The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2009 (The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook Series)

The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook Series Series Editors: Constantine Arvanitopoulos Professor of International Relations at Panteion University General Director, Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Konstantina E. Botsiou Associate Professor of Modern History and International Politics at the University of Peloponnese Head of Publications, Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy 10, Vas. Sofias Ave. 10674 Athens Greece www.idkaramanlis.gr, [email protected]

The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute’s for Democracy Yearbook is a collection of essays on international politics from a European standpoint. Each volume reflects on events that marked the previous year and addresses the challenges ahead. Eminent political figures, academics, diplomats, journalists and professionals offer their views on diverse political, economic, social and ideological issues that shape contemporary political and social dynamics within and beyond state borders.

Constantine Arvanitopoulos

l

Konstantina E. Botsiou

Editors

The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2009

Editors Professor Constantine Arvanitopoulos Professor Konstantina E. Botsiou Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy 10, Vas. Sofias Ave. 10674 Athens Greece [email protected] [email protected]

ISSN 1868-2111 e-ISSN 1868-212x ISBN 978-3-642-00620-3 e-ISBN 978-3-642-00621-0 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-00621-0 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook Series Library of Congress Control Number: PCN applied for Published by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved # Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, Athens 2009 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: WMXDesign GmbH, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (www.springer.com)

Acknowledgments

This book is the result of collective work and commitment. We are indebted to Dr Birgit Leick and Gabriele Keidel at Springer for the support and encouragement they offered to this project. We also thank Martha Voyadji and the Communicative English editing team for the meticulous copyediting of the draft manuscript. We are grateful to Antigoni Kouvidi at the Department of Publications of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, for soliciting and reformatting original articles from the Institute’s quarterly journal Liberal Emphasis. Finally, we are deeply indebted to the scholars and policymakers, whose work is included in this volume, for their participation and contribution.

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Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Constantine Arvanitopoulos and Konstantina E. Botsiou Transforming South-East Europe: A Challenge for Smart Power . . . . . . . . . . 9 Dora Bakoyannis Greece–France: A New Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Nicolas Sarkozy The Czech Presidency of the European Union: A Return to Roots . . . . . . . . . 21 Mirek Topola´nek Quo Vadis, Europe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Wolfgang Schu¨ssel The ‘Promise’ of the Lisbon Treaty: A Critical Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Dimitris N. Chryssochoou Climate Change and Its Effects in Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Stavros Dimas Union for the Mediterranean, or Nicolas Sarkozy’s Voluntarism in International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Fre´de´ric Allemand Does Too Much Regulation Stifle Employment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Stefano Riela

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Contents

Greek Ideals in the American Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Paul Sarbanes The Miracle and the Defects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 George Th. Mavrogordatos Euro–Atlantic Relations Following the Election of Barack Obama in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Antonis Samaras The Forgotten Crisis: Rising Food Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Asteris Huliaras On the Road to Damascus: Towards a New European Policy on the Middle East? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Sotiris Roussos The Unrest of the 1960s: Common Grounds and Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Charalambos Papasotiriou The Return of Cultural Property to Its Countries of Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 George Anastassopoulos Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Contributors

Mr Fre´de´ric Allemand Senior researcher at the Foundation for Political Innovation, and Lecturer in EU Law at the Paris Institute of Political Studies Dr George Anastassopoulos President of the General Conference to UNESCO, Ambassador–Permanent Delegate of Greece to UNESCO and former Vice-President of the European Parliament Mrs Dora Bakoyannis Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic Dr Dimitris N. Chryssochoou Associate Professor of International Organization at Panteion University Mr Stavros Dimas European Union Commissioner for Environment Dr Asteris Huliaras Assistant Professor at the Geography Department of Harokopio University Dr George Th. Mavrogordatos Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens. Dr Charalambos Papasotiriou Associate Professor in International Relations at Panteion University Mr Stefano Riela Research fellow at the Fondazione Res Publica, Milan

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Contributors

Dr Sotiris Roussos Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations and Head of the Study Group for Middle East and Islamic Affairs of the University of Peloponnese Mr Antonis Samaras Minister of Culture of the Hellenic Republic Mr Paul Sarbanes Former US Senator Mr Nicolas Sarkozy President of the French Republic Dr Wolfgang Schu¨ssel Former Chancellor of Austria Mr Mirek Topola´nek Prime Minister of the Czech Republic

Abbreviations

CFSP CSIS EC ECJ EMU ESDP ETS EU FAO FYROM GDP ICOM IEA IGC ILO NATO OECD OPEC PfP PJCC QMV SAA UNESCO UN WFP

Common Foreign and Security Policy Center for Strategic and International Studies European Communities European Court of Justice European Monetary Union European Security and Defence Policy Emissions Trading Scheme European Union Food and Agriculture Organization Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gross Domestic Product International Council of Museums International Energy Agency Intergovernmental Conference International Labour Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organisation for European Co-operation and Development Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Partnership for Peace Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Quality Majority Voting Stabilisation and Association Agreement United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations World Food Programme

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Introduction Constantine Arvanitopoulos and Konstantina E. Botsiou

Europe at a Crossroads European unification has rested on a dual premise. One part was the effort of the European nations to consolidate peace by overcoming the nationalism which had twice drenched the continent in blood in the 20th century.1 War among West European states became unthinkable in the post-war era. The second part was the creation of a single European economy following the tremendous task of post-war reconstruction and recovery.2 Over the years the achievement of economic stability was matched by initiatives that aimed to render Western Europe competitive on a global scale. The creation of the European Union (EU) in the 1990s through the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997), and later Nice (2001), which successively revised the founding Treaties of Rome (1957), was largely a response to the challenge of globalisation.3 Integration ‘rejuvenated’ the nation state, thus creating the hybrid of the European welfare state, a mix of state-imposed stability and private initiative.4 Like its

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Sforza, C. (1936). Europe and the Europeans: Community: Report A study in historical psychology and international politics. London: George G. Harrap and Company. 2 Milward, A. S. (1984). The reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951. London: Routledge. Hogan, M. J. (1987). The Marshall plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3 Dyson, K., & Featherstone, K. (1999). The road to Maastricht: Negotiating economic and monetary union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace, W. (Ed.) (1990). The dynamics of European integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Serra, E. (1989). Il Rilancio dell’Europa e i Trattati di Roma. Brussels: Bruylant. Monnar, J., & Wessels, W. (Eds.) (2001). The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam. London: Continuum. Kenen, P. (1995). Moving beyond Maastricht. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On the difficulties in the ratification of the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, see Gerbet, P. (1999). La construction de l’Europe pp. 478–554. Paris: Imprimerie national E´ditions. 4 For a thorough analysis, see Milward, A. S. (2000). The European rescue of the nation-state pp. 21–45. London: Routledge. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 1 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_1, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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American counterpart, the European breed of capitalism became in the Cold War synonymous with peace, prosperity and security. Europe’s close dependence on Washington-sponsored transatlantic security enabled the rapid transition of Western Europe from the ruins of World War II to the spotlight of the enviable Western way of life. The policy of enlargement contributed to the creation of an all-inclusive integration project. It warded off criticism that the Community was an exclusive club of the privileged few. Thus, the European Union became a strong point of reference for political planning and economic growth, in particular for smaller and weaker countries. The 1970s were marked by the triple ‘northern’ accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark (1973),5 and the single accession of Greece (1981),6 which introduced the ‘southern’ wave, to be completed some years later by the membership of Spain and Portugal (1986).7 Sweden, Finland and Austria followed in 1995.8 All three waves added new perspectives to the integration process. The promotion of democracy became a salient feature of the unification agenda after the accession of the three countries that had suffered authoritarian rule: Spain, Portugal and Greece. At the same time, Brussels turned its attention to regional development by investing more resources and by shaping new policies for balancing the standard of living among the national economies, hence preparing them to join a single economic and monetary system. Above all, the ‘digestion’ of the British membership proved a major test for Europe’s economic and social structure.9 Charles de Gaulle’s double veto on Britain’s accession (1963, 1967)10 produced a legacy of continental European scepticism towards Britain, to be revisited later against Margaret Thatcher’s excessive capitalism. As Cold War bipolarity waned and globalisation redefined the way economics and politics were shaped, the

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O’Neill, Sir Con (2000). Britain’s entry into the European Community: Report by Sir Con O’Neill on the negotiations, 1970–1972. London: Whitehall History Publishing and Frank Cass. 6 Tsoukalis, L. (Ed.). (1979). Greece and the European community. Farnborough: Saxon House. Botsiou, K. E. (2002). Greece in the European Union: A historical account. In Greece in the European Union: The new role and the new agenda pp. 17–36. Athens, Brussels: EKEM/Greek Ministry of Press/European Commission. 7 Royo, S., & Manuel, P. C. (2004). Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The first fifteen years. London: Routledge. 8 Redmond, J. (1995). The 1995 enlargement of the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. Hansen, L., & Waever, O. (2002). European integration and national identity: The challenge of the Nordic states. London: Routledge. Gsto¨hl, S. (2002). Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the process of integration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 9 For Britain’s alternative European projects see Benoit, E. (1961). Europe at sixes and sevens: The common market, the free trade association and the United States. New York: Columbia University Press. Camps, M. (1964). Britain and the European Community 1955–1963. London: Oxford University Press. 10 Moravcsik, Choice for Europe pp. 159–237 and De Gaulle between grain and grandeur: The political economy of French EC policy, 1958–1970 p. 2, Journal of Cold War Studies, 2(3)(Fall 2000), 4–68. Bange, O. (2000). The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, De Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict pp. 27 ff . London: Macmillan.

Introduction

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process of integration was re-launched through the bold initiatives of Jacques Delors as President of the European Commission (1985–1995).11 In the second half of the 1980s Europe witnessed a much-celebrated ‘relance,’ starting with the return of the founding members, notably France, to European priorities.12 The revision of the EC’s institutional structure demonstrated the Community’s capacity for amalgamating diverse confessions of Keynesianism, such as the continental ‘orthodox’ paradigm of the mixed economy and the puritan capitalist credo of the Anglo-Saxons. It also confirmed the dynamic interaction between inter-governmentalism and supranationalism in shaping Europe. The European Council, which had been established in 1974, when unification was practically immobilised by oil and economic crises, was again recognised as a key actor of the decision-making process.13 The making of the European Union was a commitment to the free market, strict regulations for economic convergence within the EU as well as between the Union and the candidates for membership, higher economic contributions to security structures, and the delineation of a virtual border that would keep out mounting threats to social peace and safety (organised crime, illegal migration, etc.). The three-pillar concept of the EU (European Community-EC, Common Foreign and Security Policy-CFSP, Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters-PJCC) summarised a collective will to integrate simultaneously on many levels. The euro, the single common currency, materialised the first step in the economic area. Participation in the eurozone became a sine qua non for ‘equal’ full membership.14 Following the collapse of communism, Eastern European countries turned to the EU for guidance and support in order to realise a rapid transition to democracy and the market economy. They had to re-tune themselves to the demands of both integration and globalisation. Equally radical was the decrease of Russian influence in former bastions of Soviet hegemony. Accession to NATO and accession to the EU became the cardinal twin objectives that promised to provide security and prosperity, respectively.

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Endo, K. (1999). The Presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors: The politics of shared leadership. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 12 Dyson & Featherstone, Road to Maastricht p. 130. Thatcher, M. (1993). The Downing Street years pp. 740ff . London: Harper Collins. On the failure of the inward-looking economic programme of the first Mitterrand government and the re-channeling of France’s economic strategy through bold integration initiatives see Howarth, D. J. (2001). The French road to European Union pp. 83–144. Basingstoke: Palgrave 13 On the development of the European Council see Werts, J. (1992). The European Council. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Bulmer, S., & Wessels, W. (Eds.). (1987). The European Council: Decision-making in European politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 14 McNamara, K. (1997). The currency of ideas: Monetary politics in the European Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Sandholtz, W. Choosing union: Monetary politics and Maastricht, International Organization 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 1–39. Kenner, P. B. (1995). Economic Monetary Union in Europe: Moving beyond Maastricht. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dinan, D. (1999). Ever closer union (2nd ed.). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

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The enlargement to the East was a virtual realisation of an old vision of a single Europe ‘from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals’.15 Considerations for the involvement of Russia itself in the process of integration gained new impulse. The enlargement agenda was further expanded through the addition of Turkey in the list of accession candidates in 1999. Widespread euphoria for the prospects of the EU recognised only a temporary setback in the Union’s failure to deal with serious crises in Southeast Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia). Indeed, the Western Balkans remained for years a source of instability for the entire region. The active involvement of international organisations, the EU and NATO in the settlement of local conflicts has been often demonised since then; still, it has effectively blocked the export of local conflicts in the European Union.16 In the aftermath of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), which were initiated in 2001, the prospect of EU membership attracted public interest also in this area, imposing visible readjustment of state policies to the EU guidelines. In the post-Milosevic era there has been rising EU interest in the gradual inclusion of all successor states of former Yugoslavia in the Union as a remedy against political marginalisation and anti-Western resentment in the region. The enlargement from 15 to 25 (2003) and shortly thereafter to 27 (2007) rendered the EU a strategic sponsor of peace and prosperity across Europe.17 However, an old critical issue resurfaced with a vengeance: Can the EU convert its broad membership to an ever closer union? The shift of emphasis to institutional reform as a means of strengthening cohesion among 27 member countries and boosting the EU’s international competitiveness has turned out to be a difficult venture in recent years. The debacle of the Constitutional Treaty is a striking example. The effort to set down a social contract between institutions and citizens in the EU, practically an effort to delineate the character and mission of the Union, proved stillborn. The French and Dutch ‘No’s’ in the respective national referenda for the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 reflected not only the much-discussed suspicion of European societies towards the obscure ‘Brussels bureaucracy’, but also an elementary unwillingness to commit more deeply to burden-sharing and common welfare across national borders. It turns out that the

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For the original idea by de Gaulle see Weidenfeld, E. (1991). De Gaulle, Deutschland und der Osten. In Loth, W. & Picht, R. (Eds.) De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 16 On US involvement in the Balkans see Kissinger, H. (2001) Does America need a foreign policy? pp. 234 ff . New York: Simon and Schuster. On the Stabilisation and Association Agreements see Botsiou, K. E. (2003). Moving closer to the European Union: The Stabilisation and Association Agreements as a pre-Accession strategy. In Arvanitopoulos, C., Botsiou, K. E., Lammers, B. (eds.), EU Integration and the future of Southeastern Europe pp. 81–92. Athens and Berlin: Sideris, Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. 17 Mayhew, A. (2002). Recreating Europe: The European Union’s policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Avery, G. and Cameron, F. (1998). The enlargement of the European Union. Sheffield: Sheffield University Press. Baun, M. (2000). A wider Europe: The process and politics of European Union enlargement. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

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opportunities offered by internationalised capital markets and the lasting prosperity in Europe created centrifugal forces from the integration process. The younger generation in particular, which takes prosperity for granted and has experimented with globalisation only with the backing of the welfare state, often considers the intensification of Europeanisation a menace to its current well-being. The Treaty of Lisbon was drawn up as replacement for the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty, but it also ran up against national hurdles that brought it to standstill. This time it was the Irish ‘No’ (2008) that brought forward the complexity of the treaties, the negative impact of the democratic deficit and the loss of public confidence in the prospects of the EU. The process of integration on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation is now strongly questioned. Equally questioned is the theory of functionalism, since the expected positive spillover effect of the European Monetary Union (EMU) to the ‘real economy’ has not materialised. The pillars upon which the unification of Europe was initially built provide insufficient support to current European goals. Old issues are being superseded by migration, employment, financial security, social cohesion, environment, etc., presenting Europe with pressing challenges. Another blow to the cohesion of the EU has been caused by discord on the Euro– Atlantic level in recent years. Euro–American consensus on defending fundamental common values and addressing common threats has been a central incentive, not only for the formation of a close partnership since 1945 but also for the integration process itself. However, the end of the Cold War signalled a visible reallocation of power and influence in favour of the Atlantic superpower within the Alliance. The two decades after the end of the Cold War were marked by growing American unilateralism and the predominance of the United States in the international system, which resulted in the weakening of Euro–Atlantic solidarity. Europe’s internal weaknesses contributed to that development. Conflict in Southeast Europe, discord about the European Union’s political structure, and disagreements over the compatibility of the welfare state with the need for international competitiveness diminished Europe’s credibility as an international player. The war in Iraq, policies vis-a`-vis Iran, but also Russia’s reactions to NATO overtures towards Ukraine and Georgia have caused transatlantic and intra-European divisions. The rift between the two sides of the Atlantic has been also linked with matters of international law (e.g., the prison of Guantanamo), armaments, energy (Russian pipelines of natural gas) and climate change (e.g., Kyoto Protocol). The war against terrorism has generated disagreements between the United States and Europe, not solely in terms of certain initiatives, but especially in terms of principle. Increasing unilateralism on the part of Washington under the administration of George W. Bush and the doctrine of preventive war troubled transatlantic unity against asymmetric security threats. The early post-9/11 testimony that ‘We are all Americans’18 gradually gave way to fears of over-militarisation of international

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For an analysis of the famous position of Columbani, J-M. (2001). see his book Tous Ame´ricains? Le monde apre`s le 11 Septembre 2001. Paris: Librairie Arthe`me Fayard.

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affairs and over-expansion of Western responsibility. The EU found it hard to follow the volte-face of the American leadership after September 2001, whereas the Bush administration had distinctly declared during its first months in office that it would pull American forces out of regional fronts, thus criticising the interventionist legacy of Bill Clinton in the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere. The call for democratisation in the Middle East after the victorious military campaigns in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) hardly won broad support in Europe, as it did not include a clear timetable and terms of disengagement. However, European positions on international security were not based on solid consensus. Internal dissension provided ammunition for advocates of late American unilateralism to differentiate, at times even to discriminate against ‘old’ Europe. Multilateralism became only weaker in this context.19 At the same time, American military and economic capacity left the European countries of NATO far behind. The ‘lonely superpower’20 acted definitely as the only centre of gravity in the chaos of international anarchy. All this occurred before the onset of the current global economic crisis.21 The threat of prolonged recession puts established truths to the test. Globalisation might be challenged, but the reactivation of state intervention is not as simple as it might seem at first sight. Our conventional Keynesian wisdom was forged in the Great Depression of the 1930s and in the post-war decades of super-growth and full employment. The pervasive loss of trust today affects the public’s confidence in the self-regulating ability of capitalism. But trust drops with regard to government capabilities to guarantee jobs, goods and capital at home as well. How long can European countries combine liberalism with urgent calls for economic nationalism as a recipe for employment and social cohesion? Where do we put the limits of regulating the market economy so as to balance supply and demand without sacrificing productivity? How can we effectively resist the temptation of protectionism and avert xenophobia? What should be the characteristics of the new international order? Financial strain already cancels national budgets and development projects. There is mounting fear that fragile economies, mainly in East and Southeast Europe, will shrink dangerously, as they have been depending on international borrowing in recent years. This might sweep along investments of other EU members. Despite the backing of national economies by various rescue plans, the sirens of economic nationalism cause alarm across Europe. As more and more jobs

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See Caraley, D. J. (Ed.) (2004). American hegemony: Preventive war, Iraq, and imposing democracy. New York: Academy of Political Science. Evans, M. (Ed.). (2005). Just war theory: A reappraisal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 20 See Samuel P. Huntington’s article, The lonely superpower, Foreign Affairs, 78 Winter 1999– 2000, vol. 2, March-April 1999, pp. 35–49. Cf. Smith, T. (1994). America’s mission. The United States and the world wide struggle for democracy in the 20th century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 21 On the regional recessions of the late 1990s see Krugman, P. (1999). The return of depression economics. New York: W.W. Norton.

Introduction

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are being lost, the choice between short-term social stability and long-term economic revival seems hard for governments to make. This crisis asks Europe to redefine itself. Brief recessions and political calamities are not uncommon phenomena in the integration process. It is the first time after 1945, however, that European countries confront the menace of a deep and long recession. The focus of economic planning shifts from the requirements of the Stability Pact to policies that can safeguard employment and avert social explosion. The fiscal austerity of the eurozone is being compromised by the political and economic impact of thousands of job losses each month, which mirror the crisis of entire sectors, beginning with banking and the construction industry. Many EU countries have not yet decided what kind of rescue plan fits their special needs and what amounts of capital they should spend on it. The idea of common European planning clashes with urgent national problems. Some analysts consider the economic crisis to be incompatible with the unification process as we have known it. To trust supranational institutions, one needs to be safe and prosperous on the national level, the argument goes. In a case of crisis the loss of trust limits the scope and freezes the pace of integration.22 But the opposite observation also gains significant support. There are strong counter-arguments regarding the adaptability of the European economy to an international financial upheaval.23 The European social model is thus presented as better equipped to deal with the crisis than the American variety of capitalism. In this perception, the crisis is ultimately an opportunity to overcome deficits in economic coordination and social cohesion, which do not appear urgent when markets thrive and national economies flourish. Recession coincides with an important change of leadership on the other side of the Atlantic. The domination of American politics by neoconservative dogmas in the past eight years hindered efficient mutual consultation within the Atlantic alliance. Unilateral American initiatives regularly alienated European leadership, especially in ‘old’ Europe and regardless of the diverse political affiliations of European governments.24 High expectations have been placed upon President Barack Obama in several policy areas. In transatlantic relations, Obama links burden-sharing with essential consultations between the United States and Europe. The mounting problems in Iran, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East will require increasing cooperation among Euro–Atlantic partners. The economic crisis is also likely to motivate the United States’ return to its basic ‘primus inter pares’ status within the Alliance. The crisis lessens the economic gap between Europe and the United States and facilitates solidarity in economic conduct. Hit heavily by the financial and economic crisis, the United States needs to reconsider the political 22

Big government is back, The Economist. (29 January 2009). The return of economic nationalism, The Economist. (5 February 2009). 23 Krugman, P. Gordon does good, New York Times. (13 October 2008). 24 Kristol, I. (1995). Neoconservatism. The autobiography of an idea. New York: The Free Press. Ehrman, J. (1995). The rise of neo-conservatism: Intellectuals and foreign policy, 1945–1994. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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correctness of ‘economic fundamentalism’ and unilateralism in international politics. In 2009, NATO celebrates the 60th anniversary since its establishment. It reminds us that its accomplishments regarding the preservation of peace and the support of Western prosperity rested heavily on transatlantic unity on major issues. This unity seems imperative in the spirit of the now widely preached new internationalism as a guarantee for Western security and growth. This volume addresses various aspects of the challenges that lie ahead for Europe. Essays on climate change and the protection of cultural heritage join forces with presentations about Greek Balkan policies, Greek–French relations and the idea of a Mediterranean Union, the current EU institutional and political agenda, as well as the international consequences of the economic crisis. Both American democracy and American foreign policy are also strongly represented, with special emphasis on Euro–Atlantic relations. These essays by distinguished scholars and political leaders highlight the policies and ideas that shape issues of international interest, reflecting also the public debate in Greece within the European context.

Transforming South-East Europe: A Challenge for Smart Power* Dora Bakoyannis

One might ask, ‘Why South-Eastern Europe in combination with smart power?’ and I admit it may appear odd to delve into South-Eastern Europe when the focus of international attention is on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan or the ever-tumultuous Middle East. Well, yes, I plead guilty to a certain geographical bias. Being ‘closer to home’, this is a region of utmost concern for Greece. But I assure you, it is much more than that. South-Eastern Europe remains a fragile post-conflict zone. Here is the picture drawn by a recent New York Times opinion column: ‘The Balkans have a dismal way of living up to their stereotype as a region of ancient, intertwined and irreconcilable feuds.’ Since 1989 the region has witnessed extraordinary change – both positive and negative. Yet, despite all they have endured, the peoples of the Balkans are now building the springboard towards their dreams of a better life. It is disquietingly clear, however, that peace in the region is far from guaranteed. Stability and economic development are far from sustained. Ethnic tension, weak rule of law, organised crime, porous borders and sluggish economic performance continue to haunt considerable areas of the wider Balkans. Simply put, to complete the region’s transformation we still have a long ways to go. One lesson we have learned is that only integrated strategies can carry the day. A comprehensive approach is essential. We need – to use a term coined by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye – ‘smart power’: a potent blend of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. We are not the first to discover the merits of such a strategy. Thucydides faithfully records the famous words of Archidamus, the King of Sparta, who said that good allies were to be defined ‘not as those who were forced, but rather persuaded . . . as those who will not welcome our friendship because of our power, but who will be disposed towards us as friends’.

