TAKING RELIGIOUS CLAIMS SERIOUSLY A Philosophy of Religion
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TAKING RELIGIOUS CLAIMS SERIOUSLY A Philosophy of Religion
TAKING RELIGIOUS CLAIMS SERIOUSLY A Philosophy of Religion
Warren E. Steinkraus
Edited by
Michael H. Mitias
Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1998
Cover design by Chris Kok based on a photograph, ©1984 by Robert Ginsberg, of statuary by Gustav Vigeland in the Frogner Park, Oslo, Norway.
© The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of "ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence". ISBN: 90-420-0403-7 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1998 Printed in The Netherlands
CONTENTS Editorial Foreword ONE
Orientation 1. A Few Observations 2. Religion and Superstition 3. Religion and Science
TWO
Religious Diversity, Reason, and Truth 1. Shortcut Efforts to Solve the Problem of Religious Disagreement by Means Other than Reason 2. What Do We Mean by the Use of Reason in Religious Claims? 3. More on Reason and Religion
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
Factual Claims 1. Devices Used by Regular Historians to Check and Discover Facts 2. Extraordinary Factual Claims Crucial to Faith 3. Levels of Criticism of Current Extravagant Claims 4. Other Observations 5. A Look at Crucial Factual Claims and How These May Be Handled The Concept of God 1. May God Be Viewed as One or Many—Monotheism or Polytheism? 2. Is God Conscious or Unconscious? 3. What Is God's Relation to the Natural World and to Living Creatures? 4. How Is God Related to the Good and Valuable? 5. What Is the Relation of God to Time, History, and Events? God and Arguments 1. The Argument from Religious Experience 2. The Argument from Beauty and Design in the Natural World 3. The Argument from the Alleged Need of a Cause 4. The Argument from Moral Standards and the Status of Values
IX
1 1 7 9 11 15 24 27 33 34 40 42 45
47 53 54 56 62 70 72 77 80
83 87 89
VI
CONTENTS The Argument from the KnowabiUty of the World ofNature 6. Abstract Arguments 7. Grounds for Denying the Existence of God 8. Opponents of Theism from Within Religion
97 101 102 108
Value, Evil, and Suffering 1. Empirical Findings 2. A Critical Look at the Empirical Findings . 3. Attempts at Solutions 4. Answers That Explain Evil as Essentially Unreal 5. Answers That Reinterpret Evil as Disguised or Unknown Good 6. Pragmatic or Poetic Solutions 7. The Solution That Concludes No God Exists at All 8. Reconsidering the Nature and Idea of God 9. Concluding Comments
127 130 131 132 {35
SEVEN
The Religious Experience of Worship and Prayer 1. Reports of Individual Experiences 2. Varieties of Religious Experience 3. Worship 4. Positive and Negative Results of Worship 5. Prayer 6. General Types of Prayer 7. Further Observations on Prayer 8. Other Characteristic Problems 9. More Problems Regarding Prayer 10. Objections to Prayer
137 137 138 139 144 147 147 149 149 151 153
EIGHT
Claims about How a Person Should Live 1. Religious Demands 2. Ethical Demands
155 155 162
NINE
Religious Claims about the Person 1. The Ontological Status of the Individual 2. Does the Individual Have a Free Will? 3. The Axiological Nature of the Finite Individual
171 173 179 182
TEN
Claims about the Future: Immortality 1. Grounds for Denying the Existence of Survival in Any Form 2. Grounds for Supporting Some View of Immortality 3. Impersonal or Objective Immortality
185
SIX
111 112 115 119 125
188 190 194
Taking Religious Claims Seriously 4. 5. 6. 7.
Pre-Existence Individual Survival versus Reincarnation Conditional Immortality Claims about Future General History: Eschatology
VI1
194 195 196 197
ELEVEN
The Cognitive Question 1. Analyses of the Character of Religious Language 2. Critical Evaluation and Questions 3. The Cognitive View
201 207 210 216
TWELVE
Further Problems 1. Criticisms of Religion: External and Internal 2. Additional Questions for Consideration
221 225 227
Notes
231
Bibliography
237
About the Author
241
About the Editor
245
Index
247
EDITORIAL FOREWORD This book is a rational, systematic, and comprehensive analysis of the following question: What are the foundation, essential elements, and purpose of religion as such—not of particular religions, whether of the past or present, whether of the East or West, but of the phenomenon of religion as a historical fact that played, and continues to play, a formative role in shaping the structure, content, and direction of human civilization? For Warren E. Steinkraus, religion is grounded in religious experience, which itself is based on a thoughtful, vibrant, reverent, and responsive consciousness of an Ultimate Being as the creator and governor of nature and human history. This experience is, moreover, the basis of religion as an institution, that is, as a set of beliefs, doctrines, creeds, rituals, practices, traditions, and rules of conduct—in short, as a way of life based on an understanding of the Ultimate Being. Is this understanding acquired directly by rational insight or by some kind of revelation? This is perhaps the most difficult question in the philosophy of religion, mainly because the Ultimate is not given to human experience as an object of ordinary experience. Yet the various world religions seem to have an exclusive, clear, valid, and final understanding of the Ultimate, of its essence, will, and purpose. Thus, questions such as the following necessarily arise: How do we know that an Ultimate exists in the first place? Supposing it exists, and supposing it has created the totality of the world including human destiny, how do we know its will or purpose? Religion is essentially grounded in a claim about this will or purpose. Accordingly, we can view the. diversity of human religions as a diversity of religious claims about the sort of being the Ultimate is and about its plan, its will, and the way it rules the world. - Steinkraus's Taking Religious Claims Seriously: A Philosophy of Religion is a critical study of these religious claims, of their meaning, validity, and the extent to which upholding them ennobles human life. His method of analysis is phenomenological. Unlike the majority of philosophers of religion, Steinkraus has first mapped the vast domain of religions. Next, he placed them on the table of philosophical analysis, proceeding to examine their claims with the utmost care, rational scrutiny, and objectivity. He was guided throughout by one important concern: What are the essential truths undergirding the fabric of religion as a meaningful human adventure? He has meticulously considered every significant question, idea, peculiarity, contribution, value, or practice of literate religions. Steinkraus's mind is encyclopedic, revealing extensive yet deep knowledge and appreciation of both literate and preliterate religions. For him, religion should be envisioned as a human achievement that proudly stands next to science, technology, philosophy, art, and the sociopolitical institutions that played a constructive role in the development of civilization. Most important, we cannot understand religion as such unless we critically investigate its source—religious experience—because the religious claims that constitute the structure of religion are embedded in this source.
X
EDITORIAL FOREWORD
Moreover, the reader of this book will readily see that in his analysis and evaluation of the major questions, concepts, assumptions, and values of world religions, Steinkraus has spoken with two voices. The first is the voice of the truly religious person, the person who makes serious religious claims. Here we have in mind the ordinary person who struggles daily for survival, who feels pain, pleasure, guilt, elation, frustration, joy, and despair, who loves and falls into the trap of envy, hate, animosity, violence, and selfishness, who seeks justice, peace, and freedom, who in short builds culture. The religious claims that are the highest object of analysis for the philosopher of.religion originate from the soul of this kind of person regardless of whether he or she is a saint, prophet, social reformer, teacher, politician, businessperson, farmer, scientist, artist, or homemaker. Thus, the Ultimate that Steinkraus seeks to study in this book is not the Ultimate (God) of the metaphysician, theologian, or scientist but the being or power that moves people in their daily pursuits and that inspires them in their hope and struggle for a more decent life. The second voice with which Steinkraus speaks is the voice of the philosopher. As a philosopher, he is motivated by a profound passion for understanding, for truth. His singular aim is to understand the meaning of the religious as such. But this understanding cannot be accomplished without examining the fine fabric and subtle claims of the different religions of the world. This examination proceeds through critical analysis, reasoning, comparison, evaluation, and the revelation of insight. Reading Taking Religious Claims Seriously is, in short, an intellectual adventure into the foundation of the mosaic of human religions. Warren E. Steinkraus is an axiologist par excellence. He has written extensively on important issues in the areas of aesthetics, ethics, and social and political philosophy, but in writing this book he distinguished himself as one of the most perceptive, authoritative, and challenging philosophers of religion. The present work is based on actual encounters with the religions of the Far East, Africa, and the Middle East, on personal discussions and debates with Indian, Japanese, Chinese, African, Western, and Middle Eastern scholars, and on vast knowledge of the literature of the literate religions. He was always open for ideas that may reveal a new aspect of religion or the religious experience, and he was doing research on this book until his death in February 1990. The manuscript that Warren E. Steinkraus left was complete. In revising it, I modified some passages and added a few sentences and passages on the basis of the copious remarks, quotations, and references that he left. The text contains several unfootnoted quotations, mainly because of difficulties in identifying their sources. Barbara Steinkraus was most gracious and patient in compiling the manuscript for me. I am grateful to her for her loving contribution. I am also grateful to Robert Ginsberg for asking me to prepare the manuscript for publication. Without his encouragement and support, this book would not have seen the light of day! Michael H. Mitias
One ORIENTATION A fair-minded discussion of the claims of religious people throughout the world suggests the need for a brief rehearsal of some of the salient facts about religious phenomena and a corresponding concern for making some distinctions, without which a proper understanding is unlikely. Unfortunately, many who have expressed themselves negatively about the scope of religious experience—its meanings and its claims—have displayed an unconscionable lack of basic information and a surprising inability to notice distinctions and differences within the vast fund of human religious thought and activities. We simply cannot, as persons pursuing a philosophical investigation of religious claims, begin with the distilled arguments of a few Western thinkers, analyze them logically, and think we have done our job. An appreciation of how religion operates across time and space demands that we acquaint ourselves with basic facts before we work out some neat, inclusive conclusions that preclude alternatives. 1. A Few Observations (1) Eleven religions are currently practiced throughput the. world. Each has traditions, Scriptures, defenders, critics, and spokespersons. We may group them historically and geographically. The first group includes those of primarily Indian origin: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Hundreds of millions of Hindus and Buddhists, about two million Jains, and perhaps six million Sikhs exist throughout the world. The second group includes religions of Middle Eastern origin: Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The third group consists of those of the Far East: Confucianism, Taoism, and Shintoism. A current world almanac estimates the number of adherents of each. Of these, only the oldest, the Zoroastrian faith, may be said to be diminishing because they admit no converts. These eleven religions are world-wide. Even the most, nationalistic—Shintoism, largely confined to Japan—has sectarian offshoots found in many countries. Other religions of recent origin have emerged. However, in every case thus far, they may be viewed as in some way the offspring of these eleven even though they usually claim utter uniqueness. Some have striven for individuality and have cut themselves off from their roots. The Bahai tradition has its roots in a branch of Islam, though it is now vastly different from it. Soka Gakkai is a popular offshoot of Buddhism and Shintoism, just as Mormonism and Christian Science have roots in the Christian tradition. That any new religion of significance has appeared since the sixteenth century, when Sikhism was
2
ORIENTATION
founded, is doubtful. And even Sikhism was a brilliant effort at synthesizing elements of Hinduism and Islam, now quite individualistic. (2) While other religions are scattered across the planet, they are nonliterate, and though spokespersons have begun to appear seeking to articulate their features, these religions are still regarded as "primitivistic." Remarkably, the features found in religious practices of aboriginal Australians are comparable to ones found among the practices of some native American religions, west Africans, Philippine Islanders, and Melanesians. Students will find that the work of anthropologists provides fascinating material on this topic. (3) Several religions of antiquity are no longer living in any sense, but they seem to have had some influence on currently practiced faiths. Note, for example, that we have evidence of religious activities from peoples in Paleolithic and Neolithic time periods. We think readily of the religions of Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, as well as those striking defunct religions of Central America. Also entrancing are the Druids and the religious practices of the wandering tribes of ancient Europe. Some idiosyncratic minor efforts to initiate ancient rites of witchcraft or revive seasonal rituals, such as Stonehenge, are inconsequential and may scarcely be regarded as serious. (4) Each of the eleven major religions has divisions within it, some deep, some sectarian or denominational. These divisions may be organizational, ideological, or both. Thus, we find two major types of Buddhism—the Mahayana and the Theravada. Each of these has further subtypes numbering in the hundreds. The Buddhism of Nepal and Tibet is so different from the Buddhism of Sri Lanka and Thailand as to suggest they are different religions. The rifts between Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant sections of Christianity are significant, but they have definite elements in common. Muslims similarly have divisions—the Suimi and the Shiite—each of which has sects and subsects, though respect for Mohammed and the Koran is both uniform and mandatory. Some Taoists are of an intellectual sort, while other Taoists perform witchcraft. Differences abound. Some, as in the case of the Jains, focus on which Scriptures may be regarded as authoritative. Others differ as to what are the proper interpretations of Holy Writ, as do Jews and Chi'istians. Doctrinal matters, such as the role of the sacraments or theories of the atonement, produce more divisiveness in Christianity. A devotional act in the Saivite emphasis of Hinduism may be rejected outright by one whose Hinduism is viewed from a Vaishnavite or Tantric perspective. Recognition of such internal differences gives pause when initiating potentially destructive criticisms of some faith in general. (5) Most of the major religions as well as the lesser ones have undergone some transformations during the years and are still undergoing development— perhaps evolution and maybe even devolution. The growth factor in religion helps us come to appreciate internal differences. Accordingly, some people claim to be the proper guardians of the "original" faith while others accept newer interpretations. When the Brahmo Samaj developed in India a century
A Few Observations
3
ago with a view to accommodating some features of Western religion into Hinduism, the Arya Samaj shortly arose, which was in effect a "back to the Vedas" movement to restore the "original" teachings. Vitally important to the philosophy of religion is the recognition of internal changes and developments. For example, the idea of God manifest in the earliest days of ancient Hebrew religion was not the same idea voiced by the eighth-century prophets. The earliest teaching identified Yahweh as a tribal deity. Later Jewish thought maintained that the Supreme One was the Lord of all nations and was as much concerned with the Egyptians as with the Jews. To criticize a view of God as an Oriental despot, bloodthirsty and vengeful, is relatively easy; but to judge negatively a God of all nations whose character is merciful and conciliatory is not so easy. (6) We must also recognize that each of the major religions has had and does now have thoughtful, articulate spokespersons and leaders who are quite prepared to discuss the bases for their views, to listen to critics, and to offer defenses that appeal to logic and experience, not merely to authority, feeling, or tradition. Always have some leaders announced that rational justification is impossible, but in the long history of philosophical thought their number is minuscule. We need think only of the Upanishads, those brilliant intellectual efforts to explicate the religion of the Vedas to inquiring minds. Even though Gautama the Buddha seems to have taught that arguments about doctrine did not make for edification, many later Buddhist thinkers have been prepared to explicate and even challenge their faith on rational grounds. Apparently, we may not honestly discount the value or truth of a religious claim until we have heard it in its best form as set forth by devout yet informed, thoughtful leaders. (7) Moreover, levels of activity and levels of religious consciousness exist within each religion. Just as in the general realm of literature some people enjoy and prefer popular magazine romances to Shakespeare or James Joyce, so too can we see levels of religious awareness and understanding. Just as all operatic excellence is not found in the pleasingly delightful works of Gilbert and Sullivan, so too in religious awareness and practice a similar difference is manifest. Truly devout worshipers in the differing religions have more in common with each other than they do with nominal followers in their own religion. A Christian mystic finds more intrinsic fellowship with a Sufi or Hindu mystic than with an ordinary churchgoer who visits the cathedral or synagogue only on annual holy days or for weddings, baptisms, and funerals. Such levels of religious awareness are absolutely vital. This is not just a distinction between professionals and laypersons, for some professionals have little genuine religion and some laypersons evince profundity. This recognition helps us appreciate philosophical problems more squarely. We must regularly ask the critic whom they are arguing against, what form of belief they are judging. Whether philosophical arguments opposed to religion have ever been addressed to the lives and thought of saints is doubtful. And few saints have ever paused to worry about attackers who showed not the slightest
4
ORIENTATION
understanding of their experience and motivation. 1 have yet to find a philosophical critic discussing Saint Francis, Saint Vincent de Paul, Rabbi Heschel, Sri Ramakrishna, or Lord Buddha and the like. Can they remain unmoved by the work and lives of such people in their scurrying to find logical flaws in their implied intellectual beliefs? Even the most jaded atheist must have some respect for Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. And can professional skeptics or magazine atheists begin to be their equals? Even A. J. P. Taylor, the brilliant British historian who has no use whatever for religion, remarked that the Quakers are one of the best things thaMias happened to the human race. This seventh observation has a corollary: Just as levels of religious awareness and achievement exist, so too do levels of criticism and types of opponents of religious beliefs. Some critics are of the jotirnalistic type, naive and uninformed, looking to ridicule or poke—persons George Berkeley called "minute philosophers," such as magazine atheists, who make grimaces at theism but whose only view of things is weak. Others seek to be sympathetic but have little resilience. If talking about music, they would be unable to distinguish Mozart from Tschaikowsky, and in literature they could not tell Wordsworth from Pope. Nor could they distinguish Da Vinci from Van Gogh or little league baseball from the Red Sox. Accordingly, some critics are simple and some are sophisticated. Not all philosophers betray sophistication. Sociological and scientific critics may make worthwhile observations, but whether they grasp the phenomenological claims of religion is doubtful. Fortunately, some trained philosophic minds well-versed in the ways of religion through background and study nevertheless reject the claims of religious belief. Those persons we must heed. (8) 1 now list some of the types or levels of religious response found throughout the world. (i) No religious sensitivity at all. Like color-blind persons or those who are tone deaf, some persons have no interest in or feeling for religious claims. (ii) Reluctant recognition but a hesitancy to endorse or approve of any religious ideas or claims. They are not quite ready to despise it, and, like the husband who hates operas, occasionally will participate in it if a member of the family asks them. (iii) The nominal or incidentally religious person. The religious belief never makes a difference in thought or in life, though in some celebrations and occasions religion seems useful. They assent to religious weddings and fimeral ceremonies, would be offended to see their tradition doubted, and would be struck dumb if anyone really practiced it. These people cannot imagine giving up religious holidays, but they care little about religious claims to truth or to our life. (iv) The practical, interested, and loyal believer. The bulk of religious people in the world are in thiscategory. They find some satisfaction in religious belief, when their needs are met, and they engage in regular acts of piety—
A Few Observations
5
visiting the sick, helping others in time of trouble, giving support to humanitarian causes, and providing funds for education, hospitals, and culture when asked. They have respect for their tradition but generally are not much interested in questions of truth or in discussing the grounding of their faith. (v) Thoroughly committed believers. Here the active follower organizes life around his or her religious beliefs. They study their faith, try to live up to it, and constantly seek to be and do better. Religious criteria inform morality, patriotism, life's goals and even vocation. Religious belief puts the believer in tension with society and culture. Some separate themselves from it (for example, the Amish), some try to transform it from within, and a few are revolutionaries. At worst, these believers can become fanatics as in some fans of Islamic Shiism and Christian Fundamentalism. (vi) Saints or holy persons. These people are so devout and committed that they are recognized as great exemplars of their tradition and viewed as saints. The lives they live are generally respected by persons outside of the tradition. They are exceptional people in every sense, but primarily in their dedication to the service of others. They often renounce early possessions, sometimes family, and always selfish aims. If mental problems are associated with such saints, they are overlooked because of the benefits their devotion brings to others. (vii) In some religions, we speak of yet a higher type of religious life. This occurs primarily in Hinduism, as in the attainment of divinity, samadhi. Some persons are recognized as having attained divine status in this life, and this level of spirituality is so high that their followers worship them as living gods. Theoretically, they are souls who have overcome all karma and become identified with the Supreme Being. Western religious believers, especially Muslims, regard this not only as presumptuous but as blasphemous. We may safely say that all of the eleven religions recognize the sixth category. Only Hinduism, and possibly Buddhism and Jainism, would accept this seventh possibility. Now, if our sources of awareness for religious phenomena and claims are limited to reports from persons of the first three types indicated above, that we will or can give a fair account or appraisal of religious claims is unlikely. (9) In addition to different levels of human response to religion, notice also some different emphases reflected in the lives of persons who are more than nominally or incidentally interested in religious phenomena. These are modes of appreciating or understanding religious phenomena. (i) The intellectualistic mode. Here the person thinks primarily about ideational questions and topics. He or she is interested in doctrines, creeds, confessions, or the conceptual materials of active religion. Obviously, the majority of religious believers have little interest in conceptual matters or even in truth as such. They assume the truth of their adopted religion and are not worried about thought problems or intellectual puzzles. But the philosophical mind relishes intellectual issues and might think on occasion that religion can
6
ORIENTATION
be set aside as full of sound and fury if he or she can but show some logical difficulties in a belief or truth claim: "Sometimes, however, intellectualism in religion is the result of atrophy of the emotional and ethical sides of character." (ii) The aesthetic approach. Persons with this tendency display little interest in truth or intellectual matters; they are concerned with the mode, manner, and techniques of religious expression. A real love is shown for ceremonies, fine music, charming atmospheres, beautiful temples, and liturgical order. Priestly functions must be performed with exactitude and in the accepted traditional way. This aspect of religion—its literary, ritualistic, and generally emotionally satisfying features—entice many .sensitive persons to allegiance and practice. (iii) The ecstatic type. Here the emphasis is on having uplifting experiences. Indeed, some persons actively seek to cultivate moving and vital experiences. On one level, a person may engage in religious activities to promote peace of mind or internal security. On another, someone may seek strong experiences of the divine, either in the form of dramatic emotional response or in some state of blissful mystical awareness. Religion experientially based has been a powerful force in human history. In the Christian tradition, some people seek "holiness," the "witness of the spirit," or even glossolalia (speaking in tongues), while in Hinduism a person may through meditation lose self-awareness and concentrate only on the supreme. Yogic disciplines are aimed at seeking profound experiences, and they have their counterparts in almost every major religion. Heightened experiences are taken by some as firm evidence of the truth of their claims. Some religious doctrines, however, deemphasize human religious experience. Not many philosophers have been sympathetic to reports of ecstatic worshipers, realizing that similar experiences in different cultures are differentiated merely by elaborate interpretive mechanisms and clarifications. (iv) The moral emphasis. Confucianism, while putting some stress on proper ceremony, is primarily motivated by ethical matters. Beliefs seem incidental. Other religions too have had strong concerns for promoting righteousness. Jesus praised those who "hungered and thirsted after righteousness." This desire may be viewed as the voluntaristic mode of religious response. The emphasis is on duty and obedience, not on particular ideas, ceremonial correctness, or the having of vital experiences. Some thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant, virtually identified morality with religion. The concern here is not limited to private or individual morality but exten'ds to society, politics, and economics, as well as international relations. The moral approach is illustrated acutely in the tension between the eighth-century Hebrew prophets and the priestly conservatives they opposed. (v) The institutional interest. Considerable numbers of active religious devotees are motivated and interested in organizational matters. They find satisfaction in group behavior that is linked with institutions and linked with a vital tradition. The subtle differences in Tibetan Buddhism are seemingly
Religion and Superstition
7
primarily organizational matters, including units at different levels, types and subtypes of brothers, presbyters, prebendaries, monsignors, and archimandrites, and a great love of order and acceptance of hierarchies. One concern is the promotion of unity within some faiths; another is the seeking of unity among faiths. Ecumenism—the bringing together of peoples of diverse outlooks—bulks large in the world, as if mere union and institutional integrity had intrinsic merit. (vi) Religious phenomena may also be approached in a broad or synoptic way. Here, intellectual values, the love of beauty, ethical justice, and organizations may be taken into account. But an attempt is made to keep those tendencies in some kind of coherent relationship, respecting the diversity yet not allowing one mode or approach to be the sole or dominating one. To say that ideally most religious persons would strive to cultivate this broader approach is probably correct. To say so seems more philosophically sound while not becoming over-intellectual. 2. Religion and Superstition A.word must be said about the tendency of some intellectuals to equate all religion with superstition. The philosopher George Berkeley once wrote that "religion was a mean between incredulity and superstition." Religion is neither avoidance of belief nor an abundance of belief that accepts any event or idea, however wild. The German term for superstition is Aberglaube, which is distinguished from Glaube. Glaube means "belief." Aberglaube means "more or further belief, bordering on the excessive." That is a working definition of a superstition that helps us begin to see its difference from belief. I need do no more than mention the persistence of popular superstitions in daily life that are not linked to religious belief, such as fear of opening an umbrella in a house, breaking a mirror, having our path crossed by a black cat, or special acts of baseball players and the like. These minor things trade on the popular conflation of signs with causes, although no connection exists between a sign and a cause. Empirically speaking, we do in fact find events and practices in most of the eleven world religions that can be called superstitious, to say nothing of those religions now defunct and those we may with hesitation have classified as "primitive." We simply cannot add up instances of actual practices and ignore the teachings and practices of leaders and writers. Popular responses to mysteries, misfortune, and death are to be expected where reason, thought, and science have been neglected or suppressed. If we were to catalogue the apparent superstitious practices that have been associated with religion from its beginnings, we could easily conclude that not only is religion as practiced rife with superstition, but it is almost identical with it. But historical honesty will not allow this, for we see that some of the strongest opponents of the superstitious practices have been religious leaders
8
ORIENTATION
themselves. They have consciously offered religious belief as an alternative to superstition. In the Book of Isaiah we read: "And when they say consult the mediums and wizards who chirp and mutter . . . should not a people consult their God?" (Isa. 8:19). As early as the Book of Exodus, we find injunctions against sorcerers (22:18). In 1 Samuel (28:3), King Saul put the mediums and wizards out of the land. New Testament writers similarly oppose idolatry and sorcery (Gal. 5:19). In the Book of Acts, we read the report that Paul helped a slave girl who "had the spirit of divination" and who had brought gain to her masters. When they saw that their gain was gone, they got after Paul (16:16). We can trace an historic tension in other religions between those seeking a higher life of ethical fulfillment and justice and those who resort to trickery, sorcery, or magic. Gautama the Buddha opposed the practice of caste among the Hindus as well as the practice of bribing deities. Mahavira, founder of Jainism, abhorred the bloody animal sacrifices of the Hindus, who thought such sacrifices would win salvation. Mohammed was attacked by the traditionalists when he opposed such primitive tribal practices as infanticide and polytheism. Whenever we find a religious leader stressing the ethical life over trust in magical devices to secure wishes, as we find in Confucianism, we have a case of religious opposition to superstition. As much as a century ago, Moncure Conway observed: "But relatively to numbers the proportion of those free from religious superstition is as large in India as in England and America." However, when we survey actual practices today among the living religions, we still find a persistence of superstitious elements, which might lead us to generalize too quickly. We do not find thoughtful leaders defending or employing such things, but we might like to see Hindu thinkers make a more overt denunciation of palmistry, astrology, charms, or the claim that eating cauliflower in the winter is not wise. If a Muslim thinks that touching the Black Stone in the Kaaba may actually have a magical effect, that is superstition. But if treated as an object to recall holy events, such an act is scarcely as superstitious as twenty-one-gun tributes to known and unknown soldiers. Many popular acts are symbolic and practical and are not at all superstitious. Indeed, thinkers who judge religious practices so abruptly may well ponder their own tendencies to practical superstitions. Ron Hirschbein wrote: Just as Aztec priests insisted that only human sacrifices kept the world from ending, today's national security managers convince the faithful that only more nuclear weapons can preserve the peace. But philosophic critics of religion have since the earliest times been unable to see, as Berkeley saw, that the same kinds of criticisms can apply to their political or patriotic allegiances, which most hold uncritically and even fundementalistically. Those who too readily equate religion with superstition might recall that when it comes to new superstitions, such as flying saucers or occult practices,
Religion and Science
9
the "irreligious minds and liberals" are much more likely to accept them. The Fundamentalists appear most virtuous according to scientific standards when we examine the cults and pseudosciences proliferating in our society today. Based on statistical study among college students, born-again Christians have a strong tendency to reject several occult and pseudoscientific notions. Cults and individual occult activity tend to be most common where traditional churches are the weakest. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the move from Glaube to Aberglaube seems always ready to happen in religions. Undoubtedly, superstitious elements and practices can be found, but that does not give us the right to make random judgments about all religions or put off trying to understand the ideas of thoughtful proponents who themselves uniformly oppose superstitious practices. When confronted with religious diversity, confusions, and superstitions in the religious claims of humankind, we need to explore how our reason may help us. We simply may not initiate the study of religious claims by giving them the name of superstition. (Not only does it backfire, but it is simply unfair as well as untrue.) 3. Religion and Science No natural opposition or allegiance exists between science and religion. Some scientists are devout practicing religious believers and some scientists reject all religion emphatically. I am concerned here with what the relationship could be and is. Religious phenomena and claims have been approached from a scientific standpoint, giving rise to at least three sciences of religion: history of religion, psychology of religion, and sociology of religion. Sometimes these make empirical studies—finding facts, organizing them, measuring where possible, and even, on occasion, conducting experiments, as in the psychology of religion (which has both a theoretical and a practical thrust, as in psychotherapy). Consider also an important organization known as the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, founded in 1949, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. A great deal of work has been done in all three areas and much light has been given in coming to appreciate the prolixities of religious phenomena. Were it not for the findings and reports of scientists studying religion, those who philosophize about it would be narrow indeed. Insofar as science is descriptive and searching, it is neutral on religion. When it makes blanket statements about religions based solely on empirical findings, it can hardly still be called science. Fortunately, this is not done often, but scholars such as James Frazer and, more recently, Joseph Campbell have extrapolated their anthropological findings into quasi-philosophies of religion without acknowledging what they have been doing. To the uncritical mind, this gives the impression that the theories and hypotheses generalizing about myths,
10
ORIENTATION
for example, are themselves findings of science. They are scarcely that. They are, instead, the judgments of skilled scientists offering theories that are themselves as questionable as any philosophical theory would be. Unfortunately, a reluctance exists to criticize such scientists.
