US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard

US-Grenada Relations

Other works by Gary Williams “Brief Encounter: Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s Visit to Washington.” Journal of Latin American Studies 34, no. 3 (August 2002). “A Matter of Regret: Britain, the 1983 Grenada Crisis, and the Special Relationship.” Twentieth Century British History 12, no. 2 (2001): 208–230. Review of Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The Promises of Deliberative Democracy by Irwin P. Stotzky. Bulletin of Latin American Research 18, no. 2 (1999): 255–256. “Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983.” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 1 (February 1997): 131–169. “The Tailed That Wagged the Dog: The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States’ Role in the 1983 Intervention in Grenada.” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 61 (December 1996): 95–115.

US-Grenada Relations Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard

Gary Williams

US-GRENADA RELATIONS

Copyright © Gary Williams, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS. Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978-1-4039-7390-0 ISBN-10: 1-4039-7390-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Williams, Gary. US-Grenada relations: revolution and intervention in the backyard / by Gary Williams. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-4039-7390-3 1. United States—Foreign relations—Grenada. 2. Grenada—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1977–1981. 4. United States—Foreign relations—1981–1989. 5. Grenada—Politics and government—20th century. 6. Grenada—History—American Invasion, 1983. 7. Intervention (International law)—History—20th century. 8. United States—Foreign relations—Caribbean Area. 9. Caribbean Area—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. E183.8.G84W55 2007 327.730729845—dc22 2007019809 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Macmillan India Ltd. First edition: December 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

vi

Acknowledgments

vii

List of Abbreviations

xi

Introduction

1

1

United States’ Intervention in the Caribbean Basin

5

2

Prelude to a Revolution

21

3

Not in Anybody’s Backyard: The Carter Years

33

4

Splashing Dominoes: The Reagan Years

55

5

Death of a Revolution: Prelude to an Intervention

77

6

Days of Decision

101

7

Planning an Intervention

131

Conclusion

163

Epilogue

175

“A Lovely Piece of Real Estate”: Rebuilding Grenada

Appendix 1

Talking Points for Ambassador Ortiz, April 10, 1979

179

Appendix 2 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States’ Request for US Assistance in Grenada

181

Appendix 3 Letter from the Governor-General of Grenada to the Prime Minister of Barbados

183

Appendix 4

185

Dramatis Personae: March 1979–October 1983

Notes

191

Bibliography

261

Index

291

List of Illustrations

Maps Map of Grenada

ix

Map of Central America and the Caribbean

x

Photographs

Satellite photograph of Point Salines International Airport used by President Reagan during his March 23, 1983, Strategic Defense Initiative speech

127

The top square inside Fort George where Prime Minister Bishop and his colleagues were executed by a firing squad against the stone wall on the right

127

The National Security Planning Group meeting, October 23, 1983

128

President Ronald Reagan of the United States of America and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica at a White House press conference take questions having announced the US-Caribbean intervention in Grenada, October 25, 1983

128

US soldiers on patrol in Grenada

129

Two of the People’s Revolutionary Army’s armed personnel carriers that took part in the “Bloody Wednesday” massacre lie immobilized.

129

St. George’s University students are evacuated from Point Salines airport, October 26, 1983

130

A relic of the revolutionary years—an abandoned Cuban airplane rusts away at the side of the runway at Pearls airport.

130

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the many individuals and organizations that made this study possible. The willingness of the participants in the Grenada story to share their time and recollections of distant events has been invaluable. I would particularly like to express my gratitude to Langhorne “Tony” Motley, Larry Rossin, John Kelly, the late Milan Bish, Peter Bourne, and Meg Conlon. This study has benefited from the assistance of many colleagues in discussing Grenada, reading draft chapters, and providing useful suggestions and encouragement: Paul Sutton, Robert Beck, John Walton Cotman (who kindly allowed me access to his research interview transcripts), Mitch Leventhal, Richard Loppnow, and Ann Wilder. All have played their part in contributing to the final study. In addition I would like to acknowledge the financial support provided toward this project by the Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy. I would also like to thank staff at the Library of Congress, National Security Archive, and Ronald Reagan Presidential Library for their assistance. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my parents who have always been supportive, encouraging, and understanding of my fascination, or perhaps obsession, with a small island in the Caribbean. I gratefully acknowledge permission from the following publications in which portions of chapters 5, 6, and 7 previously appeared: Journal of Latin American Studies, “Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983” (February 1997) Twentieth Century British History, “‘A Matter of Regret’: Britain, the 1983 Grenada Crisis, and the Special Relationship” (2001) Journal of Latin American Studies, “Brief Encounter: Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s Visit to Washington” (August 2002) Acknowledgment also goes to CEDLA (Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation) for European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/Revista Europea de Estudio Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, “The Tail That Wagged the Dog: The

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Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States’ Role in the 1983 Intervention in Grenada” (December 1996) The photographs appearing in this book are courtesy of the author, the Department of Defense, and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

Map of Grenada

Map of Central America and the Caribbean

List of Abbreviations

AID ATF BDF CARICOM CBI CC CDB CIA CINCLANT CPPG DIA FCO GMMWU GNP GPP GULP IMF JCS JEWEL LIAT MACE MAP MAU NAM NDC NEO NJM NNP NSC NSDD

[US] Agency for International Development [US] Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Barbados Defence Force Caribbean Community Caribbean Basin Initiative Central Committee Caribbean Development Bank Central Intelligence Agency Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Crisis Pre-Planning Group Defense Intelligence Agency Foreign and Commonwealth Office Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union Grenada National Party Grenada People’s Party Grenada United Labor Party International Monetary Fund Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation Leeward Islands Air Transport Movement for the Advancement of Community Efforts Movement for the Assemblies of People Marine Amphibious Unit Non-Aligned Movement National Democratic Congress Non-Permissive Evacuation Operation New Jewel Movement New National Party National Security Council National Security Decision Directive

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List of Abbreviations

NSPG OAS OECS OREL PB PRA PSIA PRG RFG RIG RMC RSS SDI SGU SSG TNP TRC UN UPP WIAS WINBAN

National Security Planning Group Organization of American States Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Organisation for Revolutionary Education and Liberation Political Bureau People’s Revolutionary Army Point Salines International Airport People’s Revolutionary Government Radio Free Grenada Restricted Inter-Agency Group Revolutionary Military Council Regional Security System Strategic Defense Initiative St. George’s University Medical School Special Situations Group The National Party [Grenada] Truth and Reconciliation Commission United Nations United People’s Party West Indies Associated States Windward Islands Banana Association

Introduction

G

renada is the southernmost island in the Windward Islands chain in the Eastern Caribbean. The island was sighted by Columbus in 1498 and named Concepción; it was subsequently renamed Granada by his Spanish sponsors. Early English and French efforts at colonization were defeated by fierce resistance from the native Carib Indians. In 1650 the French established a settlement; conflict with the Caribs ensued with the French triumphing in 1654. The island was renamed la Grenade and remained in French hands until it was captured by the British during the Seven Years’ War and formally ceded to them in 1763. Grenada, as the British called it, was recaptured by the French in 1779 but returned to British rule in 1783. Like most of the West Indies, Grenada was settled to cultivate sugar on large estates. After several natural disasters in the late eighteenth century other crops were successfully introduced—cocoa and nutmeg initially and then other spices, giving Grenada its title as the “spice island.” Grenada became independent in 1974.1 At 10:15 a.m. on March 13, 1979, listeners to Radio Free Grenada (RFG) heard this dramatic announcement by Maurice Bishop, the former leader of the opposition New Jewel Movement (NJM) but now the new prime minister: At 4:15 a.m. this morning, the People’s Revolutionary Army seized control of the army barracks at True Blue . . . After half-an-hour struggle, the forces of Gairy’s army were completely defeated, and surrendered . . . At the same time, the radio station was captured without a shot being fired. Shortly after this, several cabinet ministers were captured in their beds by units of the revolutionary army . . . Several police stations have already put up the white flag of surrender . . . People of Grenada, this revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future for our children and great-grandchildren.2

This was a momentous event and an unprecedented one in the Eastern Caribbean with its democratic tradition. The young NJM leaders, most in their thirties, were determined to challenge the political and socioeconomic status quo in Grenada and the region by pursuing a Marxist-Leninist revolution and the

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noncapitalist path of development. That fact, and Grenada’s location in the United States’ “backyard,” meant that relations with the United States were always going to be testing. Four-and-a-half years later, at 9:07 a.m. on October 25, 1983, President Ronald Reagan of the United States of America, accompanied by Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, addressed journalists in the White House Briefing Room. Surprising the audience, Reagan announced that on Sunday, October 23rd, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the five member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada . . . Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landings on the island.3

The most powerful country in the world had unleashed its military might against a microstate twice the size of Washington, D.C., with a population of approximately 85,000 people. Grenada was practically unheard of by most Americans outside of tourist circles.4 Reagan gave three reasons for the United States’ participation: “to protect innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans, . . . to forestall further chaos . . . [and] to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions.”5 Several days earlier in Grenada, a power struggle between government factions had ended violently and tragically when Prime Minister Bishop and seven colleagues were executed. The United States’ largest military operation since Vietnam was a sledgehammerto-crack-a-nutmeg affair and bound to attract domestic and international criticism, especially with the total exclusion of the media for three days.6 The United Nations General Assembly condemned the intervention as a “violation of international law” by 108 to 9 votes.7 Nonetheless, the strong support for the action in Grenada and the Caribbean, and favorable support from the American public, combined with the military success, brevity of the operation, and quick withdrawal, determined that Grenada could be seen in a positive light. As one Caribbean expert noted in 1988, “Since the revolution on 13 March 1979 and the invasion of 25 October 1983, more has probably been written on Grenada than in all its previously recorded history.”8 It is therefore surprising that until now there has been no book-length study examining US-Grenadian relations between March 1979 and October 1983. As well as redressing this omission, this study will focus on the days of decision surrounding the October 1983 intervention. With the passing of time more sources have become available, which has facilitated a more complete reconstruction of the crucial period. A relatively large number of Reagan officials have now published memoirs.9 Interviews with participants and an increasing amount of declassified US and British government documents have also been important sources. This book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides the historical context of US policy toward the Caribbean basin and its interventionist tradition. Chapter 2 examines the origins of the revolution via the rise and fall of Grenada’s

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3

prime minister Eric Gairy and the origins and triumph of the NJM in deposing him. Chapters 3 and 4 examine US-Grenadian relations during the Carter and Reagan administrations between March 1979 and Grenadian prime minister Maurice Bishop’s visit to Washington in June 1983. Grenada’s relations with the United States and its Eastern Caribbean neighbors are charted. An account of the steady deterioration in US-Grenadian relations is provided as is an account of key developments including the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) alignment with the Soviet bloc, Cuba’s involvement in the construction of an international airport in Grenada, the failure to arrange elections, the suspension of the constitution, the large numbers of political prisoners, the suspension of habeas corpus, and the closure of Grenada’s only independent newspaper. The United States adopted a “distancing” policy, employing a combination of economic, political, and military pressure to isolate Grenada. Chapter 5 examines the demise of the PRG in the summer of 1983 and the events that climaxed in Bishop’s death on Wednesday, October 19. After Bishop’s arrest on Thursday, October 13, a train of events was set in motion that resulted in an overt military intervention only two weeks later. The decision to intervene was a result of events in three locations: Washington, Barbados, and Grenada. Consequently, a day-by-day analysis reconstructs the flow of these events and interactions among the three venues for the crisis period. Several important events between Bishop’s house arrest and his death effectively established the foundations for, and direction of, subsequent decision making. In Washington the State Department’s Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) convened daily and advocated an evacuation of US nationals to avoid a potential hostage situation; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reviewed evacuation procedures; a USCaribbean plan to rescue Bishop was discussed; and on the morning of Wednesday, October 19, Barbadian prime minister Tom Adams confirmed the Eastern Caribbean leaders’ feelings by requesting US participation in a military action. The central period of the crisis, between Thursday, October 20, and Tuesday, October 25, is the focus of chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 covers the period between Thursday, October 20, and Saturday, October 22. During this time several key developments occurred: the attention on Grenada was elevated to cabinet-level in Washington; the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met in Bridgetown, Barbados, and issued an oral request to the United States inviting it to participate in a multinational military force; the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) met in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, and proposed a nonmilitary solution; and at a Special Situations Group (SSG) meeting President Reagan made a “75 percent” commitment to action.10 Chapter 7 examines the period from early morning on Sunday, October 23, when President Reagan’s party returned from Augusta, Georgia, to Washington, until the final order was given to launch operation Urgent Fury on Tuesday, October 25. The key events of this short period include the impact of the Beirut bombing; US diplomats’ meetings with a member of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) on Grenada; the dispatch of Special Emissary Ambassador

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Frank McNeil to meet the Caribbean leaders and assess their rationale for action; the issuing of a formal written request by the OECS; Grenada’s GovernorGeneral Sir Paul Scoon’s request for assistance; and Reagan’s ultimate decision to accede to the OECS request and intervene. The Conclusion examines the three key factors that influenced the US decision to act: (1) “assuring the safety of American citizens on Grenada,” (2) “in conjunction with OECS/other friendly government participants, the restoration of democratic government in Grenada,” and (3) “the elimination of current, and the prevention of further, Cuban intervention in Grenada.”11 The decision was also guided by the United States’ interventionist tradition in what it considers its sphere of influence and “backyard,” and the ideological and geopolitical contest of the Cold War. In January 1984 a US official commented that “Grenada has disappeared off the radar screen; nobody talks about it much. It is now sinking gradually into the oblivion we reserve for our friends.”12 The Epilogue briefly examines Grenada post-intervention, looking at the United States’ political and economic reconstruction efforts and to what extent Grenada has come to terms with the dramatic events of almost 25 years ago.

CHAPTER 1

United States’ Intervention in the Caribbean Basin

T

he United States was always destined to take a close interest in the affairs of Latin America, and in particular the Caribbean basin, owing to geographical proximity and strategic interests.1 President George Washington envisaged the United States as a “rising empire,” and as the Latin American republics gained their independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States was faced with the prospect of European powers attempting to regain control of their colonies. In response President James Monroe’s 1823 State of the Union Address included a proclamation that the American continents were “henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers . . . We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” and “manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”2 It was not until the late nineteenth century that the United States had the industrial and military power to act on the “Monroe Doctrine,” and even then it did not act to exclude all foreign influence. The Monroe Doctrine laid down a firm marker that would guide US policy in the Caribbean region for the next century. It also marked the “earliest rumblings of incipient hegemony”3 and complemented the popular public belief in “manifest destiny,” whereby America had a mission to expand and spread its form of democracy and freedom. US policy was often described as a moral crusade; it was its natural right and duty as a superior civilization to be its southern neighbors’ self-appointed guardian. By the dawn of the twentieth century the United States had acquired, almost overnight, a global empire stretching from Cuba to the Philippines. The Spanish had been fighting a guerrilla war in Cuba for many years. In February 1898, an explosion sank the USS Maine in Havana harbor; the US media, which had long campaigned for US intervention, blamed Spain. Whilst this was not the direct cause of the Spanish-American war, it highlighted Spain’s inability to pacify the

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island. Spain rejected a peaceful solution, largely for domestic political reasons, and so war was declared in April. President William McKinley presented Congress with four justifications for acting: humanitarian decency, the international legal right to protect US citizens, the negative impact upon US trade and commerce, and the geographical proximity of Cuba, which made it near impossible to ignore.4 These justifications would become familiar in later years. The acquisition of Cuba raised the dilemma of what to do next. Independence and annexation were not appealing options, so Washington devised an imaginative solution of informal control. The 1901 Platt Amendment, named after Senator Orville Platt, who formally proposed the measures to Congress, allowed Cubans to establish their own laws but their new constitution had to include four provisions: 1) the United States had the right to intervene as it wished to protect Cuba’s independence; 2) Cuban debt had to be limited so that European creditors could not use it as an excuse to use force to collect it; 3) the United States be granted a 99-year lease of the naval base at Guantanamo, and 4) an extensive sanitation program to protect the people and make the island more attractive for US investors.5 In 1903 the United States ratified a tariff pact that gave preference to Cuban sugar in the United States and protection to certain US goods in Cuba. Sugar came to dominate the Cuban economy, which became deeply integrated into the US economy. Deeply unpopular with Cubans, the Platt Amendment formed the basis of US policy toward the island until 1934. The Big Stick McKinley’s successor, Theodore Roosevelt, personified the central themes of US foreign policy post-1890: a willingness to use force to obtain order, an emphasis on a special US responsibility to guarantee stability in Latin America, and a belief that Anglo-Saxon values and successes gave America a right to conduct such foreign policy.6 Roosevelt was determined to deter European intervention, teach the Latinos to be civilized, elect democratic governments, and develop the region as a market for US business. In 1897 US foreign investment totaled $0.7 billion and by 1908 it totaled $2.5 billion; half of this was in Latin America and the Caribbean.7 Except for the involvement in Panama’s independence, Roosevelt was unwilling to assume responsibility for other countries’ internal affairs; the age of territorial expansion had finished and the United States now needed markets. Washington was concerned that Caribbean instability would attract European intervention; stability was also necessary for US business. In 1902 a debt crisis in Venezuela led Roosevelt to permit the governments owed money to police the area. Public and congressional opposition forced him to ask Britain and Germany to expedite their missions. In Santo Domingo, US business groups clashed with German and French interests. As internal disorder grew, and the possibility of revolution increased, Roosevelt seized the customhouses and settled the payment of debts to the Europeans.8 Against this backdrop, at a speech in Chicago in April 1903, Roosevelt stated: “There is a homely old adage which runs: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick; you

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will go far.’ If the American nation will speak softly, and yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far.”9 In December 1904 he applied the “big stick” principle to the Monroe Doctrine: It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that the country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous . . . Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.10

The Roosevelt Corollary has contrastingly been seen as a logical update of the Monroe Doctrine or the transformation of a doctrine “intended for the protection of the states of the New World against intervention from Europe into a doctrine of intervention by the US.”11 The Monroe Doctrine now had teeth. As Perez notes, the concept of “intervention as deviation,” with the United States keeping watch from afar and acting when things broke down, was an idea indicative of the sphere-of-influence perception of the region.12 The Corollary was soon tested when the Cuban president Estrada Palma was fraudulently reelected in 1906. The opposition called for US intervention; Washington’s hope that the threat of intervention would ensure stability backfired, as the opposition had used this threat hoping to change the political balance. When the United States did not intervene, the opposition rebelled. Estrada now called upon US help, claiming he could not guarantee the safety of US nationals and property.13 When Estrada resigned of his own volition, Roosevelt was forced to establish a provisional government and land 2,000 troops. The army kept peace and order, exercising what Langley terms “moral suzerainty.”14 The rebels were disarmed and a Rural Guard established. The provisional government rewrote electoral law and supervised honest elections. Despite these achievements the United States had to return to Cuba in 1912, 1917, and 1922 to suppress rebellions and protect nationals and property. President William Taft’s policy vision was to “substitute dollars for . . . bullets,” displacing the pound and reducing European claims whilst simultaneously promoting the United States’ interests and removing the need for intervention. However, “the success of dollar diplomacy rested on the willingness of private investors . . . to invest in the tropics.”15 The policy often ended up promoting business interests at the cost of democratic and social development.16 Critics decried dollar diplomacy as economic intervention to stave off the unpleasant and sometimes necessary task of military intervention, as Taft discovered in Nicaragua. Relations with Nicaragua had grown fractious under the liberal dictator President Jose Santos Zelaya; he had fanned the flames of revolution elsewhere

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in Central America and campaigned for the reestablishment of the Central American Federation. Alarm bells rang in Washington when Zelaya started negotiations with Germany and Japan to build an isthmian canal through Nicaragua. Washington began to support a nascent revolutionary movement; when two American mercenaries assisting the rebels were captured and executed in 1909, it was provocation enough for Washington, and 450 troops were landed. Zelaya was soon defeated and eventually replaced in 1911 by the conservative Adolfo Diaz. Diaz quickly encountered domestic liberal opposition and unrest over his plans to make the country a US protectorate and had to rely on 2,600 US troops intervening to quell the revolt in 1912. Ominously, this was the first time US troops had intervened to restore order and prop up an established government. The troops remained until 1932. By default Washington became the arbiter of Nicaraguan politics and in an effort to establish stability got sucked further into the maelstrom.17 Loan negotiations had left US bankers owning Nicaragua’s banks, customs, and 51 percent of the railways.18 During the 20-year occupation Nicaragua was virtually run by Washington and American banks and troops. President Woodrow Wilson’s idealist and moralist convictions were manifested in his policy. He was strongly anti-imperialist and promised “the firm establishment of a foreign policy based upon justice and good will rather than upon mere commercial exploitation.”19 Wilson felt that it was the duty of the United States to spread democracy, that regional unrest originated from problems such as poverty and oppression, and that intervention was counterproductive. Wilson believed that “revolutions would not occur when elections were held, constitutional provisions obeyed, and bad men removed from power.”20 Military force would be used when necessary but as a civilizing force to guarantee political stability.21 It is ironic that Wilson would prove to be the most interventionist president yet. In April 1914, US troops occupied the Mexican port of Veracruz after seven US sailors were arrested on shore leave. The United States had substantial business interests in Mexico, but relations between the two countries had faltered when Victoriano Huerta took control of the Mexican revolution in 1912. Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta regime as it had seized power by force. The Veracruz incident was the excuse Wilson had been waiting for; the occupation helped to bankrupt Mexico’s government and ensured Huerta’s demise. A more substantial intervention occurred in Haiti, which had experienced 102 civil wars, revolutions, or palace revolts, and US gunboats had been sent to protect nationals 28 times since 1868 alone.22 When the latest Haitian president fell in 1915, US-backed Oreste Zamor became president. Predictably, a revolution erupted. So Wilson sent two warships and 800 marines to persuade Haitians to accept Zamor. However, Zamor went into exile before the troops landed. His successor soon resigned, and Guillaume Sam became president. Within weeks another revolution occurred. Sam declared martial law, which resulted in the massacre of 167 political prisoners. The French legation, where Sam was hiding, was stormed, and Sam was lynched.23 As in previous instances Washington realized authority relied on military strength. The occupation government suspended direct elections and the military supervised elections in which the favored candidate

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was duly elected. For the next 19 years the United States ran Haiti in a quasidual dictatorship with Haitian presidents. In 1916 internal political quarreling in the Dominican Republic resulted in the army seizing the capital and President Juan Jimenez resigning. Four US warships were dispatched and 600 troops landed; more troops followed and a military government was established, removing the problem of working with a client government as in Haiti.24 The United States hoped that its presence would induce stability and promote democracy. As elsewhere what this really meant was a search for pliable, pro-US presidential candidates to promote in supervised elections. This highlighted the emergence of a wider, more interventionist policy in the Caribbean. Wilson had wanted election, change, order, and nonintervention simultaneously but discovered that keeping order required US economic presence and occasionally military intervention.25 Wilson shared Roosevelt’s aims, but time and experience had varied his methods. Under Wilson, the Roosevelt Corollary was expanded as “protective imperialism,”26 an effort to save people from their own shortcomings. Intervention was the zeitgeist of US policy between 1898 and 1933: interventions in Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic totaled over 50 years of occupation. As Perez stresses: Intervention signifies considerably more than armed landings and military occupation. At its most advanced and fully developed state, it is a system that works best . . . from within; when it is successful in transferring the political leadership and institutional order into direct extensions of American influence and power.27

He concludes that such interventions promoted and institutionalized US hegemony and perpetuated the subordinate client state system in the region.28 The US and Caribbean economies became inextricably linked: between 1897 and 1914 US investment in the region grew from $304 million to $1,641 million and trade from $240 million to $801 million.29 The search for new markets, business opportunities, and raw materials was an important but not always decisive influence on policy. Taft’s “dollar diplomacy” was the clearest example of using economic power to try and buy stability. Washington discovered the problems of promoting democracy via intervention or coercion. Numerous methods were employed, including overt military intervention and occupation, gunboat diplomacy, surrogate troops, customs control, economic blockades, treaties, and supervised elections.30 The constant cycle of revolution and counterrevolution caused Under Secretary of State Norman Davis to complain: It has been due to the failure to take preventative and corrective means that the US has repeatedly intervened by force . . . that military occupations have succeeded military intervention and all of the attendant evils . . . We should have learnt by now that the enforcement of peace from the outside does not remove the basic causes which make men resort to revolution.31

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The United States veered from full-scale occupation to limited intervention to compromises. Whatever the method, US action always provoked local opposition and, unsurprisingly, created feelings of hostility and distrust. Although policy was prescribed in Washington, the armed forces in situ often had the final say. This latitude frequently defined the course and extent of interventions. US policy failed to produce a stable Caribbean and never satisfactorily addressed the central causes of unrest. The United States ignored social and cultural differences and imposed its own solutions rather than sponsoring internal Caribbean solutions. The Good Neighbor Policy The failure of interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the ill will created by gunboat diplomacy led to a gradual transition in US policy toward nonintervention and Pan-Americanism. This is most commonly associated with President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, which originated in the “paradox between fraternity with neighbouring republics and domination over them.”32 At the 1933 Inter-American Conference the United States reluctantly accepted that no nation “has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”33 At the 1936 conference the United States recognized “the right of all nations to handle their affairs in the way they choose . . . even though their way may be different from our way, or even repugnant to our ideas.”34 Unilateral intervention was renounced in favor of collective security measures to exclude extra-hemispheric powers. Eschewing intervention was not as progressive as it seemed: it had become costly, largely ineffective, and unpopular. The United States established, trained, and supplied National Guards in several countries to oversee the political process, resulting in pro-US dictatorial regimes.35 As Roorda comments: “The Good Neighbor Policy demonstrated to a generation of Caribbean dictators that they were free to run their countries however they pleased, so long as they maintained common enemies with the United States: first the fascists, then the communists.”36 Whilst the Good Neighbor Policy appealed for inter-American unity based on common interests, it also pursued US national security and prosperity by whatever means.37 With the outbreak of war in Europe, and Japan’s increasing power, Washington realized it could face a two-ocean war. Latin America and the Caribbean were perceived to be the United States’ exposed southern flank and so Washington set about gathering support from the region. Roosevelt sought to secure military bases, access to important raw materials, and an agreement on behalf of the region’s countries to join an alliance against the Axis powers or remain neutral.38 The war marked the point at which the United States became the undisputed military power in the Caribbean. With the war going badly in Europe for Britain in 1940, the United States agreed to a Destroyers for Bases Agreement. In return for transferring 50 obsolete destroyers to the Royal Navy, the United States was granted land for air or naval bases in the Caribbean and Canada on 99-year free

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leases.39 One significant result of this was that the United States had now assumed some responsibility in an area previously seen as exclusively Britain’s responsibility. The Cold War The Cold War globalized, militarized, and institutionalized US foreign policy, with everything subordinated to the East-West conflict. The 1947 InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance promised that “an armed attack by a State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States.”40 At the 1948 Inter-American Conference, the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter was signed. Article 15 of the charter stated that “no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in internal or external affairs of another State.”41 However, Article 15 was undermined by Article 19, allowing, in response to such threats, measures to be adopted for “the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties.”42 Although a regional agency of the United Nations (UN), the OAS was weak and subservient to Washington, which used it to handle Latin America outside the UN and to legitimize intervention. Guatemala The first test for the United States’ Cold War policy in Latin America came in Guatemala, where President Jacobo Arbenz’s legislative program was transforming Guatemala’s economic infrastructure. The most significant measure was Decree 900, the Agrarian Reform Bill, arguably the most successful in Latin American history, which expropriated land from the landowning oligarchy and redistributed it to promote the participation and organization of the rural poor in the transfer of power.43 Foreign companies were subject to the Bill; the powerful US United Fruit Company (UFCO) owned 42 percent of Guatemalan land and had 80 percent expropriated.44 Arbenz offered UFCO $2 million in compensation, partly in government bonds, based on the land’s taxable worth.45 The United States declined the offer and demanded $16 million instead. Washington now concluded that Arbenz was a communist based on his political connections to communist leaders in labor organizations and local government, his reforms, and pro-Soviet line in the UN. Primarily a nationalist, Arbenz “enthusiastically accepted the backing of the Communists. He never doubted that when the need arose, he could keep them in line.”46 The US ambassador to Guatemala John Peurifoy told President Dwight Eisenhower: “I spent six hours with him one evening, and he talked like a Communist, and if he is not one, Mr. Chairman, he will do until one comes along . . . He had all the earmarks.”47 Eisenhower was a firm anticommunist and believed that “radical” governments like Guatemala’s were a security and ideological threat, and where political and economic measures proved ineffectual, a military solution was required.48 At the

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Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas in March 1954, US Secretary of State John Dulles forced through a declaration stating that “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement . . . would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America.”49 This reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine was aimed squarely at Guatemala. The United States armed and trained an army of exiles and mercenaries in Nicaragua, led by the exiled Guatemalan colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Drawing on its success in removing Prime Minister Mossadeq in Iran in 1953, the CIA’s plans to remove President Arbenz relied on psychological demoralization and political destabilization rather than military force. In the weeks before the intervention the CIA organized rebel radio broadcasts from outside Guatemala, although they claimed to be inside the country, and on June 18 Colonel Armas’s force of about 150 men entered Guatemala and stopped just inside the border.50 The idea was “to create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength. Through air support and massive use of radio broadcasting, the CIA was working to support the impression of Castillo Armas’s strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime’s weakness.”51 In the atmosphere of uncertainty Arbenz assumed this was the vanguard of a full-scale US-backed invasion. He appealed to the UN but the United States persuaded the UN to refer the issue to the OAS, effectively quashing the appeal. The Guatemalan military, worried by the worsening situation and the prospect of Arbenz arming the militia, demanded, and got, his resignation on June 27. The United States’ belief that Guatemala was communist dominated was more imagined than real. As Secretary of State Dulles admitted to the Brazilian ambassador shortly before the operation: “It will be impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan government to Moscow; that . . . decision must be a political one and based on our deep conviction that such a tie must exist.”52 Under Arbenz the communists enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the government but they were never a controlling force.53 The intervention ushered in a more aggressive US policy to protect strategic and economic interests globally. After the success of Guatemala, the stage was set for Cuba. The Bay of Pigs Since 1934 Cuban politics had been dominated by Fulgencio Batista’s repressive and corrupt dictatorship that had engendered increasingly strong opposition. US support waned and an arms embargo was imposed. Batista remained defiant but finally fled into exile on December 31, 1958, in the face of internal opposition from the left-wing guerrilla movement led by Fidel Castro. The United States officially recognized Cuba in January 1959, hoping to persuade Castro to conduct political, economic, and social reforms, reassuring itself that Castro would have to moderate his revolutionary proposals once faced with the reality of office.54

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By mid-1959 there was a marked deterioration in US-Cuban relations. Castro began expelling moderates and anticommunists from his government and developing popular support by identifying with the working-class and well-organized Communist Party. During a visit to Washington in April 1960, Castro met privately with Vice President Richard Nixon, who concluded that Castro was “either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline.”55 In May an Agrarian Reform Law expropriated and redistributed land.56 The assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom summarized the important first year of relations thus: From January to March might be characterized as the honeymoon period of the Castro government. In April a downward trend in U.S.-Cuban relations had been evident . . . In June we had reached the decision that it was not possible to achieve our objectives with Castro in power . . . In July and August we had been busy drawing up a program to replace Castro. However some U.S. companies reported to us during this time that they were making some progress in negotiations, a factor that caused us to slow the implementation of our program. The hope expressed by these companies did not materialize. October was a period of clarification . . . On October 31, in agreement with CIA, the Department had recommended to the President approval of a program . . . to support elements in Cuba opposed to the Castro government while making Castro’s downfall seem to be the result of his own mistakes.57

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved Operation Pluto, a fourstage CIA plan over six to eight months to create a respected and unified exile government, a propaganda offensive, the establishment of a covert intelligence organization in Cuba, and a paramilitary force outside Cuba.58 In February 1960, Castro signed a trade and economic agreement with the Soviet Union. In July Czech arms arrived, and soon after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared the Monroe Doctrine dead and adopted the Cuban Revolution as part of the new Third World “wars of national liberation.”59 Castro subsequently nationalized $900 million of US-owned property. On October 19 the United States imposed an embargo on exports to Cuba and finally cut diplomatic relations on January 4, 1961. By November, Pluto had evolved into a Guatemala-type operation. The exile force would make a surprise landing at Trinidad in Cuba and establish a beachhead; the exiles’ planes would destroy Castro’s air force and communications; CIA radio would create uncertainty and confusion; Castro would panic and lose support, and widespread unrest would produce a coup within weeks.60 In December the invasion date was set for March 1961. In January 1961 John F. Kennedy took office. He had emphasized renewal and change⎯the so-called New Frontier⎯in his presidential campaign and believed US power should be recognized and used. Kennedy pledged to win the Cold War in Latin America and the Caribbean, which he described as “the most dangerous area in the world.”61 The United States had long relied on dictators to maintain stability and protect its security interests in the region; between 1956 and 1960 ten of these military dictatorships were overthrown. A different approach was

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needed; the Alliance for Progress was unveiled in March 1961 and pledged $20 billion over a decade to underwrite social and economic transformation and political freedom.62 Fighting the Cold War required more than financial assistance, and Kennedy approved the use of covert intervention and traditional gunboat diplomacy. Whilst campaigning Kennedy had placed a strong emphasis on Cuba and now he “suddenly faced a plan that fitted his campaign rhetoric. Moreover, the plan had the warm endorsement of no less a military expert than Dwight Eisenhower himself.”63 Kennedy’s straight talking and willingness to use power endeared him to the CIA, and he was beguiled by its mysticism and decisiveness.64 In essence the agency was in control; it cloaked Pluto in secrecy from the start, ensuring that only a few presidential advisers and bureaucrats were in the loop and even then knew only what the agency wanted them to: that Castro was a threat, was still weak, and that intervention now would have, in Dulles’s words, a “fighting chance” of success. The White House had misgivings though; Kennedy’s main objection was that it was too dramatic. The need for “plausible deniability” was paramount. Thus in March the landing site was switched to the remote Bay of Pigs. Kennedy was adamant about US noninvolvement. His determination not to involve US marines was not new; President Theodore Roosevelt, discussing Cuba in 1906, announced, “I feel it is important that if any bloodshed occurs it should be between Cuban and Cuban not American and Cuban.”65 In the weeks before the invasion Kennedy “worked on the plan to minimize every risk he could foresee: secrecy for American involvement, the guerrilla option if things turned out bad. A quiet landing at a remote spot without press coverage.”66 These amendments reduced the political risk but simultaneously increased the military risk. The planned air strike against Castro’s air force on April 15 was scaled down by Kennedy and a second air strike canceled altogether. Only half of Castro’s planes were destroyed. Castro was well aware of what was about to happen; the Cuban underground was suppressed and the chance of an internal uprising remote.67 On April 17, 1,400 exiles were landed; some supplies and men did not land, Castro’s planes sunk a command ship and the exiles faced 36,000 Cuban troops.68 By April 19 the exiles’ position was hopeless and the majority were captured and later ransomed. The Bay of Pigs has been described as the “perfect failure.” Castro emerged more defiant. In Washington covert intervention had been discredited, but policymakers’ determination to prevent “another Cuba” was undiminished. Another Cuba? British Guiana Soon after taking office Kennedy had decided that the “Task Force on Cuba would consider what can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over [in British Guiana].”69 The Task Force’s concern focused on the political orientation of the leader of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP),

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Cheddi Jagan. Jagan had formed the PPP with Forbes Burnham in 1950, espousing a nationalist and socialist policy. In the 1953 election the PPP won partial control of the government but the British government intervened to remove the PPP, alleging that they were communists.70 By 1957 British priorities lay elsewhere, and when Jagan was elected to a cabinet post the British did not act. In 1960 the British held a constitutional conference that set elections for August 1961, with independence to follow within four years. In the 1961 elections the PPP won 43 percent of the vote and 20 parliamentary seats. Forbes Burnham’s People’s National Congress (PNC) won 41 percent of the vote and 11 seats.71 In Washington a British Guiana under Jagan was perceived to be a threat to Latin America and the Caribbean, the Alliance for Progress, and US national security. Jagan’s political orientation was never clear-cut: the CIA thought he could be a communist but found no evidence of SovietCuban influence. Jagan had visited Cuba in the past and once in power established commercial links. As Rabe notes: “Controversy has always surrounded the question of what political philosophies Jagan, Burnham, and other members of the PPP actually followed. Leading political figures altered their views endlessly and used the terms ‘Communist’, ‘Socialist’, ‘Marxist’, and ‘Marxist-Leninist’ interchangeably.”72 The prospect of another Cuba meant that Washington was not going to take any chances. The United States made it clear to the British that an independent British Guiana under Jagan was unacceptable. In June 1963 Kennedy told Prime Minister Harold MacMillan that if Britain pulled out, British Guiana would become a communist state and that this would “create irresistible pressure in the United States to strike militarily against Cuba.”73 The British had little choice but to bow to US pressure: they undermined Jagan and parliamentary procedure by agreeing to the opposition’s demand for proportional representation, scheduled new elections, and postponed independence.74 At the 1964 elections, under the new system Burnham’s PNC won 24 parliamentary seats to the PPP’s 22 seats. The communist threat was a chimera; the East Indian and Afro-Guyanese communities’ racial conflict was the key factor in the country’s politics. As Rabe concludes: “The imperatives of the Cold War distorted political and racial relationships within British Guiana . . . the struggle for independence became transformed into an internal struggle for power, one that resulted in the racial polarization of Guyanese society.”75 Yet Another Cuba? The Dominican Republic The 1965 US military intervention in the Dominican Republic was a clear break with the nonintervention policy observed since 1933. It was heavily influenced by the fact that “preventing a ‘second Cuba’ shaped American policy toward the Dominican Republic at every stage after [Rafael] Trujillo’s death in 1961.”76 Trujillo had been de facto ruler since 1930; as with other dictators, he protected US interests and opposed communism in return for US support.

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Batista’s expulsion from Cuba marked the beginning of the end for Trujillo. The United States gradually concluded that right-wing dictatorships conceivably stimulated revolution rather than precluded it. For Washington the implication was clear: “Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to X. But who would X be?”77 Fearing “a domino effect of Castro-like governments” in the region the State Department advocated a military intervention “to prevent a Castro-type government or one sympathetic to Castro.”78 In April 1960, Eisenhower approved a contingency plan to remove Trujillo if the situation declined. President Kennedy, determined to avoid another Bay of Pigs, made it clear that Trujillo’s removal would not be initiated until his replacements were confirmed. He outlined the options: “A decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we can’t renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third.”79 The problem was resolved on May 30 when Trujillo was assassinated by members of his armed forces. Subsequently, a provisional government under existing president Joaquin Balaguer was established until elections could be held.80 The United States worked with Balaguer and the military to advance liberalization but domestic opposition grew. The opposition was divided three ways: the Union Civica Nacional (UCN, middle- and upper-class anti-Balaguers), the Fourteenth of June Movement (nationalists and communists), and the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD, lower-class).81 Efforts to incorporate the three into a coalition with Balaguer failed. In January 1962, a power-sharing seven-man Council of State was established. The PRD candidate, Juan Bosch, was elected with 59 percent of the vote. Bosch’s land reforms and nationalizations conflicted with United States business interests and his emphasis on civil liberties prompted Washington to conclude that Bosch tolerated communists and was unwilling to suppress them. The United States told Bosch that unless he was “harder” on communists, economic loans would cease. In September 1963, a military coup removed Bosch. The United States stopped economic assistance and cut diplomatic relations but refused to act because there was no threat of a communist takeover. As one journalist observed: “Democracy was being saved from Communism by getting rid of democracy.”82 Bosch’s fall was not a great surprise to US officials; he had inherited a country on the verge of political, economic, and social chaos. Bosch was replaced by an unelected triumvirate, headed by Donald Reid Cabral, who aligned himself closely with the United States. However, popular opinion wanted Bosch’s return; the CIA reported that only 5 percent of Dominicans supported Reid.83 On April 25 a group of PRD and military officers, who became known as the Constitutionalists, seized the radio station in Santo Domingo and demanded constitutional government and Bosch’s return.84 When the United States refused Reid’s request for help he had to resign. The Constitutionalists announced that a provisional government would be formed until Bosch’s return. Conflict then broke out with anti-Bosch military officers, the Loyalists. After several days of unrest the pro-Bosch faction gained the upper hand.

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The US embassy badly misjudged the weakness of Reid’s government, the possibility of revolt, the rebels’ strength and aims, and the Loyalists’ strength. It perceived the coup as internecine military squabbling rather than the military revolt that it was, supported by the PRD and the populace, to return an unlawfully ousted president, and expected that the rebels would support the formation of a military junta.85 Washington initially found it hard to tell which group had the upper hand; the fear was that the communists within the rebel group would gain control. The US ambassador reported: All indications point to the fact that, if present efforts of forces loyal to the government fail, power will be assumed by groups clearly identified with the Communist party. If the situation described above comes to pass . . . we should intervene to prevent another Cuba from arising out of the ashes of this uncontrollable situation.86

When Loyalist Colonel Pedro Benoit appealed for US intervention to forestall a communist takeover, he was told that if there was a threat to American nationals then the United States would act; Benoit quickly rephrased his request to include the United States’ traditional justification for intervention.87 As Loyalist fortunes declined, the US ambassador cabled Washington: “The country team is unanimous that the time has come to land the marines. American lives are in danger . . . If Washington wishes they can be landed for the purpose of protecting evacuation of American citizens.”88 On April 28, 1965, 500 marines were landed to protect American lives. Within ten days the number had risen to 23,000 troops. The experience of the Cuban revolution led the Johnson administration to perceive only two options: “The choice is: Castro in the Dominican Republic or U.S. intervention.”89 Domestic factors also played a part: “Like the underlying ‘No Second Cuba’ policy itself, the Dominican intervention was based in good part on the premise that the American people would not stand for United States passivity in the event of a new hemispherical Castro.”90 The intervention ended the Good Neighbor Policy’s nonintervention pledge and contradicted the spirit of the Alliance for Progress. The Nixon Era Under President Richard Nixon US foreign policy focused on the big issues: the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and the Middle East. Latin America and the Caribbean were low down on the list of priorities. Firmly shaped by the ongoing Vietnam War, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine stated: “We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.”91 This effectively meant continued support for pro-US authoritarian regimes to act as regional policemen; arms sales to Latin America increased from $30 million per annum in the 1960s to $118 million in 1974.92 Overt military intervention may have been abandoned but Nixon was committed to preventing “another Cuba”; Washington covertly attempted to prevent the

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election of socialist Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970 and continued to strongly oppose his regime until its overthrow in 1973.93 In the Caribbean basin the 1970s was a period when the gradual withdrawal of the British, to be replaced by the US, had resulted in a group of new countries seeking to assert their independence. A Caribbean Free Trade Association and Caribbean Development Bank were established. These countries also flirted with the United States’ arch enemy Cuba; as Maingot observes: “The Cuban card was used as political leverage in some instances, as a protective shield in others, and in more and more cases as a straw man.”94 Now Washington found itself largely powerless to influence such actions. The Carter Years ⎯A New Approach Upon taking office, President Jimmy Carter made clear his foreign policy intentions: “It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each nation, and to other fundamental U.S. interests.”95 As Pastor comments, the human rights focus “helped, perhaps more than any other element of policy, to correct the image of the United States as an unfeeling giant, casting its shadow over its neighbors.”96 Carter paid particular attention to the Caribbean basin, negotiating a highly contentious Panama Canal Treaty, which agreed to abolish the Canal Zone and transfer responsibility of the canal to Panama by 2000. He pursued improved relations with Cuba and established a Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development under World Bank auspices that quadrupled foreign aid to $1 billion. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman summarized the administration’s outlook: We no longer see the Caribbean in quite the same stark military security context that we once viewed it. Rather our security concerns in the Caribbean are increasingly political in nature. The threat is not simply foreign military bases on our doorstep. It is possibly an even more troublesome prospect: proliferation of impoverished Third World states whose economic and political problems blend with our own.97

By 1979 though, Cold War pressures forced Carter to return to a more traditional policy focus based on security and stability. Marxist revolutionary groups had seized power in Nicaragua and Grenada, and El Salvador was on the brink of civil war. Carter’s perceived failure to deal with these developments, and the Iran hostage crisis and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, sealed his fate in the 1980 elections. The Reagan Years ⎯ Drawing the Line in the Backyard The election of Ronald Reagan marked the reemergence of the Caribbean basin as a key foreign policy priority. President Reagan made it clear that this “backyard” would be the place where the United States would draw the line against communist

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expansionism: “The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble and the safety of our homeland would be put in jeopardy.”98 With Vietnam still fresh in the minds of Americans, the use of direct military force was unlikely, apart from the quick-strike one-sided case of Grenada, as we shall see later. The centerpiece of US strategy was the Reagan Doctrine, which promised overt and covert aid to anticommunist movements globally attempting to “rollback” Soviet-backed governments.99 In the Caribbean basin the United States armed and trained an oppositional military group, the Contras, in a war against the ruling Marxist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Reagan also used “dollar diplomacy” of a sort with his 1982 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which provided trade incentives and $350 million in bilateral economic aid to Caribbean nations. The CBI was simultaneously designed to protect US national security interests against the spread of Marxist regimes such as Nicaragua and Grenada, both of which were excluded from the CBI. By Reagan’s second term the world scene was changing, with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s “glasnost” policy paving the way for diplomacy. Central America remained in turmoil, but US public and congressional support had waned and the Iran-Contra scandal had broken.100 Policy was now focused on promoting democracy. Post–Cold War With the end of the Cold War in 1989, Washington faced new challenges. The December 1989 invasion of Panama to remove military strongman General Manuel Noriega was a throwback to the military actions of old but also an indicator of future priorities. Keeping communism out was replaced by combating drug trafficking. President George Bush justified Operation Just Cause thus: “to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty.”101 The United States’ great-power status has ensured that its focus on its southern neighbors has been sporadic. Pastor’s whirlpool analogy captures this well: The nations to the south of the United States have functioned as a kind of whirlpool that periodically draws Washington into its center, and for a moment nothing else seems as important . . . The center of the whirlpool is the Caribbean Basin, but the whirlpool’s force extends throughout Latin America. Caught in the middle, spinning around and around, America becomes possessed by countries previously unimportant to them. Then, almost as suddenly, the United States is released from the whirlpool’s force, and the names of these countries are forgotten.102

Between 1898 and 1945 Latin America, in particular the Caribbean basin, was a priority for Washington: the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, dollar diplomacy, and the Good Neighbor Policy were all products of this, and gunboat diplomacy was peculiar to the Caribbean.103

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In the Cold War era the United States’ approach changed from a regional perspective to a global one where the Third World was incorporated into the bipolar power system. In the name of anticommunism the United States conducted covert operations in Guatemala and Cuba, supported a proxy war against the Marxist government in Nicaragua, undermined regimes in British Guiana and Chile, and overtly intervened in the Dominican Republic and Grenada. At present the Caribbean “backyard” is enduring a period of general US inattention beyond trade and investment and countering drug trafficking. Regional organizations, such as the OAS, have made a more concerted effort to assert their concerns. However, Washington has always reserved the right to use military force when deemed necessary and, as Sutton makes clear, the Caribbean basin will always remain significant “because of what it represents to the people of the United States and to the outside world . . . a belief that if the USA cannot deal effectively with events in its own sphere of influence it will not deal effectively with events elsewhere.”104

CHAPTER 2

Prelude to a Revolution The Rise and Fall of Eric Gairy Between 1951 and 1979 one man dominated Grenadian politics. Eric Gairy was born in 1922 near Grenville to a poor family; his father was an estate foreman and his mother a maid. Gairy left for Trinidad in 1941 to find work, moving on to Aruba to work as a clerk in the oilfields. It was there that he first became involved in trade unionism and was eventually deported in December 1949, accused of agitating the refinery workers. The Grenada Gairy returned to was clearly divided by race and wealth: the rich, white, colonial elite represented 0.9 percent of the population and the poor, black majority 78.2 percent.1 Maldistribution of land was one of the main grievances of the majority of Grenadians: 98 percent of the farmers owned 53 percent of the land and 1.45 percent owned 44.68 percent of the land.2 Using his organizational skills and knowledge of Grenadian society, Gairy took up the cause of some evicted worker-tenants and won sizable compensation from the landowner. Realizing that the support of a trade union expedited the route to power, Gairy registered the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union (GMMWU) in July 1950. For the first time, the elites were faced with demands from an organized peasantry. When negotiations over a 50 percent wage rise for sugar workers failed, Gairy organized Grenada’s first ever General Strike on February 19, 1951.3 After leading a demonstration to Parliament, Gairy was arrested and exiled to Carriacou.4 Rioting ensued, only subsiding when he was released two weeks later. Gairy seized the opportunity to exploit his popularity and established the Grenada People’s Party (GPP) and in the 1951 election, the first with adult suffrage, won seven of the eight seats on the Legislative Council with 71 percent of the vote.5 The GMMWU was Gairy’s vehicle to power and once there his true colors began to show. In the 1954 elections Gairy’s party, now renamed the Grenada United Labor Party (GULP), won six of the eight seats but received only 46 percent of the vote.6 His increasing disconnect from the interests of the

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people led to GULP losing the 1957 election, gaining only two seats and 44 percent of the vote. Gairy was subsequently disenfranchised for five years for marching a steel band through an opponent’s political meeting. Assuming the status of a martyr he remained popular with the working class as a charismatic, messianic leader of the same color and beliefs as them, a “People’s Champion.” Singham characterized Gairy as the “hero” amongst the “crowd”—“the hero does not have a genuine mass party; he has supporters who are personally committed to following him but who are not controlled by him.”7 GULP won the 1961 elections but the government was dismissed by the colonial authorities for corruption and financial irregularities, an episode that became known as “squandermania.”8 The 1962 election was dominated by the demise of the West Indian Federation; the opposition advocated union with Trinidad and Tobago but Gairy remained equivocal on the subject. GULP subsequently lost the election gaining only four seats and 46 percent of the vote.9 The opposition Grenada National Party (GNP) government, widely perceived as a party of the elites, did little to appease most Grenadians concerns and Trinidad showed little interest in a union. Hence in 1967 Gairy was back in power after GULP won the election, though now Grenada had become an associated state, which meant that Britain now only had responsibility for its defense and foreign affairs. Between 1951 and 1967 Gairy had become the most powerful trade union leader; fought the colonial office, businesses, and the civil service; alienated the upper- and middle-classes; and improved the position of the populace. However, he had simultaneously presided over violent strikes, been disenfranchised, and had his government dismissed. Consequently, “by 1967 when Gairy had returned to political office he was certainly the most controversial personality, positively the most loved and most hated individual on the island.”10 Working-class support for Gairy now began to wane as he sought to distance himself from the populace politically and socially: “his demand for ‘recognition by his enemies as their equal or superior’ was rejected, ‘not only by the elite, but also by some of his own followers, who interpreted these desires for high personal status as involving dissociation from themselves.’”11 For Gairy government was a tool of personal power for self-aggrandizement. As Brizan explains, Gairy perpetuated his position in power in three ways: (1) making as many people as possible economically dependent on government and Gairy himself, (2) crushing dissent and making it difficult for the parliamentary opposition to operate, and (3) establishing a highly centralized bureaucracy where decision making depended on the cabinet, which meant Gairy.12 By 1970 the Black Power movement had become a visible force in several Caribbean nations’ politics, especially Trinidad and Tobago.13 Concerned about the possibility of links to the Black Power movement from Grenada—there was a relatively large Grenadian emigrant community in Trinidad and Tobago—Gairy announced: “It is said that when your neighbour’s house is on fire, keep on wetting your own house. We are now doubling the strength of our Police Force, we are getting in almost unlimited supplies of new and modern equipment.”14

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It was at this time that the “police aides” (the Mongoose Gang15) were established. Gairy made no secret of the nature of these aides: “The Opposition referred to my recruiting criminals in a reserve force. To this I shall not say yea or nay. Does it not take steel to cut steel? . . . [S]ome of the toughest and roughest roughnecks have been recruited.”16 Other security measures included an Emergency Powers Act allowing the police to search opposition houses and the Public Order Amendment Act restricting antigovernment demonstrations.17 Harassment, intimidation, and fear were regularly employed to deter opposition to the government. As Gairy tightened his grip on power even further, he eyed up the prize of independence. He had expressed his dislike of the associated statehood arrangement, viewing it as akin to quasi-colonialism. The majority of Grenadians did not share Gairy’s view that independence would be a benefit and not a burden but that was of little importance; he argued that it would open the doors to international financial institutions and other sources of aid. Gairy’s maxim was that “independence will support Grenada, the people of Grenada do not have to support independence.”18 The GNP opposed independence on the grounds of economic viability and the prospect of an even more powerful Gairy and his secret gangs.19 Gaining independence would not be straightforward; if an associated state wanted to become independent without British consent, which Gairy did as the British did not view the Leeward and Windward Islands as viable independent nations at this point, then a two-thirds majority in a national referendum on the issue would be required.20 However, this requirement could be sidestepped if some or all of the associate states were to seek independence as a federation. Gairy’s efforts to form a federation firstly with Trinidad and Tobago, then the other associated states and Guyana, and finally with St. Lucia and St. Vincent came to nothing. Just as independence seemed to have eluded Gairy, London came to his rescue. The continuing pressure to decolonize, and feeling that the future security of the Eastern Caribbean could be trusted to the United States, led London to inform Gairy that if he won the 1972 election on an independence manifesto then it would not block such a request. Gairy informed the country that the election would be about independence approximately one week before voting day. Despite widespread protests about the independence issue GULP won the 1972 election and 13 of the 15 seats via “a combination of vote rigging, gerrymandering, the use of patronage and genuine support among the rural poor who were still identifying more with ‘Uncle Gairy’ than the elitist Grenada National Party.”21 A new force in Grenadian politics was about to rise though. The New Jewel Movement The inspiration for the New Jewel Movement (NJM) was primarily the Black Power movement that swept the Caribbean, especially between 1968 and 1970, reaching its zenith with the unrest in Trinidad and Tobago. The Black Power ideology exerted a significant influence on the future Grenadian prime minister,

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Maurice Bishop. He was born of middle-class Grenadian parents in Aruba in 1944. The family returned to Grenada in the early 1950s, and in 1963 Maurice Bishop left to study law in London, returning via Trinidad in February 1970. Bishop first caught the public’s attention when he successfully defended 22 nurses arrested during a strike. That year he participated in a meeting of Caribbean radicals on Rat Island off St. Lucia. The tangible result in Grenada was the establishment of Forum, a political movement promoting change.22 Forum was replaced by the Movement for the Advancement of Community Efforts, which was subsequently replaced by the Movement for the Assemblies of People (MAP) in 1972. MAP’s ideology challenged one-leader domination, was anti-elections, emphasized a decentralized state, and opposed corruption and conspiratorial takeovers.23 Bishop was influenced by the ideas of Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere’s African socialism and the writings of Trinidadian Marxist C. L. R. James amongst others. Bishop aimed to replace Gairy’s distortion of parliamentary democracy with a system of “participatory democracy” and “people’s assemblies” throughout Grenada. MAP’s ultimate political problem was that in a predominantly conservative and rural society it was a radical and urban entity and therefore lacked widespread support. Coincidentally another group of educated and disaffected young men formed the Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation (JEWEL), led by an economist, Unison Whiteman. JEWEL was generally a less overtly political movement than MAP, consisting mostly of self-educated farmers seeking to address unemployment and other related issues. It advocated social and political change and gained substantial support amongst rural Grenadians, Gairy’s traditional power base. JEWEL soon gained a sizable following and by early 1973 its newsletter, JEWEL, had a circulation of 2,000.24 As Hardt suggests, “JEWEL became a viable political organization because, unlike Bishop’s MAP, the leaders were addressing their friends and neighbours, not the anonymous masses.”25 JEWEL was also the more practical organization in contrast to MAP’s theoretical focus. A logical development occurred on March 11, 1973, when MAP and JEWEL merged to form the New Jewel Movement (NJM). Some JEWEL members were very critical of this “urbanisation of the movement” and felt that they “had forsaken our direction of the people to really educate the people. We went to rhetoric, and to agitation . . . But what concerned us most was that we were no way involved in leadership any more.”26 The NJM issued a manifesto with the slogan: “We’ll Be Free in 73”. This document envisaged an intrinsic change in the island’s economic and political structure, the establishment of a welfare state, people’s participation in politics, and an improvement in the standard of living amongst other things.27 The manifesto also pronounced that “when a government ceases to serve the people and instead steals from and exploits the people at every turn, the people are entitled to dissolve it and replace it by any means necessary.”28 As Davidson concludes, the manifesto was “short on political ideology and long on pragmatism aimed at social justice.”29 There was no mention of socialism for now.30 The main objective then was the removal of Eric Gairy.

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The NJM established a military wing—the National Liberation Army—that undertook a number of actions over the next few years, including the theft of weapons and explosives from the Grenadian military.31 The NJM’s cause was helped by Gairy’s determination to achieve independence for Grenada as it united the opposition to him: Apart from the reservations concerning Grenada’s viability as a state, for the GNP and the oligarchy, independence meant the removal of the final constraint which would give Gairy a free hand to continue and consolidate his incursions against them. For the growing mass movement it meant unfettered “mongoose” power, further victimization and dictatorship.32

The Revolutionary Upsurge Unrest pervaded 1973: protests, strikes, and petitions to London were to no avail as in May a Constitutional Conference in London confirmed that Grenada would become independent in February 1974. The NJM organized a People’s Convention on Independence at Seamoon on May 6; several thousand people turned out, an indication of the NJM’s growing ability to mobilize public support, and not just from one sector of society. On November 6 the NJM stepped up its efforts and convened a People’s Congress, attended by around 10,000 people, which convicted Gairy of 27 crimes including corruption, incompetence, and brutality, and called on him to resign within two weeks or face a general strike.33 Gairy took to the radio promising to “bring the NJM rebels to their senses and wake them up from their dreams in a very short time for 54 reasons including treason and sedition.”34 The scene was set for the event that would arguably set the ball rolling for Gairy’s demise. On November 18 the general strike was scheduled to begin; a far-fetched rumor that the NJM was going to take over Grenada by force led Gairy to crack down hard. The six main figures in the NJM were arrested at a meeting with local businessmen in Grenville and badly beaten by the police and the Mongoose Gang in what became known as “Bloody Sunday.” The Duffus Commission later concluded: The action taken by members of the Police Force was not genuinely designed as a counter measure taken by the Government to meet any reliable allegation of a threat to the security of the State; but was, instead, forcible action taken to suppress political opposition which was genuinely believed to be likely to retard the progress of Grenada towards political independence.35

Gairy’s determination to gain independence at any cost this time resulted in opposition traversing all sections of society; a nonpartisan Committee of 22 was formed, including representatives from the church, business, trade unions, and opposition parties, advocating strikes and demonstrations. As Sandford concludes, “With this one stroke, Gairy galvanized his opponents into a militant unity that the NJM could never have achieved.”36 The NJM supported the committee but its attempts to join were refused on the grounds that the committee

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was a nonpolitical entity.37 It is important to note that the committee was not supporting the NJM per se but more protesting about the violation of human rights. The committee ended its action when Gairy agreed to establish a Commission of Inquiry under Jamaican former chief justice Sir Herbert Duffus and promised to disarm and disband his “aides.” When Gairy reneged on his promises and suspended the Commission of Inquiry until after independence, a national strike was called for New Year’s Day 1974. The three-week strike consisted of daily protests by the populace and reprisals by Gairy’s forces. During one march on January 21, Maurice Bishop’s father, Rupert, was shot dead by Gairy’s forces in the doorway of the Seaman and Waterfront Workers Union office on the harbor front. The strike ended when the nonpolitical Committee of 22 no longer saw any benefit from it. Gairy’s situation had become precarious; he had run out of money to pay the civil service and police, taxes went uncollected, and fuel and food ran low. He was only saved by Britain’s decision to advance Grenada £100,000 on a £2.25 million loan and EC$ (Eastern Caribbean dollar) 2 million from Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Jamaica.38 Britain was keen to see Grenada become independent but had been concerned about the unrest and political violence throughout 1973 and perhaps the prospect of “opening the door to a full dictatorship by a man who had already shown tyrannical instincts.”39 As Grenada lurched toward independence, British, Canadian, and US officials agreed that contingency plans for evacuating nationals would be prudent as the situation could deteriorate rapidly. London made it clear that it would consider “direct intervention only in [the] event Gairy is assassinated anj (sic) widespread violence ensues. In this event HMG would almost certainly intervene upon request (of [the] Government or other high ranking official) to maintain order.”40 On February 7, 1974, Grenada became independent. The occasion was not the grand event that Gairy envisaged: Britain’s representative, the Duke of Gloucester, canceled for security reasons so Permanent Under Secretary Peter Blaker went instead. Under instruction from London, Blaker read Gairy the riot act but Gairy clearly did not care and paid no attention.41 The US ambassador to Barbados, Eileen Donovan recalled that “there was so much trouble and so much fighting and so much opposition to Gairy in Grenada that the Department [of State] decided not to risk the lives of important Congressmen and people to send a delegation. I was the only representative from the United States.”42 This was a minor inconvenience for Gairy whose power was now absolute. Independence completed the emergence of Gairy’s dictatorship as Parliament could now be dominated by one individual; additionally, the centralized government bureaucracy was reliant on the cabinet that was in turn dominated by Gairy.43 With Gairy treating Grenada as his personal fiefdom the response to any opposition was more repression and more violence. The US embassy correctly concluded: Having failed in its bid to forestall independence or to force HMG’s direct intervention, and with most of its leaders in hiding or voluntary exile, organized opposition to Gairy and [the] GOG (Government of Grenada) has all but crumbled.

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Concern over continued loss of business and revenue and over [the] GOG’s hinted declaration of [a] state of emergency should prove more than adequate incentives to most workers and businessmen to end [the] strike.44

Pressure from Grenada’s neighbors led to the publication of the Duffus Report, which cataloged the violent excesses of Gairy’s henchmen during the 1973 unrest and tarnished Grenada’s image internationally; in Grenada it had little practical impact.45 The promised economic benefits of independence were more imagined than real; money arrived from the then European Economic Community, the International Monetary Fund, and Caribbean Community (CARICOM). However, CARICOM’s Caribbean Development Bank’s (CDB) complex and bureaucratic list of procedures made it difficult for Grenada to access funds.46 Another key factor was the corruption and inefficiency under Gairy. In 1977 the CDB refused to lend Grenada any money under its Small Industry Credit Scheme owing to “inadequate managing and accounting practices,” and of the EC$21.8 million pledged by foreign governments and international agencies, only EC$2.8 million was taken up due to inefficiency and malpractices.47 The 1973–1974 unrest had reduced gross national product by 33 percent and the economy never recovered; in 1975 the balance of payments was EC$0.5 million but by 1978 it was –EC$5.3 million.48 The national debt reached EC$60 million and unemployment reached 50 percent.49 Independence gave Gairy access to the world stage. By 1974 the United States had largely assumed de facto responsibility for Eastern Caribbean’s security from Britain. Washington’s primary concern was that the region was an opportunity for the Soviets to cause trouble. Relations with the United States were good with Gairy following a staunchly pro-US anticommunist line although the Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights clashed with Gairy’s track record. The US ambassador to Barbados (who was also accredited to Grenada) Theodore Britton paid quarterly visits to Grenada; he recalled that Gairy “often, of course, asked for more economic assistance there, he asked for an embassy over there, he asked for US military presence. We dismissed him out of hand.”50 Aside from security issues, Washington’s interest in the newly independent islands such as Grenada was as a voting bloc in the United Nations (UN) and other forums when votes were necessary, particularly on matters involving Israel and Taiwan.51 In June 1977 Gairy proudly hosted the annual conference of the Organization of American States (OAS). That September all Latin American heads of state were invited to Washington to mark the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty and to meet President Carter. Gairy was not one to miss such an opportunity to raise his profile. The US ambassador to Barbados at the time, Frank Ortiz, recalls the surreal nature of the meeting: Sir Eric congratulated him (President Carter) . . . saying, “You bring peace. We all love you.” Then Sir Eric took things where I’d feared he would. He told the President that before he came he had talked to God, who told him what he should say. The conversation continued, becoming more unusual every minute. Sir Eric reported

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that he had seen a flying saucer and talked with the beings inside it. “They’re not bad people,” he commented.52

Close Encounters at the UN Independence had also given Grenada access to a number of international forums, the most important of these being the UN. A central feature of Gairy’s foreign policy was to use this access to promote the establishment of an agency or department of the UN for research into UFOs (unidentified flying objects); indeed, he used the occasion of Grenada’s inaugural UN speech to do so. Gairy was well known in the Eastern Caribbean for his belief in UFOs and the occult. Gairy had requested US support on UFOs in 1977 but Washington had managed to dilute his proposed resolution and postpone it for a year. However, in November 1978 the US Mission to the UN reported that “Gairy has apparently laid the groundwork for a blitzkrieg sales pitch which will include a cast of supporters ranging from scientists to astronauts, supplemented by a Hollywood film production.”53 This time Gairy had scaled down the resolution to ask for the establishment of a small committee of experts to report on the possible framework for a study of UFOs. Having been asked to support the resolution the United States was placed in a tricky position as there was “very little interest in the item and Grenada would not wish to bring the matter to vote and chance embarrassing Prime Minister Gairy.”54 The United States took the position that it could not support the resolution on the grounds of the costs involved but also accommodated Gairy by suggesting that the General Assembly be asked “to appoint an independent rapporteur to study the matter and report back at some later date.”55 Gairy was quite happy with this outcome. Growing regional isolation led Gairy to establish alliances with unsavory regimes such as the military dictatorships of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Major General Park Chung Hee in South Korea. Gairy visited both countries in 1976, and in 1977 signed a military training and arms agreement with Chile. Two members of the Grenadian Defence Force visited Chile and in October 1977 Chilean weapons arrived in Grenada.56 In return Gairy ensured that Grenada supported these countries in international forums. The promised benefits of independence had not materialized for Grenadians. Gairy’s use of the UN to pursue his interest in UFOs and relations with right-wing dictatorships damaged Grenada’s credibility and ensured that international funding soon dried up. New Jewel Rising The failure to remove Gairy during the 1973–1974 unrest was a turning point for the NJM. In an April 8–10, 1974, meeting the NJM concluded that the failure was due to a backward economic structure with a strong petit bourgeoisie and ideologically weak and underdeveloped working class, and its own ideological and organizational weaknesses.57 Hence at the moment when the NJM

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could have evolved into a party with widespread popular appeal, its members agreed that the NJM should become a vanguard Marxist-Leninist organization with a hierarchical command structure, restricted membership, and clandestine ideology.58 By the mid-1970s the NJM consisted of three political strands: first, a social democratic, populist group of professionals and intellectuals who favored the overthrow of Gairy. Second, the group headed by Bishop, Kendrick Radix, and Whiteman whose experiences as “anticolonial, anti-Gairy, Black Power activists transformed them into revolutionary socialists who embraced Marxism and became convinced of the necessity of building a tightly knit, vanguard party to topple the Gairy dictatorship.”59 Bernard Coard, to whom primary responsibility for placing the NJM on a Marxist-Leninist footing was delegated, headed the third strand. It is important to understand his role in the development of the party. A firm believer in the “non-capitalist path of development,” he had learnt his brand of Marxism amongst the pro-Moscow, Stalinist communist parties in Jamaica, Britain, and to a lesser extent the United States, and was quickly identified as the intellectual ideologue.60 Having been absent for the formative years of the party—he joined the NJM when he returned to Grenada in September 1976—he received his entrée into the NJM via his friendship with Bishop that dated back to 1961. Coard was in nearby Trinidad between 1972 and 1974, so he was not out of the loop and whenever he was visiting Grenada prior to 1976 he would participate in NJM meetings. Coard brought a more professional and organized approach to the NJM and it undoubtedly benefited from this. In 1975 he was the cofounder of the Organization for Education and Liberation (OREL); this was a group of about 20 young party members who would meet to discuss Marxist-Leninist texts. Coard acted as the intellectual guru to this group, which became ideologically and personally loyal to him.61 OREL’s publication, Spark, was openly critical of the NJM as a petit bourgeois party, although OREL wanted to merge with the NJM. This was too much for some NJM members, and OREL was denounced as a faction, its end demanded, and Coard threatened with expulsion.62 Bishop’s intervention saved Coard who agreed to disband OREL when promised that the party would take a more Leninist structure with the creation of an Organizing Committee, which Coard later headed.63 The committee was responsible for internal coordination, administration, and party discipline, thus placing Coard in an influential position that allowed him to build a power base and maintain personal loyalties that would last to the end of the revolution. Ahead of the 1976 elections, businessmen and prominent GNP members argued in favor of a coalition with the NJM. The NJM was no fan of parliamentary politics, but an alliance with the GNP and United People’s Party (UPP) to form a People’s Alliance made sense.64 Gairy’s party won 9 of the 15 seats with 52 percent of the vote but had relied on paternalism, coercion, and ballot rigging to do so.65 The People’s Alliance gave Gairy a fright, winning 48 percent of the vote and six seats (NJM three,66 GNP two, and UPP one). Being a part of the Alliance provided the NJM with several advantages: it moderated the

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NJM’s radical image and legitimated the party, widened the base of support beyond the urban working class and youths, established the NJM as the official opposition, with Bishop as its leader rather than Herbert Blaize (GNP), and provided it with a domestic and international platform.67 The Alliance soon existed only on paper and folded when the NJM refused to say they were not communists.68 As UPP leader Winston Whyte explained, “It was an amalgam of unlike ideological dispositions, and that could not mix.”69 Parliament remained a one-party one-man affair and the NJM used it to demonstrate the inadequacies of the Westminster system and Gairy’s leadership. The election result also reconfirmed the NJM’s belief that Gairy would not go peacefully. Between 1976 and 1979 the NJM infiltrated the urban trade unions, organizing working-class support and even undermining Gairy’s support in his GMMWU, which he had become more distant from. The escalating violence and victimization expanded middle-class support for the NJM, as did Bishop’s popularity, charismatic leadership, and middle-class background. The NJM also targeted the increasingly politicized youth constituency; the voting age had been lowered to 18 at the 1976 elections and that generation’s view of Gairy was shaped by events such as Bloody Sunday in 1973.70 Gairy blamed the NJM for the unrest and, not incorrectly, claimed that “their philosophy was similar to communism. They wanted to abolish the party system and establish people’s courts. They did not want elections by ballot but by bullet” but added that “God has a design for me and no one can stop me.”71 The NJM became more socialist and Marxist in tone. Links had been established with communist groups in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Jamaica, and a Grenada-Cuba Friendship Society was established in December 1975.72 In 1977 Bishop, Whiteman, and Coard all visited Cuba. In an interview with Bohemia whilst he was there, Bishop explained that having seen “scientific socialism” in Cuba, the NJM now viewed socialism as “the only solution to our problems.”73 In 1978 six members were sent for military training in Guyana for a month with the support of Guyana’s president Forbes Burnham; most training took place within Grenada.74 In February 1979 a strike by Barclays Bank employees was violently suppressed and as Thorndike concludes, “It was painfully obvious that established procedures of political change were completely ineffectual . . . a radical alternative to electoral change grew increasingly acceptable to many.”75 The tension in Grenada increased when it was revealed that James Wardally (an American citizen) and Chester Humphrey (a Grenadian studying in the United States) had been arrested on February 2, 1979, in Virginia after a search of premises by US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents uncovered 40 firearms worth approximately $10,000.76 The arrests were the culmination of a six-month investigation triggered by the shipment of guns in three barrels marked “grease” from the United States to a company in Grenada in September 1978. The barrels were released from customs in St. George’s and delivered to the

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home of key NJM figure, Unison Whiteman.77 Two of the barrels were later found empty on a beach. The US embassy in Barbados informed Gairy of the arrests and the likelihood of further arrests soon. Gairy was keen for the ATF agents to visit Grenada as soon as possible to finish their investigation. As it happened, the ATF agent and US Customs official crossed paths with Gairy in Barbados en route to New York. The NJM meanwhile grew increasingly jumpy; several senior members’ houses had been searched and one member arrested. The other leaders decided to go into hiding. In the days following the revolution the leaders alleged that they had learnt from sympathetic sources in the police and army that Gairy had left orders for the NJM leadership to be assassinated whilst he was away and that this was the decisive factor in launching the coup. In reality it was the ATF investigation that eventually tipped the scales. It clearly implicated NJM leaders—Budhlall claims that Bishop and Coard both had regular phone contact with Humphrey and Wardally.78 Gairy had planned to arrest several NJM leaders implicated in the arms smuggling but certainly not to assassinate them.79 For the NJM its political future was at stake: When we realized that Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard, the leaders of the revolution, would be extradited back to the United States we weren’t going to allow that . . . So we decided we had to move. Although we had plans to move on him [Eric Gairy], we had to move quicker than the original plan.80

Gairy was an eccentric, repressive autocrat. The political awakening and subsequent enfranchisement of Grenada’s youth was particularly influenced by the Black Power movement and out of this the NJM emerged. What distinguished the NJM from the other opposition parties and made it a serious threat to Gairy was that it managed to build a class coalition between the middle-class, rural lower-class, and urban working-class.81 Gairy’s reliance on violence and intimidation to deal with opposition proved counterproductive. Whilst his methods united the opposition they also distanced him from his traditional support base via his union and party. His eccentricities and repression also isolated Grenada regionally and led to relations with Chile and South Korea. The NJM was well organized and “employed every conceivable weapon in their campaign against Gairy between 1973 and 1979. This included the use of propaganda calculated to discredit Gairy personally and exaggerated the real shortcomings of the regime he headed.”82 The NJM was successful in making Gairy look worse than he was and created an image of him, in Grenada and beyond, that it could confidently overthrow by force when the time came.83 The failure of the 1973–1974 uprising and defeat in the 1976 election, made a violent conclusion almost inevitable and on March 13, 1979, the almost inevitable happened.

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CHAPTER 3

Not in Anybody’s Backyard: The Carter Years The 1979 Revolution At 4:00 p.m. on March 12, 1979, the New Jewel Movement’s (NJM) Security and Defence Committee consisting of Bishop, Coard, Whiteman, and Hudson Austin secretly met to discuss “Operation Apple,” the contingency plan to topple Gairy that had been in preparation for four years.1 The vote was split, with Bishop and Whiteman against action at that time. Another NJM member, George Louison, was brought in to break the deadlock: he voted in favor of action.2 There was a certain sense of “now or never” about the choice; Bishop later explained that it was a case of “them or us . . . and we didn’t plan on it being us.”3 The main target was the army barracks at True Blue in the south. Apart from the advantage of surprise, the NJM was unsure of what the reaction would be; it had to trust that the populace would support it; that Gairy’s supporters would not fight; and, most importantly, that the police and army would not provide any significant resistance.4 Gairy’s absence meant one key target was removed. The coup began at 4:15 a.m. on March 13, 1979. Hudson Austin led the 46-man National Liberation Army armed with only 16 rifles, 2 shotguns, and a few pistols and Molotov cocktails in the main attack on the army barracks.5 The surprise attack encountered minimal resistance, with soldiers either surrendering or fleeing. Radio Grenada was captured by 5:30 a.m., with the first broadcast at 6:15 a.m. a “judicious mixture of threats, promises of clemency, half truths about the situation and broadcasts by two Grenadian ministers . . . whom they had arrested, to coerce and encourage the police to surrender.”6 By 10:15 a.m. Bishop broadcast as prime minister, promising that “all democratic freedoms, including freedom of elections, religious and political opinion, will be fully restored to the people . . . [T]his revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future.”7 By 4:00 p.m. all opposition had evaporated and a carnival atmosphere prevailed as the island celebrated Gairy’s overthrow.

