The Chinese Hsinhai Revolution: G. E. Morrison and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1897-1920

THE CHINESE HSINHAI REVOLUTION This authoritative and original work throws new light upon international relations after the Russo-Japanese War by exploring for the first time the important role of G.E.Morrison. As an Australian correspondent for The Times living in Peking and later as a political adviser to four presidents of the Chinese republic, Morrison’s concern for Australian interests often placed him at odds with The Times and the British Government. In an era when British supremacy was being challenged in East Asia by the increasingly militant Japan, Morrison regarded himself as a watchdog for Australian national security. While the protection afforded to Britain under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance against Germany often meant that the British turned a blind eye to Japanese activities in China, Morrison saw Australia’s need to check the growing power of Japan as vitally important. By showing how Morrison worked both with and against power elites of different nations, this book traces how he managed to develop an effective personal diplomacy and a successful propaganda campaign which aroused international public attention. In addition to Morrison’s diaries, memoranda, correspondence and articles in The Times, Woodhouse examines multi-national scholarly sources, including British, Japanese and American personal and official materials, in order to develop the context in which Morrison carried out personal diplomacy and to delineate the many-sided story into which he has been placed. The centenary period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese War provides an ideal backdrop against which to re-examine these events. Eiko Woodhouse gained a PhD at the University of Sydney.

THE CHINESE HSINHAI REVOLUTION G.E.Morrison and Anglo-Japanese relations, 1897–1920

Eiko Woodhouse

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2004 Eiko Woodhouse All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Woodhouse, Eiko. The Chinese Hsinhai revolution: G.E.Morrison and Anglo-Japanese relations, 1897–1920/Eiko Woodhouse Includes bibliographical references and index. I. Title: G.E.Morrison and Anglo-Japanese relations, 1897– 1920. II. Title. DS774.W63 2003 951′.036—dc21 2003010194 ISBN 0-203-49388-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-60-203--X (Adobe e-Reader Format) ISBN 0-415-32262-6 (Print Edition)

CONTENTS Acknowledgements

vi

List of abbreviations

vii

Introduction 1 International relations in China, 1897–1905

1 6

2 The outbreak of the revolution

26

3 Morrison and Yuan Shih-kai

59

4 Sino-Anglo-Japanese diplomacy

82

5 Morrison’s personal diplomacy, 1911–12

98

6 The effect of Morrison’s work

129

7 China after the Hsinhai revolution

148

Summary/conclusion

167

Epilogue

171

Notes

174

Bibliography

224

Index

240

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people and organizations assisted me in the completion of my study. My sincere thanks go to Professor Neville Meaney, my supervisor in the Department of History, University of Sydney, for his constant advice, criticism and help; to Professor Ian H.Nish, Emeritus Professor, London School of Economics, for his advice; to Dr Bernice-Eve Somerton Calf and to Mr Bruce Wylie, for their comments and editing; to Mr Toshihiko Kobayashi, former Senior Lecturer, Department of Asian Studies, University of Sydney to the late Professor Kazuo Enoki, Head of the Tōyō Bunko in Tokyo (originally the Morrison Library), to Mr Ken Kurihara, Chief Archivist, and to Mr Kazuo Kawamura, Archivist of the Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for their research material; to the Mitchell Library, the State Library of New South Wales, to the Fisher Library University of Sydney, and to the Macquarie University Library in Sydney, to the National Library of Australia in Canberra, to the Japanese National Diet Library and to the Tōyō Bunko in Tokyo, for their assistance in material gathering; to Mr Hidenori Ōnuki of Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha for his help in preparing the illustrations; and to Professor Peter King, Department of Government, and to Dr Aedeen Cremin, formerly in the Department of Archaeology, University of Sydney, for proof reading; to the Mitchell Library the State Library of New South Wales, Dr Helen Dodson Kahn, formerly in Cornell University, USA, to Cambridge University Press, to Times Newspapers Limited, London, for granting permission to use their copyright materials. My special thanks go to Dr Lo Hui-min, formerly in the Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, for editing the Correspondence of G. E.Morrison, the Cambridge University Press publication, which is an invaluable source of information for studies on Morrison. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint plates 7 and 8. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of the book. My heartfelt thanks go to Mr Alastair Morrison, G.E.Morrison’s son in Canberra, for his co-operation and understanding towards my study; to Mrs Shigeko Yaguchi, my sister in Tokyo, for her encouragement and assistance throughout. This research project would never have been possible without assistance from these many people and organizations.

ABBREVIATIONS BD

British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, ed. G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1926.

BFO

British Foreign Office Papers, British Public Records Office, London.

BPD

British Parliamentary Debates, Hansard Fourth Series: Third Session of the Twenty-Eighth Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland: 1908–1909: Under Contract with His Majesty’s Stationery Office by Wyman & Sons Limited, London.

BPP

British Parliamentary Papers, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London.

Correspondence

Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E.Morrison, vols 1 and 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976 and 1978.

FRUS

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Department of State, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office.

JADC

Japanese Archives Diplomatic Correspondence, the Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

NGB

Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Documents], Gaimushō Hensan (comp. and ed.), Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Morrison Papers

Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312.

NGJ

Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten [A Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History], Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History Compilation Committee (comp. and ed.), Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992.

SSMH

Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen-shi [The Annals of the Newspapers: Chronicle of the Meiji Period], vol. 14, The Chronicle of the Meiji Period Compilation Committee (comp. and ed.), Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai-Gakkai, 1972.

The Times

The Times, London.

Plate 1 George Ernest Morrison Source: From Mr Alastair Morrison

Plate 2 G.E.Morrison, his employees and their children Source: Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Australia

Plate 3 G.E.Morrison’s diary Source: Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Australia

Plate 4 Hikokichi Ijūin Source: Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Australia

Plate 5 John Newell Jordan Source: Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Australia

Plate 6 Yuan Shih-kai Source: Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Australia

Plate 7 T’ang Shao-yi in European dress, 1912

Plate 8 Group taken at the Wai-wu-pu after the ceremony of the inauguration of Yuan Shih-k’ai as President

Figure I The South Manchurian Railway and the Fakumen Railway Source: Helen D.Kahn, ‘The Great Game of Empire: Willard D.Straight and American Far Eastern Policy’, Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, New York, 1968

Figure II The Hukuang Railway Source: Helen D.Kahn, ‘The Great Game of Empire: Willard D.Straight and American Far Eastern Policy’, Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, New York, 1968

INTRODUCTION The rise of Japan Since the twenty-first century began, the world has been witnessing increasing complexity in international relations. It seems in this new age of ‘globalization’ that the nation-state will no longer be as important as it was in the preceding century. One wonders how historians of the next century will assess and judge today’s international politics. Similarly it is of considerable interest to reexamine international relations of the early twentieth century, where we find a very different world. It was both the high age of nationalism and the nationstate and the beginning of a new era in which the whole world was being drowned in a nation-based international system. As we have just recently celebrated the centenary of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it is very opportune to look at how the impact of the West shaped Japan and China and their relations with each other. About half a century ago, after its defeat in the Pacific War, Japan came to join the society of Western democracies. It is generally accepted in Japan that the origin of that war is to be found in Japan’s policy towards China in the early twentieth century. This policy followed its victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, which was fought on Chinese soil.1 On the international scene, Japan was a latecomer. Being urged by the Western powers, Japan opened its country in the mid-nineteenth century departing from a national policy of seclusion which had lasted over 200 years. Under the slogans of ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’ and ‘Civilizations’, Japan adopted from the West not only its advanced technology such as guns and battle-ships but also many aspects of its modern organization, especially educational, administrative, financial and judicial systems. In joining the international scene, Japan valued highly, as the pillar of its diplomacy, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which it had entered as an equal partner. To Japan this alliance enhanced Japan’s prestige and security, for the British Empire was the greatest in the world and was spread across all continents. The first Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance was signed in 1902, the second in 1905 and the third in 1911. The Alliance was terminated in 1921. As a result, it is very rewarding to ask ourselves the following questions. ‘Why was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance formed?’ ‘Why did the Russo-Japanese War, in which Britain was involved, occur?’ ‘In what way did Japan cope with the aftermath of the war?’ ‘How did Anglo-Japanese relations affect the Chinese Hsinhai Revolution of 1911–12, which overthrew the Manchu dynasty and created a republic?’ ‘Under what circumstances was the Alliance terminated and how did Japan begin to take the course that led to the Pacific War?’

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An Australian, Dr George Ernest Morrison One of the most useful ways of answering these questions is to examine the work and career of an Australian, Dr George Ernest Morrison. The merits of researching Morrison’s influence for the study of history are manifold. Firstly, Morrison was an extremely interesting man with many talents: traveller, adventurer, medical doctor, journalist, political adviser to the Chinese Government, and a key player in the backrooms of the British Empire. He significantly influenced the course of East Asian history. He played a considerable and sometimes decisive role in Japan’s foreign relations, when he lived and worked in China, as The Times correspondent in Peking from 1897 to 1912, and then as political adviser to four successive presidents of the Republic of China from 1912 until his death in 1920. Secondly, Morrison left for posterity a great quantity of valuable records. There is abundant primary source material. They are his own writings for The Times,2 and equally important are the Morrison Papers. They are his memoranda, diary and correspondence, which he bequeathed to the Mitchell Library in the State Library of New South Wales in Sydney Thirdly, Morrison offers the third eye. In this study, Anglo-Japanese relations are explored not only from the viewpoints of Japan and Britain, but also from that of Australia. In order to place Anglo-Japanese relations in their proper perspective, the study will also show how Morrison kept his Australian eyes closely on the United States as it was then vigorously stretching its influence towards the Pacific and Asia in search of new markets. The world map shows that Australia is located in an interesting position in the South Pacific. Britain, which Australia called ‘brother’, is situated at the other end to the west. Looking at Australia’s immediate environment, Japan and Russia are directly to the north and its Anglo-Saxon ‘cousin’, the United States, is on the far side of the Pacific. These great powers fan out from Australia which takes the position of the pivot of an opened folding fan. From this perspective, it is enlightening to see the changing pattern of international relations in East Asia. When Russia, expanding across the continent to north east Asia, was seen as a threat to Australian national security and Britain was too busy to protect Australia because of the Boer War and its aftermath, Morrison looked towards Japan, hoping Japan would drive Russia back to Siberia. To this end, he promoted a Russo-Japanese war. In a sense, the Russo-Japanese War was a surrogate war for Britain and Australia; Japan was a ‘bulwark’ against Russia for them. Morrison recorded in his diary that the ‘brave [Japanese] people are to serve us in fighting our battles with Russia’.3 After the Russo-Japanese War, when Australia regarded the victorious Japan as a new threat while Britain was preparing for a war with Germany, Morrison turned his eyes towards the United States for support. Although he was living in China, he observed, noted and reported the unfolding of this history from an Australian standpoint and he himself actively participated in the making of the history so it would serve Australia’s interest. Who then was G.E.Morrison?

Introduction

3

Morrison’s early career Born in February 1862 in Geelong, Victoria, Australia, Morrison stood out from an early age because of his athletic prowess. He studied at Geelong College where his father was the founder/principal. After completing his school studies at 18, he began a series of extraordinary wanderings by sailing alone along the coast from Geelong to Adelaide, a distance of about 1,000 kilometres. Later in the same year, chiefly to please his father, he entered the medical faculty of Melbourne University, although he would have preferred to become a journalist. After passing his first-year examinations, he set off from Albury on a solo canoe voyage down the Murray River to the sea, covering 2,400 kilometres in just 65 days. He procured almost all his food with his shotgun, because the river swarmed with wildlife. At night he slept in his canoe. His trip was regarded as ‘one of the most remarkable canoe voyages in history’.4 The following year he failed university examinations and left university to begin a life of roving. He signed on as a seaman on a South Seas vessel known to be engaged in the forcible removal of Kanaka islanders to work on Queensland sugar plantations. A series of articles on the Kanaka ‘trade’, which he wrote for the Age newspaper in Melbourne, aroused great controversy and contributed to curtailment of the trade.5 F.Liddell remarked: ‘Morrison’s lucid reports and his fearless criticism were instrumental in putting a stop to the evils of this nefarious black-birding traffic’.6 At the end of 1882, he joined a Chinese fishing junk in Melbourne and after landing in the Gulf of Carpentaria in northern Australia, decided to walk across the continent to Melbourne. Starting from Normanton, he walked alone, unarmed, carrying food in his swag through the most hazardous wild regions in the height of summer heat when the temperature recorded 110 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit (43 to 49 degrees centigrade) in the shade. On the central plateau, being over-taken by floods, he had to wade or swim for nearly 500 kilometres. He reached Melbourne safely after 123 days, covering 3,200 kilometres. It was a feat which The Times aptly described: A man who ventures in this country alone and unarmed must be possessed of no small amount of hardihood. Mr Morrison’s feat commands the admiration of all interested in exploration, and must be set down as one of the most remarkable of pedestrian achievements.7 On arriving in Melbourne in April 1883, Morrison learned that T.McIlwraith, the Queensland Premier, after annexing part of New Guinea, was trying to obtain the support of the British Government for his action. The Age invited Morrison to lead a small exploratory party to New Guinea to report on the region’s suitability for settlement. On this trip, Morrison, who was at the front of the party, was struck by two spears thrown by the fiercely hostile natives. One struck the side of his nose and entered the hollow of his right eye and the other pierced the stomach wall just below his chest. Morrison pulled out the spears but the heads remained deeply embedded. The one in his face, about 5 centimetres long and 1 centimetre in diameter, was not removed until five months later in Melbourne. The second spearhead, about 8 centimetres long and 1 centimetre in diameter, posed an even greater problem and Morrison’s father sent him to Scotland for

The Chinese Hsinhai revolution

4

surgery at the University of Edinburgh. Nine months after the injury, the spearhead was success-fully removed and was preserved in the university museum. Morrison decided to resume his medical studies in Edinburgh. After studying for three years, he graduated MB (Bachelor of Medicine), ChM (Master of Surgery) in August 1887. A fortnight after graduation, he set off again across the Atlantic on board an emigrant steamer bound for Philadelphia. After a short stay, he joined a ship for Jamaica, walked over the island, and went to New York on board a steamer as assistant purser, keeping a tally of the cargo of bananas and oranges. He then travelled to Spain, where he worked as a doctor for the Rio Tinto Copper Mines, soon becoming chief of the medical staff of this giant corporation for a year and a half.8 Morrison then became court physician to the Sheriff of Wazzan in Morocco. In early 1890 he studied at the Salpetière Hospital in Paris, and went back to Australia where he worked as a resident surgeon at the Ballarat and District Base Hospital in Victoria. After two years he still had a yearning to see new countries. It was China this time. In 1893 he set off through the Philippines and Hong Kong to China where he visited the coastal ports of Shanghai and Tientsin, then on to Peking and the Great Wall. He crossed the sea to Japan.9 While satisfying his insatiably inquisitive mind and adventurous spirit, however, he faced increasing financial hardship. He wrote: I was really hard up in Japan. In Kobe when I sold my telescope for $12 [US?], I truthfully wrote to a friend in Australia telling him that I had come round from Yokohama on my shirt studs, that I was at present living on my telescope, and that I hoped to return to Shanghai on my surgical instrument case.10 While in Kobe, he conceived the idea of crossing China to Burma and went back to Shanghai, telegraphed his mother for some money and in 1894 began another great crosscountry trek, a solitary journey from Shanghai to Rangoon. Dressed as a Chinese, with a pigtail attached to the inside of his hat, he covered 4,800 kilometres, much of which was unmapped inland territory where no white man had ever set foot. On being interviewed, Morrison said: ‘My entire journey, including my Chinese outfit…cost only $ 18 [US?]…. I cannot speak too highly of the invariable courtesy that was shown me by all classes of Chinese, from the highest officials to the humblest coolies.’11 From Rangoon he set off for Calcutta, India and then returned to Australia, from where he sailed in early 1895 as ship’s doctor to England, with a manuscript of his trip from Shanghai to Rangoon.12 In London while waiting for the publication of his book, he completed and submitted a medical thesis to the University of Edinburgh, receiving the degree of MD (Doctor of Medicine) in August 1895. His book on the trip, An Australian in China: Being the Narrative of a Quiet Journey across China to Burma,13 which ‘made his name familiar wherever the English language is spoken’,14 brought him to the attention of The Times. The newspaper promptly employed and posted him in 1895 to French Indo-China to investigate and report about the French activities in Siam, the region over which AngloFrench relations were strained. Then he was posted to China as its resident correspondent in early 1897. China was just about to become the storm centre of the international ‘power game’, the scramble for concessions amongst the great imperialistic powers, namely Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Japan and the United States. Arriving at

Introduction

5

Peking, Morrison decided to assume the role of watch dog for British interests in the Far East. He joined the ‘game’ with great enthusiasm. His new challenge began at the age of 34.

1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CHINA, 1897–1905 The scramble for concessions, 1897–8, and the Boxer uprising, 1900 The period from 1897 to 1905 includes the scramble amongst foreign powers for concessions in 1897–8, the Boxer uprising of 1900, the conclusion of the First and Second Anglo-Japanese Agreements of Alliance in 1902 and 1905 and the RussoJapanese War of 1904–5. They were challenging times, high noon for the Western powers’ imperialism1 in Asia. Morrison was a product of the British Empire, which, he believed, led and protected world civilization. In the mid-nineteenth century, Japan was struggling to overcome two problems, internal and external. Being forced to open its country by the imperialistic Western powers, Japan was trying hard to maintain its independence as a nation. At the same time it was trying to minimize its domestic troubles brought about by the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and by the subsequent, extremely speedy industrialization. In order to achieve its goal of catching up with the Western powers, Japan sought import/export markets outside the country. Between the newly risen Japan and the old China, which was struggling to preserve its dignity as the Celestial Empire, there arose a dispute over the suzerainty of Korea, and the Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1894. This war was regarded by the powers as a case of ‘the giant and the dwarf’. China was indeed a giant in terms of the vastness of land and abundance of labour and resources, but Japan surpassed China in terms of modernization of military training, strategy and equipment.2 Under the Shimonoseki Treaty of 17 April 1895, victorious Japan secured an indemnity of 200 million taels, the rights of extra-territoriality and of most favoured trading nation, concessions of Formosa, the Pescadores, Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula. Also under the Treaty, China recognized the autonomy of Korea, which was the main cause of the war. With these gains, Japan hoped to climb to a position of equality with the Western powers in the Far East.3 Russia saw the Shimonoseki Treaty with alarm, considering that it was imperative not to allow Japan to have a footing in north China, so close to its own region of interest. Russia invited France and Germany to join in its proposed intervention over the Treaty. France accepted the proposal because it saw the Treaty as a good opportunity ‘to kill two birds with one stone’. One was to strengthen its relations with Russia in Europe in the face of unease with Germany.4 The other was to grab this opportunity to make inroads into China. Germany, a latecomer on the Chinese scene, also accepted the proposal, as its ambition was no less than that of any other powers. Thus, the so-called Russo-FrancoGerman alliance in the Far East came into being. On 23 April 1895, only three weeks after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Treaty, the triple alliance issued an ultimatum to

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Japan to retrocede to China the Liaotung peninsula that Japan took from China. This triple intervention created Japanese hostility against Russia, but Japan was not strong enough to go against this ‘friendly recommendation’ and reluctantly retroceded the peninsula to China, and accepted in its stead the additional indemnity of 230 million taels from China.5 Three days after the intervention, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II whipped up the ‘crusading spirit’ of his cousin, the Russian Czar Nicholas II by writing to him: It is clearly the great task of the future for Russia to cultivate the Asian Continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the great Yellow race. In this you will always find me on your side…. I hope that, just as I will gladly help you settle the question of eventual annexations of portions of territory for Russia, you will kindly see that Germany may also be able to acquire a Port somewhere where it does not interfere with you.6 China, which was regarded by the Western powers as a ‘sleeping lion’ until defeated by Japan, exposed its true weakness in the defeat. Thereupon the powers launched China’s dismemberment, the so-called ‘slicing of the Chinese melon’. Each nation tried to outdo others in order to increase its political and financial influence over China by all possible methods—competing, co-operating, outmanoeuvring and double-crossing one another. Russia and France had little sea power and sought their territorial expansion in the Far East from their respective land bases. Russia encroached downwards into Manchuria from the north and France upwards into Yunnan from southern Indo-China. With this pincer movement, they tried to sandwich British interests in central China along the Yangtse River.7 On the other hand, Britain and Japan shared a common fear of the Russian southward advance, while Britain and the United States shared the common target of maintaining the integrity of Chinese territory—Britain in order to defend its existing ‘lion’s share’ of foreign trade and the United States in order to obtain its ‘fair share’ of interests in China. In short, at the risk of over-simplification, one could say that on the Far Eastern scene around the turn of the century, the powers were divided into two camps—Russia, France and Germany versus Britain, Japan and the United States. Nevertheless, it was Britain which enjoyed the greatest profit from China, nearly fourfifths of China’s foreign trade derived from its long-established commercial and political position.8 The Western powers and Japan penetrated into China by means of territorial seizure and acquisition of rights of railway construction and mining exploration. In order to obtain their ‘spheres of interest (influence)’, the powers enthusiastically joined in their scramble for concessions. It was Germany which took the lead. Under the Kaiser’s policy of a ‘strong army and colonial expansion’, Germany had chosen Kiaochow Bay in Shantung province as its most desirable strategic site, and was diplomatically pressing reluctant China to cede it. Therefore Germany did not miss a windfall opportunity, when two German missionaries were murdered by the Chinese on 1 November 1897. Within two weeks, German troops seized Kiaochow Bay In return for the loss of the two German lives, Germany demanded and later secured a 99-year lease of Tsingtao and the entire bay of Kiaochow, with exclusive railway rights, mining rights and the payment of an indemnity.9 A couple of months before taking this action, however, the Kaiser requested the prior consent of the Czar of Russia for the German occupation of Kiaochow Bay The

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Czar could not refuse this request ‘point blank’ and the Kaiser, interpreting this as ‘implied consent’, pushed ahead with his plan for the invasion of Kiaochow.10 Upon the German military occupation of Kiaochow, China asked Russia to expel the Germans under the Secret Treaty of 1896.11 However, Russia, instead of observing the Treaty, saw it as an opportunity to obtain from China a reward for the Russo-FrancoGerman triple intervention,12 and in December 1897 demanded that China surrender to Russia both Port Arthur and Talienwan, the very territory which it had compelled Japan to retrocede to China under the pretext of peace in China. Russia also demanded that China cede the right to construct a branch line from the Eastern Chinese Railway to Port Arthur.13 The Chinese Empress-Dowager Tz’u-hsi, on behalf of Emperor Kuang-hsu, was strongly opposed to acceptance of the demands, but Sergei de Witte, Minister of Finance, persuaded Viceroy Li Hung-chang, the most powerful politician in China for over 25 years, to accept the demands with a bribe of half a million roubles, and Chang Yin-huan, Vice-Minister of Finance, with a bribe of a quarter of a million roubles. The two in turn persuaded the Empress-Dowager successfully and the Port Arthur Convention was signed in March 1898. Witte noted in his Memoir:14 This was the first time that I resorted to bribing in my negotiation with Chinamen…. The act was a violation of our traditional relations with the Chinese Empire. It was a fatal step which eventually brought about the unhappy Japanese War and the subsequent revolution.15 In the face of German and Russian seizure of parts of China, Britain became greatly alarmed. In February 1898 when Russia attempted to turn Port Arthur into a naval base, violating its pledge to keep it open to world trade, Britain decided to claim Weihaiwei in Shantung province, opposite Port Arthur, as well as ensuring its ‘sphere’ in the entire Yangtze Valley area through a non-alienation agreement not to cede the area to any other power. This was its policy of compensation to maintain the existing balance of power.16 Britain pressed China to accept the demands. China was very reluctant and explained that if it accepted the British demands, it would be left without a suitable harbour for its new ships.17 C.MacDonald, British Minister to China, gave China four days for a final reply and on 31 March 1898 threatened China, stating that ‘If not affirmative, matter would be placed in Admiral’s hands’.18 In fact, the British fleet stationed in Hong Kong was on its way to Gulf of Pechili.19 China, fearing a naval attack, gave in on 3 April 1898 and accepted the British demands.20 France obtained a ‘sphere of influence’ in the Kwangtung-Kwangsi-Yunnan area with a 99-year lease, in April 1898. Japan, so far a mere onlooker, followed the Western example, by acquiring a ‘sphere’ in Fukien province opposite Formosa in April 1898 by a non-alienation agreement. The partition of China seemed imminent, threatening the existence of the Ch’ing Empire.21 The United States, which had adopted the Monroe Doctrine of non-intervention, began to expand, after the Civil War of 1861–5, towards the Pacific area in search of markets, colonies and naval bases. In 1898, after the Spanish-American War over Cuba, the United States occupied Manila, took the western Pacific island of Guam and annexed Hawaii. Thus, the United States busied itself in the Pacific region and when it finally arrived in China, it had already ‘missed the bus’ and obtained no ‘sphere of interest’ there.

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Regarding this situation with anxiety, the United States presented to the Western powers and Japan the Open Door notes in June 1899, claiming equal opportunity.22 This was ‘an obvious attempt to forestall China’s division amongst the European powers and Japan’.23 When the effect of foreign control over their ‘spheres of influence’ became more acutely felt and impoverished the people’s livelihood, and fear of a breakup of China became widespread, it was only natural that, out of the people’s misery and sufferings, social unrest and disorder broke out everywhere in the country, and became more organized into anti-foreign and anti-Manchu dynasty movements. The most powerful was the Boxer Movement. Boxers were said to have blindly believed that they were heavensent soldiers who could not be physically injured by rifles and swords when they learnt the ancient military art of boxing and chanted an incantation. In early 1900, the movement quickly spread out from Shantung to Chihli towards the capital Peking, where the foreign legations were encamped.24 By the end of May 1900, the Boxers were near Peking, terrorizing missionaries and Chinese converts, destroying railway lines, stations and churches. Alarmed, the legations brought to Peking, for their protection, 426 soldiers from the eight nations of Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States from naval ships off Tientsin. By the middle of June, the Boxers began attacking the foreign establishments in Peking and most foreigners took shelter in the legation quarters in a besieged condition. An eight-nation international relief force was organized in Tientsin and Taku, and left for Peking on 4 August. After a fierce attack, the siege was lifted on 14 August, 55 days after it began.25 While defending the legation quarters with the Japanese, Morrison, who earlier regarded the Japanese merely as handy tools against Russia, seems to have developed a personal liking for them. In his article in The Times, ‘The siege of the Peking legations’,26 Morrison stressed the bravery and discipline of the Japanese contingent. V.Chirol, Foreign Editor of The Times, added weight to Morrison’s article by writing that: ‘The splendid bravery and skill with which the Japanese held the place…are amongst the most striking features of the siege’.27 In June 1904, in Tokyo, Prime Minister Tarō Katsura personally thanked Morrison for this article, which ‘rendered important services in making Japan better known to the world’.28 A friendship developed between Morrison and the Japanese.29

The First Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance, 1902 The British Government and the public took for granted Britain’s dominant position in the Far East, enjoying the majority of China’s foreign trade. They were not aware that the situation was turning against them. Morrison realized, however, in late 1897, after inspecting the projected route of the Chinese Eastern Railway which Russia was constructing through Manchuria, that the British position was being seriously challenged by Russia. Alarmcled, he warned the British through The Times that ‘the Russification of Manchuria’ was in rapid progress. Morrison became certain that Russia’s threat needed to be met head-on. He insisted as early as January 1898 that Russia must be driven back from Manchuria. It was because he foresaw Russia’s southward advance as a menace not only to British interests in China but also eventually to Australian security He wrote:

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The more powerful she [Russia] becomes in the Far East…the greater becomes her power of aggression in that region of Asia…she can then contemplate the Annexation of Asia’…. she becomes a serious danger not only to British trade in China but to British territorial possessions in Asia from Canada to Australia.30 Morrison, thus, feared the Russian threat to Australia. Morrison assessed correctly that Britain had insufficient military strength available to check Russia, as Britain was on the verge of fighting the Boer War in South Africa. Consequently, Morrison thought that Japan, which also feared Russia’s southward drive, might prove to be an effective protector of British interests in the region. He wrote to J.O.P.Bland,31 The Times correspondent in Shanghai: ‘by all means Russia must be checked and the power to check her is Japan’.32 Morrison’s pro-Japanese attitude initially stemmed from his expectation that Japan might serve British interests in the Far East. The First Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance was signed in January 1902. It was an alliance against Russia. Britain’s leading position in the Far East, enjoyed for more than half a century, had been gradually threatened by the continental powers. Russia’s territorial ambition over Manchuria became so nakedly exposed, and its southward advance seemed to know no bounds, that it threatened British interests not only in the Far East but also in Burma and India. For this reason, Britain, departing from its traditional policy of splendid isolation, had to adopt a policy of alliance. After an unsuccessful attempt to bring about the Anglo-Russian rapprochement in early 1898, Britain concluded, half-heartedly, the Anglo-German Agreement in October 1900, but it proved to be of no value in the Far East. The United States did not want to become entangled with European complications. That left only Japan as an ally for Britain. Japan seemed to be a natural ally, sharing the common fear of Russia and exhibiting its military strength in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 and, more recently, in the Boxer suppression campaign.33 For Japan, Russia’s advance had been a night-mare. Japan felt, from its national defence point of view, that Korea should not be brought under any power’s control. But Russia was showing every sign of entering Korea. In order to stop Russia’s further advance, Japan considered certain courses. One was to reach an agreement with Russia on the basis of ManKan-kōkan (Russian predominance in Manchuria in return for a Japanese protectorate over Korea). The other was to make an alliance with Britain, with whose strength Japan could check Russia by means of diplomacy or, at the worst, by military action.34 Under these circumstances, the First Agreement was signed, stipulating that: If either Japan or Great Britain…should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its Ally (Article II) If in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that Ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. (Article III)35

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Morrison, even though acting indirectly, played no small part in establishing the alliance. Firstly, he was instrumental in shaping British public opinion. The idea of an alliance had been advocated by The Times, by Chirol in particular, who was regarded as the ‘arbiter of foreign news and moulder of British public opinion on China’.36 In fact, Chirol claimed himself to be the architect of the alliance. But if Chirol was the ‘godfather’ of the alliance,37 then Morrison helped him decisively to become so, by constantly supplying him with reliable information on the ever-changing Far Eastern situation. Secondly, Morrison encouraged the Japanese architects of the alliance, namely J.Komura, Foreign Minister, T. Hayashi, Minister in London, who was ‘the originator and disseminator of the Alliance’38 and K.Ishii, Director of the Political Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, who ‘worked very hard from the outset’ for the alliance as a liaison officer between Komura and Hayashi.39 Thirdly, Morrison influenced Japanese public opinion in favour of the alliance, through the Jiji Shimpō and the Kokumin Shimbun, the most pro-British Japanese newspapers.40 Morrison and Chirol gave considerable encouragement to Hayashi who played a key role as a ‘persuasive intermediary’ between Tokyo and London,41 and who signed both the First and the Second Agreements of Alliance. The First Agreement was a new venture for Japan, which had emerged on the international scene as late as 1900 on the occasion of the Boxer incident, and therefore needed courage to make overtures to the British Empire to become an equal partner.42 Hayashi courageously committed himself to the task of forming an alliance. Just before departing for London to take up the position of Minister to Britain, he had an opportunity to talk with Morrison who was briefly in Tokyo. Hayashi noted in his memoirs: If I remember correctly it was in early March 1900 on the top floor of the Jiji Shimpō office that I discussed an alliance between Great Britain and Japan with Dr Morrison, the famous correspondent of The Times at Peking. He wholeheartedly supported my view.43 Morrison also recorded in his diary: ‘A talk with Baron Hayashi,44 the new Minister to London. Afterwards Hayashi accompanied me to the Jiji Shimpō office’.45 Hayashi was in close contact with Chirol, who was a strong advocate of an alliance. Hayashi wrote: Mr. (now Sir) Valentine Chirol, the Foreign Editor of The Times, visited the Far East twice whilst I was Minister at Peking, and I met him several times there and exchanged views with him. When I was returning from Peking I travelled on the same steamer Higo-maru with him as far as Jinsen. Ever since I have been in close contact with him, and he has always heartily favoured the idea of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance.46 Morrison and Chirol gave Hayashi the encouragement he needed to promote the plan for an alliance. One of the reasons why Japan needed encouragement was that propaganda about the danger of the Yellow Peril, which the Kaiser had begun, was prevalent in Europe. When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was formed, the Kaiser described it as ‘an odious pact with the Yellow Race, and a dangerous betrayal of European solidarity’.47 Bland called the

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Yellow Peril ‘a poor bogey at best…yet a phantom that has served, and should serve again, many a politician’s turn’.48 Some of the British were against an alliance with a nation of a different race. As Chirol confided in K.Ishii, ‘In Britain, some thought that it was impossible to form an alliance with a nation of different race and different religion’,49 and some of the British were not keen to see an alliance with a non-Christian Asian race.50 One example of a Westerner’s superiority complex is as follows: That the belated yellow races should ever achieve coequal place in civilisation, in that which makes for advance in science, art, morals and the material blessings of nationhood, with the white races, will only be when we cease to properly use our birthright.51 The alliance was the first military contract formulated on an equal basis between a Western and an Asian nation.52

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5, and the Second Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance, 1905 In March 1903, Russia began to move troops towards the Korean border, under the pretext of cutting timber. Since Japan’s national security was thought to be so closely related to that of Korea, Japan could not overlook Russia’s encroachment into Korea. Japan decided to take positive action, that is to open direct diplomatic negotiations with Russia, which would be regarded by Russia as an open challenge and would lead to a war. Britain did not want a war in the Far East, where its interests were principally commercial and for which peace was essential. Furthermore, Britain was not in a position to fight after the Boer War, which had drained its finances. The British Government’s Far Eastern policy was also The Times’ policy The official anti-war attitude was shared by Chirol. He tried to restrain Morrison’s vigorous advocacy of war and watered down or modified his alarming tone and sometimes delayed or refused publication. Morrison lamented: ‘The Times is doing Japan irreparable harm…. If there is no war then Japan and England in the Far East sustain the worst reverse we have sustained. Our policy is damnable.’53 In spite of the anti-war stance taken by the British Government and The Times, Morrison stuck firmly to his initial determination to induce a Russo-Japanese war. To meet their opposition, Morrison found a channel in the Japanese newspapers which were a more powerful medium because war directly concerned Japan. He intensified his attempt to create a pro-war climate amongst the Japanese Government and people. Surpassing the role and capacity of a reporter, he became a vigorous champion of war, and was both interviewed and reported on. ‘Morrison’s pet theory’ was published under the title ‘Dr Morrison’s Conquer Russia Theory’ in the Osaka Asahi Shimbun, occupying a total of four columns in two instalments on 1 and 2 November 1903, and ‘caused much interest’ and was ‘favourably received’.54 In order to urge the Japanese to war, Morrison tried to inspire their fighting spirit, appealing to their reason and emotions. He tried to arouse their fear of Russia and warned them not to miss the present opportunity The article was in part translated into Chinese, English and French and reproduced in the newspapers of the treaty ports55 in China. In Shanghai it was published in the North

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China Daily News, and became the topic of conversation.56 The Japanese Government welcomed such a boost from an outsider. The Japanese Legation in Peking was also pleased with it and said to Morrison that ‘it will do much good’.57 Morrison kept in close contact with Japanese media leaders such as S.Fukuzawa, head of the Jiji Shimpō, and I. Tokutomi, founder/head of Kokumin Shimbun. He closely associated with and influenced Japanese Peking correspondents of various papers, and directly approached influential Japanese government officials—diplomats such as J. Komura, F.Yano, E.Hioki, G.Hayashi, T.Hayashi, K.Matsui, M.Odagiri and K.Ishii and politicians such as H.Itō, S.Okuma, T.Katō and T.Katsura. Morrison co-operated with intelligence officers in the Japanese Secret Service in China, such as Major-General Y.Fukushima, Major-General G.Shiba, Major-General T.Yamane, Colonel N.Aoki and Captain Y.Satō. As a result, he was treated by the Japanese as if he were a British intelligence officer, equal to Major (later Colonel) A.W.S.Wingate who was in charge of the British Intelligence Department, General Staff, North China.58 Russo-Japanese negotiations opened on 12 August 1903, with Japan’s presentation of the first proposals that Russia should recognize Japan’s special interests in Korea and that Japan should recognize Russia’s special railway interests in Manchuria. The Russian response came as late as 3 October. Its counter-proposal was that Russia ought to have a free hand in China and Manchuria and that Japan can develop only industrial and commercial interests in Korea. In short, Japan wanted all of Korea and a part of Manchuria under its control, while Russia wanted all of Manchuria and a part of Korea. After exchanging a few proposals, Japan presented an ultimatum to Russia, but Russia still refused to modify its original position. Thereupon Japan terminated diplomatic relations, delivered a coup de main on the Russian Far Eastern Squadron lying in Port Arthur on the night of 8 February and declared war on 10 February 1904.59 Japan kept Britain informed of the progress of the negotiations. Britain helped Japan in its war preparations. For example, in November 1903, when Chile decided to sell its two Britishbuilt battleships, Britain advised Japan to buy them in order to surpass Russia’s sea power, then almost equal to that of Japan. But as Japan seemed to be indecisive, Britain bought them itself, thus preventing Russia from buying them.60 It was on the night of 9 February that Morrison heard the news that he had been waiting for over six long years. He was elated. His diary reads ‘It is the naval battle off Port Arthur. I can hardly write with excitement.’61 Morrison and The Times played a dominant role in arousing worldwide feelings favourable to Japan. To Japan, the Russo-Japanese War was possible only in such a favourable international environment. In Europe, France and Germany kept out of the war, under strict neutrality due to the strength of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. China took a stance of friendly neutrality on the surface, but in reality kept in close military cooperation with Japan. Most importantly, without diplomatic, financial and technical assistance from Britain and the United States, the war would not have been possible for Japan. Morrison’s great contribution towards the Russo-Japanese War was widely acknowledged and highly appreciated by the Japanese. He was the only Westerner who was invited to join the triumphal entry march into Port Arthur.62 The Second Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance was signed in August 1905, replacing the First Agreement two and a half years before its expiry because of changes in international circumstances. It expanded the scope of the original treaty’s geopolitical

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application and extended its term by an extra seven years. The alliance was originally meant to safeguard the interests of Britain in India, and of Japan in Korea, but Britain wanted to bring into the Agreement its interests in Central Asia, Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Although Russia’s advance into China was checked as a result of Japan’s victory in the war of 1905, Britain now became concerned with Russia’s likely expansion towards these regions.63 Japan also wanted to strengthen the First Agreement to protect itself against possible Russian reprisals. To this end the new Agreement was defensive/offensive in nature, meaning that the allies would fight together against any third power. Article II laid down that: If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action…on the part of any Power or Powers either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests…the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.64 Japan’s other aim was to secure British support for its annexation of Korea, which Japan regarded as the ‘breakwater’ of its national defence. Although Britain sought to protect the independence of Korea in the First Agreement, it agreed to Japan’s control of Korea in the Second. Subsequently, on 17 November 1905, Japan concluded a treaty with Korea, establishing a protectorate. Thus the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance gave Japan added status, recognized its ambitions in Korea and saved it from the fear of isolation.65 In the case of the second Alliance of 1905, too, Morrison and Chirol played a considerable part. Chirol wrote: ‘I think we may take credit to ourselves for having set the ball rolling by our articles on the subject early in the year’.66 The day before it was signed, Chirol wrote to Morrison who was already in Portsmouth, in the United States, to cover the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations: For your own very private ear—and for no [sic] one else’s—the new contract with our friends—your friends and my friends—will be signed tomorrow. I think it is a very good contract and altogether a very good piece of business for us and for them.67 The Japanese victory checked the southward advance of the Russian Empire, allowing Britain to secure its interests in the Far East. This was precisely what Morrison had hoped for and, to show Britain’s appreciation, he pushed, with Chirol’s support, for King Edward VII to bestow the Order of the Garter on Japan’s Emperor Meiji. After the war, Morrison covered the Portsmouth Peace Conference in the United States for The Times. The Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty (the Portsmouth Treaty) was signed on 5 September 1905 through the good offices of President T.Roosevelt. The Treaty defined what Russia could retain in Manchuria and to what extent Japan could advance into that region. It gave Japan the southern half of Sakhalin Island and recognized its paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea. Russia ceded to Japan, subject to China’s consent, the Russian leases on the Liaotung peninsula and the southern part of the Russian-built railway from Port Arthur to Changchun,68 including its branch lines. Japan, however, failed to obtain indemnity. This was because, in a strictly military sense, there

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was no decisive winner in this war. Although Japan won virtually every battle, its fighting strength had been exhausted by the time it reached Mukden. Russia, in contrast, still had enormous resources in reserve, but it was preoccupied with domestic political disturbances, the events which ultimately led to the revolution of 1917. In order to conclude the peace treaty, the Japanese Government kept secret the fact that its army’s strength had been exhausted. The terms of the Treaty reflected the plight of both nations and thus Russia kept its control over north Manchuria, whilst Japan took the south.69 Morrison was bitterly disappointed with the terms of the Treaty. In fact, he was disappointed that the war itself had ended so early.70 He wanted to see Russia withdraw completely from Manchuria, so that Britain could consolidate its position and British traders expand their market. The terms of the Treaty were met with ‘blank amazement’ not only by the Japanese populace but also by the Chinese, who regarded them as proof of Japan’s ‘severe diplomatic defeat’ and ‘a sign of great weakness’. They feared that Japan would attempt to obtain from China what it had failed to obtain from Russia: ‘Japan’s concessions bode no good to China from whom compensation will be taken’.71 As China feared, immediately after the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, a Japanese delegation headed by Komura went to Peking to initiate negotiations with a Chinese delegation. Komura had two purposes: one was to obtain China’s consent to transfer to Japan the Russian leases on the Liaotung peninsula and the Russian-built railway from Port Arthur to Changchun, and the other was to consolidate Japan’s position in Manchuria.72 After 20 sessions of talks, with Japan exercising great diplomatic pressure, the Peking Treaty was signed on 22 December 1905, giving all those rights to Japan.73 As one expert has claimed, ‘the Peking Treaty was the germ of the Pacific War’,74 a sign of Japanese ambitions towards China. Whatever the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty were, Japan emerged as the victor of the war. Japan’s power had grown rapidly between the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Following Western patterns, Japan had achieved political reform, and economic and industrial modernization. Its international position was guaranteed by several treaties: the Second Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance with Britain, the Portsmouth Treaty with Russia and the Peking Treaty with China. Kajima claims that by these treaties Japan assumed for the first time in its history an equal position with the Western powers.75 Morrison achieved his personal mission of protecting Britain’s dominant position in China from the Russian threat by playing a significant part in inducing the war and assisting Japan to victory.76 Owing to Japan’s victory Britain decisively strengthened its position in the Far East.77 Throughout the war Morrison’s reports had been highly acclaimed in Britain and friendly nations. In the Portsmouth negotiations, he was the only correspondent allowed to interview the Japanese negotiator, J.Komura. Morrison also interviewed Sergei Youlievitch de Witte, the Russian negotiator, and President Roosevelt.78 Morrison arrived in London from Portsmouth on 13 September 1905 where he received a hero’s welcome from The Times, the British Foreign Office and various celebrities. As The Times had granted him a special holiday,79 he made a tour of European capitals before leaving for Peking on 25 January 1906.

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Aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, the Fakumen Railway incident and Morrison’s ‘hidden agenda’ Victorious in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan began to increase its political and commercial influence over China, disturbing the status quo amongst the foreign powers in China where Britain had long enjoyed supremacy. Japan’s advance into China coincided with the British withdrawal of its Pacific fleet to Europe to face the new German challenge, thus in effect devolving the protection of British interests to Japan.80 This was the historical turning point when Japan moved from the defensive to the offensive, the burgeoning period of the rise of Japanese militarism. Australia felt that this new situation made its own position vulnerable. Australians began to regard Japan as a future menace to the nation. This was when Morrison changed from being pro- to antiJapanese, sharing other Australians’ fear. In fact, living in China, where Japan’s advance was taking place, Morrison must have felt the problem more acutely than his fellow Australians at home. The Far Eastern policy of the British Government, in view of the German complication, and a policy supported by The Times, was to maintain friendly relations with Japan, even at some cost to British interests in China. Morrison could not and would not tolerate this and launched his own anti-Japanese campaign. His views and activities checking Japan’s ambition were described by Chirol as his ‘madness’.81 There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to show, however, that Morrison’s frequent disdain for British foreign policy had ‘reason’, which seems to have been based on a patriotic need to ensure Australia’s national security against a possible threat from Japan. On the question of opening the Manchurian market to international trade, Morrison severely criticized Japanese policy and activities. Immediately after the war of 1905, Japan permitted only Japanese commercial vessels to use Dalny and An-tung as ports of entry for goods to Manchuria, excluding all foreign ships on the grounds that these ports were still under Japanese military control. Because there was no Chinese Customs House in these ports, Japanese merchants imported goods and paid no tax, whereas the Western merchants who used Newchwang had to pay an import duty at the Newchwang Chinese Customs House. As a result, a large quantity of Japanese goods flooded into the Manchurian market, thus posing unfair competition to Western merchants.82 Morrison regarded this situation as detrimental to existing British commercial supremacy. Acting as the spearhead of British merchants in China, he denounced Japan’s trading methods as tariff discrimination. He reported in The Times: The present trade conditions are…aggravated by the unforeseen competition of the duty-free influx into Manchuria of goods by Dalny, An-tung, and Vladivostok. So serious is the competition that foreign merchants at Niu-chwang [sic] claim that pending the establishment of Chinese Customs at other places, goods should be admitted duty free into Niu-chwang [sic].83 He charged Japan with violation of the principle of the ‘Open Door’ proposed by J.Hay, the US Secretary of State, in his note of September 1899,84 the principle which Japan had agreed to observe prior to the 1905 war. Morrison’s claim was justified.

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Japan opened the South Manchurian market to international trade on completion of the withdrawal of its troops in April 1907 and the Chinese Government established its Customs House at Dalny and An-tung on July 1907. As a result, Western merchants’ dissatisfaction almost subsided. E.Grey, Foreign Secretary, wrote to C.MacDonald, Minister in Tokyo, that ‘the complaint of unfair competition with Newchwang through Dalny…had now disappeared’.85 Thereupon, Morrison began to attack Japan on moral grounds. In The Times he denounced Japan for its ‘lack of commercial ethics’, namely infringement of trademarks and fraudulent imitation of Western goods by Japanese manufacturers. He wrote: ‘China is being swamped with Japanese imitations, and there is no redress’.86 Though this study demonstrates that Morrison’s criticism here was to a large degree justified, it is notable that he had not accused Japan of these points before the 1905 war, in spite of the fact that he had been well aware of them. For example, in 1899 he expressed dissatisfaction in his diary about Japan’s imitation goods.87 This shows that he judged Japan from the way in which its position in Asia affected the British Empire, especially Australia. While Japan was helping to maintain the British position in China by fighting with Russia, Morrison had overlooked Japan’s lack of commercial ethics, turning a blind eye to it, even compromising his own sense of justice. He was indeed a most ardent Japanese supporter while the Russian threat existed. It was only when that threat was removed by Japan, and Japan began to expand into China, for the first time he publicly attacked Japan’s lack of commercial morality. All this suggests that his assessment of Japan and its actions was based on his desire to maintain British supremacy in Asia. Morrison’s criticism of Japan was not supported by his colleague, Captain F. Brinkley, Tokyo correspondent of The Times. While Morrison was busy attacking the Japanese, Brinkley was equally busy defending them. Brinkley’s articles often appeared in The Times to counter those of Morrison. An examination of the Morrison-Brinkley dispute over Japan provides a truer picture of Morrison’s motives. Brinkley, whom Morrison bluntly described as being ‘faithful to his Japanese employer’,88 effectively expressed Japan’s views. With regard to Japan’s policy and activities in Manchuria, Morrison had to deal not only with the Japanese but also with his colleague Brinkley, and with his senior Chirol who sided with Brinkley A survey of Morrison’s arguments with Bland reveals that Morrison’s aim was to preserve and further strengthen the British position in the power struggle amongst the foreign powers in China. Morrison therefore saw the representatives of the foreign powers in China as his targets. On the other hand, Bland’s main concern was British trade in China. His targets were, therefore, the Chinese themselves. Bland reminded Morrison: After all, we are in China for trade first and not only to gain victories over the Russian or German diplomatists at Peking…. We are in China, not Germany, and it is the policy and behaviour of the Chinese that chiefly affects us and our trade.89 Bland correctly observed that Morrison’s strategic orientation was that, if Britain got ‘the best of the German and the Jap [sic], we shall have things our own way’.90 Thus, examination of their disputes confirms that Morrison’s chief aim was the preservation of British supremacy vis-à-vis the foreign powers in China. Furthermore, comparison

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between Morrison’s optimistic view and Bland’s pessimistic view of China shows that Morrison’s favourable description of China in The Times and elsewhere was politically motivated. Morrison attempted to influence the British perception of China by portraying it in a better light than its condition warranted. He stated, for example, that ‘the growth in national wealth, security and prosperity [is] one of the most striking features of Modern China’.91 Bland’s comment that Morrison was determined to see China in a ‘soft rose tint’92 was not far from the mark. In fact, China was in chaos, as the outbreak of the revolution proved. Morrison’s motive in painting a bright picture of China was, in fact, to attract more British loans and investments to China so as to strengthen Britain’s strategic position and at the same time to help make China strong enough to resist Japan. Feigned optimism was one of Morrison’s tactics. No wonder Chirol tended to regard Bland’s view as more realistic and justifiable than that of Morrison. Japan obtained the southern half of the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway as one of the war trophies of the Russo-Japanese War. In order to run this line efficiently, the Japanese Government set up the South Manchurian Railway Company on 1 August 1906. The South Manchurian Railway was intended to be the spearhead of Japan’s economic development in Manchuria. The company was semi-governmental in character, as 50 per cent of the shares were owned by the Japanese Government. In addition to the normal operation of the railway lines, the company exercised other functions in the railway zone. Among these were the establishment and management of hospitals, schools and hotels, mining exploration, the operation of steamship lines and the improvement of harbour facilities. It also ran electricity plants at Dalny, Mukden, Changchun and Antung.93 The company, as Morrison reported, gave Japan effective control of South Manchuria.94 By the end of 1907, the company had rebuilt the entire line using the most advanced rolling stock of the day, importing 50,000 tons of steel railway cars from the United States.95 In mid-1908 The Times reported that great progress had been made in improving the South Manchurian Railway,96 and Morrison praised the company.97 China, regarding the economic success of the South Manchurian Railway as the symbol of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, wanted to establish a centrally organized railway system under its own control, which was essential for its growing economic and political needs.98 It launched a project to construct a railway line from Chinchow to Tsitsihar via Hsinmintun, Fakumen and Taonanfu that would run parallel and compete with the South Manchurian Railway.99 Morrison’s activities concerning international rivalry over railways in China were of supreme importance in the pursuit of his strategic objectives. Co-operating with W.D.Straight, the representative of American interests which wanted to penetrate the Manchurian market, Morrison encouraged China to construct the Fakumen Railway His aim was to discredit Japan. To finance its project, China sought capital from the Americans, whom Yuan Shih-kai, the Foreign Minister, regarded as a potential balance to the Russo-Japanese domination of Manchuria. For this purpose, T’ang Shao-yi, Director General of Railways, and Straight planned to establish a Manchurian Bank financed by an American investment of US$20 million, specifying Manchurian revenues as security. This project, however, failed owing to the American financial crisis of October 1907.100 As a result, T’ang turned to a British financier, the British and Chinese Corporation Ltd, in China, which was represented by Bland.101 Although disappointed, Straight supported the British against Japan, their ‘common enemy’.102

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The Fakumen Railway line was the first step in a scheme, a line 400 miles (640 km) long, to run from Hsinmintun to Fakumen.103 Morrison was fully aware of the political significance of the Fakumen line and noted in his diary: ‘T’ang Shao-yi hopes to have British support in the construction of this line which will seriously affect the Japanese line running parallel with it’.104 Bland acknowledged that the Fakumen project was a ‘part of his [T’ang’s] scheme for arresting Japan’s policy of “peaceful penetration”’.105 In this light, Chirol’s following comment was not far from the truth: An attempt…of playing off one Power against another…by giving to British firms a contract for the construction of the Fa-ku-men [sic] Railway, she would secure the diplomatic support of England in escaping the consequences of the pledge which she had given to Japan under the Peking Protocol.106 Straight admitted to Harriman that the new railway would compete with the South Manchurian Railway.107 E.W.Edwards aptly comments that the ‘project had been essentially political in origin, its motive being to challenge the Japanese position in south Manchuria’.108 Undoubtedly the Fakumen Railway project was a threat to Japan’s interests. The negotiations proceeded amongst T’ang, Bland and C.A.ffrench, the representative of the Pauling Company, a British railway constructer. On 8 November 1907, T’ang secretly signed two contracts, one with Bland for finance and the other with ffrench for construction of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway. Another secret agreement was attached to these contracts, proposing the extension of the line further north to Tsitsihar and then to Aigun.109 Japan made clear its intention not to agree to any railway project which would affect the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, and vetoed the construction of the Fakumen Railway.110 Morrison emphasized in The Times that Japan’s veto was prejudicial to British enterprise, namely the Pauling Company Again using the Open Door doctrine as his weapon, Morrison criticized Japan. Chirol and Brinkley supported Japan’s veto, denying the applicability of the Open Door doctrine to the financing and construction of the railway. A close examination of the language of the text of J.Hay’s Open Door note and several historians’ interpretation of it shows that the note applied only to the service and not to the financing and construction of railways by the foreign powers. Therefore, Morrison’s condemnation of Japan’s veto on the grounds of the Open Door principle was not justified. After all, Morrison used this principle merely as a handy instrument to oppose Japan’s veto. Realizing the weakness of his case, he changed his tactics and began to stress the importance of looking at the facts rather than the principle. He declared in The Times: ‘The Fa-ku-menn [sic] question allows of treatment and of settlement upon issues of fact, without inopportune debate upon issues of principle…upon the doctrines of the “open door” and of “equal opportunities”’.111 Over the issues of Japan and China, Morrison had many disputes with his superiors and colleagues at The Times, such as Chirol, Bland, Brinkley and Bell. In order to check Japan’s growing power, Morrison had to fight not only with the Japanese but also with people inside his own camp, even to the extent of terminating his personal friendship with some of them. This study explores why Morrison endeavoured to secure British

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supremacy in the Far East more than anywhere else in the world, even going against the policy of The Times and the British Government and despite obvious cost to Britain in Europe. The answer is to be found by examining the Morrison-Chirol dispute, the root cause of which was their different objectives. Chirol’s aim was to promote the cause of the British Empire worldwide, especially that of protection of Britain from German threat, whilst that of Morrison was to preserve British supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region to protect Australia from Japanese threat. For Chirol, as well as for the British Government, maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was important in view of the approaching German challenge, and therefore they tended to overlook Japan’s activities in Manchuria, a small price to pay for the security of the Empire. Chirol endeavoured to make Morrison understand this reality: to jeopardize its [the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’s] maintenance for the sake of some obscure questions in Manchuria would be the height of madness…. if you will look at this big question of our relations with Japan from the Imperial point of view, and not merely from the local Chinese point of view, you will see things in a truer light and in better proportion.112 Morrison’s preferred British policy towards Japan and China was therefore at variance with the policy of The Times and the British Foreign Office, which derived from a global strategy. From Chirol downwards, many Britons tried to remind Morrison of Britain’s position vis-à-vis Germany. While they were deeply concerned with Germany, Morrison was even more concerned with the growing power of Japan. As an Australian, Morrison must have felt the same fear of Japan as his countrymen. With Japan’s victory over Russia, coupled with the British withdrawal of its naval forces from the Pacific to Europe, Australians felt very vulnerable vis-à-vis Japan. In order to ensure Australia’s security under the umbrella of British protection, Morrison thought British supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region essential. His unique behaviour appeared ‘madness’ to Chirol and inexplicable to the British, but when his compelling concern for the welfare of Australia is considered, his behaviour becomes very reasonable. Morrison, who held an objective of his own, different from that of the British, became a lone wolf in his campaign to check Japan’s advance into Manchuria. His despatches, particularly in the period after 1906, often suffered from Chirol’s editorial scissors. In order to understand Chirol’s argument, it is first necessary to examine briefly Britain’s position and policy in world politics, which were undergoing significant changes. After the Russo-Japanese War, Britain had to deal not only with the new situation in China, but, more importantly, with a problem closer to home—the rise of German naval power. The subsequent race to become the leading naval power caused tension between Britain and Germany. Britain also had to deal with Russia. In order to prevent Russia’s siding with Germany, the Anglo-Russian Entente was signed on 31 August 1907.113 Chirol was satisfied with the Entente, as he had long held that AngloRussian tension would only benefit Germany. In Chirol’s opinion, the most important British gain from the Entente was that it deprived Germany of the opportunity to play off Britain against France, which had been Russia’s ally since January 1894.114

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Japan, too, wanted to have friendly relations with the European powers. While valuing the existing Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan wished to reach an understanding also with France and Russia, from which it needed approval and assurance for Japanese policy in South Manchuria and Korea.115 In order to eliminate its fear of Russian reprisal and to push ahead with its Manchurian policy, Japan regarded co-operation with Russia as essential.116 Russia, financially and militarily weakened by the war with Japan, also sought an ally.117 The Russo-Japanese Agreement was signed on 30 July 1907. It declared that both contracting parties would support the independence and territorial integrity of China and the maintenance of the status quo. More important, however, was the attached Secret Treaty which laid down that Russia would not oppose Japan’s further strengthening of political relations with Korea, and, in return, Japan would recognize Russia’s special interests in Outer Mongolia.118 Grey was satisfied with the Russo-Japanese Agreement, regarding it ‘as making the objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance more secure’.119 France, an ally of Russia and Britain, was also willing to seek rapprochement with Japan so as to remove the fear of a Japanese invasion of French Indo-China.120 The Franco-Japanese Entente was signed in June 1907. Both contracted parties declared that they would respect China’s independence and integrity and observe the principle of commercial equality in China. Most importantly, however, the secret notes attached to the Entente laid down that they would respect each other’s spheres of interest in the Far East. France designated the provinces of Yunnan, Kwantung and Kwangsi as its ‘spheres of interest’, while Japan was to have the Fukien province, Manchuria and Korea.121 Chirol was pleased with the conclusion of both the French-Japanese Entente and the Russo-Japanese Agreement, which effectively associated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with the French-Russian partnership. France had also been tied to Britain by the Entente Cordiale of April 1904. Chirol regarded this affiliation as ‘a sort of quadruple alliance’ which encircled Germany like a cordon, and confided in Morrison: ‘we must rely, I fear, a good deal upon our diplomacy to supply the deficiencies of our military strength’.122 Chirol looked at both the Franco-Japanese Entente and the Russo-Japanese Agreement from the view-point of world politics. Morrison looked at the emergence of the ‘quadruple alliance’ from the viewpoint of the Far East. He ‘rejoiced’ and felt proud of the new British policy, regarding it as ‘a triumph of successful and far-seeing diplomacy’.123 He expressed his joy to Chirol: ‘Here in Peking it does one good to see…how they look up to us as the most powerful, how cordial are the relations of the Russian and French Ministers with our Legation’.124 Since Morrison’s overriding concern was the British position vis-à-vis other powers in China, he recognized the importance of the ‘quadruple alliance’ as a boost to the British position in the Far East, whilst Chirol recognized it as an anti-German mechanism. To Britain, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was important as part of the anti-German cordon constituted by the quadruple alliance. The focal point of Grey’s policy was Europe and he had ‘little real interest in colonial affairs’.125 To put it another way, Grey was willing to strengthen the British position in Europe at the expense of its position in the Asia-Pacific region, a policy which Morrison could not tolerate. Failing to secure the backing of the British Foreign Office, Morrison turned to the United States, the approach suggested some three years later by the Sydney Morning Herald, which stated that Australia would ‘look with favour upon the appearance of an American battleship fleet as

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a permanent fixture in the Pacific’ and that ‘The United States stands between her Japan] and the control of the Pacific’.126

The Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1909 Soon after the signing of the Peking Treaty of December 1905, Japan demanded of China various railways and mining concessions, and Sino-Japanese negotiations began. Questions at issue were: (1) the Fakumen Railway zone; (2) the Chin-tao question; (3) Fushun collieries; (4) collieries along the Mukden-Antung Railway; (5) the railway extension from Nincha-t’un to Yinkow; and (6) the railway extension into Mukden City.127 Because of the serious nature of the demands, China was reluctant to accept and the negotiations dragged on, with no resolution in sight.128 On 1 March 1909, China rejected Japan’s demands, regarding them as a means to annihilate China’s railway plan and to extend Japan’s influence.129 Thus negotiations came to a standstill. Brinkley commented that China, which at first showed signs of accepting Japan’s demands ‘in a reciprocal friendly spirit’, now rejected it and that China’s change of mind was caused by ‘malign influences’.130 By this expression Brinkley meant Morrison. Morrison’s diary gives such an impression: ‘Liang Tun-yen (Deputy Foreign Minister and the chief negotiator) is much concerned about the Japanese negotiations…. Their demands are worse than before…. I strongly urged him not to agree to it.’131 Chirol condemned the Chinese rejection by pointing out that the Japanese always made proposals as a basis for further negotiations and therefore deserved a more courteous response.132 In March 1909, shortly after the negotiations had reached deadlock, China informed Japan that China might submit the Manchurian question to the Hague Tribunal. Japan was opposed to this, insisting that its disputes were not of a nature to suit arbitral determination.133 On 24 March 1909, the Japanese were shocked to read Morrison’s article in The Times, in which he disclosed the contents of the current Sino-Japanese secret negotiations about the Fakumen Railway and other pending questions under dispute, and supported China’s idea of submitting the matter to the Hague Tribunal: ‘It is important that China should propose to submit this and the other Manchurian questions to the Hague tribunal, and it is difficult to imagine how Japan can decline the proposal’.134 T. Katō, Japanese Ambassador in London, telegraphed the substance of Morrison’s article to Komura on the same day.135 Ijūin in Peking was also disturbed to learn that his secret negotiations with Liang Tun-yen had been leaked to Morrison. Accordingly Ijūin cautioned Liang to respect the secrecy of the negotiations, reminding him that such a leak would be injurious to a successful outcome and would create erroneous public arguments amongst those ignorant of the details of the negotiations.136 Ijūin had a discussion with Prince Ch’ing,137 from whom he learnt that the advice to seek Hague arbitration was given to Liang by a certain Englishman who was not Jordan, British Minister in Peking. Ijūin thought it must be Morrison.138 In fact, the advice came from Morrison and others,139 as Chirol’s letter to Bell reveals: Considering how often I have discussed these questions [China’s proposal for seeking Hague arbitration] with Morrison himself, I am, I confess, surprised to hear now for the first time that he was himself one of those

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who had advised the Chinese to put forward their proposal for arbitration.140 Thus Morrison was one of those who planted the idea in the minds of the Chinese. Morrison’s persistent despatches, though often politically motivated, did help gradually to mould British public opinion against Japan. China in the end did not take the matter to The Hague but nevertheless, as Chirol observed, Japan’s rejection of arbitration ‘has provoked…much adverse criticism abroad’.141 T. Katō in London recognized that ‘the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is gradually losing its popularity of the past as a result of those who had been advocating that Japan’s action has been damaging British interests’.142 It was confirmed by Lawton that Morrison was largely responsible for this: The British public is now almost wholly dependent upon The Times for information and guidance concerning Far Eastern affairs…. The conflicting views that were advanced in the columns of The Times in regard to the Fa-ku-menn [sic] Railway dispute aroused considerable comment. Dr. Morrison, who is undeniably one of the greatest living authorities on China, and whose reputation for sincerity no less than for ability is worldwide, was friendly to the Chinese view.143 By arousing British public opinion against Japan, Morrison influenced Grey’s attitude to a certain extent. Grey, who desired to maintain friendly relations with Japan, did not wish to be involved in the Sino-Japanese dispute and stayed in the background. British public opinion, however, influenced chiefly by Morrison’s constant propaganda campaign, began to oppose Grey’s ‘lukewarm’ attitude and urged him to take more active measures on the Manchurian question. In the House of Commons, questions were asked several times regarding the Manchurian problem by the Opposition.144 At last the Foreign Office moved. Wishing to see a prompt settlement of the Fakumen affair, Grey expressed his concern to Katō: As the Sino-Japanese negotiations regarding the Fakumen Railway question have not yet reached a settlement, regrettably some British feel that Japan is arresting the development of Manchuria. Does Japan wish to come to terms with China?145 Thus Grey applied mild pressure on the Japanese. By the ‘might of his pen’ in The Times, Morrison played a vital role in influencing British public opinion and subsequently and consequently the British Government’s Far Eastern policy Morrison became persona non grata to Japan. The process involved in the Sino-Japanese Agreement took over four years to conclude. The disputes began at the end of 1905, almost immediately after the RussoJapanese War. A team set up by Prime Minister T.Hayashi and Foreign Minister G.Hayashi, following the elder statesman Itō’s line, took a rather mild attitude towards China, trying to settle the six main disputes separately but failed. Then a team set up by Prime Minister Komura and Foreign Minister Ijūin, following the elder statesman Yamagata’s tough policy, tried to negotiate a political package in December 1908, which

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resulted in deadlock in March 1909. In May 1909, Peking officially communicated to Tokyo that China had decided to withdraw its proposal to submit the Manchurian question to the Hague Tribunal,146 and that China desired to resume negotiations with Japan.147 Sino-Japanese negotiations reopened on 25 July 1909 in Peking between Ijūin and Liang Tun-yen. At the first session of proceedings, Ijūin had ‘severely’ cautioned Liang to respect the secrecy of the contents.148 Ijūin was nevertheless convinced that this time again Morrison had already obtained ‘almost all correct information regarding the most recent session’. Worried that the leak might cause unexpected obstacles to the negotiations, Ijūin urged Komura to make a swift decision.149 When proceedings were reopened, both governments were earnestly committed to reaching a settlement. On 26 August 1909, Ijūin reported to Komura that all questions had been settled ‘according to our proposals’.150 The Sino-Japanese Agreement was signed on 4 September 1909. The Fakumen Railway question was settled by Article 1 of the second part as follows: ‘The Government of China engages that in the event of its undertaking to construct a railway between Hsin-min-tun and Fa-ku-men, it shall firstly confer with the Government of Japan.’151 In effect, the Chinese gave up the idea of constructing the Fakumen Railway because they realized Japan would never agree to it. Sun E-tu Zen asserts that The Peking Government, unused to the idea of opposing Japan’s encroachments alone, decided to yield’.152 As already stated, Japan’s main concern was not the Fakumen line itself, but the further extension from Fakumen to Tsitsihar, which would deprive the South Manchurian Railway of a great deal of traffic. Therefore, the Fakumen Railway was only ‘the thin end of the wedge’. With the Sino-Japanese Agreement signed according to Japan’s design, Japan was now able to establish its special rights in both name and reality. It was able to consolidate and further expand its political/economic position and influence over all south Manchuria, from its base in the leased territory of Kwantung and along the railway zone.153 The British Government supported Japan in return for benefits which would be derived from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Morrison tried to help China obtain the best deal possible, but without success.

Morrison’s role in remoulding British public opinion against Japan Morrison’s criticism overall, however, was so damaging to Japan’s international reputation that the Japanese attempted to placate him with the offer of a decoration, gifts and invitations to Japan, all in vain. In fact, Japan’s blandishments produced the opposite effect, making him more determined than ever to fight Japan’s policy towards China. He claimed, however, that he did not have any hostility towards Japan, that he wanted to create the true spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by honest criticism rather than by ‘unbalanced praise’ of the Japanese.154 His assertion that his criticism of Japan was based on his belief that it would help create true friendship seems valid. In order to appease Morrison, the Japanese Government invited him and Chirol to Japan as special guests, but could not change his view. After their visit to Japan, Chirol promoted Japan’s cause more vigorously than ever. Based on his view of world politics, Chirol recognized the increased importance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and for this reason he supported Japan and condemned China. On the other hand, Morrison’s attitude

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was exactly the opposite. He condemned Japan as disturbing the balance of power in the Far East. In their dispute, Chirol had the upper hand. He harshly applied his ‘editorial scissors’ to Morrison’s despatches. Morrison, being unable to alter the editorial policy of the paper, expressed his chagrin in these words: ‘Japan can do no wrong: China can do no right’.155 And he complained: ‘My expectations in regard to a change in the Far Eastern policy of the paper are beginning to appear illusory’.156 The Times’ policy tended to be associated with the policy of the Foreign Office, hence W.F.Monypenny, assistant to G.E.Buckle, Editor of The times, ridiculed The Times describing it as ‘the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office’.157 Morrison had to realize, with reluctance, that after all he was but a cog in the big London-centred imperial wheel whose policy he regarded as unbalanced. Although disappointed, he never gave up his crusade to restore British supremacy. He was aware that British public opinion was already turning against Japan.158 He would push ahead with his task of instigating changes in public opinion which would eventually influence government policy-makers. Morrison’s ‘war’ continued.

2 THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION The Hukuang Railway loans The Hukuang Railway Loan negotiations, which took 10 years to complete from 1901, were extremely complicated. J.N.Jordan,1 British Minister in Peking, lamented that ‘The Canton-Hankow negotiations are trying all our tempers. We have had many a tangle to unravel but this is the most confused of them all.’2 They were complicated: firstly because they involved the four powers, Britain, France, Germany and the United States, who had to settle many problems amongst themselves before reaching the stage of forming the Quadruple Financial Consortium in August 1909; secondly because Japan and Russia wanted to join the Consortium; and thirdly because the Consortium had to negotiate with the Ch’ing Government which was under heavy domestic pressure from the Rights Recovery Movement.3 The second reason for the complication is examined in the next section and the third in the section after that. The focal point of international rivalry in China since 1895 had been the railways. Before 1905, the powers tended to use railway concessions to gain both financial domination and territorial advantage in China. Following the strong competition amongst the powers during 1895–1905, there was a shift towards co-operation in developing the financial exploitation of China. After 1906, the powers’ political motives became more commercially oriented, except in Manchuria. Each power now tried to use loans to extend its interests in China.4 This intense rivalry was inextricably influenced by the political situation in Europe where Britain and Germany were preparing for war. The Hukuang Railway project was a railway issue involving China proper, separate from Manchuria. The project was to construct a trunk route consisting of two sections: one from Hankow southward to Canton in Kwangtung province via Chengsha in Hunan province, and the other from Hankow westward to Chengtu in Szechuan province.5 Because the railway would be constructed through Hupeh and Hunan provinces, which constituted the Vice-royalty of Hukuang (the lake plain), it was called the Hukuang Railway.6 As a result of the strong advocacy of Chang Chih-tung, the Viceroy of Hukuang,7 the financing and construction of the railway was handed over from the central government to the provinces concerned but it was difficult to raise funds locally In November 1908, Chang asked for British loans and Bland of the British and Chinese Corporation Ltd became the designated negotiator.8 In February 1909, Bland’s loan negotiation with the representatives of Chang Chih-tung failed because Chang thought Bland’s terms were too stringent. H.Cordes,9 the Peking representative of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank of Germany, ‘realising that the psychological moment had arrived’10 began negotiations with Chang Chih-tung. On 8 March 1909, they signed a provisional contract for a German loan to the Hukuang Railway.11 Subsequently, Liang Tun-yen, Vice-Foreign Minister, notified

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Jordan of this contract.12 Jordan protested, although the final contract was still unsigned. Morrison also protested. He warned the Chinese in The Times: The effect of disregarding the protest will be to alienate the sympathy of the British Government, who in the adjustment of several recent difficulties have rendered China friendly assistance…. Prominent Chinese admit that the Canton-Han-kau [sic] Railway dispute causes embarrassment, for the complications regarding the signature of the loan contract involve a disagreement with either England or Germany.13 Morrison’s criticism was subsequently reported in the Japan Chronicle: ‘Dr Morrison…criticises the Chinese railway arrangement as a humiliating surrender of British interests in return for permission to resume British vested interest in the CantonHankow line’.14 Further, Morrison protested strongly to Liang Shih-yi, Director-General of Railways, even though Morrison was then extremely busy preparing for his visit to Japan in May 1909. He asserted that the growing friction between the British and the Chinese over railway matters was ‘most unfortunate’ for China, because China would lose British sympathy regarding ‘Japanese aggression in that fertile country [Manchuria]’. Morrison reminded Liang that Britain had always been advocating that Manchuria was ‘an integral portion of China’, whereas Germany had not been. England has done much for China in Manchuria…. British public opinion and the moral pressure thus exercised upon Japan might have assisted greatly towards the recovery of authority in Manchuria. I have always wished for that end…. How can my Government irritated as it is by these railway questions be expected to give its assent to the revision of the Customs tariff?15 Morrison’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach to China is obvious here. Chang Chih-tung’s motive in dealing with Cordes was to obtain better terms from Britain, and therefore Chang had already obtained Cordes’ consent that, in case Britain protested, Britain would be given the right to finance the Hankow-Canton section of the line, while Germany would finance the Hankow-Szechuan section. The British Government decided on a joint loan with Germany, and, instead of Bland, made E.G.Hillier,16 of the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, the British negotiator, and Chang agreed. By this joint loan, the British monopoly of railways in its ‘sphere of influence’ along the Yangtse River was broken, and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II expressed his satisfaction.17 France asserted its right to participate in the loan project on the grounds that it had a private agreement with the former Governor-General of Yunnan province regarding the Hankow-Szechuan railway.18 Grey, who felt that the partnership with France based on the Entente19 ought to be respected, demanded of Chang Chih-tung that France be allowed to participate, and Chang again agreed. Thus, the Triple Financial Consortium came into being, the representatives being Cordes, Hillier and M.Casenave20 of the Banque de l’Indo-Chine. Subsequently, on 6 June 1909 in Peking, the representatives of the Consortium concluded with Chang Chih-tung the Hukuang Loan contract of £5.5 million

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sterling, on the condition that all expenditure would be under the supervision of auditors appointed by the Consortium.21 Morrison was outraged with this ‘Surrender of British Interest’ to the Germans, and criticized the British Government. This surrender of all our interests in the important Han-kau—Sze-chuan [sic] Railway in return for being permitted to resume our vested interests in the Canton-Han-kau [sic] Railway is bound to be unfavourably criticised. Many people wonder why the Government should delegate to one British bank [the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation], which is naturally compelled to consider financial rather than national interests, the right to assist the extension of German influence into the richest province in China.22 Chirol, equally critical, wrote: Whilst the Germans have successfully manoeuvred us into surrendering our own position in the Yang-tsze [sic], they show no disposition whatever to surrender any of the exclusive rights which they claim in Shantung, though we recognised the latter only in return for their recognition of the former.23 Both Morrison and Chirol were strongly opposed to allowing German influence to infiltrate Central China along the Yangtse valley, an area which Britain had maintained as its sphere of influence. German participation in the loan project meant the reduction of the already diminishing British interests in China. Morrison noted in his memoranda: Germany is now in favour with the Chinese…. She has reduced the number of its troops and this reduction has helped her in the Canton-Hankau [sic] Railway loan negotiations. Her action there China regards as helping to break through the English sphere of influence. China finds it convenient to forget for the moment how jealously Germany reserves her exclusive rights in Shantung.24 Morrison’s frustration was due to his conviction that Germany had successfully won China over to its side and outmanoeuvred the British, resulting in Germany obtaining the right to enter into the British sphere of influence. In April 1909, the US Government, finding out about the above international project, became alarmed because the United States was excluded. For the Taft-Knox administration, which was anxious to expand American markets overseas by means of loans (dollar diplomacy), it was very important to join in loans like the Hukuang project. Washington demanded of London and Peking that the United States should be included in the project.25 Morrison sided with the United States and noted its rights in The Times: The agreement concluded by Sir Ernest Satow with Prince Ching [sic] on October 1, 1903, provided: ‘If China desires to construct a Han-kau [sic]-

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Szechuan line and her capital is insufficient, she will obtain all necessary foreign capital from Great Britain or the United States’.26 London refused Washington’s request on 7 June 1909 on the grounds that its right had already been nullified, because, when in 1905 British businessmen asked the United States about its intention to participate in the Hankow-Szechuan Railway loan, their reply was negative.27 Chang Chih-tung, influenced by Cordes, also tended to ignore American protest.28 Washington was persistent, however. On 15 July 1909, Taft sent a telegram to the Prince Regent requesting American participation, basing US claims upon the two notes which the United States and China had previously exchanged, the first dated 15 August 1903, stating that ‘with respect to the building of the Hankow-Szechuan Railway…when the time came, application could be made to the British and American companies’, and the second dated 18 July 1904 stating that with regard to the construction of the above railway, ‘companies composed of Englishmen and Americans will be consulted’.29 By this telegram, Taft reminded the Prince Regent of China’s obligation under the agreements.30 Morrison thought that Taft’s message, which emphasized US rights ‘in friendly but unmistakable terms [was] excellent and opportune’, and disclosed in The Times the haughty attitude of the other powers who had looked down upon Taft’s action as unprecedented and quite out of diplomatic character.31 Despite their efforts, the Americans were unsuccessful. In the United States, anti-British feelings began to rise, as many thought that Britain was taking the lead in opposing American participation. Morrison was unimpressed by those who vetoed American entry. He warned Peking that it should not disregard the agreement of 1903. He was also critical of London and Washington: It is regrettable that the British and American Governments, in view of the obligations contracted by the Chinese in 1903, did not communicate with each other at an earlier stage of the present negotiations and thus prevent the difficulty.32 Morrison’s criticisms of the governments of China, Britain and the United States were mild in contrast to the criticism he meted out to the Germans. He was convinced that the Germans were masterminding the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation’s response, namely, ‘American participation is neither desirable nor necessary’.33 The Germans themselves, Morrison thought, were outwardly sympathetic towards the Americans, aiming to gain their friend-ship, while manipulating the Bank to reject the United States so as to estrange it from Britain. Morrison disclosed the supposed German ‘intrigues’ in The Times, in an attempt to eliminate their influence on the Bank: The President’s telegram is directly due to the intrigues of the DeutschAsiatische Bank whose influence over the Hongkong [sic] and Shanghai Bank is so injurious to British interests in China. Many Englishmen here hold the opinion that the British Government should bring pressure upon the Hongkong [sic] and Shanghai Bank to dissociate itself from the German intrigues, which are persistently directed, here as elsewhere, to

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bring us into a misunderstanding with the Americans, whose policy and aims in China are identical with our own.34 This article was seen as a serious diplomatic blow to the Germans and the Bank, as will be shown shortly. The Cologne Gazette counter-attacked: [The Peking telegram] seeks to arouse bad feeling against Germany among the Americans by means of fables of German intrigues against American participation in the Chinese Railway Loan, and attempts at the same time to excite German and English financial circles against one another.35 The Cologne Gazette commented that these attempts were doomed to failure.36 On 26 July 1909, Cordes and Hillier were shocked to learn of Morrison’s article, which was reproduced in the Peking and Tientsin Times, under the title ‘The Hongkong [sic.] Bank accused of being under German influence’.37 Morrison had had a 14-year association with Hillier. Occasionally, they had had heated arguments, for example in the spring of 1898.38 Generally, however, they co-operated and competed as the occasion arose. Morrison and Cordes had also had a long association since 1900. Morrison’s telegram was damaging to the reputation of both the Bank and the Germans. Infuriated, Hillier wrote to Morrison: My dear Morrison, It is a blow dealt at me from behind by a friend…and it has hurt me more, personally, than anything I have experienced in my life…. I can neither forgive nor forget…the allegations made in your telegram, which I consider baseless and most uncalled for.39 Cordes, equally shocked, wrote to Morrison: Dear Dr Morrison, I do not think it possible that you should have done it…. I shall feel very much relieved if you will kindly tell me that you are not [sic] the author of that telegram…. I am waiting in anxiety for a reply.40 Morrison did not trouble to reply to Cordes.41 Morrison rebutted Hillier, insisting that ‘I am in the place where I am demanded of conscience to speak the truth’, and that although he personally liked Cordes, his ‘duty to truth’ was higher than his duty to his ‘German friend’.42 This incident was central to the political dealings over the loan which reflected strained Anglo-German relations in Europe. Germany was desperately seeking the United States as a partner, and wanted to be seen as assisting American participation in the Hukuang Loan, as Chirol observed.43 Britain was also seeking US friendship. In this situation, whereas Morrison was working for Britain against Germany, Hillier was apparently working for the immediate business needs of his employers, the Bank. Chirol,

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although sympathizing with Hillier who was ‘merely obeying instructions from his employer’,44 agreed with Morrison: I do not see that you have any cause to regret the way in which you worded your telegram, except of course in so far as it may affect your personal relations with H [Hillier], for the subserviency of the Bank to German influences is pretty notorious now.45 Chirol and Morrison were in complete accord in their condemnation of Germany, despite their extremely strained relations over Japan. As Japan was keeping a close eye on the development of the Hukuang Loan negotiations, Ijūin sent Komura a copy of Morrison’s article as reproduced in the Peking and Tientsin Times.46 The accuracy of Morrison’s article of 24 July 1909 can be proved by the fact that the content of his information tallies with that of Chirol’s private and confidential letters, which reached Morrison after the publication of his telegram.47 In these letters, Chirol informed him of a detailed inside story about Cordes’ activities and German influence in the Bank.48 Further, Chirol told Morrison about the ‘American overtures in April’.49 It was the American Banking Corporation’s approach to the Bank to secure American participation in the Hukuang Loan. This was refused.50 Morrison’s article of 24 July 1909 influenced Grey, who had been kept in the dark about the Hukuang Loan situation. Grey now wanted to know exactly what was going on. He became very disturbed to learn from Chirol in mid-August 1909 that the alleged British opposition to American participation had caused anti-British feelings in the United States. Chirol also gave him a detailed account of the American overtures in April and the Bank’s rejection of them. Grey said it was unfortunate that he had not been apprised of the situation.51 He obtained the letters exchanged in April 1909 between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the American Banking Corporation in order to appreciate the situation fully.52 Chirol wrote to Morrison that Grey was anxious to create good relations with the Americans by removing their misunderstanding, that Chirol had arranged for Grey to meet Rockhill on his way to St Petersburg through London, and that the result was very satisfactory.53 W.W.Rockhill, former American Minister in Peking, was appointed Ambassador to Russia in August 1909. En route to St Petersburg in London, Rockhill discussed the problem with Grey and Chirol.A.E.Hippisley wrote to Morrison regarding this successful meeting: The latter [Grey] admitted that he had never heard of the American desire to participate in the railway loan or of its rejection by the British financiers…. Sir E.Grey undertook to work hereafter in greater harmony with the U.S., now it had been demonstrated to him that the aims of the two countries are identical.54 It is interesting to note that, some time later, Rockhill wrote to Morrison from Russia:

