SYMBIOTIC ANTAGONISMS Competing Nationalisms in Turkey
EDITED BY
AYfe Kadtoglu and E. Fuat Keyman
THE UNIVERSITY OF ...
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SYMBIOTIC ANTAGONISMS Competing Nationalisms in Turkey
EDITED BY
AYfe Kadtoglu and E. Fuat Keyman
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH PRESS
Salt Lake City
Copyright © 2.011 by The University of Utah Press. All rights reserved. The Defiance House Man colophon is a registered trademark of the University of Utah Press. It is based upon a four-foot-tall, Ancient Puebloan pictograph (late PIlI) near Glen Canyon, Utah. IS 14 13 12. II
I 2.
3 4 S
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Symbiotic antagonisms: competing nationalisms in Turkey / edited by Ay~ KadlOglu and E. Fuat Keyman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-60781-031-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) I. Nationalism-Turkey. 2.. Turkey-Politics and government-1980- I. Kadloglu, Ane. 1961- II. Keyman, Emin Fuat. DR434.S96 2.010 32.0.540956I-dc2.2.
Printed and bound by Sheridan Books. Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan.
For our children, in the hope that they will live in a world not shaped by competing nationalisms
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
ix
Introduction: Understanding Nationalism through FamUy Resemblances xi AYje Kadzoglu and E. Fuat Keyman PART I. TURKISH NATIONALISM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1.
Turkish Nationalism: From a System of Classification to a System of Solidarity
3
$erifMardin 2.. Nationalism in Turkey: Modernity, State, and Identity
10
E. Fuat Keyman 3. The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism
33
Ayje Kad~oglu 4. Nationalist Discourses in Turkey
S7
TamlBora s.The Changing Nature of Nationalism in Turkey: Actors, Discourses, and the Struggle for Hegemony 82.
Umut Ozkmmlt PART II. CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM
6. The Genealogy of Turkish Nationalism: From Civic and Ethnic to Conservative Nationalism in Turkey 103
UmutUzer
Contents
viii
7. On the ~estion ofIslam and Nationalism in Turkey:
Sources and Discourses
In
Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagz 8. Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam in the Construction of Political Party Identities
162
Simten COiar PART III. KURDISH NATIONALISM
9. Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?
199
Hakan Ozoglu 10.
Banditry to Disloyalty: Turkish Nationalisms and the Kurdish ~estion 223
MesutYegen II.
Toward a Nonstandard Story: 'The Kurdish ~estion and the Headscarf, Nationalism, and Iraq 253
Murat Somer 12..
Reframing the Nationalist Perspective: Kurdish Civil Society Activism in Europe 289
vera Eccarius-Kelly Conclusion
319
AYie Kadtoglu and E. Fuat Keyman References
325
List of Contributors Index
363
357
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
THE IDEA OF THIS BOOK EMERGED IN AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
that we organized in Istanbul in November 2.007 on understanding and exploring competing nationalisms in Turkey. Since that time, we have collectively worked with the contributors in order to put together a coherent and detailed analysis of nationalisms in Turkey. In this endeavor we have benefited from the help and collegial support of a number of people. We particularly thank Tuba KanCl for her valuable effort to finalize the book, Hakan Yavuz for his encouragement about preparing a book on nationalism, Peter DeLafosse for his valuable editorial contribution, Kathy Burford Lewis for meticulous editorial assistance, Bora i§yar for his assistance in translating parts of a chapter, and Evren Tok for his help in finalizing one of the chapters. We are also grateful to Sabancl University and Kos: University for their financial and organizational support for the symposium that led to this book.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding Nationalism through Family Resemblances AY~E KADIOGLU AND
E. FUAT KEYMAN
THE EXPRESSION "SYMBIOTIC ANTAGONISMS" PROMISES TO BE A REL-
evant analytical category for understanding the dynamics of the relationship among various nationalisms. It was first used by Barrington Moore (1966, p. 2.37) in his seminal book on the social origins of modern dictatorships and democracies. In analyzing the Japanese case, he refers to the relationship between the Japanese merchants and the warrior aristocracy (samurai) as one of symbiotic antagonism. The Japanese merchants turned the rice of the Japanese landowners (daimyo) into cash. The samurai were providing protection to both the daimyo and merchants. Before the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese merchants could engage in commercial activities only if the samurai ensured their protection. The samurai and daimyo, however, needed the merchants to turn their rice into cash and provide the aristocratic lifestyle that they were leading. In other words, they all needed each other to carryon with their activities and way of life. They were deriving their livelihood and lifestyles from one another. Yet, due to a prolonged period of peace and luxury during the Tokugawa Shogunate, merchants stopped needing the samurai and became the dominant partner in the menage a trois of the daimyo, merchant, and samurai. The symbiotic antagonism between the samurai and merchants resulted in the downfall of the former. This development was vital in understanding the subsequent development of fascism in Japan. Such a dialectical choreography can be useful in comprehending how the existing nationalisms in Turkey that derive their raison d'etre from one another can prepare the conditions for each other's continuous reproduction or xi
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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman
downfall. Perhaps the difference between the Japanese example and nationalisms in Turkey is that it is very hard for these nationalisms-which derive their livelihood from each other-to lead to one another's downfall. The imminent antagonism among them occasionally ends in outright military and paramilitary clashes. They have, in fact, the capability to destroy the liberaldemocratic political regime while trying to destroy each other.
UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM
Nationalist ideology constitutes one of the key parameters of modern Turkish politics, especially since 1999, when Turkey became an official candidate for membership in the European Union (EU). After this date, various constitutional amendments and other legislative changes were accepted in the Turkish parliament that aimed at the recognition of languages other than Turkish as well as facilitating religiOUS practices other than Sunni Islam. With these developments some of the key elements employed in the definition of Turkish national identity, such as common language and religion, were demystified. This led to a fear on the part of the nationalist groups in Turkey that was enhanced by feelings of insecurity on the part of the appointed state elite (the military and the bureaucratic establishment) since the national elections iJ? November 2002.. After those elections, the Justice and Development Party. with a Muslim social base. formed the government in Turkey. The military commanders have been referring to "Islamic fundamentalism" as the biggest threat in Turkey since February 1997. The rise in the popularity of the Justice and Development Party coupled with the acceptance of various legal reforms in the parliament that increased the accountability of the military as part of the European Union membership processes led to the emergence of a discourse of fear on the part of the state elite, afraid of Islamic fundamentalism and the European Union processes. When we add the increasing tension in the southeast border of'I:urkey in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, it becomes possible to understand the relevance of a nationalist discourse in Turkey based on a fear of Islam, the European Union, the United States, the Kurds, and all the non-Muslim and non-Turkish identities in Turkey. All these processes placed the tide of nationalism at the center of the political alignments and divisions in Turkey.
Introduction
xiii
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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman
By the early twentieth century. nationalist ideology was beginning to flirt with Marxism. Although Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (182.09S) referred to the workers as non-national beings. they still attempted to integrate nationalist struggles into the Communist project. They used an earlier distinction made by G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) between "historic nations" and "non historic nations." Accordingly. they argued that historic nations played a progressive role by unifying people and territory whereas nonhistoric nations failed to do so. Their views on nationalism became clearer as they evaluated the Polish and Irish struggles for independence. In fact. Marx and Engels embraced Polish nationalism because it would weaken tsarist Russia. They also thought that the Irish nationalist movement geared toward independence would weaken Britain. This opened the way for a distinction between the "nationalism of the oppressors" and the "nationalism of the oppressed." Such a distinction was sharply drawn by V. I. Lenin (1870-192.4). who argued for the right to self-determination of oppressed nations. These distinctions among different types of nationalism are important, because they seem to point to a distinction between "good" and "bad" nationalisms. Accordingly, the nationalism of the oppressed is viewed as good because it involves a transfer of power to the people akin to the nationalist ideology at the time of the French Revolution. Yet it is also possible to argue that all nationalisms including those of the oppressed are bad because they all point to a distinction between "us" and "them." A second common characteristic of all nationalisms is that they are not natural but rather modern constructs that were manufactured. in most cases, by the national intelligentsia. When Yusuf Akc;ura (1876-1935) advocated Turkism in 1904 in an article that was published in a journal in Egypt called Turk, he thought of it as the best project (the others being Ottomanism and Islamism) that would lead to the preservation of the Ottoman state. This epoch-making article is considered the first essay that professed Turkish nationalism as a political project. It is highly interesting that at this particular juncture in history the main raison d'etre of nationalism was enunciated as the preservation of the state rather than the transfer of power to the people. Such an introduction of nationalist ideology in the Ottoman society was to have a major impact on its subsequent evolution. The distinction between the nationalism of the oppressors and the nationalism of the oppressed is still used today in pointing to a distinction among the Turkish, Kurdish, and
Introduction
xv
Islamic nationalisms. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that Turkish nationalism has an unjust discourse by virtue of advocating social cohesion at the national level to the point of excluding and assimilating minorities while Kurdish nationalism and Islamic nationalism employ a JUSt discourse and Opt for a transfer of power to the people. On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that all nationalisms have the potential to exclude and assimilate. Such commonalities make it impossible to refer to the compatibility of any form of nationalism with democracy. This book constitutes one of the first systematic comparisons of different types of nationalism in Turkey: Turkish, Kurdish, and Islamic nationalisms. These nationalisms have encountered one anomer throughout modern Turkish history. It is such encounters that led to their perpetual reproduction. While they were rival ideologies, they were making use of encounters with one another not only to reproduce each another but also to constitute a hegemonic discourse in Turkey. Although mutual encounters of these nationalisms produced various tensions, it was, in fact, these very tensions that made their continuous survival possible. Nationalisms thrive on soils that are able to generate "others" over time through exclusion as well as assimilation. In this sense, in the course of the contemporary history of Turkey, these nationalisms have always acted in a relational and intertwined way as competing and essentially contested discourses of Turkish modernity and politics.