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The US Response The US reaction to the coup was one of surprise. Prime Minister Bishop quickly contacted the neighboring Caribbean governments to express his desire for continued relations and to promise early “free and fair” elections. Bishop phoned the US ambassador Frank Ortiz8 on March 13 to assure him that US citizens and property were safe, that good relations were desired, that the new government would be nonaligned, and that elections would be held promptly. Deputy Prime Minister Coard also contacted Ortiz to inform him that Grenada wished to continue receiving aid from the United States and Britain. Ortiz’s initial assessment of the new government was that they were well-educated, young idealists and violence prone. They appear to be ideologically committed to Marxism but have not demonstrated particular hostility to the US. More than anything they are anti-Gairy. It is probable that the revolutionary group are still uncertain of success and are fearful that we, the British or others may take actions against them.9

In the early hours of March 14 a Barbados Defence Force (BDF) boat left Bridgetown bound for Grenada; on board were BDF Lieutenant Commander Peter Tomlin, US embassy Consular Officer Richard La Roche, and a Canadian diplomat. The three arrived in Grenada at 10:40 a.m. with the aim of assessing the situation, particularly in terms of foreigners wishing to leave.10 They met on board the boat with Bishop, Coard, and two other members of the new government⎯Unison Whiteman, and Raphael Stanislaus. When La Roche enquired about Bishop’s political orientation, Bishop carefully explained he was a socialist and not a Marxist. Bishop assured the group that his main attention would be focused on the electoral process and that he hoped his government would gain official recognition soon.11 In Washington the reaction varied; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) saw the NJM as Cuban Marxists pure and simple, whereas the State Department was less concerned. The National Security Council (NSC) took the middle line. NSC Latin American Senior Director Robert Pastor penned a memo to National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski suggesting that the United States work through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and support its call for elections. Elections would ensure continuity, prevent Bishop from forming “revolutionary councils,” test the extent of Bishop’s following, and establish a good precedent by demonstrating that forcible takeovers were illegitimate. Pastor suggested that “if CARICOM can put Grenada under its umbrella, Cuba will remain far outside.”12 He cautioned that the situation “could go [in] either direction, and a fair amount depends on what we choose to do, with whom and when” and consequently he proposed a meeting of the subcommittee of the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee (a mini-SCC) to “mesh different agencies’ perceptions of the problem into a single and common view,” especially encouraging the State Department

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to appreciate the political dimensions and urgency of dealing with the issue effectively and expediently.13 The mini-SCC convened on March 15 and included representatives from the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CIA, DIA, and the NSC. Pastor, for one, categorized the new People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG)14 as “reasonably idealistic socialist” in the style of Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley but also pragmatic. The replacement of the police and army by the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) and the quasi-communist propaganda emanating from Radio Free Grenada (RFG) did create some suspicion.15 The Pentagon was characteristically apprehensive and the NSC staff allegedly considered imposing a naval blockade.16 Despite the differing departmental opinions a consensus was reached, particularly on the subject of Cuba: Bishop and his group could probably be co-opted by the U.S. or perhaps by Cuba. They are sensitive to international reaction to their coup, and eager to obtain international legitimacy, but if we are not sensitive to their overtures, it is conceivable that they could turn to Cuba.17

It was agreed that supervised parliamentary elections were important; Pastor made the point that if Bishop won a free and fair election the United States should be willing to help him.18 Washington decided to wait for the outcome of the CARICOM meeting and get British and Canadian support to back CARICOM’s call for elections. This option was not without its problems: The CARICOM countries are likely to achieve agreement only with the greatest difficulty, if at all, due to the differences between their interests and ideological views. In the absence of a clear and constructive CARICOM policy which we could support, the major powers with an interest in the area . . . ought to have a coherent and constructive policy which the others could then support. In short, we ought to try to lead events rather than allow them to drift.19

The Eastern Caribbean Reaction Grenada’s neighbors were similarly surprised by the coup. The shared experience of colonialism had given the Eastern Caribbean a collective identity and fostered close social, economic, and political links. The 1958 West Indies Federation had been an attempt to consolidate these ties but collapsed in 1962 amongst internecine squabbling. In 1968 the Caribbean Free Trade Association was formed, later becoming CARICOM, to promote economic integration and intraregional cooperation and coordination in foreign affairs.20 Therefore, the first undemocratic change of power in this close community was destined to have a profound impact. The immediate response was emphatic. St. Lucia’s Prime Minister John Compton called for “Caribbean coordination to ‘sterilize and quarantine’ the revolutionaries through the use of an oil or trade boycott.”21 He also contacted the British government to request “immediate assistance.”22

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An extraordinary meeting of CARICOM ministers of Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, and St. Lucia (the independent members) was held in Barbados on March 14.23 The main focus of the meeting was the reestablishment of constitutional process. The plan agreed on was for the PRG to release Gairy’s acting prime minister, Herbert Preudhomme, who would then appoint Bishop minister without portfolio. Preudhomme would then resign and the governorgeneral would appoint Bishop acting prime minister; Bishop would then advise the dissolution of Parliament to be followed by a free election.24 The significance of this issue led to the decision to extend the meeting for a day and request that the PRG send a representative. Louison, the PRG minister for education, attended the meeting and in response to the question of elections told the meeting that “elections cannot validate a revolution but that the PRG was committed to holding free and fair elections, to a return to constitutional normalcy, and to fair play and justice in society.”25 Louison’s assurances seemed to satisfy the ministers. The Preudhomme plan eventually collapsed when he refused to cooperate. In the circumstances the ministers agreed that events in Grenada were contrary to traditional methods of changing power but that it was an internal matter and that there should be no external interference. They also expressed their desire for a return to constitutionality as soon as possible to preserve the unity of the region and hoped that the PRG’s election pledge would be honored and offered help if it was requested.26 However, the meeting was divided along the question of recognition; Jamaica and Guyana favored quick recognition to normalize relations, but the smaller states were more wary, fearing that this would encourage “more Grenadas.” It was decided to await the outcome of the West Indies Associated States (WIAS) meeting before the issue of recognition was resolved. Trinidad and Tobago took the position that recognition is accorded to states and not governments and therefore no special act of recognition was required.27 An emergency meeting of WIAS convened on March 20 in Antigua. The prime ministers of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the premier of Montserrat attended. The WIAS members had made no secret of their disapproval of the coup, and even desire to overturn it, in the previous days; Bishop condemned the meetings as “an act of gross interference in Grenada’s domestic affairs” and declined to send a representative.28 As expected WIAS expressed its “strong disapproval of a coup d’etat as a means of changing Governments in the region” and therefore “would not at this time accept the present regime in Grenada unless and until arrangements were made to return Grenada to the constitutional process.”29 In addition it was agreed that the judges of the Supreme Court of the joint Eastern Caribbean legal system would be removed from Grenada. Most significant was the decision to establish a Regional Security Force to be used in member states to “preserve and protect the rule of law; protect the Constitutional integrity of the States against armed revolution; protect the society in situations where the normal peace and tranquility of the society is threatened.”30 As Payne et al. conclude: “They were terrified lest the Grenada ‘virus’ began to spread, infecting

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next their islands and thus bringing about their downfall. It was a crude, gut reaction to an event which the Commonwealth Caribbean was unfamiliar.”31 The search for a constitutional solution had failed and “it was impossible for . . . the WIAS governments to hold Bishop’s feet to the fire because both they and he knew that before long Jamaica and Guyana would break ranks and recognize the new government.”32 As expected Jamaica, Guyana and Barbados officially recognized Grenada on March 20, followed by the United States, UK, and Canada on March 22.33 Despite the differences between the CARICOM and WIAS, Grenada was cautiously accepted because Gairy had been a universally disliked character;34 Bishop was well known and liked, and his friendship with prime ministers Forbes Burnham and Michael Manley helped the PRG’s case in most regional bodies. Second, faced with a fait accompli there was a desire to maintain a sense of regional identity and solidarity. Third, the PRG’s promise of elections; desire for good relations; and retention of the governor-general and membership of the Commonwealth, CARICOM, and the Organization of American States (OAS) boded well. The PRG also contained a broad base of businessmen, trade union leaders, and professionals, although the NJM was clearly the dominant faction. Finally, the Eastern Caribbean tradition of tolerance and noninterference was reinforced by President Carter’s promotion of ideological pluralism. As one Caribbean diplomat noted, Bishop made “all the right moves.”35 Grenada’s neighbors always remained apprehensive but were willing to give the PRG a chance. Meeting the PRG Despite expressing concern about the need for elections, Ambassador Ortiz interpreted the unusual situation as an opportunity, believing that “the assumption of power might moderate some of the extremist ideas which the NJM had advocated.”36 It was clear that the United States’ aim was to seek ways to facilitate early democratic elections. Washington believed that “any sanctions at this stage could be counterproductive,” only serving to push Grenada into Cuba’s arms.37 Ortiz reasoned that if the PRG did not feel threatened it would organize elections quicker. In Washington the prevailing mood was one of optimism as there was a sincere belief that here was a case where the United States could successfully influence a “socialist” group to democratize for the first time.38 Embassy official Richard La Roche had remained on Grenada since his arrival on March 14 and met Bishop, Coard, and Whiteman again on March 16. La Roche described the meeting as “extremely relaxed and free-wheeling”; Bishop emphasized the PRG’s fear of a Gairy counterattack and astonishment that his government had not yet been officially recognized. He explained that PRG foreign policy would “look across the board but focus on regional issues, especially CARICOM” and on the question of elections he indicated that enumeration would commence in a fortnight although the timing of an election was not mentioned.39

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Ambassador Ortiz met with Bishop and Whiteman on March 23 to convey the United States’ official recognition of Grenada and to express a desire to continue relations. Moving on to a number of talking points, Ortiz offered to increase the number of Peace Corps volunteers, provided details of five pending US Agency for International Development (AID) programs the PRG was unaware of, and pointed out that as these were administered via the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) they frequently took time to reach the government and therefore the PRG might be interested in the $5,000 available immediately via the Special Development Act funds for community projects.40 Bishop expressed interest but was noncommittal; he wanted the Peace Corps volunteers to come but was unable to discuss specific economic requests yet, and indicated that it would take a few months for the PRG to get on its feet.41 Ortiz then underlined that the PRG’s election promises had made US recognition possible and that three months would be an “acceptable maximum” time period until elections and that six months would “reawaken concern.”42 Bishop explained that Gairy had left the political system in a mess and that even six months was an unrealistic time frame. Ambassador Ortiz had deliberately pushed Bishop on the election issue and came away with the “strong impression that the NRG disliked, as ‘fraudulent and farcical,’ the recent moves towards finding a solution under the present Constitution, and preferred the ‘honest’ answer of abrogating the Constitution and replacing it by something new, attuned to the new Grenada.”43 As Rossin concludes: “US policy toward Grenada was, until this point, characterized by hopefulness tempered by a concern engendered by the evasiveness about elections . . . coupled with the knowledge of the past radical NJM viewpoints.”44 US concerns heightened on March 25 when Bishop suspended the constitution and announced ten fundamental People’s Laws that legalized the PRG and gave the PRA police powers amongst other things. Bishop undertook to return to constitutional rule as soon as possible. A “lingering optimism” still remained in the State Department: “We cannot demand that Grenada retain a precise Westminster parliamentary system, but we can seek to diminish the disruptive ripples of a reform process by urging adherence to democratic principles.”45 The NSC was more cautious: “He [Bishop] is obviously trying to maintain a good relationship with the U.S., but his proclivities to ‘revolutionize’ the political system in Grenada may lead him toward a ‘Cuban model,’ which in turn may lead to closer ties with, if not dependence on, Cuba.”46 Such a development would clearly have implications for WIAS and CARICOM unity. Bishop had moved fast to consolidate the “Revolution”: Within a week of the coup, he had arrested many of his political opponents and transferred military and police powers to his followers. Recognized by all his neighbors, he had also received assurances of good relations and offers of aid from both the US and UK.47

Concluding that the PRG had used the election issue to gain recognition, Washington policymakers decided that “our main purpose is to keep Grenada

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from drifting into the Cuban orbit. We continue to feel that this can best be accomplished by working with the new government.”48 In light of Jamaica’s good relations with Grenada, Prime Minister Manley was consulted to discuss the ideological orientation of the PRG and its relationship with Cuba, and how the United States might best develop a productive relationship. A new factor was added to the equation on April 4 when a Cuban plane unloaded small arms in Grenada. On April 7 a Cuban flight from Guyana to Cuba was diverted to Grenada and unloaded more arms and eight Cubans. The following day another Cuban plane, allegedly experiencing technical difficulties, landed and left behind more arms and Cubans, and on April 14 the Cuban ship Matanzas docked with yet more arms.49 The Guyanese were even quicker off the mark. Around March 16 the first weapons from Guyana arrived by air; further weapons arrived by ship on March 22 and April 9.50 The PRG was supersensitive about the threat of a Gairy countercoup and on April 7, claiming that Gairy was organizing a mercenary invasion, officially requested arms from the United States. At this point the United States was unaware of the arrival of Cuban and Guyanese arms. Bishop also asked Britain and CARICOM, and planned to ask Canada for military assistance. The next day, using the Gairy threat to justify his actions, Bishop told a rally that he planned to ask for Cuban and Venezuelan military help and expected Cuban diplomatic recognition and technical and material assistance soon after.51 From the timing of the arrival of Cuban and Guyanese transports it is irrefutable that arms were en route to Grenada even before Bishop’s public request to the West or Cuba. Unsettled by these developments the State Department dispatched Ambassador Ortiz to Grenada on April 9. Ambassador Ortiz found the island in the midst of an invasion scare and witnessed PRA soldiers firing on a Holiday Inn charter plane. Ortiz met first with Coard. Ortiz commented that the invasion scare would deter tourists and Coard replied that Gairy was a threat. The ambassador assured Coard that Gairy was in the United States and not on a neighboring island as the PRG claimed. He informed Coard that the embassy was ready to send AID officers to meet with PRG officials but Coard repeated the familiar message that the new government was not ready. The meeting concluded with Ortiz mentioning that the talking points for his meeting with Bishop later that day would include a statement about relations with Cuba, but Coard did not respond.52 Ambassador Ortiz’s meeting with Bishop has received much attention as the purported starting point for the deterioration of US-Grenadian relations and merits some attention. Bishop was aware that Ortiz was there to carry out some important instructions but Ortiz began by telling Bishop that he would like to talk informally first. Ortiz had a fair amount of leeway because until this meeting Washington had no firm Grenada policy.53 The ambassador also made a point of mentioning that he would be traveling to Washington soon and that the details of affairs would be available to senior officials there. The first subject was Gairy. Rumors of an invasion were widespread and Ortiz assured Bishop that Gairy was in San Diego and that the Federal Bureau of

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Investigation was keeping an informal track of his activities and had no firm evidence of any invasion plans.54 Ortiz suggested that it would be helpful if the PRG publicized Gairy’s location to ease the tension. In relation to the Gairy threat, Ortiz, now speaking formally, told Bishop: Although my government recognizes your concerns over allegations of a possible countercoup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada’s best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall an armed attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba.55

Ambassador Ortiz continued to speak formally, reading verbatim the text of a nonpaper containing ten talking points.56 He asked Bishop if there would be a follow-up to the PRG’s request for arms that had been made on April 7. Bishop said that there would not be, so Ortiz pointed out that the United States had no details of the numbers or types of arms required; Bishop estimated that 500 semiautomatic rifles and 200 machine guns should suffice.57 The conversation now returned to the crucial subject⎯Cuba. Bishop told Ortiz that “after one month there had been no response to Grenada’s urgent needs from its traditional friends and that it had to find help where it could.”58 Ortiz pointed out that the United States had only received the request for arms a few days earlier and the specific details about ten minutes earlier and so it was difficult to call the United States “unresponsive.” Bishop conceded the ambassador’s point and blamed overwork.59 Ortiz then cut to the quick: I asked him [Bishop] point blank if the Cubans had offered assistance. He firmly said they had not. I asked him what his response would be if they did. He answered that depends on the circumstances. I asked what he meant by that. He replied if mercenaries invade [the] PRG would get help wherever it could.60

Ortiz suspected, correctly, that Cuban arms were arriving but Bishop did not know this; when Ortiz said that he would be “particularly concerned about arms,” Bishop probably assumed that the ambassador knew for certain and that the United States would intercept the shipments or inform the Eastern Caribbean governments.61 Ortiz stressed that Grenada was an independent and sovereign country and could do what it wanted but that the PRG should “have no doubts that developing close ties with Cuba would greatly complicate relations with Grenada’s neighbors and with friendly countries like the U.S.”62 Noting Bishop’s “apparent exhaustion” Ortiz decided to close the meeting and told Bishop that the United States was willing to provide aid, possibly even arms, if a clear indication of Grenada’s needs was provided. The ball was in Grenada’s court for the moment. The PRG’s response came on April 13 at 8:00 p.m. on RFG. Bishop spoke at length saying that Ortiz had made “veiled threats” against Grenada’s tourist industry, saying that if talk of “mercenary invasions by phantom armies” continued Grenada would lose all its tourists.63 Moving on to the question of economic

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aid, Bishop acknowledged that Ortiz had outlined the multilateral basis of US aid via the CDB and that bureaucracy often made obtaining aid a slow process but melodramatically charged that the only aid available in the near future was “the paltry sum of a few $5,000 (sic) . . . all that the wealthiest country in the world can offer to a poor but proud people.”64 For a grand finale Bishop returned to the threat of a mercenary invasion to inform people that if Cuba offered assistance Grenada would accept it, affirming that [n]o country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country or who to be friendly with. We certainly would not attempt to tell any other country what to do. We are not in anybody’s backyard, and we are definitely not for sale.65

In Washington the speech was viewed as a purposeful distortion of events by Bishop to justify the “already-in-train” move toward military and diplomatic ties with Cuba. Bishop had ignored the five AID programs mentioned previously and emphasized the Special Development Activities66 funds that Ortiz had discussed with Coard. The State Department felt that Bishop had portrayed Ortiz’s notification of US displeasure of the development of “closer ties” with Cuba as an outright threat to encourage Grenadians to support the PRG’s ties with Cuba.67 The NSC met to reassess the situation; until now the approach to Grenada had been “relaxed but concerned”: We premised this posture on the belief that Bishop and his followers were of the Manley “socialist democratic” school, but that they were pragmatic and could be co-opted by us or, for that matter, by the Cubans. The feeling was that as time passed, the realities of governing . . . would steer Bishop towards working with us . . . A more confrontational strategy by us could perhaps push the Grenadians in [to] the arms of the Cubans.68

The Manley analogy was now rejected as it became clear that Bishop was moving in the direction of a one-party state, with close ties to Cuba. Washington was now at an important crossroads: “adopt a different strategy to try to counter Grenada’s drift towards the Cubans” or concentrate on “preventing similar kinds of coups on neighboring islands.”69 As Pastor underlined, it would have to be the United States that acted as the “catalyst” to counter the drift toward Cuba in the region. However, he felt that this would be best achieved from behind the scenes by supporting Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in calling for elections, a cessation of the militarization of Grenada, the freeing of political prisoners, and the delegitimization of Cuba’s involvement by linking it to the arms buildup and lack of elections.70 This “regional” strategy placed emphasis on consultation with Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago to ensure wider Caribbean support for US policy. The alternative to this was to “test Bishop’s alleged interest in good relations with the U.S. by playing with him on aid. We should send teams down to survey, but we should keep

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from making firm decisions until the direction of his ‘revolution’ is clarified.”71 This was certainly the State Department’s preference as it believed the PRG was co-optable and favored trying to “buy out” Grenada.72 At a mini-SCC meeting on April 27 Washington made the decision. The cooptation strategy of providing bilateral aid was rejected because it was felt that it would have a negative effect on the democratic Eastern Caribbean countries that needed aid just as much and it would also set a precedent for other regimes to confront the United States in order to receive more aid.73 Perhaps more importantly, Bishop had never displayed much interest in being co-opted; the PRG’s requests for aid had been nonspecific, vague, and perfunctory in nature. Consequently, the “pressures and incentives” of the “regional” strategy won out. Grenada’s neighbors would pressure the PRG to hold elections and reduce their ties to Cuba. All the islands would receive more aid except Grenada, which would be told that if it implemented changes it too would receive aid. The participants concluded that this option was more congruent with the Administration’s approach to the region; and . . . the regional nations could probably have a more positive influence on the PRG than could the US. It appeared the NJM was comfortable with the US as its enemy, and perhaps the best strategy for the US was to avoid giving them a target.74

The change of policy was not as quick as might be expected. The State Department remained wedded to the co-optation option, or more accurately “keeping the door open” to avoid charges of pushing Grenada away and toward Cuba.75 Displaying a noticeable lack of “distancing,” the State Department recommended that Grenada should be included on the schedule of a small AID survey team visiting the Caribbean islands to allow Washington to “retain the flexibility to consider assistance at some future point.”76 When Pastor at NSC learnt of this he was surprised as it contradicted the regional strategy agreed on April 27; he felt it would be a “terrible mistake” as Grenada had not given the US any reason to act positively.77 As it happened, the US embassy deputy chief of mission (DCM) John Eddy was due to visit Grenada in early May. Whilst Ambassador Ortiz suggested that this would be a good opportunity to clarify that “assurances that the Cubans . . . would leave Grenada would be met with USG responsiveness to Grenada development needs and would help to ensure continued US trade and tourism,” the State Department rejected such a firm line and instructed Eddy that “no new statements to the PRG on Cuban involvement should be made in light of Bishop’s strong earlier reaction.”78 Eddy met Bishop on May 9 to, among other things, solicit the specifics of Grenada’s aid requests.79 According to John Bushnell, deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, Grenada remained eligible for regional aid;80 Washington scaled down bilateral programs and if Grenada had asked for aid they would not have received anything. When the AID team visited the Caribbean Grenada was excluded.

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Grenada could have accepted US aid to reduce the mounting tension but this might have jeopardized the opportunity of a closer relationship with Cuba: [P]erhaps the best way to resolve the contradiction was to go on the attack and try to organize a diplomatic front against the United States around the themes of nonintervention and sovereignty⎯that would be ideologically satisfying in itself, would allow the Soviet Union to be courted, and could indeed be the most effective constraint upon the United States.81

From prison, years later, Coard reflected that “as young revolutionaries on a mission of transforming our country . . . [we] were not prepared to allow any foreign power to dictate to us in any way, to hold us back.”82 Rediscovering the Cold War in the Caribbean The United States has traditionally pursued a policy of “strategic denial” of geopolitical presence to nonhemispheric powers that could be a potential threat. From Washington’s viewpoint Cuba was the “rotten apple in the middle of this vital area that threatened to undercut US influence.”83 Grenada was seen in the same light. Britain’s gradual withdrawal from the Caribbean left a legacy of political and economic instability to the newly independent microstates of the Eastern Caribbean. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations perceived the creation of a strategic vacuum that could unsettle the global balance of power. As a result the United States encouraged a militarization of the region and integrated it into a broader global context.84 When the Grenada revolution was followed by left-wing electoral victories in Dominica and St. Lucia it resurrected US fears of “splashing dominoes” in the Caribbean. Such thinking would receive more attention during the Reagan administration. President Carter’s “discovery” of a Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba prompted him to announce: “We will increase our economic assistance to alleviate the unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further to insure the ability of troubled people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination.”85 On October 1, 1979, Carter established a Joint Task Force at Key West, Florida. The tone of future relations was soon set when, on May 8, Bishop accused the CIA of conducting a multistage “Pyramid Plan” to destabilize Grenada.86 Irked by this the United States decided that a response was necessary; a press release described Bishop’s accusation as “unwarranted and without foundation.”87 Interestingly, the next day Bishop told the US embassy’s DCM Eddy that he understood relations had got off to a bad start, that he wanted to improve them and believed that the White House and State Department wanted good relations, and that the CIA was acting without authority.88 In public and in private, as the Grenada documents confirm, the PRG saw CIA-backed agents behind every bush. By coincidence, NSC Director Brzezinski sent a memo to CIA

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Director Stansfield Turner on May 8 conveying President Carter’s concerns about the growing Cuban presence in Grenada. The memo suggested some sort of covert effort to bring these developments to the attention of the international media.89 The United States was being strongly criticized for its hostility toward Grenada and public perception was that this had pushed Grenada toward Cuba rather than Grenada making such a decision.90 The CIA responded on May 14 with a proposed political program that went beyond Brzezinski’s original suggestion by intending to counter the Cuban presence in Grenada. According to Gates, Carter signed a “finding” on July 3, 1979, that authorized covert operations to promote the democratic process and support domestic resistance to the Marxist PRG.91 When the Senate Intelligence Committee was briefed on the plan on July 19 it expressed its “strong displeasure,” pointing out how such action would contradict the administration’s stance on human rights and noninterference, and sent a letter to the President informing him that it could not “support the projected covert action directed at Grenada.”92 Although the committee had no legal jurisdiction over covert operations, the CIA, to the White House’s dismay, respected the committee’s reaction and all plans for covert action against Grenada were shelved on July 23, 1979.93 In contrast to the support for covert action by the White House, NSC, and CIA, the State Department continued its more moderate line. On June 7 Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky met with Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard for 40 minutes at the second annual meeting of the Caribbean Group. Vaky told Coard that Washington wanted a “constructive relationship” and that there had been “misunderstandings” in the past but that this could be avoided in the future by establishing a “free and candid” dialogue.94 Coard apparently agreed that it was time to rebuild the relationship but restated with “force and conviction” that Grenada was not a client state and would accept help from wherever it was offered.95 Vaky inquired as to what the “true story” was concerning the Cubans in Grenada but Coard sidestepped the issue. Despite learning nothing new, Vaky felt that “the atmospherics were good and tended to support the impression we have received from several sources that the NRG is looking for ways to mend fences with us.”96 By June 1979 the US embassy had adopted a policy of regular consular visits and reduced direct contact with the PRG, working on a “listen and report” basis.97 Ambassador Ortiz, who the PRG had seemingly taken a personal dislike to, was succeeded by Sally Shelton in June. The PRG made noises about improving relations and the State Department and embassy felt that Shelton’s appointment was “an opportunity for the U.S. to make another effort at reconciliation with the PRG and a new start at achieving our objectives.”98 Shelton was similarly optimistic and was instructed to make US concerns clear and inform Bishop that to remove the causes of “tension or misunderstanding” their dialogue should be based on “frankness and candor.”99 An indication of the PRG’s position was demonstrated immediately when it postponed Shelton’s presentation of her credentials to the governor-general for seven weeks after she expressed her hope at an embassy press conference in Barbados that human rights would be

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respected by the new Grenadian government. Shelton recalled that “the somewhat extreme reaction of the PRG . . . did make me wonder if this were not going to be quite a prickly government to deal with.”100 Ambassador Shelton finally met with Bishop on July 23, 1979. Shelton began by emphasizing that Washington wanted to work with the PRG and the United States had approximately $40 million of foreign assistance funds committed to regional projects in the Eastern Caribbean.101 Discussion then moved on to the PRG’s request for the extradition of Gairy from the United States. Knowing that this was a potentially controversial issue, the State Department took the relatively unprecedented step of asking the Department of Justice to assist the Grenadians with the complex extradition process. The PRG welcomed the idea and in February 1980 an extradition expert traveled to Barbados; however, efforts to arrange a meeting with the Grenada Justice Secretariat were rebuffed with claims that officials were too busy. Shelton was “livid” with the PRG and concluded that “they were never really serious about the Gairy extradition, but rather were using it to hammer at the U.S. for allegedly being uncooperative.”102 Ambassador Shelton’s conclusion was prescient. The next time the United States heard of the matter was via the media when Bishop accused the United States of procrastination. Washington’s pique was understandable; it had made an appreciable effort to respond to the extradition request and advised the PRG how to expedite the process but once again the PRG had used the public arena to denounce the United States. Ambassador Shelton also reiterated the United States’ position on the issue of Chester Humphrey and James Wardally who were under arrest in the United States for gunrunning. The case was originally raised by Ambassador Ortiz in his meeting with Prime Minister Bishop on March 23 to indicate how seriously the United States took violation of its Neutrality Act, alluding to the PRG’s charges that Gairy was building a mercenary army. Since that point the case had developed into a “significant irritant” in relations.103 On March 31, 1979, Grenada’s ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Kendrick Radix, and ambassador to the OAS, Dessima Williams, met with the director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs at the State Department, Ashley Hewitt. Radix and Williams were told that the Department of Justice had no option but to proceed owing to the strong evidence but had agreed that no one else would be indicted or named; the significance of this was that Justice had evidence of Williams’s involvement.104 The PRG continued to pursue the case: in April, Bishop asked a visiting embassy officer whether Wardally and Humphrey could be swapped for an American embezzler living in Grenada; in May a letter from the Grenadian acting attorney general Lloyd Noel suggested that the dropping of charges would be conducive to good relations and in the “spirit of reciprocity” with regard to the PRG having dropped charges against an American student accused of arson.105 The Grenadians had already made it clear that this issue complicated the improvement of relations. The State Department had asked the Justice Department to take full account of the foreign policy implications of this case but

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the Justice Department decided that the seriousness and strength of the case against Wardally and Humphrey meant that the case had to be pursued. The PRG changed tack in August when Williams and Noel told Justice Department officials that the request for clemency was not being fairly considered for political reasons and that the department was collaborating with Eric Gairy to embarrass the PRG.106 This did not affect matters and on September 1, Wardally and Humphrey were indicted on five counts, having rejected a plea bargain, with a trial due within two months. The PRG response came in a Washington Post article where Ambassador Williams explained that the detention of an American citizen in Grenada since July 9, without charges and consular access, was linked to the indictments of Wardally and Humphrey and that the whole situation would create a “very sour and antagonistic relationship between the U.S. and Grenada.”107 In a Diplomatic Note the United States formally protested the linking of the two cases as interference in the US legal process. An unexpected resolution to the problem arose on September 29 when Wardally and Humphrey jumped bail and made their way to Grenada. Extradition of the pair was unfeasible so the matter was dropped. Rossin concluded: PRG conduct in this case, which started off at a low-key level and degenerated into virtual hysteria and threats against a private American citizen (who was never charged and who suddenly was released and deported over one month after Wardally’s and Humphrey’s return to Grenada) once again manifested the ill-will that regime bore toward the United States.

The investigation’s findings would clearly have implicated the PRG leaders in the gunrunning, which would have been highly embarrassing and would have probably impacted upon relations with neighboring governments. The seriousness of the charges meant that dropping the case was impossible; the PRG was simultaneously accusing the United States of not enforcing the Neutrality Act with regard to the extradition of Eric Gairy. The State Department had promised the PRG that the foreign policy implications of the case would be taken into account and the mildest sentence sought.108 The PRG’s efforts to do an exchange for Wardally and Humphrey, linking the case to the detention of an American in Grenada and threatening that the issue would hinder the development of good relations were inappropriate and only served to vex Washington further. Grenada’s ties with Cuba were the United States’ central concern and precluded the normalization of relations. Cuba provided Grenada with an introduction to the Soviet Union; diplomatic relations were established in December 1979 via a communiqué signed in Cuba. The PRG worked hard to prove its communist credentials with Moscow. In international forums such as the UN and Non-Aligned Movement it consistently supported the Soviet position, most notably at a UN vote to condemn the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when Grenada joined Cuba as the only supporters of the action. According to Payne, the decision was taken primarily by Coard in Bishop’s

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absence from Grenada, who subsequently agreed with the decision in order to maintain unity and demonstrate his radicalism.109 Grenada’s vote was consistent with its foreign policy orientation but it complicated relations with other countries in the region and beyond. Grenada’s ambassador to the OAS, Dessima Williams, understood this well and issued a public statement saying that she hoped the vote would not disrupt already strained relations.110 It was a forlorn hope; for the State Department the vote was a “deep disappointment and a prime cause of disillusionment.”111 The Grenada-Soviet Union relationship, much facilitated by Cuba’s role as an intermediary, developed gradually, and a Soviet embassy was not established in Grenada until September 1982. Content to let Cuba take the lead, in October 1980 Moscow signed a secret military aid agreement with Grenada worth 4.4 million roubles. In February 1981 a protocol to this effect was signed worth 5 million roubles and in July 1982 an agreement worth 10 million roubles was signed.112 Economic aid was less forthcoming and the Soviets did not contribute funds to the airport project.113 Grenada also established relations with a range of Soviet bloc countries and received military and economic aid from countries such as Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, and North Korea. In November 1979 Bishop announced that a second airport would be constructed at Point Salines. The need for improved airport facilities had been discussed several times since 1955.114 A 1980 World Bank Memorandum confirmed earlier studies when it “identified air access as a major constraint on full utilization of existing capacity and further development of the [tourist] sector. Pearls Airport cannot accommodate international flights or night landings.”115 The PRG placed the airport at the center of its economic strategy, anticipating that tourism and improved transport facilities would act as a catalyst for the economy.116 Grenada had already signed an extensive economic and technical agreement with Cuba and now Castro offered to contribute $10 million, 85 pieces of equipment, and 250 technicians toward the project.117 Grenada requested US help but it was unsurprisingly declined on political and economic grounds. With Cuba’s public offer of aid almost preempting Bishop’s announcement of the airport project, many in Washington concluded that it was part of a Soviet-Cuban master plan to convert Grenada into a military outpost. Strategists argued that at 9,000 feet the runway was designed to be able to handle military aircraft, that Castro wanted a secure staging post for moving troops to Angola, and that Grenada would become a projection of Soviet power as part of a geopolitical circle of bases in the Caribbean.118 The PRG did little to assuage Washington’s fears. When asked about the possibility of Cuba and the Soviet Union using the airport to transport troops to “hotspots” such as Angola, Bishop replied: “Suppose there’s a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control, and the Trinidadians need external assistance . . . Why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them?”119 Incontrovertible proof that the Cubans or Soviets would have used the airport does not exist. Whether it would have been used as a military facility is inconsequential; the airport’s potential use

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as a military facility and Cuban involvement in its construction meant that the US perception of it was as a potential Soviet-Cuban military facility. Consolidating the Revolution The PRG secured control of the media when it closed down the opposition newspaper Torchlight in October 1979 for printing “lies and distorted information and . . . excluding pro-government news, thus threatening national security.”120 People’s Law 81 was passed to limit individuals to a 4 percent stake in any particular medium and banned foreign ownership entirely. This law automatically transferred all foreign shares, and those of Grenadians who held more than 4 percent, to the PRG.121 Despite its compliance with People’s Law 81 the Roman Catholic Church’s Catholic Focus was closed down by the PRG after its first issue. The goodwill toward the PRG that had prevailed in the Caribbean was gradually dissipating. A Caribbean Contact article asked, “What has gone wrong, Mr. Bishop?” and in another article Grenadian journalist Alister Hughes wrote that there were some “disturbing straws in the wind.”122 In July the GNP leader Herbert Blaize organized a public meeting, the first one since the revolution, in Sauteurs; he called for a return to constitutional government and an end to political detention. The meeting of 250 people was quickly disrupted by about 30 hecklers and eventually cancelled; the same happened again a few days later when Blaize tried to hold a meeting in Grenville.123 This Gairy-like denial of freedom of speech was not condemned by the government. Another point of departure occurred when the government intervened in a strike at the W. E. Julien Coca-Cola bottling factory. The PRG advised the company to reopen the factory and reinstate two sacked workers and establish a tribunal to decide the issue. The company declined and so the government reopened the factory. The PRG explanation was that the strike was affecting the economy and causing suffering to the workers and general public.124 The clear message was that “unless the employer respected the worker’s rights, his rights would not be protected by the state.”125 It had been made very clear to the PRG that a free and fair election would be essential to good relations with its Eastern Caribbean neighbors and the United States. Bishop had promised an election to help gain recognition but subsequently an election had not been deemed a priority. Feeling more secure, Bishop was noncommittal: “We do not want to state for what period of time elections must be postponed . . . but we are equally very, very clear in our minds that elections are NOT the key question.”126 The absence of an election may have been disappointing but should not have been surprising. The PRG had not come into power constitutionally and if it had followed the constitutional route it would have had to operate within that route, which would have been a hindrance to the revolutionary regime that it wanted to be.127 On a practical note, quick elections would have been flawed. Many political opponents had been detained and it is unclear who would have opposed the PRG. By late 1979 electoral victory would

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not have been certain. In the 1976 election the NJM had only won three of the seven opposition seats and all of them had been in St. George’s parish; Bishop won his seat by just 110 votes.128 As time passed, more and more people were becoming quietly critical of the PRG; its ideological approach was alien to most Grenadians, there were more detainees than under Gairy, and people felt that they had not had a revolution to lose their freedoms.129 Once in power the PRG began to rely increasingly on state repression for control. Numerous counterrevolutionary plots, real and imagined, were uncovered and arrests made. The US embassy summed up the trend thus: “periodically ‘revealing’ national security threats apparently designed to consolidate the PRG’s control of Grenada, to intimidate domestic critics, and to preach the doctrine that there is a serious and ongoing external threat.”130 The most serious of these threats occurred on June 19, 1980, when a bomb exploded near the podium the entire PRG cabinet was on at a rally in Queen’s Park. Three members of the crowd were killed. Bishop claimed that the assassination attempt was one of the “foul deeds of imperialism.”131 True to form the PRG used the bombing to generate more anti-US propaganda. The chosen forum this time was the UN. As the embassy sardonically reported: “We are in for an even more difficult period in our relationship with the insecure, paranoid and self-righteous PRG, as it continues to blame the US for its internal security problems and whip up pro-revolutionary fervor at US expense.”132 In the aftermath of the Queen’s Park bombing, civil liberties were again eroded as a Terrorism (Prevention) Law was passed. The number of political prisoners climbed further and Bishop derided democracy as “a situation where every five years, and for five seconds in those five years, a people are allowed to put an ‘X’ next to some candidate’s name, and for those five seconds they became democrats.”133 The PRA functioned as the enforcers of NJM policies and assumed the responsibility for protecting the revolution from counter revolutionaries. They quickly became the eyes and ears . . . Allegations or mere suspicion of being a “counter” resulted in detention because no one would be allowed to stop the wheels of progress . . . [T]he net of suspicion of being a “counter” was spread very wide.134

In Washington such actions only served to reinforce and advance perceptions of the PRG as a hard-line socialist government with a less than healthy respect for human rights. In November 1979 two US citizens in Grenada were arrested and denied access to US consuls. This “mini-hostage” situation was naturally a cause for concern. Remarks on the matter by PRG ministers caused the State Department to be “fearful that [the] PRG may take adverse action against Americans once the PRG is informed of our inability to move more promptly on the extradition of Gairy.”135 Such a scenario may or may not have been far-fetched but the specter of another hostage crisis led Washington to instruct Ambassador Shelton to “carry out a demarche on the treatment of American citizens arrested in Grenada

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and PRG violations of consular conventions” in her next meeting with Bishop, scheduled for December 17, 1979, and convince Bishop that the protection of US citizens was of paramount concern for Washington.136 Shelton was instructed to ensure that the PRG got the “definite impression that we view the PRG as responsible for the deterioration in U.S.-PRG relations and any improvement in our relations can only occur if there are important changes in the way the PRG relates to the U.S.”137 The meeting was “relaxed and cordial” but “discussions were frank with both governments’ positions forcefully outlined . . . Neither side minced words but there was an absence of contention.”138 Bishop again raised the issue of Gairy’s extradition and expressed his desire for good relations but added that this would not be at the cost of “sacrificing principle.”139 This condition made good relations more distant than ever. As US hopes for any improvement in relations ebbed, their policies reflected this. In February 1980 Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Bushnell warned that “the rapid reduction in the British role in the Caribbean requires us to open the door to cooperative security relationships . . . To do otherwise is to leave the field to Cuba, which is aggressively expanding its influence with its smaller Caribbean neighbours.”140 The United States made its feelings clear in May 1980 with the Operation Solid Shield military maneuver in the region involving 20,000 men, 42 ships, 350 aircraft, and a landing at Guantanamo in Cuba.141 The message sent to Grenada was unequivocal. US economic aid was the most realistic method of nudging Grenada away from Cuba. It is difficult to dispute that US policy was punitive. In January 1980 after severe floods in Grenada, the PRG requested help from the OAS’s InterAmerican Emergency Aid Fund (FONDEM), but the US AID delegate questioned the need for aid and insisted that an investigation be conducted.142 Aid was finally granted but only after a long delay. On August 2–3, 1980, Hurricane Allen swept through the Eastern Caribbean, badly damaging the all-important banana crops.143 The Windward Islands Banana Association (WINBAN) and St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica immediately requested US aid, but Grenada did not. It was not until September 8, when the Grenadian representative to the UN passed a letter to the US representative, that Grenada requested help. The United States’ final decision was to dispense $1.8 million among St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica because they were the worst affected. Grenada received nothing on the grounds that it suffered less damage and that bananas were not the island’s main crop. Washington was cynical: “What it really was was a case of a belated, dubious and relatively unjustified Grenadian request for aid probably made precisely so it would be rejected and could be used for propaganda.”144 The inherent bad faith that pervaded relations and the politicization of the economic aid program was manifest in this decision. In the United States’ defence it must be remembered that both ambassadors, Ortiz and Shelton, had offered aid when the possibility of good relations still existed but by late 1979 this was not the case. Rossin acknowledges that while many of the PRG’s allegations of economic destabilization by the United States were “either created from whole cloth or are serious distortions of the original

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situations. Others did happen, and represent efforts by the United States to protect its own security and interests as the major aid donor in the region.”145 The regional approach of the AID programs also complicated matters because “direct assistance to individual islands or organizations on individual islands is precluded much to the consternation of the citizenry who see their problems as specific and immediate.”146 Regional bodies such as the CDB were large bureaucracies and made receiving aid a slow process. The United States’ economic policy undoubtedly had an important impact on the PRG but it was already following its chosen road. As Ambursley points out, the PRG’s economic policy involved the mobilization of all international sources of financial aid.147 With Grenada’s ideological disposition and Cuba’s desire to help Grenada become a showcase for Cuban Third World aid programs it was inevitable that closer ties would develop. Politically, the distancing tactics were also evident. The United States refused to recognize the PRG’s nominee, Dessima Williams, as ambassador to the United States.148 Ambassador Shelton was forbidden from paying the customary farewell visit to Grenada irrespective of Bishop’s invite to discuss “matters of mutual interest with a view to promoting and developing friendly relations.”149 Despite a sense of déjà vu, Ambassador Shelton and some embassy staff believed that it would be in Washington’s best interest to accept the invite particularly in view of the apparent shift in PRG views on the questions of Gairy’s extradition and Williams’ agrement. It may well be that the PRG would like to remove these irritants from our bilateral relations so that it can begin on a different footing with the new U.S. President, a suggestion supported by a diminution of anti-U.S. rhetoric . . . Our policy of distancing ourselves from the PRG may be having an effect with Bishop appearing to feel that it is better to talk face-to-face than to continue to hurl epithets publicly.150

In Washington though the patience and appetite for improved relations had disappeared. The bottom line was that good relations were dependent on the reduction of links with Cuba, a return to constitutional government, free and fair elections, improved human rights, a reduction in anti-US rhetoric, and a true nonaligned policy. This was hardly a flexible line that left room for Grenada to maneuver in, but the Grenadian leopard was not about to change its spots. The United States had classified Grenada as “a country which seeks and exploits occasions to harm the interests of democratic societies around it.”151 Washington felt deceived by the PRG’s move toward Cuba and violation of its commitments to elections and irritated by Bishop’s incessant accusations and thus decided it was preferable to ignore and isolate Grenada. The embassy summed up the United States’ perception of the situation in October 1980: The PRG continues in its mindset that all differences between us are the fault of the United States Government, that they have not acted in any way against us, and that it is up to the USG to take steps to correct these matters . . . We are more useful to the PRG as a bogeyman than as a friend.152

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Unease in the Backyard After a cautious start, Grenada’s relations with its neighbors cooled. The postindependence islands realized they could not afford a national military capability, reasoning that international security arrangements, such as the OAS, or the United States’ historical preeminence would protect them. In addition, CARICOM felt immune to political extremism and regional instability, being isolated by the long tradition of Westminster democracy.153 Caribbean concern was increased by left-wing electoral victories in June and July in Dominica and St. Lucia respectively. On July 16, 1979, Grenada, Dominica, and St. Lucia signed the Declaration of St. George’s, which, among other things, stated that “popular democracy, respect for the rights of workers and social and economic justice for the masses must be the main objectives of their government.”154 It appeared that a “New Left” was emerging in the region. Throughout the islands various left-wing opposition groups flexed their muscles in anticipation. The threat Grenada posed was exaggerated but it must be remembered that a small force of men could overthrow a government and there were numerous coup scares during this period.155 Grenada’s relations with the United States worsened almost as fast as those with Cuba improved. By mid-April there were 2,000 Cuban-armed PRA and militia members and approximately 40–80 Cuban advisers in Grenada.156 Prime Minister Adams of Barbados, the harshest critic of the PRG, described the Grenada-Cuba military link as “obnoxious, dangerous and unwise.”157 Several secret military agreements were also signed; that security relationships existed was assumed because in the smallness and intimacy of the Eastern Caribbean system each leader knows approximately their neighbor’s security relationships but this was not so with Grenada, which increased their unease.158 The leaders had always assumed that the United States would act to prevent Cuba establishing a presence in the area but that presumption was now being challenged. Grenada’s neighbors continued to pressure the PRG over human rights, links with Cuba, political prisoners, and elections. Bishop’s unflattering response to Tom Adams’s remarks in November 1980 suggesting Grenada’s lack of elections would restrict the ability of the CDB to attract investors, compared Adams to “an expectant dog barking for his supper, he rushes in to please his new master Reagan like all good yard fowls by attacking Grenada.”159 This invective mirrored Grenada’s relations with the United States. Adams had pursued a policy of “quiet diplomacy” toward Grenada rather than utilizing the media, and there was great concern over the personal and very public nature of Bishop’s criticism. Whilst the Eastern Caribbean nations tolerated Grenada, they simultaneously pursued a more security-oriented path. Only a few weeks after the coup, Tom Adams and Trinidad and Tobago’s prime minister Eric Williams signed a memorandum of understanding acknowledging security problems, notably, “terrorism, piracy, the use of mercenaries and the introduction into the region of techniques of subversion.”160

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Grenada’s militarization led Caribbean leaders to approach the United States for assistance despite concerns that the “the more arms we have available in the country, the greater will be the temptation to solve our problems with a coup.”161 Apart from Grenada, only Barbados had a standing army.162 The Dominica Defense Force was disbanded in April 1981 primarily owing to the cost of maintaining it and the apparent involvement of some members in a coup attempt against Prime Minister Eugenia Charles. Of the other islands, the St. Kitts-Nevis Defense Force was also disbanded in 1981 partly due to a lack of justification for its maintenance and doubts about the allegiances of the army and police leaders. St. Lucia only had a police force as did St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force, created in September 1981, was the only other military organization.163 After the 1979 Soviet Brigade incident, Carter designated Barbados, which had never received US military aid, for a special role and disbursed $5 million dollars for communication and navigational equipment to “strengthen the security of the entire Eastern Caribbean.”164 Conclusion The United States sought, and accepted, the Eastern Caribbean and British judgment in deciding to recognize the PRG. Bishop’s pledge to hold “free and fair” elections assuaged US suspicions and left Washington sanguine about future relations. It conceded that the PRG had different views but initially believed that the PRG wanted good relations with the United States. Holding the PRG to its promise of early elections was of central importance; elections would have signified the PRG’s good intentions, a readiness to rely on a honest test of its support amongst Grenadians, and legitimized the new government.165 Frustrated by the PRG’s evasiveness over their aid requirements, the United States grew concerned when it was apparent that Grenada was establishing close ties with Cuba. When Ambassador Ortiz informed Bishop that the effect of “an intimate relationship between the NRG and Cuba in the military and security areas might eventually be to limit the breadth and depth of the kind of relationship that would be possible with the US,”166 Bishop, in a style that became familiar, publicly blasted the United States for telling Grenada who it could have relations with. Whilst it is important not to overemphasize the Ortiz episode, its impact on an inexperienced PRG, feeling vulnerable and sensitive to criticism, was significant. In light of the United States’ patience and optimism of the earlier weeks it was a turning point: the PRG’s “response confirmed the impression in Washington that these young Marxists wanted to provoke the U.S. to justify their militarization and alliance with Cuba.”167 About six weeks after the revolution, the NSC held a meeting that recommended the previously described “regional” strategy to President Carter. With no sign of elections, a steady flow of anti-US rhetoric, vague requests for aid, and the growing ties with Cuba, it appeared that the PRG’s professed interest in good relations was superficial. It is likely that the PRG clearly understood that its political program was of the type Washington would not find acceptable. Although it

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may have wished for normal diplomatic relations, it was not willing to sacrifice its domestic and international political program in order to secure Washington’s blessing. The State Department remained optimistic far longer than Grenada’s actions would seem to have merited. It did not have the conscious impression that the PRG deliberately wanted bad relations and that there had been some misunderstandings, but felt that the PRG knew its actions would be incompatible with normal relations with the United States.168 Washington, in general, was prepared to accept Grenada’s diplomatic relationship with Cuba but not the military relationship.169 The toleration of ideological pluralism that Carter advocated had proved impractical on this occasion. As the point of contact with Grenada, the US embassy in Barbados was initially optimistic but as time passed the absence of elections, rising numbers of political prisoners, press restrictions, and relationship with Cuba provided little incentive for talking with the PRG. Some ties with Grenada were cut and the establishment of new ones avoided; attention was focused on issues where contact with the PRG was unavoidable, basically the welfare of US citizens and St. George’s University Medical School. In the Eastern Caribbean the coup “opened up a Pandora’s Box of questions related to legitimacy, morality, constitutionality and recognition.”170 The islands feared the divisive effects of the PRG’s ideological stance: The NJM posture and rhetoric were somewhat extreme in the degree of alignment with Cuba, and the USSR, and the extent of hostility to the United States. Some countries, therefore, distanced themselves from Grenada, thereby weakening the region’s collaborative and supportive network.171

Whereas US-Grenadian relations nosedived almost immediately, Eastern Caribbean leaders followed their own agenda, albeit a more security-conscious one. The left-wing victories in Dominica and St. Lucia were ephemeral; in 1980 the political climate in the region changed with a series of right-wing victories in Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, Dominica, and Antigua, as well as with Ronald Reagan’s victory in the United States. By January 1981 the PRG was relatively isolated and relations with its neighbors decidedly frosty.

CHAPTER 4

Splashing Dominoes: The Reagan Years

W

hilst the Reagan administration pursued a policy similar to its predecessor with respect to Grenada, its relations with Grenada were noticeably more antagonistic. This chapter will concentrate on certain episodes that highlight the development of these relations and examine the economic, political, and military pressure that the United States exerted on the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG). Ronald Reagan portrayed the 1970s as a decade of “doubt, defeat, deceit, and despair,” frightening and angering the public into supporting him.1 By January 1981 détente had been discredited, a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union adopted and defense spending increased. Reagan’s beliefs were those of a committed “Cold Warrior”: the world system was bipolar, communism was monolithic and expansionist, local conflicts were communist inspired, and compromise was a sign of naiveté and weakness.2 Reagan later described the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the modern world.”3 He was also strongly influenced by the legacy of Vietnam, which he famously described as a “noble cause” in his 1980 presidential campaign and which he believed had produced a more isolationist United States, hesitant to protect its interests overseas. Reagan entered office promising “no more Vietnams,” but simultaneously determined to counter the constraints of the Vietnam Syndrome.4 In 1979 Reagan had warned that “the Caribbean is rapidly becoming a Communist lake in what should be an American pond and the United States resembles a giant, afraid to move.”5 Once in office, an increasingly strong Soviet military and expansionist policy in the region led Reagan to adopt a hard-line and promise that El Salvador would be the place where the United States would draw the line against communism. The new administration portrayed the Caribbean as a vulnerable “backyard” area that must be secured and denied to extra-hemispheric incursions; contain Cuban activity; protect sea lanes of communication; and secure access to raw materials, military bases, and the Panama Canal.6 Security was seen as an essential precondition for political, economic, and social development. Secretary of State George Shultz said that “if this region

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should be dominated by regimes hostile to us or if it becomes the scene of prolonged social upheavals, the impact on our economy and society would, indeed, be of major proportions.”7 In 1981 alone, US exports to the region totaled $6.8 billion, imports $9.9 billion, and investment $22.5 billion.8 The Caribbean basin was also a test site for US credibility. Reagan argued: “If we cannot defend ourselves in this area . . . we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy.”9 Grenada therefore became a test case for Reagan’s foreign policy in the region. Following the impasse that had been reached under Carter, the PRG hoped that with a new president relations might change. However, policy was to change in style rather than content. Although several senior officials, including the president, spoke publicly about Grenada, it would appear that until October 1983 it was never a major issue. As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne “Tony” Motley said of Grenada: “It’s not something people dwelled on, but it could be considered a minor irritant.”10 For the first six months of the Reagan term Grenada policy was a de facto continuation of the Carter policy and drifted along on autopilot.11 The United States sent an unambiguous signal to the PRG by not accrediting its new ambassador to Barbados, Milan Bish, to Grenada and by continuing to refuse to accept Grenada’s nominee ambassador to Washington, Dessima Williams. However the US embassy kept tabs on Grenada: there were always two political officers and two consular officers available for the PRG to talk to, and the presence of US medical students and the new airport meant it received the most attention of all the Eastern Caribbean islands the embassy covered.12 By contrast the PRG was obsessed about US activity. The Grenada Documents13 reveal that in private, as well as in public, Bishop accused the United States of propaganda and political, economic, and military destabilization. These charges were exaggerated rather than completely erroneous. The constant barrage of accusations led the US embassy to conclude that these allegations were made with “indeterminate proportions of genuine alarm and calculated cynicism.”14 The Point Salines International Airport (PSIA) was a central issue in USGrenadian relations for the Reagan administration. The PRG’s economic development plans centered on tourism, and a modern airport was a prerequisite. In reality the airport was a major cause of the economic crisis that engulfed Grenada by 1983, consuming 40–50 percent of capital investment funds and EC$81 million of the EC$98.8 million in Cuban civilian grants Grenada received.15 The PRG was reliant on foreign aid to construct the airport and operate the tourist sector. A 1982 World Bank report concluded that a 10,000-foot runway was not essential, tourist numbers would have to increase substantially, the accommodation and infrastructure was inadequate, more flights would be necessary, and that the marketing of Grenada was not productive.16 To Grenada the airport had important symbolic value as a sign of prestige, independence, and economic development.

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The US concern from the start was that the Cubans were seizing an opportunity to obtain a safe airport from which to transport their troops to Angola and extend Soviet-Cuban power projection in the region. When, in January 1981, the European Commission agreed to provide facilities at a Grenada donors meeting in Brussels in April, the United States decided to make its views known. The US argument rested on several points: the airport was too large for Grenada’s tourist requirements and was a bad economic development model that was uncoordinated with the overall development plan; international support would distort the pattern of aid to the Eastern Caribbean; the commission’s concentration on one island that is also aligned with the Soviet bloc would seem to reward Grenada’s human rights violations; Cuban involvement in the area would be extended; Western donors would be paying to enhance Cuba’s image and contribute to the establishment of a Cuban military facility.17 Apparently, most governments contacted by the United States were sympathetic to its case and did not attend or only attended as observers.18 In a March 26, 1981, letter to President Reagan, Bishop addressed US efforts to dissuade potential funders for the airport and expressed his “deep concern and dissatisfaction with the position of your administration.”19 In a trend that was familiar, Bishop said in the same letter that he desired good relations. In a speech on March 29, Bishop accused Washington of trying to sabotage the Grenadian economy. The US response was candid: “The United States Government does not like the airport project, for it is clearly not in the interest of American security or the security of the Caribbean.”20 Washington’s line was that whilst it would do nothing to prevent the construction of the airport, it would aim to prevent its use in a threatening fashion.21 With funding coming from countries such as Libya and Iraq, the United States could do little to prevent construction.22 US protestations that the airport was a military facility undoubtedly served propaganda purposes but it was a private concern too and came up “not infrequently” when Grenada was discussed.23 Whilst not classifying the airport as a military facility, the US government was aware of its potential to enable Soviet MIG-23s to cover the entire Caribbean basin and act as a base for Cuban flights to Angola and Soviet bloc flights to Central America.24 The United States also argued that the promotion of tourism and the construction of infrastructure associated with the airport were insufficient. Eastern Airlines had told the PRG that it would require 2,200 hotel rooms to justify an air service; even by 1983 Grenada only possessed 645.25 The PRG was obviously aware of the airport’s military potential too: in December 1981 Minister of National Mobilization Selwyn Strachan told a Workers Party of Jamaica meeting that the airport would be available to regional allies when necessary.26 The only reference concerning the use of the airport in the Grenada Documents is a short note in Central Committee (CC) member Liam James’s notebook: “The Revo has been able to crush counterrevolution internationally. Airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military.”27 The Grenadian

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project manager confirmed that the airport, whilst not a purely military facility, would have a dual use.28 The image of a Soviet-Cuban airbase was contradicted by reality. US, British, and Finnish firms were involved in PSIA’s construction and it was far from secret; the US medical school was nearby and students went jogging on the runway. The 9,000-foot runway was a similar length to most of those in the region.29 Discounting the fact that no concrete evidence of military use existed, the United States was suspicious because it found the PSIA hard to justify on economic grounds. Image rather than reality proved decisive; no matter what the PRG said or did it could not dispel US doubts and preconceptions. Upon taking office Secretary of State Alexander Haig reaffirmed existing policy by giving instructions to ensure that Grenada would not receive “one penny” from any international financial institution (IFI), adding Grenada to the State Department’s unofficial “hit list.”30 In March 1981, Washington was successful in building a political coalition, including the British, German, and Dutch members of the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to block a $19 million application from Grenada.31 The PRG, with IMF encouragement, accused the United States of manipulating the IMF and threatened to withdraw from the organization. Nevertheless, on April 1 the IMF announced that Grenada had borrowed $2.5 million under compensatory financial facilities and on May 12 authorized a one-year $4.1 million standby loan. IMF management developed the loan agreement as a politically expedient substitute for the withdrawn application in order to maneuver around the US-led blockade of the Executive Board.32 The IMF repeatedly obstructed US efforts to block IMF loans to Grenada. Echoing the thinking of the Cuban government, “[f ]or the IMF movement, Grenada represented a potential showcase in which the IMF could demonstrate that its economic adjustment programs were both relevant and effective in promoting economic growth even in revolutionary socialist regimes.”33 The United States successfully opposed a subsequent $6.3 million loan on the grounds that the money would be used on the airport, but failed to block a larger $14.715 million IMF loan in August 1983.34 Regardless of US efforts, the PRG managed to garner an impressive $125.1 million of foreign aid in total, including $31.4 million from IFIs, between 1979 and 1983.35 On June 12 the Grenadian Voice, the first private newspaper since Torchlight, was published.36 The Grenadian Voice was the brainchild of businessman Leslie Pierre who had become disillusioned and concerned by the PRG’s policies. He figured that the government would not allow anyone to publish a private newspaper and that it would be shut down and someone detained, but that this would open people’s eyes to the fact that the revolution was not about freedom and democracy.37 Pierre was careful to conform to the requirements of relevant People’s Law 81 that limited ownership by one Grenadian to no more than 4 percent and selected 25 co-shareholders. The first issue quickly sold out. The Editorial stated that “we hold firmly to the opinion that a country which does not boast a free press is fundamentally unstable.”38

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The PRG reaction was swifter and firmer than expected. As the second issue was being prepared, Pierre was detained overnight for possessing counterrevolutionary material. Most of the 25 other shareholders were harassed and their houses searched. On June 19, with the second issue due, Pierre and two other shareholders were arrested and ultimately detained until the October 1983 invasion. 39 The PRG claimed that the “Group of 26” shareholders had been issuing counterrevolutionary pamphlets and had links to the CIA.40 Bishop also claimed that the PRG had been tipped off about the new paper when the director of Caribbean Affairs at the State Department, Robert Warne, told their ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Kendrick Radix, that the “US would judge [the] course of Grenada policy by how it reacts to [the] establishment of this newspaper.”41 Whatever the accuracy of the claim, the PRG must have realized that how they handled this issue would be taken note of far beyond Grenada. A series of People’s Laws were passed that prohibited the publishing of any new papers. Bishop warned that this is not about freedom of the press, it is about overthrowing the Grenadian revolution . . . [and] when the revolution speaks, it must be heard, listened to whatever the revolution commands, it must be carried out; when the revolution talks no parasites must bark in their corner.42

As Meeks concludes, the earlier refusal to reopen the Torchlight and now the forced closure of the Grenadian Voice could “only be attributed to paranoia and rampant authoritarianism.”43 The only domestic papers remaining were the government’s Free West Indian and the internationally renowned journalist Alister Hughes’s Grenada Newsletter; Hughes’s reputation and the factual nature of his publication explain its survival. The closure of the Grenadian Voice lost the PRG a lot of sympathy amongst the media and progressive groups and was in US eyes simply the latest example of the lack of human rights and basic freedoms in Grenada. The PRG had constantly warned about the danger of invasion and the United States did little to calm these fears. From August 1 until October 15, 1981, the largest naval maneuvers since 1945 occurred; “Ocean Venture” involved 120,000 troops, 250 warships, and 1,000 aircraft from 14 nations. Part of the maneuvers included “Operation Amber and the Amberines” (an unsubtle allusion to Grenada and the Grenadines) on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques. Amber and the Amberines were designated as “our enemy in the Eastern Caribbean,” who were supported by “Orange’” (Cuba), who were in turn supported by “Red” (Soviet Union), and the objective of the exercise was to “rescue twenty U.S. citizens held hostage there after negotiations with the Amber Government had broken down” and to organize elections that would produce a government “favorable to the way of life we espouse.”44 The PRG interpreted this activity as “a trial run preparatory to a military invasion of Grenada and the Grenadines.”45 On August 11, Bishop sent another letter to Reagan, criticizing the United States’ propaganda and diplomatic offensive,

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economic aggression, and military destabilization, and restating that PSIA was a nonmilitary facility. He went on to say: [Y]our Administration has consistently demonstrated an overtly hostile attitude towards the people and Government of Grenada . . . Members of your Administration have persistently made false, malicious and misleading statements . . . particularly in regard to our international airport project.46

The letter concluded by saying that the United States’ actions had been interpreted as a “virtual declaration of war” and that if no reply was received this would be taken to mean that the United States “does not desire even normal or minimum relations.”47 Despite the accusatory tone of the letter, Bishop wrote that he still wanted good relations. Washington’s reply came via the US embassy in October: “While the points raised in your letter have been carefully considered, we continue to look for indications of a serious commitment by your government to establishing a climate conducive to better relations with the United States.”48 On October 20 the embassy received a reply from a low-level PRG official informing them that the letter had “not been referred to Bishop because it ignored the points made in Bishop’s letter.”49 The Reagan administration perceived no reason to make an effort to improve relations and by late 1981 Washington firmly viewed Grenada’s repeated calls for “high-level” dialogue as “propagandistic and insincere,”50 an unavailing option, and a waste of time. Raising the Stakes On February 24, 1982, Reagan unveiled his Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).51 Designed to address the socioeconomic causes of unrest in the region, the CBI was based on security and reinforced the effectiveness of military aid. Reagan described the Caribbean as a “vital strategic and commercial artery” for the United States and that “the well-being and security of our neighbours in this region are our own vital interests.”52 In his address to the Organization of American States (OAS) promoting the CBI, Reagan had warned of “the dark future foreshadowed by the poverty and repression of Castro’s Cuba, the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in Grenada and Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet-backed, Cuban-managed support for violent revolution in Central America.”53 Washington argued that it had not sought to exclude Grenada from the CBI when it was submitted to Congress but that it did not propose direct aid to Grenada⎯although other elements of the program would be available⎯and that “its remarks and characterizations of the Caribbean Basin program, as it describes it as ‘chicken feed’, and ‘only a guise for the attainment of military objectives in the area’, would certainly seem to indicate that it has no desire to participate.”54 Criticism of the CBI was not confined to the PRG. The emphasis

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on private investment excluded Grenada, Nicaragua, and Cuba; 87 percent of Caribbean exports entered duty-free already; and of the original $350 million made available, $128 million was earmarked for El Salvador and only $10 million for the Eastern Caribbean.55 As the Caribbean nations had to request CBI help, the United States telexed the PRG about its possible participation. The PRG felt that participation would make Grenada appear opportunistic and that it should consult with Nicaragua and Suriname to see if they had been asked.56 Ideology and concern about its image as a Soviet bloc–aligned country ruled out Grenada’s participation in the CBI, irrespective of its financial benefits or even as a possible initiator to better US relations. When President Reagan visited Barbados in April 1982 he told regional leaders that Grenada “now bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among its neighbours.”57 The rhetoric was backed up by “Ocean Venture 82” between April 28 and May 16, 1982, involving some 60 naval vessels, 350 planes, and 45,000 men.58 This increased an insecure PRG’s anxiety and belief that the United States would invade in the near future. In June 1982, Washington’s Grenada policy was the focus of a Congressional Hearing, held at the behest of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). Congressman Mervyn Dymally led the criticism of US policy, describing the State Department’s behavior as “petty, arbitrary, discriminatory, outrageous and absurd.”59 In response to the general criticism of US policy the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs Stephen Bosworth, provided a useful summary of what Grenada needed to do in Washington’s eyes to improve relations: It should halt its unrelenting stream of anti-U.S. propaganda and false statements about U.S. policies and actions. Grenada should move to restore constitutional democracy, including prompt, free and fair elections . . . There should be a return to the high standard of human rights observance that is typical of the Caribbean commonwealth islands. Finally, Grenada should practice genuine non-alignment rather than continuing its present role as a surrogate of Cuba.60

The hearing concluded that Washington did not have a clear policy and that “isolating” Grenada was counterproductive. Relations with Grenada appeared to quieten after the rhetorical volleys about the CBI, and PRG accusations about destabilization lessened. This led some to believe that the PRG was toning down its anti-US rhetoric to prepare the way for improved relations. The embassy was more pessimistic: We think the invasion theme was temporarily suspended, not because the PRG intended to send a positive signal to [the] U.S. but because the many false alarms served to undermine the regime’s domestic credibility and a certain momentum and revolutionary alertness had already been accomplished amongst army and militia through the use of the “external threat” strategy.61

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Such inherent bad faith and cynicism typified relations on both sides; even if the United States had made overtures it would have been far from certain that the PRG would have responded. The rhetorical attacks on Grenada resumed in December 1982. At the annual Miami Conference on the Caribbean, Vice President George Bush called Grenada “economically weak, militarized, repressive and dependent.”62 The PRG telexed the US Embassy saying that Bush’s remarks were “regrettable” and “inaccurate, misleading and made in a context in which Grenada was not allowed to respond.”63 The PRG offered to send a “high level emissary” to brief Bush. The embassy commented: We would characterize this effort as yet another thinly disguised ploy to engage the U.S. in a propaganda exercise aimed at eliciting a respectability and legitimacy the PRG is not willing to earn by moderating its actual behaviour . . . There is nothing conciliatory or new in the note that could be interpreted as evidence of PRG interest in a serious dialogue with the U.S.64

No further action was recommended, and the PRG’s diplomatic note was dismissed as another effort to score public propaganda points. During February and March 1983, Grenada was censured by several senior members of the Reagan administration. On February 27 the Washington Post reported on the aborted 1981 Central Intelligence Agency plan to destabilize Grenada, which was probably deliberately leaked. In the article the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Inter-American Affairs Nestor Sanchez stated that Grenada was a “vital surrogate” of Cuba and that the Cubans were constructing air and naval facilities in excess of Grenada’s needs.65 On March 10, President Reagan stated that “Grenada, that tiny little island . . . is building now, or having built for it, on its soil and shores, a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and facilities for the storage of munitions, barracks, and training grounds for the military.”66 He proceeded to explain how this would extend Soviet and Cuban power and admonished that “it isn’t nutmeg that’s at stake in the Caribbean and Central America; it is the United States national security.”67 On March 23 Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and again, with the aid of satellite photos, drew attention to Grenada: “The Cubans, with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn’t even have an air force. Who is it intended for?”68 Reagan concluded that “the Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region.”69 He returned to Grenada yet again in his April 27 address to a Joint Session of Congress, suggesting that PSIA would facilitate the transshipment of arms to Nicaragua.70 This litany of indictments was not solely for the consumption of the PRG. Central America was the main focus of US attention and things were not going well by 1983; the Contadora peace plan was introduced in January 1983 and whilst the United States professed its support it was not exactly flavor of the month in Washington. Also, Congress was becoming increasingly skeptical of

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the administration’s Central America odyssey. Consequently, Grenada was a convenient tool to use to demonstrate the threat posed by Soviet-Cuban activity in the region and the necessity for continued aid to the Contras. As before, the rhetorical attacks were backed up with military displays of strength. During March, 77 US ships had assembled off Barbados and several moved to within 6 miles of Grenada. This was followed by “Operation Universal Trek” in May, which demonstrated “how US forces could land in a small Caribbean nation where a civil war [was] taking place.”71 The Grenadian response was shaped by a mixture of propaganda benefit and real fear. An internal PRG draft letter to the US embassy reveals that “until the recent statements, the People’s Revolutionary Government felt fairly confident that these re-assessments had dispelled the unfounded and unreasonable fears of the US Administration.”72 In public, Bishop, who had curtailed his visit to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in India to return home, warned that the PRG was “convinced that an armed attack against our country by counterrevolutionaries and mercenaries organized, financed, trained, and directed by United States imperialism, is imminent and can come any day now.”73 Grenada turned to the international arena to counter the perceived threat. At the United Nations on March 28, Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman announced that “based on a careful analysis of evidence we are convinced that the Reagan Administration is planning an aggression. We believe the attack is imminent.”74 It would appear that the PRG leaders were among the few who believed such threats were real rather than imagined. As the embassy remarked: “PRG charges of a US or US-backed invasion did not appear to have dampened the enthusiasm of most Grenadians for Americans and things American” but that President Reagan’s mention of Grenada in March had “probably resulted in a temporary strengthening of PRG popular support . . . The government has effectively exploited the ‘David vs. Goliath’ theme and the fact that virtually all Grenadians consider the new airport of vital importance to their country’s future.”75 This flurry of activity marked the end of an overtly confrontational stage of relations. The next time Grenada came to prominence was with Bishop’s June 1983 visit to Washington. The first year of Reagan’s term had seen a continuation of the Carter policy of distancing and isolation. The PRG was determined to ensure the survival and consolidation of the revolution. External help from ideologically compatible regimes was obtained and strident rhetoric employed to alert the world to the United States’ alleged intentions. Unfortunately, this only reconfirmed the United States’ suspicions and increased the tension. The administration had wearied of the constant public criticism, and “with no change in the attitude or policies of the PRG, they (relations) remain cool and are conducted at a level appropriate to the PRG’s conduct.”76 Any improvement in relations would have had to be initiated by Grenada as the United States, despite its economic obstructionism and overemphasis of Grenada as a military threat, was not actively looking for a solution to a situation that was no more than a sideshow to Central American.

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The United States was confident that the PRG was aware of its views and decided it would restate its position clearly and leave the ball firmly in Grenada’s court. There had been no tangible changes in the PRG’s stance. Anti-US propaganda remained a staple feature, a return to constitutional democracy seemed increasingly remote, and free and fair elections improbable in what had become a one-party authoritarian state. The PRG did make appreciable advances in social justice, education, and various economic programs but “the building of ‘a new democracy’ serving the interests and needs of the Grenadian masses became . . . dependent upon state repression.”77 Bishop’s opponents were incarcerated, the People’s Revolutionary Army was used to enforce PRG policy, and the media firmly government controlled. The United States, however, had supported more repressive governments; there was another factor, the major one—nonalignment— that condemned the PRG. The issue of nonalignment was pivotal. The PRG believed: “Non-alignment does not imply for us that we must be neutral in the sterile and negative sense . . . It is an affirmation of that fundamental attribute of all peoples and states to sovereignty, independence and the right to freely determine their own domestic and foreign policy.”78 This meant alignment with the Soviet bloc, especially Cuba. A sort of “Cubaphobia” influenced US policymakers, making relations “a total impossibility on a strictly ideological basis,” and “an equally elusive commodity at a rational, pragmatic level of decision making.”79 The New Jewel Movement (NJM) contact with Cuba had started prior to 1979 and continued to deepen thereafter. The PRG identified closely with Cuba for several reasons: the shared problems of capitalist underdevelopment, a positive view of Cuban socialism, a respect for Cuba’s international actions, a confidence in its commitment to antiUS parties in the Caribbean, and the belief that Cuba would provide substantial financial aid.80 There was also a good personal rapport between Castro and Bishop. Splashing Dominoes Since the Cuban revolution the prevention of “another Cuba” in the hemisphere became a US policy maxim. In his 1982 CBI address to the OAS, Reagan warned: “If we do not act promptly and decisively in defense of freedom, new Cubas will arise from the ruins of today’s conflicts. We will face more totalitarian regimes tied militarily to the Soviet Union⎯more regimes exporting subversion, more so incompetent yet so totalitarian.”81 Grenada was the potential “new Cuba” that would export revolution throughout the Caribbean.82 Thus a domino effect would be triggered, a process that the United States had to oppose and/or reverse. Reagan had made his beliefs clear in 1980: “The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren’t engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hot spots in the world.”83 Grenada was consequently seen as a Soviet probe to test the US resolve and that if the United States did not respond, this “loss” would lead to others. This thinking is certainly reflected in the statements

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of many administration officials. In October 1981 Secretary of State Haig warned: [W]e have a vital interest in not allowing the proliferation of Cuba-model states which would provide platforms for subversion, compromise vital sea lanes and pose a direct military threat at or near our borders . . . In the short run we must work to eliminate Cuban/Soviet influence in the region, and in the long run we must build politically stable governments able to withstand such influences.84

Grenada’s militarization was perceived to be partly to legitimize the revolution but also feasibly to export revolution to a vulnerable, susceptible Eastern Caribbean. At the time, the poor standard of living in many islands provided a plausible scenario for the domino effect; the PRG appealed to many and the United States was concerned that the PRG would serve as an example to likeminded groups in the region.85 The implication was that a supine US reaction would embolden the communists, encourage regional radical groups, disillusion Caribbean allies, and reduce US credibility. The domino theory is a worst-case scenario and therefore will always be part of decision-makers’ thinking. It is, however, a misleading theory. The theory overlooked the indigenous roots of the Grenadian revolution, obscured the tradition of democracy in the surrounding states, and overestimated the impact of the revolution on Grenada’s neighbors; rather than bandwaggoning they took measures to oppose or inoculate themselves against the revolution.86 Grenada-Caribbean Relations After the brief flirtation with leftist governments in several islands, the Eastern Caribbean reverted to its traditional political makeup as right-wing governments were elected in St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Dominica. Grenada lost its only real ally in the region in October 1980 when Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley lost to Edward Seaga, who followed a staunchly pro-US line. As relations with the United States worsened, the Eastern Caribbean nations adopted a more pragmatic approach. The first manifestation of this stance was displayed in June 1981 when the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) rejected a $4 million US grant because it expressly excluded Grenada, on political grounds, thereby contravening the bank’s charter. In Washington this rejection was interpreted predominantly as a criticism of the political input into multilateral aid programs rather than criticism of US efforts to isolate Grenada.87 Several other countries subsequently approached the United States about bilateral programs.88 On June 18, 1981, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Treaty was signed at Basseterre, St. Kitts. The OECS was designed to promote cooperation, unity, sovereignty, a harmonized foreign policy, and economic integration. It also included provision for collective security.89 Grenada’s inclusion demonstrated the reduced fear of subversion in the Eastern Caribbean.

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Bishop described the OECS as “an encouraging and significant development for our subregion and region in general. The closer coordination in fields such as economics and foreign policy . . . will help to further consolidate the integration process.”90 The OECS was based on consensus rule and it seemed counterproductive to create a fuss over Grenada. The larger Caribbean Community (CARICOM) organization also decided not to discriminate against Grenada; members agreed that they “did not consider that ideological differences between individual member countries constituted a real obstacle to ‘meaningful regional integration.’”91 In September 1981 the CARICOM foreign ministers met to discuss the recently announced CBI; they insisted that “participation in the program should be open to all territories in the region” and that “criteria used in granting aid should not be based on political or military considerations.”92 Reagan’s obsession with anticommunism appeared incongruent with reality in the region: “The region’s rather muted reaction to the US plan was revealing . . . [I]t demonstrated how far the PRG had come in the preceding year in winning the grudging respect of several of its CARICOM colleagues.”93 Admittedly, the other Eastern Caribbean countries were not about to reject the CBI because of Grenada’s exclusion but they remained consistent in their stance toward Grenada. During President Reagan’s 1982 Barbados trip he met the leaders of Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Vincent. As we have seen, Reagan told them that Grenada “now bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among its neighbours.”94 The Barbadian prime minister Tom Adams’s response was that Grenada was not a military threat and that he wanted to “get on with policies of economic development.”95 The United States’ hard-line did not coincide with Eastern Caribbean views; it had learned to accept the PRG and now wished to conduct “business as usual.” The Third CARICOM heads of government meeting was scheduled for November 16–18, 1982, at Ocho Rios in Jamaica.96 Although Grenada had been gradually reassimilated into Caribbean politics, the PRG still faced criticism from certain quarters. The Antiguan deputy prime minister Lester Bird commented that some “Caribbean territories are more firmly wedded to ideological bonds with third countries than they are committed to regional integration.”97 Adams, supported by Seaga, proposed that the CARICOM Treaty should be amended to commit members to uphold “the principle of political liberty and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual through adherence to the principle of the rule of law and practice of free, fair and regular elections.”98 Political issues dominated the meeting. The resultant Declaration of Ocho Rios recognized the “political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights” of the populace; promoted integration as the only viable option for development; accepted that each country should be free to chose its own path of development; and, most notably, that “while recognizing that the emergence of ideological pluralism in the Community responds to internal processes and is an irreversible trend within the international system, we are committed to ensuring that it will not inhibit the processes of integration.”99 For Grenada the meeting was a relative

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success. The PRG had sent a high-powered delegation to combat the expected opposition of Adams and Seaga and to convey their position and reaffirm their commitment to regional integration, one of the “principles” of PRG foreign policy. The centrality of regional integration to the CARICOM and OECS charters underlines how essential cooperation is: “What is lacking in the smaller eastern Caribbean islands in terms of size and natural resource endowment could be more than fully compensated by joint and coordinated actions on the external front to realize their latent geopolitical power.”100 The islands also had established cultural and population ties; Thorndike describes Caribbean societies as “compact and homogenous with . . . a strong sense of community and widespread and interlocking kinship networks.”101 This tradition of interrelationship helps to explain that once the initial threat from Grenada was perceived to have decreased, the Eastern Caribbean nations were not willing to weaken the unity of the region by exiling Grenada. The relationship between the region’s leaders also helped to accommodate Grenada and they pursued an informal policy of “constructive engagement.”102 They felt that Bishop was a potential force for moderation and were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, even though they knew about Grenada’s militarization and ties to Cuba. The significant thing is that Grenada was not treated as a pariah and thus the possibility of improved relations was always present, something notably absent from US-Grenadian relations. The Eastern Caribbean nations had not dismissed the threat posed by a militarized Grenada but reassessed its probability. Contrary to President Reagan’s image of “splashing dominoes,” they perceived the threat not as a “territorial one (a physical takeover by Grenada/Cuba/Soviet Union) but a threat to government/ survival through contagion and possibly subversion, as well as a threat to the traditional political culture.”103 Although Grenada was received in the political arenas of CARICOM and the OECS, the other members simultaneously made provisions for improved security. The islands’ economic weaknesses meant that the less they had to spend on defense the better; they spent less than 1 percent of the gross national product on defense on average. With economic affairs assuming prominence and the leaders’ different threat perceptions, there was no consensus on Grenada or the question of an operational collective security mechanism. The Eastern Caribbean’s security concerns were articulated on October 29, 1982, when Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Barbados signed a “Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Security and Military Co-operation.” The memorandum had a wide agenda: “to prepare contingency plans and assist one another on request in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, natural and other disasters and threats to national security.”104 The Regional Security System (RSS) the memorandum established provided the operational and institutional instruments for collective security that had been outlined in the OECS Treaty.

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The Eastern Caribbean felt the need for a stronger military capability than they possessed and decided to ask Barbados to join them.105 The RSS was not a new idea but its emergence in 1982 was a clear reaction to the Grenada situation. It provided some semblance of security, even if it could only act as a “trip-wire, containing a situation until assistance from abroad could be obtained.”106 Additionally, it acted as a forum where the members could confer without Grenada’s presence. This marked the zenith of an increased emphasis on security that was greatly promoted by the Reagan administration. For Washington, “Grenada provided another reason for giving economic and security assistance to the other poor but certifiably democratic nations of the Caribbean.”107 The United States offered the Eastern Caribbean significant economic and military carrots to secure their support against Grenada. Between 1980 and 1983 economic aid increased from $323.9 million to $759 million and military aid increased from $13.8 million to $195.2 million.108 The recession-hit Eastern Caribbean welcomed any increase in US aid, even if its military percentage grew from 4 percent to 25 percent and was negotiated on a bilateral basis and detrimental to the integration process. Aid was also conditional on an anticommunist policy by each government. As Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia Charles admitted: “Weak governments must fall into line and learn to beg properly . . . Thus this fragile island . . . must court a special relationship with Washington and, possibly as an inducement, has increased rhetoric against the Bishop regime.”109 Undoubtedly disquieted by Reagan’s cold war ideology, the Eastern Caribbean nations, even if they had not felt threatened by Grenada, could not realistically afford to object to US aid on the grounds that it excluded Grenada. The establishment of the RSS was a wake-up call for the PRG. An internal report concluded that “Grenada does need to seek possible friends in the region, in order to prevent the isolation which would provide imperialism with a valuable front of assistance.”110 The PRG considered its relations with most of CARICOM as normal but was pessimistic about its members. Jamaica was seen as a “lackey of the U.S.” and Barbados as the United States’ “watchdog for [the] Eastern Caribbean.”111 St. Lucia, Barbados, Jamaica, Dominica, and St. Vincent were classified as an anti-Grenada bloc in CARICOM; Trinidad’s “neutral” position was interpreted as “suspect,” Guyana was an “ally of convenience,” and only in Antigua, which the PRG believed saw itself as mediator between the United States and Grenada, was the “door . . . not closed to dialogue.”112 This would suggest that irrespective of its inclusion in the OECS and CARICOM, the PRG felt isolated in the region but was not prepared to compromise its “principled positions” to improve the situation. The PRG continued to extend its ties to the Soviet bloc and Third World socialist-oriented regimes and underwent substantial militarization that dwarfed its neighbors. Five secret military agreements were signed with Cuba, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, which by 1986 would have provided the PRG with four People’s Revolutionary Army battalions and 14 militia battalions equipped with 10,000 rifles, 450 machine guns, 294 rocket launchers, 84 mortars, 12 cannon, 60 antiaircraft guns, 60 armed personnel carriers, 4 patrol boats, and 20,000 uniforms.113 However, the general consensus is that this buildup was designed to

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defend, rather than export, the revolution. This trend is reflected in the Grenada Documents; Grenada did act as a magnet for left-wing Eastern Caribbean groups and as a link to Cuba but the PRG displayed no fervid desire to export revolution. A December 1983 CIA assessment concluded that the PRA was “mainly engaged in enforcing the NJM policy” and that the militia assisted the PRA in defending the country, performed neighborhood control duties, and served as a “vehicle for ideological recruitment and indoctrination.”114 The assessment also concluded that “the large numbers of weapons seized in Grenada were intended primarily for use by Grenadians in their own defense⎯first in anticipation of an invasion by counterrevolutionary pro-Gairy forces, later in reaction to US Navy exercises in the Caribbean.”115 Mr. Bishop Goes to Washington In June 1983 Prime Minister Bishop visited Washington.116 This initiative represented a convergence of views of influential PRG supporters who felt that Grenada was losing ground and becoming increasingly and dangerously isolated. Grenada’s Ambassador to the OAS, Dessima Williams, met a senior congressional figure to outline what might be possible in a visit and then travelled to Grenada to try and sell the idea to the party. Predictably, the hard-liners were strongly opposed to the visit, feeling it was a concession, a sign of weakness, and that the United States should make the first move.117 However, the support of the CBC and influential black lobby group Trans-Africa proved decisive and after a week of tense discussion the party voted in favor of a visit.118 ‘Sometime after, the leader of the CBC, Mervyn Dymally, visited Grenada and took the opportunity to formally invite Bishop to Washington, supported by Trans-Africa. Reagan officials learnt of the visit in a letter from congressmen John Conyers and George Crockett of the CBC, who would be sponsoring the visit, on April 20.’119 There are two schools of thought on the timing and purpose of Bishop’s visit to Washington. Thorndike argues that the visit was an aborted rapprochement prompted by alarm at the United States’ recent rhetorical broadsides and by economic necessity. Alternatively, Payne suggests that the trip was a public relations exercise, a “tactical adjustment designed to take the heat off the revolution for a while.”120 When the PRG’s Political Bureau (PB) came to discuss Bishop’s trip on May 4, surviving records reveal that there were three “strategic objectives” of the trip: to convey Bishop as a “sober and reliable statesman,” to develop “unshakable links” with the US black community, and to promote tourism.121 In an undated letter to Bishop, Gail Reed, the American-born wife of the Cuban ambassador to Grenada, Julian Torres Rizo, advised him to justify the trip in terms of the long history of relations between the two countries, the large numbers of Grenadians living in the United States, and tourism and economic links: “The purpose of the visit is to reaffirm and develop these ties at as many levels as possible, and by so doing help lessen the tensions that have cropped up.”122 Reed emphasized the need to deny that the trip would be a cover for a meeting with Reagan as this would make Grenada appear opportunistic.

