The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010 (The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook Series)

The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook Series Series Editor: Konstantina E. Botsiou Associate Professor of Modern History and International Politics at the University of Peloponnese, Corinth, Greece Director General, Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy 10, Vas. Sofias Ave. 10674 Athens Greece www.idkaramanlis.gr, [email protected]

The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook series features collections of essays on international politics, written from a European point of view. Each volume reflects on events that marked the previous year and addresses the challenges ahead. Eminent political figures, academics, diplomats, journalists, and professionals offer their views on diverse political, economic, social, and ideological issues that have shaped and continue to affect contemporary political and social dynamics within and beyond state borders.

Constantine Arvanitopoulos · Konstantina E. Botsiou Editors

The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010

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Editors Professor Constantine Arvanitopoulos Panteion University 136, Syngrou Ave. 17671 Athens Greece

Associate Professor Konstantina E. Botsiou Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy 10, Vas. Sofias Ave. 10674 Athens Greece [email protected]

e-ISSN 1868-212X ISSN 1868-2111 ISBN 978-3-642-12373-3 e-ISBN 978-3-642-12374-0 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook Series Library of Congress Control Number: 2010928332 Published by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010. All Rights Reserved © Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, Athens 2010 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: WMXDesign GmbH, Heidelberg, Germany Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Acknowledgements

This book is the result of collective work and commitment. We are indebted to Katharina Wetzel-Vandai and Gabriele Keidel at Springer for the support and encouragement they offered to this project. We also thank Martha Voyadji and the Communicative English editing team for the meticulous copyediting of the draft manuscript. We are grateful to Dr Antonis Klapsis and Antigoni Kouvidi at the Department of Publications of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, who devoted a lot of time and energy to the collection and formatting of the draft texts. Finally, we are deeply indebted to the scholars and policymakers, whose work is included in this volume, for their participation and contribution.

Preface

The year 2009 was indelibly marked by the global economic crisis. Indeed, the crisis has changed the way policymakers and citizens view both politics and the economy. Established ideas regarding the role of states and international organisations in economic affairs have been challenged. However, a new economic order has not yet arisen: we are still waiting to see how the developed Western states will capitalise on the effects of the crisis in order to avert similar phenomena in the future. For the European Union, the task will be very complex. The euro knits national European economies tightly together, thus obliging the Union to formulate solutions that will keep all members of the Eurozone fit for growth and competitiveness. The economic crisis has exposed the difficulties attached to this venture, with many national economies facing stagnation or recession. The new European institutional framework that will be shaped by the Lisbon Treaty will definitely take into consideration the new economic landscape, both within the EU and across the international markets, in the capacity of setting priorities for its member countries and the countries that are willing to join. The global economic crisis and the long process of enlargement in previous years have, in many EU countries, given rise to second thoughts as to the identity and the borders of the Union. Although the EU cannot afford to compromise its potential for further enlargement and deeper integration, it seems natural that national governments will need to renegotiate among themselves the timetable for further bold institutional initiatives. Urgent issues, rather than long-term strategies, dominate the political agenda these days. Climate change ranks very high on the list of priorities held by the EU and other international organisations as it affects a wide area of the international economy as well as national policymaking.

VIII Preface Terrorism and instability in the Middle East are as pressing as ever, while, at the same time, poverty and war force thousands of people to join the great waves of migration to the developed world, thus creating a potentially explosive social situation. The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy continues to address the domestic and international issues that affect growth, individual freedom and democracy. The 2010 Yearbook presents analyses of current developments, but also essays that reflect deeper long-term approaches to economic, political and social challenges. Prominent politicians, scholars and researchers provide us with insight into the past and the present, thus stimulating political thought and action for the future.

Ioannis M. Varvitsiotis President of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, former Minister

Contents

Introduction................................................................................................ 1 Constantine Arvanitopoulos and Konstantina E. Botsiou European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future ......................................................................................... 5 Jerzy Buzek Europe after the Lisbon Treaty .............................................................. 19 Panos Kazakos Necessary Progress in the Defence of Europe ....................................... 33 Pierre Lellouche Eastern Partnership: The Polish Perspective ........................................ 45 Joanna Popielawska Women’s Participation in Europe’s Social and Political Life.............. 55 Rodi Kratsa The Privatisation of Defence and Security: Risks and Opportunities ........................................................................................... 63 Nikolaos Tzifakis The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Threats, Prejudices and Solutions.................................................................................................... 73 Dimitrios Kokoromytis

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Greek Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Strategies ................ 85 Dimitris Keridis The Origins of Greece’s European Policy ............................................. 93 Konstantina E. Botsiou The Greek Economy, 1959–2009: From Association with the EEC to Accession and EMU........................................................................... 109 Michalis Psalidopoulos Greek Liberalism in the Twentieth Century: Dilemmas of Research.................................................................................................. 119 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou Small States in World War II: The Greek Example .......................... 129 George Th. Mavrogordatos Index ....................................................................................................... 137

Contributors

Dr Konstantina E. Botsiou Associate Professor of Modern History and International Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Peloponnese and Director General of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Dr Jerzy Buzek President of the European Parliament and former Premier of the Republic of Poland Dr Evanthis Hatzivassiliou Assistant Professor of History of the Post-War World in the Department of History-Archaeology at the University of Athens Dr Panos Kazakos Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at the University of Athens Dr Dimitris Keridis Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia Mr Dimitrios Kokoromytis Political Scientist; M.A. in Chinese Studies, National Political Science University, Taipei, Taiwan; Research Associate of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Mrs Rodi Kratsa MEP for New Democracy and Vice-President of the European Parliament

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Dr Pierre Lellouche Secretary of State for European Affairs of France Dr George Th. Mavrogordatos Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Athens and holder of the Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Chair at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Mrs Joanna Popielawska Research Fellow at the European Centre Natolin Dr Michalis Psalidopoulos Professor of History of Economic Thought in the Department of Economics at the University of Athens Dr Nikolaos Tzifakis Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Peloponnese and Deputy Director General of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy

Abbreviations

BBC CAP CFSP CMPD EaP EBRD EC EDA EEC EFTA EIB EIIs EMU ENP EON EPP EPP-ED Group ERE ERM ESDP EU EURO-NEST EVEA FYROM GDP GSEE IGC KEPE NATO

British Broadcasting Corporation Common Agricultural Policy Common Foreign and Security Policy Crisis Management Planning Directorate Eastern Partnership European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Community United Democratic Left European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Investment Bank European Industrial Initiatives Economic and Monetary Union European Neighbourhood Policy National Youth Organization European People’s Party European People’s Party-European Democrats Group National Radical Union Exchange Rate Mechanism European Security and Defence Policy European Union EU-Neighbourhood-East Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gross domestic product General Confederation of Greek Workers Intergovernmental conference Centre of Planning and Economic Research North Atlantic Treaty Organization

XIV Abbreviations ND ND NGO OEEC PASOK POWs R&D SACEUR SET Plan SEV SME UK UN USSR WTO

New Democracy (Nea Demokratia) Northern Dimension Non-governmental organisation Organisation for European Economic Co-operation Panhellenic Socialist Movement Prisoners of war Research and Development Supreme Allied Commander Europe European Strategic Energy Technology Plan Greek Industrials Association Small and medium enterprises United Kingdom United Nations Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Trade Organization

Introduction

Constantine Arvanitopoulos and Konstantina E. Botsiou

A World in Crisis ‘Make men work together; show them that beyond their differences and geographical boundaries there lies a common interest.’ Jean Monnet’s famous quote seems today more appropriate than ever. Nations all over the world are facing challenges and opportunities that bring international cooperation to the centre of attention. The global economy is still experiencing the effects of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Over the last three years economies worldwide have slowed and international trade has declined. Often, national governments have found themselves unable to deal with the tidal waves triggered by the crisis; several states have even faced bankruptcy. Most importantly, the crisis has negatively affected the lives of ordinary people, creating a sense of uncertainty about the future and thus posing a direct threat to social cohesion. The prosperity of even the wealthiest nations has been challenged in an unprecedented way, leading the public to question the effectiveness of states’ guarantees of economic growth and social peace. Governments and policy makers are also concerned about the effects of the crisis on international politics. Local conflicts have been inflamed by the deterioration of global trade and the reservations expressed by many Western governments over the continuation of international commitments that burden national budgets. The first year of the Obama administration in the United States is drawing to a close with the debate still open over US involvement in the war against terrorism in the Middle East. At the same time, international terrorism has all but receded. Western security systems have proven inadequate to deal with the growing aggressiveness of antiC. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_1, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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Westernism in regions where the rule of law and respect for human rights have no historical roots. The recruitment of ‘soldiers of terror’ in such areas is still an easy task, even almost a decade after the 9/11 attacks. Closer cooperation between the United States and the European Union is conditio sine qua non for establishing a coherent strategy towards the continuing asymmetric threats that challenge conventional wisdom over war and peace. Evidently, international cooperation is reinventing itself in order to deal with problems that have permanently transcended national borders: most prominently, migration and climate change. For years, most European societies have been demonstrating growing concern over the economic and social effects of migration. The global financial crisis has aggravated feelings of social exclusion among immigrants whom many social groups perceive as both an economic threat and a subversive element to national identities. To prevent the growth of xenophobia and political extremism, national governments must redefine their migration policies and enhance the capacity of the EU as political coordinator of new strategic approaches, especially towards the ‘near abroad’ that is the source of large waves of migration to Europe. The conclusion of a long process of enlargement is now providing space for the reconstruction of the EU’s internal social and economic agenda. Climate change is also forcing the developed world to formulate a common strategy that will balance growth and environmental protection. The task is complicated, however, as quite a few developing countries appear reluctant to have their economies bound to the limitations of climatefriendly policies: the cases of energy-thirsty China and India are most telling. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen in December 2009 did not reach a legally binding agreement on the reduction of greenhouse gases and failed to satisfy the demands of world public opinion on this matter. The good news is that climate change, which has been questioned as a fact by influential scientific and political analyses until this day, has been placed very high on the international political agenda. The EU seems determined to keep environmental protection at the epicentre of its growth strategy. The coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, combined with the experience gained during the economic crisis, is expected to strengthen the EU’s involvement in the operation of the markets. The balance between state and market, a longstanding

Introduction

feature of the European welfare state, will no longer be monopolised by the rules of self-regulation that dominated the golden era of growth in the past three decades. This volume addresses the complex political agenda through chapters that focus on current issues from a European point of view. It also presents aspects of the Greek public debate over important events of recent history and their impact on Greek policies and public memory. In the first chapter, Jerzy Buzek analyses the European priorities concerning the use of renewable sources of energy and the supply of nonrenewable energy sources (such as oil or natural gas) from different providers outside the EU. In the second chapter, Panos Kazakos discusses the changes brought into effect by the Lisbon Treaty and what they signify for the institutional structure of the EU. Next, Pierre Lellouche highlights the importance of a common European defence structure as a means for promoting European security and solidarity. Joanna Popielawska then analyses the new relations promoted by the EU with Eastern European countries, and Rodi Kratsa follows by presenting the latest EU initiatives for gender equality. In the sixth chapter, Nikolaos Tzifakis sheds light on the growing trend towards the privatisation of defence and security in certain international missions and its impact on international organisations. Dimitrios Kokoromytis then examines North Korea’s nuclear policies in connection with the country’s recent political history. Dimitris Keridis discusses major aspects of Greek foreign policy on the threshold of the new decade. In chapter nine, Konstantina E. Botsiou analyses Greece’s European policies from the late 1950s until the signing of the Treaty for its accession to the European Communities in 1979. On the same theme, Michalis Psalidopoulos provides a detailed account of Greek economic policies in connection with Greece’s European policies from 1959 to 2009. In the penultimate chapter, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou offers an insightful account into the recent history of liberalism in twentieth-century Greece. Finally, in view of the 65th anniversary of the end of the World War II, George Th. Mavrogordatos discusses the role of small states in the war and, on another level, provides a Greek perspective with a special focus on Greece.

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European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future∗

Jerzy Buzek

As we all know, Konstantinos Karamanlis challenged Greece to pursue its European destiny. The topic of my article is precisely this challenge: our common European destiny. European integration after the Second World War started with the Coal and Steel Community. It is a very important symbol for us, because coal was at that time – and is still today – the essential source of energy for economic and military development. The Founding Fathers of Europe were talking and thinking about a Coal and Steel Community, but in fact they wanted to avoid war on their continent, because it was absolutely certain that with a common policy in the coal and steel industry, it wouldn’t be possible to start a war with another country in the community. So we can say that the European Community began with energy, with coal, and that the second step was the Treaties of Rome. Thus Euratom became one of the communities that continued almost until today. It is very, very significant that over the second half of the twentieth century we are still talking about energy all the time. At this specific moment in our history we are talking about a much wider community of democratic states, and we are starting to discuss a common European energy policy, in other words, an energy policy which would be common to all EU member countries. It is quite a new idea, and could probably solve some very important issues for us. But our discussions take place in the wider context of major dilemmas regarding European integration. ∗

Liberal Emphasis 40, July-August-September 2009. This text is derived from a speech Dr Jerzy Buzek delivered at an event organised by the Karamanlis Institute for Democracy in Athens, on 18 March 2009.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_2, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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The fate of the Lisbon Treaty remains undecided. This is not about a defeat of a broader vision of the European Union. It is not only about the question ‘What kind of Europe would we like to build?’ At the end of the day, it is not only about our ambitions, but also about a common foreign policy. The problem with the Lisbon Treaty, even if it is only a temporary one, is that it has direct, specific consequences on the everyday functioning of the EU. This is not to say that it is not working properly; but it is to say that it is not working in an optimal way. We, the EU, are a ‘political dwarf’ if we compare our political strength with our economy, which is almost the largest in the world. It is very difficult to introduce our Lisbon Strategy one or two years after the changes we made to it, because, since 2006–07, we have adopted quite a new strategy, a renewed one, because we failed to achieve a lot in the first implementation period from 2000 to 2005/6. Moreover, the Lisbon Strategy has to deal with the issue of competitiveness and the exit from the economic crisis. We must, therefore, recognise and distinguish the following: the Lisbon Treaty is directly related to the political strength of the European Union and the Lisbon Strategy is directly related to the economic strength of the European Union. But we must distinguish between the two and I think it is good news that it is totally up to us to make the EU a major power in whatever field we decide. We need only to master our political will and believe in our own potential. This is currently the most important issue facing the European Union. I think it is as simple as that. There is no need for a new world order, or a new economic school to be developed, merely to overcome crises. We need the political will to work together and to move forward together in the European Union. We need the kind of approach I sometimes find is met with surprise among many of my colleagues in the European Parliament, especially those from Western countries. And I can say that this approach, the belief in our own potential and our will, is a recent contribution of the Eastern European countries, whose political experience of the 1990s or 1980s, or even the last century, taught a much different lesson than the one learned in the West. I think that many of the experiences faced by Greece are very similar to ours from Central and Eastern Europe. So there is no challenge other than the political one. The Lisbon Strategy is an economic challenge we are facing today, requiring us to be more competitive, especially today in a time of global crisis.

European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future

Another major issue we need to focus on is threats. One such major threat is demographic. We are a continent in population decline and we know it. Europe’s demographic situation has repercussions for Europe’s economies, economic relations and our way of life, which is very comfortable under the social welfare shield. Yet these repercussions are so complex that it is impossible to dwell on them in detail. And, after all, in Greece the effects of the demographic problem, such as immigration, are quite well known. Although Poland faces no immigration challenge, the demographic problem there is probably much worse than in Greece. However, demographics is not Europe’s only problem. I would like focus my analysis on energy issues, specifically, the energy policy of Europe, which is connected with the obligation to combat climate change. This is quite a new obligation that was not an issue five or ten years ago. Apart from the traditional dilemmas of oil and gas prices, finding reliable suppliers, diversifying suppliers or developing new, more energy efficient technologies, we have taken on the responsibility of radically changing our approach to energy. It is a radically different approach of strategic importance, although not in a traditional, narrowly defined geopolitical sense. Today it is climate change that is at the heart of our fears, but also of our hopes. The climate and energy package naturally brings on all European member states serious obligations that are symbolically presented by the 20-20-20 approach. This means a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% in energy savings and a 20% share of renewable energy by 2020. Additionally, a 10% share of renewable energy in road transport (Figure 1). Equally, though, it brings a whole spectrum of opportunities. We should always think of the opportunities that emerge, not only the threats. There is great potential for development. The climate and energy package provides major incentives for innovation in energy, and research and development in the field of new technologies such as clean coal, nuclear energy, new modes of energy transmission, fully integrated energy networks and so on and so forth. First of all, however, we should reduce our energy consumption and focus on renewable energy sources.

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Figure 1. EU – Leader in fighting global warming. Targets for 2020

Developing this potential will have consequences not only for the field of energy policy but also for military technologies, and we will find much wider applications in the future for everyday life. Currently, we have renewable energy sources, fossil fuels and nuclear power. Fossil fuels include coal, oil and gas. We today identify energy efficiency and savings as our top priority, because the cheapest energy is the energy which it is not necessary to produce. And we must also remember that the demand for energy in Europe doubles every 30 to 40 years. Moreover, there are the goals set by the EU: security of supply, environmental protection through climate protection and competitive costs for energy; the most important goal being security of energy supply. We have to understand that we are helpless without energy while not ignoring, of course, the importance of environmental protection. Moreover, we should not forget competitive costs, given that security of supply costs dearly. However, we will be able to overcome our economic problems with the Lisbon Strategy. So we must ensure competitive energy costs or else we will fail to meet the Lisbon Strategy goals. It is only new technologies that can provide a solution to this problem (Figure 2).

For more information, please visit WWWjnogate.org

European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future

This publication is produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sde responsibility of the contractor, EIR /Hill /G&Fint, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

Figure 2. Integrated hydrogen generation from fossil fuels, biomass and wind

Additionally, it is very important to see how new technologies could help our economy grow. The most important issue is energy efficiency and savings. We should remember that renewable energy is still expensive to generate. Renewable energy is of especial interest to Greece, but it is equally important for every other European country. The use of local and decentralised sources of energy is a major issue for an insular country like Greece. It is very important that our energy policy has such a starting point if we want to develop new technologies and have security of energy supply. The situation in Poland is very difficult. We have limited solar and wind energy potential, and although we have large amounts of biomass and biogas, things are still very difficult. But it is only one country in the European Union. A very good example for Poland is Denmark, which uses wind energy and biogas extensively and solar energy to a lesser extent. They have moved from 20 or more large electricity generating stations to thousands of dispersed supply plants (Figure 3).

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Figure 3. Future – disperse supply. Good example – Denmark

For Greece renewable energy technologies, particularly solar, are of major interest. There is much interest and a great deal of research going on presently in Europe and the world on renewable energy and solar energy in particular. There are some projects in the Sahara Desert to develop enormous solar energy production in the future. To understand the significance of renewable energy, in terms of not only climate change but also economy and politics, it suffices to look at the economic recovery plans of both President Barack Obama and the European Commission. Our economic recovery plan provides for major investments in sustainable energy projects as part of its recovery package, and renewable energy is the most important part. With regard to other energy sources, in Poland there are mainly fossil fuels, namely coal, gas and oil. There are shortages in supply, since we don’t have our own coal. The solution of the European Commission is to combine renewable energy sources. Moreover, in the European Union area we can easily combine coal and renewable energy, making this combina-

European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future

tion highly effective. In my country, of course, coal remains very important. I think that the combination of different energy sources could be a solution to many problems in Greece also. But coal provides us with some other possibilities; it enables us to produce synthetic gas through coal gasification. This diversification of gas supply could be achieved through gasification of either lignite or hard coal. We have only just started constructing two big facilities in Poland, and in a few years we will probably be able to produce our fertilisers/raw materials in the chemical industry directly from coal rather than from natural gas imported from Russia. We also know that synthetic gas produced from coal could be used in our households, or even everywhere. This is a possibility you must also consider in Greece. I am pointing this out because there is really no doubt that new energy technologies will be an extremely important driving force in the near future and especially in times of crisis. This is a major opportunity, a chance we cannot afford to waste. What will the outcome of these efforts be? An economic boom, high competitiveness and, due to highly advanced technologies, more highly qualified workplaces. It is also true though that these efforts will lead us to substitute new energies for the traditional sources, namely gas and oil. At EU level, there is ample support. Resources for R&D and new technologies are growing compared with structural funds, which are declining, or agriculture funds, which are also dwindling. As indicated in Figure 4, in

Figure 4. Growing budget of the Framework Programmes for R&D

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forthcoming years R&D and innovation will be allocated €54 billion. In the Seventh Framework Programme, energy is for the first time a top priority. Energy has slowly become, step by step, the most important issue in these programmes. Another fairly recent development is the establishment of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (Figure 5). It is the knowledge and innovation communities, as well as sustainable energy, that play the leading role in this institute, set up at the end of 2008. That it has given priority to calls for proposals only for sustainable energy implies that this is the most important issue for the European Union; a lot of funds will be spent on it in the future. The issue of energy is tightly linked with security. There cannot be security without a secure energy supply. By choosing to make such investments, we can also overcome problems caused by the crisis, because at the EU level we can have constant support for such development, for ideas and investment. I should come back to the climate and energy package. We were talking about this issue in 2008 and we concluded the climate and energy package

Figure 5. European Institute of Innovation and Technology

European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future

in December. The climate and energy package introduces maximum values for CO2 emissions and charges for the countries that exceed these values. This is unprecedented, as no country had incurred economic or other costs due to CO2 emissions five or ten years ago. Sulphur dioxide (SO2) is yet another issue that has recently emerged. Removing CO2 or minimising CO2 emissions is costly at EU level. As in all cases, environmental protection comes at a cost. In this respect, too, the European Union has introduced the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan). It is the first time that such a plan for industrial initiatives and research has been set up in the European Union. The plan brings together researchers and industry, engineers and professors, and aims at creating new technologies and developing a completely new way of overcoming our climate and energy problems. Figure 6 is quite characteristic in that it shows the European Industrial Initiatives: the industrial wind initiative, the solar initiative and the bioenergy initiative. The first two are the most important for Greece. The European CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage Initiative is rather typical. It concerns the use of coal, specifically, and it is very important to have such initiatives to demonstrate that the goal of zero CO2 emissions is a possibility. The use of wind and solar energy, as well as bioenergy, has a similar purpose, because they generate zero CO2 emissions, too. The same is true for nuclear energy. Therefore such initiatives, which are supported by the EU, are very important. We have, for instance, fission, wind energy, energy efficient buildings and coal when we use coal to generate not only

The European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan)

European Industrial Initiatives (EIIs) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

European Wind Initiative Solar Europe Initiative Bio-energy Europe Initiative European CO2 capture, transport and storage initiative (CCS) European electricity grid initiative Sustainable nuclear fission initiative Energy efficiency and energy savings

Figure 6. The European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan)

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electricity but also heat and chemicals. We can have efficiency of such production as high as 50%, while today, producing electricity only, the efficiency is 35%. So we are losing our coal. It is very costly to transform only 35% of the coal into something useful. In the case of polygeneration, we can achieve 50%, or even more than 50%, and be much more efficient. We also have fusion. Fusion is different from fission; a typical example is the use of hydrogen in cars. So the time horizon is probably around 20–30 years, and for fusion probably 50 years. All these data are detailed in Figure 7. For now, oil and gas remain dominant in the energy sector. As long as we are dependant primarily on coal, we will continue to have a problem with oil and gas in Europe. In this area we are faced with a new reality, a new framework for shaping our policies. Just as the climate and energy package adds a new dimension to energy policy considerations, so too does the third energy package, which places emphasis on the problem of security of oil and gas supply, as well as electricity supply. It is the third energy package that is now the

Figure 7. Technology map for the SET Plan

European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future

topic of discussion among three EU institutions: the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council. How will this third energy package change the landscape in the energy area? Based on the very same principles that have laid the foundation for European integration since the ’90s, and which have been developing ever since, it means a common market in electricity and gas, a stable legal and regulatory environment, an agency responsible for the regulation of cooperation, an agency for cooperation among energy regulators and crossborder connections in electricity and gas. In practice this means that the EU countries will be able to help each other when there are shortages of oil and gas or electricity supply. And what do we expect to gain, in terms of principles? How do we aspire to benefit from the third energy package in the area of values that shape our common present and future? The answer is that we will benefit in those fundamental areas upon which our common European past is grounded. The third energy package will make the postulated European solidarity a reality and will ensure more security of energy supply. It will drive us towards solidarity and security – values that underlie our common European experience. The map outlined in Figure 8 is probably the most important from many points of view. It is exceptionally important for Greece, which is slightly apart from the centre of Europe. The same is true for the Baltic states and Finland, or even Poland. As a matter of fact, we in Poland don’t have electricity or gas transmission connections; so Poland, like Greece, has problems in this area. And, as can be seen on this map, natural gas is flowing into Europe from East to West, as is the case with our political dependence. We are politically dependent on the eastern part of Europe, because we need energy, and we are afraid of losing our supply. So there can be no security today without stable energy supplies. I wouldn’t like to explain all the connections, because they are very complicated. Some of them, in fact, have not been built yet. They are only proposals, like the North Stream or Nabucco pipelines. And all states have to realise that without stable energy supplies there is no security today in any field. Social security is a major challenge, but it is the security of energy supplies, as we saw at the beginning of this year, which is seriously threatened at the present moment.

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Figure 8. Proposed priority axes for natural gas pipelines

Conclusions Energy supply, and the eventual shortage thereof, has repercussions in every sphere of the politics of countries. It also has a military dimension. So it is worth reiterating that solidarity and security underlie our common European experience. Security now has two brand new and important dimensions: energy supply and climate change prevention. But how did our common European experience, the European vision which must also have motivated the great Greek politician, Konstantinos Karamanlis, come about? How did we manage to turn the strong values, the high ideals, into successful reality? At this point I would like to recall the words I heard very often in the Solidarity underground when we started to fight against Communism in my country. We often used to say at the time, ‘The answer to a problem is not a piece of paper or a meeting or a strategy. The answer to a problem is action.’ So we undertook action and managed to gain something enor-

European Solidarity: Energy and Security. A Vision for a Common Future

mous. We couldn’t even imagine, back in the ’70s or ’80s, being a free country, a member of NATO and the European Union. The situation is similar with regard to energy. We have today the necessary studies on security of supply, security in the energy field; there are thousands of pages of paper. We have had and held thousands of meetings. We have the necessary strategies in place, as well. So now it is time for action.

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Europe after the Lisbon Treaty∗

Panos Kazakos

The EU is in constant evolution and since Maastricht has changed its basic rules (governance) at relatively short intervals. By 2007 six intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) had taken place, giving the impression of uncertainty in constitutional and, indeed, strategic matters. Other changes have occurred and are still occurring in parallel processes outside the IGCs; for example, on immigration issues. The last round of intergovernmental negotiations to reform the Union’s institutional structure ended with the Lisbon Treaty (hereafter LT) which came into force in 2009 after a protracted ratification process. In the current debate one is tempted to answer questions by utilising familiar terms and concepts. In my view, the EU has become the most developed ‘postmodern’ model of organising relations between (still) sovereign states whereby sovereignty is redefined. This perhaps makes partly obsolete the old distinction between intergovernmentalism and supranationality. Robert Cooper suggested that the European Union de-emphasises sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The Union has become a highly developed system for interference in each other’s domestic affairs in the framework of mutual surveillance. Thus, it is ‘more a transnational than a supranational system, a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central power’ (Cooper, 2002). The stability of the Union is based on the mutual openness of the member states. As with previous revisions, several factors influenced in various ways the outcome of the protracted negotiations that led to the new treaty: external threats; the latest enlargement that initially seemed to increase the risk ∗

Liberal Emphasis 41, October-November-December 2009.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_3, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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of policy immobilism and redistributive conflicts (these fears turned out to be false); the perception of a democratic deficit derived from the assumption that the Union could be judged by democratic criteria applying to normal states; and a declining legitimacy. I do not attach equal importance to all of these factors. Assessing the outcome of the negotiations, I have come to the conclusion that the LT, hence the form of Europe in the next 10–15 years at least, was decisively but not exclusively influenced by converging perceptions of external threats (e.g., terrorism and energy security). Indeed, the rapidly changing international environment seemed to demand more coherent, decisive and independent action on the part of the Union in international affairs and strengthened cooperation in ‘home affairs’. Threats and challenges were early and explicitly recognised in a paper on security strategy that governments adopted in 2003. It was stated there that Europe faces security threats and challenges […] Distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or south-east Asia may be a threat to European countries and their citizens. (Solana, 2003, pp. 3 and 11)

This explains why the most significant changes of the last revision pertain to issues of Justice and Home Affairs (internal security and judicial cooperation) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (including defence). In contrast, the LT merely reaffirmed the established rules of economic integration.

Turning Grand Plans into Pragmatic Solutions The Lisbon Treaty is based on the same assumption of an ‘ever closer Union’ as its predecessors. It makes explicit provision for the basic values and strengthened forms of cooperation presupposing stable democratic institutions in the member states and domestic structures receptive to the need for sharing sovereignties. It emphasises democracy and human rights and these characteristics are, along with economic and welfare regimes, constitutive for the EU. In other words, European integration is coupled to a particular type of state and society (Habermas, 2001).