FAMILY RESEMBLANCES
Despite all the debates about nationalism touched upon throughout the book, it is important to specify from the outset how we approach nationalism. In doing so, six "family resemblances" are worth mentioning.' First, as one of the founding philosophers of feminism and existentialism, Simone de Beauvoir (1989 [1949], p. 267), suggests: "One is not horn, hut rather hecomes, a woman:' Similarly, we suggest in this book that one is not born, but rather becomes, a nationalist. In this sense, nationalism is SOcially, historically, ideologically, anthropologically, institutionally; and politically constructed. Second, on the basis of the fundamental principle of critical realism that there is a difference between appearance and essence, nationalism operates at the level of lived reality rather than involving efforts to explore the essential
xvi
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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman
or concealed sources of societal processes and problems. For instance. as in the case of the debates ahout the rise of unemployment in Europe or North America. the nationalist assumption that establishes a causal relationship between migrants and unemployment stays at the level of appearances and hence appeals to the lived reality and experience of the society rather than searching for the structural and essential sources of unemployment. Third. the fact that nationalism operates at the level of appearance does not mean that it lacks effectiveness and power. On the contrary. the nationalist discourse is very powerful in constituting the relationship between the subject and the other. the subject and nature, and the subject and herself/ himself It is through its appeal to lived experiences that nationalism constitutes a community based on we/us versus they/them as the other. Moreover, in creating a community identity through the principle of sameness. nationalism codifies difference as the dangerous other to be resisted or silenced. In this sense. nationalism always operates as a boundary-producing practice between the self and the other as well as between identity and difference. Fourth. in creating a sheltered. warm, and protected community for its followers. nationalism always establishes and reproduces a feeling of insecurity. fear. and resentment against the others who are outside of the boundaries of the community. In this sense, as Zygmunt Baumann ( 200 7, p. 37) suggests. nationalism speaks as "I shout and I resent, therefore I am" rather than promoting critical thinking as the basis of existence. Fifth. nationalism is not only an ideology but also a strategy utilized by different actors, groups. and communities in their search to strengthen their own communitarian identities. In this sense, the distinctions made in regard to different nationalisms in the existing literature on nationalism-between "good" and "bad" nationalisms, nationalisms of the "oppressor" and the "oppressed:' "civic" or "ethnic" nationalisms-are not immune from these constitutive features of nationalism. Last but not least, these family resemblances of di~erent manifestations of nationalism portray the crucial point about its endurance and ability to be pervasive in modern times despite all the changes and transformations. This renders nationalism an ever-present ideology with a hegemonic character. Hence it is imperative to recognize its ability to endure in modernity rather than assuming that nationalism "rises" and "falls" in various periods.
Introduction
xvii
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK
The main endeavor of this book is to explore the encounters among competing nationalisms in Turkey. To recognize competing nationalisms does not ignore the historically dominant position of Turkish nationalism. This book starts with ~erif Mardin's exploration of the endurance of nationalism in the Ottoman-Turkish context as it evolves from a system of classification to a system of solidarity. In chapter 2. Fuat Keyman attempts to read different paradigms of Turkish modernity in order to establish a historical and analytical framework for an understanding of how nationalism has endured and also has been subject to changes and modifications. Keyman traces the role of nationalism in Turkey's journey in modernity since 192.3, including the processes of democratization. globalization. and Europeanization. This brief historical account of the intertwined relationship between nationalism and modernity also provides a background for the chapters to follow. In chapter 3 Ay~e KadlOglu substantiates this intertwined relationship between modernity and nationalism by fOCUSing on the twin motives ofTurkish nationalism: the preservation of the state and Westernism. KadlOglu maintains that these two motives as spelled out by two critical thinkers (Yusuf Ak~ura and Ahmed Agaoglu) at the turn of the twentieth century constitute the root-language of all subsequent nationalisms in Turkey. Kadloglu also considers whether the twin motives of Turkish nationalism that were visible at the time of its emergence are still relevant today. In chapter 4- Taml Bora elaborates on the role of nationalism in Turkish modernity by exploring its recent manifestations. Bora's exploration provides the reader with a very illuminating analysis of the competing discourses of Turkish nationalism that covers a wide spectrum, ranging from officialind left-wing versions of Kemalist nationalism to neo-conservative and neo~ liberal nationalism as well as ultra-right, isolationist. and ethnicist national discourses. Bora's discussion of competing discourses of Turkish natioll:l.lisnl.·· also serves as the basis for a critical reading of the myth that TurkeYI'epresents a homogeneous nation. ..... .. : . . . . . .•.
In chapter) Umut Ozkmmh draws together a Gramscianrea~i.tl.g6frta~ tionalism and the topographical approach of Jean Pierre Faye~.tl.d~~t:~t.tl.pts to deconstruct this myth as well as the ideas of the civic versUsecllllic::nat:io.tl.~ alism and the "rise" and "fall" of the nationalist discourse overtirriei1'l,T\l~key.
xviii
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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman
In doing so. Ozkmmh provides a topography of nationalist discourses in Turkey to illuminate the dynamics of the ongoing struggle for hegemony over the nation by various social and political forces at the turn of the twenty-first century. This particular reading places the emphasis on the protean nature of nationalism and presents it as a field of positions in which different and often competing narratives circulate. One of the Significant domains in which Turkish nationalism has been reproduced and reconstructed involves the relationship between conservatism and nationalism in general and Islam and nationalism in particular. In chapter 6 Umut Uzer prOVides a historical and analytical exploration of such relationships. In doing so. he discusses the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the late nineteenth century as well as the main proponents of nationalism such as Ziya Gokalp and Yusuf Ak~ura and other important figures. including Hiiseyin Nihal Atstz and ibrahim Kafesoglu. He maintains that conservative nationalism entails a reference to traditional and moral values, thereby giving religion a central role in the definition of national identity. In chapter 7 Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagt furthers Uzer's analysis of conservative nationalism by providing an overview of the interplay ofIslam and nationalism from the late Ottoman era onward. She focuses on the discourses of key Turkish nationalist figures who attempted to incorporate Islam into their nationalistic views and traces how this interaction has been articulated in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis since the 1980s. Koyuncu-Lorasdagt argues that Islam and Turkish nationalism have had a symbiotic and instrumental relationship in Turkey, where their mutual benefits have been endorsed. and that this articulation ofIslam and nationalism can be called instrumental pious nationalism. She further suggests that Islam has always been an indispensable element of the discourse of nationalism in Turkey. The constant presence ofIslam as one of the defining elements of the nationalist discourses in Turkey can also be observed in Turkish politics, especially with reference to ultra-right and center-right political parties. In chapter 8 Simten Co~ar elaborates this point indetaU. Co§ar analyzes the role of conservative nationalism in the strategies. programs. and discourses of three political parties: the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Grand Unity Party (BBP). and Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Analyzing these political parties' discourses of nationalism as well as the encounters among them. Co~ar reveals the political significance of Sunni Islam as an
Introduction
xix
ingredient of Turkish nationalism, which has also given rise to the use of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an effective political strategy by which these parties attempt to widen their social bases. Finally, this book also analyzes Kurdish nationalism and its historical and political encounters with Turkish nationalism. In doing so, we start with the question of the origins and genealogy of Kurdish nationalism. Separating Kurdish identity from Kurdish nationalism, in chapter 9 Hakan 6zoglu suggests that Kurdish nationalism was not the result of an evolutionary process; it was, in fact, constructed at a certain time in history. This means that Kurdish nationalism's link with the past was not organic; rather it was historically and institutionally constructed at the end of World War I. Ozoglu also argues that Kurdish movements had existed prior to this time but were not nationalist. It was only at the end of World War I that we could begin to identify Kurdish nationalism as an ethnic-based nationalism that has given rise to the creation of a Kurdish identity. In fact, Turkish nationalism and its approach to the Kurdish question on the basis of an "us" versus "them" distinction have played a crucial role in the construction of Kurdish identity. In chapter 10 Mesut Yegen takes up this issue and examines the ways in which "mainstream," "extreme right-wing:' and "left-wing" versions of Turkish nationalism have viewed the Kurdish question. Yegen's chapter shows that the Kurdish question has been perceived by means of a rich vocabulary, including terms such as "resistance of the past; "banditry;' "political reactionary," "regional backwardness; and "foreign incitement." Despite existing differences, Yegen argues, the idea that the Kurds are Turks-to-be and that the Kurdish question may basically be solved by means of assimilation has remained a constant theme in Turkish nationalist discourses. But he also demonstrates the changes that have taken place in recent years regarding the perception of Kurds in the Turkish nationalist discourses: the increasing characterization of Kurds as "disloyal" in the Turkish nationalist discourses. The historical context in which the term "disloyalty" enters the agenda of the Turkish nationalist discourses about the Kurdish question is what has come to be called the post-9iII world in general and the invasion of Iraq in particular. This historical context has also brought a new dimension to Kurdish nationalism: the possibility of an autonomous Kurdishstai:e in northern Iraq. In chapter II Murat Somer deals with both internal and external