Two
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, REASON, AND TRUTH The philosophical enterprise does not take its rise in some abstract way. It is undertaken because a need occurs, problems appear, and questions arise. In the last chapter, I noted the wide diversity of religious experience and the persistence of differences in claims about various ideas and meanings. The plain fact of diversity and downright disagreement incites philosophical attention to religious questions. An alert mind is even a bit curious as to what religious believers are actually saying and doing and is prompted to try to understand. Sometimes the committed religious person also begins to wonder whether philosophical activity can be of assistance in clarifying, if not eradicating, differences found between private beliefs and those of others who seem every bit as sincere and committed. We might ordinarily think that religious believers would themselves naturally be interested in truth for its own sake. That is not the case, nor has it been in the past. Religious believers are quick to claim that they have found the truth and that they do not need to search further. Some approach arrogance in asserting that they have the final answers. They have found a measure of satisfaction in what they believe, and while they are probably willing to improve and enrich their own religious life, they do not have much actual concern for the views and practices of people with a different faith. Most of them are simply not curious at all, even about opposing views held with fanatical fervor. Nor do philosophical problems posed by their own religious claims attract their attention. We have the paradox of those who claim to know the truth and who wish to tell others what it is, but who never for a moment wonder whether others might have more truth or a better mode of belief than they. If religious believers were really devoted to truth, they would at least consider alternatives. A leader of the active Soka Gakkai sect in Japan observed that the concrete benefits of religious devotees "are much more important than some abstract notion of 'truth,' which has little meaning for ordinary people." The Quaker philosopher Rufus Jones put it another way when he remarked that truth is a personal experience instead of a statement to which the mind gives assent. Note that one reason for the conflict between ordinary religious believers and intellectuals is that the intellectuals think of truth first and insist that their logical and evidential demands be met. They then take particular pleasure in asking simple and sincere believers for defenses and justifications of their beliefs, which by the very nature of the case those believers cannot provide. The slightly prejudiced intellectual then easily pokes fun at all religion, having
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not often encountered persons who can discuss, or justify religious belief. This helps explain the successes of Robert Ingersoll in the last century and other professional unbelievers of the journalistic type who travel on the lecture circuit. Clearly, religious people come to their commitments as a result of other factors. The motivation for accepting a set of religious claims, if not merely because of cultural inheritance or social conditioning, is that a religion meets specific needs, including practical, emotional, aesthetic, social, and possibly some unconscious ones. When left to themselves, ordinary believers do not really know what they believe or why. They often do not know what the traditional language of their inherited or acquired faith intends. They may repeat it with piety but probably do not put it into their own words. They usually do not know how their beliefs differ from others nor what the points of contact are among religions. We might ask whether any religious persons are so devoted to truth that they would willingly surrender their beloved views to find it. Many may have the courage of their convictions; few have the courage to challenge their convictions. The same is equally true of actively irreligious persons. Thinking is always harder than avoiding thought. Accordingly, for religious people to listen to or acknowledge the ideas of a friendly, thoughtful critic is troublesome. Customarily, we do not want our religion brought out into the open for critical discussion, any more than we would like seriously to discuss our eating habits, clothing preferences, or other personal tastes. This is a furtive timidity. Paradoxically, religious people do talk about their beliefs, but not critically. They boast about the benefits they have received; they invite their friends to join them; they encourage youngsters to participate; they openly donate money and gifts; they urge their leaders to spread the good word; they exhibit symbols of their faith on their bodies or doorposts or bumper stickers; and in the USA they gloat over ostentatious religious television shows. Some are so sure they are right that they spend large sums on missionary enterprises to win others to their beliefs and practices, though not all religions are evangelistic. I now review some of the factors that make it difficult to engage in rational inquiry about religion. (1) Most people were not argued into their religious beliefs and most will not be argued out of them. The number of believers who conscientiously chose one set of beliefs after having considered alternatives is minuscule. So worry over rational truth is generally uncommon. However, converts from one religion to another—a Christian who becomes Hindu, for example—sometimes are well prepared to discuss the reasons for their switch because they have usually been schooled in the differences and advantages. (2) People participate in religious activities because they find satisfaction in them. Specific psychic, emotional, and social needs are met, longings satisfied, joys experienced, and bereavements comforted. As a result of some marked conversion experiences, some people have not only turned away from
Taking Religious Claims Seriously
13
fruitless and dissipated living but have found a new vocation as well as personal fulfillment. Where once they were disorganized personalities drifting lazily from random impulse to random impulse, a vivid religious awakening brings about a marked change. They see themselves and their families as well as their neighbors and peoples of the world in a new light. They want to be contributors to human well-being, not parasites on others. To get that sort of person to reconsider and evaluate objectively the truth of the transforming faith is almost impossible, though in honesty we must still raise questions about the quality and intent of striking turnabouts in personality. No transforming experience is self-validating, nor is it the final criterion of what constitutes true religion. Persons having experiences of fulfillment and self-realization cannot be argued out of their commitment by some clever intellectual who poses logical puzzles, especially if that intellectual is an unkind, self-centered pleasure seeker. (3) Religious people without scientific or philosophical temperament find it irksome to be curious or investigative about theological preferences. They view rational objectivity as both vexing and perilous. The position of one such person was ably characterized by Cecil Cadoux: "The bare possibility of finding my beliefs untrue is so distressing to me that the less I enquire after them the better." Those who have made an "existential commitment" to a religion feel that rational discussion might subvert their commitment or demolish its uniqueness. They allege that a person cannot both be a participant and a disinterested observer. The one erases the other. But that is not obviously true. (4) Sometimes tensions in religion do not yield to rational clarification because of a basic personality clash. In the early days of Christianity, we read how Paul and Barnabas worked together successfully. Then they split up. And the contention was so sharp between them, that they departed asunder one from the other: and so Barnabas took Mark and sailed unto Cyprus and Paul chose Silas and departed, being recommended by the brethren unto the grace of God. (Acts 15:39) We do not hear of Barnabas again. New sects are sometimes formed as a result of a personality clash. We can hardly expect rational discourse to occur among rival parties formerly harmonious. Deep divisions in Islam seem largely to be a result of competing leaders among early imams. Today such differences will be understood as doctrinal. Divisions among contemporary Hindus seem again to depend on strong leaders who gather followers, who then become strong partisans. When so much of the psychological is involved, we cannot expect much sustained interest in settling differences through rational inquiry. At this point, psychologists will provide more insight than any philosopher. Personality clashes occur in political and educational circumstances too and make for
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unreasonable variations. Even a few psychologists have been known to be irrational toward opposing views. (5) Some differences among religions result from nothing more than geographical factors or historical accidents. These cannot be argued away. The devout Jain of the Digambara sect who is a strict vegetarian and wears no clothes can thrive on the Indian subcontinent, but he or she cannot persuade the Christian Laplander or traditional Eskimo to stop eating animal flesh or refrain from wearing furs. When individuals claim some vision, miracle, or divine visitation, such events are interpreted according to the locaj religious tradition. We do not see the Hindu goddess Parvati manifesting herself in the gardens of Spain. Nor does the Virgin Mary make any appearances to children in Tibet. Yet, we would think that manifestations of the Ultimate should not be conditioned by geographical parameters. To those outside of the Muslim community to hear it announced that the omnipotent power of the whole universe, Allah, gave his final revelation in the Arabic language is a marvel. A person living in Nigeria or Norway may become a Muslim but must learn the language of Allah. Chinese and Soviet Muslims must say their prayers in Arabic as well. Would Arabic still be required for worship on some remote planet outside of our galaxy? Rational arguments seem of no avail concerning such things. Again, many places in Europe and Asia have seen forcible conversions of whole populations by a conquering force or because of a ruler's preference. Except for its remaining architectural marvel, Borobudor, Buddhism disappeared from Indonesia, partly because of the impact of Islam. One accepted European formula in the sixteenth century was that the religious confession of the subject was to be dependent on that of the territorial leader. Simple British folk in the same century who became Protestants under Henry VIII and Edward VI were forced back into Catholicism under Queen Mary; they were then allowed to return to Protestantism under Queen Elizabeth. The clashes in Europe during the age of the Reformation produced much animosity. The differences persisting today are not so intense, yielding little argument. Lutherans in Sweden are not much interested in debating religious truth with Roman Catholics in Bavaria. Reason had little or nothing to do with the initial fixing of the faith. (6) In addition, even though they may not oppose discussion, sincere people do not inquire much about varying religious views because they have little time or energy for it. Few persons have the desire to become acquainted with the Scriptures, teachings, and history of other religions. They do not have the leisure or stamina to do so. When scholars find themselves frustrated in their efforts to master a new religion, how can laypersons be expected to do so? Indeed, if we persistently discussed and argued religious alternatives, we would be unable to practice any religion seriously. Moreover, even if we wished to try out differing religious truths on an experimental basis, we could scarcely succeed. Would a two-year experiment
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with Buddhism, followed by a two-year experiment with Confucianism, suffice for a person to make a decision? And why just two years? A decade might be needed for a fair experiment. What of marriage regulations and child-rearing? Can we experiment with these? Could a wife who enjoyed the relatively privileged status of Sikh or Parsee be willing to experiment with the rigors of Islamic law regarding the role of women or the strictures placed on widows by Orthodox Hinduism? Devotees of the Hindu saint, Sri Ramakrishna claim that he actually lived several religions at different times. He came to the conclusion that they were all one, but he did not investigate Shintoism or Confucianism. But I must offer a critical word here. Even in selecting life's vocation, or a mate, experimentation is not possible. Anyone who aimed at becoming the male lead in a ballet company could not first try being a brain surgeon and then play professional football for two years. Trying some vocations precludes others, but that does not mean that we cannot make an intelligent informed choice for ourselves. Accordingly, to insist on mastery of the major doctrines and Scriptures of religions and to experiment with some before any one can be truly justified is an artificial, abstract, and false position. The options are not so complicated in large outline. We may acquire, in a brief time, enough basic knowledge and comprehension about the general thrust of similar religions to be able to make an intelligent choice of the direction in which we might like to move—if we want to move at all. Direct experiment is unnecessary. We regularly enter into the experience of other people through art, music, and literature. Through imagination we can come to some fair-minded realization of what another's religion must be like. To say, as some do, that they will never be able to understand another's beliefs is logically fallacious and is an appeal to ignorance. Although to enter easily into the mind-set of a so-called "primitive" person whose powers of communication are minimal may be impossible, the great religions of the world, as well as differing philosophies, are accessible to us in a broad outline. Thoughtful decisions can be made without years of disciplined study. The fact is that thinkers of various faiths have discussed the possibility of inter-religion dialogue. Such persons must converse with each other in categories mutually understandable, because each of the eleven religions has articulate spokespersons. We do not accept the often dogmatic assertion: "No simple answers exist." Basic categories of human communication exist, and significant degrees of understanding are possible. 1. Shortcut Efforts to Solve the Problem of Religious Disagreement by Means Other than Reason We see a commonsensical, unthinking attitude about religious diversity, then, which gives no care about the fact of disagreement and rests comfortably in avoidance of discussion, ignoring counterclaims and overlooking the reports of sincere believers of different faiths. This is a complacent attitude, often
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RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, REASON, AND TRUTH
sentimental, sometimes dogmatic, and usually overconfident if not arrogant. As Harry Costello once put it: "We are most confident that we are thinking aright when we have not been alerted to possible alternatives." But what of those who are aware of alternative claims? Many avoid the discipline of rational investigation and offer in its place other efforts to solve the tensions. (1) Though naive, some have suggested that all religions are really the same, that is, all are equally untrue. The apparent disagreements are only about the use of words or result from cultural variations. While this idea has been voiced even by so prominent a person as Mahatma Gandhi, who did so on several occasions, it hardly merits serious attention. Gandhi himself shunned the practice of goat sacrifices in Calcutta and surely disapproved those strains in Hinduism that make a place for approaching God through sexual experience; yet, he said religions were basically the same. This is a viewpoint that is at best motivated by ideas of toleration and permissiveness, but it is as intolerable intellectually as to say that all political systems or all means of locomotion are really the same. We must distinguish the normal human attitude of respect and tolerance toward persons from the intellectual quest for truth. We must be intolerant of untruth. I may surely "tolerate" a person who does not accept the germ theory, but I cannot indulge the false view. To recognize the fascinating and fruitful differences among religions is far better than to try to catch them up in one big net of vague commonality. No devout believer of any specific religion would ever assert such commonality. Some contend that other faiths are fountains of error or that they are at least misleading and incomplete. To say that all religions are equally untrue betrays even more ignorance than the position that says they are equally true. Instead of noticing distinctions between benighted superstition and enlightened social service or between crudeness and magnificent artistic creations, this view fuses all into one type. We are obliged to confess that this "know nothing" position is found among some intellectuals. One recent thinker, Jiddu Krishnamurti, well-versed in comparative religion, held a more thoughtful variation of this idea. Originally linked with Theosophy, he ultimately took the position that "truth is a pathless land" and calmly preached a doctrine of vacuity, a refusal of any set creed or organization. This is a tantalizing form of agnosticism, understandable as a practical objection to arrogant religious advertising but at base irrational, for it proposes another creed of insistent "creedlessness." To say "I don't know" is the easiest thing in the world, a phrase usually coupled with the corollary "and I won't try to." (2) Quite the opposite is the exclusivistic standpoint, the position of radical displacement. We simply claim that our own religion is the only true one. All the others are false. Such arrogance is regularly found among Western Christians who regard those outside their fold as heathens or pagans. The words attributed to Jesus have apparently fostered this: "I am the way, the truth and the life. No man cometh to,the Father but by me." Exclusivism is found even within segments of historical Christianity. The leaders of the Russian Orthodox
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Church have openly opposed Ecumenism on the grounds that any effort to unite Christians of different persuasions fails to recognize that theirs is the only true church. Sectarianism, divisiveness, and ill-feeling are the fruits of such exclusiveness. It can lead to fanaticism of the Jonestown variety, which resulted in mass suicide at the command of the leader. In this connection, we instructively read how Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, faced the question of disagreement and conflicting views that he encountered as a young truth seeker. He reports that while laboring under the difficulties caused by contests between parties of religionists, he came across a verse in the Book of James (1:5) that suggested to him that he ask God directly for wisdom. Early in the spring of 1820, he began his quest and reported a vision that eventuated in the founding of the Mormon Church, a denomination based on new Scriptures and one which then itself claimed new and exclusive truth! Though a believer likes to think that his or her religion is the only true one, to announce that all the rest are false and only one is absolute seems utterly repugnant. Perhaps such absolutism is purely practical or heuristic, a commitment, like the choice of a mate or a vocation. We select one vocation and reject all the others, but that does not make the rejected vocations wrong or less noble or the other person's spouse of lesser quality. In recent years, some intellectuals have held the putatively more discreet outlook of maintaining that Christianity was a faith while all the others were mere religions. This idea has beguiled some. It promotes confidence and energizes radical missionary movements, which are out to win converts to a particular form of salvation. Muslims run a close second to Christians on this point. But then we confront the problem of which type of Christian to become or which type of Muslim. Shall it be Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventism, Roman Catholicism, or "mainline" Protestantism? Shall it be Shiite or Sunni? If a Shiite, a Sevener or a Twelver? The most exclusivistic form of believer, I suppose, would say that Satan is the cause of competing religious claims and that those who investigate alternatives are satanically motivated. (3) Another position gives the appearance of tolerance, for it recognizes a rightful role for each religion, suggesting that all might be good and that different religious ideas satisfy different people. In effect, it says, I will take my religion and you take yours, and trying to work out differences or disagreements has little point. Discussion and arguments are too taxing and emotionally disturbing. To avoid them is best, for we can learn to live in amity with one another despite contradictions. This is a practical view somewhat like the older henotheism in the days of ancient Israel. Other gods were recognized but each nation had its preference and there was an attitude of relative tolerance. This sort of a view does not inspire much religious confidence because it ignores the question of truth. Soon in the history of Israel the gods of the neighboring peoples and tribes were called upon to contend with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The prophet'
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RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, REASON, AND TRUTH
Elijah could not agree that Baal was just the same as Yahweh. Nor could the prophet Mohammed agree that the tribal folk religion of his ancestors was just as good as the new revelation he obtained from Allah. Tolerance of the sort represented by this view does not inspire great thinkers and movements. We can cleave to our own religion as true and at the same time respect those who differ from us without admitting the simplistic, even sentimental relativism the view implies. We may respect devotees of a religion without regarding the religion as true. (4) Another means of overcoming religious difference is to claim that value may be found in every religion and pick the best parts of each. In our age of rapid communication and travel, is it not wiser to learn what we can from the differing viewpoints and develop a religion for ourselves that takes the best to be found in each of the great religions? This approach is known as eclecticism. It works quite well when participating in a smorgasbord dinner, but it is meaningless intellectually. First, how do we decide what is best in each religion? What criterion other than personal whim could exist? Second, to say that we can accept the doctrine of forgiveness as found in Judaism and Christianity and at the same time accept karma—which denies divine forgiveness and insists that we must pay for our sins—is monstrous. Suppose someone tried to overcome differences in politics by picking the best in anarchism, communism, democracy, fascism, and monarchism? Or suppose someone thought respect for different views of medicine was wise, taking the best from acupuncture, the gentle healing of the Tibetan Kum Nye, naturopathy, Ayur Vedic medicine, Christian Science, and Western scientific medicine? Eclecticism is an abstract position, an irrelevant mood, the nonsense of which appears the moment we try to frame the idea. (5) A more appealing way to deal with competing religious claims is to select the religion that is the oldest, the most traditional. Surely an ancient religion with an unbroken tradition must be truer and better than more recent ones! The lure and weight of tradition figure in arriving at a faith, but we cannot say that the oldest extant religion is the truest and the best. Of the eleven religions I have been looking at, Sikhism is the most recent, but were we to try to determine objectively which one is the oldest, we would find ourselves in a puzzle that scholars have had difficulty solving. Apparently, either Zoroastrianism or Hinduism would be chief contenders. But the line of tradition is not so sure. Honest investigation shows that some views become heresies because of chance factors alone and that revolts against long-standing traditions have yielded clearly beneficial results for humankind, for example, the doing away with human sacrifice and widow immolation. A corollary to this approach states that some day we will come to see that the oldest tradition is really the best. Someday, all will return to the fold and see that the great tradition is the only true one. This trades on the time factor. On the one hand, it says time and age show superiority, and on the other hand, given a little more time, we will come to realize the truth. Some of the
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staunchest atheists and opponents of religion have taken the same slant. Not only is atheism old, but vigorous atheists today, such as doctrinaire Marxists and Freudians, confidently affirm that when individuals mature sufficiently, they will come to see the "truth" of atheistic views. Such an appeal overlooks the fact that some former Marxists have come to realize the truth in traditional religion, and some former Freudians have achieved maturity in the Buddhist faith. This sort of discussion makes for unreason and gives us no solution. (6) A more attractive point of view is one that claims to recognize the value and truth in all other religions while claiming to supersede and surpass them. This is not the oldest view but instead the latest one—one that draws upon those older than it. But the view is better because it is the culmination of others. Islam has the advantage of this position. It freely and willingly recognizes the great persons and teachings in the Jewish tradition, granting a common ancestry. It also accepts some of the stories and insights of traditional Christianity, though it claims to be a corrective as well as an additive set of beliefs. Thus, Judaism and Christianity paved the way for the great final truths found in the Koran. Still, few religions are as willing to admit the value and truth in those that preceded it. Islam has a definite appeal. But then the natural question arises of whether any new religion will emerge, which by the same argument will be better because it surpasses even Islam. Surely, devout Sikhs could claim by this argument that their religion is superior. It not only respects Islam but also incorporates aspects of Hinduism. The Bahai religion, which grew out of Islam, now claims to be a truly universal religion incorporating the messages of others. But it is thoroughly sundered from Islamic teaching and has suffered persecution by Iranian Muslims. The story can go on repeatedly. Theosophy incorporates features of Hinduism and Buddhism. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormons) accepts both the Old and New Testaments, but adds its own revealed Scripture, the Book of Mormon. The active Christian Science church does the same, but instead of the Book of Mormon, it offers Mary Baker Eddy's Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures. The Unification Church, founded by Sun Myung Moon, claims likewise to be the latest form and hence the truest version of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Soka Gakkai, now with ten million members, founded in 1937, claims to be the culmination of the teachings of the Buddhist leader Nichiren from the thirteenth century. We can always hold out hope that a new prophet will arise who will supersede and surpass those who claim to have superseded the others. Unfortunately, those views that have been consolidated into fixed patterns will not, under questioning, admit that new truths may supersede theirs. However, one distinguished Christian theologian, A. C. Knudson, has remarked: "there is no way by which it can be demonstrated that Christianity will never be superseded by another and higher religion."1 The vital issues in religious controversy cannot be decided by appealing to a time patch. If we are interested
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in truth, (and many are not), the issues must be joined on their merit, not decided by recentness. One example of a book that tries to bring together different perspectives is Beatrice Bruteau's Evolution toward Divinity, which compares the pioneering work of the Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin with views in the Hindu tradition, finding strong correspondence and linking twentieth-century Christianity with ancient Hindu traditions.2 Rumi, a Sufi, saw in the differing sects and religions separate ways to one goal: "The lamps are different, but the Light is the same: I come from beyond. O Thou who are the kernel of existence, Thy disagreement between Muslim, .Zoroastrian, and Jew depends on the standpoint." (7) Yet other ways exist to "solve" the problems of religious diversity outside of the appeal to rational discussion. A more attractive view than the foregoing is what we may call the "incorporative" view. This outlook announces in its most prominent form that while genuine religious disagreement and variation exists, all religions are striving toward one basic outlook. They may employ different terminology, worship in different ways, and have different creeds, but these are only minor variations in the overall unity they seek. On the altar in a Hindu temple in Boston we find these words: "Truth is one, men know it by different names." In a morning worship service in that temple, the priest's prayer will address the deity by the names of the differing theistic religions. The implication is that all religions are questing for and are really in touch with the unified fundamental reality but they have different names and ways of approaching it. For members of the different world religions to be told their faiths are really at one with each other and that all are striving toward the same goal is gratifying. This is a magnanimous view. Disagreements are dissolved by submerging differences and even contradictions. But most serious devotees of any faith do not care to be told that their religion is a form of Hindu Vedantism. They do not wish to have their distinctive claims overlooked or drowned in some all-embracing doctrine that turns out in the end to be a particular religion. This seventh view, gracious as it sounds, becomes in reality a veiled defense of Advaitic Vedantism, a form of Hinduism that other Hindus reject in spite of its philosophical sophistication and prestige. I once heard a Sikh philosopher vigorously oppose a Hindu thinker who tried to assert that Sikhism was nothing more than the Santana Dharma in different verbiage. This outlook has the great merit of offering profound respect for all religions with the exception of rank "primitivism." But it achieves its practical unity at the expense of overlooking distinctions devotees insist on, and more important, by assuming a theory of the Ultimate that can be questioned seriously. To hold to any form of Vedantism without the doctrine of karma, which is simply assumed as the undergirding truth, is impossible. The Vedantic doctrine, which insists that the goal of life is absorption or identity with the Absolute, cannot in any way be squared with the view of the Near Eastern
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religions, which claim that the destiny of the individual soul is retaining its identity in everlasting fellowship with God. A word must be added about the genuine respect Hindus have for other religions. This is evinced in the Vaishnavite doctrine of the avatars (incarnations). The claim is that Vishnu comes to earth whenever the need arises. The divine enters human existence in times of trouble. Accordingly, Hindus can then treat the great leaders of other religions as avatars of Vishnu. Buddha is one, Mahavira (the founder of Jainism) another, Nanak (the founder of Sikhism) another, and Jesus still another. (Mohammed is not regarded as an incarnation because Muslims would resent that as blasphemous.) (8) A view akin to the incorporative view is one we may call "the hidden unity" view. This position willingly admits that the eleven world religions are not the same, nor does one exist that is better and toward which all the lesser ones are tending. Instead, it claims that if we look deep enough and get below the surface differences, we will find a hidden unity among religions that encompasses all of them and that each is truly seeking to uncover. No less an astute thinker than Huston Smith has offered this view in his book Forgotten Truth. Smith speaks of a "primordial unity" deeper than all specific religions, which committed persons are seeking but which they have not fully grasped, or if once grasped, have forgotten in this complex world. No effort is made to submerge differences in the quest for the underlying unity. But I am led to ask critically whether all religions have in common some metaphysical ultimate without realizing it. Smith finds his clues not in Vedantism but in a form of Tibetan Buddhism. But then larger metaphysical questions emerge about the relation of the finite to the infinite. He holds a mystical view of that underlying, forgotten unity. The finite are swept into the infinite. Now, this view could be true, but it must be argued and defended on theoretical philosophical grounds. It has serious difficulties concerning such problems as human identity, evil, and the integrity of the Ultimate. Moreover, while we can see how philosophical Taoism might lead to this unity, to see that typical Shintoism has any such hidden unity is more difficult. The rigorous realistic pluralism of the Jains would similarly disallow such a unity, as would the Judeo-Christian-Muslim idea of God, which sees God as metaphysically distinct from his creatures. (9) Yet another position has something of an aesthetic appeal. Some literary and anthropological thinkers point out that while striking differences exist among living religions, we must not be concerned with the question of authenticity or truth. Religious beliefs are the emotional expressions of differing stories or myths that develop in one culture and another. We should not think of myths as being true or false but instead as serving some emotional, social, historical, or psychological function or purpose. Just as we regard the stories about the gods in ancient Greece and Rome as myths, so today we should recognize the existence of Hindu myths, Christian myths, and Taoist myths. They grow up in a culture and serve fundamental and needful social
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purpose in promoting group unity, preserving a nation's past, and perhaps providing a rallying point for social unity. Another aspect of this approach to various religious claims is that religious myths are like stories told to children. They serve useful goals that enable us more readily to cope with daily routines that might in themselves be unbearable if we did not have the myths to help us cope with troubles, perplexities, and even joys. The question of truth is irrelevant here, just as the question of truth does not need to be considered when playing a game. Accordingly, each society or group has its religious myths, which play a vital role in the ongoing progress, identity, and social health of a group. This approach has a certain "wise" ring about it. It is overarching, admits differences, but does not become involved in settling anything. At its worst it is intellectually patronizing. It offers a formula for appreciating the wide-ranging differences among peoples, but like some abstract philosophical arguments, it is out of touch with living human beings and their needs, interests, claims, and ideas. Furthermore, it presupposes a view of the nature of truth and philosophy that is at least questionable if not thoroughly unsound. If the claims of earnest religious thinkers are to be subsumed under the rubric "myth," may we not ask whether the mythic explanation of religion is not itself another kind of myth, in this case, a myth introduced to overcome the anguish of some hard, direct thinking? Except for a handful of Christians and Jews, few philosophers among the world religions would be prepared to say that the beliefs they have chosen and focused on, and perhaps even dedicated their lives to, have the status t>f mere myths, mere devices to bring about comfort and social peace or to assuage normal fears and anxieties—forms of therapy, perhaps. Yet, to-define a myth is difficult. No Buddhist would regard the teachings of their Lord as myths. No Muslim would consider the life and message of Mohammed as myths, nor would Jains regard their ethical commitment to ahimsa as the group expression of a socially useful emotion. Indeed, we find thoughtful spokespersons for the great religions distinguishing within the confines of their own religions, myths and events or beliefs they regard as authentic or true. Whether any contemporary Shinto thinker would argue that the islands of Japan actually came from the drippings of spears as they were lifted out of the ocean's brine by Izanagi and Izanami in prehistory is doubtful. That is a pleasant legend making no claim to literal truth, but it may present an emphasis on the divine origin of things. And while we might say that some myths have grown up about the boyhood of Jesus, to say to a Christian that the Crucifixion and Resurrection are myths, or to a Jew that the Passover experience is nothing more than a myth told to unite people into a nation would be repugnant. I will consider the question of factual claims and authenticity in Chapter Three. But any effort to view the major teachings of the world religions simply as myths seems as wrongheaded and inconsiderate as it is glib and simplistic.
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(10) One other possible attitude remains. Since to evaluate- or decide religious questions on rational grounds is impossible, the only thing left to do is to gamble that a religion is true in hopes that if it is, we will receive benefits. This idea was suggested by the distinguished mathematician and sometime philosopher Blaise Pascal. Reason, he asserted, cannot provide adequate religious answers. "The heart has its reasons which reason does not know."3 Thus, when choosing a faith, all we can do is wager.4 I have nothing to lose by gambling on Christianity, for if it turns out to be true, I shall reap benefits if I have adopted it. Should it be true and I had not chosen it, I stand to lose everything, perhaps be condemned. Whereas if I have chosen it and it does not turn out to be true, I shall lose nothing. Pascal writes: "I would have far more fear of being mistaken, and finding that the Christian religion was true, than of not being mistaken in believing it true."5 He puts the wager more directly: Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then Without hesitation that He is . . . But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite . . . And thus, when one is forced to play he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness. . . 6 This alternative to reason has an initially pleasing charm and psychological appeal. But a little reflection indicates serious drawbacks. For one thing, some religions promise more than others. Some involve a long-term punishment to unbelievers, while others guarantee immediate eternal salvation. Some require repeated reincarnations in order to attain the highest bliss. When we wager in a horse race, we pick the horse most likely to win. But Pascal's wager says that we have no way of deciding which faith is more likely. He thinks only of Roman Catholic Christianity. We must make a leap in the dark and hope it is the right choice. This is a frustration of rationality, though it still has an appeal among those inclined toward religious existentialism. And like that view, Pascal's idea of what reason is and what it can do is limited. He views it only as deductive rather than as synoptic. In conclusion, note that we apparently cannot use any shortcut nonrational method to solve the problems of religious diversity. We must wrestle with the competing claims and come to some conclusions about their respective validity on the basis of our best thought, and that means on a rational basis. And in evaluating the variety of religious claims, we need to dig behind to the underlying philosophical principles that are often obscured in ordinary religious talk and experience.
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RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, REASON, AND TRUTH 2. What Do We Mean by the Use of Reason in Religious Claims?
In the face of diverse and often competing religious claims, we may now ponder the character of reason and its place in adjudicating those claims. While reason has different emphases and aspects, philosophers will agree that it is not only the primary self-correcting tool of the mind but the very essence of what being fully human means. Reason involves the willingness to listen to alternatives, to weigh their merits, to initiate proposals, to formulate hypotheses, to test them, and to seek truth wherever it leads. Reason may be excluded from no precincts of experience. But logical thinking alone is never a substitute for experience. It cannot deny the differences, yet it must point out that even in the reporting of evidence, interpretive, nonrational factors seep in. This is especially so in evaluating the claims of sincere religious believers. The very data reported are mingled with emotions and ideas that can obscure or prejudice the discussion itself. Thus, if we followed a vagrant impulse to do something naughty, we might say: "The Devil made me do it." Remarkable coincidences may be interpreted as instances of divine Providence. Aberrations of eyesight may be taken as visions or theophanies. I am not saying that such interpretations are necessarily erroneous, but reason requires us to detect the factors at work and judge them. Clearly, in practice reason is akin to the methods of the scientist, but we may not identify rationality with science for reason must stand in judgment over science itself, recognize its frailties, variations, and limitations, as well as applaud its worth. The impressive successes of science in the past century have seduced a number of philosophers into thinking that rationality means science and little more. Accordingly, they maintain that experiences or data that cannot be measured, tested, or experimented with are not worth regarding with serious intent. This remarkably simplistic view rules out any sympathetic consideration of religious phenomena and often results in the blanket identification of religion with superstition. We need to be aware that some philosophic pronouncements about religion are merely results of this recent circumscribed view of reason. It often shields the questionable metaphysics of scientific realism. At its worst, full-blooded allegiance to the methods of science becomes itself a creed.7 Note that the value of science cannot be established scientifically. But reason can elucidate its value for humanity and judge the truth claims of the scientist. Reason alone can tell us when the methods of the scientist apply and when they do not. Philosophers of religion have no quarrel with those who study religion scientifically—the historian, the psychologist, or the sociologist. Moreover, we cannot study religion philosophically without giving attention to the findings of skilled scientists. But when scientists make value judgments about the larger questions of reality and truth—about soul, freedom, and God— we must ask what philosophical grounds they have and we must inquire whether or not some uncriticized or hidden world-view is being taken for
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granted. We may not, for example, be attracted personally to the religious belief in miracles, but should a scientist tell us that no miracles ever happened or could happen, we must pause to examine the metaphysical assumptions behind these assertions. Science alone cannot decide such issues in advance of examination by critical reason. (1) When people think of reason, they often first associate it with deduction—with drawing necessary logical conclusions from premises or assumptions. This sort of reason is like mathematics, especially geometry. The seventeenth-century philosopher Benedict Spinoza thought a whole philosophical system could develop if the geometrical method was used. In his Ethics., we see a brilliant system of philosophy worked out based on selfevident axioms, clear definitions, postulates, theorems, and the propositions that follow from them with apparent logical necessity. He and others thought that if philosophy was to be worth the trouble it ought to result in the kind of certainty achievable in mathematics. From simple deductive principles we might learn a few things about religious assertions-. For example, we cannot logically switch around statements and claim automatic validity. If I say that all rabbits have long ears, I am not entitled to conclude that all long-eared creatures are rabbits. If I claim that all sin will result in suffering, I cannot conclude that any form ofsuffering I see must necessarily be a result of sin. That is illogical conversion. Nor may I assert only two sides to a question when I am sure that those two sides are exact logical contradictions, not mere contraries. For most questions yield far more than two sides. Now, if I say, as some religious leaders have, that you are either for me or against me, have I not overlooked the possibility that a person may not even know what he or she is supposed to be for or against? Is someone against the religion of Emmanuel Swedenborg if not for it? Most people have not even heard of that brilliant eighteenth-century innovator. But we cannot force the richness and complexities of human experience into a strictly deductive system. We can deduce that an ultimate substance, which by definition cannot be understood by anything less than itself, must of necessity be its own cause. But what about human goodwill overcoming sullenness? Where in a deductive scheme may we find a logical place for tears, pygmies, earthquakes, a beautiful lake, or multiple sclerosis? Reason seen exclusively as deductive is removed from human life and its exigencies just as pure mathematics is. Deductivism can help us avoid contradictions, sloppy thinking, and inconsistencies, but it cannot deal with the full sweep of human experience. (2) Others see reason as a type of analysis that aims at understanding something by examining the parts or elements constituting it. When we have isolated the factors that compose some apparent unity, we may then claim to have provided a rational grasp of it. This emphasis of reason has some firm historical support, as does the stress on deduction. And rational analysis is self-evidently useful in examining religious claims. David Hume, the great-
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grandfather of a bevy of contemporary analytical thinkers, challenged the traditional notions of cause, substance, and the self, showing that none of these terms refer to anything factual or real. "Cause" may be a useful word in discourse, but we cannot detect causes in sense-experience. Nor do any generalized substances exist as such, neither as material nor as spiritual. The so-called "soul" is thus a fixation. And an analysis of what we call the self indicates that selves are nothing more than collections or "bundles" of perception. More recent analysts, building on Hume, have viewed reason as the analysis of language, maintaining that many traditional philosophical problems and especially religious issues are dissolved if we clarify linguistic usage and show the structure of concepts analytically. More will be said on this in Chapter Eleven. Some have gone so far as to say that language analysis is a type of therapy whose only task is to clarify ordinary language. This is a formidable view and is usually pervasive in contemporary Anglo-American thought, though not elsewhere. Analysts do not usually offer reasons for defending the value of their approach, suggesting that it is intuitively the only sound type of reasoning. (3) A broader view of reason leads us to inquire further into the meaning of analysis, to evaluate critically its subtleties, and to ask not only whether real understanding of human problems comes from this approach, but also how that approach may be justified. Immanuel Kant offered a reply to the Humean method of asking for its presuppositions—what factors were logically required to make analysis successful and meaningful? If we say the human self is nothing more than a series of sensations associated in several ways, how can that conclusion be reached without first being a unified self who then does the analyzing? In order to present an argument showing that no self exists, the one so arguing must first be such a self. Reason thus points us away from mere analysis. Furthermore, reason suggests that we do not adequately understand a work of art, social justice, an act of human kindness, or a saint's prayer merely by picking out the elements constituting them or by analyzing the language used in discussing them. If it is to provide adequacy of understanding and approach large truth, reason must make use of analysis but never be limited to it exclusively. Socrates was a brilliant analyst, but he also used deduction and he held a view of reason that enabled it to operate productively in the thick of human life. The task of a philosopher is to see life steadily and holistically, to see not just the parts but also how the parts are interrelated and connected. Socrates' famous pupil Plato remarked that the philosopher is a synoptic person, someone who pulls things together in order to understand them. Thereby do we achieve wisdom. Philosophy involves systematic thinking and careful structuring; yet, it also requires an openness to new ideas and discoveries. We guard against contradiction and inconsistency and strive for coherence, which is more than consistency.