Europe after the Lisbon Treaty

Despite multiple concerns, the LT does not drastically change core elements of the EU structure; it satisfies federalists even less, and it falls short of some of the initial and ambitious objectives of the Laeken Declaration (2001). It preserves the fine postmodern balance between central institutions and national authorities. The ‘Community method’ remains a characteristic feature of the decision making – and is even moderately expanded in certain areas. During the negotiations the member states made it clear that they wished to remain the ‘masters of the Treaties’, a desire reflected, inter alia, in the role of the Council and various veto rights, break clauses, opt-outs and protocols. However, the LT brings about some remarkable changes in institutions and procedures that are of practical importance and may make the Union more effective (for more, cf. Kazakos, 2008; Ioakimidis, 2005). These changes represent to some extent the need to find common answers mainly to changes in the international environment. The LT does not signal the kind of transformation implied by the term ‘constitution’ earlier employed. Indeed, the ‘draft Constitution’ signalled, by its very title – at a symbolic level – a decisive leap to a new legal and political order in Europe. The LT retained almost all practical provisions of the Constitution,1 yet is deprived of any federal symbolism. The term ‘constitution’ or any references to a flag or anthem (nonetheless used since the ’80s) have been deleted and terms such as ‘European law’ and ‘European framework law’ replaced by those of the community jargon. The LT is not, therefore, the constitution of a new state to be built. It is introduced as what it really is, namely a new treaty among sovereign states amending previous treaties that regulate their relations. This return to realism was almost inescapable. With the final text the EU governments demonstrated the importance they (and their citizens) attach to the nation state and restated the limits to supranationalism on matters where national preferences (and interests) diverge. At the same time, they broadened the scope of supranationalism in their postmodern edifice on issues where preferences converge (see below).

1

The Economist, 27 October 2007. According to other estimates 96% of the LT text is identical to that of the Constitutional Treaty. Only 10 out of 250 proposals in the new treaty are different from the proposals in the original EU Constitution. Cf. www.openeurope.org.uk/research/comparison.

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The events since the Laeken Declaration (2001) have shown that the EU member states converge on many issues, but continue to have different views about the future of Europe. Differences were already known from previous EU negotiations. But meanwhile the arena has grown tougher due to the increased number of members. There is a lack of consensus on the desired extent of concentration in Europe, some important economic issues (as it was plainly exemplified in the dispute about the Services Directive) and the international role of Europe. In a more technical formulation, the governments give different responses to the question which collective goods should be produced on the European level on what scale and at what cost.

A Constant: The Liberal Economic Regime The LT brought about some marginal improvements to EU economic governance. It made the euro area more ‘visible’ and reinforced its capacity to decide autonomously, excluded non-member states from voting on matters of multilateral surveillance and excessive-deficit procedures applied to member states and changed the voting process in the Council to allow for a more effective excessive-deficit procedure. But it did not amend essentially the key elements of the economic regime as it has emerged, especially after Maastricht, and is currently in force; namely, it changed neither the distribution of responsibilities between the supranational and national authorities, nor the fundamental principles and rules of the internal market and competition policy, the monetary union and euro, the social and political cohesion. The established set of principles and rules primarily reflect a liberal economic philosophy. However, the primacy of open markets does not exclude regulatory and other policies at both the European (common market regulations, a cohesion policy aimed at improving the competitiveness of less developed countries and regions) and the national level (e.g., recognition of the special nature of services of general economic interest). It is a remarkable indication of continuity that the EU preserved the basic features of its economic governance. For the time being, the member states (certainly those who are able to influence developments) seem to believe that the model they have established yields net benefits and that there is no alternative offering more benefits or lower costs (including the cost of changing it). However, it can be debated whether the economic govern-

Europe after the Lisbon Treaty

ance of the EU managed quickly and consistently the economic downturn of 2008-2009 and, therefore, whether the management of the European economy should be improved, inter alia, to be enable to generate a credible process for restoring long-term sustainability. The Social Market Economy The LT introduces the term ‘social market economy’ but integrates it immediately into its broader philosophy by specifying that The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. (LT/EU art. 3 para. 3)

The term ‘social market economy’ meets symbolically the broader need for a fairer Europe2 and, at the same time, highlights the ‘social dimension of the Union’. It is translated into a broad set of policies. Although social policy has been (and remains) mainly the responsibility of national governments, the social dimension of the EU has a long history. Since the mid-1970s, the social legislation has been expanding. The European Social Fund co-finances employment programmes for young people, people with disabilities, long-term unemployed people and gender equality. The overall objective since 1997 (Amsterdam Treaty) has been employability, namely ‘promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to economic change’ (LT art. 125/EU art. 145). The employability concept fits well into the overall economic philosophy of the EU. Under the LT, future legislative initiatives may serve any goals (hence, non-economic goals as well): social rights are part of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, social cohesion and social policy is explicitly declared as ‘shared competence’, which means that both the EU and the member states can legislate (LT/EU art. 4 para. 2, art 5 para. 3), and so on.

2

It emerged from an initiative of the French conservatives (de Villepin) and German Social Democrats and Greens (J. Fischer)

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Overall, the social dimension emerged as a robust element of the Union against the objections of neoliberals. Yet all relevant activities are subject to three conditions; they must • be compatible with the (internal) market mechanism; • respect the division of competences between the EU and the national governments; and • not pave the way towards a social policy structured on the model of a federal system. The balance between market and politics, reflected in the treaties (including the LT) and favouring the role of competition without neglecting the social dimension, is dynamic. Due to its traditions, Europe is a real battlefield for rival economic and social concepts. The disagreement on the direction of economic and social policies or on the preferred balance between efficiency and equity will never be suppressed. In the spirit of Eisenstadt (2000), this disagreement is a constituent element of the European modernity. The result has been a distinct European way to organise society. It is worth noting in this context that two concepts competed in the discourse during the reform decade – ‘free market’ versus ‘European social model’. The UK government emphasised until recently the need for Europe to adopt an even more liberal stance than the one it presently allows for. This would conform to the realities of globalisation. Many scholars argue that Europe has to choose between an essentially neoliberal reform and decline (see, inter alia, Alesina and Giavazzi, 2006). But the idea of protecting the European social model also had a prominent place in the discourse. It is derived from the conviction that the European way generates less inequalities and insecurity and provides institutions, which encourage long-run trust relations between all actors involved and a forum to cooperate in adapting to the new environment (Rifkin, 2004). The phrasing of the LT is the updated compromise between these competing concepts. It is linked to the Lisbon strategy that sets reform priorities in a whole range of policies: research and development, education and labour markets, social security, product markets regulation and poverty alleviation.

Europe after the Lisbon Treaty

The Main Institutional Changes The LT revises in many respects previous arrangements. It 1. clarifies the competences of the EU, grouping them into exclusive, shared and supporting ones; 2. gives to national parliaments a greater say in European affairs by acknowledging their role as ‘watchdogs’ of the subsidiarity principle, and thus marginally strengthening their control of the EU’s legislative initiatives; 3. introduces a new and rather clearer voting system that gives countries with larger populations more weight; under the new system a vote is passed if 55% of the member states are in favour and these countries represent 65% of the EU’s population; 4. expands the co-decision procedure in several policy areas, most importantly in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (asylum, immigration, judicial and police cooperation), thus giving the European Parliament a bigger say and making it harder for a member state to block legislation; but 5. preserves the unanimity in the CFSP with, however, some noticeable exceptions; 6. establishes a President of the European Council who will be chosen by Prime Ministers and Heads of State for two and a half years but is not endowed with executive powers; 7. merges the posts of the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative into a new and stronger High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy; 8. paves the way for sup-groups on defence issues (‘permanent structured cooperation’) as a major amendment to the CFSP/CDSP; 9. introduces a clause on mutual defence commitment in case that a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory; 10. recognises the Charter of Fundamental Rights as having the same legal value as the treaties; 11. and so on. The Treaty therefore aspires to make the decision-making process more democratic and more effective (but it retains the veto in sensible policy areas along with other intergovernmental arrangements. It also allows for more diversity within the EU. This is yet another expression of

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Europe’s broad orientation towards ‘unity through diversity’ which in a sense represents a synonym for ‘postmodernism’. Some consider it a great historic advantage, others a stumbling block in adapting European governance to the challenges of a rapidly changing international environment.

The Potential Impact of the LT on the Workings of the Union Despite its significant innovations, it can be debated whether the LT gives the Union the institutional resources needed to cope with the internal and external challenges in the decades to come. Most probably, by the end of the next decade new reforms will be required in Europe, either through revising the Treaties or taking advantage of the leeway they leave for institutional changes. Acceptance of the EU among Its Citizens Is Diminishing The LT aims at increasing acceptance of the EU among citizens by reducing the widely perceived ‘democratic deficit’. It extends the standard legislative procedure in which the EP is involved into a series of policy areas where decisions are taken by majority. This may have major fiscal and political repercussions. The changes made the EP ‘co-legislator’. Previous treaty revisions (Maastricht, Amsterdam) had already added to the powers of the EP. Judged by that, the democratic deficit has been diminishing with every revision of the Treaties. The paradox is, however, that, despite the EP’s growing powers and the debate following the long LT negotiations (since 2001), citizens abstained at increasing rates in the 2004 and 2009 elections. The long-term trend is quite clear (Table 1). In contrast, the turnout rates in national elections have been mostly higher. In the case of Greece, one of the countries with above-average figures, the turnout rate in the EP elections was lower than in the immediately preceding national elections by 3.8 (1989), 8.8 (1994) and 26 percentage points (2009). This discrepancy has to be explained.

Europe after the Lisbon Treaty Table 1. Turnout rates for European Parliament elections 1979 1984 1989 EU 63.0% 61.0% 58.5% Greece 79.5% (*) 78.0% 80.0% (*) 1981, after accession to the EU.

1994 56.8% 71.2%

1999 49.8% 70.2%

2004 45.6% 63.2%

2009 43.09% 52.6%

Is the Democratic Deficit Really Reduced? One reason is that the EP is still far from being equivalent to national parliaments: it has no substantial influence on foreign and security policy issues, nor is it vested with the fiscal powers that national parliaments have nor, finally, does it play any role in the process of appointing the President and High Representative, as was clearly demonstrated in November 2009. The most significant European policy decisions are not taken by the EP, or even by ‘co-decision’ of the EP and the Council, but rather through a nontransparent ‘variable geometry’ of governments and by the European Council. It is there, behind closed doors, that the basic characteristics of the EU's foreign policy are shaped, officials are nominated for the most important jobs in the Union and amendments to Treaties are agreed to (Neyer, 2007, p. 391). In fact, the LT has made the EU less transparent and for the citizens more difficult to understand, due to the increase in opt-outs, protocols and statements. Moreover, all major decisions (enlargement, EMU etc.) were taken against the will of the majority of European citizens, alienating them from Brussels. The legitimacy of the EU was declining, which is doubtless a serious problem, but it was not adequately explained. Critical is that the big projects of the Union – the internal market and EMU – are perceived by many as a threat to the welfare models developed in Europe through complex and difficult compromises during the post-war period. The prevailing direction (open markets, de-politicised money, fiscal discipline) may be justified on economic grounds, but it obviously generates many losers and threatens the status of many more (for more, see Kazakos, 2009). Will the Union Be More Effective? It has been argued that the LT makes the Union more effective than in the past. The new qualified majority (55% + 65%), the new President of the

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European Council and the redefined High Representative, who will be one of the Commission’s Vice-Presidents, were intended to enhance the ability of the Union to decide and act. Other Treaty provisions were also aimed at making the Union more effective (e.g., LT/EU art. 24). It is difficult, however, to estimate or predict the extent of improvement, given the various safety valves that have been integrated into the system. Moreover, governments preferred in the past to seek consensus rather than to call for a formal vote. It is claimed in particular that the new Presidency will improve the workings of the European Council, ensure the continuity and consistency of the EU’s international activities and help the EU to appear as a less ‘fragmented power’. However, the exercising of strategic leadership depends on the support granted by the European Council, the personality of the President and circumstances – whether, for instance, a strong political figure emerges in one of the large EU member states, who will outshine the President. The new High Representative and the President cannot guarantee that the foreign policy will indeed be more effective or that member states will adopt a more ‘European’ rather than a ‘national’ stance (Best, 2007), especially if weak personalities are charged with the new jobs, as was the case in November 2009. The appointment of Herman Van Rompuy as President of the European Council and Baroness Cathy Ashton as High Representative suggests that the leaders of the bigger member states do not want the new posts in Brussels to be too powerful. In addition, several provisions may prove counterproductive. For example, the President will not have executive powers, the new High Representative can only implement policies that have been decided unanimously and the old system of rotating presidencies will also co-exist in a new form. The LT does not ensure that Europe will become a decisive global player. Much will depend on the political will of its leaders. It is therefore doubtful whether the LT can make the Union more decisive in taking action on pressing regional security issues or in combining its resources to influence the future global economic order, given the institutional complexities and, certainly, the disagreements about purposes and means (e.g., financial regulation and Turkey’s accession). The capacity of EU institutions to work effectively in sensitive areas under the new Treaty will not prove to be substantial until and unless national preferences converge markedly. If the US is taken as a benchmark,

Europe after the Lisbon Treaty

then it is certain that the EU will not come anywhere close to it in the next 10 to 15 years.3 Increased Weight to Large Member States? The LT tends to reinforce the position of the larger member states in the institutional system of the EU, at least with regard to issues where their interests converge, particularly in the CFSP (including defence). It does so, first, to the extent that it reduces the number of players involved in the decision processes (rotating presidencies, separate external relations commissioner etc.). In the CFSP the EP is not a key player. Moreover, the new voting system gives countries with larger populations more weight. The significance of the population criterion is not offset by the second criterion (55% of the member states), because the large member states dispose of the necessary diplomatic and material resources to build majorities. Finally, the LT paves the way for initiatives on defence issues (‘permanent structured cooperation’) to be undertaken mainly by large member states, which want to act under the umbrella of the EU. It is possible that some future forms of cooperation will be closer to the ‘variable integration’ model. In a benevolent view, one could justify this trend by referring to the special role that large member states have always played. Experience however has shown that it is their rivalries that often lead to entanglements, while smaller member states are less in a position to create permanent problems. Further, it will be disturbing if the enhanced role of the large member states backs their tendency to develop a type of interventionism in the world, which is often politically and ethically questionable, and, from the point of view of Greece, often unresponsive to its interests.

3

It is not by chance that the Union has adopted only a few common strategies that allow subsequent decisions to be made by qualified majority. Compare Thomas (2009).

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Conclusion The LT fails to fully meet the initial aims of the reform process and probably lags behind already discernable current and future challenges. Per se it will make the EU neither more accepted by citizens nor more transparent. Its democratic quality depends on the criteria that one may chose. But the Union may work a bit more effectively even though one question is left unanswered in many policy areas: more effective to what ends? It is also true that the prospect of the accession of Turkey and other countries to the EU generates new uncertainties about the institutional structure of the Union, European identity and national welfare institutions. There are reasonable arguments to support Turkish accession. As in the past, membership (or the prospect thereof) may be conceived as a way of exporting stability to the neighbour; and it would perhaps better serve strategic imperatives, energy security, trade and investment. It is obviously a liberal option. But, if Turkey becomes a member of the Union, there will be no reason to deny this prospect to Ukraine, to name just one country in the East. The impact upon the scope and internal workings of the Union will be immense. In the new, brave and ‘wider Europe’, if nothing is changed, it would be more difficult to manage the economy; to monitor, implement and extend the network of hundreds of social directives and regulations; to implement a common monetary policy; to define an international role; and to agree on shared values. A new revision will probably become unavoidable around the end of the next decade if the accession of our neighbour proves unavoidable, and if undesirable disturbances within Turkey do not stop the process. It has been claimed that the EU is a ‘fair-weather ship’. Previous challenges have proved this claim wrong. But it is not a place easily conformable to everybody’s wishes; and it may be suffering from over-stretch.

Selected References Alesina, Alberto, & Giavazzi, F. (2006). The future of Europe: Reform or decline. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Amoroso, Brunno. (2001). On globalization: Capitalism in the 21st century. Houndmills and New York: Palgrave. Armingeon, Klaus, & Byeler, Michelle (Eds). (2004). The OECD and the European welfare states. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Europe after the Lisbon Treaty Best, Edward. (2007). After the Constitutional Treaty: Reasoning rather than rushing. Eipascope, 1. Cooper, Robert. (2002). The post-modern state and the world order. London: Demos. Eisenstadt, S. N. (2000). Die Vielfalt der Moderne. Weilerwist: Velbrück Wissenschaft. Habermas, J. (2001).Why Europe needs a constitution. New Left Review, 11 (Sept.–Oct.). Ioakimidis, P. Κ. (2005). European Constitution and unification (in Greek). Athens: Themelio Editions. Kazakos, P. (2008). Prepared for the future? Europe after the revision of the Treaties (in Greek). Athens: Papazisis Editions. Kazakos, P. (2009). The rationalism of abstaining from the European Parliament election (in Greek). Evropeon Politia, 2, 293–302. Moravcsik, Andrew. (2006). What can we learn from the collapse of the European constitution? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 47/2, 219–241. Tsoukalis, Loukas. (2004). What Europe? (In Greek; trans. Andreas Pappas) Athens: Potamos Editions. Neyer, Jürgen. (2007). Welche Integrationstheorie braucht Europa? Integration, 4, 382–393. Rifkin, Jeremy. (2004). The European dream: How Europe’s vision of the future is quietly eclipsing the American dream. Cambridge: Polity Press. Solana, Javier. (2003). A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy. Paris: The European Institute for Security Studies. Thomas, D. (2009). Explaining the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches. International Politics, 46, 339–357. Verhofstadt, Guy. (2006). The United States of Europe: Manifesto for a new Europe (Greek translation, first published in English). Athens: Papazissis.

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Necessary Progress in the Defence of Europe∗

Pierre Lellouche

I am very pleased and honoured to be here with you today to close this conference on ‘necessary progress in the defence of Europe’, opened by my dear friend Hervé Morin, Minister of Defence, this morning. Many among you in this room are aware of my long-standing concern for defence and geopolitical questions. It should not come as a surprise to you that the defence issue will henceforth figure among the duties of the Secretary of State for European affairs, at least the way I see this office, in agreement with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and my colleagues Bernard Kouchner and Hervé Morin. To underscore this interest of mine, I appointed a military consultant in my office. Europe’s capacity to be present on the international scene is also – or mainly – due to the revival of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). From my point of view it will be a strategic pillar of the European project in the coming years. Making European defence one of my major areas of action, I fully join and endorse the ambition and proactive vision of the President of the Republic.

∗

This article is from a speech Dr Pierre Lellouche gave at the conference ‘Vital Progress for European Defence Policy’, which was co-organised by the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, the Robert Schuman Foundation and the Centre for European Studies in Paris on 24 September 2009.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_4, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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The Context We are currently, at the end of 2009, at a crucial turning point, the change of an era. The twenty-first century is beginning today. The twentieth century came to an early end, in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall – the twentieth anniversary of which we will celebrate in a few weeks – followed by the collapse of the Communist system in Central and Eastern Europe and then the disappearance of the USSR itself in 1991. These 20 years since 1989 have been, in fact, a transition period that has seen immense success, namely, the reunification of Germany and, thus, of the entire continent. Who could have guessed, only 20 years ago, that the Soviet Union would break apart without a single shot being fired, and that the traditional satellite countries of what used to be called the ‘Soviet buffer zone’ would join us in the European family to become our partners and allies within the European Union and Atlantic Alliance? The reunification of the continent is almost complete today, after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, although the stabilisation of the Balkans is yet to be completed. A new era is opening up before us today. The question that we, the other Europeans, have to raise is whether we will be mere spectators or cobuilders of twenty-first-century history. This is a question posed to us by the US: at the end of last July, in Washington, President Obama welcomed over 150 Chinese officials who came to attend the first meeting of the Economic and Strategic Dialogue between the United States and China, and described the bilateral relations with China ‘as important as any bilateral relationship in the world’ and predicted that the twenty-first century would be shaped by the Chinese–American relationship. Are we doomed to pass, after the above short transition, from the Soviet–American condominium that marked half of the twentieth century to the Sino-American G-2 preannounced for the twenty-first century? The same question is also raised by the crisis. It forces us to look reality in the eye, ‘think hard’ and, without respect for taboos to come, go beyond the politically correct. The hierarchy of powers, as the President of the Republic rightly put it, will no longer be the same when we exit the crisis. Some poles of power have grown weaker; others have asserted themselves – with Europe at the forefront of the latter. The rules of the international game will also evolve, as currently indicated by the Pittsburgh Summit.

Necessary Progress in the Defence of Europe

Let us not be inhibited when it comes to, for instance, defending respect for social and environmental standards that have to be considered as the equals of the rules of the World Trade Organisation. I appreciate, of course, how surprising all this may be as long as there is widespread Euroscepticism. It is true that until recently we have not been accustomed to see Europe embracing the major problems of the world, having been absorbed by institutional problems when it was not too preoccupied with producing legislation, sometimes oddly, on the Alsacien hamster or rosé wine… Consumed by Euroscepticism, Europe, divided over the Iraq issue, continues to pursue, 10 years after the Helsinki objectives, a weak defence policy (a fraction of the defence efforts made by the US). As for public opinion, it is largely distracted from the European idea. I will confide something to you: when I shave in the morning, to use an already famous expression, I naturally think of the 60% of French and German voters who did not vote in the election last June; 60% means 50% more abstentions than 30 years ago when the first European elections were held. And yet there are a lot of recent developments that should make us look at the future with hope and ambition. The crisis, which should also be seen as an opportunity, forces Europe to be concerned with issues other than its institutions, to look the world in the eye once again; in a nutshell, to act and by doing so again to whet the appetite of its 500 million citizens for a great common project. In this new context, we will again be able to do politics in Europe and focus on the issues that preoccupy our citizens and have a direct impact on their daily lives: the exit from the crisis; energy; the environment and climate; immigration; and, certainly, security and defence. I would like to be straight with you: I will speak the truth about this last issue. As General de Gaulle used to say, jumping around like a kid while crying ‘L'Europe!’ was not enough. I suggest that we look reality in the face, without ignoring either the successes or the insufficiencies and difficulties of the venture.

Progress in European Defence What is the status of European defence at the end of 2009? My first remark: the institutions work. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), born in Helsinki in 1999, a year after Saint-Malo – which will

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soon become the Common Security and Defence Policy when the Lisbon Treaty takes effect – is about to resume its place in the heart of the European Union’s political agenda. After a French Presidency that gave new impetus to European defence, the future Spanish Presidency has already announced its desire to continue this path after next January. I observe this every week in the course of my talks in different European capitals: more countries, taught by history, are coming closer together; among others the United Kingdom and Poland come to my mind. We have the ‘toolbox’: a political and security committee, a military committee, a situation centre, a European Union military staff and a European Defence Agency. Thanks to the progress achieved during the French Presidency, the European Union reinforced its planning capacity through the establishment (scheduled for this year) of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). It is the only organisation to have a civil-military structure of this type. I insist that its establishment is not yet a reality; I believe it is essential that the CMPD be operational on the first day that the Lisbon Treaty takes effect. Europe will then be the only organisation to have a civil-military structure of this type. Second, the track record of actions is not negligible. In 10 years, some 23 civil and military operations have been carried out in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 10 years, 67,000 Europeans, men and women, have been engaged in these, often distant, 23 civil and military operations. The European Union is currently the only organisation that has an abundant array of economic, diplomatic and military tools, which can be used in a combined manner for crisis management. Having worked a lot on Afghanistan, mainly, I can say how essential it is to combine these means. European defence, as I have often observed, will make more progress thanks to its operations rather than institutional reforms. Consider the events in the Balkans 10 years ago and the awareness that allowed the creation of the ESDP. In Georgia, a year ago, the personal engagement of the President of the Republic enabled the launch of a purely European operation, which was the only operation possible under the circumstances. In the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, Operation Atalanta, the first marine operation of the EU, has been a success, while NATO’s Ocean Shield operation has had difficulty mobilising more than two ships. Europe plays a major part in ensuring free movement in that zone which is vital for our supplies.

Necessary Progress in the Defence of Europe

The new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Admiral Stavridis, fully understands this, and has been talking about NATO operations complementary to Atalanta since his appointment. When there is will and leadership in Europe, the ESDP is effective. It is these kinds of operations that push European defence forward. It is only by working together that our armies can improve their interoperability and capabilities, and develop a common doctrine. Acting together, the member states can gradually crystallise their common interests in security and everything will move in the right direction. These operations make Europe visible on the international scene and its foreign policy relevant. The EULEX operation in Kosovo, the largest civil operation of the EU, does remarkable work in contributing to the building of law and order in that part of Europe where European defence was born. Having said this, we have to be focused on the road that remains to be covered on the way to European defence.

The Shortcomings of European Defence Must Be Examined with Lucidity and Courage First of All, the Budgets Are Not Equal to the Challenges The sum of the defence budgets of the EU-27 member states, the combined GDP of which is higher than that of the US, accounts for barely half of the Pentagon budget. The situation is quite heterogeneous within the EU: France, the UK and Germany represent two-thirds of the total defence force, while France and the UK between them account for 40% of the defence force of the 27. With the crisis, a boost to European defence by means of the budgetary lever may seem illusive to some people. I observe however that in France the budgetary effort agreed to by the government is not being challenged and the recovery plan benefits defence as well. It Is Essential to Reinforce our Military Capabilities The difference from the United States, which I mentioned with regard to defence budgets, is even more striking when considering the capabilities; in particular the projection capabilities in international theatres, where the

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European Union as a whole can hardly match 10% of US military capabilities. As the President of the Republic stated before our ambassadors last month: ‘Europe has to reinforce its military capabilities because Europe is not a vast Red Cross organisation!’ In fact, Europe ‘is not a vast NGO’. Thus There Can Be No Capabilities without Armament Programmes The situation in this area is anything but encouraging. The United States invests three times more than the European Union in equipment spending and five times more in research, while Europe dissipates its resources in developing three combat aircraft programmes, six submarine programmes and a score of armoured vehicle programmes, instead of concentrating its efforts. Ladies and gentlemen, let us be honest, without cooperation on programmes, there will be no defence industry in Europe; and without an independent armaments industry, there will be no European defence. I had a meeting recently with the French defence industry: the truth is that there are currently no major cooperation projects, much as they are essential for the establishment and preservation of a European industrial and technological base for defence research. We are far from the ’70s and ’80s when the Transall, the Jaguar and the HOT and MILAN missiles programmes were born, and the A400M transport aircraft and the NH90 or Tiger helicopters projects were launched. At the Level of Operations, the Record Is Even More Limited I already told you that we have made significant progress since Saint-Malo. This is true, but there is still a lot to be done. We are far from our initial force objectives announced in Helsinki, a projection force of 60,000 troops. The truth is that the operations currently led by the European Union are, more often than not, mainly civil and of limited scope considering the stated ambitions. The European Union has carried out only six military operations over a period of 10 years. And let me recall the difficulties that we had in view of launching the EUFOR Tchad operation, for instance. Today, 6,500 men and women of the 27 member states are engaged in European operations, half of them in purely military operations: Althea in Bosnia and Atalanta off

Necessary Progress in the Defence of Europe

the coasts of Somalia. At the same time, as you know, France alone has over 9,700 troops engaged in 10 or so international operations. So Europe is an international actor that has to defend its own interests and assume its responsibilities. Europe must also stand up for itself. I am thinking specifically of Afghanistan, where Europe appears divided with its two delegations: one for the Council and another for the Commission. The Commission financial resources, although considerable, are spent without any visibility or coherence with the states engaged in the field, in the absence of any political guidance at the EU level. Similarly our European troops have different rules of engagement and, therefore, limited cooperation among them. I am thinking also of Africa, where Europe has its responsibilities and own interests. I would then go to Djibouti to mobilise our European partners. Europe has to be involved in the formation of Somali security forces at the side of our soldiers in Djibouti, to reinforce the vulnerable Somali government. Operation Atalanta cannot last forever and everyone knows that the solution is on land. At stake here is the proliferation of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, Europe has to be immediately involved in the formation of coast guard forces in the region that will be able to ensure the freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Operations such as these allow Europe to exercise its duties as an international actor in its own right. We have to be able to act together when we have common interests without relying on others. The Final Shortcoming Is that Coordination between the European Union and NATO Remains Insufficient The European Union and the Atlantic Alliance rub shoulders in Brussels but fail to work efficiently together. Besides, as you know, 21 NATO countries out of 28 are also EU member states. Coordination of operations, where both organisations are engaged at the same time, remains an unfulfilled wish, despite the possibilities that are available after the so-called Berlin Plus agreements. The truth is that the European Union has relied only twice so far on NATO resources, first for Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and second for Operation Althea in BosniaHerzegovina. It still lacks the capacity to efficiently plan and manage crises.