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A new stage in the history of the Far East is just opening now with Japan a Continental Power. There must be some day a new policy adopted by the interested Powers of the West to meet this absolutely new condition.55 Rockhill’s recognition of a need for the West to make a concerted effort to confront the rising power of Japan must have given considerable solace to Morrison, who sought a tie with the United States. Further, Rockhill acknowledged Morrison’s ability and contribution, remarking that: ‘You can do more than anyone I know of to create an intelligent interest in the present state of China as you [sic.] know it.’56 Grey decided that the American request should be met. His decision was due to the information regarding the Hukuang Loan situation which he had gained, from Morrison’s article and Chirol’s co-operation. As Germany had displayed its willingness from the beginning, and as France had no objection, the United States was finally admitted to the group on 17 August 1909. Thus, the Triple Banking Consortium became the Quadruple Consortium.57 In recognition of the role played by Morrison and Chirol, Fletcher, Charge d’Affaires of the American Legation in Peking, reported to Knox, Secretary of State: The change of attitude on the part of the British Government is due, in my opinion, largely to the influence of Mr. Valentine Chirol, who criticized in The Times the action of his Government and the legation here [Peking] for failing to cooperate with American interests and for surrendering to the Germans…. Dr. Morrison…has also been favorable to a frank recognition on the part of the British interests of our rights, and has freely criticized the haggling of the Hongkong [sic] Bank, which he has attributed to German influence which is represented on the board of directors of this institution.58 Thus, together with Chirol, Morrison played a significant part in making American participation possible, and consequently in bringing the United States into closer cooperation with Britain. J.G.Reid specifically named Morrison as objecting to Germany’s penetration into the Yangtse valley.59 In the matter of American participation, The Times’ two major experts were of one mind, in contrast with their disagreement over other issues, as already seen. Morrison wanted American friendship from Far Eastern considerations, whereas Chirol viewed the situation from a European perspective. After Britain withdrew a large part of its fleet from the Far East to Europe, Morrison looked to the United States to check Japan’s expansion in Manchuria. American friend-ship, therefore, was essential for Morrison, as exemplified in the Fakumen Railway question where Morrison closely co-operated with Straight and Marvin, US Consul-General and Consul respectively in Mukden. On the other hand, Chirol wanted American friendship so as to prevent the United States going over to the German side.60

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Hukuang project involving Japan and Russia The United States, which had finally joined in the Hukuang Loan project, was independently pursuing a financial project of its own with China, namely the Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan project in Manchuria, the brainchild of Straight.61 It aimed at American expansion into the Manchurian market.62 In The Times Morrison pointed out the necessity for currency reform: ‘China, through her ignorance of the elementary principles of sound finance, is increasing the currency confusion, although she is under a treaty obligation to reform her finances’.63 For trade to be effective between China and the powers, a currency reform was essential. China, well aware of this fact, was willing to negotiate with the United States in the hope that closer ties with the United States would serve as a deterrent to possible threats from Russia and Japan. China needed financial as well as political support from the United States. Prompted by mutual needs, the Chinese Government and the American group signed the Preliminary Agreement for Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan of $50 million on 27 October 1910, which was regarded as a triumph for Straight. The United States, however, could not implement this Agreement because of lack of capital. Therefore, when the United States was admitted to the Triple Consortium, it invited the three powers to join its own loan project as equal partners. Thus, not only the Hukuang Loan but also the Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan came under control of the Quadruple Consortium. The Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan Agreement of £10 million was signed between the Ch’ing Government and the representatives of the Quadruple Consortium on 15 April 1911, when £400,000 was advanced.64 Morrison observed: There is much less friction among the Powers in Peking than there formerly was. England, France, Germany and America working together, for “Four Nations” loans has [sic] removed the friction that used to be evident.65 Morrison was happy to see the apparently harmonious relations amongst the four powers, who had excluded Japan and Russia. Morrison and the four powers might have been happy, but Japan and Russia were certainly not. They protested against Article XVI of the Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan, which stipulated that: Should the Imperial Chinese Government decide to invite foreign capitalists to participate with Chinese interests in Manchurian business contemplated under this loan, or to be undertaken in connection therewith, the banks [of the Quadruple Consortium] shall first be invited to so participate.66 Japan and Russia contended that Article XVI granted preferential loan rights for all future Manchurian enterprises solely to the Consortium, which was a violation of the principle

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of the ‘Open Door’ and equal opportunity Japan and Russia presented a Note Verbal to Britain and France on 26 June 1909 and to the United States and Germany on 11 July 1909, demanding a revision or abolition of Article XVI.67 Grey supported Japan’s claim. Consequently, Hillier and Casenave insisted on the insertion of an additional clause to the effect that Article XVI was not to affect adversely the special interests of Japan and Russia. Straight was strongly opposed to the insertion of such an additional clause because he had formulated Article XVI specifically in order to halt the expansion of Japan and Russia in Manchuria. In order to appease Japan and Russia, however, the inclusion of the additional clause was decided upon, which virtually thwarted Straight’s plan.68 Grey’s friendly attitude towards Japan throughout the Hukuang Loan negotiations helped consolidate Tokyo’s trust in Whitehall, which wanted early renewal of the AngloJapanese Alliance because of concern about Germany. During 1909–10, Anglo-German rivalry was at its height.69 In this atmosphere, the Third Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance was signed on 13 July 1911, four years ahead of the date of expiry of the second. The Third Agreement was to run for 10 years from the date of signature. There were three main differences between the Third and the Second Agreements. In the former, mention of Korea was omitted as Japan had already annexed Korea in August 1910 without British objection; reference to India was also removed, because British fear of a Russian invasion of India was dispelled by the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. The most important difference was the inclusion in the Third Agreement of an arbitration clause, Article IV, which laid down: Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.70 This virtually removed Britain’s obligation to go to war against the United States, in case of an American-Japanese war. Article IV was inserted in order to place the United States outside the scope of Article II of the Alliance Treaty which stipulated that if either party should be involved in war, the other party ‘will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common’.71 Thus Britain ensured that the Alliance would not run counter to the arbitration treaty with the United States, which Britain had been negotiating.72 In brief, Japan wanted British support for its expansion into Manchuria, while Britain wanted Japan’s friendship to meet the German challenge. Finally Britain did not want to alienate the United States. So the Third Agreement included the arbitration clause. The negotiations for the Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance, like the other two previous negotiations, took place in secret. When it was signed, Ijūin received a copy of its full text from his government and promptly sent a copy to Morrison. Morrison observed that the British in China welcomed the extension of the Alliance, considering that the British Government had done ‘the right thing at the right time’. Morrison also thought that London had acted ‘wisely’, because it had obtained the approval of the ‘Colonial Premiers’. He regretted, however, that Reuters had omitted to report in The Times that ‘the approval of the Overseas Dominions had been unanimously accorded to the

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Agreement prior to its signature’.73 Morrison’s comment shows clearly that he continued to look at Anglo-Japanese relations from an Australian point of view. Australia felt vulnerable at the emergence of victorious Japan as the dominant power in the AsiaPacific region, seeing evidence of its ambitious intentions in its annexation of Korea in August 1910.74 Morrison was outraged with Japan’s annexation of Korea: What could be more foolish than for Japan to publish the announcement of her annexation of Korea as the result of a friendly treaty spontaneously entered into by the Emperor of Korea? It is so dishonest, so dishonourable.75 Morrison represented what Meaney calls Australian post-1905 defence thinking’.76 Australia accepted the Anglo-Japanese Alliances, believing that its national defence needs could be best met under the umbrella of British defence and foreign policy, although still wishing to have its voice reflected in the imperial decision-making. Dominion participation, however, did not occur in practice. Grey did not like the selfgoverning colonies asserting themselves and making claims on matters which conflicted with imperial foreign policy In the case of the first Alliance of 1902, Australia accepted it because it did not regard Japan as a threat to its national security, although it had a dispute with Japan over immigration. It was only after 1905 that Australia began to feel the danger of Japan’s growing power.77 In the case of the second Alliance of 1905, there is no evidence of Australia’s influence in the making of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance although the immigration problem still existed. For the third Alliance of 1911, Australia was consulted for the first time.78 At the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 between the Admiralty and the dominions’ representatives, a decision was made to join local and imperial naval forces to form a Pacific fleet. Australia’s action stemmed from its fear of Japan’s aggressive intention, the problems of strained Japanese-American relations, and the Japanese immigration issue. In fact, in September 1909, J.Cook, Australian Minister for Defence, candidly described Australia’s defence position: Australia is the most distant, the richest and at the same time the most vulnerable part of the British Empire. We are surrounded by nations hungry for room and breathing space’.79 In 1911, Australia agreed to the extension of the Alliance because it believed that it was better to have some influence over Japan than not.80 To the Japanese, Australia’s restrictive immigration policy was annoying but it did not hinder the renewal of its alliance with Britain,81 which permitted Japan to display to the other powers its ties with Britain while expanding its influence in Manchuria. That was why Japan acceded to the inclusion of Article IV in the Third Agreement of Alliance, in spite of the fact that Article IV blocked Japan’s aim of making the Alliance a deterrent for a possible American-Japanese war. Consequently, Japan sought a deterrent elsewhere and looked towards Russia, which had shared the same fate of being excluded from the Quadruple Consortium for the Hukuang Loan.82 Japan and Russia found a common bond that resulted in a series of Russo-Japanese treaties.83 By the First Treaty of July 1907, they agreed to share Manchuria by establishing a dividing border line, the north to Russia and the south to Japan.84 Furthermore Japan recognized Russia’s special position in Outer Mongolia in exchange for Russia’s respect of Japanese predominance in Korea.85 The Second Russo-Japanese Treaty of 4 July 1910 declared that the two nations would

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maintain the status quo in Manchuria, in particular the railway rights of each country.86 A secret clause attached to it, however, agreed that Russia approved Japan’s annexation of Korea in exchange for Japan’s recognition of Russia’s free hand in Outer Mongolia. In essence, the Second Treaty consolidated the First Treaty, confirming Russo-Japanese cooperation against any American advance into Manchuria.87 The Third Russo-Japanese Treaty of 8 July 1912 extended the border line westward to cover the entire area of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.88 In the case of the Second and the Third Treaties, Japan consulted Britain during the course of the negotiations, as Japan considered that they would not run counter to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance,89 and in fact Britain and France welcomed the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Treaties as a means of consolidating their strength against Germany The Russo-Japanese tie, however, was a blow to the Americans and to Morrison, because it thwarted American railway plans for Manchuria,90 which Morrison vigorously supported. Although Morrison did not know the contents of the Russo-Japanese Treaties, he nevertheless regretted that ‘the policy of Mr. Knox should have been so blundering as to drive Japan and Russia into a community of interest in regard to Manchuria’.91 P.C.Knox, Secretary of State, was President Taft’s right-hand man. Knox became most influential in the Cabinet and in late 1909 he advocated a plan to internationalize the Manchurian railways belonging to Japan and Russia, a plan which failed because of strong objections by the two countries concerned. However, he was still eager to secure the Manchurian market for American businessmen.92 If Morrison had known the contents of the secret clause attached to the Russo-Japanese Treaty, he would have protested more vigorously The clause was not publicly known, however, until 1921, one year after Morrison’s death. While international arguments over the Hukuang Loan project were developing, the relationship between Morrison and The Times changed. Since Morrison was employed by M.Bell in 1895, 12 years had passed without prospect of promotion. On 15 August 1907, however, Morrison received Bell’s confidential offer of the position of foreign editor of The Times, as Chirol’s successor, if and when the post became vacant. The offer worried Morrison, as he was unsure of the circumstances. He went to London to find that his worry was groundless. Nevertheless he decided to continue to be the Peking correspondent,93 probably because Peking was the most important place for him to oversee and frustrate Japan’s ambitions in the Far East. While in London, Morrison behaved strangely. Although ‘in a guarded way’, he imparted news of Bell’s offer to Chirol. Chirol said ‘he had no intention of retiring’. Furthermore, Morrison confided in Chirol his desire to become British Minister in Peking.94 It was strange for him to assume that Chirol, whose views on Japan and China were opposed to his own, would help him become Minister to China, where Japan had been heavily involved. In fact, Chirol destroyed Morrison’s chances. Morrison learnt later in 1910 from his friend, M.King, that his ambition was thwarted by Chirol,95 which would have made Morrison feel even more bitter towards him. On 16 March 1908, A.C.W.Northcliffe,96 the founder and proprietor of the Daily Mail, bought The Times from A.Walter, which had been founded by J. Walter as the Daily Universal Register in 1785. Just as A.Walter had praised Morrison’s efforts by saying that ‘Britain’s position in China was due to Morrison’,97 Northcliffe too appreciated Morrison’s work. In fact, in November 1906, he wanted Morrison for his Daily Mail’s Far Eastern Service. When Morrison’s ability and reputation are considered, it is not

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surprising that Northcliffe, looking for ‘the best living man to direct his Far Eastern service’, wanted Morrison to work for his paper. If Morrison had accepted the post he would have received a salary far above what he was receiving from The Times, and he could have afforded every facility to build up a great Far Eastern service.98 Morrison, however, declined the offer, probably because he had felt allegiance to The Times which gave him an opportunity to display his talent and to mix with its editors who generally were themselves talented literary men.99 However, more importantly it was because The Times had the most powerful influence on public opinion worldwide, which was undoubtedly a valuable way for Morrison to advance his own political aim, namely maintenance of British supremacy in the Far East and Asia-Pacific region where Australia was situated. In The Times, Northcliffe became ‘overlord’ and began to wage ‘a war of nerves’ on those executives, such as Bell, Chirol, Buckle and Capper, whom he called the ‘Old Gang’ of The Times.100 Morrison regarded it as a good opportunity for him to win Northcliffe’s support for his claims, as Northcliffe said to him: ‘You have rendered great services to The Times and to the Empire’, and ‘the proprietors of whom I am the Chief are determined that if any man has to go, it is not the Peking correspondent’.101 At Northcliffe’s request, Morrison spent some time with him in Paris in late October 1910. Even back in London, Northcliffe extended his favours to Morrison.102 Morrison made full use of these opportunities and made two criticisms of The Times to Northcliffe. One was the method of transmitting messages to The Times. Whereas Morrison preferred telegrams to letters, Chirol ordered him to send letters. This had long been a contentious issue. Morrison appealed to Northcliffe: ‘It is the policy of the paper to prefer belated reports by mail to prompt despatches by cable. I think the policy is a wrong one.’103 On this question, Northcliffe’s reply was evasive, in fact negative,104 probably because the cost of telegrams was a financial burden to the paper. The other complaint was about the paper’s Far Eastern policy to regard foreign news from a diplomatic and not from a journalistic viewpoint.105 By taking a diplomatic stance Chirol had suppressed, modified and delayed publication of Morrison’s dispatches—actions which had long annoyed Morrison. Morrison sarcastically told Northcliffe that ‘I think there is little use of my going back [to Peking] seeing that I have done no work for two years’, meaning that his messages had been suppressed or heavily modified. Northcliffe responded: ‘What is the use of paying a man £1200 a year and keeping him at the end of a silent wire?’106 Northcliffe guaranteed Morrison that in future his messages would not be expurgated and his letters would not be suppressed without giving Morrison satisfactory reasons.107 Believing that he had secured Northcliffe’s support, Morrison lodged two audacious letters of demand with Bell, sending copies to Chirol. He demanded that he should have control of Far Eastern communications, that Brinkley and all correspondents of The Times in China should be placed under Morrison’s control, and that he should see copies of all their communications to The Times. He even proposed that he should appoint correspondents at Hankow, Canton and certain other points in China.108 In regard to suppression of his messages, Morrison demanded of Bell that his telegraphic messages to The Times should be published ‘without expurgation or mutilation, unless in extreme cases when explanation of the reason shall be sent’ to him. Finally, and most importantly for him, Morrison suggested that The Times should change its Far Eastern policy.109 Bell did not agree and replied:

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Differences of opinion on matters of policy are always bound to exist and I have not hesitated to tell you that I think our advocacy of Japanese interests has sometimes been carried to an undue extreme, but from that to a systematic suppression of facts is a long step…. Such a charge ought to be supported by overwhelming proof.110 Chirol also refused to accept Morrison’s demands. He was adamant that Morrison should not gain control of foreign correspondents’ communications. 111 Despite the strong opposition from Bell and Chirol, Morrison was hopeful that, with Northcliffe’s support, he could bring about a change of The Times’ Far Eastern policy for his own ends, namely, for helping China gain strength enough to check Japan’s ambition. In order to earn Northcliffe’s stronger backing, Morrison was willing to serve him as private agent. He promised Northcliffe that he would keep him informed on events ‘using a code as he suggested’. On leaving London, Morrison wrote to Northcliffe that he enjoyed the opportunity of talking with him about the future of The Times and that: ‘Thanks to you I go back to China more contented than I have been for a long time past, for I know that I can always communicate with you should need arise’.112 Thinking that he had found in Northcliffe a patron/supporter for thrusting his demands upon The Times, Morrison returned to Peking contented. His letter to Braham, Foreign Editor of The Times while Chirol was away, shows, however, that the suppression and/or delay of publication of his messages from Peking continued: ‘I hope that Lord Northcliffe will not think that because nothing is being published from the Far East, or is published only after many weeks of delay, that nothing is being sent from the Far East’.113 Braham explained that he had been able to get from the editor no extra space for foreign news.114 Worse still, Bell asked Morrison to keep his cabling expense down by not sending too many cables, because The Times was suffering a financial difficulty.115 Morrison’s attempt to change The Times’ policy, making use of Northcliffe’s influence, failed.

The Szechuan uprising Morrison wanted to help make China strong enough to resist Japan’s expansion for which, Morrison believed, Western support, in particular financial support in the form of loans, was essential. Morrison, therefore, thought that the railway loans from the Quadruple Consortium were beneficial to China. Why then had the Hukuang Railway Loan contract triggered the Szechuan uprising? On the advice of Sheng Hsuan-huai,116 who was firmly pursuing the railway nationalization policy of the Ch’ing Government, an edict was issued on 9 May 1911 proclaiming that all trunk lines were to be built by government in future and that all those under private construction would be resumed by the government.117 On 20 May 1911, the Imperial Chinese Government Hukuang Loan Agreement of £10 million was signed between Sheng Hsuan-huai and the representatives of the Consortium.118 Thus, after long and delicate negotiations, the Hukuang Railway Loan question seemed to have reached a successful conclusion. Morrison was pleased with the nationalization of the railways,119 not only for the Consortium but also for the Chinese, believing that:

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[the Chinese were] tired of the everlasting squabbling, corruption and wastage of public moneys, and as they are more and more realising the priceless value of railways, they are more ready to support a vigorous railway policy on the part of the Central Government.120 He also thought that the terms of the Hukuang Loan were ‘more favourable for the Chinese than any previous loan’, and that the people in the provinces would benefit from the railway services. He wrote to Edith Blake, wife of the Governor of Hong Kong: ‘Wherever a railway has been built, the province through which it runs has benefited.’121 Thus, Morrison thought that the Chinese in the provinces involved would be satisfied with the contract. Morrison’s view of the railway loan contract was as follows: What we are trying to induce the Chinese to do is to build their railways by contract…. We want them to have a railway built, and when finished and paid for to be handed over to the Chinese…in fact, as they would have a battle-ship [sic] built for them.122 For the Chinese, however, the railway question was a very serious matter concerning their national identity. It was not nearly as simple as a ‘battleship’. After all, they had bitter experience of foreign territorial encroachment through railway concessions, particularly in 1898 at the time of the ‘scramble for concessions’.123 Therefore the Chinese people wanted to have their railway system free from foreign control. The provincial gentry-merchants124 and the Chinese local press championed the Rights Recovery Movement in their quest for gaining control of railways and mines from the foreign powers, which was a manifestation of the people’s aspiration for independence.125 Regarding the people’s desire to recover their railway rights, Morrison observed: While a short time ago the Rights Recovery Movement was at its height, one of the chief manifestations of which was the refusal of the proposal to accept foreign loans, now the provinces are tumbling over one another to secure foreign loans.126 Thus, Morrison thought that the Rights Recovery Movement had already passed its peak and failed to recognize the underlying seriousness of the matter, namely the significance of the events which symbolized the awakening of nationalism. Foreign loans were inevitable, however, for sufficient funds could not be raised locally.127 In fact, the Ch’ing Government needed foreign loans in every field of industry, under whatever pretext. As Morrison observed: ‘There have been railway loans, Post Office loans, a Currency loan, a great Naval loan, a loan for the Peking Water Works, mining loans, opium loans, etc., etc.’128 In spite of its national aspirations, China was urgently in need of foreign loans. In order to attract Western investors to China, Morrison portrayed China’s future in ‘a soft rose tint’.129 For instance, he wrote to Edith Blake in an optimistic vein about the Chinese Government’s use of the loans: ‘Railway development is making real progress…. I see no reason to be apprehensive that the money will not be spent on the object for which it has been lent.’130 Morrison’s optimism, however, was wishful thinking

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rather than a matter of conviction, designed to assure Westerners that China would be a safe place in which to invest. That Morrison’s optimism was mere pretence is shown in his letter of warning to Liang Shih-yi, Director-General of Railways, which reveals that he was aware that railway loans were being misused: Letters from England now tell me that the British Government is…so disgusted with the way railway loan funds are being squandered or embezzled that it will express no further opposition to the expansion of Japan and Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia.131 Meanwhile, the provincial gentry-merchants tried to acquire more autonomy for themselves in the form of control of railways and mining rights.132 By the ‘Railway Regulations’ of 1903, the Ch’ing Government granted Chinese merchants rights to operate railways. For the construction of the Canton-Hankow Railway, a Chinese private company, the Szechuan Railway Company, was formed with locally collected capital, much of it put up by provincial gentry shareholders.133 Morrison’s ulterior purpose to create a better image of China to the outside world is perhaps best illustrated in the case of arguments between Morrison on one hand and Chirol, Bland and Hillier on the other, over the question of provincial power. During the period 1906 to 1911, in yielding to popular demand the Ch’ing Government implemented drastic political, economic and social reforms. It adopted dual policies: one was the modernization of the central administration system so as to strengthen the authority of the central government, and the other was constitutionalism designed to maintain provincial loyalty. This, however, precipitated a power struggle between central and provincial interests, because many Chinese realized that the Manchu’s ‘reform’ was nothing but a political expedient to prevent provincial upheaval.134 In September 1907, a decree promised the introduction of constitutional government within a few years, and in October 1909 the first provincial assembly met and demanded that a national parliament be convened within two years. This demand, however, was rejected.135 The first national assembly, which opened on 3 October 1910, demanded that any new loan agreement should have its approval. When, in 1907, the question of whether the railways should be imperial or provincial became an issue, an edict of 3 October asserted that these should be the central government’s undertaking. Morrison applauded the government’s strong line and commented in The Times: the importance of the question deserves to be recognised since upon the maintenance of the central Government’s authority depends the future construction and organisation of the railways as a definite system as opposed to independent undertakings on the part of the provinces, the futility of which has been sufficiently demonstrated.136 Thus, outwardly, Morrison took a view to disregard the increasing power of the provinces. Bland’s attitude was just the opposite. He stated that ‘the work of the [provincial] assemblies…must mean, sooner or later, the end of the Manchu dynasty’.137 Hillier also suggested that the provincial assemblies would become more independent of the central government and would constitute ‘a certain element of danger’ to it.138 History

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proved Bland and Hillier correct and there-fore Morrison appears to have been mistaken. But Morrison was not ignorant. He had observed the same symptoms as Bland and Hillier had. The difference was that Morrison did not admit it in public in order to conceal the problems of China. His honest and frank view was revealed only in a ‘Private and Confidential’ letter to a friend, as early as summer of 1909: ‘I have never known the Central Authority here to be so hopelessly weak. Provincial opposition seems to be growing against the Central Authority. What is it to lead to?’139 This admission shows that Morrison was well aware of the provincial threat to the Manchu Government and therefore his optimism was pretence. He purposely kept painting a rosy picture of China, just as he had done previously when writing to Chirol at the end of 1909: ‘I take the view that one of the most striking features of Modern China is the growth in national wealth security [sic] and prosperity… Bland however sees the country on the verge of bankruptcy’.140 Morrison must have written this with the express aim of changing Chirol’s ‘pessimistic’ policy towards China. In 1911, he wrote to Edith Blake, commenting on the material wealth of the people: ‘There can be no question as to the material prosperity of the people. Of nothing am I more convinced. Evidences of the growth of wealth throughout the country meet you everywhere.’141 Contrary to Morrison’s statement, China was, in fact, on the verge of financial collapse. The long-standing fight for survival was reaching a climax all over China. Peasants refused to pay taxes and ‘rice riots’ became commonplace throughout the country China was seriously ill and was in need of major surgery.142 Morrison’s optimism was part of his strategy to secure foreign trust, confidence and investment. In February 1911, in an interview, Morrison stated: ‘Within her provinces there has been a steady strengthening of central authority and increase of material prosperity’,143 which was contrary to the facts. Morrison’s pretence is understandable because this interview was published by the London Magazine owned by his employer Northcliffe, whose China policy Morrison was trying to influence. While Morrison was convinced that foreign loans, which would enable railway construction, would benefit the local people, the local gentry were opposed to foreign loans. The issue was the centralization of railways with foreign capital or decentralization with domestic capital. The Chinese people’s opposition to the government’s nationalization scheme came from the two political elements, the provincial ruling class and the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries regarded foreign loans as domination and encroachment by imperialistic foreign powers, while the local ruling class regarded them as threats to their own investment. The local ruling class, the power base of the provinces, had been increasing their influence in provincial authorities ever since the central government promised constitutional reform in 1908.144 The gentry-merchants power group, being conservative, had no intention of over-throwing the Manchu dynasty, under whose protection they could maintain their privileges as industrial capitalists.145 However, when they felt that their interests were threatened by the central government’s railway nationalization plan and the use of foreign loans, they protested against the government.146 They demanded the cancellation of the Hukuang Loan contract. The provincial government supported this demand, for the provincial assembly was often made up of the local ruling class.147 The central government tried to pacify these groups without success. It proposed to exchange its railway shares for interest-earning government bonds, for the people in Hupeh and Hunan provinces. For the Szechuanese,

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however, it offered to redeem the sums spent solely for railway purposes rather than the sums actually subscribed. It was believed that such a policy was taken because Sheng Hsuan-huai had invested significantly in bonds in Hupeh and Hunan provinces but none in Szechuan province.148 The outraged Szechuanese groups protested that the government intended to sell Szechuan to the foreigners. The local ruling class mobilized students, workers and peasants into their ‘patriotic’ protest. On 5 August 1911 the Szechuanese banded together and convened the Defend Railways League, declaring their defiance of the Hukuang Railway Loan contract.149 Morrison reported to Braham that the agitation was mainly anti-governmental and only indirectly anti-foreign because of the foreign capital for the railway’s construction in Szechuan Province. 150 By mid-September, the protest took the form of rioting and street fighting, and the revolt quickly spread throughout the province. Even at that stage, on 25 September, some two weeks before the outbreak of the revolution, Morrison, disregarding the people’s protest, still supported the government’s railway nationalization plan and urged the railway construction.151 There were external and internal causes for the popular uprising. The people had long been discontented with the foreign powers’ domination of China. That was why they participated so promptly in militant action on the grounds of national interest and patriotism. In addition to this external cause, there were long-established internal causes for social unrest, including worsening economic conditions which undermined the authority of the Manchu dynasty. Public expenditure was mounting due to the government’s modernization programme of the army, education system, railways and so on. Meanwhile, the indemnity payments stemming from the Boxer incident of 1900 and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 still continued and drew the Ch’ing Government further into debt. This all resulted in heavier tax levies and rising public discontent with the dynasty Population increases and food shortages were other problems China faced,152 so that famine and pestilence were rampant. In particular, the years 1910–11 also saw the worst floods in 40 years and the struggle for survival became difficult enough to cause widespread social unrest.153 In fact, a prominent Chinese told Morrison: ‘never has the outlook been so black, for never has China been menaced with such immense perils from flood and famine’.154 Morrison reported to Braham that ‘People will perish by the hundred thousand. Cholera and typhus have already appeared in the refugee camps.’155 In this situation, the railway nationalization plan gave the people an opportunity to vent their dissatisfaction with the authorities. The Ch’ing Government was sandwiched between external pressure from the foreign powers and internal dissension from its own people. Nevertheless, the Szechuan uprising took Morrison by surprise. His reaction was confused, like that of most foreigners in China. On 2 September 1911 when he learnt through Reuters about the riot in Chengtu, he was thrown into ‘a state of great excitement’.156 In his report of 4 September to The Times he amplified157 the message, stressing the seriousness of the situation. Shortly afterwards, however, he corrected his mistake of calling the situation serious in a message to the Foreign Editor of The Times’,158 to W.D.Barnes, and to O.M.Green, Editor of the North China Daily News. He explained that he had made the mistake because he had been misled by ‘the hyperbole’ of Chinese official reports which were grossly exaggerated,159 and also because he had been misled by ‘the grotesque exaggerations telegraphed by our Consul at Chungkin [which] almost pass belief’.160 The irony of Morrison’s position was that he was away from China

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for a considerable period prior to this historically important Szechuan uprising, just like in the case of the Boxer uprising of 1900.161 Before the former and the ensuing revolution, Morrison was away from China on leave for one year and two months from mid-January 1910 to mid-March 1911.162 When he wrongly thought that he had overrated the importance of the Szechuan uprising, he confided to Barnes that he felt ‘somewhat sore about the whole thing’.163 He also wrote to Braham: Before the Boxer trouble of 1900 we always underrated the importance of these provincial disturbances. Experience had taught us that their danger was always magnified in the telling, and when the Boxer uprising came, we failed to recognise its immense possibilities. Since then the tendency has been to exaggerate the importance of provincial disturbances.164 Thus, Morrison thought that he had exaggerated the seriousness of the Szechuan uprising, but he was wrong. The uprising was, in fact, very serious. Morrison did not predict the impending outbreak of the revolution. On the other hand, Chirol saw the approaching danger to the Manchu regime, which Morrison denounced as Chirol’s ‘erroneous dictum’, and wrote to Bell: ‘I suggest that we should modify the attitude based upon the erroneous dictum [of Chirol] that “the Chinese Empire is sinking into a decline and its extremities are already rotting away”,’165 Chirol’s predictions proved to be correct. Braham also foresaw the approach of the revolution, which Morrison denounced as a hasty judgement. Morrison wrote to his friend that Braham ‘was always foreseeing revolutions: formed his judgements hastily: was prejudiced and not easily convinced’.166 Grey also was critical of the methods of the Chinese Government, which he thought could cause a revolution. Grey wrote to MacDonald, Minister in Tokyo: I observe that it would be very desirable to have a better Government in China…. it went to the extreme of provocation by its unbusinesslike methods and then found itself confronted by risks which might entail revolution in China.167 Thus Morrison did not see what Chirol, Braham and Grey saw. Because Morrison had been enthusiastically portraying a better China for six years, by 1911 he must have been carried away by his own optimism, and as a result failed to see the coming disaster for the Ch’ing dynasty Morrison was still seeing China from inside, although he was physically outside it during his holiday This seems to be the only explanation why, in 1910–11, he could not see the approaching revolution. Indeed, some 15 years earlier, he had thought China was heading towards revolution. In his book An Australian in China, being the narrative of a quiet journey across China to Burma, published in 1895, he wrote: ‘Trouble, serious trouble, will begin in China in the near future, for the time must be fast approaching when the effete and alien dynasty now reigning in China, the Manchu dynasty, shall be overthrown.’ 168 In 1911 he could not see what he saw in 1895, in spite of the fact that China’s overall condition worsened during these years. Morrison’s opinion of the Hukuang Railway Loan contract was that ‘I have been taken to task for describing this loan contract as the most important loan contract ever signed in

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China’.169 Ironically however, this contract turned out to be ‘the most important loan contract ever signed in China’, not because it benefited the four powers and the Chinese people as Morrison had expected, but because it became the fateful trigger of the revolution. Morrison never dreamt that such a dramatic event would follow within two months. Ten years later, in 1920, Jordan wrote that: the Hukuang Railway Agreement…was the proximate cause of the downfall of the Dynasty…. Ten years have since passed…and the railway, which would have united North and South and possibly have given political unity to China, is still far from completion.170 Jordan’s statement was made in retrospect. At the time of the signing of the Hukuang Loan contract, however, Morrison and most Westerners did not imagine that it would become the fuse that ignited the Hsinhai revolution of 1911, the revolution which brought down the 248-year-old Ch’ing (Manchu) dynasty171 and gave birth to the first republic in Asia.

The outbreak of the Hsinhai revolution The Ch’ing Government ordered the Imperial Army stationed at Wuchang to suppress the rebels in Szechuan province. Two regiments departed. With this opportunity, an uprising broke out amongst the remaining troops at Wuchang. The revolutionary movement had been proceeding on parallel lines with the constitutional movement for some 10 years since the Boxer uprising of 1900. Many revolutionary societies sprang up amongst the Chinese in the treaty ports and in Japan. By 1909 Huang Hsing172 had successfully subverted some imperial troops and engineered army revolts in Hunan province, aiming to overthrow the Ch’ing dynasty The final showdown was the Wuchang uprising, and the revolution began on 10 October 1911.173 To Morrison, the revolution came as a great shock because it was most unexpected. On this fateful day of 10 October 1911, Morrison noted in his diary: ‘Beautiful morning. Better night. Up fairly early. Revised some notes and leaving at 9 walked to the Hsi Pien Men where my ponies were waiting for me and then rode into town’.174 After spending a peaceful day in his country cottage, Morrison came home to Peking on the following day His diary reflects his alarm: Worked during the morning and then came back to Peking after lunch where letters waiting for me from Bowra re the mutiny in Wuchang…. Saw Aglen who [was] much excited by the messages from Sugden in Hankow saying that City had been sieged, the Viceroy had fled and Chang Piao had been killed. So hustled around, saw Sir John and others and as a result sent off my message of this evening…. Everyone much excited. It is the Real Thing [sic] this time said Ohl at the club. 175 This time Morrison sensed the seriousness of the uprising, as his message in The Times of 12 October shows:

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Peking is thoroughly alarmed by the news of a revolutionary outbreak and mutiny of troops at Wuchang…. The Viceroy is a refugee on board a Chinese gunboat…. His Yamen and Treasury have been burned and the City of Wuchang is in the hands of the revolutionaries.176 Shooting continued in Wuchang throughout the night.177 By 12 October the uprising had crossed the Yangtse River and two important cities opposite Wuchang, namely Hankow and Hanyang with its arsenal, were also taken by the revolutionaries.178 Morrison’s reaction to the outbreak and the panic of the Pekinese were described by Dorothy Straight, wife of Willard Straight: All Peking is in a wild state of excitement now over the Revolution in Hankow…. The diplomats here in Peking are scared to death…. Yesterday, Dr Morrison, the famous correspondent of the London Times, rode up and down the Legation street saying that the end of the Manchu dynasty was at hand. Everyone generally is in a blue funk.179 Morrison’s behaviour seems to indicate spontaneous celebration of the signs of the end of the Manchu dynasty. Morrison personally wanted to see the end of the dynasty, no doubt out of his compassion for the Chinese people, whom he regarded since 1895 as being oppressed by ‘the effete and alien dynasty’.180 His following view of the revolution, which he expressed some three years later in 1914, must have also been his view at its outbreak: ‘the revolution was a legitimate aspiration of the people towards better things…. It arose out of opposition to the Manchus, due to the total failure of the Manchus to understand the trend of events in China’.181 Wearne182 regarded Morrison as ‘a champion of the weak’.183 Morrison resented the injustices of an autocratic ruler. As Morrison reported, the Ch’ing Government was confronted with the most serious danger since the Taiping rebellion of 1851–64,184 but showed ‘the utmost flabbiness and irresolution’.185 All the arrangements which the Manchu Government had made, failed. An Imperial Edict hastily ordered Minister of War Yin-chang, whom Morrison described as ‘a Manchu who inspires little confidence in his Chinese officers’, to take two divisions of the Northern Army to Hankow to suppress the rebellion.186 Morrison pointed out in The Times that one of the perils confronting the government was ‘the growing disloyalty’ amongst its troops. His diary reads that ‘Yin Chang does not partir demain. Troops not yet started.’187 Regarding the low morale of the Imperial Army, Morrison pointed out in The Times: ‘To the growing disaffection among the Government troops, their lack of spirit, and the insufficiency of ammunition and supplies of all kinds is now added congestion.’188 The Imperial Naval Commander, Admiral Sah Cheng-ping, was sent to recapture the Wuhan cities on 15 October.189 Responding to an impassioned appeal by Li Yuan Hung, the revolutionary leader, however, Sah changed sides, betraying the Throne.190 Morrison endeavoured to obtain accurate information to report in The Times. Hoping to gain an eye-witness account of the fighting, he tried to reach Hankow, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby the British Military Attaché in Peking, Sir Douglas Brownrigg, the Naval Attaché in Tokyo, who was on a brief visit to China, and a Russian officer. They departed on 18 October but when they arrived at Sinyang, the headquarters

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of Yin-chang’s forces,191 they were halted by the Imperial Army on the grounds that foreigners’ protection could not be guaranteed.192 Morrison learned privately that Yinchang’s troops had been defeated near Hankow. The General Staff, however, officially handed Morrison ‘a spurious telegram concocted for our edification reporting the defeat of the rebels with great loss’, which Morrison disclosed in The Times. Morrison also reported his impression about the people’s sympathy towards the revolutionaries: ‘Even Imperial officers spoke with respect of Li Yuan-hung, the revolutionary leader, saying that he was “a good man”’.193 Although foreign consuls in Hankow had been assured by Yin-chang and Sah Chengping that the foreign concessions would not be exposed to fire during the proposed bombardment of Wuchang, there was great fear for the welfare of foreigners in Hankow, and therefore the powers quickly made arrangements to ensure that their warships would be present at Hankow.194 Each power hastened to send for its warships, then stationed downstream on the Yangtse River. In this inter-national rush, the Japanese were the first to arrive. Admiral Kawashima reached Hankow on 11 October 1911 and took command of the international warships.195 This alertness invited Morrison’s suspicion that the Japanese might have been in league with the revolutionaries during the uprising. He noted in his diary: I walked with Willoughby to fat old Aoki who [knew] about the revolution before it occurred…. There at the table [was] also Major Saitō, the assistant of Aoki and Admiral [Kawashima] arriving moment after. … All very curious and much more than coincidence.196 Morrison reported in The Times that Admiral Kawashima’s arrival ‘synchronized so strikingly with the outbreak’, suggesting that Japan had engineered the outbreak in concert with the revolutionaries.197 Despite Japanese official denial, Morrison’s suspicion was not mitigated. He reported his suspicion to Braham that the Japanese and the revolutionaries were banded together, and that Major Saitō and Admiral Kawashima must have been involved.198 E.T.Williams, Charge d’Affaires in the American Legation in Peking, had also entertained a similar thought.199 Suspicions were reported also in the Chinese press at Peking and the charge was raised of Japanese complicity in the uprising. It is true that Japanese military leaders considered as early as December 1910 that a kind of coup d’état would break out in China in the near future and therefore they attached great importance to being prepared, with a strategic plan—hence such a speedy response of the Japanese Navy to the outbreak of the Wuchang uprising The Japanese, however, had not engineered the Wuchang uprising together with the Chinese as Morrison suspected, although many revolutionary leaders were ex-students from Japan. Japanese newspapers ‘indignantly’ denied the allegation and stated that Japan had no ‘foreknowledge’ of the Wuchang uprising and had not been connected with it. Nozawa asserts that the Hsinhai revolution was an unexpected incident for the Japanese populace.200 McCormick201 thought that Morrison’s suspicion that Japan had engineered the outbreak together with the revolutionaries was groundless because Saitō was on his way from Peking to Szechuan where he was to report on the outbreak.202 Apparently, Morrison overreacted, probably because of his feelings of mistrust of and rivalry with

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Japan, and because of his desire for Britain to take command of the international warships at Hankow. As early as 11 October 1911, Jordan advised Grey that the British should take charge of foreign warships at Hankow. As a result, Vice-Admiral Sir A.L. Winslow arrived at Hankow on board the Alacrity on 17 October, and Japan handed over command of foreign forces to Britain.203 Jordan was pleased with his initiative in this matter, and his lengthy recapitulation to Grey followed: On the receipt of this news [the outbreak of the revolution] I at once asked the naval commander-in-chief to send all available assistance to Hankow, and his Excellency readily responded to the request…. I am glad to report that I have received a telegram from Vice-Admiral Winslow stating that he expects to reach Hankow about noon tomorrow, the 17th October.204 Jordan recounted to Morrison his ‘prompt and appropriate initiative’, which Morrison recorded in his diary: Sir John showed me the telegram he had sent to Goffe,205 to the Admiral whose whereabouts, as usual, are unknown and to the FO. All available ships to be sent to Hankow as soon as possible.206 Credit should go to Morrison for retention of the 1st Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, which was stationed in North China. It was due to leave for India before 24 October 1911, to be relieved by the Somersetshire Light Infantry, which was to arrive on 26 October. General E.J.Cooper, officer commanding the British troops in North China,207 thought that the departure of the Inniskilling Fusiliers should be postponed because of the outbreak of the revolution. From Tientsin he hurried to meet Jordan and urged him to detain the Inniskilling Fusiliers in Tientsin until the situation became clearer. Jordan flatly refused Cooper’s request on the grounds that ‘Lord Hardinge would never consent to their remaining in North China as they were specially needed for ceremonial purposes on the occasion of the visit of the King and Queen to Bombay’.208 Unable to ‘shake’ Jordan, Cooper went to Morrison for help. Morrison’s diary relates the story: He [Cooper] could not shake the Minister. Could I help? I said I would do what I could and went over to see Sir John and argued with him…. Sir John who was much worried said these troops were wanted badly in India; they were to be the guard at Bombay.209 Morrison’s desire for the retention of the Inniskilling force is understandable, because his main preoccupation was to maintain the dominant British position amongst the powers in China. He almost threatened Jordan, saying that Jordan ‘would be severely attacked in The Times, if he were to allow the troops to leave’. Morrison urged Jordan to send a telegram to the Foreign Office recommending the retention of the Inniskilling Battalion at Tientsin in addition to the Somersetshire Battalion.210 Jordan reluctantly yielded and sent a telegram to Grey on 21 October: ‘I venture to suggest that the postponement of the

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departure of the outgoing Inniskilling Fusiliers for a week or ten days might be a prudent precaution, since…the issue of events at Hankow is still doubtful.’211 The Foreign Office accepted Jordan’s recommendation and transmitted a telegram to the War Office, suggesting the desirability of retaining the Inniskilling Fusiliers and noting that ‘Sir E.Grey will be glad to learn that the Army Council are [sic] able to comply with Sir J.Jordan’s suggestion’.212 The War Office complied.213 Thus, the Inniskilling Fusiliers were retained at Tientsin. Morrison must now have been especially satisfied, seeing that the international warships in the port of Hankow by 16 October 1911 numbered five British, with two more to arrive on the following day; three American; two Japanese; two German and a French one.214 Morrison was proud of this result and reported to Braham that ‘I think Sir John is now pleased that he was well advised’.215 This incident shows that Morrison had influence on the decision-making of Jordan, and, through Jordan, on the British Foreign Office. Incidentally the Inniskilling Battalion was retained in North China until 8 June 1912, when the War Office asked the Foreign Office whether the condition of affairs in China was such as to warrant the battalion’s withdrawal.216 The revolutionaries selected Li Yuan-hung as leader.217 As Morrison commented in The Times, ‘Brigadier-General Li Yuan-hung…is well known to the Military Attaches [of the powers]. He speaks English.’218 Li was on good terms with foreigners. Jordan also had a good opinion of Li and reported to Grey: The rebel generalissimo, Li Yuan-Hung [sic], is reported to be a man of considerable intelligence, who speaks English and has had some experience abroad.’219 In fact, most revolutionary leaders were educated overseas in the United States, Britain or Japan, and knew that the foreign powers had advanced modern military weaponry and superior financial backing. They therefore were determined not to take any action which would give any excuse for the powers to intervene. Accordingly, Li Yuan-hung notified the foreign powers that the revolutionaries had set up a Military Government of the Republic of China at Wuchang, that it would respect existing treaties, previous loans, indemnity payments and engagements with foreign powers, and that it would guarantee efficient protection to all foreigners as long as they did not assist the Ch’ing Government.220 Li’s notification clearly shows the nature of the revolution. It was targeted exclusively at the dynasty and not foreigners. Morrison, welcoming Li’s notification, reported in The Times that ‘Foreigners here praise the foresight and powers of organisation shown by the revolutionary leaders.’221 Morrison also wrote to E.T.Nystrom, a Norwegian Protestant missionary, that ‘Every indication so far points to its not being directed against foreigners.’222 Morrison recognized that the revolution was not anti-foreign but he did not seem to have appreciated the Chinese people’s fundamental desire for independence from foreign domination. To achieve their aspiration to attain dignified independence of the nation, the revolutionaries had to eliminate foreign domination of China. The revolutionary leaders, however, knew well the dangers of making enemies of the powers, and had recourse to an immediate practical solution rather than a fundamental ideological solution. As Bergère points out, the revolutionaries’ anti-Manchu actions were only a substitute for antiimperialist actions. It was because the Manchu represented an easy target. Strong antiimperialistic feelings existed but the revolutionary leaders adopted an expedient solution to the fundamental problem because it was seen to be impossible to defeat the might of the foreign powers.223 Besides, China needed foreign investment in order to survive. As

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seen earlier, Chinese finance was largely controlled by the powers through the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs and huge loans of various kinds, in addition to China’s obligation to pay the Boxer indemnity. Any incoming government had to depend on foreign loans to survive. This aware-ness served to make the revolutionaries refrain from taking anti-imperialistic action. They had no choice.224 In fact, the revolution was carried out under the ‘supervision’ of the foreign powers, as is shown later. The goal of this particular revolution was only to overthrow the Ch’ing dynasty and not to terminate foreign domination. That was why Morrison assisted the Chinese to attain this goal. Eight months before the outbreak of the revolution, Morrison’s main concern was still the British position in China. In an interview, Morrison declared: ‘I see no signs of the decline of British prestige in China…. On the contrary, the British name is held in greater respect, and British influence is, I believe, increasing politically.’225 The notion that the foreign powers’ domination of China led by Britain was partly responsible for the people’s sufferings and for the outbreak of the revolution did not occur to Morrison, who was an imperialist and the champion of British interests in Asia.

The powers’ reaction to the outbreak The powers decided to adopt a common approach towards the revolution, unifying their differing policies. In working out a common policy, Britain took the lead because of its dominant position, and the other powers aligned them-selves with it.226 Britain devised a policy of neutrality for several reasons. Firstly, in the wider context of world politics where Anglo-German tension was growing, China was of secondary importance to the continental powers and the best policy was to avoid disturbing their existing balance of power in China. Secondly, the powers knew that another Boxer uprising would be a nightmare. Another special consideration for Britain was that British interests in China were mainly in the Yangtse valley area which was in the hands of the revolutionaries. Therefore the British thought it unwise to offend them in case British lives and property were endangered. Recognizing the revolutionaries as a belligerent force, Grey’s policy was one of neutrality.227 Japan felt obliged to follow the policy of Britain as its ally, but at the same time thought that, for Japan, China was not secondary but crucial. Generally speaking, the Japanese people were sympathetic towards the revolutionaries. The initial reaction of the Japanese Government to the outbreak, however, was to protect the Ch’ing dynasty because it thought that the emergence of a republican nation in the neighbourhood would cause republican ideology to spread amongst the Japanese public, an ideology which could be damaging to the Japanese monarchy.228 Japanese military protection was requested by Sheng Hsuan-huai, a Chinese imperial official and entrepreneur who was representing the Board of Hanyang Iron Works and some Japanese related industries in Hankow, but Muramatsu, Consul-General in Hankow, advised his government to refrain from any military action because of international considerations.229 Ijūin, Minister at Peking, however, advised Y.Uchida,230 the new Foreign Minister, that seeing that Britain was retaining the Inniskilling Fusiliers (some 2,000 troops) and that the United States was planning to strengthen its force with an extra 100 troops, Japan could also transfer warships, both to Ch’ing-huangdao and

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Taku, without any international complications. Ijūin urged his government to despatch warships urgently to China,231 but Uchida did not accept his recommendation. Although Japan agreed to observe a policy of strict neutrality, it did intervene in the revolution to the extent of supplying arms to the Ch’ing Government. On 13 October 1911, Yin-chang, through General N.Aoki, secretly requested Japan to supply arms and munitions.232 Uchida discussed the matter with Yamagata, an elder statesman, Saionji, the Prime Minister, and Ishimoto, the War Minister. They decided to comply with Yinchang’s request.233 Accordingly, Uchida instructed Ijūin to convey to the Ch’ing Government that ‘In view of the fact that the Japanese Government is taking a great risk in supplying arms, we request the Ch’ing Government to change their attitude towards Japan into gratitude and to respect the Japanese position in Manchuria.’234 Thus, by taking this opportunity, Japan attempted to change the Ch’ing Government’s attitude towards Japan. Because of the delicate situation, however, the Japanese Government avoided official commitment, and instead arranged secretly for Japanese merchants to perform the task. This precaution was necessary because Li Yuan-hung’s notification to the powers clearly stipulated that ‘in order that any misunderstanding may be avoided…all munitions of war supplied by any foreign power for the assistance of the Imperial Government will be confiscated’.235 About this time, Morrison spoke to Aoki, who he thought had ‘just come from the Lu Chun-pu [the Ministry of War]’, but he had no means of knowing what Aoki was doing there.236 Towards the end of October, Morrison obtained information from Y.Washizawa, Peking correspondent of the Jiji Shimpō, about Japan’s arms deals with China, and noted: Three Japanese arms dealers, namely, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Takada and Okura, have combined to form the Taiping Kung Co. and have divided China into spheres of influence. Okura being in Peking, Takada in Shanghai, and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha in Central China. They work with the Yokohama Specie Bank.237 This suggests that Japan was conducting nationwide arms deals in China, not only with the Ch’ing Government but also with the revolutionaries. In fact, with government approval, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha was dealing with the revolutionaries at Canton in central China.238 Whereas the Japanese Navy took a position of neutrality towards the outbreak, the Army took a definite position in deciding that Japan should help the revolutionaries by supplying arms.239 Ijūin asserted that Japan ought to assist the revolutionaries as well as the Ch’ing Government.240 Saionji and Uchida opposed such a move but K.Hara, the Home Minister, thought it was not a bad idea.241 Consequently, the Taihei Syndicate242 carried the first batch of arms offshore from Shanghai on 8 December and transferred the arms to a waiting revolutionary ship. A.Ariyoshi, Consul-General in Shanghai, who had obtained the information from a spy, asked Uchida whether he ought to intercept the shipment. The reply was in the negative.243 Chan Lau Kit-ching’s comment that Japan’s policy was dubious244 is justified considering that Japan aligned itself to the powers’ policy of neutrality, while supporting both the Ch’ing dynasty and the revolutionaries. About a month later, Morrison was able to report to Braham about the financial operations of the Japanese arms dealers:

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A loan of 3,000,000 yen from Okura and Co. [has been extended], half of which was provided in the shape of military stores by this firm…. With two other firms, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha and Takada, they have divided China into spheres of activity for the sale of arms, one in the north, one in the south, and one in the Yangtse. The other half of this amount was paid to the revolutionaries in money.245 Morrison condemned the Japanese, declaring that ‘the transaction was wholly wrong’. He was certain that ‘it was…done not only with the approval of the Japanese Government but at their instigation’. Morrison ‘interrogated’ Ijūin but obtained an unconvincing reply The Japanese Government’s excuse, according to Morrison, was that Ariyoshi ‘had assisted the transaction through ignorance. … He was a new man at his post, and had not had time to read the archives.’ Of course, Morrison did not believe this excuse, because he knew correctly that Ariyoshi was ‘an extremely intelligent and well-informed man’.246 The US Charge d’Affaires in Tokyo, Schuyler, who felt it unlikely that Japan would act in concert with the other powers, urged T.Hayashi that ‘Japan take no action without previously consulting the United States Government’, and Hayashi promised to do so. Schuyler, still doubtful, reported to Knox, Secretary of State, that ‘Japan will…act independently of other countries; whatever she does will be with a view to making herself indispensable to the future Government of China’.247 The Japanese Cabinet finally determined on the following China policy on 24 October: In view of the close political and economic relations between Japan and China, we shall strive to extend our influence on [mainland] China while trying to permanently preserve the existing position in Manchuria. … With regard to a fundamental solution of the Manchurian question, we will wait for an opportunity which would be most advantageous to us. In the meantime…we will endeavour to make the other powers recognize our dominant position…. With regard to Manchuria we will try to co-operate with Russia in order to protect our interests. We will try to soften China’s feelings [towards us] and attempt to make them trust us. With Britain we will respect the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, while with France and other powers that have interests in China proper, we will seek a way of creating harmonious relations. We will try our best to make friends with the United States. In this way we should gradually attain our final goal.248 Thus the aim was to extend Japan’s influence in mainland China while maintaining the existing special position in Manchuria. Keeping this design in mind, the Japanese Government decided to take a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude towards the revolution, while associating itself with the powers in keeping neutrality. This was a shift of attitude compared with its initial reaction to support the Ch’ing dynasty. Uchida informed Ijūin in Peking and Yamaza in London of the Cabinet decision. Yamaza in turn transmitted this decision to every ambassador stationed in Europe and the United States.249 A month later, Uchida made it clear to Ijūin that neither the Japanese Government nor the Army had any

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intention of allowing Japanese merchants to sell arms to the revolutionaries.250 Ijūin was not satisfied with the Cabinet decision. He maintained that his opinion, being that of the ‘man on the spot’, ought to be respected. Towards the end of October, seeing the revolutionaries were gaining strength, he tried to press his opinion on the government by sending telegrams on 27, 28, 30, 31 October and 2 November 1911. His urgent confidential cable of 28 October to Uchida reads: There is no denying the fact that the Chinese people no longer respect the Manchu dynasty. The dynasty has no dignity nor power to rule the nation…. It is not premature to state that the revolutionary forces in Wuchang have become consolidated…. Taking advantage of this situation, Japan ought to strive to create two independent nations in central and southern China, while keeping the present dynasty to rule north China…. This plan would establish the base for Japan’s future prosperity and now is the time to act towards this end…. In my belief, preservation of the Ch’ing (Manchu) dynasty in the north in order to play them off against the Chinese (Hans in the south) would be to our best advantage. For this purpose, I shall try my best to induce and guide some factions within the dynasty.251 Influenced by N.Kawashima,252 an extreme right-wing expansionist, Ijūin claimed that China should be partitioned into three independent nations.253 Ijūin became more outspoken and on 2 November, he went so far as to advise Uchida that ‘it is essential for Japan to check the Ch’ing Government by giving assistance to the revolutionaries in Wuchang and Canton’ in order ‘to prevent the revolutionaries’ loss of morale and to come to terms with the Ch’ing Government’. His idea was to set one against the other to prolong the disturbance in order to weaken China so as to make Japan’s expansion easier. On the same day, Uchida cabled Ijūin: It is necessary for us to cautiously observe the development of events, then to make our policy…. Needless to say, it is wise to consult at least with Britain beforehand…. Views held by ministers of foreign powers in Peking greatly influence their respective government’s decision. You have not yet reported to me about their views. So please sound them out fully and cable to me…. With regard to your request for us to despatch warships and military units…it is necessary to consult with the British Government…. Our Government has not yet come to make such decision, as the Chinese situation is not yet clear.254 Thus Uchida refused to accept Ijūin’s extreme advice, and, instead, instructed him to communicate with the ministers of the other powers in Peking, in particular with the British Minister. Japan after all adhered to the policy of acting in concert with the other powers. Morrison observed that there existed ‘immense suspicion’ in some quarters that Japan might be ceded territory in return for protecting the Manchu dynasty. Although he was suspicious of Japan, he thought that it would not take such an ‘absurd’ action. He wrote

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to Braham: ‘that they would identify themselves with the failing minority and incur the hostility of the immense mass of the Chinese people, is not to be thought of’.255 Braham agreed, and wrote that ‘It would be madness for the Japanese to intervene, and I do not believe they will.’256 However, Braham, who had been quite suspicious of Ijūin since the early stage of the outbreak, cautioned Morrison to keep his ‘eye on Ijūin and Co’. Braham thought that if Katsura and Komura who led the Russo-Japanese War were in office, he should be ‘really anxious’, but now that Saionji and Uchida were in charge he was less worried about Japan’s general attitude.257 Of course, Morrison and Braham did not know everything about the decision-making process of the Japanese Government. If they had learnt about Ijūin’s recommendation of a partition of China into three independent nations, they would have been shocked and infuriated.

Morrison’s involvement in the downfall of the Ch’ing dynasty With the outbreak of the revolution, all loans to China were suspended. It was because the powers had decided to take a stance of strict neutrality and non-intervention towards the revolution. Accordingly, the implementation of the Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan Agreement of £10 million sterling258 and the Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement of £6 million sterling, which had been concluded on 15 April and 20 May 1911 respectively between the Ch’ing Government and the Quadruple Consortium, were also suspended.259 Because of the nationwide spread of the revolution, the revenue from local governments going to the central Ch’ing Government lapsed. Within a week, the Ch’ing Government faced a severe financial crisis.260 Furthermore, the Wuchang outbreak caused financial chaos in several cities, as Morrison reported: A disturbing feature is the currency chaos which must inevitably follow the destruction of the treasury The main currency of the immensely populous three cities…is Hupeh Government dollar notes, which have been issued in unknown millions. A financial crisis is, therefore believed to be inevitable.261 In Peking, there was a heavy run on the Ta Ch’ing Government Bank and the Bank of Communications. The revolutionaries issued military currency in Kuangtung, however, making the banknotes of these two banks worthless.262 In Shanghai, depositors caused a run on the local commercial banks, but foreign banks appeared to be surviving the run because of their enormous reserve funds.263 In this situation, various ministries of the Ch’ing Government appealed for foreign loans. Morrison informed Braham that the War Office had appealed to the Quadruple Consortium for a loan.264 The Shanghai correspondent of The Times wrote: ‘There is a report that the soldiers in Hupeh had not been paid any wages for the last twelve months: if this report is correct, as is not improbable, it easily explains their joining the rebels.’265 On 18 October the Minister of Posts and Communications appealed to the Consortium for a loan of half a million taels.266 On 19 October, the Minister increased the request to 2 million taels. Morrison

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reported that because of the serious financial crisis the Treasury was ordered not to expend any money except for military purposes and the repayment of foreign loans.267 On 19 October, the Ministry of Finance asked the Consortium for a loan of 10 million taels for one year, with interest of 8 per cent or more per annum.268 Morrison made it his business to keep a watchful eye on the loan position, declaring that ‘Here in Peking my work as correspondent chiefly consists in ascertaining the extent of loan developments’.269 The correspondence between Morrison and C.S.Addis, Manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in London, is interesting, for it reveals Morrison’s efforts to make himself familiar with the loan situation. Addis was influential in British economic circles. In November 1911, Morrison asked Addis to send him a copy of The Chinese Government Loan Diary of Payments Due in Europe for Interest and Redemption. He indicated that it was important for him to possess such a document so that The Times could supply its readers with correct information. He wrote: We are passing through an anxious time in China. Many misleading reports are being sent to Europe by irresponsible correspondents…. You have been in Peking yourself and you know how difficult it is to learn the truth, when it is to the interest of so many people to receive it.270 Morrison’s effort was rewarded, for he received the latest edition of the China Loans Diary from Addis two weeks later.271 Morrison left no stone unturned in his attempt to gain a better understanding of the ever-changing Chinese situation in every field, and Chinese commerce and finance were no exceptions. For this purpose he needed the help of an expert. Since his arrival at Peking in 1897, he had gradually built up an information network throughout China. One of his contacts was P.H.King, Statistics Secretary of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs in Shanghai. Morrison’s zeal for obtaining information is reflected in his diary: ‘I wrote to Paul H.King, begging him to come to assistance and write an article on the Commerce and Finance of China during 1911. I hope he will.’272 King’s reply was equally enthusiastic: ‘Willing’ I am [sic] willing, but fear that in view of present happenings anything about trade and finance in China in 1911 if written a day before the 31 Dec. [sic] may be stultified almost before the ink it’s written in is dry. However, I shall do my best…and also [try] to live up to the reputation you are kind enough to assume for me.273 King wrote that Morrison was an ‘astute observer of things Chinese’,274 and that Morrison ‘retained his interest in the under-dog in the Customs Service, Indoor and Outdoor, until the very last’.275 By constant effort, Morrison became well acquainted with the financial situation in China. Peking’s financial straits were extreme. In a panic, Manchu nobles and high-ranking officials such as the Regent, Prince Ch’ing and Na-tung withdrew large sums of money from the Ta Ch’ing Government Bank. For example, Prince Ch’ing withdrew 250,000 taels.276 As a result, the Bank faced a crisis, and Casenave, the Peking representative of the Banque de l’Indo-Chine, came to its rescue. On his own volition, Casenave lent the

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bank 1 million taels, ignoring Morrison’s warning that he would strongly oppose it in The Times.277 No wonder Mrs Straight, Casenave’s friend, described him as ‘the redoubtable Dr. Morrison’.278 J.W.N.Munthe279 informed Morrison immediately of Casenave’s action. It was directly against Morrison’s declared opinion that no money ought to be lent to the Ch’ing Government, although Morrison understood that ‘the bankers would desire to assist in the prevention of financial chaos and anarchy’.280 Morrison noted in his diary: 23 October 1911, Monday: Was it true that the French Bank is prepared to lend money to the Manchus without conditions when the British and American Banks had refused to do so. Had he lent 500,000? It was absolutely false. He had lent one million. Why? Because he felt that his action in leaving half a million at the [indecipherable] had contributed to the crisis. Therefore he came to their assistance.281 Morrison disclosed Casenave’s action in The Times: ‘the Banque de l’Indo-Chine gave assistance to the Taching [sic] Government Bank by advancing one million taels repayable in six months with 7 percent interest’.282 Morrison’s diary shows its outcome: 27 October 1911, Friday: While at dinner Casenave came in greatly excited. He had a telegram from his directors ‘Is it true as stated in The Times you lent Ta Ch’ing Int. [sic] Bank one million taels?’ and it is true. He had not informed them except by letter. He wanted me to send a reassuring message. Since he gave that money there had been no bankruptcies in Peking…. His action had calmed the panic.283 In spite of this incident, Morrison and Casenave seem to have remained on good terms. Casenave’s action might have calmed the financial panic but this was short lived. On 25 October, when A.Hosie, British Commercial Attaché in Peking, asked Morrison if it would be safe to make a loan to China, Morrison ‘argued strongly and strenuously against the fatuity of such a procedure’.284 Morrison had no wish to help the Manchu Government from its dire financial position, as will be discussed shortly. It is important to understand why Morrison could exert such influence on those concerned with the loan operation, such as Jordan, Hillier, Straight, Casenave and Cordes. His relationship with Jordan was special in that Jordan owed his post in Peking to Morrison. Morrison’s relations with Hillier and Cordes have been explained. Morrison had become associated with Casenave in 1902 when the latter went to Peking as Chargé d’Affaires in the French Legation. Morrison and Straight had co-operated in their attempt to challenge Japan’s veto on the Fakumen Railway project, as has been discussed. Morrison closely observed the people involved, while a vast amount of diplomatic and commercial correspondence regarding China’s appeal for fresh loans was hastily exchanged, criss-crossing amongst the four powers’ ministers, four representatives of the Consortium in Peking, the four governments and the four banks’ head offices concerned. In this matter, as in many others, Britain played a leading role. In Peking, the ministers of the United States, Germany and France were willing to lend, whereas Jordan was reluctant to do so. Jordan wanted to wait until the situation became clearer. His objection to a loan was due to his fear that if the powers helped the Manchus, it would invite the

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revolutionaries’ wrath and endanger British lives and property in the Yangtse region, which had been in the revolutionaries’ hands.285 He told these ministers that he was doubtful as to ‘the wisdom of such a policy’ and suggested that this loan and any other new loans in the future should not be made without referring to their respective governments, to which the three ministers agreed.286 As for Morrison, he firmly opposed any financial help to the Manchus for two reasons. One was the same as that of Jordan, as J.G.Reid points out: ‘British leaders, like Jordan and the London Times’ [sic] correspondent, Morrison, were in no hurry to endanger British interests in rebel territory and preferred awaiting a solution of the political debacle’.287 Morrison’s other reason was that he wanted to see the fall of the Manchu dynasty He noted: ‘this revolution is a national protest against misrule’.288 He regarded the dynasty as the root cause of the people’s sufferings and believed that without this money, the Manchu Government would fall into the most disastrous situation.289 Croly maintains that ‘Dr. Morrison and Sir John Jordan…both welcomed the fall of the dynasty in the interest of the welfare of China’.290 The representatives of the Consortium faced a difficulty, as loans in such a crisis would entail not only financial but also serious political consequences. The extremely close interrelation between finance and diplomacy was a special characteristic of the powers’ dealings with China. The four banks, which had secured the exclusive backing of their governments, acted almost like government agents.291 The representatives had a series of heated arguments. Straight and Casenave were willing to lend, Cordes was not, and Hillier was uncertain.292 Straight and Casenave believed that ‘the Manchu dynasty was in no way lost’ provided that it entrusted power to a strong statesman like Yuan Shih-kai. At this early stage of the revolution, Straight and Casenave, like most Western observers in China, appear to have underestimated the revolutionaries’ relative strength.293 Morrison, giving Jordan ‘some moral support’,294 encouraged him to convince the other ministers not to lend. Jordan made a strenuous effort, stating to the ministers that he was uncertain of the sincerity of the Ch’ing Government which ‘might easily concede “full powers” on paper and in practice nullify them’. Jordan tried to induce the German minister to support him. His idea was that since the ministers of the United States and France were willing to make loans, if the German minister, who seemed to be neutral, could be invited to join with the British, then Britain might be able to avoid isolation.295 On 24 October 1911, however, a decision was made by the representatives of the Consortium in Peking that China’s appeal should be considered ‘if Yuan Shi-Kai [sic] returns with full powers’296 and it was reported to Addis in London. The first consideration of the Consortium was naturally to make money by lending money Being alarmed by this decision, Morrison tried to thwart it. He immediately cabled The Times strongly suggesting that the powers should not make loans to the Ch’ing Government. He disclosed the decision of the representatives and commented: Such a loan would not be commercial, for assuredly no British shareholders would consent to such a gamble but admittedly would be political, the four Governments concerned being involved. Obviously such a risky transaction requires to be considered with extreme caution.297

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Needless to say, on the same day Yamaza in London transmitted the substance of Morrison’s article to Uchida.298 Grey had already formulated a proposal and had been consulting the three loan powers, stating that ‘no hasty decision should be taken by the Powers’ and that: ‘no loan ought to be made unless safeguarded by certain conditions’.299 Grey had not been firm enough up to this stage. However, on the day following Morrison’s article of 25 October, Grey categorically decided that Britain ‘would certainly not lend money or guarantee a loan’ to the Manchu Government.300 Therefore it is highly likely that Morrison did influence Grey’s decision-making. Hillier, following Grey, expressed his opinion a few days later that ‘further loans were undesirable at present’.301 The responses of the three governments to Grey’s proposal were favourable. Berlin ‘particularly desire[d] to work in unison with His Majesty’s Government’.302 Paris, which had previously urged that loans be granted to Peking, now agreed not to lend.303 Jordan worried that Washington would prefer to lend, because Straight wanted to bolster the Ch’ing Government by giving loans in order to save ‘the currency loan on which his reputation depends’.304 In fact, Straight believed it essential to make loans to prevent China from breaking up.305 Washington, however, agreed with Grey, attaching the condition that ‘should a new situation arise, his [Knox’s] present attitude may not apply to altered conditions’.306 Thus the three powers’ governments responded favourably to Grey’s proposal, agreeing not to lend. Of course, Morrison did not want Japan to make loans to the Ch’ing Government. He had observed that every foreign bank was ‘being individually approached by various [Chinese] ministries for loans of varying amounts required urgently’.307 He tried to forestall such a possibility in Japan’s case. On 24 October, he visited Y.Matsuoka, Counsellor in the Japanese Legation in Peking, to convey a message stressing the point that no loan should be made.308 In fact, Japan was considering loans to the Ch’ing Government. Sheng Hsuanhuai, Minister of Posts and Communications, requested a loan of 6 million yen from the Yokohama Specie Bank, which was acting like the Japanese Government’s agent. The loan was for the Han-Yeh-Ping Company of which Sheng Hsuan-huai was president.309 Shortly after his request to Japan, Sheng was impeached and expelled from his office by the National Assembly for his alleged misconduct in foreign loan matters. Consequently, Japan’s loan negotiations with Sheng were halted. Apart from Sheng, the Viceroy of Manchuria asked the Yokohama Specie Bank for a loan of a half million yen on 25 October but the bank refused after a close examination of the situation.310 Morrison must have been pleased to hear from P.H.Patchin, correspondent for the China Press, that ‘the Japanese Legation had given him the fullest most explicit [sic] assurance that Japan would lend no money to China at present’.311 Morrison became aware that the Ch’ing Government had also asked Russia for loans. I.I.Korostovetz, Russian Minister in Peking, told Morrison that The Chinese have…appealed to his Bank for financial assistance, which has not been given’.312 Shortly after, however, The Times reported under ‘Peking, Nov. 7*’: ‘The Russians have concluded with the Viceroy of Manchuria what is nominally a loan, but is in reality an advance of 5,000,000 roubles (500,000 pounds) against the Chinese shares in the RussoAsiatic Bank, which amount to 6,000,000 taels.’313 The content of this article was not correct. Furthermore, it was not Morrison’s article although it was despatched from Peking. The asterisk ‘*’ attached to the date meant that it was a Reuters telegram.

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However, because the asterisk was difficult to recognize, both the Russians and the Chinese thought by mistake that it was written by Morrison. Consequently, they blamed Morrison and demanded that he correct the statement in the article. Morrison had to explain that it was not his article. Furthermore, he rejected the authenticity of the telegram, stating that The whole story has very little foundation. No such negotiations were ever concluded. No such advance was ever made’, and he had to explain in detail the exact financial situation of the Russo-Asiatic Bank.314 Russia did not make any loan to the Viceroy of Manchuria. Thus, all the nations involved came to an accord that no loan was to be made to the Ch’ing Government, and that they would wait and see how the situation developed. This important decision, which had a direct bearing on the fate of the dynasty, was reached following Grey’s proposal. The fact that Morrison and Jordan were in full accord not to make loans is evident in Morrison’s report to Braham: ‘Sir John…was not in any doubt at all that the loan ought not to be granted, and I of course very heartily agree with him’.315 Bland, however, observed that Morrison not only agreed with Jordan but had a part in convincing Jordan to take the position he did. Bland wrote: There is reason to believe that, at this juncture, as indeed throughout the revolutionary crisis, his [Jordan’s] attitude and actions were considerably affected by those of The Times correspondent.’316 Throughout this crisis, Jordan’s worries seem to have known no bounds. Morrison often thought that Jordan was ‘nervous, distraught, and worried to death’,317 and gave him ‘some moral support’.318 Morrison was deeply involved in the loan matters. As Reid aptly stated that ‘Peking required an immediate loan to pay its troops and thus to “survive” the crises’,319 the survival of the dynasty depended heavily on the availability of foreign loans. If Morrison had not opposed making loans with such vehemence, Jordan might not have had the courage to stand out against the other powers’ ministers in Peking. Loans would have made it possible for the Ch’ing dynasty to survive a little longer. Morrison, by influencing Jordan, and in turn Grey, not to lend money to the Ch’ing dynasty played a part in precipitating its downfall.

3 MORRISON AND YUAN SHIH-KAI Morrison, Yuan Shih-kai and the Ch’ing dynasty The Wuchang uprising set off a chain of revolts in the cities and provinces south of the Yangtse valley. By the end of October 1911, some two-thirds of the whole of China had passed over to the revolutionaries and declared independence. Confronted with this danger, the dynasty took two measures. Firstly, on 22 October, it hastily reconvened the National Assembly which had been adjourned since the spring of 1911. Secondly, it tried to recall Yuan Shih-kai1 to office.2 When Morrison heard on 14 October 1911 that an edict had appeared appointing Yuan Shih-kai Viceroy of Hukuang province and ordering him to proceed at once to Hankow to suppress the rebels in order to ‘save the Empire’, he thought that the ‘Throne must be in extremity to appoint Yuan Shih-kai’.3 Yuan’s appointment was a ‘dramatic incident’, because he was the very man whom the Regent had ‘unceremoniously dismissed’ less than three years before in January 1909, immediately after the death of the EmpressDowager Tz’u-hsi, Yuan’s protector. The pretext for his dismissal was his ‘foot affection [sic]’. Yuan had to ‘flee for his life’ to Hsing-cheng, his birthplace in Honan province.4 Morrison commented ironically: It is impossible to believe that Yuan Shih-kai will recover his health in time to join the Government unless he is given full powers to make terms with the revolutionaries. His attitude adds another to the serious difficulties of the Throne.5 Yuan Shih-kai politely declined the appointment on account of his ‘foot affection’.6 As Morrison pointed out, Yuan ironically employed the very words which the imperial edict used to dismiss him in 1909. Dillon cynically referred to the edict as a ‘rheumatic edict’.7 Yuan wanted to secure a free hand to control the Ch’ing Government which had humiliated him. In fact, Yuan’s first son, Yuan Ke-ting, informed Jordan that ‘unless direct command of the troops were given him’, Yuan would not proceed to Hankow.8 The Manchu dynasty, which had come ‘face to face with the gravest crisis in its history’, had to ‘persuade Yuan Shih-kai to save the country’,9 because Yuan possessed two powerful weapons. One was his influence over the Peiyang (Northern) Army and the other was his popularity amongst foreigners—a prerequisite for obtaining foreign loans. Thanks to several incidents in his career, Yuan had won the loyalty of the Chinese Army. After serving with the Chinese Army in Korea for 10 years, in July 1895 after the SinoJapanese War, Yuan was entrusted with the organization of an army corps at Tientsin where he established a strong military base. With the help of the Japanese Colonel N.Aoki, Yuan converted his old-fashioned troops into a modern army which was made

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up of six divisions of about 10,000 men each.10 Yuan had formed and trained it with strict discipline and the adoption of modern weaponry. The Northern Army came to be known as a corps d’élite and pledged loyalty personally to Yuan. As Morrison asserted, it was Yuan who had created China’s modern army.11 Yuan also became very popular amongst foreigners during the Boxer incident of 1900. Yuan, Viceroy of Shang-tung province, drove the Boxers northward to Chihli province, thereby maintaining order in his province. This earned him the trust and popularity with foreigners.12 Morrison praised Yuan’s wisdom and courage in these terms: [Yuan] took with him his foreign drilled troops, and attacked them [the Boxers] fearlessly…he warned the Government that they would prove a serious danger to the Empire if not promptly checked…. He disobeyed the murderous edicts issued from Peking, ordering him to exterminate the foreigners. His services at this terrible time can never be forgotten, for he maintained order and saved the lives of every foreigner in the province when the adjoining Metropolitan province was in flames.13 Jerome Ch’en, however, comments that Yuan shrewdly chased the Boxers away from his Shantung province, thus saving himself a lot of trouble, and that Yuan tried to be on friendly terms with foreigners because he saw that the downfall of Li Hung-chang, his predecessor, had been caused by his opposition to the foreign powers. Yuan was well aware of China’s dependency on foreign loans.14 Morrison promoted Yuan in the eyes of the powers, whose support, financial or otherwise, was essential for a ruler of China. Morrison’s praise for Yuan in The Times was often politically motivated. For example, Morrison claimed that Yuan’s work during the Boxer uprising in protecting foreigners saved the Empire from falling into chaos.15 Yuan’s work, however, had another aspect. In suppressing the Boxers, he ‘had had forty thousand [sic] Boxers put to death’, according to the Russian Minister in Peking.16 Morrison, who had an excellent information-gathering network throughout China, must have known about Yuan’s massacre of the Boxers, but he did not touch upon this subject. On the contrary, he emphasized that Yuan had been accused of being too lenient. After the Hsinhai Revolution in 1912, he wrote: ‘Previously the chief fault alleged against him [Yuan] has been that he is too forbearing, too conciliatory; that he has acted too much on the belief that there is no sure foundation set in blood.’17 Dillon commented that what Morrison called Yuan’s ‘leniency’ was in fact his ‘ruthlessness’.18 For many years, Morrison had been pleased to observe that ‘Yuan Shih-kai is in closer touch with us [the British]…. We are being consulted and referred to in a way that never was before the outbreak [of the Boxer uprising]’.19 Morrison described Yuan as ‘the statesman in whom foreigners had the highest confidence, and who stood in the sight of the Foreign Representatives for order, stability, and progress’.20 Morrison asserted that, because Yuan carried out various progressive reform programmes during 1901–7, under his viceroyalty the metropolitan province became the most advanced in China.21 Among Yuan’s several reform programmes, the most significant was the modernization of the army, which he kept under his control.22 However, Yuan’s increasing prestige ‘excited the jealousy of his enemies at Court’.23 Consequently the Manchu Government, in an attempt to deprive him of his military

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influence, recalled him to Peking in August 1907, making him foreign minister and a grand councillor. Morrison acclaimed Yuan’s performance in his new position stating that since Yuan became the foreign minister, the powers came to respect China for the first time ever,24 a view shared by Jordan who thought that Yuan as foreign minister greatly improved China’s diplomacy.25 Yuan in his new post continued to be the Empress-Dowager’s favourite. Morrison’s report on the occasion of Yuan’s birthday in 1908 reads: During the week Peking has been celebrating the 50th birthday of Yuan Shih-kai…. During three days the street leading to his official residence has been lined with troops…. A more remarkable manifestation of honour of Imperial favour and of popular esteem has never before been seen in China.26 The way in which Morrison reported the occasion seems to show his satisfaction with Yuan’s position. The deaths in November 1908 of the Empress-Dowager and Emperor Kuang-hsu, however, changed the political situation within the dynasty. The Emperor’s younger brother Ts’ai-feng (I-huan) took up the regency for Emperor Hsuan-tung (later P’u-yi), his 3-year-old son. Morrison reported: ‘Since her death the Government, in the hands of the Regent and the Manchu cabal, is losing the element of solidity and the Palace is becoming a hotbed of party faction and intrigue.’27 The Regent took revenge for Yuan’s ‘betrayal’ in the One Hundred Days’ Reform incident of 1898 and dismissed him from office when the Empress-Dowager died. The Reform Movement was led by respected Confucian scholars like K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chai and supported by the Emperor Kuanghsu. The movement tried to change the existing political system so quickly, however, that it alarmed the conservatives around the Empress-Dowager, who had already resigned from the regency and retired to the Summer Palace in 1889. The reformers planned a coup d’état and the Emperor’s order was given to Yuan Shih-kai to carry it out. It is said that Yuan informed the EmpressDowager of this plan, who forestalled the coup, resumed the regency and richly rewarded Yuan Shih-kai.28 In November 1898 when the Reform Movement started, Morrison and other Westerners regarded it as ‘a power game’ between the reformers supported by Emperor Kuang-hsu and the conservatives centring on the Empress-Dowager. They could not see that the movement was ‘an awakening process of the Chinese nation’.29 Now that the Empress-Dowager was dead, the Regent preferred to have Yuan put to death. Ch’en claims that, in the reform incident, in which Yuan was branded traitor to the Emperor, Yuan had displayed two characteristics-duplicity and realism.30 Yuan was realistic in siding with the conservatives, who were far stronger than the reformers.31 His dismissal created a furore amongst the Chinese and foreigners. In particular, it was a blow to Morrison. He wrote: the precarious tenure of office under Oriental autocracy is well exemplified in the downfall of Yuan Shih-kai. No man in China deserved better of his country. He has been in the forefront of progress, and is the best administrator China has produced in this generation.32

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Morrison kept reporting on Yuan’s ‘contemptuous’ dismissal in his articles on 5, 6, 8 and 17 January 1909.33 The foreign ministers in Peking suspected that Yuan’s dismissal would be a means for China to reverse the policy which Yuan had successfully established and which had inspired the foreign powers’ hopes for China’s stability.34 Jordan and Rockhill joined forces to exert diplomatic pressure on the Regent to save Yuan’s life, demanding and obtaining an assurance for his safe conduct to his home in Honan.35 Morrison blamed Japan for the powers’ failure to save Yuan from dismissal, and wrote in The Times: ‘It is known here that both Japan and Russia opposed the making of representations, especially Japan, who cannot but view with contentment the removal of the most formidable opponent of her Manchurian policy.’36 Japan adopted a policy of non-intervention, stating that the retirement of a single politician would not affect SinoJapanese relations.37 Consequently, many thought that Japan was pleased with Yuan’s downfall.38 Westerners were concerned about Yuan’s dismissal. A.Smith, a Scottish missionary, had held that the dismissal would bring about ‘a collapse of China’.39 In spite of Yuan’s down-fall, Morrison continued to praise him. Some eight months before the Wuchang outbreak, Morrison described Yuan as ‘the most able and far-seeing of modern Chinese statesmen’.40 Given the deplorable state of the Ch’ing Government, Morrison believed that Yuan would return to power before too long,41 and in May 1911, he predicted: His return to power cannot…be much longer delayed. I venture to predict that he will be made Minister of War in place of Yin Chang, and that he will then be promoted to a seat as Vice-Minister-President of the Cabinet.42 Many foreigners supported Yuan even after he had been deprived of all offices. For instance, Grey believed that under Yuan Shih-kai ‘China was progressing until the Manchu dynasty dismissed him’.43 S.Sazanoff, Russian Foreign Minister, who worried about lack of leadership in China, wanted Yuan to return to office.44 Bowra observed that the total collapse of the Manchu regime was evident after Yuan was ousted.45 Commenting on Yuan’s leadership, Weale described him as a man of iron will and inflexibility and likened him to Bismarck of Germany and Palmerston and Kitchener of Britain.46 Many mandarins in Peking and in the provinces also believed that only Yuan could save the Empire from collapse.47 Prince Ch’ing 48 advised the Throne that Yuan Shih-kai should succeed him as premier.49 Thus, many wanted Yuan’s reinstatement. Yuan declined the appointment of viceroy of Hukuang, because his ambition was much greater. He wanted to take the leadership in settling this national crisis, which might otherwise divide China into two parts, a monarchical north and a republican south. Yuan regarded himself as indispensable for the great task of preserving national unity. All he had to do was to wait until he could obtain a free hand to control the dynasty and the Ch’ing Government.50 And indeed, on 27 October 1911, the Emperor appointed him Imperial High Commissioner, placing all the troops under his control.51 Jordan welcomed the appointment believing that ‘No man could be better fitted to play the role of mediator between the Chinese people…and the Manchu dynasty’,52 and that ‘Yuan’s practical common sense’ would bring about ‘much prospect of success’.53 Yuan’s power was

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increasing. N.Aoki, Japanese Military Attaché, who was ‘the best informed of the Japanese’54 in China, told Morrison: This revolution is the end of the dynasty…every hour the power of Yuan Shih-kai is increasing. He will have dictatorial powers…. He is the only hope of the Throne, the one man whose prestige in China and whose good name abroad can be looked to in the hope of restoring order from the present chaos.55 In spite of his increasing influence, Yuan’s position was still precarious. Morrison was worried, observing that: ‘He is distrusted by the revolutionaries, who believe him to be the mainstay of the dynasty, and distrusted by the Manchus who believe him to be conspiring for their downfall.’56 Yuan was placed between the Manchus and the revolutionaries. His rise to power was still fraught with danger. On 28 October 1911, Morrison attended the first session of the National Assembly as observer, together with the American journalists, P.H.Patchin and J.K.Ohl. The National Assembly demanded three conditions of the Throne: firstly, that a capable and virtuous person be appointed to organize a responsible cabinet, from which nobles would be excluded; secondly, an amnesty be proclaimed for all political offenders; and thirdly, a constitution be drafted only after consultation with the National Assembly.57 Morrison welcomed the conditions, because they virtually meant a surrender of the dynasty’s traditional absolute powers: The Tsu-Cheng Yuan [the National Assembly] demands that no Princes shall be given high office in the Government—this will be a blow to the Manchu princes—Tsai-hsun, Tsai-tao, P’u- lun, Tsai-tse and Prince Su not to mention the chief…of all Prince Ching [sic]. The princes must go. Good riddance will be the verdict.58 The dynasty was reluctant to accept the demands. On 29 October 1911, the Imperial Northern Army mutinied, pressing the dynasty to accept the National Assembly’s three demands. Chang Shao-tseng, in command of the 20th Division stationed at Lanchow, which was about to depart south to suppress the revolutionaries, announced his intention to attack Peking instead, unless the Throne assented to the three demands.59 Morrison suspected that the National Assembly had instigated Chang Shao-tseng’s mutiny,60 while Jordan thought that Yuan Shih-kai might be the mastermind. Jordan had reason to believe so, because Yuan K’e-ting, Yuan Shihkai’s first son, informed him on 2 November 1911 that Chang Shao-tseng had acted on his father’s orders. Accordingly Jordan reported to Grey that Chang and his officers were ‘under-stood to be acting with the approval, if not at the instigation of Yuan Shih-kai, who has been in close communication with them’.61 Later in January 1912, Morrison came to see the mutiny in the same light as Jordan, but he did not criticize Yuan for his disloyalty to the dynasty. Instead he vaguely reported to Braham: ‘We are living in an Oriental country, where all things are possible. I wonder how far Yuan Shih-kai was responsible for this action of the troops at Lanchow.’62 Morrison turned a blind eye to Yuan’s intrigue.