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Accordingly, with this broader view of reason in mind, we may ask ourselves such questions as the following: Have I paid attention to all the relevant facts? Can I propose a reasonable hypothesis to account for them? Have I been logically consistent? Have I considered the negative evidence? What other reasonable possibilities exist? Is one of them more probable than another? Can it be justified by both evidence and argument? What are the logical implications of this view? Do any practical considerations render it doubtful? Can I know that alternative views are less able to cope with the difficulties than the view I tentatively favor? Have I relied unduly on tradition or authority? Have I overlooked any hidden assumptions? Does my hypothesis or belief allow room for alterations should new evidence be put forward? Is my hypothesis in harmony with relevant scientific findings? Have I missed any presuppositions? Is my belief falsifiable? Is my "verdict" or conclusion beyond any reasonable doubt? Can I actually accept it myself, in spite of weaknesses that I readily acknowledge? Does my hypothesis or conclusion justify me in making an actual decision or even a life commitment? The richer view of reason implied by these questions is not so unfamiliar as it might seem. Many practical decisions by thoughtful people on matters of ethics, politics, medicine, justice, education, and culture are reached not by insisting on deductive certainty or analytic clarity but by seeking reasonableness. Jury decisions in courtrooms are made on the basis of inherent reasonableness. Judgments about medical ethics are not deductively certain but they must be made and they can be justified rationally. We cannot prove with absolute certainty that the sandwich we choose in a fast-food restaurant will not contain poison. But to worry over such matters is as unreasonable as to wonder whether the sun will rise tomorrow. We are content in most matters to trust our best rational thought, though we know we do not have absolute logical certitude. Strictly speaking, we may help our understanding of the use of reason if we think of it as trying to solve a problem as best we can instead of as establishing a final solution. Those who seek and demand full certainty on religion or other matters will probably not be willing to adopt the broad view of reason I am advocating here. Reasonable adequacy, not fixed finality, may be another way of indicating this approach. 3. More on Reason and Religion I have suggested a broader view of reason offered by some thinkers as a proper way of approaching religious problems and diversity philosophically. I need next to summarize other developed views of the relation of reason to religion. (1) We are already aware that sincere believers prefer not to use reason because they feel it has no place and would be destructive of faith. Some Christians, for example, take to heart the verse from Paul's letter to the Colossians: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of me, after the rudiments of the world and not after
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Christ" (Col. 2:8). Both theologians and philosophers have defended that stance with varying degrees of sophistication. They claim that religious belief is sacred, exclusive, and above reason. To examine beliefs and commitments by reason destroys those beliefs. A truly religious person cannot also be philosophical. Philosophical reason should be avoided. At worst it is sinful. Anti-rationalism of this sort is most commonly found among Protestant Christians. Luther viewed reason as a whore, but anti-rationalism is present in forms of Judaism and Islam too. It is unheard of in the long Buddhist tradition and equally foreign to Confucianism. It is an outlook associated with what is called Fundamentalism, but not all Fundamentalists are against the use of reason. Unfortunately, opposition to the use of reason in religion also carries over to science. Science is seen as destructive in genuine religion too (although scientific findings in medicine might be acceptable). In the United States, religious groups develop in their own schools, colleges, and graduate schools, which devotees and their children are urged to attend so they may not have the taint of reason or science. In such educational practices, we find strong opposition to Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory as well as the branding of opposing philosophical views as corrupt and of other religions as heathen. If philosophy is studied at all in such situations, it is seen either as a weak apologetic tool or as a collection of errors that should be vigorously shunned lest the faith be lost. This attitude is unheard of in the Buddhist tradition and is equally foreign to Confucianism and much of Hinduism. Note that those who ridicule the use of reason and urge some pure faith in its stead are a primary source of the divisiveness and even nastiness that goes on among believers of different branches. A history of religions without the use of reason is really a history of a shambles, of fights, heresy trials, wars, and hatreds. Often more kindness and human sympathy is to be found in the irreligious who may trust reason than in those who oppose it. That the degree of fanaticism found in religious believers is increased the more that reason is ridiculed is almost an axiom. No historical basis exists for this fact. It is an excrescence. But another striking iheptness is found in this anti-rational approach. Those who oppose reason as a criterion or measuring stick to evaluate a belief often reintroduce reason by asking us to believe one of their views on the basis of evidence or reported experiences. To base the truth of Christianity, for instance, on some report of a miracle or on fulfilled prophecy is rationalistic. To offer any basis for a belief is to offer an argument, and when this is done the anti-rational attitude has defeated itself. Except for political fascism or mere superstitious primitivism, religious anti-rationalism has been nothing more than a blight if not a disease in some human beings. (2) A second view of the relation of reason to religion suggests that reason is a useful and necessary tool in the exposition and clarification of a
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faith once the faith has been adopted. Accordingly, reason and thought function after a commitment has been made. In more figurative language, we make a leap of faith and then find reason of great use in clarifying what the leap means. Reason can never on its own evaluate the truth of religious hypotheses; it can be used only to justify the faith after it has been accepted. We can, then, be religious and philosophical, but we must be religious first. Commitment must occur before thought because human reason alone is tainted. This approach has its historical roots in Saint Augustine and Saint Anselm and is characteristic of the view known today as Neo-Protestantism or Neo-Orthodoxy. It is a view of reason out of harmony with that of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The most dramatic and literary statement of the view is found in the thought of Paul Tillich, who went so far as to suggest that before reason is enlightened by faith it is blind and corrupt. Once a faith is adopted, the eyes of reason are opened and reason can then be a worthwhile tool. Tillich writes: Reason stands, like everything in man, under the bondage of estrangement. There is no part of man that is excepted from the universal destiny of sin. For the cognitive function of man's spiritual life this means that reason is blinded and has become unable to recognize God. The eyes of reason must be opened by the revelatory presence of the Divine Spirit in the human spirit. Only when this happens can truth be received by human reason.8 Detached observation and analysis of hypotheses are impossible. A more subdued and recent formulation of this view has been voiced by Nicholas Wolterstorff: "The Christian scholar ought to allow the belief-content of his authentic Christian commitment to function as control within his devising and weighing of theories."9 To illustrate, Wolterstorff notes that we ought to reject Freudian and behaviorist theories and develop theories "that are consistent with the belief content of our authentic commitment."10 This view that reason is useful only after we have made a faith commitment has its basis in a questionable theological assertion about the nature of humanity. How do we arrive at the conclusion that human beings are in bondage until enlightened by faith? Were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle unable to arrive at important truths by reason because they were estranged from God? This view has had some marked appeal, especially since the end of World War I, which was seen as a breakdown of human rationality, when it was really a clash between powers wanting to control markets and colonies. The view had a resurgence after World War II and reflects a mood of despair. By insisting that commitment must come before rational thought, it opens itself to all sorts of logical befuddlement. To which set of beliefs should I commit myself? Do I accept Vedantic Hinduism and then employ reason to clarify it, or do I accept a
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form of Lutheranism and then apply reason?. This approach is virtually meaningless for a Confucian or Buddhist, though it might find some response in Islam. Its primary difficulty lies in its failure to recognize that we can use reason to find a commitment or change a commitment. Moreover, reason can enhance a commitment. No sharp sundering of the rational from the volitional is needed. As a matter of psychological fact, no such thing exists. We can, however, alternate between periods of commitment and reflectfbn. We need not begin with a faith and only then begin to use rational reflection. The view does not work in other areas of life either. (3) A third view 'admits that religious belief is unique and not fully dependent on philosophy but can be aided by philosophy. Indeed, reason can bring us to the point where we might be led into a religious belief. A person without any religious beliefs, such as belief in God, is sound and is acceptable on general grounds. But the details of doctrines will not be discoverable or deducible by reason. They will come from tradition, revelation, and possibly church authority, perhaps as a result of God's grace. Furthermore, while some of the theological doctrines cannot be reached by rational means, reason is nevertheless useful when considering criticisms of those doctrines. While we cannot prove strictly that particular miraculous claims are authentic or valid, we can evaluate criticisms of those miraculous claims by the use of reason. Reason, in this view, may lead to a faith, but the details or body of religious knowledge has an additional source, which is not anti-rational but perhaps nonrational. This view has a grand history. It is in essence the view of Aquinas and his followers. Reason is never ridiculed or set aside. Its limits are defined and yet even those are discussible. One reason for the persistent strength of Roman Catholicism and its allies is perhaps because it has always respected human reason and trusts it. Some truths may be above reason, but reason and the use of reason are never seen as sinful or presumptuous. Nor must we have faith first, as view two says. In its most extreme form, this view could yield what is known as the double-truth theory. Thinkers such as Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, who both respected and used reason in their philosophical excursuses, tended to hold that in matters of religion w'e are dealing with a different kind of truth. Thus, the double-truth theory emerges! Consequently, what would be theologically true could be philosophically false. Hobbes was able to be a part of the Church of England while at the same time fostering a totally materialistic metaphysics. This schizophrenic view of how the mind finds truth would be repugnant to Aquinas, but we may wonder exactly why reason must be resisted at some points and not be trusted regarding, for example, the validity of the sacraments. (Spinoza, by the way, said that theological truth is useful, since it aids piety and obedience, but is not a source of truth as is philosophy.) (4) A fourth distinguishable view notes that religious belief is a basic and apparently unique trait of nonanimal experience and as such can be examined
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and interpreted by the use of the instrument of reason. Such examination does not necessarily hurt the purity, uniqueness, or sacredness of that experience. We can be both religious and philosophical. We can be dedicated or we can pause and reflect on the grounds of that dedication. The pause does not hurt the dedication, any more than a conductor's analysis of a musical score hurts the pure devotion to music. Reason, then, is viewed as the arbiter in all of the claims that are offered as candidates for truth. This view is widespread in the history of philosophy, being found in thinkers who represent differing religious traditions. The view respects science but it does not hold that all explanation must be scientific or that the canons of scientific measurement are final. Even contemporary analysts take this view, but they concentrate on epistemology alone and the nature of the arguments philosophers use instead of weighing the meaning and possible truth claims religious believers make. Some would say that the view attempts too much, which is what the previous three views would say. Other critics would claim that religious experience is sui generis, as in the example of the mystic who sees personal experiences as above reason, not as antagonistic to it. The Hindu mystic who would attain samadhi sees philosophy as highly useful, but the level of experience achieved cannot be looked at rationally. (However, the interpretation of samadhi is a rational matter, given differences between advaitic, dvaitic and vishishtadvaitic Vedanta.) The, view treats the subject of philosophy of religion as analogous to research in the sciences. Scientists work at their tasks without significant regard for the practical value of their findings. They are temporarily detached, yet their findings often have profound significance for practical life. Philosophy of religion tries to approximate this, to achieve, for a time, practical detachment and to examine the various claims of religious experience as a whole. If we cannot achieve a measure of rational detachment in matters religious, does continuing the study have any point? Indeed, is truth possible? One of the serious drawbacks of this view is that it willingly admits a risk—the risk that we might find our pet religious views false. Religion does not like theoretical tentativeness. But we can be almost psychologically certain and yet leave open the doors for investigation.
Three FACTUAL CLAIMS The origins of each of the major religions of the world are all but smothered in mystery. Details are difficult to discover. But manifestly none of them began with creeds consisting of sets of philosophical propositions. The past reveals challenging personalities, moving experiences, striking events, and fairly straightforward teachings, followed shortly by some elementary organization. Systems of belief, interpretations, institutional patterns, divisions, and philosophical arguments always came afterward. But in contemporary discussion, the theories, beliefs, and arguments primarily interest philosophers, instead of the authentication of historical events. Nevertheless, some religious people feel that without accepting specific historical claims as authentic, both the dynamic and the validity of their traditions will disintegrate. Some earnest devotees are bothered by such questions, particularly as they concern claims to the abnormal or supernatural or apparently nonscientific. Accordingly, we need to examine the question of how we may test the authenticity of historical claims, noticing along the way that while some religions seem to require acceptance of specific historical events, others clearly do not. We may safely say that the religions of the Near East—Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—have a genuine and strong interest in specific past occurrences while those of the Far East do not. Although. Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism have distinct personages as their founders, as does Confucianism (and perhaps Taoism), the strength, validity, and value of those religions do not rest on believing that particular events of crucial importance happened in the lives of their founders. Apart from distinct sects within them, Hinduism and Shintoism have no interest in biographies, simply because no known personalities founded them. While true that Buddhists figure their calendar from the date of Siddhartha Gautama's birth, a person can be a loyal Buddhist without affirming that any striking events in Lord Buddha's life changed history or altered the relations between human beings and the Ultimate.* However, Judaism, Christianity, and. Islam are a different matter. Though Zoroastrianism is a Near Eastern religion and takes history seriously, the faith itself does not rest on any particular deed in the life of its founder. If we suggested that the Passover did not occur in Judaism, that the Resurrection of Jesus Christ did not take place in Christianity, and that the Hegira did not occur in Mohammed's life, many devotees of those religions would feel that their faith was meaningless and no longer viable. In each of those religions, particular historic events assume major importance (and not only those mentioned). In Judaism, the Exodus and the delivery of the Ten Commandments; in Christianity, Pentecost and the Ascension; and in Islam, Mohammed's trip to Mecca are accepted in some sense as authentic
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and all are commemorated, some with national holidays. Note too that some sects or divisions in, or religions affiliated with these three make additional claims about sect founders, new Scriptures, innovators, striking events, and so on, the denial of which apparently renders the particular faith impotent and otiose. Also, some sects of Hinduism and Shintoism as well as Buddhism require the acceptance of a striking historical personage's acts in miracles as their base. The Shiite division of Islam, which is further divided into denominations, depends upon the acceptance and belief that one or another of the sons of Hussain (offspring of Mohammed's daughtej Fatima) as well as the manner of that leader's death, has grand historic import. The Bahai faith, now clearly distinct from Islam, takes its rise in the historic work of Bahaullah and his corrective teachings. If these teachings are doubted, the unique values of Bahai insight might not be lost but the traditional religion would probably suffer lack of motivation. Similarly, the founding of the Mormons (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) depends wholly upon believing in the discovery of Joseph Smith who, in 1807, unearthed some golden tablets near Palmyra, New York, which contain additional revelations for both the Judaic and Christian traditions. Other examples within the Christian tradition alone include the revelations to Mary Baker Eddy and her Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, and the contemporary assertions of Sun Myung Moon, founder of the Unification Church. A book in the philosophy of religion seems hardly the place to go into the detailed questions involved in the history of religions, but we must face directly the question of historic authenticity because it is a problem for many serious inquirers and thoughtful believers who would like to know whether what they have been taught is true. They are not sophisticated enough to talk about myths or symbols or literary types. They just want to know if what purportedly happened really did take place or not. They are sure that the Battle of Waterloo happened in 1815. Can they be as sure of the Passover in the thirteenth century B.C., or the Resurrection over 1,990 years ago? And some would like to know whether Joseph Smith really found those golden tablets written by the Angel Moroni (and whether such an angel existed). Apparently, in wondering about whether an event as reported by some religion actually occurred, we may make use of the ordinary methods employed by scientific historians. 1. Devices Used by Regular Historians to Check and Discover Facts Historians use several ways to get their information and verify their claims. (1) Eyewitness reports. If the historian is present, he or she simply reports what they see or take as authentic, namely, the direct report of someone else who was on the scene. Except for some contemporary sects of differing religions whose founders lived in the late nineteenth century or the first three quarters of the twentieth century, no reports of people who have actually seen
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events is likely or possible. Some of the miraculous claims of the Indian religious leader Sai Baba have been witnessed by people in the 1970s. Moreover, direct accounts of religious sects such as Mahatma Gandhi's have been known directly. This is not much of a source for the great major religions. (2) But if we do not have direct eyewitness reports any longer, we do have long streams of oral reports and written records and documents for each of the major religions. Oral reports may become modified through the years, so we tend to regard written documents and records more highly. Sometimes written records need not only diligent translation but also decoding and deciphering. This eventuates in comparing texts and manuscripts and can become a scientific activity. We try also to corroborate the oral and the written reports in coming to an assessment of the facts. Each religion has a band of scholars who work over the texts, yielding high excitement when some new texts are discovered, such as the famous Dead Sea Scrolls. (3) In addition to various written records, striking archaeological findings of various sorts exist. And the digging is still going on. Not only do archaeologists find artifacts and remnants of older civilizations, but they sometimes find portions of buildings, and ancient markings, glyphs, and hieroglyphs. Digs in the Near East have supported written records in the Hebrew Scriptures. Remnants of the walls of Jericho have been found, and inscriptions on stone have helped establish the path of the Israelites out of Egypt. The early origins of Hinduism have been unearthed in places such as Mohanjo-Daro or Harappa. One of the major discoveries was the famed Ashokan column verifying the sermon of Buddha at Sarnath (near Varanasi). Note how eagerly believers seek to show actual evidence of founders or events in the present. Thus, the Panja Sahib temple has an impression of Guru Nanak's palm in stone. An alleged tooth of the Buddha is housed in a special casket in Kandy, Sri Lanka, in the Temple of the Tooth. Hairs from Mohammed's beard are in Pakistan at Rawalpindi and in glass holders in the Topkapi museum in Istanbul. A footprint of Jesus is preserved at the small chapel of the Ascension in Jerusalem as well as a footprint in marble of Mohammed in the Delhi mosque, along with a slipper of the prophet. Such items are shown to the faithful from time to time to help make an actual link with a religious personage. The abuse of such "relics" by traveling monks of the church helped to trigger Martin Luther's revolt against Rome. A strong desire exists to show and establish actual physical links. Christians long to go to the Holy Land (as do Jews and Muslims), retrace the journey of Paul, and see the birthplace of Jesus. The time link has more a psychological than any possible authentic support; for example, the shroud of Turin has been independently shown not to have been a sheet covering Jesus' body in the tomb, though it is revered as such. (4) In recent years, sophisticated methods for dating some of the archaeological findings of scientists have been developed. This can be done by
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chemical analysis, especially the technique of carbon-14 dating, which helps verify claimed authenticity. (5) In a larger perspective, checking written records by working over the astronomical and geological data is possible. Just as eclipses, for example, can be predicted, so too can their past occurrences be computed: This is useful for the paleontologist who is concerned with the demise of dinosaurs as possibly due to a meteorite shower. It might also be of some use in checking other claims about births. At the Christmas season, for example, planetariums customarily have shows depicting the sky as it was in Israel at the reputed time of Jesus' birth. By the same token, acceptance of the Bethlehem birth narratives produces some problems astronomically, unless we wish to say that at the time a conjunction of planets occurred in the East seen by the Magi. Astronomical data also show clearly that for the sun to stand still during one of the Old Testament battles would have been utterly impossible. (We can wonder whether evidence of the Flood story is universal or whether geological findings regarding volcanoes and floods are equally universal.) (6) We may also draw deductions or at least reasonable inferences from the kind of data that are present. If we know about the town of Nazareth or about natural phenomena, we can see how some recorded events fit in even though we have no direct evidence. This sort of detective work is done by historians all the time, being sometimes useful in verifying the claims of religious people. For example, a cave in the Himalayas has a remarkable flow near the source of the Ganga. Devout Hindus regard it as a manifestation of the Lord Shiva, and today it is a pilgrimage spot. The fact is that such an ice formation exists and it is ages old. Whether it is a theophany or not might be a matter of faith, no less than the one in Lourdes, which is but two hundred years old. If the Shiva manifestation happened, perhaps the Lourdes manifestation did as well. But to accept the tower of Babel and the trip of Joseph, Mary, and Jesus to Egypt is unreasonable, for no corroborating evidence exists to support such a belief. (7) Other means of verifying reputed historical claims are not viable, though some have considered extrasensory methods. So far such claims have not amounted to much, even about the present, let alone efforts to contact deceased historians or those who were present at some scene of religious history. A few claims to theophanies exist in modern times, when a spiritual being became manifest to someone. This is the basis for the shrine at Lourdes, for example. Interestingly, such claimed direct visitations by religious personages are always linked to the culture where they occur. Hindu devotees do not see the Virgin Mary in Mysore, and French Christian children do not find Lakshmi. (8) Sometimes no reasons exist to doubt factual claims because even though we cannot verify them directly, we know that in principle they are verifiable, and indeed, might be verified some day through continued research.
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This has happened, and we need not doubt reported events that could lend themselves to verification. But must we not doubt those claims that could not be substantiated in principle by ordinary means available to historians? To see an alleged footprint of Jesus in stone at the church at the Mount of Olives, indicating the point of departure for Jesus' Ascension into Heaven, is small comfort. If a religious claim is of such a nature that it has no chance of being tested or verified in any ordinary way, we may reasonably either reject it or regard it as of minimal importance. (9) We may now go a step further and ask whether a reported claim of religious people, though unverifiable as such, is reasonably commensurate with all we know, violates no known principles, and does not fly in the face of all known procedures, that is, does not require the suspension of scientific credibility. As for the written records of the major religions, we do accept stories and reports as they come to us, because they fit into a reasonable pattern, even though this or that particular event cannot be verified. The stories about the kings in the Hebrew Scriptures cannot uniformly be validated, but usually no reason exists to disbelieve them. We accept them because they fit in with a whole complex. We might have trouble with the size of Goliath the Philistine as reported in 1 Samuel 17:23-54, but no reason exists to disbelieve the story of the shepherd boy David slaying him with a pebble from his slingshot. The reported age of some of the Hebrew patriarchs such as Methuselah and Enoch is no easier to accept than the alleged ages of some of the twenty-four Jain Tirthankaras, whose life spans lasted millions of years. Rishabha, the first Tirthankara, was 3,000 feet tall, while Mahavira, the apparent historic founder, was virtually of normal height and lived seventy-two years. In such cases, the exaggerations—while not to be taken literally—may suggest a deep-lying idea of religious value or ethnological meaning. Thus, ancient Hebrew names may represent the life span of a tribe rather than of an individual. And the extreme ages of the Jain leaders plus the equally long gaps between them, suggests that this religion, which opposes belief in an eternal God, is itself eternal. The point is that we do accept most ordinary narrative reports in religious histories even if we do not have full evidence. This is what all historians do. There is just no reason to doubt some of the stories. As historian Cecil Cadoux has written, "As to the difficulties and uncertainties of historical evidence, they form no justification for ignoring historical probabilities. . . . Our belief and conduct will both be wrong if we refuse to take into account the probabilities established by historical inquiry."1 Yet we often tend to depart from historical facts in the interests of devotion and edification. Reportedly, Alfred Loisy, for twenty years a Roman Catholic priest and New Testament scholar, admitted late in life that the only thing in the Apostle's Creed he could say with assurance was "suffered under Pontius Pilate." T H. Robinson, in referring to the interwoven narratives of the stories of Joseph as
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reported in the Book of Genesis remarks: "Differences in detail only add to the certainty of the main narrative." To mention reports of miracles found in Near Eastern religions may also be instructive. We may have difficulty accepting the so-called nature miracles Jesus reportedly performed, such as turning water into "wine or stopping turbulent winds, but reports about healing persons mentally or physically ill are not so baffling. However, when claims are made even today that a missing thumb was restored through Christian Science, we become understandably skeptical. (10) May we come to rely on extra-scientific (not necessarily antiscientific) modes of verification? C. J. Ducasse, not a theist, does this in Nature, Mind, and Death in discussing evidence for possible survival after death, such as ESP, mental telepathy, or reports from seances. We may even be so "scientific" that real evidence is not admitted. For example, a member of the French academy upon hearing Thomas Edison's recordings said they could not happen and were the "work of a ventriloquist." But most of the eleven major religions, to say nothing of the so-called preliterate religions, make claims about extraordinary things that baffle scientists and philosophers. Some of them are not amenable to checking by the ordinary techniques of the historian or social scientist. Since they are more closely linked to the actual history of peoples, religions of the Near East seem more concerned that the extraordinary claims be accepted, lest the religion lose its uniqueness and dynamic. While Buddhists, Hindus, and to some degree popular Taoists and Confucians have their quota of claims to extravagant occurrences, no one insists that all such claims be accepted as authentic by someone wishing to be an adherent of any of those traditions. But the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions are another matter. While many practicing Christians, Jews, and even Muslims may seriously doubt and even deny that particular miraculous reports are authentic, a high percentage of devotees in each tradition insist that we must accept as true any such event when it is recorded in holy Scriptures or tradition, no matter how minor it seems to be. At work here is the logic of the "all-or-none" principle. We have no right to doubt or challenge those events that are reported in "revealed" Scriptures because to do so is, in effect, to deny that they are revealed. If we accept any of the Koran reports, we must accept all of them. To question a part is to deny the whole. I mention this here because it is a view that has a wide following in North America and it is the basis of much current religious division. On one extreme, we find Christians who insist on an "inerrant Bible" and on the other extreme, we find equally devout Christians who willingly assent to the age-old major doctrines, even creeds of their faiths, but who do not feel that the Bible is a textbook of science or that every event there recorded must be accepted as absolutely accurate. Significant in this connection is the recognition that every religious believer makes distinctions about extraordinary claims simply because he or
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she decides to accept those in other traditions. Some Christians will accept all the factual claims in the Hebrew Scriptures as authentic, even those that aver that a donkey spoke or an axe swam, to say nothing of the story of Noah's ark. But Jews will not accept the miraculous claims in the New Testament. Muslims willingly accept stories in the Old Testament as authentic and they regard some events in the New Testament as true, but they offer corrected versions of other claims to what seem to be extravagant events. Neither a Jew nor a Christian will accept such claims as valid. Those who insist on the all-or-none principle do admit that a few of the remarkable claims made are not as important as others even if they must be taken as authentic. They will not deny the story that tells us about the burial of Elisha. When Elisha's body was placed in a grave, it came in touch with previously interred bones, which sprang into life again upon said contact. But they will insist that the miracles of Jesus, the raising of Lazarus, and the turning of water into wine, for example, are much more important. And they will accept the preposterous story that Mary and Joseph took their infant son to Egypt to escape the murderous wrath of jealous Herod. Furthermore, those who take the all-or-none principle will reject out of hand stories about their religious heroes that appear in ancient writings that are not part of the canon of holy Scriptures. No Christian will accept the stories told of the child Jesus in writings known as the pseudepigrapha or the spurious gospels of Peter. And they will treat as ordinary history those reports in the Apocrypha, in spite of their long tradition. And they will surely reject as authentic claims to miracles made in other world religions, such as Hinduism. For example, one story reports that once in the carpentry shop in Nazareth, Joseph cut a board too short, whereupon the child Jesus used his powers to lengthen it. Another time the young child waved his hand over some clay pigeons he and his chums had fashioned and they forthwith came to life and flew away. Those insisting on total scriptural authority and accuracy will regularly distinguish those things that are figurative from those that are literal, but here we can find disagreements too. What is passing strange is that some literalists insist that we must accept miracle stories without question, while at the same time holding that particular ethical precepts that are unmistakable in their expression are to be ignored or not heeded. Thus, while insisting that Jesus turned water into wine at the marriage feast at Cana, they will not require that we follow Jesus' explicit injunction not to take oaths. Nor will they insist on foot-washing. On what basis are such decisions reached? Incidentally, those who do persistently refrain from swearing to the truth, following Jesus' teaching, do not make much bother over specific miracles. To try to work out the principles at work when such distinctions are made is instructive. They are more like psychological hang-ups than rationally thought out principles. Furthermore, all major branches and sects in the Christian tradition reject and even denounce assertions made by fairly recent efforts to "improve" their
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faith. They do not accept the Mormon view that Jesus traveled to North America, nor the Neo-Shin claim that Jesus did not die on the cross but instead traversed Asia and died in northern Japan. This strange view is voiced by John B. Noss in Man's Religions.3 And they speak with one voice against the novel claims of Sun Myung Moon and his Unification Church. Moon claims to be a new Son of God, a new Messiah, while defending his right to freedom of worship. 2. Extraordinary Factual Claims CruciaLto Faith So far I have been discussing factual claims that may be regarded as minor. We have even seen different attitudes about these among various devotees. Next, I ask about those claims that are at once extraordinary and also deemed crucial to a religion. The Jewish nation and the Jewish religion are based on an historical event celebrated every year in Jewish homes, namely, the Passover. The central claim of Christians is the Resurrection of Jesus from the dead. Both of these claims refer to events outside of the ordinary course of human life and they both apparently entail miracles. A person cannot really be a Jew if he or she rejects the Passover story. We may doubt the age of Methuselah, the Noah's ark story, and even the story of Adam and Eve; but we may not doubt that the Passover occurred and be regarded as a member of the Jewish religion. Yet the Passover entails a host of claims to miracles: the Angel of Death who passed over the homes of the Jews and killed the first-born sons of Egyptians instead, the parting of the Red Sea, the presentation of the Ten Commandments to Moses, and so forth. Clearly, Jesus accepted these events as authentic. On the night before he was crucified, he celebrated the Passover with his disciples. In the case of Christianity, we may doubt the authenticity of Nativity stories, some of the miracles, and even possibly the Virgin Birth, but if we doubt the Resurrection in any sense we are, strictly speaking, not to be classed as a traditional Christian, for this has been the one incontrovertible emphasis through the years. With the exception of Islam, and possibly the most orthodox forms of Shinto, Orthodox Shintoists believe the current emperor is divine, a descendent of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu through the first emperor Jurniso Tenon, or they at least believed this apparently until 1946 when emperor Hirohito resumed his duties. No other world religion insists that we must believe that specific events happened in human history. They have other demands that may be difficult to accept, but no Hindu is required to believe that the Ganga flowed from the head of Lord Shiva, and Buddhists do not have to believe that the funeral pyre of Gautama gave off a jasmine fragrance. Nor must Confucians or Taoists believe special things about their founders as long as they respect their teachings. Zoroastrians and Jains have grand traditions and relate stories about their heroes and saints, but none are crucial to the faith. The Sikh faith requires
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acceptance of particular precepts based on events in the life of the last human Guru, Teg Bahadur, but these are not extraordinary and a person can be a devout Sikh without accepting some of the miraculous claims attributed to Guru Nanak. Observe that those who insist on holding to the factuality of some fundamental historical claims in their own religion reject the equally extraordinary claims in other religions. While Christians, who insist on the historicity of the Resurrection (in some sense), might also accept the authenticity of the Passover, Jews at once reject out of hand the Resurrection stories. Christians reject the apparent extravagant claims of the Muslim and Shintoist, and they discount and disown the stories about Joseph Smith, whose Book of Mormon was based on the golden tablets he discovered in 1833. But on what basis could we reject the extraordinary claims of other religions while insisting on belief in extraordinary claims in our own religion? We may approach this intriguing question by noticing that extraordinary claims are still being made today in the name of various religions. If we examine what reasons are given for rejecting the claims of current religions that make extravagant claims, we might find a clue as to why devout believers in one religion reject the similar claims of another. I confine the discussion to claims made in connection with the major religions. I cannot cope with the reports issuing from primitive witch-doctors and shamans (see Bhagwan Rajneesh, for example). The kind of claims noticed today often have much to do with physical healing. On television screens across North America, we can watch programs during which people with long-term disease are claimed to be instantaneously and miraculously healed. In India, some of the popular leaders such as Sai Baba not only perform healing miracles before large groups but also seem able at will and as a blessing to the assembled multitude to provide baskets of sweets that are reputedly from Lord Krishna. In France, as many as ten thousand people a day visit the famous shrine at Lourdes, either to benefit from miraculous cures or to observe others so benefiting. Some contemporary minor sects have claimed "soul travel" and "out-of-body" experiences. Others assert they have witnessed intricate surgery performed with fingers alone. A large literature surrounds a remarkable person, Edgar Cayce, who is said to have had, under Christian auspices, remarkable powers of both diagnosis and healing. Some practice modern-day witchcraft or perform apparent "miracles" with physical objects, claiming power from extra-planetary sources. Astrology has a vise-like grip on India, and scarcely a newspaper in North America does not print a daily astrological chart. Palmistry and Numerology are still found in today's world. In addition, both the Anglican Church and the Roman Catholic Church have explicit rituals for exorcising demons. Priests in popular Taoism use firecrackers to chase demons away; Anglican priests use incantation. Here, the more serious question is whether any such demons even exist.
