POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY
VIBS Volume 227 Robert Ginsberg Founding Editor Leonidas Donskis Executive Editor Associate Edito...
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POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY
VIBS Volume 227 Robert Ginsberg Founding Editor Leonidas Donskis Executive Editor Associate Editors G. John M. Abbarno George Allan Gerhold K. Becker Raymond Angelo Belliotti Kenneth A. Bryson C. Stephen Byrum Robert A. Delfino Rem B. Edwards Malcolm D. Evans Roland Faber Andrew Fitz-Gibbon Francesc Forn i Argimon Daniel B. Gallagher William C. Gay Dane R. Gordon J. Everet Green Heta Aleksandra Gylling Matti Häyry Brian G. Henning
Steven V. Hicks Richard T. Hull Michael Krausz Olli Loukola Mark Letteri Vincent L. Luizzi Adrianne McEvoy J.D. Mininger Peter A. Redpath Arleen L. F. Salles John R. Shook Eddy Souffrant Tuija Takala Emil Višňovský Anne Waters James R. Watson John R. Welch Thomas Woods
a volume in Social Philosophy SP Andrew Fitz-Gibbon , Editor
POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY
Sanya Osha With a Guest Foreword by
Seth N. Asumah
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2011
Cover Photo: www.dreamstime.com Cover Design: Studio Pollmann The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-3317-7 E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-3318-4 © Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2011 Printed in the Netherlands
Social Philosophy (SP) Andrew Fitz-Gibbon Editor
Other Titles in SP Evgenia Cherkasova. Dostoevsy and Kant. 2009. VIBS 206 Craig Hanson. Thinking About Addiction. 2009. VIBS 209
CONTENTS EDITORIAL FOREWORD Andrew Fitz-Gibbon
ix
GUEST FOREWORD Seth N. Asumah
xi
PREFACE
xix
INTRODUCTION
1
ONE
Discourses of Decolonization
9
TWO
The Lure of Ethnophilosophy
41
THREE
An Anthropology of Colonialism and Contemporary Globalization
57
FOUR
The Frontier of Interculturality
73
FIVE
An Ethic of Culture and Memory
89
SIX
Agency and a Deterritorialized Literature
97
SEVEN
Figures of the African Female
115
EIGHT
The Poetics of Corruption in a Global Age
147
NINE
A Postcolonial Text and the Agency of Theory
159
TEN
The (Re)Colonization of Globality
167
ELEVEN
Race and a Postmodern World
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POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY
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Sarah Baartman, Sexuality, and the Theater of Race
185
CONCLUSION
195
WORKS CITED
199
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
209
SUBJECT INDEX
211
NAME AND TITLE INDEX
225
EDITORIAL FOREWORD In 1998, the philosophy department at State University of New York at Cortland took the innovative step to create a program focused on social philosophy. The key components of the program are social and political philosophy, ethics, and applied philosophy. In 2007, following the successful implementation of the program, the department formed the Center for Ethics Peace and Social Justice to extend the outreach of philosophy through publications, conferences, and a summer ethics institute for faculty, and philosophical practice and activism. As part of that outreach, we are delighted to co-sponsor the VIBS special series in Social Philosophy. Sanya Osha’s innovative work, Postethnophilosophy, is the third volume in our series. In this book, Osha reconsiders the question: “What is African philosophy,” and introduces a strategy for setting a broad and productive agenda for contemporary African philosophical thought. The scope of this work is broad. It explores the links between contemporary anthropology and African thought by critiquing the contributions of primary scholars such as Kwasi Wiredu, Wim van Binsbergen, and John and Jean Comaroff. He argues that African philosophy had been impeded by an engrossing search for identity. This book advances beyond the problem of identity and selfconstitution, and focuses instead on the dynamics of decolonization, race in a post apartheid context, the problematic interactions between race and sexuality, and a range of other discursive deliberations. On a broader scale, the book addresses the question of producing knowledge in Africa. In particular, it examines the role of the public intellectual in relation to politics and cultural memory. These various preoccupations bypass the central assumptions of classical ethnophilosophy. Osha makes a bold announcement for the beginning of a postethnophilosophical phase in contemporary African thought. Andrew Fitz-Gibbon Associate Professor of Philosophy Director, Center for Ethics, Peace and Social Justice State University of New York College at Cortland and VIBS Social Philosophy Special Series Editor
GUEST FOREWORD RETHINKING AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY In this era of globalization and Sino-Africanization, there is an urgency to reexamine the decolonization discourse and its concomitant questions, issues, and prospects for the African continent in relation to the processes of development and modernization. There is always a point in time where the evolution of the corpus of the field of study tends to eclipse with the field itself, and we have reached that juncture for African philosophy and the continent. The deadline for the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) propounded by all the member states of the United Nations and twenty-three transnational organizations is a few years away. Yet we are nowhere near the eradication of extreme poverty, achievement of universal primary education, promotion of gender equity, combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, reduction of child mortality and developing global partnership for development, to name some of the goals for the Millennium Project. In the post-colonial era, scholars and policymakers have been engaged in scholarship, discursive consciousness, and practical perceptions of reconciling the differences between African cultures and European ones. Most often, Africanists and Africologists are submerged in laborious projects of vindicating the African personality and the African collective self. In these troubling times of socio-economic and political uncertainties across the continent, there is a dire need for a new ubuntu that emphasizes relational democracy, where Africans will command respect in the global village, reconstitute their shared values, and utilize participatory avenues through sustained institutional arrangements to shape the life and direction of their societies. In this perspective, if postethnophilosophy interrogates the African body politic by bringing the questions and issues of race, power, hegemony, development, modernization, multiculturalism, interculturality, globalization, and intersectionality to the forefront, then, from not engaging readers on topics above to what postethnophilosophy attempts to achieve, we have come a full circle in our Africaness regardless of identity politics, location, and culture. Without rehashing the debate over whether there even exists a corpus of African philosophy and its origin, one can firmly make the claim that African philosophical tradition has been long situated to confront the questions and issues that have gained currency in terms of the Millennium Development Goals. The intellectual works and practices of African philosophers and the discourses about the continent and its interaction with, especially, Europe and the Americas constitute this philosophical tradition that attempts to mediate the forces of structural variables in Africa and systemic dynamics of global capitalism. African philosophical thinkers, in this perception, continue to de-
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fine and redefine their roles as mediators of the African personality and the African polity. With the emergence of ethnophilosophy, the intensity and scope of the decolonization discourse, the effects of globalization, and Chinanization, the task of interrogating the African self and the European other has become more complex because of the politics of discursive omission and commission. Some scholars may argue that in the process of globalization, local culture becomes synonymous with Western culture, and that consequently, there is a need for subordinate cultures to go back to their source of the essence of being (Sankofa) to search for productive elements that will bring new meanings to their lives. Indubitably, this occasion is not the time for pessimism. Nevertheless, the European nostalgia for slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and now, globalization, always remind Africans of the trauma and the nature of decolonization. In a similar vein, Salih Booker and William Minter document the inequalities in today’s global village as the: foundation of the old inequalities of slavery and colonialism. . . . Like apartheid in South Africa, global apartheid entrenches great disparities in wealth, living conditions, life expectancy and access to government institutions with effective power. (2001, p. 15) Globalization is not a panacea for most of Africa’s problems, as the winners of the global movement would make the world believe. Africans should be careful in participating in a movement that champions the style of globalization that is blind to the needs of the majority of the members of the global village. If this present process of globalization continues into the next twenty-five years, African nation states are likely to permanently reinscribe in a position of subjugation, exploitation, marginalization, and life-threatening status that is mystified by Western rationalization of a free market and equal benefits for all members of the global village. Furthermore, the emergence and increasing activity of parastatal agencies, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations in the postcolonial era have impacted the nature and function of the African nation state. The role of the African nation state, in the process of development and modernization, continues to elude both scholars and policymakers in these times of liberalization and globalization. Depicting the role of the nation state as elusive is associated with the question of whether transnational actors’ activities on the continent have rendered the nation states’ role to become anachronistic or epiphenomenal. In decolonial discourse, as the modern nation state continues to evolve in Africa, it retires into a different type of entity in order to respond to the demands and needs of the society at large. Yet the authoritative action of the nation state to shape and constrain the expectations, demands, and pressures from the general populace, international actors, and other institutions are modified according to paradigmatic reorientation of the
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state itself. If the security and power of the nation state are eroding, is it perhaps because of free trade zones, international financial institutions, nongovernmental institutions, global capitalism, terrorism, environmental challenges, patriarchal hegemonic African societies, or a combination of structural paralysis and systemic dynamics? The postcolonial African nation state, in addition to being anthropomorphic, has to constantly deal with the development crises of identity by unifying the general populace, promoting autonomous political participation by improving the democratic process, facilitating penetration of the law into the society by maintaining law-governing structures, and distributing resources and power by decentralization in governance. These crises, inter alia, have prevented the postcolonial African nation from reaching a takeoff stage—a point of prematurity, where the necessities for development are secured. Since we must not perform a premature autopsy on the body politic of the African nation state, African philosophers must lead the way to challenge scholars, educators, and policymakers to confront the issues and conditions above and find solutions to them by taking the conversation beyond the postcolonial discourse and traditional ethnophilosophy. A courageous act is required to address the totality of issues and questions pertaining to the African human condition and globalization through the lenses of ethnophilosophy. Yet, Sanya Osha’s volume is the first I have read that is Janus-headed in its discursive approaches. Osha’s corpus is, on the one hand, ipsissima verba of the African philosophers whose work precede him. On the other, it transcends the limits and substantially raises the bar of the works of Kwesi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji, Kwame Anthony Appiah, John L. Comaroff, Jean Comaroff, Wole Soyinka, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Van Binsbergen, and the like. For instance, if Hountondji finds a philosophical problem with African ethnophilosophy because it plays into the hands of Western ethnophilosophy, but falls short of finding a clear solution to the theoretical lacuna, Sanya Osha effectively captures the domain of discursive consciousness through his work on postethnophilosophy. As it is noted in the Akan, “one does not tell Kweku Ananse stories to Ananse’s own children.” However, in this case, the new stories of Ananse must generate better meaning through effective use of language that makes sense of the ancient narratives. Osha does not spare his readers and ethnophilosophers from a critical analysis of Wiredu’s corpus. This begs the question: in the postcolonial era, is the African collective self still subordinate to the superordination of the European other in order to authenticate African philosophy, as Wiredu does in his Anglo-Saxon analytical framework, and Osha carefully reveals? The African sage must have insights and the griot must be charged with the preservation and critique of tradition and culture. If the sage and griot surrender their vision and wisdom to outside agencies, then they have to reexamine their own ideals and approaches to mediation in the society. Axiomatically, Van Binsbergen is well captured in his dilemma of maintaining both the qualities of a
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North Atlantic academician and a sangoma high priest of East Africa. Van Binsbergen has to reconcile these differences in his theoretical approaches, but he still suffers a dosage of double consciousness in his philosophical narratives. Osha immaculately brings the narratives and discursive consciousness of the interlocutors of ethnophilosophy to life in his assessment of their works, yet he compels the student of African philosophy or anyone who appreciates knowledge of the African postcolonial experience to resign in the existential anxiety of wanting to be further engaged by the text. Where other philosophers have failed to clearly conceptualize and problematize decolonization to encapsulate the African experience in toto by addressing the issues of globalization, interculturality, sexuality, and intersectionality, Osha masterfully succeeds. Osha’s volume will have a profound influence on African postcoloniality, ethnophilosophical discourse, cultural studies, and the new corpus of postethnophilosophy. As if writing about African postcolonial experience and African philosophical traditions are not laborious enough challenges, Osha raises the bar in demanding that African philosophers move the conversation beyond traditional ethnophilosophy. He is effective in utilizing the prism of culture, race, class, gender, sexuality, globalization, and the intersectionality of these categories to engage his readers—an approach unique to Osha’s work. This work should not be regarded as just another contribution to African philosophy. It must be appraised as a much needed and timely extension of African philosophy beyond the realms of enthnophilosophy. Taking the decolonization discourse beyond its traditional boundaries means that Africans must revisit the role of women in the process of development, modernization and globalization. Even though the process of Chinanization or Sino-Africanization have been around for over fifty years, neither Africans nor the Chinese have paid any particular attention to the Chinese adage, “women hold up half of the sky.” Euro-American and Chinese development agencies in Africa conducting business with or for Africa tend to be somewhat oblivious to women’s roles in the process of development and modernization. African hegemonic, masculinist societies have also, until recently, neglected women’s role in development and modernization. Gender inequality is a fact of life in many places around the world. Yet, the exploitation, marginalization, and injustices against women are more pervasive in Africa than in most other parts of the world. In addition, the processes of development, modernization and globalization have reduced African women’s roles to negligible limits. Forces such as colonialism before the above-mentioned processes neglected African women’s issues such as female genital mutilation, wife beatings, sale of child brides, honor killings, murders due to dowry, and prostitution. These issues remain unfinished business, and can arguably be tantamount to a “silent genocide” of African women. This is not to sensationalize the levels of women’s suffering in different parts of the world or engage in another kind of an Oppression Olympics for women. Nor should Africologists define gender roles through essentialism, em-
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phasizing the categorical differences between the African man and woman and, consequently, differentiating how oppression relates to women in Africa. Nevertheless, the African woman’s oppression is prejudiced by the phallocentric patriarchal African society, cultural values, colonialism, neocolonialism, global capitalism, development, modernization and globalization. The argument above is clarified by the fact that the African woman is not victimized by her womanhood alone, but by many prevailing systemic forces. Thus, the project for gender liberation and equality cannot be limited to a duality of discursive consciousness emphasizing male superordination vis-á-vis female subordination. Indubitably, African hegemonic masculinity is a socio-cultural construction that can experience paradigm shifts in different cultures. Therefore, our analyses must not be accepted as “universal.” A kaleidoscopic approach to tackling African women’s oppression and repairing the gender gap is a mindful and deliberate approach to interrogating power, space, hierarchy, culture, class, and intersectionality in reaching gender parity. I am not yet optimistic about gender equality and liberation in this decade, but I am hopeful. To capture the essence of the dynamics of decoloniality adequately, and the application of appropriate discursive consciousness, an avoidance of a duality or binary approach is necessary for interlocutors of the decolonization discourse. In this respect, readers of this volume are primed to transcend the parameters of Africa/Europe, core/periphery, good/bad, Black/White, or male/female quagmires. Yet these approaches are sometimes unavoidable if one has to deduct such experiences from universal historical contradictions of slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, and globalism to discover future possibilities. This author carefully brings the matrices of domination into his analytical framework, but they do not stand apart from the decolonization discourse. Consequently, an inclusive perspective is attained by recognizing the African experience in both local and global spheres. A transdisciplinary and multidimensional approach to appraising African philosophy enriches Osha’s work. Today, Anglo-American values have indeed swept the African continent. Most cities and villages in Africa are submerged in this neoconvergence era, adorned by “McCulturization,” “Coca-colization,” “Americanization,” computer technology, Internet cafés, hip-hop music, rock music, Hollywood films, Eurostar, MTV, soap–operas, blue jeans, and other symbols of democratic capitalism. If the prophesy of the convergence theory appears to be accurate, then what would be the essence of African philosophy? From Algeria to Angola, and from Zambia to Zimbabwe, people of the African world are adopting similar tastes in food, dress, art, popular music, entertainment, and intellectual property. These tastes are predominantly Western ones. Paradoxically, there seems to be a trend toward “cultural sameness” in our multicultural world. The African world is experiencing a cultural disintegration to adopt Western forms of life-style and protocol, and most African nation states are losing their raison d’être as sovereign states. I am not an Afro-pessimist, but the
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movement to modernization without development is disturbing. African nation states’ susceptibility to global forces has facilitated the “dollarization,” Coca-colization and McCulturalization of the African world––making them even more vulnerable to the process of globalization. African countries are converging at a very fast rate with the West; however, they remain underdeveloped according to commonly accepted measures of development. African nation states must be true partners in setting development goals that will take their cultures into consideration. African cultures must be realistically integrated into the Millennium Development Goals and the process of globalization through renewed emphasis on African development, and the promotion of arts, indigenous dressing, and cultural festival must not be set apart from economic and socio-political development. Africans must also take into the account the forces of their deep culture, how that affects the process of modernization, and how the process of development is stifled because of certain cultural settings that are not conducive to the process of modernization and development. There is a plethora of evidence that African nation states are vehemently endeavoring to develop, become modern, and transcend the decolonization discourse. Hitherto, the issues and problems of the cultural divide between Africa and the West are being neglected because of global hegemonic cultures and the complacency of African nation states to start a new conversation over cultural imperialism, sexuality and intersectionality. To be true partners in the global village, a new conversation about cultural partnerships and development must begin now. Africa, in this volume, has reached new heights and African philosophers are meeting the challenges of problematizing issues and finding solutions for the questions of the development of underdevelopment of the continent. Thus far, regardless how developed and modernized Africa becomes, Africans must still combat the traditional ills, stereotypes, activities of predatory regimes and vampire parastatal agencies in addition to the forces of the international system. Solutions to the African problem and condition are complex and difficult, but discussions in this volume and postethnophilosophy should contribute to a new avenue of finding solutions to Africa’s problems. To enable the impacts of globalization to be meaningful to Africans in the global village, local cultures should be juxtaposed with global cultures through deliberate discourses and policy goals. Moreover, the values of Western cultures impact on African ones should be studied and analyzed constantly through institutional frameworks to determine the lethal impact of globalization on African cultures, so that prudent decisions could be made about mitigating the differences. Finally, to remain authentic players in the global village, African nation states must utilize the African Union in cooperation with the private sector and governments from the West and create their own strategic plans that address their special needs and cultural preservations.
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Sanya Osha’s work sets a strong analytical stage for African philosophers to sharpen their discursive approaches to provide agency for the rapid changes in what is cerebral and practical due to international interaction. African philosophers must continue to reexamine current global forces in addition to returning to the African essence of community sustenance, dependability, and African worldview. Ethnophilosophers must move beyond the status quo ante. As with all things, Osha’s work may contain risky propositions for African philosophers and the continent. Nonetheless, I invite you to engage in this penetrating adventure of reading Osha’s captivating work on postethnophilosophy. Seth N. Asumah SUNY Distinguished Teaching Professor Professor of Political Science Chair, Africana Studies Department State University of New York at Cortland Cortland, New York, 13045 USA
PREFACE On the whole, this work is concerned with some of the major currents of contemporary African thought; the dynamics and configurations of decolonization, paradigmatic shifts in Africanist anthropology, the politics of culture and social memory, and questions of race, multiculturalism, and globalization which are all preoccupations that transform the contours of classical ethnophilosophy. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between Africanist anthropology and African philosophy has a long and deep history. The discourse known as ethnophilosophy is in many respects a product of that history and relationship. Postethnophilophy refers to the discursive rupture in this foundational relationship. It also refers to the complexities of contemporary Africanity in which questions of race, place, and belonging have moved beyond the primary concerns of ethnophilosophy. Postethnophilosophy is also a product of the crisis of identity that bedeviled conventional African philosophy in its search for different discursive orientations. It is both a condition that forms African theoretical discourse and also an attempt to institute a different set of problems. In some ways, this work addresses a significant part of the African forms of discourse that deal with themes relating to the traumas and realities of colonization, the dynamics of postcolonial subjectification, processes of decolonization, questions of agency, and modes of knowledge construction in Africa. However, by addressing the subjects of gender and sexuality, and their intersections with the problem of raciology, it departs from the classical ethnophilosophical turn and the overriding problem of origins in contemporary African thought. Parts of Chapter Two have been revised and expanded from the ideas previously published in my, “Legacies of a Critique of Ethnophilosophy: Hountondji’s African Philosophy: Myth & Reality Revisited,” QUEST: An African Journal of Philosophy, Revue Africaine de Philosophie, 17:1-2 (2005). Ideas in Chapter Three have been developed from work previously published in my “Anthropology at the Limits: A Genealogical Re-Appraisal of Colonialism in the Time of Contemporary Globalization,” Research in African Literatures, 34:1 (Spring 2003), pp. 173–186. Other works to which I refer are cited in the text. I am grateful to Wim van Binsbergen for insisting on the viability of this project and making available the moral, institutional, and intellectual resources needed for its realization. Mirjam de Bruijn, coordinator of the Agency in Africa theme group of the African Studies Centre in Leiden was equally supportive of the project by encouraging its publication. I thank the faculty and staff of the African Studies Centre for the tremendous support and hospitality that I received while I was a visiting fellow at the Center between October and December 2005. The conception and efforts needed to realize this
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project took place within those crucial months. The beginning of the research process dates much further back. Over the years, I have incurred many intellectual debts. I thank Georges Herault, Dipo Irele, Abiola Irele, Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, Eghosa Osaghae, Pius Adesanmi, Francis Nyamnjoh, Rasigan Maharajh, Mario Scerri, Pumla Dineo Gqola, Nal Abdelrasq, Graeme Reid, and Philippe-Joseph Salazar, who in different ways have contributed in making the long journey it took for this book to find its shape possible. My VIBS Special Series Editor, Andrew Fitz-Gibbon, went beyond the call of duty in guiding the manuscript through many drafts. I am grateful to him and his excellent team for making the entire exercise a worthwhile effort. Finally, I thank Elizabeth D. Boepple for the superlative copy-editing.
INTRODUCTION Since the ground breaking texts of contemporary African philosophy, such as Kwasi Wiredu’s Philosophy and an African Culture (1980), Paulin J. Hountondji’s African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1983), Valentin Yves Mudimbe’s The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge (1988), Kwame Anthony Appiah’s In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (1992), and Achille Mbembe’s On the Postcolony (2001) were published, much has been accomplished within the discipline. This is not to suggest that the authors mentioned belong to a particular school of thought, or that they adopt similar conceptual methodologies. Neither is it to suggest there are not other equally significant African philosophers. The philosophers mentioned here are quite dissimilar in many respects. Wiredu draws much of his inspiration from the Anglo-Saxon analytic tradition while Hountondji, Mudimbe, and Mbembe belong to what may be termed the continental school of philosophy which draws a considerable part of its discursive impetus from European philosophical figures such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Louis Althusser. Appiah, on the other hand, is indebted to what he calls the philosophy of culture. Indeed, a school of philosophy emerged from the University of Ibadan in the 1970s that eventually produced a distinct orientation in the discourse that is known as African philosophy. True, Universities of Ghana, Legon, and other academic institutions in East Africa (Kenya in particular) have been crucial in fashioning the discursive grids on which modern African philosophical practices are based. However, the Ibadan school of African philosophy has sought to uphold the tenets of these foundational grids in ways that have made it almost impossible to operate outside these disciplinary frameworks. Both students and teachers are more or less obliged to observe the injunctions of the elementary grids. Most West African and East African schools of philosophy constantly stress the distinct discursive formations that make up contemporary African philosophy; ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalist-ideological philosophy and professional philosophy. Placide Tempels’ La philosophie bantoue (Bantu Philosophy, 1949) initiated the ethnophilosophical trend in modern African philosophical thought. Tempels sought to address racist views of colonialist anthropology in initiating this trend. Although African philosophers such as Paulin Hountoondji have denigrated the philosophic validity of his efforts, they are significant in two crucial respects. Tempels reversed the racist tempo of colonialist anthropology thereby opening up the space for more balanced interventions on African identities and subjectivities. Secondly, his work complicates the status on race in African forms of discourse in ways that an either/or approach regarding the racial character of modern African philosophical traditions is simply not quite tenable.