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The terrified dynasty succumbed to the demands of the National Assembly, issuing an edict on 30 October, which promised to respect the constitution and to carry out reforms based on the people’s will. The tone of the edict was very apologetic and included the following phrases: ‘Being a very small person standing at the head of our subjects…. We see that Our heritage is nearly falling to the ground…. We regret Our faults and repent greatly.’63 Morrison despised the edict as ‘a whining appeal by the Throne for the mercy of the people’ and commented that ‘the Throne is paralysed with fear’,64 and Jordan described the edict as ‘perhaps the most humiliating one which was ever issued by the Throne in China’.65 On 1 November the Throne appointed Yuan Shi-kai as premier. Morrison wrote in The Times: It is reasonable to hope that he will display statesmanship sufficient to effect a compromise with the forces of revolution…. His appointment …is bound to have a tranquillising effect, for Yuan Shih-kai enjoys the confidence of the military as well as of the National Assembly.66 Everything was moving in Yuan’s favour. On 2 November, the Throne approved a constitution of 19 articles which the National Assembly had formulated.67 Thus a constitutional monarchy with limited powers was created, in which the Emperor was assigned ‘much the same position as that enjoyed by the English king’.68 On 4 November, the Throne issued another edict of apology, reiterating its recent concessions, and including the following phrases: ‘Hereafter anything which the people may suggest, if it is in accordance with public opinion, we will openly adopt. Heaven owns the people and provides rulers for them. The people’s ears and eyes are Heaven’s ears and eyes.’69 The edict, however, failed to win the people’s sympathy. On the contrary, ‘the more the Throne takes the people into its confidence, the colder the response with which its overtures are met’, as Jordan correctly observed.70 In this predicament, the urgency of the dynasty’s dependence on Yuan Shihkai increased daily. Yuan, however, was not in any hurry He had his own agenda. On 5 November, he telegraphed the National Assembly stating that he would not accept the premiership until a formal resolution appointing him premier was passed in the National Assembly Morrison knew, however, that before sending this telegram Yuan had already decided to assume the post. This is clear from K’e-ting’s words of 3 November to Morrison that Yuan would return to Peking in two weeks.71 Morrison, however, explained in The Time the reason for Yuan’s refusal: In accordance with custom, Yuan Shih-kai presents to the Throne the stereotyped request to withdraw his appointment as Prime Minister on the ground of his unfitness and gives the Throne an opportunity to refuse to accept the request and to repeat its expressions of confidence in his loyalty and ability.72 Morrison presented a better picture of Yuan, showing that Yuan had respected traditional Chinese custom by paying due respect to the Throne. On 8 November, Yuan was elected prime minister by the National Assembly with 78 out of 87 votes.73 Yuan at last attained

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the position to control the dynasty and its government. Morrison reported: ‘Fortified by this mandate, Yuan Shih-kai will assuredly come to Peking, having already received repeated messages from Prince Ching [sic] and other high functionaries beseeching him to come to Peking and save China from disruption.’74 Morrison vigorously promoted Yuan as the saviour of the nation in the hope of ensuring Western support for him. Such praise probably influenced Grey to form an opinion of Yuan. Grey wrote: ‘We have conceived very friendly feelings and respect for him personally from his previous record.’75 As already mentioned, his praise for Yuan in The Times was often politically motivated. In fact, Morrison in public was not quite the same as Morrison in private. For instance, contradiction is found in his diary in which he noted that: ‘the appointment of Yuan as Imperial High Commissioner gave Yuan Shih-kai “dictatorship”’.76 Also in a confidential report to Braham, he disclosed his conviction that ‘if he lives he intends to be Dictator’.77 Morrison stated in The Times, however, that: ‘Those who attack Yuan Shihkai, alleging that he is aiming at a dictatorship, are ignoring the facts of his career.’78 Morrison invariably portrayed Yuan in a better light in an attempt to increase his popularity amongst foreigners: Some anxiety is felt by the British employees stationed at the Peking Syndicate mines in Honan…. [but] Yuan Shih-kai to-day assured Sir John Jordan…that the Government would take all steps within its power to protect life and property at the mines.79 The Prime Minister is making an energetic effort to relieve the 75 foreigners of various nationalities confined in Sianfu and to secure them a safe conduct to the railway.80 These articles read as if written by Yuan’s press secretary

Yuan Shih-kai’s scheme In order to rise to power, taking advantage of the revolution, Yuan Shih-kai had to contend with five major players. They were the Imperial Northern Army, the Manchu dynasty and the revolutionaries as well as Britain and Japan. Yuan saw himself holding the pivotal position amongst them, any of whom could become competitor, enemy or friend, depending on the constantly changing situation. Morrison thought that the Imperial Northern Army would ‘favour’ Yuan and that Yuan ‘must be sure of the loyalty of the troops’.81 Jordan was also certain that Yuan’s ‘name will carry great weight with the troops, especially with the sixth division, which still treasures his portrait, and his loyalty [to troops] is not in question’.82 Morrison and Jordan were, however, too optimistic. Yuan himself was not so sure about the troops’ loyalty to him since his three years’ retirement. He, therefore, wanted to secure for himself their absolute loyalty An occasion arrived for him to do so when Chang Shaotseng, a supporter of Yuan Shih-kai, mutinied at Lanchow. The panic-stricken dynasty had sent Wu Lu-chen, Commander of the 6th Division of the Northern Army, whom Morrison regarded as ‘perhaps the ablest of them all’,83 to dissuade Chang from taking mutinous action. Wu was, however, the wrong choice because Wu and Chang were

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friends. They were both natives of Hupeh and had studied together in Japan. Wu defected in secret and made an arrangement to take joint action with Chang to take Peking. Wu was subsequently assassinated on 7 November 1911.84 Morrison reported that ‘General Wu Lu-chen…has been assassinated by Manchu soldiers of the 1st Division for associating himself with mutinous soldiers who had murdered Manchus at Taiyuanfu’.85 Thus Morrison suggested that this assassination had been a manifestation of racial hatred between the Manchus and the Chinese. It was not known, however, who was responsible. A few days later, Morrison heard from N.Aoki that Yin-chang, Minister of War, had been responsible for the assassination,86 while J.W.N.Munthe, a Norwegian in the service of Yuan Shih-kai, confided to Morrison that Wu had gone to the railway station at ShihChia-chuang to intercept the return of Yuan Shih-kai, and that he was murdered for his treachery by soldiers of the 6th Division who were loyal to Yuan.87 Thus Munthe hinted to Morrison that Yuan was responsible. In fact, one historian, T’ang Leang-li, claims that Yuan eliminated Wu Lu-chen by sending two assassins to Wu and made Chang Shaotseng ‘harmless’ by promoting him to a higher rank.88 Chang was promoted Councillor to President Yuan Shih-kai in April 1912, Military Governor in Suiyuan province in October 1912 and then Deputy Military Commissioner and Assistant-Resident at Kiakhta in 1915.89 In this way, Yuan successfully secured control of the Northern Army Whilst setting his house in order, Yuan commenced dealings with the revolutionary leaders, combining a show of military force with diplomatic negotiations. On 27 October 1911, Yuan ordered the Northern Army to attack Hankow,90 while sending his negotiator Liu Ch’eng-en to Li Yuan-hung, the revolutionary leader. Liu had known Li personally as they both were natives of Hupeh. On 29 October, Liu proposed Yuan’s terms of settlement to Li—amnesty, constitutional monarchy and the revolutionaries’ participation in the parliament as a political party. Li refused to negotiate.91 Thereupon the Northern Army recaptured Hankow within two days and set fire to it. Nevertheless the fighting capability of the Northern Army was limited, as Morrison reported: The orderly extension of the revolution is making an immense impression on the Chinese. Even if the Government troops gain a success in the approaching engagement near Hankow the retention of the revolt cannot be stayed, while a reverse will be disastrous.92 In fact, Yuan knew that he could not control the revolutionaries by military force alone. Therefore, he wanted to settle the matter by negotiation. Immediately after the recapture of Hankow, Yuan ordered Liu to reopen negotiations with Li. Morrison reported: Yuan Shih-kai…will begin parleying with the revolutionary leader in the hope of pacifying the rebels by compromise and discontinuing the work of suppression with bloodshed…. Yuan Shih-kai…will endeavour to effect reconciliation on the basis of a Constitutional Monarchy.93 On 8 November 1911, Li Yuan-hung, instead of accepting Yuan Shih-kai’s proposal, solicited Yuan’s support for the revolutionaries’ cause, offering him as a reward the republican presidency. Ironically, however, on the same day, the National Assembly in

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Peking notified Yuan that he had been elected premier of the new representative Manchu Government.94 Thus, Yuan was sought by both the Manchus and the revolutionaries. On 9 November 1911, he set out on a journey northwards to Peking. At the same time, he pushed ahead the negotiations with Li Yuan-hung through his emissary Liu Ch’eng-en, with the added support of Ts’ai T’ing-kan.95 Ts’ai had known Li personally, when Ts’ai was the commander of a torpedo boat in which Li served as a third engineer.96 On 11 November at Wuchang, Liu and Ts’ai conducted negotiations with Li and other revolutionary leaders. It was generally believed that the negotiations broke down because Yuan insisted on a constitutional monarchy while the revolutionaries were insistent on a republic.97 Jordan reported to Grey that ‘It was known on the third November that communications were passing between Yuan Shih-kai and the rebel leader, but that the latter showed no alacrity to respond to the overtures that had been made to him.’98 Morrison’s confidential report to Braham, however, revealed a somewhat different picture. He reported that a tacit understanding had been reached, whereby Yuan would eventually go over to the revolutionaries to become president of a republic, a subject which is examined later. Yuan Shih-kai’s objective was to become the ruler of China, which was under the strong influence of foreign powers headed by Britain. Therefore in order to achieve his aim, the powers’ co-operation and support were essential. Yuan tried to keep close ties with Jordan. As early as 15 October 1911, the day after the Throne had appointed Yuan Viceroy of Hukuang, Yuan ordered his 38-year-old son, Yuan K’e-ting, to go to Peking to do some groundwork for him.99 On 2 November, K’e-ting visited Jordan as Yuan’s messenger to tell him that his father’s wish was to ‘establish full constitutional government with retention of the Manchu dynasty’.100 On the following day, K’e-ting visited Morrison to tell him the same thing.101 Jordan feared that ‘the task Yuan had to grapple with was a stupendous one’ because the revolutionary movements were widespread and it seemed that ‘the rebels’ preferred to establish their own government rather than trust Manchu promises given under duress.102 Jordan confided his concerns to Morrison: ‘What hope with Yuan? With 100 Yuans, there would be no hope.’103 Jordan communicated his pessimistic view of the future of China to Grey Yuan’s appointment as premier would not be ‘a panacea for existing trouble’,104 and Yuan’s task ahead was enormous because in the provinces ‘Imperial authority has almost ceased to run’.105 Yuan’s position can be summarized as follows. At the beginning of the revolution, Yuan’s publicly espoused goal was retention of the reigning monarchy with himself as prime minister, and the establishment of a representative government in which the revolutionaries could participate as a political party Yuan proposed this to the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries, however, made a counter-proposal that if Yuan would arrange for the Manchu abdication, then he would be given the republican presidency as a reward. Yuan had been a monarchist throughout his career but his dismissal in January 1909 seems to have been the turning point in his life, after which his loyalty to the Throne played no part. His sole aim now was to fulfil his personal ambition of attaining supreme power irrespective of the form of government, in spite of the fact that he did not know what republicanism meant.106 Yuan would act, however, as a loyal monarchist until the right time came. In this early stage of the revolution, Morrison still regarded Yuan as a monarchist and was of the opinion that a constitutional monarchy might be the best form of government for China: ‘After all, the Manchu dynasty has had

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a uniting influence upon the provinces and people of China. It may be best to retain the dynasty, shearing it of all Manchu prerogatives, and giving it constitutional powers only’107 Morrison’s view then was that there would be an intermediate stage between a monarchy and a republic.108 The atmosphere in Peking was tense, reflecting the upheavals which were now spreading all over the country Morrison observed that Peking was full of wild rumours,109 that the distrust between the Chinese and Manchus was increasing and that many were fleeing Peking or sending away their families fearing each other’s reprisals.110 Ch’en held that the ‘decadent’ Manchu regime became the target of racial hatred by the Chinese.111 Morrison reported: There is much suppressed excitement in Peking: the city is full of rumours; and the exodus is still continuing.’112 Peking was becoming such a dangerous place that Straight asked Morrison’s opinion about whether the legation guards should be strengthened so as to be ready if and when a massacre occurred in Peking. He also asked whether the powers should send notes to both the Manchus and the revolutionaries to warn them ‘that no massacre could be tolerated in Peking and that bloodshed here would mean foreign intervention’.113 Morrison did not have a clear-cut answer to these questions. On 13 November, Yuan Shih-kai returned to Peking in a special train escorted by 2,000 troops. They were Manchu troops plus a bodyguard of Honan soldiers, ‘wild looking halberdiers carrying long two handled swords’.114 Many Chinese officials and foreigners welcomed him at the station, but no Manchu princes were there. ‘Crowds of Chinese lined the route from the station to his residence—a striking contrast to the meagre gathering of intimate friends who witnessed his departure three years ago’, commented Morrison in The Times.115 F.McCormick, ‘a very anti-British’ American journalist according to Morrison, on the other hand, reported that The public is only impressed by the physical spectacle…. It stands in awe, more of this great man’s escort and the spectacle of his procession to the temple where he is to stay, than of the man himself.’116 This disparity in the reporting shows the differing political stances of the journalists. Morrison’s pro-Yuan stance is reflected in his reports.117 The tense Peking was calmed by Yuan’s arrival. Morrison noted that ‘Already the knowledge of his early arrival has had a tranquillizing effect’,118 and Jordan observed that ‘A reassuring effect…on the situation here [has been achieved] by the prospect of the arrival…of Yuan Shih-kai’.119 On his arrival Yuan was given extensive power by the Throne to command all troops in the region of Peking including the imperial guards. In Peking, Yuan Shih-kai took up residence at the Hsien Liang Ssu Temple, where Li Hung-chang had formerly lived. In this temple, G.D.Tenney, an American missionary, educationist and diplomat, waited for Yuan in order to hand him an important telegram addressed to the Regent.120 Tenney confided to Morrison121 that the telegram came from Shanghai on 11 November signed by Wu T’ing-fang, a revolutionary leader, and three others.122 The telegram demanded the abdication of the Emperor: If you will but wake up and change your attitude, and co-operate in republicanizing…treating the citizens with justice and consideration. … The citizens will, doubtless, be able to show you every courtesy in return, with due regard to ensuring your living in wealth, and honour as becomes

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the Imperial Household, the peace and safety of the Manchu clans being not excluded from our aim.123 Wu T’ing-fang cabled this message to the American Legation asking them to deliver it to the Regent. The Legation hesitated to carry out this embarrassing task, however, and decided to ask Yuan to do the job. Hence, Tenney handed the telegram to Yuan: ‘Yuan said it was nonsense, and put it away’.124 Yuan made Tenney understand that Yuan ‘would support no policy that had for its object the removal of the dynasty’.125 On the following day, however, Yuan did present the telegram to the Regent. This reveals the disparity between Yuan’s outwardly expressed view given to a Westerner and his real actions. Morrison, through his diary, was a recorder of history in the making. By mid-November 1911, Yuan had changed from a monarchist to a repub-lican. He was convinced that it would be impossible to keep the monarchy and decided to accept the revolutionaries’ offer of a republican presidency in return for his arranging the Manchu abdication. E.P.Young’s claim that Yuan must have been ‘converted’ from midNovember 1911 onward to become head of a new republic126 seems valid. Matsushima, a contemporary observer, also thought that the ‘conversion’ took place around the time of his arrival at Peking in mid-November.127 E.G.Hillier regarded Yuan as ‘an opportunist…always endeavours to be on the winning side…. he is not now going to commit himself to what he considers a lost cause’.128 In fact, as Morrison witnessed, many officials were changing over to the revolutionary side.129 Yuan, however, did not disclose that he had converted. Outwardly, he continued his stance of advocating a constitutional monarchy, because he thought that it was not yet the time to reveal his hand. Dorothy Straight rightly observed that ‘Yuan is ostensibly loyal to the Manchus; yet his sympathies are entirely with the rebels’.130 Yuan had reason to hide his ‘conversion’ because many influential foreigners thought that China was not yet suited to a republic. Morrison thought that democracy was premature for China and that a limited constitutional monarchy with Yuan as prime minister would be the best solution.131 Bland thought that Yuan ‘knew full well the hopelessness of the Republican dream…. If they should succeed in overthrowing the Dynasty, the result would be chaos.’132 H.G.W.Woodhead, a British journalist, observed that: Yuan Shih-kai favoured a limited monarchy…. Representative government…can never be put into practice in the empire until the masses have attained a standard of intelligence which will enable them to exercise some discrimination in the selection of their representatives.133 Woodhead held that ‘If a Chinese Republic be founded we fear that it will not be long before the nation at large shows an unmistakable preference for the old regime.’134 Because of this conviction, Woodhead endorsed Yuan’s announced intention of supporting the dynasty. McCormick thought that Yuan feared that a republic meant China’s dissolution.135 Such being the prevailing view of influential foreigners, Yuan had to secure assurances from the powers that they would not object to a republic, before he could safely declare his intention of assuming the republican presidency. To declare it prematurely would have destroyed his existing popularity and could be suicidal to his political ambition.

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Yuan Shih-kai started to work cautiously on Jordan. Firstly, on 2 November 1911 he sent K’e-ting to Jordan to sound out his view on the matter. Finding from K’e-ting that Jordan was still in support of the monarchy, Yuan tried to make Jordan believe that Yuan himself was a monarchist. On 14 November, Yuan again sent K’e-ting to Jordan to explain that, due to popular demand, the retention of the dynasty was no longer possible; that rebel leaders were urging Yuan to become republican president; and that T’ang Shao-yi and many of his followers were refusing to work under the Manchus. Jordan, however, did not agree that China should become a republic.136 He wrote in a private letter to Campbell that ‘I must say the prospect of a Chinese republic frightens me as likely to lead to endless friction and internal dissension’.137 On 15 November 1911, Yuan himself talked to Jordan. Yuan told Jordan that his policy was to retain the dynasty by winning over the revolutionaries by negotiation, or, if necessary, by force of arms. Yuan emphasized that ‘he and his forefathers…had owed much to the Throne…and he was resolved to support the formation of a constitutional monarchy’.138 On these grounds, Yuan asked for Britain’s financial support, explaining that the public treasury was empty with no revenue coming in and that the troops had to be paid.139 Since Yuan’s arrival in Peking, Yuan K’e-ting, T’ang Shao-yi, and the three republicans had visited Jordan trying to persuade him to change his support from monarchy to republic. Jordan correctly thought that they were all Yuan’s messengers and that K’e-ting’s visit was ‘a feeler’. Jordan became convinced that these men were now in favour of a republic with Yuan as president.140 Meanwhile, Ts’ai T’ing-kan arrived at Peking on 15 November, after having served as Yuan’s emissary to the revolutionary leaders in Wuchang.141 He reported to Yuan a full account of his talks with the revolutionary leaders and gave him Li’s letter for Yuan to hand to the Regent. The tone of Li’s letter was ‘vehement, bitter, contemptuous’ and it expressed in very strong terms that the Manchu dynasty should no longer hinder the land of China. The letter acclaimed Yuan and criticized the Throne for its maltreatment of him.142 Yuan clearly realized that retention of the dynasty was impossible and that it was imperative for him to influence Jordan to become a supporter of a republic. However, Yuan had already failed to do so, in spite of his sending various messengers to Jordan. For Yuan, Morrison was the last and most important hope. Yuan correctly observed that Morrison was the only man who could influence Jordan to change his mind. The correctness of Yuan’s observation is shown in the next section. In order to influence Jordan, Yuan first had to win Morrison’s support for a republic. Yuan started to work on Morrison. Yuan’s messenger to Morrison was Ts’ai T’ing-kan, Yuan’s devoted confidante, with whom Morrison had been friendly for many years.143 Ts’ai’s mission was to win over Morrison to Yuan’s cause. If successful, Morrison would become Yuan’s most powerful ally, because he would influence Jordan, who in turn would influence the British Foreign Office, which had power to influence Japan. On 16 November 1911, Ts’ai confided in Morrison the contents of his negotiations with the revolutionaries as follows. On 11 November, Ts’ai and Liu had visited the revolutionary leaders in Wuchang where they were treated with great respect by some 40 delegates from all the Yangtse provinces, which had already declared their independence.144 Li Yuan-hung had called these provincial delegates to Wuchang in order to form a revolutionary council, because so far the revolts which had taken place in

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several cities and provinces had been a series of spontaneous independent events which had lacked a well-planned unified revolutionary strategy.145 To those delegates, Ts’ai conveyed Yuan’s proposal that the best way to preserve the integrity of China was to retain the Manchu dynasty, under which the revolutionaries would be recognized as a political party. The delegates vehemently insisted that the Manchu dynasty must go. The delegates were so determined that Ts’ai and Liu were convinced that the revolutionaries would not accept any other form of government than a republic. The delegates spoke highly of Yuan and desired that he should come over to their side. The two emissaries were deeply impressed and assured them that ‘if it were not for their personal devotion to Yuan Shih-kai, they would join the revolutionaries’.146 Hearing all this, Morrison wondered ‘How can these three parties be reconciled—the Throne, Yuan and the Revolutionary Party?’ Morrison realized why Ts’ai and Liu could not persuade the revolutionaries. ‘Ts’ai T’ing-kan, while defending constitutional monarchy in theory, is as strongly anti-Manchu as the men with whom he was sent to parley’.147 Morrison received from Ts’ai a clear impression that the retention of the monarchy was impossible, that Ts’ai himself was opposed to its retention and that the Throne itself was beginning to realize the hopelessness of its position. Morrison and Ts’ai talked about the difficulty of Yuan’s position. Morrison’s understanding was that Yuan was trying to retain the dynasty and endeavouring to reconcile this view with the revolutionaries who were determined on a republic. Morrison asked: ‘How is it conceivable that he can reconcile two such divergent views? It is impossible. There can be no compromise. He cannot assist the dynasty to retain its power by force.’ Morrison concluded: ‘What better solution can there be than that the dynasty should abdicate? This would prevent all manner of difficulties.’ Furthermore, Morrison touched on the crucial point, asking ‘in that case will Yuan be appointed President?’ Ts’ai replied that ‘it was not certain’.148 At this point, Ts’ai flattered Morrison, saying that Yuan had spoken to him about Morrison and his services to China. Morrison became convinced that ‘the dynasty must go’ and said: Perhaps the foreign powers might be induced to intimate to the Manchu dynasty that they could expect no help from any foreign intervention, that they had better accept the proposals made to them and abdicate, and withdraw into honourable retirement.149 This must have been exactly what Yuan and Ts’ai wanted to hear from Morrison. It is to be noted here once again that, by his papers, Morrison helps posterity to understand a part of history which would otherwise not be known. Morrison decided to help Yuan become republican president. To Morrison it did not matter whether the form of the Chinese Government was a constitutional monarchy or a republic, as long as Yuan became the head. As seen already, Morrison regarded the uprising as a people’s protest against the corrupt and ineffective Manchu rule which he could not tolerate. Therefore, when he had realized Yuan’s delicate position, it took him no time to change his stance from a supporter of a constitutional monarchy to that of a republic. While he might seem naive by being so easily influenced, he had no intention of becoming Yuan’s agent or puppet. He had his own reasons to be Yuan’s ally. Morrison would help Yuan assume the presidency and, he hoped, it would in turn increase the

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British voice in Yuan’s new government, in order to check Japan’s ambitions. Thus, Morrison needed Yuan as much as Yuan needed Morrison. Ts’ai’s mission was successful. Morrison had further discussions with Ts’ai on 17 and 18 November,150 and Ts’ai arranged for Morrison to have direct talks with Yuan Shih-kai.

Relations between Morrison and J.N.Jordan As already shown, Morrison’s objective was to ensure British supremacy in China by maintaining the existing balance of power amongst the foreign powers in that nation. Because the other powers had been enthusiastically seeking to expand their interests since the days of the scramble for concessions in 1898, Morrison wanted the British minister in Peking to display qualities that he considered essential for the post—correct and prompt judgement of the prevailing situation, clear vision, strong will-power and diplomatic finesse to conduct business with the diplomats of the other powers and with Chinese officials.151 Morrison was afraid that Britain had not been properly represented by its ministers. His concern was that incompetent diplomats could damage the future of the Empire by wrongly advising the Foreign Office, as its decision-making was largely influenced by the information and views of its representatives on the spot. Wrong policies formulated by the Foreign Office would weaken the British position. When posted to Peking in the spring of 1897, Morrison formed a poor opinion of both the judgement and firmness of C.MacDonald,152 the Minister in Peking, although he became a friend on a personal level. Being critical of MacDonald’s lack of ‘discretion and secretiveness’, Morrison concluded that ‘Surely the F.O. now recognise their folly in selecting an ill-read, half-educated infantry major, without brains, memory or judgement.’153 Although Morrison’s view seems very severe, it does seem to have been correct in view of the fact that A.J.Balfour154 also thought that it was ‘very difficult to get a point into his [MacDonald’s] head’.155 Morrison also regarded E.M.Satow,156 MacDonald’s successor, as unfit for the post. He thought Satow lacked the realistic view of power politics, required for the representative of a nation like Britain.157 Satow was well versed in Far Eastern affairs as a scholar,158 but apparently was not a practical man. In fact, Chirol confided in Morrison that ‘from all I hear now he seems to be an exceedingly unpractical man—a scholar no doubt, but not a man of business’.159 Morrison’s complaint was that the Foreign Office had not selected a suitable man for such an important post as Minister in Peking. Bland also thought that Britain had sent incompetent ministers to China.160 Morrison’s choice for successor to Satow was J.N.Jordan, then Consul-General in Seoul. Two reasons for this choice can be considered. Firstly and more important to Morrison it could have been that he thought he could influence Jordan’s decision-making and in turn that of the British Foreign Office. It would be an exaggeration to assume that Morrison wanted to be the mastermind behind Jordan, but at least because of their friendship and prior co-operation he would be able to exert considerable influence over him. Further cases are shown as the study develops. Jordan was not a strong-minded man—certainly easier for Morrison to influence than most other men. In fact, Chirol confided in Satow that Jordan was ‘not so strong a man…. He is timid.’161 C.Hardinge,

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British Ambassador in St Petersburg, shared a similar view of Jordan.162 Another reason for Morrison’s choice of Jordan could have been that Morrison and Jordan got on well and could co-operate. Because they both were to involve themselves deeply in Chinese problems for a long time (1906 to 1920) it is interesting to learn how their relationship began and how Morrison secured for Jordan the post of British Minister in Peking. Their relationship began in early 1897 when Morrison arrived in Peking as The Times correspondent. Morrison visited Korea from time to time, believing that ‘It is important that Korea should be kept before the notice of the world, it will surely be the cause, if not the scene, of the next war [the Russo-Japanese War]’163 and on every visit he saw Jordan. They shared a mutual regard, helping each other by exchanging views and information. Jordan appreciated Morrison’s information very much. For example, with regard to the attitude France might take in the case of the outbreak of a Russo-Japanese war, Morrison let Jordan know on 17 January 1900 that A.J.Balfour believed that the influence of the Russo-French Alliance would not extend to the Far East. This view upset Jordan’s ‘preconceived opinions’ that, in the case of war, France would militarily take the side of Russia due to the Alliance. Jordan greatly appreciated Morrison’s information because it prevented him from making a fool of himself, by publicly expressing his own view. Jordan ‘was very pleased indeed’ with Morrison.164 Likewise, Morrison profited from Jordan’s knowledge. For example, Jordan gave Morrison strictly confidential information regarding the Masampo affair in Korea, which involved Korea, Japan and Russia. The Masampo affair was briefly as follows. The Russian Consul-General in Seoul coerced the Korean Foreign Minister into signing two secret agreements—by one, Korea granted Russia the lease of a site for a coaling station and a naval hospital and by the other, Korea promised not to grant any land on Kojedo Island to any foreign power. Morrison obtained this information from Jordan who had obtained it from G.Hayashi, Japanese ConsulGeneral in Seoul. Thanks to Jordan, Morrison was able to make an outstanding scoop in The Times of 25 May 1900 and became world famous.165 Because of this background, Morrison must have thought that they would be able to join forces to promote the affairs of the British Empire in China. In order to make Jordan the Minister in Peking, Morrison started to work on Chirol, because he knew that Chirol had a special connection with and influence over the decision-making of the Foreign Office.166 On 5 May 1905, when Satow was about to leave his post, Morrison wrote to Chirol: I have just returned from Korea…. I spent much of my time as I always do with Jordan…. He thinks as we all think that he deserves promotion. The post that ought to be given to him is Peking…. It is in every way desirable that Jordan come to Peking when Sir Ernest leaves. I hope you agree with this…. He must stand high with the Foreign Office…. He is persona gratissima with the Chinese…. He is a strong man, is clear headed and he knows the subject. His claims are incontestable.167 It is noteworthy that Morrison claimed here that Jordan was a strong man, which was contrary to his real view of Jordan. Later in 1911, Morrison confided in Braham that Jordan was ‘the most amiable and hard-working of men but the weakest’.168 This

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supports the claim of this study that a part of Morrison’s recommending Jordan to the post was that he wanted to influence Jordan and consequently the Foreign Office. While working on Chirol, Morrison also pleaded Jordan’s case enthusiastically with Foreign Office people. In London in September 1905, Morrison talked to G.Tyrrell, Chief of the China Department, and to L.Mallet, Private Secretary to Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary. Morrison’s diary shows how he spoke of Jordan: I urged the claims of Jordan to Peking and the suggestion found favour. Both the F.O. men…thought that the appointment could be made and that it seemed a good one. I spoke…of his friendly relations with the Japanese169…and of the circumstance that [G] Hayashi would probably be sent from Seoul to Peking and there the friendly relations could continue.170 Morrison declared that, if the Foreign Office wished to perform a popular act in the Far East, it should appoint Jordan. Morrison’s promotion of Jordan impressed Mallet and Tyrrell, to the surprise of Chirol who did not think much of Jordan. Morrison had promised Jordan that he would ‘speak to Lord Lansdowne’ and he fulfilled this promise. Morrison urged Lansdowne to appoint Jordan to Peking.171 His diary recalls: I was in the F.O…. to see Lord Lansdowne…. His [Satow’s post] will be a difficult post to fill, he said. I expressed the hope that… Sir John Jordan should be his successor and I ran briefly over his incomparable qualifications. He said all that I have heard of Sir John has been in his favour. His claims will certainly receive consideration.172 Later Morrison heard from Chirol that Jordan’s name had been submitted. The post was eventually given to Jordan but not without difficulty because many were doubtful about his suitability for the post. W.L.F.Langley, Assistant Under-Secretary, assured Bland that Hippisley was the official choice. Satow was opposed to Jordan as his successor and had several talks with Morrison, who had just returned to Peking from Europe on 15 April 1906.173 Morrison said that he believed that ‘Lord Lansdowne suggested Jordan’, and described the occasion when the suggestion was made. Satow’s choice was either R.T.Tower174 or W.B.Townley,175 both of whom he recommended to Grey.176 Morrison ruled them out,177 although Lady Susan Townley had asked Morrison to help obtain the Peking ministerial post for her husband.178 This shows that Morrison not only had, but also was seen to have, influence in the selection of the Minister in Peking. Morrison’s choice, however, was Jordan. After a lengthy discussion with Morrison, Satow concluded that ‘The chances of the latter [Jordan]…are very good.’179 Satow was doubtful of the suitability of Jordan, however, and frankly told Chirol of his apprehension: [the Minister’s post in Peking] was a very difficult position which he [Jordan] could only maintain if he were supported by the F.O. and provided with definite written instructions; that a man taken out of the

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consular service and made Minister over the heads of his seniors in the service lacks prestige, which must be given to him artificially.180 Although Chirol had a rather poor opinion of Jordan, he did not refuse Morrison’s request to help obtain the post for Jordan, probably because he hesi-tated to reject such an enthusiastic appeal by Morrison who had done so much for The Times. He wrote to Morrison: Jordan succeeds Satow. I am glad of it on public grounds, and equally glad of it for your sake, for I know what a pleasure it will be to both of you to be working together in the same field.181 Thus, Chirol supported Jordan for the sake of Morrison. Despite much apprehension about his suitability, Jordan obtained the post, largely on the strength of Morrison’s recommendation. Jordan, well aware of this fact, wrote to Morrison: My chief object in writing at all is…to say once more how grateful I am to you for all you have done on my behalf. I account myself especially fortunate in having seen you before you started, as otherwise I could not have realised the position.182 It is wrong, however, to assume that Jordan was incompetent to fulfil the task, as will be shown later. When it comes to the selection of Jordan amongst many other candidates, Morrison was the driving force behind him. It is not surprising that Morrison was able to exert a considerable influence over Jordan in Peking. Morrison was a powerful determined person by nature. U.Hattori, a Japanese scholar of Chinese literature, who shared with Morrison the ordeal of the siege in Peking during the Boxer uprising, recorded in his diary that Morrison was said to be more powerful than the ministers of the foreign powers.183 The British Minister then was C.MacDonald. In June 1905, Rockhill, American Minister in Peking, said to Wu T’ing-fang, then ViceMinister for Foreign Affairs, that Morrison had ‘more power than all the [foreign] Ministers put together’.184 The British Minister then was Satow. P.Weale, an employee of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs in Peking, wrote about Morrison: there is only one other thing worth seeing in Peking—it is no other than Dr. Morrison. Just as the Chinese Government watches the provinces and the Legations watch the Chinese Government, so does Dr. Morrison watch the Legations, which is the finest thing of all. For there is much to discover…his word is now more powerful than that of the British Minister, which for years has not been very much, but which now, they protest, is a little more weighty.185 Weale’s description is valid in that the Chinese Government lived in fear of provincial movements against it; and that the foreign powers in China were keeping watch on the Chinese Government. Morrison kept the foreign powers in China under close

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surveillance. They were all trying to expand their share of interests in that nation, sometimes by manoeuvring and intriguing against each other and sometimes by cooperating. Morrison always closely scrutinized the activities of the representatives of foreign powers in China and sought to discover and if possible to prevent their plots, quite often with considerable success. The Morrison-Jordan team in Peking came into being. They would work together in China, though not always in harmony, for 14 years from 1906 through one of the most turbulent periods of Chinese history—a period which led to the revolution of 1911 and the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty.

Morrison and Yuan Shih-kai On 20 November 1911, Morrison had a discussion with Yuan Shih-kai, at Yuan’s residence. Morrison was cordially welcomed and ushered by Yuan K’e-ting, who was living with his father and had been familiar with his father’s aspirations. K’eting asked Morrison ‘to urge his father to cease his stubbornness and save the Republican cause’, and said that ‘if the Court went away, his [my] father could become President or even Emperor’.186 At this remark, Morrison thought that he was ‘light-headed…not lacking in ambition but very stupid’.187 Morrison’s perception was that ‘Yuan could be Emperor if he chose, but he is too loyal to the Throne’.188 Morrison realized that not only K’e-ting and Ts’ai T’ing-kan but also most of Yuan’s entourage were republican—‘Even Chao Ping-chun189 is anti-Manchu’,190 and ‘T’ang Shao-yi is also a revolutionary and the mastermind of Yuan’s camp’.191 Morrison also realized that Yuan’s entourage was urging Yuan to accept the revolutionaries’ offer that, if he could make the Emperor abdicate, then he would be given the post of republican president. Morrison had to know exactly what Yuan himself was contemplating. Yuan said to Morrison in a whisper: ‘If there were more pressure perhaps the Court would leave for Jehol.’192 Morrison realized that Yuan was ‘conspiring’ to oust the Court to Jehol, but that this did not necessarily mean abdication. Yuan did not tell Morrison in clear terms that he wanted to become republican president. Instead, Yuan spoke of the obstacles he had to remove in order to oust the Court. The Manchu dynasty would not just go without a fight. Amongst the Manchu princes, there was a die-hard faction. Yuan confided in Morrison that he immensely feared two princes, Ts’ai-hsun, Minister of the Navy, and Ts’aitao, one of the two Chiefs of the General Staff of the Army.193 They were younger brothers of the late Emperor Kuang-hsu. About that time, there was a rumour that Yuan’s assassination was being plotted. T’ang Shao-yi thought ‘Yuan Shih-kai will surely be assassinated or at any rate he is in great danger.’ Morrison also heard from J.W.N.Munthe that ‘the Manchus were desperate, that they were determined to kill Yuan Shih-kai… that the Captain of the Guard had been induced into the plot’.194 Morrison was afraid that Yuan was ‘in great personal danger’195 and worried ‘should he be assassinated, then we may have chaos’.196 Jordan also feared for Yuan’s safety and reported to Grey: Intelligence had been received by some of my colleagues that a party was being formed at the palace strongly hostile to Yuan Shih-kai, and that

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there seemed to be some ground for anticipating an attempt upon his life. It was said that his Excellency was aware of this threat, and that he contemplated removing himself from the immediate neighbourhood of danger, and going to Tien-tsin [sic].197 The foreign ministers in Peking, fearing for Yuan’s life, discussed supplying Yuan with a group of foreign guards to ensure his security. At the same time, they inti-mated to the Manchus, according to Morrison, that ‘if a hair of Yuan’s head were injured, it could mean the end of the Manchus’.198 Ts’ai T’ing-kan, being Yuan’s confidant, also received a threatening letter.199 Morrison’s view of the situation after his conversation with Yuan was that the members of Yuan’s entourage were all in sympathy with the revolutionaries and were urging Yuan to accept the revolutionaries’ offer; Yuan himself, however, was undecided as to whether to accept the offer, but was nevertheless determined to become the ruler of China irrespective of the form of government. Immediately after his talk with Yuan, Morrison called on Jordan and confirmed that Jordan’s grasp of the situation ‘entirely’ agreed with his.200 Their understanding, however, was not quite correct because Yuan was shrewd enough not to let Morrison and Jordan know that he had already made up his mind to accept the revolutionaries’ offer. Morrison decided to help Yuan to become republican president because he realized that that was the only way to settle the crisis and because he himself wanted to see the dynasty go. That night Morrison wrote a long article about this interview. The article aimed to portray Yuan as the sole saviour of the nation. Morrison presented him as a physically fit man, able to cope with the strenuous duties, and stated that ‘I found him in excellent health’.201 His diary, however, reads: ‘Much stouter than before. Bronchitis, spoke…in whisper.’202 Morrison wrote in The Times about Yuan’s efforts in the difficult situation that: ‘I found him …full of courage, realising the seriousness…of the task…but determined to spare no effort to re-establish a stable Government and to preserve the country from disintegration.’ Morrison portrayed Yuan as a monarchist, although he knew that Yuan did not really oppose a republic: ‘He is advocating the retention of the present dynasty…fearing, if…the dynasty is removed, that there would be internal wrangling leading to anarchy, in which…foreign lives be endangered, and so foreign intervention and partition would follow.’203 Morrison then broached the subject of the relations between the revolutionaries and the dynasty. This core issue was introduced in the form of a conversation, as follows. Morrison suggests to Yuan: that the Revolutionary movement was a protest against the weakening of China…and against the corrupt influences of a decadent Court… that the forces of the Revolution were directed towards increasing the strength and solidarity of the Empire and the people, not towards disintegration.204 Yuan repeats his fear of the instability of an uncontrolled democracy, of conflict and division, and insists that the retention of the present monarchy would be a link of the nation. Morrison argues that such an unpopular dynasty could not be a link but a disturbing power. Yuan disagrees and says that even if the present revolution succeeds,

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another counter-revolution might take place in order to restore the monarchy, resulting in chaos for a long time to come, and no peace would be expected in the Empire. Morrison’s condemnation of the dynasty, however, was relentless. He points out that the Manchu monarchy is not trusted. Yuan says: ‘Next Friday the Regent would swear before the altars in the Temple of Ancestors that the Throne would be faithful to its promises.’205 This conversational part of Morrison’s article was designed to create a false impression amongst the readers that Yuan was trying his best to save the monarchy despite all the difficulties. Then, Morrison went to the heart of the matter. He said that the removal of the Court to Jehol would eventually lead to abdication of the Emperor. Morrison wrote: ‘Yuan Shih-kai admitted that the scheme had been submitted to him, that it was supported by many reasonable men and could not be dismissed lightly… and that the question was still under consideration’.206 Morrison knew that it was Yuan himself who was ‘conspiring’ to remove the Court to Jehol.207 This passage, however, reads as if Yuan might be forced to accept the decision of ‘many reasonable men’ who wanted to oust the Court. To portray Yuan as monarchist was Morrison’s strategy By this strategy Morrison took the precaution of protecting Yuan from the possible accusation of treachery when in the near future the actual overthrow of the dynasty took place. The rest of Morrison’s article, nearly a whole column, was devoted to an apologia, supposedly given to Morrison by Yuan himself, concerning Yuan’s role in the case of the failed coup d’état during the 1898 Reform Movement.208 In this apologia, Yuan denied the charge of disloyalty to the Throne and defended ‘his action as loyal and patriotic and dictated by the best interests of the country’. In defence of Yuan’s action, Morrison categorically stated: The main facts of the story are well known, but the Prime Minister declares that the statements published in the public Press, purporting to describe his participation in the episode, are largely misrepresentations of fact.’209 Thus, Morrison sought to restore Yuan’s reputation, essential for the future leader of China. Later, Ts’ai assured Morrison that Yuan had been ‘much gratified’ by the publication of his apologia regarding the coup d’état of 1898.210 Morrison’s article, which portrayed Yuan Shih-kai as a moderate conservative, loyal to the Emperor, was well received and widely circulated because it was taken at face value. Morrison’s article was quoted by several journalists. Bland, who was trapped by Morrison’s strategy and took Morrison’s article at face value, commented that: He [Yuan] stated fully and frankly the reasons which led him to advocate retention of the dynasty in the person of the child Emperor…. He endeavoured to dissuade Dr. Morrison from his enthusiastic support of Young China and the Republic.211 Woodhead reproduced Morrison’s article in the Peking and Tientsin Times and commented that ‘it would be best for China to retain the present dynasty as a limited monarchy’.212 Lawton reproduced part of the interview in The Empire of the Far East, and accepted that Yuan’s policy was the retention of the reigning monarchy.213 The Osaka Mainichi Shimbun also reproduced the substance of the Morrison-Yuan talk.214 All these comments favoured the monarchy This means, paradoxically, that if Morrison had

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disclosed the fact that Yuan did not mind becoming republican president, it would have caused an uproar accusing him as traitor to the Emperor. In order to direct public opinion towards the idea of republicanism without causing any criticism of Yuan Shih-kai, Morrison gradually changed the tone of his articles in The Times. The changes can be noticed in the articles from 21 November onwards. To illustrate the changes, some articles before and after that date are examined. On 16 November, in referring to the revolutionaries Morrison used strong terms, whereas in referring to Yuan, he was much milder: The Prime Minister does not underrate the immense difficulties…in attempting to reconcile the moderate views of those like himself who are resolved to retain the present dynasty…with the extremist views of the revolutionary leaders, who are committed to the policy of compelling the abdication of the Emperor.215 In the article of 18 November, Morrison explained that Yuan’s aim of sending troops was to pressurize the revolutionaries into a compromise for the retention of the Manchu monarchy, which the revolutionaries were resolutely refusing.216 These articles give the readers an impression that Yuan was reasonable, seeking compromise, whereas the revolutionaries were insisting on no compromise. Compared with the above articles, the tone of the article of 21 November, already shown, is slightly different in that it portrays the revolutionaries in a more sympathetic light, by describing their claims and representations as seeking justice against a corrupt dynasty. This reveals Morrison preparing to herald Yuan as leader of the new republican order. If the revolutionaries were all that bad, it would be odd for Yuan to become their leader. After 21 November, Morrison’s articles began to take a ‘middle course’. On 25 November, for the first time, ‘the people’s will’ becomes important, and Yuan’s military attack on the rebels is said to have been done with ‘regret’: Yuan Shih-kai, while expressing regret at the continuation of hostilities, declares that it is impossible to suspend operations until the modus vivendi for which he is now working has been arranged in Peking pending the assembling of a national convention for the declaration of the people’s will.217 The target of Morrison’s criticism then shifts from the rebels to the Regent, the representative of the dynasty, and the removal of the Court from Peking is deemed reasonable: It is admitted on all sides that the cardinal difficulty is the vacillation and irresolution of the Regent, an amiable but impetuous weakling swayed by Palace women and eunuchs. Even Prince Ching [sic] is understood to be urging the Regent to withdraw the Court to Jehol.218 If Morrison had used the word ‘abdication’, it would have provoked a public outcry: a gradual preparation aiming towards it was necessary. So Morrison began to condition

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readers to the idea of the removal of the Court from Peking, which could lead to the Emperor’s abdication, so that when the time came for Yuan to make the Emperor abdicate, the people would think that it was necessary for the sake of the nation and abdication would not invoke the people’s anger against Yuan. Morrison asked Wang Ch’ung-hui, doctor of civil law, barrister-at-law of the Middle Temple, ‘the most intelligent member of the revolutionary committee’ then in Peking, to write ‘a statement of the republican case’ for The Times. His plan, however, did not materialize because Wang had to leave for Tientsin to activate a movement to expel the Court to Jehol.219 Nevertheless this episode shows Morrison’s new approach of portraying the revolutionaries in a better light. After the revolution began, Morrison was once again in his element, displaying his literary skills. As seen already, after the Russo-Japanese War, Morrison had criticized Japanese policy towards Manchuria, which was at variance with the policy of The Times and of the British Foreign Office. The Times editorial ‘scissors’ cut down or substantially modified Morrison’s articles. Thus, Morrison’s voice had been silenced to a degree. In reporting on the Chinese Revolution, however, there were no such restrictions. Morrison could again fully display his literary mastery Braham, who found Morrison’s telegrams ‘excellent’, wrote to him that ‘You must feel like old times again writing the telegrams that are “the” news of the day.’220 Braham appreciated Morrison’s work: We are grateful for your most excellent telegrams…. We have left every other paper standing. The first day the Daily Mail gave only ten lines or so of Reuter and no paper had a telegram of its own and none, save ourselves, dared to comment.221 Buckle, an Editor of The Times, wrote to Morrison: We are greatly your debtors for your admirable cables about the revolution. The whole world has to go to The Times to find out what is really going on in China; and your work is widely admired and quoted…. We are watching the momentous drama which you unfold to us in breathless expectation; it seems as difficult to predict what will be the outcome, as it was in the French Revolution.222 Ethel Bell, wife of Moberly Bell, wrote to Morrison: ‘Once again you are the most read man in London.’223 Morrison’s work was appreciated also by the Chinese. Lin Wench’ing, medical practitioner, entrepreneur and educationalist, wrote to Morrison: ‘The Chinese people think a great deal of you, and all powerful papers eagerly translate all your telegrams…. If you will help China so far, the Chinese and Manchus will be under deep obligation to you for ever.’224 Morrison was satisfied with being famous, probably because the more famous he became, the more weight his articles would carry. He privately wrote to Braham: ‘whether I am a good correspondent or not, the fact remains (or the phenomenon if you like) that I am the best known Englishman at present east of India, and I am often told the best known correspondent in the world’.225 Morrison worked hard. He cabled The Times 8, 113 words between 11 October and 24 November 1911.226 Buckle wrote to Morrison:

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‘I am afraid you must be in danger of overworking yourself, and trust that your health has not suffered.’227 Morrison confided in Braham that ‘I work from daylight until midnight, trying to track down rumours and learn the truth’,228 and that he had to write under great pressure because visitors of all classes wanted to see him from early in the morning till late at night.229 Morrison finally found in the revolution a way to achieve his objectives. He would help Yuan to become republican president, and in return he would obtain Yuan’s co-operation in checking Japan’s growing power in the Far East.

4 SINO-ANGLO-JAPANESE DIPLOMACY The truce Morrison kept watch on the political and military battles between Yuan Shih-kai and Li Yuan-hang. When the negotiations of 11 November 1911 between Yuan’s emissaries and Li Yuan-hang broke down because of Li’s refusal to accept Yuan’s terms,1 Morrison learnt from Aoki that Yuan was preparing a sudden attack on Hanyang.2 Yuan Shih-kai again took to using military force. A concentrated attack by the Northern Army over the period of 18–27 November succeeded in regaining Hanyang.3 Morrison took it for granted that Yuan would press on to recapture the revolutionary stronghold of Wuchang, which would deliver a lethal blow to the revolutionaries. In fact, Morrison had heard from Aoki and Patchin that Wuchang had fallen,4 which Morrison accordingly reported in The Times.5 He and others believed that after the recapture of Hanyang Yuan had recaptured Wuchang as a matter of course. A few days later, however, Morrison became uneasy about the accuracy of information. He noted in his diary: ‘I am not far out as regards capitulation of Wuchang. But it has not capitulated so far. Ts’ai Ting-kan [sic] says that the suburbs are in the hands of the Govt. troops. Goffe wires that Wuchang is untenable.’6 Then on 1 December Morrison realized that the news of Wuchang’s fall was incorrect and had to change his report: ‘Wuchang, while it is premature to speak of its capitulation, is admittedly untenable.’7 Morrison, E.T.Williams, Patchin and Aoki all believed at one time that Wuchang had fallen, and Yuan’s strategy of not recapturing Wuchang puzzled many observers. Yuan explained that a shortage of funds and munitions and fear of causing further suffering to the people were his reasons for not advancing to Wuchang.8 Many contemporary observers and historians have speculated as to Yuan’s real motives for not recapturing Wuchang. Two main suggestions have been put forward—the first concerns Yuan’s lack of fighting capability, and the second, his personal intrigues and quest for power. As to Yuan’s fighting capability, Morrison was correct in judging that the enormous expansion of the revolutionary movement in the provinces made it impossible to suppress by force.9 Jordan was also doubtful about the strength of the Northern Army10 Weale maintained, however, that ‘it is correct to declare that had he so wished Yuan Shih-kai could have crushed the revolution entirely before the end of 1911’11 and Ch’en, too, claims that if Yuan had continued to attack, he could have suppressed the revolutionaries.12 But Weale and Ch’en seem to have overestimated Yuan’s military strength. In fact, Yuan’s forces could not really suppress the revolution.13 T’ang Leang-li maintains that although Yuan’s military forces were ‘superior to those of the revolutionaries, Yuan realized that suppression of the revolutionaries by the armed forces would ultimately end in failure’.14 E.P.Young claims that ‘There were serious difficulties in Yuan’s control of the Peiyang [Northern] Army’ and that the military

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balance was not necessarily in Yuan’s favour. Furthermore, the Northern Army had not totally pledged allegiance to Yuan. In fact, it was not fully committed to anyone.15 As Jordan correctly observed, Yuan’s aim, ‘though bearing a military character is understood to be rather one of conciliation’.16 Ch’en also comments that Yuan’s operations had more political than military implication.17 Yuan preferred the political use of troops, because he had realized, as early as mid-October, that military operations alone would not suppress the revolutionaries as feelings against the Manchus were widespread in the provinces.18 Apart from the doubtful superiority of Yuan’s fighting capability, there was another reason why Yuan did not recapture Wuchang. Yu Shin-tin claims that Yuan allowed the revolutionaries to keep Wuchang so as not to eliminate their power to force the Emperor into abdication.19 Yoshino and Katō explain that Yuan wanted to keep the revolution alive so that he could use the republican threat as a pretext to compel the Emperor to abdicate and, by so doing, gain power himself.20 Ch’en maintains that ‘Yuan would not destroy them [the revolutionaries] lest he should deprive himself of an opportunity to play them off against the imperial court’.21 Lo Hui-min aptly summarizes Yuan’s tactics: ‘As Premier of the Government, Yuan served between his master and the revolutionaries as something of a broker, bargaining with both and setting one against the other, making himself ultimately the indispensable arbiter.’22 In order to make the Emperor abdicate, it was necessary for Yuan to let the revolutionaries make some headway, and, at the same time, in order to make the revolutionaries accept Yuan’s proposal, it was necessary to demonstrate to them the superiority of the imperial force. Morrison failed to perceive Yuan’s shrewd tactics of playing the revolutionaries off against the dynasty. Morrison also could not detect that Yuan had helped the revolutionaries. Yuan wanted the revolutionaries to have sufficient military force to threaten the dynasty, but because of lack of money, they could not compete with the Imperial Army Some historians claim that Yuan supplied the revolutionaries with money to keep them going, by using Yuan K’e-ting, and that T’ang Shao-yi financed Huang Hsing, a revolutionary leader.23 A lieutenant-colonel serving the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army, H.Saitō, who was a major in Peking during the revolution, stated: I have heard that Yuan Shih-kai’s eldest son was a revolutionary, which I could not believe then. But later, I realized that it was true. It is correct that Yuan K’e-ting tried to strengthen the revolutionaries by financing them. I have heard this directly from Huang Hsing.24 Although Morrison had regarded ‘Young Yuan almost violently republican and antiManchu’,25 Morrison did not realize that K’e-ting was financing the revolutionaries. Li Yuan-hung, the revolutionary leader, greatly demoralized by the defeat at Hanyang, sent a message to Yuan, stating that he was prepared to accept the terms offered, which Li had previously rejected, namely a government based on constitutional monarchy.26 Morrison welcomed Li’s acceptance and reported: ‘the willingness of Li Yuan-hung…to accept the terms proposed originally by Yuan Shih-kai, greatly improves the outlook for peace’.27 Li’s intention to accept a constitutional monarchy did not suit Yuan, however, who was now after the republican presidency Yuan was very cautious about this matter. He wanted to know what authority Li had and to what extent Li represented provincial views.28 Yuan found that Li represented only Hupeh, and not other provinces. Yuan there

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upon declared that he was prepared to send delegates to discuss the situation with delegates from all the provinces at a national conference. Yuan could now negotiate on his own terms, which was, in fact, his objective of striking at Hanyang. Morrison commented on Yuan’s attitude in The Times: Yuan Shih-kai will certainly act in a conciliatory manner, hoping to win back the loyalty of the Revolutionaries…and to induce them to accept the view that, since everything in the form of Constitutional Government for which they are contending, except the removal of the dynasty, has been granted, further strife is useless.29 Morrison was tireless in his effort to promote Yuan’s cause. He had already decided in mid-November to work towards making Yuan republican president, and was hoping that Yuan’s entourage would successfully persuade Yuan towards this end. Morrison apparently still did not realize at the end of November that Yuan had already made up his mind and was quietly working towards the republican presidency Yuan now wanted to obtain a consensual guarantee from the representatives of the revolutionary provinces that he would be elected president. The person who took up the task of securing this guarantee was Wang Ching-wei.30 Morrison saw Wang often about this time and was very impressed by him.31 Morrison under-stood that Wang had been closely associated with Yuan.32 On one occasion Wang told Morrison that he had just spent three hours with Yuan.33 Wang, ‘persona grata of the revolutionary leaders’,34 had his letter delivered by his confidant Chu to the conference at Wuchang35 held by the representatives of the revolutionary provinces, in an attempt to urge them to elect Yuan Shih-kai as the first republican president.36 Morrison learned about this from Ts’ai T’ingkan and noted in his diary: ‘Wang Chao-ming and Chu (a Hunanese) left for Hankow last night by special train…to consult the Revolutionary leaders to make Yuan Shih-kai President of the republic’.37 Morrison, however, did not quite understand Yuan’s ulterior object. On 28 November he reported to Braham his understanding of Yuan’s purpose was that ‘This, it is thought, will bring the Regent to his bearings.’38 Morrison, however, must have thought this interpretation was not convincing and felt uneasy about it. A few days later, Morrison, still puzzled, disclosed to C.D.Bruce, British Commissioner of Police, International Settlement at Shanghai, that: It is difficult to know what Yuan Shih-kai has at the back of his head. Two of his men—or rather, two men who have been in somewhat close intercourse with him in Peking—have gone to Hankow in order to induce the revolutionary leaders to proclaim Yuan Shih-kai President of the Republic.39 Morrison knew that Wang Ching-wei was a revolutionary and yet was Yuan’s follower. Morrison, however, did not grasp the fact that Yuan was trying to control the provincial representatives’ voting through Wang Ching-wei, their ‘persona grata’. Morrison was uncertain of Yuan’s motives and, probably because of it, he did not want this move of Yuan to be publicized. Hence his message to Braham: ‘Naturally I have to exercise caution in using the information communicated to me.’40 Of course, Morrison did not

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send to The Times any news about Yuan’s action, which, if publicized, would have provoked suspicion about Yuan and decreased his trustworthiness. On 23 November 1911, Wu T’ing-fang, a revolutionary leader, gave foreign consuls at Nanking three days’ notice to evacuate, and then began to attack the city.41 The revolutionaries captured Nanking on 2 December.42 Morrison welcomed the fall of Nanking because he correctly judged that this would counter-balance the loss of Hanyang and therefore enhance the prospect of a peace conference.43 He did not realize, however, that Yuan could deliberately give away Nanking in order to boost the revolutionaries’ morale and make them a threat to the dynasty. In fact, several contemporary observers felt suspicious of the circumstances surrounding the fall of Nanking. Weale observed that ‘to equalize matters…he [Yuan] secretly ordered the evacuation of Nanking by the Imperialist forces’.44 Suzuki, Japanese Consul in Nanking, reported to Uchida that casualties at Nanking were small, because most imperial troops had been evacuated on the night previous to the fall and the remaining troops had surrendered.45 And yet, Morrison naively expected that Yuan would strengthen the defence of Nanking by sending the imperial troops by the newly completed Tientsin-Pukow Railway, which of course Yuan never did. Morrison did not seem to realize, or did not want to admit, that the fall of Nanking was yet another of Yuan’s political ploys. An historian, Hirakawa, argues that Yuan deliberately gave Nanking to the revolutionaries in order to make the dynasty believe that the revolutionaries’ military strength was such that peace talks would be essential. For this purpose, Hirakawa maintains, Yuan did not send any reinforcements, nor raise any military fund, to save Nanking, and thus victimized his own troops there.46 The political/military balance between the contending parties was attained, to a degree, as Hanyang went to Yuan Shih-kai and Nanking to the revolutionaries. While battles were being fought, preparations for a cease-fire were being made by Jordan and Yuan. As seen already, the basic British policy had been one of non-intervention in China’s domestic affairs as long as British interests were not threatened. British interests, however, had been threatened because the revolutionaries took control of south and central China along the Yangtse valley which had been Britain’s sphere of interest. Therefore Britain intervened and played the role of mediator for a peace talk between the north and south. As Jordan observed, ‘if no truce were made, a long and bloody struggle would continue…the outcome…would have been by no means certain’.47 Therefore an armistice and a peaceful settlement by negotiation were considered to be the best course. As this study will show, the revolution was settled under British supervision and guidance. Jordan’s mediation is important for the purpose of this study in that Morrison exerted a strong influence over the decision-making of Jordan, who had by that time acquired a strong influence over Yuan Shih-kai. Amongst the foreign ministers, Jordan had the most urgent desire for a cease-fire. It was because in Hankow the British concession was located close to Hanyang, and when the northern troops attacked Hanyang, the British concession came under fire, exposing the residents to danger. The other powers’ concessions, namely Russian, French, German and Japanese ones, were situated alongside the Yangtse River in this order from the south. Goffe, British ConsulGeneral in Hankow, reported to Jordan about the danger to the British residents. On the following day Jordan complained to Yuan about the danger. Yuan stated that he would suspend the fighting, ‘if an armistice on mutually satisfactory terms could be arranged’.

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With Yuan’s consent, Jordan ordered Goffe to pass on Yuan’s statement unofficially to Li Yuan-hung.48 As Morrison observed, ‘Sir John is trying to arrange the Armistice. Goffe with Li, he with Yuan and for this purpose saw Yuan yesterday.’49 The terms of the armistice were formulated by Jordan and Yuan and were conveyed to Li through Goffe. On this basis, recorded Morrison: ‘Progress is being made.’50 On 27 November, Li Yuan-hung made a proposal to Yuan Shih-kai, through Goffe and Jordan, suggesting an armistice of 15 days.51 On 1 December, Yuan counter-offered five terms of armistice to Li. The five terms were: (1) Ground as at present occupied to be held by each side. (2) Three days fixed as duration of armistice. (3) Advantage must not be taken of the armistice by men-of-war. (4) During the armistice neither side to increase their military strength. (5) In order that any infringement of the conditions may be obviated, British Consul-General to sign armistice agreement as witness.52 Li accepted the terms. Morrison knew exactly what was going on because Yuan had informed him through Ts’ai T’ing-kan.53 On 2 December, the three-day armistice was signed at Wuchang between Li and Yuan’s representative in the presence of Goffe as witness. Thus the armistice was achieved owing to the British efforts. Goffe played an important part during the crisis, and Morrison reported to Braham that Goffe had done very well.54 An edict was issued praising Goffe for his work, which Morrison thought was ‘the first one of its kind ever published in China’.55 Morrison reported that it was ‘to the friendly offices of the British Minister that the truce is due’.56 Apparently he was pleased to see Britain taking the major role in its attempt to end the revolution, which no doubt would increase its prestige and influence over a new Chinese government.

Morrison, the Regent, T’ang Shao-yi and Prince Ch’ing The armistice was signed and the next step was to arrange peace negotiations, badly needed by both contenders, due mainly to their financial straits.57 Morrison hoped that a united China under a stable government headed by Yuan Shih-kai would emerge as a result of the peace conference. With this hope in mind, Morrison became Yuan’s ‘spokesman’ in order to promote his good image amongst the foreign population: He is confident that his policy of conciliation backed by force will prevail, and ardently hopes for the early restoration of stable Government which will enable him to obtain abroad the financial assistance so badly needed by the country.58 Morrison publicized China’s desperate need for foreign financial assistance. Morrison thought that the Regent was ‘the stumbling block’59 to the settlement of the crisis. In fact, Yuan Shih-kai and T’ang Shao-yi wanted to force the Regent to resign before entering into negotiations with the revolutionaries, because they considered this essential to successful peace negotiations.60 The reasons were, firstly, that the Regent, as representative of the Throne, was the direct target of the revolutionaries’ attacks and his removal was thought to ‘be more palatable to the south’.61 Secondly the Regent had proved to be an extremely poor administrator, inviting much criticism even from his entourage. Just as Yuan told Jordan that ‘He takes back with one hand what he concedes

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with the other’,62 Morrison also thought that ‘He takes back today what he has amended the previous day He is the trouble.’63 Thirdly, as the Regent had been the driving force in the dismissal of Yuan in February 1909 and T’ang in January 1911, it was thought that both would be eager to seek revenge by terminating his political life. In order to help Yuan and T’ang, Morrison attempted to incite foreign public opinion against the Regent through The Times. At this opportune moment, Morrison received a lengthy letter from Yen Fu, a Chinese scholar, who had pointed out that one of the primary causes for the present crisis was ‘The wretched incapability of the Regent and his Ministers.’ Yen’s claim was that in 1908 when the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager Lung-yu died, the Regent did not grant amnesty to Kang Yu-wei’s Constitutionalist Party, making it for ever anti-Manchu. Yen lamented that ‘Had not the Regent been an unfeeling goose…he would win most of the hearts of the people, and nothing of the present revolt could happen.’ Morrison, delighted with the letter, asserted that it was ‘a document of human interest’ and requested The Times to publish the whole content anonymously. The Times’ article under the subtitle of ‘The Regent an “Unfeeling Goose” ‘did not add to the Regent’s reputation.64 The Regent was not popular amongst the revolutionaries, the foreigners and the mandarins. E.Backhouse65 told Morrison that the Regent was ‘the weakest ruler of the present dynasty’.66 Y.Washizawa, Peking correspondent of the Jiji Shimpō, told Morrison that even the local authority had discussed overthrowing the Regent and had presented a memorial to the Emperor to that effect.67 Straight and Casenave were of the firm opinion that only if the Regent conceded power to a strong man like Yuan Shih-kai would the Manchu dynasty be ‘in no way lost’.68 Ts’ai T’ing-kan said to Morrison: ‘how could he make up his mind, when he had no mind?’69 Just as Morrison attempted to help remove the Regent from office by means of media coverage, so did Jordan by diplomatic pressure. Jordan thought that Yuan Shih-kai would welcome foreign support to obtain his removal and advised Grey to propose to Japan that it join with Britain to assist in the Regent’s removal.70 Despite much criticism from every quarter, the Regent was reluctant to resign. Yuan and his entourage, having recourse to their usual manipulation, declared that if the Regent would not resign, Yuan would withdraw to Tientsin, leaving the government in the hands of Chao Ping-chun, the Minister of the Interior.71 On 3 December Ts’ai T’ing-kan ‘whispered’ to Morrison that the Regent would abdicate and Morrison felt that his article ‘might safely have been more emphatic than it was’.72 On 5 December, the Manchu Court arranged the Regent’s dismissal, following the procedure devised by T’ang Shao-yi, who had originally suggested the removal to Yuan Shih-kai and Prince Ch’ing. T’ang’s scheme confided to Morrison was: ‘the Regent should issue an Edict announcing his abdication, and appointing a Chinese…as Guardian of the Emperor [Hsuan-tung] or a Council of Regency consisting of Chinese, both Edicts to be issued in the name of the Empress Dowager [Emperor Hsuan-tung’s mother]’.73 T’ang’s scheme worked. On 6 December, early in the morning, Ts’ai handed to Morrison in secret the copy of the edict in Chinese and informed him of the Regent’s resignation. On the previous night, however, Jordan had already received the information from Yuan and cabled Grey immediately that ‘Today or to-morrow the Empress Dowager will issue an edict in which the Regent will be ordered to abdicate, and an apology for his mis-government made to the nation.’74 Morrison complained in his diary that Ts’ai ‘knew it last night but too busy

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to tell me! Yet he told Sir John.’75 Morrison had to have it translated into English before sending it to The Times. He noted in his diary: the Edict was a very difficult one and even with the help of Gatrell [British secret service agent] who sent me his version of the most assured passage, I made but a poor telegram. My translator Lin Shaoan is better than the average but is not scholarly in the good sense.76 This passage reveals Morrison’s commitment to his work, with a sense of mission, ‘accuracy and speed’77 being his motto. He was therefore frustrated by being forestalled by Jordan, with whom he must have shared a feeling of healthy rivalry. The edict of 6 December announced the Regent’s abdication. Morrison’s article appeared in The Times on the following day: the Regent has verbally memorialised the Empress-Dowager blaming himself as the cause of the present upheaval, admitting that he has lost the confidence of the people, and humbly begging permission to abdicate, and that the Empress-Dowager has granted his appeal…. The edict affirms that hereafter all responsibility for political affairs is entrusted to the Premier [Yuan] and the Cabinet of Ministers.78 China Press pointed out the unfriendly relationship between the Regent and Yuan: If there is anything of the spirit of revenge in the make-up of the Premier he must be gloating now, for he has completely vanquished the man who, three short years ago, was responsible for his dismissal from office and his retirement to humiliation.79 The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun reported: ‘Although the Regent’s resignation was announced in the name of the Empress Dowager…it has been an open secret that it was mainly arranged by T’ang Shao-yi.’80 Removing one obstacle, Yuan and T’ang approached a step closer to their objective. T’ang Shao-yi was the think-tank of Yuan’s entourage. It was T’ang who had advocated, as ‘the most pressing needs’ of the day, securing the resignation of the Regent and the prolongation of the existing armistice at Hankow, as Jordan reported to Grey.81 Both of these needs were now satisfied.82 It was also T’ang Shao-yi who had advocated that Yuan Shih-kai be elected by the National Assembly and be appointed by the Ch’ing Government to the post of Prime Minister; that the Throne issue a decree of penitence; and that Sheng Hsuanhuai, a political enemy of Yuan and T’ang, should be dismissed. All these had been achieved. T’ang Shao-yi’s career after the dismissal of Yuan Shih-kai in early 1909 was hazardous. T’ang retired from the governorship of Feng-chen, which he had assumed in 1907, but in August 1910 he was appointed Minister for Posts and Communications. In January 1911, he was dismissed from the portfolio and superseded by Sheng Hsuan-huai. It was speculated that T’ang’s dismissal was due to his opposition to the Regent’s railways nationalization plan.83 T’ang kept in close contact with Yuan in retirement.

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When the anti-railway-nationalization movement started, Yuan and T’ang co-operated in taking advantage of the opportunity to carry out their own plans, which were to instigate popular protests against the railway nationalization plan; to keep in touch with the revolutionary leaders, Huang Hsing in particular, in order to stir the revolutionary movement; to buy up newspapers in various cities to publish anti-Manchu propaganda; and to oust both the Regent and Sheng Hsuanhuai. For these purposes, T’ang made frequent visits to Tientsin, Shanghai and Hong Kong.84 Matsushima claims that Liang Shih-yi, Yuan’s secretary, inveigled newspapers to support the revolutionary cause.85 D.Fraser86 wrote to Morrison in March 1912 that ‘Yuan appears to have bought many of Shanghai papers’.87 Soon after the Wuchang outbreak, when Yuan was requested to take up the premiership, T’ang was reinstated on 26 October 1911 as the Minister of Posts and Communications, from which post Sheng Hsuan-huai had been expelled. T’ang came to Peking on 17 November and late that night visited Morrison, together with Ts’ai T’ing-kan. They had a lengthy discussion and T’ang explained his scheme to Morrison. It was, after forcing the Regent to resign, to hold a national convention to ascertain the people’s will as to the future form of government, a constitutional monarchy or a republic. The outcome of this plan was a foregone conclusion. China would be a republic because almost all provinces, except a few northern ones, had gone over to the revolutionaries. Morrison observed that T’ang was certain that his scheme would be accepted by the revolutionaries, with whom T’ang had been in close relations.88 Yuan Shih-kai formed the new Cabinet on 16 November. As to the weak character of Yuan’s Cabinet, Morrison reported ‘it is impossible to believe that …the colleague he has selected can assist Yuan Shih-kai in the hopeless task of reconciling the irreconcilable’.89 After all, the Cabinet was merely makeshift, a temporary expedient until the national referendum. When T’ang did not take the portfolio of Minister for Posts and Communications, Morrison realized that it was because he had intended ‘doing this higher duty’ of acting as a negotiator at the coming peace conference, representing Yuan Shih-kai.90 On 20 November, T’ang attempted to persuade Prince Ch’ing to agree to his scheme of entrusting the form of the future government to the people’s will. Prince Ch’ing refused.91 Morrison did not think much of Prince Ch’ing. As early as May 1906, he noted in his diary ‘Prince Ching [sic] is nominally Prime Minister but consults Yuan Shih-kai in everything’,92 and in August 1909 he wrote to W.Kirton, the Managing Editor of the National Review, that ‘Prince Ching [sic] absolutely shirks all responsibility’.93 Morrison’s critical view of Prince Ch’ing was published in the London Magazine shortly before the outbreak of the revolution: ‘a decrepit official of the old school, whose neglect of his important functions has been a subject of condemnation for several years past’.94 Morrison’s description of Prince Ch’ing’s career appeared also in The Times: Prince Ching [sic] has been for years the most conspicuous and the most notorious figure in China. The story of his life is…the story of the most disastrous experience in the history of the Empire…. Whether Constitutional development can be guided satisfactorily by a decrepit old man, irresolute, wily corrupt, and inefficient, is a question which may be disputed.95

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Morrison’s article was reproduced in Peking as follows: The Times publishes a long letter from its Peking Correspondent discussing the career and character of Prince Ching [sic]. The letter describes Prince Ching as a decrepit old man, irresolute, wily and corrupt, his official record always associated with disaster.96 Morrison protested against The Times publishing it as a despatch from its Peking correspondent on the grounds that his intention was that The Times should hold it over and use it as a biographical note or as an obituary coming from The Times itself.97 Nevertheless, these articles show that Morrison had regarded the Manchu regime administered by Prince Ch’ing as unfit to rule the nation, even before the outbreak of the revolution. No wonder Morrison helped to overthrow the dynasty. On 24 November, T’ang left Peking and Morrison bade him farewell at the station: This morning I was with Tang [sic] Shao-yi seeing him off by the train to Tientsin. He is in feeble health, and could only shake hands with the left hand. He is working for compromise and trying to induce Yuan Shih-kai to accept the will of the people.98 T’ang went to Tientsin to develop his plans. Morrison would further co-operate with T’ang towards their aim to make Yuan republican president.

Sino-Anglo-Japanese diplomacy Just as Morrison aimed to make Yuan Shih-kai a British ally, Ijūin, Japanese Minister in Peking, also tried to bring Yuan to his side. Japanese attitudes towards Yuan were divided: some Japanese had high regard for his ability and popular support and wanted to encourage him to maintain the monarchy—the attitude held by Ijūin and at the initial stage by the Japanese Government; others recognized Yuan’s power but regarded him as Machiavellian and therefore to be treated with caution—the attitude taken by the general public and later by the government; while a third group regarded him as a menace to Japanese expansion and therefore sought to check or eliminate him—the stance taken by the extreme continental adventurers like N.Kawashima and his group.” Ijūin thought it possible to bring Yuan to his side because of their friendly relations in the past.100 Ijūin tried to do this with the help of Chao Ping-chun, Yuan’s ‘henchman’ according to Morrison,101 and someone whom Ijūin regarded as Yuan’s representative.102 Yuan avoided Ijūin in order to hide his plan to attain the republican presidency because he knew that Japan was strongly against a republic. Therefore, he sent Chao Ping-chun to Ijūin with information of minor importance. Yuan successfully used Chao merely to divert Ijūin’s attention. Even after Yuan had named his first Cabinet on 16 November,103 he would not call on Ijūin. Uchida, apparently becoming impatient, instructed Ijūin on 17 November to go and see Yuan. He advised Ijūin to tell Yuan the following:

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If Japan were to help the Ch’ing Government, Japan has to be prepared to meet with violent resistance from the revolutionaries and slanders from foreign powers. For Japan to commit herself to such a task, it is necessary, first of all, that the Ch’ing Government place total trusts in Japan.104 Ijūin visited Yuan on 18 November. The substance of their conversation was as follows: IJŪIN: Japan thinks that Asian problems should be solved by the Asians, and that peace and order in Asia should be restored promptly. YUAN: Fortunately, there has been no foreign intervention so far. The revolution has been spreading so rapidly that, if we don’t suppress it quickly no doubt China will be fragmented. My basic policy is to adopt a constitutional monarchy The revolutionaries, however, are so bent on a republic that it is extremely difficult for me to carry out my policy In your view, which do you think would be suitable for China, a constitutional monarchy or a republic? IJŪIN: In view of the Ch’ing history of 300 years and of the local situation, I consider it best to unify the nation in the form of constitutional monarchy. My frank criticism of the Western people is that they are not really concerned about the form of the government. All they are concerned about are their nationals’ lives and property, their trade and interests. Japan is different. Japan and China share same interests. That is why we are so closely watching the development of the matter. YUAN: I agree with you. However, my position is extremely difficult. IJŪIN: I sincerely hope that you will keep close contact with us. And if there is anything you would like the Japanese Government to do, I shall be most happy to be at your service.105 Ijūin sensed that Yuan could not be sure of a possible form of government and became very pessimistic about the future of the dynasty. He proposed to Uchida, three possible solutions in order of preference: 1 To divide China into three nations, as I had advised on 28 October. In order to carry it out, Japanese military intervention is essential. 2 To maintain the Ch’ing dynasty in Manchuria and Mongolia, forsaking the eighteen provinces in China proper. 3 If/when the Ch’ing dynasty is abolished and a federal republic is set up, Japan ought to induce a situation most favourable to her, in this case, to remove the capital from Peking to somewhere in central China.106 Ijūin’s reason for wanting to shift the capital was obvious. By moving it to central China and thus making Manchuria and Mongolia look like remote frontier regions, Japan would be more able to expand in that area where it already possessed considerable interests. Ijūin strongly urged Uchida to launch an active policy of intervention.107 Uchida, who took a middle stance, was unimpressed by Ijūin’s advice and organized Cabinet discussions on how to deal with the Chinese situation. The Cabinet decision on 28 November was that Japan would abandon the onlooker’s approach hitherto taken, and would now adopt an active policy of diplomatic intervention, thereby recommending to

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China to establish ‘a government which is nominally under the Manchu dynasty, but actually controlled by the Chinese (Hans)’.108 In an attempt to obtain British co-operation, Uchida made a proposal to Grey through Yamaza on 1 December: The Japanese Government considers that the time has come for the powers to take prompt and appropriate action in order to safeguard their interests in China. The Japanese Government is of the opinion that the idea of a republic in China should be abandoned and that a constitutional government under the nominal sovereignty of the Manchu dynasty should be set up, which would be actually run by the Chinese. The Japanese Government considers it may be advisable that the powers recommend this idea to the Manchus and at the same time advise the revolutionaries that their schemes for a republic are not feasible and are likely eventually to disintegrate China. The Japanese Government, therefore, would like to exchange frank views on the subject with the British Government, and if the British Government agrees, then the other powers could be consulted.109 By making this proposal, Japan wanted to take a leading role to settle the Chinese crisis in a form of constitutional monarchy, and also wished that the other powers would recognize the leadership of the Anglo-Japanese team, especially that of Japan.110 Yamaza assured Grey that, by ‘appropriate action’, Japan did not mean military intervention but diplomatic arbitration. Grey promised to reply as soon as possible. Grey also told Yamaza that, as Jordan had already been arranging an armistice, it could be possible that the Chinese affair could be settled by the Chinese.111 Regarding Uchida’s proposal, Grey sought advice from Jordan.112 Jordan advised Grey not to accept it: A republic is likely to prove impracticable and might lead to a break-up of China. But it is probable that the cause of constitutional monarchy will be prejudiced rather than advanced by foreign intervention at present…intervention is, in my opinion, a measure to which we should have recourse only in the last resort. 113 Jordan’s concern was that if foreign intervention were allowed to occur it ‘would give Japan and Russia, by virtue of their military proximity, an undesirable measure of tutelage over the court’.114 Jordan feared that the existing balance of power amongst the foreign powers in China might be disturbed by Japan and Russia. On this basis, he firmly advised Grey not to accept the Japanese proposal of intervention. Regarding Uchida’s proposal, Grey also sought the view of C.MacDonald in Tokyo.115 MacDonald entirely supported Jordan’s view.116 It is interesting to note at this juncture that, in the diplomatic triangle of London-Peking-Tokyo, Jordan and MacDonald closely co-operated by communicating to each other, whereas such co-operation did not exist between Ijūin and Yamaza. Japanese diplomatic correspondence was exchanged between Tokyo and London, and between Tokyo and Peking, Tokyo always being the pivot.