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The alternative explanation is that Bishop was seeking rapprochement. The Grenadian economy was stalling, the international airport project was consuming much of the foreign aid received, and the PRG was growing increasingly unpopular amongst the populace and being isolated in the region. For Washington rapprochement would have to mean PRG flexibility over the issue of Soviet-Cuban involvement in Grenada in particular, and the PRG’s Eastern Bloc foreign policy orientation in general.123 After the March exchanges with the United States, Bishop had suggested a moratorium on anti-US rhetoric as it could jeopardize his forthcoming visit.124 The release of political detainees and the establishment of a Constitutional Commission were interpreted in some quarters as goodwill gestures. The US embassy in Barbados were more skeptical: The fact is that if the PRG had wished to return to democracy, they have had more than 4 years to do so, but have made no move whatsoever in that direction. Instead, Westminster style democracy has repeatedly been declared dead and the constitution and election will change nothing as both will be devised to assure continued PRG control over the country.125

Thorndike proposes that the crippling costs of the airport, the need to attract tourists, and the hope that Washington would soften its attitude and subsequently enable Grenada to be included in the CBI were on Bishop’s mind.126 Inclusion in the CBI would have helped the stagnating economy and perhaps helped to rehabilitate Grenada somewhat with the United States and its Caribbean neighbors. Most usefully though, foreign aid would buy the PRG time whilst talks with the IMF and World Bank progressed. Once news of Bishop’s wish for a meeting with President Reagan during his visit reached Washington it prompted a meeting of the State Department’s Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) to reassess the Grenada policy. The State Department pessimistically forecast that “Mr. Bishop can be expected to use the occasion of his visit . . . not only to attack USG policy towards Grenada but also US foreign policy in general.”127 Momentarily they discussed the unprecedented measure of denying a head of government a visa to enter the United States.128 Ultimately it was the inevitable negative reaction such a measure would produce from the OAS, CBC, media, and academia that ruled such a drastic option out. The CPPG recommended that first, Bishop’s overtures for diplomatic contact would be accepted and if the PRG displayed any sign of flexibility over the issue of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Grenada then Bishop’s trip to the United States would be an “opportunity for additional meetings.”129 There has been speculation that this decision was influenced by rumors that Bishop was considering moving Grenada away from the Soviet bloc. The second recommendation was to reduce hard currency earnings for Grenada, in particular by facilitating the removal of St. George’s University (SGU); it was estimated that SGU generated about $2 million per annum in income for the PRG.130 The final recommendation was that support would be increased for the democratic opposition to the PRG; the CIA and State Department would prepare detailed briefings for congressional leaders to highlight the threat that Grenada posed.131

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The CPPG’s recommendations provide an excellent snapshot of Washington’s reaction to the news of Bishop’s visit. There were no great expectations but Washington had nothing to lose by not opposing it. PRG flexibility over the issue of Soviet and Cuban presence was the key issue. Questions about human rights and the lack of elections were of secondary importance. Bishop’s entourage arrived on May 30 for an 11-day stay. At a rally for Grenadians in Washington, Bishop renewed his request for a meeting with US officials: “We wish to see the US government demonstrate a serious interest in holding talks with us at the highest level at any time.”132 Only after much media criticism and congressional pressure did the government agree to meet with Bishop: “We determined we should meet with Bishop to lay out our concerns and defuse critics on the Hill and in the media who contended we were stonewalling Bishop.”133 With rumors circulating that Bishop was considering distancing Grenada from Cuba there was a certain optimism in some administration quarters. In his memoirs Secretary of State Shultz described the administration’s decision to meet Bishop as “an effort on our part to size him up and see how committed he was to his present course.”134 In a draft of a post-intervention speech Reagan revealed: “I, too, was convinced that Bishop was at least contemplating a change in his earlier position . . . It seemed we were cautiously taking some steps toward a new relationship.”135 Other officials were less sanguine; Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger did not favor a government meeting because of Bishop’s, and the PRG’s, bad reputation and the belief that he was simply after financial aid.136 In the days prior to his meeting with US officials Bishop had repeatedly made the point at public engagements and private meetings that he wanted to establish some sort of dialogue with Washington. On June 5, Bishop addressed a packed audience of over 2,500 at Hunter College, New York. In a lengthy speech he explained that “bad relations do not make sense” and that there was a “critical and burning need” to normalize relations.137 With a meeting with US officials imminent, Bishop recounted the PRG’s efforts and desire to normalize relations; he promised to “try yet again to establish some form of official contact, an official dialogue . . . [because] if there is no established mechanism for holding dialogue then there is no basis on which relations can be maintained in an effective way.”138 To that end he announced that for his forthcoming meeting he was “proposing no agenda with any preconditions. Let us look at all questions.”139 Whilst not exactly avoiding pointing the finger of blame at Washington, Bishop did at least tone down his criticism and try to promote a sense of reasonableness and determination on the PRG’s part. The pivotal factor that was at the heart of the poor state of relations between Grenada and the United States was Grenada’s close relations with Cuba. As we have seen, PRG flexibility on this issue was the key interest to those in Washington. Good relations with Cuba had always been the most important aim of PRG foreign policy and, as Bishop explained, there were three good reasons that this would not change: first, Cuba was part of the Caribbean family of

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nations; second, a policy of nonalignment that meant “the right to choose your own friends” and “not something that implies neutrality”; and third, an admiration and respect for the internationalism and achievements of Cubans.140 For good measure he closed by condemning the imperialistic policy of the United States in Central America. Thus in the days prior to his meeting with US officials Bishop had repeatedly made the point that he wanted to establish some sort of dialogue with Washington but had not foresworn singing the praises of Cuba or criticizing US policy in Central America when the occasion called for it, as the public address in New York obviously did. Of the surviving PRG documents that deal with relations with the United States, the majority relate to Bishop’s Washington trip including two of particular interest: “Background Notes for Meeting with National Security Advisor Clark” and the “Handwritten Notes of Meeting with National Security Adviser Clark.”141 A declassified US document provides a record of one of the US officials’ report of the meeting. The meeting took place on June 7 with an unusual mixture of National Security Council (NSC) and State Department officials, headed by National Security Adviser William Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam.142 Dam recalled that Clark did not want any such meeting to occur at the White House because of the cachet it would afford Bishop. Thus Clark requested Dam’s involvement in a joint NSC-State Department meeting with Bishop at the State Department; Clark ensured that he had the meeting on his terms and could remove any chance of State “walking off ” with the meeting.143 Taking the familiar line that Grenada’s numerous overtures for a normalization of relations had been ignored by the United States, the PRG’s “Background Notes” suggested that having pushed for this meeting Bishop should be “seen to take the initiative, even perhaps the offensive.”144 The proposals certainly reflected this strident line: first, “[o]ur two countries must exchange Ambassadors this year” and second, the United States “must end its economic aggression and propaganda destabilization against Grenada without delay.” Two further subjects of discussion for later addition were no less subtle: alleged Miami-based agents of destabilization and a request to cease support for countries that opposed the PRG’s efforts to extradite Sir Eric Gairy.145 The document reads more like a lecture than the agenda for a meeting. According to the primary source material and interviews with participants it would seem that Bishop wisely did not follow the guidelines of the “Background Notes” to the letter. He began by expressing thanks for Washington agreeing to the meeting and stating that the bottom line was “dialogue and normal relations” and to this end proposed an exchange of ambassadors within the year and the establishment of a joint commission to review the areas of dispute in USGrenadian relations.146 Clark replied that there was no problem with dialogue but conduct was more important. He proceeded to outline the well-established key areas of concern: the Cuban-Soviet presence, the anti-US rhetoric, and the improvement of individual liberties. According to the PRG’s notes Clark also raised the specter of the relocation of SGU. Clark also emphasized that if discussions were

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to continue, and there is mention of agreement to a second secret meeting in the PRG’s notes, the administration wanted to conduct these in private rather than in response to public attacks as had been the trend in the past. The surviving records indicate that Bishop was encouraged by Washington’s receptiveness to talks on normalizing relations and went as far as agreeing that anti-US rhetoric should be toned down, although the United States should do likewise vis-à-vis Grenada. Clark left the meeting early, leaving Dam to restate that the Cuban-Soviet presence was the key factor and the general need to improve conduct. On this key issue Bishop emphasized that the PRG was not about to restructure its entire foreign policy.147 Bishop briefly raised the issue of economic destabilization and tourism and told Dam that “[w]e can explore any range of subjects and give fullest assurance that we constitute no threat to the US.”148 This point was not elaborated on in the records but it is most likely a reference to the airport. Dam expressed the United States’ interest in such assurances and on that positive note the 60-minute meeting came to an end. Washington had approached the meeting in the standard diplomatic manner and found Bishop to be intelligent, articulate, and nonprovocative.149 The conversation was described by one participant as “straightforward but amicable.”150 One conclusion that officials did reach was that Bishop would be easier to do business with than the likes of Bernard Coard; they also wondered if Bishop had the power to pursue this normalization path.151 In his report of the meeting to President Reagan, Dam struck a cautious tone; he noted that Bishop saw Grenada as a “David” being attacked by the US “Goliath,” hence the flow of antiUS rhetoric, but more significantly on the other key areas that Clark had outlined Bishop “demurred on relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and had nothing to say about restoring human rights.”152 Dam’s conclusion summed up Washington’s position succinctly: I believe we achieved the purpose we had in mind. Bishop now knows what we expect of him. We went more than half way to satisfy his and others requests for a high level meeting in Washington. Now the ball is in his court. We will judge his sincerity by the actions he takes in the coming weeks.153

What happened next provided a typical example of the PRG’s handling of relations with the United States and can only have reconfirmed every preconception Washington had of the PRG. Bishop called a press conference for 11:00 a.m. on June 9 at the UN headquarters in New York; he described the meeting with Clark and Dam as a useful “exploratory” meeting addressing the “formalizing [of ] the mechanism for assuring ongoing dialogue.”154 After this the tone of the press conference changed considerably. The PRG had long been convinced that a US intervention was “imminent.” Now, having met with senior US officials, Bishop pronounced that he believed there was a “fair chance that the timing of the threat has been pushed back” but that “[w]e [the PRG] do not think the threat has been entirely removed.”155 When pushed on the matter by journalists Bishop said the PRG had “lots of

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evidence, lots of information about the CIA’s coordinating role in an intervention from a base in a neighboring country using Cuban exiles and Nicaraguan Somocistas trained in Miami.”156 Bishop did not stop there; he drew attention to the fact that due to US machinations “Grenada has not been able to get ‘one single cent’ from the World Bank or been able to establish a stand-by arrangement with the IMF.”157 Bishop finished blotting his copybook by declaring that it would be at least two years before any sort of elections took place. If rapprochement was in Bishop’s mind it might be expected that such outbursts would be avoided. There was some discussion amongst Grenadian officials beforehand as to the timing of the press conference; however, Bishop was “very stubborn and principled” and thus the decision was taken to proceed.158 Washington was “surprised and disappointed” by Bishop’s performance and felt that it was a clear contravention of the understanding reached at the June 7 meeting to mutually curb critical rhetoric that would only create “misimpressions and an atmosphere of hostility.”159 The upshot of this was that on June 20 Reagan approved the recommendations made by the CPPG a month earlier. Most significantly this meant a departure from previous policy by restricting Grenada’s hard currency earnings from SGU. If Bishop had hoped to improve Grenada’s economic outlook, his efforts had had the opposite effect. For Bishop, securing a meeting was considered to be an important concession from the United States.160 After the critical rhetorical exchanges of recent months such a meeting might have been viewed as impossible. Bishop described it as an “exploratory” meeting and “a useful first step in the recommencement of dialogue between the governments.”161 Williams felt that Washington knew that the PRG (or elements of the PRG) wanted and needed to improve relations but that it wanted to make an example of the PRG; however, she also believed that Bishop had pushed the door to better relations ajar, if not open.162 One senior Grenadian official was franker: “not much of a working session with no give and take on either side.”163 Bishop was promised nothing substantive to take back to the PRG; Clark had agreed to respond to Grenada’s proposals in due course but the emphasis was on the PRG changing its behavior. A top secret report by CC member Liam James reported that the trip had been “a major success and had great impact where it really matters,” with senators and congressmen, liberals, blacks, the US administration, and the media.164 James felt that the trip had been particularly successful in convincing the media that the PRG were nationalists rather than communists.165 He was generous in his praise of Bishop, describing him as the “symbol of our revolution” and emphasizing that “one of the biggest triumphs was Maurice’s success in establishing himself as a truly matured statesman of the Caribbean and Third World.”166 If Bishop was considering loosening the ties to the Soviet bloc then it might be expected that the Washington trip would have had an impact. The PRG had obviously felt uncertain about the possible Soviet reaction; when discussing the visit at the PB in May a decision had been taken to keep the Soviets, and the Grenadian ambassador in Moscow, in the dark. The recent escalation of tension by the United States may have meant that even the Soviets were not as concerned

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as they may have otherwise been about Bishop’s visit if it lowered tension in the region. The Cubans were aware of the visit but were probably similarly concerned about the precipitous rise in tension between Grenada and Washington and viewed this trip as an opportunity to lessen the potential of US hostility. Havana had much time and money invested in Grenada and was keen to see the PRG endure. In the aftermath of the US/OECS intervention, Bishop’s June visit was cited by many as a major factor contributing to his downfall. Some members had never warmed to the idea of meeting US officials, viewing it as tantamount to ideological compromise. As Thorndike points out, Bishop had conceded too much for some: he had ordered the moratorium on denunciations to continue, had established a Constitutional Commission, and recently released political detainees.167 When the PRG imploded in October, one of the main charges leveled against Bishop was “onemanism” and “individualism” and the June trip was part of the evidence his accusers probably had in mind; “[i]t seemed that only he [Bishop] was the revolution, and that only he could represent and articulate its aims, policies and principles.”168 A post-intervention CIA assessment concluded that the trip had had a “catalytic” effect on Coard who had kept his ambition in check until that point.169 In some respects Bishop was in a no-win situation. Had the United States embraced Bishop’s request for normalization, the PRG hard-liners would have provided strong opposition to such a process. As it was, Washington’s demands were unacceptable and all the hard-liners’ opposition to the trip justified. That the arrangements for Bishop’s visit were made during Washington’s most sustained rhetorical attack on Grenada, and that the visit itself occurred shortly thereafter, have possibly given undue credence to the argument that Bishop was seeking rapprochement. The US embassy in Barbados certainly did not think this was Bishop’s motive: The PRG continues to place prime importance on potential publicity gains which only a meeting with the President would have generated in their view, rather than to be pinned down on the main issues impeding a normalization of relations . . . In our view, Bishop’s much publicized crusade to ‘forge a new beginning’ in our relationship . . . has regretfully, but predictably, amounted to nothing new at all.170

As is apparent, throughout the visit the emphasis was on contact with the public, media, businesses, Congress, and Grenada’s friends in the United States to “provide a better understanding of the Grenada revolution”171 and in this sense the trip could be considered a success although Bishop was probably preaching to the converted most of the time. Perhaps the most balanced conclusion is that the trip was designed to be a public relations exercise, an opportunity for dialogue and economic support. For some Grenadian officials steps to normalize relations with the United States were essential; the PRG was in a harmful “tailspin of second-guessing” that saw ever-increasing military spending and worsening relations with its Caribbean neighbors.172

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Despite the optimism of some Grenadian officials it is evident that a Newsweek article, written before Bishop’s meeting, reached a prescient conclusion: “His [Bishop’s] inevitable criticism of Reagan’s policies may bolt more doors than his good will opens.” In fact the effect was a lot more dramatic. In the aftermath of Bishop’s visit President Reagan approved the CPPG’s pre-visit recommendations that effectively would have seen a “tightening [of ] the screws”173 if the PRG had not self-destructed in October 1983. The June visit provides an insight into how US-Grenadian relations would in all likelihood have developed over the longer term if the PRG had endured. Both governments were not averse to exploring the normalization of relations but only on terms that would have proved unacceptable to the other in practice. The deterioration of relations during the Reagan administration was a continuation of the trend that was established during the Carter administration, albeit more pronounced. In conclusion, “given the nature of the Bishop regime’s political objectives and of its foreign support, the administration had substantial grounds for wishing the PRG’s demise, if not for taking active steps to remove it.”174 Reagan’s policy was one of attrition rather than actively seeking the removal of the PRG as it simply did not merit a military solution. The implosion of the revolution in October would change this.

CHAPTER 5

Death of a Revolution: Prelude to an Intervention

B

y the summer of 1983 the tension in US-Grenada relations had decreased. However, simultaneously, the People’s Revolutionary Government’s (PRG) internal problems had grown increasingly insurmountable: a faltering economy, waning popular support, and an internecine party power struggle that culminated in the PRG’s implosion in October and its replacement by a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), which was then overthrown by a multilateral US-Eastern Caribbean military force. This chapter will trace the decline of the PRG and the subsequent arrest of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his death on Wednesday, October 19, and the US and Caribbean reaction to these events which laid the foundations for a military intervention. An indication that all was not well within the PRG came in October 1982 when Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, the chief political theoretician of the party, resigned from the Political Bureau (PB) and Central Committee (CC). Coard felt that his authority as chairman of the Organizing Committee (OC) had been undermined and stated that he was “tired and sick of being the only hatchetman and critique (sic) . . . he concluded that he was the main fetter on the development of the CC because everyone was depending on him for everything especially in the area of the economy.”1 The CC concluded that a more select membership2 was required and that “the party must be placed on a firm Leninist footing.”3 Coard also cited accusations against him of undermining Bishop’s leadership and a belief that if the stricter adherence to Leninism that he felt necessary was implemented it would cause “personality clashes” with Bishop.4 By the fourth year of the revolution the feeling of disillusionment with the PRG was more widespread than ever amongst the populace. The economic downturn meant the government struggled to meet Grenadians’ increased socioeconomic expectations. The Marxist-Leninist dogmatism of the PRG had little in common with the people and alienated the small middle-class sector. The

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PRG also criticized the churches as subversive in a strongly religious society. The PRG’s mass organizations gradually lost support and a combination of the dislike of regimentation and poor pay led to the demoralization of many in the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) and many militia members. In March 1983 a report to the CC concluded that the government was “close to losing its links with the masses.”5 The decision to restrict the size of party membership resulted in administrative overload as overworked officials suffered mental and physical exhaustion. The external pressure placed on the PRG by the United States had contributed to Grenada’s militarization and the subsequent increased intrusion of the PRA, in particular, and militia into everyday life. One explanation of Maurice Bishop’s demise is that it was the result of a carefully planned conspiracy by the hard-line Leninist faction of the PRG led by Bernard Coard who plotted to remove the more moderate Bishop. Accordingly, Coard used his position to appoint his disciples to key posts and then resigned to disguise his intentions. Finally, in late 1983, the Coard faction manufactured a crisis to introduce the proposal of joint leadership and when Bishop expressed opposition they arrested him to clear the way for Coard’s return.6 That the CC was divided into Bishop and Coard supporters is indisputable, but the struggle that evolved was more of a classic power struggle involving personality and leadership differences rather than purely ideological ones. Bishop and Coard were very contrasting personalities. Maurice Bishop was the public face of the PRG: “tall, handsome, popular, an inspired and inspiring public speaker, a man who had come to his leadership position in a spontaneous, natural fashion . . . who received the accolades and the recognition.”7 As Marable states, “Bishop was the charismatic, symbolic link between the PRG, the NJM and the Grenadian masses.”8 Whilst his secret September 1982 Line of March speech revealed he was also clearly committed to Marxist-Leninism, his attitude to Marxist-Leninist doctrine has been described as “ambiguous and reverential.”9 Indeed, as Feuer points out, “his speeches contain little of the rhetoric or class analysis usually associated with Marxist-Leninism; there seems more emphasis on the youth, women and small farmers than the working-class.”10 Finally, a factor that is important to remember, Bishop’s political style was one of consensus and accommodation. Heine concludes that Bishop “was overaccommodating as a leader. He didn’t want to offend people, and therefore his own beliefs and positions were often compromised.”11 For example, when Coard made the decision to close Torchlight in 1979 while Bishop was abroad without consulting him, Bishop made no objection upon his return, despite his reservations about the matter. Bernard Coard was the private face of the PRG. His forte was long-term planning and managerial strategy, and he was responsible for the PRG’s political economy policies. He was a dogmatic, ideology-oriented Marxist-Leninist who favored a pro-Soviet hard-line policy. He was the man behind the party’s organization and tactics and “from his positions on the Organizing Committee, the Politburo, and the CC, he kept trying to build a highly centralized, hierarchical, elitist party structure in accordance with his own strict interpretation of Leninist doctrine.”12 It was this situation, combined with his former Organisation for

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Revolutionary Education and Liberation (OREL) associates’ support, that “enabled him to assign loyalists to strategic positions throughout the party, mass organizations, and government ministries.”13 According to some authors this process was all part of a master plan to depose Bishop. As far as the working relationship between Bishop and Coard was concerned, “Maurice generally bowed to Bernard’s tactical and ideological leadership with Bernard in turn accepting his position of chief ideologue/tactician while ceding the kudos of popularity and later national leadership to Maurice.”14 Bishop respected Coard’s understanding of the “science” of Marxist-Leninism and trusted his judgment. Coard accepted that Bishop epitomized the revolution for Grenadians but in private he criticized Bishop’s leadership style. In October 1982 an extraordinary meeting of the CC discussed issues raised in a letter of resignation (from the CC and PB) from Coard. He outlined a number of points: the undermining of his authority as chairman of the OC, slackness of the CC, lack of preparation for meetings, and unwillingness of members to speak up and study. Coard felt the solution to this would result in personality clashes with the chairman of the CC, Maurice Bishop. Coard recommended that “stringent Leninist measures are required”: (1) change the chairman of the CC; (2) “chop deadweight” from the CC; (3) all CC members should attend work committees; and (4) the PB should be expanded.15 Members agreed that the party was at a crossroads: The first route would be the petty (sic) bourgeois route which would . . . only lead to temporary relief, but would surely lead to the deterioration of the Revolution . . . The second route is the Communist route—the road of Leninist standards and functioning, the road of democratic centralism, of selectivity, of criticism and self-criticism and of collective leadership.16

The decision was taken⎯the party would be placed on a firm Leninist footing. After collective assessments of each member’s performance, three Bishop loyalists were censured: Kendrick Radix was removed from the PB and CC, Fitzroy Bain was put on probation, and Unison Whiteman severely warned.17 Simultaneously, three ex-OREL members⎯Liam James, Ewart Layne, and John Ventour⎯were promoted to the PB. Disregarding the theory of a multistage gradualistic plan by Coard to overthrow Bishop, there were obvious problems within the party. Most authors concur that the crisis that destroyed the PRG arose from the Coard faction’s disappointment over the rate of social and economic transformation, the persistence of “petty (sic) bourgeois” tendencies in the New Jewel Movement (NJM), and the difficulties encountered in establishing a Marxist-Leninist party structure and control system.18 As Ambursley and Dunkerley suggest, the division within the PRG “was not essentially about ideology, but it did centre on political tactics and party discipline, which inevitably helped to draw out and sharpen incipient differences of style, approach and strategy.”19 Over a series of CC meetings in July, August, and September 1983 the power struggle reached its violent denouement.

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The First Plenary Session From July 13 to 19, 1983, the CC convened its first ever plenary session. Here ideological, political, and organizational weaknesses were identified: “The continued failure of the Party to transform itself ideologically and organizationally and to exercise firm leadership along a Leninist path in the face of the acute rise in the complexities and difficulties facing the Revolution on all fronts.”20 There was also concern that the “emergence of deep petty (sic) bourgeois manifestations and influence in the Party has led to two ideological trends.”21 Bishop’s name was not mentioned but at subsequent meetings he would be strongly denounced for his petit bourgeois tendencies. The CC complained that mass organization activity had stagnated, workers’ attendance at classes was low and inconsistent, militia numbers had fallen, anticommunist activity was rising as was church activity; a report warned “how dangerously close the Party came to losing links with the masses.”22 At an emergency meeting of the CC on August 26, 1983, criticism focused on the composition and function of the CC. Selwyn Strachan warned that “sections of the party have begun to rebel against the higher organs of the party . . . This silent rebellion will turn into open rebellion and if we do not address it now it will be resolved in a petty (sic) bourgeois way.”23 Prophetically, Liam James cautioned that “we are seeing the beginning of the disintegration of the party.”24 In summarizing the meeting Bishop agreed with James’s diagnosis and recommended greater CC self-criticism, work committees, and study groups to improve CC members’ performance and that members should read a history of the Soviet communist party.25 Thus, instead of attempting to improve its relations with the populace, the party looked inwards to proper analysis in true Marxist-Leninist fashion. At the next meeting of the CC Bishop and his supporters would become the target of criticism. An extraordinary meeting of the CC took place between September 14 and 16, 1983. The meeting started ominously for Bishop when his agenda was rejected as “lacking in focus” and was replaced by the radicals’ agenda consisting of an analysis of the state of the party and revolution, an analysis of the CC and its main problems, and discussion of the way forward.26 Ewart Layne began the proceedings by stating that the revolution was in more danger than ever: The party is crumbling, all mass organizations are to the ground, organs of people’s democracy is about to collapse (sic). The internal state of the party is very dread (sic). There is wide protest against the higher organs, prestige has fallen in the eyes of the party members and the masses. The C.C. has proven its inability to give leadership to the process e.g. this time the C.C. cannot determine the stage the revolution is at.27

More attention had to be paid to the people if the revolution was to survive. On the second day Bishop was the target of direct criticism. Liam James led off by criticizing the “levels of disorganisation, low ideological level and failure to put the party on a firm M.L. [Marxist-Leninist] footing” and that “the most fundamental

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problem is the quality of leadership of the Central Committee and the party provided by Cde. Maurice Bishop.”28 Phyllis Coard, Bernard’s wife, was more direct: “The Cde. (sic) Leader has not taken the responsibility, not given the necessary guidance, even in areas where he is directly in charge of the guidance is not adequate. He is disorganised very often, avoid (sic) responsibilities for dealing with critical areas of work.”29 In response the pro-Bishop George Louison said that Bishop’s leadership was “not the only problem.” However, Bishop conceded that “it is correct as the maximum leader to take the full responsibilities” and that he needed time to think about the situation.30 The stage had been set for what some authors would argue was the final step in Coard’s elaborate plan to marginalize Bishop and seize power himself. Having soundly criticized Bishop’s leadership, James, seconded by Layne and Leon Cornwall, proposed a “joint leadership” plan: Bishop would be responsible for work with the masses, propaganda, the organs of popular democracy, militia mobilization, and regional/international affairs. Coard would be responsible for the OC, party organization and development, and strategy and tactics.31 It would seem that the majority of the CC thought joint leadership was the most appropriate solution. There was general agreement that Coard’s return to the CC and PB would be welcome and Bishop’s and Coard’s abilities did complement each another. Meeks suggests that “joint leadership was not, as some have implied, a bolt out of the blue. It was simply the formal interpretation of Coard and Bishop’s pre-1979 relationship.”32 Bishop did not initially oppose power sharing although he felt it was a vote of “no confidence”; his concern was what Coard’s view of this arrangement was, its implementation, and that joint leadership would project an image of a revolution undergoing a power struggle and near collapse.33 Again, Bishop asked for time to consider the proposal. The meeting closed with a vote on the formalization of James’s proposal, which was passed by nine votes for, one against, and three abstentions. On September 17 the CC met with Coard to discuss joint leadership. Coard agreed that the situation was grim and believed that the party would disintegrate in six months unless a “fundamental package of measures are done.”34 Coard was initially reluctant to return to the CC and PB and emphasized that the implementation of joint leadership must satisfy Bishop. On September 25 there was an extraordinary general meeting of the full members of the party. A CC report explained that joint leadership was “an attempt to bring a creative and scientific solution to the leadership question in our concrete circumstances and most fundamentally . . . it is the formal recognition of the leadership of our party for the first ten years . . . up to one year ago.”35 Bishop’s failure to attend was interpreted as “contempt to the C.C. decision and democratic centralism.”36 Coard felt his presence without Bishop would be inappropriate so he did not attend either. Eventually the members voted to force both to attend. It appears that Bishop was having second thoughts, saying that “I am suspicious that Comrades have concluded that the party must be transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party and I am the wrong person to be leader.”37 Charges of “vacillation” and “individualism” were leveled against him. Despite his reservations Bishop’s only response was

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accommodative: “I sincerely accept the criticism and will fulfill the decision in practice.”38 It seemed that the crisis had been averted. On September 27 Bishop and two of his main supporters, Whiteman and George Louison, unwisely left Grenada to visit Czechoslovakia and Hungary on an economic aid mission. During his trip Bishop, encouraged by Whiteman and Louison, had second thoughts about joint leadership. Louison later recalled that “here were these people, at a time when it was claimed that relations between Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard were at the lowest, coming up with a solution that had to rely on the very closest of working relations between the two men.”39 Addressing Grenadian students in Hungary, Louison said that the issue of joint leadership was unsettled but if accepted it would “mash up the Revolution.”40 Bishop had come to the same conclusion; he told his bodyguard, Cletus St. Paul, that the crisis was a “power struggle” and that “no state had joint leadership.”41 Returning via Cuba, Bishop told Castro that he had “given little attention to the militia. I’ve given little attention to the work of the party. When I return I shall give more attention to the work of the party and mass organizations.”42 The Coard faction later claimed that Bishop discussed the PRG’s problems with Castro. In a 1985 interview Castro denied this and stated that Bishop had informed him about plans to delegate his party and state responsibilities to enable him to focus on other tasks and discussed what aid to request from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.43 If Bishop did discuss the leadership problem it would not be too difficult to imagine Castro, the epitome of the maximum leader, advising Bishop to reject joint leadership. The CC learnt of Bishop’s change of mind when St. Paul phoned the committee from Cuba and hinted that “blood will flow.”44 The CC accused Bishop of discussing his problems with Castro and interpreted this latest development as a plot to eliminate the radicals. The Coard faction had not been idle in Bishop’s absence: the militia had begun to be disarmed and the PRA given a pay rise. Also, the Coard group “called in all party members, did full assessments of their personal situations, financial positions, and other things. They made big promises to help them solve personal situations.”45 Bishop returned on October 8 convinced that joint leadership was a plot to undermine his authority. He was met at Pearls Airport by a casually dressed Selwyn Strachan; word had reached the CC of Bishop’s change of mind so they decided not to send the usual reception party. Bishop told Strachan that he wanted the joint leadership issue to be put back on the agenda and that he now favored “collective” rather than joint leadership.46 A CC emergency session on Monday, October 10, refused to reopen the leadership issue, considering that Bishop only wanted to reject the proposal and that such a process was an unacceptable challenge to party policy.47 Bishop sent St. Paul to the meeting to test the water. In a conversation with Vincent Noel the following day, Noel mentioned talk by Coard supporters of an “Afghan solution” if Bishop continued to vacillate.48 The PB met at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, October 12, in what was to prove to be the beginning of the end for Bishop. The morning session was spent discussing

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the expulsion of George Louison who was charged with “poisoning the mind of MB [Maurice Bishop] and manipulating him not to implement the decision.”49 The meeting reconvened as a special CC session at 3:30 p.m. Bishop’s challenge to the joint leadership decision⎯that it would be a prelude to him being eased out of power⎯received short shrift as he was outvoted nine to three; James made it clear that “we have to be cold-blooded and cast all emotions aside, we have to be determined. MB [Maurice Bishop] is mainly responsible for the crisis in the party.”50 By the time the CC convened, word had reached the committee of a rumor being spread that the Coards were plotting to kill Bishop. General Austin ordered an investigation, which resulted in one of Bishop’s security guards, Errol George, confessing that he and St. Paul were responsible and acting under Bishop’s orders.51 The matter was raised at the meeting as Bishop’s opponents sensed their opportunity. Bishop denied spreading rumors as did St. Paul when he was summoned to the meeting. Whatever the truth, the rumor “really created chaos, mistrust, anxiety and fear in the Party.”52 Despite trying to defend themselves and counter the accusations, there was no way back for Bishop, Louison, and Bain; they were charged with “one-manism,” “cultism,” and “spreading rumours as a precondition for murdering the CC and chasing the party off the streets.”53 Bishop was informed that he would have seven days to take a decisive position in favor of joint leadership or be expelled from the party. It was at this point that Liam James received news that some of the militia in St. Paul’s parish had mobilized and were heading to Bishop’s residence to protect him.54 A worried CC insisted that Bishop give a radio broadcast to deny that there was any dissension within the cabinet and to dismiss the assassination rumor (it was briefly broadcast on RFG three times between midnight and 2:00 a.m.).55 Before the meeting closed at 10:30 p.m. a vote was taken to expel Louison from the PB and CC. Unbeknown to Bishop, the Coard faction had assembled key PRA figures at 1:00 a.m. that morning and informed them that Bishop had rebelled and that “they were to defend the working-class as a whole and not the life of any individual leaders.”56 At a 7:00 a.m. meeting of all party members in the PRA, a statement was issued supporting joint leadership: “Never will we allow cultism, egoism, the unreasonable and unprincipled desires of one man or a minority to be imposed on our Party.”57 The only dissenter was Chief of Staff Einstein Louison (George Louison’s brother) who was placed under house arrest later that day. With his power undermined and many of the PRA supporting his removal, Bishop’s political fate was sealed. The final act occurred at a meeting of nearly all the approximately 300 NJM members on Thursday, October 13, at 10:00 p.m. Bishop had not been informed of the meeting and only found out about it when Vincent Noel visited him that afternoon. At the meeting Bishop was denounced as having “disgraced the party” and was now “without redemption.”58 He again denied spreading assassination rumors but to no avail; in an atmosphere that Noel described as “a horrendous display of militarism, hatred and emotional vilification,”59 an isolated and confused Bishop was a sitting duck. What happened next was a formality. On the pretext of a threat to the Coards and other

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CC members and for “stirring up counter[revolution] against the revo[lution]”60 it was decided that Bishop should be placed under house arrest indefinitely. On the morning of Friday, October 14, Bishop was formally expelled from the party. Under Arrest The US embassy in Barbados had been monitoring the situation and as Kenneth Kurze, the counselor for political and military affairs at the embassy, commented, “rumors that the radicals led by Coard were discontent (sic) and planning something (at the very least, pressure on Bishop to conform) had been circulating for weeks.”61 Amongst the first to pick up on this in Washington was the staunch right-wing anticommunist Constantine Menges, the president’s national security assistant for Latin American Affairs. Menges was concerned about the possible danger to US citizens, predominantly the 600 or so medical students, on the island. He later recalled that in crises there is opportunity, and I believed that this emergency just might present an excellent chance to restore democracy to Grenada while assuring the safety of our citizens. I immediately asked all the foreign policy agencies to provide their latest facts on Grenada. I also sought up-to-date information on any activities by Cuban or Soviet-bloc secret police or military units that might be sent to help one or the other communist faction. Further, I suggested that there be an immediate increase in efforts to detect any movement of Cuban or other hostile forces toward Grenada.62

Subsequently, at a 7:30 a.m. National Security Council (NSC) meeting on Thursday, October 13, Menges gave a summary of the situation in Grenada. After the meeting he drafted an ambitious, even presumptuous considering Bishop had not yet been arrested, one-page plan for “the protection of our U.S. citizens and the restoration of democracy on Grenada. It suggested action by an international, legal, collective security force that would include democratic Caribbean countries.”63 Later that day the State Department’s Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG)64 met, chaired by the assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Tony Motley. Grenada was not originally on the schedule but was added to discuss the BishopCoard split and the possibility of further unrest and the threat this posed to US citizens on the island.65 Thus the NSC and RIG had both considered Grenada before Bishop was arrested late that Thursday. Washington learnt of Bishop’s arrest from its embassy in Barbados. The embassy had learnt of events from the British deputy high commissioner in Barbados, David Montgomery. Montgomery, informed by the British representative on Grenada, John Kelly,66 had contacted the embassy late on Thursday, October 13, to report “rumblings from Grenada indicating that Coard [is] about to throw Bishop out and declare a Marxist state.”67 Early on Friday, October 14, Montgomery confirmed that “Coard [had been] all but successful in his maneuver.”68

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In the Caribbean, the Barbadian prime minister Tom Adams heard of Bishop’s arrest on Thursday, October 13, from a “friendly diplomatic source,” the British. He described it as “an act so extreme as to imply some measure of imminent violence and disorder.”69 The Dominican prime minister Eugenia Charles did not initially share Adams’s concern, believing that “at that time I didn’t feel it was my business to even think of interfering because if the people of the country want their leader kept under control, it’s their business, not mine.”70 Irrespective of Charles’s indifference other Eastern Caribbean leaders concluded that “whatever our differences in the past, Mr. Bishop deserved the support of Caribbean governments in the circumstances.”71 Adams contacted Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Ludlow Flower at the US embassy and suggested that “we” (Barbados, OECS, and the United States) had to act. According to Flower, Adams was not proposing intervention at this stage but more a “united front.”72 In Washington that Friday, the RIG convened again to specifically discuss Grenada. The group, aware of the possibility of a hostage situation and the inescapable analogy with Iran in 1980, reviewed standard evacuation procedures. There exists four “layers of active participation for protecting lives”73: the host government is reminded of its obligation to protect the welfare of foreign nationals; if the host is unable to guarantee this then they are requested to assist in the removal of nationals from the danger area; if the host is unable or unwilling to do this the United States will do it as long as the host pledges noninterference; and finally a forced evacuation when the host is unable or unwilling to promise noninterference.74 The last of these is usually referred to as a nonpermissive evacuation operation (NEO). Additionally, the assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, a RIG member, was instructed to tell the JCS to review their contingency plans for an evacuation operation. In turn, the JCS contacted the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) Admiral Wesley McDonald at CINCLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, and instructed him to “investigate the possibility of conducting US Naval presence and possible non-combatant evacuation operations if the need to evacuate American citizens from the island arose.”75 Washington had interpreted Bishop’s arrest as the result of a power struggle but it was already clear that it would not be the end of the story. Word of the arrest had spread around the island and when the minister of mobilization Selwyn Strachan, a henchman of Coard’s, appeared at the offices of the Free West Indian newspaper to announce Bishop’s removal and replacement by Coard, he was shouted down and chased off the premises. RFG officially broadcast this development at 3:30 p.m. to an unsettled and stunned populace. Perhaps not anticipating the hostile reaction of the people, Coard instructed RFG to announce his resignation at 4:00 p.m. to “put a stop to the vicious rumor that he has been attempting to replace Comrade Maurice Bishop as Prime Minister.”76 RFG also stated that all PRA reservists should report for duty the next morning at Fort Rupert.

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Saturday, October 15 In Barbados US Ambassador Milan Bish approached the Barbadian permanent secretary of defense and security with the offer of a transport plane “to cover both a [voluntary] release of Bishop” or “Bishop’s forcible freeing by a raid being contemplated by several Caribbean states.”77 The exact origins of the plan are not clear but Bish believed that it was a CIA initiative.78 According to one embassy official, the hope was that Bishop’s removal would prevent further violence and encourage stabilization.79 Planning for the rescue proceeded but events would soon make it redundant. In St. George’s, Kendrick Radix organized 300 people in the market square and told them that Coard was “obsessed with power” and if they wanted Bishop freed they should “seek out Coard.”80 Radix warned the Coard faction that unless Bishop was released by Monday, “the people would go on strike and there would be continuous mass demonstrations to try to pressure a solution to the problem.”81 He was arrested and ended up in Richmond Hill prison. On RFG Leon Cornwall condemned Bishop for spreading rumors and underlined that “until now Maurice Bishop has led the NJM and the PRG, but no man is above the party”82 and that the PRA “would not tolerate any disruption of peace and calm on the island.”83 In Barbados the US embassy was speculating about how Cuba would respond; at this early stage they reported that the Cubans appeared to be “avoiding taking sides at this point. They may be trying to mediate the dispute to insure the factional infighting does not break out into a divisive civil war . . . a situation which would endanger their position in Grenada.”84 With a relatively large Cuban contingent on the island it was felt that if the Cubans were to back one side against the other it would prove decisive: A complete political impasse would mean the military will have to weigh in. They are at present divided. Other things being equal, Coard could well need the Cubans to enforce a takeover. On the other hand, Bishop would probably not need the Cubans to restore his rule.85

For Washington, Cuban involvement would “create a whole new ballgame.”86 The embassy reported that the situation in Grenada remained “confused and fluid” but that the chances of civil war seemed low and the current level of violence was not a threat to the students, although “should widespread disorders develop . . . U.S. citizens could be endangered.”87 In the event that Coard should triumph the embassy recommended a more “energetic” response.88 The Cuban ambassador, Julian Torres Rizo, had learnt of the division within the PRG from Bishop on October 12. The next day Ambassador Rizo and the Soviet ambassador, Gennadiy Sazhenev, were briefed. On October 14 Coard and Strachan met with Ambassador Rizo: clearly aware of the decisive role the Cubans could play and where their allegiances probably lay, Coard asked how the Cubans would respond to a request from the prime minister for assistance.89 Rizo did not reply but did offer to meet with the CC to help defuse the crisis; he was rebuffed.

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On Saturday, October 15, Castro sent a frank letter to the CC saying that “the supposed notion that on passing through our country Bishop had informed me of the problems inside the Party is a miserable piece of slander” and that “everything which happened was . . . a surprise, and disagreeable.”90 Castro also answered Coard’s question to Rizo by making it clear that Cuba would “pay strictest attention to the principle of not interfering in the slightest in the internal affairs of Grenada.”91 Over the next three days (Saturday, October 15, to Monday, October 17) serious negotiations took place between Coard and Strachan and the pro-Bishop George Louison and Unison Whiteman to find a solution to the crisis. The four met for several hours on each day; Louison reports that Coard was buoyant during the talks, believing that it was possible to remove Bishop because the CC was popular with the people and that “once it was sold as a party decision and demonstrated that Maurice was resistant, they thought the masses of the people would say, ‘Well look, you cannot have somebody resisting the majority in that way.’”92 George Louison believed that the joint leadership proposal was folly and that the party and CC had been discredited. He told Coard that it was imperative Bishop be released or it could lead to a civil war as Grenadians were growing increasingly restive. Coard was dismissive of the threat: “Well, the people can march, they can demonstrate, and we won’t stop them. But they’ll get tired . . . and life will return to normal. And we will continue the revolutionary process on a more Marxist, more Leninist footing.”93 The last meeting ended around 5:00 p.m. with Coard promising to convey Louison and Whiteman’s views to the CC and to produce a final, concrete proposal by the following morning. At 12:04 p.m. on Sunday, October 16, General Hudson Austin went on RFG to provide the fullest account of the situation yet: Maurice Bishop has deeply resented this collective leadership, and has taken the position that no action should be taken to which he is opposed. At the same time, he has become increasingly hostile to criticism and increasingly suspicious that other members of the leadership of the party may be seeking to seize power from him. 94

Austin went on to deny rumors of a power struggle: “The struggle of Comrade Bishop has been the struggle of one man to exercise unlimited power. And that our party cannot and will not permit.”95 Acknowledging that people were confused about what was happening, Austin informed them that Bishop was at home and safe—he did not mention he was under arrest though⎯that the CC was in full control, and that this was not a military takeover as rumors had suggested. A disbelieving and increasingly angry population were not in the mood to listen though. The US embassy reported that sides are still being chosen up (sic). The showdown could be tomorrow, if it is not already over. Given the Commonwealth Caribbean’s non-violent tradition, bloodshed is possible but not likely. If it comes to guns, the People’s Revolutionary Army has them all, in which case Coard with PRA support has won.96

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The embassy believed that Coard’s “slow motion coup” left the door open for a Bishop countermove and rated the odds “40 for Bishop and 60 for Coard.” With Bishop under house arrest and the PRA backing the Coard faction, these were generous odds. On the more important issue for Washington of the threat to US citizens, the embassy concluded that “we have no reason to believe American citizens are in danger, but the situation is fluid and could change quickly.”97 Monday, October 17 The RIG met again for two hours on Monday, October 17, to review all the available information on Grenada. There was a general awareness of Reagan’s “frequent reminder that there must never be ‘another Teheran’⎯a hostage situation involving U.S. citizens.”98 Motley was driven by the Iran analogy and knew that Reagan would not tolerate a hostage situation for any period of time. Shultz agreed: “He [Reagan] would not stand still while American hostages were held for 444 days. In fact, he probably wouldn’t stand still for a week.”99 Motley, supported by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger, was concerned about the safety of US citizens and argued that serious consideration of an NEO was necessary. However, Vice Admiral Moreau was unwilling to initiate planning yet. Similarly, the JCS was not convinced that all nonmilitary options had been examined and believed that the quality of intelligence was inadequate.100 Fundamentally, the JCS was unenthusiastic and “preferred to await specific high-level authorization before considering a military operation.”101 In Barbados, Adams had decided that as planning for Bishop’s rescue proceeded, it was time to discuss the situation with Ambassador Bish face-to-face. Adams met with Bish and Flower, having conferred with some of his fellow heads of state in the Eastern Caribbean. He suggested that the situation in Grenada provided the United States with a golden opportunity to remove an unpopular Marxist-Leninist regime and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence in the region.102 In response to this tacit request for US involvement, Bish could only repeat the offer of a plane and promise to relay Adams’s message to Washington. That same day the United States also received another request for help, this time from Eugenia Charles; she believed that Bishop had returned from Eastern Europe wanting a more moderate socialism for Grenada and that now the Marxist hardliners had made their move the United States should deal severely with them.103 Charles spoke with Charles Gillespie, the deputy assistant secretary for InterAmerican Affairs, who relayed her oral request to Secretary of State Shultz. The embassy’s earlier speculations proved accurate when they learnt from the Canadians that Coard had approached the Cubans for support but that they had been noncommittal.104 In Washington President Reagan’s principal deputy press secretary Larry Speakes had told reporters: “The situation in Grenada is fluid at this point and is unclear. It is unclear who is in charge. The military seems to be exerting an increasing amount of power . . . foreign journalists continue to be banned from the island and news reports are sketchy and incomplete.”105

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In order to remedy this problem and also to check on US citizens, the embassy decided to send two officials, Kenneth Kurze and Linda Flohr, the third secretary, to Grenada.106 Thus by Monday, October 17, the decision-making process had changed up a gear; National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane had briefed Reagan on the situation and persuaded him of the need to order the go-ahead with planning of an NEO. Henceforth, “planning took place in an interagency forum with representatives of all relevant agencies participating on a daily basis. The President and Vice President were kept personally informed of all developments.”107 Washington was also aware by this time that the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)108 leaders, along with Adams and Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga, were clearly in agreement about the need for military action and that they viewed US participation as essential. In Grenada torrential rains kept the people off the streets as the CC met for what would prove to be the final time. Various options for dealing with Bishop were mooted: court martial, jail, continued house arrest, exile in Cuba, and even a military solution.109 As O’Shaughnessy notes, “It was clear to the Coard faction, as it was to their opponents, that the majority in the Central Committee would use force if necessary to impose their will.”110 The meeting concluded with a six-point proposal that would be presented to Bishop: the party was committed to a Marxist-Leninist strategy and Bishop would not impede it, Bishop would assume responsibility for the crisis, he would accept the principles of democratic centralism, remain an ordinary member of the NJM and on the PB as a consultant, accept the supremacy of the party over the state, and his commanderin-chief post would be abolished.111 The proposal read more like an ultimatum than a proposal; it was apparent that the CC had determined not to change its course. Tuesday, October 18 On Tuesday morning the NSC met and Menges decided to present his plan to McFarlane. To Menges’s surprise he simply replied, “Well, . . . that’s okay.”112 Menges then met with US Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) William Middendorf to probe likely OAS reactions to a military operation. He told Menges that “if it could be done, this would be a great step for freedom” but again cautioned that “I wouldn’t get my hopes up.”113 That same day, Shultz authorized the establishment of a Grenada Task Force under Motley, which, as Shultz reflected, “put into place a round-the-clock watch and . . . got us all mentally and administratively ready as the problem became more grave.”114 Shultz now replied to Charles’ Monday, October 17, request by asking for a formal evaluation of the situation by the OECS. According to Shultz this “attended to her request and showed her that we were responsive and alert, and, second, it set the stage for the United States to act in a manner consistent with our national interests and with international law.”115 In a move that was coincidental and fortuitous, an 11-ship Navy Task Force116 left Norfolk en route to the

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Mediterranean where it was to relieve the US 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Simultaneously, the military crisis action team at Norfolk began to examine various possible courses of action.117 At the embassy in Bridgetown a diplomatic note was sent to Grenada asking for assurances about the safety of US citizens and informing Grenada of plans to send Kurze and Flohr to the island.118 Grenada’s reply the next day stated that “the interests of US citizens are in no way threatened by the present situation in Grenada which the Ministry [of External Affairs] hastens to point out is a purely internal matter.”119 The response did little to allay Washington’s concern and noticeably did not mention the proposed visit by Kurze and Flohr. As Motley commented, “The answer contained no assurances, no concrete measures to safeguard foreign residents, just a bland assertion and a blunt slamming of the door.”120 As will become apparent, by Tuesday in Grenada it was doubtful that those in control, to whatever degree, were in any position to make such assurances. Final preparations were made for Kurze and Flohr to travel to Grenada the following morning. The US embassy in London cabled Washington to report that the situation was still “too murky to call” and that the success of the Coard faction would depend on “whether Bishop will phase out quietly, [the] extent of Cuban involvement, and how other Eastern Caribbean Commonwealth nations will react.”121 One of the United States’ fears was that Bishop would call for Cuban intervention to regain control. It seems that the embassy at least felt that Bishop was the key to the present crisis and that what happened to him would be pivotal.122 In Grenada, Michael Als from the Peoples Popular Movement (Trinidad and Tobago) and Rupert Roopnarine of the Working Peoples Alliance (Guyana) had been invited by CC members to help mediate. Als met with Bishop in the afternoon; in discussion he told him that the people were supportive but the party and the PRA were against him. Als later reported that Bishop “was ready to work out something but that he was not prepared to be humiliated by anyone” and that he appeared determined⎯“Dem men tough as hell and I just as tough. We go see. They have their model and I have mine.”123 Louison and Whiteman’s efforts at negotiation finally collapsed around 4:00 p.m. when it became clear that the CC was stalling: Louison, Whiteman, and three other pro-Bishop ministers, Jacqueline Creft (education), Norris Bain (housing), and Lyden Ramdhanny (tourism), resigned their posts to put more pressure on the CC and to mobilize the people.124 From around 5:00 p.m. Whiteman managed to speak to Radio Antilles, based in Montserrat and receivable in Grenada, and told them that “Coard is running the place single-handedly” and despite the advancement of a set of proposals by the ex-ministers to resolve the crisis, “Coard had shown that he was not serious about resolving it”; they were now “apprehensive that Coard may try a military solution.”125 The public now began to make their presence felt. Approximately 500 people rallied in Grenville, Gouyave, and Sauteurs. Students marched on Pearls Airport and forced it to close for several hours. Schools and factories closed as the people

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took to the streets chanting “No Bishop, no revo!”126 Four members of the CC, Austin, Layne, James, and Bartholemew Tan, visited Bishop that evening to deliver their final six-point compromise proposal. Bishop promised to respond the following morning but, again, wanted to talk with Louison, Whiteman, and Ambassador Rizo first. “Bloody Wednesday” At 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, October 19, Kurze and Flohr left Barbados bound for Grenada to get an “on-the-ground update” of the situation and “check on the Medical School people.”127 Halfway through the flight the pilot informed them that he had been refused landing permission at Pearls Airport and was returning to Barbados. In Grenada the drama was unfolding. In Barbados there was an important development. From 9:30 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. Bish met with Adams who began by requesting US assistance in rescuing Bishop, his family, and 70 political prisoners.128 He argued persuasively that this was a unique opportunity and would produce a favorable world reaction, especially among developing countries, with the United States being seen in a different light, “promoting human rights on behalf of a popular leftist dictator, and this would be in dramatic contrast to the conventional wisdom that the U.S. supports only conservative, right-wing regimes.”129 He pointed out how “powerful symbolic asset to the West Bishop would be in exile, especially if he were assisted out by the U.S.”130 Adams assumed that Bishop was under close arrest and that he could not talk alone but believed he would welcome rescue, even if it was by the United States.131 The hawkish prime minister contended that a rescue would be less problematic than an occupation and was “feasible, necessary and desirable.”132 To reinforce his point he asked hypothetically, “Would the United States consider invading Grenada? If not, we will do so without you.” Adams knew this was unlikely, and probably militarily impossible, but such talk persuaded Bish of his candor. Bish inquired as to exactly how far Barbados would support a rescue, likely Barbadian public opinion, and regional support. Adams was unequivocal; he offered his country as a staging post, use of the Barbados Defence Force if necessary, and assured Bish that only Guyana, Belize, and Antigua carried a torch for Grenada.133 He went on to outline a possible military takeover by a multinational US, Eastern Caribbean, and Venezuelan force, perhaps under the umbrella of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which would establish an interim government and lead to free and democratic elections, even with Bishop as a candidate.134 Adams stressed that this was only a scenario and not a conclusive plan. A diplomatic-political solution was also discussed whereby the OECS might pressure Coard and the PRA to free Bishop and restore order with the option of sanctions if necessary. Barbados and Jamaica could “chime in forcefully” to reinforce the OECS’s efforts. Adams was clearly hoping to convince the United States of the severity of the situation, the Eastern Caribbean’s unanimity, the need for external help, and the potential benefits Bishop’s rescue could yield for the United States

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whilst simultaneously probing Washington’s receptiveness to the idea of a more extensive operation. Adams had already conferred with the British high commissioner Giles Bullard who was skeptical and expected a similar response from the Canadians later that day. In an emergency meeting of the Barbados Cabinet it was agreed to “proceed with a rescue plan, in collaboration with Eastern Caribbean countries and larger non-Caribbean countries with the resources necessary to carry out such an intricate operation.”135 The rescue plan was soon overtaken by events in Grenada. After Adams left, Bish sent a cable to Washington reporting that Adams would like to see US involvement in an intervention or the OECS would act alone. Bish also sent a “back channel” note, outside of the embassy communications, to the CIA. Fort Rupert As previously mentioned, Bishop had promised to reply to the CC’s proposal by Wednesday but only after consulting with Whiteman, Louison, and Rizo. Whiteman was on the streets whipping up support and Coard was not about to let Rizo talk to Bishop, possibly fearing that Bishop would request Cuban assistance. Consequently only Louison, who had been placed under arrest the previous evening, was taken to see Bishop at 7:30 a.m. that Wednesday morning. The two came up with a two-point reply to put to the CC: There would be a formal negotiating committee set up which would start to meet on that day and secondly that he [Bishop] be released from house arrest and that a statement be put on the radio from him pointing out that he was no longer under house arrest and that negotiations were in process.136

The proposal was not destined to see the light of day. By 9:00 a.m. about 15,000 people had assembled in St. George’s market square. Shops, offices, and schools had all been closed. At 9:00 a.m. about 3,000–4,000 of the crowd, mainly schoolchildren, led by Whiteman, Noel, Fitzroy Bain, and prominent businessmen marched toward Bishop’s house where he was being held. While the crowds advanced on Bishop’s house, the CC met at Coard’s house. At 10:00 a.m. Cornwall had been sent to the Cuban workers’ compound near Point Salines to inform them not to participate in the pro-Bishop demonstrations.137 Coard’s house was adjacent to Bishop’s and the crowds had to pass it; the CC witnessed the crowd passing chanting “We want Maurice, we want Maurice!” and “B for Bishop and betterment; C for Coard and communism.”138 Recognizing their vulnerability, Layne reinforced the PRA guard at Bishop’s house to 100 and sent for three armed personnel carriers (APC). Coard feared that the crowd could turn on him and told Layne to contact Bishop and tell him to calm the crowd and recommence yesterday’s talks.139 However, Layne and Austin’s efforts proved futile as the crowd was simply too large and too aroused to listen. The APCs were ordered to fire into the air but the crowd were not deterred and pushed forward. Uncertain of what to do, the PRA withdrew, and by 10:35 a.m. Bishop and Creft, who had been found tied to their beds in their

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underwear, were brought out.140 Bishop appeared weak and disoriented; he had had little sleep and had reportedly not been eating for fear of being poisoned. What happened next has been interpreted by some as a fatal mistake that cost Bishop and his companions their lives. After vacillating between a car or truck for the trip into town to address the huge crowd waiting in the market square, Bishop decided to divert to Fort Rupert, the PRA’s headquarters, on the promontory overlooking St. George’s. This was a practical move: medical treatment could be obtained from the hospital, which was adjacent to the fort; Bishop wanted to use the fort’s army transmitter to address the people; there were firearms there; and it was a defensible position.141 Fort Rupert’s daily security was the responsibility of Lester Redhead, who commanded the platoon stationed there. The Coard group had believed that Fort Rupert was in danger before Bishop reached it at around 1:00 p.m. and had decided it should be barricaded and defended with tear gas if necessary; Redhead was sent to Grand Anse police station but there was no gas there and so he went to the St. George’s station; by the time he returned Bishop was in control of the fort.142 Several hundred Grenadians followed Bishop up the steep and narrow road to Fort Rupert, shouting “We get we leader, fuck Coard.”143 With no physical obstacles and the PRA soldiers uncertain what to do, the crowd swept into the fort unopposed. The fort consisted of a main lower square connected to an upper square by steps and a tunnel. Bishop’s group took up place in the operations room on the upper floor of the communications building in the lower square. Bishop ordered that the fort’s soldiers should be disarmed and their weapons given to the base commandant, Chris Stroude. Bishop then summoned Stroude and told him that Coard and his accomplices must submit to the will of the people; negotiations must begin right then in the operations room; Coard, Layne, and Cornwall must be arrested and jailed; the PRA should lay down its arms; and that the armory keys must be handed over so that arms could be distributed to defend the fort.144 Soon after, Bishop announced that Einstein Louison had replaced Austin as head of the PRA; Einstein Louison arrived at the fort sometime between 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m., having been freed from house arrest, and was told to organize the defence of the fort.145 Arms were distributed to members of the militia present. Despite his weak condition it seems Bishop had a strategy. He instructed two telephone engineers to hook up a line to the radio transmitter. Peter Thomas, an immigration officer present, was sent to the Cable and Wireless offices, accompanied by two telephone employees with militia training, with a list of numbers to get disconnected, especially the lines to Coard’s house and Fort Frederick to prevent Coard organizing a counterattack.146 Unfortunately the telephone link at the old water works was overlooked and this allowed Coard to keep in touch with Stroude at Fort Rupert. Bishop sent his press secretary, Don Rojas, to Cable and Wireless to broadcast that the prime minister had been freed; that Cuba had not been involved; and that all nations, organizations, and individuals should organize effective opposition to US intervention.147 When Bishop had been freed earlier in the day he had sent someone to the Cuban embassy to seek support and in response Ambassador Rizo sent a messenger to Fort Rupert to offer aid to Bishop.148

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An increasingly worried CC retreated to Fort Frederick. As one member recalled, “With Cuba’s backing . . . he [Bishop] had an alternative manpower and material resource base outside of our Party to fall back on.”149 Layne phoned Iman Abdullah, the officer in charge, and told him to report in and then left at 11:00 a.m. for Calivigny to call up reinforcements, returning at noon with a squad of 25 soldiers.150 The CC attempted to contact Bishop but he refused to speak with them; Whiteman told them bluntly, “No negotiations; is manners for all you.”151 Stroude had been keeping the CC informed of the developments at Fort Rupert: The civilian members of the committee seemed paralysed: to the PRA leaders, the military and political position was intolerable and untenable. They concluded from the information they had received that orders had been given by Bishop to eliminate them, that the Central Committee was to be arrested and an armed assault mounted on Fort Frederick.152

As Adkin comments: Up to this moment, no decision had been taken to kill Bishop . . . Negotiations, firing in the air, the use of tear gas⎯everything short of shooting to kill had been considered or tried. But now it was a simple matter of Bishop’s life or theirs. If Bishop triumphed . . . they were all dead men.153

Consequently, Austin was told that it was necessary to recapture Fort Rupert and establish military rule for a short period. Austin was not convinced but he could not offer a feasible alternative.154 The fatal decision was taken around 12:30 p.m.: the three APCs and the platoon of soldiers from Calivigny would storm Fort Rupert and Bishop and his supporters would be killed in the fighting.155 The three APCs and the squad of soldiers, numbering 35, arrived at Fort Rupert at 1:00 p.m. The people in the fort had seen that the PRA had not fired on them earlier that morning and at first thought that the new arrivals had come to support Bishop. Tragically this was not the case; the pro-Coard soldiers opened fire on the fort with machine guns, grenades, and rocket shells. Bishop and many others with him survived the first onslaught. Dumbfounded, he could only utter, “My God, my God, they have turned the guns against the people.”156 There was some return fire and between 30 and 40 Bishop supporters died⎯either shot or by jumping off the fort walls to escape, a drop of between 50 and 90 feet—and over 100 were injured. After the initial burst of shooting “there was a discussion among Maurice and some of the fellows to the effect that what we had to do was go out and say we surrender, that anything else would be suicide.”157 Bishop then led the group out to meet its fate. Bishop, Creft, the Bains, Whiteman, and Brat Bullen were marched to the upper square to join two others, Evelyn Maitland and Keith Hayling, who were also condemned. In the communications room Iman Abdullah consulted with Stroude who remained in touch with the CC.158 The eight prisoners were

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lined up against the west wall of the square. Abdullah then told them that “this is an order from the Central Committee, that you shall be executed by fire. It is not my order, it is the Central Committee’s.”159 The firing squad then carried out its orders. By about 1:20 p.m. Bishop and his companions were dead. The CC moved quickly; by 3:00 p.m. it was decided that a 16-member Revolutionary Military Council would be formed with its headquarters at Fort Frederick.160 Coard was not an official member of the RMC but it is generally assumed that he was pulling the strings.161 The RMC was officially headed by General Hudson Austin; this was a tactical choice as Austin was popular with the PRA, of senior rank, and, until switching to the Coard camp, had been viewed as a Bishop supporter.162 A list of potential pro-Bishop opposition figures was compiled and a statement to be read on RFG composed. A communiqué was sent to the PRA to explain the day’s events and remind it where its true allegiances lay: “Today our People’s Revolutionary Army has gained victory over the right opportunists and reactionary forces which attacked the Headquarters of our Ministry of Defence. These anti-worker elements using the working people as a shield entered Fort Rupert.”163 It concluded by saying, “All patriots and revolutionaries will never forget this day when counter-revolution, the friends of imperialism were crushed.”164 At 10:10 p.m. Austin went on RFG to present the RMC’s version of the day’s events. Having recounted Bishop’s freeing and the storming of Fort Rupert, emphasizing that the PRA had been ordered only to fire in the air, Austin continued: They declared their intention to arrest and wipe out the entire General Committee and the senior members of the Party and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces as well as to smash the Revolutionary Armed Forces. At that point the Revolutionary Armed Forces sent a company of soldiers to reestablish control of Fort Rupert. Maurice Bishop and his group fired on the soldiers killing two members of the PRA . . . The Revolutionary Armed Forces were forced to storm the fort, and in the process the following persons were killed: Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, Vince Noel, Jacqueline Creft, Norris Bain and Fitzroy Bain among others.165

The earlier formation of the RMC was announced, stating that it had full executive and legislative powers. Austin then warned: Let it be clearly understood that the Revolutionary Armed Forces will govern with absolute strictness. Anyone who seeks to demonstrate or disturb the peace will be shot. An all day and all night curfew will be established for the next four days . . . Anyone violating this curfew will be shot on sight. 166

News of the massacre had spread and Grenadians had no reason to doubt this warning. The curfew allowed the RMC to impose some sort of control and to clear up the mess at Fort Rupert as well as round up and imprison potential opponents. Amongst Grenadians fear gradually turned to anger; “for them, it was a simple,

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straightforward matter that an assault against Bishop . . . had become an assault against themselves and therefore against the revolution as they understood it.”167 For the moment the curfew repressed any thoughts of action against the RMC. Soon after hearing that Bishop had been freed, the US embassy learnt that he had been recaptured; an unconfirmed report from Voice of Barbados radio stated that Bishop had been shot. Ambassador Bish cabled Washington to report that the situation [is] obviously worsening. The “masses” . . . decided not to let [the] NJM Central Committee and security forces foist Coard on them. The follow-up means now there can be no peaceful “Joint Leadership” solution. One group or the other will have to come out on top and it could get bloodier.168

On Barbados, Adams asked his cabinet to permit him to demand Bishop’s release and asked Charles to do likewise as head of the OECS.169 Bish and DCM Flower sent another cable to Washington: There appears to be imminent danger to U.S. citizens resident on Grenada due to the current deteriorating situation, which includes reports of rioting, personnel casualties (possibly deaths), automatic weapons being discharged, Soviet-built armored personnel carriers in the Grenadian streets, and some loss of water and electricity on the island . . . [American Embassy] Bridgetown recommends that the United States should now be prepared to conduct an emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens residing in Grenada . . . We are not yet prepared to recommend an evacuation be initiated. Repeat, not yet. But we strongly counsel that all preparations be effected in order to deploy immediately as required . . . It has already come to our attention . . . that the Venezuelans have already initiated action for evacuation of dependents in Grenada because of violence.170

Although Bish was not ready to recommend evacuation he sensibly “urged all preparations be immediately taken” as the embassy reviewed contingency plans and identified assets.171 Sometime that afternoon, Austin called the US embassy to express his concerns about invasion rumors and to reassure the ambassador that the students were safe. Bish was tough on him and made it clear to Austin that he would be held personally responsible if the students were harmed.172 That same afternoon Charles Gillespie arrived at the embassy to help Bish and Flower.173 Gillespie was in the region by coincidence, accompanying Vice President Bush on a visit to Jamaica before continuing on a familiarization tour of the other islands. Bush and Gillespie had heard of the unrest in Grenada before leaving Washington and decided to discover what Jamaica’s prime minister Edward Seaga knew when they had their scheduled meeting. Seaga’s view was: “This is not good. It doesn’t portend well for the future of the Eastern Caribbean if this kind of thing is going on. However, maybe it’s an internal affair and maybe it’ll be resolved.”174 Gillespie heard of the massacre at Fort Rupert on a car radio shortly before leaving Jamaica for Barbados. He was met at the airport by Flower who told him of Bishop’s death. Gillespie had already spoken with Charles and was due to meet St. Lucian Prime Minister John Compton the next day. Gillespie and Bish met

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with Tom Adams around 5:00 p.m.; the prime minister was very concerned and explained the difficulties that a revolutionary takeover could pose for the other islands and that “the United States will have to help.”175 At about 8:00 p.m. the embassy’s defence attaché, Lawrence Reiman, interrupted a formal dinner at the embassy to inform Ambassador Bish that Bishop’s death had been confirmed. Bish phoned Adams who corroborated the news. Bish and Gillespie then drafted a cable and dispatched it to Washington.176 In Washington, the RIG met that Wednesday afternoon, probably in response to the unconfirmed reports of Bishop’s death.177 Richard Brown, deputy director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs, briefed the meeting that there were approximately 600 Cubans on Grenada and two Cuban ships at anchor. He advised that the JCS should plan for a worst-case scenario⎯evacuation under Grenadian and Cuban opposition⎯and that such an operation might need to begin as soon as Thursday, October 20.178 The participants, including JCS and CIA representatives, then discussed “alternate ways of conducting a ‘quick in and out’ military rescue of U.S. citizens” with or without Grenadian government permission.179 Existing concerns about the safety of US citizens grew as the situation in Grenada seemed to be deteriorating rapidly; reliable information was scarce as US diplomats had not managed to reach Grenada that morning and RFG had gone off the air. Military preparations advanced as the Pentagon provided a preliminary list of military resources available for an NEO, possibly hoping to demonstrate that they had insufficient military forces in place.180 Later that day the JCS issued CINCLANT with a warning order to contemplate the “possibility of the evacuation of Americans under both benign and hostile conditions.”181 Admiral McDonald and his staff made a number of plans for an NEO using navy and marines corps units only. Elsewhere, the Joint Special Operations Command, the military’s special operations unit, was also working on an evacuation plan; these plans subsequently merged and involved other actors.182 That evening Motley briefed Shultz on the situation. Bish’s “imminent danger” cable had not been received but the two were aware of the unconfirmed reports of Bishop’s death. The RIG had already decided that an NEO at least was necessary; Shultz “had to be convinced” that military planning was required but Motley eventually got his agreement.183 Plans were made for the cabinet-level Crisis Pre-Planning Group to convene the next day, Thursday, October 20, as the momentum for a military operation gathered. Conclusion By July 1983 the PRG was in crisis; the economy was faltering, Point Salines Airport was consuming most of the available money,184 the PRA and militia were demoralized, relations with the United States remained cool and, most significantly, connections with the populace lessened. At the first plenary of the CC on July 13 it was reported that “over the year under review our Party has demonstrated many weaknesses . . . ideologically, politically and organizationally. At the same time, the emergence of deep petty (sic) bourgeois manifestations and influence in

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the Party has led to two ideological trends.”185 There was no disagreement in the CC that the party was in trouble, but there was not a consensus that the joint leadership proposal put forward in September was the solution. Differences between Bishop and Coard undeniably existed: “on one level [it] was one of personalities: the spontaneous and charismatic Bishop against the calculating and ascetic Coard” and “on another level, the NJM power struggle was ideological and political. Coard and his supporters were impatient with the pace of social transformation.”186 A December 1983 CIA report concluded: It was becoming increasingly clear that Bishop, ever confident of his appeal to the Grenadian people and his international stature, had paid insufficient attention to the inner workings of the party. He thus found himself in a position of embodying the Grenadian revolution for most of those on the island who continued to sympathize with the New Jewel Movement, but at the same time commanded a dwindling base of support within the upper echelon of the party.187

This situation led to accusations of “cultism” and “onemanism” from his opponents. The argument that Bishop’s demise was the result of a long-term operation masterminded by Coard may seem plausible, especially given the extent and personal nature of the criticism of Bishop at the CC meetings, but as Meeks points out, the “inability to escape from a deeply-entrenched cumulative and available ideological context of Leninism and hierarchy and not the chimera of conspiracy was the critical element in the denouement of the revolution.”188 The joint leadership plan was considered by the majority in the CC to be the best solution to its problems but in reality it would have eventually reduced Bishop’s role to that of a figurehead. Bishop realized this and found it simply unacceptable. To the CC, the discussions Bishop had with Whiteman and Louison during the Eastern Europe trip were part of a conspiracy to seize power, and the stopover in Cuba was to gain Castro’s support. Bishop’s reneging on the acceptance of the power sharing arrangement was interpreted as an unacceptable challenge to the party’s Leninist principles of democratic centralism. Bishop’s efforts to circulate rumors of plans to assassinate him was the final straw and resulted in the irreversible move of placing Bishop under house arrest. The CC soon discovered that it had a major problem⎯it had detained the most popular politician and his proposed replacement was highly unpopular. The reality was that “the majority of Grenadians saw Bishop as the symbol of the revolution and, being largely ignorant of developments inside the party, understood only that, out of the blue, their leader had been jailed on the basis of rumors about a planned political killing.”189 The discussions with Louison and Whiteman to find a solution were futile; the final proposal put to Bishop on Tuesday, October 18, suggested that he accept full responsibility for the crisis and not oppose the CC’s commitment to a Marxist-Leninist strategy. Essentially, “there was no indication that the committee was prepared to settle the crisis on any terms other than its own.”190 Added to Bishop’s intransigence, it did not

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seem that any agreeable solution would be found. A more experienced and less ideologically doctrinaire party may have been able to settle the crisis peacefully; as the former PRG attorney general Richard Hart bemoaned, “Whichever way we look at the matter, the conclusion is inescapable that the revolutionary leaders, from Bishop downwards, displayed deplorable immaturity in failing to resolve their disagreement and preserve the unity of the party.”191 Coard dismissed the protestations of the populace but it was at this point that “people power” took over and started the train of events that would destroy the revolution and lead the United States to intervene. The Eastern Caribbean leaders were unsettled by Bishop’s arrest. With US collusion, a plan to rescue Bishop was underway by Saturday, October 15. By the time Adams met with Ambassador Bish on the morning of Wednesday, October 19, and requested US involvement in a military operation, he was echoing the sentiments of most of his Eastern Caribbean colleagues. In Washington the State Department’s RIG had been meeting daily and by Wednesday had decided that an NEO was desirable. Although the RIG was aware of Adams’s suggestion that this was a perfect opportunity to remove a Marxist-Leninist government and reduce Soviet and Cuban presence in the region, it appears that the situation was predominantly defined as a potential hostage situation. This perception is what set in motion the decision-making process that concluded in intervention. After the experience of Teheran, the United States was hypersensitive to any possibility of a similar crisis. Dam highlighted such feelings after the intervention when he said that “sometimes action is necessary to keep a bad situation from getting worse. This was such a time . . .”192 The RIG certainly reflected such preemptive thinking; the office of the JCS was contacted as early as Friday, October 14, because an NEO “required the use of military assets and the securing of military targets on Grenada.”193 Prior to Bishop’s death the military were reluctant to consider action and it was only on Wednesday, October 19, that the JCS agreed to examine the resources available. Memories of Vietnam and Iran made the JCS more cautious than its civilian counterparts and it was only when Grenada was discussed at cabinet level from Thursday, October 20, onward that the military began to believe an operation was conceivable.194 Once the JCS accepted this, it argued that an evacuation would require seizing the island rather than any limited surgical strike-style action to evacuate foreign US nationals.195 This was a prime example of the military’s post-Vietnam doctrine of using overwhelming force to ensure quick victories. By the end of “Bloody Wednesday” Bishop and six of his colleagues were dead, Grenada was under a shoot-on-sight curfew, and little intelligence was available on the situation. Although the RIG favored military action before news of Bishop’s death was received, the final decision lay with President Reagan and the National Security Planning Group.

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CHAPTER 6

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he dramatic events of “Bloody Wednesday” in Grenada took Washington by surprise and forced officials to focus on the situation as concern about US citizens was “raised to the highest level.”1 The Restricted Inter-agency Group’s (RIG) chairman, Tony Motley, later clarified the situation: “After October 19, our primary task regarding the safety of U.S. citizens was to determine whether the situation on the ground was likely to improve by itself. Without clear indication of a return to civil stability, an evacuation would be prudent.”2 Momentum for a military action had been mounting with RIG recommending a nonpermissive evacuation operation and several Eastern Caribbean leaders making individual invitations to Washington to participate in a collective military action. Thursday, October 20 At 9:00 a.m. in Washington the president’s deputy national security adviser Vice Admiral John Poindexter convened the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG)3 in Room 208 of the Executive Office Building, the new crisis management center. The meeting began with a briefing on the latest developments in Grenada. The Revolution Military Council (RMC) was an unknown quantity; US intelligence was relatively poor as they had no one in situ; the Central Committee (CC) had been a secretive group; and decisions in Grenada were now being made on the spot.4 The general impression of the RMC in Washington was of a group more pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet than Bishop.5 There were “suspicions” that the Soviets or Cubans were involved with Bishop’s demise but it was never a significant issue.6 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had reported that the Cuban ship Vietnam Heroica was moored in St. George’s harbor and might have landed 240 Cuban workers on October 6 and that another Cuban ship had delivered weapons on October 13.7 Most of the participants had already decided that military action of some sort was necessary.8 The option under consideration was a quick and effective

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evacuation although it was unclear how extensive an operation this would require; the difference between evacuating the students and seizing the entire island was perceived to be marginal and so the military and logistical requirements for both were discussed.9 The CPPG estimated the total armed strength available to the RMC to be 4,000 Grenadians and 600 Cubans, with Castro able to airlift 5,000–10,000 men there within days.10 It was decided that secrecy was essential to prevent this last possibility and reduce the chances that “the students might be put under much tighter military control and declared hostages to prevent any counteraction.”11 After further discussion of a rapid in-and-out action, Menges took the opportunity to promote his plan advocating “a multinational force that would not only rescue citizens and leave, but also restore democracy and eliminate this communist threat permanently.”12 This plan was supported by Middendorf and Iklé; Poindexter then closed the meeting by announcing that the NSC cabinet would meet that evening at 6:00 p.m. The consensual Eastern Caribbean response was horror and condemnation; no one had envisaged such a bloody resolution of the power struggle. Adams described the RMC as “brutal and vicious murderers” and announced that “I do not think it will be possible to accommodate so wide a range of governments within the Caribbean. It goes far beyond ideological pluralism. This is the difference between barbarism and human beings.”13 Seaga stated that his government, “while not in sympathy with the Bishop government, is repulsed by the tragic death of Mr. Bishop and his colleagues under the new regime of Cubantrained Army generals and other Marxist ideologies (sic).”14 Even the Jamaican opposition leader, and former prime minister, Michael Manley, condemned the executions as a “squalid betrayal of the hopes of the ordinary people of our region.”15 Relations with Bishop’s government had been strained but endurable; the RMC was simply intolerable. That morning Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia phoned Adams and “expressed himself in the strongest possible terms that the situation in Grenada could not remain as it was and he proposed that there be a Caribbean initiative to intervene in Grenada on a multinational basis to restore law and order.”16 Compton believed that Coard’s regime would attempt to “push the Caribbean community into the Communist camp.”17 Adams, unsurprised and pleased, shared Compton’s concerns. It was decided that the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) should meet the next day in Barbados. Compton took on the task of contacting the Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM’s) head, Prime Minister George Chambers of Trinidad, to arrange a meeting of the organization in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on Saturday evening. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Charles Gillespie had been due to visit St. Lucia to sign a US Agency for International Development agreement and took the opportunity to sound out Compton.18 Meeting privately with Gillespie, Compton asked, “What the hell are you going to do about this?”19 He recalled that the situation with the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) had been uncomfortable enough but that further revolutions would put democracy in the region at risk and consequently “we” (the OECS) must do

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something about it and asked Gillespie forthrightly for US help.20 Compton outlined a detailed scenario for destabilizing the RMC and replacing it with a legitimate government; he, Adams, and Charles would work to mobilize and unite the Eastern Caribbean leaders in an effort to brand the RMC as “murderers, outlaws and illegitimate renegades.”21 Compton speculated that CARICOM would “provide the best and biggest umbrella for such action” and that despite doubts about the supportiveness of Chambers, “initial efforts should be to gain the broadest possible base of support.”22 He assumed that pressure from neighboring states (cut all air transport, communications, refusal to load vessels and move cargo etc.) would lead to a public reaction on the island which would in turn lead to more violence. That would justify . . . [the] insertion of a Caribbean security force to rid the island of the outlaws and re-establish a stable situation.23

Once this was achieved Compton described how Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon could appoint a cabinet to govern until elections could be arranged in about six months.24 Compton envisaged US participation in response to an OECS request but acknowledged that the presence of US students meant Washington “might need to act unilaterally but urged that we [United States] consult and concert with Caribbean heads of government in advance if possible.”25 The meeting concluded with Compton inviting Gillespie to the upcoming OECS meeting in Barbados, which, along with the CARICOM meeting, Compton saw as “crucial events” that offered “an opportunity to act which will be diminished (if not lost) if heads of government don’t seize it.”26 Adams was in touch with Compton and Charles and other OECS leaders throughout the day. He also sent a representative to Jamaica to sound out Seaga who firmly supported the idea of a Caribbean initiative.27 Later that day, the Barbadian cabinet agreed on “a military intervention together with such friendly third countries as could assist with the logistic support necessary for such an enterprise.”28 Adams knew that the United States and Britain would require formal requests; so he planned that the OECS would agree to a military solution and would invite Barbados and Jamaica and then depute Barbados to invite the United States and Britain to join them.29 At noon Adams met with US Ambassador Milan Bish to argue the case for US participation in a military action again. He told Bish that action was now “more urgent than ever” and that “time is of the essence and that intervention can only be mounted and carried through by the U.S.”30 He suggested that the intervention could be carried out under the auspices of the OECS, which would probably be unanimously in favor of action, rather than CARICOM as he expected opposition from such countries as Guyana.31 Indeed, Adams advocated that “we should not attempt to construct a larger umbrella like CARICOM” and that he was thinking of a quick visit to St. Lucia to “persuade Compton that a larger group would be unwielding (sic) risking the loss of critical timeliness.”32

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Adams continued to lobby hard, telling Bish that “there will be enormous private as well as public disappointment throughout the region if the U.S. does not act forcefully to save Grenada.”33 He portrayed three possible outcomes of intervening: the RMC would not resist; the Cubans and the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) would fight; and the PRA would go it alone. Adams favored the last of these scenarios as it would remove all vestiges of authoritarianism; he hinted that “such as it is, I have information which suggests that the Cubans would sit it out.”34 After listening with interest, Bish emphasized that US involvement would depend on “unequivocal written requests” from the Eastern Caribbean nations.35 The US embassy in Barbados had been in contact with St. George’s University (SGU) on Grenada that morning and had been told that the students were well and the situation quiet. Bish was very concerned about the safety of US citizens and reported that there were between 500 and 1,000 Americans who were potential hostages. In contrast to the previous day he now advocated action: “I know there are formidable difficulties, but whatever we have to do to assure the safety of American citizens, I urge that we set it in motion now. In the process we could well rid the hemisphere of an obnoxious unwanted regime.”36 There was no recommendation of timing but Bish reported that it was unlikely that the Eastern Caribbean countries would act alone but that they were united and would support US action “materially and morally” in an operation that should aim to evacuate US citizens, remove the RMC, and restore democracy to Grenada. The enthusiastic ambassador concluded that “sentiment in the Eastern Caribbean for action is now so strong that it might be possible to elicit a public invitation from the region’s collective leadership to the U.S. to act for the sake of human decency and human rights.”37 In Jamaica Prime Minister Edward Seaga met with the US ambassador Ashley Hewitt. Prime Minister Adams had called Seaga to inform him of the plans for a military solution; Seaga confirmed to Hewitt that Jamaica stood ready to help providing that there was a written request for assistance from “a legally empowered governmental official in Grenada” (i.e., the governor-general) and that the response be within the next 48 hours.38 Seaga’s concern was that Grenada would become another Cuba and destabilize the Eastern Caribbean. He advocated “rapid, effective action . . . to ‘clean up’ and restore a government of the people.”39 That evening on ABC’s Nightline program, Adams admitted that most West Indians hoped for a military intervention. As Sandford and Vigilante conclude, this was arguably “a move deliberately calculated to signal the seriousness of the situation to the U.S. and to help smooth the way for U.S. action.”40 In Grenada the situation remained tense. Political opponents were swiftly rounded up and Richmond Hill prison was soon overflowing. The curfew was particularly harsh on a population that had few food stocks and only 40 percent of households had running water. As the militia could not be relied upon to enforce the curfew, the PRA was used; it seems that the curfew was gently enforced and people found on the streets were simply asked to return home.41 However, the curfew fostered an “atmosphere of suspicion and anger, and did

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little for the image of the RMC, domestically or internationally. Foreign journalists were expelled or prevented from entering Grenada . . . All telex and communication facilities were denied.”42 Grenadians relied on outside radio stations such as Radio Antilles, BBC’s World Service, and the Voice of America. The next few days witnessed desperate attempts by the RMC to restore some semblance of normality to Grenada. One of the first measures taken was to issue a statement presenting the RMC’s version of Wednesday’s events: Comrades, it must be very clear to everyone that it was never the intention of the armed forces to shed the blood of our people. That is why the armed forces had firm instructions not to fire when the people invaded Maurice Bishop’s house and even when they invaded the Fort. But comrades the seizure of the military headquarters of the army changed the whole character of the issue. Let us be clear that blood was shed because when the army came to restore control his group led by Vincent Noel fired on the military.43

This selective account ended by stating that the RMC was “committed to continuing the work of the revolution and improving it.”44 The threat of intervention was already looming and contact with other countries was seen as essential to survival. Austin contacted Trinidad’s president, Ellis Clarke, to tell him that the RMC was prepared to accept a visit by an international group from CARICOM to discuss elections and other matters.45 In reality Cuba was the only country that could possibly help the RMC. The RMC decided to ask Cuba for military assistance and an EC$5 million loan to pay civil servants.46 Cuba’s reaction surprised and unnerved the RMC. Castro, who had been good friends with Bishop, authorized this condemnatory statement: Bishop was one of the political leaders best liked and most respected by our people because of his talent, modesty, sincerity, revolutionary honesty and proven friendship with our country. No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position and no internal division can justify atrocious acts such as the physical elimination of Bishop and the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday. The death of Bishop and his comrades must be cleared up. If they were executed in cold blood, the guilty should receive exemplary punishment.47

Castro warned that political relations with the RMC would “undergo profound and serious analysis.”48 Although Cuba promised to continue economic and technical assistance for the sake of the Grenadian people, the RMC’s request for EC $5 million was refused. Additionally, the regular Cuban air link ceased and Castro refused to provide military reinforcements or place Cubans in Grenada under RMC control.49 Castro warned that “imperialism will try to use this tragedy and the serious mistakes by the Grenadian revolutionaries to sweep away the revolutionary process.”50 The statement was an indication of Castro’s effort to distance Cuba from the RMC to persuade Washington that Cuba was not involved and perhaps to forestall a US intervention.