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In the bid to construct a humanizing notion of African collective identities, it became attractive to pursue vistas of racial exclusivity, hence the Anglophonic concept of African personality and the Senghorian ideology of Négritude. These attempts of collective racial assertion were meant to proclaim African racial self-worth in the face of centuries of abuse, brutalization and erasure. However, the project of assembling more appropriate discursive and ideological identities for Africans has not been as insular as it appears to have been. Some Western subjects have striven to redress the shortcomings of their compatriots in the task of building postcolonial identities. Most traditions of modern African philosophy do not adequately confront this reality and instead continue to strive for a racial essence that is usually an obverse dimension of Western ethnocentrism. This conclusion does have its benefits. Instead of pursuing an ethnocentric essence in which African philosophical discourse remains locked in a perennial quest for the kernel of identity, definition and status, it acquires a universalism that rids it of a great deal of unnecessary ethnocentric baggage. African philosophy, even if born within a distorting and traumatic matrix of racial bigotry, has carried seeds that transcend the barriers of race. Beginning with the exploratory efforts of Tempels, other non-Africans have assisted in shaping the different contours of the discipline. This feature, which many ethnocentrists might find discomforting, holds out a promise of genuine cosmopolitanism. Thus, African philosophy then transcends the strictures that prevent it from participating in broader conversations of humankind. African philosophy cannot only be regarded as comprising of texts written by Africans alone. Such a conception of the discipline would not embrace the transcontinental reach and antecedents involved. In part, African philosophy is an offshoot of colonialist anthropology, which initiated an earnest search for the kernel of African consciousness. What is the identity of the African? This has been a central question. A set of discourses emerged around the question and both Westerners and Africans were engaged in the quest to find answers. The discourse of ethnophilosophy is a product of this fervent quest. Barry Hallen, a non-African, has been central in addressing the grids that continue to shape the evolution of modern African philosophical discourse. His work, African Philosophy: The Analytic Approach (2006), can be read at many levels. First, it could be read as being part of the tradition of metaphilosophical texts that attempt to define the nature of African philosophy in the manner that some of the works of Wiredu, Hountondji, and Peter O. Bodunrin have done. It is also part of a body of work that interrogates the correlation between pre-Tempelsian anthropology and African philosophy. In addition, it can be read as a work that moves beyond the metaphilosophical plane to engage in the effort of actual theoretical reconstruction. Finally, it belongs to a tradition of African philosophical discourse that restores the dignity of indigenous African epistemological constructs that are often denigrated by colonialist anthropology. Hallen’s ambitious work can be read in other ways, but
Introduction
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more importantly, his interventions in the domain of African philosophy are an indication that discursive or identitarian insularity within the field is pointless. Some of the founding texts that define the tendency known as philosophic sagacity in African philosophy are Henry Odera Oruka’s edited volume, Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy (1991) and Marcel Griaule’s Conversations with Ogotemmêli: An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas (1965). Kwame Nkrumah and Juilius Nyerere, who were leaders of liberation movements and become respective rulers of Ghana and Tanzania, are known to have initiated the nationalistideological tendency in African philosophy. Also, the school of professional philosophy has key proponents, which include Wiredu, Bodunrin, and Hountondji. As an extension of this broad classificatory grid, a protracted opposition exists between the so-called universalists and traditionalists. The universalists hold the view that African philosophy must strive to attain the objectivity of a science. Hountondji is noted to have advocated this view, in which he argues that the emergence of an African philosophical practice can only occur when the appropriate scientific infrastructure, culture, and practices have been instituted in Africa. The traditionalists on the other hand, claim that African indigenous beliefs and epistemic resources are crucial for the development of African philosophy. We have also seen what has been termed the hermeneutic-narrative approach as a way of establishing an African philosophical practice. Advocates of this tendency assert we ought to reinterpret African indigenous resources just as biblical texts are to extract worthy philosophical materials. However, if we examine these different tendencies and grids in African philosophy we would observe that there are many areas of overlap and similarities of approach. Furthermore, many of the proponents of these grids hardly move beyond entrenched metaphilosophical preoccupations. Hountondji’s main achievements as a philosopher lie in his unremitting critique of ethnophilosophy, but he is usually demobilized in a metaphilosophical mire. The same can be said of Bodunrin and those who adhere to his views. On the other hand, Wiredu who has been termed a universalist, a proponent of the professional school and a traditionalist has managed to transcend the limitations of the disciplinary grids. Accordingly, he succeeded in becoming one of the most productive philosophers from Africa. Part of his success obviously comes from working beyond the strictures of the grids. Mudimbe, for his part, works completely independent of the grids. Instead, he conducts his interrogations at the point at which colonialist anthropology constitutes the silenced figure of the Black subject as a cipher. Appiah, too, has attempted to work outside the grids. Lately, he has been exploring the possibilities available to the citizen of the world through an increasingly assertive cosmopolitanism (2006). For my part, I have an oblique attitude to the grids. I address philosophers such as Wiredu and Hountondji who are central to them. However, I do not
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take them as my starting-point, or employ them as a point of departure. My concerns revolve around the conditions and possibilities for knowledgegeneration in Africa. For instance, I am interested how intellectuals engage in public debates regarding the march of modernity in Africa. In this respect, Wole Soyinka’s interventions have been quite interesting. I am also concerned with African scholars who have been preoccupied with philosophical themes but are usually ignored by the academy. This study engages with these different tendencies and traditions of African philosophy by: (1) identifying what precisely makes them distinctive and significant; (2) seeking to evaluate their different impacts on the constitution of contemporary African thought; and (3) proffering some theoretical conclusions as to their status as structures of thought and also their possible futures. In addition, it explores the opening up of Africanist discourse through the interventions of John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff and also Wim van Binsbergen, who, as scholars of African studies, have succeeded—in different ways and with varying degrees of success—in moving anthropological preoccupations beyond the concerns of figures such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard, Leo Frobenius, and Tempels. The focus of contemporary Africanist anthropology returns us to the origins of African philosophy without the burden of what I term the problem of origins in chapter two. In this way, I explore avenues to steer the discourse away from its foundational impasse. Part of the central problem of contemporary African philosophy has been the struggle to define its disciplinary character without a systematic body of theoretical texts. Mudimbe, Appiah, and to a lesser extent Hountondji bypass this limitation by adopting a more adventurous attitude toward the notion and instrumentality of the archive. The threat, fear, and silence engendered in the presence of the archive can be regarded as one of the defining problems of the question of African philosophy. I attempt to bypass this problem by addressing texts that: (1) complicate the notion of Africanity; (2) subvert the myths about African ghettoization with an unusual understanding of the universal; and (3) centralize the theme of agency as a way of reconfiguring the notion of Africanity. The theme of agency is a recurrent trope in this study which is addressed from different perspectives. First, the question of theoretical agency in African philosophy is raised. It is suggested that different African philosophers address the issue differently. In particular, the matter of creative agency within a postcolonial context is tackled. In this event, the sociopolitical and institutional milieu in which intellectual labor is conducted is depicted to portray how it relates to the theme of creative agency. This study begins with critiques of some of the major discourses of decolonization. In particular, it assesses Wiredu’s theory of conceptual decolonization and its relations to other associated discourses such as Pan-Africanism. Also, this study examines the different meanings of decolonization in differ-
Introduction
5
ent parts of Africa. As such, the implications of decolonization as a political and ideological project are analyzed. I examine the shifts within the discourse of Africanist anthropology as it relates to the question of colonialism and the making of the modern African subject. In particular, it examines the work of the Comaroffs as a model for these discursive preoccupations. This trajectory is adopted because their work reveals the ways in which diverse structures of power affect the questions and particulars of everyday life. The fourth chapter is related to the critique of the work of the Comaroffs. It examines the work of van Binsbergen to demonstrate the possibilities to which it alludes in advancing both Africanist anthropology and African philosophy. These two approaches in Africanist anthropology mark a significant shift away from the classical ethnophilosophical consciousness. The Comaroffs demonstrate that colonialism as a process does not operate along rigid polarities but functions at much deeper levels which mark and transform both the colonized and colonizer. This thesis is supported by a skillful deployment of poststructuralist tropes. Van Binsbergen, on the other hand, transgresses the trichotomies of race, place, and belonging in order to reconfigure the infrastructure of his subjectivity in a manner that complicates the unities and presumptions of race— Eurocentricism and Africanity—and also in ways that classical ethnophilosophy or even other forms of nativist discourses did not quite accommodate. In addition, van Binsbergen’s work accomplishes an internal decolonization of Africanist anthropology in which the colonialist gaze is turned upon the architect of anthropological knowledge. In this way, the subject and object relation is subverted just as the conventional politics and positionalities of otherness are transformed. In my opinion, this feature of van Binsbergen’s work is its most radical characteristic. This preoccupation with Africanist anthropology leads to a broader engagement with the complex disciplinary relationship between philosophy and anthropology. The birth of contemporary African philosophy can be linked to this long history of mutual disciplinary reinforcements and antagonisms. One of the main suggestions of this study is that the birth of contemporary African philosophy is attributable to the complicities of Africanist anthropology with the project and discourses of imperialism. African philosophy is a reaction to Africanist anthropology’s earlier status as a discourse of the oppressor and also its site as a locus of the exclusion of the colonized subject. Van Binsbergen grapples with this problematic history in a quite direct manner. The question of race continues to generate much debate and interest. It also continues to provoke heated passions which sometimes lead to dangerous situations of conflict and even genocide, as history has repeatedly demonstrated. The connections between genocide and race are not only long standing, but are constitutive of the entire experience of modernity, and even the
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condition which we refer to as the “postmodern,” following the example of Jean-François Lyotard, the poststructuralist philosopher. In the same vein, the phenomenon of race continues to be quite topical within the post-apartheid dispensation in South Africa. Consequently, academic studies of all kinds are still being published on the issue. PhilippeJoseph Salazar, a French scholar based in South Africa, tackles the matter of race in present day South Africa from a quite interesting angle. He explores the phenomenon of race by employing an uncommon assemblage of discursive approaches. These draw from rhetoric studies, Greek antiquity, and postmodern forms of discourse to explain how it intersects with postapartheid constitutionality, public deliberation, and space. In this way, Salazar suggests that the matter of race need not always be violent. Instead, the question of race can offer ways of exploring the multiple possibilities of postmodern democracy and cosmopolitan life. The concluding part of this study examines the different rhetorical constructions of race within the contemporary South African context and their implications for the establishment of a so-called “rainbow nation.” Finally, it links the conceptual understandings of race in the present age of molecular biology with the possibilities for postmodern democracy or what the sociologist, Paul Gilroy has termed “cosmopolitan democracy.” There are also discussions of the making of the postcolonial African subject as a citizen of the world in both conceptual and concrete terms. To broaden its global and methodological reach, examples are taken not only from Africa but also India. In this regard, it becomes possible to conceive of the previously colonized subject as a fully cosmopolitan denizen who makes the old distinctions between premodern coloniality and postmodernity increasingly meaningless when not overtly confusing. This conjuncture also invites fresh theorizations of categories pertaining to the particular and the universal. One of the chapters tracks the different understandings of corruption in the age of contemporary globalization. In this regard, I critique the work of Olivier de Sardan and Kwame Gyekye to bring to the fore the different moral universes that underpin different conceptions of corruption. Appiah’s critique of Wole Soyinka as a theorist of culture is well known. Appiah concentrates on Soyinka’s authorial position and his philosophy of authorship. A part of this study, on the other hand, addresses the questions of culture, politics, and memory in Soyinka’s work. In so doing, it highlights his strengths and limitations as a theorist of culture. In the same vein, another chapter focuses on the question of creative agency in contemporary Nigerian letters. In addition to focusing on the question of agency, it addresses the issues of place, belonging, and citizenship within the contemporary moment. African forms of feminist discourse have become quite confident. As such, chapter seven traces the figures of the female African subject within the context of contemporary African philosophy in order to unearth the agential dynamics at work. In this regard, Mudimbe’s work is extensively explored in
Introduction
7
addition to other prominent African feminists such as Nkiru Nzeogwu, Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, and some Western theorists of feminism. In addition, the work of Mbembe is addressed to highlight how some particular economies of sexuality operate in Africa. The preoccupations of classical ethnophilosophy and postcolonial African thought in general have avoided the subject of sexuality, the semiotics of the body, and the politics of the private. Part of this work examines the contours of this neglect with a view to offering some kind of amendment. To my mind, this particular gesture constitutes a definite advancement with innumerable discursive possibilities.
One DISCOURSES OF DECOLONIZATION 1. On the Agency of Theory Kwasi Wiredu, distinguished Ghanaian philosopher for many decades, is one of Africa’s foremost philosophers and he has done much to establish the discipline as a solid domain of inquiry in its contemporary form, especially within the Anglophonic divide in Africa (Osha, 2005b). To appreciate the scope and importance of his work, it is necessary to possess some familiarity with relevant areas of African studies such as history, anthropology, literature, postcolonial theory, and an awareness of the contributions of figures such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Kenyan cultural theorist and novelist, Valentin Yves Mudimbe, and Paulin J. Hountondji, the Beninoise philosopher, to different forms of African discourse. Wiredu’s contribution to the making of modern African thought provides an interesting and an essential site for an inquiry into agency-in-action, since it can be read as a counterarticulation to the hegemonic discourses of colonialism. This chapter examines the limitations and immense possibilities of Wiredu’s theory of conceptual decolonization. First, a close reading of the theory itself exists, and then an identification of its location within the general movement of modern African thought. A major point I make is that, even though Wiredu’s theory has some quite interesting moments of conceptual brilliance, the need to connect with a wider ideological terrain that affirms the viability of Black subjectivity also exists. It is also necessary to be aware of current imperatives of globalization, nationality, and territoriality and how they affect the agency of theory as ideological and conceptual decolonization. Another major aim of this discussion is to explore the interconnections between processes of contemporary globalization, nationality, and postcolonial territoriality, with a brief analysis of the political situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and their links with the agency of theory as part of the general project of decolonization. It also suggests that the emergent transnationalization of the politics of recolonization and the new forms of the mobilization of conflict affect the meaning and scope of decolonization as a political and theoretical project. In addition, a central point I make is that decolonization as a unitary and unchanging concept needs to be debunked. It is not framed as a project and waged as an existential struggle in the same way under all conditions and contexts. In tracing the different gradations of decolonization as an ideological project, three other African intellectual figures are evoked as a counterweight to Wiredu’s theory of conceptual decolonization. Diop articulates a politics of
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decolonization through the affirmation of a philosophy of Black subjectivity that centralizes ancient Egypt as its main source of inspiration. Wa Thiong’o’s project of cultural and linguistic decolonization is conceived as part of a broader critique of global imperialism. Finally, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba’s interventions in the political terrain of the (DRC) display a marked transformation and an intensification of the logic of the transnationalization of recolonization which in turn necessitate a more complex understanding and critique of the general notion of decolonization. This methodological trajectory seeks to demonstrate the different turns and meanings the question of decolonization can assume. The notion of decolonization is far more complex than is often assumed. Consequently, the epistemological resources by which it can be comprehended as a concept, ideology, or process are multiple and diverse. This chapter, as a whole, is also a reflection on the diversity of the dimensions of decolonization. Wiredu’s deconstruction of some Western epistemological concepts and categories, brilliant as it is, can be given a broader ideological significance by situating his project within a general critique of imperialism and within the framework of global and Pan-African discourses of Black subjectivity. The question of Black subjectivity within a context of postmodernity and contemporary globalization is still relevant as is, for instance, the case in the volatile processes of de-racialization in South Africa. Also, Mammo Muchie’s The Making of the Africa-Nation: Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance (2003), reiterates the continuing relevance of the question. Wiredu’s Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (1996), is also, in a way, a reframing of and a response to the question. Muchie’s project re-inscribes the ideal of Pan-Africanism within a multiplicity of contexts: the project of African Renaissance, the age of advanced digitalization, processes of contemporary globalization, and the epoch of resurgent fundamentalisms. It is likely that this new conception of the Pan-Africanist ideology has changed from how it was formulated in the early twentieth century as a result of the transformation of cultural and political configurations. A few words about the ideological project contained in the Muchie edited volume might be appropriate here. Thabo Mbeki and Muchie are conjoined by similar concerns. Mbeki was once perhaps the most central political figure on the African continent while Muchie is an undoubtedly resourceful theorist of contemporary PanAfricanism. They are aligned by their strong preoccupations with notions of the African, the African-Nation, Pan-Africanism, African renaissance, and African transformation. Perhaps not since Kwame Nkrumah have we had the level of systematicity with which Muchie focuses on Pan-Africanism and its possibilities for articulating a broad range of African identities, including diasporic ones, under a unified force. Both Mbeki and Muchie are quite serious about their common project. Pan-Africanism as an ideology of transcontinental liberation was formally established in 1900 when Henry Sylvester Williams, a Trinidadian law
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student, hosted the Pan-African Congress. In those days of triumphant colonialism, Pan-Africanism was a quite revolutionary gesture as it projected a powerful ideological anti-colonialist stance and because it undermined established colonialist stereotypes of the African subject as being incapable of meaningful thought and action. Pan-Africanism was a crucial ideological response to centuries of racism and cultural and sociopolitical disempowerment. Muchie’s project attempts a resurrection of Pan-Africanism as an ideology of liberation and agency in the era of contemporary globalization. His work in this regard connects with Mbeki’s political role as perhaps the most vital advocate of Pan-Africanism in the era of late post-coloniality. Muchie’s introductory chapter is entitled, “Has the Pan-African Hour Come.” At a moment in recent history, Pan-Africanism was definitely high on the African political agenda. For instance, in October 2004, the first meeting of Intellectuals of Africa and the diaspora took place in Dakar, Senegal. Present at the event were the heads of state of countries such as Nigeria, Cape Verde, Mali, Uganda, South Africa, and the host nation, Senegal. The general conference themes included: Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century; the contribution of intellectuals of Africa and the diaspora to the deepening and strengthening of African integration in the context of the twenty-first century; African identity in a multicultural context; Africa’s place in the world; Africa’s relations with its diaspora and science and technology. These are all themes that are given prominent attention in the volume Muchie edited. Muchie agrees that the question of a single African idea or identity for the entire African continent is usually problematic. Mudimbe’s major work, The Invention of Africa (1988) is one of the most famous interrogations of the problematic status of Africanity. Hountondji has also debunked what he termed “the myth of unanimism” in relation to the question of African identities. By extension, there are quite significant moments in contemporary African philosophy that attest to the continent’s heterogeneity. Muchie concurs that there are many African identities, but he argues that this should not prevent Africans from forging a collective vision for the continent just as Indians have been able to do. Contemporary Pan-Africanism should not be a platform for ethnocentricism and all kinds of identitarian fundamentalisms. Instead, Muchie argues that it can be reconfigured as an ideology of agency in the face of the multiple disjunctures of the global moment as they affect the generality of Africans. Interestingly, when in power, Mbeki often stressed the point that he worked for a nonracialized South Africa which in a significant way undermined charges that Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance were masks for identitarian inflexibility. Muchie asserts: the right to the universal or the African does not have to challenge the right to remain different, speak different languages, and worship different deities. It can complement it and in fact it can enrich it, provided that the dialect between specificity and universality is resolved in favor of
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This is one of the ways the Pan-Africanist ideology retains its relevance within the present age. (For further understanding of some of the ideological contours of Pan-Africanism, see S. K. B. Asante, 1977; James Cameron, 1961; D. E. Cronon, 1955; Robert Cummings, 1986; Saul Dubow, 2000; Thomas Hodgkin, 1956; Hollis Lynch, 1966; Muchie, 2003; K. K. Prah, 2001.) 2. Coloniality and Early Modernity Discovering snapshots of Victorian culture playing themselves out in peculiar ways in African history and lives is always interesting. Charles Francis Hutchison’s book, The Pen-Pictures of Modern Africans and African Celebrities (2004), which was first published around 1930, boldly tackles various experiences of unfolding modernity within a dominant ambience of colonialism. The predominant dialectic is familiar enough: colonizer/colonized and tradition/modernity. But within the context of the dominant binary logic, the surprises and the diverse exigencies of existence are truly arresting, that is, the ways in which colonized/“native” subjects navigate the strange byways of Euro-modernity and in the process, re-make themselves, their life-worlds, their cultures and other subjects around them. Not only are they re-invented as subjects but also, the entire fabrics of their societies are reconstructed. Hutchison was a successful Gold Coast businessman born in Cape Coast in 1879. He trained as a surveyor in England in the 1890s and then returned to the Gold Coast where he became the preeminent land surveyor. He had also been sired by “one of the most prominent Euro-African families of the nineteenth-century Gold Coast, namely the Hutchison-Bartels clan of Cape Coast and Elima” (Doortmont, 2005, p. 16). His great-grandfather was William Hutchison, a Scot who had served the colonial administration in the Gold Coast. Within the Gold Coast of that era, it was not surprising to find families with European ancestry or members. Some Europeans—Dutch, Danish or British—married local women and raised families thereby creating what in various ways might be termed “subjectivities of Whiteness” (Nutall, 2001) within the populace. The political context in which Hutchison’s book was conceived and written is equally interesting. Great social and political changes were occurring. An African elite had emerged in the sphere of international trade and commerce. The Atlantic slave trade had provided the grounds for the creation of the local elite. Then, as the slave trade ended to make way for legitimate trade in agricultural produce and minerals, the social scene was reconfigured by new processes of social stratification and re-alignment. Fortunes were made and lost. The agglomeration of interests that emerged from this socioeconomic flux was crucial to the making of modern Ghana. As processes of
Discourses of Decolonization
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social stratification set in, the nature and configurations of political power also changed. At the time, the local elite were fairly cordial partners with the agents of Empire. They aided the machinery of the colonial administration either as minor bureaucrats or as trading partners. Afterwards, the colonial machine preferred to deal with traditional chieftains thereby incurring the displeasure of the local trading, educated elite. It was the displeasure of the elite that eventually provided fuel for the sentiments that congealed to make modern Ghanaian nationalism leading to the moment of political liberation. Obviously, this change in the general political climate led to a transformation of the perception and subjectivity of Whiteness. Pen-Pictures captures the crucial moments of incipient anti-colonialism that emerged in the 1890s. Hutchison’s book incorporates a number of registers. It is first and foremost a celebration of the lives of prominent Gold Coast indigenes. It is also a portrait of subtle and overt colonial social relations. It is a commentary on the different subjectivities of Whiteness. In addition, it is a somewhat understated translocal engagement with the dialectics of freedom as espoused by the antislavery movement of the United States. Finally, it is a depiction of the multiple social tensions involved in the making of a modern postcolonial culture. These are the broad discursive registers that inform the book. However, we must bear in mind that the book comprises biographical sketches in blank verse and prose. Part of its strength lies in being able to reveal a great deal of historical truth within those sketches of biography. In all, there are sketches of 162 individuals from diverse professional backgrounds—mercantile/business, civil service, law, traditional rulership, the clergy, medicine, and engineering. Michel Doortmont, who has done an impressive job of preparing a recent edition of Hutchison’s book, mentions some of its values: it is an important source book on vital segments of Ghanaian history. As a text filled with photographs, it is a piece of cultural commentary as well as a significant product of art. In the same vein, it is a work of West African literary art and historiography. Finally, it is an important launch pad for other historical and theoretical projects. In Doortmont’s words: Hutchison often provides numerous snippets of information that are the product of intimate personal knowledge of the individuals described, and give the reader a detailed and very private insight into the life and times of the Gold Coast educated elite of Hutchison’s generation, and that of his father, making the book both a historical biographical dictionary and an intimate sketch of upper class Gold Coast society in the twentieth century. (2005, p. 1) Doortmont’s introduction to the new edition of Pen-Portraits puts it in its proper perspective. He undertakes a major role in restoring the cultural
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significance of Hutchison’s text and in amplifying it through further research and elaboration. In this sense, he accomplishes two objectives. First, through academic research, he brings to the fore an important cultural text and second, he evaluates the achievements of its author by putting them in their proper perspective. Accordingly, we discover that Hutchison wrote other works (mentioned but publication details not cited)—A Eulogy of White Celebrities of British West Africa; African Cameos: A Book of Entertaining Stories; Shades of Africa Reflects Life, Scenery, and Psychology. Other titles by Hutchison include, Man of Genius: A Book on the Miracles of the Subconscious Mind and The Problem of Progressive Africa: Corrective Monologues of African Psychology. Those were culturally rich times for an inspiring mind in the era of colonialism. Also, the discursive context reiterates the preoccupations that would continue to dominate the deliberations of African thinkers: the Same/Other, tradition/modernity, tyranny/agency and the various dimensions of the politics of identity. In addition, the text locates a context of colonized self-making in the encounter with the modern. In philosophical terms, this apparently uncomplicated context is still evident in many parts of African continent, that is, the locus at which an African self begins to reconstitute itself through the lens of modernity. 3. Rationality and the Project of Otherness Wiredu has been formally involved with a project he terms conceptual decolonization in contemporary African systems of thought, which can be read as an affirmation of African agency (Osha, 2005a). By conceptual decolonization, Wiredu advocates a reevaluation of African structures of knowledge and thought to accomplish two theoretical objectives. First, he intends to subvert unnecessary epistemic components of indigenous cultures lodged in modern African thought so as to make it more feasible. Second, he intends to deconstruct some of the Western epistemologies to be found in the African philosophical tradition. This chapter is also a reflection on some of his more significant contributions to the invention of modern African philosophical practice in relation to the trends created by his Francophone contemporaries such as Hontondji and Mudimbe. In addressing this diverse conceptual scenario, we ought to appreciate not only the singularity of Wiredu’s work, but also the different theoretical tendencies that have informed the constitution of contemporary African thought. In spite of Wiredu’s invaluable contributions to modern African thought, it can be argued that he has a quite reductive way of reading the colonial encounter and its multiple effects within the context of post-coloniality. His conceptual stance for the project of postcolonial (re)construction marks out a schema that operates at the level of mediating divisions between tradition and modernity, coloniality and post-coloniality, and finally orality and textuality in ways that suggests that more complex models of analysis are not required.
