D I
A L F A R A B I ’ S ‘ E N U M E R A T IO N OF THE SCIENCES’
predecessors and contemporaries. One should also remember his impact on later Mus lim, Jewish, and Christian philosophers, and especially the fact that, until the recovery of Aristotle’s Politics in the second half of the thirteenth century, he remained the political philosopher par excellence. But to speak about any o f these topics intelligently and profitably presupposes an understanding of Alfarabi’s philosophy in general and the place he assigns to political philosophy in particular, and this in turn presupposes understanding his writings. This is where we must begin. 2 Çâ ‘id al-Andalusi, Classes o f Nations {Jabaqat al-Umam), ed. Louis Cheikho (Beirut, 1912), p. 53.
I do not think that either the translation of the Ihsff al-ulûm, or Gundissalinus’s adap tation of it met full understanding or appreciation. M. m a h d i : Professor d’Alverny takes issue with §â‘id al-Andalusi (d. 1070) for considering Alfarabi’s classification o f the sciences “ unprecedented” (p. 117, n. 2) and gives her reasons as follows. There were, she suggests, the so-called Alexandrian classi fications inherited by the Arabs, which Alfarabi very cleverly adapted and enlarged. He first “ added” the sciences of language and then “ added” theology and jurisprudence. All this is probably true. But I do not think that $â‘id al-Andalusi was taking issue with such a hypothesis or with the line of reasoning leading to it. Rather, he was thinkng of the two types of classification of the sciences mentioned in the paper, which were current in Arabic literature and with which he could compare directly the classification suggested by Alfarabi. It is in this context that I quoted him with approval. I must perhaps add that until one inquires more systematically and intelligently into the structure and intention of the so-called Alexandrian classifications of the sciences (e.g., into the reasons for and the meaning of the incorporation of rhetoric and poetics into the Organon in these classifications) it will not be easy to go very far in comparing them with this particular classification by Alfarabi. Professor d’Alverny also takes issue with my remark in note 1, which states that “ until the recovery of Aristotle’s Politics in the second half of the thirteenth century, he [Alfarabi] remained the political philosopher par excellence.” I suspect that she understood this statement to mean that Alfarabi as a political philosopher was widely known or understood or admired by the Christian philosophers in the Latin West. This was obviously not the case. Whatever impact Alfarabi made on the Christian philosophers in the Latin West was surely not in the field of political philosophy as such. One must recall that, until the recovery of Aristotle’s Politics in the second half of the thirteenth century, there was no political philosophy and there were no political philos ophers in medieval Western Christendom. This does not, of course, mean that there was no Christian political thought (e.g., among the legists and the publicists) during that period. For the history of the recovery of Aristotle’s Politics and especially for a critical list of the many commentaries on it, see Martin Grabmann, D ie mittelalterlichen Kommentare zur P olitik des Aristoteles (Munich, 1941). G. b e a u j o u a n : Dans ce colloque, d’importantes choses ont été dites, notamment par les P'^s. Murdoch et Sylla, pour éviter que ne se dressent ou se maintiennent des cloisonnements artificiels entre l’étude de la science médiévale et la compréhension de la théologie. U n semblable effort reste à faire pour voir les connexions qui pouvaient exister entre les arts libéraux, la médicine et le droit, tels qu’ils étaient enseignés dans les universités du moyen âge et de la Renaissance (M . Schmitt a reconnu, ici même, cette lacune). Cette liaison entre sciences et droit apparaît, du reste, beaucoup plus importante pour l’Islam que pour la Chrétienté. Je me suis déjà demandé, ailleurs, si en préconisant le recours routinier à des traités détaillés de jurisprudence, le malikisme n’avait pas freiné la spéculation rationnelle dans la science hispano-musulmane. Je me réjouis donc de ce que, dans le rapport du P^ Mahdi, l’accent soit mis sur la science politique et la jurisprudence. Mais, dans VEnumération des sciences d’al-Fârâbï, je suis personnellement intrigué par le fait que, sous une même définition, la scientia de ingeniis Çilm al-biyal) englobe à la fois l’algèbre et diverses applications pratiques de la géométrie. Chez al-Fârâbi, cette association est-elle une “ naiveté” ou, au contraire, l’écho d’une tradition déjà bien établie?
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COMMENTS M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: Professor Mahdi’s appreciation of Farabi’s classification of the sciences is very interesting. I agree with him when he points out the importance of the digressions and developments that are the distinctive feature of this tract. Fârâbi has given a remarkable account of Arabic grammar in the long chapter dedicated to the science of language and he has given a prominent part to political philosophy, which M . Mahdi has stressed in particular. I would have emphasized as well that the chapters or “ digressions” concerning engineering, optics and the science of weights are a mark of the development of Arabic science. I should not say, however, that Farabi’s classification is “ unprecedented.” When I read the Il^sff al-^ulüm, my own impression is that Fârâbi has very cleverly adapted and enlarged the current, so-called Alexandrian classification inherited by the Arabs from Ammonius and Olympiodorus (particularly the divisions of the Organon, including at the end rhetoric and poetics [cf. R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 133 f.]). He first added the “ science of language” which had not been included in the Alexandrian sche ma nor previously in Aristotle due to the fact that it was a preliminary study and not a part of the encyclopedic system. Moreover, after ethics and politics, Fârâbi added the typical Islamic sciences, and kalam. Professor Mahdi tries to justify the separa tion between the “ theology” of the Metaphysics and “ revealed theology,” namely, kalam. His analysis of Fârâbi’s motives for e x p o u n d i n g a n d kalâm as an appendix to political science is very keen; revealed sciences rely on the “ divine ruler.” W e may add that it would be difiicult to join kalâm, based on Quranic revelation, with an abstract theology having a Neo-Platonic background. It would be interesting to compare Fârâbi’s enumeration o f the sciences with Avicenna’s. There are several, and there are important variations in each o f them. In the last book of the Metaphysics of the Shifff, Avicenna gives an outline of revealed theology, law and ethics, including politics, in a demonstrative manner, all of the beliefs and customs of Islam deriving ultimately from the omnipotent will of God and His Providence. In the Ishârât, he includes sufism (mysticism) in his portrayal of the arts and sciences. Another, and rather different, enumeration is proposed in a Risala on the classification of the sciences (translated into Latin in the early sixteenth century by the physician Andrea Alpago). But Avicenna was apparently not interested in the theory of politics, perhaps because he had been obliged to practice politics, as I. Madkour once said. W e cannot share the opinion expressed by Professor Mahdi when he says (p. 146) that “ until the recovery of Aristotle’s Politics in the second half of the thirteenth cen tury, he [Fârâbi] remained the political philosopher par excellence.” This is not true, I think, as far as the Christian philosophers are concerned. On this particular point.
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P A R T II
THE TW ELFTH AND TH IRTEEN TH CE N T U R IE S IN THE L A T IN WEST
R IC H A R D MCKEON
TH E O R G A N I Z A T I O N OF SCIENCES A N D TH E R E LA TIO N S OF C ULTURES IN THE T W E LF T H A N D T H IR T E E N T H CENTU RIES
The culture o f a people is discovered in its arts, its institutions, and its lore - in things made, things done, and things said. The culture o f a time is the culture o f peoples in contact and communication. Culture is a qualification o f peoples and an order o f “ learning,” and learning is both a process o f education and an organization o f sciences. Sciences are organized and developed in cultures, and cultures are known and char acterized by sciences. The interactions and communications o f peoples are interpreted from the perspectives o f one or another o f the cultures in communication or from the perspectives o f an outside interpreter. The historian o f culture has interpreted the culture o f the Middle Ages var iously from the time when Renaissance Humanists interpreted it into existence and gave it its name and its dogmatic, verbalistic character istics, to present day scientific studies based on the invention o f a science o f culture and the rediscovery o f a culture for the Middle Ages in the nineteenth century. The historian o f science has interpreted medieval sci ences from the time when early modern scientists interpreted them out o f existence as sciences, through the discovery o f items o f observation, method, or theory uncovered in medieval writings as modern science progressed to the present. The history o f cultures and o f periods and the history o f sciences and o f disciplines are written backwards from present conceptions o f culture and present interpretations o f science. The report from the perspective o f one o f the cultures in contact with other cultures is no more objective than the report o f later interpreters, but the interplay o f culture and science appears also in the effects o f the contact on the internal structure o f the cultures engaged. Latin reports o f Arabic culture in the twelfth century are neither objective nor reliable, but the effects o f Arabic science on Latin culture and on Latin science, philosophy, and religion provide mutual controls, and changes o f culture may be expressed concretely in terms o f changes in the organization o f the sciences. The perspectives o f cultures are grounded in the structure o f a system o f knowledge, and the facts alleged about influences and
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.). The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 151-192. All Rights Reserved.
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oppositions are given significance in the data relevant to operative arts o f inquiry.
o f interrelated arts, which were also called human arts and liberal arts
The juxtaposition o f culture as structure o f values and culture as organi
‘paideia’ in the sense o f a “ general education” to form an ability to judge
zation o f sciences in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries suggests a pattern
the presentation o f theses and arguments, but he reserved the “ organiza
for the investigation o f cultural and scientific communication and under
tion o f knowledge” and the sciences for philosophy. Greek philosophies
standing. Viewed from the perspective o f the Latin West at the beginning
were encyclopedic in scope and method. Vitruvius and Quintilian used a
o f the twelfth century, the contact o f cultures was the meeting o f two
circle o f arts and sciences as elementary prerequisites to professional
traditions, the tradition in which Latin Christian culture had been formed
studies like architecture and rhetoric, ordered by rules o f art, and Pliny
and which constituted elementary general education. Aristotle had used
over a thousand years from elements borrowed from, or opposed to, the
the Elder used like interrelated arts and sciences as presuppositions to his
culture and erudition o f pagan antiquity adapted to the structure o f a
Natural History. Varro enumerated nine such arts which became, with
theology based on the interpretation o f the Bible, and the tradition o f Islamic culture based on elements derived from the same ancient source
the elimination o f architecture and medicine, the seven medieval arts - the literary arts o f words o f the trivium, grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic,
adapted to a theological structure formed by interpretation o f the Koran
and the mathematical arts o f things o f the quadrivium, arithmetic,
and the Old and New Testaments. The contact o f Latin Christian culture
geometry, astronomy, and music. After Augustine had given Latin the
with Arabic Muslim culture was mediated by scholars as well as by
ology a framework which adapted Platonic structures to Christian
crusaders, traders, and statesmen. Translations o f works o f science, phi
doctrines and Boethius had adapted logical, dialectical, and rhetorical
losophy, and theology were stimulated by reports o f Arabic science, para
methods to that framework, the arts o f divine letters were related to the
phrases, commentaries, and encyclopedic compendia which grew into a
arts o f human letters. Book I o f Cassiodorus’s Institutiones treats divine
flood during the next two centuries. The “ arts” and “ values” o f Latin
letters. Book II the arts and disciplines o f liberal letters. Isidore o f Seville’ s
Christian culture had been adapted from Greek culture, yet, paradoxi
Origins or Etymologies treats the seven liberal arts in the first three o f
cally, knowledge o f Greek sciences and o f the philosophy o f Aristotle was introduced into the West for the first time as a result o f contact with Is
twenty books before going on to the etymologies and natures o f other
lamic culture. The pattern that emerges from the contacts o f cultures at
o f Isidore’s other works were encyclopedic compendias: the De fide
that time is a pattern o f four cultures structured on interpretations o f one,
Catholica and the Sententiae o f theology, the De ordine creaturarum o f
two, or three related sacred Books - the Old Testament, the N ew Testa
cosmography, the De natura rerum o f cosmography and meteorology, the
things, including an alphabetically ordered dictionary in Book X. Many
ment, and the Koran - used to establish divergent systems o f arts, prac
Chronicon o f universal history. Hrabanus Maurus compiled a De universo
tices, and sciences developed from or constructed in reaction to a common
or De rerum natura. The Venerable Bede wrote encyclopedias o f metrical
source - Greek arts, sciences, and philosophies. The peoples o f the Books were also peoples o f encyclopedias, and the medieval cultural traditions
art, rhetoric, and a De rerum natura. Medieval Greek encyclopedias were learned and critical collections o f
o f Latin Christianity, Greek Christianity, Judaism, and Islam can be
information about styles and contents o f literary works. Like the Latin
clarified and characterized by examination o f the world conceptions, con
encyclopedias, they developed in the Roman Empire from the second
sequential facts, and accepted methods ordered and set forth in the Latin, the Greek, the Hebrew, and the Arabic encyclopedias.
century, when Marcus Aurelius wrote his Meditations and Galen and
Medieval Latin encyclopedias were concrete and practical collections
the foundations o f a distinctive cultural tradition which continued after
o f information about words and things. They were developed from Roman
the separation o f the Eastern from the Western Empire. Literary human
encyclopedias which had borrowed from the Greek the expression
istic centers flourished at the Imperial court. Philostratus reflects the cultural life patronized by Empress JuHa Domna in the second century in
‘ enkuklios paideia’ and had given it a fixed meaning to apply to the cycle
Ptolemy wrote their encyclopedic scientific treatises in Greek, and laid
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155
his Lives o f the Sophists. “ Hellenism” for Philostratus was purity and
could not read Hebrew, and Philo Judaeus completed the process o f hel-
clarity o f prose style (as “ Latinity” was to be made a criterion o f stylistic
lenization by elaborating and applying devices for its interpretation. The
excellence in the Renaissance), and his list o f sophists was a choice o f
Talmud is an encyclopedia o f the oral laws in which the written law o f the
masters o f Greek literary style. Scientists, like Eudoxus, were included
Pentateuch was interpreted in application to varying circumstances and
because o f the elegance o f their style. The ancient Sophists, Gorgias,
conditions and developed in logical consequences and relations. The oral
Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus, have a place, although their interest
tradition was put in written form and arrangement in the Mishnah to
in philosophy adulterated their sophistic accomplishments. The New
which commentaries were added in the Gemara. Two interpretative devices
Sophistic made its beginning about the time o f the beginning o f the Chris
are employed: the dialectical formulation o f the law o f the Halacha (or
tian era. One o f its effects was to concentrate attention and study on the
way or path), and the narrative accounts o f the Hagada (or saying or
Greek classics. Eunapius, who attached himself to the humanistic literary
tale). The evolution o f the meanings o f the term ‘Mishnah’ resembles those
center o f Emperor Julian the Apostate in the fourth century, reflects the
o f ‘paideia’ - from ‘repetition’ to ‘instruction’ to ‘learning’ - erudition as
effort to return the Empire from Christian to pagan culture in his Lives
method, as process, and as product. In the tenth century Saadia Gaon’s
o f the Philosophers and Sophists. He begins his “ lives o f the most celebrated
Opinions and Beliefs expanded the scope o f the encyclopedia to include
philosophers and rhetoricians” with the Neoplatonists and closes it with
consideration o f the relations o f philosophical doctrines to religious
accounts o f the iatrosophists who used sophistic arguments to cure psy
beliefs and reflected relations to the cultural traditions o f Islam. In the
chological and physical ills. Eunapius’s teacher was a Christian sophist,
twelfth century Maimonides wrote a commentary on the Mishnah and the
and the study o f Greek language and Greek classics continued with the
Mishneh Torah ( “ Repetition o f the Law” ), a systematic exposition o f the
assistance o f Greek lexicons and encyclopedias. Photius in the ninth cen
law o f Moses as contained in the Pentateuch and as repeated in the vast
tury compiled the Myriobiblion, a collection o f extracts from and abridge
Talmudic literature. He also wrote the Guide o f the Perplexed, for religious
ments o f 280 classical works, a Lexicon o f literary words and their usage,
persons who, adhering to the Torah, have studied philosophy and are
and the Amphilochia, a collection o f questions and answers in Scriptural
embarrassed by contradictions between the teachings o f philosophy and
interpretation. The Lexicon o f Suidas in the tenth century is a combina
the literal sense o f the Torah, and a Short Treatise on the A rt o f Logic to
tion lexicon and encyclopedia, an epitome, according to its author, o f the sixth century lexicon o f Hesychius o f Miletus and a mine o f borrowings
provide the art o f interpretation and o f thought. Medieval Muslim encyclopedias were systematic and constructive col
from a long line o f Greek encyclopedias. Latin encyclopedias were collec
lections o f information about principles and sciences. Like the Hebrew
tions o f meanings o f words and differentiations o f things to which they
encyclopedias they had their origin in the Hellenism o f Alexandria, but
are applied; Greek encyclopedias were collections o f usages o f words and
they built on the scientific rather than the hermeneutic tradition. The
o f excerpts or reviews o f outstanding instances o f their use. Psellos, in the
Alexandrian scientific encyclopedia had been adapted to Christian theol
eleventh century, organized his Didaskalia Pantodape or “ All-inclusive
ogy by the Syrians when they translated Greek medical, astronomical, and
Instruction” by question and answer, beginning with God and creation,
philosophical works as well as the New Testament into Syriac. In the
running through natural history and astronomy, and ending with various curious and practical questions.
Syriac and Arabic traditions medicine occupied a central place among the sciences which were brought into relation with theology, and logic oc
Medieval Hebrew encyclopedias were circumstantial and dialectical col
cupied a central place, as it did in Galen, in the study o f medicine. Alkindi,
lections o f information about laws and interpretations. They developed by
in the ninth century covered almost all the Greek sciences, and portions
use o f hermeneutic and analytic methods borrowed from Greek rhetoric
o f this work, including the Introduction to the A rt o f Logical Demonstra
and literary criticism applied to the Old Testament. The Greek translation
tion and the De Intellectu, were translated into Latin. The “ Brethren o f Purity” constructed an encyclopedia to interpret and confirm religious
o f the Septuagint made the Pentateuch available to Alexandrian Jews who
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revelation. Alfarabi wrote commentaries on various parts o f logic which
composed an encyclopedic formulation o f medicine, the Kulligat trans
included, in the Syriac and Arabic traditions, rhetoric and poetic as well
lated the Colliget, or Generality, and a vast collection o f commentaries,
as the Introduction o f Porphyry and therefore structured logic in the
long, medium and short, on the works o f Aristotle (in which the Politics
Neoplatonic interpretation which substituted dialectic for the scientific
is omitted and a commentary on the Republic o f Plato is put in its place),
demonstration o f the Posterior Analytics', and his encyclopedic treatise on
many o f which have survived only in Hebrew or Latin translation.
the classification and fundamental principles o f the sciences, the Enumera
When Arabic medical works began to be translated into Latin in the
tion o f the Sciences, has survived in two Latin translations. In the Muslim
tenth and eleventh centuries, the encyclopedic array o f sciences they con
encyclopedias prior to the eleventh century, under the influence o f Greek
tained was adapted to the Latin encyclopedia, which had been influenced
commentators, the structure given to logic was sometimes Stoic or Epicu rean rather than Neoplatonic, but since it was based on the first “ four
by the Hebrew and Greek encyclopedias in the course o f its formation. The ambiguities and oppositions o f the four cultures can be formulated
books o f logic” - Porphyry’s Introduction, the Categories, the On Inter
with greater accuracy in terms o f structural changes o f meanings and
pretation, and ih.QPrior Analytics - it was never adapted to the Aristotelian
applications introduced by structures o f arts and sciences than by simple
structure o f the Posterior Analytics. Alfarabi expounded logic in commen
comparison and opposition o f crucial propositions and inferred intentions
taries following the traditional division into three kinds: Short Commen
and principles. They ail treated o f words and things, but different methods
taries or Epitomes, Middle Commentaries or Paraphrases with supple
were used for the definition o f words and the determination and classifi
mentary explanations, and Great or Long Commentaries in which pas
cation o f kinds o f things. They all developed arts o f grammar, rhetoric,
sages from the text o f Aristotle are quoted and discussed at length. The
logic, and dialectic, but to suppose that the Latin trivium is assumed in
relation o f human sciences to theology in the encyclopedias took many
the other three encyclopedias is to distort those arts as they were devel
forms and was the subject o f continuing controversy; there were defenders and opponents o f the kalam, the word, or the logos. It was sometimes
oped in the other encyclopedias and to obscure, in consequence, the efiect
held that revelation can be explained and established by human reason,
and the physical sciences, but the quadrivium was a mode o f treating
sometimes that the truths o f faith exceed the power o f human expression
them which was characteristic o f the Latin encyclopedia as was the close
and are distorted by human argument, sometimes that human sciences
relation o f mathematics and physics and even the reduction o f physics to
have their principles and flow from divine science, sometimes that human
mathematics. They all treated law and related the law o f Moses or o f
they had on the evolution o f the trivum. They all treated the mathematical
and divine sciences are distinct in principles and methods but are not
Abraham to the laws o f the cosmos, o f natural things, o f virtuous action,
mutually contradictory. Avicenna, in the eleventh century, constructed a
and o f artistic creation, and there were controversies in the discussions o f
vast medical encyclopedia in the Canon, which was translated into Latin
all four encyclopedias concerning the relation o f divine, natural, and
in the twelfth century, and a philosophical encyclopedia in the A l Shifa or
human laws. The influence o f the cultures on each other was therefore
The Healing which was translated into Latin in part by Gundissalinus in
not the transfer en bloc o f definitions o f words, sciences o f things, meth
the twelfth century and again, in fuller forms, in the fifteenth and six
ods o f discourse, thought, inquiry, proof, or scientific system, but rather
teenth centuries - parts o f the logic and o f the physics (called in Latin
the rearrangement o f schemata which they shared and the modification
Sufficientia because o f its arrangement by causes and principles), On the
o f the data, methods, and truths organized in those schemata to new
Heavens (which is probably inauthentic). On the Soul (frequently called,
specification and evidence. The contact o f Latin with Muslim culture
because o f its position in the work. The Sixth Book o f Natural Philosophy),
raised scientific questions and revived and altered questions which had
On Animals, On Intelligences, On First Philosophy. The organization o f the
become part o f the Latin tradition as a result o f contacts with the Greek
sciences is based on the Aristotelian division o f the theoretical sciences
and the Hebrew encyclopedias. From the vantage point o f the West, the
adapted to Neoplatonic interpretations. In the twelfth century Averroes
contact may be examined in the modifications o f the structure o f the Latin
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encyclopedia and in the problems perceived and inquiries initiated as a
De Intellectu, and Isaac Israeli’ s Liber de Definitionibus. His treatise De
consequence. The encyclopedia o f the liberal arts is enlarged, and the effect o f the alteration is to initiate new sciences and new arts distinct from
Divisione Philosophiae which contains some o f his translations from Avicenna and Alfarabi, follows the lines o f Alfarabi’s organization o f the sciences: natural science, mathematics, divine science, grammar, poetic,
those implicit or developed in the older encyclopedias in isolation or in communication with each other.
rhetoric, logic, medicine, arithmetic, music, geometry, aspects (the Arabic
The Latin encyclopedia at the beginning o f the twelfth century took the
science o f optics or perspectives), astrology, astronomy, the science o f
form o f collections o f words or things, universal histories, and lives o f
weights, natural abilities or engines {de ingeniis, following the consequences
ecclesiastical writers. The encyclopedias o f words were organized accord
o f complexions o f things and minds - engine and ingenuity - the purpose
ing to the subject matters and methods o f the liberal arts; the encyclope
o f the science according to Gundissalinus is to teach ways o f thinking out
dias o f things were organized according to cosmological classifications o f
and inventing means by which natural bodies may be adapted by artifice
facts or hexamerous sequences o f creation. The translations from the
to uses rendered possible by the mathematical sciences), an abbreviation
Arabic began with medical works, moved through the related subject
o f Avicenna’ s analysis o f agreements and differences o f subjects, and
matters o f physica - astronomy, astrology, experimental science and
finally a section on the parts o f practical philosophy. Adelhard o f Bath
magic - to handbooks on the organization o f the sciences or the division
travelled in Italy, Greece, and possibly Asia Minor in search o f the new
o f philosophy. The arts became the arts o f the physici, physicians or
knowledge. He translated Euclid, wrote mathematical treatises, and a
physicists, and the things became the subject matters o f the sciences, theo
Quaestiones Naturales, and justified his wanderings in the De Eodem et
retic, practical, and productive. In the eleventh century Constantine the
Diverso by showing how the study o f the liberal arts in France is sup
African translated Greek as well as Arabic medical works, including the
plemented by study in Italy and completed by knowledge o f Greek
Microtegni, the Megategni, and the Compendium o f the Megategni o f
sources. Thierry o f Chartres, in the manner o f the twelfth century, made a
Galen, the Book o f Divisions and the Book o f Experiments o f Rasis. The
vast collection o f texts on the liberal arts in his Heptateuchon. The manu
Pantegni is an adaptation o f the Royal A rt o f Medicine o f A li ibn Abbas,
script o f 595 pages contains portions o f forty-five works including Don
which treats all phenomena o f nature in terms o f the contraries o f the
atus and Priscian on grammar, Cicero, Severianus, and Martianus Cap
elements. It is divided into two parts. Theory and Practice, theory being
pella on rhetoric. Porphyry and Boethius, the Categories, On Interpreta
the perfect knowledge o f things seized by the intellect alone, practice the
tion, the first Book o f the P rior Analytics, selections from the Topics and
manifestation o f theory in things o f sense and in manual operations in
the De Sophisticis Elenchis, but nothing o f the Posterior Analytics o f Aris
accordance with theory. Bodies are formed from mixtures o f elements
totle, on logic, Boethius, Martianus Cappella, Isidore o f Seville, Fron
called complexions, which are instruments o f nature or o f the soul, or o f
tinus, Columella, Gerbert, Gerland, Hyginus, Ptolemy and a short frag
both. The De Imagine Mundi, probably by Honorius Inclusus about 1080,
ment on regular bodies ascribed to Adelhard o f Bath on the quadrivium.
and the Liber Floridus o f Lambert o f Saint-Omer, about 1120, are in the
His On the Work o f the Six Days makes use o f the Timaeus for the inter
older tradition o f Latin encyclopedias, compilations o f materials from
pretation o f Genesis. Tw o o f his pupils, Herman the Dalmatian and
Macrobius, Martianus Capella, Isidore, Bede, and Hrabanus Maurus.
Robert o f Chester, dedicated their translation o f Ptolemy’s Planisphere
Later in the twelfth century the Philosophia Mundi o f William o f Conches,
to him as the anchor and sovereign o f the second philosophy, that is, the
which has been attributed under various titles to Bede, William o f Hirschau, and Honorius o f Autun, shows the influence o f translation from
quadrivium. Education in the Arabic tradition related medicine, law, and theology,
the Arabic, particularly o f the Pantegni. Gundissalinus, in the second half
and the mature career o f a scholar often included activities in all three.
o f the twelfth century, translated Avicenna’s De Anima, Metaphysics, and
In the Latin tradition the hberal arts continued to constitute preliminary education, and after the foundation o f universities separate faculties o f
Posterior Analytics, Alfarabi’s De Intellectu and De Scientiis, Alkindi’s
160
161
R. MCKEON
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medicine, law, and theology were established. The widely circulated ency
mar; Book 3 logic, rhetoric, and poetry; Books 4-5 monastic sciences;
clopedias o f the thirteenth century were assemblages o f facts, organized
Book 6 economics; Book 7 politics; Book 8 law; Books 9-10 crimes;
according to different plans. Alexander Neckham’s De Naturis defends
Book 11 mechanical arts; Book 12 practical medicine; Books 13-14 theo
natural science against the logical vagaries o f Paris and quotes Algazeli
retical medicine; Book 15 physics; Book 16 mathematics, including
and Isaac Israeli. Thomas o f Cantimpré’ s De Natura Rerum is an un
metaphysics; Book 17 theology. The Speculum Doctrinale contains no
critical assemblage o f information about different kinds o f things -
reference to the Arabic sciences o f optics or mechanics, but it does treat
Books 1-3 on man, Books 4-9 on animals, Books 10-12 on plants. Book
Arabic numbers. The Speculum Historiale is in 31 books and 3,792 chap
13 on waters (rivers and fountains). Books 14-15 on stones and metals.
ters; it traces the history o f the world from creation to 1254, and it has
Books 16-18 on astronomy, astrology, and meteorology. Book 19 on
24 chapters on the deaths o f great men and the end o f the world. The
elements. Bartholomew o f Glanville addressed his encyclopedia On the
Speculum Morale was added to Vincent’s three mirrors in the fourteenth
Properties o f Things to plain people - simplices et rudes. He makes use o f
century, about 1310-1325; it is in three books and 247 articles, arranged
Arabic works, undertakes to cover all things, lists authors cited, and
according to distinctions and divided into articles; it makes use o f the
organizes his chapters by propositions which state their positions in turn.
moral conceptions and differentiations o f Thomas Aquinas. Brunetto
Book 1 is on God, Book 2 on angels and demons. Book 3 on psychology.
Latini’s French encyclopedia L i Livres dou Trésor, 1260-1267, is in three
Books 4-5 on physiology. Book 6 on family life and domestic economy.
books: Book 1 on the origin o f the world and the history o f the Bible and
Book 7 on medicine (largely derived from translations from the Arabic),
o f the foundations o f governments, astronomy, geography, and natural
Book 8 on cosmology and astrology. Book 9 on divisions o f time. Book 10
history; Book 2 on morality, reflecting Aristotle’s ethics and based on a
on form and matter and the elements, Book 11 on air and meteorology,
collection o f extracts from moralists, entitled the Moralities o f the Philos
Book 12 on flying creatures, Book 13 on water and fishes, dolphins, and whales. Book 14 on physical geography, Book 15 on pohtical geography
ophers', Book 3 on politics, beginning with a treatise on rhetoric based
(in 175 chapters). Book 16 on gems, minerals, and metals. Book 17 on
on Cicero. The medieval Latin encyclopedias continued to be collections o f words
trees and herbs. Book 18 on animals. Book 19 on color, odor, savor, food
and things, o f verba and res, facta and acta, enlarged by contact with
and drink, eggs, weights and measures, musical instruments. In the thir
Arabic encyclopedias o f sciences, methods, and principles to include new
teenth century the Speculum Majus o f Vincent o f Beauvais made explicit
words and new things. That enlargement included the ancient Greek sci
in its four “ mirrors” four schemes o f organization used from antiquity to
ences and the scientific works o f Aristotle, and it led therefore to a readjust
the medieval Latin encyclopedias - according to subject matter, according
ment to the medieval Greek and Hebrew encyclopedias which had devel
to sciences, according to practical problems, and according to chronology.
oped from the same ancient Greek sources. As the contact with Arabic en
The Speculum Naturalis is in 32 books and 3,718 chapters, in which the natures o f things are treated in the order o f their creation in the first 28
cyclopedias had been adapted to the Latin liberal arts to reconstitute the quadrivium or second philosophy, so the readjustments to the Greek en
books, arranged in the sequence o f the six days o f creation; Book 29, “ On
cyclopedia led to a reconstitution o f the methods and subject matter o f the
the Universe,” is concerned with the operations o f God since the creation;
trivium and the readjustments to the Hebrew encyclopedia gave new signifi
Book 30 with the nature o f things; Book 31 with the natural history o f
cances and application to hermeneutics as applied to human and divine
man; and Book 32 with times and places. The Speculum Doctrinale presents human doctrines - grammatical, literary, and political as well as
letters and to the relations o f sciences to philosophy. John o f Salisbury’ s Metalogicon reports the reconstitution o f the trivium on a basis adapted
legal, mathematical, and physical - in 17 books; Book 1 contains an
from the academic philosophy o f Cicero. Grammar is the foundation o f
alphabetical dictionary o f about 2,300 words, and the remaining books
both philosophical inquiry and the practice o f virtue, for both are the
run throught the sciences from the hberal arts to theology: Book 2 gram
product o f reading, doctrine, meditation, and application {Metalogicon
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i. 23). The study o f poetry and “ letters” also falls in the art o f grammar.
a Platonist, and an old man who converted him from the books o f the
John enumerates three possibihties - some assign poetry to grammar,
philosophers to Holy Scripture; and he was able to discover Christians
some to rhetoric, and some to a special art, poetics - but John concludes
prior to Christ. The Recognitions o f the pseudo-Clement o f Rome tells
that poetry must remain a part o f grammar or be dropped from the lib
the story o f the family o f Clement, two parents and three sons who were
162
eral arts {ibid. i. 17) and he describes in detail the use o f grammar in
separated and wandered through the world and through the doctrines o f
teaching Uterature employed by Bernard o f Chartres {ibid. i. 23). Peter
philosophy, religion, and gnosticism until they were brought together and
Helias wrote a Latin grammar in hexameters, and the art o f poetry was
converted by Peter the Apostle and recognized themselves and the com
expounded in Matthew o f Vendôme’ s Ars Versifitoria in the twelfth cen
munity and truths o f Christianity. Hippolytus o f Rome derives Christian
tury to be continued at the beginning o f the thirteenth century by the Poetria Nova o f Geoffrey o f Vinsaud, and the Laborinthus o f Evrard the
heresies from Greek philosophical doctrines. Clement o f Alexandria’s sequence o f steps in Christian education - the Protrepticus, the Pedagogue,
German. The opposition o f a program o f grammar and letters and a
and the Strommata - makes use o f Greek philosophy and literature as a
program o f logic and the sciences became the battle o f the seven liberal
starting point for instruction concerning the teaching o f the Logos, and
arts in the thirteenth century between the universities o f Toulouse and
the Strommata is an encyclopedic carpetbag o f literary citation and in
Paris. With the victory o f logic, grammar was logicized and laid the foun
formation. Latin Apologists, like Tertullian (whose early writings were
dations for the tradition o f speculative grammars or modes o f signifying.
in Greek) and Arnobius, argue against the legaUty o f the persecution o f
The battle, however, was between a grammar and a logic already rhet-
the Christians. The Greek community was held together by cultural bonds
orized by Cicero and Quintihan. Aristotle’s Poetics was not translated
o f literature and philosophy; the Latin community was a polity held
into Latin until the end o f the thirteenth century, and it too was rhetorized
together by institutions and laws. The Greek culture produced as a genre
in the Renaissance commentaries which adapted Horace’s Poetic A rt to give poetic a rhetorical interpretation.
for its expression the N ovel or Parable o f spiritual and intellectual wan
The Greek encyclopedia was literary and critical - analytical presenta
troduced by Augustine, o f the individual sinner seeking happiness or
tions o f the elements, style, and contents o f chosen great works; the
beatitude by intellectual discipline and moral enlightenment, and in the
dering; the Latin culture found its genre in the Autobiography, as in
Latin encyclopedia a collection and manual o f Uberal arts. The method o f
Hymn, which Ambrose used to preserve the Christian community from
the Greek encyclopedia derived from the demonstrative, epideictic rhet
the threat o f transformation to Arianism. Justin encountered philosophi
oric o f the Second Sophistic; that o f the Latin encyclopedia from the
cal and religious cultures and communities o f peoples; Augustine moved
deliberative and judicial devices o f political and forensic rhetoric. The
from sin to cultivation o f himself, culture or Christian doctrina, and the
culture o f the Greek tradition was the culture o f the hterary and learned
cult o f G od; Ambrose solidified the Christian ecclesia against imperial
circles o f the Imperial court; the culture o f the Latin tradition was the
pressures to doctrinal variation. What were to become the Humanities in
culture o f episcopal and abbotal schools, o f Curias and councils. The
the Renaissance took their beginnings in two forms in the two traditions
struggle between programs o f grammatical studies o f literature and his
from the same distinctions; Themistius, writing in Greek in the fourth
tory and logical studies o f philosophy and science in the thirteenth cen
century A .D . and advocating a return from Christian to Greek culture,
tury was a continuation o f cultural differences which were apparent in
used the word ‘philanthropia’ to distinguish the hermeneutics o f human
the contacts o f the two cultural traditions in the early centuries o f the
letters from that o f divine scripture, and so separated the humanities from
Roman Empire. Greek Apologists, like Justin Martyr, Tatian, and A th
theology; Aulus Gellius writing in Latin two centuries earlier argued that
enagoras, presented Christian doctrine in the context o f philosophic doc
‘humanitas’ is a translation o f ‘paideia’ and not o f ‘philanthropia’ for the
trines. Justin sought God through the philosophers - a Stoic, a Peripatetic,
study o f outstanding achievements, and so laid the bases for the liberal
a Pythagorean (who urged the study o f geometry, astronomy, and music).
arts which were to be applied to the study o f divine as well as human
R. MCKEON
SCIENCES A N D THE R E L A T IO N S OF CU LTURES
letters. The Recognitions o f the pseudo-Clement survive in the Latin trans
and by the schism o f the Greek and Latin Churches, which began in the
lation o f Rufinus, and Origen’ s Principia was the subject o f attack and
ninth century when the Eastern emperor made Photius patriarch over the
164
165
defense in the Latin tradition, highlighted in the quarrel o f Rufinus and
objections o f the Romans. Photius was recognized as patriarch and was
Jerome.
influential as compiler o f three characteristically Greek encyclopedias,
The history o f the separation o f the two cultural traditions was traced as
the Myriobiblion, the Lexicon, and the Amphilochia. The first seven ecu
steps o f institutional growth in the Latin tradition and o f doctrinal evolu
menical councils from the First Council o f Nicaea in 325 to the Second
tion in the Greek tradition. The formation o f Latin Christianity was the
Council o f Nicaea in 787 were recognized by both Churches. The Fourth
construction o f a church and the institutional powers attributed to the pope,
Council o f Constantinople in 869-870, which confirmed the Roman sen
the curia, the bishops, and the councils for the interpretation o f doctrines
tence o f excommunication against Photius, was recognized as ecumenical
and the judgment o f actions. The formation o f Greek Christianity was the
by the Roman Church. A ll subsequent ecumenical councils from the
formulation o f a theology and the derivation o f doctrines which followed
eighth to the twenty-first, the Second Vatican Council in the twentieth
as consequences and o f deviations which were shown to be erroneous and
century, were recognized by the Roman Church. Six o f these councils
heretical. The early stages o f the cooperation and separation o f the two
were held in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, after a period o f more
traditions were over issues and problems concerned with both - with
than 250 years between the eighth and ninth. They were councils o f re
structures o f power and action and with oppositions o f doctrine and their
form, reaffirmation, and consolidation. The Fourth Lateran Council in
interpretation. The emperor Constantine summoned a “ general” council
1215 condemned the errors o f the Albigenses and the Waldenses, and o f
at Arles in 314 to deal with the problems o f the Donatist schism. After he
Joachim o f Fiore, and approved the teaching o f Peter Lombard on the
had made himself sole emperor in 324, he summoned the first ecumenical
Trinity. The Second Council o f Lyon in 1274 was summoned to end the
council, the First Council o f Nicaea, in 325 to solve the conflict in the
Greek schism, to rescue the H oly Land, and institute a moral reform.
Eastern Church over Arianism. It established 20 canons and a synodical
Albertus Magnus and Bonaventura attended the Council, and Bonaven-
decree concerning the date o f Easter. The emperor exiled Arius from Egypt
tura died during its sessions.
until he accepted the Creed o f Nicaea. The Eastern bishops expressed
The revival o f the study o f literature in the twelfth century did not lead
distrust o f the Council as a means o f resolving doctrinal disputes: Gregory
to the transformation o f the Latin encyclopedia o f the liberal arts to the
o f Nazianzus wrote that he perferred to avoid all councils o f bishops, and
form o f the Greek encyclopedia o f literature and literary history and
the easterners refused to attend the Council o f Sardica in 343, which had
criticism. The Greek reader did not depend on translations o f the Greek
been intended as an ecumenical council, when they learned that the west
classics, but he needed aids to understanding, appreciating, and using
erners insisted on the attendance o f Athanasius. The council o f Chalcedon
them. The Latin encyclopedia joined or opposed grammar and rhetoric in
in 451 approved a series o f documents, including the Creed o f Nicaea and
the interpretation o f poetry without setting up a separate science o f poet
the Creed o f Constantinople, to establish a confession o f faith and con
ics to analyze and expound Virgil and to record figures and styles in Latin
firmed a code o f canons which gave ecumenical authority to canons o f
literature. There was an efflorescence o f poets who were frequently also
earUer local or provincial councils. The four general councils were can
philosophers - Bernard Sylvester, Alan o f Lille, Bernard o f Morlas, John
onized as the rule o f orthodoxy, and in the sixth century Gregory
o f SaUsbury, Hildebert o f Lavardin, and Peter Abailard - and the subjects
the Great wrote that he reverenced them as he reverenced the four
o f their poems were frequently encyclopedic - cosmology, the nature and
Gospels.
history o f things, morals. The structure o f the encyclopedia led to new
From the viewpoint o f the Latin tradition, the process o f institutional
developments in literature as well as in grammar and rhetoric and to new
change was marked by changes in the Empire and in the Church, and in
developments in canon law, theology, and philosophy as well as in dia
particular by the separation o f the Eastern and Western Empires in 364,
lectic and rhetoric.
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167
Saint Augustine laid down the structure o f the encyclopedia o f the
expressed in a methodological factual encyclopedia with a culture ex
liberal arts. His City o f God related the history o f terrestrial cities, and o f
pressed in a literary doctrinal encyclopedia, were reechoed and expressed
Rome in particular, to the City o f God and affirmed an affinity between
in the twelfth and thirteenth century in oppositions and adjustments o f
Platonism and the Christian faith, relating the “ Platonic Sciences,” phys
grammar and rhetoric. The contacts o f the Latin with the Arabic tradition
ics, logic, and ethics, to the three persons o f the Trinity; his De Trinitate
led to the readjustment and development o f logic in its relations to dia
explored the basic principles o f theology and their relations to philosoph
lectic, rhetoric, and grammar under the influence o f the Arabic logic
ical problems; his De Doctrina Christiana applied the liberal arts to the
which had developed in relation to the sciences. Many o f the steps o f the
interpretation o f the things and the words o f Scripture; and treatises on
two developments - the development o f the liberal arts relative to litera
rhetoric and dialectic, attributed to him, were widely read. Boethius fitted
ture and their development relative to science - are the same in the two
his translations o f Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation and his
traditions because o f the operation o f ideas which entered into the origins
commentaries on them to this Platonic frame with the help o f Porphyry’s Introduction to the Categories and his own logical treatises. The conflict o f
traditions the Aristotelian logic was adjusted to a Neoplatonic dialectic.
canons led to the collection o f issues and the formulation o f methods o f
The Arabic tradition had access to the Greek commentators, and there
resolving them from the ninth to the twelfth century by Hincmar, Gerbert,
fore the adjustment was sometimes to the Stoic logistic or the Epicurean
Berthold o f Constance, Ivo o f Chartres, and Alger o f Liège. Abailard’s
canonic, which Latin commentators o f the twelfth and thirteenth cen
Sic et Non is a collection o f seemingly contradictory texts from Scripture
turies learned about from Arabic commentaries and theories. In both
and the Church Fathers on 158 questions. Many o f the citations are the
traditions Porphyry’s Isagoge became part o f the canon o f Aristotelian
o f both, independent o f but reinforced by intercultural influences. In both
same as those in the collections o f Ivo o f Chartres, who had borrowed
logic. In the Neoplatonic dialectic categories were words, not terms as
some o f them from earlier collections, and many reappear in the Sentences
Aristotle presented them, that is, words with meanings and references;
o f Peter Lombard and the Decretum o f Gratian, which was known as the
and they stood in need therefore o f an “ introduction” derived from the
“ Concordance o f Discordant Canons.” The twelfth century is an era o f
predicables which Aristotle treated as part o f dialectic in the Topics. The
Books o f Sentences. By virtue o f them it is easier to characterize the cul
predicabilia provided theoretic bases for the predicamenta. Moreover,
ture o f the twelfth century than any other period, for it is possible to make
Aristotle distinguished four predicables - definition, genus, property, and
a list o f about 3,000 important texts with which all the learned men o f the
accident. Porphyry broke “ definition” into its parts, and distinguished
period were likely to be familiar and to specify the methods by which they
five “ words” - genus, species, differentia, property, and accident - and
were interpreted and used. It is a culture distinct in content and orienta
since the distinction o f genus and species, unlike the distinction o f genus
tion from the culture expressed and advanced by the books o f excerpts
and definition, introduces the elements o f a hierarchy, it planted the seeds
and paraphrases o f the Greek encyclopedia. The “ scholastic method” was
o f “ Porphyry’s tree.” Such a hierarchy indicated the need o f a bottom as
formed by the conjunction o f the rhetoric o f resolving disputed questions
well as a top, and therefore Avicenna and Abailard introduced a sixth
and the dialectic o f constructing interdependent sequences and systems o f
“ word,” independently, in the twelfth century - “ individual.”
resolutions. The summas o f theology o f the thirteenth century are further
Moreover, since logic was an art o f words, rhetoric and poetic became
systematizations o f the subject matter o f the Books o f Sentences o f the
a part o f logic in the Syriac-Arabic tradition, and there were therefore
twelfth century - from God and Creation through man, his virtues and
eight books oflogic-th esix treatises o f the Organon, plus the Rhetoric and
laws, to last things - treated step by step in questions to which possible answers are set in oppositions to be resolved by demonstrating one and
the P o e t i c s I n t r o d u c t i o n was added. In the thirteenth
refuting the other. The earlier contacts o f the Latin with the Greek tradition, o f a culture
century, Thomas Aquinas too distinguished eight parts o f logic. The devel opment o f logic in the two traditions was in part the gradual addition o f books o f logic, and in part the methodological changes in logic conse
168
R. MCKEON
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169
quent on their addition. In the ninth century, in the time o f Alfarabi,
questions o f Boethius,” as Gilbert calls them in his prologue to the com
Arabic logic was based on the “ four books” o f logic, Porphyry’s Introduc
mentaries, God, interminable in magnitude, incomprehensible to con
tion and the first three treatises o f Aristotle’s Organon. In the twelfth cen
templation, inexplicable in word, is rightly understood and laudably pred
tury, in the time o f Abailard, Latin logic was based on the same four
icated. In the Commentary on How Substances in that they are, are Good,
books - Boethius’ s translations o f the Introduction, the Categories, and
Gilbert explains that his procedure, and that o f Boethius, is like that fol
the On Interpretation, together with his commentaries on them, and his
lowed in the mathematical disciplines o f arithmetic, geometry, music,
treatises on the syllogism, in the place o f the Prior Analytics. In both
astronomy, and many other disciplines, o f setting down at the beginning
traditions the Neoplatonic framework o f predicables and topics provided
terms or rules. These common reasons, terms, rules, conceptions, prop-
dialectical devices to establish demonstrative syllogisms and principles,
sitions, known naturally or through logic, are the indemonstrables, the
which made the Aristotelian devices o f the Posterior Analytics unneces
propositions known through themselves - the rules o f grammar, the com
sary. In that framework, the categories become “ principles” rather than
monplaces o f rhetoric, the greatest propositions o f dialectic, the theorems
terms, and in the twelfth century Gilbert de la Porrée wrote a Book o f Six
o f geometry, the axioms o f music, the theorems o f measures, the axioms o f
Principles to fill the gap left by Aristotle’s failure to expound the last six
weights. The different faculties o f the mind are distinguished according to
categories as fully as the first four. Gilbert’s treatise was added to the canon
the genera o f things o f which they treat, and o f all the forms o f knowledge
o f the books o f Aristotelian logic, which came to be called the Old Logic,
- natural, mathematical, theological, civil, rational - there is one, “ nat
the Logica Vetus, after the New Logic, the Logica Nova, was constituted
ural” or “ physical science,” which is more influential on human speech
by the addition o f the new translations o f the last four treatises o f the
than the rest, and from it distinctions are transferred to the others in a
Organon. Medieval manuscripts o f the Organon therefore contain eight
proportional sense. In its narrow meaning, natural science is knowledge
treatises, the six parts o f the Organon and the treatises o f Porphyry and
o f natural things, concrete and inabstract; in its broader meaning,
Gilbert. In 1255 the Six Principles was included among the books ofii-
the natural sciences are three, the strictly natural, the mathematical,
cially required in the Faculty o f Arts o f the University o f Paris, and com
and the theological. The mathematical sciences consider the inabstract
mentaries on it were written by many philosophers, including Albertus
forms o f natural things abstractly; they are named from mathesis or
Magnus, Robert Kilwardby, Antonius Andrea, Walter Burleigh, and
disciplina, the name applied to the seven liberal arts, and they separate
Bongratia o f Acoli. Renaissance Humanists prepared new translations o f
inseparable things in order that their natures and properties may be
the Organon from the Greek to free it from the barbarisms o f medieval Latin, and to complete that process Hermolaus Barbarus translated the
perceived. The coming o f the New Logic was not the substitution o f a complete logic
Six Principles into a more elegant humanistic Latin, which is the only
for a partial logic. The Old Logic was a dialectical logic in which the dis
form in which it was available until the original medieval text was pub
cussion o f principles was based on Porphyry’s five words or predicables
lished in the twentieth century. Albertus Magnus explains in his com
and on Boethius’s topics, which he derived from Cicero and Themistius ;
mentary why Gilbert called the ten first genera principles rather than
the New Logic made available Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Topics,
categories: they are the first essences constituting in their essentiality and
but principles were still sought dialectically in the Topics and not apo-
containing in the embrace o f their community all things which can be ordered according to the determination o f subject and predicate, and they
deictically in Aristotle’s manner in the Posterior Analytics. In the thirteenth century the choice between these two conceptions o f principles led to the
are therefore ten principles o f things in which all resolution or analysis
distinction between the Ancient Logic, Logica Antiqua, which reinstated
ends. Gilbert also wrote a commentary on the theological opuscula o f Boethius, in which the Neoplatonic framework o f this conception o f logic
the Posterior Analytics, and the Modern Logic, Logica Moderna, which
and o f the organization o f the sciences is more apparent. In “ the books o f
grammar, and mathematics.
found substitute sources o f principles in topics, sophisms, paradoxes,
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171
John o f Salisbury, whose Metalogicon is based on the New Logic, de
in Treatise I I and Treatise V. In his commentary on Porphyry in the
votes six chapters to the Topics (Bk. Ill, 5-10) because “ the body o f the
Logica Ingredientibus he demonstrates that the science o f the five words
art” o f logic is Topics, Analytics, and Refutations, and Topics is the most
or predicables is necessary not only for the science o f the categories or
important o f these for probable arguments. He merely touches on the
predicaments but also for divisions, definitions, propositions, and argumen
Posterior Analytics briefly (Bk. IV, 6 and 8) because the art o f demonstra
tations. Moreover these sciences are reciprocally related since the nature
tion is employed by almost no one except mathematicians, and among
and kinds o f words depend on their uses in statement and argument, and
mathematicians only by geometricians. Demonstrative logic is the logic o f
the nature and kinds o f arguments depend on the divisions and defini
judgment, topics the logic o f invention. Peter Abailard, who had been
tions o f words and statements. Cicero and Boethius, moreover, had set
one o f John’s teachers and who professed to know only the books o f the
up “ a double division o f dialectic, which so include each other reci
Old Logic, although modern scholars have labored learnedly to show that
procally that they comprise the whole o f dialectic” : the sciences o f dis
he must have used the P rior Analytics and the Sophistical Refutations,
covery and judgment, and the sciences o f division, definition, and col
undertook to write a systematic presentation o f the whole o f logic. Since
lection. Finally, Abailard puts words and things in a dialectical relation:
the treatment was to be complete, he called three o f the five treatises o f
they provide the difference between logic and physics, but both words and
his Dialectica by the names o f three o f the treatises o f the Organon which
things are essential to both sciences. Things are considered in logic as a
he had not read - the Prior Analytics, the Topics, and the Posterior Ana
“ category,” like “ substance” or “ quantity,” is both a word and a thing
lytics - developing their meanings dialectically and giving them different
- John o f Salisbury calls this the “ principle o f indifference” - and, in gen
subject matters than they had had for Aristotle. Scholars have been puzzled
eral, logic investigates the imposition o f words on things, while physics
by these titles for more than a hundred years since Cousin first published
investigates whether the nature o f the thing conforms to the statement
parts o f the Dialectica, and the editor o f the excellent critical edition pub lished 17 years ago dropped them because they are “ meaningless” and
made about it. The second volume o f the First Treatise is concerned with categories
rearranged the contents o f the parts to fit the new titles he substituted for
and treats the ten categories taken up in the central portion o f Aristotle’s
them. The puzzle is less inscrutable if Abailard’s treatment o f the contents
Categories. Like Gilbert de la Porrée, Abailard fills in the six categories
o f the parts o f Aristotle which he did not know is compared with his
which are treated briefly by Aristotle. Gilbert considered categories prin
treatment o f the Old Logic on which he wrote glosses which show a
ciples, and therefore added a treatment o f six principles to the four ex
detailed knowledge - Porphyry’s Introduction, Aristotle’s Categories and
pounded by Aristotle. For Abailard categories are not principles but
On Interpretation, Boethius’ s De Differentiis Topicis and De Divisionibus -
significative words, and he therefore reorganizes the list o f the categories in
and in which he sketches the dialectic o f his departure from Aristotle which
order to treat first the two categories which are directly significative o f
he develops more fully in the Dialectica.
things, substance and quantity, which is “ inserted” in substance so that
Treatise I is called the Book o f Parts and is divided into three volumes
when we understand a substance we conceive its quantity, one or many.
o f which the first and the beginning o f the second is lacking in the one
Thereafter, he goes on to the “ remaining categories,” which are adjacent
surviving manuscript. The epilogue o f Treatise I outlines the treatise: it
to substance - time, place, and position briefly, relation in more detail,
is concerned with the parts o f speech {partes orationis) which he calls
quality at length, and doing, undergoing, and having briefly.
dictions {dictiones) in three steps, Antepredicamenta, Predicamenta, and
The third volume o f the First Treatise lacks a title, but it begins by
Postpredicamenta. Abailard knew that these were the traditional three
characterizing the preceding parts which had been devoted to determining
parts o f Aristotle’ s Categories, yet it is clear that he treated the five words
(1) the significance o f names and (2) the natures o f the things designated
o f Porphyry’s Introduction in the missing first volume o f the First Treatise
by words used according to the ten categories. The next part (3) is to return
and not the antepredicamenta o f Aristotle, which he reserves for treatment
to the significative word in order to determine how many “ modes o f sig
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nifying” there are. Names or nouns signify (1) in naming things by impo
into two books one on the categorical proposition and its parts, based on
sition and detennination, (2) in joining words in statement by generation
Aristotle’s On Interpretation, the second on the categorical syllogism,
or removal, afl&rmation and denial, (3) in framing demonstrations by
based on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Part I o f Treatise I I lacks a title, but it begins with the definition o f a
adherence and concomitance, (4) in words significant naturally or by convention, in composite, indefinite, and definite dictions and in verbs.
sentence or speech {oratio), treats proposition as a kind o f speech, and
The First Treatise, thus, treats words in the three aspects in which they
examines the parts and kinds o f propositions. A sentence is vocal sound
are “ parts o f speech” - as “ predicables” capable o f functioning in sig
(voa:) which is significant by convention and is composed o f significant
nificant discourse, as predicaments signifiying meanings and designating
parts, and the definition o f the sentence can therefore be derived from the
things, and as “ modes o f signifying” operative in designation, statement,
definition o f parts in Treatise I. However, the “ parts o f speech,” pars
and demonstration. The five words o f Porphyry provide
orationis, are predicates, nouns and verbs, while the “ terms o f a sentence,”
the ten categories o f Aristotle provide predicamenta, and the first four chapters o f the On Interpretation provide nouns and verbs, parts o f sen
terminus orationis, are parts o f a significant whole, subjects and predicates,
tences or speeches, as postpredicamenta, in the discussion o f the parts o f
Treatise I, after the extended treatment o f nouns, on the verb. Among the
speech in Treatise I, under the titles “ On the Five Words,” “ On Cate gories,” and “ On Interpretation.”
kinds o f sentences - enumerations, interrogations, deprecations, imper
and the transition between the first two treatises is the final chapter o f
atives, and desideratives - propositions have the distinctive mark o f being
Treatise II is called “ On Categorical Propositions and Syllogisms or
true or false in signification. They depend therefore on distinguishing
the Prior Analytics.” It opens with a statement o f purpose and method:
ideas o f understanding {intellectus) and existence o f things {existentia rei)
now that individual significant words or dictions {singulae dictiones) have
in the designations o f the words and in the “ consequences” signified in
been treated, it is proper to go on to the composition o f statements or
words and designated in things. Part 2 distinguishes the kinds o f simple
speeches {compositio orationum). The parts, significant words, are the
categorical propositions by differences o f predicates and subjects: (1)
matter; the perfection o f the whole is formed by conjoining them.
afl&rmative and negative propositions by differences o f predicates, (2)
Abailard does not propose to consider all kinds o f sentences but only true
universal, particular, indefinite, and singular propositions by diff'erences
and false sentences, propositions, which are the sentences proper to dia
o f subjects, (3) one proposition and multiple propositions by the multi
lectic. Simple or categorical propositions are prior in nature to, and form
plication o f terms by differences o f meanings which make different nouns
the matter of, hypothetical propositions which are constructed o f them,
o f the same term, and (4) past, present, and future propositions by differ
Aristotle has treated the forms and moods o f categorical syllogism briefly and obscurely. Boethius, making use o f hypothetical “ complexions” as
ences o f time in the verb. Simple affirmative and negative propositions may be related as con
developed by Theophrastus and Eudemus, had written on both. Abailard
traries or contradictories by the opposition o f two simple categorical sen
enumerates the seven works on “ Latin eloquence” that he had at his dis
tences or in a single complex hypothetical sentence, and it is at this point
posal in his work: Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation, Porphyry’s
that Abailard introduces the diversities o f meanings which Aristotle
On the Five Words, and Boethius’s Divisions, Topics, Categorical Syllo
treated partly in the antepredicamenta o f the Categories and partly in the
gism and Hypothetical Syllogisms. The Dialectica will set forth a summa
De Sophisticis Elenchis: equivocation, univocation, diverse parts, times,
o f the art they exposit, beginning with speech {oratio) and going on to
relata, and modes. Simple categorical propositions are related by opposi
propositions and syllogisms o f which speech is the genus. Treatise II is therefore in three parts - on sentences, propositions, and syllogisms -
tion relative to meanings and by subsumption relative to things. Modal propositions are modes or modifications o f simple propositions. The
which are again reciprocally related to each other. Its organization fol
modification may be adverbial (by an adverb which modifies the predi
lows that o f Boethius’s On the Categorical Syllogism, which is divided
cate) or casual (by changing the case o f a predicate, making it the subject
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175
o f an adjective signifying a mode). “ Socrates possibiliter est episcopus”
the Posterior Analytics as the Parts o f Speech has to Prior Analytics -
is an adverbial modal proposition. “ Socrates possibile est esse episcopus”
uninfluenced by the relations which the corresponding parts o f Aristotle’s
is a casual modal proposition, since “ is possible” is predicated o f the
Organon may be thought to have had to each other. Consequently, al
predicate “ to be a bishop.” Modal propositions are related by opposi
though the manuscript does not indicate a division into parts (the Cousin
tion and equipollence.
edition follows the manuscript, the deRijk edition marks off two parts),
Part 3 turns from simple categorical propositions to complex categorical
three steps can be distinguished in the argument, comparable to the three
propositions. The analysis in Part 2 has been o f propositions in the present
parts o f Treatise I. In the Parts o f Speech the sequence was from dictions
tense. Consideration o f time, the fourth kind o f simple categorical prop
through significant dictions to modes o f signifying - all o f which are in
osition, introduces the problem o f future contingents - it is certain that
dividual words considered as predicables, as predicaments, and as nouns
a future event will occur or not occur, but not determinately that it will or
and verbs. In the Topics the sequence is from places o f inference to con
will not. The consequences in statement are distinct from the consequences
sequences o f inference to principles o f inference - all o f which are places.
in occurrence, and questions o f meaning and reference change with the
It is a sequence from underlying evidence through consequential use o f
change o f time. Freedom o f the will, fate, and divine providence are in
evidence to antecedent statement o f principles o f evidence. In the first
volved in this problem, as is the philosophic difference between Peripate
step, a place or locus is defined as a force o f inference {yis inferentiae) or,
tics and Stoics who respectively deny and affirm necessity in nature. In
more strictly, a seat o f argument {argumenti sedes). Inference is the deriva
dialectic it is a problem o f consequences, requiring rules concerning ante
tion o f consequences from places, and syllogistic inference is one kind o f
cedents and consequents. The distinction between propositions which are
consequence. In the second step, places are divided into maxims (maxima
one and propositions which are multiple, or between composite and sim
propositio) and differences o f maxims. A maxim establishes many con
ple propositions, which appUes to hypothetical as well as categorical sen
sequences by a common mode o f proof, as “ what is predicated o f the
tences provides the transition to the treatment o f the categorical syllogism,
species is predicated o f the genus.” The “ differences o f maxims” and
which is a speech ipratio) in which from something posited something else
“ topical differences” arise from the difiFerent meanings assigned to terms
follows o f necessity. The problems o f time were problems o f imposition
and connectives, such as the basic division derived from the different
relating future propositions to events which become determinate in the
senses o f the adverb “ whence” in inferences: it may be used in a material
present; they are formulated in terms o f antecedents and consequents in
causal mode, in an illative mode, or in a local mode. In the course o f
judgments and events. The problems o f the syllogism are problems o f
examining and enumerating maxims or maximal propositions, Abailard
subsumption relating universal and particular, affirmative and negative;
introduces the distinction o f opposites, relatives, simultaneities, prior
they are consequences formulated in the rules o f mediate inference, as the
ities, contraries, privations and habits, affirmation and negation which
consequences o f simple and modal propositions were formulated in the
Aristotle treated as postpredicaments in the Categories. The third step is
rules o f immediate inference.
the examination o f differences o f places - inherent, extrinsic, and medium
Treatise I I I is called “ The Topics.” Its organization is set forth in the opening section : hypothetical syllogisms will be examined in terms o f the
- as they are exhibited in two divisions o f places, by Themistius and Cicero,
hypothetical propositions o f which they are composed, as categorical
Themistius seeks the differences o f places in differences o f things signified,
which are different in their bases but can be reduced one to the other.
syllogisms were analyzed. But since the meaning o f a hypothetical prop
and his division contains a discussion o f differences o f motions which
osition depends on conditions from which consequences follow, places
contributed to the language o f differentiation in the history o f physics.
must be examined as seats o f inference and evidences o f truth before hypothetical propositions and syllogisms are examined in the next book,
Cicero seeks the difference o f places in differences o f modes o f formula
the Posterior Analytics. The Topics, therefore, has the same relation to
tion, and his division contains a discussion o f wholes and parts, likenesses and differences, antecedents and consequences, which provided language
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177
o f differentiation in the history o f rhetoric, law, and philosophy. The
patetic disciplines,” and in like fashion he constructed the “ peripatetic
combination o f the two constitutes the dialectic o f places.
tradition” concerning definition from Cicero’s analysis o f definitions in
Treatise IV is called “ The Posterior Analytics.” It is based on “ The
the Topica. The joining o f the two yields a rhetorico-dialectical logic which
Topics,” as “ The Prior Analytics” is based on “ The Parts o f Speech.”
is a science as well as an art, a part as well as an instrument o f philosophy,
Moreover, as “ The Prior Analytics” follows a sequence from sentence
whose subject matter is ratio and oratio (two related or identical trans
through categorical proposition to categorical syllogism, all o f which are
lations o f the Greek logos), and in which proof is by division (even first
sentences (that is, simple vocal forms) and all categorical complexions
principles can be proved, since they too can be divided) and the beginning,
(that is, combinations o f categorial words), so “ The Posterior Analytics”
end, and process o f proof is by definition (all words, statements, and ar
follows a sequence from hypothesis through hypothetical proposition to
guments, and argumentations are definitions). Abailard’s contribution to
hypothetical syllogism, all o f which are hypotheses (that is, conditional
logic or dialectic was to make these identities and differences explicit and
combinations o f simple sentences) and topical consequences (that is, in
to work out the structure o f their reciprocal interrelations, marking them
ferences derived from places). In the first step, a hypothesis is defined as a
o ff emphatically by giving each part in the sequential analysis and by
proposition accepted “ by consent” in a discussion or “ by condition” in a
naming it after a part in Aristotle’s Organon, topping o ff the summation
proposition. The discussion o f hypothetical propositions is limited to the
with a comprehensive analysis o f division and definition which owes a
second, internal conditions. A hypothetical proposition has three parts -
great deal, indirectly, to Plotinus’s commentary on Plato’s Sophist and to
antecedent, consequent, and condition - and its meaning is in the statement
Cicero’ s adaptation o f the commonplaces to rhetorical determination and
o f the condition, as in “ I f he is a man, he is an animal,” not in the state
definition. His systematization o f logic was not widely influential because
ment o f a substantive truth. The condition may be a conjunction or a dis
his students and contemporaries knew from their study o f the New Logic
junction. A hypothetical proposition is composed o f propositions as a
that he was wrong about Aristotle, and his modern editors and inter
categorical proposition is composed o f terms, and the consequence o f a
preters adumbrate the errors o f his textually ungrounded innovations and
categorical syllogism may therefore be stated in a hypothetical proposition.
praise him for anticipating some points o f modern logic.
In the second step, hypothetical propositions are divided into kinds - nat ural and temporal, simple and composite. The third step is the analysis and classification o f hypothetical syllogisms.
The history o f the development o f logic in the Latin West is structured by these shifting alterations. The verbal arts were three, but the third art o f the trivium was sometimes called logic, sometimes dialectic. The two
Treatise V is “ On Divisions and Definitions.” The method o f the entire
words were sometimes used as synonyms, but their use sometimes signified
Dialectica has been by definition and division - o f words, o f sentences,
an antagonistic opposition between Platonizing and Aristotelianizing tra
o f arguments, and o f hypotheses. The dialectical summation and char
ditions. Aristotle used dialectike and logike as general terms. When he
acterization o f the method is in the division and definition o f division and
distinguished the general art o f logic from the general arts o f dialectic and
definition, which are defined as speeches or sentences, orationes, and are
rhetoric, he often used the title o f the two central treatises o f the Organon
divided into kinds by determinations o f meanings and modes o f signifying.
and called it analytic. Alexander o f Aphrodisias applies, and he may have been the first to do so, the term “ logic” to the whole o f the art o f the
Aristotle had argued that Plato’s method o f division was no proof, and he sought principles o f demonstration in causes rather than definitions.
Organon in his commentaries on Aristotle. Cicero divides the systematic
But the tradition o f the Aristotelian logic which Abailard received from Boethius had been so thoroughly Platonized that demonstration had be
analysis o f discourse {ratio disserendi) into two parts, an art o f invention or topics and an art o f judgment or dialectic. Boethius begins his De Differ
come division and definition. Boethius had adduced the authority o f
entiis Topicis with the statement, “ Every systematic analysis o f discourse
Andronicus o f Rhodes, Plotinus, and Porphyry to prove that knowledge
{ratio disserendi), which the ancient peripatetics called logic, is divided
o f the science o f dividing had always been held in high honor in the “ peri
into two parts, one o f invention the other o f judgment. The Greeks called
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the part which purges and instructs judgment ‘analytic,’ which we can
analyses o f meaning in terms o f things, words, or ideas in the Stoic logic,
name ‘resolutory.’ The part which aids and supplies the faculty o f inven
the Ciceronian rhetoric, the Neoplatonic dialectic, and the wedding o f the
tion is called ‘topic’ by the Greeks and ‘local’ by us.” In the eleventh cen
three in the dialectical rhetoric o f Boethius, but with the appearance o f
tury Garland the Computist begins Book IV o f his Dialectica, De
the new logic “ modern” logicians had a choice among conceptions o f
Topicis Differentiis, with the statement that all logic, that is, the science
principles and among methods o f deriving them from commonplaces, for
o f words or disputations (sermocinabilis vel disputabilis scientia) is divided
they could go to Aristotle’s Topics and De Sophisticis Elenchis rather than
into invention and judgment, and he calls the first ‘places,’ and the second
to Cicero’s or Boethius’s Topics and with the translation o f Aristotle’s
‘syllogisms.’ Peter Abailard in the twelfth century called dialectic an art
Rhetoric, they could learn to differentiate rhetorical from dialectical places.
o f words and divided it, on the authority o f Cicero, into the sciences o f invention and judgment.
William o f Sherwood called it ‘logic’ in his Introductiones in Logicam, but
Petrus Hispanus called the modern art ‘dialectic’ in his Summulae Logicae ;
When the “ New Logic” made the last four books o f the Organon avail
he held that logic is concerned with dialectical reasoning. Both Peter and
able, a choice was possible concerning methods o f establishing the prin
William base logic or dialectic on the “ properties o f terms,” but, para
ciples o f logic and organizing the structure o f logic in accordance with
doxically, the analysis o f truth does not turn on categorematic terms,
them. Those who based their method on the Posterior Analytics came to
which signify things and their properties, but on syncategorematic terms,
be known as adherents to the Ancient Logic, the Logica Antiqua, and
like ‘air, ‘i f ’, ‘both’, ‘neither’ , which are “ consignificative.” Or if the
those who blazed new paths follow the Modern Logic, the Logica Moderna.
moderns chose to turn to grammar rather than to dialectic, rhetoric, or
William o f Ockham provides a vantage point from which to survey the
sophistic, the “ speculative grammars” presented them with “ modes o f
development o f the Ancient and the Modern Logics in the thirteenth cen
signifying” correlated with “ modes o f understanding” and “ modes o f
tury. He wrote two systematic treatises on logic, one based on the old
being,” and proceed, paradoxically, from the relations o f words to the
logic. Expositio Aurea et admodum Utilis super Artem Veterem, the other covering the new logic, Summa Totius Logicae, and his logical analyses
meanings and references o f categorematic words. The emergence o f the modern logic is marked by a contact o f the Latin
are punctuated with attacks on the modern logic. He used the ancient
and the Greek traditions. A treatise entitled Synopsis o f Aristotle’s Science
logic on the old and the new. Logic is not a science but an art concerned
o f Logic has been attributed to Michael Psellos, who wrote commentaries
with fabrications, with significative signs. According to these criteria, the
on Porphyry, and on Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation in Greek
commentaries o f Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus adhered
in the eleventh century, and the terministic logics would in that case have
to the ancient logic, but not those o f the pseudo-Scotus which have
been derived by translation from a Greek source. It is now thought that
attracted the interest o f logicians today. Paradoxically there could be no
the Synopsis is a translation from Latin into Greek by Georgios Scholarios
“ ancient logic” until the text o f the Posterior Analytics was made avail
in the fifteenth century and that the Greeks learned about modern logic
able in the “ new logic,” and the protagonists o f the ancient logic could then expound it, as Ockham did, in application to either the old or the
from the Latins. Contacts between the Hebrew and the Greek and Latin encyclopedias
new logic. It is as difiScult to determine what logic was taught in the arts
had occurred early in the two traditions. Philo’s hermeneutic method o f
courses o f universities in the thirteenth century as it is in the twentieth century, since all the books o f the “ old” and the “ new” logic are named
interpreting Scripture had been adapted to the Greek tradition by Basil and to the Latin tradition by Ambrose, through whose influence it played
among the requirements by the middle o f the century and slowly there
a crucial role in the conversion o f Augustine. In the twelfth century
after the works o f the “ modern” terministic logicians were added. Para
Maimonides used the interpretation o f homonyms as the central device in
doxically “ modern” logic is contained in the “ old” logic, that is, it goes
his Guide fo r the Perplexed, and made the transition from words to reality
back at least to the transformation o f the “ logic” o f the Organon by
by setting down twenty-five propositions about motion from Aristotle’s
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R. MCKEON
Physics as the bases for an a posteriori demonstration o f the existence o f God. Earlier he had written a treatise which was called in the Arabic original Short Treatise on the A rt o f Logic, and in the Hebrew translation O f Logical Terminology. The old logic was a stage in the evolution o f Hebrew as well as Latin and Arabic logic. The first five o f the fourteen chapters o f the Logical Terminology treat the proposition by explaining the terms used in its analysis. The chapters usually end with enumeration o f terms interpreted in the chapter, as, in Chapter 1 four terms are interpreted - subject, pred icate, proposition, and sentence. Chapters 6 to 8 treat the syllogism, the moods o f the syllogism, and the kinds o f syllogisms or demonstrations : four kinds o f assertion which require no proof - sense data, axioms, widespread opinions, and traditional assertions - and five kinds o f syl logisms and their arts - demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical, and poetic - are expounded in the interpretation o f seventeen terms. Chap ters 9 to 13 are concerned with terms important in science and demonstra tion. Chapter 9 sets forth the causes o f natural and artificial things in the interpretation o f ten terms. Chapter 10 treats logical terms - the prediables o f Porphyry, which Maimonides calls “ the five general notions enu merated by the ancients,” and the categories or predicamenta o f Aristotle - in the interpretation o f seventeen terms. What is interpreted as logical terms, however, are the predicables; the categories are treated as kinds o f predicables, genera, and only the first o f them, substance, is submitted to interpretation. The relation o f logic, thus Platonized, to the books o f the Organon o f
SCIENCES A N D THE R E L A T IO N S OF CULTURES
181
the fifth is the book o f Dialectic [Topics] ; the sixth is the book o f Rhetoric', the seventh is the book o f Sophistic; the eighth is the book o f Poetic.” Maimonides’ s Organon had the eight books customary in the Arabic tradition; and the five predicables had become six for Maimonides as for Avicenna and Abailard, by the addition o f ‘individual’ to Porphyry’s five. Chapters 11 and 12 treat the postpredicamenta o f Aristotle’s Catego ries: Chapter 11 adding essential-accidental, and actual-potential to Aristotle’s four kinds o f opposites - treated in sixteen terms; Chapter 12 treating the kinds o f priority and posteriority in nine terms. Chapter 13 returns to the antepredicamenta, that is to the opening chapters o f Aris totle’s Organon, in which he distinguishes homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms - equivocal, univocal, and derivative terms - and adds to them the ‘distinct term’ o f grammar, and divides homonyms into six kinds (1) homonyms properly so-called, (2) appellatives, (3) amphibologies, (4) homonyms by generalization and by specification, (5) metaphorics, and (6) homonyms by extension - interpreted in eighteen terms. The final chapter, Chapter 14, is a classification o f the sciences, beginning with the interpretation o f ‘logic’ . The term logic is derived from logos “ which is commonly considered by the ancient sages o f civilized peoples as a homonym with three acceptations” : (1) the faculty o f reason, (2) rational ideas or the internal language o f the mind, and (3) verbal expression o f thought or external language. Aristotle’s art o f logic has a double function : to provide rules applicable to the internal and the external language. ‘A rt’ according to the ancients, is also a homonym signifying theoretical and
Aristotle is explained by Maimonides in this tenth chapter on logical terms.
practical arts. ‘Philosophy’ is a homonym signifying the art o f demonstra
“ These ten highest genera constitute what is called ‘the ten categories.’
tion and the sciences in general, which in turn designate theoretical and
The exposition o f the particularities o f these categories and o f examples
practical, that is, human and poHtical philosophy. The theoretic sciences
o f their middle genera and their species does not enter into the framework o f the present work. A ll that constitutes the matter o f the first book o f the Logic [o f Aristotle]. The second book is devoted to the study o f composite rational notions [in judgments]; that is the book On Interpretation. The third is the book o f the Syllogism [P rior Analytics]. W e have already said enough concerning the moods and figures o f the syllogism. These three books contain in germ the matter o f the five following books [o f the Organon]. The first o f these five books, that is to say, the fourth o f the collection o f books, is the book o f Demonstration [Posterior Analytics];
are divided into mathematics, physics, and theology. Logic is not a science but an instrument o f all the sciences. The practical sciences are divided into (1) individual morality, (2) domestic morality, (3) politics o f the city, and (4) national or international pohtics. The organization o f the sciences is stated in the interpretation o f twenty-four terms. One hundred seventyfive terms are interpreted in the fourteen chapters o f the Terminology. They are terms which apply in the art o f logic, but they are also used in physics, theology, and political science. Alfarabi’s Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics uses differ
R. MCKEON
SCIENCES A N D THE R E L A T IO N S OF CULTURES
ent devices on the old logic from those o f Maimonides. Maimonides
translation o f works o f science and philosophy which resulted from the
states his purpose to explain the technical terms used in logic; his treatise
contact with Arabic culture made the culture o f the thirteenth century in
centers on homonyms and ends with the analysis o f homonyms. Alfarabi
the West a culture o f disputed questions and quodlibetal questions - ques
states his purpose to show what syllogism and inference are, and his
tions to which new answers could be established and questions about
treatise ends with the statement o f methods o f establishing propositions
anything whatever. The Latin Christian encyclopedia was an encyclopedia
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183
to serve as principles in syllogistic reasoning. Like Maimonides, Alfarabi
o f the liberal arts - the disciplines o f words o f the trivium and o f things o f
starts with statements, divides them into parts, subjects and predicates,
the quadrivium. The Arabic encyclopedia was an encyclopedia o f sci
differentiates them into kinds, affirmative and negative, categorical and
ences and principles - the knowledge o f things and o f the laws and prin
conditional, universal and particular, and sets forth the oppositions o f
ciples in which the nature and operation o f things and o f men are ex
categorical statements, but his differentiations depend on things signified
pressed. In the Latin tradition the sciences and the organizations o f the
rather than on the relations o f meanings o f words. The second step o f
sciences were methodologically adapted traditional structures - theo
the analysis is likewise similar. Like Maimonides, as preparation for
retic, practical, and poetic relative to subject matters; physics, logic, and
the treatment o f the syllogism, he enumerates four kinds o f statements
ethics relative to the transcendental sources o f their principles; philo
which may serve as premisses - received statements (Maimonides’s wide
sophy, poetry and history relative to the methods o f the arts. The transla
spread opinion), well-known statements (Maimonides’s traditional as
tion o f Arabic and Greek sciences shifted the emphasis from the signify
sertions), sensory statements (Maimonides’s sense-data), intellectual
ing words to the signified things, and opened up a plurality o f sciences
statements (Maimonides’s axioms). Both analyze the fourteen valid
with different possible meanings and subject matters and a plurality o f
moods o f the categorical syllogism and then analyze the kinds o f con
methods with different possible consequences and applications. They
ditional syllogism. From that point they diverge. Maimonides derives
developed in adversary oppositions and in dialectical assimilations during
from the four kinds o f propositions which require no proof the differ
the thirteenth century and laid the foundations for the beginnings o f sci
entiation o f demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical, and poetic
ence and the rebirth o f letters in the readjustment o f theology to the sci
syllogisms, and settles down to the analysis o f terms. Alfarabi moves from
ences and o f hermeneutics to literary criticism. Thomas Aquinas adapted
the ostensive analysis o f the arguments o f categorical and conditional syl
from Maimonides the concept o f creatio ab aeterno and a posteriori proof
logisms by way o f the method o f reductio ad impossibile, compound syl logisms, and induction to the differentiation o f four principles o f estab
o f the existence o f God, and distinguished natural theology from revealed theology by the difference o f principles established inductively from prin
lishing premisses. Abailard, Maimonides, and Alfarabi illustrate three
ciples received by revelation. He wrote commentaries on only two parts
ways in which principles are treated in the “ old” logic. Two are “ modern”
o f Aristotle’s Organon, the On Interpretation and the Posterior Analytics.
ways, one is “ ancient.” It is the old logic because its subject matter is
Bonaventura derived the principles o f science dialectically from the truths
limited to terms, propositions, and syllogisms. Abailard’s method is
o f wisdom; he wrote a treatise on The Reduction o f the Arts to Theology.
modern because principles are found, throughout the work, by the dia
Roger Bacon sought truth in experience and in “ experimental science”
lectical devices o f division and definition. Maimonides’s method is modem
and found the principles o f new scientific discoveries in the interpretation
because principles are found, throughout the work, in the shifting mean
o f Scripture; he wrote commentaries on Aristotle, a Summa Grammatica,
ings o f words. Alfarabi’s method is ancient because principles are found
a Summulae Dialecticae, and a Communia Mathematica. The Latin Aver-
beyond the compositions o f terms, propositions, and syllogisms by in duction and transfer.
roists were condemned for holding a doctrine o f two truths and bringing philosophy into conflict with theology, and in so doing casting doubt on
The Latin Christian culture o f the twelfth century was a culture o f
the two ways o f logic and the unified intellect o f dialectic. The consideration o f cultures in terms o f the structure or encyclopedia
Sentences and o f methods for the concordance o f their discordances. The
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o f organizations o f sciences suggests answers to two puzzling questions about the contacts o f cultures in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: W hy did the other Western traditions based on Greek culture learn about Greek science only from the Arabic tradition? and W hy did the introduction o f that knowledge into the Latin Christian tradition prepare the foundations for modern science? The Latin Christian encyclopedia was an organiza tion o f arts and disciplines, which had tended to lay emphasis on the formulation o f those disciplines, the arts o f words and in particular the arts o f logic and rhetoric, the arts o f statement and proof, and o f inven tion and judgment. The structure o f the arts o f things was implicit, how ever, in the arts o f words, and the introduction o f sciences o f things and methods o f inquiry into the nature and operations o f things made explicit the interrelations o f that methodological structure. The multiplicity o f logics made it possible to seek the principles o f motion and the laws o f motion not only by induction from observed motions, but by the com monplaces o f dialectic concerning motion, from the paradoxes o f motion considered as a sophism, from the specificities and perspectives o f motion suggested by rhetorical invention, from the numbers and proportions o f calculation. Moreover, as the quadrivium became the subject o f atten tion as second philosophy the double character o f the quadrivium, as a homonym, as arts o f mathematics and arts o f things, laid the foundations for the two roads to the universal mathematics o f Descartes and the uni versal mechanics o f Newton. In a culture o f disciplines contact with facts and sciences yields, when the tradition o f disciplines is strong, new dis ciplines and new facts uncovered by the disciplines o f new sciences. The University o f Chicago
DISCUSSION R. MCKEON : What I propose to do is to explain what I was trying to do in the paper.
I don’t explain it in the paper. M y enterprise was part of the John Murdoch enterprise. For a long time I have watched him look for unities, primary, secondary, and universal languages. And I have occasionally tried to tell him that he needed another dimension: in addition to the universal languages, the universal languages were structured. For example, although it is the case that one begins in the fourteenth century to talk about the intension and remission o f forms, it is a beginning in which physical and meta physical meanings are attached to terms which have a long pre-history going back to rhetorical amplification and diminution. Late medieval usage, as a result, discloses a
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variety o f intensions and remissions o f forms. Therefore, if we can get these universal languages structured and still keep them empty, then we have a means by which to look for the origins o f sciences without having a classified catalogue o f sciences in the beginning. I came to this through a problem presented by a later stage in the history o f science. I was working on the seventeenth century, and, like all good students, I knew what the Euclidean method was. It was the method of postulates and the deductive system. And then I read Fermat, Pascal, Descartes, Spinoza, Huygens, Tschirnhaus, and they all said that the Euclidean method was heuristic; it was not deductive. It seems to me that the problem that I was set in this conference is very much like that, to see Arabic culture not as modem historians may describe it, but as the Latin West perceived it. I wanted to work with the culture of the twelfth and the thirteenth centu ries in the West and to examine what came out of the contact with the Arabic culture. I wanted to ask two questions. One, why the Muslim tradition, which built on three sacred books and Greek culture, and the early Latin Christian tradition, which built on two sacred books and Greek culture, differed so radically that science emerged only through the Arabic tradition. And, two, having come into the Latin tradition, why was it that something explosive happened so that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries you had the beginnings o f the questions that led to modern science? I mean “ why” here not in the sense of the question of origins, but rather what were the structural characteristics that come into the problem. I therefore tried to deal with the culture by taking the organization o f the sciences dominant in a people at a time as an indication o f what the culture was so that the organization of the sciences is the characteristic of the people and the contact o f cultures is a contact o f these organizations. The character o f an organization of the sciences is not the organization of a library. The organization of the sciences is an organization o f ideas. It is an organization o f the expression o f ideas. It is an organization of the nature of things. It is an organization of the arts that go on. The characteristics o f a culture comprise all these dimensions. Buried in the paper, I make two statements about the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and their characteristics. Three years ago I sent an edition o f Abailard’s S ic et N on to the press. The Sic et Non led me to study its 158 questions. The entire body of the work is citations, and, therefore, in the preparation of the edition I had to go back to Ivo of Chartres and forward to Peter Lombard’s Sentences and Gratian’s Decretum. I had put the citations on three-by-five cards, and I came to the conclusion that if you wanted to know what the culture of the twelfth century was, you could list, let’s say, three thousand quotations that every intellectual would know. And you would have a method by which to deal with these quotations because each of the collections of canon law and the Sic et Non gives the method. If you have a pair of statements which seems to be contradictory on the same question, you consider who said it, to whom, under what circumstances, and for what purpose. The method is one o f adjustment to circumstances. So the culture of the twelfth century, I say in the paper, is easier to describe than the culture of any other period that I know because you can tabulate it. By the thirteenth century this is totally changed. It is changed because three thousand quotations are no longer enough. The new translations bring in new data. The method is not a method of interpretation by consideration o f circumstances. There is a multiplicity o f methods. And, therefore, my argument is that there are elements in the structure of the Western Latin tradition that led to this thirteenth century result and these elements are what I call the encyclopedia. The structure o f the Latin encyclopedia was not Aristotelian. It was organized by
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dialectical principles derived from the Topics, not by apodeictical principles based on the Posterior Analytics. Topics are empty. They are places o f discovery; they are also places o f memory. What I am saying about the Latin encyclopedia is essentially that it is an organiza tion of arts which teach how to use empty places (Jopoi) for purposes of discovery and memory, both parts of rhetoric, form them into propositions {logoi) which can refer to things or conmiunicate or persuade, and modify them in thematic organizations in which narration in poetry and demonstration in geometry are modes (trop o i) of the same argumentative form. And then, finally, systematizations are formed when you take a position {theses) and organize the variety o f propositions and the variety of interpretations. What I wanted to do consequently was to look at the use of the topics to form propo sitions or logoi which can then be bent so that they move from one discipline to another in the modes, and which can then be organized. These distinctions provide four dimen sions for the analysis o f the variety of approaches to the organization of the sciences. In the thirteenth century, the new materials and methods were given a number of differ ent structures. What Thomas Aquinas does with his revealed theology and his natural theology is, with respect to the sciences, quite different from what Bonaventura does, when he goes to theology to get the principles for all o f the sciences. Roger Bacon talks about experimental science and gives instances of observation, but all of his first principles are found in the Bible, as in his theory of the rainbow. It is these structures that I would want to look at in the thirteenth century. But ob serve what happens then. When you move from the thirteenth to the fourteenth century and the beginnings of new discussions, where do you go for principles? There were defenders of the method of the Posterior Analytics. There continued to be defenders of the dialectical method, and, as I quoted, there is a form of dialectical disputation concerning motion in which different opinions are balanced. Then the sophismata come in. D e motu is, in the fourteenth century sense, a sophism, a series of sophisms. The sophism provides as a principle the paradox. Therefore one of the innovations is that in a good respectable science from the fourteenth century on, instead o f seeking a principle which is clear and certain and intuitively verifiable, a good science can be respectable only if it gets a principle which is a paradox. And this is still going on in science. Physics can afford paradoxes. The less exact sciences can’t. And, therefore, and here I will end, the answer to the questions that I posed in the beginning is that the Latin tradition in the twelfth century - it had really begun in the eleventh century, it had come out o f medicine, the translations o f Constantine the African - moved without any contradiction into cosmology, into physics, into Gundissalinus’s organization o f the sciences, then into Aristotle. The transition was one in which an encyclopedia which had been practicing the arts of discovery came into con tact with an encyclopedia which presented systems of knowledge and principles. There fore the principles and systems were subjected to a kind of transformation from dialectic to inquiry and led, in answer to the second question, to a reformulation o f principles and a generation of new sciences. j. g a g n e : N ous sommes devant un imposant concert à quatre voix; les traditions latine, hébraïque, grecque et arabique. C ’est un imposant concert où vous reconnaissez qu’il y a des lois de l’harmonie; et vous essayez d’énoncer les lois de l’harmonie. Mais j ’ai l’impression qu’en un sens le concert est tellement imposant, qu’il ressemble à ce concert de musica mundana où toutes les voix célestes sont engagées et produisent une mélodie inouïe. Aussi, il me semble que la meilleure façon d’amorcer la discussion c’est
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de vous demander de préciser les sortes de notes que vous utilisez pour construire le concert. J’aimerais attirer l’attention sur les charactéristiques structurales des traditions. Pourrions-nous nous attacher à considérer ensemble ces caractéristiques structurales? Par exemple, vous caractérisez la tradition latine du X lle siècle à l’aide d’encyclopédies concrètes, pratiques, de mots et de choses. Est-ce que ce n’est pas insuffisant? R. MCKEON : Non, c’est même trop. For a structure it is necessary (you use the analogy of music) merely to give the scale. A scale can be formed from two notes by adding a third, and in general by using a third relative to any pair. And consequently, the charac teristics of the encyclopedias I am talking about can be given best by examining what is connected and the structure of connection. Although I began by contrasting the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they have the same characteristic matter and structure as the encyclopedia which I began with in pagan Rome. The continuing characteristic is that it is concrete and therefore deals with a thing. And a thing can be either a word, a physical thing, an idea, or an art. This is the manner o f continuity with difference o f the encyclopedia from pagan Rome to the Renaissance. The Arabic encyclopedia was an encyclopedia of sciences and principles. What happened in the twelfth century was a structure of factual connection, which was common to the two encyclopedias, taking a different form, changing from a connection of liberal arts to a connection o f sciences. j. g a g n e ; Là vous entrez dans des lois de l’harmonie. Je pense qu’on devrait, avant d’étudier ces lois, continuer l’étude des charactéristiques structurales. Prenez la tradi tion arabique et la tradition grecque; qu’est-ce qui vous justifie de les opposer en termes d’une tradition littéraire et d’une tradition de principes et de sciences? R. MCKEON ; Precisely because if you trace the Greek tradition through the Byzantine encyclopedias to the Middle Ages, they are encyclopedias like Photius and Suidas in which you get a great deal of literary information. Students of literary history can still go to them and get information. In the Arabic, on the other hand, what is central is the organization of the sciences and their characteristics. It is not the factual information o f the Latin encyclopedias; it is rather the demonstrative organization of results of systematic inquiry. Let me make a distinction. Discussions of intellectual history make use of two devices. One is to establish the accuracy of an interpretation; scholarly research makes use of such devices. The other is to examine the variety of interpretations that have been given to any document and any history; inquiry into structures makes use of such devices. There are as many interpretations of Aristotle’s Physics as there are interpretations of the nature of things. Part of my argument is that I am willing to take any one of them, but not indifferently. I am looking for the method by which, having made the choice and having recognized the multiplicity, one can go on to the consequences of that choice. In the case of Euclid, what are the consequences of making Euclid heuristic instead of deductive? I am not interested in proving that Euclid was heuristic, that Euclid was deductive. Since Euclid had two effects in the West, it would seem to me that the only reasonable thing to say is that Euclid is historically both. There are no facts except the known facts; there are no known facts except the expressed facts, and there are no expressed facts except the used facts. Therefore, I think that for our purpose it is better to look at the form rather than to examine further whether what I have done with the particular tradition is accurate or not. J. Mu r d o c h ; But before we move there may I ask aren’t you looking at, for Latin encyclopedias, one kind of document, to wit, the Roman handbook tradition, Isidore, etc., and, when you come to Arabic culture, looking at another kind of document.
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basically, although you name others, al-Fârâbi, the Enumeration o f the Sciences, and ignoring, as you had to if you were going to deal with contact, other Arabic encyclope dias? I think that you could get words and things, you see, out of Qazwini who wasn’t translated.
de Morley, où la structure de l’encyclopédie est très liée â l’observation concrète, et refuse les interprétations allégoriques et symboliques. R. MCKEON: Mais je crois que vous avez tort. Il n’y a pas de telles différences entre ces encyclopédies. Ce sont la les manières d’interpréter des historiens du XIXe siècle; il faut relire ces textes au XXe siècle. T. GREGORY: Si je considère le De universo de Hrabanus Maurus ou la lettre De naturis animalium de Pierre Damien, je trouve que la réalité physique est toujours mise en rapport avec des significations d’ordre moral et religieux. R. MCKEON: Je ne trouve pas ça. M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: You have been mostly considering encyclopedias and general knowledge, your harmony, in the tradition of logic. I was very interested by what you said of your preparation of the Sic et N on and of the three thousand quotations that the honest man in the twelfth century had to know to produce something like the Sic et Non, Gratian, and so on. It’s extremely interesting. But this means you are putting together two things which are not exactly the same; the intensive use o f florilegia, about which nobody knows much but they are certainly extremely important for the history of culture in the High Middle Ages, and encyclopedias, which are a different thing. In the florilegia you have what you term to be the characteristic of the Greek encyclope dias, that is literary florilegia and the literary tradition where you have the florilegia of the auctores. So that is one thing: you should keep in mind that the florilegia are one tradition, and though the florilegia could be used in encyclopedias (and they were to quite an extent), ft’s a rather different tradition, and they don’t have exactly the same
R. MCKEON : If you want to ask what the Arabic encyclopedia is, you can’t do it by beginning with today’s conceptions. You can’t do it by asking a member o f the culture. There are as many interpretations of the Arabic encyclopedia as there are perspectives into it. Therefore, in the opening paragraph o f my paper, I say that there is no way o f being objective, that anyone who pretends to be is talking nonsense. What I am looking for is the effect on an encyclopedia of study of the other encyclopedia. I then say that this is no more objective than anything else but it has the advantage of remaining within a single tradition. My essay is about the Western Latin tradition. j. g a g n e ; Prenons-le sous un autre angle. Vous avez quand même voulu que ce concert soit joué sur un clavier latin; vous avez dit: regardons les traditions sous l’angle de l’encyclopédie latine. Et vous illustrez le développement, l’enrichissement des mé thodes, l’enrichissement des sciences, quasiment à partir du seul exemple du trivium; c’est le trivium qui vous sert de modèle en quelque sorte pour montrer comment il y a eu enrichissement et développement, et pourquoi il y a eu développement. R. MCKEON ; Ce n’est pas une induction que j ’ai faite ici. I am not trying to establish true propositions about the Western encyclopedia. What I am trying to do is to dis tinguish devices which will be discoverable in the contact of encyclopedias. The Arabic or the Hebrew encyclopedia differs from the Latin encyclopedia, even when they treat the same thing, because they don’t use these devices. This is the reason why I go through the details of a laborious analysis of the Dialectica of Abailard. Aristotle distinguishes four predicables; definition, genus, property, and accident. Porphyry makes them five. The change looks very innocuous because, after all, a definition is made up of a genus and a differentia and a definition is of a species. Therefore there are five predicables: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. But something very curious has happened. The second list produces a hierarchy, a hierarchy which we have called Porphyry’s tree. It is not a question o f the operation of historical influence. The force of ideas operates : a tree needs a root. Avicenna added a sixth predicable - the individual - at the bottom o f the tree. Abailard, who didn’t know about Avicenna (and Avicenna certainly didn’t know about Abailard) also adds a sixth predicable, and it’s the same one, the individual. N o w the point that I am trying to make is that in order to study the relations of cultures it is important to see what the structure is that is common or unified that forces the man thinking about genera and species to see there is something missing, and therefore stick in individual. And what, in turn, separates the two so that similarly structured but differently conceived ency clopedias influence one another when they come into contact. And this is the reason why I interrupted. I could write a paper on the evolution of the trivium. In fact, I have done that elsewhere. What I tried to do here was to leave all of that out and to ask what are the typical methods? What are the typical data? T. GREGORY: II faudrait souligner l’importance qu’a eue une autre tradition de la période hellénistique: l’interprétation de la nature donnée par le Physiologus, et l’im portance qu’il a eu dans certaines encyclopédies latines. Alors ne faudrait-il pas aussi distinguer même les encyclopédies dans la tradition latine? Je trouve une différence profonde entre une encyclopédie du type de celles d’Isidorus ou de Hrabanus Maurus, symbolique et allégorique, et une encyclopédie du type de celles de Martianus Capella, pour la fin de l’antiquité, ou de Guillaume de Conches, d’Adélard de Bath et de Daniel
contents. M y second objection would be about your definitions of encyclopedias in the four different traditions. Two o f the traditions have practically no impact on the Latin West, namely what you term the Hebrew encyclopedia (the only Hebrew encyclopedia which had some impact on the Latin West was Maimonides, but it was translated from a Hebrew adaptation of the original Arabic only in the thirteenth century) and the Greek encyclopedia (unfortunately Photius was never translated). So we are left with the Latin encyclopedia and the Arabic encyclopedia. Let’s begin with the early tradition of the Latin encyclopedia. You have the Latin tradition of the artes liberales, and it came to be mixed, mostly in the time of Boethius and Cassiodorus, with the Alexandrian tradition of the classification of the sciences. It so happens that this Alexandrian traditional division of sciences is exactly the one that we find as the basis of the largest Arabic encyclopedias, Fârâbi and Avicenna, and at an earlier stage the Dchwân al-Çafâ’. R. r a s h e d : Je n’ai pas l’impression de très bien comprendre. Quand M. McKeon parle d’encyclopédie, il ne veut pas dire une classification des sciences, mais une sorte de conservatoire, presque idéalisé, de l’ensemble du savoir. R. MCKEON : It’s the structures that I compared. M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: I was speaking about the structure too. The structure does exist. R. MCKEON : In my paper I tried to show that there are five or six histories which contradict each other. You have been reciting one of them. I accept that account and the aspects of encyclopedias that it brings to attention, but you should consider the aspects of encyclopedias on which the other histories are based, and the nature of the encyclopedia comes from the way in which one harmonizes and makes possible these very histories. This is why in the early discussion I said my method is not inductive. I have written inductive papers on the liberal arts. I have explained what books con tained, but here I’m trying to build the structure o f their inter-relations.
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G, b e a u j o u a n : Je reviens à une question élémentaire mais qu’a bien posée M. Gagné tout à l’heure; en lisant le texte de M. McKeon, je n’ai pas très bien compris pourquoi, dans l’appréhension de ses structures, il a choisi les encyclopédies au sens formel plutôt que n’importe quel corpus à large vulgarisation. J’ai l’impression qu’une partie des ambigüités de notre discussion tourne justement autour de ce problème. R. r a s h e d : Je voudrais alors poser deux questions: comment pouvez-vous dire, par exemple, je caractérise l’encyclopédie arabe, de telle et telle façon; comment avez-vous pu dégager ces éléments? M a deuxième question: une fois cette opération faite, est-ce que, effectivement, cette encyclopédie peut caractériser une culture? N e peut-on pas mieux caractériser, une culture par la différence, par l’écart - ce qui est beaucoup plus important, à mon sens - que par ce caractère commun? R. MCKEON : First, with respect to the relation between history and structure. In the Western tradition histories have structures, and structures have histories. You begin with a history to structure what you take to be facts. Study of the facts suggests different ways in which they can be structured, and you can then go back and rewrite the history. It is not that history establishes facts. Immediate experience is confused; selection of elements provides focus and objects; structure orders discerned objects. Consequently, I have written two kinds of papers. I have written papers in which I try to explain what is the case, what the document says, and why it says what I interpret it to say. I have also written methodological papers in which I explain what it is that I have done and how I could have come out at another place and why I didn’t. The reason why this paper does not depend on the history is that it is meant to explain the histories. I begin with the structure and, therefore, I find a variety of histories. The characteristics that I am using to mark off the differences o f these encyclopedias are characteristics that are structural, not only the formal organizations of the sciences in the Arabic culture, but the structure of all attempts to organize a body of knowledge by principles. These I call encyclopedias. I am not trying to get a definition which will do justice for all varieties of encyclopedias, but I want to get a structure which will permit me to compare Arabic and Latin organizations o f knowledge. Both deal with “ sciences” and “facts.” But one is a structure of sciences; the other is a structure of facts. I don’t know a single systematic work in the Latin West (and I am using the word encyclopedia in a way that would bring in any organized work) which deals with prin ciples and the structures o f sciences. Latin encyclopedias present techniques, arts and facts by which to deal with concrete things. It’s important to separate the two structures because if a culture is based on arts by which to deal with concrete things, it may be interpreted, not as a simple-minded pragmatism, but as a comprehensive mode of thinking embracing the whole organization of knowledge. Suppose one were interested in the treatment of the science of physics, in the Latin and in the Arabic encyclopedia. In the Latin encyclopedia inanimate and animate bodies are the subject matter of physics. Beginning with Pliny, running through Isidore of Seville, through Bartholomew the Englishman, to Vincent of Beauvais, there will be a large number o f chapters : on man, animals, minerals, and so on. In the Latin ency clopedia it would be extremely difficult to tell when you were doing biology, when you were doing physics, when you were doing the arts, because facts from biology, physics, and the arts are in the same chapter. N ow let me balance this structure with that of the Arabic encyclopedia. In the Arabic encyclopedia the sciences are enumerated and distinguished from each other or combined with each other. In the process of distin guishing them reasons are given for the distinction. The reasons provide the principles, of the sciences. They are not principles in any restricted Aristotelian sense, but they are
the means by which to put up a fence, a determination, an enclosure within which to locate not the facts that are ordered in the Latin encyclopedias, but the systematic demonstrations that organize the things within that enclosure. Consequently, the two encyclopedias cover the same subject matter by different structures of organization. R. r a s h e d : Supposons que l’encyclopédie arabe functionnât effectivement comme vous le dites. Quand vous parlez ainsi, vous avez en tête al-Fârâbi; vous prenez des éléments concrets et vous donnez à ces éléments concrets une forme universelle... R. MCKEON : N on je ne crois pas. R. r a s h e d : Il reste que vous présentez ces éléments comme des essences, ou presque. R. MCKEON: Non, aussi loin des essences que possible. r . r a s h e d : Que sont-ils alors ces éléments, sont-ils des formes? R. MCKEON: Non, ce sont des lieux, des lieux places, topoi. R. r a s h e d : Vous les présentez comme des schemata abstraits. R. MCKEON: Non, ils sont vides.
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R. r a s h e d : V ous les dites vides, mais, à mon sens, ils sont surdéterminés historique ment. R, MCKEON : A u contraire, l’histoire est déterminée par les places vides. Si on prend une
histoire, une proposition métaphysique, une proposition mathématique, un poème, un sophisme ce n’est pas une place vide, c’est une place pleine. Il faut faire un effort pour la vider, mais c’est possible. Quand le topos est vide, il ne peut pas être expliqué. Donnez-le un nom et vous avez déjà fait entrer des choses. The whole function of a place is to get it empty so that then you can put something in. But if you don’t get it completely empty, it’s notA place. Nevertheless, places are the sources of the discoveries of science. They are the source of the progress of our knowledge. A. s a b r a : While you were giving this account I was listening to all the interesting things you were saying, but also to the questions that were asked. Many of them were on the concrete level. The reaction on your part has been that you did not want to engage in a discussion on this concrete level. Then another question began to be formulated in my mind - one that we all have to be clear about so that we don’t ask the kind of question that you think is not relevant to what you want to maintain: What would you consider to be the structure of evidence or an argument against your theory? R. MCKEON: Evidence against my theory could mean evidence against the need to differentiate the form that the argument takes from the content. I don’t think there is any possible evidence of this kind: it cannot be demonstrated that discourse is possible without a difference of subject matter and form. But the project is refutable on a differ ent level. It’s entirely possible that the scheme I have used, particularly the topos, logos, tropos, is not a pure form. It may be that it is impregnated with matter and, therefore, distorts what it structures. On this level I can think of things that are wrong with what I have done, but it is a first approximation. G. b e a u j o u a n : Mais, de toute manière, vous êtes obligé de procéder par induction à partir de ces encyclopédies pour prouver votre structure. R. MCKEON: J’ai dit au commencement qu’il ne s’agissait pas du tout d’un essai d’induction; c’est un essai de méthode. G. b e a u j o u a n : V ous ne pouvez pas prouver votre structure, R. MCKEON: D me suflSrait d’un autre rapport! G. b e a u j o u a n : Il y a quelque chose qui m’inquiétait un peu dans ce que j ’ai cru entendre dans vos discours en anglais tout à l’heure: vous disiez qu’il y a des fois où vous faites des articles d’érudition comme ceux de Mlle d’Alvemy ou de M. Gregory,
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et il y a d’autres fois où vous faites de l’histoire structuraliste. Je ne vois pas pourquoi les deux choses doivent être séparées de façon manichéenne. R. MCKEON : Nous sommes engagés dans des disciplines intellectuelles. Dans la même structure, on peut dégager un aspect ou un autre. J’ai écrit des articles, il y a vingt ans, que je croyais très bien documentés; j ’ avais examiné toutes les sources; j ’avais réfuté toutes les autres interprétations. Quand je les lis maintenant, je me dis: mais j ’étais un peu simple à ce moment là! J’ai maintenant une methode plus subtile qui peut indiquer des choses qui sont dans le texte, que je ne soupçonnais pas du tout, et qui sont main tenant beaucoup plus importantes. Maintenant, j ’essaye de faire l’histoire dans laquelle j ’explique aussi bien que possible les textes, les circonstances, les influences, et je mélan ge avec ça des examens méthodologiques dans lesquels il y a place pour ce que je faisais auparavant. Dans la première catégorie d’essais, quand je trouve une interprétation avec laquelle je ne suis pas d’accord, je la réfute. Quand je prends les mêmes exemples dans la seconde catégorie je dis: mais vous savez, il n’y a qu’une partie de vérité dans cette interprétation. Je crois que ces deux sortes d’essais ne sont pas en contradiction; l’une s’appluie sur l’autre, l’autre est le produit de la première. Pour la première fois, j ’ai essayé d’être complètement méthodologique, et je croyais que, dans la tradition de Murdoch, j ’aurais peut-être une chance! j. MURDOCH: All right, let’s try. What you say is obviously not a creation ex nihilo, but ex aliquo, out o f texts and circumstances. If we don’t want an absolute relativism in the sense that anything can be drawn from this aliquod or that one, can we not ask, given this source, given this text, whether your interpretation, what you see in it, is proper? Is it true? Let’s have alternative histories, but some of them should be refutable. R. MCKEON : You are in process when you investigate, investigating not pre-existent facts or pre-existing conditions. For example, take al-Fârâbi and his classification of the sciences. If there are two interpreters, they will very frequently give you different organizations of the sciences, different statements of what the circumstances are, and from that point on there is an argument between them. N o w if the discussion is of any interest, it will be because they don’t find the same thing on the same page. This is not a complete relativism. It is nailed down. And it is the condition of creative scholarship.
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La lecture des traités De natura rerum du haut moyen âge fait clairement apparaître l’angle sous lequel ils offraient la contemplation du monde physique: comme la recherche, non de raisons ou de causes naturelles, mais de significations et d’enseignements religieux et moraux; ainsi le discours physique tournait immédiatement en discours édifiant, changeant la réalité en symboles et en allégories
Selon une ancienne comparaison,
la nature est un livre écrit par Dieu, qu’il convient de lire - comme l’Écriture - typice, allegorice, mystice-, le monde physique ne s’ offre point à l’homme pour que celui-ci recherche les causes physiques des phéno mènes - la seule cause directe étant en effet la volonté divine -, mais (ainsi que l’écrit Pierre Damien) ut altius considerantibus fia t spiritalis intelligentiae sacramentum: tous les êtres devenaient ici les symboles des vérités de la foi et des vertus chrétiennes {sacramentum salutaris allegoriae)^. Le cosmos est ainsi transfiguré par une inépuisable mentalité symbolique dont les Bestiaires et les Lapidaires donnent assez bien l’idée: point de place pour la recherche des causes naturelles, puisque la nature des objets n’est pas dans leur consistance physique mais dans le fait qu’ils symbo lisent une réalité différente, intelligible, qui est la seule vraie réalité. Contrastant avec cette expérience, cette contemplation sacrée du cosmos, une nouvelle expérience, qui mûrit au cours du X lle siècle, prend un relief et une signification particuliers: elle propose une contemplation physique du monde s’efforçant de saisir la legitima causa et ratio^ de tout événement physique, en dehors des traditionnelles interprétations et transpositions allégoriques et symboliques; cette expérience dénote aussi la découverte d’une nouvelle dimension humaine dans un cosmos qui n’est plus un tissu de symboles mais une réalité substantielle où l’on peut lire autre chose que des messages spirituels, et qui permet à l’homme de mesurer ses nouvelles possibiUtés d’action. Cette nouvelle attitude - qui est un élément tout autre que secondaire du grand mouvement de renaissance qui marque la vie européenne du X lle siècle - est abondamment prouvée par la multiplication des écrits
J. E, Murdoch and E. D. Sylîa (eds,), The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 193-218. AU Rights Reserved.
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concernant des problèmes physiques, de philosophia mundi; les minces et
L ’horizon culturel traditionnel est brisé; la lecture des nouveaux
élémentaires traités sur les arts du quadrivium contenus dans le De nuptiis
ouvrages dans leurs traductions gréco-latines et arabo-latines, en saturant
de Marcianus Capella cèdent la place à toute une bibliothèque d’écrits
de nouveaux intérêts et de raisons physiques la spéculation philosophique
scientifiques, les uns nouveaux, les autres traductions et remaniements
du siècle, permettait de sortir de la tradition des traités du haut moyen âge
d’oeuvres grecques et arabes. Ces dernières arrivaient alors en Europe par
De natura rerum, de leur assiette imaginative et du transfert symbolique
toutes les frontières, de l’Espagne, du sud de la France, du sud de l’Italie,
qui dissolvait le monde physique dans un système de symboles et d’ensei
et par les routes commerciales ouvertes vers les pays arabes et byzantins
gnements divins; la nature se dégageait lentement, mais fermement, du
du bassin méditerranéen. La connaissance des nouvelles versions arabo-
domaine sacré, où l’avaient placée l ’enseignement chrétien primitif et la
latines et gréco-latines est de la plus haute importance pour l’histoire de la
culture monastique, pour prendre corps et densité; n’étant plus conçue
culture européenne au X lle siècle: dans l’espace de quelques dizaines
comme une simple voluntas Dei ou comme sacramentum salutaris allegoriae,
d’années, l’on redécouvrait en effet les oeuvres de Ptolémée et de Galien,
mais comme vis genitiva, ignis artifex, causarum series, qualitas planetarum,
d’Albumasar et d’Avicenne, d’Alfarabi et d’Alfarghani, des traités
regula mundi, elle devenait l’objet d’une ratio naturalis que la culture du
souvent anonymes ou pseudépigraphes d’astrologie, de magie, d’alchimie;
haut moyen âge avait ignorée, et qui était destinée à conditionner tout
enfin, vers la fin du siècle, commencèrent à circuler les oeuvres d’Aristote, ses livres de physique et de sciences naturelles.
discours philosophique ou théologique. La vague et primitive cosmologie biblique, et les efforts concordistes de
Le X lle siècle eut immédiatement conscience de l’importance de l’acquisition de ces ouvrages scientifiques: en posant des problèmes
l’exégèse patristique et du haut moyen âge, sont abandonnés comme
d’ordre physique et en formulant une nouvelle conception de l’homme et
lement morale et religieuse à laquelle la physique est étrangère: auctores
insuffisants et contra rationem ; de la Bible on souligne la finalité essentiel
du monde, ils bouleversaient certains points de vue intellectuels parmi les
veritatis philosophiam rerum tacuerunt, non quia contra fidem, sed quia ad
plus traditionnels; c’est ainsi que l’auteur (ou le traducteur?) anonyme du
aedificationem fidei, de qua laborant, non multum pertinebat ®.
Liber Mamonis in astronomia put accuser les docteurs latins d’avoir
Ainsi Guillaume de Conches, qui conduit dans ses oeuvres physiques
entravé l’évolution culturelle de l’Europe (unde factum est ut que fere
- dans le Commentaire à Boèce, comme dans les gloses au Timée, dans le
plenitudinem posset habere artium, nunc ceteris gentibus Europa videatur
Philosophia mundi, comme dans le Dragmaticon - une polémique assidue
humilior) et put opposer à leur ignorance en matière d’astronomie
contre une explication purement religieuse et théologique des événements
l’enseignement lumineux de Ptolémée, in astronomia magnificus, et des
naturels et contre une interprétation littérale de la Genèse, élabore une
Arabes: de même, un peu plus tard, Daniel de Morley opposera à la
cosmologie où l’oeuvre directe de Dieu est limitée à la création des éléments
culture livresque et présomptueuse des maîtres parisiens la doctrine
et de l’âme humaine, tandis que la constitution toute entière de Vornatus,
Arabum quae in quadruvio fere tota exis tit, qu’il était allé étudier à Tolède,
c’ est-à-dire le KÔafioç est l’effet de causes secondes, et avant tout des
où enseignaient les sapientiores mundi philosophi^. La recherche de
astres : leur action est responsable de l’apparition de zones habitables sur
nouvelles connaissances dans le sud de l’Europe, dans les régions limi
la croûte terrestre et de l’origine de la vie; le règne végétal comme le règne
trophes avec d’autres cultures, s’imposait comme une expérience exem
animal et même la formation du corps humain d’Adam et d’Eve sont
plaire; quelques décades auparavant déjà, Adélard de Bath, pionnier de
l’effet du mouvement des cieux :
la nouvelle science et traducteur lui-même, avait souligné l’importance de
Corporibus stellarum creatis, quia igneae sunt naturae, coeperunt movere se, et ex motu aera subditum calefacere: sed mediante aere aqua calefacta est. Ex aqua calefacta, diversa genera animalium creata sunt: quorum quae plus habuerunt superiorum elementorum, aves sunt. Unde aves modo sunt in aere, ex levitate superiorum, modo descendunt in terram, ex gravitate inferiorum. Alia vero quae plus aquae habuerunt, pisces sunt. In hoc solo elemento, nec in alio vivere possunt. Sic ergo pisces et aves facti
la route du sud de l’Europe pour chercher de nouveaux enseignements philosophiques dans des traditions autres que la tradition latine: quod enim Gallica studia nesciunt, transalpina reserabunt; quod apud latinos non addisces, Graecia facunda docebit
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sunt... Istis sic creatis ex aqua effectu superiorum, ubi tenuior fuit aqua ex calore et creatione praedictorum desiccata est et apparuerunt in ea quasi quaedam maculae, in quibus habitant homines, et alia animalia. Sed cum terra ex superposita aqua esset lutosa, ex calore bulliens, creavit ex se diversa genera animalium. ...Ex quadam parte vero in qua elementa aequaliter convenerunt, humanum corpus factum est. ...Et ex vicino limo, corpus mulieris esse creatum verisimile est, et ideo nec penitus idem quod homo est, nec penitus diversum ab homine, nec ita temperata ut homo, quia calidissima frigidior est frigidissimo viro; et hoc est quod divina pagina dicit: “ Deum facisse mu lierem ex latere Adae” . N on enim ad litteram credendum est, [ex]costasse [Deum] primum hominem’ .
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tradition exégétique de VHexaëmeron, le problème de la présence des eaux au-dessus du ciel, dont parle la Bible et qui reflète une très ancienne cosmologie élémentaire. Dans la tradition exégétique patristique et mé diévale, l’existence des eaux au-dessus du ciel était acceptée unanimement au nom de l’enseignement biblique, et quant on en cherchait une justifi cation physique prévalait à la fin le recours à la volonté de Dieu: quaestio divina virtute solvitur quia ibi teneantur secundum Dei voluntatem, peut-on lire dans 1’oeuvre composite anonyme qui a pour titre De mundi con
Non enim ad litteram credendum est excostasse [Deum] primum hominem:
stitutione^. L ’enseignement biblique est aussi constamment répété par les
c’était la liquidation du récit de la Genèse, la rupture, au nom de la ratio,
plus grands représentants de la culture du X lle siècle, comme par exemple
d’une tradition exégétique suivie sans interruption depuis la plus haute
Hugues de Saint-Victor et Abélard lui-même: dans la dialectique du
antiquité chrétienne; Guillaume en est très conscient lorsqu’il engage une
Paraclet aussi, la nature se résout en effet dans la volonté de Dieu, si bien
polémique contre les théologiens qui malunt nescire quam ab alio quaerere,
qu’il n’y a pas de sens, écrit-il, de se demander qua vi naturae les eaux tien
et qui préfèrent avoir recours à des explications miraculeuses plutôt
nent au-dessus du firmament, car la seule volonté de Dieu est vis naturae
qu’ à la recherche incessante de causes physiques : ...quoniam ipsi nesciunt vires naturae, ut ignorantiae suae omnes socios habeant, nolunt aliquem eas inquirere, sed ut rusticos nos credere, nec rationem quaerere, ut iam impleatur propheticum: ‘Erit sacerdos sicut populus’ [Is. X X IV, 2; Osée, IV, 9]. Nos autem dicimus, in omnibus rationem esse quaerendam®.
Or, ce discours, pour Guillaume de Conches, est justement le discours de quelqu’un qui ne connaît pas les vires naturae et n’ayant pas la possi bilité de montrer la ratio des phénomènes naturels, recourt directement à la volonté de Dieu pour couvrir sa propre ignorance; qui, au contraire, se place du point de vue physique et du point de vue de la ratio qui lui
Cette ratio qui s’impose ici comme unique principe d’explication du
correspond ne peut pas refuser la lettre de la Bible, car la présence des
processus de formation du monde est une ratio physique, c’est-à-dire liée à
eaux au-dessus du firmament est contraire aux principes physiques, est
une conception de la nature comme causarum series, vis genitiva, comme
contra rationem^^.
objet d’une étude ayant pour but de saisir la legitima causa et ratio de chaque
L ’exégèse doit donc elle aussi se plier aux exigences d‘une ratio, raison
événement naturel, comme suggère le Timée. C ’est une ratio qui manifeste
physique, qui porte à nier les enseignements bibUques fondés sur la lettre
immédiatement sa force au moment même où elle impose une nouvelle
et sur une ancienne tradition herméneutique. Cette position porterait
direction à l’exégèse de VHexaëmeron: à l’intérieur d’une conception de la
nécessairement à mettre en discussion la valeur des auctoritates de la
nature comme voluntas D ei tout est possible, et la lettre de la Bible peut
tradition patristique dont était nourri le discours théologique. C ’est le
être toujours acceptée au nom de l’insondable volonté de Dieu; là où la
problème que Guillaume de Conches affronte de nouveau dans le
nature acquiert une consistance propre - et c’est là l’expérience qui mûrit
Dragmaticon et qu’il résout en reprenant la distinction, dont il avait déjà
dans le milieu de Chartres et plus largement au cours du X lle siècle -,
fait mention dans ses gloses à Boèce, entre les enseignements relatifs à la
lui correspond une ratio qui se pose, retrouvant les lois de la nature, en
foi et les enseignements relatifs à la philosophie:
juge de Vauctoritas biblique, de la lettre de l’enseignement scriptural. Nous avons vu la position de Guillaume sur la création du premier couple humain, reportée dans le cadre des principes physiques, et le refus corres pondant de la lettre de la Genèse pour ce qui concerne la formation du
In eis quae ad fidem catholicam vel ad morum institutionem pertinent, non est fas Bedae vel alicui alii sanctorum patrum (citra Scripturae sacrae authoritatem) contradi cere; in eis tamen quae ad philosophiam pertinent, si in aliquo errant, licet diversum aflSrmare. Etsi enim maiores nobis, homines tamen fuere^^
corps d’Adam et d’Eve; nous trouvons un autre exemple significatif de
De même Adélard de Bath revendique la priorité de la ratio sur Vauctoritas
cette différente perspective dans la discussion d’un problème typique de la
(qui a son origine à partir de la ratio, comme avait déjà enseigné Jean
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Scot Erigène), dénonçant la lettre comme meretrix, disponible à tous les
prêter à une interprétation physique de la Genèse mosaïque, une fois
usages, et indiquant la ratio comme iudex universalis:
identifié le démiurge avec le Dieu créateur et une fois résolu en termes
Nisi enim ratio iudex universalis esse deberet, frustra singulis data esset. Sufficeret enim praeceptorum scriptori datam esse, uni dico vel pluribus; caeteri eorum institutis et auctoritatibus essent contenti. Amplius, ipsi, qui auctores vocantur, non aliunde primam fidem apud minores adepti sunt, nisi quia rationem secuti sunt, quam quicun que nesciunt vel negligunt, merito caeci habendi sunt. Neque tamen id ad vivum reseco, ut auctoritas me iudice spernenda sit. Id autem assero, quod prius ratio inquirenda sit; ea inventa, auctoritas, si adiacet, demum subdenda. Ipsa vero sola nec fidem philosopho facere potest, nec ad hoc adducenda est^®.
physiques Vinvolucrum du mythe cosmogonique. C ’est ainsi que les “ Dieux, fils de Dieux” du Timée deviennent les causes secondes qui ont pour mission de compléter l’oeuvre du créateur, et que Vanima mundi, principe et garantie de l ’ordre et du caractère organique du cosmos, deviendra bientôt Vigneus vigor et la natura elle-même, après que l’on se fut efforcé, avec un succès incertain et discuté, de la situer dans la sphère divine comme troisième personne de la trinité ou divina dispositio.
La découverte d’une nature comme causarum series - toute créature
Ce n’est donc pas un hasard si le renom du Timée est à son apogée au
qu’elle est - détermine la naissance d’une conception de la ratio qui tend à
X lle siècle et donne naissance à la faveur dont jouit Platon comme maître
éliminer le miraculeux, nécessaire à une conception plus ancienne de la
de physique {...In causis rerum sentit Plato)'^^. Cette faveur ne déclinera
nature comme voluntas Dei, et, tout en rendant possible la construction
que lorsque la conception péripatéticienne du monde, plus orgam'que,
d’une philosophia mundi, détermine une nouvelle direction aussi bien dans
triomphera dans les écoles; c’est alors-depuis la seconde moitié d u X IIIe
l’exégèse que dans la réflexion théologique. On ne s’étonnera pas que Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, illustre représen
Platon, selon une suggestion augustinienne, le magistère de la sagesse en
siècle - qu’on reconnaîtra à Aristote le magistère de la science, rendant à
tant de la culture monastique, attaque le maître de Chartres en soulignant
tant que recherche et contemplation d’un monde intelligible; cette anti
les bases et l’agencement physiques de toute sa spéculation: homo
thèse sera particulièrement chère aux platoniciens de la Renaissance,
physicus et philosophus physice de Deo philosophatur ', et en ce qui concerne
Il faudra donc distinguer toujours, en parlant du platonisme du X lle
la création d’Adam et d’Eve, philosophice seu magis physice describens,
siècle, d’une part l’influence plus générale du platonisme augustinien ou la
physico sensu interpretans, rejette la vérité de l’histoire en lui préférant sa
présence d’un courant précis de néoplatonisme dionysien et érigénien (qui
doctrine physique {veritati historiae suum praefert inventum)^^.
nous oriente vers la contemplation de mondes intelligibles hors de la
Thierry de Chartres professe une exégèse analogue à celle de Guillaume
réaUté physique, qui n’en est qu’une pâle image), et d’autre part un
de Conches; ainsi l’école de Chartres - qui fera placer des ligures re
platonisme bien différent - lié à la lecture du Timée, de Chalcidius et de
présentant les arts et les auteurs au portail royal de la cathédrale - nous
Macrobe - nettement orienté vers la contemplation du monde physique,
apparaît tout de suite comme l’un des centres les plus importants de la
après que l’opposition entre le sensible et l’intelligible eut été surmontée
nouvelle culture scientifique, nourrie de lectures “ physiques” d’origine
(tel était le sens du Timée), par l’intermédiaire de l’oeuvre du démiurge et
grecque-arabe. Thierry lui-même offrira un commentaire de l’oeuvre des
de l’âme du monde; ce sont là les deux “ platonismes” présents déjà dans
six jours secundum physicam qui excluait Vallegoricam et moralem lect
la culture grecque après Aristote et qui sont à la base de la spiritualité hellénistique, surtout telle qu’elle se dégage des écrits hermétiques.
ionem'^^ et où, toujours sous l’inspiration du Timée, la création s’effectu ait grâce à l’interaction des éléments sous l’action primaire et déterminante
Sous l’influence du Timée, la pensée médiévale refaisait une expérience
de Vignis et du mouvement céleste. La présence constante du Timée de Platon se devine facilement derrière
déjà réalisée par la culture hellénistique: le dialogue platonicien offrait une base pour concevoir le monde physique comme un tout vivant et
les cosmologies des maîtres de Chartres - mises sous une forme poétique
organique {animal intelligens, unum et perfectum)^'^ où le rapport entre ses
par Bernard Silvestre, puis par Alain de Lille -, comme derrière toutes les
parties constituantes, le jeu des “ sympathies” et des “ antipathies” , et
cosmologies du X lle siècle en général. Grande “ genèse” philosophique, le dialogue platonicien semblait se
d’élaborer un discours physique cohérent et concluant, sans extrapolations
surtout le lien entre les cieux et les éléments inférieurs, permettaient
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allégoriques. Dans le cadre de cette cosmologie platonicienne, la physique
des phénomènes multiples. Dans son De essentiis, est déjà réalisée, d’une
stoïcienne vient prendre une nouvelle valeur avec sa doctrine de la nature
façon évidente, l’identification de l’anima mundi du Timée avec la nature
comme ignis artifex, principe de mouvement et de vie des astres autant que du monde terrestre; natura est ignis artifex, ex quadam vi procedens in res
de la tradition stoïciennô23. Encore une fois, Hugues de Saint-Victor témoigne d’une doctrine
sensibiles procreandas: physici namque dicunt omnia ex calore et humore
désormais répandue dans les milieux philosophiques contemporains
procreari, énonce Hugues de Saint-Victor^®, en répétant une définition
lorsqu’il rapporte l’opinion des “ mathématiciens” , c’est-à-dire des astro
stoïcienne bien connue transmise par Cicéron, mais tout en visant aussi
logues et, d’une façon plus générale, des physiciens :
une position déjà affirmée parmi les physiciens contemporains; et, vers la
procreans similia une autre définition se rapportant plus directement à la
Hinc est quod mathematici mundum in duas partes diviserunt: in eam videlicet partem quae est a circulo lunae sursum, et in eam quae deorsum est. Et superlunarem mundum, eo quod ibi omnia primordiali lege consistant, naturam appellabant; sublunarem opus naturae, id est superioris, quia omnium genera animantium, quae in eo vitalis spiritus infusione vegetantur, a superioribus per invisibiles meatus infusum nu trimentum accipiunt, non solum ut nascendo crescant, sed etiam ut alendo subsistant^^.
science médicale : [Natura] dicitur naturalis calor, unde physicus dicit esse
La doctrine de Vignis artifex ou spiritus vitalis s’appuyait surtout sur la
fin du siècle, Alain de Lille, réunissant dans ses Distinctiones les différentes acceptions du terme “ nature” , rapportera auprès d’une définition de la nature aussi générale que potentia rebus naturalibus indita, ex similibus
pugnam inter morbum et naturam, id est naturalem calorem^^.
tradition stoïcienne, et n’était pas sans rapports avec la faveur dont
La doctrine de Vignis artifex, virtus agitativa venant des cieux, et surtout
jouissaient alors Cicéron et Sénèque, ainsi que Virgile, dont les vers du
du soleil, dont le rôle hégémonique parmi les planètes et dans la généra
discours d’Anchise du Livre V I de VEnéide faisaient autorité auprès des
tion des choses est maintenant vigoureusement souligné {sol...mens mundi, rerum fomes sensificus, virtus siderum mundanusque oculus tam splen
auteurs du X lle siècle:
creaturarum devient ainsi le m otif central des nouvelles cosmologies du
Principio caelum ac terras, camposque liquentis Lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque astra. Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet. Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum Et quae marmo reo fert monstra sub aequore pontus. Igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant Terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque mem-
X lle siècle:
bra25.
.. .ignis tantum agit, terra vero tantum patitur. Duo vero elementa, quae sunt in medio, et agunt et patiuntur... Ita igitur ignis est quasi artifex et efficiens causa; terra vero subiecta quasi materialis causa; duo vero elementa, quae sunt in medio, quasi in strumentum vel aliquid coadunativum quo actus supremi amministratur ad infima.
Vers célèbres dont les penseurs du X lle siècle saisiront vite le contenu
Ceci d’après Thierry 21 ; et Bernard Silvestre, transposant dans son poème
les plus anciens) il jouit de la plus grande faveur; ici aussi la doctrine de
philosophique l’expérience culturelle de Chartres enrichie d’influences
Vignis se situait dans un contexte qui était la représentation exemplaire du
hermétiques et arabes, célèbre l’union féconde de Vignis aethereus avec le sein de la terre 22.
syncrétisme de l’ère hellénistique, avec sa manière significative d’insister
doris quam caloris immensitate perfunderat universa, écrit Bernard Silvestre 20), cette doctrine organisant par ailleurs Vordinata collectio
Hermann de Carinthie, disciple de Thierry, en développant une cosmo logie dans laquelle tout se résout par le lien réciproque des principes actifs et passifs {Mundi constitucio, universam generacionem fundanda, id primum debitum habebat, ut ex parte agentefieret, partequepaciente) et où le mouvement céleste préside à tout mouvement des éléments, voit dans le soleil princeps omnis geniturae, la source inépuisable de Vignis artifîcus qui, descendant des cieux dans les entrailles de la terre, y produit des êtres et
philosophique, et qu’ils citeront avec des textes de Platon, de Cicéron, de Macrobe et de VAsclepius; le dernier écrit était déjà connu des Pères et à partir du X lle siècle (c’est le siècle auquel appartiennent les manuscrits
sur l’unité radicale du tout, thème sur lequel reviennent ponctuellement les cosmologies du X lle siècle: Ignis solum quod sursum versus fertur, vivificum; quod deorsum, ei deserviens. At vero quicquid de alto descendit generans est; quod sursum versus emanat, nutriens. Terra sola in seipsa consistens omnium est receptrix omniumque generum, quae accepit, restitutrix. Hoc ergo totum, sicut meministi, quod est omnium vel omnia. Anima et mundus a natura comprehensa agitantur ita omnium multiformi imaginum qualitate variata, ut infinitae qualitatum ex intervallo species esse noscantur, adunatae tamen ad hoc, ut totum unum et ex uno omnia esse videantur®*.
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La doctrine du feu comme principe de vie, comme force naturelle origi
La médecine renvoyait donc à un discours cosmologique plus large et
naire, se retrouvait aussi dans une tradition scientifique plus précise, la
surtout se liait - selgn l’ancienne doctrine grecque de la |X8X,o0eaia - à la
tradition médicale qui touchait à la doctrine des spiritus, au Ospixôv de la
connaissance des mouvements et des influences célestes, suggestion à la
tradition hippocratique et à la ôiaTcXaaxiKfj ôuva)xiç de la doctrine
quelle ne pourra pas échapper, dans ses visions mystiques, Herrade de
galénique^^; c’est à cette tradition médicale que se rapporte le plus
Landesberg, qui tracera, dans un dessin fameux, les correspondances
directement la définition d’Alain de Lille rappelée ci-dessus, et qui con stitue la supposition préalable sur laquelle est bâtie la théorie médicale
entre l’homme et les planètes. Vultus huius seculi sunt subiecti vultibus celestibus^^, lit-on dans une
d’Ursus de Calabre, l’un des plus célèbres médecins de Salerne au X lle siècle:
maxime du Centiloquium (attribué à Ptolémée), texte fondamental pour
Calor artifex est quidem omnium quae generantur, et ipse est causa generationis prin cipalis; sicut generatio inter motus naturae est principalior, ita et calor, qui est inductivus generationis, inter activas qualitates principalior et fortior esse debet^».