xx
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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman
dimensions of Kurdish nationalism with special reference to the novelties of the poSt-9/1I world, in which a pronounced ethnic dimension of Kurdish identity became more visible. This chapter illustrates the encounters between Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms in a more ethnically defined and contested arena. Somer maintains that it is important to distinguish between the Kurdish question and the Kurdish conflict: while the former might have been a product of nationalism and modernization, the latter results from structures and political decisions. One of the neglected areas in studying Kurdish nationalism has been the question of the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe and its role in recent ethnicization of Kurdish nationalism. In chapter 12 Vera Eccarius-Kelly explores the ways in which Diaspora Kurdish expressions of nationalism in Europe have influenced and shaped the public discourse on the future of the Kurds in Turkey. Kurdish collective activism has succeeded in connecting the language of victimization to public discourses on Turkish membership in the European Union. The Kurdish Diasporas ability to assert power by controlling and managing nationalist articulations stands out. Yet its capacity to influence Kurdish nationalists inside Turkey. to shape and to inspire new manifestations of interconnected local, regional. and global repertoires of collective protest action, requires further examination. The Diasporas challenges represent a modified version of ethnic nationalism, as Kurds increasingly focus on cultural and linguistic expressions ofidentity rather than on a preoccupation with territorial boundaries. All these chapters have been designed to portray the different manifestations of nationalism in Turkey. Operating as symbiotic antagonisms. these manifestations reveal the choreography of Turkish modernity and the defining role that nationalism plays in it. In this sense, we hope to enlarge the domain of social and political studies of Turkey by introducing one of the most neglected dimensions: critical analysis of encounters among competing claims to nationalism in Turkey. We also hope that this discussion of symbiotic antagonisms produced and reproduced by discourses of nationalism will contribute to the debates about and searches for a democratic disclosure in Turkish politicS and modernity.
Introduction
xxi
NOTES 1.
In trying to ourline the «family resemblances" of differerenc nationalisms (it la Ludwig Wittgenstein) we were inspired by a similar endeavor by Umberto Eco (1995) about fascisms in Europe.
PART I
Turkish Nationalism: Continuity and Change
1
TURKISH NATIONALISM
From a System of Classification to a System of Solidarity ~ERIF MARDIN .
THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER PRESENTS THE OUTLINES OF A ROUGH
frame that I believe can be further developed for an understanding of the process of modernization in Turkey. It is a summary of the ideas that I have acquired in the last fifty years by studying the relationship of the Ottoman Empire, Islam, and the thrust of modernity. In no way, however, does this chapter claim to establish a detailed historical account of the relations between Ottoman society and the state during the many centuries that I cover. A few years ago I developed the idea that an understanding of modern Turkish politics would require knowledge of the structure of the Ottoman Empire. I underlined the idea of a bipolar structure, of the center and the periphery. This was not a terribly original idea. A number of historians had developed the concept of an Ottoman Empire working with two structural components: the military and the nonmilitary (inalcrk 1994, pp. 16-17). A latent, unstated, but important element of the bipolarity, however, had escaped notice: that the Ottoman Empire could be studied as a system of social classification. To my knowledge, this theme has never been developed. The Ottoman map of sociopolitical relations was a static one, but it nevertheless allows today's observer to begin investigations with a new venue into the study of Turkish modernity. I propose that the Ottoman Empire may be seen as an enormous system of classification. Not only askeri (military) 3
4
~erif
Mardin
and reaya (civilians) but many other minute classifications of social positions make up the conceptual map of the Ottoman Empire as seen by Ottoman officialdom and even ulema (members of the religious hierarchy, the higher rungs of which were also integrated with the state). Part of this classificatory behemoth may be traced to detailed imperial regulations such as those proclaimed by Sultan Mehmed II, but many more regulatory strategies of the Ottoman Empire that fall in the same classifying category have been uncovered by Halil inalclk (1994, p. 143). To understand the characteristics of this classification system we may think of the Ottoman view of society as an immense checkerboard of social positions that have an essentially static function of preservation. This does not mean that the system is inflexible. But it relies on keeping the social positions under the control of the state. For example, the Ottoman cavalry is originally recruited from timar holders (inalctk 1994, p. 71). The use of gunpowder makes the cavalry unreliable. The cavalry is replaced by more foot soldiers. The increased number of foot soldiers (shown in the gradual increases in janissaries) is found to be unreliable. The state eliminates the janissaries. Nineteenth-century military reform creates a new military machine, which is found to be unreliable in the war of 1877-78, particularly because the officers are unschooled. The state eliminates unreliable officers (alaylz) and replaces them, much more systematically than in the preceding years, with graduates of military schools. In all these cases, the state remains the agent in control of the military. Compare this with feudalism, where the military forces are organized by the state only in later historical developments. now studied under the rubric of the "militarization of Europe" (Geyer I989). The same picture of change within stability may be followed in the case of dirliks (revenue granted as a living in return for performing military services) (Shaw 1976, p. 332.), which are transformed into mukataa (tax farm) (inalclk 1994. p. 139)' The position is flexible. but the state decides how to change it. The growth of the Ottoman central apparatus of rule from the fifteenth century onward allows us to glimpse the dynamics that paralleled and perpetuated the basic imaginary sOciopolitical map. What we have here is the assumption of power by a new group that in the long run developed its potential by what Max Weber would call a "Switching mechanism." In this
Turkish Nationalism
5
case, the sWitching was activated by growth of the empire in Europe. Relevant here is the Weberian difference between what he would describe as an "intelligentsia" in contrast to what he categorizes as "intellectuals." According to Weber, intellectuals are characterized by a constant strain between "idea" and "ideology:' Members of the intelligentsia, by contrast, have a "less reflective status that is geared to practical rather than theoretical reasons" (Sadri 1992, p. 72). Weber's distinction is important because it allows us to depict an Ottoman bureaucracy that has not yet developed the distinguishing elements that we associate with a modern bureaucracy but nevertheless represents a social set with similar features. Weber is well known for describing the role of these groups in premodern cultures. Weber's intelligentsia is what Ernest Gellner (1993, p. 8) sketches out as a clerisy: "a specialized clerical class or estate." Summarized, Gellner's view of the emergence of nationalism may be described as the decline of the clerisy in the modern industrial order. I see a somewhat different role for the clerisy in the history of the Ottoman Empire. By contrast to the Ottoman attempt to keep social positions fixed, the European social system was one where social positions constantly changed and where there was a growing interrelation among the agents in each social structural position. The extraordinary number of interactive links in this situation can be summarized in one sentence: StadtluJt macht fret (City air makes one free, meaning that a serf who spends two years behind the walls of a city is freed of obligations toward the feudal lord, who is deemed to accept this situation). From these sociopolitical interrelations of the late Middle Ages the following elements emerged with modernity: "society:' "civil society:' "the people;' "representation:' and "constitutionalism." These should all be seen as interactive and interlinked social spaces and positions of power. In the long run, their net effect is to develop something that is not found in the Ottoman Empire: a quality that can only be described as "consociation," the reciprocal acceptance of others and their social positions. I think that the so-called Ottoman decline is in fact a discovery by the Ottonians that their original claSSificatory system-as flexible as it was-was not as useful as the interactive Western European system that brought with it capitalism, the development of industry, and constitutionalism. Ottoman statesmeri realized that these European institutions were linked to interactive processes that
~erif
6
Mardin
created a foundation for solidarity in the sense in which Emile Durkheim used that concept much later. This very "intersociality" may be followed in Charles de Montesquieu's earlier idea of the rule oflaw. My investigations of the Young Ottoman political movement led me to understand that, despite various reform movements that the Ottomans initiated in the sixteenth century, in the nineteenth century they gradually began to realize that they had to change their rigid system of social classification and come closer to the interactive European system. During the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century, the social and political conflicts that developed between the Ottoman center and its periphery as well as the lack of will within the center confirmed that what was missing in the empire was concord, another name for social solidarity (KaraI19SS). The Young Ottoman NamIk Kemal took a first step here by giving Islam a foundational and almost remedial role in his constitutional proposal, usul-
i mesveret (Mardin 1962). Simultaneously, however, he also developed in much greater detail the organization of representation and the separation of powers. Islam remained a source of a diffuse principal base. It is also possible to distinguish
an unacknowledged step toward secularization in this mix. For