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In many ways, Wiredu’s near romanticization of the idea and possibilities of pre-coloniality closes off the potentials for other conceptual engagements with the diverse challenges of post-coloniality. It would be a mistake for Wiredu, or advocates of his project of conceptual decolonization, to attempt to universalize his theory since, as wa Thiong’o argues, decolonization is a vast, global enterprise. Instead, I read Wiredu’s project as a way of articulating theoretical presence for the de-agentialized and deterritorialized contemporary African subject. In many ways, his project resembles those of wa Thiong’o and Diop. Wa Thiong’o advocates cultural and linguistic decolonization on a global scale and his theory has undergone very little transformation since its initial formulations during the 1960s. Diop posits a quite similar theory to Wiredu and did so before him. Wiredu’s project is linked in conceptual terms to the broader project of political decolonization as advanced by liberationist African leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Nkrumah, and Nnamdi Azikiwe. But what distinguishes the tenor of his theory is its immersion in the Anglo-Saxon analytic tradition. This dimension is significant in differentiating his project from those of his contemporaries such as Mudimbe and Hountondji whose discursive orientations are indelibly marked by their Francophone backgrounds and academic training. It can be argued that Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonization has more in common with wa Thiong’o’s project of cultural and linguistic decolonization than with Mudimbe’s deconstruction of figures of the African subject in the Western anthropological archive or Hountondji’s famous critiques of what in African philosophy is called ethnophilosophy (Mudimbe, 1988 and Hountondji, 2002). In particular: for Hountondji, La philosophie bantoue [Tempels, 1945] did not represent the philosophy of Africans but that of the Belgian priest, Placide Tempels, in his veiled project of presenting the people of Central Africa as subscribing to a metaphysical system that would not be incompatible with Christian conversion. Tempels’ template served as the basis for African ethnophilosophy (the term was not invented by Hountondji and Towa but is found earlier with reference to Nkrumah’s studies, as Hountondji himself avers). (Keita, 2004) A marked difference exists between how an African philosophical figure such as Hountondji identifies and establishes a foundational problem in African philosophy and Wiredu’s approach to the same issue. In all previously colonized regions of the world, decolonization remains a quite topical issue at the highest of theoretical levels and at the basic level of everyday existence. After the attainment of political liberation by African countries, decolonization became an immediate and overwhelming preoccupation. The debates that animated and structured the trajectories of decoloni-
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zation came to be based on a series of conceptual dichotomies: modernity and tradition, West and the rest, Black and White, socialism and capitalism, and others. These broad binarisms were further mediated by conceptual categories that relate to class, gender, ethnicity, and nationality, among others. A broad spectrum of academic disciplines took up the conceptual challenges of decolonization in a variety of ways. In particular, the disciplines of anthropology, history, political science, literature, and philosophy all grappled with the practical and academic conundrums of decolonization. It is usually profitable to examine the contributions and limitations of African philosophers comparatively, along with other African thinkers who are not professional philosophers, in relation to the history of the debate on decolonization in which valuable contributions have been made by intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Diop, and wa Thiong’o. In this light, it would appear that African philosophy has been quite limited in defining the horizons of the debate when compared with the achievements of academic specialties such as literature, postcolonial theory, and cultural studies. Decolonization, as mentioned earlier, as wa Thiong’o notes, must be conceived as a vast, global, and multidisciplinary enterprise. He sees the need to connect his project of cultural and linguistic decolonization with a much broader critique of global capitalism and imperialism. He conceives it as a wide-ranging ideological initiative. At the moment when wa Thiong’o was articulating this project, the foundational nexus of discursive problems that preoccupied African philosophers—especially within the Anglophonic divide—was largely concerned with questions of identity (Masolo, 1994). These discursive preoccupations did a great deal to undermine the theoretical momentum of the nexus of discourses that constituted African philosophy. As mentioned earlier, Wiredu’s conceptual apparatus for his approach to African philosophical discourse owes much to the analytic tradition. Western philosophical figures such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and John Dewey provided the major source of inspiration for exposing the shortcomings of the Western philosophical tradition and practice just as they also yielded the basis for Wiredu’s strengthening of the analytic tradition. Wiredu does not carry out a sustained critique of the inherent racism of the Western philosophical corpus. Instead, he uses the conceptual resources of the archive of Western analytic tradition as a basis for constructing a discourse of otherness based on Black subjectivity. The constraints within Western discursive formations that consign the African subject to a fate of extreme otherness become the instrumentalities through which an otherness of agency and the project of emancipation-in-discourse are constituted. How this conceptual reversal is accomplished is quite remarkable; the discursive tradition that owes much to Hume in an era of livid racism is transformed into the discursive fund by which the project of conceptual decoloni-
Discourses of Decolonization
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zation becomes possible. There is no analysis of this reversal by Wiredu. However, the effects of this discursive transformation are quite dramatic. Wiredu’s first major book, Philosophy and an African Culture (1980) demonstrates the remarkable range of his philosophical interests. Beginning with conventional epistemology and moving to philosophy of language and sustained critiques of classical Marxism, Wiredu displays the full scope of his intellectual ambitions. Marxism in those days of pre-Soviet Union collapse was an exceedingly fashionable ideology for much of the third world. African thinkers in that ideologically charged epoch had to formulate propositions that were deemed to be “socially committed and responsible.” For many years, Hountondji, Wiredu’s great contemporary, had to deal with charges that his philosophically impressive corpus lacked ideological content and therefore merit from critics such as Olabiyi Yai. In those times of extreme ideologizing, Hountondji never avoided the required measure of socialist posturing. Wiredu, on the other hand, not only avoided the lure of socialism but went on to denounce it as an unfit ideology even though he recognized some philosophically engaging aspects in Karl Marx’s corpus. Within the context of the sociopolitical moment of that era, the moment of political liberation, it seemed a quite reactionary posture to adopt. Nonetheless, he had not only laid the foundations of his project of conceptual decolonization at the theoretical level, but had also begun to explore its different empirical implications by his analyses of concepts such as “truth” and by his focused critique of some of the more destructive impacts of both colonialism and traditional culture. Arguably, Wiredu’s contribution to the debate on the origins, status, problem, and future of contemporary African philosophy resides in his formulations regarding his theory of conceptual decolonization. His approach in formulating this theory of discursive agency and philosophical practice involves the incorporation of a form of biculturalism. His approach entails analyses of the canon of Western philosophy and the manifestations of tribal cultures as a way of attaining a conceptual synthesis. This schema involves a powerful element of biculturalism as a matter of logical consequence and a high level of (multi) bilingual competence. As such, it is not only an exercise in conceptual synthesis but also a project involving comparative linguistics. This insight defines Wiredu’s attitude and gestures toward the constitution of contemporary African thought. It is an insight that is inflected by years of immersion into the discourse of logical positivism. He confesses gaining entry into the critical discourse that came to be known as African philosophy through his efforts. The universities at Legon and Oxford during his time there did not offer courses in African philosophy. However, he began his reflections of the nature, legitimate aims, and possible orientations in contemporary African thought not as a result of any particular awareness of the trauma or violence of colonialism or imperialism but through a confrontation with the dilemma of modernity by the reflective postcolonial African consciousness.
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This dialectic origin can be contrasted with those of Wiredu’s contemporaries such as Hountondji and Mudimbe. Hountondji pursues his direction in African philosophy as a result of confronting the dilemma and limitations of being an African scholar of Husserl, whom he wrote his doctoral dissertation about, under the imperatives of intellectual and ideological decolonization in Africa and within a climate of the general reaffirmation of African identities. Mudimbe, on the other hand, conducts an extensive Foucauldian critique of repressed and devalued figures of the African subject within the annals of the Western anthropological archive. He addresses the operations by which colonialism (re)invents both the African subject and African continent in largely discursive terms. In his attitude toward the notion of African philosophy, Wiredu stands closer to Peter O. Bodunrin, a major Nigerian philosopher who died in the late 1990s, than to Hountondji. Bodunrin adopted Wiredu’s philosophical stance without being able to match Wiredu’s versatile accomplishments. Hountondji, on the other hand, as compared with Wiredu’s achievement, discovered an entirely different philosophical path that has also had an equally dramatic influence on the evolution of contemporary African philosophy. His achievement lies mainly in his relentless critique of the school of African thought known as ethnophilosophy, which began as an offshoot of colonialist anthropology. Colonialist anthropology, as advanced by Western scholars such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard, Leo Frobenius, and Tempels, led to the development of ethnophilosophy as a discursive formation. Hountondji’s philosophical ideas were, in large measure, a reaction to this episteme. He was reacting to: the European claim was that the only acceptable path for the African was to evolve [evolue] by imbibing the mental products of Europe from Plato to [Jean-Paul] Sartre by way of [René] Descartes and [Edmund] Husserl. In the field of mathematics, there was Pythagoras’s theorem to be appreciated. In the field of literature, there was [Jean] Racine, [JeanBaptiste] Moliere, and [Pierre] Corneille, along with a long list of French literary luminaries. (Keita, 2004, p. 30) The theoretical compounds that define postcolonial African thought are many. In addition to the different trajectories of Anglophonic and Francophonic African thought, the trend that developed as a result of the discourse of Afrocentricism exists as well. Diop facilitated a discursive trend that addressed itself to the cultural and philosophical achievements of ancient Egypt which had scribal traditions. Followers of Diop often argue: students of a written African philosophy would also have to include in their history of African philosophy the metaphysical writings of members of the Axum school of ancient Ethiopia, such as Zara Yakob, the seven-
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teenth century philosopher. And in the African Middle Ages, the influence of Ibn Khaldun was recognized for his study of history and other social sciences. We cannot overlook the ideas of Ahmed Baba of Timboktoo who wrote systematically on jurisprudence, ethics, logic, and social philosophy. Futhermore, the writings of Songhay and scholars Kadi and Sati are extant and have been translated into modern languages. (Ibid.) Undoubtedly, Wiredu also discovered a challenging path in modern African thought in which he sometimes takes the meaning of the existence of African philosophy for granted. Also lacking is an attempt to de-universalize and localize its status as a result of indebtedness to the universalism inherent in the analytic model. African philosophy appears and sits under the universal rubric provided by Western philosophy and the theoretical space made available for its articulation is derived from the same Western-donated fund of universalism. A crucial theoretical space donated by analytic philosophy provides the occasion for the appearance and consolidation of African philosophy. Terms such as “reflective integration” and “due reflection” offer the critical spaces for the theoretical articulation of a project whose existence has not yet been concretely conceived. In Wiredu’s corpus, we see the familiar problem on the origins of modern African thought involving the tradition and modernity dialectic being played out. This tension is not quite resolved but fortunately it is also a tension that never jeopardizes his philosophical inventiveness. Instead, it appears to fuel his reflections in unprecedented ways. However, this gesture, this stance of universalism, can also be read in a positive way. It can be construed as instances of the affirmation of identity, articulations of subjectivity in the face of colonialist denigration. No apologies are required for the Black presence, which is de-ghettoized and universalized at the same time. This is a gesture that is accomplished by the sheer rigor of his mode of philosophizing. Despite whatever criticisms one might have about some aspects of Wiredu’s work, in terms of founding a tradition for the practice of modern African philosophy, his contributions have been pivotal. He has also been consistent in his output and the quality of his reflections regardless of some of their more obvious limitations. The absence of anti-colonial rancor and judicious employment of philosophical distance distinguishes the complexion of his thought from many of his contemporaries and this particular quality extends the relevance of his thought beyond the African continent. At this juncture, a reading of one of Wiredu’s major texts, Cultural Universals and Particulars, will better situate the distinctive features of his contributions to modern African thought. In this text, Wiredu is more focused on his theory of conceptual decolonization than in Philosophy and an African Culture (1980). Instead of also offering critiques of classical canons of rationality in addition to Marxist ideology, here Wiredu addresses issues that border on the ambiguities of the universal and contingent dimensions of African phi-
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losophical discourse. A central thesis in the work is that Africans have become enmeshed in the conceptual difficulties created by the imposition of foreign epistemological categories and modes of rationality. Accordingly, he argues: it is a more striking fact that many contemporary African expositors of their own traditional systems of thought yield no ground to their Western colleagues in stressing the role of belief in the supernatural in African thinking. It is hard not to see this as evidence of the fact in some ways Christian proselytization and Western education have been oversuccessful in Africa. (1996, p. 51) In addition, he says that the notion of a Supreme Being created out of nothing does not occur in traditional Akan thought and perhaps also most traditional African systems of thought. This conceptual gesture, this advocacy of a form of Africanity, is certain to win the respect of staunch Afrocentrists. In his critique of Christianity, Wiredu, as usual, employs some of the discursive taxonomies of analytic philosophy. Arguably, this critique can also be extended to the analytic canon as a mode of philosophy. The analyticity of analytic philosophy is turned against itself to reveal forms of subjectivity it excludes. In different ways, Diop and wa Thiong’o attempt to extend the critique of alien conceptual categories into the being of language by which those categories are constituted. The critique of the structure of discourse is one thing. However, the critique of the language of discourse with a view to transcending and reinventing it is another. At several moments Wiredu addresses the structure of discourse and the effects of its epistemological dichotomization within the context of the embedding of analytic philosophy into modern African thought. He does not extend the critique to the ways in which language at the basic level (parole) invents ontology, being, and the world. To be sure, this conceptual doubling creates a series of overlappings, which notions of ambivalence in critical theory could do much to unravel. The promise of Wiredu’s theoretical approach can also be undermined by a threat of infinity. Its sustainability lies in its constant and endless invention of interlinking conceptual bridges which ultimately can only serve as odes to brilliance. However, conceptual brilliance is not always the overarching pursuit of an Africa-centered agenda. Instead, it aims to resolve a long standing racial and imperialist impasse created by the broad effects of the colonial encounter and by the prolonged denigration of the Black subject in Western culture. However, Wiredu lands on safe philosophical grounds when he debunks Cartesianism within the context of an African epistemological practice. On this level, he says: the category itself is conceptually inadmissible in this system of thought. Should the reader be curious at this stage as to whether mind too is qua-
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si-material in the Akan way of thinking, the short answer is that mind is not thought of as an entity at all but rather simply as the capacity, supervenient upon brain states and processes, to do various things. Hence, the question of whether mind is a spiritual or material or quasi-material entity does not arise. (Ibid., p. 53) In this move, Wiredu reveals the incongruity of a key mode of Western rationality. One wishes such incisive conceptual subversions were more common within the annals of African philosophy. At a more mundane level, Wiredu is equally incisive in exploring his theory of conceptual decolonization as it relates to the domain of morality. In his essay, “Custom and Morality: A Comparative Analysis of Some African and Western Conceptions of Morals,” he demonstrates in different ways how morality has come to be confused with custom and vice versa. Polygamy, for instance, was attacked by Christian moralists as being immoral for traditional African societies even when custom and necessity validated it on economic grounds. According to him: the Christian missionaries who came to Africa to “save” our souls, perceiving the practice to be incompatible with their own norms of good conduct, condemned it as immoral and worked assiduously to eradicate it. (Ibid., p. 69) This, in Wiedu’s view, has led to “a kind of ethical schizophrenia in the consciousness of many of our people” (ibid., p. 51). His point is that the exigencies of operating within the framework of a modern economy have rendered the practice of polygamy unsupportable. Similarly, the Christian missionaries preached that premarital sex was immoral conduct whereas custom in traditional Akan society held that carnal knowledge among intending marriage partners was not only desirable but also legitimate. Christianity, on its part, eroded this established custom and conflated it with morality. In this regard, Wiredu’s main argument is that, “this notion of the dependence of morality on religion . . . does not even make sense in the Akan context” (ibid., p. 74). Again, he demonstrates the limitations of, and injury caused by, a colonial imposition. In relation to the African philosophical practice, Wiredu’s thesis—which forms the core of his theory of conceptual decolonization—is that modern philosophical concepts such as “mind,” “person,” “soul,” “spirit,” “proposition,” “truth,” “fact,” “substance,” “existence,” and so on “ought to be reformulated in African languages to determine their relevance and validity with the African epistemic context” (ibid., p. 93). This proposition, in short, spells out some of the limits and the often arresting possibilities of his theory. In articulating this conceptual strategy, Wiredu moves beyond a delimiting yet
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foundational African philosophical problem which is, “does African philosophy exist?” The existence of African philosophy is affirmed and its ontology is willed into being by: (1) discountenancing the conventional foundational problem of African philosophy, and (2) by a startling series of (re)problematizations. Wiredu demonstrates that there is always much an aspiring African philosopher can do. The apparent tabula rasa that confronts the African philosopher is only due to a weakness of the imagination and the intellect and once this initial weakness is surmounted, the field becomes open to endless conceptual inventiveness. The African subject is always prone to the colonial archive’s mechanisms of invention which construct the African philosopher as other. The same colonial archive may also confine the African philosopher to silence. So it is left to the African philosopher to raid that archive, to ignore its fundamental violence and silence, and struggle instead for the endless project of auto-invention. Wiredu himself unveils the enormous scope for invention in African philosophy by his deconstruction of the concept of truth in the Akan language. Wiredu’s point is, “one can reason to one’s heart’s content in Akan without recourse to any word or phrase separately standing for fact, (that is, in addition to the term expressing the idea of being so)” (ibid., p. 110). The brilliance of this discovery is not in doubt. But the wider ideological meaning of this conceptual brilliance needs to be made clearer and linked to a broader project. At a point, Wiredu suggests the possibilities for articulating this project, “the agenda for contemporary African philosophy must include the critical and reconstructive treatment of the oral tradition and the exploitation of the literary and scientific resources of the modern world in pursuit of a synthesis” (ibid., p. 112). Here, he veers toward an appealing direction, but again the ideological imperatives of the mode of rationality are not clearly defined. Wiredu appeals to an ideal of rationality within a universe that has few ideals. The Kantian scope of his thinking does not fully confront the disturbing reality that modes of rationality are in essence constructs of brutal or impersonal power. The figure of Michel Foucault sheds a guiding light here. But if we wish to avoid the recontextualization of Foucault a la Mudimbe, then we could turn toward the direction of Diop, whose ideologies of Blackness affirm the raciologically-dependent nature of so-called universal knowledge. Wiredu makes an appeal for the virtues of synthesis in thought. However, collective thought and universal thought are not mere products of disinterested rationality. Instead, they tend to emerge from bloody battlefields and incendiary furnaces of the mind. Let us assume that the synthetized products of rationality emerge from the most serene contexts with a minimal amount of strife. How are these products inserted into a condition of post-coloniality? How does one address the multiple nuances of the in-betweenness such a condition invariably en-
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tails? This is a less fervent but no less seductive ideological route than the Diopian imperative. Under the classical postcolonial condition, the postcolonial meets the postmodern, discards the Kantian seriousness of Wiredu’s search for synthesis, and embraces instead the seductions of jouissance (enjoyment), the limitless inventiveness of play as the world gets consumed by its products and endless need for violence. So far, I have identified two ideological possibilities for Wiredu’s project: the Diopian recuperation of the ideologies of Blackness and the affirmation of their historical sanctity, and the postcolonial and postmodern dissolutions and resurrections within the light of play. We might as well mention a third ideological possibility. In a world of such extremes, the spirit of fundamentalism has become pervasive. Undoubtedly, Wiredu will not go in this direction, but the spirit and context of fundamentalism need to be critically engaged. In many respects, our age, in addition to being one of digital globalization, has also become the age of fundamentalisms. I will say more on these ideological possibilities later. Wiredu urges African philosophers to attempt to think out different philosophical concepts: in your own language and, on the basis of the results, review the intelligibility of the associated problems or the plausibility of the apparent solutions that have tempted you when you have pondered them in some metropolitan language. (ibid., p. 137) However, Wiredu himself is aware of the immense problems involved in this conceptual structure: “a program that is easier prescribed than implemented, but to which there is not alternative” (ibid., p. 153). Here, we are confronted by the necessity to evolve a broader ideological project, to move beyond the approach to African philosophy as an ode to conceptual brilliance. Once this theory moves beyond the realm of pure conceptuality into the field of thought-reframed-as-ideology or thought-must-becomeideology, its limits as part of the logistics of ideology become all too apparent. For instance, it is necessary to note that half of the world’s 6,500 languages are about to become extinct. We must also bear in mind, as wa Thiong’o has argued, that the struggle for linguistic and cultural decolonization must be linked to the larger project of global anti-colonial critique and struggle. Powerful institutions and mechanisms support powerful languages: educational establishments, global finance, the military and industrial complex, political institutions, and more. In addition, they are also invested in powerful infrastructures of consciousness that do the work of ideological legitimation. For Wiredu’s project to be ideologically viable, this kind of awareness and critique is necessary. Language is also inextricably linked to the politics of identity. The politics of identity, as in the case of the Hutu/Tutsi conflict in Rwanda, is in turn tied to the politics of death. An urgent need exists to re-
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conceptualize the ways in which the politics of language and identity leads to sociopolitical incohesion and, in many African situations, genocide. (For an analysis of the relationship between identity and genocide, see Mamdani, 2001.) If the politics of language and identity holds some powerful romantic allure, it also has its dangerous underside which has been replayed many times in Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, and several other African countries. Africa has almost two thousand languages, so we can imagine the sheer laboriousness involved in thinking through philosophical concepts in those languages. The logistical problems will be overwhelming. Language in Africa is also tied to the phenomenon of ethnicity and in this case, the ethnocentricism of ethnicity. Ethnicity is also a vital marker of identity linked to the ability for generating life and death situations. Although there are cosmopolitan forms of African ethnicities in existence, it is ethnicity as a bounded construct, as pristine materiality, as a form of blood and flesh and soil corporeality that governs the lives of the majority of African subjects. In a Hutu/Tutsi context of ethnic strife—and they are many in Africa—language becomes the bearer of both life and death, it becomes a property of extremities, and it also acquires the rigidities of an ideological and religious fundamentalism. To return to Wiredu’s core thesis in his project of conceptual decolonization, he states: It would be a major first step toward the formulation of modern thought in African languages if we in Africa were to cultivate the habit of thinking in our own indigenous languages as much as possible when talking in one metropolitan language or another about issues involving concepts such as “God,” “Mind,” “Person,” “Soul,” “Spirit,” “Sentence,” “Proposition,” “Truth,” “Fact,” “Substance,” “Existence,” and about categorical distinctions such as “the Physical and Spiritual,” “the Natural and the Supernatural,” “the Religious and the Secular,” and “the Mystical and the Nonmystical.” (ibid., p. 93) The conceptual novelty involved in this gesture entails bypassing a perplexing yet pervasive foundational problem of modern African philosophy. In doing African philosophy this way, a philosopher moves beyond the circularity of a particular kind of metaphilosophy into a terrain of ideological contestation. After several successes at conceptual inventiveness, another kind of gesture is required within the ideological field. This becomes necessary within the context of new forms of dispossession brought about by contemporary processes of globalization. If the sole aim of the African philosophical project is confined to an exercise in conceptual brilliance without a broader social engagement, the old crisis of relevance reoccurs. The current ideological situation both globally and within the African continent threatens to stifle not only the possibility for philosophical deliberation but also the existence of bare life.