L ’importance des écrits de la médecine grecque et arabe qui se propa geaient alors en Europe - après les premières traductions de Constantin l’Africain au X le siècle, jusqu’à la version du Canon d’Avicenne en plein X lle siècle - n’est pas toujours pleinement évaluée, car les oeuvres de médecine (la tradition de cette science ne s’était jamais perdue au moyen âge, mais elle avait maintenant acquis une influence culturelle considérable) supposaient, et souvent développaient directement dans leur partie théorique, une conception générale du cosmos dont l’homme microcosme reflète la structure: de la doctrine de la composition élémentaire des corps, nécessaire pour une connaissance plus précise de leur complexio et de leur temperatura, à la doctrine des propriétés des différents êtres naturels pour en utiliser les capacités thérapeutiques, jusqu’à la science des rapports entre les cieux et le corps humain, fondamentale pour le diagnostic et le traitement des maladies. Nulli dubium est - écrit Ursus de Calabre - superiora corpora, utpote quantitate maiora, puritate et loco digniora, virtute eflScatiora in inferioribus agere et secundum corporum complexionem variam, diversitate motus vel coniunctionis, inferiora corpora et magis similia vel mutationi habilia multiformiter permutare.
l’astrologie médiévale, traduit au X lle siècle par Jean de Séville et par Hugo Sanctallensis: c’est une oeuvre, annonçait Hugo Sanctallensis dans le prologue, de hüs que ad iudiciorum veritatem attinent, cum in illis totus astronomie consistat effectus secundum arahice secte verissimam inquisicionem et tam Grecorum quam Arabum, qui huius artis habiti sunt profexores famosissimi, auctoritatem . Nous avons déjà rappelé quelques textes des cosmologies de Chartres, où le mouvement et l’influence des cieux sont le fondement de toute l’oeuvre des causes secondes; et il est significatif que, dans des oeuvres dépendant plus directement de la science arabe, la natura elle-même s’identifie avec l ’action exercée par les planètes : elle est la qualitas plane tarum dans le pseudo-hermétique De V I principiis à travers laquelle se réahse la divina dispositio, et les cieux constituent la natura elementans de Bernard Silvestre : est igitur elementans natura caelum stellaeque signifero pervagantes, quod elementa commoveant ad ingenitas actiones^^. La fusion de la physique platonicienne avec les doctrines astrologiques arabes devient explicite chez Hermann de Carinthie, traducteur du Planisphère de Ptolémée (dédié à Thierry de Chartres comme à la “ ré incarnation de Platon” ) et de YIntroductorium de Albumasar: dans son De essentiis, se dessine de plus en plus nettement sur un fonds platonicien la primauté des cieux, qui constituent la partie active du cosmos (la nature “ identique” de la cosmologie du Timéé) et exercent leur ducatus incontesté non seulement sur les éléments et sur le corps de l’homme mais
Et Daniel de Morley, rappelant un point classique de VIntroductorium de Albumasar, écrivait;
sur tout le cours de l’histoire. Peut-être que l’astrologie est justement l’expression la plus significative
siderum virtus in medicina prepotens est... qui igitur astronomiam damnat, physicam necessario destruit. Non enim facile curat, qui causas rerum ignorat. Causam autem previderit astronomus, cui medendum sit et quare et quando, cum demum medicus utiliter accedit^*.
tous les phénomènes du monde sublunaire est attribuée non plus à Dieu,
de la nouvelle conception de la nature dans laquelle la causalité directe sur mais aux cieux, qui, même s’ils sont considérés comme des instruments de Vopus creatoris, représentent cependant la tentative de définir un domaine
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autonome de causalité naturelle: qui celum et terram, écrit Bernard
des conjonctions célestes les principes et les lignes de l’évolution et de la
Silvestre, creavit quibusdam creaturis super alias creaturas potestatem
civiUsation du genre.humain; dans cette perspective, son auteur finit par
donant: ut septem planetis quibus totum mundum, cuncta eius elementa, in sua mutacione posse mutare disposuit ^3.
repousser toute référence spécifiquement chrétienne: la vie humaine, dans
De sorte que Hugo Sanctallensis pourra présenter la doctrine de la causalité et de l’influence des cieux comme reconnue par tous les philo sophes : Apud universos philosophie professores - écrit Hugo Sanctallensis - ratum arbitror et constans quicquid in hoc mundo conditum subsistendi vice sortitum est, haud dis simile exemplar in superiori circulo possidere^^.
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ses âges successifs, est soumise à l’influence des astres: Principatus igitur planetarum naturam humanam ita moderatur et potestas eorum in humana vita sic ordinatur: principatus enim Lune incipit a nativitate pueri et disponit qualitatis aptitudinem secundum quantitatem annorum nutricionis, qui sunt iiii°=^ anni, deinde Mercurius, x,, inde Venus, viii,, deinde Sol novendecim, deinde Mars, xv., post lupiter. xii, Saturnus denique usque in finem vite.
Et si 1’homme pouvait vivre seulement sous le règne bénin de Jupiter, il en deviendrait immortel: Essent homines immortales si numquam in genituris
Les cieux sont désormais considérés comme les véritables causes du mouvement et de la vie dans le cadre du monde physique: Celum autem - peut-on lire dans la Philosophia de Daniel de Morley - quod sua natura movetur, movet predicta quatuor et permiscet et complexionatur ea, quia celum si non esset, procul dubio nec moverentur nec permiscerentur. Ex motu igitur eius figuratur substantia, que est sub circulo lune, multis figuris et permutatur de accidente ad accidens de forma ad formam, de figura ad figuram...»5
Ainsi les cieux deviennent les cronocratores, les dominateurs du temps et du cosmos : l’on pourra retrouver dans leurs fades les causes des événe ments physiques et y lire, préfigurée d’une façon emblématique, l’histoire du monde humain. C ’est ainsi que Hermann de Carinthie pourra retrouver dans les cieux les étapes de l’histoire sacrée et profane, la succession des empires:
hominum Jovis benignitas vinceretur
La doctrine du péché et de la
mort n’a point de place dans le monde de l’auteur anonyme ; dans d’autres textes, la doctrine de l’influence céleste sur l’histoire des hommes remplace le concept théologique de providence, dont elle pose à nouveau, sans les résoudre, tous les dilemmes. Le fait de reconnaître la suprématie de la causalité céleste fondait la suprématie de l’astrologie dans le cadre d’une nouvelle conception du savoir où les sciences se subordonnaient entre elles en empruntant à l’astrologie leurs principes premiers. Qui ignorat celestium principia corporum et qualitates temporum constat eum ignorare naturas temporalium, écrit l’auteur de De V I principiis \ et Daniel de Morley:
Ce sont là des thèmes que l’on retrouve dans toute la littérature scientifique
llli vero qui syderis motibus vim et efiicatiam negant, adeo sunt impudentis amentie, ut antequam scientie disciplinam habeant, eius doctrine incipiant derogare. Unde quidam ex solo nomine astronomiam odio habent. Sed si attenderent quante digni tatis quanteque utilitatis foret, numquam nisi ex invidia ei derogarent. De dignitate eius invenitur, quod illius partes, secundum quod dixerunt sapientes primi, octo sunt; scientia de iudiciis, scientia de medicina, scientia de nigromantia secundum physicam, scientia de agricultura, scientia de prestigiis, scientia de alkimia, que est scientia de transformatione metallorum in alias species, scientia de ymaginibus... scientia de spe culis et hec scientia largior est et lacior ceteris__ Utilitas vero astronomie non minima perpendi debet. Astronomus namque, cum futuros rerum eventus prescierit, poterit eorum noxa repellere, vel evitare, ut sunt bellum publicum, generalis fames, universalis terre motus, exustiones, eluviones, communis hominum seu bestiarum pestilencia. Si vero ista penitus effugere nequeat, provisi tamen eventus, tolerantia multo levior est previdenti quam ignorantibus, quos improvisus atque repentinus percutit terror®®.
de cette époque et qui marquent d’une façon très significative le naturalisme
Daniel rassemble ainsi dans le cadre de l’astrologie toutes les disciplines
du X lle siècle. L ’auteur anonyme du De V I principiis - qui utilise large ment les Matheseos libri de Firmicus Maternus - place dans la succession
qui, dans le De scientiis d’Alfarabi et le De divisione philosophiae de
Hinc enim astrologi varios seculorum usus, hinc diversos humani generis status, hinc eciam diversa mundi imperia meciuntur. Sic enim regnum ludeorum sub Saturno describunt, Arabum dominiimi sub Venere et Marte, Romanum imperiimi sub Sole et love^®.
Et la sûreté des prédictions célestes, la précision de l’horoscope des religions comprenant l’annonce de l’incarnation du Christ, deviennent les arguments de la polémique contre la Hebraeorum caecitas: ...cum etiam in nature speculatione seculorumque serie vel barbare nacioni veritas Jhesu Christi prenotata fuerit^’ .
Gundisalvi, étaient classées dans la scientia naturalis', cette transposition
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est significative, car elle rattachait à la contemplation du mouvement
l’intermédiaire de remaniements arabes; la figure d’Hermès connaît une
céleste et à la science des influences astrales tout un ensemble de sciences
nouvelle faveur: pater philosophorum, rex et philosophus et propheta qui in
pratiques se rapportant à des tâches et à des buts humains. C ’est là un
liberalibus et mechanicis artibus prevaluit et astronomiam prius elucidavit
élément de premier plan permettant d’apprécier la signification qu’avait
(ainsi que le célébraient la Tabula smaragdina et le De VIprincipiis, selon
pris le savoir astronomique: au moment où il semblait que l’astrologie dût
une doxologie précise), Hermès était le prototype du savant, mage,
enfermer l’homme dans les lois d’un destin déjà écrit et préfiguré dans les
astrologue, prophète qui “ expérimente” et “ interroge” la réalité afin de la
cieux, elle se trouvait à offrir une nouvelle possibilité d’action au moyen de
connaître et de la dominer; et, sur la base des enseignements du fabuleux
la connaissance des rapports et des influences entre le ciel et la terre: la
Hermès, il semble possible de comprendre et de reproduire l’oeuvre de
maxime du Centiloquium que nous avons soulignée, devient fondamentale
créateur par l’intermédiaire de pratiques de magie qui, à partir de la pierre
pour comprendre la perspective du nouveau savoir: Vultus huius saeculi
philosophale - comme Dieu à partir du chaos -, permettent d’accomplir
sunt subiecti vultibus celestibus, et ideo sapientes qui imagines faciebant
d’ “ admirables opérations” :
stellarum introitum in celestes vultus inspiciebant, et tunc operabuntur quod debebant La contemplation des figures célestes s’associe toujours, dans la science astrologique, à la recherche des moyens pour contrôler ces mêmes forces célestes dont le sage, l’astrologue a constaté l’influence; la doctrine des imagines, des electiones, des interrogationes, bref tout l’ensemble des techniques astrologiques représente l’expérience la plus considérable, ébauchée déjà au X lle siècle, d’un savoir qui s’efforce de sortir de son
Sic mundus creatus est, hoc est, sicut mundus creatus est, ita et lapis noster factus est. Quia primitus totus mundus, et omne quod fuit in mundo, fuit una massa confusa, seu chaos confusum, ut superius dictum est, et postea per artificium summi creatoris, divisa est ista massa in quatuor elementa, mirabiliter separata et rectificata, propter quam separationem diversa fiunt. Ita possunt fieri diversa, aptatione nostri operis per separationem diversorum elementorum a diversis corporibus. H inc erunt adoptationes mirabiles', id est, si separaveris elementa, fient mirabilia composita, apta nostro operi in nostri lapidis compositione. ...S ic habebis gloriam totius mundi, id est, hoc lapide sic composito, gloriam huius mundi possidebis. Ideo fugiet a te omnis obscuritas, id est omnis inopia et aegritudo.
attitude purement contemplative et d’intervenir dans le jeu des forces qui gouvernent le cosmos; ainsi l ’homme, qui semblait enfermé dans le cercle
Ainsi la Tabula smaragdina laisse entrevoir la possibilité d’un savoir
des mouvements célestes, s’élève au-dessus d’eux et les domine au moyen
opérant de façon créative dans un cosmos dont il faudrait savoir compren
de la raison : ratio imperat celo et avertunturftagitia, écrit Bernard Silvestre,
dre l’unité primordiale et radicale: quod est superius, est sicut quod est
reprenant une ancienne auctoritas d’Albumasar, dans la préface de VExperimentarius, manuel de géomancie qu’il se préparait à faire connaître
inferius ad perpetranda miracula rei unius Et Daniel de Morley, confirmant la même doctrine: ideo sicut ab in
à ses contemporains'*1.
expugnabili sententia magni Hermetis habeo, audaciter cum illo unum tan
L ’astrologie est ainsi liée à toutes les sciences qui, pendant des siècles, représenteront plus clairement la tentative de briser un monde solide et
tum principium esse concedo Comme on l’a très justement observé
unitaire, hiérarchisé selon des formes et des essences immobiles, pour
tion hermétique de la dignitas hominis, telle que la transmet une page
instaurer avec la nature un rapport nouveau, actif, susceptible de changer
célèbre de VAsclepius, de la science magique et astrologique recherchée et
les espèces et les formes; la magie, l’alchimie, la géomancie, toutes ces branches du savoir - et les techniques qui leur étaient associées - promet
assurée par un grand nombre d’écrits de la littérature hermétique de
on ne saura séparer la célébra
l ’âge hellénistique ; de même, le sens des différentes cosmologies du X lle
taient un rapport nouveau avec la réalité physique, céleste et terrestre,
siècle serait difficilement compréhensible si l’ on ne soulignait pas la
que l’on sentait plus proche de l’homme et plus utile à sa vie.
recherche de l’échelle humaine dans la nature, par l’intermédiaire des
Cet aspect de la science au X lle siècle semble répéter lui aussi une
différents rapports, des multiples “ expériences” qui ont pour but de
expérience déjà faite à l’ère hellénistique et dont témoigne amplement la
retrouver de nouveaux rapports avec elle. L ’on peut dire que cette nouvelle idée de nature qui mûrit au X lle
littérature hermétique que l’on redécouvrait alors, directement ou par
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siècle prend sa plus importante signification précisément dans les pers
En fait, la conscience du lien entre l’art et son utilisation l’emporte sur
pectives qu’elle ouvre au savoir scientifique à travers les suggestions de
la considération purement contemplative des arts, telle qu’elle subsistait
l’astrologie, de la magie, de l’alchimie; mais pour comprendre le sens de
chez d’autres contemporains: tel Adam de Balsam qui, lorsqu’il traite des
cette expérience cruciale, ébauchée au X lle siècle, il est nécessaire de se
ustensiles domestiques, oppose nettement la cognitio des techniques, qui
libérer d’une conception étroite de l’histoire de la pensée scientifique qui réduit celle-ci à une liste des anticipations et des découvertes progressives
affaiblie, mais encore présente, dans le Didascalicon d’Hugues de Saint-
appartient à la philosophia, à la possessio, qui lui est étrangère. Distinction
des solutions que la science mathématique et expérimentale moderne considérera ensuite comme vraies.
Victor, où tous les arts mécaniques, dans leur ratio, sont placés dans le
Qui lira le prologue écrit par un anonyme traducteur sicilien de VAlma-
reconnaît toutefois la valeur irremplaçable des arts mécaniques pour
geste de Ptolémée, avec l’assidue polémique contre ceux qui, ignorant la
permettre à l ’homme de surmonter les infirmitates dérivant du péché
science des astres, la repoussent comme inutile et profane, peut saisir sur le v if la conscience d’ une époque:
d’Adam47.
Sensisti vero et tu nonnullos hiis temporibus cause quam ignorant iudices audacissimos, qui, ne minus scientes videantur, quecunque nesciunt inutilia predicant aut profana... Rideant et insultent artium inimici, ignota iudicent, astrorum studium insaniam predicent. Michi confiteor hec insania dulcis, michi dulce clamare cum Nasone: Felices anime quibus hec agnoscere primum. Inque domos superas scandere cura fuit^®.
doute à l’évolution réelle des techniques au cours du X lle siècle, de celles
Du reste d’autres aspects de la culture du X lle siècle confirment le
en plein progrès, leur englobement dans la considération - pour livresque
cadre des discipHnes philosophiques; mais ici, dans le Didascalicon, on
La libération des arts de leur état d’infériorité, correspond sans nul qui se rapportaient à l’agriculture à celles qui avaient trait à la construc tion des grandes cathédrales, à celles enfin de la guerre, de la navigation, du commerce. Mais la compréhension de leur valeur, les premières tentatives pour voir leur signification et leur importance dans une société
rapport nouveau qui s’instaure entre l’homme et la nature: on ne saurait
qu’elle fût - des “ intellectuels” (du reste, on tend trop souvent à opposer
négliger en elfet la nouvelle appréciation des arts mécaniques dans leur
l ’oeuvre des théoriciens à celle des techniciens : les écrits, par exemple, de
signification terrestre et mondaine, c’est-à-dire comme moyens utilisés par
médecine ainsi que les textes hermétiques, astrologiques, magiques, sont
l’homme pour modifier et améliorer son miüeu naturel et sa propre condition humaine.
les premiers à nier cette opposition), ne peuvent être dissociés de l’attitude
La page du Poîycraticus qui laisse comprendre le lien intime des arts
à l ’égard de la nature, avec l ’espoir confiant de connaître son dynamisme
mécaniques avec l’évolution de la société citadine et marchande, en rapport avec les nouvelles conditions de vie économique et civile, a la
intime. Les techniques, magiques ou mécaniques, trouvaient leur valeur et leur
valeur d’un document plus encore, peut-être, que la célèbre page du
justification “ philosophique” du fait qu’elles étaient en relation avec une
Didascalicon d’Hugues de Saint-Victor, auquel fit écho, en la résumant, Richard de Saint-Victor.
nature dotée d’un densité et d’une consistance propres. Devant une nature sacramentum salutaris allegoriae, d’autres techniques
En effet, par ces arts, rei publicae membra per terram gradiuntur, écrit Jean de Salisbury; il souligne efficacement à quel point le précepte cicéronien du lien nécessaire entre l’étude de l ’éloquence et son utilisation civile doit être étendu à tous les arts, libéraux et mécaniques, ces derniers surtout ne progressant que grâce à la pratique: Adeo quidem ut si artem usumque dissocies, utilior sit usus expers artis quam ars quae sui usum non habet ... Progressus ab usu ab arte perfectio, si tamen iugi exercitatione fuerit solidata^^.
nouvelle et plus générale qui mûrissait peu à peu, dans les mêmes milieux,
entraient en action: c’ était l ’exégèse allégorique, morale, anagogique, qui dissolvait la densité du symbole dans ses implications spirituelles: c’étaient là les techniques de Vhomo viator. Les autres - la navigatio, Varmatura, Varchitectura, le lanificium, la theatrica, etc. - étaient les techniques de Vhomo faber. Ce n’est pas sans raison que la dignitas hominis, sur laquelle on insiste tellement au X lle siècle, sort du parallélisme traditionnel entre microcosme et macrocosme, pour souHgner les capacités de l’homme devant la nature.
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sa capacité de connaître et d’agir pour devenir empereur et pontife de la
® Adélard de Bath, De eodem et diverso, éd. H. Willner dans Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 4, 1 Münster, 1903, p. 32. « Guillavmie de Conches, In Boethium, éd. P. Courcelle dans Archives d ’histoire doc trinale et littéraire du moyen âge 12 (1939), 5-140, 85. 7 Guillaume de Conches, Philosophia I, 23 ; P .L . 172, 55-56 (cf. P .L . 90, 1137-38). 8 Ibid., col. 56 (cf. P .L . 90, 1138). ® De mundi constitutione, P .L . 90, 893. Abélard, Expositio in Hexaemeron, P .L . 178, 746; Cf. T. Gregory, Considerazioni su “ratio” e "natura” in Abelardo dans Studi medievali 14, (1973), 287-300. Guillaume de Conches, Philosophia H , 2-3; P .L . 172, 57-58; Dragmaticon, éd. Gratarol, Argentorati, 1567, p. 65ss. 12 Guillaume de Conches, Dragmaticon, pp. 65-66. 13 Adélard de Bath, Quaestiones naturales, éd. M. Müller, dans Beitrage 31,2, Münster, 1934, pp. 11-12. 1^ Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, P .L . 180, 339-340. 1^ Thierry de Chartres, D e sex dierum operibus, éd. N . M . Hâring dans Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry o f Chartres and his School, Toronto, 1971, p. 555. 1® Bernard Silvestre, De mundi universitate, éd. Barach-Wrobel, Innsbruck, 1876, p. 16. Sur la cosmologie de Bernard Silvestre, voir B. Stock, M yth arui Science in the Twelfth Century - A Study o f Bernard Silvester, Princeton, 1972. 17 Platon, Timée, 30C, 33A. 1® Hugues de Saint-Victor, Didascalicon I, 10, P .L . 176, 748; éd. Ch. B. Buttimer, Washington, 1939, p. 18. 1® Alain de Lille, Distinctiones, P .L . 210, 871. Bernard Silvestre, De mundi universitate, p. 44. 21 Thierry de Chartres, De sex dierum operibus, p. 562. 22 Bernard Silvestre, De mundi universitate, p. 29. 23 Hermann de Carinthie, D e essentiis, éd. M. Alonso, Comillas, 1946, pp. 48, 51-52, 89-92. 2^ Hugues de Saint-Victor, Didascalicon I, 7; P .L . 176, 746; éd. Ch. H. Buttimer, p. 14. 25 Virgile, Enéide V I, 724-32. 2® Asclepius, 2, éd. A. D . Nock & A. J. Festugière, Corpus Hermeticum, vol. 2 (Paris, 1945), p. 298. 2’ Cf. Hippokrates, Ueber Entstehung und Aufbau des menschlichen Kôrpers [jrepi aapKÔv], von K. Deichgrâber, Leipzig-Berlin, 1935, pp. 2-6, 30ss. ; Galien, De nat.fac. I, 6; ‘Ali ibn al-‘Abbas, Pa n tegn ilV , 2 (éd. avec l’attribution à Constantin l’Africain, D e communibus medico cognito necessariis locis, Basilae, 1539, p. 82). 28 Libellus de effectibus qualitatum, éd. C. Matthaes {Der salernitaner A rzt Urso aus der 2. Halfte des 12. Jahrhunderts und seine beiden Schriften "D e effectibus qualitatum” und “D e effectibus medicinarum” , Boma-Leipzig, 1918), p. 17. 29 Cf. R. Creutz, D ie medizinisch-naturphilosophischen Aforismen und Kommentare des Magister Urso Salernitanus dans Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissen schaften und der Medizin 5, 1, Berlin, 1936, p. 63; Daniel de Morley, Philosophia, ed. cit., p. 32 (cf. Albumasar, Introductorium, Venetiis, 1506,1, 4). 3“ Centiloquium Ptolomei, trad. Jean de Séville, Venetiis, 1519, fol. 97vb. 31 Haskins, Studies, p. 69. 32 Liber Hermetis M ercu rii Triplicis de V I principiis, ed. Th. Silverstein dans Archives d ’hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge 22 (1955), 248, 282; D e mundi univ., pp. 30-31.
nature même: Viderit in lucem mersas caligine causas, ut natura nihil occuluisse queat... Omnia subiciat, terras regat, imperet orbi: Primatem rebus pontificiemque dedi'*®.
Bernard Silvestre résume ainsi la tâche de l’homme, à la ratio duquel VExperimentarius reconnaissait le pouvoir de dominer les cieux. Il est difficile de sous-estimer la signification de ces pages et d’autres du même genre, surtout si on les rapproche des divers aspects de l’histoire culturelle et civile du X lle siècle, qui semblent graviter autour d’une nouvelle valorisation des réalités terrestres et profanes, autour d’une nature: Cui velut mundi dominae, tributum singula solvunt
Au début du siècle, Adélard de Bath, dans la préface du traité sur l ’astro labe, écrivait que si on ignore la structure du monde physique et sa ratio, on n’est pas digne d’y demeurer, et on devrait, si possible, en être chassé La culture du X lle siècle, dont Adélard avait été l’un des précurseurs, tira profit de cette leçon: l’homme, en cherchant la legitima causa et ratio des événements physiques et en construisant une philosophia mundi était devenu digne d’habiter ce monde et de le posséder. Università di Roma NOTES ^ Pour un tableau général du problème, qu’il me soit permis de renvoyer à mon rapport au Ille Congrès International de philosophie médiévale (1964); L ’idea di natura nella filosofia medievale prima dell’ingresso délia fisica di Aristotele. I l secolo X II, publié dans les actes, La filosofia délia natura nel Medioevo, Milano, 1966, pp. 27-65. 2 Pierre Damien, D e bono religiosi statu et variarum animantium tropologia, dans Patrologia Latina 145, 779 et 771 ; cf. J. Leclerq, Saint Pierre Damien, ermite et homme d’Eglise, Rome, 1960, pp. 186 ss. 3 Cette locution est dans la traduction chalcidienne du Timée (28A): omne autem quod gignitur ex causa aliqua necessario gignitur; nihil enim fit, cuius ortum non legitima causa et ratio praecedat {Timaeus a Calcidio translatus etc., éd. J. H. Waszink, Londinii et Leidae, 1962, p. 20, 20-22); le texte grec a seulement xcopiç aixiou. ^ Liber Mamonis in astronomia, éd. C. H. Haskins, Studies in the History o f Mediaeval Science, N ew York, 1960 (réimpr. de l’éd. de 1927), pp. 99-100; Daniel de Morley, Philosophia, éd. K. Sudhoff dans A rch iv fiir die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik 8 (1917), 1-40.
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33 Bernard Silvestre, Experimentarius, éd. M . Brini Savorelli dans Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 14, (1959), 283-342, 312-313. Haskins, Studies, p. 78. 35 Daniel de Morley, Philosophia, p. 23. 3® Hermann de Carinthie, D e essentiis, p. 69, 72. 37 Ibid., p. 29, avec la citation d’Albumasar, Introductorium VI, 2. 38 Liber Her metis M ercu rii Triplicis de V I principiis, p. 266,289 (cf. Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos libri V III, Stutgardiae, 1968, pp. 56-57). 39 Liber H er metis M ercu rii Triplicis de V I principiis, p. 296; Daniel de Morley, P/wlosophia, p. 34; cf. Albumasar, Introductorium, I, 5. Centiloquium Ptolomei, trad. Jean de Seville, Venetiis, 1519, p. 97vb. Bernard Silvestre, Experimentarius, p. 317. 42 J, Ruska, Tabula smaragdina. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der hermetischen Literatur, Heidelberg, 1926, p. 182, 185. 43 Daniel de Morley, Philosophia, p. 14. 44 Cf. E. Garin, Medioevo et Rinascimento, Bari, 1954, p. 154; aussi dans Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 29 (1950), 362-67. 45 Haskins, pp. 192-93 (cf. Ovide, Fasti, I, 297-98). 46 Jean de Salisbury, Policraticus, VI, 19; éd. Ch. Webb, Oxonii, 1909, vol. 2, pp. 57-58. 4’ Cf. F. Alessio, La filosofia et le “artes mechanicae” nel secolo A7/dans Studi medievali 6 (1965), 71-161 ; voir aussi infra le rapport de G. Beaujouan. 48 Bernard Silvestre, D e mundi universitate, p. 56. 49 Alain de Lille, De planctu naturae, P .L . 210, 447. 5® Haskins, Studies, p. 29.
D ISCUSSION R. m c k e o n ; Mr. Gregory, I read your paper with great interest, and I agree with your
general thesis that in the twelfth century there appeared a sense of nature that did not exist before. But having agreed, I find it difficult to express what it is that was new in that “ sense of nature.” I wonder whether you would tegin by saying more about the ratio physica and the causarum series which you find in the twelfth century and which you find lacking in the Physiologusl In other words, I would like to know what the new science looked like and what the old science looked like. T. GREGORY: Le sens de la nouvelle conception du monde physique au X lle siècle émerge justement en polémique avec la conception du haut moyen âge où la causalité divine joue un rôle prédominant et les phénomènes physiques sont considérés comme l’expression immédiate d’enseignements moraux et religieux: avec le X lle siècle, s’af firme, au contraire, une conception selon laquelle on veut donner aux événements une explication “ physique” , c’est-à-dire, selon un ordre de causalité naturelle, en ayant recours à un ensemble de causes secondes qui acquièrent, alors, une autonomie et deviennent le véritable objet de la philosophie. Dans la première conception - qui est une contemplation religieuse du cosmos - l’influence de S. Augustin est profonde par le fait qu’il réduit la nature à la voluntas D ei et par son attitude polémique envers la vana curiositas. Où la voluntas D ei est la cause directe des événements physiques, il n’y a pas de recherche des causarum series, parce qu’il n’y a pas alors de series causarum, mais la volonté de Dieu qui cause directement un phénomène physique. Selon un
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exemple célèbre de S. Augustin, le miracle des noces de Cana est tout à fait naturel, tout conune le processus de maturation des vignobles et la production du vin, parce que Hans l’uji et dans l’autre cas c’est toujours la volonté de Dieu qui va produire directe ment des effets. C ’est une théorie, on peut dire, occasionnaliste avant la lettre. C ’est une théorie aussi que S. Thomas reprochera aux Mutakallimün, qui disent que ce n’est pas Vignis qui va brûler mais Dieu en présence de Vignis', quand Dieu est la cause directe, il n’y a pas de recherche des causes naturelles. Bien différente est la conception qui mûrit à Chartres et dans les milieux ouverts à l’influence de la science grecque et arabe: on voit naître une conception de la nature qui a consistance et autonomie propres. Par exemple, Guillaume de Conches, Thierry de Chartres et d’autres “ physiciens” du X lle siècle disent: voyez. Dieu a créé les éléments puis les éléments vont tourner et avec les mouvements des éléments vont se former les cieux; selon l’action des cieux la vie sur terre va se développer, et la vie ne dérive pas directement de Dieu mais des cieux, de Y ignis \les corps des animaux sont aussi consti tués par ce jeu des forces physiques, et le corps de l’homme l’est également par un cer tain jeu des forces physiques. Nous avons ici une causarum series, c’est-à-dire une suc cession de causes qui, à l’intérieur d’une conception de Dieu créateur, ont toujours une certaine autonomie, une certaine consistance. Et alors l’étude physique de cette causarum series prend une signification. C ’est-à-dire qu’entre Dieu créateur et chaque événement physique il y a une series de causes. Ce qui va diff'érencier à l’intérieur de la nouvelle mentalité scientifique du X lle siècle cette nouvelle conception des causarum series de la conception de la nature qui remonte à l’âge hellénistique, à la littérature des mirabilia et du Physiologus, qui se développe au moyen âge dans la tradition allégorique et symbolique, c’est que dans la tradition allégorique-symbolique chaque phénomène physique est étudié surtout pour sa signifi cation d’ordre spirituel ou moral; alors on renvoie directement du phénomène non pas à la causarum series physique mais directement à des enseignements que les phénomènes peuvent donner. Par contre dans la mentalité qui se forme au X lle siècle, on cherche à dégager cette causarum series du contexte symbolique; on met de côté le contexte sym bolique et on cherche plutôt à pouvoir constituer une physique pour expliquer la con nexion des causes. C ’est la première fois qu’on va reconnaître aux causes physiques une consistance vraiment autonome, toujours à l’intérieur, évidemment, d’une idée de la nature comme créature. Le contraste entre ces deux conceptions opposées s’exprime d’une façon paradigmatique dans la polémique entre Guillaume de Saint-Thierry et Guillaume de Conches. R. m c k e o n : The importance of discovering nature in the twelfth century is that it pro vides a beginning point from which later science would develop. Y ou object quite rightly to a science that would make the world merely symbolic. But don’t you think that to find the beginning of science in magic, alchemy, and astrology is rather curious? T. GREGORY: Je dirais d’abord que magie et astronomie ou astrologie sont des ex pressions de la nouvelle science du X lle siècle; il faut se libérer des catégories du juge ment qui sont nées en rapport avec une conception de la science différente et plus ré cente, Je rappellerai même que avant l’avènement de la science moderne on ne distin guait pas l’astrologie de l’astronomie. S’il faut à tout prix une différence - qu’il m’arrive rarement de trouver - on peut quelquefois isoler l’aspect mathématique de la science des astres, mais il faut dire que même après la traduction de VAlmageste de Ptolémée presque personne n’était capable de lire un texte mathématique du niveau du texte de Ptolémée. Aussi, je crois qu’il vaut mieux ne pas les distinguer; une astronomie ma thématique surgira plus tard. On pourra dire plutôt que dans l’étude de l’astronomie-
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astrologie, certains développent plutôt les aspects mathématiques et d’autres insistent au contraire sur les influences des cieux, la science de iudiciis etc. A u X lle siècle l’astrologie est une des sciences physiques qu’il faut étudier comme science physique et non pas comme une chose basée sur des données imaginaires, car il s’agit bien d’une science positive pour les hommes du moyen âge. La théorie de l’in fluence des cieux disparaîtra seulement avec la naissance de la physique moderne, au XVIIe siècle. Je dis donc que l’astrologie, tout comme l’alchimie et la magie, sont des sciences physiques au sens plein du terme dans une période où elles étaient consi dérées comme sciences physiques. C ’est la science moderne, mécanique, mathématique, qui va repousser ces sciences comme des superstitions. Pendant le moyen âge et la Renaissance, elles sont pleinement sciences. G. b e a u j o u a n : Le cas de l’astrologie et celui de la magie ne sont pas tout à fait sem blables. Dans l’alchimie, il y a une part de mysticisme qui ne se trouve pas du tout dans cette espèce de rationalisme de code civil qui préside à l’astrologie. T. GREGORY: Sans doute, mais la magie est très liée à l’astrologie, car on peut faire des opérations magiques dans la mesure où on connaît les rapports entre les natures, et le rapport entre les natures est déterminé par la connaissance de l’influence des astres. Aussi le magus doit-il connaître les influences des astres pour opérer d’une façon magi que. Vous avez bien raison, l’astrologie-astronomie a un outillage que nous sommes tentés de qualifier du point de vue moderne - de plus scientifique, mais le magus est toujours un homme de science et il est reconnu comme tel par ses contemporains, sur tout pour la magie naturelle; évidemment pas pour la magie noire. G. b e a u j o u a n ; Croyez-vous qu’un astrologue du X lle siècle se considérait comme un magusl M oi je crois que l’astrologue du X lle siècle aurait été très surpris de se voir qualifier ainsi. T. GREGORY: Non, je ne dis pas ça, mais je dis que le magus doit connaître l’astrologie; je dis que la magie est une science qui dépend de l’astrologie. Je ne dis pas que l’astro logue est aussi un magicien, mais que le magicien est toujours aussi astrologue, en ce sens que des notions d’astrologie sont toujours la base scientifique d’opérations magi ques. R. m c k e o n : I didn’t object to astrology as a basis of science. As a matter of fact, I would go further and accept magic as a basis for science. When Francis Bacon planned a new instauration of science its culmination was natural magic. But what I was looking for was the difl’erentiation, even in the twelfth century, between astrology as a supersti tion and as a science. It is this differentiation that I thought might be discerned by a sense of nature. T. GREGORY: Je n’ai pas du tout nié ceci; j ’ai plutôt souligné le fait que l’astrologie dans plusieurs textes est indiquée comme le fondement de toutes les autres sciences physiques. R. m c k e o n : But not any kind of astrology. There were anti-astrologers and there were positive astrologers. There were those who made natural science on a foundation of principles and those who substituted astrology for scientia naturalis. j. g a g n e : V ous avez assez facilement assimilé l’astronomie et l’astrologie à une science physique. Il me semble que c’est encore très rare au X lle siècle. On assimile alors l’astronomie et l’astrologie principalement à la science mathématique. Et je vou drais en montrer un peu les conséquences: même si l’on dit que les corps célestes gou vernent le monde, on ne dit pas que la science des corps célestes gouverne la science du monde en aucune façon. Ce n’est que beaucoup plus tard que l’on bâtira ce genre de raisonnement, et il y a même des étapes intermédiaires avant qu’on y arrive. Vous avez
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donné l’impression que le changement de mentalité implique que la science des corps célestes va gouverner la science du monde. Il me semble que c’est beaucoup plus tard. T. GREGORY: L a littérature astrologique est très riche au X lle siècle et la thèse selon laquelle plusieurs “ sciences du monde” dépendent de l’astrologie est très répandue; j ’ai rappelé un texte significatif de Daniel de Morley, et d’autres auteurs aussi, de Hugo Sanctallensis à Ursus de Calabre, au D e V I principiis: ils insistent tous sur le fait que la connaissance des influences des cieux, et donc l’astrologie, est essentielle, soit pour la médecine, soit pour l’agriculture, soit pour d’autres sciences et techniques; on retrouve souvent ce que dit Albumasar, c’est-à-dire que la connaissance de l’astrologie permet des formes de contrôle et d’intervention sur les événements naturels. D u reste, ce sont ces nouveaux développements de l’astrologie qui peuvent faire comprendre certaines polémiques anti-astrologiques, destinées non pas à nier l’influence des cieux, mais seule ment à nier la possibilité de tirer des prévisions sur l’avenir qui risquent ainsi de limiter la liberté humaine en la renfermant dans le cercle des influences célestes. G. b e a u j o u a n : V ous parliez tout à l’heure de la difficulté de distinguer astronomie et astrologie. Il y a tout de même deux niveaux: c’est d’abord le vague contexte astrolo gique qui avait subsisté au haut moyen âge, et puis il y a le moment où on commence à réutiliser les tables astronomiques d’héritage arabe. Il se pose donc un problème de chronologie très important à l’intérieur même du X lle siècle. M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: D ’autant plus qu’im homme comme Guillaume de Conches était, je crois, tout à fait incapable de lire ces tables astronomiques. Je veux aussi dire que malgré tout la distinction astronomie-astrologie existe; et, ce qui est beaucoup plus im portant - et répond en partie à votre objection - : il y a cette distinction déjà marquée chez Isidore de Séville, qui est reprise dans le Didascalicon d’Hugues de Saint-Victor, entre l’astrologie naturelle et l’astrologie superstitieuse. D e plus, le Didascalicon s’inspire de la distinction d’Isidore de Séville; il ajoute seulement quelques petites phrases sur les fonctions de l’astrologie naturelle, qui montrent que, même à une période contem poraine de Guillaume de Conches (vers 1130-1135), Hugues de Saint-Victor avait déjà entendu parler tout au moins des progrès de l’astrologie naturelle. L ’astrologie naturelle admet l’influence des astres, et sur toutes sortes de phénomènes, et beaucoup plus qu’on le croirait. En particulier, Hugues de Saint-Victor fait allusion à l’utilisation de l’astro logie pour la médecine. Il n’y a qu’une phrase, mais c’est tout de même suffisant pour se rendre compte que déjà de son temps les médecins sérieux commençaient à faire de l’astrologie et à observer les astres. Donc c’est un témoignage en faveur de la connais sance assez précoce déjà des textes d’astrologie. Ce que Jean de Salisbury attaque éner giquement, c’est l’astrologie superstitieuse, c’est-à-dire les judicia, la divination, et les jugements, etc. ; naturellement, c’est là qu’il entre en conflit avec des astrologues d’autre part très sérieux astronomes, parce que, comme mon Raymond de Marseille, ils soutien nent avec énergie que l’astrologie fait un tout et que les judicia font partie de l’astrologie. Les objections des théologiens viennent surtout du fait que les traités d’astrologie arabes qui sont traduits comprennent aussi l’astrologie judiciaire. Les amateurs, même des hommes scientifiques du type de Raymond de Marseille, qui sont des savants, des astronomes, qui s’occupent des tables astronomiques, etc., tiennent également à l’astrologie judiciaire. B. s t o c k : Vous avez montré qu’il y a une véritable science de la nature au X lle siècle. Alors la question se pose: avait-on besoin d’Aristote pour cela? T. GREGORY: Je crois que le moyen âge a obtenu à travers la connaissance d’Aristote im système vraiment plus scientifique de la nature. U n tel système n’était pas donné par la tradition platonicienne. La tradition platonicienne a commencé à réveiller des
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intérêts pour le monde physique et a de quelque façon préparé l’entrée d’Aristote; déjà vers la fin du X lle siècle Aristote est introduit par des remaniements un peu platoniciens ; le premier Aristote physique et métaphysique qu’on va connaître de la fin du X lle siècle est un Aristote influencé par la tradition d’Avicenne, etc. Je n’opposerai pas, comme on l’a fait, le platonisme humaniste du X lle siècle à l’aristotélisme physique du XlIIe. Le platonisme du X lle siècle introduit une conception du monde physique qui sera complétée par l’unique système de l’antiquité connu du moyen âge: le système d’Aristote. Ainsi voit-on dans la tradition franciscaine encore des éléments platoni ciens, augustiniens; ainsi la théorie de la lumière, surtout, va se lier d’un côté avec les études d’optiques de la tradition arabe, et de l’autre avec les études aristotéliciennes. R. r a s h e d : Excusez-moi, je voudrais poser une question vraiment naïve: où se trouve le savoir scientifique dans tout cela? T. GREGORY: Il y a une tentative de percevoir, d’expliquer la séquence ordonnée et autonome des causes. En ce qui concerne l’astrologie et la physique, en disant: lescieux exercent une certaine influence, une certaine causalité, et par cette influence et cette causalité il va se former la croûte terrestre, etc. ; c’est encore par les mouvements des cieux que se forment les animaux; nous voyons une tentative d’explication physique du cosmos.
auteurs théologiques. Mais c’est autre chose, ce n’est pas la même chose que l’explica tion allégorique et morale qui, à la suite des pères de l’Eglise, était souvent ajoutée dans
R. r a s h e d : Vous dites “ explication physique”, mais le mot “ physique” , ici, peut comporter plusieurs sens. Il aura un sens déterminé s’il y a vraiment des critères. Est-ce que ces critères existent? Ya-t-il des raisonnements, des démonstrations? T. GREGORY: On ne doit pas poser le problème dans le sens de demander un ensemble de démonstrations comme l’exigerait un homme de science moderne: le concept de physique, d’expérience, de démonstration change au cours des siècles. L ’influence des cieux, au X lle siècle, comme il en était auparavant pour l’astrologie grecque et arabe et au cours de plusieurs siècles suivants, se présente comme une donnée de l’expérience et constitue le fondement de toute une conception du monde physique; cette conception est scientifique dans la mesure où elle veut donner une explication organique de certains phénomènes cohérente avec certains principes qui se placent dans ce que l’on conçoit comme ordre naturel, sans faire recours directement à la causalité divine. A. s a b r a : T o answer the question about criteria: if you ask, not only in the twelfth century, but if you ask Ptolemy: “ How do you, Ptolemy, know that these correspon dences that you talk about in the Tetrabiblos exist, how do you know them to be true?” the answer is “ My knowledge of these things is empirical. It is based on the experience o f people over a long period o f time.” R. r a s h e d : No, excuse me, we cannot say that it is empirical, because Mr. Gregory says also that there are all the symbolic interpretations. M y difficulty now is how to join empirical criteria with symbolic interpretations. Which criteria are there now for knowledge?
que au X lle siècle? T. GREGORY: En ce qui concerne le problème que j ’ai mentionné, ce qui change est le fait que la preuve se compose d’une théorie précise des qualités des éléments et de leurs rapports réciproques; il s’agit d’une ratio ou d’un argument physique qui s’oppose à la preuve d’ordre théologique religieux qui se résolvait à faire recours directement à la volonté de Dieu: la différence est évidente. R. r a s h e d : Donc le seul critère scientifique de la théorie, de la preuve, c’est le bon
G. b e a u j o u a n : L ’interprétation symbolique s’évanouit au moment où apparaît cette nouvelle forme. En d’autres termes, cette vision de la nature liée à l’astrologie est con traire à la conception symbolique. R. r a s h e d : Si l’astrologie intervient, elle intervient avec des symboles ! M.-Th. d’ALVERNY: Si vous pensez à l’astrologie d’Abü M a‘shar avec les images dans le ciel, il est juste en effet de dire qu’il y a une nouvelle sorte de symboles qui s’élabore et qui aura un énorme succès artistique, mais là n’est pas l’aspect fondamental. De plus, au X lle siècle, on a traduit Abü Ma'shar, et à partir du milieu du X lle siècle, on com mence à utiliser Abü M a‘shar pour l’apologétique chrétienne, avec l’horoscope des religions et l’image de la Vierge et de l’enfant dans le ciel. Vous trouvez ça chez des
217
les traités D e natura rerum. R. rash ed : Je comprends très bien qu’il y a un changement dans cette image du cos mos, peut-être un changement dans le mode de la connaissance, par l’intervention des séries de causes, mais ma question reste: si on veut parler d’un savoir quelconque, la première chose à donner, ce sont les critères de ce savoir. Bashy dit que les critères sont purement empiriques; est-ce qu’au X lle siècle ces critères sont purement empiriques? Que veut dire empirique à l’époque? Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres critères? T. GREGORY: Le concept d’empirie change d’un siècle à l’autre. Quand pour le problème des eaux super caelum les théologiens disent: c’est Dieu qui va mettre les eaux au-dessus du firmament, elles sont là parce que Dieu le veut; Guillaume de Conches, Thierry de Chartres disent: non, parce que les eaux sont plus lourdes que l’air et il n’est pas possible qu’il y ait des eaux au-dessus de l’air. En bien, il s’agit ici d’un discours scientifique, en tant que cohérent avec une certaine conception du rapport réciproque entre les éléments et en tant que refusant de faire recours à la volonté divine pour ex pliquer ce que la causalité naturelle ne peut admettre. R, RASHED : Quelle théorie de la preuve a changé pour donner un autre savoir scientifi
sens! T. GREGORY: Ah, mais pour avoir une théorie de la preuve comme vous voulez, il faut
attendre assez longtemps. r . r a s h e d : Non, elle a existé avant, pendant, et après. Si vous parlez d’une théorie scientifique, d’un savoir scientifique, il faudrait nous donner la doctrine de la preuve. Quand deux n’étaient pas d’accord, quels étaient les moyens à leur disposition pour trancher? Étaient-ce les moyens traditionnels? Les mathématiques intervenaient-elles ou pas? C ’est ça que je veux savoir surtout. G. b e a u j o u a n : Vous posez le problème d’une manière qui n’est pas celle du X lle siècle. Il faut distinguer deux choses différentes. Il y a d’abord une certaine philosophie de la nature pour laquelle sont imaginés des modèles plus ou moins satisfaisants. Bien. Ensuite, si vous prenez des cas particuliers comme diverses tables astronomiques, par exemple, alors là vous retombez dans une problématique de la science qui est la vôtre, mais c’est un problème complètement différent de celui posé par M. Gregory. M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: Puis-je maintenant dire quelque chose pour défendre un peu des gens que vous avez repoussés avec beaucoup de mépris, les prédécesseurs de la fin du Xe et du X le siècle, parce que l’intérêt scientifique n’a pas surgi absolument comme par miracle du temps de Guillaume de Conches. Vous avez ces premières traductions ou adaptations d’astronomie et de mathématique, surtout d’astronomie; elles sont plutôt pratiques, ce sont des traités d’astrolabe. Cela commence à la fin du Xe siècle; et Gerbert y a été pour quelque chose, puisque les premiers traités des usages de l’astrolabe, s’ils ne sont pas de lui, ont tout au moins été apportés par lui. D ’autre part, vous avez des traités d’astrologie qui sont non pas traduits directement mais adaptés de l’arabe et sont vraisemblablement de la fin du Xe siècle, tout au moins il y a un manuscrit de la
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fin du Xe, d’autres du Xle. Donc on s’y est intéressé, et il y a plusieurs textes de gens qui littéralement s’arrachent ou se prêtent des astrolabes. Donc là aussi vous avez un intérêt vraiment scientifique et un désir de recherche qui explique un petit peu la suite. Et il y a toute cette quantité de traductions médicales du grec et de l’arabe et l’introduc tion de la philosophie de Galien. Je crois qu’il est vrai de dire que cette nouvelle con ception de la nature se révèle au X lle siècle mais a été préparée par de la recherche scientifique beaucoup plus positive. Ce que l’on peut dire, c’est que c’est chez Guillaume de Conches qu’on voit intervenir ces recherches scientifiques dans des notions philoso phiques. Mais la curiosité scientifique, la recherche des causes, ça existe déjà. G. b e a u j o u a n : Dans les exemples que donne Mlle d’Alverny, la recherche est en réalité une recherche de textes, et pas une véritable recherche. Ces traités d’astrolabe sont finalement des traductions ou des adaptations. Dans le cas de Galien ce sont aussi des textes de Galien qu’on exhume. Dans le cas même de l’astrolabe, c’était un instrument d’une science dont on entrevoyait mal la finalité à ce moment-là. M.-xh. d’ALVERNY: Oui, mais malgré tout ce sont des marques de curiosité et d’intérêt scientifique, c’est ça que je voulais dire. Bien sûr, c’est encore à l’état de première recherche. Ce sont des pionniers, mais ces pionniers existent et leur curiosité existe, et ils ont vraiment cherché quelque chose. T. GREGORY: Je suis tout à fait d’accord. Et en ce qui concerne les médecins, j ’ai noté aussi dans mon rapport que la tradition médicale n’avait jamais disparue au cours du moyen âge et que surtout à la fin du Xle siècle elle s’enrichissait. Pour les autres con sidérations, je suis proche de M. Beaujouan, parce que pour l’espace d’un siècle, de la fin du Xe à la fin du Xle, vous pouvez citer seulement le fameux cas de Gerbert d’Aurillac et des traités sur l’astrolabe. Il y avait une curiosité, mais il n’y avait pas une ten tative de systématisation globale. Par contre, au X lle siècle, nombreux sont ceux qui s’occupent de ces problèmes, une bibliothèque scientifique va se constituer. Et puis il y a une systématisation théorique du problème. La différence à souligner est justement ce qui sépare la curiosité de laquelle vous parlez et une bibliothèque qui va transformer la culture européenne.
EXPERIENCE, PR AXIS, W O R K , A N D P L A N N IN G IN B E R N A R D OF C L A IR V A U X : O BSERVATIO NS ON THE SE R M O N E S IN CAN TIC A *
Inde est quod homines in praesenti a sese exsules per oblivionem, in alia per inanem sollicitudinem migrant saecula, non profutura, immo nec futura. Hence it is that men, alienated from themselves in the present through oblivion, migrate through empty anxiety to other worlds which are not going to be of use to them, indeed, wh'ch are not even going to be. De Consideratione 2.10
in t r o d u c t io n
: MONASTICISM
a n d
‘M O D E R N I Z A T I O N ’
In his controversial classic, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, Max Weber made the following statement on the significance o f western monasticism for the rise o f rationally organized, scientific culture: The significance in world history of the monastic plan of living (Lebensführung) in the West, in contrast with eastern monasticism,... is based on its general type {allgemeinen Typus). Beginning in principle with the Rule of St. Benedict, continuing with the Cluniacs, again with the Cistercians and with decisive finality in the Jesuits, the [plan of living] had been emancipated from unsystematic withdrawal from the world and direc tionless self-torture. It had become a systematically improving method for a rational plan of living with the object of overcoming the status naturae, in order to free man from the power of irrational impulses and his dependency on the world and on nature, to subject him to the supremacy of a purposeful will, to place his actions under constant self-control through the consideration of their ethical consequences; and thus, objec tively, to instruct the monk as a worker in the kingdom o f God, and also subjectively through it to insure the salvation o f his soul.^
In this statement, as in greater detail in Economy and Society,^ Weber suggested three ways in which western monasticism furthered the devel opment o f the legal and organizational structures o f modern society. First it substituted ‘rationality’ for ‘irrationality’ in an attempt to over come the limitations, as then conceived, o f the human condition. Then it gradually evolved a decision-making process which not only produced a ‘rational plan o f living’ , but also began to relate individual human action to wider ethical principles. Finally, it taught the monk, through discipline,
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 219-268. All Rights Reserved.
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B. STOCK
OBSERVATIONS ON BERN AR D OF C L A I R V A U X
obedience and the adoption o f a systematic ‘work ethic’ to postpone
intentio in generalized Thomistic terms.® He assumes that medieval
present consumption in anticipation o f future reward. In Weber’s view,
Christians expended labour not for accumulation and reinvestment, but
monasticism thus played a vital role in institutionalizing what later writers called ‘economic rationality’ .
‘^naturali ratione^ for the preservation o f the individual and the whole” ® o f the community. Sombart’ s treatment o f early medieval intellectual
Weber’s observations on this subject formed part o f a general theory o f
history is no better, and even Troeltsch, who is still cited as an authority,
modernization in traditional societies, one which, with all its defects,
contents himself with repeating Weber’ s insights while supporting them
“ has provided, probably more than any other specific thesis in the social
by documents written at least a century too late.^o Tawney, the most
sciences, a continuous focus o f scientific c o n t r o v e r s y . Y e t little o f the
respected among the first generation o f Weber’s supporters, makes no im
abundant scholarship devoted to the wider issues has concerned itself with authenticating or modifying Weber’s views on monasticism.^ One
portant references to authors before the thirteenth century,^i nor does Weber’s most incisive early critic, H. M . R o b e r t s o n . ^ 2 classical
reason is that the theory o f economic development, o f which Weber’s
economic historians opened a new area o f research but did not retrace its
views on monastic culture formed a part, has since his time largely been preoccupied with societies outside Europe. Still another reason derives
developmental stages in sufficient depth. N or, for their part, have professional medievalists, who, by and large,
from the manner in which the classical economic historians formulated
have written o f the period 1100-1350 in almost complete neglect o f the
the problem. Terms like ‘capitalism’ and ‘Protestant ethic’ created new
problem that Weber so brilliantly brought to the surface. Historians o f
problems in their wake. But a more serious defect arose from the narrow ness o f the time dimension. In most studies the center o f gravity lay in the
science, who perhaps had the most to gain from such an investigation, have been the most persistently internalist in perspective, For the social
Reformation.® The search for the religious values that favoured or
and intellectual changes o f the period confront them with an interesting
inhibited the emergence o f the modern economy focussed on the narrowly
paradox. On the one hand, they see the growth o f authoritarian attitudes
defined period in which capitalism, in an international sense, made its
which so seriously interfered with the emergence o f a free intellectual
first appearance. The early literature falls into two stages, one in which the
community in the Middle Ages ; on the other, the development o f a hitherto
debate revolved around Calvinism and capitalism itself, another in which
unprecedented set o f institutions, without whose establishment, Weber
its main theme was Calvinism and Lutheranism.® This scholarly work did
recognized, modern science and its unique social environment would not
much to clarify the growth o f religious attitudes from the fifteenth to the
have been possible. U p to now they have kept these two aspects o f change
seventeenth century, but it left the earlier period in a curious void. It also
in separate categories. W ork in the field, by and large, has focussed on individual biography and intellectual achievement; it has not isolated the
emphasized the discontinuities in an historical development which Weber had felt in its institutions to be continuous.
economic, social, and cultural variables through which traditional medieval
weakness. There was too much analysis, not enough concrete historical
civilization, hesitantly at first and always with great reluctance, began to adopt as its image o f betterment the values (and prejudices) later asso
research. For example, in Weber and his contemporaries, medieval
ciated with scientific rationality. These changes may be thought o f as the
The early socioeconomic studies o f the question also contained another
attitudes towards work, activism, and planning are inevitably derived from
external history o f medieval science, or, perhaps more accurately, as the
a single source, Aquinas. The great scholastic’s views are thrust onto the prescholastic period, o f which they are the logical consequence, and into a
prehistory o f modernization. In the twelfth century no figure stands closer to the center o f this devel
monastic milieu which was quite different from the later medieval univer
opment than Bernard o f Clairvaux (1090-1153). Unquestionably the most
sity. Unwarranted assumptions are also made about Aquinas’s influence on later scholastic thought. Weber, for instance, asserts that all medieval
influential author o f his age, he was also the protagonist in its most spectacular controversy, and scholarly opinion on the value o f his contri
Catholics held activity in this world to be morally neutral."^ He refers to
bution has been sharply divided. Historians o f philosophy and theology
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OBSERVATIONS ON BER NARD OF C L A I R V A U X
have on the whole judged his achievement to be inimical to the growth o f
for analyzing Bernard’ s way o f thinking which emerge naturally out o f
rational science. He disliked scholasticism; he remained ignorant in large
his thought itself. The first section discusses the notion o f experience, its
part o f the translators ; and he personally opposed three o f the century’s
relation to everyday reality as well as to higher, mystical forms o f knowl
leading intellectuals, Gilbert Porreta, William o f Conches and Abelard.
edge. The second treats the connection between experience, as a normative
The character o f his style and thought would also seem to preclude any
activity, and learning and improvement; the third, the function o f knowl
significant contribution to scientific culture. A monastic theologian, he
edge as it relates to both thought and action. The fourth turns to the more
devoted most o f his attention to the perfection o f the inner man, to the
general theme o f praxis, which, in Bernard’ s terms, is conceived as a
repatriation o f the human soul in God. The organization o f his writings
Pauline distinction between the internal and external man. The fifth
is not logical or didactic; it is literary, affective, and symbolic. He seems
section treats the active and contemplative life as aspects o f overall
at an early age to have acquired a strong dislike for the exercise o f logic
planning. The conclusion makes some suggestions for further research
without a practical function. Even historians o f theology have not known
on the problem o f material success and spiritual progress among the
quite what to make o f Bernard. The early commentators saw him simply
Cistercians.
as a defender o f the faith; the later ones have tried unsuccessfully to
I. TH E V A L U E OF E X P E R I E N C E
assimilate him into the more structured patterns o f thirteenth-century thought. 14 Despite a renewal o f interest by specialists, he remains a figure
The notion o f experience is central to Bernard’ s whole endeavor.^^ In the
known to all, respected by many and read by few. Yet, in the early history
Sermons on the Song o f Songs he returns again and again to the value o f
o f European modernization, practical religious thinkers like Bernard,
experience, and some o f the simple phrases in which he uses the terms
whose influence was on action as well as thought at every stratum o f
experiri, experimentum, or its derivatives provide useful points o f depar
society, played a hitherto unrecognized role. Like their later counterparts, such as Calvin, they were confronted with widespread economic and
ture for his more complex ideas. Sometimes he will employ experience as a commonplace, as in the
social changes, and were forced to decide whether new values should
following examples:
supersede the old. The study o f the interaction o f their ideas with social history o f their times is only beginning. This essay attempts to make a very limited contribution to this new area o f research. It provides no definitive solutions to the problems it it raises. Rather, it tries to re-open the subject, and to propose that the practical religious mind is a useful bridge between economic change and
Tale sane experimentum de Verbo habens... Soundly having such an experience o f the Word... or: His praemissis ad cautelam... mexpertorum....^^ Having prefaced these matters for the aid o f the inexperienced....
cultural values. Its specific topic is Bernard’s Sermons on the Song o f Songs,
Soon however the careful reader begins to discern deeper meanings, as,
which, together with other sermons and De Consideratione, offer good
for instance, when Bernard describes Christ’ s reason for coming to earth,
examples o f his mature thinking between 1135 and 1153. The essay is not
...ut miserias hominum homo factus experimento sciret...,
constructed around the classical themes o f medieval theology. It attempts
...so that, having been made man, he might know the miseries
to outline the way in which Bernard thinks, for he is above all a thinker o f
o f men by experience...,
relations rather than ideas. The most obvious weakness is the lack o f mention o f the economic and social changes taking place in his time, or even, within the essay itself, o f a philological analysis o f his central terms,
or, as in the following examples, in which Bernard describes his herme neutic role as interpreter o f the Biblical text:
along with an account o f their usage in other twelfth-century authors.
Quod tamen dixerim, non quasi expertus, sed quasi experiri
Within these limitations, however, it does attempt to suggest categories
cupiens;!®
OBSERVATIONS ON BERN AR D OF C L A I R V A U X
B. STOCK
224
225
Yet I should state this not as one experienced but as one desiring to experience;
Let them place their trust in what they have not experienced,
Loquor vobis experimentum meum quod expertus sum;^o
fruition o f experience.
I teli you my experience because I am experienced; Volo
VOS
experiri illud quod sanctus propheta consulit...
so that, by the merit o f faith, they may then also attain to the
-I
It is perhaps unwise to separate Bernard’ s notion o f experience from its
I wish you to experience that which the holy prophet counsels... ;
wider contexts, to which we shall turn shortly. However, there are some
Porro in huiusmodi non capit intelligentia nisi quantum experientia attingit. 22
often called a pure mystic, only a part o f experimentum or experientia is
For in such a matter intelligence only grasps to the degree that experience attains;
experience takes its point o f departure from an everyday, hard-headed,
general features which have already made their appearance. In an author given over to metaphysical, non-empirical, or spiritual notions. Rather pragmatic approach to the meaning o f existence, and in particular to man’ s reflection upon la vécue. Unless it were joined to something more
or, again, when he imputes this type o f experience to the relationship between God and man, stating: Tali namque experimento et tali ordine deus salubriter innotescit... ;23 For by such an experience and such an order God becomes known in a saving manner... ;
intellectualized, it could not, in normal usage, be termed an ‘idea’ . It is rather a co-ordinated set o f responses, partly sensorial and partly intel lectual, to that aspect o f the present which either, through reflection, refers to the past, or through faith, to the future. It receives a good deal o f its meaning from the interpenetration o f historical events with lived exper ience. Its relation to the future may be described as a type o f psychological forecasting deeply involved, from man’s point o f view, in the practice o f
or, in a similar vein, when he speaks o f the converted Gentiles, who are
charity, and from G od’ s, in the bestowal o f grace. It thus interrelates man
...illuminati spiritu sapientiae et suo experimento docti...
and his maker through the medium o f la vécue. It involves not only the
.. .illuminated by the spirit o f wisdom and taught by their own experience...;
intellectual faculties, but more often the whole world o f the senses, through which man experiences the flow o f life. Moreover, experience is not only a means by which the past and future can be related to the present ;
or when he speaks o f the prophets o f the Old and New Testaments in a typological relationship to each other:
it also provides a formula for uniting the general and the specific, the object and the subject, the text and its interpreter. Thus, the spiritual
Tenebant nimirum proprio experimento huius sententiae veritatem...
sense o f the text, which Bernard, in the Greek fashion, calls theoria or
Indeed, they were recalling the truth o f this proposition through their own experience....
a means o f wringing harmony from a welter o f discordant patristic
contemplatio, is not an abstract tool, an adjunct o f the scholastic method, opinions. The allegorical meaning o f the text is inseparable from the experience the text is presumably enhancing: as one understands it better,
Bernard even places a high value on experience when he is subordinating it to faith. On one occasion he speaks disparagingly o f "'experimentum fa lla x,'' but on most issues takes the opposite position, which he sum marizes as follows: Credant quod non experiuntur, ut fructum quandoque exper ientiae, fidei merito consequantur.2«
it informs and transforms one’ s existence.
II.
E X P E RI E N CE , L E A R N I N G , A N D I M P R O V E M E N T
A ll o f Bernard’ s works o f practical theology may be described as attempts to structure raw experience according to external models o f conduct and
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B. STOCK
OBSERVATIONS ON B E RNA RD OF C L A I R V A U X
rules for decision-making. The idea was aptly summed up in the title o f
raise itself up to the spiritual and intelligible. Y et it may help men who
226
his little treatise De Praecepto et Dispensatione. In the first o f the Sermons
wish to do so. Bernard thus argues that all irrational spirits are instrumenta
on the Song o f Songs, he states that the Biblical text is not so much a cantica
through which rational man may be aided in his search for spiritual
canticorum as a cantica graduum.^’^ The sermons may be thought o f as a
truth:
series o f steps or unrealized projects in moral reform. A little later in the
Yet in order to attain those ends, [the irrational spirit] is known by reason o f its cor poreal and temporal obedience to help those who are transferring all the benefit (usuni) of temporal things to the enjoyment (fructum ) of eternal ones, ‘using this world’, so to speak, ‘as if not using it.’®^
same sermon he makes clearer the relationship between experience and learning: But there is a canticle which with good reason surpasses all the others which we have mentioned by its own singular dignity and sweetness, as if all the others existed through it: and rightly I should call it the Song of Songs, since this one is the fruit of all the others. Only an anointing (unctio) teaches a canticle of this kind, only experience in creases one’s knowledge. The experienced (experti) may recognize [it], the inexperienced (inexperti) may burn with desire, not so much for knowing (cognoscendi) as for experiencing (experiendi).
This passage makes essentially two statements. First, that initiation into the text is not only an intellectual process; it is also sensorial.2» The term
Bernard’s meaning here, as elsewhere, is inseparable from the rhetorical manner in which it is presented. It is also difficult to understand it in isolation from the Bibhcal text upon which it is an evident gloss. Here he is playing on ususfructus, which he separates into its two component terms in order to further the parallel statement o f 1 Corinthians 7:29-31, in which Paul describes the transitoriness o f all earthly things : Hoc itaque dico, fratres: tempus breve est; reliquum est u t ...
unctio even suggests that one is besmearing oneself with ointment before a
qui utuntur hoc mundo, tanquam non utantur, praeterit enim
religious ceremony. Secondly, one’s knowledge is increased by experience,
figura huius mundi. I teli you, brethren, the time is short. From now on, let those
and this understanding too is not o f a purely intellectual kind; it is rather a product o f experience itself. Through these two paths one arrives at
.. .who deal with the world do so as though they had no dealings
Bernard’s mysticism: immersion into the text is not cognitive but affec tive,
with it. For the form o f this world will pass away.
Sermons 4 and 5 present the first stages o f a doctrine o f spiritual
In Bernard’ s rephrasing o f the Pauline ""utentes hoc mundo tamquam non
progress intimately related to learning through experience. Sermon 4
utentes,'" one has, in a nutshell, the theology o f work which is developed
begins with an allegorization o f the three kisses o f Song o f Songs 1:1 ;
in various directions throughout the sermons. The problem is the funda
they become the three stages o f mystical and experiential progress. There
mental ambivalence o f man before the material universe o f which he is,
are, he says, “ three states, or progressive states {affectus sive profectus) o f
in part, a product, and which he in turn must appropriate to himself if he
souls, made known adequately and manifested only to the experi
is to achieve his spiritual goals. The goals, o f course, are entirely spiritual.
enced....’ ’ ^i In Sermon 5, something o f a parallel, he divides spirits into
Therefore, although we must continually labor, our labor may be
four basic types, brute, human, angelic and divine.^^ O f these, all need
useless for attaining grace, which can only be bestowed from above.
bodies except the last. The human spirit needs a body to ascend to the
W e must use this world, and those below us, the servi et pecora, must work
divine ; the angelic in order to bring about its own motion (since no motion,
for us, even though what we achieve may be without reward. W e must fill
according to Bernard, is possible without a body). Thus the bodily parts o f both brutes and angels perform a certain utility.33
up the time because the time is short. In the next stage o f the argument Bernard makes these ideas clearer.
A t this point the argument becomes more complex, leading to the first
The notion o f ‘using the world while not using it’ is systematically related
affirmation in the Sermons o f a philosophy o f action or o f work. Each o f the two abovementioned spirits, the brute and the angelic, acts in a differ
to the first three levels o f spirits, the irrational, the rational and the angelic. In each case Bernard confirms that a material component is necessary for
ent way. The irrationabilis spiritus, because it is merely corporeal, cannot
achieving the precondition o f spiritual progress, and it is through the
B. STOCK
OBSERVATIO NS ON B ER NAR D OF C L A I R V A U X
desire for renewal, rather than the condition itself, that the brute and
capacity o f the mind. Experience informs action and action in turn
angelic spirits are related to man:
instructs the mind. Thus there is a dialectical movement, discernible in
228
But it is clear that the spirit of man, which holds a place midway between the highest and the lowest, has a body to the extent of the necessity of both [the brute and angelic spirits], with the result that neither can [the irrational] advance without it, nor can [the angelic] give benefit to the other [i.e. the rational, man]... Therefore, since without the assistance of the body, the servile, bestial spirit would not suffice to absolve the debt of its condition, nor the celestial and spiritual to implement the ministry of piety, nor the rational soul to give counsel for the salvation of its neighbour or even for itself, it fol lows that every created spirit, whether that’t may help or whether that it may at once be helped and help, has, to that degree, need of corporeal assurance.®®
229
Bernard’ s style as well as in his thought, between experience and its referent, the subject and the object, man and the world. Bernard, as we shall see, often refers to these two in Pauline terms as aspects o f the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ man. The ideal, for him, is a state in which, through experience, inner and outer, theory and practice become one. Moreover, consistent with his own theory, Bernard nowhere presents these ideas in an abstract or systematic fashion. Like the insights they provide, they arise from his own experience o f the Biblical texts on which he is commenting. ^7
In the second part o f the sermon, Bernard returns to the same idea: without the corporis instrumentum no spiritual component can make man
III. THE F U N C T I O N S OF K N O W L E D G E
learn more or improve himself morally.^^ N o angel, no soul, no man may act without a material agent. In fact, Bernard goes so far as to suggest that even the angels, acting upon each other, need matter. And if the angels
Speaking elsewhere o f this sort o f commentary, Bernard makes a typical
cannot act upon man without the aid o f a body, it follows that man cannot
statement:
raise himself towards the angels except through the same instrument.
Sed nec studium tam esse mihi ut exponam verba quam ut
Thus the material components o f man and his world, in Bernard’ s theology,
imbuam corda.®®
are not merely the debased reminders o f original sin; they are quasi-
But my desire is not so much to comment on words as to
technological instrumenta through the correct application o f which he
imbue hearts.
may again raise himself up. Human labor and human tools are in part the preconditions for salvation. Experience, then, in Bernard’ s mind, is related to man’ s spiritual progress, and man achieves amelioration, in part, through his activity in this world, using it, so to speak, and not using it. The object o f living is to arrive at this betterment, which is a precondition or preparation for grace. In order to realize these ends man must direct his activities towards certain long-range goals ; he must plan his existence so that it realizes the possibilities in his own renewal. Man cannot ever fully recreate the poten tiality which was his in Eden, but he can, through order, discipline and obedience, through the reform o f his physical and spiritual life, imitate a more divine model. This model may be called the psychological ideal o f
One might express this another way: his interest is not so much in the intellectual analysis o f meaning as in strengthening resolve for action. It follows that he has in mind two distinct types o f knowledge with two different functions: knowledge for its own sake, disinterested fact, and knowledge related to conduct, which enables one to pursue ideal goals. In contemporary terms we could say he is distinguishing between thought and action. Bernard derived this distinction principally from Paul, but in his imagination it became somewhat transformed. Paul had spoken at 1 Corinthians 8:1 o f the knowledge that puffs up {scientia inflat), but Bernard is more interested in the relative functional utility o f the two main types o f knowledge. For him, useful knowledge is the knowledge born o f experi ence; it is this which conduces towards the practice o f charity.
Cistercian monasticism. In Bernard’s eyes it is not a static but a dynamic
The distinction between Paul and Bernard perhaps deserves a little
conception, requiring ceaseless activity on the part o f the individual. It also
further amplification. In Sermon 29, Bernard, citing Paul, makes the following statement:
requires that he devote himself to learning primarily through experience. This sort o f education, as much a discipline o f the spirit as o f the mind, implies a special relationship between action, experience, and the affective
And see if Paul himself, who invites you to ‘better gifts’ [1 Cor 12:13], shall not in sinuate charity among the others, whether he says that, with faith and hope [1 Cor
B. STOCK
OBSERVATIONS ON BERNARD OF C L A I R V A U X
13:13] it is the better and supereminent knowledge {scientia) [or whether on the other hand he sends you the gift of grace.]®®
Perhaps I appear to bruise knowledge, and, so to speak, to reprehend the learned and to prohibit the study o f letters. Far from it. I am not ignorant of how much the students of letters have benefitted and still benefit the Church, whether in refuting its enemies or in giving instruction to the untaught. For I have read: ‘Because you have rejected knowledge, I for my part will reject you, lest you perform the ofiice of the priesthood for me’ [Os 4:6]. And I have read: ‘Those who would be learned shall shine forth like the splendor of the firmament, and those who teach many men justice as the stars in perpetual eternities’ [Dan 12:13]. But I also know where I have read, ‘knowledge puffs up’ [1 Cor 8:1], and again, ‘H e who brings knowledge also brings suffering’ [lo 1:10]. Y ou see that, when the one is inflating and the other deflating, there are different know ledges.^^
230
Unlilce Paul, Bernard is not merely contrasting the scientia which puffs up with that which leads to charity. He is attempting to place the contrast within a larger framework which includes experience. This relationship is made clear in Sermon 49, where he states: Indeed, zeal without knowledge (scientia) is insupportable. Therefore, where striving (aemulatio) is most passionate, discretion, (discretio) the regulator (ordinatio) of charity, is most necessary. For zeal without knowledge is always found less efficacious and useful; what is more, it is even pernicious.'*®
231
N or is Bernard taking the position that the contemplative life is superior
Again, the knowledge o f which he speaks in this paragraph is derived from
to the active. He is merely emphasizing a special kind o f activity directed
the mediating influence o f experience. For him, experience, knowledge
towards the fulfilment o f spiritual goals. He makes this clear throughout
and charity are intimately bound to each other. Experience is the mediator
the Sermons', a good example occurs when he allegorizes the lovers’ bed
between theory and practice, while useful knowledge is that which
bestrewn with flowers in the Song o f Songs. The bed, he says, does
conduces towards charity. Thus experience modifies the strictness o f the
not symbolize the passive life. N or does it indicate that it suffices to
original Pauline and Augustinian dualism.
complete an action only once. Rather it represents ceaseless activity:
There are other aspects o f Bernard’ s theory o f knowledge that merit special attention. However, central to the whole concern is a single theme: the nature o f human ignorance. Thinkers from Augustine to Bacon used this topos as a point o f departure for outlining the possibilities o f human
But if, as I related in another sermon, a bed bestrewn with flowers is the con science filled with good works, surely you will see, as the simile requires, that it by no means suffices to labour at what is good once or twice, unless you incessantly add new things to the old... Otherwise the flower of good works falls and withers, and in a short time the luster and strength are drained from it.^®
progress in this world, and Bernard is no different. The clearest statement o f his ideas occurs in Sermon 36. He begins with a time-worn question:
Perhaps only an author o f Bernard’ s power could have wrung from so
is all ignorance worthy o f being condemned? Here is his reply:
traditional a symbol o f passivity as thalamum a new expression for action. The conscience filled with good works is not a contemplative idea; it is an
Indeed it seems to me that it is not, for all ignorance does not damn; rather, an in numerable number of things exist of which one may be ignorant without a diminished possibility of salvation. For example, if you do not know the mechanical arts, either that of the carpenter or the mason..., what impediment would there be to your spiri tual health? Even without all those arts which are called liberal..., how many men have been saved, giving satisfaction in their ways of life and their works? H ow many does the apostle enumerate in the Letter to the Hebrews who are made blessed not in the knowledge (scientia) of letters but in a pure conscience (conscientia) and by a faith un feigned [Hebr 11:1; Tim 1:5]. They all pleased God in their lives: not through the merits o f knowledge but the merits of living.^i
ongoing process requiring ceaseless vigilance. Thus, by implication, although the mechanical arts and liberal studies do not suffice for salva tion, they may play an active role in the pursuit o f charity. The important point o f departure in Sermon 36, then, is not the approval or disapproval o f secular studies. It is the fundamental contrast between scientia and conscientia, between knowledge for its own sake and knowl edge for the collective spiritual goals o f man. In thus distinguishing between knowledge as it may be individually possessed and as it may be collectively
It is important at this point to note what Bernard does not say. He is not
shared, Bernard was o f course building on a distinction fundamental to the
condemning the study o f the mechanical arts or o f literature. He is merely
thought o f Paul, Augustine, and Benedict. But he gave it the characteristic
stating that they are not sufficient in themselves for guaranteeing salvation. Hence, in theory, a man may remain ignorant o f them and still be saved.
stamp it was to bear throughout the thirteenth century in manuals for confessing and the cure o f souls. He therefore took the first positive steps
He makes this point clear later in Sermon 36 :
after the classic age o f monasticism in the direction o f the social regulation
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OBSERVATIONS ON BERN AR D OF C L A I R V A U X
233
o f human behaviour. In his thought these steps are still very largely
The next stage o f the argument consists o f two parts. The first develops
theoretical: they are directed towards a limited monastic community, not
the relationship between the type o f knowledge which is useful and the
the general public. But their importance in the methodological history o f
potential uses to which it may be put. The second, picking up an earlier
the social sciences cannot be underestimated. For Bernard was suggesting
theme, turns to the potentially retrograde effects o f knowledge for its own
that all forms o f detached knowledge, all scientiae, should be used primar
sake. Both parts are found in the following statement:
ily in the service o f individual or collective moral perfection. That is what he means by conscientia: collective knowledge and collective morality. This idea, and its implications, were to give rise in a much changed eco nomic context to some o f the greatest tensions as well as achievements o f the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is o f special interest therefore, to complete the outline o f Sermon 36, and, in particular, to analyze the relation between thought and action. Bernard first suggests that, as man has little time on earth, he must decide on his priorities : And [Paul] said; ‘Moreover, I say through that grace which is given to me to all who may be among you; do not be wise more than it is necessary to be wise, but be wise for seriousness [Rom 12:3]. He does not forbid them to be wise, but to be wise more than is necessary. And what is it ‘to be wise for seriousness?’ To observe most vigilant ly what we know more completely or [to know it] before it may be necessary. For time is short [1 Cor 7:29]. N ow while all knowledge, provided that it is supported by truth, is good in itself, nonetheless you, who hurry on account of the brevity of time ‘with fear and trembling’ [Phil 2:12] to work out your salvation o f it [i.e. of knowledge], take care to know better and beforehand those things which you sense closer to salvation.'*^
[Paul] says: ‘He who thinks he knows anything does not yet know the manner in which he ought to know’ [1 Cor 8:2]. You see that he does not approve of a man who knows many things if he should be ignorant of the manner of knowing (sciendi modum). You see, I repeat, how he establishes the fruit and utility (ususfructus) of knowledge in the manner of knowing. But what does he call the manner of knowing. What indeed, if not that you should know by what order, what zeal, and to what end it is necessary to know each thing. By what order, in order to know earlier what later leads to salvation; by what zeal, in order to know more ardently that which more vehemently leads to love; with what end, in order to know not for empty glory or curiosity or anything similar, but rather for your edification or that of your neighbour. For there are some who wish to know much with this end, that they may know, and this is shameful curiosity. And there are those who wish to know in order that they themselves may be known, and this is shameful vanity... And likewise there are those who wish to know in order to sell their knowledge, for example, for money or for honors, and this is shameful profit (quaestus). But there are those who wish to know in order that they may be edified, and this is charity.^®
In addition to the distinction between types o f knowledge, Bernard introduces a difference between knowledge as a static and completed act, scientia, and knowledge as a process o f education or learning, sciendi modus. He also contrasts the positive role o f conscience in planning for the
Bernard here extends and modifies his notion that there are two different
future with the disinterested market o f ideas. The ultimate purpose o f
sorts o f knowledge. Again, he asserts that all knowledge, provided it is
knowledge is to combat uncertainty and to prepare the way for salvation.
verified, is useful; but for man, who has but a short time on earth to
Preparation, moreover, is not a state; it is a process. It cannot, o f course,
prepare his salvation, some types o f knowledge take precedence over others.
insure salvation, but it can create its necessary condition, which is charity.
These are the types which he associates with the edification o f conscience.
The precondition for salvation thus rests on two collective ideas: con
Important to note is that this type o f knowledge is directed towards the
science and charity. Conscience is the inner, psychological ordering;
future, not the undefined future o f remote possibility, the future o f utopia and apocalypse, but rather the future determinable by man and under
charity, the external. Together the two provide a framework in which the somewhat mystical Pauline notion o f love can be transmitted by ordinary
standable within his lifetime. It is a future related to his potential for
human beings through their institutions and ideas. Bernard tries to bridge
reformed conduct. In other words, through his actions, through his recon
the gap between the individual and collective morality, between the
struction o f his own experience according to an external model, man, to
responsibility o f each Christian for himself and wider obligations o f an
the degree that he understands his situation, makes the moral universe in
all-embracing charity. Charity is a communal, family ideal, but one which
which he lives, and this psychological control helps him to determine
issues from the individual conscience. Knowledge which promotes individ
his fate. Christian conscience is thus made a partial answer to the perennial problem o f uncertainty.
ualism but does not contribute to communal responsibilities is idle curiosity, vanity, or profiteering.
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OBSERVATIONS ON BE RNARD OF C L A I R V A U X
235
The argument o f Sermon 36 has now been followed to the point at
activity for the former. The model acts upon us as we, reflecting on our
which Bernard has fully articulated his doctrine o f useful knowledge. It
selves, attempt to know our souls better; and thus it renews us through its
remains for him to indicate more clearly the relation between thought and
image. By the activity o f our minds we in turn are transformed into the
action. This part o f his teaching, even more than what has preceded, is
same image: as we come to know ourselves better, we also come to know
difficult to reduce to clearcut, factual statements, as it is deliberately
God. What we know o f God, or that aspect o f him which is knowable,
presented in charged, symbolic language. T o take a simple example, in
is only that which is related to man’ s capacity to renew himself through
linking the above argument with the next stage o f the discussion, Bernard
reflective experience. In the interplay between the model held out before
states that thought and action should act like a good digestion. Knowledge
us and its internalization in our makeup, at the nexus o f the reflective
is food, memory the stomach o f the soul. Food that is not digested does
experience which relates subject and object, is found the essence o f
not promote health; similarly, knowledge, stored up in the memory,
Bernard’s dialectic. By this means, man begins to depart from the regio
must be cooked over the fire o f charity - decocta igne caritatis - in order to issue in good works.^s From this, one concludes that thought, separated from action, is not useful.
dissimilitudinis, the country o f unlikeness, Bernard’s symbol o f man’s
One could not conclude however that the interplay between the two is
new contribution to the classical problem o f image/likeness in the Fathers.
alienation from himself.^» Moreover, Bernard has not merely worked out a solution for internalizing a model o f ideal conduct. He has also made a
dialectical. This is the burden o f the last part o f the sermon. The thought
He has restored the question to its primitive integrity, in which it comprises
once again proceeds in two stages. First he establishes that knowledge
the central existential question facing a Christian. Although the matter
must provide a dynamic model for conduct, a ratio for utihty and order:
must be put forward cautiously, has he not also used it as a bridge be
D o you not perceive how truly the apostle sensed that ‘knowledge puffs up’ [1 Cor 8:1]? First I wish then that the soul know itself, since the rationale (ratio) of both utility and and order demands it: of order, to be sure, since our first object is what we ourselves are; but also of utility, since this kind of knowledge does not inflate but humbles, and is a certain preparation for edification.'*’
tween the thought o f the Fathers and the first tentative stages o f social planning?
So far in the discussion o f the uses o f knowledge, emphasis has been placed
But how is the soul to know itself? In Sermon 36, Bernard gives a brief
on its pragmatic function, its psychological utility. Y et there is another
answer, one which must be amplified by his later teaching on reform.
important side to the matter: the mystical. In his notions o f experience,
As long as I look inwardly upon myself, he says, my eyes are held in
charity and grace, Bernard often hovers between pragmatism and mysti
bitterness. This can only be overcome by holding out before myself a
cism. For this reason his mysticism is seldom a state o f pure rapture ; nor
happy vision o f God {laeta visio Dei). The visio acts like an external model
is it a system. Rather it is designed to complement the pragmatic side o f
o f ideal charity, informing the actor’s experience o f introspection as he continually attempts to reform himself :
experience. Like the pragmatic, it plays an important role in reforming
For by such an experience and such an order God becomes known in a saving manner... By this means the understanding of yourself will be a step towards an acquaintance (notitia) with G od; and from this image, which is renewed (renovatur) in you, he will himself be seen. At the same time you yourself, beholding with evident trust the now revealed glory of the lord’s face, will be transformed into the same image, so to speak, from clarity to clarity by the spirit of the lord [2 Cor 3: IS].-*»
This is a remarkable passage, in which experience is related both to self-
man, and it does so in two ways. First it provides a mode for experiencing a foretaste o f grace while on earth. This is a very rare occurrence. It also touches upon the gradual process o f edification by which man improves himself. In this sense Bernard refers to the stages o f illuminatio. The Sermones in Canrfca provide a number o f instances o f the illuminative side o f mystical experience. But the clearest statement o f Bernard’ s meaning occurs in his third sermon for Christmas Eve. Its text is Exodus 16:6-7 :
knowledge, or knowledge o f the subject, and understanding o f God, or
Hodie scietis quia veniet Dominus, et mane videbitis gloriam
knowledge o f the object. The latter acts as a model o f psychological
eius.
236
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Today you shall know that the lord will come and in the morn ing you shall see his glory.
OBSERVATIO NS ON BER NARD OF C L A I R V A U X
237
Quae est autem ista scientia? Profecto scire quia veniet dominus, etsi quando veniet scire non possumus. H oc est illud totum quod postulatur a nobis.^^
The exposition begins in the traditional manner o f discussing the sensus
But what is this knowledge? T o know certainly that the lord
litteralis, then turns to the allegoricus. These words, Bernard says, refer
will come, even though we cannot know when he will come.
to actual events, but they are also intended to signify later ones. M ore
This is all that is demanded o f us.
specifically, they recall a past event in such a way that it has present significance, thus interrelating the literal and the allegorical, history and
This type o f illumination is limited to the few, and it differs in emphasis
experience. The two sets o f events are part o f a pattern o f préfiguration and fulfilment.50
from Augustinian doctrine, even though it uses the same symbols. Unlike
The discussion o f this point then leads him to a second problem. He
some o f the steps towards his lost divinity through the cultivation o f the
refers briefly to the future utopie state, and, finding himself uneasy with
liberal arts, Bernard suggests that man, as a creature alienated from true
his own abstractness, returns to the present predicament o f man, which,
illumination, can be reanimated only through the type o f knowledge that
Augustine, who said that man, though a fallen creature, could reclimb
owing to its brevity and lack o f illumination, is called the custodia in
influences character and behavior. Augustine emphasizes factual learning
nocte.^^ This watch o f the night has httle value compared to the future
in the service o f Christianity; Bernard stresses the unity o f theory and
regeneration o f man. Y et Bernard’ s mind is so heavily oriented around the problem o f human reform in the present that he attempts to find some
practice in the formation o f conduct. Acquiring this sort o f knowledge, then, is a process o f learning, partly
practical use for it. Some sort o f illumination must take place on earth, he
factual, but mostly reflective and mystical. It proceeds in three stages,
argues, otherwise we should emerge into the final court o f judgment in total ignorance:
which Bernard calls poenitudo, correctio and sollicitudo.^^ The first step,
And even in this very time [i.e. the watch o f the night], God exhibits reason for man, he bestows intelligence. For it is necessary that he should illumine man with the light of his knowledge as he leaves this world, lest, in departing extinguished from the home of the flesh and the shadow of death, he should not be able to be relighted in eternity.^z
what pleased one before. The second step is improvement (correctio),
penitence, requires a reversal o f one’s previous tastes: laughter is changed into tears, song into mourning, joy into grief, as one begins to dislike which insures that the vices o f gluttony, pleasure, and pride are controlled. The first step is useless without the second. The purpose is not to pull the personality apart but to restructure it around new goals. But improvement
In the next part o f the sermon, Bernard attacks the problem o f illumina
will not continue to interrelate theory and practice unless the mind exer
tion and knowledge. The necessity o f illuminating man while he is on
cises an incessant influence over the body. Thus sollicitude or care, the
earth, he continues, is the reason why the son o f God showed himself
third step, is necessary “ so that the human mind, in keeping constant
amidst the gloom and darkness o f this world, in this place o f our banish
watch over itself, may begin to walk with its own God and may anxiously
ment, hke a torch, a brilliant flame that pierces the darkness. Those who desire to be illumined may approach and be united with him in such a
scrutinize every part, lest she somehow ofiend the eyes o f so great a majesty.” 5« In psychological terms, the whole process may be summarized
way that there is no longer any space between the two. For it is our sins
as follows. Man must restructure his personality, first by a reversal o f his
that separate us from God, and as soon as these are removed, we come into contact with the true hght o f the universe, “ just as, when we want to
previous, anarchic mores, second by imposing upon himself a new, externalized model for conduct, and thirdly, through praxis, by allowing
light an extinguished taper, we touch it to another that is shining with
consciousness to effect a re-examination o f all decisions governing
flame.”
action. Uniting his own symbolism to the Pauline idea o f renewal,
But what is this illuminated knowledge, which, as the prophet
Hosea says, shines before us like a star:
Bernard says:
B. STOCK
238
OBSERVATIONS ON B ERN ARD OF C L A I R V A U X
239
In poenitudine accenditur, in correctione ardet, in sollicitudine
Cum ergo sic lumbi nostri praecincti fuerint, et lucernae
lucet, ut interius et exterius renovetur.
ardentes, custodiendae sunt vigiliae noctis supra gregem
In penitence [the mind] is kindled, in improvement it is set on
cogitationem et actionum nostrarum.®^
fire, in sollicitude it radiates light, so that [man] is renewed
Since then our loins have been girded and our lamps lighted,
within and without.
the vigils o f the night must be kept over the flock o f our thoughts and actions.
Illumination, then, is related to the knowledge that governs conduct. In the above statement, Bernard also suggests that the restructuring o f human conduct is brought about by a mystical union o f theory and practice. It is this point which he elaborates in the remainder o f the sermon. In the conscience o f a man seeking reform, he states, fear and joy wage a fierce battle. But this battle cannot be won. It is rather an unceasing struggle. A t the center o f his humanist vision is not a cohesive but a conflict model o f human personality: “ Happy the conscience in which the conflict [o f fear and joy] is being carried on incessantly, until that which is mortal is absorbed by life, until the fear in which in part it consists is emptied out and the jo y which is its completion follows.” ^8 Man then, while on earth, is engaged in a constant struggle, which will only be concluded at the end o f time, when the inherited state o f his nature, so to speak, shall wither away. Good and evil are not absolutes, abstractions detached from man, but rather essential aspects o f moral experience. Thus again practice informs theory. The pragmatic nature o f Bernard’s response is conveyed in a metaphor which follows. W e are continually exposed, he says, to three principal evils: the world, the flesh
The important point is that custody must be maintained at once over thought and action. Within this framework, the three prescriptions are then amplified. The first vigil, rectitudo operis, is outlined as in the Rule. The second relates the illuminating knowledge o f an external model to one’s internal conduct: “ The second, purity o f intention, takes as its purpose that the simple eye should make the whole body radiant: that, whatever you may do, you may do it according to God, so that grace may flow back to the place from which it pours
forth.”
The third, the custody o f unity, relates the individual to the collective conscience. The communal ideal comes first. In the concluding words o f the sermon Bernard once again reiterates the central tenet in his whole theory o f knowledge : that man, by reforming his conduct, may restructure his personality, and, by setting up guidelines for decision making and planning, may combat the uncertainty o f his existence: “ In this way, then, on this day, the advent o f the only begotten kindles true knowledge in us, that knowledge, I say, which teaches that the lord will come - which is the enduring and stable foundation o f our conduct.” ®'^
and the devil, all o f which “ attempt to extinguish the light o f conscience.” 5» But man, who consists, in his bodily frame, o f a house built with hands, must work with his hands to protect himself. And with his hands alone he must erect the edifice o f conscience: “ Therefore the soul must be covered {tegenda) with both hands, that o f the heart and the body, lest perchance what has been lighted be extinguished.... And just as we do not easily forget that we are held in our own hands, so we should never forget the interests o f our souls, and their care should chiefly animate our hearts.” ®*^ H ow is man, in practical terms, to do this? Bernard turns to this ques
IV.
praxis
:
the
in te r n a l
an d
external
m an
Attention has so far been concentrated on two questions, experience and knowledge. A n analysis has been made o f the normative and mystical sides o f experience, and o f the cognitive and activist functions o f knowl edge. It is now necessary to turn to the idea by which Bernard links the two, the internal and external nature o f man. Paul had written at 2 Corinthians 4:16:
tion in the last section o f the sermon. He recommends three methods for
... Licet is qui foris est, noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is
improvement: correctness o f work, purity o f intention and care for unity
qui intus est renovatur de die in diem. Although our humanity which is outside is in decay, yet that
{rectitudo operis, puritas intentionis, custodia unitatis). The integration o f thought and action is evident from his opening words:
which is within is renewed from day to day.
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OBSERVATIONS ON BERN AR D OF C L A I R V A U X
The internality and externality o f man, also known as the image/likeness
manner later made famous by Dante, he states: “ W e have transversed the
problem, had sustained much debate among earlier theologians, in
shadows o f allegories {transivimus allegoriarum umbras)', it remains to
particular Origen, Gregory o f Nyssa, and Eriugena. Using it as a point o f
inquire into moral meanings. Faith has been built up in order that life may
departure, monastic theology, for its part, had consistently developed the
be instructed. The intellect has been exercised in order that action may
idea that the purpose o f living was the renewal o f the inner man. Bernard, too, in taking up this well-known subject, assumes that man
result.” ®^ In Sermon 18, he turns to the relation between experience and work, and,
240
should dedicate his life to spiritual ends. However he differs from earlier
in order to relate allegory to activity, he introduces the twin notions o f
thinkers in specifying how man should attain them. His thinking on the
infusion and effusion. Thus the theme o f internality and externality makes
matter is not always consistent, and any attempt to reduce it to a few
an early appearance. In Sermon 20, the philosophy o f planned activity is
systematic propositions is bound to overlook essential details, especially
related to love: one proceeds from amor carnalis to amor rationalis and
o f language and phrasing. Nonetheless there is an overall shape to his
then to amor spiritualis. Again, the steps begin on earth and lead upward.
thinking. Moreover, the subject is one to which, in diflFerent contexts, he
In Sermon 21 the major topic is sloth, and in Sermon 22 the four perfumes
returns again and again. For example, on one occasion, discussing the
o f the bride are allegorized as various attractions to the spiritual life.
paradise o f the saints, he takes up the otherworldly asceticism o f earlier
Thus, when Bernard turns in Sermon 23 to the meaning o f the mystical
monastic writers Uke Peter Damian: “ Surely ... the saints, having spurned
garden, the reader (or listener) has had a long preparation for the idea
the superfluous ornament and worship o f their own exterior self, which
that allegory is both a symbol o f alienation and a stimulus to action. In the
is certainly corrupted, devote and occupy themselves with all diligence
garden Bernard has the perfect traditional image o f each: o f the state
with the cultivation and embellishment o f the inner self, which is in the image o f God and which is renewed from day to day.” ®®
from which man fell and to which, through grace, he will return. It is
On another occasion he reworks the traditional imagery o f Paul’ s
profound statements o f the manner in which man may actively renew his
interpretation o f original sin. Bernard believed, as did the Greeks, that in Eden sin had been added somewhat artificially and impermanently to
inner self. In order to bring his thoughts together, Bernard utilizes as his text for
man’ s essential nature. A t the end o f time, through the administration o f
the sermon not only Song o f Songs 1:3 ( ‘The king has brought me into
grace, it would presumably be removed. Bernard employs the metaphors
his storerooms’), but the texts, in part, o f the sermons which precede.
therefore not surprising that he presents in this sermon one o f his most
o f ‘clothing’ and ‘covering’ from Colossians 3:10 {induentes novum, eum
Thus, to the cellarium he unites the previously mentioned garden and
qui renovatur ... secundum imaginem ejus qui creavit), but also changes the
bedchamber. What results is a trinity o f ideas for which he will find paral
idea slightly to suit his own idea o f alienation :
lels throughout. The first occurs in the discussion o f the allegorical method
Non plane anima nativam se exuit formam sed superinduit peregrinam.®® For clearly the soul did not divest itself o f its form from birth but put on that o f a wanderer on top. Bernard, in short, utilizes traditional expressions in attacking the problem, but goes considerably beyond them in proposing new solutions. His most sustained series o f thoughts on the internal and external man occurs in the sermons which lead up to the twenty-third. Bernard prepares the way as early as Sermon 17, where, discussing allegory in a
itself. In the garden we discover “ the plain and simple history, in the storeroom the moral sense, and in the bedchamber the secret o f the theo retical contemplation.” ®® Let us begin with historia, the garden: ... The garden is history, and in a threefold sense. For it contains in itself the creation o f heaven and earth, the reconciliation and the restoration: the creation, so to speak, as the sowing or planting of the garden and the reconciliation as the growing of what has been sown or planted. For in its own time, when the heavens were producing mois ture and the clouds pouring down rain, the earth opened and budded a saviour. Through him is brought about the reconciliation of heaven and earth... But the future restoration is at the end of time. For there will be a new heaven and a new earth, and the good will be collected in the midst of the evil, as the fruit from the garden, in order to be placed again in the storerooms of God lApoc 21:1].®®
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OBSERVATIONS ON BERN ARD OF C L A I R V A U X
I f this statement is original in its poetry or in stressing the utopie, there
earth. The restoration through grace, which is the long-range goal, is not
is nothing new in points o f doctrine. In fact, it underlines the literal and orthodox. It is, so to speak, the foundation upon which a rather unusual
forgotten, but it recedes somewhat from the center o f the stage as attention
structure is to be erected. Bernard lays the first stages by stating, immedi
Reconciliatio, for all intents and purposes, is described as the product o f
ately afterwards, that he has other equally valid names for these three stages
discipline and obedience, o f active labour in the present. Through these,
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is focussed on day-to-day behavior, on the continuity o f one’s experience.
o f history. They are discipline, nature and grace. Thus the three stages o f
man is directed from a state o f pure discipline, in which the will is perfected,
Biblical history are redefined as three essential aspects o f man’s everyday
to that o f nature, o f complete harmony o f thought and action. By means o f
existence. A n attempt is made to effect a union between the unidirectional
obedience and discipline, moreover, man appropriates, or rather re-
and irreversible movement o f history and the desirable direction o f man’s
appropriates, nature to himself. The nature that was once his is re-acquired
life in the here and now. This union allows him to interrelate allegory and
in slow, painful steps. And by controlling nature, man thus controls the
alienation, to bring together the potential remoteness o f the text and man’s
inner psychological world essential for renewal. In assimilating a nature
active aspirations on earth. One o f the most highly scrutinized o f Biblical
that was once interior, but now, through alienation, is exterior, man too,
ideas is thus imaginatively retransformed into the primitive meaning it had
inevitably, renews both sides o f his character at once. Bernard even implies
for the Greek Fathers: it is an inspiration to active reform.
that man, in regaining control over nature, also, to some degree, subdues
The union o f the abstract and the concrete, as elsewhere, is brought
the hostile world outside himself. It is almost as if the taming o f the
about by referring both to experience. Y et here the idea is deepened.
countryside, in which the Cistercians were involved, acted as an unconsci
What are the moral conditions, he asks, for structuring experience? This is his answer:
ous motivation for his choice o f images for man’s renewal o f himself.
... I should call the first discipline, the second nature, the last grace. In the first... you learn that you are inferior, in the second, equal, in the last, superior... Thus by the first you learn to be a disciple, by the second a comrade, by the third a master. For nature brought forth all men equal. But since, after the good of nature was corrupted by pride of morals, men were made impatient of equality - contending to be raised above each other... [and] provoking each other - first and foremost in the primary storeroom the irregularity of morals must be restrained by discipline. Then the stub born will, worn away by the hard daily laws of our superiors, is humbled and healed, and retrieves through obedience the good of itself in nature which it had lost through pride. During this time it will have learned to keep itself quiet, insofar as it can, by natural affectivity alone, not by the fear of discipline; [and] along with all the other comrades of its own nature, that is, with all men, socially, [it will] pass over to the cell of nature.’ ®
These are ideas which Bernard develops in the rest o f Sermon 23. Continuing the trinitarian symbolism, he turns next to the meaning o f the three cellars. The first two contain spices and unguents. Spices, like discipline, must be pounded out with mortar and pestle ; unguents, like obedient nature, flow freely. Nature herself is a ‘ storehouse’ o f good discipline. The ideal o f nature, moreover, is not a fixed principle like natural law, but rather the normative function towards which man must continually strive.’ ^ The third cellar, which presupposes the other two, is the winecellar. It represents the practice o f charity, through which, as a sort o f mystical inebriation, man obtains a foretaste o f grace in this world.'^^ The core o f the sermon occurs in the next section, in which Bernard pre sents his allegory o f paradise, the state o f perfect s e l f - k n o w l e d g e . jh e
This statement should not be separated from the monastic milieu for
text is the king’s bedchamber from the Song o f Songs. Just as the bride
which it is intended. However, even in its proper context, it reveals a
groom has many unguents, so the king has many bedchambers. As would
psychology o f learning which interrelates nature, experience, and the ex
be expected, Bernard gives examples o f three. Each is presented as a
ternal constraints which can presumably shape both. The most important
modified version o f the rhetorical topos o f the locus amoenus, the standard
element is the stress on man’ s capacity to reshape himself in the present.
technique employed by medieval authors for illustrating various kinds o f
It is thus that the will, mollified by discipline, acquires the type o f
ideal states. Here is the first o f the three:
obedience which it had in Eden. And Bernard makes it clear that in perfect obedience man has very nearly re-acquired this lost state while he is on
There is a place in the home of the bridegroom, from which the governor o f the uni verse himself decides on his laws and distributes his counsels, appointing laws for every
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B. STOCK
sponds in Bernard’ s mind to knowing God; it is the place o f scientia,
creature, their weight, measure and number. This place is high and secret, but not at all peaceful. For although, insofar as he is able, [God] disposes everything sweetly [Sap 8:1], he does nonetheless dispose. N or does he permit a contemplative, who may by chance have reached this place, to remain inactive, but marvelously and delightfully he tires out the investigator and admirer and renders him untranquil.’^
The first locus, then, is the home o f law, o f disciphne. But it is also the residing place o f continual activity. Bernard, it should be recalled, has already suggested that there is a relation between the discipline that in
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cognitio. It is a preparation for the second locus, in which one passes from understanding in a cognitive sense to activity, and, by implication, to a new level o f comprehension which blends theory and practice, thought --1
and action. In Bernard’ s terms one passes from instructio to affectio. Affectio is not a concept; it is a state o f mind. It is the disposition towards the good action. In the second locus, as in the first, there is ceaseless
forms conduct and the model held out before it. Here he makes the relation
activity, but they are o f different kinds. In the first it is the activity o f
ship between the internal and external forces more explicit. The paradise
learning facts; in the second, o f applying them. Overlooking both is the
o f disciphne is not a place where law rules as an absolute; it is rather one
omnipotence o f the ultimate law-giver and decision-maker. Tw o important implications arise from this sermon. The first, already
in which legal and normative action function together. Although God gives his orders in an unequivocal manner, the ideal that is held out to man is a
emphasized, is that, in order for a man, in Bernard’ s terms, to attain
process, a constant interplay o f action, discipline, and further action.
wisdom, he must effectively balance theory and practice. He must pass
Bernard has turned around a traditional m otif and presented an unpeaceful paradise in which the only sin is not activity but its opposite. The second locus amoenus, that o f judgment and fear, is outlined in similar terms. Through it, one proceeds once again from discipline to obedience. One also has a complete picture o f the two sides o f human re form in his mind: that o f activity seeking to conquer lack o f discipline and that o f an external model which is to be internalized by man. The real importance o f the second locus however arises from the discussion which follows it. Here he compares his first two paradises, giving his reasons why the first must lead to the second: D o not yourself be disturbed then that I have given the beginning of wisdom to the second locus rather than the first. For in the one, as in a lecture-hall, we hear Sapientia as a mistress who teaches all things; in the other we are receiving. In the one we are in structed, but in the other we are influenced. Instruction renders us learned, our state of mind, wise. The sun does not light all that it warms. Similarly wisdom, which teaches many what is to be done, does not always quicken them for doing it. It is one thing to know of many riches but another to possess them; and it is not the report which makes a man rich but the possession. By the same reasoning, just as it is one thing to know God, it is another to fear him: and it is not recognition which makes a man wise but fear which affects him. You would not call a man wise whom knowledge puffs up [1 Cor 8:1]... God has a taste for the soul first when he influences it for fearing, not when he instructs it for knowing; and so well [it is written]: ‘The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the lord’ [Ps 110:10]... What then is the first locus! It only prepares for wisdom. There you are prepared so that here you may begin. Preparation is the under standing of things.’ ®
from discipline to obedience, and, in doing so, he arrives at a foretaste o f grace. Grace remains a future state, but it is one for which there is a manifestation on earth. This manifestation is mystical, not only in the sense o f coming from above, but also because it is an active reworking or synthesis o f the two previous states. Thus one passes from discipline to nature, which assimilates discipline into obedience, and from there to grace, which assimilates both. Grace, then, as man experiences it on earth, is both the application o f discipline and the appropriation o f nature. It is praxis, the identity o f subject and object. Bernard refers to this locus, as would be expected, in mystical language. The second implication concerns his conception o f God. God is not defined, as in the School o f Chartres, naturalistically as the creative architect o f the physical universe, but rather psychologically as the arranger o f the ideal plan o f living. This is another way o f stating that God’s relationship to the world and to man is not in terms o f cause and effect but means and ends. Bernard says in a passage quoted above: ‘You fear the justice o f God, you fear his judgment.’ These are moral not causal injunctions, Hebraic or Pauline rather than Greek or naturalistic. Precedents for them may be found in earlier monastic writings, but Bernard takes the tradition further than previous writers, not only in the rigor and asceticism o f his formulations, but in making specific man’ s psycho logical nature. What Bernard does, in fact, is to present a psychological
This passage brings together a number o f themes relating experience,
approach to the relation between God and man. The mediator between
knowledge and action. The first locus, that o f law, o f discipline, corre
the two is experience, through which man, by actively ordering his exist
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o b s e r v a t io n s o n
BER NARD OF C L A I R V A U X
247
ence, appropriates nature to himself and leads himself to the ideal blend
Tw o points are apparent from the beginning. First, the question o f activity
ing o f theory and practice which anticipates grace. Grace is not only a
and inactivity is related to the written word. The mediator between otium
mystical ideal; its futurity is made present in man’s overall capacity for
and negotium is the hermeneutic value o f the text. A written rather than
decision-making. Bernard summarizes his view o f reform in a few words in
oral model is thus proposed for conduct, one which, presumably, can be
Sermon lA, where he relates the idea o f daily renovation to experience:
both standardized and easily communicated. Moreover, the choice is not
, .And from the examination and refutation o f my hidden aflfairs, I have
between the active and contemplative life. It is rather that man, using the
marvelled at the profundity o f God’s wisdom; and, insofar as possible,
word as a model, must somehow make action inform contemplation.
from the perfecting o f my morals, I have experienced the goodness o f his
Thus, once again, he suggests a type o f praxis which interrelates allegory
meekness; and from the reformation and renovation o f the spirit o f my mind, that is, o f the interior man o f me, I have received in one way or another the loveliness o f his beauty.”
and experience. The second major point is that the active life recommended is o f a special kind. It is not the pursuit o f activity for its own sake, which would be meaningless. It is a sort o f planning, a continual redirecting o f the mind. Its order is psychological, not material. In Sermon 46, Bernard
V.
p l a n n in g
;
the
active
a n d
contem plative
life
cites Paul’s well-known statement from 2 Thessalonians 3:10, { ‘Qui non laborare non manducet’), but he relates the idea to Christ’ s exile from heaven and to man’ s spiritual salvation.'^^ Statements therefore about human
A n outline has now been presented o f Bernard’ s notions o f experience,
work and labor in Bernard should not be artificially separated from their
useful knowledge, and reform. It has been clear throughout that such ideas
contexts. Again, in Sermon 47, he idealizes this special type o f activity in a
gain their significance from certain assumptions about the active and
beautiful metaphor, stating that “ the bed bestrewn with flowers is the
contemplative life. The mystical and pragmatic sides o f experience, the
conscience filled with good works.”
cognitive and activist functions o f knowledge and the union o f theory and
complicated than it would first appear. There are two general themes which run through Bernard’ s writings
practice, o f the inner and outer man, all, to some degree, derive their
In sum, the idea o f actus is more
meaning from Bernard’ s conception o f the ideal plan o f living, which inter
on the active and contemplative Hfe. One is the notion o f affective thought,
relates the traditional values o f the active or contemplative life. Monastic-
{affectus), that is, o f thought directed towards action, and its relation to
ism, o f course, had never advocated a purely theoretical existence.
charity. The other is a more theoretical statement o f the relation between
Early writers had for the most part taken up positions midway between the
consideratio and contemplatio. O f the two, the latter is by far the best
two extremes. It is not clear how much Bernard actually took from previous
known. Y et it depends for its meaning almost entirely on the former.
authors on the subject. As elsewhere, he seems to build a few common
The difference between affective and effective charity is the subject o f
places, known to all, into a new and original synthesis.
Sermon 50. The question is whether charity is to be considered as a dis
Bernard is fond o f introducing the theme by contrasting the two
position o f the mind or as completed works. The text is Song o f Songs 2:4,
classical terms otium and negotium. The following statement is typical:
'‘Ordinavit in me caritatem.’’ Bernard summarizes his position as follows:
‘ Sapientiam scribae in otio’ [cf. EccU 38:25]. Ergo sapientiae otia negotia sunt; et quo otiosior sapientia, eo exercitior in genere suo.’ ^ The wise man speaks o f ‘the wisdom o f the scribe in leisure.’ Therefore the leisure o f wisdom is a time o f activity; and the more leisured wisdom, the more occupied with its kind.
Charity exists in activity {actu) and in a state o f mind (affectu)... The former is com manded for merit; the latter is given in reward. And I do not deny that in the present life we can through divine grace make a beginning and even some progress; but clearly, we defend [the position] that happiness is a consummation o f thef^uture. But how could those things be commanded which could not in any way be implemented?... It has not escaped the legislator that the burden of the legislation exceeds the strength of men; but he judged it useful that they be reminded of their insufficiency by this very matter, in order that they might know soundly that they ought to strive towards this end of jus tice in proportion to their pdwers...
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Moreover, if we were indeed convinced that a law pertaining to a state of mind had been given, I should afBrm it. But the statement seems rather to pertain to the active (actuali). This appears in particular when the lord said: ‘Love your enemies’ [Lc 6:27], soon adding, on the subject o f works, ‘D o good to them that hate you.’ Likewise in Scripture: ‘If your enemy is hungry, give him to eat; if he is thirsty, give him to drink’ IRom 12:20]. Here again you have what concerns action {de actu), not a state of mind (de affectu). Listen still again to the lord as he gives the command concerning the love of himself: ‘If you love me’, he says, ‘keep my commandments’ [lo 14:15]. Once again we are directed towards works... For, as regards labor, his instruction would have been useless, if, at the time, his love had been in a state o f mind.®®
The difference between affective and effective charity is o f course more
1
OBSERVATIONS ON BER NARD OF C L A I R V A U X
249
But why have I spoken of him acting externally, as if Gerard was ignorant of internal matters and lacking in spiritual gifts?... His comrades knew how much his habits and desires did not savor o f the flesh but rather grew fervent with the spirit. W ho was more rigid in keeping discipline than he, who stricter in castigating his body, more suspended in contemplation, more subtle in disputation?... He was not acquainted with literature, but he possessed the sense of one who discovers letters: and he had an illuminating spirit. He did not reveal himself to be small in the greatest tasks but rather greatest in the smallest. In the buildings, fields, gardens, water-works, indeed, in all the skills and jobs of the peasants - was there anything, I say, in this kind of activity which would have escaped Gerard’s ability? With ease he was the master of the stone-masons, car penters, gardeners, shoemakers and weavers. And as he was, in the judgment of all, wiser than all, in his own eyes he was not wise.®^
complex than is evident from this quotation. Yet, in general, the distinc tion is aptly summarized in the previously discussed opposition o f thought and action. In Bernard’s mind actus is related to affectus. It is clear, again, that grace is not bestowed on man on earth; but he can while in exile make some progress if he takes as his goal a reworking o f the spirit
The ideal monk, in Bernard’s view, is the wise p e a s a n t , the master o f all the practical arts, and, most o f all, the practical art o f reforming him self. Had the topos o f docta ignorantia ever reached so low in the social order in the previous history o f the classical tradition?
which is not a passive emotional state but an active striving after charity. Affective charity, moreover, moves upward from man toward God; effective, from man to man. And if the one implies the other, it is none theless true that affective charity has a higher value in his mind. In relating man and God, affective charity also holds an important position in Bernard’s overall approach to belief. Above it was pointed out that functional knowledge is in his mind a partial answer to the problem o f uncertainty. Affective charity illustrates how this works. Charity, through action, is ordered and directed towards the future; it becomes a type o f applied decision-making in the service o f higher ideals. Uncertainty cannot ever be fully resolved, for grace is not guaranteed. But man, by using various methods for gaining control over the day-to-day direction o f his life, makes his goals clearer and thereby less uncertain to himself. In his doctrine o f charity, Bernard is stating once again that thought, i.e. effective charity, comes first, but that action, affective charity, must follow. Charity, then, is a sort o f practical or practicable philosophy, and it may be useful, before turning to more complex matters, to give a concrete
The most significant elaboration o f the theme o f the active and contempla tive life does not occur in the sermons on the Song o f Songs, but in the short treatise Bernard wrote for the first Cistercian pope, Eugene III, entitled De Consideratione. Am id a great deal o f practical advice, Bernard summarizes his most important thoughts on the question in the dichotomy between consideratio and contemplatio. For Cicero, as all classical authors, the two terms were virtual synonyms for reflective inquiry.
N o r are they
greatly developed in the patristic period. In Bernard, consideratio in particular, which is a rare word in classical Latin, takes on an entirely new dimension, one which cannot be understood without relation to contem platio. A discussion o f the two terms is also the simplest bridge to Bernard’ s conception o f spiritual and material goals, and through them, if somewhat indirectly, to the real world o f action o f which he was a part. Let us begin once again with simple distinction. Near the beginning o f De Consideratione, Bernard states:
example o f what Bernard has in mind. Fortunately he has provided one
Si quod vivis et sapis totum das actioni, considerationi nihil,
himself. In Sermon 26, deviating from the formal texts o f the Song o f
laudo te? In hoc non laudo.... Certe nec ipsi actioni expedit
Songs, he devotes a few lines to his brother Gerard, who had recently died.
considerationi non praeveniri.®'^ I f you give everything that gives you life and pleasure to
In Bernard’ s eyes, his brother was an ideal-type o f the perfect monk. Here, in part, is what he says :
activity and nothing to consideration, do I praise you ? I do not
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OBSERVATIONS ON BE RNA RD OF C L A I R V A U X
251
bestow praise for this..., N or indeed is it expedient for activity
Paul makes two related statements, both modified by Bernard. First he
itself not to be preceded by consideration.
says that one should practice piety above all; then he adds that piety is
Clearly there are two types o f activity, planned and unplanned, and only the first, which relates to future goals, has any value. A little later in book one, Bernard leads the reader more deeply into the idea o f consideration. He is praising piety as man’s most valuable asset, and he says: D o you ask what piety is? To take time for consideration. Perhaps you will say that in this I differ from him who defined piety as the worship of God. It is not so. If you reflect carefully, I have expressed his sense, although in part, by my words. For what is so per tinent to the worship of G od as what he himself urges in the Psalm [45:11] : ‘Take time iyacaté) and see that I am God’ - which exists especially in the parts of consideration. Moreover, what is as efficacious for all things as the parts o f this very activity. By its beneficent presumption he performs his own acts, prearranging and preordering in a certain manner what is to be done, lest those things which were able to be foreseen and premeditated by sound and clear necessity might rather be precipitated by trial... For consideration purifies the very fountain, that is, mind, from which it arises. Then it governs affections, directs actions, corrects excesses, forms manners, ennobles and orders life, and finally confers the knowledge (scientia) of divine as well as human af fairs. It is [consideration] which confines what is disordered, closes what is opened, ex plores secrets, tracks down truths, examines the resemblances of the truth, and reveals what is counterfeit or dyed. Consideration is what preorders what is to be done and recogitates what has been done, so that nothing remains in the mind either uncorrected or wanting correction.*^
Chapter seven, from which this passage is quoted, is rhetorically con structed around the use and reuse o f a few central terms :pietas, consideratio, actio, the Pauline phrase ^ad omnia valens", and some terms for futurity like praevisa, praemeditata and praesentire. The initial question is simply, ‘what is essential for piety?’ Bernard is recalling the words o f Paul in 1 Timothy 4:7-9:
useful for all things, not only in this life but in the life to come. Bernard, in his discussion o f consideratio, makes reference to both o f these ideas, but changes them somewhat. As in Paul, the emphasis is on the practical achievement o f the good life, but Bernard, in consideratio, refers to only a part (licet ex parte) o f the whole. Paul, moreover, refers to the future in apocalyptic terms. Bernard, after all, is giving advice to a pope on how to plan his daily life. Paul therefore does not discuss the manner in which life may be structured in order, so far as possible, to insure future reward. Grace, in his mind, is a visionary, miraculous, supernatural event. Within Bernard’ s thought, as we have noted, grace is also a gift o f God, but emphasis is placed on the foreordering o f conduct in this world. And from the analysis o f conduct in this world, Bernard infers certain aspects o f the conduct o f God directed downwards towards the world. His point o f departure is ratio. What does “ irrefragable reason” show? That what is most valuable and potent for the future is pietas. The futurity o f Bernard’ s interest is clear from the gerundives proferendam, collendam, and later, agenda. What then is piety? T o have time for consideration {vacare considerationi), to have time for reflection upon experience directed towards the future, in short, to have time for planning. A t Job 28:28 in Bernard’s version o f the Vulgate, piety was defined as cultum Dei. But Bernard, as he states, interprets this in a special sense. The Psalmist says : ‘ Vacate et videte quoniam ego sum deus' [45:11]. In the use o f vacare, Bernard intends ‘to have time for reflection directed towards future goals.’ That, in effect, is what consideration is. For what, he adds, is so powerful as to do all things {qu id ... ad omnia valens [I Tim 4:8]), as the beneficent goodwill through which he performs all that is to be done : for he does this
Ineptas autem et aniles fabulas devita; exerce autem teipsum
by bringing it about ahead and by ordering it ahead {praeagendo et
ad pietatem. Nam corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis
praeordinando). I f God did not do this by clear necessity, what is foreseen
est; pietas autem ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitae quae nunc est et futurae.
and premeditated might fall to chance. This statement must not be interpreted merely as a repetition, in
Avoid moreover improper tales, fit for old women, and train
rhetorical language, o f the classic Christian defence o f free will. It does o f
yourself for piety. For bodily exercise is useful in a limited way ;
course defend that thesis. But it does so within a framework o f everyday
but piety is useful for everything, since it holds promise not
planning. T o the question, how should a pope plan for the future, Bernard
only for the life which now exists but also for that which is to come.
replies, by the imitation o f those divine actions by which God himself pre ordains what is to be done. God here is not a mathematician or an architect ;
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OBSERVATIO NS ON BERN AR D OF C L A I R V A U X
he too is a planner. Bernard may even be guilty o f seeing God in the image
divine. He also unites, through a series o f interlinked metaphors, his
o f man as the perfect planner. He has, in a sense, utilized Scripture for
previous thinking on experience and knowledge:
252
legitimizing consideratio. The first book o f De Consideratione, then, introduces the subject o f planning in significant depth. The other books refine and amplify the notion. Before turning to the other examples o f consideration, it may be useful to introduce the well-known contrast Bernard himself offers between consideratio and contemplatio. The initial distinction is made in book two, where he states; First then, consider what I mean by the term consideratio. For I do not wish it to be understood as contemplation in all cases, since the former is concerned with the certi tude o f things, the latter rather with their investigation {inquisitio). According to this sense, contemplation can be defined as the true and certain intuition o f the mind {intuitus animi) concerning any object whatever, or the apprehension without certainty of a truth, but consideration as the intense deliberation for the investigation of truth, or the exertion of the mind investigating truth. At the same time, it is customary for each to be used for the benefit of the other.®®
Bernard is here contrasting not aspects o f truth but ways o f approaching
Great is he who is content to measure out the experience of the senses, spending it, like the wealth of the citizens [of heaven], for his own and many others’ salvation. N or is he less great who, in philosophizing, establishes this for himself as a step towards those invisible goals... But best of all is he who, having spurned the very experience o f things and of the senses, insofar as it is permitted to human fragility, has formed the habit of flying aloft to those sublime heights from time to time through contemplation: not through ascending steps but through unexpected departures. I think those departures of Paul belong to the last kind... Moreover the three are attained as follows: when consideration, although in the place of its wandering, rises up through the desire of virtue and the assistance of grace, and either represses the appeal of the senses... or keeps it within bounds... or flees... D o you wish to distinguish these species of consideration by their own names? If it please you, let us call the first distributive {dispensativam), the second estimative {aestimativani), the third speculative {speculativam). Definitions will illustrate the meanings o f these terms. Distributive consideration is using the senses and sensible things in an orderly and sociable way for deserving God. Estimative consideration is scrutinizing and pondering those same things prudently and diligently for inquiring into God. Speculative consideration is collecting them in themselves, and, insofar as divine assis tance is available, removing human matters in order to contemplate God. Y ou note clearly, I think, that the last is the fruit of the others, and that the other two, if they are not referred to it, are not what they are said to seem to be...®'^
it. Contemplatio is intuitus. It is a process o f reasoning from cause to effect ; it is thought considered as thought alone, abstracted and detached
Although the matter must be stated most tentatively, has not Bernard here
from the process which has brought it about. Consideratio is intensio. It
presented the paradigm o f a simple social science? The three stages o f
represents the activity o f the mind as it goes about its search for truth.
consideration represent the experience o f the senses or o f sensible things,
Contemplatio represents the completion o f a system o f thinking, whether it
organizing the impressions into a coherent whole, and evolving empirical
results in truth or just in a probability. Consideratio is the method o f
generalizations based upon the data. What distinguishes this primitive
deliberation, the exertion o f man’ s problem-solving capacities. Contem
social or applied science from a pure science is the third stage, which
plation may therefore be placed in the category o f thought divorced from
depends upon the other two. Bernard does not propose that an abstract or
action, consideration in the category o f dialectical reasoning, since, at
inductive model be imposed on experience ; he suggests that a model, if it is
every stage in the latter, thought must be guided by action and vice versa.
to have any validity, must continually be verified by the data o f experience.
Thus, although they are complementary, consideration and contempla
Within the paradigm, other sorts o f relations are also indicated. The
tion represent methods for different sorts o f sciences. Contemplation is
purpose o f consideration, first o f all, is spiritual, not material. The end o f
reserved essentially for pure sciences; consideration for applied ones.
planning is salvation. Secondly, the three stages correspond to the distinc
Like experience, knowledge, and reform, however, consideration has
tions outlined above between discipline, nature, and grace. Thus it re
both a pragmatic and a mystical side. It has an earthly appUcation, in
phrases and presents in a more philosophical manner the pragmatic advice
teaching the pope how to spend his time effectively, and a celestial one,
o f the sermons. Thirdly, the three stages are related, as elsewhere, to the
in aiding the mind to rise above earthly cares. Bernard turns to these
three steps a man takes in his personal, sensorial awareness o f the world.
refinements in book five. In the following quotation he divides considera
A t the end o f the above quotation Bernard states: “ Therefore the first
tion into three types and indicates how it may help man ascend to the
desires, the second smells, and the third tastes.” Lastly, contemplatio.
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which Bernard, later in book five, subdivides into four types, is related to consideratio just as, earlier, thought is to action. Historians have some times wished to detach the notion o f contemplation from the real world and to present it as a pure idea. It is rather a generalization from a series o f empirical steps. Consideration, then, may be described as a type o f problem solving, decision-making, or planning. It provides a simple and unsophisticated model o f how to improve the managerial skills o f the head o f a large complex organization. Elsewhere in De Consideratione, Bernard elaborates
BER NAR D OF C L A I R V A U X
255
marketed better and better. Through a sort of ironic revenge on the part of the economy, these apostles of penury became rich. Doubtless, in the isolation in which they lived, they remained faithful to their ideal. But in the eyes of those who only saw them nego tiating at the fairs, or, by successful overbidding, rounding out their heritage at the expense of their neighbors, in the eyes of those who, during this century, in the very bosom of a growing prosperity, supported all the worse that men of God were not, by way of compensation, really poor, the Cistercians ceased little by little to incarnate spiritual perfection; the same reverence was directed towards others, who went bare foot through the poorer parts of the towns, dressed in sackcloth, and who possessed nothing.®°
What Weber, writing over a half-century ago, called the monastic
other aspects o f consideration, nowhere altering the overall thesis but
Lebensfiihrung, Duby, summarizing historical insights born in the same
presenting new and different sides. As in his sermons, it would be inaccurate
period, refers to as the règle de conduite. Thus, from different perspectives
to suggest that his observations form a consistent body o f theory; but it
and with different aims, the sociologist and the historian are united in a
would be unjust to ignore the self-conscious design in his way o f thinking.
common problem area. For many years, instead o f pursuing Weber’s
On one occasion he suggests that man, as perceiver and decision-maker
genuine discoveries, debate centered on a single issue: whether economic
in his own moral universe achieves praxis by interrelating subject and
events had a psychological determination, or whether, as Marxist critics o f
object. He also makes it clear that consideration is the only type o f knowl
Weber maintained, religious values were merely a superstructure o f
edge that can rescue man from his present state o f alienation and start him
economic and social change. Both views, as extremes are attempts to
on the pathway to salvation. On the same occasion he summarizes his
oversimplify a very complex phenomenon. Bernard’ s notions o f experience,
views on the useless or irrational pursuit o f knowledge in a brilliant state
the functions o f knowledge, reform through praxis, work and planning,
ment relating reminiscence, alienation, and progress : “ Hence it is that men,
are not reducible to economic or social changes. They are rather the prod
alienated from themselves through oblivion, migrate through empty an
uct o f a mind consciously reflecting on cultural values in a period o f
xiety to other worlds which are not going to be o f use to them, indeed,
change, which is quite a different matter. Y et they are clearly preceded by
which are not even going to be.” »8 There is also a whole series o f practical
technological and material improvements which provoke a crisis o f
hints for the pope on issues like appeals to the papal court.»® Far from a
inherited values, and they must not be artificially separated from their
philosophy, consideratio appears throughout with a sense o f immediacy, commonsense, and experiential relevance.
historical context. For idea-complexes as powerful as Bernard’ s philosophy o f action, once articulated and institutionalized, have an internal life o f their own. They create a psycho-sociological ideal for lesser men to
VI.
c o n c l u s io n
:
a c is t e r c ia n
c o n t r a d ic t io n
?
imitate. Few o f Bernard’ s followers were capable o f his flights o f mysticism, but many could attempt to put his ideas into practice as they went about
The paradox o f Cistercian life and thought has recently been summarized as follows by Georges Duby:
their everyday lives. And thus his thoughts, in part, could be translated
Because they had refused to live from rents, because they had decided to draw their sustenance from the ground by their own labor, because they had chosen to instal themselves in solitude in the midst of pasture and forest, these communities found themselves established in spite o f themselves, and, in accordance with the model they had incautiously taken as a rule of conduct (règle de conduite), in the avant-garde of the dominant economic system, in a position to produce in abundance the commodities that they did not consume themselves - wool, meat, iron and wood - which could be
doctrine o f the just war. In his eyes, where the cause was just, armed conflict
into action. In at least two areas Bernard’ s ideas come close to reality. One is his was a legitimate side o f Christian expansion.®^ His letter to the templars uses the same phrases to describe the holy war as do other treatises to outline the stages by which a monk may achieve spiritual perfection.®^ The templar, he states, must observe all the ascetic principles o f other
B. STOCK
OBSERVATIONS ON BERN AR D OF C L A I R V A U X
Cistercians. He must come and go at the order o f his chief, dress himself
the practical advice which he presented more rhetorically in the sermons,
in what is given him, and presume to wear no other clothing. He must live
and made a notable attempt to give a logical structure to his thoughts.
in common with the other knights neither with wives nor other women. In
Typical is the following statement from book two:
256
order to attain evangelical perfection, he must live entirely without per sonal property. Like the monk, he must be o f one heart and one soul with the other members o f his community; his only desire must be to give allegiance with a free will. A t no time must he be otiosus or curiosus\ and on those rare occasions when he is not on the march, lest he should enjoy his bread without first working for it, he should repair his armor or the rents in his clothing, replace worn out equipment, reorganize what has become disordered, and, in general, serve community interests. Only rarely is a guest to be received; and when he is, the rule is "‘‘defertur meliori, non nobiliori.’’’ Each knight should bear the other’s burdens, and each should try to outstrip his comrade in the rigor o f his service and the pursuit o f honor. The insolent word, the useless activity, the immoderate laugh, and even the hushed whisper are to be avoided. Games and dicing are forbidden along with hunting. Mimes, magicians, and tellers o f tales, to gether with risqué songs and the performance o f plays, are to be regarded as truthless forms o f madness. Hair must be cut short. In his choice o f horse, the templar like the cathedral builder, must studiously avoid
257
W e cannot deny that you have been raised up, but the reason is a subject for careful deliberation. Not, I think, for governing. For when the prophet was similarly raised up, he heard: ‘...in order to root up and to pull down, to lay waste and to destroy, to build and to plant’ [Jer 1:10]. What sounds like arrogance in this? Rather, in the metaphor of the peasant’s sweat, a spiritual labor is expressed... Learn by the example of the prophet to be raised up not so much for giving orders as for practicing what the time requires. Learn that your work is with the hoe, not with the scepter, if you would do the work of the prophet. And to be sure he did not ascend in order to reign but in order to root out. D o you not think that you will find some labor to perform in the field of your lord? Indeed, much. Truly the prophets did not cleanse everything. They left something to be done by their sons, the apostles, and those relatives of yours something for you. N or shall you be sufficient for everything. When you are done you will leave something to your successor, he to others, and others to others to the end of time. For this reason the laborers are reproved for idleness at the eleventh hour and sent to work in the vineyard [Matt 20:6-7]. Your predecessors, the apostles, heard that ‘the harvest is indeed great but the laborers few’ [Matt 9:37]. Claim for yourself your paternal inheritance. For, ‘if a son, also an heir’ [Gal 4:7].In order to prove your inheritance, awaken to responsibility; and do not waste your time in inactivity, lest it be said o f you: ‘Why does he stand here the whole day idle’ [Matt
20:6].94 Bernard is here speaking o f spiritualis labor, and he places it in the context
ornament. His horse should be plain, but strong and swift. In battle he
o f an historical inheritance from the prophets and apostles, an inheritance
should not be impetuous, but like his Biblical ancestors, cautious, orderly
descended from the original ruin o f Jerusalem. The first sowing was in
and well organized. Although few in number, he must attack ferociously.