instance, one element-love of the fatherland-interrelated in his general system was new. NamIk Kemal assumed the role of Weber's "intellectuals," but, as I showed in Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, his proposal was in fact a reappropriation that still carried out the requirements of the basic Ottoman system of classification. Nineteenth-century Ottoman ism and late nineteenth-century "Turkism" are two different attempts to modify the Ottoman traditional classificatory system and to replace it with a system of solidarity. In other words, the introduction of the idea of Turkishness as a new foundation for Ottoman society in the late nineteenth century was, paradoxically, a harried attempt to establish the foundations of a powerful but equilibrated, productive, and peaceful society as it had grown in Europe. The promotion of such prenationalistic ideas as a culmination of the Ottoman search for civility may appear bizarre in view of the forbiddingly narrow restrictions of the European project of nationalism. To understand how nationalism in the Ottoman Empire carried the element of solidarity that I attributed to it we could turn to the Young Turk Yusuf Aks:ura. He was one of the first authors of a systematic modern political program for the empire. In Of Tarz-t Siyaset (1904), Aks:ura
Turkish Nationalism
7
proposes three alternatives for the solution of Ottoman political problems: first. an Ottoman solidarity; second. an Islamic solidarity; third. a "Turkist" solidarity. As we know, only one of these options. "Turkism," triumphed in the long run. This is not a surprise, because that solution kept the hegemony of the state, the key to the original system of classification. The story of this differentiation has lately begun to be studied. It is not clear, however, to what degree these new historians understand what Ak~ura had in mind: to establish a modern social equilibrium and a "civil SOciety" in Turkey. Fran~ois Georgeon's 1980 study is one exception. The importance of the latent, socializing aspect ofTurkification is once more underlined when we remember the foundational role that Durkheim played in the ideology of the Turkish Republic. Founders of the republic saw no contradiction between the search for the deeply buried, still hidden elements of a Turkist nationalist culture and the quest for a common cause. One element still missing from my description of the Ottoman system is the new space that Islam developed for itself while all these changes were taking place. In the original Ottoman classification, Islam appears under two configurations. The state claims universal leadership for Islam. but it is also extremely suspicious of Islam as the fountainhead of collective movements. As noted, Namtk Kemal's ideas are an interesting example of recasting the political role ofIslam without granting it the secret and contested refuge that had been allowed in popular religious movements. From 1895 onward Namtk Kemal's Young Ottoman constitutionalistIslamic syntheSiS was replaced by a starker element that mirrored the starkness of European international politics and political theories of the time, such as those of the new Machiavellians-Robert Michels and Georges Sorel. The Ottoman dissidents in exile in Europe were now suffused by these increasingly pessimistic European intellectual trends. The shift from their earlier ideals is described well by Zeev Sternhell (1994, p. 9) in his assessment of the wider European context: From the end of the nineteenth century, the new nationalism truly expressed the revolt against the spirit of the French Revolution. The gulf that divided Corradini from Mazzini, or Barrc~s, Drumont, and Maurras from Michelet, reveals the distance between Jacobin nationalism
8
~erif
Mardin
and that of la Terre et les Morts, the Land and the Dead. This formula of Barres was in fact only the French counterpart of the German formula Blut and Boden (blood and soil). and it showed that the old theory consecrated by the French Revolution, that society was made up of a collection of individuals, had been replaced by the theory of the organic unity of the nation. The idea of the organic unity of the nation, which reproduced the unitarian thrust of the Ottoman system of classification, was now added to the search for a formula of "consociation;' basically producing an internal tension between what we may describe as the "Great Search" and demands that brought back the centripetal element of the original classification system. A final development that sets new parameters in the study of Ottoman social change remains to be traced: the new role ofIslam in the nineteenth century. This renovated Ottoman Islam still operated within the boundaries of the earlier incorporated Ottoman political game in the sense that Ottoman rule did not have to bother with an institution like the church. as had been the case in Europe. In Europe, secularity and its promise of freedom were associated with a diminution of the power of the church and ideally its total elimination. In the Ottoman Empire, state Islam, as I have described it, did not have to contend with a church. To the contrary, Islamic collective liberation from state control was the equivalent of the liberation of individuals from the Catholic Church. This independence from state control was what many Muslims began to seek in the nineteenth century. Indeed, during this century an Islamic reform movement, the salafiyya, promoted a type of Islam with the idea of a new Islamic collectivity that had its own autonomous dynamic and validity criteria and was set in opposition to the state's control of religion. Once again, the Young Ottoman Namlk Kemal appears to have taken a first step in this direction in the 1860s. Nevertheless, the earlier control of the state over religion is still visible even in his proposals for a more socially active Ottoman Islam. It is this very continuity of the control of Islam by the state that was eventually taken over by the Turkish Republic. Unfortunately. in our time both "Islamists" and "laics" have taken positions that systematically misconstrue Ottoman political and military history. Laics fear Islam because they believe that it was the sole foundational element of the Ottoman Empire. Islamists want to expand the influence of Islam in
Turkish Nationalism
9
today's Turkey because they believe it was the sole foundational element of the Ottoman Empire. In reality the interests of the Ottoman state were paramount. as was the constant control of Islamic elements that would not fit the classificatory system. I hope I am not mistaken in thinking that these are the main themes promoted by Ahmet Ya~ar Ocak in his studies of Ottoman Islam (see ihsanoglu 1999). I realize that the current contest between Islamic values and secular principles in Turkey in the last decade also must- be studied in a much more complex contemporary frame that takes into account the new parameters of modernity. mass communications. and the emergence of the so-called true believers and their grotesque dreams. That is an investigation that I do not claim to have carried out in this chapter. but I insist that we must begin to unravel the present conundrums in Turkey by remembering the basic features of the Ottoman social imaginary and the real position ofIslam in the Ottoman Empire. Where does all of this take us? It leads us to consider that Turkish nationalism is originally an idiosyncratic form of solidarity creation. Possibly the Western experience of nationalism itself should be studied in comparison with that of Turkey to clear the issue. When I look at nationalism in Germany I am reminded of all the prominent writers about fascism, such as George Mosse (1964). Ernst Nolte (1965). and K. D. Bracher (1970). but in particular of the magnificent description of the diSintegration of the imperial Germany around 1918 found in the memoirs of Ernst Von Salomon (2.007 [1930 D. Frightening. accelerated disintegration had also been the problem of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. For reasons that will have to be studied in detaU. Ottomans in their new republican raiments of 192.3 had been switched by their original counterentropic claSSificatory system onto a regime that carried Ottoman residuals of state authoritarianism, rigidity. severity, and formalism but that nevertheless did not bend to the worst characteristics of fascism. The "Great Search" still had some clout. I believe that it is these complex, contradictory, self-assertive, self-denying, and in the end paradoxical elements that we shall have to pursue to clarify the nature of the republican regime of contemporary Turkey.
2
NATIONALISM IN TURKEY Modernity, State, and Identity
E. FUAT KEYMAN
IN WRITING ON THE HISTORY OF IDEAS THAT HAVE DOMINATED MOD-
ern times, Isaiah Berlin (1979, p. 337) has correctly pOinted out: There was one movement which dominated much of the nineteenth century in Europe and was so pervasive, so famUiar, that it is only by a conscious effort of the imagination that one can conceive a world in which it played no part.... But, oddly enough, no significant thinkers known to me predicted for it a future in which it would play an even more dominant role. Yet it would, perhaps, be no overstatement to say that it is one of the most powerful, in some regions the most powerful, single movement at work in the world today.... This movement is nationalism. Almost half a century after Berlin's observation that nationalism constitutes one of the most powerful and dominant ideas in modern times, David Miller (1995. p. 33) has made a similar suggestion in his diagnOSiS of world affairs in the post-Cold War era:
10
Nationalism in Turkey
11
The claims of nationality have come to dominate politics in the last decade of the twentieth cenmry. As the ideological contest between capitalism and communism has abated with the breakup of the Soviet Union and its satellite regions, so questions of national identity and national self-determination have come to the fore. It matters less, it seems, whether the state embraces the free market, or the planned economy, or something in between. It matters more where the boundaries of the state are drawn, who gets included and who gets excluded, what languages is used, what religion endorsed, what culture promoted. Likewise, Aviel Roshwald (2006, p. 3) argues in his recent work on nationalism and its historical roots that-despite the contradictions and paradoxes it involves-nationalism "pervades in the modern world" and therefore that the focus of the study of nationalism should be placed on "its endurance" rather than its demise. Isaiah Berlin, David Miller, and Avid Roshwald are correct in their diagnosis that the relationship between nationalism and modernity is much more complex and integral than indicated by those studies assuming that the power of nationalism will eventually die as liberalism and liberal mar· ket values disseminate throughout the world. Contrary to Michael Mandelbaum's powerful argument that "the ideas that conquered the modern world" have been and will be those of "peace, democracy and freedom" (Le., "the liberal Wilsonian triad, widespread although not universal, dominant and unchallenged"), the diagnOSiS regarding the endurance of nationalism has remained even truer in to day's highly globalized and postmodern world.' Rather than suffering a demise, today nationalism and nationalist sentiments are becoming more and more unleashed and paving the way to the emergence and dissemination of ethno-nationalist and religious fundamentalist identity conflicts throughout the world. Moreover, as the claims to national identity and national self-determination have recently involved the simultaneous existence of global terrorism and war (which constituted the defining features of what has come to be known as the "post-9hI world"). it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that nationalism will retain its dominant place in politics in the foreseeable future of national and global affairs.