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Grey, finding Jordan’s advice ‘most helpful,117 closely followed it in formulating his reply to Uchida.118 With regard to Grey’s foreign policy, Nish maintains that ‘Grey was, on the whole, ready to accept the advice of the man on the spot and certainly valued the verdict of Jordan’. Nish holds that ‘the calibre of Sir John Jordan was quite exceptional: in his knowledge of Chinese, his skill in negotiation and his personal acquaintance with successive Chinese leaders. His experience of Chinese problems was unrivalled.’119 Undoubtedly Jordan directed Grey’s China policy In contrast, Ijūin’s performance as Japanese Minister to China seems to have been rather poor, partly because he was kept uninformed by Jordan and Yuan. As seen already, since 26 November Jordan and Yuan had been arranging the armistice, about which they did not inform Ijūin. He learned about it as late as 30 November from Uchida, who had gained the information from Matsumura, Consul-General in Hankow.120 Uchida also learned about it from Admiral R.Kawashima in Hankow who was notified by Goffe.121 Uchida, being concerned that Ijūin on the spot knew nothing about it, wrote to him: Apparently the British Minister in Peking did not communicate to you at all about such an important matter, in spite of the fact that the Japanese Government has been making a point of co-operating with the British Government, and they also expressed their similar desire to us.122 Uchida was quite annoyed by Jordan’s failure to communicate.123 He instructed Ijūin to go immediately to Jordan to enquire into the matter and to emphasize the importance of maintaining Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the future.124 There was another occasion where Ijūin was avoided by the Jordan—Yuan team. On 4 December 1911, Uchida learned by chance from MacDonald in Tokyo that T’ang Shaoyi was about to leave for the south to attend a peace conference. Prior to the meeting with Uchida, MacDonald had been informed by Jordan about this development and, assuming that the above would have been common knowledge, touched upon the subject. Uchida was shocked that he had not yet received such important information from Ijūin. Uchida instructed Ijūin to report to him immediately if he knew anything at all about the matter.125 Ijūin was frustrated. He realized that, in this case too, he had been kept uninformed. Again, the information was transmitted to him in a roundabout way—it went from Yuan to Jordan, MacDonald and Uchida, and then finally to himself. It seemed obvious that Ijūin was marginalized by the Jordan-Yuan team. Following Uchida’s instruction, Ijūin visited Jordan on 5 December. Jordan for the first time disclosed to Ijūin that he had been involved in arranging the armistice from the beginning. Regarding the method of settling the crisis, Jordan said that he would not agree to the Japanese proposal of intervention on the grounds that it would be difficult to enforce and that it would impose a great responsibility upon the foreign powers. Jordan also made it clear that, before resorting to any foreign intervention, it would be desirable to let the Chinese find their own way to solve the crisis amongst themselves, since they had already started to do so.126 Ijūin objected, stating that ‘It would be desirable, but in view of the fact that the unrest is spreading all over the country, foreign intervention might become inevitable.’127

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As a result of this talk Ijūin recognized the divergence of their views. He also realized that he had been purposely not informed. He became very dissatisfied and wrote to Uchida without reservation: It seems to me that the British Minister in Peking has not been frank with me, although I understand that he has been telling Morrison that he has been keeping me informed. I suppose his behaviour is due to his reserved, indecisive and timid disposition. If his Government instructs him to try to keep in touch with me, he might make efforts to do so…. I have already asked you to communicate with the British Foreign Secretary to that effect and received your reply that you would do so. If you have not yet done so, however, I appreciate very much your doing so urgently. Of course, for my part, I shall try to continue to be frank with him. But it would be rather odd for me to repeatedly approach this negative and passive person, and bother him with many questions. Please understand this is a delicate situation which requires some tact.128 Ijūin’s observations of Jordan’s disposition do not seem altogether groundless. Morrison also thought Jordan was ‘nervous and distraught’, ‘worried to death’129 and he therefore gave him ‘some moral support’.130 Naturally, during the revolutionary emergency, Jordan had much to worry about and might have needed Morrison’s support. Even before the outbreak of the revolution, however, Jordan was often seen to be a weak man. Morrison wrote to Braham that ‘poor old Sir John…. He is the most amiable and hard-working of men but the weakest. He does not know his own mind.’131 F.A.Campbell, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, the Foreign Office, told Yamaza, when referring to the armistice arrangement, that Jordan was an extremely cautious type and would not venture to take any decisive action.132 Jordan might have been nervous and timid, but it does not mean he was incompetent. On the contrary, as previously seen, he showed his diplomatic capability by guiding Grey’s decision-making. Jordan was quite secretive, withholding from Ijūin his co-operation with Yuan, but this was most likely because they both feared that Ijūin would thwart their plan of organizing an armistice and a subsequent peace conference with the revolutionaries. Jordan perhaps tried to keep Ijūin at a distance until the plan for a peace conference became possible. Grey considered, however, that Jordan’s secretive behaviour was not in keeping with the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Because his policy was ‘to keep in touch with the Japanese Government if new developments occurred’,133 Grey instructed Jordan to co-operate with Ijūin: ‘Japanese charge d’affaires [Yamaza] displays curiosity as to how our consul-general at Hankow came to be mixed up in negotiations, and why he signed the armistice agreement as a witness. Please explain to your Japanese colleague.’134 When Jordan arranged the armistice co-operating with Yuan Shih-kai, Jordan was not frank with Ijūin, acting as if Jordan and Yuan had a tacit understanding to keep Ijūin in the dark. When it came to the United States, however, Jordan took a different stance. He disclosed important things, such as Yuan’s views, to W.J.Calhoun, American Minister in Peking. Grey became concerned, as he thought it unwise to incur Japan’s suspicion of Britain’s sincerity. Grey instructed Jordan:

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I notice that you have communicated Yuan Shih-kai’s views to the United States Minister, but not to your Japanese colleague…. I entirely approve your action in keeping in touch with American Minister, but we must avoid giving the Japanese any reason to suppose that we are treating them in a less open manner than we are treating any other nation.135 Jordan reported to Grey on 15 November that he had informed Ijūin of the contents of his talks with Yuan Shih-kai and with Yuan K’e-ting but he may not in fact have done so. If Ijūin had heard from Jordan about them, he would have surely reported to Uchida immediately. There is no such record in the Japanese diplomatic correspondence, despite the fact that Ijūin wrote to Uchida every day around this period.136 Grey felt obliged to repeat the instruction a few times: ‘You will of course keep in touch with your Japanese colleague.’137 Following Grey’s instruction, Jordan explained to Ijūin on 5 December the whole process of how he came to act as intermediary for the making of the armistice.138 On 13 December 1911, Uchida instructed Ijūin to create a good relationship with Jordan and to exchange frank opinions with him in the future. 139 Ijūin complained bitterly about Jordan’s secretiveness, but, according to Morrison, Ijūin also kept Jordan uninformed. In the summer of 1909, Morrison wrote to M.Bell that ‘Ijūin [sic] kept Jordan absolutely in the dark.’ and ‘Ijūin [sic]…never under any circumstances communicates anything about his negotiations with the Chinese to the British Legation’.140 It is interesting to note Morrison’s view of Ijūin: ‘Japanese have always thought highly of Ijuin [sic]…. We cannot judge Japanese statesmen from the same point of view as Japanese. Englishmen have never admired Ijūin’s [sic] ability.’141 While Britain and Japan were negotiating matters regarding China, Yuan was playing his own game. Yuan tried to avoid Ijūin, but he did not mind seeing Major R.Banzai.142 Morrison’s view of Banzai was ‘no one was on more intimate terms with Yuan Shihkai’.143 On 2 December 1911, Yuan asked Banzai for help, expressing ‘his deep concern’ about Goffe’s arranging an armistice which, Yuan said, would lead to foreign intervention. Yuan asked Banzai if there could be any way of despatching a Japanese representative to various strategic regions in order to sound out the revolutionary leaders’ intentions and to take charge of concluding an entente with them. Banzai promised that he would consult Ijūin in the matter. Being asked about the financial situation, Yuan replied that money was badly needed and he asked Banzai to raise the subject of finance with Ijūin as well. Yuan told Banzai: If Japan alone could take charge of arbitration, I would welcome it as the best way. If we do so and it becomes public knowledge, however, it would surely invite foreign intervention. If such a situation is allowed to occur, how could I stop intervention?144 Considering the fact that, only a week earlier, Yuan had asked Jordan to mediate and that the arrangement for an armistice was already in full swing, Yuan’s request to Banzai was nothing but a tactical ploy. Ijūin, however, accepted Yuan’s story as genuine and welcomed it. He answered Yuan, via Banzai, that the matter would receive priority attention. Ijūin then made the following urgent confidential suggestions to Uchida:

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1 Japan’s mediation: Responding to Yuan Shih-kai’s request, I would suggest that a Japanese be sent to Wuchang and other important regions to sound out the revolutionary leaders’ intentions concerning an entente. By so doing, gradually we would be able to gain Yuan Shih-kai’s reliance upon us. 2 Financial assistance: if the Japanese Government is going to consider this, it would be a good idea to give a reply to Yuan Shihkai, either from the Government or from myself in my own personal capacity.145 Ijūin was so eager to gain Yuan’s reliance upon Japan that he seems to have over-reacted. However, Uchida, looking at the situation from a wider perspective and with more caution, instructed Ijūin to find out Yuan’s true intention, so as to prevent any misunderstanding with Britain regarding the mediation issue.146 Meanwhile, Uchida’s suspicions of Yuan’s sincerity increased. On 8 December, he instructed Ijūin to see Yuan to ascertain any ulterior motives. Uchida reminded Ijūin that Yuan had recently sent Chao Ping-chun to Ijūin, and Chao’s stories had often been false; that Yuan had misinformed Banzai; and that Yuan had failed to tell Ijūin of his consultation with Jordan about the dismissal of the Regent and about the impending departure of T’ang Shao-yi to the south.147 Ijūin talked with Yuan on 12 December. Regarding his request to Jordan to mediate, Yuan explained that at first he intended to ask Japan to do the task, but, considering the existing ill-feelings of the Chinese people against Japan, and possible complications from the other powers, he thought it best for Jordan to mediate in the interests of both Japan and China. Ijūin told Yuan: ‘I do not mind your consulting with Mr. Jordan…but in the future, I wish you will also consult with me every time you consult with him about important matters, and keep in touch with me.’148 Yuan agreed. Incidentally, Yuan told Jordan about Ijūin’s request and asked Jordan whether he had any objection to it, and Jordan replied that he had ‘no objection whatever’.149 Most importantly for Japan, Ijūin secured from Yuan a pledge that he would always insist on a constitutional monarchy. Reporting to Uchida, Ijūin stated that he could not agree with many things that Yuan had said but what had already been done could not be undone.150 The British reply to Uchida’s proposal of 1 December for an Anglo-Japanese diplomatic intervention in China was transmitted on 5 December via Yamaza to Uchida. It read: His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion…that foreign intervention would prejudice rather than advance the cause of constitutional monarchy… According to the latest reports received here, a conference is about to be held at Hankow between the revolutionaries and representatives of Yuan Shih-kai…. It appears to His Majesty’s Government advisable to await the result before deciding upon what further action, if any, can be taken by the Powers interested to further a settlement.151

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Japan’s expectation that Britain would agree and support Japan’s proposal by virtue of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance proved wrong.152 Japan felt, with regret, that it had placed more importance on the Alliance than it warranted.153 However, Uchida diplomatically replied to Grey on 9 December that Japan would accept the British counter-proposal to await the result of the impending peace conference in Hankow, as long as no unexpected incident occurred.154 Comparing the diplomatic abilities of Jordan and Ijūin, it may not be fair to determine, at this stage, that Jordan was superior to Ijūin, because Yuan’s duplicity towards Japan was often involved. It is clear, however, that in the case of Britain, Jordan supplied Grey with information and advice which helped him to formulate British policy towards China. In the case of Japan, it was Uchida in Tokyo who often had to inform Ijūin in Peking about what was going on in Peking, because Ijūin failed to discover and judge the situation developing around him. As seen above, Uchida sometimes declined to accept Ijūin’s advice and took his own initiatives to determine Japan’s policy towards China. This was the situation in which Morrison worked. In these entangled SinoAngloJapanese relations, Morrison was able to exert a powerful influence on Jordan, Yuan Shih-kai and Ijūin alike, in order to create the situation which he sought, that is to help make Yuan Shih-kai republican president in order to maintain and consolidate British and diminish Japanese influence in China, and by so doing to ensure Australia’s national security

5 MORRISON’S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY, 1911–12 The Shanghai Peace Conference Peace talks, which were needed by both the Ch’ing Government and the revolutionaries, were arranged mainly by the British intermediaries. They were, for example, E.D.H.Fraser, British Consul-General in Shanghai, whom Morrison observed to have used his power to induce the revolutionary leaders to become ‘reasonable’,1 and E.S.Little, who took the initial step by writing to Yuan Shikai. Little also wrote to Morrison that he had consulted Wu T’ing Fang,2 and then sent a telegram to Yuan Shihkai. Little asked for Morrison’s support to urge Yuan. Yuan cordially accepted Little’s invitation.3 Morrison observed with satisfaction that ‘things are looking much better. There is a reasonable prospect of peace. Both sides were sick of fighting—both sides were experiencing financial difficulties.’4 Yuan asked T’ang Shao-yi to go to the conference as his delegate. T’ang accepted and left Peking on 9 December.5 Between the Wuchang and the Shanghai groups of the revolutionaries there was a dispute regarding the leadership and the venue for the conference, but in the end the Shanghai group triumphed and it was settled that the conference would be held in Shanghai, with Wu T’ing-fang as the representative of the revolutionaries.6 The British traders were concentrated in Shanghai and were anxious to see a successful outcome of the conference.7 Morrison observed that ‘E.Fraser is doing splendidly. We are greatly strengthening our authority in Shanghai.’8 Morrison’s desire for British predominance is once again witnessed here. In mid-December, Morrison decided to go to the peace conference. The British Legation, Yuan Shih-kai and the revolutionaries in Peking had all requested him to go.9 The purpose of his presence was not only to cover the conference as The Times correspondent but, more importantly, to persuade the people involved to settle the crisis by making Yuan republican president. Morrison thought ‘Perhaps I may be able to do some good, because both sides attach a wholly fictitious value to my opinion.’10 The news of Morrison’s departure put Ijūin on the alert. He had reason to suspect that Morrison’s trip was partly due to a confidential request by Yuan Shih-kai. Ijūin reported to Uchida: Morrison is a man of impulse who tends to lose a balanced view. Therefore in the Yangtse area, if and when he hears about exaggerated rumours of the Japanese who had participated in the revolutionary army, he might report it in The Times without much discretion. If so, it would be damaging to Japan’s reputation.11

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Thinking it wise to placate Morrison before his departure, Ijūin instructed Y. Matsuoka, Counsellor in the Legation, to give Morrison information in some detail. Ijūin advised Matsuoka to assume an attitude of taking Morrison into his confidence. Matsuoka had a conversation with Morrison on the day before he left, and tried to secure Morrison’s consent that no divergence existed in the views held by Morrison and the Japanese Government. Morrison was not so readily influenced. He pointed out: ‘One thing which is difficult to understand and needs clarification between Britain and Japan is that, while the British news-papers are unanimously placing trust in Yuan Shih-kai, various Japanese papers seem to be attacking him.’12 Matsuoka’s reply was evasive, avoiding confrontation, because the whole purpose of inviting Morrison for a talk was to contrive to reach an understanding with him. Matsuoka changed the subject and touched briefly upon a continental adventurer, T.Miyazaki. After Morrison left the consulate, Matsuoka sent him an urgent message, in which he claimed to have forgotten to mention the issue of continental adventurers: We have lots of these hard-up, crazy ex-officers in Japan, frustrated in finding the means of livelihood, these fellows dare to do almost anything, even to betray their country in some cases (though it is shameful even to mention it).13 These adventurers involved themselves heavily in Chinese affairs, in particular in Manchuria. Some of them were expansionists, regarding Yuan Shih-kai as an obstacle to their ambitions, and attempted to check him even by extreme measures. N.Kawashima, who had influenced Ijūin to advise Uchida to seek the partition of China into three independent nations, and his group attempted to assassinate Yuan with a bomb but failed. This intrigue was secretly supported by some Japanese Army officers.14 Matsuoka confided to Morrison: To tell you the truth, we have our ex-lieutenant ‘worthy’ right in Peking now, who came from Manchuria a few days ago. Information wired us concerning this man states that he is capable of committing any shameful act, and so we are keeping very sharp watch over the fellow. As soon as he shows any sign of undesirable acts performing, we’ll at once order his deportation.15 Apparently, Matsuoka tried to dissociate these men, in Morrison’s eyes, from the Japanese Government in order to end the rumour that the Japanese military or some politicians were giving them financial and other assistance. Incidentally, Morrison let Jordan see Matsuoka’s letter.16 Ijūin believed that ‘since Morrison had already acquired a fair amount of information about these men, it would be better if Matsuoka voluntarily informed Morrison in order to prevent Morrison’s having “a wrong idea”’.17 In fact Morrison knew that, ‘at the time it [Matsuoka’s letter] was written, the Japanese Legation was aware of the presence in Peking of bomb throwers who were subsequently captured and deported to Japan’, as T’ang Shao-yi told Morrison that ‘it was a very serious attempt that had been made upon Yuan, and that the Japanese Legation had acted very well in this matter [by capturing and deporting the culprits]’.18

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Ijūin’s concern regarding Morrison’s trip south is illustrated by the fact that he wired not only Uchida but also the Japanese consuls in Hankow, Shanghai and Nanking, warning them that Morrison was coming. Ijūin informed them of the content of the Morrison-Matsuoka talks and advised them about what subjects and in what manner they ought to talk to Morrison.19 This shows the extent of Japan’s fear of Morrison’s criticisms in The Times. In contrast to Ijūin’s anxiety, Yuan was delighted with Morrison’s departure because he knew that Morrison’s main purpose was to play the role of a flxer/king-maker for Yuan. Yuan was so pleased that he provided Morrison with a complimentary train carriage for his sole use and one of his military officers to escort him for the whole journey Furthermore, a cook and a boy from the Aster House, an exclusive hotel in Peking, were supplied to serve him. When the train arrived at Shun-tsu-fu, the second station master, who was ‘none too civil’, asked Morrison for his ticket. Morrison replied that ‘I am the guest of the Prime Minister and am proceeding in this private car to Hankow’.20 This special treatment by Yuan, however, invited suspicion and there were rumours in some quarters that Morrison was carrying great sums of money on behalf of Yuan in order to bribe anti-Yuan factions of revolutionary leaders. Yoshino and Katō held that there had been a rumour that, on behalf of Yuan, Morrison took 300,000 taels to Shanghai. This rumour, however, seems groundless because there is no evidence whatsoever to substantiate it. Apparently Yoshino and Katō were not certain about this rumour in any case and further wrote that ‘It could be true, although not certain, that Yuan Shih-kai tried to bribe revolutionary leaders.’21 Kuo-feng pao, a Chinese-language newspaper in Shanghai, reported about Morrison’s close friendship with Yuan and Yuan’s providing Morrison with a special train to Hankow.22 On 15 December Morrison arrived at Hankow where he learned about the change of the venue to Shanghai. Sailing down the Yangtse River on the S.S. Ngarkin, he arrived at Nanking.23 W.H.Wilkinson, former Consul-General in Chengtsu in Szechuan province, explained to him the local sentiments: that the Chinese were universally insisting on a republic; that the Manchus could no longer be tolerated.24 Arriving at Shanghai, Morrison talked to E.D.H.Fraser, Consul-General in Shanghai, who said that the southern leaders, but not the rank and file, had a high regard towards Yuan.25 Morrison himself witnessed evidence of the strong anti-Manchu sentiments of the people in the south during his trip. On his railway journey to Hankow he saw the double-dragon flags of the Manchus but after leaving Hankow by steamer, he noticed that all the areas along the Yangtse valley were under the revolutionaries’ control.26 At Shanghai, P.King of the Chinese Maritime Customs took Morrison for a drive passing through the Chinese section of the city where Morrison saw ‘republican flags everywhere, but the poor old dragon nowhere’.27 The imperial delegates headed by T’ang Shao-yi arrived at Shanghai on 16 December. The revolutionary leaders offered them accommodation, but Fraser politely declined on T’ang’s behalf, fearing that, if their offer was accepted, T’ang would be spied on by their ‘underlings’—an idea held by C.D.Bruce.28 Fraser accepted Little’s offer for the delegates to stay at his private residence as his guests. Little’s plan, confided to Morrison, was to place a Sikh or naval guard to ensure that they would be well protected from ‘any hot-headed students or others who may seek to do them harm’. Little wrote to Morrison that his house was on neutral ground,29 but it was, in fact, on British ground because Little represented the British mercantile community in the Shanghai Municipal Council.

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Little’s letter to Morrison shows the great expectations held by the British traders who wished the delegates to put an end to the crisis which had nearly destroyed their trade. Together with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, British business in Shanghai had a strong influence over the Manchu Government. This influence originated from the time of the scramble for concessions in 1897–8, when Jardine Matheson Co. and the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation formed the syndicate called The British and Chinese Corporation Ltd. As Morrison pointed out, this syndicate ‘has been able since then to command almost a monopoly of the British Government support’. The British preserved almost exclusive trade rights along the Yangtse valley.30 Their stance is shown in the letter which Addis, Manager of the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation in London, wrote to Morrison: I am not hopeful of the result if the retention of even a vestige of the Court of the Manchus is made a condition of settlement. However limited its powers, it would still be the hotbed of intrigue and instability. You cannot build on that rotten rock.31 The British community in Shanghai opposed the retention of the Manchu dynasty. T’ang looked depressed on his arrival.32 He shut himself inside Little’s residence and avoided visitors. T’ang explained to A.Ariyoshi, Consul-General in Shanghai, that he had already received several threatening letters from the people of protesting provinces.33 The Chinese Student Committee told O.M. Green of the North China Daily News, in an interview, that they were threatening T’ang with assassination.34 Morrison, who saw T’ang almost every day while in Shanghai, noted in his diary: ‘People are attacking him, are threatening him, yet nobody would be more sympathetic with Republican ideals than he is…. What sympathy can he have for the Manchus?’35 In contrast to T’ang’s low morale, Wu looked high spirited and showed that he, and not Tang, was ‘No. 1’. This was displayed in the incident where Fraser suggested to Wu that, as T’ang was a guest from afar, Wu might like to make the first approach. Wu categorically refused, saying that ‘Tang [sic] has come here to sue for peace [then changed his words into arrange terms with us], so he ought to make the first call I think’. 36 In fact, Wu was merely pretending to be ‘high spirited’, a subject which is examined later. The two negotiators’ behaviour reflected their different mental attitudes to the coming conference: while T’ang went to Shanghai to compromise, Wu intended to win with his demands. Morrison placed himself between them. He would persuade both negotiators to reach a settlement by way of making Yuan Shih-kai republican president.

The first session of the peace conference The peace conference between T’ang Shao-yi and Wu T’ing-fang,37 each accompanied by four assistants, commenced in the Shanghai Town Hall on 18 December 1911. Wu did not present his republican demand at this first session but at the second session on 20 December. This time factor is important for the purpose of this study, and therefore it examines this aspect in some detail.

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The evidence that Wu’s republican demand was made for the first time at the second meeting on 20 December is found in the works of Hirakawa, Yoshino, Katō, Ikei and Usui.38 Fraser’s report to Jordan, referred to by Chan Lau Kitching, also makes the situation clear: on 19 December E.Fraser…received a visit from T’ang Shao-i [sic]. The latter had been informed that at the second meeting of the conference scheduled for the following day, the revolutionaries would demand an acceptance of a republic in return for further negotiations. T’ang asked Fraser to reason with Wu T’ing-fang. Fraser did as requested but found Wu extremely truculent.39 The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, which reported the proceedings of the first session of the conference, did not refer to Wu’s republican demand.40 The Chronology of the Modern Chinese History simply records for 18 December the names of all the delegates headed by T’ang and Wu. For 20 December, however, it clearly states that in the second session of the conference, Wu demanded, among other things, the abdication of the Emperor and the establishment of a republic.41 There are some documents, however, which state that Wu presented the republican demand at the first session on 18 December. Jerome Ch’en wrote that: ‘On the morning of December 18th T’ang Shao-i [sic], Dr Wu T’ingfang and their fellow delegates met…to hear Dr Wu’s four-point plan-[including] the abolition of the Manchu Government in Peking; [and] the creation of a republican Government.’42 Also the Sankei Shimbunsha, which compiled The Secret Records of Chiang Kai-shek, states that: ‘the first session of the North and South negotiation was held at 2 p.m. 18 December 1911, where Wu T’ing-fang presented the four articles’, including abdication of the Manchu Government and establishment of a republican government.43 The statements of Jerome Ch’en and the Sankei Shimbunsha seem erroneous—there is a discrepancy between them as to the meeting time of the conference. While Ch’en states ‘On the morning of December 18th,’ the Sankei Shimbunsha states ‘at 2 p.m. 18 December’. Jordan’s report to Grey also states that ‘From the outset, T’ang Shao-yi found that the other side adhered resolutely to their demand for a republic and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty’.44 Jordan’s report was a résumé written about three weeks later on 6 January 1912. Therefore, what Jordan meant by ‘From the outset’ could be ‘from the early stages of the conference’. In spite of the fact that it had already been known that the national convention at Nanking consisted of the representatives of the revolutionary provinces would decide by vote for a republic,45 Wu did not demand of T’ang a republic at the first session of the peace conference on 18 December. The most likely reason for this might be that Wu was not courageous enough to make this demand because of weaknesses in the revolutionaries’ position. Wu and the revolutionary leaders were well aware that their military and financial position was no match for that of the north. Furthermore, there was division amongst the revolutionary leaders. A national convention, formed by the representatives of the revolutionary provinces, had been in session at Nanking, since shortly after its capture. At the convention, there was a dispute regarding leadership. This disunity was so disastrous to the revolution that the revolution itself looked like ending in

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failure. The power struggle amongst the revolutionary leaders continued, who failed to organize a united front against the north, which further weakened their position. Thus, the revolutionaries’ cause was under-mined before the conference started.46 On 11 December, W.H.Wilkinson was informed by a revolutionary leader that: it will be decided by vote [in the national convention] whether the future Government of China is to be a republic or a constitutional monarchy…even if a constitutional monarchy was the form of Government decided upon, under no circumstances would the revolutionaries agree to a continuance of the present dynasty If they had to have an Emperor, their choice would probably be Duke K’ung, the descendant of Confucius.47 This shows that the revolutionaries did not mind having an Emperor, as long as he was not a Manchu. When T’ang’s group arrived at Wuchang on 15 December, Li Yuan-hung made a four-point proposal which did include the overthrow of the existing dynasty but did not include a demand for a republic.48 Even when T’ang’s group arrived at Shanghai on 16 December, the revolutionaries were still indecisive on the republican issue. Bland claimed that shortly before the conference started, Wu was ready to discuss Yuan Shihkai’s proposal for a limited monarchy: There is evidence to show that, until T’ang Shao-yi’s arrival on the scene, a number of the Shanghai revolutionaries, including Wu T’ingfang, influenced by the recent success of the Imperialists at Wuchang [Wuchang’s recapture], were ready to discuss a settlement on the lines proposed by Yuan Shih-k’ai [sic],49 Some three and a half months later, on 29 March 1912, J.K.Ohl reported in the New York Herald that on his arrival at Shanghai T’ang found: that the revolutionary representatives were ‘ready to quit’ with the knowledge of ‘the superiority of the Northern Army’ and ‘the meagreness of the resources of the Southerners’; that only few leaders believed in the republic idea; and that the majority were ready to accept a constitutional monarchy. Ohl wrote: ‘In secret conferences with the Southern leaders he [T’ang]…gave them assurances of co-operation on the part of Yuan that opened their eyes.’50 It was indeed T’ang Shao-yi himself who encouraged revolutionary leaders to take a firm stance to demand a republic. The peace talks took place on two levels: official and unofficial.51 On 18 December 1911, while the official talks took place in the Shanghai Town Hall under the supervision of the powers, the unofficial talks were held in secret in the Wen-ming Bookstore in Kansu Road, Shanghai, so as not to be detected by the foreign powers who were keeping a sharp watch over the development of the peace talks.52 The secret peace talks were carried on between Liao Yu-ch’un, representing Tuan Ch’i-jui,53 who in turn represented Yuan Shih-kai, and Ku Chung-ch’en, Chief of Staff of the Kiangsu and Chekiang Joint Forces, representing Huang Hsing.54 On 19 December, T’ang Shao-yi and Huang Hsing met and T’ang assured Huang that Yuan would cooperate with the revolutionaries to set up a republic. Then with the endorsement of T’ang and Huang, a secret agreement was signed on 20 December by the above-mentioned

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representatives. The agreement comprised five points: (1) that a republic would be established; (2) that favourable terms of abdication would be granted to the royal family; (3) that whoever should first succeed in causing the downfall of the Manchu dynasty would become president; (4) that all war claims between the armies of the north and the south would be relinquished; and (5) that order would be restored and a provisional parliament organized. This agreement provided the terms which later became the basis of the official agreement.55 As Ohl pointed out, T’ang was ‘responsible for the bold front which Wu Ting Fang [sic] and the men on the South side of the conference table put up’.56 If T’ang was responsible in convincing Wu that Yuan would not object to a republic, Morrison played an equally important role in convincing Wu that the foreign powers would not object to a republic as long as Yuan became president. The question of why Morrison, a newspaper correspondent, could exert such influence on Wu is important. The reason was that Morrison had a special relationship with Wu T’ing-fang. In order to appreciate this relationship and how Morrison influenced Wu, it is necessary to look at a very important incident in the past, as follows.57 There is evidence to suggest strongly that in January 1901, Wu had supplied Morrison with a confidential document which enabled Morrison to prevent the signing of a RussoChinese secret agreement. In late 1900, although the Boxer rebellion had already been suppressed, Russia did not withdraw its troops from Manchuria, intending eventually to take it over. Realizing Russia’s intention, Morrison endeavoured to block it. Russia coerced China into signing the Manchurian Convention (the Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement) in November 1900, which could virtually have led to the surrender of Manchuria into Russian hands and have made it a de facto Russian protectorate.58 Morrison obtained a copy of the document and disclosed it in The Times of 3 January 1901. His scoop shocked the powers, in particular Britain and Japan.59 In order to ratify the Manchurian Convention, Lamsdorff, Russian Foreign Minister, pressed Yang Ju, Chinese Minister in St Petersburg, to sign a proper treaty in February 1901, to be kept secret from the other powers. Yang Ju sent the draft of the treaty in the form of a private secret message to Li Hung-chang and Prince Ch’ing. Its arrival became known immediately to Morrison and others who were ‘at once on the alert’.60 Morrison endeavoured to obtain a copy, but in vain. He was frustrated and ‘very much worried’.61 However, on 26 February, he managed to obtain the document, which he disclosed in The Times of 28 February 1901. For Japan it was a matter of national security. If Manchuria went to Russia, then Korea, which Japan regarded as its life line, would eventually be lost. In desperation Japan launched, with the risk of war, a vigorous diplomatic offensive, and Morrison launched an equally vigorous media offensive. On 5 April 1901, Russia finally gave up the intended conclusion of the Yang Ju-Lamsdorff Treaty This was a victory for Japan. The leading authority in the study of Anglo-Japanese relations, I.H. Nish describes this incident as ‘like a coming-of-age ceremony’ of Japanese diplomacy.62 It was also a victory for Morrison. He became a hero and benefactor of the Japanese and a persona non grata to the Russians. This incident made Morrison world famous. Morrison was able to attain this status, because he managed to obtain a copy of the secret treaty from St Petersburg through his ‘patriotic’ Chinese friend. The evidence strongly suggests that this Chinese friend was Wu T’ing-fang. Morrison’s diary reads: ‘Hillier says that Li Hung-chang sleeps on the Russian agreement and that it is impossible

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to obtain it, but Wu is trying’.63 Four years later, Morrison noted in his reminiscence how he obtained the secret document: Information was always difficult to obtain…and but for the help of a patriotic Chinese who disclosed the intrigues that were menacing their country, the world might have remained in even greater ignorance than it did…. On Sunday 24 February 1901, I saw my Chinese friend and as the document might be signed that very week I urged him to try to obtain it. On the evening of Monday I received a note from him saying that he could not obtain it but that he was still trying. On Tuesday evening he sent it to me.64 Wu T’ing-fang was closely associated with Li Hung-chang. He accompanied Li to Japan when Li signed the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty with Japan in 1895 after the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War. Then Wu entered diplomatic service under Li Hungchang and was in Washington as Chinese Minister from 1897 till 1901. Returning to our narrative, now on to Shanghai in December 1911, Morrison wrote to Wu T’ing-fang and received his reply the same day: 18 December 1911 Dear Dr. Morrison, I am glad to hear from you that you have arrived here. Though I am extremely busy, I cannot forgo the pleasure of seeing an old friend from Peking. If you will kindly call tomorrow between 3 and 4 p.m., I shall be most happy to see you. Yours very truly Wu T’ing-fang65 On 19 December, they had a good talk. Wu was in high spirits and started off ‘very loud and blatant’ so that ‘all might hear his Republican platitudes. [Wu is] growing younger. Eating vegetables, living on immaterial.’ They argued and discussed many points. Wu confided in Morrison that he was in favour of a constitutional monarchy but that ‘the luck of the country favours a republic’.66 Wu’s statement is supported by E.Fraser who told Morrison that ‘Wu T’ing-fang did favour a Constitutional Monarchy but others were too strong for him’.67 Wu repeated the contents of his conversation with Morrison to P.King of the Chinese Maritime Customs in Shanghai, who recorded: He [Wu] had seen Dr. Morrison…and put before him the view that… the Chinese were determined to have a Chinese Government, whether republican or limited monarchy was immaterial, but the Manchu element must go.68 Wu did not mind a limited monarchy or a republic. What he was resolutely demanding was the elimination of all Manchu elements from power. Morrison agreed. He emphasized ‘the danger of keeping the child Emperor’, and said ‘The Manchus cannot be

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retained in any shape or form.’69 Wu stressed that ‘If Yuan Shih-kai will come over to us the matter is settled’ and regretted that Yuan was supporting the Manchu dynasty: Yuan Shih-kai is the stumbling block. If he had not come out of retirement the Manchus would long since have been finished. The Court was all prepared to flee, they had made all preparations. Yuan’s coming out prevented their flight. Now Chinese are killing other Chinese to keep the Manchus on the throne.70 The revolutionaries invited Yuan to come over to their side, but Yuan was still outwardly declaring his loyalty to the Manchu dynasty. The revolutionaries understood that Yuan’s refusal was largely due to the objection to a republic by the foreign powers, in particular Britain and Japan. This is where Morrison played a significant role, carrying out his own personal diplomacy independent of the British Foreign Office. He told Wu that Britain was not necessarily supporting a monarchy and that if Yuan Shih-kai, and not anyone else, was made president, the powers would recognize a republic: It was hopeless to expect that any other leader such as Sun Yat-sen, who knew nothing about China, or Li Yuan-hung, who had no standing outside of his own province, could, if appointed President of the Republic, obtain for the Republic early recognition from foreign Powers…. Yuan Shih-kai alone could obtain the confidence of the Powers, because he had shown capacity for administration greater than any other recent Chinese statesman.71 Wu replied that he was ‘confident that he will talk T’ang Shao-yi over’. Morrison assured him that ‘if Yuan were made president, the Republic would receive immediate foreign recognition’.72 Wu could now afford to be bold and adamant in officially demanding a republic at the conference without worrying about foreign intervention. In the second session of the conference of 20 December, Wu resolutely demanded a republic and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty,73 his attitude ‘being obviously stiffened by the information and advice tendered by the Imperial delegate’74 T’ang Shao-yi and by Morrison. Morrison then had talks with other revolutionary leaders such as Wen Tsung-yao,75 Chen Chin-tao76 and Wang Ching-ch’un.77 Wen Tsung-yao criticized Jordan’s friendship with Yuan Shih-kai and Yuan’s intimacy with Prince Ch’ing. Apparently, Jordan was not popular amongst the revolutionary leaders. E.Fraser told Morrison that ‘Sir John’s idea to arrest Wu T’ing-fang and Wen Tsung-yao would have caused a riot’.78 Morrison promoted Yuan’s cause, reminding Wen of Yuan’s courage by staying in Peking in the midst of the Manchus, exposing himself to great danger, while the revolutionaries kept away. Morrison also criticized Wu T’ing-fang stating that Wu ‘favours the change of the capital because he is afraid to go to Peking. Personal fear of the pusillanimous agitators is the chief reason for renouncing the capital.’79 Morrison pointed out to Wen Tsung-yao that Yuan’s wish was ‘to prevent bloodshed and foreign interference’ and that the powers held Yuan in immense respect. Morrison emphasized that Yuan Shih-kai alone could obtain foreign loans. Wen said that T’ang Shao-yi had come to sow dissension. Morrison

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said ‘Nonsense’, and ‘strongly’ defended T’ang, saying ‘no one is as republican as he is, perhaps, not so extremist’.80 Before Morrison left Shanghai, he received the following message from Wen: The question at issue is not one of sentiment versus reality, nor one of Chinese versus Manchus: but one of Chinese versus the Manchu dynasty with the adoption of a Republic as the most effective fulcrum to ensure its extinction, and the only possible means of satisfying the wishes of the people.81 Thus Wen made it clear that he was against the Manchu dynasty, and not against Yuan Shih-kai. Morrison ‘did a good deal to assist Yuan Shih-kai’ by talking to the revolutionary leaders. He wrote to Braham: ‘The revolutionary leaders declared to me that he [Yuan] should certainly be appointed first President of the Chinese Republic, and that they were prepared to give that undertaking now in writing.’82 Reformers such as Wu T’ing-fang and Wen Tsung-yao were said to have desired to build a republican nation, inspired by their own patriotism and political ideology Believing that they were grappling with the task of ‘their self-chosen role of saviour of the State’,83 Wu T’ing-fang, Wen Tsung-yao and Li Ping-shu had organized a republican committee in Shanghai at the beginning of November 1911.84 However, Morrison thought, although he did not declare it, that to impose a quasi-Western-style democracy and republic on a tradition-bound and Emperor-revering China was still premature. Hence he regarded Wu’s passion for a republic as a mere dream of a visionary King described Morrison in his memoirs as follows: ‘Even so astute an observer of things Chinese as the late Dr. Morrison was inclined to look upon Wu as a visionary and on his Republic as a vain dream.’85 Morrison changed his view of Wu, however, when King pointed out that Wu was ‘a self-made man and rich’, and that a visionary makes no money.86 Morrison realized that Wu was a practical man. Probably because Wu was practical he was hesitant to push his republican demands at the time when he had believed the foreign powers would object. With Morrison’s assurance, however, he realized that he could officially put forward his republican demand at the peace conference. Bland most aptly commented that Morrison ‘exercised a very powerful influence…upon the atti-tude of the Republican leaders themselves’.87 Thus Morrison played a vital role in the course of the conference and in the revolution itself.

The second session of the peace conference On 19 December 1911, Morrison learned from T’ang Shao-yi the main reason for Yuan Shih-kai’s hesitancy in declaring his support for a republic. It was Yuan’s fear of Japan. Morrison recorded in his diary: ‘Always his fear is Japan, his distrust is of Japan! Japan supports the Monarchy! Japan to intervene! Always his fear of Japan.’88 In order to help remove the fears of Yuan and T’ang, Morrison explained to T’ang that Japan could not afford to offend the Chinese people because Japan was afraid of trade reprisals: ‘Japan was finan-cially in straits, Japan was never going to pursue a policy which would provoke a boycott from the great mass of the people. “Boycott” they feared more than

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most.’89 Morrison further explained that Japan could not afford to offend the United States: ‘And why should they oppose a Republic? Dare they do anything which might be misinterpreted in America?’ Morrison pointed out that his fears were ‘groundless’ and encouraged T’ang to ‘take the bull by the horns’.90 It was difficult, however, for the Chinese to oppose the will of the foreign powers. The powers’ control of China’s politics and economy was so great that China could not change from a monarchy to a republic without their endorsement, if not permission. There were sufficient reasons for the Chinese to be afraid of pressure from the powers.91 Their keen interest in the conference was demonstrated in the form of the identical notes handed to the two negotiating sides on 20 December by the governments of Britain, Japan, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. The notes comprised three paragraphs. The first merely intimated to the negotiators that the government of such and such a country was presenting the note.92 The second paragraph carried the following message: ‘The Government of (such nation) considers that the continuation of the present struggle in China exposes not only the country itself but also the material interests and the security of foreigners to grave danger.’93 The third paragraph, which conveyed the powers’ attitude of absolute neutrality, was but ‘a futile proceeding at best’ as Bland pointed out.94 The notes were intended to remind the negotiators of the powers’ close involvement in the Chinese dispute. The notes could have been taken as a mild threat that, if the struggle were to continue, the powers might intervene. No wonder the Chinese were acutely conscious of the powers’ watchful eyes. Morrison observed that the notes had encouraged the revolutionaries: The action of the six Great Powers in handing identical Notes to the peace delegates, being the first official recognition of the Revolutionary Party as belligerents, has added prestige to the Revolutionary cause, which is gaining strength.95 The two negotiators’ responses show that Morrison’s comment was correct. T’ang, regarding the notes in the same light as Morrison, reported to Yuan that the revolutionaries had taken the notes as recognizing them as equal to the imperial government, and consequently their morale was boosted.96 While T’ang simply thanked the powers, Wu had the courage to declare to them that he would not ignore the will of his people and would object to a ‘patched up peace’, which could lead to a further revolution.97 Japan, prior to its joint action with the other powers in handing the notes to the negotiators, independently passed an unofficial note to both negotiators, which read: ‘His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Government deems it its duty unofficially to call attention of the two delegates to the need of arriving as soon as possible at an understanding calculated to put an end to the present conflicts.’98 In this way Japan warned T’ang and Wu that Japan, whose wish was for a monarchy in China, was carefully watching developments. At the second session of the peace conference on 20 December 1911, Wu was resolute in insisting that ‘the people would accept no other form of Government than a Republic founded upon the will of the people’, and urged the necessity of the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty.99 Wu declared that ‘No compromise whatever could be discussed.’ Furthermore Wu announced that a republic ought to embrace not only 18 provinces but

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also Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet. Wu guaranteed that if the main republican demands were met, the Emperor would receive generous treatment and that the Manchus would be entitled to full rights of citizenship equal to those of the Chinese.100 With Morrison’s assurance that the powers would give immediate recognition to a republic so long as Yuan was made president, Wu could now afford to press his republican demand. Although T’ang made no secret of his personal sympathies with the republican cause, T’ang’s official reply was: ‘the question was so vitally important that it must be referred to Yuan Shih-kai’ in order to secure a formal reply.101 At this point it was decided that the proceedings would be suspended until such a date when T’ang could give a formal reply. In this session it became clear that T’ang and Wu shared the same objective of establishing a republic. The outcome of the conference was already expected in some well-informed quarters even before the conference opened. The China Press of Shanghai pointed out on 12 December that ‘Between Imperialist and Republican the difference is, in reality, one of form and not of substance.’102 E.A.Selle, biographer of W.H.Donald,103 described the conciliatory mood of the second session: [Wu said] ‘Let us not argue about it. The Manchus…have failed after more than two hundred and fifty years as our conquerors’. He stopped and gazed at Tong [T’ang] for some time. ‘I am a Cantonese,’ he said. ‘You are a Cantonese. We are all Cantonese’. He [T’ang] said ‘I agree with everything you say’. Dignity was forgotten. The rebels stood up and whooped. Tong [T’ang] had been won over. The difficulties of the moment were at an end.104 This is obviously a dramatization of the scene, based probably on hearsay, because only the delegates were allowed in the conference room, but nevertheless it seems to convey the atmosphere of the conference. It could well have captured the true feelings of Wu and T’ang. After all they were old friends.105 China had been like a federal state, where political/social characteristics differed greatly from province to province.106 Dillon held that China’s key political characteristic was its decentralization, which was loosely managed by the central government.107 E.P.Young maintains that the revolution can be seen as an affair which gave vent to a provincialism which had been suppressed during the preceding years.108 In view of the railway riots where provincial consciousness was vigorously expressed, Young’s claim seems appropriate. A sense of solidarity amongst fellow provincials played an important part in this revolution. After the second session of the conference, the official communiqué, which concluded that ‘His Excellency Tong [T’ang] Shao-yi expresses his readiness to accept Dr. Wu’s views, but as revolution is one of greatest importance he has to communicate with Peking’,109 was distributed to both the foreign and Chinese newspapers.110 Contents differed between the native and foreign language papers and it was difficult for those who could not read the Chinese papers to learn the truth. This was because European language newspapers were usually financed by various interest groups and served as their organs ‘by suppressing, inventing and distorting facts to order’. The communiqué to the Chinese papers additionally contained T’ang’s statement:111 ‘Personally, I am in favour of a Republic, which is the only solution of the present crises.’112 The tone of the local

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newspapers, which had been disposed to compromise by accepting the retention of the monarchy one week before T’ang’s arrival, suddenly became ‘boldly republican’. T’ang equally became bold and affirmed to Ariyoshi that primarily he had been a republican.113 Bland claimed that T’ang was responsible for the newspapers’ change.114 T’ang’s next task was to obtain from Yuan a formal reply to Wu’s republican demand. The T’ang-Yuan correspondence was on two levels, official and unofficial. On the official level, T’ang reported to Yuan that it was impossible to refuse Wu’s republican demand and proposed for Yuan to persuade the Emperor to issue an edict summoning a national convention which would decide the future form of the government reflecting the people’s will.115 Bland aptly called T’ang’s proposal ‘a death warrant’ to the Manchu dynasty.116 The result of the vote was already known to be for a republic, because, except for the four northern provinces of Manchuria, Chihli, Shantung and Honan, all the provinces had already declared independence.117 The substance of Yuan’s reply was: acceptance of a republic would be difficult; the six powers would not recognize a republic; continue negotiations.118 T’ang wrote again: If and when the negotiations fail, there would be no guarantee for lives and property of foreigners in China. The only one way out of difficulty is to submit the question of republic or monarchy to the vote of a representative national convention. If you disagree with this, I shall resign as delegate.119 Because these letters were exchanged through the British channel of Fraser and Jordan, they knew their contents.120 Yuan Shih-kai also sent copies of the T’ang-Yuan official correspondence to Ijūin on 22 December.121 Their unofficial correspondence is more important because it gives the true picture. Morrison’s diary enables us to learn its content because of T’ang’s disclosure to Morrison, promising that he would treat Morrison ‘with much confidence’, which Morrison believed.122 It is to be noted once again that Morrison’s contribution to the student of history is invaluable. According to Morrison’s diary, Yuan’s unofficial reply was: In my heart I desire peace. I have received your dispatch regarding proposal for national assembly and am considering it. But suppose the decision should be for Republic I fear the action of England and Japan. Ijuin [sic] tells me that ‘under no circumstances whatever will Japan recognise a Republic of China’.123 So, the true cause of Yuan’s fear was not just Japan but Britain and japan acting in concert. Morrison noted in his diary: ‘He [T’ang] says Yuan is obsessed with the idea that Japan and England are prepared to intervene, even by force if necessary, to prevent the establishment of a republican Government.’124 If it was only of Japan, his fear would not have been so great. Morrison believed that Yuan’s fear of an Anglo-Japanese joint opposition was caused by ‘the veiled threat made by Ijuin [sic]’. Morrison reported to Braham:

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Having carefully allowed the Chinese to know that England and Japan were acting in unison… Ijuin [sic] took the opportunity, when the Republican cause seemed to be gaining ground, of informing Yuan Shihkai that ‘under no circumstances whatever’ would the Japanese Government recognise the establishment of a Republican Government in China.125 Yuan’s mistaken notion of the two nations’ joint opposition to a republic was highly likely brought about by the following process. On 11 December, Ijūin requested Yuan to seek advice from Britain and Japan prior to consulting with any other powers, if/when T’ang failed to reach agreement on the basis of a constitutional monarchy in the approaching peace talks. Ijūin added that: The other powers would not mind it [if Yuan sought Japan’s advice] in view of Japan’s position in the Far East. In particular, Britain, Japan’s ally, would not doubt Japan’s sincerity. Therefore when you seek Britain’s advice, please consult with me too. I do not mind at all if you tell Mr Jordan that you also consulted with me.126 Thus Ijūin emphasized the importance of the Alliance and then shortly after this, he told Yuan that Japan would never recognize a republic. Yuan therefore naturally took this to mean that Japan and Britain together were opposed to a republic.127 Morrison explained to Straight how Yuan’s erroneous notion originated: Jordan and Ijuin acted under explicit instructions from their chiefs to cooperate. Separately they both so informed Yuan. Ijūin, however, without telling Jordan, advised Yuan that Japan would never recognise a republic and would interfere with force, if necessary, to prevent its establishment. In view of what both Jordan and Ijūin had said about cooperation, Yuan took this as meaning that Great Britain agreed with this attitude.128 That was why T’ang was also misled to believe in Anglo-Japanese joint opposition to a republic. Morrison observed that Jordan was in a difficult position: Sir John Jordan has had a position of much delicacy, for he had to appear to be working in concert with the Japanese when he was not doing so. See how easy it was for a misunderstanding to arise. Yuan Shih-kai telegraphed down to T’ang Shao-yi that England and Japan, acting together, would oppose the establishment of a Chinese Republic, and that he had been informed that all the other great Powers had come to a similar understanding.129 Although Jordan did not tell Yuan that Britain and Japan were acting together, he did tell Yuan that ‘the only possible solution was generally considered to be a constitutional Government, with nominal Manchu sovereignty’.130

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Through his conversation with T’ang Shao-yi, Morrison became suspicious that T’ang’s proposal to Wu T’ing-fang for a national convention had been made ‘with the full approval of Yuan Shih-kai’. He did not have proof but he had ‘no doubt’ in his mind that ‘Yuan must have been prepared for the intimation that he [T’ang] made, even if such intimation was not made by his [Yuan’s] explicit orders’. Morrison noted in his diary: ‘Yuan Shih-kai had surely arranged T’ang Shao-yi’s coup!’131 The word ‘coup’ was used because T’ang’s proposal in substance meant the abdication of the Emperor. As time passed, Morrison became certain that Yuan and T’ang had been in collusion. Morrison wrote to Braham: ‘I have never had any doubt whatever that Yuan Shih-kai was fully aware of T’ang Shao-yi’s intentions when he sent the latter to Shanghai.’132 Morrison also wrote to W.W.Rockhill in Russia: ‘That he [T’ang] did so with the knowledge and approval of Yuan Shih-kai I am convinced.’133 Nevertheless, he took an extremely tolerant attitude towards them, stating that ‘In these matters everyone lies a little or a great deal—something is always kept back’,134 most likely because he wanted their scheme, to make Yuan a republican president, to succeed. Other contemporary observers such as Ariyoshi, Saitō, Fraser and Jordan also thought that T’ang and Yuan had an understanding to attain a republic. As early as 24 December 1911, speculating that a T’ang-Yuan secret understanding existed, Ariyoshi asked T’ang: ‘Is Yuan Shih-kai still insisting on a constitutional monarchy or is there any possibility for him to accept a republic out of necessity?’135 T’ang replied that Yuan seemed to have realized by now that it would be impossible to resist the revolutionaries. Ariyoshi, not being satisfied by this evasive reply, tried further to sound out the truth, using a different approach. T’ang answered: ‘The expectation that Yuan and I had held before I left Peking was that an agreement would be reached with Wu on the basis of a constitutional monarchy but it is now unlikely’ T’ang further stated that: The most important is to reach an agreement one way or the other in order to end the hostility…. Only if Yuan could obtain an edict…then the hostility would end and Yuan would eventually become republican president. However, Yuan is hesitating to obtain an edict in fear of inviting Japan’s wrath.136 Ariyoshi reported to Uchida: In my judgment, it is most likely that from the outset Yuan Shih-kai had a tacit understanding with T’ang Shao-yi that Yuan would become the first republican president and that T’ang had come down here with this purpose in mind.137 Ariyoshi predicted that there would be a dramatic change in Yuan’s attitude within a few days. In view of the fact that Yuan obtained an edict two days later on 28 December 1911, as will be shown later, Ariyoshi’s prediction was correct. T.Saitō, a lieutenant-colonel in the Japanese Army, asserted that he had heard from an officer of the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Chinese Army that T’ang’s mission as delegate was to reach an agreement with the revolutionaries even at the cost of the Emperor’s abdication.138 Fraser, who transmitted the T’ang-Yuan official correspondence

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to Yuan through Jordan, suspected that something was wrong but could not work it out. Frustrated, he told Morrison: ‘All the people are lying, everyone is keeping something back. What game are they at? What is Yuan really scheming?’139 Morrison, however, did not disclose to him what game Yuan and T’ang were playing. As early as 18 November, Jordan observed that: A republic with Yuan Shih-kai as President is evidently the final solution…and it is for that object that he [T’ang] appears to be working.’ Jordan speculated that: ‘In so doing he [T’ang] enjoys…probably the acquies-cence of Yuan himself.’140 Jordan’s speculation was not firm, because later, on 6 January 1912, he reported to Grey: ‘He [T’ang] appears to have been so influenced by his surroundings as to have expressed his sympathy with the republican ideal.’141 Some 10 years later Jordan wrote: Yuan himself would…have preferred to retain the young emperor as a figure-head and establish a Constitutional Monarchy with himself as Prime Minister…. But the telegrams from Shanghai, where T’ang Shao-yi was carrying on negotiations with the Southern leaders, showed clearly that the South was insistent upon a Republic and Yuan …reluctantly accepted the alternative of a Republic.142 Thus Jordan thought T’ang had changed his stance after arriving at Shanghai. Although Jordan was ‘in close communication all throughout this crisis’ with Yuan,143 and sometimes was suspicious of Yuan’s motives,144 he did not realize that Yuan and T’ang had an arrangement before T’ang’s departure south. The Secret Record of Chiang Kaishek claims that T’ang and Yuan had already been in accord on their republican scheme prior to the peace conference.145 In addition to these contemporary observers, there are historians who have made similar claims. Yoshino and Katō suggest that the action T’ang took in Shanghai had already been decided upon between himself and Yuan before T’ang’s departure from Peking.146 J.Ch’en holds that Chao Ping-chun said that Hung Tsushu urged T’ang to have discussions with Yuan Shih-kai, before his departure, about ‘a detailed plan for deposing the Emperor’.147 Although Morrison was convinced, and some others speculated, that T’ang acted with the full approval of Yuan, most contemporary observers did not realize this. They regarded T’ang’s behaviour as an act of treachery and disloyalty to the dynasty and Yuan. T’ang’s ‘defection from the Imperialist cause’148 was much criticized. Bland repeatedly condemned T’ang: Had T’ang Shao-yi been faithful to his [Yuan’s] trust as Imperial delegate to the revolutionaries…the republican program would have received its quietus.149 [Yuan] would have won if T’ang Shao-yi…had not betrayed his confidence.150 The part played by T’ang Shao-yi as Yuan’s delegate…has greatly damaged him in the eyes of Chinese and foreigners alike.151 McCormick wrote that ‘The Throne and Yuan Shih-kai have been completely abandoned by T’ang Shao-yi…he [Yuan] felt himself betrayed by his envoy.’152 Straight ‘was inclined to believe that T’ang-Shao-yi, in submitting to the republic, had betrayed

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Yuan’.153 Weale claimed that, in mid-December after despatching T’ang Shao-yi to Shanghai for the peace conference, Yuan ‘soon found himself committed to a course of action different from what he had originally contemplated’.154 Keen observers such as Bland, McCormick, Straight and Weale, who were supposed to have been well versed in Chinese affairs, regarded T’ang as a betrayer because they believed that Yuan was a monarchist. T’ang, however, did not betray Yuan. T’ang performed his role according to the plan made prior to his departure. His true mission in the name of imperial delegate was in fact to make the Emperor abdicate so as to make Yuan republican president. The most crucial task for the T’ang-Yuan team, at this stage, was to remove Yuan’s monarchical mask without causing trouble with the powers. They had to do this sooner or later but T’ang was urging Yuan to do it immediately Morrison noted in his diary that ‘T’ang Shao-yi had to help Yuan, had to go slowly, yet not slowly but very quickly had he moved’.155 Yuan, on the other hand, feared to ‘fall between two stools’156 by prematurely offending the dynasty before securing the presidency. Now that T’ang had made his republican sympathy known publicly, Morrison defended T’ang in The Times: No surprise is felt here nor among his friends that T’ang Shao-yi should have so early declared Republican sympathies. Ardently desiring to prevent further bloodshed, and convinced that the majority of the people will accept no compromise involving the retention of a puppet Emperor of a despised and distrusted dynasty, he has taken the only possible course and given his adhesion to a Republic.157 Morrison now openly supported the revolutionary cause for establishing a Republic of China. Later, in August 1912 when Morrison became political adviser to Yuan Shih-kai, the republican president, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun wrote about Morrison’s career and under the subtitle of ‘Dr Morrison and China’, the paper commented that during the Hsinhai Revolution, Morrison became a Sinophile and formed so close a relationship with T’ang Shao-yi that he published biased articles in T’ang’s favour.158 Morrison played a part in deciding the direction of the course of the Shanghai conference from outside the conference room by encouraging the two negotiators to declare openly and resolutely their intention for a republic—a republic with Yuan Shihkai as president. Hirakawa claims that Morrison played an important role in the conference.159 Pearl goes so far as to describe T’ang and Wu as ‘Morrison’s confidants’.160 Morrison thus worked towards his objective to make Yuan Shih-kai the republican president, and in so doing strengthen British influence in China and reduce that of Japan.

Morrison’s personal diplomacy While encouraging Wu T’ing-fang and T’ang Shao-yi to work towards making Yuan Shih-kai republican president, Morrison launched his own campaign. He approached the Japanese Government and strongly recommended support for making Yuan republican president. On 20 December 1911, Morrison visited Ariyoshi in the Japanese Consulate in

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Shanghai and categorically stated that ‘in order to solve the present crisis, there is no other way but to make Yuan Shih-kai republican president’.161 Morrison pointed out the hopelessness of the Southern Army. He explained the relative strength of the north and south and that the Northern Army was better equipped, better trained and, in view of the approach of winter, had the advantage. Morrison argued that because of this, the revolutionary leaders would not oppose Yuan as republican president as long as Yuan forced the dismissal of the Manchu dynasty.162 Then Morrison broached his favourite subject of the foreign powers’ pressure—a subject on which Japan had always been quite sensitive. He said, ‘Should either Huang Hsing or Sun Yat-sen be made republican president, it is quite doubtful whether the powers would recognize the republic.’ Morrison disclosed the existence of a secret agreement between Yuan and T’ang which stated that ‘Yuan would resign if the peace negotiation failed’,163 and asked Ariyoshi ‘If that ever happened, who else could control the Northern Army and settle the present crisis?’ Further, Morrison reminded Ariyoshi that the republican cause had public support. He then explained his method of realizing Yuan’s republican presidency—the two negotiators would force the dynasty to retire to Jehol, and then make the Manchu Court agree to a republic. Morrison confided to Ariyoshi that he had already convinced Wu T’ing-fang to consent to this plan. Morrison acted as if he was giving Ariyoshi friendly advice. In order to demonstrate this, he added the following remark: To those Chinese who are seriously concerned about Japan’s ulterior motives, I always make it a point to explain that if Japan had ambitions in Manchuria, it would be easy for them to take action there, but Manchuria is at peace. This fact shows that Chinese anxiety is due solely to their own suspicious minds.164 For Morrison to recommend a Chinese republic to Japan was a bold step. This proposal was his individual unofficial diplomacy, which was in fact against British Government policy, hitherto expressed by Jordan. Furthermore, almost all foreign newspapers abroad were opposed to a republic in China.165 Morrison’s ‘friendly advice’ was, therefore, a ‘thunderbolt’ even to Ariyoshi, who, according to E.Fraser, was the ‘best informed’ in the consular body in Shanghai.166 Judging from Morrison’s tone, Ariyoshi was convinced that Morrison was confident of the success of his proposal.167 After his conversation with Morrison, Ariyoshi reported to Uchida and Ijūin: ‘Morrison stated that there was no other way of settling the crisis but to make Yuan Shihkai republican president.’168 The message was a shock to them both because it came from Morrison, whom they regarded as an influential institution in Peking. They knew that Morrison’s advice was not to be treated lightly. On 21 December, Ijūin was just about to visit Jordan to discuss Morrison’s proposal when Jordan appeared in the Japanese Legation.169 Apparently Jordan had also received a telegram about the Morrison proposal.170 The proposal had a dramatic effect on Jordan. He changed his support from the dynasty to a republic. Their conversation was as follows: JORDAN: In the peace conference, it appears almost hopeless to expect retention of the Manchu dynasty. As a choice, how about adopting ‘Morrison’s proposal’ to settle the crisis by making Yuan Shih-kai republican president?

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IJŪIN: Do you expect it to be possible to restore order in China by abolishing the Ch’ing dynasty and establishing a republic? Dr Morrison seems to be advocating Yuan as republican president, believing that Yuan is generally respected and trusted by the whole nation. But I don’t agree with him. We cannot ignore the fact that there exists a strong anti-Yuan sentiment in the South. Even if Yuan becomes president…it is quite doubtful that his rule would last long. JORDAN: My belief from the outset of the revolution has been that the best solution is to retain a constitutional monarchy under the Manchus…. But there is no way of compelling the revolutionaries to agree. The only way is to choose one of two evils, break-down of the peace conference or a republic. IJŪIN: I agree with you to choose the lesser evil of the two. However, a republic is likely to prove impracticable and to lead to a break-down of China. If this happened, it is quite obvious that the problem would expand from domestic to international…. If the present situation is really like the one reported from Shanghai, perhaps application of some pressure from a third party is inevitable in order to secure a settlement. JORDAN: As a matter of principle, I quite agree with you. However, because Britain has important trade interests in the south and central China, we cannot afford to run a risk of our interests being threatened, by forcing the Chinese into a constitutional monarchy and disregarding their opinions and feelings. It is more so at the present time when a person like Dr Morrison is sending telegrams to his newspaper in London, promoting Yuan for president. 171 The two ministers kept on arguing about various aspects of the matter but in fact they were just repeating the same thing. In the end Ijùin proposed that the matter had to be decided by the two governments, to which Jordan agreed.172 Until 20 December 1911, Jordan had never agreed to a republic. This was the first time ever that he expressed his consent to Yuan becoming republican president. Britain’s policy had been ‘strict neutrality’, although it was ‘neutrality with a pro-Yuan bias’.173 Obviously the direct and immediate cause of Jordan’s change was the Morrison proposal. Commenting on Jordan’s change, Ijùin reported to Uchida that it was not because of his sympathy for the revolutionaries but because of Morrison’s influence upon him.174 Morrison did influence Jordan to change his mind. It is an exaggeration to claim, however, that Morrison was the only influence. British merchants and missionaries whose sympathies were for the revolutionaries also played a role. Hirakawa made the following observation: from the outset of the revolution, the attitude of the British in China was divided; one view was that of the diplomats in Peking, and the other, that of the British merchants and agitators in the Shanghai area and British missionaries all over inland China. The former, under the name of ‘strict neutrality’, tended to support Yuan Shih-kai, who was supposed to have adhered to a limited monarchy, while the latter, in support of the revolutionaries, opposed the view of the British officials.175 Morrison appreciated missionaries’ interest, vigour and dedication which helped increase British prestige in the Far East, and he regarded their work as ‘the great value for civilisation’.176 Missionaries mainly resided in the interior but the mercantile communities resided in the treaty ports which were ‘the breeding bed and stamping ground’ of the revolutionaries. The survival of British mercantile interests depended on peace. In order to conduct business and to protect their vested interests, they could not

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afford to prolong the disturbances nor offend the revolutionaries.177 As Morrison reported, the British Legation was deeply concerned to protect its vast interests in Shanghai.178 Jordan nevertheless was strongly in support of Yuan’s policy to adhere to a monarchy—hence the pressure from the British mercantile community on the Peking diplomats.179 Reflecting the views of the British mercantile communities in China, the English language news-papers in the treaty ports criticized the attitude of the British authorities. The papers also served as a medium to convey the views of missionaries, who were the main correspondents to the papers from the hinterland. Their sympathy for the oppressed, which derived from their sense of justice, was reflected in the papers. Thus the press in the treaty ports almost unanimously and ‘loudly’ protested against the diplomats’ support for a constitutional monarchy.180 The opinion of the southern interest groups gradually influenced the attitude of the British officials in Peking. Confronted with this opposition, Jordan could no longer maintain the stance of ‘strict neutrality’.181 Morrison acted as the spearhead for these groups. Hirakawa specifically named Morrison as the driving force in influencing Jordan’s conversion: ‘In particular, the sympathetic tone of Morrison, correspondent of The London Times, seemed to have been the most powerful force in bringing about the change in attitude of the British officials in Peking.’182 K.Usui claims that around 20 December the movement to establish a republic under Yuan’s presidency suddenly came from Shanghai.183 According to Chan Lau Kit-ching: G.E.Morrison’s stay in Shanghai just at this juncture was no doubt to the advantage of the revolutionaries…. Jordan could hardly slight the studied opinion of someone who had recommended his current appointment, and who was instrumental in moulding British public opinion on Chinese affairs.184 Chan’s remark seems most appropriate. Morrison had studied the local situation and sentiment. As already shown, he had discussions with British consular officials, Wilkinson and Fraser, Donald of the New York Herald, and Bruce, British Commissioner of Police at Shanghai.185 Morrison also had talks with T.Richard of the London Missionary Society, P. King of the Chinese Maritime Customs, O.M.Green, Editor of the North China Daily News, J.C.Ferguson, an American adventurer and A.W.Pope, General Manager of the Imperial Chinese Railways, and others. Morrison had discussions with revolutionary leaders such as Wu T’ing-fang, Wen Tsung-yao, Chen Chin-tao, Wang Chin-ch’un and others.186 He learned from them the views prevailing in the south. His interests agreed with those of the British mercantile community in the south and therefore he acted willingly as their vanguard. His goal was to make Yuan Shih-kai head of the nation. For Morrison, the form of government was a secondary issue. The British merchants’ interest was to end the crisis as soon as possible and a republic was the only way to achieve this. To them, the question of who becomes head of the nation was secondary. Therefore to make Yuan Shih-kai republican president satisfied the needs of both Morrison and the British merchants. Thus, although Morrison’s proposal was the immediate cause of Jordan’s change of policy, other causes also helped bring this about. These included Jordan’s personal wish to make Yuan Shih-kai the head of the nation;187 the Chinese people’s preference for a

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republic; the determination of the revolutionaries to remove the Manchu dynasty; T’ang Shao-yi’s support for a republic; and the pressures from the British trade interests and missionaries in the south. Apart from these considerations, there was also a fear that if the revolution was prolonged it would result in the foreign powers’ intervention and likelihood that Russia and Japan would benefit, resulting in a disturbance of the existing balance of power amongst the foreign nations. In fact, S.D. Sazanoff, Russian Foreign Minister, expressed his opinion that ‘Russia and Japan must use the present favourable moment to fortify their position in China’.188 The situation being such, an early settlement of the crisis was essential for Britain. Morrison’s pressure, nevertheless, was the deciding factor in Jordan’s change. Morrison was an independent strategist who endeavoured to achieve his own selfassigned mission of halting Japanese expansion in China by making Yuan Shih-kai head of the Chinese Republic.

Morrison’s influence on Jordan, Yuan Shih-kai and T’ang Shao-yi As shown in the last section, Grey followed Jordan’s advice and refused to accept Uchida’s proposal of joint diplomatic intervention in the revolution. Instead, he invited Japan to join Britain in offering their support in settling the peace negotiations in Shanghai, which Japan accepted. Accordingly, Fraser and Ariyoshi in Shanghai were instructed by Jordan and Ijūin respectively; and the two Chinese negotiators, Wu T’ingfang and T’ang Shao-yi, were also informed to that effect.189 The Anglo-Japanese lead in the Chinese affair was public knowledge. The Times reported that a decision had been made between the British and Japanese ConsulsGeneral in Shanghai that they would take a mediating role in the peace negotiations.190 The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun also reported on the two countries’ joint assistance in the conference.191 The other foreign powers, apparently not content with the situation, also expressed their interest in assisting the conference. The European legations in Peking were authorized by their governments to mediate in the peace negotiations. Grey was concerned about arousing their ‘jealousy or hostility’, in spite of the fact that Britain and Japan were the only two powers to rely on in this revolution. In mid-December 1911, Grey instructed Jordan to be careful not to provoke other powers’ hostility. Grey also made it quite clear that Britain had no desire whatsoever to be committed to military intervention.192 Fearing Anglo-Japanese intervention, Yuan Shih-kai adopted a submissive attitude to the two governments. He told Jordan that he would be guided solely by Britain and Japan.193 There was good reason for Yuan to be apprehensive. Morrison noted in his diary: ‘Wang Ta-hsieh [Chinese Minister to Japan] wires that Japan has ready two divisions to be despatched to Wuchang should China decide upon establishing a Republic.’194 Kawamura asserts that Yuan made use of Wang’s telegram to justify his fear of Anglo-Japanese intervention.195 Meanwhile, Uchida sent K.Matsui, Secretary of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, to Peking in mid-December to assist Ijūin.196 Uchida had realized that Ijūin’s views were limited to local issues lacking a wider perspective.197 As stated before, Ijūin’s inability to judge the situation was caused partly by Yuan’s intrigue and partly by the secrecy of the Jordan-Yuan team who purposely kept him uninformed. In addition, Ijūin was

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handicapped by his poor language skills. Mochizuki, journalist/politician, observed that the misunderstandings between Ijūin and Jordan, if any, would have been caused by Ijūin’s poor English.198 Subsequently Matsui was sent to Shanghai to assist Ariyoshi, who, together with Fraser, acted as mediator in the peace negotiations.199 Morrison attempted to find out from Matsui whether the content of Wang Ta-hsieh’s telegram was accurate or not. Matsui recognized that Japan and England were acting in unison, but ‘scorned’ the notion of military intervention.200 T’ang Shao-yi also asked Matsui about the information of Wang’s telegram and Matsui denied its accuracy.201 Matsui was correct. Although Japan and Britain were preparing to send troops to trouble spots in China, this did not mean ‘military intervention’ but protection of their own nationals. On 22 December, Japan decided to send 500 troops to Hankow to relieve marines in order to protect the consulate staff and the Japanese residents.202 The troops’ arrival at Hankow was planned for 1 January 1912,203 which Yamaza conveyed to Grey.204 Britain also prepared to send 500 troops from north China to Shanghai or elsewhere in case of disturbance.205 In addition, at the request of the commanding officer of the Shanghai volunteers and subsequently of the War Office, Grey instructed the governor of Hong Kong to make arrangements to send 80 servicemen to Canton to replace the marines.206 These troop movements, however, were not intended to suppress the Chinese revolutionaries, and therefore were not ‘military intervention’. Wang Tahsieh’s information to Yuan Shih-kai was incorrect. The fact remains, however, that because of Ijūin’s ‘veiled threat’ and Wang’s information, Yuan was still under the impression that Britain and Japan would jointly intervene by force if China chose a republic. When Yuan received T’ang’s proposal,207 he did two things. One was to submit the proposal to the Manchu Court Conference. Opinions of the imperial kinsmen were divided. Prince Ch’ing was in favour of accepting T’ang’s proposal, while Yu-lang and Ts’ai-tse were firmly opposed.208 The other thing Yuan did was to sound out responses from Britain and Japan. On 22 December, Yuan sent copies of his official correspondence with T’ang to Jordan and Ijūin, in order to ask their opinion on T’ang’s proposal.209 Before visiting Yuan, Ijūin asked Jordan how he intended to reply to Yuan on the choice between a monarchy and a republic. Jordan answered that ‘personally I would consider a monarchy safest’, although he had not yet received a government instruction which would enable him to express a firm view. Ijūin stressed that his reply would be that Japan insists upon a monarchy’. Jordan cautioned Ijūin: ‘We cannot find a means to push this idea to the Chinese people.’Jordan then took up Morrison’s proposal again, and said, ‘If we make Yuan Shih-kai republican president, I think the matter would be solved. What do you think about it?’ Ijūin objected to it. Jordan, taking this opportunity, proposed that he and Ijūin visit Yuan separately so as not to incur other powers’ suspicion. Ijūin agreed.210 Jordan’s interview with Yuan took place at 3 p.m. on 22 December. Yuan put up a show, and stated ‘most emphatically’ that he ‘would have nothing to do with a republic’, because he was convinced that it would ‘lead to disruption and ruin of country’. Yuan appealed for foreign intervention and support. Jordan talked about ‘the most disastrous consequences’ that foreign intervention would cause to the Chinese people. Jordan said, ‘We want a strong and united China, under whatever form of Government the Chinese people wished’, and suggested the ‘possibility of adopting Tong [T’ang] Shao-yi’s

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proposal’. Yuan replied that he would recommend it to the Emperor.211 In this way Jordan, in essence, recommended a republic, because the outcome of T’ang’s proposal was known to be a republic. This was what Yuan had been eagerly waiting for. Yuan, who had been pretending to be a monarchist, could not possibly ask the British to support a republic, but at last the promise of such support came from Jordan. Yuan could now officially declare that he would have to follow Jordan’s advice. Having secured Jordan’s support for a republic, Yuan’s fear of Japan evaporated. As shown earlier, Morrison was the direct cause of Jordan’s change, and this subsequently removed Yuan’s fear of Japan. Morrison was thus successful in this attempt. Ijūin visited Yuan at 4 p.m. on the same day immediately after Jordan. Yuan proved to be a skilful diplomat, setting a trap in which Ijūin would eventually be caught. The substance of their conversation was as follows: IJŪIN: I understand that T’ang now favours a republic. Do you think a person with such an idea is still capable of achieving his mission as the Imperial delegate? YUAN: I am not certain whether T’ang holds such an idea. Before he left Peking, I had instructed him to persist with the idea of a monarchy. However, if what you say is correct, then T’ang must have been infected by the revolutionary fever in Shanghai and has become confused. As far as I am concerned, I have never agreed on a republic. IJŪIN: Under the circumstances, do you think T’ang’s proposal would be accepted? YUAN: As the revolutionaries absolutely reject the monarchy, I am afraid the prospect of my achieving this objective appears to be very slim. IJŪIN: How do you intend to deal with the situation from now on? YUAN: I have been endeavouring to retain the monarchy. I have pledged this to the Throne, declared this to the Chinese people and to the foreign powers. Fortunately, the ministers of Britain and Japan have actively supported my view and promised me all possible assistance, by which I have been greatly encouraged. The most deplorable new development, however, is that the British Minister has changed his mind and abandoned me. Yuan made Jordan responsible for his ‘predicament’, and by so doing he now attempted to make Japan responsible for the future form of the Chinese Government. YUAN: The situation being thus, my hope now rests solely on Japan. If ever Japan changes her attitude like Britain, there would be no alternative for me but to resign in despair. Does Japan still hold the policy hitherto taken? IJŪIN: Our government’s policy has never changed. We will adhere to the constitutional monarchy to the bitter end in a hope of settling the crisis. Have you told the British Minister of your resolution that you would resign if there is no solution? YUAN: Most certainly. He personally recommended me to accept T’ang’s proposal and reform the national assembly to make it a thoroughly representative organization and make it decide the issue. I replied ‘That could be a good idea.’ Then Yuan repeated himself as follows:

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YUAN: Do you promise not to change your policy? IJŪIN: We will support the constitutional monarchy to the limit whereby the whole situation and the eternal peace of Asia can be secured. YUAN: Then, would you please announce it officially This would be the sole support for the dynasty, which might bring about an unexpected successful result. IJŪIN: I shall wire Tokyo what you said. Until I hear from them, please keep the Shanghai situation as it is now and do not take any hasty action. YUAN: I pledge not to take any hasty action. As the danger is imminent, I sincerely request Japan’s support in a concrete form.212 Ijūin recommended to Uchida that Japan should show Yuan a plan in a concrete form, otherwise, considering Yuan’s disposition, it would be difficult to predict what action he might take when pressed.213 The points Yuan made in the above interview were: that if he had to adopt T’ang’s proposal, Jordan should be responsible for it because he had recommended acceptance; that Yuan would desperately adhere nevertheless to a constitutional monarchy; that whether he could adhere to it in the future would solely depend on Japan’s concrete assistance. Learning these points from Ijūin, Jordan wired Grey that: ‘in response to Yuan Shih-kai’s appeal for assistance he [Ijūin] promised to telegraph to Tokyo for instructions, which he hopes to get in a few days’.214 Thus Yuan gained an advantageous position. If Japan failed to give Yuan assistance in a concrete form, financial, military or otherwise, Japan would become responsible for China’s inability to retain the monarchy. Yuan would be able to declare that, as he had no assistance from Japan, he had no choice but to adopt T’ang’s proposal, which would enable him to force the Emperor to abdicate and eventually make himself republican president. Yuan was able to become master of the diplomatic situation with Ijūin, thanks to Morrison’s influence on Jordan in support of a republic. Outwardly, Yuan Shih-kai assumed an attitude of submission, a diplomatic device in order to take command of the situation. On the other hand, T’ang Shao-yi in Shanghai, as a result of Morrison’s encouragement, adopted a straightforward approach. T’ang boldly stated to Ariyoshi and Matsui that he would support the idea of a republic.215 Under the instruction of Uchida, who was seriously concerned about T’ang’s attitude,216 Matsui tried to placate T’ang, informing him of Japan’s intention of giving Yuan sufficient assistance to maintain the monarchy. T’ang retorted that Japan’s assistance meant military intervention to help the Manchus at the cost of many Chinese lives. T’ang said: I have remonstrated by telegraph with Yuan Shih-kai on such a folly of depending on foreign military aid…. It is utterly unreasonable for Japan to butt into another country’s business by prescribing a form of government for them against the Chinese people’s wish for a republic.217 T’ang firmly expressed his intention of making the dynasty accept his proposal. Regarding the role of the powers, T’ang stated: Whether the powers would recognize a Chinese republic would be up to them but one has to see if the Chinese Republic could maintain law and

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order, and only when China failed to do so, then foreign intervention might be attempted. Until such a time, however, any foreign pressure is quite out of question.218 Matsui denied that Japan’s offer was for military intervention. Morrison suggested to T’ang that he advise Yuan to instruct Lew Yuk-lin, Chinese Minister to Britain, to request from Grey an explicit statement regarding Anglo-Japanese non-intervention. Morrison assumed that this was done.219 Morrison suspected that there had been a communication problem between Ijūin and Yuan: Here we have considerable difficulty in working with the Japanese. It is perfectly ridiculous that the Japanese Government should retain in Peking a Minister like Ijuin [sic]…. Nearly all the misunderstandings which take place between him and his English speaking colleagues can be traced to his defective knowledge of English.220 Referring to ‘Ijuin’s [sic] veiled threat of Japan’s military intervention’, Matsui told T’ang: ‘Yuan must have misunderstood Ijuin or misinterpreted what he said.’ After this conversation, T’ang telegraphed Yuan: I can talk face to face with Matsui with no possibility of misunderstanding. You must see Ijuin [sic] and be careful that there is no misinterpretation. The entire nation is looking to you. If you cannot see your way to the issue of the Edict, then you must resign!221 T’ang pressed, almost threatened, Yuan to obtain the edict to convene a national assembly. T’ang told Morrison the contents of this private telegram and asked him to inform Fraser, so that Fraser could wire Jordan.222 It was clear that Japan’s efforts to soften T’ang had failed. T’ang, who had been so depressed with his role as the imperial delegate on his arrival at Shanghai, now became extremely courageous and took ‘the bull by the horns’, as Morrison had told him to do.223 In Peking on 24 December, Yuan Shih-kai and Prince Ch’ing met the Ministers of Britain and Japan again separately. They saw Jordan first and showed him the draft telegram which they proposed to send to T’ang Shao-yi authorizing him to leave a decision regarding the future form of government to a national assembly newly to be convened from all provinces. Being asked for an opinion, Jordan said the ‘proposal seems to me a fair one’.224 Jordan agreed to T’ang’s proposal. After Jordan, Yuan showed the draft telegram to Ijūin and said that Jordan had agreed. Here again Yuan used Jordan’s view as a means to obtain Ijūin’s consent. Ijūin pointed out Yuan’s volte-face—only three days earlier Yuan had pledged to adhere to a monarchy and asked for Japan’s assistance. Ijūin requested Yuan to defer sending the telegram pending receipt of Uchida’s answer to Yuan’s request of 22 December for concrete help, to which Yuan agreed.225 Morrison learned about the contents of the Ijūin-Yuan conversation from Ts’ai T’ingkan who had been present at their meeting. Morrison sensed the approaching defeat of Japanese diplomacy and wrote to Braham: ‘never has our position in China shown greater

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predominance than at present’.226 Morrison, who had made it his mission to maintain and strengthen British predominance in the Far East, must have felt assured of success.