*Liberal Emphasis 34, January-February-March 2008. This article is based on a speech given by Mrs Dora Bakoyannis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington on 13 February 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 9 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_2, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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Smart power is not only a matter of reason. Much of its success depends on the heart and on the force of our values. These common principles include respect for democracy, human rights, free trade, free enterprise and tolerance of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. Adhesion to these values forms the very roadmap that determines the course of accession for countries aspiring to membership in the Euro–Atlantic family. In 2003, during the Greek Presidency, the European Union outlined the region’s prospects for EU membership. Coupled with NATO enlargement, the prospect of EU membership is an important driving force for these countries as it provides them with the impetus to make the necessary change and reform. The road to NATO and the EU fosters peace, breeds security and provides space for viable and sustainable development. In the words of Constantine Cavafy, ‘Ithaca gave you the splendid journey. It was Ithaca that brought you on the road.’ Now I must admit that I am not sure whether I would go as far as to call EU or NATO enlargement paradigms of smart power, but I can definitely say it is smart politics. The fruits of these policies are more than evident. Look no further than Slovenia, the holder of the EU Presidency from January until June 2008, a country of this region that was invited to join NATO in 2002 and was welcomed into the European Union in 2004. Croatia, a newly elected non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, is an exemplary candidate for both the EU and NATO. One can safely assume it will join both organisations very soon. Albania’s efforts in social and financial reform have been recognised with the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. Montenegro, a new entrant in the world of nation states, has managed, in a very short time, to endorse the SAA with the EU and join NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Euro–Atlantic prospects gained new impetus when the SAA with the EU was authorised last December. Of course, 12 years after the Dayton Accords, much remains to be done, especially when it comes to streamlining decision-making. Yet, it is significant that countless prophesies of doom have failed to materialise. Turkey is well down the long and difficult road to reform. 2008 provides a window of opportunity for the Cyprus problem. Should Turkey be ready to comply with the European acquis, the EU must in turn honour its commitments and grant full member status. Our neighbour’s EU membership will, for Greece, be a moment of great satisfaction. It will mean that years of negotiations and laborious efforts have borne fruit. Abiding by our set of values, we must honour our promises. Despite internal differences in the Union or in the Alliance, we must ensure that our credibility remains unchallenged. This means sticking to our basic principle that full compliance means full membership. This was tangibly demonstrated by Romania and Bulgaria, who joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007. These were historic events with profound regional significance, events that carried with them hope and optimism for the

Transforming South-East Europe: A Challenge for Smart Power

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Balkans. But they also sent a clear message: countries that meet requirements should be allowed to join the Euro–Atlantic family. We should not neglect this. In the framework of multilateral initiatives, as well as on a bilateral level, Greece has contributed decisively to the implementation of necessary reforms, and continues to do so. As the region’s oldest NATO and EU member, Greece feels a heightened sense of responsibility for its neighbourhood, an obligation to be constructive, supportive and practical. In socio-economic terms, a snapshot of the region often reveals poverty, inequality, displacement, unemployment, inflation and corruption – all significant barriers to foreign investment. For Greece, economic development is an essential tool for political stability. This explains our dynamic presence in the region. We are at the forefront in terms of investment, with over 20 billion dollars invested. More than 3,500 Greek enterprises are active in the region. An estimated 200,000 new jobs have been created. Greece is the primary foreign investor in Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia. It is the second largest foreign investor in Romania and third in Bulgaria. In the banking sector alone, nearly 2,000 branches of Greek banks operate across South-Eastern Europe. At the same time, a five-year programme for Greek development assistance is well under way for the period 2004–2011. With regard to the region’s ‘Road to Ithaca’, serious political issues remain unsolved. They call for rigorous efforts and closer collaboration from all of us on both sides of the Atlantic, in NATO and in the EU. It is clear that all our labours will be futile if we fail to establish political stability in the region. For the international press, as of late the Balkans have been synonymous with Kosovo. Exponents of a more traditional hard-power approach will be happy to hear that of the total 17,000 NATO-led troops deployed in the Western Balkans today, 16,000 are stationed in Kosovo, including a significant Greek commitment. Today, Kosovo faces a series of complexities. It is one of Europe’s poorest regions, with more than half of its inhabitants living in deprivation. Over 50% of its population is under 30 years of age, and unemployment is one of Europe’s highest. Moreover, it is a landlocked area with few competitive advantages and a long history of economic mismanagement. To this must be added the tension between the region’s ethnic Albanians and the remaining Serbs, which, to say the least, is making Kosovo volatile. I understand there is a sense of urgency over Kosovo’s final status. Frankly speaking, however, we in Athens, like those in several other capitals in the region, do not share this sense of haste. Defining Kosovo’s future status is a very complicated and fragile task. There is no easy solution, no easy way out. Many view independence as a magic wand of sorts, which, once waved, will produce jobs, running water, electricity, education, health and prosperity. But let us be realistic – we all know that independence is no panacea. In an op-ed published recently in the International Herald Tribune, Prime Minister Thaci made a parallel point from Pristina when he wrote, ‘We need more than independence. We need economic, social and political development. . . . The way we live from here on will depend on how well we manage development.’

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Make no mistake: at the heart of the European continent, Kosovo’s stability concerns us all. Europe has a central role to play both now and in the future, and it is imperative that the EU speak with a single voice. Any solution reached must be in line with EU values as this provides the necessary safeguards for the region’s stability. Kosovo must be democratic, multi-ethnic and multicultural. It must display tolerance and ensure that the rights of all its inhabitants are protected – regardless of religion and ethnic origin. For a solution to be viable, it must foster stability and security. One must admit that it is difficult to manage and control developments. Even the best-laid plans can get out of hand. However, whatever the outcome of ‘the day after’, the international community in general – and Europe in particular – must remain committed to Kosovo. Hence, launching the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission as soon as possible presents fewer legal and political hurdles than any other alternative. Needless to say, the ESDP mission will allow the EU to play a balanced and constructive role in Kosovo, to the benefit of all parties involved. Resolution 1244 offers the basis for such a move. This very conclusion was also reached at the tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Romania and Greece, held in Athens this past December with the purpose of coordinating a common regional approach. Of course, no discussion can be complete without Serbia, one of the region’s key states. Indeed, there can hardly be any equilibrium in the Balkans without Serbia. It is perhaps less known that Serbia’s structural reform has been impressive, making it even more unfortunate that EU–Serbian relations have been at a stalemate for so long. This particular unravelling of EU–Serbian relations is a setback for both Serbia and the region as a whole. We envision Serbia as an integral part of South-Eastern Europe in our European neighbourhood. It has a great deal to offer the EU, and the EU has a great deal to give in return. Serbia can no longer be haunted by its past; it must move forward in order to reach its full potential. Europe recently demonstrated its flexibility by inviting Serbia to sign a political agreement of cooperation. This was a clear-cut and unequivocal political message: Serbia belongs to the Union, and its people are an essential part of the European family. Likewise, Serbia’s invitation to NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) was catalytic. It is vital, however, that the PfP not be allowed to lay dormant. President Tadic´’s re-election (3 February 2008) is a good omen. He has a clear vision of Serbia’s Euro–Atlantic perspective, which must be encouraged by the international community. More often than not, good news does not travel fast, but I am hopeful that SouthEastern Europe will soon find its way into the international media for a different reason: NATO enlargement. At the NATO Bucharest Summit (2–4 April 2008), the Alliance is expected to decide on whether to extend invitations to three aspiring partner countries: Croatia, Albania and FYROM. Greece wholeheartedly supports NATO’s enlargement. We believe NATO enlargement can contribute significantly to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro–Atlantic area. Enlargement will reinforce the overall tendency towards closer integration and

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cooperation in Europe, strengthen the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security and boost the transatlantic partnership. As a 1995 study carried out by the Alliance concluded, enlargement would, amongst other things, contribute ‘by fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus-building characteristic of relations among members of the Alliance and promoting good-neighbourly relations’. Croatia and Albania, I am happy to say, have made considerable headway in the past few years, proving that they are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, it saddens me that I cannot say the same of our neighbour FYROM. For over 15 years Greece and FYROM have been involved in UN-sponsored negotiations regarding FYROM’s name. Greece has real concerns over the issue. ‘What’s in a name?’ you may ask. A great deal, I assure you. Geographically, Macedonia is a wider region, more than 50% of which belongs to Greece. Today there are more than 2.5 million Greeks who consider themselves Macedonians. You may have met some of these proud Macedonians in the United States. Some 2.5 million Greek Macedonians feel that the very core of their identity is under siege. Why? Because of Skopje’s nationalistic, anachronistic policy of attempting to monopolise Macedonian identity. Our neighbours use the language of the nineteenth century and hope to be understood in the twenty-first. This is not a question of political psychology or mass sentiment. It is an issue of regional stability. Greece has repeatedly demonstrated its goodwill and expressed its eagerness to support FYROM both politically and economically. As the largest foreign investor in FYROM and one of its biggest trading partners, we have spared no effort in responding to the country’s quest for economic growth and stability. Under UN auspices Greece has come to the table with a clear objective: a longoverdue, mutually acceptable, composite solution that includes the geographical term ‘Macedonia’ and yet makes the mark. This reflects the letter and spirit of the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and the 1995 Interim Accord. We have engaged in this process constructively and with an open mind. We have proven to be considerably flexible in our quest for a win-win solution. However, our friends in Skopje must also cover some ground. Thus far, they have failed to do so. They tend to define compromise rather erratically as a state in which everyone agrees with them without them having to move an inch. Skopje has but one route to NATO and the European Union: respect for the principle of good-neighbourly relations, which includes a mutually acceptable solution. Alliances and partnerships can only be fostered between countries if there is mutual trust and good-neighbourly relations. In conclusion, let me stress that we must not fall into the trap of focusing purely on the rubble that, unavoidably, is part of every ‘work in progress’. We must not overlook the resilience and commitment of the peoples, who, with courage and optimism, look to the future – or, better said, to their European–Atlantic future. We cannot ignore the involvement of the EU and its member states in the countries of South-Eastern Europe. We must not neglect NATO’s commitment to consolidating stability and security in the region. And we cannot overlook the

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important role the United States plays and the influence it exerts in the region. This is the ‘smart power’ that is in demand today. In this light, Greece is aware of its key role and responsibility and is prepared to rise to the challenge. The prominent French-Romanian playwright and dramatist Eugene Ionesco once wrote, ‘Ideologies separate us. Dreams and anguish bring us together.’ In an unstable world, common dreams alleviate our fears of an unpredictable tomorrow. We believe that our shared dream should be the birth of solid partnerships. We need to act as partners within the global community and for the global community. This, for us, is our ultimate Ithaca.

Greece–France: A New Alliance* Nicolas Sarkozy

Mr President of the Hellenic Republic, Mr Prime Minister, Mr Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Ministers, Members of the Parliament, dear friends: I am profoundly moved to be here today at the Hellenic Parliament, a location that for the people of France stands for freedom, democracy and the restoration of Greece’s magnificence. Whatever your political beliefs, I would like to reassure you that I am aware of the honour you have bestowed upon me – and through me, to the French people – by giving me the opportunity to address this House. When my grandfather – whom I adored – left Thessaloniki, he was young and certainly never imagined that his little grandson would later come to Greece as President of the French Republic. I am thinking of him now, as I am thinking of all those who managed to find their identity on this planet. Twenty-six centuries ago, only a few yards from where we are today, the assembly established by the Laws of Solon and Cleisthenes, the assembly of people, guided by the Vouli – after which this House was named – was addressed by Themistocles, Pericles and Demosthenes. Their orations have gone down in history. For me, having devoted my life to politics, being here today, 26 centuries later, feels like being at the place where the human mind first conceived and tried the concept of democracy. We are the heirs to this concept. For the first time in the history of humanity, people succeeded in living together and giving meaning to the word ‘politics’. Here, for the first time in the history of humanity, democracy as we know it today was born. I believe that humanity should be grateful to Greece. It was here in Greece, and specifically in the city of Athens during the fifth century BC, that philosophy, architecture and sculpture reached their ultimate perfection, that theatre and rhetoric were born and reached their pinnacle. Indeed, we are all very fortunate that you are successors of those people. All of these achievements glorified ancient Greece, and no other nation can better

*Liberal Emphasis 35, April-May-June 2008. This text is from a speech Mr Nicolas Sarkozy gave before the Greek Parliament on 6 June 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 15 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_3, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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comprehend this than France, which fully appreciates Greece’s contribution to civilisation. It was Greek thought that inspired the ideals of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the French Republic. The French philhellenes – from Delacroix to Victor Hugo – followed in turn the heroic liberation of modern Greece, without forgetting the unknown heroes in the Battle of Navarino. France continues to honour those heroes, and we are proud of this. The same philhellenic spirit is present now and guides our mutual friendship. It was manifested when General de Gaulle delivered his speech here 45 years ago. It inspired France to endorse Greece in its accession to the European Communities. It also sparked the events in Bucharest, at the latest NATO Summit (2–4 April 2008), when France heartily supported Greece. Since 1974, when Konstantinos Karamanlis returned after the hard years, it has been this special relationship between France and Greece that has led to the ‘Greece–France alliance’. I have come to tell you today that this alliance is now a reality. We instinctively know that we can count on each other: Greece can rely on France and France can rely on Greece. In light of all the challenges, I would like to suggest a new slogan: ‘Greece– France: a new alliance’. This new alliance must be placed at the service of European integration, because Europe is the most remarkable accomplishment. It is perhaps the most significant achievement of the past half century. Europe has enabled us to live peacefully, led us to prosperity and protected us from nationalistic temptations. We know all too well what nationalistic trends mean in Europe. It is this unified Europe that has made war impossible. Yet with Greece’s accession, Europe not only guarantees peace, but also holds and supports freedom and democracy for all people who have known and withstood difficult times. Greece set the example. You showed the way to Spain, to Portugal and to the countries forming the major enlargement to the east. On this path, Greece and France have always been together. Very soon you will have to take a stance on the Lisbon Treaty. Although this treaty is not perfect, it does put 10 years of institutional debate to rest. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by Greece is a crucial step towards jointly meeting the challenges of European integration. It was not easy in my country. A large percentage voted against the treaty in the referendum, despite the fact that France is one of the founding member states of the European Union. Nonetheless, we are asked to make choices. I wanted to speak to the Greek leaders before the start of the French EU Presidency so they could be involved in it. As I know all too well, the new treaty does not solve any problems or surmount the crisis. It is a prerequisite, but not a panacea. We will overcome the crisis when we demonstrate to everyone – the French and all other European peoples – that Europe is a safeguard. This is why I will talk about immigration, which is among the priorities of the French Presidency. France and Greece do not want a closed Europe, a Europe withdrawn into itself. But neither do we wish for a Europe that helplessly watches the arrival of waves of immigrants. I know that your country is under pressure to accommodate the arrival of these immigrants. The problem of Greece is our problem, too. This is why I do not want Greece to be left alone in facing this problem. Greece’s immigration problems are Europe’s problems. At a time when

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we are establishing a free movement region for European citizens, it is not possible for each country to have its own national immigration policy. The French Presidency will, therefore, propose a European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. I would like to touch upon another issue, which is a purely European responsibility: defence and security. Greece and France have been making some of the strongest efforts in the area of defence. We are telling our partners that the European Union is one of the wealthiest regions in the world, and as such, we cannot claim to be powerful and have a strong voice in the world while failing to ensure our own defence. What will happen to its economic and political forces if Europe is unable to guarantee its defence and security? In my opinion, it is not – and will never be – a case of competition between the EU and NATO. I have said it before and I am reiterating it here in Athens: the European Defence and the Atlantic Alliance are complementary. We need both NATO and European Defence. I would also like to add that Greece is located at the crossroads of multiple worlds. This is a great advantage for you. You know better than anyone else that peace and stability depend on what happens on your doorstep. This is true for the Middle East, 60 years after the establishment of the state of Israel. We have to do everything in our power in order for this problem to be settled and for the two states – Israel and Palestine – to be able to coexist peacefully within secure and recognised borders. The best guarantee for Israel is a safe, democratic and internationally recognised Palestinian state. Furthermore, Lebanon must survive as an independent country, as it is an example of diversity. Tomorrow I will be in Beirut to tell them that Europe and France will be on the side of all the citizens of Lebanon. As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, both our countries border this sea. Who can speak of the Mediterranean better than Greece? I am convinced that everything currently occurring around the Mediterranean will be decisive for our future. Europe thought it was turning its back on its past. It did not realise that it was turning its back on its future. This is why we, the Greek and French peoples, must prepare this future. This is why Greece has a major part to play in the Mediterranean Union. We can make the Mediterranean the cleanest sea on the planet and collaborate on safety to fight fires, such as those that devastated your country last summer. All of Europe must be mobilised to help you. And when a problem arises in Portugal, the entire European community must be mobilised to help Portugal. We need all the civil protection forces to be mobilised across Europe in order to develop a single European force mainly comprising fire-fighting aircraft, which are used only three months a year. I am aware of the problems in the Mediterranean, including the issue of Cyprus. It is high time the wall separating Nicosia fell. My wish is that nobody be satisfied as long as the wall in Nicosia stands. Therefore, I would like to reassure you that France will do its utmost within the framework of the UN Security Council to advance the current initiatives for the settlement of the Cyprus questions. The negotiations have been resumed with renewed hope. Indeed, I greet and encourage the leaders of Cyprus to pursue their

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efforts for reunification in a fair and viable manner. Cyprus belongs to the European Union and the European family. I am certainly aware that the relationship between Europe and Turkey has to be treated responsibly. I consider Turkey a great country and a great people, with longstanding ties to France that I wish to maintain. Yet there is the issue of its accession to the European Union. The negotiations started back in the 1960s, but there has not been any response. Thus it is not a simple issue. My position on this question is clear, known and unchanged. I am convinced that a close partnership would be the best solution for both Europe and Turkey. I know, however, that others have different views, which I respect. I also know that this is a very delicate issue for Greece and that there are conflicting views about history and geography. I also know that we often say something other than what we think – there is the heart and the mind. Our emotions may run counter to the dictates of reason. I understand Greek society – and not merely because my grandfather was Greek – and that is why I can share these conflicting feelings. So here, before the Hellenic Parliament, I would like to state that France will be unbiased and respect the views of all parties during its Presidency. This is the role of a presidency, and I will rigorously observe it. As far as the Balkans are concerned, the stabilisation of this region is a key goal for all of Europe. Greece has a leading role to play in this region. France, like Greece, believes that the Balkans have a European perspective. We must express with renewed dynamism this promise of Europe to the Balkans. Europe should manifest openness and the Balkans should make efforts at reform. I am saying this to all the Balkan countries, that once you become democratic and make progress in policies of convergence with the EU, you will be invited to join the European Union. With regard to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, both France and Greece would like to see it approach membership in both NATO and the EU in due time. Let me say, however, that the settlement of the name dispute is a precondition for any accession. Solidarity between France and Greece has been and will be real. I have told the Prime Minister that Greece’s position is legitimate, responsible and open to dialogue, and we hope the governments in Skopje and Athens will reach an agreement on the name of the state under the auspices of the United Nations. I want you to know that France favours the Greek side and we will not change our stance. Likewise, I believe we should tell Serbia that after all the hardship it has been through in recent years, it has a European perspective which we look forward to enhancing. The French EU Presidency will do its best to offer Serbia the European prospect it deserves. We do not want a part of our family to be left out of Europe. We do not want to condemn Serbia to exclusion from the European family. In conclusion, I would like to say that Greece and France are not simply two beautiful countries with exquisite locations that fascinate French people, such as Athens, Mount Athos, Corfu and Delfi. They are not merely about the founding myths of civilisation and the struggles for freedom of the past two hundred years. France demonstrates its solidarity as a fraternal and faithful ally of Greece. The new Greece–France alliance must be based on this legacy. Our civilisations are very close, and we share many family ties. How many families in France have Greek

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origins – and not only in Thessaloniki? Of course, Thessaloniki has a special place in my heart. The world is changing, new giants are emerging and we must collaborate. Our two nations must play a leading part and propose a new European cultural model to the world. Greece and France are great when they belong to all of humanity. And as ancient intellectual nations, we should not resort to our past, but build a future equal to that past. This is true for both Greece and France: although they both belong to the past, they must escape nostalgia and not shut their eyes to the future. We should, therefore, work to establish the future we deserve. Dear Greek friends, we will be stronger by joining forces. It is my belief that this Parliament means a lot to the French people, and that a significant moment in my political life is summed up by the phrase: ‘Long live Greece, long live France, long live the new Greek–French alliance!’

The Czech Presidency of the European Union: A Return to Roots* Mirek Topola´nek

Lately, people have been asking me (both at home and abroad) about the priorities of the Czech Presidency of the European Union (EU). I realise that a country, irrespective of its size, has limited possibilities for setting its own priorities for the Presidency. The EU follows its own path, and changing that within a mere six months is as impossible as turning a supertanker around in one hundred meters. Nevertheless, we know that ideas have consequences. To be sure, during its Presidency the Czech Republic will need to address the matters already planned for the period. As to our own priorities, summarised by the motto ‘Europe without barriers’, there will be very little time and room to address them. What we want to influence is much more long-term in nature. We want to turn our attention to values that form the foundations of the EU – values that, for the past 50 years, have resulted in prosperity and security and are key to solving both the problems of today and those of the future. The core European value is freedom, followed by solidarity. The EU’s main and still-valid objectives are the top requirements originally established by the European Coal and Steel Community: peace and prosperity. We need not discover anything new. Our first President, T. G. Masaryk, said that states are supported by the ideals on which they were built. This also applies to the EU, and it will apply to the Czech Presidency. The world has changed in the 50 years since the Treaty of Rome, and so has the shape of the European community, which has evolved into the European Union. Despite all these changes, the same foundation still exists; yet the same critical questions also remain. Do we believe in the ideals of freedom? How do we respond to all four of the Union’s freedoms: the free movement of people, goods, capital and services? Do we continue the process of enlarging the area of security and prosperity? I believe these are perennial questions for which we need to constantly find new

*Liberal Emphasis 35, April-May-June 2008. This text is from a speech Mr Mirek Topola´nek gave at the Constantinos Karmanlis Institute for Democracy on 11 April 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 21 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_4, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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answers. In this article I will try to develop some answers by linking these abiding questions with the current problems in the constantly changing global and European reality. The first question concerns enlargement. In the past four years, the EU has had to address the issue of a very ambitious enlargement. The number of member states has risen from 15 to 27. I must say, however, that the enlargement was successful and the EU has responded very well. Despite the interim period that was, in a way, artificially created around the issue of the institutional reform, the fact remains that the experiment has shown that the EU can operate with 27 member states while still remaining true to original principles. The claims that the EU was in crisis and that it needed to undergo administrative reform before any further enlargement were more like a fog veiling the discontent regarding the accession of new members. The claims may also have been the lever for implementation of the reform. The fog has since dissipated, and many problems solved. Today, after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, this debate has ended, and we can now focus on the real problems that trouble our citizens. Herein lies the problem of enlargement. Both the Czech government and I feel that the enlargement process must continue. Europe has no geographic boundaries; it only has boundaries with respect to values. In my opinion, all people and every state that accept the EU’s values and are in a position to respond to its requirements must be entitled to full membership, whether the Balkans, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia or South Africa. In essence, we are talking about our cultural territories, our ‘cities’ from the time of ancient Greece. The enlargement of the EU does not only mean enlargement of the common free market – although this is a major advantage. It means, as I have already stressed, the enlargement of an area of security and stability wherein the same values are recognised and cooperation prevails. This is why I feel that further enlargement is critical to the EU’s future. The moment we cease our efforts, the moment we start to close the walls of Europe will be the beginning of the end. Peace and prosperity are linked with cooperation, not isolation. The second question concerns unification. In other words, a deeper unification within the EU is also linked with enlargement. In my opinion, the firmer and stronger the unification, the more difficult enlargement will be. Conversely, by enlarging rapidly, Europe becomes more flexible. I do not think that the EU is suffering from an institutional crisis. Accepting the Lisbon Treaty is a necessary political step. Most countries have ratified the previous Constitutional Convention. If we fail to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will become paralysed, not by a lack of institutions but by a lack of political will. Today, the EU has reached through the Lisbon Treaty a compromise that we must all accept, although none of us like it. We must not only accept it because it was a difficult compromise to reach, but also because it enables us to make further enlargements and to move forward with the unification process. Our problem is not that Europe is not unified enough or that the decision-making mechanisms do not function well. Quite the opposite: the EU suffers today from the lack of sincere and concrete content.

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This view is based on an analysis of the current international situation. Traditional diplomatic and international relations are becoming increasingly determined by economic relations. States and international organisations fight with money instead of weapons. Countries that were underdeveloped just a few years ago are now developing very rapidly. A state or a group of states that wants to succeed in this fiercely competitive world will need to be able to constantly adjust and react swiftly and flexibly to an ever-changing international environment. This is the law of competition. Unfortunately, the EU is not so flexible in adjusting to changes in international conditions; instead, it applies the motto ‘ever closer Union’. Within the international environment, the slogan of past empires, ‘big is beautiful’, is already outdated. We must accept that with its enlargement, the EU has become more heterogeneous, and not only in terms of political preferences and interests. It is also heterogeneous in terms of economic cycles and economic conditions in general. An abrupt unification of this heterogeneity cannot lead to prosperity; on the contrary, it can only destroy the advantages of participating countries. The third question relates to flexibility. If the EU wants to find answers to the challenges of modern times, which it ought to do, the solution does not lie with enforced uniformity. On the contrary, we need a Europe that is more flexible and more adaptable. The world beyond EU borders does not believe in the control, red tape and restrictions associated with unification. And this world, once pejoratively called the Third World, is succeeding today. Europe needs to become more flexible. This is the reason our contribution to the discussions on the Reform Treaty revolved around the ‘directed flexibility’ mechanism, which enables the transfer of power back to the national state level if such power cannot be effectively exercised at the EU level. We often compare European unification to the cyclist who needs to keep cycling so as not to fall. May I add to this that the cyclist is always riding down a one-way street? Let us help him get off his bicycle, give him a car and allow him to freely roam the motorways of free Europe and economic liberalism. Let him go and stop wherever he pleases in order to admire the landscape or plan his future route. Liberalism, decentralisation and flexibility are mechanisms that will help us find our goal for the future, namely, freedom. The harmonisation of tax systems is a very relevant example. The European Service is attempting to implement a single tax rate for all legal entities. I am afraid that it will not end there, that it will also try to implement the second stage, which is to unify the tax rate. I do not believe that this is the correct path to follow. The true cause of this pressure lies with the fact that large countries that impose high taxes, such as Germany and France, are justifiably afraid of the possibility of seeing businesses based in their countries relocate to other, more business-friendly countries. My country is one of those countries that have reacted to the economic reality, and on this basis we have dropped our tax rate to 19%. Many accuse us fixing our tax rates too low. Those who accuse us obviously believe that there is something akin to a ‘natural taxation scale’ that all states must apply. I do not think that this is necessary and, as proof of this, many countries have not implemented this so-called natural taxation scale. Had the efforts to harmonise high taxation been successful, companies would continuously flee to countries with lower tax rates. Only this time,

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instead of moving towards Slovakia, the Netherlands or the Czech Republic, they would relocate to Asia. Therefore, harmonisation is not the solution to the problem, but only to parts of the problem. We need to go back to the roots of European unification, which was based on the elimination of economic barriers and the creation of a free market. These factors also increased competitiveness outside the European Union. In essence, this means that competitiveness, not unification, must be the EU’s primary goal and at the same time, its tool for growth. The countries behind the old Iron Curtain, with its enforced uniformity, were poor. The situation of Germany is a striking example. It is now all one country and one people. Previously, however, one part was free and the other was not; one part prospered and the other lagged behind. It is therefore preferable to aim for flexibility rather than complete uniformity. The fourth question concerns the European Union’s four freedoms and our Presidency. European integration must serve the truth, but the truth must not be sacrificed for uniformity, as sometimes happens. There is only one justifiable form of conformity in the EU: a conformity that leads to conditions in which the Union’s four freedoms can apply in practice and not just on paper. This is why the theme of our Presidency is ‘Europe without barriers’. This means abolishing not only political, economic and administrative barriers, but also psychological hindrances among states – dealing with our phobias and fears. Enlargement was a striking example of such fear, which, as it turned out, was not justified. With reference to my previous comments, and as the Prime Minister of a country that has assumed the Presidency, I would like to contribute a dose of liberal ethics to the discussion about the future of the EU; ethics arising from a return to the roots of the community. Our theme ‘Europe without barriers’ consists of five principles that cover the largest part of the concept of Europe: a competitive and confident Europe; a safe Europe; a budget for the future of Europe; Europe as a global partner; and a peaceful and safe Europe. In 2009, during our Presidency, we will celebrate the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the fifth anniversary of the EU’s largest enlargement. And as we consider this historic moment, we note the obstacles to European unification, especially with regard to the internal market. The absolute free movement of people and services is not only fair to the new EU countries, but also a guarantee for the progress of other countries and an augmentation of the fair competition that has contributed to Europe’s success. The free movement of people within Europe is an advantage for all member states, not only new ones, as this increases the competitiveness which is critical for Europe’s growth. To be sure, we need to emphasise that there are also cases in which a transition time must be made with regards to the free movement of persons, capital, services and goods. We must also point out some unpleasant issues, such as the policy of subsidies to the agricultural sector, on which more and stricter directives will be issued concerning better regulation. We do not want more regulation, we want less. We want a national reaction to this issue, since all regulations imposed on businesses must have a response. At this point we are concentrating on the low levels of market liberalisation with third countries, the slowdown of the EU’s growth and the existing obstacles to transatlantic cooperation. Moreover, we need to create a

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common migration and asylum policy by eliminating obstacles to movement within EU member states. The common denominator of all these proposals is the principal European value: freedom. I chose the subtitle of this article very carefully. Yes, the world and Europe are changing, but undoubtedly the direction to success remains the same: a return to our roots. Let us follow the concepts that led us to success 50 years ago. Thousands of years ago, freedom made Europe a dynamic continent. It is definitely worth pursuing that same value in the 21st century.