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What Are the Prospects? We have to move on. To do so, there has to be the strong participation of the United Kingdom and Germany, but also of Spain, which will next assume the EU Presidency, and of Poland, Greece and all the member states that have the will and the capabilities. This is the message I convey during my travels throughout Europe. But to make Europe advance with our partners, we have to change our narrative. We Have First of All to Remove Our Shackles and Strengthen the EU–NATO Link Our complete and unconditional return to the structures of the Atlantic Alliance has removed the ambiguities of the past. You know how hard I have worked in this direction and supported the President of the Republic. Nobody can accuse us any longer of wishing to build European defence apart from NATO. I observe it in all of my travels in Europe: this reservation has already been removed, paving the way for the European involvement of numerous significant partners, mainly from Central Europe. As the President of the Republic phrased it: ‘France in NATO signifies a stronger Europe in the Alliance’; when European defence is reinforced, NATO is likewise reinforced. The European Union and NATO are complementary. They should not be opposed to each to other, because European capabilities contribute to those of NATO and vice versa. We should put a stop to the ideological debates on both sides of the Atlantic and show pragmatism. We all need strong allies. Matters being as they are, NATO has also to be renewed. The Atlantic Alliance was established to dissuade the Warsaw Pact: it was the time when 20 ‘ultra-efficient’ Soviet divisions were stationed in East Germany, with scenarios of almost-instantaneous escalation to a nuclear apocalypse. That time is long since gone, and NATO has honoured its contract by preserving peace on our continent. But in order to conduct operations today, NATO has to be reformed even more. The lesson learnt in Afghanistan is clear. We need a renewed NATO to face the crises of the twenty-first century. I hope that the shaping of a new strategic concept for the alliance will occasion a slimming of its bureaucracy and a change in culture: does

Necessary Progress in the Defence of Europe

NATO really need 2,700 officers in its HQ in Kabul? Wouldn’t these personnel be more useful on the field? The renovation of NATO must be an opportunity to help the progress of European defence. A strong European defence means a strong NATO. We want them both. In this context, I would like to believe that the new strategic mission of the alliance will reflect the new complementarity of the two organisations. One of the challenges is to find the means for mutual support in operations, including the civil–military sector, without being hampered by the current institutional hurdles and without any rigid distribution of tasks. The renovation of the alliance, with the central role assigned to the Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) in this renovation process, is an opportunity that we Europeans have to seize together with our American allies. I had, incidentally, received General Abrial before he was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and also met the new SACEUR, Admiral Stavridis, last week. I noticed, in my conversations with them, a substantial convergence of views. This year will be decisive. It is an opportunity for the defence of Europe. The French EU Presidency Has Defined the Paths that We Have to Follow Instead of focusing on the institutions, we must rather act now on capabilities. Wars are not won with committees. Without mentioning all of the progress made by the French EU Presidency, I would like to stress the following: 1. We investigated potential synergies between military and civil capabilities, launching concrete and useful projects such as sharing of operations support services. 2. We implemented in practice the ambitious goal adopted by the Heads of State and Government in December 2008: to be capable, among other tasks, of deploying 60,000 troops in 60 days in the event of a major operation and have the capacity to plan and lead concurrently two significant stabilisation and reconstruction operations with a civil component over two years. 3. We found ways to use effectively the GT 1500 in operations as an initial entry force. 4. We breathed new life into the industrial and technological base and the European defence equipment market.

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These are all means to support the European Defence Agency: we must certainly allow it some time. Five years after its establishment, the feeble budgets for the Agency’s programmes indicate primarily the absence of political will on the part of the member states. This raises again the issue of the necessity for a European armaments markets, reflection on common capability needs and joint conduct of research and development programmes. This also means to boost more extensively industrial cooperation in Europe: cooperation means to allocate the best skills in synergy in order to best equip our armies. Inversely this means that we have to resist the negative reflex which consists in, under the pretext of cooperative programmes, favouring national strategies for the acquisition of new skills, using the logic of fair return, to the detriment of meeting deadlines and costs. Finally, this means thinking about how we can advance the Community market for the defence industry. Currently, the armaments market globally is first and foremost American: $120 billion worth of equipment in the US market alone, while the European market represents €50 billion more or less divided among 27 countries. We need regulations that will boost our businesses within the European Union versus the businesses across the Atlantic or elsewhere. We have made some progress this year with the approval of the ‘defence package’. But shouldn’t we continue these efforts and consider in particular that defence expenses could perhaps benefit from Community funding especially for research and development? We should start a debate on the pooling of certain expenses associated with common security in the framework of future EU financial perspectives. We Also Have to Prepare Europe to Assume Its Responsibilities American engagement with the European continent has been steadily declining since the end of the Cold War – the recent decision of the new US administration to give up the establishment of American bases in Poland and the Czech Republic, which had been part of the missile shield, is the latest example. This trend should strengthen the will among the Europeans to fill this capability gap, but also to better coordinate their strategic vision. Some countries of Eastern Europe – and I am thinking of Poland particularly – have already come out in favour of this in public. We must also think of Europe’s operational contribution to nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation, of protecting ourselves against the

Necessary Progress in the Defence of Europe

potential consequences of programmes such as that developed by Iran. The new American evaluation of the Iranian threat is close to ours. It underscores that it is European security that is at stake. In this context, it also makes sense to work on a common early warning system. Finally, we must, as proposed by the President of the Republic in Cherbourg in March 2008, ‘engage with those European partners who so wish in an open dialogue on the role of dissuasion and its contribution to our common security’. Generally speaking, it is time, in my opinion, that we jointly tackled these questions head on, possibly by means of a White Paper on the Security of Europe: our citizens expect Europe to protect them against threats, crises, proliferation of terrorism, but also against pandemics and natural disasters. As we hope to see the institutions stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty being implemented, it is about time Europe took care, at last, of its citizens’ concerns. The Final Perspective in the Short Term: The Lisbon Treaty It will provide Europe with the coherence that it currently lacks in order to act. With the Lisbon Treaty, Europe will see its capacity to take decisions and actions facilitated. It is what is at stake in the days to come and, in particular, in the Irish referendum. New institutions will be set up: a permanent President of the Council and, most importantly, a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will head the External Relations Council – a key novelty of the treaty. This new diplomatic task force will be the world’s largest diplomatic service. Coordinating with development aid and security questions, it will serve as the essential means to affirm Europe’s existence on the global scene. We have already been working at Quai d’Orsay on defining the nature, the outlines and the missions of this new service, in close collaboration with our partners. We will examine, upon completion of the Irish vote, the modalities of its implementation. We must avoid a new institutional apparatus without any real decision-making power. France is firmly ambitious: these institutions must enable progress with regard to the defence of Europe. What is the use of diplomacy, after all, without armed force? Ladies and gentlemen, you must have realised that the fundamental question for the future of European defence and Europe in general is political will. The levers have been identified. What is needed now is a strong

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and shared political will, because when Europe wants, it can. Look at what Europe has managed to achieve in the past few months. Far from being called into question, the European Union and the Eurozone stood out as major actors and leaders of the global economic and financial system. The same is true of climate change. France intends to play a leading role, in order to build a Europe capable of asserting its responsibilities on the global scene, where and when it so wishes. I am convinced that the coming months will be decisive. France has the will. We hope that it will be appreciated by its principal partners.

Eastern Partnership: The Polish Perspective∗

Joanna Popielawska

On 7 May 2009 the European Union launched the most recent initiative directed towards its closest neighbours: the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The project is the fruit of Polish and Swedish efforts and was supported by the Czech Presidency, of which it is seen by many as the only highlight. Thanks to the determination of its sponsors and the favourable political climate within the EU, it was possible to launch it in an unusually short period of time – at least by EU standards. For Poland, however, the EaP inauguration is the result of a longstanding campaign to influence the EU’s Eastern policy, dating back to the time when Poland was not yet a member of the EU. The first part of this chapter gives an insight into the efforts of the subsequent Polish governments in lobbying for the EU’s Eastern policy. The second part presents in greater detail what is planned for the EaP, while the final part touches upon the most crucial questions relating to successful realisation of the project.

The Origins of the Eastern Partnership The term ‘Eastern dimension’, when used in relation to EU policies, was first coined in 1998, when it entered the public debate at the ceremony inaugurating Poland’s EU membership talks in a speech given by Professor Bronisław Geremek, the then Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Three years later (in 2001) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a ∗

This article is based on the author’s research conducted at the Natolin European Centre. Related publications can be found on www.natolin.edu.pl.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_5, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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document presenting this concept in greater detail, in which Poland advocated closer cooperation between the EU and the countries east of its borders so as to forestall the rise of growing divisions (Poland, 2001). Geographically, the proposal covered the entire post-Soviet territory, although with a particular emphasis on Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast as well as Ukraine. Interestingly, it handled the question of European aspirations – openly voiced at the time by Ukraine – in a very cautious manner. The concept was subsequently further developed by the Polish MFA in late 2002 and early 2003,1 by which time the discussion within the EU about the Community’s new neighbours had begun in earnest, even if it was not at the forefront of the EU agenda. The revised document now defined specific areas of cooperation, while limiting its scope to Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia. Many of its points also came into line with the thinking outlined in other documents that were by that time already circulating within the EU: specifically, there was the idea of differentiation as well as, to a lesser extent, joint ownership by the recipient countries of the policies relevant to them.2 Incorporating these approaches within a multilateral framework such as the Eastern dimension would ensure their enhanced coherence and coordination. Unlike the original document, the version from 2003 clearly recognised the European aspirations of Ukraine and Moldova, inviting them to enter into EU association agreements. The Polish proposal from 2003 echoed concepts then under consideration in the EU forum. It shared a common character and policy tools – if not the ultimate goals and geographical scope – of the other notions, ending with the definition of the neighbourhood policy presented by the Commission in a Communication in 2003 (European Commission, 2003). The one crucial difference was that Poland set more ambitious aims for the EU. Ultimately, however, the neighbourhood policy drawn up as a result of the discussions within the EU went in an entirely different direction. First and foremost, the EU failed to create a separate Eastern dimension, instead combining all of the countries on its eastern flank with its Mediter1

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Poland (2003). See also ‘The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View’, a speech by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, given at the conference ‘The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy’, which was held in Warsaw on 20 February 2003. The term ‘differentiation’ means that the ENP offer addressed to the countries covered by this policy depends on their aspirations and their level of development.

Eastern Partnership: The Polish Perspective

ranean neighbours. This was done mainly at the behest of Spain and France. Aligning the Mediterranean countries – which according to the guidelines do not qualify for EU membership and often simply lack such aspirations – with the EU’s eastern neighbours not only called into question but downright threatened the European aspirations of the latter. Poland was also critical of the idea of basing the new policy exclusively on bilateral cooperation as this approach removed the support necessary to establish regional ties. Finally, Poland refused to view the neighbourhood policy as an end in itself, deeming it instead to be an instrument whereby the European aspirations of the EU’s eastern neighbours would be recognised (Cimoszewicz, 2004). Subsequent efforts on the part of Poland – especially in the wake of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine – were focused on strengthening the links between its eastern neighbours and the EU. In practical terms, this meant seeking to increase the flow of funds to the eastern beneficiaries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as well as attempting to make the ENP rely to a greater extent on differentiation, especially on a regional level. The argument in favour of such an approach was provided by a commonly accepted notion that it was necessary to enhance the EU offer addressed to its eastern neighbours. The stars ultimately aligned when France, traditionally opposed to the eastern dimension, proposed and implemented the Mediterranean Union, thereby proving that it was prepared to accept the new initiative in the east.3 The war in Georgia provided a further impetus, which clearly demonstrated the need for increased EU involvement in the east.

What Is the EaP? 4 The EaP aims to cement cooperation with Ukraine, Belarus,5 Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. It intends to fortify the European 3

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Before that, during its 2007 EU Presidency, Germany also pursued the same objective, albeit unsuccessfully. Based on a December 2008 European Commission Communication and the subsequent May 2009 Prague Declaration. At this stage Belarus is offered conditional participation on technical and expert levels only. Future cooperation will be continued depending on the progress of the democratic processes in Belarus.

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Neighbourhood Policy toward these countries by enabling them to strengthen their links with the EU, especially as regards economic cooperation and movement of people and security. A decidedly new feature of the EaP is its structure around two levels: bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The main role of the latter will be to promote cooperation between countries and to build regional ties. On the bilateral level, which is to remain the basis of the relations between the Six and the rest of the EU, the EaP proposes strengthening relations according to the individual countries’ aspirations and capabilities, recalling the idea of differentiation. The other basic principle – originally borrowed from the enlargement policy – is the idea of conditionality. The most ambitious partners are offered new association agreements, which would not only formalise stronger political ties but also encourage greater convergence with EU legislation and standards, as well as promote closer foreign and security policy cooperation. To assist partners in developing the capabilities necessary for the implementation of the reforms stipulated by the new agreements, the EU foresees the drafting of comprehensive institutional development programmes with each partner. As for economic integration, it is proposed that agreements to create a far-reaching and comprehensive free trade area be signed with each of the partner states (providing they join the WTO first). The agreements would provide for increased access to the Common Market as well as sectorspecific support to the economies of the partner states which would first have to adopt relevant EU legislation, regulations and standards. In the long term it is envisioned that a Neighbourhood Economic Community6 be created by bringing the partners together under a framework of bilateral agreements. The EU is also offering its partners a ‘mobility and security’ agreement. This agreement would envision progressive visa regime liberalisation by easing visa restrictions (while at the same time implementing readmission agreements), abolishing visa fees, and coordinating and enhancing the services of the EU member states’ consular sections located in the countries involved, including opening shared visa application centres.7 In the long term, cooperation in this area would eventually lead to the establishment of

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The Prague Declaration makes no mention of this point. Such centres are to be modelled on the already existing facility in the Moldovan city of Chisinau.

Eastern Partnership: The Polish Perspective

visa-free travel. These steps would be accompanied by initiatives to enhance security and border management as well as combat trans-border crime.8 The new association agreements or separate bilateral agreements signed with the EU would also include clauses pertaining to energy interdependence. Measures taken with respect to individual partners will, in the case of Ukraine, for example, involve its accession (along with Moldova) to the Energy Community9 as well as lend greater support for full integration of the Ukrainian energy market with its EU counterpart, achieved by the repair and development of its natural gas delivery infrastructure. It is worth noting that the Commission has already taken action in this regard (see, e.g., Olearchyk, 2009). The EU also wishes to share its experience and the mechanisms behind its social and economic policy. The goal of multilateral cooperation is to aid the individual efforts undertaken by the EU partners by creating a forum whereby they would be able to share their reform experience and tips on reform implementation, and which would become a conduit of EU assistance to these countries. Decisions on this multilateral level of partnership will be made by both the EU and the partner nations. Cooperation on the multilateral level will be organised around four thematic platforms: • democracy, sound management and stability;10 • economic integration and convergence with the EU policy (i.e. access to EU agencies and programmes);11 • energy security; and • interpersonal relations. In an effort to sharpen the EaP’s focus it is proposed that several flagship projects be implemented. These include an integrated border management 8

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Among other things, it is proposed that the partner nations receive special status in the relevant EU agencies. The Energy Community extends the common electricity and natural gas market to the Western Balkan countries. Presently, in addition to Ukraine and Moldova, Turkey and Georgia also hold observer status. The rather controversial proposal floated with regard to this thematic platform calls for mutual assessment of governance practices. For further reading consult European Parliament (2008). A detailed analysis of this issue has been conducted by Trzaskowski (2009).

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system; an SME facility; the promotion of regional energy markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources; development of the southern energy corridor; and measures concerning prevention, preparation and response to natural disasters and man-made catastrophes. Multilateral cooperation has also been given a clearly defined structure featuring biennial summits to be attended by country leaders and Prime Ministers, annual Foreign Affairs Ministers’ meetings each spring, and meetings of senior officials revolving around the four thematic platforms to be held at least twice a year. Such a formula guarantees first and foremost the continuity of this process while providing – in principle, at least – clear political support shown by the meetings between country leaders and Prime Ministers. Information on the projects and the thematic working groups will be available for review to third countries whose participation will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Although neither the declaration nor the communication specifically point to any third countries in particular, some EU member states deemed it important to keep the project open to Russia and Turkey. The Commission Communication, as well as the Prague Declaration, also mentions a European Parliament proposal initiated by the EPP-ED Group to create the EU-Neighbourhood-East Parliamentary Assembly (EURONEST).12 Aside from MEPs, EURO-NEST would also include deputies from Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the democratic factions in Belarus.13 Meanwhile, the Commission was invited to submit a proposal on the creation of an EaP civil society forum. As concerns the necessary financial support, the Commission in its Partnership Communication explicitly pointed to additional resources which should be devoted to this initiative. The sum allocated was €600 million for the years 2010–13, and this commitment was subsequently confirmed by the European Council in a special declaration issued in March 2009.

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European Parliament report on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 2008. Interestingly, the first chairmanship to preside over the new body will go to the Socialists.

Eastern Partnership: The Polish Perspective

The Way Forward Even before its official launch the EaP caused many controversies. The first concerned its financing, even more acute in light of the current financial crisis. The initial wish of Poland and Sweden was to keep the initiative neutral to the EU budget. Although it certainly helped in securing the project’s go-ahead, it soon became clear that for the EaP to bring any noticeable change, additional funding would be needed. The Commission found an additional €350 million from the EU external action budget, which with some reservations was later approved by the member states.14 During the Prague Summit, institutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other financial organisations operating in the region were invited to participate in the EaP. The former has already given favourable consideration to this request. Another existing instrument is the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (which will provide €700 million). These funds are earmarked for the years 2009–13 and are available to all ENP countries. Poland has also submitted a proposal for the creation of a group of ‘friends of the EaP’ consisting of countries outside the EU which are interested in financing the project. Finally, there are the individual contributions of the member states. However, the most crucial issue remains the new financial perspective and negotiating an appropriate sum for the Eastern Partnership. A step in the right direction could be breaking down the traditional division of ENP funds between the south and the east into a 70:30 split by complementing the current population criteria with a more incentive-driven system. The Governance Facility, the Commission’s instrument for rewarding the protagonists for their implementation of the agreed reform agenda, serves as a good example. Another controversy, this time mostly rhetorical in nature, was the extremely negative reaction of Russia in accusing the EU of attempting to enlarge its sphere of influence (Pop, 2009). Although no one would expect anything else from the side of Moscow, it is worth noting that the idea of Russia’s participation in the project did in fact have support in the EU. France and Italy advocated for the EaP to include not only Russia but also 14

Some member states admittedly expressed concern about using the financial margins for such purposes, with the United Kingdom, for instance, pointing to the uncertain situation in Kosovo and in Palestine. See United Kingdom (2009).

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Turkey (Pszczółkowska, 2009). While opening the EaP to Russia would be utterly disastrous for this initiative – given its rather shameful role in any joint international endeavour, especially in this particular region – inviting Turkey could be beneficial. Considering its political weight and its role in the region in all kinds of issues that the EaP will sooner or later have to face, such as energy or the ‘frozen conflicts’, the importance of having Turkey on board, with its much more constructive attitude (in comparison to Russia) should not be underestimated by EaP supporters. These briefly mentioned questions serve to show just how difficult it could be to maintain the necessary political support to ensure the success of the EaP. Incidentally, the EaP remains open to both Turkey and Russia on the multilateral level. These kinds of demands, however, as in the case of Russia, demonstrate the diverging priorities of the member states as regards regulating relations between the EU and its nearest neighbours, especially those who openly declare their aspirations for membership. This state of affairs directly translates to the challenges faced by the ENP and undoubtedly presents a challenge to the EaP itself.15 Given the political controversy surrounding the EaP and the inconsistent support on the part of EU member states, the only hope for the project in the longer term may well prove to be the European Commission. For this to happen, however, the Commission needs a partner on the other side of the table. Finally, one should not forget that the EaP is not the only regional initiative of the EU on its eastern borders. In 2007 the EU initiated the Black Sea Synergy (European Commission, 2007), which, in encompassing all of the EaP participants (except Belarus), is causing strong concerns when it comes to, for example, duplication of efforts. Although the Commission has been consistent in emphasising the compatibility of the two projects, their competition for funds and political support remains a fact. The same applies to the Northern Dimension.16 This venture, often finding itself in 15

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The controversy surrounding the appropriate naming of the term for the EaP countries in the Prague Declaration was symptomatic of such problems. Ultimately, describing them as ‘Eastern European States’ seems to have pleased both sides: the supporters of further eastern EU enlargement, because the adjective ‘European’ was used, and the opponents, because the prefix ‘Eastern’ sharply distinguishes them from the unqualified European states. The Northern Dimension (ND) is a partnership between the four participating parties – i.e., the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. It is not part of the ENP but

Eastern Partnership: The Polish Perspective

the shadow of the two other project initiatives, is the oldest of the three and is functions relatively well, which should serve as a good example, especially when it comes to its modus operandi.17 With the growing importance of the Arctic region, the Swedish Presidency and Iceland knocking on the EU’s door, it would be no surprise if the Northern Dimension were soon given more attention, giving the EaP another competing factor.

References Cimoszewicz, W. (2004). Polska w zamęcie świata. Gazeta Wyborcza (Polish daily), 12 June. European Commission. (2003). Wider Europe. Brussels. COM 104 final. European Commission. (2007). Black Sea synergy: A new regional cooperation initiative. 11 April. Brussels. COM 160 final. http://ec.europa.eu/education/ policies/2010/doc/comuniv2006_en.pdf. European Parliament. (2008). The Eastern Partnership: Context, key Commission proposals and the EP’s role. Olearchyk, R. (2009). Ukraine wins key energy funding. Financial Times, 3 August. Poland. (2001). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. EU eastern policy in the context of EU Eastern and Central Europe enlargement – the Polish perspective. Reprint. Poland. (2003). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy toward new eastern neighbours after EU enlargement. http://www.mfa.gov.pl/?document=2041. Pop, V. (2009). EU expanding its sphere of influence, Russia says. Euobserver.com, 21 March. http://euobserver.com/?aid=27827. Pszczółkowska, D. (2009). Eastern Partnership for now moneyless. Gazeta Wyborcza (in Polish), 24 February. http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6310845,Partnerstwo _Wschodnie_na_razie_bez_pieniedzy.html.

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rather an autonomous EU foreign policy tool. By design, the ND is a regional expression of the four EU–Russia Common Spaces instituted in 2003. It is intended to serve as an instrument facilitating the introduction of roadmaps for implementation of the Common Spaces where they relate to the ND geographic scope: the Baltic Sea basin, northwest Russia, Kaliningrad Oblast, the Arctic and the Barents Sea. The mechanism driving the ND relies on a model of partnership which must enjoy the support of all ND partners, have at its disposal financial resources assigned in advance and, importantly, be autonomously managed.

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Joanna Popielawska Trzaskowski, R. (2009). How to strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy? Participation of the ENP countries in the Community policies and agencies. Analizy Natolińskie 3:1–4. United Kingdom. (2009). UK Parliament European Scrutiny Committee. The EU Eastern Partnership. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/ cmselect/cmeuleg/19-xiii/1903.htm.

Women’s Participation in Europe’s Social and Political Life∗

Rodi Kratsa

Europe and women are two inextricably linked notions, realities and values. Safeguarding equality between men and women and banning gender discrimination goes way back in Europe’s history, to the beginnings of the European Community. Since 1975 the EU has issued a series of directives on gender discrimination and the European Court of Justice has delivered many relevant judgements. Article 2 of the treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) entrenches gender equality as an aim of the Community’s mission: ‘The Community shall have as its task to promote equality between men and women’. Equality is, moreover, in addition to being a general mission or goal, statutorily entrenched in the EC Treaty as a horizontal target that must be promoted in every activity of the Community. Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty, which lists the areas of Community activity, highlights that in all its activities ‘the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities and to promote equality, between men and women’. In addition, however, to these programmatic declarations on equality, the Community has from the outset established a legal basis for more practical issues related to general equality, such as promoting pay equality between men and women as the prerequisite for a fair and competitive common market. As of 1957, the EC Treaty prohibited unequal remuneration between men and women, and Article 141, as revised by the Treaty of ∗

Liberal Emphasis 40, July-August-September 2009. This article is based on a speech given by Mrs Rodi Kratsa at an event organised by the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy in Athens, on 25 May 2009.

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Amsterdam, stipulates that ‘Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.’ The gender gap in pay is nevertheless a fact, connected with a variety of legal, social and economic factors that largely go beyond the simple issue of equal pay for equal work. The gap in pay between the genders is an outcome of the continuous discrimination and inequalities in the job market, which in fact mostly affect women. Throughout Europe, women earn on average approximately 17% less than men, while in some countries the gender gap in pay is much larger, a fact that has in turn a significant impact on the overall earnings of women’s professional lives and pensions. The legal basis of Article 141 has inspired numerous constitutional provisions in member states, including our country. Special reference should be made to Article 141, Paragraph 4, which stipulates that the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for special advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.

The Treaty of Amsterdam further extended the principle of equality, with the addition of two provisions to the treaty establishing the European Community. To be more exact, the new Article 13 in the Treaty of Amsterdam added that the Council can take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Lisbon Treaty strengthens the EU’s legal basis for combating discrimination and the gap in pay, and for promoting equality between men and women more generally. The new Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union acknowledges equality to be a fundamental value and Article 3 reconfirms it as a target. Parallel with this, equality is delimited in a broader context of EU social action that now expressly includes solidarity between generations and the protection of the rights of the child. The new Article 8 of the treaty maintains of course equality’s horizontal statutory entrenchment and the new Article 10 maintains the struggle against discrimination between genders. It is also particularly important that, in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU acknowledges for the first time the issue of domestic violence and makes

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combating it a collective goal. A special statement regarding Article 8 highlights that in its general efforts to eliminate inequalities between women and men, the Union will aim in its different policies to combat all kinds of domestic violence. The Member States should take all necessary measures to prevent and punish these criminal acts and to support and protect the victims.

The European Parliament, through the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in particular, has played a significant role in promoting the values on which the EU was established, as well as in promoting its aims, placing particular emphasis on the elimination of all kinds of discrimination and on the promotion of equality between women and men. The new treaty also, however, changes the role of the European Parliament in the context of boosting gender equality within the EU’s statutory framework. The new Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU stipulates that hereafter the European Parliament shall give its approval to the Council’s adoption of measures to combat all discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. At the same time, the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e., codecision by the European Parliament and the Council) will be followed for the adoption of measures that will aim at combating trafficking in human beings, particularly women and children, and sexual exploitation. This means that Parliament’s role during the preparatory stage of laws is magnified. It is thus able to exert more pressure on the Council for the adoption of measures and policies that enhance the position of women both in Europe and as regards the EU’s relations with third countries. We must of course refer to a more essential breakthrough of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of women’s protection, that is, the acknowledgement of its legitimacy in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 6 of the EU Treaty). This charter stipulates the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex and further extends protection of the maternity right, particularly in the area of employment. In addition, however, to these breakthroughs within the new architecture of the EU, we should also refer to the Lisbon Strategy’s particular contribution to enhancing gender equality and improving the position of women. The Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, adopted during the European Council in March 2000 and revised and redefined in 2005, set the goal to

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make the EU by 2010 the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, with social cohesion and integration, respect for our environment and full employment. To achieve the Lisbon Strategy a list of numbered goals was prepared, such as an increase in women’s employment rate to 60% by 2010. The European Council of Barcelona in 2002 further set quantitative goals that are to be achieved by 2010 regarding the provision of childcare for at least 90% of children between the age of three and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under three years of age, both in the cities and in the countryside. The European Parliament continually examines the outcomes of the Lisbon Treaty through the prism of gender, having expressed its concern about the ongoing professional inequalities between the genders and having highlighted the need to take additional measures in favour of women’s employment and social integration. The Parliament has repeatedly invited member states to promote female quality employment more intensively, with the aim of boosting women’s participation in the economy and safeguarding the sustainability of pension systems. The European Parliament monitors, intervenes and jointly forms the EU’s policies and takes initiatives at a European level, with a view to eliminating discrimination on the one hand, and boosting women’s participation in Europe’s social and political life on the other. To enable one to understand the work done within the European Parliament in relation to women, I mention only that the competent Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality has during its latest Parliamentary session adopted 34 own-initiative reports, 9 reports on legislative proposals and 117 opinions, with the aim of stressing the female aspect of other parliamentary committees’ reports, such as the EU’s renewed social agenda and common immigration policy. Its manifold work covered various internal and external issues, extending from the position of women in Europe’s rural areas to the integration of the gender aspect in the EU’s foreign relations and the use of sexual violence against women as a weapon in armed conflicts. Meanwhile, the Women’s Committee organised 34 public hearings on matters that concern the position of women both in Europe and third countries, particularly Africa and the Middle East. Overall, the Parliament strongly supported women’s rights to, and position in, social and economic life and exerted pressure on the Council and the Commission to solve chronic problems that concern women, such as social insurance for women helping in agricultural undertakings. At the same time, however, the Parliament

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brought new questions to light, such as best practices for reconciling work and family life and the position of women in the context of the flexicurity policy. Furthermore, the European Parliament decided to actively promote gender equality in its staff and administration. Having established a Highlevel Group for Gender Equality in 2004, of which I am honoured to be the president since 2007, the Parliament tasked the group to promote a comprehensive approach for gender equality in all its policies (parliamentary committees, communication etc.), including its external relations, that is, inter-parliamentary relations. The group also tracks the position of women within all administrative structures of the Parliament, monitors the implementation of gender equality principles and recommends appropriate measures for cases where it considers that the position of women should be improved. The Parliament now has nine women in the positions of Director-General and Director, as opposed to only four in 1997, while the staff is 61% women. Despite the importance of promoting these policies both within the EU’s statutory instruments and overall on a European scale, we must accept that women’s participation in social and political life is not a Community area of responsibility but requires, in the first place, appropriate national policies. The EU is thus called on to make citizens aware of realities about women that are extremely diverse, such as the place of women in Scandinavian states as opposed to that in Mediterranean ones, or the place of women in old and new member states. The differences among them are obvious both as regards women’s employment rates and their political representation and thus reflect on the composition of the EU’s statutory instruments, particularly when it comes to staffing positions of responsibility. Women’s participation in the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Council thus depends on their participation or the decisions taken in national political life. Today, there are seven female Commissioners, who were chosen by their governments. Within the European Parliament, the percentage of female MEPs has risen from 17% in 1979 to 31% in 2009. Therefore, in the final analysis, women who occupy posts of responsibility in Europe are placed there through national elections and are thus the result not only of political parties that exhibit the courage to overcome stereotyped perceptions about politics and choose new faces, but also the boldness of the voters. Besides, let us not forget that the measures each country takes to ensure the balanced participation of men and women are different. For example, the exact way the

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quota of women or other encouraging measures are implemented is very important, to allow the quota to have a substantive effect on the political equality of men and women. It is however also interesting to briefly go through the results of a recent special political poll and promote the equal representation of men and women in political life, but voters will also have to boldly overcome stereotypical perceptions about policy and make new choices about the people they elect. A Eurobarometer poll on women and elections for the European Parliament was carried out in all 27 member states with a sample of 35,000 women and 5,500 men. It was the first time such a Europeanwide survey and study had been carried out on women’s electoral attitudes and views about Europe, women’s priorities as regards European policy and the choices made both by the parties and voters. As regards the participation of women in political life, national and European levels are two discrete areas of communication. This implies a responsibility for political parties, which must demonstrate the political will to promote the equal representation of men and women in political life as well as their equal role in politics. The results of the survey reveal significant differences among member states, but a common view is that politics is a male-dominated world. The vast majority, or 83% of women and 76% of men, believe that women can bring a different perspective and added value to politics and one out of two women would like to see 50% of MEPs being men and 50% being women. Among Greek women 58%, compared with 46% of European women, in fact consider that their interests were not well or not at all represented in the EU. When choosing a candidate, the most important factors for female voters are experience in European issues and personality; political orientation matters much less. The main issues women would like to see debated in election campaigns are unemployment, economic growth and purchasing power; in other words, issues that have to do with their everyday lives. They also consider it a priority to count child-rearing years as pensionable years, ensure service provision and day-care facilities for children and extend parental leave for fathers. According to women, priority as regards gender equality in society should be given to opportunities for equal work, the combating of violence and trafficking, equal pay and a better representation of women in decision-making positions. These findings are valuable for political parties and politicians, both men and women, as well as European statutory instruments, in their effort to help build a true Europe of citizens.