Morrison’s influence on the British Foreign Office, Japanese diplomacy thwarted The news of Jordan’s change surprised Uchida, who instructed Yamaza to sound out Grey’s opinion on the subject.227 On 24 December 1911, Yamaza informed Grey that Japan still viewed a constitutional monarchy as the best solution for the Chinese crisis; that Japan had learned, however, that Jordan was now in favour of supporting Yuan Shihkai as president of the republic, should the peace conference prove abortive. Yamaza asked whether Britain had changed its attitude and now supported Jordan’s view.228 Grey was perplexed because he had not heard of Jordan’s conversion. Asked by Grey,229 Jordan replied emphatically: ‘I am not in favour, and never have been in favour, of supporting Yuan Shih-kai as President of Republic. He has always told me...[that he] would accept no such office.’230 As already seen, however, Jordan recommended to Ijūin: ‘how about adopting the Morrison proposal and settle the crisis by making Yuan Shihkai president?’ Furthermore, while denying the volte-face charge, Jordan admitted to Grey that ‘While giving, when asked, my personal view that a republic is a risky experiment, I have invariably made it clear that question of a monarchy or republic is one which Chinese people are best qualified to decide.’231 Since the expected outcome of the decision of the National Assembly was already known to be for a republic, Jordan was in fact accepting a republic. Thus Jordan’s denial to Grey and his previous behaviour were inconsistent. Lowe’s defence of Jordan’s inconsistency was as follows: Any diplomat, especially in a time of great complexity, must reach his own decisions to some extent. It must be admitted, however, that Jordan was in an invidious position and generally proceeded sagaciously; occasional misunderstandings were inevitable. The criticism that may be offered is that Jordan could have stated his own views more clearly.232 Jordan should have conveyed his own view to Grey more clearly During the first half of the revolution until mid-December, Jordan had preferred a monarchy with Yuan as prime minister because he thought it ‘would have probably been the best solution’ for Britain and China.233 The revolution was prolonged, however, and devastated British trade, with no prospect of a solution. In order to save British interests, it was essential to restore peace as quickly as possible, under whatever form of government. Also, direct pressure came from Morrison. In this situation, Jordan changed his support from a monarchy to a republic. Jordan’s sudden change, however, was a shock to Japan which had been supporting a constitutional monarchy, and was a puzzle to Grey, who had been cooperating with Japan. Under the circumstances, Morrison felt sympathy for Jordan who ‘was put to some embarrassment to explain his difficulty, having apparently to act in concert with the Japanese and yet being compelled to oppose their policy’.234 Jordan’s sudden change surprised many even MacDonald in Tokyo, who told K.Ishii, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, that ‘I was sure that the Japanese representative at

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Peking had quite misunderstood Sir J.Jordan, who, in his telegrams, had never once mentioned the possibility of Yuan Shih-kai as president’.235 Ishii agreed that the matter was a misunderstanding. MacDonald, thinking that Ijūin’s poor English was the root cause of the misunderstanding, reported to Grey as ‘very confidential’: For some time past Japanese Foreign Office has been of opinion that Japanese representative at Peking’s knowledge of English has not been sufficient to enable him thoroughly to understand or to make himself understood in that language. They have therefore attached Mr. Mizuno, late consul-general in New York, to Peking legation. He left here a week ago. (Repeated to Peking.)236 In addition to Mizuno,237 K.Matsui was also sent to Peking to assist Ijūin, as shown already238 By influencing Jordan, Morrison successfully dispelled Yuan’s fear of joint AngloJapanese intervention. Furthermore, Morrison decided to secure for Yuan Grey’s pledge that there would be no military intervention. This was the aim of his article of 23 December 1911 in The Times. Morrison began the article by giving a general picture of the situation, emphasizing that the Chinese crisis would be settled only if Yuan accepted T’ang Shao-yi’s proposal. Morrison justified the proposal as ‘the only possible course’ for China to take in order ‘to prevent further bloodshed’. He pointed out that the revolutionaries were willing to accept T’ang’s proposal. Regarding Yuan Shih-kai, Morrison wrote that ‘Yuan Shih-kai still adheres to the Monarchical idea, but…it is confidently expected here that he will yield to the inevitable and will become the first President of a Federal Republic with ample powers’. 239 By describing Yuan in this way, Morrison attempted to protect him from being branded traitor to the Throne when his republican presidency finally eventuated. Morrison asserted that the foreign powers were generally believed to be willing to give recognition to the Republic of China under Yuan, ‘as he commands most respect among foreigners’. Morrison declared that ‘Every Revolutionary of every class whom I have met declares uncompromisingly that the Manchus must go. To them it seems incredible that Yuan Shih-kai can continue fighting in order to retain the Manchus.’240 The Times readers of course would wonder why then Yuan continued to insist that the monarchy should be retained. Morrison then explained the reason, with a subtitle of ‘Fears of Foreign Actions’: The present issue is complicated by the openly-expressed fears of Yuan Shih-kai that England and Japan, acting in unison, are determined to maintain a Monarchical Government in China, if necessary, by force. Absurd though the story is, it is believed by Yuan Shih-kai and is having a baneful effect that the British Foreign Office might wisely dispel.241 Thus Morrison virtually challenged the Foreign Office to take action to bring about a republic. Morrison pursued the matter two days later, asserting that: Evidence is accumulating showing that the unreasonable fear that Japan and Great Britain are pledged to take concerted measures to prevent the

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establishment of a Republican Government is blocking the way to Yuan Shih-kai’s freedom of action.242 Morrison reported that Ijūin had informed Yuan, according to Yuan, that in no circumstances would Japan recognize a republic in China and that, according to the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, Japan was preparing to despatch two divisions of troops to Wuchang if China decided on a republic, as shown already.243 Although Morrison added that Matsui had denied the accuracy of the above two stories, Morrison offered no opinion of his own about Matsui’s denial, making his denial appear questionable. Morrison concluded: It may be said that the whole nation is awaiting the decision of one man…. Personally Yuan Shih-kai desires peace, personally he is willing to abide by the decision of a National Convention, but he fears, if the decision should be for a Republic, as there is every indication, subsequent complications with Great Britain and Japan.244 Morrison’s article was designed to provoke British public sympathy for Yuan in order to persuade the Foreign Office to dispel Yuan’s fear. He wrote to Braham that the British Government would be wise to notify the Chinese that they had not promised to support the continuance of the Chinese monarchy.245 Morrison’s professional commitment as correspondent was to use The Times to influence public opinion and through that means to influence British policy He stated to the London Magazine: ‘Publicity for wrongdoing and an aroused public opinion will be the best weapons for fighting corruption.’246 Morrison made this statement referring to China’s policy, but, in the same vein, he attempted to galvanize Whitehall to action by bringing the matter to public scrutiny The reaction of the Foreign Office was immediate. To forestall public criticism of Foreign Office inaction, Grey issued a communiqué which declared that, although taking concerted action with the other powers, Britain had been endeavouring to help China to establish a sound government based on the will of the Chinese people. Yamaza reported to Uchida that Morrison’s articles were responsible for Grey’s communiqué. 247 While attempting to forestall public criticism, Grey instructed Jordan: You should strongly deprecate statement by Yuan Shih-kai, which is mischievous and, as far as we are concerned, quite untrue. Telegram in today’s Times from Shanghai248 states that present issue is complicated by openly expressed fears of Yuan Shih-kai that England and Japan are determined to maintain a Monarchical Government in China, if necessary by force.249 Thus Morrison’s article achieved the desired objective. Accordingly, Jordan warned Yuan Shih-kai against associating Britain with Japan ‘as avowed supporters of monarchy’.250 In no time Morrison learnt that ‘the Foreign Office wired back my message to Sir John Jordan, and asked him for an explanation’. Although Morrison thought Jordan was embarrassed to have to explain his position, he was convinced that ‘My telegram did unquestionable good, for as a result Sir John frankly

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exchanged views with Ijūin.’251 Bland aptly pointed out that Morrison ‘undoubtedly exercised a very powerful influence…on the judgement of the Foreign Office and the Legation’.252 Yuan realized that his notion of Britain acting in complete accord with Japan was erroneous. He did not need to fear Japan any longer. As seen already, confident Yuan began to manipulate his negotiations with Ijūin and became master of the situation with Japan. Morrison’s articles were reproduced in Shanghai, and Jordan had to instruct Fraser to refute Morrison’s claim of Anglo-Japanese joint intervention.253 Local newspapers had in fact mis-reproduced Morrison’s articles. The Kuo-feng pao, a Chinese-language paper in Shanghai, incorrectly stated that Morrison had thrown his backing behind the Manchu dynasty, and deplored that a correspondent of Morrison’s ‘eminence should have given expression to sentiments so inhuman and subversive to universal peace’.254 Morrison wrote a letter of protest to the Kuo-fen pao and as a result Li [the son of Li Hung-tsao] promised Morrison that he would secure a reply from the Kuo-fen pao.255 To Morrison’s dismay, the Peking Daily News reproduced from a Japanese paper ‘an absurdly garbled version’ of Morrison’s message, and therefore he had to send to the paper ‘a contradiction’ of that version.256 Morrison’s articles created a sensation in China, where the newspaper industry was growing rapidly. In Japan, too, the popular press was expanding rapidly, supporting an ideological shift towards democracy Morrison was well aware of the reasons why the Japanese Government was so vigorously opposed to a republic in China. He learnt from T.Sahara, Proprietor and Editor of the Shanghai Mercury, that the socialist movement was also on the rise in Japan and that the establishment of a republic in China, which would give stimulus to the movement, was much feared by the Japanese authorities. Incidentally, Morrison described him as ‘an exceedingly clever Japanese publicist whom I have known for many years, and whose information is corroborated by others’.257 Less than 10 years after the SinoJapanese War of 1894–5, Japan had gone through an industrial revolution based on light industry Within 10 years after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, Japan had quickly developed heavy industry such as steel, machinery and ship-building. This remarkably quick industrialization was achieved by government protection and at the expense of a diligent and long-suffering work force. This situation accelerated the growth of socialism and resulted in incidents such as the Great Treason.258 Under the circumstances, the Japanese Government was extremely sensitive towards republicanism in the neighbourhood—hence its ideological intolerance towards the Chinese Revolution.259 Morrison heard from Ts’ai T’ing-kan, who had been present at the meeting of 22 December, that Ijūin had told Yuan: ‘In the event of China becoming a republic, its ideological influence on Japan would never be minimal and for this reason, we would like to assist a constitutional monarchy to the best of our ability.’ From this Morrison gathered that ‘the Emperor himself is much perturbed by the course of events in China and that the people in their devotion to him would even be prepared to carry out his wishes and prevent the establishment of the republic’.260 Another reason for Japan’s resolute support for the Manchu dynasty was to be found in the characteristics of Japan’s economy With its lack of raw materials and a small domestic market, Japan had to acquire raw materials and a larger market for its expanding manufacturing industry. China could satisfy these needs. Japan could not compete with the Western powers in trade because it lacked finance and technology Its

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strengths lay in its geographical proximity to China and its military background. In this situation Japan wanted to take advantage of the Chinese Revolution to increase its influence over the Ch’ing Government.261 Confronted with Jordan’s reversal on the republican issue, Yuan Shih-kai’s urgent demands for Japan’s assistance in a concrete form and T’ang Shao-yi’s attack on Japan’s attitude, Uchida was compelled to review Japan’s overall policy towards China. The Cabinet meeting of 22 December, which he had promptly organized, unanimously agreed to abandon the policy of supporting a constitutional monarchy Two days later in a joint conference of the Cabinet and the genrō (elder statesmen), however, Yamagata, the head of the military clique, demanded the government make a final attempt to influence Britain to support the monarchy, and to pressure Yuan to defer the despatch of a telegram to T’ang.262 In this instance, just as in many other cases, the military dominance over the Cabinet was apparent. Uchida, being influenced by Yamagata, suggested to Grey that the six powers should make a combined effort to apply moral pressure on the Shanghai conference by sending the message that ‘they believe that the best solution would be constitutional monarchy with Manchu dynasty’.263 Grey asked Jordan for his opinion and the latter replied that the application of ‘moral pressure’ would be unwise, and, if enforced, the powers would ‘incur odium of [the] south’.264 Grey entirely agreed with Jordan and wrote: ‘We desire to see a strong and united China under whatever form of Government the Chinese people wish…. I approved your expression of that view.’265 Grey had given his approval to Jordan. Thus Morrison, by influencing Jordan, eventually influenced Grey His efforts had born fruit. Being informed by Grey that Britain would not agree to force upon the Chinese a solution that they were not prepared to accept,266 Japan finally decided to follow British opinion. Uchida informed Grey that Japan would wait for further developments and take no action.267 Japan’s expectation that Britain would agree and support Japan’s proposal because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance proved incorrect268 and Japan felt betrayed in that it had placed too much importance on the Alliance.269 In Lowe’s words, ‘this meant the ignominious end of the Japanese proposal’.270 Reid correctly claims that Ijūin ‘had yielded to British remonstrance’, and that ‘Japan was held in check by its British ally, because Tokyo was not yet strong enough financially to oppose or to defy Britain in China proper’.271 Yamagata, the most prominent elder statesman, who had acclaimed Morrison at the end of the Russo-Japanese War by stating that ‘We are much indebted to Dr Morrison, for he counselled us to go to war against Russia never doubting the result’,272 now wrote to S.Terauchi, former Minister of Army in the Katsura administration of July 1908-August 1911: It is most regrettable that Britain has changed her policy and has now decided to leave the future form of the Chinese Government to the decision of the national assembly. I think this change is brought about by the influence of correspondent Morrison and Minister Jordan.273 Terauchi agreed with Yamagata and wrote to Katsura, the Prime Minister, that the British Foreign Office had placed great importance on the views of Morrison.274 The overjoyed Yuan feigned dissatisfaction and accused Ijūin, stating that Japan’s failure to give assistance had compelled him to accept the idea to leave a form of

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government to the decision of the National Assembly.275 Yuan held Japan responsible for his ‘reluctant’ acceptance of T’ang’s proposal, which in fact Yuan himself had contrived together with T’ang before T’ang’s departure south. Such was Yuan’s Machiavellian ability in political manoeuvring. Furthermore, Yuan made use of Japan in order to intimidate both the dynasty and the revolutionaries into agreeing with him. He urged the revolutionaries to come to terms with the north immediately so as to forestall Japan, which would otherwise invade China to help the dynasty. At the same time, Yuan urged the dynasty to abdicate immediately in order to unify the north and south so as to block Japan’s invasion.276 On 28 December, an imperial decree was issued ordering the convocation of a national assembly to decide the future form of government.277 Japan’s diplomacy lacked flexibility and broad perspective, compared with that of Britain which took a realistic flexible approach and displayed clearer vision. Even after Britain changed its attitude and decided to leave the decision to the Chinese themselves, Japan was still insistent on a monarchy for China. Japan did not change its attitude until it came to look most unreasonable in the eyes of the Chinese and the foreign powers alike. In the end, however, Japan yielded to the British lead. This resulted in a British victory in the diplomatic contest with Japan, which proceeded as an undercurrent throughout the revolution, despite the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Japanese diplomacy was disrupted by the Morrison-Jordan-Yuan-T’ang team, and was always a step behind the actual development of the situation. Morrison played a decisive role in bringing about British diplomatic victory over Japan, which would lead on to the establishment of the Republic of China with Yuan Shih-kai as President.

6 THE EFFECT OF MORRISON’S WORK The Republic of China and its presidency Morrison’s efforts to allay Yuan Shih-kai’s fear of Japan bore fruit, as seen in the previous chapter. As a result, Yuan caused the issue of an edict on 28 December 1911, which authorized the convocation of the National Assembly in order to decide the form of government.1 Because the outcome was a foregone conclusion, the establishment of a republic was virtually secured, although Yuan was still wearing a monarchical mask. The dynasty was in a state of political collapse, and Yuan made the Empress-Dowager surrender the palace treasures to pay for the army and government services, further weakening the dynasty financially Morrison felt neither sympathy nor respect for the Empress-Dowager: ‘What a deplorable condition of things that a woman of such ignorance and incapacity should have control of such vast sums of money when the State is in such a dire predicament.’2 Morrison’s objective was to make Yuan president, as already mentioned. However, a major obstacle emerged intercepting Yuan’s rise to power. Sun Yatsen, the head of the Revolutionary Party, who was in the United States at the time of the Wuchang outbreak, was coming home through Europe where he had attempted to obtain finance. Morrison’s diary reflects the popular mood surrounding Sun’s homecoming: Sun Yat-sen is due to arrive today. His arrival is awaited with much expectation. He is to bring torpedo boats! Much money and an aero plane! Suppose he brings none of these things, will there not be a great reaction against him?3 Sun arrived in Shanghai on 25 December 1911. Although he brought back ‘none of these things’, the revolutionaries welcomed him enthusiastically. Their morale soared.4 Even the most anti-republican Chinese paper in Peking, the Kuang-hua pao, changed its opinion and warned the Throne of ‘the fate of Louis XVI and of Charles I’.5 The disunity regarding leadership amongst the provincial delegates, which had seemed fatal to the revolution itself, was overcome by Sun’s return.6 For the Chinese the name of Sun Yatsen had a ‘magic sound’, because his efforts for reform over many years as head of the Revolutionary Party had made him the popular choice for president.7 Whilst the T’angWu negotiations were proceeding,8 the revolutionaries, who had set up a provisional republican government in Nanking, elected Sun as its first provisional president on 29 December 1911. The inauguration took place on 1 January 1912 in Nanking.9 Thus the Republic of China was born, although the Ch’ing Government with Yuan as premier still existed in Peking. As Morrison reported to Braham, Sun had sent a telegram to Yuan stating that he had accepted the provisional presidency and later would vacate the

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position for Yuan, subject to certain conditions which included the abdication of the Emperor.10 Sun also made this clear in his inauguration speech. Yuan was outraged. He felt deceived by the revolutionaries who had repeatedly promised him the republican presidency. He seemed to have ‘difficulty in conversation’ with Jordan to such an extent that Jordan wondered if he was genuine.11 Yuan even said to Jordan ‘I will die’ and Jordan became ‘very gloomy’.12 In spite of this, Morrison was certain that Yuan would be the first republican president ‘provided he has not been bombed in the meantime’.13 Morrison continued his praise of Yuan. He wrote to Braham: ‘Yuan Shih-kai has indeed a hard row to hoe. He is worked to death. One cannot but admire the courage and fortitude he has shown.’14 The upset Yuan Shih-kai blamed T’ang Shao-yi for being too conciliatory with the revolutionaries’ demands and exceeding his power at the negotiations with Wu T’ingfang on 30 and 31 December. Yuan dismissed T’ang on 2 January T’ang’s dismissal, however, was never anything but a ploy by the Yuan—T’ang team in order to terminate the Shanghai conference. For Yuan, the conference had already achieved its purpose, because a vote in the National Assembly was a foregone conclusion to favour a republic. Now that the establishment of a republic had been secured, it only remained to ensure Yuan’s presidency by secret negotiations.15 Accordingly, Yuan carried on telegraphic negotiations with Wu T’ing-fang until 13 January and from then onwards with Sun Yatsen. Officially the negotiations were about the mode of election of the National Assembly, and the venue and timing of convention.16 In these negotiations Yuan represented himself and no longer the dynasty whose departure from power was imminent, and behind the scenes T’ang Shao-yi and Wang Chaoming,17 a revolutionary leader, also busied themselves as intermediaries between Yuan and Sun.18 Morrison soon realized that, even after his dismissal, T’ang was still in close communication both with Yuan and with Wang Hence Morrison deduced at last that Yuan had been ‘identified with the Republican movement’, while persisting in calling himself a monarchist. Morrison never ceased to be amazed by what he considered to be the ‘unscrupulousness’ of Orientals. He confided to Braham: ‘You understand the Orientals better than I do. We are dealing throughout this crisis with Orientals. We cannot understand the motive force of their actions as we can understand that of Europeans.’19 Nevertheless, Morrison continued to help Yuan’s rise to power. At the end of May 1912, Ohl of the New York Herald uncovered the Yuan—T’ang charade, claiming that T’ang’s ‘repudiation was never anything but “face-pidgin” [sic]’. T’ang remained Yuan’s personal representative to the end and in this capacity handled all the secret negotiations.’20 Ohl disclosed the message which, he claimed, Sun Yat-sen had sent to the National Assembly after the abdication: President-elect Yuan has signified his advocacy of the Republican plank since the early stages of the revolution. The correspondence exchanged between him and the Nanking Government was employed only for the purpose of bringing matters to a peaceful head. This fact, which was studiously [sic] kept from the public, can now be made known, since now the North and the South have been welded into a harmonious whole.21

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Thus, apart from Morrison, Ohl also found out that Yuan and T’ang had been in league, which Western contemporaries had failed to detect.22 The difference between the two was that while Morrison kept the matter secret, Ohl disclosed the Yuan—T’ang scheme in his sensational article in the New York Herald. Morrison’s opinion of Sun Yat-sen was extremely low. He regarded reformers such as Sun Yat-sen and K’ang Yu-wei as ‘ruffians’, ‘lunatics’ and ‘cranks and visionaries’.23 Yuan told Morrison that Sun was a ‘half Chinese’ who knew very little of China.24 Ts’ai’s opinion was that Sun knew nothing about China. Ts’ai called Sun ‘Hawaiian Chinese so-called Christian’.25 Morrison noticed that even some revolutionaries regarded Sun with contempt as a man ‘who had taken no actual part [in the revolution], always keeping away in order to save his own skin’.26 Wu T’ing-fang said ‘Sun is a good man, but he does not know how to govern’.27 Li Yuan-hung said in July 1913 that ‘I had regarded him as a visionary.’28 Donald, who had written the republican manifesto which Sun issued as provisional president, was convinced that Sun imagined himself to be ‘the Moses of China’ and found him the ‘most impossible of persons’.29 For Morrison and others, it was out of the question that Sun Yat-sen should become China’s republican president. In the opinion of Morrison, Jordan and many others, Yuan was the only hope to save China from disintegration. The difficulty was how to make Yuan president without his incurring a stigma of traitor to the Emperor. Yuan himself was still ‘emphatically’ declaring that he would not take the position, stating that he and his ancestors had been loyal to the dynasty and that he could not become ‘a usurper’. Reporting this delicate question to Braham, Morrison devised a face-saving scheme for both the dynasty and Yuan: Suppose the Manchus themselves should desire his appointment? Their interests would be better safeguarded with him in the Presidency than with any other Chinese in the Empire. This seems to me to be the best possible solution. I do not see why it cannot be arranged that the Manchus themselves shall support his appointment should it be offered to him by a National Convention.30 Morrison was delighted with his own ingenuity: ‘This is my own idea. I have not yet had time to develop it.’31 This was what Pearl describes as ‘the germ of the idea that was to produce the most remarkable event in China’s history: the creation of a republic by the edict of an Empress’.32 Morrison told Ts’ai of his idea: The Manchus must be induced to support Yuan Shih-kai for the presidency I say that he can best show his loyalty by accepting this position, for the Manchus can then be guaranteed due payment of their pensions, whereas their position would be a very precarious one if the President were to be a man of declared hostility of the Manchus such, for example, as Sun Yat Sen [sic].33 Ts’ai passed this idea to Yuan and came back to Morrison and asked: ‘How best to bring about the abdication and after the abdication what was the procedure to follow?’34 Morrison made public this procedure in The Times: ‘I understand that when terms have

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been arranged the Throne will abdicate by an edict leaving Yuan Shih-kai to continue the Government with the existing machinery’ Yuan was then to form a republican provisional government together with the revolutionaries until a national assembly could be convened and a permanent government could be established.35 Some three weeks later, Ts’ai told Morrison: Yuan was tickled to death at your suggestion for the establishment of a Constitutional Republic by the Throne in an Imperial edict—appealing thus to the traditions of the Empire and saving the face of the Throne and of Yuan Shih-kai. It is the best possible solution of the difficulty…. The Republic will then be legally, legitimately and constitutionally established.36 Morrison’s ‘own idea’ was manifested later in the edict of abdication. Morrison, Yuan and Ts’ai were adamant that ‘Every pressure ought to be brought to bear to induce them [the Manchus] to go.’37 Yuan supplied Morrison with a scheme, through Ts’ai, and asked him to put it into effect. The scheme was to get the foreign Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai to send a petition through Jordan to the Manchu Court suggesting the Emperor’s urgent abdication, on the grounds that ‘the Throne stood in the way of peace, and that without peace there could be no return to normal trade conditions’.38 This could be taken as a mild threat in order to protect trade interests. Morrison and Ts’ai thought it a good way to attain abdication because, if Shanghai took the lead, then all other Chambers of Commerce in various treaty ports would follow, and this would have a very powerful cumulative impact on the dynasty.39 Morrison wrote to E.G.Hillier and C.D.Bruce, who accordingly arranged a petition by the foreign mercantile community in Shanghai. With the approval of E.Fraser, Consul-General in Shanghai, and of the republican representatives in Shanghai, the petition was sent to the Manchu Court through Jordan and Yuan.40 Morrison was ‘personally interested’ in the text of the petition, because it was Morrison who engineered it.41 Because the Chambers of Commerce had great influence over the Ch’ing Government, their demand in the form of a petition was effective. In fact, the Chambers of Commerce in various treaty ports held great influence over both the dynasty and the revolutionaries by dint of their financial strength. Therefore it was vital for both parties not to incur the wrath of the Chambers.42 Furthermore, The Times correspondent in Shanghai reported on the commercial damage the mercantile community had been suffering from the hostilities between the dynasty and the revolutionaries: In view of the very serious condition of trade and the apparent dead-lock in the peace negotiations, it is proposed to call a meeting of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce in order to draw the attention of the Diplomatic Body to the danger of further delay It is no exaggeration to say that unless peace can be restored, many merchants in the Far East will be faced with absolute ruin.43 As Morrison and Ts’ai expected, similar petitions from Chambers of Commerce in various treaty ports were subsequently telegraphed to the dynasty. On 19 January

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Hankow, and on 27 January Hong Kong, endorsed the view of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce regarding the abdication,44 and Canton and Tientsin were expected to follow.45 Morrison observed how this tactic had worked and reported: Considerable progress has been made with the negotiations for the abdication of the Emperor, a marked impression being created by a telegram addressed by the commercial community of Shanghai to Prince Ching [sic]…urging that in the whole of the Southern, Central and Western provinces the authority of the dynasty has ceased to be effective; that there is no longer any guarantee for the lives and safety of foreigners; that a continuance of the conflict will ruin Chinese foreign merchants.46 It really suited Yuan for foreign mercantile communities to urge the Throne to abdicate, because it saved him pressing the Manchus. It was his usual way to organize things in such a way so as to make himself appear to be the innocent victim of inevitable circumstances. Morrison, realizing this, assisted Yuan by willingly engineering the plan for him. Yuan exploited this incident to give Ijūin the impression that the Western powers were in favour of a republic. He told Ijūin the story, the substance of which was as follows: Yuan had received the telegram from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce demanding abdication of the Emperor. In his disbelief, he asked the ministers of Britain, the United States and France to investigate the matter to find whether the message was authentic. Because the ministers did not intervene to stop the Chamber’s action, they must have found it authentic. Yuan submitted the Chamber’s demand to the dynasty. Being asked by the Empress-Dowager for his opinion, Yuan replied that, since the situation had thus developed while he was premier, he wished to atone for his failure by death. He submitted his resignation. The EmpressDowager requested him not to resign and to make further efforts for the dynasty.47 This story was Yuan’s fabrication. Ijūin warned Yuan: ‘the Chamber’s demand was an act of utmost arrogance. It was utterly inexcusable for mere merchants to question the form of government. If you allow such misconduct, it will create a bad precedent.’48 Ijūin did not have the faintest idea that this scheme had been conceived by Yuan himself and put into practice by Morrison. Thus he was completely fooled by the Yuan-Morrison team. Even as late as 21 January, Ijūin pressed Yuan to support a constitutional monarchy.49 Ijūin’s pressure upon Yuan was not in accordance with Uchida’s overall China policy, which, as seen already, was to work in harmony with Britain. On 26 January in the House of Representatives, T.Inukai, the leader of the National Party and supporter of Sun Yatsen, questioned Uchida: ‘Did not the Japanese Government attempt to force China into a particular form of government under the guise of friendly advice?’ Uchida replied:

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The Japanese Government has never urged China to adopt a particular form of government. Minister Ijūin has given Yuan Shih-kai his private opinion. He acted independently and not under any instruction of the Government, and therefore the Government has no responsibility in the matter.50 Hearing this incident from Mizuno, the First Secretary in the Japanese Legation, Morrison confirmed that differences existed between Ijūin and Uchida. Morrison learnt this also from Ts’ai and reported it to Braham.51 Matsuoka also told Morrison about the strained relationship between Ijūin and Yuan Shih-kai.52 On 16 January, Morrison witnessed an attempt on Yuan Shih-kai’s life. When Yuan was returning at midday from an audience with the Empress-Dowager, bombs were thrown at him by three men belonging to a secret organization of the revolutionaries in Peking. The attack killed one person and wounded 20 others.53 Morrison wrote to W.W.Rockhill: My secretary and I were standing at the front door, when we heard the explosion and saw the sky darken, at the corner where the road comes into my road from the Tung-hua Men. With remarkable speed the bombthrowers were captured, and have since been executed.54 Morrison, as if he were Yuan’s spokesman, stressed in The Times the importance of Yuan: ‘Their attempt has nearly resulted in the death of the one man indispensable to the nation in the present crises.’55 In stark contrast, the Japanese regarded Yuan as ‘lacking in those qualities of a great ruler which are essential to the harmonious working of the new system’.56 From the day of the assassination attempt onwards, Yuan ceased to go to the palace and the business of abdication was carried out by his men, Chao Ping-chun, Liang Shih-yi and Wu Wei-te.57 Morrison observed ‘Terrorization is extending.’ He heard from his Danish friend that Yuan’s 350 bodyguards in civilian clothes were carrying Browning revolvers. To Morrison’s great concern, even Jordan became the target of assassination plots. Leaflets intimidating Jordan with death threats were circulated in Peking and Jordan also received several threatening letters.58 Ts’ai T’ing-kan showed Morrison two hand-bills which stated that they would murder Yuan and Jordan together. Lo Hui-min holds that the hand-bills could have been fabricated by Yuan’s men ‘in order to strengthen their master’s position vis-à-vis the revolutionaries and the foreigners’.59 A conference among the princes of the imperial clan and eight princes of Inner Mongolia took place from 17 January 1912 for three days. On 17 January, Princes Ch’ing and P’u-lun were in favour of abdication, but on 18 January, the imperial kinsmen and Manchu nobles, who had formed the Imperial Clan Party and had prepared for a final showdown with the revolutionaries, published a statement proposing strong measures to retain the dynasty. After heated argument, on 19 January, the princes came to a decision to abdicate.60 Morrison noted that the procedure for abdication was based on his ‘own idea’, that is the appointment of Yuan to form a republic by imperial edict, a face-saving procedure for both the dynasty and Yuan. Ts’ai told Morrison that ‘the southern party and we are coming to a good understanding’, and explained the situation.61 Morrison reported:

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There shall be two Edicts. In the first… Yuan Shih-kai will be given full powers to establish a republican government in China. Yuan Shih-kai will accept, whereupon the conference of delegates from the 17 provinces now assembled at Nanking will elect him President. The present Provisional President, Sun Yat-sen, retiring in his favour. Yuan Shih-kai will then accept the Presidency, and there upon the throne, in a second Edict, will abdicate together. There is every reason for being hopeful of a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the present difficulties.62 Morrison was pleased to observe that Yuan’s negotiations both with Sun Yat-sen and with the Manchus were proceeding satisfactorily owing to the ‘better understanding’ of the republican leaders in Nanking, ‘whose present policy is inspiring confidence by its reasonableness’.63 Yuan was skilfully negotiating with the dynasty on the one hand and with the Nanking Government on the other, endeavouring to engineer an outcome in his own favour, with Morrison’s enthusiastic help.

Morrison’s involvement in Yuan Shih-kai’s political intrigues The Emperor, on the verge of abdication, empowered Yuan Shih-kai to head a new regime pending the convocation of a national assembly Suddenly, however, the situation changed. Yuan encountered trouble caused by both sides, from the revolutionaries and from the dynasty Morrison reported that ‘Sun Yat-sen repudiates his own pledges’; that on 20 January 1912 he had sent Yuan ‘a humiliating telegram demanding that there shall be no Provisional Government in the North and that Yuan Shih-kai shall not participate in the Republican Government until it is recognized by the Powers’. Morrison called this ‘Sun Yat-sen’s breach of faith’.64 Morrison was extremely disappointed over the obstacles that Sun threw in Yuan’s way and wrote to Wen Tsung-yao, a republican politician who had attended the Shanghai Peace Conference together with Wu T’ingfang: ‘I have been much disappointed at the hitch that has occurred between the Premier and Dr. Sun Yat Sen [sic]’.65 Sun’s change of heart was said to have been caused by the advice of his entourage who wanted to fight.66 Thus the establishment of an amalgamated government of the north and south was hampered by Sun’s new demands, making Yuan’s position precarious.67 Yuan’s position was further jeopardized by a sudden change of face by the Manchus. T’ieh-liang, Tartar General at Nanking, who had been the leader of the extreme Manchu faction and Yuan’s arch-enemy, returned to Peking from Nanking in mid-January 1912. According to Morrison, T’ieh-liang was the most influential member of a Manchu cabal which had brought about Yuan’s downfall and retirement in 1909.68 In co-operation with Liang-pi, the leader of the Imperial Clan Party, T’ieh-liang worked to undermine Yuan’s power by opposing abdication.69 Caught between the revolutionaries and the Manchus, Yuan faced his most critical period. He now took up his usual recourse of threatening the Manchus with resignation, while sending for 3,000 troops from his home province of Honan under the pretext of providing protection for Peking.70 Morrison, being greatly disturbed by the emergence of T’ieh-liang, reported:

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Under the evil inspiration of T’ieh-liang, the Manchu opposition to Yuan Shih-kai is increasing in force. The Premier declares that his position is becoming untenable, and again threatens to resign. Should Yuan Shih-kai resign presumably T’ieh-liang, who was one of the Boxer leaders in 1900, will become Manchu generalissimo.71 The Manchus declared that they did not mind if Yuan resigned and prepared to establish a new Cabinet after Yuan’s departure.72 Thoroughly disgusted, Morrison warned the Manchus that if ever Yuan resigned, they would lose what Yuan was endeavouring to secure for them, pensions, property and everything.73 Morrison feared that Yuan might go into retirement and China could lose the strongman who could check Japan’s advance. Hirakawa, however, regarded Yuan’s threat of resignation as his usual theatrical trick.74 Even Jordan did not quite believe that Yuan really meant to resign. Jordan reported to Grey that ‘Situation is strained, and may possibly become serious if, as secretary [Ts’ai Ting-kan] indicated, Yuan Shih-kai resigns or leaves Peking but it is very difficult to arrive at the truth.’75 In fact, Morrison heard from C.D.Tenney an American diplomat and Yuan’s confidant, that Yuan had confided in him that ‘he would not resign’.76 Morrison nevertheless took the new situation very seriously and advised Yuan through Ts’ai not to flee to Tientsin because he did not want Yuan to appear as the underdog. He also encouraged Ts’ai: ‘I am confident that both the English and Japanese legations similarly hope there will be no withdrawal [of Yuan] to Tientsin.’77 Having said this, Morrison launched a personal attempt to influence the diplomatic body, in particular the Japanese Legation, to stop Yuan’s flight to Tientsin. On 23 January, Morrison called on Matsuoka to inform him of a ‘strictly confidential and most important matter’: I have reason to believe that Yuan Shih-kai will submit his resignation tomorrow morning and immediately leave for Tientsin. The day before yesterday Sun Yat-sen, suddenly changing his attitude, demanded that after abdication the Nanking Republic Government is to be recognised [by the powers]. According to secret information to Yuan, Sun’s sudden change was caused by his Japanese advisers, Dr. Terao and two others.78 Morrison wrote to Braham that blame for Sun’s change should be placed on his Japanese advisers.79 The three advisers were: T.Terao, professor at the University of Tokyo, Soejima, professor at Waseda University, and K. Haraguchi, one of the most prominent railway engineers in Japan.80 Another cause for Yuan’s alleged resignation threat was the volte-face of the Manchus. Morrison told Matsuoka: Recently T’ieh-liang has been urging the Manchu princes to take a strong attitude. Liang Pi, too, is taking an active part in this plot. Rumour has it that Minister Ijūin is behind T’ieh-liang and Major General Aoki is behind Liang Pi. The situation being thus, Yuan cannot do anything, so he has decided to resign. The Manchus have decided to make T’ieh-liang premier after Yuan’s resignation.81

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Ts’ai wrote to Morrison that he had ‘further proof of the plot to throw Yuan out of the Government and some further proof of [Japanese] complicity’. 82 Morrison tried to make the Japanese feel responsible for Yuan’s predicament, though he frankly admitted that he did not believe the rumour about the T’iehliang—Ijūin relationship to be true. In fact, being asked by Ts’ai, Morrison made a careful investigation and ascertained that there had been no direct contact ‘whatever’ between them. In regard to the Aoki-Liang relationship, Morrison could not deny it.83 He stressed that, if Yuan left, the situation in Peking would become very tense and that the existing dynasty-revolutionaries conflicts would develop more clearly into a racial conflict between the Manchus and the Hans (Chinese). Morrison then proposed that Britain and Japan, being the two nations capable of shouldering the great responsibility of solving the Chinese crisis, should dissuade Yuan from resigning. Morrison told Matsuoka that he had already informed Jordan of this and recommended that Jordan discuss the matter with Ijūin. He added that he had also informed the Ministers of the United States and France and that he had already sent an article regarding these matters to The Times. Morrison warned Matsuoka that, should Yuan leave Peking, it would create a grave situation, and the blame would likely be imposed upon the Japanese. Matsuoka simply replied that he would convey the message to Ijūin.84 Shortly after Morrison’s warning to Matsuoka, Jordan, highly likely to have been pressed by Morrison, approached Ijūin to discuss the same subject. Jordan sought Ijūin’s opinion regarding Anglo-Japanese intervention to halt Yuan’s resignation, which Morrison had recommended strongly Ijūin replied that he was doubtful whether Yuan really intended to resign and leave Peking. Jordan did not press the matter any further. Regarding Morrison’s accusation about Japan’s alleged backing of T’ieh-liang and Liang-pi, Ijūin said that he had no connection with T’ieh-liang and that Aoki had rung Liang-pi several times recently but the latter had avoided him. Ijūin had had enough of what he considered to be Morrison’s meddling. He reported to Uchida, reminding him that ‘This is only my conjecture’: Morrison, showing sympathy towards the revolutionaries from the outset of the revolution, has advocated abdication as the only solution and has vigorously campaigned for Yuan’s cause. Seeing that Yuan’s position has now become uncertain, he has moved Jordan who tends to be easily influenced by him into action. Morrison then tried to influence ministers of the United States and France, without much success. He is now attempting to press his proposition to us under the pretence of kindness.85 As Saitō pointed out, Morrison had attempted to influence the foreign powers to dissuade Yuan from resigning,86 with no success. In any case, it is clear that it was not Yuan’s intention to resign in the first place. The problem with Sun Yat-sen was solved in a conciliatory manner following a telegram to Yuan from Wu T’ing-fang on behalf of Sun suggesting an alter-ation in the wording of the proposed abdication decree. Morrison was satisfied, recognizing that ‘it is unjust to describe Sun Yat-sen’s recent telegrams as repudiating his pledges. The differences are due to a misunderstanding.’ Morrison affirmed that both parties were ‘capable of reasonable adjustment’.87

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The problem with the Manchus, however, was resolved in a drastic manner. Liang-pi was assassinated by a revolutionary, about which Morrison gave Braham a detailed account, describing him as ‘an exceedingly able man, keen, alert, 35 years of age’.88 As a result the Manchu leaders, including T’ieh-liang, dispersed, fleeing from Peking to Tientsin, Tsingtao, Port Arthur and other places.89 Morrison was quite relieved and reported: ‘T’ieh-liang, the most truculent opponent of Yuan Shih-kai and the noisiest in urging resistance to abdication, is hiding in the foreign concession at Tientsin, dreading the same fate as his fellow Manchu Liang-pi’.90 Prince Ch’ing, the chief advocate of abdication, was immediately and miraculously cured of his illness and returned to office. Every newspaper in Peking voiced the view that abdication was imminent. Morrison did not forget to emphasize that Yuan Shih-kai had taken every precaution to safeguard foreign lives and property, should any disturbance arise.91 Overcoming the various obstacles, Morrison was now nearing the objective which he had set out to achieve—the republican presidency of Yuan Shih-kai, who would co-operate with Britain to check Japan’s growing influence over China. The final push towards the Manchu abdication came from within the imperial camp itself. On 26 January 1912, the Imperial Army generals submitted to the Emperor, through Yuan Shih-kai, a memorial alleged to have been signed by 47 generals and commanders. It protested against delay in Yuan’s carrying out the abdication plan, and urged the Throne to authorize immediately the establishment of a republican government with Yuan Shih-kai as interim president, so as to prevent the imminent danger of partition, if not total destruction, of the Chinese nation.92 These same generals had pledged their allegiance to the Emperor only 24 days before.93 This memorial dealt a lethal blow to the dynasty. The dynasty realized that it had been deserted by its own army. Most of the uncompromising imperial kinsmen fled Peking to Mukden in Manchuria to see if there was any chance left for them to ‘resuscitate the fallen fortune of the dynasty’.94 Yuan Shih-kai now pressed the Empress-Dowager, with success, to surrender more of the palace treasures to enable him to pay the Imperial Army Yuan obtained 3 million taels, a sum sufficient to pay for the army for two months, which, Morrison observed, greatly improved Yuan’s position.95 Yuan was also involved in urging the army generals to threaten the dynasty. Morrison learned from Ts’ai Ting-kan as early as 2 January that two of the generals, Baron Feng Kuo-chun and Chiang Kuei-ti, dined with Yuan and signed the demand to the Manchus. ‘They were chatting at the table and making light of the misfortunes of the Manchus. They have to go, they said.’96 Apparently it was Yuan’s usual tactic to make himself appear loyal to the Throne and have others demand abdication. Meanwhile Morrison discussed with Ts’ai T’ing-kan the terms of abdication and future treatment of the imperial family, which, when agreed by the dynasty, would be cabled to Nanking for endorsement. Morrison ‘strongly urged that it [the court] should be forced to retire to Jehol’. As to the imperial pensions, Yuan was ready to pay them 5 million taels per annum, which Morrison regarded as ‘a quite preposterous amount’. Morrison advised Yuan that 1 million taels would be enough, explaining as examples the cases of Persia and of Turkey.97 Yuan, however, intended to pension off the dynasty generously in spite of China’s dire financial straits. Hence Morrison’s report in The

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Times: ‘Yuan Shih-kai proposes to grant the retiring Court pensions aggregating 5,000,000 taels a year. Special honour is to be shown to the Dowager-Empress.’98 Thus Yuan applied a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to the Court. Being offered generous pensions and at the same time being intimidated by the two incidents of 26 January, namely Liang-pi’s assassination and the memorial from the generals of the Imperial Army, on 10 February the Manchus finally decided to abdicate. Their main worry was the tragedy which usually follows the fall of a dynasty—execution of the imperial family as seen in the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917.99 The abdication procedure Yuan proposed was: • The issue of abdication edicts • Sun’s resignation from the provisional presidency • Yuan’s own election as provisional president by the National Assembly in Nanking • The inauguration of the amalgamated government of the North and South. Sun, although agreeing in the main, suggested that Yuan should come to Nanking to be elected president. For Sun, who was suspicious of Yuan, this meant that the united republican government would be created by the revolution.100 On 12 February, three edicts for the abdication of Emperor Hsuan-tung (later known as P’u-yi) were issued. Morrison, having received information from Ts’ai regarding the abdication, was able to report it in The Times on the same day it took place.101 On the following day, the Osaka Asahi Shimbun reproduced Morrison’s article102 and the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun summarized the three edicts.103 About these edicts, Jordan reported to Grey as follows: 1 The first edict invests Yuan Shih-kai with full powers to organize a provisional Republican Government and to negotiate with the leaders of the Republican Party with a view to the elaboration of a joint scheme uniting north and south in one republic, which is to be the established form of Government. 2 The second edict enumerates the terms of treatment accepted by the Imperial family, which both sides are to communicate to the foreign representatives for transmission to their respective Governments. 3 The third edict exhorts the officials and people to do their duty by the new Government, and orders measures to be taken for the preservation of peace.104 The terms of abdication were: good financial settlement, the promise of security of the imperial household and provision for the upkeep of the imperial tombs. The Ch’ing dynasty which had ruled China for 268 years since its creation in 1644 thus came to an end.105 It is important to note that Morrison’s advice that the dynasty should appoint Yuan to organize a republican government was manifested in the edict. It read: ‘Yuan Shih-kai shall have full powers to organize a Provisional Republican Government…on a united plan of action, with the view of securing peace to the people and the country’.106 In fact, on 5 February Liang Shih-yi, who drafted the edicts,107 consulted Morrison, the originator of this unique abdication procedure, about the wording of the edict.108 Morrison’s advice

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thus came to fruition and he observed with satisfaction that the procedure for the Emperor’s abdication was according to his advice. This very procedure, however, was a blow to Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues because it meant that a united republican government was decreed by the Throne and not created by the revolution. Morrison observed that the edicts had been well received in Peking, while the reaction in Nanking was just the opposite. D.Fraser wrote that the revolutionaries were ‘all desperately suspicious of Yuan’, recognizing that by the edict ‘the Manchus are only put aside to make way for Yuan himself’.109 Even T’ang Shaoyi and Wu T’ing-fang were dissatisfied, although they both telegraphed their congratulations to Yuan. Sun sent a telegram to Yuan arguing that a republican government should not be created by the Manchus’ edict, which upset Yuan. Yuan asked Morrison for assistance, showing him Sun’s telegram. Morrison thought Sun was again ‘virtually repudiating his promises, insisting that Yuan cannot hold any power from the Manchus, and demanding that he [Yuan] shall come at once to Nanking and there arrange matters’. Morrison regretted that ‘things are worse than I expected’.110 Yuan told Morrison that his reply was that he would not go to Nanking and asked for Morrison’s support. Yuan did not forget to thank Morrison for the assistance The Times had given him, and Morrison believed that ‘he spoke sincerely for he has been in frequent, almost daily, communication with me since he returned to Peking’ on 13 November 1911.111 Yuan was now treating Morrison as if he were his foreign adviser or counsellor. In fact, when abdication was near, Ts’ai wanted to ensure Morrison’s support and wrote ‘Please pave the way for abdication so that the foreign powers will accept with goodwill’,112 which Morrison considered to be his task. Morrison immediately called on the Japanese legation to sound out Japan’s attitude towards a republican government under Yuan.113 Morrison tried to contrive a way to lobby the diplomatic body into action by forcing Jordan to take the lead. Such a device, however, became unnecessary, because Ts’ai telephoned Morrison to report that Sun had telegraphed Yuan that the Nanking assembly had unanimously elected Yuan president, and that Nanking was to be the provisional capital.114 An elated Morrison wrote to Braham: ‘With the election of Yuan Shih-kai I think you can congratulate The Times on having put its money on the right horse’,115 but Morrison was in fact congratulating himself on the fruition of his efforts. Yuan, in great spirits, thanked him, saying that ‘If I am President it is largely due to your help.’ Yuan, however, said the same thing to Jordan. Yuan’s tribute to Jordan and the acclaim of Jordan in London were, however, an anticlimax for Morrison because he felt his own contribution had not been duly recognized by the British Government. He noted in his diary: Sir John was also heartened by some flattering words spoken…by Lord Crewe, and telegraphed out by Reuter. No praise could be spared for me, and yet how much I have kept poor old Sir John straight throughout this crisis. But for me I believe that long before this he could have had a nervous breakdown.116 Morrison’s frustration was increased by the attitude of The Times and the British Foreign Office. He noted in his diary: ‘no word of commendation for my work which is however much superior to all others’.117 From the Foreign Office Morrison received nothing, but a

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week later, he received what he had thought he would not get from The Times. Braham wrote: You have certainly distanced everybody throughout the whole of the long drawn-out crisis, and I am more than glad that we had faith enough to file practically all that reached us from other quarters, no matter how plausible or even probable it looked. We put our trust in you and you did not fail us.118 The Times did recognize Morrison’s singular contribution.

Morrison’s co-operation with Yuan Shih-kai’s final push for a republic: Britain’s gain from the revolution and Japan’s frustration Yuan Shih-kai had played out his role of ousting the dynasty, and it was now Sun Yatsen’s turn to do his part to resign the presidency in Yuan’s favour. On 14 February 1912, Sun agreed to resign only after three conditions were met: (1) Nanking should be the seat of the government. (2) Yuan Shih-kai should take an oath of inauguration in Nanking. (3) The president should abide by the principles of the draft constitution drawn up by the Nanking assembly.119 Sun held that his resignation would become effective only after Yuan’s inauguration.120 The southern leaders insisted that the removal of the capital from Peking, ‘the symbol of the Manchus’ evil tradition’, was essential to shake off the associations of the Manchu regime.121 Yuan refused to go to Nanking, however, arguing that, if he left Peking, Japan and Russia would invade it and that shifting the capital would cause great inconvenience to the diplomatic corps in Peking.122 Yuan explained to Morrison that ‘he had no intention of relinquishing the task to keep the North in order’, and that he did not expect to receive much support from the south, which Morrison took to mean that Yuan feared for his welfare in Nanking, the stronghold of the revolutionaries.123 Morrison himself did not want to go to Nanking. Being asked by Jordan whether he would go to Nanking if the capital were shifted, Morrison replied in the negative.124 D.Fraser wrote to Morrison from Nanking: If there is a change it will be a very serious one for many who have invested money in Peking, including yourself. Nanking from the point of view of a foreigner suddenly coming here, is a ghastly place. One miserable hole of a hotel and no houses to let where one could live. It means building from beginning to end. It’s a big question.125 Knowing that the shift would cause foreign complications, Morrison obtained declarations from many legations saying that they would not leave Peking ‘unless for adequate compensation’. The legations were unanimous that a change would greatly damage ‘China’s sovereignty’. On 17 February, Morrison informed Yuan of the legations’ unanimous opinion. At the same time, Morrison devised an ‘ingenious’ scheme126 and gave it to Yuan. His scheme was that various provincial capitals under

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Yuan’s control should send him telegrams demanding each to be the capital; that they should all put their own name first and Peking second, so that the casting vote would go to Peking. Morrison reminded him of a story of the Battle of Marathon and Miltiades: Before the battle of Marathon when the question arose as to who was to have chief command, each of the ten Athenian generals voted for himself as the most deserving, and put the name of Miltiades as second, but because of this the casting vote was given by the Polemarch Callimichus to Miltiades, and Miltiades commanded.127 Regarding this analogy, Morrison admitted to Braham: ‘my recollection is some-what hazy, but at any rate the illustration serves’. Lo Hui-min points out that Morrison has confused two stories: the story of the Battle of Marathon and Miltiades and the story of Themistocles and the Greek generals written 10 years later.128 At any rate, for this suggestion, which Morrison believed was acted upon, Ts’ai thanked him: ‘Thank you for the Capital [sic] suggestion which is capital.’129 Meanwhile on 25 February, a special delegation of the southern leaders, which included Wang Chao-ming, a supporter of Yuan Shih-kai, arrived at Peking in order to accompany Yuan back to Nanking.130 Yuan agreed to go and welcomed the delegation. Behind the scenes, however, he asked Morrison to persuade the delegation, through Wang Chao-ming, to change their minds. Ts’ai wrote to Morrison: T’ang and Wang Chao Ming [sic] are coming in today. As you know Wang very well and he is likely to call on you without delay, I hope you will point out to him the danger of the Government shifting to Nanking and also the objections the Legations would have on the removal…. All depends on You!!!131 Morrison accepted the task with his usual enthusiasm. Wang, however, told Morrison: Yuan will go by special train to Hankow, there he will meet Li Yuanhung, and Yuan will go down to Nanking accompanied by all the delegates. They will always be with him so that should anything happen to him it would happen to them also.132 The problem of shifting the capital was solved, not by Morrison’s persuasion, but by violence. On the same day Morrison talked to Wang, the 3rd Division of Yuan’s Northern Army mutinied. It looted and burnt large parts of Peking. The disturbance spread quickly to Tientsin, Paotingfu and other places.133 It is obvious from circumstantial evidence that the ‘mutiny’ was yet another plot of Yuan,134 although Morrison did not believe so. Morrison placed great importance on this incident, thinking that ‘The whole future of China depends upon how this situation is handled. If there is to be conciliation, and the men are to be bribed to keep quiet, then the country is finished.’135 Realizing that all the officers and soldiers had escaped punishment and that even the police had joined in the looting, taking off their uniforms, Morrison asked Major Menzies, a British officer who was serving in Yuan Shih-kai’s Army, to use his influence with the authorities to give

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these men the death penalty.136 Morrison also asked Yuan to severely punish these men,137 fearing that such mutiny and looting were bad publicity for Yuan. Yuan was reluctant to punish the soldiers, but promised that he would deal with them in due course.138 Morrison lamented his ‘lack of the sense of justice’. Morrison was naive to think that Yuan was innocent. D.Fraser in Nanking wrote to Morrison that many people responsible, including Consul-General E.Fraser, believed that Yuan himself was the mastermind of the incident in Peking. 139 Yet Morrison refused to believe it and wrote: Could anything conceivably be more preposterous than the suggestion that Y.S.K. inspired the mutiny in Peking in order to prevent his going to Nanking?… No man ever seriously believes that for him to have brought about the mutiny…seems to be as unreasonable as to employ a steel hammer to crush a gooseberry.140 K.S.Liew holds that ‘If Yuan had done it, he had done it extremely well, for not even a journalistic wizard and China hand like G.E.Morrison seems to have suspected it’.141 It was very strange if Morrison did not suspect Yuan despite the evidence. Morrison witnessed that the loot had been piled up in the compound of the Chinese Foreign Office ‘under the very eyes’ of Yuan Shih-kai. Morrison observed with disgust that no attempt was made to punish the men of the 3rd Division. He was well aware that the 3rd Division was the original division of the Chinese Army created by Yuan in 1895; that it was specially brought into Peking to preserve order during the crisis; and that it was regarded as containing the most trustworthy men in the Chinese Army and devoted to Yuan.142 Since as early as 30 November 1911, Morrison had been well aware that Yuan had been replacing the Manchu soldiers in Peking with his own men.143 Morrison reported: The situation in Peking is undergoing a change. The number of Manchu troops is being reduced and that of the Chinese increased. Nearly a whole division of the latter has been newly brought from Mukden to the neighbourhood of the capital.144 Immediately after the looting occurred, Morrison went out, together with four Englishmen, into the countryside towards Fengtai to find that no foreign property, including his own cottage, had been looted and that no foreigners had been molested, but that Chinese property had been savagely pillaged,145 which suggests that an order had been given to these soldiers not to touch foreign interests. In spite of all this, Morrison claimed that the mutiny occurred as a total surprise to Yuan.146 He listened to Yuan’s complaint that he had no money to pay the soldiers; that if the foreign powers had assisted him with money, the soldiers would not have mutinied. Morrison wrote to Menzies that Yuan might commit suicide, in which case Morrison feared that Japan would invade Peking.147 It is most likely that Morrison acted like this in order solely to defend Yuan Shih-kai. The mutiny was exploited by Yuan’s camp to blame Japan. Chao Erh-hsun, the Viceroy of Manchuria, in his speech, told the commanders and officers of the Chinese Army in Mukden that it was suspected that the mutiny in Peking had been instigated and supported by the Japanese, and he warned them to keep a watchful eye on the Japanese

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Army in Mukden.148 In view of the fact that Chao and Yuan shared anti-Japanese feelings, and that Ts’ai Ting-kan had been to Mukden shortly before the mutiny,149 it is reasonably inferred that this was yet another intrigue of Yuan to make a culprit of Japan. In Shanghai, various Chinese newspapers claimed that the Imperial Clan Party had instigated the Peking mutiny with the support of a certain nation, suggesting Japan. They held that Japan was hindering the unification of the north and the south and the establishment of a unified government under Yuan Shih-kai.150 As Yuan had bought up many newspapers in Shanghai, it is likely that these newspaper reports were instigated by him.151 During this upheaval, the Nanking delegation had to take shelter in the legation quarters in Peking.152 On 2 March the delegation advised Sun by telegram to agree on the establishment of an amalgamated government in Peking. On 6 March, Sun and the Nanking assembly accepted the advice.153 Sun surrendered the presidency to Yuan under the conviction that China needed strong unified rule, which he himself could not provide, and that the revolution had achieved its fundamental goal of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty and replacing it with a republic.154 Schiffrin holds that Sun’s giving away the presidency to Yuan was based on three factors: his fear of foreign intervention, his lack of organizational skills and his naive confidence that the aim of the revolution would be accomplished if only the dynasty was overthrown and Yuan had converted to republicanism. Schiffrin maintains that personally Sun was satisfied to see himself universally praised as a self-restrained disinterested patriot.155 On 10 March 1912, Yuan Shih-kai took the oath of office in Peking and became the Provisional President of the Chinese Republic.156 Morrison attended Yuan’s inauguration ceremony and noted in his diary: Yuan came in wobbling like a duck looking fat and unhealthy, in Marshal’s uniform loose flesh of his neck hanging down over his collar, hat too large for him nervous and uncomfortable. No more kowtowing. Now shake hands. No more Chinese official dress.157 Yuan’s method of assuming the top job was criticized by some contemporaries. Hippisley’s letter seems to sum up their observation: After accepting the highest office in the gift of the Throne and posing as the champion of the dynasty, he loses no time in making use of the Abdication he had been mainly instrumental in bringing about, for his own personal advancement.158 Ton Kai-son, a Chinese diplomat, a clever Chinese according to Morrison,159 confided to Morrison that though China was not yet ready for a republic, he nonetheless acknowledged Morrison’s work, saying that ‘the sympathetic attitude of the British people to the republic was largely due to me.’160 The first Asian republic was born, but whether this new ‘democratic’ republic would prove to be a better form of government remained uncertain.161 As far as Morrison was concerned, the outcome of the revolution was a personal triumph, because he had achieved his self-assigned mission of making Yuan Shih-kai the President of the Chinese Republic.

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Japan’s diplomacy towards Britain and China in this revolution was a failure, as already shown. Ijūin was disappointed with its outcome, because he had caused Japan diplomatic embarrassment by opposing a republic to the bitter end. Adding insult to injury, there was an incident where Ijūin ‘lost face’. Soon after Yuan’s inauguration, nearly all the foreign ministers in Peking, beginning with Jordan, paid Yuan a congratulatory call, and Yuan thanked them with a return call. No such diplomatic courtesy was exchanged between Ijūin and Yuan.162 Morrison suspected that Ijūin was ‘acting under orders’,163 but the real cause was Ijūin’s carelessness. Usually the diplomatic corps in Peking took concerted action, but in this case they acted individually, and Ijūin simply missed the opportunity to call on Yuan through oversight. He blamed Jordan who did not let him know about his own courtesy call. This diplomatic blunder left Ijūin in lonely isolation and he held a grudge against Jordan. Ijūin even claimed that Jordan’s action was against the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of mutual cooperation.164 Kanda, the Peking correspondent for the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, and Mizuno told Morrison that Ijūin was to be recalled.165 In fact, Ijūin requested Uchida to recall him.166 Uchida, however, refused to accept Ijūin’s request for the reason that recalling him immediately after the revolution would be unwise from the viewpoint of Japan’s overall policy.167 Uchida must have feared that Ijūin’s recall would look like an admission of Japan’s diplomatic failure. Ijūin was not relieved from his Peking post until July 1913. In the eyes of the public in Japan and abroad, Ijūin had made a fool of himself. He was criticized not only by Morrison,168 but also by many Japanese.169 One said ‘much more is expected of Ijūin’.170 Another said ‘Ijūin was second rate’.171 It is interesting to note that as early as April 1909 Morrison regarded Ijūin as ‘a failure’.172 He was now widely humiliated. For example, a Japanese wrote: ‘He has no skill to cope with the everchanging Chinese situation.’173 Another wrote: Describing the man Ijūin in a word would be ‘stubborn and foolish’. He used to be highly regarded in his Tientsin days as the Consul-General as a result of Yuan Shih-kai’s help. Yuan carried out various projects advantageous to Japan which brought about Ijūin’s fame which was higher than his actual ability. In this revolution, however, his honour and distinction plunged because he was tricked by Yuan Shih-kai and as a result made various mistakes. Since Ijūin earned his high reputation owing to Yuan in the first place, it cannot be helped if he loses it because of Yuan. After all, it was an inevitable consequence.174 Ijūin stubbornly adhered to a monarchy even after most Chinese and the British had come to prefer a republic. Some blamed both Uchida and the Saionji administration for Ijūin’s failure.175 They were all responsible for Japan’s diplomacy Uchida, ‘weak and vacillating’,176 was blamed because he retained Ijūin in the important ministerial post in Peking, although he did send Matsui and Mizuno to assist Ijūin. After all, Morrison was correct when he said ‘I cannot see how it is possible for him to remain as Minister in Peking’.177 Britain, Russia and Japan saw in the revolution an opportunity to consolidate their positions in China’s outlying dependencies, Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria. Britain

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wanted to increase its influence in Tibet, which Britain regarded as an important outpost for the defence of India, and which China had claimed to be its vassal state since the midthirteenth century.178 When the Manchus were weakened during the 1911 revolution, with British instigation Tibet invaded Szechuan province, murdering Viceroy Chao-Erh-feng, who was ‘one of the best known Viceroys in China, who restored Chinese authority in Tibet’, according to Morrison.179 In April 1912 Yuan Shih-kai, the Republican President, declared that Tibet and Mongolia constituted an integral part of China, and in July 1912 sent a military expedition to regain control of Tibet. Jordan then sent a memorandum to Yuan which demanded that China not intervene in Tibetan internal affairs.180 Russia sought a privileged position in Mongolia, which China claimed to be its vassal state. In fact, after the Tartar Empire broke up in the fourteenth century, between 1688 and 1756, the Manchus conquered Mongolia and made it their dependency.181 Backed by Russia, Mongolia declared its autonomy and expelled the Chinese officials in 1911. In early January 1912, Russia demanded of China that Mongolia come under Russian suzerainty and that Russia had exclusive rights to railway construction in northern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.182 Morrison proposed to support Russian demands on the grounds that ‘Our interests there are quite insignificant, and if Russia could get any advantage there, we could not look upon this with any regret.’183 Morrison’s intention in supporting Russia was to secure its agreement to British control of Tibet. Accordingly, he demonstrated his ‘understanding’ for Russia’s action stating in a friendly tone that ‘She desires peace between the Mongols and the Chinese, and discontinuance of the Chinese oppressive methods, which have tended to a disturbance involving possible costly interference.’184 In September 1912, Britain and Russia made a deal, agreeing that, in exchange for British recognition of Russia’s control over Outer Mongolia, Britain would obtain Russia’s approval of Britain’s special position in Tibet.185 This agreement was made despite the existence of the following conventions: the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 27 April 1906 which recognized that Tibet was a part of China186 and the Anglo-Russian Settlement of 1907 which acknowledged Chinese suzerainty in Tibet.187 Soon after this, Britain agitated for the independence of Tibet.188 Jordan told Yuan that, if China interfered with Tibetan affairs, Britain would not recognize the Republic of China. In December 1912, Yuan yielded to the British demand, and Tibet declared its independence in January 1913. Soon after, in July 1913, Britain concluded a trade agreement with Tibet and finally recognized the Republic of China in October 1913.189 Thus Yuan abandoned China’s control of Outer Mongolia to Russia and Tibet to Britain. Kahn rightly maintains that British actions regarding Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet had ‘deviated far from its announced policy of complete “Neutrality”’.190 Shigenori claimed that Britain had made an exorbitant demand of Yuan after making him president.191 Taking advantage of the revolution, Britain and Russia increased their influence in the Far East, while Japan felt that it had emerged empty-handed192 in spite of its expectation. For Katsura, the Prime Minister, the Chinese upheaval was a welcome phenomenon, of which Japan would take advantage in order to extend its influence on that nation.193 As has been examined, the causes of Japan’s failure in the Hsinhai Revolution are to be found in the inexperienced quality of Japan’s diplomacy, coupled with Morrison’s antiJapanese activities, Yuan Shih-kai’s Machiavellian activities which Morrison helped and

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Grey’s China policy which was determined largely by the opinion of Jordan, whom Morrison influenced. In order to compensate for its failure, a frustrated Japan would try to take advantage of the next disturbance, the First World War. Ikei suggests that a cause and effect relationship can be found between Japan’s frustration in the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and its enthusiasm to participate in the First World War of 1914.194 Morrison once again would attempt to thwart Japan’s ambitious designs in order to ensure the British strategic position in the Far East and thereby Australia’s national security.

7 CHINA AFTER THE HSINHAI REVOLUTION Morrison becomes political adviser to Yuan Shih-kai In March 1912, Yuan Shih-kai inaugurated the Republican Government of a 10-man Cabinet, appointing T’ang Shao-yi as Premier. Morrison wrote to Wen Ping-chung, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: There is no question that the President since his election has by his conduct, his high statesmanship and his impressive personality, added to the honour of his country…. To the Prime Minister [T’ang Shao-yi] also the country owes a great deal…. He will, I am sure, lead the country along the right path, and he commands an influence abroad of the highest importance to the Chinese nation.1 Morrison’s hope in the future of China under Yuan Shih-kai and T’ang Shao-yi was too optimistic, which will be seen shortly. As Yuan reached the pinnacle of his career by becoming President of the Republic of China, Morrison reached an anti-climax in his journalistic career. In fact, he found himself at a turning point in his life. Now that the republic was established and about to embark on the course of nation-building under Yuan Shih-kai’s presidency and T’ang Shao-yi’s premiership, Morrison considered it an appropriate time to withdraw with honour from the Chinese scene. He decided to resign from The Times and go home to Australia.2 He was now 50 and in poor health. He was tired of his work, which required irregular hours and continual attention, with no prospect of advancement or increase in salary.3 He wanted to return to Australia ‘in order to try and do some good for myself while I am still able to enjoy life’.4 ‘It has always been my ambition to return to Australia sooner or later’,5 he wrote. Morrison explained to Buckle that he had intended to resign two years previously but that his resignation then would have looked as if he was forced out because of his dispute with Chirol regarding Japan.6 Morrison now suggested to Buckle that The Times should give him recognition for his work ‘in the form of a sum of money’.7 Buckle reminded Morrison that The Times had already shown its appreciation of his excellent work ‘in letters and by word of mouth, again and again’. Buckle reassured Morrison that his work had been ‘the most distinctive and valued feature of the Paper’, thanked him ‘sincerely’, wished him all success in the future, but apologized for The Times being unable to grant him any retiring allowance owing to the Paper’s unhealthy financial condition. Buckle, instead, suggested that Morrison sell his library. If he left the Far East, ‘a valuable collection of Chinese works’ would be of no special use

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to him.8 Chirol and Bland shared their joy over Morrison’s decision to resign. In fact, Morrison had been feeling uncomfortable with The Times after his split with Chirol.9 Northcliffe, becoming angry, said that Morrison had thrown away the best chance ever a journalist had, by leaving The Times.10 Morrison’s career as a correspondent of The Times, which began in November 1895, ended in this sorry fashion in July 1912. At this opportune moment, Morrison was asked by Yuan Shih-kai to become his political adviser with the handsome salary of £3,500 per annum,11 nearly twice the amount he was receiving from The Times. It was an enormous amount. F.Fernand, Morrison’s friend, expressed his doubt if foreign advisers would really receive the money out of the empty state treasury.12 In fact, in order to gather the sums to pay the foreign advisers, the salaries of all Chinese officials were greatly reduced.13 Morrison reflected on the occasion when the offer was made: Immediately I went down to Sir John. I assured him…the Chinese knew that I was contemplating leaving China…and they made me this offer hoping to retain my services in China. I said that Yuan considered that I had been of constant help to him, that I was one of the mainstays of the Republic, and that he wished me to remain with him and be his adviser as long as he was President.14 It is of interest to know that some four months prior to the actual offer made by Yuan Shih-kai, Finlayson said to Morrison that Wearne had told Bush, a British businessman in Newchwang, that Morrison was seeking a position with Yuan Shih-kai.15 Similarly, Buckle wrote as early as in May 1912 that Yuan would need Morrison’s guidance.16 Such information suggests that Morrison knew before his resignation from The Times that Yuan would offer him a position. Morrison became Yuan’s political adviser on 1 August 1912. He believed in a positive future of China, as he wrote to R.F.Johnston, who was to become the tutor in English in 1919 to P’u-yi, deposed Emperor of the Ch’ing dynasty.17 He also believed that he could be of assistance to Yuan in creating a new nation.18 Congratulatory telegrams and letters flooded in to Morrison from Grey downwards. Grey wrote to Jordan: Please inform Dr. Morrison that I am very glad that the offer has been made to him and convey my congratulations. You may add that in his efforts to assist China through her difficulties he has all my sympathy and my best wishes for his success. 19 Various newspapers and magazines reported his new appointment, including many Japanese publications,20 mostly acclaiming his ability, efforts and performance in his career, using terms such as ‘pilot’, ‘the man at the helm’, and ‘the man to lead China to her salvation’.21 Morrison was one foreign adviser amongst many, but it was he who was the first foreign adviser to the president and who recommended all the others to Yuan.22 The position of foreign adviser, however, was but an expensive strategy used by China to acquire loans and recognition from the foreign powers. At the time of Morrison’s appointment, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun correctly forecast:

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The main motive of the Chinese Government employing Dr. Morrison is to obtain various diplomatic privileges by making use of him. In the past those who entered the Chinese service under the magnificent title never had real influence on the Chinese.23 Soon after joining Yuan, Morrison found his job a mere fruitless sinecure. He was disappointed, having no real involvement in or influence over Chinese affairs. He wrote to Ts’ai T’ing-kan ‘I am given very little opportunity of doing anything…. I am kept more in the dark now…than…when I was a Correspondent.’24 He became disillusioned with the Chinese Republic and wrote to H.Cockburn, former British Consul-General in Korea (1906–9), who joined the Peking Syndicate on Morrison’s introduction: ‘I have many disappointments and I cannot see that the Chinese of the Republic are very different from the Chinese we knew 15 years ago.’25 Morrison, however, never openly criticized the new regime. Dillon, publicly criticizing the new regime and Morrison who defended it, wrote that ‘Dr. Morrison rails at the old regime but corruption under the new regime is flourishing as before. Nay, it is worse.’26 Morrison regretted that he had resigned from The Times. Donald commented that as The Times correspondent Morrison had ‘twice the prestige and three times the influence’. Donald told Morrison during the revolution that ‘once a man entered the paid service of a Chinese his influence was gone’, but Morrison scoffed.27 Morrison realized with regret, however, that he had made a great mistake in joining Yuan’s service with so much enthusiasm.28 He found happiness in his private life, however. He married his 23-year-old secretary, Jennie Robin Wark from Melbourne, on 26 August 1912, an event widely reported by various papers including The Times. Although Morrison was disappointed with his job, he continued to serve three presidents subsequently, namely Li Yuan-hung, Feng Kuo-chang and Hsu Shih-ch’ang, until his death in 1920.29

Foreign loans to the Republic of China It is important to examine Morrison’s two major achievements during his seven years’ service to the Republic of China—one was his efforts to introduce foreign loans to China, the other his successful attempt to make China enter the First World War on the side of the Allies of Britain, France, Japan and Russia. With the outbreak of the Hsinhai Revolution, the powers, in taking a neutral stance, decided to suspend all loans to the Peking (Manchu, Ch’ing) Government. Accordingly, during the revolution the Quadruple Consortium of Britain, Germany, France and the United States refused the repeated demand for loans by the Peking Government. After the revolution, China, which Yuan Shih-kai took over from the Manchu dynasty, was in dire financial straits. Provincial leaders were not remitting money; the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs revenues were mortgaged by the powers as security against loans and Boxer indemnities; the administration of the likin excise and the salt tax was chaotic. Because the influence of the central government in Peking and local authorities derived from the military who were loyal to whoever paid them, Yuan’s pressing need was for money to pay the military in order to maintain his power. 30

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As seen in Chapter 2, in April 1911 the Quadruple Consortium already advanced to the Peking Government £10 million as the Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan and in May 1911, £6 million as the Hukuang Railway Loan for railway nationalization, which triggered the Hsinhai Revolution. When the revolution was over, the question of loans from the Consortium arose as a matter of urgency.31 On 23 February 1912, Yuan Shih-kai requested the Consortium for a loan of 7 million taels in order to make the Nanking Government disband troops and liquidate outstanding liabilities, and on 28 February the Consortium advanced 2 million taels. Furthermore, Yuan requested, through T’ang Shao-yi, the Prime Minister, an immediate loan of 3 million taels in March for the Peking Government, and 64 million taels each month, for a period of three months from April, half for the Peking and half for the Nanking Government. On 9 March the Consortium advanced to Yuan 1.1 million taels, requesting at the same time that Yuan submit to the Consortium a note of guarantee that in the future China should give the Consortium special preferential rights to make loans to China. Yuan conceded to the request because he desperately needed money to build up his own army in the north while disbanding the revolutionaries’ army in the south. The Consortium, satisfied that they had secured Yuan’s note, decided on 12 March to provide Yuan with monthly payments of 64 million taels until August on condition that more stringent foreign control be applied—the expenditure of loan funds to be supervised by a Bank-appointed foreign expert and the salt tax to be reorganized immediately T’ang, regarding these conditions as humiliating, categorically refused to accept them and the negotiations came to a standstill. 32 On 14 March 1912, independent of the Quadruple Consortium, T’ang Shaoyi concluded with the Anglo-Belgian Syndicate33 an immediate loan of 1 million taels at 5 per cent interest and at the same time arranged a subsequent optional loan of 9 million taels, offering the Peking-Kalgan Railway as security.34 Yuan Shih-kai formally endorsed this loan arrangement. The annoyed representatives of the Consortium requested their respective ministers in Peking to lodge a formal protest to the Chinese.35 To the ministers, T’ang explained that the terms of the Consortium were humiliating to an independent nation and that the Anglo-Belgian Syndicate offered better terms; for example, supervision of expenditure of loan funds was not requested.36 D.Fraser’s observation of the Chinese view, that the Consortium considered themselves all powerful and entitled to monopoly and domination,37 seems valid. On 6 March 1912, C.S.Addis, Manager of the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, explained to the Foreign Office the Bank’s contention against the forthcoming Anglo-Belgian Loan: the Bank was entitled to claim that the Foreign Office should not support any financial group to make loans or advances to China except the Consortium, until such a time when the Consortium signed a reorganization loan with China. Addis warned the Foreign Office by stating that: It is certain that our continental friends would regard it as a breach of faith if support were given to any group which is not a party to the international agreement. An embarrassing and even dangerous situation would be created, and great difficulty might be experienced in maintaining the agreement between the groups.38

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Bland condemned the Anglo-Belgian Loan contract as ‘a Russian undertaking, political in its origin’. In fact, the Syndicate was supported by the Russian Government whose political motive was apparent by the nature of the pledged security, namely the PekingKalgan Railway, the only railway in China which was native-built and free of any political complications. Bland saw in this loan Russian encroachment on Chinese territory.39 Morrison, whose self-appointed mission was to protect British political and economic interests in China, was outraged with the Anglo-Belgian Loan. He viewed T’ang’s deal as a breach of faith with the Consortium and condemned it as ‘one of the most unwise and unstatesmanlike acts’.40 He publicized T’ang’s act in his article in The Times of 21 March 1912 titled ‘The Anglo-Belgian Loan to China: views of Tang [sic] Shao-yi’.41 At the same time, he took a ‘carrot and stick approach’ to Yuan Shih-kai. He gave ‘friendly advice’ to him, through Ts’ai T’ing-kan, Yuan’s Private Secretary, in the hope that Yuan would cancel the Anglo-Belgian Loan. He stressed that a speedy recovery of friendly relations between China and the Consortium was essential; it was not that T’ang acted in bad faith (here Morrison was diplomatic), but he overlooked by mistake, in the pressure of his work, the existence of the note submitted by Yuan to the Consortium on 9 March 1912, which accorded to the Consortium special preferential rights, and T’ang’s mistake ought to be rectified as quickly as possible. The note did not forbid China to deal outside the Consortium, but morally bound China to give the Consortium a first option. Apart from giving Yuan advice as to how China should solve its financial crisis, Morrison warned him that foreign ministers in Peking were offended by the Anglo-Belgian Loan which was secretly entered into behind their backs. Morrison suggested Yuan consult with Jordan: Fortunately the doyen of the diplomatic body is British, and there never has been in China a foreign Minister more entirely sympathetic with China, and one more anxious to do all he can to assist China in her present embarrassment.42 It is true that Jordan was friendly towards Yuan Shih-kai, as Chan Lau Kit-ching states: ‘The high esteem and friendship which Jordan had for Yuan was to play an important role in the Reorganization Loan.’43 Nevertheless, Jordan’s duty as British representative was to secure British interests first and in the case of loan negotiations, his sense of duty came before his personal friendly feelings towards Yuan. Jordan’s following report on the occasion of the signing of the Reconstruction Loan in August 1912 seems to show clearly their relationship: ‘Yuan looks…upon me as a sort of renegade. At our last interview he pictured the six ministers44 as trying hard to strangle him but said he knew I kept the knot from being tied too tightly’.45 On 14 March, the Foreign Office assured Addis that it would not give its support to any other group until a settlement of the reorganization loan, out of which advances had already been made to China, was reached. At the same time, the Foreign Office let Addis know that it was considering a possibility of inviting other British banks to participate in the Consortium so as to form a British group together with the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, along the lines of the French and German groups in the Consortium.46 On 27 April, Yuan, yielding to the pressure by Morrison and the

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Consortium, promised to abide by his note and cancelled the Anglo-Belgian Loan, paying them compensation.47 While, being pressed by British banks, Grey was considering the necessity to let them join the Consortium to form a British group, the Consortium itself was wondering if they should let Japan and Russia join the Consortium to expand the membership to form a sixpower one. Being afraid that Japan and Russia might make their own separate loans to China, the Consortium considered it preferable to have them inside rather than outside the Consortium. Although it was feared that the entry of Japan and Russia might make the Consortium’s negotiations with the Chinese more complicated, invitations were offered and after some difficulties, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Russo-Asiatic Bank finally joined the group on 18June 1912 on condition that the loan funds should not be expended in such a way as to prejudice Japan’s special rights and interests in Manchuria and those of Russia in Mongolia.48 Thus the Sextuple Consortium came into being. Morrison, who was concerned with Britain’s declining influence in China, was opposed to the entry of Japan and Russia. His view was: We ought to be the predominant Power in China, for our interests enormously outweigh those of any other country, but in our insane support of one Banking Group we have striven to subordinate our interest to the level of that of the weakest of the Six Powers. Our prestige is vanishing, our interests are suffering everywhere.49 In the House of Commons the Opposition Party expressed apprehension that Japan and Russia might take advantage of their entry and attempt to enhance their influence in China.50 The negotiations were now carried out between China and the Sextuple Consortium. On 20 June 1912, the Consortium insisted on their previous conditions, namely the supervision of expenditure of loan funds, reorganization of the salt tax and the Consortium’s financial agent to assist in the work of reorganization. Yuan rejected these terms because he wanted to use the money to buy off the threatening southern troops and thus to lead the nation towards unity under himself. He sacked T’ang on 26 June 1912, ostensibly for his blunder in the Anglo-Belgian Loan, but Moller maintains that Yuan wanted to get rid of T’ang who was opposed to Yuan’s becoming autocratic and independent from the Cabinet. On 29 June, Yuan requested an immediate loan of £10 million, reduced from £60 million, hoping that that would relax the terms. Uchida, Japanese Prime Minister, opposed the relaxation of the terms to which the other powers agreed. The Consortium refused Yuan’s request on 9 July, declaring that no advances would be made if the terms were not met. The deadlock ensued.51 Meanwhile, in early 1912, British banks, such as the Capital and Counties Bank, the Eastern Bank, the Chartered Bank, Lloyd’s Bank, the London County and Westminster Bank, which were dissatisfied with the support of the British Foreign Office exclusively given to the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, formed a new financial group, the Crisp Syndicate, headed by C. B.Crisp, a British financier. Crisp started negotiations with the Chinese Government on 30 May 1912 and made a preliminary agreement for a loan for 10 million taels with Hsiung Hsi-ling, Finance Minister, on 2 July.52

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Morrison learnt about this agreement after accepting the post of political adviser to Yuan Shih-kai on 1 August 1912. Yuan asked Morrison to enquire into the bona fides of this loan agreement in London, because Morrison was going there to say farewell to The Times and to get married. Arriving in London on 18 August, he learned from McLeavyBrown, Counsellor of the Chinese Legation in London, and from the Foreign Office that Crisp was a man of integrity and high standards and he was to be recommended.53 Morrison saw Crisp for the first time on 23 August, together with Lew Yuk-lin (Liu Yulin), Chinese Minister in London, and gained ‘a favourable impression of his knowledge and clearsightedness [sic]’.54 On that day, Crisp informed the Foreign Office that his Syndicate was negotiating a loan with China. The Foreign Office explained to him that ‘His Majesty’s Government did not consider that China was free to borrow outside the Consortium until the repayment of the advances made by the latter had been duly provided for.’55 The Foreign Office also tried to discourage Crisp advising that it would be difficult for a syndicate without much experience and unsupported by any foreign government to be successful in China.56 Morrison saw Crisp for the second time on 29 August,57 and the next day, Crisp concluded a formal loan agreement with Lew Yuk-lin. As Lowe maintains, Morrison was ‘the moving influence’ in the Crisp Loan transaction.58 It was a loan contract of 10 million taels, with 5 per cent interest and redemption in 40 years, secured on the salt revenue of China. For China these terms were better than those of the Consortium.59 The frustrated Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation tried to prevent the Crisp Loan. Crisp retaliated and recriminations began.60 Meanwhile China presented a set of counterproposals to the Consortium on 21 September but the Consortium rejected it and the deadlock continued. Subsequently, Crisp paid the Chinese 5 million taels, the first half of the loan.61 Morrison maintained that ‘China wanted the money badly and she obtained the money from the best source in London’ and that the Crisp Loan was beneficial to both Britain and China.62 He believed that in order to increase genuine British interests in China, it was essential for ‘a pure British group’ to secure a footing in China. In this belief, he was determined to break the Foreign Office’s exclusive support of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank in the Chinese financial market. To Morrison, the Bank’s ‘monopoly’ was ‘highly injurious’ because the Bank was under German influence.63 Although only 2,000 shares out of 120,000 were held by Germans, German influence was strong on the board of directors which had four German directors out of eleven.64 Morrison observed with regret that British influence in China was waning and he thought that it was because of its policy which was not beneficial to British trade and British bankers. He held that British policy had caused serious damage to its interests on the grounds that it was blocking authentic British enterprise.65 Morrison endeavoured to make the Foreign Office change its policy On 2 September 1912, he visited the Foreign Office and in a conversation with J.D. Gregory66 he criticized British loan policy to China, in particular its exclusive support of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, which he claimed to be discriminating against ‘pure British banks’. He also explained to Gregory the situation in China: that China regarded the Consortium’s severe terms as humiliating for an independent nation; that the terms excited popular alarm; and that Yuan feared that the entry of Japan and Russia into the Consortium might lead to the dismemberment of China.67 Gregory apparently admitted

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that the exclusive support of the Bank had exposed the Foreign Office to continuous criticism and protests from other British banks.68. It seems that Morrison placed the Foreign Office in a difficult position. Its dilemma was that on one hand it had already guaranteed to the Bank its exclusive support until a reorganization loan to China was concluded, and on the other hand Crisp was backed by many British banks and by Morrison, political adviser to the President of the Republic of China. Gregory, however, tried to explain away this exclusive support stating that the Bank had rendered considerable services in creating the Consortium. Morrison thought that nobody regarded Alston69 and Gregory as having ‘either the knowledge or the mentality to enable them to consider all the factors of such complex situation when they led Sir Edward Grey into this policy’.70 Gregory proposed a change of foreign policy, however. He was ‘now coming to the front in the Far Eastern Department’71 of the Foreign Office, and argued that the Consortium’s attempt to conclude a reorganization loan agreement, if it failed, should be regarded as final, and in that case the Consortium should be dissolved, making Grey free to allow any British loan group on its merit to make loan negotiations with China. Jordan opposed Gregory’s proposal, however. Jordan, who had reported to Grey that ‘Morrison was instructed [by Yuan] to examine [Crisp’s] proposals, and was understood to have reported favourably’, was against Gregory’s proposal, claiming that to encourage competition by allowing China to borrow outside the Consortium would confuse the Chinese financial market and jeopardize the success of reconstruction loan negotiations. Jordan’s argument was to keep the Consortium alive and the Foreign Office should advise them to relax their terms of loan, to which Grey agreed.72 Grey’s decision to accept Jordan’s advice and to continue, at least for the time being, current exclusive support of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank was due to his recognition of the Bank’s contribution to the creation of the Consortium. Grey also believed in the importance of signing a large reconstruction loan long pursued by the Consortium, which would help China to ease its financial crisis. Creation of sound finance in China would in turn help maintain current British dominance of the Chinese financial market. As Morrison feared, China eventually yielded to the pressure from the Consortium backed by their respective governments,73 and cancelled the Crisp Loan on 23 December 1912 by paying £150,000 in compensation.74 Morrison lamented: The British Government have wrecked this loan contract which would have been highly advantageous to British interests and would have helped to reorganise the Chinese Government at a critical time and they have done this in the interests of countries whose interests in China are not identical with our own.75 Morrison was very disappointed with the Foreign Office, whose policy he believed to have been a devastating failure.76 Believing that the Foreign Office was exploiting China’s financial straits, which would in turn eventually damage British interests in China, he directed a campaign against its policy, claiming that China should be allowed freedom to borrow, and this campaign won support from radical groups in Britain.77 Morrison hoped that the Foreign Office would have the courage to acknowledge its failure and endeavour to retrieve it.78 After carrying out this policy of exclusive support

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for the Bank, Grey thought it was the time to expand the British membership of the Sextuple Consortium. Subsequently being invited, Barings, Parr’s, the London, Country and Westminster Bank and J.H.Schröder and Co. joined the Consortium, while Rothschild and the Chartered Bank declined to join on the grounds of unequal partnership with the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation.79

Morrison’s propaganda campaign Morrison devoted most of his professional life in an effort to maintain and increase British predominance in the Far East so as to ensure Australian security. He accordingly had assisted Crisp but without success, as seen already. On the other hand, Jordan, who wanted to finalize the prolonged negotiations and to conclude a reorganization loan between the Sextuple Consortium and China as quickly as possible, was the main force in blocking the Crisp transaction.80 Relations between Morrison and Jordan became strained. Morrison wrote to Jordan: I am convinced that I did what was right for British interests. I claim that in assisting to introduce new British interests into China, however humble was the part I played in doing so, I was doing a service to the British and therefore increasing the influence of the British Legation in China.81 In this letter, Morrison for the first time clearly exposed his true self by proclaiming himself as ‘a patriotic Australian’. Morrison’s varied assistance to Jordan, including Jordan’s obtaining the Peking ministerial post, was an integral part of Morrison’s lifelong project to achieve his mission. And on this important occasion, Jordan betrayed Morrison’s expectation. A disappointed Morrison wrote to Jordan: For 15 years I have known you, and in whatever capacity I could, I have defended you and supported you both in The Times and elsewhere. In London, in a published interview, I spoke of your work with praise, as I have always done since I first worked for you, urging that you be appointed to your present post.82 Jordan’s response was very short because otherwise ‘it raises many controversial points which it would be undesirable for me to discuss’. Jordan, however, made it clear that he could not support Morrison’s action in the Crisp Loan on the grounds that ‘this Loan was the avowed cause of the inspired newspaper campaign against Sir Edward Grey and myself as the local exponent of British policy’. He defended the ongoing British policy as being ‘founded on justice and reason’.83 Jordan seems to have forgotten that in international politics, policies are not always ‘founded on justice and reason’ and that he himself shared the view with Morrison that the Bank had been influenced by the Germans and that the Bank was more concerned with its own profits than ‘those of British trade as a whole’.84 Morrison’s strained relations with Jordan were unfortunate for Morrison, because it jeopardized his relations with the Foreign Office, which so far had been quite amicable in

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spite of his sometimes opposing its Far Eastern policy. The Foreign Office now regarded him as a ‘dangerous instigator’ and this made his work difficult as political adviser to the President of the Chinese Republic, who had employed him in the hope of making use of his services as ‘a sounding-board, moderating influence and contact between himself and the foreign powers’.85 Although the Foreign Office became antagonistic to Morrison, his loyalty remained first and foremost to the British Empire, which included Australia. He never discredited the British Government in the eyes of the Chinese. In all his communications to the Chinese, Morrison emphasized friendly and sympathetic feelings of the Foreign Office towards the Chinese and its willingness to assist them to build a strong and united China. He wrote toL. G.Fraser, on the editorial staff of the Pall Mall Gazette, who later became one of the chief leader-writers of The Times: ‘To the Chinese I am always championing the British action, always endeavouring to make them realise that we British are their best friends.’86 While making the Foreign Office look better in the eyes of the Chinese, Morrison attempted to show China in a much better light in the eyes of the British. When he arrived in England in mid-August 1912, he found that there was considerable scepticism about the future of the new China. Newspapers and posters publicized China’s chaos and impending civil war. Morrison thought that such publicity would give a detrimental image of China to the people who were intending to invest in China.87 Accordingly, he publicly negated such ‘rumours’. In his Letter to the Editor published in The Times of 23 August entitled ‘The Outlook in China, A Reply to Pessimists’, Morrison reassured its readers of the stability and prosperity of the Chinese Republic. In a leader ‘Dr Morrison on China’, The Times recognized that Morrison’s letter was ‘a useful corrective to the exaggerated reports which have recently been current about the situation in China’, although it stated that it did not share Morrison’s complete optimism. The Evening News and the Westminster Gazette both took up Morrison’s letter and commented favourably.88 Morrison’s usual feigned optimism seems to have been effective. Being invited to an interview by L.G.Fraser, Morrison answered a set of questions, which was published on the first page of the Pall Mall Gazette of 16 September 1912, as ‘Dr Morrison on the New China’. Morrison is reported to have stated: This will be a record year for trade in China despite the enormous floods…. They [the military] are being steadily disbanded. The administration of President Yuan Shih-kai is not now seriously disputed anywhere. The very quietude of China today is proof of stability.89 Morrison stated about Yuan Shih-kai that ‘the chief complaint against Yuan is that he is far too anxious not to transgress constitutional limits’.90 The Manchester Guardian of 17 September commented favourably on Morrison’s statement in the Pall Mall Gazette.91 F.A.Mackenzie, formerly a war correspondent for the Daily Mail (1900–10) who became editor of the weekly edition of The Times (1910–14), interviewed Morrison and wrote a column-long article in the Daily Mail: A talk with Dr Morrison…is a good cure for such pessimism. He left China steadily settling down, with the authority of the Central Government growing, with trade everywhere reviving, and with the

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unwieldy armies of the revolution being gradually disbanded and absorbed in the civil population.92 By his propaganda campaign, Morrison created a better image of China amongst the British. L.Fraser wrote to Morrison: You have placed the Republic in a far more favourable light…. From many quarters I hear that your published statements have made a deep impression, particularly in the City. The best proof, however, is to be found in the remarkable change of attitude in a large proportion of the British press…. The change in public opinion is due to you. I fear China will never realise how much it owes you in this and similar matters. 93 However, Morrison’s following undated Reminiscences reveal his real recognition of China’s condition. Disbandment [of the troops] was difficult for the military preferred a life of ease with the possibilities of plunder to a life of labour. The provincial authorities always opposed disbandment because their power was derived from the military and without the military their authority disappeared.94 Meanwhile, on 5 November 1912, negotiations between the Sextuple Consortium and China resumed. The Foreign Office wanted to see the conclusion of a reorganization loan as quickly as possible, and suggested to the Sextuple Consortium to relax the terms governing foreign control of the salt tax and expenditure of loan funds, in an attempt to make the loan more acceptable to China. Towards the end of the year, an agreement for a loan of £25 million was almost reached, but a further delay was caused by a disagreement amongst the six powers regarding nomination of foreign advisers who would supervise the expenditure of loan funds. Morrison observed that China felt deceived by the Sextuple Group when it reopened negotiations, and Morrison judged that the Sextuple Group was an ‘unworkable combination’.95 Frustrated, China notified the Consortium that it would terminate the negotiations. In mid-March 1913, the six powers finally solved the adviser problem, and signature for the loan between the Consortium and China seemed finally in sight. On 19 March 1913, however, people involved in the loan question were shocked to read in The Times an article entitled ‘Dr Wilson and the Six Power Loan’ sent by its Washington correspondent. It reported that the American group had withdrawn from the Consortium, accepting the request of newly elected President W.Wilson who had regarded the Consortium’s terms of the loan as a violation of Chinese internal administration. Wilson’s deed was highly acclaimed by the Chinese and the Americans as an expression of his high ideals to respect China’s sovereign rights.96 Since then, however, Kahn’s study97 of the Straight Papers98 and other materials99 has revealed that in his statement of 18 March 1913, Wilson refused to give exclusive support to the influential Wall Street bankers within the Consortium, namely J.P.Morgan and Co., Kuhn Loeb and Co., the First National Bank and the National City Bank of New York. By this refusal, Wilson gave additional support to small American investors and financiers in

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order to enable them to conduct business independently in China. In fact, the small bankers, who had been excluded from the American group in the Consortium, had appealed to Wilson that if they could act independently from the European powers, the United States could secure more concessions from China for mining, railway, oil, steel and shipbuilding enterprises and gain a larger share of business in the Chinese market. Wilson’s statement, therefore, was welcomed by American small financiers.100 Grey, who had learned of the American withdrawal only in a newspaper,101 criticized Wilson’s procedure, which lacked a prior consultation, as ‘a breach of all diplomatic decency’.102 The Sextuple Consortium was now reduced to the Quintuple Consortium. Morrison thought it was a good opportunity to break away from the Consortium altogether for the reason that Britain could not gain any advantage from its association with the Consortium.103 The Quintuple Consortium was afraid that the group’s strength might be weakened because the Americans had withdrawn. Fraser wrote to Morrison that ‘the defection’ of the American group would annihilate the scheme altogether.104 A sudden change in the Chinese political situation, however, not only removed the anxiety of the Consortium but also prompted the conclusion of the loan contract. On 20 March 1913 Sung Chiao-jen,105 Yuan Shih-kai’s political enemy, was assassinated at the Shanghai Railway Station. When it was revealed that Yuan’s man, Chao Ping-chun, Minister of Interior, was involved in this murder case, the nation was shocked and the southern republicans’ revolt became imminent. In order to suppress the impending uprising, Yuan needed money urgently on almost any terms. In this situation, the Reorganization Loan contract of £25 million, the so-called Grand Loan, was finally signed on 26 April 1913. This loan was unconstitutional because Yuan signed it without ratification by parliament. His action was severely criticized by the Kuomintang (the National People’s Party) and the southern republicans. The signing of the Grand Loan, coupled with the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen, infuriated the people and led the nation into a civil war between the south and north, which was known as the Second Revolution. This loan, however, enabled Yuan to defeat the army of the south.106 The angry Chinese denounced this loan as ‘one of the ugliest crimes committed by the imperialist powers’ on the grounds that it increased Yuan’s military strength to defeat his opposition and as a result democracy was ruined.107 Chiang Kai-shek, then a young republican officer, lamented that ‘Even after the Hsinhai revolution, the powers continued to make a fool of the Chinese as their prey.’108

The First World War After leaving The Times, Morrison remained a lone wolf, but without fangs. He ceased to be a serious threat to Japan’s expansion. In spite of this, he continued his efforts to check Japan. His work had been appreciated by the Chinese, in particular by Yuan Shih-kai, who awarded him two Chinese decorations. The first one was the Second Class Order of the China-ho (Plentiful Crop) on 22 June 1913 ‘for services that cannot be numbered’. Morrison described it as ‘a decoration which I don’t value a brass farthing’. The second one was the First Class Order of the China-ho on 21 September 1914.109 In spite of the decorations, Morrison was not given any adequate work as political adviser.