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In this sense, academic and public discourse has shown an upsurge of interest in the question of the power of nationalism to remain one of the dominant ideologies of modern times as well as its ability to revitalize itself and resurface in various forms in different world-historical contexts and to articulate itself in different political ideologies and social movements. Turkey constitutes an important and interesting case in demonstrating how nationalism has been able to maintain its presence both ideologically and politically in modern times and in understanding its system-defining and systemtransforming power even today. Nationalism has operated as a dominant ideology in the process of the transition to modernity in Turkey. Moreover, the historical experience of Turkish modernity throughout the twentieth century and even now has to a large extent been determined by nationalism's continuing system-defining and system-transforming power. The modern state-building process and the state-centric mode of modernization in Turkey have constituted the very foundation on which nationalism has acquired its dominant ideological status and its transformative power. It should also be pointed out, however. that Significant changes and transformations in the connection between nationalism and modernity have also taken place throughout the modern history of Turkey. Nationalism has been experienced and articulated differently by various political actors, which has given rise to different claims to moder~ity, state, and identity. In this chapter I elaborate on these points by delineating the ways in which the ideology of nationalism has been put into practice historically and discursively in relation to modernity in Turkey. First, I offer a methodological and theoretical basis for an adequate understanding of the continuing presence of nationalism in Turkish modernity. In doing so, I focus on different models of Turkish modernity: modernity as modernization, modernity as identity, and modernity as a project of nation-building. I suggest that concern about the security of the state, the rapid and top-down modernization of society, and the will to civilization have framed the intertwined relationship between nationalism and modernity in the history of modern Turkey. But this intertwined relationship is neither static nor unchanging. In fact, it involves both ruptures and continuities. For this reason, I also analyze briefly and thematically how nationalism has been experienced in different periods of Turkish modernity. More specifically, I focus on the continuities and changes that have occurred in the discourse and practice of nationalism. as the formation
Nationalism in Turkey
13
of Turkish modernity has been transformed through the processes of the transition to state-centric modernity, the transition to democracy, and the exposure to globalization and Europeanization. Finally, I suggest that only through the democratization of the state-society relations could we resist the power of nationalism and its continuing impact on the nature and formation of Turkish modernity.
DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF TURKISH MODERNITY AND NATIONALISM
The history of modern Turkey raises an interesting question for the students of social change. As a postempire social formation, as a strong state tradition, and as a republican, secular, and state-centric modernity, modern Turkey cannot be analyzed adequately as a product of a class-based revolution or a postcolonial political transformation (Mardin 2.006). This is precisely because Turkey had never experienced colonialism in the real sense of the term; nor had its national independence been achieved by a social class. Just as in other postcolonial states, however, the history of the making of modern Turkey has also entailed Westernization as "the will to (Western) civilization" (Keyman and 6ni~ 2.007). In the process, the image of the Kemalist elite was to "reach the contemporary level of civilization" by establishing its political, economic, and ideological prerequisites, such as the creation of an independent nation-state, the fostering of industrialization, and the construction of a secular and modern national identity. The Kemalist elite thus accepted the universal validity of Western modernity as the way of building modern Turkey. In this sense, the making of Turkey was based upon both a war of independence against Western imperialism and an acceptance of its epistemic and moral dominance. The embeddedness of the Kemalist will to civilization in Western modernity requires a new theoretical framework that goes beyond the existing models of Turkish modernity. With a certain degree of generalization, the available literature on modern Turkey is dominated by two paradigmatic readings ofKemalism: those of modernization and identity. The modernization paradigm situates the Kemalist will to civilization in a teleological and typological understanding of historical development as a transition from Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (society)! The issue of how to
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think of this transition, however, produces two different positions in this paradigm. Political modernization sees this transition as a process of nationbuilding, in which the nation-state is taken to be the unfolding essence of modernization. The making of modem Turkey then refers to the process of political modernization aimed at creating a modern nation vis-a.-vis the Ottoman past as a representative of a backward, traditional society. Whereas political modernization sees this transition as a positive break from the past and a move forward, economic modernization in line with dependency theory considers it to be a new form of peripheralization and dependent capitalist development that started with the integration of the Ottoman economy into the world capitalist system in the nineteenth century. In this respect, nationstate building does not alter the condition of economic dependency as the unfolding essence of modernization, even though it means de jure recognition of modern Tuckey as a politically independent state by the international community. However useful the modernization paradigm is in accounting for the making of modern Turkey, as a mode of analyzing the processes of political and economic modernization it operates as a theoretical framework that is limited in itS scope and reductionist in its methodological procedures.! It is limited because it attempts to analyze its subject matter by privileging a certain type of social interaction as the prime mover of social change. Thus either nation-state building or economic development is considered to be a process that produces a system-transforming effect in social interactions, which results in a lack of attention paid to the role of other processes such as culture, identity, and international relations, thereby neglecting their transformative capacity. The modernization paradigm also proves to be reductive insofar as, in a Hegelian fashion, it attributes to the concept of society a quality of being an expressive. constituting totality in which the conditions of existence of various social interactions are regarded as necessarily linked to and determined by the unfolding essence. As a result, the making of modern Turkey is analyzed as a process of modernization, reducing its multidimensionality to what is conceived as the essence: the political level or the economic level. Thus nationalism is seen as an ideology of political or economic modernization: that is. it is an ideological dimension of what constitutes the prime mover of social change.