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They are also valuable for the media in their efforts to disseminate information and contribute to awareness-raising. National and European parties should seriously consider women’s political pursuits, their will to combine work and family life, to have a say, and their views on economic and political life. Moreover, we need to highlight the commitment of the European Parliament, and the work already completed, as well as to inform the whole of the society about the positive impact of its work on the life of women. The European People’s Party (EPP), of which New Democracy is a member, has in its pre-election programme given priority to the promotion of gender equality in economic and political life. The EPP acknowledges that women’s employment rates in Europe are low and that concerted efforts are required, both by the EU and the member states, in order to achieve the goals agreed to on women’s employment in the context of the Lisbon Strategy. The EPP aspires particularly to focus on boosting women’s innovation and entrepreneurship, assisting through appropriate measures the establishment of new enterprises by women. Let us not forget that two-thirds of all jobs in the private sector in Europe are provided by small and medium-sized enterprises, which moreover are also the ones that create most new jobs. The EPP aspires to promote more effective measures that will allow reconciling women’s family life and work life, acknowledging the important barriers they still face in their effort to combine a family and a career. We acknowledge that the demographic challenges Europe now faces, which, if we continue at the same pace, will in the future seriously endanger the viability of the European social model, are connected with the role of women. Therefore, we must focus on encouraging women’s employment and facilitating the reconciliation of a professional career, political activity and family life for women with concrete, flexible and effective measures; we must introduce family policies that will support parents who also wish to work; we must adjust our educational system and conditions of work to accommodate working parents; and we must intensify our efforts to create an adequate number of childcare facilities, an area in which many countries lag considerably behind the targets set during the 2002 summit. We are aware, based on the example of the Scandinavian countries and France, that policies that help parents combine a career and a family result in boosting women’s employment. We also know that parents, in countries where both can use parental leave and that have adequate

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childcare facilities and more flexible ways of organising working time, also have higher fertility rates. The new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty allow us more than ever to take the necessary initiatives to effectively face the challenges of the future and make equality between men and women in Europe a reality. Let us not forget that the balanced participation of men and women, in addition to being a prerequisite for maintaining a competitive economy and society in Europe, is also the key condition for a true democracy.

The Privatisation of Defence and Security: Risks and Opportunities∗

Nikolaos Tzifakis

Introduction Over the past years, several states and international organisations have increasingly been entrusting private agencies with tasks such as training, restructuring and modernising armies and police forces; gathering and analysing intelligence; securing military communications; operating technologically advanced military systems; providing military transportation and protecting strategic targets; clearing minefields; and interrogating prisoners. Meanwhile, an ever-increasing number of non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations and individuals are turning to private companies for security services. The contractor enterprises are either private military companies that participate in actions such as military operations, stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of societies and security sector reform,1 or private security companies specialising in the provision of assets and personal protection services.2 The use of coercive force by private agencies is not a novelty. The phenomenon is as ancient as warfare itself (Shearer, 1998, p. 69). The involvement of mercenaries in armed conflicts has been recorded from the times of ancient Egypt and ancient Greece to our days (Singer, 2001/02, p. 190; ∗ 1

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Liberal Emphasis 40, July-August-September 2009. For certain interesting attempts to categorise these companies in relation to the extent of their involvement in military operations and the type of services they offer, see Mobley (2004, p. 22), Brayton (2002, pp. 307–308), Singer (2001/02, pp. 201–202) and Fredland (2004, pp. 207–209). For the distinction between private military companies and private security companies, see Brooks (2000, p. 129), Olsson (2007, p. 346), and Abrahamsen & Williams (2007, p. 239).

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Fredland, 2004, p. 206). The Westphalian state as the sole agent of the right to use violence is an exception in history, which in fact existed for a considerable amount of time only in the West.3 The process by which sovereign states expanded and established themselves on a global scale (whose key feature was their monopoly in their territory on the legitimate use of force) was essentially accomplished as late as the twentieth century.4 However, the transnational and corporate nature of the current private security sector, as opposed to the freelance and unorganised mercenaries of the past, is unprecedented.5 Although the sector of private military and security companies is extremely diverse (encompassing both local, smallsized enterprises and multinational giants listed on international stock exchanges) (Singer 2003; Cilliers, 2002, p. 146), its overall growth since the end of the Cold War is impressive. The turnover of private security companies alone rose in 2007 to $165 billion. G4S, the largest private security company in the world, operates in more than 110 countries and has more than 585,000 employees. In 2008, G4S had an annual turnover of £6 billion.6 MPRI, a subsidiary of L-3 Communications specialising in the provision of military training services, operates in the United States and 40 countries overseas.7 MPRI officials have bragged about the fact that their company can muster more (retired) generals than the American army actually has in its service (Leander, 2005a, p. 609). In states as different as the United States, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and India, the number of private security contractors is much higher than the number of employees in the respective state security agencies (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p. 2). An assessment of the activities of private military and security companies would consider both several actions successfully accomplished and important weaknesses and failures. Starting with the fact that, under the 3

4 5

6 7

Note here that companies such as the British East India Company survived for a long time in non-European regions, continuing to possess their own military forces. See Owens (2008, pp. 980–986), and Singer (2001/02, pp. 190–191). Mercenaries were used extensively during the Cold War in conflicts in Africa. Deborah Avant (2004, p. 20) reminds us however of the military ‘contractors’ active in Europe from the twelfth century until the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), who sent mercenaries to fight side by side with those who could afford to pay them. See http://www.g4s.com/home/about.htm. See http://www.mpri.com/esite/index.php/content/about/company_profile/.

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current circumstances, the international system shows no evidence that the privatisation of security will be reversed or limited, this article will list certain crucial observations on how to make this practice more beneficial to the interests of the public.

Theory and Practice: The Relevant Discussion Supporters of outsourcing security services to private agencies stress the opportunity offered to states to make substantial cutbacks to their public expenditures. In fact, this opportunity is extremely timely today, given the global economic crisis and the large deficits many states are facing. Generally, in times of peace, states can avoid the cost of training and maintaining large tactical armies, considering that, if they ever need extra military capabilities, they will be able to seek them directly in the private market (Fredland, 2004, pp. 210–215). The human resources of private military and security companies include military veterans noted for their professionalism, excellent qualifications and experience. Further, private companies’ forces often feature higher operational readiness, coherence and efficiency than the multinational missions of international organisations that are often slow to deploy and are then tormented by internal conflicts among their national components (Bures, 2005, pp. 540–541). Private military and security companies can be used even in cases where the international community lacks the will, cohesion and readiness to act and prevent the outbreak of humanitarian disasters (e.g., the genocide in Rwanda) (Bures, 2005, p. 539). It is also worth recalling that the success of military operations is now directly correlated with the use of sophisticated technological systems, for which the majority of military staff does not have the appropriate training. For example, the United States relies on private military companies for the maintenance and use of state-of-the-art weapon systems, such as Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aircraft (Mobley, 2004, p. 24). Similarly, a state’s participation in specific international actions of post-conflict reconstruction is related to its ability to send civilian experts (e.g., civil engineers), who are otherwise not required in armed forces (Mobley, 2004, p. 24). Outsourcing supporting military services (e.g., logistics) to private enterprises allows states to dedicate a larger part of their military staff to

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the deployment of war capabilities, resulting in a more combat-ready and professional force (Leibstone, 2007, p. 6). In the area of military organisation and training, private companies expand states’ capabilities to protect their territorial integrity and offer opportunities for the reform of their security (Singer, 2001/02, p. 217). Lastly, private security companies help establish public order and security and combat crime with their work. Broadly speaking, some claim that the action of private military and security companies does not challenge or question states and their sovereignty. Rather, these companies appear to be the ‘tools’ at the disposal of states, international organisations, nongovernmental organisations, enterprises and citizens for the protection of their safety (Leander, 2005b, pp. 806–807). On the other hand, several analysts take a critical stance vis-à-vis the idea of privatising security itself, which, they claim, transforms a public good into a marketable commodity. At the individual level, citizens are regarded as consumers of security services, free to search the market for the most suitable solution for their protection. This implies differences in security provision, according to their wish and their ability to afford such services (Loader, 1999, pp. 374–377). At the same time, privatising security also means releasing states from at least part of their responsibility to provide security to their citizens. Security is gradually depoliticised; from a major political question it becomes a technical one that can have a private solution (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p. 5). Private security-service provision changes, moreover, the content of the concept of security. Private companies want demand for their services to expand in order for them to survive and develop within the free market. Therefore they often exaggerate the challenges to security or even contribute to the securitisation of new threats, only to claim that they alone have the necessary tools to manage them (Krahmann, 2008, pp. 390–393). In other words, they exert influence on the assessment, prioritisation and management of threats by their potential customers. This is done not only through their advertising campaigns and their operation as interest groups, but also through the consulting services they offer about law enforcement and military organisation and training, as well as through their participation in intelligence gathering and analysis (Leander, 2005b, pp. 803–826; Olsson, 2007, pp. 353–355; Avant, 2006, pp. 512-513). Thus, critics of the privatisation of security contend that these companies contribute to the down-playing of threats for which they have no services (such as climate

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change) and show preference for their own tools to face other problems (regardless of whether they are suitable or not), contributing to the escalation, militarisation and perpetuation of emerging threats (Leander, 2005a, pp. 611–613). A typical example is how the US faced the scourge of drugs as a war, the key aim of which was to limit supply (instead of lowering demand). Furthermore, a large part of the criticism directed at private military and security companies has to do with media revelations of (sporadic) incidents, in which their employees participated in acts of human rights violations8 or other criminal activities.9 These incidents have revealed that in some cases, recruiting procedures were problematic and resulted in nightclub bodyguards and former officials of the South-African apartheid regime, for example, being hired by private companies (Spearin, 2005, p. 249). Others remark that in the vast majority of criminal cases that took place in third countries, the actual perpetrators were not prosecuted and justice was never rendered. This was due to two reasons: first, the existing international law does not sufficiently regulate the activities of private military and security companies and their employees (Nevers, 2009a, p. 174, and 2009b, p. 488). Second, on top of the fact that national courts have no jurisdiction over the territory of other states, private military and security company employees usually enjoy a status of immunity in the areas in which they conduct their operations (Carbonnier, 2006, p. 410). Overall, many analysts agree on the fact that, in the area of security, the level of accountability of private companies is insufficient. For example, it is worth recalling that private companies can transfer their registered office offshore, to avoid being subject to the national jurisdiction of states that have strict laws regulating their activity (Shearer, 1998, p. 78). Moreover, nothing prevents these companies from offering their services to nonrecognised or illegal (e.g., secessionist or terrorist) organisations, thereby promoting international insecurity and instability (Leander, 2005a, p. 614). States also lack appropriate procedures and suitably trained staff to oversee the progress of implementation of the actions they outsource to private companies abroad. So in some cases companies significantly exceed the 8

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In Iraq, for example, private security company employees repeatedly used excessive violence, not hesitating even to open fire and kill non-belligerents, and were also involved in torture in Abu Ghraib prison. Note as an example the case of Dyncorp employees who took part in a network trafficking in young women in Bosnia.

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cost foreseen for their services, while at other times they complete their work but deliver outcomes of a dubious quality (Mobley, 2004, pp. 25–26). Finally, other analysts express concern about the dependency developing between states and private companies, particularly when the latter offer unique services and gain a monopoly position in the market (Mobley, 2004, pp. 25–26; Hartley, 2004, pp. 204–205).

Concluding Remarks The provision of military and security service by the private sector is an undeniable and irreversible reality (at least in the near future). The operations of the overwhelming majority of military and security companies are acceptable and supported by most states and international organisations (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007, p. 238). The largest private companies have more advanced know-how and more material and human resources than the security agencies and armies of many states within the international system. Not surprisingly, these companies thus tend to become a constituent part of the international distribution of power, while they already actively participate in global security governance (Krahmann, 2005, pp. 247–268). The implications of outsourcing coercive force to private agencies are not a priori positive or negative. Besides, the relationship of state sovereignty with private power is not necessarily a ‘zero-sum game’ (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007, p. 238). Essentially, states must rapidly adapt to the new reality, to maximise the benefits and minimise the losses of this new practice (Avant, 2004b, pp. 153–157; Patterson, 2008, p. 218). First of all, states ought to continue to handle security as a public good. It is necessary that they respect the commitments arising from the basic social contract that governs relations with citizens and it is required that states make every effort to protect the life and liberty of their inhabitants. Where possible, states should favour policies for the prevention of threats as opposed to policies for the management of their impact, which usually fail to effectively protect all those in danger (Krahmann, 2008, pp. 382–387). In this effort, states must not hesitate to develop synergies or partnerships with private security companies. Examples of public–private sector synergies to reduce crime in the centre of Cape Town, South Africa, to protect diamond extraction in Sierra Leone and to guard oil drilling and transport

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facilities in Nigeria can be a paradigm for other similar cooperation (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, pp. 1–17, and 2007, pp. 237–253). Furthermore, states should establish a regulatory framework for the operation and activity of private military and security companies, both at the national and international levels (within the framework of the United Nations). This is in any case the wish of most private companies, which anticipate that this development will contribute to entrenching their legitimisation, and will specify their conditions of operation, leaving out of the market those that will fail to meet the conditions (Brooks, 2000, p. 137). Moreover, states should establish appropriate supervisory mechanisms for more efficient control of the activities of private enterprises. It is worth noting that since the end of 2007, when the United States decided to place the action of private contractors in Iraq under the jurisdiction of US courts, as well as improve coordination of their supervisory activities, cases in which private employees opened fire have decreased by 67%, without any other obvious explanation (Nevers, 2009a, p. 184). Moreover, states should safeguard the smooth functioning of market mechanisms. First of all, we need to affirm that supply should not determine demand. It is alarming, for example, that in the United States, the same companies that take part in the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence information for imminent threats are then tasked with the implementation of recommended security policies. It is equally striking that top-ranking US officials have been members of the boards of private military and security companies while they held government office (e.g., Dick Cheney) (Leander, 2005b, pp. 803–826). In any event, states should entrench their capability to select the most appropriate solutions to deal with their insecurity, even if these solutions oppose the concerns and recommendations of private companies. Finally, states should avoid transferring services to private companies that enjoy a monopoly position in the market, to let competition carry out its function. In conclusion, the benefits of privatising security are not detached from the framework in which this practice takes place. Benefits are directly connected with the answer we give to the classical political questions: who makes what, when and how. Paraphrasing the famous saying that war (and security in general) is too important to be left to the generals, we may say that war is too important to be handed over to private companies unconditionally and without thorough study (Nevers, 2009a, p. 185).

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References Abrahamsen, Rita, & Williams, Michael C. (2007). Securing the city: Private security companies and non-state authority in global governance. International Relations, 21(2), 237–253. Abrahamsen, Rita, & Williams, Michael C. (2009). Security beyond the state: Global security assemblages in international politics. International Political Sociology, 3(1), 1–17. Avant, Deborah. (2004a). Mercenaries. Foreign Policy, 143, 20–28. Avant, Deborah. (2004b). The privatization of security and change in the control of force. International Studies Perspectives, 5(2), 153–157. Avant, Deborah. (2006). The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory: The Democratic Peace, Late State Building, and the Nature and Frequency of Conflict. Perspectives on Politics, 4(3), 507–528. Brayton, Steven. (2002). Outsourcing war: Mercenaries and the privatization of peacekeeping. Journal of International Affairs, 55(2), 303–329. Brooks, Doug. (2000). Messiahs or mercenaries? The future of international private military services. International Peacekeeping, 7(4), 129–144. Bures, Oldrich. (2005). Private military companies: A second best peacekeeping option? International Peacekeeping, 12(4), 533–546. Carbonnier, Gilles. (2006). Privatisation and outsourcing in wartime: The humanitarian challenges. Disasters, 30(4), 402–416. Cilliers, Jakkie. (2002). A role for private military companies in peacekeeping? Conflict, Security & Development, 2(3), 145–151. Fredland, Eric J. (2004). Outsourcing military force: A transactions cost perspective on the role of military companies. Defence and Peace Economics, 15(3), 205–219. Hartley, Keith. (2004). The economics of military outsourcing. Defence Studies, 4(2), 199–206. Krahmann, Elke. (2005). Security governance and the private military industry in Europe and North America. Conflict, Security & Development, 5(2), 247–268. Krahmann, Elke. (2008). Security: Collective good or commodity? European Journal of International Relations, 14(3), 379–404. Leander, Anna. (2005a). The market for force and public security: The destabilizing consequences of private military companies. Journal of Peace Research, 42(5), 605–622. Leander, Anna. (2005b). The power to construct international security: On the significance of private military companies. Millennium, 33(3), 803–826. Leibstone, Marvin. (2007). Military outsourcing – healing the cuts. Military Technology, 31(11), 6. Loader, Ian. (1999). Consumer culture and the commodification of policing and security. Sociology, 33(2), 373–392.

The Privatisation of Defence and Security: Risks and Opportunities Mobley, Blake W. (2004). Outsourcing post-conflict operations: Designing a system for contract management and oversight. Journal of Public and International Affairs, 15, 21–37. Nevers, Renée de. (2009a). Private security companies and the laws of war. Security Dialogue, 40(2), 169–190. Nevers, Renée de. (2009b). (Self) Regulating War?: Voluntary Regulation and the Private Security Industry. Security Studies, 18(3), 479–516. Olsson, Christian. (2007). The politics of the apolitical: Private military companies, humanitarians and the quest for (anti) politics in post-intervention environments. Journal of International Relations and Development, 10(4), 332–361. Owens, Patricia. (2008). Distinctions, distinctions: ‘Public’ and ‘private’ force? International Affairs, 84(5), 977–990. Patterson, Malcolm. (2008). A corporate alternative to United Nations ad hoc military deployments. Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 13(2), 215–232. Shearer, David. (1998). Outsourcing war. Foreign Policy, 112, 68–81. Singer, P. W. (2001/02). Corporate warriors: The rise of the privatized military industry and its ramifications for international security. International Security, 26(3), 186–220. Singer, P. W. (2003). Peacekeepers, Inc. Policy Review, 119. Spearin, Christopher. (2005). Between public peacekeepers and private forces: Can there be a third way? International Peacekeeping, 12(2), 240–252.

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The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Threats, Prejudices and Solutions

Dimitrios Kokoromytis

The most recent international nuclear crisis, with North Korea as its epicentre, broke out with the nuclear test on 25 May 2009. This article looks back at the political history of North Korea and addresses the nature and features of the regime in order to make clear the political rationale that led to the nuclear test on 25 May 2009. The primary cause of the May crisis is associated with the succession procedures of the North Korean regime. Regardless of the person who will succeed Kim Jong-il in the regime’s leadership, North Korean officials consider that this transitional period is an opportunity for foreign powers (the US, Japan, Russia, China and South Korea) to turn against North Korea. The response to these concerns was the nuclear test, which was intended to act as a deterrent against any attempt by foreign powers to cause the collapse of the regime. In this manner they wish to demonstrate that, even during times of political fluidity, there exists the means and will to counter their enemies. Another reason, of a more technical nature, for the conduct of the nuclear test was to check the progress of North Korean ballistic and nuclear technology. North Korean technical and military staff had the opportunity to observe the magnitude of the explosion and the size of the device that can cause it. The first question of interest to us is the domestic politics of North Korea and the international environment in which it operates, but the historic origins of the current situation are also of interest. It is crucial to study both North Korea’s recent history (which is virtually identical to the history of the two Kims) and the characteristics of the regime ruling the country.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_8, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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When the Korean Peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel, in 1945, into the Communist north and capitalist south, the Soviets established Kim Il-sung in the north and the Americans did the same in the south with Syngman Rhee. The efforts of Kim Il-sung to unify the peninsula under his leadership led to the Korean War (1950–53), without any territorial rearrangements but with major human and material losses for both Korean states, with the north having suffered the most. The de-Stalinisation of the Soviet regime caused the estrangement between North Korea and the Soviet Union. Even before Stalin’s repudiation by Khrushchev (1956), Kim Il-sung had started using the ideology of selfreliance (juche1 in Korean) turning his country from Stalinist orthodoxy to a Communism with Confucian features.2 The ideology of self-reliance was adopted by the Korean Workers Party at the Fifth Party Congress as the unique guideline for all action (Becker, 2005; Ford & Kwon, 2008; Lim, 2009). The goal of economic restructuring was to develop heavy industry along the lines of the Soviet Union, facilitated by the industry developed mainly in the north during the Japanese colonial era. The efforts of Kim Il-sung to consolidate his power – purging capable administration officials who had been trained in the Soviet Union and replacing them with favoured comrades – deprived the administration of experienced cadres.3 In agricultural production collectivisation was implemented to increase production. This 1

2

3

Lankov (2007). Lankov disagrees with the widely known translations of the term juche as ‘self-sufficient’. According to him, Kim Il-sung meant that Koreans should seek their identity aggressively against foreign pressure. The dominant meaning of the term can be determined from a speech delivered by Kim Il-sung in Indonesia in 1965. In this speech, juche denotes independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy and self-defence in the army. The collapse of the economy, however, left nationalism as the sole pillar of juche ideology. The term juche is so broad and untranslatable because its meaning is formed to respond to the changing needs of the elite and because the core of the idea centring around national pride is not a cohesive set of ideas; in reality it does not constitute an idea (Oh & Hassig, 2000). Despite Kim Il-sung’s indisputable leadership, his decision to free North Korea from the influence of the Soviet Union did not proceed without reaction and the ensuing purges. See Lankov (2005). For a history of the purges, see Ford and Kwon (2008). Purges followed by the reconstruction of the administrative edifice have not been unusual in NE Asia. At around the same period, the same policy was applied to the members of the Chinese Communist Party; for more see Lee (1991).

The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Threats, Prejudices and Solutions

intensive production method yielded results but was discontinued. The Soviet Union’s hesitation to contribute to the growth of heavy industry in North Korea led Kim Il-sung to increase military expenditure, reallocating budgetary funds to armament systems by removing vital resources from electrification and reclamation projects as well as the production of mechanical equipment. The economy’s decline and stagnation in the 1960s and 1970s and the deterioration of North Korea’s relationships with China and the Soviet Union forced the regime to shut its doors to the outside world and follow its own peculiar track. The personality cult around Kim Il-sung was intensified thanks to the efforts of his son Kim Jong-il. Thus any failures of the regime were the result of the inability of its cadres rather than the country’s ideological direction. Marxism-Leninism stopped being a pillar of the regime and was replaced by the idea of self-reliance.4 This is particularly significant for the nature of the regime and can help us to find ways to resolve the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The personality cult around the leader Kim Il-sung was extended to his successor, Kim Jong-il. The most important factor in Kim Jong-il’s victory was the illness of Kim Yong-ju, brother of Kim Il-sung, uncle of Kim Jong-il and heir apparent. Kim Jong-il started his career in the party in 1964, holding personnel management and security positions (Lim, 2009). Having eliminated his political rivals by 1967, Kim Il-sung concentrated all power in his own hands. Since then North Korea has acquired a personalistic regime and a deified leader. All the power and legitimation of the regime were derived from its leader. Additionally, the regime may also be characterised as totalitarian (Arendt, 1973); a state with parallel structures, where the party takes supremacy over the state that does not pose any threat to the status of the person who leads it, supported by the existence of secret police and the use of terror through concentration camps. As well as being totalitarian it is also nationalistic and impenetrable to the outside world, that is, it has a restrictive ideology. Ever since it acquired secular power, it has not tried to convert foreigners, conquer foreign states or expand (Bernholz, 2007, p. 255).

4

Any reference to Marxism-Leninism disappeared from the Party’s charter in 1980 and from the Constitution in 1992 (Oh & Hassig, 2000).

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Although some of the characteristics of North Korea are reminiscent of Stalin’s regime, the most important adhesive factor that keeps it fixed in power is its nationalistic character. The collapse of the economy allowed the nationalistic aspect to gain a prominent place in the regime’s ideology, along with the personality cult. As very eloquently noted by Harrison (2002, p. 16), ‘the holy trinity in North Korea still consists of Kim Il Song the father, Kim Jong Il the son, and juche the holy spirit’. The ‘siege mentality’ (Harrison, 2002, p. 16) that was created during and after the Korean War enabled Kim Il-sung to instil fear of anything foreign among North Koreans. The traits of the North Korean regime, therefore, are Confucian ethics and a tradition of totalitarian power, a personality cult around its leaders and nationalism. Having defined the regime, we may now proceed to an analysis of the crisis in May 2009. The nuclear test on 25 May 2009 was conducted in the shadow of suspicion about Kim Jong-il’s health and ability to rule the country. His poor health dictated the announcement of his successor. The collapse of the North Korean economy, the dramatic decline in the standard of living and the failure of the juche ideology had weakened the position of Kim Jong-il in the eyes of the army, which is the regime’s pillar. Another reason why the current North Korean leader is finding it difficult to continue the Kim dynasty, bringing its third generation to power, is the lack of any revolutionary credentials for himself and his successor. Kim Il-sung’s unimpeded post-1967 leadership was successful due to his resistance to the Japanese and the emergence of the leadership team from the unit that had been under his command. Kim Jong-il, on the other hand, has had no military training or any special qualifications other than his relationship to Kim Il-sung. To compensate for any deficiencies, Kim Jong-il placed more emphasis on the army, proclaiming it the pillar of socialism (1997) and designating the presidency of the National Defence Committee as the highest office of the state (1998). The army has three key functions: ensure national security, support the Kim regime and maintain social control, serving as an example for the rest of the society (Oh & Hassing, 2000, p. 106). Since the 1990s Kim Jong-il has given promotions for the purpose of establishing a higher military leadership loyal to his power; promotions and expulsions have never been questions of performance or capability but rather of loyalty to the two

The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Threats, Prejudices and Solutions

Kims.5 Oh and Hassig (2000, p. 124) mention three reasons why the military will never turn against Kim Jong-il and the regime in general: both they and their families will be faced with severe penalties if even the mildest complaints reach Kim Jong-il; they are afraid of losing their privileged social status; and even if a coup against Kim were successful, there is no successor offering alternatives. The above may lead us to draw further conclusions about the structures holding up the regime. There is no doubt that an effective mix of ideology and suppression keeps it anchored in power. It should be understood that apart from the ideological background of the North Korean regime, there are material goods and privileges that foster loyalty to Kim Jong-il. If this assumption concerning the prosperity of the partisan nomenklatura and military leadership is correct, then we may understand the suspicion of the ruling elite towards any external intervention that would upset the status quo. It is from this viewpoint, therefore, that we should look at the nuclear test on 25 May 2009. The stability of the regime and the smooth transition can serve as excellent tools for interpreting the crisis. The missile test and the two nuclear tests undertaken by North Korea were targeted at audiences at home and abroad. At home they reaffirm the strength of the juche ideology through the development of its technology and the political advance of the armed forces; abroad they demonstrate North Korea’s deterrent capacity in the event of attack. The situation was similar in 1998, when a three-stage missile was test-fired over Japan causing rage and strong disapproval in Japan and the US. As was very well stated by Bush (2009), North Korea has technical reasons to test both its long-range missiles and nuclear devices. With regard to the technical characteristics, North Korea’s nuclear scientists and military are focusing on increasing the magnitude of the explosion and decreasing the size of the nuclear device so that it can be carried by a missile capable of striking targets over long distances (e.g., the US mainland) thus enhancing North Korea’s deterrent capability. Abroad they demonstrate the destructive capability that North Korea’s armed forces have in their conventional and nonconventional arsenals, thus making any attempt to overthrow the regime through invasion, as in Iraq in 2003, ill-advised.