Quo Vadis, Europe?* Wolfgang Schu¨ssel

‘Quo vadis, Europe?’ is a good question. And although the question is easy, the answer tends to be a little bit more complicated. Maybe it helps to think back in time. After World War II, Winston Churchill began his famous lecture at the university in Zurich on the future of Europe with the idea of a United States of Europe. However, that is not what we have become, as we could not fulfil the vision developed by Winston Churchill 62 years ago in 1946. But we have a different vision and a different positive model, which I think is working quite well. The interesting thing is that the concept of a united Europe was based on three important pillars. One, which came after the terror of dictatorship, was that parliamentary democracy would become a solid basis for a united Europe. The second pillar was the European economic model, which is based on a social market economy and competition, rather than a centrally planned economy as its organising principle. And the third pillar, European integration, was the solution to excessive nationalism, which under the Nazi regime had led to a pan-European catastrophe. Today, all three pillars are under discussion, under scrutiny and subject to criticism. Problems are being expounded and their solutions called into question. Parliamentary democracy, for instance, is increasingly seen as an insufficient, although legitimate, mechanism for making far-reaching decisions. This has led to frequent calls for referenda in Greece, Ireland and other parts of Europe. Our model of a social market economy was founded by individuals like Konrad Adenauer, Konstantinos Karamanlis, and Julius Raab and Reinhard Kamitz in Austria. It has been denounced as a kind of neo-liberal model incapable of coming to terms with the realities of a modern, global economy. International thinking and international interests are gaining ground. In their exaggerated form, their imperative is the maintenance of identity. In some areas, they undermine the European project of unification and integration. These issues raise the question of whether there is in fact a better model than the one we are used to. Are there better ideas? If so, maybe we should be open to them. *Liberal Emphasis 37, October-November-December 2008. This text is from a speech Dr Wolfgang Schu¨ssel gave at the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy on 13 November 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 27 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_5, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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They might not be perfect, but I think these three pillars remain valid and are still very important for the future. And I think the European Union as such is a very well-managed instrument, especially in difficult times. The Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, a critical and liberal newspaper, recently noted the ‘EU’s impressive crisis management’ during the crisis in Georgia and in the current financial situation. Indeed, the results are remarkable. An action plan for the European Union, coordinated in Paris by the Euro Group and the United Kingdom, comprises state guarantees for inter-bank lending, the possibility of recapitalisation, a European emergency task force for the financial market, improvement of European financial market supervision, new European rules as regards capital requirements for banks and deposit protection, as well as more stringent provisions for rating agencies. And Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, introduced this morning concrete proposals regarding financial markets, and in two days from now, the day after tomorrow, the G20 will discuss these matters, according based on the European proposals. Therefore, I do not think there is reason to be sceptical about our model. Naturally, we should take time to reflect on this global economic crisis, which started with the housing bubble in the US. In fact, it is quite interesting to see what happened. It was not a problem with the market as such, but one prompted by politics. It is worth remembering that the housing bubble was started by the Clinton administration and continued under Bush – on this issue, at least, there was no difference between these two administrations – as a way to give poor families the opportunity to purchase their own homes. Is it easy in Greece, for instance, to get a loan from your bank for more than 100% of the value of the house? In Austria it is impossible, while in the US, it was possible to get credit for 105 or 110% of a house’s value. But this was a housing bubble, and there is no doubt that such a bubble can end by bursting, thereby creating problems. The banking system and the financial system were affected; now the entire economy is under pressure. We Christian Democrats are strongly opposed to the American model of greedbased capitalism. Paul Krugman, who won the 2008 Nobel Prize for Economics, keeps a blog, which I read whenever possible. (I think the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Mr Krugman was a clear signal that he is not only an ivory tower economist who thinks about things we cannot understand, but is fully engaged in day-to-day economic policies.) In his famous blog, Paul Krugman wrote that he found it strange that in one year, the best-paid hedge fund manager in the United States earns the same amount of money as do all the teachers of the state of New York for three years. Imagine that. This is madness. It has nothing to do with our social market economy model that was created by Karamanlis, Adenauer, Raab and others. We should be aware of these very important differences. Our European way of life, the European way of managing an economy – by creating jobs, building a consensus, continually supporting employment opportunities and the quality of life – is important. What will follow the crash? In my opinion, there are three possible scenarios. One scenario is a kind of renewed social market economy, one with more and better regulation, of course. The problem was not a crisis of the system as such; it was, in part, a problem of less regulation in important sectors. There were elements in the derivatives market, for instance, that were never regulated or controlled.

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Continuing in this way is impossible, because the financial market is a kind of life source, a lifeline, for the real economy. Consequently, there must be a clear regulation of the market carried out by the state or the European Union, at European Union level, of all market participants. This is essential. Therefore, one future possibility is a renewed social market economy with better rules. I am sure this is the desirable solution. The second possible scenario is a kind of soft socialism, a neo-statism. However, there is a danger and a tendency in many countries, even European countries, to move towards this neo-statism or soft socialism. This move is designed to overregulate the whole economy, to control, to restore the state’s involvement in the living economy, to give it a role in industry and in the banking system, among other sectors. Of course, in a period of transnationalism this movement is possible and perhaps necessary, even now. Nevertheless, I think it is important to have strong state regulation that establishes a framework but does not intervene in day-to-day business. So soft socialism is one of the big issues, and there is a tendency to move in that direction. Finally, the third scenario is a global depression. We cannot exclude this possibility, because the economic crisis is not over. When the Bank of England made its latest forecast for 2009, it anticipated a contraction of 2%. In real economic terms, this is significant. As all the big players in the world examine ways to improve their growth rate, we must ask ourselves what we can do. China, for instance, is injecting around $500–$600 billion towards a stimulus package of measures for families and infrastructure. This is a good move, because it’s not possible for China to keep getting more and more currency reserves. They have to do more internally to return a portion of their growth back to the Chinese people. The US is now working on a $170 billion growth package. In Japan the figure is $50 billion and in Germany, $16 billion. In the United Kingdom, Alistair Darling is now creating a similar package, and this trend is being duplicated in other countries. The real problem, in my opinion, is still on the American side. In the 1980s, America had a savings rate of around 6%. Today that rate is a negative value; de facto it is even worse in the private sector. This is a significant imbalance. Americans do not save money. They buy everything they can. The confidence that emerging countries like China or others show in the American economy by buying dollars is, in a manner of speaking, giving the US the opportunity to continue on this spending spree. This has created a substantial trade deficit of around 5% of their GDP. There must, therefore, be an adjustment, and this is the real question that the new President, Barack Obama, is facing. The second big problem, after the economic and financial crisis – for which I think Europe had the right solutions and which it should continue to pursue – the second big problem is the energy sector. Today, energy dependence is a real issue for countries such as China and India, as well as for whole regions like Europe. The quest for energy security will cause more widespread tension as countries compete for privileged relationships with the producers. And this is the important issue. We are in fierce competition for energy supplies with countries like China, India and the United States.

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In 2030, Europe will be dependent on energy imports, amounting to 90% of our oil and two-thirds of our gas needs. According to a recent publication of the International Energy Agency (IEA) that highlighted the outlook for the coming 25 years, a 45% rise in energy demand is expected by 2030. This would require around 60 million additional barrels of oil per day, six times what Saudi Arabia produces today. The price will go up to from $120 a barrel to $200 in today’s prices. OPEC countries will control 50% of the fossil fuels, compared with 40% today. The real problem is not so much the reserves. The reserves are there. The real problem is the investments needed to exploit the reserves. The OPEC countries will have to cover the demand. In order to fulfil this demand, an investment of $8 trillion is needed. And $8 trillion is not easy to get, especially in those countries where multinational companies are not easily established. The IEA describes a tendency in which the state-owned national companies will play a much bigger role than they do today. This, of course, will have a large impact on climate change. If this tendency continues, the IEA predicts an overall increase in temperature of 6 C, compared with the desirable, yet very difficult scenario of a 2 C increase agreed to by the European Union. This would mean that hundreds of millions of households, car owners and businesses would have to dramatically change the way they use energy. This is not easy to do, and Europe has taken the lead in this cause. In fact, Europe is probably the only large region that is truly committed to deliver on such an important issue. Obama’s message on the issue of energy consumption has been quite impressive. Since his election on 4 November 2008, he has made two major announcements in which he reassured the world that he wants to implement a radical departure from Bush’s environmental policy, from high-energy use to lower energy use. This is quite interesting for us. And it could give us an important role to play, together with the US and other partners. The third point I want to raise concerns the importance of EU–US relations. There was a global commentary following Obama’s electoral victory, a kind of sigh of relief now that the dark times of the Bush administration are over and Obama’s time has come. The scenes were impressive, from Athens to Nairobi and from Washington to New York. The scenes from the election-night rally in Chicago’s Grant Park were impressive. This was really an emotional outbreak of sympathy and of high hopes that surely will not be easy to fulfil. And maybe it is a specific American characteristic to always look for a messiah rather than for average politicians like Kostas [Karamanlis], myself or others. But this is the American way. There is an enormous need for change. The White House will now have a leader who believes that climate change is a serious issue instead of one who denies it. Obama’s proposed bailout of the American car industry is now linked to a programme devised to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles. This is quite impressive, and would have been impossible to imagine three or four years ago. On Iran there is a growing, maybe unanimous, consensus that Tehran cannot be allowed to become a nuclear power. And there is a commitment to diplomacy, cooperation and dialogue. And the noises now coming from the incoming American administration are much less warlike. Force is not excluded, but treated as it always should be – as the

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last resort, not the first. I am sure Al Qaeda will be a target of the Obama administration. This is also in our own interest because the hunt for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and other terrorists remains high on the agenda. Obama’s criticism of the war in Iraq was that it diverted the attention away from the real fight against terrorists. This is an important issue, and I am sure the Washington Post was right when they predicted that this will be a big issue during the first days of Obama’s administration. The EU foreign ministers met informally last week in Marseilles at a Gymnichtype meeting, where they prepared a six-page paper on our offer to the US. The paper’s first point was a new commitment to a multilateral approach to using the United Nations. It was founded and created by America and European countries; it is our joint instrument. The second point concerns the Middle East. Remember that a major group of conflicts in the world are more or less linked to the Palestinian–Israeli question. I am sure that as President, Obama will tackle this problem as soon as possible, because there is an old rule in politics: big problems must be addressed immediately. If you postpone the solution, you will never be able to deliver it. Therefore, I think this is one of the big issues on which Obama will have to deliver. The third point, and this is something that concerns me, is the nuclear weapons issue. Vienna is the home of the International Atomic Energy Organisation, and I was a member of a group of so-called wise men who discussed the future of this organisation. The absolutely overriding message is that today we still have around 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world, 3,000 tons of fissile material, enough to make 250,000 bombs, stored in more than 40 countries. And it is a small step from enriched uranium, which is needed for civilian use, to weapons production. At the moment there is a recommendation by the IEA, calling for 1,400 new nuclear power plants in the world by the year 2050. Imagine what this means. So there is first a need for a new approach to disarmament, and second, the need for an internationally functioning mechanism to regulate fissile material and to control enrichment banks. On this subject there is great hope. In spring 2007 a document was published by two Republicans and two Democrats: George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn. And all of them, from both political parties, had the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. And this is also what Obama promised in his election campaign. I think this is something we should really focus on – it is something that Europe should also demand. This is particularly important because if we do not work towards nuclear disarmament, there will be a real threat, especially from some terrorist groups, who will be able to get enough material to construct a relatively crude and easy-to-build bomb to threaten civil society in one or another country. So there is really a two-step approach needed: disarmament and international regulation. And this should be on the agenda in both Europe and the US, in my opinion. And now to Europe itself. I think that in the coming years, we will surely face different perceptions and different analyses in both America and Europe. There will not be a big change in fundamentals, in the interests of America and Europe. There will also be a tendency to divide and rule, different ideas between old Europe

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and new Europe; this is the old way and it will not change. But in my opinion, we have to take a new initiative. Today’s EU leaders want to take more decisions on an intergovernmental basis, rather than use the supranational EU structures. This is a recipe for fewer decisions, because there must be unanimous agreement. Even so, Europe will not only remain an important economic player, because we are the greatest and largest economic group in the world, but also an extremely important policy player, as the largest democratic group of countries in the world. There will be a need for growing cooperation between Europe and the US in management, competition policy, business regulation as well in as setting norms. The EU has one important element: the eurozone. And we can now say that this has been an important and very effective shield for our economies against speculation and uncertainties. Look at Iceland. They now have a 15% interest rate. They lost 70% – more or less two-thirds – of their currency reserves. And it is no surprise that Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen last week proposed that the people of Denmark should decide as soon as possible on joining the eurozone. In 2000 they said no. A similar rejection occurred in Sweden, the Baltic states and other countries. But I am concerned about the tendency in some European member states towards a kind of euroscepticism, which is not easy to understand. It has become all too easy to brand the Brussels elites and politicians who support Europe as scapegoats for all political problems and lacking in substance, because they do not understand the concerns of average citizens and they ‘submit to the EU dictatorship’ – here I am simply quoting popular press headlines. They [EU politicians] do nothing, or not enough, or take the wrong measures against rising prices. They prevent referenda on European themes. One only has to look at the most recent example in Austria. It has also come to my attention that in Greece, George Papandreou asked for the same thing as our Social Democrats in Austria: all important changes to the Lisbon Treaty should be submitted to a referendum. What does this mean? We want a more integrated European policy? We from the center-right want this. Socialist and Social Democrats do not. They want to continue with a populistic approach, and this is not easy to understand, since integration made us strong. The Irish example is very instructive. It shows that national referenda simply do not offer a solution to a complicated technical matter such as the Treaty of Lisbon. They merely create a vehicle with 27 brake pedals, since for every referendum vote virtually all 27 members have to vote. Indeed, the European Union does have experience with referenda. A total of 37 have been held since 1972, 20 of them on accession and 17 on new treaties and/or the introduction of the euro. Ten out of these 17 did not yield the desired result. Moreover, three-quarters of the member states are familiar with the referendum mechanism. In two member states a referendum is obligatory for certain EU treaties. But it is important to realise that a no from a single member state means a no for all 27 members, not only for the state that voted no. I am concerned because there is now a growing tendency for all the eurosceptic voices to join together. Take Ireland’s Declan Ganley, a millionaire who financed the ‘no’ campaign there. It was a perfectly designed campaign: if you don’t know,

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vote ‘no’. This is easy to understand but provides no solution at all. Stuart Wheeler, a millionaire in the UK, orchestrated a similar campaign. And in Austria, the former owner of the largest newspaper does everything to promote a ‘no’ campaign. I am certain that the next European election, to be held on 7 June 2009, will be a de facto referendum on Europe, our European way of life and our European model. This is an important thing. Despite this, we have to be united. The Christian Democrats, the Conservatives and even the pro-European Social Democrats should be aware of what is at stake. It is not only the result of the election but much more, because the Lisbon Treaty is really misunderstood in some parts. The Libson Treaty is not a big change; it is not a constitutional treaty. It is just a new and better step forward. It simply places the European Parliament in a better position, a position of greater equality regarding the decisions taken by the European Council, nothing more. It represents a fully democratic vote on two sides: the member states and the directly elected members of the European Parliament. The European Charter is a big step forward for average citizens, who can now fight for their own rights before the European Court. There is no danger in this, only an advantage for average citizens. And with respect to other areas such as the energy policy: as I mentioned, the Treaty includes an article indicating that Europe is now able and willing to create a new energy policy. I find it quite interesting to see that during the last days or weeks, three former prime ministers of the Social Democratic movement, Costas Simitis in Greece, Gerhard Schro¨der of Germany and Franz Vranitzky of Austria, condemned calls for national referenda because they knew what it meant. This is one important step we should be aware of, and my plea is that we should not give in. This is my plea. I will conclude by explaining what Europe must do. First of all, think of what is coming around the corner. There are big challenges, not only in the financial and economic crisis, but also, as Kostas Karamanlis has mentioned, around the question of migration. This is a big issue, and we cannot create a European fortress. It is impossible to guard the thousands of islands around Europe with military or police forces. What we need is a kind of solidarity among member states in order to help each other. We have the tiny island of Malta, which gets hundreds of refugees every day. What does this mean for a member state like Malta? The same goes for refugees and for asylum seekers from the East. We have to be aware of this major problem. We must stay open. I will never forget the summit in Thessaloniki that created the open-door policy for all the Balkan states, allowing them to become, sooner or later, member states of the European Union. This is the only solution, the only way to create a stable and peaceful Balkans. There is no other alternative. It was the Greek Presidency that created this open-door policy. Austria has always supported it because it is also in our own interest. We must face these coming events. What are the real problems? We must think big. We have to speak loudly and with one voice, and not only concerning our own national interests.

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The Lisbon Treaty is one solution. An elected president of the European Council is needed, not these revolving six-month presidencies. It is not easy. The Slovenian Presidency was fine. Then the French had a very successful Presidency. And now the Czech Presidency will have to learn the same lesson. But the problems are not over. So it makes sense to have a continuing process. Therefore, the message is: Think big. Speak loud. Act fast, without putting off all the difficult questions of budget, pensions and demographic issues. Act fast, and live in a positive way, based on hope and optimism.

The ‘Promise’ of the Lisbon Treaty: A Critical Reading* Dimitris N. Chryssochoou

Introduction At the conclusion of a high-stakes public campaign, French and Dutch voters rejected, in May and June 2005 respectively, the Constitutional Treaty that had previously been approved by EU heads of states and governments on 29 October 2004 in Rome. Such a major blow to the ratification process threw the EU into a profound, but not entirely unexpected, political crisis. However, the Constitutional Treaty – which was meant to be replaced by a reform treaty, as agreed to by EU leaders in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 – was viewed by many as a rather modest step towards the constitutionalisation of the treaty framework. Most analysts have asserted that the whole constitutional project was expected to contribute to a more balanced form of decision-making in an enlarged EU-27, coupled with a strengthening of the EU’s institutional capacity to act in a more coherent and coordinated manner regarding its external relations (through a European Foreign Affairs Minister, who would also serve as a member of the Commission – a provision, however, that was not part of the Lisbon Treaty). Overall, the causes for rejecting the Constitutional Treaty were mainly nationally driven. Taken together, these produced an ideologically incoherent yet discernible block of votes against ratification. This does not imply that greater democracy in the larger polity can only be an outcome of integration, since the French and Dutch voters exercised their equally democratic right to oppose the enactment of a major treaty reform for which they had little democratic input. Be that as it may, had the Treaty been ratified by all its signatories, the EU would have continued to rest primarily on a dynamic set of treaty-based rules or, at best, on a quasi-constitutional system of checks and balances designed to organise authority within a non-state polity. Yet by virtue of its integrative and symbolic nature, the Constitutional Treaty promised a new constitutional ordering, albeit of a (much) less federalist type than a conventional

*Liberal Emphasis 34, January-February-March 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 35 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_6, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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constitutional settlement. In other words, the Treaty was not meant to take the EU towards a post-national state of play (Habermas, 2003).

The Lisbon ‘Promise’ At the June 2007 European Council meeting in Brussels, a decision was taken to set up a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to make the necessary preparations for a reform treaty to be agreed upon by the end of 2007. The new treaty was signed by EU leaders in Lisbon and was expected to be ratified by 1 January 2009; a year of European Parliament elections followed by the appointment of a new Commission. It promised to ‘rescue’ most of the Constitutional Treaty’s envisaged reforms, save for its strong political symbolisms, thus representing the long-awaited response of the EU to a prolonged political crisis, which was conveniently termed, if not camouflaged, by EU officials as a ‘reflection period’. The Lisbon Treaty was to be ratified by national parliaments, with the exception of Ireland, which had committed to holding a referendum. Turning to the Treaty itself, the areas of actual or potential EU involvement are classified under three categories: 1. Exclusive competences (allowing the EU to make directives and to conclude an international agreement when provided for in a piece of EU legislation in the fields of customs union; competition policy; monetary policy for members of the eurozone; the conservation of marine biological resources under the fisheries policy; and common commercial policy); 2. Shared competences (in the areas of the internal market; economic, social and territorial cohesion; agriculture; fisheries, environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-European networks; energy; areas of freedom, security and justice; and common safety concerns in public health matters); and 3. Supporting actions (allowing the EU to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement state action in areas relating to the improvement and protection of human health, industry, culture, tourism, education, youth sport and vocational training; civil protection; and administrative cooperation). Other pro-integrationist elements, such as those relating to the EU’s democratic life and the abolition of the three-pillar structure, include an extension of QMV (qualified majority voting) in some 40 new instances (most crucially in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, with Britain and Ireland having secured the right to pick and choose whether to participate therein, and with the ECJ [European Court of Justice] gaining broad oversight for the first time); a single legal personality for the EU; a full-time standing president of the European Council (elected for a 2.5-year term, renewable once); a smaller Commission, with fewer commissioners than there are states, beginning in 2014 (a rotation system would apply every five years, with each country having a commissioner for ten years of the first 15); a strengthening of the European Parliament’s co-legislative rights; an enhanced role for national parliaments in their dealings with the Commission

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(with reference to the application of subsidiarity). But there was no mention of a European Foreign Affairs Minister. Instead, the Treaty merged the post of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) High Representative with the Commissioner for External Relations. Also, all references to EU symbols, including the term ‘constitution’, were dropped. Although the Treaty made a legally binding reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the latter was not included in the Treaty, as had the aborted Constitutional Treaty. These developments, together with the fact that the Lisbon Treaty was not an integrated text replacing all earlier treaties, constitute instances of constitutional regression. The overall assessment is that the Lisbon Treaty was a compromised structure among divergent and, more often than not, conflicting national interests, accommodating in the end the demands of the more sceptical actors such as Britain and Poland. Too many reservations, opt-outs, references to the retention of states’ prerogatives in relation to competences and reform practices, along with a considerable delay in applying the double majority system of the Constitutional Treaty (not before 2017, although from 2014 a new version of the 1994 Ioannina Compromise will take effect) have prevented the EU from consolidating its political identity and have failed to signal a shift in the basis of legitimation towards more active and inclusionary virtues of belonging. The Lisbon Accords were on a par with the Amsterdam and Nice reforms and, hence, made at the expense of a democratic visionary project to re-ignite the public’s interest in EU affairs. At a time when the EU retains its character as a via media between different forms of polity, governance and representation, the initial prospects for endowing a fragmented demos with a common civic identity that would nurture a sense of ‘demos-hood’ did not in the end prove realistic enough. Instead, the nebulous and unceremonious outcome of Lisbon reveals that the exclusion of citizens from the drafting stages – the absence of a participatory method of EU constitution-making – has been at the expense of elevating their status to a system-steering agency. The whole enterprise has thus acted against the interests of better equipping citizens to become the decisive agents of civic change and further enhancing their horizontal integration within a pluralist order composed of entangled arenas for action. Anything less will perpetuate an elitist operation that deprives the EU from acquiring a distinct political subject, whose civic identity exists independently of national public spheres, but whose politics extends to both EU and national civic arenas. Even the new dialectic between sovereignty and integration, carrying the implication of an explicit right to co-determination, has failed to produce a credible commitment to democratising the EU. As with previous reforms, the Lisbon Accords, far from representing a cause ce´le`bre for a democentric process of union, amount to a cautiously negotiated deal of ‘partial offsets’ to key democratic problems facing the future of the EU. For what they failed to produce is not only a common democratic vision per se, but also a belief that such a vision remains beyond reach, at least in the foreseeable future. This is justified further by a perception of the Lisbon outcome as the product of a predominantly utilitarian calculation among the divergent and even controversial expectations of national elites.