Eden, and the prophets, inheriting the labor undone, there both de
The ideal templar, in short, must possess both the monachi mansuetudo
stroyed and recreated in order to sow anew. Like the Cistercians, in whose
and the militis fortitudo. Above all, he must beware, like the monk, o f
image they are now recreated, they rooted out the forests, cleared, and
yielding to vice, neither in exulting victory nor taking pride in killing.
replanted. They achieved their ends not by focussing on intellectual
But he may, at the same time, possess a pure conscience, since, if victorious,
utopias, but “ by practicing what the time requires.” This is what is meant
he will further Christianity on earth, and if slain, will insure his own salva tion in heaven.
by taking time, in the larger sense, for consideration, for proper decision
A second area o f contact with reality occurred in his previously men
for the apostles, who, along with their predecessors, left something for the
tioned treatise o f counsel to Eugene III, De Consideratione. Here he not
present age. Bernard focusses on the present, not like Augustine, to indicate
making, for planning. The prophets labored well, but they left something
only touched upon the problems o f running a large bureaucracy, but also
a crushing debt from which man can only be released at the end o f time,
raised the moral question o f its involvement in the real world. How was
but rather to indicate that progress, which has both a material and a non-
the pope to use the world without using it? Differing from earlier monastic
material side, is a matter o f perpetual labor. I f one’s eye is fixed on the
theorists and from critics in his own time like Joachim o f Flora, Bernard asserted that the Church’ s essential mission lay in this world; only by
distant future, one’s hand is nonetheless bound to present servitude. What is man bequeathed? Cura et opera. What must he avoid? Otium.
fulfilling it could Christians insure their reward in the next. He expanded
H ow must he do this? Utens illis quasi non utens. The familiar phrases occur
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OBSERVATIONS ON B ER NAR D OF C L A I R V A U X
again and again. In book two o f De Consideratione, a single passage o f
conversion, settlement, the opening o f frontiers and the confrontation o f
rare power and eloquence summarizes the doctrine o f spiritual progress which transforms the world:
enemies. And as the images are violent, the message is direct and unequiv
258
G o out into the field of your lord and consider how much, even today, it runs wild with thistles and thorns from the ancient curse. G o out, I say, into the world. For the world is the field, and it has been entrusted to you. G o out into it, not as lord, but as steward, to look after it and take care of it, whence a reckoning shall be demanded of you. G o out, I repeat, with your feet of intense sollicitude and sollicitous intention. For even those who are commanded to go around the whole world [M k 16:15] do not circuit the globe in their present body but in the providence of the mind. You, as well, raise the very eyes of your consideration and look out over the lands; see whether they are not rather dry for fire than white for harvest [lo 14:35]. H ow many lands, thought to be fruitbearing, on close inspection, turn out to be brambles. Indeed, not even brambles. They are old and lifeless trees, either bearing no fruit at all or the kernels of husks, which pigs eat. H ow long will they occupy the land? If you go forth and see such things, will you not be ashamed that the axe is lying idle? Will you not be ashamed that you accept ed the apostolic sickle with no end in view? Long ago Isaac the patriarch went out into this field, when first Rebecca appeared before him; and, as the Bible says, he went forth meditating [Gen 24:63]. It is neces sary that you go forth, not as he, for meditating, but for exstirpating. Meditation ought by now to have preceded you: it is time to act ‘for our hands’ [cf. Ps 118:126]. If you begin to hesitate now, you will do so later. Before, according to the counsel of the saviour, you ought to have sat down, estimated the work, measured your powers, weighed your wisdom, counted up our merits, computed the costs of virtues. Act there fore: think that ‘the time of pruning’ [Cant 2:12] is come, that the time of meditation has gone before. If you move your heart, your tongue is now to be moved and your hand ^s to be moved. Gird your sword, the sword o f the spirit, which is the word o f God. Glorify your hand and your right arm ‘to wreak vengeance on the nations and chastisement on the peoples, to bind their kings in chains, and their nobles with fetters of iron’ [Ps 149:7-8]... For it is a sin for you to know and not to act...®®
These lines summarize the fundamental ambivalence o f Bernard’ s philos ophy o f action. They achieve their profound effect through a series o f bald antitheses: in the first lines, in the contrast between the field, open for cultivation, and consideratio, man’s reflection on what is to be done; later, in the contrast between the spiritual and the physical voyage, also symbolized in the good and bad harvest, the fruit-bearing and the lifeless trees; lastly, in the two-sided image o f the sword o f the spirit, with its implications o f putting the word o f God into action. Consciously or un consciously Bernard has summed up the tension in Cistercianism between spiritual values and material change. It was a tension, o f course, which he felt deeply and sincerely; but in the minds o f others, it could easily serve as a legitimation o f expansion, o f peaceful and unpeaceful colonization. The images are all sudden, abrupt and somewhat arbitrary, juxtaposing
259
ocal. He urges the pope: “ ejc/ .. .et consideras.Go forth, he says, not as Paul, into the realm o f the spirit, but into the world: “ ex/, inquam, in mundum.” He ironically places side by side expressions o f spiritual barrenness and physical cultivation, the otiosa securis, the idle axe and the apostolica falcis, the apostolic sickle. In such statements Bernard cannot be considered only a mystic and theologian; he is a philosopher o f action, even a social planner, who sees man laboring in this world so that he may, in part, ^"ruinas Jerusalem restaurarent.” ^^ The Pontifical Institute o f Mediaeval Studies, Toronto and Centre fo r Medieval Studies. University o f Toronto
NOTES * This essay forms part of a study of religious values and economic changes in the medieval West which has been undertaken with the support of a Senior Killam Re search Fellowship of the Canada Council. The translations from foreign languages, including Latin, are the author’s own. 1 D ie protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, in Johannes Winckelmann, ed.. M a x Weber. D ie protestantische Ethik I. Eine Aufsatzsammlung, 3rd ed., Hamburg, 1973, pp. 134-35. 2 See in particular Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grmdriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 5th ed., ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen, 1972, pp. 695-97 {=E con om y and Society. An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, N ew York, 1968, vol. 3, pp. 1168-70). Weber’s other statements on monasticism are conveniently listed in the index to the English translation. 3 S. N . Eisenstadt, ed.. The Protestant Ethic and Modernization. A Comparative View, New York, 1968, p. 3. ^ But see Lynn White, Jr., ‘What Accelerated Technological Progress in the Western Middle Ages?’ in A, C. Crombie, ed.. Scientific Change... Symposium on the History o f Science, University o f O xford 9-15 July 1961, London, 1963, pp. 286-90, and ‘Cultural Climates and Technological Advance in the Middle Ages’, Viator 2 (1971). 186-93. ® In addition to the volume by Eisenstadt, historical material relating to Weber’s thesis will be found in the bibliography of Benjamin Nelson, The Idea o f Usury. From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood, 2nd ed., Chicago, 1969, pp. 161- T i l , and in David Little, Religion. Order, and Law. A Study in Pre-Revolutionary England, N ew York, 1969, pp. 226-37. * Eisenstadt, The Protestant Ethic..., pp. 4-8. ’ Protestantische Ethik, ed, Winckelmann, p. 67; “ ...sie ist die unentbehrliche Naturgrundlage des Glaubenslebens, sittlich an sich indiflFerent wie Essen und Trinken.” 8 Ibid., p. 132. » Ibid., p. 169.
B. STOCK
OBSERVATIO NS ON BER NARD OF C L A I R V A U X
The Social Teaching o f the Christian Churches, New York, 1930, vol. 1, pp. 241-43. On Troeltsch’s relation to Weber, see Carlo Antoni, From History to Sociology, trans. H. White, Detroit, 1959, pp. 62-70. The study of Max Weber in this volume, although overlooked by the sociologists, is one of the most useful that has appeared; on the Protestant ethic, see pp. 147-61. There is a single reference to St. Bernard; Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism, Lon don, 1936, p. 29. Aspects o f the Rise o f Economic Individualism. A Criticism o f M a x Weber and his School, Cambridge, 1933, pp. 6, 21, 117. Historical work on the sociology of science is summarized by Eisenstadt, p. 40, n. 25. This is the chief imperfection of Gilson’s attempt to expose the ‘systematics’ of Bernard’s thought; La théologie mystique de saint Bernard, Paris, 1934. cf. J. Monroux, L ’expérience chrétienne, Dijon, 1952. Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, éd., J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot and H. M. Rochais {S. Bernardi Opera, 1-2), Rome, 1957-58; Sermon 74.2.7. References to Bernard’s works are all from this edition and are cited by number. 17 17.2.4. 18 56.1.1 19 69.1.1 20 51.2.3
49 cf. E. Gilson, ‘Regio Dissimilitudinis de Platon à Saint Bernard de Clairvaux’, Mediaeval Studies 9 (1947), 108-30. 50 In Vigilia Nativitatis Sermo 3.2 {Opera, vol. 4). 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 3.3 54 Ibid. 55 3.4 6« Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 3.5 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 3.6 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 In Cantica 25.A.1 66 82.2.2 67 17.4.8 68 23.2.3 69 23.2.4 70 23.3.6 71 23.3.7 72 23.3.8 73 23.4.9 74 23.4.11 75 23.5.14 76 74.2.6 77 85.3.8 78 46.2.5 79 47.1.2 80 50.1.2-3 81 26.5.7 82 Ibid., rusticus', cf. In Adventu Sermo 6. 83 Acad., 2.41.127 84 De Consideratione 1.5.6 (Opera, vol. 3.)
260
21
11.1.2
22 22.1.2 23 36.4.6 24 44.1.1 25 48.1.1 26 84.1.7 27 1.5.10 28 1 .6.11 29 cf. 22.2.4; ''sentiri... et experiri."" 30 cf. 3.1.1 31 4.1.1 32 5.1.1
5.1.3 34 5.1.3 35 5.1.5-6 3« 5.2.8 37 cf. C. Bodard, ‘La Bible, expression d’une expérience religieuse chez S. Bernard’, Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciencis 9 (1953), 24-45. 38 16.1.1 39 29.2.3 40 49.2.5 41 36.1.1 42 36.1.2 43 47.1.2 44 36.1.2 45 36.2.3-3.3 46 36.3.4 47 36.4.5 48 36.4.6 33
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85 1 .8.8
86 2.2.5 87 5.2.3^ 88 2.10.19 89 3.4.14; 4.6.17 90 Des sociétés médiévales. Leçon inaugurale, Collège de France..., Paris, 1971, pp. 16-17. This view has recently been given an empirical foundation. See Richard Roehl, ‘Plan and Reality in a Medieval Monastic Economy; the Cistercians’, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 9 (1972), 83-113. 91 Liber ad M ilites Templi de Laude Novae M ilitiae 1.2.16 (Opera, vol. 3). 92 This and the following details are drawn from the same book, 4.7. 93 1.2
262
B. STOCK
D e Consideratione 2.6.9 85 2.6.12 In Adventu 1.5
D IS C U S S IO N B. s t o c k ; M y paper, which is incomplete and provisional, is primarily intended to be a point of departure for discussing some larger issues. They are both specific issues in medieval cultural development, and, I would argue, raise more general questions in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of science. To date, it seems to me, with rare exceptions, the history of medieval science has explained change in one of two ways: by simply cataloguing scientific discoveries or in ventions, or by utilizing the philological method, that is, by relating ideas to other ideas. I do not wish to belittle work of this kind, merely to make two observations on it. First, it is slowly growing out of touch with other currents o f intellectual history, which, while not necessarily abandoning philological methods - 1 would stress that - are grad ually augmenting them with more flexible tools of analysis. The new tools are offering more plausible explanations of change because they take account of mutations in material culture, that is, of economic and social transformations. Perhaps I may state this another way by saying that there is nothing wrong with the old teclmiques within their own frame of reference. The trouble is that the frame of reference is too small. In the history of science what is being explained by and large is change among a small group of literate people. Nothing is being said about the effects of change on larger groups. More specifically, in the period between the late eleventh and mid-fourteenth century, when a scientific rationality re-emerged in the West, we are not asking why large masses of people so fundamentally altered their views of reality. How could one go about doing this? There is at least one method that cannot any longer be followed; a crude sociology of knowledge. The discussion of Rashed’s paper brought up a very important point, that one cannot reduce an abstract science to econo mic or social forces. The vulgar Marxist view, which sees in all idea-systems only the superstructures of economic and social factors, is not much use to the historian. But the retreat into a world of pure ideas, a frequent response, is perhaps just as bad. What became clear to me was that if I wanted to explain just some of these widespread changes, I had to abandon ideas of a theoretical nature, which have an internal development of their own. I had to deal with notions that were closer to the real fabric of life. In other words, after this roundabout route, I came to a conclusion which should have been obvious to me from the beginning; in order to write a concrete social history of ideas, one has to deal with ideas that have a concrete social history. If we look at the period from the eleventh to the fourteenth century in terms of this problem orientation, I would argue that two questions have to be faced from the begin ning. The first concerns techniques of communication. What were the techniques which aff'ected the spread o f literacy and what is the relation between written culture and economic development? This is a fundamental problem in two respects. Unless facts are communicated, influence is impossible to determine. And the written, as opposed to the oral culture, anthropologists now know, imposes upon its members a certain kind o f representation or externalization. In other words, when people adopt the norms of the written culture, they also adopt to some degree its processes of conceptualization, and, in an economic sense, its rules for decision-making.
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The second question is very different; Is there a relation between religious values and economic or social change, and, if so, what is it? Why religion? For an obvious reason. In the Middle Ages, as in many countries right down to the Industrial Revolu tion, what one may call the ideal plan o f living was almost always expressed in religious terms. In the light of recent anthropological field work, one may, I think, make this statement without appearing too reverently Weberian. In any traditional society there are a number of ways of facing uncertainty - by magic, witchcraft, folk medicine, mir acles, or popular eschatology. By all these routes we are led back to religion. Moreover, by religion I do not mean theology, the systematization of its concepts, but rather the ideas that influenced religious movements, movements that have no meaning outside the economic and social context in which they arise. N ow it seems to me that a study of this kind has some distinct advantages over a crude sociology of knowledge. First, its theoretical structure is fairly loose. It is what Merton would call a middle-range theory, and it can easily be adapted to historical situations. Secondly, there is plenty of evidence that there is some inter-relation. Thirdly, one does not need to go beyond the evidence and impose a pattern on events. The actors speak for themselves. Let me summarize. There was a time when the only history was that of lords and lawmakers. Nowadays there is also a history of the people who shaped events from below. Similarly, intellectual history used to be concerned with big ideas alone, and now it has started looking at little ones. It is perhaps time that the history of science did the same. By its very nature the field will always have a large number of purely theoretical issues. But there is also a social history of medieval science. T. GREGORY; M. Stock vient de souligner la méthodologie générale de son rapport. Je crois que l’exigence qu’il a posée est très juste; il faut poursuivre des recherches qui tentent d’établir des rapports entre certains mouvements d’idées et certains facteurs sociaux et économiques. Pour ma part, je me permettrai de soulever quelques doutes, de discuter de la possibilité d’établir des rapports directs entre certains textes de Ber nard et certains des événements de l’économie de son temps et aussi de la réforme qu’il va développer au X lle siècle. M. Stock souligne, par exemple, la formule bernardienne utentes hoc mundo tanquam non utentes, et il établit un rapport entre cette formule et les textes de Bernard sur le thème de instrumentum corporis, nécessaire au développement spirituel de l’homme. Nous sommes ici en face de problèmes très importants. Mais je voudrais souligner que le thème de corporis instrumentum est lié à un discours plus large sur la nécessité du corps pour tous les esprits créés, et donc est utilisé par Bernard pour mieux souligner la difl’érence radicale entre les esprits créés et Dieu. Dans le texte de Bernard, la corporéité est la limite de la créature. La formule utentes tanquam non utentes est alors tou jours liée à une perspective spirituelle ultra-mondaine. Parler d’une théologie du tra vail à propos de ces textes n’est peut-être pas très clarifiant, d’autant plus que l’expres sion même “ théologie du travail” est en elle-même équivoque et recouvre des signi fications très différentes entre elles. On peut parler de théologie du travail à propos du récit biblique selon lequel Adam est condamné à travailler dans les champs conune à l’occasion de la justification théologique des prêtres-ouvriers. Il est, je crois, diflBcilede trouver chez Bernard de Clairvaux sur ce problème, une position originale et nouvelle dans son siècle si nous voulons éviter de moderniser sa position. Il faudrait encore éclaircir dans quelle mesure et où dans les écrits de S. Bernard on peut retrouver quelque référence à la réforme cistercienne touchant le travail dans les champs, la bonification des terres et l’exploitation des terres en friche. Je me demande, M . Stock, si chez Ber nard le travail des moines, des conversi, dans les terres en friche a jamais été loué aussi
B. STOCK
OBSERVATIONS ON B ERN ARD OF C L A I R V A U X
fortement que la congrégation des templiers. J’ai l’impression que S. Bernard s’intéresse plus aux templiers qu’à la réforme et à la bonification des terres. D ’autre part, il conviendrait de mettre en rapport la position de Bernard de Clairvaux avec les autres ambiants de la vie monastique. Je pense à la célébration de la dignitas hominis etiam secundum corpus de Godefroid de Saint-Victor ou à la louange des arts mécaniques chez Hugues de Saint-Victor. En réalité, je crois qu’il est difficile de trouver chez Bernard une évaluation positive des réalités terrestres au delà de la tradi tionnelle contemplation religieuse du cosmos. Enfin il est utile d’examiner de près un lieu des Sermones in cantica, souligné juste ment par mon ami Stock, en ce qui concerne la période entre nous et la fin du monde. Stock dit en passant que les problèmes éschatologiques restent en deuxième plan et que par contre apparaît au premier plan le problème de la réforme de l’homme dans sa vie terrestre. Il a raison. Mais je me demande si on peut amplifier ces considérations et dire qu’à l’intérieur de la spiritualité cistercienne de Bernard la tension éschatologique va diminuer en même temps que va augmenter l’attention pour la réforme de l’homme au jourd’hui sur la terre. On peut se demander dans quelle mesure la chute de la tension éschatologique dans la spiritualité monastique du X lle siècle comporte une évaluation des réalités terrestres, et dans quelle mesure les ordres monastiques favorisent la chute de cette tension au profit d’un engagement au travail dans ce monde, et encore dans quelle mesure cette chute au X lle siècle dans les ordres monastiques peut être mise en rapport avec la reprise polémique au X lIIe siècle de la tension éschatologique, a l’in térieur de rOrdre de S. François. On ne peut pas ignorer les rapports entre les problèmes de l’éschatologie et la modification profonde des conditions politiques, économiques, écclésiastiques. Dans les textes que M . Stock utilise la perspective, l’optique éschatolo gique de Bernard semble en réalité extrêmement mince et laisse seulement à l’homme la tache de suppléer aux ruines de la Jérusalem céleste. On profiterait à mettre en rap port la tension éschatologique, la réforme individuelle et la réforme de la communauté des croyants. Ce sont là des problèmes qu’on doit se poser en lisant les pages de Stock. Il souligne la dimension sociale dans certaines thématiques de Bernard. Mais le doute demeure devant son affirmation que nous avons ici un modèle des sciences sociales. Il faudrait approfondir et voir de près ce problème. Je crois que cette thématique n’intéresse pas Bernard de Clairvaux, qui est surtout lié à des perspectives mystiques. Sans doute on ne doit pas toujours donner une signification purement mystique, allégorique aux textes de Bernard. Mais, il faut reconnaître qu’il est très difficile d’éloigner Bernard de son côté monastique et mystique. M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: Comme M . Gregory, je pense que vous avez diminué exagérément le côté tout de même obvious du sens spirituel et mystique des Sermons sur le Cantique. Ce que je vous reprocherais un peu ce sont vos traductions; elles sont, dirions-nous en français, “ orientéer Traduire, par exemple, affectus par state o f mind, me paraît faible, mon cher ami. V affectus, en language mystique, c’est autre chose. Quant à Vexcessus mentis, c’est l’extase dans tous les traités du X lle siècle, et même avant et après. Dire simplement departures n’est pas assez. Vous avez parlé de notre bon Bernard sans rap peler qu’il y a aussi Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, qu’il y a aussi le vocabulaire de Hugues de Saint-Victor, exactement son contemporain; c’est le vocabulaire du langage des spiritualités, du langage des mystiques. B. STOCK ; Oui, mais celui qui étudie S. Bernard se trouve en face d’une véritable masse d’historiens qui, selon moi, ont beaucoup exagérés ses tendances mystiques. Le mot ‘mysticisme’ est un peu comme ‘démocratie’. On en fait ce qu’on veut, subjectivement.
selon la situation. Mais il me semble qu’il faut distinguer entre les mystiques qui se sont vraiment retirés et un mystique comme Bernard, qui a exercé une influence énorme dans le monde. j. CADDEN : To tum to a somewhat broader question, I had some difficulties with your general method or approach. In particular, because I am conservative, I find that you have gone too far from what you call a purely philological approach. But on the other hand, because I am sympathetic with your goals, I find that you stayed too close to a purely philological approach. Too close, in the sense that, if what you are trying to establish is some relationship between certain kinds of ideas and certain kinds of social behaviors and organizations and changes, you really must go beyond a text like the Sermons which deals basically in ideas. All that you can establish by using these texts are relationships between ideas about behavior and other kinds of ideas. On the other hand, I find that you are too far from the philological approach in the sense that, in trying to bring some of these ideas to bear on social notions, you have used words like ‘activity’, ‘society’, etc. Now, a lot of these words clearly do belong to Bernard himself, but words like ‘life’, ‘activity’, ‘society’ need to be clarified, I think, by a traditional philological approach. A lot of the contentions that you make are ambiguous without such an approach. For example, it is not clear that when Bernard is talking about re form and about life that he is talking about anything beyond a purely psychological reform. If you are going to try to make the transition to a larger, social context, you really need to know how Bernard is using words like ‘activity’, and how the transition can be made to activity in the real world. B. s t o c k ; Yes, that is a valuable criticism. With a thinker like Bernard, whose in terest is primarily psychological, who directs his views toward a monastic community, there is a tremendous distance between the texts themselves and the real world which surrounds them. In such instances I am not sure that the rapport is ever a direct one. But the challenge to the historian today is to attempt to look at the material and intel lectual sides of culture at once, and not to separate them artificially. One of the problems with the social historians is that they won’t look at ideas except to reduce them; and the problem with the intellectual historians is that, even when they want to make con nections, they are not trained to deal with the other side. I do see this as a real problem. G. c o n s t a b l e : Let me make a more specific conmient. You refer to Cistercian spiri tuality and Cistercian monasticism as something distinct and separate from the other monastic movements of the twelfth century. But I think that the emphasis that you place on work even occurs, for instance, in Cluny, which is so frequently contrasted with the Cistercians. I agree with your major point, but I think that some of your formu lation may grow out of your concentration on Bernard at this point in your work. You might put a slightly different interpretation upon where the novelty is and wheie the distinctive locus is. On the role o f technology among the Cistercians, there may be some question, but on the question of economic organization, I think that the originali ty and the advance of the Cistercians is very strongly questionable. H, o b e r m a n : Rather central to your paper is the question of the role of experience. N ow relative to this there is the more specific point of whether you are right - and here I appeal to your own knowledge of Bernard of Clairvaux - in translating experientia and experimentum as synonyms. I am interested in this because in the later Middle Ages, in texts from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a distinction is operative. Experien tia is direct experience and experimentum is usually interpreted experience, rationally organized experience. N ow it seems to me that this is of some interest because, when you emphasize experientia as a step in the direction of experimentum, at that point It
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starts to become pertinent to the history of science. And let me add to this another related point: You allude to the famous statement o f the expertus novit about which there is a whole tradition. Theologians can use this notion to put laymen in their place, and a mystic can also speak about his world of experience in these terms and claim that no one else will be able to understand him as spiritual master and guide unless he is willing to be taken along this road. This expertus novit tradition becomes, then, very interesting when in the later Middle Ages we see that the nominalists use it as a defense of their insistence upon cognitio intuitiva. They use the same words for a completely different purpose. One has to know the individual thing in order to talk about it. Again, this seems to me to be a point in the history of this expertus rwvit tradition at which it becomes truly interesting in terms of the history of science. N ow I wonder whether you would claim that you find all of this already in Bernard. I was inclined to agree with the criticism of Mr. Gregory. With Bernard there is more of the ultra-mundane direc tion; there is not yet this insistence on experientia as we find it in the later Middle Ages related to its fruition in experimentum. B. s t o c k : I have done some work on experiential experimentum, and as far as I can see the distinction you are making does not exist in St. Bernard. I am interested in what you say about the nominalists and cognitio, but Bernard, it seems to me, limits the range of experience to two sides. I have emphasized the pragmatic, but I tried to make clear that there is also the mystical side which everybody else has emphasized. Moreover in Bernard the two are not clearly distinguished ; one cannot understand the one apart from the other. In that sense you are partially right in seeing much that is ultra-mundane in Bernard. But Gregory also suggested that Bernard’s reduction of the eschatological might be related to the changing conditions of monastic life. That is worth pursuing. Although Bernard often speaks of paradise and the last day, he is really concentrating on the present and the not too distant future. T. GREGORY: Par les mots experientia, experimentum et tous les mots qui sont liés au terme experientia, Bernard décrit un moment central de la vie religieuse, un contact direct et global avec la totalité de la réalité qui alimente la vie religieuse. Bien! Mais si l’usage constant de Bernard est très important, il serait bien de mettre en rapport l’usage de ces mots et les langages de la spiritualité chrétienne contemporaine. Une analyse historique du langage de Bernard peut faciliter la compréhension de la terminologie autour à 'experientia utilisée par Bernard. Je crois qu’il n’apporte pas de nouveau à cette terminologie. En réalité, il est très difficile, je crois, à travers l’analyse du language d’isoler les thèmes tout à faits personnels de Bernard de Clairvaux. B. s t o c k : A u contraire, il est facilement démonstrable que Bernard est un innovateur dans le langage et les symboles de la spiritualité chrétienne. Mais ça n’est pas mon problème. G. s c h m it t : Both philosophers and theologians used the terms ‘experience’ and ‘ex periment’ during the Middle Ages and, it seems to me, that the contexts in which they were used furnish an important locus where we can investigate the interrelations be tween philosophy and theology. Yet I find that I am in disagreement with what Profes sor Oberman has said about the later Middle Ages. I had occasion some years ago to try to sort out some terms in Galileo. In investigating the background of the distinction between experientia and experimentum, I found in looking at the scientific literature (and I now realize that my approach was too narrow, for I looked merely in logical and scientific contexts and I should have looked in theological and mystical ones as well) that in the thirteenth century, for example, there was an order from one of the Domi nican superiors which says that the monks are not to have books on necromancy, on
OBSERVATIO NS ON B E R N AR D OF C L A I R V A U X
267
superstition, or libri experimentorum, a term which seems to indicate books of occultism. This sort of use of experimentum also occurs in Arnald of Villanova and Petrus His panus among others. That is, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries experimentum had strongly occult overtones while experientia didn’t, at least in the contexts which I have looked at. And if you look at the sixteenth century, you see that experientia (which seems to be a better classical term) gradually replaced experimentum. Moreover, if you look at the translations and commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, for example, dur ing this whole period you find a continual shift from one term to the other. Some translate empeiria as experimentum, some as experientia. You see a shifting back and forth and, as far as I can see, no terminological consistency. H. o b e r m a n : Yes, this use of the word experimentum in exactly that context of some thing forbidden or occult goes back to St. Augustine and his interpretation of the devil tempting Jesus to jump from the pinnacle of the temple. That is then picked up as a theme throughout the Middle Ages. This interpretation of St. Augustine is quoted, when it is said that it is an experimentum to try to jump from the temple to see what happens. You are right, it is diabolical, but it is also to see what happens. That is the other aspect of it. B. s t o c k : What I would like to know is whether there is a clean break anywhere in the tradition in the use of the word experimentum, in (say) the fourteenth, fifteenth, or sixteenth centuries. A. s a b r a : The difficulty with your question is what you would consider to count as an appearance of a real concept of experiment. Is it making experiments? Is it the occur rence of the word ‘experiment’, somebody using the word consistently to mean the same sort of thing? Or are you referring to the formulation of a theory of experiment as a methodological tool? These things are sometimes merged into one another. Take Galen. There you have the word peira which in some cases definitely means trial. He describes, for example, what he calls a geometrical proof of something to do with visual illusion and then says: “ As for those who have no head for geometry, they can make the following peira." He then describes what we would readily call an experiment. But does that mean that Galen has presented us with a concept of experiment in the sense of trial? Well, yes and no. For he also has the word empeiria which means something quite different, and the two words are used interchangeably. So because of this con fusion, because you don’t have one and the same word always attached to one and the same situation, perhaps one should conclude that we don’t have aproper concept of experiment in the sense of trial. One can make trials for all sorts of purposes, in order to prove something, in order to refute something, and so on. Which of these are you going to include? All? Ptolemy, however, has the same concept of peira in the context of astronomy where one doesn’t make experiments in the sense of manipulating things, but where one does make tests. That is to say, you test observations that were made a long time ago by waiting until you can make an observation that you can compare with these earlier observations. Here the concept of comparison and peira are joined together. If you go on, then, to the optics of Alhazen, there you have the concept of experiment as trial and also as something implying manipulation. But now the whole situation is related or joined to a word that is not the word used by the Arabs to translate empeiria, nor the word used to translate peira in Galen, but a completely different word, the dictionary meaning of which would be something like “ comparison.” N ow I think this came about as a result of translating the particular text I mentioned of Ptolemy. There, in the Optics o f Alhazen, you have terms corresponding to experimentum, to experimentator, and to
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experiri. And in the Latin translation these correspond exactly to three forms of one and the same Arabic root: ‘BR, from which i^tibâr is formed. It should be noted further that i^tibâr is a common word, used for many things. Indeed, I should stress the fact that it is used in different contexts to mean different things. For in the particular con text I have in mind it is always used in the sense o f testing with the purpose of proving something. N ow this is, of course, taken over into the Latin translation. And it is in a way surprising that the Latin translator, working without a dictionary, would translate Vtibar by experimentum, but this is what he did. Obviously, it was the context that sug gested the correct translation. j. g a g n e ; Chez Bacon il y a une expression toujours liée à “ expérience” : la confirma tio (ou la certificatio). L ’expérience, apparaît comme une confirmatio, comme dans l’expression experientia patet. Il s’agit d’une vérification; non pas d’une manipulation, et elle est très différente de Vempeiria grecque. A. s a b r a : That is what I am saying: It is not empeiria, it is a different concept.
P A R T III
THE FOURTEENTH. FIFTEEN TH , AND SIXTEEN TH C E N T U R IE S IN THE LATIN WEST
JOHN E. MURDOCH
FR O M SOCIAL IN T O IN T E L L E C T U A L FACTO RS: A N ASPECT OF THE U N IT A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF L A T E M E D IE V A L L E A R N IN G *
INTRODUCTIO N
The history o f medieval science has for some time now been o f age; it is not merely a recognizable, but a recognized area o f study. This is, to be sure, all to the good, especially in the eyes o f its practitioners. What is more, with this increased recognition has come a corresponding specialization. This too is all to the good, for what better means are there for the dis covery, investigation, and understanding o f the primary sources o f medieval science than an active cadre o f historians whose training and interests are focused primarily on the Middle Ages? Yet this necessary and welcome specialization has at the same time often been the bearer o f less fortunate separatist tendencies. As all histo rians o f science, those whose special burden has been the Middle Ages have been, and are, a relatively discriminable lot. Still, although this has undeniable virtues, I think one can now plausibly claim that this dis crimination, this separatism, has gone too far. That is to say, there are any number o f other, “ non-scientific,” aspects o f medieval intellectual history whose appreciation and comprehension are so crucial to the historian o f medieval science that, for the good o f the discipline, traditional distinctions o f profession ought to be relaxed in order to facilitate their effective incorporation into scientific history. It is not that other pastures are greener; on the contrary, there is but one large plot to be tilled. The mistake has been, I think, to tend only certain parts o f the plot, to neglect what had been regarded (erroneously I would argue) as weeds in contrast to the more “ recognizably scientific” flora. As a remedy, all segments o f the plot should be cultivated, for each one can and will yield proper food for thought. Thus, I have on an earlier occasion urged that a good part o f the history o f medieval science should not only heed the history o f medieval philos ophy, but, properly understood, should be part o f the history o f medieval philosophy.^ I should now like to carry this counsel one step further and
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.). The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 271-348. All Rights Reserved. ~
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argue that historians o f medieval science should also enlist the assistance
within the university milieu and pursue them to a point o f detail most often
o f the historian o f medieval theology. Indeed, given the likelihood that
o f only peripheral interest to the university historian proper. T o be sure the
those aspects o f medieval theology o f greatest interest to the former will
university in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was the locus in which
not turn out to be a primary concern to the latter, historians o f science should even do some history o f theology o f their own. 2
found to straddle the areas o f the arts, theology, medicine, and law, the
such developments occurred and insofar as any o f these developments are
Some o f this has been, and is being, done. Attention has not only been
university must have been a contributing factor in their occurrence.
paid to philosophical sources but to theological ones as well, but often
Nevertheless, at best, this ascribes to the university only the role o f a
without sufficient appreciation o f the possible significance o f the kind o f
partial cause o f the unity or unification in question. Further, to gauge
source in question. ^ O f historians o f medieval science, surely the late
effectively the significance o f this or that unifying factor within medieval
Anneliese Maier was acutely aware o f the benefits to be derived from
learning, one had best look to effects rather than causes. Besides, it seems
broader contexts within the intellectual history o f the Middle Ages, and
unlikely that we should be able to establish much in detail about causal
even Pierre Duhem was no stranger to medieval philosophical and theo
factors unless we first know with some intimacy the results they may be
logical texts (although he admittedly drew hasty and erroneous conclusions from many o f them^). Yet, even so, the bringing together o f the histories
held to explain. What follows then is intended as a preliminary and limited essay on the
o f medieval science, philosophy, and theology needs further urging; it
level o f effects, not causes. It is preliminary insofar as the best one can do
cannot help but enrich at least the first o f these disciplines, and probably the other two as well.
in the present state o f the historical sources is to outline the basic struc
What is more, the unification I am urging has a very good basis in
the future. It is limited insofar as it addresses itself to but a single aspect
medieval fact. The most obvious elementis, o f course, the unity impressed
o f the unitary character o f medieval learning and is further restricted to the
upon medieval learning by the medieval university. As the predominant
fourteenth century.
ture o f things and to suggest possible fruitful avenues o f investigation for
social factor effecting intellectual development and change in the Middle Ages, the university surely fostered a cohesive structure for learning.
L THE N A T U R E OF THE
UNIFICATION
OF
MEDIEVAL
LEARNING
N ot the least o f the reasons why it did so was its tradition o f having all those who progressed to the advanced studies o f theology, law, and
A . A Spectrum o f Unities
medicine initially nurtured within the faculty o f arts. One could not help
There is no question but that one can discriminate a variety o f “ unities,” or
but derive at least some unity from this common artes origin. In fact, to
better a variety o f ways to view unity, within medieval intellectual endeavor.
judge from the condemnations that are found from the 1270’s onwards,
T o specify just which will be my primary concern is therefore in order.
perhaps more unity than the theological faculties had bargained for.
T o do so, let me indulge in the convenience o f restating some o f the
I f this is coupled with the relatively common curricula advocated and
conclusions I was led to in an earlier investigation.® In straightforward
followed in each o f the medieval faculties, the university seems the natural
terms, one o f the theses I then suggested was that the most significant seg
starting point for any inquiry into the unitary character o f medieval learning.
ments o f medieval science were, especially in the fourteenth century,
But it is only the starting point. Setting the institutional history o f
but a part o f late medieval philosophy.® The unity I then had, and still have, in mind is a rather strong one. It is not merely that there was a good deal
medieval universities aside, even that part o f their intellectual history
o f philosophy in most science; it is that most science was philosophy,
involving common sources, common teaching methods, and the often incredible continuity they gave rise to, is not enough. One must track
For it seems to me that the most accurate and most adequate way o f de
down specific “ unifying” issues, ideas, and techniques that developed
scribing the activity o f the likes o f Richard Swineshead and Nicole Oresme
natural philosophy to be specific, and that scientists were philosophers.
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is that they were doing philosophy; they were, to put it in other terms,
What is more, in spite o f the frequent conservatism o f theological
far more at one with other (to all historians, admittedly) philosophical
faculties and o f many theologians, one factor within late medieval
activity in the later Middle Ages than they are with the activity o f a
theology appears to have made it quite receptive to arts material: the
Ptolemy or a Newton. Considerably more mathematics may have been
ever present Commentaries on the Sentences. There is a touch o f irony
utilized in their enterprises than in those o f other medieval philosophers, but they were, in their way, philosophizing none the less."^
perhaps in what one might view as the relatively static requirement for
In contrast to this strong unity, indeed identity, I would now like to take
Commentaries thereon were, over time, among the most dynamic o f medi
the additional step o f suggesting a weaker unity : that o f philosophy and
eval works. Apart from the increasing amount o f philosophical material
theology in the fourteenth century.® In fact, although the claims I shall
that was, especially as one moves on into the fourteenth century, imported
every bachelor to lecture on Lombard’s Sentences. For the resulting
make in what follows about the unitary character o f late medieval learning
into the Sentences, there was a concomitant flexibility in just which
will, a fortiori, apply to the stronger unity o f “ science” and natural philos
distinctiones o f Lombard need treatment. Even the number o f questiones
ophy that I have just mentioned, they are primarily meant to cover this weaker unity.
varies, dropping sharply from the hundreds to a mere ten to twenty, Few Aristotle commentaries ever saw such latitude o f treatment.
And
But let me explain what I mean by calling it “ weaker.” Simply put, the
the different issues that were to find a home for examination in a single
qualification derives from the fact that the unity in question is not one
distinctio also testified the relative ease o f introducing external matters
based on an inability to discriminate disciplines or areas o f intellectual
into this sine qua non for any aspiring theologian.
endeavor (as is the case with most “ science” and natural philosophy).
opportunity to note even more with respect to the Sentences as a kind o f
W e can and do differentiate philosophy and theology, and the medievals themselves did the same.
what has already been said it is clear that this work would be more likely
On the other hand, there surely is a unity to late medieval philosophy
than most others to reflect changes and developments in intellectual
and theology, weaker though it may be. T o begin with, some o f the very best - indeed, the best - philosophy was done by theologians and in their
interests and attitudes. ^ In any event, I shall be treating the Sentences as the primary bearer o f
theological works (Scotus, Ockham, and Robert Holcot, for example).
the weaker, secondary unity o f philosophy and theology o f which I have
That speaks for at least some kind o f unity. One should not, it suggests,
spoken. The justness o f considering it as such a bearer, and the accuracy
W e shall have ample
“ wild card” in the fourteenth century theological game, but merely from
distinguish between philosophers and theologians even though we can draw
o f my claim o f this unity, will become more evident, I trust, as I move on
lines between philosophy and theology. Secondly, given the structure o f
to more specific details.
the medieval university, there was a built-in interchange between the two areas, especially in the fourteenth century. Thus, to say nothing o f
B. External Evidence o f the Secondary Unity
content, the methodological input from the arts into theology scarcely
The few fourteenth century features o f the Sentence Commentary that have
needs mention. On the other hand, in return, one can discern the flow,
just been mentioned are in themselves presumptive evidence o f the kind o f
not o f methods, but especially o f problems from theology into philosophy
unity I am u r g i n g . S o are also the more institutional factors o f Arts
(that o f extra-mundane void space, o f the relative perfection o f species,
dominance within the medieval university and the common core o f material and methods used in teaching. But there is other external testimony as well.
and o f future contingents, for example).® O f course, movement from philosophy to theology was stronger and the nest o f common methods and
Codicological evidence, for example. Any number o f instances o f
conceptions that allowed one to pass with relative ease from faculty to faculty for the most part had an artes origin, but it seems to have been far from a one-way street.
manuscripts that have duly collected philosophical and theological treatises side by side can easily be found. Yet, o f greater interest and significance is the evidence presented by the occasional “ student notebook”
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that we are fortunate enough to possess. Thus, it has recently been
counsel to avoid, even to make a point o f avoiding, the logical and the
established that three bulging theological notebooks and what has long
mathematical, and to follow only speculative and moral philosophy,
been regarded as the most important notebook o f fourteenth century
the metaphysical and the theological.^» Standing alone, such documents
science all belonged to the same student, presumably one Jean de Falisca.i^
intrigue one’s historical imagination. When combined with what one can
Valuable materials for the intellectual biography o f a single fourteenth
learn from the actual examination o f late medieval Sentence Commentaries
century figure are thus at hand. It will take completion o f the extremely
o f the extent to which logic, mathematics, and philosophy (o f the wrong
difiScult task o f carefully analyzing all four o f these manuscripts to estab
sort, presumably) had infiltrated theology, the substance o f the fears that
lish just what the yield o f these materials will be, but even a preliminary
they expressed becomes more real. It is to such an examination that we
examination reveals traces o f the logical and natural philosophical
must turn now.
conceptions and methods in the “ scientific” notebook in the theological ones. And other notebooks appear to hold promising evidence o f a similar sort.
C. Philosophical-Theological Unity ‘Materialiter’: The Importation o f
Philosophical Content
Another external indication o f the unitary character o f philosophy
It has already been pointed out that much o f the very best philosophizing
and theology that I have in mind is the fact that genuine parts o f four
in the fourteenth century was done by theologians, most often within
teenth century theological works have successfully masqueraded as
Sentence Commentaries, less frequently in Quodlibetal Questions. T o
straightforward tracts in natural philosophy. Thus, Gerard o f Odo’s
appreciate just how and why this was so one need not push very far into
examination o f the problem o f the composition o f continua was detached
any number o f Sentences. Indeed, it is immediately clear from the slightest
from the Sentence Commentary to which it belongs and circulated sepa
reading o f the various Prologues to Book I. For there one finds the locus
rately. So totally without specific theological relevance (it was shorn o f
classicus o f the investigation o f the nature o f scientia, o f its objects, its
its introduction), it appears exactly as i f it could be the initial questio o f
certitude, o f the notions o f evidentia, and o f the relation o f all o f these to
Book V I o f a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.^^ Even more interesting
relevant similar material within the Aristotelian tradition,
Although the
is the opening questio o f the Commentaria sententiarum o f Roger Rosetus :
ultimate purpose o f these investigations is naturally that o f determining
its first article enjoyed an extensive separate career as a Tractatus de
the status o f theology as scientia, there is little doubt that the fundamental
maximo et minimo. Originally theology, then circulating widely as natural
issue at stake is a philosophical one and is accordingly treated as such.
philosophy, we also know that, coming full circle as it were, in its new
What is more, what was done in this, and in other similar, theological
guise it interested some whose primary preoccupation was the theology
contexts in the fourteenth century is so recognizably philosophical that
from whence it had come; for a copy o f it was owned by no one less than Peter o f Candia.^'^
historians have been able without exaggeration to claim that its “ character and direction” were at one with modern philosophy. 22 That is to say, not
A final genre o f external evidence for the secondary unity o f philosophy
only was the problem treated properly philosophical (though the way it
and theology is that o f the complaints we witness about it. A t minimum,
was put may frequently have had a theological tinge), but the conceptions
condemnations from Etienne Tempier forward bewail the excessive
and methods utilized in examining and resolving it were also philosophical
incursion o f artes thinking into theology {studentes in artibus proprie facultatis limites e x c e d e n te s ).In the following century, essentially the
in the modern analytical, non-speculative, sense o f the term. I f one returns for a moment to the dynamic character o f the Sentence
same approach becomes more pointed and more specific: the University
Commentary that we have noted, one reason why such straightforward
o f Paris statutes o f 1366 officially rule quod legentes Sententias non tractent quaestiones vel materias logicas vel philosophicas nisi quantum textus
philosophizing was so often possible and, what is more, effective becomes evident. The text o f Peter Lombard upon which the young bachelor was
Sententiarum requiret.^^ And an echo o f this is found in the unofficial
asked to comment presented a quite different state o f affairs than, for
J. M URD OCH
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M EDIE VAL L E A R N I N G
example, some work o f Aristotle. In commenting or writing questiones
the rising and setting o f the signs, the astronomy o f eclipses and so on).^4
on the latter, the medieval scholar was furnished with a battery o f
And such phenomena can be found almost ad infinitum.^^
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conceptions and doctrines by the work itself and he not only treated
This is not to say that these more unexpected imported matters had no
these conceptions in setting down his commentary but operated with them
relevance to the theology contexts in which they occurred; they did, even
as well. N ot so with Lombard’s Sentences; frequently (and the more so
if in instances only marginally so. But it is to suggest that the quantum
in the fourteenth century) the conceptions with which a commentator
textus Sententiarum requiret o f the 1366 Paris Statutes was more than
operated were quite external to anything Lombard said in the text. Often
occasionally at low ebb and that this kind o f injection o f philosophical
they were his own. Surely, this not only allowed, but positively encouraged,
content into the Sentences may well have been one o f the things the author
the importation o f new material, material that was, as often as not, philosophical or artes derived.
ities had in mind in promulgating this regulation. That other sorts o f abuses may also have troubled them will become apparent shortly.
The major concern o f this paper will be the importation o f such material
However, a word is in order about the importation o f logic in particular
on the methodological level. T o that I shall turn in the next section.
into the Sentences before we leave the consideration o f the secondary
For the present I wish to underline that, in a great number o f contexts,
unity o f philosophy and theology taken materialiter. Passing over the
a similar importing occurred materialiter, that is, on the level o f content.
everywhere evident fact that logic is used throughout late medieval
In most instances, what was imported was directly or indirectly relevant
Sentences,^^ some attention should be paid to a slightly different pheno
to the theological question into which it was inserted. One has to do with
menon, namely an explicit awareness and discussion o f this use. Perhaps
a unity, one might say, such that the same question was at once theological
the most striking example is a set o f regule given by Egidius de Campis in
and philosophical. So for example the aforesaid question o f utrum
his Lectura super primum Sententiarum.^'^ Put briefly, his concern was to
theologia sit scientia. And the case is similar when the Baccalarius
set forth succinctly a series o f rules covering the theological terms com
Sententiarus faced the issues o f God’s omniscience and future contingents
monly used in the discussion o f the Trinity and relating them, albeit some
or o f God’s omnipotence relative to the infinite.^3 In these, and numerous
what crudely, to the logical doctrine o f suppositio. That he saw fit to make
other, instances we expect to discover philosophical deliberation.
a special point o f this in his Sentences and, especially, that someone shortly
In other cases, one does not have such an expectation, at least not until one develops a tolerable familiarity with later medieval Sentence Commen
thereafter thought it important enough to extract these regule alone from
taries. The introduction o f philosophical content appears somewhat
felt to have in theological matters. Moreover, Egidius’ s concern was not
forced; one has the suspicion that the theological point at hand is being
an unusual, let alone a unique, one. He belongs, I would suggest, in a
used not as a genuine reason, but merely as an excuse, to discuss such
tradition that, before him, includes Adam Wodeham’ s discussion o f the
and such a philosophical - even natural philosophical or “ scientific” -
relevance o f the art o f solving paralogisms intra materiam Trinitatis^^ and,
problem. Thus we find an elementary discussion o f light and the multi
after him, contains such relatively unstudied figures as Herman Lurtz
plication o f species or o f the rainbow inserted into the context o f the
de Nuremberg 29 and Petrus de Pulka.^o
his Commentary is surely evidence o f the integral importance logic was
creation, an examination o f the problem o f the motion o f gravia et levia
Indeed, this kind o f worrying over the relevance o f logic to the Trinity
in a similar context, an elaborate consideration o f terms o f first and second
was a tradition in the proper sense o f the term. But one comes upon other
intention in the context o f the Trinity, an extended investigation o f astrol
attempts to introduce logic into the Sentences in non-traditional, unique
ogy relative to the problem o f whether creation occurs de necessitate,
ways. Pierre Ceffons is a model o f how it might be done. He is also
and even a major question
unusually informative, since he possessed the rather rare habit o f speaking
creatione celi dealing with whether one can
prove that there are nine spheres (for discussion o f the ninth sphere, can,
quite directly about his motives for doing what he did and about the
and does, lead to the consideration o f the precession o f the equinoxes.
milieu in which he worked. He candidly tells us that friends had asked him
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to speak de logicalibus inasmuch as he was presumably reputed to be
considered by historians as the very foundation o f “ Ockhamism” : (I) Deus
knowledgeable in such matters. The result consists in two rather lengthy
potest facere omne quod fie ri non includit contradictionem', (II) Pluralitas
prefatory questiones in Book II o f his Commentaria sententiarum: the
nunquam ponenda est sine necessitate ponendi.^'^ Both function throughout
first gives what is in effect a complete tract de scire et dubitare, a very current
fourteenth century philosophical literature (that which is genuinely
and fashionable logical topic, while the second does the same de insolubi
Ockhamist and also much o f that which is non-Ockhamist in other
libus.^^ In the course o f his exposition he pauses to castigate those who
significant ways) as analytical principles. The first is, o f course, a direct
despise logic (invariably those who are ignoramuses concerning it) and to praise its value for the faith.^^
expression o f the potentia D ei absoluta. I realize that, on the one hand, one can and should probe further into its precise function and scope
Although taken as a whole, there are indications that CeflFons was
(especially with respect to theological matters) and, on the other hand,
unusually anxious to have, or to make, opportunities to display his knowledge,®^ the fact that he saw fit, and was even asked, to locate this
that within philosophy and theology some o f its most important applica
display in his Sentences is but one other bit o f evidence o f the weaker
dispensability o f secondary causes and in assuring or denying putative
unity o f philosophy and theology that I am suggesting as a frequent feature
distinctions among entities.^s However, within most o f natural philosophy,
o f the fourteenth century. As evidence, it is unusual only in that it is more explicit than most.
and within theology where the application o f the new languages that I
tions as an analytical principle consist in its utilization in grounding the
shall shortly describe is concerned, its function is, in my view, at once broader and simpler. Its role is there thoroughly logical and it merely
D. Philosophical-Theological Unity ‘Formaliter’: Languages o f Analysis in the Fourteenth Century
functions as a way o f pushing the analysis o f any given problem beyond
In my earlier essay in which, I have mentioned, I sought to establish the
natural philosophy into the broader fabric o f all that is logically permis
“ strong unity’ ’ o f natural philosophy and science, I attempted to character
sible. T o put it another way, it is an absolutely valid warrant to argue
ize what I believed to be one o f the most important aspects o f the change
secundum imaginationem. But more with respect to that later.
the limits o f the physical possibilities licit, for example, within Aristotelian
that occurred in natural philosophy between the thirteenth and fourteenth
The predominant function o f the second analytical principle above,
centuries in terms o f the development and application o f new conceptual
Ockham’ s so called “ razor,” is reductionist. As such, when the application
languages and tools.34 “ Languages,” as I then put it, “ with which to treat
o f the new languages is at stake its role is secondary. It serves most
the traditional problems o f natural philosophy on the one hand, and with which to invent and solve new problems on the o t h e r . ” 35 Now, in addition
frequently as a guarantor o f the universe o f particulars to which the
to being instructive and fruitful in interpreting the evident thirteenth-
governing how they are applied. Again with the new languages in mind, it seems appropriate to add a
fourteenth century shift in natural philosophy, I also believe that these
languages are applied in the first place and plays but a minor part in
among the primary bearers o f the unity o f science and natural philosophy
third analytical principle to the foregoing two: non est maior ratio quare ...A quam Perhaps more a manner o f arguing than a principle, it is
new languages (their development and use as well as their existence) are as I see it. I should now like to maintain that these very same languages
nevertheless o f considerable significance because it does enter into the
and tools played a similar role in the fourteenth century with respect to the weaker unity o f philosophy and theology.
moves one makes in applying the new languages.^! One final conceptual tool should be mentioned before turning to the
This being so, it will be prudent to explain what I take these new langu
(by now much anticipated) languages. Unlike any o f the above three
ages and tools to be.^» To the “ tools” first; for they govern and assist the
analytical principles it seldom, if ever, receives explicit statement. Properly
application o f the languages in a number o f important ways. I can begin
speaking, itself neither a language nor a principle, it might best be termed
with that which is well-known, to wit, those two principles so often
a procedural rule consisting as it does in the prescription o f the effectiveness
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o f a second intentional point o f view in the analysis o f problems. That is
mean those rules that stipulate which relations can or cannot obtain
to say, in place o f analyzing a given problem in terms o f the entities or
between the entities for which the terms constituting their vocabularies
objective events involved, analysis is shifted to the terms and propositions
stand. The most familiar such algorithm is that o f mean degree measure
which speak o f these entities and events. O f incredible importance within
which states that for any uniformly dilformly qualified subject, its measure
fourteenth century philosophy as a whole, for present purposes it is
or denominatio relative to the quality in question is the same as i f the
sujficient to note that the function o f this procedure is simply, and often
whole subject were qualified uniformly with the degree o f that quality that
most significantly, to transfer the analysis effected by means o f the new languages to the propositional level.^s
is the arithmetic mean between the two extreme degrees it possesses in its
When one turns to the newly developed languages themselves, one has
sion and remission algorithm, it is by no means the only, or even the most
the tendency, as I did myself in my first interpretation o f them, to divide
frequently applied, one. Others stipulate, for example, the possibility or
them into the logical and the mathematical. N ow such a distinction is
impossibility o f the existence o f a most intense or a most remiss degree,
instructive, and does have more than a modicum o f truth to it, most
the scale relative to which intensity and remissness is to be calculated, the
uniformly difform state.^s Although this may be the most famous inten
evidently because elementary mathematics is utilized in several o f the
determinate manners in which the highest degree o f a quality can be
most important o f the languages. But it also has a tendency to make
introduced into a subject already possessing a given ‘configuration” o f
things a good deal neater than they actually were and to ignore features
that quality but undergoing a certain specified alteration, and so on.^»
o f considerable significance. Put abstractly, it ignores the important fact
Indeed, a whole treatise could be created through the mere tabulation o f
that logic was not only central to the languages we would have no
the extensive vocabulary and numerous algorithms o f the intension and
hesitation calling logical, but was also operative within those we would
remission o f forms without even broaching the issue o f how they were
term mathematical. Just how this was so will become clear as we proceed.
utilized by the medieval scholar. In any event, it is worth emphasizing that,
Setting aside, then, any attempt at rigid pigeon-holing based on
in this and all other cases, the vocabulary plus the algorithms constitute
modern categories, we can begin by noting that the lion’s share o f these new, essentially fourteenth century, languages has to do with measure,
the analytical language in question. Thus, the measure language o f proportiones draws its vocabulary from
provided we take ‘measure’ in an appropriately broad sense. How broad
the relevant traditions within Greek and Arabic mathematics 4? and has
is best indicated by a description o f the languages themselves. (It is worth
as its algorithms many o f the established theorems within the theory o f
while even here to note the intimate connection with logic. For “ measure”
proportion o f that tradition.^» Once again, however, there were appro
to medievals was most frequently considered a matter o f denominatio and
priate medieval additions, one rather well known: Thomas Bradwardine’ s
to elucidate the denominatio o f a subject was to delineate accurately the
so-called “ Dynamical Law” relating an arithmetic increase or decrease in
predicate or predicates that belong to it under such and such circumstances,
velocities to a geometric increase or decrease in the force-resistance
be these predicates numerical or comparative ones involving “ measure” or more normal “ logical” ones, no matter.
proportiones functioning as their causes."^® It too, even in face o f the
One o f the most universally appUed o f the new “ measure” languages is
not the only medieval member o f such rules. Other medieval creations
that o f the intension and remission o f forms. As with all o f the languages,
occur especially when there arose the attempt to include the infinite
one can distinguish between its vocabulary and the algorithms or rules operative within it. In this instance the vocabulary consists o f intensus,
within the compass o f proportiones languages.^® W e must begin to stretch the notion o f measure when we come to the
intensior, intensissimus, intendere (and the corresponding terms for remis
other new languages in this category. Fundamentally, they all “ measure”
sio), latitudo, gradus, uniformis, difformis, uniformiter difformis, difformiter
in that they ascribe limits to one or another entity, process, or event.
difformis.^^ By the algorithms o f this intension and remission language I
There are, ignoring disguises, three languages that are enlisted to carry out
goodly number o f algorithms lifted directly from Greek mathematics, is
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this function. In medieval terms they are: (1) de incipit et desinit, (2) de
one hand, upon the determination o f the number, relation, and order o f
primo et ultimo instanti, (3) de maximo et minimo.^^ For the most part,
parts within continua and, on the other hand, upon the delineation o f the
they derive from remarks o f Aristotle, but anything like their proper
relations that can or cannot exist between entities that are, in one sense or
development only occurs in the Latin West, chiefly in the fourteenth
another, infinitely distant or different from one another.^’
century. 52 In contrast to the languages o f intension and remission and
The precise function in the fourteenth century o f this whole continuity-
proportiones, their vocabulary is meager, consisting basically o f the terms just mentioned in labelling them. I f to these one adds such terms as
infinity language and, particularly, its relation to the other five measure languages can be more adequately treated later. por the present it is
quod sic or quod non (to specify the kinds o f maxima and minima involved),
sufiicient to note, first o f all, that its vocabulary was drawn largely from
esse or non esse (to specify the limiting function o f the first and last instants
such traditional terminology as divisiones or divisibilitas, partes propor
in question), mediate or immediate, ante or post (relative to both instants
tionales, excessus, pars, totum, etc. Medieval ingenuity was, to be sure,
and beginnings), and positio or remotio (o f the past, present, or future),
exercised in the invention o f new meanings or terms to describe the possible
one has a fairly complete catalogue o f what might be called the first level
relations between parts o f continua^^ and the logical tradition was called
o f basic vocabulary for these three languages. A second level o f terminol
upon to furnish ‘categorematic’ and ‘syncategorematic’ for the distinction
ogy deals directly with the entities to which the languages apply: res
o f types o f the infinite.®® But this is paltry little compared to the termino
permanentes or res successive (re: de instanti and de incipit) and potentie
logical (and hence conceptual) inventiveness one finds with respect to the
active or potentie passive (for maxima and minima).^^
intension and remission o f forms or even relative to the three “ limit setting”
rithms or rules o f these three “ limit” languages at bottom amount to
languages that have been noted. Considering how much o f the vocabulary was not o f medieval creation,
the specification o f just when (and when not), and just which kind of,
it may be initially surprising to realize that the algorithms o f the continuity-
instants, beginnings, and endings or maxima and minima apply, or do not
infinity language to a great extent did originate in the Middle Ages.
apply, correspondingly, to permanent vs. successive things or to active vs.
Y et this surprise disappears when one reflects that the “ mathematics o f the
passive potencies under such and such circumstances.®^
infinite” with which this language so often dealt was not part o f the inherited mathematical tradition. Indeed, any self-respecting Greek
Given all o f this, it probably does not even need saying that the algo
Complex as this might seem, there is one other item that needs adding to make the account o f the structure o f these limit languages complete.
mathematician would have regarded a good deal o f it with horror. When
It is that the vocabulary and algorithms o f yet another language, the
one also realizes that in many instances the medievals were attempting to
essentially logical language o f suppositio, is everywhere applied in formu
fit algorithms designed for finite quantities to infinite ones, the problems
lating the algorithms o f these languages, in moving from one algorithm
that they faced immediately become apparent. It will be more fruitful,
to another, and in establishing that they do indeed fit or apply to the casus under examination.
however, to postpone the examination o f some o f these difficulties as well as a sampling o f the algorithms themselves until after we have had the
In point o f fact, the language o f suppositio is one o f the next that needs
opportunity to observe the application o f all o f the measure languages
attention, but before attempting this, one final measure language requires
within theology, since there the exemplication o f factors concerning
mention. As we shall see in what follows its role is considerable and, in
continuity and infinity is a predominant feature.
many ways, central. I refer to what might best be termed the language o f
It remains to examine one final analytical language; it is the most com
continuity and infinity. Here ‘measure’ must be taken in an even broader
prehensive o f all in its applications : the theory o f suppositio o f the so-called
sense. For in addition to the normal sense o f m easuring ^6 and to that o f setting hmits, we find a special concern with what can be interpreted as
logica moderna. This is not the place to pause for even the most compen dious description o f the theory or o f the service it was to philosophy in
extensions o f these senses; that is, with investigations focussing, on the
general. This, together with considerable detail about what I would call its
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vocabulary and rules or algorithms, can be gleaned from other sources.®^
(save that o f proportiones). Perhaps the hierarchy stops there, but not so
For our purposes it is enough to note that, as an analytical language, it was
the intrusion o f one language into another. For one can find the rules o f
used to treat any philosophical problem. M y past interest has been in its
the languages o f first and last instants and o f maxima and minima applied
application to problems within natural philosophy, most notably those
within the language o f the intension and remission o f forms ; so too, as one
de motu. But is was similarly applied in theology as well. As part o f logic,
might expect, rules from the language o f proportiones. But the inverses o f
wherever is was brought to bear, it functioned metalinguistically. That is,
these cross-applications also occur. ®'^ In fact, the translation o f one o f the
its application amounted to an invocation o f the procedural rule to adopt
fundamental algorithms o f proportiones, Bradwardine’s “ Dynamical
a second intentional point o f view; one dealt not with individual entities, but with propositions and with terms within propositions that stood for
important o f such occurrences. For it not only transferred a formulated
{supponit pro) such entities. Accordingly, the elucidation o f the kind o f
relation from one language into another, but in so doing opened up a new
supposition that was had by the terms in a given problematic proposition was one o f the most common ways o f resolving the problem carried by
and more effective technique o f handling that relation.®® I have now spent so much time describing these languages (albeit only
the proposition, especially when that problem had to do with the analysis
in outline form) and have so clearly implied their crucial importance for
o f continuous processes or quantities, with the determination o f the proper
fourteenth century natural philosophy, that one can almost not help but
order o f “ parts” within those processes or quantities, or with the setting o f limits for them.®^
ask how and why their application to all manner o f problems in philosophy
These last phrases are the key to the importance o f supposition theory
slightly more limited way: how and why did the near frenzy to measure
for our purposes. For they imply a rather direct connection between it as
everything imaginable come about in the fourteenth century?®® Unfortun
an analytical language and those languages I have characterized as mensu-
ately, this is an extremely important question that I do not yet know how to
rational. I have already indicated the central role played by suppositio in
answer with any adequacy. Here and there I believe I see a glimmer o f a
the three limit languages.®^ But it also did considerable service for the
solution, but nothing anywhere near being definitive. But perhaps these
broader continuity-infinity language and, when questions o f the continuous
half-formed and unconfirmed suspicions are worth recording none the less.
Law,” into the language o f intension and remission was among the most
and theology developed in the first place. Or, to ask the same thing in a
were at stake, in the language o f intension and remission as well. Here,
In a category somewhat by itself is the language o f suppositio and the
and equally within the three “ limit setting” languages, the medieval was
second intentional point o f view that is its concomitant. Their markedly
eminently successful in clarifying conceptions o f what we would term the
increased application in the fourteenth century within philosophy and
bounds or limits o f continuous series; and it was the “ metalanguage” o f
theology is most likely connected in some way, I would judge, with late
suppositio that furnished the means more adequately to express those
thirteenth century concerns about evidence and certitude. Scotus is
conceptions and, in the bargain, to test whether a given series instantiated
naturally the key figure, but Ockham carries these concerns further and
this or that kind o f limit.®^ Supposition theory was, then, truly extensive in
puts an edge on them that might well have cut in the direction in which
scope; indeed, o f all our languages, it seems that only that o f proportiones rarely suffered its intrusion.
we are here interested. I have in mind in particular the form he brings to
One has to do, therefore, with what might be considered an order o f
radical contingency o f individual res permanentes about which scientia
comprehensiveness among these languages. Proportiones, intension and
must speak. T o oversimply greatly, the point o f interest here lies in the
remission, and the three limit languages are embraced, as it were, by that
realization that, since certitude cannot be grounded in the contingent
o f continuity and infinity, for the vocabulary and algorithms o f the latter
individuals themselves, it is instead to be based within prepositional
are frequently applied to the former.®® The theory o f supposition, on the
knowledge about these individuals. That is to say, the propositions become the bearers o f the requisite certitude and scientia is viewed as consisting o f
other hand, functions metalinguistically relative to these other languages
the confrontation between the required certitude o f scientia and the
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such propositions (although it naturally still relates to individual physical
for the discussion o f the intension and remission o f fo rm s.’ 3 Perhaps its
things and events insofar as the terms in these propositions stand for
role in urging the measure o f intension and remission is also o f appreciable
{supponit pro) such individuals),
N ow this sort o f move demanded a more
significance, but in a way that we have not yet been able to discern
than usual reliance upon logic, in particular it demanded the assumption
adequately. M ore straightforward are suggestions concerning theological
o f a second intentional point o f view. But to view scientia second inten
contributing causes in the case o f the “ measure” o f the infinite. For we
288
tionally accordingly urged one to view problems within it in a similar
can easily establish that later thirteenth century speculation about G od’s
fashion; and to do that immediately opens the door for suppositio theory
infinity involved in the possibility o f an eternal world did contain elements
as a conceptual (and second intentional) tool to be utilized in analyzing
found operative within the fourteenth century measurement tradition.
these problems. Such is one possible explanation o f the rapid upsurge in
And there is also the relevance o f the analysis o f continua within the
applying the language o f supposition to philosophical and theological
discussion o f angelic motion.'^^ Yet with respect to all o f these suggestions
problems. I f it be a proper one, then one has to do with the interesting
one can only conclude that a good deal more work is required. The detail concerning the new, fourteenth century, languages that I have
phenomenon o f having metascientific convictions, beliefs about science, materially ajffect which methods o f analysis are efficacious and should hence be operative within it.
felt it necessary to indulge in may perhaps seem excessive. But I have deemed
Speculation about the origin o f the application o f the measure languages is not (at least in my head) even this developed and surely not as interesting.
their application in theology will be examined and secondly, and more
It is suggestive to conjecture that it too may be somehow connected with
whole paper. That is, that aspect o f the unitary character o f medieval
it important to do so first as a kind o f prerequisite to the next section where importantly, because they are so very central to the major burden o f this
the concern for certitude, especially if one could couple this with a parallel
learning that I hope to establish is located in the weaker unity o f philosophy
worry about precision. But for the present this must remain nothing more
and theology in the fourteenth century, taken formaliter. Moreover, to
than an undocumented conjecture. Slightly less speculative is the possibility
return to the very title o f the present section, that unity in that sense is
that the newly appearing measure-mania may have had a different sort o f
expressed most adequately and precisely, I believe, by the common appli
logical origin, one connected with the medieval interpretation o f measure
cation o f those new languages o f analysis that have just now been des
as denomination^ However, this also needs further probing and documen tation.
cribed.
I f we realize that the earlier and more effective application o f the mea
n. C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S
AND
EFFECTS
OF
THE
sure languages occurred at Oxford in the fourteenth century, then another
L A N G U A G E S OF A N A L Y S I S
very attractive alternative lies in the fact that thirteenth century Oxford had scholars that were more versed in mathematics than Paris.'^^ y e t if we
A . Some Features o f Their Application in Theology
APPLICATION
OF
much an affair o f logic as it was o f mathematics, then this possibility
There is little question that the application, often systematic application, o f the foregoing languages was more pervasive in natural philosophy than
reflect on the further fact that the measurement tradition was at least as seems less likely to have produced the phenomenon in question. A t least
in theological contexts. Yet it is not only this difference in frequency which
to any appreciable extent. For the development and exercise o f logic at Paris appears to have been at least equal, if not superior, to that at Oxford.
is noticeable at the “ first glance” level in the two disciplines. There is another distinction that strikes one even before a reading o f the specific
One final suggestion: that o f a theological catalyst, i f not origin.
arguments and problems: theology appears to lack the “ basic rule testing”
Perhaps it was intra divinis that the tendency to measure found a primary moving force. The theological issue o f the augmentation o f caritas is
that I have elsewhere taken to be one o f the central features o f exactly how the languages o f measure were applied in natural philosophy.^® Briefly
already well established as one o f the classic contexts {Sent., I, dist. 17)
described, I have maintained that, for every given measure language, one
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U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M ED IE VAL L E A R N I N G
o f the most important ways in which it was applied consisted in the “ trying
ingenious application within theology unimportant, even for historians
290
out” o f some fundamental algorithm within it (Bradwardine’ s law relating
o f science. For it seems to me that an investigation o f what happened in
velocities, forces, and resistances or the mean degree measure rule, for
the utilization o f these languages within theology may well tell us things
example) by applying this algorithm to all conceivable variant cases o f the
about their scope and character that we might not learn from our study
quality, process, or other entity being measured under the language. By
o f the central works within fourteenth century natural philosophy.
such a means there were even formulated complete brief tracts on indi
Thus even for the history o f science, let alone the history o f theology or o f
vidual algorithms or groups thereof. Logically speaking, the form that
late medieval learning in general, such an investigation has a good poten
some o f these tracts assumed was that o f deducing a battery o f corrollary rules from the basic algorithm or rule from which they began. But when
tial o f being beneficial. None the less, no matter how convinced one may be o f this prospective
one looks beyond logical form, it seems proper to say that this deduction
benefit, the problem remains o f just how to structure this investigation
bore the feature o f testing the mettle, as it were, o f the basic algorithm,
and how best to limit, at least initially, its scope. For limitation is required,
the deduced correlary rules being, in effect, the variant cases by means o f
considering the mass o f fourteenth century theological material that does
which the test was carried out. Moreover, this pattern o f application is
contain application o f the languages and the rather amazing variety o f
found in all o f the various measure languages o f which I have spoken and
problems with respect to which this application takes place. With this in
should be considered, I maintained, as absolutely central to the thrust o f
view, I have chosen to exclude from consideration those theological
what is new and important in fourteenth century natural philosophy.’ ’^
contexts in which one would expect to find our languages appUed as a
It is a pattern, however, that does not seem to be present in the applica
matter o f course (for example, problems dealing with the augmentation o f
tion o f our languages in theology. But this is a distinction between theology
caritas, the eternity o f the world, the possible infinity o f G od’s power,
and the major “ measurement o f motion” works in the natural philosophy
future contingents, etc.). This may seem an odd choice to make. I think not.
o f the later Middle Ages, the works o f the likes o f Bradwardine, Heytes-
For to begin with, we will discover that the application in those areas that
bury, Swineshead, Oresme, and others. The languages o f measure are
I shall treat is not necessarily any less extensive or informative than in the
applied in all manner o f other works in natural philosophy {Questiones on the Physics, for example) and there one does not find “ basic algorithm
more “ naturally fitting” contexts that I shall exclude. Secondly, from the
testing” as the predominant feature o f their application. As one would
point o f view o f interest o f the history o f theology, who is to say that the employment o f these languages in “ non-obvious” matters was non-essen
expect in such works, the languages, or selected algorithms from them,
tial? That is, although the occurrence o f the languages in such contexts
are applied with the intention o f solving some particular given problem
may initially seem forced and excessive (and would be regarded by some
(a problem furnished in almost all instances, by the text or doctrine being
historians as positively silly and stupid), in the final analysis it may well
commented upon). There may occur some deliberation establishing that
prove to be the case that such a phenomenon was really very much part
the language is appropriate to the problem in the first place, but what is fundamental is the resolution o f the problem by its means.’ ® N ow this
- even, perhaps, a necessary part - o f doing theology as it was then con
pattern in the application o f languages in natural philosophy is the same as that which one finds in theology.
ends up with the very interesting result that the remaining major areas in
One might also wish to note, however, a difference in quality in this
we know to be the very heart o f theology in the period in question:
regard between theology and natural philosophy. That is, scholars like Swineshead and Oresme are incredibly more deft and competent in
namely, that o f the issues o f the will, justification, and grace. In approaching the phenomenon o f the application o f the various
applying the languages and algorithms, no matter what the pattern o f
analytical languages within theology, one o f the primary questions that
application. Agreed. But this does not make the study o f their less
demands attention is why fourteenth century theologians (or at least some
ceived. Finally, excluding the “ to be expected” cases o f application, one which extensive application occurred are roughly coextensive with what
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U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M E D IE V A L L E A R N I N G
293
o f the more important ones) felt urged to use them in their analysis o f
case. A t bottom, these texts essentially tend to ground this application in
certain issues in the first place (issues, o f course, that did not fit obviously
the assertion o f a relatively direct connection between the theological
with this kind o f analysis)."^® Similarly, in addition to the question o f why
matter at issue (for example, the action o f the will) and processes within
they may have thought it wise to apply these languages, what was it that made it possible for them to do so? Apart from the recognized general
the physical world insofar as these processes fall under determinate laws or rules as set forth in natural philosophy.®^ Often this connection is far
utihty and effectiveness o f philosophical methods and conceptions within
from being merely implied or stated only in passing. Some time and effort
theology (something that must have been present by this time in no small
may be expended in setting out the complete “ physics” into which the
degree), it is interesting to speculate about the role fourteenth century
theological subject is to be inserted. Thus, we find the same problem o f the
voluntarism may have played in both these regards. I f it is true, for example,
will’s action connected to the whole physics o f generation and corruption
that one o f the effects o f this voluntarism was to weaken the ties that, in a
(both agents and patients being explicitly considered). Further, this is in
theology that emphasized the primacy o f the intellect, harmonized G od
turn related, via the necessary divisibility in one sense or another o f res
and the world, and as a consequence to lay bare the radical contingency o f
creata, to the physics o f intension and remission. The problem o f establishing the fit o f the language to be applied to
all created beings and events,®^ then perhaps it is equally just to see at least one o f the reasons behind the newly found fondness for our languages in
specific subjects within theology also occurs in a more tacit, and simulta
this same new kind o f relation that was held to obtain between God and
neously more important, way. It amounts to a demonstration o f the
his creatures. For the application o f these languages (in theology as in
consistency o f the language, in particular o f its algorithms, with what
natural philosophy) proceeded secundum imaginationem and this, as we
might best be interpreted as the necessary theological principia governing
have seen, was permitted, even urged, by the invocation o f potentia D ei
the point or doctrine upon which the language is to be brought to bear.
absoluta, a factor in turn at the very center o f the rising voluntarism.
Foremost in this regard is G od himself. T o show the consistency o f a
In other words, since G od’s will can act with absolute contingency, it
given language with the deity was tantamount to plugging G od into natural
follows that, in a given problem, the entities or events involved can exist
philosophy. Perhaps the most astonishing display o f this procedure is
or can occur in all these imaginable ways, where ‘can’ is to be taken de
Jean de Ripa. For when all is said and done is this not exactly what his
potentia D ei absoluta and where ‘all these imaginable ways’ consist in the
relating o f G od to the latitudo totalis entium, and hence to the language o f
alternative casus that are analyzed by our languages. Furthermore, a
intension and remission, amounts to?®"* The result is one that was o f
specific question concerning the theological welcome that these languages
central importance to Ripa’ s theology as a whole. However, attempts to
received follows hard on the heels o f the preceding speculative suggestion:
relate God to something less comprehensive than the whole chain o f
to what extent, if any, did the new view o f the relation between G od and
being also occur. A t times, this takes the form o f fitting some sort o f
creature encourage speculation, not about creatures as relata, but about
human action amenable to treatment by our languages to some aspect o f
their relations to God? For there was a good amount o f just such specula
the Divine
tion within fourteenth century theology and a considerable part o f it took
action with a relation to God.®® Moreover, the same fitting o f the languages to theological principia
the form o f attempts to measure these Deus-creatura relations.®^ Hence again, o f course, the introduction o f our languages.
essence.
Or the fit in question might be that o f the human
occurs in any number o f contexts other than G od alone (although H e is
I have thus far considered only the possible unspoken reasons for the
naturally almost always involved).®’ As evidence, let me briefly mention
theological application o f our languages; only such it seems to me, will
at least one other such additional area: that o f the whole complex o f
satisfactorily answer, howsoever partially, the general question o f motiva
grace, merit, reward, and sin and their determined relations. The ways
tion with which I began. There are, however, a variety o f texts concerned
in which the fit is accomplished are sometimes explicit, sometimes rather
with showing that the languages can be so applied in this or that particular
more implicit; but allow me to tabulate, as it were, a number o f examples
J. M UR DOC H
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M ED IEVA L L E A R N IN G
without regard to such qualification. The augmentation, and hence
Indeed, we even find “ theological retreat” in the abandonment o f a
intension, o f caritas through meritorious acts must be consistent with the fact that only a finite amount o f caritas is permitted man.®® Or, the inten-
hitherto accepted authority. »6 As in the case o f almost any method, the application o f the languages
sibility and remissibility o f acts o f the will must not lead to the equation o f
occurs both in order to estabhsh the author’s position and to argue
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295
mortal and venial sin.®® Or, if love for God and fellow-man is intensible and
against it. Again as is usual in scholasticism, the arguments using the
remissible and capable o f having proportiones between its degrees, then we
languages lead in any direction that will serve the author’s purpose: to
must take care to avoid having this obliterate the required distinction
confrontation with a theological principle, to a logical contradiction,
between fruitio and usus.^^ Or, the proportionabihty o f caritas and premia
or to a state o f affairs that is in some other way intolerable (usually,
must fit with the fact that omni beato Deus est equatepremium.^'^ Or, more
interestingly enough, involving the infinite). A t times, the author argues
broadly now, the whole “ mechanics” o f merit, demerit, sin, reward,
immediately from the languages as applied to the entity under investiga
conscience, precepts, etc., must, because this “ mechanics” operates in time, mesh with the language o f first and last instants.®^ Or, finally, this same
tion directly to the point he wishes to make; but this is only occasional as
language o f instants must be made consistent with the simultaneous
is usual with most scholastic argument.®’^ O f greater interest is precisely what it is that makes the languages an
action o f God and the human will in each actus voluntatis, for otherwise
effective tool in each argument or casus ; what is, one might ask, the moving
man could sin mortally instantaneously after being in a state o f grace.
force or crucial step in each case? It is difficult to generahze, but there do
I f the imaginativeness o f these tests o f consistency seems impressive
appear to be several recurrent factors.®® In some instances, it is what might
(or depressive as the case may be), then the reaction may well be next to
be called the “ additivity” invoked in the measure language being applied
overwhelming when it comes to the actual application o f our languages to
that gives rise to that being sought (usually a difficultas against the author’ s
particular instances. I f time would permit, it would be worthwhile to
view).®® A t other times, the moving force derives from the attempt to fit
display at random a fair number o f these theological casus secundum
the languages with one or another res in d iv is ib ilis .O f greatest frequency
imaginationem in all their complexity. Such would more accurately give a
o f all - and also I think o f greatest interest - is the connection made
truer flavor o f the original sources. As it is, I shall have to treat the matter
between the freedom o f the will (both Divine and human) and the language
far more briefly. Unfortunately, there seems to be no striking overall
o f continuity. In effect, the liberty or contingency postulated by the will
pattern to the particular arguments in which the languages are invoked.
allows o f the choice o f any one o f the infinity o f “ values” within a given
Y et there are remarks that should be made about the ways the various
continuum. Interestingly enough, the function o f the velle libere involved
appHcations are made, their scope, and the apparent repute in which they were held.
may be either to determine some particular value within a continuous
The first thing that needs saying is that all o f the measure languages
not stand (since another can be selected infinitely near it that will serve the
are applied, those o f intension and remission and continuity-infinity most
same function).^®^ In addition to its intrinsic interest, to have the libertas
frequently so.®^ Secondly, it should be emphasized that, once the general
voluntatis play such a role might be considered evidence relevant to my
fit o f the language to the context in question has been established (and
speculation about the importance o f voluntarism in general in the rise o f
it almost always is), then no matter what difficulties or logical peculiarities may be made to surface in the application o f the language in specific
the application o f our languages. I have above stated that in many instances (indeed, it seems in most)
casus, the language is never, as far as I have been able to discover,
the measure languages were applied in arguments directed against the
rejected as inappropriate. Even when such difficulties reached the level
author’s opinio propria. In almost all such cases, the language was not,
o f near insurmountability, the languages are tenaciously retained, the
as I have said, compromised. Instead we almost always have to do with
maximum retreat being an occasional declaration o f a casus impossibilis.^^
some alteration, some distinction, made with respect to the subjects to
interval or, more naturally, to show that an already determined value can
J. M URDO CH
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M EDIE VAL L E A R N I N G
which the language is being applied.^o^ From time to time this tidying up
exhibit the same pattern (save, o f course, for the condemnation). A ll o f
o f the domain o f application becomes relatively systematic. One is witness to minor disquisitions on the permissible manners o f augmentation,
the various theologians it has been, and will be, our occasion to cite are
or on the general applicability o f proportiones to entities o f a variety
that are here referred to, but in all manner o f other corners o f their
o f sorts.104 Jean Mirecourt, however, seems to be the most systematic
Sentence Commentaries. The proper conclusion is, I beheve, that utiliza
and thorough o f all in this respect. He formulates, for example, what can
tion o f our languages was in no sense remarkable, but rather quite
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297
cases in point. For they apply the languages not merely in those contexts
appropriately be considered his own language o f proportiones and
common.iio There is, moreover, one thing that should be said about the
excessus, complete with its own vocabulary and algorithms, the whole o f
significance o f their use, even in face o f the fact that we naturally need far
it tailored in advance to fit his purposes. The “ alteration o f subjects”
more work on the sources before anything like a definitive evaluation can
I have mentioned is, in other words, built into the language,
astonishing is the fact that in another Book o f his Sentences he devotes
be reached. I have above drawn attention to the well-recognized role o f the potentia
Even more
seven complete questiones to the elucidation o f whether, and just how, a
D ei absoluta in fourteenth century theology (and philosophy for that
whole battery o f theological conceptions fit with the languages o f intension
matter) and have noted its connection with rationes and casus secundum
and remission and first and last instants, lo® That he regarded this to be a
imaginationem.
serious undertaking receives confirmation from his own expUcit reference
application I have described since that point. One should maintain, I
Let me reconsider this link in terms o f the language
in his Apologia prima to its significance.^o'^ And this is not the only time
think, that appeal to the potentia absoluta accounts for the fact that we
that we find our languages implicated in Mirecourt’s condemnation.
have to do with secundum imaginationem procedures within theology, m
W e even find him establishing his innocence o f an error his accusers had
But this is only half o f the story. W e must explain not just that a greater
charged him with by explaining that, far from it being his intention to
number o f casus were treated de potentia D ei absoluta, but why it was that
assert the notion in question, what he really meant to do was simply to
these new casus, or these kinds o f new casus, were treated. N ow it seems
determine the proper way to measure man’ s meritorious goodness
to me that the application o f the new analytical languages takes care
{Volebam igitur dicere, quod penes maximum gradum habitus meritorii
o f the second explicandum for a particular (but tolerably large) set o f
attenditur bonitas hominis meritoria, et non penes maximum gradum actus \
these new casus. Further, I would urge this in the strong sense o f main
it is worth noting that the terms penes quid attenditur were a standard,
taining that these particular
fourteenth century way o f asking for the measure o f a thing), lo®
would not have been possible without the languages. Given this, at least
Mirecourt is an extraordinarily explicit yardstick, it would seem, for the extent and importance o f our languages in theology. The frequency with
imaginationem elements in theology
two questions, or better two prospective avenues o f investigation, follow.
which they occur in his Sentences surely would have put him at odds
The first is to determine how many, or which sorts, o f these “ language-
with the 1366 Statutes we have cited. But Mirecourt also represents a different level o f official displeasure. The Statutes, and the anonymous
based” casus and rationes were new versions o f older, but substantially equivalent,ii2 casus and rationes, and how many, or which sorts, were
text I have cited o f roughly the same time, frowned on the use o f logic and
totally new creations. (A n educated guess would be that the latter would
mathematical conceptions; Mirecourt was condemned for asserting
far outnumber the former.) Secondly, would it not be profitable to inquire
propositions that resulted from his use o f such tools, that is to say, from
whether the apphcation o f one or another o f the new languages may not
his application o f our languages.!®^
have been the reason behind, not the origin, but the development and
One might wonder if Mirecourt is not rather uncharacteristic in the
preservation o f some o f the major questiones in which this application
apparently quite thorough penetration the new analytical languages had
occurs?
made into his theological work. N ot so. There are numerous others who
treated here; they are, rather, a program for another paper.
Both o f these queries are, o f course, not subjects that can be
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B. Extensive Concern with Continuity and the Infinite
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M ED IEV AL L E A R N I N G
299
divisibility o f a static magnitude (a geometric line, for example) was one with that o f a continuous variation over time in (say) the heat o f some subject.
The roster o f the new measure languages that has been given above in
But other properties that could be considered for measure might be non
cluded one labelled that o f “ continuity and infinity.” It was also pointed
isomorphic (for instance, the points or parts o f the line vs. the degrees or
out that its function was more comprehensive than that o f the other mea
differences o f degrees over segments in the heat variation).
sure languages and that its elements often embraced and found expression
N ow such a greater comprehensiveness in the subjects involved was
in the elements o f these other languages. I should now hke to examine this
directly reflected in the languages themselves. T o begin with, one should
embracing at closer quarters and relate it to the preponderance o f
realize that all three limit languages were themselves continuity-infinity
continuum-infinity considerations that is immediately discernable in the
languages, for if they were not always faced with representing the setting
“ language-application” segments o f theology.
o f limits for continuous processes or entities, they consistently had to come
It is best to begin with a brief overview o f this language’s constituents.
to grips with the distinction between the continuous and the discrete no
On the one hand, it had to cover the infinitely great: cases o f entities
matter what they were being applied to.i^^ Secondly, the remaining two
infinitely distant from one another, the relation o f infinities to finîtes and
measure languages o f intension and remission and o f proportiones also
o f finite values to (indivisible) zero values. On the other hand, infinity
fell under the jurisdiction o f that o f continuity-infinity. This took the form
entered the field in a second way through the infinite divisibility o f continua,
o f having what might appropriately be called derived algorithms in the
which was perhaps the factor most frequently behind the invocation o f
former being legislated by the latter. Thus, for example, from the attempt
this particular measure language. This divisibility, and hence the language
to determine precisely how the initial point o f a line segment is related to
in question, entailed consideration o f the order, the “ betweenness”
the rest o f the line and the resulting algorithm that there is no point in the
properties, o f the divisions and parts resulting from it, o f the number o f
line immediately following its first point, one has the parallel attempt to
these parts (how many in a part o f a continuum versus how many in the
determine the relation o f the non-gradus o f a given quality to the total
whole?) and o f their relations (what are the ultimate parts o f a continuum
latitudo o f that quality and the derived algorithm that there is no gradus
and how do they “ fit together” in constituting it?). Further, it also
remississimus o f that quality,
considered the various manners o f characterizing this infinite divisibility
derivations from the continuity-infinity domain when, from reasoning
{partes eiusdem quantitatis and/or partes eiusdem proportionis) and the
about the relation o f a line to a point, or a surface to a line, one set up
Alternatively, one can observe similar
problem o f what one must say o f its corresponding necessity in domains
algorithms de proportionibus quoad excessum infinitum, or when, from the
that were connected on other grounds (parallel divisibility, for example, for motion, time, and magnitude). Relative to all these considerations, a
divisibility o f a continuum into aliquot parts, one derived rules governing the partes o f p r o p o r t i o n e s O f course, given such connection between
pertinent vocabulary was developed and appropriate algorithms set out,ii4
languages, one had to keep a watchful eye on maintaining their consistency,
although to a greater degree than in the case o f the other measure lan
and especially their consistency with one’ s conception o f the subjects to
guages such could be obtained from the inherited tradition, especially
which they could apply, something that occasionally gave rise to a certain
from the later books o f Aristotle’s Physics. It will be evident even from this incomplete catalogue o f the contents o f
amount o f trouble, With these facts about the “ second level” position o f the continuity-
the continuity-infinity language that it was broader than the other
infinity language and about its relation to the other measure languages
measure languages. Broader because the continuousness o f the subjects
in m i n d , l e t us now attempt to see in outline why and how this more
to which the languages were applied was a more fundamental or more
comprehensive language was applied in theological contexts. Taking the
primary property than others whose “ measure” might similarly, even
two halves, as it were, o f the language one by one, the most obvious
simultaneously, be being taken, Thus, the continuity and hence the infinite
causal factors in this regard have to do with the presence o f God as an
J. MU RDO CH
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M ED IEV AL L E A R N I N G
“ urger o f the infinite.” First in the order o f obviousness is the infinity o f God himself. Taken in almost any o f its various s e n s e s , 1 2 0 this automat
are repeatedly used to lead to the existence o f unacceptable infinites. These
ically brought in one or another o f the languages in order to measure the
are almost always intensive infinites, and their possible existence either
infinite involved. It could be a question o f setting the yardstick to His
runs counter to theology (infinitely intense sin, merit, caritas, dilectio, or,
infinity as such, to the kinds o f infinites He could possibly (i.e., logically)
more generally, actus) or to natural philosophy (infinite velocity, for
produce, or to His infinite “ distance” from res creata.^^^
example).^^’ There is also, fortunately, some pattern in how the existence
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301
The first is that secundum imaginationem casus applying our languages
On the other hand, in addition to infinitely great magnitudes and
o f these infinites is established. Sometimes the “ proportional part matrix”
multitudes in general, God also served as the introducer o f the particular
ploy is used, but more often it is either the libere action o f the will or the
infinite multitude that arises from the infinite divisibility o f continua.
possibility o f indivisible values that affords the required ammunition. The
By far the most common way He was called upon to serve this role was
freedom o f the will is made effective because its free action entails the
the de potentia D ei absoluta actual infinite division o f a continuum into all o f its proportional parts.122 The number o f secundum imaginationem
intensibility and remissibility, and hence successiveness, o f its acts ; in turn,
rationes and casus that employ this “ proportional part matrix” is almost
in question.^2® Indivisible values, almost all o f which consist in the admis
incalculable (in natural philosophy as well as in theology).
sion o f some kind o f change or action within an instant, lead to the
the rules for intension and remission then provide for the infinite increase
However, there was another way in which the infinite divisibility o f
undesirable infinites when they are plugged into the relevant algorithms
continua fell into theological contexts. It did not require an appeal
governing the necessary increase in the effect o f an agent the longer it acts. 129
to God, but arose so to say, secundum naturam. That is, many o f the
The implied existence o f all o f the foregoing infinites is always to be
processes that demanded theological consideration were either themselves
denied. But there were infinites that had to be admitted. Indeed, they con
continuous or necessarily occurred against some continuous background
stitute the ingredients within the second recurrent theme that is to be
(usually the continuum o f time). In the first case, continuity-infinity derived algorithms o f intension and remission were directly pertinent ;i23
found in the theological application o f continuity-infinity language: that
in the second, one invariably had recourse to one o f the limit languages.124
the languages, both that o f continuity-infinity and that o f proportiones.
o f the accommodation o f certain types o f infinite excess into the fabric o f
It bears mention, moreover, that precisely the same phenomenon occurred
This accommodation was necessary for two reasons: to account for, or
everywhere within natural philosophy, for the processes and entities it
better to measure, the relation o f God to his creatures and to set up a
had to treat were also invariably continuous or took place within con tinuous time.^25 In contrast, however, natural philosophy usually did
proper scale for the required radical distinction between the different
not possess the built-in infinity o f God for the benefit o f its deliberations.
not merely because it seemed required to say something about the relation
species o f these creatures. The first kind o f measuring had to be admitted
Infinite values did indeed permeate these deliberations, but they did not
o f G od’s perfection to that o f inferiora, but also because man necessarily
result from the presence o f God as infinite. A t most, they were assured
had the capacity o f being able to stand to God with the same kind, but
through an appeal to His potentia absoluta, although in most instances
different degree, o f relation (notably that o f dilectio and visio) as he was to
natural philosophers were content to create infinite values by the simple secundum imaginationem exercise o f their wits.^^e
other finite things. This required the permissibility o f infinite values in the measure o f at least those relations.
In any event, given the foregoing account o f how the language o f
Such values were also required, however, even when God was excluded
continuity-infinity was most often introduced into theology, it remains to
from the scale. For the radical distinction o f created species was con
consider what it looked like once there. Again the problem o f elucidating
sistently interpreted in the sense o f an infinite “ distance” between the
some pattern is a formidable one. Nevertheless, one can sift out at least
members o f such species. Thus, consideration o f the perfection o f species
three themes that are recurrent enough to bear generalization.
went hand in hand with the problem o f making adjustments for the intro
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U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M E D IEVA L L E A R N I N G
duction o f infinite excess into the relevant measure languages.i^i But
preponderance o f continuity and infinity into account and appreciate its
the revision and supplementing o f the languages did not end here.
significance. 138 The medievals themselves did. For, to return again to
For i f one was under the obligation to allow infinite distance between
theology, not only is the importance o f such revealed by its fit with the
God and creature and also between creature and creature, then clearly at least two kinds o f infinite excess must be accommodated. 1^2
infinity o f God as its subiectum, but we find some theologians aware enough o f what they were doing to remark on the necessity o f examining
Still another kind o f struggle with the infinite forms the third, and final,
303
the whole basis o f “ ad infinitum” arguments,
theme that I shall note. Less a matter o f having to effect an adjustment in the measure languages than was the problem o f infinite excess that I have
C. Sophismata and Unity
just described, it nevertheless seems to have been believed that the languages
Were I at this point to attempt to formulate a one sentence resume o f what
would not be in proper order unless this additional factor could be encom
I have been trying to say and trying to assemble evidence for, it would
passed as well. M ore o f a puzzle than a simple factor, their concern was
claim, first o f all, that there existed a secondary (and hence weaker)
with what we would term the problem o f relating infinite sets and sub
methodological MViiiy o f philosophy and theology in the fourteenth century
sets. The context was usually the discussion o f either the possible eternity o f the world or the kinds o f infinities licit under G od’s omnipotence,i33
which resided in the common application o f the new analytical languages (largely measure languages) o f which I have been speaking and, secondly,
but it also appears as relevant to the kinds o f issues o f grace and the will
that in both theology and natural philosophy in a very large number o f
that we have been concentrating upon.i34 Apparently, infinity and con
cases this application was concerned specifically with questions o f infinity
tinuity had so thoroughly penetrated theology that all o f their aspects
and continuity, that, in other terms, the dominant kind o f measure at
were regarded as o f significance, not merely those that one would have
stake was one occupied with infinite values. I f all o f this, as methodological,
thought most relevant to theological debate. In at least one instance the
speaks o f a second level unity, then what I should now like to treat
penetration was so complete that a fair interpretation o f a whole Sentence
briefly introduces a third level unity. For I shall be addressing myself to a
Commentary would be to consider it a treatise on the continuum and the infinite. 135 An exaggerated case perhaps, but directly related to a general
description o f one o f the predominant ways in which the analytical
point that should be made. In as many, indeed in more, instances than not, whenever it was a question o f measure and measure languages, what
That way was through sophismata. The terms ‘ sophismata’ and ‘ sophisma’ (let alone ‘sophistice’ , ‘ sophis-
was being measured involved some aspect o f the infinite, be it infinite
matice’ , etc) have a variety o f meanings in the Middle Ages, so it is well
distance, infinite multitudes, or the infinite denseness o f continua made
that I specify at the outset precisely what I have in mind. The simplest and
no difference. I have above noted a specific instance o f the insertion o f a theological subject into the “ physics” relevant to it.i^e But what kind o f
most adequate way o f accomplishing this is, I think, merely to point to
“ physics” is it or what is the nature o f the elements that were considered in this “ physics” ? Basically, such elements have to do with considerations
o f Peter o f Spain or in the Sophisma nuper emendata o f Albert o f Saxony. Looking at elements o f this sort, whatever other characteristics they may
o f infinity and continuity: what is important, we are told, is whether the
have or whatever role they may play in medieval intellectual history,
power o f the agents involved is finite or infinite, whether they act in time
it is fair to say that a sophisma is a proposition (often bizarre in some way)
or instantaneously, whether the effect produced is divisible or indivisible, etc. But these are all pieces o f the continuity-infinity game.
that can be interpreted in two different ways, one o f which is usually the
Furthermore, it is not just in theology that measurement so often in
as probatur and improbatur) are reflected in the very enunciation o f the sophisma itself insofar as it contains, prima facie, both o f two seemingly contradictory elements.i^o
volves infinite values; the same is true within fourteenth century natural philosophy as well.^®'^ It is important that, as historians, we take this
languages were applied (again in both natural philosophy and theology).
those elements called sophismata in, for example, the Summule logicales
proper one. A t times these “ two different ways” (appropriately displayed
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U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M ED IEV AL L E A R N I N G
J, MU RDO CH
305
Whether sophismata taken in this sense are the disputationes de sophis-
especially clear in those instances in which the application o f these
matibus articulated in university statutes, or whether one should consider
languages was set upon the testing o f a basic rule or algorithm o f the
them the Artes mate to the quodlibetal question o f the faculties o f theology, are problems that need not be resolved here.^^^ For without such in
language in question (again Heytesbury, Swineshead, and the whole
stitutional support, there is more than adequate evidence in the logical
variant cases invented to carry out this test as sophismata. A long
Mertonian clique in particular). For one can rightly interpret the outlandish
literature o f the twelfth and thirteenth centuries revealing that sophismata
standing tradition in the exercise and development o f logical subtleties
(in precisely the sense I have in mind here) formed a frequent and well developed preoccupation. One has to do, therefore, with a tradition
was bearing fruit, one might say, in the newer pastures o f subtilitates de
that is a good deal older than the analytical languages o f which I have
motuM'^ What is more, this is also a profitable way to view things even in many
been speaking. As we shall see, it was a tradition that can also be properly termed analytical.
instances (in both natural philosophy and theology now) in which
For a concise statement o f how the medieval operated with sophismata,
mind, the proof o f something external to the language being applied is that
“ basic algorithm testing” is not the primary concern. In the cases I have in
it seems to me that the most satisfactory interpretation is still that o f one
o f central importance. In establishing this external point (the freedom o f
o f the first historians to concern himself with the relevant literature.
the will, for example, or the fact that it necessarily acts successively), one
The literature in question is, o f course, more involved with logic and
faces a secundum imaginationem argument to the contrary in which a new
grammar, than with philosophy as a whole or with natural philosophy
measure language is applied; this argument is then in turn resolved in
as a part o f it. W e are told, in sum, that the treatment o f logical and
terms o f the same measure language. N ow I believe that one can appro
grammatical sophismata can be interpreted as having the character o f the
priately consider such an argument and its resolution as bearing an intrigu
“ application o f a theory,” o f a set o f rules or distinctions. That is to say,
ing resemblance to a sophism. O f course this “ sophism” itself is almost
their treatment has this character insofar as the sophismata themselves
never stated explicitly; but I think it can be elicited. Note first the usual
furnish (often rather strange) confirming examples o f the theory, the the
procedure in the contrary argument: One moves from the idea being op
ory being applied in order to “ resolve” these examples. (Indeed, it is only
posed to a secundum imaginationem casus that utilizes some measure
after they have been resolved that they can appropriately be said to be confirming instances.)
language and from this one infers some absurd and unacceptable result
In the thirteenth century, and in most instances in the fourteenth
the soul o f Judas, or what have you), this absurdity in turn naturally
(venial is equivalent to mortal sin, the soul o f Christ is comparable with the rejection o f the initial idea. Consider now the resolution:
century as well, the “ theory” involved was naturally most often a logical
im p ly in g
one. It might have to do, for example, with something simple like the distinction between two kinds o f supposition (and between the types o f
T o be sure, the absurdity is done away with or rendered innocuous, but in addition it is almost always simultaneously shown that the measure
logical descent to singular propositions that is licit in each instance),
language used in the casus that gave rise to the absurdity still applies to
or the “ theory” might consist o f more complicated matters such as the
the “ variables” in the casus (to mortal and venial sin, or to Christ and
distinction between the composite and the divisive sense or such as the
Judas, for example). Just how it applies is also shown. N ow the “ sophism” involved is not the absurdity alone,i45 but rather
rules governing the modal context elicited by the presence o f cognitive verbs o f knowing, doubting, or believing.
the whole procedure that I have just described. The fact that the absurdity
The point I should like to make with respect to all o f this is that the
is dissolved but nevertheless has the variables generating it taken into ac
pattern o f the application o f such a “ theory,” or o f such rules, was
count by the language, corresponds, I would submit, to the two ways o f
with few exceptions quite the same as that which we find in the applica
interpreting a genuine sophism (its probatur and improbatur phases, as it
tion o f the new languages o f measure in the fourteenth century. This is
were). Finally, the “ theory” or “ set o f distinctions” involved in our less
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J. M U RD O CH
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF ME DIEV AL L E A R N I N G
authentic “ sophism” is naturally the measure language in question, or
which to pour secundum imaginationem arguments and examples. One
307
some part o f it. For it is preserved; its terms are utilized in both the
would imagine moreover, that the relative antiquity o f the tradition from
“ generating” argument and its resolution,
This, then, is at least one
which they came must also have given a certain amount o f expertise to
possible way that the influence o f the sophismata tradition may be seen in
their utilization. In concluding, I cannot resist quoting a couplet created
a broader domain o f language application and not merely in that o f the
in honor o f sophismata that a fourteenth century student was moved to
Oxford calculatores and their confreres.
inscribe in the margins o f his notebook: Concedat Cristus michi perlustrare
I f nothing else, perhaps it might
offer some explanation o f why it is that so many o f the measure language
sophisma, ut panis pistus reddat nullibi cisma.^^^
casus sound so very much like at least parts o f sophisms. Let me now try to establish that my claim o f this pervasiveness o f
I I L C O N C L U S IO N
sophismata-h2L^Qà reasoning, especially in natural philosophy, is not an overworking o f the historical imagination. Attention should be drawn, to
Every essay comes to an end, I would imagine, by its author trusting that
begin with, to the fact that it has for some time been recognized that a
what has been said has in some measure succeeded in showing how
number o f sophismata physicalia occur in the fourteenth century literature.148 xhis discovery was based merely on the enunciations o f the
unnecessary was the reader’ s willing suspension o f disbelief. In this case,
sophismata in question and one could extend this kind o f evidence
was a secondary, methodological unity within fourteenth century philo
considerably. One can, however, confirm the connection in question in other, more substantial, ways.
to spell out at least one form that this unity assumed, a form that was,
I hope that any success has at least had the effect o f estabUshing that there sophy and theology. In addition to this fact, I have o f course been concerned
There is, for example, the occurrence o f physicalia in a number o f
I beUeve, an important one among those factors enabhng the fourteenth
the logical sophismata o f the thirteenth century, especially when it is a
century scholar to move with relative ease, as I put it above, from faculty
question o f ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ as syncategorematic terms.i^o There is
to faculty, and to do so with a reasonable confidence in his competence to
also a good deal o f the physical, in particular much that is directly bound
deal with the tasks and questions asked o f him. How important has been at
up with our measure languages, in fourteenth century sophisms that have been hitherto regarded as purely logical, gut even stronger evidence
made in passing about the application o f the new analytical languages. In
can be found in the fact that, within the most important natural philo
least partially indicated, I hope, by the particular points o f significance
sophical treatises de motu in the fourteenth century, we find the variant
concluding, I should like to propose several additional remarks about the significance o f this phenomenon. They are remarks, unfortunately, that
cases o f change with which the author was dealing explicitly being called
will have to be put in a general and abstract way and in part will be intended
sophismata. What is more, if we there examine the nature o f the sophis ma so revealed, in many instances the measure it is concerned with is the
as more suggestive than conclusive. The remarks are all, basically, ones o f comparison: what can be said o f
familiar brand dealing with infinite values.
the fourteenth century unity o f philosophy and theology with respect to
Turning to the bearing that all o f this has within theology, it is o f course
that which preceded it? In the interests o f getting down to essentials
true that we do not have any collections o f theological sophismata.^^^
quickly, let us concede the existence o f such a unity in both the fourteenth
N or do we have, as far as I have noticed, anything more than the incidental
and thirteenth centuries, (from, say, 1260 on for the latter) and let us also
labeUing o f arguments in Sentence Commentaries as sophismata. This not
grant that there occurred a shift from a fundamentally cosmological,
withstanding, it is proper, I think, to regard many o f the particular applications that I have noted o f the measure languages as just that. W e
speculative stance in the thirteenth to an analytic and critical one in the fourteenth. 155 Was there, let us now ask, any significant difference in the
have, as it were, '‘'‘sophismata without announcement.”
character o f the unity from century to century (i.e., an important difference
In both philosophy and theology they provided a convenient mold in
beyond the fact that different things or problems may have been so uni-
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J. MURDOCH
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M ED IE VAL L E A R N I N G
fied)? Intuitively, one would gather that there would be numerous
much less o f Aristotle there and in a different way. For fourteenth
differences. I should like to direct attention to one. It stands a good chance,
century philosophy, especially natural philosophy, bore a largely re
I think, o f being the most important. Put abstractly, it amounts to claiming
formulated Aristotle, reformulated in terms consistent with the new
that that which did the unifying in the fourteenth century (or at least those
logical and epistemological requirements developed in that century
unifiers o f which I have been speaking) was less touched, less changed,
(our analytical languages being involved in no small part, incidentally,
in carrying out the unification in question than was that which played
o f these requirements).!®^ This in turn meant that one did not have to do
the corresponding role in the thirteenth century. Let me try to fill in a few details.
so much with parts o f theology expressed in Aristotelian terms, but
Whatever unity there was to philosophy and theology in the thirteenth
terminology that stood apart from each. When to this one adds the fact
century, what was central to it can profitably be interpreted in terms o f the prevailing Aristotelianism.i^e Unification occurred, that is, by
that this terminology and the conceptual apparatus behind it were basi
means o f the systematic application o f Aristotelian conceptions, defini
formaliter quam materialiter follows rather naturally. But such is just the
tions, and principles to theological subjects. But when these Aristotelian
unity that the new analytical languages, and my thesis, speak for.
308
rather with Aristotelianism and parts o f theology expressed in a single
cally analytical, then a unity for theology and philosophy that is magis
notions were apphed, as it were, to God and to the Christian universe,
I could finish with this confirming observation were it not for the fact
they were altered in a way, and to a degree, that the parallel “ unifying”
that, save for occasional references to the importance o f the medieval
algorithms o f the fourteenth century analytical languages were not.i^?
university, I have said almost nothing about the first part o f my title. Y et
The fourteenth century languages did not suifer, to put it in terms o f a
I have not by this intended that social factors be removed from the scene
metaphorical example, anything like the Avicennizing or Dionysianizing undergone by Aristotelianism.iss Or, to make another comparison, no
by silence. I should like to offer at least some argument for the background
algorithm o f a fourteenth century analytical language was ever prey to a debate as controversial and as extended as that surrounding the Omne quod movetur axiom.^^®
position I have apparently assigned to them. As is to perhaps a certain extent already implicit in some o f the things I have said, the unitary character o f medieval learning in general started socially, or had a social base. By this I mean to point not simply to the
T o this one might object that the accommodations made to allow the
universities, but also to the monastic and cathedral schools before them,
incorporation o f such new elements as infinite values consitute a four
and to all other social elements o f tradition that went into constituting a Christian education and to producing Christian scholars. Nevertheless,
teenth century analogue o f the thirteenth century Aristotelian alterations. N ot quite. For these accommodations were almost always additions that
although one can thus properly maintain that such a unitary character
did not violate the existing structure o f the language or change its algorithms.!®»
started socially, it seems to me undeniable that it developed intellectually.
Another manner o f expressing the particular point I am attempting to
cal-theological unity that I have been describing, the relevant factors are
In particular, when it comes to the explanation o f the kind o f philosophi
make would, I suppose, be to claim that the unification o f philosophy and
overwhelmingly intellectual. A t best, social factors account for available
theology in the thirteenth century occurred magis materialiter quam formaliter. How could this be avoided, one might ask, i f a great part
possibilities; they seldom say anything about which ones were taken up
o f theology was to be expressed in Aristotelian terms and i f this expression
involved in a training in depth in logic within the thirteenth century,
was to be carried out within the fabric o f all-encompassing philosophical-
but they do not, as far as I can see, explain why this or that was done with it at the end o f the century, Furthermore, I do not really see that any
theological systems? This is not to maintain, by contrast, that all philos ophy in fourteenth century theology was analytical languages (or analytical anything for that matter) and no Aristotle. But there was
and why. It may be true, for example, that social factors are intimately
non-intellectual ideology dictated, or perhaps even influenced, the devel opment o f the kind o f unity I have been treating or o f the analytical langu
J. M URD OCH
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M E D IEVA L L E A R N IN G
ages that made it what it was. i^^Adequate investigation and explanation
ground o f the same territory. T o be aware o f the “ critical and analytic
o f such developments demand, I believe, a detailed consideration o f just
habit” may well prove to be o f immeasurable assistance in properly
those kinds o f sources I have here utilized for documentation, and they
interpreting such new material. Surely, however, we should not stop there.
are not, save with few exceptions, social ones. Y et I know o f no other way
One should - to cite my own bias - inquire further into the “ habit” :
to proceed and to answer these kinds o f questions. As I have tried to
given an analytic attitude, one ought to ask in precisely what way it was
indicate in the first, perhaps overly enigmatic, part o f the title to this
analytic and how it may have changed, grown, or passed into disuse.
310
311
paper, the historian must follow the path o f sources running from social
I have intended the present essay in part to do just that: to set forth one
into intellectual factors. The intellectual factors that I have found to be
important aspect o f just how the fourteenth century attitude was analytic.
most relevant, however, are not ones specifically tied to individual works
But it is just one aspect. T o follow this kind o f trail, however, is to con
or accomplishments; they are largely common, methodological ones that
tinue the track from social into intellectual factors.
can be seen as binding together whole groups o f scholars and, hence, as
The results that I have reached over the short part o f the trail I have
indicative o f broader intellectual characteristics and developments. As
thus far managed to cover are intended as an instance (albeit quite
such, they are those factors most likely to be encountered in moving from
one-sided) o f the cooperative history o f science-philosophy and theology
the social to the intellectual.
that I recommended at the outset, so it is perhaps well that I conclude
One might reply to my belief in the necessity o f making this move that
with a few reflections in this direction. Simply put, I should merely like
the analytical attitude that the new fourteenth century languages expressed
to offer a few suggestions, or perhaps questions, o f how, apart from any
can be viewed as a “ habit o f mind” characteristic o f a particular social
historical value it may hold per se, the weaker unity o f philosophy and
group.
theology that I have been touting might prove o f interest to the histories
Although I must admit to speaking with an appreciable ignor
ance o f most sociology o f knowledge, I do not think that this is o f much
o f medieval science and theology in general.
help. It cannot explain or account for the occurrence o f the phenomenon
A t the most evident level, I would think that it would be appreciably
I have been concerned with if for no other reason because, as I see it, such
instructive to the historian o f science to observe with some care exactly
a “ habit” or “ mentaUté” is an eflFect o f the development in question, not a
how languages and techniques developed largely in natural philosophy
cause. It is, i f one can so speak, the development developed or at least partially developed. As such, it may indeed explain the growth o f the
looked when disseminated to other areas or disciplines. One might even
attitude for which it stands, yet even here I would hazard that it would
whether the “ results” obtained through the application o f the measure
wish to summon enough courage to ask the rather intriguing question o f
function more adequately in accounting merely for expansion in extension,
languages within theological contexts may not be viewed as in some sense
both in the number o f new adherents and in the number o f new areas or
being more important to the medieval scheme o f things as a whole than
problems in which the attitude can be discovered. Seldom would it explain,
were those elicited in natural philosophy proper. Further, it would be
I think, a change or development in the attitude itself.
well to sensitize one’s antennae for the discerning o f any possible change
Further, a related point can be made in historiographic terms. It is that
the languages may have suffered when transferred to the theological
when we find a historian asserting the existence o f such a “ habit o f mind”
realm (one thinks for example, o f determining what may have been added
(characterizing the fourteenth century, for example, as “ critical and
to their development through their appUcation to “ theological infinites” ).i65
analytic” ), the assertion is naturally almost always in the nature o f a conclusion drawn from a great deal o f previous research. Once it has been
The possible yield for the history o f theology is perhaps even greater.
asserted (assuming it accurately describes the intellectual phenomenon in
For in spite o f the separation o f faith and reason that is frequently to be
question), it can then serve the quite valuable function o f telling other
found confidently asserted in so many h i s t o r i e s , i t seems to me that
historians what to expect and what to look for when they cover unexplored
theology ended up being more philosophical in the fourteenth century
J. M U RDO CH
U N I T A R Y C H A R A C T E R OF M E D IEVA L L E A R N I N G
than it had previously been. Setting aside those evaluations that have seen
ideas of this earlier paper owes a great deal to discussions and correspondence we have had, as does much else in the present essay. 2 Such interchange and cooperation should also be extended to the histories of law and medicine (the latter having been, for the most part, far too isolated from the rest o f the history of medieval science). 3 I have in mind the further investigation of why it is that such standard history of science topics as impetus theory often found expression in Sentence Commentaries (e.g., Peter John Olivi, Franciscus de Marchia) and whether such a context was of significant effect in the development and the nature of the ideas expressed, 4 Such a conclusion would be, for example, Duhem’s view that the essentials of seven teenth century mechanics could be found in the fourteenth as a result of the Church’s 1277 condemnation of Aristotelianism. ® Above, note 1. Revisions that I would now like to make of some of the views I then expressed are for the most part made below. ® The medieval “ science” in question excludes mathematics, technical astronomy, formal logic, natural history, practical medicine, and (for somewhat different reasons) statics and optics. But this leaves the substantial area of so-called “ kinematics and dynamics” in which the most creative thought of fourteenth century “ science” is to be
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the fourteenth century as a whole as decadent and as guilty o f inducing the disintegration o f scholasticism, this theology has been pictured as one o f logicizing, as one of, to cite one o f the most expressive ways o f putting it, un usage extrêmement serré et touffu des procédés d ia le c tiq u e s .True. But the application o f the new analytical languages explains at least one way in which this thorough-going dialecticism occurs, one form which de potentia D ei absoluta secundum imaginationem machinations took. And there is much more to be appreciated along similar lines, especially the pervasive utilization o f a second intentional point o f view within theology .168 Finally, if historians can muster the patience to trace, step by step, the application o f the new languages through all o f their convolutions, perhaps we shall learn better to appreciate the proper significance within theology o f what have sometimes been regarded as mere “ logical stunts” or the calculated display o f “ Oxonian sensationaUsm and casuistry.” ^®® The application was not, I would suggest, simply the result o f trying to dazzle one’s audience by the ostentatious flaunting o f knowledge and know-how, at least no more so than in any number o f other scholastic philosophical and theological works in which the analytical attitude was not present. It was instead, I believe, a very serious way o f accomplishing things, o f contributing to the resolution o f important issues, in both natural philosophy and in theology. What is more, a more detailed inspection o f these languages and o f the way in which they developed and were disseminated will reveal that they were not a product o f “ an academic society which lacked... the impulse o f creative thought.” !'^® They were the result o f precisely what such a judgement denies. Harvard University NOTES * Much of the research into the primary sources upon which the present paper is based was supported by a research grant from the National Science Foundation. 1 J, Murdoch, ‘Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Later Middle Ages’, The Interaction between Science and Philosophy (ed. Y. Elkana, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1974), pp. 51-74. This paper, and a number o f variant versions o f it, have been both given as lectures on a number of occasions and circulated in manuscript form. The reaction and criticism that have resulted have naturally proved most valuable, especially that of Edith Sylla. Much in the revision that appears below of some of the
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found. ’ Much more than merely stating it is necessary to convince one that this is true. Some o f what follows may serve this function, but I have tried to argue for the point some what more explicitly elsewhere (above, note 1). * Future research might address itself to the question of the “ degree” of a similar unity with law and academic medicine. ® Although there was naturally some material in Aristotle directly relevant to such prob lems (most notably, of course, D e interpretatione, ch. 9 for future contingents), many important new elements in their treatment derived from their theological context. See, for example, P. Glorieux, ‘Sentences (Commentaires sur les)’. Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 14, col. 1875. Such extreme sparseness in the number of questiones I have been able to find only in John Sharpe’s work on the Physics (he has - M S Balliol 93, 35v-91v - but one questio for each Book, save two for IV). Book I, dist. 37, for example, whose concern is, to use St. Thomas’s words, quibus modis dicatur Deus esse in rebus, accommodates the examination of the possible in finite capacity o f an entity like the soul (R. Killington, B N 14576, 150r-161r: Utrum omnis creatura sit sue nature cum certis limitibus circumscripta), a detailed discussion of the possible composition of continua out of indivisibles (Gerard of Odo; see note 16 below), and an extensive examination of imaginary infinite void space (Jean de Ripa; see Traditio 23 (1967) 191-267). It is probably obvious that in claiming this unity, both here and in what follows, I do not wish to maintain that all fourteenth century Sentence Commentaries exhibit it. But many of the most important do, especially the anglicanae. P. Glorieux, ‘Jean de Falisca: La formation d’un maître en théologie au X lV e siècle’. Archives d ’hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge, 33 (1966) 23-104. The MSS are (for theology) B N 16408, B N 16409, B N 16535 and (for science) B N 16621. On the last see, for example, P. Duhem, L e système du monde, vol. 7 (Paris, 1956) p. 607ff; L. Thorn dike, ‘Some Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts on Physics’, Proceedings o f the American Philosophical Society 104 (1960) 189-191. Thus, Worcester Cath. F.35, although it contains much more logic and natural
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philosophy than theology, is a good case in point. A preliminary analysis indicates that it should prove of considerable value in allowing us to construct the picture of the spread and utilization o f “ Mertonian” natural philosophy in the later fourteenth century. For details, see Franciscan Studies 26 (1966) 213-214. On Rosetus and his Sent, in general see note 82 below. For MSS of Q .l, art, 1 as a separate tract see Archivum franciscanum historicum 46 (1953) 91, to which one can add Oxford, Can. misc. 177, 17r-182r; Sevilla, Colomb. 7-7-29, 147r-167r. That one of these copies (viz. Erfurt, Ampl. Q° 107, 87r-10v) belonged to Peter of Candia is learned from its explicit: iste caternus... est ad usum fratris P e tri de Candia ordinis Minorum provincie Romane. Chartularium Univ. Paris., vol. 1, p. 543. 19 Chartularium Univ. Paris., vol. 3, p. 144, cited by Glorieux op. cit. (above, note 10) col. 1876. M S B N 16408,123r : In omnibus hiis, potissime in primo articulo, victa (!) et vitare te pretende cavendo processum logicum ac mathematicum, solum philosophicum speculativum ac moralem et processum methaphisicum et theologicum prosequendo. D . Trapp {Augustinianum 4 (1964) 403) has cited this text from its clean copy in B N 16409, 185r; but he has omitted the first six words and missed te, while the last six words do not appear in B N 16409. For the possible intention behind this note, see the table of contents o f M S 16408 as published in Glorieux, op. cit. (above, note 14) p. 26. See the incisive analysis of Ockham’s treatment of this problem by Robert Guelluy, Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d ’Ockham (Louvain/Paris, 1947). For other fourteenth century treatments, see Josef Kiirzinger, Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre, Beit. z. Gesch. Phil. Mittelalters 22, Heft 5-6 (Münster, 1930). 22 Ernest Moody, ‘Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy’, Philosoph ical Review 67 (1958) 161. 23 The standard contexts in which discussions of these problems usually occur in Book I of the Sentences were: Dist. 38-39, for future contingents; Dist. 42-44, for G od’s om nipotence and infinity, where the infinity in question was introduced either by asking directly about God’s infinity itself (e.g., in vigore, in potentia, etc.) or about the kinds o f infinities that He could possibly produce. Other frequent contexts for the introduction o f the infinite were the discussion of the eternity of the world and the question of whether God could know the infinite. For still others, see Section II, B below. 24 In Book II o f his Sent. (MS. Valencia, Cated. 200), Gerard of Odo asks (dist. 13, Q Q l-2 ); Utrum lumen vel lux multiplicet speciem suam in instanti vel in tempore; Utrum lux ista que fuit facta prima die multiplicaverit lumen suum sicut modo sol mul tiplicat lumen suum (52r-53r), In dist. 15, Q. 1: Utrum yris sit unum de operibus 6 dierum (64r-65v). Finally, in Book I, dist. 23, Gerard asks no less than twelve questions directly relating to first and second intentions (M S Valencia, Cated. 139,88r-101v). For the introduction of gravia and levia, see the questiones of Franciscus Mayronis as re ported in Franziskanische Studien 53 (1971) 207. For the investigation of astrology, see principium to Book II by Pierre CeflFons as cited by D . Trapp, ‘Peter Ceffons of Clairvaux’. Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 24 (1957) 105; Cf. p. 103, n. 2. The fascination with the ninth sphere is also that of Ceffons (in dist. 1 of Book II ; Trapp, op. cit., p. 104). 2® For example, from work in progress on Henry of Hassia’s voluminous commentary on Genesis, Nicholas Steneck has reported the existence of a veritable avalanche of
scientific materials and questions. Indeed, even within Comm. Sent., the hexaemeron is a favorite context for the introduction o f such matters. 2« See, for example, the recent book of Fritz Hoffmann, D ie theologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert H olcot, Beit Gesch. Phil. Theol. Mittelalters, Neue
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Folge, 5 (Miinster, 1971). 27 Egidius flourished at Paris ca. 1370-1395; student of theology at the College of Harcourt, attached to Norman Nation ca. 1371, lectured on Sentences 1377-1378, licentiate in theology 1384, Master of House of Navarre in 1389; made cardinal by John X X III in 1411, died 15 March 1413. His Comm. Sent, has not yet been discovered. Inasmuch as the text of his regule is brief and interesting, I give it here in toto (from MS Vat. lat. 3088, 26r-26v): Prima regula: Quod nomina supponentia pro essentia et supposito, que non sup ponerent pro essentia, si essentia et suppositum distingwerentur realiter, talia ut plurimi dicuntur de personis pluraliter. Verbi gratia: ista nomina: persona suppositum ypostasis. Et ab illa regula debet excipi hoc nomen deus quod non dicitur pluraliter de per sonis divinis secundum usum doctorum. Secunda regula: Nomina supponentia pro essentia et supposito, que non suppo nerent nisi pro essentia, si essentia et suppositum distingwerentur realiter, talia nomina dicuntur de tribus personis singulariter et non pluraliter. Verbi gratia: deitas, essentia, natura. Tertia regula: Nomina substantiva absoluta supponentia pro essentia et supposito, et etiam sic supponerent, si distinguerentur realiter essentia et persona, talia nomina dicuntur de tribus personis pluraliter et singulariter. Ut est iste terminus res et iste terminus entitas prout dicit Robiton quod ego non assero ut tres persone sunt tres res et una res. Quarta regula: Nomina adiectiva supponentia pro essentia et supposito quolibet, et ad huc sic supponerent, esto quod distingwerentur realiter, talia nomina dicuntur de tribus personis singulariter et non pluraliter. Verbi gratia: Creator eternus infinitus pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, unus eternus unus creator et non tres creatores. Quinta regula: Nomina supponentia pro uno supposito et non pro alia nunquam dicuntur db tribus personis, licet bene dicantur de isto termino deus; ut iste terminus pater. Sexta regula: Nomina supponentia pro supposito et non pro tribus suppositis non dicuntur de essentia, sumpto hoc nomine essentia vel deitas adiective, sed bene subiective, ut essentia et pater. Si pater capitur ( !) subiective est vera ; si adiective est falsa, quia valet tantum sicud essentia est generans. Septima regula: Omnia nomina essentialia substantiva non numeralia vere dicuntur de essentia et quolibet supposito in singulari. Et dicunt essentialia que sic supponunt pro essentia quod non persona; vel si distingwerentur essentia et persona, adhuc sup ponerent pro essentia, ut iste terminus deitas; et sic conceditur pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt deitas (26v). Et dico notanter non numeraliter quare non conceditur pater est trinitas. Octava regula: Nomina essentialia substantiva numeralia vere dicuntur de essentia singulariter et non de supposito, ut essentia est trinitas et non pater. Nona regula: Nomina essentialia adiectiva dicuntur de essentia et non de supposito, ut essentia est communicabilis et non pater. Decima huiusmodi: Nomina scilicet essentialia sive adiectiva sive substantiva veraciter dicuntur de nominibus communibus totius trinitatis et etiam isto termino deus.
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Undecima regula; Nomina personalia vere dicuntur de essentia et supposito, ut essentia est persona, pater est persona. Duodecima: Nomina personalia propria abstracta, ut paternitas filiatio, dicuntur de essentia et aliquo supposito, ut essentia est paternitas et pater est paternitas. Tredecima regula; Nomina personalia concreta dicuntur de essentia et supposito aliquo quando sumuntur substantive, sed non quando sumuntur adiective, ut pater dicitur de essentia substantive et non adiective, quia tunc valet tantum sicud generare, Quartadecima regula: Nomina nocionalia, ut generatio et spiratio et cetera, dicuntur de essentia et supposito aliquo vel aliquibus, non autem de omnibus, ut essentia est generatio et pater est generatio et non spiritus sanctus est generatio et cetera. Quinta decima regula; Omnia verba tam substantiva quam adiectiva communia dicuntur de essentia et quolibet supposito et eorum participia, ut essentia creat pater creat et cetera. Et dico notanter communia, quia propria non dicuntur de quolibet sup posito, ut generare spirare et cetera. Sexta decima regula: Verba adiectiva essentialia dicuntur de essentia et non de per sona, ut communicare communicatur, ut essentia communicatur et non persona. Decima septima regula: Verba adiectiva personalia dicuntur semper de persona et non de essentia, ut generare spirare, quia essentia non generat nec spiret sed pater. Decima octava et ultima regula; Participia talium verborum dicuntur de persona et non essentia nisi cum aliquo adiuncto quod redit ipsum non adiectum ut generans sit adiectum huius quod est res in ista propositione: essentia sit res generans. Istas regulas posuit reverendus magister egidius de campis in lectura sua super primum sententiarum quas cum labore ex diversis doctoribus collegit anno domini m ccc° 78 die sabbati ante purificationem gloriossime virginis marie. Amen. Adam Wodeham, Comm. Sent., Abbreviatio Henr. de Oyta (I have not found this questio in the one copy of the versio longioris that I have examined). Book I, Q.30; Utrum aliqua sit regula vel ars per quam solvi possint communiter paralogismi intra materiam Trinitatis (B N 15894, 83v). Lurtz (fl. ca. 1390) wrote a Tractatus de paralogismis consuetis fieri in materia Trini tatis (see L. Meier, ‘Contribution à l’histoire de la théologie à l’Université d’Erfurt’, Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, 50 (1955) 455-470). He even cites Egidius and his regule {op. cit., p. 460). Petrus de Pulka ffl. at Vienna, d. 1425) Comm. Sent., I (dist. 8?): Utrum regule silogizandi et paralogismes dissolvendi tradite a philosophis suflBciant christiano ad silogizandum et respondendum in materia benedicte Trinitatis (M S V I 4668, 133v-142r). Bk. II, Q.2: Quia postulas amice dilectissime, o Bemarde, ut alica de logicalibus in huius secundi libri principio diligenter annectam, idcirco aJica logicalia que dudum multa velocitate composui que tibi in scolis non protuli hic annecto, que tuo prospicaci reliquuntur examini, nec correctionis limam diligentis horrescunt. Et quoniam in hiis diebus nonnulli dubitari videretur de scire et opinari, quero utrum circa idem scire et opinari contingat (M S Troyes 62, 87r-96r). Bk. II, Q.3: Quia petitur a me ut, si quidquam de insolubilibus novi, de ipsis aliquid hic pertractarem, idcirco in hac lectura secundi sententiarum quero utrum beatus augustinus vel etiam magister petrus lumbardus vel aliquis alius theologus fidelis per aliquod insolubile potuerunt ad in conveniens deduci (M S cit., 96r-101r). CeflFons was also willing to put together on the spot disquisitions de proportionibus and drop them into his Comm. Sent. ; See J. M ur doch, ^Mathesis in philosophiam scholasticam introducta-. The Rise and Development of the Application o f Mathematics in Fourteenth Century Philosophy and Theology’, Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge (Paris/Montréal, 1969) p. 233. Ceff’ons, in-
cidentally, seems to have been quite familiar with Oxford philosophy, citing Roger Swineshead, Killington and others. 32 Hie est advertendum quod nulli {lege nonnulli?) logicam despiciunt totadie simientes: “ Linquo coax ranis, era corvis vanaque vanis, et cetera” ; et sumentes illud dictum senece: “ Mus caseum rodit, et cetera.” Despiciuntque tam insolubilia que solvere nun quam noverint quam obligationes... Hic tamen bene aude astruere quod nunquam vidi peritum logicum qui logicam dilîameret, ignotos logicos logicam contempnere vidi... et propter ignorantiam logice multi in vanos prolabantur errores, sicut et olim nonnulli propter ignorantiam logice defeciunt pro ut scimus astrucxisse philosophum et eius commentatorem averoys (M S Troyes 62,96r-96v). The quotation from Seneca (Epist. ad Lucilium, 48) points a satirical finger at the triviality of “ solving” the likes of: “ Mus syllaba est. Mus autem caseum rodit; syllaba ergo caseum rodit.” The other reference made by Ceffons is medieval: a couplet (the line not quoted by Ceffons is: “A d logicam pergo, que mortis non timet ergo.”) ascribed to the twelfth century En glish scholar and poet Serlo of Wilton. The story is that Serlo composed the verses up on being converted from the vanities of a secular life to a monastic one. Cf. F.J.E. Raby, A History o f Christian-Latin Poetry from the Beginnings to the Close o f the Middle Ages, 2d. ed. (Oxford, 1953), pp. 340-41. 38 Cf. supra, note 24. 34 I also would maintain that the development of these languages is one of the factors that characterizes the shift from a cosmological and speculative attitude in the thir teenth century to a critical and analytic one in the fourteenth. The terms describing the shift are those o f Ernest Moody (above, note 22). 35 For much in the following paragraphs, compare my earlier essay (above, note 1). 3® I do not mean, of course, that what I shall here characterize as languages, their vocabulary, rules, and algorithms, were ever called that, or seen as exactly that, in the relevant sources. They are, however, intended as an accurate and instructive way of interpreting what transpired. Note that my present account o f them is an expanded and slightly revised version of what I have said about them earlier. 3’ For the sake of simplicity I have cited these principles as they appear in the pseudoOckham (but quite Ockhamist) Tractatus de principiis theologiae (ed. L. Baudry), pp. 45, 125. 3® For the relevant texts, see P. Vignaux, ‘Nominalisme’, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 14, col. 767. 3® This is not, to be sure, to deny that reductionism (often from connotative to absolute terms) was not of extreme importance in natural philosophy (see, for example, the De successivis compiled from Ockham’s writing [ed. P. Boelmer (St. Bonaventure, 1944)] and the analysis of it by Herman Shapiro, M otion, Time and Place According to William Ockham [St. Bonaventure, 1957]), Furthermore, it is also not to claim that the analy tical languages in question could not, and were not, applied by those who did not ad here to Ockham’s “ particularism.” Cf. R. Guelluy (above, note 21) p. 220, It is especially important when the infinite divisibility of continua is at stake (as it often is), since then there frequently is no reason to choose one, rather than another, of two “ infinitely close values,” or to select one, rather than the other, o f two conver gent infinite series that have the same limit. See below Section II, B. For examples of this kind of analysis, see J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 1) p. 61, 43 Cf. J, Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 1), 62-63. At times, one even finds the decision o f when, and when not, to ascribe some property to a subject directly based upon the
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measurement o f the degree o f that property in the subject; see Nicole Oresme’s questio: Utrum quodlibet sit ita album sicut aliqua eius pars est alba, in his Quaestiones super geometriam Euclidis (ed. H. L. L. Busard; Leiden, 1961) pp. 41-45. A convenient listing of such vocabulary can be found in the Summulus de motu incerti auctoris in M. Clagett, The Science o f Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, 1959) pp. 445-462. For the development of different meanings for some of the vocabulary, and for the whole intension and remission language in general, see the articles o f Edith Sylla, ‘Medieval Quantifications of Qualities: The “ Merton School’” , Archive fo r History o f Exact Sciences 8 (1971) 9-39; and ‘Medieval Concepts o f the Latitude o f Forms: The Oxford Calculators’, Archives d ’hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge 30 (1973) 223-283. Note should also be made o f the fact that terms for the subjects to which the languages were applied also formed part of the relevant vocabulary, but it is best seen save in the instances o f the three “ limit” languages to be described below - as separate from the vocabulary of the language applied. Thus, for the most part, such “ subjectum” vocabulary will be ignored in what follows. '*5 Thus, a subject that varies uniformly in heat from zero degrees at one extreme to 8 degrees at the other is “just as hot” as if it were uniformly hot in degree 4 throughout. A special case of this “ mean degree” algorithm is, of course, the familiar Mean Speed Theorem of the Middle Ages. On the whole, see M . Clagett, op. cit. (above, note 44) ch. 5.
languages are applied since the subjects suffering application are more intimately related to the determination of the relevant algorithms than is the case in the other
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For the three examples given: (1) Thomas Bradwardine, Tractatus de continuo (M S Torun, R 4° 2, p. 166): Nullius forme suscipientis magis et minus remississimum gra dum esse; (2) Richard Swineshead, Liber calculationum (ed. Venice, 1520,2r): Intensio habet attendi penes distantiam a non gradu et remissio penes approprinquationem ad non gradum (there was considerable controversy concerning this algorithm and its al ternatives: See M. Clagett, ‘Richard Swineshead and Late Medieval Physics’, Osiris 9 (1950) 131-161; and E. Sylla, “ Medieval Concepts...” {above, note 44]); (3) Richard Swineshead, op. cit., 54v: Si subiectum uniformiter difforme terminatum ad summum alteretur uno gradu uniformi per totum, isto subiecto aliunde non moto nec facta muta tione illius alterationis, per illud subiectum gradus summus uniformiter inducetur. That is, basically the vocabulary relevant to Book V of Euclid’s Elements, that found in various treatises on composed ratios translated from the Arabic, plus several medieval Latin additions, such as denominatio (sc. proportionis), excessus secundum proportionem vs. excessus sec. quantitatem, etc. Again, the primary source for such algorithms was Book V o f Euclid. Medieval versions and supplements can be seen from Thomas Bradwardine’s Tractatus de pro portionibus, ed. L. Crosby (Madison, 1955) pp. 76-80. See L. Crosby, op. cit. (above, note 48) and M. Clagett, op. cit. (above, note 44) ch. 7. A similar algorithm was applied within medieval pharmacology: See M . McVaugh, ‘Arnald of Villanova and Bradwardine’s Law’, Isis 58 (1967) 56-64, See below. Section II, B. 51 On all three languages: Curtis Wilson, William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise o f Mathematical Physics (Madison, 1956) ch. 2-3. Herman and Charlotte Shapiro have edited Walter Burley’s D e primo et ultimo instanti [Archiv f ü r Geschichte der Philosophie 47 (1965) pp. 157-173], but it contains a number of errors and should be consulted with care. The pertinent Aristotelian background is given in Wilson, op. cit. (above, note 51) pp. 29-32, 59-62. I have here included within the vocabulary terms referring to that to which the
languages. A good number of examples can be found in the references cited in note 51 above. See the example cited in Wilson (above, note 51) pp. 43-44. Such “ normal measure” for the medieval made no use at all of standard units or constants, but relied, in proper Greek fashion, upon the theory of proportion. Examples o f relevant algorithms would be (here conflated from any number of works): ( I ) On the number of parts in continua: Tot sunt partes in quolibet toto con tinuo quot sunt in eiusdem medietate; (2) On the relation o f parts in continua: In nullo continuo sunt partes immediate ad invicem; (3) On the order of parts in continua: Inter primum punctum linee et omnem alium punctum eiusdem linee cognitum a Deo est linea media; (4) On the relation between things infinitely “ different” : Nulla est pro portio inter finitum et infinitum. Attention should be drawn to the fact that there was frequent disagreement about algorithms such as these (e.g., one might deny the first example given above and substitute ‘plures... quam’ for ‘tot... quot’). Much of the disagreement arose because o f an imperfect understanding o f what we would consider the “ part-whole” relations for infinite sets. At times, this misunderstanding took the form o f considering infinite magnitudes and infinite multitudes on the same level with respect to part-whole relations (e.g., considering one foot of an infinitely long line as analogous to all even nimibers in the infinite set of all positive integers). Section II, B below. See, in particular, J. Murdoch, ‘Superposition, Congruence and Continuity in the Middle Ages’, Mélanges Koyré (Paris, 1964) 1, 416-441. Treatment of ‘infinita’ as a logical term can be found in Peter of Spain, Summule logicales, ed. L. M . DeRijk (Assen, 1972) pp. 230-32 and in William o f Sherwood, Syncategoremata, ed. J. R. O ’Donnell, Mediaeval Studies, 3 (1941) 54-55. Relevant secondary literature on the “ categorematic vs. syncategorematic” infinite is: P. Duhem, op. cit. (above, note 14) vol. 7, pp. 3-157; Anneliese Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 1 (Rome, 1964), pp. 41-85, 460-62. A later, but still thoroughly medieval, source is Jean Mair, L e traité de l ’infini, ed. & tr. H. Elie (Paris, 1938). William & Martha Kneale, The Development o f Logic (Oxford, 1962) pp. 246-274; Ernest Moody, Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval L o gic (Amsterdam, 1953) ch. 1-3; Philotheus Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham (St. Bonaventure, 1958) pp. 174-267; L. M . De Rijk, ‘The Development o f Suppositio naturalism Mediaeval Logic’, Vivarium, 9 (1971) 71-107; 11 (1973) 43-79 and the other articles o f De Rijk cited in the biblio graphy to his recent edition of Peter of Spain (above, note 60). Since suppositio is a significative relation had by terms only as they occur in proposi tions, this qualification is necessary. Any number o f examples o f this application o f supposition in the resolution o f prob lems within natural philosophy could be cited, but an abstract account of how such applications worked would perhaps be more useful. Thus, omitting for the present a number of important qualifications, one can fairly describe the procedure at hand in the following way: Given two propositions (say) p and q, where q is being offered as an interpretation, analysis, or explanation of p (and hence where one often regards p as logically implying q), attention is directed to the supposition of some single term occurring in both p and q. Most frequently, it is noted that this same term has one kind o f supposition in proposition p, another in proposition q. Given this additional in formation, on grounds o f the logic o f supposition theory alone and without any regard
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for the particular problem of which p and q speak, one determines whether a licit in ference can be made from a term (indeed any term) having the first kind of supposition (i.e., that had by the term in questionin p ) to a term having the second kind of supposi tion (i.e., that had in q). If the inference is not licit, then q is not an admissible analysis or interpretation of p and the attempted explanation o f the problem at hand must be rejected. If, on the other hand, the inference is licit, then the analysis is a (logically) proper one (although, admittedly, other considerations may have to be invoked in order to determine whether it is an informative one). In a rather rarefied form this gives, I believe, the basic structure o f how the new conceptual tool or language that was supposition theory was applied. «4 See above, note 55. *5 To distinguish, for example, between some single determinate element falling be tween the first element o f a series and all other elements in the series and the quite dif ferent case in which there is merely always some element falling between the first element and all others. N ow the medieval would say that, in the first case, the term ‘some single determinate element’ has determinate supposition, while ‘some element’ in the second case has merely confused supposition (in an actual example the terms in both cases would merely read ‘some element’, but I have added qualifications in the first case for the sake of clarification). But we know from our logical primer, as it were, that from any term having determinate supposition we can make a direct inference to singulars, while in the case o f merely confused supposition one cannot, which means that one cannot argue from the latter state of affairs to the former. Hence, the two cases are quite different. For the kind of text this example represents, see J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 31) p. 220. (The whole procedure is, incidentally, an instance of the type of utiliza tion o f supposition theory that has been outlined above in note 63). «« See Section II, B below.