5

For the loyalty of the military and the attempted coups and the overthrow of the regime, see Oh and Hassig (2000, pp. 119–120) and Bermudez (2001).

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The nuclear test on 9 October 2006 had different attributes from that on 25 May 2009. The former was intended to shift the balance in the six-party talks (North Korea, the US, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia) and convince the US to assume direct bilateral talks with North Korea. Thus the first test was an endeavour to show the world that North Korea would not be a new Iraq and Kim Jong-il a new Saddam Hussein. The second test aimed at reaffirming the role of the army after the new leader came to office. The difficulties that the country is faced with in terms of provisions and security issues render the regime’s supporters increasingly more hostile to the international community and dissidents. The political ramifications of the first nuclear test included the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, acceleration of the US–Japan anti-missile shield (theatre missile defence) and the sale of nuclear material from North Korea to other totalitarian regimes or even terrorist groups (Joo & Kwak, 2007, pp. 3–4). So far, even after the second nuclear test, only the first two scenarios have been verified. Iran, seeing that North Korea has essentially enhanced its negotiating position vis-à-vis the US and other parties to the six-party talks, has stepped up its nuclear weapons acquisition process so as to talk with the US (as well as Israel) from a position of power. The critics, though, point out that the nuclear-technology transfer deal between the US and India violates the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the opponents to this new deal consider that the US has adopted double standards for India on one hand, and North Korea and Iran on the other. Throughout the Bush presidency, the core of the US policy on the talks with North Korea was the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear programme. The Bush administration estimated that the collapse of the North Korean regime was in sight and that the transition could be controlled. This is why the first half of 2001 was dedicated to the revision of the Clinton policy, mainly aiming at revising the 1994 Agreed Framework (Martin, 2007, pp. 66–67). Both assumptions of the US government were wrong. The Kim regime did not collapse and the smoothness of the transition was questioned by China and South Korea, which feared an uncontrolled collapse of the North Korean regime and a subsequent humanitarian tragedy at an overwhelming cost to both countries. The opportunity to cancel the 1994 Agreed Framework arose in October 2002 during the talks between the American Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, and the North Korean First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kang Suk-ju. During the

The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Threats, Prejudices and Solutions

fraught talk between the two interlocutors, when the Assistant Secretary of State attempted to ascertain the validity of the US intelligence services’ suspicions about uranium enrichment, the North Korean First ViceMinister appears to have replied that the US President had called North Korea a member of the axis of evil, the US had deployed troops on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea certainly had a nuclear programme.6 Several US officials consider that the Kim regime is irrational and that it is driving its people to disaster. As for the second part of this reasoning, we should side with the American opinion. As for the first part, though, we should realise that the goal of the Kim regime is its survival (Dukarric, 2001) and, since the second nuclear test, its perpetuation. It is therefore useful to review the effectiveness of the US foreign policy from 1994 to date. The US and North Korea came to the brink of war in June 1994. It was thanks to the intervention of the former US President Jimmy Carter that the crisis was warded off and the Agreed Framework was signed. The – not unfair – criticism of the aforementioned agreement focused on the excessive concessions without any certified verification of the promises made by North Korea (O’Hanlon & Mochizuki, 2003). On the other hand, however, the ineffectiveness of the hardened position taken by the Bush administration prompted North Korea to renege on the 1994 agreement and withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003, obtain the nuclear option and proceed to carry out two nuclear tests. It is the dogmatism and bad faith of the US administration that are largely responsible for the current situation (Pritchard, 2007). What are the options of US foreign policy from here on? How can it attain its goals? Are these goals feasible? In order to establish which political 6

As for the accuracy of the wording used by the North Korean Vice-Minister, there are questions. Ford and Kwon (2008, p. 154) report that the accent could cause problems for the translation; it could be either ‘is entitled to have’ or ‘has come to have’. The BBC mentioned this discrepancy and, according to it, ‘four of its monitors had double-checked the disputed passage and were confident there was no missing syllable’ (although we suspect these must have been South Koreans and the incident should be considered unresolved); see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2487437.stm. Harrison (2005) comments that the North Korean Foreign Minister, Paek Nam-sun, claimed that his ViceMinister simply reiterated the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy pursued by North Korea; akin to the ‘strategic ambiguity’ concept adopted by the US in its relationships with other countries in the same region.

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options are feasible, we have to examine the context of the two states on the Korean Peninsula. The only reliable option for North Korea is the armed forces. North Korea’s failure to replace its aging military equipment drives its leadership to opt for power multipliers. The only option seems to be the capability of destroying Seoul, striking US forces stationed in South Korea and Japan and, eventually, striking the western coast of the US. If North Korea gave up these capabilities during the negotiations, it would in fact give away 100% of its power (Dujarric, 2001, p. 480). Moreover, we should not overlook the national character of the regime, nor South Korean nationalism. Possession of nuclear weapons would act as a deterrent to any external intervention in the Korean Peninsula unless Korean views were taken into account. Although on the face of it the acquisition of nuclear weapons is directed against the US, a secondary analysis may not exclude that it is also directed against its neighbour China, thereby inhibiting a potential intervention. It already looks like China has exhausted all of its options for intervention in the area with the convocation of the six-party process (Scobell, 2004). Thus, the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea might be a limiting factor to the rising Chinese influence in the region. Under no circumstances does South Korea wish a regime implosion (which would eventually occur without warning), because it will be the country that will suffer the most from such a contingency. It will have to deal with the humanitarian problem that would be caused by the thousands of refugees from North Korea who would wish to seek a better fate in the south of the peninsula. The next terrifying consequence would be the huge cost of reconstructing the North Korean economy. The German experience with reunification – East Germany was in much better shape than North Korea is – clearly demonstrates the reasons why South Korea hopes the regime collapse scenario will not take place. This was the point of discord between the South Korean governments (Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun) and the Bush administration from 2000 to 2008. Of the neighbouring countries (China, Russia and Japan) the only one that would not be faced with a humanitarian problem is Japan, since it shares no land borders with North Korea. The other two countries will initially have to cope with waves of immigrants, possibly larger than those towards South Korea because there is no demilitarised zone along their common borders as in the case of the 38th parallel zone. Indeed, China shares much longer borders with North Korea than does Russia and there

The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Threats, Prejudices and Solutions

is a large Korean population in the Jilin province, adjacent to North Korea. Thus, a collapse of the North Korean regime would cause, primarily, a humanitarian disaster and, secondarily, a security gap to the three aforementioned countries (South Korea, China and Russia). The problems Japan has with North Korea are limited to the questions of missing Japanese citizens who were abducted in the ’70s and ’80s, and reparations related to the Japanese colonial period 1910–45. Although these are not too difficult to resolve, domestic factors make their resolution problematic. The US administration may change its course of action and adopt a policy of patience and pressure. Huntington (1991) believes that a change in the policy of authoritarian regimes occurs after the transition from one regime leader to another. Problems will arise from such a transition from Kim Jong-il to his third-born son Kim Jong-un because it will be a prolonged process for the following reasons: first, the young age of the successor makes it imperative that power be temporarily assumed by a collective body or a relative of Kim Jong-un. Second, the rise of Kim Jong-il to power lasted twenty years, which were needed to prepare the heir apparent by making sure that he held various political offices and positions as a kind of political apprenticeship. Finally, Kim Jong-il’s ailing health and the need to select a successor in a short period of time will lead to disturbances in the regime. The military and political leadership of North Korea are favourites of the current leader, so any change in the course of North Korea will be difficult without some guarantees of the well-being of Kim Jong-il’s ‘court’. A collective body in power will complicate any crucial decisions on the nature and the direction of the regime. Until a real centre of power arises, it is reasonable to believe that the regime will continue to rely on its unique foothold in society, the army, the only institution that acts as a deterrent to the desires of the great powers to overthrow the leadership. The domestic crisis that North Korea is experiencing should make the US leadership very cautious and patient. If there is any chance of moderation from the next leadership of North Korea, it would be eliminated, leading to a hardening of the North Korean stance, if the US exercised pressure in an effort to take advantage of the crisis and potential leadership vacuum.

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References Arendt, H. (1973). The origins of totalitarianism. New ed. New York: Harcourt. Becker, J. (2005). Rogue regime: Kim Jong Il and the looming threat of North Korea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bermudez, J. S. (2001). Shield of the Great Leader: The armed forces of North Korea. St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin. Bernholz, P. (2007). Ideology, sects, state and totalitarianism: A general theory. In Maier, H., & Schäfer, M. (Eds.), Totalitarianism and political religions: Concepts for the comparison of dictatorships, 3 vols. (vol. 2). London: Routledge. Bush, R. C. (2009). North Korea’s nuclear bargain. 26 May 26. Brookings Institution. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0526_north_korea_ bush.aspx?rssid=northeast+asia&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed &utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Ftopics%2Fnortheastasia+%2 8Brookings%3A+Topics+-+Northeast+Asia%29 (accessed on 19 November 2009). Dujarric, R. (2001). North Korea: Risks and rewards of engagement. Journal of International Affairs, 54(2), 465–487. Ford, G., & Kwon, S. (2008). North Korea on the brink: Struggle for survival. London: Pluto Press. Harrison, S. S. (2002). Korean endgame: A strategy for reunification and U.S. disengagement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Harrison, S. S. (2005). Did North Korea cheat? Foreign Affairs, 84(1), 99–110. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Joo, S.-H., & Kwak, T.-H. (Eds.). (2007). North Korea’s second nuclear crisis and Northeast Asian security. Aldershot: Ashgate. Lankov, A. (2005). Crisis in North Korea: The failure of de-Stalinization, 1956. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Lankov, A. (2007). Juche (self-reliance) on translation. The Korea Times, 26 August. Available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/10/ 166_9008.html (accessed on 6 November 2009). Lee, H. Y. (1991). From revolutionary cadres to party technocrats in socialist China. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Lim, J.-C. (2009). Kim Jong Il’s leadership of North Korea. London: Routledge. Martin, C. H. (2007). U.S. policy toward North Korea under George W. Bush: A critical appraisal. In Joo & Kwak (2007). Oh, K. D., & Hassig, R. C. (2000). North Korea through the looking glass. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. O’Hanlon, M. E., & Mochizuki, M. (2003). Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to deal with a muclear North Korea. New York: McGraw-Hill.

The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Threats, Prejudices and Solutions Pritchard, C. L. (2007). Failed diplomacy: The tragic story of how North Korea got the bomb. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Scobell, A. (2004). China and North Korea: From comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute – United States Army War College.

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Greek Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Strategies

Dimitris Keridis

Introduction At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Greek foreign policy is faced with old and new challenges. The Turkish threat, albeit in changing shape and form, provides continuity with a past that goes back to the period before the end of the Cold War in 1989. Turkey remains Greece’s main foreign policy preoccupation. Dealing with the Turkish problem has consumed enormous Greek resources, financial and diplomatic, and it seems that this will remain the case for some time to come. However, new challenges and issues have emerged, including Greece’s leadership role in the Balkans, its active support for deepening and enlarging European integration, economic diplomacy and, more recently, for dealing effectively with climate change and related issues such as developmental aid and poverty reduction in the Third World. Thus, Greek foreign policy is both traditional and new in content as well as conventional and radical in approach, as it struggles to cope with a changing and very demanding international environment. In some important ways, current Greek foreign policy is a reflection of the dramatic changes that have taken place inside Greece and in its international standing during the last 20 years. Greece is no longer a poor laggard lingering on the European periphery. It has grown into a mature and prosperous democracy with increasing international responsibilities, mainly regional. However, old habits die hard and Greece has often appeared to be struggling to respond to the role that its past success has earned it and, instead, it has often allowed itself to be consumed by domestic dramas, among which ‘Macedonia’ has been the most prominent and damaging. C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_9, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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Recent History Starting with a brief historical overview of the past 20 years, one can say that change came abruptly, unexpectedly and forcefully in 1989 with the end of the Cold War, the fall of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself two years later. The so-called annus mirabilis or miracle year of post-war European history, 1989, was a watershed for Greece since it was among the Western nations most affected by the geostrategic change following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The opening of Greece’s northern neighbourhood and the Eastern Europeans’ economic and political convergence towards liberal markets and democratic politics provided a huge new space for potential interaction and mutual cooperation. Greece acquired a hinterland where before it had had none, since the northern border was mostly closed during the Cold War. For the first time in its modern history, with the brief exception of the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Greece was no longer preoccupied with its mere survival but could project its influence beyond its borders. Thus, 1989 presented Greece and its elites with a real, historic change that shook old certainties to their core and demanded the formulation of effective new policy responses. Initially, Greece reacted defensively to changes in the Balkans and in the rest of Eastern Europe. Although the break-up of Yugoslavia benefited Greece in power terms, since it allowed Athens to assume a certain leadership role in the Balkans that would have been unthinkable had Yugoslavia still been in existence, the Greeks strongly objected to the changing of borders. All Western countries, including the United States and Canada, initially supported the unity of Yugoslavia. But as violence mounted they changed their policy from favouring unity to sanctioning the independence of the break-away republics. Greece was the last Western country to come to terms with this new reality and its continued support for Yugoslavia was increasingly misinterpreted as direct support for Milosevic’s Greater Serbia policy. Furthermore, Greece’s maximalist position on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s (FYROM) name, adopted by Greek leaders in 1992, gave the wrong impression internationally that Greece was more part of the Balkan problem than its solution. In contrast to politicians, journalists and the emotionally driven and volatile public opinion, Greek businessmen, broadly speaking, saw the changes in the Balkans as an opportunity for expansion and growth and

Greek Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Strategies

engaged in exporting and investing heavily abroad. Today, Greece is the primary foreign investor in Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria and the third largest in Serbia and Romania. Greek banks, utilities, food and agricultural industries, textile, retail and tourist groups have used the opening of these countries to expand their business to better withstand increased international competition. Given the pressure of globalisation, Greek business cannot afford to restrict itself to its own small market. In the Balkans, Greece looms large and lucky. Greece has a larger economy than all the other Balkan countries combined. In 2009 Greek GDP will surpass $400 billion, while FYROM’s GDP will be around $9 billion, or 2.4% of Greece’s.1

A Paradigm Shift If 1989 was the year of change, 1999 was the year of truth for Greek foreign policy. The Oçalan crisis grew into a diplomatic disaster but ended with the promising Helsinki compromise when Greece lifted its objections and lent its support to Turkey’s European orientation and EU accession prospects. Thus, in 1999, starting with Turkey, a paradigm shift took place in Greece’s perceptions of the international order. The shift involved turning away from a realist, security-obsessed, ‘Clausewitzian’ paradigm of international relations towards a liberal, cooperation-focused, ‘Kantian’ paradigm. The reasons for this paradigm shift are multifaceted. To begin with they have to do with the failure of past policies which, instead of resolving Greece’s problems, have complicated them. Greek policy makers slowly realised that the US, in the absence of the pressure of the Cold War and often diverted by crises elsewhere, could not always be relied upon to be ready and willing to intervene and manage relations between Greece and Turkey, as Washington last did in 1996 over the Imia crisis in the eastern Aegean. Another reason is globalisation and the pressures of intensified international competition. As a small country with a stagnant and aging population, 1

In particular, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, in 2006 FYROM’s GDP was $6 billion, Serbia’s $29 billion, Slovenia’s $36 billion, Bulgaria’s $31 billion and Greece’s $299 billion (Country profile ‘Macedonia 2007,’ p. 24). According to the EUI’s 2009 reports, ‘Greece 2009’ and ‘Macedonia 2009’, FYROM’s GDP has risen to $9 billion and Greece’s to $400 billion.

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Greece needs to put its resources to better use than simply misspend them on armaments.2 Participating in the process of European integration has also been extremely helpful. Mentalities and attitudes learned in Brussels naturally spill over into Greece’s relations with the outside world more broadly, and especially with the part that aspires to join the EU itself, the Balkans. Since 1999, Greece Europeanised its foreign policy in two important ways: first, in embracing a policy of engagement abroad rather than solely counterbalancing, and second, in using European integration as the best process for the resolution of its bilateral problems with its neighbours, mainly Turkey and FYROM. Success has been slow in coming but has been real nevertheless. Greece achieved the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union despite Turkey’s and the Turkish Cypriots’ objections and forced upon Turkey a change of policy on Cyprus, towards unification and away from partition. Its veto of FYROM’s accession to NATO and subsequently to the EU is pushing the young country to the north to start negotiating seriously for a compromise resolution of the name dispute. After 2004, the election of a Conservative administration under Kostas Karamanlis slowed down some of the activism exhibited earlier between 1999 and 2004 but did not reverse Greece’s main foreign policy direction. The main new development, of which the Conservatives were particularly proud, was the attempt to build a strategic partnership with Russia,3 based mainly on energy cooperation that put some distance between the Greek government and the United States, in ways parallel to the fairly proRussian policies followed by the old Europe of Germany, France and Italy. In sum, Greece will continue to explore opportunities internationally for counter-balancing Turkey while, at the same time, engaging it through Europe.

2

3

On 15 November 2009, the daily newspaper TO VIMA published a story signed by M. Spinthourakis that the European Commission was asking Greece, once again, to reduce its defence expenditures in order to reduce its budget deficit. See www.mfa.gr/foreign policy, the official site of the Greek Foreign Ministry.

Greek Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Strategies

A New Strategy? Since October 2009, the Socialists under George A. Papandreou have been back in power. The new Prime Minister has kept the foreign affairs portfolio to himself and appears confident about his foreign strategy. One can argue that this strategy resembles a ‘Matryoshka’ Russian doll. The larger doll on the outside is Turkey. This is the main focus of Greek foreign policy. The next doll is Europe, then the Balkans, and the smallest one inside is ‘Macedonia’. In other words, the Greek strategy aims at building up political capital and alliances internationally by being helpful and constructive in its neighbourhood, mainly in the western Balkans, through its membership in Europe, in order to be better placed to deal with Turkey. Greece is particularly concerned with the growing international influence of Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The settlement of the historic dispute with Armenia, Turkey’s increased involvement in the Middle East and its privileged relationship with the United States under Barack Obama have given Greece much to think about. Today, Greece understands that it cannot afford to be idle or conservative. It needs to match Turkey’s activism with its own strengthened presence internationally, which is further underlined by Papandreou’s strong personal commitment to foreign policy. In his first foreign trip to Istanbul, Papandreou launched the cornerstone of his new strategy: Greece is to champion the accession of all the western Balkan nations to the European Union by 2014, the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War.4 In a sense, Papandreou wants to revive the spirit of Thessaloniki 2003 when the EU, under the presidency of Greece at the time and Athens’ strong lobbying, agreed to speed up the accession of the countries of the western Balkans. The goal is ambitious because of the current widespread scepticism in many European capitals about further enlargement. But it remains realistic given the small size of the countries involved and the huge benefits derived from reviving the prospects for accession. 4

See www.mfa.gr/articles for a full text of Papandreou’s speech in Istanbul. Excerpts include: ‘A roadmap for this enlargement […] of the Western Balkans, a roadmap for accession which I think could be a date which is both symbolic but also realistic. It could be 2014, one hundred years after 1914 when World War I began and unluckily over these hundred years we have still had many divisions and many wars and many conflicts in this region’.

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Even if the strategy fails to achieve its accession goals by 2014, Greece can credibly claim to be representing the Balkans in Brussels, while, at the same time, applying pressure both regionally towards further reform and towards its large European partners so that they match this progress with a tangible prospect for membership. Thus, through Europe, Greece can play a leadership role in its region and offer its support for the normalisation of the Balkans, constructively working together with the United States. The aim is to unleash a certain virtuous cycle that will eventually make it easier for Greece to negotiate with Turkey the final resolution of their old dispute over the Aegean, something which could build up the trust needed to support the reunification of Cyprus. The one open question remaining is ‘Macedonia’. This is the smallest doll at the core of the whole strategy. Greece cannot credibly appear to be championing the EU’s south-eastern enlargement while blocking the accession hopes of its neighbour to the north. The continuation of the dispute undermines the fundamentals of Greece’s Balkan and wider foreign policy. A resolution is very much needed both for its own merits and for unblocking the wider Greek strategy. Unfortunately, ‘Macedonia’ has become a highly charged and inflammable domestic problem inside Greece, fed by the nationalism of the VMRO government in Skopje. The new Greek government needs to quickly confront the rejectionists and allow FYROM’s accession negotiations to start as the European Commission recommended on 14 October. The negotiations themselves can unleash a positive dynamic for reform that could enhance the realists against the nationalists inside FYROM and facilitate the resolution of the name dispute. After all, this was the logic of the Helsinki compromise vis-à-vis Turkey back in 1999. What Greece accepted for a neighbour that has the power and the proven will to threaten Greek sovereignty in the eastern Aegean while occupying Northern Cyprus should be, at least, equally acceptable for the small, weak, poor and internally divided neighbour that FYROM is today. For the Matryoshka dolls to fit nicely into place, ‘Macedonia’ needs to be resolved. And its resolution will help Greece deal with Turkey, where the real danger lies.5

5

Another good example where Greece ‘sacrificed’ some of its interests because of the burden of the Macedonian dispute is Albania. There are all sorts of outstanding issues between Greece and Albania, the most recent one being the

Greek Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Strategies

Problems and Prospects What we have today is a bifurcated reality where Greek business and much of the political elites have embraced the new paradigm but large parts of the electorate remain suspicious of change, opposed to Turkey no matter what, uncompromising on ‘Macedonia’ and so on. At the same time that the two main parties, PASOK and New Democracy, support Turkey’s European vocation, 70% of Greeks, according to The Economist6 and many opinion polls, remain hostile towards Turkey and oppose any type of Turkish membership in the EU. Thus, as in many other Western democracies, there exists a growing divergence between Greece’s leadership and the Greek people. This gap often provides many opportunities for unscrupulous demagogues to carry the day. Another problem is that many differences might be hibernating but remain unresolved, with the potential of erupting forcefully through a repetition of an Imia-style crisis. The general public discourse in the country is not helpful. It remains dominated by the view that Greece is the perennial victim of international politics and needs to close ranks in defence of its inalienable rights instead of being an active and credible player with interests that are best served by alliances with others and through beneficial compromises. To achieve this, Greece needs a political system that produces and implements policies instead of passively barricading itself behind a high-minded rhetoric that might sound compelling in the short run but it is very costly in the long run. The third problem is that Greece’s strategy is heavily dependent on the strength of the EU’s drive for integration and enlargement. This drive in turn depends on Europe’s economic health. In times of economic stagnation, Europe loses its dynamism, protectionist instincts are revived, further integration becomes more difficult and European citizens, afraid of unemployment and losing their social benefits, grow resistant to enlargement

6

expropriation of the property of members of the Greek minority in Albania by government-related agencies in Tirana. However, the Greek government that signed and the Greek parliament that ratified the deal accepted Albania into NATO with no reservations and did not raise any objections, preoccupied and consumed as they both were by the veto against FYROM. For more see the minutes of the plenary session of the Greek parliament of 17 February 2009 (www.parliament.gr/ergasies). ‘Better late than never’, The Economist, 4 October 2005.

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and to bringing in additional new members. Thus, for better or worse, Greek foreign policy finds itself hostage to the broader trends shaping Europe today. Thankfully, the European economy seems to be moving again, adding some wind to the sails of Greek policy in the Balkans. A fourth problem can easily be identified as having to do with the inefficiency and corruption of the Greek state and its public administration. The Greek state machinery is notoriously slow to respond to the changing times and to facilitate Greek business endeavours both at home and abroad. For example, Greek aid to the Balkans is mismanaged; most of the promised €550 million remain unspent eight years after the start of the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans; issuing visas at Greek consulates abroad remains a very cumbersome process; Greek diplomats hesitate to promote Greece’s economic interests, afraid of being accused of corruption and kickbacks on the side, while they are often schooled solely in old-fashioned geopolitics; the Greek education system fails to prepare young Greeks for the new borderless world they live in; and so on. Finally, as important for Greece as its Balkan backyard may be, this is not enough. New regions, such as the Middle East with reforming countries such as Egypt, Libya and Jordan, have recently opened up and Greece should not be absent, politically, economically or culturally. The world is becoming increasingly more interdependent and an interlinked wider region from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, with Greece at its centre, has emerged. The reorientation of Greek interests towards the Balkans was necessary and healthy for a time but it has now run its course. Today the focus should be broadened. The surroundings in which Greece lives form an interrelated and interdependent whole and they should be understood as such. Ours is a dynamic world with multiple linkages, trade-offs and exchanges. Through its engagement with the Balkans, Greece’s horizons have expanded as never before. The process was not easy nor is its happy end assured. But today a new Greece, a partner in Europe and a leader in its region, can play the constructive role that its history, culture, geography, economics and international politics provide. A reformist government in Athens should use these advantages for the benefit of the country’s longterm national interest within a more peaceful and cooperating world.

The Origins of Greece’s European Policy∗

Konstantina E. Botsiou

May 28, 2009 marked the 30th anniversary of the treaty on Greece’s accession to the European Communities. This ‘round’ anniversary was coupled with the 35th anniversary of the restoration of democracy, which sealed the collapse of the seven-year military dictatorship (1967–74). Both events are persistent reminders of the major political goals that shaped Greek domestic and international priorities over the past three decades following the political change of 1974, namely, democratisation, economic prosperity, international security and Europeanisation. These goals promised to meet long-standing social demands and initiate an irreversible course of comprehensive modernisation through the inclusion of Greece in the European Communities. As this key policy was defined and promoted by the centre-right governments of the 1970s under the leadership of the then Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, the impact of his personality and style of governance on the basic policies opted for by Greece right after the junta can hardly be overrated. In fact, when Karamanlis linked Europeanisation with the democratisation agenda of the new party he founded in 1974 – which was duly named Nea Demokratia – he reintroduced the historically most relevant legacy of his pre-1967 government. The radical break with pre-junta domestic politics in the name of genuine democratisation was thus accompanied by a strong element of continuity with the Western identity of the country. Democracy

∗

A short version of this essay, entitled ‘Greece–European Union, 30 years since the Accession Treaty, 1979–2009’, was published in a special edition of the newspaper Kathimerini, on 24 May 2009.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_10, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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was expected to grow hand in hand with the Europeanisation of Greek political structures.1 The focus on Europe was greatly facilitated by the international political environment that surrounded the fall of the dictatorship. The first elected post-junta Karamanlis government (1974–77) submitted an official application for membership in the European Communities (EC) in June 1975 instead of merely reviving the Association Agreement with the EEC of 1961/62 – which had become operational again in the fall of 1974 (Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 8, p. 115). The spirit of international détente, which was soon reflected in the Helsinki Final Act (1975), permitted Greece and its allies to pursue more elastic policies towards the socialist Eastern European countries, thus breaking the tradition of limited relations that had prevailed in the previous decades of the Cold War (Niti, 2008). Such openings enhanced Greece’s profile among its allies at a time when relations with its major strategic partner, the United States, were suffering greatly as a result of the tolerance shown by Washington and NATO to the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (July–August 1974). It was unthinkable for Greece to abandon its Western orientation or even the Atlantic Alliance, but temporary measures were indeed taken as a response to widespread popular demands for a reaction to the ‘betrayal’ by the superpower and as a means to pressure Turkey, NATO and the United States to reverse the situation on the island. As long as the possibility of a military conflict with Turkey could not be excluded in the aftermath of the invasion, the withdrawal of Greece from the military branch of NATO in 1974 was presented as a natural means of protest and pressure. Until 1980, though, when Greece returned to the military planning of the Alliance, the latter goal had been much less served than the former, and this especially in the domestic rather than the international sphere of Greek politics. European policies were surely not meant to fill the gap after the partial withdrawal from NATO. But they definitely aimed to advance Greece’s international leverage and avert the eventuality of further Turkish aggression. Karamanlis was very careful not to associate the Greek application for membership with Greek–Turkish problems, as many EC countries were adamantly opposed to the idea of importing this hot issue into European affairs. Quite the contrary, Greece pursued rapprochement with Turkey during its negotiations with the EC – only a couple of years after the Turkish 1

On this correlation see Botsiou (2005).