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Theoretical Projection At this juncture in the integrative process, a theoretical projection of the EU as a general system gives credit to the concept of ‘synarchy’, for it offers the possibility of thinking about the establishment of a novel form of polity that can reconcile the quest for segmental autonomy with a sense of political unity for the whole (Chryssochoou, 2009). The theory chimes well with the idea of extending the organisation of authority in new areas of collective symbiosis, but should not be taken as a means for regional state-building. This view accords with Tsatsos’s (2007) view of the EU as ‘a sympolity of states and peoples’, and is indicative of the kind of conceptual synergies normative theory allows in post-statist directions (Walker, 2003). Synarchy advocates a system of co-determination based on the idea that the parts co-constitute the general system. This is linked to the ability of the latter to perform political functions that promote the sharing of sovereignty. Thus synarchy does not invalidate the member sovereignties, nor does it threaten their legitimising role within states. It refers to a form of governance that does not presuppose the end of the nation state or its ability to guide the future of the political community to which it refers: the members of a national demos. It also brings to the fore a commonly shared perception of states as constituent units with the capacity to co-exercise their individual sovereignties in a convergent manner. Hence, it recomposes the latter: politically, by extending the level of collective symbiosis; legally, through a commonly formulated law. In a word, it is an organised ‘multiplicity of autonomies’, rather than an ‘autonomous multiplicity’. The term ‘synarchy’ derives from the Greek verb suna´rwo and means ‘co-governance by two governors’. It directs us to a form of governance that accords with the post-statist reality of the ‘EU order’, linking together the praxis of co-determination with the idea of ‘organised co-sovereignty’. In the debate about the transmutations of sovereignty, synarchy sketches out a transition from classical Westphalian interstate relations to a multilevel and post-statist system of shared rule, operating within the structural logic of ‘co-governance’: the joint exercise of competences at multiple territorial and functional areas. Yet the idea of synarchy should not be equated with a new type of stato beyond the nation state and capable of transcending the historic reality of nation-building. It does not point to the emergence of a new sovereignty, as in the process of creating a federal state, nor does it sweep away the member demoi with an imposed homogenisation, building a new legal and political subject devoted to a new hierarchy. Rather, it rests on the ascent of a cooperative culture among the subunits that is based on mutually reinforcing perceptions about the organisation of collective life. This allows the parts to acknowledge the idea of synarchy as the basic principle around which a new form of unity is being built: a cooperative political culture, as an expression of an advanced sense of political co-ownership. Today, one could perceive the European synarchy as a post-statist analogy, paving new paths in debating the transmutations of sovereign statehood. To the extent that the idea of co-determination offers an instrumental view to understanding the nature of ‘co-governance’ in the EU, synarchy indicates a wider frame that

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preserves a dynamic equilibrium between the collectivity and the parts. In this light, the changing conditions of state sovereignty can now be interpreted as the right of the constituent polities to be involved in the process of co-exercising common competences and to claim an active role in the representation of their interests in the general system, while retaining responsibility in critical decisions. The point made by Taylor (2003, p. 27, 28, 53) is that just as in the classical sovereignty doctrine, where a higher normative order was said to exist that legitimised the terms of sovereignty in the secular power structures of the day, so too are states recognised as sovereign, not on the basis of what they can actually do on their own, but on the basis of their ability to participate in the arrangements of the international community and to abide by the demands of a higher value system that constitutes the international culture of the community of states. This relates to the idea of a ‘political society of states’, where states can now be taken as ‘citizens’ of a world community (Taylor, 2003, p. 57). Only if a state qua citizen fulfils its international obligations can it be considered sovereign: as a member of a rule-governed society of states. Hence, a new quality in sovereignty relations has developed, evident in Europe’s composite polity (Manitakis, 2007): even though sovereignty is still being made by the subsystems, these are constituted by the general system to which they also belong; their sovereignty being an expression of their participation in a larger management system. As a synarchy, the EU directs the dialectics of state sovereignty towards a philosophy of governing that reconciles the political tradition of Europe as the cradle of Westphalian sovereignty with the transcendence of sovereign statehood. This dialectic rests on a common learning process depending on mutual trust, ‘in which ideas as well as interests shape the search for consensus’ (Wallace, 2000, p. 253). Such properties make the EU the most advanced application of the principle of ‘consonance’: neither do the institutions of the general system exist independently of the subunits, nor do the latter operate independently from the institutional structure of the whole (Taylor, 2003, p. 213).

Interim Conclusion For a polity that was founded and is still based on an international treaty, and whose incipient but fragmented demos lacks effective civic competence, the transition from an aggregative to a deliberative model of governance is neither easy nor linear. Yet the Lisbon Treaty lends support to those who argue that the general system is closer to a state-centric form of governance – a synarchy of entwined sovereignties – rather than to a democentric form of polity. It was a treaty without a vision, lacking a sense of democratic purpose with reference to the emergence of a European demos. Like any other polity that aspires to becoming a democracy, the EU has to engage itself in a constitutive process to bring about a new framework of participatory politics, whose decisions are informed by a principled public discourse. This is because the EU will continue to be confronted with the reality of multiple polities and demoi.

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References Chryssochoou, D. N. (2009). Theorizing European integration (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. Habermas, J. (2003). The postnational constellation (in Greek). Athens: Polis. Manitakis, A. (2007). The impasses of EU constitutionalisation and the prospects for the transition from the condominium of states to the joint rule of the peoples of Europe (in Greek). International and European Politics, 8, 111–126. Taylor, P. (2003). International organization in the age of globalization. London: Continuum. Tsatsos, D. T. (2007). European sympolity: For a European Union of states, peoples, citizens and European constitutional culture. Athens: Livanis. Walker, N. (Ed.) (2003). Sovereignty in transition. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Wallace, W. (2000). Collective governance. In H. Wallace & W. Wallace (Eds.), Policy-making in the European Union (5th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Climate Change and Its Effects in Greece* Stavros Dimas

The number of ‘climate sceptics’, namely people who obstinately deny the existence of the problem, has now dropped to a minimum. Science has spoken, almost with one voice, on the causes and effects of climate change, and the ways it must be addressed. Questioning the findings of science on this issue is no longer possible. Climate change has acquired great economic, social and political importance. It also impacts health, foreign policy and international security. In Europe and, indeed, throughout the world, the matter is now in the hands of political leaders at the highest level. Despite the contentions of some, this is not an issue of the moment that will eventually fade from the political horizon. Unfortunately, it will be with us for quite some time. Therefore, all of us – citizens, governments, parliaments, the media, international organisations, local societies, educational institutions, businesses, nongovernmental organisations – must take an active stance to ensure that the right measures are chosen and effectively implemented. Contrary to what some, at least until recently, have claimed, there is no contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection, especially as regards fighting climate change. Economic growth can and must be achieved in a manner that respects the environment and the principle of sustainability. To achieve this, climate parameters must be included in all policies. Indeed, the economic transformations we have recently witnessed as we move towards a low-carbon ethos are generating new economic opportunities through the promotion of ecology-related innovation and new job creation in areas such as clean technologies. Perhaps the most powerful image we all have of the effects of climate change is the melting of the Arctic ice cap. But in many other ways as well, the negative impact of climate change is becoming more and more evident. If the appropriate measures are not taken in a timely manner and on a global scale, the consequences

*Liberal Emphasis 34, January-February-March 2008. This article is based on a speech given by Mr Stavros Dimas at a public event organised by the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy in Athens on 22 February 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 41 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_7, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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will be catastrophic. We must not forget that climate change leads to climate destabilisation, followed by extreme, uncontrollable phenomena – not to linear, predictable global warming. There are of course some – fortunately few – who claim that climate change and global warming could even be a positive development, since, for example, the Mediterranean will lose its tourist business, and the North Sea will become a popular tourist destination. It has even been said that Siberia, which will become warmer, will be ideal for growing bananas. If this were not the opinion of an advisor to the Russian President, published in the international press, it would merely be dismissed as a joke. In layman’s terms, climate destabilisation, which I mentioned above, means we do not know which areas will become warmer or colder, and who will suffer the most. It is interesting to note, however, that at a global level, climate change is ‘socially unfair’ since poor countries, and in particular those that historically have not had the slightest responsibility for creating the greenhouse effect, are the ones most severely hit. In the Mediterranean and in countries like Greece, there will be major effects. The average yearly temperature in the region has risen by one degree Celsius, compared to an average global increase of 0.74 C. The effects will be felt in many sectors and impact existing natural resources, the economy and way of life. Drought and water shortages will intensify and desertification will accelerate. Seaside towns such as Thessaloniki and Mesolonghi will most likely become inundated. In terms of nature and biodiversity, there will probably be a migration of birds, for example, from Cape Tenaros to beyond the Greek borders and further north. There will be consequences for agricultural production and crops. The problem of forest fires will become even worse, leading to loss of forests and greater carbon dioxide emissions. Health will also be affected since we will witness the reappearance of diseases that now occur only in warmer climates. Tourism will also suffer. We must never forget that climate change is a global problem and, as such, requires a global solution. The European Union is taking the global lead in tackling this problem. During the UN Climate Change Conference in December 2007, we managed, after very difficult negotiations, to meet the targets that we as the European Union had set. Now the negotiations will start for a new international agreement, which needs to be completed by the end of 2009. There is much to be done in the next couple of years. ‘Climate diplomacy’ is particularly intense. To be sure, the United Nations process will take priority. We will, however, be actively present and participate in a series of fora such as the G8. We will place special emphasis on EU bilateral talks and summit meetings with major players in the international arena, including the United States, Russia, China and India. In the upcoming, difficult negotiations, the EU’s objective will be for all states to reach an agreement to limit global temperature increase to no more than two degrees. To achieve this, global greenhouse gas emissions must be cut by half by 2050 (in relation to 1990 levels). Last March (2007) European heads of states and governments committed themselves to cutting EU emissions by 30% by 2020 – on the condition that other

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developed countries follow suit, in the framework of an international agreement. However, until this international agreement is reached, the EU has committed itself to unilaterally cutting emissions by at least 20% relative to 1990 levels by 2020, irrespective of what other countries do. The EU’s reliability and effectiveness of action at the global level is to a great extent judged on the basis of the measures it adopts for itself. The EU is making very good progress and will meet its targets for the first period of the Kyoto Protocol, which ends in 2012. This target is an 8% reduction. Moreover, the European Commission recently adopted an important set of proposals for climate change and energy-related measures that will allow us to meet the targets set by the European Council in 2007. Without going into great detail, this set of measures contains the following: l

l

l l l

A proposal to review the directive on the EU’s greenhouse gas Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS); A proposal for fair burden sharing, based on per capita GDP, regarding the efforts member states must make to reduce emissions in sectors of the economy not covered by the ETS; Proposals to increase the share of renewable energy sources to 20% by 2020; A 20% improvement in energy efficiency and energy saving by 2020; The creation of a legal framework for carbon dioxide capture and storage, in order to protect the environment from the implementation of this technology.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Commission has already proposed other important measures in a similar vein, including proposals for better energy efficiency and energy saving for cars and the reduction of carbon dioxide in fuels and air transport – and even proposals for waste disposal (the well-known problem of waste disposal sites). For those who are not very familiar with the decision-making process in the Brussels ‘maze’, here is a summary guide: following the Commission’s proposals, the next step is the codecision process, namely, the Council of Ministers and Parliament discuss and vote on the proposal. The quickest possible adoption of these measures is of great importance if we want to meet our targets. Having discussed the global and European aspects, I want to return to the local level and refer to Greece. I would like to present a broad outline of my thoughts on tackling climate change here. 1. Greece must systematically work towards meeting its Kyoto Protocol targets. The emissions target for Greece is +25%. Whereas the overall EU target is an 8% reduction, some member states, including Greece, are allowed to increase their emissions. As early as 2005 the country increased its emissions by 25.4%. Projected to 2010, and on the basis of the total measures already taken, Greece’s emissions will rise to +34.7%. This calls for particular attention since only by implementing additional measures, which are now being planned, will Greece be able to meet the Kyoto target and, according to calculations, reach a level slightly lower than +25%, i.e., +24.9% – which is certainly feasible. This

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2.

3.

4.

5.

S. Dimas

needs to be taken into consideration before making any new major investment decisions, especially in the field of energy, that could unfavourably tip the carbon dioxide balance. Moreover, by 2020 carbon dioxide emissions from facilities and sectors not covered by the trading scheme will have to be reduced by 4% relative to 2005 levels. Implementing the proposals entails a cost for all member states. But the Commission’s proposal offers a just distribution of these costs. In the case of Greece, the implementation cost will amount to 0.6% of GDP. There is, however, a general consensus that by making swift and smart moves in this field, one can lower the costs. Moreover, the required cost has been overestimated as it does not take into account collateral positive effects. For example, a reduction in the use of fossil fuel, especially oil, will lead to a drop in the cost of importing such resources and greatly improve the reliability of the energy supply. Moreover, a drop in carbon dioxide emissions will contribute to improving air quality, thus generating very substantial health benefits. There is often lively debate on the need to supply the country’s energy requirements, on the one hand, and environmental and climate change policy, on the other. Today, however, all areas of policy must integrate environmental and climate change issues. Moreover, the carbon dioxide balance needs to constitute a crucial criterion in all business and financial planning. In this context our investment decisions should be guided by the implementation of community policies, in the sense that the correct implementation thereof would even create the conditions for generating profit, e.g. with the sale of emissions rights through the emissions trading scheme, which is based on market imperatives. Conversely, if the emissions reduction obligations are not fulfilled, those who have remained inactive will suffer a financial burden. In the medium-long term, energy saving and efficiency will be of vital importance for Greece. There is great potential in this area. Moreover, energy saving and efficiency are broadly speaking more economical and seem more likely to offer an interim solution until cheaper renewable energy sources become more widely available. According to a recent study conducted by McKinsey consultants, annual investments in energy saving amounting to $170 billion globally would generate an annual return of approximately 17% or $29 billion. Such investments – which would only include low-cost, easy-to-implement energy saving measures that immediately produce results – would lead to a significant reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. For example, there is a great deal of room for improvement as regards energy recovery in both new and existing commercial and residential buildings. Calculations have shown that 40% of carbon dioxide emissions are building related. Greece, like other EU countries, has committed itself to having 20% of its energy consumption come from renewable energy sources by 2020. The target for Greece is 18% relative to 2005, when the share of renewables, including hydroelectric power, was 8%. Increasing the share of renewable energy sources is important. To achieve this, our country needs to have a comprehensive strategy in place. Its geomorphology offers great potential for utilising renewable energy

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sources, which today provide a relatively small share of the energy needs. Apart from solar and wind energy, emphasis can also be placed on other forms such as geothermal energy and biomass. Local companies need to participate in these processes and receive accurate information regarding the environmental and financial benefits that renewable energy sources can generate. Although according to EU legislation each member state is solely responsible for choosing its energy sources and production unit locations, the use of various fossil fuels in electrical power generation multiplies the production of greenhouse gases and counteracts the efforts other industrial concerns and sectors are making to limit them. Turning to renewable energy sources is to the country’s benefit, and it is heartening to see that this is the government’s policy. 6. EU countries also need to meet specific targets for biofuels. From an energy standpoint, biofuels could help the EU gradually reduce its dependency on imported energy sources. In our country, biofuels are important for farmers growing sugar beets, for instance. But we need to be cautious with biofuels. Massive use could have negative consequences, in both the environmental and social domains. For example, during production, energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions may be greater than the energy supposedly saved when the fuel produced is used. Furthermore, the anticipated rapid increase in biofuel demand could lead a country to redefine its agricultural planning, namely, to abandon traditional crops and seek new arable areas. Both practices would have negative effects on ecosystems and the supply of certain kinds of agricultural produce. Rainforests are at risk of being sacrificed to make room for energy crops. In addition, the anticipated increase in the price of many essential agricultural goods, as a consequence of the energy demand, will create serious social upheaval in poor countries where it will not be possible to secure food for large segments of the population. From an environmental perspective, so-called second-generation biofuels are expected to have better results. This is why the European Council has prescribed that biofuels need to be sustainable. In its set of measures for the climate and energy, the Commission has included the introduction of strict viability and sustainability criteria. 7. The policies aimed at addressing climate change must always be accompanied by a series of measures in many other areas. Taking the area of transportation as an example, this would mean tackling the traffic problem, imposing special taxes on high cubic capacity 4  4 recreational vehicles, offering incentives for the withdrawal of old cars and strengthening the low-cost car market, which would allow old cars to be replaced with clean technology vehicles. It would also mean addressing the problem of waste disposal sites, strengthening green entrepreneurship for cleaner products and preserving as many open and green areas as possible. 8. Finally, raising the public’s awareness is of particular importance. It is our duty to foster an ecological conscience: parents to children, teachers to pupils, politicians to citizens. Today, citizens express themselves as voters and consumers. Their environmental awareness is reflected in their political choices and consumption patterns. Responding to this, political parties and businesses need

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to include the environment in their long-term planning, policies and everyday practice. Furthermore, environmental education must become a required component of the school curriculum. According to recently published data, the environment is an optional subject in schools, with a small number of pupils participating – just 7% of junior secondary-school pupils. In conclusion, I would like to say that I am truly happy to see that environmental concerns have become deeply rooted in Greece’s political life. Environmental consciousness, just like democracy, is a sign of a civilised society. Environment, democracy, human rights and social justice are all interwoven. Having been a pioneer in so many important areas in the past, Greece must today be a pioneer in environmental issues as well.

Union for the Mediterranean, or Nicolas Sarkozy’s Voluntarism in International Relations* Fre´de´ric Allemand

On the night he was elected President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy promised ‘France’s return to Europe’.1 A little more than a year later this return was confirmed. France held the EU Presidency from 1 July 2008 until 31 December 2008. Thus, it was de jure and de facto ‘at Europe’s centre of gravity’.2 Furthermore, immediately upon his election, the new President took a stance on several matters crucial to the EU’s future (institutional reform, energy policy, combating climate change) and multiplied his initiatives and announcements (economic governance reform, European immigration pact, reviving European defence). The key point signalling this return was the organisation of a summit conference in Paris, on 13 July 2008, with the participation of heads of states and governments from EU member states, as well as from 16 countries of the Mediterranean basin, including Israel and its Arab neighbours. The objective of this meeting was to revive Euro– Mediterranean relations by creating an enhanced cooperation entitled ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’. This French dynamism in European affairs is not something that surprises us. On the one hand, France took over the Presidency of the EU 18 months after the German Presidency, which was considered a particularly successful one.3 On the other hand, the next French Presidency of the Council will not be until the year 2022!4 Finally, Sarkozy wants to prove that in politics, inevitability is the offspring

*Liberal Emphasis 36, July-August-September 2008. 1 Speech, Salle Gaveau, 6 May 2007. 2 Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, Strasbourg, 2 July 2007. 3 According to a poll conducted in April 2008 by Hill and Knowlton, 72% of the French who took part in the survey considered Germany to be the country with the greatest influence in Europe; 14% of responses rated France as most influential. 4 Whether the current treaties (art. 203 of the EC Treaty) remain in effect or the New Lisbon Treaty (art. 19, para. 9 of the EU Treaty) enters into effect, the Presidency of the Council will still be governed by the rule of half-year alternating terms. If the Lisbon Treaty enters into effect, the only notable change will be that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs will assume the Presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council (art. 16, para. 9, and art. 18, para. 3 of the EU Treaty). See also Les Echos (2008, p. 15).

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 47 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_8, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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of abandonment.5 ‘The future is written nowhere.’6 And what marks a statesman is his will to change the flow of things.7 However, being willing is one thing and being able is another, as the Cardinal of Retz (1999) noted in his memoirs: ‘There is a great distance separating intention from willingness, willingness from deciding the means, deciding the means from implementing.’ Although there is in general significant resistance to change at the national level, this resistance is much greater at the European level, where President Sarkozy is but the first among equals. This became evident specifically in the case of the draft of the Union for the Mediterranean. In order for the French proposals to be implemented, Nicolas Sarkozy had to gain the confidence of his European partners and transform his voluntarist rhetoric (namely, the rhetoric based on the perception that the driver of any action is our willingness to implement it) into diplomatic realism. And for French initiatives to last over time, this voluntarist dynamic had to be institutionalised.

From the Mediterranean Union to the Union for the Mediterranean: Voluntarism Faces Realism Since November 1995, relations between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean area have developed within the framework of the Barcelona Process. Having three aspects – political, economic and cultural – this process aims at ‘promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region’ (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Euro–Mediterranean cooperation was launched in a climate of relative optimism: the Oslo agreements at the end of 1993 and early 1994 revealed some hope for the general normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab countries. At the time, the expectation was that this more peaceful climate would be followed by economic growth in the Mediterranean basin and the strengthening of cultural ties. Ten years later, optimism gave place to disappointment from one side of the Mediterranean to the other. The Euro–Mediterranean process was unable to resolve the political crises that the Mediterranean basin had gone through in the past decade.8 The respect for rights and political freedoms was not adequately promoted (COM, 2003a; see also AHDR, 2002 – for reports on human rights in Arab countries). In areas of economy and culture, the Barcelona Process demonstrated some interesting 5

Lluvs Bassets, a columnist for the Spanish paper El Pais, feels that ‘the French President needs a brilliant and aggressive foreign policy in order to satisfy the French and get them out of their depression’ (cited in Torreblance, 2008). 6 Speech by Sarkozy, Toulon, 2 February 2007; the same expression was also used a few days later in Strasbourg, 21 February 2007. 7 Speech by Sarkozy, Ambassadors’ Conference, Paris, 27 August 2007. 8 The Barcelona Declaration did not manage to have an impact on the development of political crises that erupted in the Mediterranean area: the closing of the land borders between Morocco and Algeria due to the conflict in West Sahara (August 1994); the civil war and massacres in Algeria (1996–1998); the American invasion in Iraq (March 2003); or even the crisis in Lebanon (Summer 2006).

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results, such as the conclusion of eight association agreements between the EU, its member states and Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, this progress still falls short of initial expectations.9 The average income difference between the North and the South of the Mediterranean is still significant and according to one report, it stands at a ratio of one to five (almost US$30,000 in the EU compared to US$6,200 per resident of the South Mediterranean). Just 1% of the EU’s direct investments go to Mediterranean countries (Quefelec, 2003). Finally, the Euro–Mediterranean process is stuck because of technocratic and bureaucratic file management issues. Close to 2000 there were more intensive calls for a revision of the Euro–Mediterranean policy (Action Plan, 2002; COM, 2003b; Le Pensec, 2001; Mehdi, 2004; Lebatard, 2005), both at the Community body level and at a political level. Certain improvements were then made; however, they were inadequate and did not meet the expectations for reform.10 It is worth noting that only half of the heads of states and governments of Mediterranean partner states of the EU participated in the summit organised in Barcelona to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Euro–Mediterranean process. There was thus a favourable climate for an initiative, so President Sarkozy seized the opportunity and proposed the creation of a new regional organisation with the participation of Mediterranean countries that were separate from the EU. This was the ‘Mediterranean Union’. Its tasks would be structured around three common policies: immigration, ecology and common development. As regards its ties to the EU, the Mediterranean Union would ‘closely cooperate with the EU and share certain bodies’.11 This is a bold endeavour, inspired by the Council of the Baltic Sea States made up of the states surrounding this sea (France has observer status).12 By taking the Mediterranean Union out of the EU, this new organisation is freed from European rules and procedures governing foreign relations. This also allows for intergovernmental rather than Community governance,13 where heads of states and governments will hold a central position. As soon as he was elected, Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed his Euro–Mediterranean ambitions (during the Ambassadors’ Conference in August 2007), along with the guidelines for the Mediterranean Union (during his official visit to Morocco in October 2007).14 Nevertheless, given that its competences overlapped with those of

9

The creation of a broad free trade area in the Mediterranean area by 2010 appears unlikely today, due to the lack of liberalisation agreements in the farming products and services markets, or because of inadequate trade integration among the countries of the South. 10 In 2002, a new finance facility was created (the FEMIP). 11 Sarkozy, speech in Tangiers. 12 More information on the Council of the Baltic Sea States is available at http://www.cbss.st. 13 In the version presented in February 2007, the Mediterranean Union stipulated a periodic meeting of heads of states and governments of the member states and a Mediterranean Council based on the model of the Council of Europe. 14 The plan presented in Tangiers in October 2007 is similar to that presented in February 2007. However, important clarifications are made: on the one hand, ‘the Mediterranean Union, according to France, does not intend to substitute all pre-existing initiatives and plans’, including the Barcelona Process; on the other hand, the Mediterranean Union will be ‘of variable geometry, depending on the programmes’.

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the EU and it did not include certain de facto ‘Mediterranean’ EU member states (that have, for example, a large population coming from the Mediterranean or with economic interests in the Mediterranean basin), it stirred major negative reactions in Europe. Germany placed the issue at the top of the agenda during its talks with France in 2007 and early 2008. Italy and Spain were not all that keen to accept this possible challenge to the Barcelona Process, being two of its major inspirers. Other Europeans also feared that this would place an additional financial strain on Community resources. As for Turkey, it criticised the French initiative, saying that it was a poor substitute for accession into the EU. On the part of the Mediterranean countries, reactions were rather favourable, albeit moderate. In order to convince the 26 other Member States to support the Union for the Mediterranean, Nicolas Sarkozy was forced into being more realist, pragmatic and open to compromises. French diplomacy then embarked on a new effort. Sarkozy formed a team of 15 diplomats and high-ranking officials. The President multiplied his trips to European capitals and official visits to Mediterranean countries (six in one year, a record number). And the French plan evolved. In December 2007, at the Rome summit between Nicolas Sarkozy, Romano Prodi and Jose Luis Rodrigues Zapatero, the Mediterranean Union became the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’.15 Then in March 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel sealed their agreement for an initiative included in the Barcelona Process, but with a variable configuration: all EU member states will participate in the new process, but only those interested in specific actions taken up it its context will be allowed to take an active part. The March 2008 European Council adopted this agreement at the European level. Thus the Mediterranean Union was renamed the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’. The French plan became a Community plan. The EU resumed control of fostering Euro–Mediterranean relations. Then the European Council called on the Commission to submit a proposal on this issue (in close cooperation with the French government). This proposal, presented in May 2008, was approved at the European Council in June 2008. In return for the ‘communitisation’ of its plan, France succeeded in retaining the Mediterranean Union’s governance model, with some amendments enabling the application of Community treaties. The Union for the Mediterranean will have a council of heads of states or governments responsible for setting strategic guidelines and for resolving any political snag. The council will meet once every two years, co-chaired by one representative from the EU and one from the Mediterranean partner countries. The Union for the Mediterranean will also have a permanent general secretariat and a common standing committee. The plan proposed by the Europeans was approved at the summit of 13 July 2008. France’s success was almost absolute.