Zw ei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 3 Aufi. (Rome, 1968); E. Sylla, ‘Medieval Quantifications...’ (above, note 44); C. Wilson, references in note 52 above; L. M. D e Rijk, Logica modernorum, 2 vols, in 3 (Assen, 1962-1967). 70 See particularly Ockham’s Prologue to his Expositio on the Jp/l>’^IC^(inhisP/»7o^'opAICûl/ Writings [ed. & tr. P. Boehner; Edinburgh, 1957] pp. 2-16); cf. note 42 above. All o f this also bears directly on the problem of the “ object” of a proposition (the dictum sive significatum propositionis). For the latest literature on this: E. A. Moody, ‘A Quodlibetal Question of Robert Holcot, O. P., on the Problem of the Objects of Knowledge and Belief’, Speculum 39 (1964) 53-74; T. K . Scott, ‘John Buridan on the Objects of Demonstrative Science’, Speculum 40 (1965) 654-73 ; H . Schepers, ‘Holkot contra dicta Crathom’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 79 (1972) 106-136.
For examples, see Wilson, op. cit. (above, note 51) p. 79 ; Burley, op. cit. (above, note 51) p. 170; Oresme, op. cit. (above, note 43) p. 44. *8 The translation of Bradwardine’s rule that I have in mind is that o f John Dumbleton. In effect, what Dumbleton does amounts to observing that the latitudines involved in the language of intension and remission apply to both motion (or velocities) and the force-resistance proportiones causally related to these motions. This is permissible be cause not only are there parts to the (ordered) range o f available motions or velocities but also to the range o f proportiones. However, equal parts o f the latitudo motus proceed arithmetically over their range while equal parts of the latitudo proportionis must pro ceed geometrically (since such are the only kind o f parts obtained when one divides a proportio). Therefore, to correlate equal parts in one latitudo with equal parts in the other is to restate Bradwardine’s law in terms of the language o f intension and remission; Latitudo proportionis et motus inter se equaliter adquiruntur et deperduntur (Dum bleton, Summa natural., M S Cambridge, Peterhouse 272, 24v). On ail o f this, see E. Sylla, ‘Medieval Concepts...’ (above, note 44). The problem is not basically one o f the possible origins o f the languages themselves, but rather that of the origins of their wholesale application. O f course, a great deal of the substance (i.e., the vocabulary and algorithms) o f these languages developed, even originated, during the course of this application, but it is also true that a good deal existed beforehand. One can point, for example, to an unravelling of the notion o f latitudo before it was used to measure things, or to the availability of the notion o f first and last instants in Aristotle before they were made to serve a similar role. On this “ pre application” stage of the development of some of the languages see: Anneliese Maier,
Cf. above, note 43. Guy Beaujouan, ‘Motives and Opportunities for Science in the Medieval Universities’, Scientific Change, ed. A . C. Crombie (London, 1963) pp. 220-21. A. Maier, op. cit. (above, note 69). J.Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 31) pp. 221-24. It appears that the “ infinity” in volved in measuring the “ distance” of creatures to God was a later development (see Section II, A -B below). It is interesting to speculate whether, and to what extent, various elements in that development may have been the effect of the existence of our measure languages. Duns Scotus {Sent. II, dist. 9, q. 2) was the locus classicus for such a connection. On the whole continuimi-composition problem see; J. Murdoch & E. Synan, ‘Two Quest ions on the Continuum: Walter Chatton (?), O E M and Adam Wodeham, O E M ’, Franciscan Studies 26 (1966) 212-288; Of. J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 31) pp. 216-221 and ‘Naissance et développement de l’atomisme au bas moyen âge latin’. Cahiers d'études médiévales, vol. 2; L a Science de la nature: théories et pratiques (Montreal/Paris. 1974), pp. 11-32. I must admit, however, to a certain degree of skepticism about the explanation o f angelic motion as a context for these discussions: Was it truly a “ cause” for them, or merely mostly an “ excuse” ? J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, notes 1 & 31). ” It also does much to confirm the view that the procedure of the fourteenth century “ scientists” who made these applications was a philosophical procedure very much in harmony with other medieval philosophical activity (cf. reference in note 1, p. 74). If one compares this more “ ordinary” use o f the measure languages in natural philosophy with that of Swineshead and other Mertonians, then another way of view ing the distinction is to say that the former imports the language and its rules to solve the problem, while the latter imports (or invents) the problem to test or confirm the rule. In all o f what follows, unless stated to the contrary, the theological issues or contexts o f which I shall be speaking are these “ non-obvious” ones and will consequently exclude those I have mentioned above as holding a natural expectation that the languages will be found to be applied within them. P. Vignaux, op. cit. (above, note 38) col. 763 and Nominalisme au X lV e siècle (M on tréal, 1948) pp. 22-26; H . Oberman, ‘Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism’, Harvard Theological Review S3 (1960) 60-61 ; David Knowles, The Religious Orders in England, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1955) p. 76. See above, note 74. To make things even neater, can we establish a defiinite connec tion between voluntarism and interest in the perfection of species? The example in question is from Roger Rosetus and the physical process with which the connection is made is that of an agent or potency acting through time (where
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the effect increases in proportion to the time). The context is Book I o f Roger’s Sent, (ca, dist. 1) Q.2, art. 2: Circa secundum articulum, supposito quod voluntas causet aliquos actus suos,
utrum causet illos subito vel successive... Primo ponam alicas conclusiones... Prima conclusio: Quod voluntas, quando causat actos suos, solum causat illos successive et nullos instantanée ita quod sit dare aliquem actum voluntatis quem actum voluntas causet totum simul et non per partem ante partem... sicut alie qualitates corporales successive causantur... Istam conclusionem probo sic: quia si posset actum suum volendi causare instantanée, sequitur quod voluntas posset causare actum infinitum intensive; patet, nam ponatur quod voluntas eliciat unum actum volendi in A mediante alico conatu, et cum hoc quod voluntas in tendat actum suum immediate postea mediante eodem conatu per aliquod tempus; quo posito, sequitur quod voluntas mediante illo conatu in qualibet parte huius temporis tantum causabit de actu et hoc totaliter distinctum ab illo quod causabatur in A ; et cum sint infinite partes in illo tempore per quod sic continue intendet actum suum, sequitur quod infinite partes in tali actu erunt quarum quelibet erit equalis illi parti que precise causabitur (!) in A et ab invicem totaliter distincte; igitur per consequens erit actus infinitus (M S Bruges 192, 28r). Almost nothing is known of Rosetus, save that his Sent, are at least as early as 1337, at which time they were read at Norwich (perhaps by Roger himself). On Rosetus see: V. Doucet, ‘Le Studium franciscain de Norwich en 1337 d’après le MS Chigi B.V.66 de la Bibliothèque Vaticane’, Archivum franciscanum historicum 46 (1953) 88-93; cf. note 17 above. (I might note here that in many of the examples and references that I shall give below, I have often not troubled to indicate whether the example in question is being employed for or against the author from whose work it is drawn or to cite the additional text necessary to establish the author’s reply if its use is negative. I have done this not merely to keep my citations as compen dious as possible, but primarily because indication of such a pro-contra distinction is not necessary for my purpose, viz., to illustrate the application of this or that analytical language.) Robert Halifax, Comm. Sent., Q.5: Utrum aliquis actus voluntatis possit subito esse productus a voluntate (M S V A 1111, 34v)... Circa istum articulum... primo ponam aliquas suppositiones, secundo conclusiones... Prima suppositio est (1) quod omnis G7v) res quocunque modo de non esse ad esse producta - quod dico pro generatione Filii in divinis et pro processione S. S. quia ibi non est productio de non esse ad esseper motum vel mutationem producitur... (2) quod omnis res quocunque modo corrupta per motum vel mutationem corrumpitur; et accipio motum et mutationem proprie secundum quod eos distinguit Philosophus 5 et 6 Phisicorum... (3) quod omnis res producibilis vel corruptibilis per motum habet partes et divisibilis est... (4) omnis res habens partes est divisibilis secundum extensionem tantum vel secundum intensionem vel secundum utrumque; secundum extensionem ut forme substantiales in subiecto quanto que non decipiunt (! sed lege suscipiunt) magis vel minus, et materia prima; secundum intensionem tantum ut qualitates spirituales in subiecto non quanto cuiusmodi sunt omnes actus ipsius intellectus et omnes actus et habitus ipsius voluntatis; secundum utrumque sunt ut omnes qualitates et omnes actus in subiecto quanto cor porali... (5) rem aliquam intendi non est aliud nisi immediate ante hoc aliquam partem eiusdum speciei in eodem situ non habuisse quam modo habet et im mediate post hoc aliquam partem fore habituram precise in eodem situ quam non habet modo, quia additio partis et non in eodem situ non est proprie intensio sed augmentatio... (6) quod rem aliquam remitti non est aliud quam immediate hoc... (and so on, corresponding to suppositio 5)... [Conclusiones]: (1) omnis res producta vel
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corrupta ab alica potentia finita per motum producitur vel corrumpitur... (2) nulla res carens partibus est producibilis a potentia finita... (3) nulla res producta a potentia finita producitur subito et in instanti... (4) nulla res divisibilis solum secundum extensionem est intensibilis vel remissibilis... (5) onmis res divisibilis secundum intensionem sive in partes non distinctas secundum situm est intensibilis et remissibilis... (6) omnis actus elicitus a voluntate est productus a potentia finita... (sc. a voluntate)... (7) omnis talis actus producitur in tempore... (8) 8a conclusio est quod ad bonum intellectum hecest vera: quod omnis actus voluntatis potest intendi et remitti; ista patet quia omnis actus voluntatis habet partes non distinctas secundum situm et cuilibet tali actui possunt addi per motum partes eiusdem speciei. A Franciscan, very little is known about Halifax, for he has hardly been studied. W e do know that his Lect. Sent, were before 1332. For this, and other facts and references, see A . B. Emden, A Biographical Register o f the Uni versity o f O xford to A .D . 1500, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1958) pp. 850-51. (See now, however, W . J. Courtenay, ‘Some Notes on Robert of Halifax, O.F.M .’, Franciscan Studies 33 (1973) 135-142, who dates his Sent, slightly later.) In addition to the specific connec tions the foregoing text makes between generation, potencies, divisibility, intensibility, etc., it also illustrates another frequent preoccupation; namely, establishing that the theological entity at hand fits into the doctrine of intensio and remissio. Frequently, as here, this is accomplished by showing that the entity in question possesses partes. 84 This theme is so central to Ripa that one comes upon it throughout his works. The late André Combes published (at times with the assistance of P. Vignaux or F. Ruello) a good amount of Ripa: Determinationes (Paris, 1957), Conclusiones (1957), Lect. Sent. I, QQ Prol. (1961-1970), De gradu Supremo (1964). They are all relevant to the point at issue here. To this one should add Combes’s posthumous article ‘L ’intensité des formes d’après Jean de Ripa’, Archives hist. doct. litt. du moyen âge 27 (1970) 17-147. Cf. J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 31) pp. 241, 246. For example, the fitting of the action of the human will with the infinite virtus of God. Roger Rosetus, Sent., Q.2, art. 2 (in another proof of the same conclusion cited above in note 82): si volitio possit sic causari in instanti, sequitur quod virtus infinita non posset citius producere talem quam virtus finita; hec consequentia [M S consequens!] est bona et consequens falsum, igitur antecedens; probo consequentiam, quia Deus, qui est virtutis infinite, non potest citius producere effectum suum quam in instanti ex quo nulla est mensura minor; et sic potest voluntas effectum suum, igitur et cetera. Consequentis falsitatem probo, quia si alica virtus potest producere effectum aliquem in alica mensura, et maior virtus potest illum effectum in minori mensura producere; hoc videtur esse de intentione Philosophi 7° Phisicorum; ergo si voluntas potest producere in instanti voiitionem, sequitur quod Deus potest illam producere in minori mensura quam sit in instanti, quod non potest dari (M S Bruges 192, 28r). Note once again the fitting with the rules governing physical processses. Rosetus is here tacitly using propor tiones thinking in his argument, but he goes on to fit the action of the will into intensio and remissio language (see below, note 97). A more curious kind of “ fitting” of God is found in the Centiloquium theologicum attributed (wrongly) to Ockham (ed. P . Boehner, Franciscan Studies 23 (1942) 262-63) where God’s eternal existence outside time and His creation o/'time are put together with the temporal language of de incipit et desinit. Richard Killington, Comm. Sent., Q .l: Utrum Deus sit super omnia diligendus... [Conclusiones]: (1) Quod quecumque dilectio Dei super omnia quam habet quis, est maior dilectio quam sit dilectio eiusdem meritoria respectu alicuius creature... (2) Quod quecumque dilectio Dei super omnia in alico infinite excedit dilectionem creature in eodem... (3) Quod non est possible amplius diligere Deum super omnia propter bene-
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ficium factum sibi vel proximo... (4) Secundum nullam proportionem que est vel esse posset inter finitum et finitum eiusdem rationis vel speciei est Deus amplius diligendus quam alias foret sine beneficiis (MSS V A 4353, lr-2r; Bruges 503, 80r-80v). 87 In addition to the various contexts cited above and below, the following examples (all o f them, again, not “ to be expected” contexts) from fourteenth century Comm. Sent, might be mentioned (ignoring MSS): Adam Wodeham: Utrum solus Deus sit immutabilis (I, Q. 21); Utrum anima Christi possit in verbo cui unitur distincte cog noscere minimas partes accidentium sibi inherentium vel minima»; particulas corporis quod informat (III, Q. 11); Richard Killington: Utrum peccans solum per instans mereatur premiari per infinita instantia interpellata (Q. 5); Robert H alifax: Utrum commensuratio premii ad meritum et pene ad peccatum, que per studium theologie ex scriptura possit cognosci, sit iuste a Deo ordinata (I, Q. 1) Thomas Buckingham'. Utrum sit dare primum instans meriti vel demeriti (Q. 4); Roger Rosetus: Utrum aliquis in casu possit ex precepto obligari ad aliquid quod est contra conscientiam suam (Q, 1; this the questio the first article o f which circulated as De maximo et minimo ; see above, note 17) ; Anon. VA 986: Utrumsit(!)aliquodenscitraprimumequesecundum perfectionem distare a summo esse, scilicet Deo, et ad simpliciter non esse seu non gradu entitatis, etc. Roger Rosetus, Sent., Q. 5: Utrum caritas augeatur per opera meritoria... Secundus articulus erit quod tangitur in secundo argumento quod caritas potest esse infinite (proved in that argument by considering meritorious acts over the infinity o f propor tional parts in a day), ideo queritur utrum alica creatura posset esse infinita (M S Bruges 192, 42r-44r). 89 R. Halifax, Sent., Q. 5: Within the same questio cited above (note 83), Halifax asks the following subordinate question: Utrum actus voluntatis create possit intendi vel remitti; His own position is quod sic, but he sets forth a number of argumenta princi palia to the contrary, among them the followmg: Capio aliquem actus voluntatis qui est mortale peccatum et sit idem A , et capio alium actum qui est veniale peccatum et sit B, et sit C aggregatum ex A et B; tunc arguitur sic: C excedit A , quia est totum respectu A ... tunc quero aut C excedit A finite vel infinite; non infinite patet, igitur finite, igitur in aliqua certa proportione, sit quod in sexquialtera proportione; capio tunc aliquod peccatum mortale quod in eadem proportione excedit A sicut C excedit A et sit idem D ; <et> smt due partes illius G et F ita quod G sit equalis A ; tunc arguitur sic: eandem proportionem habuerint G et F ad A quam habet C ad A , quia C et D habeant eandem proportionem ad A ; igitur A et G et F et B sunt equalia... cum igitur onmis pars pec cati mortalis est peccatum mortale, ut prius probatum est; sed F erit pars peccati mor talis, quia pars D, et B est peccatum veniale; igitur peccatum veniale et mortale erunt equalia (M S V A 1111,36r). The effect of the whole argument is to show that the radical distinction between mortal and venial sin (as actus voluntatis) must be taken into ac count if we are to apply the language o f proportiones to actus voluntatis (which is entailed by the latter being intensible and remissible). Richard Killington, Sent. Q1 (the proof of Concl. 2 cited in note 86 above): Sit A alica dilectio Dei super omnia que ponitur non excedere nisi solum finite dilectionem creature B ; et sit quod A excedat B dilectionem in duplo precise, et sit C dilectio Dei in duplo precise remissior quam A ; tunc A equaliter excedit B et C, igitur B et C sunt dilectiones equales et C est fruitio et B est usus vel dilectio creature; igitur dilectio alica creature est equalis dilectioni Dei super omnia, quod est contra primam conclusionem probatam (M SS V A 4353, 2r; Bruges 503, 80vX The implication of this is, that if the languages o f intension and remission and proportiones are to be applied to dilectiones, then either there will have to be two separate “ scales” (one for usus, one for fru itio )
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or one will have to maintain (as Killington does) that dilectio D ei infinitely exceeds dilectio creature. »1 Adam Wodeham, Sent. (Abbrev. Oyta), II, Q8: Utrum secundum proportionem charitatis vie succedat pro premio proportionabiliter magnitudo glorie... Videtur quod non: Deus est premium cuiuslibet beati non solum objectivum sed formale; igitur om nium beatorum est penitus idem et equale premium; non autem in via erat caritas eadem vel equalis (ed. Paris, 1512; 107r). 92 This is the thrust of a whole battery of arguments against a particular conclusio (Quod nullus potest mereri precise in instanti ita quod non per tempus) and their resolu tions (the text of which is too long to cite here): Roger Rosetus, Sent. Q. 2, art 2., MS Bruges 192, 31r-33r. 93 Jean Mirecourt, Apologia prima, ed. F. Stegmiiller, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 5 (1933) 71-72. Note should be made of the fact that, although one could occasionally disagree with the applicability of the measure languages o f intensio and remissio and of proportiones to a given theological subject, one almost always had to explain the consistency and application of the “ limit” languages to such subjects. For they invariably existed or occurred in time, and this automatically and irrevocably brought in the languages of incipit et desinit and of first and last instants. Cf. note 124 below. 94 Save that the language o f suppositio is perhaps of even more frequent occurrence; but I am ignoring its pervasive application in the present investigation. 95 That is, the claim is made that, utilizing a given language, one has set up a situation in the casus that amounts to a contradiction. The following is a good example of such a casus impossibilis (explicitly recognized as such): R. Rosetus, Sent., Q. 2, art. 1: Pono quod Sortes velit currere si Plato velit currere et aliter non, et quod Plato velit currere si Sortes non velit currere et aliter non (M S Oriel 15, 265v). See also note 101 below. 9« Robert Holcot, Sent. I, Q. 3, arg. prin. 8 (ed. Lyon, 1518 reprt. Frankfurt, 1967 fol. biiii^): It is argued that, if the will has a libertas contradictionis with respect to fru i and uti, then it can elicere duos actus oppositos successive et immediate ; but this is not per missible, the argument proceeds, because on the authority of Anselm omne quod aliquid vult libere, prius movet se ad volendum illud. In his reply to this Holcot simply says that we should dispense with this “ authority” : Dico quod argumentum stat in pondere auctoritatis Anselmi; ideo videtur quod facile est homini volenti illo onusto pondere seipsum deonerare, negare illam auctoritatem (ad sign, in mg. EE). 97 Thus, one can argue directly from the fact of the intensibility and remissibility of something to its necessary successiveness (which is that to be established): R.Rosetus, Sent. Q2, art. 2: Preterea, tales actus (scil. voluntatis) sunt intensibiles et reniissibiles, quia aliter non posset quis uno tempore intensius diligere quam alio; et si sic, igitur potest talis actus diligendi successive causaii, quia omne intensibile et remissibile potest sic causari (M S Bruges 192, 28v). 98 Other general factors will be treated in the following section. 99 R. Killington, Sent., Q. 1, secundo ad principale: The point is made that : Deus est plus diligendus quam frater vel proximus; aut igitur finite plus aut infinite. After rejection of the possibility of a finite excess, the attack is made on the possibility of an infinite excess as well : Ponatur quod A sit dilectio qua quis diligit Deum propter Deum et sit B illa pars latitudinis qua quis diligit Deum propter beneficium exhibitum proximo; tunc A non est incomparabiliter maior quam B, quia tunc in nulla proportione fieret dilectio composita ex A <et> B maior quam B; ymmo sequitur quod talis dilectio composita ex A et B fieret infinita intensive, quia componitur ex duabus partibus qualitativis quarum
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una excedit aliam infinite; ergo tota est infinita intensive (M S Bruges 503, 80v). Note that the assumption allowing the formulation of this particular casus is: Licet augere dilectionem Dei simpliciter ad alium gradum propter beneficium exhibitum creature vel proximo (jb id ) 10“ R. Holcot, Sent. I, Q. 3, art 7 (ed, Lyon, 1518, sign, mg, I-K ): Septimus articulus est an volitio fiat subito an successive... Quod autem nulla volitio causata possit esse subito declaratur, quia si sic, tunc foret possibile quod angelus peccaret sive pecasset in instanti sue creationis. Consequentia patet, quia si in instanti haberet cognitionem boni et mali et usum liberi arbitrii, tuncin illo instanti posset bene vel male velle et peccaret. Falsitas consequentis ostenditur multipliciter... Preterea, si actus voluntatis fiat subito, aliquis angelus necessario peccaret et invitus; quia supposito quod Deus creet in hoc instanti angelum, et precipiat sibi actualiter quod diligat quam citissime poterit, et sequestret actum voluntatis sue per hoc instans precise; quo facto, iste in aliquo instanti amabit Deum, et sit illud instans A . Et arguo sic: inter A et hoc instans fuit tempus medium in quo ille angelus non amavit Deum; ergo tunc peccavit, et tamen hoc vitare non potuit; ergo invitus et necessario peccavit. The “ moving force” behind this partic ular argument is the inconsistency of indivisible (i.e., instantaneously occurring) actions and the continuity o f time (together with the language therefore) in which these actions must occur. Another, more straightforward, example of the problem o f indivisibles and a language is R. Halifax, Sent, Q. 5 (Cf. note 83 above): Si voluntas potest producere actum suvun in instanti; sequeretur quod, si voluntas intenderit actum suum per aliquod tempus, in fine temporis actus voluntatis esset infinitus intensive (M S V A 1111, 35v). For other instances o f difficulties with indivisibles see note 82. 101 The role played by the libera volitio is evident in general from the whole context (i.e., usually some aspect o f the freedom o f the will itself). On the other hand, the specific role that it plays in allowing or determining choices within a continuous interval is usually hidden within the twists and turns o f an often complex argument; but it is there none the less. A good example is Roger Rosetus, Sent., Q. 2, art. 1 : The questio principalis is : Utrum voluntas creata libere vel necessario causet actum fruendi respectu D ei... Primus articulus est utrum voluntas sit causa sui actus... pono alicas conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod cuiuscumque sue libere volitionis est voluntas cause... (After two further conclusiones, there follows a series o f argiunents contra conclusionem p ri mam, among which is the following): Preterea, si conclusio foret vera, tunc voluntas libere posset in actum indifferentem, puta moveri. Tunc pono quod quilibet movens localiter motu uniformi premiabitur alico premio sic quod velocius movens et uni formiter magis premiabitur; et volo quod cum hoc Sortes summe appetit premiari. Tunc arguitur sic: Nullus est velocissimus motus uniformis quo Sortes potest moveri, igitur est remississimus quo non potest moveri; sit igitur talis motus A . Tunc arguitur sic: Sortes efiicaciter vult premium et Sortes non potest habere premium, ut suppono, nisi moveatur localiter; igitur Sortes movetur localiter propter premium; igitur Sortes per casum movebitur uniformiter et per consequens alico gradu uniformi; sit ille gradus B, Queritur tunc utrum B et A sint gradus equales vel non. Si sic, igitur cum Sortes move bitur B, sequitur quod possit moveri A gradu, quod est contra prius assumptum. Si autem B sit gradus remissior quam A sicut oportet positione, ergo inter B et A erit vel saltem est possibile gradum medium quem suppono esse C. Et arguitur sic: Si Sortes summe appetat premium et per C gradum magis potest moveri quam per B cum C sit gradus intensior quam B, et voluntas Sortis fu it libera ut eliceret C gradum; igitur eliciebat C gradum, non B gradum, cuius oppositum fuit positum. lam restat probare quod nullus erit intensissimus gradus velocitatis uniformis quo Sortes potest moveri... (MSS
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V A n o s , Ir, 3v; Oriel 15, 264v, 256v; Chigi B. V. 66, 38v, 40r). [In passing, one might note that a good part of Rosetus’s reply to this argument is devoted to showing that it is a casus impossibilis (necessario Sortes non movebitur illo casu posito).] In other instances, the function of the libera volitio is not even as explicit as it is here (as indicated by the italicized words in the text above); but it can, and should, be in ferred. For example. Adam Wodeham, Sent. I, Q. 21 (for context, see note 87 above): Deus est primus motor; aut ergo modo nature vel libere... non igitur est Deus primus motor nature quin ipse sit mutatus vel mutabilis; ergo si est primus motor, ipse movet libere contingenti libertate. Sed hoc videtur falsum, quia tunc posset omne mobile, immo omnia mobilia, movere sicud vellet. Consequens falsum, ut videtur; quia volo tunc quod sint hic duo mobilia equalia per omnia et incipiant simul moveri super spacia equalia; et sit unum A et aliud B, et volo quod Deus moveat A et B per istum modum quod cum A precise pertransivit primam partem proportionalem sui spacii, id est primam eius medietatem, quod B de suo spacio pertransivit precise duas, scilicet pri mam eius medietatem et primam medietatem residui, et cum A duas B quatuor, et sic deinceps semper duplo plures donec totum spacium sit pertransitum. Et tunc quero utrum A citius pertingeret ad terminum sui spacii quam B vel tardius vel simul... (M S V A 955,123r). Here, the casus involving what are in effect two convergent infinite series with the same iimit is made possible by fact that God posset omnia movere sicud vellet. In a final example, the role of a free will as an “ actualizer” of the infinite divisibility of a continuum is even less evident. R. Holcot, Sent. I, Q. 3, arg. prin. 8 (ed. Lyon, 1518, fol. b iiii'^): Si sic (scil. si voluntas hominis esset libera), sequitur quod voluntas posset simul mereri et demereri libere. Consequens falsum. Quod probo multipliciter. Primo sic: Ponatur quod aliquis homo in prima parte proportionabili unius hore mere atur et in secunda peccet et in tertia mereatur et in quarta peccet et sic semper alternatim secundum omnes partes proportionabiles huius hore, in cuius hore ultimo instanti moriatur; et sit illud instans A . Tunc sequitur quod istum hominem non potest Deus premiare nec punire, quia nec fuit finaliter malus nec finaliter bonus; ergo tale non potest Deus nec sciet indicare... (and there follow eight other similar proofs). Here it is man’s, not God’s, will that realizes the infinite series. It is worthwhile noting that in his resolution of these nine arguments, Holcot applies the languages of maxima and minima and first and last instants {ed. cit., ad sign. mg. FF). 102 xhe following can be cited as examples of such alteration: (1) R. Rosetus, Sent., Q. 2, art. 2 : A series of arguments directed against Rosetus’s conclusio prima (see above, note 82) to a great extent revolve about the possibility of applying the will (as a potency) to proportiones algorithms relevant to potencies acting against resistances and the corre sponding effects so produced. The difficulty is, o f course, that the will acts with no resistance. In place of changing the algorithms or denying their applicability, Rosetus “ alters the subjects,” i.e., he makes a distinction with respect to resistances: Dico quod duplex potest poni successio: una causata ex contrarietate que est in passo ad effectum producendum; et sic est successio in productione caloris in passo alico propter frigidita tem que est in passo... et talis successio que sic causaretur ex tali contrarietate non est in productione successiva volitionis. Alia autem est successio in productione alicuius effectus in passo... propter limitationem agentis, quia agens respectu talis actionis est finite virtutis. Et talis successio... est in voluntate respectu productionis actus voluntatis (M S Bruges 192,28v). (2) Adam Wodeham, Sent., Abbrev. Oyta, I. Q. 3 ( =dist. 1, Q1): In the context of a discussion of one condition under which man might merit visio D ei (scil. Utrum pro studio sacre theologie ex caritate procedente debeatur pro mercede visio Dei et eius fruitio), a number of argumenta principalia are brought to bear to show
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the untenability of such a visio\ all of them, in effect, reject the possibility because, fol lowing the required proportionability between visiones and obiecta visionis, the visio D ei would be of infinite perfection, which is an unacceptable result. In reply, Wodeham allows the formulating of proportiones, but only within latitudines within the same species. Given this, it is a simple matter to resolve the arguments in question by showing that the subjects that were held to be proportionable in the arguments belong to different “ scales” ; Nullum obiectum quantecumque perfectionis etiam naturaliter agens potest producere visionem sue speciei in eadem anima perfectiorem seu meliorem quam visio mille graduum [the particular value is not important, this one deriving from its chance occurrence in a previous casus] in eadem specie... Correlarium: ceteris paribus ex parte intellectus et certitudinis vel evidentie actuum et obiectorum perceptorum, non oportet quod actus in eadem proportione se excedant in qua obiecta quo ad perfectionem speci ficam, quia tunc visio mille graduum respectu Dei esset in infinitum perfectior visioni mille graduum respectu cuiuscumque obiecti creati... Unde dicendum est quod tota latitudo specierum visionis possibilium equalium semper graduum cuilibet in sua specie est semper finita ita quod sunmium gradum tenet visio obiecti infiniti (ed. Paris, 1512; 8v-9r).
broader domain for proportiones, for example, one including virtutes elementorum, ve locities, motive powers, qualitates alterationis, etc. All very well, but precisely how do proportiones apply to such entities? Haverel does not answer in general, but he does examine their relevance to velocities, especially those of alteration. The major point at issue in his view is how one should measure such velocities; he attempts its resolution by giving four opiniones: (1) Quod nulla velocitas alterationis est velocior alia... (2) Quod velocitas attenditur penes maximam latitudinem acquisitam in maiori tempore vel minori... (3) Quod velocitas alterationis debet attendi penes maximum gradum in ductum vel inducendum ita quod illa alteratio sit velocior per quam acquiritur gradus intensior... (4) Quarta opinio est, et verior inter istas, quod duplex est velocitas altera tionis: una est per se et qualitativa, alia est materialis et quantitativa. Illa que est per se et qualitativa adtenditur penes maximam latitudinem forme acquisitam; illa que est materialis et quantitativa attenditur per comparationem ad subiectum (M S Chigi B. V.
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R. Rosetus, Sent., Q. 4 (Utrum caritas possit augeri), art. 2 (Utrum caritas possit augeri in perfectione sine alico alio novo adveniente): Primo ponam unam divisionem de isto termino ‘augeri in perfectione’, postea eliciam aliquas conclusiones... Distinctio est ista : Quod aliquid augeri in perfectione potest esse dupliciter : uno modo potest aliquid augeri in perfectione quia unum et idem est primo minus perfectum et postea magis perfectum, et hoc est proprie augeri in perfectione. A lio modo dicitur aliquid augmentari in perfectione, sed improprie, quia ipsum precedit et postea adveniente aliquo eiusdem speciei fit unum perfectius in illa specie ex precendente quam illud quod precessit in tali specie, et ideo dicitur illud precedente augeri... [Conclusiones] (1) Quod nullum inanima tum augetur in perfectione primo modo loquendo de augmentatione ita quod idem sit prius minus perfectum et postea magis perfectum... (2) Quod aliquod inanimatum potest augeri in perfectione secundo modo, scilicet improprie, loquendo de augmenta tione... (3) Quod aliquod animatum in perfectione augmentatur primo modo, puta homo, quia adveniente continue nova et nova perfectione, dummodo maneat eadem anima, semper est idem homo quod prius, et per consequens idem animatum primo est imperfectius et postea perfectius... (4) Quod non omne animatum potest sic augeri quod ipsum sit primo imperfectius et postea perfectius, quia nullum animatum aliud ab anima intellectiva potest sic augeri... (5) Quod caritas ex quo est quid inanimatum non augmentatur sic quod alica eadem caritas s:t prius minus perfecta et postea magis per fecta. .. (6) Quod caritas secundo modo loquendo de augmentatione augetur improprie... (M SS Bruges 192, 36v-37r; Chigi B. V. 66, 66v-67v). 104 jh e text in question is a theological questio by an otherwise unknown Haverel Norvici. The most we can say until we have studied the few questiones that we know to be by him, is that he flourished at the Franciscan convent in Norwich ca. 1337-1339 (on the M S of the questiones and on HavereJ, see V. Doucet, op. cit. [above, note 82] pp. 93-95). The context is thoroughly theological: Utrum aliquis possit meritorie frui Deo et eidem venialiter displicere vel peccare venialiter. However, the extent to which our languages are present is unexpected. Because several of the argumenta principalia em ploy casus involving proportiones, Haverel decides that some judgment must be made concerning the propriety o f their use. Beginning from the observation that proportio non est nisi inter quantitates (which is supported by references to Euclid and Aristotle), he replies by all manner of other passages in Aristotle that do maintain, in his eyes, a
6 6 ,105r-106r). J. Mirecourt, Sent., I, Q. 10; Utrum cognitiones excedant se perfectione proportionaliter per excessum obiectorum... Respondeo premittendo unam distinctionem quod unam rem excedere aliam intelligitur dupliciter: uno modo quidditative seu es sentialiter, alio modo accidentaliter. Res una dicitur excedere aliam essentialiter quando sic excedit quod etiam quodlibet illius speciei excedit illud nec est possibile quod aliquid sue speciei sit et non sic excedit iliud... Accidentaliter vero dicitur una res excedere aliam quando sic excedit quod possibile est aliquam rem eiusdem rationis esse quam non sic excedet vel non sic excedet aliam... Excedere etiam accidentaliter dicitur dup liciter, uno modo intrinsece, alio modo extrinsece. Res una dicitur excedere aliam intrinsece accidentaliter quando hoc sit propter aliquam rem que non est extra ipsum... Res dicitur excedere aliam extrinsece accidentaliter quando comparatur ad aliam vel comparari potest penes excessum propter rem aliquam que non est ipsa nec aliquid ipsius nec in ipsa... Tunc pono conclusiones: (1) Prima est quod nulla cognitio nec aliqua res creata excedit aliam rem creatam infinite quidditative vel essentialiter... (2) Nulla cognitio nec res creata finita permanens excedit vel excedere potest rem aliquam creatam infinite accidentaliter et extrinsece... (3) Quod aliqua cogn itio vel aliqua res creata excedit vel excedere potest aliam infinite accidentaliter extrinsece... (4) Quod quelibet cognitio et universaliter quelibet res quamlibet aliam rem excedere potest vel excedi potest ab eadem vel quidditative vel accidentaliter intrinsece vel extrinsece... (5) Quod una res potest excedere aliam in duplo quidditative vel in alia proportione finita vel infinita, et tamen non oportet cognitionem eius excedere cognitionem alterius propriam et distinctam in duplo accidentaliter vel in aliqua proportione et tamen non oportet cognitionem eius excedere cognitionem propriam et distinctam alterius (M S Napoli, B N V i l . C. 28, 17r-18v). Several observations are in order. First, Mirecourt carries systematics further when for each of his conclusiones (save the last) he gives proofs, arguments contra, a series o f propositiones, and resolutions o f the contrary ar guments by means of these propositiones. I mention this because these propositiones add to his little “language o f proportiones" in that, in addition to the conclusiones, they too furnish algorithms, often of a more specific nature. Secondly, note should be made of the fact that infinite excessus and infinite proportiones have been incorporated into Mirecourt’s system, as well as other different kinds o f excess that will allow the simultaneous proportio o f a given thing to another in various senses. This naturally allowed of a broader application of the language in theology. Thus, Conclusio 3 permitted him to accoimt for the proper proportio o f dilectio D e i to dilectio creature, a problem that we have abeady seen giving Richard Killington much exercise (above, notes 86, 90, 99)
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Alternatively, Conclusiones 5-6 enabled him to treat the kind of issue that had troubled Wodeham in separating visiones from thcir obiecta (above, note 102). Finally, attention should be drawn to the fact that the combining of the scale of perfections, their mutual excessus and proportiones, with cognitiones or mental contents was also carried out by Pierre Ceffons, Sent. I. Q. 6 circa prol: Utrum necesse sit quod generaliter scientie se excedant in perfectione secundum quod subiecta (M S Troyes 62,19v-24r). Considering that Ceffons apparently knew Mirecourt well, the two accounts would bear comparison. (For some of the material contained in the Ceffons questio, see J. Murdoch, op. cit. [above, note 31] pp. 243-46). 108 J. Mirecourt, Sent. Ill, Q Q 4,6-11 (MSS Paris, B N 15883,113r-133r; Praha, Univ. III. B. 10 (41g) 85v-88r, 91v-105v, et 112v-113r tabula). It is difficuU to indicate in a single footnote the scope of what Mirecourt tried to accomplish, but at least some of the pains he went to in order to fit the various measure languages into theology can be re vealed by citing the relevant questiones and a few of the conclusiones he established within them. Quest. 4: Utrum voluntas per additionem partis ad partem vel per diminu tionem partis a parte meritum vel demeritum suum possit intendere vel remittere: Conci. 1; Intensio actus meritorii ipsius voluntatis fit per additionem partis ad partem. Quest. 6: Utrum voluntas creata posset intendere vel remittere meritum suum vel demeritum (this questio appears only in the Paris M S - where the order of questiones differs and all are collected together in a single series at the very end of Book III - and the Praha tabula): Concl. 5: Non solum quilibet actus voluntatis sic potest intendi et remitti, ymmo etiam quilibet actus intellectus et quilibet actus animo ; Concl. 6 : Quodibet accidens in anima receptum naturaliter vel supernaturaliter potest intendi et potest remitti. Quest. 7: Utrum ahqua creatura possit aliquod instantanée precise producere. All four conclusiones deny the existence of a primum instans esse for various physical and intellective processes; for example: Concl. 3: N on est dare primum instans in quo luminosum primo illuminet medium. Quest. 8 : Utrum creatura a solo Deo per solum instans possit conservari. Immediately preceding the assertion of his first conclusio Mirecourt neatly reveals the fact that he was consciously applying the measure languages at hand: D e questione proposita supponendo modos communes loquendi secundum quod dicimus res esse in tempore vel in instanti, pono aliquas conclusiones... Concl. 1: Nulla res indivisibilis potest esse vel non esse precise per instans sic quod non per tempus. Concl. 3: Hec propositio non est possibilis: Hec res permanens est, sive sit divisi bilis sive indivisibilis, et immediate post hoc nec ipsa nec aliquid ipsius erit. Concl. 6 : Hec est possibilis : Aliqualiter res non est talis in hoc instanti, qualiter talis erit immediate post hoc; similiter aliqualiter res est talis, qualiter talis non erit immediate post hoc. Quest. 9 : Utrum voluntas creata mereri vel demereri possit in instanti precise per in stans. Concl. 1: Si voluntas meretur in hoc instanti, illa voluntas immediate ante hoc merebatur. Concl. 3: Possibile est quod in instanti in quo voluntas desinit mereri ipsa incipiat demereri. (In the discussion of this conclusio Mirecourt considers the example of a bean thrown upward being met by a falling millstone, a casus frequently invoked in treatments o f the problem o f a quies media.) Concl. 4: Quod immediate post intensionem meriti potest aliquis remittere meritum vel demeritum. Concl. 5 : In alico instanti potest quis incipere peccare mortaliter qui immediate ante erat in caritate. Concl. 6: Quod non est dare ultimum instans caritatis. Quest. 10: Utrum voluntas creata, que in hoc instanti non meretur vel in hoc instanti non demeretur, immediate post hoc instans possit mereri vel demereri. Concl. 1: Si voluntas in hoc instanti meretur, ipsa immediate post hoc merebitur. Concl. 3 : Possibile est quod voluntas nunc non mereatur vel demereatur que immediate ante merebatur vel demerebatur. Concl. 4: Pro nullo instanti quo quis mere
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tur debetur aliquod premium cuius nulla pars prius debeatur. Concl. 5 : Cuiuslibet meriti vel demeriti est primum instans sui esse (this conclusio and the following should be com pared with those dealing with physical processes given in quest. 1). Concl. 6: Contingit dare primum instans in quo aliquis mereatur hoc merito et primum in quo demereatur hoc demerito. Quest. 11 : Utrum voluntas creata ad quemcumque gradum meriti possit intendere vel remittere actum suum. Concl. 1: Voluntas creata per aliquod tempus ra tionale potest eligere actus meritorios equalis intensionis. Concl. 2: Aliquis est gradus ymaginabilis meriti tam intensus quod hec voluntas cum gratia quam habet vel habitura est ex ordinatione Dei et in tempore quo potest esse in statu merendi ad illum non posset intendere meritum suum et aliquis est gradus ymaginabilis tam remissus quod hec voluntas cum gratia quam habet vel habitura est ex conatu suo quantumcumque modico non posset illum habere per se sic quod illo habito cessaret ulteriorem habere. Concl 3: Nullus est gradus meriti ita intensus quod voluntas cum gratia habita vel habenda posset acquirere quin posset intensiorem acquirere nec aliquem gradum ita remissum quin possit remissiorem. Concl. 4: N on semper ad quemcumque gradum voluntas vult intendere vel remittere meritum suum intendit vel remittit meritum suum. Again, several observations: I have cited but some 20 o f the 36 conclusiones that Mire court formulates in these questiones (I have concentrated mostly on those with theologi cal referents), but in addition to this, following his usual pattern (see note 105), Mire court sets forth numerous propositiones that also serve as algorithms for the languages with which he is dealing. One final, incidental, remark about Mirecourt’s possible sources: Before proceeding to the drawing out of conclusiones in quest. 7 (B N 15883, 112v), he sets down duas propositiones. Now , save for three repeated words and a few transpositions, these propositiones are precisely the same as two suppositiones of Robert Halifax that were cited above (note 83), even to the point o f excluding the Son and the Holy Spirit in exactly the same terms. Moreover, in another place (B N 15883, 118v) suppositiones 5 and 6 of Halifax (again note 83) are used verbatim by Mirecourt. In neither case is Halifax mentioned, at least in the MSS I have consulted. In any event, the relation of the two thinkers bears further investigation. Apologia prima, ed. Stegmiiller (above, note 93) pp. 71-72: et hoc (scil. de primo et ultimo instanti) diffuse satis pertractavi in aliquibus questionibus tertii libri. 1”® Apologia prima, ed. Stegmiiller (above, note 93), p. 61. That this is not too strong a claim is evident from the fact that a careful examina tion o f the condemned proposition reveals that, although some equivalent proposition might have been formulated in another way, that particular proposition could not have resulted without the languages. See, for example, the proposition to which the foregoing note refers: Non peior est moraliter vel demeritorie habens habitum malum cum actu quam habens habitum malum eiusdem intensionis sine actu; nec melior est moraliter vel meritorie habens habitum bonum cum actu quam habens habitum bonum eiusdem intensionis sine actu. Cf. Chartularium Univ. Paris., II, p. 611, prop. 20-23. Thus, for example, Adam Wodeham brings in intensio and remissio in an astounding number of questiones and Richard Killington commences a questio that makes liberal use of measure language (e.g., above, notes 86,90,99) by remarking that his discussion will proceed nihil penitus asserendo ignotum (M S Bruges 503, 80r). This is not to say, to repeat my eariier caution, that the languages were so popular that all fourteenth cen tury theologians used them freely. m By this I mean not merely that the potentia absoluta accounts for the possibility of these procedures, but also for the fact of these procedures. 112 By ‘equivalent’ I mean, o f course, that the rationes or casus themselves are some
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how similar, and not simply that they are concerned with establishing the same point. I have in mind, for instance, something in the nature of a “ translation” o f an earlier, non-language based, ratio or casus into one that did apply the languages. To what extent, for example, was the problem o f the instantaneous vs. the succes sive action of the will an issue that was developed or “ egged on” by the fact that the languages were available to treat it? It certainly was a frequent context for their exer cise; beyond the instances that have been cited above (notes 82, 83, 100, 106), one could add Wodeham, Sent. I, QQ. 10-11, Richard Fitzralph, Sent. I, Q. 9, art. 2[cf. Gordon Leff, Richard Fitzralph, Commentator o f the Sentences (Manchester, 1963) pp. 93-96], Killington, Sent., Q. 5, and many others. See above, note 57. With respect to the languages of first and last instants and of de incipit et desinit this is also evident from the fact that they had roots going back to Aristotle’s discussions of continuity and continuous change. (For these roots see note 52 above.) For such a parallel compare the citation from Bradwardine in note 46 with that involved in note 65. 11'^ Thus: (1) In his discussion in Sent. 1, Q. 3 about the latitudo visionum and their obiecta (above, note 102), Wodeham is led to consider the infinite excess of any rectili near angle over a hom-angle (viz., that formed by any circle and a tangent to it). He grants that the latter is infinitely more acute than the former, but claims that, even so, it does not infinitely exceed it in acuteness. For proper infinite excess (which is the kind at issue in this questio) one must appeal to the excess of a line over a point; Dico quod licet quod angulus contingentie {ed. continentie!) in infinitum sit acutior rectilineo, cum sit solum circumferentialiter divisibilis et rectitudinaliter indivisibilis, non tamen con ceditur quod infinite excedat in parvitate vel acutie angulum rectilineum, quod tamen oporteret si directe valeat ad probandum unam intellectionem finitam excedere aliam infinite. Unde si poneretur punctus indivisibilis linea in infinitum esset maior, ipso accipiendo comparationem proprie (ed. Paris, 1512, 9v). (2) Just as one could divide a continuous line into (say) 5 equal parts, so one could divide a proportio into 5 equal parts (e.g. 32/1 into five 2/1 parts). And just as three such equal parts of the line are to the whole line, so three such equal parts of the proportio are to the whole proportio [which, in our terms, amounts to (8/1)®/® = 32/1]. Nicole Oresme went so far as to generalize the existence o f incommensurable parts for a proportio. On all of this, see Nicole Oresme, De proportionibus proportionum and A d Pauca respicientes, éd., transi., comm, by Edward Grant (Madison, 1966), although the parallel between the division o f continuous quantities and the division o f proportiones is not emphasized there. 11® For example, Walter Burley seems to have had more problems than he realized in fitting the “ indivisibilism” o f his view of the intension and remission o f forms with the necessary continuity o f time in which intending and remitting took place; see E. Sylla, ‘Medieval Concepts...’ (above, note 44). Another way of viewing phenomena such as this, is to note that the new analytical languages were “ content loaded.” That is, simply to apply them to some subject often implied something about the nature of that subject, what properties it might have other than those eliciting the application, what relations it might have to other entities, etc. For example, the application of intensio-remissio language was usually seen to entail that the subject had parts (whence Burley’s prob lem). Or one might even claim that the utilization of personal suppositio and the rules that went with it implied a domain taken in extension. O f course this “ content loaded” character of the languages is really what is behind much of the concern over their “ fit” with theological principia and subjects.
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119 Recall, also, the function of suppositio with respect to continuity-infinity. See note 65 above. 120 See above, note 23. 121 J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 31) pp. 221-224, 238-246. 122 This technique is of extremely wide use. It is even employed by those who would argue against there being an infinity of proportional parts in a continuum: Roger Rosetus, Sent., Q. 4, art. 2 (M S Bruges 192, 37r-37v): A series of arguments directed against Roger’s second conclusio (above, note 103) of this article all center around prov ing quod in nullo inanimato sunt infinite partes proportionales. To show that there is no such infinite, one invokes it (via God) to see what happens: Volo quod Deus faciat unum continuum cuius prima pars proportionalis sit alba, secunda nigra, tertia alba, quarta nigra et sic deinceps alternatim in infinitum; et pono quod in extremitate illius continui, versus quod divisio fit, ponatur stilus; tunc queritur utrum illa pars que tangit stilum sit alba vel nigra vel composita... W e need not pursue the argument further to appreciate its thrust. Our specific interest is merely to reveal God’s role in playing the “ infinity of proportional parts game.” This role is made even more explicit in Roger’s reply to another move in this particular series of arguments. W e do not need to know the argu ment itself, since Roger makes everything involved admirably clear in his reply : Quam vis ita sit quod nullum agens naturale posset sic se movere quod tantum precise quie sceret in fine cuiuslibet partis proportionalis, tamen Deus posset sic movere unum mobile quod mobile moveretur sic uniformiter per aliquod spacium quandocumque movebitur super illud spacium et quod quiescat in fine cuiuslibet partis proportionalis precise per tantum tempus per quantum movebatur super illam partem proportionalem quantumcumque parvum, quia Deus habet notitiam distinctam de illa parte propor tionali, et fiat argumentum ut prius. Ideo dicitur aliter, scilicet, quod casus est possibilis de potentia Dei et per consequens possibilis, quia ut mihi videtur non includit con tradictionem quod sic moveatur, quia mihi apparet Deus potest hoc facere, ideo pos sibile... Roger’s specific reply from this point on need not concern us. What does con cern us is made perfectly clear (Roger bothered to say it only three times!): God is the Master of the proportional parts. In most instances, not so much attention is drawn to God’s function; but it is usually there. Cf. Wodeham in note 101 above. 123 This is clear in many of the texts cited above; so for example Halifax’s suppositio 5 (note 83), Rosetus’s argument about Sortes movens propter premium (note 101), and of course especially Mirecourt’s systematizing o f the will, merit, and demerit in terms of intension and remission (note 106; Cf. note 108). The connection between intensionremission and continuity is even more direct and evident in those “ naturally fitting” contexts that I have tried, for the most part, to exclude from present consideration. The augmentation of caritas is an excellent case in point. Once again, one of the clearest examples is presented by Rosetus: Sent., Q. 4 (Utrum caritas possit augeri), art. 1: Utrum tot sint partes in medietate alicuius caritatis sicut in tota caritate... Circa primum articulum sic procedam: Primo ponam alicas conclusiones ex quibus patebit quid sit dicendum ad articulum... (1) Non sunt plures partes in alica tota caritate quam in eius medietate... (2) Demonstrata alica caritate totali, quod in illa tota caritate non sunt tot partes quot sunt in medietate illius caritatis... (3) Quibuscumque partibus medietatis illius demonstratis, adhuc plures sunt partes in tota illa caritate et in quacumque parte... (M S Bruges 192, 35r-35v). Ignoring as not relevant to present purposes Roger’s in triguing distinctions concerning “ equality” and “ inequality” between numbers of parts, it is quite pertinent to ask why Roger found it proper and necessary to move so quickly from the augmentation o f caritas, and hence its intension and remission, directly to such
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puzzles about continua. Once more the answer is unambiguous ; because the connection was made in the (single) argumentum principale. For if, this argument urged, caritas is capable of augment and intension, then this occurs either with or without the addition of new parts (for without see note 103 above). If new parts are acquired the augmen tation, like any intensification, occurs continuously and not by leaps and bounds, then there will be as many new parts acquired - to wit, an infinite number - in half a day as in a whole day (since there are an infinity of parts in both such intervals of time) ; there fore, etc. Although the connection in question is made more explicitly than most, it should not surprise us. For intension and remission does occur continuously, so the shift to considerations about that continuity should follow almost as a matter of course. 124 The most evident examples here are all of those dealing with the will, since it neces sarily acts in the continuum o f time, even if it be held to do so instantaneously. Note that almost all instances of intension and remission also fall into this category, since once again action in time is involved. 125 Cf. C. Wilson, op. cit. (above, note 51). 126 por examples of appeal to the potentia absoluta in questiones on ih.QPhysics, see Jean Buridan (ed. Paris, 1509) 64r, 72v, 73v, etc; Marsilius of Inghen (ed. Lyon, 1518; repr, Frankfurt, 1964) 41v, 43v, 54r, etc. 127 See, for examples, the texts cited above of Rosetus (note 82), Killington (note 99), Halifax (note 100), and Wodeham (notes 102 and 128). 128 As a sub-class of the examples just cited, see Rosetus (note 82) and Halifax (note 1(X)). To this one can add A . Wodeham, Sent. I, Q. 8 (Utrum voluntas necessario vel libere principiet suos actus): In a series of dubia directed against the actio libera of the will, implication of an unacceptable infinite is one of the most recurrent themes: Dub. 2: Tunc (i.e., si voluntas causat actus suos libere) voluntas posset libere peccare sine causa movente, et tunc peccaret peccato infinito secundum intensionem malitie, quod est impossibile... Dub. 4: Tunc voluntas libere posset se conformare rationi recte, et quia illa dictat quod Deus est diligendus quod quanto aliquid est melius tanto ceteris paribus est magis diligendum, sequitur quod voluntas posset diligere Deum infinite, quod est impossibile cum sit virtus finita... Dub. 1 : Tunc possem tantum diligere Deum quod vellem sibi dare gloriam infinitam... £)m6. 9: Si voluntas aget libere, igitur potest efiicacius et velocius agere et sic in infinitum (ed. Paris. 1512; I8r-19r). 129 Again instantiation from Rosetus (note 82) and Halifax (note lo o i 130 See in particular the citations of Killington (notes 86,90) and of the conclusiones of Mirecourt (note 105). Cf. the references above in note 84. 131 One of the most striking examples is an anonymous Utrum per debitam suceptionem sacramentorum Christi remittatur culpa et gratia confertur (M S B M Harley 3243, 91rlOOv). The author confesses to three difficultates principales, each of which in turn forms an article: Prima erit numquid aliquod peccatum finitum aliud peccatum finitum vel gratia gratiam vel quecumque res finita aliam rem finitam excedere possit infinite. Revers ing the usual direction of subordination, the discussion contains an elaborate examina tion of the problem o f the perfections of species and the “ infinite excesses” that obtain between them. (The second article of this questio is also relevant to present concerns: Numquid intensio gratie vel alicuius forme sic possit esse sine additione cuiuscumque forme noviter adquisite.) Other instances of the connection reverse the order of treat ment and approach infinity via perfections; thus, Mirecourt (note 105) and Wodeham (note 102). 132 Specifically, inasmuch as variation was allowed within each species, the problem was to establish some kind of “ infinite increase” or variability that remained within the
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species, that is, an “ infinite increase” (and “ decrease” for that matter) with a “ limit.” The “ limit” was another species, and the “ infinite increase” expressed the required in finite excess between species that was grounded in their radical distinctness. But there remained an additional problem: there is no single “ next” species that can function as such a “limit” ; for between any two species God can always create another. Thus we must have an infinite number of species within a finite latitude each one of which is (a) infinitely distant from all others, (b) of a greater distance from some than it is from others, and (c) equally distant with all others from God in an amount greater - infinitely greater - than the equal infinite distance o f each from all others. To construct a scale of measure to satisfy such conditions is what, for example, might be seen as the funda mental theme in Jean de Ripa’s enormous output (see above, note 84). But one of the most ingenious, if rather fanciful, attempts to solve the puzzle was that of Pierre Ceffons who applied the divisibility properties of horn-angles and other curvilinear angles relative to the divisibility properties of rectilinear angles as a model (see J. Murdoch, op. cit. above, note 31 pp. 243-246). Cf. Wodeham in note 117. 133 Cf. J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 31) pp. 221-224. 134 See Rosetus (note 122). Killington also treats the problem (Hie forte videtur unum dubium numquid unum infinitum extensive est maius alio; M S Bruges 503, 81r) in the questio on dilectio D ei that we have mentioned above. 135 The Comm. Sent, o f Roger Rosetus. Not of especially great length, it consists of five questiones principales (see above, notes 87, 82,103, 88) each divided into sub-ques tions corresponding to the various articuli. But only one questio principalis (Q. 3 : Utrum de essentia Dei, que est creatrix omnium, possit aliquid ostendi) does not contain an extensive application of the measure languages that concentrates on issues of infinity and continuity. And this one is not one-fifth of the whole, but only some five per-cent. 136 Above, note 83. 137 A particularly striking example is Richard Swineshead’s development of what we would regard a divergent out of a convergent infinite series (see J. Murdoch, op. cit. [above, note 1], note 39). But this is only an instance, there are countless others that, qua their consideration of infinite values, await analysis. 138 cf. the references in J. Murdoch, op. cit. (above, note 1) note 54. 139 Adam Wodeham addresses himself to the importance of rejecting the a ctm l divi sion of a continuum into all of its proportional parts in Sent. Ill, Q. 10 (ed. Paris, 1512; 123v), while Robert Halifax develops extensive arguments relative to the same prob lem in Questio 6 of his Sent. (M S V A 1111, 62v-70r). But Robert Holcot addressed the issue differently and rather more directly: In a Quodlibetal Question on grace and justification he claims that : circa istam questionem, si tempus permiserit, ciuinque fient... Tertio videbitur an ista forma arguendi sit bona: A excedit B in duplo, in triplo, qua druplo et sic in infinitum, ergo est infinitum [in Paolo Molteni, Roberto H olcot o.p. Dottrina della grazia et della giustificazione con due questioni quodlibetali inedite (Pinerio, preface dated 1967) p. 179]. Unfortunately, perhaps time did not permit, for this part of Holcot’s questio does not seem to be in any of its MSS. 1^0 A t times the term sophismata was taken generically to cover insolubilia (closer to what we would regard as, for example, logical paradoxes), but this is not the “ con tradictory” character I have in mind. Rather, I mean, the “ contradiction” apparently present in the likes of : ‘Si nullum tempus est, aliquod tempus est’ ; ‘Infinita sunt finita’, etc. 1^1 See J. A . Weisheipl, ‘Curriculum o f the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century’, Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964) 154-156,177-181. Themajor problem
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is that there are questiones explicitly called sophismata in their opening lines or ex plicits, but save for a missing ‘Utrum’ differ in no way at all from the usual scholastic questio. Grabmann appears to have been the originator of the suggestion that sophis mata were the quodli^tal questions of the Faculties of Arts (Weisheipl, op. cit., p. 182). ^•*2 For some indication o f this literature see Martin Grabmann, Die Sophismataliteratur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts. Beit. z. Gesch. d. Phil. u. Theol. Mittelalters 36, Heft 1 (Münster, 1940). 143 G. Wallerand, Les oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai (Louvain, 1913) pp. 20-33. What follows represents a slight revision and shift in emphasis with respect to Wallerand’s views. O f course, this is not to say that Swineshead, Heytesbury, and others simply trans ferred the form of the procedures they found in logical sophisms to new ground. There are differences, but in no case so serious as to damage the filiation I am suggesting. What is more, the differences are explicable ones. W e can rapidly pass over the fact that the literature of the measurement tradition (Swineshead in particular) often “ resolves” the variant cases or confirming examples by a kind o f deduction from the basic rule being applied or tested; this is to be expected when the rule itself is mathematical in character and measurement is its function. A more tantalizing difference lies in the fact that in our treatises on scientia de motu quite frequently it is a single rule or algorithm that is being examined. Or at least one such rule per chapter or tract. Although this kind o f procedure also appears in the more strictly logical sophismata literature, more often a whole series of rules are “ tested” in rapid succession over consecutive sophisms. At times, the grouping is not by types of rules, but rather by kinds of examples, that is, sophismata, that are connected in other, external ways. W e even find a number of rules being applied within the resolution of a single sophism. Again, 1 think that this differ ence is to be expected. The easy mix and move from rule to rule in logical sophismata follows, I believe, from the fact that the rules in question were part o f a larger, more systematic and unified logical theory. They were, that is to say, a good share of the sum and substance o f the logica moderna, especially of that part of it falling collectively under the rubric de proprietatibus terminorum. When we tum to the measurement tradition, we do not find such imity or such system. There is a oneness, to be sure, insofar as all of the rules here belong to this measurement tradition. But there is no attempt to spell out the logical connections o f the various rules on mean degree measure, on proportiones velocitatum in motibus, on maxima quod sic and minima quod non or de prim o et ultimo instanti. And no wonder. For in most cases there was no logical connection. In any event, I would suggest that it is this lack of a higher, more unified theory that makes a procedure of “ take it one rule at a time” quite natural within the measurement tradition. For an example o f a sophisma from a work o f natural philosophy consider the fol lowing from Richard Swineshead’s Liber Calculationum (ed. Venice, 1520; Fr): A nunc est solum finite intensum, et per rarefactionem finitam solum subito fiet infinite inten sum. For its “ resolution” see the reference in note 137. Cf. below, note 152. 145 To do so would make almost all indirect arguments ending with a bizarre absurdity something like sophismata, which is certainly not my intention. 146 To cite several examples merely from texts quoted above: (1) Rosetus (note 102) has a contrary argument that moves from the successive action o f the will in time to a casus (in which proportiones language is applied to the variables of agent, resistance, and time) in turn leading to the absurdity that something that acts against no resistance also acts in time; this is in turn resolved by Rosetus’s introduction o f an alternate way o f viewing resistance that simultaneously renders the absurdity innocuous and shows how one can
still apply proportiones to the variables in the casus. (2) In another place Rosetus (note 103, where only fragments of the total relevant text are given) has the following pattern : Augmentation by parts - casus with continuity language finfinity of proportional parts) - absurdity: X belongs to the set of black and white things but is neither black nor white; resolution: amounts to showing that a proper understanding o f what is truly involved in the infinity of proportional parts in a continuum does not allow the element (viz., an ultimate part) giving rise to the absurdity, but that it can still cover the variables (alternating black and white parts) in the casus. Similar patterns can be found in still other Rosetus texts (note 101), Halifax (note 89), and Holcot (note 101). 14’ There are other instances of arguments applying measure languages in natural philosophy that are sophismata in a more straightforward sense inasmuch as they trans fer the substance of more genuine sophisms to the context of some more general prob lem under investigation. This occurs quite frequently in investigations of the composi tion of continua. For an example, see note 65 above. One can compare this kind of discussion of the “ continuum problem” with the numerous sophisms dealing with the term ‘infinitum’ (found from the thirteenth century on) and especially with the likes of Immediate sunt partes continui (Albert of Saxony [ed. Paris, 1494], Sophisma 178). 148 This was first noted by K . Michalski, but see the relevant reference to him and others in Weisheipl, op. cit. (above, note 141), p. 178, n. 96. 149 See, for example, the work called A est unum calidum, apparently by one Johannes Bode: H . L. L. Busard, ‘Unendliche Reihen in A est unum calidum'. Archive fo r History o f Exact Sciences 2 (1965) 387-397. 1®“ See, for example, the sophisms dealing with these terms in the works o f Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood cited above (note 60). i®i Thus, elaborate considerations of intension and remission, o f first and last instants, of maxima and minima, and of velocities, etc. occur in a substantial number o f Heytesbury’s Sophismata (ed. Venice, 1494), especially V, VI, VIII, IX, X IX and XXFV. In each case the sophisma itself is a standard logical one. It is interesting to couple with this the fact that Heytesbury’s Mertonian colleague, John Dumbleton, also thought it most appropriate to inject physicalia into the logical pars prima for his Summa. He speaks and argues, for example, about the intension and remission, and the latitudes and degrees, of scientia, credulitas, evidentia and hesitatio, and treats such standard Aristotelian issues as the magis nota nobis character of a proposition in terms of ita intensus gradus scientie and unum intensius scitur quam alio (M S Cambridge, Peterhouse 272, 9 v -llr). i®2 The casus are not all explicitly labelled sophisma, but in the course of an argument the words in hoc sophismate are often used, or at the end o f some secundum imagina tionem case there occurs some such phrase as de hoc multa fie ri passent sophismata. See, for example, William Heytesbury, Regule solveruii sophismata (ed. Venice, 1494) 26r, 27r, 31r, 32v, 41v, 42r, 44r, etc.; Richard Swineshead, Liber calculationum (ed. Venice, 1520), 9r, 15r, 16v, 22r, etc. 1®^ However, the investigation of such works as the Tractatus de paralogismis of Her man Lurtz (above, note 29) might alter the situation slightly. Further, such anonymous treatises as that in B N 16401,178r-198r (/«c: In hoc tractatulo aliqua sophismata com munia conscribam quorum primum est hoc: Deus est, quod sine probatione aliqua ex fide nostra suppono esse verum... Sophisma secundum (191r)... Homo est asinus) bear further examination in order to determine how “ theological” they may be and whether or not they belong to the sophismata tradition proper or are merely rather ordinary questiones disputate so labelled.
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M S Worcester Cathed. F. 118, 136r. 155 xhe terms are those of Ernest Moody, op. cit. (above, note 22) p. 161. 156 I realize that, for purposes of brevity and simplicity, I am ignoring the importance of Platonic and Augustinian elements, but the point I wish to urge can be made, mutatis mutandis, with respect to them as well. Similarly, I also realize that I shall be concentrat ing rather more on the unity of theology with natural philosophy than withepistemology or metaphysics, and that I shall have in my mind chiefly St. Thomas as an example, but once again I do not believe these restrictions affect my point. Finally, I should draw attention to the fact that I shall be deliberately excluding (as I have throughout this essay) the use of the logic of syllogisms or consequentie within theology; for that gives, I think, a rather trivial, certainly less interesting, kind of unity. This “ alteration” had good precedent, of course, in Aristotle himself who was some thing o f an expert “ model bender” when it came to working out a fit with a new area or topic. 1®® By this I do not mean to imply anything about elements in the fourteenth century other than the analytical languages suffering or not suffering such alteration. 159 See Roy Effler, John Duns Scotus and the Principle ^‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur” (St. Bonaventure, N .Y ., 1962). That is to say, such algorithms as Nulla est proportio inter infinitum et finitum al ready existed, or fit into the tradition (e.g., Aristotle or Euclid). And even the incorpora tion o f such essentially new problems as that of infinite sets and sub-sets did not cause a great deal of disturbance among algorithms. The kind of excess here involved was either (wrongly) assimilated to the Omne totum est maius sua parte algorithm for finite quantities or, when the issue was properly appreciated, a new alogrithm of set/sub-set relations was added without affiecting previously existing ones. This reformulation often carried with it what might be viewed as a reversal in the “ direction of argument.” For example, in the thirteenth century one frequently ana lyzed a given problem beginning from and operating with and within its authoritative formulation (in, say, Aristotle una cum Averroes or Avicenna), where this authoritative formulation provided almost all of the variables and conceptions to be utilized in exam ining the problem. In the fourteenth century, on the other hand, one often finds the same problem analyzed where the operation is with and within an Aristotelianism reformulated in new terms and where the analysis essentially works toward the pertinent issues to be treated in the authoritative formulation of the problem. Compare, for example, Albertus Magnus’s treatment of the problem o f the nature of motion in his Comm. Phys. (Book III, tract. I, ch. 3) with that of Ockham in the D e successivis (above, note 39).
thence to be led to such conceptions as that of fourteenth century philosophers as a socially “ distinct and self-conscious group” (Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist’s Role in Society, Englewood Cliffs, 1971) misrepresents the situation. 165 See for example Pierre Ceffons’s multiplication of algorithms for curvilinear angles (above, note 132X Indeed, in general one might not be wrong to make the claim that more was accomplished in the various discussions of infinity in theological literature than in that of natural philosophy. 186 See, for example, that of Maurice D e Wulf, or better, Philotheus Boehner’s attack on it {pp. cit., above, note 61) espec. pp. 155-156. 167 H. D. Simonin as quoted by P. Vignaux, ‘Occam (Originalité philosophique et théologique)’. Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 14, col. 882. 168 Frequent as the occurrence of such a point of view is within late medieval theology, it is hard to escape noticing it. But to interpret it as something like “ the inferential logic expressed in consequentiae” (E. Synan, Mediaeval Studies 25 (1963) 261) misses what it is and what importance it held. 169 The terms are those of Damasus Trapp (Augustinianum4(1964) 404; 5 (1965) 269). One should also note Trapp’s unappreciative evaluation of the measurement tradition in his ‘Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century’, Augustiniana 6 (1956) 148-149. 170 David Knowles, op. cit. (above, note 80), p. 83.
i®2 They do not account, for instance, for the rise of the application of a second inten tional point of view within philosophy or theology. Much more relevant are, I believe, such considerations as those which I suggested above (pp. 287-288). i®3 I am much less convinced of the importance of the 1277 condemnations than many other historians of science and philosophy. They may have indeed lent a helping hand in the rising criticism of Aristotelian notions, but I am skeptical about their “ causing” this criticism in any substantial way. Often it seems that the criticism was “ ready to go” before 1277 (e.g., about the eternity of the world) and would have come to a healthy state of development without Tempier’s assistance. In any event, we need far more work on the relevant literature just preceding 1277 to be able to tell. 1®^ One must also be careful, incidentally, not to make the relevant social groups too “ particular.” To operate with modern ideas of professionalism and specialization and
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DISCUSSION H. o b e r m a n : I have noted a series of questions that came to me while rereading your
paper a number of times, and the first of them has to do with the “ social factors” that you mentioned in your title. That the unities you are after stemmed from those social factors that constituted the university context goes without saying. It is perhaps more important to keep in mind that many of these people were simultaneously both theo logians and natural philosophers. But where the question becomes critical is when we try to explain how it is that there emerges such a new climate in the fourteenth century That is to say, perhaps we should ask the question : ‘ ‘What are the social factors that led to this new profile in the fourteenth century?” And here we are very much at the begin ning o f things, as we should be. W e should not overreach ourselves because, whether we approach it from the level of the sciences and natural philosophy or from that of theology, we are - to compare our work, for instance, with Renaissance studies - in the very initia. Perhaps we should try to avoid the temptation of considering social factors until we have more fully catalogued what is going on. That you can suddenly, as John does, open up a whole new series of sources to be looked at by the historian of science shows what can still happen. That is the first observation. The second relates to another aspect of the unities you speak of. There is indeed a weaker unity, to use your vocabulary, between theology and natural philosophy than there is between philosophy and science. The whole idea is for me a very urgent one. For while it is true that one of the achievements o f the fourteenth century is the clear distinction between philosophy and theology (and I think that your paper also points in that direction) why is there at the same time so much natural philosophy in theology? I have come up with the answer that the traditional, thirteenth century Sentence Commentaries comprised a totality of theology and metaphysics that was no longer accepted. That is to say, by means of potentia absoluta arguments, four teenth century authors became interested in showing that in the traditional treatment of
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theological problems there were only certain elements that could be considered prop erly theological. Now, just as their thirteenth century predecessors, they also had to comment on Lombard’s Sentences. They had a whole series of Sentences o f ih&h Masters and of the teachers of their Masters before them, and they now had to distinguish with in earlier Commentaries a whole set o f subjects that were not properly theological. But they still had to deal with these subjects bôause as the members o f this new generation they were still very much in debate with the former generation. That seems to me a sli^tly different way of interpreting the fact that we have so much natural philosophy within theological Sentence Commentaries. Finally, let me say something about one o f the questions you yourself raise in your paper: it is that of the origin of, as you put it, the near frenzy to measure everything imaginable. To me, this jibes with the tendency to translate quantitas into res quanta, creatio into res creata, motus into mobile and so on. That is, in the fourteenth century you see everywhere an eflfort to translate abstractions into the concrete. And it seems to me that this use of “ measure languages” (as you interpret them) is due to the fact that it is part of a campaign against a metaphysics that is based on abstractions and that therefore removes one from reality. Whether the basis o f this campaign is in natural philosophy or in theology we can perhaps leave open. I am inclined to believe that it has a theological impetus behind it and that it is an impatience with earlier thinkers who, by an erroneous interpretation of Aristotle, have fractured or threatened the unity of theol ogy by concentrating their speculations on abstractions and therefore moving away from reality. N o w when we try to answer the question of why there is this near frenzy to measure, my suggestion is that part o f the answer is to be found in the fact that all abstractions are translated into things concrete. You are then already halfway in the direction of describing the individual res in a new way. You no longer describe it as placed in an ontological hierarchy, or as belonging somewhere on the Porphyrean Tree, but you have to describe it now in terms of itself and how it is distinguished from other individ ual things. This at least relates these new measure languages to the whole climate of the time. This is a point to be kept in mind. j. MURDOCH: Well, I take it that what you are saying, Heiko, is something like the following (and let me put it in terms of a concrete example) : W e move from abstraction, as you put it, to the concrete, to particulars, to a particularism. W e would then say, for example, this individual thing is whiter than that other individual thing and, therefore, if you want to describe just how this is whiter than that, you are led to “ measure.” Is this the kind o f thing that you are talking about? This is a possibility, but then where do you find evidence for this in writers at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century? It doesn’t seem to me that it is an hypothesis that has any more, perhaps even less, substantial support behind it than the conjectural ones that I have put forth in trying to connect measure somehow with the new-found emphasis on evid ence and certitude and so on. E. s y l l a : Can’t you say that all three things fit together? You want to be certain, so you want to reject metaphysics and rely only on the concrete and so you get this exact ness that we call measuring. In other words, you could say that certitude is what caused the effort to be more concrete. H. OBERMAN : I don’t think that these are competing interpretations. I have myself tried to show that everywhere there is a hunger for reality, a search for certainty. I think that you find it, for example, with Holcot in many passages and with Gregory o f Rimini very explicitly in the prologue to his Sentences. In fact, one of the reasons why he hails
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Ockham and why he can be called a nominalist is because, he says, we have always been debating general propositions, we have been debating what quantitas is (and then comes the example, of course, of the Eucharist), but we should instead ask what a res quanta is. J. mxjrdoch : Y o u see, I have been looking for the origin of this “ measure mania.” One of my problems is that, in looking for texts that will help me, I keep finding very suggestive ones that are later than 1330, but that’s not early enough because the frenzy is already there. I would like to find somethingin the 1320’s or even earlier - and this is why I have moved back to Scotus - that would lead in this direction. If you use some one like Holcot or Rosetus (who is presumably also in the 1330’s) you are presented with z fa it accompli-, they are already running around measuring everything, particular ly Rosetus, less so Holcot. Y ou have this put together with the other elements we have just mentioned: particularism, emphasis upon certitude, and so on and so forth. I want to see what the beginning of it all is. H. OBERMAN : John, I think there are perhaps two ways to do this. You would like to have the earliest in time. But in later generations - in the 40’s, in the 50’s, even in the 60’s and the 70’s - you see that people are then able to verbalize why they opted for this, and what they say may be an indication o f why it originated. }. MURDOCH: Good. Yet given these suggestions by later people, it seems to me that it is imperative for me to try to find what they are talking about in earlier material, and in that I have been unsuccessful. G. b e a u j o u a n : Sans vouloir rabaisser la valeur de recherche de ce langage des calculationes, je crois qu’on peut dire qu’il y a une mode aussi dans son adoption; je n’irai pas jusqu’à dire que c’est comme la mini-jupe ou le structuralisme de nos jours. Ce qui me semble important cependant, c’est de savoir pourquoi, dans certains milieux, cette mode prend, pourquoi elle se démode; plus concrètement, pourquoi par exemple cette mode a-t-elle pris à Paris au milieu du XlV e siècle avec une telle virulence, alors que, en Italie, elle n’a pas pris? M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: C ’cst là où malgré tout les facteurs sociaux peuvent entrer. b. s t o c k : John, in suggesting that we might examine this rising frenzy to measure in connection with the emphasis on evidence and certitude, perhaps we should consider things such as textual criticism, bookkeeping, legal documents, and the like. Certainly evidence and certitude and other nominalistic tendencies can be discerned in some of these areas. I would agree with Professor Oberman that we are perhaps not ready to examine some of these things. But backing away from the question doesn’t make it any
better, you know. J. MURDOCH: Well, I wouldn’t want to commit myself one way or the other; this might be fruitful or it might be sheer nonsense. But at best I would think that any con nection between bookkeeping, legal things, on the one hand, and certitude on the other would be a very general one. What I am interested in, however, is a connection between some social or institutional factors and this particular push toward certitude. But I have not been able to find them; “ internal” factors seem to give a more plausible ex planation o f the specific kind of certitude we have to do with here. J. g a g n e : Parlant de textes assez anciens qui pouvaient être reliés à cette question de frenzy to measure, un point et une série de textes m’ont frappé: ce sont les textes de Roger Bacon sur l’emploi des mathématiques. Us sont tous marqués de près ou de loin par un propos didactique; non pas la certitude, non pas le rejet d’une méthode anté rieure, mais l’utilité. Il appelle d’ailleurs ça l’utilité des mathématiques pour la clarté de l’exposé. Lorsque tous ces textes sont rassemblés, il devient manifeste que c’est là
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une ligne caractéristique: utiliser des exemples, utiliser la mesure, utiliser le schéma géométrique, simplement pour faire comprendre. D ’autres textes qui me paraissent intéréssants aussi, à peu près aussi anciens que ceux de Roger Bacon, ceux de S. Thomas où, à l’aide d’exemples, il veut faire comprendre. Je me demande si on n’a pas là déjà une somme importante de textes pour mettre en relief la simple utilité didactique de la mesure, du schéma géométrique ou de l’argument philosophique, ou même de l’argu ment scientifique. Lorsque au début de la Summa S. Thomas parle des épicycles et de la querelle des épicycles, il entend mieux faire comprendre son propos: quelle sorte de science est la théologie? Et il se sert d’arguments connus, clairs, facilement compré hensibles. j. MURDOCH: To these texts I would add Grosseteste who specifically introduces measure, even calls God a Primus Mensurator. But there is a different sense involved here, it seems to me. As I look at Bacon and Grosseteste - 1 do not have any feeling at the moment for the St. Thomas that you refer to - what they say about the application o f mathematics and its utility is essentially different in spirit from the people in the fourteenth century. For one thing, it lacks this application of analytical languages which I think is characteristic, and it lacks the sophismata flavor that I think one finds in the Mertonians. There is something wrong, I think, with putting Bacon and Grosseteste together with the Mertonian calculatores. j. g a g n e : Je crois que l’utilisation des mathématiques est beaucoup plus simple et plus spontanée. Je me demande, en parlant de facteurs sociaux, si ce n’est pas simple ment la tâche d’enseigner qui crée cette relation et non pas un raisonnement abstrait qui dit: sur la base de l’unité, on peut illustrer de cette façon-là. Je ne connais pas d’arguments de ce genre dans la deuxième partie du X lIIe siècle. s. v ic t o r : I think that the big difference you are going to see in these uses o f measure in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is their function. I don’t see the fourteenth century materials that are talked about in this paper as didactic examples but as re search. The universal or general languages are research tools, not didactic ones. J. g a g n e : I agree with that; it’s different. But isn’t there some continuity at least with respect to content, materialiter, to take your category? s. v ic t o r : If there is a connection seen by people in the fourteenth century between mathematical methods and logical methods, might not the application o f these new languages in theology be seen as an attempt to make theology an exact science? This move toward a kind o f specification or particularization within theology might be viewed as a striving toward exactitude. J. MURDOCH : But if you look at the theological works in which these languages occur, and then at the same time look at what they have to say about utrum theologia sit scientia, their answer is that, not only is it not an exact science, but it is not scientia in any proper sense of the term. R. m c k e o n : May I suggest a different way of raising your question, a less argumenta tive and controversial one? Suppose in the thirteenth and the early fourteenth century that one were trying to make theology scientific. If one of the results o f this attempt was to disclose a difference between natural science and theology as a supposed science, the distinction would be one of the results of trying to make theology scientific and therefore not against your position but a stage in the evolution o f it. J. MURDOCH: Well, if they were going to try to make theology a science, they would presumably have tried to get their heads clear about what a science was, or scientia was, in the first place. That is exactly, as a matter o f fact, what did happen. And one o f the results of this is, I have suggested, this new development of analytical languages,
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or at least one of the results may have been this. Perhaps, somewhat more surely one of the results was at least the utilization of a second intentional point of view. E. s y l l a : Could we not say - and perhaps this is what Steve has in mind - that theo logians were trying to be more scientific? A theologian who was seeking certainty might try to be more scientific in his theological work even though when he was being more scientific what resulted wasn’t theology, but, for example, philosophy. c. SCHMITT: These languages that you speak about, although they continue on - you can still see intension and remission notions in Newton and so forth - it seems to me that in many ways they have a very short history. The internal development somehow comes to an end very abruptly in the middle third of the fourteenth century. Is there anything that you can say about this problem? D o they raise internal problems that can’t be resolved and then have to move into new developments? E. s y l l a : I don’t think that there was an intrinsic limit to them. It seems rather that their demise was caused by something like a humanist or anti-intellectual reaction. c. SCHMITT : Well, this is the sort of argument that people usually put forth. But if you look at the matter specifically - take Oxford for example - humanism only came to Oxford at the beginning of the sixteenth century and this use of analytical languages ended much before that. The same thing is true at Paris. I can’t see any connection whatever between humanism and the end of this phenomenon. E. s y l l a : Well, what about Gerson? Or someone like him, who claims that when this kind of approach or material falls into the hands of second-rate thinkers, it is a waste of time and is even liable to mislead people. One should stick to simpler and more religious concerns. c. SCHMITT: Well, why are there no first-rate thinkers? D o we have a situation in which a number of very intelligent people come together and develop something and then in the next generation there are no people intelligent enough to carry it on? This is to me a very significant problem with this whole development. J. MURDOCH: I can’t think of any internal problem that made it stop short. Y ou are quite right in claiming that after the 1370’s or 1380’s not much new is done with these things (although there is a little flourish at Paris about 1500 when someone like Alvarus Thomas put together a good deal of the material in a rather unique way). But through out most of the fifteenth century what you find in terms of these languages is repetition on the one hand and, on the other hand, an inability to understand them. H. o b e r m a n : But if it is true that the theologians - let us say some kind o f commenta tor on Lombard’s Sentences in the 30’s or 40’s of the fourteenth century - had first of all to do the basic job of indicating that in the traditional discussion of a given ques tion, three-fourths o f it really belongs to natural philosophy and only one-fourth to theology, then it is very understandable that only in the next phase there is a man like Gerson who had a lot to say about the reforms of the University of Paris and who advised that for theology it is important to concentrate on matters of the spiritual life, biblical interpretation, etc. Let the other faculties, he would urge, deal with this other material. One is at the next stage, then, in the fight to establish the lines o f demarcation. c. scHMirr: Well, this raises another question: D o you see a shift of emphasis in the development of Sentence Commentaries! Are certain questions given preferred treat ment? D o you see an increasing emphasis, for example, on moral problems as against theoretical problems? H. oberm an: Y ou see something very significant. They shrivel. Fewer and fewer ques tions are being dealt with. And again, this is understandable. For after you have this whole debate in which you have come to discover the earlier confusion tetween theo
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logy on the one hand and this theological natural philosophy on the other, then the traditional Sentence Commentaries can no longer do a proper job in providing a frame work for either one. Then it splits up into a treatise on proportions, for example, on the one hand and writings on the spiritual life on the other hand, T. GREGORY; Notte ami Murdoch a bien souligné qu’il est nécessaire pour faire de l’histoire des sciences de puiser à l’intérieur de la théologie. Mais on peut élargir un peu sa considération et dire qu’on ne peut pas faire de l’histoire de la théologie si on ne connaît pas ces questions de science. Nous sommes habitués aujourd’hui à une façon de faire de l’histoire de la théologie en prenant le problème de Dieu, les problèmes de la chute d’Adam, la rédemption, la fin des temps, etc. Nous avons pour ainsi dire purifié certaines conceptions historiques de tous les éléments qui se réfèrent à une certaine mentalité, à certains matériaux de caractère philosophique, scientifique, qui ont été, quand même, toujours utilisés par des théologiens. Et nous avons fait une histoire de la tiiéologie en présupposant que les problèmes sont toujours les mêmes, que le problème de Dieu, par exemple, se pose d’une façon égale chez Origène, chez S. Augustin, chez S. Thomas, chez Duns Scot, chez Occam, etc. Par contre, chaque période, chaque hom me aussi, est toujours conditionné par un certain tableau mental où entrent de plein droit toutes les conceptions philosophiques et scientifiques. On ne peut pas faire de l’histoire de la théologie si on ne comprend pas l’importance fondamentale des pro blèmes que posent les théologiens du X lV e siècle et qui font de leur théologie une théologie tout à fait différente de la théologie du X lle siècle et du X lIIe siècle. On ne peut pas comprendre autrement ce qu’est la théologie au X IV siècle. H. o b e r m a n : Before we go on, may I just come back to the last part of the question that Charles raised, namely, whether these shriveled Sentence Commentaries at the end o f the Middle Ages any longer have anything to contribute to moral issues. N o w two o f the Sentence Commentaries from the end o f the fifteenth century - those o f Gabriel Biel and Wendelin Steinbach - say explicitly that they have used everything they could from Ockham and the nominalists, but that in moral issues, that is to say in Book IV, they are almost ninety per cent dependent on Duns Scotus because the nominalists have not made independent contributions to moral theology. W e may not agree with it, but this is an interesting evaluation. Thus, theologians who are very consciously nomi nalists use a purified Scotus when it comes to ethics. In general 1 think it is important to realize that we have made our own work in the history o f theology so difficult because we have elevated St. Thomas to a level beyond his true medieval status. That is a seven teenth century invention; the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries pass him by. They tip theh- hats politely, they will quote him on certain issues, but the main thrust o f theology in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is not Thomistic; Thomism lies in waiting till the Counter-Reformation. R. r a s h e d : A u début de son rapport John a eu la sagesse de limiter ce qu’il appelle une unité forte à un certain domaine, celui du mouvement. On peut donc exclure de l’exposé général des problèmes comme l’optique, la statique, etc., ou l’on peut dire au moins que déjà dans cette période le rapport entre philosophie et mathématique en tant que science est assez limité; nous avons pour ainsi dire une optique scientifique où la philosophie intervient peu. Ensuite Jean a parlé de l’application des mathématiques au X llle siècle, avec l’optique, Grosseteste, l’arc-en-ciel. A ce moment-là John a répondu que ce n’est pas la même chose que l’application des mathématiques courante au X lV e siècle. M a question aux spécialistes du X lV e siècle est la suivante: comment différen cient-ils ces deux types d’application des mathématiques? Qu’est-ce qu’ils veulent dire exactement par le mot “ mesure” chez les auteurs?
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3. MURDOCH; Let me start with your remark about the non-penetration of philosophy into optics. Yes, I did exclude optics from the “ strong unity” of philosophy and science primarily because in such texts as Alhazen and Witelo the importance o f philosophical factors is much, even drastically, less. On the other hand, I think that one can show the penetration o f philosophy into optics if one reads other texts. D o not consider Alhazen as the central or the most important optical text for the Latin West, because it wasn’t. John Peckham was, something that can be established simply by appealing to the number o f manuscripts and the number of marginalia within them testifying to their use. So we have Peckham. And there are philosophical elements there. What is more, as one moves into the fourteenth century - I think of such works as the Questiones of Blasius o f Parma on optics - the philosophical elements become more dominant. So that I think one could establish a unity - perhaps it would be less strong - also within
fourteenth century optics, A. s a b r a : YeSÿ in the Latin tradition the situation is a bit different from what one finds in the Arabic, Alhazen is not known to have had any influence on Grosseteste, but he certainly did influence Bacon and Peckham, and in the work of these two you find the doctrine o f the multiplication o f species joined to the optics o f Alhazen. N o w that doctrine is completely extraneous to Alhazen, Yet it affects his theory as one has it in the Latin tradition in a very fundamental way. R. h a s h e d : Ce n’est pas ça que j ’essaye de nier. Mais prenons l’exemple de Thierry de Freiberg. En dépit de toutes les spéculations de l’allure du D e multiplicatione specierum, dès qu’on commence à élaborer le modèle de la sphère ou à traiter de l’arc-en-ciel, ces spéculations n’interviennent plus. Je ne nie absolument pas l’importance de ces considérations dans l’histoire des sciences. J’essaye simplement de réagir contre un danger. Ce danger consiste à rendre l’histoire des sciences - je ne dit pas que John fait cela - une histoire de la philosophie des sciences. Une histoire des sciences n’est pas ime histoire de la philosophie des sciences; quoi qu’on en dise, une histoire des sciences doit répondre aussi à des problèmes techniques posés et à des problèmes techniques à résoudre. Par exemple, le problème de l’arc-en-ciel ou le problème de la double réfrac tion. G. b e a u j o u a n : Mais alors vous faites ce contre quoi John Murdoch lutte depuis déjà longtemps, c’est-à-dire que vous ne résistez pas à la tentation d’inclure dans le moyen âge occidental une conception de la science qui, malgré tout, est une conception moderne de la science. Evidemment une expérience comme celle de Thierry de Freiberg sur l’arcen-ciel est pour vous un bon exemple parce qu’elle correspond davantage à notre catégorie de science. Le problème justement posé par le rapport que nous discutons, c’est précisément de penser la science médiévale avec un cerveau totalement médiéval et de ne pas la penser, plus ou moins malgré soi, avec un cerveau influencé par la science
moderne. R. r a s h e d ; Non, il y a une question nette avant cela : doit-on parler de “ science médiévale” ou de “ sciences médiévales” ? Est-ce que vous pouvez grouper l’optique et ce que j ’appelle, entre guillemets, “ la théorie du mouvement du X lV e siècle” telle qu’elle est traitée par “ l’école de Harvard” ? Est-ce que je peux grouper cela sous les
mots “ la science médiévale” ? E. s y l l a : If you are saying that there are categories o f things that are different and that the unity only belongs to things within natural philosophy and not to the more mathematicized sciences, like optics and statics, which were inherited from the Greeks and also from Islam, isn’t it the case that, when they came to the Latin West, they were always changed in the direction of becoming more similar to natural philosophy?
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R, r a s h e d ; Mais, je possède par contre un exemple différent, c’est l’exemple de l’étude de l’arc-en-ciel.
occur, at times even mixed with the more traditional way of applying mathematics, but they are not the optical works that you have in mind. E. s y l l a : I think that when we talk about “ measure” in late medieval natural phi losophy it is really not measure in its usual sense at all. Although I am not very familiar with the procedure, it seems to me that it is closer to the social sciences where you have a general equation, for instance in economics, but don’t really know what capital (or something of this sort) is. Y ou have to specify the variable in question. Y ou don’t call that measuring so much as making precise what is it in the real world that corresponds
E. s y l l a : But in Theodoric of Freiberg, do we really have a counterexample? True, he does those experiments, but that is just an excerpt. The whole is not a purely experi mental treatise, it contains natural philosophy as well. But can we not put the whole problem in another way? If you were just a natural historian and you never knew about the seventeenth century, and you looked at the manuscripts of the thirteenth and four teenth centuries, you examined Witelo and Swineshead’s Liber calculationum, then what classifications would you make within these centuries? What did they really think about such works on optics? How did they fit in with such other works on motion? Were they kept in a separate category? What were they there for? Why were they com menting on them? Where did they fit into the university rubric? c. SCHMITT: One o f the problems that an historian has to face is that they did put them in categories different from ours. But it is very difiicult to sort out just how they are different and what difference this makes in our interpretation. And it seems to me that the reason for the argument here between Roshdi and others is that he sees science in a particular way, I would say perhaps in a twentieth century way. But if we look at the fourteenth century and see what these people thought science was, it’s a very different range of things; it includes theology and a great number of other things. And it seems to me that you can shed light on this question by looking at it from both points of view. That is, there is a certain continuity between fourteenth and (say) nineteenth century discussions of astronomy and optics. On the other hand, if you look at science in a generalized way in the fourteenth century, there is a perspective in which physics, op tics, and so forth are somehow related to theology. E. s y l l a ; M . Beaujouan said something to me yesterday that is relevant to this. In the Middle Ages there is some mathematics and astronomy that serves the purposes of astrology or o f computus treatises, and it is different because it had a different destina tion within the medieval context, not because, as seen from our point of view, it is more scientific, but because it fits in differently with what they were doing. There were, then, mathematical treatises for calculating the date of Easter and not at all for mathematics as such or for natural philosophy. G. b e a u j o u a n : Je crois que la position de M . Rashed s’explique un petit peu par sa propre spécialité. En effet l’algèbre ou l’optique sont des traditions que même à l’in térieur du moyen âge, il est relativement possible de suivre de façon indépendante. Ce n’est pas la même chose pour, par exemple, la philosophie naturelle ou tout ce qui tourne autour de l’astronomie et de l’astrologie, il y a là, si j’ose dire, de véritables paquets qu’on est obligé de penser globalement, c’est-à-dire avec la forte intégration que préconise John Murdoch.
j. MURDOCH: But we still have to answer Roshdi’s question about the different ways in which mathematics is applied. It can’t be done properly save ostensively; one has to do it case by case. And if one does this, it seems to me that one of the things that can be claimed for the case o f the application of mathematical measure languages within na tural philosophy, within scientia de motu, is that here the application often serves the function, as I have put it, of testing a basic rule. Namely, you test a basic rule by apply ing it to all conceivable variations, particularly variations where subtle issues of con tinuity, infinity, and the like are involved. Such tests often amounted to working out sophismata. N ow in the kind o f optics that you are talking about - Theodoric o f Frei berg, for example - where you do have an application of mathematics, this kind of ap plication or measuring doesn’t occur. Yet there are optical treatises where this does
to the theoretical terms at hand. j. MURDOCH: Put that together with the incredible variations and you have your an swer. R. RASHED : That is the Harvard School ! A. s a b r a : John, there is quite a lot that can be said and should be said for the way
you want the history of medieval science to be done, but there is another way as well. There are these historians - and here I am playing the devil’s advocate for a while namely, historians who have been writing on fourteenth century science, or on medieval science in general, from the viewpoint of the seventeenth century. They would say, we are working on the assumption that sometimes people read books and that sometimes when they read books they are influenced by what they read. N o w what is wrong with telling their story, the story o f the transmission and development of ideas, without this necessarily being contradictory to what you want to do? Why can’t I tell that story? It’s not the story you want to tell, but what’s wrong with it? J. MURDOCH: Not only is there nothing wrong with it, it is quite consistent with what I am advocating. But the problem is that, first o f all, doing it only from the seventeenth century point of view, the results may be, indeed often are, taken to be the sum and sub stance of fourteenth century or medieval science, what medieval science amounts to. Furthermore, in using the seventeenth century point of view one often positively mis interprets some of the fourteenth century material. That would be a second charge against it. H. o b e r m a n : Are you not granting too much when you say that it can also be done that way? It seems to me that only by going through this very laborious and detailed investigation o f the fourteenth century on a much broader level would you then also be able to write the story of the seventeenth century. Only then will you be able to show that there occvirred a misunderstanding o f the medieval material and to show exactly where and how it took place. I don’t think that you can take the shortcut of simply looking back from the seventeenth century; you have to do it on this broader front. J. c a d d e n : Because what you have set up as the explanandum in the seventeenth cen tury is really much too narrow, John. You need not only to explain the origins of speci fic theories, but you need to explain why, if seventeenth century people did read four teenth century texts, they were able to transform these fourteenth century texts. What was the shift in understanding and expectations that allowed this? A. s a b r a : Yes, but whatever your answer to these questions, my explanation would still be an element in the overall picture. I am not eliminating these other things, but if they are such that they led Galileo to read a text in such a way that he transformed it, then it meant something to him which it would not have meant to someone in the four teenth century. This, then, is part of the explanation of Galileo, whatever else this ex
planation may include. s. v ic t o r : ‘Part’ is the operative word. And the important thing about history is not its analytic nature, but the way it grasps on to more and more and more. And the ex
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planation of why Galileo read fourteenth century texts in this funny way is probably even more interesting for our understanding o f Galileo than the positive contributions that the fourteenth century may have made to Galileo. Yes, there are broader questions than the vertical one that Bashy is asking.
E D ITH D U D L E Y S Y L L A
A U T O N O M O U S A N D H A N D M A ID E N S C IE N C E : ST. T H O M A S A Q U I N A S A N D W I L L I A M O F O C K H A M O N T H E P H Y S IC S O F T H E E U C H A R IS T
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
It is a commonplace o f the history o f science that the rise o f modern science involved the breaking off o f the specific disciplines o f modern science from theology and from philosophy in general.^ This is supposed by some to have occurred mainly in the seventeenth century and later and by others to have had its origins in the Middle Ages or earlier. Sociologists o f science have suggested various external social or cultural factors that might have allowed or supported such specialization. In his classical study o f seventeenth century England, Robert Merton pointed to religious, economic, and technological factors.^ In a more recent study extending to the medieval origins o f specialization, Joseph Ben-David suggests that the medieval university guilds acted as a buffer between the practical goals o f public service set by outside society for university graduates and the individual professor who might be inclined to pursue his special interests in conjunction with colleagues.^ In general, however, it is assumed that the natural sciences^ did not have autonomous status within medieval society and that their specialized development was therefore necessarily limited.® Aside from a few noble or royal patrons o f learning, the church was the main source o f support for medieval scholars, and it, naturally, set religious goals for scholar ship. Secular arts and sciences were considered at worst as useless and distracting and at best as handmaids providing some slight assistance to the religious learning which was o f primary concern. Thus within medieval universities most students and professors had ultimately religious goals. A man might do work in logic or physics, but he would also teach or write on theology, ethics, canon law, or other more strictly religious subjects. I f one looks, however, for at least nascent specialization in the secular sciences, one can point to the division o f many universities into faculties o f arts, theology, law, and medicine, and suggest that some professors may have confined themselves to topics proper to their own faculties. In the
J. E. Murdock and E. D. Sylla (eds.). The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning. 349-396. All Rights Reserved.
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time o f Buridan at Paris there was a regulation that professors o f arts or
or to providing the theologian or canon lawyer with the tools needed for
philosophy should not treat specifically theological subjects.® But since
his work.i® Since much teaching in medieval universities was based on
the same regulation also stated that if a professor o f arts should find it
standard texts, one would expect to find primarily commentaries on these
necessary to treat a subject bearing on theology and faith, he should
standard texts, questions related to the texts, or elementary compendia
resolve it in accordance with faith, it was assumed that such an arts pro
related to the various arts. One would not expect to find many advanced
fessor would also know his theology.'^ In the reverse direction, professors
specialized treatises in the arts although one might find these in theology
o f theology often assumed it was their right to treat questions bearing on the arts. Although this was perhaps supposed to occur only where the
and perhaps in law and medicine. When one surveys the extant medieval works on the arts, one does, in
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arts were relevant to theology, in various cases theologians were accused,
fact, find mostly elementary compendia and commentaries. There are,
with some justice, o f an excessive interest in non-theological m aterial.^
however, some notable exceptions. Logic, perhaps, attracted more ad
So the division o f the medieval university into faculties provided only a
vanced work than any other secular field. William Heytesbury’ s Regule
weak basis for specialization in the secular arts and sciences.
Solvendi Sophismata, just to pick one example, although it claims to be a
A second possible source within medieval universities o f at least
work directed to first year students o f logic, has seemed to some historians
temporary specialization in the arts might have been the fact that the medieval student studied and perhaps even taught arts before he went on
too difficult for that purpose. The sophismata hterature in general, in fact, seems to assume advanced proficiency in logic.^^ There is, however,
to theology or one o f the other higher faculties, so that he might in a sense
a likely institutional explanation for this apparent exception. Logic or
be said to be a temporary specialist in the arts before he went on to higher
dialectic held in the medieval university the place that mathematics
studies. In many cases, however, the earliest work we have o f a medieval
holds in the modern university: it was considered the basic key to many
professor is his Sentence Commentary, whereas his lectures on arts topics,
other areas o f knowledge.^® It might have been a discipline primarily o f
logic, physics, or the like were at least revised i f not originally produced
interest because o f its use in other disciplines, but its use was so widespread
after his first work in theology, so it is difficult to determine what his
and considered so necessary in other disciplines, that it outgrew its service
views were before the possible influence o f theological studies. ^ In addi
role. Since there were many competing service functions, no one other
tion, because the arts were widely considered to be o f value only insofar
discipline could control the teaching o f logic, and logicians could control
as they were handmaids to theology, theological concerns were very likely
the development o f their own discipline. There were also large enough
to influence what was taught in the arts even at an elementary level.
numbers o f teachers o f logic that they could provide an audience for each
Arts courses in medieval universities, like their counterparts in some
other and mutual stimulation.
modern universities, namely the “ service courses” that students may be
mathematics in the modern university, could become not a mere hand
Thus logic in the medieval university, as
required to take in addition to courses in their major departments o f
maid biit something like the “ queen and servant o f the sciences.”
study, tended to be elementary and directed either to basic information
Besides logic, other secular arts could also gain greater acceptance
that every student must know (how to read and write well, for instance)
because o f a recognition o f their special service. In numerous appealing
or to more specialized tools that would be useful in the student’s intended
and convincing studies, M.-D. Chenu has described the use and accep
major field o f study. So medieval university structure in general provided
tance o f various arts within theology. First grammar, then logic, and then
only a very limited place for specialization in secular arts and sciences.
the Aristotelian conception o f science were applied to theology.^^ Despite
On the whole, the surviving medieval works on secular subjects tend to
worry and rejection o f these tools by some, it was those who were most
confirm this view. Given the primary role o f the arts in medieval universi
expert in the arts that had the chance o f being the best theologians, as
ties as service disciplines, one would expect that most medieval works
Chenu has argued so persuasively.
written on the arts would be directed either to teaching elementary courses
arts, these theologians allowed the arts to be o f utmost assistance in the
Rather than restricting the role o f the
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unfolding o f theological insight. Thus in addition to gaining acceptance
so the physical sciences and mathematics beginning in the late thirteenth
because o f its very widespread applicability to other disciplines as in the
century and especially in the fourteenth century proved their value as
case o f logic, an area o f secular knowledge could gain greater acceptance by proving its value within theology in particular.
handmaids to theology to the extent that their further autonomous - i.e. theologically undistorted - development was stimulated? Physical science
Theology must be dependent on the state o f the contemporary disci
was certainly applied to theology, but was it useful and did it prove its
plines o f textual analysis, Chenu argues, because the word o f God is
value, or was it in fact, even at this early date, mainly a competitor for
revealed in human language.^’ Only to the extent that men are able to
men’ s attention and a distraction from the higher truths o f theology?
understand and interpret human language will they be able to derive the
Were apparently purely secular advanced treatises on natural science -
utmost benefit from the revealed word o f God. Thus as the arts o f the
for instance, Richard Swineshead’ s Calculationes ~ justified by their
trivium were accepted into use in theology, one would expect to see a more
supposed applicability to and usefulness in theology? When logic became important in the medieval universities because o f
and more advanced development o f these arts. In fact, new insights into to theological problems, so that the theological motivation in the devel
its service to other disciplines, it was chiefly the methods o f logic that were applicable and received further development - how does one, for instance,
the arts o f the trivium were often developed hand-in-hand with solutions opment o f grammar or logic is readily apparent.^» This might mean that
use rules o f logic to solve sophisms arising in the various disciplines? I f
the autonomy o f the arts would be submerged and that the principles o f
natural philosophy received a similar increase o f importance because o f
the arts would be distorted by theological considerations, but, Chenu
applicability to theology, it was not only the methods o f natural philos
argues, in the best cases the arts were allowed their own autonomy and
ophy that were applicable - although as I have said, St. Thomas did
dynamisni and thus contributed even more to the benefit o f theology,
apply the Aristotelian theory o f science to theology - but also the results
Before the arrival o f Aristotle’s physical works in the West, the real
or content o f natural philosophy. So, as in St. Thomas’s case, one might
sciences, in particular the quadrivium and physics, may not have seemed
look to natural philosophy to see what it had to say about the eternity o f
to have as much to offer to the development o f theology. With Thomas
the world versus its special creation by G od .22 Although even where use as
Aquinas, Aristotle’s theory o f science (i.e. his description o f what makes
a method was concerned one might need to look to theology to see what
something genuinely scientific) and to a lesser extent Aristotle’s science
parts o f the available methods might be likely to be useful, it was more
itself was applied in theology. 20 It is probably in the fourteenth century,
clearly the case where content or conclusions were concerned that theol
however, that one finds the greatest use o f the natural sciences in theology.
ogy would have to be the guide as to which areas o f natural science were
One can point to numerous Sentence Commentaries in which natural science is used extensively, and there are some Sentence Commentaries
applicable and therefore worthy o f further development. Thus one might expect that in the case o f natural philosophy the great
which in fact seem to be works on logic and natural science in disguise -
est development would come in contexts closely connected with theology.
in response to each theological question raised, the author immediately
One might indeed have commentaries on Aristotle’s works or other
launches into a logical-mathematical-physical disquisition and then re
standard texts for the elementary courses on natural philosophy, but the
turns only briefly at the end to the theological question at hand. 21 One
advanced treatises might spin off" not so much from Aristotle’s works as
can also point in the fourteenth century to the simultaneous, apparently
from theological texts or contexts. In discussions comparing the “ Augus-
autonomous development o f logical-mathematical-physical science at Oxford, Paris, and elsewhere.
it has been stated that the Augustinians provide very little scope for a nat
tinian” attitude toward natural philosophy with the Thomistic attitude,
that as grammar and logic beginning in the twelfth century if not earUer,
ural philosphy separate from theology, whereas St. Thomas uses a separable philosophy.23 Despite this, however, even those in the Thomistic
and the Aristotelian theory o f science beginning in the thirteenth century.
tradition might not be expected to devote themselves wholeheartedly to
This paper, then, is directed to the following questions: can one show
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the further development o f secular philosophy - after all such philosophy
demonstrate various preambles to faith, such as the existence and uni
even for non-Augustinians maybe assumed to be o f secondary importance.
queness o f God; second it can clarify matters o f faith by analogies with
But if an autonomous secular philosophy is shown to be o f important
philosophical doctrines; third it can refute objections against faith.^s
help w^ithin theology, then one might look for greater interest and atten tion. 24
It is the second o f these uses, however, which is particularly characteristic
So
one might expect the most advanced philosophical work done in the
o f Aquinas’s theology. This is an important point and deserves elaboration, for Aquinas’s
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to have been done in a theological
notion o f theology as a science was based on an adaptation o f Aristotle’s
context. This expectation would be reinforced by the fact that most
notion o f subalternate sciences that was quite different from Aristotle’s
people did their work in philosophy proper when they were young and
original conception. In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle had stated that a
then did work in theology when they were more mature and might be
genuine science must be based on logical deductions from self-evident
expected to have deeper insights.25 Against this expectation would be the
axioms. In some cases, however, he allowed that when one science
possibility that the theological context would lead to a superficial treat
naturally fell under another, the subalternate science could use as its
ment o f the philosophical issues. But were there not, at least in the four
axioms not self-evident propositions but conclusions o f the higher
teenth century, some extended and insightful philosophical discussions within theological works?
science. Thus optics or perspective is subalternate to geometry and can use geometrical conclusions or theorems as premises without tracing
In the rest o f this paper I will try to investigate these sorts o f questions
these back to the self-evident axioms by which they are demonstrated in
by looking primarily at two o f the best known theologians o f the thir
geometry. A subalter«afe science can demonstrate that things are so
teenth and fourteenth centuries to review their theories o f the relations o f
(demonstrations quia) while the suhalternating science demonstrates why
theology and philosophy and to examine how in practice they carry out the cooperation o f theology and philosophy. For the thirteenth century I
{propter quid) they are so. As a rule the subject matters o f the subalternating and subalternate
will look at the ideas o f St. Thomas Aquinas and for the fourteenth
sciences are not the same - if they were exactly the same, one would have
century I will treat William o f Ockham. I hope to show that even though
a single science and not two separate sciences. So, for example, the subject
Aquinas may have acknowledged the value o f an autonomous philosophy,
matter o f geometry is lines, whereas the subject matter o f optics is visual
his use o f philosophy within theology prevented philosophy from receiv
lines. Since a visusal line naturally is a type o f line, optics falls under
ing the autonomous development to which Ockham’s use entitled it.
geometry. Geometry, then, can be used as a tool o f optics.^'^ Combining premises from geometry and optics, one can draw optical conclusions. The subalternating science alone, however, cannot provide a complete
IL T H E O R E T I C A L R E L A T I O N S OF P H I L O S O P H Y A N D T H E O L O G Y
propter quid demonstration o f a conclusion o f the subalternate science
How then did Aquinas and Ockham conceive o f the relations o f theology
because its subject matter is not identical,
and natural philosophy? I f the application o f the trivium is justified, as Chenu argues, because G od’s revelation appears in human language,
demonstrate conclusions about visual lines. T o demonstrate propter quid
Thus geometry alone cannot
what is the justification o f the application o f the quadrivium or natural
the conclusions o f the subalternating science with premises proper to the
philosophy? To answer these questions I can rely mainly on the researches o f other historians.
genuinely scientific since they could be traced back, i f necessary, through
the conclusion o f the subalternate science, therefore, one must combine subalternate science. The conclusions o f the subalternate science will be
In the work o f Aquinas, reason and physics or metaphysics were used to elaborate theological conclusions. Thus, according to Aquinas, there
the subalternating science in part, to self-evident propositions.
are three ways in which philosophy can be o f use to theology: first it can
other hand, it is only a matter o f faith that the premises taken from reve
In Aquinas’s modification o f the notion o f subalternate sciences, on the
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lation are self-evident or truths known to God. The analogy that Aquinas
differences great enough so that even Aquinas himself called theology
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357
sees is that in both cases one takes from a higher science premises whose
“ quasi-subalternate” to Divine science.^o Nevertheless, Aquinas felt
truth is guaranteed by the higher science. Aquinas wants to point out that
enough confidence in his view o f theology as a science that he was willing
there is not such a great disparity between theology based on faith and
to make extensive use o f reason in his works to draw further conclusions
science based on axioms because in many sciences-i.e., in the subalternate
from revealed premises. In doing this he claimed he was not introducing
sciences - one also takes one’s premises “ on faith” assuming that the
an alien philosophical element into sacred doctrine, but using a purified
subaltemating science has proved them starting from self-evident axioms.
reason that combined with revelation to make a single sacred science -
The difference is that whereas in Artistotle’s case the premises taken from
the water o f philosophy when mixed with the wine o f revelation was turned
the higher science can be demonstrated by man, in Aquinas’s theological science this truth cannot be demonstrated rationally. Nevertheless, in both
into wine.®i In the work o f Ockham and other nominaUsts, by contrast, this uni
cases, one presumably has a soUd foundation o f truth to base one’s
fied sacred science was, for better or worse, split apart to a great extent.32
reasoning on.
Thus o f Aquinas’s three uses o f philosophy in matters o f sacred doctrine,
A second difference between Aristotle’ s and Aquinas’ s notions o f
Ockham generally allows only the first and third, external uses. He belie
subalternate sciences is that whereas for Aristotle the subaltemating and subaltemate sciences have different subject matters as a ru le-e.g., lines
ves one can prove certain propositions preliminary to faith, such as the existence o f a Prime Mover,^^ but far fewer such propositions than
versus visual lines for geometry and optics - for Aquinas Divine science
Aquinas thought he could prove. His most extended use o f philosophy in
and theology as subalternate to it have the same subject matter. Theology,
theology is to refute objections against the faith or to refute false views
therefore, really forms one science together with Divine science, although
in theology. He does not think that it is possible to any great extent to
Divine science cannot be known directly to man. Whereas the separate
elaborate a rational theology based on revealed premises (in other words
subject matters o f Aristotle’s subalternate sciences provide for these
he greatly downplays the value o f speculative theology).
sciences some degree o f autonomy and separation from the subaltemating
The guiding principle o f Ockham’s distinction between divine and
sciences, Aquinas’s theology does not have this autonomy and separate
natural knowledge is the distinction between G od’s absolute power
ness.
(potentia D ei absoluta) and His ordained power {potentia D ei ordinata).
A third difference between Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s notions is that
Although historians still disagree about the interrelations o f these two
whereas for Aristotle the principles o f inference o f the higher and lower
potentiae and about whether one or the other represents what a given
sciences tend to be the same - and tend to be simply the rules o f logic or
author is really committed to,^4 it is fairly certain that in the work o f
reason -, for Aquinas the principles o f inference may be diflferent. Divine
Ockham both had their own intrinsic validity. Thus God’s absolute power
science is presumably known immediately and non-discursively to God and to the Blessed. Theology, on the other hand, draws its conclusions by
represents the possibilities open to God - and these are limited only by the laws o f logical contradiction - whereas G od’s ordained power
reason, although perhaps, in view o f its subject matter, it must make use
represents what He has in fact chosen to do. Happily for the possibility o f
o f a purified and circumspect reason. This last point - the possible need to
natural science, God has chosen to act in regular ways for the most part.
“ purify” one’s reason for use in theology - can be crucial in undermining
Man knows how He has chosen to act through experience and intuitive
the autonomous status o f secular sciences in their use within theology.^®
cognition or through revelation. On the basis o f his intuitive cognition and
This point will be made clearer in the example which forms the third
by his memory o f previous intuitive cognitions man can formulate true
section o f this paper.
propositions about what exists. God could, by His absolute power, create
Thus there are crucial differences between the status o f theology for
the intuitive cognition in a man’ s mind o f something that did not exist,
Aquinas and the status o f the usual sub alternate science for Aristotle -
but this would be an exception to the ordinary course o f nature. In Ock
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ham’ s own view, although he was not followed in this by other nomina
tuitive cognition or sense experience o f the world is always reliable but
lists, the man would probably recognize that, contrary to the case o f most
that its rehability is limited to what is directly perceived - the inference
intuitive cognitions, the thing did not exist.^s Ockham never satisfactorily explains how, if one had the intuitive cognition o f a non-existent thing,
from quality to substance or from cause to effect or vice versa is not certain.38 Given Ockham’ s theory o f sensation and perception, it would
one would be able to judge that it did not exist,^^ but, i f this is so, it indi
be natural to expect him to conclude that i f there were an intuitive cogni
cates that the intuitive cognitions that men have had and on the basis o f
tion o f a non-existent, one would judge the thing to exist as in normal
which they have judged things to exist, were in fact natural intuitive cog
cases. Then Nicholas’s dilemma would be a telling one. Because Ockham
nitions o f existing things - if they had been intuitive cognitions o f non
began from the view that intuitive cognition provides evident knowledge
existent things, this would have been obvious.
o f the existence o f objects and because he thought it a contradiction in
Thus on the basis o f perceptions (intuitive cognitions) o f what exists
terms for evident knowledge to be false, however, he concluded that in
(which in the ordinary course o f nature for human beings are always
tuitive cognition o f a non-existent would lead one to conclude that the
accompam’ed by sensations o f external things or else involve perception o f
thing did not exist. He did not have to face directly, therefore, the prob
one’s own mental processes), one can develop natural science based on the
lem o f the unreliability o f intuitive cognition. In fact, although the in
ordinary course o f nature (ex puribus naturalibus) and God’s ordained
tervention o f G od’s absolute power is always a possibility, Ockham pro
power. On the basis o f direct revelation, scripture, and authoritative
ceeds in doing natural philosophy as if God does not intervene except in
Christian doctrine, one can receive gUmpses o f G od’s absolute power.
those cases where Scripture or the Church specifically states that it has
Paradoxically, since God never changes. He must always have ordained that these exceptions were going to occur at a particular time, but never
been revealed to be otherwise. In the work o f Ockham, therefore, the role o f natural knowledge was
theless they are considered to be in some respects special interventions
almost the reverse o f its main role for Aquinas. Rather than using philo
into the ordinary course o f nature.^^ The point is that, although God has
sophy to build and extend theology, he uses it to limit the area in which
freely decided to act in regular ways. He is also free to act in other ways. Although in the normal course o f events, for instance, a man cannot
theology and special revelation is necessary. Thus to take a very simple
attain salvation except if he is in a state o f Grace when he dies, God could
ral phenomena, and make the hypothesis o f supernatural or miraculous
save a man who died without Grace if He so chose. The only Umit to
intervention unnecessary. Despite G od’s absolute power hovering in the
G od’s absolute power is the law o f non-contradiction - He cannot choose
background, natural science could be essentially autonomous in its own
to do something that is logically impossible.
case, natural explanations could be found for some apparently non-natu
sphere. Heiko Oberman has described how, in his view, the autonomy o f
Thus for Ockham one has three main sources o f knowledge: intuitive
man was one o f the four basic principles o f nominalistic theology, along
cognition as the basis o f natural science, revelation, which is contained in
with the sovereignty o f God, immediacy, and secularization.^» T o recon
scripture or other authentic Christian writings as determined by the
cile the apparent contradiction between the sovereignty o f God and the
church (thus in this case there are two bearers, scriptures and the Church,
autonomy o f man, Oberman uses the image o f a dome within which man’ s
o f one type o f knowledge), and reason or self-evident truths, as exempli
autonomy prevails.^» The autonomy o f natural philosophy is, I think, the
fied in the law o f non-contradiction and other laws o f logic. A ll three
partner o f the autonomy o f man, and is also an autonomy within limits
sources o f knowledge are sufficiently reliable in their own domains.
or within the “ dome.” Thus the kind o f relationship between theology and natural philosophy
Nicholas o f Autrecourt later argued that i f intuitive cognition o f nonexistents is ever possible, then intuitive cognition is not a reliable source
that one would expect in the work o f Ockham is a relationship o f mutual
o f knowledge. Rather than accept this alternative, he proposed as a postu
cooperation where each type o f knowledge has its own proper sphere
late (if he had arguments for his postulate, they are not known) that in
within which it is autonomous. It is, o f course, assumed that God is the
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first cause o f all events within the natural sphere and not only o f super
spoken in the proper circumstances. Thus the Mass involved not G od’s
natural events de potentia D ei absoluta. Since, however, man knows by
usual ordained power, but a kind o f second order ordained power, which,
experience that God has chosen to act in regular ways, the ultimate
as Ockham would emphasize. He could again abrogate by His absolute
causality o f God can be kept in the background within the natural realm.
power.‘*2
In line with Ockham’s famous razor, Ockham also states that one should
i n . TH E E U C H A R IS T
not multiply miracles beyond necessity - although even here Ockham admits that sometimes it may please God to cause more miracles when fewer would do!
That there was a direct conflict between natural philosophy and theology
It is a trademark o f Ockham and other nominalists to introduce possi
beginning o f Distinction 10 o f Book Four o f the Sentences. There are
bilities de potentia Dei absoluta into natural science. This is often supposed
some insane people, he said, who, measuring the power o f G od by
to have been partly the result o f the 1277 condemnation o f propositions
natural means, audaciously and dangerously contradict the truth, assert
implying that God could not violate the laws o f physics. The actual func
ing that the body and blood o f Christ are not actually present and that when
tion o f the reference to God’s absolute power in most natural contexts,
Christ said, “ This is my body,” he was speaking only metaphorically.
concerning the Eucharist was signalled directly by Peter Lombard at the
however, is essentially equivalent to an appeal to reason and almost al
In fact, as determined by Pope Innocent II I and the Fourth Lateran
ways is made to determine what are the real and distinct entities {res) in volved in the situation.
Council, one has in the Eucharist the substance o f Christ accompanied by
Both Aquinas and Ockham commented on Aristotle’ s Physics, Ockham
trary to Aristotle, therefore, the accidents o f the bread do not inhere in
several different times. For both authors, however, theological contexts
any substance - it would be absurd and irreverent to suppose that they
are more likely to be important and to reveal the nuances o f how the
inhere in Christ - and yet it is obvious to the senses that the qualities
author conceives the interrelations o f theology and natural science. In
behave physically just as i f the substance o f the bread were still under
such contexts one has to do not only with what G od might have done
the accidents o f the bread, but without the substance o f the bread. Con
without logical inconsistency although in fact He has not done it: in
lying them. How this could be so required explanation. Aside from problems concerning the remaining accidents o f the bread,
addition one has to do with cases in which Scripture or Church authority
there were problems concerning the accidents inhering in Christ: i f
indicates that God has in fact done something outside o f the ordinary
Christ was really present in the Eucharist, what was the status o f the
laws o f nature. How can one use natural science to help explain a situation in which it is agreed that the laws o f natural science have been violated?
qualities inhering in Him - why can’t He be seen, for instance - and how was His quantity present - how could Christ’ s extension be present in the
In the third main section o f this paper, therefore, I will look at how in
Eucharist, and was Christ in place in the Eucharist so that H e could move
practice Aquinas and Ockham resolved the conflicting claims o f revela
locally with the Eucharist? A further problem concerned transubstan-
tion and natural philosophy within a theological context. Good contexts
tiation - how exactly did Christ come to be present in the Eucharist and
to look at would be the ones in which Aristotle and the Church disagreed,
what exactly happened to the substance o f the bread? Aquinas and Ockham each consider the physics o f the Eucharist in
such as concerning the eternity versus the creation o f the world, or con Aquinas and Ockham in particular, however, perhaps the best problem to
several different works, but each also repeats essentially the same view in the different contexts so it is not necessary here to distinguish between
look at is that o f the Eucharist. In the sacrament o f the Eucharist one had a
their separate treatments. Aquinas’s two most important treatments o f the
strange middle ground where, as both Aquinas and Ockham agreed
problems are in his Sentence Commentary, Book IV, Distinctions 10-12
cerning the nature and possible inxmortality o f the human soul. For
although they may not have put it quite this way, God had freely agreed
and in his Summa Theologiae, I I I “, Questions 75-77. Ockham has three
consistently to produce a miracle whenever the words o f the Mass were
important treatments - in his Sentence Commentary, Book IV , Questions
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4-7 ; in his separate treatise De Sacramento Altaris (actually two separate
Ockham opens his discussion o f Christ’s presence in the Eucharist with
works on the same subject); and in his Quodlibet Quartum, Questions
a refutation o f Aquinas’s view.'*® Christ cannot be present precisely be
20-39. For convenience sake, I will follow primarily the parallel discus
cause o f the conversion o f the bread into His body, Ockham says, be
sions o f the two authors’ Sentence Commentaries, referring in footnotes to
cause God could have caused Him to be present beneath the accidents o f
parallel texts from the other works. Thus in the order that they are dis
the bread even if the substance o f the bread had never been there. Since
cussed by Peter Lombard the five main problems are: concerning Christ,
Christ is now present where H e was not present before, there must be a
(1) His quantity and (2) His qualities (Distinction 10); (3) transubstantia-
change involved and Christ must be moved. Contrary to Aquinas, Christ
tion (Distinction 11); and (4) the qualities o f the bread and (5) the quan tity o f the bread (Distinction 12).
is in place definitively i f not circumscriptively beneath the species o f
In his Sentences, Book IV, Distinction 10 Peter Lombard treats the real
Eucharist and at the same time circumscriptively present in Heaven.
presence o f Christ in the Eucharist. Both Aquinas and Ockham naturally
Furthermore Christ is in place immediately and not only via the species o f
accept the fact o f Christ’ s real presence and their discussions concern
the bread or because o f the conversion - all things are immediately pre
subsidiary aspects o f this presence - in particular the quaUties, quantity,
sent in a given location and not one via the other unless there is some
bread - it is not contradictory for Christ to be definitively present in the
place, and possible motion including action and passion o f Christ in the
special union o f one thing with another. So if Christ were present only via
Eucharist. Both authors agree that Christ is entirely present in the
the species o f bread, He would have to have some special union with the
Eucharist - including his soul as well as his body - but that He still re mains in Heaven also. Both authors agree that He is not in the Eucharist
species o f bread, which He does not have.®® Ockham’s points here are, from the point o f view o f natural philosophy,
circumscriptively with His parts extended in space, but rather that He is
all well-taken. Leaving aside the question o f conversion which will be
entirely at every part o f the Eucharist. They agree that Christ cannot be
considered below, Aquinas’s views on the lack o f change in Christ’s body
sensed or perceived in the Eucharist although it is known by revelation
and the relation o f Christ to the place o f the Eucharist clearly go against
that He is there.
the Aristotelian doctrines concerning change and place, the vocabulary at
Beyond these points o f agreement, however, the two authors diverge.
least o f which both authors are using. Aquinas, in fact, admits that his
Aquinas emphasizes that Christ is not really in place per se in the Eucha
view o f how Christ is in place does not correspond to any o f the philo
rist because His dimensions are not extended with the dimensions o f the
sophically recognized ways o f being in place.®^ Y et his use o f Aristotelian
Eucharist. Since the bread was previously in place, however, Christ is now
philosophical terminology would make one think he was doing philoso
within the former place o f the bread as if by accident and indirectly be
phy. Thus right from the start the basic difference between Aquinas’s proce
cause the substance o f the bread was converted into His body.^4 Although Christ is now present where He was not present before, it is not necessary that He was changed or moved in any way to become present in the
dure and Ockham’s procedure is clear. In almost every important case Aquinas modifies or “ sublimates” natural philosophy to explain the
Eucharist.45 The substance o f the bread is changed directly into the body
Eucharist whereas Ockham allows natural philosophy its own autonomy
o f Christ, Aquinas says, and the rest o f Christ - for instance His blood,
- where natural philosophy is not applicable Ockham refers to G od’s
soul, and accidents like quantity - are present by natural concomitance.^®
direct intervention rather than assuming a modified physics. Thus in Ockham, but not in Aquinas, natural philosophy has its proper autonomy
Christ cannot be seen in the Eucharist because He is not there quantita tively and action by qualities presupposes quantitative presence and contact."^’ Like Christ’s quantity. His qualities in the Eucharist are
even within theological contexts. Ockham prefaces his own view o f the physics o f Christ’s presence in the
present only mediately through His substance and hence have no imme diate relationship to the species o f bread or surrounding bodies.^»
view o f quantity, according to which quantity is not a separate entity, but
Eucharist with a long excursus expounding his famous and well-known
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only a connotative term.^^ There were two contexts within discussions o f
The role o f Ockham’s theory o f quantity in solving the problem o f
the Eucharist that led authors to discuss quantity - this context concern
Christ’s quantity in the Eucharist is the following. It was generally agreed
ing Christ’ s quantity or lack thereof in the Eucharist and the context o f
that Christ is present in the Eucharist with all his essential and accidental
the quantity o f the species o f bread. Aegidius Romanus’ s brilliant in
properties just as He then exists in heaven.®» But Christ’ s quantity or
sights concerning quantity were developed in the second o f these contexts
extension, it was generally thought, is present in Him in Heaven and must
and resolved serious problems concerning the quantity o f the species o f
therefore also be present in the Eucharist. Y et in the Eucharist Christ is
bread as he viewed it.s4 Ockham’s analysis o f quantity, on the other hand,
wholly present in every part - otherwise He would not be present in every
is developed to solve the problem o f Christ’s quantity in the Eucharist.
part o f the host after it was broken, and furthermore He would be broken
Since it clearly does remove the very great inadequacies o f both Aquinas’s
apart when the host was eaten which, all agreed, was an irreverent thought.
and Duns Scotus’ s views concerning the quantity o f Christ in the Eucha
How, therefore, can Christ’ s quantity be in the host when He is not
rist, it seems to me very likely that Ockham’s theory o f quantity was first
extended in the host? Aquinas simply declared that since only the substance o f Christ is
developed for this purpose and not solely as a logical-ontological excercise in the avoidance o f multiplying entities beyond necessity.
present in the Eucharist by virtue o f the sacrament whereas the dimen
As Anneliese Maier has shown,5s Ockham’s equation o f quantity with
sions o f Christ are present by natural concomitance, it followed that con
substance (or quality) was not new with him, but had been expounded
trary to the usual situation in which extension precedes substance (the
earlier in several contexts by Peter John Olivi, perhaps originally in the
extension preceding substance being Averroes’s “ indeterminate dimen
context o f the quantity o f the species o f bread. Other authors before
sions” and not determinate extension), here the substance o f Christ is
Ockham, in particular Richard o f Mediavilla, had sharply attacked
immediately present and the extension o f Christ is only subsequently and
Olivi’s view and Ockham was familiar with their attacks.^® This may
accidentally present.
explain why, even before Lutterell initiated censure proceedings against
mined by the preceding indeterminate dimensions and thus the substance,
Ordinarily the mode o f being o f substance is deter
Ockham, including in his list o f errors Ockham’s view o f quantity in its
in itself intrinsically unextended, is extended. In the Eucharist the mode
relationship to the Eucharist, Ockham seems to have been particularly
o f being o f Christ’ s dimensions is determined by the preceding unextended
on the defensive about his theory o f quantity.^’ Since the order o f Ock
substance, and hence the dimensions are unextended. Thus the dimen
ham’ s works is not known with certainty, it cannot be established abso
sions o f Christ are not directly comparable to the dimensions o f the
lutely whether Ockham first developed his version o f OUvi’s view o f
species o f bread and in fact they are not extended. Philosophically
quantity in a theological context, but it seems very plausible that it was in
speaking, this is a contradiction in terms - a non-extended extension -
fact either in the context o f the earlier o f his separate treatises on the
whatever its theological value may be.®^ Aegidius Romanus later made
Eucharist, as Maier argues, or in his Sentence Commentary. S i n c e
good philosophical sense out o f this approach to Christ’s quantity by
Ockham says twice in the earlier separate treatise on the Eucharist that he is resolving issues that arose when he was expounding the Sentences, the
distinguishing between what today would be called quantity as mass and quantity as extension.®^ Christ’s mass-quantity could be present in the
Sentence Commentary would seem to be the most probable original con-
Eucharist without extension without supposing anything self-contra
text.5® Whether Ockham’s view o f quantity had a theological origin or
dictory. Aquinas does not try to elaborate or justify his view philosophi
not, Ockham extends it to quantity in general and makes it an important and truly philosophical doctrine - unlike Aquinas’s view o f the quantity
cally along the lines o f Aegidius’s approach or any other. Ockham who, like most o f his contemporaries, was peculiarly unable to
o f Christ in the Eucharist which is used solely in that context and which,
conceive o f a quantity o f matter distinct from extension o f matter as
although expressed in philosophical language, has little philosophical plausibility.