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The RMC probably decided from the outset to be solicitous toward SGU and its 650 students; any threat to them would provide the United States with a golden opportunity to act. Therefore, at 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, two armed security guards visited SGU’s vice-chancellor Geoffrey Bourne to inquire about the students and check if they had sufficient food and water.51 Bourne was given a pass to travel anywhere and informed that General Austin wanted to meet with him at 11:00 a.m. Before Bourne met Austin he asked the British representative John Kelly if he could drop by. They discussed the curfew and Kelly suggested that Bourne try to persuade Austin to lift it.52 Austin arrived at Bourne’s house at 11:00 a.m. looking “like a man completely overwhelmed by what he had done and the worldwide reaction it had caused and that he was looking for help.”53 He recounted what had allegedly happened at Fort Rupert and bemoaned that “no country will talk to me. None of the Caribbean countries will talk and the United States will not even respond.”54 Austin said he hoped to end military rule soon. Bourne inquired about the media blackout and whether Austin would be willing to talk to US diplomats if a visit could be arranged. Austin agreed to this. He concluded the meeting by asking Bourne about the students: “Did I think many would want to leave? What were their reaction in general?”55 Austin assured Bourne that the students were in no danger. Bourne adjudged Austin to be a man out of his depth but “not particularly sympathetic to the Marxist cause.”56 Additionally, he felt that “their attitude was unexpected and reassuring,” there was little threat to the students.57 He telexed the substance of the meeting to SGU’s chancellor Charles Modica in New York. Modica was initially skeptical of Austin’s sincerity but trusted Bourne’s judgment and concluded that [I]n his[Austin] own mind, it was very important that the school remain on the island and classes be held and he was willing to do any, anything and everything (sic) to make sure that the students were safe and that the classes were held and the employees’ jobs were safeguarded.58

SGU also telexed the US embassy about Austin’s agreement to meet with embassy officials.59 The embassy had tried unsuccessfully to get two officials to Grenada on Wednesday, October 19, and accepted the offer. In two lengthy conversations with the embassy that day, Modica expressed his belief that the RMC would do nothing to jeopardize SGU or harm the students to avoid giving the United States a pretext to act. He was worried that with RFG off air not all the students would be aware of the curfew and feared a “violent backlash” against the RMC with some students caught in the middle.60 Although Modica also identified two possible helicopter landing points, he speculated as to whether the dispersion of the campuses and students and staff would make it safer to leave the students in place or to evacuate them.61 In his subsequent conversation just after midnight he considered the situation “to be sufficiently tense and threatening so that if it were simply a matter of evacuating those resident on campuses . . . USG should move as quickly as circumstances dictated.”62 With a

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curfew in place and the students in multiple locations, an evacuation would be difficult; additionally Modica felt that “a move to evacuate American citizens which did not get all of them off the island would . . . trigger vindictive behavior by Grenadians.”63 The chancellor concluded ominously by saying that “violent reaction by Bishop’s supporters should be expected within a week or so⎯ if not within the next few days.”64 By the evening of Thursday, October 20, evening the RMC had taken a number of decisions in an attempt to improve their almost untenable position. After Cuba’s negative reaction, Coard was seen as a burden and dropped out of sight. Curfew passes and escorts were arranged for foreign diplomats and those in essential services, and all workplaces were to be reopened on Monday, October 24. Lastly, the RMC decided to “create a ‘broad-based’ civilian government within two weeks, a process that would commence with the deliberate co-option of businessmen, bank managers and hoteliers in order to restore confidence both domestically and internationally.”65 However, many of those approached by the RMC were reluctant to become involved or simply refused.66 Despite the RMC’s frantic maneuvering it was impossible to counter the effect of the massacre of the previous day and it was that which guided the Eastern Caribbean and US approach to the new regime. The Special Situations Group During the afternoon in Washington, Constantine Menges had composed background memos for Vice President George Bush to use at the Special Situations Group (SSG)67 meeting later that day. The SSG68 convened at 4:45 p.m. to discuss the safety of the students and the availability of military forces and the time required to ready them for action. Reports from the embassy in Barbados had recommended action to rescue the students and possibly topple the RMC. Washington knew little about the membership of the RMC or the balance of power within it.69 In the absence of reliable information about the students’ situation, decision makers drew an analogy with the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979–1981. Weinberger thought that “we naturally had to think about how we could either extricate the Americans, or prevent their being seized as hostages in a reprise of the frustrating and very dangerous Iranian seizure of our citizens and capture of our Embassy in Teheran in 1979.”70 As Carothers notes, “The Iran experience had left such deep scars in the U.S. psyche that it was enough for the vague possibility of another hostage-taking situation to arise for alarm bells to go off in the U.S. government.”71 The uncertainty of the situation in Grenada played on Washington’s fears; as Dam revealed, “It was never clear that Austin or any other coherent group was in fact in charge. The RMC indicated no intention to function as a new government.”72 Motley expressed similar concerns: The danger aspect for the students came from the fact that (sic) the absence of assurances from any bona fide authorities. Every report that we got showed that there didn’t seem to be much organization or discipline on the island, other than

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the fact that there was this curfew . . . we didn’t have any assurances . . . there were six hundred U.S. citizens in four different concentrations on this island. That gave cause for alarm. The thought, early on, crossed the minds of . . . many people that it was a . . . situation ripe for hostages.73

This genuine concern for the students provided the background for the second point of discussion⎯a military option. Just after 1:00 a.m. that morning the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) had produced six options for an evacuation-type operation, as had been requested on Wednesday, October 19, and briefed General Vessey at Norfolk, Virginia.74 Vessey briefed the SSG about the risks of using force and the possibility of third country intervention, specifically Cuba and the involvement of its workers on Grenada; the DIA had advised that the PRA would resist an evacuation but neither the Cubans or the Soviets were likely to get involved.75 Nonetheless, Vessey recommended an expanded mission to neutralize the Grenadian forces and the Cubans, and to restore government.76 The discussion was “framed in terms of the action being a combined rescue and restoration of democracy.”77 Essentially, the political parameters of any subsequent operation had been set; citizen safety and the removal of the RMC. Shultz, backed by McFarlane, supported a less-ambitious plan but favored readiness for possible military action.78 According to Motley, “Initially we looked at a surgical type action, and then a decision was made, properly so by the military, that the situation was such that you could not have a surgical action per se. So the operation became more expanded.”79 Despite this, Vessey was reluctant to act and got the support of Weinberger in asking for more time and intelligence.80 After the meeting Vessey notified CINCLANT on advanced planning for an evacuation from a hostile environment.81 There was general consensus amongst the SSG in favor of action and when North mentioned that the Sixth Fleet Carrier Battle Group had left Norfolk on Tuesday, October 18, en route to the Mediterranean, Motley proposed diverting it south toward Grenada as a “precautionary measure”82 and a “prudent, low-profile, low-risk” move that would provide Washington with a military capability nearby.83 It was also speculated that the task force “might intimidate the Grenadians into reasonableness regarding the evacuation of the [U.S.] medical students.”84 Vice Admiral Moreau, Vessey’s assistant, flatly refused to divert the task force; he told a frustrated Motley that the JCS would not consider such a measure without a written presidential order. McFarlane drafted the order from the president to General Vessey to divert the task force after the meeting. Washington had received news of Adams’s conversation with Bish urging military action to safeguard foreign citizens, restore law and order, and remove the RMC. It was noted that the OECS was unsettled and would be meeting the next day. As Menges recalls: “I knew from our information that these leaders had a practical problem: what if they asked formally for military help from the United States and then were refused? Would the RMC take retaliatory action? Might Castro? Their problem was very real.”85 An official OECS request for help

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reduced concern that this would be a unilateral operation. It was thus decided that before any commitment to military action was made, Washington would wait for the outcome of the OECS meeting. It was widely expected in Washington that the OECS would request help, a measure that would aid the United States’ political and legal justification for intervention. The US ambassador to the OAS, William Middendorf, was instructed to “test the water” amongst the Latin America community to see if the OAS was likely to issue a condemnatory resolution should the United States intervene.86 A final measure was to maintain secrecy;87 the schedules of top officials remained unchanged in an effort to mislead the Cubans, the Soviets, and the media. After the SSG meeting concluded at 5:45 p.m. McFarlane, Poindexter, North, and Menges assembled to outline the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that would function as Reagan’s written “prepare-for-action” order to all government departments.88 A revised draft of the NSDD was delivered to Reagan who ordered planning to proceed.89 This was not the final decision that authorized a military operation though. The decision to divert the Navy task force was enacted around midnight on Thursday, October 20, when Captain Carl Erie was instructed to turn his fleet south and take up position 500 miles northeast of Grenada. No explanation was given but Erie was told that if no further word was received by midnight on Sunday, October 23, the fleet should resume its course to the Mediterranean.90 The meeting of the SSG marked the elevation of the Grenada crisis to cabinet level. As in previous RIG meetings there was agreement on the need for a military solution with, predictably, only the JCS protesting. Thus the SSG decided that, as the danger to the Americans on Grenada increased, the President would probably order intervention. Given the assessment of probable resistance by Grenadian forces, the SSG supported contingency planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and began drafting a National Security Decision Directive expanding the original mission to include neutralization of enemy forces and political reconstruction of Grenada.91

At this stage a number of significant decisions had been taken: the safety of American citizens was of utmost importance; the RMC should be removed; intelligence needed to be improved; the JCS were instructed to prepare an advanced plan for a hostile environment evacuation; the task force en route to the Mediterranean was diverted south toward Grenada; secrecy was deemed essential to the operation at this stage; the legal aspects of intervention were to be examined to provide a firmer basis for any operation; and the results of the OECS meeting in Barbados the next day would be awaited before any final intervention decision was made.92 Friday, October 21 Friday began in Washington with a 7:30 a.m. NSC meeting chaired by McFarlane. Menges provided an update and reported that the State Department was readying a detailed political plan to be reviewed at a midday RIG meeting.93

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In addition a CPPG meeting would be held later that afternoon. Friday was a busy day in Barbados as the OECS met to discuss the events in Grenada and the US involvement in a multinational military solution. The US embassy sent a diplomatic note to the RMC to request permission for Kenneth Kurze and Linda Flohr to visit Grenada on Saturday, October 22. At 9:45 a.m. the embassy received the first news of the arrest the previous night of a US citizen, Michelle Gibbs.94 Later that morning the embassy cabled Washington that in contrast to earlier reports there were now “life threatening situations in Grenada.”95 Prime Minister Adams met with the high commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago to convey in confidence that he [Adams] would be unable to attend the upcoming CARICOM meeting because “a military intervention was being contemplated by the OECS with Barbados and other countries, in which participation of all CARICOM countries would be invited.”96 At 12:30 p.m. Adams met the British high commissioner Giles Bullard97 to notify him that the OECS was “contemplating” inviting the United States and that Britain would also be invited. Finally, Adams met with Ambassador Bish to tell him that the OECS would be deliberating over intervention and that the United States should await a formal request which the prime minister was confident would be forthcoming.98 Adams made it clear that [t]he only prior condition for the region to take the lead in calling publicly and unambiguously for U.S. armed assistance and subsequent intervention was that he would have to be positively sure that after such a call was made, the United States would, in fact, deliver on the assistance . . . For us [the U.S.] to get cold feet after they got out in front would be an intolerable political burden.99

In Grenada the curfew was lifted from 10:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. to enable people to get provisions. The RMC appeared “weakened, divided, and totally isolated from the rest of the Caribbean.”100 Stung by Cuba’s rebuff, the RMC criticized Castro, claiming that his personal friendship with Bishop “had caused the Cuban leadership to take a personal and not a class approach to the developments in Grenada” and that “the Cuban’s (sic) position creates an atmosphere for speedy imperialist intervention.”101 As one RMC member despaired: “almost have no militia, no social base. Only country which can help is fucking around.”102 There was a glimmer of hope for the RMC when St. Vincent’s prime minister Milton Cato offered to meet with Austin to “negotiate a way out of the ‘tragic events’ on Grenada.”103 Considering the RMC’s tenuous position, Austin’s 24-hour delay in accepting this offer is puzzling, perhaps underlining the turbulence and inexperience within the RMC. Austin eventually responded to Cato’s proposal at 2:30 p.m. on Saturday, October 21, offering to meet Cato the next morning on Carriacou, but by this time Cato was attending the OECS meeting. Irrespective of Austin’s delayed response, Cato’s initiative was soundly resisted by Vincentians, his Caribbean colleagues, and the United States.104 Between 1:30 p.m. and 1:50 p.m. that afternoon the US embassy was in telex contact with SGU who relayed an “apparent invitation” from Austin for US officials

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to visit Grenada.105 Austin told SGU officials that he would not oppose the departure of the students but was keen to ensure that the school remained open; he promised that Grenadian forces would protect the school and “instructed the administrators to consolidate the student body on the main campus.”106 The RMC also issued a statement saying that “not one American citizen has been harmed, neither has any other foreign citizen in Grenada been harmed in any way.”107 This may well have been technically true but obscured the wider picture. As Kelly recalled, on Friday an ever-growing number of people came to see him about leaving. He started to find out how many people wanted out and began arranging evacuation flights for Monday, October 24.108 At 6:00 p.m. that Friday the SGU bursar Gary Solin got in touch with the embassy to report that of 200 students who had been contacted, 34 had signed up to leave. However, he was “certain that when emboffs (embassy officers) arrive the urge to leave will snowball.”109 The embassy cabled Washington to suggest that “we will have to consider arranging charter flights or [a] sea lift for at least fifteen percent of U.S., Canadians, and British nationals.”110 At 12:00 p.m. in Washington the RIG met for two hours. A number of issues were discussed: which pro-US countries would be informed and when, the postintervention role of Governor-General Scoon, the formation of an interim government, and the domestic and international legality of an action. The secrecy surrounding the decision-making process militated against notifying allies in advance. The RIG knew the unrest in Grenada provided an opportunity to “install a process where [a] government would be elected more favourable to our interests”111 and reasoned that Governor-General Scoon would be the focus of post-intervention political authority and the creation of an interim government. The introduction of the State Department’s lawyers was the result of the suggestion of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs James Michel; Motley agreed, feeling that should an intervention occur, a plausible legal justification would be advantageous. As he subsequently commented, “I didn’t want nine thousand years of [post-invasion] Security Council debate.”112 The lawyers began to examine the relevant aspects of the OECS, OAS, and UN charters and also the War Powers Resolution. The OECS position was considered. In Menges’s opinion: The Caribbean leaders hesitated to suggest military action in Grenada⎯an ally of Cuba⎯unless they were certain that the United States would participate. If the United States were unwilling to join them, the best they could do would be to deplore the violence on Grenada and avoid arousing additional hostility from Cuba or the new communist faction that conrolled (sic) Grenada. At the same time, some in our government were hesitant to act unilaterally. It was my view that a collective security action was by far the most desirable for political and strategic reasons, but that if the Caribbean countries were too afraid to ask for help, the United States had the right to act alone to protect American citizens.113

Menges felt that the likelihood of an OECS invitation would be increased if Ambassador Bish “could tell the Caribbean leaders that the probability of

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U.S. military action would be much higher if they requested military action collectively.”114 Before Shultz left Washington for a weekend in Augusta, Georgia,115 he met with Motley who reported that the OECS meeting was in session and that the OECS leaders were “out in front” and that Venezuela was unlikely to join in.116 Both men were especially worried about the students and “increasingly convinced we had run out of ways to accomplish a peaceful evacuation of the American students and that the situation on the ground was deteriorating into total anarchy. Conditions were ripe . . . for hostage taking.”117 Dam later explained Washington’s unease: “Our concern for their welfare was heightened by the murders, the curfew, and difficulty in getting accurate information on their well-being and future prospects. The RMC’s failure to reopen the airport to allow free departures suggests that anything was possible.”118 For Motley, the question was how to quantify the students’ safety; “Our mission just has to be either to get the students out, peacefully if possible, or to get 100 percent assurances that they are safe.”119 It is difficult to imagine how such a guarantee was ever possible. Motley later admitted that for him the situation was simpler; either the students were allowed to leave or the United States would intervene.120 At 4:00 p.m. Reagan signed a preliminary NSDD, ordering planning to proceed, before flying to Augusta for the weekend. At 5:00 p.m. Poindexter reconvened the CPPG. According to Menges “the tone of our discussions had shifted from whether we would act to how this could be accomplished with minimum casualties while insuring speed to avoid the likelihood of Cuban or Soviet counteraction.”121 The State Department representatives, Motley and Johnstone, presented a revised preliminary plan of action. As yet the United States had not received a formal invitation from plausible authority: “An invitation from Grenada’s neighbors would be of inestimable value in the diplomatic fallout that the State Department saw as inevitable after the U.S. action.”122 Despite the strong support for military action amongst civilian decision makers, the final decision between an NEO and takeover of Grenada had not been made. The JCS had previously opposed action but once they accepted that action was necessary they argued that the dispersal of students in three areas and the multiple targets necessitated seizing the entire island.123 The possible involvement of the Cubans on Grenada “fuelled the growing consensus that a military operation would be needed to protect the evacuation area or to disarm hostile forces elsewhere on the island.”124 Consequently the JCS were instructed to plan for both eventualities; that evening CINCLANT developed plans to include an occupation and restoration of democracy.125 According to Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s instructions, the military were to “plan to begin the operation at the soonest possible time consistent with the maximum safety of our forces, and with the actual time needed to assemble both the forces and supplies for a successful action.”126 Vessey estimated that Tuesday, October 25, was the earliest safe date. Despite cautions about the need for secrecy, officials were appalled to learn that the lead story on CBS’s Evening News was the diversion of the fleet. This leak

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deprived the fleet of the element of surprise and forced the JCS to compensate by the use of overwhelming force. The OECS Meeting The meeting began after lunch at the Dover Convention Centre near Bridgetown.127 Ambassador Bish and Gillespie were present at the venue but did not participate in the meeting. Bish had been instructed to use the occasion to approach the OECS leaders “separately or in a group, though a one-on-one would appear best from our vantage point” to make several points: Some of our friends have counseled that we should take direct military action to prevent further violence and help free the Grenadians of an oppressive military regime. We see many difficulties in this approach, although we would not rule it out completely should Americans in Grenada become the targets of violence. The preferable approach would be for Grenada’s democratic neighbors to act to resolve the Grenada problem. The U.S. might consider supporting others in an effort to restore freedom to the Grenadian people; but our support should be clearly secondary. We would consider providing such support only after receiving a strong request from our friends and after knowing what kind of forces others are willing to commit.128

These points must have left the OECS leaders in no doubt as to what was needed from them and under what conditions the United States would participate. The meeting commenced with the Defence and Security Committee and then the main authority of the OECS convened. The members expressed their horror at what had happened in Grenada and felt such brutal behavior was as “unprecedented as it was unacceptable.”129 They were worried about the domestic repercussions of the coup. As Seaga warned: If a whole government can be wiped out overnight either by political or military extremists and the governments of the Caribbean remain silent and passive, then no government elected by the people can be safe from madmen of one type or another who would seek to replace a government of the people, elected by the people with one selected by a chosen few of whatever nature. If we ignore the occurrence of brutal military take-overs or political over-throws of governments, we would immediately give heart to every subversive group in the region.130

In their formal request to the United States on Sunday, October 23, the leaders clearly communicated their concerns, painting a grim picture of the situation: [M]ilitary forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its neighbours; and that the capability of the Grenadian armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country.131

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As long as the RMC endured, it could “undermine political, social and economic stability and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and security in the OECS sub-region as a whole.”132 Something had to be done and without delay. According to Prime Minister Charles, the participants were unanimous and quickly reached a decision: “Within a half hour, we all knew we were going to go into Grenada and do something . . . Everyone came with their minds made up, without any discussion, that we were going to go in.”133 In fact opposition to military action came from Lester Bird, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Antigua and Barbuda, who abstained from the OECS vote. However, when Ambassador Bish learnt of this he phoned the Antiguan prime minister Vere Bird Sr., Lester’s father, to explain the correctness of a military solution. It is reasonable to assume that Bish’s intervention influenced Vere Bird’s subsequent decision to withdraw the abstention vote.134 As Braveboy-Wagner comments, the OECS was a small, coherent group with leaders who were well acquainted and of similar political persuasion. Their decision to use force was as much personal preference as any rational ends-means decision.135 The leaders’ choice was made easier by the fact that regional public opinion generally favored some sort of decisive action. Although the OECS had the inclination to act, they did not have the muscle; as Charles recalls, “We sat back and said ‘But how do we go in? What do we have? I have ten policemen, you have ten, you have twenty, and so on, it didn’t add up to one hundred.’”136 The OECS knew it needed the support of a larger nation; Britain, Canada, France, and Venezuela were considered but the United States was most likely to help it was decided.137 Adams, Charles, and Compton had all discussed the possibility of military assistance with US officials in the past few days, Bish and Gillespie were at the venue and now “the diversion of the U.S. fleet provided a dramatic demonstration of U.S. seriousness and of the availability of a military option.”138 Charles confirmed this, “We asked America because they already had ships in the area because they’d come close to [unintelligible]; they had to evacuate the people.”139 The situation in Grenada forced the OECS to confront unanswered security questions such as what constituted a threat and how a security arrangement could function in the region. Issuing an invitation to a superpower was possibly a precedent-setting measure that reinforced the belief that [in times of crisis] Eastern Caribbean security relied on the involvement of extra-regional powers. The legal aspects of an intervention did not concern the OECS; indeed, several leaders were lawyers by vocation. According to the OECS’s director general, Vaughan Lewis, they knew the legal definition of self-defence was subjective and concepts of humanitarian intervention disputable.140 Subsequently, under Article 8141 of the OECS Treaty, the leaders voted to take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by requesting assistance from friendly countries to provide transport, logistic support, and additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean.

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The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the assistance of friendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions of tranquility and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights pending the restoration of constitutional government.142

As it was considered that Grenada had no government, Governor-General Scoon, who had been retained by the PRG as a figurehead, could usefully act as the lawful authority in Grenada. Partly to mask their true intentions, the OECS voted in a package of political and economic sanctions including the cutting of all air and sea links.143 This last measure made any evacuation operation even less feasible. Having voted, the OECS requested that Adams attend the meeting. The OECS then issued an invitation to Barbados to join them. Another late addition to the meeting was Jamaica’s Prime Minister Seaga. He was unaware of the OECS decision and proposed a naval blockade of Grenada by the United States and Venezuela “in order to preclude the Cubans from augmenting their personnel on the island or taking [any] pre-emptive action.”144 Once apprised of the OECS’ earlier decision he agreed that a blockade was superfluous and that he stood ready to contribute Jamaican Defence Force personnel. Seaga then also received an invitation from the OECS for Jamaican participation. The meeting ended with troop numbers being settled and planning commencing and Adams being deputed to inform the United States and Great Britain of the decision. Between 9:00a.m. and 11:30 p.m. Charles, Adams, and Seaga met with Bish, Flower, and Gillespie.145 They were informed that the OECS had unanimously formally resolved to form a multinational Caribbean force to undertake to depose the outlaw regime on Grenada by any means, including intervention by force of arms; and secondly, to ask the United States and other friendly countries for the necessary assistance and means to do this. If it is desirable, the OECS would make a request to US in writing.146

Several other points were addressed during the evening. The leaders explained that Article 8 could be used to legitimize an intervention. They cautioned that their decision was not public knowledge and they had no intention of announcing it yet.147 However, Charles stressed that the invitation was official and formal and “it is not repeat not a tentative one to be later withdrawn or denied.”148 Britain, France, and “others” would be asked but if the United States acceded to the request, the OECS would not wait for “latecomers.”149 A Caribbean Regional Peacekeeping Force, with Jamaica leading, would be used once the revolutionary council and the PRA accepted terms such as the establishment of an interim representative government and holding of elections within six months.150 The CARICOM meeting was due the next day, Saturday, October 22. Adams and Charles feared that CARICOM was “leaky” and hoped the United States would reach a decision prior to the meeting. Adams had already decided not to attend the CARICOM meeting, and both leaders were pessimistic about the chances of Trinidad joining them; Adams remarked that holding the meeting in

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Port-of-Spain was “simply a gesture to satisfy that country’s vanity.”151 He informed the Americans that the OECS would not cancel the CARICOM meeting as this would be a negative signal that could jeopardize intervention plans; with low expectations of anything useful resulting from the meeting, it was decided that other issues would be placed on the agenda rather than simply intervention.152 The discussions then drew to a close. The result of the meeting was received in Washington by Motley who instructed Gillespie to inform the OECS that a written request would be required. At 2:45 a.m. in Augusta, McFarlane called Shultz and the two met in the Eisenhower cottage to discuss the OECS cable that “basically gave the OECS states analysis of the situation and stated their very strong feeling that they must do something about it on Grenada and their feeling that they were not able to do it on their own, and so they asked if we would help them.”153 The OECS advocated swift action to deny the RMC and Cubans time to prepare their defences or take hostages and recommended Sunday, October 23, as the best time to act.154 The OECS cable was the logical conclusion of the previous few days’ communications between Washington and the Eastern Caribbean; as McFarlane later recalled, “It was the call we had expected.”155 At 3:35 a.m. in Washington, Bush chaired a meeting of top advisers, joined by Shultz and McFarlane on a secure conference call line from Augusta. Shultz confirmed that the OECS had issued a request and he apparently urged that action be taken on Sunday, October 23, as the OECS had suggested.156 Weinberger expressed his opposition to any rushed operation, emphasizing that there was not enough available information yet and that Vessey had advised him that Tuesday, October 25, was the earliest safe date for an intervention. Nonetheless, it was agreed that “the ships heading for Grenada should be deployed for possible action, but without arousing suspicion.”157 Although Weinberger had opposed a Sunday operation it now appeared certain that a military operation would be undertaken in the next few days. Weinberger’s comments confirmed Shultz’s fears: “We had to move quickly, before this window of opportunity closed. We couldn’t let the Pentagon drag out our preparations until it was too late, which I feared they might do.”158 President Reagan was woken and apprised of developments by McFarlane and Shultz at 5:15 a.m. Reagan had met the OECS leaders in Barbados in April 1982 and was apparently impressed and moved by their request.159 McFarlane presented the case for acting: The United States is seen as responsible for providing leadership in defense of Western interests wherever they may be threatened . . . For us to be asked to help and to refuse would have a very damaging effect on the credibility of the United States and your own commitment to the defense of freedom and democracy.160

Reagan asked McFarlane how long the Pentagon needed to prepare a “rescue mission.” When he told him that the JCS believed it was feasible in 48 hours, Reagan simply replied, “Do it.”161 McFarlane described Reagan’s response as

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“very unequivocal . . . He couldn’t wait.”162 Reagan later explained, in terms similar to McFarlane’s, his support for an intervention: We couldn’t say no to those six small countries who had asked us for help. We’d have no credibility or standing in the Americas if we did. If it ever became known, which I knew it would, that we had turned them down, few of our friends around the world would trust us completely as an ally again.163

The secure conference phone line was reopened at 6:00 a.m. Reagan spoke with Weinberger and Bush; Weinberger restated his belief that there was insufficient intelligence for an operation yet but Reagan was not deterred.164 Reagan felt that Bush’s suggestion to approach Venezuela would only delay the operation and increase the possibility of a leak.165 He then approved military planning for an operation, most probably for Tuesday, October 25. In response to the OECS request, Reagan told Bush to “tell Mrs. Charles that we recognize the problem, we’ll be glad to respond, and we’ll stay in close touch with her while we get busy planning.”166 Having completed the call, Shultz advised that Reagan call back and ask General Vessey how many troops would be required and that “after he has told you, Mr. President, I suggest that you tell him to double it.”167 Shultz felt that this would underline Reagan’s determination to act and, along with the order to the State and Defense Department to “move beyond a ‘warning order’ status and prepare for a noncombatant evacuation order, including an invasion plan,” would keep the Defense Department moving.168 An SSG meeting was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. that morning in Washington; the presidential group decided to remain in Augusta and keep in touch by phone to avoid raising suspicion and maintain the secrecy surrounding planning so far in Washington. Saturday, October 22 The SSG was convened in Washington at 9:00 a.m. by Vice President Bush.169 President Reagan and Secretary Shultz participated via conference phone from Augusta for five minutes. The meeting began with an overview and update of the situation in Grenada; the CIA had “continued to receive unconfirmed reports that Coard had been killed” and “conflicting reports about who was actually in charge indicated that the power struggle was not over.”170 Essentially, intelligence indicated that the RMC were an unsavory bunch who were more hard-line than the PRG and demonstrated no pro-US tendencies, or the possibility of them, and that it was unlikely relations would improve in the foreseeable future.171 The State Department representatives then focused on the political aspects of an intervention. As with previous high-level meetings, the Iran hostage analogy was invoked. One participant at least “had a real fear that it could be a very bad situation. Desert One all over again.”172 Eagleburger emphasized the credibility angle by arguing that doing nothing would cause the United States to lose face in the region, particularly Central America, at a crucial time.173

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The OECS’s oral request received the previous night was also discussed. It was decided that Ambassador Frank McNeil would be dispatched to Barbados to “make certain that the Caribbean leaders had in fact a common position and would secure from them a formal written invitation.”174 McNeil would be accompanied by two-star General George Crist who “would help signal to the Caribbean leadership Washington’s serious intent and in the event that the military option were taken, ‘make sure that the [Caribbean] flags’ were brought in early.”175 Washington realized that without an OECS request they would have to reevaluate the level of anticipated threat to the students against the prospect of a unilateral operation: a further indication of threat, perhaps the shooting of a student, would be needed.176 Thus decision making was guided to an extent by the importance of a potential multilateral intervention. As Beck suggests, the CARICOM meeting scheduled for that evening in Trinidad was also probably discussed; CARICOM was “an international organization larger, older, and better recognized than the OECS, though not a regional security organization, [that] might decide to request American assistance.”177 The SSG must have been aware of Ambassador Bish’s report of his meeting with Tom Adams on Thursday, October 20, when Adams had told Bish he believed CARICOM would not support an intervention, with particular opposition expected from Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana. Guyana was the only other undemocratic regime in CARICOM and the PRG had been a socialist ally; military intervention, especially by the United States, was not a precedent Forbes Burnham wanted to endorse. Discussions proceeded with the military aspects of an intervention. Weinberger and Vessey insisted that not enough was known about the numbers and ability of the Grenadian and Cuban opposition they would face and that more time was needed to gather intelligence. Consequently, Weinberger got approval for the use of Navy SEAL (sea, air, and land) forces to collect pre-landing intelligence.178 Despite their obvious reservations, the JCS was ordered to continue planning on the basis of a “go” order.179 Clarridge recalls that “on the surface it looked like a go. After all, the President had given the order, but strangely it was an equivocal go as far as the U.S. military was concerned; they really wanted no part of it.”180 The draft NSDD that had been circulated contained three objectives: “ensuring the safety of American citizens on Grenada; in conjunction with OECS friendly government participants, the restoration of democratic government on Grenada; [and] elimination of current, and prevention of further, Cuban intervention on Grenada.”181 The first and last objectives were not unrelated; theoretically, if the RMC had been pro-US and anti-Cuban the students would not have been perceived to be in such danger and the Cubans would have had to leave.182 The pros and cons of going beyond an NEO were discussed with Bush querying the NSDD objective of restoring democracy. Reagan’s response was succinct: “Well, if we’ve got to go there, we might as well do all that needs to be done.”183 Another participant warned Reagan that there would be “a lot of harsh political reaction” to an intervention. Reagan was not dissuaded; “I know that. I accept that.”184 A perfunctory discussion of the applicability of the War Powers Resolution185 to an

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intervention concluded that any action would be finished long before Congress became involved. A final issue was the need for absolute secrecy. Some SSG members had been dismayed that the papers were already carrying reports of the diversion of the fleet toward Grenada. Measures were authorized to deceive the Cubans and Grenadians.186 The presidential party would remain in Augusta as planned to avoid attracting attention by returning early. Even the United States’ closest allies would remain in the dark. A decision about when to inform British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had to be taken: “After all, we were about to take down a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Decision: notify her at the last minute.”187 Reagan later explained: “We did not even inform the British beforehand, because I thought it would increase the possibility of a leak at our end and elevate the risk to our students.”188 Secrecy within the administration was just as important; from the start Shultz had insisted that the situation be “close held.” He had established the ground rules and cut out all manner of people who would normally be involved in the decision-making process.189 One prime example was White House Spokesman Larry Speakes who was only informed a few hours before the intervention commenced. The SSG also decided, at Weinberger’s suggestion, that the media would be excluded from the operation for the first 48 hours.190 The official reason given for this exclusion was the need to preserve the secrecy of the operation and ensure the element of surprise and also the inability to guarantee the safety of noncombatants. Another reason is what has been described as the “Vietnam legacy” and the “Falklands inheritance.”191 Amalgamating the perceived lessons of Vietnam and the Falklands, Washington decided that “live television coverage of casualties and civilian destruction in the early stages was to be avoided, and almost all press commentary which might be critical was to be postponed.”192 As with previous administrations the Reagan one was not entirely happy with the media’s coverage of foreign policy; as Shultz complained, “[T]hese days, in the advocacy journalism that’s been adopted, it seems as though the reporters are always against us and so they’re trying to screw things up, and when you’re trying to conduct a military operation you don’t need that.”193 Deciding to exclude the media was one of the easier choices made. By the conclusion of the meeting at 11:30 a.m. it was apparent that a consensus had been reached. As with other decision-making meetings during this period, there was a noticeable absence of anyone arguing against intervention; the Department of Defense may have wanted more time to gather intelligence, State interpreted this as unwillingness to act, but there is no evidence that they actively opposed intervention. This pattern is partly explained by the intentionally small number of officials involved, which automatically limited the chance of opposition.194 They obviously also shared similar political beliefs although some were noticeably more hard-line than others. In general it appears that different opinions were sought, points of disagreement discussed, and everyone allowed to have a say before a decision was made. The seeming lack of opposition was also indicative of the fact that Washington felt it had a fair idea, rightly

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or wrongly, of what was happening in Grenada and that they had to act; framed in these terms there was, in the words of one official, “not much of a decision to be made.”195 As Dam stated: “Inaction would have increased . . . [the] dangers, including the possibility of a hostage situation, and made any subsequent efforts even more costly.”196 The SSG meeting marked the point at which most of those in the loop on Grenada believed that military action was necessary and likely.197 The final decision to intervene had not been made yet but during the SSG meeting Reagan had made a “75 percent” commitment to action.198 Soon after the SSG meeting Weinberger met with the JCS at the Pentagon to review planning. An initial planning conference for a full operation and evacuation had been held that morning at CINCLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. Weinberger told the JCS to “double whatever CINCLANT says he needs.”199 This measure reflected Weinberger’s underlying philosophy from Vietnam that if there was no intention of winning, the operation should not be done; if something was to be done, more troops than are strictly necessary should be used, it should be done swiftly, and with clear objectives.200 On Saturday morning in Barbados, Ambassador Bish met with Adams, Compton, Seaga, St. Kitts-Nevis Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds, Montserrat’s chief minister John Osbourne, and Barbadian foreign minister Louis Tull.201 The leaders again pressed for quick action. Bish underlined that Washington was still studying the possibility of an intervention and even if the United States did act it could only remain in Grenada temporarily.202 Seaga and Compton repeated that an early decision would be helpful; Seaga needed six hours to mobilize his armed forces and Compton was concerned about what to tell Chambers who was unaware of the pace and direction of the US-OECS discussions and the strong possibility of intervention.203 The leaders discussed the forthcoming CARICOM meeting. They warned Bish of Chambers’s “unpredictability” and Guyanese “untrustworthiness.”204 Adams suggested that the CARICOM meeting be prolonged to detain the media who were becoming increasingly suspicious that something was afoot.205 Concerned about the United States’ noncommittal stance, and aware that two embassy officials were due to visit Grenada that day, Adams advised Bish that the United States should have no contact with Austin as it would only legitimize him.206 As we have seen, Ambassador Bish clearly favored action and urged the Eastern Caribbean leaders to take the lead in advocating action but the wily Adams knew that the “political costs” were too great for the leaders without a US guarantee of action.207 This, of course, Bish was not authorized to do. The ambassador later cabled Washington recommending that “to stop the carnage and spread of communism I recommend that you positively support the call for help by our friends and neighbours.”208 Motley instructed Bish to be careful and work closely with the OECS because it was their action.209 Whilst the ambassador met the leaders, the embassy was making final arrangements for Kurze and Flohr’s visit to Grenada. They would be accompanied by the British deputy high commissioner David Montgomery. A last-minute problem was encountered

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when RMC representative Major Leon Cornwall attempted to delay the flight until the following day, Sunday, October 23, and have the diplomats stay for two days. Having had the flight turned away once, on Wednesday, October 19, any further delays were unacceptable and the embassy was insistent that the visit be that day. Ambassador Bish contacted SGU’s Solin to try and remedy the situation; Bourne later recalled: “I called New York and talked to [Chancellor] Modica who had been keeping in close touch with Washington and the U.S. ambassador in Barbados . . . He immediately got on the phone to Maj. Stroude and finally got him to agree that we should let the American diplomats come at once.”210 Bourne telexed the embassy at 11:15 a.m. to report that the problem had been resolved and the flight could proceed as planned. The diplomats’ flight left Barbados at 2:45 p.m., arriving in Grenada 45 minutes later. Kurze and Flohr’s instructions were “to learn more of what was going on; to check out the situation and morale at the Medical School; to talk to other American citizens as possible; to impress on those whom . . . [they] met the wider implications of the RMC’s actions.”211 Montgomery similarly was to check on British citizens and also meet with the governor-general. On arrival the threesome noticed an antiaircraft gun emplacement at the end of the runway and PRA soldiers on the roof of the terminal building with guns trained on them. The group were escorted by armed soldiers directly to SGU in two cars, the Americans in one and Montgomery in the other. During the journey Kurze observed that the streets were empty; “It was an eerie atmosphere, with an obvious RMC show of strength/ ‘we are in full control’ effort behind it.”212 On arriving at SGU Kurze and Flohr met with Bourne for approximately an hour whilst Montgomery waited outside.213 Bourne had hoped that “once these officials realized that the students and faculty were in no danger and had also a chance to see the political direction in which Austin wanted to move it would be clear an invasion was entirely unwarranted.”214 After leaving SGU the Americans were driven to the Ross Point Inn to check in; Montgomery meanwhile joined John Kelly and toured the island checking on British citizens and seeing how many wanted to leave. Kurze and Flohr visited the SGU’s Grand Anse campus215 and addressed the students at 6:00 p.m. The diplomats’ problem was that they could not shout “everybody evacuate” because they did not know how feasible an evacuation was and also could not promise that Washington would actually get them out.216 Isolated on Grenada, 99.9 percent of the students were oblivious of Grenadian politics and the extent of the crisis and regional uproar.217 Kurze emphasized the outrage in the Eastern Caribbean and their calls for the United States to “do something.” He also felt it imperative “to impress on people our view that just lifting the curfew [on Monday, October 24,] would not stabilize the situation. Radicals had taken power. Where would it end?”218 Kurze and Flohr had attempted to impress upon the students what a “hot” situation they were part of but reassured them that they should remain calm. They did not encourage the students to leave simply because there was no way out presently without the RMC’s cooperation. News of the diversion of the US fleet and the

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scheduled OECS and CARICOM meetings had made the RMC increasingly agitated. At 2:30 p.m. RFG broadcast a mobilization order for the militia “in view of the threat facing Grenada.”219 Such announcements could only have increased concerns in Washington. Continuing the RMC’s conciliatory line, Pearls airport was to be opened on Monday, October 24, at 6:00 a.m. and the curfew would be reduced to 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.220 At 6:40 p.m. an RMC “Statement of Intention” announced that a new cabinet would be established within 10 to 14 days, “ensuring that all social classes and interests in our country are represented.”221 More promptly efforts would be made to immediately explain the real situation in Grenada to the many countries and organizations, as well as to our Caribbean neighbours, to counter the lies being told in the foreign press. Efforts made recently to better relations with the United States government would continue.222

Additionally, all SGU students should be treated with the “utmost consideration” by the PRA.223 Whatever Grenadians made of this, it was apparent that there was a difference of opinion between Bourne and the US diplomats. Bourne had already met with General Austin and believed he had established a good dialogue and with the arrival of Kurze and Flohr thought that a peaceful resolution was possible;224 in his eyes this announcement was “very encouraging.”225 Contrastingly, Kurze’s interpretation was that “it was bullshit, farcical, really. They were stalling for time.”226 Whichever interpretation was most accurate, the broadcast conveyed the image of an RMC desperately scrambling to preserve their tenuous position. Also that Saturday Cuba clarified its position. In a message to Ambassador Rizo, Castro ruled out evacuation as “highly demoralizing and dishonourable for our country in the eyes of world opinion.”227 Cuban personnel should strengthen their positions and “vigorously defend” themselves “but only if . . . directly attacked.”228 The army and Ministry of Interior advisers were to remain at their posts and await further orders whilst trying to “exert as much positive influence as possible on the behaviour of the [Grenadian] Army and the Security forces towards the people.”229 When Rizo met with RMC officials he told them that Castro had precluded the sending of reinforcements as “impossible and unthinkable.”230 Furthermore, the RMC should seek a “reconciliation with the people” by clarifying the deaths at Fort Rupert and “seeking out those responsible” and “try to prevent affording a pretext for intervention by publicly offering and reiterating total guarantees and facilities for the security and evacuation of U.S., English and other nationals.”231 Finally, Cuban officials emphasized that Cuban personnel would not go beyond the perimeter of Point Salines under any circumstances and RMC troops should not enter this area or attempt to coordinate their defences with the Cubans.232 If the RMC had harbored any hopes of Cuban help, this must have dashed them. In Washington the level of activity increased. A final draft of the NSDD had been produced. The document contained a “total action plan” that would

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“land U.S. and allied Caribbean military forces in order to take control of Grenada no later than dawn Tuesday, October 25.”233 At 2:10 p.m., it was dispatched to State, Defense, and the CIA. This was another preparatory step in the intervention timetable rather than any final decision; Washington “retained the ability to halt final implementation until the last moment.”234 Pursuant to the SSG decision, William Montgomery, Eagleburger’s executive assistant, set about contacting Ambassador McNeil in Boston. He eventually reached McNeil between 1:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.; the ambassador was only told to come to Washington and bring tropical clothing.235 Also rounded up was Larry Rossin who would accompany McNeil to Barbados and “assist in any way necessary Ambassador McNeil in his special mission.”236 When the United States had received the OECS’s request the legal implications had to be seriously considered. Lawyers from the State Department, the Justice Department, and the Defense Department studied all the domestic and international legal angles, in order “to prepare an outline or list of essential points to be included in any formal OECS written request for assistance.”237 It was this list that McNeil would take with him to Barbados for his meeting with the OECS leaders. At 4:54 p.m. the JCS issued CINCLANT with orders to plan to “conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants assist in the restoration of a democratic government on Grenada.”238 In the Caribbean Captain Erie’s task force had continued to steer a southern course, unaware of the decisions being made in Washington. The Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) on the USS Guam focused on the capture and securing of an evacuation site rather than the extensive operation Washington planned. Most aboard believed that it was “doubtful that we’ll be called upon to carry out this mission.”239 At 10:00 p.m. however, Captain Erie received the message to move south toward Grenada. A second message provided general information about the strength and disposition of forces on Grenada and stated that further intelligence would follow.240 A final message from Metcalf informed Erie that the army was planning for an airborne assault.241 A Message from Cuba Castro had made it clear that the RMC had made “serious errors” and that Cuban forces would not come to the rescue. The OECS had made little effort to hide its sentiments and the diversion of the US fleet was public knowledge by Saturday; aware of the likelihood of US military action Castro sent a message to the US Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Havana at 9:00 p.m.: That the U.S. side is aware of the developments in Grenada; that it is also aware of our position on these developments and of our determination of not interfering in the internal affairs of that country. That we are aware of their concern about the numerous U.S. residents there. That we are also concerned about the hundreds of

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Cuban cooperation personnel working there in different fields and about the news that U.S. naval forces are approaching Grenada. That according to the reports we have, no U.S. or foreign national, nor our personnel has had any problems. It is convenient to keep in touch on this matter, so as to contribute to solve favorably any difficulty that may arise or action that may be taken relating to the security of these individuals, without violence or intervention in the country.242

John Ferch, head of the US Interests Section, described the message as “bizarre” and commented that it was treated as a ploy in Washington and no answer was sent.243 A message, but not a reply to Havana’s message, was eventually sent to Havana at 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday, October 25, three hours after Urgent Fury began.244 As Motley explained, Washington viewed the Cuban reaction to events in Grenada as “smart.” Grenada had been “tailor-made” for Cuba to “bug” Washington via a surrogate country and they had made a big investment in Grenada. By this rationale Bishop’s demise would have been seen as irresponsible and wasteful, and in the aftermath Castro had no interest in seeing something he had some influence over escalate into an international episode.245 Britain’s Noninvolvement Grenada was one of the microstates that had gained independence (1974) from Britain in the wave of decolonization that swept the region in the late 1970s and early 1980s.246 Although London no longer regarded the post-independence affairs of the islands as any of its business, it remained concerned about Grenada though never to the same degree as the United States. With a representative on Grenada and established contacts within the region, Britain was a valuable source of intelligence for the United States throughout the crisis period. However, the secrecy surrounding decision making in Washington and the OECS’s request to the United States led a UK Parliamentary Report on Grenada to conclude that “it was not the intention of the United States Government that the United Kingdom should be actively involved in the military intervention in Grenada, and that the timing, nature and extent of the information provided . . . by the United States were consistent with this position.”247 On the morning of Saturday, October 22, Adams confirmed what British High Commissioner Bullard had learnt of the night before: the OECS’s intention to form a multinational force to resolve the crisis in Grenada. He explained that British participation would be desired and other countries⎯France, Canada, Venezuela, and the United States⎯would also be asked. Adams also explained that a formal written request would follow shortly.248 At 1:00 p.m. local time Bullard reported this news to London, advising that “if the United States agreed to participate then Britain should give its support or, at the very least, should refrain for doing anything that might weaken or jeopardize the Caribbean initiative in any way.”249 In London the telegram prompted Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials to consider the increasing possibility that

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they would be “faced shortly with choices involving participation in or acceptance of plans for military action without other possibilities having been fully explored.”250 It was decided to wait for the outcome of the CARICOM meeting before making any decisions. Earlier that afternoon the decision had been made to divert the West Indian guardship, HMS Antrim, and her supply ship Pearleaf, from Cartagena, Colombia, to Grenada as a “precautionary measure,” echoing the diversion of the US fleet, should an evacuation of British citizens be necessary. British embassy officials in Washington had been fishing for indications of US intentions. On Saturday morning Robin Renwick, head of the chancery at the embassy, visited the State Department only to get “what is known diplomatically as a bum steer: everyone was proceeding very cautiously and nothing would happen without consultation with Britain.”251 This promise would prove to be not entirely true. London’s apparent unwillingness to become involved generated a postintervention feeling in the region that by not participating, Britain had “failed both the people of Grenada, and the people of the Caribbean in general.”252 As Tom Adams explained, London knew “from the word go that the Eastern Caribbean States hoped for a military intervention in which British forces would take part.”253 The reality was that London favored the CARICOM solution and the signals being received from Washington and the OECS were not opaque. Additionally, Britain simply could not mount an operation in the timescale envisaged by the Eastern Caribbean leaders; the only British forces in the region were in Belize and numbered 1,800.254 As Deputy High Commissioner Montgomery told Adams, it would take weeks rather than days for a British intervention to be planned and executed. Washington felt no need for British involvement and so all Britain could realistically do was offer “tea and sympathy and make a few belligerent noises.”255 The Caribbean Community Meeting Representatives from all of the CARICOM256 nations, except for Grenada, assembled at the Trinidad Hilton at 8:30 p.m.257 As previously discussed, the OECS did not expect much from the meeting but did not cancel to avoid arousing suspicion. Talks centered on a nonmilitary solution; Seaga’s contention that the use of force should not be ruled out was flatly rejected by Chambers, Burnham, Pindling, and Price.258 The OECS group remained silent for the moment about its request to the United States and went along with CARICOM proposals that there should be no external involvement in what was an internal problem that required a CARICOM solution that would respect international law and restore normalcy to Grenada.259 The governor-general in Grenada would be the point of contact for these efforts to avoid the possibility that the RMC interpret this as some sort of official recognition. Four aims were outlined: the establishment of a broad-based civilian government that would arrange elections at the earliest possible date; a fact-finding mission by eminent CARICOM state figures; arrangements to ensure the safety of foreign citizens

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in Grenada and/or their evacuation; and the deployment of a CARICOM peacekeeping force.260 At 3:06 a.m. the meeting was adjourned, with Chambers confident that a consensus had been reached. The OECS members were less happy with some aspects of the consensus and had argued that sanctions without the threat of the use of force would be ineffective and therefore greater emphasis should be placed on the wider security implications of the RMC remaining in power.261 The one problem for those who favored a peaceful solution was what should happen if the RMC refused to comply with CARICOM’s measures.262 Charles, Bird, Seaga, and Tull immediately met secretly to consider how to steer CARICOM back toward the issue of a military solution. The first session had perhaps gone worse than expected. Sometime around 4:00 a.m. Adams phoned the group; it was probably at this stage that the OECS group decided to proceed with its plans irrespective of CARICOM’s position. When the meeting reconvened at 9:00 a.m., “certain” heads of government announced that “there was no consensus on the proposals and that in any event they were of the opinion that no further discussions should continue along those lines.”263 Continuing the offensive, Charles introduced the sanctions the OECS had previously agreed on. Additionally, Seaga put forward a proposal that human rights and democracy become qualifications for inclusion in a restructured CARICOM and the unanimity voting regulations be changed in some areas. The latter was part of a deliberate OECS ploy to put other issues on the meeting’s agenda to mask their intentions.264 As one participant recalled, “It became clear . . . that their earlier plans for military invasion with the involvement of the United States should neither be sidetracked nor impeded.”265 The meeting finally closed by imposing sanctions on Grenada and voting by eleven to one to expel Grenada from CARICOM.266 In the aftermath of the Grenada crisis, the OECS-CARICOM relationship was slow to heal.

Satellite photograph of Point Salines International Airport used by President Reagan during his March 23, 1983, Strategic Defense Initiative speech

The top square inside Fort George where Prime Minister Bishop and his colleagues were executed by a firing squad against the stone wall on the right

The National Security Planning Group meeting, October 23, 1983

President Ronald Reagan of the United States of America and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica at a White House press conference take questions having announced the US-Caribbean intervention in Grenada, October 25, 1983

US soldiers on patrol in Grenada

Two of the People’s Revolutionary Army’s armed personnel carriers that took part in the “Bloody Wednesday” massacre lie immobilized.

St. George’s University students are evacuated from Point Salines airport, October 26, 1983

A relic of the revolutionary years—an abandoned Cuban airplane rusts away at the side of the runway at Pearls airport.

CHAPTER 7

Planning an Intervention

A

t 12:22 a.m., Washington time, on Sunday, October 23, a suicide bomber crashed an explosive-filled truck into the US marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 marines. In Augusta, Reagan was woken up early, 2:27 a.m., for the second successive day by McFarlane to be told: “We’ve had a terrible attack on the marines with a substantial loss of life.”1 It was the start of a long and arduous day for Reagan; he later remembered it as the “saddest day of my presidency, perhaps the saddest day of my life.”2 Reagan met with McFarlane and Shultz for two hours before making the two-hour flight Washington. The first of the day’s two National Security Planning Group3 (NSPG) meetings began at 8:40 a.m. The subject of both meetings that day was identical: “Beirut, then Grenada.”4 Critics have suggested that intervention in Grenada was a reflex action. This reasoning portrayed the United States as a weak and impotent power in the face of Third World challenges; swift and successful action in Grenada would help restore US credibility. Apart from Reagan, three other senior officials were particularly affected by Beirut. Shultz, a former marine himself, was shocked and saddened. Likewise McFarlane who had visited the troops, knew many of the officers and as Reagan’s former personal representative to the Middle East had supported their presence there.5 Weinberger was “horrified and frustrated.” He and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “were convinced that Shultz and his diplomats were blind to the dangers of allowing the Marines to remain in the hostile environment of Lebanon” with no clearly defined mission and inadequate forces.6 In the first half of the morning meeting Weinberger and the JCS made their position clear: the situation in Lebanon was futile and the marines should be withdrawn as soon as possible. For the second half of the meeting the Grenada group, Eagleburger, Motley, Menges, Iklé, and North, who had been waiting in McFarlane’s office, were called in to update the group on the situation and military preparedness. Reagan asked everyone for their opinions. As one participant recalled, the JCS interpreted this as an opportunity to “second-guess” the Grenada operation: “It was

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as if the Joint Chiefs were saying to the president ‘because Vice President Bush was sitting in your chair when this operation was green-lighted the first time, maybe you didn’t really mean it. Wouldn’t you like to think again?’”7 JCS Chairman John Vessey gave a “very clear, sober, cautious” assessment “without recommendation”: [T]here are a lot of questions, we don’t know the answers . . . We have very bad intelligence, our Navy SEALS are down there collecting intelligence, but we don’t have much from them . . . it is going to be a violent, opposed landing and we are going to lose some people and I believe we can prevail Mr. President, but it is going to be a fight and I can’t guarantee you that it will be easily secured.8

Nonetheless, the primary issue was whether Beirut should affect planning for Grenada.9 Having got everyone’s views Reagan made his position clear: “If this was right yesterday, it’s right today, and we shouldn’t let the act of a couple of terrorists dissuade us from going ahead.”10 Beirut clearly did not derail intervention plans but obviously did have some impact on the decision makers: it was a question of degrees rather than direction though. A “do something” mentality could be detected in certain quarters; Shultz for one pursued intervention in Grenada with more fervor post-Beirut.11 For the Grenada group the disaster in Beirut did not have much impact; what it did do that Sunday was to provide good cover as the press overlooked the presence of the Grenada group at the White House.12 It is evident that the decision to intervene was not a product of the Beirut disaster; it was simply too soon afterwards to be a reflex action, nor was it particularly affected by the bombing. Reagan had not signed the “go” order yet but Grenada had been discussed at cabinet level since Thursday, October 20, and preparations were well underway by Sunday, October 23. Fundamentally, Grenada and Lebanon existed on “parallel but separate tracks.”13 Over at the State Department that morning, Ambassador Frank McNeil was given the details of his special mission at an 8:00 a.m. Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) meeting.14 The ambassador was told that Reagan wanted another assessment of the situation before he made any final decision. A list of instructions and essential points, prepared by the State Department’s legal team the previous day, to be included in any formal Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) request, was presented to McNeil; he felt that the list was unsuitable as it lacked orderliness and might be interpreted as a Washington-written invitation.15 It was emphasized to McNeil he should make his own independent appraisal. His written instructions were supplemented by oral instructions from Shultz, via Eagleburger, that no final decision had been made and that he should give no hint of his recommendations.16 McNeil later summarized the purpose of his trip: I was to make crystal clear to the OECS that the president had not yet decided whether to intervene and that the decision could go either way. I was to assess with the Caribbean leaders the situation on the island, including particularly that of the

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American students . . . and discuss in depth with the Caribbean leaders their rationale for intervention. Finally, after assessing such other information and intelligence as might be available on the scene, I was to report back my assessment and my recommendations.17

He was not sanguine about the possibility of action: “When I left I sensed that we would probably not intervene. The White House, shocked by the loss of 250 marines in the Beirut bombing, feared the political consequences, and the Department of Defense was reluctant at the least, wanting more time to prepare.”18 He was whisked off to Andrews Air Force Base to take a 10:30 a.m. flight to Barbados.19 A Walk in the Garden In the aftermath of the intervention one of the justifications advanced was the issuing of an invitation by Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon. Adams revealed that his “views were sought well before the military operation commenced on the issuing of an invitation of friendly countries to enter Grenada and restore order.”20 An examination of the legality of Scoon’s request is beyond the scope of this study; Scoon issued a request but doubts surrounding its authorship have attracted strong criticism.21 Although the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) had suspended the constitution in March 1979, People’s Law Number Three stated that “the Head of State shall remain Her Majesty the Queen and her representative in this country shall continue to be the Governor-General who shall perform such functions as the People’s Revolutionary Government may from time to time advise.”22 Politically, Scoon was just a figurehead with minimal power. Austin had visited Scoon on October 20 to inform him of the Revolutionary Military Council’s (RMC) plans and asked him to remain in office and help establish a civilian-based government. During the days prior to Montgomery’s visit Scoon had been in contact by phone with Buckingham Palace, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Shridath Ramphal, and Trinidad and Tobago President Ellis Clarke among others. He had not requested help on any occasion but did confide to Clarke that “I would prefer not to have a military solution even though in the back of my mind I thought this was perhaps the best option.”23 On Sunday morning Scoon met with Montgomery for an hour. The governor-general was unaware of the advanced state of intervention planning and Montgomery conveyed a message from Prime Minister Adams that the OECS had decided to seek help from the United States and that Barbados and Jamaica would be involved.24 Montgomery advised Scoon that “it cannot be ruled out that there will be some sort of military action” and that he should prepare himself for such an eventuality and emphasized that as governor-general he was the only constitutional authority on Grenada: if the United States intervened they could not run Grenada, only he could; consequently, he should plan the appropriate political measures.25 Scoon certainly did not request help of his own volition and it was only when Montgomery directly

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asked him, “Would you welcome intervention?” that Scoon admitted that he saw it as the only thing that could save Grenada, otherwise there was the possibility of sliding into civil war.26 Montgomery then queried whether Scoon would be willing to issue a written request for assistance. Understandably concerned about his own safety, Scoon agreed to issue an oral request that Montgomery could pass on to Prime Minister Adams “to be regarded pro tem, as such a request with a formal written request from me to follow as soon as a secure, practicable means of communication became available.”27 As the NSPG met in Washington and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) met in Port-of-Spain, another important meeting was taking place in St. George’s. At 9:00 a.m. that morning Cornwall sent a message to Bourne asking him to arrange a time and place for a meeting with the US and British representatives; Bourne proposed 11:00 a.m. at the Ross Point Inn where the diplomats were staying.28 The meeting with Cornwall29 started at noon and was attended by Kurze, Flohr, Montgomery, Kelly, Bourne, and Solin. Cornwall began by admitting that mistakes had been made and time was needed to restore normalcy but that the RMC was in control. The curfew would be lifted and a cabinet formed soon. Montgomery felt this was just a “catalogue of reassuring noises” for the diplomats’ benefit and if the RMC were really in control why was the curfew still in place.30 Montgomery asked to see Coard as soon as possible but Cornwall nonchalantly replied that he was not even sure if Coard was still on the island. When Montgomery pressed Cornwall about Coard later in the meeting he was told that the day’s meeting was to discuss practicalities and that another meeting could be arranged the following day.31 The main topic of conversation was the students and their possible evacuation; Kurze and Flohr’s primary interest was to get an assurance that if evacuation flights were arranged they would get clearance.32 Cornwall made repeated assurances that the students were in no danger and “bragged that things would be back to ‘normal’ the next day when the curfew was lifted.”33 He promised that Pearls would reopen on Monday, October 24, and that “those U.S. . . . citizens who want to leave Grenada for whatever reason would be able to do so tomorrow following normal procedures” on regularly scheduled flights.34 Kurze emphasized that CARICOM had suspended Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) flights and that Pearls airport could only accommodate 46-seater planes and therefore any evacuation would be too time consuming and the difficult journey across the island to the airport made it difficult to ensure safety. Plane evacuation was further complicated by the RMC insisting that flights would be properly organized and formalities such as customs would not be waived: “If it took hours or even days to process all 1,000 Americans, very well, they would have to wait.”35 When Cornwall revealed that the RMC was willing to let 40–50 people leave each day at most, both Kurze and Montgomery told him he was not being realistic.36 Kurze suggested an evacuation by a large ship, not necessarily a warship, from St. George’s harbour. Cornwall rejected evacuation by warship believing it to be “tantamount to allowing a military occupation of his state”37 and an evacuation by the cruise liner Countess, volunteered by Cunard in response to an embassy

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request, was never pursued.38 When the meeting ended after 50 minutes, Kurze was not hopeful: “We wanted a quick evacuation; the RMC was stalling, stressing normalcy and no need to rush as everyone was safe; no progress was made.”39 That afternoon two more US diplomats, James Budeit and Gary Chafin,40 arrived to replace Kurze whose mother had just died. Their arrival was not uneventful. On the plane’s first approach their pilot could not contact the Pearls control tower and diverted to Union Island about 15 minutes away. It transpired that Austin’s secretary had misdialed the airport’s number to alert them of the plane’s arrival.41 Upon landing the plane was surrounded by the security forces who “looked and behaved like Caribbean pirates.”42 Budeit and Chafin were already running late and there was no sign of Kurze and Montgomery who were due to return to Barbados and nobody knew where they were. Budeit and Chafin now became worried that they had walked into a trap; they heard gunfire, the sonic booms of US reconnaissance planes overhead, and rumors that a counterrevolution was underway in St. George’s.43 Soon after, one of the armed personnel carriers that had wreaked havoc at Fort Rupert arrived. Budeit had already decided that if Kurze “hadn’t come out, I wasn’t going in”44 and Chafin began to think it might be wise to reboard the plane and leave. In fact Kurze and Montgomery had simply been delayed and arrived at Pearls in one piece about two hours later. Their flight left without incident at 3:30 p.m. Back at the embassy Budeit and Chafin’s dramatic, but misleading, reports presented officials with an exaggerated picture of the volatility of the situation on Grenada. Kurze and Flohr’s reports were not positive either. Kurze noted that the students were safe and well; there were no reports of injuries or threats being made but that a significant number of students were scared and wanted out.45 However, he felt that “you could not have an orderly evacuation of large numbers of foreigners in a situation controlled by the military council, given their shakiness and the large chance of violence. Therefore, if you’re going to do this, you have to secure control of a certain area.”46 If an evacuation was problematic then a negotiated solution was even less likely: “A piecemeal deal with the RMC would not work. The RMC had no local support, was over its head, and would likely fall like a house of cards.”47 Images of another hostage crisis weighed heavily on the two diplomats’ minds; they believed the RMC would have little compunction about using foreign citizens to get themselves out of a corner. As Kurze explained, “These were desperate people, heavily indoctrinated to boot. I think that if the situation had dropped out, without an intervention to nip it, this [hostage taking] was a clear possibility.”48 The diplomats told Bish that the RMC had no organizational structure, no coherent leadership, and could disintegrate rapidly. More worryingly, it seemed that the RMC simply did not understand the problem; they believed that if they held on to the students they would be safe when, in fact, the opposite was true.49 As far as the RMC was concerned an evacuation was the prelude to an intervention. It probably felt that the longer it could prevent intervention by diplomatic means the harder it would be to justify any external intervention internationally. Kurze and Flohr’s conclusion was that the United States had run out of choices

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and that an intervention was necessary to rescue US citizens. Their report was naturally read with interest in Washington; as Speakes explained, the report “amplified our thinking. It increased our worries.”50 The British High Commission received a different picture from Montgomery. He reported that between 30 and 40 British citizens and 22 Canadians wanted to leave but that they were not in imminent danger. Montgomery described the situation as “calm, tense, and pretty volatile” but was in “no doubt that members of the revolutionary council would keep their word” and open Pearls on Monday to allow people to leave.51 He also reported his conversation with Scoon to Bullard. Bullard had received an oral request from the OECS on Saturday, October 22. In response London had diverted the West Indian guardship HMS Antrim toward Grenada in case an evacuation of British nationals prove necessary.52 As London waited to hear the outcome of the CARICOM meeting, British officials’ inquiries in Washington yielded little more than the promises that Washington was proceeding “very cautiously” and that Britain would be “consulted immediately if the United States decided to take any action” or “before further steps are taken.”53 National Security Planning Group Meeting Two In Washington a busy day continued as the final decision to intervene loomed. After the morning NSPG meeting Vessey requested a further meeting with Reagan; also present were McFarlane, Weinberger, Shultz, and McMahon. Vessey briefed the group about the stage of military planning, the intention to use the Special Forces, and the possible dangers. At 11:00 a.m. the Commanderin-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) submitted the plan for Urgent Fury, the assigned code name, to the JCS, and after some minor alterations received approval.54 At the State Department decision makers were increasingly worried that Defense’s cautiousness would undermine the central rationale for intervention; the unstable conditions in Grenada and the concomitant threat to US citizens. Another day or two and the situation there might de-escalate, making any action harder to justify politically at home and abroad. At 2:45 p.m. Shultz reviewed the military aspects of an intervention with Howe who told him that timing is important . . . and we are losing time. Some reconnaissance flights have been out. There are some advance CIA elements under way. But the Pentagon officers are still saying that if we invade, we have to do it right. They are reflecting Cap Weinberger’s mood.55

Shultz felt that Weinberger’s request for more time and information was “the counsel of no action at all.”56 At 4:00 p.m. the NSPG reconvened to discuss Lebanon and Grenada. Discussion centered on the political risks of the operation and the possibility of hostage taking. Reagan was not deterred by the possibility of failure in Grenada

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being amplified by the Beirut bombing; he felt an obligation to the US citizens in Grenada and to the OECS that had requested help.57 Even with only the slightest chance of a hostage situation the Iran analogy was invoked as Reagan reputedly bemoaned that “I’m no better off than Jimmy Carter.”58 Not wishing to continue the parallel Reagan asked whether an intervention could precipitate hostage taking.59 The State Department representatives told him that if the operation was done soon and done quickly the chances of this would be low and advised that “it was risky to abort the operation . . . news of it might leak out and. . . [the] Americans would be seized before the Marines could land.”60 Irrespective of the political risk of an intervention so soon after Beirut and the nightmare of a potential hostage crisis, Reagan remained resolute. As Meese recalled, “The negatives arrayed against decisive action in Grenada were almost too numerous to count. Not only did the operation proceed in the very wake of the disaster in Beirut, it flew in the teeth of fashionable opinion about the uses of American military power.”61 It appears that the only thing that would have deterred Reagan was the “flat military infeasibility of it and nobody implied that.”62 The military still urged caution; Vessey was apparently “personally ready to go” but the rest of the JCS were more hesitant, concerned about a last-minute about turn, undertaking an operation without securing public support and conducting another “little” intervention with political constraints.63 The Vietnam experience loomed large for the military. Weinberger told Reagan that he favored a delay and reconsideration of the situation. Weinberger was understandably concerned about the safety of the troops and anxious that Reagan understood the risks, the lack of intelligence, and the need for a larger force.64 The JCS echoed this and “wanted to go in with enough force absolutely to get the job done . . . to minimize casualties, both on our side and theirs” but to also “intimidate the Cubans.”65 The degree of Cuban resistance the US troops would face remained an unknown quantity. State Department officials feared that the opportunity for positive action was slipping away. Motley asked Defense officials if they could guarantee to the president that the situation on Grenada would not deteriorate and hostages be taken.66 Naturally they could not guarantee this and Motley had made his point. Perhaps in response to this Vessey asked Reagan if a definite decision had been made: “Not yet” was the reply.67 Ironically amidst all the talk of a possible hostage crisis there was still some doubt as to whether the students on Grenada actually wanted to be evacuated: “the worst nightmare of the administration had been that we would launch a full-scale assault of Grenada to rescue the students, only to find ourselves forcibly tearing them out of their quarters and off the beaches to ‘liberate’ them.”68 At this point McMahon distributed the latest report from Linda Flohr on Grenada confirming that, contrary to what SGU had been saying, the students were scared and wanted to be evacuated and that the RMC were not going to allow this, interpreting it as the prelude to an intervention. Flohr’s report led Weinberger to request that the meeting be reduced to principals only. The military maintained their position; General Vessey went as far as to caution the president that an intervention might adversely affect his reelection chances. Reagan remained undeterred: “General

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Vessey, my reelection and national security issues are very divisible. We go.”69 Reagan’s use of the Iran hostage crisis analogy to define the situation and the risks involved overshadowed other considerations. When the meeting ended Reagan made what Shultz described as a “tentative” decision to accede to the OECS’s request and conduct Urgent Fury as planned. This was essentially a “confirmation of the decision that had been 75% made on Saturday” at the Special Situations Group (SSG) meeting.70 After the meeting Reagan gave McFarlane the oral “go” order. Later that evening McFarlane delivered the “smooth copy” of the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) to Reagan to sign “go.” Once again this decision was not irreversible; as Speakes subsequently claimed: “If at any time up until 5:00 a.m. on Tuesday morning . . . we had been in any way certain that we could have accomplished this short of a military situation, we would have done so.”71 This scenario was highly improbable but not impossible. The McNeil Mission Special Emissary McNeil’s party had arrived in Barbados just before 5:00 p.m. local time for their 6:30 p.m. meeting with the Caribbean leaders. Bish, Flower, and Gillespie were also in attendance for the meeting with Adams, Charles, Seaga, and Foreign Ministers Louis Tull and his Jamaican counterpart Neville Gallimore amongst others. The OECS had still not received a definite answer from the United States and had grown agitated. Adams had cabled Washington the previous day to report that the OECS “felt they must do something about it on their own if the U.S. was not going to participate.”72 Charles was similarly concerned by Washington’s procrastination: “All the way going I was thinking, ‘we must hurry the Americans up, if they’re going to come with us, we must hurry them up’.”73 The Caribbean leaders knew that they had to convince McNeil of the need for action. McNeil came to verify from an independent and external viewpoint the OECS request and to ensure that the US embassy had not “gone native” in recommending that Washington support the request and to that end he came “appropriately skeptical.”74 As the crisis in Grenada unfolded it was clear that the embassy in Bridgetown would play an important role. However, the State Department noticeably lacked complete confidence in Ambassador Bish. Bish was a Nebraskan businessman; he was a staunch Reaganite and heavy contributor to the 1976 and 1980 campaign coffers. The reward was an ambassadorship in the quiet diplomatic backwater of Barbados in late summer 1981. At the State Department there was a certain skepticism about Bish’s abilities. For his part Bish believed he was there to serve the president above all. As a political appointee he was not concerned about his future career in government and was therefore very candid.75 In his memoirs Shultz is particularly harsh on Bish: We found that Bish had recently prohibited embassy political and U.S. Information Agency officers from even visiting Grenada to do the normal contact and reporting work. His rationale . . . seemed to be: these are communists; therefore, they are evil

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and not trustworthy; therefore we shouldn’t talk to them . . . The upshot was that we had neither current information nor good contacts with whom to talk.76

The ambassador was never accredited to Grenada although other embassy officers were; the embassy maintained chiefly consular-level links. Bish did view the PRG as communists and was not sanguine about embassy foreign service officers’ suggestions that consular and reportage trips to Grenada be increased, but he never banned them as Shultz claims.77 As we have seen, Bish intervened in the OECS proceedings to phone Antigua’s Vere Bird to persuade him to withdraw Lester Bird’s opposition to an intervention. Washington felt that Bish was “out of his depth” and possibly “exceeding his instructions”; there was concern in some quarters that Bish was “too readily committing us [Washington] to a course we might not be able to pursue or defend.”78 Indeed, by Thursday, October 20, the very next day after Bishop’s death, Bish had cabled Washington to express his “strong conviction that if we must, and we may have to, we should: (1) evacuate American citizens, by force if necessary and (2) depose the thugs who have taken over, and (3) restore Grenada as a free society.”79 As one participant recalled, Bish was ready to act without all the facts, essentially an “intervention on principle.”80 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Gillespie’s presence in the Caribbean that October was coincidental and a bonus for his boss, Tony Motley, who wanted someone more professional at the embassy to provide a situation report. As Clarridge recalls, for Bish “things didn’t go fast enough. Not wise in the ways of bureaucracy, Bish would ‘back-channel’ messages (use CIA rather than embassy communications) to me for the White House. This, of course, didn’t endear him to Tony Motley.”81 Gillespie was “Motley’s man” and it has been suggested that once in Barbados he “ran the show.” Bish had no problems with Gillespie’s presence and was glad of the help as the embassy lacked the manpower. Gillespie offered his advice and opinion and handled most of the latenight meetings, along with Flower, due to Bish’s poor health, but ensured that the ambassador was kept informed of developments.82 He was not sent to replace Bish though. In a similar move, Ambassador Frank McNeil was dispatched as someone who was “not expected to salivate at the notion of sending in troops,”83 to “check Bish out,” and confirm the embassy’s reports that the OECS was champing at the bit. Bish felt that McNeil’s presence was “an attempt by career foreign service diplomats to counter his appraisal.”84 Bish’s handling of relations with St. George’s University (SGU) has come under scrutiny. Beck states that on Wednesday, October 19, on his own initiative Bish phoned SGU’s chancellor in New York Charles Modica to persuade him to fly to Barbados and publicly request intervention.85 Bish did not recall doing this and other embassy officials were extremely skeptical that it occurred. Motley had assigned Grenada Task Force member Richard Brown to handle Modica and a call for intervention that early would only have served to panic the students. According to McNeil, Bish dealt with SGU rather badly, tending to get into shouting matches with officials instead of explaining that the United States would have to make its own assessments of the situation.86

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In retrospect, Bish’s performance during the crisis was perfectly adequate; his reports to Washington may have been enthusiastic in tone but they did not distort the strength of feeling amongst the Eastern Caribbean countries. McNeil’s visit validated Bish’s reportage; he spoke to the same people and came to the same conclusions: the Eastern Caribbean nations were united in their support for US action and were ready, with the United States, to share the inevitable “knee-jerk” type criticism that an intervention would draw from various quarters.87 Meeting the Caribbean Leaders McNeil began his meeting by emphasizing that the Caribbean request was under “active consideration” in Washington but no final decision had been made. The initiative for military action had to originate with the Caribbean leaders and they would have to take the lead. McNeil stressed that whilst Eastern Caribbean concerns about the threat to regional security were understandable, the United States’ main concern was the safety of its citizens. Adams picked up on this and asked whether “the restoration of Grenada to a constitutional government could be a legitimate U.S. goal.”88 McNeil replied that “we [the U.S.] might be supportive of such a policy objective but only if set by local initiative and fully supported at the local and regional level.”89 Embassy officials had met with an RMC official over the past two days and Adams wanted to know what would happen if the RMC offered safe passage for US citizens; would Washington’s inclination to help wane?90 As an emissary, McNeil had no authority to speculate and simply restated that Washington’s paramount worry was the citizens, but reassured Adams that they were also concerned about Grenada and the restoration of the rule of law, although the Eastern Caribbean leaders would have to lead the way on this. McNeil later recalled that judging from the signals the RMC’s actions emitted no such decision was necessary.91 McNeil told the leaders that if there was to be US involvement, an appropriate and official method for the OECS to request assistance, a written invite, would be essential. Adams revealed that they had been grappling with the problem all afternoon. He was happy to “go along with whatever language and content met the needs of the OECS and would be favorably received by the United States.”92 McNeil had brought a Washington-written draft invite but felt it was badly worded and its use would cast doubt over the origins of the invite. He would not have mentioned the draft but discovered that Gillespie had already apprised the Caribbean leaders of it and so they asked to see it. McNeil let them peruse the draft but told them they could produce a better version. Prime Minister Seaga commented that McNeil’s draft seemed to focus on the “vacuum of authority” in Grenada as a justification for action. Seaga argued that the world leftist movement would quickly condemn an intervention and therefore it was necessary to rely on the best argument for intervention: foreign interference. In Seaga’s mind the overthrow of Bishop was accomplished by forces hostile to the values of the Caribbean and coming from outside the region . . . the Russians and Cubans took

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over Grenada in order to now have complete control over the island as a platform to project their power into the Caribbean.93