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Such reports and events—and their number is not decreasing—are readily cast aside by scientists and other intellectuals and perhaps by commonsense smiles. Note that persons who regard themselves as practicing Hindus or Christians will reject as both outlandish and spurious some of the claims offered under the aegis of their own religious tradition. What is the implicit reasoning involved in such rejection? If we can show the grounds why some loyal contemporary believers reject current extravagant claims, will we acquire insights as to how we might judge rightly the crucial and extravagant claims of the past on which some major faiths rest their cases? Notice that historically both Judaism and Christianity have opposed occultism. Though he wavered, King Solomon wanted the witches chased out of his land. Saint Paul railed against sorcerers, magicians, and soothsayers and was outspoken in his opposition to astrologers, but the New Testament contains reports of odd miracles nevertheless. Hindus accept astrology despite the work of brilliant Indian astrophysicists. Note, however, that the claims of nationalistic patriotism are accepted as quickly as religious claims, even though the evidence goes against the claims. Claims about the justice of our own nation and an unwillingness to recognize outright lies on the part of government leaders is widespread. Think of the lies regarding the Lusitania not carrying arms and the lies surrounding the Tonkin Gulf affair that led to the despicable Vietnam War. 3. Levels of Criticism of Current Extravagant Claims A number of observations may be made on how and why thoughtful persons today can and do reject extravagant claims. (1) The data are often hard to obtain. Careful and thorough reporting of what is seen and heard is uncommon. Thus, we reject some reports as mere hearsay; furthermore, we must carefully separate factual data from "constructions" or interpretations involved in the very reporting of the data. Thus, a sincere religious person may regard an impulse as a stimulus from Satan and thus make a corresponding claim. Similarly, some have taken positive intuitions as direct evidence that God has told them to do something. The data, which may be simple, are made into the miraculous by an overreadiness to color by words. Note that the same historic facts about the war between the states are given a differing "coloring," depending on whether the texts are in northern or southern elementary schools, just as in war propaganda on all sides. (2) But if some data are made available, little opportunity exists for double-checking by disinterested observers and scientists. Indeed, those dramatic healing services in tents or on television are not witnessed by practicing physicians. No genuine effort is made before and after observation. And sometimes the medical sciences are ridiculed in the name of some ancient
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practice or "faith" when authentication is virtually made impossible. Can a thoughtful person still accept? (3) Linked to these facts is the unfortunate practice of reporting only selective evidence. Data favorable to the claim are set forth and those that are unfavorable are not. Unwillingness or perhaps inability to consider all the evidence is the basis for most superstitions. When we hear of instantaneous healing miracles, we would also like to know how many efforts at praying and laying on of hands have not yielded the anticipated results. Religious data (as well as some beliefs) are too often not subject to falsifiability. (4) Warrant exists for asserting that in contemporary claims to religious miracles mass hysteria or psychological trickery might be involved. Such a thing as mass hypnosis does exist. William Sargant in his Battle for the Mind points to such occurrences in his study of brain-washing tactics and conversions. Deep unconscious needs, in addition to psychological immaturity, may account for such phenomena. (5) But apart from witnesses and evidence, notice also that alternate explanations of the reported event often exist that clarify what has actually happened. Any professional conjuror can produce candy or money from the air and can cause lighted candlesticks to appear at his or her fingertips. Most socalled contact with spirits and mind-reading feats can be similarly duplicated, often with expensive electronic equipment. Similarly, the most obvious account of "psychic surgery" is that it is a clever display of legerdemain towards people who are gullible and anxious for the favorable result. Persons affiliated with religion who are desirous of personal aggrandizement and fame are not above such trickery. We may easily suppose such cases in the past as well. (6) Some might ask for the duplication of the extraordinary events, if possible under experimental conditions, but this cannot usually be done because no controls exist and no one dares experiment with human beings to see whether they might not have been cured by other means. (7) If an event reported as extraordinary contains facts or sequences out of harmony with all known events of the same type, we are led seriously to question it. We do not want to preclude in advance the sui generis character of specific events and personalities, but we must be hesitant about claims to miracles that are out of line with all known experience and science. When contemporary Hindus claim that persons having a yogi's powers can transport themselves to distant places, pass through closed doors, and the like, Westerners are properly skeptical, because such claims do not harmonize with known laws in the sciences. Similarly, if we were today to assert that parthenogenesis occurred, the medical profession would introduce serious objections. They know about "test tube" babies and in-vitro fertilization, but they know of no ovum becoming a child that was not fertilized in some distinct physiological way. (Incidentally, several virgin births are known.) Also, socalled miracles may illustrate scientific laws that are but dimly understood. But if someone were to insist that this universe is lawless and, hence, that
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interruptions of the natural order can and do occur, we must ask him or her what metaphysics permits such an inference. In theistic religions piety generally demands the trustworthiness of God—his faithfulness and reliability. The theological requirements for explaining how a trustworthy God can act against his own nature are overwhelming. If the laws illustrate and evince the trustworthiness of God, then interruptions of those laws indicate an unreliable God or a whimsical one. (This involves the deeper traditional theological question of which is prior in God, his reliable goodness or his power, which would logically enable him to alter the multiplication tables or the speed of light just by fiat.) (8) As reported, some contemporary events are so extreme and so out of harmony with all we know about nature and God that we cannot accept them as literally true. But we might willingly admit that some vivid, moving facts occurred and we might then need to consider them seriously. But we may treat them as having metaphorical or symbolic meaning and give such interpretations. Now, if we admittedly use such counterexplanations or interpretations of some of the extraordinary claims we hear about in our contemporary world, what does this tell us about how we might handle those factual claims of the past (such as the Passover and the Resurrection) that figure so heavily in many religions, especially those of the West? Obviously, some of the possibly minor claims to strange minor events in a religious tradition can be interpreted or explained in the ways mentioned. As a sample, consider the report in Judges of the sun standing still during one of Joshua's battles. Some insist the event is a literal fact, but for the sun to have stood still in the sky would require that the Earth not rotate on its axis, which is impossible astronomically. To demand that it be believed in. spite of known astronomical laws is chauvinistic and absurd, but what else can we do with the biblical record? A reinterpretation is not only possible but warranted. Newer translations of the same passage indicate that it is in poetic meter, that the writer was strongly moved by the event, in effect saying that the occurrence was as //the sun stood still. Even the writer did not mean that the sun ceased moving across the horizon, or that the earth stopped rotating, but that the event was so momentous it felt as though it had. And we have the added support of the text itself, which indicates at that point that it is not a straight narrative. If some intense literalist takes issue with this conclusion, does he or she believe that tongues walked the earth too (Psalms) or is that expression not also a case of literary hyperbole? We may not treat every claim to an extravagant minor or major event in this fashion, but persons of one religion will surely do that with claims from another religion! We cannot be swept up in a sea of mythological interpretation, coming to the glib conclusion that every extravagant event is merely an instance of myth, that none have any factual basis. This is a catch-all literary device that shows no ability to make the necessary distinctions. To use some sweeping simplistic assertions about the events recorded in Scriptures is
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simply not fair to religious experience, especially since so many of these events are and can be substantiated by external evidence. For example, we easily hold that the vivid subjective experience of Paul in which he made a turnabout from prosecutor to advocate on the road to Damascus was an instance of an epileptic seizure. But we find it harder to think that a mere epileptic fit could have wrought the changes in Western civilization that Paul's commitment after that experience wrought. Nothing in contemporary experience allows us to interpret that experience as merely a physiological malfunction. It might have been that but it was also much more, for it changed Paul's personality and efforts. 4. Other Observations (1) When we wish to handle both minor and major claims (sometimes seemingly preposterous), instead of treating each one as a separate case and thinking each one through, we may appeal to some authoritative interpretation or long tradition of interpretation as having the "answers." In religions with a developed intellectual tradition, some of the earliest leaders came to grips with unusual claims and worked out modes of interpretation that may be accepted today. In the Roman Catholic tradition, we can find a long tradition of interpretation that provides a method for coping with difficult questions (see the Catholic Encyclopedia). Usually not much room is left for an alternate explanation. We are supposed to accept the one the authorities work out. In Judaism, degrees of acceptance are not so demanding. From the earliest days, Jewish thinkers worked out ways of understanding various historical claims in their tradition. When reported that Jacob wrestled with an angel, so ancient a philosopher as Philo Judaeus gave an allegorical meaning to it by saying that the story illustrated the conflict between spirit and flesh. And other examples could be cited, but no one does that with the Passover, do they? A body of rabbinical literature arose that speaks with the authority of tradition and offers ways of understanding factual claims. The Talmud—with its first section, the Mishnah (compiled about 200 A.D.) and the second part, the Gemara—constitutes the basis of religious authority for traditional Judaism. These texts contain alternate explanations. A similar body of corollary literature that serves a similar purpose—the Hadith—exists in Islam. It is perhaps more authoritative but not binding. In the case of Hindu and Buddhist Scriptures, many traditional commentaries account for some of the factual claims (and also provide theological clarifications), but these are not regarded as the authoritative way of explaining things. Nor do the Protestant or non-Roman forms of Christianity provide strict authoritarian interpretations. (They vary with groups and often cause them.) But to accept an authoritative mode of "explaining" extravagant events does not adequately wrestle with the problem, since the individual thinker may still wish to work out a solution. (2) Some Protestant circles give an alternative mode of explanation, unusual on first appearance but not unpopular. Miracles and wondrous stories
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do not occur in the recent past or in the people's contemporary period but they were possible in a previous "dispensation." This view asserts a "divine ordering of world affairs" and different dispensations in history. Accordingly, in one period in God's plan of history miracles were to be expected and were necessary and meaningful. But because of folly and persistent unbelief, God has not seen fit to perform or duplicate miracles in this present dispensation, though he could if he wished to. In the coming age of "dispensation," we may expect similar miracles to occur. But all the extravagant and extraordinary events that have occurred may be accepted as properly true within the dispensation of God's activity. This "explanation" of unusual or apparently incredible happenings is irrelevant to the Eastern religions, which do not take such a linear view of history and which do not have the intense concern to insist that incredible events happened as reported. Moreover, this solution hardly does more than restate the problem of dealing with unusual factual claims. To say that the extraordinary claims of religion occurred between the appearance of Adam and the spread of the Christian church interestingly enough sets aside all other claims since then (denying miracles for present healing evangelists and such theophanies as Fatima and Lourdes). The dispensational view has too many hidden assumptions and begs far too many questions. It dismisses all objections and honest inquiries as failures to understand the way God works at different periods, and it certainly begs the question as to what "dispensation" we are in now. It requires a grasp of human history that would have baffled even Saint Augustine. (3) We need to bear in mind that an implicit world-view or a metaphysics is always at work behind the scenes in the mind of any honest inquirer who is baffled by unusual factual claims. The minds that reject all the unusual factual claims of religions usually work within the framework of philosophical naturalism or scientific realism. All too quickly they set aside unusual claims as not fitting scientific requirements, for either accurate measurements are not possible or experiments cannot be performed, nor are the data subject to ordinary means of verification or falsifiability. Thus, we find a wholesale rejection of anything even slightly unusual, with no concomitant awareness that a metaphysics uncritically accepted is at work. Note that while an uncritical scientific realism is at work, even in the thinking of such modern theologians as Paul Tillich, this same mode of dealing with other facets of life is ignored. The unusual claims of the religious person are summarily set aside, but at the same time, those other aspects of human life that are clearly not subject to scientific measurement are accepted on sentimental grounds. Many of the most meaningful things in life—its greatest value experiences—cannot be understood or dealt with by scientific means. Human good will, parental love, and the human commitment to honest inquiry itself cannot be explained in scientific terms. Some scientific realists are more naive on matters of emotional patriotism and politics than committed religious believers, yet they
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cannot support their patriotism or social and political conclusions by science alone. Western scientific realists, incidentally, reach different social and political conclusions than those from nations in the East such as the former Soviet Union. Some of the hypotheses in both East and West are almost as baffling as the factual religious claims under investigation in this chapter. (We may wonder whether the revolution led by Lenin or Marx could be explained as a sort of epileptic fit, too, and why not? Are only striking religious leaders to be interpreted as doing things because of glandular upsets or deep unconscious problems? This sort of talk gets us nowhere, but note that it cuts both ways.) Other metaphysical positions are at work too in the understanding of unusual religious claims. Accordingly, if someone holds to a sharp dualism between the spiritual and the physical world, he or she is more able to accept belief in miracles, which then may be seen as an intervention into the material order of a supernatural deity who wishes something special to happen. If someone holds to an essentially spiritualistic view of the world, he or she is more likely to say that the Ultimate Spirit is actively involved or immanent in the natural world and that world is not foreign to it, whereas its manifestation or expression to us is foreign. In this case, no supernatural intervention can exist, the world as we know it'manifests the actions of God, and scientific laws are modes of his operation. To perform a striking miracle, especially of the minor sort, would in effect go against God's very nature. This is not the place to dwell on metaphysics or the theory of reality, but we always need to ask what kind of view is at work as we examine factual claims. Interestingly enough, in Indian religion six distinct metaphysical systems of explanations arose to try to give a rational account or interpretation of Hindu religious experience. One or two tend to dominate in the world today, but not one of the six is self-evidently authoritative. An Indian thinker is always made aware of the different permissible modes of interpretation. The most extreme is the Purva Mimamsa, which thinks that religion is primarily a matter of language usage that promotes worthwhile experiences but for which no real objective reference exists. "God" then becomes a word in the dative case, that is, the term "God" is the indirect object in the ritual's sentences. 5. A Look at Crucial Factual Claims and How These May Be Handled If we now take some time to examine two of the most important miraculous historical claims in two major religions, we may gain some light from the analysis thus far. In a sense, these may be treated as paradigms, as samples of what we may do with basic yet extraordinary claims, without which the respective religions would be mere shadows. I have considered some of the problems in connection with evaluating extravagant factual claims made even today. And note that on the basis of such points we fairly easy set aside many of those unusual claims to healing miracles, and the like. When we recognize that data are hard to obtain and to~
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separate out from "constructions," they cannot be checked by trained observers. Sometimes only selected data are given to us, and if we recognize too the possible roles of mass hysteria and hypnosis as well as the distinct possibility of alternative explanatory accounts, we may conclude that such fundamental events as the Passover and the Resurrection could not and did not actually take place, especially since they are out of harmony with our experience of natural order. When we add to this the fact that members of one religion that accepts extravagant claims deny the same claims in others, what are we to do? Several solutions suggest themselves. (1) We may assert that the crucial events took place in spite of all demurrers and doubts. The grounds for such uncritical acceptance would simply be Faith. We must believe in some things, so why not believe in a particular great claim that is so central to our faith and without which the faith would lose its uniqueness? This solution is the one that many persons will insist on without giving the previously stated objections any consideration. After all, God gives us this faith, the ability to believe! But this appeal to faith is primarily anti-rational. It elevates an attitude above thought and it ridicules reason. Furthermore, it ignores dogmatically the claims of other sincere believers by dismissing them as erroneous and as unimportant. If we were to accept things on faith alone, we could then accept anything whatsoever, including the most absurd doctrines of astrology, palmistry, and any occultism or superstition. No way exists to separate out the spurious from the true if all we appeal to is faith. The position is unthinking and one we find in all areas of life, especially blind patriotism. We cannot allow it. (2) The other extreme is to reject the claimed event because honesty demands it. This is severe but it may be the only option for the sincere mind that finds far too many problems in believing such things as either the Passover or the Resurrection. If we were to take as an example here the claim of Joseph Smith's discovery of the golden tablets, we can see why so many reject it. No corroboration, outside evidence, or archaeological support exists, and the idea that Jesus came to North America before Columbus and any known history is totally without foundation. That is why many people have rejected Mormonism, in spite of its many worthwhile and humane practices and its apparent ethical fruitfulness. Can we do the same with the two great events of Judaism and Christianity? Millions of Hindus and Buddhists have no trouble setting aside those claims, while making other claims. Some Westerners totally abandon both claims, setting them aside as mere fiction and not even admitting they are useful myths that provide a source of community and cultural or national loyalties. Some treat them in a patronizing way. Consider the philosopher coming from the Jewish cultural tradition who still has his or her sons circumcised by the rabbi, or consider the father of a traditional Christian family who attends mass on Easter because it is a socially acceptable thing to do. Some may be led to this view, but it does overlook
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the possibility of alternative modes of explanation that may preserve the general theme. (3) In a broad philosophical sense, we may insist on a general religious belief that has some practical value and has broad truth, selecting as our particular religion one that does not require the acceptance of debatable historical claims. We may select a religion that has only practical ethical teachings plus a reverence for the Supreme, and we may worship the Ultimate without accepting a baffling traditional doctrine. A number of practical world religions do not require belief in extraordinary factual claims. A religion such as Confucianism may satisfy emotional needs without apparently demanding supernatural miracles. Taoism in its purest form is similar. If we turned to any of the religions of India, we might find that we would not have to accept as necessary any unusual historic event, but instead we would find in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism in all their forms a required doctrine of karma and reincarnation. Those religions demand such beliefs, and for some to accept karma may be harder than to accept the Resurrection. No chance exists of a "religion in general" that recognizes some fundamental general religious things, for such a religion in general would have no organization, no ongoing tradition to foster it, and no trained clergy or Scripture. If we insist on being religious, we will have to affiliate with some particular religion, even though we may not accept all that it teaches. (Unitarian-Universalists and Quakers are denominations that do not require acceptance of the Resurrection story.) (4) A more prevalent and perhaps better view is the following. We may admit the essentiality of an extraordinary claim but interpret it or reinterpret it as a useful myth or in some other fashion. We may distinguish at least four of these as they relate to the Passover and the Resurrection. The four are not mutually exclusive but involve some overlapping. Both crucial events when recounted in Scripture show the inadequacy of language to report a vital human experience. Although the accounts may be taken as literal truths, we must examine the "grammar" of the stories, perhaps as a language game. Or we can first try to translate the story into scientific language, if possible, instead of denying it outright as impossible. We could try to see how the story fits in as part of the whole language game of Judaism or Christianity. In any event, both the Passover and the Resurrection are pleasant vital stories that are part of the ritual rhythm of life in the Western world. This view, however, raises a host of problems. At the annual Ram Lila festivals in India, few would accept the stories recounted in the public drama as fully accurate, yet the stories do help us enjoy and understand Hinduism better even if they are not to be taken literally. (Even to imagine the monkey god Hanuman picking up a mountain, which he uses as a shelter, is impossible.) But in the case of both Judaism and Christianity, we do not have stories like the Ramayana. Jews and Christians really do think the events, more or less as
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described, have some basis in historical fact. To say they are useful stories might work for a few literate people but will not suffice for the millions of believers. A second way is to treat the stories as useful myths. We may see them as neither false nor true but as practically worthwhile. Just as mothers in North America find it useful around the Christmas season to tell stories about Santa Claus selecting good and bad children, so too perpetuating these great Jewish and Christian stories is useful. They have pragmatic value. Spinoza felt that stories such as these helped to motivate people toward piety and obedience but that we could never take them as true events. A more widely held view among thoughtful committed yet critical practicing Jews and Christians is to admit at once that in the case of both the Passover and the Resurrection, definite striking events did in fact occur. Around those events stories and reports grew up with fuzzy and sometimes contradictory details. The point is that something happened, but exactly what literally occurred may be undiscoverable. In each case, however, the event was of such moment that cultures and nations were born, the calendar was altered, and history was viewed from a different perspective. We may not conclude that the Passover as described in Holy Writ happened as such simply because of the tremendous vitality and persistence of Jewish culture and tradition. Nor may we say that the Resurrection must have occurred because of the success of Christianity throughout the world—its institutions, hospitals, art, and other cultural monuments. We may not infer that an historical event has been so prominent. But we can ask what the germ events might have been that prompted such changes in history and so enriched human experience since their occurrence. Obviously, this applies to some degree to all religions. The tremendous sweep of Islamic culture, with its persistence in science and architecture through the Dark Ages, is hard to account for as a manifestation of mere mythical reports. The viability of Buddhism and Hinduism is also traceable to some momentous events or persons, even though not as specific as the Passover and the Resurrection. We need now to separate out the two. In the case of the Passover, we do know that the Jews were in Egypt, that they were slaves, that they were led out by a powerful leader, Moses, and that they wandered for some years before settling in Palestine. But we have practical doubts about the tricks that Moses did or the plague of frogs, as being literal. And we can reasonably doubt the stories about the Angel of Death, especially if we have trouble believing in angels. Furthermore, we can have doubts about the parting of the Red Sea and the consequent drowning of hundreds of pursuing Egyptians. We have reasonable doubt about the manna in the wilderness and the leading cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night as well as the anthropomorphic way the Ten Commandments were transmitted by Jehovah to Moses. But we cannot deny the elemental fact of the exodus itself. And we cannot deny that the children of Israel left in a hurry to the point of needing to eat unleavened bread. The details
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may be unimportant and may be the expression of writers who tried to impress their readers with the significance of the event, but this event has been commemorated ever since the earliest days. And it was celebrated by Jesus and his followers (disciples) just before his trial and death. When we look at the Resurrection story, we have a somewhat different situation. No single or straightforward account exists in the gospel narratives. We cannot make the tales fit each other. The reports differ. We might try to write down the sequence of reported events upon the discovery of the empty tomb but will find that a consistent account cannot be made. The events leading up to the burial of Jesus present no special problems for the historian, but to claim that Jesus was dead and buried and rose out of his tomb, alive, on the third day and was seen by his closest acquaintances first, then later by a larger group, is a story that baffles. Nor can a consistent account be made of events after the reported resurrection. What then can be said? According to Paul, if we do not accept the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, the Christian faith and all that goes with it is in vain. Interestingly, not even the most literalistic dogmatic believer can possibly tell the story with perfect consistency. What we might be able to say is that the followers of Jesus were so impressed and overcome by his personality that, after some reflection, the firm belief arose in them that such a good person could not really die. If he did die, what he taught loses all of its meaning, for he taught that God loved individuals to the uttermost and would do anything to show that love. Could such a loving God, then, consistently allow so fine and noble a person as Jesus to perish under these dire circumstances and never be thought of again? In the minds of his followers, we can say this belief grew quickly. They then translated it into a story that could be grasped by people who earlier had required parables and similar stories in order to grasp fundamental ethical teachings. Yet many do not accept the Resurrection event in this interpreted sense. The story as it stands is not intrinsically persuasive to those who are not identified with the Judeo-Christian tradition in some sense. But this interpretation also has problems. As Cadoux says, we cannot think of the risen Lord as eating nor can we accept a literal ascension, since it frustrates astronomical views and assumes the earth is not round and Heaven is up. It implies a pre-Copernican flat-earth astronomy and is intolerable. Finally, some suggest that the whole question of historical accuracy and objective validity is not the one to consider here. We need not, says C. C. J. Webb, decide religious questions on the balance of evidence. Religion is communal, and because communal it is traditional, and because traditional it is historical. We can dismiss the idea of history "as an objective record of past events unaffected by any interest." But for some to find a professedly historical narrative baseless must be a real shock. But this should not necessarily undermine the validity of religious truth. Consider, for example, William Tell's story. Tell never existed—a fact hard to take for the Swiss—but they still accept
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the general truth that their forefathers won freedom from tyranny by bravery. Tell did not exist but the forefathers were brave and got freedom. As has also been suggested, the poetical merit of Virgil's Aeneid would not change if instead the Aeneid was the product of medieval monks masquerading as ancient pagans. The values are not lost even if the facts of the story are not authentic. What matters is whether those values are valid, whether they are meaningful in the life of a people, and whether they continue to be the basis of genuine religious feeling and piety. The following quotation from Dean Inge sheds some light on this point: "The 'truth' of religion must reside in the dynamic relation to absolute truth. By this I mean that though our beliefs may contain a larger admixture of myth, of illusion, of illogical accommodation, we must be content if they compose the best creed that we can live up to and if they continually point forward and lead us up to something better." We may hold that the traditional or historical framework within which religious truth is connected is a cultural medium in and through which the Divine reveals itself. The historical framework is only a means, a mode of communication that a people can understand and identify with. The validity of this truth can be determined not by the historical method but by the extent to which this truth can ennoble and sustain the spiritual quest of human beings.
Four THE CONCEPT OF GOD During the McCarthy hearings in the United States in the 1950s, the distinguished philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy was called to testify. The questioner asked: Do you believe in God, Professor Lovejoy? His response: "Mr. Chairman, there are fourteen distinct meanings of the term 'God.' Do you wish me to distinguish them and state my attitude toward each? If so, I shall be glad to do so." Practicing believers in eight of the eleven major religions regularly talk about God and try to develop some relationship with what they regard as the Supreme One or Ultimate. They use different language, have differing ways of expressing their relationship, and often have differing concepts. Any philosophy of religion, before plunging into the arguments about whether God exists should first recognize such differences and find out what the arguments are about and whether they apply. The agnostic or atheistic casts of mind attain notoriety largely because they do not recognize distinct meanings of the term "God" that are actually believed in by hundreds of millions of ordinary people. They often attack views no serious thinker really holds or ever accepted. And critics address their arguments to dominant views of the thirteenth century without any regard to the careful philosophic thought about God since that time. In the eighteenth century, in his Alciphron, George Berkeley was aware of this problem. "The great point is what sense the word God is to be taken in." More than fourteen meanings of the term may exist. Untutored minds who are undiscriminating foes of religion—and many exist among professional philosophers—are not usually aware of the historic fact that one religion is openly atheistic, historically having collected some of the weightiest arguments against the existence of a divine being. I am thinking of the Jains and will consider their criticisms later. In addition, while much variation exists in Buddhist thought, some European Buddhists oppose the idea of God rigorously. Theoretical Confucianism, while not opposing the idea of Heaven or an ultimate ground of the world, makes little of the idea of God, and we are hard pressed to find a Confucian theology. In the Western world of religion, the idea of God looms largest. Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs traditionally place God at the center of their faith. But even here the differences are surprising. If we limit ourselves to Christians, we find some who think of God with every typical characteristic. In some theological schools, emphasis is on God as an intelligent, conscious person. In others the idea that God is a person is rejected for the view that God is some sort of unconscious power that sustains values and is creative. In his doctoral dissertation, no less a figure than Martin Luther King, Jr., focused on three of these differing concepts of God within the
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Christian tradition alone. Even within so-called orthodoxy we find different views. The so-called biblical literalists seem to have an idea of God that is in sharp contrast with the concept held by millions of others. Accordingly, if learned philosophers wish to, they can make a shambles of some of the ideas of God held by persons who have given little thought to their concepts and who believe their view is the one the Bible teaches. But that is question-begging, because the idea of God even in the Bible itself varies. That does not mean that God changes or depends on people's interpretation. It simply means that as early believers tried to set down their thoughts, they worked within limits we no longer have today. And we can see developing views of the nature of God throughout the Bible, especially in the Hebrew Scriptures. If that is the case within Christianity, so too regarding Judaism, but less so in Islam. Hinduism reveals almost a menagerie of ideas of God. The distinctions are subtle, the insight occasionally profound, and the differences in practical religion issuing from different emphases on God are striking. The diversity of ideas of God should give the popular atheist more pause than it does; it should make glib professional philosophers more reticent in their blanket judgments. As early as 3500 B.C., people began to think of God. In the sixth century B.C., thought became more serious and searching, with no let-up since. An examination of what religious people today actually claim about the Supreme suggests five different kinds of possible contrasts. Any ensuing arguments or discussions about God simply must show an awareness of such things or they may be regarded as petulant. These contrasts may be put in the form of questions: (1) May God be viewed as One or as Many? (2) Is God conscious or unconscious? (3) What is the relation of the deity to the natural world and to living creatures? (4) How is God related to the Good or the valuable? (5) What is the relation of God to time and to events in history? 1. May God Be Viewed as One or Many—Monotheism or Polytheism? A look at the history of religions as well as at some currently practiced religions suggests that polytheism has always been present. It lasted for 2,500 years in Egypt, and though efforts were made to elevate the Sun God above others, polytheism enjoyed some resurgence in Egypt's later days. The Greeks and later the Romans spoke of many gods, though as time went on they wondered whether one god—either Zeus or Jupiter—was older or the father of the gods. In Roman theology, polytheism was so extensive that it yielded gods not only of the door but of the hinges and the lock. Even in Judaism, which has always been monotheistic, the earliest leaders admitted that other gods might exist for other tribes or nations, but their own god was obviously superior (henofheism). Not until the eighth-century prophets was it common for Jews to regard Yahweh or Jehovah as a universal deity, the Lord of all nations. In
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preliterate cultures, we may still observe practices that suggest the presence of many gods. In the living religions of Shintoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism, we find semblances of polytheism. Worshipers seem to have their favorite gods, and in India temples to Durga, Hanuman, Minakshi, and others exist. But even in current Shintoism, which has never been strongly monotheistic, Amaterasu is unquestionably the chief goddess, the superior one, and (practically) the only deity. But thoughtful spokespersons in the other faiths just mentioned would not assent to polytheism intellectually, but they would allow that some ordinary worshipers might be led to the one true deity through popular polytheistic practices. A villager who performs pujas at the Durga (or Kali) temple is in his or her limited awareness and understanding really striving after Brahman, the one, unified being. Not all devotees are able to grasp the profound truth that the One deity is unity, but in their devotional acts they are approaching the One. Even decidedly monotheistic religions reveal remnants of polytheism in supposing beings between ordinary mortals and the divine unity that enable some to approach that unity. Islam is uncompromising in its monotheism, but angels or messengers do the bidding of Allah. In Zoroastrianism, with one supreme god, Ahura Mazda, subordinate fravashis may offer believers assistance toward the Supreme. And in popular Roman Catholicism, the saints are honored, adored, and prayed to. They are more "accessible" than the Holy One. Indeed, in popular Roman Catholicism, a person may ask special favors of, or even pray to, Saint Jude or Saint Joseph without being directly cognizant of the one true God. But none of these practices on the popular level as found in millions of worshipers are ever regarded as polytheistic. The fundamental creed of Judaism is: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God." In spite of Trinitarian theology, Christians also emphasize the unity of God, as do Sikhs who call God "Sat Nam" or "the True Name." Taoists affirm but one Tao, in spite of popular polytheistic tendencies. And Confucians affirm only one heavenly being. Hindus avow but one absolute deity, though people may approach it in accord with their understanding and possibly limited insight. Logically, the idea of many gods—perhaps competing with each other for followers—is repugnant and unacceptable simply because of the laws of science and the dependability of nature. Even though polytheism enjoyed some success for many hundreds of years, how the unity of the natural order is better explained by a proliferation of divinities than by one is hard to understand. We do not need to multiply entities beyond necessity when one is sufficient to account for the perceived unity of the natural world. Even the Greeks thought that their many gods were themselves subject to a higher, overarching law of destiny called Moira. The human mind seeks unity of explanation and is puzzled when confronted with inexplicable diversities. Even the Jains, who are anti-theistic, still adhere to the unity of the law of karma, as do all Buddhists
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and Hindus. Indeed, all karmic religions think, that the law of karma is selfoperating and self-sustaining. Conflicting laws of karma could never be. Accordingly, any arguments philosophers set forth today will always assume but one deity on the grounds that polytheism is unintelligible. The question of a countergod or a devil as an "explanation" of evil and suffering will be looked at later. Theological questions such as the Trinity are not within the scope of this study. But I must point out that trinities also exist in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism, according to some believers. And Hinduism avows multiple incarnations, while in one branch of Islam, the Ahmaclayya, we see only one incarnation. 2. Is God Conscious or Unconscious? Religious believers in the major world religions, save Buddhism, regard the Supreme Being as in some sense conscious. This does not make the claim true, but throughout the world daily prayers are offered by countless millions of Parsees, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs. All of them, rightly or wrongly, believe that someone is listening, that their deity is conscious and in some way aware of their prayers. According to this view, this nonhuman consciousness may or may not do something about those prayers. Millions of ordinary Hindus also offer prayers, and others seek to find unity with the one supreme Absolute Consciousness. Similarly, in some forms of Mahayana Buddhism, devotees offer regular prayers to conscious lords such as Amida. To a lesser degree, this is also true of Taoists, Confucians, and Shintoists. In the preliterate, so-called "primitive" religions, we find a vague belief in a world of spirits who are consciously aware of what is going on. In short, for five thousand years, human beings have piously offered prayers to some conscious being whom they have regarded as supreme. Now, when religious believers claim that the object of their attention is conscious, what can they mean? They will sometimes also speak of God as a conscious person, an intelligent mind who remembers the past, plans for the future, knows all that is knowable, is creative and purposive in some sense, and both creates and sustains the good while apparently opposing evil, though possibly tolerating it. More will be said later about the character and attributes of God as they are affirmed by sundry religions. But when someone believes that God is a conscious person, some today immediately charge such a belief with the devastating name of anthropomorphism, the idea that God is imagined to be merely an enlarged human being, an omnipotent, benevolent, bearded grandfather or greatgrandfather. Religious paintings during the Renaissance in the West even depicted God as an aged figure. Thus, for the modern sophisticate to ridicule anthropomorphic depictions of God is a simple matter, possibly asking where he lives, how old he is, how he cuts his fingernails, and so on. We recall how the prophet Elijah ridiculed the priests of Baal who could not get their deity to
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respond, by wondering whether perhaps he was sleeping or away in some distant room. A few contemporary theologians, upset by such vain imaginative representations of the deity, have totally rejected the idea of God as conscious or as a person, falsely assuming that if we thought of God as conscious, such a being would have to have a nervous system or a body of some sort. They say this because they have known of no instance where consciousness exists without such physicalistic support. Indeed, some have capitalized on this criticism and almost made a sport of criticizing the idea of God as conscious because of what they saw as a necessarily entailed anthropomorphism. To attack views no serious thinker ever defended is easy, and that is what these modern theologians have done. Charles Hartshorne has acutely observed regarding-Jean-Paul Sartre's criticisms of religion: "What we are given by Sartre is a twentieth-century criticism of eighteenth- or thirteenth-century religious ideas. By this procedure the essential issues will always be missed."' To think of God as physical goes against the experience and teaching of most theistic religions, even since the time of the ancient Greek philosopher Xenophanes in the sixth century B.C. He allowed that if the Ethiopians had gods they would make them black and snub-nosed and if horses had gods they would make them horselike. But Xenophanes went on to say that God is one and that he is intelligent: "God is one, supreme among gods and men and not like mortals in body or in mind. The whole of god sees, the whole perceives, the whole hears. But without effort he sets in motion all things by mind and thought."2 This is an early thinker's recognition that the functions of consciousness in God cannot depend on spatial characteristics. We would think that this ancient distinction could have been recognized by modern critics, but their interests have unfortunately been journalistic and popular. Thus, we may still expect patronizing diatribes against a pictorial grandfather-like God that no serious religious thinker or philosopher in the faiths mentioned has ever held and would not hold. Indeed, attacks on anthropomorphism by sages, prophets, and philosophers within the framework of religions can be traced to the earliest times, in addition to Xenophanes. We find such attacks in Isaiah, Ezekiel, and even in the second commandment of the Mosaic Decalogue, which forbids "graven images," implying that God may not be likened to any human form. While Jesus spoke of God as a loving Father, he insisted that God is a Spirit. In Book Six of The Confessions, Saint Augustine wrote: "It was profane to believe God to be bounded by the figure of a human body." The prophet Mohammed rejected the idea of God as a father because even that connoted for him a biological connection. Nothing physical even by metaphor could be accepted. Mormons are the only group of believers who claim that "God is in form like man," but this is an exception. In addition, while Hindus and Buddhists do allow graven images in the form of sculptured or pictorial images of lesser deities, even those popular representations are given physical traits that set them off from ordinary mortals. If they are not gold or blue in color, we need only count the arms of Siva to
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realize that when spatial representations are made, they are marked off from the human form in unmistakable ways. More intellectual Hindus may have a shrine to the supreme Lord, though at its center is not physical representation but merely the symbol for the word "God." Ancient Jews regarded God as so utterly different from human beings that they did not even write out the name of God fully or mention it orally. Thoughtful Jewish students in philosophy classes today will writ G-d instead of G-o-d to keep a remnant of that tradition alive. Sikhs speak of God as Sat Nam—the True Name—and shun all representative forms as energetically as do Muslims.- Accordingly, we may conclude that those faiths that think of God as conscious do not maintain that God can be imagined. That is the crucial point. We cannot picture consciousness but we know what it means to be conscious, and those popular efforts in their visible depictions still indicate that the divine, whatever it is, cannot be understood as merely anthropomorphic. But if we were to say that God is conscious, what else can that mean? No thinker would say that to think of God as conscious is the same as to picture God as some sort of human being. They would say, instead, that God is at least conscious, and probably more. We are unable to know what words such as "intelligent," "creative," or "purposive" mean without thinking of consciousness. Nor is the idea of memory or self-knowledge possible apart from consciousness. These are terms human beings understand from their own experience. All believers would say that if those words are applicable to God, God excels in those traits beyond our capacity to think, let alone imagine. Is God then to be conceived of as a superperson, a superconscious being beyond our thought of personality yet including consciousness? Religious thinkers of several faiths argue that God is indeed beyond finite understanding but that we may have some minimal comprehension of him by using such terms as those cited above. Benedict Spinoza, an enemy of anthropomorphism, held that God had an infinite number of attributes, of which two could be known by us. We can know and believe some things about God, but we cannot comprehend God's nature in a complete sense or define him exclusively in human categories. But some human categories, such as consciousness, must be used or we have no God at all but merely an indefinite blur. H. P. Owen says: "We know that God is personal; but how he is personal we do not know."3 The historic fact is that for at least five thousand years believers have said that God is a conscious being. This is not mere frailty groping for the indescribable. It is an affirmation, a claim, that any God worthy of worship has traits that we can assert, and that affirming those traits does not in any sense limit the deity or magnify the creature who is trying to understand. A few theologians still ridicule honest human efforts by suggesting that our best thought still has no referent or relevance when it comes to the Ultimate. Frankly, that is misplaced intellectual humility. It offers no more than mystery. Religious experience through the ages admits plenty of mystery, but God is not a total mystery. If so, neither God nor religion would exist for us. We need no
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pejorative views about human inabilities when we are honestly striving after truth. Or, to say it differently, we find it hard to say that Moses' and the eighthcentury prophets' views are muddleheaded, that Jesus and Mohammed knew nothing whatever of the Supreme, that Nanak and Zoroaster were as misguided as any ordinary layperson, that Ramakrishna had no insight at all, and that Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Kant, Leibniz, and Hegel were likewise fundamentally in error, speaking about a being of which no one can know anything. Modern faddists of skepticism and agnosticism might take a few moments to dwell seriously on the amount of hard thought that has gone into the idea of God as conscious instead of announcing in a perfunctory way a skeptical epistemology that may be baseless. Suppose that we were to say that the Ultimate or the Supreme Being cannot be regarded as conscious. It is neither superconscious nor a superperson nor even an all-encompassing Absolute who incorporates consciousness. If we take this approach, two major alternatives are possible: (1) The term "God," though not referring to a conscious being, does have a referent of some sort. The being is outside of mere subjective wishing. (2) The term "God" as used by religious people for thirty or more centuries has no referent at all; it is some kind of a projection from within—social or psychological. We need to examine these two standpoints. (1) The first view says that the term "God" refers to something other than human beings. Henry N. Wieman, a philosophical theologian, thinks of God as creativity, as the unconscious source of human values and goodness. He strongly opposes the view that God is conscious: "A being capable of doing what God is said to do cannot be a person."4 All arguments against God as a conscious person, says Wieman, can be put into one statement: "God exercises a power different in kind from what any person could ever have."5 Another group of thinkers, led by Paul Tillich, have held that God is an indefinable ground of all being, a being beyond ordinary being yet somehow its source. When we speak of God, we mean that we experience something that is an object of our ultimate concern and that underlies everything that is. It is the creative ground or formative unity and cannot be defined. Our language cannot, by its very nature, adequately characterize the ground of being, though it has practical and emotional value; while on a popular level to think of God as conscious may be useful, that must never be taken as literally true but merely as symbolic. In recent years, some have seen this approach as a profoundly religious one. Others view it as a disguised form of naturalistic metaphysics, presupposing that in such areas only science may give us rational truth. With such a conception of God, we can see why a man such as Tillich is not interested in arguments or proofs of God's existence. Still others—less developed but of interest—hold that God is an unconscious power making for righteousness. Samuel Alexander held the usual view that the term "God" referred to a thrust or direction in the evolutionary