Aegidius did, cut the Gordian knot concerning Christ’ s quantity in the host simply by arguing that quantity is not a distinct absolute or relative
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entity so that it is not necessary to suppose that Christ’s quantity is pre
than circumscriptive presence in the Eucharist should not hinder action and passion.'^2 After all, the physical proximity necessary for action is
sent in the Eucharist.
Since all o f Christ’s parts are together in every
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part o f the host, Christ is not extended, or not a quantum, in the Eucha
still present. One should not deny, he says, the common proposition o f
but since Christ’ s quantity is nothing else but His substance in any
physics that when an agent is approximated to a properly disposed
case. He is not lacking any real attribute in the Eucharist.®® Thus Ockham
patient action follows unless this denial is compelled by reason, authority,
saves the basic theological doctrines concerning Christ’s presence in the
or experience.’ ^ So it should naturally be possible to perceive Christ in
Eucharist without having to invent a non-extended mode o f existence for
the Eucharist - although the fact that the colors, for instance, o f all o f the
extension. T o show naturally that Christ’s parts can be together in the
parts o f Christ’ s body are now superimposed at each point o f the Eucha
Eucharist Ockham refers to condensation, where parts that existed
rist might mean that only one dominant color would be seen.’ ^ Since it is
separately in the rare substance now exist together. T o show naturally
a fact o f sense experience that Christ is not visible in the host, the only
that a single indivisible thing, as Christ is when all o f His parts are together, can exist simultaneously in distinct places, Ockham refers to the intellec
possible conclusion is that God has chosen to suspend miraculously His normal concurring causality in this case, so that Christ is not seen.’ ^
tive soul which was thought to exist entirely in every part o f the body. H e
Concerning the possibility o f Christ’ s own sense perceptions in the host,
also provides theological parallels for each o f these two aspects o f Christ’s
Ockham concludes that there is no reason or experience sufficient to
presence in the Eucharist.
convince him one way or another but that it seems more reasonable to
r i s t ,
So concerning the quantity o f Christ in the
Eucharist, Ockham has a view that makes philosophical sense, and he
assume that Christ knows where He is when in the Eucharist.’ ®
tries to show that it makes sense in natural contexts,®» whereas Aquinas does not.
Eucharist, Aquinas proposed a “ sublimated” philosophy, which, from a
Concerning the other aspects o f Christ’s presence in the Eucharist,
purely natural point o f view, does not always make good sense. It may be
Ockham also preserves the tenets o f Aristotelian natural philosophy far
a kind o f metaphysics but it is not physics. Thus Aquinas’s assertion that
Thus concerning the physical conditions o f Christ’s presence in the
more carefully than Aquinas. He allows that in the Eucharist Christ is in
Christ’s extension is present in a non-extended way in the Eucharist is
place definitively, one o f the two natural ways to be in place.®® He ad
essentially self-contradictory from a purely natural point o f view. Aquinas
mits that Christ is moved locally when the Eucharist is moved - which
was certainly capable o f doing good philosophy as he shows in purely
seems obviously to be the case philosophically speaking i f Christ is pre
natural contexts, such as commenting on Aristotle’s works, so his propo
sent in the host - whereas Aquinas tries to avoid this by saying that since
sal o f such apparently self-contradictory ideas was not a simple mistake
Christ is not strictly speaking in place He does not move locally unless by
on his part. Near the end o f his discussion o f the real presence in the
accident.70 Ockham even takes Christ’s motion with the Eucharist
Summa Theologiae, he in a way acknowledged that his concept o f the
seriously enough to worry how the Aristotehan dynamics o f motion will
real presence did not make good sense from a purely natural point o f
be fulfilled - it would appear that a mover naturally proportioned to move
view by saying that the mode o f Christ’ s presence was wholly super
the species o f bread will not be in proportion to move Christ with the
natural {penitus supernaturalis)^'^ Thomas’s primary goal, however, was
same velocity. He solves this by saying that Christ moves voluntarily - or
not to prove the consistency o f the real presence from a purely natural
i f He does not do it voluntarily God moves Him - with the species o f bread.
point o f view nor to follow the principles o f natural philosophy wherever
Concerning Christ’s quaUties in the Eucharist and the possibihty o f
Christianity in a reverent way. When explained in the proper way, there
Christ having sense perception there, Ockham again allows natural
should be nothing in sacred doctrine that would seem unreasonable -
philosophy its proper autonomy. According to the usual Aristotelian ana
reason is from God as well as revelation and God would not be contrary
lysis o f action and passion, he concludes that Christ’s definitive rather
to H im self- but faith can be above reason, supra rationemJ^
they might lead, but to explain and clarify, to sustain, the dogmas o f
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Ockham, by contrast, explains the real presence in a way that makes
from heaven by local motion or the previously existing bread must be
good philosophical sense. Where there is some aspect o f the real presence
converted into Him.®i Since, among other reasons, Christ remains in
that he cannot deal with from a purely natural point o f view, he simply
heaven. He is not moved locally from heaven, so the bread must be con
says so - as when he says that reason cannot conclude whether Christ
verted into Him.82 Aquinas draws two consequences from this under
perceives things as He is present in the Eucharist. Where revelation con
standing o f transubstantiation. First, the substance o f bread can not be
tradicts normal experience and natural philosophy he also says so openly
present when the substance o f Christ is present - it must have been con
and gives the priority to revelation. He does not, as Aquinas, develop a
verted into Christ for Christ to be present.^^ Second, the substance o f
“ reverent” or “ sublimated” philosophy or metaphysics. In a spirit similar
bread cannot be said to be annihilated since it is converted into the sub
to that o f the twentieth century logical empiricists, his attitude seems to be
stance o f Christ and not into nothing. ^4 Ockham, by contrast, interprets transubstantiation as the annihila
that there are no sufficient grounds - neither experience nor revelation nor self-evident axioms - to establish the validity o f such “ sublimated”
tion o f the bread along with the concomitant creation o f Christ in the
philosophy. He limits himself instead to statements for which he thinks he has evidence and labels these statements according to the type o f evidence
former position o f the bread. H e denies that the first o f Aquinas’s con
in their favor, whether it be reason, revelation, or experience.
N o authentic scripture expressly says that the substance o f the bread is no
sequences o f his theory can be shown on the basis o f revelation or reason.
Having made clear, I hope, the differences between Aquinas’s and
longer present, he says. Furthermore many aspects o f the Eucharist could
Ockham’s uses o f philosophy within theology in the context o f Distinc
be explained much more easily by the normal processes o f nature i f the
tion 10, let me indicate more briefly that similar differences can be found
substance o f the bread did remain, since then there would not be accidents
concerning the subject matters o f Distinctions 11 and 12. In Distinction
present not inhering in a substance. It is naturally possible for two sub
11 Peter Lombard treats the process o f transubstantiation. Both Aquinas
stances to be present in the same place. One should not, he argues, posit
and Ockham hold that transubstantiation occurs and that it involves the
more miracles when fewer would do. He eventually accedes, however, to
replacement o f the substance o f the bread by the substance o f Christ
the view that the substance o f the bread is not present in the consecrated
while the species or accidents o f the bread remain. Both agree that this
Eucharist not on the grounds o f reason but because the church (Innocent
replacement takes place at the last instant o f the priest’ s pronunciation o f the words o f the sacrament and that there is a first instant o f Christ’s
I I I) had so determined.®® Ockham similarly refuses to give any weight to Aquinas’s argument
presence and no last instant o f the existence o f the substance o f bread.
that the bread is not annihilated. In transubstantiation, he says, the bread
Both agree that the accidents o f the bread cannot inhere in the air as
simply ceases to exist (except in the sense that God has the power to
some, including Peter Abelard, had proposed previously since this would
recreate it) and Christ begins to be present in the Eucharist, ss Indeed,
involve physical implausibilities - such as that the air would have to
according to well-established principles o f Aristotelian physics, for one
rush into the space previously occupied by the bread instantaneously
thing to be converted into another there should be a subject or substrate
whereas no such motion o f the air is observed, i f indeed such instanta Thus both authors use
which is the same throughout the process. Thus in accidental change the substance is said to be changed because its qualities or quantity change,
natural philosophical principles to clarify the conditions o f transub
the substance remaining the same, and in substantial change, as when
stantiation. Beyond this, however, Aquinas makes several strong argu
water is converted into air, the matter remains the same throughout the
ments which, from Ockham’s point o f view, involve an improper confu sion o f the realms o f theology and philosophy.
that remains the same. Although the accidents o f the bread remain the
neous translation were physically possible.
process. In transubstantiation, on the other hand, there is no substrate
First, Aquinas asserts that there are only two ways in which Christ can
same throughout, they are not involved in transubstantiation - God could
come to be present in the Eucharist - either He must be brought there
equally well cause Christ to be present without them. Since God is capable
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o f creation ex nihilo, Aquinas is wrong to limit the ways in which Christ
For the second o f the problems concerning the species Aquinas replies
could come to be present in the Eucharist to local motion or conversion o f
that in the consecrated host the only accident without a subject is the quan
the bread - God is not limited to obeying the laws o f normal physics.®’
tity o f the (former) bread and that the other, quahtative accidents inhere
One o f Aquinas’s major motivations for his view was apparently the
in the quantity as in a subject. God gives to the quantity all the properties
desire to avoid having to say that Christ is moved or changed in coming to
and capabilities for action and passion that the substance o f the bread
be present in the Eucharist. A change has occurred when Christ comes to
formerly had and, after He does this, action and passion occur as before,
be present and it is not in Christ, so it must be a change in the bread,
only with the quantity acting as substance, and with no need for further
since this is the only alternative left. Ockham simply asserts that Christ
intervention by God - it is like the situation in which God gives sight to
has changed or moved in coming to be present in the Eucharist - or at
the blind - once the bhnd are given sight they see normally like anyone
least has moved in a broad sense o f the term since He still remains in heaven. Again, from the point o f view o f Aristotelian natural philosophy,
else. Ockham agrees with Aquinas in allowing that God by His absolute
Aquinas’s view that Christ can come to be present and later cease to be
power can create accidents without a substance.
present when the species are destroyed without any intrinsic motion or
consistently in his logical and physical as well as theological writings that
change in Christ himself seems to be a contradiction in terms.®®
the two types o f distinct real things {res) in the universe are substances and
Indeed Ockham allows
In Distinction 12 Peter Lombard discusses the remaining species o f the
qualities. God can create any such distinct things separately since it in
bread. Concerning these species the main problems faced by Aquinas and
volves no logical contradiction, although in the normal course o f nature
Ockham were first, quite simply, Aristotle’s view that accidents must in
qualities always inhere in substances.®®
here in substance, and, second, Aristotle’s view that it is not qualities
It is at least arguable that had it not been for the Eucharist, Ockham
primarily that cause and suffer change, but the substance underlying the qualities.
would have concluded that the only distinct res in the universe are sub
Aquinas solved the first o f these problems by declaring that the First
tion that God could not create a quality not inhering in a substance - and
Cause is more important as a cause than the second cause and hence that
hence Ockham might have been led by the condemnations to treat quali
God as the First Cause o f accidents can take the place o f substance, which
ties as distinct res - probably the proposition appeared in the 1277 con
is the normal secondary cause o f accidents.®® The definition o f accidents,
demnation because o f its connection with the Eucharist.®’ As in the case
stances.®® Although the condemnations o f 1277 did include the proposi
he claims, is not that they inhere in a subject, but that they ought to be in
o f his doctrine o f quantity, therefore, here too Ockham may have adopted
something else. This latter quiddity o f an accident is not removed from
his view for ultimately theological reasons. In this theological and non-
an accident even i f by divine power the accident does not inhere in a
theological works, however, he consistently develops his view o f substance
substance.®^ T o the argument that a disembodied form would not be
and quality as the two distinct types o f res and makes it a genuinely natural
individuated because forms are individuated by matter, Aquinas replies
philosophical doctrine. So a theological origin may tend to lead to “ subli
that in this case the accidents are individuated by the quantity remaining
mated” philosophical doctrines in Aquinas’s work, but in Ockham’s
(thus introducing a different cause o f individuation than the normal one).®^
system a theological origin can lead to an autonomous philosophical
Concerning the special case o f density and rarity which would seem to
doctrine. Ockham does not think that the qualities inhere in the quantity,
include matter in their definitions, he claims that density and rarity can
but, if anything, the reverse - the quantity o f the species o f bread is only
remain without matter because the true essence o f density is not that
a connotative term referring to the qualities directly and to their coexten
much material is contained in small dimensions. Density is instead a
sion in space with other bodies indirectly. Concerning the action and passion o f the species o f bread, Ockham
property consequent upon the fact that matter is thus disposed and hence God can create this property without matter.
says very plainly that naturally there cannot be action or passion where
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there is no substance, but we see that action and passion occur, so such action and passion must be caused directly by G od’s absolute power.®»
this to have been one o f his main interests. Ockham’s two main commit ments in his early theological, logical, and physical works seem to have
Indeed, Aquinas’s assertion that God gives the quantity the power to
been instead to emphasizing the absolute power o f God, on the one hand,
act as a substance had been simply that - an assertion with no elaboration
and to demonstrating how the sense o f propositions can be explained
as to how a quantity could act as a substance. Again it seems clear that
without multiplying entities on the other. Other authors who do creative
372
from the point o f view o f natural philosophy Ockham has by far the better
and autonomous physics in the context o f problems o f the Eucharist -
argument. Aquinas, to be sure, may have a theologically more suitable
including Aegidius Romanus who developed his concept o f quantity o f
conclusion - he rejects the argument that God may cause directly the
mass and Walter Burley who showed how qualities could produce
action and passion o f the species o f bread basically because such action
substantial forms without the aid o f previous substantial forms
and passion eventually lead to the annihilation o f the species o f bread,
not nominalists. Rather than empiricism or nominalism, then, I think
- were
and God never acts directly to annihilate anything.®® Ockham, however,
that the desire to have ostensive or demonstrable grounds, whether experi
follows the logic o f his philosophical argument even when it leads to a theologically disturbing conclusion.
ential, rational, scriptural, or even authoritative, for one’s assertions was probably the common motivation behind recognition o f the autonomy o f natural philosophy in the fourteenth century,
IV. C O N C L U S I O N S
Ockham’s way o f respecting the autonomy o f philosophy and theology has been considered by some to involve skepticism and the disintegration
philosophy to clarify theology. Unlike the so-called “ Augustinian” or
o f the medieval synthesis represented pre-eminently by the work o f Aquinas.103 Some historians have interpreted his views as involving the
anti-philosophical theologians, both believe that philosophy as pure
abandonment o f the rational search for truth about the universe and the
reason has an important role. Aquinas’s philosophy, however, is often
substitution for it o f simple faith. Others, however, studying Ockham’s
Thus in their Sentence Commentaries both Aquinas and Ockham use
“ sublimated” to the special demands o f theological doctrine with little
purely physical works have concluded that Ockham wanted to restore
attempt to preserve the conclusions o f normal, natural, non-theological philosophy or to reconcile what is said in the theological context with
pure Aristotelian physics undistorted by Islamic or Christian theology.
what might be said in a purely natural context. Ockham, on the other
physics on the other, Ockham would seem to come dangerously close to
hand, very carefully preserves the autonomy o f the natural philosophy he
what has been called the doctrine o f the “ double truth.” !®®
In advocating simple faith on the one hand and purely Aristotelian
uses. Whether or not a philosophical proposition may have an ultimately
Some at least o f these labels applied to Ockham are, however, seriously
theological origin, he is always sure that the philosophy he uses preserves
misplaced. The tone o f Ockham’s writings, for instance, is not at all
its philosophical validity. T o be sure, where there are contradictions
skeptical.!®® o n the contrary, within each separate realm, be it theology,
between philosophy and revelation, revelation is given the superior
logic, or physics, Ockham appears to be committed to the validity o f his
authority, but this is done without destroying the autonomy o f the purely
ideas and not at all doubtful about the possibility o f achieving knowl-
philosophical - an exception de potentia D ei absoluta to the normal order
edge.i®'^ H ow the various facets o f Ockham’s views fit together while retaining
o f things is recognized as such but this does not change the fact that there is a normal order.
their separate autonomy and sometimes apparent contradiction can per
The autonomy o f Ockham’s physics was not, I believe, the result o f a
haps best be seen by recognizing the similarity o f Ockham’s epistemolog-
great interest in and commitment to physics on his part. Among later
ical position to that o f some modern pragmatic philosophers. I have in
nominalists, Buridan does seem to have genuinely physical interests, but
mind, for instance, the views on the relations o f science and spiritual
Ockham devotes too little attention to everyday physical observations for
values expressed by James B. Conant, the chemist and former president o f
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Harvard. Starting from science and trying to reconcile modern science
treatise usually printed second although probably written first, are ex
with spiritual values, Conant argues that we have at present no sufficient
cellent examples o f the working out in practice o f this epistemological
grounds for formulating a “ cosmic creed” or “ world hypothesis” com
position. These works are written like legal briefs, indicating the exact
bining in a single conceptual scheme the findings o f the various sciences,
degree o f authority or probability to be attached to each proposition.
common sense, religious views, and so forth. W e do have, however,
Like Peter John Olivi before him ,m Ockham repeats several times that
sciences which have been successful within their own limited areas and similarly ethical codes or religious insights which have been successful.
when he goes beyond the teachings o f the Catholic church he is only reciting opinions for the sake o f mental exercise.^^^ But he also makes
In this situation, then, Conant advocates using our separate conceptual
careful, essentially lawyerhke distinctions between types o f religious
schemes in the areas where they have proved successful without trying to
documents and the degrees o f authority to be ascribed to them. What the
combine them in a “ world hypothesis” o f doubtful validity. I f separate
Bible says has greater weight than what the saints say, and what the saints
conceptual schemes can be applied to the same problem, then by all
say has greater weight than the opinions o f modern theologians. When
means let them be applied and compared, and let the conceptual scheme
modern theologians disagree one is perfectly free to reject their opinions.
which provides better results take precedence over the conceptual scheme
Canon law is to be respected, but not necessarily the opinions o f any
that fails. I f conceptual schemes do not overlap in applicabihty to the
bishop. Only the Pope, Ockham says, can decide when theologians
same problem, then let them remain separate. Each conceptual scheme can
disagree concerning Christian faith. The Inquisition is often staffed by
be developed and expanded in the area o f its applicabihty but should not
simple men and hence it would be absurd to submit to it difficult and profound matters on which university professors d i s a g r e e .
be extrapolated to areas where it has no competence, Conant’s position, I would argue, is the same in spirit as Ockham’s.
Thus, unless the view that quantity is really distinct from substance and
Although neither attempts the grand synthesis, neither is in any way a
quality can be shown to have church authority o f the strongest type
genuine skeptic. Both are devoted to the advancement o f the separate
backing it, Ockham is not prepared to go against his own reason merely
areas o f knowledge and to maintaining the close relationship o f each con
because it differs from common opinion.^^^ A view that is different from
ceptual scheme to the grounds for its validity. For Conant the pre-eminent
common theological opinion need not be heretical. A search o f authori
sources o f validation are agreement with empirical facts and usefulness in
tative church documents, Ockham claims, does not reveal that his view
action. For Ockham the preeminent sources o f validation are, in order o f decreasing weight, revelation, the Bible, and ecclesiatical authority in
o f quantity is heretical.^!® It is perfectly true, therefore, that Ockham does not claim absolute cer
theology, intuitive cognition and reason or the laws o f logic in natural
tainty for the conclusions o f natural philosophy, reserving such cer
philosophy. 109 For Ockham, but not for Conant, there is a clear ranking o f validity between the separate types o f knowledge - revelation or truly
tainty for authoritative doctrines o f the Church. Anneliese Maier has shown that Buridan and the other nominahsts at Paris take a similar
authoritative sacred doctrine takes precedence over natural philosophy.
standpoint - although they may at times sound like exponents o f the
But the precedence o f revelation for Ockham should not obscure the essential similarity o f his view to Conant’s because the precedence o f
“ double truth,” in fact they are not since they assign only probability and
revelation for Ockham leaves the autonomy and intrinsic validity o f natu
Ockham and Buridan, as well as other nominalists at Oxford and Paris,
ral philosophy intact.iio And Ockham is not at all shy about trimming the
take their natural philosophy very seriously and are by no means skeptical
feathers o f theology, reducing it from the full display o f contemporary
about it. Their position does not, it should be emphasized, involve any loss o f
theological opinion to the minimum certified and authoritative Christian doctrines. Ockham’s two treatises De Sacramento Altaris^ and in particular the
not certainty to the conclusions o f natural philosophy.^^^ But both
integrity as far as respect for the conclusions o f natural philosophy is concerned. Here, I think, some historians fail to give Ockham and other
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medieval authors their just credit because they think that a loss o f inte
the better theologian. The question that I asked at the start o f this paper,
grity is involved. When Pierre Duhem proposed Christian positivism as
therefore, whether the best natural philosophers were the best theologians
the proper attitude toward science and as the medieval attitude leading to
in the fourteenth century, remains an open one. It is, I think, an histori
modern science, some other historians were quick to point out that Du
cal fact that Ockham represents a way o f combining theology and natural
hem himself was a Catholic and might therefore be suspected o f bias in favor o f medieval churchmen.i^^ Duhem himself, however, did not arrive
philosophy that allows both theology and natural philosophy a proper
at his positivism concerning science simply from his Catholicism and
advanced natural philosophy separate from theological contexts among
autonomy. One also finds historically the development o f an autonomous
from the need to downplay the certainty o f science to protect the certainty
men who have been labelled nominalists or Ockhamists at Oxford and
o f religion. Duhem’s book on The Aim and Structure o f Physical Theory has won the deserved respect o f many non-believing philosophers o f science
Paris. Some historians may judge that this approach also led to the best theo
purely on the grounds o f the cogency o f its philosophical arguments.^^®
logy. The contemporary reaction to Ockham’s theology was, however,
The same can be said for Ockham, Buridan, and the others like them.
often negative, although the reaction was complicated by Ockham’s subsequent anti-papal activities.122 Some historians think that Ockham’s
I f they denied the absolute certainty o f natural philosophy, they had good purely philosophical reasons for it. Many o f the best modern philosophers o f science - and I take Conant as my example but there are many others -
theology leads at least indirectly to Martin Luther’s theology and the Reformation.123 T o the question, therefore, o f whether in the fourteenth
arrive at the same conclusion. When, from within the philosophical
century the best natural philosophers had the chance o f being the best
disciplines themselves, one concludes that absolute certainty cannot be
theologians, this historian must answer that it depends on what you think
ascribed to philosophy, this in no way involves a loss o f autonomy or
is the best theology. Thus although some Franciscan historians and some
integrity - in fact to assert the certainty o f philosophy without sufficient grounds would seem to involve the greater loss o f integrity.^^o j f ^ natural
Protestant historians may answer the question in the affirmative, modern
philosopher consistently reaches conclusions that contemporary theolo
followers o f St. Thomas Aquinas may well be expected to have the oppo site viewpoint.124
gians would like him to reach, one is entitled to be suspicious - especially,
Concerning the autonomy o f the sciences or the separation o f philo
as in the case o f Ockham, when the philosopher himself is a theologian.
sophy from theology with which I began this paper, I think the above in
But when, as in Ockham’s case, the philosopher lays his philosophical
vestigation demonstrates that autonomy or its lack was not solely a matter
arguments meticulously on the line and proves their intrinsic philosophi
o f social or institutional factors. Both Aquinas and Ockham produced their commentaries on the Sentences in essentially the same institutional
cal worth, the evidence should be sufficient to allay such suspicions. There is no reason why, given Ockham’ s approach, the best theologian
framework, that, namely, o f the medieval university. That Aquinas pro
cannot also be the best natural philosopher. Whether conversely, the best
duced a “ sublimated” philosophy and Ockham an autonomous natural
natural philosopher can be the best theologian is a matter which is much
philosophy must have been caused, therefore, not so much by external
more difficult to decide. Fernand Van Steenberghen has argued that Aquinas was a great theologian because he was a great p h ilosop h er .121 I f
factors as by their different epistemological positions. I f external factors
this is true, however, it is because Aquinas uses his philosophy in his
and only indirectly on the content o f philosophy. Since with Ockham’s approach there is still a single person using the diverse autonomous
theology. Although this may compromise the autonomy o f natural philosophy, as I have argued above - replacing physics by a kind o f meta physics valuable to theology but not to natural philosophy - it may, but
were influential, they must have operated directly on this epistemology
sciences, it would be very unlikely that an institutional separation could occur.
this is a matter o f opinion, make good theology. Many people would indeed argue that if Ockham was the better natural scientist, Aquinas was
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spective medical student. Perhaps there were not enough pre-medical students, at least at Oxford and Paris, to provide a sufficient demand, as compared to the larger numbers of students destined for theology or law. Cf. James A . Weisheipl, ‘Ockham and Some Mertonians’, Mediaeval Studies 30
1 Many of the ideas lying behind or expressed in this paper were first developed during conversations and correspondance on the nature of fourteenth century philosophy between the author and John Murdoch. In many cases I can no longer recall whether a given idea was my own or suggested to me. In any case I want to express my indebted ness for his contribution while absolving him o f any responsibility for errors that may remain. 2 Robert K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970). Originally published in Osiris 4, Part II (1938). ® Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist’s Role in Society. A Comparative Study (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1971), pp. 46-55. I here use the terms ‘natural science,’ ‘natural philosophy,’ and ‘physics,’ as if they were synonymous although obviously in many medieval contexts it would be important to distinguish between them. I similarly use the terms ‘arts,’ ‘philosophy,’ and ‘secular sciences’ as if they were synonyms and included the natural or real sciences plus the trivium. I do not think that for my purposes a more precise terminology is necessary. 5 Cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement o f the Thirteenth Cen tury (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1955), p. 112:... the rationalist historians have long denied that the philosophy o f the Middle Ages had arrived at this scientific autonomy ; they maintained that during this long period there was only a philosophical-religious syn cretism, a speculation dominated by dogmas and watched by ecclesiastical authority. « Anneliese Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde der Spatscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1955), pp. 3-4. ’ Cf. Paul Wilpert, ‘Boethius von Dacien - Die Autonomie des Philosophen’, Beitrage zum Berufsbewusstsein des Mittelalterlichen Menschen, Miscellanea mediaevalia, vol. 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1964), pp. 136-7, referring to a 1272 Univer sity of Paris statute on this topic. * Cf. Pope Gregory IX ’s admonitions to the faculty of the University of Paris in 1231. Étienne Gilson, History o f Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 246,250. The statutes o f the University of Paris of 1366-1389 also say that Sentence Commentaries should not include discussions of logic or philosophy unless absolutely necessary. (P. Glorieux, ‘Sentences’, Dictionnaire de théologie catho lique, tome 14, part 2, col. 1876). For theologians’ limitations o f themselves from treating philosophical questions, see Daniel A . Callus, ‘The Function o f the Philosopher in thirteenth-century Oxford’, Beitrage zum Berufsbewusstsein des Mittelalterlichen Menschen, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Vol. 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964), pp. 156-158. * Cf. Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement o f the Thirteenth Century, p. 114: ...we know that, in virtue of the organization o f teaching in the medieval universities, “ one had not to grow old in the Arts Faculty” ; you taught there for a few years, before starting theology studies; the young masters of the Arts Faculty thus had no oppor tunity to acquire full philosophical maturity; they only gained that at the time of their theological teaching and, most often, they no longer had the opportunity to express their philosophical ideas except in theological works. As a result, their philosophy has almost always to be separated from their theological writings and, consequently, a good historian of medieval philosophy must also be a good historian o f scholastic theology. There do not seem to have been many arts textbooks specifically slanted to the pro
(1968), 197. Cf. Theodore Kermit Scott, (ed.), John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 5: As is evident in Buridan’s work, by the fourteenth century, the sophism had taken on major philosophical importance and its scope had been restricted, by and large, to a consideration of logical and semantical questions. The impossibilia, as merely formal exercises, are ignored by Buridan, and the insolubles are retained only as sophisms of a special sort. This is because the develop ment of the logical summa as an introduction to logic freed the sophisms from more menial duties and allowed them to serve as tests of logical rules and as devices for extending the application of basic principles expounded in the summae. And since logic was understood very broadly as including questions o f meaning and truth, as well as structure and inference, Buridan’s sophisms are anything but a mere dialectical exercise and are arranged so as to constitute an advanced treatise in the theory of language. 1* Cf. Robert W . Schmidt, S. J., The Domain o f Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 25-26. Aquinas says, for instance, (JExpositio super librium Boethij D e Trinitate, 6,1, sol. 2 ad 3): In addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud requirat. Quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo non incipere ab eo quod est facilius, sed ab eo a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere ...quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent. Aquinas also says {In II. M et., 5, n 335): Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logica tradit com munem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis. Cf. Ben-David, The Scientist’s R ole in Society, pp. 46-55. This audience or demand factor would hold true even if professors of logic were only temporarily so before going on to theology and even if professors o f logic had many other simultaneous non-logical interests. 15 Cf. M .-D . Chenu, L a Théologie au douzième siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), especially Chapter 4, ‘Grammaire et théologie’, originally published in Archives d ’histoire doctri nale et littéraire du moyen âge, 20 (1935-36), pp. 5-28, and Chapter 15, “ Les Magistri. La ‘science’ théologique.” Also by Chenu, La Théologie comme science au X lIIe . siècle, 3rd. edit. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957). 1* Chenu, La Théologie au douzième siècle, p. 91 : Lès regies de Donat ne commandent pas en théologie, car le mystère les met en échec; la doctrina sacra les emploie comme des “ servantes” , comme des moyens, pour pénétrer dans la parole de Dieu. Mais plus la théologie est fidele à son objet transcendant, plus, chez elle, la grammaire joue selon ses lois propres. Ainsi dans la parole de Dieu elle-même. A u X lle siècle, ce sont ceux qui pratiquèrent la meilleure critique grammaticale, qui avaient chance d’être les meil leurs théologiens. 1^ Chenu, L a Théologie comme science, pp. 15-16. 1* Cf. Chenu, La Théologie au douzième siècle, p. 353. 1* Ibid., pp. 90-91: ... les “ sept arts” , en entrant au service de la sacra doctrina, y apportent leurs lois et leur dynamisme, ce qui les amène à réclamer un jour, jusque dans le plus fidèle service, l’autonomie de leurs démarches et de leurs méthodes... La même histoire montra que le triomphe de la théologie a consisté précisément à traiter la
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grammaire - comme la dialectique, comme la métaphysique - non en esclave asservie, entendez en simple outillage, mais en discipline majeure, dont les lois et les méthodes sont d’autant plus valables religieusement, en expression de la parole de Dieu, que leur humaine vérité est loyalement reconnue. 20 Chenu, La Théologie comme science, pp. 11,67-92. 21 See, e.g. the anonymous Sentence Commentary in MS. Vat. lat. 986, which is thought to be associated with fourteenth century Oxford. Also the Sentence Commentaries of Grerard of Odo, Roger Rosetus, and Pierre Ceffons contain a great deal o f natural philosophy; see, for example, J. Murdoch, '^Mathesis in philosophiam scholasticam introducta. Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge (Montreal/Paris, 1969) pp. 217, 232-33,238,242-46,249. 22 Etienne Gilson, History o f Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 372-375. Cf. also Wilpert, “ Boethius von Dacien,” (note 7) for Boethius of Dacia’s treatment of the relations of theology and philosophy particularly as applied to the question o f the eternity of the world. 23 Gilson, History o f Christian Philosophy, p. 331flf, 366. Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement o f the Thirteenth Century, pp. 63-64,68fF. 24 Cf. Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement o f the Thirteenth Century, pp. 113-114: Theology is a science whose essential characteristic is that it takes as its prin ciples or as its starting point, the data of divine revelation... Speculative theology... studies the data of revelation with the aid of a philosophy, which serves as its instrument: hence the well-known scholastic expression: “philosophia ancilla theologiae” (“ philo sophy is the handmaid of theology”). The data of revelation being the same for all, the theological systems differ essentially by the philosophies which serve as their instrument in the interpretation of revealed truths; and the richer and more profound the philosophy a theologian utilizes, the greater the chance that his theology will be excellent. This is just what one finds in the Middle Ages; the systems of speculative theology constructed by the scholastics are worth exactly what the philosophies utilized in these systems are worth; their variety and originality are above all of the philosophical order. 25 Cf. Van Steenbergen, The Philosophical Movement o f the Thirteenth Century, pp. 114-115 : Professor Gilson was struck by the fact that the most noteworthy philosophies of the Middle Ages were created by theologians. It is a fact, but it must be understood accurately. If the masters of the Theology Faculty pushed philosophical research further than their colleagues of the Arts Faculty, it was not because they were theolo gians, but simply because they were older and possessed greater maturity of intellect.... 28 Chenu, La Théologie comme science, p. 89. My discussion o f the relations o f theology and philosophy for St. Thomas is based mainly on this study by Chenu. 27 It is worth noting that in this relationship of subaltemating and subaltemate sciences, it is the superior science which is a tool in the inferior science and not the reverse. 28 Cf. A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins o f Experimental Science 1100-1700 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. 91-96. 29 Cf. Chenu, La Théologie comme science, p. 87. Gilson, History o f Christian Philo sophy, says ; p. 365 : Thomism was not the upshot of a better vmderstanding of Aristotle. It did not come out of Aristotelianism by way of evolution, but of revolution. Thomas uses the languge of Aristotle everywhere to make the Philosopher say that there is only one God, the pure act of Being, Creator o f the world, infinite and onmipotent, a provi dence for all that which is, intimately present to every one of his creatures, especially to men, every one of whom is endowed with a personally immortal soul naturally able to
survive the death of its body. The best way to make Aristotle say so many things he never said was not to show that, had he understood himself better than he did, he could have said them. For indeed Aristotle seems to have understood himself pretty well. He has said what he had to say, given the meaning which he himself attributed to the principles of his own philosophy. Even the dialecticial acumen of Saint Thomas Aquinas could not have extracted from the principles of Aristotle more than what they could possibly yield. The true reason why his conclusions were different from those of Aristotle was that his own principles themselves were different. As will be seen, in order to metamorphose the doctrine of Aristotle, Thomas has ascribed a new meaning to the principles of Aristotle. As a philosophy, Thomism is essentially a metaphysics. Cf. p.
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708, fn. 90. 3“ Chenu, La Théologie comme science, p. 82. 31 Ibid., p. 86. 32 For Ockham’s views of the relations of philosophy and theology in general, see Robert Guelluy, Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d ’Ockham (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1947). 33 Cf. Philotheus Boehner, éd., Ockham. Philosophical Writings (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), pp. xliii-xlvi. 34 Cf, Heiko Oberman, The Harvest o f Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Me^/jeva/iVom/nfl/w/n (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 30-56. 35 OF. Anneliese Maier, Ausgehendes M ittelalter, Vol. 2 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1967), pp. 373-376. Philotheus Boehner, ‘The Notitia intuitiva o f NonExistents According to William Ockham’, reprinted in Boehner’s Collected Articles on Ockham, Eligius Buytaert (ed.), (St. Bonaventure, N .Y .: The Franciscan Institute, 1958), pp. 268-300. 3« Cf. Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 2, p. 520, for Gabriel Biel’s attempt to fill this gap. 3’ Cf. Ockham, Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, Book IV, Q. 7 S in Opera Plurima (Lyon, 1494-96, reprinted Gregg Press Ltd., 1962). 38 Cf. Maier, Ausgehendes M ittelalter, Vol. 2, pp. 376-391. Gilson, History o f Christian Philosophy, pp. 505-511. 39 Heiko Oberman, ‘Some Notes on the Theology o f Nominalism with Attention to its Relationship to the Renaissance’, Harvard Theological Review, 53 (1960), 47-76. 40 Ibid., p. 63: The supernatural world, instead of accompanying and nourishing the viator, has receded and has become a hemisphere, a dome. This dome shuts out the world of God’s non-realized possibilities and provides room on the inside for man’s own realm, in which he, as the image o f God, thinks and acts. 41 Quodlibeta Septem (Strasbourg, 1491, Réimpression en fac-similé, Louvain: Editions de la Bibliothèque S.J., 1962), Quodl. IV, Q. 35. 42 Cf. Aquinas, Sentence Commentary, Book IV, Dist. 12 (in Opera Omnia, Parma: Petrus Fiaccadorus, 1852-1873, Photolithographice Reimpressa, N ew York: Musurgia, 1948), Vol. 7, p. 654: ... divina dispositio quae aliquid ordinat secundum legem com munem, etiam sibi aliqua reservat praeter legem communem facienda ad aliquod privi legium gratiae communicandum; nec ex hoc sequitur aliqua inordinatio, quia divina dispositio unicuique rei ordinem imponit. Also Summa Theologiae, Illa, Q. 77, art. 1 (Blackfriars, 1965), Vol. LVIII, p. 128: ... dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse ordinatum secundum communem legem naturae, cuius tamen contrarium est ordina tum secundum speciale privilegium gratiae.... Ockham says, for instance, concerning the motion of Christ with the consecrated
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host {Sentence Commentary, Bk. IV, Q. 5F): Sed potest ne anima intellectiva Christi in hostia separari ab hostia ita quod non moveretur ad motum hostie. Dico quod sic nisi esset ordinatio divina in contrarium que de facto ordinat semper illud corpus moveri ad motum hostie. Sed non obstante illa ordinatione potest separare se ab hostia et hoc volendo quiescere hostia mota vel hostia quiescente volendo recedere et moveri ad alium locum. Tunc esset causa partialis concurrens cum deo ad causandum istum motum. Et eodem modo potest separari illud corpus ab hostia predictis modis sicut causa totalis.
strictly as not only gaining a new place but also leaving the old one - and Aristotle uses the word in this way - then Christ is not moved since He remains in heaven. 51 Dist. X, Q. I, Art. 3, Solutio 1, p. 623: ... dicendum quod comparatio corporis Christi ad species sub quibus est, non est similis alicui comparationi naturali; et ideo non potest reduci, proprie loquendo, ad aliquem modorum a Philosopho assignatorum; tamen habet aliquam similitudinem cum illo modo quo aliquid dicitur esse in loco secundum quod esse in loco est esse in aliquo separato extra substantiam suam, quod non est ejus causa.... Cf. Ockham, Sent., Bk IV, Q. 4 N : Item hec opinio ponit modum essendi in loco qui non competit creature.... 52 This may not be the best word to use, but I hope my meaning is clear enough. Aqui nas creates new metaphysical distinctions using the old Aristotelian vocabulary in a
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As in Aquinas’s Sentence Commentary, p. 616; Sunt item alii praecedentium insa niam transcendentes; qui Dei virtutem juxta modum naturalium rerum metientes, audacius ac periculosius veritati contradicunt.... 44 Dist. X, Q. I, Art. 1, and 5, p. 619. 45 Dist. X, Q. I, Art. 1, ad 4, p. 619. 4« Dist. X, Q. I, Art. 2, Quaestiuncula 1, Solutio, p. 620-621. 47 Dist. X. Q, I, Art. 4, Quaestiuncula 5, Solutio, p. 625. 48 Summa Theologiae, III®, Q. 76, art. 7, p. 116. 49 Sentence Commentary, Bk. IV, Q. 4 B -C . This is followed by a refutation o f Scotus’s views, which is not relevant to the comparison being made here. Ockham says: Est igitur una opinio que ponit quod corpus Christi est ibi ex vi conversionis substantie panis in corpus Christi et ideo locus non habet immediate ordinem ad corpus Christi, sed mediantibus speciebus sub quibus fuit substantia panis; et ita non est ibi sicut in loco proprie: sed sicut in sacramento; quia ex vi conversionis est sub speciebus substantie panis. Secundo declaratur quomodo est ibi quantitas corporis Christi: quia non est ibi ex vi conversionis; sed tantum ex naturali concomitantia; et ideo contrario ordine sunt ibi dimensiones corporis Christi et dimensiones corporis locati in loco: quia substantia non potest esse alicubi sine dimensionibus suis, et ideo una substantia non potest esse cum alia: nisi quia dimensiones sue possunt esse cum dimensionibus alterius: sic est in proposito, et sic est ibi quantitas corporis Christi. Contra istam opinionem primo quia non videtur ibi esse precise corpus Christi ex vi conversionis: quia quicquid potest deus conservare circumscripto quocimque alio illud potest facere sine alio, igitur sicut potest corpus Christi sub illis speciebus sine substantia panis: ita ibi potest facere corpus Christi sub illis speciebus et tamen quod ibi nunquam fuit substantia panis, quia si nunquam fuisset ibi nunquam fuisset conver sa in corpus Christi: et tamen eodem modo foret ibi tunc sicut nunc. Et tunc non foret ibi ex vi conversionis; igitur nec nunc. Si dicas quod non potest ibi fieri corpus Christi sine mutatione: quia tunc corpus Christi mutaretur localiter et haberet diversa ubi. Contra non obstante conversione ignis in aerem posito quod si talis conversio esset ibi mutatio localis aeris igitur eodem modo in proposito. Nam sicut materia non potest habere novam formam sine mutatione sic nec corpus potest habere esse quod prius non habuit sine mutatione illius corporis. Mutatur igitur corpus Christi sed non secundum perditionem loci prioris, sed per acquisitionem loci prius non habiti, quia nunc est presens illi loco qui prius non fuit presens, et tamen cum hoc est presens illi corpori cui prius fuit presens.... Tunc sic: illud cui primo acquhitur respectus primo mutatur, corpus Christi est huiusmodi, igitur etc. Item aut corpus Christi ibi est in loco imme diate aut mediate, si immediate habetur propositum, si mediate contra: omne quod competit alicui mediante alio cui primo competit non competit illi nisi propter specia lem unionem unius ad alterum quam prius non habuit.... sed unio corporis Christi ad illas species non est unio specialis.... 50 Cf. Ockham’s Quodl. 6, Q. 3. Ockham concedes to Aquinas that if motion is defined
“ pxirified” or extrapolated sense. 53 Cf. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde, pp. 176-198. 54 Cf. Anneliese Maier. D ie Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, 2nd edit., (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1966), pp. 29-41. ®5 Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde, pp. 159-175. 5« Ibid., pp. 151-158. Cf. A . Pelzer, ‘Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censures, en Avignon, en 1326’, Revue d ’histoire ecclésiastique, 28 (1922), 261 (art. 21): Recitat opinionem dicentem quod substantia et quantitas sunt eadem res nec tamen reprobat, immo secundum ea Respondet in diversis locis ad argumenta et in ea in uno loco residet. Magistri-. Dicimus quod ponere quantitatem non esse rem distinctam a substantia est contra communem sententiam sanctorum, doctorum et philosophorum, quam reputamus veram. Quo supposito dicimus esse erroneum et periculosum et contra determinationem ecclesie, que ponit in sacramento altaris solam substantiam converti, quantitate et ceteris acci dentis remanentibus. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde, pp. 176-177. 59 Ockham, D e Sacramento Altaris, ed. T. Bruce Birch, (Burlington, lowa: The Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), pp. 160,210. Although this edition has been criticized, it seems adequate for my purposes. I have occasionally checked it against the version printed with Ockham’s quodlibetal questions. Anneliese Maier (Metaphysische Hinter griinde, p. 177; Ausgehendes M ittelalter, vol I, p. 221, fa. 28) argues that the existing version of Ockham’s Sentence Commentary, Bk. IV, cannot be the one to which Ock ham refers and that Ockham may have commented on the Sentences in the Franciscan studium at Oxford previous to giving his public lectures. It was also agreed that if the sacrament had been celebrated during the days when Christ was in the tomb, then only His body would have been present in the Eucharist and not His soul. Cf. Ockham, Sent. IV, Q. 6 E. Dist. X, Q. I, Art. 2, Solutio 3, ad secundum, p. 621 : Cf. S. T., III“, Q. 76, art. 5, Responsio, p. 108. The editor of the Summa Theologiae remarks, p. 108, fn. b : The substance is envisaged as contained by the dimensions or the quantity. This ‘being contained' is understood as prior to ‘being the subject ’ which the quantity affects by dividing it into integral parts. This metaphysical distinction is solely an insight o f Eucharistie theology; it is the key to an understanding of the Real Presence. See Anneliese Maier, Die Vorlâufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, pp. 29-41. ®4 In the D e Sacramento Altaris but not in his Sentence Commentary, Ockham does approach Aegidius’s view of a quantity o f matter not identical to extension by saying that if one calls a quantum whatever has really distinct parts that are dfôigned to be
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distant locally (natas distaré) and to be produced {natas produci) by a natviral agent in distinct locations, then Christ can be conceded to be a quantum in the Eucharist. (Ockham-Birch, p. 344). He obviously does not see the appeal of this view, however, and usually identifies being a quantum and being extended. Cf. Sentence Commentary, Book III, Q .6 E . 85 S e n f.,B k .IV ,Q .4 K . ®® Q. 4 L, ad quartum; cf. Quodl. 7, Q. 25. 67 Q .4 H .
actionem qualitatum ne agant. Tum quia non repugnat intellectui pati non habente modum quantitativum sicut patet de intellectu meo vidente albedinem extra. Nec etiam ab obiecto non habente modum quantitavum sicut patet quando intelligit se et suam cognitionem, ergo ad hoc quod naturaliter intelligat aliquid non refert an habeat mo dum quantitativum vel non. Tertio dico quod de facto corpus Christi et accidentia eius corporalia non videntur naturaliter ab homine, licet forte videantur ab angelo. Sed hoc solum scimus per experientiam. Et causa quare non videtur de facto est quia deus non coagit naturali influentia illis qualitatibus ut videantur ab homine. Unde si deus coageret illis qualitatibus generali influentia sicut coagit aliis, tunc de facto naturaliter viderentur et ideo videtur quod Deus miraculose suspendit illas actiones sicut fecit actioni ignis in camino. Sed utrum Christus videat oculo corporali illa et visione intel lectuali vel non nescio quia non habeo rationem ad hoc convincentem nec experien tiam sed ipse novit quomodo. Rationabilius tamen est dicere quod sic etiam loquendo de facto quia satis videtur mirabile et extraneum quod Christus sit in eucharistia et
Also in his non-theological works. Cf. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde, pp. 192-198. In his Summa logicae, P. I. Ch. 44 (Ed. Philotheus Boehner, Franciscan In stitute Publications, Text Series N o. 2, St. Bonaventure, N .Y .: The Franciscan Insti tute, 1957), Ockham repeats several times that Aristotle held this view of quantity: ...recitabo opinionem... quae mihi videtur esse de mento Aristotelis, sive sit vera sive falsa, sive catholica sive haeretica (p. 122); Propter quod mihi videtur, quod de inten tionis Aristotelis est, quod quantitas continua non est res absoluta realiter et totaliter distincta a corpore. Ideo contra istam opinionem communem modernorum intendo aliquas rationes, etiam theologicas recitare, sive concludant, sive non, saltem valeant, quantum valere possunt (p. 123); Ideo est alia opinio de quantitate, quae mihi videtur esse de mente Aristotelis, sive sit haeretica sive Catholica, quam volo nunc recitare, quamvis nolim eam asserere. Et ideo quando illam opinionem posui, et scripsi super Philosophiam, non scripsi eam tanquam meam, sed tamquam Aristotelis, quam exposui, ut mihi videbatur. Et eodem modo nunc sine assertione recitabo eam. Est autem ista opinio, quam etiam multi theologi tenent et tenuerunt, quod scilicet nulla quantitas est realiter distincta a substantia et qualitate.... (p. 125). Leaving aside the question of why Ockham does not want to give his personal backing to the view that quantity is not a distinct res, it is clear that he wants to show that the concept is philosophically respect able. «9 Q .4N ;cf.G «oi//.4,Q .36. ’ 0 Cf. S. T., III“, Q. 76,6, pp. 112,114. ’ 1 Quodl. 4, Q. 21 ; Sent. IV, Q. 5 II, ad tertium. Cf. Sent. IV, Q. 5 F. ’ 2 Sent. IV, Q. 5 D. Sent. IV, Q. 5 D : Aliter ergo dico ad articulos predictos quod sepositis illis que sunt fidei non potest probari per rationem quin omnem actionem et passionem terminatam ad formam absolutam quam potest corpus habere existens in loco circumscriptive habeat in loco diffinitive et non quantitative.... Unde videtur quod ista propositio communis quod agente approximato et passo disposito sequitur actio non est neganda nisi obviet sibi vel auctoritas vel experientia.... Sent. IV, Q. 5G: Hec patet quia posito activo sufficiente et passivo disposito et approximato sequitur actio. Hoc non est neganda nisi appareat ratio evidens in contrarium vel experientia certa vel auctoritas quorum nullum patet in proposito sicut supra dictum est.... Ideo teneo quod omnem actionem et passionem quam potest habere quando existit circumcriptive in loco potest habere in eucharistia nisi aliud impediret puta voluntas divina sicut supra dictum est. ’ 4 Sent. IV, Q. 5 K. ’ 5 Sent. IV, Q. 5, D and G ; Quodl. 4, Q. 20: Secundo dico quod Christus in eucharistia posset videre oculo corporali illa que fiunt in altari et similiter posset videri consimili visione ab aliis nisi esset speciale impedimentum. Quod patet tum quia posito activo sufficienti et passivo potest sequi actio sicut supra dictum est. Nec est ista propositio neganda nisi propter rationem que hic non apparet, vel propter auctoritatem scripture que etiam non apparet hic, vel experientiam que hic non concludit, quia deus suspendit
tamen nesciat ubi sit. 78 Sent. IV, Q. 5 G ; Quodl. 4, Q. 20. ” S. T., 111% Q. 76, Art. 7, p. 116. Dist. X, Expositio textus, p. 627; Quid ergo hic quaeris naturae ordinem! Ergo vide tur quod non licet disputare per rationes de hoc sacramento. - Et dicendum quod loquitur contra illos qui nihil in hoc sacramento, et in aliis quae sunt fidei, volunt credere, nisi hoc quod per naturalem rationem probari potest; non autem contra illos qui ex principiis fidei disputant, et qui ex principiis naturalibus non volunt probare quae sunt fidei, sed sustinere: quia quae sunt fidei, quamvis sint supra rationem, non tamen sunt contra rationem: alias Deus esset sibi contrarius, si alia posuisset in ratione quam rei veritas habet. ’ 9 Aquinas, Sent. IV, Dist. X I, Q. I, Art. 3, Solutio 2, pp. 655-657; S. T., III“, Q. 75, art. 7. Ockham, Quodl. 2, A . 19. Since Ockham does not think that instants as such exist, he does not emphasize the second half of this proposition. Cf. Ockham-Birch, D e Sacramento Altaris, p. 306 for the relevant passage from canon law. 80 Aquinas, Sent IV. Dist. XII, Q. I, Art 1, Solutio 3, p. 654 and Art. 2, Solutio 4, p. 658; S. T., III^, Q. 77, art. 1. The identification of A W a r d as a holder of this view is made by the editor o f the S. T., p. 126, fn. 6. 81 Dist. XI, Q. I, Art. 1, Solutio I, p. 631. 82 S. T., III», Q. 75, Art. 2, pp. 60,62. 83 Sent. IV, Dist. XI, Q. I., Art 1, Solutio 1 ; S.T., 111%Q. 75, Art. 2. 84 Dist. XI, Q. I, Art. II, pp. 632-633 ; S.T., IIP, Q. 75, Art. 3. 85 Sent. IV, Q. 6 D . Cf. Quodl. 4, Q. 35: Tertia opinio (that the substance of bread remains) esset multum rationabilis nisi esset determinatio ecclesie in contrarium. Quia ilia opinio salvat et vitat omnes diflîcultates que consequuntur ex separatione acci dentium ex subiecto. Nec contrarium illius habetur in canone biblie. Nec includit ali quam contradictionem corpus Christi plus coexistere substantie panis quam eius accidentibus. Nec repugnat rationi. Tum quia tantum repugnat quantitas quantitati quantum substantia substantie. Sed due quantitates possunt simul existere in eodem loco sicut patet de duobus corporibus existentibus in eodem loco. Tum quia substantia Christi potest esse in eodem loco cum quantitate hostie. Ergo eadem ratione cum substantia eiusdem. Ockham concludes : Ad argumentum principale dico quod aliquando sunt ponenda plura miracula circa aliquod ubi posset fieri per pauciora et hoc placet deo et hoc constat ecclesie per aliquam revelationem ut suppono et ideo sic deter minavit. The insertion “ ut suppono” appears to me to indicate Ockham’s preference
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for the view rejected by the church. Cf. Ockham-Birch, D e Sacramento Altaris, pp. 172-186.
te a deo. Ockham-Birch, De Sae. A lt., p. 478: ...potest aeque faciliter dici quod Deus ordinavit quod omnia apparentia sensui quae fiunt circa hostiam non consecratam, fiant etiam circa hostiam consecratam. Et ideo illa, quae non possunt fieri virtute creata,
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8® Sent. IV, Q. 6 F: Ideo dico quod duplex est mutatio, una acquisitiva alia deperditiva. Aquisitiva est in corpore Christi quia accipit esse ubi prius non habuit esse. Sed deper ditiva est ipsius substantie panis que non manet et prius mansit. Ockham here follows Duns Scotus’s view of transubstantiation. The Thomist and Scotist interpretations of transubstantiation are both considered orthodox. Cf. S.T., p. 66, fn. e. See also Gabriel N . Buescher, O.F.M., The Eucharistie Teaching o f William o f Ockham (Washington, D . C. : The Catholic University of America, 1950). »7 D i s t .X I I ,Q .4 C ;Q .6 F ,K . 88 Cf. 5. r., 111“ A . 76, Art. 6. 89 Sent. IV, Dist. XII, Q. I, Art 1, Solutio 1, p. 653. 90 Dist. XII, Q. I, Art 1, Solutio 1, ad secundum, p. 654. »1 Dist. XII, Q. I, Art. 1, Solutio 3, ad tertium, p. 635. Cf. S.T., III“, Q. 77, Art. 1, ad 3 where he gives a different answer. Jfames A. Weisheipl, ‘Matter in Fourteenth Century Science’, in Ernan McMullin, (ed,). The Concept o f M atter, (Notre Dame, Indiana: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), p. 153, fn. 18, remarks : only in speaking o f the Eucharist, in which there is no primary matter, does St. Thomas call dimensive quantity a “ quoddam individuationis principium” {Sum. Theol. Ill, q. 77, a. 2), but this does not mean that quantity is an independent source o f individuality.... »2 Dist. XII, Q. I, Art 1, Solutio 3, ad 6, p. 655; S.T., 111% A . 77, Art. 2, ad 3, p. 134. 93 Dist. XII, Q. I, Art 2, Solutiones 1-3, pp. 657-8 ; S .T., III», Q. 77, Art. 2. 94 Sent. IV ,Q .6 C . 95 Cf., e.g. Summa Logicae, P. I., Ch. 49, p. 141. 9« Cf. James A . Weisheipl, ‘Matter in Fourteenth Century Science’, pp. 157-8: Were it not for the Eucharist, Ockham would have denied absolute reality to every accident. But the Christian faith teaches that sensible qualities such as color, taste and weight, remain per se subsistentia in the Eucharist without any subject. 97 H. Denifle and A . Chatelain (eds.). Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris: 1889-1897), vol. 1, p. 551: Quod Deus non potest facere accidens sine subiecto nec plures dimensiones simul esse. 98 Sent. IV, Q. 7M, N ; Quodl. 4, Q. 31 : Quarto sic. Causa naturalis potest qualitatem in hostia consecrata de novo producere et priores augmentare quia hoc negare est tollere omnem certitudinem quam habemus via sensus et dare infideli occasionem errandi et non credendi eo quod ad presentiam ignis videmus illas species calefieri post consecrationem sicut ante sed causa creata non potest aliquid agere sine passo et sub stantia non est ibi quantitas.... Ad quartam dico quod illud argumentum est contra te ponendo quantitatem de rarefactione et condensatione quantitatis ubi non potes dare subiectum. Ideo potest de omnibus talibus dici quod omnia apparentia sensui que fiunt circa hostiam non conse cratam per ordinationem divinam fiunt circa hostiam consecratam immediate a deo ex quo non possunt fieri a potentia creata. Dico ergo quod tam augmentatio quam pro ductio nove qualitatis fiunt totaliter et immediate a deo sicut tu ponis de rarefactione. Non plus tollitur hic certitudo que habetur in via sensus, nec datur infideli occasio errandi vel non credendi plus quam per rarefactionem et condensationem quantitatis. Unde ista constant partim ex fide et partim ex ratione. Ex fide tenemus quod substantia panis non remanet post consecrationem. Per rationem tenemus quod quantitas non distinguitur a substantia et qualitate. Et per experientiam tenemus quod causa creata presupponit passum in sua actione. Ex quibus sequitur quod omnia talia fiunt immedia
disposuit facere inunediate per seipsum. Ex predictis colligi potest quomodo illa accidentia manent simul, quamvis non sint in aliquo uno subiective nec unum sit subiectum alterius; quia sive hoc possit fieri virtute creata sive non, non debet esse dubium quin possit fieri virtute divina.... Sic etiam omnes transmutationes, quas videmus fieri circa qualitates remanentes in sacra mento altaris, possumus salvare quod illae, quae non possunt fieri virtute creata, possunt fieri virtute Dei, sicut multi ponunt de multis. 99 Sent. IV, Dist. XII, Q. I, Art. 2, Quaestiuncula 3, argument 3 and reply, pp. 656,658. Cf. Guelluy, Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d ’Ockham, p. 365: Notre au teur semble avoir repris, avec la seule préoccupation de n’avancer que des idées claires et des raisonnements rigoureux, les problèmes que le Docteur subtil avait traités avec une âme plus religieuse et le souci de montrer que la pensée paienne n’epuisait pas le domaine du savoir possible. For Aegidius Romanus, see Anneliese Maier, D ie Vorlaufer Galileis, pp. 28-41. Walter Burley’s treatment of this aspect of the physics o f the Eucharist occurs in his Tractatus Primus. Cf. Anneliese Maier, Ausgehendes M ittelalter, vol. 1, pp. 219-226, and Edith Sylla, The O xford Calculators and the Mathematics o f M otion, 1320-1350, Unpublished Dissertation, Harvard University, 1971. 192 The importance o f the quest for certainty was suggested to me by John Murdoch. Cf. also Heiko Oberman, The Harvest o f Medieval Theology, p. 35: The issue of certi tude and security, for all kinds of non-theological reasons, may have become so central that this has led to the questioning o f the reliability o f traditional physics, metaphysics, and theology. 193 Gilson, History o f Christian Philosophy, p. 489: Like Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, Ockham was first and last a theologian using certain philosophical doctrines in order to elaborate his own understanding o f Christian faith. The dissolving influence excercised by his doctrine in the history of mediaeval scholasticism is due to the fact that, professing as he did a radical empiricism in philosophy, he had to reduce the understanding o f faith to a bare minimum. An Ockhamist intellect is as badly equipped as possible for metaphysical cognition, and since where there is no metaphysical know ledge theology can expect little help from philosophy, the consequence of Ockhamism was to substitute for the positive collaboration o f faith and reason which obtained in the golden age o f scholasticism, a new and much looser regime in which the absolute and self-sufiicient certitude of faith was only backed by mere philosophical probabili ties. Cf. also by the same author, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, (N ew York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938) pp. 87-88: The influence o f Ockham is everywhere present in the fourteenth century; it progressively invaded Oxford, Paris, and practi cally all the European universities. Some would profess it, others would refute it, but nobody was allowed to ignore it. The late Middle Ages were then called upon to witness the total wreck of both scholastic philosophy and scholastic theology as the necessary upshot of the final divorce o f reason and Revelation. Cf. Guelluy, Philosophie et Théologie, pp. 14-21. For the “ double truth” see Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, pp. 58-66. Also Wilpert, “ Boethius von Dacien,” p. 149flF.; Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde, pp. 3-44. I think that Philotheus Boehner’s views on this issue - that Ockham was by no
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means a skeptic - are generally correct. Cf. also Guelluy, Philosophie et Théologie, p. 359.
A view of the universe that rejects the necessity for a imified W orld Hypothesis con sistent in principle throughout is not defeatist as regards the advance of science. For if one regards scientific theories as guides to investigations, each theory is continuously open to testing by experiment and observation. Such a view leads to suspicion of all assumptions carried over from one area o f investigation to another.... There is nothing in such an outlook to discourage attempts to bring different scientific theories into close
Interestingly, for Ockham’s procedure to be useful there must exist separate sciences that have clear procedures for establishing their own validity. Ockham would have little use for simple speculations or hypotheses without proof and indeed he discounts much such speculation by means o f a nominalistic analysis. Conversely, any methods successfully applied to defeite areas would be likely to receive enthusiastic use by those taking Ockham’s approach wherever they were applicable. This would help explain the popularity o f the Mertonian mathematical and logical techniques and of the new “ conceptual languages” of the fourteenth century. Cf. John Murdoch, ‘Philosophy and the Enterprise o f Science in the Later Middle Ages’, The Interaction between Science and Philosophy, ed. Y. Elkana, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1974, pp. 51-74. 1'’* James B. Conant, M odem Science and Modern M an (Garden City, N .Y . ; Double day and Company, Anchor Books, 1953), pp. 166-178 : A s to the unifying, materialistic W orld Hypothesis, my doubt stems from its manifest inadequacy. As a conceptual scheme attempting to account for everything in the whole universe, it seems to me unsatisfactory because it is incomplete. It fails to provide for the altruistic and idealistic side o f human nature. It fails to accommodate what I regard as highly significant facts, not facts of science but facts of human history.... On the other hand, the formulations that attempt to include spiritual values, modem physics, biology, and cosmology within one total consistent scheme attempt, to my mind, far too much. Whether the unifying principle can be a dualism of matter and spirit, mechanism, formism, or some form of idealism, the whole attempt seems to me to be in the wrong direction. M y preference would be for more adequate exploration o f special limited areas of expe rience; one o f these would include those experiences which can be ordered in terms o f a system of spiritual values. Each of these restricted areas o f exploration I venture to designate a universe o f inquiry. I do so only to underline my objection to those who insist on using the “ in principle” argument to relate concepts in one set of inquiries to those used in another. Such insistence is, o f course, almost second nature for those who regard a scientific theory as a creed or a map o f at least a portion of the universe. But for those who regard scientific concepts and conceptual schemes as policies and guides for action, the need for an “ in principle” consistency between inquiries in different areas disappears. If two policies in two areas (universes of inquiry, to use my phrase) can actually be brought into conflict as guides to action, then an observational or experimental test between them becomes possible. The conflict generates, so to speak, a series of limited working hypotheses, a chain o f reasoning that finally eventuates in a hypothesis so restricted that a fairly clean-cut yes or no answer can be obtained. But if attempts to bring the two policies into conflict fail, as in the case of the corpuscular and wave theories of light, then one may say that the two theories are so dissimilar as to constitute incompatible universes o f inquiry.... Within the general field of the natural sciences, I suggest that those inquiries that involve the assumption of the uniformity of nature over long periods of time constitute a special universe of inquiry (or perhaps a group o f such universes).... The point o f view I have presented regards scientific theories as restricted policies, not parts of a unified cosmic creed. I am well aware that it can be attacked in the name o f man as a rational being. It can be labeled defeatist, obscurantist, or just a lazy man’s way out of embarrassing difliculties....
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relation.... A s a man o f action, each o f us must not only manipulate a world of inanimate nature full of all sorts of plants and animals..., but also accommodate ourselves to other people.... For many people in the Western W orld the concepts that are particularly relevant to human intercourse are religious doctrines.... Cf. L. Baudry, ed.. L e Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribué a G. d ’Occam (Études de Philosophie Mediévale, 13, Paris: J. Vrin, 1936), p. 125 : Pluralitas nunquam ponenda est sine necessitate ponendi. Exponit autem quid vocat necessitatem ponendi et dicit quod est ratio vel experientia vel auctoritas scripture, cui contradicere non licet, et auctoritas ecclesie. Hoc autem rationabile principium est quia sine istis liceret res ad placitum multiplicare. An earlier thinker with a position similar to Ockham’s was Boethius of Dacia. Cf. Wilpert, ‘Boethius von Dacien’, pp. 145-146: Die Position des Boethius is klar umrissen. Jede Wissenschaft ist auf ihre Voraussetzungen und auf die Reichweite ihrer Methode angewiesen. W o die Philosophie aufhort nicht mehr mit rationalen Argumenten zu arbeiten, oder wo sie auf etwas anderes sich stiitzt als auf die erfahrbaren Phanomene, da hat sie sich selbst preisgegeben.... Worum es Boethius geht, das ist nicht die Trennung der Person, hier wissenschaftlicher Forscher, dort glaubiger Christ, sondem die saubere Trennung der Bereiche. Es ist nicht wichtig, wer eine Aussage macht, aber ist diese Aussage gestiizt auf die Phanomene und auf rationale Deutung dieser Phânomene, so handelt es sich um eine philosophische Wahrheit. 1st sie gestiitzt auf Off'enbarung, so ist est eine Glaubenswahrheit. Es its nicht wichtig, ob eine philo sophische Wahrheit von einem theologen ausgesprochen wird oder eine theologische Wahrheit von einem Philosophen. Nicht wer sie ausspricht, des bestimmt den Charakter einer Wahrheit, sondern mit welchen Begründungen und mit welchem Recht er sie Ausspricht, davon hângt die Einordnung dieser Wahrheit in das Gebaude der Wissen schaft ab. Among earlier authors at Oxford a somewhat similar position may have been taken by Geoffrey o f Aspall. Cf. Daniel Callus, “ The Function o f the Philosopher in thirteenth-century Oxford,” pp. 159,161. The 1277 Paris condemnations were directed in part against Boethius’s view. That Ockham writes after 1277 may account for his frequent repetition that when he speaks philosophically he is only reciting hypotheses. Both Boethius and Ockham, however, assume that certified Christian belief is abso lutely true whereas the results o f natural philosophy are probable. Cf. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 159-160,166, fn. 34,167. Ockham-Birch, De Sacramento Altaris, p. 336: Ista sunt subtiliter dicta, nullus tamen amator veritatis debet offendi si causa veritatis inquirendae et exercitii impug nentur. Si enim vera sunt, expedit audire obiectiones ut solvantur ut sic veritas clarius innotescat. Si falsas sunt, expedit ut convincantur. See also pp. 158-160,196, 210, 240. Ibid., p. 378: Et certe fateor numquam me legisse nec in scripturis canonicis nec in originalibus sanctorum nec in decretis alicuius summi pontificis, nec in aliquo con cilio generali, nec in aliquo authentico scripto talem propositionem, ‘quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi,’ .... quamvis sententiam contrariam multos doctores
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modernos se mutuo reprobantes video ponere, et ideo eorum scripta non sunt authentica; immo etiam aliquorum multae opiniones in universitatibus solemnibus sunt damna tae quia tales propositiones approbare praesumpserunt.... Cf. also pp. 356,360,444-6. Ibid., p. 442: Patet igitur quod cum controversia sit inter theologos de aliquo arti culo an sit consonus an dissonus fidei Chriatianae, ad summum pontificem est recur rendum. Cum enim ofScium inquisitionis de haeretica pravitate aliquando simplicibus vel non magnis doctoribus committatur, absurdum videtur quod ad talem inquisitio nem pertinet quamcumque quaestionem difficilem et profundam de articulis quibus cumque pertinentibus ad theologiam auctoritate propia terminare, et quemcumque magnum et in theologia famosum et dignum tam ratione vitae quam scientiae doctoris officio per universitatem solemnem approbatum, si suae opinioni contradiceret, tam quam haereticum condemnare. Videtur igitur ad Romanum pontificem recurrendum, quando quaestio ventilatur de aliquo quod non est in scripturis canonicis expressum, nec est per Romanam Ecclesiam determinatum, quod etiam videmus fieri modernis temporibus.... Not long after this Ockham decided that the Pope himself was unreliable. Ibid., p. 126: ...doctores modernos mutuo se reprobantes publice et occulte et etiam in scriptis.... Nihil enim quod dicunt est recipiendum nisi quod possunt probare per rationem evidentem vel per auctoritatem sacrae scripturae vel per determinationem ecclesiae vel per doctores approbatos ab ecclesia.... Immo periculosum et temerarium aestimo velle artare quamcumque ad captivandum ingenium suum et ad credendum aliquod quod ratio dictat sibi esse falsum, nisi possit elici ex scriptura sacra vel ex determinatione Ecclesiae Romanae vel ex dictis doctorum approbatonmi.... Si tamen possit probari, quod sit de mente alicuius sancti vel doctoris approbati ab ecclesia quem negare non est licitum, propter eum volo ingenium captivare et concedere quod sit alia res a substantia et qualitate. Earlier in the same passage Ockham says that if authors are found who seem to contradict his view their statements should be expound ed to show how they can be reconciled with the truth. Cf. p. 450 for a similar passage in the second treatise. 11« Ibid., pp. 276,360,370,378,436,440. 11’ Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde, pp. 3-44. 11® Cf., e.g., Stanley Jaki’s introductory essay in Pierre Duhem, To Save the Phenomena. An Essay on the Idea o f Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. xix-xxii. Also Pierre Duhem, ‘Physics o f a Believer’, published as an appendix to Duhem’s, The A im and Structure o f Physical Theory (N ew York: Atheneum, 1962). 11® Originally, La Théorie Physique'. Son Objet, Sa Structure, 2nd edit., (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1914).
This thesis seems capital to me. ...even if he (St. Thomas) was a theologian by profession rather than a philosopher, I am sure that he was a great theologian because he was a great philosopher, and not vice versa. 122 For the opposition to Ockham see A. Pelzer, ‘Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censurés, en Avignon, in 1326’, Revue d ’histoire ecclésiastique, 28 (1922), 240-270; J, Koch, ‘Neue Aktenstiicke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon gefiihrten Prozess’. Récherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 7 (1935), 353-380, 8 (1936), 79-93, 168-197 ; F. Hoffmann, Die erste K ritik des Ockhamismus durch den Oxforder Kanzler Johannes Lutterell, Breslauer Studien zur historischen Théologie, N.S. 9 (1941); Ernest A . Moody, ‘Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt. The Parisian Statutes of 1339 and 1340’, Franciscan Studies, 7 (1947), 113-146; Ruprecht Paque, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut zur Entstehung des Realitatsbegriffs der Neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970). Despite Paqué’s efforts to correlate the Parisian statute of 1340 with Ockham’s views, I believe that Moody was essentially correct and that on the whole the errors listed in the 1340 statute were not Ockham’s views. They do, however, represent another way in which fourteenth century authors
120 Cf. Wilpert, ‘Boethius von Dacien’, p. 150: Doch gerade dann miisste er die Bereiche sauber auseinanderhalten. Was er als Wissenschaftler bestreiten muss, mag er als Christ glauben. 1st das nicht doch das Verlangen einer schizophrenen Geisteshaltung gegen die Tempier den gesunden Menschenverstand verteidigt? Ich meine im Gegenteil, was Boethius hier vertritt ist, um mit Nietzsche zu sprechen, die Forderung der intellektuellen Redlichkeit. 121 Cf. Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement o f the Thirteenth Century, pp. 114-115: (After agreeing with Gilson that the best medieval philosophy was done by theologians. Van Steenberghen goes on) But that in no way implies, as Professor Gilson would have it, that these philosophies owed their worth and interest to the theologies in which they were incorporated. In my opinion, good scholastic philosophers make good theologians ; and not, good theologians make good philosophers.
attempted to attain certainty. 123 Cf. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, pp. 86-95. 124 por instance, Philotheus Boehner, although he concentrates on Ockham’s philos ophy rather than on his theology, seems not unfavorably disposed to Ockham’s achievements. Cf. Boehner’s quotation from Luke Wadding, Annales Minorum (Col lected Articles on Ockham, p. 319): Neque vero depravatorem theologiae... aut philosophiae fuisse Occhamum, probant ipsa eius scripta philosophica et theologica, quae passim in scholis leguntur, approbantur, commandantur: confirmantque desti nata sibi subsellia in quibusdam orthodoxis academiis, ex quibus solae Occhami sen tentiae tum philosophicae, tum theologicae, designatis stipendiis edocentur....
D IS C U S S IO N c. scHMmr: I’m quite in agreement with you that everything cannot be explained by social and institutional factors as some historians and sociologists would want it. On the other hand, I’m not certain whether you haven’t made their argument sort o f a straw man. If there were a strong social and institutional historian here, I think he might be able to answer some o f your questions. You say, for example, that Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham were were both members of the same institution, the university o f Paris. This is important, but I think that there were also other institutional factors, for example one of them was a Franciscan and the other was a Dominican, a fact which certainly must be taken into account in any discussion o f this sort. Secondly, I think that your work is a good example of a view of medieval philosophy, science, and theology based upon accepting Oxford and Paris as typical universities of the time and leaving out not only the whole Italian tradition but also the tradition of a place like Montf>ellier, where the orientation was very different. Our general studies of medieval universities are somehow distorted by taking Paris and Oxford as much more important than anyplace else. Perhaps they were the two most important universities, but Bologna, Padua, Montpellier, and others were also extremely important and must be given serious consideration. A third question concerns the function of the law and medical faculties. Medieval universities were essentially set up for very practical reasons, to produce theologians.
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physicians, and lawyers for society. The law faculties were very large and dominated a number of universities, not only Italian ones such as Bologna, but northern ones such as Toulouse. W e must also pay more attention to the medical traditions in universities. The scholars who began studying the history of universities in the last century were primarily interested in theology and, to some extent, in philosophy, particularly the philosophical problems related to theology. Much o f the impetus for the study o f medieval intellectual history and medieval universities, it seems to me, resulted from the revival o f interest in medieval philosophy and theology with the Aeterni patris with its emphasis on Thomism, and so forth. This provided an incentive for others who didn't agree with this emphasis to study the Franciscan tradition and yet others to study the proto-Protestant movements o f the Middle Ages, but the focus o f the study o f medieval intellectual history has up to now, or up to very recently, been on the study o f theology and those aspects of philosophy directly touching on theology, such as meta physics. Only within the last couple of generations, with the work of Anneliese Maier, Marshall Clagett, and some o f the people here, has a strong interest been taken in the very vast literature o f natural philosophy. The medical literature of the Middle Ages has largely remained unstudied. I am not attempting to say that the theological and metaphysical issues are not important, but I think that perhaps they have been unduly emphasized. B. STOCK : I don’t want to bring in a lot o f institutional factors here, but let me ask whether you would distinguish between “ specialization,” as you use it, and what might be called “ professionalization” ? What distinction would you make? It seems to me that the two ideas are distinct, although, when you are dealing with the institutional context, they have to be considered together as well. W e are dealing here with a period o f increasing professionalization. It is also a period of increasing specialization in terms o f classification o f sciences and o f divisions o f labor among people who are working in intellectual disciplines. Would you see these developments as related? E. s y l l a : I don’t know what the profession involved would be except Master o f Arts or Master or Doctor o f Theology. B. s t o c k : Take the lawyers; they became specialized. E. s y l l a : But do you think there were very many specialist mathematicians or specia list physicists? It would be very hard, I think, to pick out very many people in the thir teenth century or in the fourteenth century who are specialists in one branch o f physical science. Bradwardine can write the De proportionibus, which is an entirely physical work, but he also wrote the D e causa Dei, so be cannot be a scientific specialist or professional mathematician.
c. SCHMITT: But there is an increasing professionalization, it seems to me, with the rise of new universities. There are more positions for someone who is a theologian, for someone who teaches in the Arts Faculty, for the physician who teaches natural philos ophy, and so forth. There would seem to be is a new professional class rising during this period.
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E. s y l l a : Would these people have been medical doctors? c. sc h m it t : Most o f them became medical doctors. It was a higher profession with
greater prestige and greater salary. Most people taught logic for a couple of years, then natural philosophy, and finally teach medicine as they become older, ^tter known and could move to higher positions. j. MURDOCH: I agree with you that you wouldn’t want to call Buridan or others who never did theology theologians, but isn’t there a problem in moving from what you just said, somebody doing X, Y , or Z, to calling him an X-ist, Y-ist, or Z-ist? Y ou are making an assumption that has to be justified. If you take the major philosophers o f the fourteenth century, almost all of them were theologians as well, Now , are they both at the same time? c. SCHMITT: Well, Siger of Brabant, for example, taught in the Arts Faculty, and I would say that he was a philosopher and taught philosophy in the Arts Faculty, whereas Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas did philosophy, but I would call them theologians, if I had to choose one or the other. It is a difficult distinction. J. Mu r d o c h : A curious thing, of course, is that, with the possible exception o f Buri dan, those philosophers who didn’t do theology seem to me to be quite inferior, as philosophers, to those who did theology as well. Why this is so, I don’t know. c. Sc h m it t : That may also be tied with the basic social factor of prestige. I mentioned before that in Italy those who were good philosophers and good logicians, later stepped up to the more prestigious job of being a physician. Perhaps in Paris those who were rather mediocre philosophers never got to be theologians because this was a higher calling. The social historians may be able to shed some light on this. M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: Let me make a comment more directly related to the paper. I think that to understand and to appreciate St. Thomas’s position on the Eucharist you cannot entirely leave out the historical background. The question is already treated in Lom bard, o f course, and in many o f the theologians. St. Thomas is only one link - he may have tried to give a better explanation, but he is only one link in a long trend of discus sions which took place in the Western Church. There is the controversy between Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus in the Carolingian era and o f course the Berengarian quarrel. What is important is that the terms used - ‘substantia’, for instance, and ‘accidentia’ - are Aristotelian right from the beginning, even at a time when Aristotelian physics was known only by the short quotations or allusions in Boethius or in the Greek Fathers. So I don’t think that St. Thomas’s terminology is new by any means. His explanation is clearer, I think, but it is not entirely different even in terminology from that of some of his predecessors. I shall not read the text, but I have brought Peter Cantor, who is a rather good example of late twelfth century theology, because he did not try to do anything new. He describes the current opinion o f his times and the termi nology is the same. I think that you are right to say that St. Thomas was more definite and precise and so on, but I think that he was fairly traditional and not so influenced in
c . SCHMITT: Yes, there doesn’t seem to be scientific specialization, but it may begin taking place in the sixteenth century universities. But let’s look at the situation, say, at Padua rather than Paris. j. MURDOCH: In the fourteenth century?
that respect by Aristotle’s Physics in particular. E. s y l l a : But would it really count against my argument if St. Thomas were not original in this? Whether Thomas was original or not, it seems to me that there were some people before him who didn’t even claim to be using physics, but claim instead to be thoroughly religious. They don’t claim that they are using natural reason, they just claim to be expounding the doctrine of the Church. So that would be one thing.
c. SCHMITT: Yes, in the fourteenth or the fifteenth century there are people who teach natural philosophy and logic in Italian universities to prepare students to study medi cine, that is in the first two or so years of medical studies.
But Aquinas claims to be rational. R. f r a n k : Aquinas is, I think, here fully consistent with his own philosophical principles - that is to say with his conception o f the ontological relationship o f
E. s y l l a : But aren’t the major categories physician, lawyer, and theologian?
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quantity with the other accidents, etc. This is a thoroughly theological section of the Summa. The only question is whether as a theologian Thomas is consistent with his own meta physics. N ow you can dislike metaphysics or like it, but the real question is whether he maintains the integrity of the metaphysics which is the base of his philosophy at this point. c. SCHMITT : In preparing for this discussion I looked through Denziger and so forth, and it seems to me that the substance-accident terminology and the discussion of change in the Aristotelian sense really comes in in a strong sense only with the intro duction of Aristotle’s own works.
M.-Th. d ’ALVERNY: In a strong sense, maybe, but it was used earlier. You find it in Lanfranc, Berengar, and so on.
j. MURDOCH; I agree with you that the Aristotelian tradition and terminology does occur earlier, but more Aristotelian terminology, if I remember correctly, occurs in the «
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E. s y l l a : I don’t know enough about theology so I may be wrong here, but what I was thinking about is the kind of discussion where Ockham says that, for instance, God could take a sinner to heaven - even though ordinarily to go to heaven one must be in a state of grace when he dies, God could, even so, save someone not in a state of grace. H. o b e r m a n : Yes, but then you have to be extremely careful and realize that this is not a real statement about what could happen in the future. Ockham wants to show that there is no necessity on God’s part o f accepting someone who has a certain amount of charity, a certain amount of merit ; but God has freely committed Himself in a pactum cum ecclesia to reward everyone who has this amount of charity with acceptatio, with accepting into heaven, and that commitment is absolutely reliable. Ockham emphasizes this in opposition to those we would call the Averroists who try to construct a necessary framework for God’s actions and who want to explain the principles of theology on the basis of natural reason, showing why God has to do this or has to do that. Tempier’s condemnations fit in here. Ockham’s statement is not a statement about what God is really going to do; it is a statement showing that we could never have outguessed G o d ’s pactum, since there is no necessity (Averroist) for God to have established it. You cannot give reasons why G od has established things as He did - that is the point of the potentia absoluta. He could have done things very differently, but He won’t. E. SYLLA : I was thinking about this when I was reading about thepotentia D ei absoluta, because it seems, when you start thinking about God’s foreknowledge and all, that really G od has already made His decisions. The potentia D e i absoluta seems in some contexts to be counter-factual: He could have done it otherwise, but actually it is all
laid out. H. o b e r m a n ; Yes, that is the problem De futuris contingentibus: to what extent is the whole future already sketched out, and do we have freedom of action in it? In that context, one tries with all logical means to show that man can make free decisions even though they are already a part of G od’s eternal plan. j. MURDOCH: Heiko, there is a difference between saying “ He could have done it otherwise, but He won’t” and saying “ He could have done it otherwise, but now He can’t,” Saying that X = Y is always the case, is now the case and always will be the case, is, logically speaking, not at all equivalent to saying that it must be the case. Saying “ He won’t” is much, much weaker than saying “ but now He can’t,” once He has made the
pact. H. o b e r m a n : Yes, the medieval theologian would avoid saying “ He can’t,” because that would limit God; it is rather a voluntary decision on the part o f God to make this contract. But when you say “ He can’t” you mean that now that He has made the pact. He will not deviate from it, because He, of his free will, is reliable. J, v a n ess ; M ay I ask, do these theologians ever introduce the concept o f time into this? The future is our category. It has nothing to do with God. God is eternal and there is no time in the eternal ; there is no future. So the problem of G od’s foreknowl
edge is our problem, not God’s problem. H. o b e r m a n : That was a commonplace: that God is a mirror in which all times - the past, the present, and the future - are mirrored, and that for us this mirror is fractured. This is an image that is always repeated. But perhaps the problem o f future contingents could be for a moment eliminated - we have our hands full with the Eucharist. The Eucharist is such a good case because there Ockham could show that what Thomas has done (although Ockham would more often talk about Scotus and other theologians) is to take the doctrine of the Church and show why it is metaphysically right and sound and has to be that way. By contrast, Ockham himself says that, although this is the
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doctrine of the Church, there are many other ways that God could have done it, as it were, much more prudently (d’Ailly and later nominalists will almost go that fax). W e have to accept Church doctrine; it is a decision of God, it is absolutely reliable. But de potentia absoluta G od could have done it differently and we should not be so arrogant in our theologizing that we forget to take into account that it could have been set up very differently. R. m c k e o n : Let’s leave science and turn to morals since moral questions have been brought up. Questions were raised whether God could will the opposite o f the Ten Commandments. In the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas argued that He could not have; Duns Scotus held that He could have willed the opposite o f the last eight, but not the first two; William o f Ockham took the position that He could have willed the opposite of all ten. The evolution of positions on the Ten Commandments bears on the question of the absolute power o f God and the ordained power o f God. According to William of Ockham, we can say nothing about the absolute power of God. Our propo sitions are only about His ordained power. The absolute power of God is, as it were, the first principle from which these ordained powers result. Therefore both in the pact with the Church and in the natural sciences, working with human minds, we start from ordained powers, and the statement of absolute power is an inference to the necessary first principle about which we can say nothing. In science, therefore, it is conceivable that any scientific conclusion might be different - it is even conceivable, when you move out of our present human understanding, that God could have set up not only a differ ent science but a different logic, even one in which the principle of contradiction didn’t hold. H. OBERMAN: Let me add this one point, because your example on the level of morals is very well taken: the real point of the pactum cum ecclesia is not clear unless you see it in contrast to an earlier tradition where the highest that can be grasped is God as Being and as an ontological structure of one piece with the world, so that theologians who understand God have an insight into all lower levels of reality. In the fourteenth century, however, for Ockham and the nominalists, what lies beyond the pactum cum ecclesia is just the will of God which does not allow further penetration. N ow you no longer talk about Being; you talk about what God has decided - it is the business of the theologians to interpret and to preach God’s will.To understand reality, on the other hand, it is no longer a help to be a theologian, you have to be a “ technician.” You have to be a man who relies on his experientia to discover reality. This world is held together by natural laws (since parallel to the pactum cum ecclesia, there are natural laws that are reliable which God has grafted into this world). But these laws are not revealed, we have to discover them by experientia. D ’Ailly and Gerson have a whole series o f statements in treatises where they sing the praises of the new task of discovering these natural laws.
R E F O R M A T IO N A N D R E VO LU TIO N: C O P E R N IC U S ’ S D IS C O V E R Y IN A N E R A OF C H A N G E * .-4
This paper is not to be just an interesting commemoration o f the historical past. Copernicus has become more than a private scholar who made a scientific discovery. Copernicus has become a symbol if not a syndrome; and it is not easy to define exactly what this symbol stands for, so varied is the reaction to his name and the associations it evokes. The nerves o f Western man are hit, titillated, or hurt, and sometimes all o f these at once. By no means without precedent, but certainly most intensively, today’s community o f scholars and - with a remarkable intuition for essentials society at large is probing the ultimate questions o f man and matter, o f time and space. The inability to present the Copernican Revolution in a more or less objective-descriptive fashion, myth-proof as it were, was obvious in the series o f articles and television programs commemorating the five hun dredth anniversary o f Copernicus’s birth. But the serious scholarly tradi tion on which these popularizations had to rely gave ample occasion, reason, and cause for the spread o f myth. With ill-hidden ideological passion the name o f Copernicus has been used to propagate the values o f the French or Russian Revolution as his legitimate heirs. Replacing the Aristotelian hierarchy o f multiple spheres, Copernicus then would mark the end o f feudahsm and emerge as the herald o f our modern society. Or his name suffices to connect the Christian faith with the dark Middle Ages. Pre-Copernican man is seen as caught in the blinding spiritual captivity o f the “ Ptolemaic Church” from which this astronomical giant hberated us to lead us into the promised land o f modern times. Furthermore, what is at stake in this complex issue-indeed a central issue underlying our Western Copernican complex - is the question what the access-route to knowledge is and, concomitantly, what the universities on the tightrope, tottering between impatient relevance and vain curiosity,^ can do and should do. It concerns the question o f theory and practice, o f reason
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.). The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 397-435. All Rights Reserved.
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and test, speculation and experience. It is the classical clash between Plato
to Galileo: 3 “ Y ou want to degrade the earth, although you live on it and
and Aristotle, today intermittently illuminated by tensions between the
receive everything from it. Y ou dirty your own nest! But I for one am not
German and the Anglo-American tradition o f scholarship and research -
going to stand for it! I am not just some being on some little star which
underlying in parallel but different ways the student revolution o f our times.
circles somewhere for a short time. I pace on a firm earth with a firm foot,
And finally, the Copernican Revolution touches upon - and is rooted
and the earth does not move. It is the center o f the universe. I stand at that
in - man’s new relation to nature, suggested by the development from pre-
center and the eye o f the creator rests on me and on me alone. Around me,
historical animistic veneration to the classical adoration o f nature, and via
fixed to eight crystal spheres, revolve the fixed stars and the mighty sun,
Christian admiration to the post-Christian administration o f nature therefore implying man’s own changing role.
which exists to light my surroundings. And me too, so that God can see
The five hundredth anniversary celebrations may appear as a feast for
the achievement o f God, the creature at the center, the very image o f
fools ; after all, Copernicus’ s heliocentric cosmology places man o ff center
me. It is certain and beyond dispute that everyting is aimed at me, at man, G od.” 4
and unmasks him as cosmically eccentric. Y et we have to reconcile this
The scene here presented by Bertolt Brecht is as moving as it is mis
with another phenomenon, on the level o f anthropology, where we see a
leading. Granted, there is some truth in seeing in Galileo’s plight the clash
geocentricity reemerging in a sublimated form as anthropocentricity,
o f science and faith; and therefore we cannot avoid asking whether the
since man in a succession o f stages developed from the microcosm and
same applies in the case o f Copernicus, whether just as the Roman
image o f God into the homo faber^ and partner o f God, to end up, finally,
Catholic Church forced Galileo to recant, so - some twenty years after
as the homo manipulator, God in his own realm. A t that very point, what
Luther’s appeal to his conscience at Worms - the Reformation did not
used to be the mysterious dwelling place o f man and dewed path for the
unmask itself as an intolerant, repressive, and anti-conscientious movement
feet o f God becomes the secular “ environment” - the mechanical context
which tried to suppress, and for a time succeeded in subverting, the Coper
o f Man’s survival. That is : the contemporary sore point where cosmolo
nican Revolution. However, it is to be said with all possible clarity that pre-Copernican
gical, behavioral, and environmental studies converge. Even this short tour d ’horizon suggests the range o f concerns and apper
cosmology did not posit the earth at the static center as a place o f glory
ceptions with which I have approached the given theme. I f done well this
but as a place o f inertia, the farthest removed from divine movement so
paper will be a festive historical commemoration, but at the same time
perfectly reflected in the circular movement o f the stars. Man, not his
something o f an acupuncture o f nervous centers without the Chinese promise that it will not hurt.
earth, held the cosmic place o f honor, reaching in the summit o f his soul
W e begin by looking into the first encounter between the two sixteenth
it to the mystical tradition that ‘center’ and ‘summit’ could become inter
century reform movements - in theology and in cosmology - for a time
changeable and equivalent in dignity® - as can still be noticed in the
suspended in a precious but precarious balance between partnership and
parallel mixture o f spatial and anthropological components in the words
rivalry. In a second part we gain historical perspective and distance by dealing with the preceding late medieval phase in which both the modern
‘ depth’ or ‘profundity’ . The resistance against Copernicus may have had other causes than the
sciences and the modern cowsciences prove to evolve simultaneously, in
normal healthy resistance in intellectual man to novelty - it might have
terms awaiting translation to reveal their effect on modern man.
been furthered by a mystical sense o f the cohesion o f man and his cosmic
{apex mentis) the greatest proximity to God. As far as I can see, we owe
environment. But this resistance cannot be explained in terms o f hurt II
pride as the defence mechanism o f Ptolemaic-medieval man. T o the contrary, Copernicus gave the earth a cosmic dignity in keeping with the
In his play, The Life o f Galileo, Bertolt Brecht has the old cardinal say
ontological rank o f man, its divine inhabitant.
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H. OBERMAN
401
It is thus all the more important to analyze the first reactions to Coper
want to take a closer look. For those who know this period Luther’ s
nicus from close quarters. In order to test the traditional story o f Coper
reaction is predictable: he does not give his considered opinion o f the
nicus’s lone-battle-against-the-mighty-Church we have to listen to Luther’s
Copernican thesis; he sees him merely as an instance o f the sickness o f the
oft-quoted (“ Tabletalk” ) and weigh more extensively the argu ments in the famous case o f Osiander’ s “ fraud.”
times, o f the so-called vana curiositas. Luther stands in a late medieval
I f this story could be substantiated Luther and the Reformation would
be seen from the identical views o f Gerson and Erasmus. More generally a
stand against the new science: it would imply the withdrawal o f faith into
characteristic o f the via moderna and devotio moderna, this acute aversion
the intimacy o f the heart. And Copernicus would have a valid claim on
to curiositas is the awareness o f the danger o f one-sided intellectualism.
tradition contra curiositatem which is pre- and supra-confessional, as can
the gratitude o f all those who see in the emancipation from Christian
A t its worst this “ modern” attitude is pietistic and anti-intellectualistic,
faith the basis for the cultural progress o f Western man. M ore gratitude,
reeling back from secular scholarship as a threat to the sacrality o f the
at least, than is owed to Galileo, whose similar claim is convincingly
inner life. A s its best - and closer to its historical origins and main thrust
rejected by Friedrich von Weizsacker® and - for very different reasons by Bertolt Brecht himself.'^
- it calls for a reform o f the universities to discard intellectual games, far removed from experienced reality. And exactly here Luther stands. As we
Subjectively the case is clear: Copernicus felt intimidated by the antici
shall see, this very thrust o f seeming obscurantism but de facto antispecu-
pation o f the charge o f innovation: the very fact and the carefully worded
lative empiricism proves to be the great wedge which is to provide Coper
content o f his letter o f dedication to Pope Paul I I I make this abundantly
nicus with the metaphysical antidote and the intellectual antecedents pre
clear. (See Appendix I). This is the element o f truth in Arthur Koestler’s
supposed in his discovery: it is the contra vanam curiositatem critique o f
Sleepwalkers^ where he casts Copernicus as a fearful and submissive weakling.
time-honored truths not verified by experience. The appropriate slogan for this campaign contra curiositatem we find
But objectively seen Copernicus’s expectation o f a curt, i f uninformed,
in the Adagia o f Erasmus: “ Quae supra nos nihil ad nos.’ ’ ^^ Erasmus
rejection seems to be well founded. On hearing the advance rumor, Luther
found it as a dictum socraticum (Socratic saying) with the Church-father
spontaneously exclaims: “ Nowadays people try to show their genius by
Lactantius (f3 2 0 ) and knows that its main thrust is directed against
producing new deviating ideas; this man subverts the whole field o f
cosmic speculation as “ the curious investigation o f things celestial and the
astronomy. Even when that whole field stands topsy turvy I believe H oly
secrets o f nature.”
Scripture. After all Joshua (10:13) commanded the sun to stand still and not the earth.” ®
cursus in his Confessions to the dangers o f curiosity,1 ®but left the deepest
Calvin - who without documentation and basis in fact is held by recent scholarship to have been a critic o f Copernicus - seems to present an
confronting the Greek metaphysical-cosmological speculation by arguing
alternative to Luther by introducing another relation between revelation
happiness: what we should know are the causes o f good and evil; hence
(in Scripture) and (experienced) reality. After all, as Calvin points out in
not metaphysics, but ethics deserves our dedication and intellectual pur
his commentary on Genesis}^ the story o f creation does not compete with the “ great art o f astronomy,” but accommodates to and speaks in
suit. This Augustinian legacy o f the contrast, antithesis, and even mutual
terms o f the unlettered idiota, the common man. 12 Exactly the same argu
exclusiveness o f metaphysics and ethics, o f cosmology and theology, had
ment we find a hundred years later with Kepler, when this admirer o f Copernicus reconciles Joshua with his new cosmology.^^
been submerged
A fter Lactantius Augustine had dedicated an ex
impression in a more direct parallel to Lactantius in his Enchiridion,'^'^ that to know the cosmic forces, the causas motionum, does not bring
and was lying dormant throughout the era o f the
successful Aristotelian band wagon - till in the fourteenth century human
Since we touch here, in this difference between Luther and Calvin,
experience in physics and theology started to pull at the dogmatic Aristo
upon one o f the main phenomena o f change in the Copernican era, we
telian chains. It is this pulling which is expressed in the campaign contra
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403
vanam curiositatem, the campaign that would provide both Luther and
In words almost identical with Kepler’ s in his Astronomia Nova,^^
Copernicus with their initial thrust. Seen in this perspective Luther and
Calvin sees astronomy no longer in competition with theology or as
Copernicus are kindred minds related by force o f a common origin.
sacrilegious penetration o f the heavens traditionally rejected with the
It would be a fatal mistake to see in this campaign the high tide o f
charge o f vain curiosity and audacious preoccupation with the things
medieval obscurantism thwarting the emergence o f modern science. On
supra nos. The sky above us is no longer the realm beyond us, beyond
the contrary, contra vanam curiositatem is best translated as “ against the
our ken, supra nos. Calvin’s solution is not the obscurantist rejection o f
ivory tower o f dogmatic intellectualism” and marks the revolt which not
astronomy, nor does he go along with the adherents o f the doctrine o f
only paved the way, but also provided method and models, for the com ing era o f science.
“ double truth” who say that what is true in theology is not true in philos
Before reform and revolt grew into religious reformation and scientific revolution as two distinguishable movements, we see how a man like
one’s personal limits - the medieval definition o f humility and the alter
Gerson can hold together the threads o f renewal in both fields. The com
field o f competence. The medieval differentiation between the university
mon impetus is the call for experience as the best antidote against curio
faculties - programmatically transcended in the preceding stages o f the
sity. On the one hand the reform o f religion. Church, and theology urged
Renaissance - is here recaptured by Calvin to defend and respect the
a return to mystical piety (Bonaventure!) and thus stressed experience as
different methods o f illuminating the common object, the glory o f God.
ophy. His point is rather that one has to respect the limits. T o stay within native to proud curiosity 21 - means now to stay within the limits o f one’ s
the hallmark o f the true Christian. On the other hand the renewal o f the
It is in Calvin’s new hermeneutics that I find the historical basis for the
sciences called for a revolt against metaphysics and thus based the new
early latitude in Calvinism to favor or reject the Copernican vision. And
physics on the sources (fontes) o f experience, a similar return to the
this stance helps to explain as well why - against all expectations - the
sources (adfontes) as energized humanists throughout Europe.
relationship between Puritanism and science is to be a most intensive and
Less than a century and a half later, the common impetus is severely tested when the experience o f faith and the experience o f science are in the process o f turning against each other as alternative bridges to the future.
fruitful
u n io n .2 2
After all, before the Restoration the Puritans “ were the
main support o f the new science.” 23 The so-called fraud o f Osiander, who in his introduction to De Revolu
It is here that the voice o f John Calvin carries particular weight. Calvin applies the slogan “ Quae supra nos nihil ad nos” not to the reader o f
tionibus tried to pass Copernicus’ s heliocentricity thesis o ff as “ hypo
Scripture, but to the intention o f Moses as the author o f Scripture, who did not intend to provide a chart o f the heavens.
the scholarly world (See Appendix II). It may explain Melanchthon’s shift
The discrepancy between the story o f creation and the secured data o f
provide a more lasting basis for welding together the new science and
astronomy is not to be solved by condemning astronomy as the obscuran
rehgion. Such a basis could only be found in the conviction formulated by
tists {phrenetici) do, who arrogantly reject everything unknown to them.
Calvin that Scripture is not a supernaturally revealed book o f nature, so that religious experience and scientific experience can go hand in hand.
N or should the data o f astronomy be taken as proof that Moses erred.
theses,” 24 as it is usually put, was intended to raise the toleration-level in from early condemnation to cautious support 25 - it could o f course not
Moses was not a teacher o f astronomy, but a theologian, hence concerned
Only after Darwinism as the scientific “ arm” o f Cartesianism program
with the glory o f God which - contrary to vain curiosity - is most useful
matically separated these two hands, was the threat o f Descartes to Christian faith met with obscurantist fanaticism.26 One reaction was to
to man. In his field the astronomer does exactly the same: his field is not only exciting, but also most useful providing access to the breathtaking wisdom o f God; “ nam astrologia non modo iucunda est cognitu, sed apprime quoque utilis ; negari non potest quin admirabilem Dei sapien tiam explicet ars illa.”
hold the book o f Genesis against the book o f Darwin and to match God’s Adam with Darwin’s ape, hence falling back into a pre-Calvin stage o f unenUghtened obscurantism, all the more offensive since science had made such remarkable progress in the meantime.
404
R E F O R M A T IO N A N D R E V O L U T IO N
H. OBERMAN
405
It is a serious mistake, however, - and very often made - to read the
phenomenon, it should be regarded as belonging to scholarly freedom
reactions against Copernicus in the Hght o f the anti-Darwin crusade.
( “ Freiheit in Forschung und Lehre” ) that more convincing hypotheses
Even the seventeenth century stir over GaUleo is a misleading paradigm.
can be always advanced: “ In that way the potential opponents will be
Apart from the over-cautious suspicion o f vain curiosity which all that
lured away from massive criticism to more intensive research; and,
emerged from academic circles had to face in late medieval society, the
through newly gained respect and a lack o f counter arguments, they will be
opposition to Copernicanism was rather due to weaknesses and obscuri
moved to fairness and ultimately to acceptance.” Finally, the word ‘hypotheses’ should not be as offensive to us as it was
ties immanent in the Copernican system itself, as well as to his assump tions ( = hypotheses!) which were not to be substantiated until the time o f Kepler, Galileo, and Newton.
to Kepler and many a Copernicus scholar since.^i In one o f the most
“ It is safe to say that even had there been no religious scruples whatever
Edward Rosen 32 has established Copernicus’s own use o f the term in his
against the Copernican astronomy, sensible men all over Europe, especial
concise but also most accurate treatments o f the Copernican discovery m ain
works. And the first beUever, Rheticus, describes the achievement
ly the most empirically minded, would have pronounced it a wild appeal
o f his beloved master as “ renovare hypotheses.” 33 in his own dedicatory
to accept the premature fruits o f an uncontrolled imagination, in prefer
letter to Pope Paul I I I Copernicus describes the genesis o f his breakthrough
ence to the solid inductions, built up gradually through the ages, o f man’s
and provides us with a number o f significant parallels with Osiander’ s
confirmed sense experience.... Contemporary empiricists, had they lived
Preface. But more importantly the letter lays the basis for our effort to
in the sixteenth century, would have been [the] first to scoff out o f court the new philosophy o f the universe.” ^7
place the Copernican Revolution in an era o f change. The point o f departure for Copernicus is that the hypotheses o f preced ing astronomy, the theoretical explanations o f the postulated mathemati cal astral movements, did not jibe with observed reality: the actual fore
III
casts o f future movements o f sun and moon on the basis o f the assump
The unauthorized preface to De Revolutionibus by the first Lutheran Minister and astronomer in Nürnberg, Andreas Osiander, has been
tion o f concentric circles did not prove true. Above all - and now comes
characterized by Bishop Tideman Gisius as a “ frau d ” 28 and has, ever
explanations did not lead to the discovery o f the forma mundi, the true
since, drawn a major portion o f research energy away from the real
shape o f the universe, or to the symmetry o f its structure {partium eius
the explicit goal which Copernicus had set for himself - earlier assumed
subject Copernicus. Some o f the charges against Osiander can be easily
certam symmetriam). What had been lacking was a blueprint explaining the
disposed of. There is no sly effort on his part to suggest that his Preface is
inner workings o f the universe (ratio motuum machinae mundi) - the world
actually written by Copernicus. Content and style - he speaks about the
machine which, after all, the greatest and the most orderly machinist has
author in the third person - clearly pointed to a third person, often a
produced because o f us (propter nos). Encouraged by the witness o f classi
friend o f the author who introduced the book to the reader, as was often the case in this genre during the sixteenth century. 2»
cal authors “ I too began to think seriously about the mobility o f the
One more aspect o f Osiander’ s subjective honesty: the basic structure o f
earth. And although this still seemed to me an absurd point o f view ( o p i n i o ) , I knew that others before me had been granted the liberty o f
his Preface can be found in a letter sent two years earlier to Copernicus
postulating whatever cycles they pleased in order to explain astral pheno
and to the first Copernican and original editor, Joachim Rheticus. Here
mena. Therefore, I thought that I too would be readily permitted to test
we already find the proposal to placate and then win the Aristotelians and
(ut experirer), on the assumption that the earth has some movement (an
theologians by emphasizing that the Copernican theory is based on a
posito terrae aliquo motu), whether a more convincing explanation, less
series o f assumptions (hypotheses) and hence cannot claim ultimate truth. Since several hypotheses can be offered to explain one and the same
shaky than those o f my predecessors, could be found for the revolutions o f the celestial spheres.” (See Appendix I)
406
H. OBERMAN
R E F O R M A T IO N A N D R E V O L U T IO N
407
U p to this point there is a striking double parallel with Osiander. First,
Osiander embodies a basically nominalist position. As Blumenberg sees
the appeal to the freedom o f scholarly investigation in a time o f emanci
it, the nominalist stands in an alien, unreachable universe, which is meta
pation from the homogenizing weight o f tradition. This is the very junc
physically systematized by him as “ astronomical resignation.” ®’ Out o f
ture at which the ideal o f self-directed research frees the true scholar from
this heteronomous world, the great humanist Copernicus, as it is claimed,
the pious shackles o f metaphysical orthodoxy. This is an implicit plea
freed us to relate man to his Umwelt within which he is to gain his con
against vain curiosity and a call for acknowledgement o f the limits o f each discipline. For Copernicus it is the piety o f the Church-father Lactantius
scious autonomy. In a last section, I shall attempt to show that where the Copernican
that leads to obscurantism - quite audaciously put in a letter to the Pope!
Revolution is a cause o f celebration for modern man, it presupposes and
But appropriately so, since it was Lactantius, who handed down to
is based on a nominalist platform - and that, when we let ourselves be
posterity the slogan “ Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos” (“ The things above
waylaid and lured away from this platform, we are bound to fall back
us do not concern us” ) to ridicule those who discovered the rotundity o f the earth.
into worse, to confuse again astrology and cosmology, Weltbild and Welt anschauung. N o t Protestantism, nor Roman Catholicism - and much
Secondly, there is the common description o f the Copernican research-
less Blumenberg’ s philosophical humanism - gave birth to modern science.
process in terms o f “ hypotheses.” This is as far as the parallel goes. What
For that we have to look at a preceding stage, a true fertile crescent.
Copernicus now discovers remains for Osiander on the level o f opinio, that is assumption, hypothesis, without an ultimate claim to a true expla
IV
nation o f cosmological causality - o f what makes the universe tick. For Osiander that is the sole domain o f God and o f those with whom he cares
“ ... nous avons du ciel trop peu d’experience.” ®» That is an exclamation,
to share his wisdom.^s After all, Osiander is a nominalist who knows that
a cri de coeur o f the leading nominalist philosopher in the generation
science develops models, not eternal laws, Osiander the nominalist was in
between Ockham and Gerson (fl4 2 9 ), Nicolas Oresme (|1382), one
a position to distinguish between cosmology and astronomy, between
hundred and fifty years before Copernicus, younger contemporary o f
final causality and efficient causality. Copernicus, on the other hand,
Thomas Bradwardine ( f 1349) and disciple o f Jean Buridan ( t 1348). W e
claims to have surpassed the level o f assumptions at the moment when he
do not quote him here because we believe that he influenced Copernicus
made his breakthrough: at that moment, namely, when his hypothesis o f
directly, though Copernicus had in his library besides some Bradwardine
the movement o f the earth is hardened, as he argues, by experience and
at least one nominahst source, the Quaestiones o f Pierre d’A illy ( f 1420).4o
confirmed by observations (multa et longa observatione tandem repperi).
Copernicus probably did not know French. And it is in beautiful, in
Sense-data suddenly fall into place, and above all, show a universal
deed creative French that Oresme made available the works o f Aristotle -
p a t t e r n , a true cosmos: blueprint and global machine fit perfectly together.
in translation, commentary, and critique. But in France we find Oresme
W e are now in a better position to assess the charge o f fraud against Osiander. Osiander is not a misleading guide to the world o f Copernicus. Y et
Germany and in Italy. Moreover nominalism is such a powerful and all pervasive movement that we cannot ignore Oresme, one o f its pacesetting
without questioning the former’ s good intentions, the worlds o f Osiander
spokesmen, if we want to catch at least a glimpse o f its originality and
and o f Copernicus are not identical and clearly to be differentiated. Yet we would miss the true nature o f science’s advance if we cede traditional
constructive revolt."*! It is by no means a novelty to introduce Oresme’ s name in our attempt
scholarship the point that these two worlds are to be designated as “ me
to understand the significance o f Copernicus. Since Pierre Duhem modern
dieval” and “ modern.” With great erudition as well as with dizzying
scholarship has been very aware o f this point: among others, Lynn Thorndike,42 Anneliese Maier, and Marshall Clagett have furthered our knowl
rhetorical magnetism Hans Blumenberg has advanced the thesis that
quoted by d’A illy and Gerson. And his name was soon respected both in
408
H. OBERMAN
R E F O R M A T IO N A N D R E V O L U T IO N
409
This means that
edge o f Oresme significantly. Y et the high claims o f Duhem for Oresme’s
final causality is recast in terms o f efficient causality,
role as precursor and even as preemptor o f later discoveries have now
the Weltbild, the experienced world, is set free from the fangs o f a Weltan
generally led to an overcautious reaction. With their usual nod to Anne-
schauung, the postulated world. Simultaneously the unmoved Mover thus
liese Maier’ s impressive phalanx o f manuscript-based evidence,scholars
cedes his place to the inscrutable Lawgiver. Here the potentia ordinata
invariably tend to come to the conclusion that Oresme may have had
stands for the realm o f nature, the “ present order,” or as Oresme puts it,
some theoretical insights but remained “ Aristotelian” and offered mere speculative possibiUties without relation to fact and reality.'^^
“ le cours de nature.”
Whereas in theology the established order (e.g. o f
the Church, Sacraments) is at the same time the revealed order (through
It is, however, misleading to speak here o f “ mere speculation,” for we
H oly Scripture, and/or Tradition), in the realm o f physics the established
then miss, I believe, the decisive access-route to the phenomenon o f moder
order is the order o f the established laws o f nature,still to be investigat
nity. Hence we should be prepared to listen more patiently to the sources.
ed and freed from the babylonian captivity o f metaphysical a priori.
The systematic application o f the theological distinction between potentia absoluta (what God could have done without contradiction) and
In this climate there emerge before our eyes the beginnings o f the new science. W e see the first contours o f this science in a double thrust:
potentia ordinata (what G od de facto did or, as Oresme puts it, “ selon
(1) The conscious and intellectually ascetic reduction and concentra
vérité,” actually revealed, decided to do, or ordained) functioned, in line
tion on experientia both as collective experience entered in the historical
with the condemnations o f Averroism in 1277, to place God beyond the
record o f mankind; andasjenje or
fangs o f necessity in thought or action. In other words, the transcendence o f God is what really concerned the nominalists here.
rience which allows for general conclusions and the discovery o f laws, and
test-tube'’ (cognitio intuitiva) expe
The distinction - and this we have not realized before - works itself out
such only by induction.^» (2) The discovery o f the scientific role o f imagination^^ that allows for
in two different ways in theology and physics - which includes o f course
mental experiments. Where facts are not in the reach o f experience, we
astronomy. In theology it goes to show the irrelevance and irreverence o f
grope for the facts with our imagination, the realm o f the potentia abso
speculative theology and man’s absolute dependence on G od’s own
luta, the terra incognita, the unknown realm o f logical possibilities.
revelation. Speculation makes us leave reality behind, and orbit in the
In the field o f theology this would be vain curiosity; in the field o f
infinite realm o f the potentia absoluta, disoriented and lost amongst the
natural philosophy this is research, investigation. This is the breeding
infinite number o f possibilities God could have decided to realize. T o penetrate this realm o f the Deus absconditus is vana curiositas, to fathom
ground o f the so-called hypotheses which are completely misunderstood when seen as “ mere speculation” ; hypotheses are at once the feast o f
the thoughts o f God is vain curiosity, whereas it is the task o f religion and
free research unhampered by a priori, unassailable assumptions and
faith to base itself on God’s own revelation, the potentia ordinata. T o
the forecast o f possibilities based on experiments, the formulations o f
gether with the humanist quest for authentic sources {fontes), the insis
scientific expectations. The nominalist scientific revolution cannot be
tence on nothing but God’ s commitment, the sola potentia ordinata, may
sufficiently measured when one merely looks at the research results, even
evolve into a sola scriptura, the Reformation principle “ Scripture alone.” But as history can document, nominalism has left its profound impact not
though these are most impressive; but nominalism brings about a revolu
only on Luther, but also on Erasmus and the decrees o f the Council o f Trent.
tion in research methodology, which is strictly oriented to experiment and experience. In the field o f astronomy the nominalist hunger for reality is all the
In both theology and physics the distinction between possibility and
more acute, since the heavens are so far removed from collective (the
reality helped to free man from the smothering embrace o f metaphysics.
records o f observations made by preceding scholarship) and one’ s own
Y et in physics the same distinction works itself out in a different way. Here
individual experience. Hence the cri de coeur o f Oresme:
the main shift over against preceding tradition is that the investigation o f
du ciel trop peu d’experience.” While this very hunger will lead to the
nous avons
411
H. OBERMAN
R E F O R M A T IO N A N D R E V O L U T IO N
development o f such instruments as the telescope and microscope, the
racy until the mental experiments are confirmed by experience. It is im
needed extensions o f the human sense, in the meantime imagination has
pressive to see how far Oresme - drawing on advances made by the preced
to fill the gap left by actual experiments, in a conscious suspension o f
ing generation o f scholars in Oxford and Paris - has opened up the realm
final judgement. A ll in all the mental hypotheses reach out to reality and expect to be verified by it.
o f imagination, and o f theoretical astrophysics - the impetus theory, the
When the distinction is allowed between microcosm (for man), macro
thus “ homing” significant pieces (i.e. assigning their proper place) in the
410
cosm (for the universe), and metacosm (for the realm o f God)
we may say :
three-point-requirement in perspectives, the diurnal rotation o f the earth puzzle that would reveal to Copernicus the vision o f heliocentricity.
(1) Nominahsm has discovered “ space” by transforming the metacosm
But again, outlasting by far the significance in material progress, we
from the “ heavenly abode” o f God into the infinite extension o f the
emphasize the advance in scientific attitude an - attitude which is not
macrocosm,^^ hence placing His presence squarely in the macrocosm -
tagged on but integrally related to the new religious and theological
an aspect pursued in Luther’s theology and particularly in his doctrine o f the Eucharist; 52
attitude: vain curiosity is the effort to penetrate the unknown realm o f God omnipotent {qui supra nos; potentia absoluta) - true and valid
(2) After the elimination o f the metacosmos as sheer speculation, all
curiosity is concerned with the whole machina mundi which includes earth
attention is given to the natural laws grafted by God into his creation. In
and heaven {quae supra nos; Vordre selon nature). Programmatically God
concentrating on the macrocosm as machina mundi or the reliable clock
and the heavens are separated. The fifteenth century heirs o f the wise
set by God,®^ the demarcation line between G od and nature is clearly
Greek Thales - once the laughing stock and object o f jokes about dangers
marked and hence space is demythologized and dedivinized.^^ The thrust
o f the ivory tower o f speculative Platonism - may still stumble, but now
o f this development is better expressed in the designation “ naturalization
because o f proud penetration o f the G od beyond God, the deus abscon
o f the universe” than in the more depreciating two-dimensional “ mechani zation o f the universe;”
ditus o f the unrevealed mysteries, no longer because o f astronomical
(3) The demarcation line drawn by God himself between his own being
curiosity. Put in our modern parlance: the mysteries o f the heavens have been “ declassified.”
and his creation terminates the centuries-long argument that the very existence o f God requires celestial movement including the orbiting o f the sun. 55
W e have presented a sketch o f Oresme because we sense here a remarkable
The very example from the book o f Joshua that was going to be used
proximity to the birth o f the modern theory o f research in the natural
as a biblical argument against Copernicus to prove that the sun moves -
sciences. With much truth yet with little humility and hence in a strikingly
“ Sun stand still” 10:13 - is adduced by Oresme to show that creation is
post-medieval way Oresme concludes his Livre du ciel et du monde with
not a necessary function o f the Highest Being but the result o f a voluntary
the words: “ I dare say and insist that there is no human being who has
decision o f the Highest Person.56 It is important to note that for Oresme
seen a better book on natural philosophy than this one.” 58 59
Scripture admits the possibility that the earth moves - “ qui commovet
W e have not dealt with Oresme, the Parisian master, to reopen the
terram de loco suo” (Job. 9:6) - so that henceforth the investigator is
issue o f the forerunners o f Copernicus. Though it may have become clear
forced to offer a physical instead o f a theological solution.57
that we do not support the theory o f “ spontaneous combustion,” ®® the
For Oresme as well as for those who stand in his tradition the issue o f
point is rather that we thus gain a revealing perspective on Copernicus,
the heavenly movements - o f the orbits o f the sun, the moon, the moving
and this evaluation necessarily includes his two unfortunate editors. T o
stars, and the earth - is no longer to be solved in terms o f a deductive speculative cosmology, but in terms o f an experiental inductive cosmo-
begin with there is Joachim Rheticus - who had cause to feel sUghted by
nomy - with the aid o f imagination, but without claim on scientific accu
this Protestant disciple in his dedicatory letter to Pope Paul III.
his beloved master Copernicus when the latter decided not to mention
412
H. OBERMAN
In a letter to Peter Ramus, dated Krakow 1568, Rheticus describes his
RE F O R M A T IO N A N D R E V O L U T IO N
413
the earth had been probed and approved - but indeed only as possible.
future program as the task o f liberating astronomy from hypotheses;
Hindrances in all three fields had been cleared to make Copernicus’s
henceforth astronomy was to be, as he insists, solely based on observa
theory conceivable, a Denkmoglichkeit.^^ But it was Copernicus who
tion (jsolis observationibus)’,^^ in the field o f physics modern research
formulated heliocentricity with clarity and audacity, particularly when the
should be freed from the shackles o f tradition and be allowed a direct
limited basis o f facts established by experience is taken into consideration.
approach, based only on the analysis o f the phenomena o f nature {ex sola naturae contemplatione).
is formally a step backwards in comparison to nominalistic research
Yet, on that very point Copernicus, though materially an advance,
W e find here some two centuries after Oresme a reformulation o f the
standards.®^ Copernicus presented a system mathematically equivalent to
nominahstic anti-metaphysical program which envisioned the replace
that o f Ptolemy and based on the AristoteUan, pre-Newtonian hypothesis
ment o f metaphysical a priori assumptions by experiment and experience.
o f the circular movement o f the planets without the substantial addition o f
In discarding classical sources as a hindrance to progress, Rheticus proves
new ol3servations (experience). In describing the road to his discovery
that he has outgrown the scientifically unproductive phase o f the Re
Copernicus mentions heliocentricity as an initial assumption which then,
naissance which, with its sun-symbolism and magi, blinded many a scholar until our own day.®^
however, becomes conviction and certainty {repperiï). Until hard proof had been ascertained by Galileo, Kepler, and Newton,
As far as Osiander is concerned we are, I think, now in a position to do
Copernicus asked from his readers a faith in his intuition {fides implicita);
justice to his vision o f reality and to see the element o f truth in his
from such faith the nominalists had wanted to free science in their crusade
Preface. Better, I believe, than either those who are understandably irri
against metaphysics, against arguments drawn from a dimension o f faith
tated by his face-saving (but not faith-saving!) devices or those who have
beyond the test o f experience. Copernicus’ s discovery would not have
opted for the via antiqua and reject the nominalist stance on principle.
been less but more modern i f he had highlighted the gap between his
However harsh it may sound, astronomy cannot reveal the “ true
heliocentric “ imagination” - as Oresme would have termed it - and the
causes” o f astral phenomena in so far as final causality Hes beyond its
compound o f experiment and experience interpreted by it. Such a proce
purview. It can deal with efiicient causality - what is called in German
dure might have made Osiander’s “ fraud” redundant, it most certainly
“ system-immanente Faktoren.” Put in our terms it can deal with cosmo-
would have made early Copernicanism more difficult to combat. Whatever
nomy in contrast with cosmology. But even here astronomy and science
the differences in goals and methods, common to the natural sciences and
in general provide hypotheses whose validity cannot be established
the humanities is the accurate description o f the credibility-gap between
without experiment and experience, which, most literally, were not yet
conceived and sensed reality as a precondition for every advance in our
“ in sight” in Osiander’s day. Whatever we may hold concerning his claims for the Christian faith, I for one am prepared to grant that the goal
different accesses to reality. The most significant and lasting aspect o f the Copernican discovery is
o f the natural sciences is validity in the sense o f accuracy, whereas that o f
that Copernicus crowned an era hungry for reahty, groping for answers,
the humanities, particularly o f philosophy and theology, is validity in the
and seeking to initiate change. By the very fact that the earth is launched
sense o f truth. Where this distinction is lost, a mechanized and not a
as a planet into space, the macrocosm is drawn into the orbit o f man:
naturalized world view has emerged out o f the process o f nominalist demythologization.
heliocentricity is the extension o f creation in space and infinity. This projection into space is the part o f the revolution o f Copernicus
And now finally the case o f Copernicus himself. In the first place
that has not yet been “ received” and absorbed by modern man, it is the
heliocentricity is a significant advance and break-through in the accurate
part that psychologically, i.e., effectively, is still ahead o f us. A t the histori
charting o f the universe. Before Copernicus, the theological, philosophi
cal beginnings o f our conception o f the universe the Greeks projected
cal, and physical possibility o f the daily and yearly (dual) movement o f
their polis, their city-state, into the skies as the model o f the cosmos.®^
415
H. OBERMAN
R E F O R M A T IO N A N D R E V O L U T IO N
That was at the same time the beginning o f a long process o f demytholo
the philosophers whose books I could lay my hands on, to see i f anyone
gization o f the divinized planets. Y et the older view proved to be virile,
ever advanced the view that the movements o f the spheres o f the world
indomitable, time- and science-resistant: the gods jealously contested
are different from those postulated by the specialists in the field o f
Man’s access to space: “ What is above you, man, is none o f your business {Quae supra vos nihil ad vo5)” ! The Icarus complex or space-angst - the
mathematics. As a matter o f fact I first discovered in Cicero that Nicetas thought that
hidden motive in the Icarus story - is so fundamental a trait o f man that
the earth moved. Afterwards I also found in Plutarch that there were
faith, science, and superstition combined to stage the fundamental anti
others o f the same opinion. I shall quote his words here, so that they may
thesis between Mother Earth and Father Cosmos. This is what was and is
be known to all:
414
blocking the medieval emancipation o f astral physics from cosmology and obscuring the distinction between Weltbild and Weltanschauung, between astronomy and astrology, and finally, between legitimate research and vain curiosity.
Whereas the others hold that the earth is immobile, Philolaus, the Pythagorean, claims that it moves around the fire with a nearly circular motion, not unlike the sun and the moon, Herakleides of Pontus and Ekphantus, the Pythagorean, do not assign to the earth any movement of locomotion. Instead they think in terms of a limited movement, rising and setting around its center, like a wheel.
In this long drawn-out intellectual dawn, Copernican heliocentricity is and a call
This was reason enough so that I too began to think seriously about the
for the radical colonization o f space: '‘'Quae circa nos tota ad nos,"’ (the
mobility o f the earth. And although this still seemed to me an absurd
cosmos around us is our immediate concern). Till this very day we modern
point o f view, I knew that others before me had been granted the liberty o f
at the same time a manifesto proclaiming the secular cosmos
men have not been existentially able to absorb this vision o f reality, as is
postulating whatever cycles they pleased in order to explain astral pheno
clear from the fact that the designation “ cosmopolitan” has been reduced
mena. Therefore, I thought that I too would be readily permitted to test,
to the tourist badge for the well-travelled on this very small globe.
on the assumption that the earth has some movement, whether a more
With an allusion to Paul Tillich’s book The Courage To Be, we may conclude by saying that Copernicus is properly celebrated when in the
convincing explanation, less shaky than those o f my predecessors, could be found for the revolutions o f the celestial spheres.”
name o f the survival o f man (Copernicus: “ propter nos” ) the dedivinization o f space finds its completion in the exorcism o f our residual space-
Translated from Nicolai Copernici Thorunensis, De Revolutionibus Orbium
angst, thus freeing us to face the future with the courage to be in space.
Caelestium libri sex. Vol. 2, ed. Franciscus Zeller and Carolus Zeller (München, 1949), pp. 5,18-6, 3.
Universitat Tubingen A P P E N D I X II APPENDIX I
Copernicus's Dedication to Pope Paul I I I
Osiander's Preface “ Since the newness o f this work’ s hypotheses which assume that the earth
“ After I had pondered at length this lack o f certainty in traditional
is in motion and that there is an immovable sun at the center o f the uni
mathematics concerning the movements o f the spheres o f the world, I
verse, has already received a great deal o f advance publicity, I do not
became increasingly annoyed that the philosophers, who in other respects
doubt that some scholars will have taken grave offense and think it wrong
made such a careful scrutiny o f the smallest details o f the world, had
to raise havoc among the liberal arts with their properly time-honored
nothing better to offer to explain the workings o f the machinery o f the
classical tradition.*
world, which is after all built for us by the Best and Most Orderly W ork man o f all. Hence I assigned myself the task o f reading and rereading all
* It has not yet been noted, as far as I can see, that this passage reflects, almost ver batim, Luther’s Tischrede quoted in note 9.
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Yet, if they are willing to ponder the matter seriously {exacte), they will
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come to the conclusion that the author o f this work has done nothing which merits blame. For it is the specific task o f the astronomer through
“ Thus Kepler and Galileo, in contrast to Plato, put forward a mathe
patient and refined observations to chart the course o f the stars and
matical empiricism. This was quite evident in one o f the most decisive
planets. On this basis he has to compute the causes or, rather, develop
moments in the history o f science. It had been a dogma o f the ‘church
hypotheses, since he cannot possibly establish the final causes o f these
scientific,’ up to the time o f Kepler, that movements in the heavens could be nothing but uniform and circular. Everywhere, everybody had always
movements. By these assumptions past and future heavenly movements can be calculated with the help o f geometry.
held this to be true a priori', Platonists and Aristotelians, Idealists and
This scientist has done a first-rate job in both respects. After all, it is
Nominalists, Copernicus and Galileo had accepted this dogma and
not necessary that his hypotheses should be true, or even probable. This
Kepler himself was thoroughly convinced o f its truth. Y et a difference o f eight minutes between observation and calculation
alone suffices: that they provide a computation which tallies with the observations....
o f the orbit o f the planet Mars forced him, after a struggle o f several
And if scholars in the field construct and think up causes - and they
years, to abandon this dogma o f circularity and to postulate a non-uni
have certainly thought up a good many - nevertheless they advance their
form motion in elliptical orbits. He submitted to given facts rather than maintaining an age-old preju
models not in order to make a claim o f unshakable truth, but to present a correct basis for calculation.
dice; in his mind a Christian empiricism gained the victory over platonic
Since, then, for one and the same movement several hypotheses, such as
rationalism; a lonely man submitted to facts and broke away from a
eccentricity or epicycles for the movement o f the sun, have been advanced
tradition o f two thousand years. With full justice he could declare:
in the course o f time, the astronomer will be inclined to accept that one
‘These eight minutes paved the way for the reformation o f the whole o f
which has the highest degree o f prima facie consistency. The philosopher
astronomy,’ and it was with full justice, too, that in 1609 he gave to his
is more likely to insist on probability; but neither o f them will be able to
book the title New Astronomy.^'
learn or teach anything that claims to be ultimate truth, unless it has been divinely revealed to him.
R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise o f Modern Science (Edinburgh-
Therefore, let us allow these new hypotheses to take their place among
London,1972)p.35f.
the old ones - which were by no means more probable - especially since these are impressive, crystal clear, and based upon a vast amount o f learned observations. But, as far as the hypotheses are concerned, let no one expect absolute certainty from astronomy, since astronomy cannot provide this. Other wise, if one takes models, which have their own good purpose, to stand for reality, one becomes through involvement in this discipline more ignorant than before.” Translated from Nicolai Copernici Thorunensis, De Revolutionibus^ Vol. 2, ed. cit., pp. 403, 3-404, 7.
NOTES * With the permission o f the Smithsonian Institution Press, the present paper is re printed, with changes, from The Nature o f Scientific Discovery, edited by Owen Gingerich, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1974. ^ The association o f astral (meta) physics and irrelevance has a classical root. Cf. the wise Thales falling in a pit while watching the heavens; Werner Jaeger, Paideia. Die F orm m g des griechischen Menschen, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1954), p. 211. This asso ciation is reflected in Christian antiquity when St. Augustine applied to it the term curiositas [see note 16]. Since that time the growth - and stagnation - of intellectual European man is reflected in his attitude to “ the heavens,” “ quae supra nos.” With the expression “ vain curiosity” I allude to the title of the November 1402 sermon and manifesto calling for university reform by Jean Gerson ( t 1429) as Chancellor o f the University of Paris. Cf. Steven E. Ozment ‘The University and the Church. Patterns of Reform in Jean Gerson’, Medievalia et Humanistica New Series 1 (1970), pp. 111-126; p. 113. Edition and English translation by Steven E. Ozment. Jean Gerson, Textus
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Minores, Vol. 38 (Leiden, 1969), pp. 26-45; p. 82ff. I emphasize and cherish Gerson’s adjective “ vain,” because of the heahhy ambiguity of “ curiosity” in the western tradi tion. For Hans Blumenberg’s learned but illegitimate identification of curiositas with true learning and therefore his identification of the campaign contra vanam curiositatem as medieval (non-modern) obscurantism, see his D ie Legitimitat der Neuzeit (Frank-\ furt a. M., 1966), pp. 201-432; esp. pp. 350-352. However, Gerson could harmoniously have reconciled his attack “ contra vanam curiositatem” with Adam Ulam’s description of the lasting task o f the university: “ A liberal education seeks to indoctrinate the student in c u r io s it y ...The Fall o f the American University (London, 1972), p. 31. For a description and documentation of the history of ‘curiositas’ see my "Contra vanam curiositatem: Ein Kapitel der Theologie zwischen Seelenwinkel und Weltall {Znnch., 1974), 2 “ During the first Christian millennium, in both East and West, God at the moment of creation is represented in passive majesty, actualizing the cosmos by pure power of thought, Platonically. Then, shortly after the year 1000, a Gospel book was produced at Winchester which made a great innovation: inspired by Wisdom 11.20, ‘Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti,’ the monastic illuminator showed the hand of God - now the master craftsman - holding scales, a carpenter’s square, and a pair of compasses. This new representation spread and, probably under the influence of Prov erbs 8.27, ‘certe lege et gyro vallabat abysses,’ the scales and square were eliminated leaving only the compasses - the normal medieval and renaissance symbol of the engineer - held in G od’s hand.” Lynn White, Jr., ‘Cultural Climates and Technological Advance in the Middle Ages’, Viator 2 (1971), 171-201,189. 3 Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 3, “ Leben des Galilei” (Frankfurt a. M., 1967), pp. 1229-1345; p. 1282. 4 The Laughton translation authorized by B. Brecht was not available to me in a European library. Mr. Philip J, Rosato made this elegant translation. Generally, I am most indebted for his critical perusal of my English efforts. 5 “ ‘Centrum’ est terrae medium magis presse, est punctum quoddam defixum in totius mundi parte infirma, unde ad superficiem caeli aequales undique lineae producuntur. Hinc transfertur ad significandum medium vel imum quodlibet, vel proprium, aut improprium, in corpore, vel in anima. Nam in hac quoque medium et imum agnoscunt Mystici. Et est idem quod Animae apex... Theologiae Mysticae Clavis, ed. Maximilianus Sandaeus (Cologne, 1640), fol. 12. For ‘centrum’ as image of the spirit that is free from the body within all directions ( = in every respect) with a unique immediacy ( = same distance) to reality, see Nicolaus Cusanus, Liber de mente, cap. VII, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, 3rd ed. (Darmstadt, 1963, [1st ed., Leipzig, 1921]), p. 248, lines 18-21. See further Norbert Schiffers, Fragen der Physik an die Theologie. D ie Sakularisierung der Wissenschaft und das Heilsverlangen nach Freiheit (Düsseldorf 1968), p. 14 ff.
viens pas. Il n’en reste pas moins vrai que le conception, métaphysiquement très hardie, de Nicolas de Cues, à savoir celle d’un Univers indéfini sinon infini, n’a pas été acceptée par Copernic (ni personne d’autre, avant Giordano Bruno); que sa cosmologie, scienti fiquement parlant, est inexistante; que, s’il attribue un mouvement à la Terre, il ne lui attribue pas de mouvement autour du Soleil et que, en général, ses conceptions astro nomiques sont tellement vagues et souvent tellement erronées (il attribue par exemple, une lumière propre aussi bien à la Lune qu’à la Terre) que Nicolas de Cues - sauf en dynamique - ne peut d’aucune façon être classé parmi les précurseurs de Copernic, ni même prétendre à une place dans l’histoire de l’astronomie.” La Révolution astrono mique. Copernic, Kepler, Borelli, Histoire de la Pensée, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1961), p, 75. ® “ W ir kônnen also sogar behaupten, dass die Inquisition von Galilei nicht mehr verlangte, als dass er nicht mehr sagen solle als er beweisen konnte. Er war der Fanatiker in dieser Auseinandersetzimg.” Weizsâcker’s radicalization - and romanticization of Inquisitional objectives - is decisively mitigated, when he introduces his views on the parallel between faith and science: “ ... Er hatte damit recht, dass er der Fanatiker war. Die grossen Fortschritte der Wissenschaft geschehen nicht, indem man angstlich am Beweisbaren klebt, Sie geschehen durch kiihne Behauptungen, die den W eg zu ihrer eigenen Bestatigung oder Widerlegung selbst erst off^nen. Allés was ich iiber den Fall der Korper und über das Tràgheitsgesetz gesagt habe, erlautert dieser Satz, und wir kônnen nicht zweifeln, dass Galilei sich dieser methodologischen Situation voll bewusst war. Die Wissenschaft braucht Glauben so gut wie die Religion, und beide Weisen des Glaubens unterwerfen sich, wenn sie sich selbst verstehen, der ihnen jeweils eigentiimlichen Probe: der religiose Glaube in menschlichen Leben, der wissenschaftliche im Weiterforschen,” ‘Kopernikus, Kepler, Galilei. Zur Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft’, in Einsichten, Gerhard Kruger zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Klaus Oehler and Richard Schaeffler (Frankfurt a. M., 1962), pp. 376-394; p. 392. Galileo as the “ glorious fanatic” is also reflected in the words of Albert Einstein. See his Foreword to a translation of Galileo’s Dialogue: “ A man who possessed the passionate will, the intelligence, and the courage to stand up as the representative of rational thinking against the host of those who, relying on the ignorance of the people and the indolence of teachers in priestly and scholarly garb, maintained and defended their positions of authority. His unusual literary gift enabled him to address the educated man of his age in such clear and convincing language as to overcome the anthropocentric and mythridden thinking of his contemporaries.” Quoted by Stillman Drake, Galileo Studies. Personality, Tradition, and Revolution (Ann Arbor, 1970), p. 65. The puzzling complexi ty of the assessment of the significance and “ human dimension” of Galilei’s achieve ment may be seen in the fact that exactly the anthropocentrism of Copernicus, as basis for his faith in the cosmic order, marked the path toward his discovery. See his Dedica tion to Pope Paul III (Appendix I). “ In Wirklichkeit hat Galilei die Astronomie und die Physik beteichert, indem er diese Wissenschaften zugleich eines Grossteils ihrer geseUschaftlichen Bedeutung beraubte. Mit ihrer Diskreditierung der Bibel und der Kirche standen sie eine Zeitlang auf der Barrikade fiir alien Fortschritt, Es ist wahr, der Umschwung vollzog sich trotzdem in den folgenden Jahrhunderten, und sie waren daran beteiligt, aber es war eben ein Um schwung anstatt einer Revolution, der Skandal artete sozusagen in einen Disput aus, unter Fachleuten, Die Kirche und mit ihr die gesamte Reaktion konnte einen geordneten Riickzug vollziehen und ihre Macht mehr oder weniger behaupten. Was diese Wissen schaften selber betrifl't, erklommen sie nie mehr die damalige grosse Stellung in der Gesellschaft, kamen nie mehr in solche Nâhe zum Volk.