What he wanted was “a tough, believable justification like foreign intervention to make his case at home.”94 He reiterated his position strongly several times throughout the meeting. The other leaders did not doubt Soviet and Cuban involvement but as Adams pointed out, at this stage their precise role was ambiguous and there was a lack of hard evidence.95 Possibly to appease Seaga, McNeil acknowledged that “it could be said that foreign interference on Grenada provided the ambiance even if not the spark for the violence and collapse of authority.”96 Adams explained to the Americans that Article 8 of the OECS Charter provided for “the possibility of a preemptive strike by member countries in the interest of their collective security”97 and would therefore legitimize any action. He proposed that human rights violations on Grenada should be stressed and that the OECS’s letter should quote from the charter as much as possible as its validity relied heavily on it.98 The Americans accepted this as a reasonable approach to the situation. Adams deputized his foreign minister Louis Tull to chair a drafting committee on the spot to prepare another draft. They returned about 40 minutes later with the new document, and after a few minor amendments it was approved by the Caribbean leaders. Another topic of discussion was Montgomery’s meeting with GovernorGeneral Scoon that afternoon. According to McNeil the fact of Montgomery’s visit was known but not the substance or result of the meeting.99 As Adams later argued, “Scoon was the only one who, in addition to any treaty rights which might and did exist, could issue a formal invitation to foreign countries.”100 At some time that Sunday, McNeil received a cable instructing him to “ask OECS military representatives if it would be possible to communicate with GovernorGeneral Scoon in advance of military operations to elicit a request for military assistance from Scoon.”101 Washington believed it might make things easier if Scoon characterized the situation as an emergency and his request as a cry for help.102 There was a feeling that Scoon’s request would be important at some stage but Washington was not going to hold its breath waiting for it. The Caribbean leaders probably reasoned that if Washington had an invitation from a head of state it might make their final decision easier and quicker. Addressing the likely reaction to an intervention, McNeil posed several questions: Was resistance to the hardline faction growing on the island? Was a civil war on Grenada likely? In the event of such a conflict, what was the probability that the communist forces would prevail? How would the Soviets and Cubans react in the event of a civil war?103

The leaders replied that a bloody civil war appeared likely and that the Soviets and Cubans would become involved: this contradicts what Adams had told Ambassador Bish on October 20. They also revealed that Coard’s car had been seen daily at PRA headquarters and that in due process he would probably reappear as

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a communist puppet leader.104 Eventually, the leaders argued, democracy in the entire region would be undermined. The reaction of Grenadians to an intervention would be crucial. Seaga and Adams both asserted that anti-Cuban sentiment on the island was growing, as was pro-US sentiment, and that an intervention would be welcomed. 105 The Caribbean leaders raised the question of what McNeil termed the “endgame.” They feared the United States would secure its students and then leave, rather than staying to improve conditions in Grenada. Post-intervention elections would be an opportunity to provide a firm base for democracy. There was some difference of opinion over the timetable for elections; Seaga did not favor early elections because he felt there were too many problems on Grenada and that “to do it [elections] right would take time. Not to do it right would risk a return of the Russians and Cubans.”106 Adams acknowledged Seaga’s point but suggested that “an early election would be desirable because while the U.S. intervention on Grenada would be very popular he didn’t want to see the purity of the motive come to be questioned in a long and drawn-out interim government and election process.”107 A timetable of six months was eventually agreed upon. The leaders also emphasized that Eric Gairy must not be permitted to have any political role in elections.108 Repeating that Washington had not made a final decision yet, McNeil told the leaders that he thought that Washington would be “willing to provide technical assistance in this area to assure an early and fair election” and that “it would be very important for there to be good effective international supervision of the election in order that its fairness could not be later questioned.”109 McNeil raised the subject of an interim government should intervention occur and if the governor-general would be a suitable figure to head it. Adams indicated that if it came to intervention Scoon would be the sole remaining legitimate authority and a “good prospect” to form an interim government, one that had a strong anti-Gairy and anti-Bishop bias.110 A final topic of discussion was what to do with the Cubans, Soviets, Libyans, and other Eastern bloc officials on Grenada and also the RMC and New Jewel Movement (NJM) members. Adams asked McNeil if Washington had any thoughts about the Cubans on Grenada and if they should be allowed to complete the airport project. McNeil had discussed this subject in Washington before he left but had not received exact instructions beyond a general “get them out of there” brief.111 He thus recommended that all the Soviets, Cubans, Libyans, and Eastern Bloc nationals should be invited to leave on the first available transports. Charles was characteristically adamant on the subject: “The Russians, Cubans, Libyans—out!”112 It was decided that the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) would be disarmed and disbanded although the police force, which were less politicized, would be retrained. In the case of the RMC itself, McNeil proposed two options: trial and punishment or exile. Once again Seaga took the hardest line by suggesting that show trials would be useful for public education, but it appears the majority favored the traditional form of justice: arrest, trial, and conviction according to the law.113 The meeting then concluded with McNeil yet

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again underlining that no final decision had been made114 but that he would indicate to Washington the need for a quick decision either way. Judging by the comprehensive nature of the discussions, the Caribbean leaders knew this meeting was crucial in securing US assistance. As one participant recalled, the leaders “wanted it [an intervention] badly.”115 Washington’s concern was that the Caribbean countries would not stand up to be counted in the aftermath of intervention when they had time to reflect upon everything in the cold light of day.116 But McNeil realized only ten minutes into the meeting that these concerns were unfounded; everybody was deadly serious and “no one expressed second thoughts.”117 At 11:00 p.m. Major General Crist met with Caribbean military officials at the Barbadian Defense Force headquarters to be briefed on the military situation and discuss contingency plans. He reminded the officials that US participation should not be presumed. Crist was told, “We are very small countries. We do not have military forces. We are basically police and there they are with weapons, troops. They have murdered their leaders. What can you do? Can you help us?”118 Part of Crist’s mission was to convey that the Eastern Caribbean ought to be willing to contribute forces as a sign of seriousness and to “ensure that in the event of an invasion, Caribbean troops would quickly be introduced to the island, thus facilitating an early U.S. withdrawal.”119 Back in Washington prior to his trip, Crist had reflected the JCS’s position that all this was “a lot of effort for something that probably won’t happen” because the RMC would “bottle out.”120 Once in Barbados, Crist found it was a “different world” and he was highly impressed by the Caribbean leaders. He finally returned to the embassy around 1:00 a.m. Washington had stressed the political and diplomatic importance of the Caribbean allies and recommended that Caribbean military forces, a Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF), should be integrated into the US command structure and be included in the initial landings. General Vessey insisted that the CPF play a “visible but comparatively safe role.”121 However, the plan from US CINCLANT excluded any CPF role; Crist had to persuade them at the last minute to include a role for the CPF in relieving US troops once they had secured a number of key locations.122 There remained little guidance on how exactly to integrate the CPF though. Sometime on Sunday evening on Grenada, Budeit and Chafin met with the students to discover how many wanted to leave. When Kurze and Flohr had arrived on the Saturday they had reported that about 15 percent of the students wanted to leave. Kurze and Flohr had not encouraged the students to leave and reassured them that their best course of action would be to stay put for the moment. When Budeit and Chafin met the students they painted a grim picture of imminent danger; Chafin believed it was important to emphasize that if a peaceful evacuation was arranged the students should not reject the opportunity lightly and with the possibility of military action things could become very dangerous.123 Bourne observed that “as the students asked questions . . . the U.S. diplomats made it clear they felt the wise course was to get off the island.”124 Critics have suggested that Budeit and Chafin’s tone appeared “more oriented toward worrying them about their future safety than to ascertain their honest

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views.”125 In fact their advice reflected their own personal feelings; after their eventful arrival they had grown very concerned about their own safety.126 The diplomats may have unsettled the students but they emphasized that the students had to make up their own minds. As one student commented, “They really left it up to us to decide if we were in danger . . . The [school] administration was attempting to quell our fears, but not giving us any real information.”127 Irrespective of the extent to which the diplomats convinced the students they were in danger, there was another cause of the increasing numbers of students who wanted to leave. With the conclusion of the CARICOM meeting people on Grenada heard “rumours from outside radio, mostly Caribbean stations, that the CARICOM countries were going to invade Grenada. That stirred up the students quite a bit. They were scared, and that jumped the number who wanted to leave to over 50 percent by Monday.”128 Upon telexing the US embassy and inquiring about the veracity of these reports, Bourne was given a “no comment” reply. He then contacted Chancellor Modica in New York to see if he could get any information from the Washington end. Modica telexed back that an intervention was unlikely. Bourne did not believe that the Caribbean countries could arrange an intervention so quickly and “pooh-poohed” the idea.129 Nonetheless, the prospect of military action now loomed one step closer to the students, the majority of whom had been uncertain as to what was going on until then. With the question of student safety one of the central rationales for intervention it is interesting to note that SGU officials in Grenada and New York maintained until after Urgent Fury that intervention was unnecessary. SGU had been there since 1976 and enjoyed good relations with the PRG. As Maurice Bishop had explained: Our government . . . is very happy to have the school with us in Grenada. We are very conscious of the benefits which the school has brought to our people and our country over the years, in terms of jobs, in terms of foreign exchange, in terms of direct government revenues . . . [and] in several intangible ways also.130

In his dealings with the RMC, Bourne got the impression that it was struggling and, with Coard reviled by the populace, Austin had been thrust into the limelight “unprepared, unequipped and on his own.”131 It would seem that Austin respected Bourne’s judgment and at one stage simply asked, “Tell me what to do. I need advice.”132 Modica, who relied heavily on Bourne’s reports from Grenada, felt that the negotiations I had set up with the U.S. Embassy and the Grenadian officials were working. They did produce two people to leave (sic) the country on Monday, and I felt that would open up on Tuesday and Wednesday and Thursday, we could probably get most, if not all, the students who wanted to leave off of the island.133

Bourne met with the students twice each day, keeping them informed of the situation and getting their reactions which were “pretty controlled”; he advised them that

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he believed it was “pretty safe” and reminded them that the school had been through one revolution in 1979.134 Modica and Bourne were confident that the economic impact of the school on the island’s economy would guarantee its future, even under hard-line rule.135 By Sunday, October 23, Bourne sensed that events were moving inexorably toward intervention and he tried forlornly to stall this process; his concern was that should an intervention occur students would most likely be killed, which was exactly what an intervention was supposedly meant to prevent.136 That same evening Cornwall sought out Budeit, Chafin, and Flohr to plead for talks to avoid bloodshed; a similar message was sent to Tom Adams.137 Chafin was instructed by the embassy to take the line that Washington was interested in seeking a way out without military intervention to see what type of flexibility Cornwall would offer in response.138 Chafin and Flohr met Cornwall who “looked like death warmed up” as rumors of divisions within the RMC and Austin’s death circulated. Cornwall presented details of a civilian cabinet that would be set up and told the diplomats that he was willing to “entertain suggestions as to the make-up of the cabinet.”139 Some have argued that this was a missed opportunity but the details Cornwall had of the cabinet suggested they would be puppets and merely a cosmetic change.140 The RMC had already spoken to businessmen, Scoon and Bourne about establishing a civilian government and appeared serious although with the hopelessness of their situation becoming evermore apparent it could have been a stalling effort. In an effort to establish who exactly was in command, the diplomats asked if Coard was still alive or dead but Cornwall was noncommittal. The gravity of the situation was communicated to Cornwall and he was advised that the RMC should be flexible. Chafin still felt that if the RMC had been willing to make concessions at that stage an intervention could possibly have been forestalled.141 Chafin and Flohr reminded Cornwall that they were there mainly to discuss the students. The use of the Cunard liner to evacuate them was raised but again Cornwall evaded the issue, joking that he did not want them to drown. Whilst arrangements to evacuate those students who wanted to leave were discussed Austin phoned Bourne, complaining that Chafin and Flohr were insisting on military planes and helicopters to evacuate all the students, rather than the ten percent Bourne had estimated wanted to leave. According to Bourne the general was not pleased: “He [Austin] reacted very strongly to me and as a result of that I actually had grave doubts if they [the students] could have been gotten out.”142 Back at their hotel Chafin and Flohr contacted the embassy to report that it was uncertain who was in charge of the RMC. Cornwall, or the RMC, or both, had proved inflexible during discussions and it appeared that they were determined to remain in power. This report, and subsequent ones, did nothing to deter intervention. At 10:00 p.m. Cornwall visited the diplomats again to tell them that the RMC had decided to retain its links with the Cubans and Soviets and that a diplomatic note would be delivered to them at 2:00 a.m. that will request a clear, definite and immediate response regarding a U.S. commitment not to invade Grenada, will point out that Grenada is a sovereign nation, and will

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restate that recent events are an internal matter. The government will also point out that an invasion will be resisted to the last man.143

At 6:10 p.m. an unusually well informed Radio Free Grenada (RFG) had announced that [m]ember countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, along with Barbados and Jamaica this afternoon took a decision to send military forces to invade Grenada and to call on foreign forces also to invade our country. The decision was opposed by Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas and Belize. However, some islands have already sent armed forces to Barbados as a jumping off point for this invasion of Grenada and units from Jamaica and Antigua are on their way to join them. At this time a warship is only seven and-a-half miles from Grenada, well inside our territorial waters. An invasion of our country is expected tonight.144

The broadcast was by turns bellicose and appeasing as it stated that the RMC was “prepared to fight to the last man and woman to defend our homeland, though it is equally prepared to hold discussions with any of these countries in order to find a peaceful solution.”145 That evening the RMC dispatched a diplomatic note to the US embassy in a desperate effort at self-preservation: it announced that any invasion would be viewed as “a rude violation of Grenada’s sovereignty and of international law” and that “[t]he present situation in Grenada is of an entirely internal and domestic nature and presently peace, calm and good order prevailed.” The embassy was assured that the lives, well-being and property of every American and other foreign citizen residing in Grenada are fully protected and guaranteed by our government. However, any American or foreign citizen in our country who desires to leave Grenada for whatever reasons can fully do so using the normal procedures through our airports on commercial aircraft. As far as we are concerned, these aircraft can be regular flights or chartered flights and we will facilitate them in every way we can.146

The note was ignored;147 events had overtaken any possibility of a peaceful solution to the RMC’s predicament. The RMC also fired off a cable to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, including a copy of the note to the US embassy, requesting Britain to act to prevent an intervention.148 After the lengthy meeting that evening, McNeil called Motley in Washington to report that the Caribbean leaders were firmly behind their request. McNeil, Gillespie, and Flower then reviewed the latest intelligence on Grenada; things were happening very fast and McNeil wanted to wait and assess the situation more thoroughly. Gillespie called an increasingly impatient Motley to tell him that McNeil would call soon. At 11:30 p.m. McNeil spoke to Chafin on Grenada who told him that the island had become an “armed camp” with constant military activity. An atmosphere of fear was prevalent and several hundred students wanted to leave. Chafin reported Cornwall’s dramatic plea for talks and mentioned that during the meeting he was initially interested in providing

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assurances about the students but subsequently backed away and became intransigent.149 McNeil cabled his appraisal to Washington: “the new Grenadan (sic) government seems stupid as well as brutal. But they have put two and two together and come up with something near three and a half. They clearly expect the U.S. and the Caribbeans to come storming across.”150 The RMC’s plea for talks perhaps suggested a “willingness to surrender” but when the subject was raised during McNeil’s meeting with the leaders they “wanted to charge ahead. Don’t want to respond to Grenada’s message. Only Adams even contemplates the notion of giving them an ultimatum.”151 McNeil suggested that if Washington could nail down who was actually in charge within the RMC an ultimatum might be possible. He outlined the case against such a move first: —Tip our hand and permit them to take hostages, kill political enemies or otherwise do things that would raise the potential loss of life. —Plays into the hands of what may simply be a ploy to buy time. —And, even if they are serious, would ultimately fail because they probably couldn’t accept the Adams formula, the only one that would be acceptable to the Caribbeans and, we are sure, to the people of Grenada.152

In favor of the ultimatum was the following fact: —How could we turn down out of hand the possibility, though slim, of achieving our objectives without any bloodshed, which might include Amcits, bringing about public and congressional protest that we had needlessly gotten people hurt in order to exercise our military capabilities.153

McNeil did not believe the RMC would respond to an ultimatum but, following his instructions to be objective, advised Washington not to dismiss it out of hand: It is a close call. I conclude that Washington should—with Ambassador Bish and DAS Gillespie—game plan a contingency scenario for a last minute ultimatum and consult it with Prime Minister Adams . . . so that Caribbeans (not yet the US) could go ahead with ultimatum if we judge that there is some prospect of success.154

At 12:30 a.m. Tom Adams called the embassy; he told Deputy Chief of Mission Flower that he had been in touch with Montgomery at the British High Commission, who informed him that the only reason Scoon had not called for military intervention was fear of his own personal safety and that he was ready to “fully co-operate in an intervention and would do whatever was necessary to form an interim administration afterwards.”155 The message was conveyed to Motley in Washington; he viewed the governor-general’s request with some skepticism but figured it was an “added stimulus” and a “nice legal justification.”156 McNeil reaffirmed the conclusions of his earlier cable: the RMC believed an invasion to be imminent and was not keen to let the students leave, possibly

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planning to use them as bargaining chips, and the situation on the island was deteriorating steadily. Recalling the Iran hostage crisis, he consequently recommended sending in the troops, so long as it was done quickly before surprise was lost. In doing so, I was mindful of Teheran . . . It is far easier to prevent a hostage situation than to deal with it once it was consummated, and I judged the danger to the students was growing.157

Having made his recommendation McNeil was told that the military intervention would proceed as planned. No final decision had been made though and a couple of fail-safe measures remained in place. In the waters off Grenada the USS Guam moved within helicopter-flight distance of Antigua. Instead of the State Department officials who had been expected, two liaison officers from CINCLANT were flown aboard with additional intelligence and a draft operation order for the assault on Grenada.158 At this point D-day was set for Tuesday, October 25, at 2:00 a.m. Preparing Operation Urgent Fury As head of Joint Task Force (JTF) 120 Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf wanted it understood that he would coordinate forces and tell commanders “what” to do rather than “how” to do it and to ensure he got this point across, and to meet his commanders “eyeball to eyeball,” he arranged for a meeting of the available commanders at Norfolk on Monday, October 24, at 7:00 a.m.159 The meeting was a preparatory one; in a frank and candid session participants discussed their problems and clarified their responsibilities.160 Admiral Wesley McDonald from CINCLANT began by stating, “Before we get into the operational plan, everyone should bear in mind the strong possibility that we won’t have to carry it out. The crisis is still being handled through diplomatic channels, and we are told it is very likely that the rebels will back down.”161 The discussion started with a review of the coup de main operation. The optimistic briefers assured the commanders that the opposition would melt away: “intelligence had portrayed the PRA as poorly armed and with such low morale that it was not expected to resist, and had portrayed the Cubans as not likely to fight. The intelligence depicted anti-aircraft defenses as three or four guns with poorly trained crews.”162 The commanders expressed a number of concerns, which resulted in a request for a 24-hour delay to gather more intelligence. McDonald was amazed: “I can’t believe what I’m hearing around this table. All you’re going to face is a bunch of Grenadians. They’re going to fall apart the minute they see our combat power. Why are we making such a big deal of this?”163 As the State Department representative, Craig Johnstone began to feel that nothing would get done at this rate. Whilst some military officials did have genuine fears about the potential opposition they would face, he felt that others would do anything to find a reason to halt, or delay, an operation.164 Feeling that the military might conclude that it was impossible to act by Tuesday, October 25,

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Johnstone, supported by navy Commodore Jack Darby, who courageously argued against CINCLANT and the JCS, countered that the size of Grenada alone made it ridiculous to say that the operation could not be done militarily.165 Johnstone “pounded the table and said, ‘Admiral, you just don’t understand this, do you? The President is about to issue an order. If you’re not prepared to comply with that order, you’re probably going to be out of the Navy.’”166 He also told the group that Washington would oppose any delay because “the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, which asked us to intervene, is a shaky coalition at best. There’s no telling how long it’s going to support this thing.”167 This statement was tailored for the audience; Johnstone and Darby had been specifically sent to ensure the military did not falter. The OECS was the strongest advocate of intervention and was anxious that the United States should help. After hearing Johnstone and Darby out, McDonald was convinced that Urgent Fury should proceed as planned although H hour was delayed by three hours until 5:00 a.m. With this confirmed, Johnstone outlined the political parameters of the operation: the removal of the RMC and the securing of the students and Governor-General Scoon. The students were the crucial factor. Failure to secure them or indeed the governor-general would make the operation a political failure.168 Other critical components were the rescue of political prisoners, who were thought to be at risk, and the use of the minimal level of force necessary.169 In Washington, at a morning Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) meeting, the situation in Grenada had not appeared to worsen and no hostages had been taken. Nonetheless, Weinberger argued in favor of an ultimatum rather than an intervention.170 At noon Weinberger, having found no support for an ultimatum, met with Vessey at the Pentagon. Vessey was told: “Be sure we have enough strength.” Weinberger authorized the use of the 82nd Airborne as backup if required.171 From 2:15 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Reagan met with Weinberger and the JCS for a final technical planning meeting. News of the loss of one SEAL team had reached the White House and, according to McFarlane, “concern about the mission began to grow; we faced the possibility that our lack of knowledge about the beach and the level of resistance we might face could end up aborting the operation.”172 Despite this, when Reagan polled each member of the JCS they all assured him that the operation could be done, casualties were expected to be low, and that they were ready to go. After the experience of Vietnam, and especially the failed Iran hostage rescue mission, the JCS also stressed that once the operation commenced it was important that the White House left the military to do their job.173 The JCS appeared more concerned about the political problems of an intervention. Vessey told Reagan that “there is a potential public opinion downside to this because of what happened to the marines.”174 Reagan had considered the political costs of action in the previous few days and had not been dissuaded;175 he knew the cost of unpopular action but had made definitive action decisions since his days as a governor in California.176 The president simply asked the JCS, “Is there any military reason for not going ahead with the operation?”177 The JCS replied, “No.” The meeting concluded at 3:30 p.m. and

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a “semi-final military decision” to intervene had been made.178 Weinberger concluded that “by this time it was clear to me from his [Reagan] comments and questions that the President had decided to move into Grenada unless something was done by Grenada to free the American students from danger.”179 The final “go” decision would be considered later that day. Countdown in the Caribbean That morning in Barbados, McNeil and Gillespie met with Adams and Seaga, at the latter’s request, for an hour before Seaga departed for Jamaica. Washington had not given the Caribbean leaders a final answer yet; Adams expressed the leaders’ satisfaction with the talks. He also played the Scoon card again, assuring the Americans that Scoon was prepared to cooperate and would issue a formal request for assistance from the OECS to establish a secure peace once he had been rescued.180 The two leaders suggested that “no provisional government can or should be established immediately” and that the OECS Defence Committee would work with the governor-general and forces commander to direct activities on Grenada for one week.181 Yet again McNeil could only reiterate that no final decision had been made but did deviate slightly from his instructions by revealing that he had “urged Washington to act immediately if it were to act at all.”182 McNeil and Gillespie saw Seaga off and returned to the embassy. McNeil reported back to Motley in Washington and was told to collect Eugenia Charles from Guadeloupe.183 Charles had returned to Dominica, via Antigua, after the McNeil meeting unsure if the United States would participate; she decided to travel to Washington to make a final effort to elicit help. Her message was that “it doesn’t take much—just a cell of twenty or so determined men, and they wouldn’t have any trouble finding recruits, to overthrow a state like Dominica” and that the PRA “has access to an airstrip more than 9,000 feet long . . . [and] clearly for military use. A thousand armed Cuban advisers are there to help them. That’s what it’s all about: to point a dagger at the Eastern Caribbean states.”184 When McNeil left Barbados around 5:00 p.m. with the OECS’s official request for assistance under Article 8, he had been told that unless he heard otherwise by 4:30 p.m., to inform Charles that Washington had acceded to the request at 6:00 p.m. Washington time. By Monday, October 24, the RMC’s situation looked grimmer than ever: US warships were massing on the horizon for an expected intervention, the OECS and CARICOM had imposed sanctions; domestically and internationally the RMC was a pariah; Cuba had made it clear that it would not get involved in Grenada’s internal political problems; fuel and money were running low. A desperate request to Moscow for EC$5 million was declined.185 The US embassy received the official results of the student survey that day, confirming earlier reports that about half wanted out. The US diplomats also reported that they felt the RMC had “changed their tone,” asking for six hours’ notice of evacuation flight schedules.186 More ominously the embassy learnt that antiaircraft guns had been positioned near the SGU campus and the Ross Point

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Inn.187 The RMC had promised on Saturday, October 22, that Pearls would be opened on Monday for people who wanted to leave. As far as Washington was concerned there had been “lots of promises about the airport being open but very little action.”188 At a press briefing Speakes asserted that “[n]o one has been leaving the island on regularly scheduled or chartered air flights . . . The situation remains unstable. Trouble and considerable uncertainty remain.”189 As Clarridge suggests though, “In hindsight, having the MAU prowling around was perhaps not the best idea, because it caused the Grenadians to refuse to negotiate the evacuation of the students.”190 During Congressional hearings, Congressman Stephen Solarz pressed Dam on whether the United States had renewed its request for the students to be allowed to leave once it learnt about the planes that had left. Dam replied that “I am not clear as to what extent we were aware. We were certainly aware planes were not getting in. To what extent we were aware the small planes had been able to get out. I do not know.”191 The embassy had initially been unable to confirm if LIAT would be able to operate flights if the curfew was raised on Monday, October 24. They were eventually assured that LIAT would have five flights available; the embassy simultaneously explored the possibility of chartering planes if LIAT was unable to carry all those who wanted to leave.192 The RMC had undeniably complicated and obstructed a straightforward evacuation, stalling for time, but it appears that air flights were hindered by the OECS countries as well. At the OECS meeting on Friday, October 21, it was decided to suspend air and sea links with Grenada. On Saturday, October 22, the Canadian high commissioner Noble Power had chartered a plane from LIAT having been assured by the RMC that Pearls would be open on Monday. On Sunday, October 23, the Canadian flight was blocked by Adams. LIAT was apprised of the OECS decision to suspend all air and sea links and that it was “not allowed to make flights even for humanitarian reasons.”193 On Monday, October 24, minutes before the Canadian flight was due to leave for Grenada at 11:00 a.m., Barbados again blocked the flight. It was rescheduled for 2:30 p.m. only to be vetoed by the heads of Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts.194 After Charles’s mediation the situation was resolved and the flight given the go-ahead but it was too late to find a crew and too dark for planes to land in Grenada.195 There was no question of a large-scale evacuation but the planes that did leave encountered no problems as a former US government official recalled: “There were no police, no military; we got to the airport, everything was calm. There were about one hundred people trying to get out on the few charter planes, but there was no rioting.”196 By this time intervention was a virtual certainty and the departure of a few planeloads of people, even if it contradicted Washington’s argument that the airport was closed and no one could leave, was not about to disrupt this. In addition to the four charter planes that flew in that day, a Cuban plane carrying Colonel Pedro Tortolo Comas, Carlos Andres Diaz Larranga, and a 12man flight and security team arrived at 11:50 a.m.197 Tortolo had been sent to take charge of the Cuban contingent and ensure that the RMC knew that the Cubans would only defend their positions, would not undertake other missions,

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and advised the RMC that the area around SGU should be demilitarized.198 In Washington, Tortolo’s arrival199 made Motley nervous; he knew of Tortolo’s background and felt Cuba had “upped the ante,” perhaps increasing the danger to the students .200 At least one of the US diplomats on Grenada, Flohr, now knew that an intervention would occur the next morning.201 The plan was for her to be at the governor-general’s residence when the US SEALs arrived to evacuate the governorgeneral. However, with Government House situated close to the Coard residence it meant that there were several APCs and antiaircraft gun emplacements nearby that made a safe helicopter landing impossible.202 Flohr did visit the governorgeneral before leaving for the relative safety of British representative Kelly’s house where she reported the situation to the embassy in Barbados. Discussion about evacuation had ceased. When Budeit met Cornwall at the Foreign Ministry at 4:00 p.m. he told him off-handedly that the United States had no evacuation proposal for the RMC because it had taken a long time to relay it to President Reagan. Cornwall was now “rather pressing” and more interested in getting an assurance that the United States would not intervene rather than guaranteeing the welfare of American citizens.203 In fact, Navy SEALs had already carried out reconnaissance missions and Urgent Fury was scheduled for just before dawn the following day. Although lectures had resumed at SGU, about half of the students now wanted to leave. At a turbulent meeting with Bourne they were ready to blame the SGU administration for the entire situation.204 Bourne still felt the students were not in danger and telexed his son, Peter, in Washington to report that “we are all still well and safe. News distorted and exaggerated.”205 With rumors of intervention rife and US warships on the horizon the RMC knew intervention was only a matter of time. Around 1:00 p.m. Bourne received a call from a somber Austin saying, “I want to thank you for all you have done and I am not going to forget it.” Bourne concluded that If General Austin knew an invasion was coming when he spoke to me, then I assume[d] that he meant by his statement that his revolutionary army would not harm the students or attempt to take them hostage. I believe this may have been the correct interpretation of what he said.206

In Washington the decision making had been done and attention focused on the handling of Congress, allies, and the media. On Monday afternoon, around 4:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., a final NSPG207 meeting was held where a final confirmatory decision was taken. Shultz, accompanied by Motley, presented a comprehensive ten-point checklist of “plans and actions” including a signed, formal request from the OECS; a carefully prepared legal justification; press statements; a guarantee from the JCS and CINCLANT that the CPF would “land at a respectable time, not after everything was over”; a plan for immediate transition to civilian power; the establishment of an embassy on Grenada; and the dispatch of Larry Rossin, to join the SEALs rescuing Scoon, to brief him on the situation

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because “[h]is first public statements would be critical.”208 At 6:00 p.m. Reagan made an immutable decision. Motley recalls that everyone gave their appropriate briefings, there were some questions raised by some of the members, exploratory, not aggressive type of questions. To the point. The president asked, made a couple of questions himself . . . then asked if there were any other questions, any other comments and there ensued a silence that probably lasted thirty seconds . . . And after this silence, he said, “O.K., let’s go.”209

London had been promised by Washington that it would be kept informed. At 10:00 a.m. (GMT) on Monday, October 24, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher chaired a cabinet meeting that reviewed reports of the OECS and CARICOM meetings, Montgomery’s meeting with Scoon, and news from Washington. No formal request for assistance from the OECS had yet been received, British nationals did not appear to be in danger, Scoon had not called for military intervention, and Washington was remaining tight-lipped. That afternoon in the House of Commons, Howe said that “we are keeping in the closest possible touch with the United States Government and the Caribbean Governments . . . I have no reason to think that American military intervention is likely.”210 When he was asked, “Can the Foreign Secretary assure us that there is no question of American military intervention on the island?” he could only reply, “I know of no such intention.”211 As far as London was concerned, “it was plain that no effective military action could take place without American participation.”212 Hence more weight was given to the messages being received from Washington than the Caribbean and when attention did turn to the Caribbean it was the nonmilitary CARICOM solution that London favored. At 12:00 p.m. in Washington the British ambassador, Oliver Wright, communicated British reservations about the possibility of an intervention to Jonathan Howe. Howe contacted Eagleburger who phoned Wright to explain that Downing Street would be contacted. After failing to reach Thatcher by phone, Reagan sent a letter to Downing Street at 1:47 p.m. It cited Bishop’s elimination, the violence, and danger to US citizens as causes for Washington’s concern and advised London that the United States had received a request from the OECS and that it was understood that London had received such a request. The letter referred to emissary McNeil’s meeting and that McNeil had told Tom Adams that the United States “firmly endorses the political objectives of their proposed operation . . . to restore order and security so as to permit the formation of a provisional government which would hold early elections.”213 Reagan concluded by stating that he was “giving serious consideration” to the OECS’s request and that he would welcome Mrs. Thatcher’s “thoughts . . . advice and support on this important issue.”214 Thatcher was just leaving for a farewell function for the US ambassador J. J. Louis when she was informed of Reagan’s letter. She gave instructions for a reply to be drafted reiterating the British position on intervention. During dinner

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she received a phone call to return to Downing Street. Arriving back at around midnight (GMT), she was informed that a second letter from Reagan had been received at 10:00 p.m.; the president had decided to respond positively to the OECS request and that US forces “will establish themselves in Grenada. The collective Caribbean security force will disembark on Grenada shortly thereafter . . . We will inform you of further developments as they occur.”215 She met with Howe, Secretary of State for Defence Michael Heseltine, and the military to prepare a reply to Reagan’s letters. The reply was sent at 12:30 a.m. and made four points: First, the only credible justification for intervention would be the need to protect the safety of US and British citizens. Their lives were far more likely to be endangered by military action than the reverse . . . Secondly, we had particular and express reason to be fearful for the life of the Governor-General in such circumstances. Thirdly, we had received no formal request for help from the OECS, and most members of the CARICOM . . . had declared themselves against the use of force. Fourthly . . . the action would be criticized as an unjustified intervention by a Western country in the internal affairs of a small independent nation.216

Thatcher emphasized her own personal feelings: “I cannot conceal that I am deeply disturbed by your latest communication. You asked for my advice. I set it out and hope that even at this late stage you will take it into account before events are irrevocable.”217 In Washington that stage had already been reached. In accordance with his instructions, McNeil informed Charles of the presidential decision shortly after 6:00 p.m. as their jet left Homestead Air Force Base after refueling.218 In Barbados, Bish informed Adams of the decision at 7:02 p.m. local time: We may face some difficult times in the immediate days ahead but we are confident that we have chosen the right course and that we will prevail. You can count on us to do our part and we know we can look to you and your colleagues to do yours.219

The administration had stressed the need for secrecy and when the media picked up on a possible story on the eve of the intervention the response was emphatic. Around 5:00 p.m. that afternoon at Grantly Adams International Airport, Barbados, Sharon Sakson of ABC and Mark Potter, a correspondent, saw a US jet land and 50 marines transfer to helicopters and fly off toward Grenada. An embassy spokesman offered, “What you are seeing could be used as Part One of the option to effect a departure of the Americans (from Grenada) and to ensure their security.”220 CBS’s Bill Plante approached Speakes with this story. Speakes was instructed by his superiors to “knock it down hard.”221 Plante agreed not to pursue the story and relayed the message to colleagues in Washington and New York.222 As far as Speakes knew he was telling the truth; “I suspected we might send troops into Grenada at some point to rescue the American students, but I had no inkling that that was imminent, nor did I have any idea that we

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might launch a full-scale invasion.”223 Not only were the public misled but sections of the administration too. At 8:00 p.m. the bipartisan leadership of Congress were assembled at the White House to be informed of the intervention by Reagan and his advisers.224 The briefing was restricted to the bipartisan leadership because the administration felt it was “impossible to have any kind of leak-proof contact with Congress. Therefore, it was important to keep this [the Urgent Fury decision] as close hold (sic) as possible until Grenada went down.”225 The president opened the twohour meeting by announcing his decision to assist the OECS and that the troops would land at 5:00 a.m. the following morning. Reagan handed over to McFarlane who provided a background to the crisis: [T]here were six hundred Cubans in Grenada, building an airport, and that Cuba had several hundred armed troops there as well. He added that some of Grenada’s neighbors were afraid the island was being used for training terrorists. But the most pressing reason we were going into Grenada was to protect approximately a thousand Americans, most of whom were medical students.226

Weinberger and Vessey then detailed the military aspects of the operation. Reagan related the OECS’s request and his belief that Washington had “absolutely no alternative but to comply,”227emphasized the need for military action to avert a possible hostage situation, and warned that “failure to act now . . . would mean the prospect of a permanent, Soviet-sponsored Cuban presence on the island.”228 The Congressional leadership’s response was unenthusiastic. Speaker O’Neill thought the intervention was premature and warned Reagan that he was “going to take a lot of heat over this. Americans don’t want their kids put at risk for something that’s none of our business.”229 A number of questions were asked but the Congressional leaders did not raise any strong objections. Eventually, O’Neill told Reagan that “if you are determined [to act] we’ll support you.”230 Having been presented with a fait accompli the Congressional leadership left with the distinct impression that they had been “informed but not consulted.”231 Reagan had listened to their views but was not discouraged. Prime Minister Thatcher decided to call Reagan on the secure telephone link between Downing Street and the White House; the 12:50 a.m. (GMT) call reached Reagan in the middle of the Congressional briefing. In his memoirs Reagan remembers that “[a]s soon as I heard her voice, I knew she was very angry” and that she asked him to call off the operation “in the strongest possible language.”232 Thatcher apparently repeated the points she had made in her reply to Reagan’s earlier letters. McFarlane recalls that Reagan told her: “I cannot sit here with a formal request from a group of friendly governments who are facing a threat that I have declared as the central dimension of threat to stability in the world today and refuse it and you must know that.”233 Reagan heard Thatcher out but told her that “we are already at zero.”234 On this note the conversation

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concluded. Reagan sent a third letter at 6:56 a.m. (GMT) thanking Thatcher for her thoughts but informing her that he had decided to go ahead with the operation: “I well appreciate the dangers inherent in a military operation to assure the safety of these citizens, but, on balance, I see this as the lesser of two risks.”235 He also assured her that there was “special planning” to protect the governor-general.236 Elaborating on his decision Reagan explained: Quite frankly, this [OECS] request has weighed heavily in my consideration on whether to commit US forces. With so clear an expression of the will of the nations of the region I would find it difficult to explain either to them or to others who depend upon us why we had not acted . . . In our view, relying upon economic and political sanctions would provide time for Cuba and the Soviet Union to consolidate the position of the new regime.237

Reagan was surprised and disappointed by Thatcher’s response; he had been hoping for understanding at least.238 Downing Street’s response was an indication of Thatcher’s “personal frustration . . . mixed with her indignation”239 in a situation where her government had actually supported action but then been shut out by Washington at the last stages of decision making. For once the much-vaunted Reagan-Thatcher relationship had not worked. Another important factor was the political embarrassment involved for her government; it had “been made to look impotent; at worst . . . deceitful.”240 Indeed, Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Howe faced a tough time in the Commons in the following days. After the White House meeting Weinberger and the JCS returned to the Pentagon to issue the “execute” order and review the latest information available. One SEAL team was already missing at sea and it was now feared another two SEALs had been lost and still “no real pre-landing intelligence” had been gathered.241 At 11:30 p.m. in the situation room a final NSC meeting was held; present were McFarlane, Poindexter, North, Menges, and Sims. The response of the Congressional leadership was discussed and McFarlane assigned several present to brief a few members of the House and Senate Foreign Relations committees.242 This done, the meeting broke up. Urgent Fury was now in the hands of the military. Operation Urgent Fury Military victory in Grenada was a foregone conclusion; “it offered ideal circumstances for an invasion. Small, isolated, inhabited by a disgruntled population—it was a military planner’s dream.”243 Urgent Fury began at 5:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October 25, when nearly 400 marines mounted a helicopter attack on Pearls airport on the northeast coast. Resistance was minimal and the airport was secured in two hours. At 5:36 a.m. the first of about 350 Army Rangers parachuted into Point Salines airport, coming under fire from PRA gunners in the surrounding hills. The US forces had expected the Cubans barracked at the northern end of the runway to fight; the Cubans resisted for a couple of hours until they ran out of ammunition.244

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By 10:00 a.m. the runway was deemed “safe and secure”; another 750 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne arrived along with the 300-man CPF soldiers who were assigned to guard the 634 Cubans who had been captured. By noon the True Blue campus of SGU situated at the eastern end of the runway was secured. It was only now that the US forces discovered that there was a second campus at Grand Anse on the west coast near St. George’s.245 This was eventually reached at 4:00 p.m. the following day. Other students in the Lanceaux-Epines area on the southwest coast had to wait until Friday, October 28, for relief. On Wednesday, October 26, Governor-General Scoon was rescued and Forts Frederick and Rupert were captured although fighting at Richmond Hill prison and Calivigny Point barracks continued until the following day. It was only on Friday, October 28, by which time some 6,000 US troops had landed, that “virtually all significant military objectives had been secured.”246 Hostilities officially ended on Thursday, November 3. Whilst the outcome was never in doubt, JCS Chairman General Vessey admitted that “we got a lot more resistance than we expected.”247 Operation Urgent Fury encountered several major problems: a number of special forces missions against key targets were unsuccessful or ran into serious difficulties; the characterization of the opposition was overoptimistic; maps and charts were inadequate; interservice rivalry and communication problems hindered progress; reliable human intelligence prior to the operation was minimal and the media was alienated.248 US military interventions always provoke strong reactions and Urgent Fury was no exception. Media coverage was mixed, with the total exclusion of the media from the operation threatening to be as big a story as the intervention itself.249 The initial reaction from Congress, notably the congressional Democrats, was in Secretary of State Shultz’s words, “snide, scathing and condemnatory.”250 Congressman Don Bonker proclaimed that “committing U.S. troops in Grenada is shocking and flies in the face of the President’s condemnation of Soviet interferences in other countries,” and Senator Patrick Moynihan complained that the United States did not have the right to promote democracy “at the point of a bayonet” and that the intervention was “an act of war.”251 The Organization of American States naturally condemned the intervention, but privately expressed their support.252 On November 2, the United Nations General Assembly issued a resolution condemning the intervention as a “violation of international law”; the resolution was approved by 108 to 9 votes, more than had previously condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.253 President Reagan brushed this aside, joking that “it didn’t upset my breakfast at all.”254 Comments on BBC World Service by Washington’s closest ally, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher may have had more of an impact: We in the Western countries, the Western democracies, use our force to defend our way of life. We do not use it to walk into independent sovereign territories . . . If you are pronouncing a new law that wherever Communism reigns against the will of the people, even though it’s happened internally, there the United States shall enter, then we are going to have some really terrible wars in the world.255

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The public reaction to the intervention was quite different. An ABC News poll found that 64 percent of Americans supported the action; this jumped to 86 percent after Reagan’s “Address to the Nation” on October 27.256 There was widespread support in the Caribbean; a CBS News poll found 91 percent of Grenadians supported the intervention.257 The presence of nearly 800 Cubans on Grenada and the discovery of huge weapons caches and documents detailing secret military agreements with the Soviet Union and North Korea helped to quell criticism. With the protection of US citizens being offered as the primary justification for the intervention, the reaction of the SGU students was going to be crucial for the administration. As Larry Speakes, the White House acting spokesman, recalled: The medical students were grateful for the rescue. In fact, they were almost delirious with joy. When that first planeload returned to the air force base at Charleston, South Carolina, on October 26 and the first student off the plane knelt and kissed the ground and they all cheered their country and thanked the U.S. military for rescuing them from a dangerous and chaotic situation, the public relations problem was solved right there. There was no way that all the negative reporting and complaining by the press about being kept off the island could overcome the power of that television picture.258

Media cynicism and skepticism diminished as they gained access to Grenada and got a better understanding of the events of Bloody Wednesday and the impact it had had on Grenadians. A bipartisan Congressional Delegation visited Grenada in November 1983; according to Charles Gillespie (by then the ambassador to Grenada) the Democratic members were “really going to go after President Reagan.”259 However, after touring Grenada and meeting with the Caribbean leaders involved, they realized that their earlier criticism of the intervention was unwarranted and they reported this back to Congress, effectively ending any Congressional pressure on the administration. The Congressional Black Caucus, who had been firm supporters of the PRG, also visited Grenada and came to a similar conclusion. Conclusion The execution of Bishop and his associates at Fort Rupert on Wednesday, October 19, led to a convergence of thinking in Washington and the Eastern Caribbean that would climax in a US-Caribbean military intervention six days later. With Bishop’s death the Caribbean leaders were immediately convinced of the need for a swift military solution. The central concern was that whilst it was Grenada today it could be any one of their countries tomorrow.260 The OECS leaders were all resolute, articulate individuals with strong conservative views and the decision to use force was a reflection of personal preference combined with public pressure for decisive action rather than a diplomatic solution. A triad of sorts shaped the proceedings with Adams as the brains, Compton as the engine, and Charles as the spokesperson.261

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The OECS was under no illusions about the situation as Charles explained: We looked at the options that were available to us to regularize the situation because it was a situation we thought that was extremely dangerous to us, knowing firstly the military might that was in Grenada and, secondly, in whose hands this might was. And therefore we realized that the only thing we had was a military option, and we examined our resources to see what we had available to us. In the Eastern Caribbean we did not have enough.262

The consequence was a request to Washington for assistance; as Adams explained, “aid was sought where aid was most easily available.”263 The leaders were pessimistic about gaining CARICOM support. CARICOM was a much looser organization with different political orientations, different perceptions of the crisis, and different leader personalities.264 When certain CARICOM countries ruled out the use of force almost immediately, it confirmed the OECS’s expectations that the CARICOM involvement would only cause delays. The RMC had shown no remorse and retained the allegiance of most of the PRA; quick and decisive action was necessary to prevent the RMC becoming entrenched. The OECS knew it had little influence in Washington beyond the extent to which its views and objectives coincided with Washington’s. Hence it stressed the serious danger to the political, economic, and social security of the region; the opportunity to remove a Marxist-Leninist regime; and reduce the Soviet and Cuban presence in the area and the threat to US nationals. The OECS leaders talked of military action in terms of “how” rather than “whether” and, to the delight of Washington, were “way out in front” in calling for intervention. In Washington the OECS request was not unexpected and it marked the moment when US decision making escalated: The drastic changes that had occurred in Grenada and the reaction of the neighboring Caribbean governments raised the level of concern and the possibility of involvement of Washington. Rather than thinking in a reactive manner about what should be done to forestall a hostage crisis or to protect U.S. citizens should the situation in Grenada worsen, the United States was instead being asked to consider invasion—invasion as a partner, by invitation.265

The early morning consultations between Washington and Augusta on Saturday, October 22, effectively signaled the stage at which military planning was officially transformed from a Non-Permissive Evacuation Operation to a takeover of Grenada. The degree to which the US citizens on Grenada were in danger is imponderable but memories of Teheran, combined with the lack of intelligence available on the situation, undoubtedly generated genuine concerns for their safety.266 Essentially, the presence of the students gave proceedings a sense of urgency.267 The origins of the RMC and its seemingly unstable nature meant Washington “didn’t trust them . . . so, consequently, any assurances they gave us, in our opinion, weren’t worth two cents.”268 Although the signals Washington got from the RMC

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were not overly aggressive, they were nothing that could be relied on.269 With time passing and students dispersed around the island the RMC began to stall, fearing intervention, and grew intransigent. The US diplomats who visited Grenada assessed the RMC official they met with as “obstructionist and uncooperative.”270 This rekindled Washington’s initial fears and led to a situation where Reagan had to decide which was the greater risk, the risk that we might go in in response to this request in order to safeguard American lives . . . or the risk that we would wait and find that, as in Iran, it was too late, that we had hostages or we had dead Americans.271

In this case Washington erred on the side of caution and decided action was necessary. The presence of the students on Grenada was easily the strongest political and legal justification for action but it would be cynical to suggest that efforts to evacuate them were superficial. As one sympathetic member of the bipartisan Congressional mission to Grenada concluded: [E]very attempt was made to extract the students prior to the intervention, but those attempts were met by a persistently hardening opposition on the part of the revolutionaries. The State Department was prepared to bring in a commercial cruise ship, Pan American aircraft, military aircraft, charter aircraft, civilian boats, and military boats to get the students out, but all of these avenues were rejected by Revolutionary Military Council official Leon Cornwall.272

At the first SSG meeting on Thursday, October 20, there was a consensus that planning for a military operation was necessary; with the diversion of the fleet that night and the receipt of the OECS’s oral request the following day the odds on action shortened. At the SSG meeting on the Saturday, October 22, Reagan made a “seventy-five percent” commitment to act and an NSDD was drawn up. The State Department was the main proponent of military action and a certain amount of opportunism was involved. As Brands states: “Instability provided the opportunity for intervention in that in an unstable and fluid situation the possibility of tipping the balance in a direction favourable to the United States was increased.”273 Washington estimated that there was a very low probability of Soviet or Cuban counteraction and Grenada’s size made prompt military victory inevitable; senior military officials dismissed a protracted conflict as “not a serious military consideration.”274 The State Department was confident that Grenada was a low-risk opportunity that an ideologue such as Reagan would not refuse. However, the window of opportunity would not remain open for long: The chance would exist for a few days, a week at most, before events and world opinion made intervention impossible . . . The opportunity for inflicting military defeat on a rigid Marxist dictatorship, establishing democratic government, and getting away with it virtually unscathed was unlikely to be repeated.275

The Defense Department was concerned about lack of planning time and shortage of good intelligence. When Washington received news of the Beirut

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bombing it was the JCS who raised the potential political costs of action in Grenada so soon afterwards. Over at the State Department they knew that any significant delay would make an operation politically untenable. Craig Johnstone’s trip to CINCLANT on the day before the intervention was the most obvious manifestation of their concern. During the preceding days a significant momentum had built up in favor of intervention and when Reagan signed the NSDD on Sunday, October 23, it almost guaranteed Urgent Fury would be undertaken. As Motley recalled, all the “diplomatic rabbits were out of the hat” by that stage.276 Monday was a day of military preparation; all the important decisions had been made. Washington’s fears about a hostage situation, desire to remove a Marxist regime and the Cuban presence in the area, and the OECS’s request for assistance combined to result in a military intervention.

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Conclusion

I

t is no exaggeration to say that without Eric Gairy there would have been no “revolution” in 1979. The 1970s saw the political awakening and subsequent enfranchisement of Grenada’s youth, particularly influenced by the Black Power movement. Out of this emerged the New Jewel Movement (NJM) whose ability to forge a cross-class coalition of support made it a serious threat to Gairy; as Brizan concludes, “He [Gairy] never, in fact, understood the type of opposition he was up against.”1 The result was the traditional response of violence and intimidation: the events of “Bloody Sunday” in November 1973 alienated many people, especially the younger generation, and the fraudulent election victory in 1976 reinforced the NJM’s belief that Gairy would never willingly relinquish the reigns of power. When the NJM finally seized the day on March 13, 1979, and overthrew the Gairy regime, the near bloodless coup⎯three people were killed⎯was widely popular in Grenada as jubilant Grenadians chanted: “Freedom come. Gairy go. Gairy gone with U.F.O.”2 Grenada’s neighbors looked on warily. Supporting the return of Gairy was unthinkable but the unconstitutional change of power was unprecedented and troubling. The People’s Revolutionary Government’s (PRG) promise of free and fair elections assuaged some concerns and the Caribbean countries decided to maintain unity and give the PRG the benefit of the doubt for the moment. The United States took its lead from the Caribbean nations and London. Again, the PRG’s commitment to elections was the key consideration for Washington. Over the following month the PRG became increasingly elusive in its dealings with the United States about elections, aid, arms, and relations with Cuba. When Prime Minister Bishop publicly warned Washington that “no country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country or who to be friendly with . . . We are not in anybody’s backyard, and we are definitely not for sale,” it was interpreted as a deliberate distortion of events to justify a predetermined move toward Cuba. In response Washington gradually adopted a regional strategy that focused on providing support to Grenada’s neighbors.

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What is striking about the period up until April is Washington’s conviction that its actions would determine Grenada’s foreign policy orientation. The National Security Council staffer Robert Pastor considered that “a fair amount depends on what we choose to do, with whom and when.”3 There was obvious concern that US actions could “push” Grenada toward Cuba: the theory posits that unsympathetic, or hostile, US responses to Third World revolutions “pushes” them toward the communist bloc. The PRG’s control of information and propaganda skills meant that it was somewhat successful in persuading people in the region of Washington’s unresponsiveness over aid, and the warning against relations with Cuba, had indeed “pushed” the PRG toward Cuba. After Bishop’s May 8, 1979, speech accusing the Central Intelligence Agency of planning to destabilize Grenada, Ambassador Ortiz reported that “as usual he [Bishop] displayed skills of the highest order in the arts of psywar” and urged “department denial of Bishop’s allegations about the U.S.”4 The State Department agreed and issued a press release refuting Bishop’s accusations and setting out Washington’s policy: It is not correct that the U.S. has been pressuring Grenada or withholding assistance . . . The U.S. had indicated willingness to be helpful in economic assistance as well as in the security area. We have offered to send an economic team to Grenada to discuss with the new government its economic development priorities and requirements. We made those offers before Mr. Bishop asserted that his government had to turn to Cuba for arms, aid, and advice because Grenada’s traditional friends were not responsive.5

Whether the United States pushed the PRG into Cuba’s arms or not has been debated.6 Considering the rapid time frame in which events unfolded it is hard to believe that the PRG’s policy decisions were simply reactions to US policy. As Rossin suggests: [I]t seems to give the NJM much more their due to credit them with having thought through which system they preferred, decided it was the Cuban and not the western one for a variety of ideological and self-serving practical reasons, and then both acted and reacted to us [the US] and events in ways which would justify and bolster their prior choice.7

The NJM was a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party; its 1973 manifesto provided adequate guidance to the PRG’s likely foreign policy orientation.8 Washington underestimated the PRG’s unwillingness to compromise on what it later described as “principled positions” of foreign policy. Having dealt with the PRG, Ambassador Ortiz was in no doubt: “A Marxist-Leninist like Bishop is not ‘driven’ into the Communist camp; that is where he started out to go.”9 By May 1979 the nature and themes of US-Grenada relations were largely established, and most in Washington believed that the PRG’s priority was good relations with Cuba. Some optimism still remained in the State Department; Ambassador Shelton was informed that her arrival was “an opportunity for the U.S. to make another effort at reconciliation with the PRG” after “a number of

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unfortunate misunderstandings” since March.10 That was an understatement and apart from the PRG’s professions of interest in good relations with the United States, there was little to suggest any substance to the claims or to merit a renewed US effort. Over the next four-and-a-half years US-Grenada relations did not improve. As the Grenadian mouse roared, Washington tired of the PRG’s constant criticism, distortion of events, and conduction of bilateral relations via the media, and adopted a distancing strategy. Although at times it was unnecessarily antagonistic, betraying a degree of inexperience and ideological inflexibility, the PRG proved quite successful in pursuing its own agenda in dealing with the United States and perpetuating the “David vs. Goliath” theme: as Pastor notes, “In any struggle between a colossus like the US and a tiny island, the US is going to lose in terms of public opinion. The US looks foolish or hegemonic; it’s a no-winner.”11 Admittedly the United States did make the PRG’s job easier on occasion, such as its portrayal of Point Salines airport as a military facility and efforts to block International Monetary Fund loans to Grenada. With a regular flow of anti-US propaganda emanating from Grenada, the United States could not completely ignore the PRG and therefore pursued a “policy of ignoring the most absurd statements and of . . . [countering] others in consultations with its friends in the region and allies farther flung.”12 Washington remained clear about what it would need the PRG to do for relations to improve. Washington also undoubtedly exerted political, economic, and military pressure on Grenada that contributed to the internal problems the revolution was experiencing by 1983. Grenada gained a higher profile during the Reagan administration as an adjunct to the Central America crisis. Washington may have found the PRG to be insincere and irritating but military intervention to overthrow it was never on the cards. The Bishop-Coard schism, and its dramatic denouement, was the finale to a wider problem that affected the PRG and precipitated its demise: the failure to reconcile its ideology with reality. The pursuit of the socialist path of development did not take into consideration local socioeconomic, sociocultural, and geopolitical realities, and imported wholesale inappropriate authoritarian models; the PRG’s approach was “Leninist in conception, Stalinist in practice, and brutal in its ultimate results.”13 The other crucial factor was that the United States was an inescapable fact of life for Grenada and, as Thorndike astutely concluded, “to believe that Grenada was not in anybody’s backyard was an exhilarating experience⎯but it was an illusion.”14 Grenada’s flirtation with communism under the PRG was not an entirely negative experience: free medical and dental care and free primary and secondary school education were introduced, low-cost houses were built, and unemployment fell from 49 per cent in 1979 to 14 per cent in 1983. As one Grenadian recalled, the revolution was an experiment that filled people with emotion and passion and a feeling that for the first time they were in charge of their own destiny. Grenadians became more politically aware and the establishment of the PRA and militia created a more disciplined society.15 The revolution also created opportunities for common people to train as doctors or engineers, opportunities

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that simply did not exist beforehand.16 The PRG also raised Grenada’s profile on the international stage and gained a degree of respect and credibility for the country in some quarters. Despite these positive aspects it is clear that the negative ones outweighed them; the initial detention of Gairyites soon spread wider, freedom of the press was denied, the Churches were alienated and placed under surveillance, and society became militarized. The PRG’s antagonistic policy toward the United States did not reflect the majority of Grenadians’ attitude toward the United States, an important source of tourism and remittances, and they soon tired of the PRG’s propaganda. Many voted with their feet and emigrated; the PRG was concerned about the net population loss experienced between 1979 and 1982 but motivations for migrating varied and as Pool concludes, “attitudes about migrating were not often altered by the revolution but when attitudes did change, it was to the negative side.”17 Deciding to Intervene The Grenada intervention was in many respects a traditional US Caribbean intervention, harking back to era of gunboat diplomacy and the “big stick,” but it was also the product of the Cold War context that saw the world in terms of an ideological and geopolitical contest. As has been demonstrated, the crisis evolved quickly and decisions were being taken in a very short time frame. The National Security Decision Directive that President Reagan signed on October 23 contained the three objectives that were the drivers behind the US decision to act: (1) “assuring the safety of American citizens on Grenada,” (2) “in conjunction with OECS/other friendly government participants, the restoration of democratic government in Grenada,” and (3) “the elimination of current, and the prevention of further, Cuban intervention in Grenada.”18 Protecting Americans in Grenada The protection of nationals abroad is enshrined in international law and the taking of Americans as hostages was arguably Reagan’s greatest concern throughout his presidency: “It is the sworn duty of every President to protect American lives, never to gamble with them.”19 He was particularly sensitive to this subject: “Having ridden to office on charges of his predecessor’s incompetence in handling the Iranian affair, Reagan did not intend to experience such a predicament himself.”20 Indeed, the subsequent Iran-Contra scandal indicated just how far Reagan was willing to go; trading arms for hostages and giving in to terrorists was bound to have domestic and international costs but he was not deterred.21 When the Restricted Inter-Agency Group convened during the first few days after Bishop’s arrest on October 13 it was the Iran analogy that it drew upon. With around 1,000 US citizens on Grenada, the potential for an “Iran-in-theCaribbean” hostage situation was evident.22 Ambassador Bish stated that the situation was fluctuating and whilst there was no threat to the students yet, further disorder could easily reverse this situation.23 The failure of two embassy officials

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to reach Grenada and the Grenadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ reply to a US diplomatic note promising that “the interests of U.S. citizens are in no way threatened by the present situation in Grenada . . . which is a purely internal affair,”24 sounded like a warning to keep out, which only reinforced Washington’s anxiety. When the massacre at Fort Rupert occurred on Wednesday, October 19, it became the prism through which Washington viewed the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC). With Grenada under a shoot-on-sight 24-hour four-day curfew, the imprisonment of certain prominent figures, the cutting of communications, and expulsion of journalists, fears of a hostage situation grew. Ambassador Bish felt that Americans “could be taken hostage, as in Iran” and therefore whatever measures were necessary to assure their safety should be “set in motion.”25 The RMC was a young and inexperienced group in a highly charged, politicized situation; Washington felt it might seize hostages even if it was a suicidal move.26 A US military intervention could not be resisted for long but “[w]ith fifty or so students locked up . . . it would become a very different ballgame. Demands for the invasion force to withdraw or at the least for the RMC’s safe conduct out of the country would be difficult and costly to refuse.”27 The discussions between embassy officials and RMC member Leon Cornwall did little to dissipate the fear of a hostage situation. It is probable that the RMC’s strategy was to try and delay an intervention for a few days or a week by alerting the world to the plans of the United States and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), thereby increasing the political cost of action for the interveners.28 In Washington though “the specter of Teheran . . . was beginning to take on a more definite and frightening shape. The students were not yet hostages and perhaps they would never have become hostages. But, as of this conversation with Cornwall, they had been made into pawns.”29 For Washington it was obvious that the RMC believed an evacuation was the prelude to an intervention and it was not keen to let the students leave. The students’ safety was the bottom line for decision makers and in their eyes the RMC may well have seized hostages to preserve its position or to “make something happen.”30 The prevention of a hostage situation was essential and therefore a preemptive action as soon as possible was preferred. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored such action because if the students were taken hostage the “military forces might not be permitted or able to rescue them.”31 A rapid, secret military operation would minimize the chance of hostage taking. The Iran analogy also served to justify the intervention. In his announcement of Urgent Fury to the press, President Reagan explained that action was taken because “[f ]irst, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans.”32 In his “Address to the Nation” on October 27, Reagan invoked the hostage analogy again: “The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated.”33 On November 4 Reagan remarked that “[w]ith 1,000 Americans, including 800 students, on that island we weren’t about to wait for the Iran crisis to repeat itself, only this time in our own neighborhood⎯ the Caribbean.”34

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Critics were quick to claim that Washington had exaggerated the danger to justify the intervention and that US citizens, essentially the St. George’s University students, were not in danger until the fighting began.35 The extent to which the students were in danger is of course debatable but what is crucial is that in Washington, based on the information decision makers were receiving, the perception was that they were.36 As Beck suggests, to claim that Washington was unconcerned about the students and viewed them as an excuse to act is to “impute to every Reagan administration decisionmaker either a cavalier disregard for life or Machiavellian motives in the extreme.”37 Restoring Democracy The promotion of democracy, by force when necessary, has long been a staple of US global foreign policy.38 In a 1982 address to the British Parliament, President Reagan made a firm commitment to the cause: What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term ⎯ the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people . . . Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best ⎯ a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation.39

Washington had repeatedly made it clear to the PRG that for relations to improve a return to constitutional democracy would be necessary, and especially free and fair elections. When Grenada’s neighbors approached Washington expressing their genuine concerns that the unrest in Grenada represented a threat to democracy throughout the region, and that Washington had to help them restore democracy, it reflected a core Reagan administration principle that proved influential. At Ambassador McNeil’s meeting with the Caribbean leaders, post-intervention interim government arrangements and elections were discussed.40 The importance that the United States placed on the OECS’s request naturally resulted in accusations that Washington solicited the request having perceived an opportunity to remove a Marxist-Leninist government and reduce Soviet and Cuban presence. Consequently, the United States simultaneously raised the prospect of military action and did not encourage the OECS to consider nonmilitary options. Critics charge that the written version of the request was composed in Washington and flown to Barbados to be signed and was engineered to provide “legitimacy for unilateral U.S. action through the illusion of multilateral support.” Pearson summarizes the skeptics’ argument thus: “It appeared as if the United States was orchestrating things to make it appear as if it was responding to events rather than initiating them.”41 As has been demonstrated, such criticism is unfounded. The OECS was no one’s puppet. Prime Minister Adams made the point forcefully to the

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media: “[T]he thought and initiative came from us to redress a mighty wrong and to bring back to the West Indies the spirit of democracy and freedom.”42 The Caribbean leaders kept steady pressure on the United States throughout the crisis and played an instrumental role, acting pragmatically when they invited the United States to participate, knowing that they lacked the military capacity and that the United States would be inclined to act, and was in fact the only power who could do so in the time frame. A Soviet-Cuban Colony After the 1959 Cuban revolution, Washington’s Caribbean policy was essentially “no more Cubas” as the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic showed. Although Reagan did not immediately justify Urgent Fury in geopolitical terms, in his televised “Address to the Nation,” he described Grenada as a “SovietCuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy” and that US forces had “got there just in time.”43 An earlier draft of Reagan’s address was more direct: Grenada will not become another Cuba. The Cuban presence has been reduced . . . Democracy has been strengthened by our joint actions, not only for Grenada, but for the rest of the Caribbean as well . . . [L]et there be no mistake, the tide of Cuban aggression and subversion in the Caribbean is receding . . . There will be no more Cubas in this hemisphere.44

Grenada clearly had good and extensive relations with Cuba; Manigat suggests that there was a kind of “Cuban fixation” in Grenada and the island seemed to be the “mini-Cuba of the Eastern Caribbean.”45 Washington’s hard-liners perceived a hostile Cuba-Nicaragua-Grenada “red triangle” in the region. In May 1982 Reagan had announced that Grenada “bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among its neighbors.”46 The prospect of “another Cuba” promoted a preventative military action. As McFarlane recalled: “The prospect of a second Cuba at our doorstep, with all that implied for the export of revolution to countries in South America, was a serious challenge from Moscow. We were going to have to act.”47 Reagan shared such a view; “he saw this as the Russians trying to come into his backyard on his watch and he wasn’t about to let that happen.”48 Weinberger echoed this: “One Cuba, we felt, was enough, and we counted our preventing the establishment of a second Cuba in Grenada as being not only a great success, but a necessity.”49 Washington chose a rapid preemptive intervention to nip the situation in the bud before it threatened to become another Cuba. The size of the stockpiles of weapons discovered on Grenada was a genuine surprise and the PRG’s secret military agreements with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea did reinforce the Cuba analogy somewhat. However, the Grenada Documents do not support the United States’ claims that the weapons were for offensive purposes or that there were any existing plans for

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Grenada to become a Soviet-Cuban military base. As a Soviet official later confirmed: [N]o one in his right mind was thinking in Moscow along the possibility, along the lines of any possibility of turning Grenada into yet another Cuba. It was too small and too susceptible to economic and political pressures and could not be defended militarily, therefore people were rather skeptical about that.50

Cuban internationalism was dealt a severe blow by the intervention and for some in Washington it represented an important symbolic rollback of the Soviet Union’s Third World advances in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan and in Central America in the past decade. As Reagan later emphasized: “Communist subversion is not an irreversible tide. We have seen it rolled back . . . most recently in Grenada.”51 A Matter of Credibility As long as the United States has considered the Caribbean to be its “backyard” it has been evident that Washington believes that how it deals with events close to home impacts upon its global credibility. Grenada was no different. Credibility itself is intangible and subjective, relying essentially upon influencing the perception and beliefs of other states and the lessons one state believes another will draw from its actions. As McMahon concludes, credibility is “a blend of resolve, reliability, believability, and decisiveness.”52 With this in mind, Washington’s decision to intervene is frequently framed in realist terms as a test of credibility in regard to the United States’ commitment to allies and to the exercise of power to contain and rollback communism. Several senior administration officials emphasized the wider importance of honoring the OECS’s request for help. Secretary of State Shultz felt that in terms of reputation the United States could not afford not to act: [I]t is precedentially terribly important that a formal request from small countries for our help against a significant, and yet certainly not towering opposition, could be refused, is out of the question . . . We must win this one. It is terribly important not just for the outcome in Grenada, but the precedent it sends all over the world, from Moscow to Korea, to European capitals.53

In 1983 there was a palpable feeling amongst many Washington officials that a credible show of force was needed to counter the image of the United States as a “paper tiger.”54 In this respect the intervention restored a degree of self-confidence especially amongst the military who were “back on their feet and standing tall,”55 having seen that the effective use of force was still possible and, just as importantly in the post-Vietnam era, that the American public would support selective military action as well. Urgent Fury in some small way also helped to counter the constraints of the Vietnam Syndrome. Military action also gave some substance to

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Reagan’s hard-line rhetoric and according to Woodward, “Grenada grew as a positive symbol in Administration lore. It was routinely invoked as a sign of a new toughness.”56 Indeed, in a speech on the first anniversary of the invasion, Shultz advocated an activist global strategy: “We must reach a consensus in this country that our response should go beyond passive defence to consider means of active prevention, preemption and retaliation.”57 The United States’ action against Grenada also served to increase the credibility of policy in Central America. Although Washington stressed that the intervention was the result of a unique combination of circumstances and should “not [be] taken as a sign about anything else,”58 the Nicaraguan government feared it would be next. Indeed, the Sandinistas “gave every appearance of being prepared to go to considerable lengths to achieve settlement.”59 It seemed that Suriname’s military leader Lieutenant Colonel Desi Bouterse, who had had good relations with the PRG, also received a message from the intervention; only days afterwards he expelled nearly 100 Cuban embassy staff, including the ambassador, and military advisers.60 As previously mentioned, credibility is subjective and for critics Urgent Fury did little to bolster US credibility. They agreed that military defeat was inconceivable but the level of force used overwhelming and excessive. Worse than that they argued, it was a violation of international law and comparable to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A Nonmilitary Solution There has been much criticism along the lines that “the administration turned to the military option as a first step rather than a last resort.”61 As with all crisis situations, lack of time and information limited the options available but the odds were stacked against a nonmilitary solution due to President Reagan’s ideological convictions that made the alternatives to a military operation appear more risky that a nonmilitary solution.62 The reputational damage of not responding to the OECS’s request, the failure to halt the perceived spread of communism, and the reluctance to use military force would all have unwelcome domestic and international repercussions. The Caribbean leaders kept the pressure on Washington, urging action at every turn. With momentum for an intervention gathering in Washington, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) met in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on October 22–23, to discuss a peaceful solution to the crisis. Their four-point plan envisaged the creation of a civilian government to arrange elections, a CARICOM fact-finding mission, arrangements to protect and/or evacuate foreign nationals, and the deployment of a Caribbean peacekeeping force.63 Judging by the RMC’s behavior and determination to retain power, it is far from clear that any CARICOM solution was feasible or would have worked; if it had been tried and failed, then what was to be done? There was strong public pressure in the region to “do something” and the CARICOM solution did not seem to promise this. The OECS members of CARICOM would not have supported this option,

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which would have weakened it. By the time CARICOM met, the OECS had already requested US help. The US embassy officials reported from Grenada that the RMC was “obstructionist and uncooperative” and not anxious to evacuate the students.64 As Gillespie recalls, after receiving these reports, the pendulum swung toward military action.65 When Cornwall delivered a last-minute plea to US diplomats on Grenada it is possible that if the RMC had made some concessions⎯fundamentally this meant relinquishing power⎯an intervention might have been averted. However, the RMC displayed little, if any, flexibility, which made a negotiated solution near impossible. In his cable to Washington, Special Emissary McNeil considered that, apart from being a possible ploy to buy time, an ultimatum might allow the RMC to take hostages.66 Essentially, the United States and OECS’s perception that the “window of opportunity” for action would not remain open for long precluded any likelihood of a nonmilitary (CARICOM) solution. Although Washington later claimed that Urgent Fury was “consistent with both the purpose and the principles of both the OAS and UN Charters,”67 there was never any serious consideration given to pursuing a solution via either body. As one official explained: [W]e could have gone on for 6 weeks or 6 years in the United Nations addressing concerns. But within 6 days the island would have been much more fortified . . . Another day or so and our losses would probably have been much more severe. Another 2 days and perhaps our students would have been kidnapped, held ransom, or held hostage.68

This reflected the reality that in the Grenada crisis “international legal considerations were not determinative of policy.”69 Conclusion The use of force still plays an important and often difficult role in international affairs and some of the issues raised by Urgent Fury still resonate in today’s conflicts including preemptive and preventive action, regime change, multilateral action, promoting democracy and post-conflict reconstruction.70 As Haass concludes: “Sometimes it is necessary to act⎯when the need is great and it is possible to use force to improve matters at a cost that is commensurate with the stakes.”71 In Washington and the Caribbean in 1983 that was how the situation in Grenada was perceived. Even though the Caribbean leaders were fairly confident that the United States would accede to their request, they were wary about asking because if for whatever reason Washington declined they would have been left “high and dry.”72 They were also worried that Washington might limit their action to evacuation of US nationals and not the removal of the RMC.73 Unsurprisingly the leaders found a willing ear in Washington, in particular the State Department, the main proponents of action. Amongst the White House,

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State Department, Defense Department, CIA, and NSC, there was a consensus on the use of force if not on “all aspects of the timing, means, and objectives.”74 The tragedy of Bloody Wednesday led to a convergence of thinking in the Caribbean and Washington. The Caribbean leaders, especially Prime Minister Adams of Barbados, did pressure the United States to act but this in itself would never have been enough to persuade Washington. However, in combination with the possibility of hostage taking and the threat of “another Cuba,” it was an important factor. No one factor tipped the scales but the combination of them proved decisive. After four and a half years of PRG warnings about US invasion plans and CIA destabilization, the United States finally did intervene in Grenada. On this occasion though, it was not Bishop’s PRG that was the target but the RMC that was, judging by their actions, little more than “a brutal group of leftist thugs.”75 Considering the history of unilateral US action in the region, operation Urgent Fury was, by contrast, “truly . . . a collective enterprise . . . brought about through collective actions and wishes.”76 It is appropriate to give the last word to Tom Adams, the architect of the OECS request and driving force, who concluded: The pros and cons of the action of the Caribbean Governments will long be debated. So will those of President Reagan in coming to our aid. But I think that history will agree with the verdict of public opinion in the Eastern Caribbean. There has seldom in these islands been such virtually unanimous support in the media and at political and popular level for an action so potentially divisive.77

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Epilogue “A Lovely Piece of Real Estate”: Rebuilding Grenada

T

he Reagan administration set itself the not inconsiderable challenge of making Grenada a showcase for what the United States could do in terms of promoting democracy. The majority of US troops were quick to leave and by mid-November an Interim Advisory Council, named by Governor General Scoon, was established. Washington pumped a substantial amount of aid into the island; in 1984 Grenada received $57 million but this halved in 1985 and by 1986 Grenada received $15 million, the same as its Eastern Caribbean neighbors.1 Ironically it was US money that paid for the completion of Point Salines Airport. When US Secretary of State George Shultz visited Grenada in February 1984 he described it as “a lovely piece of real estate”; unfortunately, foreign private investment did not agree and so Washington’s plans to stimulate economic growth and development met with limited success.2 The other challenge the United States faced was political. The restoration of a constitutional framework opened up the possibility of Eric Gairy returning to political life or even pro-New Jewel Movement elements gaining a foothold. Hence in August 1984 a coalition of the four main parties was established as the New National Party (NNP) under the leadership of the Grenada National Party (GNP) stalwart Herbert Blaize; as Ferguson comments, “In the NNP the US and its regional allies had created an intrinsically shaky alliance between normally opposed forces who were lumped together simply to exclude to Gairy.”3 Nonetheless, the NNP achieved its aim and won 14 out of 15 seats and 59 percent of the vote in the December 1984 elections. Gairy’s Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) won one seat with 36 percent of the vote. It was not long before tensions within the NNP emerged and finally in 1987 five members of parliament left to form the National Democratic Congress (NDC). In 1989 Prime Minister Blaize split the NNP to form The National Party (TNP). This guaranteed that no party would have a majority at the 1990 elections: the NDC won seven seats, GULP won four seats, and the TNP and

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NNP two each. The election in 1990 proved to be Eric Gairy’s final election; GULP remained surprisingly popular and Gairy himself only missed being elected to parliament by 175 votes.4 An NDC-dominated coalition emerged. In the 1995 elections fortunes changed as the NNP won a narrow majority with eight seats that it consolidated in 1999 by winning all 15 seats. In the 2003 elections the NDC staged a comeback but the NNP triumphed by winning eight seats. Whilst Grenada has now had five free and fair democratic elections since October 1983, it was the absence of sustained political stability and efficient government in the early post-intervention years that undermined Washington’s efforts to turn Grenada into a showcase.5 Hurricane Ivan On September 7, 2004, Grenada experienced the worst hurricane in living memory when Hurricane Ivan hit, devastating 90 percent of the island, killing 39 people, and causing $815 million damage.6 Grenada’s economy was devastated; prior to September 2004, projected economic growth was 4.7 percent but by the end of the year the economy had actually contracted by 3 percent. The government announced that its public debt was unsustainable and sought to restructure payment schedules with creditors. However, just as rebuilding was progressing, Hurricane Emily hit the island on July 14, 2005. Less damage was done but it was a bitter blow to recovery efforts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan, Grenada quickly received approximately US$150 million in aid and in 2006 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a $15.2 million loan and the World Bank a $3.5 million loan. Despite the growth in the construction industry post-Ivan and recovery of the tourist trade, the IMF has emphasized the importance of containing public spending in 2007 if the government wants to achieve fiscal and debt sustainability.7 Hurricane Ivan also prompted a review of foreign policy as Prime Minister Keith Mitchell explained: “Our foreign policy and diplomatic relations must now be strongly related to our reconstruction goals. The effectiveness of our relations with the international community must be informed by our reconstruction and development needs.”8 The immediate result of this was the breaking of diplomatic relations with Taiwan after 15 years and the reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China in January 2005.9 The Chinese diplomatic carrot included $40 million to complete a National Stadium in time for the 2007 Cricket World Cup, 2,000 low-income homes, new hospital facilities, support for agricultural programs, and $6 million to fund incomplete Taiwanfunded projects.10 The Taiwanese government successfully sued Grenada for $21 million for loans agreed before diplomatic relations were broken off and must have smiled when, at the opening ceremony of the Chinese-funded and built National Stadium, the Royal Grenadian Police Band played the Taiwanese national anthem instead of the Chinese one by mistake, much to the discomfort of the Chinese officials and workers present.11 Diplomatic relations have also been reestablished with Cuba. Having been removed from Grenada in 1983, the Cubans have returned and are once again

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funding scholarships for Grenadians to study in Cuba and have contributed funding for several projects, including a new hospital.12 President Fidel Castro received a warm welcome when he visited the island in August 1998. Not Forgotten; Not Forgiven The traumatic events of “Bloody Wednesday” continue to haunt Grenada. In 1986 a total of 17 people (the Grenada 17) were tried and convicted of murdering Prime Minister Bishop and his colleagues: 14 were sentenced to death and 3 given long sentences; the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment in 1991.13 The adequacy of the trials and appeals process has remained a bone of contention for supporters of the Grenada 17 and human rights groups. In February 2007 the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council quashed the original convictions and ordered that the remaining prisoners be resentenced by the Supreme Court of Grenada.14 The possible release of the prisoners has always been a highly contentious issue in Grenada. The 2006 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report was subtitled “Redeeming the Past: A Time for Healing” but does not make for optimistic reading. The TRC recommended a retrial for the Grenada 17 but found a “lack of will and desire, and even blatant refusal on the part of many—those who have done wrong . . . and those who have been wronged—to actually forgive and forget.”15 Shortly before the resentencing hearing began in June 2007, the government made its position clear as the Director of Public Prosecution asked the court to consider life sentences for the defendants. Lawyers for the 13 defendants had asked for leniency, arguing that the convicts had undergone a “spiritual transformation” in prison and accepted moral responsibility for the 1983 coup.16 When Justice Francis Belle delivered his verdict on June 27, he ordered the immediate release of 3 of the 13 and resentenced the others to 40 years—35 years of which most have already served.17 Justice Belle’s judgment met with predictably mixed reactions. The government, which had unsuccessfully tried to have him removed during the hearing because of his perceived involvement with the defendants, issued an unequivocal statement in response to the outcome: Government like the vast majority of Grenadians is disappointed by today’s ruling. However, like the majority of our law abiding Grenadian citizens we have to accept this decision and will have to abide by it as dictated by the law of the land. Government would like to express its deep sympathy for the families who lost loved ones in the events of October 1983 . . . We know that many of us may not be able to understand the reason behind today’s ruling but we ask for God’s guidance to lift us out of this very troubling time.18

Perhaps in a small island society some wounds are too deep to heal. However, with 33 percent of the population under 15 years old, and approximately half under 30 years old, the revolutionary era and the intervention are fast becoming a foreign country for many Grenadians.

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Appendix 1 Talking Points for Ambassador Ortiz, April 10, 1979 —My government is aware of your concern over allegations that Gairy may launch an invasion to regain control of Grenada. —The conduct of any activities on U.S. territory aimed at overthrowing a friendly government are strictly prohibited by U.S. law and are a matter of grave concern to my government. —Neutrality matters are investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as criminal violations. The FBI is required to investigate alleged violations thoroughly to obtain the full facts, the identities of the parties concerned, and other available pertinent information. Such allegations are then relayed to the criminal division of the Department of Justice for its review. The Department of Justice then determines what actions should be taken by the FBI to further investigate the alleged violations. —The Department of State has advised the FBI of the possibility that Gairy might attempt to gather a mercenary force to invade Grenada and of the concerns of your government. —We do not yet have hard facts in this regard, only unsubstantiated allegations. —We are awaiting a determination by the Department of Justice on what action might be warranted. —My government will attempt to keep track of Gairy’s whereabouts and activities, to the extent that it is proper and possible to do so. However, until the Department of Justice determines that surveillance of Gairy is warranted by the facts in the case, it is difficult to know where he is at all times, particularly since he is no longer under Secret Service protection. Gairy waived further Secret Service protection when he arrived in San Diego on March 20. —We would appreciate receiving from your government any information bearing on possible illegal acts on the part of Gairy in the U.S. —Although my government recognizes your concerns over allegations of a possible counter-coup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada’s best

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interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba. —It seems highly unlikely to us that Chile or Argentina would find it in their best interests to assist Gairy in launching a counter-coup. Source: Lawrence Rossin, Secret airgram to secretary of state, United StatesGrenada Relations since the Coup: A Background Paper (Bridgetown, Barbados: US Embassy, 1983), 21–22.

Appendix 2 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States’ Request for US Assistance in Grenada October 23, 1983 Your Excellency, The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States presents her compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States to the Eastern Caribbean and has the honour to transmit herewith a request for assistance under Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States avails herself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of her highest consideration. Sincerely Eugenia Charles Attachment: Text of OECS’s Request for Assistance The authority of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met at Bridgetown, Barbados on Friday 21st October 1983 to consider and evaluate the situation in Grenada arising out of the overthrow of the Government led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the subsequent killing of the Prime Minister together with some of his colleagues and a number of other citizens. The authority is aware that the overthrow of the Bishop administration took place with the knowledge and connivance of forces unfriendly to the OECS leading to the establishment of the present military regime.