Nationalism in Turkey
15
Contrary to the modernization paradigm, the paradigm of identity attempts to discover the essence of the manner in which Kemalism approaches the question of national identity." This paradigm produces two alternative accounts of the essence, which are derived from two different interpretations of the meaning of "Turk" in cultural practices put into service in the process of the making of modern Turkey. One mode tends to interpret Kemalism as a nationalist discourse whose understanding of national identity was "cultural" in its essence. In this sense, the notion "Turk" is referred to as a meta-identity that is situated above and beyond the difference principle and thus operates as a point of sameness at which the claim to the impartiality and the universality of the state is constructed. The other mode interprets Kemalism on the basis of the difference principle, claiming that the notion "Turk" is framed to a large extent by and within an ethnic-based understanding of national identity. In this sense, Kemalism is regarded as an ethno-nationalist discourse that aims to impose a secular and ethnically essentialist vision of modern Turkey on what Kevin Robbins (1996) terms the other but real Turkey. Despite the fundamental difference between them. however. these two modes of interpretation share in their modus operandi two sets of highly problematical epistemological and methodological gestures. The first concerns the historicist nature of the paradigm of identity, insofar as its search for discovering the true essence of the Kemalist vision of national identity rests upon an attempt to read the past in terms of the present (Dean 1999, p. 9). What is at stake in this paradigm is not to analyze Kemalist nationalism in its own right or in its own context but to find a legitimizing ground for the competing political discourses of the present political landscape over issues such as political Islam. the Kurdish question, laicism, ethno-nationalism, and the crisis of representation in state/society relations. The second problem concerns the essentialist nature of the paradigm. The notion of identity employed in the claim that the Kemalist understanding of national identity is constituted by and operates as a cultural or ethnic identity assumes that each individual or collectivity possesses a fixed, coherent, and totalizing self This means that each identity involves an unfolding essence that makes it a self-contained, self-referential, and self-propelling presence and therefore that the variations that occur historically in terms of the identity formation of individuals or collectivities do not alter the essence
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E. fuat Keyman
of their identities. The paradigm of identity thus acts as an essentializing gesture that ignores the relationality, multiplicity, and historically constructed nature of identity formation and presents the Kemalist understanding of national identity as a universalizing discourse of what is in fact a fixed, unchanging, and original identity. In this sense, what is missing in the paradigm of identity is the idea that nationalism and national identity both are open to changes, modifications, and alternations. If identity is ideological and anthropological-in that it is given but socially, institutionally, historically, and discursively constructed-so is nationalism and/or national identity. So far I have attempted to point out the problematic nature of the paradigms of modernization and identity in order to ground the argument that we must go beyond these paradigms to recognize the crucial fact that the Kemalist will to nation-state building and civilization is intrinsically linked to and operates within the discursive horizon of global modernity. The Kemalist elite's will to civilization was not simply an economic or a political modernization. Nor was it based essentially upon an attempt to create a national identity. It was much more complex and at the same time more ambiguous than these paradigms suggest. To understand this, however, requires regarding the Kemalist will to nation-state building and civilization as a project of modernity premised on the equation of modernity with progress: that is, creating a modern nation through the introduction and dissemination of Western reason and rationality in what seemed to be traditional and backward social relations. In this sense, we must explore the connection between Kemalism and modernity as well as between nationalism and modernity (which has been ignored by these paradigms) in order to provide an adequate account of Turkish nationalism.s In his analysis of the making of modern Turkey, ~erif Mardin (2006, p. 120) argues that the meaning of Kemalism lies in "the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in its fullest form" and finds its expression in its constant effort to create a modern nation. Mardin's seemingly straightforward and commonsensical argument in fact carries with it a number of crucial insights for a more adequate understanding of Kemalism. First, to think of Kemalism as "an act of conceptualization" is to present it as a "project" of creating a nation on the basis of a set of epistemological and normative procedures. Second, to argue that Kemalism means the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in its fullest form is
Nationalism in Turkey
17
to recognize that it constitutes a project of modernity: a project of creating a
modern nation that "accepts the claim to universality of the 'modern' framework of knowledge" (Chatterjee 1986, p. II). Third, to think ofKemalism as a project of modernity is to recognize its modus operandi as a social engineering project aimed at creating a modern nation in a social formation that lacks the material and institutional availability of the conception of a modern nation as a nation-state in its fullest form. These three points also indicate that Kemalism is a nationalist discourse that operates as a "will to civilization" by producing at the conceptual level a boundary between what is civilized and what is uncivilized. Thus. by accepting rational thinking and rational morality as the way of becoming modern, Kemalist nationalism attempts to "reach the level of civilization": that is. the making of modern Turkey as nation-state in its fullest form. According to Mardin (2.006), the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as nation-state manifests itself in (1) the transition in the political system of authority from personal rule to impersonal rules and regulations; (2.) the shift in understanding the order of the universe from divine law to positivist and rational thinking; (3) the shift from a community founded upon the elite-people cleavage to a populist-based community; and (4) the transition from a religious community to a nation-state. Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) regarded these transitions as the precondition for the possibility that "Turkey would live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization" (Ahmad 1993, p. S3). It is in this context that the Kemalist elite attempted to remove from political discourse the notion of an Islamic state, the existence of which was regarded as the main cause of the perpetuation of the backwardness of Turkey. Thus the foundation of a modern nation-state was seen as the key element of the will to civilization. For the Kemalist elite, modern Turkey could thus possess secularity and rationality, employ reason to initiate progress, and establish a modern industrial economy, thereby fostering the processes of industrialization and modernization. In a Weberian fashion, the purpose of political power was considered to "carry out a social and economic revolution without which the political revolution would dissipate" (Ahmad 1993, p. 72.). This means that for the Kemalist elite political power was "not reducible but interrelated to the economic." The rationalization of the political and the rationalization of the economic were seen to be relational processes whose reproduction could be made possible through the
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construction of a national identity as a modern rational sel£ In this respect, the Kemalist will to civilization was based upon an articulation of modernity (reason) and capitalism (capital) in Turkish society through the construction _ of a modern nation-state. What is striking here, which defines the basis of Kemalist nationalism, is that the identification of popular sovereignty with national sovereignty within the context of the organic conception of society derived not from those "to whom sovereignty belonged" but from those "to whom it did not belong" (Heper 1985, p. 45). In other words, embedded in the making of modern Turkey as an organic society was (to use Michel Foucault's terminology) the governmentality of nationalist discourse to practice inclusion/ exclusion. to create identity in relation to difference. and to freeze the Other (such as the Islamic identity, the Kurdish identity, or the Ottoman past) into history.6 By assuming a self-identity as the primary agent of progress and organic society, the Kemalist elite thus came to locate the principles of secularism and the territorial integrity of the state in binary dichotomies such as progressive versus conservative. modern versus traditional. national identity versus ethnic difference, and the present versus the past. In the process of constructing binary oppositions, which also had functioned as a boundaryproducing practice between the Kemalist regime and its others. nationalist discourse played a crucial role in enabling the state to be successful in its performance: to operate on the basis of the assumed coexistence of the state and the nation, to exclude the Islamic Other and the Kurdish Other from the politicallandscape, to subjugate them to the secular and homogenous national identity. and to prevent them from becoming political actOrs. It can be argued in this respect that the Turkish nation-state did not have a fixed ontological status; on the contrary, its identity was performatively constructed. More importantly. nationalism acted as the main ideological and strategic device by which the state governed society, put the top-down modernization and transformation of society into practice, approached society through a conception of national identity as a secular and homogeneous identity, and also attempted to implement the will to civilization as the main motto of Turkish modernity {Campbell 1992, p. 9),1 I believe that this theoretical extrapolation about the state and the role of nationalism in its performatively constructed identity provides a crucial insight for both the
Nationalism in Turkey
19
endurance of nationalism in Turkish modernity and the changing content and actors of nationalism since the 1980s.
THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY AND NATIONALISM
In the light of this brief and critical reading of the different paradigms of Turkish modernity, in this section I daborate on the intertwined rdationship between nationalism and modernity in Turkey historically. In doing so, I hope to show that the endurance of nationalism is not static but dynamic, insofar as it involves both continuity and change. r have already provided a brief account of the basic characteristics of Turkish modernity in the early republican era (192.3-45). Here I delineate the way in which nationalism frames and acts as an integral element of the process of the making of Turkey in this era. Although it is true that "Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was 'made' in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime" (Ahmad 1993, p. 2.), the history of nationalism goes back to late Ottoman times. A quick glance at the Tanzimat reforms (1839-76) and the Young Turk movement (1908-18) in late Ottoman times demonstrates that nationalism was put into practice as an articulating principle of the need for modernization and the desire to save the Ottoman state (KazanclgU 1981, pp. 37-39). The making of modern Turkey brought about a rupture with the Ottoman past in the emergence of the nation-state, however, and in that context nationalism was situated in direct rdation to the process of state-buUding. To a large extent, the republic indeed presented a radical break with the past, as it was nurtured by "concepts and doctrines such as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean positivism and solidarism," owed a lot "to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century scientism:' and aimed as "its ultimate consequence to create a modern Turkish state" (Kazanclgil 1981, p. 37). The creation of modern Turkey presented a rupture with the past, insofar as it privileged the Turkish state as the sovereign and dominant actor of modernity. Yet, at the same time, it carried in itsdf certain dements of continuity with the past: the goal of saving the state through modernization remained the dominant motto of nationalism in the republican era.