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The problem of Cusanus as forerunner of Copernicus is best presented by A. Koyré, in a fashion which deserves a full quotation: “ On pourrait m’objecter, sans doute, que, cent ans avant Copernic, en 1440, Nicolas de Cues, dans sa Docte Ignorance {D e docta ignorantia, II, 17) avait déjà proclamé que la ‘Terre est une étoile noble’ (terra est stella nobilis) et l’a enlevée du centre du monde, en proclamant, au surplus, que ce centre n’existe pas, vu que le monde est ‘une sphère infinie ayant son centre partout et sa circonférence nulle part’ ; et que son oeuvre, que Copernic avait probablement connue, a pu, ou dû, influencer sa pensée (R. Klibansky, ‘Copernic et Nicolas de Cues’, in Léo nard de Vinci et l ’expérience scientifique du X V Ie Siècle [Paris, 1953]), Je n’en discon
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Galileis VerbreChen kann aïs die ‘Erbsünde’ der modernen Naturwissenschaften betrachtet werden. Aus der neuen Astronomie, die eine neue Klasse, das Bürgertum, zutiefst interessierte, da sie den revolutionâren sozialen Strômungen der Zeit Vorschub leistete, machte er eine scharf begrenzte Spezialwissenschaft, die sich freilich gerade durch ihre ‘Reinheit,’ das heisst ihre Indifferenz zu der Produktionsweise, verliâltnismassig ungestôrt entwickeln konnte. Die Atombombe ist sowohl als technisches als auch soziales Phânomen das klassische Endprodukt seiner wissenschaftlichen Leistung und seines sozialen Versagens.” Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 17 (Frankfurt a. M., 1967), p. 1108 f. ® Koestler ponders a number of explanations why Copernicus did not object to or have Osiander’s Preface removed and concludes: it is more likely that he submitted to Osiander’s proposal since he had already submitted his whole life long, more likely he procrastinated, as he had done all his life.” Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1964 [Penguin Book]), p. 175. ® In the reading of Lauterbach, with a better claim to authenticity than Aurifaber’s: “ D e novo quodam astrologo fiebat mentio, qui probaret terram moveri et non coelum, solem et lunam, ac si quis in curru aut navi moveretur, putaret se quiescere et terram et arbores moveri. Aber es gehet jetzunder also: Wer do w’l klug sein, der sol ihme nichts lassen gefallen, das andere achten; er mus ihme etwas eigen machen, sicut ille facit, qui totam astrologiam [alias: astronomiam] invertere vult. Etiam illa confusa, tamen ego credo sacrae scripturae, nam losua iussit solem stare, non terram.” D . M artin Luthers Werke. Tischreden 4.4638. Cf. Ibid., 1. 855. Basic literature: Werner Elert, Morphologie des Luthertums, Vol. 1, Theologie und Weltanschauung des Luthertums hauptsâchlich im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 2nd ed. (München, 1958), pp. 363-393. Heinrich Bornkamm, ‘Kopernikus im Urteil der Reformatoren’, Archiv fü r Reformationsgeschichte 40 (1943), 171-183; repr. in Das Jahrhundert der Reformation. Gestalten und Kràfte, 2nd ed. (Gottingen, 1966), pp. 177-185. John Dillenberger, Protestant Thought and Natural Science. A historical interpretation o f the issues behind the 500-year-old debate (New York, 1960), pp. 28-49. Klaus Scholder, in a large cultural and historical setting: Urspriinge undProbleme der Bibelkritik im 17. JahrhuTukrt. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehung der historisch-kritischen Theologie (München, 1966), pp. 57-65. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution. Planetary Astronomy in the Development o f Western Thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 196: “ Protestant leaders like Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon led in citing Scripture against Copernicus and in urging the repression of Copemicans. Since the Protestants never possessed the police apparatus available to the Catholic Church, their repressive measures were seldom so effective as those taken later by the Catholics, and they were more readily abandoned when the evidence for Copernicanism became overwhelming. But Protestants never theless provided the first effective institutionalized opposition.” Since the Protestant “ attack” is interpreted as being due to its “ sola scriptura,” the Catholic reaction to Galilei has to be explained in different terms - and much to the historian’s surprise - it is presented as anti-protestant reaction and part of Catholic reform. R. Hooykaas has eloquently opposed the myth that Calvin mentioned - and rejected - Copernicus in his works “ ‘There is no lie so good as the precise and well-detailed one’ and this one has been repeated again and again, quotation marks included, by writers on the history of science, who evidently did not make the effort to verify the statement. For fifteen years, I have pointed out in several periodicals concerned with the history of
science that the ‘quotation’ [Ps 93:1] from Calvin is imaginary and that Calvin never mentioned Copernicus; but the legend dies hard.” Religion and the Rise o f M odem Science (Edinburgh-London, 1972), p. 121. Furthermore, Hooykaas dealt with the theological thrust of Calvin’s Genesis com mentary by pointing to another aspect: “ Thus Calvin’s exegetical method was based on the Reformation doctrine which held that the religious message of the Bible is accessible to everybody. The Spirit o f God, as he put it, has opened a common school for all, and has therefore chosen subjects intelligible to all. Moses was ordained a teacher o f the unlearned as well as of the learned; had he spoken of things generally unknown, the uneducated might have pleaded in excuse that such subjects were beyond their capacity; therefore, Moses ‘rather adapted his writing to common usage.’ ” p. 118. See Corpus Reformatorum, Vol. 51 (Calvini Opera 23), col. 20-22. 12 “ Tenendum est illud, Mosen non acute Philosophari de occultis mysteriis: sed referre quae passim etiam rudibus nota sunt, et posita in vulgari usu.” Calvin, loc. cit. Cf. “ Moses duo facit magna luminaria: atqui astrologi firmis rationibus probant, Saturni sidus, quod omnium minimum propter longinquitatem apparet, lunari esse maius. Hoc interest, quod Moses populariter scripsit quae sine doctrina et literis onmes idiotae communi sensu percipunt: illi autem magno labore investigant quidquid himiani ingenii acumen assequi potest. Nec vero aut studium illud improbandum est, aut damnanda scientia, ut phrenetici quidam solent audacter reiicere quidquid est illis incognitum. Nam astrologia non modo iucunda est cognitu, sed apprime quoque utilis: negari non potest quin admirabilem Dei sapientiam explicet ars illa.” Calvin, loc. cit. 13 See K. Scholder, op. cit., p. 68 ff. and Heinrich Karpp, ‘Der Beitrag Keplers und Galileis zum neuzeitlichen Schriftverstandnis’, Zeitschrift f iir Theologie und Kirche 67
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(1970), 40-55; 46 f. 1^ Adagiorum Chiliades I 6, 69; in Ausgewahlte Werke, Vol. 7, ed. Theresia Payr (Darmstadt, 1972), p. 414 f. 15 “ Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos. Dictum Socraticum deterrens a curiosa vestigatione rerum coelestium et arcanorum naturae. Refertur proverbii vice a Lactantio libro tertio, capite vigesimo: E x his, inquit, unum eligam quod ab omnibus sit probatum. Celebre hoc proverbium Socrates habuit: Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos. Torqueri potest et in illos, qui de negociis principum aut theologiae mysteriis temere loquuntur. Vertere licebit et in contrarium; Quae infra nos, nihil ad nos, ubi significamus res leviusculas, quam ut nobis curae esse debeant.” Erasmus von Rotterdam, Ausgewàhlte Werke, Vol. 7, ed. cit., pp. 414,416 Cf. L . Caeli Firmiani Lactanti Divinae Institutiones, IIL 20; Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum 19, p. 240,15. Though Lactantius seemingly rejects the Socratic warning as contrary to God-oriented piety, de facto he concurs as far as the campaign against vain curiosity is concerned. The Church father explicitly says that he prefers Socrates to those impii, who “ in secreta caelestis illius providentiae curiosos oculos voluerint immittere.” Ed. cit., p. 245,8 f. In a learned and stimulating article Eberhard Jüngel pursues the function of the “ Socratic saying” in Luther’s theology: ‘Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos. Eine Kurzformel der Lehre vom verborgenen Gott - im Anschluss an Luther interpretiert’, Evangelische Theologie 32 (1972), 197-240. A comparison e.g. with Gerson’s sermon “ Con tra vanam curiositatem” [particularly Oeuvres Complètes, ed. M gr P. Glorieux, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1962), p. 233 f.] would have allowed for an equally solid grasp o f Luther’s dependence on the preceding tradition as of his originality. 1® “ Quoniam magnus es, domine, et humilia respicis, excelsa autem a longe agnoscis: nec propinquas nisi obtritis corde, nec inveniris a superbis, nec si illi curiosa peritia numerent
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stellas et harenam, et dimetiantur sidereas plagas, et vestigent vias astrorum.” Augustine Confessions, Lib. V. 3, 3. In the further context it becomes clear, however, that the charge of curiositas is not directed against the validity o f the astronomical findings but against “ border-crossing,” i.e. the vain effort to find beyond creation the creator: “ non noverunt hanc viam, qua descendant ad ilium a se, et per eum ascendant ad eum. N on noverunt hanc viam, et putant se excelsos esse cum sideribus et lucidos, et ecce ruerunt in terram, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum. Et multa vera de creatura di cunt, et veritatem, creaturae artificem, non pie quaerunt, et ideo non inveniunt...” Cf. Lib. V. 3,5. With great subtlety Hans Blumenberg presents the secondary argument of Augustine “ mente sua enim quaerunt ista et ingenio, quod tu dedisti eis, et multa invenerunt” as the main thrust and sees in Augustine’s subtlety here the reason for its lack of influence; “ In dieser Subtilitat war der Gedankenicht traditionsfahig.” Die Legitimitât der Neuzeit, op. cit., p. 298. “ III. 9. Cum ergo quaeritur, quid credendum sit, quod ad religionem pertineat, non rerum natura ita rimanda est, quemadmodum ab eis, quos physicos Graeci vocant; nec metuendum est, ne aliquid de vi et numero elementorum, de motu atque ordine et defectibus siderum, de figura caeli, de generibus et naturis animalium, fruticum, lapi dum, fontium, fluminum, montium, de spatiis locorum et temporum, de signis immi nentium tempestatiun, et alia sescenta de his rebus, quas illi vel invenerunt vel invenisse se existimant, Christianus ignoret, quia nec ipsi omnia reppererunt tanto excellentes ingenio, flagrantes studio, abundantes otio, et quaedam humana coniectura investi gantes, quaedam vero historica experientia perscrutantes, et in eis, quae se invenisse gloriantur, plura opinantes potius quam scientes. Satis est Christiano rerum creatarum causam... non nisi bonitatem credere creatoris...” Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide et spe et caritate. Corpus Christianorum 46, p. 52 f. (= e d . J. Barbel, Testimonia I, [Düssel dorf, 1960], p. 34) “ V. 16. Quae cum ita sint, quando nobis Maronis ille versus placet: Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causes, non nobis videatur ad felicitatem consequen dam pertinere, si sciamus causas magnarum in mundo corporalium motionum, quae abditissimis naturae sinibus occuluntur: unde tremor terris, qua vi maria alta tumescant, [obicibus ruptis rursusque in se ipsa residant, et cetera huiusmodi. Sed bonarum et malarum rerum causas nosse debemus, et id hactenus, quatenus eas homini in hac vita erroribus aerumnisque plenissima, ad eosdem errores et aerumnas evadendas nosse conceditur. Ad illam quippe felicitatem tendendum est, ubi nulla quatiamur aerumna, nullo errore fallamur. Nam si causae corporalium motionum noscendae nobis essent, nullas magis nosse quam nostrae valetudinis, deberemus. Cum vero eis ignoratis medicos quaerimus, quis non videat, quod de secretis caeli et terrae nos latet, quanta sit patientia nesciendum?” Corpus Christianorum 46, p. 56 f. (= e d . cit., p. 39). A restrictive interpretation of the Augustinian position we find with Hugo o f St. Victor in his Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem S. Dionysii Areopagitae, Migne, Patrologia latina 175, 925 A : “ Praedicatus est Christus crucifixus, ut humilitate veritas quaereretur. Sed mundus medicum despexit, et non potuit verum agnoscere. Voluit enim contemplari opera Dei quae miranda fecerat, et quae proposuerat imitanda noluit venerari. Neque enim morbum suum attendit, ut pia devotione medicinam quaereret; sed de falsa sanitate praesumens dedit se ut vana curiositate aliena investigaret. Et vide batur extra se proficere, sed defecit in se et eum, qui erat supra se, non invenit.” It is not, I believe, a significant difference over against Augustine to replace the realm “ quae supra nos” with the personalized “ qui supra nos,” also intended by Augustine. Much more telling is the “ videbatur,” whereas Augustine would have conceded the
potential accuracy of secular research. Cf. note 16. This passage is referred to by Gerson: “ De errore philosophantium ex curiositate nimia loquitur Seneca in Epistola de liberalibus artibus (“ quantum habent [philosophi] supervacui, quantum ab usu rece dentis... diligentius loqui scirent quam vivere.” Ep. 88, 42); et Hugo melius in pro oemio...” Oeuvres Complètes, ed. cit. Vol. 3, p. 231. Source identifications by S. E. Ozment, Jean Gerson, ed. cit., p. 82 f. N.B. the apparently necessary characterization of curiositas by nimia, parallel to vana. 19 Ca/v/mPpera23, et/. ci7., col. 22; see footnote 12. 20 “D e motibus stellae Martis,” in Astronomia nova, Joannis Kepleri Astronomi Opera omnia, ed. Ch. Frisch (Frankofurti a. M . et Erlangae, 1858-1871), Vol. 3, pp. 153-
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156. 21 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Contra Gentiles, III. Liber IV, ‘De unione hypostatica,’ cap. 55: “ ...virtus humilitatis in hac consistit ut aliquis infra suos terminos se contineat, ad ea quae supra se sunt non se extendens, sed superiori se subiiciat.” For a discussion of the Renaissance ideal of the “ unlimited man,” the comprehensive “ Uomo universale,” see note 62. 22 Cf. J. Dillenberger: “ Statistical evidence points to a predominant Puritan member ship in the Royal Society,” op. cit., p. 130. 2® See R. Hooykaas, op. cit., p. 148; cf. p. 945".; pp. 135-138. 24 Nikolaus Kopernikus Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 2, D e revolutionibus orbium caelestium (München, 1949), pp. 403, 29-404, 7: ... astronomus eam [hypothesim] potissimum arripiet, quae comprehensu sit quam facillima. Philosophus fortasse veri similitudinem magis requiret; neuter tamen quicquam certi comprehendet, aut tradet, nisi divinitus illi revelatum fuerit. Sinamus igitur et has novas hypotheses inter veteres nihilo verisi miliores innotescere, praesertim cum admirabiles simul et faciles sint, ingentemque thesaurum doctissimarum observationem [sic; lege: observationum] secum advehant. Neque quisquam, quod ad hypotheses attinet, quicquam certi ab astronomia expectet, cum ipsa nihil tale praestare queat, ne si in alium usum conficta pro veris arripiat, stultior ab hac disciplina discedat quam accesserit. Vale.” A d lectorem de hypothesibus huius operis. N.B .: The title page of the Nuremberg 1543 edition is enlarged by a publisher’s “ blurb” : “ Habes in hoc opere... motus stellarum... novis insuper ac admirabilibus hypothesibus ornatis.” For the bibliographical data see Gottfried Seebass, Bibliographia Osiandrica (Nieuwkoop, 1971), p. 130 f. 25 H. Bornkamm, op. cit., p. 182 f. ; K . Scholder, op. cit., p. 63. 26 On the Cartesian dichotomy between the two experiences see J. Bots, Tussen Descar tes en Darwin. G eloof en natuurwetenschap in de 18e eeuw in Nederland, (Assen, 1972), pp. 136-139 (German summary of this section, p. 186 f.). 27 E. A . Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations o f M odem Physical Science, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1951), p. 25; cited by J. Dillenberger, op. cit., p. 26 f. Franz Wolf, though more restrained, presents the same argument in his 1943 commemoration address: “ Auch in den Einzelheiten war die Überlegenheit des kopemikanischen Systems über das des Ptolemaus so deutlich zunachst noch nicht zu erkennen.” ‘Von der Welt des Kopernikus bis in die Fernen der Spiralnebel - ein Blick in die Entwicklung der modemen Himmelskunde’, Karlsruher Akademische Reden 22 (1943), 5-23; 11. Cf. on ‘Die Schwache des Kopernikus’ Norbert Schiffers, Fragen der Physik an die Theologie. op. cit., p. 13 f. 28 Karl Heinz Burmeister, Georg Joachim Rhetikus 1514-1574, Vol. 3, Briefwechsel (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 55. It seems clear that Gisius refers to Osiander as responsible for
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putting pressure on Petreius. Gisius’s interpretation of Osiander’s motives is - under standably - more malicious than convincing; dolens descendendum sibi esse a pristina professione, si hic liber famam sit consecutus.” In letters to Copernicus and his co-editor Rheticus Osiander had as early as April (20) 1541 developed his plan de campagne for winning over the two expected opposition parties. See K. H. Burmeister, op. cit.. Vol. 3, p. 25 : Peripathetici et theologi facile placabuntur [instead o f : placabunter], si audierint, eiusdem apparentis motus varias esse posse hypotheses...” Cf. note 30. 29 In early copies the name o f Osiander is identified; as a matter of fact, this is the way in which Kepler could name Osiander as the author o f the Preface. Yet even as late as Laplace the Preface was read as being written by Copernicus. See A . Koyré, op. cit., p. 99, note 14. 3“ “ Andreas Osiander an Rhetikus in Frauenburg, Nürnberg, den 20. April 1541. ‘...Peripathetici et theologi facile placabuntur, si audierint, eiusdem apparentis motus varias esse posse hypotheses, nec eas afferri, quod certo ita sint, sed quod calculum apparentis et compositi motus quam commodissime gubernet, et fieri posse, et alius quis alias hypotheses excogitet, et imagines hic aptas, ille aptiores, eandem tamen motus apparentiam causantes, ac esse unicuique liberum, immo gratificaturum, si Commodio res excogitet. Ita a vindicandi severitate ad exquirendi illecebras avocati ac provocati primum aequiores, tum frusta quaerentes pedibus in auctoris sententiam ibunt...’ ” K . H. Burmeister, op. cit.. Vol. 3, p. 25. For the parallel, partly identical letter of Osiander to Copernicus, dated on the same day, April 20,1541, see “ Apologia Tychonis contra Ursum,” Kepleri opera omnia, ed. cit.. Vol. 1, p. 246. 31 Kepleri opera omnia, ed. cit.. Vol. 3, p. 136. Edward Rosen, Three Copernican Treatises, 2nd ed., 1959, pp. 28-33. The appen dix o f annotated bibliography (pp. 201-269) proved to be invaluaWe. 33 E. Rosen, op. cit., p. 31. Cf. also Rheticus’s dedicatory letter to the Narratio Prima, quoted by Leopold Prowe, Nicolaus Copernicus, Vol. 2 (Berlin, 1884), p. 321,27. 34 In contrast to assertio which means conviction, opinio means “ view” in the sense of “ assumption.” 35 ... neuter tamen quicquid certi comprehendet aut tradet nisi divinitus illi revelatum fuerit.” For an accessible and emendated Latin text o f Osiander’s Preface, see Emanuel Hirsch, D ie Theologie des Andreas Osiander und ihre geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen (Gottingen, 1919), Anhang 1, p. 290. 3« This universal vision as the essential advance beyond Ptolemaeus is highlighted by Matthias Schramm in his commemoration address in Tübingen, February 1, 1973, entitled “ Die Leistungen des Copernicus.” The author kindly supplied me with his manuscript. 37 “ Der Mensch ist nicht, wie es die Stoiker bestimmen sollten, zur Betrachtung des Himmels disponiert, sondem seine theoretische Neugierde stellt ihn vor die Erscheinung einer heterogenen und unerreichbaren Weltregion, für deren Erkenntnis ihm seine Natur keine Anhalte liefert. Die Erkenntnistheorie der astronomischen Resignation ist damit metaphysisch systematisiert,” Hans Blumenberg, Die kopernikanische Wende. (Frankfurt a. M., 1965), p. 64. Cf. D ie Legitimitat der Neuzeit, op. cit., p. 346 flF. 3* “ Kopernikus hat nicht nur humanistische Formeln gebraucht, er hat mit seiner astronomischen Reform den genuinen Sinn der humanistischen Bewegung des ausgehenden Mittelalters genauer getroffen und wesentlicher realisiert als viele von denen, die das Programm dieser Stromung ausdrUcklich formuliert hatten.” H. Blumenberg, D ie kopernikanische Wende, op. cit., p. 77.
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3® Nicole Oresme. L e Livre du ciel et du monde. Book II, 8. fol. 89 d; ed. Albert D . Menut and Alexander J. Denomy ,C.S.B. (Madison. 1968), p. 356,15 f. ^ See Emst Zimmer, Entstehung und Ausbreitung der Coppernicanischen Lehre, Sitzungsberichte der Phy.-Med. Sozietât Erlangen 74. (Erlangen, 1943), p. 406. These Quaes tiones are part of a genre o f composite volumes described by Pierre Duhem, Les O rigigines de la statique. Vol. 2 (Paris, 1906), p. 59, note 1; p. 337 flf., note 1. In another context - with respect to the significance of neostoicism as the “ setting” for Descartes, Spinoza, and Calvin - the French philosopher Eric Weil observes that such “ authors are credited with an originality they themselves would not have admitted, simply because we do not study what every cultured man in their times had always present in mind.” See his article ‘Supporting the humanities’, in Daedalus 102,2 (1973), 27-38;33. 42 On a broad (often manuscript) basis Lynn Thorndike presents Oresme’s views on astrology, magic, and miracles, A History o f M a gic and Experimental Science, Vol. 3. (New York, 1934), pp. 398^71. 43 Anneliese Maier herself has often been more ready to grant Oresme his subjective sense of exploring reality; see e.g. An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spatscholastik III, 2nd ed. (Roma, 1952), p. 354 f. In a characteristic formulation Anneliese Maier now ascribes to Oresme a view (earlier assigned by her to Albert of Sachsen) “ in der man eine erste Ahnung des Âquivalenzsatzes der modemen Mengenlehre sehen kann.” D ie Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spatscholastik I, 2nd ed. (Roma, 1966), p. 309. 44 See Menut’s bibliography in N icole Oresme. L e Livre du ciel et du monde, ed. cit., pp. 753-762. 45 Anneliese Maier assigns to Jean Buridan the central role: “ ... Buridans Verdienst ist es, aus ail diesen Erkenntnissen die metaphysischen und methodologische Konsequenzen gezogen zu haben: er ist der erste, der zu sehen glaubt, dass diese Prinzipien genügen, um das Naturgeschehen zu erklâren, und dass man auf die Annahme von Finalursachen und Finaltendenzen verzichten kann. Und damit hat er tatsàchlich den Gedanken vorweggenommen, der die Naturwissenschaft der folgenden Jahrhunderte beherrschen sollte.” Metaphysische Hintergründe der spàtscholastischen Naturphilo sophie, Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spatscholastik IV (Roma, 1955), p. 334 f. 4« Book 1.2. fol. 7a ; ed. cit., p. 58,23. See also the synonyms used by d’Ailly, as quoted by Francis Oakley, ‘Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept o f the Laws o f Nature’, Church History 30 (1961), 433-457 ; 454 f., note 74. 4’ Book II. 2. fol. 71a; ed. cit., p. 288, 236. Cf. Jean Gerson: “ Mundus est universitas rerum ab arte divina conditarum; quae res ab eius dominantissimo et liberrimo regimine suis legibus ordinantur...” “ Lex est recta ratio practica secundum quam motus et operationes rerum in suos fines ordinate regulantur: vel est ipsa talis regulatio in quocumque....” “ Lex naturae est in rebus creatis regulatio motuum et operationum et tendentiarum in suos fines.” Opera omnia, vol. 3, ed. E. du Pin, “ Definitiones termino rum ad theologiam moralem pertinentium,” coi. 107 A , coi. 108 A , coi. 108 C. Gordon D . Kaufman’s effort to make Christian theology responsible for the modem ecological crisis, is - well-considered - a plea to return to a pre-nominalistic belief in a “ divinized cosmos,” in which man is “ embedded” : “The very ideas of God and man, as they have gradually been worked out over millennia, are so framed as to blur or even conceal man’s embeddedness in the natural order as we now are increasingly conceiving it. The great religious struggle between Israel and Canaan was over the question o f the
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relative metaphysical importance of natural power and process on the one hand and personal moral will on the other. When Yahweh won that struggle it meant that the object o f ultimate loyalty and devotion for men in the West would be conceived in creasingly in terms o f models rooted in man’s moral and personal experience, not in his sense of dependence upon and unity with the orders and processes of nature. Thus the very concept of God itself - as that concept has developed in the West - has built into it a depreciation of the metaphysical, and certainly the religious, significance of nature.” ‘A Problem for Theology; The Concept o f Nature’, Harvard Theological Review 65 (1972), 337-336; 354 f. The confusion of historically heterogenous elements [e.g. depreciation of the metaphysical (!) and (!) certainly (!) the religious] is presented in an article which sets out to complain about too much historical research! “ The great reli gious struggle between Israel and Canaan” is reflected both in Gen, 1:26 (man’s domi nion over nature) and in Gen. 2:15 (man’s care and protection of nature). Francrs Bacon (fl626) perceptively points to vain curiosity as a threat to man’s proper use of nature: “ Bacon feared that the new science would lead to a new hubris and a new fall, if it did not develop side by side with charity, for ‘knowledge puffs up, but charity edifies’ [I. Corinthians 8:1] ; to him the kingdom of man is closely tied up with the kingdom of God. The new science means the restoration of our dominion over nature which we have lost by our second fall ; it means a purification of the intellect from all its pride and misconceptions; it is a humble acceptance of what has been given in nature, ‘for the entering into the Kingdom of Man, founded on the Sciences, does not differ very much from the entering into the Kingdom of Heaven, where nobody can enter, except as a little child.’ Thus, Bacon’s divorce between science and theology was no divorce of science from religion. On the contrary, ths core of his prophetic message of the kingdom of man was his faith in the kingdom o f God.” R. Hooykaas, op. cit., p. 69 f. See, however, G . W . Coopland: “ O f Oresme’s use of experience in the everyday sense little need be said; it is illustrated at every turn and furnishes the most attractive part of his work. It is evidently the result of wide interests and knowledge of his world, although in this connection, again, we discern that strange stopping short of closer and more searching enquiry demanded by modern standards. O f organised and controlled observation in the form of experiment we can find no trace.” N icole Oresme and the Astrologers. A Study o f his Livre de divinacions (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 35. For the double function of imaginatio as “ not fact” and as point of departure for inquiry, see Jean Buridan, as quoted by Pierre Duhem: “ Et ideo sufficit eis accipere faciliorem imaginationem secundum quam, si esset vera, corpora caelestia moverentur tot motibus et talibus velocitatibus sicut nunc moventur, et non debent curare utrum sit ita in re sicut imaginantur. ... Sed de talis imaginationibus eorum et aliorum philo sophus habet inquirere, quae sit vera et quae non. L e Système du monde. Vol. 4 (Paris, 1916), p. 138 f. For imaginatio as modus inveniendi loca planetarum, and therefore merely as calculatio à la Osiander see ibid., p. 146 f. Even the editors of Oresme’s Livre du ciel et du monde have not always differentiated between matter and method. “ Under these conditions, we may suppose that a ship could float on the surface of the sphere o f air just as naturally as it would on the Seine River or on the surface of the sea (199d). This final ‘Ymagination’ in Oresme’s long critique of Aristotle’s De cae/o exhibits impressiv ely the distance that separates the science of today from that of the 14th century.” Ed. cit., p. 30. Jean Gerson uses for our ‘metacosm’ mundus archetypus: “ Macrocosmus, est maior iste mundus exemplatus et productus a mundo archetypo Deo, continens in se univer sam creaturam, corporalem et spiritualem, ad ipsum Deum finaliter ordinatam. Micro-
cosmus, est minor quidem mundus, continens in se duplicem substantiam, corporalem scilicet et spiritualem Dei capacem, ad finem beatitudinis ordinatas.” Opera omnia. Vol. 3, ed. E. du Pin, “ Definitiones terminorum ad theologiam moralem pertinentium,”
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coi. 107 B. 81 See Anneliese Maier’s Addenda to the second edition of her D ie Vorlaufer Galileis im l4 . Jahrhundert, Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spatscholastik 1,2nd ed., (Roma, 1966), p. 315, and the comparison with Bradwardine’s view of the immensitas Dei, p. 315, note 1. Cf. John E. Murdoch: “ U est remarquable qu’au Moyen Age, une telle spéculation sur l’infini se soit centrée sur le problème plus ancien, et en soi moins scientifique, de l’éternité du monde. Les raisonnements sur l’infini étaient initialement destinés à résoudre cette question plus traditionnelle. A u XlV e siècle, au contraire, dans beaucoup de cas, le problème de la possibilité d’un monde éternal était simplement devenu l’occasion de discuter des mystères de l’infini.” “ ‘Rationes Mathematice’, U n aspect du rapport des mathématiques et de la philosophie au Moyen Age.” = Confé rence donnée au Palais de la Découverte de 4 Novembre 196L Histoire des Sciences (Université de Paris, 1962), p. 22. 52 The significance of this “ breakthrough of G od” for Luther’s theology is described well by W . Elert, op. cit.. Vol. 1, p. 386 f. 63 For Oresme’s fascination with the image of the clock see also Lynn Thorndike, op. cit.. Vol. 3, p. 441, note 1. For Jean Buridan - Oresme’s teacher also in this respect - see Quaestiones super libris quattuor de caelo et mundo; Liber II. qu. 22, ed. Ernest A. Moody (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), pp. 226-233. 54 The wide spread of popular astrology is one of the many indications that the Ara bian “ myth screen” had not been sufficiently effective. See here Manfred Ullmann: “ Die Deutungsmoglichkeiten der Planetenstellungen beruhen auf der Gleichsetzung der Planeten mit den Gottem, ein Vorgang, der sich seit dem 6. Jhdt. vor Chr., zunachst bei den Pythagoraern, dann im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch, eingebürgert hatte. Alle Eigenschaften, Fâhigkeiten und Taten der Gotter, die in den Mythen ihren Niederschlag gefunden hatten, wurden nun mit den betreffenden Planeten assoziiert und ermoglichten es, die Konstellationen auszudeuten. Fiir die Araber und Muslime verloren die Namen der Planeten in der Übersetzung ihren Charakter als Gotternamen. Aber die Araber iibemahmen das komplizierte Gefiige der Deutungsmoglichkeiten, das ihnen ohne den antiken mythologischen Hintergrund ein rein mechanistisches, unerklarbares System bleiben musste.” Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam (Leiden, 1972), p. 348. 55 Conversely, developments in the field of physics show effects on theology. After the Thomistic ontological relation between grace and movement, the new impetus-doctrine transforms “ motion” and personalizes the concept of grace. W e have pursued the history of theology and the history of the medieval sciences so long in separate depart ments that we stand only at the very beginning of seeing the interactions between shifts in these fields. 5« “ Et donques appert par ce que dit est que il ne s’ensuit pas se [= s i] Dieu est que le ciel soit et, par consequent, il ne s’ensuit pas que le mouvement du ciel soit, car selon vérité, tout ce depent de la volenté de Dieu franchement sanz ce que il soit aucune nécessité que II face ou produise telles choses ou ait faites et productes perpetuelment, si comme il fu plus a plain déclaré en la fin du X XX IVe chapitre du premier. Item, encore ne s’ensuit il pas se le ciel est que il soit meu, car si comme dit est. Dieu le meut ou fait mouver purement voluntairement. Et selon vérité, ce monstra II ou temps de Josué, quant le soleil se arresta par tant de temps comme dure un jour, car de ce dist l’Escripture: Et una dies facta est quasi due. Et est vraisemblable que lors cessa le
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mouvement journal de tout le ciel et des planetes et non pas le soleil seulement. Et pour ce disoit le Prophete en recitant ceste chose; Sol et luna steterunt in habitaculo suo, etc.” Nicole Oresme, L e Livre du ciel et du monde. Book II, 8. fol. 92 b; ed. cit., p. 364. Cf. Eccl. 46:5; Hab. 3:11.
portant characteristics of a movement we can trace from protohumanism (Richard de Bury’s library, used by Bradwardine and Holcot) to Pico and Reuchlin. See Eugenio Garin, Portraits from the Quattrocento, 2nd ed. (New York, 1972) pp. 145-149. Wayne Shumaker, The occult sciences in the Renaissance. A study in intellectual patterns. (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 201 flf; on the sun, ibid. p. 221. For a perspective on Copernicus’s discovery this tradition does not help us a step further. Here A. Koyré’s evaluation of the parallel case of Cusanus applies. See note 5. The ;?re-scientific and regressive impact of Renaissance “ occultism” should be clearly seen. This should not be over looked out of respect for the pre-modern ideal of comprehensive scholarship operative behind it. This perspective is particularly pertinent, since such claims continue to be advanced; “ Renaissance Hermeticism prepared the way emotionally for the accep tance of Copernicus’ revolutionized universal structure. In this case, then, scientific advance was spurred by the renewed interest in the magical Hermetic religion of the world.” Peter J. French, John Dee. The World o f an Elizabethan Magus (London, 1972),
“ Or donques, posé que la terre fust meue avecques le ciel ou au contraire du mouve ment du ciel, il ne s’ensuit pas que pour ce le / (92d) mouvement du ciel cessast. Et donques ce mouvement, quant est de soy, ne requiert pas de neccessité que la terre repose ou milieu. Item, ce n’est pas impossible que toute la terre soit meue d’autre mouvement ou d’autre maniéré : Job IXe : Qui commovet terram de loco suo,...” Nicole Oresme, L e Livre du ciel et du monde. Book II, 8. fol. 92 d; ed. cit., p. 366. Cf. Job 9:6. Hardly more cautious is the explicit of a physics commentary. Quaestiones, assigned to Buridan: “ Tu melius scribe, qui dixeris hoc fore vile / Si melius fuerit, plus tibi laudis erit!” Quoted by Pierre Duhem, L e Système du monde, op. cit.. Vol. 4, p. 132. The same desideratum from the inversed perspective is formulated by John Murdoch in his ‘Philosophy and the enterprise o f science in the later Middle Ages’, The Interaction o f Science and Philosophy, ed. by Y. Elkana (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1974), pp. 51-74. 59 With all respect for my fellow country man, E. J. Dijksterhuis, who belongs to the pioneers in the history of science, I cannot share his view o f Parisian nominalism. “ Dat er in hunne werken van eenige verdere ontwikkeling der vruchtbare, maar nog geheel onontgonnen denkbeelden, die deze theorie bevatte, geen sprake is, typeert de decadentie, waarin de Scholastiek vervallen was ; toch waardeert men tenminste in de Parijsche philosophen van dezen tijd, dat ze althans het goede wisten te behouden, wanneer men in dezelfde periode de Italianen op mechanisch gebied ziet terugkeeren tot de te Parijs reeds lang overwonnen Aristotelisch-Averroistische dwalingen.” Fal en worp. Een Bijdrage tot de Geschiedenis der Mechanica van Aristoteles tot Newton (Groningen, 1924); Hoofdstuk II: Val en Worp in de Scholastiek, pp. 117-121 ; p. 118. See, however, A . Koyré: “ ... personne, sauf Copernic, n’en a tiré une astronomie hélio-centrique. Pourquoi? Question oiseuse. Parce que personne, avant Copernic, n’a eu son génie. Et son courage. Ou peut-être, parce que, entre Ptolémée et Copernic, il n’y a eu personne qui fut à la fois astronome génial et pythagoricien convaincu.” Op. cit., p. 44. “ Quarto nunc primum accedam ad hoc opus, quod et tibi in mentem venit, ut hypothesibus artem astronomicam liberarem, solis contentus observationibus. Atque utinam haberemus omnium aetatum observationes idque iuxta nostras capiendi obser vationes rationes traditas, quas omnino iudico easdem esse, quibus primi artis indaga tores usi sunt, et talem tablularum modum exquisiverimus, quod non perpetua opus haberent emendatione. ... Habeo etiam prae manibus novas de rerum natura philo sophandi rationes, ex sola naturae contemplatione, onmibus antiquorum scriptis sepositis.” K. H. Burmeister, op. cit.. Vol. 3, p. 188. Cf.: “ Gegen Ende seines Lebens versuchte Rheticus aus seinen reichen Erfahrungen als Astronom, Arzt und Chemiker ein neues philosophisches System aufzubauen, dessen Grundlage nur die Natur sein sollte: ‘ex sola naturae contemplatione’. N ur von daher, so schrieb er 1568 an Ramus, wolle er seine Naturphilosophie begründen. Er verzichte dabei auf aile Schriften der AUen. Diese Forderung hatte Rheticus, wie wir wissen, für Medizin, Astronomie und Astrologie ebenfalls aufgestellt.” K. H. Burmeister, op. cit.. Vol. 1, Humanist und Wegbereiter der modemen Naturwissenschaften (Wiesbaden, 1967), p. 173. See the - in other respects - excellent study by Francis A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 2nd ed. (London, 1971), pp. 241-243. The Sun-analogies and Hermetic traditions - alluded to by Copernicus in his Preface - are certainly im-
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p. 103. “ ...characteristic of all discoveries from which new sorts of phenomena emerge. Those characteristics include; the previous awareness of anomaly, the gradual and simultaneous emergence of both observational and conceptual recognition, and the consequent change o f paradigm categories and procedures often accompanied by resistence.” Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (ChicagoLondon, 1969), p. 63. 64 And as Randall has shown, the Paduan Aristotelians a century later dominated the climate o f thought with which Copernicus must have become familiar during his Italian study years. Cf. John Herman Randall, The School o f Padua and the Emergence o f M odem Science, Saggi e testi I (Padova, 1961), p. 24 f. ; p. 71 fF. «5 W . Jaeger, Paideia, op. cit., p. 220. 6« There may not be much time left to adjust to the secular cosmos, since a post secular cosmology is appearing on the intellectual horizon. Cf. Karl R. Popper; Thus we live in an open universe. W e could not make this discovery before there was human knowledge. But once we have made the discovery there is no reason to think that the openness depends exclusively upon the existence of human knowledge. It is much more reasonable to reject all views of a closed universe - that of a causally as well as that of a probabilistically closed universe; thus rejecting the closed universe envisaged by La place, as well as the one envisaged by quantum mechanics. Our universe is partly causal, partly probabilistic, and partly open; it is emergent.” ‘Indeterminism is Not Enough’, Encounter 40 ( 1973), 20-26 ; 26.
DISCUSSION E. s y l l a : I am a little bit worried about the emphasis on the campaign apinst vain curiosity as something that may have led to Copernicus, and I tried to distinguish for myself various reasons why someone could be against intellectual endeavor or secular science. It seems to me that, for example, Lactantius, Augustine, the nominalists, and modem science represent four different reasons why one might criticize some kinds of intellectual activity. There is Lactantius, who really seems to be afraid of scientific discovery, believing that a person might hurt himself if he found out certain things. (“ Curiosity killed the cat.” ) There are some things that it is dangerous to know. I do not think he is very typical. Probably the most common position on vain curiosity is Augustme’s in the Confessions, the Enchiridion, and elsewhere where he says that
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science is perfectly good in itself, but it is not very important. The Christian doesn’t need to know how many stars there are, how many grains of sand there are, but it wouldn’t hurt him to know. If we had all the time in the world, all right. If you com pare someone who, like Faustus, the Manichaean, is ignorant about astronomy, with someone who really knows astronomy, obviously it is better to know astronomy. Astronomy works, you can predict eclipses, and they happen as you say. But the Chris tian has more important things to do. So this view puts limits on science, but not because science has intrinsic limits, but just because it is not as important. And I think some of this is similar to the ideas of Bernard of Clairvaux, which Brian Stock talked about. Or Gerson. It is not really as anti-intellectual as Lactantius, but it is more pastoral, saying to people, “ let’s pay attention to the important things.” H. OBERMAN : I don’t see the point of contention between us, because I brought in vana curiositas to try to interpret the immediate reaction of Luther in his Table Talk to Copernicus. Luther formulates his ideas in words that can only be understood once you have seen the whole medieval curiositas tradition. I think there is a consensus of scho larship that Lactantius is far more radical; he still thinks in terms of the apologetes. Augustine is already in a more relaxed situation. With Augustine there is a certain openness to scientia, although he warns of its spiritual dangers. There is an intensificacation of the warning in the Rule of Benedict, where curiositas is the first basis of superbia or pride. Then there is a warning that you should not look beyond the monas tic walls or to science because it will lead you astray, scientia inflat, it will puff you up. W e know that all too well : when you travel from campus to campus, you know that the words scientia inflat are very true! And then in the later Middle Ages, Gerson uses the expression in his famous sermon Contra vanam curiositatem to show that there are limits, and here he is completely right, there are limits for each faculty. The theologians should not feel that they can tell what physics should be, to do this they should become good physicists, and the logicians should not in their curiosity feel that they can plot the course of theology. E. s y l l a : I think what bothered me was saying that being against vain curiosity is a typically nominalist position. Because the nominalists say let’s limit metaphysics, let’s limit theology, but at the same time they will be very committed to extending rational inquiry as far as it can go. If you take someone like Ockham or the more typical nomi nalists, they are not counselling a self-limitation upon rational inquiry; they are saying that each faculty should not trespass on the other faculties, but there isn’t a necessary limit within any faculty. H. OBERMAN : I am in complete agreement with you. The nominalists are very keen on saying that you are curiosus when you try to penetrate the potentia absoluta Dei, and the theologians should stick to what God revealed about himself You should not go to Aristotle or to other sources, you should go to Scripture and the tradition of the Church So I think that the fight against curiosity is no longer anti-scientific, it is now used to show the limits of each faculty. E. s y l l a : I don’t think that someone like Ockham would give a sermon against vain curiosity. H. OBERMAN: I would love to find such a sermon by Ockham; I think that would be very revealing. But what Gerson did was to give a series of lectures in three weeks to the theological faculty warning against vain curiosity. E. s y l l a : But I would claim that Gerson is not a typical nominalist, to the extent that he is doing that. H. OBERMAN : There is quite a debate on Gerson’s nominalism. Combes shares your
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view. I think that he has all the characteristics of a nominalist and the later nominalists always counted him in their list of “ school saints.” E. s y l l a : In any case, I wanted to say that there are two things that are not necessa rily always to be identified. Whereas I agree with you that the nominalists may be behind things like Copernicus, I am not so sure that sermons against vain curiosity ^ e o f help; sometimes they are going to be allies, but they are not always going to be allies in producing something like what Copernicus is doing. T. GREGORY: Sans doute il est vrai qu’il ne serait pas très justifié de considérer la polémique contra vanam curiositatem comme medieval obscurantism. Mais je ne vou drais pas qu’on aille à l’excès opposé, c’est-à-dire jusqu’à interpréter la polémique contra vanam curiositatem comme quelque chose qui peut préparer la méthode et les modèles f o r the coming era o f science. La polémique contra curiositatem dont tous soulignent les origines patristiques est toujours une polémique contre une science qui n’est pas finali sée vers la conversion spirituelle, n’est pas finalisée vers Dieu. Je me souviens d’un texte de S. Bonaventure, qui peut représenter un moment de cette tradition, lorsque, dans les Collationes in Hexaemeron, il dit: Salomon factus est curiosus et vanus, oblitus est sui. En d’autres mots, la curiosité c’est quelque chose qui porte à considérer les choses particulières et qui nous fait oublier Dieu, notre dernière et première pensée. Les textes que vous citez de Gerson et d’Erasme sont tout à fait dans la même tradition augustinienne, ils témoignent d’une polémique contre une science fin pour elle-même. Aussi, je ne vois pas comment on peut prendre cette polémique contre la curiosité comme un medieval obscurantism, pas plus que je ne puis considérer cette curiosité comme quelque chose qui va favoriser la naissance de la science moderne. Cette polé mique que nous trouvons au XVIe siècle contra vanam curiositatem est tout à fait la même polémique augustinienne. H. OBERMAN : As far as curiositas is concerned, there I tend to differ from you; vana curiositas becomes in the eleventh and twelfth centuries a single term; you no longer have to add the word ‘vana’ to characterize curiositas. For Gerson it is important to combat curiosity in the realm of theology, but its goal is to combat metaphysics. Its result, therefore, is to free physics from the claims of metaphysics. You have for the first time with Brulifer, sometimes called “ Scotellus,” and then with Luther - those are the two instances that I know of - texts where after centuries they speak again of the vana (or the mala) and bona curiositas. And at the moment when one can start to speak again about bona curiositas, then something very significant has happened. Because until that time you did not have to add the word vana. Curiositas was always to the detriment of yourself, implying, that is, that you are fragmented, you are going in all kinds o f directions, and you lose yourself, and you therefore have to collect yourself, to get out o f the disparateness of the outside world and find yourself and your strength. Curiositas was always that loss o f internal substance. Now, what has happened, when for the first time one can talk again about bona curiositas, is that the investigation of this world is seen as useful. Thomas Aquinas solves the problem by distinguishing between curiositas and studiositas, but be leaves the word curiositas with the onus o f being bad. Something has happened at the moment that you can talk about bona curiositas: the inner freedom to investigate the world. B. s t o c k : I would like to ask a question about Blumenberg’s Die Legitimitât der Neuzeit, which you quote and refute. One of the points Blumenberg goes into in detail is the question o f curiositas in the Middle Ages. He makes a real contribution, I think Professor Oberman would agree. But do you realize that this paper was in part an answer to Blumenberg?
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H. OBERMAN : Accoiding to Blumenberg, the whole o f the Middle Ages was engaged in a campaign contra curiositatem. He abbreviates it; and I point to the fact that it is a campaign contra vanam curiositatem, that you should take the qualification vanam seriously; that there were times when the two expressions were identical, but there were times when they were not. Blumenberg says that curiositas signifies the medieval scien tific captivity (I put it now in my own terms), and that only with Copernicus are you freed from this. I wanted to show that akeady in the 15th century you see that there are other ways to deal with curiositas, that one is already seeing that though there is a dangerous curiositas, there is also a very productive curiositas, and that therefore the argument used by Blumenberg is not historically valid. I think that the diflSculty of our discussion at the moment is that I have used the tradition concerning vain curiosity as a roimdabout way to help understand Luther’s first reaction. Another line of argument is that Osiander’s Preface is to be understood as nominalist, and that Copernicus is only to be understood on the basis of what I call the fertile crescent of new methods of inquiry into the world with experientia. E. s y l l a : All right, but then there is another reason why someone could be against excessive intellectual speculation which, I think, when you talk about experience and reality you seem to have in mind, and which I would identify as the viewpoint of Fran cis Bacon or of early modem science. It is the case in which you are against intellectual speculation because you want to have experience, to go to experiments, and be more empirical. And I don’t think that a nominalist, just because he is against over-extending theology into the natural realm, necessarily has experience as his alternative. The alter native may be giving demonstrable proofs, which would include reason, revelation, or experience, the three, but not so much concentration upon experience. H. OBERMAN: After I had already worked for years with the distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata and had tried to pursue it in every new example, it appeared to me that there are different ways in which the dialectic of the two powers is applied in theology and in the area outside theology. In theology we know the truth because it is revealed. By the potentia absoluta we can imagine what other possibilities would have been available to God, which shows us the limits of our theological specula tion about the given revelation. But in the rest o f nature we do not really know what reality is. D e potentia absoluta may there mean that whole realm that is not yet known to us, that we have still to penetrate. I am inclined to believe that there are a number o f texts that one can only understand if one assumes that potentia ordinata refers to the course o f the laws o f nature as we already know them. N ow we have to penetrate the potentia absoluta (as the not-yet-known) to enlarge that domain. Whereas in theology this would be impiety, it would be bona curiositas to want to enlarge the domain o f the potentia ordinata and penetrate the unknown mysteries o f God’s world; it is the task of the natural philosopher to do exactly this. N o w this leads also to a further preoccupation with the term imaginatio. Hitherto, John Murdoch has discussed if in papers of his. W e can also refer to Curtis Wilson’s book on Heytesbury, w h e r e i s what we would translate as “ sheer imagination” or “ only imagination.” A quote from Wilson here: “ It is convenient to posit terms like ‘point’ and ‘instant’ - terms which the antiqui believed to stand for really existing indivisibles, but which actually refer to entities existing only secundum imaginationem in order to avoid prolixity of speech.” Now, while Wilson shows the crucial role of imaginatio, he unfortunately restricts it to the realm of logic without pointing to its function as theoretical experiment on the bridge between logic and natural philosophy. So we can say that the importance of imaginatio in the scientific development o f four
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teenth century nominalists has perhaps not been sufficiently appreciated. There is a revealing definition by Pierre d’Ailly (who died in 1420, and it may be important for us to note that he belongs to the century after Ockham), which shows that Wilson’s inter pretation of imaginatio can be right in some cases, but does not have to be right and is not appropriate if imaginatio is linked with apparentia. I shall read you this one text from his Sentence Commentary. “ Dico quod imaginari multipliciter potest capi: Uno modo idem est quod mente concipere, et isto modo non solum vera sed etiam impossibi lia et contradictoria possunt imaginari, quia non est aliud quam mente formare ali quam propositionem.” It seems to me that this is the interpretation that we have hith erto been dealing with. But now comes another interpretation: “ Alio modo idem est quod mente formare aliquam propositionem cum apparentia quod ita sit.” (Petrus Alliacensis, Sent. I, q. 5 ad arg princip. 1 G G ; Strasbourg 1490, Reprint 1968, fol. k5r, col. 1.) And then he goes on to discuss the importance of apparentia and that, therefore, the imaginatio has to be oriented to apparentia. It seems to me that here we have another aspect of what one does per imaginationem; it is directed to some observations that one has made, but one tries now theoretically to devise and to forecast how experi ments (now I am adding a lot of terms that do not occur in this immediate context) will work out. So, when related to the apparentia (that matters are as they are conceived), per imaginationem is not just sheer logical speculation but already stands on the border line between the realms o f logic and theoretical experiment. In the realm of theology, the nominalists would want to insist that you have to base your arguments on revelation; in the realm of metaphysics they would say that people have been led astray, that there is no common opinion on matters of daily life, because they have been misled to become metaphysicians instead of physicists, to do metaphy sics instead of physics, they have been dealing with general abstracts, and therefore they have not sufficiently analyzed the reality around them. So there are two ways in which the distinction between potentia absoluta and ordinata is used as a warning. In theology, one should stick to the business of interpreting Scripture and the tradition of the Church. On the other hand, those in other faculties should no longer read Aristotle, but should now actually analyze reality. They should start again cé ovo from the individ ual thing; that is the method W induction. On the basis of that, men develop or discover the natural laws that God put into this world. There, they are against intellectualism as speculation. E. s y l l a : But logic and mathematics are equally useful to them. J. MURDOCH: That is what bothers me, Heiko. Talking about fourteenth century
natural philosophy as such, I would think that experience or looking to nature, observa tion, plays very little role. N o w what do we mean by an appeal to experience? It seems to me that there are about four or five things that can be meant and most of these are not really central (they may be permissible, they may occur from time to time in the fourteenth century in the central figures, but 1 do not think they are predominant). W e can go back beyond the fourteenth century, we can worry about experimental procedure ; I think that this is just wrong, that it is not there. One confuses experimental procedure with a theory of experimental method and in their proper senses neither exists in the thirteenth century. So we can leave out experimental procedure and we can leave out theory of experimental method. But one might also maintain that what you mean by an appeal to experience is not an actual experiencing of anything, but rather simply a reference to the likes of “ You know what such and such is, or you perfectly well know that experience gives this evidence or that evidence.” All right, that occurs. So does also the occasional implication that we should go out and observe something. But in
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most o f the natural philosophy of the fourteenth century I don’t think that is important. What is significant (and here, I think, is where we meet) is the emphasis on cognitio intuitiva. Fine, all well and good; that is absolutely characteristic. But that is to develop an empiricist epistemology, which does not at all necessarily carry with it the necessity of basing science or building up science on observation, of appealing to experience. This being the case, I don’t think that we should be misled by the empiricist temper of the age, where the empiricist temper is specifically, or mostly, on the epistemological level. E. s y l l a ; It is not only empiricism, but the desire for evidentness. “ Show me, somehow.” H. OBERMAN : May I try to answer John? In the field of theology it is a different kind o f experience. There you have revelation, reason, and experience; there, “ experience” has that other, more modern, connotation: something that you really have an inner feeling about. That is in the field of theology. N ow outside the faculty of theology, for the astronomer, for example, it is quite clear that his field of experience is muchnarrower than in the other enterprises. Therefore, he has to work more with imaginatio, he has to conceive of theoretical solutions. He has to reach out for more experience. In the field o f theology experience helps lead to truth; in the field of natural philos ophy, what it should do is to establish accuracy, to establish that what we observe in the world is understood by us. Assuming that this is a correct description of what takes place, Ockham is a reaction against a view of reality that talks about reality in abstrac tions and therefore separates us from reality. He wants to get back to it again. There fore, the cognitio intuitiva. The way to marshall and discipline our minds is to apply logical propositions that we can check, on which we can really unite and after discus sion come to the conclusion that they are true or not true. About the middle of the fourteenth century we get the next step in which the proposition is to be related to an outside truth. Only then have we marshalled and disciplined our minds, and brought back what Ockham wanted to reach, namely a clear conception of reality, to be sure by way of logic and the observation of the outside world together. j. Mu r d o c h : I can bring you many examples of people - Swineshead, Bradwardine, all of these people - doing natural philosophy where observation or what “ really is the case,” isn’t relevant to the issue. Where are these texts where what “ really is the case” is relevant? I don’t want to say that there aren’t any, but it seems to me that they are very, very much in the minority. What works shall I look at and what examples will you point out to me? Most of the examples turn out to be secundum imaginationem exam ples where infinite this and infinitely small that are involved or some other circumstance that it would be impossible to observe. H. OBERMAN : But where our discussion becomes most pertinent and sharp and reveal ing is at that point where secundum imaginationem thinking is no longer a theoretical, logical, mathematical device to train the mind; instead you want to relate it to the outside world on which it has to impinge and where it has to be verified, over and against apparentiae. Therefore, the d’Ailly quotation I cited is not so irrelevant. There is one kind of imaginatio that is sheerly theoretical. That seems to me to be the phase that you have been describing in the fourteenth century. With Bradwardine I am in precisely that climate of thought. But it seems to me there is something else that hap pens in the fourteenth century, and the next phase starts. The task that Oresme carries through is fantastic. He has already read in Buridan about the stick that you drop through the whole of the world and ask whether it would have different friction in the north than it would have in the south. W e can laugh about it and ask how can you drop
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a stick through the whole world? But the case is per imaginationem. It is a test that can not be carried through, but it is already on its way to thinking how you could put different kinds of experience that you have had together and whether what you con clude would apply under all circumstances. It is not sheer imagination in the logical sense of the word. j. MURDOCH: Oh, I think it is, because the most developed example of this is Swineshead’s, isn’t it? E. s y l l a : When you say in your paper that one use of imagination is to formulate hypotheses that will be confirmed by experiment, that does not apply here. They are not trying to formulate the case of dropping the stick through the center of the world in a way that could ever be realized experimentally. J. MURDOCH: The secundum imaginationem element that is important in dropping the stick through the center of the world isn’t to imagine a hole in the world and drop ping a stick at all. The secundum imaginationem element enters when it drops and one half passes the center and starts pushing it back the other way. H ow are you going to determine the relevant variations between the forces pushing it this way and the resis tances pushing it back that way? To answer the question whether it ever gets to the center o f the world, oscillates past it, and so on? Anyone can imagine dropping the stick through the world, but then to imagine how to apply Bradwardine’s law to the stick once I drop it - that requires more ingenuity. H. OBERMAN: The diurnal rotation of the earth is discovered not because they already know it, but as a possibility, exactly by these tests per imaginationem. And only after we have conceived of this possibility, can we start to see whether it jibes with other elements. It is a theoretical reaching out for what cannot at the moment be verified, but it also makes very clear what is not yet verified. That is the point, E, SYLLA : But they are not looking forward to checking their cases ; they are just trying to clarify their concepts, s, v ic t o r : There is no model of physical experiment that they could be planning these things for; it is only as an historian that you can see that the later development o f experimental physics may have then proved the actual possibility o f some of these things that were developed secundum imaginationem. But I don’t think even Copernicus looked for an empirical proof or suggested any things that might have served as empir ical proofs of his theories. H. OBERMAN: Oh yes, he felt that suddenly all the observations were falling into place and that he could explain them and that he actually had explained them.
G U Y BEAUJOUAN
R É F L E X I O N S S U R LES RAPPO RTS EN TRE TH É O RIE ET P R A T IQ U E AU M OYEN ÂGE
Même s’ils ne sont pas marxistes, les historiens sont de plus en plus sensi bles aux facteurs sociaux qui, dans toute civilisation, conditionnent les modalités de la vie culturelle. Pourtant, les travaux consacrés à l’histoire intellectuelle du Moyen A ge semblent généralement peu enclins à cet engouement pour le social. Certes, par vocation ou par une sorte de mimétisme, les spécialistes de la culture médiévale sont, encore aujourd’hui, plus volontiers “ conserva teurs” que fascinés par les idéologies dites “ de gauche” . Mais, même s’il cessait d’en être ainsi, l ’histoire sociale de la pensée médiévale resterait extrêmement difficile au niveau même de la recherche érudite. ParticuUèrement lancinante est, à cet égard, la question des rapports qui pouvaient exister, au Moyen Age, entre les connaissances théoriques et la vie réelle. Ayant déjà pubUé, en 1957, une brochure intitulée Vinterdépendance entre la science scolastique et les techniques utilitaires^, je ne vais évidem ment pas la resservir ici, mais, au contraire, essayer de réfléchir sur les orientations nouvelles qui semblent s’être dégagées, à ce sujet, depuis quinze ans. En un tel domaine, tout essai de bibliographie systématique est illusoire. Les pages qui vont suivre doivent donc beaucoup aux hasards de discussions avec des collègues, des élèves, des amis. Les principaux exemples ci-après retenus sont empruntés à mes propres recherches ou aux travaux qu’il m’a été donné de suivre dans le cadre du séminaire dont j ’ai la charge à la IV e section de l’Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes.
QUEL QUES REMARQUES GENERALES
On entrevoit désormais combien la société médiévale a profité des muta tions techniques qu’ont amenées le brassage des ethnies, la résorption de l’esclavage, le déplacement vers le nord du centre de gravité du monde civiHsé, enfin, à partir du X le siècle, l’augmentation puis l’urbanisation croissante de la population. A la suite du hardi pionnier que fut Lefebvre des Noëttes, les synthèses de L. White^ et B. Gille^ présentent maintenant,
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 437-484. All Rights Reserved.
G. BEAUJOUAN
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
aussi bien que possible, les grandes innovations médiévales antérieures au
Posidonios et de Panetius. Pour Hugues de Saint-Victor, le travail des
X lIIe siècle: étriers permettant la chevalerie de choc, attelage moderne,
artisans tente d’imiter la Nature; la ratio des arts mécaniques est dès lors
meilleure captation de l’énergie des rivières et du vent, adaptation des
un moyen de comprendre la Création, donc une voie d’accès vers Dieu.
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moulins à diverses activités industrielles, progrès dans la métallurgie du
Ceci paraît bien loin d’une conception de la science visant à augmenter
fer, labourages plus efficaces et rotation des cultures, transformation du
l’emprise de l’homme sur le monde. L ’histoire des sciences est ainsi invitée
métier à tisser et de la fabrication des draps, alourdissement des navires
à se méfier du risque d’anachronisme psychologique que, fatalement,
ronds du Nord et de l’Atlantique, passage du style roman au gothique, etc..., etc...
pour les périodes anciennes, elle porte en elle. Si, après bien des hésitations, l’on attribue à Hugues de Saint-Victor la
G. Duby'^ vient de fort brillamment caractériser le relatif dynamisme de
Practica geometriae'^ connue sous son nom (vers 1125-1130), si même ce
cette période qui va de l’an mille à 1180: “ passage d’une économie fondée
texte innove par la netteté de sa distinction entre théorie et pratique, il ne
sur la guerre et le butin à une économie fondée sur l’agriculture” , avec par
faut pas s’y tromper: les véritables préoccupations des Victorins n’al
conséquent, en ce qui concerne notamment l’emploi des chevaux et des
laient pas à l’arpentage, mais bien plutôt à la compréhension approfondie de
métaux, “ application retardée des outils de l’agression militaire aux tra
divers passages de l’Ecriture^, tels ceux relatifs à l’arche de N oé (Hugues),
vaux des champs” , avec aussi la magnificence pour la gloire de Dieu et le gaspillage des cours seigneuriales.
au Tabernacle, au Temple de Salomon ou à la vision d’Ezechiel (Richard).
A de tels niveaux, il peut sembler vain de chercher des connexions
numériques à valeur symbolique, les théologiens n’exerçaient pas une
symptomatiques entre pensée spéculative et travail manuel. Un premier ordre de recherches consiste justement à préciser quelle fut, au Moyen Age, la place des techniques dans les diverses classifications des
Encore faut-il se demander si, en prétendant découvrir là des relations certaine influence encourageant des créations artistiques à structure mathématique. Ceci conduit à un autre ordre de réflexions. Le problème de l’interdé
sciences et, plus généralement, quelle a été l’attitude de la scolastique à l’égard du travail et des arts mécaniques.
pendance entre théorie et pratique s’est posé dès le haut Moyen Age, mais
Bon nombre de textes sont commodément passés en revue dans Tassez récent ouvrage de P. Sternagel, Die '‘"artes mechanicae"' im Mittelalter:
et cantor. Abstrait de la pratique musicale grecque, le traité de Boèce s’appUquait
surtout dans un secteur assez particulier, celui des relations entre musicus
Begriffs- und Bedeutungsgeschichte bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhmderts
assez mal au plain chant grégorien; caractéristique est, à cet égard, le cas
(Kallmünz, 1966). Faute cependant d’une bibliographie encore plus pous
des “ tropes de hauteur” de la musique grecque abusivement assimilés aux
sée, ce livre ne s’attarde guère aux controverses qu’ont pu susciter, parmi
huit “ modes” médiévaux des tonaires. Ainsi, pour les écoles du X le siècle,
les érudits, certains des textes les plus importants,
dans le domaine privilégié de la musique, la relation théorie-pratique
Hugues de Saint-Victor occupe évidemment une place d’honneur pour
n’ était pas l’habituel rapport entre science et applications; elle se trouvait
avoir, dans son Didascalicon, fait de la “ mécanique” (c’est-à-dire de l’étude
marquée par la volonté de concilier une théorie et une pratique qui, histori
des techniques) l’une des quatre branches fondamentales de la philosophie.
quement, n’étaient pas nées l’une pour l’autre. De là la foi, exceptionnelle
Bien que venant d’un mystique, une telle prise de position semble en rap
pour l’époque, d’un Gui d’Arezzo quant au progrès: "'Usque in hunc diem
port avec le développement économique et technique amorcé au X le
ars paulatim crescendo convaluit...’’ '^. Pour Jean d’Afiligem (Cotto), au
siècle^. Pourtant, contre M. Crombie et moi-même, le P*^ F. Alessio a fort
tout début du X lle siècle, le chantre sans formation musicale est comme
brillamment contesté qu’il en fût ainsi®. Hugues de Saint-Victor a, en effet, une position moins personnelle qu’on ne croit: il s’inspire d’un
un ivrogne qui parvient à rentrer chez lui, mais sans savoir par quelle rue il est passé: “ Cm/ ergo cantorem melius comparaverim quam ebrio qui
passage du De civitate D ei de saint Augustin; or, ce dernier puisait dans le
domum quidem repetit, sed quo calle revertatur penitus ignorat)"^^. Et de
De natura deorum de Cicéron qui, lui-même, reflétait l’enseignement de
citer Gui d’Arezzo:
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“ iVûAw qui facit quod non sapit diffinitur bestia''^^. A la faveur d’un contexte philosophique imprégné de platonisme, la musique a habitué les esprits au rôle éminent que doivent jouer les mathé matiques dans le dialogue théorie-pratique. Les textes relatifs aux orgues et aux carillons sont, à cet égard, très intéressants^^. La fonction du monocorde a, en cela, été capitale. Or, grâce justement aux instruments pédagogiques alors couramment employés (monocorde, rithmomachie, main, abaque, astrolabe, etc.), l’enseignement scientifique du X le siècle apparaît relativement concret^^, surtout si on le compare à la scolastique ultérieure. Mieux aussi que plus tard les études universitaires, la vie monastique du haut moyen âge se prêtait à la conciliation de la culture intellectuelle avec le goût pour les techniques ou la création artistique: on pense, par exemple, au moine Oliva de Ripoll, à Eilmer de M ahnesburyi^ ou à Hézelon de Clunyï®. Une publication très récente permet de bien conndtre un cas analogue, celui du chroniqueur, canoniste et théologien Odorannus de Sens (mort peu après 1045). N on seulement il se consacre à la musique théorique et pratique (division du monocorde et tonaire), mais on le voit aussi s’intéres ser à la géométrie et au symboUsme des nombres, travailler de ses propres mains pour construire un puits ou pour confectionner un crucifix et une châsse^®. C ’est, peut-on dire, à la même lignée qu’appartiennent le moine Théo phile, auteur du De diversis artibus, et même, au X lIIe siècle, le chroni queur Matthew Paris dont les cartes et les dessins sont si passionnants à
étudier!’. Pour apprécier les liens existant au Moyen âge entre science et savoirfaire, il faut bien se garder de trop penser aux architectes et aux ingé nieurs de la Renaissance. Envisagé dans un contexte authentiquement médiéval, le problème concerne au premier chef la musique, le symbolisme des nombres, l’alchimie, les cartes géographiques, l’illustration des manu scrits scientifiques, les instruments astronomiques et, bien sûr, la médecine. Pour ce qui est de cette dernière, theorica et practica sont nettement dif férenciées dans le Kitâb-al-mâlikî d’‘A lî ibn al-*Abbâs traduit en latin, dès avant 1085, par Constantin l’Africain (Pantegni) puis, en 1127, par Etienne d’Antioche (Regalis dispositio). Le cas des premiers architectes et ingénieurs du Moyen A ge latin est
R A P P O R T S E N T R E TH É ORI E ET P R A T I Q U E
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assez difficile à appréhender. On connaît, dans l’Angleterre de la seconde moitié du X lle siècle
un intéressant groupe d’architectes militaires
appelés ingénieurs (par exemple, dès 1157-58, Ailnoth qui démantèlera, en 1174, les châteaux forts des rebelles; vers 1170, Richard l’ingénieur, “ v/> artificiosus et prudens architectus''; ou encore "''Mauricius ingeniator'' et "'Urricus ingeniator Regis''). En ce qui concerne la France, apparaît en 1182, dans une charte de l’abbaye poitevine de Nouaillé^^, un Petrus ingeniator". Comme l’indique R. E. Latham ^o, le mot ingeniator se trouve dans le Domesday Book^^ dès 1086, c’est-à-dire avant la grande époque des traductions arabo-latines. Uingeniator c’est celui qui, avec des machi nes de guerre généralement en bois {ingenia), prépare la défense ou l’at taque d’une place forte (il y a, pour dire cela, un verbe ingeniaré). Il reste à se demander si la mode de ce titre à'ingeniator est ou non en rapport avec la scientia ingeniorum ( ‘ilm al-hiyal) incluse dans la classification des sciences d’al-Fârâbï que vulgarisa, peu après 1150, Dominicus Gundisalvi: ""Scientia vero ingeniorum docet modos excogitandi et adinveniendi qualiter, secundum numerum, corpora naturalia coaptentur per artificium aliquod, ad hoc ut usus quem querimus proveniat ex eis” ^^. Cette définition englobe à la fois l ’algèbre et la science des machines. Dans son interprétation d’al-Fârâbï, Dominicus Gundisalvi trahit certes sa connaissance de Hugues de Saint-Victor; pourtant, selon ce courant nouveau d’origine arabe, le propos est tout différent. Il n’est plus question d’arts mécaniques plagiant la nature et servant donc à la com prendre; il s’agit bien de techniques appliquant des sciences théoriques en vue d’une certaine efficacité. Avec sa subdivision de chaque branche en spéculative et active, la classification du savoir selon al-Fârâbi a surtout exercé une influence dans la mesure où, comme pour l’illustrer, les traducteurs ont révélé à l’Occident chrétien de nouvelles sciences encore inconnues de lui au X le siècle (à commencer, pourrait-on dire, par la géométrie spéculative, naturel lement aussi l’algèbre, l’optique, la statique etc.). Mais c’est ici qu’intervient une sorte de paradoxe lié à la manière dont, aux X lle et X lIIe siècles, les moines ont renoncé à l’exercice de certaines activités en voie de professionnalisation comme la médecine^s et l’architecture^^. Bien sûr avec l’essor des universités à dominance théologique, juridique voire médicale, les connaissances d’origine livresque s’enrichi rent et le parallélisme theorica-practica apparut cororne un lieu commun
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au début de maints commentaires scolastiques. On peut se demander
chinois. Or, malgré les admirables travaux de Joseph N e e d h a m ^7, l’his
pourtant si, dans le cadre des Facultés universitaires, au Moyen A ge com
torien ne parvient pas à bien reconnaître conunent s’est effectuée la trans
442
me plus récemment encore, les “ clercs” ne se coupaient pas un peu de la
mission entre la Chine et la Chrétienté. On en est réduit à la notion de
vie réelle. N e devinrent-ils pas encore moins sensibles aux problèmes
stimulus diffusion"' (des récits oraux de voyageurs poussant des bricoleurs
pratiques que ne l’étaient, fût-ce avec un bagage intellectuel plus limité,
occidentaux à réinventer ce qu’avaient déjà trouvé les Chinois).
certaines fortes personnalités antérieures ou extérieures au système universitaire^s?
richesse de nos sources d’information sur le moindre désaccord doctrinal
Au X lIIe siècle, la classification des arts mécaniques semble assez peu
au sein de la scolastique et, d’autre part, notre désarroi lorsqu’il faut
varier d’un texte à un autre, les différences de détail reflétant plus ou moins
situer dans leur véritable ambiance l’intérêt d’un Roger Bacon pour les
l ’environnement social de chaque auteur (importance, par exemple, de
techniques, les dessins d’ingénieur d’un Villard de Honnecourt ou l’ar
l ’architecture chez Vincent de Beauvais, du commerce et de la marine chez Raymond Lulle). Il serait bon que soient commodément regroupés
rivée des inventions chinoises en Occident. D ’un côté une foule de manu scrits soigneusement conservés; de l’autre, des conversations aussitôt
et analysés de plus nombreux passages (même très courts) où des maîtres
envolées, des croquis généralement tracés sur la cire, le sablées ou le
de la scolastique parlent incidemment des techniques. Sans un tel instru
plâtre et, en tout cas, destinés à disparaître.
ment de travail, les discussions risquent de rester assez académiques, celles notamment sur le rôle des franciscains.
Ceci est symptomatique d’un effarant contraste entre, d’une part, la
DES O B S C U R I T É S LIÉES À L A T Y P O L O G I E DES S OU R C E S
Par leur sensibiUté à la Nature, par leurs voyages d’apostolat et de mission, par leur attention aux problèmes des gens du peuple, par aussi
Pour ce qui est du Moyen Age, l’historien des sciences travaille comme
leur goût des mathématiques selon une certaine tradition augustinienne,
celui de la philosophie. L ’histoire des techniques est, au contraire, beau
les frères mineurs constituaient peut-être, dans la société des X lIIe, X lV e
coup plus proche de l’archéologie. On peut dès lors se demander si, avant
et X V e siècles, une sorte de levain favorable au progrès technique et aux
de reprocher au Moyen Age un excessif cloisonnement social entre “ clercs”
découvertes. Il est loisible d’imaginer une trame continue entre l’enthou
et praticiens, il ne faudrait pas d’ abord constater un manque d’interdis
siasme de Roger Bacon pour Pierre de Maricourt et la protection dis
ciplinarité entre, d’une part, l ’histoire des idées et, d’autre part, celle de
pensée à Christophe Colomb par le prieur de la Râbida^s. Inutile de citer encore, tellement ils l’ont été souvent, les célèbres pas
l’art, des découvertes maritimes voire de l’économie. Lorsque des réseaux de tracés directeurs sophistiqués sont superposés à
sages de Roger Bacon sur les possibilités attendues d’une ingénieuse ap-
des photographies d’oeuvres d’art médiévales, lorsque sont attribués à
pUcation des sciences : ce sont là des professions de foi certes exception
des artistes du Moyen Age, y compris à Dante29, \q plus extravagant sym
nelles pour l’époque, mais sans doute plus remarquables par leur ton que par leur contenu.
bolisme des nombres, lorsque sont prêtées aux marins des X lV e et X V e
Comparées en effet à celles précédemment apparues au Moyen Age, les
plus journaUstiques divagations, l’érudit sérieux est irrité et tenté de con
siècles les méthodes nautiques du XVIe, lorsque l’alchimie donne heu aux
nouveautés techniques de la période 1190-1330 sont, peut-on dire, plus
damner comme fantaisiste tout ce qui ne s’accorde pas avec les enseigne
fines et donc plus immédiatement rattachables à la science de l’époque
ments des manuscrits scientifiques de l’époque. Ce genre d’arguments,
(boussole et magnétisme de Petrus Peregrinus; lunettes et optique; poudre
objecte-t-on, n’est pas décisif. En effet, à travers les oeuvres d’art et les performances techniques du Moyen Age, se manifesteraient des ensei
à canon et alchimie pratique; horloges mécaniques et instruments astrono miques comme l’astrolabe ou l’équatoire). Mais plus encore que la ques
gnements oraux et des savoir-faire transmis comme initiatiquement sous
tion de leurs liens avec le savoir théorique, se pose le problème de la
le sceau du secret, traditions et procédés dont il serait évidemment chi
dépendance de ces nouveautés techniques vis-à-vis de leurs antécédents
mérique de chercher la divulgation dans des livres normaux.
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G. BEAUJOUAN
445
Qu’il concerne la construction des cathédrales, les découvertes mari
A en croire le grand archéologue Erwin Panofsky, voici quel aurait été
times, l’art militaire, l’alchimie ou même certaines survivances du gnos
le sens de ce passage, h désignant la hauteur du triangle équilatéral de
ticisme, le thème du “ secret” pourrait, à lui seul, faire l’objet d’un grand
base 96:
colloque. On y trouverait un complexe mélange de notions fort diverses: naturellement les secrets qu’exigent les affrontements militaires, diploma
2
1010
tiques ou économiques; les secrets corporatifs dont le contenu n’est pas obligatoirement d’ordre technique; la tradition hermétique propre à l’al chimie, mais aussi un cliché rhétorique lié à l’idée que la science est un trésor susceptible d’être caché et découver
L ’historien risque, en tout cas, d’être
inconsciemment influencé par une foule de notions non médiévales liées au mouvement rose-croix, à la franc-maçonnerie et même au romantisme.
~10x-27[=405] donc A < 84. Il suffirait alors d’apporter une légère correction D C D C C M X , X S E S Q U IA LT E R A X X V II...”
Que cela soit ou non la conséquence de ce fameux secret, il est très diffi
Sans entrer dans tous les arcanes de cette interprétation, retenons qu’ elle
cile de correctement évaluer les connaissances théoriques qu’impliquent
revient à penser qu’on pouvait, au Moyen Age, calculer la hauteur d’un
les capacités techniques du Moyen Age. Face à la grande abondance des
triangle équilatéral en prenant le double du dixième du huitième de la
textes scientifiques encore conservés, les documents vraiment techniques
moitié de la base multiplié par 100 puis par 700 et divisé par 1010.
sont exceptiormels avant le X V e siècle et leur interprétation comporte souvent une considérable part de subjectivité.
turale du Moyen Age pour imaginer que Stornaloco ait ainsi procédé et
Qu’il me soit permis de brièvement évoquer une petite recherche à laquelle je me suis naguère amusé^i.
un triangle équilatéral, le rapport de la hauteur à la base est approxima
La scène se passe en 1391 et la question se pose de savoir si la cathédrale
Il faut vraiment beaucoup croire à l ’ésotérisme de la tradition architec qu’il n’ait pas connu la formule alors très répandue selon laquelle, dans
de Milan doit être construite ad quadratum (c’est-à-dire aussi haute que
tivement de 13/15, ahas 26/30. Puisque Beltrami avait, pour ainsi dire, dessiné l’original sans le com
large) ou ad triangulum. Dans cette seconde éventualité, quelle doit-être la
prendre, point n’est besoin d’être grand paléographe pour restituer le
hauteur d’un triangle équilatéral dont la base est de 16 unitates contenant
très mauvais latin: XXVI
chacune 8 quantitates^ soit un total de 96. Nous écririons
"'‘de duccione in X X sesnarà’\ A = 96 X ^
= 83,136...
c’est-à-dire que la phrase entière peut se comprendre “ résultat provenant de la multiplication par 26; mais, en prenant le trentième, cela fait un
Telle n’était évidemment pas la façon d’opérer sur le chantier d’une
peu moins de 84” .
cathédrale. Pour discuter donc avec les “ ingénieurs” , intervient un spécialiste, Gabriel Stornaloco "'expertus in arte geometriae... causa
A = ?^[=83.2]<84
discutendi cum inzigneriis dictae fabricae...". Exemple presque unique d’un calcul médiéval appliqué à l’architecture, ce texte (dont l’original a
On voit à quel point les généralisations sont hasardeuses en ces ma
malheureusement disparu) n’est plus aujourd’hui connu que grâce à sa publication par L. Beltrami en 1887.
tières: les documents sont trop peu nombreux et leur interprétation est
X X V II '‘'‘radix de dcc m xx sesâra quia tregesime quod est aliquid minus de L X X X IIir
trop différente selon la spécialité et les préjugés de l’interprétateur. Le cas de Stornaloco n’est, du reste, pas caractéristique puisqu’il s’agit, non d’un “ ingénieur” ordinaire, mais d’un spécialiste, ""expertus in arte geometriae"^ intervenant à titre exceptionnel.
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447
En ce qui concerne, à proprement parler, les architectes et maîtres
tes se ramènent à des constructions de figures retenues davantage par
maçons du Moyen Age, leur bagage scientifique vient d’être examiné dans
l’oeil que par l’esprit. Typique est (Figure 1) la façon dont se trouve
deux publications raisonnables et bien documentées qu’ on peut désormais
visuaUsée, chez Roriczer, l’approximation de 7r= 3y
retenir comme base de discussion: d’une part, un excellent article de L. R. Shelby, The Geometrical Knowledge o f Mediaeval Master Masons, dans Speculum, Al, n° 3 (juillet 1972), 395-421. D ’autre part, la toute nouvelle édition revue et augmentée du si stimulant ouvrage de Pierre du Colombier, Les chantiers des cathédrales (Paris, Picard, 1973). Sur l’essen tiel, ces deux chercheurs arrivent, grosso modo, aux mêmes conclusions. Si
rares sont les documents vraiment révélateurs que, fatalement, on
revient toujours aux mêmes. Pour le X lIIe siècle, le fameux recueil de Villard de Honnecourt; à l’aube de la Renaissance, Matthaus Roriczer32 avec sa Geometria deutsch (1487-88) et son petit livre sur la construction
Un cas très curieux est, au fol. 20^^ de Villard de Honnecourt (magister
exacte des pinacles, Das Bûchlein von der Fialen Gerechtigkeit (1486). De
2), la spirale pour la taille des clefs de tiers et quint-point: la prudence
même que, pour les dessins proprement techniques, B. Gille^^ admet une
s’impose cependant, car la très ingénieuse interprétation de Branner a été
certaine continuité des carnets de Villard de Honnecourt au Bellifortis de Konrad Kyeser; de même peut-on voir en Roriczer l’enregistreur de la
contestée®'^. Qu’englobait cette géométrie quasi artisanale et comportait-elle, en
tradition gothique au moment oij elle va disparaître. Encore faut-il noter,
particulier, la connaissance de la “ proportion dorée” ? Si corporatif que
avec L. R. Shelby, que la Geometria deutsch ne puise pas seulement dans
fût ce savoir, n’a-t-il pas été enrichi grâce aux conversations de certains
l ’enseignement coutumier des maîtres-maçons, elle s’inspire aussi, non
architectes médiévaux, comme Roriczer lui-même, avec des patrons cul
sans énormes contresens34, d’un texte latin analogue à l’anonyme De
tivés détenant des livres de science? Par la fascination à la fois mystique et artistique qu’il exerçait au Moyen
inquisicione capacitatis figurarum^^. Il est tentant d’établir une distinction simpliste; parlerait latin la science
Age38, par ses relations surtout avec le nombre d’or, le pentagone régulier
tournée vers la philosophie; serait en langue vulgaire le savoir suscep
fournit, à propos de ces deux questions, un exemplaire objet de recherche
tible d’applications pratiques. Mais les choses sont, en réaUté, plus com plexes. Il n’y a presque aucune parenté entre, d’une part, ce qui se trouve
et de réflexion. Que, pour un architecte médiéval, la construction d’un pentagone
chez Villard de Honnecourt (magister 2), comme “ figures estraites de
régulier constituât une sérieuse difficulté théorique et donc l’un des plus
geometric” et, d’autre part, une géométrie pratique elle aussi en dialecte
beaux fleurons de son savoir géométrique, cela apparaît bien à la manière
picard du X lIIe siècle (M S 2200 de la Bibliothèque Ste Geneviève). Cette dernière est, comme l’a découvert S. Victor^®, une adaptation du traité
dont procède Roriczer (Figure 2), d’une seule ouverture de compas, en partant de deux cercles égaux passant chacun par le centre de l’autre.
latin '‘‘‘Artis cuiuslibet consummatio..." et elle fait suite à une arithmétique
Cette construction s’avère mathématiquement incorrecte, mais très ap
en français qui, elle-même, démarque l’algorisme d’Alexandre de Villedieu.
prochée; elle est, du reste, bien connue pour avoir été reprise et vulgarisée par Albrecht Dürer^». Incontestablement le premier à publier cette astuce,
Les géométries pratiques en langue vulgaire se rattachent généralement aux traités de calcul, à l’héritage des agrimenseurs et souvent aussi à la
Roriczer l’avait-il imaginée lui-même ou l’avait-il héritée de la tradition
pratique du quadrant. Tel, au contraire, qu’on peut l’entrevoir à travers
médiévale? Rien ne permet de dire, en tout cas, qu’il l’ait puisée à une
Villard de Honnecourt et Roriczer, le bagage géométrique des maîtres-
source livresque. Voici, à son propos, quelques observations d’une mathématicienne.
maçons exclut à la fois les démonstrations et les calculs; ses sortes de recet
G. BEAUJOUAN
448
” •4 « ‘‘ÎS 5
ï | 2| s
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
449
450
G. BEAUJOUAN
Mlle Debarnot, qui a bien voulu l’examiner pour nous. L ’étrange procédé de Roriczer dérive peut-être de la construction de l’hexagone régulier sur trois cercles (Figure 3); si alors, pour réduire de 12° l’angle A B N , on pose /--S le point K au cinquième de l’arc C N, les points F, E et K donnent l’illusion d’être alignés. Mais si, comme Roriczer, on obtient effectivement K en prolongeant FE, l’angle A B K est supérieur d’environ 22 minutes aux 108 degrés que doit avoir l’angle du pentagone régulier^®. Le sommet du
451
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
îû
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pentagone de Roriczer tombera dès lors à l’intérieur du cercle circon scrit, à une distance, il est vrai, inférieure au cinquantième du côté. Une si faible erreur était sans importance pour un artiste médiéval et, à supposer même qu’ il fût parvenu à la constater expérimentalement, il l’eût sans doute attribuée à une imprécision du tracé. Comment par ailleurs imaginer que des artisans médiévaux n’aient jamais demandé à des clercs ce qu’enseignait Euclide à propos du penta gone? Il semble, en tout cas, que certaines figures des Eléments étaient retenues pour elles-mêmes, à la manière de Villard de Honnecourt ou de Roriczer, c’est-à-dire comme des formules visualisées et débarrassées de toute démonstration. Les figures les plus frappantes pour l’oeil s’étaient, du reste, vu attribuer de pittoresques sobriquets comme, par exemple, le pont
.[ù
c <
{/) s.
aux ânes (Elem. I, 5), la tunique de François {Elem. I, 47), la patte d’oie (Elem. III, 7) ou la queue de paon {Elem. III, 8) (Figure 4). Pour ce qui est de ces deux dernières dénominations (j>es anseris et cauda pavonis), on a autrefois cru qu’elles apparaissaient pour la première fois, en 1509, dans la révision des Eléments par Luca Pacioli, autrement dit chez un mathé maticien de la Renaissance justement célèbre pour avoir vulgarisé la
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“ divine proportion” . En fait, ces noms de figures semblent issus d’une
D u. O
sorte d’argot scolaire médiéval. Le P*^ John Murdoch me signale, par exemple, la façon dont Bradwardine conclut, dans son De continuo, un raisonnement par l’absurde: “ circulus habet multa centra; pes anseris infirmatur, de cauda pavonis pulcherrime penne cadunt et tota geometria de speris et circuUs subvertetur” "^!. Dans le manuscrit 2085 de Salamanque, j ’ai découvert, il y a quelques années, une Mathematica due à un médecin toulousain du milieu du X lV e siècle, Philippus Elephantis Anglicus^^^ Qq ^g^te n’est pas encore publié, mais l’un de mes élèves, Paul Cattin, l’a transcrit et en a méticuleusement
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452
G. B EAUJOUAN
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
453
retrouvé les sources^^. La partie géométrique s’inspire principalement des Eléments d’Euclide dans la version de Campanus. Philippe Eléphant in dique les noms de diverses figures'*^. Deux de ces appellations sont bien connues: la fameuse caudapavonis {Elem. III, 8) et aussi elefuga, “ la fuite des misérables” pour le pont aux ânes {Elem. I, 5). D ’autres dénomina
to
tions semblent au contraire ne pas avoir été signalées jusqu’ici: Victoria
O o
(Elem. II, W), figura equatrix (Campanus VI, 9 = fig. Elem. V I, %), figura exemplaris (Campanus V I,
1 8 = £ ’/ew. V I, 20), Faratra, c’est-à-dire
pharetra (papéxpa le carquois {Elem. X III, 18) (Figures 5, 7, 8). Deux
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figures se rattachent à la quadrature du cercle : figura mediatrix [pour un
u> L
cercle donné, aire de l’octogone régulier inscrit moyenne géométrique entre l’aire du carré inscrit et celle du carré circonscrit'^®] ou encore pax et concordia [quadrature du cercle proprement dite'^®] (Figure 6). Noter enfin la figura cotis [coj=pierre à aiguiser] pour diviser plus ou moins approximativement un angle dans une proportion donnée (Figure 5). Mais revenons au pentagone régulier, car son tracé, chez Euclide, se trouve justement jalonné par deux des figures dont Philippe Eléphant in à)
révèle les surnoms et donc la célébrité au Moyen Age. Ainsi la construc tion du pentagone régulier {Elem. IV, 11) part, on le sait, du triangle isocèle “ qui a chacun des angles de la base double de l’angle restant” {Elem. IV, 10) (Figure 7). L ’illustration de cette dernière proposition n’est pas très frappante pour l’oeil, elle se voit cependant attribuer un nom
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très remarquable: la figure de Démon ou de celui qui comprend, Demonis sive intelligentis. C ’est que, pour obtenir ce fameux triangle isocèle, il faut savoir diviser un segment de droite selon la section dorée,
a
comme Euclide l ’a précédemment enseigné {Elem. II, 11): “ Couper une
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droite donnée de manière que le rectangle compris sous la droite entière
Q)
et l’un des segments soit égal au carré du segment restant” . La figure
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U)
D
donnant la solution de ce problème devait être populaire puisque, tou jours d’après Philippe Eléphant, elle porte un nom triomphal: Victoria (Figure 7). La pharetra ou carquois fait également intervenir la section dorée pour déterminer l ’arète du dodécaèdre {Elem. X III, 18) (Figure 8). Commentateur du Timée de Platon, Philippe Eléphant était sans doute fasciné par la divine proportion, puisque plagiant avec quelques variantes Campanus X IV 10, il écrit: ^'‘Mirabilis itaque estpotencia linee secundum proporcionem habentem medium duoque extrema divise; cui cum plurima philosophantium admiracione digna conveniant, hoc precipuum ex suorum^’^
454
455
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
G. BEAUJOUAN
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b
p partage be en moyenne et extrême raison bp arête du dodécaèdre
Pharetra
de=eg
eb = ez
zd
cote du décagone
bz
côte du pentagone Fig.9.
Fig. 8.
Il semble bien que cette figure se soit vulgarisée indépendamment du principiorum invariabili natura producit ut tam diversa solida tum magnitu
texte de Ptolémée, et ceci à un niveau si peu savant qu’ on ait pu commet
dine, tum basium numero, tum etiam figura, irracionali quadam symphonia racionabiliter conciliet''.
tre l’erreur d’y prendre de triangle isocèle bez pour équilatéral. Une telle
Les considérations précédentes ne suffisent évidemment pas pour ap
rinstitut52; “ Si un cercle a son centre placé sur le milieu de la base d’un
prouver ou condamner ceux qui croient retrouver dans l ’art médiéval le
triangle équilatéral et que sa circonférence passe par le sommet de l’angle
fameux partage “ en extrême et moyenne raison” . Largement répandue
supérieur, ce cercle contiendra nécessairement en lui cinq des bases du
par les nombreuses copies des Eléments, la section dorée pouvait très bien
susdit triangle équilatéral” ®» (Figure 10).
s’être vulgarisée même chez des artistes ignorant le latin. Point n’est besoin d’avoir lu Euclide pour comprendre, si quelqu’un vous l’explique, le tracé d’un pentagone régulier. Il n’était pas nécessaire de posséder un coûteux manuscrit des Eléments pour retenir des constructions comme la Victoria ou la figura Demonis. Il n’est donc pas du tout invraisemblable que de telles figures aient eu une tradition propre^® analogue à celle qu’atteste, pour d’autres procédés, la géométrie allemande de Roriczer. On pourrait en dire autant de la figure par laquelle, au chap. 10 du livre I de VAlmageste, Ptolémée donne très simplement les côtés du pentagone et du décagone réguliers inscrits (Figure 9); cette figure devait sembler remar quable puisque, par exemple, elle est reprise avec insistance par Abraham ibn Ezra^® et judicieusement utilisée dans la Practica geometric de Leo nardo Fibonacci®®. On la trouve aussi interpolée après la figure illustrant la proposition II, 11 des Eléments d’ Euclide^i.
méprise est attestée, peu avant 1492, au fol. 13^ de l’actuel manuscrit A de
458
G. BEAUJOUAN
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
De ce théorème assez grossièrement approximatif Léonard de Vinci tire,
recherches récemment consacrées à l’équerre. Principal instrument et
au fol. 17'" du même manuscrit, la construction suivante (Figure ll)^^;
presque emblème de l’architecture aux Xle, X lle et X lIIe siècles, l ’équerre
459
est souvent représentée. Or il faut bien faire, avec A. Sené, la constatation suivante: “ Les équerres romanes et du premier âge gothique se présentent comme de fausses équerres, c’est-à-dire qu’il leur manque le côté de l’hypoténuse, ce qui est parfaitement classique, mais les plus anciennes d’entre elles possèdent une particularité remarquable: leurs bras sont de largeurs inégales et, fait plus étrange encore, très souvent les bords n’en sont pas parallèles deux à deux: ils convergent et divergent créant un angle droit interne situé sur un axe différent de l’externe” . Il est bien possible en effet que, en plus naturellement de l’angle droit, ces équerres médiévales ma térialisaient certains angles intéressants: 60 et 30° souvent; 54 et 36° parfois^?. B. G. Morgan et A . Sené^® croient que, par le non-parallélisme Fig. 11. cmn équilatéral tnr = rn nb==bc mb = ma a, centre du cercle circonscrit au pentagone de côté mn
de leurs côtés internes, elles pouvaient aussi donner les angles d’or (58° 16' 51" et 31° 43' 03") c’est-à-dire les angles que forment avec la diagonale les côtés d’un rectangle obéissant à la divine proportion y/5 + i
= 1,618 ...
On trouve cependant ailleurs, dans ses notes, des formules assez différentes^®^ jnais dont pareillement il conviendrait de déceler les antécédents
côtés rectangulaires intérieurs forment avec l’hypoténuse les fameux
médiévaux.
“ angles d’or” . Malheureusement ce remarquable instrument semble ne
Les constructions d’Euclide et de Ptolémée partaient, en fin de compte,
C ’est en effet grosso modo le cas pour l’équerre de Liverpool dont les
dater que du X V IIIe siècle. E. Maillard a pareillement lié à la mise en
l’une et l’autre, de la section dorée: on objectera sans doute qu’un pra
oeuvre du nombre d’or trois magnifiques instruments de la Renaissance
ticien comme Roriczer ne les connaissait pas puisqu’il préconisait un
(?) aujourd’hui conservés au Musée de Cluny à Paris^®: une équerre
procédé tout différent et d’ailleurs erroné. Mais le problème, notons-le,
pliante, un niveau et une règle à fil à plomb. Mais tout ceci ne prouve rien
n’était pas posé de la même façon puisque, chez Euclide et Ptolémée,
en ce qui concerne le Moyen Age.
c’est le cercle d’inscription qui était donné; c’est, en revanche, le côté du
A Reims, en revanche, sur la tombe de l’architecte Hugues Libergier
pentagone®® dans les exemples ci-dessus empruntés à Roriczer et à Léonard de Vinci.
( t après 1263), se trouve représentée une équerre dessinée, semble-t-il, en suivant les contours de celle effectivement possédée par le défunt maître.
Puisque les architectes et sculpteurs du Moyen Age n’assimilaient guère
L ’hypoténuse forme avec les côtés intérieurs des angles de 31° 30' 10" et
les formules numériques et les raisonnements de type euclidien, l’applica
58° 29' 50" (Figure 12), valeurs très proches, on le voit, de celles indiquées
tion de constructions géométriques apparemment savantes se réduisait
ci-dessus pour les angles d’or.
souvent, semble-t-il, à la mise en oeuvre de quelques angles caractéristiques (par exemple 36° dans la construction du décagone ou du pentagone).
ment en partant des proportions mesurées sur les monuments eux-mêmes
Cette importance de certains angles confère un tout spécial intérêt aux
qu’on peut discuter l’emploi, aux X lle et X lIIe siècles, de cette prétendue
En fin de compte, et avec tous les aléas d’une telle méthode, c’est seule
460
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
G. B EAUJOUAN
461
Fig. 13. Taille des voussoirs et construction d’un arc: utilisation des équerres à bords non parallèles d’après Shelby. Reproduced by permission of the Society for the History o f Technology and the author from Lon R. Shelby, ‘Medieval Masons’ Tools II, Compass and Square’, Technology and Culture 6 (1965).
d’ogive (Figure 13). C ’est alors le rayon de courbure et non plus le nombre d’or qui expliquerait la divergence des côtés interne et externe de cer taines équerres«i. Il semble que ces bizarres équerres tombèrent en désuétude au fur et à Fig. 12. Tombe de Hugues Libergier. Reproduced by permission o f the Liverpool University Press from B. G . Morgan, Canonic Design in English Medieval Architecture, Liverpool, 1961.
équerre “ canonique” construite selon le nombre d’or*®. Personne n’a, du
mesure que le compas s’imposa entre les mains d’artistes moins inexperts en géométrie. Mais ici encore que de pièges pour l’historien! Revenons un instant sur la tombe de Hugues Libergier (seconde moitié du X lIIe s.): près de l’équerre susmentionnée, se trouve représenté un compas. Selon O. von Simson®2 “ this proportion compass seems to be based on the gol
reste, encore montré comment matériellement, sur le terrain, de telles
den section” . En réalité, ce compas n’est pas basé sur la section dorée pour
équerres auraient pu être utilisées à grande échelle. Détail étrange, l’une
cette excellente raison que, comme l’a montré Pierre Du Colombier®^,
des cathètes est parfois représentée courbée, ce qui suggérerait l'emploi de tels instruments pour la taille des voussoirs et la construction des arcs
ce n’est pas un compas de réduction, mais un compas à branches croisées (Figure 14).
462
G. BEAUJOUAN
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
463
donne nulle part l’équivalent de la formule
1
1+V5\"
/ 1 -V 5
Un = -7 = '
■ -( Il n’envisage pas, non plus, que le rapport de deux termes consécutifs tende vers le nombre d’or (1 +^5)/2. C ’est qu’ on en est venu à donner comme de Fibonacci lui-même les considérations d’arithmétique supé rieure exposées, à son propos, par E. Lucas®®. Ce dernier pourtant at tribue expressément au X V IIe siècle, nommément à Albert Girard (15951632), la découverte du lien entre le nombre d’or et la série de Fibonacci®'^, Fibonacci a cependant parfaitement connu les propositions d’Euclide et de Ptolémée sur le pentagone et l’hexagone réguliers. Comme par exemple Abù Kâmil®®, il les a utilisées pour résoudre par l’algèbre divers problèmes de géométrie, et ceci en deux endroits de sa Practica geometrie^^ : aucun recoupement, du reste, avec la progéniture du couple de lapins. Si, changeant complètement d’horizon, nous quittons les chantiers des cathédrales pour étudier les navigations annonciatrices des grandes dé Dans une progression géométrique ayant pour raison le nombre d’Or,
couvertes maritimes, nous retrouvons les mêmes problèmes de méthode:
chacun des termes est égal à la somme des deux précédents: il y a donc là
la même difficulté à harmoniser sciences et techniques; les mêmes incerti
une série dite de Fibonacci. Le nom du célèbre mathématicien pisan se
tudes de l’historien face au secret; la même difficulté à suivre des tradi
trouve ainsi fréquemment invoqué pour garantir l’intérêt prétendûment
tions orales (ou de métier) dont seuls d’exceptionnels affleurements ap
porté au nombre d’Or par les architectes du X lIIe siècle. Comment ne pas
paraissent dans la documentation écrite; les mêmes efforts enfin de quel
constater, à cette occasion, les dangers de l’à-peu-près et des rapproche
ques érudits ingénieux pour imaginer, grâce aux instruments et aux cartes
ments hâtifs?
ou à l ’aide de manuels tardifs, des procédés restés curieusement absents
Chacun sait que, dans son Liber abbaci (1202,1228), Leonardo Fibonacci
du savoir livresque médiéval.
calcule la progéniture d’un couple de lapins®*^ selon la célèbre série récur
Plusieurs colloques et d’assez nombreux travaux ont, ces quinze der
rente 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 233, 377... Dans son récent petit
nières années, sensiblement éclairé les conditions dans lesquelles, malgré
livre, par ailleurs excellent, sur le nombre d’ or, M . Cleyet-Michaud®®
sa finalité essentiellement astrologique, l’astronomie médiévale fut mise
ajoute comme une chose bien connue: “ Désireux d’en savoir davantage,
au service de l’art nautique.
Fibonacci eut l ’ingénieuse idée de comparer deux termes consécutifs de
Certes, dès lors qu’ils utiUsaient des cartes nautiques à lignes de rhumb
la série en question, c’est-à-dire, pour être plus précis, d’étudier comment
tracées en fonction de la boussole, les marins du X lV e siècle étaient
se comporte le rapport M(„+d/w„. Cette idée devait le conduire au nombre
susceptibles de recourir à certaines méthodes scientifiques (cf. Raymond
d’or” . En effet, dès le rapport 89/55, apparaît le nombre d’or 1.618 avec
Lulle à propos du nocturlabe ou des élémentaires tables trigonométriques
trois décimales exactes.
bientôt dites de marteloioy^. En simplifiant un peu, et sous réserve de deux ou trois textes controver
Malheureusement, loin d’éclairer l’histoire de l’art, tout ceci ne fait que l’égarer. Il suffit, pour s’en convaincre, de relire de Liber abbaci: Fibonacci
sés, on peut dire que l’astronomie nautique a vu le jour, au Portugal,
n’y calcule les termes de sa série que par une succession d’additions. Il ne
durant la décennie 1480-1490. Elle n’est pas le fruit d’une plus grande
464
G. BEAUJOUAN
R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
465
précision des tables astronomiques'^^, ni même d’un brusque rapproche
On s’est dès lors demandé si, dans la Httérature nautique de la Renais
ment entre astronomie et marine. Elle fait partie d’un vaste effort d’or
sance, certains détails jusque là négUgés pour leur bizarrerie n’étaient pas,
ganisation et même, pourrait-on dire, d’une véritable politique scientifi que orchestrée par Jean II, le “ prince parfait” (relevés de latitudes, mise
en réalité, des survivances de procédés archaïques. En 1551, par exemple, Martin Cortés révèle que, sur les cartes-portu-
en service de grands astrolabes en bois, vulgarisation scientifico-technique
lans sans parallèles ni indications de latitudes, la distance entre le cap de
annonçant les futurs manuels nautiques, missions terrestres par Aden
Sâo Vicente (Portugal) et la plus grande des îles Berlenga indique tacite
pour préparer l’aboutissement vers l’Inde des navigations le long des côtes occidentales de l’Afrique, etc.).
ment une différence de trois degrés. On ne trouve antérieurement aucune
Sans doute ne faut-il pas trop considérer comme une institution établie
mise à la fin du Moyen Age, R. Laguarda Trias a, sur diverses cartes
la fameuse
de savants juifs et chrétiens à qui le roi confiait l’examen
mention de cette convention. Pour vérifier cependant si elle était déjà ad nautiques des X lV e et X V e siècles, mesuré et, grâce à l’échelle, évalué en
des questions scientifiques touchant les découvertes maritimes. Il y a là
milles cette distance Sâo Vicente-Berlenga prétendument indicatrice de
cependant, sans doute pour la première fois dans l’histoire, un effort
trois degrés. A en croire Laguarda Trias, les résultats obtenus ne sont pas
cohérent pour mettre la science au service d’une grande entreprise na tionale, avec ses énormes c o n s é q u e n c e s ’ ^^
nautiques, à partir de 1327, le degré de 56 milles 2/3 selon al-Farghânï ou
Pour la période antérieure à ce tournant décisif des années 1480-1490, les liens entre astronomie et navigation restent incertains, mais l’attitude actuelle des chercheurs, face à ce problème, est très symptomatique.
quelconques: on verrait ainsi s’imposer implicitement dans les cartes Sacrobosco, et ensuite, à partir de 1424, le degré de 66 milles 2/3 comme chez al-Çasan al-Marràkushi'^^, Bien qu’essentiellement faites pour la navigation à l’estime, les cartes-
Les deux positions extrêmes sont simples. Beaucoup d’historiens des
portulans auraient donc permis un approximatif contrôle des distances
sciences constatent que, malgré le grand nombre des traités consacrés aux instruments astronomiques et malgré l’insistance quasi-publicitaire de ces
grâce aux différences de latitude. Tant que des tables de déclinaison solaire n’étaient pas vulgarisées
textes sur les moindres usages des dits instruments, la littérature scientifi
parmi eux, les marins du X V e siècle ne pouvaient pas, de jour, utiliser
que ne décrit pas l’utilisation nautique du quadrant ou de l’astrolabe
profitablement le quadrant. De nuit, les choses étaient tout aussi com
avant la fin du X V e siècle. L ’emploi de tels instruments s’accorde, du
pliquées puisque, à l’époque, l ’étoile polaire se trouvait à environ trois
reste, fort mal avec l’utilisation de la carte-portulan à rhumbs magnétiques.
degrés et demi du pôle. En combinant, d’une part, une difficile citation de D iogo Gomes se
A l’inverse, divers marins-historiens (Portugais le plus souvent) soulignent avec raison la fréquence des voyages aux Açores à partir de 1427 et la
rapportant aux années 1456-1462 et, d’autre part, une note seulement
quasi-impossibilité de repérer ces îles sans un rudiment d’astronomie
publiée en 1565 mais reflétant sans doute une tradition ancienne, E. G.
nautique: le silence des textes s’expliquerait par la “ politique du secret” .
R. Taylor et A . Teixeira da M ota ont proposé une curieuse théorie.
Entre ces deux positions radicalement opposées, d’intéressants efforts de
Les navigateurs du X V e siècle n’auraient donc pas cherché à savoir la
conciliation ont été récemment tentés’ ^. Les érudits reconnaissent de plus
valeur absolue de leur latitude comme pour faire le point; ils se seraient
en plus les limites de ce qu’ils peuvent attendre de la documentation
contentés de demander au quadrant de leur fournir les différences de
écrite. D ’autre part, bien que les astronomes ou astrologues médiévaux
latitude entre divers Ueux d’observation, ce qui était évidenmient très
fussent couramment capables de déterminer à terre la latitude géogra
facile à condition de viser la même étoile circumpolaire dans une position
phique, les historiens de la marine commencent à admettre que, si une
convenue de la Petite Ourse. En marquant sur le limbe de l’instrument
astronomie nautique a dû exister avant 1480, elle ne pouvait pas consister à prendre en mer la latitude avec un astrolabe ou un quadrant pour la reporter sur une carte.
les positions successives du fil à plomb lors d’une série de telles observa tions le long de la côte occidentale de l’Afrique, on constituait un utile moyen de contrôler sa route lors d’une expédition ultérieure (Figure 15).
466
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467
n’est jamais employée comme mesure angulaire; c’est cependant en une autre unité linéaire (la goue=coudée) qu’y est évaluée la hauteur crois sante de la Tramontane au fur et à mesure que le voyageur remonte de l’équateur vers le nord. D ’une façon assez voisine, Jourdain de Sévérac, voyageant vers 1324-1327 également en Inde, indique la hauteur de la Tramontane en doigts (sans doute l’isba* arabe couramment utilisé, dans rOcéan Indien, pour la hauteur des étoiles, comme le montrent, par exemple, les instructions nautiques d’Ibn Mâdjid, le célèbre pilote arabe de Vasco da Gama). Une telle manière d’apprécier les angles est, semble-t-il, complètement étrangère à la, pourtant si abondante, littérature astronomique du Moyen Age latin. On la trouve, au contraire, dès le X e siècle, dans le célèbre livre de ‘A bd al-Rahmân al-Sûfï sur les constellations’ ». Pour indiquer les distances angulaires entre étoiles y apparaissent la lance (rumh), la stature Tout ceci est bien différent de ce que professaient les traités de quadrant
d’un homme (qâmat al-insân), la coudée (dhirâ*), l’empan (shibr), le doigt
plus ou moins liés à l’enseignement des universités médiévales (celui de
(isba‘). Distance entre a Andromedae et y Pegasi, la lance aurait valu 14° (six
Robertus Anglicus, par exemple). En revanche, cette manière de se placer en latitude n’est pas sans rappeler les procédés employés par les navigateurs arabes dans l’Océan Indien'^s. Il est, à première vue, bien difficile d’admettre une quelconque parenté
coudées de 2° 20' chacune), ce qui s’accorde assez bien avec le texte de Cadamosto sur la Tramontane haute d’une lance à 13° 30' de latitude
Nord’ 9.
entre l’art nautique de l’Océan Indien et celui de l’Atlantique avant que
Le D r Paul Kunitzsch connaît mieux que personne les tables d’étoiles
les Portugais n’aient atteint le Cap de Bonne-Espérance. Cette bizarre
du Moyen A ge islamique. Je l’ai donc consulté sur ces curieuses mesures
suggestion réapparaît pourtant à propos d’une question fort délicate, celle des mesures linéaires employées pour caractériser des angles'^®.
tales, observe-t-il, les tables médiévales d’étoiles fixes fournissent les coor
d’angles : sa réponse mérite ici réflexion. Qu’elles soient arabes ou occiden
Lorsque, en juin 1455, Alvise de Cadamosto se trouve à l’embouchure
données, toujours en degrés et minutes, jamais en mesures linéaires. Le
de la Gambie, à 13° 30' de latitude Nord, il trouve que la Tramontane
livre d’al-Süfï ne fait qu’ apparemment exception. Pour chacune des 48
s’élève au-dessus de la mer la hauteur d'une lance. Quand, en 1462, Pedro
constellations ptoloméennes, il comporte en effet quatre sections.
de Sintra est à l’île Shenge, à 7° 55' de latitude Nord, il note l’étoile polaire “ à la hauteur d'un homme sur la mer” . Ces textes ont fourni les arguments
1° discussion sur les étoiles de la constellation. 2° excursus sur la nomenclature purement arabe de certaines étoiles.
les plus contraires pour soutenir, soit l’existence d’une véritable astrono
3° deux figures de la constellation vue comme au ciel et comme sur un
mie nautique dès cette époque, soit à l’inverse la crasse ignorance des premiers découvreurs.
globe céleste. 4° table des étoiles comprises dans la constellation.
Or, dans son célèbre Conciliator (dif. L X V II) Pierre d’Abano fait état
C ’est seulement dans la première de ces quatre sections qu’al-$ùfï
d’une conversation au cours de laquelle Marco Polo lui aurait dit s’être trouvé dans l’hémisphère sud là où le pôle antarctique s’élève à plus d’une
emploie des mesures angulaires du type lance, stature d’un homme, coudée, empan, doigt. Il semble en cela, ajoute P. Kunitzsch, se conformer
alnce de soldat {polum antarcticum a terra elevatum quantitate lancee
à l’astronomie populaire arabe indigène, celle des Bédouins, telle qu’elle
militis longe in apparentiay^. Dans le livre même de Marco Polo, la lance
s’exprimait, par exemple, dans les livres d’al-anwâ*.
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R A P P O R T S ENTRE THÉORIE ET P R A T IQ U E
G. BEAUJOUAN
On assiste donc ici à la peu fréquente juxtaposition d’un savoir évidem
469
O RI E N T AT I O N S P O U R L A RECHERCHE
ment livresque et d’une science populaire normalement transmise de l’historien, mais c’est surtout à elle que se rattachent les instructions nau
On ne fait guère progresser l’étude de la pensée médiévale en y adjoignant de vagues considérations sociales. D ’autre part, l’histoire des techniques
tiques arabes en vers dont on conserve les mises par écrit au X V Ie siècle.
est encore, pour le Moyen Age, une discipline si difficile et si incertaine
Ibn Mâjid ne déclare-t-il pas lui-même que “ la meilleure description de la mer se fait oralement” ?so.
tats les plus récents: il faut préalablement vérifier comment, par qui et
En histoire des techniques, les secteurs où prévalent ainsi les traditions
d’après quoi, ces prétendus résultats ont été obtenus. Il a été montré ci-
orales sont souvent ceux où se produisent d’intéressants échanges entre
dessus avec quelle circonspection il convient de manier, par exemple, les
civilisations différentes: ceci sans que, naturellement, aucune traduction
données relatives à l ’architecture et à la navigation.
bouche à oreille. Cette tradition orale échappe presque complètement à
qu’on ne saurait, sans risques, philosopher de seconde main sur ses résul
de texte n’intervienne. Dans de tels cas, l’étude de la métrologie pourrait
Les rapports entre théorie et pratique se prêtent donc mal à des recher
beaucoup nous apprendre; malheureusement, il s’agit là d’un domaine aride, difficile et encore fort mal exploré.
ches systématiques où se puissent engager des médiévistes débutants: trop
A propos, par exemple, des mesures d’angles qui viennent d’être évo
grande y est la part des polémiques, des rapprochements fortuits, des trouvailles faites par hasard sur des détails apparemment minimes.
quées, bien des questions se prêteraient à de longues discussions. Les
Il est certes des secteurs dont l’exploration place l’érudit tout près de
coudées médiévales ont-elles une parenté avec le coude astronomique grec
la frontière entre théorie et pratique®®: par exemple les arithmétiques
généralement évalué à 2°? S’il faut attribuer une valuer de 1° 36' (360/
conunerciales qui permettent de comparer l’enseignement des universités
224) à l’isba* (doigt) des navigateurs arabes de l’Océan Indien du X V e
et celui destiné aux futurs marchands ; la géométrie pratique®® sous réserve
siècle, il y a là, selon J. Needham, une frappante ressemblance avec le
de ce qui a été dit plus haut; bien sûr la chasse, l’hippiatrie, la chirurgie,
chih des marins chinois qui fréquentaient les mêmes eaux®^, du reste le
les réceptaires, les carnets d’ingénieurs du X V e siècle; les instruments
chih se subdivisait en 8 chio, comme l’içba* en 8 zam. Mais la valeur de l’i|ba* n’est pas tout à fait la même selon les diverses données (mathéma
astronomiques et les horloges aussi. A ce propos, certains historiens ont du mal à comprendre que les
tiques, astronomiques ou géographiques) qui peuvent servir à la fixer®^ :
horloges mécaniques aient été des instruments astronomiques de prestige
il n’est pas facile de discerner quelle était la définition originelle, à sup poser qu’il y en eût une.
avant de devenir des machines à rythmer la vie sociale®’ . C ’est ainsi
A ce casse-tête métrologique se rattachent des discussions, elles aussi fort délicates, sur les liens possibles entre la dioptre grecque, le kamal de
souvent par le biais de l’astrologie (donc des instruments astronomiques, y compris les horloges) que, aux X lV e et X V e siècles, des médecins en sont venus à valablement s’intéresser aux techniques®®.
rOcéan Indien et le bâton de Jacob ou arbalestrille. Ce dernier instrument
Même si elle est moins révélatrice qu’ on ne le pense généralement, la
fut révélé aux astronomes occidentaux par le grand savant ju if Levi ben
comparaison entre science latine et savoir en langue vulgaire a une certaine
Gerson (1288-1344) qui, selon B. Goldstein®^, en serait bien l’inventeur.
signification sociale. On peut en dire autant des raisons qui semblent
Mais Laguarda Trias se demande s’il n’y a pas là un écho des méthodes
avoir induit les premiers imprimeurs à publier (ou à négliger) tels ou tels
pratiquées dans les régions de faible latitude comme l’Océan Indien®"*. On Goldstein aura
traités scientifiques®®. L ’histoire de certains mots témoigne excellemment des échanges entre
publié l’important travail qu’il prépare actuellement sur Levi ben Gerson.
la pensée spéculative et la vie réelle: nous l’avons vu à propos d 'ingenium
Une fois de plus, la question des rapports entre théorie et pratique
et de ses dérivés. Encore convient-il que la recherche ne s’enferme pas
débouche sur celle des relations entre théorie et expérience ou obser vation.
a priori dans le vocabulaire purement philosophique voire scientifique.
ne pourra se faire une idée à ce sujet que lorsque le
S’il reste beaucoup de documents à découvrir et de textes à publier, il
470
G. BEAUJOUAN
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semble aussi souhaitable que, surmontant l’obsession d’une sorte de per
botanique®^. Donc, une fois de plus, Villard de Honnecourt témoigne
471
fection formelle, les meilleurs médiévistes ne se cloisonnent pas dans des
d’un savoir pratique qu’ on chercherait en vain dans les livres de l’époque,
spécialités trop étroites. Bien des documents connus peuvent ainsi être
en l’occurrence ceux destinés aux médecins et aux apothicaires du Moyen
réexaminés dans un esprit plus compréhensif. Que de connexions à établir, par exemple, entre l’alchimie et la numismatique, entre les recettes des
Age. Pratique, observation et expérience sont indissolublement Uées. C ’est
manuscrits et les examens de vestiges archéologiques en laboratoire, entre
pourquoi il est si passionnant de voir progressivement se réveiller, au
les fascinantes cartes géographiques du Moyen A ge et toutes sortes d’au tres domaines.
Moyen Age, l’aptitude à traduire par un dessin une idée ou une réalité®^.
Un gigantesque et déUcat travail reste à faire sur les recettes: on a trop
Il y a beaucoup à trouver en ce domaine, comme l’a montré, dans un
tendance à les considérer comme “ populaires” voire “ folkloriques” ,
Les plans et cartes terrestres présentent, à cet égard, un particulier intérêt. dernier article, le regretté P. François de Dainville®'^.
surtout lorsqu’elles sont en langue vulgaire. En réaUté, beaucoup d’entre
Je n’insiste pas davantage sur cette question capitale des illustrations
elles proviennent d’ouvrages savants. Il est malaisé de vérifier si une recet
scientifiques médiévales. Le P ' John Murdoch prépare, à ce sujet, un
te, apparemment nouvelle, dérive de l’expérience ou si elle remanie, pour
volume important et impatiemment attendu®^.
des raisons a priori, une recette antérieure (typique est le cas des ingrédients rares et coûteux remplacés par des produits faciles à trouver).
Lorsque le médiéviste veut réfléchir sur les rapports théorie-pratique, il consulte assez volontiers les traités théoriques, mais il ne refait guère,
Il est un autre secteur insuffisamment exploré: c’est celui des illustra
dans de semblables conditions d’environnement, les gestes mêmes des
tions de manuscrits scientifiques. N ’insistons pas ici sur les problèmes que
praticiens médiévaux. Notre compréhension du Moyen Âge s’en trouve
peut poser la fiUation des enluminures par rapport à un stemma codicum
fondamentalement déséquihbrée.
naturellement établi d’après les accidents du texte: qu’on pense, par exemple, aux mappemondes dites de Beatus®^ ou encore aux herbiers
Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris
français du X V e siècle actuellement étudiés par M lle Opsomer. Mais une fois connue l’image originale, reste à retrouver si elle copie un modèle
NOTES
antique ou oriental, si elle s’inspire d’un autre ouvrage médiéval, si elle illustre littéralement le texte ou si elle apporte un témoignage visuel sur la réalité. La réponse à ces questions est souvent fort délicate. Voici, par exemple, l’éléphant que Matthew Paris prétend représenter d’après nature ^Hpso elephante exemplariter assistente'’ ; l’animal est si raide qu’on le dirait en bois.
La contradiction n’est qu’apparente, car l’auteur croyait,
d’ailleurs à tort, que la patte d’un éléphant ne comportait aucune articulation®!. Il y a même, chez Villard de Honnecourt, le dessin d’un lion dont on nous dit:” saciés bien qu’il fu contefais al v if” ... et pourtant il a une face humaine. Cependant, dans l’album de ce même Villard de Honnecourt, se trouve une recette fort valable pour conserver leurs couleurs naturelles aux fleurs d’un herbier. Des préoccupations de ce genre n’apparaîtront, semble-t-il, qu’au début du X V IIe siècle dans la littérature proprement
1 Paris, 1957 (Conférences du Palais de la Découverte, série D , n° 46). 2 L. White, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962); trad, française (Paris, 1969). Idem, Machina ex Deo: Essays in the Dynamism o f Western Culture (Cam bridge, Mass., 1968). 3 B. G 'i\\Q,à3 .m Histoire générale des techniques, dir. M.Daum as, t. 1 (1962), pp. 425601, et t. 2 (1965), pp.1-139. Cf. ci-dessous, note 33. 4 G. Duby, Guerriers et paysans (V lIe - X I Ie siècle): premier essor de l'économie européenne (Paris, 1973). ® Voir, dans le présent volume, T. Gregory, La nouvelle idée de Nature et de savoir scientifique au X lle siècle. ® F. Alessio, La filosofia e le “ artes mechanicae" nel secolo X II, dans Studi medievali, ser. 3a, anno 6 (1965), fasc. 1, pp. 71-161. ’ R. Baron éd., Hugo de Sancto Victore, Opera propaedeutica: Practica geometrie (Notre Dame, 1966). * Dans quelle mesure, jusqu’à la fin du X lle siècle, le quadrivium était-il effectivement mis à contribution pour la compréhension des Saintes Ecritures? C ’est là une impor tante question que se propose d’étudier M . Stephen K. Victor: voir déjà, dans sa thèse (citée ci-dessous n. 36), les considérations intitulées Practical Geometry in Education. ® Gui d’Arezzo, Micrologus, ed. J. Smits Van Waesberghe (Roma, 1955), p. 223.
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Johannis Affligemensîs D e musica cum Tom rîo, ed. J. Smits Van Waesberghe (Roma, 1950), p. 52.
divers chiffres pour les remplacer par d’autres: “ Loco delete figure in p u lvere...". En dehors même de l’imprimerie, l’abaissement du prix du papier a eu des conséquences très importantes. 2» L.-P. May, Dante et la Mystique des nombres (Paris, 1968), par exemple p. 30 sur
Gui d’Arezzo en tête des Regulae rythmicae publiées dans M. Gterbert, Scriptores ecclesiastici de musica, t. 2, p. 25. J. Smits Van Waesberghe, Musikerziehung: Lehre und Theorie der Musik im M itte lalter (Leipzig, 1969). 13 G. Beaujouan, L ’enseignement du "quadrivium” , dans Settimane di studio..., 19, L a Scuola neir Occidente latino deWalto medioevo (Spoleto, 1972), pp. 639-667. L. White, Eilmer o f Malmesbury: An Eleventh Century Aviator. A Case Study o f Technological Innovation: Its Context and Tradition, dans Technology and Culture 2 (1961), 97-111. J. Stiennon, Hézelon de Liège, architecte de Cluny I I I , dans Mélanges René Crozet (Poitiers, 1966), 1.1, pp. 345-358. K. J. Conant, Cluny: les églises et la maison du chef d ’Ordre (Mâcon, 1968). Le P‘‘ Conant croit à une savante structure mathématique du plan de Cluny III, mais ses thèses sont contestées par F. Salet et A. Erlande-Brandenburg, Cluny I I I , dans Bulletin nwnumental 126 (1968), 235-232. Odorannus de Sens, Opera omnia, textes édités, traduits et annotés par R.-H. Bautier et M . Gilles, et, pour la partie musicologique, par M.-E. Duchez et M. Huglo (Paris, 1972) [Sources d ’histoire médiévale publiées par l’institut de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes, n° 4]. R. Vaughan, Matthew Paris (Cambridge, 1958). L. F. Salzman, Building in England Down to 1540 (Oxford, 1952), p. 11. J. H. Roimd, The S ta ff o f a Castle in the Twelfth Century, dans English Historical Review 35 (1920), 90-97: sur ingeniator, pp. 93-95. Références dans Transactions o f the Archeological Society o f Birmingham 48 (1925), 43-44. Archives historiques du Poitou 49 (1936), 345. Je dois cette référence à Mme Bautier (fichier du nouveau D u Cange). R. E. Latham, Revised Medieval Latin Word Lis t from British and Irish Sources (London, 1965). M. Latham m’a fourni de précieux renseignements sur les plus anciens emplois du mot ingeniator en Angleterre: je l’en remercie bien vivement. “ Waldivus ingeniator” sans autre précision, dans Domesday Book, t. 1, 365b. On trouve ensuite un “ Gaufridus ingeniator” en 1130 (Pipe Roll, p. 143). 22 Domingo Gundisalvo, D e scientiis, ed. M. Alonso (Madrid, 1954), p. 109, Idem, De divisione philosophiae, ed. L. Baur, dans Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. M . A . 4, 2-3 (1903), 122. Al-Fârâbï, Catàlogo de las ciencias, ed. trad. A . Gonzalez Palencia, 2a ed. (MadridGranada, 1953), pp. 51 et 104. 23 V. L. Bullough, The Development o f Medicine as a Profession (New York, 1966). 24 p. D u Colombier, Les chantiers des cathédrales (Paris, 1973), Chapitre IV. 25 J’ai étudié le cas du monastère de Guadalupe où, encore au jh 'Ie siècle, une méde cine restée conventuelle avait im tel prestige qu’elle attirait, comme stagiaires, des praticiens déjà pourvus de titres universitaires. Cf. G . ^^u}o\jia.n. Médecine humaine et vétérinaire à la fin du M oyen Age (Paris, 1966), p. 380. 2« Voir, par exemple, J. Cortesâo, Os ikscobrimentos portugueses (Lisboa, 1960), pp. 70-78. 2’ J. Needham, Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West (Cambridge; 1970). Idem, Science and Civilisation in Chirm, en particulier le tome 4, Physics and Physical Tech nology, part 2, Mechanical Engineering (Cambridge, 1965), et part 3, Ci\il Engineering and Nautics (Cambridge, 1971). 2* Le calcul algorismique médiéval est basé sur la possibilité de successivement effacer
473
3,1416! 3° A . Cortesâo, “ Descobrimento” e descobrimentos (Coimbra, 1972), sur la distinction entre première trouvaille et découverte officielle. J’ajouterai, pour ma part, que la version portugaise du Secretum secretorum montre bien la relation entre “ descubrir” et “ encubrir” un secret. J. Barradas de Carvalho termine un important travail sur l’emploi de ce mot “ découverte” . 31 G . Beaujouan, Calcul d ’expert, en 1391, sur le chantier du Dôme de Milan, dans Moyen Age 69 (1963), 555-563. 32 Rééd. F. Geldner (Wiesbaden, 1965). 33 B. Gille, Les ingénieurs de la Renaissance (Paris, 1964), p. 28. 34 Par exemple la proposition selon laquelle un triangle ^uilatéral de côté 3 aurait même surface qu’un carré de côté 2. 35 Edité par M. Curtze, dans Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Mathematik 8 (1898), 30-68. 3« S. K. Victor, Practical Geometry in the High Middle Ages: An Edition with Transla tion and Commentary o f the "A rtis cuiuslibet consummatio” (Harvard University, May 1973). S. Victor insiste sur les éléments communs à cette géométrie et aux carnets de Villard de Honnecourt. Mais, même sur ces points, l’esprit des deux documents est bien différent. Cf. ci-dessous, note 86. 37 R. Branner, Villard de Honnecourt, Archimedes and Chartres, dans Journal o f the Society o f Architectural Historians 29 (1960), 91-96 et polémique ibid. 30 (1961), 143145. L. R. Shelby, Setting Out the Key Stones o f Pointed Arches, dans Technology and Culture 10 (1969), 537-548. 38 Voir par exemple J. Schouten, The Pentagram as a M edical Symbol (Nieuwkoop, 1968). 39 A . Dürer, Underweysung der Messung mit dem Z irck el und Richtscheyt (Nürnberg, 1525), livre 2. Traduction latine: Institutionum geometricarum... (Paris, 1532), p. 55. 40 S. Günther, D ie geometrischen Naherungskonstruktionen Albrecht Diirers (Ansbach, 1886), pp. 5-7. Voir la bibliographie indiquée par M. Steck dans Dictionary o f Scientific Biography, Vol. 4, p. 261. 41 Thorn, Gymnasialbibliothek, R 4° 2, p. 159. Erfurt, Ampl. Q ° 385, fo. 20v. 42 G. Beaujouan, Manuscrits scientifiques médiévaux de l ’ Université de Salamanque (Bordeaux, 1962), p. 101. Idem, La science anglaise dans les bibliothèques de Salamanque au X V e siècle, dans Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 5 (1961), spécialement pp. 263-269. 43 P. Cattin, L ’oeuvre encyclopédique de Philippe Eléphant: mathématique, alchimie, éthique (m ilieu du X lV e siècle), dans Ecole nationale des chartes. Positions des thèses (1969), pp. 9-15. 44 L ’unique manuscrit, celui de Salamanque, est une assez mauvaise copie. Tracées dans les marges, les figures y apparaissent souvent défectueuses ou mutilées par le relieur. D u reste, les noms ici étudiés ne se trouvent pas sous les figures, mais dans le texte, à la fin de la proposition correspondante: “ Hec figura dicitur...” . 45 Ce théorème se trouve, par exemple, dans le D e triangulis de Jordanus Nemorarius, ed. M. Curtze (Thom, 1887), proposition IV, 15: ''Octogonus circulo inscriptus inter quadratum eidem inscriptum et quadratum circumscriptum proportionalis."