15

Joint press conference by Sarkozy, Prodi and Zapatero, Adrian Temple, Rome, 20 December 2007.

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The Functioning of the Union for the Mediterranean: The Necessary Institutionalisation of Voluntarism Placing the ‘return of politics to European construction’16 and to Euro–Mediterranean relations in the hands of a single person would only work for a limited time span. As Jean Monnet pointed out in 1952 in relation to the European Union, . . .[a union] cannot be founded merely on goodwill. It requires some rules. The tragic events we have experienced, as well as all that is happening today, may have made us wiser. However, people are not eternal and others will come to take our place. What we can bequeath to them is not our professional experience, as this will vanish with us, but institutions. Institutions have a longer lifespan than people and thus, if correctly created, can accumulate and convey the wisdom acquired by successive generations. (Monnet, 1952)

If it is to have lasting results, voluntarism must be channelled, institutionalised. As President of France, and as President of the European Council in the second half of 2008 (COM, 2008), Sarkozy is the first person who has also assumed the joint presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean, on behalf of the EU (along with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who will preside on behalf of the Mediterranean partner countries). Now that the French Presidency has ended, another state has assumed the European co-presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean, and nothing guarantees that it will have the same priorities as France. Indeed, the Czech Republic and Sweden, France’s successors in the EU Presidency, prefer to foster cooperation with Eastern Europe rather than the Mediterranean basin.17 So the Union for the Mediterranean is running the risk of soon becoming a ‘sleeping beauty’ and facing the same fate as the Barcelona Process. Organising regular summit meetings of heads of states and governments of the countries participating in the Union for the Mediterranean aims at minimising that risk. ‘Upgrading top political level relations between the EU and its European partners’ will give a new impetus to Euro–Mediterranean relations.18 Besides, the co-presidency principle allows the actions of the active co-president to offset the possible inaction of the other. In order to truly generate a chain effect, the co-presidency must not restrict itself to purely administrative roles (setting the agenda and chairing the meetings of the council of heads of states and governments). It must be able to actively contribute to the resolution of potential problems arising in the implementation of action in the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean. The leeway that each co-president has is commensurate with the capacity in which they exercise the presidency. If they represent a regional area (EU/Mediterranean partner countries), they will implement the directions that may have been fixed by their principals.

16

Ibid. There is very limited reference to the EU’s relations with its neighbours in the South in the work programme of the Council that was jointly prepared by France and the two countries (see European Council, 2008). 18 Sarkozy, speech in Tangiers. 17

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If they represent their country (France, Egypt, Tunisia, etc.) then the presidents may set their own priorities. The statement made on 13 July 2008 in Paris appears to favour a differentiated approach, depending on each regional area, as is evidenced in paragraph 22 concerning the terms for appointing each co-president (the co-presidency principle is established in paragraph 21). As for the EU, ‘the new co-presidency must agree with the European Union’s external representation according to the applicable provisions of the Treaty’. This means, on the one hand, that the president, on behalf of the EU, must obtain a mandate to represent the Council, and/or a negotiation mandate. On the other hand, when it comes to matters discussed in the context of the Union for the Mediterranean that concern a field of EU competence, prior Council agreement is required. Finally, the Commission will be actively involved in the negotiations and the European co-presidency, given the fact that it daily handles all EU relations with third countries.19 Entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty will also require the involvement of the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs in the European co-presidency. Europe’s representation will again be quite complex. As regards the Mediterranean partner countries, the solution adopted in July is simpler. It only includes the co-president appointment terms, and enables the countries of the South Mediterranean to decide on the status of their copresident. We doubt whether this person will have a negotiation mandate, given that the countries of the South enjoy an inadequate level of regional integration. The main mechanism, namely the Arab Maghreb Union, has been blocked since 1994 because of a conflict between two of its members (Morocco and Algeria). At the same time, nothing prohibits the Mediterranean co-president from contributing to strengthening the coordination between the countries of the South. Since 2002, Arab countries have made efforts to achieve internal coordination during the preparation of Mediterranean ministerial conferences. From the first draft until final implementation, the French initiative for a Mediterranean Union had to be amended and adjusted. This was the price of realising this endeavour. Sarkozy’s adherence to his plans had to comply with the requirements of international negotiations and the complexity of the Community legal framework. Nevertheless, Albert Camus’ remark that ‘in reality, the road has little importance; the will to arrive suffices for all’ (Camus, 1985) is absolutely manifest in the Union for the Mediterranean. For eight months, the Mediterranean was back at the heart of political debate, generating a rare interest. We now have to wait and see whether this interest will continue after the first actions of the Union for the Mediterranean begin. And so we shall meet again in two years’ time at the summit meeting of heads of states and governments of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

19

For a simple presentation of the competences and terms of EU representation in the various fields of EU responsibility, see the working document ‘Exterior action’ (European Convention, 2002).

Union for the Mediterranean, or Nicolas Sarkozy’s Voluntarism in International Relations

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References Action Plan. (2002). Adopted by the 5th Euro–Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22–23 April. AHDR. (2002–). Arab Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme (PNUD). http://www.arab-hdr.org. Barcelona Declaration. (1995). Adopted at the Euro–Mediterranean Conference, 27–28 November 1995; included in Attachment II, Conclusions of the European Council Presidency, Madrid, 15–16 December. Camus, A. (1985). Le mythe de Sisyphe. Paris: Gallimard. Cardinal de, R. (1999). Me´moires . . . Paris: Le Livre de Poche. COM. (2003a). Reinvigorating EU actions on human rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners – strategic guidelines. Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003) 294 final, 21 May. COM. (2003b). Wider Europe – neighbourhood: A new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours. Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003) 104 final, 11 March. COM. (2008). Communication to the Parliament and Council regarding the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, COM (2008) 319 final, 20 May. European Council. (2008). Joint programme of the Council, 13 June, 10684/08. Les Echos. (2008). Sarkozy’s European ambitions faced with reality. 10 January, p.15. European Convention. (2002). Working group VII on ‘External action’, Working document 15. http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/wd7/4154.pdf. Lebatard, C. (2005). Strengthening Euro-Mediterranean partnership: The role of civil society. Economic and Social Committee, Paris, October. Le Pensec, L. (2001). Senate report on behalf of the EU delegation regarding the progress of Euro– Mediterranean partnership, no. 121, Paris, 6 December. Mehdi, R. (2004). Public hearing on the dialogue of peoples and cultures in the Euro–Mediterranean area, before the European Parliament Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport. 18 February. http://www/europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20040218/cult/mehdi.pdf. Monnet, J. (1952). Speech delivered in Strasbourg, 11 September. Quefelec, S. (2003). European direct investments in Mediterranean countries. Eurostat: Statistics at a glance, no. 13. Torreblance, J. I. (2008). Sarkozy’s foreign policy: Where do European interests and values stand? FRIDE, Comment, February.

Does Too Much Regulation Stifle Employment?* Stefano Riela

It is widely accepted that even in a market-oriented economy, regulation is necessary. Only in theory can we design markets where the natural behaviours of economic agents lead to perfect competition equilibria, i.e. those situations in which consumers enjoy the highest possible level of prosperity. Since the adjective ‘perfect’ does not appear in the lexicon of daily life, we need regulation for negative externalities (e.g. pollution), information asymmetries (cf. moral hazard and adverse selection in the insurance sector) and natural monopolies (they exist, albeit for a limited period of time, until technology dramatically changes or demand increases). According to the Heritage Foundation (2008), when government coercion rises beyond the ‘minimal level’, it becomes corrosive to freedom. The first freedom affected is economic freedom. Notwithstanding the nature of the additional governmental intervention, an expansion of state power requires enforcement and therefore funding, which is extracted from the people. Moreover, not only markets, but even government intervention can fail (Stigler’s ‘capture theory’ deals with one way this can occur1). Therefore, regulation can be ineffective or even reduce the level of prosperity.

*Liberal Emphasis 37, October–November–December 2008. 1 According to Stigler (1971), regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with a highstakes interest in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and energies on attempting to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the outcome, will ignore it altogether. The economic basis is that vested interests in an industry have the greatest financial stake in regulatory activity and are likely to be less hindered by collective action problems that might riddle those affected by regulation (like dispersed consumers, each of whom has little particular incentive to try to influence regulators).

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 55 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_9, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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Therefore, we can affirm that there is physiological regulation (required to solve market failures) and pathological regulation (which leads to an equilibrium in which costs exceed benefits).

A Simple Methodology The aim of this article is to analyse whether there is a correlation between economic freedom and employment. Using a sample of 10 countries – Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland, Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and the United States – we consider the Index of Economic Freedom scores2 for 2000, 2004 and 2008, which in each case refer to the previous year and can therefore be used with the Eurostat employment data for 1999, 2003 and 2007. Figures 1–3 show a positive relation between economic freedom and the employment rate for the three years under consideration. The slope of the trendline3 is positive (0.9 for 1999, 0.8 for 2003 and 0.7 for 2007) and R2 increased during the period being discussed.4 Therefore, if we assume that pathological regulation restricts economic freedom, we can conclude that employment is affected negatively. The previous statement is for the most part confirmed by the country-level graphical analysis provided in the following figures. The correlation between employment and the Index of Economic Freedom is very clear for Ireland, Spain

80 R2 = 0,5996 US NL UK

70

PT DE FR PL

60

GR IT

ES

50 50

60

70

80

90

Fig. 1 Economic freedom (X axis) and employment (Y axis) in 1999

2

See the methodology described in Annex A. The trendline, the equation of the best-fit line, is determined using linear regression analysis. 4 The square of the correlation coefficient is a statistic that gives information about the goodness of fit of a model. In regression, the R2 coefficient of determination is a measure of how well the regression line approximates the real data points. An R2 of 1.0 indicates that the regression line perfectly fits the data. 3

Does Too Much Regulation Stifle Employment?

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80 R2 = 0,6384 NL 70

US UK

PT

FR

DE ES

60

GR

IT PL

50 50

60

70

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Fig. 2 Economic freedom (X axis) and employment (Y axis) in 2003

80 R2 = 0,7711

NL DE

70

US

UK

PT GR

FR

ES

60 PL

IT

50 50

60

70

80

90

Fig. 3 Economic freedom (X axis) and employment (Y axis) in 2007

and Italy. Of course, employment is less volatile than the Index of Economic Freedom since employers and employees need time to understand and adapt to new policies or measures introduced by governments, which are assessed in the Index as soon as they are approved. The Index trend, though volatile, is consistent with Dutch employment but is ineffective in explaining the steep raise in Greece after 2001. In Poland, liberal reforms were not immediately effective in supporting employment during the transition period. In the case of the United States, the degree of volatility is similar for the two variables, but the 2000 shock created a discontinuity whose effects have not yet been absorbed.

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France employment index of EF

68 66 64 62 60 58 56 1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

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2002

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employment index of EF

70 68 66 64 62 1995

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employment index of EF

62 60 58 56 54 1995

1996

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1999 2000

2004 2005

2006 2007

Does Too Much Regulation Stifle Employment?

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Ireland employment

84

index of EF

80 76 72 68 64 60 56 52 1995

1996

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index of EF 64

60

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48 1995

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1997

The Netherlands 84

employment index of EF

80 76 72 68 64 60 1995

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Poland 72

employment index of EF

68 64 60 56 52 48 1995

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1997 1998

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Spain employment index of EF

72 68 64 60 56 52 48 44 1995

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Does Too Much Regulation Stifle Employment?

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employment index of EF

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2001

A Focus on Labour Market Regulation As regards regulatory activity, particular attention should be devoted to labour markets, especially in continental Europe. Employment regulations are needed to allow efficient contracting between employers and workers and to protect the latter from discriminatory or unfair treatment by the former. According to the EC Treaty, regulation of the labour market falls mainly within the competence of member states. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find a competitive country such as Germany, which ranks 25th for ‘Ease of Doing Business’, being placed 142nd for ‘Employing Workers’5 (see the table that follows). This is slightly better than France (in 148th position), while the UK ranks 28th in this category, leading the

5

See the methodology described in Annex B.

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European countries in our sample. Thus, even though being in 96th place, Greece ranks last among OECD countries in the category ‘Ease of Doing Business’ - yet it does not have the ‘worst’ labour market in our sample (133rd). According to the World Bank (2009), governments all over the world face the challenge of finding the right balance between worker protection and labour market flexibility. But even if the perfect recipe does not exist, the World Bank affirms that while employment regulation generally increases the tenure and wages of incumbent workers, overly rigid regulations may have undesirable side effects. These include less job creation, smaller company size, less investment in research and development, and longer spells of unemployment and thus the obsolescence of skills, all of which may reduce productivity growth.

Concluding Remarks The analysis described in this article shows that regulation affects employment, one of the key drivers for boosting competitiveness: an internal aim (the more successful the economy is, the higher the probability that a government will be re-elected) and an external constraint (the challenges of globalisation should have turned what was once called the ‘Lisbon Strategy’, now ‘Growth and Jobs’, into an effective Brussels-approved agenda). Markets need regulation (as the financial crisis that has emerged in the last months has dramatically confirmed), but no clear rule exists to define what constitutes good regulation and bad (i.e. too much regulation). This being the case, we cannot but approve the European Commission’s proposals to improve regulation by working in these four areas: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Withdrawing a number of pending legislative proposals; Implementing a strategy to simplify existing legislation; Tackling the issue of administrative burdens; Placing greater emphasis on the use of impact assessments and public consultations when drafting new rules and regulations, the aim being to assess how new legal measures could help or hinder the functioning of Europe’s enterprises.

This is what every member state should do as regards both national and local policies.

Ease of doing business rank

France 31 Germany 25 Greece 96 Italy 65 Poland 76 Portugal 48 Spain 49 The Netherlands 26 United Kingdom 6 United States 3 Source: World Bank (2009)

Country 148 142 133 75 82 164 160 98 28 1

Employing workers rank 67 33 33 33 11 33 78 17 11 0

Difficulty of hiring index 60 60 80 40 60 60 60 40 20 0

Rigidity of hours index 40 40 40 40 40 50 30 70 10 0

Difficulty of firing index 56 44 51 38 37 48 56 42 14 0

Rigidity of employment index

32 69 24 11 13 95 56 17 22 0

Firing costs (weeks of wages)

Does Too Much Regulation Stifle Employment? 63

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Annex A: The Index of Economic Freedom The Index of Economic Freedom is a simple average of 10 freedoms: 1. Business freedom is the ability to create, operate and close an enterprise quickly and easily. Burdensome, redundant regulatory rules are the most harmful barriers to business freedom. 2. Trade freedom is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. 3. Fiscal freedom is a measure of the burden of government from the revenue side. It includes both the tax burden in terms of the top tax rate on income (individual and corporate separately) and the overall amount of tax revenue as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP). 4. Government size is defined to include all government expenditures, including consumption and transfers. Ideally, the state will provide only true public goods, with an absolute minimum of expenditure. 5. Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. Both inflation and price controls distort market activity. Price stability without microeconomic intervention is the ideal state for the free market. 6. Investment freedom is an assessment of the free flow of capital, especially foreign capital. 7. Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well as independence from government control. State ownership of banks and other financial institutions such as insurer and capital markets is an inefficient burden, and political favouritism has no place in a free capital market. 8. Property rights is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. 9. Freedom from corruption is based on quantitative data that assess the perception of corruption in the business environment, including levels of governmental legal, judicial and administrative corruption. 10. Labour freedom is a composite measure of the ability of workers and businesses to interact without restriction by the state. In the Index of Economic Freedom, all 10 factors are equally weighted. Each one of the 10 freedoms is graded using a 0–100 scale, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. A score of 100 signifies an economic environment or set of policies that is most conducive to economic freedom. The grading scale is continuous, meaning that scores with decimals are possible. Many of the 10 freedoms are based on quantitative data that are converted directly into a score. In the case of trade, a country with zero tariffs and zero non-tariff barriers will have a trade freedom score of 100.

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Annex B: Doing Business The World Bank’s Doing Business examines government regulation in the area of employment. Two measures are presented: a rigidity of employment index and a firing cost measure. The rigidity of employment index is the average of three sub-indices: difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours and difficulty of firing. Each index takes values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. The difficulty of hiring index measures the flexibility of contracts and the ratio of the minimum wage to the value added per worker. The rigidity of hours index covers restrictions on weekend and night work, requirements relating to working time and the workweek, and mandated days of annual leave with pay. The difficulty of firing index covers workers’ legal protections against dismissal, including the grounds permitted for dismissal and procedures for dismissal (individual and collective): notification and approval requirements, retraining or reassignment obligations and priority rules for dismissals and reemployment. The firing cost indicator measures the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of salary. To make the data comparable across economies, a range of assumptions about the worker and the company are used. The company is assumed to be a limited liability manufacturing corporation that operates in the economy’s most populous city, is 100% domestically owned and has 201 employees. The company is also assumed to be subject to collective bargaining agreements in economies where such agreements cover more than half the manufacturing sector and apply even to firms not party to them. In its indicators on employing workers, Doing Business measures flexibility in the regulation of hiring, working hours and dismissal in a manner consistent with the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO). An economy can have the most flexible labour regulations as measured by Doing Business while ratifying and complying with all conventions directly relevant to the factors measured by Doing Business and with the ILO core labour standards. No economy can achieve a better score by failing to comply with these conventions.

References Heritage Foundation. (2008). 2008 Index of economic freedom. Downloadable at http://www. heritage.org/research/features/index. Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics, 2(1), 3–21. World Bank. (2009). Doing business 2009: Comparing regulation in 181 economies. http://www. doingbusiness.org/documents/Press_Releases_09/DB09_Overview.pdf.

Greek Ideals in the American Democracy* Paul Sarbanes

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. The Institute is a carrier expressing the values of the Greek democracy, ancient democracy and American democracy. Through its work, it strives to promote democracy and the liberty of man, while maintaining its focus on promoting social cohesion through constant and open public debate. I think that the Institute demonstrates the role these values and ideals play in any democratic society. The Institute for Democracy quite rightly bears the name Constantine Karamanlis, for Constantine Karamanlis was a great public official, a visionary who, at the same time, was realistic, efficient, dynamic, devoted to his work and, for me personally, a source of great inspiration. I entered politics for the first time in 1967, as a member of the Maryland legislature. This was just a few months before the abolition of democratic institutions, rule of law and open public debate in Greece following the coup. That was a heavy blow for all exponents of democratic processes and democratic institutions throughout the world. The event greatly affected Americans like myself who respect and greatly appreciate ancient Greece’s contribution to the idea of the liberty of man. Indeed, as the distinguished American writer Edith Hamilton said when she was made an honorary citizen of Athens at the age of 90, ‘Greeks were the first free nation in the world. Freedom is a Greek discovery. Greece gained distinction because Greeks were driven by the most important spirit that drives humanity, the spirit that makes a man free.’ It was the same spirit that Patrick Henry conveyed during the American Revolution when he proclaimed, ‘Give me liberty or give me death’ and that in 1821 permeated Bishop Paleon Patron Germanos’s utterance ‘Freedom or Death.’ In the summer of 1974, the junta collapsed and Constantine Karamanlis returned to Greece to lead the new government. During the same period, as a member of the

*Liberal Emphasis 35, April-May-June 2008. This text is from a speech Mr Paul Sarbanes gave at the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy on 26 May 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 67 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_10, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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Justice Committee of the American House of Representatives, I was deeply involved in the impeachment process against President Richard Nixon, who was accused of obstruction of justice and abuse of power and was ultimately forced to resign. Therefore, in both our countries, the summer of 1974 was a period that saw the re-establishment of democratic institutions and democratic processes. I will try to share with you some thoughts regarding the relation between Greek ideals and American democracy. This is an issue that has often attracted the interest of intellectuals and scholars. Indeed, Constantine Karamanlis himself once noted that ‘the bonds linking Greece to the United States are old and strong. These are bonds stemming from the devotion of the peoples in both countries to the noble ideals of liberty and world peace.’ In his article in honour of Professor Kotsiris of the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki, Professor Keith Werhan of the Tulane University Law School identified certain analogies between the processes implemented in ancient Greece and those applied in the United States. He noted that ‘as is usually the case in world history, the Greeks got there first. Democratic governments achieve proper governance if they function through public institutions based on the rule of law.’ And while recognising the radical differences that distinguish the direct democracy of Athens from the representative democracy of the United States at the end of the eighteenth century, Professor Werhan concludes that ‘a common democratic spirit gave life to both systems of government during the critical phases of their creation. That very common spirit later lent a specific logic to the decision-making processes, a concept demonstrating astounding similarities over a 2000 year gap.’ American democracy is very young; everything is recent. There is no American antiquity. The United States, however, looks beyond this gap. Other scientific works focus on various points. Most examine the degree to which the founders of American democracy were inspired and taught by the Greek experience. Richard Gummere, a distinguished professor of classical studies at Harvard University, has written a profoundly important work entitled The American Colonial Mind and the Classical Tradition: Essays in Comparative Culture. In this work, he points out that what was exceptional of the American colonial period, during which practice combined with theory and ideas were considered more important than techniques, was political activity. In no other field nor period were ancient Greek and Roman sources used so often and to such an extent as sources of ideas and sayings than in the period of discussions for the Constitution, the Constitution ratification process and the shaping of the American Federation. Gladstone, the great British Prime Minister of the nineteenth century, described the founders of American democracy who gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 to draft the Constitution as ‘the most unusual gathering of leaders in human history’. According to Professor Gummere, ‘the authors of the Constitution did not just echo classical ideas. They applied them to the objectives of their times by giving them functional form. In their discussions, one often comes across references to

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Plutarch, Demosthenes, Thucydides, Xenophon and many others.’ He also notes that the material used by Jefferson, Adams and Madison included all legislators and political thinkers from Bracton to Blackstone, as well as every important writer of Greek and Roman antiquity. No eighteenth-century leader could evade the exalted spirit of Aristotle. His work Politics, which was based on the study of 100 constitutions, remains as topical today as when it was first written. It is quite remarkable to see how lively a part Greek thought played in the discussions for the drafting of the American Constitution. Its authors studied and discussed the virtues and imperfections of the Achaic Confederation and other confederative forms of Greek antiquity, and attempted to apply the teachings from this study to the new American democracy. They sought moderation and balance as they endeavoured to avoid both excessive executive power (after all, they had just revolted against the excessive power of a king) and extreme tendencies of legislative bodies (which, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, they had regularly experienced in the legislatures of many states). Apart from studying the history of Greek confederations, the forefathers of democracy sought direction on the basis of the universal belief that the power of every individual person must be subject to strict constraints. They referred to history to find examples of abuse of power and models for avoiding it. The great emphasis placed on the teachings of ancient Greece and ancient Rome stirred protests from certain delegates at the Convention. Delegate Barrell from Massachusetts commented ironically on the worship afforded to Cicero and Demosthenes at the Convention. Delegate Randall from Massachusetts noted that quotes from ancient history were about as important as narrations on how the first settlers used to fish for mussels in Plymouth, Massachusetts. In any case, Greek-Roman tradition made a decisive contribution to the American Constitution. For those of us who appreciate the Constitution and feel it is the cornerstone of American democracy, the strong and direct influence of Greek ideals is of great importance. In later times there was strong American support for the Greek Struggle for Independence. The three great men of the US Senate at the time, Henry Clay of Kentucky, Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, were strongly in favour of the Greek struggle. For more than two centuries, Americans have lived on the basis of the principles set forth in our Constitution. The forefathers of the Constitution relied on Greek ideals that, in turn, became the ideals of our society. When I have visitors from abroad, I am constantly surprised by the fact that they all want to visit the National Archives and see the original text of the American Constitution. I think this shows they understand that this document is America – this is the text that brings us together as a nation. Let us now turn to more contemporary influences. I would like to touch upon more recent developments. Following the nineteenth century there were, naturally, fewer and fewer references to classical Greece. But during a large part of the nineteenth century, classical Greece featured prominently in higher education in the United States. If one was a student at Harvard or Princeton, ancient Greek and

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Latin were central to the curriculum. But towards the end of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, there was a wave of immigration from Greece to the United States, which followed the earlier immigration waves from Ireland and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. Towards the end of the century, many Italians and Eastern Europeans arrived, followed by the Greeks. My father was part of that generation. He came to America in 1907, at the age of 15, from a village in Laconia. I would like to speak of the influence the Greek community had, as this was yet another dimension of the preservation and further fostering of the relations between Greece and the United States. I believe there are four core values that the GreekAmerican community has preserved all these years that are very important, since they shaped and continue to characterise our community. One value is hard work. Hard work is a feature of our community. Petros Liakouras, a good friend who for three decades was the dean and, later, president of Temple University, noted that 100 years ago, most Greeks arrived in America with no education. They reached the blooming cities of the New Land, where the prevailing values were hard work, self-sufficiency, family life and innovation. Their path towards the American dream started with a lot of hard work. They made huge sacrifices so that their children could at some point succeed. This is what I saw in my family, how hard my parents worked to keep their small business alive and support their family. Hard work is an inherent element of the Greek community in America. The second value is the very close and strong family bonds. You will know that we have extended families – we support all family bonds and we support each other. We are not familiar with the concept of a ‘nuclear family’. Strong family bonds, too, are a value that is characteristic of the Greek-American community. Our third core value is the emphasis we place on the church, which indeed was the force that actually organised the Greek-American community. In America there are more than 550 parishes spread across all 50 states, and every parish is the organisational foundation of every community. There are of course other organisations, such as the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association and smaller organisations representing smaller, local communities such as the Laconian Community. But it is very difficult to bring all these communities together. The fourth pillar of the Greek-American community is education. Families pay a great deal of attention to the education of their members. Second-generation GreekAmericans were educated more quickly than the second generations of any other ethnic community in the United States. This community, as in my own case and that of many others, was started by immigrant parents who worked very hard when they arrived in the United States. In essence, they started from the bottom to see not their grandchildren but their children graduate from the finest universities in the United States and start brilliant careers. This is truly an impressive feat. The importance we give to education is evident in the studies that our children pursue compared to children from other ethnic communities. Emphasis on education is characteristic of our community and,

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I think, is reflected in the fact that its members have played leading roles in all areas, including business, academia, the sciences and culture. In our activities we have tried to remain faithful to the heritage bestowed by our parents and to their Greek tradition. They tried to teach us a lot. My parents taught me, early on, the importance of public service. They would always tell me that in ancient Greece, he who cared only for his own interests was reprehensible. They believed that in a community, everyone must contribute. If someone did not, and  tZ’ only took care of his own affairs, they would disdain him, calling him an ‘idio (idioti), hence the English word ‘idiot’. When I go to university graduation ceremonies, I always refer to this and stress the importance of public service. Throughout my time in public service – I was an elected representative for four decades – I tried to fulfil my obligations and meet my responsibilities by following the Greek tradition, a tradition that honours education and knowledge over ignorance and values reasonable debate as a means to resolving differences. As I have already mentioned, this is a tradition that was fundamental in the course of American society and contains universal and timeless values. Although I usually resist the temptation to react to comments in the press, I made an exception when a generally very positive article on my political career also mentioned that the excellent education I had received at great universities (Harvard, Oxford and Princeton) and the law firm I had worked in helped me overcome my Greek origin. My answer to the newspaper was that I had never considered the values conveyed to me by my parents and my Greek heritage as something I needed to overcome. On the contrary, I considered those attributes a great source of strength that allowed me to contribute to American society.