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In fact, this legacy still frames the debate on nationalism in today's Turkey. This means that nationalism has been one of the most important and effective characteristics of the process of making modern Turkey and continues. to play that role. even in different contents and articulations. The main goal of Atatlirk and his followers was to reach the level of "Western civilization" by installing an independent nation-state, fostering industrialization. and constructing a secular and modern national identity. This goal was derived to a large extent from the desire to save the state and secure its existence; it was nationalism that linked security with modernity and became the dominant ideology of the state (Keyman 2008). From the inception of the Turkish nation-state in 1923. modernity and security have constituted intertwined processes that had to be carried out through the ideology of nationalism. As noted, the Kemalist elite's will to civilization was not simply a local project of economic or political modernization. The idea of the state as a commitment to political modernity plays a crucial role in the process of constructing the Kemalist will to civilization. The Kemalist elite saw "the modernization of the polity and society" as "linked to the state" and hence attempted to establish the legitimacy of the new regime through the strength it "bestowed on the state" (Gellner 1984, p. 83)' However, the Kemalist idea of the state was not only institutional. On the contrary. as Bobby Sayyid (1997. p. 269) has correqly pOinted out, the Kemalist elite "took seriously the Weberian answer to the riddle of the 'European miracle'; that is. that the reasons behind Western advancement could be located precisely in Western cultural practices. Kemalism understood modernization not just as a question of acquiring technology, but as something that could not be absorbed without a dense network of cultural practices which made instrumental thought possible:' This means that the commitment to political modernity has to be supplemented with a set of cultural practices in order to ground the articulation of reason and capital via the nation-state. The Kemalist commitment to political modernity in this sense aimed to achieve a top-down and state-based transformation of a traditional society into a modern nation by introducing and disseminating Western reason and rationality. As an integral element of the project of modernity, the state employed nationalism to initiate a rapid political, economic, and cultural modernization, in order to create a modern institu.tional political structure. a quickly industrializing economy, and a homogeneous national identity with
Nationalism in Turkey
21
a highly secular and progressing society. The rapid modernization was necessary not only to catch up with the level of Western civilization but also to make the Turkish state more secure and stronger.8 Therefore how to achieve both modernity and security Simultaneously was and has remained the fundamental question for the state to cope with, and it was in this context that nationalism was employed as the effective answer. The idea of the state in the mind of Atatiirk and his followers was by no means abstract: rather it was a reaction to two aspects of the Ottoman state, which they identified as key to the empire's decline. First, because the Ottoman state was identified with the personal rule ot the sultan, eventually it was unable to compete within the European state system, which was organized on the basis of legal-rational authority. Second, the Islamic basis of the Ottoman state was seen as the primary obstacle to progress in Ottoman society, insofar as modernization required the regulation of state-society relations through the nation-state. Thus the republican elite sought to create a state distinct from the person of the sultan and secular enough to reduce Islam to the realm of individual faith. For them, the state had to involve commitment to political modernity, meaning that the state had to establish the link between the modernization of the polity and the modernization of society. It is for this reason that the republican elite initiated reforms, imposed from above to enlighten the people and help them make progress (Heper 1985, p. I). These reforms were designed to equate the national will with the general will and included the principles of republicanism, nationalism, etatism, secularism, populism, and revolutionism (or reformism from above). In each principle, nationalism enabled the state to initiate political and economic modernization, to construct a secular and homogeneous national identity, and thus to make sure that the security of the state could be maintained. Moreover, it is through nationalism that the state maintained its sovereign and dominant role in almost every sphere of societal relations, from politics to economics, from cultural identity and morality to everyday life practices of individuals.
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM
In this sense, the continuing power of nationalism in Turkey can be said to have gone hand in hand with the success of the strong state in governing
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its society. This was true in the early republican era of the transition to modernity. It remained true as Turkey made its transition to democracy in the second half of the 1940S. In other words, as Turkey created the necessary in-. stitutions for the project of political and economic modernity in terms of politicS, law, economics, and industrialization in order to make its transition to multiparty democracy in 1945 as well as in foreign policy with respect to Turkey's integration in the Western alliance system, this transition did not change the prevailing dominance of the strong state tradition and the endurance of nationalism in it (Ozbudun 2.000, chapter 3). The period of the transition to democracy in Turkey (1950 to 1980), although not altering the essence of nationalism (in terms of its integral character in the strong-state tradition and its security concerns as well as its homogeneous and secular discourse of national identity), has nevertheless given rise to the emergence of the left-right axis in politics and thus has brought the idea of class. As the dominant ideology of the strong-state tradition in this period, nationalism has also been linked with the geopolitical security concerns of the state as well as with the question of national identity, in that it shaped the state's foreign policy vision with respect to the Cold War. At the same time, however, as an ideology of anti-imperialist struggle, nationalism has also been employed by the Left and social democratic actors in their call for a national democratic revolution or nationally independent developmentalism in order to create equality, liberty, and social justice in Turkey (Keyman and Oni§ 2.007, pp. 2.3-2.5). This class dimension involved in nationalism has placed it in the left-right axis of politics and made it possible for various political actors to make different uses of it. Whereas the Left employed nationalism in framing its anti-imperialist discourse of national developmental ism, the Right associated its nationalist discourse with the geopolitical and security concerns of the state. Its goal was to protect the territorial integrity of the state in the context of Cold War international relations, where the Soviet expansipnism was regarded as the real danger confronting the West. Thus the dominance of nationalism in Turkish modernity has remained in this era, yet it has been used by various actors in different ways. In addition to national identity and citizenship, social class has become one of the subjects through which nationalism can be put into practice.
Nationalism in Turkey
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Neither the emergence of the lett-right axis in politicS nor the reference to the concept of social class was strong enough to challenge the hegemony of Kemalist nationalism. Several reasons explain this continuing hegemony. First, the process of the transition to democracy did not constitute an alternative to the essentialist posture ofKemalist nationalism toward secular national identity. Instead, Kemalists affirmed and reaffirmed such essentialism and its practice of inclusion and exclusion. For this reason, to the extent that they characterized their modus operandi as acting "in the name of the people" and "revolution/reform from above:' they were unable to construct a subjectivityalternative to the secular national identity.9 For example, the critique of Kemalism and its one-party-based operation put forward by the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) was intended only to secure the representation of the private sector in Turkish politics; it was not aimed to challenge the Kemalist notion of the secular and unitary national identity (Ahmad 1993, pp. 103-2.0). Likewise, lettist formulas such as national democratic revolution, which were put forth by the Workers Party of Turkey (Turkiye i~~i Partisi, TiP) and its counterpoint the Yon (Direction) movement during the 1960s, were derived from what Ahmet Samim called "a lett-Kemalist substitutionalism." Its aim was to resist imperialism and to lead Turkey democratically "on behalf of the workers and peasants"- "for the people, in spite of the people" (Samim 1981, p. ISS)' Second, both Democratic Party and New Lett discourses were intrinsically bound with modernity and in this respect were by no means a challenge to the Kemalist will to civilization. Both accepted the validity of the Kemalist notion of the state as the privileged agent of rationality, whose existence was central to the process of modernization. Both prOVided a reading of Turkish society through the lenses of the state by assuming that it is the state that shapes and reshapes social relations. The Democratic Party's critique of Kemalism was therefore only partial: it was directed exclusively at the strict etatist and populist policies by which the state coped with the problems of capitalist industrialization. But the New Lett critique of Westernization as imperialism and its characterization of Kemalist nationalism as an agent of the subordination of Turkey to Western imperialism were derived solely from the rejection of capitalism. In other words, while capitalism was being rejected as a mode of production that generated inequalities and
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E. Fuat Keyman
uneven development, the modernity aspect of the will to civilization (that is, its epistemic dominance and its reason) was accepted as given. As noted. however. the Kemalist will to civilization was based not on capitalism but on Western modernity. Third. although etatism was subjected to serious criticism, importsubstituting industrialization remained the motor of industrialization after the transition to the multiparty system. Whereas its counterparts in Latin America (such as Brazil. Argentina, and Chile) faced military coups due to the deepening crisis of import-substituting industrialization. the Turkish economy experienced an economic boom during the 1960s (Keyman and Oni~ 2.007, chapter 6). For this reason, liberal discourse, though critical of etatism, was linked with import-substituting industrialization. According to yaglar Keyder, an explanation for this long-lasting dominance of import-substituting industrialization as a form of economic nationalism can be found in the fact that nationalism was a site of global capitalism. a way of reproducing it, and therefore did not present a contradictory tendency. This made it possible for KemaUst nationalism to foster industrialization not against but in concord with global capitalism (Keyder 1987, 1993). For Keyder, only when global capitalism was formed by the liberal market logic did nationalism become a discourse contradictory to the systemic logic. The point here is that the transition to a multiparty system did not involve the replacement of the economic logic. Hence Kemalist nationalism was not questioned with respect to its industrialization policy. As such, the Democratic Party's discourse of industrialization lacked an alternative economic vision and affirmed the functionality of import-substitution industrialization:o
THE EXPOSURE TO GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM
Since the 19805 and especially the 1990S, however, Turkey has begun to witness a set of radical changes and transformations in its economy, politics, and culture. These changes and transformations, being felt in almost every sphere of life, have to do with the increasing globalization of Turkish modernity (Keyman and Oni§ 2007, chapter 7). Two of these changes and transformations that have had an important impact on the discourse and practice of nationalism are the increasingvulnerabUity and fragility of Turkish economy as it has been exposed to the strong global, regional, and local dynamics, on
Nationalism in Turkey
25