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aggression – and therefore alleviated concern among the Nine that EC accession might offer Greece too much of an advantage over Turkey, which might further destabilise peace in the south-eastern flank of NATO (Syrigos, 1997; Ioannides, 2001; Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 10). Inside Greece, Karamanlis’ twin goal of Europeanisation was all but universally accepted. The domestic debate over Greece’s association with the European Economic Community (EEC), resembled strongly the relevant discussion on Greece’s association with the EEC back in the 1950s. That process had revealed a wide range of pro- and anti-European views across the Greek political spectrum. Before the dictatorship, however, opposition to Europeanisation came mainly from the Greek Left and certain economic groups that were dependent on state protectionism and resisted rapid economic liberalisation, for example, traditional state-subsidised Greek industries (Coutsoumaris, 1963; Botsiou, 1999; Minotou, 2002). After 1974, Euroscepticism and anti-Westernism became also features of the up and coming socialists of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), which finally came to power in 1981. A mix of Balkan and Third World isolationism serving national sovereignty, and the extensive reorganisation of state mechanisms ‘in the name of the Greek people’, was central to the political philosophy that PASOK and its leader, Andreas Papandreou, stood for in the 1970s, instead of the strict rules of adjustment to the Western-type modernisation offered by the EC membership (Spourdalakis, 1988; Verney, 1993). The socialist rhetoric was highly popular among many social groups in Greece. On the one hand, it satisfied the long-lived resentment about centuries of foreign intervention in Greek political affairs, which was held responsible by mostly leftist intellectuals for Greece’s economic and political underdevelopment (Rousseas, 1967; Tsoucalas, 1969; Stern, 1977; Roubatis, 1987), including the imposition of the military dictatorship. The United States had been the main target of Greek anti-Westernism and isolationism since the 1950s. However, anti-American and anti-Western bias reached a peak in 1974 as a result of the ambivalent policies of Greece’s NATO allies on the Cyprus question (Botsiou, 2007; Stefanidis, 2007, pp. 169–241). In the 1970s, the Greek Left and centre-left usually made no clear distinction between the two sides of the Atlantic (Rozakis, 1997). The Left and the centre-left stressed, above all, the incompatibility of the Greek economy with the EEC industrialised exploitation. Actually, the

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Greek centre-right governments of the ’70s took measures to alleviate the anticipated economic shock of EC-accession. Democratisation after 1974 was accompanied by growing state interventionism in economic affairs as a means to build up a viable welfare state and prepare the Greek economy for the tremendous leap forward to the European Common Market. Yet the expansion of state protectionism soon became a salient feature of the Greek economy, although it ran contrary to the essentially reformist agenda of Europeanisation. More than the centre-right, which introduced such policies on a temporary basis and finally lost power in 1981 (Psalidopoulos, 1996; Kazakos, 2001, pp. 293–350; Katsoudas, 1987), it was PASOK that preached the institutionalisation of this sort of state protectionism as a precondition for growth and democracy according to Greece’s own ‘special needs’ (Clogg, 1993; Tsakalotos, 1998; Pagoulatos, 2004). The opposition to Karamanlis’ European policy actually increased the element of emergency in his efforts to see Greece join the EC as soon as possible, before an eventual electoral victory by PASOK could threaten his European agenda. As a matter of fact, this did not materialise after the socialists came to power in 1981, as both their rhetoric and policies gradually moved towards the pro-European path. At the time of the negotiations, however, the Greek government had to take into account the strongly Eurosceptical positions that were presented by the opposition. During the accession negotiations (1976–78), Karamanlis, together with a prominent team of ministers and experts that constituted the Greek delegation, was anxious to separate the Greek candidacy from those of Spain and Portugal; tying all three to the earlier Greek application for membership might have caused serious delays. Reservations expressed by certain EC-members as to the adaptability of the Greek economy to EC standards were often overcome through the newly created European Council, where the Greek Prime Minister could use his leverage with the leaders of the Nine much more effectively than with the European Commission. Political criteria, particularly the compatibility of the ‘miracle’ of democratisation in Greece with the new focus of the EC agenda on democracy and the rule of law, often marginalised economic obstacles (Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 10; Verney, 2002). Greece’s association with the EEC was underlined by the Greek delegation as a criterion speaking in favour of full membership. Thanks to the association the Greek economy was de facto tied to the Common Market, despite the awkward and isolationist economic policies that had been adopted by the dictatorship and had disrupted both the smooth flow of

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capital and investments from Western Europe as well as the realisation of the Association Agreement itself.2 The great accomplishment of EC accession after 1974 has overshadowed for many years the importance of the association with the EEC back in the 1960s. The fact that the EEC decided to ‘freeze’ the Association Agreement as a reaction to the dictatorship of the colonels also fostered the perception of the agreement as a strictly technical economic affair, not a political breakthrough with important repercussions on the country’s economic and institutional organisation. Nevertheless, the political and economic background of the Association Agreement of 1961/62 is telling about the evolution of Greece’s participation in European integration. It is also enlightening with regard to the continuity of Karamanlis’ European convictions and strategic thought and action. Indirectly, it also illustrates the internationalist background of the political changeover of 1974. The Association Agreement paved the way for Greece’s future full membership at a time when the European Communities were still shaping basic institutions and policies. Karamanlis turned to the EEC very shortly after its establishment through the Treaties of Rome (1957). He pointed from the outset not only to the promising economic perspectives that were opening up, but also to the common policies then being designed by the EEC as a means to create in the future an ever-closer union (the Common Agricultural Policy, regional policies etc.). Parallel to the build-up of economic institutions, the EEC aimed at the establishment of a cohesive community of goals and principles that would safeguard the post-war Western European model of a mixed economy and European cooperation. At the time of Greece’s association, the EEC was at a critical transition stage. General Charles de Gaulle was introducing bold plans of deeper integration among the Six based on intensive French– German cooperation, while challenging American hegemony and quarrelling with US President John F. Kennedy over the latter’s grand design for transatlantic partnership (Conze, 1995; Costigliola, 1984). De Gaulle’s proposals for the design of a common European Security and Foreign Policy and a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at the heart of the EEC ran parallel to the anticipated opposition of his to British EEC-membership (1963). The EEC was, as ever, seeking to strike a balance between supra2

On the policies of the dictatorship see Woodhouse (1985).

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national and intergovernmental mechanisms for avoiding the supremacy of any European power – notably de Gaulle’s France – in European matters, without jeopardising the vital friendship between Paris and Bonn (Mazey, 2001). For a small developing country like Greece, the dynamics of the EEC entailed considerable risks, but offered a more viable perspective for growth than the openly laissez-faire European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which was then being promoted chiefly by Britain. The EEC was much keener to discuss economic support to associate partners during a period of economic harmonisation and contribute to investment projects. Crucial as well was the emphasis the EEC gave to agriculture, a central economic sector for the Greek economy. The connection with the EEC meant also primarily that Greece would commit itself to a radical reorganisation of state and economy in line with EEC economic and political targets. To Karamanlis and his pro-European government this was the key for the far-reaching reform of state and economy that was badly needed in Greece. Greece was unable to realise this reform on its own as it was caught between the Scylla of economic underdevelopment and the Charybdis of domestic geopolitical insecurity. The association provided Greece with a point of reference for its overall economic, political and ideological modernisation. However, Greece did participate in the discussions on a ‘greater EFTA’ in 1957–58. Together with other developing countries in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), mainly Turkey and Ireland, it called for the protection of fragile European economies, financial assistance for capital investments and gradual adjustment of trade tariffs to a common European system. A basic objective was to overcome the favourable treatment given to imports from former European colonial territories, which still enjoyed preferential trade terms with the old metropolises – a relationship that served primarily the interests of the British proposal for the EFTA. London’s insistence on the ‘loose’ character of the EFTA as a classical customs union, its focus on industrial production, its rejection of a system of external tariffs and its unwillingness to support financially the development of the weaker OEEC economies soon rendered Greece’s eventual inclusion in the Free Trade Zone disadvantageous. At the end of 1958 Greece abandoned the path that was soon taken by seven of its OEEC partners, which established the ‘small EFTA’ in May 1960 (Britain, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden). The failure of

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the discussions between the Six and the remaining OEEC countries, the result of a clash between France and Britain, put an end to the initial ambivalence towards a direct (through accession) or indirect (through a greater OEEC) connection with the Six. Instead, a new dilemma arose, concerning the form of the connection with the EEC. The negotiations for a greater OEEC had been a valuable lesson for Greece. Not only had it had the chance to follow closely the goal-setting of the Six and the Seven and present its own views on integration and the role of small economies, but it had also managed to approach the delegations of countries that showed interest in accommodating the special needs of developing countries, in particular the German and French representatives. Karamanlis himself had also grasped the opportunity to win the economic support of Bonn and Paris for his ambitious five-year Plan for Economic Development (1960–64), a blueprint for preparing Greece for the challenges of integration (Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 4, pp. 275–282, 509). On the basis of this experience, Athens was well prepared to seek a promising arrangement with the EEC in 1959. The Greek positions that had been revealed in reports of various special committees during the negotiations for a ‘greater OEEC’ were now repeated with more confidence in the willingness of the EEC to balance long-term political aims with short-term economic criteria. Not coincidentally, the vulnerable strategic position of Greece at the frontline of Western Europe, which threatened it with marginalisation in case it was excluded from the process of integration, often enriched Greek arguments on the economic prospects of the country (Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 4, pp. 348–365, 471–473, 507–510). However, the choice between direct accession to or association with the EEC was resolved on the basis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Greek economy. The Greek government preferred from the outset an association that would provide ample time and financial assistance for the gradual convergence of the Greek economy with the Common Market (Svolopoulos, 2002, vol. 4, pp. 37–41). Some representatives of the proWestern opposition parties of the Centre blamed the government for the waste of time in the unproductive OEEC talks and its lack of a coherent accession or association strategy (Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 5, pp. 292–295). The most heretical view was presented by the leader of the small Progressive Party, a renowned former Minister of Coordination in the centre-right Papagos government of 1952–54, Spyros Markezinis. He insisted, already

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100 Konstantina E. Botsiou in 1957, on the immediate accession of Greece to the EEC as shock treatment for the uncompetitive Greek economy (Markezinis, 1994, vol. 3, pp. 91–95). Finally, Athens opted for an association agreement that would not permit the stronger Western European competitors to drive out low-quality Greek exports as long as the Greek economy was preparing to enter the Common Market on an equal basis. The projected long harmonisation period was meant to prepare Greek industry and agriculture to narrow the gap vis-à-vis the Six. At the time of association with the EEC, Greece’s economic development was still being undermined by the low productivity and poor marketing methods of Greek agricultural and industrial production. Both sectors enjoyed generous state subsidies and channelled the bulk of their production into the domestic market (Candilis, 1966, pp. 125–145). To deal with recurrent export crises, Greek governments had since the mid-1950s come to rely increasingly on bilateral trade with Communist countries. This policy provided relief to the balance of external trade but also to millions of farmers, particularly those dependent on traditional Greek export goods like tobacco, which had been rapidly losing ground in Western markets after the Second World War. At the same time, however, trade with the East constituted a powerful disincentive for the improvement and diversification of Greek exports.3 In 1958–59, when negotiations for association with the EEC were under way, Greece was largely dependent on exports to Communist countries. Prominent among them was the Soviet Union itself, which sought to balance Greek agricultural exports with oil and industrial products, a trend that alarmed both Greece and its Western partners because of the eventual future implications of ‘Red oil’ in the political arena. Apart from the Soviet Union, Greece had developed considerable trade links with Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and – through the so-called triangular trade via West Berlin – with East Germany (DDR) (Wallden, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 63–67). Greek producers were slow and reluctant to substitute traditional but outdated crops with new more exportable ones (e.g., cotton) and seek export opportunities in the competitive markets of the OEEC zone. An additional handicap was the lack of flexibility and modern know-how in the labour market. The multitude of protected trades prevented the inflow of 3

On Greece’s Eastern trade see Wallden (1991).

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professional knowledge and new techniques from the developed Western markets, thus nurturing the vicious circle of economic underdevelopment (Candilis, 1966, pp. 125–167). State protectionism had provided an effective social safety net in the tough years of post-war reconstruction. In the aftermath of the occupation and Civil War (1946–49), Greece had sought primarily monetary and economic stabilisation. The extensive American assistance programmes had contributed greatly to the combined pursuit of economic and political stabilisation, and development and national security, from 1947 until the mid1950s (Botsiou, 1999, pp. 117–195, 268–313; Stefanidis, 2002, pp. 235–293). As external aid was reduced and Western Europe passed to a stage of rapid development, however, Greece was unable to sustain this balance without bold reforms in the functioning of the state and the economy. The need for a strong external incentive became even more apparent when the bold economic reforms introduced by Markezinis in 1953, which sought to protect the Greek currency from gold speculation, strengthen Greek credit institutions, attract foreign investment, liberalise imports and promote major state investment, produced only modest results until the end of the 1950s (Kazakos, 2001, pp. 164–194). The negotiations around the Association Agreement between Greece and the EEC lasted for about 22 months (June 1959–July 1961). The Greek delegation had to fend off numerous objections of the Six to its request for a long transition period for the harmonisation of Greek agricultural and industrial production with Common Market standards. The delegation consisted of prominent economic experts and economic ministers and was headed by the Professor of Economics and Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece, Ioannis Pesmazoglou. The Ministers of Coordination, Aristidis Protopapadakis (1958–61) and Panayis Papaligouras (1961–63), and Foreign Affairs, Evangelos Averof-Tossizza (1958–61, 1961–63) also held important roles during the negotiation, signing and ratification of the agreement. The so-called Athens Agreement was signed in Athens on 9 July 1961. Greece was the first third country to become associated with the EEC. This first agreement was followed by similar – though less generous – Association Agreements with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. The Athens Agreement of July 1961 has been characterised as a ‘small accession’ (Beitritt im kleinen) due to the long period it provided for the adoption by Greece of the community’s tariff system (Oppermann, 1989). The two transition periods of 12 and 22 years satisfied the Greek preference for

102 Konstantina E. Botsiou a slow adjustment that would not upset Greek economic and political structures. The EEC would remove its tariffs on Greek products within a 12-year period, while Greece would lift its tariffs and quotas in order to enter fully into a customs union with the EEC at the expiration of the 22-year period. Special arrangements were made for vulnerable Greek products – tobacco being one of those that absorbed a great deal of the lengthy association negotiations. Finally, the EEC granted Greece loans of $125 million over five years, in order to support its efforts at harmonisation with the Six (Association Agreement between Greece and the EEC, in Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 4, pp. 545–559). The Association Agreement was prepared and signed in the period when the United Democratic Left (EDA) was the major opposition force in the Greek Parliament (1958–61). The EDA was the only party in the Greek Parliament that did not ratify the agreement in the new Parliament of 1961–63. During the ratification process (January–February 1962) the major opposition party, the Centre Union under George Papandreou (senior), approved the Treaty, raising objections only with regard to the ‘delayed timing’ and to certain clauses of the agreement. It was a rather peaceful discussion, if one takes into account the bitter controversy that had dominated Greek politics after the October 1961 elections, due to the campaign of the Centre Union against the conduct and the result of the election, which was stigmatised as a product of violence and falsification (‘relentless struggle’, anendotos agonas). The leftist EDA branded the Association Agreement as a path that led directly to the deterioration of the standard of living of the Greek people, as ‘a leap into the vacuum with the only certain outcome being a decline in our trade with Eastern countries’ (Ilias Iliou). The prominent leftist intellectual Νikos Kitsikis, an EDA Member of Parliament, characterised the Association Agreement with the EEC as ‘colonial’, and thus a barrier to much-needed industrialisation.4 The prospect of an association with the EEC had been treated with reserve from the outset by a broad circle of intellectuals of the time. Evangelos Papanoutsos, a major expert on educational issues, warned that the close 4

Svolopoulos (2005, vol. 5, p. 295). Those Members of Parliament, who after the dictatorship associated themselves with a new Communist Party with proEuropean views (Communist Party of the Interior), adopted a less polemical position when Greece negotiated its accession to the EC (Linardatos, 1986, vol. 4, p. 27; Svolopoulos, 2005, vol. 10, p. 420, vol. 11, pp. 179–181).

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connection with the EEC would distort Greek culture and traditions, whereas Angelos Angelopoulos, a prominent university professor of economics, criticised association as ‘a premature and poorly prepared move’ in his Nea Oikonomia magazine. Scepticism was further expressed in the publications of the newly founded (1959) Centre for Planning and Economic Research (KEPE), a think tank that sought to help Greece liberalise its economic policies. Its first director would later become Prime Minister: Andreas Papandreou, who had just returned to Greece as a famous member of American academia in the field of economics. A typical example was the book Common Market and Economic Development (1964) by the Greek-Canadian Professor S. Triantis, which pointed out the incompatibility of the EEC’s competitive common market agenda with the needs of developing countries like Greece (Minotou, 2002, pp. 273–275). Such positions found fertile ground in further influential writings of the 1970s and 1980s, which, usually elaborating on the theory of dependence, compared Greece with the Latin American paradigm of underdevelopment, underlining the detrimental effect of economic associations between industrial powers and underdeveloped agricultural countries.5 Euroscepticism was evident among Greek labour unions and industrial associations as well. The Greek Industrialists Association (SEV), the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry (EVEA) and the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) favoured a limited engagement of Greece with the EEC, long adjustment phases and special ‘protective’ arrangements for Greek products (Minotou, 2002, pp. 226–230). In view of Greece’s first major commitment to European integration, the Karamanlis government focused more intensively on its ambitious fiveyear-programme of Economic Development. This plan aimed to attract major foreign capital investment, expand and improve basic industries and reform the educational structures of the country, placing emphasis on technical and vocational training that would help train staff for new industries and the growing tourism sector. Parallel to this, the social security system was reorganised in order to offer Greek farmers access to pensions and coverage against damages to their crops. The five-year plan clearly reflected efforts to prepare the Greek economy to gradually abandon the practices of a small, closed market on the periphery of Europe in order to survive and thrive in the demanding environment of the Common Market. 5

Among the most influential, see Mouzelis (1986) and Kofas (1989).

104 Konstantina E. Botsiou A similar reformist spirit was also the driving force behind initiatives that aimed at the modernisation of the state bureaucracy and the conduct of governmental policies. The most comprehensive plan was the proposal for the revision of the 1952 constitution in order to ensure stronger executive power for the government, lessen the Crown’s scope for political intervention, limit inter-party factionalism in the Greek Parliament and reform the domestic security system which was burdened with the legislative relics of the Civil War years (Alivizatos, 1995, pp. 525–600). The revision of the constitution was rejected by the opposition parties in the spring of 1963. Large European investments, such as those of the French aluminium unit of Pechiney, were also viewed negatively by large social groups and political forces, which stressed the eventual exploitation of Greek natural resources and infrastructure (e.g., low-cost electricity) by foreign capitalist giants as disproportionately harmful compared to the advantages offered to the Greek economy (Kostis, 1999). For the period of transition and adjustment Athens endeavoured to secure economic assistance not only from EEC countries, chiefly France and Germany, but also from the United States and NATO. The latter effort failed, however, as it did not fit the changing economic strategies of the Kennedy administration in Washington. Being a European country that had received ample US aid in the previous years and had reached a level of development which could support self-sustainable development, Greece did not meet the criteria of the American aid programmes for underdeveloped Third World countries (Patterson, 1988). Direct American assistance to Greece was accordingly terminated in 1962 (Stefanidis, 2002, p. 276). All in all, the association was launched under quite unfavourable political conditions for the centre-right government which had made it the centrepiece of its development strategy for Greece. Ironically, the Karamanlis government fell from power before the Association Agreement started to bear fruit. In June 1963, Karamanlis resigned from office after a long crisis of legitimacy that culminated in the clash between the Prime Minister and King Paul. The short-lived Centre Union government (1963–65) confirmed Greece’s commitment to the Association Agreement. However, its political agenda was so deeply entangled in the Cyprus question, which had resurfaced in 1963, that there was hardly any room left for bold European initiatives. Unlike Karamanlis, the new Prime Minister and the leading cabinet members were absorbed by security issues over the political situation on the

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island of Cyprus and the deteriorating Greek–Turkish relations, thus limiting the European agenda to technical economic questions. By 1965–66, though, the association was already producing visible results, especially in the field of Greek exports, with Western Europe steadily taking a larger share and thus leading to radical reductions in trade with the Eastern bloc. The coup d’état of 21 April 1967 put an abrupt end to Greece’s early European policies. Based on a resolution of the European Parliament, the Commission decided to freeze the Association Agreement in June 1967 and imposed a series of economic sanctions on the colonels’ regime, which lasted until its collapse in the summer of 1974. The public denunciation of the military regime by the EEC was one of the few open international reactions from Greece’s Western partners. It led to the clear economic and political isolation of the regime. Its effects were deeply felt during the 1973 energy and economic crisis which destabilised the junta and exposed the scarcity of international economic inputs into the Greek economy. After 1974, Karamanlis underscored the stance of the EEC during his efforts to secure Greece’s accession to the European Communities as quickly as possible. He also stressed the fact that Greece was actually rebuilding its European policies following the seven-year gap of the dictatorship. The simple reactivation of the Association Agreement was not accepted by Karamanlis, although influential political and economic circles tried to repeat the precedent of 1961–62 and secure anew a conveniently long harmonisation period. Karamanlis worked tirelessly to achieve accession long before the expiration of the 22-year transition period that was provided for in the Athens Treaty (1962–84). Greece’s application for membership had had a rough road since the submission of the official application in June 1975. In January 1976, the European Commission actually put forward a negative opinion on the prospect of accession, based both on the bad state of the Greek economy as well as on the difficulties the EEC itself faced as a result of the international economic crisis and the triple ‘Northern’ enlargement of 1973 (Britain, Denmark, Ireland). Karamanlis took upon himself the task of winning the support of European leaders for the Greek application. The French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing turned out to be the most ardent champion of Greece’s European effort. After initial reservations, the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt also emerged as a valuable ally of the Greek side. A devoted pro-European team of economic experts and ministers had

106 Konstantina E. Botsiou the dual task of promoting the Greek case both in EEC organisations and on the domestic front under the inspired guidance of Panayis Papaligouras, Minister of Coordination and Economic Planning (1974–77) and Foreign Affairs (1977–78). The Treaty of Accession was signed in Athens on 28 May 1979. Karamanlis did not fail to point out his long-standing faith in the economic and political mission of European integration, a faith that helped Greece regain a position in the EEC after the restoration of democracy. For Karamanlis, full membership had a doubly positive effect for Greece. On the one hand, it gave Greece a fixed and permanent orientation to the more developed Western Europe. On the other hand, it triggered a modernisation process that could be reversed only with difficulty by any alternative political experiment. In a sense, Europeanisation was the vital alter ego of democratisation. These two elements were thought of as the quintessence of Greek politics after 1974. Today, 35 years after the signing the Accession Treaty to the EC and 50 years after the beginning of association negotiations with the EEC, Greece continues to seek a balance between this organisational model and its practical implementation.

References Alivizatos, N. (1995). The political institutions in crisis, 1922–1974: Aspects of the Greek experience (in Greek). Athens: Themelio. Botsiou, K. E. (1999). Griechenlands Weg nach Europa. Von der Truman-Doktrin bis zur Assoziierung mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1947–1961. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang. Botsiou, K. E. (2005). In search of lost time: The European course of the political changeover. In Arvanitopoulos, C., & Koppa, M. (Eds.), Thirty years of Greek foreign policy, 1974–2004 (in Greek; pp. 99–121). Athens: Livanis. Botsiou, K. E. (2007). Anti-Americanism in Greece. In O’Connor, B. (Ed.), AntiAmericanism: History, causes, and themes (4 volumes; vol. 3, pp. 213–234, 340–345). Oxford: Greenwood. Candilis, W. O. (1966). The economy of Greece, 1944–1966: Efforts for stability and development. New York: Praeger. Clogg, R. (1993). Greece, 1981–89: The populist decade. London: St Martin’s Press. Conze, E. (1995). Die gaullistische Herausforderung. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik, 1958–1963. Munich: Oldenburg.

The Origins of Greece’s European Policy 107 Costigliola, F. (1984). The failed design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the struggle for Europe. Diplomatic History, 8, 227–251. Coutsoumaris, G. (1963). The morphology of Greek industry. Athens: Centre for Economic Research (KEPE). Ioannides, C. P. (2001). Realpolitik in the Mediterranean. From Kissinger and the Cyprus crisis to Carter and the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo. New York: Pella. Katsoudas, D. (1987). The Conservative movement and New Democracy – from past to present. In Featherstone, K., & Katsoudas, D. (Eds.), Political change in Greece, before and after the Colonels (pp. 85–111). London: Croom Helm. Kazakos, P. (2001). Between state and market: Economy and economic policies in post-war Greece, 1944–2000 (in Greek). Athens: Patakis. Kofas, J. V. (1989). Intervention and underdevelopment. Greece during the Cold War. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Kostis, K. P. (1999). The myth of the foreigner, or Pechiney in Greece (in Greek). Athens: Alexandria. Linardatos, S. (1986). From the Civil War to the Junta (5 volumes; in Greek). Athens: Papazissis. Markezinis, S. (1994). Modern political history of Greece (1936–1975) (in Greek). Athens: Papyros. Mazey, S. (2001). European integration: Unfinished journey or journey without end? In Richardson, J. (Ed.), European Union – power and policy-making (pp. 27–51). London: Routledge. Minotou, M. (2002). The European choice of the Karamanlis government, 1947–1959 (in Greek). PhD diss., University of Athens. Mouzelis, N. (1978). Greece: Facets of underdevelopment. New York: HolmesMeier. Mouzelis, N. (1986). Politics in the semi-periphery: Early parliamentarism and late industrialism in the Balkans and Latin America. London: St Martin’s Press. Niti, L. (Ed.) (2008). The crisis of détente in Europe, From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985. London: Routledge. Oppermann, T. (1989). Grundsatzfragen der Einbeziehung Griechenlands in die Institutionen der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. In Ott, A. E., & Wenturis, N. (Eds.), Griechenland vor dem Beitritt in die Europäische Gemeinschaft (pp. 55–81). Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang. Patterson, T. G. (Ed.) (1988). Kennedy’s quest for victory and global crisis: American foreign policy, 1961–1963. New York: Simon & Schuster. Pagoulatos, G. (2004). Believing in national exceptionalism: Ideas and economic divergence in Southern Europe. West European Politics, 27(1), 43–68. Psalidopoulos, M. (Ed.) (1996). Speeches and articles of Panayis Papaligouras (in Greek). Athens: Eolos.

108 Konstantina E. Botsiou Roubatis, Y. (1987). Tangled webs: The U.S. in Greece, 1947–67. New York: Pella. Rousseas, S. (1967). The death of democracy. New York: Grove Press. Rozakis, C. (1997). Greek foreign policy, 1980–1991. In History of the Greek nation (in Greek, vol. 16, pp. 373–393), Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon. Spourdalakis, M. (1988). The rise of the Greek Socialist Party. London: Routledge. Stefanidis, Y. (2002). Asymmetrical partners: The United States and Greece in the Cold War, 1953–1961 (in Greek). Athens: Patakis. Stefanidis, Y. (2007). Stirring the Greek nation: Political culture, irredentism and anti-Americanism in post-war Greece, 1945–1967 (pp. 169–241). London: Ashgate. Stern, L. (1977). The wrong horse: The politics of intervention and the failure of American diplomacy. New York: Times Books. Svolopoulos, C. (Ed.) (2005). Konstantinos Karamanlis: Archive, facts and texts (12 vols.). Syrigos, A. (1997). The status of the Aegean Sea according to international law. Brussels/Athens: Bruylant/Sakkoulas. Tsakalotos, E. (1998). The political economy of Social Democratic economic policies: The PASOK experiment in Greece. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14(1), 114–138. Tsoucalas, C. (1969). The Greek Tragedy. Baltimore: Penguin. Verney, S. (1993). From the ‘special relationship’ to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community, 1981–89. In Clogg, R. (Ed.), Greece, 1981–89: The populist decade (pp. 131–153). Hampshire and London: Macmillan. Verney, S. (2002). The Greek association with the European Community: A strategy of state. In Costa-Pinto, A., & Teixeira, N. (Eds.), Southern Europe and the making of the European Union (Social Science Monographs; pp. 109–156). New York: Columbia University Press. Wallden, S. (1991). Greece and the Eastern bloc countries, 1950–1967 (2 volumes; in Greek). Athens: Odysseas. Woodhouse, C. M. (1985). The rise and fall of the Greek colonels. London: Granada.