474
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G. BEAUJOUAN
Chez Raymond Lulle, la figure de la quadrature du cercle porte un autre nom, celui de “figura magistralis". Il s’agit, notons-le, de quelque chose d’assez différent puisque, pour Lulle, la surface du cercle est égale à celle d’un carré dont les côtés se situent à mi-distance entre ceux du carré inscrit et ceux du carré circonscrit. Cf. J.-M. Millâs Vallicrosa, E l libro de la "N ova geometria” de Ramôn L u ll (Barcelona, 1953), pp. 16 et 84. “ superiorum” dans les éditions de Campanus. Dans le MS Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 7219 (XVe siècle) se trouvent rassemblées, sans le texte, les diverses figures des Eléments d’Euclide selon Campanus, trois d’entre elles portant des noms caractéristiques: dulkarnon (I, ^6),pes anseris (III, 7) et caudapavonis (III, 8). Chaque figure porte l’indication chiffrée de la proposition qu’elle illustre. Ce recueil était donc sans doute destiné à rendre compréhensible un exemplaire des Elé ments copié sans figures. Bien que ce ne soit pas ici le cas, il a évidemment pu exister une tradition orale liée à la mémorisation visuelle de certaines figures. J.-M. Millâs Vallicrosa, E l libro de los fundamentos de las tablas astronômicas de R . Abraham ibn Ezra (Madrid-Barcelona, 1947), p. 127. 5“ Edition B. Boncompagni (Roma, 1862), pp. 105 et 208. Paris, Bibl. Nat., M S lat. 2719: voir, ci-dessus, note 48. 62 Léonard de Vinci, L e manuscrit A de l'institut de France, transcr. N . de Toni, trad. A . Corbeau (Grenoble, 1972), pp. 58-59. Traduction plus compréhensible, mais moins littérale que celle de l’édition Corbeau citée ci-dessus. Cf. éd. Ch. Ravaisson-Mollien, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1881), p. 23. Ed. N . de Toni et A . Corbeau, pp. 72-73. Ed. Ravaisson-Mollien, p. 27. Par exemple aux fol. 13^" et 14 du MS B de l’institut (années 1485-1490). Ed. N . de Toni, trad. F. Authier et A . Corbeau (Grenoble, 1960), n®* 150-153, pp. 38-41: “Je constate que les côtés du pentagone s’éloignent du cercle de 1/5 de ces côtés” . Pourtant, Léonard construit un triangle équilatéral sur le côté donné du pentagone et, aux 4/5 de la hauteur de ce triangle, il place le centre du cercle circonscrit au pentagone. Bien que les Eléments n’enseignassent pas à construire un pentagone régulier sur un côté donné, il n’était pas très difiScile d’imaginer une solution euclidienne à ce problème. C ’est ce que fit, peu après 990, A bü’l-W afà’ dans son “ Livre sur ce qui est nécessaire aux artisans en fa it de constructions géométriques". Il y proposa deux constructions du pentagone régulier, l’une très simple, l’autre plus sophistiquée mais d'une seule ouver ture de compas. Cf. F. Woepcke dans Journal asiatique, 5e série, 5 (1855), 327-328. Voir aussi la bibliographie donnée par A . P. Youschkevitch dans Dictionary o f Scientific Biography, Vol. 1, pp. 39-43, en particulier S. Krasnova dans Fiziko-matematicheskie nauki v stranakh vostoka, 1, 4, (Moscou, 1966), 42-140. 57 Equerre de l’architecte des stalles de Saint-Pierre de Poitiers (après 1270). Equerre du cimetière de Niederhaslach dans le Bas-Rhin (1326). Voir A . Sené, Quelques in struments des architectes et des tailleurs de pierre au Moyen Age: hypothèses sur leur utilisation, dans Actes du Congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l ’enseigne ment supérieur: Besançon, 2 -4 juin 1972 (publ., 1973), pp. 39-58. B. G. Morgan, Canonic Design in English Mediaeval Architecture (Liverpool, 1961). A . Sené, Un instrument de précision au service des artistes du Moyen Age, dans Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 13, n° 4 (oct.-déc. 1970), 349-358. Id., Les équerres au Moyen Age, dans Actes du 95^ Congr. Nat. des Soc. savantes: Reims 1970: archéologie (Paris, 1974), pp. 525-548. 6* E. Maillard, Les cahiers du Nombre d ’Or, fasc. 1: Albert Dürer (Paris, 1961), pl. 7 et pp. 21-22. Voir aussi le fasc. 3 : Eglises du X lle au X V e siècle (Paris, 1964), notam ment pp. 23-31 sur les équerres médiévales.
475
Nous ne pouvons fournir ici une bibliographie des innombrables publications souvent très discutables - consacrées au nombre d’or. A ux références spécialement données dans les notes voisines ajouter, par exemple, M. Borissavlievitch, L e Nombre d ’O r et l ’esthétique scientifique de l'architecture (Paris, 1963). T. Brunes, The Secrets o f Ancient Geometry and its Use, 2 vols. (Copenhagen, 1967). Rappelons aussi P. H . Michel, De Pythagore à Euclide (Paris, 1950), pp. 523-630. 81 L. R. Shelby, Research Notes. Mediaeval Mason’s Tools. 11. Compass and Square, dans Technology and Culture, 6 (1965), 236-248. 82 O. von Simson, The Gothic Cathedral (London, 1956), p. 34. 83 P. D u Colombier, Le compas du maître d ’oeuvre, dans Bulletin de la Société natioruile des Antiquaires de France (12 janvier 1966), pp. 17-26. 84 Ed. de B. Boncompagni, S crittid i Leonardo Pisano, Vol. 1 (Roma, 1867), pp. 283-284. 85 M . Cleyet-Michaud, Le nombre d ’or (Paris, 1973), p. 72. 88 E. Lucas, Recherches sur plusieurs ouvrages de Léonard de Pise et sur diverses ques tions d ’arithmétique supérieure, dans Bullettino di bibliografia e di storia dette scienze matematiche e fisiche 10 (1877), 131 sqq. 87 soit faicte une telle progression 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, etc., dont chasque nombre soit égal aux deux précédens; alors deux nombres pris immédiatement dénotteront la mesme raison, comme 5 et 8 ou 8 et 13 etc., et tant plus grands, tant plus près... tellement que 13,13,21 constituent assez précisément un triangle isocèles ayant l’angle du pentagone” . Albert Girard précise bien qu’il s’agit là d’une “ particularité non encor par cy devant practiquée” . On trouve cependant, dès 1610, dans la Strena de Kepler, ce lien entre la série de Fibonacci et la “ Divine proportion” . Cf. J. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, B. 4 (München, 1941), p. 270: trad, anglaise par C. Hardie, The Six-Com ered Snowflake (Oxford, 1966), pp. 20-21. 8® D u pentagone et du décagone : trad, latine de Gérard de Crémone dans le M S Pans, Bibl. nat., lat. 7377A fol. 93e. Cf. H. Suter, Die Abhandlung des Abu Kâm il Shogà^ b. Aslam über das Fünfeck und Zehneck, dans Bibliotheca mathematica, 3. Folge, 11, 2 (1911), pp. 15-42. M. Yadegari et M. Levey, Abu Kâmil’s "O n the Pentagon and Deca gon” , dans Japanese Studies in the History o f Science, n° suppl. 2 (1971), 1-54. 89 Distinctiones, 3 et 8 {de quibusdam subtilitatibus geometricis)', édition Boncompagni, pp. 105-107 et 207-216. J’ai vérifié les textes dans les trois manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale: lat. 7223, lat. 10258 et nouv. acq. lat. 1207. 70 E. G. R. Taylor, Mathematics and the Navigation in the X lllth Century, dans Journal o f the Institute o f Navigation, 13 (I960), 1-12. 71 II y a longtemps qu’a été abandonnée la thèse attribuant, en matière de découvertes maritimes, un certain rôle à Regiomontanus et à l’école astronomique allemande. Jusqu’ici, en revanche, l’almanach perpétuel d’Abraham Zacut passait pour la source des tables solaires du régime nautique d’Evora. Celles-ci semblent, en réalité, dériver tout simplement des tables alphonsines alors vieilles de deux siècles et demi. Cf. E. Poulie, Les conditions de la navigation astronomique au X V e siècle (Coimbra, 1969), pp. 13-16. L. Mendonça de Albuquerque, Introduçâo à historia dos Descobrimentos (Coimbra, 1962) et Curso de histôria da nàutica (Rio de Janeiro, 1971). A. Cortesâo, Historia da cartografia portuguesa (Coimbra, 1969-1971); trad, anglaise. 73 G. Beaujouan, Science livresque et art nautique au X V e siècle, dans Aspects inter nationaux de la découverte océanique: 5e colloque int. d ’hist. maritime (Paris, 1966), pp.
72
61-85. Voir aussi ci-dessous, note 76. 74 R, Laguarda Trias, La aportaciôn cientffica de Mallorquines y Portugueses a la
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cartografianàutica (Madrid, 1964), spécialement pp. 41-49. Voir également, ci-dessous, note 84. ^5 A . Teixeira da Mota, Méthodes de navigation et cartographie nautique dans l ’Océan Indien avant le X V Ie siècle (Lisboa, 1963). G . Ferrand, Introduction à l ’astronomie nautique arabe (Paris, 1928). Voir maintenant les importants travaux de G. R. Tibbetts (ci-dessous, note 82). G. Beaujouan, L ’astronomie dans la Péninsule ibérique à la fin du Moyen Age (Coim bra, 1969), surtout pp. 17-20. Le contexte relatif au Nuage de Magellan est emprunté par Pierre d’Abano à VAbumasar in Sadan. Cf. L. Thorndike, dans Isis 45 (1954), 22-32. R. Lemay: voir cidessous, à la note 80. L. Olschki, M arco Polo, Dante A ligh ierie la cosmografia medievale, dans Oriente poliano ( studi in occasione del V I I centenario della noscita di M a rco Po lo ) (Roma, 1952), pp. 45-65. Description des étoiles fixes, trad. H. C. F. C. Schjellerup (St. Petersbourg, 1974), p. 26 et sqq. Cf. Emmy Wellesz, An Islamic Book on Constellations (Oxford, 1965). Peut-être la stature d’un homme est-elle la moitié d’une lance de 14°, soit 7°: ceci s’accorderait assez bien avec la latitude de 7°55’ (Pedro de Sintra). Dans la littérature géographique arabe, maints renseignements sont donnés comme ayant été recueillis de la bouche même des marins; mais cette dernière formule n’est souvent qu’une sorte de cliché. Il est cependant certain que très tôt les navigateurs arabes de l’Océan Indien se transmirent oralement des instructions nautiques assez précises. En ce qui concerne, par exemple, les dangers du Chenal de Mozambique et la recommandation de contourner Madagascar, R. Lemay a attiré l’attention sur un très intéressant passage de VIntroductorium maius d’Abu M a ‘shar (848 de notre ère). Voir X lle Congrès int. d ’hist. des sciences (Paris, 1968): Actes, 1.1 A , pp. 109-110 [= R e v u e de Synthèse (1968)] et t. IB, p. 100 (observations de J. Vemet) puis 103-104. J. Needham (cf. ci-dessus note 27), Sc. and Civ. in Chirui, t. 4, part 3:... Nautics, p. 573. *2 G. R. Tibbetts, Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the Coming o f the P o r tuguese (London, Luzac, 1972). L ’auteur a présenté les idées essentielles de ce livre dans The Navigational Theory o f the Arabs in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Coimbra, 1969). Interprétations parfois un peu différentes chez H. Grosset-Grange, L a navigation arabe de jadis: nouveaux aperçus sur les méthodes pratiquées en Océan Indien, dans Navigation 17 (1969), 227-237 et 437-448; autres études du même auteur sous presse. Importants travaux aussi du D r Ibrahim Khoury: Afimad ibn Màgid, la "Hâwiya” , abrégé versifié des principes de ruiutique, dans Bulletin d ’études orientales 24 (1971), 249-386; I. Khoury a également publié, à Damas, des textes de Soleimân el-Mahrî. B. R. Goldstein, Prelimirmry Remarks on Levi ben Gerson’s Contribution to Astron omy, dans The Israel Academy o f Sciences arui Humanities, Proceedings 3, n° 9 (Jerusa lem, 1969), 239-254 (surtout pp. 244-246). R. Laguarda Trias, Interpretaciôn de los vestigios del uso de un método de navegaciôn preastronômica en el Atldntico (Coimbra, 1970), surtout p. 25. Cf. du même auteur. Las màs antiguas determirmciones de latitud en el Atldntico y el Indico (Madrid, 1963). On puisera utilement dans deux ouvrages collectifs à participations surtout alle mandes; Fachliteratur des Mittelalters: Festschrift fü r G. Eis (Stuttgart, 1968) et A. Zimmermann, Methoden in Wissenschaft und Kunst des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1970). Voir la thèse de S. K. Victor citée à la note 36. U n ouvrage compilé par un “clerc” peut vouloir être pratique, mais ne pas l’être pour autant. Symptomatique apparaît, dans r “ Artis cuiuslibet...” une amusante confusion: pour donner l’aire des polygones.
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l’anonyme parisien de 1193 présente, en réalité, la formule des nombres polygonaux selon l’arithmétique de Boèce. On peut pareillement s’interroger sur l’utilité réelle d’im traité comme la Practica geometriae de Dominicus de Clavasio, ed. H. L. L. Busard, Archive f o r History o f Exact Sciences, 2, n° 6 (1965), 520-575. L ’un de mes élèves, H . L ’Huillier étudie actuellement la géométrie inédite de Nicolas Chuquet dont, en liaison avec l’algèbre, la valeur semble, en fin de compte, plus pédagogique que pratique. J. Le Goflf, Le temps du travail dans la “ crise” du X lV e siècle: du temps médiéval au temps moderne, dans Moyen âge 69 (1963), 597-613. S. Bedini et F. Maddison, Mechanical Universe: the Astrarium o f Giovanni de Dondi (Philadelphia, 1966). E. Poulie, Un constructeur d ’instruments astronomiques au X V e siècle, Jean Fusoris (Paris, 1963); noter le cas du médecin Henri Amault de Zwolle. ®9 Outre le répertoire de Klebs et les réflexions qu’il inspira à G. Sarton, voir aussi maintenant M. B. Stillwell, The Awakening Interest in Science During the First Century o f Printing (1450-1550) (New York, 1970). F. de Dainville, L a Gallia dans la mappemonde de Saint-Sever, dans Actes du 93e congrès national des sociétés savantes (1968), section de géographie (Paris, 1970), pp. 391-404. Voir notamment p. 392. Voir, ci-dessus, note 17. 92 J. E. Opsomer, Note sur l ’art des herbiers aux siècles passés, dans Annales du 51e congrès (M alines, 1970) de la Fédération archéologique et historique de Belgique. 9e sec tion: Histoire des sciences, pp. 518-525. Outre la bibliographie sur les carnets d’ingénieurs, voir notamment L. C. MacKinney, Medical Illustration in Medieval Manuscripts (London, 1965); P. Huard et M. D . Grmek, M ille ans de chirurgie en Occident, V e-X V e siècles (Paris, 1966). M. Des tombes, Mappemondes A . D . 1200-1500 (Amsterdam, 1964). »4 F. de Dainville, Cartes et contestations au X V e siècle, dans Imago mundi 24 (1970), 99-121. »5 A paraître aux éditions Ch. Scribner de N ew York, en supplément au Dictionary o f Scientific Biography.
D IS C U S S IO N G. b e a u j o u a n : Plus progresse, d’un côté, l’histoire des sciences, et, de l’autre, l’histoire
des techniques, plus grande est notre impatience de ne pas bien parvenir à concilier théorie et pratique au moyen âge. Il y a grand danger à introduire dans un tel débat des notions pensées de façon moderne, comme les concepts de science, de technique, voire de technologie. L ’architecte et l’ingénieur du moyen âge méritent certes de retenir ici toute notre attention. Mais c’est dans un contexte psychologique authentiquement médiéval qu’il nous faut observer le couple theorica-practica du X le au XVe siècle: je pense, par exemple, à la musique, aux instruments astronomiques, à la médecine et même au symbolisme des nombres ou à l’interprétation des songes. Dans mon rapport, mes préoccupations ne sont pas tournées vers l’épistémologie. Très modeste ouvrier de l’histoire, je suis surtout préoccupé de faire consciencieuse ment mon travail d’historien. Je suis un homme qui s’interroge, à la base, sur ce métier d’historien, sans se préoccuper de l’utilisation idéologique des résultats qu’il peut offrir à des penseurs installés plus haut. J’insiste donc sur la problématique. Nous en trouvons, je crois, une bonne illustra
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tion à propos des recherches récentes sur l’application de l’astronomie à la navigation au XVe siècle. Scrutons le cas de conscience de l’historien. Il existe, au moyen âge, un très grand nombre de traités consacrés aux instruments astronomiques. Avec une sorte d’ostentation quasi publicitaire, ces textes multiplient les usages des quadrants et astrolabes, mais sans se référer à une éventuelle utilisation nautique. Tirant argument des silences de cette masse de manuscrits, les “ rats de biblio thèques” sont portés à affirmer que l’astronomie médiévale ne s’est pas appliquée à la navigation, pas du moins avant 1480. Rappelant cependant que les voyages aux Açores se sont multipliés à partir de 1427, les historiens marins prétendent au contraire que le repérage de ces îles aurait été impossible sans une certaine détermination astronomique de la latitude en mer. Face à cette contradiction, deux attitudes sont évidemment possibles. La première se cramponne à l’aphorisme; “ Pas d’Histoire sans documents” . Elle est celle du policier à la frontière: “ Vos papiers! Si vous n’avez pas de papiers, vous n’existez pas!” . A u contraire, la seconde attitude procède secundum imaginationem. Selon elle, les choses les plus importantes étaient secrètes et seuls se trouvaient divulgués des éléments rela tivement secondaires. L ’imagination de l’historien serait alors plus valable que les documents. A nous donc d’imaginer, en fonction des résultats qu’elles ont permis, les techniques mises en oeuvre par les architectes des cathédrales ou les navigateurs des Grandes Découvertes. Entre deux positions de cet ordre, vous le voyez, il ne reste qu’un sentier très étroit pour l’historien scrupuleux, mais non borné par la manie du document. Il faut bien ad mettre, surtout pour le moyen âge, l’existence de traditions techniques artisanales et orales dont, fatalement, on ne trouve qu’exceptionnellement l’écho dans les documents. Il y a là une sorte à'underground de la science dont, seulement de façon très sporadique, on décèle la trace dans des témoignages fortuits, dans des représentations iconogra phiques, dans des cartes et plans, dans la manière même dont, sur un original, ap paraissent les petits trous laissés par la pointe d’un compas. M on rapport est une réflexion sur la difficulté d’explorer cet underground de la science médiévale, sur les efforts qui restent à faire pour mieux coordonner le savoir livresque et le dynamisme technique du moyen âge. Dans cette délicate recherche, une part décisive revient à l’étude des instruments, qu’ils soient effectivement conservés ou seulement connus par des dessins. Je voudrais insister sur un dernier point. L ’historien de la vie intellectuelle médiévale apprendrait beaucoup en essayant de refaire matériellement, si modestes soient-ils, les gestes mêmes de l’homme du moyen âge. j. MURDOCH! The question that M . Beaujouan put us, the “ question des rapports qui pouvaient exister au moyen âge entre la connaissance théorique et la vie réelle,” is in my eyes - and I do not think that it is due to the fact that I have not worked in practica perhaps one o f the most difficult questions of all to resolve or to get even partial an swers to, and, as one reads through M . Beaujouan’s paper, it is evident why this is so. The only thing I can do is to ask other questions, in particular about the pair theorica and practica and about other points that to me indicate the difficulty o f establishing in any proper sense the relations between theoria and praxis in the Middle Ages. The fost and major thing that I would like to do is merely to address myself to the problem of the two domains themselves, theorica and practica, and ask, what should they be? O f course, there is no problem in deciding that the application of astronomy within navigation, the application of geometry within architecture, and many o f the other case histories that M . Beaujouan cites, certainly are relevant to the two do
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mains; but how far - let us look first at practice or practica - should we extend this domain? I think that what I am about to say is partly explicit and certainly implicit in M . Beaujouan’s paper, namely, that we must take it beyond the realm o f the applica tion of science, hard or soft, to the affairs of everyday life. W e must move it, for in stance, to exegetical use o f the so-called theoretical sciences. Whenever there are hand books or treatises of one sort or another in which the theoretical material is intended for external use, for example a handbook o f natural philosophy and logic for pastoral theology or something of the sort, would this not move one from the realm of theory into praxis? The praxis in this case would be pastoral theology. Related to this is the question of the didactic use of theorica in the Middle Ages. M . Beaujouan cites the instruments that we are told existed, chez Gerbert par exemple, for the purpose of teaching the new profane sciences. But in addition to this, visual mate rials of any sort, illustrations, diagrams, schemata: do these not also move us from theory into praxis! There are, of course, those diagrams and pictures that are necessary in order to carry out the science itself (what I refer to are such things as astronomical diagrams, geometrical diagrams, diagrams for optics). These do not take us into praxis. But there are diagrams that do, I have in mind, for example, diagrams that are represen tations o f vie réelle in one fashion or another. Herbals are the most evident case, but there are also didactic treatises in medicine, where one finds illustrations of, for exam ple, points o f cautery or so-called blood-letting men; these things are necessary to cany out medicine on the practical level. One of the problems in investigating these, it seems to me, is that although observa tion and new external material may have been used in these illustrations, for the most part it seems to me this is not the case. They seem to be derivative in the sense that you can put together filiations of manuscripts where one illustration clearly seems to be copied from another. So a great deal o f investigation into the manuscript histories o f illustrations must go together with the question whether an illustration is representing something in the outer world. Yet another kind of illustration that moves in the direction o f the practical is the attempt to gloss a text. There is, for instance, the supposed eleventh century graph of the motion of the planets in latitude that has come into the history of science in various guises. But what is being “ graphed” is twelve lines o f Pliny. N o observations whatsoever are involved. So we should pay very close attention when we are looking at such dia grammatic material to whether there need be any outside input in order to give us a picture or whether it is part of what M. Beaujouan called science livresque. Finally, and I think most important of all, are the so-called schemata which are not a gloss o f a text, not a representation o f something external, not a diagram that is necessary for the calculations being carried out in this or that mathematics, but rep resentations o f a world system. There are very elaborate and beautiful ones showing the four elements, the four seasons, the four ages of man, etc., appearing in the works o f Isidore, Macrobius, Bede, William o f Conches, and others, and borrowed from one work to another. I think that one should also consider these as moving in the direction o f the practical. The schemata are clearly o f tremendous importance for the teaching of these treatises, but have been ignored by historians of science and philosophy. Let me say something much more briefly about theorica and then conclude with a few reflections on the problem o f the relation between theorica and practica. It seems to me that one of the things we should do - and M. Beaujouan is certainly aware o f this is to divide theorica abstractly into that theorica which cannot possibly, or only by the greatest stretch o f the imagination could possibly, have relations to the practical (there
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is certaiiüy a great deal o f medieval science that could only under the most unusual circumstances be applied to anything having to do with la vie réelle) and those theories that look as if they could receive practical application. N o w it turns out, it seems to me, that the sciences that can be applied are the most traditional. This is a curious fact: that which is newest in medieval Latin science is not that capable o f application; that which is more traditional - astronomy, optics, traditional mathematics - is more capa ble o f application. This is a first approximation; let us try this idea out, see how it works.
G. b e a u j o u a n : Ça dépend à qui on enseigne. s. v ic t o r : Exactly. And that’s the point. Now, clearly, if we look at practical arithmetic, an accountant or a banker had to know arithmetic. A ll right, he learned it somewhere and he applied it. Where would he have learned it? Would the treatises of theoretical arithmetic have been o f much use to him? N o, he wanted to know how to do calculations. So he would have turned to the treatises on practical arithmetic, or he would have been taught out o f these treatises. One needn’t find inunediate applications o f a treatise in order to call it practical, in other words. I think that second-hand application, that is with didactic intervention, is perhaps the most fruitful place to look. And this ties in with the things that Professor Murdoch mentioned about exegesis, on some of which I have worked and continue to work. This again is a didactic tradition and the geometry that is talked about in de scribing Biblical architecture is practical in a v o y real sense, but not in the sense of
Concluding with a few reflections on how difficult it is to establish the possible chain between the practical, on the one hand, and the theoretical on the other, even in the more traditional sciences like mathematics, I shall choose geometry as an example. Begin from the most theoretical o f all: Euclid’s geometry. As this develops, there is an exces sive didacticism as I have argued on numerous occasions elsewhere. In the version of Euclid that is presented to the medieval thinker, there are numerical examples all over the place. This is indeed moving one in the direction o f application, of practice. So a possible chain might go from there to practical geometries. Then one has to move somehow (and I cannot fill in the links) either from Euclid with his didacticism or from practical geometry to actual practice, architecture or what have you. Let me offer a few reflections on these links. If you are asking about the link between Euclid and practical geometry, there are not just many versions o f Euclid, but many of them with a great number o f marginalia. There is almost no mention in these mar ginalia o f anything to do with (a) external practical things or (b) even practical geometry. Why so? Are there references to practical geometry, the necessity o f paying attention to it and studying it, in university materials? If so, when and where? Such references might enable us to bridge the gap between Euclid’s geometry on the one hand and practical geometry on the other hand. What about the link between practical geometries and actual practice? If you believe the article of Lon Shelby cited by M. Beaujouan, the problem probably should be decided negatively, or mostly negatively, because he says that what one finds within practical geometries, namely the uses o f the astrolabe, the quadrant, is absent in Villard. His conclusion is that, if you ask about the so-called géometrîe pratique that is mentioned in Villard, its relation to masonry or architecture is no more solid, no closer, than the relation of geometry to portraiture within Villard. G. b e a u j o u a n : Quelques mots justement à propos de la géométrie pratique. Depuis que j ’ai rédigé le texte provisoire de mon rapport, m’est parvenue la belle thèse de M. Stephen K. Victor, Practical Geometry in the High Middle Ages: An Edition o f the “Artis cuiuslibet consummatio” . La lecture de ce travail m’a beaucoup frappé et voici pourquoi. V A rtis cuiuslibet est une géométrie pratique parisierme de 1193. Bien qu’elle cite Johaimes Hispalensis, elle continue la tradition de Gerbert et de la Geometria incerti auctoris publiée par Bubnov. La base théorique d’un tel savoir est donc déjà pratique puisqu’elle dérive des agrimensores et des usages de l’astrolabe. En ce qui concerne la finalité pratique de VArtis cuiuslibet^ya\ été frappé par un fait stupéfiant: l’anonyme de 1193 enseigne à calculer l’aire des polygones en donnant les formules des nombres polygonaux selon Boèce. Quelle que fût sa bonne volonté de servir à la pratique, un tel texte semble avoir été compilé sans aucun contact avec des practiciens. s. v ic t o r : O f course that is the case. But, at one time I remember that M . Beaujouan had an objection to the consideration of astronomical instruments, and also treatises on these practical instruments and on practical geometry, as didactic. That is, M. Beaujouan preferred to think that there was a more practical bent to them. N ow it seems to me that the didactic is practical in a very real sense.
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manually or physically practical. N o w another way in which practical geometry is practical is not in its intent, but in its historical origin. M . Beaujouan just mentioned the development of the tradition of practical geometry out o f the tradition of the agrimensores. N ow I think there is no doubt in anyone’s mind that the texts of the Roman agrimensores, the field measurers, were genuinely practical handbooks. So this brings us to the links that John Murdoch wants to establish. The links, I think, are not going to be found, at least at first, between Euclid and practical geometry. Practical geometry is not an application o f Euclid in any sense. It is rather a growth out of a tradition that was genuinely practical, and called practical for that reason. I try to show in my thesis that practical geometry is not called practical geometry until there is a model of theoretical geometry in the new translations of Euclid in the twelfth century in the West. I think this is an important point. It shows that these practical geometries are not attempts to apply Euclid. They do acquire much Euclid in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But this is not why they are practical in the beginning. These are later incursions, additions, and improvements. G. b e a u j o u a n : Je veux répondre à vous - et aussi à M . Murdoch - sur le plan de la
J’en prends pour exemple l’arithmétique dont des secteurs où le^ choses sont le plus claires grâce à la richesse de la documentation. Prenons les deux traités d’arithmétique les plus répandus dans l’Occident médiéval: l’algorisme d’Alexandre de Villedieu et celui de Sacrobosco. Ils se trouvent, l’un et l’autre, inclus dans une tradition universitaire et, s’ils débouchent sur quelque chose de pratique, c’est sur l’application du calcul à l’astronomie et à l’astrologie. Si nous examinons, en revanche, les arithmétiques commerciales de la fin du moyen âge, nous y trouvons une tradition qui, par divers intermédiaires méridionaux, dérive du Liber abbaci de Fibonacci. La situation apparaît donc assez étrange. D ’un côté l’algorisme tourné vers l’astronomie et accroché au calcul sur le sable avec corrections successives en effaçant. En face, des arithmétiques commerciales enseignant le calcul écrit sur papier avec retenues. On le voit par cet exemple: l’utilisation effective d’un traité théorique n’est pas implicite dans le texte lui-même. R. h a s h e d : Mais, dans cet exemple, M . Beaujouan, il n’y a pas de théorie; il s’agit de l’application d’une pratique à une pratique. Voyez l’arithmétique de l’époque: qu’on ^ a c e ou qu’on suive la méthode de retenue, il s’agit essentiellement d’une pratique. U n traité d’arithmétique, c’est un traité pratique.
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G. BEAUJOUAN: Je suis d’accord. Mais il y a quand même deux choses: D ’une part la science consignée par un enseignement livresque et d’autre part la pratique. Peut-être y a-t’il équivoque sur l’emploi du mot théorie. R. r a s h e d : Je ne suis pas spécialiste, et j ’ai quelques difficultés à comprendre le mot pratique. Vous m’avez expliqué le mot théorie, je comprends mieux, disons, la science livresque. Mais, à suivre la discussion, il me semble qu’il y a déjà plusieurs notions de pratique qu’on utilise en même temps et en leur donnant la même signification. M a question est de savoir comment différencier entre “ théories appliquées” - s’il y a vrai ment, dans la période que vous considérez, des théories appliquées - et la plupart des applications qui, en effet, sont simplement des recettes. A moins qu’il n’y ait une troi sième catégorie d’application: ce que vous appelez “ applications théoriques” . Ce qu’on vise dans cette troisième catégorie d’application n’est pas du tout l’utilité mais simple ment l’exercice d’une théorie qu’on vient de découvrir. G. BEAUJOUAN: D u point de vue philosophique, c’est une horreur de confondre ces notions, mais dans la vie réelle, pour quelqu’un qui a le malheur de n’être qu’historien et pas philosophe, les choses sont assez claires! Vous oubliez qu’au moyen âge le monde occidental est complètement sous-développé; il ne faut pas projeter des notions trop raffinées au milieu de problèmes qui se présentent, malgré tout, dans un certain état de sous-développement.
des sciences comme la médecine pour Ibn Sînâ, la musique pour al-Fârâbi, que ces philosophes ont pu définir la double fonction théorique et pratique du savoir. La médecine fait partie pour Ibn Sînâ de ces disciplines qui, comme la rhétorique, le tir à l’arc, la lutte et la dialectique, sont toutes art. Mais c’est sans doute à al-Fârâbi qu’il revient d’avoir précisé le statut de ces sciences intermédiaires qui utilisent des principes théoriques d’une part, des notions dégagées empiriquement d’un objet et au cours d’une pratique d’autre part. Telle est la fonction de Hlm al-hiyal, celle de l’art également, dans les productions artificielles de l’homme. Dans la Physique d’al-Fârâbi, en effet, la notion aristotélicienne de l’art comme imita tion de la nature est remplacée par celle de l’art comme création, où l’homme dégage des notions de forme à partir des principes de la science d’une part, d’un savoir dégagé de la matière d’une chose particulière, d’autre part. Parmi les sciences, la musique se distingue comme un exemple privilégié d’une disci pline qui requiert à la fois des connaissances communes, des démonstrations apodictiques, et d’une pratique dont al-Fârâbi est sans doute le premier à avoir donné une définition aussi claire: l’expérience. Reprenant la notion aristotélicienne d’expérience proposée dans les Seconds analytiques, al-Fârâbi l’élabore, et, ce qui n’avait pas été fait par Aristote, la distingue de l’induction à laquelle on pourrait à première vue l’iden tifier, puisque les deux démarches portent sur des cas particuliers. L ’expérience est, se lon al-Fârâbi, le renouvellement plusieurs fois d’une sensation concernant de nombreux objets jusqu’au point où l’intellect intervient pour effectuer son opération et introduire la certitude. C ’est dans cette opération de la raison que l’expérience se distingue de l’induction, car, dit al-Fârâbi, dans la démarche de l’induction l’intellect n’intervient à aucun moment. Si al-Fârâbi prend le soin d’affirmer qu’il ne fait ici qu’expliciter le point de vue d’Aristote, un retour au passage évoqué montre que les Seconds analytiques ne proposent pas de distinction nette entre induction et expérience, mais que ces deux démarches sont confondues et considérées comme deux moments d’une même étape dans le processus aristotélicien de formation des idées qui va de la sensation pure aux stades les plus élevés de l’intellection. On voit ainsi quels enseignements, pour la ques tion des rapports entre théorie et pratique au moyen âge, pourraient être dégagés d’une étude approfondie d’oeuvres comme la Musique d’al-Fârâbî et la Médecine d’Ibn Sinâ, et que le retour à une oeuvre aussi connue que le Recensement des sciences s’avère
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R. r a s h e d : Je n’oublie pas la nature de ce développement. J’essaye simplement de distinguer, pour pouvoir suivre votre discussion, les différents sens de “ pratique” . G. BEAUJOUAN: Oui. Mais dans la réalité, il y a toute une série d’attitudes pouvant s’échelonner entre la théorie pure et la pratique la plus matérielle. R. r a s h e d : D ’accord, M . Beaujouan, mais j ’ai grand doute qu’il y ait des théories ap pliquées, aussi bien dans le moyen âge chrétien que dans l’Islam. G. b e a u j o u a n : Je veux préciser mon problème en l’illustrant par un exemple évoqué dans mon rapport. Lorsque, travaillant sur le chantier d’une cathédrale, un artiste ou un artisan voulait correctement tracer un pentagone régulier, était-il susceptible d’avoir une conversation à ce sujet avec un chanoine de cette cathédrale? L ’artisan consi dérait, sans le connaître, qu’Euclide était le patron des maîtres maçons. Le chanoine était-il susceptible de consulter, pour la circonstance, une géométrie pratique ou un exemplaire des Eléments d’Euclide? Socialement et intellectuellement, un tel dialogue entre “ clerc” et “ praticien” était-il possible? C ’est à ce niveau, purement historique, que je me pose des questions: elles n’ont rien de philosophique, même inconsciemment. r . r a s h e d : Le dialogue théorie-pratique peut être étudié à travers la pensée théorique des auteurs, et principalement chez les philosophes arabes, où se modifie la distinction traditionnelle entre science et art. Or l’intérêt de la subdivision de chaque branche en spéculative et active n’est pas seulement d’avoir permis aux traducteurs de révéler à rOccident chrétien de nouvelles sciences - la géométrie spéculative, l’algèbre, l’optique, la statique, etc. L’innovation porte sur le statut même de la notion d’art, telle qu’elle fut élaborée par les philosophes arabes, puis transmise à l’Occident par des philosophes latins comme Albert le Grand. Le renouvellement de cette notion va permettre le rap prochement du “ penser” et de l’“ agir” , de l’universel et du particulier, du théorique et du pratique.
Depuis al-Kindi, le couple Hlm-^aiml, science-action, ne se présente pas conmie un rassemblement de deux notions dont l’une est supérieure à l’autre et la domine (comme la distinction aristotélicienne), mais comme deux aspects complémentaires de la con naissance, qui remplissent cependant deux fonctions différentes. C ’est ce qu’exprime Ibn Sînâ dans son introduction à la logique d'al-Shifâ'. Il semble que ce soit à travers
également fructueux. r . mckeon: M. Beaujouan’s communication clears up a difficulty that we have been having for the last four days, but now we are trying to force him into the way we have been talking about it. W e always put the theoretic in a science that we can recognize as a product of thinking, and then we put the application out in the product of the artisan who is working. But let’s take the second example that M. Beaujouan puts in at the center of his paper, namely architecture. This has a tradition which even in the Middle Ages goes back to Vitruvius. Vitruvius begins by saying that architecture has two parts, ratiocinatio and fabrica. These two parts are in architecture, not in astronomy or any other recognized science. The ratiocinatio of architecture, he explains, is the solution of the theoretic problem, which can then be translated into the habits of the hand and the use of implements. Therefore the architect is the planner and the artisan, Vitruvius then goes on to say that there are technological disciplines that the architect should have. He should know philosophy, he should know mathematics, he should know history, he should know literature. But this doesn’t mean that he has to know Euclid: he has to know how to add, subtract, draw lines, and be able to perform opera tions of this kind. In literary criticism you find exactly the same situation.
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G. BEAUJOUAN
It seems to me, therefore - and I would deny that M . Beaujouan is merely an artisan in history, he is the philosopher among us - what M. Beaujouan has given us is a way by means o f which we can, beginning with the eleventh and twelfth centuries, ask what it is that went into the Middle Ages as ratiocinatio, as modes of thinking. W e dodged the question “ Is this science?” by saying “ Let’s call it natural philosophy,” but that was a dodge. These are forms o f ratiocinatio. Out o f the twelfth and thirteenth cen turies there then developed a form in which all the theory moved up into science. This is the evolution we are talking about. W e should not answer the question “ Which is theory and which is practice?” by saying that you find the theory in Euclid and the practice in the knack o f chopping bricks or stones into particular forms. This I look upon as the great contribution made by M. Beaujouan’s paper.
CHARLES B. SC H M IT T
P H I L O S O P H Y A N D S C IE N C E IN S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U N I V E R S I T I E S : SOME P R E L I M I N A R Y C O M M E N T S *
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
In Spite o f the enormous amount o f research which has been devoted to an understanding o f the history o f universities, much further work is required before we can begin to comprehend fully the place o f these institutions in the Western cultural life o f the past seven or eight centuries. i N o t only is much basic work left to be done in the documents themselves o f even the most important and influential university centers, but we are sorely in need o f synthetic and comparative studies relating several uni versities to one another. Nevertheless, even on the basis o f the materials which have already been published, we are in a position to begin some sort o f synthesis.2 Though we know a great number o f individual facts from various universities concerning philosophy instruction in the six teenth century, for example, no one has yet attempted an overall evalua tion o f these materials with an eye towards an eventual synthesis.^ This certainly is not the only question to be faced by historians o f uni versities, but it is one to which little attention has previously been given, and, at the same time, one which is o f potential interest to scholars in a variety o f different fields. In the present paper I should like to deal with several aspects o f uni versity culture in the sixteenth century. Among the topics which I shall touch on are: (1) philosophy teaching in the universities; (2) changes wrought on the universities by humanism, the Reformation, and scientific change ; and (3) developments in the teaching o f medical and mathematical subjects. T o this I shall add a brief comparison between two representative universities, viz., Pisa and Oxford, in which more specific elements o f change (or lack o f it) can be isolated. Finally, I hope to be able to present a provisional sketch o f the regional variations between universities during the sixteenth century. In venturing into this vast area, I realize the partial nature o f the evidence I am utilizing, for as yet I have not been able to explore systematically even all o f the relevant published information on
J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (ed s.). The Cultural Context o f Medieval Learning, 4 8 5 - 5 3 7 . All Rights Reserved. •—
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this subject. Y et even the impressionistic picture which I paint might have
research into the documents has hardly begun. Only in a few cases have
the virtue o f encouraging others to think more deeply about this topic
matriculation lists and graduation lists been published for the early modern
and to investigate it in greater detail. In the meantime I hope to be able to
period. Though the medieval period up to about 1400 is well covered in
pursue further studies on this subject with the view o f extending and
some instances (e.g. Paris and Oxford), the later period has often been
amplifying the views which I put forth here. In brief, what follows is to be
hardly considered by modern historians using sound historical methods.
considered merely a preliminary attempt at a general synthesis.
While the Padua attended by Harvey and the Cambridge attended by Milton and later by Newton are reasonably well understood - though even here
II. M E T H O D O L O G I C A L PREMI SES
there are gaps - we know relatively little about the Pisa attended by Galileo or the Tübingen attended by Kepler. In a sense, a more general synthetic ap
Before continuing it might be well to raise some o f the methodological
proach is not possible until the extant primary sources are brought to light.
problems which we encounter when attempting to deal with university
This brings us to the third point. University history has, perhaps some
history o f the sort with which we are here concerned. A t present I shall limit myself to four o f the major points.
what more than most other branches o f intellectual history, been prey to
First, when we propose to study universities in general over a period o f
what might be termed “ extreme regionalism.” This approach has resulted
a century or two, we are faced with a vast number o f variations o f all sorts.
in the production o f many rather narrowly conceived histories o f a single
Geographically universities range from Aberdeen and Uppsala in the
university. These, however, should not be scorned, for they are often
what the Italians call campanilismo^ which is not precisely nationalism, but
north, to Catania and Évora in the south, and to Cracow and Budapest
excellent ranging from Fabroni’s eighteenth-century one for Pisa to the
in the east. Some such as Bologna, Padua, Salamanca, and Paris were
recent one o f Jena. Some are even truly distinguished, e.g. Annerstedt’s
large and famous international centers, while others were miniscule by
work on Uppsala. On the other hand such works tend to take a narrow
comparison and served only local needs. After the Reformation we find
view and there is little or no use o f a comparative approach, at least once
universities aligning themselves with one or another religious group and
we get past the medieval centuries. The task before us now is to attempt
new universities being in one or another camp from the outset. Scottish
a comparative study o f early modern university history without losing
universities which were originally Cathohc, became strongly Calvinist; in Germany, Freiburg and Cologne remained Catholic, while Tübingen and
sight o f individual and local characteristics. Finally, we must go beyond the apparent sources for the study o f uni
Wittemberg became Protestant; Leiden was founded as a Calvinist
versity history and begin to dig deeper. For example, it is becoming in
university, Jena as a Lutheran one, and Würzburg as a Catholic one.
creasingly apparent that statutory requirements for teaching tell only a
Some universities were very much influenced by new intellectual currents
part o f the story. When upon occasion one attempts to uncover what was
(e.g. humanism), while others continued on along traditional lines. As
actually taught in the classroom, it often turns out that the statutes were
mathematical sciences developed some felt this influence quite deeply, while
only followed in the loosest o f senses. T o demonstrate this gulf between
others seemingly ignored such novelties. Consequently, though there are
statutory theory and classroom practice in even one case for a single uni
some rather general patterns o f university organization and teaching during
versity, however, requires much painstaking research and many such in
the Renaissance, there are perhaps more variations than is generally real
stances must be carefully investigated before we can come to have a
ized. In short, there are many individual facts to betaken account o f before
reliable general picture o f the overall situation.
we can hope for a synthetic overview which is anything but superficial. Secondly, nearly all o f the scores o f universities (there were about 100
i n. MEDIEVAL B A C K G R O U N D
by 1650) have left behind their own documents. While some universities have been well served by historians, there are others in which the basic
It was in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the oldest and most
488
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C. SCH M ITT
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U NIV ER SITIES
influential universities were talcing shape,"^ that philosophy worked its
is part o f a larger question, viz., the fortuna o f university philosophy and
way into a central position o f the curriculum. As the corpus Aristotelicum was gradually recovered by the West during the thirteenth century, ® it
science from roughly the time o f the Black Death until the revolution wrought by Galileo and Descartes.^^ This is the period during which,
became increasingly realized that here was a ready made structure around
according to commonly received opinion, the Aristotelian philosophy,
which to build an educational system to prepare trained individuals for a
though still entrenched in the universities, had outlived its usefulness and
place in society, especially as physicians and theologians. The impact o f
served largely to hold back the progress o f mankind, which had been
Aristotelian philosophy on the law faculties o f universities was not so
freed from the shackles o f darkness by the Renaissance, Reformation,
dramatic perhaps, though further work is needed to reveal its precise role.
and Scientific Revolution.i^ It must be stressed that there was a very marked continuity in university
It was in the arts faculties, however, that the new learning gradually be came entrenched, supplanting the rhetorical tradition o f the twelfth century. By the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century,® the basic
philosophy and science teaching during the period just mentioned, ca.
structure o f philosophy instruction was fixed and it was to remain a
and changes, though the latter become apparent to us only after an in
foundation stone o f education in arts, science, medicine, and theology
tensive scrutiny. One often reads about the breakdown o f scholastic-
until the end o f the seventeenth century and even later in certain localities.
AristoteUanism because o f Humanism, Copernicanism, Ramism, etc.,
It was not so much that Aristotehanism was selected from several aspirant
but traditional philosophy and science were alive, well, and flourishing
1350-1650. On the other hand, there were also remarkable developments
philosophical and scientific systems as it was that it alone presented itself
throughout the sixteenth century.^^ In retrospect, we might be able to see
to the men o f the Middle Ages as a comprehensive system o f natural truth
some o f the roots o f their destruction in fifteenth- and sixteenth- century
upon which to erect a variety o f different structures. For them, as for the
developments, but it was apparent to only a very few at the time. The
men o f the next several centuries, it represented philosophy (i.e. scientia) pure and simple.
criticisms o f Petrarca, Valla, More, Erasmus, Gianfrancesco Pico, Coper
As university arts faculties developed in the Middle Ages, it seems as
the most part one-sided and lacked balance. I f these men were able to
though they took on a different coloration in different universities. Those
show a few Aristotelian doctrines to be in error, they could in no way
institutions with strong theological orientations - e.g. Paris and Oxford -
produce a comprehensive alternative system to replace the established
developed arts faculties with certain emphases, ^ while those more directed
one. This is, I think, one o f the keys to understanding why Aristotehanism
nicus, Ramus, Telesio, and Bruno all had legitimate content, but were for
toward the study o f medicine developed in another direction.® This seems
maintained its hold for so long. Despite flaws - which were evident to many
to explain, in part at least, why Montpellier, Bologna, or Padua came to
from antiquity onwards - it still covered such a wide range that no other
have different biases than did Paris or Oxford. On the other hand, other
system could challenge its cultural hegemony. What did happen, however,
factors were operative, and the famous school o f natural philosophy and
was that a syncretic approach was developed by a number o f philosophers
mathematics centered at Merton College, Oxford,® certainly rivaled the medical universities in its pursuit o f scientific studies. But, both that
o f the Renaissance, and we find non-Aristotelian doctrine being absorbed increasingly into commentaries and textbooks. The precise way in which
school and the contemporary one that developed at Paris under Buridan
this happened was quite complicated and varied from one instance to
and Oresme were short lived,i® expiring before the end o f the fourteenth
another. It requires a much fuller treatment than can be given here.
century, though having a continuity in Italy, Germany, and Eastern Europe for some time.^i
IV. A R I S T O T E L I A N I S M I N THE S I X T E E N T H C E N T U R Y
These two traditions - the theological and medico-scientific ones - con tinued on into the sixteenth-century universities. Though we are here concentrating on that century, it becomes increasingly apparent that ours
The task o f attempting to understand the philosophy and science taught in the universities during the above mentioned three-century period is a
490
C. SCH M ITT
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U NIVE RSITIES
daunting one. It is fraught with difficulties on all sides. Here we shall focus
new texts, which the humanists were able to uncover in their systematic
upon the sixteenth century and try to illustrate briefly what seem like the
search for ancient literary remains, were introduced and exerted signif
major strands o f the development o f Aristotelianism within the univer sities.
icant influence, while filling in some o f the gaps in the system. Tw o such
University philosophy in this century must be viewed in relation to
unknown in the Middle Ages, but which came to be the focus o f enormous
various external factors which affected it. In addition to social, political,
interest in the sixteenth century. Moreover, the greatly expanded knowl
and economic forces - which, among other things, brought about chang
edge o f the ancient world and o f the ancient languages, which the
ing functions for the universities and modifications o f various sorts in
humanists were gradually able to obtain, made possible vastly superior
university populations and the social backgrounds o f incoming students^®
editions o f the Greek texts and better Latin renderings.^’ These pro
- we must bear in mind the various new intellectual traditions which
gressively replaced the medieval translations in the university teaching
examples are the Poetica^^ and Mechanica,
491
works which were all but
emerged. In my opinion, there are three o f these which should particularly
o f Aristotle.28 What is more, despite much variation from university to
be considered: the new scientific and philosophical developments, hu
university, there seems to have been a general tendency to concentrate
manism, and the Reformation. Let us look at each o f these in turn more carefully.
increasingly on a study o f the Greek text o f Aristotle as the sixteenth
Though important, one should not be tempted to overvalue the signif
first time an attempt on the part o f philosophers to begin teaching from
icance o f new philosophical and scientific ideas. During the sixteenth
the Greek text. 2» By the early seventeenth century specially prepared
century we find not only the re-introduction o f previously lost ancient
Greek editions o f various Aristotelian writings, accompanied by detailed
materials such as Plato,i® Stoic texts,^’ and a t o m i s m , b u t also are
conmientaries based on the Greek text, were in wide circulation. Par
published the writings o f men hke Copernicus, Vesalius, Telesio, Patrizi,
ticularly important were those prepared by the Jesuit Fathers at Coimbra^o
century wore on. About the turn o f the sixteenth century, we see for the
and Bruno. On the whole, however, the influence o f this material was but
and those o f the Italian ex-patriate, Giulio Pace.^i These editions were
relatively little felt in university education, though perhaps on specific
meant to be used by those who read Greek and who were prepared to
points o f detail some o f this material was assimilated into the philosophy
study Aristotle in the original language. Even the handbooks and com
teaching to a greater extent than is normally realized.^® O f this we shall
mentaries o f the later sixteenth century, while not usually including the
say more below. In my view the influence o f these newly introduced ideas
Greek text, do explicate key Greek terms found in Aristotle and assume at
had to be confined to relatively small issues since, all things considered,
least some knowledge o f Greek on the part o f the reader. In short, spurred
Aristotelianism still represented a more comprehensive and internally
by the humanist emphasis on the study o f original texts rather than trans
coherent system than any that was available to replace it. 20
lations, the university reading o f Aristotle took on a new cast in the course
The impact o f humanism was much more significant.^! First o f all, the
o f the sixteenth
c e n tu r y .® ^
newly developed techniques o f the humanists allowed the weeding out o f
O f equal or perhaps even greater importance was the coming o f the
spuria from the corpus Aristotelicum. Medieval mainstays gradually disap
Reformation. Though not exerting quite the same sort o f influence as did
peared from the editions. T o take but one example the pseudo-Aristote
humanism, the emergence o f various religious factions in the course o f
lian work which passed under the title o f Secreta secretorum was widely
the century left a very definite and recognizable mark on the intellectual
read and used in the Middle Ages - more than 50 manuscripts o f it are still extant22 - and there were at least seventeen printed editions o f it in
Ufe o f the universities. Even though Luther was himself quite anti-Aristo telian,33 his educational reformer Philip Melanchthon saw matters quite
Latin or vernacular between 1501 and 1540, but only three printings dur
differently. 34 The net result was that, regardless o f religious persuasion,
ing the last sixty years o f the century. ^3 Confidence was gradually lost in
universities emerged from the years o f turmoil ensuing upon the events o f
those works that could no longer be claimed as legitimate. ^4 Secondly,
1517 to remain staunchly Aristotelian regardless o f confessional af
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C. SCH M IT T
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U N IVER SITIES
493
filiation. This is true o f Calvinist universities such as Edinburgh or Leiden,
Bearing in mind this general picture o f a scholastic curriculum in
o f Lutheran universities such as Tübingen or Jena, as well as Catholic
Aristotelian philosophy continuing throughout the sixteenth century,
universities such as Padua, Salamanca, Coimbra, or Cologne. The way in
even though impinged upon and partially transformed by various new
which Aristotle was taught varied somewhat from place to place, though
intellectual tendencies, let us now look at the actual philosophy teaching
regional differences were often greater than those imposed by religious
in a bit more detail. As already mentioned, it largely retained the form
affiliation. A t the end o f the sixteenth century and more markedly in the
that it had assumed in the fourteenth century. The grounding in logic was
seventeenth century we see the development o f two different sets o f man
deeply rooted in a range o f Aristotelian texts, though there is variation.
uals and textbooks, one for use in Catholic universities and the second
The Pisa statutes o f 15434« specify only Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristot
for use in Protestant ones.^s On the other hand, there continued to be more
le’s Posterior Analytics, while those o f Coimbra o f 155941 ]ist the entire
intellectual interchange between the two camps than is normally realized.
Organon in addition to the Dialectica o f Georgius Trapezuntius from the
N ot only was Spanish scholasticism, particularly Suarez, most influential
fifteenth century, and a Tübingen study plan for 1524^2 lists besides
in Germany,®* both in Catholic and Protestant quarters, but equally in
Aristotle also the thirteenth-century text book o f Peter o f Spain. Paul o f
fluential was the important commentary tradition that developed in
Venice’s Summulae logicae was officially named as a text at Padua in
Italy in the sixteenth century.®'^ Or, to give another example, though the
1496 and remained in use for some years.43 Natural philosophy in all o f
seventeenth-century textbook tradition that dominated philosophy teach
the universities seems to have been solidly based upon Aristotle and no
ing in England (e.g. Burgersdijk, Keckermann, and Magirus) was the
extraneous texts introduced. In several institutions the newly discovered
Northern European Protestant one, a surprising interest was also shown
Mechanica served as a teaching text,44 until its spurious nature was dis
in the writings o f Italian and Spanish Catholic commentators^^ during
covered in the early seventeenth century, and its influence gradually
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The major point to keep in mind with regard to the influence o f the
waned. It was lectured on at Padua a number o f times between 1548 and 1600.45 A t Uppsala, as the 1626 statutes tell us, it was read along with the
Reformation on university philosophy is that, despite the enormous
commentaries o f Guido Ubaldo and Henri de Monantheuil.46 An interest
changes which were wrought, in the final analysis the end product in all
ing feature o f the teaching o f moral philosophy is that in Italy it was often
universities, regardless o f religious afiiliation, was fundamentally Aristo
not taught by philosophers, but came under the responsibilities o f the
telian. As much as Luther or others wanted to get away from the rather
humanists or teachers o f Latin and Greek.4^ Though the Pisan statutes,
rigid intellectual structure which had grown up during the “ Babylonian
for example, do not mention specifically any Aristotelian works o f moral
Captivity o f the Church,” when all was said and done the die had been
philosophy, we know that the Rhetoric, Ethics, axid Politics were all taught
cast centuries earlier and the appeal o f Aristotelian Scholasticism re
from time to time by the “ Lettore d’Humanita” during the second half o f
mained too strong to be thrown aside easily. Though sceptical and other
the sixteenth century.48 In the field o f metaphysics, the work o f Aristotle
notions may have invaded the theological debates o f the sixteenth century from time to time, the basic framework remained the Aristotelian one
by that name seems to have been universally used. This, then, in brief, is the sort o f thing which the statutes tell us. It
which had been forged in the medieval universities. In fact, the net result
would be worthwhile to go through the extant statutes for the period and
o f the coming o f the religious split was a more firmly entrenched Aristote
determine precisely which works were officially required from university
lian scholasticism than we can find in the first third o f the sixteenth cen
to university. In fact this would seem to be a starting point for a full in
tury. The precise way in which Protestant and Catholic scholasticism
vestigation o f the question. Once we have determined what the phi
differed from one another has yet to be documented, though one’s initial
losophy requirements were de jure we can more confidently examine other
impression is that there were definite variations and characteristic em-
materials to learn what they were de facto, in so far as this is possible on
phases.39
the basis o f extant sources. From our prehminary study o f selected
494
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U N IV E RSIT IE S
C. S CHM ITT
statutes it appears that we can expect little change before the end o f the
6556
495
see that moral philosophy lecturers are offered the possibiUty o f
sixteenth century. The seventeenth century, however, will probably
teaching Plato’s Republic as an alternative to Aristotle’s Politics or Ethics.
present us with a somewhat different picture, though one cannot be too
Whether such an option was ever actually taken advantage o f I have thus
certain o f this. The reformed Laudian statutes o f 1636 for Oxford, early
far not been able to determine.^? W e do know that during the last quarter
seventeenth-century teaching practice in Italy, and the situation in the
o f the sixteenth century, the teaching o f specifically Platonic philosophy
Dutch universities seem to indicate that changes were slow in coming.^»
courses was introduced into the universities o f Pisa, Ferrara, and Romeos
What we do see even from this partial picture is that there was a strong
and that several platonically oriented individuals were teaching at Paris.^»
emphasis on logic and natural philosophy as the foundation stones o f
Differently oriented was the Paduan mathematician Francesco Barozzi
philosophical education. Only rarely did metaphysics have the place which
who introduced a consideration o f the mathematical sections o f the
it later attained in this area.^» The Metaphysica was printed and comment
Republic into his lectures in addition to utilizing Proclus’ s commentary on
ed on much less frequently than works such as the Meteorology, Posterior While the works o f moral philoso
Euclid.®® T o go beyond the information contained in the statutes and in various
phy were widely read - perhaps the Nicomachean Ethics was as influential
archival records is, however, most necessary, i f we are to have a more
Analytics, or De anima, for example,
as any o f Aristotle’s works during the sixteenth century®^ - in Italy at least
accurate picture o f the situation. T o do this for even one university in
it did not occupy a very central place in the philosophy curriculum. Works
volves great difficulties, let alone attempting to get a general picture based
o f moral philosophy were, however, quite important in both the Jesuit
on a number o f representative institutions. For this, i f for no other reason,
and the Lutheran curricula which were oriented towards an educational
an understanding and comprehensive synthesis lies far in the future.
ideal somewhat different from that obtaining in the older Itahan universi ties. The seventeenth-century philosophical handbooks indicate that, i f
V. T W O
examples
: PISA A N D OXFORD
anything, Aristotelian moral philosophy came to have a more important place in the overall cursus than it had had in previous centuries.
Let us now look at the situation in a little more detail in two specific uni
In addition to a domination o f the curriculum by Aristotelian texts,
versities, which were medieval foundations, but continued to flourish
there were occasionally a few other materials added. As we have seen this
during the sixteenth century. The two which I have chosen are Pisa and
occurred especially in logic where the medieval work o f Peter o f Spain or
Oxford. O f the first I can claim to have a little specialized knowledge and
the fifteenth-century texts o f Paul o f Venice or Georgius Trapezuntius
the second presents an instructive example from another part o f Europe. Our findings here will only be indicative o f certain general tendencies, for
sometimes supplemented, i f they did not replace, the Organon. The place o f Plato requires particular comment. Although at least as
one thing which is learned from the study o f university history during this
early as Ficino an attempt was made to give Plato a more central role in
period is how much variation there was and how difficult it is to generalize
philosophical and theological education, this met with little success. Ficino’s own Theologia Platonica, modeled in some ways on Thomas’s
from only a few instances. Let us first look at Pisa. Pisa was a university o f moderate importance, though it was the major
Summa contra g e n t i l e s , never was accepted in university circles as a
university o f the Medici and did produce Galileo. For our purposes we
teaching text, though it was widely read and influential in other spheres.
can speak o f the university for the period after 1543, when it was re-opened
Egidio da Viterbo’s commentary on the Sentences, ad mentem Platonis,
with new statutes and a new impetus towards excellence after having been
was never printed or even finished and was apparently but a minor success.55 In the second half o f the sixteenth century, however, we see the
closed frequently by war and political disputes during the previous half
beginnings o f a moderate attempt to insert some Platonic teaching into a
tions until the eighteenth century.®^ The university had about 40 to 50
few philosophy curricula. In Oxford documents o f both 1549 and o f 1564/
staff* members and 300 to 400 students during this period with a certain
century.®^ The new statutes o f 1543 remained in effect with few modifica
496
C. SCHM IT T
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497
amount o f expansion towards the end o f the century. Two-thirds to three-
In short, Pisa represents a stronghold o f conservative Aristotelianism
quarters o f the students were in the law faculty; most o f the others studied
little affected by outside influences and still very much in the medieval
arts with a mere handful in theology. Philosophy was, o f course, em
mold.’ ^ Little new came from the philosophy faculty, but more interesting
phasized in the arts faculty and the curriculum was completely Aristote
developments came from elsewhere. In fact, i f Pisa showed little innova
lian and traditional, at least until 1576 when the first (optional) Platonic
tive spirit in the standard philosophy curriculum, in other ways it was
course was introduced, and, indeed, this met with a good deal o f opposi
quite progressive. Botany, anatomy, humanities, and mathematics all
tion. On the whole, humanism and new movements in philosophy had very
show elements o f advanced attitudes and, occasionally, as in the case o f
little impact on philosophy teaching at Pisa and even at the end o f the century there were men lecturing on philosophy who showed no evidence
having the first established university botanical garden, Pisa gained a Europeanwide r e p u t a t i o n . Moreover, the year by year list o f books
o f ever having looked at the Greek text o f Aristotle. Their writings are
taught by the lecturer in humanities indicates that in that subject a very
largely on rather traditional lines, though we do find some surprises. One
wide range o f Greek and Latin literature was
c o v e r e d .’ 3
interesting feature, for which I have found no explanation - though
Andrea Cesalpino was a botanist and medical man, but wrote more
Oxford here offers a similar and even more extreme example - is that
penetratingly on Peripatetic natural philosophy and with greater subse
there is no ready nearby source o f textbooks for the students.®^ Moreover,
quent influence, both in Italy and abroad, than did any o f his colleagues
whereas professors in Padua and Bologna tended to publish their com mentaries on Aristotle, those at Pisa left theirs mostly in manuscript.
who were professionally tied to teaching philosophy per seJ^ Galileo
Both by reading the works o f the professors and by looking into student
philosophy, though significantly enough many o f the problems to which
correspondence we see the quite conservative nature o f the teaching
he addressed himself were those o f the natural philosopher. Both o f these
there, which contrasts markedly with certain more progressive tendencies
instances indicate that despite the fact that Aristotelianism was primarily
to be found at Padua.®^ On the other hand, Galileo’s unpublished Logical
the province o f the professional philosopher it also spread over into
Questions^ which apparently took form during the early 1580’s, when he
other disciplines. F or Cesalpino it provided a structure within which to
was a student, show a full acquaintance with the logical developments in
discuss theoretical problems o f natural philosophy o f interest to the
came from mathematics with a strong aversion to Aristotelian natural
other universities o f Northern Italy.®® W e know very little about the way
physician. For Galileo it provided a framework within which to discuss a
logic was taught at Pisa, largely because we have few books and manu
central problem on which his later fame was based, i.e. motion. Galileo
scripts by those who taught it. W e do know that logic teaching was a low
rejected many aspects o f the Aristotelian analysis, but his ability eventual
paid position and that one normally taught it for a few years before being
ly to set forth answers to that problem stemmed in large measure from
named to a chair o f natural philosophy or medicine. This was apparently the case in most Italian universities and even one such as Zabarella, whose
his training in natural philosophy, as well as in mathematics. Oxford presents a different and, in some ways, a more confusing pic
logical works became famous, spent only a few years teaching the subject
ture, as well as one which is more nebulous owing to a much leaner array
before moving on to natural philosophy. ®^ We also have evidence, in the form o f a manuscript, that an introductory and somewhat condensed and
o f extant documentary evidence. W ith regard to Oxford and particularly with regard to the teaching o f
elementary logic course was put on for those in the law faculty.®» A t Pisa
philosophy, we are on much firmer ground for the end o f the sixteenth
there is no evidence whatever, to the best o f my knowledge, o f any in
century than for the beginning.’ ®The growing importance o f the colleges
fluence or even concern with Ramus during this period. Indeed, except
as teaching institutions has made it much more difficult to pin down
for Viotti,®® little note seems to have been taken o f Ramus in Italy and the
precise details o f teaching practice and, indeed, to determine who was
situation contrasts with most all o f the countries o f northern Europe where
actually teaching at any given time.’ ® For Oxford we seem to lack the rotuli which form the starting point for the study o f most other univer-
the impact o f the Ramist reform was most evident for more than a century.’ ®
498
C. SCH M IT T
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499
sities. On the other hand, the fact that the medieval tradition o f frequent
and about 20 in Poland and a similar number in the Low Countries. The
disputations by both students and masters continued to play an important
Iberian peninsula produced relatively few editions o f Aristotle in this list,
role in the educational practice o f English universities gives us other in sights into the situation.'^’ One v^^onders whether the actual approach to
but a great abundance o f conmientaries, o f which we have practically none from Britain. Thus, in the sixteenth century, the British Isles are
the study o f philosophy was different elsewhere or whether the surface
very much on the outer margin o f the European philosophical culture in
differences merely hide fundamental similarities. A number o f the ques
which they played a central role in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
tions disputed'^® and perhaps some o f the disputations themselves are still
and will again assume an important position in the seventeenth century.
preserved’ ® and give a valuable insight into the intellectual life in the
Though there were not many books printed in Britain, nor were there many
university in the sixteenth century. Before turning to a fuller analysis o f these, however, I should like to briefly discuss other matters.
philosophers o f note in the sixteenth century the teaching o f the subject
By and large Kearney’s overview®» o f the Oxford situation in the six
went on, though largely derivative from Continental sources. Am ong the philosophers in Oxford who did produce books which had
teenth century seems accurate enough, though his analysis is not based on
a certain importance and influence were Griffith Powel o f Jesus College
the fullest possible exploitation o f the evidence and seldom penetrates as
and John Case o f St. John’ s, among others. Powel’s commentaries on
deeply as one might have wished. On the whole, however, his charac
the Posterior Analytics and Sophistical Refutations o f 1594 and 1598®^ are
terization o f Oxford as being in the first generation o f the sixteenth cen
much more advanced than the low level introductory manuals o f John
tury scholastic, in the second humanist, and in the third Ramist, with a
Seton®4
return to scholasticism at the end o f the century, seems plausible, i f per
the Continent in these matters, his books do draw very heavily upon
and Edward Brerewood.®® Though perhaps some years behind
haps not detailed enough. One o f the problems which must be faced is
Italian and other sources for the explication o f Aristotle’s ideas. In the
that we have different sorts o f evidence for different periods. The titles o f
Preface o f his two works he states clearly that N ifo and Pace would be
disputations, the published Aristotelian treatises, and a few manuscripts
followed in the Sophistical Refutations^^ and Pace, Zabarella, and Crellius
and notebooks o f Aristotelian orientation are almost all from the last
were primary sources for the Posterior Analytics.^'^ What is more, there is
quarter o f the century. It may well be that the middle o f the century was
frequent recourse to the Greek text and, even more interestingly, mathe
equally Aristotelian, but that we have less extant evidence with which to
matical examples are often discussed. Though I have not specifically made
substantiate this fact. I fear that a definitive answer to philosophy teach
a comparison on this matter, it strikes me that mathematics was more
ing at Oxford during the first three quarters o f the sixteenth century must
central to his conception o f logic than it had been for the Italians. Zabarel
await a scholar who can devote several years to a careful consideration o f
la, nevertheless, was his main recent authority and the Paduan’s influence
all o f the extant evidence. Consequently, the bulk o f my remarks must be directed towards the last quarter o f the century.
is everywhere evident. In short, Powel’s volumes are respectable and upto-date compendia o f Aristotelian logic and should be related to the
For the first time we see the beginnings o f the printing o f Aristotelian
European-wide context rather than remaining the province o f a few
philosophical works in Britian. I f one looks at the history o f book printing, he is met with a fact which is unassailable. Very little Aristotle - indeed
scholars who work on British intellectual history in a most insular way. The same strong Italian orientation is to be found in the work on
few classical editions o f any sort - was printed in Britain before the seven
demonstration by John Flavel®® o f Wadham College published in 1619.
teenth and eighteenth century. The evidence o f the Index Aureliensis
N o t only is a specifically “ Paduan” topic such as B e regressu discussed
shows that nine Aristotle editions appeared in London, one only at Oxford,
in detail,®® but once again Zabarella is the major source o f ideas and the
and one at Edinburgh in the sixteenth century with no other British im prints appearing.®^ This contrasts with over 450 sixteenth-century
writings o f Petrella, Tomitano, Balduino, Tommaso de Vio, and Giulio Pace are utilized, as well as Soto, Crellius, and others. N o r is such an
editions in France, over 200 in German-speaking lands, over 150 in Italy
orientation confined to logical writings. Crakanthorpe’ s Metaphysical
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1
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U N IV E RSIT IE S
501
o f the same date draws upon various Catholics including Zabarella,
Oxford at the time is not wholly clear, but we know that when the Savilian
Fonseca, Bellarmino, and Sixtus o f Siena; as well as the Protestants
professorships o f geometry and astronomy were established by statute in
Timpler, Keckermann, Zanchius, and Luther; besides the occultists Giorgi and Postel.
side o f their profession.®® This would seem to indicate that there were
John Case®i is obviously a major figure in the development o f the late
occultists about and, indeed, we need look no further than John Dee to
1619 it was expressly forbidden for the incumbents to cultivate the occult
sixteenth-century wave o f scholasticism. He wrote several very bulky
discover that this is true.®"^ The quaestiones, however, are constantly con
works on various branches o f Aristotelian philosophy. As a dominant
cerned with such themes, as a few examples will show.®® In 1581 there
force at Oxford at the end o f the sixteenth century he certainly deserves
was set a question o f judicial astrology, three years later there was one
careful monographic treatment. Rather than discussing his work at
dealing with the problem o f sympathy and antipathy, which was repeated
length, in the present paper, however, I should like to say something
in 1603, in 1586 the basic alchemical question o f whether gold can be
about the quaestiones from the last quarter o f the century, published by Andrew Clark nearly a century ago but still largely unstudied.
produced from base metals found its way into the disputations, in 1590
These quaestiones were the ones set twice each year for the incepturi for the M .A . in arts. These disputations were the culmination o f the whole
tion for debate was “ A n chymicus sit philosophus.” The contemporary revival o f atomism is also well represented. The 1581
educational process, which in addition to requiring the student to hear a
questions contain one on whether a plurality o f worlds is possible, and a
prescribed number o f lectures also involved a long series o f disputations
similar one is repeated in 1588. The next year “ A n visus sit extramittendo”
in parvisis, which seem to have served as preparation for the more ad
was posed and may reflect Democritus’s peculiar theory o f vision.
“ A n divinatio astrologica sit probanda” was posed, and in 1593 a ques
vanced disputations for the M.A.®^ W e know little about the preliminary
W e also find a strikingly large number o f epistemological questions
stages, but the topics discussed must have been elementary ones such as
which seem to reflect a sceptical threat. Perhaps this is connected with an
the questions raised in the introductory logic textbooks o f Seton and
interest in Sextus Empiricus and scepticism at Oxford in the late sixteenth
Brerewood. T o some extent even this might be reconstructed through proper attention to manuscript sources.
tained in MS Sandcroft 17.®® Though I am particularly sensitive to this
century as evidenced by a Latin translation o f John Wolley now con
The more advanced disputations disclose some rather interesting as
issue, the interest in the basic sceptical problems seems unmistakable. In
pects. In addition to the lists o f Clark, several manuscripts seem to have
1586 we find the question “ An omnia constent opinione,” which is again
either a record o f some o f the actual disputes or practice sessions meant
repeated in the same form in 1604. “ An contradicere sit summa scientia”
to prepare one for the ordeal. A careful study o f these - as well as the
is asked in 1593 and two years later “ An sit certa rerum scientia.” Cer
report o f the disputations held during the visit o f Queen Elizabeth in 1566
tainly these are answered in an antisceptical fashion whenever the expected
and again in 1592®^ - can give us an insight not only into how they were
answer is indicated, but such topics still seem to indicate a pressing con
carried out, but some idea o f nature o f philosophical discussion at Oxford.
cern with the sceptical question. This once again intimates that we still are
Though the quaestiones themselves are largely from Aristotle and the peripatetic tradition, they betray certain constantly recurring themes,
in need o f a solid scholarly study on scepticism in Tudor and Stuart
which should be investigated further. For example, quite unexpectedly the theme o f women comes in quite frequently, perhaps because England
philo-vernacularism o f the literary historian.^®® Much more is to be learned from a careful study o f all o f the material
was then ruled by a Queen, but perhaps for other reasons as well. Topics
relating to these disputations, but I hope that even my brief survey in
such as “ A n foeminae sint literis instruendae” recur time and again.®^
dicates what we might find there. What it seems safe to say, even at this
W e also find an unexpected concern with various problems o f occultism. T o what extent this side o f Renaissance thought was firmly entrenched in
cussed in philosophy at Oxford in the sixteenth century. While the an
England and one based on sound scholarly methodology rather than the
very beginning stage o f inquiry, is that a wide range o f topics was dis
502
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swers given to the questions posed were probably by and large Aristotelian, we find other positions being given serious consideration.
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U NIV ER SITIES
was much different from that gained by Linacre a century
503
p r e v io u s ly .
Though the study o f botany had been closely tied to medicine from
As I have indicated much work is still required before we can begin to
antiquity, it was only in the course o f the sixteenth century that specific
understand in any systematic and penetrating way what philosophical
chairs in the subject were established in medical faculties throughout
life was like in sixteenth-century Oxford. The medieval carry-over o f the
Europe. After botany had been separated off from practical medicine for
disputation technique seems to have functioned as pedagogic tool in the sixteenth century, when it had been eliminated by most other universities.
the first time with the establishment o f a chair o f botany at Rome in 1513,^®3 many other universities followed suit in the sixteenth century, in
One feels that in practice it was perhaps not too different from the “ Aca
cluding Padua (1533), Bologna (1534), Ferrara (1543), Pisa (1544), and
demic” change advocated by Ramus and Talon at Paris in mid-century, loi
Montpellier (1598). The teaching o f the subject was soon followed by the
From this emphasis on encouraging the student to express himself and to
foundation o f botanical gardens, the first being those o f Pisa and Padua,
engage in philosophical debate grew the tutorial system which later became the envy o f universities throughout the world.
both dating from about 1544.1®^ The second half o f the century saw such gardens springing up frequently in connection with the establishment o f university chairs. The university interest in materia medica was, o f course,
VI. M E D I C A L A N D S C I E N T I F I C C H A N G E S W^ITHIN THE U N I V E R S I T I E S OF T HE S I X T E E N T H C E N T U R Y
accompanied by a growing fascination with simples and an extensive worldwide exchange o f both botanical information and botanical speci mens, which led to a vastly increased knowledge o f the richness o f the
In a previous section the impact o f new philosophical and scientific ideas
plant world.i®^ The institutional establishment o f botany also brought
on the development o f the sixteenth-century universities was minimized.
with it much more, however. Beginning with Luca Ghini’s teaching at
Our statement there, however, is in need o f qualification. While it would
Bologna in 1534 and later at Pisa, a broad approach to the study o f the
be a mistake to over-emphasize the significance o f new ideas in the overall
natural world developed among university botanists.^o® In addition to
educational context, we must not go to the other extreme and accept the
theoretical instruction in the subject, students were familiarized with the
widely received opinion that universities o f the Renaissance were static
plants themselves and with the range o f their uses.^®’ Benedetto Varchi,
and resistant to change. W e have already given some indications how
who was one o f Ghini’s students at Bologna, later recalled that the prac
novel materials and subjects such as Platonic philosophy, were sometimes
tical aspect o f his master’ s teaching extended to several fields o f natural
introduced into university curricula. It remains, however, to indicate other
history other than botany.i®^ in fact, university lecturers on botany quite
instances where the teaching o f medical and scientific subjects was af
soon began lecturing upon minerals,i®^ and perhaps also poisons.ii® By
fected in an important way. For the present, I shall principally concentrate
the second half o f the sixteenth century the teacher o f botany could cover
on two areas o f study where innovations o f lasting influence became ac cepted into university teaching.
range in his own researches. This is perhaps best exemplified by Ulisse
The first lies in the field o f medical studies where the sixteenth century
Aldrovandi, whose significance in this respect does not yet seem wholly
saw the development o f several important changes in the way in which
appreciated, m In brief, the introduction o f botany into the medical
students were trained. Three innovations which come immediately to
curriculum had far reaching implications for the development o f a medical
a wide range o f natural history subjects in his lectures and even a wider
mind are the introduction o f botanical studies, clinical medicine, and
and scientific education more broadly based than previously, and this
public anatomical demonstrations. Each o f these played a significant role example, was far better at the end o f the sixteenth century than it had been
novel element was a contribution o f the sixteenth century. Another important addition was the introduction o f a clinical element into university medical education.^i^ Undoubtedly the roots o f this go
at the beginning. In short, the education received by Harvey about 1600
far back into the Middle Ages and practical medicine had always been a
in insuring that the medical training which a student received at Padua for
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part o f the education, sometimes, as at Montpellier, being the dominant
o f sixteenth century mathematics, little attempt has been made to under
part. W e also know that the Padua statutes o f 1496 spell out the require
stand the teaching and research in the subject which went on within the
ment that the medical student spend at least a year working alongside “ a
universities. From the middle o f the century onward we find two different
famous physician.” ii3 The precise meaning o f the stipulation is some
patterns o f mathematical teaching developing at Pisa and at Padua.
what vague, but by the middle o f the sixteenth century, we can recognize
It must be kept in mind that mathematics, as the subject was under
the beginnings o f the institutionalization o f clinical practice in the training
stood in the sixteenth century, comprised various other disciplines in
o f the physician. The individual usually credited with originating the
cluding astronomy, astrology, optics, geography, mechanics, etc. Uni
practice o f taking students with him to the bedsides o f the ill is Giam
versity teaching reflects this. Euclid, Sacrobosco, and Ptolemy were the
battista da Monte. The practice was apparently already established at
mainstays o f the mathematics curriculum, but other works, including
Padua somewhat earlier, for Vesalius tells us o f this requirement as early
those o f Georg Purbach and Oronce Fine, were also taught in some locali
as 1537. In any case, before mid-century, students were used to visiting
ties. As mentioned above we can see two different orientations at Pisa
the ill o f the hospital o f S. Francesco with their professor and learning at
and at Padua. It so happens that Galileo taught at both places, therefore,
first hand the practical aspects o f treating such patients. Thus, besides the
to some extent, being heir o f both traditions. Let us first look at Pisa.ii^
renewal o f medical studies through reading o f Galenic texts that were not
The statutes o f that studio specifically state that Euclid, Sacrobosco,
known to the Middle Ages, there was a parallel evolution o f the practical side o f the training o f students.
and Ptolemy were the texts to be taught by the lecturer o f mathematics in
A third important contribution on the part o f university medical
what was actually taught, that this pattern was in the main followed,
faculties was the development o f immensely improved anatomical teaching.
though with certain modifications. For example, works o f Purbach and
a three year cycle. W e find, through reference to the archival records o f
The revolution o f Vesalius is well known, but in actuality his work is
Finé were also taught upon occasion and the annual sequence o f text
merely the high point o f the remarkable changes in the subject which span
prescribed by the statutes was not followed ad litteram. The statutory re
from the end o f the fifteenth century to the end o f the sixteenth. Though
quirement for Ptolemy is left quite vague, saying merely quaedam Ptolmaei.
the origins o f pubUc anatomical demonstrations are masked in obscurity,
A study o f the extant manuscript materials shows that this allowed the
it is evident that temporary anatomical theaters were already in use at Padua in the 1490s when Alessandro Benedetti was teaching the s u b j e c t ,
partitium, a rather brief work o f Ptolemy dedicated to judicial astrology
The role o f dissection became increasingly important during the sixteenth
and having strongly occult overtones, was a favorite teaching text. More
lecturers quite a latitude in the selection o f teaching texts. The Quadri-
century with Vesalius, Falloppia, and others. By the end o f the century
over, the Geography was apparently taught quite often. From the teach
the first permanent theaters had been constructed and the teaching o f the
ing activity o f Filippo Fantoni, GaUleo’s predecessor as a mathematics
subject was on a wholly new footing. This development is so well known,
lecturer, emerged a long work synthesizing the fields o f geography and
however, that there is no need to delay over a further discussion o f it other
astronomy. Included in it are sections describing parts o f the N ew W orld
than saying that this important advance in medical science and medical education evolved wholly within university precincts.
which had recently been revealed by the Renaissance explorations. Thus
A second area o f change, and perhaps o f significant advance, which I
the knowledge contained in Ptolemy’s Geography was supplemented by new materials and an attempt was made to synthesize the whole into a
should like to discuss is that o f mathematics. Once again I shall confine the
Compendiaria institutio cosmographiae et astronomiae. Though this work
discussion to sixteenth century Italian universities, particularly two o f
survives in several manuscripts and was being prepared for publication
them, Padua and Pisa. Unfortunately, our understanding o f the position o f mathematics in sixteenth century universities is as yet in a very rudi
at the time o f Fantoni’s death in 1591, it was never printed. Other writings to emerge from the Pisan mathematicians are oriented in a strongly astro
mentary state. While scholars have devoted some attention to the study
logical way, though we also find among the manuscripts left behind
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C. SC H M IT T
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treatises on motion and on mathematical certitude, which form direct
the second half o f the sixteenth century, thus establishing it as one o f the
links with the Padua tradition and with Galileo’s early Pisan work.
centers for study o f the work.i^o Three successive mathematics teachers,
Nevertheless, the astrological and pseudo-scientific side o f the mathemat
Catena (1548-1576), Moleto (1577-1588), and Galileo (1592-1610), all
ical arts seem to have been more cultivated at Pisa than were those as
taught the book along with other mathematical works. Moleto, as we learn from Antonio R icc o b o n i,i2 i his contemporary and the first historian
pects which modern historians o f science find more congenial. The situation in Padua in the sixteenth century seems to have been
o f the university, taught a wide range o f mathematical subjects, including,
somewhat different, though I must admit that I have not yet had the
in addition to the more usual ones, optics, mechanics, cosmography,
opportunity to look into the possible intrusions o f the occult tradition in
anemography, and hydrography. Barozzi, who was a contemporary o f
the mathematical teaching there,
From all indications Paduan mathe
Moleto, had an equally broad range o f interests, as his publications show.
matics instruction had a broader basis, a wider range o f mathematical
One is compelled to conclude that mathematics teaching and research,
and astronomical topics were taught, and there were fruitful interconnec
as it developed in sixteenth century universities, was somewhat more
tions between mathematics and other subjects contained in the university
broadly conceived than has usually been thought to be the case. This can
curriculum. What is more the Paduan lecturers published a larger number
also be verified through looking at the situation beyond Padua and Pisa.
o f works, and we are consequently in possession o f more materials through which to understand what was being done there.
It has recently been shown that mathematics played quite an important role in the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum, in part at least through the efforts o f
As at Pisa, Euclid, Sacrobosco, and Ptolemy dominated. Again, there is
Christopher Clavius, who was responsible for impressing upon his collea
clear evidence that Ptolemy’ s Geography was taught upon occasion and
gues in the Society the importance o f mathematical studies. A t the end o f
that Francesco Barozzi, one o f the key figures in Paduan mathematics o f
the sixteenth and beginning o f the seventeenth century, we also find the development o f practical mathematical skills within university contexts,
the second half o f the sixteenth century, devoted a good deal o f his time in preparing a Cosmographia, based in part on Ptolemy. In addition, how ever, there was also a serious interest in Proclus’s mathematical works.
for example at Leiden. I have covered all o f this far too briefly, but from even the few examples
After Alessandro Piccolomini first came into contact with the Commentary
given in medical and mathematical studies, I hope I have been able to
on Book I o f Euclid's Elements during his years at Padua,
it remained
indicate to sonie degree that new and important fields o f study could enter
for Barozzi to publish a Latin version o f this work for the first time in
into university curricula. The standard accounts perhaps focus unduly
1560.11® There was, in fact, a strong tendency among Paduan mathema
upon the failure o f universities to adopt the Copernican system and tend to
ticians, during the half century before Galileo came there, to go back to
lose sight o f the changes which were made. A more accurate assessment o f
Greek sources. Thus, such an effort was not confined to humanist-mathematicians outside the universities.
the situation must however be based on further research in the source
Perhaps more significant, but even less studied, was the interest o f
materials, accompanied by an attempt to abandon the worn out clichés and slogans which plague most general interpretations o f the period.
these Paduan mathematicians in certain key philosophical problems connected with methodology and natural philosophy. Though attention
V II. R E G IO N A L V A R IA T IO N S
has been given to a possible influence o f methodological discussions by Paduan philosophers on Galileo, little has been done to investigate the
While at this stage o f our knowledge it would be impossible to give a
methodological interests o f pre-Galileian Paduan mathematicians. Y et
full panorama o f university philosophy in Europe in the sixteenth century,
such an interest is manifest. Several o f the mathematicians wrote on
we can at least attempt to sketch in a brief picture region by region. Let us start with Italy, where humanism emerged first and began to exert some influences on the u n i v e r s i t i e s . 122 it was there, presumably for
Aristotle’s logical works, including the Posterior AnalyticsM^ A t Padua, we also find an interest in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanica throughout
508
C. SC H M IT T
S IX T E E N T H - C E N T U R Y UNIV ERS ITIE S
509
the first time, that Aristotle was taught from the Greek text. In the begin
mian
ning, this was done by the humanists who were teaching moral philosophy,
philosophy in sixteenth-century Spanish and Portuguese universities can
but by 1497 a chair for the teaching o f the natural philosophy o f Aristotle
be characterized as “ conservative” in the sense o f perhaps retaining more
humanism^^s
and both had enormous fortunae. On the whole the
in Greek was instituted at Padua.i^s in the course o f the sixteenth century,
o f the medieval characteristics than what we find elsewhere. Medieval
we find an increasing tendency to read and comment on the Greek text in
logic and natural philosophy seems to have held on longer on the Iberian
university philosophy courses. Moreover, as the sixteenth century ad
peninsulai29 than in Italy, for example. Morover, humanistic influence,
vanced, the Greek commentaries on Aristotle (Alexander, Themistius,
particularly by way o f emphasizing the Greek text and introducing an
Philoponus, Simplicius), some o f which were only recovered in the fifteenth
extended range o f ancient commentaries, was from all indications less
and sixteenth centuries, attained an increasing importance in the inter pretive framework.124 On the other hand, the medieval approach to
prominent than in Italy. Towards the end o f the century in the wake o f
Aristotle continued throughout the sixteenth century and the constant
Thomistic revival, especially in the “ School o f Salamanca,” where the
reprinting o f Averroes’s commentaries on the works (especially between 1550 and 1575) bear eloquent witness to this fact.i^s Consequently, in
markedly theological orientation o f Francisco de Victoria was carried on by Cano, Soto, and Bânez.i3o Though there was a continuing interest in
Italy, and this holds, as we shall see, for other areas as well, there was a
problems o f natural philosophy, such as motion, through the middle o f
mixture o f old and new, o f conservative as well as progressive tendencies.
the century, the ultimate orientation became increasingly theological as
This admixture o f “ medieval” and “ humanistic” elements, often jux
the Counter-Reformation implemented by the Council o f Trent took hold.
taposed in a most unexpected way, was a constant feature o f sixteenthcentury philosophical life.
This led to a textbook tradition, which supplanted the careful reading o f
In Italy, we find a strong continuity, it seems, with the medieval ap
comprehensive handbooks o f John o f St. Thomas^®^ and the Alcalà
the post-Tridentine Counter-Reformation, there was a very strong
Aristotelian writings, in the next century becoming formalized in the
proach o f direct reading and commentary on the works o f Aristotle him
Cursus.
These were strongly theological in orientation, and the pre
self. In most places, students still read (or, at least, had read to them) the
vious emphasis on natural philosophy and logic which had been a part o f
prescribed texts with commentaries, and, from what I have been able to
medieval scholasticism is present only in a severely watered-down ver-
gather, handbooks and compendia were significantly less used than in most other countries.126 jh e extensive and detailed commentary which was so
sion.133
common in thirteenth and fourteenth-century universities continued to
place o f a handbook approach, the Coimbra commentaries took form.i34
dominate the Italian scene to the end o f the sixteenth and into the seven
In these there is still a very strong focus on the text, the full humanistic
teenth century. Again there may be regional variations in this, and further
apparatus which had been acquired in the past century being utilized to
In Portugal the development was along somewhat different lines. In
study o f the matter is required. Extensive commentaries on one or more o f
interpret the Greek Aristotle. The Coimbra editions also contain a com
Aristotle’s works were published by N ifo, Boccadiferro, and Vimercato
prehensive commentary, though theological elements, e.g. in the Physics,
down to Pendasio, Zabarella, Cremonini and Liceto at the end o f the century and into the beginning o f the next one.
are emphasized and the more naturalistic aspects seem definitely to be
In Spain and Portugal we find in many ways a quite different picture.
should be, and they exerted an enormous influence not only in the Iberian
First o f all there was not the strong fourteenth and fifteenth century
peninsula but also in Catholic Germany, the Low Countries, and
tradition o f Aristotelian Scholasticism which we find in most o f the re
France.^®® France presents particular problems. On the one hand we know that
mainder o f Europe. A strong emphasis on this philosophy seems to have come to Spain only with Francisco de Victoria’ s return from his Paris studies.127 This tradition arrived roughly at the same time as did Eras-
played down.^®® Nevertheless, they are models o f what a real “ text” book
far more sixteenth-century editions o f Aristotle were published on French soil than elsewhere; on the other hand, we have very little detailed modem
C. SCH M IT T
S IX T E E N T H - C E N T U R Y U N IV ERSIT IE S
secondary literature on university philosophy teaching there during the Renaissance and seventeenth century.^^v of the approximately 1100 six-
moral training o f the individual seems, however, to have been the main
teenth-century editions o f Aristotelica recently listed in the Index Aure-
through most o f the seventeenth, we find the development o f a strong
liensis we find that about 300 came from Paris and more than 150 from Lyon, the two most important centers (Venice produced only 134).i38
the Wolflian tradition which emerged at the beginning o f the eighteenth
510
Who read these editions? O f course some were exported, but what hap pened to the many copies which remained in France? While Paris is per
511
objective o f university education.^'^'^ Toward the end o f the century and orientation toward text book philosophy which sets the foundation for century. With the Reformation in Germany there was a split in the universities.
haps the best studied o f the medieval universities, as we reach 1500 we are
Some, e.g. Tübingen and Wittemberg, became Protestant, while others,
faced with a nearly complete blank when it comes to understanding what
e.g. Freiburg and Cologne, remained Catholic. New universities show the
happened in the day to day teaching o f philosophy or in even the decade to decade development o f the subject. Ramus and Talon, o f course,
same split, some are Protestant (e.g. Jena) and others are Catholic (e.g. Würzburg). Toward the end o f the sixteenth century, the Jesuits became
caused an uproar, but while that was happening university life certainly
strong and dominated teaching in the latter group.^^s As elsewhere, Jesuit
continued as usual. 1^9 The other French universities, with perhaps the
education became closely aligned with humanism and with Aristotelian
exception o f the medical faculty at M o n t p e l l i e r , a r e equally little
philosophy. Perhaps more dependent on Iberian and Italian traditions
studied. Early in the century we know that the fourteenth-century tradi
than were the Protestants - though only slightly so -, the Catholics too
tions o f natural philosophy continued in France, but this seems to have
continued to teach the traditional texts. A t the end o f the century, how
died out some time in the ISlOs.^"^! Sixteenth-century France was torn by
ever, when the Protestants went more and more in the direction o f hand
religious dispute giving rise to a vast polemical literature, and we also see
books and compendia, the Jesuits adopted the Coimbra course.
the rise o f a rich new literary culture, but what was happening in the uni
German Protestants and Catholics alike were keenly alive to what was
versity philosophy teaching? Here is a vast field o f research yet to be tap ped, and one is hesitant to hazard even the wildest o f guesses.
happening south o f the Alps. Zabarella in logic,i®® Cesalpino in natural philosophy,i5i and Suarez in metaphysics^^a were used by both groups,
In Germany and the Low Countries the picture is a bit clearer. Both
while the gradual invasion o f Ramus was more confined to the Protestants.
were strongholds o f Scholastic Aristotelianism o f a remarkable range o f
In Britain we see certain reflections o f the continental situation. Cam
varieties. With the coming o f Luther and the Reformation there was a
bridge was not really significantly different from Oxford - at least when
strong reaction against the rationalistic approach o f scholastic philosophy
viewed in the perspective o f the European-wide situation. There were, o f
and theology. Already in the Heidelberg Disputation o f 1518 this is abun dantly c l e a r . 142 j n f^ct, Luther was very unfavorably disposed toward the
course, variations in detail. The Scottish universities offer a somewhat different picture. Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and St. Andrews all
What apparently happened, however,
seem to have adhered to a strong European commentary system o f
was that even the new somewhat anti-rationalistic approach o f a Luther
exposition o f Aristotle,1^3 indicating a certain contrast with the English
had to be adapted for didactic purposes and through Melanchthon the
universities. For England, the general picture o f philosophy teaching is as follows.
university philosophy
t r a d itio n .
teaching method o f Reformed universities became thoroughly Aristotelian.144 There was a strong dose o f humanism to be sure - one need only look at Melanchthon’s own commentaries on Aristotle to see this - but what emerged was still fundamentally Aristotelian, though Aristotelian with a difference. A t Tübingen, for instance, the teaching o f Jakob Schegki‘^5 and Andreas Planer,i46 which spanned most o f the sixteenth century, indicates a clear knowledge o f tradition as well as novelty. The
After the early sixteenth century brought a wave o f enthusiasm for humanism,i54 not only with native born men such as Colet, More, and Linacre, but with great Continental figures such as Erasmus and Vives which was continued in mid-century by Pole, Hervet, and others, there seems to have been a growing tendency towards the end o f the century to return to an Aristotelian curriculum. Printed editions o f Aristotle and o f
512
513
C. S CHM ITT
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y U N IV ERSIT IE S
peripatetic commentaries proliferated, and we see more and more manu script works o f similar orientation. The seventeenth century saw a con
and England, Aristotle was increasingly taught from the Greek text in Italy, and German universities such as H e i d e l b e r g ^ ^ e and Tiibingen^s’
tinuation o f this, only partially stemmed by the strong personalities and
came to absorb humanistic ideals in a steadily expanding way. This wave
intellectual perspicacity o f the Cambridge Platonists who built upon the
o f enthusiasm left a permanent mark, though during the second half o f
Ficinian Platonic tradition introduced to England a century earlier by
the century there was, in certain quarters at least, a return to a more
Colet and More. Like most other places, after a wavering induced by return to Aristotelian orthodoxy, which was supplanted only in the
traditional sort o f Aristotelian orthodoxy. This leads me to the third point. Even where there was some degree o f innovation in philosophy teaching - the use o f Valla and Trapezuntius in
second half o f the seventeenth century, when Cartesianism, the N ew
some logic courses in Spain, a strong development o f humanism at Paris
Science, Lockean empiricism, and other novel developments found their way into universities.i^s
and Oxford and Agricola’s increasing influence in dialectic - this gave way
humanist reform in the first half o f the sixteenth century, there was a
to a new burst o f emphasis on Aristotle towards the end o f the century. This seems to be evident nearly everywhere in Europe. What is more this
V III.
C O N C L U S IO N S
new wave o f enthusiasm for the Stagirite carried on into the seventeenth century and was a dominant factor in university education for most, i f not
The general picture we have then on the basis o f this preliminary analysis
all o f the century. The fact that there was a visible wave o f humanist anti-
indicates once more that we must look at the whole situation in greater
Aristotelian and anti-Scholastic thought in the first half o f the sixteenth
detail - locality by locality and decade by decade. Until this is done - at
century - Erasmus, More, Ramus - has led interpreters to assume that
least for a substantial part o f the whole - we cannot hope to have more
that was the death knell o f the movement. What they fail to realize is that
than a few vague and questionable generalizations at our disposal. Yet,
it revived and was probably stronger (or at least as strong) in the first half
even at this stage, we can be fairly sure o f certain matters.
o f the seventeenth century than in the first half o f the sixteenth.
First o f all, several fourteenth-century traditions - including nomina
Finally, I should like to propose what I feel might be a possible explana
lism, the logical traditions o f sophismata and insolubilia, and the Merton
tion for the Aristotelian “ revival.” A s the new religiously divided Europe
and Paris schools o f philosophy o f motion - continued on into the first
took shape during the middle years o f the century, a new line o f rational
few decades o f the sixteenth century and after that quickly lost ground to
defense had to be found. Though scepticism had a certain degree o f novelty
other approaches and sets o f problems. The printing history o f the medie
and charm for a few, it was not - as it never has been - the philosophical
val texts in question as well as new commentaries being written on
position o f the many and, certainly, was not a philosophy which could be
Aristotle indicate this. Why this happened is not clear. Humanism had a
institutionalized. Though mysticism and anti-rationalism were rife in the
strong impact, as did the réintroduction o f the writings o f the Greek com
later Middle Ages and into the sixteenth century - we might recall the
mentators on Aristotle, but neither o f these facts explains why the calcula
Imitatio Christi and the Rhineland mystics, Geiler von Kayserberg and
tores and writers on sophismata lost out, while the commentaries o f Aver-
Sebastian Brant, the Joachimites and Savonarola - Catholics and Prot
roes did not. In brief, certain medieval aspects o f the tradition expired in
estants alike (at least the bulk o f them represented in intellectual circles)
the early sixteenth century, while other equally medieval aspects continued to play an important role.
took refuge in an already well-known and easily accessible rational ap
Secondly, though I am unable yet to document this precisely it seems
short-lived and Catholic devotionalism and mysticism proved to be but a
increasingly clear to me that it was during the first third o f the sixteenth
splinter movement and Trent ruled that there was to be a tightening o f
century that humanism began to play an ever more important role in the
reigns, a return to discipline, and carefully structured intellectual life.
philosophical teaching o f the universities. Erasmianism invaded Spain
Thus, after the initial smoke caused by the confessional fragmentation
proach to the world: Aristotelianism. Lutheran anti-intellectualism was
515
C. SCH M IT T
S IX T E E N T H - C E N T U R Y U N IV ERSIT IE S
had blown away, all sides concentrated upon educational reforms whereby
meantime I invite comments and suggestions of interested readers regarding the ideas put forth in the present paper, which has benefited from comments by Mrs. L. Jardine» C. H . Lohr, J. E. McGuire, I. W . F. Maclean, P. Machamer, and C. Webster. 1 The best general survey remains S. d’Irsay, Histoire des universités françaises et étrangères des origines à nos jours (Paris, 1933-35), 2 vols. For a review o f literature on the history of universities from the time o f d’Irsay’s book until about 1960 see S. StellingMichaud, “ L ’histoire des universités au moyen âge et à la Renaissance au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années,” X le Congrès international des sciences historiques. Rap
514
theologians and polemicists could be trained in a new orthodoxy. The basis o f all these was one or another variety o f Aristotelian-based phi losophy. Thus, Aristotelianism continued as the foundation stone o f philosophical education. There were differences, however, between these new “ Aristotehanisms” i58 and the earlier ones, but the precise details o f this must be left for another occasion. Consequently, in the final analysis, though Catholics and Protestants alike wanted to - and to a certain extent, did - reform their educational systems, the Aristotelian-Scholastic element still loomed large. As yet there was not a comprehensive and solid substitute to replace it. There were chinks in the armour to be sure, as there were internal flaws, which ultimately led to the tradition’s downfall. Perhaps these are more apparent to us in retrospect than to all but the most astute o f the system’s sixteenthcentury critics. It was only the coming o f Cartesianism, the New Philoso phy o f Galileo and others, and the seventeenth-century popularization and promulgation o f Copernicanism that led to the beginnings o f new philosophical traditions in universities. Thus, it was in the course o f the eighteenth century - the century in which the self-consciousness o f na tional characreristics, national vernacular literatures, and nationalism in general began to assume a dominating importance - that individualized national traditions in philosophy and science began developing. This is what ultimately replaced Aristotelianism in the universities. It must, nevertheless, always be remembered that even then many remnants o f the old system remained imbedded in the new and that one area o f Aristo telian philosophy, logic, was still retained for several more centuries with little change. The Warburg Institute, University o f London NOTES * This is a revised and expanded version o f papers which have served as the basis of several seminars and lectures at the Warburg Institute, the University History Seminar at Oxford University, Summer Meeting of the British Society for the History of Science (Exeter, 1972), and elsewhere. I am indebted to Mr. T. H. Aston who first invited me to bring together some of my thoughts on this subject. I hope to be able to publish more detailed and more comprehensive studies on the same topic at some future date. In the
ports I (I960), 97-143. 2 Again d’Irsay (note 1) must remain the starting point. For the Middle Ages H . Rashdall. The Universities o f Europe in the M iddle Ages, ed. F. M. Powicke & A . B. Emden (Oxford, 1936), 3 vols, is the fundamental work. More limited in scope, but still useful are H. Denifle, D ie Entstehung der Universitaten des Mittelalters bis 1400 (Berlin, 1885) ; G. Kaufmann, Geschichte der deutschen Universitaten (Stuttgart, 1888-96; reprint Graz, 1958); and C. M. A jo G . y Sâinz de Zûfiiga, Historia de las universidades hispanicas (Madrid-Avila, 1957-66), 7 vols. 3 Much valuable material is collected, however, in studies such as P. Dibon, La phi losophie néerlandaise au siècle d ‘or, I (Paris-Amsterdam, 1954) and B. Nardi, Saggi sull’aristotelismo padovano dal secolo X I V al X V I (Firenze, 1958). 4 The account of Rashdall (note 2) is still standard. 5 R. Lemay, Abu Ma^shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century (Beirut, 1962) and F. van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West: The Origins o f Latin Aristotelian ism, tr. L. Johnston (Louvain, 1955) tell the story. Further details are to be found in the Aristotles Latinus. Dr. C. H . Lohr is preparing a synthetic study on Aristotelianism in the West and when his work is complete a number of fundamental questions should be much clearer. See his ‘Aristotle in the West; Some Recent Books’, Traditio 25 (1969), 417-31 for some observations as well as his ‘Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries’, appearing serially in Traditio 23 (1967) sqq. « For Paris see C. Thurot, D e l'organisation de l ’enseignement dans l ’université de Paris au moyen-âge (Paris, 1880; reprint Frankfurt, 1967) and for Oxford, J. A . Weisheipl, ‘Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century’, Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964), 143-85. Much useful information is to be found in J. Koch (ed.), Artes liberales: Von der antiken Bilding zur Wissenschaft des Mittelalters (Koln-Leiden, 1959) and esp. A rts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge [Actes du qua trième congrès international de philosophie médiévale] (Montréal-Paris, 1969). 7 See especially Rashdall (note 2), Thurot (note 6), Weisheipl (note 6), and H. Denifle 6 E. Chatelain (eds.). Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1889-97), 4 vols. A useful recent comparative study with further references is G. Leff", Paris and Oxford in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (New York, 1968). It is worth remembering that theology developed later at many universities, especially those of Italy. On this see d’Irsay (note 1) 1,161 and the reference cited in the next note. 8 For the documentation of this see P. O. Kristeller, ‘Renaissance Aristotelianism’, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 6 (1965), 157-74, at 162-63 and the literature cited in his notes 14-16. 9 There is now quite a substantial literature on the development of natural philosophy at Merton College. I shall limit myself to mentioning a few of the more important pieces. The starting point is now J. A . Weisheipl, ‘Repertorium Mertonense’, Mediaeval Studies 31 (1969), 174-224. See also Thomas o f Bradwardine, His Tractatus de Propor tionibus: Its Significance fo r the Development o f Mathematical Physics, ed. H. L. Crosby
517
C. SCH M IT T
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(Madison, 1955); William Heytesbury, Medieval Logic and the Rise o f Mathematical Physics, ed. C. Wilson (Madison, 1956); M . Clagett, The Science o f Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, \959), passim ', M . McVaugh, ‘Am ald o f Villanova and Bradwardine’s Law’, Isis 58 (1967), 56-64; A . G. Molland, ‘TheGeometrical Background to the “ Merton School’” , British Journal fo r the History o f Science 4 (1968-69), 105-25; E. Sylla, ‘Medieval Quantification of Qualities: The “ Merton School’” , Archive f o r History o f Exact Sciences 8 (1971), 9-39. Also important are two unpublished theses (th o u ^ Weisheipl’s has now mostly appeared in article form): J. A. Weisheipl, “ Early Fourteenth-Century Physics and the Merton School” (Oxford, 1957) and A . G. M ol land, '^Geometria speculativa of Thomas Bradwardine: Text with Critical Discussion” (Cambridge, 1967). It is not entirely clear why these traditions died out relatively rapidly in the places where they originated, but continued on elsewhere. Their technical and specialized nature only in part explains this. It is now clear, however, that the fourteenth-century traditions continued on at Oxford only in abbreviated and watered-down versions. See J. M . Fletcher, “ The Teaching and Study o f Arts at Oxford c. 1400-c. 1520” (Oxford D . Phil. Thesis, 1961), 179-93. In general it seems that rather derivative commentaries and compendia began to win the field. Important among these are the largely unstudied writings of Johannes Versoris, who perhaps as well as anyone represents the late medieval variety o f Aristotelianism which dominated universities o f the late fifteenth century. A brief glance at the number of MSS and printed editions of his writings indicates their popularity. Versoris was a contemporary of Ficino and from all appearances was far better known to the literate public of Western Europe in the fifteenth century than was the famous Platonist. Modem scholarship has focused upon the Platonist rather than his Aristote lian contemporary, making him a famous “ Renaissance” figure, while the Aristotelian lies lost in oblivion. For information on Versoris, with a listing o f his works, MSS, and editions of them, and further bibliography, see the article by Lohr (note 5), in Traditio 27 (1971), 290-9. On this see esp. Clagett (note 9), 629-71. For further details see esp. M . Qagett, Giovanni Marliani and Late Medieval Physics (New York, 1941; reprint, 1967); P. Duhem, Système du monde (Paris, 1913-58), vol. X ; P. Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci (Paris, 1906-13), 3 vols., passim’, T. E. James, “ D e primo et ultimo instanti Petri Alboini Mantuani. Edited with an Introduction, Analysis, and Notes” (Columbia Uni versity Dissertation, 1967) ; A . Maier, Ander Grenze von Scholastik undNaturwissenschaft (Roma, 1952), 354-84 (“ Die Nachwirkung der Oresme’schen Lehre”); M. Markowski, Burydanizm w Polsce w okresie przedkopernikanskim (Wroclaw et al., 1971), an im portant study with an English summary, pp. 531-39; C. Vasoli, ‘La cultura dei secoli XIV-XVr, in A tti del primo convegno internazioruile di ricognizione delle fo n ti per la storia della scienzaitaliana: i secoli X IV -X V I, ed. C. Maccagni (Firenze, 1967), 31-105. It should be noted that there was particularly at Paris some continuity of the fourteenthcentury tradition, as Clagett (pp. 635-40) indicates. Further work is required on this topic, as well the related one of the extent of a revival at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century at Paris as evidenced by the reprinting of the works o f Buridan. 12 For some information and further bibliography see my Critical Survey and Biblio graphy o f Studies on Renaissance Aristotelianism, 1958-1969 (Padova, 1971) and my ‘Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism’, History o f Science 11 (1973), 159-93.
13 This opinion is so commonly portrayed in general histories of science and philosophy that there is no need to document it. Let us hope that we see in the next few decades a serious attempt to understand why things developed as they did in the early modern period in view of the actual primary evidence rather than beginning with a p rio ri assumptions as to what was important and what was trivial. 14 One clear indication of this is the extent to which Aristotle editions and commen taries continued to be printed throughout the sixteenth century. There were 1100 edi tions of one or more of Aristotle’s works during the century and probably nearly as many commentaries, compendia, paraphrases, etc. For a reasonably comprehensive list of Aristotle editions see F. E. Cranz (ed.), A Bibliography o f Aristotle Editions, 1501-1600 (Baden-Baden, 1971). Professor Cranz is preparing a more detailed biblio graphy of Aristotle editions before 1520 and his results will show quite clearly how many more Aristotle items there are than are listed under Aristotle’s name in the Index Aureliensis, which forms the basis of the volume mentioned above. O f other biblio graphical works special mention should be made o f L. W . Riley, Aristotle Texts and Commentaries to 1700 in the University o f Pennsylvania Library (Philadelphia, 1961). This collection should make the University of Pennsylvania a natural center for studies on later Aristotelianism. 15 For Oxford, for example, see L. Stone ‘The Educational Revolution in England, 1560-l640',PastandPresentno. 28 (1964), and ‘Literacy and Education in England’, Past and Present no. 42 (1969), 6^139; Curtis (note 75). A recent interesting paper on Avignon is J. Verger, ‘Le rôle social de l’université d’Avignon au XVe siècle’. Biblio thèque d'humanisme et Renaissance 33 (1971), 489-504. 1® On this see below pp. 494-5. 1’ There was a strong Stoic element in Pomponazzi’s thought, for example. See L. Zanta, L a renaissance du Stoïcisme au X V Ie siècle (Paris, 1914) and P e tri Pomponatii Mantuani libri quinque de fato, de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione, ed. R. Lemay (Lugano, 1957), ad indicem (p. 482). It would be interesting to investigate sixteenth and seventeenth-century “ Aristotelian” treatments of moral philosophy to determine the extent of Stoic influence there. 18 Though there is some evidence of influence from Atomism in the sixteenth century, it seems to gain in importance in the next century in thinkers such as Sennert and Maignan. For the latter see Emmanuel Maignan, Cursus philosophicus, 2nd éd., enlarged (Lyon, 1673), 223-46 for a defense o f the possibility of a void existing in nature, a quite un-Aristotelian position. 19 Another equally important point is that even those thinkers who were avowedly anti-Aristotelian absorbed much more peripatetic doctrine then they themselves realized. See my comments on this in Schmitt, Survey (note 12), 129-32. A similar point is made by Kristeller (note 8), 157, 173. 2® Though I am largely in agreement with the points made by N . W . Gilbert, ‘Renais sance Aristotelianism and Its Fate: Some Observations and Problems’, in Naturalism and Human Understanding. Essays on the Philosophy o f John Herman Randall, Jr. (Buf falo, 1967), 42-52,1 now feel that he has tended to underestimate the staying power of the Aristotelian tradition through most of the seventeenth century. Though many of the criticisms brought against it in the course of the sixteenth century were quite devastating on particular issues, few if any off’ered the same comprehensiveness. I am not certain that it is merely a question of “ inertia,” i.e. of the inability of new and better ideas to oust the older ones, but tend rather to feel that we see the whole matter somewhat out o f perspective. While it may seem obvious to us that Copernicus is superior to Aristotle,
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it perhaps was not so obvious at the time and each side had supporters. The same is true o f Ramism or Telesianism. This whole question deserves much fuller consideration. 21 See esp. P. O. Kristeller, ‘Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance’, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Roma, 1956), 553-83 and E. Garin, ‘Le traduzioni umanistiche di Aristotele nel secolo X V ’, A tti e memorie dell’Accademia fiorentina di sdenze morali "L a Colombaria,” n.s. 2 (1947-50), 55-104. 22 See the Aristoteles latinus, ed. G. Lacombe et al. (Roma etc., 1939 sqq.) for details. 23 See Cranz (note 14), 163-4. It should be noted, however, that the Secreta secretorum was never a university text and did not find its way into the university curriculum. Its widespread influence and diffusion is unquestionable, however. O f the extensive litera ture on the subject see the general remarks in L. Thorndike, History o f M a gic and E x perimental Science (New York, 1923-58) II, 267-lS and passim. O f more recent books see the two recent German theses W. Hirth, Studien zu den Gesundheitslehren des sogenmnten Secreta secretorum (Heidelberg, 1969) and F. Wurms, Studien zu den deutschen und den lateinischen Prosafassung des pseudo-aristotelischen Secreta secretorum (Ham burg, 1970). 24 A number of such spuria are not contained in the editions o f the Opera by Isaac Casaubon (Lugduni, 1590) and by Guillaume DuVal (Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1619), though they do still contain quite a niunber of other works which modem scholarship generally holds not to be genuine. 25 See esp. E. N . Tigerstedt, ‘Observations on the Reception of the Aristotelian Poetics in the Latin West’, Studies in the Renaissance 15 (1968), 7-24 and B. Weinberg, A History o f Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1961), 2 vols. 2® See H. M . Nobis, ‘Über zwei Handschriften zur friihneuzeitlichen Mechanik in italienischen Bibliotheken’, Sudhoffs Archiv 53 ( 1969), 326-32; idem., ‘Die wissenschaftshistorische Bedeutung der peripatetischen Quaestiones mechanicae ais Anlass für die Frage nach ihrem Verfasser’, M aia 18 (1966), 265-76; M . Schramm, ‘The Mechanical Problems of the Corpus Aristotelicum, the Elementa Iordani super Demonstrationem Ponderum^ and the Mechanics o f the Sixteenth Century’, in Maccagni (note 11), 151-63 ; and P. L. Rose & S. Drake, ‘The Pseudo-Aristotelian Questions in Mechanics in Re naissance Culture’, Studies in the Renaissance 18 (1971), 65-104. It should be noted that the Mechanica is generally thought by most modem scholars (though Nobis, in the works cited above, is an exception) to be spurious. Nevertheless, it seems to be a rela tively early work o f the Peripatetic school and maintained an important position throughout the sixteenth century. 27 This, however, has yet to be docimiented. For some indications see Garin (note 21) ; J. Glucker, ‘Casaubon’s Aristotle’, Classica et Mediaevalia 25 (1964), 274-96; L. MinioPaluello, “ Attività filosofico-editoriale aristotelica dell’Umanesimo veneziano,” in Umanesimo europeo e umanesimo veneziano (Firenze, 1964), 245-62; J. Soudek, ‘Leonardo Bruni and His Public: A Statistical and Interpretative Study o f the An notated Version of the (Pseudo-) Aristotelian Economics', Studies in Medieval and Re naissance History 5 (1968), 51-136; and E. F. Rice, ‘Humanist Aristotelianism in France: Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples and His Circle’, in A . H. T. Levi (ed.). Humanism in France at the End o f the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance (Manchester, 1970), 132-49. 28 One sees that translations by Quattrocento figures such as George of Trebizond, Theodoms Gaza, Bessarion, and Poliziano came gradually to replace the standard medieval ones. In the sixteenth century, the translations o f Lefèvre, Vatable, Périon, and Grouchy, among others, became increasingly popular. Very little work indeed has been done on these sixteenth-century translators and their editions and it is difficult in
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many cases even to find out the basic facts about their lives. It must also be noted, how ever, that new sixteenth-century translations of a “ medieval” commentator such as Averroes were made in profusion. O f Averroes’s 38 extant commentaries on Aristotle, 15 were translated (from Arabic) into Latin in the thirteenth century, and 19 more were translated (from Hebrew) into Latin in the sixteenth century! See H. A . Wolfson, ‘Revised Plan for the Publication o f a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem'^ Speculum 38 (1963), 88-104, at 92-94. This startling fact should be kept constantly in mind when we are tempted to see Averroism as fading out about 1500 and a purified, humanistic approach to Aristotle carrying the day after that. Multi-volume editions of Aristotle with Averroes’s commentaries appeared at Venice in 1550-52,1560,1562, and 1575. For details see Cranz (note 14). 29 See below note 123. This edition with translations and commentary on the most important works of Aristotle appeared at Coimbra between 1592 and 1605 and was often reprinted else where. See F. Stegmiiller, Filosofia e teologia nos universidades de Coimbra e Évora no século X V I (Coimbra, 1959), 95-99 (with further references). For a list of the many editions o f the commentaries see C. Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de nouvelle éd. (Bmssels-Paris, 1890-1932) II, 1273-78; IX, 62-63, which is probably the fullest list now available. Also see below, note 136. He produced editions with Latin translations and commentaries of the Organon (Geneva, 1584; Frankfurt, 1591; Frankfurt, 1592; Frankfurt, 1597; Frankfurt, 1598; Geneva, 1605; Hanau, 1606; Hanau, 1611; Hanau, 1617; Hanau, 1623; Helmstadt, 1682), the D e anima (Frankfurt, 1596; Hanau, 1611 ; Frankfurt, 1621), and the Physica (Frankfurt, 1596; Hanau, 1608; Hanau, 1629). ®2 This can be verified by the reader by looking at most any commentary (but not all) on Aristotle from the sixteenth century. A n attentive reading of representative com mentaries on Aristotle from different localities could give us some indication o f the level of knowledge of the Greek text the writer assumed on the part of his readers. Though I have not studied this matter in detail, it seems clear to me that at Padua it was assumed that students had a better grasp of Greek than at Pisa (for the period 15501600), for example. It also seems to the present writer, on the basis o f his reading in printed and manuscript commentaries on Aristotle, that there was a general and sub stantial increase in literacy in the Greek language among university students through out Europe during the first half of the sixteenth century. 53 F. Nitzsch, Luther und Aristoteles (Kiel, 1883). Cf. d’Irsay (note 1), I, 308-9. For Luther’s anti-Aristotelian feelings see e.g. D . M artin Luthers Werke, Kritische Ausgabe (Weimar, 1883 sqq.) I, 221sqq.(99 conclusiones contra scholasticam theologiam [1517]), 355 {Disputatio Heidelbergae habita [1518], conclusio 36). 34 On the shift from Luther’s view to the more sympathetic attitude of Melanchthon see P. Petersen, Geschichte der Aristolelischen Philosophie im Protestantischen Deutsch land (Leipzig, 1921), esp. 19-108 and E. Lewalter, Spanisch-Jesuitische und DeutschLutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Hamburg, 1935; repr. Darmstadt, 1967). 35 See below pp. 509-11. 3* For some indications see Petersen (note 34), 287-93 and passim', K . Eschweiler, ‘Die Philosophie der spanischen Spatscholastik auf den deutschen Universitaten des 17. Jahrhunderts,’ Spanische Forschungen der Gorres-Gesellschaft, I. Reihe, Band I (1928), 251-325; M. Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen, 1939); and E. Lewalter, Spanisch-Jesuitische und Deutsch-Lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Hamburg, 1935; repr. Darmstadt, 1967).
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See Petersen (note 34). For the specific case of Zabarella see W . F. Edwards, “ The Logic of lacopo Zabarella” (Columbia University Dissertation, 1960). The reader can easily verify for himself the extent to which the thought of Italian writers on Aristotelianism penetrated German scholasticism by looking at the writings of the figures men tioned in Petersen’s book. See, for example, the Quaestiones of John Day of Oriel College, Oxford, written in 1589 found in MS Oxford, Bodleian, Rawl. D . 274,127-259. as well as the writings of Powel, Case, Flavel, and Crakanthorpe cited below, pp. 499-500. It is also interesting to note that there are a series of notes on Zabarella’s D e natura logicae made, it seems, by a Scottish student about 1600 in Edinburgh University Library M S Dc.3.89, fols. 152sqq. 3^ A few students o f the period have taken a comparative view, but the majority have been content to focus upon one or another locality, or, at best, upon one or another religious grouping. A beginning, however, has been made in studies such as- E. J. Ashworth, ‘Propositional Logic in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries’, N otre Dame Journal o f Formal Logic 9 fl968), 179-92; ‘The Doctrine of Supposition in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, Archiv f iir Geschichte der Philosophie 51 (1969), 260-85; ‘The Treatment of Semantic Paradoxes from 1400 to 1700’, N otre Dame Journal o f Form al Logic 13 (1972), 34-52; N .W . Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts o f Method (New York, 1960) ; P. Reif, ‘The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy’, Journal o f the History o f Ideas 30 (1969), 17-32; W . Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit. Band /.• 1500-1640 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964). F. Buonamici,‘Sull’antico statuto della UniversitàdiPisa:alcunipreliminarinotizie storiche’. Annali delle Università toscane 30 (1911), 46-47. S. Leite (ed.), Estatutos da universidade de Coimbra (1559) (Coimbra, 1963), 315-17. J. Haller, D ie Anfange der Universitat Tubingen, 1477-1537 (Stuttgart, 1927-29), II, 39^0. “ Deputati ad sophistariam teneantur legere Logicam Pauli Veneti et Quaestiones Strodi cum Dubiis Pauli Pergulensis et pro tertia lectione Regulas seu Sophysmata tisberi [i.e. Heytesbury],” F. Facciolati, Fasti Gymnasii Patavini (Patavii, 1757) II, 118. See Drake & Rose (note 26), 92-100. 45 Ibid., 94-6. C, Annerstedt, Upsala Universitets Historia (Upsala, 1877f.), Bihang I, 278. On this question in general see Kristeller, Studies (note 21), 337-53, 553-83 and Renaissance Thought H (New York, 1965), 20-68; Garin (note 21); and Soudek (note 27). The sixteenth-century teaching of moral philosophy at Padua has recently been treated by A . Poppi in a paper to be published in the volume cited below in note 58. For the moment see the summary in J.-C. Margolin, ‘Platon et Aristote à la Renais sance’, Bibliothèque d ’Humanisme et Renaissance 36 (1974), 157-73, at 161. See my ‘The Faculty of Arts at Pisa at the Time of Galileo’, Physis 14 (1972), 243-72, at 254. Statutes continued to prescribe the same texts well into the seventeenth century, however, and change seems to have come relatively slowly. This question has yet to te studied in detail. To limit ourselves to one example here we might mention that the socalled “ Laudian Statutes” of 1636 have remarkable similarities to those of previous centiyies. See Statutes o f the University o f O xford Codified in the Year 1636 under the Authority o f Archbishop Laud Chancellor o f the University, ed. J. Griffiths (Oxford, 1888), 33-40. But see Schmitt, Reassessment (note 12), note 22. Metaphysics was not wholly without importance in the philosophy curriculum.
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What I mean to emphasize here is that vis-à-vis logic and natural philosophy metaphy sics did not have the central importance which it was to attain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See A. Gabriel, ‘Metaphysics in the Curriculum of Studies of the Mediaeval Universities’, in D ie Metaphysik im Mittelalters, ed. P. Wilpert [Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 2] (Berlin, 1963), 92-102 and Lewalter (note 36). 51 For some indications see Cranz (Note 14). 52 There is little literature indeed on this subject, but for some indications see Petersen (note 34), 166-86, for Germany, and A . Levi, French Moralists: The Theory o f the Passions 1585-1649 (Oxford, 1965), 152-65, for France. A striking example of how im portant Aristotelian ideas on moral philosophy still were and how influential they were on the crucial problems of the century is to be found in L. Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians. A Study o f Race Prejudice in the Modern World (Chicago, 1959). 53 p. O. Kristeller, ‘Francesco da Diacceto and Florentine Platonism in the Sixteenth Century’, in Studies (note 21), 287-336. 54 E. Gilson, ‘Marsile Ficin et le Contra Gentiles', Archives d ’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 24 (1957), 101-13; P. O. Kristeller, Le thomisme et la pensée italienne de la Renaissance (Montréal-Paris, 1967), esp. 93-98.1 have not been able to see A . B. Collins, “ The Doctrine of Being in the Theologia Platonica of Marsilio Ficino, with Special Reference to the Influence of Thomas Aquinas” (Dissertation University o f Toronto, 1968). 55 E. Massa, I fondamenti metafisici della "dignitas hominis” e testi inediti di Egidio da Viterbo (Torino, 1954) and J. W . O ’Malley, Giles o f Viterbo on Church and Reform (Leiden, 1968), 15-16 & passim. 5« S. Gibson, Statuta antiqua universitatis Oxoniensis (Oxford, 1931), 344, 390. 57 W e do know that quaestiones dealing with Platonic philosophy appeared from time to time in the disputations which students engaged in before taking the M .A . For example in 1602 the following question was set: “ A n depravati Alcibiadis mores ad parentes magis quam ad praeceptores sint referendi.” A. Clark (ed.). Register o f the University o f Oxford, vol. I I (1571-1622) : Part I, Introductions (Oxford, 1887 = Oxford Historical Society, vol. 10), 175. For further information on these quaestiones see below, 500-1. 58 I have dealt with this in greater detail in a paper entitled “ L ’introduction de la phi losophie platonicienne dans l’enseignement des universités à la Renaissance,” to be published in the Actes of the Seizième Colloque international du centre d ’études supérieu res de la Renaissance (Tours). For the present see Kristeller (note 21), 291-94 and Schmitt (note 48), 263-4. 59 Louis Le Roy had strong sympathies with Plato and translated several works into French (see W . Gundersheimer, The Life and Works o f Louis Le Roy [Geneva, 1967]). Though the proposed reforms of Petrus Ramus and Omer Talon were strongly criticized by Jacques Charpentier, all three drew some inspiration from the Platonic tradition, though in different ways. For the influence of one aspect of the Platonic tradition on Ramus and Talon see, inter alia my Cicero Scepticus: A Study o f the Influence o f the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972), 78-91. For Charpentier see his Platonis cum Aristotele in universa philosophia comparatio (Paris, 1573), which is very sympathetic to the Platonic tradition, as the Preface (fol. D iii) shows. Plato was ap parently also taken seriously by Vincent RaflTar, Professor of Greek and Latin Philoso phy from 1589 to 1606, whose works amply show this fact (copies in Bibliothèque Nationale) and on whom there is very little secondary literature indeed. He published D e Platonicae atque Aris totelicae philosophiae conjunctione oratio... (Paris, 1604) (see
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B N catalogue, vol. 145, page 740). For some information on Raffar see C. P. Goujet, Mém oire historique et littéraire sur le collège de France (Paris, 1758; reprint Geneva, 1971) II, 223-34.
in natural philosophy and logic, there was a degree o f innovation and originality at
P ro cli Diadochi L y cii philosophi platonici ac mathematici probatissimi in primum Euclidis Elementorum librum Commentariorum in universam mathematicam disciplinam principium eruditionis tradentium libri I U I a Francisco Barocio... opera cura... (Patavii, 1560) and Francisci Barocii... Commentarius in locum Platonis obscurissimum et hactenus a nemine recte expositum in principio D ialogi octavi de Rep. ubi sermo habetur de numero geometrico de quo proverbium est, quod numero Platonis nihil obscurius (Bononiae, 1566). For the history o f the university see esp. the standard work A . Fabroni, Historia academiae pisanae... (Pisis, 1791-95), 3 vols., esp. vol. 2 for the sixteenth century. A brief survey is to be found in G . B. Picotti, “ Per la storia dell’università di Pisa,” in his S critti vari d istoriapisana e toscana... (Pisa, 1968), 11-48. See also Schmitt (note 48), and the recently published A. Verde, L o studio fiorentino, 1473-1503: ricerche e docu menti, vols. I-II (Firenze, 1973), which also deals with Pisa in the period indicated and has an extensive bibliography o f other studies relevant to the same subject. See Buonamici (note 40) for details. Relatively few university textbooks were printed at Florence, the major printing center closest to Pisa. See, for example, A. M. Bandini, D e florentina luntarum typographia (Lucae, 1791), which shows that the Florentine branch of the Giunta publishing empire produced a much smaller percentage o f university texts than did the Venice or Lyons branches. I am indebted to my friend William Pettas for information on this and other points regarding book printing in sixteenth-century Tuscany. A mere handful of suitable books were printed at Lucca, principally by Busdraghi. The question of the book trade and provision of textbooks for students in sixteenth-century Pisa does not seem to have been studied in detail as yet. Though there are several incunables printed at Pisa, there were apparently no books whatever produced in the city during the six teenth century, a press being re-established only in 1609. For some information see U. Morini, ‘La tipografia in Pisa dal secolo X V alia metà del secolo X IX ’ and A. Segré, ‘U n libraio ed un tipografo nel secolo X V I in Pisa’, in Miscellanea storico-letteraria a Francesco M a rio tti nel cinquantesimo armo della sua carriera tipografica (Pisa, 1907), 34-43, 67-69; and F. Vincentini, ‘Notizie sulle stampede pisane dalle origini al I860’, Bollettino storico pisano 8 (1939), 33-63. Many examples o f this could be given. Giulio Angeli da Barga (tl601), who taught logic at Pisa and later medicine for some years (1577-92), seems to have published nothing, but left behind many manuscripts. Most are to be found at Pisa, Biblioteca universitaria, 231-234, 332-346, 355.1 am preparing a repertorium of the works of Pisa professors o f the Faculty o f Arts for the period 1543-1609. When this has been com pleted we shall see clearly the extent of the unpublished writings. By this I do not mean to endorse the thesis of Renan, Busson, Randall, and others [recently reiterated by Martin Pine, ‘Pomponazzi and the Problem of “ Double Truth” Journal o f the History o f Ideas 29 (1968), 163-67)] that there was a unique secular quality about Padua which made it more progressive than other universities. It seems to me that the objections o f P. O. Kristeller, ‘The Myth of Renaissance Atheism and the French Tradition o f Free Thought’, Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 6 (1968), 23343 [but first published in Spanish many years ago] have not been adequately met by Pine. What does seem evident, however, is that Padua was a wealthy and prestigious university in a sense in which Pisa was not. In medicine and in mathematics, as well as
Padua not to be found at Pisa. «« See M S Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale, Galileo 27. Cf. Schmitt (note 12), 45. A . Poppi, La dottrina della scienza in Giacomo Zabarella (Padova, 1972), 16. M S Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale, magi. VIII. 49, fois. 176-99 contains a short treatise on syllogisms by Francesco Buonamici apparently used in his instruction of law students. Cf. Garin, Scienza e vita civile nel Rinascimento italiano (Bari, 1965), 141. The extent to which the Aristotelian logical texts were used in the instruction of law students has hardly been studied. When the research o f Dr. H. Jaeger o f Paris, which in part deals with the way in which logical texts were used to instruct law students, has been published we should be in a better position to evaluate the significance of this aspect of “ Aristotelianism.” See N . W . Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts o f Method (New York, 1960), 152-57 and C. Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica dell’Umanesimo (Milano, 1968), 521-27. Ramus’s influence seems to have been confined nearly completely to Protestant philosophers. The researches of Ong, Risse, and Vasoli seem to show this. See the remarks by Garin (note 68), 109-46 and E. A . Moody, ‘Galileo and Avempace: the Dynamics of the Leaning Tower Experiment’, Journal o f the History o f Ideas 12 (1951), 163-93, 375-422, as well as my paper referred to in note 48 and my forth coming papers ‘The University of Pisa in the Renaissance’, History o f Education 2 (1973) and ‘Girolamo Borro’s Multae sunt rwstrorum ignorantium causae (Ms. Vat. Ross. 1009)’, Humanism and Philosophy: Renaissance Essays in Honor o f Paul Oskar Kristeller (scheduled for publication in 1973). By ‘conservative’ here I mean that the philosophy teaching at Pisa was little influenced by the humanist movement, which perhaps more than anything else represented progressivism and novelty at the time. That is to say, at Pisa little attempt was made to study the Greek text of Aristotle and little use was made of the newly recovered ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle. This, I think, offers a significant contrast with Padua. ’ 2 See our discussion below, p. 503. ■^8 For some indications see Schmitt (note 48). See esp. U . Viviani, Tre medici aretini (A . Cesalpino, F. Redi, e F. F o lli) (Arezzo, 1936), 5-72; the introduction of M. Dorolle to Césalpino, Questions péripatéticiennes (Paris, 1929), 1-93; and W . Pagel, William Harvey’s Biological Ideas (Basel, 1967), 169-209. For his influence in Germany some information is to be found in P. Petersen, (note 34). C. E. Mallett, A History o f the University o f Oxford (London, 1924-27), 3 vols, is of little use, though it does present to us a number of facts and anecdotes. More valuable are W . S. Howell, L ogic and Rhetoric in England 1500-1700 (Princeton, 1956); M. H. Curtis, O xford and Cambridge in Transition 1558-1642 (Oxford, 1959); Fletcher (note 10); J. K. McConica, English Humanists and Reformation Politics (Oxford, 1965); and H . Kearney, Scholars and Gentlemen: Universities arui Society in Pre-Industrial Britain, 1500-1700 (London, 1970). Further bibliography is to be found in the excellent volume E. H. Cordeaux & D . H. Merry, A Bibliography o f Printed Works Relating to the Uni versity o f O xford (Oxford, 1968). A new general history of the university is now being prepared under the direction o f T. H . Aston. 7® For some information on the changing situation see Curtis (note 75), 36ff. See also A . B. Emden, An O xford H a ll in Medieval Times, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1968), 228-9, which discusses the reduction o f the number o f halls in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.
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77 Clark (note 57) is still the best source of information on this. ’ 8 Clark (note 57), 170-9,189-94 lists the questions disputed in philosophy and medi cine for the years 1576-1622.
Introductio in metaphysicam authore Ri[chardo] Crakanthorpe olim Collegii Reginae Oxon. Socio (Oxoniae, 1619). The same author also wrote Logicae libri quinque: de praedicabilibus, de praedicamentis, de syllogismo, de syllogismo demonstrativo, de syllo gismo probabili... (Londini, 1622), a long comprehensive treatment o f the subject. Zabarella again stands out as a major authority. On Crakenthorpe see D N B V, 2-3 and
’ 9 Some sample disputations seem to be preserved in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Rawl. D.274, fols. 127-259. This is John Day’s notebook and it illustrates both the range of questions discussed and the authorities used. To cite but a few examples should suflBce to give an idea of its contents: “A n corpus naturale sit subiectum physices?” (with a mention of Zabarella in the discussion) [132]; “ An ratio insit brutis?” (with references to Galen, Toletus, and Fonseca) [141]; “ A n motus sit in mobile vel in movente?” (with reference to Toletus) [144]; “ A n mixta moveantur admotum elementi praedominantis?” [159]; “ A n amicitia sit virtus?” (with a quotation from Plato in Greek) [213]. Among the authorities most frequently cited in the disputations are the Collegium Conimbricense, Fonseca, Javellus, Piccolomineus, Thomas Aquinas, Toletus, Zabarella, and Zanchius. Cf. Kearney (note 75), 82-8. Op. cit. For a discussion of the situation and an incisive critique of Kearney’s meth odological and factual shortcomings see the review by J. K. McConica in English Historical Review 87 (1972), 121-5. There were, however, other books of Aristotelian orientation and the early seven teenth century brought an increase in Aristotle editions. For Oxford see F. Madan, O xford Books (Oxford, 1895-1931) I, 317 {ad indicem). *2 See Cranz (note 14) for details.