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Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonization is also an attempt to undermine the unfolding logic of colonization. The point, though, is that logic has become even more virulent and more subtle. Consequently, the conceptual mechanisms by which the unfolding ramifications of the logic of colonization are confronted must be stronger, more diverse, and more subtle. They require a rupturing of the borders of philosophy and a ceaseless contestation of their limits. 4. The State of the Discourse It is sometimes intriguing and at the same time tiresome that decolonization continues to generate interests and debates in African philosophical circles. This is not to say the motif of decolonization is not significant. It is a relevant preoccupation. However what is required is a continuous problematization of the discourse of decolonization to reflect (1) the changing sociopolitical conditions within the African continent; (2) to include in our analyses global configurations within the contemporary moment and how they impact on general conditions in the African continent; (3) to meditate on the historical transformations in the discourse of decolonization itself to keep track of its turns and changes; (4) to reconceptualize the project and discourse of decolonization where and when necessary with a view to doing away with old conceptual models if they fail to describe adequately present realities. Messay Kebede, in his book, Africa’s Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonization (2004), does not take the points just enumerated into account. He fails to define or clarify in a satisfactory manner what precisely he means by decolonization. Wa Thiong’o has done critical conceptual work on the discourse of decolonization, but he is hardly mentioned. Even Wiredu (1980, 1996), one of Africa’s foremost philosophers and major theorists of conceptual decolonization, is not treated on the basis of his work in this domain. Kebede’s text commits a great number of fallacies in relation to concepts and key African philosophical figures. Some of these include postmodernism, deconstruction, ethnophilosophy, Négritude, Senghor, Mudimbe, and Wiredu. It is essential to address some of these fallacies. Even the choice of theoretical periods and models is often obsolete when not incongruous. For instance, Levy-Bruhl is adopted as a primary figure on whom to heap the blame of Eurocentric racism. Within the context of outmoded anthropology, Levy-Bruhl is a notable figure, but we have become used to beginning the critique and condemnation of Eurocentricism around the figures of Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Hume (Gates Jr., 1992). None of these famous Western philosophical figures is discussed comprehensively in the more important and continuous task of denouncing Eurocentricism and other related virulent forms of racism. Kebede points out that had the scourge of racism been absent, global economic growth and development would have been much higher:
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POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY some theories suggest that Europe could have obtained higher economic gains of it had avoided the cumbersome and inhuman practice of political and cultural subjugation and opted for the development of the continent through free economic exchanges. (Kebede, 2004, p. 9)
However, none of these theories is mentioned and neither are the implications of this proposition exhaustively explored. Messay’s conceptualization of ethnophilosophy is also quite problematic. He regards John Mbiti and Senghor as major proponents of ethnophilosophy. To put the discourse and counter discourses of ethnophilosophy into proper perspective, it is imperative to turn to the work of Hountondji. Tempels initiated the ethnophilosophical turn in philosophico-anthropological discourse in Africa with the publication of his pioneering text, La philosophi bantoue (Bantu Philosophy) in 1945. Hountondji mentions that this text was written primarily for a European audience, in which the Bantu subject is characterized as a mere anthropological cipher, a non-presence awaiting the attentions and ministrations of the European adventurist and influence in the figures of the missionary, administrator, and soldier. In his words: it aims on the one hand at facilitating what it calls Europe’s “mission to civilize” (by which we understand: practical mastery by the colonizer of the Black man’s psychological wellsprings) and, on the other hand, at warning Europe itself against the abuses of its own technocratic and ultra-materialistic civilization, by offering her, at the cost of a few rash generalizations, an image of the fine spirituality of the primitive Bantu. (1996, p. 49) An important injunction is made: colonizers can “civilize” the “native” on the condition that they possesses the appropriate spiritual qualities. Tempels’ corpus provoked a few intellectual reactions from a Rwandais priest, Alexis Kagame. Kagame attempts to construct a universal ontology drawing from an Aristotelian philosophy of consciousness. Similarly, in incorporating Greek syntactical structures in relation to his mother tongue, his entire theoretical project fails in Hountondji’s view: His critique, . . . is not a radical one. He should have renounced Tempels’ whole project instead of accepting its dogmatic naiveté and carrying it out slightly differently. Kagame should not have been content to refute Tempels, he should have asked himself what the reasons were for his error. Then he might have noticed that Tempels’ insistence on emphasizing the differences was part and parcel of the whole scheme, the reconstruction of the Bantu Weltanschauung, inasmuch as the scheme was not inscribed in the Weltanschauung itself but was external to it. (Ibid., p. 51)
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Hountondji grants that Kagame has a powerful theoretical temperament, but concludes all the same that his “work simply perpetuates an ideological myth which is itself of non-African origin” (ibid., p. 44). Other prominent ethnophilosophers Hountondji mentions include Archbishop André Makarakiza, François-Marie Lufuluabo, Vincent Mulago, Jean-Calvin Bahoken, Basile Fouda, and in some respects, William Abraham. This significant historical background is absent in Kebede’s discussion of this major African philosophical tendency. Other significant assessements of ethnophilosophy within the canon of contemporary African philosophy are Mudimbe’s (1988; 1991). Kebede mischaracterizes ethnophilosophy: “Ethnophilosphers come out strongly in favor of the existence of African philosophy because they find the colonial denial of African philosophy highly insulting and degrading” (Kebede, 2004, p. 83). It should be recognized that even the project of ethnophilosophy can be defined in racial terms and this classification is quite important. Western and African schools of ethnophilosophy both reinforce and antagonize one another. No mention is made of this crucial distinction. At a point, he terms Hountondji’s method as “critical ethnophilosophy.” This characterization is quite problematic. Does he mean to cast Hountondji as the ultimate anti-ethnophilosopher, which he is, or to state that Hountondji advances a more critical project of ethnophilosophy, which he does not? Hountondji’s entire metaphilosophical program has been dominated by a relentless attack on the project and status of ethnophilosophy in whatever guise. This point cannot be overemphasized. An apparent confusion arises between Senghor’s conception of Négritude and ethnophilosophy. For instance, this confusion, in not seizing the opportunity to differentiate the boundaries between the project of ethnophilosophy and Négritude, becomes apparent in the following statement, “Leopold Sedar Senghor’s specification of emotion as an African specialty promotes the same idea of African irrationality with even greater strength” (ibid., p. 85). Kebede never makes a consistent attempt to differentiate Négritude and ethnophilosophy. Instead, he evinces a recurring tendency to formulate both as the same enterprise. Kebede makes a sweeping and unduly damaging remark, “Unable to rescue Africa, the glorification of the Black essence by the Négritude philosopher thus leads to nothing” (ibid., p. 60). Many readings of Senghor have been undoubtedly critical, usually on account of his identitarian essentializations. For example, famous criticisms of Senghor have been made by Wole Soyinka. He writes, “Leopold Sedar Senghor is a priest—but a failed one” (1999, p. 97). He argues that the main reason for the failure is: Senghor appears compelled to query deep into the humanism of the oppressed to escape the undeniable pressure of history, counter its imperatives in the present with an excursion into pristine memory, and forge
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However, there are also complementary readings of the Senghor work. Paul Gilroy writes of Senghor in quite favorable terms: Senghor is a convenient representative of the generation of colonial intellectuals who faced fascism on the battlefield and then used their confrontations with it to clarify their approaches to freedom and democracy, culture and identity. Senghor’s work exhibits a similar pattern in which fervent humanism is combined with, but somehow not contradicted by, a romantic ethnic particularity and an appreciation for cultural syncretism and transcultural symbiosis. The Senegalese poet, statesman, resistance fighter, socialist, and influential theorist of Négritude, hybridity, and cultural intermixture . . . . (2000, p. 91) This sort of reading transforms the traditional image of Senghor as a proponent of ethnic particularity and the cult of Black “inner rhythm” with its anti-rationalist connotations. Soyinka’s reservations in this light appear narrow minded while the usual allegations of essentialisms in the face of a restated quality “for cultural syncretism and transcultural symbiosis” appear lame and untrue. Kebede’s reading of Senghor is based on presuppositions of essentialism and within the frame of an unreconstructed logic of what postcolonialism entails. Kebede’s primary concern, as we have to keep reminding ourselves since it forms the thrust of the title of his book, is decolonization. Yet, as I have noted elsewhere, decolonization remains hardly theorized in the text. Wiredu, on the other hand, has demonstrated why the project of conceptual decolonization should be a central concern in contemporary African philosophy. Accordingly, he argues: the agenda for contemporary African philosophy must include the critical and reconstructive treatment of the oral tradition and the exploitation of the literary scientific resources of the modern world in pursuit of a synthesis. (Wiredu, 1996, p. 112). Wiredu has proffered both definitions and elaborations of decolonization as it relates to contemporary African philosophy. We do not come across the same qualities regarding the topic in Kebede’s text. Similarly, there are attempts to stress the relevance of postmodernism as a conceptual approach for processes of agentialization in Africa. Nonetheless, most of these attempts fall flat. Kebede subscribes to the only partially accurate view that postmodernism is overwhelmingly indebted to the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. There are far more influences than
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this narrow view admits. Kebede posits the opinion: “what makes postmodernism crucial for Africa is that the theory rehabilitates Africa even as it suggests alternative ways of achieving modernity and development” (2004, p. 140), and yet earlier, he had also expressed the view, “the emergence of postmodernism from the womb of Western philosophy remains a mystery” (ibid., 126). Deconstruction crops up a few times in Kebede’s text and he mentions Mudimbe as belonging to the African school of deconstruction. Surprisingly Achille Mbembe is hardly mentioned or discussed in this regard. Yet the term is, as Jacques Derrida once quite reluctantly called it, difficult and problematic. Deconstruction has as its central concerns: the deconstruction of the metaphysics of the “proper” of logocentricism, linguisticism, phonologism, the demystification or the desedimentation of the autonomic hegemony of language (a deconstruction in the course of which is elaborated another concept of the text or the trace, of their originary technization, of iterability, of the prosthetic supplement, but also of the proper and of what was given the name of expropriation). (1994, p. 92) These clarifications are absent in Kebede’s discussions of the topic. Let us examine a few more of Kebede’s preoccupations. On African historic religion he writes “Mbiti defends traditional African religions on account of their closeness to the original, non-Hellenized message of the Bible. What the West stigmatizes as primitive is the innocent human being, the one that remains loyal to the original wish of the Creator” (2004, p. 76). The discourses on African traditional religions have long since moved beyond these kinds of jaded anthropological notions (van Binsbergen, 2003). It is also imperative to note that Mbiti argues that religion is a key presence in African lives. It permeates virtually all aspects of existence within the African context such as apparently simple occurrences like waking up in the morning, activities during the course of the day, and preparations for winding down the day at dusk. Religion also influences birth ceremonies including naming festivals, burial rites, and communions with departed ancestors. According to Mbiti, religion in Africa is not a cerebral or scriptural affair. Instead it is a fundamentally organic phenomenon dating back to epochs in antiquity. Due to the organic nature of religion in Africa and African lives, Mbiti points out that the distinction between the secular and the sacred does not quite exist. Nonetheless, he does not go as far as to posit that the absence of this distinction is evidence of pantheism. Fanon is also discussed, but as usual the picture of him that emerges from Kebede’s reading is neither totally accurate, nor completely agreeable. According to him, “Frantz Fanon occupies a distinct place by the argument that only a philosophy of violence consummates the rejection of both otherness and the restoration of the past” (Kebede, 2004, p. 94). He also makes the point, “Fanon’s resolution to convince the colonized that they have no other
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option than recourse to violence is at best exaggerated and highly restrictive” (Kebede, 2004, p. 101). There are far more sophisticated readings of Fanon available. A more astute reading is offered by Homi Bhabha: It is not for the finitude of philosophical thinking nor for the finality of a political direction that we turn to Fanon. Heir to the ingenuity and artistry of [François-Dominique] Toussaint [L’ouverture] and Senghor, as well as the iconoclasm of Nietzsche, [Sigmund] Freud and Sartre, Fanon is the purveyor of the trangressive and transitional truth. (1986, pp. viii–ix) Bhabha’s analysis locates Fanon’s importance in a multiplicity of discursive domains, not just as a theorist of colonial counter violence or critic of ethnophilosophy as he is made to be in Kebede’s reading. Nigel Gibson on his part states that Fanon’s “[Les damnés de la terre] Wretched of the Earth [1961] is perhaps one of the most important pieces of engaged and critical transition literature available” (Bhabha, 2004, p. 1). Mudimbe is a theorist who warrants frequent mention. However, the discussions of Mudimbe are not altogether satisfactory. A remark such as “in terms of deconstruction and relativization, what Mudimbe has achieved does not seem to surpass Négritude” (Kebede, 2004, p. 127) is quite confusing. How does “deconstruction and relativization” figure within this particular equation? Mudimbe’s main project has been the Foucauldian deconstruction of the African subject, known as infrahumanity, and forms of subjectivity within the Western anthropological archive. His primary method in this regard is an archaeological focus on a wide range of disciplinary texts and domains: literary, linguistic, philosophical, religious, and anthropological. Kebede, at crucial moments, seeks to validate the political importance of his philosophical project. After all, any conception of decolonization ultimately has strong political implications. In this regard, a couple of passages are especially striking, “The recognition of the concomitance of myth and rationality, of traditionality and modernity, is the appropriate way to diffuse the African dilemma” (ibid., p. 208). Also, he writes: closely following the arguments of [Henri] Bergson, I endorse the autonomous existence of the myth-making function together with the empowering purpose of the function, the understanding being that excessive valorization of rationality results in the complete asphyxia of the power of the mind. (Ibid., p. 212). Two points are worth noting here: an easy acceptance of the influence of Bergson and the centrality of the poetic elements in the constitution of philosophical projects. How does this project differ from the more accomplished projects of Senghor and Mudimbe, who often come up for condemnation? The sudden espousal of poetry in the middle of the attempt to put up a front of
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philosophical respectability appears to be a problem with the philosophical enterprise itself. Kebede begins his discourse on decolonization on a quite familiar terrain with a representation of Levy-Bruhl’s ascription of pre-logicality to the African subject. Levy-Bruhl’s anachronistic anthropological project has been promptly criticized and stripped of any lasting intellectual value. In contemporary African philosophical discourse, the denigration of the African subject and the counter-discourses of that denigration have more interesting ontologies and intellectual frames of reference. For instance Mudimbe’s scholarly account of the mummification of the Black subject in Greek antiquity or Wiredu’s reconceptualizations of Akan traditional worldviews in the garb of analytic philosophy. The recurring figures in Kebede’s philosophical preoccupations are Levy-Bruhl, Tempels, Senghor, Bergson, and sometimes Marx. Other figures are Hountondji, Mudimbe, and to a lesser extent, Wiredu. However Kebede’s engagement with other projects of decolonization, together with his conceptualization of decolonization, is quite uneven. There are new genealogies of colonialism to be taken into consideration, including that of Anne McClintock (1995) and Ann Laura Stoler (2002). Even the Fanonian theorization of colonial relations has been radically rewritten and reinterpreted by contemporary theorists such as Bhabha, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Gibson. Such radical re-readings are necessary to ensure that meaning is not lost in the different processes and stages of decolonization. The inherent binarisms of the traditional colonial structure are always open to critique. Kebede’s assumptions about that structure reinforce the same stereotypes about colonial relations. In the present age of globalization, there exists the necessity to reconsider the meaning and possibilities of decolonization within contemporary politics. New forms of colonization are occurring in which definitions of “center” and ‘periphery” become quite problematic, as what is regarded as the global gets colonized by the local in ways in which its character is radically transformed (see Muppidi, 2004). Kebede’s concept of decolonization excludes the vital cultural, sociopolitical, and economic configurations of contemporary globalization and it is based instead on the reinforcement of different primordialisms within an understanding of the global; the nation-state, the old international and national identitarian form of politics. The new configurations, within the political economy of the global, that are occurring have affected the trajectories of decolonization and the meaning of the term. Kebede does not demonstrate an appreciation of this radical transformation which shows that he still operates within a pre-Fanonian mindset. We have to rethink the notion and possibilities of decolonization and their usefulness in the age of contemporary globalization. Similarly, in Kebede’s text, the project of decolonization is represented within an undeconstructed format which excludes the necessary and important categories of class, gender, and sexuality. Patriarchal nation-state structures in
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Africa need to be appropriately critiqued to demonstrate much of what they exclude. We have to learn to tell new stories not only within the old narrative frameworks but with new languages as well. Perhaps decolonization as conceived by the pre-Fanonian consciousness in the face of the contemporary politics of the global has become obsolete as a conceptual category; and perhaps it is time to theorize the notion of de-agentialization within the context of the global. 5. Different Shades of Decolonization Interestingly, there are many other accents to the project of ideological decolonization in Africa. For instance, the corpus of Diop represents an influential dimension not only to the project but also for other struggles for the affirmation of African forms of subjectivity and historicity. These forms are not only affirmed but their historic significance is explored and projected into more poignant frames of reference. Diop’s project is undergirded by the ideology of Pan-Africanism. He celebrates the authenticity of Black Africa’s cultural attainments which he goes on to link the intellectual achievements of ancient Egypt. In this regard, his project is transformed into a philosophy of Black consciousness which in many ways bears a close resemblance to the ideology of Négritude as an affirmation of Black subjectivity. Through both conscious and unconscious multidisciplinarity, and by a broad conception of the African ideological project, Diop expands the possibilities for the emancipation of the African collective self. Wa Thiong’o, another intellectual concerned with the cultural possibilities inherent in decolonization, affirms the overriding importance of language and culture as indispensable tools for the project of global ideological decolonization. On the question of language as an impediment for the reconstitution of the African self, both wa Thiong’o’s and Wiredu’s projects are similar. However, wa Thiong’o’s project is also marked by the globality of its conception. For him, the project of ideological decolonization of language and culture does not remain confined to the theoretical realm. Instead, it is extended to the critique of cultural imperialism and its multiple links with global capital. This globality of conception marks wa Thiong’o’s project from Wiredu’s theory of decolonization. The globality of conception inherent in wa Thiong’o’s project does not undermine its potency in local sites of struggle since a prominent part of the program involves cultural and linguistic reconstitution, a radical reformulation of post-coloniality itself dictated by an unambiguous politics of indigeneity. In this way, wa Thiongo’s project involves: (1) a broad critique of imperialism and its intimate relations with global capital; (2) an affirmation of an ethics and politics of indigeneity; and (3) an incorporation of these conceptual approaches into a single program for a more general struggle of the global dispossessed against global oppression. In the main, these elements constitute
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wa Thiong’o’s project of ideological decolonization. We would recall that wa Thiong’o elaborated on his project of ideological decolonization by writing in Kikuyu (Bantu native language) and by his involvement with a community based drama group, the Kamiriithu Community and Education and Culture Center. These activities and engagements led to a conflict with the Kenyan government and his subsequent detention which in turn led to his exile. The politics of ideological decolonization has become even more complex in the era of contemporary globalization. The colonizer and colonized dichotomy, which at the moment of political liberation appeared quite understandable, is no longer as lucid. The transnationalization of capital, material resources, interests, and people have transformed the logic of global oppression that had previously held the demarcation between local and global interests and configurations of power in place. The scramble for the political dismemberment of the DRC is an apt example of this development. The DRC is a mineral rich country with large deposits of copper ore, tin concentrates, cola, zinc concentrates, colbalt, uranium, tungsten ore, industrial diamonds carats, gem diamonds, silver, gold, crude oil, tantalum, and niobium. Joseph Désiré Mobutu, the ruler of the DRC (formerly Zaire), had been installed by the West to checkmate the political development of Patrice Lumumba, the elected nationalist prime minister who was eventually assassinated in 1961. Mobutu then led his nation through a protracted saga of plunder and mismanagement. When the West believed it was no longer in its interest to have a large, if amorphous, state apparatus in existence, it withdrew its support for Mobutu and instead collaborated with his opponents, such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and Laurent Kabila of the DRC, in undermining his reign. Mobutu was eventually defeated and Kabila installed. Kabila soon fell out with his main supporters, Museveni and Kagame, and was eventually killed in the struggle to remain in power. Political analysts often claim that the DRC never received independence. The quest for political liberation was truncated at the moment of the death of Lumumba who symbolized the politics of sovereignty. Mobutu, on the other hand, pursued and acted as a stooge for the politics of neoimperialism which discarded him when he was no longer useful to its aims. Kabila, even with his rhetoric of liberty, pursued a contrary logic of neoimperialism. In the DRC, the contestation between the politics of sovereignty and neo-imperialism has not been resolved. Within this particular historical juncture, the political and theoretical meaning of decolonization is bound to be peculiar. In the context of this protracted struggle, the figure of the intellectual as political participant reemerges: Wamba dia Wamba. In Africa, the line between artistic creativity, intellectual production, and political activity in many contexts is almost nonexistent. Wamba dia Wamba, as an intellectual and former university professor, went further than wa Thiong’o in his engagement with political processes. In
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the event, he assumed the profile of an armed rebel. However, Wamba dia Wamba’s profile does not project the singularity of vision, or the vision of the intellectual as revolutionary that wa Thiong’o reflected in his political heyday. Arguably, Wamba dia Wamba is engulfed by the struggle between the politics of sovereignty and the complex logic of global imperialism in which his so-called African brothers, including Museveni of Uganda and Kagame of Rwanda, are deeply enmeshed. Due to the undermining of the ethos of nationality and territoriality by a combination of forces, Wamba dia Wamba has few credible resources from which to draw from to articulate an ideological project that will overcome the divisions between the attractions of sovereignty and the ubiquitous interests of transnationalization. In many ways, Wamba dia Wamba has experienced a loss of credibility: The Assembly of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) comprised only twenty-eight members from groups which were approved by Uganda and Rwanda. Some of the leaders such as Wamba dia Wamba and Ngoma had the direct backing of the Americans, the Belgians, and the French. As it turned out, the rebellion was popular and the liberators in the eastern part of the DR, where the rebellion was located, were hated and called “collabos” or “traitors and puppets of foreign interest. (Nabudere, 2004, pp. 46–47) Moreover, the case of Wamba dia Wamba exposes the theoretical limitations of decolonization as a political project. This is to demonstrate the topicality and complexity of decolonization in the era of contemporary globalization. The politics of decolonization within the present context is not only undermined by a subtle eradication of the colonizer and colonized dichotomy but also by the transnationalization of the ideology and project of recolonization in which African agents play a crucial role. In addition to the reconfiguration of colonized and colonizer binary and the logic of contemporary recolonization, two other developments compound the politics of decolonization; first, the emergence of new processes of territorialization in which old colonial and postcolonial boundaries are being contested. The second development relates to exportation of theaters of war and conflict in Africa to other nations and regions within the continent. Apart from creating new territorial pressures, these conflicts and new forms of territoriality affect the politics of place, belonging, identity, and citizenship in ways that mean that the general notion of decolonization will have to be rethought. Within the context of de-apartheidization, the dynamics of discursive agency assume quite distinct forms. Fortunately, in present-day South Africa, debates, both in the media and in the academy, on the question of African scholarship are gaining momentum again. The question of African scholarship in the context of contemporary South Africa entails many facets and consti-
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tutes in many ways the theoretical dimension of the ongoing project of deracialization. To begin with, there exists the need to interrogate what the term “African” meant during the period of apartheid. The term has deep historical meanings. During the apartheid period, it was a devalued term and so part of the thrust of present scholarship ought to be to: (1) probe why the term was devalued in the first instance; (2) investigate the mechanisms of power by which the apartheid regime devalued the term; (3) undertake a rigorous study of the official and academic texts that legitimated this devaluation; and (4) interrogate what the term means in the post-apartheid dispensation together with a thorough examination of the official and academic texts that valorize the post-apartheid understanding of the term. This set of problems appears to be quite daunting. It begins by interrogating the historical moorings of the term within different sites—officialdom, academia, and the popular imagination—and then proceeds to analyze what the term entails in present-day South Africa. To better understand the term, there is also the need to examine the concepts of identity and the politics of identity construction in relation to South Africa. This entails a secure grounding in history and a systematic critique of the apartheid system and its modes of identity construction to expose its myths and realities. It necessitates an understandable conception of official post-apartheid politics in relation to its aims and objectives. How does South African officialdom define what it means by “African”? How do the different peoples and races of South Africa define it? Do the debates around it create uneasiness? If so, why? In posing and addressing this spectrum of questions, an attempt is being made to put into greater relief the condition of the contemporary South African against the backdrop of his or her past, present, and future. At this juncture, one might as well suggest that the understandings of the term are bound to be many according to different spatio-temporal frames. Nonetheless, the objectives of this sort of undertaking ought to be (1) to attempt to understand the shifts in meaning the term has experienced and the reasons behind them, and (2) to attempt to formulate new conceptions of the term, bearing in mind the pressing exigencies of the postapartheid moment. This is the set of tasks which can serve as opportunities for discovering avenues for a conceptual clarification for the term “African,” in ways that relate the present and the future. Finally, one of the ways of understanding what is meant by “African” is to engage with the continent itself and its mechanisms for knowledge generation. Some critics have decried the preoccupation of Black writers in the apartheid era with the hardships and politics of revolutionary life. They argue that life is not all about revolution alone. The great motivating themes of literature, they assert, are about love, death, betrayal, and other apparently mundane issues that have universal resonance. Accordingly, some critics have noticed a shift in the general preoccupation with the revolutionary ethos. For instance, it is claimed that the work of the late Kabelo Sello Duiker—Thirteen
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Cents (2000), The Quite Violence of Dreams (2001), and The Hidden Star (2006)—a novelist of immense promise, constitutes a shift from what is perceived to be a largely jaded revolutionary ethos to the unifying spirit of the postapartheid dispensation. Duiker is primarily concerned with issues of identity and masculinity and the sort of fissures created by postmodern existence. For his part, the late Phaswane Mpe, in his novel Welcome to Our Hillbrow (2001), addresses the scourge of HIV/AIDS in contemporary South Africa and so in this sense embraces what is perceived to be a post-apartheid sensibility. Sadly both Duiker and Mpe passed on in early 2005. Other Black writers such as Nicholas Mhlongo (Dog Eat Dog, 2004), Johnny Masilela (We Shall Not Weep, 2002), Kgebetli Moele, (Room 207, 2007; The Book of the Dead, 2009) Martin Koboekae (Taung Wells, 2004), Mtutuzeli Nyoka (I Speak to the Silent, 2004), Sandile Memela (Flowers of the Nation, 2005), Letepe Maisela (The Empowered Native, 2004), Ishtiyaq Shukri (The Silent Minaret, 2006) and other writers, both White and Black, all exemplify this new sensibility in contemporary South African letters. Scholars of literature should find it profitable to track how this new post-apartheid sensibility has taken shape and what it means for the definition of the South African collective self. Scholars in South Africa generally are compelled to examine the histories of racial oppression and segregation and the histories of de-racialization and desegregation. It is between these discursive polarities that we can begin to make greater sense of the entire project of African scholarship within the context of contemporary South Africa. Presently, the discursive domains that constitute African scholarship are many and accordingly a diverse variety of disciplines, scholars, and competencies are required to sharpen its focus and orientations. As mentioned earlier, the project of African scholarship in South Africa will be more meaningful if pursued on the terrains that surround and lie between the histories of racial oppression and the multiple contexts of deapartheidization. Finally, the challenge of de-apartheidization is a different, but fundamentally related, formulation of the dynamics of decolonization. 6. The Promise and Limits of Invention The limits of Wiredu’s conceptual inventiveness lie in not locating a broad ideological compass for situating his odes to conceptual brilliance in the face of the contemporary forms of imperialist de-subjectification of the Black subject. The scope of his epistemological reconstructions is more impressive than that of his other great contemporary, Hountondji, who wages his battle for the consolidation of an African philosophical practice at a largely metaphilosophical level. However, Hountondji’s location at the metaphilosophical plane serves as a powerful ideological armature, even though it is often misinterpreted by dogmatic socialists. For Wiredu’s impressive epistemological reconstructions to acquire their fully deserved importance, the invention of a structure of ideology is required to meet the demands of the ideological field
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and to track the trajectories of the Black subject’s movement from the different histories and events of oppression—slavery, colonization, and apartheid— to the resumption of unhindered philosophical speech. Philosophies of Black subjectivity such as Négritude, Pan-Africanism, and Afrocentricism—whatever shortcomings they might have—are attempts to identify and reconfigure the meanings of these histories and events of racial oppression. The disconnection between a more involved reading of the histories of racial oppression and Wiredu’s unquestionably inventive epistemological reconstructions reveals the limits of his entire conceptual approach. The recuperation of the figures of the Black subject within the histories of oppression when linked to Wiredu’s theory of conceptual decolonization becomes a compelling blend of discourse and subjectivity; an unassailable conceptual refinement and rewriting of the existing philosophies of Black subjectivity. Apart from these available philosophies of Black subjectivity, Wiredu has indicated another direction and theorists have the challenging task of reconciling the apparently opposing tendencies, within these two crucial movements, of decolonization as ideological struggle and the theory of conceptual decolonization, in Black thought. A suspicion exists that there is the need for an amalgamation of these two critical movements of African thought as new technologies of domination and dispossession wreak untold havoc on African populations in the livid quest for profit (Nabudere, 2004). In this understanding of the processes of contemporary globalization, Africa is being reprocessed as it was during the 1885 Congress of Berlin, only this time around the forces, mechanisms, and peoples, both African and non-African, that are orchestrating the new scramble are stronger. Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonization exposes both the limitations and strengths of the discourse of African philosophy. First, he bypasses a fundamental theoretical aporia about its disciplinary status by instituting a new kind of epistemology. However this epistemology reaches beyond the confines of conventional African philosophical practice into the tumultuous universe of politics. Decolonization in Africa is being reconfigured as recolonization, in which the distance and relationship between life and death are also being transformed. The murky world of politics shows the limits of conceptual decolonization as a theoretical and an ideological project. Once conceptual decolonization meets with the exigencies of political activity and the traditional demarcation between life and death has been abolished by relentless conflict, conceptual decolonization loses much of its attraction as a theoretical project. It should also be pointed out that Wiredu’s advocacy of consensual democracy as part of his theory of conceptual decolonization brings about closer relations with politics. However, his version of consensual democracy does not draw its main inspiration from contemporary forms of African political life or politics. Instead, it reaches into pre-coloniality for its epistemological resources. This bypassing of contemporary African forms of politics does not engage
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with crucial sociopolitical configurations within the African continent that have become the defining features of general existence and ways of death in the continent. An engagement with politics in Africa entails an awareness of the politics of ethnicity, (in the case South Africa, race and ethnicity), the dissolution of the state, resource control and distribution, deterritorialization, and the transnationalization of the politics of recolonization, all of which have transformed the nature and meaning of politics in Africa. Since the question of decolonization remains vital in Africa and regions experiencing the transnationalization of recolonization, it is necessary to reformulate the process as it relates to other global counter-ideologies and counter-articulations of global recolonization, such as postmodern Pan-Africanism, postcolonial territoriality, and the politics of indigeneity, for it to engage with a wider field of vital significations. Wiredu’s theory of conceptual decolonization has its shortcomings. However, one of its main strengths lies in bypassing the obsolete problem of identity that constitutes the foundations of African philosophy. In formulating those odes to conceptual brilliance, Wiredu surmounts a crucial rhetoric in African philosophy, identifies a path of fertility in relation to the problem of identity, and finds theoretical agency and momentum on grounds that had in critical moments been barren. His attention to the general question of decolonization leads to other ways by which it can be posed. At the conceptual level, the current dilemmas of decolonization within the canon of philosophical discourse have to be addressed so as not to fall into the position, for instance, of (re)inscribing the problem and crisis of relevance into the context of intellectual production. Wiredu’s formulation of his theory of conceptual decolonization can also be regarded as a confrontation with the problem of relevance in African philosophy. However, the epistemological resources to address this dilemma are not all to be found within the archive of African philosophical discourse. Neither does one nation or region exhibit all the different dimensions and possibilities of decolonization. For my part, I have argued that the question of decolonization needs to be framed not only within the strictures of the conventional African philosophical canon but also beyond it. Posing the question beyond the conventional disciplinary canon entails an engagement with different processes and pressures—globalization, new technologies of violence and domination, and the transnationalization of the politics of recolonization—that are transforming essential variables of the project of decolonization. In addition, issues such as ethnicity, postcolonial territoriality, the politics of belonging and identity, and the issue of citizenship all have to be included in the equation. Decolonization as a theoretical project encounters serious limitations when it fails to engage with these significant variables. As the epistemological and existential resources by which the struggle for decolonization can be waged are being depleted by the new pressures on the nation-state, the local community, and the family, the struggle can reinvigorate itself by a widening
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of the conceptual terrain of decolonization as both theory and praxis. Decolonization remains relevant, but what must change is its theoretical and ideological conception as a project. Diop, Fanon, and wa Thiong’o have indicated different trajectories of the project of decolonization, but Wamba dia Wamba’s challenge best exemplifies the current dilemmas of decolonization as an ideological project. It also demonstrates that decolonization is an inherently political project that changes according to different sociopolitical demands and exigencies. In this way, the contemporary pressures of transnationalization have transformed the political complexion of decolonization and so critiques and critics of it would be better served by acknowledging and engaging with this wave of transformations. Some changes within the logic of decolonization invariably invite reformulations of the procedures of critique.