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process of nature, a nisus. A. N. Whitehead's "Process Theology" resembles this view, for it speaks of creative process "with a tender care that nothing be lost," but Whitehead does not clearly deny that God is conscious. Some critical remarks are in order here. When we think of God as an impersonal, nonconscious power—a being or a creative thrust—problems arise. The first is how we may possibly conceive creativity and value production as intelligible without the factor of conscious intelligence. Maintaining that creative purpose and the presence of intelligible law as well as the bounty of values is the product of an unconscious, general being is more mysterious than saying that they are better explained as consequences of conscious intelligent ordering, even if we do not grasp the extent of God's consciousness or comprehend the scope of what it means for God to be a person. The eminent divine of a century ago, Phillips Brooks, put it this way: "You must see how at the very bottom of His existence, as you conceive it, lie these two thoughts— purpose and righteousness; how absolutely impossible it is to give God any personality except as the fulfillment of these two qualities—the intelligence that plans in love and the righteousness that lives in duty."6 If good purposes result from an unconscious source of value, are we not left with a greater mystery? If a "power making for righteousness" exists, as Matthew Arnold said, which may not be defined as other than "force," does not also considerable evidence exist for a power making for pain, suffering, and injustice, as well as ugliness? And just what is this generalized power's relation to the world? To say that God is the "being beyond being" or the ground of being, or that some being beyond God exists is to produce even further mysteries, for we might then be led to ask whether a ground beyond that exists, though to be sure no causal sequence is intended. But how, then, does this view differ from the straightforward metaphysics of scientific realism or naturalism? Such a difference is especially likely because the idea that an ultimately real Spirit exists is unequivocally denied. G. W. F. Hegel held to an Absolute Spirit as the fundamental reality, and while it does not resemble any traditional religious idea, Spirit is nevertheless conscious. One of his friends, Friedrich Schelling, vacillated and took the position we now think of as romantic impersonal absolutism. Religious believers throughout the world cannot rest in such vagueness. Is anything about the "ground of being" available for worship, prayer, and fellowship? Religion would soon die off if ordinary people concluded that the highest being they know is a vague something, unconscious of individuals, nature, and the good. Such an argument is not logical, but when we reinterpret the idea of God so fully, we are not addressing the claims and feelings of thousands of sincere people for the last five thousand years. Even Sigmund Freud, who was no friend of religion, was upset by the modern effort to squeeze all traditional meaning out of the word "God." He remarks:
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One would like to mix among the ranks of the believers in order to meet these philosophers, who think they can rescue the God of religion by replacing him by an impersonal, shadowy and abstract principle, and to address them with the warning words: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain!"7 (2) The second view, which denies consciousness to God, maintains that while the term "God" is used widely and by different religions, it must be seen as a symbol. It must not be interpreted as referring to a force t>r agency outside of human persons; it is a term that springs out of human need—human persons, unconscious wish, or perhaps social demand. Thus, Ludwig Feuerbach could propose that God was invented by society's needs. The word "God" has no referent in the objective order. Viktor Frankl, a distinguished psychoanalyst with sympathy for religious experiences, remarks that a religious sense is deeply rooted in every person's unconscious depths. The function of psychotherapy is to enable the patient "to become conscious of the God within." Thereby, we will find the transcendent meaning in life and be able to respond fully to it. Others suggest that the idea of a conscious personal God is a projection of the psychologically immature. It fills an unconscious need to have a kind father-God in a world that is uncomfortable, disorderly, and unkind. And as is well-known, the general Marxist position thinks that the idea of a conscious God is little more than a word invented by special, wealthy, economic power groups to serve the purpose of keeping people with limited intelligence and powers of criticism in a subjugated state. Some think that instead of thinking that the word "God" refers to a conscious deity, it should be understood as "truth." So God equals truth. And we may then regard respect for truth as respect for God. A minor school in Hindu philosophy takes a similar position, holding that the term "God" is a noun in the dative case. The Purva Mimamsa, while respecting the authority of the Vedas, do not say a God exists apart from individuals. Instead, in ritual observances, "God" is an object in ceremonial performances, providing traditional satisfactions. When we think critically of these options, we do notice evidence in the history of religions for such assertions. Much religion seems rooted in psychic or social needs and much seems purely verbal and ritualistic. But (1) if we say that the idea of a conscious God is a tool for the rich to keep the poor in submission, how do we account for the teachings of religious leaders that attack the wealthy in the name of God and preach that God is on the side of the oppressed? Such is the case in both the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament, for example. Although we can see evidence of the social control of the masses by ecclesiastical institutions in Russia, Rome, and elsewhere, the most penetrating criticisms and actions against such artificiality come from religious teachings that affirm God's conscious protection of the downcast and
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oppressed. (2) We may regard the teaching of the prophet Hosea, with his idea of forgiving love, or the teaching of Jesus on unconditional goodwill, as psychologically immature. But can anyone who prays to a conscious God to forgive those who do not know what they do be counted among the stunted, dependent personalities of history? The great historic leaders of religions have spent much of their effort promoting humanitarian causes. The institutions that developed may have sided with the wealthy and done bad things, but that cannot be seen as normative when studying the idea of God present in historic religions. In short, theories of this second type, which deny any referential value to the word "God," grossly overlook the actual teachings of religious leaders who have struggled against oppression and against conservative wealthy interests, and who conscientiously seek full human maturity in the name of a God who helps persons grow into such maturity. 3. What Is God's Relation to the Natural World and to Living Creatures? Here, again, a number of viable conceptions may be found among the religions of the world, even including differences within some religions. While we might say generally that the religions coming from the Near East emphasize the transcendence of God over nature, those with an origin in India stress immanence, God's presence in nature. But no such simplistic division is possible. We need to clarify further by categories and show some distinctions. A. Deism The popular view found in the West—one that is the object of much criticism, perhaps disproportionate to its significance—is the view that thinks of God as distinct and separate from the world of nature and living creatures. This may be called strict superaaturalism and is usually called deism. God is understood as the supreme creator of all that exists. God is totally other. The world depends on God for its very existence. We find this doctrine in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism, and to a minor degree in Confucianism. It is not found in Hinduism or Sikhism. Religious supernaturalism of this type must be distinguished from philosophical deism, which developed in the eighteenth century under the leadership of John Locke, John Toland, William Paley and, later, under Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin. These deists tried to expunge all miraculous elements from Judaism and Christianity, viewing the prophets and Jesus as great teachers without any direct or metaphysical relation to God (that is, the incarnation). God was the great mastermind of the universe and was to be reverenced as such, the creator and source of all. While a person might pray to such a deity in acts of worshipful thanksgiving, or might even petition
What Is God's Relation to the Natural World and to Living Creatures? 63 him for occasional help, the concept yielded no idea of intimacy, fellowship, or communion with God, and no room for miraculous intervention or selfvalidating revelations. In stressing the supernatural, religious deism to this day maintains that not only is God the distant creator, utterly transcendent, but also that he may and does manifest himself to human beings in breakthroughs in the form of miracles and revelations at specific times in the historic process. Much of traditional, conservative theology, both Fundamentalist and Roman Catholic, works with this idea. And it is found as well in Islam, which emphasizes the vast difference between Allah and his creatures—a distance so great that all that remains for the human being is to submit before God and accept his revealed words in the Koran. Accordingly, supernaturalistic deists have what may be called a dualistic view of God and nature. God is at considerable remove from the world and from his created beings—human beings and animals. Because of this distance from God, the world may be seen as entailing evil. Philo Judaeus thought that the deity was so perfect, pure, and bright and the world so imperfect, sinful, and dark, that the distant deity could not have any close relation to the created world, for such a relation would be contaminating. He proposed that God made the world through an intermediary, a Logos. This preserved the purity of God and at the same time may have given a clue to early Christian thinkers, like the writer of the fourth Gospel, who viewed Jesus as the Word, bridging the gap between God and the world and its creatures. This* view is widespread and runs deep in the religious consciousness of the religions of the Near East. Allied with it is the interesting doctrine of a time limit on when miracles and revelations took place, a "dispensation" in the historic process long since passed. Others think that while no new revelations such as the Holy Scriptures are forthcoming, miracles, instances of divine intervention, can still happen. These are most often found in the claims to healing we find both in conservative Fundamentalist churches in the Roman Catholic tradition and in the Greek Orthodox tradition. These two insist that a miracle takes place at every Mass, or liturgy, where the elements of Eucharist are transformed into the body and blood of Christ. Critically speaking, note that this deistic view, this strict supernaturalism, has a wide appeal in the West. It is probably the strongest popular view of the three religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. And the deistic, supernaturalistic view of God comes under most attacks from external critics. In Protestant thought, it had lost some hold until the period between the two World Wars. Pessimism about human possibilities and discomfort with the idea that God cooperates with human beings led to a resurgence of supernaturalism in the thought of important theologians such as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. They prompted a rediscovery of the brilliant Danish theologian S0ren Kierkegaard, who in the nineteenth century revolted against the use of reason and opposed the view implied in Hegel's philosophy, namely, that God was
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immanent in the world. The late Reinhold Niebuhr, an American theologian, made much capital of this view, which confined all knowledge and thought about God to the revelation of his Word in the Scriptures and which railed against the trust in human reason. At the same time, these thinkers were seen as unsound by the Fundamentalists for engaging in serious biblical criticism. Although these theological matters are beyond my scope in this treatment, some philosophical assumptions—even a metaphysics and surely an epistemological commitment—need to be challenged. Is the realm of existence clearly divided between spirit and matter? Does such an intense opposition exist between the Creator and his creation? If so, how could God actually work in the physical order, and why does he apparently limit himself to so few instances, and to such a small segment of the world's population? To answer that God can do anything he wants to do is scarcely more than begging the question. Rene Descartes saw the problem in such extreme dualism and tried his best to cope with it. He went so far as to suggest that all organic life, with the exception of human beings, could be understood as mechanically caused. Only God and creative spirits could be purposive. Nature ran on a strict cause-and-effect basis. The supernaturalists cannot grant this claim while adhering to divine intervention in the form of miracles. The metaphysical problems are insurmountable. Furthermore, if we stress the distance of God from creation and creatures, we may argue that this is not in accord with religious experience and the testimony of religious people. Muslims view Allah as a literal guide of Mohammed, both present in some sense to Mohammed in his various activities as the prophet of Islam and as concerned with the world and history. The same is true in Judaism and Christianity. Jehovah led the Hebrews out of Egypt, guided them through the wilderness, and led them to the promised land, showing concern and mercy to them in their activities. But how can a strictly supernatural deity be involved in actual, datable, historic events without losing some of the purely supernatural flavor? Those who pray to such a deity earnestly believe that distant deity is somehow individually concerned with their woes and joys and can actually effect changes. But a strict dualistic view seems to preclude such temporal involvement. In the Christian tradition, the dualism is partly annulled by the doctrine of the Comforter or Holy Spirit who is involved in day-to-day affairs of the world. But that, philosophically, does little more than restate the problem. Philosophical deists of the Jeffersonian sort are more consistent. They do not think that the creator of the world has any causal or temporal power, and while they might hold to an overarching Providence, their prayers would be confined to thanksgiving and their religious life limited to morality. Some of the anxiety felt by American Fundamentalists about the questions of evolutionary theory has its roots in their naive, perhaps even crass, supernaturalism. They cannot grasp the alternative view that the Creator may work through the evolutionary process because they argue that Genesis teaches
What Is God's Relation to the Natural World and to Living Creatures? 65 that God made the world for all, without continual creation. Hence, they see evolution as a contradiction of their view of God and spend much wrath opposing it instead of entertaining the hypothesis that evolution may be a scientific description of the way the Creator has worked and is working. Interestingly, because of the strict supernaturalism of traditional deism, some branches of Christianity may introduce intermediaries in the form of saints to whom prayers may be addressed. The actual claims of religious devotees seem to vacate deism, as well as do the logical demands of an integral metaphysics. B. Pantheism In sharp contrast to traditional deism stands the position of pantheism, which identifies God in various degrees with the natural order and living creatures. It is found both religiously and philosophically. The religious experience of the advaita Vedantists of Hinduism affirms that God is all and in all, that the aim of life is to "become God" or to realize the identity of the individual finite creature with the Ultimate. Generally, owing to karma, that identity is lost sight of. When "realization" occurs, the goal of life has been achieved; bliss has taken place. But philosophers have looked at this religious claim and, in the schools of Indian thought, have tried to clear up its meaning. Several positions have emerged as a result of that effort. The first form of pantheism in Greek thought, which developed long after the Upan'ishadic view in Hinduism, may be found in Ammonius .Saccas, the Neo-Platonic philosopher. He had been a Christian but gave it up. Plotinus, his student, took the view that the world and its creatures were emanations of God. They "flowed" out of him as products but were still linked with the One, though the more distant the flow, the darker and more estranged they became. Accordingly, Plotinus's metaphysics has a built-in doctrine of salvation. A person can return to the One through moral discipline, intellectual awareness, and artistic sensitivity. Beauty is the doorway to holiness and ecstatic union with God. What consequence follows from identifying the world and its creatures as God? Advaitic thought in Hinduism suggests that individuality and the world of nature are unimportant and even false or unreal. If God is all, then finite individuality is of little consequence in itself. Human personality is of little consequence until it comes to the realization that it is divine: "That art Thou." Conjoined with this idea is the doctrine that the world of sense, the natural phenomena of daily life, amount to "cosmic ignorance" or mdyd. That is not illusion, but a "show" produced by us, or projected outward by us because of karma. Thus, when I see a waterfall and think it is real, externally existing, I show that I am attached to my sense and have made it "exist" because I am ignorant of my true self (dtman). 1 regard the materials of sense as representing objects independently existing because of my own ignorance, my own sin. My
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individual, private self is hampered by conditions related to its origins, in this case, former lives. The accumulation of pressures and impulses makes me think I exist independently and causes me to emphasize my own ego's reality. These pressures result from former deeds in previous lives. Karma, which controls all, is the law that explains why I am what I am today. Negative karmic influences must be worked off, and I slowly get closer to my goal, which is recognition that I am really one with God, that I am divine. This teaching that the physical world and finite selves are fundamentally unreal is difficult for the Western supernaturalist to comprehend. A semblance of it exists in Mary Baker Eddy's Christian Science position, for there, too, the world is viewed as unreal—evil and illness being products of ignorance. Yet, Eddy's view does claim that finite human beings are independently real. The Indian view is not without its appeal, but to denominate the world of the senses as unreal, though metaphysically intriguing, changes little. If I cut my unreal finger and unreal blood gushes forth, I must still apply an unreal bandage and unreal antiseptics. The Western mind is hard to persuade on such matters. Apart from the highly sophisticated views of the Hindu that God is all reality, we do occasionally find a romantic pantheism in the Western world. Poets and popular religious writers have used the language of pantheism. The well-known Christian hymn by George Matheson, "O Love that wilt not let me go," typifies this. The second stanza reads: 0 Light that followest all my way, 1 yield my flickering torch to Thee; My heart restores its borrowed ray, May brighter fairer be. The writings of the Lebanese poet, Khalil Gibran, popular with hundreds of college students through his The Prophet, imply a romantic if not sentimental pantheistic view throughout. The view involves a fusion of self, God, and nature but offers no categorical clarity and no developed doctrine. We read these things and feel edified, but they baffle the intellect. Such ambiguous vagaries attract inquiring people for a time, but they are soon set aside because of the vagueness and haze. More important historically is the position voiced by the Society of Friends asserting that a divine spark may be found in every person. Quaker philosophers such as Rufus Jones and Douglas Steere have urged this point of view, but it is not so much a developed metaphysical system of pantheism as it is an ethical position aimed at promoting awareness of the value of each individual. The poetry and meditative literature of the Quakers suggests that the aim of life is a mystical experience in which we feel identified with the Ultimate. At the same time, practical Quakerism insists that God may speak to every person as once he spoke in the past. But speaking to an individual is not becoming that individual.
What Is God's Relation to the Natural World and to Living Creatures? 67 Arguably, the philosophers Spinoza and Hegel are pantheists because the first identified God and nature and the second saw all of the world, history, and experience as in some way the dialectical unfolding of Absolute Spirit. But to defend so glib an interpretation of either of these thinkers would require intense technical commentaries. Interested students may wish to pursue this matter more seriously. Less controversy emerges in interpreting thinkers such as J. G. Fichte, Schelling, and F. H. Bradley as absolute idealists, even pantheists; but even in their thought room exists for unique individuality. When we look into the criticisms of pantheism, apart from the usual strong cultural differences between East and West, we must ask questions about the status of science and history. Are we to announce that the discoveries of the scientist and the details of human history in reality amount to nothing, to may a"? A learned Hindu philosopher once told me that even the simplest Indian, the rickshaw drivers, know that the whole world is "false." But what have we gained when we redefine the metaphysical status of the world of the senses? It is uplifting, I suppose, to announce that only God—Brahman-Atman—is ultimately real, that all else amounts to nothing, but even holy persons must breathe, drink water, and eat (or rather have food brought to them). To call food maya does not help us understand the digestive processes or the relation between nutritive maya and poisonous maya. In short, the doctrine is so metaphysical that we cannot live with it, or even write books or print advertisements urging bodily discipline or the spiritual value of yogic practices. Distinctions exist within the allegedly unreal physical world, including degrees of vividness and degrees of color and weight. To make a blanket statement that claims all is false may fit some metaphysical scheme, but it does not account intelligibly for the ordinary experience of ordinary people. Pantheism does have the advantage of avoiding the ex nihilo creation doctrine necessarily accepted by the deistic supernaturalist. More serious in any pantheistic view are questions relating to human persons. Instances of error and ignorance surely exist in finite individuals, including plenty of what may generously be called nastiness. Are these distinctions to be wiped out and denied because they too are phases, modes, or parts of the all-encompassing Supreme Being? Can the Ultimate harbor, as part of its very being, the cruelties of an Adolf Hitler or a P. W. Botha? To suggest, as Hindus do, that karmic consequences cause errors and evil deeds, is not to offer an explanation but to appeal to a mystery for the sake of saving the system. To lose distinctions between good and evil, ugliness and beauty, error and truth, by saying they are all part of the consciousness of the same being is not to solve a problem but to state it. Doctrines of total or complete immanence, asserting that God is to be identified with finite human consciousness in any sense, seem doomed to fail, at least logically. But we must notice that the view above described is a live and thriving doctrine—probably older than the religious view that emphasizes transcendence.
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The religious significance of pantheistic views is that they help us understand mysticism, the claim of the person to have direct awareness of or direct access to the Supreme. We find leanings toward this not only in Christian mystics but also in Muslim Sufis, and even in some Hasidic practices found in Judaism. The more philosophic forms of Taoism have "mystical features, implying an intimacy between the finite and the infinite. Note, however, that the claims and announcements of the mystic are to be taken as reports of intense, profound experiences. In struggling for verbal expression, mystics use pantheistic language, although the traditions in which such expressions occur have insisted on the claim that God is above finite persons and may not in any sense be identified with them. On the other hand, the reports of the soul's intimacy and kinship with the divine may need to be taken into account by the philosopher. They may point to something about the nature of the Ultimate, telling us something is so that reason says can't be so. Think of the utterances of the Psalmist and the writer of the fourth Gospel. C. Theism The third major view of the relation of God to the world is generally called theism. Those who take this view are not offering a half-way position between deism and pantheism but are proposing a view that recognizes value in each without yielding to either extreme. Accordingly, theists insist that God is definitely other than finite creatures and transcends them, but also that God is active in both nature and history—at work providentially, accessible by prayer, available for fellowship—but is always separate existentially from human and other individuals. If God is immanent, he is immanent in nature and history but not in finite beings. God transcends them. "Now what can this mean? Relating theism to religious feeling and experience, and even Scripture, we may think of God as immanent in nature when the chaotic shows evidence of organization. The world was without form and void; God organized it and gave it order as a potter works over undifferentiated clay. God was and is involved in the actual process of the world, both as it was brought into being and as it continues to be. If we were now to accept the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe, we could then say that God arranged for and planned the Big Bang, and steadily saw to it that things proceeded in an orderly way. We could say metaphorically that the world of nature can be construed as an emanation of God, his continuing process, his activity. If we would understand this relationship by reference to our own conscious experience, the following might be indicative: When I write a poem, a letter, or even my signature, I am in some sense present in it. I express myself, project part of my personality into the words or signature. Someone may recognize the handwriting as uniquely mine. I am surely more than any single poem or signature; yet I am somehow "in" the signature just as I am "in" my conversation while it is going on. My conversation is one way in which I
What Is God's Relation to the Natural World and to Living Creatures? 69 manifest myself to others. I am obviously more. Accordingly, we can say that God is in the process of nature. It is his language, as Berkeley and others who follow him have said. But God is more than nature. Berkeley saw in nature "manifest tokens of divinity." This idea does not identify God with nature or nature with God. Instead, it recognizes that nature is somehow in God, continuously dependent upon him. Incidentally, Berkeley thought that a deistic view of God was harmful both to religion and to morality. Borden P. Bowne and others viewed nature as "the divine energizing," as divine activity rather than language. Some call that view panentheism (Hartshome). Nature is in God but God is more than nature. Moreover, this view affords a proper place to the natural sciences. It sees no great gap between nature and God in the sense of the sharp dualism found in deism. There nature stands opposed to God. Theism would, then, ostensibly solve the problem posed by the conservative deistic supernaturalist who is baffled by what to do with the overwhelming evidence of evolutionary theory. Theists see the evolutionary process as the unfolding and developing of God's creative action. God develops new forms in the way described by evolutionary theists. Strictly speaking, what the scientist does is to display and make evident the secrets of God's creative activity, and it lays bare the laws by which God operates. Thus, a scientist with the religious piety of Isaac Newton may properly say that he is thinking God's thoughts after him. The truths discovered in science are to be viewed as partial truths about God. Albert Einstein, for example, thought of God as a great mathematician. But just as a human being is not fully revealed or discovered through writings, so too God is not totally laid bare to our minds when we discover the laws of his operation in some realms. We see the brilliance of William Shakespeare's mind in his thirty dramas, but no one would thereby claim to know everything about Shakespeare. Theism has long emphasized the continuing activity of the divine being. It accords with what is called "Process Theology," though it insists that God's character is permanent and that God's existence is unbegun. It does not view God as a static, external, creative cause but recognizes the reality of change and becoming. It thus partially vacates the traditional Buddhist criticism, which, in insisting that everything is impermanent, denies any eternal causal power, thereby failing to admit that the changing world may be the continual activity of a permanent intelligence who retains identity through change. No matter which view we take of God as a conscious intelligence, the problem of suffering must be faced. Deists have the problem because they must account for why miraculous interventions have not stopped awful events. Those who think all is God must similarly account for how so much can be wrong in the world. To call it may a is merely to name it, not to account for it. And if God is at work in nature as immanentalists say, then he is behaving worse than many kind human fathers behave.
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The problem of the relation of God to nature becomes a central problem for those who say God is conscious and intelligent. Because so much incoherence and mystery is found, this issue may nullify'the view that God must be conceived as a person. But note that some thinkers maintain that God himself suffers. We find this theme in some Japanese thought and also in process thought as found in Whitehead and Hartshorne. 4. How Is God Related to the Good and Valuable? The religious consciousness across space and time has always thought of the Supreme in relation to what is regarded as good and evil. While some aberrational views may say that the Ultimate is supporting evil (for example, Arthur Schopenhauer), none of the traditional eleven religions of the world ever say this. They do differ on how evil comes into the world and how it can be explained, but that is another topic. Religions that emphasize a God think of God as in some sense the creative energy supporting the good. Those who view God as nonconscious and impersonal similarly say that God is to be identified with the good in some way, as its creative source, as its constant support and sustainer (for example, Whitehead). In theoretical Hinduism, God is seen as above the good, as more than the good and as beyond it, and hence, fundamentally indifferent to it. While lesser manifestations of the one God may be seen as creator and preserver, another popular aspect may see him as a destroyer. But theoretically Brahman-Atman is beyond the good and does not engage actively in the world. This is also the case with Aristotle's actus purus—without its modification by Saint Thomas Aquinas—as a basic description of God. Pure actuality reflects purposiveness but is not an object of goodness that we could adore or worship. The same is true for Alexander's nisus. For an impersonalistic humanist, God becomes a term for the highest standards of value. Thus, when we struggle for the best we know, we are approaching God. Religious experience claims that God is on the side of the good and that he is opposed to evil. This view is evident in Parsee faith, which views God as a god of light (whose symbol is fire, Ahura Mazda). And Ahura Mazda stands in eternal opposition to the evil force of darkness, Ahriman or Angra Mainyu. The two are viewed as in a constant struggle, but faith holds that the God of Light will eventually win out. Judaism is not so sharply dualistic but traditionally has claimed a Satan, who as a fallen, willful angel disobeyed" God and opposed him. Some strict literalist Christians and Muslims have taken a similar view as derived from Judaism. God, the Lord, Allah, is good but he has opposition from a devil who may have a legion of helpers. Whether any theologian or philosopher holds to a counterforce or Satan in this fashion—except for those we may call Fundamentalists—is doubtful. The dilemmas are intellectually insurmountable since, for instance, the all-good God is still responsible for allowing an evil being to come into existence.
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Thus, God is seen as basically good. And piety invokes such words as Merciful Father, gracious, benevolent, kind, and so forth, to describe the religious response to such a good God. How is God related to the good? The philosophical attempt to clarify the relation of God to good may be approached in a threefold way. (1) God can be viewed as the source of all that humans and creatures enjoy—their blessings, from life itself to the beauties of nature, the glories of science, and the daily joys of life. God is viewed as the "fount of every blessing," where "blessing" means simply the fact of joy or value. (2) But God's relation to the good in a second sense means that he himself is good in intention. Muslims say he is merciful and worshipful. Jews also say merciful but add loving, as do Christians and Sikhs. Jews think of God as a loving father and so do Christians. One branch of Shintoism cleverly speaks of God as a parent to imply loving concern but to remove lingering attachments to maleness. Religious devotees as well as thinkers often dwell on the goodness of God as his salient feature, even saying that behind a gloomy countenance a smile is to be found. Generally, the idea of goodness is linked with forgiveness and sometimes even with suffering and cooperation, though religions differ on this point. (3) The third way God is viewed as relating to the good is that he is the upholder of standards of morality, justice, truth, and beauty. God is aware of the truth about all these areas of human life and nature and, just as we might discover the laws of physics, so too can we discover the laws of justice and righteousness that are his. This idea finds early expression in Judaism in the form of the Ten Commandments, which are proposals and standards for conduct directly issuing from God. Even the earlier code of Hammurabi preserves such a divine source. The Jewish and Christian traditions are full of explicit teaching on what God requires of his followers, not only morally but even ceremonially. The same note is to be found in Islam. We do not find it in Taoism (yet we should be like the Tao) or Confucianism, and the moral principles of the Shinto deities are obscure. The idea of God's linkage with morality and justice has been a major factor in Western theological and philosophical discussion. Some earlier thinkers thought we could derive moral principles from God himself. But beginning with Immanuel Kant, scholars began to say that the presence of a moral standard in human experience is itself a testimony to God, for moral standards must be known by some conscious being in order to be meaningful; hence, God exists as their conscious source. Or, to say it another way, since Kant the presence of moral values in the world has been taken as evidence for the existence of God, while some of the traditional "proofs" from causation, design, and ontology have been discounted. The only person who denies a grounding of value in the universe is an atheist. Atheists must, strictly speaking, say that anything we call good is a mere convention or an expression of human desire or taste; it has no status in
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the universe as a whole. That is one of the hardest things to accept in the atheist mode of thinking. While easily disposing of the notorious problem of evil, an atheist cannot meet objections that suggest structural laws of human value that seem firmly grounded in the universe itself (such as laws of nutrition or laws of child psychology showing the need for love to infants or treatment of the mentally ill). The structure of value-law or standards is basic to all religions that employ the idea of God, even the tangential ones of general being. (While this Tillichian being may be viewed as personal, he is still the ground of all that is good.) 5. What Is the Relation of God to Time, History, and Events? Questions bearing on the nature and existence of God are at base metaphysical questions more than epistemic or logical questions. One of the most difficult is the relation of the Ultimate to time. Much of religious experience throughout the world holds that God is the eternal, utterly timeless, reality, in no way entrapped or limited by time but wholly beyond it. For God, human time amounts to little. This is the mood of the Psalmists, the Upanishadic writers, and others. In examining the claims of religious believers, two basic positions emerge: (1) the Ultimate is completely beyond time. This we may call the eternalist view. And (2) the Ultimate is somehow linked to time and in time. This we may call the temporalist view. Even if we were to say that God is in time and yet in another way transcends it, that would still be a temporalist view. No half-way view exists. The eternalist view is the traditional position in most practicing religions. For believers to see how the ultimate ground of the universe could be anything more than completely eternal is impossible, which means God is unbegun and unending. The eternal one cannot have begun to be at some time; at no time was he not. This eternalist view is usually coupled with the unchangeableness of God and is vigorously defended by Vedantist thinkers. God is completely apart from time, history, persons, and nature. This view is, of course, linked to the doctrine that the world as we perceive it is maya. Nothing can affect God one way or another on this view. Human actions and history are affected by the law of karma and in turn have effects on karmic law. But the eternal is above karmic law as well. When we enter into bliss, it is a timeless bliss. While Buddhists do not speak with one voice on the question of God, they do insist that the highest form of human existence (or nonexistence) is also timeless (that is, Nirvana). In Taoism, too, the Tao is evidently eternal, for if we could even name it, it would no longer be the Tao. In the religions of the Near East, commencing with Zoroastrianism, the Ultimate is also viewed as the timeless, eternal, unchanging source of all, but with some differences. These religions with one accord stress the role of the
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divine in history. Judaism sees Jehovah as guiding and furthering the destiny of Israel, as entering into a covenant relationship, which binds him and Israel in a moral unity. If Israel honors the covenant, God will see to it that his children prosper. The same is true in Christian and Muslim belief. Both regard God as eternal, but they also stress that he is much interested in what his devotees do. Indeed, those who shun him or do evil will be strongly judged on Judgment Day, the end of time and history. The idea of the end of time suggests that God is letting a few things happen in the. drama of human history but in the end all will turn out according to his plan and purpose. Squaring this eternalism with the idea that God is at work in history is difficult. The usual response of the theologians is that the whole thing is a mystery. God is eternal and unchanging and yet works in history, rewarding and punishing those who obey and disobey him, respectively. This suggests that God is affected by what happens in history because his judgment of individuals is made on the basis of what they do. We can see now how extreme Calvinism can occur in order to preserve the utter eternality of God because it says that God does all the action and that we can do nothing on our own but simply indulge the hope that we might be one among the elect. To say that someone can do anything on his or her own would logically imply that God would pay attention to that and judge the person accordingly. This would make God in some way "dependent" on human choice. Most Jews and Christians (and possibly some Muslims) would not take so strong a view of God as being totally separate. But if God is not wholly above time, then is he God any longer? Can the eternal in any way be affected by temporal events? The Vedantist is the most logically consistent here, along with strict followers of Aristotle. To get around the problem, some appeal again to mystery as their solution, but many are committed to seeking, not to giving up in the face of problems. In Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, normal piety insists that God is somehow involved in human affairs, while being eternal at the same time. The Christian doctrine of the person of Christ and his relation to God indicates the strong Christian belief that God is involved in time. Indeed, the orthodox view says that the Holy One, the eternal, entered time in an incarnation. Without getting involved in theology or Christology, we must raise the philosophical question. Christians say God became human, and some say that God suffered on Calvary. This is surely a time-bound circumstance. Muslims who stress the eternity of God perhaps more consistently than Christians shun the idea of an incarnation or any sort of theophany. Islam means submission to Allah. We do not cooperate with him but do what we must do, offering all to Allah but never for a moment thinking that Allah is actually affected by what we do. But one area of religious experience apparently goes against a strong eternalist view—the area of prayer. For the eternalist, prayer can only mean meditation on the wonder of the Ultimate, or it can be adoration and thanksgiving. Prayer might request mercy and forgiveness, but any prayer of petition that asks the Ultimate to do something different in the world seems to
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suggest that prayer can make a difference to God. If it can make a difference to God then God is affected by history. Here is where piety is an intrinsic part of most religious experience. Does it presume to think that the Ultimate is in any way affected? Many religious people will simply pray, "Thy will be done," and forthwith proceed to suggest that whatever happens is indeed the will of God, meaning (though ambiguously) the working out of a prearranged plan. So, prayer must be merely the adopting of an attitude of acquiescence in what is. This is scarcely what we find in Jewish, Christian, Sikh, or Parsee experience. Elijah prayed to God to strike fire on the altars of the .worshipers of Baal and according to the story, fire came to verify who was the true God. Jesus repeatedly urges his followers to pray, saying "ask and ye shall receive." If a child asks for bread will his father give a stone? Accordingly, actual religious piety feels that prayer to an utterly eternal God makes a difference. Consider also the popular Hindu view that also involves prayer to lesser gods in seeking particular assistance. In Roman Catholic views, ordinary people sometimes pray to accessible saints for direct assistance. Pilgrimage spots in Europe are full of notes and signs from people who thank a saint for a particular act of kindness in restoring health. This prayer via saints implies that saints as mediators may do things more readily than an eternalist Ultimate. One other critical remark needs to be made. Development and evolution have apparently taken place since the earliest days. Scientists continue to unearth evidence indicating that present forms of life have arisen from earlier forms. Marxists even believe in social evolution. Astronomers have strong evidence for the evolution of the galaxies from an earlier state. All this suggests (if we believe in God), that God is not an ultimate do-nothing who contemplates existence, a mere "edge" of a first cause, but that he is creatively at work in existence throughout the world even now. Philosophical support for eternalism has also been strong in thinkers after Aristotle, especially in Spinoza and up through Kant. Berkeley recognized the problem when he said that to discuss God and time would get us "lost and embrangled in a host of difficulties." With Hegel, we get a wholly different point of view. The absolute is in dialectical development. The Idea is process. Hegel had a philosophy of development thirty years before Charles Darwin's Origin of Species (1859). With the appearance of revolutionary doctrine, some new efforts to define the relation of God to time developed. One of the most distinguished was Alexander's Space, Time, and Deity. God is definitely linked to the temporal order, and we wonder whether any transcendence remains. Personalistic idealists such as E. S. Brightman also urged a temporalist view of God as logically coherent as well as in keeping not only with the testimony of religious experience but also with the evidence of growth and development in the sciences—notably, astronomy, biology, and geology. But the most outstanding philosopher of recent times who has taken a clearly temporalist view of God is Whitehead in Process and Reality. In this view, God is so close
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to time that critics think the God of the religious worship and faith has all but disappeared. Hartshorne has made Whitehead's views more explicit in his total rejection of the eternalist position. Critically speaking, we must ask whether a God so conditioned by time has any fundamental ultimacy left in him. Whitehead speaks of God's two natures, primordial and consequent. Religious believers have found this not in keeping with their experience. A God so trapped in the time sequence cannot be the ultimate ground of existence. What happens is that the idea of God gets so redefined that it no longer jibes with the thoughtful claims of believers. The truth is the main thing, but we need to ask about the relation between thousands of years of belief in the Ultimate and the idea that no Ultimate exists. Yet a pure eternalism seems equally unacceptable unless we are prepared to say that all natural order and history mean nothing or are to be construed as maya. When we think of all the time that has passed and all that may yet come, the span of one human life seems totally inconsequential, a mere tick of a clock as Spinoza might say. On the other hand, within the brief span of seventy years, we see growth, creativity, pain, illness, suffering, and joy. These things do take place and people must deal with them. Mass suicide is not warranted merely because individual life is so fleeting and inconsequential. We need to remind ourselves that we are the beings who are finding all this out. We are the finite, limited minds who are trying to grasp what this flick of existence might mean. And religious minds think it does mean something, even in the sweep of the eternal. Human beings are insignificant, and the Psalmist's query "What is man that Thou art mindful of him?" can be answered by noting that people at least recognize a Thou and seek the Eternal. Some wish only to acquiesce silently. Some curiously seek understanding. Others give it all up to mystery, while others seek to work with and cooperate with the Ultimate in promoting the good, the true, the beautiful, and the holy. In a sense, the Eternal is, as has been said, a deeply obligated being. He made creatures without their request or approval. Have we not the right to ask who he is and what he is doing and why? We refuse to be put down by saying that God is all and that we are mere nothings. We can properly ask: If we are mere nothings, why did he bother to make us? The motives of God are no doubt unfathomable, but we cannot allow persons from an ancient time who viewed the Ultimate as scarcely better than the Oriental despot they knew in their time to dictate how we must think of God today. Furthermore, linked to this is the idea of Providence. In the Near Eastern religions, this is a strong and clear belief. We may not regard it as merely symbolic if we take the idea of God seriously. If Providence is to mean anything, it requires some clear presence of God in time. Thus, we could say God is timeless in the sense of unbegun and unending. Nevertheless, he is involved in time in some way—in realms clarified by the scientist, in history, and in daily human affairs.
Five GOD AND ARGUMENTS Manifestly, more than two billion people on the planet who currently believe in God did not arrive at their beliefs by- careful processes of logical analysis or deduction. Nor have most of the atheists in the world worked out their concepts by skillful argumentation. We may like to think that our views can be supported by argument, but usually our convictions about God developed in a cultural context over a period of years. They are most often not the result of rigorous disciplined thinking in scientific seminars or in philosophical forums. That is also true about our attitude toward scientific medicine, patriotic devotion, the sentimental trust in military power, our economic allegiance, or our nutritional preferences. These are not things we initially decide upon abstractly and openmindedly, as we might carefully select an automobile after weighing its merits and defects among options available. Natural pressures and circumstances figure more heavily in topics bearing upon our value attitudes than do reason and argumentation. This is not to say that reason is useless and arguments irrelevant or that a person is so molded and conditioned by his or her background as to make impossible a fair-minded, logical attitude when investigating the question of whether belief in God is warranted. Nor would we say that our family patterns of eating are so insistent and motivated that it would be impossible ever to decide what a proper human diet should be, let alone to change our eating habits. The fact is that minds studying such matters have found out, with considerable objectivity, what food and drink is best and what dietary items should be avoided. Some have become vegetarians and even opponents of red meat. Evidence and reasons are not only given, they are accepted and trusted. The burden of proof is on the person who suggests that on matters of religion, especially belief in God, we cannot or should not try to find out what is true. Beliefs come before arguments, convictions before debate, but discussion and argument can be entered into for the sake of testing pet ideas or inherited preferences, religious or otherwise. Just as we may change eating patterns on the basis of evidence, or may alter an uncritical patriotic fear for good reasons, we may also change our beliefs about God, either for or against. Or, just as we may find, upon examination, that our inherited political preferences are justifiable, so too we may discover, after thoughtful examination, that no good reason exists for giving up our inherited beliefs about God. Once the question is raised by an inquiring mind, the issue is: Is my belief sound or true or isn't it? Another kind of question would be: What is to be retained from my traditional faith and what is to be rejected and for what reasons?