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The meeting took note of the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada. The authority was deeply concerned that military forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that the country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members. The authority further noted that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country. Furthermore the member states of the OECS have no means of defence against such forces. The member governments of the organisation hold the strong view that such a situation would further undermine the political, social and economic stability and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and security in the whole OECS sub-region as a whole. The authority noted that the present regime in Grenada has demonstrated by its brutality and ruthlessness that it will stop at nothing to achieve its ends and to secure its power. Under the authority of Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, the authority proposes therefore to take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by requesting assistance from friendly countries to provide transport logistics support and additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean. The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the assistance of friendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions of tranquillity and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights pending the restoration of constitutional government. Source: “Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Request for U.S. Assistance in Grenada.” American Foreign Policy Current Documents (1983), Document 656, 1397–98.

Appendix 3 Letter from the Governor-General of Grenada to the Prime Minister of Barbados October 24, 1983 Dear Prime Minister, You are aware that there is a vacuum of authority in Grenada following the killing of the Prime Minister and the subsequent serious violations of human rights and bloodshed. I am therefore seriously concerned over the lack of internal security in Grenada. Consequently I am requesting your help to assist me in stabilizing this grave and dangerous situation. It is my desire that a peacekeeping force should be established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to peace and tranquillity and also a return to democratic rule. In this connexion I am also seeking assistance from the United States, from Jamaica, and from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States through its current chairman the hon. Eugenia Charles (Prime Minister of Dominica) in the spirit of the treaty establishing that organization to which my country is a signatory. I have the honour to be, Yours faithfully, Paul Scoon, Governor-General. Source: William Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation (London: Mansell, 1984), 95.

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Appendix 4 Dramatis Personae: March 1979–October 1983 Carter Administration (1977–1981) Peter Bourne Zbigniew Brzezinski John A. Bushnell Jimmy Carter Ashley Hewitt Robert Pastor Viron Vaky

Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues National Security Adviser Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs President Caribbean Desk Officer, Department of State National Security Council, Director of Latin American Affairs Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

US Embassy, Bridgetown, Barbados John Eddy Richard La Roche Frank Ortiz Sally Shelton

Deputy Chief of Mission Consular Officer Ambassador, Barbados (until June 1979) Ambassador, Barbados (until January 1981) Reagan Administration (1981–1984)

James Baker III George Bush William Casey Duane Clarridge

White House Chief of Staff Vice President Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Latin America Division Chief of the Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

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William Clark Major General George Crist Kenneth Dam Commodore Jack Darby Michael Deaver Lawrence Eagleburger Roger Fontaine Charles Gillespie Rear Admiral Jonathan Trumbull Howe Fred Iklé Craig Johnstone Jeane Kirkpatrick Michael Kozak Admiral Wesley McDonald Robert McFarlane John McMahon Francis McNeil Edwin Meese III Constantine Menges Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III James Michel William Middendorf II William Montgomery Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, Jr. Langhorne “Tony” Motley Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North Vice Admiral John Poindexter Ronald Reagan

National Security Adviser (resigned October 13, 1983) Vice Director, Joint Staff, US Army Deputy Secretary of State Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff Presidential Assistant Undersecretary for Political Affairs National Security Council, Latin American Affairs Director Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Director of Political-Military Affairs Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Ambassador to the United Nations Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces National Security Adviser (appointed October 17, 1983) Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency President’s Special Emissary Presidential Counselor National Security Council, Assistant for Latin American Affairs Commander of Joint Task Force 120 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Ambassador to the Organization of American States Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs Deputy National Security Adviser President

Appendix 4

Davis Robinson Lawrence Rossin Nestor Sanchez

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Department of State Legal Adviser Foreign Service Officer Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs National Security Council, Director of Latin American Affairs Secretary of State Principal Deputy Press Secretary Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretary of Defense

Alphonso Sapia-Bosch George Shultz Larry Speakes General John Vessey Caspar Weinberger US Embassy, Bridgetown, Barbados Milan Bish James Budeit Gary Chafin Linda Flohr Ludlow Flower III Kenneth Kurze David Ostroff Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Reiman

Ambassador to Barbados Consul General Political Officer Third Secretary Deputy Chief of Mission Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs Consular Officer Military Attaché

British Government Giles Bullard Geoffrey Howe John Kelly David Montgomery Margaret Thatcher

High Commissioner, Barbados Foreign Secretary British Representative, Grenada Deputy High Commissioner, Barbados Prime Minister

Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Lester Bird Vere Bird, Sr. Milton Cato Eugenia Charles John Compton Vaughan Lewis John Osbourne Kennedy Simmonds

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister of Dominica Prime Minister of St. Lucia Director General Chief Minister of Montserrat Prime Minister of St. Kitts-Nevis

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Other Caribbean States Tom Adams H. Brazane Babb Linden Forbes Burnham Fidel Castro George Chambers Neville Gallimore Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis Lynden Pindling George Price Bernard St. John Edward Seaga Lieutenant Commander Peter Tomlin Louis Tull

Prime Minister of Barbados Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Minister of Barbados President of Guyana President of Cuba Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Foreign Minister of Jamaica Commander of the Barbados Defence Force Prime Minister of the Bahamas Prime Minister of Belize Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados Prime Minister of Jamaica Barbados Defence Force Foreign Minister of Barbados

Grenada Geoffrey Bourne Charles Modica General Gennadiy Sazhenev Sir Paul Scoon Gary Solin Julian Torres Rizo

Vice Chancellor of St. George’s University Chancellor of St. George’s University (based in New York) Soviet Ambassador Governor General of Grenada Bursar of St. George’s University Cuban Ambassador

People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee Membership 1983 General Hudson Austin Fitzroy Bain Major Tan Bartholomew Maurice Bishop Phyllis Coard Major Leon Cornwall Chris De Riggs Lieutenant Liam James

Minister of Communications, Works and Labour; Commander of the People’s Revolutionary Army Trade Union Leader People’s Revolutionary Army Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Interior and Carriacou Affairs Head of National Women’s Organization People’s Revolutionary Army; Ambassador to Cuba Minister of Health People’s Revolutionary Army

Appendix 4

Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne George Louison Kamau McBarnette Ian St. Bernard Selwyn Strachan John Ventour Unison Whiteman

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People’s Revolutionary Army Minister of Agriculture Deputy Minister of Information Commissioner of Police Minister of National Mobilization Trade Union Leader Minister of Foreign Affairs

Political Bureau Membership 1983 General Hudson Austin Maurice Bishop Lieutenant Liam James Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne George Louison Selwyn Strachan John Ventour Unison Whiteman

Minister of Communications, Works and Labour; Commander of the People’s Revolutionary Army Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Interior and Carriacou Affairs People’s Revolutionary Army People’s Revolutionary Army Minister of Agriculture Minister of National Mobilization Trade Union Leader Minister of Foreign Affairs Others

Norris Bain Bernard Coard Jacqueline Creft Alister Hughes Ian Jacobs W. Richard Jacobs Major Einstein Louison Lloyd Noel Vincent Noel Leslie Pierre Kendrick Radix Lyden Ramdhanny Major Christopher Stroude Dessima Williams

Minister of Housing Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Finance Minister of Education, Youth and Culture Journalist Ambassador to the United Nations Ambassador to the Soviet Union People’s Revolutionary Army Chief of Staff Attorney General (resigned 1980) Trade Union Leader Journalist Minister of Agro-Industries and Fisheries Minister of Tourism Political Commissar of the People’s Revolutionary Army Ambassador to the Organization of American States

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Notes

Introduction 1. For the definitive account of Grenadian history see George Brizan, Grenada: Island of Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1998). 2. Maurice Bishop, “A Bright New Dawn, March 13, 1979,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979–83, ed. Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1983), 24–25. Eric Gairy was the dominant political figure in Grenada between 1951 and 1979. He served as chief minister between 1954 and 1960 and between 1961 and 1962 and then as premier from 1967 to 1974, when Grenada became independent and Gairy became prime minister. 3. “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada, October 25, 1983,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102583a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). 4. It was not just Americans who knew nothing of Grenada. At one stage there was uncertainty over exactly how “Grenada” (gri-ney-duh) should be pronounced. One anecdote relates how a Russian television station announced that the United States had invaded Granada in Southern Spain! 5. “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles.” 6. The U.S. military presence on Grenada peaked at 7,335 on October 31. Vijay Tiwathia, The Grenada War: Anatomy of a Low-Intensity Conflict (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987), 187. 7. Robert Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 2. 8. Paul Sutton, “Grenadian Callaloo: Recent Books on Grenada,” Latin American Research Review 23, no. 1 (1988): 133. 9. Among the more useful ones are: Duane Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA, with Digby Diehl (New York: Scribner, 1997); Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Allan Gerson, The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology: America at the United Nations, 1981–1985 (New York: Free Press, 1991); Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon &

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Schuster, 1988); Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993); and Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael Joseph, 1990). Also of use were memoirs by the former British foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994) and former prime minister Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993). 10. “Britain’s Grenada Shut-Out: Say Something, If Only Goodbye,” The Economist, March 10, 1984, 22. 11. National Security Decision Directive 110a, October 23, 1983, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2171t.gif (accessed March 4, 2007). 12. Quoted in Sutton, “Grenadian Callaloo,” 146.

Chapter 1 1. The geographical definition of Latin America is usually considered to be the Spanish-speaking countries and Brazil, where Portuguese is spoken, and not the Caribbean basin countries. In the United States though, Latin America is often used to refer to all countries south of the United States. This study will use the term “Caribbean basin” to refer to the 12 island states and 11 island dependencies to be found in the Caribbean Sea and the 12 states on the littoral in Central America and South America. 2. US Department of State, “The Monroe Doctrine,” http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/ infousa/facts/democrac/50.htm (accessed December 10, 2006). 3. Anthony Maingot, The United States and the Caribbean (London: Macmillan, 1994), 15. 4. Ibid., 23. 5. Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 197. 6. Ibid., 221. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 232. 9. http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/30185.html (accessed January 20, 2007). Roosevelt had first used the “big stick” quote at the Minnesota State Fair in 1901. 10. LaFeber, The American Age, 232. 11. Whitney Perkins, Constraints of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 119. 12. Louis Perez, “Intervention, Hegemony, and Dependency: The United States in the Circum-Caribbean, 1898–1980,” Pacific Historical Review 51 (1982): 180. 13. The United States’ feeling of responsibility for improving the political situation in the region led Caribbean governments to rely on Washington to solve their problems: “The game for each politician was to convince the US that he was the one who held the key to stability and the protection of American economic interests.” Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 52. 14. Lester Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean 1898–1934 (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), 42. 15. Ibid., 66.

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16. Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach, “Introduction: U.S.-Caribbean Security Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation, ed. Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 3. 17. Lake, Somoza Falling, 50. 18. LaFeber, The American Age, 49. 19. Graham Stuart and James Tigner, Latin America and the United States (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1975), 257. 20. Robert Freeman Smith, “Good Neighbours and War,” in The United States and the Latin American Sphere of Influence, vol. 1, Era of Caribbean Intervention, 1890–1930, ed. Robert Freeman Smith (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1981), 22. 21. Lake, Somoza Falling, 53. 22. Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 158. 23. Ibid., 125. 24. Langley, The Banana Wars, 159. 25. Jules Benjamin, “The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay,” Diplomatic History 11 (1987): 99. 26. Maingot, The United States, 31. 27. Perez, “Intervention, Hegemony, and Dependency,” 181. 28. Ibid., 181. 29. Fred Fejes, Imperialism, the Media and the Good Neighbour (Norwood: Ablex Publishing, 1986), 16. 30. See Abraham Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 31. Perez, “Intervention, Hegemony, and Dependency,” 182. The large US companies frequently had disputes with Caribbean governments and usually played a role in events resulting in intervention. Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1964), 534. 32. Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930–1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 27. 33. Ibid., 356. 34. Maingot, The United States, 47. 35. The regimes of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Jorge Ubico in Guatemala were prime examples. 36. Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 1. 37. Ibid., 27. 38. Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modern Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 347. See also Thomas Leonard, Latin America during World War II (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 39. The bases were in Newfoundland, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Trinidad. 40. Organization of American States, “Charter”, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ charter.html (accessed February 6, 2007). 41. LaFeber, The American Age, 466.

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42. Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd rev. and exp. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 95. 43. Jim Handy, “The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution: The Guatemalan Agrarian Land Reform, 1952–54,” Hispanic American Historical Review 68 (1988): 705. 44. As Schlesinger and Kinzer note, “For many Guatemalans the United Fruit Company was the United States . . . In the past, UFCO and its sister companies had bribed politicians, pressured governments and intimidated opponents to gain extremely favorable concessions. To the Guatemalans it appeared that their country was being mercilessly exploited by foreign interests which took huge profits without making any significant contributions to the nation’s welfare.” Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983), 73. 45. Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, 331. 46. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 61. 47. Richard Immerman, “Guatemala as Cold War History,” Political Science Quarterly 95 (1980–81): 637. 48. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 61. 49. Frank Niess, A Hemisphere to Itself: A History of US-Latin American Relations (London: Zed Books, 1990), 150. 50. Immerman, “Guatemala as Cold War History,” 642. 51. Stephen Rabe, “The Clues Didn’t Check Out: Commentary on ‘The CIA and Castillo Armas,’” Diplomatic History 14 (1990): 93. 52. Ibid., 88. 53. As Blasier points out though: there is “no doubt that Guatemalan communists had made substantial political gains in half a dozen years. They dominated the Guatemala labour movement and had relatively free access to and influence with the President. Influence is one thing; control another.” Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 156. 54. Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of the Inter American System (London: Heinemann Education Books, 1974), 228. 55. Blasier, The Hovering Giant, 182. 56. It predominantly affected Cuban landowners, but five US sugar companies, owning two million acres, stood to lose all but 16,500 acres. Lincoln Bloomfield and Amanda Liess, Controlling Small Wars (London: Allen Lane and Penguin Press, 1969), 94. 57. Piero Gleijeses, “Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27 (1995): 3. 58. Stephen Ambrose with Richard Immerman, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and Espionage Establishment (New York: Doubleday, 1981), 309. 59. Smith, “Good Neighbours and War,” 56. 60. Lloyd Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), 12. 61. Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 91. 62. See L. Ronald Scheman, The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988). 63. Lucien Vandenbroucke, “Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs,” Political Science Quarterly 99 (1984): 484.

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64. Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties (New York: Farrar, 1980), 358. 65. Trumbell Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 95. 66. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? 15. The fallback guerrilla option was used to reassure Kennedy and as such the CIA never planned for the eventuality. Gleijeses, “Ships in the Night,” 38. 67. Hugh Thomas, The Cuban Revolution (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), 578. 68. Bloomfield and Liess, Controlling Small Wars, 120. 69. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 83. 70. Ibid., 81. 71. Ibid., 82. Burnham had split from Jagan to form the PNC in 1955. 72. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 81. 73. Ibid., 91. These were dramatic words, especially in light of the nonintervention pledge Kennedy had agreed to after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. 74. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 92. 75. Ibid., 94. 76. Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 26. 77. Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 34. 78. Rabe, “The Caribbean Triangle,” 64. 79. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 26. 80. William Blum, The Central Intelligence Agency: A Forgotten History— United States Global Interventions since World War II (London: Zed Books, 1986), 198. 81. Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States and the Third World (London: Paladin, 1972), 160. 82. Blum, The Central Intelligence Agency, 201. 83. Lester Langley, The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 237. 84. Ibid, 238. 85. Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, 180. 86. Daniel Papermaster, “A Case Study of the Effects of International Law on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: The United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,” Texas International Law Journal 24 (1989): 479. 87. J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (London: Pelican Books, 1970), 89. 88. Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, 254. 89. Papermaster, “Effects of International Law on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking,” 482. 90. Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 199. 91. Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), 72. 92. Ibid., 73. 93. Allende was overthrown and died during a military coup in September 1973. 94. Maingot, The United States, 120. 95. Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive/ NSC-30, “Subject: Human Rights,” February 17, 1978, 1. Jimmy Carter Library http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/ pddirectives/pd30.pdf (accessed January 20, 2007).

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96. Robert Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 64. 97. Pearce, Under the Eagle, 110. 98. Ronald Reagan, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America, April 27, 1983,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/ 1983/42783d.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). 99. See James Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 100. See Lawrence Walsh, Firewall: Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999) and Malcolm Byrne and Peter Kornbluh, ed., The Iran-Contra Affair (New York: New Press, 1994). 101. George Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama,” December 20, 1989, George Bush Presidential Library, http://bushlibrary. tamu.edu/research/papers/1989/89122000.html (accessed January 20, 2007). 102. Pastor, Whirlpool, 18. 103. Perez, “Intervention, Hegemony, and Dependency,” 193. 104. Anthony Payne, “Rethinking United States-Caribbean relations: Towards a New Mode of Trans-Territorial Governance,” Review of International Studies 26 (2000): 70.

Chapter 2 1. Omowale David Franklyn, Bridging the Two Grenadas: Gairy’s and Bishop’s (St. George’s, Grenada: Talented House Publications, 1999), 17. 2. Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 30. 3. Approximately 5,000 agricultural workers and 1,500 public workers participated. Thorndike, Grenada, 33. 4. Carriacou is the main island in the Grenadian-administered part of the neighboring Grenadines chain. 5. Brian Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada (London: Macmillan, 1993), 137. 6. In both the 1951 and 1954 elections Gairy’s was the only party along with a collection of independent candidates. Patrick Emmanuel, Farley Braithwaite, and Eudine Barriteau, Political Change and Public Opinion in Grenada, 1979–1984 (Cave Hill, Barbados: University of the West Indies, 1984), 15. 7. Aaron Segal, “Background to Grenada: When the Social Scientists Invaded,” Caribbean Review 12 (December 1983): 42. Segal’s article is a review of the two classic studies of Grenada under Gairy: Michael Smith (ed.), The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965) and Archie Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). 8. Tony Thorndike, “Grenada: Maxi-Crisis for Mini-State,” World Today 30, no. 10 (1974): 440. 9. Thorndike, Grenada, 38. 10. D. Sinclair Dabreo, The Grenada Revolution (Castries, St. Lucia: Management and Publicity Services Publication, 1979), 50. 11. Smith quoted in Segal, “Background to Grenada,” 42. 12. George Brizan, Grenada: Island of Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1998), 366. 13. Paul Sutton, “Black Power in Trinidad and Tobago: The Crisis of 1970,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 21, no. 2 (1983): 115.

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14. Kai Schoenhals and Richard Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 24. 15. The gang was named after a mongoose program that sought to eradicate rabies, and in which most of the members had worked. 16. Eric Gairy, “Black Power in Grenada,” Radio Grenada, May 3, 1970, Report of the Duffus Commission of Inquiry into the Breakdown of Law & Order, and Police Brutality in Grenada, Part 3, paragraph 51. The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/duffus53thru54.html (accessed January 20, 2007). 17. Ewart Archer, “Gairyism, Revolution and Reorganization: Three Decades of Turbulence in Grenada,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 23, no. 2 (1985): 96. 18. Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 11. 19. Thorndike, “Grenada: Maxi-Crisis,” 440. 20. Payne et al., Grenada, 11. Gairy’s opposition to “the miserable indignity” of a referendum was not a lone voice. None of the other British colonies had been required to hold one prior to gaining independence, and referendums were alien to the West Indian political experience. Ibid. 21. Schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada, 25. 22. W. Richard Jacobs and Ian Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution (Habana: Casa De Las Americas, 1979), 76. 23. Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 146. A MAP Report outlined their objective: “We have set ourselves a single aim—the organization of a mass movement to seize political power. The masses need to take power into their own hands.” John Walton Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution: The Impact and Limits of Cuban International Aid Programs,” 2 vols. (PhD diss., Boston University Graduate School, 1992),107. 24. Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution, 111. 25. D. Brent Hardt, “Grenada Reconsidered,” Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs 11, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 281. 26. Interview with Teddy Victor, cofounder of the New Jewel Movement, by John Cotman, January 19, 1989. 27. Thorndike, Grenada, 45. 28. Payne et al., Grenada, 13. 29. Scott Davidson, Grenada: A Study in Politics and the Limits of International Law (Aldershot, Surrey: Avebury, 1987), 9. 30. In an NJM document entitled The ABC of the NJM. Questions and Answers on NJM— Its History, Ideas, Principles, one excerpt read: “Is the organisation communist? No. We think that some of the Marxist analysis is valid however. [. . .] Our manifesto is not ‘The Communist Manifesto.’” Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution,” 114. 31. Franklyn, Bridging the Two Grenadas, 73. 32. Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 144. 33. Cathy Sunshine and Philip Wheaton, Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution (Washington, D.C: EPICA Taskforce, 1982), 46. 34. Gregory Sandford, The New Jewel Movement: Grenada’s Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Services Institute, 1985), 18. Gairy arrived at the figure 54 by simply doubling the 27 charges laid against him by the NJM previously. 35. Report of the Duffus Commission, paragraph 131.

198

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52.

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Sandford, The New Jewel Movement, 18. Thorndike, Grenada, 46. Schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada, 29. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books, 1984), 48. Eileen Donovan, confidential telegram to the secretary of state, “Subject: Planning for Possible Evacuation of Foreign Residents from Grenada,” 302030Z, January 30, 1974, Bridgetown 00185, 2. Ironically this is very similar to the justification the United States gave nearly 20 years later when it intervened. Author telephone interview with Lord Peter Blaker, former parliamentary undersecretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, September 2, 2006. Interview with Eileen Donovan, former US ambassador to Barbados, by A. L. Lowrie, December 3, 1985, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/(accessed March 3, 2007). Brizan, Grenada, 381. Eileen Donovan, confidential telegram to the secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Independence Celebrations,” 081745Z, February 8, 1974, Bridgetown 00241, 2. The Report recommended the reorganization of the police force and removal of Assistant Superintendent Innocent Belmar, who led the attack on the NJM leaders on “Bloody Sunday,” and his preclusion from holding public office. Gairy’s response was to promote him and in 1976 Belmar was a GULP candidate in the general election and elected with a majority of over 500 votes. Brizan, Grenada, 384. In 1978 Belmar was murdered by unknown assailants. Anthony Payne, The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961–79: Regional Integration amongst New States (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 41–44. Fitzroy Ambursley, “The New Jewel Movement,” in Crisis in the Caribbean, ed. Fitzroy Ambursley and Robin Cohen (London: Heinemann, 1982), 200. O’Shaughnessy, Grenada, 75. Payne et al., Grenada, 14. Interview with Theodore R. Britton Jr., former US ambassador to Barbados, by Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 29, 1989, Frontline Diplomacy, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 10, 2007). Author correspondence with Theodore R. Britton Jr., former US ambassador to Barbados, September 25, 2005. Frank Ortiz and Don Usner, Ambassador Ortiz: Lessons from a Lifetime of Service (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 119. Records indicate that Gairy and Carter discussed the Panama Canal Treaties, OAS meeting, human rights, economic aid, US military facilities, psychic phenomena, and UFOs. In arguing the need for economic aid, Gairy explained that “there is a small group of young Grenadians trained in foreign universities who were beginning to agitate, spread communist literature and be otherwise disruptive” and that “he was concerned with the great number of unemployed young people who might be susceptible to extremist solutions.” Ambassador Frank Ortiz, Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: President Carter/Prime Minister Gairy–Bilateral,” The White House, September 9, 1977, 2–3. This was a play for economic assistance rather than real concern about his hold on power.

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53. James Leonard, unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenadian UFO Crusade: Déjà Vu,” 180251Z, November 18, 1978, US Mission United Nations New York 05165, 1. 54. James Leonard, unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenadian UFO Resolution,” 232125Z, November 23, 1978, US Mission United Nations New York 05313, 2. 55. James Leonard, unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenadian UFO Resolution,” 242141Z, November 24, 1978, US Mission United Nations New York 05323, 2. 56. O’Shaughnessy, Grenada, 69. 57. Sandford, The New Jewel Movement, 20. 58. Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 151. 59. Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution,” 126. 60. Ibid., 202. Coard studied at Brandeis University in the United States and the University of Sussex in Britain, and lectured at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica and Trinidad. 61. O’Shaughnessy, Grenada, 71. Members included Liam James, Ewart Layne, Basil Gahagan, and Liam Cornwall. 62. Interview with Kendrick Radix, former People’s Revolutionary Government minister, by John Cotman, December 12, 1988. 63. OREL members continued to meet at Coard’s house throughout the PRG’s lifetime. 64. The GNP represented mainly the middle classes and businessmen and never had much support outside St. George’s. The UPP represented the interests of the business community. 65. Colin Henfrey, “Between Populism and Leninism: The Grenadian Experience,” Latin American Perspectives 11, no. 3 (1984): 19. 66. Bishop, Whiteman, and Coard all won their seats in the urban St. George’s parish. Coard had insisted on being the candidate for the Town of St. George’s seat, traditionally the most anti-Gairy one. Jorge Heine, “The Hero and the Apparatchik: Charismatic Leadership, Political Management, and Crisis in Revolutionary Grenada,” in A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 223. 67. Thorndike, Grenada, 51. 68. Denneth Modeste, “Grenada: Tumultuous Decades,” Freedom at Issue, September– October 1984, 5. 69. Interview with Winston Whyte, former leader of the United People’s Party, by John Cotman, February 15, 1989. 70. A 1984 public opinion survey recorded that 73.5 percent of under 25s disliked Gairy’s leadership compared to just 41.3 percent of 45–59-year-olds. Emmanuel et al., Political Change and Public Opinion, 19. 71. R. McGee, unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Political Rally June 19,” 210024Z, June 21, 1977, Bridgetown 00063, 2. 72. During 1977 Bishop, Whiteman, and Coard all visited Cuba. The society remained secret until 1978 because, as Einstein Louison later explained, “the whole question was how to deal with Cuba in the context of our own political situation here. You had to be careful so that you didn’t appear to be a communist in this country; that would have affected the struggle, that would have affected the alliances that were necessary to be formed.” John Cotman, The Gorrion Tree: Cuba and the Grenada Revolution (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 49.

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73. Maurice Bishop, “The Struggle for Democracy and against Imperialism in Grenada, August 1977,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979–83, ed. Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (New York: Pathfinder, 1983), 22. 74. Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution,” 195. Guns were stolen from the Grenadian military cadet school. Author interview with Kennedy Roberts, former People’s Revolutionary Government economic attaché to Cuba, June 21, 2006. 75. Thorndike, Grenada, 53. 76. Lawrence Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup: A Background Paper (Bridgetown, Barbados: U.S. Embassy, 1983), 44. 77. Ibid., 44. 78. Interview with Kennedy Budhlall, former People’s Revolutionary Army officer, by John Cotman, November 11, 1989. Budhlall was a PRA commander, and NJM member, who helped lead the coup in March 1979. He later grew disenchanted with the PRG and was detained in May 1980. 79. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 45. The assassination myth was repeatedly promulgated by the NJM as a justification for taking violent action. 80. Interview with Budhlall. 81. Pedro Noguera, The Imperatives of Power: Political Change and Social Basis of Regime Support in Grenada from 1951–91 (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 80. 82. Franklyn, Bridging the Two Grenadas, 74. 83. Author interview with Leslie Pierre, editor of the Grenadian Voice, June 21, 2006.

Chapter 3 1. Most of the military training had taken place secretly in Grenada although six NJM leaders had traveled to Guyana for four weeks’ training in late 1978 with the support of Guyana’s President Forbes Burnham. John Walton Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution: The Impact and Limits of Cuban International Aid Programs,” 2 vols (PhD dissertation, Boston University Graduate School, 1992), 195. The United States was aware of the NJM leaders’ visits to Cuba, Guyana, and Eastern Europe prior to 1979. Author telephone interview with Frank Ortiz, former US ambassador to Barbados, August 10, 1994. 2. Brian Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada (London: Macmillan, 1993), 155. 3. Manning Marable, African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to the Grenada Revolution (London: Verso, 1987), 221. 4. David Lewis, Reform and Revolution in Grenada: 1950 to 1981 (Habana: Casa De Las Americas, 1984), 151. As a UK report later concluded: “Special branch had been effectively infiltrated by the NJM. Promotion had long been decided by political favouritism rather than merit . . . The defence force was similarly inadequate. Poorly equipped and trained with part-time officers, it was a rival rather than an effective back-up for the police force with whom there was no effective liaison.” No author, Mexico and Caribbean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Anglo-US-Canadian Talks on Security in the Caribbean, Brief No. 5, Assistance to Enhance Security, Including Police, Intelligence and Possibly Regional Coastguard,” April 30, 1979, 1. 5. Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 155. 6. Henry Stanley, report to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Revolution in Grenada: The First Three Weeks,” British High Commission, Port of Spain, Trinidad, April 4, 1979, 1.

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7. Maurice Bishop, “A Bright New Dawn, March 13, 1979,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979–83, ed. Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (New York: Pathfinder, 1983), 25. Although the NJM referred to its victory as a “revolution,” it is often referred to as a coup. Marable suggests that the action was “not a genuine social revolution, but a political insurrection against a despotic and corrupt regime.” Marable, African and Caribbean Politics, 220. Meeks suggests that the NJM’s action was “a revolution from above, marginally distinguishable from a coup d’etat by its execution by armed irregulars and by the willingness of the leadership to mobilize popular support, though firmly under its command.” Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 156. 8. Ambassador Ortiz was based in Barbados and accredited to the other Eastern Caribbean islands. 9. Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Situation Report Twelve Forty-Five Local,” 131954Z, March 13, 1979, Bridgetown 00869, 1. 10. Author interview with Peter Tomlin, former lieutenant commander, Barbados Defence Force, June 14, 2006. Tomlin was seconded to the BDF from the British Army. 11. Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Coup,” 141945Z, March 14, 1979, 1. Author interview with Tomlin. 12. Robert Pastor, NSC secret memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski/David Aaron, “Subject: Next Steps in Grenada,” March 14, 1979, no. 1603, 1. 13. Robert Pastor, NSC secret memorandum to Reg Bartholomew, “Subject: MiniSCC Meeting on Grenada—March 15 1979,” March 15, 1979, unnumbered, 1. 14. The PRG became the People’s Revolutionary Government within a week of the coup. It is also referred to as the NRG (New Revolutionary Government) in some literature. 15. Robert Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 6. 16. John Goshko, “Caribbean Ministates are a New Source of Concern for U.S.,” Washington Post, July 6, 1979, A12. 17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, NSC secret memorandum to the president, “Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada,” March 15, 1979, no. 1629, 1. 18. Ibid., 1. 19. Viron Vaky, confidential telegram to American Embassy, Brasilia, “Subject: Grenada: Policy Options,” 142333Z, March 14, 1979, Washington D.C. 63301, 1. 20. Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike. Grenada: Revolution and Intervention (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 89. 21. No author, British Embassy, Washington, D.C., telegram to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Grenada,” March 14, 1979, 2. 22. The British agreed to divert the Belize guardship, HMS Mohawk, to Barbados to reassure Grenada’s neighbors and to improve reaction time if an evacuation was necessary. No author, Mexico and Caribbean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, memorandum, “Coup d’etat in Grenada,” March 13, 1979, 9. 23. Trinidad and Tobago did not attend, stating that the “situation in Grenada was complex and confusing and sufficient information was not available to it.” Rasleigh Jackson, Guyana’s Diplomacy: Reflections of a Former Foreign Minister (Georgetown, Guyana: Free Press, 2003), 50. 24. Private secretary, Downing Street, letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “The Prime Minister’s telephone conversation with the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Tom Adams, on 15 March 1979,” March 15, 1979, 1.

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25. Jackson, Guyana’s Diplomacy, 51. 26. UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report, Caribbean and Central America, Session 1981–82 (London: HMSO, 1982), 287. 27. Jackson, Guyana’s Diplomacy, 50. 28. “GRENADA—Overthrow of Gairy Government by Main Opposition Party— Regional and International Reactions,” Keesings Contemporary Archives 25 (June 29, 1979): 29,691. 29. WIAS Communique, March 20, 1979, 1. In reality only Dominica and St. Lucia were independent, sovereign states and could withhold recognition. Scott Davidson, Grenada: A Study in Politics and the Limits of International Law (Aldershot, Surrey: Avebury, 1987). 42. WIAS finally granted de facto recognition to Grenada in May after the PRG had again promised to hold elections. 30. WIAS Communique, March 20, 1979, 3. 31. Payne et al., Grenada, 91. 32. Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Hewitt Meeting with Foreign Minister Forde,” 062311Z, April 6, 1979, Bridgetown 1315, 1. 33. It is important to remember that for the United States diplomatic recognition is an act of approval rather than just an act of recognizing reality. US nonrecognition of Grenada for any protracted period was unviable due to the presence of a sizable number of US citizens, notably at St. George’s University Medical School (SGU), on the island. Author telephone interview with John Bushnell, former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, July 29, 1995. Bushnell was the assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs during the Carter administration and remained in government as part of the transition team until mid-1981. 34. Prime Minister Adams commented that “many of us were so glad to be rid of Gairy . . . that we (the Eastern Caribbean) were prepared to overlook the means by which this regime was ended.” Robert Pastor, “The Impact of Grenada on the Caribbean: Ripples from a Revolution,” in Latin America and the Caribbean Record, vol. 3, 1983–1984, ed. Jack Hopkins(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 12. 35. “Grenada Special: A Souvenir Edition Covering the Grenada Coup,” Grenada Documents Microfiche Collection (GDMC), no. DSI-83-C 005533, 12. The documents will be referred to using the final six-digit number. 36. Lawrence Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup: A Background Paper (Bridgetown, Barbados: U.S. Embassy, 1983), 1. 37. Ibid., 4. 38. Author telephone interview with Ortiz. 39. Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Developments in Grenada,” 162207Z, March 16, 1979, Bridgetown 0932, 1. In a phone interview with Trinidadian television on March 15, Bishop replied to a question about when elections would be held thus: “Certainly as far as we are concerned in the shortest period of time—I would say within six months or so—that would be about right.” M. Fox, unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Maurice Bishop Interview with T&T Television,” 162103Z, March 16, 1979, Port of Spain 00929, 1. 40. Frank Ortiz, “Letters to the Editor,” Atlantic Monthly 253 (June 1984): 9. 41. On March 28, Bishop called the embassy to put the arrival of the Peace Corps on hold for a couple of weeks. Ortiz, “Subject: USG and Assistance to Bishop,” 3. 42. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 7. 43. Henry Stanley, British High Commission, Port of Spain, telegram to Mexico and Caribbean Department, FCO, “Grenada,” March 24, 1979, 1.

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44. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 12. 45. Warren Christopher, confidential telegram to US Embassy, London, “Subject: Recent Events in Grenada,” 312052Z, March 31, 1979, Washington D.C. 81187, 2. 46. Robert Pastor, confidential NSC memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski/David Aaron, “Subject: Update on Grenada,” March 27, 1979, no. 1871, 2. 47. Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba?” 8. 48. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 15. 49. Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba?” 8. A 1981 Grenadian Chief of Staff memorandum detailed the arms received from Cuba in April 1979: 3,400 Soviet and US rifles with three million rounds; 200 machine guns with half a million rounds; 100 pistols with 66,000 rounds; 100 shoulder-fired rocket launchers with 4,000 rockets; 12 82mm mortars with 4,800 shells; 12 75mm cannon with 600 shells and 12 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns with 237,000 rounds. Grenada: A Preliminary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1983), 22. 50. Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution,” 244. 51. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 18. 52. In his report Ortiz wrote: “Coard is generally believed to be the hard-core ideologue and evil genius of the Bishop government.” Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Minister of Finance Coard,” 111603Z, April 11, 1979, Bridgetown 01363, 2. 53. Author telephone interview with John Bushnell. 54. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 21. Ortiz even gave Bishop Gairy’s phone number and offered to fly someone to San Diego to verify his whereabouts. Author telephone interview with Ortiz. The State Department had discussed with the Department of Justice placing Gairy under official Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance, but the Department of Justice declined the request due to insufficient evidence of wrongdoing. 55. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 21. 56. A non-paper is not an official document but an exact copy of talking points. Ortiz left one with Bishop to avoid any ambiguity. Author telephone interview with Ortiz. 57. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 22. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to the secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop,” 111843Z, April 11, 1979, Bridgetown 01368, 2. 61. Author telephone interview with Ortiz. 62. Ortiz, “Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop,” 2. Pastor later claimed that “Ortiz made a mistake in expressing displeasure with Grenada’s relations with Cuba rather than just the military relationship, and his delivery of the talking points was an unprofessional error.” Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba?” 22. See also Robert Pastor, “Ortiz/Pastor Correspondence on Grenada,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 28, (Winter 1986–1987): 197–203. However, as official documents show, Ortiz followed Washington’s instructions to the letter and Pastor’s charges were unfounded. 63. Maurice Bishop, “In Nobody’s Backyard, April 13, 1979,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks, 27.

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64. Ibid., 29. 65. Ibid. 66. These were small grants of up to $5,000 that could be disbursed immediately by the ambassador. 67. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 24. 68. Robert Pastor, secret NSC memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski/David Aaron, “Subject: Time to Reassess US Policy to Grenada and the Caribbean: SecondGeneration Surrogates?” April 14, 1979, no. 2271, 1. 69. Ibid., 2. 70. Ibid., 3. 71. Robert Pastor, secret NSC memorandum to David Aaron, “Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada—April 27, 1979, 10:30–11:30 am,” April 23, 1979, no. 2385, 2. 72. Ibid., 2. 73. It dawned on Washington that supporting the democratic countries in the region was essential if the threat of more Grenadas was to be reduced. Author telephone interview with Bushnell. 74. Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba?” 14. 75. Richard Loppnow, “Deciding Quickly and Deciding Well: A Case Study of Grenada,” (PhD diss., University of Miami, 1996), 347. 76. Robert Pastor, NSC secret memorandum to David Aaron, “Subject: U.S. Assistance to Grenada,” May 8, 1979, no. 2770, 1. 77. Ibid. 78. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 28. 79. Ibid., 30. 80. Grenada’s attitude to regional aid suggested it were disinterested anyway. About six months after the revolution a new coast guard training program began. There was uncertainty as to whether Grenada should be included; it was decided that if the Grenadian representative was a member of the PRG they would be rejected but if it was a career civil servant they would be accepted. As it was, nobody showed up. Author telephone interview with Bushnell. 81. Anthony Payne, “The Foreign Policy of the People’s Revolutionary Government,” in A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, ed. Jorge Heine (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 140. 82. “Reflections and Apologies by Bernard Coard and His Colleagues,” The Grenada 17, http://www.grenada17.cwc.net/Apologies.htm (accessed February 6, 2007). 83. US Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Statement of Daniel Lynch, Office of Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency,” Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), 116. 84. Dion Phillips, “The Increasing Emphasis on Security and Defense in the Eastern Caribbean,” in Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean, ed. Dion Phillips and Alma Young (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986), 44. See also Richard Sim and James Anderson, “The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum,” Conflict Studies 121 (1980): 1–24. 85. Tad Szulc, “Caribbean,” New York Times Magazine, May 25, 1979, 57. 86. Bishop outlined a three-stage plan: (1) false media reports and the recruitment of prominent individuals to generate internal dissatisfaction, (2) violence and arson, and (3) assassination. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 29. The accusation was based primarily on two fires that had occurred on May 6.

Notes

87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

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A SGU student had burnt down his cottage accommodation and coincidentally a building in St. George’s was gutted in a suspected case of arson. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 31. Ibid., 30. Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 143. Author correspondence with Robert Pastor, former National Security Council member, February 18, 2003. Gates, From the Shadows, 143. Ibid. Ibid. The CIA had recently been the focus of an extensive Congressional investigation. Warren Christopher, confidential telegram to American Embassy, Bridgetown, “Subject: Meeting between Bernard Coard, Finance Minister of the NRG in Grenada, and Assistant Secretary Vaky,” 160008Z, June 16, 1979, Washington D.C., 154578 . 2. Ibid., 2. Vaky described Coard as “intelligent, aggressive by nature, and self-confident and in explaining his government’s policies and goals he was cogent and quite convincing.” Ibid., 4. Christopher, “Subject: Meeting between Bernard Coard, Finance Minister of the NRG in Grenada, and Assistant Secretary Vaky,” 4. Author telephone interview with Bushnell. Warren Christopher secret telegram to American Embassy, Bridgetown, “Subject: Talking Points for Your Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada on June 18,” 142202Z, June 14, 1979, Washington D.C., 153150, 2. Ibid., 3. Author correspondence with Sally Shelton-Colby, former US ambassador to Barbados, September 7, 2004. All of the US aid programmes in the Eastern Caribbean were regionally oriented, designed to strengthen regional institutions and systems. There was no possibility of a bilateral program with Grenada, or any of the other islands, because of the overhead costs (to Washington) and the United States’ strategy of attempting to build and strengthen regional cooperation. Ibid. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 43. Ibid., 46. Ibid., 47. Ibid., 49. Ibid., 51. Ibid., 43. Payne, “The Foreign Policy of the People’s Revolutionary Government,” 134. Coard generally handled relations with the Soviets and headed the first official PRG delegation to Moscow in May 1980. Marcus Poole, “A Study of the Impact of the Bishop Government of Grenada upon the United States and Caribbean relations” (MA dissertation, American University, 1982), 44. The Grenadian ambassador to the USSR, Ian Jacobs, later commented that “the USSR is satisfied with the degree of support that they receive from Grenada . . . especially if our vote on Afghanistan for example, is recognized as one of two Latin American votes (the other being Cuba) in their favour. Considering the risks that we have taken on this and other matters, it might be fair to say that

206

111. 112.

113.

114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.

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Notes

their support for us is actually below our support for them.” W. Richard Jacobs, “Grenada’s Relations with the USSR,” July 11, 1983, in The Grenada Documents, ed. Brian Crozier (London: Sherwood Press , 1987), 86. Jacobs, “Grenada’s Relations with the USSR,” 83. By 1986 the agreements would have delivered approximately 1,000 pistols, 4,000 submachine guns, 90 portable rocket launchers, 7,000 land mines, 15,000 hand grenades, and the following heavy artillery: 84 mortars, 400 heavy machine guns, 48 antiaircraft guns, 50 GRAD-P howitzers, 30 field guns, and 30 anti-tank guns. Also included were 60 armored personnel carriers and patrol vehicles, 86 other military-related vehicles, and 14,000 uniforms. Grenada: A Preliminary Report, 23. See also Nestor Sanchez, “What Was Uncovered in Grenada: The Weapons and Documents,” Caribbean Review 12 (December 1983): 21–23, 59. The Soviets were the primary supplier of military aid although a substantial $32.4 million agreement was signed with North Korea in April 1983. Dae-Ho Byun, North Korea’s Foreign Policy: The Juche Ideology and the Challenge of Gorbachev’s New Thinking (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Reunification of Korea, 1991), 161. For more details on the Grenada-Soviet Union relationship see Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, “Leninism in Grenada,” Problems of Communism 33 (July–August 1984): 1–24; Payne, “The Foreign Policy of the People’s Revolutionary Government”; and Peter Shearman, “The Soviet Union and Grenada under the New Jewel Movement,” International Affairs 61 (1985): 661–673. Brian Hudson, “The Changing Caribbean: Grenada’s New International Airport,” Caribbean Geography 1, no. 1 (May 1983): 52. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books, 1984), 88. Jay Mandle, Big Revolution, Small Country (Lanham, MD: North-South, 1985), 23. Lewis, Reform and Revolution in Grenada, 219. Author telephone interview with a former Department of Defense official, October 10, 1994. Larry Rohter, “Grenada: A Tiny Exporter Of Revolution?” Newsweek, March 31, 1980, 44. John Lent, “Mass Media and Socialist Governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean,” Human Rights Quarterly (1982): 387. The main targets of this arrangement were a Grenadian, D. M. B. Cromwell, who owned 22 percent, and the Trinidad Express newspaper that owned 13 percent. Lent, “Mass Media and Socialist Governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean,” 387. Ricky Singh, “What Has Gone Wrong, Mr. Bishop?’” Caribbean Contact 7 (November 1979): 1. Alister Hughes, “Straws in the Wind,” Caribbean Contact 7 (October 1979): 6. Hughes, “Straws in the Wind,” 6. Alister Hughes, “Strachan Explains Coca-Cola Take Over,” The Grenada Newsletter 7, no. 32 (October 27, 1979): 2. Richard Hart, “Introduction,” in In Nobody’s Backyard: Maurice Bishop’s Speeches: 1979–1983 A Memorial Volume, ed. Chris Searle (London: Zed Books, 1984), xviii. Hughes, “Straws in the Wind,” 6. Author interview with Lyden Ramdhanny, former People’s Revolutionary Government minister, June 22, 2006. Selwyn Ryan, “Grenada: Balance Sheet of the Revolution” (paper presented at a conference on The Grenada Revolution, 1979–83, May 24–25, 1984, Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad), 4.

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129. Author interview with Sir Daniel Williams, Grenadian Governor-General, June 23, 2006. In a 1984 survey 60.3 percent of people felt that freedom of speech had deteriorated under the PRG and 70.1 percent were critical of the lack of elections. Patrick Emmanuel, Farley Braithwaite, and Eudine Barriteau, Political Change and Public Opinion in Grenada, 1979–1984 (Cave Hill, Barbados: University of the West Indies, 1984), 26–28. 130. Virgil Randolph, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Bishop charges Attempted Coup,” 052250Z, November 5, 1979, Bridgetown 4597, 3. 131. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 53. 132. Sally Shelton, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: US-Grenadian Relations in the Aftermath of the Bomb Blast,” 232024Z, June 23 1980, Bridgetown 03122, 3. 133. Maurice Bishop, “Forward Ever! Against Imperialism and Towards Genuine National Independence and People’s Power, March 13, 1980,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks, ed. Marcus and Taber, 84. However, as Ryan states, “despite all the justified criticisms which are leveled against Westminster type elections, they are nonetheless part of a package of norms and practices which are mutually reinforcing, and once they are dismissed as irrelevant there is nothing else which cannot be withdrawn in the name of the people’s democracy, guided democracy or some other variant.” Ryan, “Grenada,” 4. 134. Cynthia Mahabir, “Heavy Manners and Making Freedom under the People’s Revolutionary Government in Grenada, 1979–1983,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 21 (1993): 225. 135. Cyrus Vance, confidential telegram to American Embassy, Bridgetown, “Subject: Talking Points for Meeting with PM Bishop,” 150133Z, December 15, 1979, Washington D.C. 322604, 9. 136. Ibid., 1. 137. Ibid., 2. 138. Sally Shelton, confidential telegram to the secretary of state, “Subject: Ambassador’s Visit to Grenada: A Preliminary Report,” 182105Z, December 18, 1979, Bridgetown 5310, 1. 139. Ibid., 2. 140. US Congress, Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean, 68. 141. Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), 154. 142. Chris Searle, Grenada: The Struggle against Destabilization (London: Writers & Readers Publishing, 1983), 56. 143. In St. Lucia 97 percent of the crop was lost, 95 percent in St. Vincent, 75 percent in Dominica and 40 percent in Grenada. Pearce, Under the Eagle, 141. 144. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 68. 145. Ibid., 62. 146. US Congress, Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean, 68. 147. Fitzroy Ambursley, “Grenada: the New Jewel Revolution,” in Crisis in the Caribbean, ed. Fitzroy Ambursley and Robin Cohen (London: Heinemann, 1982), 208. 148. Washington had reservations about Williams due to her alleged involvement in gunrunning prior to the revolution. Washington delayed making a decision hoping that the PRG would get the message that the United States would prefer an alternative candidate. Warren Christopher, confidential telegram to American Embassy, Bridgetown, “Subject: Request for Agrement for Dessima Williams as PRG Ambassador to the United States,” 151521Z, May 15, 1980, Washington D.C. 127947, 1–3. As

208

149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

159. 160.

161.

162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

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Williams later commented, the PRG’s inexperience meant that it did not interpret Washington’s response correctly and kept the issue alive, refusing to take no for an answer. Author telephone interview with Dessima Williams, former Grenadian ambassador to the Organization of American States, June 21, 2000. “Telex to the United States Embassy, Barbados, 12.12.80,” GDMC, no. 003104. Sally Shelton, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Requests Ambassador to Visit for High-Level Consultations,” 161402Z, December 16, 1980, Bridgetown 07147, 2. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 85. Virgil Randolph, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Blames U.S. for Poor Relations,” 231915Z, October 23, 1980, Bridgetown 06314, 3. H. Michael Erisman, “The CARICOM States and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 31, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 142. “The Declaration of St. George’s,” Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 5 ( July–August 1979): 32. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 124. Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba?” 12. Ralph Gonsalves, “The Importance of the Grenada Revolution to the Eastern Caribbean,” Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 5, no. 1 (March–April 1979): 9. US Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The English-Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Policy, Report by the Congressional Research Service of the proceedings of a workshop held on December 11, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985), 100. Eudine Barriteau, “Regional Comments on Barbados-Grenada Relations,” Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 6, no. 5 (November–December 1980): 23. Dion Phillips, “Defense Policy in Barbados, 1966–1988,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 32, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 77. Having almost been toppled by a radical-led revolt and army mutiny fed by Black Power militancy in 1970, Williams had pursued a repressive policy against perceived left-wing subversion. Anthony Maingot, “The United States in the Caribbean: Geopolitics and the Bargaining Capacity of Small States,” in Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean, ed. Anthony Bryan, J. Edward Greene, and Timothy Shaw (London: Macmillan, 1990), 74. The BDF was formed in August 1979 and by 1983 contained 610 members. Phillips, “Defense Policy in Barbados,” 81. Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean, 130. Phillips, “Defense Policy in Barbados,” 80. Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1986), 181. Christopher, “Subject: Talking Points for Your Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,” 7. Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba?” 12. Author telephone interview with Bushnell. Author correspondence with Pastor.

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170. Gonsalves, “The Importance of the Grenada Revolution,” 3. 171. Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean, 234.

Chapter 4 1. Richard Melanson, Writing History and Making Policy: The Cold War, Vietnam, and Revisionism (New York: University Press of America, 1983), 230. 2. Goran Rystad, Prisoners of the Past? The Munich Syndrome and Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era (Lund, Sweden: CWK Gleerup, 1982), 44. 3. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 316. 4. The Vietnam Syndrome refers to the impact of the Vietnam War on US foreign policy. The essence is that intervention abroad would not be supported by the public and would end in disaster. US policy in Central America and the evolution of the Reagan Doctrine reflect the constraints imposed by the Vietnam Syndrome. 5. Robert Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 16. 6. James Greene and Brent Scowcroft, ed., Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin, Reportof the Atlantic Council’s Working Group on the Caribbean Basin (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984), 144. 7. Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 117. 8. Tom Enders, “A Comprehensive Strategy for the Caribbean Basin,” Caribbean Review 11, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 11. 9. Michael Klare, “The Reagan Doctrine,” New Statesman, November 4, 1983, 10. 10. “Operation Urgent Fury,” PBS Frontline, transcript no. 602 (New York: Journal Graphics, 1988), 5. 11. Author telephone interview with John Bushnell, former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, July 29, 1995. 12. Author telephone interview with Linda Flohr, former third secretary, US embassy, Barbados, December 19, 1994. 13. During the intervention, US troops captured over 5 tons of PRG documents. A microfiched copy of this valuable resource can be found at the US National Archives, Maryland. 14. Lawrence Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup: A Background Paper (Bridgetown, Barbados: U.S. Embassy, 1983), 61. 15. John Walton Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution: The Impact and Limits of Cuban International Aid Programs,” 2 vols (PhD diss., Boston University Graduate School, 1992), 132. 16. Courtney Smith, “The Development Strategy of the People’s Revolutionary Government: The Political Economy of Economic Transformation in Grenada, 1979–1983” (PhD diss., University of Hull, 1988), 342. 17. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 71. 18. Ibid., 72. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany declined to attend. Britain had not been invited. Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Sweden, Syria, Venezuela, and several international agencies such as OPEC did attend and

210

19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

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pledge funds. “GRENADA: World Bank and IMF accused,” Latin American Weekly Report: Caribbean and Central America, May 8, 1981, 1. Maurice Bishop, “Bishop Letter to President Reagan, March 26, 1981,” The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/ bishltr1.html (accessed February 7, 2007). Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 73. Ibid. Funding came from Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Venezuela. Iraq’s contribution was sent twice by mistake and, ironically, Libya’s £2.5 million contribution was used to pay the American company Layne Dredging. Author interview with Bob Evans, former Point Salines International Airport project manager, June 14, 2006. The British firm Plessey won the £6.5 million contract to provide navigation and communications facilities; the contract was underwritten by the British government’s Export Credit Guarantee Department. Author interview with Mike Barnard, former Plessey contractor, October 25, 2006. Author interview with Craig Johnstone, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, September 1, 1994. US Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1983), 5. For the military facility argument see Timothy Ashby, The Bear in the Backyard: Moscow’s Caribbean Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 81–101. Smith, “The Development Strategy,” 326. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 73. People’s Revolutionary Government Political Bureau, “Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 27th May, 1981,” in The Grenada Documents: A Selection and Overview, document 53, ed. Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1984), 3. Author interview with Lawrence Rossin, Foreign Service officer, October 28, 1994. The original Cuban design was for a 7,800-foot runway but commercial transatlantic planes required a 9,000-foot runway so the PRG asked the Cubans to revise the plan. Author interview with Bob Evans. Robert Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 27. Horace Bartilow, The Debt Dilemma: IMF Negotiations in Jamaica, Grenada, and Guyana (London: Macmillan, 1997), 303. Ibid., 332. Ibid., 290. Claremont Kirton, “Grenada and the IMF: The PRG’s Extended Fund Facility Program, 1983,” Latin American Perspectives 16, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 121. Frederic Pryor, “Socialism via Foreign Aid: The PRG’s Economic Policies with the Soviet Bloc,” in A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, ed. Jorge Heine (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 156. “The Grenada Voice,” The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/voice1stissue.html (accessed January 25, 2007). Author interview with Leslie Pierre, editor of the Grenadian Voice, June 21, 2006. Alister Hughes, “New Newspaper in Grenada/‘Voice’ issue seized: Arrests made,” Grenada Newsletter 9, no. 3 (August 8, 1981): 2. Author interview with Leslie Pierre. Lloyd Noel, former PRG attorney general, and Tillman Thomas were also detained. Both were contributors to the first issue.

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40. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 58. 41. Virgil Randolph, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Bishop’s Speech Concerning Closing of ‘The Grenadian Voice’,” 261051Z, June 26, 1981, Barbados 03164, Folder 1, Incoming FOIAs, Box 4, Grenada 6104, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. In his dealings with Grenada, Warne recalls that “I really was given very strong instructions. I really didn’t give them any room at all.” Robert Warne, former head of the Caribbean Desk, State Department, interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, April 1, 1995, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., http://memory.loc. gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 12, 2007). 42. Maurice Bishop, “Freedom of the Press and Imperialist Destabilization, June 19, 1981,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979–83, ed. Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (New York: Pathfinder, 1983), 164. 43. Brian Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada (London: Macmillan, 1993), 161. Meeks was the editor of the PRG-controlled Free West Indian newspaper during 1981–1982. 44. Chris Searle, Grenada: The Struggle against Destabilization (London: Writers & Readers Publishing, 1983), 37–38. 45. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bureau, “Draft/letter to the US embassy,” GDMC, no. 002308. 46. Maurice Bishop, “Bishop Letter to President Reagan, August 11, 1981,” The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/bishltr2. html (accessed January 25, 2007). 47. Ibid. 48. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Text of Grenada-U.S. Exchange of Letters Released,” 111453Z, March 11, 1982, Bridgetown 01335, 1. 49. Ibid. 50. Bish, “Subject: Grenada: Text of Grenada-U.S. Exchange of Letters Released,” 2. 51. The CBI included one-way free trade, investment incentives for US businesses, technical assistance to the private sector, and $350 million in bilateral aid. Robert Pastor, “Sinking in the Caribbean Basin,” Foreign Affairs 60 (1982): 1039. 52. US President, “Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, February 24, 1982,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan. utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/22482a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). 53. Ibid., 211. 54. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, United States Policy toward Grenada, 97th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), 47. 55. Kai Schoenhals and Richard Melanson. Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States and the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 128. 56. “Minutes of the Political and Economic Bureau, August, 31st, 1983,” GDMC, no. 002306, 5. 57. US President, “Remarks in Bridgetown, Barbados, Following a Luncheon Meeting with Leaders of Eastern Caribbean Countries, April 8, 1982,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan. utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/40882a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007).

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58. David Eric Pearson, “The Betrayal of Truth and Trust by Government: Deception as Process and Practice,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1988), 171. 59. US Congress, United States Policy toward Grenada, 3. Dymally was the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus Task Force on the Caribbean. 60. US Congress, United States Policy toward Grenada, 41. 61. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, no subject heading, 162143Z, n.d., Bridgetown 01527, 2. 62. “Text of a Telex Sent to the United States Embasy (sic) in Barbados on December 30th,” GDMC, no. 002303, 1. 63. Ibid., 1. 64. Ludlow Flower, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Protests Statement by Vice President Bush,” 042122Z, January 4, 1983, Bridgetown 0044, 1. 65. Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Tracks Cuban Aid to Grenada: In ’81, Senate Unit Nixed CIA Plan to Destabilize Isle,” Washington Post, February 27, 1983, A11. 66. US President, “Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers, March 10, 1983,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/31083a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). 67. Ibid. 68. US President, “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). 69. Ibid. 70. US President, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America, April 27, 1983,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/42783d. htm (accessed March 25, 2007). 71. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 28. 72. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bureau, “Draft/ letter to the US embassy,” GDMC, no. 002308. 73. Maurice Bishop, “An Armed Attack against Our Country Is Imminent, March 23, 1983,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks 279. 74. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books, 1984), 112. 75. Ludlow Flower, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada after the Bishop-Reagan Exchange: Quiet, Puzzled, Disgruntled,” 201845Z, April 20, 1983, Bridgetown 02334, 2. 76. “Statement of Stephen W. Bosworth, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs,” in US Congress, United States Policy toward Grenada, 29. 77. Cynthia Mahabir, “Heavy Manners and Making Freedom Under the People’s Revolutionary Goverment in Grenada, 1979–1983,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 21 (1993): 233. 78. “Grenada’s Foreign Policy,” GDMC, no. 006097, 7. 79. Max Azicri, “Cuba and the U.S.: What Happened to Rapprochement?” in The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean, ed. Barry Levine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 171.

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80. Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution,” 101. 81. Reagan, “Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative.” 82. James Herbert Anderson, “National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions during the 1980s: A Comparative Analysis of Operations Urgent Fury, El Dorado Canyon and Just Cause” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993), 53. 83. Robert Pastor, “The U.S. and the Caribbean: The Power of the Whirlpool,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 533 (May 1994): 28. 84. John Walton Cotman, The Gorrion Tree: Cuba and the Grenada Revolution (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 84. 85. Author interview with John Kelly, former British representative in Grenada, British High Commission, Barbados, February 16, 1995. Kelly was the Foreign and Commonwealth Office representative in Grenada between 1981 and 1984. 86. Betty Glad and Charles Taber, “Images, Learning, and the Decision to Use Force: The Domino Theory of the United States,” in Psychological Dimensions of War, ed. Betty Glad, 73 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990). 87. Rossin, United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup, 76. 88. Another form of available US aid was via direct assistance to the private sector and AID devised ways to funnel aid through the CDB without it reaching Grenada. US General Accounting Office, AID Assistance to the Eastern Caribbean: Program Changes and Possible Consequences (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), i. 89. Article 8, paragraph 4, of the OECS Treaty states: “The Defence and Security Committee shall have responsibility for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” William Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation (London: Mansell, 1984), 81. 90. Maurice Bishop, “For Greater Caribbean Community Integration, June 29, 1981,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks, 171. 91. “CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY—Third Meeting of Heads of Government Conference,” Keesings Contemporary Archives 29 (February 1983): 31, 946. 92. “Memorandum by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat,” UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, Grenada (London: HMSO, 1983–84), 304. 93. Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Intervention (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 96. 94. Reagan, “Remarks in Bridgetown.” 95. Anthony Maingot, “The English-Speaking Caribbean and Hemisphere Security Policy: The Lessons of Grenada,” in Security in the Americas, ed. Georges Fauriol (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1989), 243. 96. This was the first meeting since 1975. 97. “The Political Situation in the Caribbean and Grenada’s Present Position within that Scenario,” GDMC, no. 004872, 2. 98. Payne et al., Grenada, 97. 99. “CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY,” Keesings, 31948.

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100. William Demas, Head of the CDB, quoted in D. Brent Hardt, “Grenada Reconsidered,” Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs 11, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 296. 101. Tony Thorndike, “Politics and Society in the South-Eastern Caribbean,” in Society and Politics in the Caribbean, ed. Colin Clarke (London: Macmillan, 1991), 124. 102. Author interview with Joseph Edmunds, former St. Lucian ambassador to the United States, August 2, 1994. 103. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 29. 104. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, 88. 105. Barbados contributed 49 percent of the cost to a Central Fund, appointed a chief of staff to serve as a regional security coordinator, and provided facilities for a headquarters on Barbados. H. Michael Erisman, “The CARICOM States and US Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 31, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 169. 106. Paul Sutton, “The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (1993): 13. 107. Frank McNeil, War and Peace in Central America: Reality and Illusion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 172. 108. Erisman, “The CARICOM States and US Foreign Policy,” 162. 109. H. Michael Erisman and John Martz, Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 215. 110. “The Political Situation in the Caribbean,” GDMC, no. 004872, 6. 111. Ibid., 3. 112. Ibid., 2. 113. US Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary Report, 21. The United States and Britain knew weapons had been arriving but not the quantities involved. Author interview with Kelly. 114. CIA Interagency Intelligence Assessment, “A First Look at Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement,” December 19, 1983, 3. http://www.foia.cia.gov/default.asp (accessed January 25, 2007). 115. CIA Interagency Intelligence Assessment, “A First Look at Mechanisms,” 16. 116. For a detailed examination of the visit see Gary Williams, “Brief Encounter: Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s Visit to Washington,” Journal of Latin American Studies 34 (2002): 659–685. 117. Author telephone interview with Dessima Williams, former Grenadian ambassador to the Organization of American States, June 21, 2000. 118. The final vote was not unanimous, with Coard and Liam James expressing their uncertainties. Author interview with Kelly. 119. Charles Hill, secret memorandum for Mr William P. Clark, The White House, ‘Subject Visa for Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada’, May 18, 1983, Department of State 8315359,1. 120. Anthony Payne, “The Foreign Policy of the People’s Revolutionary Government,” in A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, ed. Jorge Heine (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990) 142. 121. Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story (New York: Madison Books, 1984), 105. 122. Gail Reed, “Advice on U.S. Tour,” in The Grenada Papers, ed. Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall(San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), 173.

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123. The PRG had outlined five core foreign policy principles—anti-imperialism, achievement of a new international economic order, promotion of world peace and cooperation. pursuit of regional cooperation and integration, and support for national liberation struggles. See Payne, “The Foreign Policy of the People’s Revolutionary Government.” 124. Selwyn Strachan subsequently met with the Grenadian media to request them to tone down their attacks on the United States as it could jeopardize Bishop’s visit. “Minutes of the Political Bureau 4th May, 1983,” in The Grenada Documents, document 93, 5. 125. Ludlow Flower, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Local Coverage of Bishop’s Visit to US,” 012008Z, June 1, 1983, Bridgetown 03082, 1. 126. Tony, Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 130. In the aftermath of his visit Bishop raised just such prospect in a plenary session of the PB, arguing that “the private sector must be encouraged to explore opportunities in the area of investments by the CBI.” “Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, July 13–19 1983,” in The Grenada Documents, document 110, 12. 127. Charles Hill, “Subject: Visa for Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada,” 1. 128. Ibid. 129. Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, secret memorandum to William Clark, The White House, “Visa for Grenadian Prime Minister Bishop,” May 23, 1983, National Security Council 3421, 1. 130. Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, confidential memorandum to Robert McFarlane, The White House, “St. George’s Medical School,” June 7, 1983, National Security Council 3900, 1. 131. William Clark, top secret memorandum to George Shultz, secretary of state, “Grenada,” June 20, 1983, The White House 90742, 1. 132. “Press Statement: Council on Hemispheric Affairs,” GDMC, no. 006522, 1. 133. Kenneth Dam, confidential memorandum to President Ronald Reagan, The White House, “Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada,” June 7, 1983, Department of State 8317648, 1. 134. George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 324. 135. Constantine Menges and Roger Fontaine, memorandum for Alan Myer, National Security Council, October 25, 1983, “Grenada/Lebanon 27.10.83,” White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, File OA 16044, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 2. 136. Author interview with Caspar Weinberger, former secretary of defense, October 7, 1994. 137. Maurice Bishop, “Maurice Bishop Speaks to U.S. Working People, June 5, 1983,” in Maurice Bishop Speaks, 289. 138. Ibid., 290. 139. Ibid. 140. Ibid., 306. 141. Anonymous, “Handwritten Notes of a Meeting with National Security Advisor Clark,” in The Grenada Papers, 178–180. 142. Also in attendance were William Middendorf, NSC staffer Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, and Department of State Head of Caribbean Affairs Ambassador Richard Brown. Accompanying Bishop were Dessima Williams, Unison Whiteman, and Liam James.

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143. Author telephone interview with Kenneth Dam, former deputy secretary of state, August 17, 1999. 144. Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall, eds., The Grenada Papers (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), 176. 145. Ibid., 176. 146. Ibid., 178. 147. Author telephone interview with Dessima Williams. 148. “Handwritten Notes of a Meeting with National Security Advisor Clark,” 179. 149. Author telephone interview with Dam. 150. Dam, “Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,” 1. 151. Author telephone interview with former Department of Defense official, October 10, 1994. 152. Dam, “Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,” 1. 153. Ibid., 2. 154. Bernard Nossiter, “Grenada Premier Establishes ‘Some Sort’ of U.S. Rapport,” New York Times, June 10, 1983, A8. 155. Ibid. 156. Ibid. 157. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo, “Bishop Says U.S. Blocked International Aid,” Declassified Documents Catalog, document no. 002433, vol. 14 (September– October 1988), 1. 158. Author telephone interview with Dessima Williams. 159. Charles Hill, confidential memorandum to William Clark, The White House, “Subject: Grenada: Response to Bishop’s Remarks, Attachment: Talking Points for Ambassador Middendorf,” June 21, 1983, Department of State 8319071, 1. 160. Author telephone interview with Dessima Williams. 161. Schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada, 136. 162. Author telephone interview with Dessima Williams. 163. “Grenada Awaits the US Response,” Caribbean Insight 6 (July 1983): 1. 164. Liam James, “Report on Visit of Prime Minister to the USA,” The Grenada Documents Collection, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections, Box 3 Folder 43, “International Relations—United States of America,” 1. http://www.library. georgetown.edu/dept/speccoll/grenada.htm (accessed January 26, 2007). 165. Ibid., 5. 166. Ibid., 7. 167. Thorndike, Grenada, 141. 168. Ibid. 169. CIA Interagency Intelligence Assessment, “A First Look at the Mechanisms of Control,” 23. On the day that Bishop returned from Washington, Coard addressed the Caribbean People’s Alliance meeting in Grenada and accused the United States of “propaganda tactics, threats of possible military force, recruitment and training or mercenaries, and economic coercion.” Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Assessments and Research, “Grenada: The Bishop Years, A Chronology,” Secret Report 721-AR, November 22, 1983, 14. 170. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Bishop Calls U.S. Arrogant,” 0813502Z, June 8, 1983, Bridgetown 03195, 1. 171. “Press Statement by Mr. Maurice Bishop,” no. 005810, 2.

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172. Author telephone interview with Dessima Williams. 173. Author correspondence with Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, former National Security Council member, December 12, 1999. 174. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 32.

Chapter 5 1. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee, “Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM, 14–16 September, 1983,” document no. 112, in Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, ed. Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and the Department of Defense, 1984), 43. 2. There were never more than about 70 full members of the NJM as most of the 300 individuals were “candidate members” who were still receiving political education and lacked full voting rights. In a society of approximately 85,000 people “it confirms that the party continued to repudiate easy populism and membership for its own sake, and that it adhered rigidly to the concept of a ‘vanguard organisation’.” Fitzroy Ambursley and James Dunkerley, Grenada: Whose Freedom? (London: Latin America Bureau, 1984), 58. 3. Brian Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada (London: Macmillan, 1993), 173. 4. Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, “Leninism in Grenada,” Problems of Communism 33 (July–August 1984): 16. 5. Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Intervention (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 111. 6. Kai Schoenhals, “The Road to Fort Rupert: The Revolution’s Final Crisis,” paper presented at the conference on Democracy, Development and Collective Security in the Eastern Caribbean: The Lessons of Grenada, (The Caribbean Institute and Study Center for Latin America of Inter American University of Puerto Rico, San German, Puerto Rico, October 17–19, 1985), 1. 7. Jorge Heine, “The Hero and the Apparatchik: Charismatic Leadership, Political Management, and Crisis in Revolutionary Grenada,” in A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, ed. Jorge Heine (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 241. 8. Manning Marable, African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to the Grenada Revolution (London: Verso, 1987), 225. 9. Heine, “The Hero and the Apparatchik,” 221. The Line of March speech can be found in The Grenada Papers, ed. Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), 59–88. 10. Carl Feuer, “Was Bishop a Social Democrat?” Caribbean Review 12, no. 4 (Fall 1983): 39. 11. Heine, “The Hero and the Apparatchik,” 244. 12. Ibid., 238. 13. CIA Interagency Intelligence Report, “A First Look at the Mechanisms of Control,” A1. 14. Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 171. 15. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee, “Minutes of ExtraOrdinary Meeting of the Central Committee of NJM From Tuesday 12th–Friday

218

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

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15th October, 1982,” document no. 105, in Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, ed. Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and the Department of Defense, 1984), 1. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 8. Payne et al., Grenada, 106. Ambursley and Dunkerley, Grenada, 55. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee, “Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13–19 July, 1983,” document no. 110, in Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, ed. Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and the Department of Defense, 1984), 1. Ibid., 1. Ibid. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee, “Minutes of Emergency Meeting of N.J.M. Central Committee Dated 26th August, 1983,” document no. 111, in Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, ed. Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and the Department of Defense, 1984), 4. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 6. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee, “Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee,” document no. 112, 3. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 14. Ibid., 16. Ibid., 19. Ibid., 21. Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 175. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee, “Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee,” in Grenada Documents, ed. Ledeen and Romerstein, document no. 112, 29. Ibid., 43. Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 151. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee, “Extra-Ordinary General Meeting of Full Members, September 25th, 1983,” document no. 113, in Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, ed. Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and the Department of Defense, 1984), 10. Ibid., 14. Thorndike, Grenada, 152. Grenada Foundation, An Interview with George Louison and Kendrick Radix (New York: Grenada Foundation, 1984), 25. George Brizan, Grenada: Island of Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1998), 434. Payne et al., Grenada, 128. John Walton Cotman, The Gorrion Tree: Cuba and the Grenada Revolution (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 211. Fidel Castro, “Nothing Can Stop the Course of History,” quoted in John Walton Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution: The Impact and Limits of Cuban

Notes

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

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International Aid Programs,” 2 vols. (PhD diss., Boston University Graduate School, 1992), 501. Payne et al., Grenada, 129. Louison quoted in Steve Clark, “The Second Assassination of Maurice Bishop,” New International: A Magazine of Marxist Politics and Theory 6 (1987): 50. Payne et al., Grenada, 129. Ambursley and Dunkerley, Grenada, 71. In December 1979, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet troops assassinated the president and installed their favored replacement. Selwyn Strachan, “Report on the Meeting of the PB [Political Bureau] and CC [Central Committee] held on Oct. 12th given by Cde. Strachan,” in The Grenada Papers, ed. Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), 317. US Department of State and Department of Defense. Grenada: A Preliminary Report (Washington D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1983), 34. Author interview with Vincent Roberts, former head of CID, Grenadian Police, June 21, 2006. Roberts led the investigation into the rumor. Michael Als, “Press Statement Presented by Michael Als on Mediation of the Crisis in the NJM,” 8. The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/mediation.html (accessed January 26, 2007). Several militia units loyal to Bishop began to mobilize and arm themselves. Kai Schoenhals and Richard Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States and the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 73. There were also reports of unrest in other parishes and steps were taken to remove militia weapons and strengthen PRA units. Gregory Sandford, The New Jewel Movement: Grenada’s Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, 1985), 179. RFG usually went off the air at midnight so it is unclear how many people would have heard the broadcast. Marable, African and Caribbean Politics, 258. “Resolution of People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces Branch of the New Jewel Movement,” The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/praresolution.html (January 29, 2007). Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 14. Vincent Noel, “Letter from Noel to Central Committee, October 17, 1983,” The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/noelletter. html (accessed January 29, 2007). Clark, “The Second Assassination of Maurice Bishop,” 55. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 116. Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 60. Ibid. Menges’s forwardness might be partly explained by the fact that a week earlier, on October 4, he had secured presidential approval for a review of Eastern Caribbean regional security policy with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 105. Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981–1991 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 333.

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64. The RIG was an offshoot of the five Inter-Agency Groups (IGs) that existed to handle each of the main regions of the world. IGs commonly had about 20 members; representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, the Treasury, and so on. Motley was in charge of the IG for Latin America. He created the RIG so that only the key actors—the secretary of state, JCS, CIA, and NSC—would be involved. The RIG reported to the National Security Planning Group. 65. Author interview with Langhorne Motley, former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, August 25, 1994. Motley also contacted a JCS representative to advise that it might be necessary to plan on short notice a military operation in support of an evacuation. Ronald Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October–2 November 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/urgfury.pdf (accessed January 29, 2007), 11. 66. Kelly had first reported rumors of Bishop’s house arrest and the danger to his life on Tuesday, October 11. He remained in contact with the high commission in Barbados throughout the crisis via the telephone and VHF radio. Author correspondence with John Kelly, former British representative in Grenada, British High Commission, Barbados, December 21, 1995. 67. Milan Bish, former US ambassador to Barbados, private papers. 68. Ibid. 69. Tom Adams, “Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados the Hon. Mr. Tom Adams Explaining His Reasons for Taking Part in the Invasion of Grenada,” in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Supplement no. 1 (October 1983): 35. 70. Janet Higbie, Eugenia: The Caribbean’s Iron Lady (London: Macmillan, 1993), 223. 71. Adams, “Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados,” 35. 72. Author interview with Ludlow Flower, former deputy chief of mission, US Embassy, Barbados, October 27, 1994. 73. Author interview with Motley. 74. Stephen Edward Flynn, “Grenada as a ‘Reactive’ and a ‘Proactive’ Crisis: New Models of Crisis Decisionmaking” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University), 1991, 106. 75. John Quigley, “The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger Than Fiction,” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 18, no. 4 (Winter 1986–1987): 338. 76. Marable, African and Caribbean Politics, 259. This announcement directly contradicted the broadcast of a mere 30 minutes before. 77. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 96. One of the authors of the plan, Major Mark Adkin, reveals that the rescue operation “assumed a hostile reception and was based on a surprise coup de main operation. The first phase would occur during darkness, with the troops arriving by helicopter. Key targets were Bishop’s house, the governorgeneral’s residence, Pearls and Salines airfields, the radio station, and a series of blocking or ambush positions to the north and south of St. George’s.” Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), 92. 78. Author interview with Milan Bish, former US ambassador to Barbados, September 21, 1994.

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79. Author interview with Flower. 80. Payne et al., Grenada, 132. 81. Clark, “The Second Assassination of Maurice Bishop,” 59. Radix had resigned his post on October 13. 82. Bish’s private papers. 83. Schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada, 75. 84. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Current Situation,” undated, 1. 85. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Unrest: Political Solution Talks Apparently Going On: Military Divided Between Coard and Bishop,” 151602Z, October 15, 1983, Bridgetown 06249, 1. 86. Ibid. 87. Bish, “Subject: Grenada Current Situation,” 1. 88. Bish’s private papers. 89. John Ventour, “October 1983: The Missing Link,” in The Grenada Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report on Certain Political Events which Occurred in Grenada 1976–1991, vol. 2 (St. George’s, Grenada: Government Printery, 2006), Appendix 14, 22. Ventour was a trade union leader and later a member of the Political Bureau. 90. Fidel Castro, “Letter from Castro to Central Committee 10/15/83,” in The Grenada Papers, ed. Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), 327. 91. Ibid., 328. 92. Bernard Diederich, “Interviewing George Louison: A PRG Minister Discusses the Killings,” Caribbean Review 12 (December 1984): 17. 93. Marable, African and Caribbean Politics, 259. 94. Hudson Austin, “Statement Broadcast by General Hudson Austin on Behalf of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement, 16th October 1983, at approximately 12:04 p.m., on Radio Free Grenada,” in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Supplement no. 1 (October 1983): 5. 95. Ibid., 9. 96. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to the secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Army Plumps for Coard, but Bishop Not Yet Out. Where Do We Go from Here?” 162225Z, October 16, 1983, Bridgetown 06265, 3. 97. Ibid., 5. 98. Ralph Kinney Bennett, “Grenada: Anatomy of a ‘Go’ Decision,” Reader’s Digest, February 1984, 72. 99. Author interview with Motley. George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 328. 100. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 98. 101. Don Oberdorfer, “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention,’” Washington Post, November 6, 1983, A21. 102. Author interview with Bish. 103. Bish’s private papers. 104. Ibid. 105. Larry Speakes, “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 9.21 A.M., October 17, 1983,” The White House: Office of the Press Secretary (WHOPS), no. 876 /10-17, Box 33, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 1.

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106. Flohr was an experienced CIA case officer. Duane Clarridge, with Digby Diehl, A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), 247–260. On Monday, October 17, two Barbadian military personnel, Alvin Quintyne and Marita Browne, visited Grenada under cover to assess the situation. They returned the next day. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 92. 107. US Department of State, Langhorne Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” Department of State Bulletin 84 (March 1984): 70. 108. The OECS was established in 1981 and consisted of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 109. Diederich, “Interviewing George Louison,” 17. 110. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books, 1984), 129. 111. Ibid., 130. 112. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 64. 113. Ibid., 65. 114. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 326. 115. Ibid. 116. The Naval Task Force included the Navy’s Amphibious Squadron Four and the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit (22d MAU). Ronald Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1984), 1. At the same time the USS Independent left the naval base at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Bennett, “Grenada,” 73. 117. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 117. 118. Bish’s private papers. 119. Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” 71. 120. Ibid. 121. US Embassy London, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: [excised] Bishop’s ‘Slow Toppling’,” 181511Z, October 18, 1983, London 22273, 2. 122. Ibid. 123. Als, “Press Statement Presented by Michael Als,” 8. 124. Diederich, “Interviewing George Louison,” 18. 125. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Update: Cabinet Members Resign. Foreign Minister Criticizes Coard,” 191905Z, October 19, 1983, Bridgetown 06372, 1. 126. Marable, African and Caribbean Politics, 259. 127. Author correspondence with Kenneth Kurze, former counselor for political and economic affairs, US Embassy, Barbados, August 20, 1995. 128. Adams had apparently heard rumors a few weeks before that there was a serious threat to the prisoners’ lives. In a conversation with St. Vincent’s prime minister Milton Cato, Cato had questioned the propriety of rescuing Bishop while ignoring “many other political prisoners in Grenada, put there by Bishop’s government.” Patrick Tyler, “The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning,” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, A14. 129. Bish’s private papers. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. Adams was willing to offer Bishop asylum as well and had in fact done so previously. 132. Ibid.

Notes

133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148.

149. 150. 151. 152. 153.

154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

159. 160.

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Ibid. Ibid. Adams, “Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados,” 36. Interview with George Louison, former People’s Revolutionary Government minister, by Hugh O’Shaughnessy, undated transcript, 22. Cotman, The Gorrion Tree, 216. Thorndike, Grenada, 159. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 51. Thorndike, Grenada, 159. Creft was detained with Bishop when she visited him. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 53. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 56. Ibid., 57. Ibid., 58. Ibid. Cotman, The Gorrion Tree, 216. Ibid. It is uncertain what the offer contained. In a 1985 interview, Castro insisted that “I would never, under any circumstances, have authorized the Cuban personnel to have become involved. Of that you can be sure. Our answer would have been ‘no.’ But there wasn’t even time to answer. There was no need to answer.” Cotman, The Gorrion Tree, 217. Ventour, “October 1983,” 19. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 60. Ibid. “Manners” is a colloquial Grenadian term for discipline or punishment. Thorndike, Grenada, 160. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 61. In 1996, Coard, imprisoned for life, confirmed that “on that fateful day, some of us were destined to die. If things had unfolded differently . . . there is no doubt in our minds that some or all of us now in prison would have been killed.” Bernard Coard and Colleagues, “Reflections and Apologies by Bernard Coard and His Colleagues,” The Grenada 17, http://www.grenada17. cwc.net/ (accessed January 29, 2007). Also published in the Grenadian Voice, February 1997, 2. Thorndike, Grenada, 161. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 61. Thorndike says that the alleged plan was to “take Fort Rupert with the minimum of force and to storm the communications building and, if possible, capture Bishop and his allies.” Thorndike, Grenada, 161. Gordon Lewis, Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled (Baltimore, NJ: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 57. Thorndike, Grenada, 161. Ibid., 162. Adkin says Redhead, Abdullah, and Stroude actually went to Fort Frederick to report to Coard who was not pleased. The Coards, Austin, Layne, James, Strachan, Cornwall, Ventour, McBarnette, Bartholemew, and St. Bernard then voted unanimously to execute the eight detainees. This chronology places the executions at 2:00 p.m. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 74. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 76. Ibid., 77. Although the PRG was disbanded and the cabinet dismissed, the 16member RMC contained five former ministers. It was headed by Austin, with James and Layne as joint vice-chairmen. Cotman, The Gorrion Tree, 209. In reality the RMC was just a list of names and never formally met.