Two THE LURE OF ETHNOPHILOSOPHY Several African thinkers ascribe the emergence of modern African philosophy to a discourse known as ethnophilosophy which in a way is an outgrowth of colonial anthropological interventions. Ethnophilosophy in recent times has become greatly undervalued because (1) it is conceived as a product of a vast imperial undertaking that has its beginnings in the legitimation of colonialism, and (2) because of its relentless and systematic de-agentialization of subject peoples and agents, and then (3) even at its best, because it can be excessively patronizing in its claims to give voice to the voiceless and power to the powerless. However, it can be argued that ethnophilosophy in the wave of decolonization might, in some respects, have aided nationalist agitations and postcolonial ideologies of liberation that gave rise to counter-discourses, to colonialism and the master-discourses that promoted it, through which modern African thought gained its different discursive orientations, momentum, and stability. For an African philosopher like Paulin J. Hountondji, ethnophilosophy provided the fertile grounds on which to develop a powerful philosophical practice such that is unique within the canon of modern African thought. This chapter revisits Hountondji’s famous critique of ethnophilosophy by: (1) rereading his landmark text, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1996); (2) discussing the debates that attended its sometimes problematic reception by several African scholars; (3) providing a reading of Hountondji’s other major text, The Struggle for Meaning (2002), to demonstrate the multiple ways in which the second text amplifies the arguments of the first; and (4) evincing how the second text reduces the philosophical exclusivity of the first as a strategy for popularizing his central theoretical concerns. Hountondji’s major contribution to African philosophy, the critique of ethnophilosophy, is implicated in the problem of origins, which is also a quest for foundations. In erecting this particular discursive frame we will see how little Paulin J. Houndonji’s thought has changed and demonstrate how the second text (The Struggle for Meaning) provides the contexts and conditions for a better appreciation of his structures of thought together with several other equally significant African thinkers. In some ways, it can be argued that The Struggle for Meaning is not an advancement of Hountondji’s thought. Instead, it is a largely eloquent recapitulation of earlier theoretical positions that often employs para-philosophical modes of discourse to restate what is philosophical in African thought and what continue to be the enduring problems and challenges that face the contemporary African philosopher in considerably harsher milieus and times.
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In his forward to The Struggle for Meaning: Reflections on Philosophy, Culture and Democracy in Africa, Kwame Anthony Appiah calls African Philosophy: Myth and Reality perhaps “the most influential work of African philosophy written in the French language” (Hountondji, 2002, p. xii). In his preface to a more recent edition of the controversial text, Hountondji explains why he makes the critique of ethnophilosophy his theoretical point of departure in addition to restating the conditions of mental enslavement in Africa, the ever unfavorable relations in the international division of labor, the continuing peripheralization of so-called peripheral knowledge, and the abiding interest in science and technology in the African postcolony. These different concerns are important for him because they have a profound impact not only on how Africa relates to itself but also to other parts of the globe. Abiola Irele, echoing Hountondji, writes: No cultural development of any importance will be possible in Africa until she has built up a material strength capable of guaranteeing her sovereignty and her power of decision not only in the political and economic but also in the cultural field. (1996, p. 25) Since the publication of African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, the multiple problems of the African continent have worsened. Africans know what needs to be done to get out of the unending cycle of degradation, violence, and general sociopolitical disequilibria but the material power and conditions together with favorable international contexts are usually lacking. Placide Tempels initiated the ethnophilosophical tendency in philosophico-anthropological studies in Africa with the publication of his work, Bantu Philosophy 1945. Houndonji argues that this pioneering text was written primarily for a European audience, in which the presumed Bantu subject features as a mere anthropological object, a passive presence awaiting the attentions and ministrations of the European adventurist in material, intellectual, and psychic terms. In his words: it aims on the one hand at facilitating what it calls Europe’s “mission to civilize” (by which we understand: practical mastery by the colonizer of the Black man’s psychological wellsprings) and, on the other hand, at warning Europe itself against the abuses of its own technocratic and ultra-materialistic civilization, by offering her, at the cost of a few rash generalizations, an image of the fine spirituality of the primitive Bantu. (1996, p. 49) A crucial problem is raised: the colonizer can “civilize” the “native” on the condition that she spiritually redeems herself. Tempels’ work elicited a number of scholarly responses as it signaled the formal emergence of the discourse of ethnophilosophy. Hountondji argues
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that African scholars who engage in ethnophilosophy are no better than their Western counterparts in constructing doubtful mythological theories and depictions of Africa. In his view: The African ethnophilosopher’s discourse is not intended for Africans. It has not been produced for their benefit, and its authors understood that it would be challenged, if at all, not by Africans but by Europe alone. Unless, the West expressed itself through Africans, as it knows so well how to do. In short, the African ethnophilosopher made himself the spokesman of All-Africa facing All-Europe at the imaginary rendezvous of give and take—from which we observe that “Africanist” particularism goes hand in glove, objectively, with an abstract universalism, since the African intellectual who adopts it thereby expounds it, over the heads of his people, in a mythical dialogue with his European colleagues, for the constitution of a “civilization of the universal.” (Ibid., p. 45) In several instances, Hountondji argues that the discourse of ethnophilosophy, instead of instituting a genuine philosophical practice in Africa, has instead prevented its development. It is a waste of time as a scholarly endeavor and a misdirected kind of labor in which preconstituted structures of thought are mummified. In short, the preoccupation with ethnophilosophy discourages confrontation with the problems and challenges of the present. By the practice of ethnophilosophy: we have unwittingly played Europe’s game—the Europe against which we first claimed we were setting ourselves to defend. And what do we find at the end of road? The same subservience, the same display of wretchedness, the same tragic abandonment of thinking by ourselves and for ourselves: slavery. (Ibid., p. 50) Within ethnophilosophical literature: here is a myth at work, the myth of primitive unanimity, with its suggestion that in “primitive” societies—that is to say, non-Western societies— everybody always agrees with everyone else. It follows that in such societies there can never be individual beliefs or philosophies but only collective systems of belief. (Ibid., p. 60) By the time Hountondji attained the height of his intellectual and philosophic powers, ethnophilosophy had been deprived of its theoretical momentum, “that discourse has lost its critical edge charge, its truth. Yesterday it was the language of the oppressed, today it is a discourse of power. Formerly a romantic protest against European pride, it is an ideological placebo” (ibid., p. 171). Perhaps one of the most damaging remarks Hountondji makes regarding
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is that the concept of ethnophilosophy is “a mystified discourse and a dreamlike description of a collective thought that exists only in the inventor’s head” (ibid., p. 173). Similarly, Hountondji has criticized the trend in Africa called philosophic sagacity or what he terms a literature de pensee (literature of thought) (ibid., p. 81). The word ethnophilosophy was not coined by Hountondji or Marcien Towa as often assumed. Kwame Nkrumah registered for a doctoral dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania in 1943 and proposed to work on what he termed “ethnophilosophy.” In one of his many definitions of ethnophilosophy, Hountondji writes: the extension into the field of thought in general of the inventory of the corpus of so-called primitive knowledges [an inventory], . . . had been undertaken at that time for plants and animals by two pilot-disciplines: ethnobotany and ethnozoology” (2002, p. 208). Consequently, Hountondji, together with Towa, made his reputation as a philosopher based on his relentless critiques of ethnophilosophy. Hountondji has made many metaphilosophical reflections, indulged in elaborate political philosophizing and written about the adverse conditions that prevail as a result of the international division of intellectual labor. First, he is a committed intellectual in some of the most illustrious connotations of the term. For instance, he has argued that: the responsibility of African philosophers (and of all African scientists) extends far beyond the narrow limits of their discipline and that they cannot afford the luxury of self-satisfied apoliticism or the quiescent complacency about the established disorder unless they deny themselves as both philosophers and as people. In other words, the theoretical liberation of philosophical discourse presupposes political liberation. (1996, p. 46) One of the charges often made against Hountondji is that he is not sufficiently political for an African philosopher and that he is too theoretical to have any redeeming political value in the continent. But more on this claim later. Ethnophilosophy, we are constantly reminded, is an invention of the West; an invention that defines what is “primitive” and what is “civilized,” what is “natural” and what is “unnatural,” what is “normal” and what is “abnormal,” and so on. Hountondji points out that these classifications and different myths of unanimity only serve to “feed the Western taste for spice, sensation, and exoticism” (ibid., p. 80). The native is violently otherized, violently abused, and laid prostrate for Western gaze, scrutiny, fetish, and consumption. In this way, “the essential fine responsibility of the primitive was preserved, along with his good-natured insouciance, his passivity, his impotence” (ibid.). Many of Hountondji’s conclusions are relevant for postcolonial
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theory and cultural studies. Unfortunately, theorists of postcolonial and cultural studies do not always cite his work. But this grave oversight is perhaps not as damaging as the charges made against him by his fellow African scholars. Olabiyi Yai wrote a searing critique of African Philosophy: Myth and Reality that provoked a multiplicity of reactions within and beyond the African continent. First, he accuses Hountondji of not giving an adequate definition of African philosophy itself. Specifically, he writes, “the flight from a debate on the content of African philosophy tells of the inadequacy of the political and philosophical discourse conducted by our abstract philosophers” (Yai, 1977, p. 7). Yai charges Hountondji of “elitism, philosophism, and scientism” (ibid., p. 16). He strikes hard at Hountondji when he writes: the philosophical stake in Africa is not an interest that concerns only the “philistine” or “intellectual” strata of the petty bourgeoisie, for the masses too must make their voices heard. And here dialectical materialism becomes pertinent, with its irreplaceable role as philosophy of praxis and as philosophy of the oppressed. (Ibid., p. 18) Hountondji’s thought has virtually no political relevance. Oyekan Owomoyela also published a long critique of Hountondji’s work which is less strident than Yai’s. Owomoyela’s general contention about Hountondji’s philosophical project is: Whereas the case against ethnophilosophy could be construed as being against the misguided concoctions of foreigners and their African cohorts, the philosophers’ pronouncements leave one with the certainty that the real object of their displeasure is African tradition and not what ethnophilosophers make of it. (1987, p. 80) He also states with a modicum of demonstrable hesitation, “Hountondji’s suggestion that African Studies as a discipline is suspect because it was invented by Europeans and is, therefore, part of the European tradition, is strange” (ibid., p. 92). Finally, he claims, “Anglophone philosophers tend to be more receptive to the philosophical traditions of African traditions than are their Francophone colleagues” (ibid., p. 96). We have two popular arguments against Hountondji’s corpus. One is the claim that he is not sufficiently political. The other is the charge that, in his attempts to denigrate ethnophilosophy, he ignores the importance and possibilities inherent in indigenous African traditions. How accurate are these assertions? Do they do justice to Hountondji’s landmark text, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality? How has his subsequent work tried to grapple with these two main charges? These two charges relate to two of the most powerful tendencies in modern African thought: Marxism and nativism, which a formulation of poststruc-
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turalist thought in Africa has revealed to be fake philosophies [philosophies du travestissement] (Mbembe, 2001b). Are Yai and Owomoyela fair in their assessments of Hountondji’s work? Hountondji had defined African philosophy to “mean a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves” (Hountondji, 1996, p. 32). This appears to be an agreeable starting point. However, this not only the definition he gives. He also concerns himself with the different tasks that face the contemporary African philosopher: In the case of Africa, philosophy as a meditation on the logic of sciences, on the conditions of their constitution and their development, on the theoretical and historical relationships that they have between them, and, as the case may be, between them and their technical applications, on the forms and ways of their social insertion, the modes of social appropriation of their theoretical and practical results, briefly, philosophy as theory of science in the widest sense of the term, can play a considerable role by illuminating with a new light the problem, henceforth classic, of the contribution of science and of technology to the development of our societies. (Hountondji, 1987, p. 19) To identify and appreciate the value, richness, and range of Hountondji’s philosophical contributions in Africa we have to look beyond Marxian and nativist critiques to refocus on the historical conjuncture in which his work took shape in terms of cultural, political, and intellectual parameters and how they affected the production of philosophical thought. We also have to consider the contributions of his contemporaries in relation to his thought and how they have fared over time and space. If we employ this set of criteria, Hountondji remains vital to modern African thought. However, I think his importance lies beyond his critique of ethnophilosophy that oftentimes is overdrawn. It lies instead in his readings of African thinkers such as Anton-Wilhem Amo and Kwame Nkrumah and what their works and contributions accomplished in particular contexts. This is a point I will stress later on. Apart from his extensive metaphilosophical preoccupations, Hountondji also employs empirical instruments to define the boundaries and possibilities of African philosophy. He not only identifies what he understands to be African philosophy but also identifies the pioneers of the field. Part of his empirical strategy is bibliographical. For instance, he mentions authors and their works that have had an impact on modern African philosophy: The Rwandais abbot, Alexis Kagame, Archbishop André Makarakiza of Burundi, Antoine Mabona, a South African priest, Antoine de Padoue Rahajarizafy, a Jesuit priest of Malagasy, François-Marie Lufuluabo of the former Belgian Congo, Vincent Mulago also of the former Belgian Congo, Jean-Calvin Bahoken, the former Protestant clergyman of Cameroon, the Kenyan pastor, John Mbiti, the
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Nigerians, Adesanya and Jeremiah Omosade Awolalu, Alassane N’Daw from Senegal, Prosper Laleye, from the Republic of Benin, and so many others who contributed to the making of modern African philosophy (Hountondji, 1996, pp. 58–59). In retrospect, most of Yai’s charges seem insubstantial. Some quite sympathetic readings of his work includes: Hountondji outlines . . . criteria that if met, would give substance to African philosophy. The first criterion is a shift away from the metaphysical issues; for example, the meaning of life, human dignity, and the existence of God, that have infused ethnophilosophy and stifled genuine philosophical activity. (Jaya, 1999, p. 208) On the other hand, Owomoyela’s misgivings about the general criticisms of ethnophilosophy go beyond his reading of Hountondji. He claims, for instance, that Anglophone philosophers tend to be more receptive to traditional African religions than their Francophone counterparts (1987, p. 96). This claim is highly suspect. In their works, Hountondji and Valentin Yves Mudimbe demonstrate that Francophone Africa, with its strong traditions of colonial Catholicism, was at the forefront of philosophical deliberation on the continental level. Ethnophilosophy, as a discursive branch of African philosophy, gained its initial indigenous impetus, and counter-discourses, through the efforts of authors such as Kagame, Towa, Fabian Eboussi-Boulaga and Hountondji who are and were from the French-speaking parts of Africa. Most of the central texts of African philosophy that Mudimbe names are Francophone or have French authors: Tempels’ La philosophie Bantoue (Bantu Philosophy, 1945); Marcel Griaule’s Dieu d’eau: Ententiens avec Ogotemmeli (God of Water: Interviews with Ogotemmeli, 1948/1975); Leopold Sedar Senghor’s, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin et la politique africaine (Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and African Politics, 1962); Eboussi-Boulaga’s “Le Bantu problématique” (“The Bantu Problématique,” 1968); Eboussi-Boulaga’s La Crise du Muntu. Authenticité africaine et philosophie (The Crisis of Muntu: African Authenticity and Philosophy, 1977); and Alfons Josef Smet’s, Histoire de la philosophie africaine contemporaine (History of Contemporary African Philosophy, 1980) (Mudimbe, 1991, pp. 52–53). Finally, Hountondji claims, “Kagame began the era of African philosophy stricto sensu [in a strict sense], that is, of the acceptance of responsibility for philosophical discourse by the Africans themselves” (2002, pp. 90–91). Consequently, both Yai and Owomoyela have little of enduring value to say of Hountondji’s work. This is not to say there are no shortcomings to be found. There are some. Hountondji’s second major book on African philosophy, The Struggle for Meaning, rehearses most of the arguments in African Philosophy: Myth and Reality in addition to providing the biographical, cultural, political, and intellectual contexts that formed the background of the second text. In terms of new major philosophical breakthroughs, one finds
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little to say about it. However, it is a crucial text since in many respects, it is consistent with his earlier book and since it has so much to say about the processes of intellectual conditioning that informed the work of one of the most influential and most consistent philosophical minds of modern Africa. Hountondji began by writing his doctoral dissertation on Edmund Husserl under the watchful eyes of Georges Canguilhem, Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, and Louis Althusser, who were his teachers at Ecole Normale Superieure. He was fascinated by “Husserl’s effort to ‘purify the sign.’” First, he excluded from his concerns the indicative sign—a material and empirical sign that is neither discourse, nor part of discourse—to concentrate solely on expression. Next, he excluded from discourse itself those body movements and different gestures that involuntarily accompany speech and still derive from empirical indication, to focus on expression proper—on the linguistic which alone is the true bearer of meaning. Finally, he amputated the communicative dimension from language in which expression functions simultaneously as indices, to concentrate solely on the expression in “solitary mental life” (Hountondji, 2002, p. 54). More than two decades after his doctoral examination, Hountondji returns to Husserl this time (1995) for a doctorat d’etat at the Universite’ Cheik Anta Diop in Dakar, Senegal. What influenced his return to Husserl after a lapse of about twenty-five years? Hountondji gives a few hints: any conclusion, provided at this precise stage of my thinking, would have seemed premature to me. I necessarily left the reader dissatisfied and even I had a feeling that I had interrupted myself midway through a sentence . . . . (2002, p. 72) It is as if Hountondji had to return to complete an unfinished sentence in both a metaphoric and literal sense. But what does this consummation mean in a philosophical sense? That is difficult to tell given his earlier reservations about continuing his research on Husserl with the ultimate aim of publishing his findings. After his doctoral dissertation defense in France, Houtondji decided not write for a foreign public or over the heads of his compatriots (ibid., pp. 72– 73). The fate of Amo, a philosopher from the former Gold Coast who lived and worked in eighteenth century Germany had indicated to him that an epistemic break was required. On Amo, he says: I considered it a failure that the work of this African philosopher could only be part, from beginning to end, of a non-African theoretical tradition, that it exclusively belonged to the history of Western scholarship. I concluded on the urgent need to put an end to the extraverted nature of all European-language discourse. (Ibid., p. 73)
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He concludes, “to publish on Husserl was not the obvious thing for an African academic” (ibid.). Yet, more than two decades later, he returns to Husserl as if it were a project he had to complete. Whether he completes it is uncertain. Instead, he merely retreads a well-known path; this maneuver can be seen as a strategy to revalidate his major philosophical trajectories to date. Husserl remains an abiding interest for him, but this long-standing preoccupation had to be matched and counteracted with the quest to create a non-Western theoretical practice. In view of this, his fascination for Husserl had to be held in check: I therefore had to work on the margins and, rather than plunge head-first as a narrow specialist on an author or a current of thought, to clear the field patiently, establish the legitimacy and the outlines of an intellectual project that was at once authentically African and authentically philosophical. (Ibid) He moves from a preoccupation with Husserl to reading Tempels, which entails the beginning of his critique of ethnophilosophy. He retains the view, “the critique of ethnophilosophy is still largely a Western affair, because the ethnophilosophy that denounces it is itself an invention of the West” (ibid., p. 79). Henceforth, his project would be to show “that ethnophilosophy had a more ancient history that was linked to the history of anthropology in general—that is, to the history of the Western gaze on so-called ‘primitive’ societies.” (ibid.). Olabiyi argued in his famous article (“The Theory and Practice in African Philosophy,” 1977) that speculative philosophers such as Hountondji ignored the issues of praxis in their theorizing. Hountondji, on his part, claims that theory has no usefulness for him unless it is linked to practice. In his words, “theory has meaning only if it is organized and subordinated to practice, that it derives its legitimacy—insofar as it is itself a form of practice—from its foundational role in relation to other practices” (2002, p. 85). In organizing his philosophical practice, he acknowledges his debts to Frantz Fanon for indicating the relations between the political and language and Aime Cesaire who he calls the “unrivaled awakener of consciences” (ibid., p. 87). However, there existed the problem of foundations. The inferiorization of the Black race by the histories and experiences of slavery and different forms of colonization—political, economic, and cultural—had the effect of depicting the African continent as a tabula rasa: The question of writing became unavoidable: to what extent could one conceive a history of African thought in the absence of a writing that would have enabled the different doctrines to situate themselves in relation to others. (Ibid., pp. 91–92)
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There was the urgent need to initiate, expand, and sustain traditions of philosophical writing in Africa. Hountondji recounts his role in accomplishing this through his participation in different initiatives that aimed to establish, and consolidate where necessary, modern traditions of African philosophy. The absence of theoretical traditions, before and after the dawn of political liberation, and universally recognizable philosophies of the self in Africa has been contentious issues of much theorizing. So the textual tabula rasa that Hountondji identifies as a crucial theoretical problem can be tied to deeper sociopsychological concerns and patterns. The problem has its origins in the events of slavery, colonization, and decolonization. On the level of individual subjectivities, there is the idea that through the processes of slavery, colonization, and apartheid, the African self has become alienated from itself (self-division). This separation is supposed to result in a loss of familiarity with the self, to the point that the subject, having become estranged from him- or herself, has been relegated to a lifeless form of identity (objecthood). Not only is the self no longer recognized by the Other; the self no longer recognizes itself. (Mbembe, 2002, p. 241) The trauma of the event of colonization affected the collective African psyche directly and this is a point that Hountondji does not stress. Instead, he concerns himself with the challenges of creating a philosophical tradition that is a preoccupation that has its own peculiar problems. The problem of creating an appropriate theoretical practice to deal with the multiple disorienting effects of the colonial encounter has been framed, “The effort to determine the conditions under which the African subject could attain full selfhood, become self-conscious, and be answerable to no one else soon encountered historicist thinking in two forms that led to a dead end. The first of these is what might be termed Afro-radicalism, with its baggage of instrumentalism and political opportunism. The second is the burden of metaphysics of difference” (ibid., p. 240). This reading of historicist thinking can be said to have acquired its first impulses and manifestations in African philosophical discourses in which a tradition of discursive radicalism arose out of the different nationalist liberation struggles as exemplified by the works of Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Cesaire. In this tradition, there is usually a reappropriation and spectralization of Marxist and socialist ideologies, on the one hand, and the multiplicity of tendencies and discourses that have been generated by theoretical validations and counter-discourses of ethnophilosophy on the other. The opposing divisions in historicist thinking have deep philosophical implications and perhaps also philosophical origins. However, this largely convenient theoretical dualism is more complex in the case of ethnophilosphy and its critiques and counterdiscourses since it is problematic to typify ethnophilosophy as a form of na-
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tivism and nothing else. Hountondji has pointed out on several occasions that ethnophilosophy is an invention of the West but was later adopted by Africans for instrumental reasons. Many strands and orientations characterize the problematic course of its gestation and development as a philosophical tendency; Western and African, Marxist and non-Marxist, Eurocentric and Afrocentric, Francophonic and Anglophonic, and others. Even Hontondji’s project does not address these multiple tendencies and their concrete manifestations to their fullest possibilities. In one of his many critiques of African forms of ethnophilosophy, Hountondji writes: The return to the real thus shatters into smithereens the founding myths of ethnophilosophy: the myth of primitive unanimity—the idea that in “primitive” societies, everyone is in agreement with everyone else— from which it is concluded that there could not possibly exist individual philosophies in such societies, but only belief-systems. In reality an unbiased reading of the existing intellectual production reveals something else. The African field is plural, like all fields, a virgin forest open to all possibilities, to all potentialities, a host to all contradictions and intellectual adventures like all other sites of scientific production. (2002, p. 107) In this way, he differentiates between European and African forms of ethnophilosophy and suggests ways in which to move beyond the second form. If the critique of ethnophilosphy is one of the most valuable and one of the most consistent contributions of Hountondji to the development of modern African philosophy, then his preoccupation with the structures and institutions of knowledge production in Africa and on the global level is equally worthy of attention. For instance, he has committed himself to critiquing a trend within ethnophilosophy to demonstrate: how scientific exclusion connects to political exclusion and how, . . . the double problem of Europe’s “civilizing mission,” and inversely of the “heightening of the soul” expected from Bantu cultures, is only meaningful as the “ideological problematic of triumphant imperialism.” (ibid., p. 103). This scenario lies at the heart of the European projects of ethnophilosophy that, as we ought to have noticed, are different from African projects. Hountondji explains “the exclusion practiced by the European scholar becomes, when it is taken over by the African intellectual, extraversion” (ibid.). To overcome this pitfall of the impasse of intellectual extraversion, there is the necessity to create “an autonomous space for reflection and theoretical discussion that is indissolubly philosophical and scientific” (ibid.). Hountond-