The Greek Economy, 1959–2009: From Association with the EEC to Accession and EMU

Michalis Psalidopoulos

The Economy’s Orientation towards the EEC The year 1958 was a particularly dismal juncture for the Greek economy. Agricultural production, then accounting for 50% of gross domestic product, was hit by the olive fruit fly. Consumer demand fell immediately and the impact of this was reflected in the 1958 elections, when the United Democratic Left (EDA) became the opposition party. Although the drachma had remained stable since 1953, the memories of previous setbacks were still vivid and underemployment or unemployment was a common phenomenon in Greek economic life. On top of this, it was announced that US assistance, which was somewhat of a relief for the country’s balance of payments, would gradually decrease and eventually be discontinued in the beginning of the 1960s. Under these circumstances, Greek economic policy makers turned to discussions about the possible benefits of the country’s participation in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), promoted by Great Britain as a loose multilateral trade agreement. Yet these aspirations were soon laid aside as EFTA would include states at disparate development levels without special provisions for poorer member states. So, discussions with the European Economic Community began. Greece’s problem was that, being an agricultural country, it mainly produced agricultural products, which were uncompetitive, however, due to the small scale of farming in Greece. Surpluses were absorbed by Eastern European countries through clearings, leading Greece to a trade dependency totally undesirable on political grounds for the governments involved. There was a general view that industry should develop, yet the country C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_11, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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110 Michalis Psalidopoulos completely lacked a mechanical engineering industry. Industry’s manufacturing equipment had to be imported and by doing so the deficit in the balance of payments increased further. The country’s industrial development seemed weak given its meagre exchange reserves. This problem, referred to as the ‘balance of payments issue’ in the financial journals of the time, called for an urgent solution. The solution appeared to be the association agreement with the EEC. The agreement focused on how Greek industry would gradually align with European competition. Tariffs on Greek products in EEC countries would be eliminated in 11 years, and respective Greek tariffs on European products in 22 years. Greece would be granted observer status in the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy and have access to low interest rate loans from the European Investment Bank for investment in infrastructure. This would not solve immediately or in the long term the balance of payments issue, but Greece would gain valuable time to set up a new framework for its economy’s operation and orientation. Greece’s association with the EEC gave new impetus to economic growth, directing export goods towards EEC countries more than in the past. Throughout the ’60s, growth rates annually were 7% on average and inflation was minimal. Emigration to Germany in 1962–64 somewhat relieved the pressure of unemployment and industry rapidly developed, gradually changing the country’s economic structure. The flats-for-land exchange programme changed the architecture in urban centres, and towards the end of the so-called Greek economic ‘miracle’ in the mid ’70s, agriculture accounted for 18% of GDP, while industry accounted for about 30%. Employment was similarly distributed. Property deals in golden liras had already been discontinued in early 1966, and were now made in the national currency, in recognition of its stable value.

Development and Problems: The Post-1967 Disorientation The aforementioned developments were certainly not the effect of the association agreement exclusively, nor was the EEC the keeper of the country’s economic development. On the contrary, the association agreement was frozen during the military dictatorship, evidence of democratic Europe’s dislike of the junta. Tariff ‘disarmament’ continued on both sides, yet Greece’s drawing rights

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at the European Investment Bank were suspended and so were communications and consultations between Greek and European officials. However, the economic conditions that had been established in the previous years allowed the Greek economy to continue its upturn, despite the 1968 depression and the decelerated rate of investments. The ‘freezing’ of the Association Agreement with the EEC, though, and the drying-up of beneficial credits from the European Investment Bank resulted in the disorientation of the productive classes. The policy of boosting production activity, initially applied by the dictatorship regime, consisted in granting tax benefits and exemptions and in increasing credits to the economy’s private sector, further favouring exports, tourism and construction activities via subsidies. Still, emigration grew, while a broad policy of public investments in infrastructure projects led to a rise of the public debt service ratio from 7.8% of total expenditure in the 1966 budget to 12.4% in 1971. The economy’s monetary expansion and granting of cheap loans to boost construction activity and commerce in 1968–70 occasioned a gradual overheating of the economy that reached its peak when the international fixed exchange rate system imploded; Greece managed the situation without any understanding with its trade partners.

First Steps after the Collapse of the Bretton Woods System (1971) After the US administration terminated the convertibility of the US dollar to gold in August 1971, the US dollar experienced an 8% depreciation by the end of the same year. Greek monetary authorities initially maintained unchanged the drachma-to-US dollar exchange rate and the drachma was depreciated by the same rate against all other currencies. The balance of trade deficit deteriorated and prices began to rise. In 1972, the Bank of Greece followed a restrictive economic policy with a view to limit liquidity in the economy. The percentage of mandatory deposits with the Bank of Greece increased and loans to construction companies were suspended. When in February 1972 the US dollar was further depreciated against gold by 10%, the drachma followed suit again. In May 1973, bank deposit interest rates, as well as discount rates, increased in a new effort to limit liquidity. At this juncture, the oil crisis broke out. Its outbreak in October

112 Michalis Psalidopoulos 1973 and the increase in oil prices strengthened domestic inflation. The Monetary Commission, in an ultimate effort to stop the drachma’s slide, decided to decouple it from the US dollar and effect a 10% revaluation, loosening at the same time price controls. Yet the subsequent rapid political and financial developments decelerated domestic economic activity and halted the growth of the Greek economy. The economy ‘deflated’ and inflation skyrocketed to 35% in 1974. In the following months, the drachmato-US dollar exchange rate was restored to 30:1, while the Bank of Greece applied once again a deflationary policy, as the Cyprus-centred political crisis peaked.

The Controlled Economy and the Downturn in Growth, 1974–81 The reorientation of economic policy brought about by the National Unity Government after the political changeover led the real economy to a partial recovery and the drachma to a mild slide against the core European currencies. The drachma depreciated against the English pound by 7.3% in 1975, 14.2% in 1976 and slightly appreciated by 0.8% in 1977. The drachma’s depreciation against the German mark was 0.7% in 1975, but it appreciated by 7% in 1976. The National Unity Government managed to successfully deal with the liquidity crisis in the market, while the Bank of Greece reduced the discount rate, thus contributing to the return on private bank deposits. Economic activity recovered in 1975. GDP, as compared to 1970s constant drachmas, increased by 6.4% in 1975 and by 6.9% in 1976. At the same time, the association agreement ‘unfroze’ and soon Greece applied for accession to the EEC. The drachma was once and for all uncoupled from the US dollar and the Bank of Greece began to set the drachma’s exchange rate based on the value of a currency basket. Setting the drachma’s exchange rate became a new tool for the fulfilment of economic policy targets, particularly with regard to maintaining the Greek economy’s competitiveness. Monetary policy was targeted at controlling price increases, improving the balance of payments and restoring the country’s economic activity. However, these efforts coincided with the second oil crisis. At that unfavourable juncture, the Greek economy took a downturn, with the rate

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of growth of GDP falling from 7.2% in 1978 to 3.3% in 1979, 0.7% in 1980 and -1.8% in 1981. Meanwhile, on 28 May 1979, the agreement for Greece’s accession to the EEC was signed, to take effect on 1 January 1981. The agreement included many transitional arrangements and provisions that would prevent a shock to the productive classes that had constantly put off investments in modernisation and adaptation to the changing – due to the crises and stagflation – international environment.

Inflation without Growth, 1981–90 Soon, however, uncertainty about the intentions of Greek economic policy returned. The rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) to the country’s leadership signalled a time of stronger state presence in the economy to meet the targets of economic and social policy. Industry went through a severe crisis because of the stagflation and the accession to the EEC/EU, as also confirmed by numerous expert reports. ‘Ailing enterprises’ began to emerge, burdening bank balance sheets with their non-performing loans and in turn weakening the banks. Soon, however, the target was to stabilise economy, control inflation and the current account deficit, while the government’s wish to redistribute income and control overall demand became a secondary priority. Prices rose by 24.5% in 1981; the rate of increase remained above 20% in the next five-year period. The budget deficit skyrocketed from 2.6% of GDP in 1980 to 9.1% in 1981 and 11.7% in 1985. To tackle inflationary problems, the government imposed a stabilising programme in January 1983, which included devaluation of the drachma by 16% against the US dollar and 15% against the ECU. This effort did not have a happy ending. The country’s accession to the EEC had aggravated the balance of trade (from $4,342.8 million in 1978, the deficit reached $6,696.8 million in 1981 and $6,267.9 million in 1985); the growth in costs caused by the increase in the minimum wage by 32% in 1981 intensified the financial problems of many enterprises, driving them to multiple impasses. Investment as a percentage of GDP dropped from 19.1% in 1980 to 17.7% in 1981 and 16% in 1984.

114 Michalis Psalidopoulos The Economic Stabilisation Plan, 1985–87 The growing fiscal deficits and high inflation rates drove the second Andreas Papandreou government to apply a stabilisation plan in October 1985, submitted to the European Commission for its endorsement. The plan devalued the drachma by 15%, cut public expenditure and froze salaries and wages; it had a spectacular impact on economic indicators, but was abandoned after 1987. It signalled however the government’s turn to the European state of affairs and fully-fledged participation in European institutions, which were then endowed with a regional development policy. Inflows from various EU funds had unprecedented effects on Greece’s political and economic life. They in fact mitigated or eliminated the anxiety about the balance of payments issue, while the recommendations of the Karatzas Committee led to, when implemented, conditions of competition in the banking system, rationalising the portfolios of commercial banks. The drachma started sliding at a slower rate than inflation (the ‘hard drachma’ policy) after 1987, the result of a policy to bring more than one economic policy target into equilibrium, and in an effort to control inflation and public debt, which had expanded due to the currency devaluations. This policy contained the over-expansion of the public debt, yet cost a deterioration of the balance of payments and Greek industry’s competitiveness, with repercussions that are still felt today. Public debt as a percentage of GDP remained steadily above 100%, while the current account deficit rose from 0.8% of GDP in 1987 to 4.3% in 1989. After the government changed in 1990, a new effort was made to contain the fiscal deficit and restructure the domestic economy’s production sector by adopting a plan for a gradual macroeconomic adjustment.

The Journey toward EMU, 1991–2001 As early as in the beginning of the ’90s, the plan for the EU’s internal market integration was inaugurated. In December 1991, the decision was taken in Maastricht to transform the EU into an Economic and Monetary Union based on specific fiscal and monetary criteria. The alignment of Greek economic policy with these new facts required immediate action in line with the European developments, imposing a plan to limit budgetary deficits through privatisations. In August 1992, new

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austerity measures were announced, including a new convergence plan that relied on increasing indirect taxes and privatising ailing utilities. Nevertheless, the public deficit as a percentage of GDP failed to drop below 10% until 1995. Moreover, automatic wage indexation was abolished and price-controlled markets were liberated. The second stage of EMU began in January 1994 and a few months later the drachma experienced strong pressure, managed by the Bank of Greece by drastically increasing lending rates. At the same time, a policy on containing the slide in the value of the drachma was applied, setting an interim monetary target. The aforementioned monetary actions had a significant impact on economic indicators, which began to improve. In 1995, inflation dropped to single digits for the first time in 20 years, whereas the growth rate followed an upward trend throughout the second half of the ’90s, climbing to 2.1% in 1995, 3.4% in 1997 and reaching 3.8% in 2000. In the meantime, the industrial sector was restricted to 12–15% of GDP, employment in agriculture accounted for 5–8% of total labour and the economy was becoming one made up of service industries. In December 1997, the European Council defined the scenario for the transition to the last stage of monetary union and decided that the name of the new single currency would be ‘Euro’. In parallel, in June 1997, the Amsterdam European Council adopted the Stability and Growth Pact, which required that European governments pursue a stabilising economic policy. The strains exerted on the drachma at the end of 1997 led the Bank of Greece to increase interest rates and prepare to integrate the currency into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-I) that finally took place in March 1998. The drachma was devalued by 12.3% to 357 GRD/ECU and joined the ERM with a fluctuation band of +/- 15%. The Bank of Greece entered the Eurosystem. Economic policy continued its alignment with the third stage of EMU, without anticipating entry at that stage. As soon as the third stage of monetary union began, the drachma’s entry into ERM-II was set at a central exchange rate of 353.109 GRD/€ (with a fluctuation band of +/- 15%). Moreover, a strong boom in activity was observed in the Athens Exchange, peaking in September 1999. This development did not prevent efforts to get the drachma to converge with its conversion rate, which was set at 340.75 GRD/€ (3.5% revaluation) in January 2000. Shortly after, an application was filed to assess Greece’s prospective accession to EMU,

116 Michalis Psalidopoulos which was approved in June 2000 during the summit held in Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal. The public deficit had dropped to 1.9% of GDP in 1999, and inflation was 2.1%, according to the information available at the time. Furthermore, the criteria on the downward trend of the public debt and a reduction in interest rates were met. Besides, 10-year Treasury bond interest rates had fallen from 17% in 1995 to 6.3% in 1999. So, it was decided to fully integrate Greece into the Eurozone and irrevocably set the drachma conversion rate to the new European currency. On 1 January 2001, we successfully began the drachma’s change-over to the euro; on 1 January 2002 the drachma was withdrawn and replaced by euro banknotes and coins.

In Lieu of a Conclusion The country’s experience within EMU to date has been one of high rates of growth, followed by a deceleration aggravated by the international economic crisis. Key economic indicators have deviated from Community averages, growth rates are declining and youth unemployment is persistent. Today, 50 years after the EEC association agreement, the Greek economy has changed radically and so have the other European economies. Problems have been solved, but rigidities have been reproduced. There has been growth and prosperity, but new poverty has also emerged. Greece is certainly no longer the distressed economy of the past, but will bequeath serious economic problems to the next generation, mainly in terms of employment. If one thing strikes any observer of our country’s economic progress over the years since its association with/accession to the EEC/EU, it is that for long periods of time there was an ambivalence vis-à-vis European trends towards unification. During such periods, Greek economic policy followed its own ‘internal’ paths, avoiding broader, pro-European commitments that would perhaps bring the country to the forefront of developments and decisions. Early association with the EEC was a good omen, a comparative advantage for the Greek economy that has been only partially capitalised on. A considerable part of the industrial base failed to make investments in productive infrastructure in time. As a result, it turned into commercial capital over time, unless it opted for privileged partnerships with the state. Political parties, on the other hand, brought their voters together around simplified ideas about Europe, or made ‘ideological

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use’ of the European concept. The simple citizen stands in awe before the issues emerging from the EU’s expansion and the new political realities. It is high time that their concerns became a force for intervention and the joint shaping of politics, replacing the current management and the lack of any plan to solve our current economic problems.

Greek Liberalism in the Twentieth Century: Dilemmas of Research∗

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

There is a strange imbalance in the historiography on the political forces of twentieth-century Greece: whereas the Left has been extensively studied, research on the forces of Greek liberalism is far from adequate (see among others Hering, 2004; Diamantopoulos, 1985; Mavrogordatos & Chatziiossif, 1992; Alivizatos, 1996; Alivizatos, 1991; Hatzivassilou, 2003; Tzermias, 2007). Scholars have mostly turned their attention to the political practice of the Greek liberal forces, mainly their decisions and policies on democratic reform, economic development or the European option. This is understandable: these forces held power and thus determined the course of Greek history. However, their decisions were linked with fundamental ideological orientations, which also need to be studied.

Contemporary Liberalism as a Political Agenda It is important to start with an effort to define the terms. This article will not discuss the theoretical basis of liberalism, but will focus on its evolution as a political strategy. Often in the literature a distinction is made between ‘conservatism’ and ‘liberalism’ as opposing ideological currents. This differentiation derives from the political traditions of Western and Northern European countries, as well as of the US, and has different meanings according to the period under examination; indeed, in the US the term ∗

Liberal Emphasis 39, April-May-June 2009. This article is based on a speech given by Dr Evanthis Hatzivassiliou at an event organised by the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy in Thessaloniki, on 29 May 2009.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_12, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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120 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou ‘liberal’ today still retains a left-wing flavour. However, the clash between conservatives and liberals is a cleavage referring to a previous era, namely the period from the end of the eighteenth century up to 1914. It is less relevant for the period after the Great Depression and the Second World War, two cataclysmic events which swept aside the old conservatism and led to the advent of a new liberal centre-right. After the Great Depression (for Europe after 1945) a new model of capitalist-liberal organisation emerged, which focused on the role of state intervention in a free economy, aiming to ensure economic development and a larger measure of social justice. This model, dominant in the West until the second oil crisis in 1979–81, led to a ‘reformed capitalism’, which managed to cope with the mounting challenges of the post-war era, including the ideological conflict with Soviet Communism (Leffler, 2000, p. 57). In other words, after the 1930s, the capitalist-liberal model sought legitimisation through the employment of new strategies on the social and economic levels. Thus, in the post-war European centre-right, there was a convergence between the older conservative trends (most of them discredited because of their inability to cope with the crisis of the 1930s) and a new socially oriented liberal reformism, within the wider context of the free economy. After its severe electoral defeat in 1945, the British Conservative Party enriched its platform with state intervention and social considerations (the absence of which, following the party’s neglect of the Beveridge Report, had proved so costly); it thus achieved a political hegemony which, with short intervals, lasted until the advent of Tony Blair’s New Labour. However, it was in this same Conservative Party that the ‘more liberal’ strategy of Margaret Thatcher emerged in the late 1970s, when the limits of the interventionist state had become apparent (Hennessy, 2006; Sked & Cook, 1988). The West German Christian Democrats – an evolution of the preHitler Zentrum – offered the concept of the ‘social market’ (Lacquer, 1982, pp. 216–220; Hallett, 1990). The French Christian Democrats (but also the Gaullists) accepted the idea of economic planning, which opened the way for the advent of Jean Monnet to the forefront of European affairs and European integration. These examples are indicative of the pragmatic nature of the centre-right: within the wider liberal context, it is possible to opt for governmental strategies which emphasise different mixtures of policies or a different level of state intervention, depending on the nature of the problems of each society or era.

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After 1945 political conservatism in Europe had little electoral influence. The major forces of the centre-right displayed specific characteristics and orientations and a specific political methodology, which allow for their inclusion in a completely different category. At any rate, it is important to keep in mind that, despite sharing a non-dogmatic political culture, these parties were still distinguished by minor differences, arising out of their differing national cultures or social traditions. In this respect, it is better for the scholar of the post-war years to avoid entanglement in an outdated ‘conflict’ between conservatism and liberalism, which refers to a previous era. In contemporary political history, liberalism is not the theory of an avant-garde, or of the few members of an imagined (and socially rather isolated) elite. Such a concept would turn liberalism into a mere appendix of the Right, and would neglect the wide dissemination of its agendas, as well as its emphasis on new social references. Thus, I will insist that the term ‘liberalism’ describes all the political forces which implemented a policy based on the preference for (not the simple acceptance of) a system based on a free economy, accompanied by a multi-party representative democracy.

A Greek Diversion? There is a degree of Greek exceptionalism in all this. Since the years of Ottoman domination, the development of political ideas in the Greek world was influenced by the teachings of the Enlightenment and the American and the French Revolutions; this was only natural for an ethnic community seeking liberation from foreign rule. Leaving aside the discussion about the ideological bases of the radical Greek constitutions during the War of Independence of the 1820s, one needs to note that the independent Greek kingdom which finally emerged in 1830 displayed a notable tendency towards progressive political ideas. Although its social and economic backwardness often caused confusion for the implementation of the liberal agenda, Greece had its successful constitutional revolution in 1843, several years before the European experience of 1848. Furthermore, the country lacked an aristocracy on the Western or Central European pattern, namely a group of people anxious to preserve privileges and capable of restricting the move towards greater political participation. Note, for example, that universal male suffrage was already in place in the mid-1840s and became

122 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou a constitutional provision in 1864. Discussing the notion of ‘bourgeois radicalism’ in the early twentieth century, a leading scholar of the Greek political parties pointed out that With the term ‘radical’ we do not mean that, which in European countries is taken to be radical after the French Revolution. In comparison with the democratic radicalism of Central and Western Europe, all Greek political parties (with the exception of some minor groupings) were radical on the issues of the constitution and citizens’ rights. Popular sovereignty, universal male suffrage and a singlechamber Parliament, equality, political freedom and the parliamentary system were included in their programmatic principles, and formed – as an exception in Europe – the indisputable foundation of the political system. Thus, the demands of bourgeois radicalism in Greece referred to the effectiveness of the political system and mostly the public administration, to the realization of constitutional rights, and to the socioeconomic system; it called for radical reforms for the modernization of the state and the society, and for the undoing of wrongs, on the basis of the aforementioned principles, not in the context of a different state of affairs. (Hering, 2004, vol. 2, pp. 746–747)

This fundamentally liberal tendency of the Greek political system and of its major political forces (an almost universal phenomenon until the emergence of a Communist Party and the two dictatorships of the interwar years) is a guideline for the analysis. Thus, under the term ‘liberal forces’ one needs to include both the ‘Venizelist’ and the ‘anti-Venizelist’ parties of 1915 to 1936, as well as the forces of the post-war Centre and the Right. Differences existed between them. For example major cleavages appeared between royalists and republicans, especially in the interwar years. Some of these forces were ‘more’ progressive than others. The fervent reformism of Venizelism in 1910–32 is correctly compared to a fear of change often displayed by the anti-Venizelists. On the other hand, in many respects the post-war Centre, nostalgic for the ‘aristocratic’ Republic of the interwar years, was much more static compared to the boldly reformist post-war centre-right. Still, the common element of the acceptance of the fundamental principles of liberalism remains. In Greece, the post-war model of ‘reformed capitalism’ was broadly acceptable both to the Centre and the new centre-right (after the foundation of Alexander Papagos’ Greek Rally in 1951), but found its pre-eminent expression in the governments of Konstantinos Karamanlis (1907–98), the

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major leader of the contemporary Greek centre-right.1 A recent study describes this model as ‘liberal eclecticism’, putting the emphasis on a developmental strategy based on ‘surgical’ state intervention in the economy (Kazakos, 2001, pp. 171–172). Another study refers to ‘realistic liberalism’ (Psalidopoulos, 1994). Karamanlis himself would finally, in 1979, offer a term to describe it, which would find its way into the party documents of New Democracy: ‘radical liberalism’, referring precisely to the establishment of a mixed economy. Still, there was an element of irony in all of this: Karamanlis used the term at the first party congress of May 1979, exactly at the time when the new oil crisis and ‘stagflation’ were about to lead to a change in liberal strategies internationally. It fell to New Democracy, then, to adjust to an era of new challenges, new agendas and new concepts. Still, the post-war employment of the strategy of ‘liberal eclecticism’ proved substantially successful. In 1955–63 major steps were taken in the field of economic development: the economy grew on average at 6% annually, ending the perennial problem of Greece’s underdevelopment; agriculture was mechanised and modernised; a mild form of industrialisation was achieved and tourism grew enormously. After 1959, a Five-Year Development Plan was successfully implemented for the first time in Greece’s history. This was combined with a fundamental orientation to Europe: Greece became the first country to become an associated member of the EEC in 1961. Although an effort to modernise the Constitution was blocked in 1963 by a strange combination of the Crown, the Centre and the Communist-led Left (and Karamanlis was forced to resign and eventually depart from the country), Karamanlis effected a major constitutional revision in 1975, after he had returned to lead the transition to democracy, following the collapse of the 1967–74 military dictatorship. In 1979 the Treaty of Accession of Greece to the European Communities was signed. In addition to the spectacular successes of the second half of the 1970s at institutional or European levels, emphasis has to be placed on the importance of the developmental strategies of the 1950s and 1960s, which created the economic and social basis for the stable, European democracy of the 1970s.

1

Karamanlis led the National Radical Union (ERE) in 1956–63 and New Democracy (ND) in 1974–80; in both periods he also held the premiership.

124 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou Problems of Research and Methodology Apart from theoretical and notional challenges, the student of Greek liberal political forces faces an additional set of problems. As always, stereotypes form a major obstacle. The first stereotype arises from the fact in Greece that there was a political group called the ‘Liberal Party’, which had been the instrument of Venizelist reform in 1910–20 and 1928–32, and until 1961 was the major force of the Centre. Many conclude that, as a result, all other parties were not liberal. This is the obvious problem of the existence of Liberals (with a capital initial, the members of the specific party) and liberals, who could belong to other political groups. This distinction becomes even more important for the post-war years, exactly because it is often used in order to ‘prove’ that the centre-right was not liberal. To be sure, this is not an exclusively Greek phenomenon: the existence of a Liberal Party creates a similar problem in other countries as well. However, the use of this argument, in the context of an ‘anti-right syndrome’, seems to be significantly more intense in Greece. Still, research cannot be limited by stereotypes. Even during the post1915 National Schism both the Venizelists (the Liberal Party) and the anti-Venizelists (the People’s Party), were liberal. For the Liberal Party this was, more or less, obvious, and Eleftherios Venizelos’ governments in 1910–20 and 1928–32 provided the first wave of liberal reform in twentiethcentury Greece. But even the anti-Venizelists identified their ideology with this term. The anti-Venizelist leader, Dimitrios Gounaris – sadly executed, together with the leadership of the People’s Party in 1922 – made his name as a member of the pre-Venizelist radical ‘Group of the Japanese’. ‘I am sincerely democratic and liberal’, Gounaris’ successor in the party’s leadership, Panayis Tsaldaris, wrote to none other than the exiled King George II on 27 August 1935 (quoted in Kitsikis, 1981, p. 57), expressing a widely held belief of the ‘era of the dictators’, namely that a constitutional monarchy was a more stable form of parliamentary democracy. George Pesmazoglou, a prominent figure of the People’s Party, wrote to the next leader, Constantinos Tsaldaris, in December 1941:

Greek Liberalism in the Twentieth Century: Dilemmas of Research 125 I have always followed, without deviation, the line which Gounaris drew, when in June 1913 he asked me to participate in his party: totally liberal and progressive, always based on the absolute respect for popular sovereignty.2

The two groupings of the Greek National Schism disagreed on many things: the strategy for the realisation of national territorial claims (the Venizelists always being in favour of a more aggressive policy); the position, or the very existence, of the Crown; the organisation of the state and the directions of economic policy (the Venizelists were, on the whole, more ready to accept state intervention in the economy) (see among others Mavrogordatos, 1983). But it would be incorrect to suggest that one was ‘liberal’ and the other ‘anti-liberal’. This of course does not mean that all their members were indeed liberals. For example, the two Greek dictators of the interwar years (Theodore Pangalos of the Venizelists and Ioannis Metaxas of the anti-Venizelists) were not liberal at all; but after they had imposed their dictatorships, they both faced the hostility of their former political allies. The second stereotype involves the tense party disputes during the largest part of the century. For many analysts, this phenomenon is sufficient to prove that these parties were representatives of fundamentally opposing views regarding society and politics. Again, the National Schism is the most impressive relevant event: its memory could easily be revived when a political force wished to raise tensions. During periods of fierce polarisation, in 1932–36 and in 1961–67 (both times the country ended up under a dictatorship), the fundamental ideological convergence between the liberal forces (parliamentarianism, economic development, Europe), was neglected, in order to project the picture of a fight between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and of a conflict of ‘worlds’, which in reality was neither fundamental nor unbridgeable. However, even at that time sober analysts tended to question such Manichean interpretations. In 1956, the leading liberal (and centrist) analyst, George Theotokas, noted that, although the Centre and the Right were two different ‘worlds’, if one sought ‘clear ideological differences between them’, one would not find them; there were only differences of ‘climate’ (Theotokas, 1996). In other words, the scholar must move beyond a simple emphasis on the phenomenon of party conflict. Two parties could clash,

2

Pesmazoglou to C. Tsaldaris, 15 December 1941, Constantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation (Athens), C. Tsaldaris Archive, File 4/2.

126 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou but this, in itself, does not suggest that it was impossible for both to be liberal. The defence of the regime presents a problem of a different magnitude. During the twentieth century, all forces of Greek liberalism accepted this need. Thus, in the interwar years the Alexander Papanastasiou government passed legislation against the supporters of the exiled King (i.e. the antiVenizelists); a little later anti-Communist measures were adopted, most notably Law 4229/1929, by the Eleftherios Venizelos government. During the Civil War of the late 1940s the Communist Party was outlawed and such legislation became infinitely harsher, under a Great Coalition of the Liberal and the People’s Party which prevailed over the Communists in that conflict. However, the phenomenon of the defence of the regime was not exclusively Greek; anti-Communist measures were a widespread practice in interwar Europe, at a time when the Great War and the Russian Revolution had shaken the confidence of the parliamentary democracies (see, among others, Mazower, 1997). Anti-Communist policies were pursued after 1945 even in Western European countries which had not gone through the experience of a civil war against the Communist Party. At any rate, such measures, including the excesses of their implementation, entailed a compromise of the liberal ideology which an honest scholar must note. But a party’s espousal of liberal ideology cannot be taken to mean that it would not defend the political and social system. Often in Europe liberal forces proved more efficient – sometimes even more fervent – in the defence of parliamentary democracy against its enemies. Another problem involves the loose organisation – one could even refer to an ‘anarchical’ structure – of the liberal world, which always rejected dogmatism and unquestioned authority. At the end of the day, it is easy to study the Left (especially the Communist Left, which possesses a rigid hierarchy and an obligatory theory, the dogma). The liberal world is not like that. It is pragmatic and outward-looking: it can be expressed by different political parties; it is certainly expressed by a variety of schools of thought. No analyst, no school of thought and no political team ever acquired – and should not acquire – full control over its ideological development. Thus, an enormous volume of research is required in order to establish a satisfactory picture of the variety of ideas within this large liberal space. It is not enough to locate one analyst, one group of leaders, one theory. Those which will be located (and they will be many) must be evaluated by the scholar, who always needs to keep in mind their non-dogmatic nature, and the need

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to assess their relative interdependence and the intensity of their influence. Additionally, the scholar needs to evaluate the interactive nature of the relationship between a liberal movement and society. In other words, precisely because the liberal ideological current is pragmatic and nondogmatic, it evolves in time. This is one of the most difficult aspects of a study of liberal forces.