*3 Analysis Analyticorum Posteriorum sive librorum Aristotelis de demonstratione, in qua singula capita per quaestiones et responsiones perspicue exponuntur', adhibitis qui busdam scholiis ex optimis quibusque interpretibus desumptis, opera et studio G. P . Oxoniensis confecta et edita in usum iuniorum (Oxoniae, 1594; editio secunda, Oxoniae, 1631) and Analysis lib. Aristotelis de sophisticis elenchis, in qua singula capita per quaes tiones et responsionespercipue et dilucide exponuntur... opera et studio G. P . Oxoniensis confecta et edita in usum iuniorum (Oxoniae, 1598). For additional information on Powel see Dictionary o f National Biography (hereafter D N B ) XVI, 243. Dialectica loannis Setoni Cantabrigensis... I have used the London, 1577 ed. The work was first printed, it seems, in 1545 and was reprinted at least ten times between then and 1639. For further information on the work and its author see Howell (note 75), 50-6. Elementa logicae in gratiam studiosae iuventutis in Academia Oxoniensi. Authore Edouardo Brerewood olim Aeneanasensis alumno dignissimo (Londini, 1614), which was reprinted at least ten times by 1684. On Brerewood see D N B II, 1181-82. 86 . Qui primos in hac re obtinent, sunt Niphus et Pacius, quorum uterque mihi post bellum finitum in subsidium venit, utriusque tamen ope et opera in quibusdam locis explicandis usus sum.” Analysis... de sophisticis elenchis... (note 83), fol. 4*’. 87 “ Ego levem ac simplicem illam viam tyronibus ostendi, per quam, tamquam per ianuam ad diligentissimam et exactissimam aliorum interpretationem, praesertim Zabarellae et Crellii (quos solos in hac re consuli vellem) aditus patefiat.” Analysis Analyticorum Posteriorum... (note 83), fol. 5>^. 88 Tractatus de demonstratione methodicus et polemicus quatuor libris absolutus: ante haec in usum iuventutis in Collegio Wadhami apud Oxonienses privatis praelectionibus traditus, a loanne Flavel A rt. M ag. et eiusdem Collegii Socio (Oxoniae, 1619). On Flavel see D N B VII, 253. 8^ Ibid., Xyi-AX, De regressu, ubi obiter de circulo, which is largely drawn from Zabarel la.
Kearney (note 75), 83. 91 In the near future I plan to work on Case in greater depth. For the present some in formation is contained in D N B III, 1171-2; Howell (note 75), 190-3; and W . H. Ste venson & H. E. Salter, Early History o f St. John’s College Oxford (Oxford, 1939) 133, 256, 337-8. Among his writings are Speculum quaestionum moralium in universam Aristotelis philosophi summi Ethicen... (Oxoniae, 1585) [the first book printed at Ox ford]; Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam Aristotelis... (Oxoniae, 1592); Ancilla philosophiae seu epitome in octo libros physicorum Aristotelis... (Oxoniae, 1599); and Lapis philosophicus seu commentarius in octo libros physicorum Aristotelis in quo arcana physiologiae examinantur (Oxford, ca. 1600). Cited above in note 78. See Clark (note 57), 21-3 ; Curtis (note 75), 89. For further information on the teach ing system at Oxford at the time see also the works of Weisheipl (note 6) and Fletcher (note 10). For details of the visits see the reports printed in C. Plummer (ed.), Elizabethan Oxford. Reprints o f Rare Tracts (Oxford, 1887). Clark (note 57), 170-9, under the year 1581. Other related questions include: “ An natura intendat foeminam?” (1585); “ An foeminarum ingenia sint acutiora quam virorum?” (1590); “ An foeminae jucundius vivant quam viri” (1495); “ Foeminae esse debent literatae?” (1596); “A n reprehendendus sit Aristoteles quia inter bona felicis bonam uxorem non commemoravit?” (1606). In the section entitled “ De utriusque professoris munere et officio,” we read “ Ge nethliacorum vero doctrinae et totius in universum divinatricis astrologiae sibi penitus noverit [scii, professor astronomiae] interdictam professionem.” S. Gibson (éd.), Statuta antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis (Oxford, 1931), 529. For this aspect of Dee see esp. P. J. French, John Dee: The World o f an Elizabethan Magus (London, 1972), which cites earlier literature. See also N . H. Clulee, ‘John Dee’s Mathematics and the Grading of Compound Qualities’, Ambix 18 (1971), 178211. Unfortunately, many recent students of Dee have overemphasized this “ occult” side and have failed to recognize his more conventional scientific and mathematical achievements. See, however, E. Rosen, ‘John Dee and Commandino’, Scripta mathema tica 28 (1970), 521-6; P. L. Rose, ‘Commandino, John Dee and the D e superficierum divisionibus of Machometus Bagdedinus’, Isis 63 (1972), 88-93 and the further note by A. G. Watson in Isis 64 (1973), 382-3. 98 The following examples are taken from Clark (note 57), 170-9. It is interesting to note that the anti-alchemical and perhaps generally anti-occult thrust of these questions parallels a similar attitude in John Case. See, for example, his Lapis philosophicus (note 91) 175-83 and passim. For example. Case discusses the question “ Utrum arte chymica naturale aurum fiat” at some length (pp. 181-3), concluding that “ artem posse rem vere naturalem fingere, aurumque verum et naturale efformare,” though he rejects the conventional alchemical solution to the question and is particularly critical of the Paracelsians. Case distinguishes sharply between the legitimate Aristotelian use of “ art” and the illegitimate use of it characterized by the Paracelsians. I shall discuss this question further in my forthcoming study on Case.
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9® See F. Madan et a l. Summary Catalogue o f Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at O xford (Oxford, 1895-1953) III, 95 [no. 10, 318]. I plan to study this MS in greater detail on another occasion.
113 Statuta Dominorum Artistarum Achademiae Patavinae (Venetiis, ca. 1496), 28'^. There is a microfilm o f the Marciana copy [shelfmark; 12.C.141] o f this rare work in the Wellcome Library [microfilm 8 9] which I use. The text is also printed in the 1589 ed. o f the Statuta and in A. Favaro, ‘Lo Studio di Padova al tempo di Niccolô Copernico’, A tti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed A rti, ser. 5, 6 (1880), 285-356. See
100 This subject has been largely studied by historians of English vernacular literature who have nearly uniformly given undue emphasis to the so-called literary works written in the vernacular language and have paid little attention to the vast learned literature of the period written in Latin. 101 On this see my Cicero Scepticus. A Study o f the Influence o f the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972), 78-108.
102 por a survey of the situation at Harvey’s time see G. Whitteridge, William Harvey and the Circulation o f the Blood (London-New York, 1971), 9^0 . For the situation a hundred years earlier, i.e. in Linacre’s time, see my ‘Thomas Linacre and Italy’, to appear in Linacre Studies, ed. F. Maddison & M. Felling (Oxford, 1975). 103 For some general information see P. A . Saccardo, L a botanica in Italia (Venezia, 1895) [also published in Mem orie del R. Istituto Veneto... 25, no. 4]. 104 There is now quite a large literature on this, but see esp. E. Chiovenda, “ Nota sulla fondazione degli orti medici di Padova e di Pisa,” A tti dell’ V I I I congresso internazionale di storia della medicina (Roma, 1930; published Pisa, 1931), 488-509. 105 An adequate history of botany during this period has yet to be written, though there is a large, widely dispersed secondary literature on the subject. For some informa tion with additional bibliography see K. H . Dannenfeldt, Leonhard Rauwolf (Cam bridge, Mass., 1968); H . Fischer, Conrad Gessner, 1516-1565 (Zürich, 1966); C. B. Schmitt, ‘Some Notes on Jacobus Dalechampius and His Translation of Theophrastus (Manuscript: B N , lat. 11, 857)’, Gesnerus 26 (1969), 36-53; J. Stannard, ‘Dioscorides and Renaissance Materia Medica’, Analecta Medico-Historica (London, 1966), 1-21 ; J. Stannard, ‘P. A . Mattioli; Sixteenth-Century Conunentator on Dioscorides’, Bibliographical Contributions. University o f Kansas Libraries I (1969), 59-81. A funda mental orientation is provided by C. E. Dubler, ‘La materia médica’ de Dioscorides: transmisiôn medieval y renacentista (Barcelona, 1953-59), 6 vols. 106 See esp. L. Sabbatani, ‘La cattedra dei semplici fondata a Bologna da Luca Ghini’, Studi e memorie per la storia dell’Université di Bologna 9 (1926), 13-53. For further in formation and additional bibliography see the article by A . G. Keller in Dictionary o f Scientific Biography (hereafter D S B ). 5 (1972), 383-84. 107 For Ghini’s “simplicis medicinae tradendae et monstrandae munus” see Sabbatani (note 106) 20,32. For a similar example at Pisa see Schmitt (note 48), 254n.57. 108 Sabbatani, 20-1.
also my paper cited above in note 102 11^ G . de Bertolis, ‘Alessandro Benedetti: il primo teatro anatomico padovano’, A cta medicae historiae Patavinae 3 (1956-57), 1-13; E. A . Underwood, ‘The Early Teaching of Anatomy at Padua with Special Reference to a Model of the Padua Anatomical Theatre’, Annals o f Science 19 (1963), 1-26, esp. 5-6; W . Heckscher, Rembrandt’s Anatomy o f D r. Nicolaas Tulp (New York, 1958), 182-3. For the text in Benedetti de scribing his theatre see [Alexander Benedictus], Historia corporis humani sive anatomice [Venice, 1502]. For a discussion o f the significance o f this see my paper on Linacre cited above in note 102. 115 The next paragraphs are based on my paper cited above in note 48 and on my forth coming ‘The University of Pisa in the Renaissance’, History o f Education 2 (1973). 11« Here I base myself largely on A . Favaro, ‘I lettori di matematiche nella Université di Padova dal principio del secolo X IV alia fine del X V F, M em orie e documenti per la storia della Université di Padova 1 (1922), 1-70; G. Crapulli, Mathesis universalis: genesi di una idea nel X V I secolo (Roma, 1969), esp. 42-62. For possible occult ten dencies see the paper of Galluzzi cited below in note 118, esp. 49 n. 24.
109 p of Ghini see the testimony o f Benedetto Varchi, Questione sull’alchimia, codice inedito (Firenze, 1827), 34, which reads “ ...Mess. Luca Ghini Medico, e Semplicista singularissimo, oltra la grande non solamente cognizione, ma pratica dei Minerali tutti quanti, secondo che a me parve quando gli udii da lui pubblicamente nello Studio di Bologna...” Cf. Sabbatani (note 106), 20-1. 110 See Schmitt (note 48), 254-55.
117 Crapulli (note 116), 44. 11® In primum Euclidis Elementorum librum commentariorum lib ri //// (Patavii, 1560). On Barozzi’s life and works see, in addition to the works cited in note 116, also B. Boncompagni, ‘Intorno alia vita ed ai lavori di Francesco Barozzi’, BuUettino di bibliografia e di storia delle scienze matematiche 17 (1884), 795-848; Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani V I (1964), 495-9; G. C. Giacobbe, ‘Francesco Barozzi e la Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum', Physis 14 (1972), 162-93 ; and P. Galluzzi, ‘II “ Platonismo” dei tardo Cinquecento e la filosofia di Galileo’, in P. Zambelli (ed.), Ricerche sulla cul tura delVItalia moderna (Bari, 1973), 39-79, esp. 49-53. 11® For some information see Crapulli (note 116), 44-50. 120 p. L. Rose & S. Drake (note 26), esp. 92-96. 121 A . Riccoboni, Orationes (Patavii, 1591), 41-46. 122 On this see esp. Kristeller (note 21), 553-83 (‘Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance’), as well as the same author’s paper cited in note 8. 123 The first incumbent was apparently Niccolô Leonico Tomeo (1456-1531). For the document telling of his appointment see J. L. Heiberg, Beitrage zur Geschichte Georg Valla’s und seiner Bibliothek (Leipzig, 1896), 19. See also I. Facciolati, Fasti Gymnasii Patavii (Patavii, 1757), vol. I, L V -L V I. On Leonico Tomeo in general the best study seems to be A. Serena, Appunti letterari (Roma, 1903), 3-32. According to another tradition going back to Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, Francesco Cavalli was the first to teach Aristotle from the Greek text at Padua. See Schmitt (note 102), note 91 and pas
111 For some information see Intorrw alia vita e alle opere di U. Aldrovandi (Bologna, 1907), an excellent volume which has unfortunately inspired little further research on the topic. See also the article of C. Castellani in D S B I (1970), 108-10. 112 This subject does not seem to have been adequately treated in the literature, but see F. Pellegrini, La clinica medica padovana attraverso i secoli (Verona, 1939), 81 flF.; C. D. O ’Malley (ed.). The History o f Medical Education (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1970), 95-96. This paragraph is based on these works.
sim. 124 For some general information see Kristeller (note 21), 341 n. 13. On specific points see B. Nardi (note 3), 365-442 (“ II commento di Simplicio al D e anima nelle controversie della fine del secolo X V a del secolo X V I”) ; C. B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco P ico della Mirandola (1469-1533) and His Critique o f Aristotle (The Hague, 1967) ad indicem [John Philoponus]; F. E. Cranz, ‘Alexander Aphrodisiensis’, in Catalogus transla tionum et commentariorum (Washington, 1960f.) I, 77-135; II, 411-22; and E. P. M a-
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honey, ‘Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander of Aphrodisias: an U n noticed Dispute’, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 23 (1968), 268-96. Dr. C. H. Lohr of the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut of the University of Freiburg is the general editor o f a new project to reprint the Renaissance translations of the Greek commentaries on Aristotle [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Corpus versionum Latinarum sedecimo (sic) saeculo impressorum] with the Minerva Publishing Co. of Frankfurt. When these reprints are available further work on this material will become easier. 125 See above note 28. 128 This generalization must be subjected to careful study. At present I can offer no specific documentation for this view. 127 See esp. R. G. Villoslada, L a universidad de Paris durante las estudios de Francisco de Vitoria O .P. (1507-1522) (Romae, 1938). 12® On this see esp. M. Bataillon, Erasme et l ’Espagne (Paris, 1937). 129 For natural philosophy see esp. the studies of W . A . Wallace, including ‘The Enig ma of Domingo de Soto: Uniformiter difformis and Falling Bodies in Late Medieval Physics’, Isis 59 (1968), 384-401; ‘The “ Calculatores” in Early Sixteenth-Century Physics’, British Journal fo r the History o f Science 4 (1969), 221-32, where further ref erences may be found. For logic see the many publications o f V. Munoz Delgado, esp. La logica nominalista en la Universidad de Salamanca (1510-1530) (Madrid, 1964) and ‘Lôgica Hispano-Portuguesa hasta 1600 (Notas bibliografico-doctrinales)’ in Repertorio de historia de las ciendas eclesiasticas en EspanaW (1972), 9-122 (with a bibliographical foundation for other studies). 130 A general orientation with additional bibliography on this vast subject is to be found in G. Fraile, Historia de la filosofia H L D el Humanismo a la Ilustracion (Madrid, 1966), 410-21,
projectile motion, with those of Buridan or Albert of Saxony or with the discussion of this problem by members of the “ Merton School.” The fourteenth-century treatments are far more detailed. 136 I am preparing a study of the diffusion of the Commentaries throughout Europe. This will be accompanied by a bibliography of the various printings. In general, the in dividual commentaries were printed from ten to twenty times during the years 15901635. For example, the D e anima has the following editions: Coimbra, 1598; Cologne, 1600,1603, 1609,1617,1619,1629; Lyon, 1600,1604,1612,1616, 1627; Venice, 1602, 1606, 1608, 1616; Strasbourg, 1627. 137 Some information is to be found in E. Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médié vale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris, 1930) and Levi (note 52). Further bibliography can be found in the section by L. V. Rosenfield (‘Aristotelian and Scho lastic Tradition’) in Critical Bibliography o f French Literature (Syracuse, 1947-68) III,
131 Cursus philosophicus thomisticus secundum exactam, veram, genuiruim Aristotelis et Doctoris Angelici mentem (Madrid, 1637-8), which went through various later editions. Cf. the useful article with further bibliography in Enciclopedia filosofica, 2nd. ed. (Firenze, 1967) III, 206-7 (by A. Munoz Alonso). 132 The course began to be published in 1624 and was reprinted several times thereafter. A five volume version is Cursus philosophicus Collegii Complutensis ad clariorem f o r mam redactus (Lugduni, 1670f.). Florencio dei Nifio Jesus, Los complutenses (Madrid, 1961) is the best secondary work. Cf. Enciclopedia filosofica (note 131) I, 1506-7. 133 This can be seen, for example, in the rather half-hearted way in which the problem o f the void is treated in Collegii Complutensis... Disputationes in octo libros physicorum Aristotelis (Lugduni, 1667), 215-9. This might be contrasted with the vigorous and “ modern” approach to the subject found in a “ progressive” and “ experimental” Aris totelian such as Emmanuel Maignan. See his Cursus philosophicus (note 18), 228-46. The process of increasing simplification in logic in the scholastic manual tradition was called to attention some years ago by P. Boehner, Medieval Logic: An Outline o f Its Development from 1250 to ca. 1400 (Chicago, 1952). 134 These were only in part “ commentaries” [i.e. for the Physica, De coelo, Meteora, Parva naturalia. De anima, and De generatione et corruptione]. The Ethica Nicomachea volume is a relatively brief collection of disputations and the common Dialectica [under which title were published two quite different recensions] only covers a part of the Organon. There was no commentary on the Metaphysica [but that of Fonseca was commonly used to fill this lacuna], nor on the Poetica, Politica. Rhetorica, Oecono mica, etc. 135 It is instructive to compare the Physics commentary, especially the sections on
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486-90. 138 Cranz (note 14). 139 For the early part of the century much valuable information is to be found in A. Renaudet, Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d ’Italie (1494-1517) (Paris, 1916; 2nd, ed. Paris, 1953) and Villoslada (note 127). Though we lack a comprehensive and detailed study for the later period much valuable informa tion is to be found in C. P. Goujet, Mém oire historique et littéraire sur le collège royal de France (Paris, 1758); A. Lefranc, Histoire du collège de France (Paris, 1893); W . J. Ong, Ramus: Method and Decay o f Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass., 1958); as well as the unwieldy, difficult to use, and often unreliable C. E. Bulaeus, Historia universitatis Parisiensis (Parisiis, 1665-73; repr. Frankfurt, 1966), esp. vol. 6. A useful guide, esp. for the extant manuscript and archival sources, is J. Bonnerot, ‘L ’ancienne Université de Paris, centre international d’études’. Bulletin o f the International Committee o f H is torical Sciences 1 (1926-29), 661-82. 140 See V. L. Saulnier, ‘Médicins de Montpellier au temps de Rabelais’, Bibliothèque d'humanisme et Renaissance 19 (1957), 425-79; Matricule de V Université de Médecine de Montpellier (1503-1599) (Genève, 1957). 141 For some indications see Villoslada (note 127) and H. Elie, ‘Quelques maîtres de l’université de Paris vers l’an 1500’, Archives d ’histoire doctrinale et littéraire au moyen âge 18 (1950-1). 193-243 and M. Clagett, The Science o f Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, 1959), 638-40, 653-59, as well as the older studies of Duhem. 142 Text cited above in note 33. 143 Nitzsch (note 33) has collected and analyzed the relevant information. 144 See the literature cited above in notes 34 and 36 as well as the older works of H. E. Weber, D er Einfluss der protestantischen Schulphilosophie auf die orthodox-lutherische Dogmatik (Darmstadt, 1908; repr. 1968) and Die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie (Leipzig, 1907) and P. Althaus, Die Principien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der Aristotelischen Scholastik (Leipzig, 1914). 145 On Schegk see esp. C. Sigwart, ‘Jakob Schegk, Professor der Philosophie und Medicin’, Kleine Schriften (Freiburg, 1889) I, 256-91 and W . Pagel, ‘William Harvey Revisited’, History o f Science 8 (1969), 1-81 & 9 (1970), 1-41, at 9, 26-30. James Hinz is preparing a Ph. D. thesis on Schegk at Stanford University, and I am indebted to him for allowing me to see his unpublished “ Jacob Schegk (1511-1587), Aristotelian Polymath,” which contains much valuable information. 146 There seems to be little readily accessible information on him, but see Allgemeine
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Deutsche Biographie 26 (1888), 231-2. Though he was one of Kepler’s teachers little attention seems to have been paid to this fact. See, however, the Exhibition Catalogue Kepler und Tübingen (Tübingen, 1971), items 24, 32, 37, 38. Sturm and Melanchthon were the key figures here. O f the large literature devoted to them and their educational ideas see esp. C. Schmidt, La vie et les travaux de Jean Sturm (Strasbourg, 1855: repr. Nieuwkoop, 1970); K. Hartfelder, Philipp Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae Œerlin, 1889) and Petersen (note 34). The studies of Petersen and Wundt amply show this. See also F, Ruello, ‘Christian W olff et la scolastique’. Traditio 19 (1963), 411-25; A . Bissinger, D ie Struktur der Gotteserkenntnis: Studien zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs (Bonn, 1970) and the review of the latter by C. A . Corrin in Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 11 (1973), 270-4. 149 This is too vast a topic to treat here. For a general orientation see d’Irsay (note 1) I, 342-61. The case of Freiburg has been dealt with in T. Kurrus, D ie Jesuiten an der Universitat Freiburg i. Br. 1620-1773 (Freiburg, 1963). 15“ See Edwards (note 37) and Petersen (note 34), esp. 196-9 for some indications. According to Petersen it was Fortunatus Crellius who first introduced Zabarella’s work in Germany. The Strasbourg professor Johannes Hawenreuter was one of Zabarella’s champions in Germany and was responsible for several of the German editions of his works. The Paduan’s writings had a remarkable in Germany as illustrated by the numerous German editions of the Opera logica [Basel, 1594; Cologne, 1597, 1602, 1603; Frankfurt, 1608, 1623] and D e rebus rmturalibus [Cologne, 1590, 1594, 1597, 1601; Frankfurt, 1606, 1617, 1654]. Some information is in Petersen (note 34) ad indicem. Cesalpino’s Quaestiones peripateticae were printed at Cologne in 1646; the De metallicis at Nuremberg in 1602; and the Speculum artis medicae Hippocraticum at Frankfurt in 1605 and at Strasbourg in 1670. 152 See esp. the studies of Eschweiler and Lewalter cited in note 36. 153 This is a general impression which is difficult to document briefly. Among other things there are a number of extant manuscript commentaries on Aristotle from Scot tish universities including the following: Aberdeen, University Library, MS 116 [com mentary on Ethica, dated 1602-3]; M S 150 [annotations on the Organon, dated 1623]; MS 186 [commentary on Logic and Physics, dated 1605-7]; Edinburgh, University Library, MS Dc. 5.55 [annotations on Physica, D e coelo, etc., dated 1661-62]; M S La. 721 [annotations on the Physica, De coelo, etc., dated 1647, from St. Andrews]. 154 O f the large literature on this see R. Kelso, The Doctrine o f the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century (Urbana, 1929); S. R. Jayne, John Colet and Marsilio Ficino (Oxford, 1963); McConica (note 75): and H. C. Porter, Erasmus and Cambridge (Toronto, 1970). 155 Thus the really radical change in university philosophy teaching (i.e. esp. natural philosophy) seems to have come, at least in Northern Europe, at the end of the seven teenth and beginning o f the eighteenth centuries. The detailed analysis o f this pheno menon must wait for another occasion. 15* See the material cited by L. Bertalot, ‘Humanistische Vorlesungsankündigungen in Deutschland im 15. Jahrhundert’, Zeitschrift f iir Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts 5 (1915), 1-24. 157 H. Hermelink, ‘Die Anfânge des Humanismus in Tübingen’, Wiirttembergische Vierteljahrschrift f iir Landesgeschichte, new series, 15 (1906), 319-36. 158 On this term see my book cited above in note 12.
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DISCUSSION c. SCHMITT : I have tried to give a general interpretation of the significance of philosophy and science in sixteenth century universities and to focus on something that perhaps doesn’t fall directly within the scope of this meeting. It does, I think, relate to it insofar as we see the continuity of certain traditions discussed here. On the basis o f research as it now stands, I have tried to summarize what I think the situation is, but it must be emphasized that despite all of the work that has been done on the Renaissance per se, very little has been done on the universities and on the continuity of earlier traditions during this period. In a way I think we are victims of a confused periodization of history. I do not deny that the term ‘Renaissance’ has some meaning, but its significance is more limited than normally realized. It means something quite precise in the development of the arts or in the recovery of classical literature, but I think the term is confusing when applied to science. One of the great problems of history of science is that we now have quite detailed studies on fourteenth century science and on seventeenth century science, but, except for a few major figures like Vesalius and Copernicus, we really know very little indeed about the scientific thought o f the intervening centuries. And we know particularly little about that type of thought which continued in the universities through to the end of the seventeenth century, viz., the medieval philosophical and scientific traditions initiated with the introduction of Aristotelian doctrine in the twelfth century. This formed the foundations of the universities and continued to dominate until the end of the seventeenth century. This unity of the Aristotelian tradition in the West as a domi nant pedagogical instrument is largely lost sight of by virtue of our division of chronol ogy into the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Our particular historiographical ap proach to the Renaissance has emphasized novelty. It has stressed the formation of academies, the introduction o f Platonic philosophy and so forth, but has done very little to try to illuminate the continuity of earlier traditions, Aristotelianism, for exam ple, in the Renaissance. The universities are considered to be typically medieval in stitutions and are therefore not studied by Renaissance scholars with the care that they deserve. I must say that I find many traditional interpretations of the Renaissance very unacceptable; for example, the normal view one gets from various writings on the Renaissance is that Aristotelianism died out and that Platonism took over. It seems to me that no matter how you look at it this is not the case. If you look at it in a purely statistical way, you see something like ten to twenty times as many editions of Aristotle were published during the sixteenth century as were editions of Plato, that Aristotelian ism continued to dominate the universities and was also important in the academies along with Platonism. Even in something like literary theory and practice, where most histories tell us Platonism took over, Aristotelianism again dominated. The other view we often find is that humanism, a creation of the Renaissance, destroyed the scientific spirit of the Middle Ages. It seems to me that this is equally false, and that there is no direct connection between the rise of humanism and the decline of science in the universities. In fact, in the places where we have the best documentation, that is Paris and Oxford, we know that science had already declined fifty years before humanism was introduced into these institutions. N ow the humanists were very critical of the medieval scholastic tradition, but as an institutional factor it
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does not seem that humanism was responsible for the decHne of science in the univer sities. Furthermore, I think that humanism contributed in a number of ways to the development of scientific ideas during the period. Most of all, I think by introducing new texts and by fostering a new critical spirit toward the interpretation of texts. The mathematical works, which I think prove to be a decisive factor in the development o f early modern science, were introduced by humanists and largely translated and edited by humanist mathematicians. G. b e a u j o u a n : On a dit que la guerre est une chose trop sérieuse pour être confiée aux militaires! On pourrait dire de la même manière que l’histoire du XVIe siècle est une chose trop importante pour être confiée aux historiens de la Renaissance! C ’est donc fort à propos que nous sommes invités à discuter le très intéressant rapport de M. Schmitt, même si apparemment il déborde les limites chronologiques de notre colloque. Les questions que je voudrais poser touchent à deux domaines. Le premier se rat tache à la méthodologie de l’histoire des universités au XVIe siècle comparées à celles du moyen âge. Le second, c’est évidemment la diflférence qu’il y a entre l’aristotélisme proprement médiéval et cet aristotélisme qui reprend vigueur à l’époque du Galilée. Sur les grandes lignes, probablement parce que je suis médiéviste, je suis totalement d’accord avec M. Schmitt. Je suis d’accord avec lui sur l’impact relativement faible des innovations scientifiques dans l’enseignement universitaire; sur l’influence relativement limitée - en dehors de la purification des textes - des tendances humanistiques, sur la persistance et même la renaissance de l’aristotélisme dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle; sur l’impact assez faible de la Réforme protestante. Il y a cependant un autre point qui différencie fondamentalement le XVIe siècle du moyen âge, sans que M. Schmitt y ait insisté: c’est l’existence des livres imprimés. La question que je voudrais poser est la suivante; dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que l’emploi des livres imprimés a modifié la pédagogie universitaire? Lorsque l’on catalo gue des fonds de manuscrits, on sent bien que les manuscrits du XVIe siècle n’ont plus la même fonction que ceux du XVe. Si, comme le remarque M. Schmitt, les universités du XVIe siècle ont assumé les progrès de l’anatomie, de la botanique, voire de la géographie, ceci est évidemment en rapport avec l’histoire du livre et de la gravure. c. SCHMITT : The impact of printing upon university education is not a subject that I know a great deal about, but one that should be investigated more fully. I think there is no doubt that printing had a very strong influence on university teaching if for no other reason than that by the second or third decade of the sixteenth century books were relatively cheap and students could have their own copies, whereas in the Middle Ages only wealthy students could aff'ord to own manuscripts. We have a great deal of evidence of this sort of thing. In the middle of the sixteenth century Plato was taught particularly in the Greek courses at Paris and we see a number of very small economical issues of works of Plato, the dialogues, the Greek texts of which are only twenty or thirty pages long. A number of these which exist in various libraries are covered with notes in the margin by a student, which shows that students in the sixteenth century could own their own text books. And this example could be multiplied many times. I think that this is one of the great changes. Furthermore, and this is something that Brian Stock has emphasized several times at the Colloquium, there is greater communication given this situation of printed books. There were fairs in Frankfort and Lyon, for example, where people came from all over Europe to buy books. There was shipping of books from Venice to Northern Europe through the Straits of Gibraltar, and so forth. W e know all of these facts. Books really did change the situation.
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G. b e a u j o u a n : Et au niveau de la pédagogie même? c. SCHMITT : I am not certain whether it really changed the level of instruction in any
way that is completely independent from the fact that humanists developed new methods of giving good critical texts. Modern editors and the medievalists tend to em phasize how bad these humanist texts are and that there are better manuscripts from earlier periods, but I think that on the whole the general quality control, if we can use such a term, of the printed text did change the situation quite significantly. G. b e a u j o u a n : M a seconde observation relative à la méthodologie de l’histoire uni versitaire était la suivante: j ’ai été frappé dans votre rapport par l’observation tout à fait juste que les facultés des arts sont beaucoup plus importantes par exemple à Paris et à Oxford que dans les universités italiennes. Et vous donnez comme explication de l’importance de la faculté des arts à Paris et à Oxford le voisinage d’une faculté de théologie puissante. Je me demande si une autre raison de la débilité relative des facultés des arts italiennes n’était pas qu’il existait en Italie une certaine forme d’ensei gnement primaire et secondaire, je pense par exemple aux écoles d’abaque ou à d’autres enseignements destinés aux enfants de la classe marchande et commerciale. Et d’une manière generale, ma question est la suivante: peut-on vraiment comprendre de l’in térieur le problème des universités du X V I siècle si on ne le juge pas en fonction des autres formes d’enseignement, qu’il s’agisse d’enseignement secondaire ou d’enseigne ment technique plus spécialisé dehors des universités? c. SCHMITT : Yes, this is a very important point and a good criticism of what I have done in this paper. I must admit that I have not looked into the secondary education to the extent that I should have, but in several cases - for instance at Pisa and also at Oxford and Cambridge in the sixteenth century - we find people in universities com plaining that the incoming students are not well prepared, that they do not know Latin, and consequently can’t follow the lectures, and so forth. So, there seems to be some question whether the secondary education was adequate for those going into the uni versities during this period. I did not mean to give the impression that the Arts Faculties were weaker in Italy than in the North. I think that there is a difference in orientation. At Padua, for example (and in general in Italian universities, although there are variations), medicine is con sidered an Arts Faculty subject. At Pisa there was also a very close relation between medical and arts subjects. Theology was quite different and a very small faculty. There was a very large faculty of Law - and this is the general pattern, that Law was by and large perhaps twice as large or more than the Arts Faculty. The important aspect of Italian universities during this period is the Law Faculty about which I have said nothing. G. b e a u j o u a n : Pour ne pas allonger mon commentaire, je pose tout de suite ma question finale, elle concerne la continuité de l’aristotélisme et même sa restauration lors de la tentative de remise en ordre des esprits qui marque la seconde moitié du X VIe siècle. Cette survie d’Aristote ne s’explique pas seulement par la routine. La Renaissance n’a trouvé aucun système philosophique capable de remplacer celui d’Aristote. M. Schmitt se demande pourquoi Averroès a bien survécu dans les univer sités du XVIe siècle, alors que la littérature des Calculationes et Sophismata a com plètement sombré à partir de 1520-1530. C ’est, je pense, parce que l’oeuvre d’Averroès illustre cette cohérence du système aristotélicien alors que, au contraire, la littérature des Sophismata apparaît comme une dégénérescence perverse de la logique d’Aristote. Malheureusement M . Schmitt refuse dans son rapport de caractériser ces nouveaux aristotélismes de la Contre-Réforme par rapport à ceux du moyen âge. Il y a pourtant
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là un point qui me semble pour nous, ici, d’une extrême importance. Peut-être M . Schmitt pourrait-il nous caractériser ici ce que sont, selon lui, les différences impor tantes entre l’aristotélisme de la fin du XVIe siècle et l’aristotélisme médiéval. Voilà: c’est un peu lui demander d’ajouter trois pages à son rapport, mais ce sont, je crois, trois pages utiles.
T. GREGORY: Je crois, en ce qui concerne le problème posé pour l’histoire des uni versités, qu’il serait très important d’utiliser aussi les reportationes des étudiants: elles sont tout à fait nécessaires, je crois, pour connaître la vie réelle des universités. C ’est dommage qu’on n’ait pas un répertoire des reportationes de la Renaissance et du XVIIe siècle. Il y en a un grand nombre dans les bibliothèques européennes et je crois qu’elles sont parmi les sources les plus importantes pour connaître la variation des perspectives dans la culture des universités à la Renaissance. Dans les reportationes, les étudiants saisissent souvent des nuances, des mots d’fôprit qui témoignent la vivacité de l’ensei gnement du professeur, ses polémiques contre certaines thèses traditionnelles, ou contre certains collègues ; et tout ce-là est parfois très important pour suivre le mouvement réel
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c. s c h m it t : This is very diflScult and, if I might just make a sort of parenthetical statement of how I came to study this subject at all, I think this might illuminate the problem to some degree. I began by studying the university o f Pisa at the end o f the sixteenth century because I thought it might shed some light on Galileo. Most scholars working on Galileo have emphasized his connection to Padua and his relation to non university traditions o f the sixteenth century or perhaps to traditions of the fourteenth century. But it seemed to me that it would be more useful, if there were a scholastic in fluence on Galileo, to look at what was going on at Pisa when he was a student there. It became apparent to me after a year or two that this method of approach had numer ous difficulties, the main one of which is that you can’t really study Pisa in isolation from other universities; you must study what is going on in general throughout Europe. When I looked at other universities, mostly focusing upon six or ten characteristic universities, some Protestant, some Catholic, some German, some Spanish, some Italian, and so on, it became apparent that there was tremendous diversity. I have almost come to the conclusion that you can’t make any general statement about sixteenth century universities. To distinguish between, say, universités in 1500 and universities in 1350 would, I think, involve great problems. I think that you could do it for individual uni versities. One can say, for example, that Oxford in 1550 as compared to Oxford in 1350 or 1400 had certain very different characteristics. In 1350, of course, the Merton School was still very strong. In 1400 it is less strong and the impression I get is that Scotist philosophy and theology were the dominant factors. The very technical and high level intellectual activities o f the Merton School were almost lost sight o f and the logic text books were sort of watered-down versions of what they had been fifty years earlier. In 1550 we see this tradition that spanned the fifteenth century dying out. W e see the advent o f humanism, Ramus was beginning to hit Oxford (in the 1550’s and 1560’s this hap pened), we see a new emphasis on learning Greek, and so on. There is, in short, a strong humanistic influence. At the end of the century we find a revival of Aristotelianism, but it is not the Aristotelianism of the fourteenth century; it is an Aristotelianism that comes largely by way of Italy, an Aristotelianism that has certain humanist aspects, but also one that gives due emphasis to Italian commentators on Aristotle, such as Nifo, Boccadiferro, and Zabarella. So this is the case with Oxford. I think that one can do the same for other universities, but to give a characteristic view of universities in, say, 1550, is, I think, very, very diflficult. There are so many regional variations that it is almost impossible to generalize. G. b e a u j o u a n : Et même on peut se demander si la caractéristique à un moment n’est pas propre à tel collège plutôt qu’à l’ensemble de l’université. c. s c h m it t : Yes, this is another thing that is very important: the college system be came dominant in the English imiversities and continued in some degree also in Sala manca and Paris. The Italian universities had residential colleges but as there was no instruction in the colleges there was greater unity. In fact, the Continental system with a few exceptions, Paris probably the most important one, was a single university with general lectures being given by the professors, with unified statutes, whereas the English universities had great variations from college to college. This is a characteristic which has remained to the present day.
des idées. Pour le XVIIe siècle - je m’excuse, je déborde un peu les limites chronologiques il y a une autre source que je crois très importante, plus importante aussi que les ma nuels - la variation dans la culture réelle est toujours en avance en égard aux manuels - : les positions des thèses, qu’il faudrait étudier. On voit s’annoncer des problèmes et des intérêts nouveaux qui étaient en train d’animer et modifier la culture universitaire. En ce qui concerne les manuels, il faut encore pousser la recherche parce que les manuels constituent sans doute un moyen d’unification des écoles différentes. Si on considère les manuels de Colmbre, on peut voir qu’il y a une structure de pensée qui est toujours aristotélicienne, mais on développera par exemple les doxographies. L à nous voyons l’influence de l’humanisme. Il y a des perspectives sur l’histoire des doctrines qui ne changent pas tout de suite la pensée aristotélicienne, mais qui donnent des ma tériaux pour changer les perspectives. En ce qui concerne les problèmes justement posés par M . Beaujouan sur la différence entre l’aristotélisme à la fin du XVIe siècle et au moyen âge, il faut avant tout souligner la diversité substantielle des universités, mais aussi des milieux intellectuels. Par exemple, il y a une tradition averroïste qui est presque toujours la même. A u X lIIe siècle elle représentait une position avancée, au XVIe siècle il est évidemment une position ar riérée, très conservatrice. Il y a une continuité des écoles qui, selon la période, va changer en réalité; le cas de l’averroïsme est typique. On doit aussi distinguer, dans les traditions de l’université, les branches différentes de la recherche philosophique: quelqu’unes restent presque telles quelles dans leur thématique traditionnelle (c’est le cas de la métaphysique, par exemple), d’autres changent profondément, comme par exemple la logique va f.hanger de façon très profonde, sous l’influence de l’école d’Oxford sur tout. L ’influence de la logique nominaliste surtout est très large jusqu’à la fin du XVIIe siècle. A l’intérieur de l’aristotélisme il faut donc distinguer entre une discipline et l’autre. La logique, par exemple, a une histoire tout à fait particulière. G. beau jou an : M . Schmitt a raison de marquer que, si la logique nominaliste eut une certaine importance au XVIe siècle, son influence déclina tout de même à partir des ann ées, disons, 1530. Son recul semble dès lors rapide. M.-Th. d a l v e r n y : Je pense qu’il faudrait ajouter un petit mot pour une autre tradi tion qui est à la fois philosophique et scientifique et dure pendant tout le moyen âge, mais est tout de même très développée encore au XVIe siècle, c’est la tradition galénique. Parce que la médecine est tout de même basée non seulement sur l’enseignement médical mais aussi sur la philosophie de Galien. Et ce qui est assez curieux, c’est que des auteurs qui dans le reste de leur enseignement suivent les classements d’Aristote, dès qu’ils en viennent a la médecine - je pense à Ibn Sinâ dont le premier livre du Canon est plein d’exposés philosophiques - suivent la philosphie de Galien. c. s c h m it t : Yes, that is a very important point and an omission from my paper.
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Particularly in the methodological discussions of the universities of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries this plays a very important role. M. GILMORE; Charles, you speak toward the end of your paper about the revival of Aristotelian studies and commentaries in the second part of the sixteenth century. I know that you have not intended to deal with the lawyers, but I am struck with the fact that you have in that same period in the law faculties a kind of revolt against earlier humanist criticism. There comes a conviction that texts like the Digest cannot really be understood by what were called mere grammarians or mere philologists. I wonder if you see a parallel kind o f resurrection of the importance o f medieval commentaries occurring in theology, philosophy, and the law. c. SCHMITT: This is a very interesting point. One of the great shortcomings of all my work in this field is my complete ignorance of the history o f law. The one point that I do mention, and this has always been a puzzling point to me, is the editions o f Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle at Venice between 1550 and 1575. This is a fourteen volume work which was reprinted, I think, five times within twenty-five years. N o w they don’t print books like this unless people are reading them, but, at this stage I can’t really make any generalization on a genuine revival of these medieval traditions. There was, of course, in the post-Tridentine period a revival of Thomism. This is very evident in Spain and in Italy and leads to the revival of certain medieval traditions. It would be interesting to trace commentaries on the Physics, for example, to see what the range of authorities mentioned are, say in twenty-five commentaries dating from 1450 to 1650 or something like this, just to get a general idea. But other than this I can’t really say very much. H. o b e r m a n : Charles, you may want to be careful about concluding from reprints to the popularity of the books. In the first place, in the beginning of the sixteenth century there are a remarkable number of printers that go bankrupt. And, secondly, very often books are published because particular politicians provide the initial sum and en courage publication. And then we get the complaint that one can’t sell the books. Just because we have the books in our libraries does not then automatically allow us to say that the book was read. It is not like a medieval manuscript. G. b e a u j o u a n : Ceci pose un problème qui se rattache à la question des sources, que soulevait M . Gregory. Dans la plupart de nos bibliothèques, les livres imprimés sont catalogués même quand ils le sont très minutieusement, sans tenir absolument aucun compte des gloses et des notes qu’ils renferment. Je pense à l’experience actuellement tentée par M. Gingerich, qui à cherché à voir personellement tous les exemplaires im primés de Copernic: elle montre l’intérêt qu’il y a à examiner tous les exemplaires d’une livre en identifiant la main des annotateurs et en remarquant les pages qui sont salies ou les pages qui n’ont jamais été lues par les propriétaires. Ceci constitue une source absolument essentielle de l’histoire universitaire du XVIe siècle: une source qui est pratiquement inaccessible du fait de la manière dont sont catalogués les livres im primés dans toutes les bibliothèques. c. SCHMITT : Yes, this is a very important point. I have looked at many, many editions and copies of, for example, Aristotle’s logic in the sixteenth century in which every vacant space is covered with notes, even interlinear annotations. Very often the an notator becomes tired and by the time he gets through the De interpretatione and the Categories he has given up, but the first few pages o f the books are very often covered and this is characteristic of all sixteenth century textbooks. H. o b e r m a n : Just one comment on the fact that you often find that only the first pages have been very heavily annotated. It seems to me that in this early printing-uni-
S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y UN IVE R SIT IE S
537
versity marriage the matter is not very different from what happens today, when stu dents complain, at least against German academic traditions, that you announce a course on the Middle Ages from Charlemagne until the end of the Middle Ages, but then you never get further than the school of Chartres. Y ou find comments where the student says finis lecture, - and they never went further. The professor used all his time to deal with the first books. c. SCHMITT : Yes, this is a very important point. The statutes say that you should read Aristotle’s Physics and what you very often find is that the manuscript commentaries are only Books I, II, and VIII, for example.
IN D E X
The following index includes names, concepts, and selected Arabic, Greek, and Latin terms. Under the entry ‘manuscripts’ are listed the manuscripts cited. An attempt was made to alphabetize medieval Latin authors by their first names in Anglicized form. Renaissance authors, on the other hand, are generally alphabetized by their last names left in vernacular form. Arabic authors are alphabetized according to the name by which they are most often called. Particles have been ignored in alphabetization unless strong previous tradition emphasizes them. Since to cross-reference every medieval and Renaissance (and, indeed, more modern) author by each of the names he has ever been called by would have unduly lengthened the index, the wise reader should check under each o f the various parts o f a name sought before concluding that its possessor is not referred to in the book. Abailard, Peter see: Peter Abelard ‘Abbasid empire 53, 87, 91, 106, 110 ‘A bd al-Jabbâr 107 ‘A bd al-Rahmân al-§üfi 467 ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr 96, 99 ‘Abdalmalik 89, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 104, 105 ‘Abdalqadir Badran 103 ‘Abdalqâhir al-Baghdâdî 102 ‘Abdalwâhid ibn Ayman 94 ‘Abdassalàm Muhammad Hârün 101 Abelard, Peter see: Peter Abelard ‘Abid ibn Sharya 98 Abraham 157 Abraham ibn Ezra 456, 474 A bü Bakr 94, 95, 97 A bû Bishr Mattâ 79 A bû Hanifa 73 A bû Hâshim 91, 95, 103, 108 A bü Hurayra 92 A bu’l-Çusayn al-Baçri 69, 76, 77, 80 A bu ’l-Jüd ibn al-Layth 45 A bü Kâmil 34, 50, 58, 59, 60, 463 A bü M'shar 194, 202, 203, 206, 212, 215, 216, 476, 515 A bü Rida, M. A. 79 A bu’l-Çaq'ab Jakhdab ibn Jar'ab 94 A bu ’I W afâ’ 53, 55, 59, 474 accidents, definition of 370
Adam of Balsham 209 Adam Wodeham 279, 321, 324, 325, 327-28, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335 additivity 295, 330, 334 Adelard of Bath (Adelhard o f Bath) 159, 188, 194, 197-98, 210 administration (mathematical needs o f) 53-57 administrative bureaus (development o f) in Islam 53-55 Aegidius Romanus see: Giles o f Rome affectus 226, 245, 247, 248, 264 Agricola, Rudolph 513 agrimensores 480, 481 Ahnaf ibn Qays 90 d’Ailly, Peter see: Peter d’Ailly Ailnoth 441 Ajo G. y Sainz de Zùniga, C. M. 515 al-Akhtal 100 ^alama (sign) 69, 70, 77, 79, 82 Alan of Lille 165, 198, 200, 202 Albert of Saxony 303, 337, 425, 529 Albertus Magnus 165, 168, 178, 338, 482 Albumasar see: Abu Ma'shar alchemy 194, 206, 208, 213-14, 440 contrasted with astrology 214 scientia de alkimia 205 Aldrovandi, U . 503
540
INDEX
Alessio, F. 212, 438 Alexander of Aphrodisias 177, 508 Alexander Neckham 160 Alexander of Villedieu 446, 481 Alfarabi see: al-Fârâbï Alfarghani see: al-Farghani Alfonsus Vargus Toletanus 314 Algazel, see: al-Ghazali algebra, Islamic 4, 6, 33-60, 147 (arithmetization o f) 34-40 (autonomy of) 51, 57-58 (development o f symbolism in) 33 (historiography o f) 33-34, 50-52 (philosophy of) 40-42, 51 (social history o f) 50-59 (systematization o f) 43-50 Alger of Liège 166 Alhazen see: Ibn al-Haytham ‘All 91, 95 ‘Ali ibn al-‘Abbas 158, 211, 440 ‘Alids 95, 96 Alkindi see: al-Kindi allegory see: nature, allegorical interpre tation of Alonso Alonso, M, 145, 211, 472 Alpago, Andrea 146 Althaus, P. 529 Alvarus Thomas 343 Alvise de Cadamosto 466 *amal (action) 482 amâra (sign) 69, 70, 76, 77, 79, 82, 83 Ambrose 163, 179, 394 Amine, Osman 145 ‘âmm (general) 72, 73, 75, 76, 77 Ammonius 146 amr (imperative) 72, 75, 76 ‘Am r ibn Sa'id al-Ashdaq 97 ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd 88 analogy see: qiyas analysis (languages of) in fourteenth century learning 25, 280-87 origins 287-89 application of 289-307 compared to thirteenth century synthesis 307-9 and their social base 309-12 see also: measure languages ancilla (handmaid) 380
Andronicus o f Rhodes 176 Angeli da Bargo, Guilio 522 angelic motion 289 angles, measures o f 468 anima mundi 199, 201 animal intelligens 199 Annerstedt, C. 487, 520 al-Ançâri, Çafwàn 88 Anselm 109, 325 anthropocentric 396 £inti-intellectualism 429-30, 510, 513 see also: contra vanam curiositatem àvTiXÆtuPàvû) (apprehend) 64, 65, 77 Antoni, Carlo 260 Antonius Andrea 168 apologetics 88
àjiôSeiÇiç apparentia 433, 434 al-*aql (intellect) 73 Aquinas, Thomas see: Thomas Aquinas Arabic language (structure o f) 51 Arabic science see: science, Arabic Archimedes 43, 44, 473 architecture, medieval and practical mathematics 444-63,482, 483-84 Aristotle (his works, Aristotelianism) 23, 42, 60, 75, 79,107,122,123,124,130, 131,132,133,134,135,146,147,152, 153, 157, 159, 161, 162, 167, 168-83, 185,186,187,194,199,210,215,216, 275,276,278,281,284,298, 308,309, 313,318,320,322,323, 328,332,337, 338, 340, 351, 352, 353, 355-57, 360, 361, 363, 366, 367, 369, 370,373, 393, 397, 398,401,408,413,417,423,426, 430,433, 487-537 passim (study of Greek text o f) 491 of Middle Ages and 16th century com pared 533-34, 535 printing of his works 498-99, 509-10, 517 arithmetic 33-60 passim, 124, 125, 4SI Arius 164 Arnald o f Villanova 267, 318, 516 Arnaldez, M. 51 Arnault de Zwolle, Henri 477 Amobius 163
IND E X arts (jechne) 118ff, 120-21, 122, 483 see also: liberal arts Arts Facuhies 23,275, 336, 349, 378,488, 533 al-Ash‘ari 66 Ash'arites 87, 110 Asclepius 201, 207 Ashworth, E. J. 520 Aspall, Geoffrey o f 389 Aston, T. H. 514, 523 astrolabe 217-18, 440, 464, 478, 480 astrology 9, 124, 194 203, 208, 215, 278 (natural vs superstitious) 214-15 and astronomy 213-14, 215 and magic 214 and science 207-8, 213-14 as expression of a new concept of nature 203-6 in 16th century universities 505-6 astronomical tables 463-64, 467 astronomy Copernican contemporary religious reaction to 398^104 hypothetical? 404-7, 415-16 mathematical 44, 54, 414-15 as intermediary between algebra and practice 51, 52-53, 57 in al-Fàrâbi 124, 125 in medicine 202-3, 215 in navigation 463-68, 478 in Sentence commentaries 278-79 in 16th century universities 505-6 see also: instruments, astronomical Athanasius 164 atheism 522 Athenagoras 162 atomism 490, 501 auctoritas 196, 197, 198, 325 augmentation 296, 328 Augustine (Augustinian) 109, 153, 163, 166,179,199,212,213,230,231,237, 257,267, 316, 338, 344,353,272, 394, 401, 417, 422, 429, 430, 431, 438 Aulus Gellius 163 Aurifaber, J. 420 Authier, F. 474 authority (ecclesiastical) 374
541
authoritarian 221 autonomy o f man 359, 407 o f secondary causes 212, 213, 216 o f science 5, 349, 352-53, 354, 359, 363, 372, 373, 377 vs a “sublimated science” 363, 367 Avempace see: Ibn Bâjja Averroes see: Ibn Rushd Averroists, Latin 183, 395, 408 see also: Ibn Rushd; truth, doctrine o f double Avicenna see: Ibn Sina ^ayn (thing) 65, 75, 78 Ayyüb al-Sakhtiyâni 102 Bâbai 99 Bacon, Francis 214, 230, 268, 426, 432 Bacon, Roger see: Roger Bacon Badawi, A . 79 al-Baghdadi, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Bàqî 40, 525 Bagdedinus, Machometus see: al-Bagdàdi, Muhammad ibn ‘A bd al-Baqi Balduino, Girolamo 499 Bandini, A. M. 522 Bafiez, Domingo 509 Banü Hâshïm 96 Banû Müsâ 49 Banü Quraysh 96, 97 al-Bâqillâni, Abü Bakr 69-70, 76, 77 al-Bâqir, Muljammad 89, 90 Barach, C. and J. Wrobel 211 Barbarus, Hermolaus 168 Barbel, J. 422 Barbier de Maynard, C. 103 Baron, R. 471 Barozzi, Francesco 495, 507, 522 Barradas de Carvalho, J. 473 al-Barràdî 98 Bartholomew the Englishman 160,190 base, in number systems 56 Basil 179 Basileus 106 al-Ba§ri see: A bu’l ^usayn al-Baçri Bataillon, M. 528 Baudry, L. 389 Baur, L. 472 Bautier, R.-H. 472 bay^a 96
542
IN D E X
bayân (explanation) 61, 64, 65, 66, 68-69, 70, 71, 75-6, 78, 81, 82, 83 Beaujouan, G. 5, 6, 321, 472, 473, 475, 476 Beck, H .-G. 103 Becker, C. H. 99 Bede (the Venerable) 153, 158, 197, 479 Bedini, S. 477 belief see: faith Bellarmino, Roberto 500 Beltrami, L. 444-45 Ben-David, J. 339, 349, 379 Benedetti, Alessandro 504 Benedict 231 (Rule o f) 219, 430 Berengar o f Tours 393, 394 Bernard of Chartres 162 Bernard of Clairvaux 7, 221-268, 430 and consideration 246-54 and the corporeal 226-28 and experience 223-29 and knowledge 229-39 his mysticism 226, 235-39, 264-65 and reform 239-46 Bernard o f Morlas 165 Bernard Sylvester 165,198,200,203, 204, 206, 210, 211 Bertalot, L. 530 Berthold o f Constance 166 Bertolis, G. de 527 Bessarion (Cardinal) 518 bestiaries 193 Biel, G, see: Gabriel Biel Birch, T. B. 383, 389 al-Bîrûni 44, 45, 47 Bissinger, A. 530 Blachère, R. 98 Blasius o f Parma 345 Blumenberg, H. 406-7, 418, 422, 431-32 Boccadiferro, Ludovico 508, 534 Bodard, C. 260 Boehner, P. 317, 319, 321, 323, 339, 381, 384, 387-88, 391, 528 Boethius 153,159,166,168,169,170,171, 172,176,177,179,189,195,197,211, 379, 393, 439, 477, 480 Boethius of Dacia 378, 380, 387, 389, 390 Bongratia of Acoli 168 Bonaventura 165, 183, 186, 402, 431
Boncompagni, B. 474, 475, 527 Bonnerot, J. 529 bookkeeping 341 Borelli, A . 419 Borissavlievitch, M. 475 Bomkamm, H. 420, 423 Borro, Girolamo 523 Bots, J. 423 Bourbaki, Nicholas 50 Bradwardine, T. see: Thomas Bradwardine Brahe, Tycho 424 Branner, R. 447 Brant, Sebastian 513 Bravmann, M. 99 Brecht, B. 398, 399, 400 Brerewood, Edward 499, 500 Brethren o f Purity see: Ikhwan al-Safa’ Brini Savorelli, M. 212 Brulifer ( “Scotellus”) 431 Brunes, T. 475 Brunetto Latini 161 Bruni, Leonardo 518 Bruno, Giordano 419, 489, 490 Bubnov, N . M. 480 Buescher, G. 386 Bulaeus, C. E. 529 Bullough, V. 472 Buonamici, F. 520, 522, 523 bureaucracy see: administrative bureaus Burgersdijk, Franco Petri 492 Buridan, John see: John Buridan Burleigh (Burley), Walter see: Walter Burley Burmeister, K. 423, 424, 428 Burtt, E. A . 423 Bury, R. G. 67, 77, 79, 80 Busard, H. L. L. 337, 477 Busdraghi, Vincenzo 522 Busson, H. 522 al-Bustânî, Butrus 78 Buttimer, C. B. 211 Buytaert, E. 381 al-Bûzjâni see: A bu ’l-W afâ’ Cahen, C. 55, 100 calculation, art o f 34 see also: arithmetic calculatores^ Oxford 306, 318, 341, 342, 512, 533
INDEX
Callus, D. 378, 389 Calvin, J. (Calvinism) 220, 222, 400, 402, 403, 425, 492 and revelation vs experience 400, 420-21 Campanus see: John Campanus Cano, Melchor 509 cantor 439 Cantor, Moritz 60 capitalism 220 Cardan, Jerome 33 caritas, and intension and remission of forms 288-89, 294, 301, 324, 325, 328, 333 carpenter’s square see: square, carpenter’s Casaubon, Isaac 518 Case, John 499, 500, 520 Cassiodorus 153,189 Cassirer, E. 418 Castellani, C. 526 categorematic 285 Catena, Pietro 507 cathedrals see: architecture Cattin, P. 450 cauda pavonis 450-51, 453, 474 causarum series 195, 196, 198, 212, 213 cause (causality) (efficient) 406, 409, 412 (final) 406, 409, 416 (prime or divine) 212, 360, 370 (secondary or natural) 195, 203-5, 212, 213, 281, 370 see also: legitima causa et ratio Cavalli, Francesco 527 Centiloquium (pj.-Ptolemy) 203, 206 Centiloquium theologicum (;j^.-Ockham) 323 certitude 25, 287, 288, 340, 341, 373 Cesalpino, Andrea 497, 511 Chalcidius 199, 210 charity (effective vs affective) 247-49 see also: caritas Charpentier, Jacques 521 Chartres (school o f) 198, 213, 245 charts, geographical and nautical 440, 463, 464, 465 Chatelain, A. 386
543
Cheiko, Louis 146 Chenu, M .-D. 351-52, 354 chih (angular measure) 468 Chinese origins o f Western technology (question o f) 443 Chiovenda, E. 526 Christians (possible influences o f) on early Islam, 100-1,107 Chuquet, Nicholas 35, 477 Cicero 113, 159, 161, 162, 169, 111, 175, 177,178,179,200,201,208,249,415, 438 Citeaux (Cistercians) 219, 228, 243, 25556, 263, 265 their technology 254-55, 265 Clagett, M. 318, 392, 407, 516, 529 Clark, A . 500, 521, 524, 525 classifications o f the sciences 113-47 passim, 392, 438-42 (Alexandrian) 146, 147, 189 (Aristotelian) 116 in Dominic Gundisalvo 159, 441 in al-Fârâbi 117, 146,147, 441 in Hugh o f Saint Victor 438-39 in Ibn Sina 146, 156 (Islamic) 116 Clavius, Christopher 507 Clement of Alexandria 163 -Clement of Rome 163,164 Cleyet-Michaud, M. 462 clock analogy 410 (mechanical) 469 Clulee, N . H. 525 Cluny (Cluniac) 219, 265 (church o f) 472 codicology 275 cognitio intuitiva 266, 357-59, 374, 394, 409, 434 o f non-existents 358-59 Coimbra, College of (manuals o f) 491, 509, 511, 535 Colet, John 511, 512 Colson, F. H. 80 Columbus, Christopher 442 Columella 159 Combes, A . 323, 430 Commandino, F. 525
544
IN D EX
Commandments, Ten 396 Communication, techniques o f 262, 532 communities, intellectual 12, 22-28 Companus o f Novara 453, 474 compass (magnetic) 463 compasses (mathematical) 418, 461-62, 474 complexio 202 Conant, J. B. 373-74, 376 Conant, K. J. 472 concomitance 362, 365, 382 condemnations (censure) 272, 276, 29697, 364 of 1277 313, 338, 360, 371, 408 configuration o f quality 282, 283 conscientia 230, 231, 232 consideratio 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 258 contemplatio 225, 247, 249, 252, 253, 254 Constantine (I) 164 Constantine the African 158, 186, 202, 211,440 context, cultural see: cultural context continuity (mathematical) 276, 289, 294, 313 medieval language o f continuity-infinity 284-85, 286, 295, 298-303 contra vanam curiositatem 5, 212, 397, 401,402,403,404,406,408,411,414, 417-18,426,429, 430,431,432 Coopland, G. W . 426 Copernican Revolution modem popular views o f 397-99 Copernicus, N . (Copernican) 5, 397-407, 410-17, 429, 431-32, 435, 489, 490, 514, 517, 527, 531, 536 Corbeau, A. 474 Cordeaux, E. H. 523 Corrin, C. A . 530 Cortés, Martin 465 Cortesao, J. 472, 473, 475 councils, church 164-65, 361, 389, 408 Counter-Reformation 509 Courcelle, P. 211 Courtenay, W. J. 323 Cousin, Victor 170,175 Crakanthorpe, Richard 499-500,520,525 Cranz, F. E. 517, 518, 521, 527 Crapulli, G. 527
Crathorn 321 creation 278, 353, 418, 439 ex nihilo 370 see also: Hexaemeron Crellius, Fortunatus 499, 530 Cremonini, Cesare 508 Creutz, R. 211 Crombie, A. C. 321, 380, 438 Crosby, H. L. 318, 515 cross-cultural factors 2, 8-9, 64 see also: intercultural cubit (astronomical measure) 467 cultural context 14-16, 20 cultures, medieval as expressed in the organization of sciences 151-92 passim cultures, relations between see: cross-cultural factors curiositas campaign against vain curiosity see: contra vanam curiositatem curiosity scientific 218 Curtis, M . H. 523, 525 Curtze, M . 473 dactylonomy see: al-üqad Dainville, F. de 471, 477 dalàla 69 Dalechampius, Jacobus 526 dalü (indicant, logical proof) 69, 70, 7172, 76, 77, 82, 83 dalil al-khifab 81 Daniel o f Morley 189,194,202,204,205, 207, 215 Dannenfeldt, K. H. 526 Dante 241, 443, 476 4arürl (necessary) 108 Darwin, C. (Darwinism) 403 Daumas, M. 471 Day, John 520, 524 Debamot (Mile) 450 decagon, construction o f 458 decision-making (rules for) 7, 225-26 (man’s capacity for) 246, 254 Dee, John 429, 501, 525 D e Goeje, M . J. 78 Deichgraber, K. 211
IN DE X Democritus 84, 501 demonstration in mathematics 125 in metaphysics, 128, 129-30 Denifle, H. 386, 515 denominatio 282, 283, 288 Denomy, A . 425 Denziger, H. 394 derivatives (in Islamic mathematics) 49, 50 Descartes, René (Cartesian) 15, 33, 184, 185, 403, 425, 489, 514 Destombes, M . 477 devotio moderna 401 Dhahabi 93,103 dhirâ (cubit) 467 Diacetto, Francesco da 521 dialectical form 89, 91-93, 99, 105, 107 see also: kalam Dibon, P. 515 didacticism 480, 481 digit (astronomical measure) 467 dignitas hominis 207, 209, 264 dilectio D e i 323-24, 325, 326, 329 Dillenberger, J. 420, 423 dimensions, indeterminate 365 Diogenes of Babylon 74 Diogenes Laertius 64, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79 Dionysius {pseudo-) 199, 422 Diophantus of Alexandria 34, 50 Dioscorides 526 Pirar ibn *Amr 88, 92 disciplines (need for delineation o f) 10 discovery (concept o f) 444, 473 discriminant in cubic equations 46-47, 48 disputations at 16th century Oxford 498, 500-2 ‘divine’ proportion 450 divine science see: metaphysics Diwald-Wilzer, S. 101 diwan (administrative bureau) 53-55 Domesday Book 441 Domingo de Soto 499, 509 Dominic (Dominicans) 266, 391 Dominic o f Clavasio 477 Dominic Gundisalvo 145, 147, 156, 158, 159, 186, 205, 441
545
Donatus 159 Dorelle, M. 523 Doucet, V. 322, 328 Dozy, R. 78 Drake, S. 419, 518, 520, 522 Dubler, C. E. 526 Duby, Georges 254-55 Duchez, M.-E, 472 D u Colombier, P. 446, 461, 472 Dürer, Albrecht 447, 474 Duhem, Pierre 15,16, 272, 319, 376,407, 408, 426, 428, 516, 529 dulkarnon 474 Duns Scotus, John see: John Duns Scotus duplication of a cube 44 Durkheim, E. (Durkheimian) 52 DuVal, Guillaume 518 earth (motion o f) 411, 415, 419, 435 eccentrics (astronomical) 416 eclipses 280 Ecphantus 415 education (Arabic) 87,159 (Latin) 159-60 (primary and secondary) 533 see also: universities Edwards, W . F. 520, 530 Effler, R. 338 Egidius de Campis 279 Eilmer o f Malmesbury 440 Eis, G. 476 Eisenstadt, S. N , 259, 260 elefuga 451, 453 elementans 203 elephant, picture o f 470 Elert, W . 420, 427 Elie, H. 319, 529 Elizabeth I (England) 500 Elkana, Y . 312, 388, 428 Ellies-Dupin, Louis 425, 427 Emden, A . B. 323, 515, 523 empeiria 268 empiricism 314, 417, 434 see also: experience encyclopedias 8,151-192 passim (Greek) 153-54, 187 their impact on the Latin
546
IND EX
encyclopedia 161-67 (Latin) 152-53, 158, 185-87, 190 (Hebrew) 154-55 (Muslim) 155-57, 187, 188, 190-91 their impact on the Latin encyclo pedia 152,157,167,182-84,186 (Roman) 152-53, 187 engineers, medieval 440-41,444ffsee also: ingeniator Ennami 103 Epicurus 68, 84 epicycles 416 epistemological closure 51,57,58 see also: sciences, diffuse vs exact equations 40 (quadratic) 33 (theory o f) 44, 45 (cubic) 33, 43 (theory o f) 43-48, 50 equinoxes, precession o f 278-79 Erasmus, Desiderius 401, 408, 431, 489, 508-9, 511, 512, 513 Erfurt, University of 316 Eriugena see: John Scotus Erigena Erlande-Brandenburg, A. 472 eschatology 264, 266 Eschweiler, K. 519, 530 eternity 289, 302, 314, 338, 353, 427 ethics 132 see also: moral concerns, political science Etienne o f Antioch 440 Etienne Tempier 276, 338, 390, 395 Eucharist 5, 360-72, 393-94, 410 (physics of) problems concerning Christ’s presence 362-68 problems o f transubstantiation 368-70 problems o f the species o f bread 370-72 and Aristotelian physics o f change and place 363 Euclid {Elements) 37, 38, 39, 52, 60, 118, 126,159,185,187, 318, 328,450,453, 456,458,463,480,481,482,483,484, 505, 506 Eudemus 172 Eudoxus 154 Eugene III (pope) 249, 256
Eunapius 154 Eutocius 44 evidence 25, 287, 340, 341, 434 evident and non-evident things 67-68 evil 91 Evrard the German 162 excessus mentis 264 excessus (mathematical) 329, 330 secundum proportionem vj secundum quantitatem 318 exegesis 439, 479, 481 experience (experiment, observation) 5, 11, 16, 108, 120, 127, 132-33, 134, 189, 207, 216, 223-29, 230, 245, 265, 357, 360, 368, 400, 402, 406, 409-11, 412,413,416,426,432,433,434,435, 483 see also: experientia, experimen tum, experiri, expertus experientia 224, 225, 265, 266, 267, 396, 409, 432 patet 268 experiment see: experience experimentum 223, 224, 225, 265, 266, 267 see also: i'tibâr experiri 223, 224, 226, 405 expertus 223, 224, 226 novit 266 explanation see: bayân extension (mathematical) 365, 367, 410 Ezechiel his vision 439 fabrica 483 Fabroni, A . 487, 522 Facciolati, F. 520, 527 fffid a (significance) 61 faith 5, 373 and reason 109, 110, 311, 419 falâsifa (philosophers) 110 Falloppia, Gabriella 504 Fantoni, Filippo 505 al-Fârâbi 4, 6, 107, 156, 158, 159, 168, 194, 205, 441, 483 Enumeration o f the Sciences 113-47, 188, 189, 191, 192 Short Commentary on Aristotle’s P rio r Analytics 181-82 al-Farazdaq 97 al-Farghânî 194, 465
INDEX al-Fayrüzabâdi 78 fatwâ (legal) opinion) 97 Favaro, A. 527 Fermat, Pierre de 185 Ferrand, G. 476 Festugière, A. J. 211 Fibonacci see: Leonardo Fibonacci Ficino, M. 494, 516, 521, 530 figura cotis 452, 453 figura demonis sive intelligentis 453, 455, 456 figura equatrix 452, 453 figura exemplaris 452, 453 figura magistralis 474 figura mediatrix 453-54 Finé, Oronce 505 fiqh Oaw) 69, 131, 146 Usül al-fiqh, 61-85 Firmicus Maternus 204, 212 Fischer, H. 526 fifra (inborn) 92, 109 Flavel, John 499, 520 Fletcher, J. M. 516, 523, 525 Florencio dei Nino Jésus (Fr.) 528 fiorilegia 189 Folli, F. 523 Fonseca, Pedro da 500, 524 fontes 402, 408 foreknowledge, divine 91, 395 form a mundi 405 Fraile, G. 528 Francis of Assisi (Franciscans) 216, 264, 391, 442 Francisco de Victoria 508, 509 Franciscus of Marchia 313 Franciscus Mayronis 314 free will 91, 92, 105, 106, 174, 251, 295, 301, 305, 325, 326-27, 395 French, P. 429, 525 Frisch, C. 423 Frontinus 159 fuqahff (jurists) 110 future contingents 174, 274, 278, 395 Gabriel Biel 344, 381 Gabriel Stomaloco 444-45 Gabriel, A. 521 Galen (-ic) 79, 153, 155, 158, 194, 202, 218, 267, 504, 524, 535
547
Galileo Galilei (Galilean) 13,15,18, 266, 347,348,390,399,400,404,413,417, 487, 489, 495-97, 505, 506, 507, 514, 523, 534 Galluzzi, P. 527 Gardet, Louis 101 Garin, E. 212, 518, 520, 523 Garland the Computist 178 Gaufridus ingeniator A l l Gaza, Theodorus 518 Geldner, F. 473 generation and corruption 293 geocentric 398-99 Geoffrey o f Aspall 389 Geoffrey of Vinsaud 162 geomancy 206 Geometria incerti auctoris 480 geometric figures, practical use of 450-58 geometric series 462-63 geometry (algebraic) 34, 42-50 in al-Fârâbi 115, 117-18, 124,125 as a subalternating science 355, 356 (practical) 439, 444-63 (theoretical vs practical) 480-84 Georgias 154 Gerard of Cremona 145 Gerard of Odo 276, 313, 314, 380 Gerbert o f Aurillac 159, 166, 217, 218, 480 Gerbert, M. 472 Gessner, Conrad 526 gesticulation see: ishâra ghâlib al-zann (most-likely opinion) 66, 69, 77 Ghaylân al-Dimashqi 92, 102 al-Ghazali 82, 109, 110 Ghini, Luca 503 Giacobbe, G. C. 527 Gibson, S. 521, 525 Gilbert de la Porrée 168-69, 171, 222 Gübert, N . W . 517, 520, 523 Giles of Rome 364, 365, 373 Giles of Viterbo 494 Gille, B. 437, 446 Gilles, M. 472 Gilson, E. 260, 261, 378, 380, 381, 387, 390, 391, 521, 529 Gingerich, O. 417, 536
548
IN D E X
Giorgi, Francisco 500 Girard, Albert 463 Gisius, T. 404 Glorieux, P. 313, 314, 378, 421 Glucker, J. 518 God 61-75 passim, 91, 92, 97 (anti-anthropomorphic view o f) 66-67 (infinity o f) 289, 300, 314 (proof of existence o f) 108-9, 129-30, 131, 143, 355 (relation to man o f) 245, 301 see also: omnipotence, onmiscience, potentia D ei absoluta, potentia D ei ordinata Godfrey o f Saint-Victor 264 “golden” proportion, section, mean, etc. 447,450,453,456,458,459,460,461, 462, 463 Goldstein, B. 468 Gomes, Diogo 465 Gonzalez Palencia, Angel 145, 472 Goujet, C. P. Grabmaim, M. 147, 336 grace 242^5 passim, 291, 293-94, 334, 335, 427 gradus 282, 326, 328, 331, 337 non gradus 299, 324 grammar 84 (Islande) 81, 83,146 (Stoic) 82 in sophisms 304 its application to theology 351-52 Grant, E. 332 Gratian 166, 185 gravia et levia 278 Gregory the Great (I) 164 Gregory IX (Pope) 378 Gregory o f Nazianzus 164 Gregory o f Nyssa 240 Gregory of Rimini 340 Gregory, T. 4, 6, 7, 9, 211, 471 Griffiths, J. 520 Grmek, M. D. 477 Grosset-Grange, H. 476 Grouchy, Nicholas de 518 Guelluy, R. 314, 381, 387, 388 Giinther, S. 473 Gundersheimer, W . 521 Gundissalinus see: Dominic Gundisalvo
Guy o f Arezzo 439-40 Habiba 102 al-Hâdi ila’I-ljaqq Yahyâ ibn al-^jtusayn see: Yahyâ ibn al-IJusayn hadith (tradition) 82, 87 hxidith al fifra 92 Haring, N . M . 211 al-yajjâj 89 al-Ifâl (state) 78, 79 Haller, J. 520 Hamidullah, M . 79 iianaf! 62, 63, 73 hand-span (unit o f astronomical measure) 467 Hanke, L. 521 Hardie, C. 475 al-Uariri 78 Hartfelder, K. 530 Hârün ibn ‘A bd al-yamid 54 Hârûn al-Rashîd 106 Harvey, William 487, 502, 523, 529 tiasan al-Baçrî 89, 92, 93,105 ^asan ibn ‘A li 96 IJasan ibn Muhammad ibn a1-ïJanafiyya 91, 92, 93, 94,95, 96, 97-98, 99,104, 106 al-Uasan al-Marrakushi 465 Haskins, C. H. 210, 211,212 Haspyl see: Geoffrey o f Aspall Haverel Norvici 328-29 Hawenreuter, Joharmes 530 Heckscher, W . 527 Heiberg, J. L. 527 heliocentric 411, 412-13, 414 Hell 91, 92 Hélot, L. and H. 78 Çenànâ 99 Henry o f Hassia 314 Henry o f Oyta 316, 325, 327 Heracleides o f Pontus 415 Heraclius 106 Herman the Dalmatian see: Hermaim o f Carinthia Herman Lurtz de Nuremberg 279, 337 Hermann o f Carinthia 159, 200-1, 203, 204 Hermelink, H. 530 hermeneutics 81, 82, 154, 161, 163, 403
IN DE X Hermes Trismepistus (hermetic) 207, 444 see also: D e Sex principiis (pseudohermetic) Herrad o f Landsberg 203 Hervet, Gentian 511 Hesychias of Miletus 154 Heytesbury, W . see: William Heytesbury Hexaemeron (exegesis o f) 196, 197, 315 hexagon, regular (construction o f) 450, 463 Hézelon o f Cluny 440 Hicks, R. D. 77 Hildebert o f Lavardin 165 Hincmar 166 Hinz, J. 529 Hippias 154 Hippocrates (-ic) 202 Hippolytus of Rome 163 Hirsch, E. 424 Hirth, W . 518 al-Hishâm 92, 97, 104 Hispanus, P. see: Peter of Spain historiography o f medieval learning 11-28, 151-52, 220-21, 262, 265, 271-73, 344-48, 485-87, 531 and practice 437, 443, 469-71, 477-78 history (stages o f) in Bernard o f Clairvaux 242 Hoffmann, F. 315, 391 homo faber 209, 398 viator 209 Honorius of Autun 158 Honorius Inclusus 158 Hooykaas, R. 417, 420-21, 423, 426 Horace 162 horn angle 332, 335 Horten, M. 78 Hosea 236 Howell, W . S. 523, 524, 525 Hrabanus Maurus 153, 158, 188 Huard, P. 477 Hugh Libergier 459-61 Hugh o f Saint Victor 197, 200, 201, 208, 209, 215, 264,422,423,438, 439, 441 Hugh o f Santalla 203, 204, 215 Huglo, M. 472
549
hukm (judgment) 61, 76 human/-ism, -ist 8,151,238,343,402,408 in 16th century universities 489,490-91, 493, 496, 498, 507-12, 533, 534 humanities 163, 412 yusamaddin al-Qudsi 102 yusayn 95, 96 Huygens, Christiaan 185 Hyginus 159 hypotheses 415, 416 in astronomy see: astronomy, Copernican, hypothetical? iatrosophists 154 Ibadites 89, 90, 98 Ibn A bi ‘Umar al-‘Adani 93 Ibn ‘Asakir 103 Ibn Bàjja 523 Ibn Batta 103 Ibn Sajar 93, 103 Ibn al-Haytham 38, 44, 49, 267, 345 Ibn Uazm 40 Ibn Hisham 101 Ibn Kathir 102 Ibn Khaldün 54,107 Ibn Labbân 54, 56 Ibn Mâdjid, Ahmad 467, 476 Ibn Man?ûr 78 Ibn al-Murtada 101,102 Ibn Rushd 156-57, 338, 365, 508, 512, 519,533,535,536 see also: Averroists Ibn Sa‘d 90, 103 Ibn Sina 70, 75, 80, 130, 146, 156, 158, 159,167, 181, 188,189, 194, 202, 216 338, 482, 483, 535 Ibn Taymiyya 40,109, 110 Ibn Wahb, Isljâq 79 Ibn al-Zubayr see: ‘Abdallah ibn alZubayr Ibrâhâm ibn Sinân 49 igneus vigor 199 ignis aethereus 200 artifex 195, 200, 201 al-Iji, ‘Adudaddin 102 ijtihâd (judgment) 66, 68-69, 70, 77 see also: mujtahid Ikhwan al-Çafâ’ 155, 189 ‘ilia (cause) 74, 82
550
INDEX
illuminatio in Bernard of Clairvaux 235-39 illustration 440, 470-71 ‘«7m (knowledge) 69 Him al-hiyal 147,441,483 see also: scientia de ingeniis imaginatio 413, 426, 432-33, 434, 345 secundum imaginationem arguments 281, 292, 294, 297, 300, 301, 305, 307, 312, 331, 337,409-11 impetus theory 313, 411, 427 impossible propositions in algebra 42 de incipit et desinit 284, 306, 323 indicant see: dalil indicant of a discourse 61, 63 indivisibles 301, 313, 326, 332, 432 induction vs experience in al-Fârâbi 483 mathematical 39 infinitum as a logical term 319, 337 infinitesimals/infinitesimalists 34, 48, 49 infinity 278, 289, 313, 427 (mathematics of) 285 (medieval language o f) 284-85,298-303 (unacceptable and admitted) 301-2 o f sets and sub-sets 302, 319, 338 ingenia 441, 469 see also: scientia de ingeniis ingeniator (inzignerius) 441, 444, 472 Innocent III (Pope) 361, 369 Inquisition 375, 419 de insolubilibus 280, 335, 512 instants 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 332, 368, 432 see also: de primo et ultimo instanti institutional factors see: social factors instruments 459 (pedagogical) 440, 479 (astronomical) 440, 464-68, 478 see also: names of individual instru ments instrumentum 227 (corporis) 228, 263 integrity, intellectual 375 intelligences 129 intelligibles 128 intension and remission of forms 184-85, 282-83, 285, 286, 287, 289, 293, 294, 296, 299, 300, 301, 323, 343 jee also:
measure languages intention (first and second) related to the Trinity 278,314 use of second intentional point of view in the fourteenth century 282,286, 287, 288, 312, 338, 343 intercultural influences, as rearrangements of schemata 157-58 relations 151-92 passim see also: cross-cultural factors interdisciplinary relations 2, 4-6, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 24, 64 of algebra and arithmetic 4 intuitive cognition see: cognitio intuitiva irjâ ' (postponement) 73, 95 K.al-Irja^ 93, 96, 97, 98 irrational quantities 38 d’Irsay, S. 515, 530 Isaac 258 Isaac Israeli 159, 160 ifba'^ (unit o f astronomical measure) 467, 468 Ishaq ibn tJunayn 79 ishara (gesture) 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 78 Isidore o f Seville 153, 158, 159, 187, 188, 190, 215, 479 Islam 31-147 passim (law in) 4, 8, 87,147 Islamic sciences see: sciences, rational vs traditional Islamic iteration 48 iUibâr ( experimentum) 268 Ivo of Chartres 166,185 Jâbir ibn Zayd al-Azdi 98 Jaeger, H. 523 Jaeger, W . 417, 429 Ja‘far al-$âdiq 90 al-Jàhi?, A bü ‘Uthmân ‘Amr ibn B a ^ 78, 79, 82, 83, 101 Jaki, Stanley 390 James, T. E. 516 al-Jaççâç, A bü Bakr al-R âa 61-85 al-Jahshayàrî 54 Javellus, Crisostomus 524 Jayne, S. R. 530 Jean see: John
INDEX Jerome 164 Jesuits 219, 491, 494, 507, 511 Jews see: Judaism jihâd (religious war) 73 Joachim of Fiore (Joachimites) 165, 256, 513 Johannis see: John John II (Portugal) 464 John X X III (pope) 315 John o f Affligem 439 John Bode 337 John Buridan 321, 334,350,372,375, 376, 379,391, 393,407,425,426,428,434, 488, 516, 529 John of Damascus 99, 100, 103 John o f Dondi 477 John Dumbleton 320, 337 John Duns Scotus 178,274,287,321,338, 341, 344,364,382,386,387,393,395, 396, 534 see also: (pseudo-) Scotus John o f Falisca 276 John Fusoris 477 John Gerson 343, 396,401, 402,407,417, 421, 423, 425, 426, 430, 431 John Hispalensis 480 John Lutterell 364, 391 John Major (Jean Mair) 319 John Mirecourt 296, 325, 333, 334 John Pecham 345 John o f Ripa 293, 313, 335 John o f Sacrobosco 465, 481, 505, 506 John of St. Thomas 509 John o f Salisbury 161-62, 165, 170, 171, 208, 215 John Scotus Erigena 197-98,199, 240 John o f Seville 203, 212 John Versoris 516 Jordanus Nemorarius 473, 518 Joshua 400, 410, 427 Jourdain de Sévérac 467 Judaism 107 (theology in) 88 judgment see: ijtihàd Jüngel, Eberhard 421 Julia Domna (Empress) 153 Julian the Apostate 154 jurisprudence see: legal theory justification 291 see also: merit Justin Martyr 162,163
551
Ka^ba 97 kalâm 4, 6, 8, 66, 75, 83, 89, 90, 93, 98, 99, 101, 131, 146, 156 (definition o f) 105, 107-9 and theology 89, 108, 109 see also: theology, Islamic Kalbfieisch, Carl 79 al-Karaji, A bü Bakr Muhammad ibn alHasan 33, 34, 35-39, 40, 45, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60 al-Karkhi, Abü Bakr Muhammad ibn alyasan see: al-Karaji al-Karkhi, ‘Ubayd Allah ibn al-Çasan 62 Karpp, H. 421 al-Kâshi 33, 60 Kaufman, G. D. 425-26 Kaufmann, G. 515 Kaysaniyya 95 see: Saba'iyya Kayserberg, Geiler von 513 Kearney, H. 498, 523, 524 Keckermann, Bartholomaous 492, 500 TÔ K E T Ô G a i 77, 78, 79 Keller, A. G. 526 Kelso, R. 530 Kennedy, E. S. 59 Kepler, Johannes 400,403, 404,413,417, 419, 421, 424, 475, 487, 530 khabar (statement) 72, 75, 76 Khadduri, Majid 79 Khârijites 88, 89, 90, 98, 105 khâss (particular) 72, 73, 75, 76 khaft (writing) 65, 66, 67, 70, 78 al-Iüiayyâmi 33, 34, 43-45, 47, 48 al-Khàzin, Abü Ja‘far 43 khitâb (discourse) 61,64,65,76,77,81,82 Khoury, A.-T. 104 Khoury, I. 476 Khoury, P. 104 Khoury, R. G. 103 al-Khwariznu, Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn 55, 56 al-Khwarizmi, Muhammad ibn Müsâ 33, 34, 48, 50, 58, 59, 60 Kieffer, J. S. 79 al-Kindi, Abü ‘Umar 54 al-Kindi, Y a ‘qûb ibn Ishaq 79, 80, 155, 158, 482 kingship, virtuous 132-33, 134, 143 Klebs, A. 477
552
IN DEX
Klibansky, R. 418 Kneale, W. and M. 78, 319 knowledge 109, 110 in Bernard o f Clairvaux 229-39 puffs up see: scientia inflat Knowles, D. 321, 339, 394 knuckles see: *uqad Koch,J. 391,515 Koestler, A . 400 Koran see: Qur'an Koyré, A . 418, 424, 428, 429 Krasnova, S. 474 Kristeller, P. O. 515, 517, 518, 520, 521, 522, 523, 527 Kürzinger, J. 314 Kuhn, T. S. 420, 429 al-Kulini 89 Kunitzsch, P. 467 Kurrus, T, 530 kuttâb (scribes) 53, 54, 55, 58, 59 Kyeser, Konrad 446 Lacombe, G. 518 Lactantius 401, 406, 429 laf? (utterance) 61, 66, 76, 77, 78, 82 Laguarda Trias, R. 465, 468, 476 Lambert of Saint-Omer 158 Lammens, H. 104 lance {rumb), unit o f astronomical measure) Lanfranc (o f Canterbury) 394 language (science o f) in al-Fârâbî 113, 115, 116, 118-19, 146 Laoust, H. 103 lapidaries 193 Laplace, P. 424, 429 Last Judgment 92 Latham, R. E. 441 latitude (geographical) (determination o f) 464-65 latitudo 282, 293, 299, 318, 320, 328, 332, 337 motus 320 proportionis 320 Laudian statutes, Oxford 494, 520 Lauterbach, A. 420 law 2, 8, 147, 157, 159-60, 313, 391-92, 409, 533, 536
its importance in Islam 87, 147 see also: fiqh\ lawgiver, divine; legal theory lawgiver, divine 131, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144,146 learning (unitary character of medieval) 5, 271-348 Lebensfûhrung see: plan of living Leclerq, J. 210, 260 Lefèvre d’Étaples, J. 518 Lefebvre des Noëttes 437 Leff, G. 332, 394, 515 Lefranc, A . 529 legal theory, in Islam 61-85 passim, 113, 114, 115, 137^5 (influence o f theology on) 72-73 legitima causa et ratio 193, 196, 210 see also: cause; causarum series; ratio Le Goff, J. 477 Leite, S. 520 Aækxôv (meaning) 64, 76, 84, 85 Lemay, R. 476, 515, 517 Xé^iç (speech) 64, 66, 77, 81, 82 Leonardo Fibonacci (o f Pisa) 456, 462, 463, 481 Leonardo da Vinci 458, 516 Leonico Tomeo, Niccolô 527 Le Roy, Louis 521 Levey, M. 475 Levi ben Gerson 468 Levi, A . H. T. 518, 521 Lewalter, E. 519, 530 Lewis, B, 78 lex 425 lex naturae 425 L ’Huillier, H. 477 (anon.) Liber Mamonis in astronomia 194 Liber Sententiarum see: Peter Lombard liberal arts 147, 153, 158, 159, 162, 163, 165, 166, 183, 230, 231, 237, 415 their use in theology 274-312 their status in medieval universities 349-54 Liceto, Fortunio 508 limits (upper and lower) 49 “limit setting” languages 285, 286,299, 300, 318
IN DEX see also: de incipit et desinit; de maximo et minimo; de prim o et ultimo in stanti Linacre, Thomas 503, 511, 527 literacy in early Islam 105-6 logic (Aristotelian) 84, 120, 167, 176, 177, 188 the Organon 79, 122, 123, 124, 159, 168-83 passim, 355-57, 493, 499, 519 (atomistic or Epicurean) 84, 156, 167 in the Hebrew tradition 179-82 (Neoplatonic) 156, 167, 168 (sophistic) 84 (Stoic) 4,8,63-65,67-68,70-72,74-77, 84-85, 156, 167 (applications o f) in Islamic law 4, 8, 61-85 (applications o f) 11,155 (history o f) in the West 167-79 in al-Fârâbi 113,115,117,119,120-24, 128, 138-39 in medieval universities 351 in Sentence Commentaries 279-80 in sophismata 304 in sixteenth century universities 493, 494, 496 and nominalism 433 XÔYOÇ 64, 66, 76, 81, 82, 84 Lohr, C. H. 515, 516, 528 Lombard, Peter see: Peter Lombard Lucas, E. 463 Luckey, P. 33, 60 Lull, Raymond 442, 463, 474 Luther, M. (Lutheranism) 220, 376, 399, 400,401,408,415,421,427,430,431, 432, 491, 492, 494, 500, 510, 513 Maccagni, C. 516, 518 McCarthy, R. J. 79 McConica, J. K. 523, 524, 530 machina mundi 405, 410, 411 McKeon, Richard 4, 6, 8 Mac Kinney, L. C. 477 McMullin, E. 386 Macrobius 158, 199, 201, 479 McVaugh, M. 318, 515
553
Madan, F. 524, 526 Maddison, F. 477, 526 Madelung, W . 93, 95, 96, 102, 103 Madkour, I. 146 madlül (that which is indicated) 71-72,76 madrasa 87, 101 Magellan, F. de 476 magic 194, 206, 208, 213, 214 Magirus, Johannes 492 al-Mâhânï, Muhammad ibn ‘Isa 43, 44, 45 Mahdi, Mushin 4, 6 Mahoney, E. P. 527-28 Maier, Anneliese 15, 272, 319, 320-21, 364,375,378,381, 383,387,389, 392, 407, 408, 425, 516 Maignan, E. 517, 528 Maillard, E. 459 Maimonides 107, 155, 179, 183, 189 O f Logical Terminology, 180-82 Makdisi, George 101 makh$ü? bi* l-dhikr (that which is partic ularly mentioned) 61-63, 76, 81 Mallet, C. E. 523 malikism 147 al-M a’mûn 107 man (inner and outer) 229, 239-41 see also: homo ma^nâ (meaning) 61, 64, 76, 82 Manichaeans 88, 101, 107 al-Mançûr 100 Mançür ibn Sarjûn 104 manuscripts as evidence of intellectual communities 27-28 cited Aberdeen, University Library 116 530 Aberdeen, University Library 150 530 Aberdeen, University Library 186 530 Bruges 192: 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 333 Bruges 503: 324, 326, 331, 335 Cairo, Dâr al-Kutub 191 ; 77 Cairo, Dâr al-Kutub 26: 77 Cambridge, Peterhouse 272: 320,337
554
IN DE X
Edinburgh University Library Dc. 3.89: 520 Edinburgh, University Library Dc. 5.55: 530 Edinburgh, University Library La. 721: 530 Erfurt, Ampl. Q° 107: 314 Erfurt, Ampl. Q ° 385: 473 Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, Galileo 27: 523 Florence, Biblioteca nazionale magi. V IIL 4 9 : 523 Istanbul, Damad Ibrahim Pasa 877 : 103 London, B M Harley 3243: 334 Napoli, B N VII. C. 28: 329 Oxford, Balliol 93: 313 Oxford, Bodleian, Can. misc. 177: 314 Oxford, Bodleian, Rawl. D. 274: 520, 524 Oxford, Bodleian, Sandcroft 17: 501 Oxford, Oriel 15: 325, 327 Paris, Bibl. de I’lnstitut (Leonardo Codex) A .: 457-58 Paris, Bibl. de I’lnstitut (Leonardo Codex) B.: 474 Paris, B N lat. 7219: 474 Paris, B N lat. 7223:475 Paris, B N lat. 7377A: 475 Paris, B N lat. 10258: 475 Paris, B N lat. 11857: 526 Paris, B N lat. 14576: 313 Paris, B N lat. 15883: 330, 331 Paris, B N lat. 15894: 316 Paris, B N lat. 16401: 337 Paris, B N lat. 16408: 313, 314 Paris, B N lat. 16409: 313, 314 Paris, B N lat. 16621: 313 Paris, B N lat. 16535: 313 Paris, B N nouv. acq. lat. 1207 : 475 Paris, Bibliothèque Ste Geneviève 2200: 446 Pisa, Biblioteca universitaria MSS 231-234, 332-46, 355: 522 Prague, Univ. III.B. 10: 330 Salamanca 2085 : 450 Sevilla, Colomb. 7-7-29: 314 Thorn, Gymnasialbibliothek, R 4° 2 :
m.
318, 473 Troyes 62: 316, 317, 330 Valencia, Cated, 139: 314 Valencia, Cated. 200: 314 Vatican lat. 955: 327 Vatican lat. 986: 324, 380 Vatican lat. 1108: 327 Vatican lat. 1111: 322, 324, 326, 335 Vatican lat. 3088: 315-16 Vatican lat. 4353: 324 Vatican, Chigi B. V. 66: 322, 327, 328, 329 Vatican, Ross. 1009: 523 Vienna National-Bibliothek 4668 : 316 Worcester Cath. F. 35: 313-14 Worcester Cathed. F. 118: 338 maps see: charts, geographical ma‘qûl (intelligized) 61 Marco Polo 466-67 Marcus Aurelius 153 marginalia 27, 480, 536 Margolin, J.-C. 520 Mariotti, Francesco 522 Markowski, M. 516 Marliani, Giovanni 516 Maronites 106 Marsilius of Inghen 334 Martianus Capella 158, 159, 188, 194 Marwân 96 Marx, Karl (marxist) 52, 262, 437 masons, medieval master 446, 482 massa 207 Massa, E. 521 Massignon, L. 51 al-Mas‘üdi 54, 103 materia medica 503 material culture 262 material world in Bernard o f Clairvaux 222-28 Mates, B. 74, 79 mathematics 33, 59-60, 433 (applications o f) 11, 53, 341^2, 344, 346-47, 444-46 (historiography of) 33-34, 50-52, 60 in al-Fârâbi 113-15, 124-26, 128 in 16th century universities 504-7 Matlub, A. 79 Matthaes, C. 211
555
IND E X Matthew Paris 440, 470 Matthew o f Vendôme 162 Mattioli, P. A. 526 Mauricius ingeniator 441 maxima (mathematical) 49, 50 de maximo et minimo 276, 284, 287 May, L.-P. 473 mean degree theorem 283 mean speed theorem 318 measure languages 282, 284-85, 288,292, 294,295,296,299, 305, 306,311, 336, 340, 344, 346-47 origins o f “frenzy to measure” 287-89, 340-43 see also: analysis, languages of; inten sion and remission o f forms; lim its; proportiones language Mechanica (ps.-Aristotle) 491,493, 506-7 mechanical arts 230,231,438,439,440-42 (new appreciation o f) 208-9, 264 see also: scientia de ingeniis; Hlm al-biyal Medici 495 medic/ine, -al 132-33,147, 155,157, 158, 159-60,202-3, 313, 391-92,440,441 scientia de medicina 205 (use o f astro/-logy, -nomy in) 202-3, 215 in 16th century universities 502-4, 533 anatomical demonstrations 502, 504 botanical studies 502-3 clinical medicine 502, 503-4 Meier, L. 316 Melanchthon, P. 403, 420, 491, 510, 530 Mendonça de Albuquerque, L. 475 Menut, A . 425 merit 293, 324, 325, 327, 328, 330, 331, 333 Merry, D. H. 523 Merton, R. K . 263, 349 Merton College (Mertonians) 342, 488, 512, 515-16, 529, 534 metacosm 410 metaphysics 314, 493,494 in al-Fàrâbî 115,128-31 (rejection o f or freedom from) 5, 340, 367,394,402,406,408-9,412,413, 430,431,433 metrology 468
Metz, A . 54 Michalski, K. 337 Michel, P. H. 475 microcosm and macrocosm 202, 209, 410, 426-27 Migne, J. P. 422 mifina (inquisition) 87, 106-7 milla (religion) 138, 139, 141 Millâs VaUicrosa, J.-M. 474 Milton, John 487 minimum parts 324 Minio-Paluello, L. 518 mirabilia 213 miracles 360, 369 (elimination o f) 198 missionary activities their possible importance in Islam 88,
101, 111 modernization 222 (Weber’s theory o f) 220-21 Moleto, Giuseppe 507 Molland, A . G. 516 Molteni, P. 335 Monantheuil, Henry de 493 monastic (-ism) 220, 232, 242, 246, 255 plan o f living 219 and theory and practice 440, 441 monocord 4 ^ monomials 39 monothelitism 106 Monroux, J. 260 Monte, Giambattista da 504 Monte, Guidoubaldo del 493 Moody, E. 314, 317, 319, 321, 338, 427, 523 moral concerns 198, 219-68 passim, 277, 344, 494, 495, 511 More, Thomas 489, 511, 512, 513 Morgan, B. G. 459 Morini, A. U . 522 Moses 155, 157, 402, 421 mosque 87 motion 184,186, 226, 320, 338, 427, 497, 512, 529 o f the earth 411, 415, 419, 435 see also: scientia de motu motus vs mutatio 322 Mu'âwiya 90, 96,100, 104 Mueller, Johannes 475
556
IND E X
Müller, M. 211 Muhammad (the Prophet) 61-85 passim, 90, 94, 96, 97 Muhammad ibn al-yanafiyya 96 mujmal (indefinite discourse) 72, 77 mujtahid, 73 see also: ijtihâd Mukhtâr 91, 94, 95, 96 mulk (kingship, possession) 97 multiplication of species 278, 345 D e mundi constitutione (anon) 197 mundus 425 see also: machina mundi Mufloz Alonso, A. 528 Mufioz Delgado, V. 528 al-murad (what is intended) 61, 82 Murdoch, John 4, 7, 312, 316, 317, 319, 320,321,330, 333, 335, 380, 388,427, 428, 450, 471 Murji’ites 88, 93, 95 music, science of in al-Fârâbi 115, 124, 125 and theory and practice 439-40, 483 musicus 439 mutakallim, mutakallimün 75, 85, 92,104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,213 (definition o f) 108-110 MuUazilites, mu^tazila 66-67, 73, 88, 89, 92, 101, 106, 108 mysticism 146, 226, 235-39, 264-65, 402, 513 Nader, A. N . 88 Nagel, T. 102 Nallino, C. A . 78 names, common and proper, in the Stoics 74-75 Nardi, B. 515, 527 nafaba (to erect) 69 al-Nasawi 54, 56 nafba see: nu^ba tiaskh (abrogation) 65, 76, 77 Nasrallah 104 na$$ (definite discourse) 72, 75, 76 natura 199, 200, 201, 203, 211 as qualitas planetarum 203 natural philosophy/science in al-Fârâbî 113,115, 126-28 (twelfth century) 4, 7, 9, 158, 215-16 (changes in) between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 280, 307-9,
317, 339-40 in 16th century universities 494, 497, 506 (lack o f certainty in) 375-76 nature allegorical interpretation of 9,193, 213 campaign against 195-97 (new idea o f) and astrology, magic, alchemy 206-7, 213-14 (symbolical vs physical approaches to) 188,193-210 passim, 426 (man’s new relation to) post-Copernicus 398 navigation, astronomical theory and practice in 463-68, 478 al-Na??âm, Ibrahim ibn Sayyâr 66, 90 necessary see: darûrî necessary propositions in algebra 41 necromancy 266 Needham, J. 443, 468, 472 Nelson, Benjamin 259 N e 0“Plat0 n/-ic, -ism 146, 154, 167, 199 neostoicism 425 Newton, Isaac (Newtonian) 15,184, 274, 343, 404, 413, 487 Nicetas 415 Nicholas o f Autrecourt 358-59, 391 Nicholas o f Cusa 418, 419, 429 Nicole Oresme 273,290,318,332,407-12, 427, 434-35, 488 Nietzsche, F. 390 Nifo, Augustino 499, 508, 528, 534 ni§ba see: nu^ba Nitzsch, F. 519 Ni?âmalmulk 87 Ni?âmiyya 87 N oah’s arc 439 Nobis, H. M. 518 Nock, A . D. 211 nominal/-ism, -ists 5, 266, 321, 341, 357, 358,359,372, 373, 375,377, 394, 396, 406-11, 412, 413, 430-31, 433, 512, 535 and science 407-14 numbers (negative) 36 (real) 35, 39 (symbolism o f) 439, 440, 443 (theory o f) 34, 38, 39
IN D E X see also: arithmetic numerals (Arabic) 56, 161 (Indian) 56 (Roman) 56 nusba (signal) 68. 70, 71, 76, 77, 83 al-nu^ba al-dalla (indicative signal) 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 77, 81, 82 Oakley, F. 425 Oberman, H. 5, 321, 359, 381, 387 Obermann, J. 102 obligationes 317 observation see: experience occasionalism 213 occultism 500-1, 505-6 Ockham, William of see: William of Ockham Ockham’s “razor” 281, 360 see also: William of Ockham O ’Donnell, J. R. 319 Odorannus of Sens 440 Oehler, K. 419 ogive arches 460-61 Oliva of Ripoll 440 Olschki, L. 476 Olympiodorus 146 O ’Malley, C. D. 526 onmipotence o f God 278 omniscience o f God 278 Ong, W . J. 523, 529 operation, mathematical (concept o f) 56-57 opinion, most likely see: ghâlib al-?ann Opsomer, J. E. 470, A l l optics 125,146,216,278,344-46,355,356 oral traditions 91,105, 443,463,468,478 see also: transmission Oresme, Nicole see: Nicole Oresme Origen 164, 240, 344 originality in mathematics 33 vs transmission 59-60 origins of mathematical developments 33, 59-60 Osiander, A. 400,403,404,406,407,412, 426, 432 Oxford University
557
in the 16th century 343, 494-95, 497502, 533, 534 Ozment, S. 417, 423 Pace, Giulio 491, 499 Pacioli, L. 450 pactum cum ecclesia 394-95 Padua, University o f 496, 499, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507 Pagel, W . 523, 529 paideia in Aristotle 153 Panetius 439 Panofsky, E. 445 paper 93, 98, 99 Pappus 38, 40 papyrus 93, 98, 99 Paqué, R. 391 Paracelsus (Paracelsian) 525 parchment 93 Paris, University o f 162, 343, 350, 391, 510, 533 statutes o f 1366: 276, 279, 296 partes proportionales 285, 300, 327, 333 particular vs general in Islamic legal theory 72-74 in the Stoics 74-75 see also: ‘dmm and khàff particularism (vs abstractions) 340, 341 see also: nominalism; Ockhamism particularization see: takh^if particularly mentioned, legal theory con cerning the 61-63 see also: al-makh$ü$ bVl-dhikr Pascal, Blaise 185 Paschasius Radbertus 393 Patrizi (da Cherso), Francesco 490, 527 Paul (Pauline) 223, 111, 229, 230, 231, 237, 239, 240, 245, 247, 250, 253, 259 Paul III (pope) (dedicatory letter of Copernicus to) 400, 405, 406, 411, 414-15, 419 Paul o f Pergula 520 Paul of Venice 493, 494 Pavet de Courteille, A. 103 pax et concordia 453-54 Payr, Theresia 421 Pedro de Sintra 466, 476 peira 267
558
IN DE X
Pellegrini, F. 526 Felling, M. 526 Pelzer, A. 383, 391 Pendasio, Federico 508 pentagon, regular (construction o f) 450, 453, 456, 458, 463, 482 perfection o f species 274, 301, 321 Périon, J. 518 perspectives 411 see also: optics pes anseris 450-51, 474 Peter 163 Peter o f Abano 466, 476 Peter Abelard 85,165,166,167,168,178, 181,182,185,189,197, 222,368, 385 Dialectica 170-77, 188 Sic et Non 166, 185, 189 Peter d’Ailly 396, 407, 425, 433, 434 Peter o f Candia 276 Peter Cantor 393 Peter CeflFons 279,280,314,330,335,339, 380 Peter Damian 189, 193, 240 Peter Helias 162 Peter John Olivi 313, 364, 375 Peter Lombard {Sentences and commen taries on the Sentences) 23,165, 166, 185, 275, 277-80, 316, 340, 343, 350, 352, 361, 362, 368, 370, 393 Peter o f Mantua 516 Peter o f Maricourt (Peter Peregrinus) 442 Peter of Pulka 279 Peter o f Spain 179, 267, 303, 319, 337, 493, 494 Petersen, P. 519, 520, 521, 523, 530 Petrarca, Francesco 489 Petreius 424 Petrella, Bernardino 499 Pettas, W. 522 pharetra 453, 456 Philip Elephantis Anglicus 450-56 Philo Judaeus 74-75, 76, 155, 179 Philolaus 415 Philoponus 508 philosopher’s stone 207 philosophia mundi 198, 210 philosophy (the theological context o f the advanced or best medieval) 274,277,353-54,
393 in al-Fâràbi 123-24 o f mathematics 40-42 teaching in sixteenth century 493 Philostratus 153, 154 qxBvfi (utterance) 64, 76, 81, 82, 84 Photius 154, 165, 187, 189 physica 158 Physiologus 188, 212, 213 Piccolomini, Alessandro 506, 524 Pico, Gianfrancesco 489, 527 Pico, Giovanni 429 Picotti, G. B. 522 Pierre see: Peter Pin, E. du see: Ellies-Dupin, Louis Pine, M. 522 Pines, S. 104,106 Pisa, University o f 495-97, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507 place of Christ in the Eucharist 362,363,366, 382 plan o f living (ideal, rational) 219, 246, 255, 263 Planer, Andreas 510 Pliny the Elder 153, 190, 479 Plotinus 176, 177 Plato (Platonism) 9, 113, 131, 132, 134, 157,166,176,177,180,198,199,201, 203,210,215,216,261,338,390,398, 411, 417, 440, 453, 490, 494-95, 496, 502, 512, 516, 521, 524, 531, 532 Plummer, C. 525 Plutarch 76, 80, 415 Pohlenz, M ax 80 Pole, Reginald 511 political context o f early Islamic theology, 93-99, 106-7 political science its importance in Islam 113 in al-Fàrâbi 114, 115, 131-37, 143^5 see also: kingship, virtuous Poliziano, Angelo 518 polygons and polygonal numbers, con fusion of 476-77, 480 polynomials, arithmetic operations on 35^ Pomponazzi, P. 517, 522 pons asinorum 451, 453
IN D EX Popper, K. 429 Poppi, A, 520, 523 Porphyry 156, 159, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170,171,172,176,179,180,181,188, 493 “ Porphyry’s tree” 167, 188, 340 Porter, H. C. 530 Posidonius 439 possible propositions in algebra 42 Postel, Guillaume 500 potentia activa 284 passiva 284 potentia D ei absoluta 281, 292, 297, 300, 312, 357-59, 360, 361, 372, 394, 396, 408, 409, 411, 430, 432, 433 potentia D ei ordinata 357-59, 361, 394, 396, 408, 409, 432, 433 Poulie, E. 475 Powel, GriflBth 499, 520 power (concept o f) in algebra 35 Powicke, F. M. 515 ‘practice’ its definition 482 practice see: theory, and practice predestin/-ation, -arian 90, 92, 93, 97, 98, 106 Preserved Tablet 66 de prim o et ultimo instanti 284, 287, 294, 296, 320 printed books their influence on university teaching 532-33 Priscian 159 Proclus 40, 495, 506, 522 Prodicus 154 professionalization 392-93, 441 proofs, rational 66, 68, 77 Prophet, see: Muhammad proportion 453 see also: “golden” pro portion; “divine” proportion; pro portiones languages proportiones languages 283,286,287, 294, 296, 299, 316, 320, 323 propositions as the bearers of certitude 287-88 as the focus of Stoic logic 85 propter quid demonstration 355
559
Protagoras 154 Prowe, L. 424 Psellos (Michael) 154, 179 Ptolemy (Ptolemaic) 153, 159, 194, 203, 208,216,267,274, 397,413,423,424, 428, 456, 457, 458, 463, 505, 506 jce also: Centiloquium (ascribed to Ptolemy) Purbach, Georg 505 Puritanism and science 403 Qadarites, Qadariyya 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 106 al-Qà(Ji, Abû Yûsuf 62 qâmat al-insàn (height of a man, unit of astronomical measure) 467 Qasim ibn Ibrahim 91, 102, 103 Qatâda 97 qawl (speech) 61,64,65,66,67,70,76,77, 81,82 Qazwini, Zakariyya Ibn Muhammad 188 qiyas (analogy, reasoning) 68, 69, 70, 73-74, 76, 77, 82, 120 quadrant 464, 465, 466, 478, 480 quadrivium 153, 157, 161, 184, 352, 354, 471, 472 qualitas planetarum 195, 203 qualities of Christ in the Eucharist 362 acc. to St. Thomas 362 acc. to Ockham 366-67 quantitas res quanta 340, 341 quantity (irrational) 38 (Ockham’s view o f) 363-65, 375 in Aegidius Romanus 364, 365 o f Christ in the Eucharist 362, 363 acc. to St. Thomas 365 acc. to Aegidius Romanus 365 acc. to Ockham 365-66 of the bread in the Eucharist 362 quies media 330 Qudama ibn Ja'far 55 al-Qûhi 49 Quintilian 153, 162 Qur^ân 61-77 passim, 82, 83, 91, 92, 94, 96, 100, 146
560
IND EX
Raby, F. J. E. 317 RaflFar, Vincent 521-22 rainbow 278, 344, 345, 346 Ralph Strode 520 Ramus, Peter (Ramism) 412, 489, 496, 502, 510, 511, 513, 518, 521, 529, 534 Randall, J. H. 429, 517, 522 Rashdall, H. 515 Rashed, Roshdi 4, 6 ratio 193, 196, 197, 198, 210, 211, 217, 234, 251 physica 212 naturalis 195 opposed to auctoritas 196-98 see also: legitima causa et ratio ratiocinatio 483, 484 rationality, scientific 221 Ratramnus 393 Rauwolf, Leonhard 526 Ravaisson-Mollien, C. 474 Raymond Lull 442, 463, 474 Raymond o f Marseilles 215 al-Râzi, Fakhr al-Din 78, 158 reason 108, 116, 358, 360, 367, 374, 397, 432, 434 Rebecca 258 recipes (for compound medicines) 470 Redi, F. 523 reform (renewal) o f the individual (theory o f) in Bernard o f Clairvaux 237-46, 264 Reformation (Protestant) 5, 8, 399, 400, 408, 491-92 Regiomontanus see: Mueller, Johannes regression, mathematical 40 regula mundi 195 Reif, P. 520 religion relation to economic or social change 263 see also: milla Renaissance Twelfth Century 193 Italian 412, 531 Renan, E. 51, 522 Renaudet, A. 529 reportationes 535 res
permanentes 284, 287 successive 284 Reuchlin, Johann 429 revelation 5,109,116,129,131, 357, 367, 374, 400, 408, 432, 433, 434 resolution o f its conflicts with natural science 360fF Rhabanus see: Hrabanus Maurus Rheticus, J. 404, 405, 411, 412, 423, 424 Riccoboni, Antonio 507 Rice, E. F. 518 Richard de Bury 429 Richard Fitzraph 332 Richard ingeniator 441 Richard Killington 313, 317, 323, 324, 325, 329, 331, 334, 335 Richard o f Mediavilla 364 Richard o f Saint-Victor 208, 439 Richard Swineshead 273, 290, 305, 318, 321, 335, 337, 346, 353, 434, 435 Rijk, Lambertus de 175, 319, 321 Riley, L. W . 517 Risse, W . 520, 523 Rist, J. M. 80 Ritter, H. 79, 89, 102 Robert Anglicus 466 Robert o f Chester 159 Robert Grosseteste 342, 344, 345 Robert Halifax 322-23, 324, 326, 331, 333, 334, 335 Robert Holcot 274, 315, 321, 325, 326, 327, 335, 340, 341, 429 Robert Kilwardby 168 Robertson, H. M. 221 Rochais, H. M. 260 Roehl, R. 261 Roger Bacon 183,186, 341, 342,345,442, 443 Roger Rosetus 276, 321-22, 324, 325, 326-27, 328, 333, 334, 335, 336, 341, 380 Roger Swineshead 317 roots, extraction of, in algebra 35-37 Roriczer, M. 446,447,448,449,450,456, 458 Rosato, P. 418 Rose, P. L. 518, 520, 525, 527 Rosen, E. 405, 525 Rosenfield, L. V. 529
IND EX Ross, W . D . 79 Roth, Guenther 259 Round, J. H. 472 Rubinacci, R. 102,103 Ruello, F. 323, 530 Rufinus 164 “rule” definitions of 118 rumb (lance, unit of astronomical mea sure) 466-67 Ruska, J. 212 Saadia Gaon 88,155 Saba’ites, Saba’iyya 94, 95 Sabbatani, L. 526 Saccardo, P. A . 526 Sachau, E. 102 sacramentum salutaris allegoriae 193, 195, 209 Sacrobosco see: John of Sacrobosco Sahas, D . J. 103,104 §a‘id al-Andalusi 146,147 Salet, F. 472 Salim ibn tJutay’a 98 Salter, H. E. 525 Salzman, L. F. 472 al-Samaw’al 34-42, 57, 59, 60 Sandaeus, Maximilianus 418 Sandubi, H. 78 Saijûn 104 Sarton, G. 477 Saulnier, V. L. 529 Savonarola, Girolamo 513 Schacht, Joseph 79,102 Schaeffler, R. 419 Schegk, Jakob 510 schemata 479 Schepers, H. 321 Schiffers, N . 418, 423 Schjellerup, H. C. F. C. 476 Schmidt, C. 530 Schmidt, R. W . 379 Schmitt, Charles 7, 516, 517, 520, 521, 522, 526, 527 Scholarios, Georgios 179 scholasticism (scholastic method) 23,166, 508, 513 Scholder, K. 420, 421, 423 Schouten, J. 473
561
Schramm, M. 424, 518 Schwarz, M. 102 sciences, medieval (Arabic) (Latin praise o f) 194, 304 (autonomous vs handmaiden) 5,349-96 (diffuse vs exact) 6, 51-52, 57-58 (rational vs traditional Islamic) 116-17 (subaltemating and subalternate) 355-57 (theoretical vs practical) 4, 5, 11, 116, 124, 127-28, 132-37, 143-45 (definition o f) 216 (Aristotelian) 352 distinguished from arts 118ff (historiography o f) 15 see also: historiography of medieval learning (organization o f) 4,8,151,156 see also: classification o f the sciences a part of philosophy 271, 273-74 and other intellectual endeavor 10 theology 155-56, 352-77 their methodological unity with theology 274-75, 280-303 their use in theology 353 according to St. Thomas 354-57 according to Ockham 357-60 see also: arithmetic, astronomy, geo metry, granunar, language, legal theory, logic, mathematics, meta physics, music, natural philosophy /science, optics, political science, theology, and scientia scientia 245, 250 inflat 229-31, 234, 244, 426, 430 vs conscientia 230, 231, 232 medieval investigations o f its nature 211, 287 scientia de agricultura 205 scientia de ingeniis 125,126,146,147, 441 scientia de iudiciis 205 scientia de motu 305, 306, 313, 336 see also: motion, motus scientia de nigromantia secundum physicam 205 scientia de ponderibus 125, 145 scientia de prestigiis 205 scientia de speculis 205
562
IN DEX
scientia de ymaginibus 205 scientific method 107 scientific rationality see: rationality, scientific; reason de scire et dubitare 280 (pseudo-) Scotus 178 Scott, T. K. 321, 379 scribes, in Islam see: kuttâb Secreta secretorum 490 “secrets” (technological) 444, 464 secularization 359, 413-14 Seebass, G. 423 Segré, A. 522 CTT]^aivô^evov (that which is signified) 64, 65, 71-72, 76 ormaîvov (that which signifies) 64, 65, 71-72, 76, 82 oîijaavTiKôç 64 CTT1U8ÎOV 67-68, 77, 79, 82, 84 commemorative 67, 70 èvSeiKxiKôç (indicative) 67, 81 Sené, A. 459 Seneca 201, 317, 423 Sennert, Daniel 517 Sentences see: Peter Lombard Sergius (father of John of Damascus) 100 Serlo ofW ylton317 Seton, John 499, 500 Severianus 159 D e Sex principiis 203, 204, 205, 207, 215 Sextus Emphicus 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 501 Sezgin, F. 102 al-Shafi‘i 68-69, 70, 76, 79, 82 al-Shahrazûri 57, 59 shakh? (individual) 65, 75, 77 Shakir, A. M. 78, 79, 103 Shakir, M. M . 103 al-Shammâkhï 90 Shapiro, H. 317 shari^a (religious law) 66, 138 shay (thing) 75, 77, 78 Shehaby, Nabil 4, 8 Shelby, L. R. 446, 461, 473, 480 shibr (hand, unit o f astronomical measure) 467 Shi‘ites 89, 90, 93, 95, 106 Shumaker, W . 429 Sibawayh 81
Siger of Brabant 393 Siger of Courtrai 336 signal see: CTTi|j,eîov nufba significant discourse 61, 63, 64 Silverstein, T. 211 Silvestre D e Sacy, A. I. 78 Simonin, H. D . 339 Simplicius 508 Simson, O. von 461 find *at al-kitaba (scribal art) 53 sine tables 44 Sixtus o f Sienna 500 skepticism falsely ascribed to Ockham 373-75,394 in the 16th century 501, 513 Smits Van W aesber^e, J. 471, 472 social factors 2, 6-8, 12, 19-28, 437 vs intellectual 21-22, 26 vs individual 22-28 and Islamic algebra 50-59 and early Islamic theology 93-99, 101, 106-7, 110-11 and al-Fâràbi’s classification of religion and political science 140-43, 144^5 and the thought o f Bernard o f Clairvaux 222, 254-59 and fourteenth century learning 309-12 and the autonomy o f medieval science 349-54, 377, 391-93 see also: universities social science in Bernard o f Clairvaux 253 sociology o f science V, 1, 20, 50-52, 57, 262, 263, 310 see also: social factors Socrates (Socratic) 401 Soleiman el-Mahri 476 Sombart, W . 221 Sommervogel, C. 519 sophismata 186,303-7, 335, 336, 337, 379, 512, 533 physicalia 306 sophists 154 Soto, Domingo 499, 509 Soudek, J. 518, 520 specialization 349-50, 392-93 speech see: qawl Spinoza, Benedictus de 185, 425 spiritus vitalis 201
IND EX square, carpenter’s 418, 459-61 Stannard, J. 526 stars action o f 195 Steck, M. 473 Steenberghen, F. Van 376, 378, 380, 390, 515 Stegmüller, F. 325, 331, 519 Stelling-Michaud, S. 515 Steneck, N . 314 Stemagel, P. 438 Stevenson, W . H. 525 Stiennon, J. 472 Stifel, Michael 35 Stillwell, M. B. 477 Stock, B. 7, 211 Stoic (s) 174, 490 logic see: logic. Stoic physics 200, 201 Stone, L. 517 Strode, Ralph 520 subalternating and subalternate sciences in Aristotle 355, 356 in St. Thomas 355-57 substance-accident terminology 394 sufism 146 Sumaniyya 106 Summulus de motu incerti auctoris 318 sun (hegemony o f) 200 symbolism 412 sunna (traditions) 61, 63, 73, 75, 76, 77 Sunnites 95 suppositio 279, 284, 285-86, 287-88, 304, 332, 333, 520 (determinate vs merely confused) 320 Sturm, John 530 Suarez, Francisco 492, 511 Sudhoff, K. 210 Çuhâr al-‘Abdi 90, 91, 98 Suidas 154, 187 al-$üli 54 Suter, H. 475 Swineshead, R. see: Richard Swineshead Sylla, E. 5, 7, 318, 320, 321, 332, 387, 516 syllogistic arts in al-Fàràbi 121-22 symbol see: nature, allegorical interpreta tion of, symbolical vs physical ap
563
proaches; numbers, symbolism of Synan, E. 321, 339 syncategorematic 285, 306 synthesis, medieval disintegration of 373 al-Tabari 54, 96, 97 Tabernacle 439 Tabula smaragdirui 207 Tadhâri 79 tahlil (analysis) 125 takh^i? (particularization) 65, 72, 75, 76 Talbot, C. H. 260 Talon, Omer 502, 510, 521 al-Tamimi, A bu ‘Ubayda Muslim ibn Abi Karima 90 Tannery, P. 50 tarkib (synthesis) 125, 126 Tartaglia, Niccolô 33 Tatian 162 Tawney, R. H. 221 Taylor, E. G. R. 465, 475 teacher-student relations 27-28 techne see: arts technology positive evaluation of 7 (changes in medieval) 437-38 Chinese influences? 442-43 Teixeira da Mota, A. 465 Telesio, Bernardino 489, 490, 518 Tempier, E. see: Etienne Tempier Templars 255-56, 264 Temple o f Soloman 439 Tertullian 163 textbooks in 16th century universities 496, 509, 511, 520 Thâbit ibn Qurra 49 Thales 411, 417 Themistius 163, 169, 175, 508 Theodoric of Freiberg 345, 346 Theodorus A bû Qurra 103 theologians in Islam see: Mutakallim theology Islamic 87 beginnings o f 4, 87-111 political context of 93-99, 106-7, 110-11 and Christianity 99-101
564
IND E X
and political philosophy 113 in encyclopedias 155 see also: kalam (natural vs revealed) 129-31, 141, 183 in education 159-60 in al-Fârâbi 114, 115, 137-45 (application of analytical languages in) 289-307, 311 and science 155-56, 272, 274 is theology a science? 277-78, 342 the sources of theological knowledge 108-110 Theophilus 440 Theophrastus 172, 526 theory and practice 4, 5,11,158,229,230, 238, 245, 397, 437-84 jee also: sciences, theoretical vs practical in astronomical navigation 463-68,478 in music 439-40 Thierry of Chartres 159, 198, 200, 203, 213, 217 Thomas Aquinas (Thomistic) 5, 7, 110, 161,167,178,183,186,213,220,313, 338, 342, 344, 352, 353, 354-57, 359, 360, 361-73, 376-77, 379, 391, 39394, 395, 396, 423, 427, 431, 494, 509, 521, 524, 536 Thomas Bradwardine 290, 318, 332, 392, 407, 429, 434, 435, 450, 515 his law 283, 287, 318, 427, 516 Thomas Buckingham 324 Thomas of Cantimpré 160 Thorndike, L. 313, 407, 427, 476, 518 Thurot, C. 515 Tibbets, G. R. 476 Tigerstedt, E. N . 518 Tillich, Paul 414 time 325 (continuity o f) 300, 326, 332 Timpler, Clemens 500 Toletus, Franciscus 524 Tomitano, Bernardino 499 Tommasco de Vio 499 Toni, N . de 474 Toulouse University 162 Tractatus de principiis theologiae (ps.-Ockham) 317 traditional sciences see: sciences, rational vs traditional Islamic
transformations (affine) 48-49 translation 8-10, 16, 80, 158, 183, 194, 195, 218 transmission in mathematics 59 in early Islam 90-91 see also: oral transmission, printed books, written literature transubstantiation 361, 362, 368-70, 394 Trapezuntius, Georgius 493,494,513,518 Trapp,D . 314, 339 trigonometry 51 Trinity 278, 279 trisection o f an angle 44 Tritton, A . S. 104 trivium 153, 157, 161, 352, 354 Troeltsch, E. 221 Tropfke, Johannes 60 truth 412, 416 (doctrine o f double) 183, 373, 403, 522 (self-evident) 358, 368 Tschimhaus, Ehrenfried W. von 185 TuyKàvov (object) 64, 65, 75 Tulp, Nicolaas 527 al-Tûsi, Sharaf al-Din 34, 45^9, 60 Ubaldo, Guido see: Monte, Guidoubaldo del Ulam, A. 418 Ulhnann, M. 427 ‘Umar I 94, 95, 97, 100 'Umar II 89, 90 Umayyad empire 54, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 97,99 ‘ummâl (governors) 53 Underwood, E, A. 527 unity o f late medieval learning 5, 7, 271-348 (external evidence o f) 275-77 (social base o f) 309 fî universe (infinity o f) 419 imiversities (medieval) 7, 162, 272-73, 275, 339, 391, 441 (faculties o f) 159-60, 349-50, 403 (religious goals o f) 349 (and theory and practice 440,441-42,
INDEX 466, 481 (sixteenth century) 7-8, 485-537 (historiography o f) 485-87, 531 (Aristotelianism in) 487-537 passim (astronomy in) 505-6 (mathematics in) 504-7 (medicine in) 502-4 (influence o f humanism on) 490-91, 531 see also: humanism (influence of Reformation on) 491-92 see also: Reformation regional variations among 486, 507-12, 534 Italy 507-8 Spain & Portugal 508-9 France 509-10 Germany 510-11 Britain 511-12 see also: names of individual universi ties al-uqad (knuckles) 65, 67, 78 al-Uqlidisi 55-56 Urricus ingeniator Regis 441 Urso o f Calabria 202, 215 ususfructus 227, 233 utens hoc mundo tanquam non utens 111, 257, 263 ‘Uthman 95, 99 Valla, George 513, 527 Valla, Lorenzo 489 Van Ess, Joseph 4, 6, 8 Varchi, Benedetto 503, 526 Varro 109, 153 Vasco da Gama 467 Vasoli, C. 516, 523 Vatable, Franciscus 518 Vaughn, R. 472 velocity of alteration 329 verbal indicants 66, 68 see also: indicant o f a discourse, lafy Verde, A . 522 Verger, J. 517 Vemet, J. 476 Vernia, Nicoletto 528 Vesalius, Andreas 490, 504, 531 via moderna 401 Victor, S. 446, 471, 476, 480 victoria 453, 455, 456
565
Viète, François (Franciscus Vieta) 33, 47 Vignaux, P. 317, 321, 323, 339 Villard of Honnecourt 443,446,447,450, 470-71 Vmoslada, R. G. 528, 529 Vimercato, Francesco 508 Vincent o f Beauvais 160,190, 442 Vincentini, F. 522 Viotti, Bartolomeo 496 Virgil 165, 201 virtus agitativa 200 vis genitiva 195, 196 naturae 197 Vitruvius 153, 483 Vives, Juan Luis 511 Viviani, U . 523 Voobus, A . 104 void space 274, 313 voluntarism 292, 295 voluntas D ei 195, 196, 197, 198, 212, 213, 217 Von Grunebaum, G. E, 78, 101,102 voyages o f discovery 463, 464 Wadding, L. 391 Wahb ibn Munabbih 98,103 Waldivus ingeniator A l l al-Walid 100 Wallace, W . A . 528 Wallerand, G. 336 Walter Burley (Burleigh) 168, 318, 320, 332, 373 Walter Chatton 321 Walzer, R. 146 (suspended) 72-73, 75 war Oust) 255 Wasil ibn ‘Atâ’ 88 Waszink, J. H. 210 waters above the heavens 197, 217 Watson, A. G. 525 Watt, W . M. 103 Webb, C. 212 Weber, H. E. 529 Weber, Max (Weberian) 7, 52, 219-21, 255, 263 Weil, E. 425 Weinberg, B. 518
566
IN D E X
Weisheipl, J. A, 335, 336, 378, 386, 515, women 500 525 work, attitudes toward Weizsacker, F. von 400 in Bernard of Clairvaux 7 Wellesz, Emmy 476 work ethic 220 Wendelin Steinbach 344 writing see: khaff Whewell, William 15 written literature White, H. 260 in early Islam 90-91, 98, 105 White, Lynn, Jr. 259, 418, 437, 472 vs oral culture 247, 262 Whitteridge, G. 526 Wulf, M. de 339 will 291, 293, 333 see also: free will Wundt, M. 519, 530 divine 396 see also: voluntas Dei', Wurms, F. 518 voluntarism William of Conches 158, 188, 195-97, Yadegari, M. 475 198, 213, 215, 217, 218, 222, 479 Yahyà ibn al-yusayn 91, 93, 98 William Heytesbury 290, 305, 318, 337, Yates, F. 428 351,432, 516, 520 Yazid III 97, 103 William of Hirschau 158 Yazid al-Azdi, Abû Zaharyyâ’ 102 William of Ockham (Ockhamism) 5, 7, Youschkevitch, A. P. 474 178,274,281,287, 314, 317,338,341, yufid (to signify) 61 344, 354, 357-77, 391, 394-96, 407, 430, 434 see also: nominalism Zabarella, Jacopo 496,499,500, 508, 511, William of Saint-Thierry 198, 213, 264 520, 524, 534 William of Sherwood 179, 319, 337 Zacut, Abraham 475 Willner, H. 211 al-?ahiri, Dâwüd ibn Khalaf 83 Wilpert, P. 378, 380, 387, 389, 390, 521 Zambelli, P. 527 Wilson, Curtis 318, 320, 321, 334, 432, Zanchius 500, 524 433, 516 Zayd 94 Winckelmann, J. 259 Zayd ibn ‘Ali 95 wisdom {sapientia) Zaydiyya (Zaidites) 91, 98 vs science 199 Zayed, S. 79 Witelo 345, 346 Zaynal-'Abidin 96, 97 Wittich, Claus 259 Zeller, F. and C. 415 Woepcke, F. 33, 50, 474 zero 56 Wolf, F. 423 Zeuthen, H. G. 50 Wolff, Christian (Wolffian) 511 Zimmer, E. 425 Wolfson, H. A. 519 Zimmermann, A . 476 Wolley, John 501 Zoroastrians 100
SYN TH ESE L IB R A R Y Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy o f Science, Sociology of Science and o f Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods o f Social and Behavioral Sciences Managing Editor: Ja a k k o H
in t ik k a
(Academy o f Finland and Stanford University) Editors:
R obert S. C o h e n (Boston University) D o n a l d D a v id s o n (The Rockefeller University and Princeton University) G ab r ie l N u c h e l m a n s (University o f Leyden) W esley C. Sa l m o n (University o f Arizona)
1. J. M . B ochei ^ski , a Precis o f Mathematical Logic. 1959, X +100 pp. 2. P, L. G u ir a u d , Problèmes et méthodes de la statistique linguistique. 1960, V I +14 6 pp. 3. H a n s F r e u d e n t h a l (éd.), The Concept and the Role o f the M od el in Mathematics and Natural and Social Sciences, Proceedings o f a Colloquium held at Utrecht, The Netherlands, January I960. 1961, V I + 194 pp. 4. E vert W . B eth , Formal Methods. An Introduction to Symbolic L ogic and the Study o f Effective Operations in Arithmetic and Logic: 1962, X IV + 170 pp. 5. B. H. K azem ier and D . V uysje (eds.). Logic and Language. Studies dedicated to Professor R udolf Carnap on the Occasionofhis SeventiethBirthday. 1962, V I + 256pp. 6. M a r x W . W ar to fsk y (ed.). Proceedings o f the Boston Colloquium f o r the Philos ophy o f Science, I9 6 I-I9 6 2 , Boston Studies in the Philosophy o f Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and M arx W . Wartofsky), Volume I. 1973, V I I I + 212 pp. 7. A . A. Zmowv.v,PhilosophicalProblems o f Many-Valued Logic. 1963, X IV +155 pp. 8. G eorges G u r v it c h , The Spectrum o f Social Time. 1964, X X V I + 152 pp. 9. P a u l L o r e n z e n , Form al Logic. 1965, V III + 123 pp. 10. R obert S. C o h en and M a r x W . W ar to fsk y (eds.). In Honor o f Philipp Frank, Boston Studies in the Philosophy o f Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and M arx W . W artofsky), Volume II. 1965, X X X IV + 4 7 5 pp.
11. E vert W . B eth , Mathematical Thought. An Introduction to the Philosophy o f Mathematics. 1965, X II + 208 pp. 12. E vert W . B eth and Je a n P ia g e t , Mathematical Epistemology and Psychology. 1966, X n + 326 pp. 13. G u id o K ü n g , Ontology and the Logistic Analysis o f Language. An Enquiry into the Contemporary Views on Universals. 1967, X I + 210 pp. 14. R obert S. C o h e n and M a r x W . W artofsk y (eds.). Proceedings o f the Boston Colloquium f o r the Philosophy o f Science I964-I966, in Memory o f Norwood Russell Hanson, Boston Studies in the Philosophy o f Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and M arx W . Wartofsky), Volume III. 1967, X L IX + 489 pp.