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Philosophers do not create the problems they are trying to solve. As they survey human experience thoughtfully, they find persuasive, traditional teachings about God, complex lines of thought about a divine being, and unique, often novel, proposals and claims about what is supreme or ultimate. They are duty-bound to evaluate and judge such claims critically with a view to arriving at truth. Accordingly, while beliefs do not usually spring from rational analysis, they may be studied and checked by rational inquiry. On the question of the existence of God, efforts have been made to apply rational techniques at least as early as the sixth century B.C. For traditional a.theists, the risk is that rational judgment may compel a change of mind toward belief in God (as Romanes and Joad, for example). For the person who already believes in God, the risk of rational inquiry is such that we may be persuaded to abandon such belief in the interest of serving truth first instead of remaining blindly loyal to a powerful tradition. The aim of this chapter is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that have been offered for supporting the existence of God. We must notice that some persons divert attention away from philosophical argument by offering theories of how the idea of God arose in human experience—how it was caused, what motivated it, or how it evolved. To ask for the cause of an idea is not the same as to ask for its rational basis. Some intellectuals, unable to see any rationality among believers in God, have therefore focused on psychological, cultural, social, or even economic forces and factors that might have been at work in producing or stimulating belief in God. Some have alleged they have found the "cause" in the deeper recesses of the human psyche, perhaps the human longing and need for a "father figure." Others, such as Ludwig Feuerbach, see the idea of God as necessitated by the social group. It becomes a projection of human wishes, not an account of the nature of the world. And some may see belief in God as an invention of crafty politicians or class interests, developed for the sake of keeping ordinary people comfortable or silent while they are being used or oppressed. Some Buddhists have tried to trace monotheism not to an original revelation but to an error of assumption by human beings. While such efforts at looking into the causes of a belief may be interesting, they have no philosophical worth. Indeed, we could with equal force ask for the causes of atheism and investigate its evolution as Borden P. Bowne once did in 1888 in an article called "The Natural History of Atheism." We may also notice that the mental health of vocal atheists does not appear to be much better than that of devout believers. But such things do not touch the issues and must be set aside summarily. Questions always arise of how we will argue, what we mean by reason, what rules we will follow, or what sort of arguments will be accepted, and so on. We may not presume to put strictures on argumentation in advance, announcing even before we consider them which arguments will be accepted and which will not, or whether arguments are even relevant. Some recent theologians, such as Paul Tillich, have said that no arguments for the existence of God are acceptable. Besides ignoring over twenty centuries of serious
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thought, that negative position is question-begging, for it is based on a concept of God that by its nature precludes arguments—a concept itself worthy of discussion. Other thinkers have suggested that they will not accept arguments based on evidence or experience because such arguments could not possibly establish the existence of a perfect, ultimate being. Even the strong theistic philosopher George Berkeley recognized that we could raise doubts about the nature of arguments even before any were considered. In his dialogue Alciphron (1730), one of the speakers says he will not be persuaded by metaphysical arguments, "such for instance as are drawn from the idea of an all-perfect being, or the absurdity of an infinite progression of causes." And he adds, I think wisely, that he will not be persuaded "by the authority of the past or present ages of mankind in general, or of particular wise men," adding that all proofs based on practical value, "utility, or convenience are foreign to the purpose." Nor can we say in advance that no argument for God is acceptable, being of necessity out of harmony with the scientific view of the world. The venue for arguments cannot be decided in an appropriate way. Surely, no single "scientific" view or orthodox "scientific" method exists that lets us decide in advance that no arguments can be given. We might suggest that the kind of reason that enables us to establish scientific hypotheses and theories cannot be out of harmony with the kind of reason employed in developing theories about God and the universe. Bearing in mind methodological debates, I now proceed to examine some of the arguments that emerge from human thought about God. We must also bear in mind the content of Chapter Four, namely, that the specific idea of God argued about is important. My approach will focus primarily on the idea of God as an intelligent consciousness, in some sense the ultimate creative force responsible for all (that is, nature and individuals). That seems to be the dominant belief held throughout the world by ordinary believers of faiths such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism. The belief is also implicit in Confucianism, Shintoism, and possibly Taoism. Buddhists have no strong idea of God; some oppose theism directly. Jains offer arguments against belief in God, which 1 will consider in my discussion. Instead of beginning with the so-called "classical" formulations of philosophers from the twelfth through the seventeenth centuries—as if "classical" arguments accepted by philosophers of religion existed—I will consider arguments that seem to grow out of human religious experience and claims. Then, I will consider some of those positions developed by Saint Thomas Aquinas and others. As will be evident, those traditional arguments have an abstract, theoretical character dependent on a string of concepts and definitions largely foreign to practicing religious believers throughout the world, even though well-known in the closets of technical philosophers.
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The appeal to religious experience as a basis for belief in God is not the same as what is sometimes called the empirical argument for God. The empirical argument considers various evidence in nature and history; the appeal to experience is concerned only with claims that God has been experienced, directly or indirectly. People come to their faith in the Supreme Being through some sort of experience long before they philosophize about it. From the earliest days, they have been taught to mumble children's prayers in the home or have from birth been associated with a religious community. Thro' Him the first fond prayers are said Our lips of childhood frame The last low whispers of our dead Are burdened with His Name. Most religious communities make a point of developing religious awareness in children apart from argument. Think of the Bar and Bat Mitzvahs of Judaism, Confirmation in Christianity, early religious education in Islam, coming-of-age ceremonies in Zoroastrianism, and the like. The child is made to feel that a Supreme Being exists who is in some way concerned with him or her in the religious community. They grow up with some "experience" of God in the general sense. Later in life, people who have had strong religious experiences while in a community of believers may abandon their beliefs, give up faith in God. Sometimes their departure from the "fold" may be for carefully worked out reasons. More often it is the result of some shock of vivid negative experience that turns their world awry. Some drift away listlessly, just as they turn away from childhood games. But religious experience may be a ground for belief in God in another sense than through indoctrination or influence upon early life. We may have a unique, striking experience that points us toward God, and we do not argue such things. When Vivekananda came in the presence of the Hindu saint Sri Ramakrishna in the last century, he was struck dumb and came to a realization of God. Or it may be an experience as luminous as that of Saint Paul on the road to Damascus, or the vivid response of Moses before the burning bush thirteen centuries earlier, or of Mohammed's graphic confrontation with Allah in the seventh century. Such personal encounters are so rousing that a change in the direction of life occurs and we say that God is the cause. We move from darkness into light, so the claim goes, and the consequences are often weighty and, as in the cases mentioned, have shaped history. Persons who through striking experiences come to belief in God at ages after adolescence, possibly as mature adults, usually cannot be argued with. They are sure their experiences are prompted by the Divine One.
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Many less-dramatic experiences have also led people to believe in God and make God the organizing center of their lives. When we make a conscious commitment to the Supreme One and thereby enter into a new relationship or mode of life, we are led to affirm the existence of God without quaking. When we are delivered from pain, confusion, mental anguish, or sheer wantonness, when our life takes on new luster and meaning as a result of such decision, we easily conclude that a ndnhuman power has been at work. Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke of his own belief in God as "validated in the experience of everyday life."2 Some also make efforts through discipline and earnest striving to cultivate experiences of God, which they then accept as guarantees of God's reality. In the Hebrew Psalms we read: "My soul thirsteth for Thee. My flesh longeth for Thee" (Ps. 63), or "My heart and flesh cry out for the living God" (Ps. 84). Sincere members of the Society of Friends, for example, engage in disciplined seeking after the divine in the form of what they call the Inner Light, and from the time of George Fox, thousands have claimed direct experience of God. This is the case among those with a mystical bent in all of the world's theistic religions. But such seeking after experiences of the divine is not normative in all religions by any mean's. In addition to having first-hand experiences that seem to attest to the existence of a divine being, we may feel warranted in believing in God by heeding reports and claims of those who have had such experiences. Two distinguished Hindu philosophers have written: "Those who have no direct experience must depend on the authority of those rare blessed souls who are pure in heart and have seen God." And they add that the Scriptures that report what the seers have experienced "may be accepted as a source of right knowledge about God."3 The writer of the Book of Hebrews in the New Testament, after listing examples of faith in God, concludes with a call to action and perseverance, "since we are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses" (Heb. 12:1). This matter of reported experiences that point to belief in God takes on still more significance when we notice the funding of similar experiences over a long period, perhaps in an unbroken line of saints and sages extending back in time as many as three thousand years. Successions of believers in God, apostolic or not, provide interesting material for our thought. To be sure, the endurance of an idea through centuries is no guarantee of its validity. Many errors have a long and persistent history. Nor may we conclude that God exists just because the idea of his existence has been securely maintained from the earliest days. Yet, we must ask: Does the repeated experience of wise people— saints and sages—count for nought? In a speech given in Cambridge in 1984, the Archbishop of Canterbury (Robert Runcie) said: "We must at least give heed to a belief when it has been filtered through the experiences of enlightened and thoughtful persons in different parts of the world over long years."
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We may not say that such experiences are either a necessary or a sufficient reason for belief in God. We may say that vivid claims of apparently honest thinkers that have not only been repeated but have borne such fruit in the whole of human history are worthy of attention. For those already leaning toward belief in God, such reports are at least confirmatory, if not convincing. When we find a conjunction of good argument and noteworthy productive experiences, to settle on belief in God is not wholly unreasonable. I must add a word about something close to experience, namely, experiment. One way of establishing or verifying a hypothesis in the natural or social sciences is to test it experimentally. Is this possible when determining whether God exists? What conceivable experiment could indicate the existence of an ultimate intelligence maintaining all of existence? Some have requested that God give them a specific sign to verify his existence. The resulting claims are a history of aberrant vagaries that tell more about the inquirer than about the ultimate being. Superficial efforts have been made to test the validity of prayer and, hence, establish the existence of God, by putting aside two groups of plants with the purpose of noting whether plants that were prayed over flourished better than those that were not. But who could adequately construct a controlled experiment of that type? The very idea violates religious sensibilities almost as much as the blasphemous nineteenth-century suggestion that we could verify God's existence if hospital patients in one ward, for whom prayers were said, fared better than patients in another ward for whom no prayers were offered. But a factor of experiment exists in several religions—a factor that suggests that if we sample or try out belief in God, the consequences of so doing will produce rewarding and possibly persuasive benefits. The Psalmist writes: "Oh, taste and see that the Lord is good. Happy is the man who takes refuge in him" (Ps. 34:8). In the Gospel of John, we find a verse that says that if we try to do what is right, we will know that it is of God (John 7:17). Jesus proposed that one test of belief is in its results, it fruits. And the Bhagavad Gita suggests that we might try several paths to attaining. God-realization. The logical force of such invitations is minimal. No one has time to sample competing beliefs about the Ultimate and, to be fair, we would also need to try out anti-theistic views to see what benefits they might produce. Life is too short and time too precious for that sort of thing. Belief in God in both East and West has truly resulted in some strikingly changed lives and in remarkable advances in human well-being and culture. Saint Augustine's creative energies were released after his conversion. Opposition to the slave trade was united by believers. Johann Sebastian Bach was no theologian but he composed, as he himself said, "soli deo gloria" (for the glory of God alone), and the resulting music has not yet been equaled. Gothic cathedrals are wonders of the world, and these were not dedicated to human beings. Nor were the marvelous temples in India. Yet, at the same time, I must note that belief in God has also apparently issued in a veritable
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menagerie of fanaticism, cruelty, wars, and persistent folly. However interesting may be the appeal to historical experience, we cannot make much headway by this sort of discussion. Indeed, generally speaking, the appeal to experience" is weakened by the negative evidence that may be adduced regarding subjective experience. Believers often resort to special pleading when they say their experience testifies to the Ultimate. Many honest persons do not and even cannot claim to have had experiences that point them to God or serve as a warrant for belief. And possibly those who come to God through some vital personal experience may be led away from such belief by some tragedy, such as the death of a loved one or the birth of a deformed infant. They may then announce that their bitter experience indicates that no God exists at all. The primary difficulty in appealing to human experience as evidence for the existence of God is epistemological. That some being other than ourselves can be experienced in the same way as we are aware of our own existence is not obvious. I may be said to experience directly and immediately some black marks on white paper, and I might soon come to accept those marks as printed letters. I may come to know what those alphabetical letters mean if they are in a language intelligible to me. But suppose they are in the Icelandic language? I will still have before me the black marks, but some time will pass before I can interpret or infer the meaning. Now, that the being of God is an immediate datum of my consciousness in the same way as are the black printed marks I see is difficult to say. I may have evidence in my experience that points to God's existence. I do not have his existence as evidence itself. But alternate ways exist of interpreting and judging what is present to me in conscious awareness. Where one person may claim a direct awareness of God, another may report an inexplicable warm sensation or a vivid feeling without asserting anything about God at all. Merely having an experience that we may think of as an experience of the Divine One is no guarantee that it is the Divine One. Even advanced Hindus who claim that God can be immediately realized and known must nevertheless offer evidence to their guru or confreres that what has happened in them is not a case of delusion or dementia. Knowledge seems to consist of inference from evidence, but is not the evidence itself, else we could never make a mistake. Perhaps inference from evidence is one way of establishing the existence of God. 2. The Argument from Beauty and Design in the Natural World Religious people who are aware of the need to express their belief in an Ultimate One by appealing to something other than their own experience will often present straightforward observations about the beauty, design, and order in the natural world. These things, they say, testify that an intelligent, purposive designer, or God at work in some sense. How account for the glories of nature to eye and ear if no purposive intelligence sponsors them? Could the vast
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beauty of the natural world be a mere accident? Once, upon hearing the young Yehudi Menuhin perform on the violin with the New York Philharmonic Orchestra years ago, Albert Einstein, after the concert, rushed up and embraced the boy exclaiming: "Now I know that there is a God in heaven."4 The presence of beauty in the natural world as well as in human beings seems best understood when viewed as the product of God. And how can we explain the fitness of the bee for the flower and the flower for the bee if these are not examples of intelligent planning? Moreover, on every level of scientific observation we find patterns, order, and a persistence of regularity that suggest a supreme intelligence is their basis. The so-called "design argument," or teleological argument for the existence of God has been formulated by a long tradition of philosophers, beginning with Aristotle and extending until modern times. Immanuel Kant thought this alone of the traditional arguments had merit even though it did not yield deductive certitude. David Hume claimed some people had "fatally weakened" the argument, but his discussion stops with eighteenth-century formulations and did not anticipate what nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers said in the light of evolutionary and other findings. Hume's line of reasoning might have bearing on William Paley's famous watchmaker analogy, but no serious philosopher of religion in the last century and a half has taken this line seriously. If we limit ourselves merely to evidence in the natural order that suggests purposive design, such as the adaptability and regenerative power of animals, we can find considerable weight in the argument. But little unanimity exists among contemporary scientists. In his Chance and Necessity, Jacques Monod sees nothing but mechanistic determinism. For him, apparent purposiveness is a result of necessity. W. H. Thorpe, an ethologist, in answering Monod in his Purpose in a World of Chance, claims purpose is behind all mechanical necessity. He cites particular and statistical evidence of apparent purpose in the animal world. The accumulation of such positive evidence can be counterbalanced not by the mere assertion of a naive scientific realism but by evidence of failures in the natural order—not just malformations and the tremendous waste in natural processes but in the dreary history of extinct species, dead ends in the animal kingdom, and the definitely predictable prospect of overpopulation and insufficient food for human beings in the next three or four centuries. C. D. Broad once observed that the ideologist who heeded the ways of the locust and the lemming would be "a sadder but a wiser man." Consider also the success of muscular dystrophy, AIDS, Parkinson's Disease, and wild cancerous growths. If we see evidence for a supreme intelligence in nature, what do we do with ugliness, disorder, and so many facts that indicate total purposelessness? (I will discuss this theme fully in Chapter Six.) Until we ponder more thoughtfully the process of evolution itself, the negative evidence in the biological sciences seems weighty enough to frustrate
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the teleological argument for God. To be sure, nature is "red in tooth and claw" and the fierce struggle for survival persists. Only the fittest have endured. But, we may ask, how do any fit species occur at all that might engage in the intense struggle to survive? For the fittest to survive implies, as -J.- G. Schurman noted over a century ago, an "arrival of the fit." The very evidence used to support evolution also becomes evidence for an intelligent purposive power in control of the process itself. A little reflection shows that the so-called conflict between creationism and evolutionism, which is rehearsed about every thirty years, not only is a misunderstanding of the theories involved but is a pseudo-problem springing from a questionable crass neo-supernaturalistic view of the deity. Furthermore, the natural world, far from making life impossible, conduces to the development of human life and well-being. Peter Bertocci remarks: "The kind of existence we know and enjoy as human beings is rooted in, if not confined to the orderly forces in the inorganic and organic world."5 J. G. Fichte held the extreme but not impossible view that the world existed solely for the development of moral character. The world of nature is "the material of duty made visible of soul-making." Plato offered evidence and reasons implying that the world as a whole is structured to support the good and thwart evil. In this view, evil by its own intrinsic nature will self-destruct; the good will thrive. The long haul of history since his time does not readily convince us that Plato was right, but his view of a universal dependable moral structure grounded in reality is not wholly unreasonable and is an unchangeable prerequisite and feature in the pervasive Oriental doctrine of karma. This implies that the universe is so built that no creature can violate the moral order without suffering consequences either in this life or another. The argument can take still another turn. Those who argue from the presence of purposive facts in nature to a divine purpose may willingly admit that the array of facts indicating design can be counterbalanced by negative facts, but they have something else to add that undercuts both negative and positive evidence. I must call attention to the reliability of natural laws, commencing perhaps with the wheeling of the planets and the processes of the outward-bound galaxies, then moving to the biological realm. To be sure, devastating facts of misery and chaos exist in the world, but discoverable laws also exist that explain and clarify the nature of these things and allow us to make predictions. Cancerous growths are an abomination, yet a scientist may find the law of their growth and make reasonable predictions, just as we may predict with assurance that the absence of vitamin C will result in scurvy and the presence of vitamin D can prevent rickets. Such discernible laws are not happenstance. Insofar as they are true or valid, they may be trusted. At this point, the teleologist can claim not that the simple facts of design suggest an intelligence but instead that the reliability of the laws of nature suggests an intelligence who is the guarantor of their reliability. The presence of natural laws may imply a designer, but the reliability and trustworthiness of those laws clearly does. Even the most committed scientist is baffled, having no
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explanation for the simplicity of the laws of nature and no way whatsoever of giving an account of why they are so trustworthy. A scientific thinker such as Julian Huxley can only say: "we must learn to accept the world as the one basic mystery." To explain why the laws of nature can be trusted is outside the function of the scientist. The scientist can only discover and report those laws but cannot tell us why such laws exist, let alone why they may be trusted. Yet scientists and their colleagues work with that reliability every day, or no science would exist at all. The cosmologist Stephen Hawking asserts a consistency at the deepest level of nature, which is what all scientists believe. "If we were not to believe we might as well give up."6 The religious response to this aspect of teleology is profound. It calls attention to the faithfulness of God in dealing with his creatures. The recognition of that faithfulness evokes practical piety and reverence in the believer, which in turn elicits feelings of security, stability, consolation, and hope in hours of confusion and pain. God is not merely a designer of marvelous artifacts; he may be depended upon anytime. This is the testimony of the Book of Job and other similar reports. To suggest in a dour romantic mood of despair that life is absurd, lacks meaning, and that no guiding intelligence or God exists in the universe, is simply not to be aware of the work of generations of scientists who know the universe is not absurd. Indeed, Robert Patterson cleverly suggests that if we say "the universe is totally irrational, that would seem to imply that the universe was prevented from being rational by some external agency."7 Scientists work out the engineering details to make possible a trip to the moon with' the sure sense that the physical laws making possible a rocket lift-off can also be depended upon to allow for the rocket's return. The laws of physics do not change in outer space. If something unpredictable happened, the scientist would immediately look for the law or principle that would account for the deviation and would not rest until having wrested that law from the evidence. Thus, the so-called teleological argument of tradition may be vacated, or we may say it takes on new meaning when the theist calls attention to the reliability of natural laws. We may not choose to believe in an intelligent God as their source, but what account can then be given? As Bowne once put it: "The continuity of law, therefore, is a pure postulate which must either be referred to an abiding purpose in the cosmic intelligence, or else be accepted out of hand as an opaque fact."8 Some scientists accept the presence of dependable natural laws with, they say, "natural piety," but they attempt no other account. Note that those scientists who have the clearest and firmest laws in the natural sciences are often likely to believe in intelligent purposive divinity. But scientists in the psychological and social sciences, where laws are scarcely firm and vary among countries (as do the laws of psychology and sociology in the USA), frown on a theistic view of the universe and try to explain away belief in an abiding intelligence, not by denying objective
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evidence but by probing the obscure motives of the believers themselves. That this approach backfires is something such scientists cannot on the whole admit. 3. The Argument from the Alleged Need of a Cause Even an unsophisticated mind not exposed to technical philosophy will think that some way must exist to account for the very presence of the world itself. And we readily think that things that are here now came into being through some cause. What we have before us are effects of something that went before them. Moreover, we know that what we have before us now will no doubt be causally related to what happens next. Today's experience is causally related to yesterday's and tomorrow's will be causally related to today's. That a causal sequence. connects all things appears unquestionable to common sense. This further implies that everything has an underlying cause, and thus that some initial cause that started the whole sequence must exist. Must not of necessity a first cause or an uncaused cause exist, something that is its own cause, a causa sui, as Benedict Spinoza put it? This first, necessary, and uncaused cause would then be the equivalent of the Ultimate, the divine being, God. Some have accepted this as an argument for the existence of God. But to accept it is not easy. Is the first cause the God of religious believers? They believe that God did not just begin a causal chain but is causing things to happen all the time and will continue to do so. How can a first cause be a present cause? And if a present cause exists, could it still be a first cause? The first cause could merely be the stuff existing before the "Big Bang" occurred, out of which the cosmic process issued. When religious persons worship, do they revere an uncaused cause? Is such a cause the providential guardian of history? What would it mean to be devoted to seek unity with, or offer prayers to, such a cause? Apparently, no reason exists to'conclude that a first cause must also be an intelligent, conscious being. Moreover, the divinity believed in by Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs is surely more than a factor in astronomy and physics. Brahman-Atman of the Hindus can scarcely be comprehended as merely the uncaused cause. God as a "causer" of the universe does not figure seriously in the Hindu faith at all. Charles Hartshorne warns against "etiolatry," the obsession with cause as such.9 We may, then, wonder about the value or force of this initially appealing causal argument. Evidently, we must rethink the meaning of cause itself and perhaps introduce the idea that conditions and grounds exist for occurrences that are factors in change but not detectable simply as causes. The argument assumes that causation is linear—a sequence of causes going in different directions, no doubt, but traceable to a single initiation. But can we ever state with certainty the cause of any single event? No one, as Hume's analysis shows, can ever see, touch, or hear a cause, or watch it pass from one thing to another. Yet, "cause" may be nothing more than a useful word introduced for convenience to help us connect objects with one another. Aristotle was astute enough to distinguish
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four kinds of causes—the material, formal, efficient, and final causes. That is too simplified in the light of modern scientific and philosophical understanding. Is cause external or internal? Is it transcendent or immanent or both? Can something that happened a long time ago cause something to happen now? Can something occurring now be causally related to something else that will happen ten centuries from now? Can cause ever be experienced even though it can't be apprehended by the senses? In their critique of theistic thought, philosophers representing the Jain religion have raised other questions about the causal argument for God. To say that God is the cause of the universe implies that the universe itself is a product. It may not be. We cannot say that God is the cause of all, because we see many objects such as houses and kettles that are not produced by God. Moreover, how could God work on material bodies if he is by definition bodiless? And one objection from a Buddhist perspective maintains that if God were the sole creative cause, everything would have to have been created at the same moment. If someone counters that God creates successively, "he is again not the sole cause of everything for then there are other causes too, which in their turn depend on still other ones."10 Such criticisms coming from religious believers themselves do have some force against a purely linear conception of causality and against a strictly supernaturalistic deism. But suppose we were to recast the idea of causality and think of it as immanent on the analogy of our own inner experience of volition? I do not literally see any causes when I write these lines but I am conscious that they would not be produced in this fashion were I not the active agent. We could, accordingly, list countless conditions necessary to produce, say, our signature, but the conscious act of writing is a direct experience of a kind of causality. My signature, to be genuine, must be written by me, and I can be aware of producing it. Are we pressing the analogy too far if we propose that God is the continual cause of the universe—the conscious agent that initiates, continues, guarantees, and perpetuates the world? It is not successive causation but continual production. Perhaps the divine being is immanent or present in the world, in that sense being its cause. The very presence of the world may then be explained as a continual product of divine activity or energizing. But then we must ask how a presumably immutable, unchanging God can be the omnipresent cause of all change. At this point, we apparently must modify and enlarge our concept of God or give up on the idea of causality. We may argue, as Hawking has, that the universe is self-contained. He professes reasonable confidence that we know the history of the universe up to one second before the Big Bang. Before that we must speculate. He says: "If there's an edge to the universe, there must be a God"; but he also claims that if we could explain everything in the universe on the hypothesis that no edge exists, we would have "a much more natural and economical theory."" We need to remind ourselves that more exists in the universe than physical energy, including values and pains, frustrations and purposes, artistic creations,
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governments, social forces, and human meanings and joys that cannot be simply reduced to energy patterns or mathematical formulae. The causal argument for God gives us pause and it stimulates us to look further. 4. The Argument from Moral Standards and the Status of Values Religious believers throughout the world have claimed for centuries that a connection exists between their behavior and what the Supreme Being requires. Even in religions long defunct, we find a belief that the deity placed moral requirements on devotees. Think of the code of Hammurabi and the fierce requirements for human sacrifice the Mayans thought their deity placed upon them. Among living religions, the Tao te Ching enjoins its readers "to be like the Tao," to live in accord with the ultimate world principle. Confucius asked his followers to heed the voice of Heaven in their undertakings. Parsees, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs firmly believe that the ultimate source of the universe places moral requirements on its followers. The Ten Commandments of the Jew and Christian claim divine origin. The Koran places moral demands on Allah's followers, even as to the type of government. Moral commands as such, however, are not so prominently related to Brahman-Atman of the Hindus, nor to traditional Shinto deities. But those religions acknowledge the facts of guilt and the failure to live up to the highest. They provide occasions for purification before the deity. Nontheistic Jains and Buddhists vigorously insist that failure to live according to moral principles will result in undesirable karmic consequences. Accordingly, in spite of the Western cult of modernity (in Northern Europe and on the East Coast of the United States), religious believers claim that right and wrong behavior makes a real difference. Moreover, strongly theistic religions affirm moral standards sanctioned by God. We can believe in morals without believing in God; but hardly anyone who has believed in God for the last two thousand years has denied the existence of objective moral standards approved by the deity. The Antinomians, for example, thought that once we achieve salvation, no duties are laid upon us. The step from belief in God to the acceptance of moral standards is almost a commonplace. But does it work the other way? Does an examination of the moral life and its claims about moral standards lead us to the conclusion that a God who knows, favors, and supports those standards exists? Can an investigation of the moral life lead us to God? If we find support for the existence of objective standards of morality, may we then infer that those standards are unintelligible unless they are known by and grounded in a supreme intelligence? I have earlier suggested that the presence of comprehensible and reliable laws of physical nature seems to require a unified intelligence as their source. Does the presence of moral standards also make that requirement? If moral ideals exist independent of human beings, can those ideals be intelligible if they are not realized and understood in some sense by a divine personality "in whom supreme good is acknowledged and actualized"?12
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Though suggestions of this argument can be found in Plato's thought, not until Kant was the moral argument for God emphasized. (Even now it is sometimes overlooked by critics who dote on Aquinas). In the third part of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant brilliantly challenged the traditional arguments for God—the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological. He found them logically defective and consequently ineffective in demonstrating the existence of a supreme personal consciousness. He later argued, however, in his Critique of Practical Reason, that though the existence of God was not logically demonstrable, it could be accepted as a necessary postulate of the moral life. An examination of the moral responsibility of duty led Kant to infer that human morality is meaningless unless we postulate a divine lawgiver. Though not logically deducible, he thought it reasonable to believe in the existence of a divine lawgiver. For us to comprehend the meaning of duty and responsibility, we need to postulate a supreme mind who guarantees a connection between virtue and happiness. Day-to-day morality means nothing if it has no grounding in the very structure of the universe, if no guarantee exists that virtue is intrinsically worthwhile. For Kant to urge that we should treat our duties as divine commands was, then, an easy step. Our best thought about responsibility may be understood as a requirement placed on us by a God who is the moral lawgiver—as one poet put it: "our highest thought of thy will." Rudolf Lotze, one of Kant's followers, went so far as to say: "I find the ground of that which is in that which ought to be." The presence of moral ideals implies the existence of a basis for those ideals in the mind of God. Other nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers have worked over this idea, lending the argument considerable support. Think, for example, of W. R. Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God or Hastings RashdalPs Theory of Good and Evil. This basic position that the presence of moral structures implies a supreme conscious mind as their source has bearing and relevance for a number of religions. The Indian tradition, however, argues that moral structures are best understood as an aspect of the law of karma. Karma is the overarching principle that operates independently from God in the Hindu tradition; it operates without any idea of God in the Jain community, and is surely not dependent on theistic belief in Buddhism. In defending the Buddhist view, Helmuth von Glasenapp maintains that the dynamic, all-embracing, infinitely adjustable law of karma and its inevitable corollary, rebirth, provides (and with greater dignity) that which in theistic faith calls for the personal attention of a creator God.13 Thus, we find two alternative religious explanations of moral claims and moral structures. Which is the better, more reasonable view? H. P. Owen puts it this way: "Either we take moral claims to be self-explanatory modes of impersonal existence, or we explain them in terms of a personal God."14 The first view asserts that value standards are best understood as issuing from a personal God, a mind that sustains, supports, and guarantees moral structures, a
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mind that is holy, just, and righteous. The alternative asserts a self-operating law of karma built into the very structure of the universe as scientific laws are, and that while reality itself might be mind-like, we are not required to postulate such a mind as an explanation of the laws. The choice is not a simple one, for each position entails consequences. If karma is accepted, then the fundamental questions of transmigration or reincarnation arise. Even those Hindus such as Ramanuja, whose theism more closely resembles Western theism, will argue that the law of karma is selfoperating. It does not depend on God, for God is above such matters. Religions of the Near East are more apt to say that the moral law itself takes on meaning primarily because it comes from God. Those who think karma is independent of any divine being can also lean toward atheism. H. P. Owen argues that the moral life becomes unintelligible if we do not explain moral claims "in terms of a personal God."15 He then quotes the Oxford logician John Cook Wilson, who had argued that reverence for the moral law is "only possible because we think of the moral law as a manifestation of the nature of the Eternal Spirit."16 In the human realm, Owen observes, claims imply a claimant and laws a lawgiver, adding: "The same implications must be posited within the super-human order if we are to make morality consistent."17 He then observes that the very sense of guilt that religious people often feel when they have done wrong is linked to our implied belief that the violation of a moral law produces shame in us "due to the fact that we are in the presence of a holy lawgiver."'8 An earlier defender of this argument, Frederick R. Tennant, similarly said: "The world may be indifferent to our moral aspirations, but the world ground is not."19 We must admit that many of the experiences reported by religious believers, as well as some found in sacred writings, accord with this observation. Some may doubt Owen's further inference "that the belief in human dignity is theoretically indefensible unless it is derived from theistic premises."20 Note that a few religious thinkers do not find the moral argument congenial to their outlook because they take a different view of morality itself. Innovative theologians such as Soren Kierkegaard maintain that a gulf exists between human ethics and the divine purpose. Humanly derived moral laws are not evidence of a divine lawgiver. Human beings are frail and infected with sin. If any genuinely moral behavior can exist, it comes as fruit of the religious life—a product of salvation—after we have been freed from the bondage of our sinful original state. Later theologians holding to this general view have said that when people say "yes" to some action, God says "no." No warrant whatever exists to trust our normal finite claims; they have nothing to do with the demands placed upon us by the divine being. This remarkable outlook has its roots in phases of the Christian tradition, harking back to the time of Augustine, and leading up through Martin Luther and John Calvin. It gained much prominence during the pessimistic mood following World War I, finding its brilliant apologist in Karl Barth. We still
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find this view in the Western world, but it is-not characteristic of religious experience and thought across the world. If anyone suggests an unbridgeable gulf between human standards and the moral ideal of the deity, they accentuate the idea that God's ways are beyond human understanding. No sincere believer would claim to know much about the mind of the divinity, but if no tie whatsoever exists between human goodness and divine loyalty, are we not caught in a hopeless skepticism? A deity so removed from human concerns and interests is shrouded in mystery; no one can even guess what God intends. The appeal is to mystery, unless we accept a special revelation that comes "perpendicularly from above"—a revelation with obvious different interpretations, untestable by human reason. Furthermore, to claim that moral knowledge comes only through revelation is to claim an exclusivistic view, a view that must subsequently hold that all other kinds of religious behavior are wrong-headed, if not evil. Such a view disparaging human reason has a ring of humility about it and thus some immediate appeal. But what is the value in a humility that promotes skepticism about moral principles? The appeal to mystery connotes humility, but is it more than a form of mediocre cowardice? Religious teachers for well over 2,500 years have repeatedly thought they had insight into what the supreme being of the universe valued. Are we to reject the moral insights of Moses, Isaiah, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, Vivekananda, Albert Schweitzer, and others, because we have fallen into a swoon over the verbiage of a poetic theologian whose own biography is not far removed from neurotic manifestations? A. Criticisms of This Argument Both the theistic and the karmic explanations of moral claims are based on the view that no final absolute principles of morality may exist, but objective standards of right and wrong surely do. If we deny such standards, then the moral argument for God is cashiered at once. A relativistic and subjectivistic view of value denies any value structure or moral order, and hence also denies the need for an intelligence or karmic law to sustain it. When thoughtful religious persons argue for moral standards supported by God, they do not necessarily claim to know precisely what those standards are. Hindus strive to meet the demands of karmic law even though none can spell out the law in detail. Nor do believers ordinarily claim to have absolute knowledge of those standards, in spite of all the aberrant and fanatical behavior patterns we can trace historically. Can the status of moral standards be comparable to the status of scientific laws, logically speaking? Few would say that when we discover scientific laws those laws are mere projections of human desires imposed by human beings on the nature of things. No science exists without scientists, but only data. When scientists mold these data into laws, we trust their thinking. When scientists correct a theory, they do so because of a
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better and clearer view. Does not the same apply to our grasp of moral principles? If our claims about science are claims about an independent order of reality, what of our claims about values and morality? Bertocci acutely observes: "The exponent of the moral argument holds that if his belief in the validity of values is a delusion, the belief in the validity of science is also a delusion since it rests on the conviction that truth is valuable."21 No scientist would lay claim to knowing with final certitude any law of nature, but any scientist would claim that the laws so far grasped were objectively sound because they were based on evidence. The same may be said of thoughtful religious believers. Opponents of the idea of standards seldom grant the distinction between absolute and objective principles. From the standpoint of empirical social science, the so-called standards of right and wrong, justice, integrity, fidelity, honesty, and the like, seemingly fluctuate from time to time and place to place. Hardly is a deed approved in one locale that is not shunned in another. Even in the same person's life, a deed frowned on today might have been seen as acceptable yesterday. Thus, socalled standards seem nothing more than indications of private or social preference—the expression of our desires or simply matters of practical convenience. No value standards exist, simply because none have been discovered, and that any will be is unlikely. Has any college sophomore not been beguiled by such observations? Many take the simple fact of disagreement as reason enough to deny that truth about moral experience can be found. But must we surrender to skepticism merely because of the fact of disagreement? Are those who deny principles content to admit that the horrors perpetrated by Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin were not bad, but only disagreeable to us, merely the expression of their taste and preferences? Can a subjectivist genuinely request that he or she be treated fairly and justly when the terms "fair" and "just" have no intrinsic meaning? Sometimes those who deny standards reflect a mood of despair and not a careful position worked out with argument. I cannot allow this prominent point of view to pass without making a few comments. (1) First, we need to distinguish between broad moral standards and what we could call detailed rules. Some principles exist that do have widespread geographical approval, while admitting many local differences. Thus, hospitality toward strangers and particularly to those in trouble is a widespread principle. But the way we show hospitality in Tibet or in Mexico may differ in detail from the way of those dwelling in the Arctic circle or those in the South Seas. But the principle holds. Similarly, we find an almost universal insistence that parents must express love and delicate care to infants. Such principles may not be absolute but they are surely viewed as valid requirements, sound apart from private whims or group wishes. (2) Even among the scientists who might deny the presence of objective principles, we see a widespread requirement, independent of time or place or desire or prejudice, that the scientist is obliged to report facts honestly,
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cooperate with other scientists, and subject the findings to the community of scientists. No social science or psychological science can exist whatever without tacit allegiance to the objective principles of honesty and cooperation. Even the scientist who announces that no such standards exist is presumably worth listening to because he or she has adhered to standards that the findings say do not exist! The announcement of such findings implies an obligation on our part to accept them as true. Scientists and logicians who might deny value standards uniformly tell us that we ought to accept what is true and reject what is false. Even if we say no oughts exist, we surely imply that we ought to believe such a claim even if we might not want to. (3) This last point suggests something unique in the human experience of obligation or ought. We notice a genuine tension between the "1 want" and the "I ought." Characteristically, religious people distinguish between what they want to do and what they ought to do. Even the most unsophisticated person can be heard to remark that they ought not feel the way they do. They may have feelings of revenge but they are also aware that they ought not have such feelings. And many individuals in all faiths govern their daily lives by considering what they take to be their duties for the day—duty often being in conflict with their wishes. Ideally, religious people try to blend their desires and their duties, wanting to do the right, delighting in the laws of God (Ps. 11), or hungering or thirsting after righteousness. The presence of duty as a real and irreducible experience suggests that valuing means more than merely following our impulses, satisfying our desires, or doing what society seems to favor. We simply cannot reduce duties to desires, since we may notice differing degrees of desiring and wanting. Duty usually speaks with simple clarity. The "tug" of duty is found in any awakened conscience, religious or not. Can it be explained away or seen exclusively as a product of unconscious drives or physiological impulses? Some personality disorders, strange habits, or instances of compulsiveness may be traceable to a morbid sense of duty, but in normal human consciousness the fact of duty apparently points beyond itself to something other than an immediate wish or need. It suggests and even implies something outside of ourselves. These observations on the skeptical tendency or position that challenges moral standards do not yet show that such standards exist, so to that question we must now turn. If the moral argument for God is to have any strength or validity, grounds for acceptance of objective (not absolute) moral standards must be shown—standards that have at least the status of scientific laws. B. A Possible Basis for Holding to Objective Moral Standards Undoubtedly, if we can trust our thinking about science we can also trust our thinking about values. We can begin with some easily recognized general standards that grow out of scientific observation and practice.