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Yuan Shih-kai was not suited to perform the task of president of a democratic republican nation. Yuan wanted China to be centralized under his strong leader-ship. In the general election for a new national assembly and new provincial assemblies in the winter of 1912–13, however, the Kuomintang had a significant victory. Yuan had recourse to his usual methods. In March 1913, his men assassinated Sung Chiao-jen, architect of the Kuomintang’s electoral victory, as already seen. In November 1913, Yuan outlawed the Kuomintang altogether and executed its members. Subsequently, he directed the drafting of a new constitution in May 1914, by which he gained virtual dictatorship for life and the right to name his successor, abolishing all elected assemblies. Thus he forcibly destroyed the growth of representative government. Bland’s view of the republic that ‘the actual government of China contains none of the elements of genuine Republicanism, but is merely the old despotism, the old mandarinate, under new names’110 and Dillon’s description of the outcome of the revolution as ‘constitutional anarchy’111 are justified. Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, on 23 August 1914, Japan voluntarily joined the war on the British side. Japan’s intention was to make use of the occasion in order to boost its industry by supplying arms to Russia, and, more importantly, to oust Germany from China and the Pacific area so as to take them over. 112 On 18 January 1915, Japan presented China with a series of demands, consisting of five groups which comprised 21 articles—hence it was called the Twenty-One Demands. The first group requested China to recognize Japan’s right to settle with Germany at the end of the war the transfer of German rights and concessions in Shantung province to Japan. Before joining the war, on 15 August 1914, Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany demanding that it transfer to Japan the leased territory of Kiaochow in Shantung province. The second group referred to south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. It demanded that China consent that the terms of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term respecting the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway should be extended to a further period of 99 years. The terms of the lease were to expire in 1923 under the Peking Treaty of December 1905.113 The third group requested China to make the Han-Yeh-Ping Company a joint Sino-Japanese company, sometime in the future. The fourth group demanded that China agree not to cede or lease to any other power any locations along the coast of China. Thus, the Demands were not limited to reaffirmation of the vested interests but also requested China to give Japan new interests. Japan distinguished the fifth group from the rest by calling it ‘wishes’, which included the wish that China should employ influential Japanese as political, financial and military advisers. Japan insisted on China’s immediate acceptance and strict secrecy of the Demands, warning that disclosure would bring upon China serious consequences. China refused to accept them. 114 Yuan Shih-kai, scared of Japan’s strong request not to disclose, did not consult his foreign advisers nor inform them of the exact text of the Demands. Morrison advised Yuan to disclose the text, but in vain. Morrison’s opinion was that ‘it would be wise to permit the publication in the Press of the exact terms of the Japanese note. It will surely strengthen China’s position if the exact demands of Japan are made known.’115 Although Morrison wanted to help Yuan to the best of his ability, Yuan did not consult him. Frustrated, Morrison recorded in his diary:

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‘The political adviser’ who not once since the crisis arose has been asked a single question by any Chinese official. Feeling somewhat ill these days, getting older and more dissatisfied with my false position as Adviser116 Morrison was disillusioned with Yuan Shih-kai. On 23 May 1915 when he saw Yuan, Morrison found him in a terrible condition: Japan is his obsession. Japan intriguing. Japan working against England, suffering from swelled head, trying to stir up strife in India etc…. Fear of this active neighbour paralyses all his actions…. He is doing no constructive work, not a single industrial enterprise is being carried out in the whole country.117 Morrison was well aware that China could not expect much help from the European powers, because they were too preoccupied with their war, but he hoped, by publicity and by world public opinion, that China might be able to mitigate the terms of the Demands. On 15 February 1915, he managed to obtain a translation of the full text, which he sent to Grey through Jordan. Grey requested of Katō, Foreign Minister, that if the Demands should conflict with British interests, a discussion with Britain was needed. On 20 February, Katō unofficially informed Britain, the United States, France and Russia of the full text of the Demands. Morrison distributed its translation to The Times, Donald, Hillier and others. In Britain, anti-Japanese public opinion had been aroused by publication of the news of the Demands. Receiving Japan’s ultimatum, China accepted the Demands on 8 May 1915. Most Chinese newspapers denounced Japan and addressed the nation to make this day a ‘National Day of Humiliation’.118 Morrison consoled himself believing that ‘Owing to the publicity given to the demands and the sympathy thus invoked China escaped more lightly than at one time seemed possible.’119 Although China finally accepted the Demands, they were a vastly modified version, excluding the fifth group. This can be regarded, although in a passive sense, as Yuan’s diplomatic victory, to which Morrison contributed. Yuan, who had won a ‘diplomatic victory’ in the issue of the Japanese Demands, was able to rally popular support for his plan to become Emperor. On 19 September 1915, the Association to Petition for a Monarchy was officially set up under the leadership of Liang Shih-yi, Director-General of the Board of Revenue, although Yuan announced his determination never to accept the Throne.120 Initially, Jordan thought it unwise to disturb China’s domestic stability and was opposed to the restoration of the Chinese monarchy. In early October, however, Jordan changed his mind, regarding the Chinese monarchy as ‘the inevitable’, and advised Grey to that effect. On the other hand, Okuma, the Japanese Prime Minister, initially approved Yuan’s plan and announced informally that he had no intention of interfering with China’s domestic affairs. After consulting with Grey who was against the monarchical scheme, however, Okuma changed his attitude and in midOctober decided to advise Yuan to renounce the monarchical plan. Learning of Japan’s opposition, Jordan decided to go along with Japan.121 Thus Jordan was very vacillating in this matter. Morrison, who had no sympathy with ‘that mad movement’ for the change

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from a republic to a monarchy,122 thought it ‘unwise and ill-timed’ on the grounds that it would lead China into international complications.123 On 28 October 1915, Japan, Britain and Russia, followed by Italy and France, advised Yuan to abandon or postpone his monarchical plan. Morrison thought the advice was ‘very proper and opportune’. His opinion was to delay the matter until the end of the war in Europe and he urged this view to Yuan Shih-kai.124 The Chinese regarded the powers’ advice as an unjustifiable interference with their internal affairs and strong resentment was aroused amongst them.125 The People’s Representative Convention of 1,993 members, which had been established to ‘rubber-stamp’ Yuan’s monarchical desire, voted unanimously for a monarchy.126 Morrison observed on 11 December that Yuan had refused to accept the Convention’s appeal ‘with anger and determination’. It was Yuan’s usual play-acting, because in the afternoon of the same day Yuan ‘reluctantly’ agreed to accept the crown. Morrison noted ‘Such is the silly make-believe.’ Yuan was enthroned on 12 December 1915.127 The official ceremony was set for 9 February 1916 in the Palace of the Enthronement, at a very substantial cost.128 On 15 December the Ministers of Japan, Britain, Russia, France and Italy jointly warned Yuan that the powers would intervene if any disturbance occurred in China, as a result of the change from a republic to a monarchy These countries, however, could not press the matter in fear of China’s deciding to side with Germany, which had openly supported Yuan’s monarchical plan from the outset. Each Allied power had its own reasons: Britain feared German underground activities in China, Russia wanted China’s large supply of arms and ammunition, France needed Chinese coolies as a labour force. Under these circumstances Britain, France and Russia did not want to offend China and therefore recognized the Chinese monarchy as a fait accompli. On 19 December, Hioki, Japanese Minister in Peking, informed Jordan that Japan might recognize the monarchy, if no disturbances occurred for a few months. But disturbances occurred within a few weeks. Opponents of Yuan’s monarchical plans rallied in the south. On 25 December 1915, the Provincial Governor of Yunnan declared independence of the province and began to advance an army towards the north, an insurrection later called the Third Revolution.129 To find out the situation, Morrison went to Yunnan and on returning to Peking, reported to Yuan that: ‘Every man I met who spoke to me on the subject deplored the present situation in China and criticised adversely the monarchical policy which has precipitated the present outbreak.’130 By mid-March 1916, however, Yuan came to realize that he was no longer able to counter Japan’s opposition and the southern rebellion. On 22 March 1916, he issued a mandate announcing the abolition of the monarchy, which had lasted 83 days.131 China’s initial reaction to the outbreak of the First World War was to stay neutral. On 1 October 1915, however, Morrison urged Yuan Shih-kai to consider that China enter the war on the side of the Allies of Britain, France, Russia and Japan. Morrison pointed out to Yuan that the advantages of China’s entry would be that China would make profit by selling arms and ammunition to the Allies, and more importantly, that it would have a voice at the peace conference after the war.132 Morrison, who knew of Japan’s opposition to China’s entry to the war, wrote to J.McCall, the Australian Agent-General for Tasmania in London: ‘China will come into this war if she be invited to join the allies. But Japan as I say has hitherto refused to join in extending the invitation.’133 Morrison, however, believed that China’s entry could be achieved and wrote to L.G.Fraser: ‘I am

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confident that Japan can be induced to come into line with us. I am confident that China…can be induced to come into line.’134 As seen already, on 28 October 1915 when the Western powers and Japan advised Yuan against his monarchical plan, the Chinese were offended by this intervention. To Morrison, it was a good opportunity to turn their anger to the intervention. To Morrison, it was a good opportunity to turn their anger to the Allies’ advantage. Accordingly on 30 October Morrison told Yuan that now was the time when China should take action to protect itself from again experiencing a humiliation and that ‘Repetition could be avoided’ by joining the war. Morrison urged Yuan to join the war showing him in writing the advantage China would gain. 135 Yuan listened to Morrison ‘patiently’ and admitted that Morrison’s arguments were ‘cogent and powerful’ and declared his willingness to join.136 Subsequently Yuan left the matter to Liang Shih-yi who approached Jordan with a proposal to allow the Allies to use the Chinese arsenals. Jordan reported the Chinese proposal to Grey who at once informed the Allies. On 11 November 1915, Grey communicated with the Japanese about the idea of the Chinese supply of munitions to Russia. On 23 November Britain, France and Russia requested that Japan join with them to invite China to participate and to ask China for the use of its arsenals. The Japanese Government declined to accept the request, being influenced by the Japanese Army which insisted on China’s neutrality, although some Japanese diplomats favoured the request. Although Grey had concealed from the Japanese the fact that the initial proposal had come from China, the Japanese eventually found it out. Furthermore, the Japanese found out that Morrison and Liang Shih-yi were the prime movers behind the Chinese proposal.137 The Japanese military were infuriated by Morrison’s actions. The Yamato Shimbun, a right-wing military organ, denounced Morrison and others: The Japanese Imperial Government has decided to reject the proposal to persuade China to enter the war on the allied side. It is only natural, therefore, that this proposal should become null and void. Both Britain and China, at least Minister Jordan, Adviser Morrison, Yuan Shih-kai and Liang Shih-yi must be disappointed to learn that their plot has been frustrated.138 Morrison and Jordan were again denounced by the Japanese military a few months later. The Yamato Shimbun wrote: Jordan and Morrison in Peking, are they not playing an active role, behind the scene, to create anti-Japanese sentiments in the Far East? Did the British public forget why Japan declared war against Germany and how hard Japan fought on land and sea?139 The Japanese denounced Jordan together with Morrison because they wrongly thought that Jordan was acting in collusion with Morrison. Jordan, in fact, tended to oppose China’s entry into the war, being extremely careful not to offend Japan whose friendship was needed. In Morrison’s words, ‘fear of Japan dominated all other considerations in his [Jordan’s] mind. Nothing was to be done of which there might be any fear that Japan

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would disapprove.’140 Morrison regarded the British policy towards Japan as too weak. Being heavily involved in the European war, Britain could not afford to alienate Japan. At the same time, Britain wanted to defend its interests in China. Hence Grey’s policy of ‘effacement’.141 The British Foreign Office dissociated itself from Morrison for fear of inviting Japan’s dissatisfaction. Morrison played an important part in bringing China into the First World War, co-operating with P.S.Reinsch, the American Minister in Peking, and with W.H.Donald, a fellow Australian and Editor of the Far Eastern Review.142 Morrison’s efforts proved fruitful. China declared war on Germany on 14 August 1917. Morrison’s aim was to secure Allied support at the end of the war for China’s claim for the retrocession of the Kiaochow Bay leased territory held by Germany, a territory sought by Japan.143 Before China entered the war, Yuan Shih-kai died, on 6 June 1916, at the age of 58. Yuan had long been suffering from poor health. Morrison’s diary on 17 August 1915 reads that Yuan was ‘puffy and ill with asthmatic breathing’. With Yuan’s death and loss of their leader, the Northern Army began to fight amongst themselves for territory and power. China’s political unity collapsed and the nation fell into a pattern of warlords, inter-provincial struggle and anarchy.144 In particular, conditions in the interior were appalling. Morrison lamented: ‘anarchy, no Government, chaos, brigandage, piracy, highway robbery etc’.145 A Russian paper, Novoe Vremya, described the state of China as ‘utter lawlessness’.146 During the First World War, the Japanese Government, influenced by its military, took advantage of the situation to further its military position in the region. The Japanese Cabinet was powerless to check the policy dominance of the military. Democracy in Japan was still in its infancy and the people’s voice, if any was not reflected in national policy.

Morrison’s wish for Australia’s security, his death Morrison went home to Australia in late 1917 for six months. He visited Sydney and Melbourne, including a hasty sentimental journey to Geelong and Queenscliff where he spent his childhood. He was suffering from deteriorating health. His movements were restricted by rheumatism. He wrote: ‘I have not felt so rotten for years. I have no strength or energy and suffer from profound dejection.’147 Nevertheless, he made himself busy with interviews, speeches and receptions. He had discussions with Prime Minister W.M.Hughes and defence authorities including the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, the First Member of the Naval Board, crusading against the menace of Japan’s southward drive.148 Morrison fought to nullify Japan’s claim on German interests. For this purpose, he accompanied the Chinese delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, where Japan attended as one of the five great powers, together with Britain, the United States, France and Italy.149 At the Conference, Japan presented two proposals: firstly, Japan’s succession to German possessions in Shantung province and in the Pacific islands; secondly, the question of racial equality. The bases of Japan’s claims were: Japan had ousted Germany from the Kiaochow Bay leased territory which Germany was using for military purposes; Japan had completely destroyed German political and military

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manoeuvring in the Far East, bringing free and unobstructed trade and communications; but Japan must still secure guarantees against German manoeuvres in the region which could jeopardize the results Japan had achieved. From the early stages of the war, Japan and Britain had frequently exchanged views regarding the disposition of the German concessions. By a secret agreement signed on 16 February 1917, Britain had already agreed to Japan’s acquiring the German possessions in China and in the Pacific islands north of the equator, on condition that Britain would take over German interests in the Pacific islands south of the equator.150 T’ing Wen-chiang, the founder and first Director of the China Geological Survey, wrote to Morrison: ‘It seems that fate is with Japan in her effort to dominate Asia, for at the Paris Conference, Great Britain, who, of all nations, should have opposed Japan in her own interest, vigorously supported her claims.’151 The second proposal Japan made to the conference was that the principle of racial equality be included in the covenant of the League of Nations. Initially the United States and other nations at the conference expressed support for Japan’s proposal. The British dominions, particularly Australia which had a white Australia policy, however, vehemently opposed the proposal on the grounds that ‘racial equality’ meant ‘unrestricted immigration’.152 Subsequently, US President W.Wilson also voted against it and Japan’s proposal regarding racial equality was not adopted.153 However, Japan’s claim regarding the German question was accepted and the Versailles Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919. The Treaty text relative to the German question reads: Article I: Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, titles of privileges, particularly those concerning the territory of Kiao-chou [sic], railways, mines and submarine cables which she acquired in virtue of treaties concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898 and [sic] of April 28 arrangements relative to Shantung Province.154 A disappointed Morrison felt that Wilson ‘completely befooled the Chinese’. Morrison’s view of Wilson’s conduct was: In order to buy off Japan’s opposition to a League of Nations which did not include words stipulating for national equality, he made a bargain, and in return for Japan’s not pressing her claim, he undertook to support in their entirety all japan’s claims in regard to China.155 Ikei holds that it was regrettable that Japan had given the impression that it was using the race question as a bargaining chip in order to win its demands regarding German concessions, despite the fact that, from the outset, Japan had fixed priorities: firstly, the Shantung question, secondly, the Pacific islands question and, thirdly, the racial equality question.156 On 13 November 1918, two days after the Armistice, S.Johnson, the proprietor and Editor of the Chinese Australian Herald in Sydney sent Morrison a letter of thanks on behalf of himself and fellow Australians ‘for the able way in which you have guided China through these years of War’.157 Morrison must have felt these thanks a special reward especially coming from Australia. With regard to Japan’s expansion south, T’ing Wen-chiang forecast:

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Japan, in spite of her organisation, is a country without resources…. The Peace Conference has given her…monopoly of Chinese iron industry. There can be no doubt that in the near future Japan will be able to build as many ships as she likes with her own steel…when she can produce 5,000,000 tons of steel instead of 500,000 she will only wait for a favourable opportunity to become your enemy instead of your ally, and not only India, but even Australia will not be safe without a large navy.158 This must have been what Morrison also feared, and the reason why he devoted so much of his working life in order to forestall such an event. Morrison became ill in Paris. His illness developed into a severe attack of jaundice and he left the Conference for London. Being a medical doctor, he was well aware of the seriousness of his illness.159 He died of jaundice in England on 30 May 1920 at the age of 58, before the demise, on 13 December 1921, of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance, which had been the pillar of Japanese diplomacy for the previous two decades. At the Washington Conference (November 1921—February 1922), Japan was forced to relinquish the various interests it had obtained in China during the First World War.160 Japan subsequently allied itself with Germany and Italy advocating a New Order in East Asia161 leading to the Pacific War. Japan’s triumph in the Russo-Japanese War ended with its defeat in the Pacific War. Morrison, with clear vision, foresaw the danger approaching Australia and endeavoured to thwart it.

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION This study examined the course of Anglo-Japanese relations in China during the period from 1897 to 1920, by studying the work and career of G.E.Morrison, whose preoccupation was to maintain British dominance in the Far East and thus to ensure Australia’s national security against possible external threat. In order to appreciate Morrison’s papers as correctly as possible, the study examined them against other historical primary sources such as British, Japanese and American diplomatic correspondence, and their accuracy was often proven. Sometimes, however, his articles published in newspapers and journals were exaggerated or biased and therefore their correctness is questionable. Such articles are often politically motivated, due to his ‘hidden agenda’ to ensure Australia’s security even at some expense to the British Empire. In such cases, his diary, private correspondence and/or circumstantial evidence reveal his ulterior motive, as shown in this study By exploring Morrison’s journalistic, quasi-diplomatic and political activities, this study showed the way in which Japan expanded towards China. After the victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan turned from being defensive to offensive and increased its political and commercial influence over China. Japan’s advance coincided with the British withdrawal of its Pacific fleet to Europe to face the new German challenge. This situation placed Australia in a precarious position and the Australians began to regard Japan as a future menace to the nation. This was when Morrison changed from being pro- to antiJapanese. Morrison, who had severely criticized Japan’s post-war China policy in trade and commerce, attempted to make use of international rivalry over railways in China to his advantage. Co-operating with W.W.Straight, the representative of American interests, Morrison encouraged China to construct the Fakumen Railway line parallel to Japan’s South Manchurian Railway line, the spearhead for Japan’s advance into Manchuria. His aim was to check Japan’s ambition. Using the ‘Open Door’ doctrine as a convenient instrument, Morrison condemned Japan’s veto of the Fakumen Railway construction. Realizing, however, the weakness of his case, he changed his tactics, stressing the importance of examining actual facts rather than the principle, but without much success. Over the issues of Japan and China, Morrison had many disputes with his superiors and colleagues of The Times. The cause of the Morrison-Chirol dispute lay in their different objectives. Chirol’s aim was to promote the cause of the British Empire worldwide, whilst that of Morrison was to preserve British supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region. For the British, maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was important in view of the approaching German challenge, and therefore they tended to overlook Japan’s activities in Manchuria—a small price to pay for the security of the Empire. While the British were deeply concerned with Germany, Morrison was even more concerned with the growing power of Japan. Morrison made good use of the Hsinhai Revolution of 1911–12 to strengthen the British position in China to the detriment of Japan. As his antagonism towards Japan

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increased, he became more sympathetic towards the Chinese, seeing them as oppressed not only by the Japanese but also by the Manchu dynasty. He regarded this revolution as a people’s protest against the dynasty, whose ‘inherent weakness and corruption’ did not fit it to rule the nation. Morrison, a compassionate friend of the underdog, personally wanted to see the dynasty overthrown. He launched his own campaigns against the dynasty He was instrumental in precipitating its downfall by influencing British policy not to extend further loans, which had been the dynasty’s life line. This was achieved through Jordan, British Minister in Peking, who owed his ministerial post to Morrison. Morrison’s aim was to help make a unified China, strong enough to resist Japan. He promoted the leadership of Yuan Shih-kai, whom he regarded as the most formidable opponent of Japan’s China policy In his view, helping Yuan assume the presidency of a Chinese republic was beneficial to Britain for two reasons—it would help strengthen its hold over Yuan’s regime and also help block Japan’s expansion. Morrison, a strategic player, advanced various schemes. With the use of media propaganda through The Times, he assisted Yuan to expel the Regent from office and disgrace Prince Ch’ing, further weakening the dynasty This study proved that Morrison influenced not only the Ch’ing Government and the revolutionaries but also the Japanese and British Governments. The most divisive issue in the revolution was the choice of the form of the future Chinese government, a constitutional monarchy or a republic. In the early stages, the powers and Morrison thought a monarchy was the better solution. In mid-December 1911, however, Morrison changed his stance and decided to help Yuan Shih-kai become republican president. At the Shanghai Peace Conference of December 1911, Morrison acted as intermediary between the negotiators for the two contending parties in the revolution, T’ang Shao-yi, Yuan Shih-kai’s representative, and Wu T’ing-fang, the revolutionaries’ representative. Morrison convinced them that the foreign powers would not object to a republic as long as Yuan became president. The Chinese, who had been apprehensive of foreign objections to a republic, became bold with this assurance—Wu in making a reso-lute official demand for a republic and T’ang in virtually accepting it. Morrison dispelled Yuan’s fear of Anglo-Japanese joint opposition to a republic. Consequently, Yuan came to take the lead in his diplomatic negotiations with Ijūin, Japanese Minister in Peking, who insisted adamantly on a monarchy for China. After arbitrarily guaranteeing to the Chinese the foreign powers’ endorsement of a republic, Morrison worked on both the British and the Japanese Governments to make them change their support from a monarchy to a republic. Independently, he launched his own personal diplomacy He urged the Japanese Government to give up the idea of a monarchy for China, advising the Japanese that to make Yuan Shih-kai republican president was the only way to solve the present crisis. This was a bold step. At the same time, Morrison played a vital part in influencing the British Government, through Jordan, to support a republic, acting as vanguard of the British mercantile community in Shanghai, which preferred a republic. Although it shocked both the Japanese and the British Governments, it worked. Jordan was immediately converted without Grey’s knowledge or permission. Morrison influenced Grey’s policy not only through Jordan but also through his articles in The Times arousing British public opinion towards his end. As a result Grey approved Jordan’s change of mind. Seeing the British change of heart, Japan finally and reluctantly surrendered and followed the British lead. This was a victory for British diplomacy,

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stemming largely from Morrison’s initiative. Thus Morrison exerted influence over the Governments of China, Britain and Japan. The study showed how Morrison adopted various stratagems in order to help Yuan rise to power. Complying with Yuan’s request, Morrison arranged to mobilize the foreign Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai to send a petition, a mild threat, to the dynasty asking for the Emperor’s early abdication. The Chambers of various other treaty ports followed, further pushing the dynasty towards capitulation. Morrison acted as adviser to Yuan in opposing the removal of the capital from Peking to Nanking. Most importantly, he contrived a face-saving strategy for both Yuan and the dynasty in order to ensure that the dynasty appointed Yuan president of the republic—the paradoxical creation of a republic by the dynasty Thus Morrison was a willing instrument in directing the course of the revolution, in the hope that in return he would gain Yuan’s co-operation in his effort to halt Japan’s expansion in the Far East. The study analysed the nature of Morrison’s role in the revolution. The Chinese revolutionary movement developed originally as a response to Western imperialism and to the Manchu dynasty who succumbed to Western pressure easily at the price of the people’s sacrifice, its ultimate goal being to win for China dignified independence as a nation. This ideological goal was not attained in the Hsinhai Revolution because the foreign powers continued, and in fact intensified, their domination of China, keeping it in the same semi-colonized situation as before. If the revolution was interpreted as a failure and Yuan as the usurper of the revolutionaries’ aspirations for his own personal ambition, then Morrison could be regarded as an accomplice who contributed to the failure. The immediate goal of the revolution, however, was to overthrow the Manchu dynasty, which was achieved. In this sense, the revolution was a success. Morrison’s performance was, therefore, to that extent justified. In the entangled mesh of international rivalries in China, Morrison contributed to the creation of the first republican nation in Asia, holding that ‘New China comes, not as a menace to the West, but as a peaceful participator in world progress.’1 After the revolution, in September 1912 Morrison resigned from The Times, for which he had served as Peking correspondent for 17 years. The study traced Morrison’s work as political adviser to the president of the Republic of China. In March 1912, Yuan Shih-kai, the President, inaugurated the Republican Government, appointing T’ang Shao-yi as Premier. Morrison accepted the post of political adviser to Yuan on 1 August 1912, having ‘great confidence’ in the future of China, and believing that he could be of assistance in the task of building a new nation. The position of adviser, however, was but a ploy for China to obtain loans and recognition from the foreign powers. Morrison realized that he had made a blunder in joining Yuan’s service. He found happiness in his private life, however, by marrying his secretary, Jennie Robin Wark from Melbourne, Australia. The study examined how Morrison played an important role in bringing China into the First World War. On 23 August 1914, shortly after the outbreak, Japan joined the war on the British side but wanted China to stay neutral. On 1 October 1915, however, Morrison urged Yuan to enter the war on the Allies’ side. Morrison’s aim was to secure Allied support at the end of the war for China’s claim for the retrocession of the territory held by Germany, a territory sought by Japan. Yuan hesitated but agreed to join the war. Cooperating with Liang Shi-yi, Morrison successfully led China towards this end—activities bitterly denounced by the Japanese military. China declared war on Germany on 14

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August 1917. Before China entered the war, Yuan Shih-kai died on 6 June 1916 at the age of 58. Morrison went home to Australia in late 1917 for six months, where he had discussions with the prime minister and defence authorities, crusading against the menace of Japan. In the hope of nullifying Japan’s claim on German interests in Shantung and the Pacific, Morrison accompanied the Chinese delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. Japan’s claim regarding the German question was accepted and the Versailles Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919. Morrison lamented that the Chinese were completely befooled. He died of jaundice in England on 30 May 1920 at the age of 58. At the Washington Conference, which commenced in November 1921, Japan was forced to relinquish the various interests that it had acquired in China during the First World War. The study compared the different diplomatic skills of Britain and Japan, displayed in China. There is a remarkable contrast between the mature subtlety and finesse of British diplomacy—realistic, flexible and far-sighted—and the naivety of the diplomacy of Japan—rigid and short-sighted. For Britain it was a trying time, requiring perseverance because of the conflict with Germany. Britain could not afford to alienate either Japan or the United States, and there-fore the growing American-Japanese tension over Manchuria was a worry. Britain, however, handled the situation skilfully by maintaining Japan’s friendship with the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance in July 1911, while ensuring US friendship with the inclusion of the arbitration clause in that agreement. When it thought it necessary, the British Government adopted an attitude of compromise and conciliation, tolerating Japan’s expansionist policy, even at some cost to British enterprises. This was an example of adept British diplomacy—a product of time-honoured experience in the international power game. In contrast, Japan was still, diplomatically speaking, a novice. Elated with its epoch-making victory over Russia, Japan grew overconfident. Presuming upon British patience, Japan behaved rashly and pushed ahead with an ambitious China policy The study found that Morrison sought in all his efforts to check Japan’s rapidly growing and expansionist power, so as to preserve British supremacy in the Far East and Asia-Pacific region and thus to ensure Australia’s national security. The study also found that Morrison contributed a great deal to the study of history, by bequeathing the vast amount of the valuable Morrison Papers to the Mitchell Library which enables us to investigate and to throw new light on the facts of history hitherto unknown during this crucial burgeoning period of the rise of Japanese militarism. Morrison was always interested in Japan, firstly as an important ally of Britain in the years before the Russo-Japanese War; secondly as a menace to British trade in China after that war; and thirdly as a serious threat to China itself. The study concluded that Morrison’s activities in China were a very important prelude to the kind of active ‘engagement’ with Asia to promote Australia’s national interests which almost defines Australia’s diplomacy today

EPILOGUE By examining Morrison’s activities in Sino-Anglo-Japanese relations, this study showed the way in which Japan politically and economically encroached into China while diplomatically dealing with the Western powers, especially with Britain. The study found that this was the time when Japan began its expansion overseas. With regard to Japan’s advance into China, V.A.Yakhontoff points out that: When, after a long period of isolation, Japan emerged as a new adept of the Western civilization, she soon demonstrated that, having imitated her new tutors [the Western powers] in many other fields, she was willing also to imitate them in that of building a Colonial Empire. 1 It is interesting to find out how Japan ‘imitated’ the West in ‘building a Colonial Empire’. For this purpose, this section looks very briefly at the Western powers’ imperialism which expanded into Asia, after the colonization of the African continent. From the sixteenth century, the European powers expanded towards Asia, with superior technology in ‘ships and guns’. The Portuguese and Spanish reached Asia but often left little trace. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the East India Companies of the Netherlands and Britain were interested mainly in trade, but this pattern of contact with the East was followed in the nineteenth century by the scramble for colonial territories amongst the Western powers.2 Britain took the lead in Asian trade. As early as the mid-seventeenth century, the merchant ships of the British East India Company, which was founded in 1600, actively engaged in trade with Asia. Britain made India its colony in the late 1770s, while leaving it free to maintain local customs, beliefs and laws.3 With its Industrial Revolution of the latter eighteenth century, Britain increased its productivity and accumulation of capital. Capitalism thrived and expansion overseas became more vigorous in search of markets. Britain brought Lower Burma under its control in 1862 and Upper Burma in 1886. In order to protect India from a Russian threat through Central Asia, Britain made Afghanistan a protectorate in 1905. By the mid-eighteenth century, Britain almost monopolized the Chinese trade. In the nineteenth century, the British succeeded in establishing a prosperous triangular trade set-up, namely Chinese tea to Britain, British manufactured goods to India, Indian opium to China. However, because opium-smoking lowered the physical and moral standards of the Chinese people, the Chinese Government banned the import of opium and hence gave rise to the Opium War between Britain and China in 1840. Victorious, Britain concluded the Nanking Treaty with China in August 1842, under which China ceded Hong Kong, opened up five ports to British trade, and paid an indemnity to meet the cost of the war.4 In its imperialistic expansion, France confronted Britain in Africa and elsewhere. Having been defeated at the Battle of Plassey by Britain in India in 1757, France

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gradually encroached into Annam (central Vietnam), over which China traditionally claimed suzerainty. After the Sino-French War (1883–5), victorious France established its rule over four regions, Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam and Tongking. In 1887, these regions were combined as Indo-China.5 Russia advanced eastwards into Siberia, obtained from China the region north of the Amur River in 1858 by the Aigun Treaty, and Primorskii (the Maritime Littoral Province of Siberia) in 1860 by the Peking Treaty. However, the Russian position in the Far East was still weak in the 1880s. Having no icefree Pacific port, Russia could not develop southward trade. In order to overcome this problem, in 1891 Russia began to build a Trans-Siberian Railway along the Amur River, with French capital. The Franco-Russian Alliance was subsequently formed in 1893. With the progress of the railway construction, Russian interest and power in the Far East increased, and its so far passive foreign policy became an active one. 6 The United States, which had made remarkable economic and industrial progress, began its expansion towards the Pacific in the late nineteenth century. It annexed Hawaii in 1897 and brought the Philippine Islands and Guam under its rule after the war with Spain in 1898.7 Thus, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Western powers accelerated their Asian expansion, creating a heyday of imperialism. In fact, Morrison was an imperialist who maintained that ‘Our true heritage in Asia is all South Eastern Asia up to and including the Yangtze Valley’.8 In pursuit of colonies, the powers first secured special trading privileges, mostly under unequal treaties, and gradually developed colonies, which aroused native nationalism, eventually producing an independent nationstate.9 Western contact with Japan was restricted because the central government, the Tokugawa Bakufu, maintained a seclusion policy from 1639 for some 200 years. In the mid-nineteenth century, Japan opened up its country under Western pressure and struggled to maintain its independence, achieving the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In order to catch up with the industrialized Western powers, Japan endeavoured to modernize following the Western pattern. Japan’s Industrial Revolution proceeded with success. After winning two wars—with China in 1895 and with Russia in 1905—Japan attained an international position almost equal to that of the advanced Western powers. It enthusiastically joined in the race of ‘building a Colonial Empire’, competing with the imperialistic Western powers. 10 As seen in the opening chapter, the powers—Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Japan—penetrated into China by primarily leasing territories and acquiring rights of railway construction and mining exploration to create their ‘spheres of interest (influence)’. In order to secure these ‘spheres’, the powers vigorously participated in the scramble for concessions. The scramble was triggered by the German occupation of Kiaochow in Shantung province in November 1897, followed immediately by Russia’s seizure of Port Arthur in December 1897. France obtained a ‘sphere’ in KwangtungKwangsi-Yunnan in April 1898. Britain, in order to keep the existing balance of power which was predominantly in its favour, acquired Weihaiwei in Shantung in June 1898, as well as ensuring in February 1898 its ‘sphere’ in the entire Yangtse valley through a nonalienation agreement not to cede the area to any other power. Japan followed the Western example by acquiring a ‘sphere’ in Fukien province opposite Formosa in April 1898 by a

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non-alienation agreement. The partition of China seemed imminent, threatening the existence of the Ch’ing Empire. The United States, a latecomer on the scene, presented to the powers its ‘Open Door’ notes in July 1900, claiming equal opportunity.11 Thus, Japan imitated the Western powers’ imperialism. It moved ahead with this policy even after the ‘high-noon’ of Western expansion in Asia was halted due to European complications, when Anglo-German relations became strained. Japan vigorously attempted to bring Manchuria under its control. In this context, Japan might claim that it just copied the Western powers. However, one cannot claim that because someone else acted wrongly, one is also entitled to do similarly. Colonization of other nations, territorial or otherwise, is questionable. We should learn from history, and try not to repeat the same mistakes. For this purpose, this study attempted to search for the origins that eventually led Japan to the Pacific War. The admission of mistakes and the exchange of criticism between nations are essential for better understanding. Morrison had, close to a century earlier, pointed out: I believe that my criticism is beneficial to Japan and conducive to better understanding…. That ill feeling [against Japan] can be best checked by full and frank criticism in the columns of a paper friendly to Japan and desirous of cementing good feeling and real friendship between two Allies.12 I would hope that my study helps, even in the smallest way, to create genuine and lasting friendship not only between Japan and Britain/Australia but also amongst all the countries in the world as we move into the twenty-first century.

NOTES Introduction 1 See for example M.Yui, ‘Nichiro-sensō go no naigai jōsei’ [Post-Russo-Japanese War Situation in Japan and Overseas], in Taiheiyō sensō-shi, 1 [A History of the Pacific War] vol. 1, History of the Pacific War Research Group (comp.), Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1972, pp. 12– 23. K.Tomoshima, ‘Nitchū kankei to kokusai jōsei: Nichiro sensō kara Taiheiyō sensō made’ [Sino-Japanese Relations and the International Situation: from the Russo-Japanese War to the Pacific War], Kokusai seiji, Nitchū kankei no tenkai [International Politics: The development of Sino-Japanese relations], March 1961, 15:1–16. 2 They are specifically marked as ‘By our own Correspondent’ in order to distinguish Morrison’s articles from those of other journalists, because his articles were considered to ‘carry more weight’. Morrison to Braham, 12 December 1911, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E.Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976. p. 680. 3 Morrison Diary, 28 August 1899, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, vol. 9. 4 A.E.Wearne, ‘Dr. Morrison: the remarkable career of a great journalist: the Australian whose despatches from Peking to The London Times were world-famous’, Lone Hand, October 1910, p. 473. E.Woodhouse, ‘Newsroom strategist’, Qantas Airways Inflight Magazine, January/February 1990, p. 74. 5 Morrison’s Reminiscences, unpublished manuscript, J.B.Capper (ed.), 1922–5, Morrison Papers, vol. 33. Australian Encyclopaedia VI, Grolier Society of Australia, Sydney: Halstead Press, 1962, p. 156. Woodhouse, ‘Newsroom strategist’, pp. 74–6. K.Enoki, Dr. G.E.Morrison and the Tōyō Bunko: in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the transfer of Dr. G.E.Morrison’s library to Baron Hisaya Iwasaki, 1917–67, Tokyo: The Tōyō Bunko, 1967, pp. 14–19. K.Enoki, Tōyō Bunko no rokujūnen [Sixty Years of the Oriental Library], Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1977, p. 4. C.Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1981, pp. 4–74. 6 F.Liddell,‘“Chinese” Morrison: a great Australian’, Royal Australian Historical Society, 1934, 20:402. 7 The Times article quoted in E.Rogers, ‘Across China in one hundred days: interview with Dr George Ernest Morrison’, Windsor Magazine, December 1895, p. 690. 8 Rogers, ibid.. Woodhouse, ‘Newsroom strategist’, p. 74. 9 Enoki, Dr G.E.Morrison and the Tōyō Bunko, pp. 14–19. 10 Morrison’s Reminiscences, Morrison Papers, vol. 33, item 1. 11 Rogers, ‘Across China’, p. 692. 12 Wearne, ‘Dr. Morrison’, p. 476. Woodhouse, ‘Newsroom strategist’, p. 75. 13 George Ernest Morrison, An Australian in China: being the narrative of a quiet journey across China to Burma, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972 (1st edn 1895, London: Horace Cox). 14 Rogers, ‘Across China’, p. 687.

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1 International relations in China, 1897–1905 1 A definition of imperialism is: ‘a national policy that favours extending power or control over another country or its possessions. Imperialism is as old as history. National prestige plus economic gains prompted many countries to acquire colonies.’ The World Book Encyclopedia, vol. 10, USA, Field Enterprises Educational Corporation, 1972, p. 77. 2 H.M.Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times, New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1928, p. 141. 3 M.Kajima, Nihon gaikō seisaku no shiteki kōsatsu [Historical Review of Japanese Foreign Policy], Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyūjo Shuppankai, 1958, p. 432. E.Woodhouse, ‘Dr G. E.Morrison and Japan 1898–1905’, Unpublished MA Preliminary Thesis, Sydney University, 1983, pp. 6–7. 4 Germany, geographically sandwiched between France and Russia, was feeling threatened since the existence of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1893 became known in January 1895, and France in turn was feeling uneasy towards Germany. 5 Kajima, [Historical Review of Japanese Foreign Policy], p. 281. Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and Japan’, pp. 6–7. 6 Wilhelm II, an den Zaren 1894–1914, quoted in M.Kajima, The Emergence of Japan as a World Power: 1895–1925, VT, Rutland: Charles E.Tuttle, 1968, p. 43. Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and japan’, ibid. 7 G.Nakayama, C.Ichiko, T.Okabe and T.Matsui, Sekai no rekishi [A History of the World], vol. 13 [The Period of Imperialism], Tokyo: Chūō-kōronsha, 1969, p. 166. 8 J.K.Fairbank, O.E.Reischauer and A.M.Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 311 and pp. 470–3. Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and Japan’, p. 9. 9 Fairbank et al., East Asia, p. 390. Vinacke, A History of the Far East, p. 149. Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and japan’, p. 13. 10 A.Yarmolinsky (trans. and ed.) The Memoirs of Count Witte, London: William Heinemann, 1921, pp. 410–11. 11 The Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of Alliance was signed in St Petersburg between LobanoffRostoffsky and Li Hung-chang on 22 May 1896. Under the Treaty Russia was to protect China, freely using China’s ports and facilities, and in return China gave Russia, among other things, the right to construct its Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria direct to Vladivostok. Although the railway was called the Eastern Chinese Railway, it was in fact a Russian railway. Later, it served as a lifeline for the Russian invasion of Manchuria. Vinacke, A History of the Far East, p. 148. 12 Yarmolinsky (trans. and ed.), The Memoirs of Count Witte, p. 100. 13 N.Murakawa, K.Egami and K.Hayashi, Sekaishi [A History of the World], Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1970, pp. 269–83. 14 Kajima, [Historical Review of Japanese Foreign Policy], p. 61. Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and japan’, pp. 17–18. 15 Yarmolinsky (trans. and ed.), The Memoirs of Count Witte, pp. 103–4. 16 Fairbank et al., East Asia, p. 473. 17 MacDonald, British Minister to China, to Marquis of Salisbury, 28 March 1898, British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, G.P.Gooch and H.Temperley (eds), London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1926, vol. 1, no. 109. 18 MacDonald to Salisbury, 31 March 1898, BD, vol. 1, no. 110. 19 Salisbury to MacDonald, 25 March 1898, BD, vol. 1, no. 108. 20 MacDonald to Salisbury, 3 April 1898, BD, vol. 1, no. 111. 21 Vinacke, A History of the Far East, p. 50. Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and Japan’, p. 33. 22 Fairbank et al., East Asia, p. 473. Murakawa et al., [A History of the World], pp. 269–83.

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23 J.G.Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908–1912: an episode in pre-war diplomacy: a study of the role of foreign diplomacy during the reign of Hsüam-T’ung, Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1973 (1st edn 1935), p. 6. 24 Fairbank et al., East Asia, p. 311. Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and Japan 1898–1905’, pp. 51–2. 25 Fairbank et al., ibid., pp. 399–400. Woodhouse, ibid., pp. 53 and 72. 26 The Times, 13 October 1900, p. 3, cols 1–6, ‘The siege of the Peking legations’. 27 The Times, Leader, 15 October 1900. V.Chirol worked for The Times for 20 years from May 1892: the first five years as correspondent in Berlin, and then as head of the foreign department until he retired in 1912. V.Chirol, Fifty Years in a Changing World, London: Butler and Tanner, 1927, p. 265. 28 Morrison Diary, 20 June 1904, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, vol. 11. 29 For detail, see E.Woodhouse, Pekin moyu: giwadan jihen to Morison [Peking is Burning: the boxer uprising and Morrison], Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, 1989. 30 Morrison to Bland, 17 January 1898, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 61–2. 31 J.O.P.Bland (1863–1945): a correspondent for The Times and concurrently Secretary of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement in Shanghai. The Bland Papers are in the University of Toronto Library (Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library). Lo Hui-min selected and edited the Bland Papers and included them in The Correspondence of G.E.Morrison. 32 Ibid. 33 Chung-fu Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931, p. 263. 34 I.H.Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: the diplomacy of two island empires, 1894–1907, London: Athlone Press, 1966, p. 128. 35 M.Kajima, [The Diplomacy of Japan 1894–1922, vol. II], p. 66. 36 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 43. 37 US President Theodore Roosevelt greeted Chirol in October 1904 with ‘I believe you are the godfather of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and I congratulate you’. Chirol, Fifty Years, pp. 208–9. 38 T.Hayashi, Nochiwa Mukashi-no-ki: Nichi-Ei Dōmei-no shinsō [Reminiscence: Truth about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance], M.Yui (ed. and annot.), Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1970, p. 320. 39 K.Ishii, Gaikō yoroku [Diplomatic Commentaries], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1930, p. 42. 40 Woodhouse, ‘G.E.Morrison and Japan’, pp. 102–10. 41 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 334. 42 For instance, H.Itō, who was regarded as the most prominent politician in Japan, tended to shrink with fear of Western countries. Ishii, [Diplomatic Commentaries], p. 364. 43 T.Hayashi, [The Truth about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance], p. 320. A.M.Pooley, (trans. and ed.) The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, London: Eveleigh Nash, 1915, p. 111. 44 T.Hayashi was made Viscount in February 1902 and Count in September 1907. 45 Morrison Diary, 8 March 1900, Morrison Papers, vol. 9. Jiji Shimpō was owned by S. Fukuzawa, the son-in-law of T.Hayashi. 46 T.Hayashi, [The Truth about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance], p. 320. Pooley, (trans. and ed.), Count Tadasu Hayashi, p. 111. 47 Chirol, Fifty Years, p. 299. 48 J.O.P.Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, London: William Heinemann, 1912, p. 407. 49 Ishii, [Diplomatic Commentaries], p. 615. Translation from the Japanese. 50 Chirol, Fifty Years, p. 299. Chang Chung-fu, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 263. 51 B.Burleigh, Empire of the East, or Japan and Russia at War, 1904–5, London: George Bell, 1905, p. 436. Burleigh was a British war correspondent for the Daily Telegraph. 52 Fairbank et al, East Asia, p. 311.

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53 Morrison to Bland, 3 November 1903, Correspondence, p. 236. 54 Morrison Diary, 21 November 1903, Morrison Papers, vol. 11. 55 In August 1842, by the Treaty of Nanking with Britain, China opened five ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ninpo and Shanghai, for foreign trade. Subsequently, China increased the number of treaty ports. Fairbank et al., East Asia, p. 144. 56 Bland to Morrison, 12 November 1903, Correspondence, pp. 237–8. 57 Morrison to Bland, 24 November 1903, Correspondence, p. 240. 58 For detail see Woodhouse, Nichi-Ro sensō-o enshutsu shita otoko: Morison, [The Man who Staged the Russo-Japanese War: Morrison], 2 vols, Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, 1988. 59 Vinacke, A History of the Far East, pp. 179–80. J.A.White, The Diplomacy of the RussoJapanese War, Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 373. 60 J.Tsunoda, Manshu mondai to kokubō hōshin [The Manchurian Questions and Japan’s Defence Policy], Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1979, p. 175. 61 Morrison Diary, 9 February 1904, Morrison Papers, vol. 11. 62 For detail, see Woodhouse, [The Man who Staged the Russo-Japanese War: Morrison], vol. 2, pp. 66–74. 63 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 229–36. Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, vol. II, pp. 401–8. M.Kajima, Nihon Gaikōshi Hachikan, Dainikai Nichiei Dōmei to sono Jidai. [History of Japan’s Diplomacy, vol. 8, The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Its Period], Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyūjo Shuppankai, 1930, pp. 6–38. 64 Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, p. 438. The Military Agreements were attached to this main Agreement. 65 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 229–36 and 348. T.Ueda, Tōyō Gaikōshi [A Diplomatic History of the Orient], Tokyo University Press, 1969, pp. 313–14. 66 Chirol to Morrison, 1 June 1905, Correspondence, p. 311. 67 Chirol to Morrison, 11 August 1905, Correspondence, p. 333. 68 See Figure I. Reproduced from H.D.Kahn, ‘The great game of empire: Willard D. Straight and American Far Eastern policy’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1968. 69 Kajima, The Emergence of Japan, p. 333. Denis and Peggy Warner, Nichiro Sensō Zenshi [A History of the Russo-Japanese War: the tide at sunrise], S.Senō and T.Mitani (trans.), Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshin-sha, 1978, pp. 600–4. 70 Morrison to Bell, 11 August 1905, Correspondence, p. 334. 71 Backhouse to Morrison, 6 September 1905, Correspondence, p. 345. 72 Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], pp. 88 and 286–9. 73 The Peking Treaty consisted of the three agreements: the Sino-Japanese Agreement on Manchuria of three Articles, the additional Agreement of 12 Articles and the Secret Protocols of 16 Articles. The contents of the Secret Protocols were notified to Britain. Komura Gaikōshi, [The History of Komura Diplomacy], vol. 2, Gaimushō (ed.), Tokyo: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1953, p. 219. Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], pp. 289–94. V.MacMurray (comp. and ed.), Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894– 1919, vol. 1, Manchu Period 1894–1911, Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 554. 74 Interview by E.Woodhouse with Ken Kurihara, former chief archivist in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, and the author of several works (see bibliography), 13 December 1988. 75 Kajima, Emergence of Japan, p. 336. 76 This is the subject dealt with in the unpublished thesis of E.Woodhouse, ‘Dr. G.E. Morrison and Japan 1898–1905’. 77 Reid, The Manchu Abdication, pp. 9 and 329. 78 Morrison Diary, 19 August–4 September 1905, Morrison Papers, vol. 12. 79 Morrison to his mother, Rebecca Morrison, 10 November 1905, Correspondence, p. 351. 80 N.A.Meaney, History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 1, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901–14, Sydney University Press, 1976, p. 209.

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81 Chirol to Morrison, 21 January 1908, Correspondence, p. 437. 82 Before the Russo-Japanese War, Newchwang used to be the only port of entrance and exit for Manchurian trade because its northern rival Dalny was closed to international trade, being under Russian control. L.Lawton, Empires of the Far East: a study of Japan and of her colonial possessions, of China and Manchuria and of the political questions of Eastern Asia and the Pacific, London: Grant Richards, 1912, p. 1257. 83 The Times, 30 July 1906, p. 5, col. 2, ‘Conditions in Manchuria: the railway administration’. Titles are shown in the first appearance only. 84 Hay to White, American Minister in Germany, Correspondence Concerning American Commercial Rights in China, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 6 September 1899, no. 927. 85 Grey to MacDonald, 3 February 1908, BD no. 454. 86 The Times, 17 May 1907, p. 5, col. 2, ‘Commercial Interests in Manchuria: pending questions with Japan’. 87 Morrison Diary, 28 August 1899, Morrison Papers, vol. 9. 88 Morrison to Ethel Bell, wife of Moberly Bell, 25 January 1908, Correspondence, p. 440. 89 Bland to Morrison, 5 July 1906, Correspondence, p. 368. 90 Ibid. 91 Morrison to Chirol, 6 December 1909, Correspondence, p. 532. 92 Bland to Morrison, 26 May 1906, Correspondence, p. 456. 93 Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], pp. 341–4. Y.Hatano, ‘Nichi-Ro sensō go ni okeru kokusai kankei no dōin: Nichi-Bei kankei o chūshin tosuru’ [The dynamics of international relations after the Russo-Japanese War: focus on Japan-American relations], in Kokusai Seiji: Nihon Gaikōshi kenkyū: Meiji jidai [International Politics: studies of the diplomatic history of Japan, Meiji period], 1957, 3:171. M.Kobayashi, Nihon no tairiku seisaku 1895– 1914: Katsura Tarō to Gotō Shinpei 1895–1914 [Japan’s Continental Policy 1895–1914: Tarō Katsura and Gotō Shinpei], Tokyo: Nansōsha, 1996, p. 197. 94 The Times, 8 October 1906, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Manchuria: the Japanese and the southern railway’. 95 R.H.Myers, ‘Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria: the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1906–1933’, in P.Duus, R.H.Myers and M.R.Peattie (eds), The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937, Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 105. 96 The Times, 13 May 1908, p. 7, col. 1, The South Manchurian Railway: remarkable progress’. Judging from its content, it was mostly likely written by Chirol, although the writer’s name was not stated. 97 The Times, 17 June 1908, p. 9, col. 6, ‘The South Manchurian Railway’. 98 S.Kitaoka, Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku 1906–1918 [The Japanese Army and its Continental Policy, 1906–1918], 2nd edn, Tokyo University Press, 1978, p. 39. 99 See Figure I. The Fakumen Railway line was to be extended further north crossing Tsitsihar to Aigun. 100 Sun E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interests: 1898–1911, New York: King’s Crown Press, 1954, p. 143. Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, p. 132. M.H.Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: the United States and China to 1914, Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 203. 101 Bland was the representative of this organization until 1910, concurrently The Times correspondent in Shanghai. 102 Straight to Harriman, 7 December 1906, Straight Papers, cited by C.Vevier, The United States and China 1906–1913: a study of finance and diplomacy, Rutgers University Press, 1955. pp. 46–52. Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], pp. 369–71. 103 See Figure I. Sun. E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interest, p. 143. Vevier, The United States and China, pp. 50–1. R.A.Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, University of Washington Press, 1966, p. 233. 104 Morrison Diary, 22 September 1907, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 236.

Notes

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105 Bland, Recent Events, p. 218. 106 The Times, 12 August 1909, p. 6, col. 3, ‘The Far East revisited: the Japanese in Manchuria II’. 107 Straight to Phillips, 8 September 1907, Straight Papers, cited by Vevier, The United States and China, p. 52. 108 E.W.Edwards ‘Great Britain and the Manchurian railway questions, 1909–1910’, English Historical Review, 1966, 81:744. 109 See Figure I.C.Tokutomi, Sekai no Henkyoku [Changes in the World], Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1915. p. 319. H.D.Croly, Willard Straight, New York: Macmillan, 1924, pp. 241–3 and 251. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, p. 234. 110 T.Hayashi to Komura, 22 January 1908, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Documents], Gaimushō Hensan, (comp. and ed.), Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 61, no. 654. 111 The Times, 28 September 1908, ‘The Fakumen Railway Question’, an article reviewed by the Peking correspondent. 112 Chirol to Morrison, 21 January 1908, Correspondence, p. 437. 113 Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 2, pp. 402–3. Ueda, [Diplomatic History of the East], pp. 311–13. 114 Chirol to Lavino, 25 April 1904 and Chirol to Wilton, 25 April 1905 in A History of The Times, London: The Office of The Times, 1947, vol. 3, pp. 391 and 416–7 respectively, quoted in Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], pp. 532–3. 115 I.H.Nish, Alliance in Decline: a study of Anglo-Japanese relationship, 1908–1923, London: Athlone Press, 1972, p. 359. 116 Y.Hatano, ‘Shingai kakumei to Nihon’ [The Hsinhai Revolution and Japan], Shirin [Forest of History], 1961, 1:98. 117 Kajima, [History of Japanese Diplomacy], vol. 8, pp. 191–5. 118 Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], pp. 554–66. Kajima, ibid. 119 Grey to MacDonald, 1 February 1908, BD vol. 8, no. 349. 120 Kajima, Emergence of Japan, p. 338. Hatano, [The dynamics of international relations], p. 165. A.M.Pooley, Japan’s Foreign Policies, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1919, p. 210. 121 Kajima, [History of Japanese Diplomacy], vol. 8, pp. 161–3. 122 Chirol to Morrison, Private and Confidential, 5 April 1907, Correspondence, pp. 403–4. 123 Morrison to Chirol, 14 May 1907, Correspondence, p. 404. 124 Ibid. 125 Z.S.Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 87–8. 126 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 1910 and 29 April 1911, in Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 209. 127 Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], p. 344. Morrison Diary, 28 December 1908, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 237. 128 Correspondence amongst T.Hayashi, G.Hayashi and Abe, 11, 13, 18 May, 4 June 1908, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comp. and ed.), Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Documents], 61, nos 683, 684, 685, 686 respectively. 129 Sun E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interest, p. 146. 130 The Times, 31 March 1909, p. 5, col. 2, ‘Japan and the Manchurian Question’. 131 Morrison Diary, 14 January 1909, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 238. 132 The Times, 12 August 1909, p. 6, col. 3, ‘The Far East Revisited: the Japanese in Manchuria II’ (from our special correspondent lately in the Far East). Written in retrospect. 133 Komura to Ijūin, 25 March 1909, NGB 63, no. 220. Komura to Katō, 2 April 1909, NGB 63, no. 226. Ijūin to Komura, 5 April 1909, NGB 63, nos 227 and 228.

Notes

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134 The Times, 24 March 1909, p. 6, col. 1, ‘Japan and Manchuria: Chinese proposal for arbitration’. 135 T.Katō, the new Ambassador in London since 7 March 1909, to Komura, 24 March 1909, NGB 63, no. 219. 136 Ijūin to Komura, 26 March 1909, NGB 63, no. 222. 137 Prince Ch’ing (I-k’ang), Manchu Imperial Clansman, Grand Councillor, President of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 138 Ijūin to Komura, 20 April 1909, NGB 63, no. 234. 139 Ijūin to Komura, 25 March. 1909, NGB 63, no. 221. 140 Chirol to Bell, 26 January 1911, Correspondence, p. 570. 141 Ibid. 142 Katō to Komura, Foreign Minister, 7 April 1909, NGB 63, no. 232. Translation from the Japanese. 143 Lawton, Empires of the Far East, vol. 2, p. 1230. 144 British Parliamentary Debates, Hansard 4th series, vol. 3, 30 March 1909, p. 166. BPD, 4th series, vol. 2, 9 March 1909, p. 170. BPD, 4th series, vol. 2, 17 March 1909, pp. 1045–6. BPD, 4th series, vol. 2, 22 March 1909, pp. 1444–5. 145 Katō to Komura, 7 April 1909, NGB 63, no. 231. Translation from the Japanese. Grey’s phrase ‘some British’ seems to be diplomatic language for ‘we, the British Government’. This kind of diplomatic device was often used in the official exchange of views in order to avoid any embarrassment of directly challenging the other party. 146 Ijūin to Komura, 26 May 1909, NGB 63, no. 237. 147 Ijūin to Komura, 31 May 1909, NGB 63, no. 238. 148 Ijūin to Komura, 25 July 1909, NGB 63, no. 255. 149 Ibid. 150 Ijūin to Komura, 26 August 1909, NGB 63, nos 296 (telegram) and 297 (letter). 151 MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, no. 790. 152 Sun E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interests, p. 147. 153 S.K.Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, New York: D.Appleton, 1928, p. 262. 154 Morrison to Chirol, 14 April 1908, Correspondence, p. 445. 155 Morrison to Steed, 24 January 1911, Correspondence, p. 564. 156 Morrison to Steed, ibid., p. 565. 157 C.Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1981, p. 219. 158 E.W.Grigg, Acting Foreign Editor of The Times, told Morrison that the feeling against Japan was growing in Britain. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 205.

2 The outbreak of the revolution 1 J.N.Jordan went to China in 1876 at the age of 24 as a student interpreter; Assistant Chinese Secretary in 1889 and Chinese Secretary in 1891 in the British Legation in Peking; ConsulGeneral in Seoul in 1896; Charge d’Affaires in 1898, and Minister in 1901, in the British Legation in Seoul; Special Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China, May 1906; retired in 1920. Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten [A Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History], (comp. and ed.), Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History Compilation Committee, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992, p. 422. 2 Jordan to Morrison, 24 February 1909, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 479.

Notes

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3 J.Nakayama, Nichiro-sensō igo: Higashi Ajia o meguru teikokushugi no kokusai kankei [The Post-Russo-Japanese War: the international relations of imperialism in East Asia], Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1974, pp. 77–104. Y.Nashimoto, Shingai kakumei [The Hsinhai Revolution], Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1974, pp. 140–3. 4 E.W.Edwards, ‘Great Britain and China, 1905–1911’, in F.H.Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 352. 5 See Figure II. H.D.Kahn, ‘The great game of empire: Willard D.Straight and American Far Eastern policy’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1968, p. viii. 6 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, p. 209. 7 Under the Ch’ing dynasty, the viceroy (or governor) was held responsible to the Emperor for the condition of the province and for the transmission of the provincial revenue to Peking. The viceroy was allowed a wide choice of means, resulting in his exercising absolute authority in the area he controlled. H.M.Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1928, p. 20. 8 The British and Chinese Corporation Ltd was formed in 1898 jointly by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Jardine Matheson and Co. In 1904, the Chinese Central Railways Ltd was formed, amalgamating the British and Chinese Corporation, the Peking Syndicate (a British firm) and a French group which included Banque de l’Indo-Chine. Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British Policy in the Reorganization Loan to China 1912–13’, Modern Asian Studies, 1971, 5:355–72, 5:357. Hsu Mongton Chih, Railway Problems in China, New York: Longmans, 1915, p. 141. 9 H.Cordes: Secretary to the German Legation in Peking (1900); subsequently the Peking Representative of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank of Germany. Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 506, fn. 1. During the Boxer uprising and the siege of Peking in 1900, Morrison and Cordes were both shot in the thigh by the Boxers. Morrison Diary, 20 June 1900 and 16 July 1900, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, vol. 9. 10 J.O.P.Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China., London: William Heinemann, 1912, p. 275. 11 E.Soejima, ‘Zengo shakkan no seiritsu’ [A counter-measure to the establishment of the four powers loan], in Shingai kakumei no kenkyū [Studies of the Hsinhai Revolution], Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobō, 1978, p. 318. With regard to this incident, Chirol thought that Cordes ‘instigated the Chinese objections to Bland’. Chirol to Morrison, 13 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 525. 12 The Times, 9 March 1909, p. 5, col. 6, ‘The Canton-Han-kau railway, China’s obligation to Great Britain’. 13 Ibid. 14 Japan Chronicle, Kobe, 16 May 1909. 15 Morrison to Liang Shih-yi, 29 April 1909, Correspondence, p. 488. 16 E.G.Hillier: a China specialist who had been the Peking agent of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation for 20 years since 1891. He conducted almost all important foreign loan negotiations with China until 1913, representing British financial interests in China. Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 62, fn. 1. 17 Edwards, ‘Great Britain and China’, p. 356. Nakayama, [After the Russo-Japanese War], pp. 77–81. 18 Ijūin to Komura, 12 May 1909, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comp. and ed.), Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Documents], 63, no. 802. 19 France had been tied with Britain by the Entente Cordiale of April 1904, and Grey’s opinion was that ‘China cannot be ruled out’ of the Entente. Edwards, ‘Great Britain and China’, p. 356.

Notes

182

20 M.Casenave: French diplomat and financial agent; Chargé d’Affaires at the French Legation in Peking in September 1906; became the Peking representative of the Banque de l’IndoChine. 21 Morrison’s article in The Times, 7 June 1909, p. 5, col. 5, ‘Chinese railways: the loan for the Hu-peh and Hu-nan provinces’. J.V.A.MacMurray (comp. and ed.), Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894–1919, vol. 1, Manchu Period 1894–1911, Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 880. 22 The Times, 10 May 1909, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Railways in China: adjustment of rival interests’. 23 The Times, 28 August 1909, p. 3, col. 3, ‘The Far East revisited: German policy and Chinese railways’. Katō cabled the translation of the substance of this article to Komura on the same day. Katō to Komura, 28 August 1909, NGB 63, no. 859. 24 Morrison’s Memoranda, 3 April 1909, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 25 This was the time when W.H.Taft was sworn in as the 27th President of the United States, succeeding T.Roosevelt. 26 The Times, 10 May 1909, p. 5, col. 1. 27 Nakayama, [The Post-Russo-Japanese War], p. 82. The Times reported that ‘Great Britain…has requested that the United States not press the claim of American bankers to participate in the Han-kau [sic] loan’. The Times, 19 June 1909, p. 5, col. 3, ‘The claim of American bankers’, from Washington. 28 Bland, Recent Events, p. 278. 29 MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, pp. 885–6. 30 The Times, 19 June 1909, p. 5, col. 3, ‘The Han-kau-Sze-chuan [sic] railway: effect of American intervention’, from Peking. 31 The Times, 24 July 1909, p. 5, col. 1, ‘The Chinese Railways: President Taft’s despatch’. 32 The Times, 19 June 1909, p. 5, col. 3, ‘The Han-kau-Sze-chuan [sic] railway: effect of American intervention’, from Peking. 33 Nakayama, [The Post-Russo-Japanese War], p. 83. Translation from the Japanese. 34 The Times, 24 July 1909, p. 5, col. 1. 35 The despatch of Berlin correspondent of The Times, 26 July 1909, p. 6, col. 1, The Chinese Railway Loan: Germany and American participation’. 36 Ibid. 37 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 505, fn. 1. 38 In March 1898, when Morrison disclosed in The Times the secret conclusion of the Port Arthur Convention between China and Russia, this disturbing news upset London financial circles, and wrecked the Anglo-German loan then being raised in London. In order to save the situation, Hart and Hillier protested. Hillier told Morrison that he thought ‘Russia’s demands have not been put in the form of an ultimatum…the matter is not being pressed’. He asked Morrison to ‘allay the immediate fears of the London market’, which Morrison refused to do. For details, see Lo Huimin, Correspondence, vol. 1, pp. 72–9 and Woodhouse Pekin moyu: Giwadan jihen to Morison [Peking is Burning: the Boxer Uprising and Morrison], Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, 1989, pp. 19–26. 39 Hillier to Morrison, 27 July 1909, Correspondence, p. 506. 40 Cordes to Morrison, 26 July 1909, Correspondence, p. 506. 41 Morrison wrote a letter of apology to Cordes on January 1910, just before he left Peking to take one year’s leave, as follows: ‘I should be sorry to leave without sending you a few lines to say how deeply I regret that anything should ever have occurred to our friendship’. Morrison Papers, vol. 55, 13 January 1910. 42 Morrison to Hillier, 27 July 1909, Correspondence, p. 507. 43 Chirol wrote to Morrison that ‘the Germans of course want them [the Americans] to come in exclusively at the expense of the very shadowy interests that have been left to us’, 2 September 1909, Correspondence, p. 522. 44 Chirol to Morrison, 27 August 1909, Correspondence, p. 519.

Notes

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45 Chirol to Morrison, 13 September 1909, Private and Confidential, Correspondence, p. 524. 46 Ijūin to Komura, 13 August 1909, NGB 63, no. 710. 47 Chirol was overseas when Morrison’s article was published on 24 July 1909. Chirol returned to London on 7 August from Japan, and then gave information to Morrison on the subject by letter. Chirol to Morrison, 19 and 27 August 1909, Correspondence, pp. 515 and 519 respectively. 48 Chirol to Morrison, 19 August 1909, and 13 September 1909, Correspondence, pp. 515 and 525 respectively. Earlier Chirol also confided the same story to Ijūin. Ijūin to Komura, 13 August 1909, NGB 63, no. 710. 49 Chirol to Morrison, 27 August, 2 September, 13 September 1909, Correspondence, pp. 519– 23. 50 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, pp. 210–15. 51 Chirol to Morrison, 27 August 1909, Correspondence, p. 516. 52 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, pp. 210–15. 53 Chirol to Morrison, 27 August 1909, Correspondence, p. 516. 54 Hippisley to Morrison, 18 September 1909, Correspondence, p. 527. 55 Rockhill to Morrison, St Petersburg, 8 September 1910, Correspondence, p. 546. 56 Ibid. 57 The American Group consisted of J.P.Morgan and Co., Kuhn Loeb and Co., the First National Bank and the National City Bank of New York. T.Harada, ‘Yonkoku shakkan seiritsu to tōkyoku no sochi’ [The foundation of the four-nation loans and the reaction of the Japanese Government], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 162:65. 58 Fletcher to Knox, 5 October 1909, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President: Transmitted to Congress, 1909, File no. 5315/576–577. 59 J.G.Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908–1912, Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1973, pp. 26–7. 60 As shown earlier in this section, Germany was desperately trying to rally support from the United States because Britain had already isolated Germany by establishing alliance relationships with France, Russia and Japan. In fact, around this time, Kaiser Wilhelm II was planning to organize a Sino-German-American entente and arranged for T’ang Shao-yi to visit Roosevelt for this purpose on the pretext of T’ang’s thanking him for an exemption of the Boxer indemnity payment to the United States. Nakayama, [The Post-Russo-Japanese War], pp. 107–11. 61 W.D.Straight: Consul-General in Mukden (1906–8); Acting Chief Under-Secretary of the Far Eastern Affairs Division of the State Department (1908–9); returned to China as representative of the J.P.Morgan Harriman Group (1909–12). Croly, Willard Straight, p. 411. 62 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, pp. 223–4. 63 The Times, 16 December 1908, p. 7, col. 5, ‘Foreign Loans and Native Administration’. 64 Kuo Tin-yi (ed. and comp., in Chinese), Kindai Chūgoku Shiji Nisshi, 1886–1911, dai nisatsu [The Chronology of Modern Chinese History, the Ch’ing Period, 1886–1911], vol. 2, Taipei: Seichu Shokyoku, 1963, p. 1383. M.Kajima, Nihon gaikō seisaku no shiteki kōsatsu [Historical Review of Japanese Foreign Policy], Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyūjo Shuppankai, 1958, pp. 282–3. 65 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 615. 66 MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, p. 848. 67 American Ambassador in France to Secretary of State, 28 June 1909, File no. 893.51/487. Copy of the Note Verbal handed to the US Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador, 11 July 1909, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, File no. 893.51/502.

Notes

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68 J.Tsunoda, Manshu mondai to kokubō hōsin [The Manchurian Question and Japan’s Defence Policy], Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1979, pp. 486–90. 69 Z.S.Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 116–17. 70 MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, p. 901. 71 Ibid. 72 Grey to MacDonald, 29 March 1911, British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898– 1914, G.P.Gooch and H.Temperley (eds), London, 1926, vol. 8, no. 415. The AngloAmerican Arbitration Treaty was ratified by the US Senate as late as 7 March 1912, and with reservations. I.H.Nish, Alliance in Decline: a study of the Anglo-Japanese relationship, 1908–1923, London: Athlone Press, 1972, p. 24.1. H.Nish, ‘Great Britain, Japan and NorthEast Asia, 1905–1911’, in F.H.Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 367. 73 Morrison to Braham, 8 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 613. 74 N.Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 1, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901–14, Sydney University Press, 1976, p. 119. 75 Morrison to ffrench [sic], 22 September 1910, Correspondence, pp. 551–2. 76 Meaney, The Search for Security, p. 119. 77 Ibid. 78 I.H.Nish, ‘Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901–1911’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1963, 9(2):201. 79 Meaney, The Search for Security, p. 188. 80 Meaney, ibid., pp. 181–3. 81 Nish, ‘Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, p. 201. 82 Nakayama, [The Post-Russo-Japanese War], pp. 6–7. 83 Nish, Alliance in Decline, p. 205. 84 The border was set in east Manchuria, longitude 122°E. NGJ p. 731. 85 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), Shōkaiseki Hiroku [The Secret Records of Chiang Kai-shek], vol. 3 [The Birth of the Chinese Republic], Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1977, p. 192. 86 MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, p. 803. 87 NGJ p. 732. 88 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), vol. 3 [The Birth of the Chinese Republic], p. 193. The border line was extended westwards at longitude 116°27′E on which Peking is situated. NGJ pp. 733–4. 89 Nish, ‘Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, p. 205. H.B.Morse and H.F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, New York: Russell and Russell, 1931, vol. 2, p. 766. 90 Morse and MacNair, ibid. 91 Morrison to ffrench, 22 September 1910, Correspondence, p. 551. 92 Tsunoda, [Japan’s Defence Policy], pp. 449–59. 93 C.Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1981, pp. 182–3. 94 In his diary, Morrison drew a side line on this section and wrote ‘omit’. This shows that he did not want this particular section to be read by others. Morrison Diary, 25 October 1907, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 236. In late 1905, Sir W.C.Hillier, brother of E.G.Hillier, Professor of Chinese, King’s College, London, was impressed by Morrison’s influence in China and said that Morrison should be British Minister in Peking. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 162. 95 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 205. 96 A.C.W.Northcliffe (Harmsworth), Viscount Northcliffe of St Peter. 97 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 436. 98 McKenzie to Morrison, 2 November 1906, Correspondence, p. 391. 99 Nish holds that the editors of The Times were literary men and the correspondents formed ‘something of a literary coterie’. Nish, ‘Dr G.E.Morrison and Japan’, Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia, 1963, 2:43.