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161. Coard had kept a low profile since resigning on Friday, October 14, and after the massacre the CIA was uncertain if he was still alive. CIA Memo, “Grenada Chronology, 7–25 October,” document no. 002449, Declassified Documents Catalog 14 (September–October 1988), 3. 162. Austin had led the March 1979 attack on the True Blue barracks and was appointed head of the PRA in 1981. Timothy O’Leary and Denise Cabrera, “Austin had close ties to Grenada’s Bishop,” Washington Times, October 21, 1983, A12. 163. O’Shaughnessy, Grenada, 139. 164. Ibid. 165. Hudson Austin, “Statement by General Hudson Austin on Behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council, Monitored on Radio Free Grenada, 10:00 P.M. October 19, 1983,” in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 11–12. 166. Ibid., 12. 167. Lewis, Grenada, 62. 168. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada Update: Bishop Re-arrested,” 192034Z, October 19, 1983, Bridgetown 06380, 1. 169. Bish’s private papers. 170. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Planning for Possible Emergency Evacuation of Amcits—Grenada,” 192356Z, October 19, 1983, Bridgetown 06387, 1. 171. Author interview with Bish. 172. Ibid. Regional radio had reported Manley’s call for “some kind of intervention.” Bish’s private papers. 173. Whilst in Jamaica, Gillespie heard of the massacre at Fort Rupert on a car radio. Author interview with Charles Gillespie, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, November 27, 1995. Motley had suggested Gillespie be sent to the embassy to help Bish and Flower. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 102. When the United States established an embassy in Grenada shortly after the intervention, Gillespie became the first ambassador there. 174. In a meeting with former Prime Minister Michael Manley, an ally of Grenada when in power, he told them that “I’m really worried. I think that Maurice Bishop is an honest and good man . . . However, there are people around him who are not good, who are bad, and who have really totalitarian ideas. I’m concerned about that, and we’ll have to watch that situation very carefully because, if the situation moves in that direction, for any reason, then we will have to take some action. We will not be able to abide that.” Charles Gillespie, interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, September 19, 1995, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 17, 2007). 175. Author interview with Gillespie. 176. Author interview with Bish. 177. Author interview with Motley. 178. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury, 13. 179. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 66. 180. The JCS emphasized that intelligence on Grenada was limited, human intelligence practically nonexistent, and intelligence on the Cuban presence inconsistent. They argued that the heavily overworked logistics system would be an impediment to anything more than a limited military operation. Donn-Erik Marshall, “Urgent

Notes

181.

182. 183. 184.

185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194.

195.

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Fury: The U.S. Military Intervention in Grenada” (MA diss., University of Virginia, 1989), 23. James Herbet Anderson, “National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions during the 1980s’: A Comparative Analysis of Operations Urgent Fury, El Dorado Canyon and Just Cause” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993), 76. Marshall, “Urgent Fury,” 32. Oberdorfer, “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention,’”A12. In late September 1983 the minister of tourism Lyden Ramdhanny was sent on an emergency trip to Libya to ask the government for $5 million to help complete the airport. Author interview with Lyden Ramdhanny, former People’s Revolutionary Government minister, June 22, 2006. The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/gaddafiletter.html (accessed January 29, 2007). “Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13–19 July, 1983,” 1. Valenta and Valenta, “Leninism in Grenada,”16. CIA Interagency Intelligence Report, “A First Look at the Mechanisms of Control,” A-3. Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, 178. Ambursley and Dunkerley, Grenada, 73. Ibid., 74. Richard Hart, “Introduction,” in In Nobody’s Backyard: Maurice Bishop’s Speeches: 1979–1983 A Memorial Volume, ed Chris Searle (London: Zed Books, 1984), xxxvii. Kenneth Dam, “Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State,” US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in Grenada (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 4. Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” 70. In the post-Vietnam era military caution has become a familiar trend, “the view of military leaders as aggressive and influential presidential advisers on the use of force has been more the premise of political debate than the conclusion of rigorous analysis.” David Petraeus, “Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force,” Armed Forces and Society 15 (1989): 490. Author interview with Motley.

Chapter 6 1. Jay Mallin, “Army Controls Grenada; Caricom Nations Shocked,” Washington Times, October 21, 1983, 5. At a morning White House press briefing, White House principle deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes reported that “we’ve seen nothing to indicate that they were having particular problems.” “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 9:17 A.M., October 21, 1983,” no. 882-10/21, Container 33, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary (WHOPS), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 4. 2. US Department of State, Langhorne Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” Department of State Bulletin 84 (March 1984): 71. 3. In attendance were State Department representatives Tony Motley, Craig Johnstone, and Lawrence Eagleburger; NSC staffers Oliver North and Constantine Menges; Defense Department officials Nestor Sanchez and Fred Iklé; CIA officials John McMahon and Duane Clarridge; and US ambassador to the OAS William

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4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

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Middendorf. The CPPG was formed in 1982 and served essentially the same purpose as the older Special Situations Group but apart from cabinet members it included deputy cabinet officers and their subordinates. Author interview with Lawrence Rossin, Foreign Service officer, October 28, 1994. “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on U.S. Military Involvement in Grenada, 9:38 A.M.,” October 25, 1983, no. 890-10/25, Container 34, WHOPS, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 14. Author interview with Craig Johnstone, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, September 1, 1994. Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 15, 19. Author interview with Johnstone. Ibid. Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 69. Ibid. Ibid. US Information Agency, Grenada: Background and Facts (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 4. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books, 1984), 147. Ibid. Tom Adams, “Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados the Hon. Mr. Tom Adams Explaining His Reasons for Taking Part in the Invasion of Grenada,” in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 36. US Information Agency, Grenada: Background and Facts, 4. Author interview with Charles Gillespie, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, November 27, 1995. Ibid. Ibid. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: St. Lucian Prime Minister’s Scenario,” 210058Z, October 21, 1983, Bridgetown 06451, 3. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 4. Ibid. F. A. Hoyos, Tom Adams: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1988), 115. Ibid. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), 97. Private papers of Milan Bish, the former and now late US ambassador to Barbados. Ibid. The embassy had earlier come to a similar conclusion: “We might expect there to be further aligning of views and agreement on possible action plans when first meeting of EC leaders takes place on October 21. Whether that could remain intact in CARICOM is [a] tough question.” Bish, “Subject: Grenada: St. Lucian Prime Minister’s Scenario,” 4.

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32. Milan Bish, US embassy Bridgetown, Barbados, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Barbadian PM Tom Adams Pleas for U.S. Intervention in Grenada: Believes Leadership of the Region Would Strongly Support and fully Associate with U.S.,” 201954Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06430, 2. 33. Bish, “Subject: Grenada: St. Lucian Prime Minister’s Scenario,” 4. 34. Ibid. 35. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 98. 36. Bish’s private papers. 37. Ibid. 38. Ashley Hewitt, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Jamaica Considers Participation in Multilateral Force to Secure Grenada,” 210133Z, October 21, 1983, Kingston 10314, 1. 39. Ibid., 2. 40. Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story (New York: Madison Books, 1984), 3. 41. Author correspondence with Joe Knockaert, Canadian International Development Agency official, May 24, 2000. Knockaert was based in Barbados but visiting Grenada at the time. 42. Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Intervention (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 137. 43. Christopher Stroude. “Statement Issued by Major Christopher Stroude, Member of the Grenadian Revolutionary Military Council on October 20, 1983,” in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 14. 44. Ibid. 45. Robert Pastor, “The Invasion of Grenada: A Pre- and Post-Mortem,” in The Caribbean after Grenada: Conflict and Democracy, ed. Scott MacDonald, Harald Sandstrom, and Paul Goodwin (New York: Praeger, 1988), 94. Clarke conveyed this message to other regional statesmen. 46. Payne et al., Grenada, 142. 47. Cuban Party, “Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government on the Events in Grenada,” in Statements by CUBA on the Events in GRENADA, ed. Nora Madan (La Habana, Cuba: Editora Politica, 1983), 42. 48. Ibid., 43. 49. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 91. RMC efforts to coordinate defences were likewise rejected; Ambassador Rizo indicated that Cuban personnel would remain at the airport site and if the RMC soldiers crossed the perimeter or tried to coordinate defences then the Cubans would be evacuated by boat. John Walton Cotman, “Cuba and the Grenada Revolution: The Impact and Limits of Cuban International Aid Programs,” 2 vols. (PhD diss., Boston University Graduate School, 1992), 516. 50. Cuban Party, “Statement by the Cuban Party,” 43. 51. Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), 412. Bourne told them the True Blue campus only had water for one night and within a couple of hours water trucks were sent there. 52. Author interview with John Kelly, former British representative in Grenada, British High Commision, Barbados, February 16, 1995. The curfew was lifted between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on Friday, October 21. Kelly met with some of the Grenadian military that day to discuss the curfew and the possibility of people leaving.

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53. “Statement of Geoffrey Bourne, M.D., Vice Chancellor, St. George’s University School of Medicine, Grenada, West Indies,” US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 188. 54. Mitchell Leventhal, “Entrepreneurship and Nation Building: Proprietary Medical Schools and Development in the Caribbean, 1976–1990” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1995), 290. 55. “Statement by Geoffrey Bourne,” U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 191. 56. Peter Bourne, “Was Intervention Necessary?” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1983, section 4, 1. 57. Leventhal, “Entrepreneurship and Nation Building,” 290. 58. “Operation Urgent Fury,” Transcript no. 602, PBS Frontline (New York: Journal Graphics, 1988), 13. For a detailed study of the history of SGU see Leventhal, “Entrepreneurship and Nation Building.” 59. US Congress, House of Representatives, “U.S. House of Representatives Fact Finding Mission: The Grenada Diary of Congressman Louis Stokes,” Documents on the Invasion, 103. 60. Bish’s private papers. 61. Ibid. When Modica inquired if he should have SGU officials talk to the RMC about moving off-campus students on to university campuses, Ambassador Bish suggested that such measures might be premature and should be put on hold for the moment. Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Attitudes of the Grenada Medical School Toward Possible Evacuation of Their Students/Staff,” 200739Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06392, 4. 62. Bish, “Subject: Grenada: Attitudes of the Grenada Medical School,” 3. 63. Ibid., 4. 64. Ibid. 65. Payne et al., Grenada, 139. 66. Author interview with Kelly. 67. The SSG was a crisis management group that was chaired by the vice president and included the secretary of state, secretary of defense, heads of the CIA, and the JCS. 68. The meeting was chaired by Bush and also attended by McFarlane, North, Menges, Weinberger, Vessey, Iklé, McMahon, Eagleburger, Middendorf, and Meese. Shultz and Motley arrived about 5:15 p.m. after testifying at Congress. 69. Author telephone interview with a Foreign Service officer, January 31, 1995. 70. Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), 74. 71. Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 114. 72. “Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State,” US Congress, Senate, The Situation in Grenada, 4. 73. “Operation Urgent Fury,” Frontline, 11. 74. Admiral McDonald’s staff had assumed the required forces would be available, no hostile country would intervene, and any evacuation would take place near Point Salines. Of the six options, two were under friendly conditions, three under hostile conditions, and the final one a “show of force” action. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 117–118. 75. Blasier, The Hovering Giant, 16. 76. Ibid., 2.

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77. Menges had prepared a one-page overview of “genuine democrats who could establish an interim government leading to fair and free elections.” Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 72. 78. Donn-Erik Marshall, “Urgent Fury: The U.S. Military Intervention in Grenada” (MA diss., University of Virginia, 1989). 24. Shultz and Motley were both proponents of the “diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual” school. As Shultz explained in his memoirs: “The use of force, and the credible threat of the use of force, are legitimate instruments of national policy and should be viewed as such . . . The use of force obviously should not be taken lightly, but better to use force when you should rather than when you must; last means no other, and by that time the level of force and the risk involved may have multiplied many times over.” George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 345. 79. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada, 98th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), 19. 80. Apparently some participants were astonished that no contingency plan existed and that the most recent aerial photos were five months old. Ralph Kinney Bennett, “Grenada: Anatomy of a ‘Go’ Decision,” Reader’s Digest, February 1984, 72. 81. The plan was to move as quickly as possible to secure Point Salines, Pearls, the medical school campuses, Scoon, and political prisoners. The Marines would land in the northeast near Pearls and the Rangers in the southeast at Point Salines and then link up and move north and west to rescue the students and work with the Special Forces to rescue Scoon and the political prisoners at Richmond Hill and capture Radio Free Grenada. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 76. 82. Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” 70. 83. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 327. Admiral McDonald later explained that the diversion was designed to “provide that type of alertness and responsiveness to protect our citizens and to provide potential for evacuating those citizens in a peaceful environment.” US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Organization, Structure, and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, Part 7 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 285. 84. Duane Clarridge, with Digby Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), 250. 85. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 72. 86. Author interview with William Middendorf, former US ambassador to the Organization of American States, August 17, 1994. Grenada had little support in Latin America. A resolution condemning intervention could not be introduced by Grenada because its representative, Dessima Williams, was absent. 87. By one official’s estimation, until the last day or so before intervention when the number of people who knew about the operation had to be expanded, only about 25 people in Washington knew what was going on. Author interview with Roger Fontaine, former National Security Council Latin American director, July 15, 1994. 88. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 73. NSDDs differ from other presidential orders in that they do not have to be disclosed to any other branch of government, notably Congress; President Reagan issued over 200 NSDDs during his presidency. Eve Pell, “The Backbone of Hidden Government,” Nation, June 19, 1989, 838.

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89. Bennett, “Grenada,” 74. The NSDD read in part: “All prudent measures should be taken to protect the lives and safety of American citizens on Grenada, should the situation so require. The United States should also be prepared to participate in a multi-lateral effort to restore order on Grenada and prevent further Cuban/Soviet intervention/involvement on the island.” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-110.htm (accessed March 5, 2007). 90. Ronald Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1984), 2. 91. Blasier, The Hovering Giant, 18. 92. Robert Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 107. 93. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 74. 94. Bish’s private papers. Gibbs had been in Grenada since 1980, working as a teacher, and was sympathetic to the PRG’s ideology. After the intervention she was invited to leave as she was on a list of “those people who present[ed] a threat to the country.” “U.S. House of Representatives: Critics of American Invasion Detained—U.S. Troops Act on Request of Grenada’s Governor General,” Documents on the Invasion, 106. 95. Bish’s private papers. 96. Adams, “Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados,” 37. 97. Bullard had been keeping Adams in touch with developments on Grenada through his contacts. Hoyos, Tom Adams, 114. 98. Bish’s private papers. 99. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Approach to Adams Re Grenada: Approach to Others Tomorrow,” 220057Z, October 22, 1983, Bridgetown 06505, 1. 100. Pastor, “The Invasion of Grenada,” 93. 101. John Walton Cotman, The Gorrion Tree: Cuba and the Grenada Revolution (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 219. 102. Ibid. 103. Patrick Tyler, “The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning,” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, A14. 104. Pastor, “The Invasion of Grenada,” 93. When asked about the offer on Saturday, October 22, Cato simply replied, “I have no meeting with General Austin.” Tyler, “The Making of an Invasion,” A14. In fact London showed the greatest interest in the possibility of using Cato as an intermediary. The FCO cabled High Commissioner Bullard in Barbados asking for comments: “Do you think there would be anything to be gained by attempting or inspiring an attempt to promote negotiation about the restoration of constitutional government in Grenada? Is it in your view possible that Hudson Austin or Coard would entertain an approach of this kind? . . . This is only a most tentative idea. We have it in mind that those in control of Grenada must now be able to see dangers of the kind of intervention which would at least threaten their own position.” Geoffrey Howe confidential telegram to British High Commission, Barbados, “Grenada,” 221815Z, October 22, 1983, London 295. Bullard’s response was negative. 105. Bish’s private papers. 106. Intelligence reports offered two interpretations: “valid assurances, or a move to make it easier to hold the students hostage.” CIA Memo, “Grenada Chronology 7–25 October 1983,” Document no. 002449. Declassified Documents Catalog IV, no. 5 (1988): 2. 107. George Skelton and David Wood, “U.S. to Post Task Force Off Grenada,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 1983, section 1, 3.

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108. Author interview with Kelly. There were about 200 Britons on Grenada but Kelly was approached by other nationalities as well as many Grenadians who had worked with the PRG. 109. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Welfare/ Whereabouts of St.George’s Medical School Students,” 212328Z, October 21, 1983, Bridgetown 06503, 1. 110. Ibid. 111. Author interview with Johnstone. 112. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 91. 113. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 75. The Caribbean nations would have been surprised if the United States had not helped considering their proximity, the plan to rescue Bishop and the general good relations they had with the Eastern Caribbean. Author interview with Joseph Edmunds, former St. Lucian ambassador to the United States, August 2, 1994. 114. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 76. 115. Reagan, Shultz, McFarlane, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, and former New Jersey senator Nicholas Brady left Washington, D.C. late Friday afternoon for a weekend of golf at the Augusta National Golf Club just outside Atlanta. According to Shultz, the situation in Grenada was part of the reason why McFarlane accompanied them. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 323. 116. Ibid., 328. 117. Ibid. 118. “Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam,” The Situation in Grenada, 5. 119. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 328. 120. Author interview with Langhorne Motley, former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, August 25, 1994. 121. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 76. 122. O’Shaughnessy, Grenada, 155. 123. Vessey’s philosophy was to minimize casualties, which meant the use of overwhelming force. Author interview with Caspar Weinberger, former secretary of defense, October 7, 1994. Vessey’s was a typical post-Vietnam military doctrine. 124. Blasier, The Hovering Giant, 19. 125. Marshall, “Urgent Fury,” 33. 126. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 78. 127. Six of the seven OECS states were represented: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Grenada was for obvious reasons not represented. This was the first time the OECS had met in a nonmember’s country. It was also the first time representatives of nonmember countries, Barbados and Jamaica, attended a meeting. Bish and Gillespie were also present at the Centre but did not participate in the meeting as some have suggested. Author interview with Milan Bish, former US ambassador to Barbados, September 21, 1994. Bish and Gillespie’s presence there does indicate the importance of the OECS request to the US. 128. George Shultz, secretary of state, secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown, “Subject: Approach Re Grenada to OECS and Barbados,” 210258Z, October 21, 1983, Washington D.C. 300202, 1–2. 129. Payne et al., Grenada, 149. 130. Edward Seaga, “Statement to the Nation by the Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Rt. Hon. Edward Seaga, on Developments in Grenada, Tuesday, October 25, 1983,” in Documents on the Invasion, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement no. 1 (October 1983): 69.

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131. “Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, Accompanied by Maj. Gen. George Crist, U.S. Marine Corps,” US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 10. 132. “Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Request for U.S. Assistance in Grenada,” October 23, 1983, American Foreign Policy Current Documents, document no. 656 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 1397. 133. Janet Higbie, Eugenia: The Caribbean’s Iron Lady (London: Macmillan, 1993), 228. It seems that negotiations were half-heartedly discussed and the idea of the OAS as a peacekeeper suggested but ruled out as it was too time consuming and almost certain that the Latin nations would oppose action. Jacqueline Anne BraveboyWagner, The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 184. 134. Author interview with Bish. 135. Braveboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in World Affairs, 189. 136. Higbie, Eugenia, 228. St. Kitts had only recently gained independence and had no forces, and Montserrat as a British dependency had to withhold its participation in any “decisions inconsistent with the views, directives, policies and obligations of Her Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom.” William Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation (London: Mansell, 1984), 87. Apart from being outnumbered, the OECS forces also had no way of combating the PRA’s APCs and, more importantly, no way of transporting its forces en masse at short notice. Author interview with Peter Tomlin, former lieutenant commander, Barbados Defence Force, June 14, 2006. 137. Adams later claimed that the “preference would have been for our traditional protector, Britain, to have taken a or the leading role in restoring democracy.” UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, Grenada, Session 1983–84 (London: HMSO, 1984), xi. 138. Pastor, “The Invasion of Grenada,” 93. 139. “Grenada Invasion/Beirut Debate,” The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, transcript no. 2107, October 25, 1983, 6. 140. Vaughan Lewis, “Small States, Eastern Caribbean Security, and the Grenada Intervention,” in A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, ed. Jorge Heine (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 260. 141. Paragraph four of Article 8 reads: “The Defence and Security Committee shall have responsibility for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, 81. 142. “Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Request,” 1398. 143. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, 92. 144. Bish’s private papers. 145. One account reports that Gillespie was informed of the OECS’s decision immediately after the meeting closed by Charles in an anteroom. Don Oberdorfer, “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention,’” Washington Post, November 6, 1983, A21. 146. Ibid.

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147. Author interview with Bish. Although news of the actual invitation had not been revealed, it was no secret in the Caribbean that something was afoot. According to Tyler, “Opponents . . . were leaking details of the proposed invasion from private council chambers to the news media and to supporters of Grenada’s leftist government.” Even Charles let slip to newsmen after the OECS meeting that “the range of options under consideration for Grenada included military intervention.” Tyler, “The Making of an Invasion,” A1. Seaga joined the meeting at 10:30 p.m. 148. Author interview with Bish. 149. Ibid. 150. George Shultz, secretary of state, secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown, “Subject: Grenada—Seaga Proposes Joint Caribbean Action and Naval Blockade of Grenada,” 211809Z, October 21, 1983, Washington D.C. 300927, 2. 151. Ibid. 152. Ibid. 153. US Department of State, “Secretary Shultz’s News Conference, October 25, 1983,” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 70. 154. O’Shaughnessy, Grenada, 158. 155. Robert McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 261. Whilst the request was expected, the fervor of it surprised some in Washington. Author interview with Johnstone. 156. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 114. 157. Quigley, “The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger Than Fiction.” University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 18, no. 4 (Winter 1986–1987): 341. 158. Ibid., 330. 159. Author interview with Fontaine. 160. McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 261. 161. Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York. Simon & Schuster, 1990), 450. 162. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 441. 163. Reagan, An American Life, 451. Given the concerns over the students already expressed by the administration, the students were undoubtedly discussed and played a role in Reagan’s decision. This statement was perhaps more a reason for accepting the invitation. 164. In his memoir Weinberger affirmed that Reagan “was aware of the difficulties, but generally seemed to me to be willing to accept the risks. He urged us to continue developing the detailed plans.” Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 77. 165. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 329. The secrecy aspect of planning was a high priority; Reagan felt that “Cuba was near enough that with forewarning it could send troops to the island in a hurry. If there were any leaks, the result could be war between us and Cuba . . . and the taking of hundreds of Americans as hostage.” Reagan, An American Life, 450. 166. McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 262. The OECS leaders were not told that the United States had accepted their invitation until the eve of the intervention. 167. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 329. 168. Ibid. 169. Present were Poindexter, North, Menges, McMahon, Clarridge, Eagleburger, Motley, Weinberger, Vessey, and Iklé. 170. CIA Memo, “Grenada Chronology 7–25 October 1983,” 3.

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171. Author interview with Johnstone. 172. Ed Magnuson, Douglas Brew, Bernard Diederich, and William McWhirter, “D-Day in Grenada,” Time, November 7, 1983, 19. 173. Reynold Burrowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada: An Account of the U.S.Caribbean Invasion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 139. 174. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 135. 175. Ibid. A cable was sent to Adams, Charles, and Seaga informing them of McNeil and Crist’s arrival, explaining that “the purpose of this trip would be to coordinate our response to this fast [breaking] situation.” Bish’s private papers. Ambassador McNeil was a career foreign service officer and former ambassador to Costa Rica. He was ambassador-at-large at Tufts University in 1983. 176. Author interview with Johnstone. 177. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 133. 178. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 77. SEAL stands for the navy’s elite “sea, air and land” special forces. 179. “Britain’s Grenada Shut-Out: Say Something, If Only Goodbye,” The Economist, March 10, 1984, 22. 180. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 252. 181. Bennett, “Grenada,” 74. 182. Author interview with Johnstone. 183. Bennett, “Grenada,” 74. 184. Magnuson et al., “D-Day in Grenada,” 19. Speaking after the intervention about the negative European reaction Dam said, “We realized that the reaction would be on the critical side. We certainly did not expect enthusiasm about it.” US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in Grenada, 98th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 16. 185. The War Powers Resolution passed by Congress in November 1973 required the president to consult with Congress before committing troops to combat and stipulated that if troops were used they would have to be withdrawn within 90 days unless Congress approved the deployment. See Michael Rubner, “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly 100 (Winter 1985–86): 627–647. 186. Oberdorfer, “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention,’” A21. 187. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 252. 188. Reagan, An American Life, 451. When two British embassy officials met with the deputy director of Politico-Military Affairs Jonathan Howe at the State Department later that day they were only assured that Britain would be consulted by Washington before any final decision was made. Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: Bodley Head, 1990), 128. 189. Author telephone interview with Langhorne Motley, former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, September 25, 1995. 190. Author interview with Motley. As Pearson points out, this was unusual because “deceptions generally persist only until an operation is underway. At that moment, the intentions of the source are obviously made clear, but this knowledge provides little benefit to the target audience since the deception has already given the source the advantage of surprise that was the purpose of the deception in the first place. During Operation Urgent Fury, to the contrary, much of the deception took place after the operation was history, and thus well after it could have served any practical military

Notes

191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198.

199. 200. 201. 202.

203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212.

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value with respect to the invasion itself.” David Eric Pearson, “The Betrayal of Truth and Trust by Government: Deception as Process and Practice” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1988), 448. Martha Block and Geoff Mungham, “The Military, the Media and the Invasion of Grenada,” Contemporary Crises 13 (June 1989): 91. George Quester, “Grenada and the News Media,” in American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation “Urgent Fury,” ed. Peter Dunn and Bruce Watson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 119. Pearson, “The Betrayal of Truth and Trust by Government,” 228. Ibid. Author telephone interview with a former Department of Defense official, October 10, 1995. “Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam,” US Congress, The Situation in Grenada, 5. Author telephone interview with Edwin Meese, former White House counselor, January 10, 1995. According to one official at the SSG meeting, “Everyone was gung-ho.” Magnuson et al., “D-Day in Grenada,” 19. “Britain’s Grenada Shut-Out,” 22. Reagan had accepted the OECS offer and dispatched McNeil to Barbados, ordered the JCS to proceed with planning for fullscale operation, implemented secrecy measures, and acknowledged and accepted the political fallout. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 77. Author interview with Weinberger. The other two OECS leaders, Charles and Bird, had already left for Port-of-Spain. Author interview with Bish. Washington feared getting bogged down in a long occupation operation to restore democracy. Ironically the OECS feared this would happen too and believed that if the United States acceded to their request they should hand over Grenada to the OECS as soon as possible after victory had been secured—one leader suggested 48 hours— and allow the restoration of democracy to be a predominantly Eastern Caribbean affair. Author interview with Bish. As it transpired, the last US forces involved in Urgent Fury left Grenada on December 15. Three hundred “support personnel” remained, including the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion. The last US peacekeeping troops departed on June 12, 1984. Vijay Tiwathia, The Grenada War: Anatomy of a Low-Intensity Conflict (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987), 190. Bish’s private papers. Ibid. Author interview with Bish. Bish’s private papers. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Emphasis added. Geoffrey Bourne, “Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition: What Happened in Grenada,” Nutrition Today (January/February 1985): 21. Author correspondence with Kenneth Kurze, former counselor for political and economic affairs, US Embassy, Barbados, August 20, 1995. Ibid. As Gilmore concludes, “The RMC was through the instrumentalities of repression available to it, in effective control of the entire territory of the state within the meaning of international law.” Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, 73.

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213. Montgomery recalled that after about five minutes groups of somewhat scared students appeared out of nowhere all wanting to ask him questions, wanting to know what was happening as they had no idea. Author interview with David Montgomery, former deputy high commissioner, British High Commission, Barbados, November 8, 1995. 214. Bourne, “Was the U.S. Invasion Necessary?” 1. 215. Flohr visited SGU’s other campus, True Blue, the following morning. She also arranged to meet with about 150 students who lived off-campus in the same area as Bourne at Bourne’s house at 7:00 a.m. that morning. Bourne, “Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition,” 23. 216. Author correspondence with Kurze, August 20, 1995. Although Kurze felt that evacuation was a possibility, Flohr believed that whilst an evacuation was technically feasible, there was no way out for the students under the present conditions. Author telephone interview with Linda Flohr, former third secretary, US embassy, Barbados, December 19, 1994 and April 19, 1997. 217. Author telephone interview with Peter Bourne, former special assistant to President Carter for health issues, September 6, 1995. 218. Author correspondence with Kurze, August 20, 1995. 219. Tyler, “The Making of an Invasion,” A14. 220. US Information Agency, Grenada: Background and Facts, 4. 221. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 85. 222. Ibid. 223. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 142. 224. Author telephone interview with Bourne. 225. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 414. 226. Ibid. 227. Cuban Party, “Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government,” 6. 228. Ibid., 7. 229. Ibid. 230. Ibid. 231. Ibid., 8. 232. Cotman, The Gorrion Tree, 219. 233. Bennett, “Grenada,” 74. 234. Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” 71. 235. Robert Beck, “The McNeil Mission and the Decision to Invade Grenada,” Naval War College Review 44 (Spring 1991): 98. 236. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 137. Gillespie specifically requested Rossin. At the time Rossin was the Peru desk officer in the State Department but prior to that, from 1980 to 1982, he had been a political officer at the US embassy in Barbados and had visited Grenada several times. Rossin was one of a number of political officers who had previously served at the Barbadian embassy and were hastily recalled to Barbados; the others included Barbro Owens and Ashley Wills. These measures were “an attempt to help the Embassy staff cope and to give Motley and Gillespie simultaneously more control over the Embassy.” Author correspondence with Kurze, March 11, 1996. 237. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 138. 238. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 126. CINCLANT was responsible for the overall plan that the JCS would have to approve before Urgent Fury could be launched. However, CINCLANT lacked the intelligence and communications facilities and planning

Notes

239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244.

245. 246. 247. 248.

249. 250. 251.

252. 253.

254.

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expertise for an operation of this magnitude, which would involve the navy, air force, and army contingents. As a result an ad hoc joint headquarters was established at Norfolk with an on-scene commander, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, in charge of the Joint Task Force. Ibid., 126. Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada, 3. The estimated force strength on Grenada was 1,200 PRA soldiers, 2,000–5,000 militia members, 300–400 policemen, 30–50 Cuban military advisers, and 600 Cuban workers. Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada, 3. Ibid. Cuban Party, “Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government,” 8. It is uncertain whether Cuban intelligence had learnt of the OECS’s request to the United States by this time. John Quigley, “Parachutes at Dawn: Issues of Use of Force and Status of Internees in the United States-Cuban Hostilities on Grenada, 1983,” University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 17, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 204. The original intention was to inform Havana as soon as possible consistent with the safety of US troops, but this was thwarted by the fact that the cable link between the US Interest Section and Washington had been out of action since Sunday, October 23. Unaware of this, Washington believed that a 6:15 a.m. message had been delivered to Havana when in fact it had not. Kenneth Skoug, The United States and Cuba under Reagan and Shultz: A Foreign Service Officer Reports (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 48. Author telephone interview with Motley. Dominica gained independence in 1978, St. Lucia in 1979, St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1980, Antigua and Barbuda in 1981, and St. Kitts-Nevis in 1983. UK Parliament, Grenada, xvi. However, this formal written request was never received. Adams explained that “our attitude was that the formal request in writing would go when the oral request had been answered and since the oral request was never answered . . . the formal written request was overtaken by the operation itself.” UK Parliament, Grenada, xiv. Eugenia Charles, head of the OECS, recalled: “I was supposed to send letters to England and Canada . . . but I never got around to doing it because things were happening too fast after that and so they had only been invited verbally, never in writing.” Higbie, Eugenia, 229. Paul Scoon, Survival for Service: My Years as Governor General of Grenada (London: Macmillan, 2003), 130. Howe, “Grenada.” John Dickie, Special No More: Anglo-American Relations— Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1994), 186. See also Gary Williams, “‘A Matter of Regret’: Britain, the 1983 Grenada Crisis, and the Special Relationship,” Twentieth Century British History 12 (2001): 208–230. UK Parliament, Grenada, xi. Ibid. As Sutton observes, Britain’s relationship with the region contains “a sensitivity to local context and a familiarity of approach which is often lacking in US assistance.” Sutton, “The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (1993): 7. The Caribbean was used to dealing with Britain who remained a major export market. The force consists of army, air force, and navy elements. The Military Balance, 1983–84 (Cambridge, England: Heffers, 1983), 42. Belize became independent in

238

255. 256. 257.

258.

259.

260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266.

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1981 at which time an ongoing territorial dispute with neighboring Guatemala led Britain to maintain a military presence there to guard against Guatemalan aggression, assist in training the Belize army, gathering intelligence on the situation in Central America, and help with disaster relief. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 69. Author interview with Montgomery. CARICOM came into existence in 1973 with the Treaty of Chaguaramus, replacing the Caribbean Free Trade Association. CARICOM was primarily a trade organization and its treaty did not include any security provisions. The participants at the meeting were: Lester Bird (Antigua and Barbuda), Eugenia Charles (Dominica), John Osbourne (Montserrat), Kennedy Simmonds (St. KittsNevis), John Compton (St. Lucia), Milton Cato (St. Vincent and the Grenadines), Edward Seaga (Jamaica), Louis Tull (Barbados), George Price (Belize), Lynden Pindling (the Bahamas), George Chambers (Trinidad and Tobago), and Forbes Burnham (Guyana). Adams and Seaga had met Price en route at the airport in Barbados. They lobbied him unsuccessfully to contribute troops to a Caribbean military force. Rasleigh Jackson, Guyana’s Diplomacy: Reflections of a Former Foreign Minister (Georgetown, Guyana: Free Press, 2003), 53. George Chambers, “Statement by the Honourable Prime Minister George Chambers to the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago on October 26, 1983 on the Grenada Crisis,” in Documents on the Invasion, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 76. Ibid., 77. Jackson, Guyana’s Diplomacy, 53. Chambers, “Statement by the Honourable Prime Minister George Chambers,” Documents on the Invasion, 77. Ibid., 78. Author interview with Bish. Jackson, Guyana’s Diplomacy, 54. The official reasons for the expulsion were: the manner of the RMC’s assumption of power; the RMC did not represent the rights and obligations of the government of Grenada; the situation was a security threat to the region; the integrity of the Caribbean must be restored; and the rights and property of Grenadians must be protected. “CARICOM Suspends Grenada,” Daily Nation, October 24, 1983, 1. As the OECS had expected, the sole opponent to these measures was Guyana, which had been a close socialist ally of Bishop’s Grenada.

Chapter 7 1. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 443. At that moment the number of known fatalities was 46. Don Oberdorfer, “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention,’” Washington Post, November 6, 1983, A21. 2. Cannon, President Reagan, 443. 3. Present were Bush, Weinberger, Shultz, McFarlane, Poindexter, McMahon, Baker, Deaver, and Vessey. The NSPG is the top-level group that meets to discuss foreign affairs. 4. Oberdorfer, “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention,’” A21.

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5. Cannon, President Reagan, 443. 6. Ibid., 418. 7. Duane Clarridge, with Digby Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), 254. 8. Interview with Robert McFarlane, former presidential National Security Adviser, by Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Randall Bently, and Stephen Flynn, November 10–11, 1988, Washington, D.C., Oral History Project (International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA), 146. 9. When North had heard about Beirut he feared that Reagan would cancel Grenada. Ben Bradlee, Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1988), 179. Eugenia Charles was also concerned: “My God, this is going to prevent them from coming to help us.” Janet Higbie, Eugenia: The Caribbean’s Iron Lady (London: Macmillan, 1993), 229. 10. Ralph Kinney Bennett, “Grenada: Anatomy of a ‘Go’ Decision,” Reader’s Digest, February 1984, 75. Reagan reportedly also reasoned, “We cannot let an act of terrorism determine whether we aid or assist our allies in the region. If we do that, who will ever trust us again?” Ed Magnuson, Douglas Brew, Bernard Diederich, and William McWhirter, “D-Day in Grenada.” Time, November 7, 1983, 20. 11. Author interview with Craig Johnstone, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, September 1, 1994. 12. Author interview with Langhorne Motley, former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, August 25, 1994. 13. Author interview with Caspar Weinberger, former secretary of defense, October 7, 1994. It is ironic that in his televised Address to the Nation on October 27, Reagan specifically juxtaposed the two crises: “The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists.” US President, “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, October 27, 1983,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). This redefinition and simplification of events in both places diverted attention from Reagan’s foreign policy problems. Additionally, Grenada may not have been a response to Lebanon but Reagan’s “rhetoric about Grenada functioned in such a way to do so. Literally overnight, Grenada became a condensation symbol of victory and pride, reminding citizens of gains in tangible and symbolic resources. Lebanon’s failure seemed blunted—almost forgotten—in the aftermath of Grenada’s triumph.” Denise Bostdorff, “The Presidency and Promoted Crisis: Reagan, Grenada, and Issue Management,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 21 (1991): 741. 14. The meeting was headed by Motley with Crist, North, Kozak, and Johnstone also present. Beck, “The McNeil Mission and the Decision to Invade Grenada,” Naval War College Review 44 (Spring 1991): 99. 15. Ibid. The comprehensive list covered a US response to the OECS’s request, the governor general, a provisional government, elections, Caribbean Basin Initiative, action in the OAS, a Caribbean prime ministerial visit to Washington. A draft of an OECS request and an OAS resolution was also included. George Shultz, secretary of state, secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown, “Subject: Instructions for Dealing with Caribbean Friends’, 231833Z, October 23, 1983, Washington D.C. 302418, 1–7. 16. Beck, “The McNeil Mission,” 99.

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17. Frank McNeil, War and Peace in Central America: Reality and Illusion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 174. 18. Ibid. 19. The flight arrived in Barbados at 4:56 p.m. Accompanying McNeil were Crist, Colonel James Connelly (USAF, chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Plans and Policy Directorate), Larry Rossin, Gary Alexander (a State Department Administrative Support official), and a CIA official. Private papers of Milan Bish, the former and now late US ambassador to Barbados. McNeil reviewed his instructions with Crist and formulated a checklist of 28 points to be raised in the impending meeting with the Caribbean leaders. Robert Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 153. 20. Tom Adams, “Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados the Hon. Mr. Tom Adams Explaining His Reasons for Taking Part in the Invasion of Grenada,” in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 39. 21. The Economist concluded that the request was “almost certainly a fabrication concocted between the OECS and Washington to calm the post-invasion diplomatic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy.” “Britain’s Grenada Shut-Out: Say Something, If Only Goodbye,” March 10, 1984, 24. A Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee report concluded: “Both the timing and nature of this request . . . remain shrouded in mystery, and it is evidently the intention of the parties directly involved that the mystery should not be dispelled.” UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, Grenada, Session 1983–84 (London: HMSO, 1984), xvi. 22. Peter Fraser, “A Revolutionary Governor-General? The Grenada Crisis of 1983,” in Constitutional Heads and Political Crises: Commonwealth Episodes, 1945–85, ed. Donald Low (London: Macmillan, 1988), 154. 23. Paul Scoon, Survival for Service: My Experiences as Governor General of Grenada (Oxford: Macmillan, 2003), 126. He also felt that the United States was the only one who could help; the British would prevaricate and were too far away to act quickly. Author interview with Sir Paul Scoon, former governor general of Grenada, June 19, 2006. 24. Author interview with Scoon. 25. Author interview with David Montgomery, former deputy high commissioner, British High Commission, Barbados, November 8, 1995. Scoon did not have many options: if he had publicly condemned the events at Fort Rupert or condemned the RMC it would have most likely turned on him. Author interview with John Kelly, former British representative in Grenada, British High Commision, Barbados. March 8, 1996. 26. Author interview with Scoon. 27. Scoon, Survival for Service, 136. 28. “Statement of Geoffrey Bourne, M.D., Vice Chancellor, St. George’s University School of Medicine, Grenada, West Indies,” US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, 98th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 192. 29. The US diplomats had been instructed not to meet with Austin to avoid implying any sort of diplomatic recognition. Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), 412. It was assumed

Notes

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

41. 42. 43.

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that Austin, the number five in the RMC, was a puppet; possibly unstable and acting under duress as he was “too close to Bishop to go this far wholeheartedly.” Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Comments/Plans of Grenada Democratic Movement,” 202026Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06431, 1. Author interview with Montgomery. Ibid. Cornwall was well aware that Montgomery and Kurze were scheduled to leave that afternoon. Author interview with Montgomery. Author correspondence with Kenneth Kurze, former counselor for political and economic affairs, US Embassy, Barbados (August 20, 1995–March 26, 1996), August 20, 1995. Patrick Tyler, “The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning,” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, A14. Cornwall also approved the use of civilian charter planes. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 413. Beck reports that charter flights were not allowed. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 144. Motley had leased three PanAmerican jets in Miami but was unable to get landing permission for them from the RMC. Author interview with Motley. Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story (New York: Madison Books, 1984), 8. The RMC wanted a list of those who wanted to leave and opened the passport facilities especially on Sunday so that students could obtain the necessary paperwork. Author telephone interview with Peter Bourne, former special assistant to President Carter for health issues, September 6, 1995. Author correspondence with Kurze, August 20, 1995. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 144. The Countess was apparently an embassy initiative but not one authorized by Bish. He told the political officer who had made the inquiry to “forget it” as the United States had its own resources to call upon. Author interview with Milan Bish, former US ambassador to Barbados, September 21, 1994. Motley states that “we explored the possibility of using a Cunard-line cruise ship then in the vicinity to evacuate Americans. It became apparent, however, that conditions on the island would not permit evacuation by civilian carrier.” US Department of State, Langhorne Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” Department of State Bulletin 84 (March 1984): 71 The Countess had been due to call in Grenada on Tuesday, October 25, but Cunard decided that the ship would only stop if Washington so desired and even then only with a US naval escort and a request from the RMC. Author correspondence with Kurze, August 20, 1995. Chafin was a political officer and had instructions to get information on the political situation and as well as the students. Wanting to know exactly what type of situation he was going into he had been told by DCM Flower in Barbados that no action decision had been made but that he should expect something to happen. Author interview with Gary Chafin, former political officer, US Embassy, Barbados, November 21, 1995. Bourne recalled later that “we were doubled up with laughter during this period . . . It was just a bunch of people inexperienced at running that kind of operation and unable to make command decisions.” Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 414. Geoffrey Bourne, “Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition: What Happened in Grenada,” Nutrition Today (January/February 1985): 22. Author interview with Chafin.

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44. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 415. 45. Kurze estimated that 22 of 85 Canadians, 40–50 of 200 British and 200–-500 of 1,000 Americans wanted to leave. George Shultz, secretary of state, secret telegram to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, “Subject: Grenada Situation Report No. Eight,” 241128Z, October 24, 1983, Washington D.C. 302451, 1. 46. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 414. Kurze told the press that before he left Grenada “he did not recommend . . . that the American citizens leave in any particular time.” “Results of US Survey by Today,” Daily Nation, October 24, 1983, 16. This was because he believed they could not be got out rather than because there was no danger as many assumed. 47. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 182. 48. Author correspondence with Kurze, August 20, 1995. Flohr later stated that the students’ “food and water supply was totally controlled by the government. These students were in effect at that point hostages for four days.” NBC Evening News, November 7, 1983, Weekly News Summary, Week of 07–13 November 1983, White House Communications Agency Videotapes, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Back in Washington, Motley was concerned that the RMC would develop a “bunker mentality” and seize hostages. Author telephone interview with Motley. 49. Author telephone interview with Linda Flohr, former third secretary, US Embassy, Barbados, December 19, 1994. 50. Larry Speakes, “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M., October 26, 1983,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, no. 892-10/26, Container 34, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 34. 51. “Still No Word on Coard,” Daily Nation, October 24, 1983, 16. 52. George Shultz, Secretary of State, secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown, “Subject: Suggested Points for OECS Approach to Grenadian Governor General,” 241947Z, October 24, 1983, Washington D.C. 302848, 1. 53. UK Parliament, Grenada, xv. 54. Vice Admiral Metcalf, who would be in command of JTF 120, thought it was a “lousy” plan, weakened by the jointness philosophy that advocated the use of all the military forces rather than just the marines. Author interview with Joseph Metcalf, former vice admiral and commander of the Second Fleet, August 16, 1994. 55. George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 331. 56. Ibid., 9. 57. Bennett, “Grenada,” 76. 58. “Britain’s Grenada Shut-Out,” 22. 59. Author interview with Weinberger. 60. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 149. 61. Edwin Meese III, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, D.C.: Regney Gateway, 1992), 217. 62. James Herbert Anderson, “National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions during the 1980s’: A Comparative Analysis of Operations Urgent Fury, El Dorado Canyon and Just Cause” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993), 63. 63. Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti, In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (New York: Farrarm Strauss and Giroux, 1991), 171. 64. Author interview with Weinberger.

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65. Ronald Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October – 2 November 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/urgfury.pdf (accessed January 29, 2007), 26. 66. Author telephone interview with Motley. Motley joked that Weinberger was “more Catholic than the Pope in his reluctance to use force.” Langhorne Motley interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 3, 1991, Frontline Diplomacy, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., http://memory.loc.gov/ ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 23, 2007). 67. Oberdorfer, “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention,’” A21. 68. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 254. 69. Ibid., 255. According to Bish, Reagan warned Vessey that if he ever heard talk like that again he would be looking for a new chief of the JCS. Author interview with Bish. 70. “Britain’s Grenada Shut-Out,” 22. 71. Speakes, “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M.,” 11. 72. D. Brent Hardt, “Grenada Reconsidered,” Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs 11, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 303. 73. Higbie, Eugenia, 230. Motley confirmed that the United States almost had to drag Charles back from acting without US support. Author telephone interview with Motley. 74. Author interview with Ludlow Flower, former deputy chief of mission, US Embassy, Barbados, October 27, 1994. 75. Author interview with Bish. Doubts about the outspoken ambassador led the State Department to send an emissary from the Bureau of American Republic Affairs (ARA) to “check Bish out”; he reported back that nothing was amiss at the embassy. Author interview with Flower. 76. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 327. 77. Author correspondence with Kurze, August 20, 1995. Other interviewees concur with this. Bish admits that he was dismayed that embassy staff had been discussing the need to increase travel to Grenada behind his back but that was all. Author interview with Bish. 78. William Nylen, United States-Grenada Relations, 1979–1983: American Foreign Policy towards a ‘Backyard’ Revolution, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs: Case 306 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1988), 34. According to Nylen, Gillespie cabled a similar assessment to Washington. 79. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Ambassador’s Assessment of the Situation on Grenada,” 200749Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06393, 3. 80. Author telephone interview with Frank McNeil, former special emissary of the president, December 13, 1995. 81. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 249. On one occasion Bish cabled President Reagan directly: “I believe it is necessary to express my sincere opinion for your upcoming decision with regard to Grenada . . . In order to stop the carnage and spread of communism, I recommend that you positively support the call for help by our friends and neighbors.” Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Personal Message for the Secretary,” 221310Z, October 22, 1983, Bridgetown 06515, 1.

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82. Author interview with Charles Gillespie, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, November 27, 1995. 83. Nylen, United States-Grenada Relations, 1979–1983, 34. 84. Carol Bryant, Milan Bish: The Measure You Give (Kearney, NE: Morris Publishing, 2000), 219. 85. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 103. 86. Author telephone interview with McNeil. 87. Author correspondence with Kurze, March 11, 1996. 88. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes of Meeting between Ambassadors Bish and McNeil with West Indian Heads of Government to Discuss Grenada Situation,” 252203Z, October 25, 1983, Bridgetown 06654, section 1, 3. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid. 91. Author telephone interview with McNeil. 92. Bish, “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes,” section 1, 4. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., section 3, 2. 95. Adams told McNeil that he saw “a typical Soviet footprint in the fact that the previous political arrangement between the factions of the PRG had now come apart in violent ideological warfare . . . a typical Russian tactic for destabilization.” He felt that the Cubans “might be as shocked as others by the brutality of the violent schism now apparent in the New Jewel Movement.” Bish, “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes,” section 2, 4. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid. 98. Ibid. 99. Author telephone interview with McNeil. 100. Adams, “Full Text of Speech of the Prime Minister of Barbados,” 38. 101. Department of State, “Consultations Chronology,” 6. Following up on this the next day the State Department provided the text of a draft letter the OECS might want to send to Scoon to elicit a request. The draft contained an “assurance that any request received from the Governor General would be kept private until he is safe” and promised “assistance as long as necessary to permit the people of Grenada to reconstitute governmental institutions.” Ibid. Gillespie recalls that “the word I was getting which helped me set my priorities was that we simply, absolutely, positively must have a request for assistance from Sir Paul Scoon . . . in writing. If we didn’t have that, we would have to accept the possibility that we would have major problems around the world, politically . . . but especially in Washington.” Interview with Charles Gillespie by Charles Stuart Kennedy, September 19, 1995, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 17, 2007). 102. Author interview with Gillespie. Deputy Secretary of State Dam later stated that Scoon’s request “carried exceptional legal and moral weight.” “Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam,” US Congress, The Situation in Grenada, 5. 103. Beck, “The McNeil Mission,” 101. 104. Bish, “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes,” section 3, 3. 105. A CBS News poll taken immediately after the intervention recorded 91 percent of Grenadians in favor of the intervention. Sandford and Vigilante, Grenada, 16.

Notes

106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.

119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

125. 126. 127.

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Bish, “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes,” section 4, 2. Ibid., section 4, p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. McNeil made a hypothetical offer of $750,000 of assistance that Adams readily accepted. Ibid., section 4, 3. Author telephone interview with McNeil. Bish, “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes,” section 4, 4. Ibid., section 5, 3. Unknown to all the participants Reagan had made a “tentative” decision to respond to the OECS request during the meeting. Author telephone interview with Bish, November 11, 1995. Author telephone interview with McNeil. Ibid. US Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, 98th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 42. Castro knew this and communicated it to the RMC: “Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade Grenada, and in that case they [RMC] could defeat them with their own forces without greater difficulties.” Cuban Party, “Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government on the Events in Grenada,” Documents on the Invasion, Carribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 9. Beck, “The McNeil Mission,” 101. Author interview with Flower. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury, 3. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury, 36. Author interview with Chafin. Ed Cody, “Medical School Director Says He Backs Invasion,” Washington Post, November 1, 1983, A12. Apparently when Budeit was asked by a student what he would do in their situation he replied, “Get the hell out.” Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 413. Having previously reassured the students to keep them calm, Flohr was stunned by the diplomats encouraging students to leave. Author interview with Flohr. On Monday, October 24, Budeit visited the married students’ homes near RFG. He explained the danger they would be in in the event of a countercoup because RFG would be a prime target. Budeit admitted “scaring the hell out of those people” and when he saw them later “they were weeping, crying . . . I stayed the hell away from them. I had done my bit, and gotten them out of there.” Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 414. The diplomats never discussed evacuation arrangements with SGU officials. Author telephone interview with Bourne. Maurice Waters, “The Invasion of Grenada, 1983 and the Collapse of Legal Norms,” Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 243. Author telephone interview with David Ostroff, former consular officer, US Embassy, Barbados, October 27, 1995. David Ettlin, “Invasion Abruptly Ended Medical Students’ Doubts,” Baltimore Sun, October 30, 1983, 3. At the embassy in Barbados a student who had left Grenada by boat on Friday, October 21, told officials that “many medical students were terrified and Bourne [was] not being honest with the students on the political danger.” US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

246

128. 129.

130.

131. 132. 133. 134. 135.

136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147.

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Miscellaneous Legislation Concerning Various Foreign Policy Issues, 98th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), 64. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 414. Bourne, “Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition,” 24. According to one student, “The only reason why one hundred percent of the students didn’t want to go right away is because we didn’t know what was going on.” ABC News, Thursday, October 27, 1983, Weekly News Summary, Week of October 24–30, 1983, WHCAV, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Tape 4. Mitchel Arthur Leventhal, “Entrepreneurship and Nation Building: Proprietary Medical Schools and Development in the Caribbean, 1976–1990” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1995), 264. Bourne estimated that SGU contributed around US$5 million dollars to the Grenadian economy per annum and was the largest employer on the island. “Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne,” US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 185. Author telephone interview with Bourne. According to Peter Bourne, Austin sent a cable to former Carter official Robert Pastor in Washington, D.C., saying that he was ready to do whatever was necessary to resolve the impending conflict. Author telephone interview with Bourne. “Grenada Aftermath/Coronary Bypass Report/Argentine Elections,” The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, October 27, 1983, transcript no. 2109, 2. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 413. As Leventhal speculates: “It is likely that the paranoid Coard faction, with its monopoly over the security apparatus, saw the medical school as a much more real and immediate security threat. From the perspective of internal security, therefore, it appears medical school prospects would have been unpromising under hardline rule.” Leventhal, “Entrepreneurship and Nation Building,” 284. Leventhal concludes that “the economic argument may still have held sway in a post-Bishop environment, despite the ideological unpalatability.” Ibid., 285. SGU had had a contingency plan to leave Grenada if necessary since December 1978 when plans for a subsidiary campus in St. Vincent were formulated. SGU never made any major infrastructural investments during the PRG era and in spring 1983 a proposal to relocate to Barbados was blocked and a move to Antigua fell through. Author interview with Vishnath Rao, St. George’s University dean of students, June 23, 2006. Author telephone interview with Bourne. Bish’s private papers. Author interview with Chafin. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 416. Author interview with Chafin. Ibid. “Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne,” US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 177. Shultz, “Subject: Grenada Situation Report No. Eight,” 1. “Invasion Fears,” Daily Nation, October 24, 1983, 1. Adams suspected that Forbes Burnham had leaked details of the CARICOM meeting to the RMC. Ibid. William Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation (London: Mansell, 1984), 93–94. The US embassy finally replied at midnight on Monday, October 24, that under Grenada’s 1973 constitution Governor-General Scoon was the “remaining legitimate

Notes

148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156.

157.

158.

159.

160. 161.

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authority, and not the ruling military council” and therefore the United States “could not respond to the message received, but reiterated U.S. concern over recent violence and the safety of American citizens on Grenada.” Speakes, “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M.,” 9. The comedy of errors continued: the RMC was using an out-of-date fax number that had been reallocated to a plastering company, Scanplast. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books, 1984), 152. Author telephone interview with McNeil. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Request for Talks,” 240639Z, October 24, 1983, Bridgetown 06575, 2. Ibid. Ibid., 3. Adams’s ultimatum envisaged the RMC surrendering peacefully and therefore possibly going into exile rather than facing trial although this plan had its problems. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 4. Bish, “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes,” section 4, 4. Author interview with Motley. Legally Scoon’s request was an embellishment; even the Statement Department’s legal adviser conceded that the legal justifications for the intervention would have been no weaker without the request. Author interview with Davis Robinson, former State Department legal adviser, August 17, 1994. McNeil, War and Peace in Central America, 174. Gillespie recalls McNeil telling him in private that “we’ve got to do this. There’s no other way. I’m convinced.” Charles Gillespie, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, September 19, 1995, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 17, 2007). Metcalf “assigned the amphibious force, now designated Task Force 124, the mission of seizing Pearls Airport and the port of Grenville, and of neutralizing any opposing forces in the area. Simultaneously, Army Rangers (Task Force 121)— together with elements of the 82nd Airborne Division (Task Force 123)—would secure points at the southern end of the island, including the nearly completed jet airfield under construction at Point Salines. A carrier battle group (Task Force 20.5) and air force elements would support the ground forces.” Ronald Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1984), 5. Joseph Metcalf, “Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation,” in Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making, ed. James March, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, and Pauline Ryan (London: Pitman, 1988), 283. Present at the meeting were Metcalf, McDonald, deputy commander of JTF 120 Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the 82nd Airborne forces Major General Edward Trobaugh, commander of the Special Operations forces Major General Richard Scholtes, the JCS’s deputy director for plans and policy Commodore Jack Darby, and Craig Johnstone from the State Department. In a highly unusual arrangement State had sent Darby and Johnstone to ensure that the military did not find a reason to delay the operation. Author interview with Johnstone. Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography; It Doesn’t Take a Hero (London: Bantam Press, 1992), 246.

248

162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175.

176.

177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185.

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Johnstone apparently confirmed this although by this stage it was unlikely that a diplomatic solution was possible. Donn-Erik Marshall, “Urgent Fury: The U.S. Military Intervention in Grenada” (MA diss., University of Virginia, 1989), 14. Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 248. Author interview with Johnstone. Ibid. Motley echoed this: “If the Pentagon can’t knock it over overnight then it ought to disappear.” Author telephone interview with Motley. Interview with Gillespie, Frontline Diplomacy. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 334. Author interview with Johnstone. Adams had previously claimed that he had learnt of a number of political prisoners being held in the condemned cell who were to be executed at an early date. F. A. Hoyos, Tom Adams: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1988), 114. It transpired that the political prisoners were not in danger and therefore not a political priority, and it would not have been unacceptable if fatalities had been incurred. Author interview with Johnstone. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 331. Weinberger’s position was most likely the result of McNeil’s report from Barbados. Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), 77. Robert McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 264. Author telephone interview with Edwin Meese, former White House counselor, January 9, 1995. Meese, With Reagan, 218. Shultz speculated that Reagan’s resoluteness was probably “bolstered by the fact that, by chance, he had been in Augusta with McFarlane and me, two strong supporters of the action, and therefore was insulated somewhat from the Pentagon’s reluctance.” Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 344. Author telephone interview with Meese. As Cannon says, “California had been on the cutting edge of the peace movement . . . and the student protests against the Vietnam War had left a lasting impression.” Cannon, President Reagan, 78. Reagan had also taken decisive action to end an air traffic controllers’ dispute with mass dismissals. Meese, With Reagan, 218. US Department of State, “Secretary Shultz’s News Conference. October 25, 1983,” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 70. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 77. Bish’s private papers. Crist was subsequently informed that Scoon’s rescue would be a priority. Ibid. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 166. Charles had been invited to Washington by Bish who was talked into it by Motley. Author interview with Bish. Allan Gerson, The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology; America at the United Nations 1981–1985 (New York: Free Press, 1991), 221–222. Soviet Foreign Minister Sergei Tarasenko recalled that “in Moscow we had no interest in this affair. We refused that sum. Grenada would fall by itself.” Deborah Strober and Gerald Strober, Reagan: The Man and His Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 257.

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186. Hedrick Smith, “Reagan Aide Says U.S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A10. 187. Author telephone interview with Flohr. 188. US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 37. 189. Larry Speakes, “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 12:16 P.M., October 24, 1983,” no. 889-10/24, Container 34, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 15. In fact four planes did land at Pearls that day. 190. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 255. 191. US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 46. It is reasonable to assume that the embassy in Barbados was aware of which planes were leaving. Chafin returned from Grenada that afternoon and Consular Officer David Ostroff flew to Grenada to replace him. Bish’s private papers. 192. Milan Bish, unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: W/W: Amcits in Grenada,” 241339Z, October 24, 1983, Bridgetown 06547, 1. 193. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, 63. Following British and Canadian pressure, flights on humanitarian grounds were permitted. 194. Thomas Walkon and Charlotte Montgomery, “Canada and the Grenada Invasion,” Toronto Globe and Mail, November 17, 1983, 4. Vere Bird was the strongest opponent of flights to Grenada. Author interview with Kelly. Canada suspected that the United States and the OECS had pressurized LIAT. “Ottawa Probing If Grenada Flights Purposely Scuttled,” Toronto Globe and Mail, November 12, 1983, 1. 195. “Ottawa Probing If Grenada Flights Purposely Scuttled,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 1. 196. “Grenada Aftermath/Marines’ Families,” The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, October 28, 1983, transcript no. 2110, 7. Robert Myers was a retired director of the Social Security administration and had been hired by the OAS as a technical adviser to Grenada. Spencer Rich, “Ex-U.S. Official Saw Grenada after Coup,” Washington Post, October 27, 1983, A10. 197. John Walton Cotman, The Gorrion Tree: Cuba and the Grenada Revolution (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 220. Tortolo was chief of staff of the Army of the Centre in Cuba. He had also been head of the Cuban military mission on Grenada from 1981 until May 1983. Daniel Bolger, Americans at War: 1975–1986, An Era of Violent Peace (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 280. Larranga was an expert on Grenada; he was killed during the intervention. Cotman, The Gorrion Tree, 220. 198. Cuban Party, “Statement by the Cuban Party,” 10. 199. Tortolo’s arrival was observed by Chafin who was at the airport to meet his replacement and return to Barbados with the RMC’s diplomatic note. 200. Motley never believed Castro would try to reinforce Grenada but he knew that Tortolo had been sent to establish good command and control over the available forces there and that the US forces job had been made a little bit harder. Any delay would only give the Cubans more time to organize themselves. Author telephone interview with Motley. Tortolo later admitted that “I never thought they were going to launch an invasion,” rather a rescue mission to extricate the students. Hence “the U.S. troops captured several of our comrades who had run out of ammo along with another group that was unarmed.” Jorge Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuban Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 168. 201. John Kelly was told of the action and that it would be a “pushover.” Author interview with Kelly. Chafin left with a clear picture of the timing of the intervention and that it might be as early as that evening. Author interview with Chafin. 202. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 256. 203. Michael Ryan, “Scenes of a War,” People Weekly, November 14, 1983, 42.

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204. Bourne, “Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition,” 24. 205. Peter Bourne, “Was the U.S. Invasion Necessary?” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1983, section 4, 1. 206. “Statement by Dr. Geoffrey Bourne,” US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 178. 207. Present were Reagan, Shultz, Weinberger, Vessey, McFarlane, Motley, and a few others. 208. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 334. 209. “Operation Urgent Fury,” PBS Frontline (New York: Journal Graphics, 1988), 16. 210. UK Parliament, Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 6th Series, vol. 47, Session 1983–84, October 24–November 4, 1983, Grenada, 24, col. 30. 211. Ibid., col. 27. 212. Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), 327. 213. Executive Secretariat NSC to Downing Street, secret telegram, “Reagan Letter to Thatcher (Thinking of Intervening),” 241847Z, October 24, 1983. The Thatcher Foundation, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid= 109428 (accessed February 5, 2007), 2. 214. Ibid. 215. Executive Secretariat NSC to Downing Street, secret telegram, “Reagan Letter to Thatcher (Decided to Intervene),” 242200Z, October 24, 1983, The Thatcher Foundation, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid= 109429 (accessed February 5, 2007), 1. 216. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, 330. 217. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 331. 218. According to McNeil, Charles was slightly surprised and said, “My, that’s fast!” Author telephone interview with McNeil. In a biography Charles recalls saying: “Why didn’t you tell me so in Guadeloupe before we went . . .The only reason for coming was to make them hurry up and make a decision!” Higbie, Eugenia, 231. After letting her finish, McNeil told Charles that she would be meeting Reagan the following morning. 219. Shultz, secretary of state, secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown, “Subject: U.S. Response to OECS Request for Assistance,” 242324Z, October 24, 1983, Washington D.C. 303362, 2. 220. “U.S. ’copters Seen in Barbados; Grenada Landings Denied in U.S.,” Washington Times, October 25, 1983, 1. 221. Larry Speakes with Robert Pack, Speaking Out: The Reagan Presidency from Inside the White House (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 152. As Pearson concludes, the administration followed a pattern of deception throughout the period: “Its initial manifestation was secrecy—hiding the U.S.’ actual intentions. When information about the movement of forces could not be concealed, these were described in as innocent a fashion as possible . . . It was only when administration officials were directly asked whether there would be an invasion was the response to flatly lie, saying reports to that effect were ‘preposterous.’” David Eric Pearson, “The Betrayal of Truth and Trust by Government: Deception as Process and Practice” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1988), 177. 222. As Plante explained: “There are unwritten rules concerning the qualifiers and statements made by White House spokesmen and with that much of a knockdown, there wasn’t much choice . . . you have to assume they’re not lying.” Mark Hertsgaard,

Notes

223.

224.

225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231.

232. 233. 234. 235.

236. 237. 238.

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On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (New York: Shocken Books, 1991), 214. Speakes, Speaking Out, 152. Speakes was only given the full story at 5:45 a.m. on the day of the intervention, with a thick wad of papers to digest before the 7:00 a.m. press briefing. Author interview with Larry Speakes, former principal deputy White House press secretary, July 27, 1994. Present at the meeting were Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, Senators Howard Baker and Robert C. Byrd; Congressmen Robert H. Michel and James C. Wright; Reagan; Shultz; Weinberger; Vessey; McFarlane; Meese; Deaver; Baker; Darman; and Duberstein. Anderson, “National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions,” 79. Thomas O’Neill, Man of the House (New York: Random House, 1987), 365. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 81. McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 265. Ibid., 264. Elsewhere, McFarlane had said of the Congressional leadership that “not one of them supported it” and that O’Neill was “violently opposed” and thought it was a “nutty idea.” Interview with McFarlane, Oral History Project, 149. Author interview with Weinberger. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 335. In defence of the administration, Hall argues that under the War Powers Resolution congressional participation in a presidential decision to use force is unnecessary; “The President is free . . . to decide, without the benefit of congressional advice, that the use of armed force is warranted under a particular set of circumstances and to consult with Congress after making the initial determination. What the President must do . . . is give Congress the opportunity to offer an opinion and to engage the President in debate prior to the commencement of hostilities.” Hall admits that the definition of “Congress” in these circumstances is problematical but concludes that “the most reasonable interpretation . . . is that it requires the President to consult with the congressional leadership.” David Locke Hall, The Reagan Wars: A Constitutional Perspective on the War Powers and the Presidency (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 196–7. Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York. Simon & Schuster, 1990), 454. Interview with McFarlane, Oral History Project, 153. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 331. Executive Secretariat NSC to Downing Street, secret telegram, “Grenada: Reagan Letter to Thatcher (Intervention Goes Ahead),” 250656Z, October 25, 1983, The Thatcher Foundation, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=109430 (accessed February 5, 2007), 1. Ibid. Ibid., 2. Other officials were irritated by Thatcher’s position. In 1982 Weinberger had “bent over backwards” to help Britain in the Falklands. Author interview with Motley. There was probably a feeling in Washington that London should return the favor over Grenada. Another view in Washington was that Britain had no need to participate; they had demonstrated their resolve in the Falklands and nonparticipation put them back in the political mainstream in Latin American eyes after the harm caused by the Falklands conflict. Author interview with Johnstone. The Foreign Affairs Committee report noted that British noninvolvement

252

239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244.

245. 246. 247. 248.

249.

250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257.

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had avoided damaging relations with the rest of the Commonwealth. UK Parliament. Grenada, xix. Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: Bodley Head, 1990), 129. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 331. At the time the lack of consultation was also interpreted in terms of the state of US-British relations in general and the impending stationing of US Cruise missiles in England. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 82. Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 83. Reynold Burrowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada: An Account of the U.S.Caribbean Intervention (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 134. Castro had given his troops specific instructions: “If the United States intervenes, we must vigorously defend ourselves . . . but only if we are directly attacked. I repeat: only if we are directly attacked.” Cuban Party, “Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government on the Imperialist Intervention of Grenada,” in Statements by CUBA on the events in GRENADA, ed. Nora Madan (La Habana, Cuba: Editora Politica, 1983), 7. There were 103 students who lived at True Blue, but there were another 224 at Grand Anse and 202 in the Lance-aux-Epines area. US Department of State, Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” 70. The official casualty toll was 18 US soldiers killed, 116 wounded; 24 Cubans killed, 59 wounded; and 45 Grenadians killed and 337 wounded. Rich Jaroslovsky, “U.S. Sees Military Victory in Grenada Despite Stiff Resistance from Cubans,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1983, 1. Richard Gabriel, Military Incompetence (New York: Hill & Wang, 1985), 143–186; and Edward Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 39–67, are both highly critical accounts. See also Peter Dunn and Bruce Watson, ed., American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation “Urgent Fury ” (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (London: Leo Cooper, 1989); and Cole, Operation Urgent Fury. Charles Kaiser, with Lucy Howard, “An Off-the-Record War,” Newsweek, November 7, 1983, 83. See also Marlene Cuthbert, Journalistic Perspectives on the Grenada Crisis: Media Coverage in the Caribbean, Canada, the United States and Europe (Kingston, Jamaica: Press Association of Jamaica, 1985) and Jan Servaes, “European Press Coverage of the Grenada Crisis,” Journal of Communication 41, no. 4 (1991): 28–41. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 339. Russell Crandall, Gunboat Democracy: US Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 156. See James Goodsell, “Latin America’s Quiet Support for US Intervention in Grenada,” Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 1983. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 2. Ibid., 66. Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, 131. Crandall, Gunboat Democracy, 152. Ibid., 160. Trinidadian Prime Minister George Chambers did not support the intervention and faced strong criticism from the local media who labeled him a “black

Notes

258.

259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266.

267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273.

274. 275. 276.

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sheep” and accused him of a “lack of leadership.” Juan Williams, “Trinidadian Leader Faces Criticism for Opposing Invasion,” Washington Post, October 31, 1983. Speakes, Speaking Out, 159. For a skeptical media account see David Ettlin, “Invasion Abruptly Ended Medical Students’ Doubts,” Baltimore Sun, October 30, 1983. A January 1984 poll of students after they had returned to the island and US forces left, revealed continued strong support for the intervention. See Michael Jay Robinson, Maura Clancey, and William Adams, “Grenada Update,” Public Opinion (February/March 1984): 51–55. Interview with Gillespie, Frontline Diplomacy. Author interview with Joseph Edmunds, former St. Lucian ambassador to the United States, August 2, 1994. Author interview with Bish. MacNeil/Lehrer, “Grenada Aftermath/Coronary Bypass Report,” 8. UK Parliament, Grenada, xvii. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 189. Burrowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada, 138. Dam later admitted that the administration had “no information” on any harm/threat to the students after October 19. Reagan clarified the situation on Tuesday, October 25: “They were in no danger in the sense of that, right now, anything was being done to them. But we know that there was concern on the part of those, because already we’d been informed of several hundred who wanted to leave. But the airports were closed. There was no way of leaving.” US President, “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada, October 25, 1983,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102583a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). Author interview with Weinberger. Speakes, “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M.,” 20. Author interview with Motley. US Department of State, Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” 71. US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, 32. Congressman William Broomfield quoted in Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 202. H. W. Brands Jr., “Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly 102 (1987): 621. Domestic instability has long been recognized as a cause of external intervention but, as Pearson concludes, “assassinations, coups (successful or unsuccessful), political executions, purges, and governmental crises were quite unlikely to result in . . . intervention from abroad” and that foreign intervention is usually aimed at “preserving rather than destroying a target government.” Frederic Pearson, “Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1974): 286. In Grenada’s case the political violence, deaths, and curfew associated with the instability were repugnant to the particularly close-knit Eastern Caribbean states and promoted intervention to remove a government. Anderson, “National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions,” 63. Adkin, Urgent Fury, 107. Author telephone interview with Motley.

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Conclusion 1. George Brizan, Grenada: Island of Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1998), 378. 2. Kai Schoenhals and Richard Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States and the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 34. 3. Robert Pastor, National Security Council, secret memorandum, “Subject: MiniSCC Meeting on Grenada,” March 14, 1979, no. 1629, 1. 4. Frank Ortiz, Confidential telegram to US Department of State, Washington D.C., “Subject: Grenada: Prime Minister Bishop Accuses U.S. of Destabilization Program,” 101256Z, May 10, 1979. 5. Lawrence Rossin, Secret Airgram to secretary of state, “United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup: A Background Paper,” Bridgetown, Barbados, US Embassy, 1983, 31. 6. See Robert Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 1986), and more generally Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985). 7. Author’s correspondence with Larry Rossin, Foreign Service officer, April 15, 1996. 8. The manifesto stated: “We stand firmly committed to a nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist position. We fully support the Organisation of Non-Aligned Nations in their courageous attempts to prevent big-power domination of their economies and internal politics . . . For as long as the present composition of the OAS is maintained, we will not apply for admission to that body. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the intervention of the U.S.A. in the internal affairs of the South East Asian countries . . . We support fully the liberation struggles being waged by our African Brothers in South Africa, S.W. Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau for self-determination.” New Jewel Movement, “The Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement,” The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www. thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/73regionintl. html (accessed March 27, 2007). 9. Frank Ortiz, “Letter to the Editor,” Atlantic Monthly 253 (June 1984): 12. 10. Warren Christopher, Confidential telegram to US embassy, Bridgetown, “Subject: Talking Points for Meeting with PM Bishop,” 150133Z, December 15, 1979, Washington D.C. 322604, 2. 11. Author correspondence with Robert Pastor, former National Security Council member, February 18, 2003. 12. Rossin, “United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup,” 33. 13. Anthony Maingot, “Grenada and the Caribbean: Mutual Linkages and Influences,” in Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S./OECS Intervention, ed. Jiri Valenta and Herbert Ellison (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1986), 144. 14. Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 118. 15. Author interview with Vincent Roberts, former head of CID, Grenadian Police, June 21, 2006. 16. Under Gairy two government scholarships were awarded each year. By 1983, 330 scholarships had been awarded. James Ferguson, Grenada: Revolution in Reverse (London: Latin America Bureau, 1991), 7. Cuba offered the PRG more scholarships but the PRG struggled to find suitable candidates for them. 17. Gail Pool, “Shifts in Grenadian Migration: An Historical Perspective,” International Migration Review 23, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 253. In 1979 the net migration rate

Notes

18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

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was approximately 1.6 migrants per thousand of the population. In 1980 the rate increased to 2.8 and in 1981 it reached 3.5. Ibid., 245. National Security Decision Directive 110a, October 23, 1983, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2171t.gif (accessed March 4, 2007). Ronald Reagan, “Presidential Address to the Nation: Foreign Policy, Thursday, October 27, 1983,” (Elliot/Myer) October 26, 1983, 9:00 a.m., White House Office of Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, OA8206, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 9. H. W. Brands, Jr., “Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly 102 (1987): 620. In November 1979, 53 US embassy staff in Tehran were taken hostage by Iranian militants. After diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions were unsuccessful, President Carter approved a military operation to rescue the hostages. The mission ended prematurely in the Iranian desert when two helicopters suffered mechanical malfunctions and a third one crashed killing eight Americans. The crisis effectively destroyed Carter’s reelection chances; the hostages were eventually released the day Carter left office after 444 days in captivity. See David Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Christopher Hemmer, “Historical Analogies and the Definition of Interests: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Ronald Reagan’s Policy toward the Hostages in Lebanon,” Political Psychology 20, no. 2 (1999): 271. Ibid., 69. The majority, about 650, of these citizens were students at the privately owned American SGU. As McNeil pointed out, the fact that they were students only there to study, rather than retirees or businessmen who had chosen to go there, seemed to increase the emotional image of them as “innocents abroad.” Author telephone interview with Francis McNeil, former special emissary of the president, December 13, 1995. Milan Bish, confidential telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Current Situation,” undated [c. October 15, 1983], 1. Langhorne Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” Department of State Bulletin 84 (March 1984), 71. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Ambassador’s Assessment of the Situation on Grenada,” 200749Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06393, 2. Author interview with Caspar Weinberger, former secretary of defense, October 7, 1994. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), 108. Ibid., 158. Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story (New York: Madison Books, 1984), 8. Author interview with Charles Gillespie, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, November 27, 1995. Richard Halloran, “Joint Chiefs Supported U.S. Action as Feasible,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, 23. US Department of State, “President’s Remarks, October 25, 1983,” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 67. The same point was made by a number of government officials over the following days. Reagan, “Address to the Nation.” An earlier draft read: “A few years ago we all watched in agony for 444 days as a tyrannical regime held more than 50 of our fellow citizens hostage. I could not risk seeing that tragedy repeated.” Ibid., 12.

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34. US President, “Text of Remarks by the President to Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station Personnel and Families, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, November 4, 1983,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/110483a.htm (accessed February 3, 2007). 35. See John McQuiston, “School’s Chancellor Says Invasion Was Not Necessary to Save Lives,” New York Times, October 26, 1983; Robert Pastor, “Outrage Follows Outrage,” Washington Post, October 26, 1983; and John Quigley, “The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger Than Fiction,” University of Miami InterAmerican Law Review 18, no. 4 (Winter 1986–1987): 271–305. 36. See Bernard Gwertzman, “Fear of ‘Another Iran’ Haunted the White House,” New York Times, October 26, 1983; and Robert Toth, “U.S. Feared 2nd Hostage Crisis: Shultz,” Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1983. 37. Robert Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 202. 38. See Abraham Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1999); and Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 39. US President, “Address to the British Parliament, June 8, 1982,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www.reagan. utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm (accessed March 6, 2007). 40. Interestingly, US officials post-intervention made it clear that Washington’s aims did “not encompass the imposition on the Grenadians of any particular form of government.” Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam quoted in Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 74. In a November 1983 State Department “Next Steps” paper, the objective was to “create a climate in which democratic government can be restarted and sustained.” Department of State, Secret Memorandum, “Grenada: Next Steps,” November 1983. 41. David Eric Pearson, “The Betrayal of Truth and Trust by Government: Deception as Process and Practice” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1988), 240. 42. Tom Adams, “Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados to Barbadian Parliament, 15/11/83,” in UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, Grenada, Session 1983–84 (London: HMSO, 1984), lv. 43. Reagan, “Address to the Nation.” 44. Ibid., 11. 45. Leslie Manigat, “Revolutionary Shockwave, Crisis and Intervention,” in The Caribbean and World Politics: Cross Currents and Cleavages, ed. Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), 187. 46. US President, “Remarks in Bridgetown, Barbados, Following a Luncheon Meeting with Leaders of Eastern Caribbean Countries, April 8, 1982,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan. utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/40882a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). 47. Robert McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 257. 48. Interview with Robert McFarlane, former presidential National Security Adviser, by Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Randall Bently, and Stephen Flynn, November 10–11, 1988,

Notes

49. 50.

51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59.

60.

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Washington, D.C., Oral History Project (International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA). Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), 87. Interview with Yuri Pavlov, former head of the Latin American Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry, CNN.com Cold War, Episode 18, “Backyard,” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-18/pavlov3.html (accessed March 13, 2007). Pavlov later became Latin American director. Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1985), 174. Robert McMahon, “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 15 (1991): 455. Shultz quoted in interview with McFarlane, Oral History Project, 147. Whether any of the United States’ allies were reassured, or felt the need to be at that time, by Washington’s honoring of the OECS request is moot. European governments were more concerned about Washington’s willingness to use force. Author interview with Langhorne Motley, former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, August 25, 1994. President Reagan quoted in Juan Williams, “President Defends Using Force,” Washington Post, December 13, 1983, A1. Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 336. Vijay Tiwathia, The Grenada War: Anatomy of a Low-Intensity Conflict (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987), 166. US Department of State, “Secretary Shultz’s News Conference, October 25, 1983,” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 70. Gerson explains the reason for this: “How we chose to characterize the Grenada operation—whether as a fluke, as an isolated incident in U.S. foreign relations” or “as part of the pattern and strategy of U.S. foreign policy—would help determine U.S. foreign policy. Our explanations . . . would give the world notice on how the Administration perceived the Grenada operation, and whether other ‘Grenadas’ might be in store in the future.” Allan Gerson, The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology; America at the United Nations 1981–1985. New York: Free Press, 1991), 225. The US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, “saw nothing wrong with putting Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega on notice about the capabilities of U.S. power and the limits of U.S. patience.” Ibid., 232. See also Fred Barnes, “Weinberger Refuses to Rule out American Invasion of Nicaragua,” Baltimore Sun, November 7, 1983, 1. Frank McNeil, War and Peace in Central America: Reality and Illusion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 175. McNeil felt that the success in Grenada “created a magnificent opportunity for a durable peace in Central America.” Ibid. Johnstone concurred that Grenada opened up certain avenues that resulted in two rounds of negotiations in Nicaragua. Author interview with Craig Johnstone, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, September 1, 1994. It is likely that the decision to expel the Cubans was made before the intervention rather than being a knee-jerk reaction to it. However, “it is possible that the move was a more calculated and opportunistic gesture to woo, or at least disarm, Brazil, the United States and The Netherlands.” Edward Dew, “Did Suriname Switch? Dialectics a la Dante,” Caribbean Review 12, no. 4 (December 1983): 29.