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ji gives greater resonance to his analyses in pointing out that the need to deghettoize African modes of intellectual production exists: Thought must be brought out of its Africanist ghetto by acknowledging its right to be occasionally interested in something other than African— for instance in Plato, in [Karl] Marx, in the theoretical heritage of Western civilization to assimilate and transcend it. (Ibid.) The problem of intellectual extraversion is one that provokes many useful insights from him. For instance, this is noticeable in his conceptualization of “distance” (Hountondji, 1983). According to him, “distance meant first of all geographical distance, the distance from which our scientific, economic, and political dependence is organized” (Hountondji, 2002, p. 232). On the concrete academic level, “distance” manifests in the following way: first and foremost, theory is elsewhere, in the sense of being physically distant. The best universities, the best equipped laboratories, the most authoritative scientific journals, the greatest libraries, and the most credible publishing houses are located in the industrialized countries. (Ibid., p. 233) In view of these kinds of conceptualizations, Olabiyi’s charge of excessive elitism on the part of Hountondji appears unwarranted. In addition Hountondji either draws from or adds to postcolonial theory with regard to his stance on postcolonial conditions of knowledge production which condemns the cashstrapped academic trapped in a postcolony into playing the role of a mere native informant for dominant knowledge producing systems based in the West. Hountondji’s views here echo those of Gayatri Chakravory Spivak who has done a great deal of work in this area. Hountondji’s disapproval of unanimism, one he shares with Appiah and Mudimbe, and which is embedded in his critique of African forms of ethnophilosophy, is also one of his central themes. It is a stance that rejects the urge to subsume African beliefs, perceptions, modes of being, and orders of production under one name. On the origins of the word, Hountondji writes: I borrowed the word “unanimism” from Jules Romains but used it in a different context to signify something different: to stigmatize both the illusion of unanimity in the reading of the intellectual history of a given culture, and the ideological exploitation of this illusion for the present and the future. The French writer had used the term, on the contrary, in a laudatory way. (Ibid., p. 132) Hountondji seeks to explode all theoretical ghettoes but sometimes he appears to be deliberately creating problems for himself. At one point, he states:
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African philosophy was first and foremost a European invention, the product of an intellectual history at the intersection of the most diverse disciplines, notably anthropology, the psychology of peoples, missiological theory, and a good many concerns. (Ibid., p. 124) It is not enough to make this kind of assertion and leave it at that. This is evidently an issue that requires far more exploration and elaboration. He sets immense goals for himself: I sought to demarginalize Africa, and to place it firmly at the center of its own history in a world that is henceforth plural; a world whose unity cannot be the result of annexation, or some kind of hegemonic integration, but of periodic renegotiation. (Ibid., p. 141) With equal lack of irony, it can be argued that the only kind of demarginalization that Hountondji has accomplished has been for himself. Being a major African philosophical figure, he is highly sought after within international circles, but it is not certain how this unquestioned commodification affects institutional structures of knowledge production in Africa. In addition, strategies for demarginalization in postcolonial regions require a continuous foregrounding and rethinking of the (post)colonial situation and the different categories and frames of perception to which it gives rise: colonizer and colonized, premodern and modern, private and public, the existential and conceptual inbetweenesses, the categories of race, sex, class, and gender, and a host of other variables. These are crucial issues for any serious project of demarginalization. Hountondji also replies to his many critics—Koffi Niamkey, Abdou Toure, Yai, Owomoyela, and others—in often uncomplimentary ways. In one such response, he writes, “one was clearly faced with a terrorist discourse, a discourse of intimidation whose aim was to frighten: a discourse that brandished the worst threats to achieve its end” (ibid., p. 168). He calls Yai “an irritated Africanist.” His attitude toward his critics who had contributed immensely to the dissemination of his thought is contradictory given his views that the African intellectual had to demonstrate, “that no doctrine, no form of thought was forbidden to him, that at the conceptual level, the freedom of the individual could not, in Africa any more than elsewhere, be restricted in advance” (ibid., p. 125). He constantly declares the wish to see “established in Africa an autonomous, theoretical debate, which would be the master of its problems and its themes rather than simply . . . being a distant appendage to Western theoretical debates” (ibid., p. 96). Again, the majority of his critics have, by critiquing his work, contributed to the broadening of the theoretical space he fought so much to get established. Politics also forms part of Hountondji’s concerns. Between 1991 and 1994, he held a ministerial position in the Republic of Benin that in some ways parallels Ernest Wamba dia Wamba’s move to join the military struggle
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of Congolese guerrilla fighters to remove Laurent Kabila from power in 1998. Hountondji’s flirtations and involvement with politics are less dangerous than Wamba’s but say much about the choices available to an intellectual in a postcolony and the existential peculiarities that result from the ceaseless conflict between the “private” and “public” domains in such a context. He makes a few remarks about the Democratic Republic of Congo which, though significant, require greater elaboration; “the ‘philosophy of authenticity,’ the state’s official doctrine, managed to reduce this identity to its most superficial and abjectively folkloristic level” (ibid., p. 112). These state-imposed attempts at identitiy construction, at regulating the infrastructure of consciousness were a ploy by Mobutism to consolidate its own myths of power and invincibility that had far more dramatic manifestations and consequences in everyday life. The torture, rape, pillage, and massacres that were commonplace under Mobutism and post-Mobutist forms of political contestation are issues Hountondji does not conceptualize, even as politics in most parts of Africa are being transformed to the “work of death” (Mbembe, 2003). The new forms of political contestation and the emergent technologies of domination in Africa require a new vocabulary and new modes of theorization as states are enfeebled or collapse under a multiplicity of pressures ranging from the usual local struggles for political power to adverse conditions brought about by neoliberal economic globalization. For instance, space, in its use and misuse, has given rise to an awareness of new forms of both statist and non-statist domination and aggression. In the so-called peripheries: the domestication of world time . . . takes place by domesticating space and putting it to different uses. When resources are put into circulation, the consequence is a disconnection between people and things that is more marked than it was in the past, the value of things generally surpassing that of people. That is one of the reasons why the resulting forms of violence have as their chief goal the physical destruction of people, including massacres of civilians, genocides, and various kinds of killing, and the primary exploitation of things. These forms of violence, of which war is only one aspect, contribute to the establishment of sovereignty outside, and are based on a confusion between power and fact, between public affairs and private government. (Mbembe, 2000b, p. 260) In The Struggle for Meaning, Hountondji’s remarks on politics in Africa have not advanced beyond how he conceptualizes it in his first book. So how productive has his critique of ethnophilosophy been? It has been critical in solidifying a new set of problems for African philosophers who wish to move beyond the founding problem of African philosophy that is: “Does it exist?” Ironically, much of his thought might have been impossible to accomplish without the existence of ethnophilosophy in both its Eurocentric and indigen-
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ous forms. Also, the critique of ethnophilosophy, which is largely a metaphilosophical undertaking, is caught up in the founding problem of African philosophy and its concomitant dead end. It is caught up in the same problem of origins. This problem is projected by the attempts to formulate definitional and taxonomic grids for African philosophy—ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalist-ideological philosophy and professional philosophy, (Bodunrin, 1981), and in related forms of African intellectual production such as the discourses of nativism, developmentalism, and Marxism which have been criticized as largely counterproductive (Mbembe, 2001b). Hountondji makes useful discoveries in evaluations of Amo and Nkrumah. For instance, his assessment of Nkrumah bears quite enduring insights: “the critical reading of Nkrumah’s development and of the social and political struggles in Ghana of the period did not aim solely at shedding light on the intricacies of the book. It proposed a method that is applicable, if needed, to other texts. The reinsertion of thought in the real movement of history should enhance both recognition of the specificity of works of speculative thought, and their relationship to the social, economic, and political context of different periods. It should finally found a pluralist vision of philosophy and African culture by sweeping away, once and for all, the unanimist prejudice and the myth of a society without history” (2002, p. 142). Those earlier critiques of these two African philosophical figures bypass the dead ends of the critique of ethnophilosophy and the founding problem of African philosophy. But we need more of them to expand the theoretical space of African philosophy. The metaphilosophical debates on ethnophilosophy were much too protracted. Appiah discovered a worthwhile path and so did Mudimbe in their separate and distinctive ways. Even Hountondji acknowledges this at several instances (ibid., p. 127). In his mature years, and perhaps also the declining days, of his career, Hountondji returns to his old philosophical concerns: the (re)discovery of Husserl with his largely Eurocentric situationality, and the familiar critique of ethnophilosophy and its inevitable problem of origins, leaving little between except a narrative of a fortunate and eventful intellectual itinerary.
Three AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF COLONIALISM AND CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION 1. Introduction The work of John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff is no doubt unique in the field of African studies due to its learned multidisciplinarity, scope, depth, and startling freshness (1991; 1997; 2000a; 2000b; 2002). It is difficult to cover the grounds made by their corpus within a single chapter of a book and therefore this discussion does not intend to do that. On the other hand, I will explain their insights into the nature and ramifications of colonialism within the context of South Africa and I will demonstrate why these insights are unique within the field of African studies. The second part of the discussion will focus on their work on globalization and the relation(s) of parts of Africa to the millennial process. The purpose is to show that the colonial encounter with all its disruptive, reconstructive, and transformative processes can be read and constructed along some thematic lines. In this way, colonialism within the African context can be read into and away from the dynamics of global capitalism with a cogent theoretical and empirical point of view. It is possible to do this in a way that is not found in the work of Valentin Yves Mudimbe (1988) and (1991), Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1981, 1986, 1993), or Kwasi Wiredu (1996). The theorists cited above have all been concerned, in a profound manner, with the historical antecedents of the colonial encounter and its enduring contemporary effects, but the theoretical models they have developed have had quite different resonances from the post-structuralist tropes adopted by the Comaroffs. Their work offers us fresh ways of linking the event of colonialism with the current wave of global capitalism. This theoretical expanse and continuity allows us to read the African predicament away from and into a contemporary global system. Oftentimes, theoretical readings of the colonial encounter are decidedly rigid and discontinuous, precluding a satisfactory engagement of the African continent with the processes of contemporary globalization. The Comaroffs turn this state of affairs around and the African continent, even with its position of extreme marginality and continuing peripheralization, can be inserted in interesting ways into the age of virtuality. This is one of the views contained in their work. To understand the multifaceted dimensions of colonialism in the work of the Comaroffs, volumes I and II of their opus, Of Revelation and Revolution
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(1991; 1997), should prove sufficient. Their theoretical reflections of the processes of contemporary globalization span several essays in which their insights are complemented by the work of theorists such as Achille Mbembe and Arjun Appadurai. The coupling of processes of colonialism with those of contemporary globalization offers unexpectedly vast apertures for inventive theoretical reconstructions of the event of colonization beyond its immediate historical limits. Those processes transcend their limits in a way such that they continually reinvent the African postcolonial subject, not only as a product of historical colonialism, but as a participant in the millennial moment whose central features she has not actively created, but whose evolving and transformative dynamics she is always subverting, replacing, and displacing in local terms. For the African postcolonial subject, the history and event of colonialism remain key parameters for the apprehension and transcendence of the millenial moment. Also evident within this discursive framework is the theme of the agency of the postcolonial African subject. 2. Colonialism and the African Body The first volume of Of Revelation and Revolution begins with a sustained discourse on the colonization of consciousness and the consciousness of colonialism. It points out: colonizers everywhere try to gain control over the practices through which would-be subjects produce and reproduce the bases of their existence. No habit is too humble, no sign too insignificant to be implicated. And colonization always provokes struggles—albeit often tragically uneven ones—over power and meaning on the frontier of empire. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, p. 5) Appadurai (1996) explains how cricket, as an apparently harmless sport, became an elaborate instrument of the colonial enterprise and then subsequently became an indigenized medium of decolonization when the time came. This only underscores the idea that no habit or sign was too insignificant for the “civilizing” and transformative imperatives of colonial process. Although the Comaroffs claim that their study is “a historical anthropology of the Non-conformist mission to southern Tswana,” there are deep lessons to be drawn from their wide-ranging analyses of the effects of colonialism as a whole. Their study establishes fresh guidelines for constructing similar productive genealogies regarding the antecedents, nature, and continuing impact of different forms and events of colonialism. Usually theorists of colonialism are unduly schematic or disappointingly Manichean in their analyses. The Comaroffs compel us to discard our explanatory binarisms in favor of deeper and more nuanced modes of analyses. For
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instance, what was the background and general culture of the missionaries who sought to transform Tswana land and how did this affect their work and general outlook? What role did their involvement play in changing the socioeconomic landscape in traditional southern Tswana? Between these general questions are to be found several challenges that compel us to modify our strategies of theorization so as to invigorate our discursive practices. We are compelled to pay much closer attention to issues of race, class, sex, and gender within a constantly mobile conceptual landscape than we find in other studies concerned with the consciousness of colonization. Wa Thiong’o offers radical critiques of colonialism and truncated options of decolonization. Mamdani explains the civic and ethnic spaces the postcolonial subject has to negotiate to meet the demands of post-Englightenment modernity. On his part, Mudimbe (1988) focuses on the textual and disciplinary invention or otherization of the African colonial and postcolonial subject. All these approaches are valid and constitute part of a general effort to locate the agency of the postcolonial subject within a context of constantly mobile conceptual landscapes. We need to carry out our interrogations not only between different conceptual schemes but also beyond them. This is one of the most obvious lessons we derive from the Comaroffs. The Comaroffs as anthropologists concern themselves with how a selfchosen group of Britons elected to work upon and transform the “passive” Black people of southern Tswana. They write: the essence of colonization inheres less in political overrule than in seizing and transforming “others” by the very act of conceptualizing, inscribing, and interacting with them on terms not of their choosing; in making them into the pliant objects and silenced objects of our scripts and scenarios, in assuming the capacity to “represent” them, the active verb itself conflating politics and poetics. (1991, p. 15) Also of note is that African subjects and problems continue to be ghettoized. To de-ghettoize African concepts, we have to construct a universally acceptable vocabulary in theoretical terms. If this cannot be done, then we have to incorporate already existing theoretical models that have universal applicability into our “modes of self-writing” (See Mbembe, 2002). The Comaroffs suggest that there are many gains to be received from some of the more acute practices of critical postmodernism. What this ultimately implies is that established anthropologies of colonialism can be productively subverted in view of the latest theoretical developments to increase not only our layers of interpretation but also enrich our ways of understanding how the event of colonization is far more profound than we are often led to believe. We would profit to take cognizance of that fact, “while signs, social relations, and material practices may become unfixed, resisted, and recon-
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structed—history everywhere is actively made in a dialectic of order and disorder, consensus and contest” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, p. 18). Another concept they on which they focus, unsatisfactorily formulated by Antonio Gramsci, is “hegemony.” They note, “the construct remains underspecified and inadequately situated in its conceptual context” (ibid., p. 20). However, they transcend Gramsci’s conceptual shortcomings in two key ways. First, they reformulate the notion of hegemony which they define as: that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies drawn from a historically situated cultural field—that come to be taken for granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it. (Ibid., p. 23) Next, they establish the difference between hegemony and ideology: Whereas the first consists of constructs and conventions that have come to be shared and naturalized throughout a political community, the second is the expression and ultimately the possession of a particular social group, although it is widely peddled beyond. (ibid., p. 24) An understanding of hegemony and ideology is shown to be necessary to come to grips with the full implications of the consciousness of colonization and the colonized consciousness. Both are never completely mutually exclusive since hegemony as a construct is always unstable and vulnerable. Similarly, the colonizer and the colonized in spite of the forces of hegemony and ideology are conjoined in often startling ways to produce meaning and value. The colonized as such is not always the passive subject she is often presumed to be.Comaroff and Comaroff write: “native people” seek to plumb the depths of the colonizing process. They search for the coherence—and, sometimes, the deus ex machina— that lies behind its visible face. For the recently colonized, or those who feel the vibrations of the imperial presence just over the horizon, generally believe that there is something invisible, something profound, happening to them—and that their future may well depend on gaining control over its “magic.” (Ibid., pp. 31–32) Just as the Tswana world and politics were transformed in all sorts of ways by the colonial encounter, the world and politics of the colonialists did not remain the same. The Boers, of Dutch, German, and French descent, struggled with the British over the control of Tswana land. In more precise terms: the African communities along the frontier became the object of struggle among White colonists with designs on their land and labor and the
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Dutch Reformed Church had long opposed mission work among the slaves at the Cape. Not unexpectedly, then, the Nonconformists entered this troubled arena as marked men and were soon drawn into the thick of the dispute. For they, too, were competitors in the battle to gain control over Black populations. Fresh from an abolitionist climate, they tried to force the issue of ‘native’ social and legal rights upon the administration. (Ibid., p. 45) This scenario, in which different European nationalities participated in the colonial process, was quite unique within the South African context, since the colonialists of other African regions were usually solely Anglophonic, Francophonic, or Lusophonic. In Tswana land, the combustible mix of these different European nationalities must have contributed immensely to the strange brew that came to be known as apartheid. The Comaroffs also draw well-deserved attention to the sociopolitical background of the evangelists who defined the shape and trajectory of the civilizing mission. This background is not depicted with the aid of anthropological or historical texts alone. Classic English literature is employed as a credible source of information into the background of the crusading evangelists. Daniel Defoe was aware of the formation of missionary societies. Charlotte Brontë drew “deft strokes” of the missionary in fictive discourse and, it is pointed out, “[Charles] Dickens called upon all his powers of polemic and sarcasm to attack the very idea of missionary philanthropy, and he dismissed Africa as irredeemably unfit for civilization” (ibid., p. 51). This evinces the extent to which the public sphere in England was affected by the missionary effort at the time. It is emphasized that we need to be less partial regarding our analyses of the encounter between Christian missionaries and African peoples. As such anthropological studies also need to focus on the sociopolitical conditions that produced and directed European missionary activity. As noted, the literary context of the period is equally essential if we are to understand the many antecedents of colonialism in their continuous and discontinuous forms: [William] Wordsworth’s romantic idealism, Defoe’s gentle skepticism, and Smith’s editorial cynicism, [Robert] Southey’s polemic imperialism, Brontë’s fictional ambivalence, and Dickens’ populist criticism. (Ibid., p. 54) are all elements that provide crucial keys for understanding the impulses that propelled Nonconformist missionary activity. To accomplish analyses that have sufficient depth and subtlety, it is necessary to bear in mind, “the missionary encounter must be regarded as a twosided historical process; as a dialectic that takes into account the social and
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cultural endowments of, and the consequences for, all the actors— missionaries no less than Africans” (ibid., p. 54). In the past, most anthropological studies, historical texts, philosophical constructs, and postcolonial themes generally excluded these crucial elements. One of the vital features in the work of the Comaroffs is the ability to carry out this two-sided project of analyses. The typical missionary who sought to change his fortunes and those of Southern Tswana was often a product of the drastic socio-economic upheavals taking place in England. Accordingly, “the industrial revolution, then, forged the particular sociological context from which rose the clerical army of Nonconformist missionaries to the colonies” (ibid., p. 59). They were also the “dominated fraction of a dominant class” as propounded by Pierre Bourdieu. In more ways than one, Christianity itself became a site of intense political struggle. Consequently, it is essential to bear in mind, “from the moment that the church had, like other human agencies, to negotiate its position in the world, its absolutist spiritual dominion began to melt away” (ibid., p. 78). This weakening of the powers of the church in Britain in turn intensified the drive to appropriate and reconstitute the African world as part of the imperial logic of colonization. But the Kingdom of God in Tswana also paved the way for the Empire of Britain. Before the advent of the Empire of Britain in southern Tswana, it is important to note that the clergy at that time were caught up in a struggle to rise above the underclass and be counted among the bourgeoisie. They had little theological education and actively sought to recreate an idyll of British yeomanry within the apparently virgin stretches of African lands or wastelands as the case may be. The epistemological and psychological framework that defined the relationship between Britain and precolonial Southern Africa is described here: We witness the rise of a more and more elaborate model of the relationship of Europe to the “dark continent”: a relationship of both complementary opposition and inequality, in which the former stood to the latter as civilization to nature, savior to victim, actor to subject. It was a relationship whose very creation implied a historical imperative, a process of intervention through which wild would be cultivated, the suffering saved. (Ibid., p. 87) From this point on, the racist biases of the colonial enterprise begin to pile up. Mungo Park, an esteemed explorer regarded “Black men as nothing” (ibid., pp. 116–117). An entire epistemology within Eurocentric discourse was initiated to liken the African continent with a passive female body waiting to be penetrated by the heroic European “spirit of improvement” and adventure. Henry Lonis Gates Jr. contends in his essay, “‘Race,’ Writing, and Difference” that Francis
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Bacon, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel were all great Western intellectual racists (Gates, Jr., 1992, p. 73). The social epistemology regarding not only the mythological classification of the passive African body and landscape, but also the need for its urgent penetration, went along with quite a remarkable intellectual vocabulary. The Comaroffs add, “the vocabulary of dark continents with Black bodies and dim minds” became a prominent mode of signification (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, p. 99). Georges Cuvier, a prestigious Swiss comparative anatomist, believed qualities such as “self-awareness and control were underdeveloped among non-Europeans” (ibid., p. 101). This kind of view contributed immensely to the social epistemology of the period in terms ascribing tropes of gender, subjection, and denigration to questions of race. For instance: in late eighteenth-century images of Africa, the feminization of the Black “other” was a potent trope of devaluation. The non-European was to be made as peripheral to the global axes of reason and production as women had become at home. Both were vital to the material and imaginative order of Europe. Yet both were deprived access to its highest values. (Ibid., p. 105) Having explored the different contours of colonialism from both sides of the racial divide, the Comaroffs begin to analyze the internal construction of southern Tswana. Prior to that, they had depicted in elaborate terms, “a colonialism, whose founding charter fixed contemporary images of nature and gender, race and reason, savagery and civility, into a compelling mythological mosaic” (ibid., p. 116). They also carry out an intensive exploration of the traditional Tswana before the intrusive excursion of colonialism. Of that supposedly stable traditional world they write: an incessant stream of political, social, and ritual acts reiterated the precedence of agnation over matrilaterality, of males over females, of pastoral production over cultivation, of the dictates of the public arena over those of the domestic sphere. (Ibid., p. 137) This extract captures the nature of traditional Tswana society. Within this broad context, we encounter different tropes of dominance and subjugation within and outside the domestic sphere, continual struggle for chief control of the realm, and its perpetual themes of power, legitimacy, centralization, and decentralization. Such were the sociopolitical tropes that were at play in Tswana society before the advent of the colonial encounter. The stage was set for the collision of two worlds, “one imperial and expansive, and the other local and defensive” (ibid., p. 171). Significant to note also is:
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Those struggles had to do with control over local resources and human capital. Tswana society was not exactly the passive virgin territory entertained by the Eurocentric imagination and the social epistemology of colonialism. Within the apparently pacific undercurrents of the initial colonial encounter loomed the imperial figure of the evangelist: The evangelist was an intrusive, forceful figure within the chiefdom, a figure not subject, finally, to indigenous control. Not only did his knowledge and technology challenge their categories, conventions, and forms of creativity, but his commanding bearing also contested existing lines of authority. (Ibid., p. 196) Soon after being admitted into the chiefdom, the primary task of the evangelist became the transformation of the habits of the local people, to remove the detritus of a counter-productive culture and replace with it European technological reason. This decisive effort at cultural transformation on the part of the Nonconformist missionary was extended into the sphere of language, a sphere that has been the preoccupation of major theorists of decolonization such as wa Thiong’o and Wiredu. The Comaroffs describe this crucial aspect of the colonization process in the following terms: the colonization of language became an increasingly important feature of the process of symbolic domination at large. Indeed, Setswana was to carry the lasting imprint of Christian Europe in its lexicon. This was evident in the commandeering of everyday terms like moruti (teacher), which took on the connotation of “minister of the church,” and modumed (one who agrees), which came to imply “Christian believer”; unlike badimo [ancestors], these were subtle acts of appropriation rather than bold mistranslations and hence were potentially all the more invasive. The process was also marked by the use of Dutch and especially English loan-words for features of the emerging colonial universe. (Ibid., pp. 218–219) For the European linguistic scholar, the domestication and restructuring of Setswana was a welcome challenge. It meant reducing a “folk” tongue into some civilized, manageable form. In a similar vein, it should be noted “it was language . . . that provided the fixed categories through which an amorphous cultural landscape became subject to European control” (ibid., p. 222). In es-
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sence, the conquest of Setswana as dialect should be perceived as a vital part of what the Comaroffs have termed “the colonization of consciousness.” Embedded in the colonization of consciousness were processes of conversion. The Comaroffs explain: “Conversion,” the ultimate objective of the Nonconformists, was a process involving the removal of difference and distinction—a process whereby the Tswana were to be assimilated into the moral economy of civilized man, in which human worth was evaluated against the single currency of absolute truth. Over the long run, the process would not efface human differences but would extend the European system of distinction over Africa, drawing its peoples into a single scale of social, spiritual, and material inequality. (Ibid., pp. 244–245) After sufficient physical and cultural penetration of Tswana political psychology by the Nonconformists, the powers of the chiefs started to wane because their previous control over tributary wealth, cattle, and serfs became far less secure. European ways of seeing and doing things had ensured that the chiefs no longer had a monopoly of power and knowledge. In overturning the powers of chiefs, the Nonconformists often conflated secular power with religious authority that within the Tswana context was quite different from European doctrines of separation of power. In Tswana society, the secular and sacred domains were fused to form a cosmological totality just as in many traditional cultures where the modern distinction between the “private” and “public” realms hardly exists. As such, the Nonconformists’ intrusion in the realm of power and authority was to prove extremely disruptive because the chiefship, instead of being the sole focus of authority, became one of two contending powers. Once this had taken place it was left for the Boers to assume control not only over the lands but also human capital. The seizure was almost total and was brutal due to the quest of the Boerish masters to possess and transform the physical landscape. The Boers continued their cruel domination and exploitation of the indigenes of Bechuanaland that eventually led to the first Anglo Boer War between 1880 and 1881. Subsequently, the Gladstone administration in Great Britain decided to install a protectorate over Bechuanaland in 1884. In the end, the missionaries had done their part for the colonizing process, but ultimately, they were not equipped for the demands of realpolitik since it entailed a tough-minded secularism. A passage in the conclusion of the first volume of Of Revelation and Revolution captures the spirit of the colonial encounter in southern Tswana. This extract summarizes the impact and ambivalences of the missionary encounter: the meeting of these two worlds was driven by a logic that transcendded—shaped—the explicit intentions of the actors on either side. On the
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The second volume of Of Revelation and Revolution continues the exploration of the conversation and cultural struggle between Africans and Europeans and how this process was also marked by a fluid context of hegemonic contestion, ideological squabble, and religious argument. This analysis of the second volume is shorter than the previous one since there is another aspect of the work of the Comaroffs to be examined—the South African postcolony in the age of contemporary globalization. It is interesting to note, “it was in the confrontation with non-Western societies that bourgeois Britons honed a sense of themselves as gendered, national citizens, as Godly, right-bearing individuals, and as agents of Western reason” (ibid., p. 6). The development of this line of thought further distinguishes the work of the Comaroffs from those of other theorists, especially African, who concern themselves with the colonial encounter. In epistemological terms, it relates to the same/other dynamic in which the colonizer constructs an otherized subjectivity as a result of constant contemplation of the notions of difference and distance. Undoubtedly, insights such as these are bound to change in a significant way current discursive approaches to the study of the colonial event and encounter. Still on the effects of the encounter, the Comaroffs state: The encounter between Nonconformists and the peoples of the South African interior, then, joined populations with divergent cultural perspectives, dissimilar intentions, dissonant notions of value—and distinctly unequal capacities to control the terms of the unfolding relations. Not surprisingly, their early exchanges initiated a protracted dialogue based in a part on misrecognition, in part on shared interests, in part on alliances across the lines that divided them. These parties acted as mirrors to and for each other, refracting and reifying new orders of social distinction and identity and struggling to master the hybrid language, the swirl of signs and objects that circulated among them. (Ibid., pp. 6–7) In the second volume of Of Revelation and Revolution, the contradictions of the colonial enterprise are unearthed on several levels and with many analytical registers. The Comaroffs argue, for instance, that the missionaries “to convert ‘natives’ into ‘civilized’ Christians, . . . had to make other into same,
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to erase the distinctions in which colonialism was founded” (ibid., p. 7). But part of what emerged from this cultural encounter, or argument as the case may be, was “the reality of a creolized African Christianity whose very vitality—often ascribed to the peculiarities of African ‘nature’—spoke to the Europeans of apostasy, even paganism” (ibid.). Nonetheless, the Nonconformists continually strove to impart the value of honest toil among the converts so as to create God’s kingdom on earth. For them, this was a substantial way to construct a moral and self-regulating civil society in Bechuanaland. This, in turn “opened the door to the liberal forces of Euro-modernism and industrial capitalism” (ibid., p. 9). But even Western-style capitalism was not without its contradictions and incoherences. The Comaroffs suggest: European capitalism was always less rationalized and homogenous than its own dominant ideology allowed; always more internally diverse, more localized in its forms, more influenced by moral and material considerations beyond its control—and, finally, wrought more by its confrontation with the rest of the world than by purely endogenous forces. Despite its own self-image and its affinity for rationalization, it was shot through with the features it projected on colonial others’ parochialism, syncretism, unreason, enchantment. (ibid., p. 11) These are the kinds of issues the Comaroffs tackle in the second volume of Of Revelation and Revolution. The construction of the colonial world was never a harmonious or strife-free endeavor. Instead, it involved complicated processes of construction that the colonial subject “contested, appropriated, joined, turned aside, acquiesced” (ibid., p. 9). In short, it was a world produced by “hybridity, mimesis, and cultural fusion.” Several of the theoretical tropes employed by the Comaroffs are postmodernist, but as we have noted within the course of this discussion, such an enriched discursive expanse definitely increases and improves our approaches to the analysis of the colonial encounter. In both volumes of Of Revelation and Revolution, they manage to develop several analytical models that can be employed in the study of different forms of colonialisms. For instance, we must always remember that the colonial encounter was never a one-sided affair with the rational, civilized, Christian Nonconformist missionary and adventurer on the one hand, and the passive, feminized colonial subject on the other. Further, in analyzing the colonial encounter, we must study in broad detail both the colonized and colonizer; their sociopolitical backgrounds, religious orientations, cultural affiliations, economic circumstances, and cosmological outlooks—all these factors go a long way in deepening our modes of analysis regarding the colonial encounter. The final section of this chapter, which is much briefer, deals with the work of the Comaroffs and the issue of globalization and the postcolony.
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POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY 3. The Globalization of Colonization
The African postcolony in the age of contemporary globalization deserves to be studied and is being studied in interesting ways. The peripheralization caused by the decisive event of the colonial encounter bears some resemblance to the forms of sociopolitical, cultural, and economic dispossession created by the unparalleled expansion of global capitalism. In spite of the mechanics of exclusion created by the different manifestations of Western capital, non-Western societies are also inventing new modes of appropriation, rejection, and subversion. Again, tropes of hybridity and mimesis, and questions concerning cultural difference and the meaning of value, are being reformulated for greater relevance, as they should be. The entrenchment of all kinds of inequalities within the global system necessitates rethinking terms such as imperialism, domination, and subjection. Similarly, terms such as gender, class, and race have to be recontextualized within a far more complicated conceptual milieu. In some cases our conceptual tools are inadequate and have to be discarded, and in other instances we need to modify and complexify them for them to function in an increasingly complex universe. We need to examine how the twin processes of colonialism and global capitalism have continued to define the destiny of African territories and peoples. Again, this is an area in which the Comaroffs have done considerable work. Mbembe observes: Far from being simple products of colonialism, current boundaries thus reflect the rivalries, power relationships, and alliances that prevailed among the various imperial powers and between them and Africans through the centuries preceding colonization proper. (1999, p. 6) The collapse of state order within the “strategic ghetto that Africa has become in the aftermath of the Cold War” (ibid., p. 10) is an occurrence that most existing explanatory models cannot quite accommodate. To be sure, strange processes are taking place. Apart from chronic economic and institutional failure in the African continent, we also have to contend with the widespread debacle of democratization experiments which in turn has truncated in a fundamental way the project of modernization in most parts of the continent. Consequently, disturbing scenarios keep emerging. For example: Through the mediation of war and the collapse of projects of democratization, this interlacing of dynamics and temporalities leads to the “exit of the state.” It promotes the emergence of technologies of domination based in forms of private indirect government, and have as their function the constitution of new systems of property and new bases of social stratification. (Ibid.)
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The informalization of many African economies is also creating disconcerting scenarios of its own. In general, a tendency that can be described as “disinstitutionalization” is not only leading to the dissolution of the state, but is also causing the diffraction of society. To understand this process of disinstitutionalization it is imperative to note: new forms of territorialization and economies of scale, movements of money have accentuated fragmentation of national and regional economic spaces. Whereas some spaces were evincing an advanced demonetarization, and even experiencing a return to practices of bartering or self-subsistence, others were entering an economy based on the dollar, with unanticipated effects. (Mbembe, 2000a, p. 7) It would be interesting to give a glance, if only in passing, to the contributions of the Comaroffs regarding these disturbing events in the African postcolony. They point out that concepts such as citizenship, identity, national-building, heritage and patrimony are being recast even in the light of the most mundane events as processes of transnationalization and informalization continue to create ever newer instances of social stratification and fragmentation. A prolonged period of “debt, dependency, and structural maladjustment” has become the condition of existence coming after the political and economic realities of the dawn of classical colonialism and the after effects of decolonization. Since we inhabit a universe in which market forces have been set free in a context of extreme digitalization largely controlled by the West, Africans have to grapple with a situation where: geography is perforce being written; in which transnational identities, diasporas connections, ecological disasters, and the mobility of human populations challenge both the nature of sovereignty and the sovereignty of nature; in which ‘the network’ returns as the dominant metaphor of social connectedness; in which liberty is distilled to its postmodern ontological essence, the right to choose identities, subjectivities, commodities, sexualities, localities, and other forms of collective representation. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000a, p. 14) The same processes of disinstitutionalization, in addition to the diffraction of society referred to before, are considerably addressed by the Comaroffs. For instance, in relation to existence and conditions in the postcolony, they write: Almost everywhere in the postcolonial world, it seems, community and family are said to be widely at risk; the existence of “society” is under scrutiny, called ever more acutely into question as other kinds of attachment take precedent; regular, standardized blue collar jobs are
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At the institutional level, they observe: “the” state, an ever more polymorphous entity, is held, increasingly, to be in perpetual crisis, its power every more dispersed, its legitimacy tested by debt, disease, and poverty, its executive control repeatedly pushed to the limit and, most of all, its hyphenation—the articulation, that is, of the state to the nation, of the nation-state—everywhere under challenge. (Ibid.) These related developments can be construed as part of the outcome of globalization and the Comaroffs suggest an interesting theoretical possibility by relating, even if only obliquely, colonialism with the process. In the final analysis, they accomplish a theoretical consistency in explicating a historical anthropology of colonialism coupled with proffering revelatory insights about the processes—continuous and discontinuous—reconstitutions and dysfunctionalities yet unfolding within the postcolony. All this is accomplished while keeping in focus valuable questions of indeterminacy and contingency without the usual postmodernist excess. The matter of life and death has become unduly vulgarized and has assumed alarming proportions in Africa to allow for such an excess. In the final analysis, the Comaroffs establish the basis for a serious methodological reappraisal of different forms of colonialism, and in concentrating a significant amount of attention on the current wave of globalization they situate Africa in discursive centers that tend to be perpetually oppressive and permanently exclusionary. Not only is considerable attention devoted to the selection of discursive strategies suited for the network of presentations about Africa, they also deepened the modes of analysis by which those strategies may become enduring paradigms. The precolonial subject’s encounter with modernity begins when she becomes a colonial subject or when she is branded “native.” This apparently simple act has an infinite scope of implications. An entire universe of relations and epistemic constructs is thrown into disarray. A complete existential mode is reconstructed by coercion. Nonetheless, this coercive process is not a one-sided affair. Victim and victimizer are transformed in spite of the unequal relations. Hybridity and the eclectic ingredients of the newly evolving world are set into motion creating new satellites, languages, commodities, commonalities, differences, and beings. In short, a new mode of existence is set in motion. Neither victim nor victimizer, or colonizer nor colonized is free from its transformative currents, from the tyrannical forces at work and the equally vehement elements of résistance. The Comaroffs encourage us to rethink the
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possibilities inherent in these processes from a much larger backdrop than we had previously been accustomed. In that way, we will come to appreciate that processes of force and power, once let loose, mold and transform all beings, commodities, and values, in their way including perhaps also their long forgotten histories. Regardless whether the Comaroffs succeed in revealing the complexities inherent in colonized/colonizer relations, they are unfortunately silent about the complicities of anthropology in those relations. They also reveal little about how their private subjectivities interact with anthropology as a discipline. Anthropology does not have an innocent history in relation to the colonial encounter. It was a victor’s discourse and a suppressor of the voice of the victim. The Comaroffs neglect to deal with this compromised disciplinary history in a central manner.
Four THE FRONTIER OF INTERCULTURALITY In this chapter, I continue with explorations of present-day Africanist anthropology and the ways in which it engages with novel discursive frontiers. The two main strands of Africanist anthropology discussed in this study mark a departure from classical colonial anthropology and its intimate relations with ethnophilosophy. African philosophy, on the other hand, in transcending the problem of origins, gains a more organic discursive character. John L. and Jean Comaroff concentrate on the multiple and lingering effects of colonialism. They also address the unfolding dynamics of contemporary globalization using a welter of poststructuralist discursive approaches. Wim van Binsbergen’s approach is quite different. Through his personal interventions into concrete spheres of African life, he complicates the meanings of Africanity, subjectivity, place, and belonging. In addition, he questions the entire project of Africanist anthropology to make it more accountable (Osha, 2005). In this chapter, I explore van Binsbergen’s discursive approach to Africanist anthropology. Van Binsbergen’s huge book, at over 600 pages, Intercultural Encounters: African and Anthropological Lessons Towards a Philosophy of Interculturality (2003) is a bold, honest, and, to some extent, a quite disturbing work. An immediately striking feature is his relentless critique of his position as a North Atlantic subject, which, given its consistency, is quite remarkable. Again, this refers to the quality of honesty. Most academics—African and Africanist—concerned with Africa, tend to exclude this crucial angle. In this way, postmodernism can be employed in two devastating ways, though many other applications also exist. An uncritical version of postmodernism may not pay sufficient attention to the author’s antecedents and van Binsbergen’s selfcritique is sometimes embarrassingly frank. Also, a playful version of postmodernism may exempt the author from social responsibility. Van Binsbergen manages to produce a forceful text, one that may alienate the positivist mind, or structures of thought that tend toward positivism and scientism, but the text already anticipates this rejection, or denial, with a formidable intellectual arsenal. Let us concentrate for a moment on the unambiguous condition of van Binsbergen’s position. Many parts of his massive work address and capture its complexities in a compelling manner. There are continual themes that demonstrate the power of the events, turns, and upheavals that have influenced his life and work as an academic, such as the absence and even denial of ancestral antecedents, the unilateral identification with the women in his life, and hard struggles against the pain of personal rejection. His merciless self-critique is an
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extension of an equally unremitting critique of the entire project of anthropology in general and of Africanist anthropology in particular. So far, his wide-ranging anthropological explorations have led him through five different African contexts; rural Tunisia, urban Zambia, rural Zambia, rural Guinea-Bissau, and urban Botswana. During his first major anthropological project in Tunisia a crucial methodological dilemma, which he did not problematize at the time, came up: “problems of power, social change, the interplay between heterogeneous semantic, social and economic systems within one field of interaction, corporeality, self-reflection, and interculturality” (ibid., p. 64). Van Binsbergen’s relationship with anthropology tends to be unusually problematic, a love-hate relationship that has been mutually beneficial. Consider the view, “anthropology is more than just a sublimated form of sleuthing or espionage” (ibid., p. 73). The evocative association of anthropology with espionage is quite intriguing. He makes many other similarly evocative and intriguing associations in relation to the project(s) of anthropology. Van Binsbergen consistently points out that anthropology is, first and foremost, implicated by the project and discourses of imperialism. However, this conjuncture led to the emergence of African philosophy and has been both liberating and constraining. To redress its often disturbing historical antecedents, “anthropology, almost by definition, sides with the peripheral, the subaltern, the non-vocal, that which is excluded from sharing in the political and economic power in the modern world,” what has been termed an “anthropology of advocacy” is required to redeem some of the wrongs of the discipline’s complicities with imperial projects and colonization (ibid., p. 30). But the complicity of anthropology with colonization does not end with the moment of decolonization. The discipline is also implicated by the more important category of class. In this regard, van Binsbergen points out: anthropology could only rise, as a critical and comparative reflection, in a complex industrial society whose ideological tissue had been torn by secularization, capitalism, and the rise of new classes and political structures, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries CE. (Ibid., p. 31) In the critique of anthropology’s complicity with forms of sociopolitical oppression, such as imperialism and colonization, van Binsbergen maintains a truly remarkable consistency: “North Atlantic anthropologists implicitly share in the privileges and the power of the Northern part of the world, as against the South” (ibid.). Anthropology represents “a form of intellectual appropriation and humiliation against which Africans in the nationalist era rightly protested” (ibid.). As a way of redressing the colonial imbalance, he advocates a radical deconstruction of the different biases and epistemologies of Africanist projects of anthropology.
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Presently, this project is not being conducted by North Atlantic Africanist anthropologists alone. Arcjie Mafeje, Ben Magubane, and Okot p’Bitek have all done crucial work in this regard. Van Binsbergen argues that a crucial strategy to reconstitute Africanist anthropology is to constantly acknowledge the significance and centrality of the process of interculturality as its logos. Interculturality transforms and diminishes its inherent violence as representation. In framing his anthropological project, van Binsbergen gained a great deal from studying the ideas of another anthropologist, Pierre-Philippe Rey. Rey’s work: encompasses, among many other things, intercontinental migrant labor to modern France, the history of capitalism in the North Atlantic region, Nambikwara kinship structures from South America, oriental despotism, and the history of historical materialist thought from pre-Marxism right through to [Louis] Althusser. (ibid., p. 76) In relation to Africa: Rey sees his work as the production of an anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois ideology, developing a theory of the class struggle of African peasants and proletarians, and thus providing the insights by which their struggle may be strengthened, may learn from earlier struggles, and may ultimately be successful. (Ibid., pp. 76–77) Van Binsbergen finds Rey’s work lacking in several ways in spite of its strenuous efforts to identify with sections of the agrarian underclass. He argues that the class location of North Atlantic anthropologists undermines the authenticity, force, and validity of their productions unless a relentless operation of auto-critique is instituted. Without this vital operation of self-critique, what they produce would be products of false consciousness. In the final examination, Rey’s analyses have grave shortcomings because (1) they are not sufficiently self-critical and (2) they do not offer a systematic critique of ideologies of North Atlantic capitalist modes of production. In articulating a different mode of anthropology, van Binsbergen’s critique of Rey’s work has proved crucial. Equally crucial are his readings of Émile Durkheim and Karl Marx. The presence and critique of marginality are also constants in van Binsbergen’s life and work. The figure of the leopard—sacred outsider—as a cosmological motif is quite instructive in several ways. Even van Binsbergen’s choice of an academic discipline speaks volumes about a marginal constant: an important factor in the relative intellectual isolation of the anthropological discipline has been the fact that that discipline has also attracted a remarkable number of outsiders: Jews, women, homosexuals, working-class children, . . . migrants, and moreover the spiritual heirs of the
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The discipline always provides space for individuals who need to work through different pressures and manifestations of wanderlust. In this regard, van Binsbergen’s earlier constitution of his anthropological project is in a way a reflection on its multiple disciplinary limits and on how the category of class undermines its capacities for adequate sociopolitical critique. Within the matrix of this ideological framework he begins his many anthropological experiments. Van Binsbergen’s academic experiments are avenues for understanding human cultures, gender relations, and the social and political systems of other peoples, and his cultural context. The Nkoya ethnic group of Zambia is quite significant in this regard. However, van Binsbergen often reminds us that the formal academic structure of textual production does not always capture all the different emotions, images, and psychological dimensions that emanate from his ethnographic excavations. To address this shortcoming he often turns to his talents as a poet and novelist. Van Binsbergen’s analysis of the sexual economy and gender relations among the Nkoya demonstrates the resilience and enduring qualities of some profound aspects of traditional cultures. On Nkoya husband and wife partnerships, van Binsbergen writes that after sexual intercourse, a Nkoya woman “kneels down before her partner and claps her hands respectfully, genuinely pleased that, of all women, this man has chosen her to manifest his manhood and donate his seed” (ibid., p. 108). She is also expected to “prepare and serve his food, then kneel before him and by hand clapping, invite him to come and eat it” (ibid.). The patriarchal mode of sociopolitical organization could not be more strongly reinforced. Yet, van Binsbergen affirms that women in Nkoya culture enjoy considerable agency and autonomy in their abilities to seek and find redress for forms of male oppression that they find unacceptable or unbearable. In the realm of sexuality, Nkoya sexual culture differed markedly from North Atlantic organizations of sexuality. Among the Nkoya: the recognition of male needs makes it normal that a woman, in cases of long periods of absence, looks for a temporary substitute for both her domestic domains and her sexual tasks: a “sister” or a friend, that will not represent a threat to her relationship with her husband. (Ibid., p. 112) Passages such as these may jar some sensibilities, but van Binsbergen’s selflacerating quest for ethnographic truth at many turns absolves him from charges of self-indulgence that ought to follow logically in contexts of this kind.