Notes

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100 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 204. 101 Ibid. 102 Morrison to Campbell, 5 September 1911, Correspondence., p. 620. 103 Morrison to Northcliffe, 25 August 1910, Correspondence, p. 545. 104 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 543. 105 Morrison to C.Smith, British Colonial Administrator, 13 February 1911, Correspondence, p. 574. 106 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 204. 107 Morrison to Smith, 13 February 1911, Correspondence, p. 574. 108 Morrison to Bell, 18 January 1911, Correspondence, p. 563. 109 Ibid, p. 568. 110 Bell to Morrison, 26 January 1911, Correspondence, p. 569. 111 Chirol to Bell, 26 January 1911, Correspondence, p. 569. 112 Morrison to Northcliffe, 16 February 1911, Correspondence, p. 576. 113 Morrison to Braham, 8 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 613. 114 Braham to Morrison, 14 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 657. 115 Morrison to Braham, 12 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 626. Morrison conveyed to Braham what Bell had told Morrison. 116 Sheng Hsuan-huai: Chinese imperial official and entrepreneur; Minister of Posts and Communications; Director-General of the Chinese Railway Company (a government organization); Director-General of Mines and Railways. Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 49, fn. 8 and p. 87, fn. 3. 117 MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, p. 895. Bland, Recent Events, pp. 248– 9. 118 Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 2, p. 1388. MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, p. 866. 119 Morrison praised Sheng who had drafted for the Throne the edict of nationalization of railways, by saying ‘He has begun well.’ Morrison to Braham, 11 May 1911, Correspondence, p. 605. 120 Ibid. 121 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 615. 122 Ibid. 123 J.K.Fairbank, E.O.Reischauer and A.M.Craig, East Asia: the modern transformation, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, pp. 470–3. 124 A definition of gentry-merchants is ‘landowner-bureaucrats who were turning into bourgeois or members of the upper bourgeoisie closely linked with the landowning officials’. Compilation Group for the History of Modern China Series (comp.), The Revolution of 1911, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976, p. 94. 125 Nakayama, [The Post-Russo-Japanese War], pp. 77–8. 126 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 614. 127 Nashimoto, [The Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 142–3. 128 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 614. 129 Bland criticized Morrison: ‘you are pledged to see the country in a soft rose tint’. Bland to Morrison, 26 May 1906, Correspondence, p. 456. 130 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 615. 131 Morrison to Liang Shih-yi, 29 April 1909, Correspondence, p. 488. 132 In 1902, the Ch’ing Government passed a commercial law to grant businessmen legal protection, and merchants were permitted to organize public associations. F. Wakeman, Jr, The Fall of Imperial China, New York: Free Press, 1975, p. 172. 133 Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955, p. 172.

Notes

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134 Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 94. 135 Y.Nozawa, Shingai Kakumei [The Hsinhai Revolution], Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1972, pp. 56–7. 136 The Times, 16 November 1907, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Railways in China: the provinces and the Central Government’. 137 Bland to Morrison, 1 January 1910, Correspondence, p. 539. 138 Hillier to Morrison, 29 December 1909, Correspondence, p. 539. 139 Morrison to W.Kirton, Managing Editor of National Review, 9 August 1909, Correspondence, p. 512. 140 Morrison to Chirol, 6 December 1909, Correspondence, p. 533. 141 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 614. 142 Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, p. 94. 143 F.A.McKenzie, ‘Four hundred million Chinamen awaken’, London Magazine., February 1911, p. 707. 144 Nozawa, [The Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 55–7. Morse et al., Far Eastern International Relations, pp. 810–11. 145 Nozawa, [The Hsinhai Revolution], p. 55. 146 Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, p. 238. Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, p. 176. 147 Nozawa, [The Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 77–8. 148 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, pp. 362–3 and p. 553, n. 3. 149 Nozawa, [The Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 77–8. 150 Morrison to Braham, 8 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 625. 151 Morrison to W.D.Barnes, British colonial officer in Hong Kong, 25 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 630. 152 Bland, Recent Events, p. 14. 153 Nozawa, [The Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 38–40. Vinacke, A History of the Far East, pp. 213–15. 154 Morrison to Braham, 12 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 626. 155 Ibid. 156 Morrison to Barnes, 25 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 630. 157 Morrison to Braham, 5 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 623. 158 Morrison to Braham, 8 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 625. 159 Morrison to Braham, 8 and 19 September 1911, Correspondence, pp. 625 and 627 respectively. 160 Morrison to Braham, 26 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 630. 161 In the case of the Boxer uprising, he was away from China from July 1899 till April 1900, for nine months, and when the uprising broke out in May 1900 it came as a thunderbolt to him, as to most foreigners. Morrison admitted his inability to foresee the event: ‘Of course I blundered in 1900 when I underrated the extent of the Boxer movement but as you know well I had been absent from China for nine months’. Written in retrospect. Morrison to Chirol, 14 April 1908, Correspondence, p. 448. 162 During this leave, Morrison visited Siam, Suchow, Urumchi, Musart Pass, Kashgar, Tashkent, London, Spain, Vienna, Berlin and Moscow. Regarding Morrison’s long leave, Chirol pointed out to Bell that ‘There is no correspondent who has been treated with more consideration than Morrison, and deservedly so in view of the services he has rendered to the paper. [I am not aware] that any other correspondent has ever been allowed to take, as Morrison is taking now, a whole year’s leave and even rather more, on full pay’ Chirol to Bell, 26 January 1911, Correspondence, p. 573. 163 Morrison to Barnes, 25 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 630. 164 Morrison to Braham, 19 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 628.

Notes

187

165 Morrison to Bell, 25 January 1911, Correspondence, p. 567. 166 Morrison to Campbell, Consul-General in Chengtu, 5 September 1911, Correspondence, p. 620. 167 Grey to MacDonald, 21 February 1911, FO 371/1062, quoted by P.Lowe, Great Britain and japan 1911–1915: a study of British Far Eastern policy, London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 59. 168 Morrison, An Australian in China: being the narrative of a quiet journey across China to Burma, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972, p. 271 (1st edn 1895, London: Horace Cox). 169 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 615. 170 J.N.Jordan, ‘Some Chinese I Have Known’, Nineteenth Century, 1920, 88:948. 171 The Ch’ing dynasty lasted from 1664 to 1912. 172 Huang Hsing: an active revolutionary who had been educated at Tokyo University; the founder of the Hua-hsing hui Society; the founder of the Kuo-min-tang Party; became Minister of War in the Provisional Government established in Nanking under Sun Yat-sen in 1912. Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 690, fn. 4. 173 The revolution is not dated from the date of the Szechuan outbreak, as the revolt was not anti-dynastic in motive. S.Hirakawa, Shina kyōwa shi [The History of the Republic of China], Shanghai: Shunkōsha, 1920, pp. 85–106. S.Yoshino and S. Katō, Shina kakumei shi [A History of the Chinese Revolution], Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1922, pp. 85–92 and 183–6. Vinacke, A History of the Far East, pp. 85–92 and 220. 174 Morrison Diary, 10 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 175 Morrison Diary, 11 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. C.A.V.Bowra, F. A.Aglen and F.Sugden were British employees of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs. J.K.Ohl was New York Herald correspondent in China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and India. 176 The Times, 12 October 1911, p. 11, col. 1, ‘Serious Rising at Wuchang: mutiny of the troops: flight of the viceroy’. 177 The Times, ibid. Jordan to Grey, 12 October 1911, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd 6148, no. 23. 178 The populous cities of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang were the largest metropolitan centre of mid-China, and were called ‘the Wuhan cities’. Hankow had the largest British concession. Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy of neutrality during the 1911 Revolution in China’, Journal of Oriental Studies, 1970, 8:358. 179 Croly, Willard Straight, p. 412. 180 Morrison, An Australian in China, p. 271. 181 W.W.Rock, ‘China and Australia: an interview with Dr George E.Morrison at Peking’, Melbourne Life, April 1914, pp. 338–9. 182 A.E.Wearne: an Australian journalist in Peking working for Reuters. 183 A.E.Wearne, ‘Dr. Morrison: the remarkable career of a great journalist: the Australian whose despatches from Peking to The London Times were world-famous’, Lone Hand, October 1910, p. 476. 184 The Times, 13 October 1911, p. 6, col. 1, ‘The rising in China: government arsenal captured: rapid spread of the movement’. 185 Morrison’s Memoranda, 13 October 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 186 Jordan to Grey, 12 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 23. Morrison’s article in The Times, 13 October 1911, p. 6, col. 1. 187 Morrison Diary, 14 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 188 The Times, 27 October 1911, p. 6, col. 1, ‘The Manchu court and the assembly: the impeached Minister dismissed: extension of the rebellion’. 189 Jordan to Grey, 12 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 23. 190 The Times, 26 October 1911, p. 6, col. 5, ‘The Rebel leader and Admiral Sa [sic]’. 191 Sinyang: near the southern border of Honan, about 133 miles (213 km) from Hankow.

Notes

188

192 Jordan to Grey, 23 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 47. Morrison’s article in The Times, 23 October 1911, p. 8, col. 1, ‘Grave situation in China: spread of the revolt: the military and financial difficulties’. 193 Morrison’s article in The Times, 23 October 1911. 194 Jordan to Grey, 17 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 10. Ariyoshi, Consul-General in Shanghai, to Uchida, 22 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 17. 195 Morrison heard from Miyaoka, a japanese journalist, that ‘Admiral Kawashima has taken charge of the ships and of the foreign concessions in Hankow, being the senior officer present’. Morrison’s Memoranda, 13 October 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 196 Morrison Diary, 13 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 197 The Times, 14 October 1911, p. 6, col. 1, ‘Crisis in China: Manchu dynasty in danger: sympathy with the revolutionaries’. 198 Morrison to Braham, 17 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 636. 199 Williams to Knox, 15 October 1911, FRUS 6367, File no. 893. 51/595. 200 Nozawa, [The Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 154–5. Brinkley’s article in The Times, 20 October 1911, p. 6, col. 4, ‘Japan and the outbreak’. 201 F.McCormick: American correspondent; went to China in 1900; during the Russo-Japanese War reported for the Associated Press, author of The Flowery Republic. Morrison described him as ‘very anti-British’. Morrison to Chirol, 12 September 1909, Correspondence, p. 524. 202 F.McCormick, The Flowery Republic, Londoni: John Murray, 1913, pp. 131–2. 203 Uchida instructed Yamaza, the Acting Ambassador in London, that he should inform Grey confidentially that Japan would support Vice-Admiral Winslow to take command of the powers’ naval forces in Hankow. Uchida to Yamaza, 23 October 1991, NGB 70, no. 642. Yamaza told Campbell that Japan was happy to come under British command, because this would save Japan from being under German command. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 64. 204 Jordan to Grey, 16 October 1911 [received 30 October], BPP Cd 6148, no. 23. 205 Herbert Goffe: British Acting Consul-General in Hankow. 206 Morrison Diary, 11 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 207 Cooper was ‘an excellent man of good judgment’ according to Morrison. Morrison to Braham, 17 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 635. 208 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 648. 209 Morrison Diary, 17 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 210 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 648. 211 Jordan to Grey, 21 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 11. 212 Foreign Office to War Office, 23 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 12. 213 War Office to Foreign Office, 24 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 13. 214 Goffe to Jordan, in Jordan to Grey, 23 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 47, Enclosure 4. 215 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 648. 216 War Office to Foreign Office, 8 June 1912, BPP Cd 7054, no. 35. 217 E.J.Dingle, an Englishman, personal friend of Li Yuan-hung, who stayed at Hankow throughout the revolution. Dingle described Li as ‘a man of political solidarity, not brilliant, but solid [and] sound’. E.J.Dingle, China’s Revolution 1911–1912: a historical and political record of the civil war, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1912, p. 199. 218 The Times, 14 October 1911, p. 6, col. 1. 219 Jordan to Grey, 16 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 23. 220 Muramatsu, Consul-General in Hankow, to T.Hayashi, 13 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 171. Jordan to Grey, 30 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 23. 221 The Times, 14 October 1911, p. 6, col. 1. 222 Morrison to Nystrom, 26 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 639.

Notes

189

223 Marie-Claire Bergère ‘The issue of imperialism and the 1911 revolution’, in S.Etō and H.Z.Schiffrin (eds), The 1911 Revolution in China: interpretive essays, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984, p. 270. 224 H.Z.Schiffrin, ‘The foreign powers and the 1911 revolution: a harmonious interval during a period of discord’, in S.Etō and H.Z.Schiffrin (eds), The 1911 Revolution in China, pp. 276– 7. 225 McKenzie, ‘Four Hundred Million Chinamen Awaken’, p. 706. 226 Bergère, ‘The issue of imperialism and the 1911 revolution’, p. 267. M.B.Jensen, The 1911 revolution and United States East Asian policy’, in S.Etō and H.Z. Schiffrin (eds), The 1911 Revolution in China, p. 269. In the Far East, British predominance remained until 1914 when the European war broke out. Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British Policy in the Reorganization Loan’, p. 357. 227 S.Yamamoto, ‘Shingai kakumei to Nihon-no dōkō’ [The Hsinhai Revolution and Japan’s Attitude], Shirin, January 1966, 49–1:31. E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-k’ai’s rise to the presidency’, China in Revolution: the fast phase 1900–1913, in M.C.Wright (ed.), Yale University Press, 1968, p. 430. 228 Yamamoto, [The Hsinhai Revolution and Japan’s Attitude], p. 32. Nozawa, [The Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 154–6. 229 Muramatsu to T.Hayashi, 14 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 208. 230 Y.Uchida: Minister in Peking (1901–6); Minister to Switzerland and Austria (1906–7); Ambassador to the United States (1909–11); Foreign Minister (1911–16, 1918–23 and 1932). Following the death of Komura on 27 August 1911, Uchida was appointed Foreign Minister on 30 August 1911 in the second Saionji Cabinet, while he was in the United States. Until Uchida returned to Japan, T.Hayashi served as Acting Foreign Minister. Uchida returned to Japan on 14 October 1911. NGJ pp. 79–80. 231 Ijūin to Uchida, 30 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 108. 232 Ijūin to T.Hayashi, 13 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 207. Morrison noted that ‘Yin Chang [sic] has been outflanked and his treasure chest of one and half million taels has been looted’. Morrison Diary, 25 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 233 Yamamoto [The Hsinhai Revolution and Japan’s Attitude]’, p. 34. K.Usui, ‘Shingai kakumei to Nichi-Ei kankei’ [The Hsinhai revolution and Anglo-Japanese relations], Kokusai Seiji: Nichiei kankei no shiteki tenkai [International Politics: the development of Anglo-Japanese relations], 1977, 58:14. M.Ikei, ‘Nihon no tai-En gaikō: Shingai kakumei ki’ [Japan’s diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai during the Hsinhai Revolution], Hōgaku Kenkyū [Studies in Jurisprudence], 1961, 35(4): 64–93 and 1961, 35(5):70–2. 234 Uchida to Ijūin, 16 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 209. Translation from the Japanese. 235 Muramatsu, Consul-General in Hankow, to Uchida, 13 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 171. 236 Morrison Diary, 25 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 237 Morrison’s Memoranda, 26 October 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 238 On 3 December 1911, the. Mitsui Bussan Co. signed a sales contract of arms amounting to 439,000 yen. Sankei Shimbunsha Press (ed.), [The Birth of the Chinese Republic], vol. 3, p. 112. 239 Yamamoto, [Hsinhai Revolution and Japan’s Attitude], p. 34. 240 Ijūin to Uchida, 2 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 225. 241 Usui, [Hsinhai Revolution and Anglo-Japanese Relations], p. 14. 242 The Taihei Syndicate consisted of the Okura Yokō Company, the Takada Trading Company and the Mitsui Bussan Company. 243 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 10 November 1911, Uchida to Ariyoshi, 11 November 1911, Enclosure no. 1 and 2, respectively in Ariyoshi to Uchida, 8 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 246. 244 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, pp. 40–1. 245 Morrison to Braham, 2 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 739. 246 Ibid.

Notes

190

247 Schuyler to Knox, 15 October 1911, FRUS 6367, File no. 893.00/566. 248 The Cabinet decision of 24 October 1911, Japan’s China policy, NGB 70, no. 105. Translation from the Japanese. 249 Ibid. 250 Uchida to Ijūin, 2 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 242. 251 Ijūin to Uchida, Urgent and Strictly Confidential Telegram, 28 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 531. Translation from the Japanese. 252 N.Kawashima: a Japanese expansionist; founded the Police Academy in Peking (1901); launched a campaign for the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia (1912, 1916); tried to re-establish the Ch’ing dynasty in the name of Manchuko (1934). NGJ p. 199. 253 K.Kurihara, ‘Abe Gaimushō seimu-kyokuchō ansatsu jiken to tai-Chūgoku [Manmō] mondai’ [The Assassination of Abe, Director of the Political Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, and the problem of Chinese policy, Manchuria and Mongolia], Kokusaihō Gaiko Zasshi [Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], 1956, 55(5):53. 254 Uchida to Ijūin, 2 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 113. Translation from the Japanese. 255 Morrison to Braham, 27 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 641. 256 Braham to Morrison, 14 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 658. 257 Braham to Morrison, 13 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 635. 258 Out of the Currency Reform and the Manchurian Development Loan, £400,000 sterling had already been advanced on 13 May 1911 for the Manchurian development project. 259 Nakayama, [After the Russo-Japanese War], p. 87. V.A.Yakhontoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 86. 260 Usui, [The Hsinhai Revolution and Anglo-Japanese Relations], p. 34. 261 The Times, 12 October 1911, p. 8, col. 1. 262 Segawa, Consul-General in Kuangtung, to Uchida, 17 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 12. 263 Ariyoshi, Consul-General in Shanghai, to Uchida, 17 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 11. 264 Morrison to Braham, 17 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 636. 265 The Times, 14 October 1911, p. 6, col. 4. 266 Jordan to Grey, 18 October 1911, British Foreign Office Papers, British Public Records Office, 405–205, no. 138. 267 The Times, 23 October 1911, p. 11, col. 1, ‘Grave Situation in China: spread of the revolt: the military and financial difficulties’. 268 Jordan to Grey, 19 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 141. 269 Morrison to E.Blake, 9 August 1911, Correspondence, p. 614. 270 Morrison to Addis, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 62. 271 Addis to Morrison, 12 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 680. 272 Morrison Diary, 28 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 273 King to Morrison, 8 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 650. 274 P.H.King, In the Chinese Customs Service: a personal record of forty-seven years, New York: Garland, 1980 (reprint), p. 234. Morrison and King were friends for a long time and Morrison’s last letter to him was written on 12 April 1920, one and a half months before his death. 275 King, In the Chinese Customs Service, p. 297. 276 Morrison to Braham, 24 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 638. 277 Morrison to Braham, 17 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 636. 278 Croly, Willard Straight, p. 253. 279 J.W.N.Munthe: a Norwegian soldier who worked for Yuan Shih-kai. Munthe’s name appears frequently in Morrison’s Diary as a supplier of information. For example, 23 October, 28 October, 13 November, 22 November 1911. Morrison had known him since August 1900 when the Peking siege was relieved. Munthe came to Peking together with the Russian Relief Force as interpreter. Morrison Diary, 26 August 1900, Morrison Papers, vol. 9.

Notes

191

280 Morrison’s Memorandum, 24 October 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 281 Morrison Diary, 23 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. The emphasis by Morrison. 282 The Times, 25 October 1911, p. 8, col. 4, ‘Financial Straits in China: application to the powers: treasure removed from the capital’. 283 Morrison Diary, 27 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 284 Morrison Diary, 26 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 285 Jordan to Grey, 17 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 136. 286 Jordan to Grey, 18 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 138. 287 Reid, The Manchu Abdication, p. 254. 288 Morrison’s Memorandum, 24 October 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 289 Morrison to Braham, 24 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 638. 290 Croly, Willard Straight, p. 424. 291 Vinacke, A History of the Far East, p. 191. 292 Morrison to Braham, 17 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 636. 293 Croly, Willard Straight, p. 417. 294 Morrison Diary, 12 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 295 Jordan to Grey, 24 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 164* [the asterisk is in the BFO]. 296 Hillier to the Hongkong [sic] Bank in London, 24 October 1911, in Townsend to Campbell, 25 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 170, Enclosure 1. 297 The Times, 25 October 1911, p. 8, col. 4. 298 Yamaza to Uchida, 25 October 1911, NGB 68, no. 737. 299 Grey to Carnegie in France, to Granville in Germany, Bryce in the United States, 23 October 1911, BFO 405–205, nos 156, 210, 259 respectively. 300 Grey to MacDonald, 26 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 175. 301 Grey to Jordan, 27 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 184. 302 Granville, British Minister at Berlin, to Grey, 27 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 182. 303 M.Simon, Manager of Banque de l’Indo-Chine, Paris, to A.M.Townsend, Manager of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in London, 24 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 170, Enclosure 2. L.D.Carnegie, British Minister in Paris, to Grey, 26 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 179. France maintained at an earlier stage that ‘a loan of 5 million taels is so small that it would be difficult to refuse’, but later when the Chinese raised the requested sum to 12 million taels, France decided to reconsider. Bertie to Grey, 20 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 149. 304 Jordan to Grey, 24 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 164* [the asterisk in the BFO]. 305 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, p. 366. 306 Grey to Bryce, British Minister in the United States, 26 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 174. Bryce to Grey, 29 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 194. 307 Morrison’s Memorandum, 24 October 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 308 Ijūin to Uchida, 25 October 1911, NGB 68, no. 736. 309 Han-Yeh-Ping Company included Hanyang Iron Works, Tayeh Iron Mines, Ping Hsiang Collieries. Ijūin to Uchida, 12 and 24 October 1911, NGB 70, nos 206 and 215 respectively. 310 Uchida to Motono, Ambassador to Russia, 25 October 1911 and 28 October 1911, NGB 70, no. 216 and no. 220 respectively. 311 Morrison Diary, 27 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 312 Morrison to Braham, 27 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 640. 313 The Times, 8 November 1911*, p. 8, col. 1, ‘The National Assembly and Yuan Shihkai’s Peking’. 314 Morrison to Braham, 28 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 671. 315 Morrison to Braham, 17 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 636. 316 Bland, Recent Events, p. 163. 317 For example, Morrison Diary, 12 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240.

Notes

192

318 Ibid. 319 Croly, Willard Straight, pp. 415–18.

3 Morrison and Yuan Shih-kai 1 Yuan Shih-kai: of humble birth; from his youth, preferred the sword to the pen; joined the military (1880); served as the Chief-of-Staff of the Chinese garrison in Korea (1884); Trade Commissioner in Seoul (1885–94); served in Manchuria sending supplies to Chinese Army fighting the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895; co-operated with the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War. NGJ p. 94. J. Naitō, Seiden Enseiga [An Authentic Account of the Life of Yuan Shih-kai], Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1913. 2 Kuo Tin-yi (ed. and comp., in Chinese), Kindai Chūgoku Shiji Nisshi, 1886–1911, dai nisatsu [The Chronology of Modern Chinese History, the Ch’ing Period, 1886–1911], vol. 2, Taipei: Seichu Shokyoku, 1963, p. 1408. 3 Morrison Diary, 14 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, Cy Reel 240. 4 Jordan to Grey, 16 October 1911, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd 6148, no. 23, Enclosure 4. 5 The Times, 23 October 1911, p. 8, col. 2, ‘Yuan Shih-kai and the Throne: an ironical reply’. 6 Jordan to Grey, 23 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 47. 7 S.Hirakawa, Shina kyōwa shi [The History of the Republic of China], Shanghai: Shunkōsha, 1920, p. 126. 8 Jordan to Grey, 21 October 1911, British Foreign Office Papers, 405–205, no. 153A. 9 E.T.Williams, Charge d’Affaires, American Legation in Peking, to Knox, Secretary of State, 26 October 1911, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 6307, File no. 893.00/724. 10 S.R.MacKinnon, The Peiyang Army: Yuan Shih-k’ai and the origins of modern Chinese warlordism’, Journal of Asian Studies, 1973, 32:422. P.Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, London: Hurst and Blackett, 1918, pp. 21–2. 11 The Times, 4 January 1909, p. 5, col. 5, ‘Downfall of Yuan Shih-Kai’. 12 D.R.Reynold, China, 1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and japan, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1993, pp. 167–8. A.W.Hummel (ed.), Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period 1664–1912, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1943–4, pp. 950–2. 13 Morrison’s Memoranda, 6 June 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 14 J.Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1859–1916: Brutus assumes the purple, London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, pp. 249 and 253. 15 The Times, 4 January 1909, p. 5, col. 5. 16 D.D.Pokotiloff, Russian Minister in Peking, told Dillon that he had heard this from Yuan Shih-kai himself. E.J.Dillon, ‘Dismemberment of China’, Nineteenth Century and After, 1912,428:649. 17 The Times, 23 August 1912, p. 4, col. 1, ‘A reply to pessimists: Dr. Morrison’s views: to the editor of The Times, G.E.Morrison’. 18 Dillon, ‘Dismemberment of China’, p. 650. 19 Morrison to Bland, 1 February 1902, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 176. 20 The Times, 4 January 1909, p. 5, col. 5. 21 The Times, ibid. A.Aoyagi, ‘Chokurei Sōtoku En Sei-gai shi no seiryoku’ [The power of Mr. Yuan Shi-kai, Viceroy of Chihli], Gaikō Gihō [Diplomatic Review], 1906, 103:27.

Notes

193

22 E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-K’ai’s rise to the presidency’, in M.C.Wright (ed.), China in Revolution: the first phase 1900–1913, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 65. 23 J.N.Jordan, ‘Some Chinese I have known’, Nineteenth Century, 1920, 88:955. 24 The Times, 4 January 1909, p. 5, col. 5. 25 Jordan held that the Yuan-Na-tung team was ‘probably the strongest combination the Chinese Foreign Office has ever produced’. Jordan ‘Some Chinese I have known’, p. 956. 26 The Times, 19 September 1908, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Honour to Yuan Shih-kai’. 27 The Times, 1 February 1909, p. 7, col. 1, ‘China under the regency’. 28 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, pp. 54–62. S.Yoshino and S.Katō, Shina Kakumei-shi [A History of the Chinese Revolution], Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1922, p. 292. 29 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 85. 30 Ch’en, ibid., p. 252. 31 Yoshino et al., [The History of the Chinese Revolution], p. 292. 32 The Times, 4 January 1909, p. 5, col. 5. 33 The Times, 5 January 1909, p. 5, col. 5 and 6 January 1909, p. 5, col. 6, ‘The downfall of Yuan Shih-kai’. The Times, 8 January 1909, p. 3, col. 6, ‘The downfall of Yuan Shih-kai: attitude of the powers’. The Times, 17 January 1909, p. 7, col. 1, ‘Representations by Great Britain and America’. 34 Morrison’s article in The Times, 4 January 1909, p. 5, col. 5. 35 Jordan, ‘Some Chinese I have Known’, p. 956. 36 The Times, 8January 1909, p. 3, col. 6. 37 The Times, 8 January 1909, p. 3, col. 3, ‘Japan and the downfall of Yuan Shih-kai’. 38 L.Lawton, Empires of the Far East: a study of Japan and of her colonial possessions, of China and Manchuria and of the political questions of Eastern Asia and the Pacific, London: Grant Richards, 1912, vol. 2, p. 1205. 39 Hirakawa, [The History of the Republic of China], p. 126. 40 F.A.McKenzie, ‘Four hundred million Chinamen awaken: a remarkable picture of the new civilized empire derived from an interview by F.A.McKenzie with the Times correspondent at Peking, Dr G.E.Morrison’, London Magazine, February 1911, p. 703. 41 Morrison to Braham, 21 February 1911, Correspondence, p. 583. 42 Morrison to Braham, 30 May 1911, Correspondence, p. 609. 43 Grey to Jordan, 14 November 1911, British Foreign Office Papers, London: Public Records Office, 405–205, no. 302. 44 Morrison in St Petersburg to Braham, 21 February 1911, Correspondence, p. 581. 45 C.R.W.Bowra, British Commissioner of the Chinese Maritime Customs in Mukden, to Morrison, 17 August 1909, Correspondence, p. 513. 46 Weale’s article ‘Foreigners’ view of Yuan Shih-kai’ in the Daily Telegraph, translated into Japanese and quoted in [Diplomatic Review], 1911, 16(8):88, Translation from the Japanese. 47 S.Matsushima, Shinchō matsuro hishi [The Secret History of the End of the Ch’ing Dynasty], Tokyo: Taiseisha, 1925, p. 261. 48 Prince Ch’ing (I-k’ang): President of the Tsungli Yamen (the governmental department of general affairs which included the foreign office), and head of the government since 1898. 49 The Times, 29 September 1911, p. 3, col. 1, ‘Yuan Shih-kai and the premiership’. 50 Yoshino et al., [The History of the Chinese Revolution], p. 300. 51 Ijūin to Uchida, 27 October 1911, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Documents] 70, no. 25. Jordan to Grey, 30 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 316. 52 Jordan to Grey, 30 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 60. 53 Jordan to Grey, ibid. Jordan to Grey, 30 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 316. 54 Morrison to Braham, 27 October 1911, Correspondence., p. 641. 55 Ibid. 56 Morrison to Braham, 24 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 670.

Notes

194

57 H.M.Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times, New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1928, p. 221. 58 Morrison Diary, 28 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 59 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Chronicle of the Meiji Period Compilation Group (comp.), Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen-shi [The Chronicle of the Meiji Period Newspapers], vol. 14, Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai-Gakkai, 1972, 1 November 1911. 60 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 648. 61 Jordan to Grey, 5 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 79. 62 Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence., p. 692. 63 Jordan to Grey, 6 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 80, Enclosures 1, 2, 3 and 4. Commercial Press (comp.), Important Documents Relating to China’s Revolution with English Translations, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1912, p. 23. 64 The Times, 2 November 1911, p. 6, col. 1, ‘The remoulding of China: Yuan Shih-kai Prime Minister: unprecedented powers conferred’. 65 Jordan to Grey, 6 November 1911, BPPCd 6148, no. 80. 66 Morrison’s article in The Times, 2 November 1911, p. 6, col. 1. 67 Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 2, p. 1419. 68 Vinacke, A History of the Far East, p. 222. 69 The Times, 6 November 1911, p. 8, col. 1, ‘The Chinese revolt spreading: a humiliating edict: the national assembly and Yuan Shih-kai’. 70 Jordan to Grey, 6 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 80. 71 Morrison Diary, 3 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 72 The Times, 6 November 1911, p. 8, col. 1. 73 H.G.Woodhead, The Truth about the Chinese Republic, London: Hurst and Blackett, 1925, p. 35. 74 The Times, 9 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Progress of the Chinese’. 75 Grey to Jordan, 15 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 311. 76 Morrison Diary, 27 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 77 Morrison to Braham, 17 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 661. 78 The Times, 23 August 1912, p. 4, col. 1. 79 The Times, 25 November 1911, p. 8, col. 2, ‘The Chinese rebellion: an appeal from Honan’. 80 The Times, 11 December 1911, p. 5, col. 2, ‘Extension of the truce in China: increasing hopes of peace’. 81 Morrison Diary, 14 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 82 Jordan to Grey, 16 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 23. 83 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 647. 84 E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-k’ai’s rise’ pp. 423 and 427. Sankei Shimbunsha Press (ed.), Shōkaiseki Hiroku [The Secret Records of Chiang Kai-shek], vol. 3, Chūkaminkoku-no Tanjō [The Birth of the Republic of China], Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan, 1977. p. 75. 85 The Times, 8 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Chinese and Manchus: murder of a provincial governor’. 86 Morrison Diary, 12 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 87 Morrison Diary, 13 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 88 T’ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London: George Routledge, 1930, p. 82. 89 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 647, fn. 2. 90 The Wuchang uprising crossed the Yangtse River and by 12 October 1911 the revolutionaries took two important cities opposite Wuchang, namely Hankow and Hanyang. 91 Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 3, p. 1415. 92 The Times, 27 October 1911, p. 6, col. 1, The Manchu court and the assembly: the impeached minister dismissed: extension of the rebellion’.

Notes

195

93 The Times, 3 November 1911, p. 8, col. 1, ‘End of the Manchu domination: Yuan Shih-kai and the rebels’. 94 Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 3, pp. 1418, 1419, 1423 and 1424. 95 Ts’ai T’ing-kan: naval officer and republican politician; one of the first group of government-sponsored students sent to the United States (1873–81); joined the Navy (1892); became a member of Yuan’s entourage as Chief English Secretary with T’ang Shao-yi’s help, and stayed with Yuan to the bitter end, working as his personal liaison officer with important foreigners in Peking. Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 480, fn. 1. 96 Morrison Diary, 20 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 97 Yoshino et al., [The History of the Chinese Revolution], pp. 298–9. 98 Jordan to Grey, received 27 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 79. On 12 November 1911, a Chinese newspaper reported that Li had offered the first republican presidency to Yuan Shi-kai. E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-kai’s rise’, p. 421. On the same day Sun Yat-sen cabled to Li from Paris that he would recommend either Yuan or Li to that position. Kuo T’in-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 3, p. 1426. 99 Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 3, p. 1408. 100 Jordan to Grey, 2 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 211. 101 Morrison Diary, 3 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 102 Jordan to Grey, 6 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 80. 103 Morrison Diary, 12 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy reel 240. 104 Jordan to Grey, 2 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 211. 105 Jordan to Grey, 12 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 51. 106 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 254. 107 Morrison to Braham, 27 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 641. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Morrison to Braham, 24 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 637. 111 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 116. 112 The Times, 6 November 1911, p. 8, co. 1. 113 Morrison Diary, 11 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 114 Morrison Diary, 13 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 115 The Times, 14 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Yuan Shih-kai in Peking: extended powers’. 116 F.McCormick, The Flowery Republic, London: John Murray, 1913, p. 169. 117 As early as 1909, Morrison wrote to Chirol that some of McCormick’s telegrams were ‘disgraceful’. Morrison to Chirol, 12 September 1909, Correspondence, p. 523. 118 The Times, 14 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1. 119 Jordan to Grey, 12 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 51. 120 Morrison Diary, 12 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 121 Morrison had known Tenney since February 1904 when Tenney informed him of the nationwide new school regulations which Yuan inaugurated. D.R.Reynold, China, 1898– 1912, p. 140. 122 Morrison Diary, 13 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 123 North-China Daily News, Shanghai, 12 November 1911, reprinted in Commercial Press (comp.), Important Documents, p. 33. 124 Morrison Diary, 14 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 125 Morrison Diary, 13 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 126 E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-k’ai’s rise’, p. 422. 127 Matsushima, [The End of the Ch’ing Dynasty], pp. 266–7. 128 ‘A Résumé of a Statement made by E.G.Hillier at a meeting of the representatives of the Four Groups’, Paris, 8 November 1911, quoted in H.D.Kahn, ‘The great game of empire: Willard D.Straight and American Far Eastern policy’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1968, p. 367.

Notes

196

129 Morrison to E.T.Nystrom, Norwegian Protestant missionary, 26 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 639. 130 H.D.Croly, Willard Straight, New York: Macmillan, 1924, p. 424. 131 Morrison to Braham, 27 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 641. 132 J.O.P.Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, London: William Heinemann, 1912, p. 152. 133 Woodhead, The Truth About the Chinese Republic, pp. 31–3. 134 Ibid. 135 McCormick, The Flowery Republic, p. 185. 136 Jordan to Grey, 14 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 298. 137 Jordan to F.A.Campbell, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, 19 November 1911, Jordan Paper BFO 350–1, quoted by P.Lowe in Great Britain and Japan 1911–1915: a study of British Far Eastern policy, London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 76. 138 Ts’ai T’ing-kan told Morrison what Yuan had told Jordan, Morrison’s Memorandum, 15 November 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 139 Jordan to Grey, 15 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 308. 140 Jordan to Grey, 19 and 20 November 1911, BFO 405–205, nos 321 and 329 respectively. 141 Morrison Diary, 17 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 142 Morrison to Braham, enclosure: Confidential: Memorandum of a visit from Captain Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 17 November 1911, Correspondence, pp. 664–5. 143 Morrison to Braham, 16 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 661. 144 Morrison to Braham, 17 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 662. 145 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [The Birth of the Republic of China], vol. 3, pp. 79–80. 146 Morrison to Braham, 17 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 664. 147 Ibid. 148 Morrison to Braham, Confidential: Memorandum, 17 November 1911, Correspondence, pp. 664–5. 149 Ibid. 150 Morrison Diary, 17, 18 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 151 Morrison to Chirol, 5 May 1905, Correspondence, p. 298. 152 C.M.MacDonald: attached to the War Office and served in Cairo, Egypt (1882–7); retired from the Army (1896); HM Commissioner on the West Coast of Africa (1888); appointed Minister in Peking (1896); Minister in Tokyo (1900–12); promoted Ambassador in Tokyo (1906); retired December 1912. During the Boxer incident of 1900, he played a significant role in the defence of the Legations. NGJ p. 948. 153 Morrison to Chirol, 21 March 1899, Correspondence, p. 118. 154 A.J.Balfour: leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons (1895–1902); Prime Minister (1902–5). NGJ pp. 529 and 1095. 155 Balfour to Lansdowne, private, 23 August 1905, Balfour Papers, quoted by Chan Lau Kitching, in Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy in the Careers of Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-k’ai: 1906–1920, Hong Kong University Press, 1978, p. 6. 156 E.M.Satow: PhD Cambridge University; barrister at Lincoln’s Inn; student interpreter in 1861, and Japanese Secretary in 1868 of the British Legation in Tokyo; left Japan in 1883 at the age of 39, and returned there as minister in 1895; Minister in Peking (1900–5), NGJ p. 349. 157 Morrison Diary, 6 November 1900, Morrison Papers, vol. 9. 158 Satow was the author of A Diplomat in Japan (1917), A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (1917) and many other works. NGJ p. 349. 159 Chirol said of Satow: ‘He had a profound knowledge of the Far East. Like the fine Japanese scholar that he was, he had made an equal study of Chinese literature.’ Chirol to Morrison, 24 December 1900, Correspondence, p. 159.

Notes

197

160 Bland, Recent Events, p. 262. 161 Satow Diary, 30 July 1906, Satow Papers, British Public Records Office, PRO 30/33/16/9. 162 Satow Diary, ibid. Satow noted in his diary ‘This (what Chirol said) is just what C. Hardinge said to me’. 163 Morrison Diary, 10 April 1900, Morrison Papers, vol. 9. 164 Jordan to Morrison, 21 January 1900, Correspondence, p. 131. 165 For more detail, see E.Woodhouse, ‘Dr G.E.Morrison and Japan 1898–1905’, Unpublished Thesis, University of Sydney, 1983, pp. 47–50. 166 Chirol wrote: ‘I enjoyed the confidence of…the Foreign Office’, V.Chirol, Fifty Years in a Changing World, London: Butler and Tanner, 1927, p. 208. Chirol worked for the Foreign Office before joining The Times, although nobody knew the reason for his resignation. I.H.Nish, ‘Dr G.E.Morrison and Japan’, Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia, 1963, 2:43. 167 Morrison to Chirol, 5 May 1905, Correspondence, p. 298. 168 Morrison to Braham, 5 April 1911, Correspondence, p. 590. 169 In late 1905, Morrison was still pro-Japanese. He became anti-Japanese, however, before returning to Peking in mid-April 1906. 170 Morrison Diary, 29 September 1905, Morrison Papers, vol. 9. 171 Morrison Diary, 22 July 1905, Morrison Papers, vol. 9. 172 Morrison Diary, 2 October 1905, Morrison Papers, vol. 9. 173 Satow Diary, 16 April 1906, Satow Papers, PRO 30/33/16/9. Satow noted in his diary: ‘Morrison came back last night, looks very fit’. 174 R.T.Tower: served Satow as Secretary of the British Legation, created KCMG in 1911. 175 W.B.Townley: Secretary at the British Legation in Peking (1902–3); transferred to Washington, DC, 1903. 176 Satow Diary, 22 April 1906 and 13 July 1906, Satow Papers, PRO 30/33/16/9. 177 Satow Diary, 22 April 1906, ibid. 178 C.Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1981, p. 158. 179 Satow Diary, 22 April 1906, Satow Papers, PRO 30/33/16/9. 180 Ibid. 181 Chirol to Morrison, 12 April 1906, Correspondence, p. 362. 182 Jordan to Morrison, 20 January 1906, Correspondence, p. 358. 183 U.Hattori, Peking Rōjō Nikki [Diaries of the siege of Peking], Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1926, p. 223. 184 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 151. 185 P.Weale, The Re-shaping of the Far East, vol. 1, London: Macmillan, 1905, pp. 207–8. 186 Morrison to Braham, 21 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 666. 187 Ibid. 188 Morrison’s Memoranda, 16 November 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 189 Chao Ping-chun: Chinese imperial official and republican politician; a close supporter of Yuan Shih-kai; former Director of the Police School, Paotingfu, then Director of Police, Tientsin; made Minister of the Interior in 1911, Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 647, fn. 1. 190 Morrison Diary, 20 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 191 Morrison Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 192 Morrison Diary, 20 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Morrison to Braham, 24 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 670. 196 Morrison to Braham, 5 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 674. 197 Jordan to Grey, 1 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 546. 198 Morrison Diary, 22 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240.

Notes

198

199 Morrison Diary, 30 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 200 Morrison Diary, 20 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. Jordan to Grey, 17 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 426. 201 The Times, 21 November 1911, p. 8, cols 1–2, ‘Yuan Shih-kai on the crisis: a limited monarchy or a republic: the danger of disruption’. 202 Morrison Diary, 20 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 203 The Times, 21 November 1911, p. 8, cols 1–2. 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid. 206 Ibid. 207 Morrison Diary, 20 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 208 Yuan’s apologia which was reproduced in Morrison’s article needs some explanation. It was Ts’ai T’ing-kan who had written this apologia at Yuan’s request and sent it to Morrison. Morrison in turn sent it to Braham and instructed him to incorporate it in Morrison’s article as if it were Yuan who had given it to Morrison on the occasion of the 20 November interview. Morrison to Braham, 3 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 645. 209 The Times, 21 November 1911, p. 8, cols 1–2. 210 Morrison to Braham, 8 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 678. 211 Bland, The Recent Events, pp. 152–3. 212 Woodhead, The Truth About the Chinese Republic, pp. 31–3. 213 Lawton, The Empires of the Far East, vol. 2, pp. 1528–9. 214 Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, 2 3 November 1911, SSMH. 215 The Times, 16 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Yuan Shih-kai and the revolution: difficulties of the premier’s task’. 216 The Times, 18 November 1911, p. 7, col. 1, ‘Yuan Shih-kai and the rebel demands: a force ordered to Hankau [sic]’. 217 The Times, 25 November 1911, p. 7, col. 2. 218 Ibid. 219 Morrison to Braham, 21 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 667. 220 Braham to Morrison, 24 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 638. 221 Braham to Morrison, 13 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 634. 222 Buckle to Morrison, 14 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 658. 223 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 229. 224 Lin Wen-ching to Morrison, 24 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 637. 225 Morrison to Braham, 9 June 1911, Correspondence, p. 611. 226 Morrison Diary, 24 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 227 Buckle to Morrison, 14 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 658. 228 Morrison to Braham, 31 October 1911, Correspondence, p. 644. 229 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 649.

4 Sino-Anglo-Japanese diplomacy 1 Yuan Shih-kai’s terms of settlement which were offered to Li Yuan-hung on 29 October and 11 November 1911 were: amnesty, constitutional monarchy and the revolutionaries’ participation in the parliament as a political party. 2 Morrison Diary, 12 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, Cy Reel 240.

Notes

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3 Kuo Tin-yi (ed. and comp., in Chinese), Kindai Chūgoku Shiji Nisshi, 1886–1911, dai nisatsu [The Chronology of Modern Chinese History, the Ch’ing Period, 1886–1911], vol. 2, Taipei: Seichu Shokyoku, 1963. p. 1435. 4 Morrison Diary, 28 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 5 The Times, 29 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Rebel capitulation at Wuchang: improved peace prospects’. 6 Morrison Diary, 30 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 7 The Times, 1 December 1911, p. 8, col. 1, ‘Three days’ truce in China: British good offices: Yuan Shih-kai’s confidence’. 8 J.Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1859–1916, Brutus assumes the purple, London: Allen and Unwin, 1961 pp. 116–17. 9 The Times, 7 November 1911, p. 10, col. 1, The panic in Peking: peace envoy to the YangTsze [sic] rebels’. 10 Jordan to Grey, 30 October 1911, British Parliamentary Papers Cd 6148, no. 60. Jordan wrote in 1920, however, that ‘The revolutionaries were defeated, and the movement could possibly have been suppressed had Yuan cared to follow up his initial successes.’ J.N.Jordan, ‘Some Chinese I have known’, Nineteenth Century, 1920, 88:957. This statement, however, contradicts Jordan’s own observation of 1912. 11 B.L.P.Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, London: Hurst and Blackett, 1918, p. 27. 12 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 116. 13 Y.Nozawa, Shingai Kakumei [The Hsinhai Revolution], Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1972, p. 87. 14 T’ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London: George Routledge, 1930, pp. 84–5. 15 E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-k’ai’s rise to the presidency’, in M.C.Wright (ed.), China in Revolution: the first phase 1900–1913, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 423–5. 16 Jordan to Grey, 30 October 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 60. 17 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 16. 18 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), Shōkaiseki Hiroku [The Secret Records of Chiang Kai-shek], 10th edn, vol. 3 Chūkaminkoku no Tanjō [The Birth of the Republic of China], Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1977, p. 75. 19 Yu Shin-tin, ‘Shingai kakumeiki no Chū-Nichi gaikōshi-ron’ [A discussion of Sino-Japanese diplomacy during the Hsinhai Revolution], Kiyō, Nagoya: Research Team of Aichi University, 1992, 97:57. 20 S.Yoshino and S.Katō, Shina Kakumei shi [A History of the Chinese Revolution], Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1922, pp. 298–9. 21 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 117. 22 Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E.Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976 vol. l, p. 623. 23 Yoshino et al., [The History of the Chinese Revolution], pp. 298–9. 24 H.Saitō, ‘Shintei no taii to Enseigai’ [The abdication of the Emperor of the Ch’ing dynasty and Yuan Shih-kai], History Studies, 1916, 27(12):32–3. The record of his speech under the title of ‘The recent events in China’ in April 1916 in Tokyo at a meeting organized by the History Studies periodical. Translation from the Japanese. 25 Morrison Diary, 20 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 26 Jordan to Grey, 27 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 85. Suzuki, Consul in Nanking, to Uchida, 28 November 1911, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comp. and ed.), Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Correspondence], 70, no. 59. 27 The Times, 29 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1. 28 Morrison to Colonel C.D.Bruce, 30 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 673. 29 The Times, 29 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1.

Notes

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30 Wang Ching-wei (Wang Chao-ming): a leading Republican politician and close follower of Sun Yat-sen. In 1910 Wang attempted, unsuccessfully, to assassinate the Regent, was arrested and sentenced to penal servitude for life. He was released on 6 November 1911 at the outbreak of the revolution thanks to Yuan Shih-kai’s recommendation for an amnesty. Since then, Wang had become Yuan’s admirer. After his release, Wang was given an extravagant reception at Yuan’s private residence where he became sworn blood-brother with Yuan K’e-ting. Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [The Birth of the Republic of China], vol. 3, p. 80. 31 Morrison wrote that ‘Wang Chao-ming is one of the pleasantest men I have ever met, an exceedingly good-looking Cantonese, of excellent manners, a good linguist, a Japanese scholar, and one of the greatest of modern Chinese literati, a master of style whom all Chinese critics admire.’ Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 689. 32 Morrison to Bruce, 30 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 673. 33 Morrison to Braham, 16 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 701. 34 Morrison Diary, 18 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 35 The representatives’ conference was held in Wuchang at first but later shifted to Hankow. 36 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [The Birth of the Republic of China], vol. 4, p. 81. 37 Morrison Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. Morrison’s entry is incorrect because Wang entrusted Chu to carry his letter to the revolutionary representatives. 38 Morrison to Braham, 28 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 672. 39 Morrison to Bruce, 30 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 673. 40 Morrison to Braham, 28 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 672. 41 The foreign consuls at Nanking left, with the exception of the Japanese Consul. The Times, 29 November 1911, by Reuters, ‘The fighting at Hanyang and Nanking’. 42 Suzuki to Uchida, 3 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 63. 43 The Times, 4 December 1911, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Armistice signed at Hankow: spread of the rebellion to Mongolia’. 44 Weale, The Fight for the Republic, p. 27. 45 Suzuki to Uchida, 3 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 63. 46 S.Hirakawa, Shina kyōwa shi [The History of the Republic of China], Shanghai: Shunkōsha, 1920, p. 122. 47 Jordan to Grey, 24 February 1912, BFO 371/1315, quoted in E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-k’ai’s rise’, p. 425. 48 Jordan to Grey, 26 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 8. 49 Morrison Diary, 29 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 50 Ibid. 51 Jordan to Grey, 28 November 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 88. 52 Jordan to Grey, 1 December 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 94. 53 Morrison to Braham, 1 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 673. 54 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 649. 55 Morrison to Braham, 5 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 674. 56 The Times, 1 December 1911, p. 8, col. 1. 57 Hirakawa, [The History of the Republic of China], p. 127. 58 The Times, 1 December 1911, p. 8, col. 1. 59 Morrison Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 60 Jordan to Grey, 19 November 1911, British Foreign Office Papers 405–205, no. 321. Morrison’s Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 61 Jordan to Grey, 4 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 429. 62 Morrison to Braham, 28 November 1911, Correspondence., p. 671. 63 Morrison Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 64 Yen Fu’s article in The Times, 28 November 1911, p. 8, cols 4–5, ‘The crisis in China: its origin and development: the Regent an “unfeeling goose”’.

Notes

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65 E.Backhouse: an English scholar and co-author with J.O.P.Bland of China under the Empress Dowager (London, 1913), and Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking (London, 1914). Backhouse is the central figure in Hugh Trevor-Roper, Hermit of Peking: The Hidden Life of Sir Edward Backhouse, trans. S.Tanaka, Peking no inja: Edowādo Bakkuhausu no himerareta shōgai, Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1983. 66 Morrison Diary, 27 October 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 67 Y.Washizawa to Morrison, 14 November 1911 (this date is according to Morrison’s annotation), Correspondence, p. 659. 68 H.D.Croly, Willard Straight, New York: Macmillan, 1924, p. 417. 69 Morrison to Braham, 17 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 664. 70 Jordan to Grey, 3 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 419. 71 Morrison Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 72 Morrison Diary, 3 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 73 Morrison to Braham, 28 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 671. 74 Jordan to Grey, 6 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 448. 75 Morrison Diary, 6 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 76 Ibid. 77 See Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 79. 78 The Times, 7 December 1911, p. 8, col. 4, ‘Resignation of the Chinese Regent: guardians of the infant Emperor: a responsible cabinet’. 79 China Press, 8 December 1911, reproduced in E.J.Dingle, China’s Revolution, 1911–1912: a historical and political record of the civil war, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1912, p. 272. 80 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 9 December 1911, Chronicle of the Meiji Period Compilation Group (comp.), Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen-shi [The Chronicle of the Meiji Period Newspapers], vol. 14, Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai-Gakkai, 1972. Translation from the Japanese. 81 Jordan to Grey, 3 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 419. 82 When the three days’ armistice had expired at 8 a.m. on 6 December 1911, it was extended for 15 days, and when this period expired, yet another week of armistice was signed. 83 Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten Hensan Iinkai [The Compilation Committee of the Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History] (comp.), Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten [A Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History], Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992, p. 638. 84 S.Matsushima, Shinchō matsuro hishi [The Secret History of the End of the Ch’ing Dynasty], Tokyo: Taiseisha, 1925, pp. 236–7. 85 Matsushima, [The Secret History of the End of the Ch’ing Dynasty], p. 237. 86 D.S.Fraser: British journalist; succeeded Morrison as The Times correspondent in Peking in August 1912 on Morrison’s recommendation and held the post for over 30 years. Lo Huimin, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 384, fn. 1. 87 Fraser to Morrison, 13 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 767. 88 Morrison Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 89 The Times, 17 November 1911, p. 5, col. 3, ‘Yuan Shih-kai’s cabinet’. 90 Morrison Diary, 26 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 91 Jordan to Grey, 19 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 321. 92 Morrison Diary, 13 May 1906, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 235. 93 Morrison to Kirton, 9 August 1909, Correspondence, p. 511. 94 F.A.McKenzie, ‘Four hundred million Chinamen awaken: a remarkable picture of the new civilized empire derived from an interview by F.A.McKenzie with the Times correspondent at Peking, Dr G.E.Morrison’, London Magazine, February 1911, p. 700. 95 The Times, 17 May 1911, p. 7, cols 5–6, ‘China’s first prime minister: Prince Ching [sic] and his record’. 96 Morrison to Braham, 19 May 1911, Correspondence, p. 607. 97 Ibid. 98 Morrison to Braham, 24 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 669.

Notes

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99 Nozawa, [Hsinhai Revolution], p. 154. M.Ikei, ‘Nihon no tai-En gaikō, Shingai kakumei ki’ [Japan’s diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai during the Hsinhai Revolution], Hōgaku Kenkyū, [Studies in Jurisprudence], 1961, 35 (4): 82. Ikei, ‘Japan’s response to the Chinese revolution of 1911’, Journal of Asian Studies, 1966, 25:217. 100 Ijūin was Consul-General at Tientsin from 1901 to 1904 when Yuan was Viceroy of the metropolitan province of Chihli. As it was the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Ijūin, Aoki and Yuan closely co-operated to suppress the activities of the pro-Russian officials of the Ch’ing Government. Koseki Satō, Bōryaku shōgun Aoki Nobuzumi [Aoki Nobuzumi: a scheming general], Tokyo: Bokusui Shobō, 1943, p. 16. 101 Describing Chao Ping-chun, Morrison wrote: ‘The Chinese Minister of Interior who was very close to Yuan Shih-kai.’ The Times, 31 October 1911, p. 8, col. 1. ‘Manchu surrender: concession of reforms: free pardon for the rebels’. 102 Ijūin to Uchida, 1 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 110, 3 November 1911, no. 111 and 9 November 1911, no. 118. 103 Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 2, p. 1429. 104 Uchida to Ijūin, 17 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 236. Translation from the Japanese. 105 Ijūin to Uchida, 18 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 532. Translation from the Japanese. 106 Ijūin to Uchida, 19 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 533. Translation from the Japanese. 107 Ibid. 108 Uchida to Yamaza, 28 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 535. 109 Ibid. Translation from the Japanese. 110 M.Kobayashi, Nihon no tairiku seisaku 1895–1914: Katsura Tarō to Gotō Shinpei 1895– 1914 [Japan’s Continental Policy 1895–1914: Tarō Katsura and Gotō Shinpei], Tokyo: Nansōsha, 1996, p. 266. 111 Yamaza to Uchida, 2 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 540. 112 Grey to Jordan, 1 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 407. 113 Jordan to Grey, 3 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 419. 114 Ibid. 115 Grey to MacDonald, 1 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 408. 116 MacDonald to Grey, 4 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 428. 117 Grey to Jordan 5 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 444. 118 Memorandum communicated to the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires by the British Foreign Office, 5 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 445. 119 I.H.Nish, Alliance in Decline: a study of the Anglo-Japanese relationship, 1908–1923, London: Athlone Press, 1972, p. 8. 120 On 28 November 1911, Matsumura happened to find out from an American colleague at Hankow what was going on between Jordan and Yuan. Uchida to Ijūin, 30 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 538. 121 Matsumura to Uchida, 28 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 536. Uchida to Ijūin, 3 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 541. 122 Uchida to Ijūin, 30 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 538. Translation from the Japanese. 123 Kobayashi, [Japan’s Continental Policy 1895–1914], p. 266. Usui, ‘Shingai kakumei: Nihon no taiō’ [The Hsinhai revolution: Japan’s response], Kokusai Seiji: Nihon gaikōshi kenkyū: Taishō Jidai [International politics: studies in the diplomatic history of Japan: Taishō period], 1958, 6:13–25. 124 Uchida to Ijūin, 30 November 1911, NGB 70, no. 538. 125 Uchida to Ijūin, 5 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 544. 126 Jordan to Grey, 5 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 443. 127 Ijūin to Uchida, 5 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 547. Translation from the Japanese. 128 Ijūin to Uchida, 6 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 549. Translation from the Japanese. 129 Morrison Diary, 12 and 14 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 130 Morrison Diary, 7 November 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240.

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131 Morrison to Braham, 5 April 1911, Correspondence, p. 590. 132 Yamaza to Uchida, 6 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 551. 133 Grey to MacDonald, 26 October 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 175. 134 Grey to Jordan, 5 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 450. 135 Grey to Jordan, 15 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 298. 136 Ijūin to Uchida: one telegram on 15 November, two telegrams on 16 November, two telegrams on 17 November, one telegram on 18 November, three telegrams on 19 November 1911 and so on. 137 Grey to Jordan, 11 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 274. Grey sent a similar instruction to MacDonald and requested him to repeat it to Jordan. Grey to MacDonald, 11 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 273. 138 Jordan to Grey, 8 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 465. 139 Uchida to Ijūin, 13 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 558. 140 Morrison to Bell, 20 August 1909, Correspondence, pp. 515–16. 141 Morrison to Braham, 5 April 1911, Correspondence., p. 591. 142 R.Banzai: a Japanese intelligence officer who worked together with Yuan Shih-kai during the Russo-Japanese War, organizing a secret Japanese task force to infiltrate Manchuria and Mongolia to harass the rear and flank of the Russian Army. S.Tani, Kimitsu Nichi-Ro senshi [The Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War], Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966, p. 280. 143 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 659, fn. 3. 144 Ijūin to Uchida, Urgent and Confidential, 3 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 542. Translation from the Japanese. 145 Ibid. 146 Uchida to Ijūin, 4 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 543. 147 Uchida to Ijūin, 8 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 553. 148 Ijūin to Uchida, Urgent and Confidential, 13 December 1911, NGB 70. no. 557. Translation from the Japanese. 149 Jordan to Grey, 13 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 508. 150 Ijūin to Uchida, Urgent and Confidential, 13 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 557. 151 Memorandum communicated to the Japanese Charge d’Affaires, 5 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 445. 152 Kobayashi, [Japan’s Continental Policy 1895–1914], p. 266. 153 Ikei, [Japan’s Diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai], p. 82. 154 Uchida to Yamaza, 9 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 556.

5 Morrison’s personal diplomacy, 1911–12 1 Morrison to Braham, 5 December 1911, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 674. 2 Wu T’ing-fang: educated in Hong Kong and became journalist; went to London in 1874 and studied law; Minister to the United States (1897–1901), Board of Commerce, Foreign Office, Board of Punishments, and also acted on the Commission to revise laws; resigned from service of the Ch’ing Government (1909); joined the cause of the revolution (1911). Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten Hensan Iinkai [The Compilation Committee of the Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History] (comp.), Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten [A Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History], Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992, p. 391. 3 Little to Morrison, 6 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 674. 4 Morrison to Braham, 5 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 674. 5 Jordan to Grey, 8 December 1911, British Foreign Office Papers, 405–205, no. 466.

Notes

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6 Compilation Group for the History of Modern China Series (comp.), The Revolution of 1911, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976, pp. 148–9. 7 Sankei Shuppansha (ed.), Shōkaiseki Hiroku [The Secret Records of Chiang Kai-shek], 10th edn, vol. 3, Chūkaminkoku-no Tanjō [The Birth of the Republic of China], Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1977, p. 82. 8 Morrison Diary, 12 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, Cy Reel 240. 9 Morrison to Braham, 12 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 679. 10 Ibid. 11 Ijūin to Uchida, 15 December 1911, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comp. and ed.), Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Documents], 70, no. 248. Translation from the Japanese. 12 Ibid. 13 Matsuoka to Morrison, 12 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 679. 14 K.Kurihara, ‘Daiichiji, dainiji Manmō dokuritsu undō’ [The first and the second movements for the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia], Kokusai Seiji, Nihon gaikōshi KenkyūTaishō Jidai [International Politics: Studies in the Diplomatic History of Japan-Taishō Period], 1958, 6:1–11 and 6:53. 15 Matsuoka to Morrison, 12 December 1911, Correspondence., p. 679. 16 Jordan wrote: ‘Many thanks for letting me see the letter from Matsuoka which I perused.’Jordan to Morrison, 30 December 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 173. 17 Ijūin to Uchida, 15 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 248. Translation from the Japanese. 18 Morrison to Jordan, 30 December 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 173. 19 Ijūin to Uchida, 15 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 248. 20 Morrison Diary, 13 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 21 S.Yoshino and S.Katō, Shina Kakumei shi [A History of the Chinese Revolution], Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1922, p. 417. 22 Backhouse to Morrison, 31 December 1911, Correspondence, pp. 686–7. 23 Morrison Diary, 15 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 24 Morrison Diary, 17 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 25 Morrison Diary, 18 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 26 E.A.Selle, Donald of China, Sydney: Invincible Press, 1948, p. 113. 27 P.H.King, In the Chinese Customs Service: a personal record of forty-seven years, New York: Garland, 1980 (reprint), p. 235. 28 Bruce to Morrison, 19 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 681. 29 Little to Morrison, 6 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 675. 30 J.O.P.Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, London: William Heinemann, 1912, p. 267. 31 Addis to Morrison, 12 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 680. 32 Bruce to Morrison, 19 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 681. 33 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 18 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 575. 34 Morrison Diary, 18 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 35 Morrison Diary, 19 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 36 Bruce to Morrison, 19 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 681. This subject is examined later. 37 Morrison’s description of Wu T’ing-fang was: ‘Wu revised and humanised the Chinese Penal Code; was made Minister of Justice in Sun Yat-sen’s cabinet of January 1912, an excellent appointment, for although the man is a blatant ass, he does possess a sense of justice somewhat rare in China, and he is a Barrister at Law of Lincoln’s Inn, born a British subject.’ Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 689. 38 S.Hirakawa, Shina Kyōwa-shi [The History of the Republic of China], Shanghai: Shunkōsha, 1920, p. 30. S.Yoshino et al., [A History of the Chinese Revolution], p. 332.

Notes

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39 E.Fraser to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, 20 December 1911, BFO 371/1097, telegraph 352, in Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy in the Careers of Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-k’ai: 1906–1920, Hong Kong University Press, 1978, p. 37. 40 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 20 December 1911, Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen-shi [The Annals of the Newspapers: Chronicle of the Meiji Period], vol. 14, The Chronicle of the Meiji Period Compilation Committee (comp. and ed.), Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai-Gakkai, 1972. 41 Kuo Tin-yi (ed. and comp., in Chinese), Kindai Chūgoku Shiji Nisshi, 1886–1911, dai nisatsu [The Chronology of Modern Chinese History, the Ch’ing Period, 1886–1911], vol. 2, Taipei: Seichu Shokyoku, 1963, pp. 1445–6. 42 J.Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1859–1916: Brutus assumes the purple, London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, p. 122. 43 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [The Birth of the Republic of China], vol. 3, p. 86. Translation from the Japanese. 44 Jordan to Grey, 6 January 1912, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd 6447, no. 63. 45 Wilkinson to Jordan, 11 December 1911, Enclosure 2 in no. 62, Jordan to Grey, 4 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447. 46 Wilkinson to Jordan, 21 December 1911, Enclosure 4 in no. 62, Jordan to Grey, 4 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447. 47 Wilkinson to Jordan, 11 December 1911, Enclosure 2 in no. 62, Jordan to Grey, 4 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447. 48 Jordan to Grey, 15 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 527. 49 Bland, Recent Events, p. 166. 50 Ohl’s article in the New York Herald, 29 March 1912, p. 11, cols 1–7, ‘T’ang Shao-Yi [sic] of Columbia, who made the republic: distinguished son of the great university of this city and the amazing part he has played in the upheaval that is even now the astonishment of the age’. 51 Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 134. P.Lowe, Great Britain and Japan 1911–1915: a study of British Far Eastern policy, London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 75. 52 It was as late as 29 March 1912 that the foreign powers became aware, by Ohl’s disclosure in the New York Herald that the unofficial secret peace talks had taken place. 53 Tuan Chi-jui became Minister of War in the republican government under Yuan Shih-kai set up in Peking in February 1912. 54 Huang Hsing became Minister of War in the provisional republican government under Sun Yat-sen set up in Nanking in January 1912. 55 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, p. 45. Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing, p. 134. 56 New York Herald, 29 March 1912, p. 11, cols 1–7. 57 For its detailed account, see Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and Japan 1898–1905’, pp. 80–102. 58 Morrison’s article in The Times, 3 January 1901, p. 3, col. 1, ‘Russia and China: a Manchurian agreement’. 59 Woodhouse, ‘Morrison and Japan 1898–1905’, pp. 80–110. 60 Morrison’s Memorandum, Manchurian note, 1897–1905, 326, Morrison Papers, vol. 184. 61 Morrison Diary, 16 February 1901, Morrison Papers, vol. 10. 62 I.H.Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907, Athlone Press, London, 1966, p. 123. 63 Morrison Diary, 16 February 1901, Morrison Papers, vol. 10. 64 Morrison’s Memorandum, Manchurian note, 1897–1905, 326, Morrison Papers, vol. 184. 65 Wu T’ing-fang to Morrison, 18 December 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 62. 66 Morrison Diary, 19 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 67 Ibid. 68 King, In the Chinese Customs Service, pp. 232–3. 69 Morrison Diary, 19 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240.

Notes

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70 Ibid. 71 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 685. 72 Morrison Diary, 19 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 73 Jordan to Grey, 6 January 1912, BPPCd 6447, no. 63. 74 Bland, Recent Events, p. 166. 75 Wen Tsung-yao: educated in America; one of the republican delegates in the peace conference. 76 Chen Chin-tao became the minister of finance in Sun Yat-sen’s cabinet in January 1912. According to Morrison, Chen Chin-tao had ‘the best knowledge of finance of any living Chinaman’. Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 690. 77 Wang Ching-ch’un [Dr. C.C.Wang]: graduate of Yale University and a former railway administrator. Morrison had a discussion with him on 20 December 1911. Morrison Diary, 20 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Morrison Diary, 20 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 81 Wen Tsung-yao to Morrison, 24 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 682. 82 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 685. 83 King, In the Chinese Customs Service, p. 234. 84 Bland, Recent Events, p. 151. 85 King, In the Chinese Customs Service, p. 234. 86 Ibid, p. 235. 87 Bland, Recent Events, p. 163. 88 Morrison Diary, 19 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Y.Nozawa, Shingai Kakumei [The Hsinhai Revolution], Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1972, p. 114. 92 Bland, Recent Events, p. 164, note 1. 93 Jordan to Grey, 28 December 1911, BPP Cd 6447, no. 46, Enclosure 2. Jordan to Grey, 15 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 529. Ariyoshi to Uchida, 20 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 585. 94 Bland, Recent Events, p. 164, note 1. 95 The Times, 23 December 1911, p. 6, col. 4, ‘The future of China: hopelessness of the Manchu cause: the republicans and Yuan Shih-kai’. 96 Ijūin to Uchida, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 593. 97 Jordan to Grey, 20 December 1911, BPP Cd 6148, no. 133. 98 Ariyoshi, Consul-General in Shanghai, to Uchida, 19 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 580. 99 Jordan to Grey, 6 January 1912, BFO 405–205, no. 566 and BPP Cd 6447, no. 63. Tōzan Sakuma, Enseigai-den [The Biography of Yuan Shih-kai], Tokyo: Gendai Shichōsha, 1985, p. 147. 100 Jordan to Grey, 21 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 566. E.J.Dingle, China’s Revolution, 1911–1912: a historical and political record of the civil war, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 191, pp. 221–2. 101 Jordan to Grey, ibid. 102 C.S.Medhurst’s article in the China Press, quoted by Dingle in China’s Revolution, p. 230. 103 W.H.Donald: Morrison’s Australian friend, Shanghai correspondent for the New York Herald. He played a significant role helping republican politicians such as Wu T’ing-fang, Wen Tung-yao and Sun Yat-sen. Later he became adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. For Donald’s role in the 1911 Revolution, see A.G.Moller, ‘George Ernest Morrison, political adviser to Yuan Shih-kai’, p. 14. 104 Selle, Donald of China, pp. 113–14.

Notes

207

105 Bruce to Morrison, 19 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 681. 106 E.J.Dillon, ‘The dismemberment of China’, Nineteenth Century and After, 1912, 428:655. 107 Dillon, ibid., 428:618. 108 E.P.Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: liberalism and dictatorship in early republican China, University of Michigan Press, 1977, p. 31. 109 Jordan to Grey, 21 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 567. 110 The substance of the official communiqué, headed ‘Authentic Account of To-day’s Peace Conference’, was: (1) the armistice should be extended to 31 December 1911; (2) Wu T’ingfang demanded the establishment of a republic and abdication of the Emperor. Dingle, China’s Revolution, pp. 220–1. 111 F.Farjenel, Through the Chinese Revolution: my experiences in the South and North: the evolution of social life: interviews with party leaders: an unconstitutional loan: the coup d’état, trans. M. Vivien, London: Scholarly Resources, 1973 (reprint of the 1916 edn, New York: F. A.Stokes), p. 328. 112 Dingle, China’s Revolution, p. 221. The Times Shanghai correspondent reported that T’ang had expressed that he was ready to accept Wu T’ing-fang’s views. The Times, 21 December 1911, p. 8, col. 3, ‘The Chinese peace conference: representations by the powers: the demand of a republic’. Therefore, The Times Shanghai correspondent apparently obtained the same information as the Chinese-language papers. 113 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 21 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 590. 114 Bland, Recent Events, p. 162. 115 Jordan to Grey, 21 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 567 and 6 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 63. F.McCormick, The Flowery Republic, London: John Murray, 1913, p. 185. 116 Bland, Recent Events, p. 162. 117 Dillon, The Dismemberment of China, p. 655. 118 Ijūin to Uchida, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 593. Translations from the Japanese. 119 Jordan to Grey, 22 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 575. Ijūin to Uchida, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 593. 120 Jordan to Grey, 21 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 567. Chan Lau Kit-ching, AngloChinese Diplomacy, p. 38. 121 Ijūin to Uchida, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 593. 122 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 683. 123 Morrison Diary, 24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. T’ang did not show Yuan’s reply but told Morrison its contents. 124 Morrison Diary, 22 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 125 Morrison to Braham, 29 December, Correspondence, p. 682. 126 Ijūin to Uchida, 13 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 557. Translation from the Japanese. 127 Grey to Jordan, 15 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 311. Jordan to Grey, 11 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 487. Ijūin to Uchida, 8 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 554. Uchida to Ijūin, 13 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 558. 128 Croly, Willard Straight, P. 431. 129 Morrison to Braham, 29 December, Correspondence, p. 682. 130 Jordan to Grey, 4 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 429. 131 Morrison Diary, 22 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 132 Morrison to Braham, 16 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 700. 133 Morrison to Rockhill, 24 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 709. 134 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1912, Correspondence, p. 683. 135 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 24 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 604. Translation from the Japanese. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 H.Saitō, ‘Shintei no taii to Enseigai’ [The abdication of the Chinese Emperor and Yuan Shih-kai], Shigaku Zasshi [Journal of History Studies], 1916, 27(12):43.

Notes

208

139 Morrison Diary, 24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 140 Jordan to Grey, 19 November 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 321. 141 Jordan to Grey, 6 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 63. 142 Jordan, ‘Some Chinese I have known’, p. 957. 143 Ibid. 144 Jordan asked Morrison ‘Is Yuan acting?’ Morrison Diary, 2 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 145 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [The Birth of the Republic of China], vol. 3, p. 86. 146 Yoshino et al., [History of the Chinese Revolution], p. 372. 147 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 120. 148 Bland, Recent Events, p. 170. 149 Ibid., p. 152. 150 Ibid., p. 153. 151 Ibid., p. 160. 152 McCormick, The Flowery Republic, p. 187. 153 Croly, Willard Straight, p. 425. 154 Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, London: Hurst and Blackett, 1918, p. 27. Weale was the China correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph at this time. 155 Morrison Diary, 20 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 156 E.P.Young, ‘Yuan Shih-kai’s rise’, pp. 434–5. 157 The Times, 23 December 1911, p. 6, col. 4. 158 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 4 August 1912, p. 4, col. 5, ‘Morrison, the political adviser’. 159 Hirakawa, [The History of the Republic of China], p. 125. 160 C.Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1967, 2nd edn 1981, p. 173. 161 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 20 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 586. Translation from the Japanese. 162 Ibid. 163 Ariyoshi to Uchida, ibid. Morrison Diary, 19 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 164 Ariyoshi to Uchida, ibid. Translation from the Japanese. 165 Hirakawa, [The History of the Chinese Republic], p. 132. 166 Morrison Diary, 18 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 167 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 20 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 586. 168 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 20 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 586. Translation from the Japanese. 169 Ijūin to Uchida, 21 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 588. 170 It is not known who sent Jordan the telegram about ‘Morrison’s proposal’. It could have been Morrison himself or E.Fraser, who had most likely heard about it from Morrison. 171 Ijūin to Uchida, 21 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 588. Translation from the Japanese. 172 Ibid. 173 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 69. 174 Ijūin to Uchida, 21 January 1912, NGB 70, no. 769. 175 Hirakawa, [The History of the Chinese Republic], p. 124. 176 F.A.McKenzie, ‘Four hundred million Chinamen awaken: a remarkable picture of the new civilized empire derived from an interview by F.A.McKenzie with the Times correspondent at Peking, Dr G.E.Morrison’, London Magazine, February 1911, p. 705. 177 Bland, Recent Events, 157–8. 178 The Times, 8 November 1911, p. 5, col. 1, ‘Chinese and Manchus’. 179 Hirakawa, [The History of the Chinese Republic], p. 124. 180 Bland, Recent Events, pp. 156–8 and 166. P.Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-kai, p. 168. Young claims that ‘The North China Herald often reflected British business and financial interests’. 181 Hirakawa, [The History of the Chinese Republic], p. 124. 182 Ibid. Translation from the Japanese.

Notes

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183 K.Usui, ‘Shingai kakumei to Nichi-Ei kankei’ [The Hsinhai revolution and Anglo-Japanese relations], Kokusai Seiji: Nichiei kankei no shiteki tenkai [International Politics: the development of Anglo-Japanese relations], 1977, 58:40. 184 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, p. 38. 185 Morrison Diary, 22 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 186 Morrison Diary, 17–24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 187 Jordan admitted that ‘I feel some difficulty in giving an unbiased account of Yuan Shih-Kai [sic]. He is the Chinese of all others for whom I had the greatest admiration, and he is the only high Chinese official whom I can claim to have known intimately in private life. Personal regard may perhaps vitiate my estimate of his achievements.’ Jordan, ‘Some Chinese I have known’, p. 953. 188 Quoted in H.Z.Schiffrin, ‘The foreign powers and the 1911 revolution: a harmonious interval during a period of discord’, in The 1911 Revolution in China: interpretive essays, S.Etō and H.Z.Schiffrin (eds), The University of Tokyo Press, 1984, p. 278. 189 Uchida to Ijūin, 15 and 16 December 1911, NBG 70, nos 559 and 565. Ijūin to Uchida, 16 and 17 December 1911, NBG 70, nos 569 and 572. Jordan to Grey, 17 December 1911, BFO 405–205, nos 541 and 542. A.M.Pooley, Japan’s Foreign Policies, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1919, p. 66. 190 The Times, 18 December 1911, p. 5, col. 5, ‘The Chinese rebels: effect of the recent fighting’. 191 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 18 December 1911, ‘The peace conference and the Anglo-Japanese mediation’, Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen-shi [The Annals of the Newspapers: Chronicle of the Meiji Period], vol. 14, The Chronicle of the Meiji Period Compilation Committee (comp. and ed.), Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai-Gakkai, 1972. 192 Grey to Jordan, 18 December 1911, BFO 405–204, no. 550. 193 Jordan to Grey, 17 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 542. 194 Morrison Diary 24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 195 K.Kawamura, Kindai Nitchū kankeishi no shomondai [Issues concerning the History of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations], Tokyo: Nansō-sha, 1983, p. 189. 196 Morrison Diary, 22 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. Morrison had known Matsui since 1902 when he was Secretary to the Japanese Legation in Peking (1902–6). It was Matsui who informed Morrison about the Russian surrender of Port Arthur on 2 January 1905. 197 M.Ikei, ‘Nihon no tai-En gaikō: Shingai kakumei ki’ [Japan’s diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai: during the Hsinhai revolution], Hōgaku Kenkyū [Studies in Jurisprudence], 1961, 35(5):53. 198 K.Mochizuki, ‘Ijūin to waga tai-Shin seisaku’ [Ijūin and Japan’s Policy towards China], Chūō Kōron, 27/2, 1912, p. 130. 199 Uchida to Ijūin, 16 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 565. 200 Matsui said that the diplomatic bodies in Peking were unanimous in believing that China ought not to adopt a republic. Morrison Diary, 22 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 201 Morrison Diary, 24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 202 Uchida to Ijūin, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 128. Uchida to Ariyoshi, 24 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 132. 203 Uchida to Ariyoshi, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 130. 204 Uchida to Yamaza, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 129. Minute by Linley, 22 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 577. 205 War Office to Grey, 21 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 574. Grey to Jordan, 22 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 576.

Notes

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206 War Office to Grey, 20 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 564. Grey to Colonial Office, Confidential, 22 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 578. Grey to Jordan, 23 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 582. 207 T’ang Shao-yi’s proposal, which he sent to Yuan Shih-kai on 20 December, was to cause the Emperor to issue an edict to convene a national assembly and let the delegates decide the future form of government. 208 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 122. 209 Ijūin to Uchida, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, nos 593 and 594. Jordan to Grey, 21 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 567. 210 Ijūin to Uchida, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 594. Translation from the Japanese. M.Kajima, Nihon gaikō seisaku no shiteki kōsatsu [Historical Review of Japanese Foreign Policy], Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyūjo Shuppankai, 1958, p. 344. 211 Jordan to Grey, 22 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 575. 212 Ijūin to Uchida, 23 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 599. Translation from the Japanese. 213 Ibid. 214 Jordan to Grey, 23 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 579. 215 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 21 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 590. 216 Uchida to Ariyoshi, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 592. 217 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 596. Translation from the Japanese. 218 Ibid. Translation from the Japanese. 219 Morrison Diary, 24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 220 Morrison to Bruce, 27 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 754. 221 Morrison Diary, 24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 222 Ibid. As a result, Jordan knew what was going on with Matsui, T’ang and Yuan. 223 Morrison diary, 19 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 224 Jordan to Grey, 24 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 588. 225 Ijūin to Uchida, 25 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 608. Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy, p. 47. 226 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 684. 227 Uchida to Yamaza, 22 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 591. 228 Memorandum communicated by Yamaza, 24 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 584. 229 Grey to Jordan, 24 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 586. 230 Jordan to Grey, 25 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 589. 231 Ibid. In Jordan’s telegram, articles such as ‘a’ and ‘the’ are omitted. 232 Lowe, Great Britain and japan, p. 79. 233 Jordan, ‘Some Chinese I have known’, p. 957. 234 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 683. 235 MacDonald to Grey, 26 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 592. 236 Ibid. 237 K.Mizuno: First Secretary in the Japanese Legation in Peking (December 1911); Councillor of the Legation in Peking (October 1913). NGJ p. 985. 238 Ikei, [Japan’s Diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-ka], p. 53. 239 The Times, 23 December 1911, p. 6, col. 4. 240 Ibid. 241 Ibid. 242 The Times, 25 December 1911, p. 6, col. 1, ‘The Chinese problem: Yuan Shih-kai and the powers, foreign intervention feared’. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid. 245 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 683. 246 McKenzie, ‘Four Hundred Million Chinamen Awaken’, p. 704. 247 Yamaza to Uchida, 25 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 612.

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248 Morrison sent the articles published in The Times, dated 23 and 25 December 1911, from Shanghai with the special note ‘From our Peking Correspondent’. 249 Grey to Jordan, 24 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 587. 250 Jordan to Grey, 26 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 594. 251 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 683. 252 Bland, Recent Events, p. 162 253 Jordan to Grey, 26 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 594. 254 Backhouse to Morrison, 31 December 1911, Correspondence, pp. 686–7. 255 Morrison Diary, 1 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 256 Morrison to Jordan, 30 December 1911, Morrison Papers, vol. 173. 257 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 664. 258 The Great Treason: in June 1910, S.Kōtoku and 11 other anarchists were executed on charges relating to their failed assassination plot against the Emperor. The Katsura administration made use of this incident to tighten and suppress the socialist movement. Nihon Kingendaishi Jiten [A Dictionary of Modern and Recent Japanese History], (ed.) Nihon Kingendaishi Jiten Henshū Iinkai, Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, 1986, p. 376. 259 Hatano, ‘Shingai kakumei to Nihon’ [Japan and the Hsinhai Revolution], Shirin, 1961, 1:97. 260 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, pp. 683–4. 261 Hatano, [Japan and the Hsinhai Revolution], 1:97. 262 Ikei, [Japan’s Diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai], 35(5):60–1. Usui, [The Hsinhai Revolution: Japan’s Response], 6:18. 263 Uchida to Yamaza, 25 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 606. Yamaza to Uchida, 25 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 613. MacDonald to Grey, 24 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 591. 264 Jordan to Grey, 25 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 589. 265 Grey to Jordan, 26 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 596. 266 Yamaza to Uchida, 27 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 623. Grey to Jordan, 26 December 1911, BFO 405–205, no. 597. 267 Uchida to Yamaza, 29 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 628. 268 M.Kobayashi, Nihon no tairiku seisaku 1895–1914: Katsura Tarō to Gotō Shinpei 1895– 1914 [Japan’s Continental Policy 1895–1914: Tarō Katsura and Gotō Shinpei], Tokyo: Nansōsha, 1996, p. 266. 269 Ikei, [Japan’s Diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai], 35(5):82. 270 Lowe, Great Britain and japan 1911–15, p. 80. 271 J.G.Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908–1912: an episode in pre-war diplomacy: a study of the role of foreign diplomacy during the reign of Hsüam-T’ung, Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1973 (1st edn 1935), pp. 271 and 257. 272 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 147. 273 Yamagata to Terauchi, 2 January 1912, in M.Yoshimura, ‘Dai-sankai Nichi-Ro kyōyaku seiritsu zengo [Before and after the conclusion of the third Russo-Japanese Agreement], Kokusai Seiji [International Politics], 1966, 31:71. Translation from the Japanese. 274 Terauchi to Katsura, 7 January 1912, ibid. 275 Ijūin to Uchida, 27 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 620. 276 Yoshino et al., [A History of the Hsinhai Revolution], pp. 413–14. 277 Ijūin to Uchida, 28 December 1911, NGB 70, no. 625. Jordan to Grey, 28 December 191 1, BPP Cd 6148, no. 140.