The Miracle and the Defects* George Th. Mavrogordatos

In most of the world, the election of the 44th President of the United States was justly celebrated as an event of historic significance. It proved the irrepressible vitality of the American Dream, precisely at a time when American capitalism appeared to be crumbling. It also confirmed the unique adaptability of an admirable political system, which never ceases to evolve, even though it is based on the oldest written Constitution. Fear of repetition or banality must not hinder the exploration and evaluation of the manifold significance that the Obama victory has on several different levels, beyond race as such. He is indeed the first African-American president, and his election was regarded as finally laying to rest a painful legacy of slavery, civil war, and discrimination. But he is also a person of mixed blood, who belongs more to the present and the future than to the past, thanks to his multiracial and multicultural background. He had to persuade not only whites, but also many blacks who understandably did not recognise him immediately as one of their own. Moreover, he is an intellectual educated at the most elite institutions, yet capable of rousing and mobilising the poor and uneducated, without concessions at the expense of his cultured rhetorical style or his cool rationalism. Change is just as impressive in this respect, after many years of Republican disdain of the intellect and intellectuals. How did such an unusual person, in such a short time, become President of the United States? The easy answer would be to classify him immediately as a ‘charismatic leader’ in the Weberian (not the journalistic) sense. Although it is a scientific term that should be used sparingly, many Obama supporters clearly do believe (as required by Max Weber’s definition) that he is endowed with ‘specifically exceptional powers or qualities, not accessible to the ordinary person’ or, more precisely, the ordinary politician. There were even references to ‘magic’ and to a ‘miracle.’

*Liberal Emphasis 37, October-November-December 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 73 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_11, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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Nonetheless, the very same ‘miracle’ would be difficult or even unthinkable in other political systems (and especially in the arteriosclerotic Greek case). Obama’s unimpeded trajectory is due, more specifically, to the American system of primaries as it has developed over the last 40 years, allowing anyone to seek the party nomination for the presidential election, provided he or she possesses the requisite ambition, persistence, resilience, financing, and strategy. Nevertheless, the expressions of admiration should not mask certain obvious defects of the American system. Quite on the contrary, the defects appear less justified precisely because the system is so admirable. This year, two major defects stood out: the selection of the Vice President and the excessive duration of the so-called interregnum, between the presidential election and the inauguration of the winner.

The Selection of the Vice President The desperate move of the Republican presidential nominee John McCain to select as vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin, governor of Alaska, not only produced derision when she began to make pronouncements of rare incoherence. It also produced genuine apprehension for the nightmarish eventuality that an evidently inappropriate individual might find herself at the helm of the superpower. This move by McCain demonstrated how defective the established method of selecting the Vice President actually is. Two major defects stand out. Who becomes Vice President is now the arbitrary decision of a single individual: the winner of the presidential election. It is also a decision mostly influenced by short-term considerations, limited to the electoral campaign, even though it may have long-term consequences. Logically, there is a glaring contradiction between the protracted, complex, and demanding process whereby one becomes President, by the will of the People, and the casual simplicity of the process whereby one becomes Vice President, by the whim of the President. As a matter of principle, but also as a precaution, no elected official in a constitutional democracy should be allowed to freely appoint an eventual successor. Even hereditary monarchs, however absolute, do not enjoy such freedom! Both the contradiction and the disregard for long-term implications are all the more amazing since there is a significant probability that the Vice President will become President in turn. Almost one-third of all American presidents had served as vice presidents earlier. During the previous century, the proportion was even higher: out of seventeen presidents, no less than seven had served as vice presidents. Five of them (Theodore Roosevelt, Coolidge, Truman, Johnson, and Ford) first became presidents upon the death or resignation of the incumbents. Consequently, the vice-presidential nomination should not be viewed merely as just another test of the presidential candidate’s ability, which will be judged by the voters. This is no adequate safeguard. The voters can only punish the presidential candidate for his or her poor choice of a running mate by not voting for the ticket at

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all – not by splitting it. Many may not feel that it is appropriate or even reasonable to change their presidential preference simply on account of the vice-presidential nominee. Has a presidential election ever been lost by the vice-presidential candidate? Did McCain lose because he chose Palin? Even if this were true, as a political scientist I doubt whether such an effect can ever be isolated and proven to everyone’s satisfaction. Established practice is also at odds with the Constitution of the United States. Originally, Article II provided for the election of both President and Vice President in a single ballot among the electors (those who constitute the so-called Electoral College). The person receiving a majority was elected President. Whoever came second was elected Vice President. After the crisis that erupted in 1800 when Jefferson and Burr received the same number of votes, the Twelfth Amendment was adopted in 1804, which provides for the separate election of the Vice President. In practice, this involves a charade. In December, the electors meet ceremonially in each state capital and go through the motions of voting twice: first for President, then for Vice President. But in November the voters only vote once, ostensibly for both offices. (In fact, they only vote for President.) This is hardly compatible with the Twelfth Amendment. A truly separate election of the Vice President has been ruled out by a factor that the Founders ignored or underestimated: competing political parties. A separate election might produce a winner belonging to a different party than that of the President. In such an eventuality, the replacement of the President by the Vice President, as provided by the Constitution, would be tantamount to an abrupt reversal of the electoral outcome. In this connection, one cannot help thinking of the lieutenant governors, who are equivalent to the Vice President in the states. In many states, they are elected separately and may belong to a different party than that of the respective governor, whom they may replace. Nevertheless, such intriguing but parochial experiences are hardly relevant for the federal level in the era of globalisation. Consequently, a truly separate election of the Vice President continues to be ruled out. Nonetheless, ways may be found to involve the voters, offer more choices and, in any case, exclude or at least constrain arbitrary decisions by one or even a few individuals. To begin with, in party primaries and caucuses voters may be safely empowered to vote separately for potential vice-presidential nominees, thereby producing at least a binding shortlist and precluding last-minute surprises.

The Duration of the Lame Duck Period If the sudden launching of Sarah Palin onto the national political stage demonstrated how defective and potentially dangerous the established method of selecting the Vice President actually is, the economic crisis demonstrated how excessive and potentially disastrous the interval between presidential election and inauguration can be.

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The term ‘lame duck’ is one of the many graphic expressions in the American political vocabulary. It refers to elected officials, whether of the executive or of the legislative branch, whose term is about to expire and whose successors have already been elected. Although these officials retain their legal authority in full until the very last moment, they do not possess the political legitimation and support that are normally required for important initiatives. The most significant instance is the President, of course, but the same applies to the Congress as well. They are elected together at the beginning of November but, in accordance with the Twentieth Amendment, the new Congress assumes power two months later (3 January) and the new President two and a half months later (20 January). Until then, the authority of their predecessors continues, with the crippling characteristic of the ‘lame duck’. Originally, the terms of President and Congress began even later: on 4 March. Four entire months intervened between election and inauguration! This situation was not dictated by the Constitution or by any specific set of reasons. It simply derived from the date when the first Congress under the Constitution convened (4 March 1789). Both congressional and presidential terms began to be counted from that date, in whole years. An interregnum of four months was perhaps compatible with the pace and conceptions of the eighteenth century. Later, however, it proved evidently dysfunctional. The greatest anomaly was when Abraham Lincoln had to wait until March 1861 before he could deal with the unprecedented national crisis provoked by his election the previous November, which triggered the secession of the South. In 1932–1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt also had to wait the same interval before he could deal with the unprecedented economic crisis, which continued meanwhile to be managed disastrously by the defeated Hoover. Already in March 1932, however, the Twentieth Amendment had been proposed, which took effect in October 1933. A constitutional amendment was required in this case because moving the inauguration to January entailed a reduction of the last presidential and congressional terms (which would normally run until 4 March). Unfortunately, the same time-consuming procedure would be required again today if it is recognised that the interregnum has to be shortened even further. In effect, the two and a half months that were considered a reasonable interval in 1932 are proving excessively long in 2008. Adverse economic developments have accelerated to an amazing degree, and dealing with them requires corresponding speed, together with credibility, of course. Credibility, however, is precisely what is missing during the lame duck interval. In the case of Bush, the situation is even worse, because of his low approval ratings. Before the election, the first set of emergency economic measures proposed by the Bush administration needed the support even of the two presidential candidates in the midst of the electoral campaign. Nonetheless, it was defeated mostly by Republicans in the House of Representatives, who apparently feared for their re-election in November. Only with the second try was it possible to have an improved bill approved first by the Senate, two-thirds of which did not face re-election this year.

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After the election, the situation essentially did not improve, despite Obama’s triumph. He emphasised immediately that there is, constitutionally, only one President until 20 January and that is Bush. Until then, the winner of the election can only announce the composition of his economic team and the directions of his economic policy, in an effort to reassure the markets. It appears so far that the positive impact of such announcements lasts very little and quickly evaporates. Meanwhile, confusion and uncertainty continue in Washington between a lameduck President and Congress. Many business voices complain about the absence of ‘leadership’ in Washington, which affects adversely the economic climate. There is an astounding incongruity here, if one considers that, thanks to the election, there is an eminently credible new leadership, which is not allowed to take over immediately. There is also tragic irony in the weird disjunction between political and economic developments, observed at the very heart of the capitalist system. Authoritative columnists have even proposed desperate solutions for circumventing the constitutional obstacle; for example, that Bush should appoint right away the cabinet chosen by Obama, so that they can start implementing their new policies without delay! It becomes obvious, in conclusion, that the long duration of the so-called interregnum is no longer appropriate and should be reduced drastically, to approximate the immediate change of government after an election in parliamentary systems. It is doubtful, however, whether there can be, on this issue, the general consensus that a new amendment to the Constitution requires.

Euro–Atlantic Relations Following the Election of Barack Obama in the United States* Antonis Samaras

There are four components to Euro–Atlantic relations following the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States: l

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First, the dynamics that already existed in Europe–US relations during the last eight years of the Bush Presidency. Second, the dynamics of European integration itself. When speaking about the US, we know what we are referring to. However, when speaking about Europe and its integration prospects, the situation is much more fluid. Indeed, we often tend to construe our desires – or fears – as realities. As a result, our analysis is often asymmetrical: it is based on certainties on one side of the equation (the American one), and on wishful thinking on the other (the European). Third, the current international financial crisis. The new US President will be called to govern in a changing America, within a changing world and opposite a Europe that is also changing. And all these changes are still volatile. We still do not know their exact direction. Fourth, the major aims in the Euro–Atlantic agenda for the upcoming years. These are key to understanding the needs and ambitions of the Europeans, the potential and fears of the Americans, the distractions for both sides in other parts of the world and the chances of priorities converging towards a common strategy.

The Ideological Construct of ‘Globalisation’ Let us begin with the first question: How have Euro–Atlantic relations evolved in the past years? Why is the election of Obama a turning point today? Following the collapse of bipolarity and of the Soviet Union, the West appeared to have completely and finally defeated the East. Therefore, in the Clinton years, *Liberal Emphasis 37, October-November-December 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 79 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_2, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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American policy turned its focus back on Europe. The belief was fostered that the Atlantic community – the US and Canada on the one side and a unified Europe on the other – could jointly dominate the world. It was then that the word ‘globalisation’ became prevalent in the international political vocabulary, where the term now meant: l

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The dominance of the US within the Atlantic community, and the dominance of the Atlantic community globally. In this setup, Europe needed to overcome its internal segregations so as to become an instrumental part of this Atlantic community; The dominance of an economic model supporting the free movement of goods, capital, raw materials and people, without national border restrictions and without regulatory interventions by national states, either small or large; The abolition of national states by transferring their powers either ‘upward’ to supranational bodies of questionable representation, power and legalisation, or ‘downward’ towards regions that operate more as local prefectures and less as sovereign state bodies; and finally The substitution of politics for economy, of supranational bodies for national states.

The Atlantic Breach and European Dissension Following the economic slowdown that started in 2000 and the market collapse of hi-tech companies – the notorious dot-com companies – throughout the world, this ideological construct of globalisation started to fade away. Thus after 2000, the US once again turned its interest away from Europe and towards Asia, where China had already started to become a significant competitor of the future, and Russia had started to claim its return to the international arena with superpower status. Then came the 9/11 terrorist strike. Immediately, America prioritised its international policy towards combating international Islamic terrorism, shifting its emphasis towards Central Asia and the Middle East. The turn to the ‘war on terror’ was, at the time, supported by both houses of Congress. Europe dropped further down the list of American strategic priorities, and European military participation in Afghanistan played a secondary role. In Iraq, Europeans refused to participate – apart from England, of course, and some other European countries outside Europe’s historic core. The campaign against Iraq created a breach between the two sides of the Atlantic and dissension within Europe itself. By 2003, Europeans felt they were powerful enough to challenge America’s leadership in the Atlantic world, but not powerful enough to overcome the ‘soft power’ syndrome. Soft power convinces rather than coerces. It is a power that isolates and stigmatises its adversaries; it does not contain or crush them. It uses soft methods to lead opponents to abandon their intentions; it

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does not neutralise them using force. It is a power that ends vicious circles of violence instead of starting them. It was then, in 2003, that Europeans put forward the ‘soft power’ policy that suited them better than the traditional power model that America projected at the time. The problem is that moral supremacy without material power proves ineffective and problematic, just like material power without moral supremacy. The Atlantic breach harmed the US in the long run. It also brought about dissension within Europe. The French and Germans tried to control the behaviour of the ‘world’s policeman’, America, and smaller countries of the traditional Western European region sided with them. Opposite them were the British, who immediately sided with the Americans, along with the then centre‐right governments in Italy and Spain (which later lost power) and almost all the Eastern European countries, already in the final stages of EU accession. The latter countries, still feeling particularly insecure vis-a`-vis their neighbour Russia, tended to identify with America’s policy almost as an automatic reflex. For them, America is sufficiently far away to not pose any threat, and powerful enough to guard them against the risk beside them. In the case of Iraq, it turned out that when it comes to major and crucial issues, European states act on the basis of their national priorities – which are different from and not based on ‘Europe’s joint interest’, which still remains to be defined. The same internal European dissension recurred in the following years – albeit in a milder tone – around the following issues: l

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The US anti-missile defence system, which the Eastern Europeans willingly accepted while Westerners discretely expressed reservations; The recognition of Kosovo, which some Europeans accepted immediately while others expressed their explicit disagreement; The accession of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, which split European opinion and did not go through, despite Washington’s insistence; And the Georgia crisis of August 2008, which again split NATO’s European branch.

In every international crisis, whether major or minor, Europeans have acted according to their own national priorities and their specific national interests. Political unity is far from present.

American Inconsistencies and Deadlocks In the meantime, the American invasion of Iraq turned into a real nightmare for the US. American forces managed to occupy the country with relative ease, but failed to control or stabilise it. The Bush administration made the mistake of opening simultaneous fronts with warring Islam and Russia; namely, attempting to eliminate warring Islam in Asia while at the same time blocking Russia’s efforts to regain its status as an international superpower.

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Russia, however, was America’s natural ally and indispensable partner in the war against Islamic terrorism. And Washington needed Russia in the future to keep China’s leadership ambitions in check. But instead of developing convergent strategies with Moscow, Washington opened a new front against it. The failure of the US to stabilise the situation in Iraq intensified insecurity in the international oil market. This led to continuous and escalated speculation, and skyrocketing global oil prices. Rising energy prices mostly helped Russia increase its revenue from energy exports – natural gas and oil – and eliminate its public debt in almost no time (extraction cost in Russia is now US$20 per barrel). Ultimately – and strangely enough – the only country that has truly benefited from the American invasion in Iraq and its effects is Russia itself, which has become the second-largest oil-producing country in the world. So, instead of cooperating with Russia in dealing with warring Islam, the US opened a front against it. And by opening this front, they strengthened Russia – unintentionally, of course. The strategic inconsistencies of the US have led American policy itself to some deadlocks and have further intensified national differentiation within Europe. The so-called Russian danger no longer unites Europeans, neither amongst themselves nor with the US. And the distancing of American priorities from Europe still has a reciprocal effect of distancing the Europeans from America. At the end of the eight-year Bush administration, Euro–Atlantic relations are still deeply scarred, although things appear to be calmer. Europe itself remains deeply divided, although it demonstrates this only in crucial times; namely, when it needs unity more than anything.

A New Rapprochement of the Two Sides of the Atlantic Recently, both sides of the Atlantic have experienced political shifts, bringing Europe and the US closer together. In Europe, all those who contributed to the Atlantic breach have been removed. In Germany, Schroeder and Fischer have retired. The German Chancellorship is now held by Angela Merkel, who clearly has a greater Atlantic orientation. In France, Chirac and de Villepen have also retired. The French Presidency is now in the hands of the much more Atlanticist Nicolas Sarkozy. In Britain as well, Tony Blair has retired, and both his successor within the Labour Party, Gordon Brown, and his aspiring replacement, Tory leader David Cameron, remain Atlanticists. In Italy, the temperamental Atlanticist Silvio Berlusconi lost the elections in 2006, but two years later returned to power after an electoral triumph and today enjoys unprecedented popularity. In Poland, the Conservatives lost power, but the Socialists who succeeded them proved to be equally Atlanticist in their outlook. On the other side, in the US, the Republicans lost their majority in Congress in 2006 and in November 2008 also lost the Presidency. Today in both the US and Europe, governments are now in the hands of political powers that seek to bring the two sides of the Atlantic together. Today’s Europe is

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sympathetic towards Barack Obama’s America. And America, now governed by Democrats, has realised that it needs to do a great deal in order to heal the wounds to its prestige and standing suffered under the administration of George Bush Jr. However, this does not signify a return to the Clinton era and the ‘idyllic’, at least for Euro–Atlantic relations, second half of the 1990s. Among other things, a careful reading of the very interesting foreign policy text published by Barack Obama in the summer 1997 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, entitled ‘Renewing American Leadership’, shows that he refers to all international matters and makes very little reference to Europe. The emphasis and priorities of American policy are now turned elsewhere.

The Return of the Nation State Earlier we saw that in recent years, European countries have handled all international political crises on the basis of their narrow, national interests. In this same period, they failed to ratify the European Constitution, following two negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, while now, after the negative referendum in Ireland, the Reform Convention is also at risk. Europe’s political integration has reached a standstill, to put it mildly. And globalisation, as an ideological construct of the elite and as a spearhead of their policy, has collapsed. National interests are once again the focus of politics. In the meantime, the economic aspect of globalisation is also being challenged. This aspect was good when Western capital acquired Russian companies, but when Indian capital came to acquire French companies and Arab capital to acquire American ports, globalisation was at once forgotten. Suddenly, the Western nations discovered that by denationalising their companies they had opened the door to the purchase of national assets by government funds of foreign countries – the notorious sovereign funds. National sovereignty and national caveats appeared again in investment decisions. And all this, before the latest global financial crisis broke out. When the crisis did break out, national states came to the foreground: as ‘national’, compared to the supranational organisations that found themselves in a secondary and auxiliary role; and as ‘states’, compared to markets that could not self-regulate because they had already been deregulated. Even the most extreme sceptics towards state intervention realised the defects of excessive deregulation. The myth of market self-regulation had been destroyed, even for the most gullible. National states undertook to prevent the complete destruction of the financial system. National states undertook to manage the bailout programs. They undertook to provide liquidity, boost active demand, boost enterprises and save jobs. And because this is an international crisis, national states are called on today to coordinate their actions internationally. Thus apart from its political role in international crises, the state has again acquired the role of preserving macroeconomic balances.

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Towards a New Structure The extremes of the neoliberal model have become evident on all levels. This, however, is no reason to return to the extremes of the Keynesian model. The national state returns, but the world does not go back to statism. Neoliberalism has collapsed, but liberal ideas are still standing. Market deregulation has failed and we have paid dearly for it, but the free market is still irreplaceable. Between the extremes of statism and those of neoliberalism, we seek today the golden mean, the new structure beyond established norms, where the state will l

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Regulate markets, not substitute for them; where free markets will maximise peoples’ creativity, not unleash their greed; Protect legality and democracy, not suck its citizens’ blood; where private profit will balance with public interest, prosperity with social justice, and the free market with democracy.

National interests will converge; they will not be flattened out. National states will learn to work together in the context of the free market; they will not be abolished. Borders will exist not to divide people, but to delineate democratic states that will compete and not collide with each other. They will be allies or adversaries, partners or competitors, but not enemies. This model may regroup Western societies and the convergences between them. And in the United States, the most appropriate person to express this today would be a politician who believes in the social state, without which societies collapse, someone who, in the name of the social cohesion that he expresses and symbolises, can rescue a mighty economy that was almost blown to pieces by the chaotic explosion and unbridled speculation of a deregulated market. It would be a politician who believes in his country’s national interest, but also in the great need to invest this interest in partnerships, not gamble it away in adventurous clashes, and to safeguard it with alliances, old and new, not expend it in rivalries. It would be someone who wants to inspire the rest of the world with the example of democratic values, not the fear of a superior power. Such are the expectations that Barack Obama has created in his compatriots and the rest of the world. And these are the very expectations he will be judged on. Will he realise or deny them? He has set the bar very high. And his task from now on will be a very difficult one.

The New, Expanded Euro–Atlantic Community The recovery of the American economy will be the first proving ground for President Obama, followed by US–Russia relations. The US and Russia have every reason to work towards a convergence of foreign policies and no reason whatsoever to enter into another Cold War. A strategic convergence between

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America and Russia will release all the deadlocks in American policy (from Iraq to North Korea), will ease Russia’s concerns (from Caucasus to China), will open the road for resolution of all international problems (from the Middle East to Islamic terrorism) and will create conditions of international stability and peace. And what about Europe? Europe also needs a strategic convergence between the US and Russia, for the following reasons: l

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This is how it will regain its unity and its momentum towards political integration. Europe will not see Russia as a ‘potential threat’, nor will it see America as an ‘intolerable hegemon’; it will not be split between relying on Washington to deal with Moscow’s ‘expansionism’ and on Moscow to balance Washington’s ‘hegemonism’. If Europe is no longer split between such dilemmas, this will open the way to its political unity – not through an abolition of national states, but through a convergence of national interests. And if Europe is united politically, it will then become an equal partner to the US and Russia.

A US–Russia strategic convergence will benefit both those countries. But it will be most beneficial for the possibility of a unified Europe, because as recent and past history has shown, Europe cannot unite within a climate of East–West Cold War competition. Europe was once the ruler of the world; now it can become the centre of global balances. l

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We will not return to the oppressive state of the eighteenth century nor to the unstable national state of the nineteenth century, the authoritarian national state of the interwar period or the handicapped and introverted national state of the Cold War period. The national state will return as a factor of stability in the international arena and as a market regulator in the economy, both domestic and global. We will not revert to the dilemmas of bureaucratic statism or uncontrolled neoliberalism. We will go forward and combine liberal markets with social solidarity, combine a social state with free market dynamism operating within clearly defined rules. We will not revert to the balance of terror between two superpowers. We will create a multi-centred world, where competition will not be abolished but balanced by numerous synergies. We will not revert to a Europe of bureaucracy, but to the true convergence of states, nations, peoples and cultures, where all will preserve their specific attributes, as well as acquiring a sense of security, growth opportunities and prospects for prosperity. As security is consolidated and as the growth and prosperity of European people grow stronger and stronger, their convergence will accelerate, their unity will be forged and their international influence will improve. On this basis:

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America will overcome its crisis and emerge as a wiser and better society if it can learn to use its power more carefully, if it utilises the ‘soft power’ of a unified Europe and if it dares to make the strategic convergence with Russia. Europe will decisively advance towards political unification if it manages to build this unification on the true convergence of the constituent members and not by exhausting its states with bureaucratic requirements. It will also need to learn to maximise the synergies ensuing from this unification. Russia will also manage to escape its deadlocks and overcome its insecurities if it converges strategically with America and Europe by establishing an international balance with the former and developing economic synergies with the latter.