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Suppose we were to say that the matter of surgical cleanliness was merely a matter of taste or local tradition. Could a surgeon anywhere in the world justify removing an appendix or gall bladder without first sterilizing the instruments and following principled procedures? The dire consequences resulting from unsanitary conditions during surgery are not dependent on any private or social preferences or practices. The principles of cleanliness are obligatory on anyone performing surgery, even though a century and a half ago those principles may not have been understood or practiced. By extension, note too that analogous principles help to insure mental health. If they are not observed, especially in the rearing of infants, irreversible stunting takes place. No medicine or manipulation can repair the harm that follows when proper care and concern for infants is not afforded early in life. The same is obviously true regarding nutritional principles. We have only recently begun to understand the laws of nutrition and some understandable controversy over them still exists, but high amounts of cholesterol evidently do endanger life. Failure to provide proper advice and care to expectant mothers regarding smoking, drugs, and alcohol can also yield devastating results. Parental love shown to infants in the early months, no matter how it may be shown, is a principle built into human biology and psychology. No subjective wish or local social practice is more sacred than this inviolable law of love, the need to show affection to children in their early years. This need has nothing to do with culture, and we can find other structures in human experience indicating how human beings should live, whether they want to or not and whether or not these principles are socially accepted.. If human life is to proceed, definite principles of care and child-rearing must be followed whether people want to follow them or not. These are not assumptions; they are findings. Of course, local variants will emerge from culture to culture concerning how we hold, feed, or dress infants, but if the equivalent of parental love is not in some way manifest, suffering eventually ensues. We do not merely agree on that principle; we discover it. We can extrapolate further in an empirical way and notice that fully selfcentered lives tend to wither away, while lives characterized by essentially selfless concern for others—lives that are outgoing in some sense—more readily thrive. All the great religious teachers have taught this, and countless religious devotees as well as stalwart heroes of the human race have claimed it for twenty-five hundred years. Has some recent statistical survey shown them to have been deluded? Has some well-paid, comfortable social scientist shown that selfish aggrandizement and greed are obviously to be preferred to self-giving kindness and humility? These are not simply matters of wishing or wanting. Accordingly, from laws of health and the ideal of surgical cleanliness, we advance to laws relevant and needed to promote wholesome childhood growth. Little effort is required to infer that proper standards exist for human relations as well. No one claims to have final knowledge on dental or mental hygiene or
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on exactly how we are to live with our neighbors, or even "enemies," but we find more and more indications of such value structures in the universe. Plato argued that those structures exhibited a dependability and went so far as to affirm that those who did not earnestly seek to live up to the highest they knew were parasites living off the benefits of the noble. To infer that these standards or value structures are basal to the universe and tell us something about its essential nature is not a difficult logical step. That is the reasoning of those who conclude that the presence of moral standards points to a supreme consciousness who establishes and maintains those structures. Those holding to karma instead of to a supreme mind would accept the argument, but they do have a difficulty. How can an impersonal law such as karma make all the subtle distinctions in type, kind, and detail that are at least conceivable for a supreme mind? At least five religions claim that God knows what human intentions are and may judge persons on the basis of their motivation even if their deeds may not yield successful consequences. We easily grasp how an all-encompassing general law of karma can make those distinctions that our experience tells us can clearly be made by a mind. To counter such observations, note how much downright evil and immorality exists in the world, and how it often seems to succeed. The prophets have been scorned and stoned; the powerful, the greedy, the privileged, and even the criminal in high places seem to succeed. If a moral sponsor of the moral laws exists, as the argument holds, how do the apparently wicked flourish and the good die young and suffer? Nero, Genghis Khan, Hitler, and Stalin lived longer and did more actual harm to the world than the good done by even famed religious leaders such as Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed, or Gandhi. Where, then, are these so-called standards, and how can we say they are regularly supported by the universe, as Plato claimed? In his "A Free Man's Worship," Bertrand Russell tells us that he rejects ordinary religious belief in a supreme benevolent intelligence on the grounds of the combined indifference and cruelty in the universe. At the same time, Russell disavows any knowledge of value standards. "But if cruelty and indifference cannot be known to be disvalues," E. S. Brightman acutely observed, "Russell's argument collapses." The conclusion is that I must admit that the moral argument for God does not finally demonstrate that such a being exists, but I must remind myself that I am not in the business of offering perfect proofs. Instead, I am concerned with giving a reasonable account of the claims and experiences of religious believers. If we admit value structures, how can we account for their reliability and persistence without postulating an intelligence as their source and sponsor? To say that they speak to our intelligence and yet are not themselves the manifestations of intelligence is to explain the known by the unknown, to make more of a puzzle than is necessary. We could hold that moral structures imply at least an undergirding for the law of karma, as all the Indian religions require. But the issue then turns on whether the law of karma is a more adequate way to
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account for the presence of human moral standards than is the idea of a divine lawgiver. 5. The Argument from the Knowability of the World of Nature Einstein once remarked that the "mystery of the universe is its comprehensibility." to think that we can come to know things that are true and meaningful about our world is a wonder. Heraclitus said: "Nature loves to hide!" It gives up its secrets slowly, but to those who persist, its secrets, its meanings, and its laws can be discovered and can be understood. Some theists have argued that the fact that we can know something about the world of nature—can unlock some of its manifold secrets—implies that the world of nature itself is the expression to us of a superior intelligence. How can we account for the presence of intelligible laws without postulating an intelligence as their sponsor and source? How can we discover meaning in the universe as we observe and study it, if that meaning had not been there in the first place—indeed, if the meaning had not been put into it? As Bowne one time put it, mind exists at both ends. The mind of the scientist discovers laws; the mind of God administers those laws. The human mind reads off the meanings the divine mind continually places into the natural order, so we may ask: If nature is not informed with a reason other than its own, how is our reason able to discover its laws? This argument seems to presuppose an immanentalist view of God, namely, that he is present in the natural order. But even a strict deistic supernaturalist might be willing to say that our ability to know nature implies not only that nature is knowable but that an intelligence exists who makes it knowable. Natural scientists such as Isaac Newton claimed to be thinking God's thoughts after him when studying the book of nature. Berkeley saw the natural order as an expression of God, taking the wonders and regularities of nature as "manifest tokens of divinity." But why should we infer an intelligence in nature just because we can understand nature? The world of nature may simply be treated as a given fact. Does its intelligibility, its comprehensibility, require us to say that nature is the manifestation of one supreme intelligence? Some might suggest that accounting for the comprehensibility of nature is unnecessary. But then they slip in an evolutionary naturalism or a scientific realism as their explanation, which are themselves metaphysical accounts that they are usually unwilling to debate or challenge. They go on to assert that any effort to explain that natural order outside of science is monstrous, as if a so-called scientific account of science is as self-evident as are the data of science. The point does not concern the possibility of accounting for nature's intelligibility, but evaluating which account is rationally better. Bertocci points out that for the naturalist the laws of nature are "nothing but a constant surprise."22
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Suppose I am walking in the woods and spot a large tree with some markings in its bark. Tree markings may be a curiosity of the tree itself or they may be the result of gnawings, perhaps by a deer, or possibly the claw marks of a bear. I move closer to the tree and notice that those marks are carvings that resemble letters of the alphabet. A still closer inspection yields the words: "Daniel Boone killed a bear here." This is an intelligible sentence, and my immediate inference is that the marks were put there by an intelligence like my own, despite the theoretical possibility that they were produced by some animal action. I may walk away, or I may investigate further, and perhaps shortly find a whitened skull that I recognize as a bear's. A bullet may even be present. If I later check with local historians and find that Daniel Boone was indeed in the vicinity years ago, I may conclude that not only were the markings on the tree carved there by Boone, but that they do tell something about an actual event. The markings point to something beyond their immediate meaning. We easily infer, similarly, that graffiti in a subway are the product of playful human beings, not chimpanzees with spray cans. When I happen to notice nearby a sign that reads: "Danger. Third Rail Alive, 600 volts," I could regard it as additional scribbling; but I would obviously take it as a warning that my life would be in danger if 1 stepped on that third rail. The words convey intelligent meaning. I infer an intelligent source, but I also take the words to be telling me something about the way things really are, and I rely on their truth. The same is true for scientific findings. We notice regularity and intelligibility in the natural order, and we can then formulate laws about the data, which we think not only describe the way things are but also enable us to make reliable predictions. We then come to trust the intelligible findings as pointing to something more than themselves, as providing us with sternly trustworthy laws. Richard Taylor, who makes use of this argument, points out that we may marvel at the intricacy of the human eye and learn the laws about its nature. But we also come to rely upon our eyes when they gather evidence. He observes that we do not simply view the eyes and other organs of sense "as amazing and striking things, and speculate upon their origins. We, in fact, whether justifiably or not, rely on them for the discovery of things that we suppose to exist quite independently of those organs themselves."23 If we do assume that they are guides to truths having nothing to do with themselves, then only with difficulty can we consistently believe them to have arisen by accident or by ordinary workings of purposeless forces even over ages of time. To recognize that the laws of nature are trustworthy as well as intelligible is not a difficult step. We come to rely on such laws. Our practical lives depend for their continued well-being upon our belief that the laws of health, for example, can be trusted. The very reliance we place on the world requires us to say it is more than utter and complete contingency. The religious believer (in several faiths) easily concludes that the trustworthiness of the intelligible laws of nature evinces God's faithfulness to human beings and, indeed, his
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providence. This is the report of thoughtful piety. The poet Paul Claudel put it this way: The creator is ever present within his creation and it is through it that he speaks and tells us everything, not only the order and beauty of the universe in number, weight and measure . . . but the whole humble catechism of nature. All things arrive punctually for our instruction and welfare, our ordeal or punishment.24 And in commenting on Berkeley's philosophy, T. E. Jessop observed: Here is an hourly manifest providence, with God immediately behind it. Philosophically, the inference to God is not a trudge along a line of innumerable causes and effects, but simply a step or two. Religiously, we have no need to make the arduous ascent of the mystic; we have only to open our eyes . . . to be confronted with the first-hand effects of divine power, wisdom and benevolence . . . [Thus] God is for everybody not the rarefied entity discovered or invented by the intellectual elite.25 But this line of argument is subject to objections. First is the religious objection that the ways of God are past finding out, that God is clothed in mystery and the world of nature is incidental and unimportant to the supreme being. A thoughtful Hindu could not say that nature is a manifestation of God, who is its immediate cause. Instead, our cosmic ignorance makes nature real. While we may give such a metaphysical account of the natural world, as the maya of Brahman-Atman, whether real or unreal, it is remarkably comprehensible and we can use it in daily religious acts. While those in the Hebrew, Christian, Islamic, and Sikh traditions may concede that the ways of God are beyond us, the Psalmist writes: "Day unto day uttereth speech and night unto night showeth knowledge" (Ps. 19:1). Piety may suggest that we cannot really know what the supreme mind is in itself, but any idea of Providence implies that God's intentions are somehow realized in the world of nature. Secondly, if we say nature manifests God and his reliability, what sort of a God would inflict such pain and suffering as he apparently does in the wild ravages of nature as well as in the horror of deadly disease? If we insist that nature is somehow God speaking to use, then what is he saying in an earthquake and a tidal wave, and how is his presumed providential care manifest in deformed babies, or in sufferers of multiple sclerosis, AIDS, and other debilitating diseases? Though I will consider this problem at length in Chapter Six, note here that religious believers do overlook the negative evidence, holding that anything that God does must be good, by definition, because he does it. Or they claim that no negative evidence exists in nature that
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would indicate the nonexistence of God. No matter, what the evidence, it always points to God. We can thus quickly see that this fits the problem of unfalsifi ability. No evidence could count against the existence of God. Hence, the idea of God itself is both unverifiable and unfalsifiable. More will be said on this later, since it is an aspect of the notorious problem of evil. We could also say that the world is neither lawful and orderly nor reliable, but absurd and at base irrational. This criticism reflects a mood of despair found in thinkers such as Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich'Nietzsche, and some contemporaries. If nature is irrational, then something is making it be that way. Moods are not arguments and, while scientists may be inveigled by governments to do terrible things with their science, the order of the universe is not affected by our moods. Others may object to inference to another mind as the source of intelligibility, arguing against such an analogy because'perhaps no mind exists even in human beings—mind being only a ghost in a machine. Several alternate theories exist, including one that says no minds exist at all, but only observable behavior patterns. Through experience and practice, we slowly learn to distinguish a human person from a marionette or a ventriloquist's dummy. Others urge that other minds are known by analogy from our own mental experience, or at least through communication. When we analyze the technical act of knowing, we see that what happens is that we pick up patterns of sensations and learn to distinguish those patterns that suggest the presence of a mind from those that do not. Then we can show how our knowledge of another mind is rationally inferred. Yet, we are scarcely aware of the inferential process in daily experience. We do go through a kind of conscious inferential process when we gather that the sounds of a foreign language coming from someone else might be Polish, Finnish, Chinese, or Spanish. We may not understand a single word. The sounds come to our ears, we sort them out, and we think we are right in claiming what the language might be. No one consciously goes through that process in saying he or she knows another mind, but if we were to analyze the thought process that occurs in a split second, it may well be something of this type. We are talking about the logic of knowing, not the psychology of knowing, and so we easily confuse the issue. Our own awareness of ourselves does not self-evidently allow us to infer similar limits of awareness in others. Is our knowledge of God achieved by the same means? We see words carved on the trunk of a tree and infer an intelligent source. We see rivers and mountains and the intricacies of nature and we notice intelligibility. We infer a mind as their source. Berkeley, with a touch of irony, once said that the evidence for mind in nature is greater than the evidence for mind in human beings.
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6. Abstract Arguments Scarcely a study of the philosophy of religion fails to present what are sometimes called "classical" arguments for the existence of God. For about eight hundred years, technical philosophers have developed arguments for God based on the meaning of perfection, the idea of a necessary being, the grades of being, and the necessity of a final cause. These arguments are uniquely found among philosophers and theologians. They are barely understood by ordinary religious believers, for they turn on the meaning of words, logical concepts, and deductive reasoning. By definition, what we call "abstract" arguments are arguments that do not draw upon human experience or on empirical evidence in the world of nature or the universe. By far the most famous of these are the five "ways" found in the thought of Aquinas. But before Aquinas, Saint Anselm of Canterbury invented an argument that has attracted even the attention of philosophers. It has been variously accepted and challenged, restructured, and refuted even up to the present time. Books have been written about it alone. It is reinstated regularly and refuted just as often. Known as the ontological argument, it has many formulations, but the gist of it suggests that the very fact that we can formulate the idea of a perfect being implies that such a being exists. Anyone interested may begin with Anselms's statement, read a refutation by Gaunilo, notice Aquinas's derogatory remarks about it, observe how it is redeveloped in Rene Descartes and challenged by Pierre Gassendi, redeveloped by Spinoza and G. W. Leibniz, and then apparently laid to rest by Kant in the third part of the Critique of Pure Reason. The argument was shunned by Berkeley and Hume, had a revival of sorts in G. W. F. Hegel, and was restructured and came to a new blossom in the twentieth century with William Hocking, who thought of it as vital in a negative way. In the last few decades, it has been reinstated vigorously by the contemporary thinker Charles Hartshorne, who has shown thirteen different formulations of it. Norman Malcolm has also supported it, and the literature surrounding this argument is way out of proportion to its significance, because the kind of God it argues for is a perfect being but not the kind of God that has much to do with actual human religious claims. No one goes to the temple, shrine, synagogue, or church to pray to a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, or whose essence is perfection. Surely, the very thought of a perfect being tells us at once that such a being exists, since no perfect being would lack the attribute of existence. But, critics ask, is existence really an attribute of anything? The mere thought of something perfect does not necessarily entail the existence of that object. And so the argument is joined. Equally abstract is the argument that notices motion in the world and concludes that a prime mover must exist. Since various causes exist, so must an ultimate cause. Another may say that the contingency of the world requires the existence of a necessary being. Natural objects are possible, not necessary. That
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this or that object exists is not necessary, but something must exist that is not merely possible but real, something that makes things possible but is itself their basis and hence necessary. Again, things around us form a graduated scale, moving from good to better, we might say. But then something must exist that is truly excellent, the apex of goodness, a perfect being—a perfect being who is also the cause of all perfect things in the universe. The last of Aquinas's "ways" maintains that everything in nature realizes some goal or purpose. This implies an intelligence to guide it. So, a purposeful universe must imply a purposing being, or God. Those who are attacked by such abstract, deductive arguments can find plenty of literature in texts and articles discussing and rediscussing them. Many who would regard themselves as atheists have come to their position perhaps because they have analyzed these arguments and found .them wanting. If we reject an Aristotelian view of cause or challenge the meaning of contingency, and so on, we can readily set aside these thirteenth-century arguments. But the sad thing is that critics stop there and do not entertain the prospect of any new or additional arguments since the thirteenth century, or they construe them merely as forms of same argument. The result is a sterility and a great deal of logic chopping that has little to do with actual religious claims of religious believers. 7. Grounds for Denying the Existence of God Those who oppose belief in a supreme being are not as great in number as those who support it, and we must recognize different levels of criticism just as we do differing concepts of God. Some popular atheists almost make a profession of their atheistic claims, expressing themselves on platforms, in popular magazines, and on television. But some people schooled in the history of thought also offer direct arguments, appealing to both evidence and logic to support their positions. We need to be aware of these levels, and I shall examine both levels and types of arguments, in addition to those already referred to in the discussion of arguments for God. (1) The journalistic or popular type of atheism is somewhat like the traditional village atheist but today has more widespread effect and influence because the media usually report their work. In recent times, atheism had a strong supporter in the person of Robert Ingersoll. His oratory was impressive and his arguments were directed toward particular religious views, sometimes attacking positions that philosophers of religion had given up, if they ever held them. The impact of Charles Darwin on religious belief in the last four decades of the nineteenth century was a big factor in the growth of popular atheism. Some recognized no need for a creator God because the species had evolved in the natural course of events, a sifting process from the beginning of the universe that eventuated in human beings. No need existed for an external deity
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who created the heavens and the earth and all creatures great and small. Evolution, it was claimed, supplanted the deity, and was a sufficient explanation of our world. As the doctrine of evolution began to take hold, it was seen to be applicable not only to biology but to all the universe. Evidence of development is found in astronomy, geology, and paleontology. Herbert Spencer, perhaps a bit overzealous, became the philosophical spokesperson for this view, and his implicit atheism had a notable influence on popular culture. But the line of argument implying that a divine being is not needed because evolution is a sufficient casual explanation has not continued to appeal to scientists. Those we may call journalistic atheists or popular atheists are usually not well enough informed even to employ the position of the evolutionist. The evidence is that some of them are just rebelling against parental beliefs or childhood patterns, announcing that the ideas of God they used to hold are downright false. This type of atheism may best be handled by the psychologist, because it seldom offers clear reasons, being largely a reaction. Its value is that it points out that some of the ideas of God cherished in the past are false and unworthy of a supreme being. But we may not infer that no God exists just because the picture of a God as an Oriental despot whose nature is wrathful and without mercy or justice is to be rejected. Indeed, the idea of God has also evolved, and the God that popular atheism opposes is also widely opposed by philosophers of religion. (2) We come now to the view that the idea of God is impractical and even hurtful. A recent Buddhist thinker has written: "This god-idea stifles the human liberty to investigate, to analyze, to scrutinize, to see what is beyond the naked eye, and retards insight."26 Others suggest that the idea of God may become an excuse for inactivity. We may come to accept illness, deformity, and death as sent by God and might not try to overcome them. Mothers with sick babies in Cairo may not visit a physician because they think the illness is what Allah intends for their child. During the Middle Ages, the Arabian scholars studied medicine and tried to improve health, while Christians viewed illness and plagues as sent by God, implying that we were not to try to change things. That mood still exists in some religious practices throughout the world. Belief in God may stifle efforts to change things if we hold that God sends everything. Another Buddhist writer, K. N. Jayatilleke, criticized one of his fellow Buddhists for holding a theistic view, because it gave a false sense of security to people and encouraged complacency by denying free will and the value of human effort, while ensuring eventual salvation.27 At the same time, this critic claims that his criticisms do not apply to a theism that stresses the importance of human freedom and encourages the cultivation of spiritual values. Buddhists, then, do not discourage belief in a personal God on pragmatic grounds, "in so far as it is not a hindrance but an incentive for moral and spiritual development."
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(3) Others have held that the idea of God is, now outdated. It may have been relevant and useful in an earlier time, but in this modern age we must reject a supernatural being. Other modes of explanation suffice. Jacob Taubes points out that the astronomical views held by the Roman Catholics in medieval times were essentially Ptolemaic, namely, that the earth is the center of the universe and God's heaven is above it. He then extends his view: It is a fundamental but seldom recognized fact that since the Copernican revolution theistic religion stands without a cosmology and is therefore forced to retreat into the domain of man's inwardness.29 Another sense in which the idea of God is not needed any longer may be noted. With the advances in science and the burgeoning of technology, some of the mysteries and hazards of the world have been removed, with the consequence that the idea of God as a protector and healer seems to some to be outmoded and no longer needed. To put it directly, when sailing ships brought people across the oceans, the perils were great and a safe journey could be regarded as an instance of divine Providence. Religious people prayed for divine protection during the voyages and regarded their arrival in port as a reason for thanksgiving to God. In today's world, while accidents still occur as a consequence of bad weather and so on, overseas travel is scarcely any risk. If a storm appears, ships that have anticipated its coming will have made preparations, and airplanes can surmount the storm and proceed safely. Technology, we may say, has done away with the need for a providential God to help us on dangerous journeys because so few such journeys occur. Alleged cases of miraculous safe arrivals or being "snatched from the jaws of death" were possible, some believed, because God intervened. Scientific technology has solved most of the problems that used to be an honest concern of piety and the end is not yet in sight. This is also obviously the case in medical science. Illness that usually meant death as late as the 1950s can now be healed through medicine. In the past, a child's recovery from meningitis was often regarded as a singular instance of God's assistance. Although it is still a dread disease, the chances for recovery are now greater than the chances of death. A God who is a refuge in time of trouble and saves people from death is no longer needed now that science has unlocked so many secrets. Note that a religious response to the above observations would suggest that the very discoveries of science and the achievements in technology are themselves instances of people having found out the secrets of the universe, which God continually and faithfully undergirds. Thus, instead of saying that science has done away with the need for God, piety would suggest that we be grateful to God for the progress of science itself. Science does not demonstrate that the idea of God is nugatory.
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(4) Another popular and understandable objection to belief in God is the attitude that God is totally unimaginable. We have no way of relating the idea of such a being to our ordinary experience. How can a being exist who is omnipresent (everywhere at once), who is omniscient (who knows the innermost thoughts of the five billion inhabitants of the world as well as those who are presumably immortal), who is omniloving (who cares for and is concerned about the welfare of each individual), and who in addition is both eternal and temporal as well as being all powerful? In spite of differences in the ideas of God claimed by religious people, how can any of these be grasped by human imagination? In several religions, the active imagination is served by introducing lesser deities who may be pictured or represented in images. Popular Hinduism is rife with these, and shrines abound to the consorts of the deity or to his various incarnations (avatars). Western religions satisfy the needs of the imagination by picturing angels, who are God's "messengers," or by recalling former religious heroes such as Francis, who have become saints and to whom we can pray. Even in practicing religion, to pray to a picturable saint or incarnation of the deity and to elevate former human beings into semi-divine or divine beings is easier than to worship pure beings who can hardly be imagined or thought of. Accordingly, millions of practicing Christians find it easier to have some visualization of God in Jesus Christ, to whom they can pray, instead of to some apparently abstract metaphysical agency than which no being is greater. But unimaginability is scarcely an argument against the existence of a supreme intelligence who undergirds creativity and value. Many people cannot imagine how a chemical can cause mental disorders, for example. (5) Another level or type of criticism is found among psychologists and social scientists. They do not discuss the claims about the metaphysical nature of God or argue against proposed theories of explaining the universe by belief in God. Instead, they see that the very business of proposing a deity in the first place must be challenged. They then ask, what in the human psyche, society, or the genetic structure of human beings triggers the idea that a supreme being exists to whom we owe our existence and who allegedly created or creates nature. These critics do not discuss the philosophical issue, the objective claims made about such a being; they ponder the subjective motives and sources of this belief. Thus, a psychologist might suggest that the idea of God has its roots in the unconscious and is a project of infantile needs for a father to whom they can turn to satisfy their many wants. They may claim that the arguments offered by theologians and philosophers are merely rationalizations of unconscious needs, prejudices, or internal psychic difficulties. Accordingly, theists of any type represent a form of immaturity. When human persons are fully awakened to human nature and properly understand the human place in the world, they will come to see that the very idea of God as well as of religion is a mark of immaturity—understandable, to be sure, but something we should and
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eventually will grow out of when we reach mature mental health. Thus, Freudian psychoanalysis teaches that our earliest impressions received at a time when we were hardly able to talk manifest themselves later in an obsessive fashion, although those impressions themselves are not consciously remembered. We feel that the same must hold good for the earliest experiences of humankind. One result of these experiences is the emergence of the conception of one great God. It must be recognized as a memory—a distorted one, but nevertheless a memory. It has an obsessive quality; it simply must be believed.30 It is a distortion and a delusion. The founder of the science of sociology, Auguste Comte, foreshadowed the Freudian view obliquely when he noted a law of three stages, which helped account for various belief systems. In the earliest stage, human beings hold to theological beliefs quite normally until they advance to philosophy. Then they realize that philosophy too needs to be supplanted by science. Thus, when human beings approach a scientific understanding of things they become properly mature. Some critical questions are required here. The first has to do with the recognition that Freudian psychology is more prevalent in Europe and the United States than in England or the former Soviet Union. The current form of behaviorist psychology voiced by B. F. Skinner and his associates would reject a Freudian analysis and accept a scientific materialism, as would many former Soviet psychologists, announcing that the idea of God is simply not true either philosophically or scientifically. It is not a vestige of infantile maturity. But if we were to grant the Freudian or Comtean indictment of believers in God as persons who are immature in some sense, we may profitably ponder for a moment who are some of the mature people of human history. Many of the leading characters of human history, including some of the most creative scientists and imaginative artists and musicians, have been firm believers in a deity. Are we to say, as we surely must that Johann Sebastian Bach was immature, that Albert Schweitzer, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa are immature in their beliefs? Who then, we may ask, is mature? The wealthy, self-centered pleasure seeker who has the time and money to undergo extensive visits to the psychoanalyst in a quest to throw off infantilism to become mature? Mohammed and Jesus believed in God. May we see them too as somehow infantile? To announce that the idea of God springs from deep-lying psychological origins is interesting and clever, but the origin of an idea does not tell us whether an objective mind is running the universe. I do not wish to be argumentative, but when views are advanced that offer a blanket of criticism of theistic beliefs without showing how those beliefs are themselves illogical, what else may we do but test such a view on its own terms? Similarly, if we were to say, with Feuerbach, that the idea of God is little more than the self-projection of a societal idea or ideal, we would find here an unusual, possibly willful ignorance of the history of religions. In several
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religions, the leading spokespersons have challenged the ideas of their society, attacked its mores, and pointed it to a higher plane. This is the case with the eighth-century prophets of Israel, with Jesus, and with Mohammed. John Hick has cogently observed: "The prophet cannot have the support of God against society if God is simply society in disguise."31 A commonplace of Marxian theory has been to maintain that belief in God is something foisted on the weak and the poor by the privileged sectors of society in order to keep them in their place. Religious belief, then, serves as a kind of drug on people. If they believe in God, they will not be alert as to their status in society or to how they are being exploited economically. Now, like other nonphilosophical challenges to belief in God, this approach has some empirical basis. The idea of God and promises of a later happy status in Heaven have been used as a club to beat down and oppress people, especially slaves. Those in economic power have developed elaborate rationalizations for maintaining their power, and religion serves them as a useful tool to keep the ordinary people content. In South Africa, until a few years ago, the system of Apartheid, we were sometimes told, had support in the Bible; and in India up until 1947, position in both social and economic life was held to be a matter of inherited caste, something decreed by the gods and supported in the Scriptures. But I must add that the same God that seems to some to justify keeping people "in their place" also motivates critics of unjust socioeconomic systems. The real opponents of Apartheid and racial oppression were not a coterie of mature atheists but those motivated by a vigorous belief in God. The same has been true of racial conflicts in the United States, both on the violent and nonviolent sides, namely, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X. The causal motivation to overthrow oppression and even change the economic order itself comes from belief in God. Marxists have been unable to recognize this simple historic fact; they regularly and doctrinally deny it, probably because it does not fit their metaphysical scheme. Natural scientists—especially physicists, chemists, geologists, and astronomers—are less likely to offer arguments against the existence of God than are those working in the so-called human sciences. Natural scientists deal more directly with the objective natural world and do not probe the inner subjective states of human behavioral responses in the individual or society. In this way, they are closer to philosophers of religion, who also seek to wrestle with broader objective data and arguments. Instead of maintaining that the idea of God has been disproved or invalidated by the natural scientists, thinkers in that area would say it is not a topic they are equipped, as scientists, to discuss. Should natural scientists argue that natural science disproves any idea of God, they must be taken to task for the philosophical or metaphysical positions they have presupposed. The question then becomes strictly a philosophical matter. What is usually involved in a case of science versus God is simply a theory of explanation, i maintain that fundamental explanation is found in
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philosophical reason taken in the broad sense of empirical coherence. I do not take the view that fundamental explanation must be found exclusively by the scientific method, as if but one mode of explanation exists. If philosophy itself can be explained scientifically, the logical issue can be joined. Thus, if we say that the only mode of explanation is scientific, then not only the idea of God, but most of the other topics in this book wait only for scientific findings to be solved. But this position is impossible. It requires endless suspension of judgment about those matters of grave importance to people, waiting until "all the evidence is in," which is never. It also overlooks the recognition that scientific laws themselves are tentative and subject to change. Philosophical conclusions are likewise tentative but without the dogged insistence that we may not make up our mind. Philosophers are prepared to go along with reasonable probability in larger matters, even as scientists practically do in smaller ones, such as medical diagnoses. Nor does the view that science is the fundamental form of explanation recognize that scientific methods themselves are a special kind of reason that grew out of philosophical inquiry in the first place But more important, scientific method and its logic are regularly judged by philosophical reason itself. And philosophy indicates the proper limits and scope of scientific reason. Science as science cannot do that itself. The scientist cannot even provide a scientific basis for the pursuit of science itself, except if it should say that science is warranted by technical progress. But even technical progress is a questionable concept. We may have "faith" in science and put our trust in it because it "works" or "benefits humankind." But these are not decent criteria, especially when we think of all the so-called neutral scientists working in Hitler's Germany or Franklin D. Roosevelt's United States producing killing machines and devices or planning the Manhattan Project, which resulted in the atomic bomb. To think that scientists work solely for the benefit of humankind is so naive as to be beneath contempt. 8. Opponents of Theism from Within Religion I have noted that at least one living religion strongly opposes the idea of a supreme being and offers arguments against the divine existence. I refer to the Jains and have noted their arguments earlier in my positive discussion. Many Buddhists, but not all, are likewise strongly anti-theistic. Buddhists in the West (such as Alan Watts and von Glasenapp) tend to be more atheistic than Buddhists in Sri Lanka or Japan. Without rehearsing either observation, I must note that those religions have strong doctrines of karma. Without karma both Jainism and Buddhism would become meaningless. Accordingly, if belief in God is seen as unlikely or unwarranted, belief in karma is a fortiori also to be rejected.
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The Jain and the Buddhist atheists who accept karma are affirming one thing that theists also affirm, namely, that the universe as such is somehow on the side of the good. Those who lead ignoble lives are subject to the impersonal law of karma and will reap what they have sown. Theists take a similar view. What the atheist by definition must say is that nothing good in itself exists. All things called good are called good not because they are good as such but because they lead to something that is,.desired or approved by someone at some time. Something becomes good because I want it; nothing is good by itself. Accordingly, no grounding of good or value exists in the universe whatsoever. Whatever is good is happenstance. Seize it while you can, for it may shortly disappear. The universe without God or without even karma is neutral and indifferent to value—value having no meaning in itself unless we decide so subjectively. We project value on the universe. The sunset is not beautiful in itself; we happen to like it and we attribute beauty to it. So the atheist has to say that anything good or valuable, from a sunset to a kind deed, is a personal projection onto a valueless, undirected universe. Occasionally, a theoretical atheist loves his or her children. A few might sacrifice themselves or give up something for another person, even for their country. But they have no reason or basis for doing so, except as it has an "agreeable leadingness" or because of animal pity or compassion of a Schopenhauerian kind. (But even Schopenhauer had the idea of a moral order, a metaphysical view.) Or to put it another way, atheists must follow out the logic of their position just as theists must. The evidence suggesting that things in nature and history operate by chance—that the good is illusory, that no such thing as sound morality exists, that life has no purpose whatever save to find pleasure where we can, that no genuine kindness exists except as an excrescence of selfishness—all these things indicate no value source in the universe, no God at all. By the same token, if positive evidence of value exists, atheists may have to revise their thinking. (Note the sociobiologist who sees that morality is nothing but a way of evolutionary survival. No exceptions can be allowed to the dogma once that view is accepted. Sociobiology is unclassifiable just as is Skinnerian behaviorism!) The facts are such as to lead us sometimes to doubt the God of religious believers. That takes us into the next chapter, which ponders the evidence of nonpurposeful facts, of evil and suffering. We may say that the presence of suffering and evil of all kinds turns out to be, on first appearance anyway, the most powerful of the arguments against the existence of God. But a number of apparently more serious arguments against the existence of God in general must be considered. One of them, voiced by so eminent a thinker as Russell, scarcely needs to be mentioned because it is so weak. It rather sarcastically asks, if God caused everything, what caused God? That this is not even a genuine philosophical question is missed by some. God may not exist as the source of all things, but
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to ask for the source of the source is to ask a meaningless question. To do so is like asking what was the beginning of the beginning. Yet this sort of question continues to be voiced. Whatever is the cause of all, by the very meaning of the words, cannot have a cause. The issue then becomes the nature of the source and whether such a source exists. Some astronomers think of things as always having existed, hence no creative agency is even considered; but even if they always existed, within that existence creative evolutionary changes need to be accounted for in some way. A more searching kind of criticism of divine beings is found in the thought of the Greek atomist philosopher Epicurus, whose puzzles were put into vivid form by his later disciple Lucretius. In Book Two of his De Rerum Natura, Lucretius wonders why any gods would have bothered to make the world at all. Why should perfect, self-sufficient beings who need nothing burden themselves with creating a world, and why should they take the arduous task of governing it? Probing the motive of creation further, he asks why they would have created it in time. If it was created in time, was the creation a condition of divine happiness? But to say that implies that perfect beings were unhappy for an eternity. What would be the purpose of creating it? Could it have been for the sake of human beings? If they made it for the sake of the few wise people who exist, the work was not worth the trouble. And if they did it in order to make wicked persons, they are cruel. No reason can be given for the world being a creation of gods. Nor can we assume that a world full of evils, such as ours, is the creation of a deity. In any case, atoms moving in empty space and mechanical causation are sufficient to account for our world. The idea of a deity or deities is unnecessary, even though people agree that gods exist. Such pungent queries give us pause, but note that the philosopher is usually concerned not with why a world exists but instead with giving a reasonable explanation of the evidence we have before us. We usually are illequipped to answer questions such as why vinegar is bitter or why sugar is sweet. We find the facts as given or presented to us and then try to understand them. Not even theologians are generally willing to ponder why a world exists. The world is here, but how are we to understand it?