Notes

212

6 The effect of Morrison’s work 1 Kuo Tin-yi (ed. and comp., in Chinese), Kindai Chūgoku Shiji Nisshi, 1886–1911, dai nisatsu [The Chronology of Modern Chinese History, the Ch’ing Period, 1886–1911], vol. 2, Taipei: Seichu Shokyoku, 1963, pp. 1448–9. Tokyo Nichi-nichi Shimbun, 29 December 1911, Chronicle of the Meiji Period Compilation Group (comp.), Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen-shi [The Chronicle of the Meiji Period Newspapers], vol. 14, Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai-Gakkai, 1972. 2 Morrison to Braham, 7 November 1911, 5 January 1912, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E.Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 691. 3 Morrison Diary, 24 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, Cy Reel 240. 4 S.Yoshino and S.Katō, Shina Kakumei shi [A History of the Chinese Revolution], Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1922, pp. 377–8. 5 Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 692. 6 Jordan to Grey, 4 January 1912, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd 6447. J.O.P.Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, London: William Heinemann, 1912, p. 166. 7 E.A.Selle, Donald of China, Sydney: Invincible Press, 1948, p. 117. 8 T’ang Shao-yi and Wu T’ing-fang met on 30 and 31 December, worked out the election and composition of the National Assembly and signed an agreement which stated that the first sitting would be held in Shanghai on 8 January 1912. Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Ch’ing period], vol. 2, pp. 1448–9. J.Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1859–1916: Brutus assumes the purple, London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, pp. 122–3. 9 Yoshino et al., [A History of the Hsinhai Revolution],, p. 347. Selle, Donald of China, p. 118. Yorozuchōhō, 6 January 1912, SSMH. 10 Morrison Diary, 1 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel, 174. From Li (son of Li Hungtsao), Morrison obtained a copy of Sun’s telegram to Yuan. 11 Jordan to Grey, 6 January 1912, BPP Cd 6477, no. 63. 12 Morrison Diary, 2 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 13 Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 691. 14 Ibid. 15 S.Hirakawa, Shina kyōwa shi [The History of the Republic of China], Shanghai: Shunkōsha, 1920, p. 137. 16 Morrison’s article in The Times, 3 January 1912, p. 4, col. 3, ‘The Chinese peace conference: government delegates’ resignation: palace treasure surrendered for the troops’. L.Lawton, Empires of the Far East: a study of Japan and of her colonial possessions, of China and Manchuria and of the political questions of Eastern Asia and the Pacific, London: Grant Richards, 1912, pp. 1539–40. 17 Wang Chao-ming (Wang Ch’ing-wei): one of the delegates to the Shanghai Peace Conference on the side of the revolutionaries and at the same time Yuan’s supporter. 18 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy in the Careers of Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-k’ai: 1906–1920, Hong Kong University Press, 1978, p. 48. 19 Yuan told Morrison that T’ang would make a good prime minister under Yuan’s presidency. Morrison to Braham, 16 January 1912, Correspondence, pp. 700–1. 20 Ohl’s article in New York Herald, 29 March 1912, p. 11, cols 1–7, ‘T’ang Shao-Yi of Columbia, who made the republic: distinguished son of the great university of this city and the amazing part he has played in the upheaval that is even now the astonishment of the age’. 21 Ohl’s article in the New York Herald, 29 March 1912.

Notes

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22 For example, both McCormick and Bland accused T’ang Shao-yi claiming that T’ang had betrayed Yuan. McCormick, The Flowery Republic, p. 189. Bland, Recent Events, p. 167. 23 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 8. 24 Morrison to Braham, 16 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 740. 25 Morrison Diary, 5 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 26 Morrison to Braham, 17 November 1911, Correspondence., p. 666. Enclosure in the confidential memorandum of a visit from Captain Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 16 November 1911. 27 P.H.King, In the Chinese Customs Service: a personal record of forty-seven years, New York: Garland, 1980 (reprint), p. 236. 28 H.G.W.Woodhead, The Truth about the Chinese Republic, London: Hurst and Blackett, 1925, p. 38. 29 Donald to Morrison, 4July 1912, Correspondence, p. 811. 30 Morrison to Braham, 29 December 1911, Correspondence, p. 685. 31 Ibid. 32 C.Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1967, 1981, p. 236. 33 Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 691. 34 Morrison Diary, 10 January 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 35 The Times, 15 January 1912, p. 5, col. 1, ‘The overthrow of the Manchus: terms of abdication’. 36 Morrison Diary, 5 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 37 Morrison to Bruce, 10 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 696. 38 Ibid. 39 Ts’ai T’ing-kan to Morrison, 10 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 696. 40 Jordan to Grey, 14 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 42. 41 Morrison to Braham, 16 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 701. 42 Hirakawa, [The History of the Republic of China], p. 128. 43 The Times, 10 January 1912, p. 3, col. 1, ‘The menace to Chinese trade: anxiety in Shanghai’. 44 Jordan to Grey, 19 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 88. Morrison Diary, 17 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 45 Morrison Diary, ibid. 46 The Times, 15 January 1912, p. 5, col. 1. 47 Ijūin to Uchida, 22 January 1912, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comp. and ed.), Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Documents], 70, no. 698. Translation from the Japanese. 48 Ibid. 49 Ijūin to Uchida, ibid. 50 An article in the Jiji Shimpō, 27 January 1912, quoted by M.Ikei, ‘Nihon no tai-En gaikō: Shingai kakumei ki’ [Japan’s diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai during the Hsinhai Revolution], Hōgaku Kenkyū [Studies in Jurisprudence], 1961, 35 (5): 68. Translation from the Japanese. 51 Morrison to Braham, 23 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 706. 52 Morrison Diary, 22 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 53 Morrison’s article in The Times, 17 January 1912, p. 6, col. 3, ‘Attempt to murder Yuan Shih-kai: bomb outrage in Peking: arrests and confessions’. 54 Morrison to Rockhill, 24 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 708. 55 The Times, 17 January 1912, p. 6, col. 3. 56 The Times (From Tokyo correspondent), 5 February 1912, ‘Japanese apprehension’. 57 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, p. 49. 58 Morrison to Braham, 30 January 1912, Correspondence, pp. 715–16. 59 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 710, fn. 1. 60 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, pp. 48–51. 61 Morrison Diary, 17 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174.

Notes

214

62 The Times, 19 January 1912, p. 6, col. 1, The Abdication of the Manchus: conferences in Peking: Yuan Shih-kai to be president’. 63 Ibid. 64 The Times, 22 January 1912, p. 8, col. 1, ‘The Chinese premier and Sun Yat-sen: change in the situation: a Manchu intrigue’. 65 Morrison to Wen Tsung-yao, 25 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 710. 66 J.G.Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908–1912: an episode in pre-war diplomacy: a study of the role of foreign diplomacy during the reign of Hsüam-T’ung, Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1973 (1st edn 1935), p. 278. 67 Jordan to Grey, 22 and 23 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447, nos 67 and 68 respectively. 68 Morrison to Braham, 23 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 706. 69 Reid, The Manchu Abdication, p. 276. 70 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 27 January 1912, SSMH. 71 The Times, 23 January 1912, p. 8, col. 3, ‘Vacillation of the Manchus: princes and the premier: Sun Yat-sen’s attitude’. 72 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, p. 51. 73 The Times, 23 January 1912, p. 8, col. 3. 74 Hirakawa, [The History of the Republic of China], p. 146. 75 Jordan to Grey, 23 January 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 68. 76 Morrison Diary, 25 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. The diary entry is: ‘Tenney saw Yuan Shih-kai yesterday who had declared stubbornly that he would not resign’. 77 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 23 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 704. 78 Ijūin to Uchida, 24 January 1912, NGB 70, no. 700. Translation from the Japanese. 79 Morrison to Braham, 23 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 706. 80 Morrison to Braham, 16 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 738. 81 Ijūin to Uchida, 24 January 1912, NGB 70, no. 700. Translation from the Japanese. 82 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 704, fn. 1. 83 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 23 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 704. 84 Ijūin to Uchida, 24 January 1912, NGB 70, no. 700. 85 Ibid., no. 701. Translation from the Japanese. 86 H.Saitō, ‘Shintei no taii to Enseigai’ [The abdication of the Chinese Emperor and Yuan Shihkai], Shigaku Zasshi [Journal of History Studies], 1916, 27(12):45. 87 Morrison’s article in The Times, 23 January 1912. 88 Morrison to Braham, 30 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 715. 89 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, p. 52. 90 The Times, 1 February 1912, p. 8, col. 5, ‘Manchu abdication imminent: Yuan Shihkai’s care of foreigners’. 91 Ibid. 92 Jordan to Grey, 10 February 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 127. Chan Lau Kit-ching, AngloChinese Diplomacy, p. 52. 93 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 127. 94 Jordan to Grey, 10 February 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 127. 95 Morrison to Braham, 5 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 691. 96 Morrison Diary, 2 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 97 Morrison to Braham, 16 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 700. 98 The Times, 19 January 1912, p. 6, col. 1. 99 Hirakawa, [The History of the Republic of China], p. 146. 100 Jordan to Grey, 10 February 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 127. 101 The Times, 12 February 1912, p. 5, col. 2. 102 Osaka Asahi Shimbun., 13 February 1912, p. 1, col. 2, ‘Special telegram in The Times: the contents of the republican edicts’.

Notes

215

103 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 14 February 1912, SSMH. 104 Jordan to Grey, 12 February 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 101. 105 H.M.Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times, New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1928, pp. 224–5. 106 Important Documents Relating to China’s Revolution with English Translations (comp.), Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1912, p. 91. 107 Liang Shih-yi also drafted the edict of 28 December 1911. Morrison Diary, 26 December 1911, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 240. 108 Morrison Diary, 5 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 109 D.Fraser to Morrison, 12 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 733. 110 Morrison to Jordan, 14 February 1912, Correspondence, pp. 735–6. 111 Morrison Diary, 14 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 112 Ts’ai T’ing-kan to Morrison, 2 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 718. 113 Ijūin to Uchida, 14 February 1912, NGB 70, no. 773. 114 Jordan to Grey, 16 February 1912, BPP Cd 6447, no. 109. Morrison Diary, 16 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 115 Morrison to Braham, 16 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 742. 116 Morrison Diary, 16 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 117 Ibid. 118 Braham to Morrison, 23 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 750. 119 D.Fraser to Morrison, 14 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 735. 120 Ibid. 121 E.J.Dingle, China’s Revolution, 1911–1912: a historical and political record of the civil war, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1912, p. 225. 122 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, pp. 137–8. 123 Morrison Diary, 14 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 124 Morrison Diary, 11 January 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 125 D.Fraser to Morrison, 16 February, 1912, Correspondence, p. 744. 126 Morrison Diary, 17 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 127 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 19 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 744. 128 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, p. 745, fn. 2. 129 Ts’ai T’ing-kan to Morrison, 19 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 745. 130 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, pp. 137–9. 131 Ts’ai T’ing-kan to Morrison, 26 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 754. 132 Morrison Diary, 29 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 133 Obata, Consul-General in Tientsin, to Uchida, 1 March 1912, NGB 70, no. 737. 134 Most historians except for E.P.Young [Yuan Shih-kai’s rise, pp. 438–42] agree, more or less, that the ‘mutiny’ was instigated by Yuan Shih-kai. For example, Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, p. 757. Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai, p. 127. Woodhead, The Truth About the Chinese Republic, p. 44. K.S.Liew, Struggle for Democracy: Sun Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution, Canberra: The Australian National University Press, 1971, p. 150. 135 Morrison to Menzies, 2 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 758. 136 Ibid. 137 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 4 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 761. 138 Morrison to Braham, 5 March 1912, Correspondence, pp. 762–4. 139 D.Fraser to Morrison, 13 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 767. 140 Morrison to D.Fraser, in Pearl, Morrison in Peking, p. 247. 141 Liew, Struggle for Democracy, p. 150. 142 Morrison to Braham, 5 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 762. 143 Morrison to Bruce, 30 November 1911, Correspondence, p. 673. 144 Morrison’s article in The Times, 1 December 1911, p. 8, col. 1, ‘Three days’ truce in China: British good offices: Yuan Shih-kai’s confidence’.

Notes

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145 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 4 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 761. 146 Morrison to Menzies, 2 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 758. 147 Morrison to Menzies, 5 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 765. 148 Ochiai, Consul-General in Mukden, to Uchida, 4 March 1912, NGB 70, no. 755. 149 Morrison Diary, 11 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 150 Ariyoshi to Uchida, 7 March 1912, NGB 70, no. 759. 151 S.Matsushima, Shinchō matsuro hishi [The Secret History of the End of the Ch’ing Dynasty], Tokyo: Taiseisha, 1925, p. 237. 152 Ijūin to Uchida, 2 March 1912, NGB 70, no. 741. 153 Kuo Tin-yi (ed. and comp., in Chinese), Chūkaminkoku Shiji Nisshi, 1912–1925, dai issatsu [The Chronology of the Republic of China, 1912–1925], vol. 1, Chūō-kenkyūin, Taipei: Kindaishi Kenkyūsho, 1979, pp. 29–33. 154 J.K.Fairbank, E.O.Reischauer and A.M.Craig, East Asia: the modern transformation, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, pp. 641–2. 155 H.Z.Schiffrin, ‘The Enigma of Sun Yat-sen’, China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900– 1913, in Mary Clabaugh Wright (ed.), Yale University Press, 1968, p. 470. 156 Kuo Tin-yi, [Chronology, Republic of China], vol. 1, p. 33. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 12 March 1912, SSMH. Yuan was formally elected president on 6 October 1912. 157 Morrison Diary, 10 March 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 158 Hippisley to Morrison, 28 May 1912, Correspondence, p. 803. 159 Morrison to Chirol 31 August 1909, Correspondence, p. 520. 160 Morrison Diary, 12 March 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 161 Vinacke, A History of the Far East, p. 225. 162 Ijūin to Uchida, 20 February 1912, NGB 70, no. 728. 163 Morrison to Braham, 27 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 755. 164 Ijūin to Uchida, 23 February 1912, NGB 70, no. 732. 165 Morrison Diary, 26 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 166 Ijūin to Uchida, 14 February 1912, NGB 70, no. 717. 167 Uchida to Ijūin, 22 and 27 February 1912, NGB 70, nos 730 and 734 respectively 168 For example, Morrison wrote that ‘Englishmen have never admired Ijūin’s ability’. Morrison to Braham, 5 April 1911, Correspondence, p. 591. 169 Ijūin was fooled by Yuan Shih-kai, blamed by the revolutionaries and humiliated in Japan and abroad. NGJ, p. 41. 170 Y.Miyake, ‘Ijūin Hikokichi shi’ [Mr Hikokichi Ijūin], Chūō Kōron, February 1912, 27(2):117. Translation from the Japanese. 171 O.Nomura, ‘Ijūin Hikokichi ron’ [A discussion on Hikokichi Ijūin], Seiji Keizai Shigaku, 1974, 101:1–12. Translation from the Japanese. 172 Morrison’s Memoranda, 3 April 1909, Morrison Papers, vol. 193. 173 Yokogi Byōshi, ‘A mere saloon diplomatist in oriental style’, Chūō Kōron, February 1912, 27(2):120–1. Translation from the Japanese. 174 Chōzenshi, ‘Stubborn and foolish’, Chūō Kōron, February 1912, 27(2): 125. Translation from the Japanese. 175 Kōin Shinsai, ‘Ijūin kun’ [Mr Ijūin], Chūō Kōron, February 1912, 27(2): 126. 176 Lowe, Great Britain and japan, p. 318. 177 Morrison to Braham, 27 February 1912, Correspondence, p. 755. 178 H.B.Morse, and H.F.MacNair Far Eastern International Relations, vol. 2, New York: Russell and Russell, 1931, pp. 818–19. Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), Shōkaiseki Hiroku [The Secret Records of Chiang Kai-shek], 10th edn, vol. 3, Chūkaminkoku-no Tanjō [The Birth of the Republic of China], Tokyo, Sankei Shimbunsha, 1977, p. 250. 179 The Times, 6 January 1912, p. 6, col. 4, Anarchy in Szechuan: murder of the viceroy: issue of a republican manifesto’.

Notes

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180 Morse et al., Far Eastern International Relations, vol. 2, p. 821. Fairbank et al., East Asia, pp. 800–1. 181 Morse et al., Far Eastern International Relations, vol. 2, pp. 818–29. 182 Bernstorff to Kiderlen-Waechter, 12 December 1911, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette, 1871–1914, in H.D.Kahn, ‘The great game of empire: Willard D.Straight and American Far Eastern policy’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1968, p. 381. 183 Morrison to Braham, 12 January 1912, Correspondence, p. 697. 184 The Times, 10 January 1912, p. 3, col. 1. 185 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [The Birth of the Republic of China], vol. 3, pp. 246 and 251. 186 E.W.Edwards, ‘Great Britain and China, 1905–1911’, in F.H.Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 352. 187 Sun E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interests: 1898–1911, New York: King’s Crown Press, 1954, pp. 21–6. 188 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, p. 382. 189 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed), [The Birth of the Republic of China], vol. 3, pp. 246 and 251. E.J.Dillon, ‘The dismemberment of China’, Nineteenth Century and After, 1912, 428:659. 190 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, p. 382. 191 R.Shigenori, ‘Toyōjihō (Oriental Chimes)’, Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 189:79. 192 Schiffrin, ‘The foreign powers and the 1911 revolution’, p. 278. 193 M.Kobayashi, Nihon no tairiku seisaku 1895–1914: Katsura Tarō to Gotō Shinpei 1895– 1914 [Japan’s Continental Policy 1895–1914: Tarō Katsura and Gotō Shinpei], Tokyo: Nansōsha, 1996, p. 199. 194 Ikei, [Japan’s Diplomacy towards Yuan Shih-kai], p. 82.

7 China after the Hsinhai revolution 1 Morrison to Wen Ping-chung, 10 May 1912, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G. E.Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 792. 2 Morrison to Buckle, 29 June 1912, Correspondence, p. 807. 3 Morrison to Buckle, 17 May 1912, Correspondence, p. 795. 4 Morrison to Hutton (Morrison’s friend from his Edinburgh student days), 17 May 1912, Correspondence, p. 795. 5 Morrison to C.W.Campbell, in Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1981, p. 254. 6 Morrison to Buckle, 27 May 1912, Correspondence, p. 801. 7 Morrison to Buckle, 17 May 1912, Correspondence, p. 795. 8 Buckle to Morrison, 20 June 1912, Correspondence, p. 808. 9 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 793. 10 Ibid. 11 A salary of £3,500 (over £4,000 including various allowances, such as travelling expenses and a house allowance of £250) per annum. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 261. 12 F.Farjenel, Through the Chinese Revolution: My experiences in the South and North, New York: F.A.Stokes, 1973, p. 208 (reprint of the 1916 edition). 13 T’ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London: George Routledge, 1930, p. 103. 14 Morrison Diary, 8 June 1912, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312, Cy Reel 174. 15 Morrison Diary, 18 February 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 16 Buckle to Morrison, 6 May 1912, Correspondence, p. 789.

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17 Morrison to R.F.Johnston, 14 April 1916, Correspondence, p. 511. Written in retrospect. 18 A.G.Moller, ‘George Ernest Morrison: political adviser to Yuan Shih-kai, president of the Republic of China, 1912–1916’, Unpublished MA Thesis, Melbourne University, 1976, p. 18. 19 Grey to Jordan, 22 July 1912, Morrison Papers, vol. 173. 20 They include: The Times, 2 August 1912, p. 4, col. 1, ‘A foreign adviser for China: Dr. Morrison appointed: a new development’, The Times, 5 August 1912, p. 6, col. 5, from Vienna, ‘Dr. Morrison’s appointment’. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 3 August 1912, p. 2. Tokyo Nichi-nichi Shimbun, 3 August 1912, p. 2. Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 189:612. 21 For example, G.Marvin chose for the title of his article ‘Morrison of China: the Australian doctor who is piloting the republic’, Melbourne Life, January 1913, p. 30. 22 Moller, ‘George Ernest Morrison’, p. 6. 23 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 4 August 1912, p. 4, col. 5. ‘Dr. Morrison and foreign advisers’. Translation from the Japanese. 24 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 27 May 1913, Correspondence, p. 151. 25 Morrison to Cockburn, 30 January 1914, Correspondence, p. 286. 26 E.J.Dillon, ‘The dismemberment of China’, Nineteenth Century and After, 1912, 428:651. 27 Extract from the Sydney Bulletin, 31 July 1913. Enclosure, Donald to Morrison, 7 October 1913, Correspondence, p. 222. 28 Morrison to Johnston, 14 April 1916, Correspondence, p. 511. 29 K.Enoki, Tōyō Bunko no rokujūnen [Sixty Years of the Oriental Library], Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1977, p. 24. 30 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganization loan to China 1912–13’, Modern Asian Studies, 1971, 5:360–1. 31 The question of the loans after the revolution is treated in this chapter despite the fact that the Belgian Loan issue occurred before Morrison became Yuan Shih-kai’s political adviser. This is because, by so doing, Morrison’s attitude towards the Belgian Loan can be easily compared with his attitude towards the Crisp Loan which immediately followed the Belgian Loan. 32 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganization loan’, pp. 362–3. 33 The composition of the Anglo-Belgian Syndicate was: Russian group, The Russo-Asiatic Bank; French group, A.Spitzer and Co. of Paris and their friends; Belgian group, La Société Générale de Belgique; British group, J.H.Schröder and the Eastern Bank. Eastern Bank to Foreign Office, 8 February 1912, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd 6446, China no. 2, 1912, Correspondence respecting Chinese Loan Negotiations 1912. 34 Eastern Bank to Foreign Office, 15 March 1912, BPP Cd 6446. 35 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganisation loan’, p. 363. J.Ch’en, Yuan Shihk’ai, 1859–1916, Brutus assumes the purple, London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, p. 118. 36 J.O.P.Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, London: William Heinemann, 1912, p. 397. 37 Fraser to Morrison, 11 April 1912, Correspondence, p. 783. 38 Addis to the Foreign Office, 6 March 1912, BPP Cd 6446. 39 Bland, Recent Events, p. 400. 40 Morrison to Braham, 22 March 1912, Correspondence, p. 773. 41 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 773, fn. 1. 42 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 2 April 1912, Correspondence, p. 779. 43 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganisation loan’, p. 360. 44 The six ministers included those of Japan and Russia who had joined the Consortium on 18 June 1912, as the following paragraph shows. 45 Jordan to Langley, Head of the China Department, Foreign Office, 4 August 1912, FO 350/8, in Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganisation loan’, p. 372.

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46 The Foreign Office to the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, 14 March 1912, BPP Cd 6446. 47 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), Shōkaiseki Hiroku [The Secret Records of Chiang Kai-shek], vol. 4, Tainichi Kutsujoku Gaikō [Japanese/Chinese Diplomacy, Humiliating to China], Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1977, p. 45. 48 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganisation loan’, p. 362. P.Lowe, Great Britain and Japan 1911–1915: a study of British Far Eastern policy, London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 139. 49 Morrison to Green, 21 December 1912, Correspondence, p. 70. 50 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 40, fn. 1. 51 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, pp. 130–4. Moller, ‘George Ernest Morrison’, pp. 25–6. 52 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganisation loan’, pp. 366–7. Lowe, ibid., pp. 131–2. J.Nakayama, Nichi-Ro sensō igo: Higashi Ajia o meguru teikokushugi no kokusai kankei [After the Russo-Japanese War: the international relations of imperialism in East Asia], Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1957, p. 96. 53 Morrison to O.M.Green, 21 December 1912, Correspondence, pp. 64–5. Written in retrospect. 54 Morrison Diary, 23 August 1912, Morrison Papers, Cy Reel 174. 55 Grey to Jordan, 23 August 1912, BPP Cd 6446. 56 Ibid. 57 Morrison to Jordan, undated, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 297. 58 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 132. 59 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [Japanese/Chinese Diplomacy, Humiliating to China], vol. 4, p. 51. 60 Morrison to Green, 21 December 1912, Correspondence, p. 65. 61 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganisation loan’, p. 367. 62 Morrison to Green, 21 December 1912, Correspondence, p. 65. 63 Morrison to Jordan, 1 November 1912, Correspondence, p. 45. 64 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 144. 65 Morrison to Green, 21 December 1912, Correspondence, pp. 65–70. 66 J.D.Gregory: an Assistant Clerk, later to become Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 67 FO 371/1322, memorandum by J.D.Gregory on conversation with Morrison, 2 September 1912, in Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 133 and in E.W.Edwards, ‘China and Japan, 1911–1914’, in F.H.Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 374. 68 Morrison to Jordan, 1 November 1912, Correspondence, p. 45. 69 B.F.Alston: Senior Clerk in 1907; Acting Counsellor at the British Legation in Peking January–July 1912; resumed duty in Foreign Office, September 1912; Charge d’Affaires in Peking, November 1916–October 1919. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, Appendix A, p. 313. 70 Morrison to Jordan, undated, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 297. 71 Edwards, Great Britain and China, p. 375. 72 Ibid. 73 Morrison in London to Braham, 9 September 1912, Correspondence, p. 32. 74 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [Japanese/Chinese Diplomacy, Humiliating to China], vol. 4, p. 51. 75 Morrison to L.Fraser, 10 September 1912, Correspondence, p. 34. 76 Morrison to Jordan, undated, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 303. 77 Edwards, Great Britain and China, p. 375. 78 Morrison to Jordan, undated, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 303. 79 Lowe, Great Britain and japan, p. 135.

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80 Moller, ‘George Ernest Morrison’, p. 30. 81 Morrison to Jordan, 1 November 1912, Correspondence, p. 45. 82 Ibid., p. 43. 83 Jordan to Morrison, 2 November 1912, Correspondence, p. 47. 84 Jordan to Gregory, 26 August 1913, FO 371/1594, in Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 144, n. 5. 85 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 37. 86 Morrison to L.G.Fraser, 13 September 1912, Correspondence, p. 35. 87 Morrison to Wen Ping-chung, 10 May 1912, Correspondence, p. 792. This date shows that even before leaving for London, Morrison knew about the unfavourable ‘rumours’ which were current in Britain. 88 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 2, fn. 1. 89 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 268. 90 Bland, Recent Events, pp. 466–7. 91 Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 21 September 1912, Correspondence., p. 36. 92 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 267. 93 Fraser to Morrison, enclosed in Morrison’s letter to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 21 September 1912, Correspondence, p. 36. 94 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 268. 95 Morrison to Green, 21 December 1912, Correspondence, p. 67. 96 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British Policy in the Reorganisation Loan’, p. 355. Nakayama, [After the Russo-Japanese War], p. 97. 97 For detail, see XVII The Wilsonian Withdrawal, H.D.Kahn, ‘The great game of empire, Willard D.Straight and American Far Eastern policy’, unpublished PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1968, pp. 427–53. 98 The Straight Papers in Regional History and University Archives, Cornell University, Kahn, ibid., p. 583. 99 For example, A.Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, Princeton, 1956 and Li Tien-yi, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913–1917, New York, 1952, listed in Kahn’s bibliography, ibid., p. 586. 100 Kahn, ‘The great game of empire’, pp. 434–5. 101 Wilson issued his statement to the press as a ‘Declaration of the policy of the United States with regard to China’. Kahn, ibid., p. 575. 102 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, pp. 136–7. 103 Morrison to Jordan, undated, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 303. 104 Fraser to Morrison, 19 March 191, Correspondence, p. 108. 105 Sung Chiao-jen: Sun Yat-sen’s chief political lieutenant; the moving figure behind the establishment of the Nanking Government; the chief executive of the Kuomintang Party. Y.Nozawa, Shingai Kakumei [The Hsinhai Revolution], Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1972, p. 111. 106 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘British policy in the reorganisation loan’, pp. 370–2. 107 Chan Lau Kit-ching, ibid., p. 355. 108 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [Japanese/Chinese Diplomacy, Humiliating to China], vol. 4, p. 54. Translation from the Japanese. 109 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, pp. 278 and 304. 110 Bland, Recent Events, p. 466. 111 Dillon, ‘Dismemberment of China’, p. 651. 112 S.Nagaoka, ‘Oshū taisen sanka mondai’ [The entry into the European War], Kokusai Seiji: Nihon gaikōshi kenkyū: Daiichiji sekai taisen [International Politics: studies in the diplomatic history of Japan, The First World War], October 1961, 23:26–7 and 36.

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113 Article VI of the Additional Agreement attached to the Peking Treaty of 22 December 1905. J.Tsunoda, Manshu mondai to kokubō hōsin [The Manchurian Question and Japan’s Defence Policy], Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1979, p. 341. 114 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, pp. 220–6. 115 Memorandum, enclosure, Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 28 January 1915, Correspondence, p. 366. 116 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 309. 117 Ibid., p. 310. 118 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [Japanese/Chinese Diplomacy, Humiliating to China], vol. 4, p. 174. 119 Morrison to W.Irvine, Australian Attorney-General, 14 March 1918, Correspondence, p. 667. Written in retrospect. 120 Ibid. 121 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy in the Careers of Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-k’ai: 1906–1920, Hong Kong University Press, 1978, pp. 85–7. 122 Morrison to L.G.Fraser, 12 October, 1916, Correspondence, p. 559. Written in retrospect. 123 Morrison to G.W.Prothero, British scholar and Editor of the Quarterly Review, 1 December 1915, Correspondence, p. 470. 124 Ibid. 125 Morrison to Irvine, 14 March 1918, Correspondence, p. 667. Written in retrospect. 126 Chan Lau Kit-ching, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy, p. 89. 127 Kuo Tin-yi (comp. and ed., in Chinese), Chūkaminkoku Shiji Nisshi [The Chronology the Republic of China], vol. 1 (1912–25), Taipei: Modern History Research Institute, 1979, pp. 207. 128 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, pp. 320–2. 129 Sankei Shimbunsha (ed.), [Japanese/Chinese Diplomacy, Humiliating to China], vol. 4, pp. 219–21. 130 Memorandum, enclosure, Morrison to Ts’ai T’ing-kan, 9 February 1916, Correspondence, p. 486. 131 Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten Hensan Iinkai [The Compilation Committee of the Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History] (comp.), Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten [A Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History], Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992, p. 225. 132 I.H.Nish, ‘Dr Morrison and China’s entry into the World War, 1915–1917’, Studies in Diplomatic History, London: Longman, 1970, p. 324. 133 Morrison to McCall, 4 October 1916, Correspondence, p. 558. 134 Morrison to L.G.Fraser, 12 October 1916, Correspondence, p. 559. Written in retrospect. 135 Morrison to Irvine, 14 March 1918, Correspondence, p. 667. Written in retrospect. 136 Ibid. 137 For details, see I.H.Nish, ‘Dr Morrison and China’s Entry into the World War, 1915–1917’, pp. 322–38. 138 Yamato Shimbun, 8 November 1915, p. 1, ‘Ei-Shi ryōkoku shitsubō’ [Disappointment of Britain and China]. Translation from the Japanese. 139 Yamato Shimbun, 1 December 1915, p. 1, ‘Nihon yori Eikoku-e’ [From Japan to Britain]. Translation from the Japanese. 140 Morrison to L.G.Fraser, 12 October 1916, Correspondence, p. 561. Written in retrospect. 141 Lowe, Great Britain and japan, p. 257. 142 Moller, ‘George Ernest Morrison’, pp. 87–9. 143 Nish, ‘Dr Morrison and China’s Entry into the World War’, pp. 322–38. 144 Nozawa, [Hsinhai Revolution], p. 111. 145 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 370. 146 Dillon, ‘The Dismemberment of China’, p. 654. 147 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 360.

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148 Lo Hui-min, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 220, fn. 2. 149 Moller, ‘George Ernest Morrison’, pp. 87–9. 150 For details see M.Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan: 1894–1922, vol. 3, First World War, Paris Peace Conference, Washington Conference, Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1980, part 2, chapter 2, section 2, The Shantung Question, pp. 361–87 and section 3, Disposition of Germany’s Pacific Islands, pp. 388–94. 151 T’ing Wen-chiang to Morrison, 14 May 1919, Correspondence, pp. 756–7. 152 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 384. 153 For details, see Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, part 2, chapter 2, section 4, Question of Abolition of Racial Discrimination, pp. 395–415. N.Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, London: Routledge, 1998. 154 Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, ibid., pp. 380–1. 155 Morrison to H.A.Gwynne, Editor of the Morning Herald, 9 May 1919, Correspondence, p. 756. 156 M.Ikei, ‘Pari heiwa kaigi to jinshu sabetsu teppai mondai’ [The Paris peace conference and the question of abolition of racial discrimination], Kokusai Seiji [International Politics], October 1961, 2:44–58. 157 Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 373. 158 T’ing Wen-chiang to Morrison, 14 May 1919, Correspondence, pp. 757–8. 159 Morrison to Gwynne, 9 May 1919, Correspondence, p. 755. 160 For details, see Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan: 1894–1922, vol. 3, part 3, chapter 3, section 4, Question of the Disposition of Shantung, pp. 591–634. 161 J.Fairbank, E.O.Reischauer and A.M.Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 606.

Summary/conclusion 1 F.A.McKenzie, ‘Four hundred million Chinamen awaken: a remarkable picture of the new civilized empire derived from an interview by F.A.McKenzie with the Times correspondent at Peking, Dr G.E.Morrison’, London Magazine, February 1911, p. 707.

Epilogue 1 V.A.Yakfontoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 44. 2 J.Fairbank, E.O.Reischauer and A.M.Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, pp. 13–14 and 311–12. 3 A.H.MacDonald (ed.), The Encyclopedia Americana, vol. 30, New York: Americana Corporation, 1946, p. 725. 4 Fairbank et al., Modern Transformation, pp. 13–14, 144, 311–12. N.Murakawa, K. Egami and K.Hayashi, A History of the World, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1970, pp. 272–3 and 279. 5 Fairbank et al., Modern Transformation, pp. 372 and 453–4. Murakawa et al., A History of the World, pp. 94 and 270. 6 Fairbank et al., The Modern Transformation, pp. 173 and 469. 7 Murakawa et al., A History of the World, pp. 283 and 288. 8 Morrison to Bland, 17 January 1898, Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 60.

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9 Fairbank et al., The Modern Transformation., p. 144. 10 K.Fujiki, The History of Japan, Tokyo: Shūei Shuppan, 1970, p. 208. 11 Fairbank et al., The Modern Transformation, pp. 311 and 470–3. Murakawa et al., A History of the World, pp. 269–83. 12 Morrison to Chirol, 14 April 1908, Correspondence, p. 445.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary sources English language Unpublished private papers Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MSS 312: 1 Diary, manuscript, vols 9 (1899–1900), 10 (1901–2), 11 (1903–4), 12 (1905–6) Diary, microfilms: Cy Reel 235 (1906), Cy Reel 236 (1907), Cy Reel 237 (1908), Cy Reel 238 (1909), Cy Reel 239 (1910), Cy Reel 240 (1911), Cy Reel 174 (1912). 2 Correspondence, vols 50 (September–December, 1905), 55 (January–September, 1910), 59 (June–July, 1911), 61 (October 1911), 62 (November–December, 1911), 63 (January–February, 1912), 64 (March–April, 1912), 65 (May–June, 1912), 66 (July–August, 1912), 70 (1 October– 19 November, 1912), 71 (20 November–31 December, 1912). 3 Subject file, vols 168 (Japanese Correspondence, 1898–1908), 169 (Japanese Correspondence, 1909–20), 170X (Japanese Documents), 171 (Japanese Notes, 1894–1914), 173 (Sir John Newell Jordan and Lady Anne Jordan, 1900–20), 184 (Manchuria, 1897–1905), 185 (Manchuria, 1906–13), 187 (Manchurian Notes, 1902–13), 189 (Maritime Customs, 1907–11), 193 (Memoranda, 1897–1911), 223 (British Legation in Peking, 1899–1920), 225 (Japanese Legation in Peking, 1897–1911), 233 (Railways, 1905–09), 245 (Railways, 1910–20). 4 Reminiscences: vol. 33, item 1.

Unpublished official papers British Foreign Office Papers, British Public Records Office: PRO FO 371/35 (August 1906) and PRO FO 371/41 (October to December 1906). Satow Papers (Diary of Sir Ernest Mason Satow), British Public Records Office: PRO FO 30/33/16/8 (21 September 1904–29 September 1905) and PRO FO 30/33/16/9 (30 September 1905–21 January 1907).

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Articles Chirol, V. ‘The Chinese revolution’, Quarterly Review, 1912, 431:536–53. Dillon, E.J. ‘The dismemberment of China’, Nineteenth Century and After, 1912, 428: 645–64. James, L. ‘Morrison of Peking’, Nineteenth Century and After, 1920, 88:164–70. Jordan, J.N. ‘Modern China’, Nineteenth Century, 1886, 20:40–50. Marvin, G. ‘Morrison of China’, Melbourne Life, January 1913, 30–2. McKenzie, F.A. ‘Four hundred million Chinamen awaken: a remarkable picture of the new civilized empire derived from an interview by F.A.McKenzie with the Times correspondent at Peking, Dr G.E.Morrison’, London Magazine, February 1911, 695–707. Pratt, F.L. ‘Four years of the Chinese Republic’, Quarterly Review, July 1916, 152–75. Rock, W.W. ‘China and Australia: an interview with Dr George E.Morrison at Peking’, Melbourne Life, April 1914, 335–42. Rogers, E. ‘Across China in one hundred days: interview with Dr George Ernest Morrison’, Windsor Magazine, December 1895, 687–95. Stanhope, E. ‘Great Britain and Japan in the Far East’, Nineteenth Century and After, 1910, 67:534–43. Wearne, A.E. ‘Dr. Morrison: the remarkable career of a great journalist—the Australian whose despatches from Peking to The London Times were world-famous’, Lone Hand, October 1910, 472–8. Yokohama Chamber of Commerce (ed.) Yokohama Chamber of Commerce Journal, May 1909, 9.

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‘Correspondence regarding newspaper articles in this country relating to the employment of Dr “Morrison” as adviser on state affairs to the Chinese government, the Hamburg Nachtlichten, 5 August 1912’ (translation of the newspaper article, ‘Yuan Shih-k’ai’s political adviser’), no. 116, 13 August 1912, R.Hatake, Acting Ambassador to Germany, to Y.Uchida, Foreign Minister. ‘Despatch of translation of newspaper article on Morrison, Nachtlichten, Freitag, 9 August 1912’, no. 29, 12 October 1912, Foreign Minister Uchida to H.Ijūin, Minister at Peking.

Published memoirs and autobiographies Note: Translation from the Japanese except E.M.Satow’s books. Hattori, U. and Shiba, G. Pekin Rojō Nikki [Diaries of the Siege of Peking], Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1926. Hayashi, G. Waga nanajū-nen o kataru [A Narrative of My Seventy Years], Tokyo: Daiichi Shobō, 1935. Hayashi, T. Nochi wa mukashi no ki: Nichi-Ei dōmei no shinsō [The Truth about the AngloJapanese Alliance], Yui Masaomi (ed. and annot.), Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1970. Ishii, K. Gaikō Yoroku [Diplomatic Commentaries], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1930. Satow, E.M. A Diplomat in Japan: Ernest Mason Satow, 1921, trans. S.Sakata, Anesuto Satō: Ichi gaikōkan no mita Meiji-ishin, 2 vols, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1971. ——Diary of E.Satow, Minister to Japan, trans. S.Nagaoka and I.Fukunaga, Arnesuto Sato Koshi Nikki, 2 vols, Tokyo: Shin-jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1991.

Published official papers Note: Translation from the Japanese. Itō Hirobumi Kankei Bunsho Kenkyūkai (comp.) Itō Hirobumi Kankei Bunsho [Papers Relating to Itō Hirobumi], vol. 9, Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō, 1975. Meiji Tennōki [The Chronology of the Emperor Meiji], vol. 2, Imperial Household Agency, Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1975. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.) Komura Gaikōshi [A History of Komura Diplomacy], vol. 2, Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1953. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comp. and ed.) Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese Diplomatic Correspondence], vols 39 (1900), 43 (1901), 56 (1906), 58 (1907), 59 (1907), 60 (1907), 61 (1908), 63 (1909), 64 (1909), 65 (1910), 67 (1911), 68 (1911), 70 (1911 and 1912), 71 (1912).

Books Note: Translation from the Japanese. Ariga, N. Saikin sanjūnen gaikōshi [The Diplomatic History of the Past Thirty Years], vol. 2, Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1910. Asaka, K. Nihon-no Khaki [The Problems of Japan], (1st edn Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihon, 1909), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1992. Higasa, S. (ed.) Kokushi Kamei Rikurō kinenshū [A Collection of Reminiscences of a National Hero Rikuro Kamei], Tokyo: Kokushi Kamei Rikurō Kinenshū Iinkai, 1939. Hirakawa, S. Shina kyōwa shi [The History of the Republic of China], Shanghai: Shunkōsha, 1920. Honda, K. ‘Reminiscence of diplomacy towards China’, in S.Higasa (ed.) Kokushi Kamei Rikurō kinenshū [A Collection of Reminiscences of a National Hero Rikurō Kamei], Tokyo: Kokushi Kamei Rikurō Kinenshū Iinkai, 1939, p. 375. Kogoshi, H. Inbōka Enseigai [Conspirator Yuan Shih-kai], Tokyo: Kenkōkai, 1913.

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Komatsu, M. Meiji gaikō hiwa [The Secret Story of Meiji Diplomacy], Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1927; 2nd edn 1976. Naitō, J. Seiden Enseigai [An Authentic Account of the Life of Yuan Shih-kai], Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1913. Tokutomi, C. Sekai no Henkyoku [Changes in the World], Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1915. Yoshino, S. and Katō, S. Shina Kakumei shi [A History of the Chinese Revolution], Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1922.

Articles Note: Translation from the Japanese. Abe, M. ‘Shina no shōrai ni tsuite’ [Concerning the future of China], Kokusaihō Zasshi [Journal of International Law], 1910, 8(6):10–23. Aoyagi, A. ‘Chokurei sōtoku Enseigai-shi no seiryoku’ [The power of the viceroy of Chihli, Mr. Yuan Shih-kai], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1906, 103:27–30. ——‘En-sōtoku no isei shittsui’ [The fall of the power of viceroy Yuan], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1907, 111:73–4. ——‘Enseigai no shutsuro’ [Yuan Shi-kai returns to office], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1911, 169:43–6. Ariga, N. ‘Masampo-ni okeru Rokoku-no kaigun kichi’ [The Russian naval base in Masampo], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1900, 31:69–72. ——‘Chokurei sōtoku En Sei-gai no seiryoku’ [The power of Yuan Shih-kai the governor of Chihli], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1906, 103:27–30. ——‘Kikai-kintō towa nanizoya’ [What does equal opportunity mean?], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1907, 112:63–6. ——‘Kokumin gaikō to kanryō gaikō’ [People’s diplomacy and government officials’ diplomacy], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1909, 139:67–70. ——‘Manshū tetsudō chūritsu no teigi’ [A proposal for the neutralization of the railways in Manchuria], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1910, 146:25–6. ——‘Chūshin dōran-ni taisuru waga kanmin no taido’ [The attitude of Japanese officials and people towards the disturbances in central China], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1911, 168:1–7. ——‘Kakumei-gun dokuritsu no shōnin’ [The recognition of the independence of the revolutionary army], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1911, 170:1–10. ——‘Ei-Doku no gaikō ni chūi subeshi’ [Beware of British and German diplomacy], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 177:1–14. ——‘Seifu komon shouhei Morison’ [Invitation of Dr Morrison to an advisership to the Republic of China], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 180:612. ——‘Chūka-minnkoku komon ōhei tenmatsu’ [The story behind accepting the offer of an advisership to the Republic of China], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1913, 200: 1–8. Chōzenshi (pseudonym), ‘Ijūin kōshi-ron, ko-ni-shite-gu’ [Discussion on Minister Ijūin: stubborn and foolish], Chuō -Kōron [Centre for Public Debate], 1912, 27(2):125. Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], ‘Zatsuroku: Dokutoru Morison-no keireki’ [Miscellany: Dr Morison’s career], 1901, 39:14–15. Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], ‘Zatsuroku: Dokutoru Morison-no nanshin junkai shokan’ [Miscellany: Dr Morrison’s impression of his trip in south China], 1901, 39: 14. Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], Weale’s article ‘Foreigners’ view of Yuan Shih-kai’ in Daily Telegraph, translated into Japanese and quoted in Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1911:88. Harada, T. ‘Yonkoku shakkan seiritsu to tōkyoku no sochi’ [The foundation of the fournation loans and the reaction of the Japanese Government], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 162:60– 80.

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Inagaki, N. ‘Nichiei-dōmei to sono mujun no genshō’ [The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its contradictions], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1906, 59:81–7. Kemuriyama, S. ‘Dokutoru Morison’ [Dr. Morrison], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 191:103–6. Kōin Shinsai (pseudonym), ‘Ijūin kōshi-ron’ [Discussion on minister Ijūin], Chūō Kōron [Centre for Public Debate], 1912, 27(2). Kokusaihō Zasshi [Journal of International Law], ‘Zatsuroku: Hōkomon tetsurdō to London Taimuzu-shi’ [Miscellany: The Fakumen railway and The London Times], 1909, 8(1):32–9. Makino, E. ‘Eikoku ichi hairo-ronsha no Manshū ryokōdan’ [An account of Manchurian travels by an anti-Russian Englishman], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1902, 59: 50–9. Miyake, Y. ‘Shina no dōran to Nihon no taido’ [The disturbance in China and Japan’s attitude], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1911, 168:7–10. ——‘Ijūin Hikokichi shi: Ijūin kōshi-ron’ [Mr Hikokichi Ijūin: discussion on Minister Ijūin], Chūō -Kōron [Centre for Public Debate], 1912, 27(2):117–20. Mochizuki, K. ‘Ijūin to waga tai-Shin seisaku: Ijūin kōshi-ron’ [Ijūin and Japan’s policy towards China: discussion on Minister Ijūin], Chūō Kōron [Centre for Public Debate], 1912, 27(2):126– 30. Nakamura, S. ‘Nichiei dōmei to ōka’ [The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the yellow peril], Gaikō Jihō (Diplomatic Review], 1905, 95:36–9. Okuma, S. ‘Ijūin kōshi-ron: Ijūin kōshi’ [Discussion on Minister Ijūin: Minister Ijūin], Chūō Kōron [Centre for Public Debate], 1912, 27(2):124–5. Saitō, H. ‘Shintei no taii to Enseigai’ [The abdication of the Chinese Emperor and Yuan Shih-kai], Shigaku Zasshi [Journal of History Studies], 1916, 27(12):25–50. Shiosawa, M. ‘Yonkoku shakkan to kikai kintō shugi’ [The four power loan and the principle of equal opportunity], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1912, 164:63–8. Tagawa, D. ‘Ijūin kōshi ron’ [A Discussion on Minister Ijūin], Chūō Kōron [Centre for Public Debate], 1912, 27(2):121–4. Takekoshi, Y. ‘Shina kōryūsetsu’ [The theory of the rise of China], Gaikō Jihō [Diplomatic Review], 1913, 174:8–18. Yokogi, B. ‘Ijūin kōshi-ron: tada tōyō-ryū-no salon jipuromachisuto’ [Discussion on Minister Ijūin: simply a saloon diplomatist in oriental style], Chūō Kōron [Centre for Public Debate], 1912, 27(2):120–1. Yokohama Shōkō Kaigisho Geppō [The Yokohama Chamber of Commerce and Industry Monthly Report], no. 152, Yokohama, 31 May 1909, 28–9.

Newspapers Fukuoka Nichi-nichi Shimbun Hōchi Shimbun Jiji Shimpō Kokumin Shimbun Osaka Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Nichi-nichi Shimbun Yamato Shimbun Chronicle of the Meiji Period Compilation Group (comp.) Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen-shi [The Chronicle of the Meiji Period Newspapers], vol. 14, Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai-Gakkai, 1972: Fukuoka Nichi-nichi Shimbun Jiji Shimpō Kokumin Shimbun Official Gazette

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INDEX abdication of Manchu Court 146–8, 149,152–5, 187 Addis, C.S. 59, 62, 111, 168, 169 Afghanistan 15, 190–1 Age (newspaper) 3, 4 Aigun Treaty (1858) 191 Alston, B.F. 172 American Banking Corporation 33–4 Anglo-Belgian Loan 167–8, 169 Anglo-Chinese Convention (1906) 162 Anglo-German Agreement (1900) 11 Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance 1,2, 22, 24, 25, 27, 104, 107, 141, 142,184, 186, 188; (1902) 6, 10–13, 38; (1905) 13, 15, 16, 38; (1911) 37, 38, 189 Anglo-Russian Entente (1907) 22–3, 37,162 Antung 17, 18, 20 Antung-Mukden Railway 178 Aoki, N. 14, 50, 54, 55, 66, 69, 73, 90,151, 152 Ariyoshi, A. 55, 56, 111, 121, 124, 126–7,130, 131, 134 armed forces: British 51–2, 131–2; Japanese 131; US 54; see also Northern Army arms supplies: Japan to China 54–6; Japan to Russia 177 Association to Petition for a Monarchy 179 Australia 2, 3, 10, 17, 18, 22, 24, 37, 38,164, 182, 183, 184, 188; immigration policy 38, 183 Backhouse, E. 96 Balfour, A.J. 80–1 Bank of Communications 58 Banque de l’Indo-Chine 30, 60 Banzai, R. 105, 222 n.142 Barings Bank 173 Barnes, W.D. 46, 47 Bell, Ethel 89 Bell, M. 21, 25, 39, 40, 41, 105 Bergère, M.-C. 53 Blake, Edith 42, 43, 45

Index

241

Bland, J.O.P. 10, 12, 19, 20, 21, 64, 80, 82, 118–19, 121, 165; on Anglo-Belgian Loan contract 168; on constitutional monarchy 86–7, 114; and Hukuang Railway loans 29; on provincial power 43, 44; on republican government 76–7, 177; condemnation of T’ang Shao-yi 125 Boer War 2, 10, 13 Bowra, C.R.W. 69 Boxer uprising (1900) 6, 9–10, 11, 46, 47, 54, 66, 83, 115 Braham, D.D., Times Foreign Editor 41, 46, 47, 51, 52, 55, 58, 59, 72, 81, 88, 89, 93, 104, 118, 122, 136, 138, 144, 148, 155, 156 Brinkley, Captain E. 19, 21, 24, 41 Britain 2, 79–80, 136–42 passim, 162–3, 179, 180, 181, 183, 188–9, 192; arbitration treaty with US 37; and Boer War 2, 13; and Germany 11, 22–3, 28, 37; and Hsinhai revolution 51–2, 53–4, 94–5, 101–7, 108; and Hukuang Railway loans 28, 29–30; imperialism 190–1; relations with Japan 13, 17, 101–7, 122–3, 181–2; see also Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance loan policy following outbreak of revolution 61, 62, 167; loan policy and Republic of China 169, 170–3, 175–6; non-alienation agreement with China 8–9; and Russia 7, 10–11, 22–3, 37, 162; and Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) 13, 14; and scramble for Chinese concessions 5, 8–9; and Shanghai Peace Conference 119, 130–1; and Tibet 162; trade with China 7, 10, 19, 191 British and Chinese Corporation Ltd 20, 29, 111, 200 n.8 British East India Company 190 Brownrigg, Sir Douglas 50 Bruce, C.D., British Commissioner of Police at Shanghai 93, 111, 130, 146 Buckle, G.E. 27, 40, 88–9, 164–5 Burma 11, 190 Bush, H.A. 165 Calhoun, W.J. 104 Campbell, F.A. 77, 104 Canton 147 Canton—Hankow Railway 43 Capital and Counties Bank 170 Capper, J.B. 40 Casenave, M. 30, 36, 60–1, 62, 96, 201 n.20 Central Asia 15, 190 Chambers of Commerce, petition for abdication of Manchu Court 146–7, 148, 187 Chan Lau Kit-ching 55, 112, 129, 169 Chang Chih-tung 28, 29, 30, 31 Chang Shao-tseng 70, 72, 73

Index

242

Chang Yin-huan 8, 29 Changchun 16, 20 Chao Erh-feng 162 Chao Erh-hsun 159 Chao Ping-chun 84, 96, 100, 106, 125, 149, 176, 217 n.189 Chartered Bank 170, 173 Chen Chin-tao 117, 130 Ch’en, Jerome 66, 68, 75, 91, 112–13, 125 Chiang Kai-shek 177 Chiang Kueti-ti 153 Chihli province 66, 121 Chile 14 Chin-tao question 24 China Press 63, 97, 120 Chinese Australian Herald 184 Chinese Eastern Railway 8, 10, 19–20 Ch’ing, (I K’uang), Prince 25, 31, 60, 69, 70, 71, 88, 96, 98–9, 115, 132, 135, 149, 153, 186 Chirol, V. 10, 13, 17, 19, 20–3, 24, 25, 39–40, 41, 43, 47, 81, 165; and Anglo-Japanese Alliance 11, 12, 15, 22, 27; on German influence in China 30, 33, 35; and J.N.Jordan 82–3; dispute with Morrison 21–3, 186; on E.M.Satow 80; and US participation in Hukuang loan project 34, 35 civil war 177 Civil War in China between north and south (1913) 177 Civil War, USA (1861–5) 9 Cockburn, H. 166 Cologne Gazette 32 concessions 5, 6–9, 94, 192 constitution: (1911) 70, 71; (1914) 177 constitutional monarchy 71, 74, 76–7, 78, 92, 102, 106, 125, 129, 132, 134, 186–7; Japanese support for 100, 101, 106, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 140, 148; Morrison and idea of 75, 79; revolutionaries and idea of 113–14, 116–17 Cook, J. 38 Cooper, General E.J. 52 Cordes, H. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 61, 62, 200 n.9 Crisp, C.B. 170–1, 173 Crisp Loan 170, 172, 173 Croly, H.D. 61 currency crisis 58–9 Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan project 35–7, 58, 167 Daily Mail 40, 175 Daily Universal Register 40, 178 Dalny (Dairen, Talienwan) 8, 17, 18, 20, 178 Defend Railways League 46 Deutsche-Asiatische Bank of Germany 29, 32

Index

243

Dillon, E.J. 65, 67, 121, 166, 177 Donald, W.H. 130, 145, 166, 179, 182, 226 n.103 Eastern Bank 170 economy: Chinese 44–5, 46; see also financial crisis Edward VII, king of England 15 Edwards, E.W. 21 Entente Cordiale (1904) 23 Evening News 174 Fakumen Railway 20–1, 24, 26, 35, 61, 185 famine 46 Far Eastern Review 182 Feng Kuo-chang 166 Feng Kuo-chun, Baron 153 Ferguson, J.C. 130 Fernand, F. 165 ffrench, C.A.T.R.J.J. 21 financial crisis, following outbreak of revolution 58–64 Finlayson 165 First National Bank 176 First World War 163, 167, 177–82, 184, 188 Fletcher, American diplomat 35 floods 46 Formosa 6, 192 France 6–7, 14, 23, 80–1, 179, 180, 181, 182, 191; and Hukuang Railway loans 28, 30, 34; and Indo-China 5, 23, 191; loans policy following outbreak of revolution 61, 62, 167; and scramble for Chinese concessions 5, 7, 9, 192; and Shanghai Peace Conference 119 Franco-Japanese Entente (1907) 23 Franco-Russian Alliance (1893) 191 Fraser, D. 98, 155, 157, 158, 168 Fraser, E.D.H. 108, 110, 111, 112, 116, 117, 122, 124, 127, 130, 131, 135, 139, 147, 158 Fraser, L.G. 174, 175, 180 Fukien province 9, 23, 192 Fukushima, Major-General Y. 14 Fukuzawa, S. 14 Fushun collieries 24 Germany 6, 14, 22–3, 37, 180, 184, 192; and Britain 11, 22–3, 28; and Hukuang Railway loans 28, 29, 30–1, 32, 33, 34; loans policy following outbreak of revolution 61, 62, 167, 171, 173; rights in Pacific 182, 183, 188; and scramble for concessions in China 5, 7, 8; and Shanghai Peace Conference 119; rights in Shantung province 30, 177–8, 182, 183, 188, 192

Index

244

Goffe, H., British Consul-General in Hankow 51, 90, 94, 95, 102, 105 government: Chinese, central 42, 44; provincial 43–4 Grand Loan (Reorganization Loan) 176–7 Great Treason Japan 140, 231 n.258 Green, O.M. 46, 111, 130 Gregory, J.D. 171–2 Grey, E. 18, 36, 38, 47, 51, 52, 69, 70, 71, 74, 82, 84, 96, 104, 107, 125, 131–2, 154, 163, 169, 179–80, 181, 182, 186; European policy 24; and Japanese proposal for intervention in revolution 101, 102, 130; and loan policy 30, 34, 37, 62, 63, 64, 172, 173; on Morrison as political adviser to Yuan Shih-kai 165; and post-revolutionary government for China 136, 138–9, 140–1; and Russo-Japanese Agreement 23; and Sino-Japanese Agreement 25, 26 Guam 9, 191 Hague Tribunal 24, 25 Han-Yeh-Ping Company 63, 178 Hankow 49, 50, 65, 73, 94, 110, 147; international warships in 50, 51, 52 Hankow-Szechuan Railway 31 Hanyang 49, 90, 94 Hara, K. 55 Haraguchi, K. 151 Hardinge, C. 52, 80 Hattori, U. 83 Hawaii 9, 191 Hay, J. 18, 21 Hayashi, G. 14, 26, 81 Hayashi, T. 11, 12, 14, 26, 56 Hillier, E.G. 30, 32–3, 36, 43, 44, 61, 62, 76, 115, 146, 179, 201 n.16 Hioki, E. 14, 180 Hippisley, A.E. 34, 82, 160 Hirakawa, S. 93–4, 112, 126, 129, 151 Honan province 68, 121 Hong Kong 9, 147, 191 Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation 30, 32, 33–4, 35, 59, 111, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173 Hosie, A. 61 Hsinhai revolution (1911) 186; outbreak of 47–64; armistice agreement 94–5, 102–3, 104, 105; peace talks 108–42 Hsiung Hsi-ling 170 Hsu Shih-ch’ang 166 Hsuan-tung, Emperor 67, 70, 96, 154, 165 Huang Hsing 48, 91, 98, 114, 127, 206 n.172 Hughes, W.M. 182 Hukuang Railway loans 28–35, 38, 39, 42, 45, 48, 58, 167

Index

245

Hunan province 28, 45, 48, 92 Hung Tsu-shu 125 Hupeh province 28, 45, 72 I-huan see Ts’ai-feng Ijūin, H., Japanese Minister in Peking 24, 25, 54, 55, 56, 99–110 passim, 127–8, 130, 141, 151, 152, 160–l; and Anglo-Japanese Alliance 37; on constitutional monarchy 133, 140, 148, 187; and Hukuang Loan negotiations 33; and problems of communication 131, 135, 137; proposes partition of China 57–8; opposition to republican government 128, 133, 140, 160; and Sino-Japanese Agreement 26; and Yuan Shih-kai 99, 100–1, 102, 103, 104, 105–6, 122–3, 132–4, 147–8, 161, 187 Ikei, M. 112, 163, 183–4 immigration policy, Australia 38, 183 Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs 53, 59, 167 Imperial Clan Party 149, 150, 159 Imperial Defence Conference (1909) 38 imperialism 187, 190–2 India 11, 15, 37, 52, 162, 184, 190, 191 Indo-China 5, 7, 23, 191 industrialization, Japan 6, 140, 191 Inner Mongolia 39, 149, 162, 178 Inukai, T. 148 Ishii, K. 11, 12, 14, 137 Ishimoto, S., War Minister 55 Italy 179, 180, 182, 184 Itō, H. 14, 26 J.H.Schroder and Co. 173 J.P.Morgan and Co. 176 Japan 1–2, 5, 9, 17, 108–10, 130, 141–2, 163, 179, 180, 181, 185, 188–9, 190, 191–2; arms supplies to China 54–6; relations with Britain 13, 17, 101–7, 122–3, 181–2; see also Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance and constitutional monarchy in China 100, 101, 106, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 140, 148; extra-territoriality rights 6; and First World War 163, 177, 181, 182; and France 23; and German possessions in China 178, 182–4, 188; Great Treason 140, 231 n.258; and idea of republic in China 101, 126–8, 132, 138–9, 155, 160–1; industrialization 6, 140, 191; Korean interests 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 37–8, 39; and loan negotiations 28, 36, 63, 169–70; in Manchuria 16, 17–23, 24–7, 36, 37, 38, 39, 56, 169, 178, 186, 189, 192; and Manchurian Convention 115; and Masampo affair 81; and Northern Army Peking mutiny 159;

Index

246

and outbreak of Hsinhai revolution 50–1, 54–8; railway interests 19–20, 21, 24 and Russia see Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty; Russo-Japanese Agreement; Russo-Japanese War (1904–5); and Shanghai Peace Conference 119, 120, 130–1; socialist movement 139–40; trade and trading methods 6, 17–19, 140; Twenty-One Demands 177–9; and Versailles Peace Conference (1919) 182–4; Yuan Shih-kai and 68, 99–101, 105–6, 109, 119, 122–3, 132–4, 135–6, 139, 140, 141, 151–2 Japan Chronicle 29 Jardine Matheson Co. 111 Jiji Shimpō 12, 14, 55, 96 Johnson, S. 184 Johnston, R.F. 165 Jordan, J.N. 25, 51, 52, 71, 90, 107, 130, 140–1, 156, 162, 163, 169, 200n.l; assassination plots against 149; and China’s entry into First World War 181; and constitutional monarchy 102, 132, 136, 139; on foreign intervention in Chinese revolution 102; and relations with Japanese 102, 103, 104–5, 123, 134, 139; on Li Yuan-Hung 53; and loan negotiations 28, 29, 48, 61, 62–3, 64, 172, 173; and Morrison 79–84, 94, 104, 127–8, 132, 137, 139, 173–4, 186; and idea of republic in China 78, 102, 113, 124–5, 128, 129, 130, 132, 136–7, 187; opposition to restoration of monarchy 179; and retention of British troops in North China 52; and revolutionary leaders 117; and Yuan Shih-kai 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 84–5, 91, 94, 96, 106, 135, 139, 144, 151, 152, 169, 179 Kahn, H.D. 162, 176 Kajima, M. 16–17 Kanaka ‘trade’ 3 Kanda, M., journalist 161 K’ang Yu-wei 67, 96, 145 Katō, S. 91, 110, 112, 125 Katō, T. (Ambassador to UK, later Foreign Minister) 10, 14, 24–5, 26, 179 Katsura, T. 58, 141, 163 Kawamura, K. 131 Kawashima, Admiral R. 50, 51, 102 Kawashima, N. 57, 100, 109, 209 n.252 Kiaochow Bay 8, 182, 183, 192 King, M. 39–40 King, P.H. 59–60, 111, 116, 118, 130 Kirton, W. 98 Knox, P.C. 35, 39, 56, 63 Kojedo Island 81 Kokumin Shimbun 12, 14 Komura, J. 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 25, 26, 33, 58

Index

247

Korea 39, 66, 80, 115; Japanese interests in 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 37–8, 39; Masampo affair 81 Korostovetz, 1.1. 63 Ku Chung-ch’en 114 Kuang-hsu, (Tsai-t’ien) Emperor 8, 67, 68, 84 Kuang-hua pao 143 Kuhn Loeb and Co. 176 K’ung, Duke 113 Kuo-feng pao 110, 139 Kuomintang (National People’s Party) 176, 177 Kwangsi province 23 Kwantung province 23, 27, 28, 59 Lamsdorff, V.N., Russian Foreign Minister 115 Langley, W.L.F. 82 Lansdowne, Lord 5th Marquis of H.C.K.P.-F. 82 Lawton, L. 25, 87 League of Nations 183 Lew Yuk-lin (Liu Yu-lin) 135, 170, 171 Li Hung-chang 8, 66, 76, 115, 116 Li Ping-shu 118 Li Yuan-hung 50, 52–3, 55, 73–4, 77–8, 90, 92, 94, 114, 117, 145, 166 Liang Chi-chai 67 Liang Shih-yi 29, 43, 98, 149, 155, 179, 181, 188 Liang Tun-yen 24, 25, 26, 29 Liang-pi 150, 151, 152, 153, 154 Liao Yu-ch’un 114 Liaotung peninsula 6, 7, 16 Liddell, F 3 Liew, K.S. 159 likin excise 167 Lin Wen-ch’ing 89 Little, E.S. 108, 111 Liu Ch’eng-en 73–4, 78 Lloyd’s Bank 170 Lo Hui-min 91, 149, 157 loans 43, 45, 53, 66, 186; Currency Reform and Industrial Development 35–7, 58, 167; Hukuang Railway 28–35, 39, 42, 45, 48, 58, 167; and outbreak of revolution 58–64, 167; to Republic of China 166–73, 175–7 London, County and Westminster Bank 170, 173 London Magazine 45, 98, 138 London Missionary Society 130 Lowe, P. 136, 141, 171 Lung-yu, Empress-Dowager 96, 143, 148, 153, 154 McCall, J. 180 McCormick, F. 51, 75, 77, 125 MacDonald, C. 9, 18, 47, 80, 83, 102, 103, 137, 216 n. l52

Index

248

McIlwraith, T. 4 Mackenzie, F.A. 175 McLeavy-Brown, Counsellor of Chinese Legation in London 170 Mallet, L. 81, 82 Manchester Guardian 174–5 Manchuria 28, 29, 120, 121, 162; American expansion in 35–6, 39, 189; Japanese interests in 16, 17–23, 24–7, 36, 37, 38, 39, 56, 169, 178, 186, 189, 192; Russian interests in 7, 10–11, 14, 16, 36, 38, 39, 115, 162 Manchurian Bank 20 Manchurian Convention (1900) 115–16 Manila 9 Marvin, US Consul in Mukden 35 Masampo affair 81 Matsui, K. 14, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138 Matsuoka, Y. 63, 109–10, 148, 151, 152 Matsushima, S. 76, 98 Meaney, N. 38 Meiji, Emperor 16 Meiji Restoration (1868) 6, 191 Menzies, Major G.F. 158 mercantile communities: British 128–9, 130, 187; petition for abdication of Emperor Hsuan-tung 146–7, 148 military intervention, Anglo-Japanese 131, 132, 134, 135, 137 mining exploration 8, 24, 43 missionaries 129, 130 Mitsui Bussan Kaisha 55, 56 Miyazaki, T. 109 Mizuno, K., First Secretary in Japanese Legation 137, 148, 161 Mochizuki, journalist/politician 131 Moller, A.G. 170 monarchy: abdication of 146–8, 149, 152–5, 187; Yuan Shih-kai and restoration of 179–80; see also constitutional monarchy Mongolia 120, 162, 169; see also Inner Mongolia; Outer Mongolia Monroe Doctrine 9 Monypenny, W.F. 27 Morrison, George Ernest 2–3; and abdication of Emperor 145–7; An Australian in China 5, 47–8; and Anglo-Japanese Alliance 11–12, 15, 37; anti-Japanese campaign 17–27; and China’s entry into First World War 180–1, 188; on Chinese economy 44–5; on currency reform in China 35; and Daily Mail Far Eastern Service 40; death of 184, 188; early career 3–5;

Index

249

and idea of constitutional monarchy 75, 79, 186; and idea of republic in China 87, 88, 92, 126–30, 138, 186; on Japanese annexation of Korea 37–8; on Japanese arms deals with China 55–6; and J.N.Jordan 79–84, 94, 104, 127–8, 132, 137, 139, 173–4, 186; and loans to Ch’ing Government 59–64, 186; and loans to Republic of China 166, 168–73, 175; and Manchurian Convention 115–16; marriage 166, 170, 188; and Nanking as seat of government 157; and Northern Army Peking mutiny 158–9; offered position as Times foreign editor 39–40; and outbreak of Hsinhai revolution 48–54; as political adviser to Yuan 164–82, 188; on Prince Ch’ing 98–9; on provincial power 43–4; and railway construction and organization 20, 21, 29, 30–4, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48; and removal of Regent 95–7; resigns from Times 164–6, 188; and revolutionary leaders 115–16, 118–19, 130; on Russian threat in Manchuria 10; and Russo-Japanese War 2, 13–14, 16, 17; on siege of Peking legations 10; and Shanghai Peace Conference 108–12, 117–19, 186; and Sun Yat-sen 145, 150; on Szechuan uprising 46–7; and T’ang Shao-yi 134–5; and Third Revolution 180; on Times policy on message transmission 40–1; and Twenty-One Demand 178–9; at Versailles Peace Conference (1919) 182–3, 188; and Wu T’ing-fang 115–16, 118; and Yuan Shih-kai 65–79, 84–9, 92–3, 95, 110, 117–18, 126–8, 137–8, 143, 144–60, 164–82, 186, 188 Morrison Papers 2, 189 Mukden 20, 24 Munthe, J.W.N. 60, 73, 84, 210 n.279 Muramatsu, Consul-General in Hankow 54, 102 Nanking: fall of 93–4; provisional republican government in 144, 151; as seat of government 156–8 Nanking Treaty (1842) 191, 196 n.55 National Assembly 65, 69–70, 71, 74, 97, 135, 141, 143, 144, 145, 150 National City Bank of New York 176 National People’s Party (Kuomintang) 176, 177 nationalism 43 Na-tung 60 New Guinea 4 New York Herald 114, 130, 144–5

Index

250

Nicholas II, Czar 7, 8 Nish, I.H. 102, 115 North China Daily News 13, 46, 111 Northcliffe, A.C.W. 40–1, 165 Northern Army 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 90, 91, 127, 158, 182; Peking mutiny 158–9 Novoe Vremya 182 Nozawa, Y 51 Nystrom, E.T. 53 Odagiri, M. 14 Ohl, J.K. 69, 114, 144–5 Okuma, S. 14, 179 Okura and Co. 55, 56 One Hundred Days’ Reform incident (1898) 67–8 Open Door doctrine (1899) 9, 18, 21, 36, 185, 192 Opium War (1840) 191 Osaka Asahi Shinbum 13, 154 Osaka Mainichi Shimbun 87 Outer Mongolia 23, 38, 39, 162 Pacific islands 182, 183, 188 Pacific War 1, 2, 184, 192 Pall Mall Gazette 174, 175 Parr’s bank 173 partition of China 9, 57, 58, 109 Patchin, P.H. 63, 69, 90 Pauling Company 21 Pearl, C. 126 Peking Daily News 139 Peking legations, siege of 9–10 Peking and Tientsin Times 32, 33, 87 Peking Treaty (1905) 16, 24, 178, 196 n.73 Peking-Kalgan Railway 167–8 People’s Representative Convention 179 Persia 15, 154 Pescadores 6 Philippine Islands 191 Pope, A.W. 130 Port Arthur 6, 8, 14, 16, 178, 192 Port Arthur Convention (1898) 8 Portsmouth Peace Confererence 16 Portsmouth Treaty (1905) 16 Portugal 190 provincial power 43–4, 83 P’u-lun, Prince 70, 149 P’u-yi see Hsuan-tung Quadruple Financial Consortium 28, 35, 36, 38, 42, 58, 59, 61–2, 167, 168–9 Quintuple Consortium 176

Index

251

racial equality 182–3 Railway Regulations (1903) 43 railways 8, 14, 19–21, 42, 43, 45, 167–8, 178, 185; Hukuang Railway loan project 28–35, 39, 42, 45, 48, 58, 167; Japan’s interests in 19–20, 21, 24; nationalization of 42, 45, 46, 98, 167; provincial versus imperial 44; Russia’s interests in 10, 14, 16, 19, 162 Reform Movement (1898) 67–8, 86 Reid, J.G. 35, 61, 64, 141 Reinsch, P.S. 182 Reorganization Loan (Grand Loan) 176–7 republican government 74–9, 84, 85, 102, 116, 119, 121–39 passim, 186–7; establishment of 143, 144, 145–6; formed by Imperial edict 145–6, 149, 154–5; Japan and idea of 101, 126–8, 132, 138–9, 155, 160-l; Jordan and idea of 78, 102, 113, 124–5, 128, 129, 130, 132, 136–7, 187; Morrison and idea of 87, 88, 92, 126–30, 138, 186; revolutionaries demand for 78, 112–14, 117, 118, 120; Sun Yat-sen and 143–4, 155 Reuters 37, 46, 63 revolution see Hsinhai revolution; Second Revolution; Third Revolution Richard, T. 130 Rights Recovery Movement 28, 42–3 Rockhill, W.W. 34, 68, 83, 123, 148 Roosevelt, T. 16, 17 Rothschild’s bank 173 Russia 2, 15, 16, 81, 102, 130, 162–3, 169, 179, 180, 181, 190, 191, 192; and Britain 7, 10–11, 22–3, 37, 162; and France 191; Japanese arms supplies to 177; and loan negotiations 28, 36, 63, 168, 169–70; in Manchuria 7, 10–11, 14, 16, 36, 38, 39, 115, 162; and Masampo affair 81; and Mongolia 162, 169; railway interests 10, 14, 16, 19, 162, 191; and scramble for Chinese concessions 5, 6–7, 8, 192; and Shanghai Peace Conference 119 Russo-Asiatic Bank 63, 169 Russo-Franco-German alliance 7 Russo-Franco-German triple intervention 6–8 Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty (1905) 16 Russo-Japanese Agreement: (1907) 23, 38; (1910) 38–9; (1912) 39 Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) 1, 2–3, 6, 13–14, 16, 17, 26, 80, 140, 184, 185, 189, 192

Index

252

Sah Cheng-ping, Admiral 50 Sahara, T. 139 Saionji, Prime Minister, K. 55, 58s Saitō, Major T. (later lieutenant-colonel) 50, 51, 91–2, 124, 152 Sakhalin Island 16 salt tax 167, 170, 175 Sankei Shimbunsha 113 Satō, Captain Y. 14 Satow, E.M. 31, 80, 81, 82, 216 n.156 Sazanoff, S. 69, 130 Schriffen, H.Z. 160 Schuyler, US Charge d’Affaires 56 Second Revolution 177 Secret Treaties: Russo-Japanese (1907) 23; Sino-Russian (1896) 8 Selle, E.A. 120 Sextuple Consortium 169–70, 172–3, 175–6 Shanghai Peace Conference 108–26, 144, 186 Shantung province 30, 66, 121, 178, 182, 183, 192 Sheng Hsuan-huai 42, 45, 54, 63, 97, 98, 204 n.116 Shiba, Major-General G. 14 Shimonoseki Treaty (1895) 6–7, 116 Siam 5 Sino-French War (1883–5) 191 Sino-Japanese Agreement (1909) 24–7 Sino-Japanese War (1894) 6, 11, 46, 66, 116, 140, 192 Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of Alliance (1896) 8, 115 Smith, A. 68 socialist movement, Japan 139–40 Soejima, Professor 151 South Manchurian Railway 20, 21, 26, 178, 185 Spain 190, 191 Straight, Dorothy 49, 60, 76 Straight, W D. 20, 21, 35, 36, 61, 62, 63, 75, 96, 125, 185 Sun E-tu Zen 26 Sun Yat-sen 117, 127, 143–4, 145, 149, 150, 151, 152–3, 154, 155; surrenders presidency to Yuan 156, 160 Sung Chiao-jen 176, 177, 240 n.105 Suzuki, Japanese Consul in Nanking 93 Sydney Morning Herald 24 Szechuan province, Tibetan invasion of 28, 46, 48, 162 Szechuan Railway Company 43 Szechuan uprising 42–8 Ta Ch’ing Government Bank 58, 60 Taft, William Howard 31 Taihei Syndicate 55, 209 n.242 Taiping Kung Co. 55 Taiping rebellion (1851–64) 49

Index

253

Takada (arms dealer) 55, 56 T’ang Leang-li 73, 91 T’ang Shao-yi 77, 84, 90, 91, 96, 97–8, 99, 103, 110, 131, 140, 144–5, 155, 186, 187; appointed Premier 164, 188; dismissal of 144, 145; and loan requests 167–8; and railway projects 20, 21; and removal of Regent 95, 96; and Shanghai Peace Conference 108, 111–26; support for a republic 130, 132, 134–5 Tenney, C.D. 76, 151 Terao, T. 151 Terauchi, S. 141 Third Revolution 180 Tibet 15, 120, 162 T’ieh-liang 150, 151, 152, 153 Tientsin 9, 147, 151, 153 The Times 2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 37, 40, 44, 46, 50, 52, 53, 59, 60, 62, 63, 66, 68, 70, 72, 85, 87, 88–9, 92, 95, 96, 99, 115, 126, 131, 137, 138, 146, 154, 156, 159, 168, 174, 186, 187; advocacy of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 11; message transmission to 40–1; Morrison offered position as foreign editor 39–40; Morrison resigns from 164–6, 188; Morrison’s disputes with 21–2; opposition to Russo-Japanese War 13; support for Japan 14, 17, 19 T’ing Wen-chiang 183, 184 Tokutomi, I. 14 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun 97, 112, 126, 131, 154, 161, 166 Ton Kai-son 160 Tower, R.T. 82 Townley, Lady Susan 82 Townley, W.B. 82 trade 146–7, 190; Japan 6, 17–19, 140; Sino-British 7, 10, 19, 191 Trans-Siberian Railway 191 Triple Financial Consortium 30, 35, 36 Ts’ai T’ing-kan 74, 77, 78, 79, 84, 85, 86, 92, 94, 96, 98, 136, 140, 145, 146–8, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 166, 168, 214 n.95 Ts’ai-feng (I-huan), Regent 60, 65, 67, 68, 76, 86, 88, 95–7, 96, 97, 98, 186 Ts’ai-hsun 70, 84 Ts’ai-tao 70, 84 Ts’ai-tse 70, 132 Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement (1900) 115–16 Tsingtao 8 Tuan Ch’i-jui 114 Turkestan 120 Turkey 154 Twenty-One Demands 177–9 Tyrrell, G. 81, 82

Index

254

Tz’u-hsi, Empress-Dowager 8, 65, 67, 68, 96 Uchida, Y 54–5, 57–8, 62, 93, 100, 101, 102–3, 105, 106, 107, 110, 124, 128, 130, 131, 135–6, 139, 140, 141, 148, 152, 161, 170, 208 n. 230 United States 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 24, 54, 61, 62, 104, 119, 182, 183, 191; arbitration treaty with Britain 37; and Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan project 35–6; and Fakumen Railway project 20; and Hukuang Railway loans 28, 31–5; and loan policy following outbreak of revolution 61, 62–3, 167; and loan policy to Republic of China 176; in Manchuria 35–6, 39, 189; Open Door doctrine 9, 18, 21, 185, 192; and Shanghai Peace Conference 119 Usui, K. 112, 129 Versailles Peace Conference (1919) 182–3, 188 Walter, A. 40 Wang Ching-ch’un 117, 130 Wang Ching-wei (Wang Chao-ming) 92, 93, 144, 157, 158, 219 n.30 Wang Ch’ung-hui 88 Wang Ta-hsieh 131, 132 Wark Jennie Robin 166, 188 warships, international 50, 51, 52, 54 Washington Conference (1921–22) 184 Washizawa, Y. 55, 96 Weale, P. 69, 83, 90–1, 93, 125, 126 Wearne, A.E. 49, 165 Weihaiwei 8, 192 Wen Ping-chung 164 Wen Tsung-yao 117, 118, 130, 150 Westminster Gazette 174 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 7, 8, 12, 30 Wilkinson, W.H. 110, 113, 130 Williams, E.T. 51, 90 Willoughby, Lieutenant-Colonel 50 Wilson, Woodrow 176, 183 Wingate, A.W.S. 14 Winslow, Vice-Admiral Sir A.L. 51 Witte, Sergei de 8, 17 Woodhead, H.G.W. 77, 87 Wu Lu-chen 72–3 Wu T’ing-fang 76, 83, 93, 108, 112–18, 120, 123, 127, 130, 131, 144, 145, 150, 152, 155, 186–7, 223 n.2 Wu Wei-te 149 Wuchang, Yuan Shih-kai and recapture of 90–1 Wuchang uprising 48, 51 Yakhontoff, V.A. 190

Index

255

Yamagata, Japanese elder statesman 26, 54–5, 140, 141 Yamane, Major-General T. 14 Yamato Shimbun 181 Yamaza, E. 57, 62, 101, 102, 104, 106, 131, 136, 139 Yang Yu 115 Yano, F. 14 Yen Fu 95–6 Yin-chang 50, 54–5, 68, 73 Yokohama Specie Bank 55, 63, 169 Yoshino, S. 91, 110, 112, 125 Young, E.P. 76, 91, 121 Yu Shin-tin 91 Yu-lang 132 Yuan K’e-ting 65, 70, 71, 74, 77, 84, 91, 92, 104 Yuan Shih-kai 20, 62, 65–79, 90–5, 97, 104, 105–6, 108, 109, 114, 117, 131, 132, 146, 156, 162, 186, 211 n.1; and armistice agreement 94–5; appointed Imperial High Commissioner 69; appointed premier 70–1; assassination plots against 84–5, 148–9; and Boxer uprising 66; Cabinet formation 98; death of 182, 188; dismissal of 65, 68; and Japanese 99–101, 105–6, 109, 119, 122–3, 132–4, 135–6, 147–8, 139, 140, 141, 151–2, 178–9; Jordan and 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 84–5, 91, 94, 96, 106, 135, 144, 151, 152; and loan negotiations 167–8, 170, 176–7; military influence 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 90–1; monarchical plan 179–80; as monarchist 74–5, 85–7, 106, 125, 133; Morrison and 65–79, 84–9, 92–3, 95, 110, 117–18, 126–8, 137–8, 143, 144–60, 164–6, 186, 188; as President of Chinese Republic 160, 164, 167–8, 170, 176–7, 177; and Reform govement 67–8, 86; and republican government 75, 76–7, 78, 79, 84, 85, 92–3, 114–15, 118, 119, 121–4, 125–6, 132, 134, 143, 144–60; resignation threat 150–2; and the revolutionaries 73–4, 90–2 Yunnan province 7, 23