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A major event that had profound implications for both van Binsbergen’s personal and professional life was becoming a sangoma, or traditional healer. In becoming a sangoma, he writes: from an ancestor-less piece of flotsam of human history, I became a priest in an ancestral cult, in a decisive step not only of professional independence and Africanist exploration, but also of self-construction. (Ibid., p. 193) He tells us: sangomas are people who consider themselves, and who are considered by their extended environment, effective healers: as mediators between living people, on the one hand, and the ancestors, spirits and God (Mwali) on the other—in a general context where most bodily afflictions and other misfortunes of a psychological, social, and economic nature are interpreted in religious terms. (Ibid., p. 202) The transformation of van Binsbergen into a sangoma involved a long and elaborate process of trials and tribulations. In his demanding attempts to become a sangoma, van Binsbergen “was seeking existential transformation, fulfillment and redress, much more than anthropological data, across cultural and geographical boundaries” (ibid., p. 171). He also ascribes his absorbing quest to a deep and unfolding Lacanian conflict within him, in which he strives to fill the void left by the loss or severance of the mother. In this way, sangomahood becomes the balm of the unification of a splintered self; a therapeutic re-articulation of painful and strife-ridden subjectivity within the confines of a deeply felt spirituality. The trances and beauty of sangomahood are for van Binsbergen therapies of freedom in which catharsis and emotional healing are equally prominent. Not even the discouragement of gore could weaken his resolve: I had to join the other sangomas in drinking from the cut throat of my dying sacrificial goat; its gall was smeared onto my feet and its inflated gall bladder tied to a string for me to wear as a pendant. (Ibid., p. 173) Apart from the ecstacy of the trance and the beauty of the dance, van Binsbergen claims that sangomahood offers: a researcher a vast range of information, both of esoteric knowledge, and of social arrangements and bodily practices that may not be as accessible to the researcher who remains a relative outsider. (Ibid., p. 185)
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The quest for sangomahood entailed extremes of beauty and sacrifice. For Binsbergen, it began as a struggle to assuage and overcome what appeared to be an existential lack. Away from his biological home, he sought to escape the traumas of incest, violence, and despair. Becoming a sangoma opened up “the possibility of a non-egoistic, not primarily libido-driven, servitude to the suffering of others” which, in many ways, soothes and redeems his sense of primal loss and the violence of his past (ibid., pp. 230–231). He had to find or create another home which he sought first among the Nkoya of rural Zambia. Eventually, he became an adopted member of the royal family. Also, he succeeded in attaching himself to one of the lodges devoted to therapeutic religion in Francistown, Botswana. In different ways, van Binsbergen makes the suggestion that sangomahood heals psychic and existential schizophrenia—that it does not compound it as it may seem to do in many Western eyes. It is meant to release victims from the traumatisms of schizophrenic situations: The aim of sangoma divination is primarily therapeutic: to reinsert the client to what may be argued to be her or his place in the universe, so that the life force in principle available for that person but temporarily blocked by their drifting away from the proper place, can flow once more. (Ibid., p. 256) Sangoma divination reconstructed and healed van Binsbergen’s emotional and psychological landscape even before he fully became a sangoma: I had only joined the sangomas in search of therapy after my mental breakdown at the rejection I was experiencing from the local population at large, because the latter perceived me as another specimen of the local hereditary enemy, the Boers. (Ibid., p. 213) As such, sangomahood and its divinatory practices aim for the unity of diverse and often contradictory subjective and psychological resources. Being a Dutch professor, husband, and father, and an adoptive member of the Nkoya royal family with strong affective relationships with people in North and West Africa, extracts many demands and sacrifices. It pushes van Binsbergen to the frontiers of interculturality, to the extremes of multicultural forms of knowledge resources, different cultures, and modes of social organization and the multiple contradictory impulses that they attract. Becoming a sangoma is a crucial way of dealing with a multiplicity of intercultural contexts, forms of communication, and orders of knowledge. Perhaps in having so many orders of knowledge at his disposal, van Binsbergen is likely to be a better sangoma than many of his African co-practitioners. He is knowledgeable about other divinatory systems such as Arabic geomantic divination, the New Age intellectual movement, I Ching, runic divination,
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tarot, the Zulu bones oracle, Native American varieties, Ifa divination, and astrology. Undoubtedly, easy familiarity with this variety of divinatory systems is likely to enrich his practice of sangomahood. Even more important is van Binsbergen’s employment of the Internet and the new information technologies to disseminate knowledge about his practice and the general nature of the divinatory system, which by his adoption he promotes. His exact words: gradually a global practice emerged, where I would no longer meet my patients in person, but they—invariably total strangers to me—would contact me via an electronic intake form on my website, and they would subsequently receive via email the outcome of the session I would conduct in their absence. (Ibid., p. 236) By his cultivation and assiduous application of postmodern information technologies sangomahood has assumed a truly global format. The mix of the biographical and the strictly academic produces quite an interesting architecture of the text. This, I think, pushes the text to the borders of a manageable trangressivity, definitely not the kind you find with compulsive and aggressive postmodernism which, after all is said and done, is almost a requirement in contemporary textuality. The interrogation of the boundaries of autobiographical reflection and academic writing is another quite interesting feature of van Binsbergen’s text. He claims to be an Afrocentrist and on the level of the sheer volume of his productions, this claim ought to be taken seriously (ibid., p. 432). In interrogating the veracity of this claim, the following texts deserve careful study: Black Athena: Ten Years After (van Binsbergen and Bernal, 1997), which has been reissued as Black Athena: Alive (van Binsbergen, 1999), and which is a sustained analysis of Martin Bernal’s work. Other researches in different stages of completion, which demonstrate his ideological leanings on the question of Afrocentricity include: “Global Bee Flight: Sub-Saharan Africa, Ancient Egypt, and the World—Beyond the Black Athena” (2004); “Transregional and Historical Connections of Four-Tablet Divination in Southern Africa” (1996); Cupmarks, Stellar Maps, and Mankala Board Games: An Archaeoastronomical, Africanist Excursion into Palaeolithic World Views (with Jean-Pierre Lacroix, 2000); and finally, “The Continuity of African and Eurasian Mythologies: General Theoretical Models, and Details and Comparative Discussion of the Case of Nkoya Mythology from Zambia, South Central Africa” (2008). Van Binsgbergen’s focus on the issue of integrity raises many personal issues. He defines integrity as “a person’s successful endeavor to create and maintain consistency between his behavior, on the one hand, and the norms and values to which he is publicly committed, on the other” (2003, p. 200). Again one is compelled to return to the question of honesty and its role in
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structuring intellectual and biographical trajectories. Most academics clothe their formulations with a veneer of objectivity which we, the readers, and they themselves, often take for granted. As we know, this easily breeds mediocrity and kills originality. His philosophico-anthropological project and intercultural encounter(s) rediscover the human subject—including author and reader, participant and observer, and priest and patient—and explode the myth of unhistoricized, unproblematized objectivity. They also succeed in producing a highly satisfying order of knowledge. In addition, his project is arguably a liminal, transgressive order of knowledge that is in no way fragmentary. Instead, it is an order that, in the final analysis, blends a form of classical scholarship with some of the more endearing virtues of high modernism. The wide-ranging and ambitious scope of van Binsbergen’s work is likely to invite varying degrees of conflict that academics such as Erin H. Kimmerle and Ineke van Wetering, whose works fall within the European context, had with his earlier work. Perhaps it would not be out place to expect more of this kind of conflict. A central theoretical quest in the text is the Foucauldian thesis and problématique (the art of formulating a problem) of epistemic regimes, orders of knowledge and their modes of constitution, and others. I sympathize with van Binsbergen’s constant reframing of this ever-present problématique, the status of the other and her place in etic anthropological frameworks. Or in crude Foucauldian terms, the hapless subject caught in the inexorable power and knowledge nexus. The typical North Atlantic academic enterprise or industrial orientation tends to appropriate all forms of knowledge, Western and non-Western, for instant and constant commodification. As a North Atlantic subject and author, van Binsbergen can hardly avoid the implications of this reality. But again, being an African by choice, and a diviner-priest as well, he is more aware in this particular context of the violences of ethnographic, epistemological and anthropological projects pursued by the privileged North Atlantic subject on the subaltern other. Van Binsbergen has emerged from a complex of elemental conflicts— position and subjectivity, and academic and textual, including the tensions between modernism and postmodernism and different orders of knowledge— a subject as conflictual as ever but one who has not chosen the path of superficial or uncritical reconciliation. Instead he has established a hard-won region of resolution. Reconciliation, which is a significant theme for him, can be interpreted in several ways. Reconciliation, within the psychological field, definitely has many upheavals. Reconciliation in a more explicit sense by which I refer to the more mundane manifestations of subjectivity, or in van Binsbergen’s terms, as a North Atlantic academic on the one hand, and a sangoma on the other. He graphically depicts the fields of conflict to which both vocations give rise and the frustrations through which they mark him. It is not surprising then that reconciliation for him is such a vital theme. In this way,
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he enables us to remember not only how we choose our themes, but more importantly in this case, how our themes choose us. The analysis of reconciliation is quite interesting for generally avoiding the dead end of developmentalism and functionalist social science. In many ways, van Binsbergen argues that reconciliation in many African contexts is a social technology of conflict management and good private and public relations. He returns to the realm of religion and other forms of theological humanism and this approach undoubtedly creates a welter of unexpected nuances. He explains: reconciliation is an essential aspect of all human relationships, both in primary human relations based on face-to-face interaction, and on group relationships of a political, religious, ethnic nature that encompass a large number of people. (2003, p. 350) Because of the severe limitations of the paradigm of structural functionalism in dealing with some of the more fundamental problems of conflict resolution, van Binsbergen calls for a new “anthropology of reconciliation” (van Binsbergen, 2003, p. 351). There exists a paralyzing disconnect between social scientific discourses and approaches to reconciliation and established theological paradigms. A reproblematization of this conceptual space, van Binsbergen argues, is necessary. Reconciliation, we are informed, “is a creative social act of rearrangement and reinterpretation.” In addition, it is “the transformation of conflict” (2003, p. 352). This realization is often ignored by the paradigm of structural functionalism. One of the excesses of the paradigm is that it does not recognize, “social systems do not work in the same way as the axiomatic systems of symbolic logic and mathematics: it is common for social systems, as it is for biological systems, to arrive at more or less the same point from different starting points, along different routes, and to invest that point with the conflicting tendencies specific to the various points of departure” (ibid., p. 357). As events in post-apartheid South Africa demonstrate, both within and outside the deliberations of the Truth and Reconcilation Commission, the collective task to discover a consensual archive that addresses in a balanced way the horrors of apartheid has proved to be exceedingly problematic. As such, reconciliation has become a fervid site for competing ideologies and meanings. The current paradigm of reconciliation does not take into full cognizance the diverse complexities of social life. On the ethical and political complexities of reconciliation, Jacques Derrida explains: An authentic reconciliation, from, let’s say, a practical compromise, then, this authentic reconciliation would be closer to justice than the compromise. In the same way, if you want to distinguish between— that’s a classical distinction—between peace and amnesty or armistice
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POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY or cease-fire. And the amnesty is not simply an act of justice. It’s something else. Now, as you know, when you make peace—and it is difficult to dissociate peace from authentic reconciliation—when you make peace, you simply imply the promise of eternal peace. And you can’t make this point too strongly—in the very concept of peace you imply that the war will never start again. So, what you call the eternal peace is not simply a peace to which you add the predicate eternal. No, eternity is included in the very concept of peace, because if you make peace without promising you will never resume war, it’s not a peace, it’s a ceasefire. It’s an act of war. It’s just a suspension of aggressivity. So, the same would be true for reconciliation. If you reconcile just in order to go on doing business and surviving and so on, it has nothing to do with the promise of perpetual peace, then this could require something closer to justice. So, it depends on the way you interpret reconciliation. And as you know, in the common language, some people, when they say reconciliation, they mean something very practical, easy, empirical, provisional, and others think precisely of the promise of indefinite friendship and peace. And justice would be on that side. Now again, once you have distinguished these two poles of concept, these two concepts, you have also to articulate them. They are absolutely heterogeneous to one another, and nevertheless our responsibility is to make justice more effective. That’s the ethical and political responsibility (2002, p. 76).
Derrida raises a noteworthy point about how reconciliation is often understood within the Western context and he also concedes that there would be some non-Western conceptions—in this case, African—of reconciliation, forgiveness, and justice that need to be addressed. An important conceptual linkage is made when van Binsbergen rereads the South African concept of ubuntu as a consciousness of reconciliation. In general terms, ubuntu means “being human, humanity, the act of being human” (van Binsbergen, 2003, p. 370). Within the post-apartheid dispensation, ubuntu is being reconfigured as an ideology of conflict management and reconciliation. The lingering cartographies of racism are seen and felt in the different forms of inequalities that the event and trauma of apartheid created. Disaffection in post-apartheid South Africa is high because of huge unemployment rates which compound the problem of crime and urban terror, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and what may be termed the general zombification of the underclass. This scenario of social discontent should be juxtaposed with the impact of the rise of new Black elites, ideologies of cosmopolitanism, and images of postmodern consumption. Given the complex nature of the sociopolitical problems, ubuntu—in spite of the common misinterpretations of its history—is being reconceptualized as an ideology of conflict resolution and social healing.
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We must be aware that the concept of ubuntu is not quite different from other ideologies of Blackness such as Négritude, Zambian humanism, or ujaama which are all reactions of Black agency to different forms of structural and epochal oppression. Employing Valentin Yves Mudimbe’s terms, ubuntu can be regarded as the liberation of difference within the uneasy and problematic context of de-apartheidization. Mudimbe’s term for such an epistemological maneuver, the liberation of Black difference by a revisitation and a romanticization of the past, is “retrodiction.” But the concept of ubuntu can also become over celebrated. There is already an ubuntu industry in existence that has led to its unfortunate industrialization. The major drawback of the concept is its lack of “explicit and systematic methodological and empirical procedures” and it is being “driven by academic philosophers’ and management consultants’ intuitive linguistic analyses and childhood reminiscences” (ibid., p. 447). To be sure, a philosophy of sociopolitical healing is necessary in a context such as South Africa, but the search to discover and institute such a philosophy of consciousness must also include the struggle against its possible industrialization. The greatest theoretical danger facing the concept of ubuntu is explained: Use of this term tempts us to deny all other possibilities of identification between South African actors (fellow citizens of the same state, fellow inhabitants of the same local space) except at the most abstract, most comprehensive level of humankind as a whole: as fellow human beings, (Ibid., p. 450) So in addition to the real danger of industrialization, there are also the dangers and excesses of abstraction with which to contend. The critique of globalization has also been one of van Binsbergen’s preoccupations. He argues that the concept remains problematic and inadequately theorized and, “the silly cliches of globalization, such as jeans, Coca Cola and the McDonald hamburger . . . have gained an absolutely metalocal distribution” (ibid., p. 405). Part of the weakness of its conceptualization may derive from the idea that philosophers until quite recently paid scant attention to it. Even Richard Rorty’s categorization appears both lame and problematic. According to van Binsbergen, globalization is better conceptualized under the following aspects: proto-globalization, the panic of space, the panic of time, the panic of language, rebellion against older inequalities, the new object, the virtualization of experience, the new inequality, and finally the new body (ibid., p. 377). In relation to Africa, van Binsbergen poses several crucial questions about the new information order:
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POSTETHNOPHILOSOPHY Does ICT in Africa lead to creative and liberating cultural appropriation by Africans? Does it lead to the annihilation of the African cultural heritage? Or do both propositions apply somehow? Is the computer in Africa to be taken for granted or does it remain an alien element? (Ibid., p. 398).
Ultimately, van Binsbergen argues that the new information technologies may prove to be beneficial for projects of liberation in Africa. He makes an intriguing claim that the text, the book, due to its rigid formalism, is antithetical to social life in Africa, which on the contrary, is marked by a considerable degree of informalization of different levels of social, political, and cultural life, and by an apparently unstructured inventiveness. The age of computer technology, on the other hand, is characterized by the emergence of the network which in its rapidities and virtualities undermine the slower formalisms of the age of the book: for as long as the book remained the norm, and for as long as the forms of communication associated with the book predominated, Africa with its un-booklike response self-evidently lagged behind in ways that it would never be able to make up for. It is not the computer in itself which constitutes an assault on the formal and the linear in information, and puts an end to the book as the gold standard. Rather, such a revolution is being prompted by the ramifying, rhizomatic forms in which information is being presented and may be managed. (Ibid., p. 424) This is undoubtedly a quite useful insight. On a different level, I would claim that van Binsbergen has lived through his vulnerabilities, insecurities, and disappointments with astounding honesty—for me a key quality of his work. His lot as an outsider—construed in a variety of contexts including class, professional, and racial—has been transformed into a personal and professional struggle of immense value, and a struggle in the broadest sense of the word. The analysis of the leopard as a cosmological and existential motif and reality is quite convincing and well researched. In a way, the leopard becomes doubly endearing in representing the Sacred Outsider and all the personas associated with it: diviner-priests, traditional leaders, and all kinds of solitary spiritual travelers. The Nkoya of Zambia know the leopard as Mwendanjangula: a hunter on his solitary journey through the deep and dense savannah forest may meet him, and if he is the first to greet, may receive great material and healing powers, but if Mwendanjangula greets the hunter first, then the latter may be stricken with madness. (Ibid., p. 197) The figure of the leopard is eternally transgressive and controversial. In van Binsbergen’s handling, divination, mystery, and the underworld become in-
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explicably attractive. Even an unadventurous academic cannot fail to be impressed by the scholastic atmosphere that surrounds van Binsbergen’s discussion of these esoteric themes; references to Asia, Europe, and ancient Egypt are made within an extensive discursive space. At this point, the text reassembles itself on another discursive register, one that broadens its already impressive history and marks the rest of the complexion of the text with other possibilities. Those possibilities need to be discussed seriously. However, this is not the place to do so. In the same manner, in structural terms, there are several levels of tension in the text. For instance, the entire textual architecture has a Kantian solemnity, a well-deserved authority that would tend to undermine postmodern notions of play, difference, enjoyment [jouissance], and others. However, it incorporates other fields of tension—the continuous problematization of the status of the knowing and observing subject, the unabashed unmasking of the author-function and its hidden motives, and the analyses of apparently contradictory orders of knowledge or canons of rationality, such as esoteric against conventional academic discourse—within the same conceptual environs, thereby creating a multiplicity of discursive registers. The architecture of the text and the industry of discourse to which it might give rise is an issue one has to examine in much greater depth and with a great many details. Let us turn to more concrete if more mundane issues. Van Binsbergen’s treatment of reconciliation is essential for centers of conflict resolution in Africa and approaches to conflict management in the continent. To be precise, his general treatment of reconciliation has a broad visceral appeal, which is absent in positivist social science approaches. For instance, one is aware of the work being done by some conflict resolution centers in Nigeria and this work mostly appears to be unrealistically technicist, a dry impractical assortment of jargon meant only for the developmentalist industry that van Binsbergen quite rightly criticizes in a dissimilar, if not totally unconnected, context. In this instance, one refers to his discussion of the Kazanga Association in rural Zambia, which illustrates how the global developmentalist industry contributes to the milking of the rural poor through a combination of the activities of bureaucrats of the industry itself and local elites. On another level, I find van Binsbergen’s approach to ethnicity especially interesting in relation to the contributions of many other Africanist scholars and their obsolete views on culture, made so by his unmasking. But more importantly, many political scientists have a quite mutilated and sterile notion of ethnicity. Van Binsbergen’s approach, with its avoidance of disconnected jargon—which in many ways parallels and complements his analyses of some ideologies of reconciliation—has immense potential for fertilizing the field. Also, his analyses of power structures, the political elites, and political institutions in postcolonial Africa are convincing and plausible. These analyses are quite responsive to the historical transformations governing the trajec-
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tories of power. In addition, van Binsbergen’s explanation of informalization and its influence on social life in Africa makes much sense. On the whole, the chapters of the text are an apt and comprehensive survey of van Binsbergen’s quite eventful, challenging, and productive intellectual itinerary to date. His intellectual itinerary on the whole has been one that involved the discovery of the intercultural path without his knowing so until he had become established in his career. An admirable case is made for intercultural philosophy using a mode of discourse that involves anthropology, ethnography, philosophy, and history. Unquestionably, this is the beginning of an uneasy but extremely challenging sub-discipline. The critique of Africa and African ethnicities, anthropological canons, and philosophical methods provides the basis for another phase of African intellectual reflection. This is not a work informed by flashes of youthful insight. It is the kind of work that can only be produced by many years of immersion in different fields of intellection and this is demonstrated at several levels. Its robust multidisciplinarity is also at all times evident. Through the text, it is possible to locate different tendencies in contemporary anthropology, postmodernist anthropology a la the Comaroffs, anthropology generally, and its slow interpeneration by other cutting-edge discourses, the genius of Mudimbe, the lapses of African political theory, the inadequacies of theoretical paradigms of conflict resolution and theories of ethnicity, the isolation and possible demise of each discipline, and the rebirth of the disciplines, such as anthropology, philosophy, and sociology, at the combustible crossroads of globalization to which we are ineluctably drawn and by which either we pursue our destruction or our redemption. Both attempts would seem to be the case at most times. Just as van Binsbergen’s intellectual itinerary is for the most part an excruciating quest for diverse truths, place, and belonging, it is also a relentless critique and an undermining of the assumed subjectivities of being and the received unities of identity. The work is in part a reflection on the traumatisms of inadequacy, incompleteness, alienation, and insecurity, and how they are overcome by the sheer force of identification, and by the power of sacrifice, which in turn gain cultural syncretisms as a means to sociocultural healing. The act of approaching and conquering the intercultural frontier has entailed a tremendous amount of personal and professional sacrifice and different kinds of effort. Ironically, the establishment of a rigorous practice of intercultural hermeneutics in contemporary times was largely accomplished through the efforts of a German Indian-born philosopher, Mall, who eventually abandoned the rich Indian philosophical heritage to learn and reinforce the German tradition. He spurned the spirit of interculturality for a reversed ethnocentricism which by a Fanonian mode of psychoanalysis would make quite interesting reading. Van Binsbergen, on the other hand, discovers that a philosophy of interculturality is only possible through sacrificial acts of continual cultural transgression and a ceaseless respect for the divisions within and amongst cultures.
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Interculturality is perhaps better served by an immersion in diverse cultures, different disciplines, and modes of activity as van Binsbergen’s professional affiliations demonstrate: poet, positivist anthropological researcher, Marxist, sangoma, distinguished professor, and finally theorist of interculturality.
Five AN ETHIC OF CULTURE AND MEMORY After having distinguished himself as a formidable literary artist, Wole Soyinka, over a considerable period, has applied himself—although not exclusively—to political commentary. Consequently, he has become one of Africa’s most visible public intellectuals. Commitment a la Jean-Paul Sartre is often deemed a necessity within the African continent because of the continuing entrenchment of underdevelopment, or the development of underdevelopment, the crises of different modes of politics, and the structural disequilibria in the economic field which the continent suffers. As Nadine Gordimer avers, the artist in Africa must not only be committed, but must make an art and if possible a science of commitment. Soyinka’s personal and intellectual trajectory is finely attuned to this postulate. Critics of Soyinka, such as Chinweizu Ibekwe, Jamie Onwuchekwa, and Ihechukwu Madubuike in Towards the Decolonization of African Literature, give an extremely parochial reading of Soyinka’s political value and relevance. Their charge that Soyinka practices art for art’s sake, in retrospect and in the final analysis, turns out to be an exercise in conceptual banalization and ill-intentioned journalism. Instead, I argue that Soyinka’s art, in addition to being enduring, has transformed the art and act of commitment into something akin to a pseudoscience. One of his recent brushes with Nigerian authorities occurred on 15 May 2004, when he, along with other pro-democracy activists such Beko Ransome-Kuti, Gani Fawehinmi (both now deceased), and Femi Falana, were sprayed with tear gas, molested, and arrested for organizing a rally to canvas for good democratic governance, federalism, and a sovereign national conference. In terms of lived experience, in terms of consistently engaging the public sphere, and then in terms of his value as a creative agent, we continually have to discover new parameters by which to evaluate his work. By extension, we must constantly reexamine his formulations—theoretical and pseudo-theoretical—on the nature of contemporary politics in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. For enterprising scholars, this should prove to be a worthwhile engagement because of the consistency and resilience by which he articulates his views on the apparently unending dimensions of the African political crises. There has been a growing strand of Pan-Africanism in Soyinka’s thought lately. Perhaps this point requires some clarification. Pan-Africanism has always been present in his thought. Before the emergence of the technologically-driven information revolution, the Pan-Africanist ideology inherent in his worldviews appeared to be splintered by the realities and setbacks of undertechnologization, by the expansiveness of space, the invincibility of time, and the lack of projection all these factors, engendered by the pre-digital age, gen-
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erate. Soyinka battled with these adverse forces, but his successes in those battles only became glaringly evident with his commodification as a public intellectual, his skillful cultivation of diverse publics, his understanding of the contemporary dynamics of postmodern iconization, and the global impact of his intellectual labor. His unremitting critique of the local through the lens of globality mocks conventional assumptions of both the local and the global. It is all about knowing the fluidities and ruptures within and around the local and the global. It is all about a new way of reading locale, context, and content. It is about a new awareness of the politics of identity, representation, place, and belonging in a world buffeted by a bewildering welter of fundamentalisms on the one hand, and the alluring promises of multiculturalism on the other. Soyinka’s unquestionably indefatigable critique of the African continent in general and Nigerian society in particular, is increasingly becoming a critique of whatever is left or possible for universal human values. At the limits of history, he has become a rare kind of humanist who bypasses conventional traditions and approaches; instead, he employs an eclectic blend of vocabularies. A way of examining how he universalizes his critique of humanity is to address the manner in which he appropriates the contemporary discourse on truth and reconciliation, not as mere political metaphors, but as fundamental concepts for global sociopolitical engineering. Within a global frame of reference, Soyinka addresses the imperatives of truth and reconciliation in South Africa, which he calls a: “zone of state engendered anomie” just as they apply to Argentina, Chile, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and Nigeria. Soyinka’s thesis in this regard is, “one of the pillars on which a durable society must be founded—Responsibility—and ultimately—Justice” (1999a, pp. 26–27). He reiterates his famous maxim, “justice constitutes the first condition of humanity” (ibid., p. 31). History remains central to Soyinka’s concerns, just as were the travails of the late Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola, the Nigerian businessman who died struggling for the recognition of his presidential mandate in 1998. On the historic import of the Atlantic slave trade, Soyinka argues: The Atlantic slave trade remains an inescapable critique of European humanism. In a different context, I have railed against the thesis that it was the Jewish Holocaust that placed the first question mark on all claims of European humanism—from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment to the present-day multicultural orientation. Insistence on that thesis, we must continue to maintain, merely provides further proof that the European mind has yet to come into full cognition of the African world as an equal sector of a universal humanity, for, if it had, its historic recollection would have placed the failure of European humanism centuries earlier—and that would be at the very inception of the Atlantic slave trade. (Ibid., pp. 38–39)
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Soyinka goes on to remind us, “much of the division of Africa owed much more to a case of brandy and a box of cigars than to any intrinsic claims of what the boundaries enclosed” (ibid., p. 40). He is not merely being dismissive here. I