References Alivizatos, N. K. (1996). Introduction. In George Theotokas, thoughts and positions: Political texts, Vol. A (1925–1949) (in Greek). Athens: Hestia. Diamantopoulos, T. (1985). Venizelism: Vol. 1, Reformist Venizelism (in Greek). Athens: Α. Ν. Sakkoulas. Hallett, G. (1990). West Germany. In Graham, A., & Seldon, A. (Eds.) (1990). Government and economies in the postwar world: Economic policies and comparative performance, 1945–85 (pp. 79–103). London and New York: Routledge. Hatzivassiliou, Ev. (2003). Greek Liberalism at the crossroads: The ‘Socialite’ phase, 1934–1944 (in Greek). Athens: Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy and I. Sideris Publications. Hennessy, P. (2006). Having it so good: Britain in the fifties. London: Allen Lane. Hering, G. (2004). Political parties in Greece, 1821–1936 (in Greek; 2 vols.). Athens: MIET. Kazakos, P. (2001). Between the state and the market: Economy and economic policy in postwar Greece, 1944–2000 (in Greek). Athens: Patakis. Kitsikis, D. (1981). History of the Greek–Turkish space, 1928–1973 (in Greek). Athens: Hestia. Laqueur, W. (1982). Europe since Hitler: The rebirth of Europe. New York: Penguin. Leffler, M. P. (2000). Bringing it together: The parts and the whole. In Westad, O. A. (Ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, interpretations, theory. London: Frank Cass. Liberalism in Greece: Liberal theory and practice in the politics and society of Greece (in Greek). Athens: Hestia (1991). Mavrogordatos, G. T. (1983). Stillborn Republic: Social coalitions and party strategies in Greece, 1922–1936. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mavrogordatos, G. T., & Chatziiossif, C. (Eds.) (1992). Venizelism and bourgeois modernism (in Greek). Herakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis. Mazower, M. (Ed.) (1997). The policing of politics in the twentieth century: Historical perspectives. Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

128 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou Psalidopoulos, M. (1994). Panayis Papaligouras’ ‘Realistic Liberalism’ and the economic policy of the period 1952–67. In Greek society in the early postwar period (in Greek; pp. 376–381). Athens: Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation. Sked, A., & Cook, C. (1988). Post-war Britain: a political history. London: Penguin. Theotokas, G. (1996). The candidates (1956). In George Theotokas, thoughts and positions: Political texts (in Greek; vol. 2, pp. 744–755). Tzermias, P. N. (2007). Konstantinos Karamanlis’ ‘Radical Liberalism’: A dialectic search guided by social justice (in Greek). Athens: I. Sideris.

Small States in World War II: The Greek Example∗

George Th. Mavrogordatos

It is often said that the history of wars and other conflicts is written by the winning side. (This may not be always true, but it is certainly true of World War II.) What is almost never identified as a problem, however, is something else: that the history of wars is written from the perspective of the major powers participating in the conflict – the Great Powers, to use a somewhat antiquated term. Small or, in any event, smaller states receive scant attention, either as mere pawns or, at most, as opportunities for action (or inaction) by the Great Powers. This is true of the historiography even when Great Power propaganda at the time had magnified the aggression and destruction befalling a small state. Remember, for example, the “rape” of Belgium in World War I. Was the avoidance or, rather, the postponement of war in 1938 worth Czechoslovakia? Conversely, was Poland worth starting the war in 1939? Was the German attack on Norway provoked by British moves? This is the sort of question that is still being debated in the endless stream of studies that keep appearing on World War II. Normally, you have to be a Czech, a Pole, or a Norwegian to go beyond this level of abstraction and examine the concrete experience of the particular country – very often at the risk of forgetting or even ignoring the larger picture. What appears even more parochial is that historians and informed citizens immersed in the wartime history of their own small country typically show no interest whatsoever in the comparable experiences of other small states, which they keep ignoring blissfully. The Greeks, for example, are ∗

This was the Annual Constantine Karamanlis Lecture at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on 22 October 2009.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K.E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-12374-0_13, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

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130 George Th. Mavrogordatos prone to regard their own successful resistance against Italian aggression (to be celebrated on 28 October) as a unique case of David facing Goliath. They are totally unaware of the earlier case of David facing Goliath, which had moved and mobilised world public opinion a year previously. That was the so-called Winter War of 1939–40 between Finland and the Soviet Union – similar in many ways to the so-called Albanian War of 1940–41 between Greece and Italy. The experience of small states in World War II is no mere academic question. Nor is it only a matter of fairness or “justice” in the study and the use of history. The traumatic memories of World War II have affected in the most concrete and lasting way the postwar politics and especially the foreign policy of practically every small state in Europe. Erstwhile neutral countries became and remain the staunchest pillars of NATO: Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium. Of course, in Western Europe the linkage between current policy and the bitter lessons of the War may no longer be perceived. This is why there appears to be so much surprise and incomprehension among older NATO and EU member states over the long-delayed reactions on the part of smaller countries for which the War actually ended only with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among them, Poland stands out, with its obsessive commemoration of the Katyn massacre after many years of repressed memory. Even in Finland wartime experiences can be evoked and celebrated freely at last, after several decades of debilitating “Finlandisation” and concomitant self-censorship. In other words, the experience of small states in World War II is not yet merely a matter of historical record. It may provide, nonetheless, useful historical material for the study of “small-state diplomacy,” in which there is a growing interest. What were the options for small states in Europe on the eve of the War? A few (like Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary) had reasons to jump on the Axis bandwagon. Otherwise, the most “natural” choice for a small state was neutrality. The other option was reliance on military alliances and on the guarantees offered by Great Powers. In the end, and in most cases, neither option provided effective protection against German aggression. Neutrality was not only brutally violated by Germany on the flimsiest of pretexts. It had also induced previously a lack of military preparedness, which was perhaps most bitterly felt in the case of Norway. Only Swiss

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neutrality was backed by an elaborate military system of defence, which may have proved effective as a deterrent (in conjunction with other factors). A far more bitter experience than the violation of neutrality by a notoriously unlawful regime was the brutal destruction of all the hopes and trust invested in alliances and Great Power guarantees. This was the experience first of the Czechs, sold out in 1938 despite their impressive military preparedness. Then of the Poles, fooled to the last by the outright lies of the French general staff promising that the French army would invade Germany two weeks after the start of the war. In this context, special mention should be made of Belgium, which wavered between the two options of alliance or neutrality in the most disastrous manner. It abandoned its alliance with France and opted for neutrality in 1937 in the naïve hope that it would not become a battlefield again. In 1940, however, its neutrality affected adversely Allied military planning and thereby contributed considerably to the swift German victory. When the day of reckoning eventually came, small states again had two options: either to submit without a fight or to go down fighting. In each specific case, the choice was dictated by the country’s historical traditions and memories, geography, particular circumstances, but also by the mentality or sheer quality of its leadership. I would like to argue that there was also an existential aspect involved: the sense that a historic nation would preserve its honour and self-esteem only if it went down fighting – rather than surrender. Listen to Winston Churchill speaking to the assembled members of his government on 28 May 1940: “If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground!” 1 French Colonel de Larminat, before joining the Free French of General de Gaulle, had been arrested on 28 June 1940 for declaring: “If we have to perish, we’ll perish on our feet!” 2

1

2

The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–45, edited by Ben Pimlott (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 28n. This is a (probably later) “marginal insertion” by Dalton. The first version was less gory: “If at last the long story is to end, it were better it should end, not through surrender, but only when we are rolling senseless on the ground.” Raoul Aglion, Roosevelt and de Gaulle (New York: Free Press, 1988), p. 5. It is quite remarkable that a French aristocratic officer like de Larminat would echo the famous statement by the Spanish communist Dolores Ibarruri, during the Spanish Civil War, that it is better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.

132 George Th. Mavrogordatos In Greece, one month before the German attack, the conservative editor George A. Vlachos published a dramatic open letter to Hitler. Its ending referred to the land which “having once taught the entire world how to live, must now also teach it how to die.” 3 One might even speak here of an existential wager: the belief that, in the long run, a nation had a better chance of eventual rebirth and survival if it went down fighting. This existential wager was made first by the Finns, then by the Poles, then by the Norwegians (or most of them), and eventually by the Greeks. Among small European states, Greece was the last to be attacked (together with Yugoslavia) and the very last to be occupied by the Axis powers. Since 1936, the country had been under the strictly personal dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas. Despite all the trappings and the theatrics in imitation of fascist Italy and nazi Germany, this was not a fascist regime, except, perhaps, in a prospective sense: the compulsory youth organisation EON was supposed to become, eventually, the fascist party that the country lacked. Until then, there was no party, nor even a recognisable ruling elite. There was only Metaxas and a handful – literally a handful – of trusted cronies. A brilliant military mind, it was he who had started preparing the country for war ever since he came to power. It was also he who chose (all by himself, without consulting anyone) to reject the perfunctory Italian ultimatum in the early hours of 28 October 1940. Alors, c’est la guerre, he told the hapless Italian ambassador. But the press and public opinion immediately opted for a single word: “No!” (OXI). Ever since then, those politically opposed to Metaxas have sought to deny his freedom of choice and, thereby, deprive him of the glory for OXI and for the ensuing victory over the Italians. Purely hypothetical and completely undocumented, these arguments are not worth discussing at length here. Suffice it to note that the rejection of the Italian ultimatum was not a precipitate or sudden decision, as these arguments assume. This was one of the most considered and calculated decisions in Modern Greek history. Consequently, though the very opposite of a charismatic personality, Metaxas emerges as a great war leader, especially when compared to his contemporaries – in Greece or elsewhere in Europe.

3

Kathimerini, 8 March 1941.

Small States in World War II: The Greek Example 133

Two days after the start of the war, on 30 October 1940, Metaxas addressed the assembled editors of Athenian newspapers, seeking to ensure their genuine support for the war effort. He explained that he had sought to preserve Greek neutrality and to keep the country out of the war. With this aim, he had secretly appealed to Berlin. He had been made to understand that Greece would be spared only if it accepted willingly its territorial “amputation” to the benefit of Bulgaria and Italy. Such a sellout inevitably would split the nation in a repetition of the National Schism during World War I – a repetition that he was intent on preventing. After the unprovoked Italian aggression, Greece’s natural ally was Britain, commanding the seas. The struggle would be long, and Greece might even be occupied (“enslaved”) provisionally. Nevertheless, he was confident that the “AngloSaxon world” would eventually prevail. At the end of the ordeal which was just beginning, Greece would find itself among the victors, augmented at least by the Dodecanese (then under Italian rule).4 This set of predictions was to prove absolutely correct, down to the last detail. The Dodecanese was indeed the only territorial gain of Greece out of the War. To the last, Metaxas wisely resisted the premature dispatch of token British forces, which would precipitate a German attack while being insufficient to repel it. He was proved right by what was to happen in April 1941, when the combined Greek and British military effort ended up merely aiming at the safe departure of the British forces. They were insufficient to repel the German offensive and, subsequently, to defend Crete. Had they remained in North Africa, however, they would have been quite sufficient to finish off the Italians there, long before Rommel could come to their rescue. Unlike his great opponent Venizelos, Metaxas was eventually favoured by the gods – to use a classic ancient formula. He died at the height of his glory, as a revered national leader, on 29 January 1941. His death caused unbelievable shock and grief among the Greeks, especially the frontline troops – unbelievable, that is, if we did not have a mass of evidence for it, both visual and textual. Everybody felt that this death was creating a void which was impossible to fill. There is no way of knowing how Metaxas would have faced the coming German onslaught in April 1941. His timely death also spared him any discussion of his responsibility for what was to follow. It is here that it 4

For the full text see his published Diary, vol. 4, pp. 520–526.

134 George Th. Mavrogordatos becomes most relevant to recall that Greece was the very last country to be occupied by the Axis. Several other smaller countries had been overrun and occupied more than a year earlier, providing a wealth of instructive precedents. In most cases, the head of state and the legitimate government had left the occupied country and were hosted by the British in London. From there, they were continuing the war with all the armed forces that had managed to escape (mostly naval) plus those being formed on the spot. In the occupied countries themselves, an extremely complex interaction was developing between the occupiers, their indigenous collaborators, the state bureaucracy (including the police), the resistance movement(s), and the representatives of the government-in-exile, which had typically been broadened to become a government of “national unity” including all or almost all political parties. None of this seems to have concerned or interested Metaxas in the least. While proving himself a great war leader, he remained nonetheless at the same time a very small man: petty, egocentric, perennially insecure, distrustful, suspicious, and even paranoid. Only in the armed forces did Metaxas allow the reinstatement of select Republican officers among those cashiered following their abortive coup in 1935. Although appearing petty and vindictive, he may have been quite correct in rejecting a wholesale reinstatement of such politicised officers, as the subsequent mutinies among the Greek armed forces in the Middle East were to show. Otherwise, he never even contemplated the slightest broadening of his regime, which remained a strictly personal dictatorship as before. There was no deputy and no designated successor. There were no contingency plans of any kind, even though Metaxas had explicitly predicted that the country would find itself occupied (“enslaved”) temporarily. What was to happen then? On the part of the dictator and his government there is not the slightest indication of any preparation. There may be two explanations, neither of which amounts to a justification. One might be the fear that, at a time of sweeping enthusiasm and martial delusions, any such planning would have been considered “defeatist” and would have sapped morale. Nevertheless, the standard practice of sealed envelopes containing contingency instructions should have been sufficient to alleviate such fears. The other explanation lies entirely in the psychopathology of Metaxas. Prone to depression and deep fatalism, he apparently sensed that his own end was approaching, and lamented that

Small States in World War II: The Greek Example 135

nothing would be left of his regime. Consequently, for him it was meaningless to prepare and/or designate a successor, or otherwise plan for the situation that would follow his death. A person who had always relished responsibility ended up subscribing in effect to the motto Après moi, le déluge! Accordingly, upon the death of Metaxas, things began to unravel and eventually to fall apart. Totally unprepared, King George II was incapable even of finding a new prime minister, apart from two successive bankers (first Korizis, then Tsouderos) – a ludicrous choice in such an emergency. At one point, he was even forced to serve as prime minister himself! The only contingency planning had been done by the Navy. Its ferocious chief of staff Admiral Alexander Sakellariou implemented it with an iron fist. Thanks essentially to him, most of the fighting ships managed to sail safely to Alexandria in Egypt. In sharp contrast, the Army was essentially abandoned to its fate. As the Germans were approaching Athens, its chief of staff General Alexander Papagos decided that this was the right moment to resign his command and go home. Earlier, the generals at the front had disobeyed him and the king and had signed an armistice with the Germans, safeguarding both officers and enlisted men from the indignity and hardship of captivity as POWs. The same group of generals subsequently agreed to form the first government under Axis occupation. Although freely used, the epithet “Quisling” is hardly appropriate in their case. These were, after all, the leaders of a victorious army that had defeated the Italians. They had the most honorable of intentions: to benefit primarily their ex-soldiers and to protect the territorial integrity of Greece even in defeat. Metaxas had wanted to lead a united Greece into World War II, avoiding a repetition of the National Schism. His own heavy responsibility for that conflict burdened him in his very last days, as his diary entry for 5 January 1941 reveals. In the end, however, he failed dismally. More than previous wars, World War II became a test not only of military resources, but also of the legitimacy and solidity of political regimes. This is because several small countries were under enemy occupation in their entirety for an extended period – something unprecedented in Europe at least since the Napoleonic era. In this respect, the War may also be regarded as a rich quasi-laboratory for the political scientist. In a case such as Norway, for example, king and government-in-exile continued the war from London, keeping essentially intact their legitimacy

136 George Th. Mavrogordatos in the occupied country, despite Quisling and his thugs. At the end of the war, it was enough for the king and government to return to Oslo for the restoration of the interrupted constitutional order to be complete. In sharp contrast, Greece entered the War with a king who was unacceptable even to some royalists because of his responsibility for the dictatorship. Greece also entered the War with a regime that was not only illegitimate and authoritarian, but also so literally personal that it was bound to vanish after the death of the dictator. Metaxas had prepared the country militarily but not politically for what was to follow his OXI. For other small European states, like the Netherlands for example, enemy occupation merely signified a power vacuum, in the sense that the legitimate government was prevented from exercising power in the country. In Greece, however, the Axis occupation reactivated and exacerbated a far more noxious generalised crisis of legitimacy which had been simmering since 1935.5 This opened the door to a protracted civil conflict which was very different from the one that Metaxas had imagined and had wished to avoid.

5

See my Stillborn Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), esp. pp. 337–349.

Index

A Abu Ghraib prison 67 Aden Gulf 36 Aegean Sea 87, 90 Afghanistan 36, 39, 40 Africa 39, 58 North Africa 133 Albanian War (Greek–Italian War) 130 Alexandria 135 Amsterdam Treaty 23, 56 Arctic Sea 53 Armenia 47, 50, 89 Ashton, Cathy 28 Asia 20, 36, 74, 78, Athens 99–101, 104–106, 115, 135 Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry (EVEA) 103 Atlantic Ocean 40, 42 Averof-Tossizza, Evangelos 101 Axis 130, 132, 134–136 Azerbaijan 47, 50 B Balkans 34, 36, 85–90, 92 Western Balkans 89 Baltic Sea 53

Baltic States 15 Barcelona 58 Barents Sea 53 Belarus 46, 47, 50, 52 Belgium 129–131 Berlin 133 Plus agreements 39 Wall 34, 86 West Berlin 100 Beveridge Report 120 Black Sea 52, 92 Blair, Tony 120 Britain. See United Kingdom British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 79 British East India Company 64 Brussels 27, 28, 39, 88, 90 Bulgaria 64, 87, 130, 133 Bush, George W. 77–79 C Canada 86 Cape Town 68 Carter, James 79 Caspian Sea 92 Central Europe 40, 121 Centre for Planning and Economic Research (KEPE) 103 Cherbourg 43

138 Index China 2, 73, 75, 78, 80, 81 Chinese 34, 80 Chinese–American Economic and Strategic Dialogue 34 Chinese–American relationship 34 Chinese Communist Party 74 Chisinau 48 Churchill, Winston J. 131 Clinton, William J. 78 Cold War 42, 64, 85–87, 94 Communism 16, 74, 86, 120, 126 Communist 100 Communist Party 74, 102, 122, 126 Communist system 34 Confucian 74, 76 Conservatives 23, 88, 120 Constitution 21, 75, 104, 121–124, 136 Cooper, Robert 19 Copenhagen United Nations Climate Change Conference 2 Crete 133 Crown 104, 123, 125 Cyprus 88, 90, 94, 95, 101, 104, 105, 112 Czech Republic 42 Czechoslovakia 100, 129 D De Gaulle, Charles 35, 97, 98, 131 Gaullists 120 De Larminat, Edgard 131 Denmark 9, 10, 98, 105, 130 Djibouti 39 Dodecanese 133 Dyncorp 67

E Eastern Europe 3, 6, 34, 42, 52, 86, 94, 109 Eastern Partnership 45, 51 Egypt 63, 92, 135 Enlightenment 121 Ergoğan, Recep Tayyip 89 Euratom 5 Eurobarometer 60 Europe European integration 5, 15, 20, 85, 88, 97, 103, 106, 120 European solidarity 5, 15 Europeanisation 93–96, 106 Europeans 34, 36, 41, 42, 86 Euroscepticism 35, 95, 103 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 98, 109 European People’s Party (EPP) 61 European People’s Party-European Democrats Group (EPP-ED Group) 50 European Union (EU), European Community (EC) 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 34, 36, 38–40, 42, 44–46, 56, 57, 88, 89 Black Sea Synergy 52 Charter of Fundamental Rights 23, 25, 57 CO2 Capture Transport and Storage Initiative 13 Commission 10, 15, 39, 46, 49–52, 58, 59, 88, 90, 96, 105, 112, 114 Commission’s Vice President 28 Commissioner 25, 29 Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 57, 58 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 97, 110

Index 139 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 20, 25, 29, 50 Common Market 15, 22, 48, 55, 96, 99–101, 103 Constitution 21, 75, 104, 121–124, 136 Council 15, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 39, 43, 50, 56–58, 96, 115 Council of Ministers 59 Court of Justice 55 Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) 36 Defence 20, 25, 29, 33, 35–43, 63, 76, 78, 91, 126, 131 Defence Agency 36, 42 Eastern policy 45 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 27, 109, 114–116 Elections 26, 27, 35, 59, 60, 102, 109 Energy Community 49 EUFOR Tchad military operation 38 EULEX operation in Kosovo 37 EU-Neighbourhood-East (EURONEST) 50 EU-Russia Common Spaces 53 European Coal and Steel Community 5 European Economic Community (EEC) 94–106, 109–113, 116, 123 European energy policy 5, 7–9, 14 European Investment Bank (EIB) 51, 110, 111, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 46, 47, 51, 52 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 33, 35 Eurozone 44, 116 External Relations Council 43 Framework Programme 11, 12

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 25, 43 Industrial Initiatives (EIIs) 13 Institute of Innovation and Technology 12 Member states 7, 20–24, 28, 29, 37–40, 41, 48–50, 52, 56–61, 109, 130 Military Staff 36, 65, 73 Neighbourhood Economic Community 48 Operation Atalanta 36, 39 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 98–100 Parliament 6, 15, 25, 27, 50, 57–61, 105, 122 President of the Council 43 Secretary of State for European Affairs 33 Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan) 13, 14 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 115 F Finland 15, 130 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 39, 86 France 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 47, 51, 61, 88, 98, 99, 104, 131 EU Presidency 41 French aluminium unit of Pechiney 104 French Christian Democrats 121 French Revolution 121, 122 G Georgia 36, 47, 49, 50 Geremek, Bronisław 45

140 Index Germany 34, 37, 40, 47, 80, 88, 104, 110, 130–132 East Germany 40, 80, 100 West German Christian Democrats 120 Giscard D’Estaing, Valéry 105 Gounaris, Dimitrios 124, 125 Great Coalition 126 Great Depression 1, 120 Great Power 129–131 Greece 3, 5–7, 9–11, 13, 15, 26, 63, 85–106, 109–116, 121–124, 130, 132–136 Bank of Greece 101, 111, 112, 115 General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) 103 Greek Civil War 101, 104, 126, 131 Greek Communist Party 102, 122, 126 Greek Communist Party of the Interior 102 Greek Constitution 104, 121–124, 136 Greek Industrial Association (SEV) 103 Greek National Schism 124, 125, 133, 135 Greek National Unity Government 112 Greek Parliament 91, 102, 104 Greek War of Independence 121 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 37, 87, 109, 110, 112–116 H Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans 92 Helsinki 38, 87, 90 Final Act 94 objectives 35

Hitler, Adolf 120, 132 HOT and MILAN missiles programmes 38 Hungary 100, 130 Hussein, Saddam 78 I Ibarruri, Dolores 131 Iliou, Ilias 102 India 2, 64, 78 Indian Ocean 36, 39 Intergovernmental conference (IGC) 19 Iran 43, 78 Iraq 35, 67, 69, 77, 78 Ireland 98, 105 Istanbul 89 Italy 51, 88, 130, 132, 133 J Jaguar missiles programme 38 Japan 73, 74, 76–78, 80, 81 Jordan 92 K Kaliningrad Oblast 46, 53 Kang Suk-ju 78 Karamanlis, Konstantinos 5, 16, 93–99, 103–106, 122, 123 Karamanlis, Kostas 88 Karatzas Committee 114 Kelly, James A. 78 Kennedy, John F. 97, 104 Khrushchev, Nikita 74 Kim Il-sung 74–76 Kim Jong-il 73, 75–78, 81 Kim regime 76, 78, 79 Kim Yong-ju 75 King George II 124, 135 King Paul 104

Index 141 Kitsikis, Nikos 102, 124 Korea Korean Peninsula 73, 75, 79, 80 Korean states 74 Korean War 74, 76 Korean Workers Party 74 See also North Korea South Korea Korizis, Alexander 135 Kosovo 37, 51 Kouchner, Bernard 33 L Laeken Declaration 21, 22 Leninism 75 Liberals 120, 124, 125 Libya 92 Lisbon Strategy 6, 8, 24, 57, 58, 61 Lisbon Treaty 2, 3, 6, 19, 20, 36, 43, 56–58, 62 London 98, 134, 135 Luxembourg 130 M Maastricht Treaty 19, 22, 26, 114 Macedonia 39, 85–87, 89–91 Malta 101 Markezinis, Spyros 99, 101 Marxism 75 Mediterranean countries 47, 59 Mediterranean Sea 92 Mediterranean Union 47 Metaxas, Ioannis 125, 132–136 Middle East 1, 20, 36, 58, 89, 92, 134 Milosevic, Slobodan 86 Moldova 46–50 Monnet, Jean 1, 120 Morin, Hervé 33 Moscow 51

N Nabucco Pipeline 15 Napoleonic era 135 National Radical Union (ERE) 123 National Youth Organization (EON) 132 Netherlands 130, 136 New Democracy, Nea Demokratia (ND) 61, 91, 93, 123 Non-governmental organisation (NGO) 38, 63 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 17, 36, 37, 39–41, 88, 91, 94, 95, 104, 130 NATO’s Headquarters in Kabul 41 Ocean Shield operation 36 Operation Althea in BosniaHerzegovina 38, 39 Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 39 Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) 41 North Korea 3, 20, 73–81 North Korean Regime 76, 77, 81 North Stream Pipeline 15 Northern Dimension (ND) 52, 53 Norway 52, 98, 129, 130, 135 O Obama, Barack H. 1, 10, 34, 89 Oslo 136 P Pangalos, Theodore 125 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 91, 95, 96, 113 Papagos, Alexander 99, 122, 135 Papaligouras, Panayis 101, 106

142 Index Papanastasiou, Alexander 126 Papandreou, Andreas 95, 103, 114 Papandreou, George 102 Papandreou, George A. 89 Pesmazoglou, George 124 Pesmazoglou, Ioannis 101 Pittsburgh Summit 34 Poland 7, 9–11, 15, 36, 40, 42, 45–47, 51, 129, 130 Portugal 96, 98, 116 Prague Declaration 47, 48, 50, 52 Prisoners of war (POWs) 135 Protopapadakis, Aristidis 101 Q Quai d’Orsay 43 Quisling, Vidkum 135, 136 R Research and development (R&D) 7, 11, 24, 42 Rhee, Syngman 74 Romania 87, 100, 130 Rommel, Erwin 133 Rompuy, Herman Van 28 Russia 11, 46, 50–53, 73, 78, 80, 81, 88, 89 Russian Revolution 126 S Sahara Desert 10 Saint-Malo 35, 38 Sakellariou, Alexander 135 Santa Maria da Feira 116 Scandinavian countries 59, 61 Schmidt, Helmut 105 Secretary of State for European Affairs 33 Serbia 87 Greater Serbia policy 86

Sierra Leone 68 Sino-American G-2 34 Skopje 90 Slovenia 87 Small and medium enterprises (SME) 50 Socialists 50, 89, 95, 96 Somalia 39 South Africa 68 South African Apartheid Regime 67 South Asia 20 South Korea 73, 78–81 Soviet 34, 40, 74, 75, 86, 100, 120, 130 Post-Soviet territory 46 Soviet-American condominium 34 Spain 40, 47, 96 Spanish Civil War 131 Stalin, Joseph 74 de-Stalinisation 74 Stalinism 74 Stalin’s regime 76 Stavridis, James G. 37, 41 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 37, 41 Sweden 51, 98 T Thatcher, Margaret 120 Theotokas, George 125 Thessaloniki 89, 119 Third World 85, 95, 104 Tiger helicopters 38 Tirana 91 Transall missiles programme 38 Treaties of Rome, Treaty of Rome 5, 97 Treaty of Accession of Greece to the European Communities 123

Index 143 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 78, 79 Triantis, S. 103 Tsaldaris, Constantinos 124, 125 Tsaldaris, Panayis 124 Tsouderos, Emmanuel 135 Turkey 28, 30, 49, 50, 52, 85, 87–91, 94, 95, 98, 101 U Ukraine 30, 46, 47, 49, 50 Orange Revolution 47 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 34 Soviet buffer zone 34 Soviet Communism 120 Soviet regime 74 Soviet Union 34, 74, 75, 86, 100, 130 Soviets 74 United Democratic Left (EDA) 102, 109 United Kingdom (Britain) 36, 40, 50, 64, 98, 99, 105, 109, 133 British Conservative Party 120 New Labour 120 United Nations (UN) 2, 69 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. See Copenhagen United States (US) 1, 2, 34, 37, 38, 64, 65, 69, 86, 88–90, 94, 95, 104 American allies 41

Pentagon 37 US-Japan anti-missile shield 78 V Venizelos, Eleftherios 124, 126, 133 Anti-Venizelist 122, 124–126 Liberal Party 124 Venizelist 122, 124–126 Vlachos, George A. 132 W Warsaw Pact 40 Washington 34, 87, 94, 104 West Anti-Westernism 95 Western countries 6, 86 Western Europe 97, 99–101, 105, 106, 122, 126, 130 Westphalian state 64 Winter War (Soviet-Finnish war) 130 World Trade Organization (WTO) 48 World War I, First World War, Great War 86, 89, 129, 133 World War II, Second World War 3, 5, 100, 120, 129, 130, 135 Y Yugoslavia 86, 100, 132