In a world relying on these three pillars of stability, China, India and other countries will be able to channel their dynamism and attain the roles they are worthy of without causing any crises and reversals from the redistribution of power. The new Euro–Atlantic relationship includes Russia, requires a US–Russia strategic convergence, accelerates and facilitates Europe’s unification and relies on making Europe the centre of international balance. Finally, it ensures adaptability and flexibility in integrating the rest of the world into a true mutually beneficial cooperative, a winning situation for all. Europe has learned from its mistakes and is ready to move forward. Russia, too, has learned from its mistakes and will probably not deny such a ‘historic compromise’ as the closer cooperation with Euro–Atlantic structures. Whether the new President Obama is ready to pave the way remains to be seen. Unfortunately, there are many obstacles in his way. It is, however, comforting that he does not have many alternatives. What is truly promising is that the multifaceted financial crisis that today has shocked the entire Western world and beyond is big enough to make us realise our mistakes and pull us back from our illusions, but not so big as to plunge the world into chaos. And in this sense, the current financial crisis can be truly redemptive. Because what does not kill you only makes you stronger.

The Forgotten Crisis: Rising Food Prices* Asteris Huliaras

I taught at a university, while the country suffered a horrible famine. People died of starvation, and I felt completely helpless. As an economist, I didn’t have any tool to deal with the situation. Muhammad Yunus, 2006 Nobel Prize winner

September 2000. Never before in world history had so many leaders come together in the same meeting at the same time. One hundred heads of state, 47 heads of governments and eight thousand dignitaries met at the UN Headquarters in New York City to discuss the future of the world. At the end of the meeting, they adopted a text entitled the ‘Millennium Declaration’. The Declaration expressed eight ‘development goals’, the first of which was eradicating poverty and reducing the percentage of undernourished people by 50% by 2015 (based on 1990 data). At the 2005 World Summit, 192 UN member states and 23 international organisations reiterated their commitment. Optimism was widespread at the time. However, just three years later, efforts to eradicate poverty are faltering. To make things worse, instead of dropping, the number of starving people is increasing. Bad news attracts press cameras, which usually focus on extraordinary situations. Food crises are extraordinary situations, but world hunger is not. For a very large number of people, hunger is part of everyday life. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the UN’s organisation in charge of food and agriculture, in 2000 – the year the Millennium Declaration was adopted – 840 million people (approximately one-seventh of the earth’s population) went to bed hungry every night. What made this situation morally unacceptable was the fact that the world had a huge surplus of food. In reality, people starved, not because of a shortage of food, but because they did not have the money to buy the food they needed (Huliaras, 2005). Optimism gradually faded away. In 2007, international food prices started to rise. In early 2008, prices were twice as high as they were in 2005, and the issue was on the front page of every newspaper in the West. In March the UN’s new Secretary

*Liberal Emphasis 37, October-November-December 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 87 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_1, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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General, Ban Ki Moon, expressed his deep concern, noting that ‘the threat of hunger and undernourishment increases. Millions of the most vulnerable people in the world are at risk’ (Moon, 2008). This publicity, however, faded. Very soon Americans and Europeans found themselves dealing with other issues, such as the Olympic Games in Beijing, the Caucasus conflict and the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Rising food prices were quickly forgotten – although not in the poorest countries of the world. There people took to the streets, and violent riots broke out in many Asian and African capital cities. In Haiti the slogan ‘We are hungry’ forced the country’s prime minister to resign. In Cameroon dozens were killed. And rising food prices remain a fundamental survival issue in more than 30 poor countries – from Guatemala to Egypt and Indonesia. According to FAO calculations, in 2007 the number of undernourished people increased by 97 million, bringing the total to 923 million (FAO, 2008). Interim figures for 2008 are even more alarming. What does the future hold? Is the pessimistic title ‘The end of cheap food’ on the cover of the 8 December 2007 Economist prophetic?

The Causes Analysts agree that rising food prices are attributable not to one factor, but to many. To be sure, the permanent reason is the increase in the earth’s population. This is the typical Malthusian trap: global food production cannot keep pace with the increase in the planet’s population, which is expected to reach nine billion by the middle of this century. The Green Revolution – with its new irrigation techniques, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides – which has led to a spectacular increase in agricultural production and helped feed the rapidly increasing world population after World War II seems to have lost its momentum. Arable areas are not increasing, and water reserves are dwindling. Malthus’s nightmare could become a reality 200 years after it was first expounded: the increase in food production may not be able to keep pace with the growth in the earth’s population. Nevertheless, the planet keeps producing more food than it needs. Structural nutrition changes are a major factor in the recent increase in food prices. The rapid economic growth in China and India has allowed hundreds of millions of people to enrich their diet with dairy products, meat and eggs. But this increase in demand has had a serious impact on the price of agricultural produce. Production of one kilogram of veal requires six kilograms of grain. The rise in food prices is simply due to there being a higher demand, as a large segment of the earth’s population is now better fed. Environmental problems – partly as a result of agriculture – also seem to have had long-term adverse consequences for food production. Soil degradation and the subsequent desertification are serious problems in China and Africa. The greenhouse effect and changes in rainfall distribution are creating even more problems for crops – especially in poor countries.

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Climate change is also affecting state policies in developed countries. In their effort to reduce energy dependency, rich nations are being forced to subsidise biofuel production to an ever greater extent. As huge expanses of land are being dedicated to plants used for ethanol production, there is a decrease in the supply of foods in international markets. In the United States an ever-increasing percentage of the corn produced is going to biofuel production, with very negative consequences for the quantities of cornmeal available to the international market. Some analysts feel that state subsidies for biofuels are the primary reason for recent price increases (Brahmbhatt & Christiaensen, 2008, pp. 30–31). However, there are other, less structural factors responsible for the recent increase in food prices. The increase in the price of oil is also largely to blame. Oil prices directly affect agricultural produce prices since they affect the cost of many inflows, from fertilisers and the operation of agricultural equipment to market transportation costs. According to World Bank studies, increased energy and fertiliser prices and the fall of the dollar account for approximately one-third of the increase in the price of agricultural produce (Brahmbhatt & Christiaensen, 2008, p. 30). Moreover, the weather has also played a secondary role in the recent increase – particularly the 2007 crop failure in Australia. Forecasts for a good harvest due to favourable weather conditions have, since the summer of 2008, resulted in a drop in international prices of agricultural produce, which were high in the spring. Nevertheless, prices remain 60% higher than in 2006. At a recent FAO conference in Rome (June 2008), delegates from 181 countries stressed that in order to overcome the problem, agricultural production needed to double by 2030. Achieving this, however, will be extremely difficult. There is no doubt, of course, that higher prices will lead to greater agricultural production. But unlike in industry, in agriculture this does not happen automatically – especially in developing countries where markets do not operate effectively. Even in rich countries it takes time for producers to respond – more than a single farming cycle. This is why agricultural produce prices cannot change quickly or easily – a price increase of 10% leads to a much smaller increase in production (just 1%) (The Economist, 2008). Meanwhile, the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP), which delivers food aid, is faced with a very serious financing problem. As food prices are now higher, the WFP needs much more money to continue providing the same quantities, and this at a time of increased need. Moreover, the financial crisis makes this an unfavourable time for donations. Urgent solutions are required. The matter is not only a deeply moral one: undernourishment can have extremely serious consequences. According to many studies, if children are undernourished for more than two years, their physical and mental growth is greatly affected.

The Solutions Today almost half the world’s population lives from agriculture. But most farmers have low-productivity farmland. In many cases they do not even use oxen or horses, and they usually suffer from diseases linked with chronic undernourishment. Thus,

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many have fled to the cities where, more often than not, life is no better. In reality, the biggest victims of increasing food prices are the poor living in slums and the landless farmers in developing states (Lewis, 2008, p. 31). The main tool in combating hunger is to increase the income of the poor to allow them to buy the food they need. This, however, takes time and huge sums of money. In the short term there are various solutions, ranging from food aid – or, even better, direct cash transfers to those in need – to tax and trade measures that reduce prices and increase production (Brahmbhatt & Christiaensen, 2008, pp. 33–36). Controlling prices – still very popular in Greece – is the least suitable policy because it discourages production, is hard to implement and encourages illegal activities such as the black market. Export restrictions are even more catastrophic as they reduce the income of indigenous farmers, restrict production, reduce incentives and encourage smuggling. Unfortunately, one of the factors that aggravated the recent food price increase was the adoption of the wrong policies by various countries that attempted to offer solutions by resorting to old – and failed – recipes, such as export restrictions and price controls. Many analysts agree that, in the long run, people and their governments must act decisively. An indicative feature of international development is that rich countries and large multinational companies are renting huge expanses of land throughout the world under long-term contracts. South Korean Daewoo Logistics has announced that it has rented one million hectares in Madagascar for 99 years, to produce five million tons of corn using manpower from parts of southern Africa (Borger, 2008). The Philippines has ceded 1.24 million hectares to Chinese rice growing companies (Head, 2008). And Libya has obtained access to 250 thousand hectares in Ukraine, in the context of an agreement stipulating payment for the land in oil and gas (Head, 2008). FAO head Jacques Diouf has called this type of agreement ‘a new form of colonialism’, where poor countries produce food for the rich instead of for their own hungry people (Borger, 2008). Other analysts do not share this view. Paul Collier, the former head of research at the World Bank and currently professor at Oxford University, recently claimed that in dealing with nutrition problems, the following three principles must be adopted: first, more and not less commercial farming (the model of the large Brazilian farms); second, lifting the European (and African) prohibition on genetically modified products; and third, abolition of US subsidies for biofuels (Collier, 2008). These measures alone, says Collier, suffice to address, in the long run, the increasing demand that is driving prices up. Greece too plays an integral part in international developments. Our agriculture may no longer be the ‘backbone’ of the Greek economy; however, the future may have some surprises in store for us. It is critically important for Greece to develop a long-term food security policy. Moreover, the Greek government needs to invest more resources in agricultural research, which, unfortunately, has been abandoned in recent decades (now is the golden opportunity, during the planning of the National Strategic Reference Framework priorities). Agricultural research can provide the country with a competitive edge. Developments in international agricultural production are a major opportunity for reassessing our agricultural policy. We also

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need to have a serious debate about the pros and cons of genetically modified products (the situation today of mass hysteria against these products does not help further the debate). Finally, the Greek government needs to significantly increase its food aid to third countries (which is very low as a percentage of total aid) and give priority to transnational development programmes emphasising agricultural technical assistance. We should not forget that we too have a role to play in the international sphere, as well as a responsibility and moral obligation to address the problem of global undernourishment. We must remember that in the relatively recent past, our situation was quite different: in the winter of 1941, during the last great famine in European history, hundreds of thousands of Greeks lost their lives. According to a recent study, the most important cause of this loss of life was the Allied naval blockade of the country, as well as the policies of the occupying forces (Hionidou, 2006). Moreover, in the period between the two wars, Greece imported a large part of its grain needs from abroad. When the naval blockade was lifted, the problem was largely solved. This could be a useful lesson: fighting hunger and reducing food prices is possible with more trade, not less.

References Borger, J. (2008). Rich world buys rights to the fields of the poor. The Guardian Weekly, 28 Novemberp, 1. Brahmbhatt, M., & L. Christiaensen (2008). The run on rice. World Policy Journal, 25(2), 29–37. Collier, P. (2008). The politics of hunger: How illusion and greed fan the food crisis. Foreign Affairs, 87(6), 67–79. The Economist. (2008). Food and the poor: The new face of hunger’, 17 April. FAO. (2008). Briefing paper: Hunger on the rise, 17 September. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/ common/ecg/1000923/en/hungerfigs.pdf. Head, B. (2008). Deal brings jobs but what’s real cost? The Guardian Weekly, 28 November, pp. 10–11. Hionidou, V. (2006). Famine and death in occupied Greece, 1941–1944. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huliaras, A. (2005). The hungry planet: The global undernourishment problem. In A. L. Matalas and A. Huliaras (Eds.), Nutrition in the 21st century: Geographies of abundance and deprivation, pp. 49–79. Athens: Papazisis Editions (in Greek). Lewis, R. G. (2008). What food crisis? Global hunger and farmers’ woes. The World Policy Journal, 25(1), 29–35. Moon, B. K. (2008). The new face of hunger. The Washington Post, 12 March, A19.

On the Road to Damascus: Towards a New European Policy on the Middle East?* Sotiris Roussos

In September 2008 a meeting of the leaders of France, Turkey, Qatar and Syria took place at a time when the US Middle East strategy was faced with a series of impasses, despite the improved security conditions in Iraq. The isolation policy against Syria, as well as against Hamas and Hezbollah, has not brought the expected results; the Annapolis peace process has reached a stalemate and the Persian Gulf monarchies are terrified at a possible military conflict with Iran; and finally, the traditional US allies, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, see their role being played down. We are currently witnessing a tectonic change in the Middle East. In essence, for the first time since 1948, neither of the regional balancing powers (Iran and Israel) in this sub-system are Arab. It is clear that the roles of Egypt and, to a certain extent, Saudi Arabia have been decreasing. At the same time, the Middle East is experiencing for the first time in five centuries an unprecedented revival of Shi’a Islam in Iraq and Lebanon (Hezbollah), among the substantial Shi’a minorities or majorities (Bahrain) in the Gulf region, and certainly under the Alawite (Shi’a-related) Assad regime in Syria. In fact, the Shi’a bloc is succeeding for the first time in influencing Sunni Muslim organisations as well, such as the Palestinian Hamas. For both the US and Europe, the key assumption so far with regards to sustaining their policies on the Middle East has been that it is necessary to deal with a clash between secular – that is, democratic and Western-oriented – political forces and Islamist ones. In the event that the secular forces prevail, then according to the same assumption, security and stability will be consolidated in the region. This assumption has major weaknesses. In numerous countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, etc.), there are no secular political forces worth mentioning that could claim power through coherent political discourse. The real conflict rages between the authoritarian state and various economic, political and social patronage networks developed by the former, and the Islamists. In Turkey, in fact, the state is vested with a typical mid-war authoritarian ideology along the lines of Salazar, Franco or Reza Sah, which is at

*Liberal Emphasis 36, July-August-September 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 93 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_14, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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any rate a political and social anachronism. The responses to this conflict have been either unavailing and ultimately failed projects to incorporate these societies into the Western model, or the use of authoritarian methods of marginalisation and state intervention against these Islamic political movements. Judging by the outcomes, both responses have been ill advised. They have indeed proven to be dangerous, because by depriving political Islamic organisations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, of the role they deserve in their national political arenas (e.g., in Egypt), such responses force them to switch political arenas and aim, instead, at the Muslim communities abroad, as demonstrated by the Muslim Brotherhood example in the UK.1 According to a recent analysis of the Carnegie Endowment, ‘numerous Arab states, traditional US allies, have shown increasing hesitation in following the US strategy in the region’. Gulf states such as Qatar are demonstrating a turn towards a more independent and flexible policy, which can be summarised as ‘neither with the US nor against it’. On the one hand, these states host vast US military bases in the Persian Gulf, especially at a time of confrontation with Iran and prolonged instability in Iraq; on the other hand, they are promoting an agreement between Hamas and Fatah, bringing the former out of its isolation by the USA, and recognise the leading role of Hezbollah in Lebanon by means of the Doha Agreement on peacemaking in the country. At the same time, they are trying to keep channels of communication and dialogue with Iran open, without underrating its hegemonic tendencies. These policies, according to the Carnegie Endowment, are not against the US but take their distance from US policy.2 At the same time, we should not forget that the Arab states of the Gulf are major customers of the US military industry, accounting for 81% of the total defence expenses in the Middle East and North Africa region.3 In many Arab capitals there was an optimistic view that the May 2008 Doha Agreement, signed between Lebanese factions in the capital of Qatar, was an achievement attained entirely by Arab countries, without any involvement from an external third party (i.e., the US, Europe and Iran). Indeed, the Agreement presents a clear contrast with the unsuccessful Damascus Summit of the Arab League, which revealed a profound split within the Arab states. The situation did not change significantly over the next few months, so the attainment of an agreement should be attributed primarily to the lion’s share agreement in favour of Hezbollah and its allies. For the Bush administration, the Doha Agreement for Lebanon and the indirect Israel-Syria negotiations mediated by Turkey are connected rather negatively. On the one hand, Syria has deterred attempts to isolate

1

Brandon, James, UK’s Muslim Brotherhood facing storm, Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, September 2008, pp. 14–16. 2 Ottaway, Marina, Mohammed Herzallah, The new Arab diplomacy: Not with the US and not against the US, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Papers, No 94, July 2008. 3 Leady, William, Equilibres militaires et strategique au Moyen-Orient, He´rodote, No 124, 1st quarter 2007, pp. 93–106.

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her. On the other hand, Hezbollah seems to have further consolidated its position in Lebanon, putting the ‘Cedars Revolution’ in the past. Thus the US and its allies are reverting to the typical Middle East dilemma: authoritarianism with peace (the Mubarak paradigm) or democratisation with permanent instability. The initiative of the French EU Presidency came just at that time of tectonic changes and when the US strategy of ideological struggle proved ineffective. It is evident that the French President is shaking off the hide of democratisation, politics, and the social and economic inclusion of the Middle East into collective Mediterranean systems, and is basing his policy on the acknowledgment of security dilemmas and state interests in the region, without yielding to ideological classification of their regimes. In other words, it is a strategy based on political realism, away from schemes such as the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership and partly contradictory to the grand project of a Mediterranean Union, which aspires to the economic, political and social integration of the nations of the north and south Mediterranean. The most significant step in the French initiative is to bring Syria back to a new Arab order. Hence, Damascus will be neither identified with and dependent on Tehran nor strategically against it. The choice of Turkey and Qatar as participants in the Damascus meeting demonstrates this very intention. In order to manage effectively the changes in regional balance, both the US and other countries such as Saudi Arabia need Turkey to assume a more active role. The key foreign policymakers of Turkey, such as the advisor to the Turkish Premier, Ahmet Davutog˘lu, profess a multidimensional policy that will encompass the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus, the Black Sea, central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Mediterranean, the Gulf and the Muslim world, making Turkey a hegemonic regional power. On the other hand, Qatar seems to realise and take advantage of the political potential granted to the Persian Gulf states by their bountiful oil income.4 It is possible that the Damascus meeting will relieve the Syrian leadership of the suffocating pressure of the litigation connected with Hariri’s assassination. The Syrian regime sees the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri as a lever to overthrow the regime (Milosevich model). If the French initiatives have a favourable outcome, we may see this procedure reaching just the lowest levels of the Syrian regime’s hierarchy (c.f. the Lockerby case). Additionally, the Israeli attack on an officially unconfirmed nuclear facility in Syria a few months ago caused the regime much concern that the Sadam scenario would be repeated, thus making Syria more susceptible to European initiatives. Syria seems to be encouraged to follow the Libyan model. Such a development would be key to the future of the Iranian nuclear programme, the stabilisation in Lebanon and Iraq and a shift in the intra-Palestinian balance with a potential impairment of the Hamas leadership, currently based in and reinforced by or through Damascus. The Arab capitals addressed the efforts of France and other powers to bring Syria closer to the West in a rather cautious manner. For countries such as Egypt,

4

Editorial, The quartet summit in Damascus, Al-Watan, 5 September 2008.

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a French/European-assisted increase in Syria’s influence may further decrease their regional role. Egypt is particularly concerned with the possibility of Syrian and French involvement in areas to which it has had privileged access, such as negotiations between the Palestinian political movements Hamas and Fatah.5 Nevertheless, it remains a valid maxim that ‘No Arab–Israeli war can ever occur without Egypt and no Arab-Israeli peace can be made without Syria.’ On the other hand, there is some concern, primarily in Saudi Arabia, about breaches in the alignment of the Gulf Arab monarchies towards Iran. The rapprochement between Qatar and Iran, as well as the alienation from the US protection umbrella, are highly delicate issues for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.6 Despite the French intervention, their opening to Moscow7 and their distrust of US policy following 9/11, the Gulf states – mainly Saudi Arabia – remain bound to US strategy. What scares the Middle Eastern states most about this strategy is that it is prone to direct military intervention. What they ask of the EU, in essence, is to convince the US to refrain from direct military engagement and to pursue an overseas balancing strategy on the basis of security dilemmas in the region rather than ideological agendas of ‘regime change’ or the influence American-Jewish lobbies.8 At any rate, the success of the French intervention will depend not only on its persuasive power over the Arab states, Turkey and Iran, nor solely on its influence on US politics. As noted earlier, Iran and Israel are the two key players in the regional balance. If there is someway that Iran can be weakened by a potential lifting of Syria’s isolation, there would seem to be no way for Israel to be persuaded or pressed to actually resume substantial direct peace talks with Syria. It is very difficult for Syria to meet Israel’s prerequisites for a substantial resumption of the peace process, namely to break the axis with Iran and stop assisting Hezbollah, without risking the survival of the regime. A complete retreat of Israel from the Golan Heights would, arguably, shield the regime against such turbulences. However, it is very difficult for Israel to relinquish its dominance over the entire Tiberian coastline, which was the reason (or excuse) for the failure of the negotiations between Hafez al-Assad and Ehud Barak in 1999. Popularity of the Israeli government, and especially of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, has reached rock bottom, and it would be difficult to make any decision on a complete retreat from the Golan Heights. A potential start of substantial peace talks would deprive Iran of a valuable ally and Hezbollah of its key material and financial transport route. A decline in its mainstays in the region might induce Iran to be more conciliatory in the handling of its nuclear programme. Let us not forget that Hezbollah assists Iran’s regional policy as well with the training, for instance, of the paramilitary forces of Moktada al-Sadr in Iraq.

5

Khaled Mahmud Ramadan, Egyptian anger at Syria and Qatar, Al-Akhbar, 8 September 2008. Muhammad Khalfan Al-Sawafi, Iran and the Gulf states: Some questions, Al-Ittihad, 10 September 2008. 7 ‘‘Bandar Bin-Sultan, Season role of emigration to the East. . . www.elaph.com, 9 September 2008. 8 Editorial, The European role, Al-Khaleej, 5 September 2008. 6

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The Israeli elite is, with a few exceptions, highly cautious about the EU’s or France’s energetic role in the region, even when their policies are by no means distant from those of the US. The mistrust of Sarkozy’s initiatives is growing stronger because, according to Israelis, they take Syria out isolation and give it room to manoeuvre, eliminating the levers of pressure that have been previously applied. In summary, the French-led European initiative in the Middle East, as expressed at the summit meeting of France, Turkey, Syria and Qatar in Damascus, has a long way to go in order to contribute effectively to stability in the region. The initiative is also expected to be initially received in a hostile manner by states such as Israel and Iran, or with reservation by powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is certain that the states of the region do not see the involvement by France and the EU as an alternative to the US hegemonic role. They are, however, hopeful that the European initiative will restore the strategy of the West back to a basis of objective understanding of the Middle East’s state interests, security dilemmas and regional balance of power, thus eliminating various obsessions that prevailed during the Clinton and Bush administrations. From this angle, the French EU Presidency seems to be on the right track.

The Unrest of the 1960s: Common Grounds and Legacy* Charalambos Papasotiriou

The upheaval of the late 1960s had an impressive geographic amplitude. In the United States, unrest was manifested by riots in the black ghettos, the movement against the Vietnam War, the New Left, sexual liberation, hippies and drugs. In Western Europe, unrest was expressed through mass demonstrations, at times violent, against the status quo, reaching their climax in May 1968 in France. Eastern Europe experienced the Prague Spring that challenged Stalin’s regime and was suppressed by the invasion of the Warsaw Pact’s allied military forces into Czechoslovakia. China witnessed the outbreak of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, an attack of zealot mobs – instigated by those in high quarters – against any kind of power other than the armed forces and of course Mao himself. This article aims to investigate two issues: first, whether these uprisings shared a common basis despite their obvious differences, or if they just happened to take place at the same time; and second, what their impact was on world history.

Common Grounds Before we seek any common causes for the multifaceted turmoil in the second half of the 1960s, we should first review any resemblances among the events, other than the fact that they coincided in time. Disparities among them are most distinct. The Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong was the only case in which mass violence and disorder were instigated by a country’s leadership. In the case of the Prague Spring, violence did not come with those who attacked the status quo but with their suppression. The Vietnam War was a driver of restlessness only in the West. The crisis in the black ghettos was a phenomenon restricted to the US reality. Therefore, we can admit in principle that there were different causes in each case. What we are

*Liberal Emphasis 35, April-May-June 2008.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 99 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_15, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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investigating is whether there were any common characteristics in the nature and social backgrounds of all cases that would explain why the respective different causes resulted in turmoil within the same short period between 1965 and 1969. A common feature shared by all cases was the strong challenge to the existing political establishment, mainly by the younger generation. The conflict between generations was particularly evident in the West (‘Come mothers and fathers throughout the land / And don’t criticize what you can’t understand / Your sons and your daughters are beyond your command / Your old road is rapidly aging’, sang Bob Dylan at the time). The same held true for China. Mao’s infamous Red Guards, key participants in events leading to the Cultural Revolution’s one million deaths and 100 million victims, were university and high school students. The generational conflict was further evidenced – although to a smaller extent – in the case of the Prague Spring. Note that the leader of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcˇek, was only 47 years old when he took leadership of the Prague Spring and came into office at the beginning of 1968, overthrowing an older class of political leaders. Was there any development, any event, any sufficiently strong common factor in the US, Europe and China that could explain the simultaneous outbreak of riots in these heterogeneous areas of the planet, all characterised by the younger generation’s revolt against the older, well-established generation? I consider the only common feature that could explain these simultaneous disturbances in diverse regions of the globe is that they all suffered from the huge strain caused by World War II and passed on to the older generation, whom the younger generation targeted with their riots during the 1960s. The catastrophic pressure of World War II on European societies is well-known. It is worth stressing that pressure on the US was equally severe. Approximately one-tenth of the American population served in the US armed forces, while defence expenditures rose to 40% of the country’s GDP. China mourned the deaths of approximately 15 million people during the Japanese invasion from 1937 until 1945, many of whom died because of the extended famines caused by war. Such an intense upsurge would inescapably have far-reaching social impact. The most easily measurable effects are in terms of demographics. The war caused an increase in mortality and decline in birth rates in the societies involved. The reaction to this was a particularly high birth rate, a baby boom, in the first two post-war decades. China’s population grew from 582 million people in 1953 to 1.008 billion in 1982. The population of the US grew from 132 million in 1940 to 203 million in 1970. Developments in Europe were similar. Note that in the US a birth rate acceleration began in 1946, while in China it started a little later, as the Chinese civil war lasted until 1949, namely four years after World War II. The result of this demographic growth was that in the second half of the 1960s, the 14–24 age group was unusually large. Young people at this age exhibit a normal tendency to separate themselves from their parents and question their authority. Representing a particularly sizeable portion of the population in the 1960s, young people became a critical mass that would inevitably trigger unrest. The grounds for the uprisings of the 1960s may well have been different in each case, but the existence of such an inflammable social material was a common component in all cases.