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61. Robert Pastor, “The Invasion of Grenada: A Pre- and Post-Mortem,” in The Caribbean after Grenada: Conflict and Democracy, ed. Scott MacDonald, Harald Sandstrom, and Paul Goodwin (New York: Praeger, 1988), 103. 62. Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 192. 63. George Chambers, “Statement by the Honourable Prime Minister George Chambers to the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago on October 26, 1983 on the Grenada Crisis,” in Documents on the Invasion, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 76. 64. Motley, “The Decision to Assist Grenada,” 71. 65. Interview with Charles Gillespie by Charles Stuart Kennedy, September 19, 1995, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 17, 2007). 66. Milan Bish, secret telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenada: Request for Talks,” 240639Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06576, 3. 67. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam quoted in Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 64. 68. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada, 98th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), 37. 69. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, 207. 70. See Robert Beck, “Grenada’s Echoes in Iraq: International Security and International Law,” The Long Term View 5, no. 1 (2003): 73–87; and Jonathan Steele, “Regime Change, the Prequel,” Guardian, October 11, 2003, Guardian Unlimited, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,1060745,00.html (accessed March 22, 2007). Preemption is firmly emphasized in the United States’ National Security Strategy. The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ nss.html (accessed March 23, 2007). 71. Richard Haass, Intervention: Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999), 154. 72. Author telephone interview with Flower. 73. Author interview with McNeil. 74. Brands, 616. 75. Reagan, “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles.” 76. Anthony Maingot, “American foreign policy in the Caribbean: continuities, changes, and contingencies,” International Journal XL (Spring 1985): 327. 77. Adams, “Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados,” 35.

Epilogue 1. James Ferguson, Grenada: Revolution in Reverse (London: Latin America Bureau, 1991), 37. 2. By the time President Reagan visited Grenada in 1986, the gross domestic product had declined each year since 1983, unemployment had reached 40 percent, and emigration had increased. “Grenada: Reagan’s Four Hours in Paradise,” News and Analysis, February 19, 1986, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), http://www.coha.org/Press%20Release%20Archives/1986/003.pdf (accessed March 20, 2007). Nonetheless, “Uncle Reagan” received a rapturous welcome from around 40,000 Grenadians who had packed out Queen’s Park to hear Reagan say that “I will never be sorry that I made the decision to help you.” Richard Stengel, “In Grenada,

Notes

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

18.

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Apocalypso Now, Time, March 3, 1986, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,960811-1,00.html (accessed September 3, 2007). Ferguson, Grenada, 46. W. Marvin Will, “From Authoritarianism to Political Democracy in grenada: Questions for U.S. Policy,” Studies in Comparative International Development 26, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 50. Ibid., 65. “Hurricane Ivan Blasts Caribbean,” September 9, 2004, BBC News, http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3634898.stm (accessed March 20, 2007). “Statement by the IMF Staff Mission to Grenada,” Press Release No. 06/256, November 17, 2006, 1 (Washington, D.C.: IMF), http://www.imf.org/external/ np/sec/pr/2006/pr06256.htm (accessed March 18, 2007). “China in, Taiwan out,” Grenada Today, February 5, 2005, http://www.belgrafix. com/gtoday/2005news/Feb/Feb05/China-Taiwan.htm (accessed March 13, 2007). Grenada had previously established diplomatic relations with China in October 1985 before breaking them off in favor of Taiwan in August 1989. “China in, Taiwan out.” “Grenada Investigates Anthem Gaffe,” February 4, 2007, BBC News, http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6328881.stm (accessed March 13, 2007). “Castro Gets Hero’s Reception in Grenada,” BBC News, August 4, 1998, http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/ hi/world/americas/144860.stm (accessed February 27, 2007). The 17 included the main protagonists Bernard Coard, Phyllis Coard, Hudson Austin, Ewart Layne, Selwyn Strachan, Liam James, and Leon Cornwall. “Law Lords Uphold Grenada Appeal,” February 7, 2007, BBC Caribbean, http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2007/02/070207_privyquash.shtml (accessed March 23, 2007). There are now 13 prisoners; Phyllis Coard was allowed to travel to Jamaica to receive medical treatment in 2000 (whilst she does remain there she has not been released) and three others were released in 2006 having served their sentences. See Amnesty International, The Grenada 17: The Last of the Cold War Prisoners? (London: Amnesty International, 2003, http://web.amnesty.org/ library/ index/engamr320012003 (accessed March 13, 2007). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, Grenada: Redeeming the Past: A Time for Healing, 3 vols. (St. George’s, Grenada: Government Printery, 2006), 53. Vol. 1 is available at http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/trccontents.html (accessed July 4, 2007). “Grenada 13 Urge Leniency,” BBC Caribbean News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ Caribbean/news/story/2007/06/070619_grenadaupdate. shtml (accessed July 10, 2007). “Grenada 13: Three released,” June 27, 2007, BBC Caribbean, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ caribbean/news/story/2007/06/070627_grenada13sentencing.shtml (accessed on July 10, 2007). The three released were Christopher Stroude, Lester Redhead, and Cecil Prime who were deemed to have played minor roles. Two others will have a review on health grounds by the end of 2007. “Government Calls for Prayer for Families Affected,” June 28, 2007, The Prime Minister’s Office, Government of Grenada, http://pmoffice.gov.gd/newsitem. aspx?nid=1232 (accessed July 10, 2007).

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Bibliography

Author Interviews and Correspondence Anonymous. Former Department of Defense official. Telephone interviews conducted on October 10, 1994 and February 9, 1995. Anonymous. Foreign Service officer. Telephone interview conducted on January 31, 1995. Barnard, Mike. Former Plessey contractor. Interview with author, October 25, 2006. Bish, Milan. Former US ambassador to Barbados. Interview with author, September 21, 1994. Telephone interview conducted on November 2, 1995. Blaker, Peter. Former parliamentary under-secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Telephone interview conducted on September 2, 2006. Bourne, Peter. Former special assistant to President Carter for health issues. Telephone interview conducted on September 6, 1995. Britton, Theodore. Former US ambassador to Barbados. Correspondence with the author September 25, 2005. Bushnell, John. Former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. Telephone interview conducted on July 29, 1995. Chafin, Gary. Former political officer, US Embassy, Barbados. Interview with author, November 20, 1995. Clarridge, Duane. Former Latin American Division Chief of the Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency. Telephone interview conducted on May 23, 1997. Dam, Kenneth. Former deputy secretary of state. Telephone interviews conducted on August 26, 1994 and August 17, 1999. Edmunds, Joseph. Former St. Lucian ambassador to the United States. Interview with author, August 2, 1994. Evans, Bob. Former Point Salines International Airport project manager. Interview with author, June 14, 2006. Flohr, Linda. Former third secretary, US Embassy, Barbados. Telephone interviews conducted on December 19, 1994 and April 19, 1997. Flower, Ludlow. Former deputy chief of mission, US Embassy, Barbados. Interview with author, October 27, 1994. Telephone interview conducted on November 2, 1995. Fontaine, Roger. Former National Security Council Latin American director. Interview with author, July 15, 1994.

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Gillespie, Charles. Former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. Interview with author, November 27, 1995. Howe, Jonathan Trumbull. Former director of Political-Military Affairs. Telephone interview conducted on May 2, 1995. Johnstone, Craig. Former deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. Interview with author, September 1, 1994. Kelly, John. Former British representative in Grenada, British High Commission, Barbados. Interviews with author, February 16, 1995 and March 8, 1996. Correspondence with the author, December 21, 1995. Knockaert, Joe. Canadian International Development Agency official. Correspondence with the author, May 24, 2000. Kurze, Kenneth. Former counselor for political and economic affairs, US Embassy, Barbados. Correspondence with the author, August 20, 1995–March 26, 1996. Lewis, Rudyard. Former Head of the Caribbean Regional Security Service. Interview with the author, June 14, 2006. McNeil, Frank. Former special emissary of the president. Telephone interview conducted on December 13, 1995. Meese, Edwin. Former White House counselor. Telephone interview conducted on January 10, 1995. Metcalf, Joseph. Former vice admiral and commander of the Second Fleet. Interview with author, August 16, 1994. Middendorf, William. Former US ambassador to the Organization of American States. Interview with author, August 17, 1994. Montgomery, David. Former deputy high commissioner, British High Commission, Barbados. Interview with author, November 8, 1995. Motley, Langhorne. Former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. Interview with author, August 25, 1994. Telephone interviews conducted on September 25, 1995, February 21, 1996, and August 16, 1999. Noel, Lloyd. Former People’s Revolutionary Government attorney general. Interview with the author, June 21, 2006. Ortiz, Frank. Former US ambassador to Barbados. Telephone interview conducted on August 10, 1994. Ostroff, David. Former consular officer, US Embassy, Barbados. Telephone interview conducted October 27, 1995. Pastor, Robert. Former Director of Latin American Affairs, National Security Council member. Correspondence with the author, February 18, 2003. Pierre, Leslie. Editor of the Grenadian Voice. Interview with the author, June 21, 2006. Ramdhanny, Lyden. Former People’s Revolutionary Government minister. Interview with the author, June 22, 2006. Rao, Vishnath. St. George’s University dean of students. Interview with author, June 23, 2006. Roberts, Kennedy. Former People’s Revolutionary Government economic attaché to Cuba. Interview with author, June 21, 2006. Roberts, Vincent. Former head of CID, Grenadian Police. Interview with author, June 21, 2006. Robinson, Davis. Former State Department legal adviser. Interview with author, August 17, 1994. Rossin, Lawrence. Foreign Service officer. Interview with author, October 28, 1994. Correspondence with the author, April 15, 1996.

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Sapia-Bosch, Alphonso. Former Director of Latin American Affairs, National Security Council member. Correspondence with author, December 12, 1999. Scoon, Paul. Former governor-general of Grenada. Interview with author, June 19, 2006. Shelton-Colby, Sally. Former US ambassador to Barbados. Correspondence with author, September 7, 2004. Speakes, Larry. Former principal deputy White House press secretary. Interview with author, July 27, 1994. Tomlin, Peter. Former lieutenant commander, Barbados Defence Force. Interview with author, June 14, 2006. Weinberger, Caspar. Former secretary of defense. Interview with author, October 7, 1994. Williams, Daniel. Grenadian governor-general. Interview with author, June 23, 2006. Williams, Dessima. Former Grenadian ambassador to the Organization of American States. Telephone interview conducted on June 21, 2000.

Other Interviews Britton, Theodore. Former US ambassador to Barbados. Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 29, 1989. Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 10, 2007). Budhlall, Kennedy. Former People’s Revolutionary Army officer. Interviewed by John Walton Cotman, November 11, 1989. Donovan, Eileen. Former US ambassador to Barbados. Interviewed by A. L. Lowrie, December 3, 1985. Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/(accessed March 3, 2007). Gillespie, Charles. Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, September 19, 1995. Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 17, 2007). Grenada Foundation. An Interview with George Louison and Kendrick Radix. New York: Grenada Foundation, 1984. Louison, George. Former People’s Revolutionary Government minister. Interviewed by Hugh O’Shaughnessy, n.d. McFarlane, Robert. Former Presidential National Security Adviser. Interviewed by Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Randall Bently, and Stephen Flynn, November 10–11, 1988, Washington, D.C. Oral History Project, International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA. Motley, Langhorne. Interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 3, 1991. Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory. loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (accessed March 23, 2007). Pavlov, Yuri. Former head of the Latin American Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry. Interview for CNN.com, Cold War, Episode 18, “Backyard.” n.d. http://www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-18/pavlov3.html (accessed March 13, 2007). Radix, Kendrick. Former People’s Revolutionary Government minister. Interviewed by John Walton Cotman, December 12, 1988. Victor, Teddy. Cofounder of the New Jewel Movement. Interviewed by John Walton Cotman, January 19, 1989. Warne, Robert. Former head of the Caribbean Desk, State Department. Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, April 1, 1995. Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division,

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Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/ diplomacy/(accessed March 12, 2007). Whyte, Winston. Former leader of the United People’s Party. Interviewed by John Walton Cotman, February 15, 1989.

Primary Sources The Grenada Documents Microfiche Collection—National Archives, Maryland The five tons of People’s Revolutionary Government documents captured during the intervention were microfiched and deposited in the US National Archives. This unique collection covers the duration of the PRG and is a “treasure trove” for researchers. For an informative account of the history of the Grenada Documents see The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/grenadadocs.html (accessed March 27, 2007). A two-volume index of the 13,220 microfiches is available online at the US National Archives—http://aad.archives.gov/aad/. An index of 1,052 microfiches by Professor John Walton Cotman (Howard University, Washington, D.C.), related to his research on Cuban-Grenadian relations, is also available at the National Archives. Several edited collections of varying documents have been published: Crozier, Brian (ed.). The Grenada Documents. London: Sherwood Press, 1987. Dujmovic, Nicholas (ed). The Grenada Documents: Window on Totalitarianism. London, Brassey’s, 1988. Ledeen, Michael, and Herbert Romerstein (eds.). Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection. Washington, D.C.: Department of State and the Department of Defense, 1984. Seabury, Paul, and Walter McDougall (eds.). The Grenada Papers. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984. Valenta, Jiri, and Herbert Ellison (eds.). Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S./OECS Intervention. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. This contains a 230-page appendix of People’s Revolutionary Government documents. Georgetown University Library, Washington, D.C. http://www.library.georgetown.edu/dept/speccoll/grenada.htm The Grenada Documents Collection Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/ White House Central Files, Countries (CO)—Grenada White House Central Name File—Robert Pastor Folder National Security Archive, Gelman Library, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ Grenada Collection Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ White House, Federal Government - Organization File White House Office of the Press Secretary

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White House Staff and Office Files White House Office of Speechwriting White House Communications Agency, Videotapes In addition to these depositories, I acquired documents through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from the Department of State and Foreign and Commonwealth Office and benefited from the generosity of Mitch Leventhal, Richard Loppnow, and Larry Rossin who shared their FOIA documents with me. I have also had the benefit of access to the private papers of Milan Bish, the former, US ambassador to Barbados.

Internet Resources A number of relevant FOIA documents are available on the Internet: Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.foia.cia.gov/ Department of State, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/ The Grenada Revolution Online, http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com, is a useful source of primary and secondary source material.

Secondary Sources Grenadian Documents People's Revolutionary Government Documents Anonymous. “Interim Report on North American Resistance Movement, 3/29/83.” In The Grenada Papers. Edited by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984. 156–161. Anonymous. “Background Notes for Meeting with National Security Advisor Clark.” 175–177. ———. “Handwritten Notes of Meeting with National Security Adviser Clark.” 178–180. Austin, Hudson. “Statement Broadcast by General Hudson Austin on Behalf of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement, 16th October 1983, at approximately 12:04 P.M. on Radio Free Grenada.” In Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 5–10. ———. “Statement by General Hudson Austin on Behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council, Monitored on Radio Free Grenada, 10:00 P.M. October 19, 1983.” In Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983):11–12. Bishop, Maurice. “The Struggle for Democracy and against Imperialism in Grenada, August 1977.” In Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979–83. Edited by Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber. New York: Pathfinder, 1983, 16–23. ———. “A Bright New Dawn, March 13, 1979.” 16–25. ———. “In Nobody’s Backyard, April 13, 1979.” 26–31. ———. “Bishop Letter to President Reagan. March 26, 1981.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/bishltr1.html (accessed February 7, 2007). ———. “Together We Shall Build Our Airport, March 29, 1981.” 143–149. ———. “Freedom of the Press and Imperialist Destabilization, June 19, 1981.” 150–166. ———. “For Greater Caribbean Community Integration, June 29, 1981.” 167–173.

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______. “Bishop Letter to President Reagan, August, 11, 1981.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/bishltr2.html (accessed January 25, 2007). ———. “Grenada is Not Alone, November 23, 1981.” 240–254. ———. “Line of March for the Party, Monday 13th September 1982.” In The Grenada Papers. Edited by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984. 59–88. ———. “An Armed Attack against Our Country Is Imminent, March 23, 1983.” 279–286. ———. “Maurice Bishop Speaks to U.S. Working People, June 5, 1983.” 287–312. ———. “Letter to Gaddafi.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www. thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/gaddafiletter.html (accessed January 29, 2007). Government of Grenada. Report of the Duffus Commission of Inquiry into the Breakdown of Law & Order, and Police Brutality in Grenada (1975). The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/duffus53thru54.html (accessed January 20, 2007). Jacobs, Ian. “Report on U.S., 4/83.” In The Grenada Papers. Edited by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984. 162–171. Jacobs, W. Richard. “Grenada’s Relations with the USSR.” In The Grenada Documents. Edited by Brian Crozier. London: Sherwood Press, 1987. 198–216. Noel, Vincent. “Letter from Noel to the Central Committee, October 17, 1983.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/noelletter. html (accessed January 29, 2007). People’s Revolutionary Government Political Bureau. “Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 27th May, 1981.” In The Grenada Documents: A Selection and Overview, document 53. Edited by Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein. Washington, D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1984. People’s Revolutionary Government Central Committee. “Minutes of Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the Central Committee of NJM from Tuesday 12th–Friday 15th October, 1982.” In The Grenada Documents, document 105. ———.“Central Committee Report on the First Plenary Session, July 13–19, 1983.” In The Grenada Documents, document 110. ———. “Minutes of Emergency Meeting of N.J.M. Central Committee Dated 26th August, 1983.” In The Grenada Documents, document 111. ———. “Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM, 14–16 September, 1983.” In The Grenada Documents, document 112. ———. “Extra-Ordinary General Meeting of Full Members, September 25th, 1983.” In The Grenada Documents, document 113. “The Political Situation in the Caribbean and Grenada’s Present Position within that Scenario.” GDMC, no. 004872. Reed, Gail. “Advice on U.S. Tour.” In The Grenada Papers. Edited by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984. 172–174. “Resolution of People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces Branch of the New Jewel Movement.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline. com/praresolution.html (accessed January 29, 2007). Strachan, Selwyn. “Report on the meeting of the PB [Political Bureau] and CC [Central Committee] held on Oct. 12th given by Cde. Strachan.” In The Grenada Papers. Edited by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984. 317–321.

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Stroude, Christopher. “Statement Issued by Major Christopher Stroude, Member of the Grenadian Revolutionary Military Council on October 20, 1983.” In Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 13–15. “Telex to the United States Embassy, Barbados, 12.12.80.” GDMC, no. 003104.

Other Grenadian Documents Als, Michael. “Press Statement Presented by Michael Als on Mediation of the Crisis in the NJM.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline. com/mediation.html (accessed January 26, 2007). Coard, Bernard, and Colleagues. “Reflections and Apologies by Bernard Coard and His Colleagues.” The Grenada 17. http://www.grenada17.cwc.net/ (accessed January 29, 2007). Gairy, Eric. “Black Power in Grenada,” Radio Grenada, May 3, 1970, Report of the Duffus Commission of Inquiry into the Breakdown of Law & Order, and Police Brutality in Grenada. Part 3, paragraph 51. The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/duffus53thru54.html (accessed January 20, 2007). “The Grenadian Voice.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline. com/voice1stissue.html (accessed January 25, 2007). “Government Calls for Prayer for Families Affected.” June 28, 2007. The Prime Minister’s Office, Government of Grenada. http://pmoffice.gov.gd/newsitem. aspx?nid=1232 (accessed July 10, 2007). New Jewel Movement. “The Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement.” The Grenada Revolution Online. http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/73regionintl.html (accessed March 27, 2007). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. Grenada: Redeeming the Past: A Time for Healing. 3 vols. St. George’s, Grenada: Government Printery, 2006. Vol. 1 is available at http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/trccontents.html (accessed July 4, 2007).

US Government Documents The majority of US documents were obtained via the FOIA. Others were available from different sources. The National Security Archives Grenada Collection is indicated at the source as NSAGC. The details of this source are as follows. Folder 1, Incoming FOIAs, Box 4, Grenada 6104, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. The documents listed in the “Telegrams and Memoranda” section are in chronological order.

Telegrams and Memoranda US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to the secretary of state. “Subject: Planning for Possible Evacuation of Foreign Residents from Grenada.” 302030Z, January 30, 1974, Bridgetown 00185. ———. Confidential telegram to the secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Independence Celebrations.” 081745Z, February 8, 1974, Bridgetown 00241. ———. Unclassified telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Political Rally June 19.” 210024Z, June 21, 1977, Bridgetown 00063.

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US Mission United Nations, New York. Unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenadian UFO Crusade: Déjà Vu.” 180251Z, November 18, 1978, US Mission United Nations New York 05165. ———. Unclassified telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenadian UFO Resolution.” 232125Z, November 23, 1978, US Mission United Nations New York 05313. ———. Unclassified telegram to secretary of state, “Subject: Grenadian UFO Resolution.” 242141Z, November 24, 1978, US Mission United Nations New York 05323. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Sitrep Twelve Forty-Five Local.” 131954Z, March 13, 1979. Bridgetown 00869. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Coup.” 141945Z, March 14, 1979, Bridgetown unnumbered. US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Confidential telegram to American Embassy, Brasilia. “Subject: Grenada: Policy Options.” 142333Z, March 14, 1979, Washington D.C. 63301. US Embassy, Port of Spain. Unclassified telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Maurice Bishop Interview with T&T Television.” 162103Z, March 16, 1979, Port of Spain 00929. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Developments in Grenada.” 162207Z, March 16, 1979, Bridgetown 0932. US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Confidential telegram to US Embassy, London. “Subject: Recent Events in Grenada.” 312052Z, March 31, 1979, Washington D.C. 81187. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Hewitt Meeting with Foreign Minister Forde.” 062311Z, April 6, 1979, Bridgetown 1315. ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Minister of Finance Coard.” 111603Z, April 11, 1979, Bridgetown 01363. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop.” 111843Z, April 11, 1979, Bridgetown 01368. (NSAGC). US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Secret telegram to US Embassy, Bridgetown. “Subject: Talking Points for your Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada on June 18.” 142202Z, June 14, 1979, Washington D.C. 153150. (NSAGC). US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Confidential telegram to US Embassy, Bridgetown. “Subject: Meeting Between Bernard Coard, Finance Minister of the NRG (sic) in Grenada, and Assistant Secretary Vaky.” 160008Z, June 16, 1979, Washington D.C. 154578. ( NSAGC). US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Bishop charges Attempted Coup.” 052250Z, November 5, 1979, Bridgetown 4597. US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Confidential telegram to US Embassy, Bridgetown. “Subject: Talking Points for Meeting with PM Bishop.” 150133Z, December 15, 1979, Washington D.C. 322604. (NSAGC). US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to the secretary of state. “Subject: Ambassador’s Visit to Grenada: A Preliminary Report.” 182105Z, December 18, 1979, Bridgetown 5310. US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Confidential telegram to US Embassy, Bridgetown. “Subject: Request for Agrément for Dessima Williams as PRG

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Ambassador to the United States.” 151521Z, May 15, 1980, Washington D.C. 127947. (NSAGC). US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: US-Grenadian Relations in the Aftermath of the Bomb Blast.” 232024Z, June 23, 1980, Bridgetown 03122. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Blames US for Poor Relations.” 231915Z, October 23, 1980, Bridgetown 06314. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Requests Ambassador to Visit for High-Level Consultations.” 161402Z, December 16, 1980, Bridgetown 07147. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Bishop’s Speech Concerning Closing of ‘The Grenadian Voice.’” 261051Z, June 26, 1981, Bridgetown 03164. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Text of GrenadaUS Exchange of Letters Released.” 111453Z, March 11, 1982, Bridgetown 01482. (NSAGC). ———. Secret airgram to secretary of state. United States-Grenada Relations since the Coup: A Background Paper by political officer Larry Rossin, 1983. ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Protests Statement by Vice President Bush.” 042122Z, January 4, 1983, Bridgetown 0044. ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. No subject heading. 162143Z, March 16, 1983, Bridgetown 01527. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada After the BishopReagan Exchange: Quiet, Puzzled, Disgruntled.” 201845Z, April 20, 1983, Bridgetown 02334. (NSAGC). US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Secret memorandum to William Clark, The White House. “Subject: Visa for Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada.” May 18, 1983, Department of State 8315359, Washington, D.C. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Local Coverage of Bishop’s Visit to US.” 012008Z, June 1, 1983, Bridgetown 03082. (NSAGC). US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Confidential memorandum to President Ronald Reagan, The White House, “Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada.” June 7, 1983, Department of State 8317648, Washington, D.C. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Bishop Calls U.S. Arrogant.” 0813502Z, June 8, 1983, Bridgetown 03195. (NSAGC). US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Confidential memorandum to William Clark, The White House. “Subject: Grenada: Response to Bishop’s Remarks, Attachment: Talking Points for Ambassador Middendorf.” June 21, 1983, Department of State 8319071, Washington, D.C. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Unrest Political Solution Talks Apparently Going On: Military Divided between Coard and Bishop.” 151602Z, October 15, 1983, Bridgetown 06249. ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Current Situation.” Unnumbered, n.d. [estimated October 15, 1983]. ———. Confidential telegram to the secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Army Plumps for Coard, but Bishop Not Yet Out. Where Do We Go from Here?” 162225Z, October 16, 1983, Bridgetown 06265.

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US Embassy, London. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: [excised] Bishop’s ‘Slow Toppling.’” 181511Z, October 18, 1983, London 22273. (NSAGC). US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Update: Cabinet Members Resign. Foreign Minister Criticizes Coard.” 191905Z, October 19, 1983, Bridgetown 06372. (NSAGC). ———. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada Update: Bishop Re-arrested.” 192034Z, October 19, 1983, Bridgetown 06380. (NSAGC). ———. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Planning for Possible Emergency Evacuation of Amcits—Grenada.” 192356Z, October 19, 1983, Bridgetown 06387. ———. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Attitudes of the Grenada Medical School Toward Possible Evacuation of Their Students/Staff.” 200739Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06392. ———. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Ambassador’s Assessment of the Situation on Grenada.” 200749Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06393. ———. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Barbadian PM Tom Adams Pleas for U.S. Intervention in Grenada: Believes Leadership of the Region Would Strongly Support and fully Associate with U.S.” 201954Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06430. ———. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Comments/Plans of Grenada Democratic Movement.” 202026Z, October 20, 1983, Bridgetown 06431. (NSAGC). ———. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: St. Lucian Prime Minister’s Scenario.” 210058Z, October 21, 1983, Bridgetown 06451. US Embassy, Kingston. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Jamaica Considers Participation in Multilateral Force to Secure Grenada.” 210133Z, October 21, 1983, Kingston 10314. US Department of State. Secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown. “Subject: Approach Re Grenada to OECS and Barbados.” 210258Z, October 21, 1983, Washington D.C. 300202. ———. Secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown. “Subject: Grenada—Seaga Proposes Joint Caribbean Action and Naval Blockade of Grenada.” 211809Z, October 21, 1983, Washington D.C. 300927. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Confidential telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Welfare/Whereabouts STGMS Students.” 212328Z, October 21, 1983, Bridgetown 06503. ———. “Subject: Approach to Adams Re Grenada: Approach to Others Tomorrow.” 220057Z, October 22, 1983, Bridgetown 06505. ———. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Personal Message for the Secretary.” 221310Z, October 22, 1983, Bridgetown 06515. Secretary of state, secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown. “Subject: Instructions for Dealing with Caribbean Friends.” 231833Z, October 1983, Washington D.C. 302418. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Grenada: Request for Talks.” 240639Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06575. US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Secret telegram to all American republic diplomatic posts. “Subject: Grenada Situation Report No. Eight.” 241128Z, October 24, 1983, Washington 302451. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Unclassified telegram to secretary of state. “Subject W/W: Amcits in Grenada.,” 241339Z, October 24, 1983, Bridgetown 06547.

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US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown. “Subject: Suggested Points for OECS Approach to Grenadian Governor General.” 241947Z, October 24, 1983, Washington D.C. 302848. ———. Secret telegram to US Embassy Bridgetown. “Subject: U.S. Response to OECS Request for Assistance.” 242324Z, October 24, 1983, Washington D.C. 303362. US Embassy, Bridgetown. Secret telegram to secretary of state. “Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes of Meeting Between Ambassadors Bish and McNeil with West Indian Heads of Government to Discuss Grenada Situation.” 252203Z, October 25, 1983, Bridgetown 06654. US Department of State, Washington, D.C. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Assessments and Research. “Grenada: The Bishop Years, A Chronology.” Secret Report 721-AR, November 22, 1983. The White House, Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: President Carter/Prime Minister Gairy-Bilateral,” September 9, 1977. The White House, Washington, D.C. Top secret memorandum to George Shultz, secretary of state. “Grenada.” June 20, 1983, The White House 90742, Washington, D.C.

US National Security Council Documents National Security Council. Secret memorandum. “Subject: Next Steps in Grenada.” March 14, 1979, no. 1603. ———. “Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada.,” March 15, 1979, no. 1629. ———. Confidential memorandum. “Subject: Update on Grenada.” March 27, 1979, no. 1871. ———. Secret memorandum. “Subject: Time to Reassess US Policy to Grenada and the Caribbean: Second Generation Surrogates?” April 14, 1979, no. 2271. ———. Secret memorandum. “Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada—April 27, 1979, 10:30–11:30am.” April 23, 1979, no. 2385. ———. Secret memorandum. “Subject: U.S. Assistance to Grenada.” May 8, 1979, no. 2770. ———. Secret memorandum to William Clark, The White House. “Visa for Grenadian Prime Minister Bishop.” May 23, 1983, National Security Council 3421. ———. Confidential memorandum to Robert McFarlane, The White House. “St. George’s Medical School.” June 7, 1983, National Security Council 3900. ———. Secret telegram to Downing Street. “Reagan Letter to Thatcher (Thinking of Intervening ).” 241847Z, October 24, 1983. The Thatcher Foundation. http://www. margaretthatcher.org/archive/default.asp (accessed on July 6, 2007). ———. Secret telegram to Downing Street. “Reagan Letter to Thatcher (Decided to Intervene).” 242200Z, October 24, 1983. The Thatcher Foundation. http://www. margaretthatcher.org/archive/default.asp (accessed on July 7, 2007). ———. Secret telegram to Downing Street. “Grenada: Reagan Letter to Thatcher (Intervention Goes Ahead).” 250656Z, October 25, 1983. The Thatcher Foundation. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/default.asp (accessed on July 7, 2007).

US Central Intelligence Agency Documents Central Intelligence Agency. Memo. “Bishop Says U.S. Blocked International Aid.” Document no. 002433. Declassified Documents Catalog XIV14 (September–October 1988). ———. Memo. “Grenada Chronology, 7–25 October, 1983.” Document no. 002449. Declassified Documents Catalog 1988 IV, no. 5 (1988).

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———. Report. Interagency Intelligence Assessment. “A First Look at the Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement, 19 December, 1983.” http://www.foia.cia.gov (accessed July 5, 2007). National Security Decision Directive 110a, October 23, 1983. Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2171t.gif (accessed July 5, 2007). ———. “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada, October 25, 1983.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102583a.htm (accessed March 25, 2007). ———. “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, October 27, 1983.” Public Papers of the Presidents. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan. utexas.edu/ archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). ———.“Text of Remarks by the President to Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station Personnel and Families, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, November 4, 1983.” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, http://www. reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/110483a.htm (accessed February 3, 2007). US Congress. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979. ———. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States Policy toward Grenada, 97th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982. ———. House of Representatives. Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Affairs. U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, 98th Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983. ———. House of Representatives. “U.S. House of Representatives Fact Finding Mission: The Grenada Diary of Congressman Louis Stokes.” In Documents on the Invasion, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983): 103–107. “U.S. House of Representatives: Critics of American Invasion Detained—U.S. Troops Act on Request of Grenada’s Governor General.” Documents on the Invasion, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin Supplement, no. 1 (October 1983). ———. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in Grenada, 98th Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983. ———. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada, 98th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984. ———. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Miscellaneous Legislation Concerning Various Foreign Policy Issues, 98th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984. ———. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The English-Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Policy. Report by the Congressional Research Service of the proceedings of a workshop held on December 11, 1984. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985. US Department of State. “Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Request for U.S. Assistance in Grenada.” Document no. 656. American Foreign Policy, Current Documents. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983. 1397–1398.

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———. “President’s Remarks, October 25, 1983.” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 67. ———. “OECS Statement.” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 67–68. ———. “Secretary Shultz’s News Conference. October 25, 1983.” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 69–72. ———. “President’s Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session (Excerpts), November 3, 1983.” Department of State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 78–79. ———. Langhorne Motley. “The Decision to Assist Grenada.” Department of State Bulletin 84 (March 1984): 70–73. ———. Office of Public Communication. Background Notes: Grenada. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992. ———.“The Monroe Doctrine.” http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/ 50.htm (accessed December 10, 2006). US Department of State and Department of Defense. Grenada: A Preliminary Report. Washington, D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1983. US General Accounting Office. AID Assistance to the Eastern Caribbean: Program Changes and Possible Consequences. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983. US Information Agency. Grenada: Background and Facts. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983. US President. “Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, February 24, 1982.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www. reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/22482a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). ———. “Remarks in Bridgetown, Barbados, Following a Luncheon Meeting with Leaders of Eastern Caribbean Countries, April 8, 1982.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/ speeches/1982/40882a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). ———. “Address to the British Parliament, June 8, 1982.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). ———. “Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meetings of the National Association of Manufacturers, March 10, 1983.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www. reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/31083a.htm (acessed March 27, 2007). ———. “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm (accessed March 27, 2007). ———. “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America, April 27, 1983.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/42783d.htm (accessed March 27, 2007).

Other US Documents Dam, Kenneth. “Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State.” US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in Grenada, 98th Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983. George Bush. “Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama.” December 20, 1989. George Bush Presidential Library. http://bushlibrary. tamu.edu/research/papers/1989/89122000.html (accessed January 20, 2007).

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NBC Evening News, November 7, 1983. Weekly News Summary, Week of November 07–13, 1983. White House Communications Agency Videotapes, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 9:17 A.M., October 21, 1983.” No. 882-10/21, Container 33, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 12:16 P.M., October 24, 1983.” No. 889-10/24, Container 34, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. “Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M., October 26, 1983.” No. 892-10/26, Container 34, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Ronald Reagan. “Presidential Address to the Nation: Foreign Policy, Thursday, October 27, 1983.” (Elliot/Myer) October 26, 1983, 9:00 a.m. White House Office of Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, OA8206, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. “Statement of Geoffrey Bourne, M.D., Vice Chancellor, St. George’s University School of Medicine, Grenada, West Indies.” US Congress, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, 98th Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983. Weekly News Summary, Week of October 24–30, 1983. White House Communications Agency Videotapes, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

UK Documents Downing Street, London. Letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “The Prime Minister’s telephone conversation with the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Tom Adams, on 15 March 1979.” March 15, 1979. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London. Mexico and Caribbean Department. Memorandum. “Coup d’etat in Grenada.” March 13, 1979. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London. Mexico and Caribbean Department. “AngloUS-Canadian Talks on Security in the Caribbean, Brief No. 5, Assistance to Enhance Security, Including Police, Intelligence and Possibly Regional Coastguard.” April 30, 1979. ———. Confidential telegram to UK High Commission Barbados. “Grenada.” 221815Z, October 22, 1983. London 295. “Memorandum by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat.” UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, Grenada. London: HMSO, 1983–84. UK Embassy, Washington, D.C. Telegram to Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Grenada.” March 14, 1979. UK High Commission, Port of Spain. Telegram to Mexico and Caribbean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Grenada.” March 24, 1979. UK High Commission, Port of Spain. Report to Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Revolution in Grenada: The First Three Weeks.” April 4, 1979. UK Parliament. House of Commons. Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report. Caribbean and Central America. Session 1981–82. London: HMSO, 1982. ———. Parliament. House of Commons. Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report. Grenada. Session 1983–84. London: HMSO, 1984. ———. Parliament. House of Commons. Command Paper 9267. Observations by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on the Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report. Grenada. Session 1983–84. London: HMSO, 1984. UK Parliament, Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 6th series, vol. 47, Session 1983–84, October 24–November 4, 1983, Grenada.

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Journal Articles Archer, Ewart. “Gairyism, Revolution and Reorganization: Three Decades of Turbulence in Grenada.” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 23, no. 2 (1985): 91–111. Arthur, Stanley. “Grenada and Eastern Caribbean Security.” Conflict Studies 177 (1985). Axline, Andrew. “Political Change and U.S. Strategic Concerns in the Caribbean.” Latin American Research Review 21 (1986): 214–225. Barriteau, Eudine. “Regional Comments on Barbados-Grenada Relations.” Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 6, no. 5 (November–December 1980): 22–30. Beck, Robert. “The McNeil Mission and the Decision to Invade Grenada.” Naval War College Review 44 (Spring 1991): 93–112. ———. “Grenada’s Echoes in Iraq: International Security and International Law.” The Long Term View 5, no. 1 (2003): 73–87. Benjamin, Jules. “The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay.” Diplomatic History 11 (1987): 76–105. Block, Marcia, and Geoff Mungham. “The Military, the Media and the Invasion of Grenada.” Contemporary Crises 13 ( June 1989): 91–127. Bostdorff, Denise. “The Presidency and Promoted Crisis: Reagan, Grenada, and Issue Management.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 21 (1991): 737–750. Bourne, Geoffrey. “Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition: What Happened in Grenada.” Nutrition Today ( January/February 1985): 17–27. Brands, H. W., Jr. “Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada.” Political Science Quarterly 102 (1987): 607–624. Castro, Janice, and Patricia Delaney. “Weighing the Proper Role: Grenada and Lebanon Illustrate the Uses and Limits of Power.” Time, November 7, 1983, 30–40. Clark, Steve. “The Second Assassination of Maurice Bishop.” New International: A Magazine of Marxist Politics and Theory 6 (1987): 11–96.

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Connell-Smith, Gordon. “The Grenada Invasion in Historical Perspective: From Monroe to Reagan.” Third World Quarterly 6 (1984): 432–445. Desch, Michael C. “Turning the Caribbean Flank: Sea-Lane Vulnerability during a European War,” Survival (1987): 528–571. Dew, Edward. “Did Suriname Switch? Dialectics a la Dante.” Caribbean Review 12, no. 4 (December 1983): 29–30. Diederich, Bernard. “Interviewing George Louison: A PRG Minister Discusses the Killings.” Caribbean Review 12 (December 1983): 17–18. Enders, Thomas. “A Comprehensive Strategy for the Caribbean Basin.” Caribbean Review 11, no. 2 (1982): 10–13. Erisman, H. Michael. “The CARICOM States and US Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization.” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 31, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 141–182. Feuer, Carl. “Was Bishop a Social Democrat?” Caribbean Review 12, no. 4 (Fall 1983): 37–39. Gill, Henry. “The Foreign Policy of the Grenada Revolution.” Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 7 (March/April 1981): 1–5. Glad, Betty. “Black-and-White Thinking: Ronald Reagan’s Approach to Foreign Policy.” Political Psychology 4, no. 1 (1983): 33–76. Gleijeses, Piero. “Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs.” Journal of Latin American Studies 27 (1995): 1–42. Gonsalves, Ralph. “The Importance of the Grenada Revolution to the Eastern Caribbean.” Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 5, no. 1 (March–April 1979): 1–11. Handy, Jim. “The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution: The Guatemalan Agrarian Land Reform, 1952–54.” Hispanic American Historical Review 68 (1988): 675–707. Hardt, D. Brent. “Grenada Reconsidered.” Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs 11, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 277–308. Hemmer, Christopher. “Historical Analogies and the Definition of Interests: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Ronald Reagan’s Policy toward the Hostages in Lebanon.” Political Psychology 20, no. 2 (1999): 267–289. Henfrey, Colin. “Between Populism and Leninism: The Grenadian Experience.” Latin American Perspectives 11, no. 3 (1984): 15–36. Hooker, Richard. “Presidential Decisionmaking and the Use of Force: Case Study Grenada.” Parameters 16, no. 2 (1991): 61–72. Hudson, Brian. “The Changing Caribbean: Grenada’s New International Airport,” Caribbean Geography 1, no. 1 (1983): 51–57. Immerman, Richard. “Guatemala as Cold War History.” Political Science Quarterly 95 (1980–81): 629–653. Kenworthy, Eldon. “Grenada as Theatre.” World Policy Journal 1 (1984): 635–651. Kirton, Claremont. “Grenada and the IMF: The PRG’s Extended Fund Facility Program, 1983.” Latin American Perspectives 16, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 121–144. Lent, John. “Mass Media and Socialist Governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean.” Human Rights Quarterly (1982): 371–390. Lewis, Patsy. “Revisiting the Grenada Invasion: The OECS’ Role, and Its Impact on Regional and International Politics.” Social and Economic Studies 48, no. 3 (1999): 85–120. Mahabir, Cynthia. “Heavy Manners and Making Freedom under the People’s Revolutionary Goverment in Grenada, 1979–1983.” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 21 (1993): 219–243.

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Maingot, Anthony. “American Foreign Policy in the Caribbean: Continuities, Changes, and Contingencies,” International Journal 40 (1985): 312–330. McMahon, Robert. “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy.” Diplomatic History 15 (1991): 455–471. Melanson, Richard. “Action History, Declaratory History, and the Reagan Years,” SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 1989): 225–246. The Military Balance, 1983–84. Cambridge: Heffers, 1983. Modeste, Denneth. “Grenada: Tumultuous Decades.” Freedom at Issue (September–October 1984): 3–11. Papermaster, Daniel I. “A Case Study of the Effects of International Law on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: The United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.” Texas International Law Journal 24 (1989): 463–497. Pastor, Robert. “Sinking in the Caribbean Basin.” Foreign Affairs 60 (1982): 1038–1058. ———. “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada.” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 1–34. ———. “Ortiz/Pastor Correspondence on Grenada.” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 4 (Winter 1986–1987): 197–203. Payne, Anthony. “The Grenada Crisis in British Politics,” Round Table 292 (1984): 403–410. ———. “Rethinking United States-Caribbean relations: Towards a New Mode of TransTerritorial Governance.” Review of International Studies 26 (2000): 69–82. Pearson, Frederic. “Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes.” International Studies Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1974): 259–289. Perez, Louis. “Intervention, Hegemony, and Dependency: The United States in the Circum-Caribbean, 1898–1980.” Pacific Historical Review 51 (1982): 165–194. Petraeus, David. “Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force.” Armed Forces and Society 15 (1989): 489–505. Phillips, Dion. “Defense Policy in Barbados, 1966–1988.” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 32, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 69–102. Pool, Gail. “Shifts in Grenadian Migration: An Historical Perspective.” International Migration Review 23, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 238–266. Quigley, John. “Parachutes at Dawn: Issues of Use of Force and States of Internees in the United States-Cuban Hostilities on Grenada, 1983,” University of Miami InterAmerican Law Review 17, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 199–249. ———. “The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger Than Fiction.” University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 18, no. 4 ( Winter 1986–1987): 271–352. Rabe, Stephen J. “The Clues Didn’t Check Out: Commentary on ‘The CIA and Castillo Armas.’” Diplomatic History 14 (1990): 93. ———. “The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Diplomatic History 20 (1996): 55–78. Robinson, Michael Jay, Maura Clancey, and William Adams. “Grenada Update.” Public Opinion (February/March 1984): 51–55. Rubner, Michael. “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada.” Political Science Quarterly 100 (Winter 1985–86): 627–647. Ryan, Selwyn. “Grenada: Balance Sheet of the Revolution.” Paper presented at a conference on The Grenada Revolution, 1979–83. Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, May 24–25, 1984. Sanchez, Nestor. “The Communist Threat.” Foreign Policy 52 (Fall 1983): 43–50. ———. “What Was Uncovered in Grenada: The Weapons and Documents.” Caribbean Review 12 (December 1983): 21–23.

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Schoenhals, Kai. “The Road to Fort Rupert: The Revolution’s Final Crisis.” Paper presented at the conference on Democracy, Development and Collective Security in the Eastern Caribbean: The Lessons of Grenada. Caribbean Institute and Study Center for Latin America, Inter American University of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico, October 17–19, 1985. Segal, Aaron. “Background to Grenada: When the Social Scientists Invaded.” Caribbean Review 12 (December 1983): 40–44. Servaes, Jan. “European Press Coverage of the Grenada Crisis.” Journal of Communication 41, no. 4 (1991): 28–41. Shearman, Peter. “The Soviet Union and Grenada under the New Jewel Movement.” International Affairs 61 (1985): 661–673. Sim, Richard, and James Anderson. “The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum.” Conflict Studies 121 (1980): 1–24. Sutton, Paul. “Black Power in Trinidad and Tobago: The Crisis of 1970.” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 21, no. 2 (1983): 115–132. ———. “Grenadian Callaloo: Recent Books on Grenada.” Latin American Research Review 23, no. 1 (1988): 133–152. ———. “The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean.” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (1993): 1–32. Thorndike, Tony. “Grenada: Maxi-Crisis for Mini-State.” World Today 30, no. 10 (1974): 436–444. Valenta, Jiri, and Virginia Valenta. “Leninism in Grenada.” Problems of Communism 33 (July–August 1984): 1–24. Vandenbroucke, Lucien. “Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs.” Political Science Quarterly 99 (1984): 471–491. Waters, Maurice. “The Invasion of Grenada, 1983 and the Collapse of Legal Norms,” Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 229–246. Weber, Cynthia. “Shoring up a Sea of Signs: How the Caribbean Basin Initiative framed the US Invasion of Grenada.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (1994): 547–558. Williams, Gary. “The Tail That Wagged the Dog: The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States’ Role in the 1983 Intervention in Grenada.” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 61 (1996): 95–115. ———. “‘A Matter of Regret’: Britain, the 1983 Grenada Crisis, and the Special Relationship.” Twentieth Century British History 12 (2001): 208–230. ———. “Brief Encounter: Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s Visit to Washington,” Journal of Latin American Studies 34 (2002): 659–685.

Magazine and Newspaper Articles Alpern, David. “How the Public Sees It.” Newsweek, November 7, 1983, 19. Barnes, Fred. “Weinberger Refuses to Rule out American Invasion of Nicaragua.” Baltimore Sun, November 7, 1983, 1. BBC Caribbean. “Law Lords Uphold Grenada Appeal.” February 7, 2007. http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2007/02/070207_privyquash.shtml (accessed March 23, 2007). ———. “Grenada 13 Urge Leniency.” June 19, 2007. http:www.bbc.co.uk/Caribbean/ news/story/2007/06/070619_grenadaupdate.shtml (accessed July 10, 2007). ———. “Grenada 13: Three Released.” June 27, 2007. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ caribbean/news/story/2007/06/070627_grenada13sentencing.shtml (accessed July 10, 2007).

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BBC News. “Castro Gets Hero’s Reception in Grenada.” August 4, 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/144860.stm (accessed February 27, 2007).” ———. Hurricane Ivan Blasts Caribbean.” September 9, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/world/americas/3634898.stm (accessed March 20, 2007). ———. “Grenada Investigates Anthem Gaffe.” February 4, 2007. http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6328881.stm (accessed March 13, 2007). Bennett, Ralph Kinney. “Grenada: Anatomy of a ‘Go’ Decision,” Reader’s Digest, February 1984, 72–7. Bourne, Peter. “Was Intervention Necessary?” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1983, section 4, 1. Caribbean Insight, “Grenada Awaits the US Response,” 6, no. 7 ( July 1983): 1. Caribbean Insight, “Sixteen Days that Shook the Caribbean,” 6, no. 11 (November 1983): 4–6. Coard, Bernard, and colleagues. “Reflections and apologies by Bernard Coard and colleagues.” The Grenadian Voice 16, no. 6 (February 1997): 1–10. Cody, Ed. “Medical School Director Says He Backs Invasion.” Washington Post, November 1, 1983, A12. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. “Grenada: Reagan’s Four Hours in Paradise.” News and Analysis, February 19, 1986. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Washington, D.C.: http://www.coha.org/Press%20Release%20Archives/1986/003.pdf (accessed March 10, 2007). Daily Nation (Bridgetown). “CARICOM Suspends Grenada.” October 24, 1983, 1. ———. “Burnham: Why I Don’t Agree.” October 24, 1983, 1. ———. “Invasion Fears.” October 24, 1983, 1. ———. “Results of US Survey by Today.” October 24, 1983, 1. ———. “Still No Word on Coard.” October 24, 1983, 16. DeFrank, Thomas, and John Walcott. “The Invasion Countdown.” Newsweek, November 7, 1983, 22D. The Economist, “Britain’s Grenada Shut-Out: Say Something, if Only Goodbye,” March 10, 1984, 21–24. Ettlin, David Michael. “Invasion Abruptly Ended Medical Students’ Doubts.” Baltimore Sun, October 30, 1983, 3. George, Alan. “Did Washington Ghost-write Scoon’s appeal?” New Statesman, November 11, 1983, 5. Goodsell, James. “Latin America’s Quiet Support for US Intervention in Grenada.” Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 1983. Goshko, John M. “Caribbean Ministates Are a New Source of Concern for U.S.” Washington Post, July 6, 1979, A12. Grenada Today, “China in, Taiwan out.” February 5, 2005. http://www.belgrafix. com/gtoday/2005news/Feb/Feb05/China-Taiwan.htm (accessed March 13, 2007). Gwertzman, Bernard. “Fear of ‘Another Iran’ Haunted White House.” Washington Post, October 26, 1983, A1. Halloran, Richard. “Joint Chiefs Supported U.S. Action as Feasible.” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A23. Hughes, Alister. “Straws in the Wind.” Caribbean Contact 7 (October 1979): 6–7. ———. “Strachan Explains Coca-cola Take Over.” The Grenada Newsletter 7, no. 32 (October 27, 1979): 1–3. ———. “New Newspaper in Grenada ‘Voice’ Issue Seized: Arrests Made.” Grenada Newsletter 9, no. 3 (August 8, 1981): 1–3, 15–17.

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Jaroslovsky, Rich. “U.S. Sees Military Victory in Grenada Despite Stiff Resistance from Cubans.” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1983, 1. Kaiser, Charles, with Lucy Howard. “An Off-the-Record War.” Newsweek, November 7, 1983, 83. Keesings Contemporary Archives. “GRENADA—Overthrow of Gairy Government by Main Opposition Party—Regional and International Reactions.” Keesings Contemporary Archives 25 (June 29, 1979): 29,689–691. ———. “CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY—Third Meeting of Heads of Government Conference.” Keesings Contemporary Archives 29 (February 1983): 31,946–950. Klare, Michael. “The Reagan Doctrine.” New Statesman, November 4, 1983, 9–10. Latin American Weekly Report: Caribbean, and Central America. “GRENADA: World Bank and IMF Accused.” May 8, 1981, 1–2. Magnuson, Ed, Douglas Brew, Bernard Diederich, and William McWhirter. “D-Day in Grenada.” Time, November 7, 1983, 12–20. Mallin, Jay. “Army Controls Grenada; Caricom Nations Shocked.” Washington Times, October 21, 1983, 5. McQuiston, John. “School’s Chancellor Says Invasion Was Not Necessary to Save Lives.” New York Times, October 26, 1983. Nossiter, Bernard. “Grenada Premier Establishes ‘Some Sort’ of U.S. Rapport.” New York Times, June 10, 1983, A8. Newsweek. “Special Report: Grenada and Lebanon—Americans at War.” November 7, 1983. Ortiz, Frank. “Letters to the Editor.” Atlantic Monthly 253 (June 1984): 7–12. Oberdorfer, Don. “Reagan Sought to End Cuban ‘Intervention.’” Washington Post, November 6, 1983, A21. O’Leary, Timothy, and Denise Cabrera. “Austin Had Close Ties to Grenada’s Bishop.” Washington Times, October 21, 1983, A12. Pastor, Robert. “Outrage Follows Outrage.” Washington Post, October 26, 1983. Pell, Eve. “The Backbone of Hidden Government.” Nation, June 19, 1989, 838. Reynolds, Barbara. “Anarchy in Grenada Was Really Frightening.” USA Today, October 27, 1983, 7. Rich, Spencer. “Ex-U.S. Official Saw Grenada after Coup.” Washington Post, October 27, 1983, A10. Rohter, Larry. “Grenada: A Tiny Exporter of Revolution?” Newsweek, March 31, 1980, 44. Ryan, Michael. “Scenes of a War.” People Weekly, November 14, 1983, 41–45. Singh, Ricky. “What Has Gone Wrong, Mr. Bishop?” Caribbean Contact 7 (November 1979): 1, 3. Skelton, George, and David Wood. “U.S. to Post Task Force Off Grenada.” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 1983, section 1, 3. Smith, Hedrick. “Reagan Aide Says U.S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup.” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A10. “Statement by the IMF Staff Mission to Grenada.” Press Release No. 06/256. November 17, 2006. Washington, D.C.: IMF. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/ pr06256.htm (accessed March 18, 2007). Szulc, Tad. “Caribbean.” New York Times Magazine, May 25, 1979, 18, 56–58, 70–71, 75. Toronto Globe and Mail. “Ottawa Probing if Grenada Flights Purposely Scuttled.” November 12, 1983, 1–2. Toth, Robert. “U.S. Feared 2nd Hostage Crisis: Shultz.” Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1983. Tyler, Patrick. “U.S. Tracks Cuban Aid to Grenada: In ’81, Senate Unit Nixed CIA Plan to Destabilize Isle.” Washington Post, February 27, 1983, A1, A11.

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———. “The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning.” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, A14. Walkon, Thomas, and Charlotte Montgomery. “Canada and the Grenada Invasion.” Toronto Globe and Mail, November 17, 1983, 3. Washington Post. “U.S. ’copters Seen in Barbados; Grenada Landings Denied in U.S.” October 25, 1983, A1. Williams, Juan. “Trinidadian Leader Faces Criticism for Opposing Invasion.” Washington Post, October 31, 1983. ———. “ President Defends Using Force.” Washington Post , December 13, 1983, A1.

Index

Abdullah, Iman, 94–5 Adams, Tom, 3, 52, 66–7, 85, 88–9, 91–2, 96–7, 99, 102–4, 108, 110, 114–16, 118, 120, 124–6, 133–4, 138, 140–2, 145, 147, 150, 153–4, 158–9, 168–9, 173 Afghanistan, 46–7 Agrarian Reform Law (Guatemala), 11, 13 Allende, Salvador, 18 Alliance for Progress, 14, 15, 17 Als, Michael, 90 Angola, 47, 57 Antigua, 54, 65–8, 91, 146, 148, 150–1 Antigua and Barbuda, 36, 53, 54, 65–7, 114 Arbenz, Jacobo, 11–12 Austin, Hudson, 33, 82, 87–9, 91–6, 105–7, 110–11, 120–2, 133, 135, 144–5, 152 Bain, Fitzroy, 79, 83, 92, 94–5 Bain, Norris, 90, 94–5 Barbados, 3, 26, 27, 31, 34, 36–7, 41, 44–5, 52, 54, 56, 61, 63, 66–8, 70, 75, 84–6, 88, 91–2, 96, 102–4, 109–10, 115–16, 118, 120–1, 123, 133, 135, 138–9, 146, 150, 152, 154, 168, 173, 183 Barbados Defense Force, 34, 143 US Embassy, 3, 26, 27, 31, 44–5, 54, 56, 70, 75, 84–6, 91–2, 96, 103–4, 110, 120–1, 138–9, 152, 154 See also Adams, Tom; Bish, Milan

Batista, Fulgencio, 12, 16 Bay of Pigs invasion, 12–14, 16 Beirut barracks bombing (1983), 3, 131–3, 136–7, 160 Belize, 91, 146 “big stick” policy. See Monroe Doctrine Bird, Lester, 66, 114, 126, 139 Bish, Milan, 56, 86, 88, 91–2, 96–7, 99, 103–4, 108, 110–13, 115, 118, 120–1, 135, 138–41, 147, 154, 166–7 Bishop, Maurice, 1–3, 23–4, 26, 29–31, 33–53, 56–7, 59–60, 63–99, 101–2, 105, 110, 124, 127, 140–2, 144, 158, 163–6, 177, 181–2 arrest of, 84–93, 98–9, 166 and Bernard Coard, 78–93, 98, 104–5 character of, 24, 37, 78–9 criticism of, 80–2, 98 demise of, 78–85 democracy, view of, 49 execution of, 2, 93–7, 99, 102, 127, 158, 181–2 and Fidel Castro, 82, 98, 105, 110 “In Nobody’s Backyard” speech and Joint Leadership, 81–4 letters to Ronald Reagan, 57, 59–60 “Line of March” speech, 78 meetings with Frank Ortiz, 39–41, 53 meeting with Sally Shelton, 45, 49–51 and revolution (1979), 33–4, 98 and Ronald Reagan, 57, 59–60, 69–70 and Tom Adams, 52

292

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Index

Bishop, Maurice, (Contd.) US rescue offer, 86 visit to Washington, D.C., 69–76 See also People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG): anti-US rhetoric Black Power movement, 22–5, 29, 31, 163 Blaize, Herbert, 30, 48, 175 Blaker, Peter, 26 Bloody Sunday (1973), 25, 30, 163 Bloody Wednesday, 91–5, 99, 101, 105, 107, 129, 158, 167, 173, 177 Bourne, Geoffrey, 106, 121–2, 134, 144–5, 152 British Guiana, 14–15, 20 Britton, Theodore, 27 Brown, Richard, 97, 139 Brzezinski, Zbignew, 34, 43–4 Budeit, James, 135, 143–5, 152 Bullard, Giles, 92, 110, 124, 136 Burnham, Forbes, 15, 30, 37, 118, 125 Bush, George H.W., 19, 62, 89, 96, 107, 116–118 Bushnell, John, 42, 50 Cabral, Donald Reid, 16–17 Canada, 10, 26, 34–5, 37, 39, 88, 92, 111, 124, 136 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 19, 60–1, 64, 66, 70 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 3, 27, 34–9, 52, 91, 102–3, 105, 110, 115–16, 118, 120–2, 134, 144, 150, 153–4, 159, 171–2 and Grenada, 66–8 Port-of-Spain Summit (October 1983), 125–6 reaction to revolution (1979), 36 and regional integration, 67 relationship with Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 125–6 Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), 18, 27, 38, 40–1, 51–2, 65 Caribbean Free Trade Association, 18, 35 Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF), 143, 152 CARICOM. See Caribbean Community Carter, Jimmy, 3, 18, 27, 37, 43–4, 53–4, 56, 63, 76, 137

Castro, Fidel, 12–14, 16–17, 47, 60, 64, 82, 87, 98, 102, 105, 108, 110, 177 and the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), 122–4 See also Cuba Cato, Milton, 110 Central Committee (CC), 57, 74, 77–84, 86–7, 89–95, 97–8, 101 Castro’s letter to, 87 and Joint Leadership, 80–3, 98 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 12–16, 34–5, 43–4, 59, 62, 69–70, 73–5, 86, 92, 97, 117, 123, 136, 139, 164, 173 Chafin, Gary, 135, 143–6 Chambers, George, 102–3, 120, 125–6 Charles, Eugenia, 2, 68, 85, 88, 90, 96, 103, 114–15, 117, 126, 128, 150, 154, 158–9, 181–2 Chile, 18, 20, 28, 31 CINCLANT. See US CINCLANT Clark, William, 72–4 Clarke, Ellis, 133 Coard, Bernard, 29–31, 33–4, 37, 41, 43–4, 46–7, 73, 75, 77–93, 96, 98–9, 104–5, 107, 117, 134, 141–2, 144–5, 152, 165 character, 78–9 and Joint Leadership, 81 removal of Maurice Bishop, 78–93, 98, 104–5 resignation from the CC and Political Bureau (PB), 79 Coard, Phyllis, 81 Cold War, 4, 11, 13–15, 18, 19, 39, 55, 68, 166 Comas, Pedro Tortolo, 151–2 communism, 1, 10–19, 29–30, 34–5, 43, 46, 55, 65, 79–80, 92, 102, 111, 120, 139, 141–2, 157, 164–5, 170–1 Compton, John, 35, 102–3, 114, 120, 158 Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), 61, 69–70, 158 Cornwall, Leon, 92–3, 121, 134, 145–7, 152, 160, 167, 172 Creft, Jacqueline, 90, 94–5 Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG), 70–1, 74, 76, 97, 101–2, 110, 112, 149 Crist, George, 118, 143

Index

Cuba, 3–7, 9, 12–18, 20, 30, 34–5, 37–44, 46–8, 50–75, 82, 84, 86–9, 92–4, 97–9, 101–2, 104–5, 108–9, 112, 115–16, 118–19, 122–4, 129, 137, 140–2, 145, 148, 150–2, 155–61, 163–4, 168–71, 173, 176–7, 179–80 aid to the PRG, 39–40, 47, 56 and Maurice Bishop, 86–8, 92–4, 97, 105, 112 message to the US, 123–4 and the New Jewel Movement (NJM), 30 Platt Amendment, 6 position on invasion of Grenada, 122–4, 150–2 and the PRG, 37–44, 46–8, 50–4, 62, 67–75 and the RMC, 105, 110 and Soviet Combat Brigade, 43, 53 See also Bay of Pigs invasion Dam, Kenneth, 72–3, 112, 120, 151 Darby, Jack, 149 Declaration of Ocho Rios, 66–7 Declaration of St. George’s, 52 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 34–5, 101 democracy, 2, 4–9, 16, 19, 24, 37, 41, 44, 49, 51–2, 58, 61, 64, 65, 70, 84, 102, 104, 108, 112, 116, 118, 126, 142, 166, 168–9, 175–6 dollar diplomacy, 7, 9, 19 Dominica, 2, 36, 43, 50, 52–4, 65–8, 85, 150 Dominican Republic, 9–10, 15–17, 20 domino effect, 16–17, 43, 64–5, 67 Donovan, Eileen, 26 Duffus Commission, 25–7 Dulles, John Foster, 12, 14 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 88, 117, 123, 131–2, 153 Eastern Caribbean (EC), 1, 27, 40, 42–3, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 60–1, 65–9, 85, 88, 91, 96, 99, 101–4, 114, 125, 140, 143, 159 banana crops, 50 and “constructive engagement” with Grenada, 67

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293

military capabilities, 53, 67–8, 182 reaction to revolution (1979), 35–7 response to Bishop’s execution, 102 See also Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Eddy, John, 42–3 Eisenhower, Dwight, 11, 13, 14 elections, 3, 7–9, 22–3, 29–31, 51–3, 64, 70–1, 91, 103, 142, 163, 168, 175–6 Bishop and, 33–4, 48–9, 74 foreign requests for, 34–8, 41–2, 52, 53 El Salvador, 18, 55, 60–1 Erie, Carl, 109, 123 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 39–40, 176 Flohr, Linda, 89–91, 110, 120–2, 134, 137, 143, 145, 152 Flower, Ludlow, 85, 88, 96, 115, 138–9, 146–7 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 124–5 Fort Frederick, 93–5, 157 Fort Rupert, 92–7, 105–6, 122, 135, 157–8, 167 Forum, 24 Free West Indian, 59, 85 Gairy, Eric, 1–3, 21–31, 33, 36–40, 45–6, 48–51, 72, 142, 163, 166, 175–6, 179 character, 21–3, 27–8, 30, 37 dictatorship, 26–31 extradition, 45–6, 49–51, 72 meeting with President Carter, 27–8 overthrow, 33 and UFOs, 28 See Mongoose Gang Germany, 6, 8, 58 Gillespie, Charles, 88, 96–7, 102–3, 113–16, 138–40, 146–7, 150, 158 Good Neighbor policy, 10–11, 17, 19 Great Britain, 6, 10–11, 14–15, 18, 22–3, 25–7, 29, 34–5, 39, 43, 50, 53, 58, 85, 88, 92, 103, 110–11, 115, 119, 121, 124–5, 133, 136, 146, 152, 168 and invasion of Grenada, 124–5, 136

294

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Index

Grenada Governor-General (see Scoon, Paul) the Grenada 17, 177 independence of, 25–8 invasion of (see Operation Urgent Fury) post-invasion reconstruction, 175–7 post-1979 revolution (see People’s Revolutionary Government [PRG]) revolution (1979), 33, 37–8, 43, 65, 75–6, 79, 96, 163, 165–6 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 177 See also Cuba; democracy; elections; Eric Gairy; Point Salines International Airport; St. George’s University; Soviet Union Grenada Documents, 56–7, 69, 169–8 Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union (GMMWU), 21, 30 Grenada National Party (GNP), 22–3, 25, 29–30, 48, 175 Grenada Newsletter, 59 Grenada United Labor Party (GULP), 21–2, 175–6 Grenadian Voice, 58–9 Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 6, 50 Guatemala, 11–13, 20 gunboat diplomacy, 10, 14, 19, 166 Guyana, 23, 26, 30, 36–7, 39, 68, 90–1, 103, 118, 120, 146 Haig, Alexander, 58, 64–5 Haiti, 8–10 Hewitt, Ashley, 45, 104 HMS Antrim, 125, 136 Howe, Geoffrey, 153, 154, 156 Howe, Jonathan, 153–4, 156 hostage threat, 102, 104, 112, 116, 120, 135, 137, 147–9, 155, 161, 166–7. See also Iran hostage crisis Hughes, Alister, 59 Humphrey, Chester, 30–1, 45–6 Hurricane Allen, 50 Hurricane Ivan, 176–7 Iklé, Fred, 102, 131 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 27, 58, 70, 74, 165, 176

interventionism (US), 4–10 invasion of Grenada (US). See Operation Urgent Fury Iran, 12, 18–19 Iran-Contra scandal, 19, 166 Iran hostage crisis, 18, 85, 88, 99, 107, 117, 137–8, 148–9, 159, 166–7 Iraq, 57 Jagan, Cheddi, 14–15 Jamaica, 26, 29, 30, 35–7, 39, 54, 57, 65–6, 68, 91, 96, 102–4, 115, 133, 146, 182 Jamaican Defence Force, 115 James, Liam, 57, 74, 79–81, 83, 90 Johnson, Lyndon, 17 Johnstone, Craig, 112, 148–9, 161 Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), 3, 35, 85, 88, 97, 99, 108–9, 112, 116, 118, 120, 123, 131–2, 136–7, 143, 148–9, 152, 156, 160–1, 167 Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL), 24 Kelly, John, 84, 106, 111, 134, 152 Kennedy, John F., 13–16 Kurze, Kenneth, 84, 89–91, 110, 120–2, 134–5, 143 La Roche, Richard, 34, 37 Layne, Ewart, 79–80, 92–4 Lebanon, 90, 131, 136–7. See also Beirut barracks bombing (1983) Leninism, 29, 77–80, 98, 165 Lewis, Vaughan, 114 Libya, 57, 142 Louison, Einstein, 83, 93 Louison, George, 33, 36, 82–3, 87, 90–2, 98 Manifest Destiny, 5 Manley, Michael, 35, 37, 39, 41, 65, 102 Marxism, 20, 24, 29–30, 34, 44, 53, 88, 160–1 Marxist-Leninism, 1, 15, 18, 29, 77–81, 87–9, 98–9, 159, 164, 168 McDonald, Wesley, 97, 148–9

Index

McFarlane, Robert, 89, 108–9, 116–17, 131, 136, 138, 149, 155–6, 169 McKinley, William, 6 McNeil, Frank, 4, 118, 123, 132, 138–48, 150, 153–4, 168, 172 meeting with Caribbean leaders, 140–8 mission of, 138–40 recommendations of, 147 Menges, Constantine, 84, 89, 102, 107–9, 111–12, 131, 156 Metcalf, Joseph, 123, 148 Mexico, 8 Middendorf, William, 89, 102, 109 Mitchell, Keith, 176 Modica, Charles, 106–7, 121, 139, 144–5 Mongoose Gang, 23, 25 Monroe, James, 5 Monroe Doctrine, 5–7, 12–13, 19. See also Roosevelt Corollary Montgomery, David, 84, 120–1, 123, 125, 133–6, 141, 147, 153 Moreau, Arthur S., 85, 88, 108 Motley, Langhorne “Tony,” 56, 84, 88–9, 97, 101, 107–8, 111–12, 116, 120, 124, 131, 137, 139, 146, 150, 152–3, 161 Movement for the Advancement of Community Efforts (MACE), 24 Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP), 24 National Democratic Party (NDC), 175–6 National Liberation Army, 25, 33 The National Party (TNP), 175 National Security Council (NSC), 34–5, 38, 41–4, 53, 72, 84, 89, 102, 109, 156, 164, 172–3 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), 109, 112, 118, 122–3, 138, 160–1, 166 National Security Planning Group (NSPG), 99, 128, 131–2, 134, 136, 152 New Jewel Movement (NJM), 1, 2, 23–6, 28–31, 33–4, 37–8, 42, 49, 54, 64, 69, 78–9, 83, 86, 89, 96, 98, 142, 163–4, 175

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295

and 1976 election, 29–30 Manifesto, 24 opposition to Eric Gairy, 24–5 and overthrow of Eric Gairy, 33–4 See also Marxist-Leninism; National Liberation Army New National Party (NNP), 175–6 Nicaragua, 7–9, 12, 18–20, 60–2, 74, 169, 171 Nixon, Richard, 13, 17 Noel, Lloyd, 45–6 Noel, Vincent, 82, 95, 105 noninterventionism (US), 10–11, 15, 17 See Good Neighbor policy Non-Permissive Evacuation Operation (NEO), 85, 88–9, 97, 99, 112, 117–18, 159 Noriega, Manuel, 19 North, Oliver, 108–9, 131, 156 North Korea, 68–9, 158, 169 Operation Amber and the Amberines, 59 Operation Just Cause, 19 Operation Ocean Venture, 59, 82, 61 Operation Pluto, 13–14 Operation Solid Shield, 50 Operation Universal Trek, 63 Operation Urgent Fury, 3, 124, 136–8, 144, 148–50, 152, 155–8, 161, 167, 169–72 and Beirut barracks bombing, 131–3 “endgame,” 142 media, 104, 112–13, 154, 157–8 versus nonmilitary solution, 171–2 objectives of, 159 parameters of, 149 planning for, 101–2 problems with, 157 reasons for, 2, 4, 99, 131, 135–6, 144, 159–61, 166–72 safety of US citizens, 54, 88–9, 91, 96–7, 101, 106–9, 119, 140, 142, 152, 159, 166–7 secrecy of, 102, 109, 112–13, 117, 119, 153–6 US credibility, 131, 170–1 See also hostage threat

296

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Index

Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 2–4, 65–8, 85, 89–92, 96, 102–4, 108–18, 120–3, 125–6, 132–3, 136–8, 140–3, 146, 149–54, 158–61, 167–73, 181–2 and Operation Urgent Fury, 113–17 regional integration, 67 relationship with CARICOM, 125–6 request to the US for help, 108–12, 115–18, 133, 136–8, 140–3, 146, 150, 153–4, 159, 161, 167–71, 173, 181–2 response to Bishop’s execution, 102–4, 113 See also Regional Security System (RSS) Organisation for Education and Liberation (OREL), 29, 77–8 Organization of American States (OAS), 11–12, 20, 27, 37, 45, 47, 50, 52, 60, 64, 70, 89, 109, 111, 157, 172 Inter-American Emergency Aid Fund (FONDEM), 50 Organizing Committee (OC), 77–8 Ortiz, Frank, 27, 34, 37–42, 44–5, 50, 53, 164, 179–80 meetings with Maurice Bishop, 38, 39–41, 53 Palma, Estrada, 7 Panama, 6, 9, 18, 19, 27, 55 Pastor, Robert, 19, 34–5, 41–2, 164–5 Peace Corps, 38 Pearls Airport, 82, 90–1, 122, 129, 134–6, 151, 156 Pentagon, 35, 97, 116, 120, 136, 149, 156 People’s Alliance, 29–30 People’s Laws, 38, 59, 133 People’s National Congress (PNC), 15 People’s Progressive Party (PPP), 14–15 People’s Republic of China, 17, 176 People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA), 1, 35, 38–9, 64, 68–9, 78, 82–3, 85, 87, 90–5, 97, 104, 108, 115, 121–2, 129, 141–2, 148, 150, 156–7, 159 People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG), 3, 35–86, 97–8, 102, 115, 117–18, 133, 139, 144, 158, 163–6, 168, 171, 173

anti-US rhetoric, 40–1, 43–6, 49, 50–3, 56–7, 59–64, 70, 72–4, 76, 165 and Cuba, 37–44, 52 decline of, 77–86, 99 Eastern Caribbean, 65–9 economic policy, 51 execution of Bishop, 95–6 foreign policy, 64, 71–2 militarization of, 41, 47, 53, 62, 65, 67–9, 78, 166 political prisoners, 41, 48, 52, 54, 75 press restrictions, 48, 54, 58–9, 166 relationships with Cuba, 38–44, 46–8, 50–4, 62, 67–75 Soviet Union, 46–8, 62, 68–74 and state repression, 49, 58–9, 64, 77, 78, 80 Terrorism (Prevention) Law, 49 tourism, 39–40, 42, 47, 56–7, 69–70, 73, 166 See also Central Committee (CC); elections; Marxist-Leninism; Organizing Committee (OC); Point Salines International Airport; Political Bureau (PB); Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) Pierre, Leslie, 58–9 Pinochet, Augusto, 28 Platt Amendment (1901), 6 Poindexter, John, 101–2, 109, 112, 156 Point Salines International Airport (PSIA), 3, 47–8, 56–60, 62–3, 69–70, 73, 92, 97, 127, 129, 156, 165, 175 cost of, 56, 69–70, 97 use as military facility, 47–8, 57–60 Political Bureau (PB), 69, 74, 79–80, 83, 89 Preudhomme, Herbert, 36 Queen’s Park bombing, 49 Radio Free Grenada (RFG), 1, 35, 40, 86, 87, 95, 97, 106, 122, 146 Radix, Kendrick, 45, 59, 79, 86 Ramphal, Shridath, 133

Index

Reagan, Ronald, 2–3, 18–19, 43, 52, 54, 55–6, 59–64, 66–9, 71, 73–6, 88–9, 99, 109, 112, 116–20, 127–8, 131–2, 136–8, 149–50, 152–61, 165–71, 173, 175 administration, 55–6, 62–3, 68, 76 Beirut barracks bombing, 131–2, 136–7 character of, 55, 116 and hostage threat, 88, 137–8, 159–60, 166–7 and Margaret Thatcher, 153–6 response to Bishop’s arrest, 89–90 response to OECS request, 116–17 visit to Barbados, 66 See also Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); domino effect; Iran hostage crisis; Operation Urgent Fury: secrecy of; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Reagan Doctrine, 19 Redhead, Lester, 93 Reed, Gail, 69 Regional Security System (RSS), 67–8 Renwick, Robin, 125 Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG), 3, 84–5, 88, 97, 99, 101, 109, 111, 132, 166 revolution (1979). See also Grenada: revolution Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), 3, 77, 95–6, 101–12, 114, 116–18, 120–3, 125–6, 133–5, 137, 140, 142–52, 159–60, 167, 171–3 Rizo, Julian Torres, 69, 86–7, 91–3, 122 Roman Catholic Church, 48 Roopnarine, Rupert, 90 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 10. See also Good Neighbor Policy Roosevelt, Theodore, 6–7, 9, 14 Roosevelt Corollary, 6–7, 9, 19 Rossin, Larry, 123, 152, 164 Scoon, Paul, 4, 103, 111, 115, 133–4, 136, 141, 145, 147, 149–50, 152–3, 157, 175, 182 invitation for assistance, 133–4

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297

Seaga, Edward, 65–7, 89, 96, 102–4, 113, 115, 120, 125–6, 138, 140–2, 150 Shelton, Sally, 44–5, 49–51, 164–5 Shultz, George, 55–6, 71, 88–90, 97, 108, 112, 116–17, 119, 131–2, 136, 138–9, 152, 157, 170–1, 175 Simmonds, Kennedy, 120 socialism, 15, 30, 34, 37, 41, 64, 68, 88, 165 Solin, Gary, 111, 121, 134 South Korea, 28, 31 Soviet Union, 3, 11, 13, 15, 17–19, 27, 43, 46–7, 53–5, 57, 59–74, 78, 80, 84, 86, 88, 96, 99, 101, 108–9, 112, 140–2, 145, 150, 155–60, 168–71 and the PRG, 46–7 and the RMC, 150, 248 n148 Soviet Combat Brigade incident, 43, 53 Soviet-Cuban relationship, 47, 57 war in Afghanistan, 18, 46, 157, 171 Spain, 5–6 Speakes, Larry, 89, 119, 136, 138, 151, 154 Special Situations Group (SSG), 107–9, 117–20, 123, 138, 160 St. George’s University (SGU), 56–7, 70, 72, 74, 104, 106, 110–11, 121–2, 129, 139, 144, 150–2, 157–8, 168 St. Kitts-Nevis, 36, 53, 54, 65, 66, 120, 151 St. Lucia, 23, 35, 36, 43, 50, 52–4, 65, 67–8, 102–3 St. Paul, Cletus, 82–3 St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 23, 36, 50, 53, 65–8, 110 Strachan, Selwyn, 57, 80, 82, 85, 87 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 62, 127 Stroude, Chris, 93–4 Taft, William, 7, 9 Taiwan, 27, 176 Thatcher, Margaret, 119, 153–7 Tomlin, Peter, 34 Torchlight, 48, 58–9, 78 Trans-Africa, 69

298

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Index

Trinidad and Tobago, 22–4, 26, 29, 30, 36, 41, 47, 52, 68, 90, 102, 105, 110, 115, 118, 125, 133, 146 Trujillo, Rafael, 15 Tull, Louis, 120, 126, 138, 141 Turner, Stansfield, 43–4 United Kingdom (UK), 27, 38, 124–5 United Nations (UN), 2, 11–12, 27–8, 45, 46, 49, 59, 63, 73, 111, 157, 172 United Nations General Assembly, 2, 157 United People’s Party (UPP), 29–30 United States (US) “backyard” policy in Caribbean, 2, 4, 18–20, 41, 55, 165, 169–70 as military power in Caribbean, 10–11, 27 Neutrality Act, 45–6 and possible evacuation of US and foreign nationals from Grenada, 101–2, 106–7, 111–12, 114, 121, 134–7, 143–8, 150–2, 154–5, 158–9, 167–8 and “strategic denial,” 43 use of overwhelming force, 99, 112–13, 120 See also Cold War; dollar diplomacy; domino theory; Good Neighbor Policy; interventionism; Manifest Destiny; Monroe Doctrine; NonPermissive Evacuation Operation (NEO); US-Grenada US Agency for International Development (AID), 38–9, 41–2, 51 US CINCLANT (Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces) Headquarters, 85, 97, 108, 112, 120, 123, 136, 143, 148–9, 152, 161 US Congress, 6, 26, 44, 61–3, 70, 75, 118–19, 152, 155–8, 160 US Department of Defense, 133, 137, 160, 172–3 US-Grenada relations David-Goliath relationship, 2, 43–4, 63, 73, 165 distancing policy, 3, 51, 63, 165 economic aid, 50 invasion of Grenada (see Operation Urgent Fury)

and Maurice Bishop, 39–41, 84–5, 96–7, 101–4 response to revolution (1979), 34–5, 37–9 and US national security, 62 See also Cold War; democracy; domino effect; Eric Gairy, extradition of; hostage threat; Iranian hostage crisis; National Security Decision Directive; nonpermissive evacuation operation (NEO); Special Situations Group US Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), 123, 151 US medical students, 56, 86, 91, 96, 104, 106–8, 112, 119, 134–7, 143–8, 150, 152, 158–60. See also hostage threat US Navy SEALs, 118, 132, 152, 156 US State Department, 34–5, 38–9, 41–7, 49, 53, 58, 61, 70–2, 109, 112, 117, 132, 136–7, 148, 160–1, 164, 172–3, 176. See also Crisis PrePlanning Group (CPPG); Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) USS Guam, 123, 148 Vaky, Viron, 44 Venezuela, 6, 39, 91, 96, 112, 117, 124 Vessey, John William, Jr., 108, 112, 116–18, 132, 136–7, 149, 155, 157 Vietnam War, 2, 17, 19, 55, 99, 119–20, 137, 149, 170 Wardally, James, 30–1, 45–6 Warne, Robert, 59 Washington Post, 46, 62 Weinberger, Caspar, 71, 107, 112, 116–20, 131, 136–7, 149–50, 155–6, 169 West Indies Associated States (WIAS), 36–8 West Indies Federation, 35 Whiteman, Unison, 29–31, 33–4, 37–8, 63, 79, 82, 87, 90–2, 94–5, 98 Williams, Dessima, 45–7, 51, 56, 74 Wilson, Woodrow, 8–9 Wright, Oliver, 153 Zelaya, Jose Santos, 7–8