Six VALUE, EVIL, AND SUFFERING Religious believers must inevitably consider the problems associated with suffering of all sorts. No matter how good or purposeful they think the universe is, all are confronted sometime with the presence of downright unhappiness, misfortune, different types of suffering, and undesirable and unwanted experiences that we traditionally call evil. Followers of every religion, either sophisticated or preliterate, make claims about what they regard as evil or, more clearly, suffering. To isolate the problem, note that I am not here speaking primarily about the question of human nastiness, unkindness, lying, lust, murder, avarice, duplicity, or other violations of moral codes or commandments. While these are matters of concern to religious believers, they are primarily instances of what we can simply call moral wrongdoing. My concern is with those undesirable experiences that are not obviously or directly linked to human wrongdoing (though some people may say they are, as we shall see). The issue arises especially for theistic believers who regard God as the source of all that is, the sponsor and sustainer of what is good, the purposive ground of nature and individuals. More bluntly, if we think that the Supreme Being exists because reason requires it, or because we see evidence of beauty, design, and order in all that is, what can we think when noticing the factual presence of so much that is regarded commonly as ugly and chaotic? Can a good God be held accountable both for the pains the world gives and for its obvious benefits? Even if God is not viewed as a conscious creative cosmic process, how can we incorporate the apparent evidence of noncreativity in this view? To isolate the question exactly is difficult because of the apparent interrelation of the evil and the good. Boethius in the sixth century put the question succinctly: "If there is a God, whence come evils? But whence come goods if there is none?" If we take into account the overbearing abundance of suffering in the world and conclude that the universe can hardly be viewed as supporting order and the good, what do we do with the persistent presence of the valuable, the orderly, and the good? Clearly, the religious problem here cannot be treated in isolation. The claims we make about the presence of evil are linked to other claims we make. We seek an overall, coherent philosophy of religion that has the ring of reasonableness. We do not have to insist on perfect answers to specific problems that then have no bearing on other questions. The value of religious experience and faith is not obviously vacated if we cannot give a perfect solution to this, the religious believer's most devastating question. But that does not mean that we are excused from trying to understand the issue. While an occasional contemporary believer may think he or she need
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not face this question squarely, from the earliest times thinkers in every single religion have tried to offer some sort of solution. It behooves us to look at or survey some of these proffered solutions. But first we should look at the evidence. 1. Empirical Findings (1) Natural catastrophes. A survey of events occurring in recorded human history gives us some dismal pictures. We have records .of earthquakes as far back as 526 A.D., the one in Lisbon in 1755 being among the most devastating. In the twentieth century alone, when better records have been available, we know of over fifty-five earthquakes, which have taken a human toll of close to two million, apart from injuries and damage to crops and property. Just one flood occurring on the Huang River in China in 1931 caused 3,700,000 deaths. Between 1963 and 1965, 79,000 people were killed in windstorms in Bangladesh. In sixty-one years, 4,700 persons have been killed in tornadoes in the United States alone. Hurricanes and other severe storms on land and sea take an annual toll. Tidal waves and volcanic eruptions have resulted in much suffering for centuries. In 1815, 50,000 died in a volcanic eruption in Indonesia. Strong evidence also exists that cosmic accidents in prehuman history have occurred, upsetting life patterns of animals and vegetation. Lightning has killed human beings and animals and caused wasteful forest fires. The vagaries of weather result in the suffering of thousands of living creatures. One scientist observed that "the chance of enough decent food for millions of human beings may depend simply on the whims of one year's weather." (2) Waste, overproductivity, and overpopulation in the biological world. From a human perspective, nature seems prodigal in producing so many polliwogs or so many seeds that never germinate. "So careful of the type," wrote Alfred Lord Tennyson, "so careless of the single life. For fifty seeds she brings but one to bear." A meaningless fecundity of minute animals seems to exist. And in the 1990s the question of the world's rapidly increasing population makes more vivid the possibility of mass starvation and death in the decades ahead. In addition, evidence abounds to suggest waste in the natural order long before human beings appeared on the scene. (3) Malformations and birth defects. Apart from the strange defects and malformations in the plant and animal worlds, human beings have experienced thousands of inexplicable cases of malformations and physical defects. Siamese twins have been born joined at the head. Babies have arrived totally deaf, some with incomplete organs, partial or malformed limbs, Down's syndrome, sicklecell anemia, congenital heart disease, hermaphroditism, and the like. It is a sad story and much suffering ensues. (4) Mental deformation. We see also imbeciles, cretins, hydrocephalics, microcephalics, and other severe mental incapacities. Some cases of profound idiocy appear in which even primitive human instincts such as self-preservation
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are lacking. Some creatures require twenty-four-hour care, with no prospect of growth because of limited brain size. In addition, about one in a thousand children are autistic, with no clear cause and with no known cure. (5) Disease, pain, and suffering. A list of the serious diseases afflicting human beings and animals is distressing when we try to look at the world of good and evil. In 542 A.D., a plague began in Constantinople imported by rats from Egypt. It spread to Syria and all of Europe had succumbed. A severe plague began in England in 1528, and by 1563 over 20,000 people were killed by it. Again in 1592, the plague brought down 15,000 more, and it spread to Paris and Italy. When the plague began in Germany in 1618, the population was seventeen million; by 1648, it had sunk to eight million. Cholera killed thousands of people in India in 1826 and in Russia and Scotland in 1832. And what of the rugged persistence of conditions such as cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy, debilitating strokes, cancer, multiple sclerosis, AIDS, diabetes, or Alzheimer's disease? These may not always be associated with pain, but many experience excruciating pain and discomfort for weeks. Patients lose their minds and identity, and they bring sorrow and suffering to loved ones who care for them. To be sure, plagues have been virtually erased and small pox has been eradicated, but disease arid suffering persist in the human and animal world. One of the characters in David Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion, Sextus, speaks of "the curious artifices of nature in order to embitter the life of every living being."2 (6) Pests. From a human perspective, far too many mosquitoes, flies, harmful viruses, bacteria, killer bees, and rodents exist. Swarms of locusts can destroy vital crops in a few days. A plague of fire ants can devour food crops, destroy farm chicks, and even kill newborn lambs. Liver flukes and the protozoa causing malaria seem to have little reason for existing. (7) Evolutionary loss. Even before the appearance of the human species, nature was replete with species long since extinct. An amazing assortment of ancient animal remains awaits the paleontologist. The LaBrea Tar Pits in Los Angeles contained fossils of fascinating and diverse species of animals that died out long before the first human being appeared. One of the most successful of all prehuman ancestors, the dinosaurs, were totally wiped out 65 million years ago.3 Evidence shows several mass extinctions in the last 250 million years. These may have been caused by powerful volcanic eruptions, an asteroid striking our planet, or the passage of a planet called Nemesis, which comes near enough to the earth every 26 million years to cause turmoil, dust, and ash—destructive of all but minute species of life. Since 1800, more than seventy-five species of animals have become extinct. Gigantic mastodons, ground sloths as big as oxen, saber-toothed tigers, and giant wolves are just examples. Reflecting on this, Austin Fairer has said: "No one can seriously believe that the Creator even in the realm of his own imagination experiments with bad ideas before he hits upon the good."
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(8) A dismal future ecological outlook. Scientists in recent years have been warning not only that certain unusual flora and fauna are becoming extinct because of the destruction of the environment, but that the reduction of the ozone layer with the consequent "greenhouse effect" will make ordinary life difficult for all living creatures. Only recently have the ill effects of acid rain and the use of fossil fuels begun to be recognized, and the claims of conservative scientists are alarming. Unless drastic changes are made in human use of the environment, the future is bleak indeed. (9) Apparent inevitable population explosion. Scientists anticipate that within the next four hundred years a tremendous increase in the human population will occur (Isaac Asimov once suggested that the population density all over the world will likely be much higher on the average than it is now on Manhattan Island).4 More specifically, according to estimates made for the United Nations Population Bureau, by the year 2025 Mexico City and Shanghai will have over 36 million inhabitants apiece. Sao Paulo will have almost 30 million, Dacca over 23 million, and the Indian cities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta will each have well over 20 million. What kind of life will exist at that time if controls on population growth are not operative? The outlook for animal species is even worse. That the universe as a whole is moving toward the good for its creatures is hard to maintain, when so many will disappear and the outlook for quality of life is so discouraging, even stark. (10) The persistence of human nastiness in prejudice, hatred, war, and racism. While I hesitate to list this as a problem here, we must ponder whether such unchanging and persistent unkindness and inhumanity is directly the result of human responsibility alone. Is something not wrong with the human psyche as such, with its genetic ordering, which makes possible such unrivaled nastiness and the kilting of its own species? Few animals destroy members of their own kind with brilliant efficiency. And if they did, they would not offer such elaborate justifications for doing so as we have seen through all of human history and still see coming from old money-making patriots. While human slavery has almost disappeared from the planet, the greatest human evil, war, shows no signs of decrease. Learned thinkers in at least eight of the eleven literary religions of the world still are perverse enough to work out clever reasons for justifying the maiming and killing of other people. From the massacres of Genghis Khan to the horrors of Adolf Hitler's holocaust and Josef Stalin's purges, as well as the persistent efforts to this very day to justify the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we can wonder whether something is intrinsically wrong and irredeemable in the human psyche. Some theologians easily propose a single-word answer—sin—but that only restates the problem. The leaders of every nation have been saying ever since history began that wars they have been engaged in were necessary and just. More human beings are killed in one day of war than in a week of floods. Is God responsible for sin and hard hearts?
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Traditionally, Judeo-Christian religion has entertained the idea that God himself causes the "hardening" of human hearts, as we read about Pharaoh in Genesis. We may have come a long way scientifically and in the accumulation of knowledge, but the signs of moral growth are greatly disappointing. If God exists, who exercises providential concern for his creatures? Why does he make kindness so hard for them? And why are hate and revenge so easy for them?5 2. A Critical Look at the Empirical Findings Before considering so called "solutions" to the issue of nonpurposeful evil in the world, a few observations on how the evidence can be taken will be useful. (1) First, some of the evidence cited above may involve what has been called "multiple meanings." Something that appears as a source of suffering, cruelty, or pain may also be a source of something good and beneficial. A nineteenth-century lad crippled from birth may not be of much use as a farmhand, but his incapacity to do chores may make possible a release of mental energies that could enable him to become a first-rate astronomer or poet. Other cases exists where an obvious physical defect has made possible a degree of human creativity that could not easily have been anticipated. Some also claim that floods, earthquakes, and forest fires have brought about unanticipated good results. Tornadoes, we read, are "mankind's friend" because life would almost be impossible without turbulence to cut winds.6 (2) Some of the suffering linked to natural disasters and birth defects can be traced directly to human irresponsibility, greed, and willful ignorance. European mothers who used the inadequately tested drug Thalidomide in the early 1960s gave birth to many malformed infants, who now as adults meet to offer each other mutual assistance. Use of drugs and alcohol by pregnant women means that their offspring will have less chance for healthy bodies, some being prone to drug use as a result. Failure to follow known laws of hygiene and preventive medicine may result in debilitating strokes, heart disease, or AIDS. Similarly, the greed of the lumber industry for quick profits has resulted in the overcutting of forests, thereby changing water run-off patterns, which can lead to wasteful flooding. The destruction of the rain forests in the Amazon basin hastens a reduction of the ozone layer. And even some of the famines that occur in the world are not consequences of bad weather patterns but are organized by grain merchants, as Bertolt Brecht once noted. Soil erosion and the gradual increase of arid deserts may likewise be attributed to bad human planning and other irresponsibility, just as the careless use of matches has led to vast forest fires. (3) Western religious minds are peculiarly prone to an anthropocentric bias—a bias that views all events solely from the human point of view. Something may be regarded as evil or producing suffering only because it brings about dissatisfaction in human beings. Mosquitoes, blade flies, and other insects are annoying pests for humankind, but are sources of needed food for
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hungry birds. That everything in nature must satisfy the desires of human beings is not at all obvious. The balance in nature is just that, and it is not geared just for human beings. As some Asian religions arid current animal rights proponents teach, animals possibly exist for their own sakes and not merely to provide pleasure, comfort, and food to human beings. At this point, Buddhists, Jains, and Hindus can offer a broader outlook on so-called suffering than the usual Westerner who puts himself or herself above every other form of existence and judges all by what it does for their comfort and well-being. (4) Interestingly, the amount of suffering in the world caused by human beings themselves seems at times to be about as great as that done outside of human auspices. While 4,700,000 Chinese people died in three major floods in forty-four years from 1887 to 1931, 8,538,000 people were killed in World War I in Europe in just four years. Over thirty million, many innocent civilians, were killed during six years of World War II, not only in battles and Hitler's gas ovens but also as a result of Allied saturation bombing and the dropping of two atomic bombs. Veterans' hospitals all over the world are still peopled with those injured, blinded, and maimed. We cannot keep exact accounts in such matters, but the suffering in this century alone caused by human hatred, cruelty, prejudice, and unkindness seems almost as great as the suffering for which a divine being might be held accountable. Even the murderous Genghis Khan, whose empires ranged from Peking to the Danube in the early thirteenth century, could not equal the horror and suffering caused by "civilized" Europeans and North Americans in two world wars. While true that tornadoes and hurricanes wreak havoc and death, so do warriors presumably acting "responsibly." On one day—1 July 1916—twenty thousand British soldiers were killed in the Battle of the Somme, four times the number of persons who died in sixty years of tornadoes in the United States. The problem of evil and suffering is a profoundly serious one for the religious believer, but it is also one for the irreligious humanist, ethicist, and professional skeptic—the great majority of whom still offer justifications for mass killings and have not yet repudiated nuclear weapons or germ warfare and who laud nationalistic patriotism to absurd extremes. The seeds of war and its horrendous attendant evils have never been repudiated wholly by the leaders of nations, religious or not. They still offer threats of deterrence and retaliation toward fellow human beings, with scarcely a twinge of conscience. The Supreme Being, if such there be, cannot be held accountable for these sources of past sufferings and the sincere intentions to cause future suffering and death if deemed necessary. This is a sordid and discouraging history, indeed. In light of the above observations and considerations, we may yet ask whether some evils are irreducible, that is, cannot be interpreted away or resolved. We may then call them surds. The evidence suggests that some instances of evil and suffering serve no imaginable or conceivable purpose and thus apparently cannot be resolved in some elaborate theological justificatory
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scheme. Think, for example, of microcephalics and human beings born without the capacity even for self-preservation. When confronted with the possibility of such surd or irreducible evils, some religious minds have (i) challenged the very process of inquiry or (ii) made simplistic appeals to faith, urging acceptance of whatever occurs. (5) Alleged fruitlessness of the inquiry. Again, before seeking a solution, notice preliminarily an attitude that shuns any effort to offer solutions to the problems of evil and suffering. This attitude is found in the early teachings of Buddhism. For the Lord Buddha, questions of this theoretical sort do not help the person suffering nor do they alleviate pain or misery or sadness. To deal directly and practically with specific harsh events is far better, he taught, than to try to explain or account for why they might have happened. Questions of why evil and suffering occur do not make for edification. In the immediate circumstances of suffering, few will oppose Buddha's plea. We must tend a wound, not ask why it happened. We must pull trapped persons out of the crumbled buildings from an earthquake, not wonder why earthquakes should be. But after emergency needs are met, human beings still do ask the question and they do seek some sort of an explanation. Note that suffering has always been the primary concern of Buddhism. Since its beginnings, Buddhists have analyzed the root of suffering, and their religious philosophy in the Four Noble Truths is replete with explanation of the cause of human suffering and how to avoid it. Furthermore, practicing Buddhists today never question the doctrine of karma and its corollary, reincarnation. That itself is a possible "solution" to the problem, and it needs to be evaluated along with other possibilities. (6) Simplistic appeals to faith. Some religious minds overlook or gloss over the raw facts of pain, suffering, and evil I have listed. They all too quickly interpret events by a simplistic faith, offering glib responses when asked how a good and purposeful deity could allow such things as malformed infants, persistent pain, earthquakes, and the like. The response is: "Some reason must exist for it." They will rationalize instances of severe suffering as goods in disguise or as part of some larger divine purpose. Even drastic cases of suffering are interpreted as having some unknown but necessary worth, simply because all that happens must be a result of the will of the Supreme One. In the past, dastardly human acts have also been seen as somehow fitting into a scheme of overall purposive goodness. A medieval hymn writer in the Christian tradition went so far as to interpret the treachery of Judas Iscariot as a "happy fault" ("O felix culpa"), believing that without Judas's betrayal, the capturing of Jesus would not have occurred. Thus, the subsequent events leading to human salvation would not have been possible. We see that same incredible fitting of evil things into a grandiose scheme in Winston Churchill's remark that "it was a blessing that Japan attacked the United States and thus brought Americans wholeheartedly into the war."7
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We are still not free in religious circles from this overbearing kind of reinterpretation of unpleasant facts. It puts a strain on the honest intelligence and often deflects the serious inquirer from further interest in religion. Logically, it is an example of the unfalsifiability principle: not a single instance of evil or suffering could possibly be intrinsically or irreducibly bad. Since God is in total charge, no negative evidence could be admitted for discussion. The idea of a good God cannot be tested. Thus, naive faith will insist that in the most devastating suffering must be found evidence of divine purpose, and it refuses to question further. But in the presence of catastrophe or incomprehensible suffering, to remain silent is better than to offer interpretations. Too much knowledge is claimed by such persons. A recent book from a religious press entitled Why God Gave Me Pain tries to find meaning in the death of a twenty-year old woman who suffered from leukemia for two years. We can, indeed, find some value in heroic suffering, but to suggest that pain had to be is another matter.8 The opposite view is also found, and it has a clear ring of piety because it insists that clear evidence of evil and suffering is an instance of the mystery we face as human beings. We must not try to account for or explain such evidence at all but merely accept it. The Supreme Being is in total charge and whatever he does must all be right in its own way. We have no right to wonder about the suffering, even of innocents, because such wondering is an act of defiance, ah instance of human pride, and perhaps evidence of our deep-seated sinful nature. Accordingly, this view does not try to find hidden meanings in foul events nor does it construct interpretations. It asks that we resign ourselves to events as they occur and hope for the best. A Hindu acquaintance warned, "We must not peep into such mysteries." The paradigm of this attitude is found in the biblical character of Job, a righteous man who suffered miseries and pain. As he reflected on the many torments he lived through, he affirmed: "Though He slay me, yet will I trust him" (Job 13:15), That may be all that any theistic believer can ever say, though in Job's case it was a conclusion he came to after some long and persistent questioning, not something he initially voiced in unquestioning pious humility. This outlook asks us to remain both humble and ignorant. It says we can never solve the problem anyway so to try is hopeless. Thus, it has the ring of humility. It has the appeal of any mind that likes to announce that we cannot know such things. Nothing is safer and easier than meekly to say "I don't know." But in reality this is a sentimental form of skepticism, which any thoughtful person must challenge even as we must challenge the religious mind that claims to have all the answers. A reflective person who inquires about serious and grave matters cannot be rationally satisfied if told that all inquiry should cease in the name of piety. If told that rational satisfaction is itself a false aim—that instead simple faith will suffice—we are thrust back into dark superstition. Theologians and others who approach the problem of evil in this
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way are doing a disservice to their religion as well as making a virtue out of posed, ignorant humility. The historical fact is, as I have said before, that most of the great religious leaders of humankind across the ages and cultures have been willing to ask blunt questions and have given the topics serious consideration. The claims of false humility or sentimental piety are irrelevant here. How can inquiring after and wondering about the facts of suffering be a case of human bravado and sinfulness? How can wondering in all sincerity why an allegedly omnipotent deity permits innocent children to suffer when he could stop it if he wished be impious? A century ago, Borden P. Bowne put it this way: I wish I could interpret the Divine goodness as easily as some of my acquaintances! . . . What an awful world this is with its pain and sorrow and wretchedness and slaughter extending all through history! . . . Would a good man do any of the things that God is doing every day? 3. Attempts at Solutions Six general kinds of solutions emerge to the problems of evil that have been offered, and I shall look at examples of each, noting a bit of the-history of each view and making critical comments. We see (1) answers that seek a causal explanation, (2) solutions that explain evil as essentially unreal, (3) reinterpretations of evil and suffering as unknown or disguised goods, (4) pragmatic and poetic solutions, (5) atheistic claims, and (6) reconsideration of the nature of the Supreme Being. (1) Answers seeking a causal explanation. In ancient Zoroastrianism, believers claimed that suffering and evil were caused by an evil force or spirit—Angra Mainyu—who stood in opposition" to God (Ahura Mazda). Rustom Masani, in setting forth this view, notes that this doctrine of what can be called eternal polarism (the first in the history of religion) postulates the independent existence of evil. Thus, evil is not sullied good, nor negation, nor good in process of formation. Two primeval powers are at work, the Beneficent Spirit (also called Spenta Mainyu) and the evil spirit (Angra Mainyu). The two spirits exist in relation to each other but "they meet in the higher unity of Ahura Mazda." This dualistic view is still widely found throughout the world among practicing believers in traditional Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. (An early Christian heresy, called Manichaeism from the fourth century, held that evil and darkness are self-existent and that the God of light bears no responsibility for them.) Commonly claimed is the existence of a personified power known as Satan, who competes with the divine being for the souls of people and is the source not only of sin but also of human suffering and natural catastrophes. Millions of Muslim and Christian Fundamentalists interpret much of their practical day-to-day experience by means of the idea of Satan or the devil.
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Some believe, as modern Parsees do, that this evil power has legions of demons to carry out his work. Indeed, active rituals are still used for exorcising demons in some Christian churches. Similarly, popular Hindu polytheism makes room for Gods such as Durga, who causes cholera, floods, and destruction; but most thoughtful or philosophical Hindus do not hold that two ultimate forces exist in the universe opposing each other. In spite of the cultura! weight of the idea of Satan, furthered in the visual arts and in literary works like Milton's Paradise Lost and Goethe's Faust, the idea of a counterforce is logically and religiously repugnant. Those who accept Satan as a real power haye argued fallaciously that the first thing Satan does is to get us to doubt his existence. (Two examples are Billy Graham and the Russian Orthodox textbook.) Others notice that the figure of Satan bulks large in the Hebrew, and at least after the influence of the Persian captivity, Christian and Muslim Scriptures, and great religious teachers such as Jesus and Mohammed seem to have accepted the idea of a satanic power. But few philosophers of religion and only the most literalistic theologians give any serious heed to the question. To account for the appearance of a satanic power in human history is difficult enough. The idea of a "fallen angel" leaves unexplained why that angel was initially motivated to turn away from the omnipotent source of goodness and creativity. A more serious question concerns the nature, character, and power of a deity that we would have to accept should such a counterpower exist. Can we conceive that an all-powerful and omniscient deity would permit an evil power to go about his vicious task unchecked, wreaking havoc and pain on innocent children when, as Martin Luther once wrote, "one little word shall fell him"? Can we revere a divine being who could stop suffering but refuses to? Human beings restrain criminals and put them away as quickly as possible, even trying sometimes to redeem them. But the Supreme Being does not and will not deal with Satan that directly. While the idea of Satan may religiously accentuate recognition that human beings seem to have built-in frailties, we need not account for those frailties by positing an external evil agency. Can an absolutely evil being such as Satan acquire any rights over his creator? Furthermore, a universe split in two is metaphysically hard to comprehend. Such a dualism cannot even be formulated consistently. If the satanic power causes earthquakes, cholera, volcanoes, and famines, and the benevolent divine being is responsible for beauty, health, fine weather, and good harvests, how can we possibly understand the unity of the laws of science? Does the supremely good being and the supremely evil one have laws that each controls? If so, how can we find any overall unified purpose to historic existence? Literalistic theologians in the West often think that philosophic queries are themselves instances of sinfulness. They provide elaborate constructions about the second coming of a Messiah or Mahdi who will conquer Satan and his forces in one final battle called Armageddon, where God will collect his enemies for destruction. After that, God will reign over his elect subjects, will no longer be challenged, and peace will cover the earth.
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The energy some religious people spend worrying and arguing over such forecasted events tends to be divisive instead of promoting more gentleness and human kindness in the world. This suggests, perhaps, a definite need for psychotherapy if not psychoanalysis. (2) Solutions that explain evil as essentially unreal. Some people have suggested that the presence of suffering in the world is ultimately a result of human free will, even going so far as to blame all human suffering on the one choice of the first man, Adam. Adam's decision to go against a command of God, so the claim goes, has been responsible for all the suffering human beings have experienced since his time when the world was an untainted paradise. But we must ask whether tuberculosis and diphtheria are the inevitable results of one bad decision made by the first human being in the distant past. Can a baby born in 1990 without arms or eyes be understood as a long-range consequence of an initial bad choice? Surely, the destruction and death wrought by volcanoes and earthquakes cannot be explained so naively. Nor can the extinction of dinosaurs or other grand creatures who perished long before any human beings were around be so explained. While possibly true that people who are careless in eating habits, unhygienic, or too lazy to prevent the spread of disease by exterminating infected rats, for example, do bear some responsibility for subsequent suffering, such irresponsibility leaves far more things unexplained than it accounts for. Another aspect of this view, which places responsibility for suffering on human beings, is suggested in the thought of Benedict Spinoza and in some practical Buddhist teachings. In his final book, the learned philosopher E. A. Burtt proposed, "nothing that happens to us is in itself good or evil, satisfying or disappointing; we make it so by the way we take it." While that viewpoint has some relevance for states of mind, moods, and even pain, it provides no account whatever of infants and children who are dfeformed or suffer. Nor does it seem viable in explicating a hurricane's devastation. We cannot make something like massive catastrophes good or better merely by adopting a different attitude toward them. (3) Evil and suffering as unknown or disguised goods. A more serious and more widespread view maintains that suffering in both human beings and animals is a result not of one person's original sin or of subjective attitudes, but of each individual's own past sins. Evil is, accordingly, a deserved punishment for sins. But which sins—our own, our parents', our ancestors', or the sins of our own individual past lives? On this point we find a significant division between East and West. In the Jewish-Christian-Islamic tradition, people sometimes claim that the iniquities of the fathers will be visited upon their children. The second of the Ten Commandments reminds us that to make a graven image of the deity will result in punishment "unto the third and fourth generation" (Exod. 20:5). However, later in the same tradition, when the disciples came to Jesus with a blind man, inquiring who had sinned that the man was born blind, Jesus set aside that interpretation: "Neither hath this man
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sinned, nor his parent" (John 9:3). We do not automatically suffer because a forebear told a lie or used false weights. But in the karmic religions, the idea of suffering as a consequence of our own past sins is a vital and widespread doctrine. Millions of believers accept it. And it is a doctrine appealed to as an explanation for all kinds and conditions of suffering. I have a disease now because I deserve to have it as retribution for some sin done in a previous life. If an infant is malformed at birth, that is a proper result of past choices, the consequence of sins in one or more past lives. If we are washed away by a tidal wave or crushed in an earthquake or suffer excruciating pain, we must realize, on this view, that we are reaping what we have sown. Each individual is responsible for what they have done and must bear the consequences no matter how severe. (We can, however, build up good karma in the present life and thereby reduce suffering in future lives.) Even if a person should perish in an automobile accident, that too is explicable by the law of karma, for why were those persons found in just these circumstances? Heinrich von Stientencron has made an interesting observation that most in the Indian tradition would share: "Reincarnation frees the deity from immediate responsibility for all the misery of the world without requiring a devil and without glossing over that misery."9 The idea is straightforward, but the logic is not good. If we sin, we will suffer. Thus, if we suffer, we must have sinned at some time in the past. No sin exists without suffering; and no suffering exists without its source in sinful acts. I cannot here go into the doctrine of reincarnation or transmigration, which is the metaphysical presupposition of this belief, but some queries remain. Seemingly, no form of suffering, human or animal, is not encompassed by this doctrine. But what about the character this doctrine does not encompass? What about the character of the suffering itself? What assemblage of what sort of sins in a previous life justifies the baby born with no eyes? And what of the individual who is born without enough consciousness to realize that he or she is being punished or enough intelligence to try to overcome the bad karma so the next life might be better? We are told that the principle is invariable. The suffering we endure as punishment always fits the crime we have committed. But no way exists for us to discover just what has brought the pain we now have. In an ordinary court of law, the criminal knows with what he or she is charged and knows the crime being punished. But in the universe we must accept whatever punishment we receive as the necessarily just dessert of previously unknown sinful actions: Such a claim would seem to make a shambles of moral growth. At the same time, we must pay for what we have done. Yet karma (discussed again below) can say precious little about the problems of overproductivity and evolutionary waste. (4) Pragmatic and poetic solutions. Some thinkers have tried to explain the facts of evil and suffering as resulting from a lack or absence of good—as privation, to use Saint Augustine's term. This view claims that everything God has made is of necessity good. If evil exists, it is a malfunctioning of good.
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Blindness is a privation, an incomplete use of the eye, though the eye itself is good. While Augustine asserted degrees of higher and lower or greater or lesser goods, whatever is evil in them has in some way corrupted or spoiled them. If we should ask why something malfunctions or is incomplete in some way—for example, disease—the response seems to be that such occurrences take place because of free will. Since God by nature cannot do anything evil or bad and all that God causes must by nature be good, the creature in some sense is responsible for the privation or lack of the good. The absence of goodness, its lack, is a consequence of the creature's freedom, a result of sin. In the tradition of the Neo-Platonist Plotinus, we see a slightly different version, for in his case all the world of nature is an emanation of God—a flowing out—and is thus part of God's very nature, though distant from the center of God's being. Evil, then, is a lessening or diminution involving distance from the good. In the religious view of Christianity, nature and creatures are not emanations but creations of God and thus evil is not a flowing out from God. While this "privation" view represents an interesting historical outlook, a new angle in viewing what evil and suffering are, it does little more than restate the problem. To say that all evil—especially the evidence of waste and destruction that obviously occurred before any human agents existed—is a product of human freedom is no "answer" or solution. But Augustine cannot be blamed for not understanding evolutionary theory, the age of the earth, the annihilation of dinosaurs, and the like. Insofar as this view of privation places responsibility on human agency, it is subject to the same criticism made above. It is even less coherent or reasonable than the karmic view, because we are speaking of but one life, not previous lives that are reaping the reward or punishment of former lives. How may we conceive that a newly born infant without arms and blind is in some way responsible for his or her state? To suggest that deformed or malformed babies are consequences of parental sin implies that innocent persons suffer for someone else's sins. That is unintelligible from any standard of human justice, and if the deity decrees that innocent children should bear the weight of a parent's sinning, the level of justice implied is subhuman and the kind of deity involved is not worthy of worship or praise. "It is not your father's will that any of these little ones should suffer." The conscience rises up in protest! (5) Aesthetic claims. An ingenious and novel effort to explain the presence of suffering in the world has been offered by the distinguished contemporary philosopher Charles Hartshorne. He absolves God of all responsibility for evil by saying that creatures, some subhuman and minute, are the causal ground for evil: "Perhaps there is no why God sends us evils, since he does not send them at all. Rather he establishes an order in which creatures can send each other particular goods and evils."10 He adds: "God is neither a wise sadist nor a detached magistrate, torturing us for some good end. Rather he turns creatures loose to be each other's destiny, within wise limits of natural law."1' Again, "the universe is, in a manner of speaking, a bureaucracy and the
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members of this bureaucracy whose actions furnish the setting for an individual's life are all fallible, more or less unintelligent, imperfect agents . . . a partial dependence upon the choices of others, there is no escape in this world or any other. . . . God himself must be qualified by creaturely choices."12 An advantage of this view is, like the previous one, that it absolves God from responsibility. He does not cause or sanction suffering, disease, or malformation. Those things occur as part of the risk of existence, and while God has established laws, he does not totally control all the myriad creatures in the universe. Bacteria and viruses contribute both to the gpod and evil in the world, and when suffering occurs it is a product of the intermingling of vast numbers of creatures. God is himself affected by what these creatures do. Hartshorne's doctrine requires an ontological panpsychism. Subhuman creatures can work together for good or evil, and evil occurs when they do not work in proper harmony. This view sees God not as an omnipotent eternal being but as a benevolent creative process who is involved in the life of his creatures but does not have the power to control their every move. While this view might offer insight in explaining illness or even malformation, to understand how it accounts for earthquakes and other natural disasters is hard unless we assert that even in the world of apparently dead nature interacting units exist that have somehow failed to function together properly. Can the predicted future ecological disasters be explicated this way? But Occam's razor exists in philosophy: We should not overcomplicate theories, given clearer and ample accounts. Hartshorne's view not only denies omnipotence to the divine being, but it makes him scarcely more than a creative process who does not seem to have any goal or overall purpose in mind except to keep the process going. He becomes the only truly intrinsic value; his creatures, who may or may not cooperate with him, amount to fleeting, impermanent identities. The view has a strongly theravadic Buddhist character. It ignores the claims of millions of believers and centuries of thought that have insisted that God is good and in charge of the good and that some far-off divine event exists to which the whole creation moves. (6) Another look at the nature of the Supreme Being. An additional view trying to account for the presence of evil in causal language is the position affirming that God is not omnipotent. The suffering and evil that exists is a result of factors not caused by him. One view claims a factor outside of God that limits his power, while another maintains factors within his very being that, while not directly causing evil, do account for it. The first is linked with Plato's view set forth in his Timaeus. The Demiurge bodies forth Ideas in the Receptacle, but the Receptacle is recalcitrant, unyielding. It does not lend itself to the full perfection of Forms. Thus, when God, for example, would produce a perfect replica of a baby's body, the effort to do so is in part hindered by the Receptacle. Reason tries to overcome necessity but is not always successful. This is not because of irresponsibility or vindictiveness, but is just part of the risk of creation.
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The second view maintains that in his very nature are given factors that God uses in creating and maintaining the universe. He controls what is going on, but an element of brute factuality exists with which he struggles and which may thus be said to put limits on his power. E. S. Brightman, who developed this view in recent times, accordingly speaks of a finite God whose will is perfect and good but who sometimes, as evinced in the long evolutionary process, is unable to create and sustain perfect physical bodies or overcome "faults" in topography that make earthquakes possible. This view, in either of its two forms, gives a nontraditional new meaning or definition to the term "God," and I will consider it again below. One serious disadvantage is that it seems to go directly against the religious claims of all theistic religions, which have long maintained that God is perfect in every sense, in power as well as character. Critics, then, charge that a being that is not omnipotent cannot genuinely be understood as God. One clear advantage of the view is that it accounts, as no other one does, for the waste and suffering in the world of nature before the presence of self-conscious human beings who knew what suffering meant, and it does so without making a good God the source. It accords also with the Judeo-Christian view that the whole of creation "groans in travail." 4. Answers That Explain Evil as Essentially Unreal These approaches to the traditional problem do not seek to explain causes or give an account of evil as such. They in effect deny that evil exists, that what we call evil and suffering are not truly real, that they are appearances resulting from our human frailty in trying to understand. (1) One form of this view that evil is an appearance is found in the branch of Hindu philosophy known as advaita