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The 1960s struggle between generations may have also been a result of the way World War II had marked the generation representing the status quo in that decade, namely parents and grandparents. For those who had been exposed to war, particularly as adults, their experiences must have had a decisive and sobering effect on their views about patriotism, national symbols and national heroes, and the need for national unanimity, and must have fostered a consequent tendency to question authority less. War may have also influenced their convictions about discipline in a way that provoked reactions in their offspring. Experts in pedagogic psychology are to investigate whether traumatic war experiences have affected the way in which the post-war generation was brought up, and potentially nourished that generation’s inclination to unrest in the 1960s. The multitudinous generation that was born immediately after World War II did not sympathise with the burdensome experiences of the previous generation. War was just a story to tell. This new generation wanted to write its own history, without being bound by the bitter experiences of the older generation. In France, General de Gaulle, as the heroic symbol of the 1940s, failed to touch young people. In China, enraged Red Guards – mere students – did not hesitate to publicly humiliate and torture some of the most important heroes of the Communist Party from the time of the Great Leap Forward in 1932 to its victory in 1949, including the President of the People’s Republic of China, Liu Shaoqi. The spirit of young people at the time concerning the quest for unprecedented experiences and models is reflected in the words of writer Kurt Vonnegut in 1969, who wrote, ‘Everything there [is] to know about life [is] in The Brothers Karamazov by Fyodor Dostoevsky. But that isn’t enough anymore.’

The Legacy The turmoil of the 1960s in the US, Western Europe and China had an underlying ideology that was strongly oriented towards the left. The Prague Spring was different, as the free market managed to gain some ground against Stalinism. However, Dubcˇek considered the movement a way to renew the socialism of the Warsaw Pact, to make it more attractive to the societies of the West. His intention was to reform and salvage socialism rather than refute it. In the next decades, however, we witnessed the centre of gravity in American, European and Chinese politics shifting largely to the right. In the US, the escalated upsurge in 1968 was followed by Nixon’s rise in power. Only one Democratic Party presidential candidate has since gathered over 50% of the people’s votes and that was Jimmy Carter in 1976. In contrast, Republicans won by over 50% five times: Nixon received 60% of the vote in 1972, Reagan 51% in 1980 and 59% in 1984, George Bush Sr received 55% in 1988 and George Bush Jr 51% in 2004. It is only recently, in 2008, that we have seen the cycle of Republican domination in US presidential politics coming to an end. In France, the Gaullists and their allies continued to rule until 1979. During the 1980s, doctrines on political trends in Western Europe were laid down by Thatcher

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and Kohl; as a result, even Social Democratic governments have only recently shifted to free market economies. In 1989–1991, we saw the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe; successor governments adopted a liberal model of politics and economics. In China, the picture is somewhat more complex. Deng Xiaoping, who essentially succeeded Mao in power after his death in 1976, introduced a system of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ that combined the economy of the free market with the ongoing political monopoly of the Communist Party. As regards the Cultural Revolution, however, an evaluation of post-Mao China would be purely negative. The official overall valuation of Mao, which still influences the current government of China, is that he was 70% right and 30% wrong; this 30% mainly has to do with the Cultural Revolution. The same multitudinous generation that was born in the first 20 years after World War II entered the labour market in the 1980s and 1990s, and their most typical representatives were the ‘yuppies’ (young upwardly mobile professionals; a term dating back to the 1980s). This generation developed the ‘information economy’ and ‘knowledge society’ based in high-tech development areas such as Silicon Valley in California (Bill Gates of Microsoft and Steve Jobs of Apple also belong to this generation). In China, this generation led the spectacular growth of the new internationalised financial centres of the Chinese economy, such as Shanghai and Shenzhen. The rising youth of the 1960s have in our time turned into the pioneers and managers of globalisation. From a world history viewpoint, this will most probably be considered their most important contribution. This same generation, however, has gradually brought centre-left issues back to the forefront of political questioning, although in a different way than through their unrest in the 1960s. As this generation gradually approaches the age of retirement, it threatens – because of its large numbers – to become an unbearably heavy burden for social security and health care systems. Smaller generations in terms of numbers will be called upon to carry the tremendous weight of paying for the pensions and health care of this generation. This has induced a new kind of generational conflict. The US, Europe and China have already launched far-reaching efforts to reform their security and health care systems, to enable the welfare state to manage the senior years of the rioting baby boomers of the 1960s. Perhaps the phrase best suited to the left-wing followers of this generation, now ageing, is the verse of Bob Dylan, who thrilled them in the 1960s and now sings, ‘The place I love best is a sweet memory.’ May 1968 and the other upheavals of the 1960s continue to be important as the ‘sweet memories’ of those who took part in them, but who currently live in a world very different from the one they envisaged and experienced in those days.

The Return of Cultural Property to Its Countries of Origin* George Anastassopoulos

At the 34th Session of the UNESCO General Conference, which took place in Paris from 16 October to 3 November 2007, UNESCO’s member states unequivocally reaffirmed their support for the 1970 international Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. They also stressed the great role played by UNESCO in combating illegal trafficking and by the Intergovernmental Committee in promoting the return of cultural property to its countries of origin. To the uninitiated observer, this initially appeared to be a largely anodyne appeal: once again, member states of an intergovernmental organisation had reaffirmed their adherence to one of the organisation’s own normative texts. What could be the added value of this statement? I would like to offer a different assessment than this overly simplistic interpretation of events. As the President of the 34th Session of the General Conference when this resolution and UNESCO’s Medium Term Strategy for 2008–2013 were adopted, I personally perceived this moment as a remarkable feat, despite its apparent banality. Indeed, if we consider the event from a historical perspective, we can appreciate the tremendous progress that has been made. Let us not forget that in the early 1970s, the Convention was seen by many leading curators and collectors (both in the public and private domain) as an unwarranted limitation on the effective mechanisms of the free market. For these professionals devoted to collecting the world’s finest masterpieces, the 1970 Convention was perceived as no more than an obstacle to their unregulated acquisition plans. Thirty-six years after the 1970 Convention came into effect,1 we can take pride in the fact that this former conception of how to develop art collections and museums is no longer held by the majority. This is the case even though some of the more

*Liberal Emphasis 35, April-May-June 2008. This text is from a speech given by Dr George Anastassopoulos at a UNESCO conference in Athens on 17 March 2008. 1 The 1970 Convention came into effect in 1972.

C. Arvanitopoulos and K. E. Botsiou (eds.), The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for 103 Democracy Yearbook 2009, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00621‐0_16, # The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. Published by Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. All Rights Reserved

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determined traditionalists, with the help of the new information and communication technologies, are setting themselves up as the proponents of digital repatriation – a convenient albeit pale excuse for allowing old collections to stay where they are and for offering plundered cultures the weak compensation of access to empty images. Hence it is no accident that the 34th Session of UNESCO’s General Conference asserted that virtual access to cultural property cannot supplant the enjoyment of such property in its original and authentic setting. As of today, 115 countries have ratified the Convention,2 including those countries that have historically been the least favourable towards it, such as Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Germany, to name only a few. Furthermore, inspired by the 1970 Convention, the majority of museums have adopted the International Code of Professional Ethics (ICOM),3 which lays down a set of principles governing museums and the museum profession in general, and acquisitions and transfers of ownership of collections in particular. UNESCO has also launched the International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property. Adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to Its Countries of Origin or Its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation at its 10th Session in January 1999, the Code was endorsed by the 30th General Conference of UNESCO in November 1999. Lastly, as further testimony to the international community’s unwavering determination to uphold the values of the 1970 Convention, there are at least 65 countries today with cultural heritage laws, all of which are inventoried in the UNESCO Cultural Heritage Laws Database4 launched in February 2005 at the 13th Session of the Intergovernmental Committee.5 This resource offers governments, customs officers, art dealers, organisations, lawyers, buyers and others a complete and easily accessible source of information on laws and procedures applicable to cultural heritage items as a whole, whether movable, immovable, intangible, underwater or natural. Both public authorities and art markets have much to gain from this database. It provides free access to national laws, allowing buyers to easily verify the legal antecedents of cultural property, in turn making it more difficult for traffickers to claim ignorance of the law and thus of the illegal nature of their dealings. Despite these undeniable signs of progress, our current economic and political environment is reframing discussions about cultural property in terms that bring to light new trends and challenges that must be addressed without further ado. Among these developments, we are observing an increasing number of requests from countries for the return of objects preserved outside of their borders, as well as for assistance in reconstituting their cultural memory and traditional knowledge.

2

Germany was the last country to ratify the Convention on 30 November 2007. The ICOM was developed in 1986. Since then it has been regularly updated. In its latest revised form it was adopted by the 21st ICOM General Conference in Seoul (Republic of Korea) in October 2004. For more information see http://icon.musem/measure.html. 4 The database is available at: http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws. 5 The Intergovernmental Committee for the Promotion of the Return of Cultural Property to Its Countries of Origin or the Return in Case of Illicit Attainment was established in 1972. 3

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We have to keep in mind that Africa has lost around 95% of its cultural property.6 We are also witnessing an unprecedented increase in trafficking via the Internet7 and the wilful damaging and illicit trafficking of cultural property during conflict. The Iraqi case is, after Afghanistan, the most striking. Many hypotheses could be advanced to explain these phenomena; two in particular strike me as most relevant to our discussions in order to understand the environment in which we are working. These tendencies can be partly explained by the fact that in general, the culture sector is an increasingly lucrative business, generating a strong and diversified demand and supply of cultural goods and services. The consumption of culture occupies a growing proportion of individual budgets and national economies, as we note from the fact that museums are flourishing around the globe and the number of visitors is growing.8 Globally, it is estimated that trade in cultural goods has grown from $39.3 billion in 1993 to nearly $60 billion, an increase of 50% in merely ten years.9 Tied to this merchandising of culture is the increasing recognition, ever since the Perez de Cuellar Commission, of the essential role culture and cultural industries play in economic growth and human development. With this comes the acknowledgment that cultural policies are ‘one of the key components of endogenous and sustainable development’.10 It is therefore not surprising that the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions includes a focus on the need to take a ‘holistic view of the development process, bringing the cultural dimensions of development together with economic and environmental objectives within a sustainability framework’ (Article 13).11 At the same time as we witness this economic boom in the culture sector, we are also seeing a general move away from purely economic analyses of power and a turning towards culture as an identity marker, thereby defying classic economic and military understandings of wealth and prestige. Societies are asserting their sovereign rights by claiming their cultural specificities and demanding, as a corollary, the right to reclaim and re-describe previously stigmatised or even unspoken parts of their history in the name of the promotion of cultural diversity and identity. In this context, museums have become much more than sites of aesthetic contemplation and judgment. At this point, I cannot help but underscore that this

6

Godonou, Alain, Directeur de l’Ecole du patrimoine en Afrique, De´bat public sur me´moire et mondialisation: nouveaux enjeux pour les muse´es, UNESCO, Paris, 05.02.07. 7 The common appeal made by ICOM, UNESCO and Interpol is available at http://icon.museum/ release.common.initiative.html. 8 Bernier, Christine, Globalized museumfication. L’art au muse. De l’oeuvre a` l’Institution, pp. 243ff, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2002. 9 Singh, J. P., Culture or commerce? A comparative assessment of international interactions and developing countries at UNESCO, WTO, and beyond, in International Studies Perspectives, 8, 36–53, 2007. 10 UNESCO, Final report of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development: the power of culture, 1998. 11 Throsby, David, Professor of Economics, Macquarie University Culture in sustainable development: Insights for the future implementation of Article 13.

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relatively recent development brings museums back to the original sense of the Greek term Mousseion, which means ‘lodging of the Muses’ – all nine Muses – a place devoted to the learning of all the arts and to coming to terms with the world. Today’s museums, whatever they may be, are rediscovering their holistic vision: they have become open spaces of cultural expression, exchange and dialogue, and invaluable vehicles for the preservation of cultural diversity as a common heritage of humanity. In the same buildings that house permanent collections and retrace periods of our common history, museums are also now hosting live performances, conferences, workshops and film festivals that establish the connection between cultural objects and the values, cosmogonies, communities and talents that produced them. This vision of culture – as a series of concentric circles with the community of origin at the centre – challenges traditional conceptions of ‘universalism’. It emphasises the organic bond that links the work of art or artifact and the location where it was created. But what do we exactly mean by ‘universalism’? And how does this principle relate to the notion of ownership? How can we promote universal access to cultural objects while honouring legitimate requests for the return and restitution of cultural property? Are we in fact undermining the authority and ideal of ‘universal museums’ by encouraging the greater mobility and return of cultural objects? Or are we simply encouraging more innovative arrangements and conceptions of museography or even ‘museology’? When Victor Hugo proclaimed that ‘monuments belong to their owner, their beauty to everyone’, he unwittingly captured a singular truth about cultural objects that I believe still holds true today. Monuments contribute to the creation of cultural consciousness in a given geographic area. They are firmly rooted in the earth and pavements that they stand on and in the collective memories and minds of the people that observe them. It is for this reason that the General Conference of UNESCO has stressed that the notion of universal access to the cultural properties exhibited in some museums of universal character cannot take precedence over the moral and legal notion of ownership of cultural goods. The increasing mobility of people has enabled easy access to heritage elements of a number of countries that have long been unknown to the wider public. Some would counter that people have a far greater opportunity today to visit ‘universal’ museums to rediscover traces of their own culture. This has unfortunately led numerous objects to acquire a status not of ‘universality’ but rather of ‘familiarity’ that progressively erases the singularity and inherent symbolic values of cultural objects.12 Does this familiarity suffice to guarantee the universal character of the work of art? I believe not. The reverse situation would be far more rewarding. Indeed, would we not be expanding the universality of cultural objects by promoting their maintenance or restitution in their places of origin, since this would bring visitors closer to the objects and their settings, instead of bringing the objects closer to the visitors? I am convinced that if we do not anchor cultural objects in their

12

UNESCO, MUSEUM No 235, The stakes of the collection in the 21st century, September 2007.

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original environment and history, we run the risk of voiding them of their universal quality and beauty by making them familiar objects of consumption. Neither the existence of universal museums nor the multiplication of museums in different sites can resolve the problem of the relation between a cultural object and the society of yesterday, today and tomorrow that produced and will produce it. The situation requires a ‘cultural or pedagogic accompaniment’ – a narrative, an explanation of the context – in addition to a common political will and ability to protect and preserve our common heritage. This is particularly true in this area, where a shared knowledge on works of art and collections is one of the fundamental factors that allow us to approach a universal ideal. I believe that it is both the economic growth of the culture sector and the increased awareness of cultural diversity that are driving changes in the policy environment in which we operate. Against this background, we, as an international community of stakeholders, must explore all paths that lead us to the most appropriate solutions for all, in accordance with internationally agreed-upon norms. The examples considered today will uncover some effective strategies for moving in this direction. These are so-called success stories that have been resolved both in and out of the realm of the Intergovernmental Committee and hence offer invaluable insights into the resolution of diplomatic, legal and ethical dilemmas associated with the return of cultural property. In these cases, we see a modification of modalities pertaining to the circulation of works of art. This is notably expressed in the rise of contractual agreements and privatisation mechanisms taking the form of long-term cultural cooperation agreements. Such texts envisage various arrangements, such as reciprocal loans, negotiated in the spirit of ‘loyal collaboration’, to quote the 2007 agreement between the Ministry for Cultural Heritage and Activities of the Italian Republic and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, an agreement that could be considered historic, since it is the first time that one of the most important museums in the world has acknowledged the true ownership of cultural objects that reached it through illicit trafficking. These breakthroughs and innovations have only begun to alter the sense of universalism that has governed the creation of museums. The future of our collections and their ‘universal character’ is in the making, and in many ways rests on our goodwill and ability to come to similar agreements. As there are many cases pending, it is my personal hope that, as mandated by the Intergovernmental Committee, the exchanges that will take place within the framework of the conference organised under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and UNESCO (17–18 March 2008) will enrich our common understanding of our mutual interests and gains, in order that we may come away with a renewed determination to find sustainable solutions to our respective aspirations as well as with a panoply of strategies for taking action.

Index

A Adenauer K., 27, 28 Afghanistan, 6, 7, 9, 105 Africa, 6, 22, 73, 88, 90, 93, 94, 105 al-Assad, H., 96 Albania, 10–13 Algeria, 52, 93 Al Qaeda, 31 al-Sadr, M., 96 American Federation, 68 American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association, 70 American House of Representatives, 68 American-Jewish lobbies, 96 American Revolution, 67 Arab countries, 48, 52, 94 Arctic, 41 Armitage, R., 9 Australia, 89 Austria, 2, 27, 28, 32, 33

B Balkans, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 18, 22, 33, 95 Baltic states, 32 Bank of England, 29 Barak, E., 96 Barcelona Declaration, 48 Barcelona Process, 48, 50, 51 Berlusconi, S., 82 bin Laden, O., 31 Black Sea, 95 Blair, T., 82 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10

Britain. See United Kingdom Brown, G., 82 Brussels, 2, 4, 32, 36, 43, 62 Bulgaria, 10–12 Burr, A., 75 Bush, G.W., 5, 101

C Cameron, D., 82 Canada, 80 Cardinal of Retz, 48 Carnegie Endowment, 94 Carter, J.E., 101 Caspian Sea, 95 Caucasus, 85, 88, 95 Cedars Revolution, 95 Central Asia, 80, 95 Charter of Fundamental Rights, 37 China, 29, 42, 80, 82, 85, 86, 88, 99–102 Chirac, J.R., 82 Christian Democrats, 28, 33 Churchill, W.S., 27 Climate change, 5, 8, 30, 41–46 Clinton, W.J., 6, 28, 79, 83, 97 Cold War, 2, 5, 84, 85 Collier, P., 90 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 3, 37 Communist Party, 101, 102 Conservatives, 33 Coolidge, C., 74 Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), 49 Croatia, 10, 12, 13

109

110

Index

Parliament, 18, 19, 33, 36, 41, 43 Presidency of the Council, 47 Reform Convention, 83 Reform Treaty, 23, 35, 36

Cultural Revolution (China), 99, 100, 102 Cyprus Cyprus problem, 10 Czechoslovakia, 99, 100 Czech Republic, 21, 24

D Damascus Summit of the Arab League, 94 Darling, A., 29 Dayton Accords, 10 De Gaulle, C., 2 Denmark, 2, 32, 104 De Villepen, D., 82 Doha Agreement, 94 Doing business, 61–65 Dubcek, A., 100

E Eastern Europe, 3, 51, 70, 81, 102 Egypt, 51, 52, 88, 93–97 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 43, 44 Enlightenment, 16 Euro–Atlantic relations (EU–US relations), 8, 30, 79–86 European Coal and Steel Community, 21 European integration, 1–5, 12, 16, 24, 27, 32, 36, 37, 79, 83 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 12 European Union (EU), European Communities (EC) Charter of Fundamental Rights, 37 Commission, 3, 35, 36, 43, 45, 50, 52 Commissioner for External Relations, 37 Commissioner for the Internal Market Services, 28 Constitution, 37, 83 Constitutional Convention, 22, 35–36 Constitutional Treaty, 4, 33, 35–37 Council, 3, 10, 33, 34, 36, 43, 45, 47, 49–52 Council of Ministers, 43 Court of Justice, 36 Euro Group, 28 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 95 High Representative of Foreign Affairs, 52 Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 17

F Fatah, 94, 96 Fischer, J., 82 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 87–90 Ford, G.R., 74 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 11–13, 18 France, 3, 15–19, 23, 47, 49–52, 56, 58, 61, 63, 82, 83, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101

G Ganley, D., 32 Georgia, 5, 22, 28, 81 Germany Chancellorship, 82 EU Presidency, 24 Greece EU Presidency, 10, 16, 18 Greece–France alliance, 15–19 Hellenic Parliament, 15, 19 Green Revolution, 88 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 29, 43, 44, 64, 100 Guatemala, 88 Gummere, R., 68

H Hamas, Palestinian Hamas, 93–96 Hariri, R., 95 Henry, P., 67 Heritage Foundation, 55 Hezbollah, 93–96

I Iceland, 32 India, 29–30, 42, 83, 86, 89 Indonesia, 88 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), 36 International Atomic Energy Organisation, 31

Index

International Code of Professional Ethics, Code of Professional Ethics, 104 International Council of Museums (ICOM), 104 International Energy Agency (IEA), 30, 31 International Labour Organization (ILO), 65 Ionesco, E., 14 Iran, 5, 7, 30, 93–97 Iraq, 5, 6, 9, 31, 81–83, 85, 93–96, 105 Ireland, 2, 27, 32–33, 36, 56, 59, 70, 83 Iron Curtain, 24 Islam, 81, 82, 93 Islamist, 93–94 Israel, 17, 31, 47, 48, 93–97 Italy, 50, 56, 57, 59, 63, 81, 82

J Japan, 29, 100, 104 Jefferson, T., 69, 75 Johnson, L.B., 74 Jordan, 93

K Kamitz, R., 27 Konstantinos Karamanlis, 16, 27, 28, 67, 68 Kostas Karamanlis, 30, 33 Keynes, Keynesian economics, 3, 6, 84 Kissinger, H., 4 Kohl, H., 101–102 Kosovo, 4, 11, 12, 81 Krugman, P., 28 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 5, 43

L Lehman Brothers, 88 Libya, 90, 95 Lincoln, A., 76 Lisbon Accords, 37 Lisbon Strategy, 62 Lisbon Treaty, 16, 22, 32–39

M Macedonia, 11, 13, 18 Malta, 33 Mao, Z., 99, 100, 102

111

Masaryk, T.G., 21 McCain, J.S., 74–75 McCreevy, C., 28 Merkel, A., 50, 82 Metropolitan Museum of Art, 107 Middle East, 6, 7, 9, 17, 31, 80, 85, 93–97 Millennium Declaration, 87 Moon, B.K., 88 Morocco, 48, 49, 52 Mubarak, H., 51 Muslim Brothers, Brotherhood, 94

N National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), 90 Netherlands, 24, 56, 59, 63, 83 New Left, 99 Nixon, R.M., 68, 101 North Africa, 93, 94 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Bucharest Summit, 12 North Atlantic Alliance, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15–19 Partnership for Peace (PfP), 10, 12 North Korea, 85 Norway, 104 Nunn, S., 31 Nye, J.S., 9

O Obama, B.H., 7, 29–31, 73–74, 77, 79–86 Olmert, E., 96 Organisation for European Co-operation and Development (OECD), 62 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 30 Oslo agreements, 48

P Pakistan, 9 Palestine, Palestinian state, 17, 31, 93, 95–96 Palin, S.L.H., 74–75 Papandreou, G., 32 Perez de Cuellar Commission, 105 Perry, W., 31

112

Persian Gulf, 93–95 Poland, 37, 56, 57, 60, 63, 82 Portugal, 2, 16, 17, 56, 60, 63 Prague, S., 99–101 Prodi, R., 50

Index

T Tadic´, B., 12 Thaci, H., 11 Thatcher, M.H., 2, 101 Truman, H.S., 74 Turkey, 4, 10, 18, 22, 50, 93–97

Q Qatar, 93–97 Quality Majority Voting (QMV), 36

R Raab, J., 27, 28 Rasmussen, A.F., 32 Reagan, R.W., 101 Renaissance, 16 Romania, 10–12, 14 Roosevelt, F.D., 76 Roosevelt, T., 74 Russia, Russian Federation, 3–5, 42, 80–86

S Sarkozy, N., 15–19, 47–52, 82, 97 Saudi Arabia, 30, 93, 95–97 Schro¨der, G., 33, 82 Schultz, G., 31 Serbia, 4, 11, 12, 18 Shaoqi, L., 101 Shiite Muslims, 93 Siberia, 42 Simitis, C., 33 Skopje, 13, 18 Slovakia, 24 Slovenia EU Presidency, 10 Social Democrats, 32–33, 102 Socialists, 32, 82 South Africa, 22, 90 South-Eastern Europe, 9–14 Soviet Union, 79 Spain, 2, 16, 50, 56, 60, 63, 81 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), 4, 10 Stalinism, 101 Sunni Muslims, 93 Sweden, 2, 32, 51, 104 Syria, 93–97

U Ukraine, 5, 22, 81, 90 Union for the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Union, 8, 47–52, 95 United Kingdom Labour Party, 82 Tories, Conservatives, 33, 82 United Nations Organization (UNO) Climate Change Conference, 42 General Assembly resolutions, 13 Headquarters, 87 UNESCO (1970) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Convention), 103 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 105 Cultural Heritage Laws Database, 104 General Conference, General Conference of UNESCO, 103–104, 106 Medium Term Strategy 2008–2013, 103 United Nations Security Council, 10, 13, 17 World Food Program (WFP), 89 United States of America (USA) Congress, 76–77, 80, 82 Constitution, Twelfth Amendment, 75 Democratic Party (Democrats), 83, 101 House of Representatives, 68, 76 lame duck period, 75–77 President, 7, 29, 31, 68, 73–77, 79, 84, 86 Republican Party (Republicans), 31, 76, 82, 101 Senate, 69 White House, 30 United States of Europe, 27 US–Russia relations, 84

Index

V

113

Vietnam War, 99

World Bank, 62–64, 89, 90 World War II, 2, 27, 100, 101

W

X

Warsaw Pact, 99, 101 Weber, M., 73 Werhan, K., 68 Western Europe, 1, 99, 101

Xiaoping, D., 102

Z Zapatero, J.L.R., 50