the one hand, and the resurgence of identity politicS and its claims to difference and recognition, on the other {Cornell 2.001). These developments have resulted in the emergence of both the global-national axis in politics (especially within the context of the question of state sovereignty) and the new political actors carrying out the process of politicizing cultural identity by voicing a demand for the recognition of difference. Moreover, the impact of globalization on Turkey and its neo-liberal discourse of free market values, minimal state, and individualism as the new universalizing codes of modernization and democratization have not led to the demise of nationalism. On the contrary. globalization has reinforced the prevailing dominance of nationalism in Turkish modernity. Let me briefly focus on each of these developments. Since the 1980s and especially the 1990S the economic strategy for industrialization has shifted dramatically from import-substitution to exportpromotion. and much more emphasis has been placed on market forces. The export-oriented industrialization created a strong shift from a vision of society that was heavily statist toward one that is characterized by neo-liberal free-market individualism. In this sense, the emerging neo-liberal ideology in Turkey during the 1980s called for and initiated radical market-oriented reforms in the name of economic progress (6ni~ 1997, p. 750), which in turn has generated a serious challenge to the state. The neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, which has placed the idea of market rationality at the center of the state-economy interactions, challenged both the dominant regulatory role of the state in the economy and its national developmentalist ideology. At the political and cultural levels, Turkish modernity has been confronted by a number of identity-based conflicts challenging the homogeneous and secular national identity (Keyman 2.008; Keyman and t~duygu 2.00S). A variety of claims to identity and demands for recognition with different political imaginations have made their mark in all spheres of social life. It is the question of identity (practiced and voiced by many actors in a wide spectrum of culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, race, and sexuality and thereby operating in a multidimensional and multiplex fashion) that marked the changing formation of Turkish modernity. From the resurgence of Islam, the Kurdish question. the rights of women, and the minority question to civil-societal calls for individual and cultural rights and freedoms, identity politics (with its challenge to national identity) has become one of
26
E. Fuat Keyman
the important characteristics of post-1980 Turkish modernity (Keyman and ic;:duygu, 2.00S). Moreover, identity politics, which has been voiced and put into practice by different societal groups, has simultaneously involved both democratic demands for multiculturalism and pluralism and the communitarian political strategies with antidemocratic and ethno-religious nationalist claims to nationality. It is true that it is not possible to think of the present nature and formation of Turkish modernity without reference to identity. Yet it is equally true that identity politics is not necessarily democratic but often conflictual and crisis-ridden. Precisely because of this, identity politics and the frequent use of ethno-religious nationalism have made it very difficult for the state to maintain the secular and homogeneous basis of the national identity that it has attempted to create through the ideology of nationalism as an articulating principle of modernity and security. Since the 19805 security has had increased dominance in state discourse, understood as the security of both the territorial state and the secular national identity of the republic. The most far-reaching impact of identity politics on Turkish modernity. however, has been a shift in the ideology of nationalism from modernity to security (Bora 2003). In other words, if rapid modernization with the intention of reaching the level of Western civilization had been considered an answer to the question of saving and securing the Turkish state in the republican period, post1980 Turkey has witnessed the privileging of security over modernity, leading to an articulation of nationalism and security within the context of identity politics. This has also created a change in the formation of Turkish nationalism, transforming it into what Ghassan Hage (2003, pp. 3-4) has called "paranOid nationalism." As the resurgence of Islam and the Kurdish question both have generated serious impact on the strong state and its claim to secular and unitary national identity (elaborated in detail in other chapters of this book), Turkish nationalism has approached them as security threats to the sovereign and secular state. The more the identity-based conflicts voiced demands for recognition, the more Turkish nationalism began to speak of national identity with a heavy emphasis on ethnicity and also approached social change in a very skeptical tone and with specific reference to the sovereignty and security of the nation-state. In a vicious circle, the more Turkish nationalism perceived the recognition-based claims and demands coming from identity as
Nationalism in Turkey
27
security threats and approached them with skepticism, the more paranoid it became, and the feeling of paranoia began to frame the terrain of nationalism as a whole (Aydm 2.005, chapters 5 and 6). It has to be acknowledged that one of the sources of paranoid nationalism was the changing global context in terms of geopolitics and its impact on Turkish foreign policy (Aras 2004, pp. 15-27). For instance, former Turkish foreign minister ismail Cem (2004, pp. 59-60) emphasized the significance of this broader international context by arguing: "In the formation of Turkey in the twenty-first century, foreign policy is a determining factor.... The goal of current generations should be to create a Turkey ... that will be a global and regional center of attraction with its history, cultural richness, democracy, economy, and progressiveness based on social justice:' With the end of the Cold War, Turkey emerged as a pivotal regional power in a volatile area. Since the 1980s Turkish modernity has also been exposed to globalization, which has triggered the process of widening, deepening, and accelerating the interconnections of states, economies, and cultures in the world. One of the most important impacts of globalization on national societies has been the increasing importance of the global, regional, national, and local interactions that have provided a suitable platform for the emergence of new demands for cultural identity and political recognition. As the research on globalization has indicated, the identity-based conflicts that have been occurring throughout the world since the 1980s and especially during the 19905 have been located in the intersection between the global and local, making claims to nationality and national identity, voicing strong demands for recognition, and strengthening themselves through global networking (Keyman and Koyuncu 2005)' The ideology of nationalism has been influenced by globalization in two ways. First, it has been articulated by the locally organized political movements in their struggle for recognition, and thus we have observed the emergence of micro-nationalism in ethnic, religious, and cultural terms. Second, the national context has lost its capacity and power to be the most important spacial ground for nationalism, and thus nationalism has become a more and more globally and locally constructed ideology. These two impacts of globalization on nationalism have been observed in Turkey too. As noted, POst-1980 Turkey has witnessed the emergence of mainly religious and ethnic identity-based conflicts that have confronted the secular and homogeneous
28
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character of national identity. Moreover, the way in which these groups have voiced their demands for recognition, legitimized their struggle to gain cultural rights and freedoms. and more importantly politicized themselves to influence national and local politics has to a large degree benefited from globalization and global debates about identity/difference. As a result, nationalism not only has become localized in ethnic and religious terms but also has become the main ideology of the state to react against these identity demands and conflicts in a highly security-oriented manner. In the context of globalization. nationalism in Turkey has continued its dominance, but now framed by securiryconcerns (Ozbudun 2000).
GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEANIZATION, AND NATIONALISM
Two specific processes-the end of the Cold War and European integration-should be taken into account in understanding how security concerns have characterized the modus vivendi of nationalism and its relation to modernity in post-1980 Turkey. The end of the Cold War gave rise to the emergence of important changes and ambiguities in the domestic and foreign policy initiatives of Turkey. It is true that the end of the Cold War has also ended the buffer-state foreign policy identity that Turkey had enjoyed and benefited from in the years of the hegemonic struggle between two superpowers and thus brought about a need for Turkey to search for a new identity. Yet it is also true that in the post-Cold War years as well as in today's post-9/n world the geopolitical and historical significance of Turkey in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia has become increasingly apparent. Thus Turkey has been increasingly perceived as a key regional actor in the creation of regional peace and stability (Larrabee and Lesser 2003). But the new identity and role of Turkey in the post-Cold War era, in which international affairs have been undergoing a significant transition and transformation process, is not yet certain. Instead, change and uncertainty about the future are going hand in hand, which has had important consequences for the ideology of nationalism in Turkey. The post-Cold War era has created a new impetus for the ideology of nationalism to continue its dominant role in modernity, a role defined increasingly by the security concerns of the Turkish state (Fuller and Lesser 1993, p. 148). This uncertainty embedded in the foreign policy identity of Turkey since the end of the Cold War
Nationalism in Turkey
29
and the increasing identity-based conflicts in ethnic and religious terms that have marked the changing nature of Turkish domestic politics have both reinforced the security-oriented operation of the ideology of nationalism and its relation to modernity in Turkey. Likewise, changes and uncertainties have also become more and more apparent in the process of European integration since the mid-I990S, as Turkey has attempted to achieve full membership status in the European Union. As a country at the borders of Europe, trying to start the full accession negotiations and initiating the significant political and con~titutional democratic reforms necessary for full membership, Turkey's expectation has been to receive an objective and fair response from Europe. But the high level of uncertainty about whether or not Europe culturally regards Turkey as part of itself has brought about not objectivity and universality but instead a sense of skepticism, double standards, and mistrust in Turkish society. As a result, even though Turkey-EU relations deepened in the period between 1999 and 2.004 and full accession negotiations began in October 2.005, this uncertainty has strengthened nationalism in Turkey. The ideology of nationalism used by the anti-European integration forces, voicing the significance of the state and its sovereignty to maintain the security of Turkish modernity and territorial integrity, has benefited from the high level of uncertainty within Europe about Turkey's place in it. Nevertheless, the EU integration process has served as an important external anchor, giving impetus to the democratization process in Turkey (Ugur and Canefe 2004), and has also played a critical role in shaping the intricate dynamics of the EU-Turkey-U.S. triangle (Larrabee and Lesser 2.003). It would not be mistaken to suggest that the impressive record of Turkey in upgrading its level of democracy in recent years as well as its perception by the United States as a key actor for the future of the Middle East would not have been possible without the positive role of the European integration process. In this sense the way in which the TurkeyEU full accession negotiations develop will to a large extent determine the role and the power of nationalism in reshaping the formation of Turkish modernity in the near future. After this brief outline of the domestic and global developmentsthat have contributed to the continuing dominance of nationalism in Turkey since the 198os, we could reach the following conclusion. Insofar as nationalism functions as the main articulating principle of modernity arid security and
30
E. Fuat Keyman
operates as the dominant ideology in formulating domestic and foreign policies of the state, it continues to operate as a powerful ideology with a systemdefining and system-transforming capacity. Put differently, as long as the experience of modernity involves a strong state without a normative and political commitment to democracy and its consolidation in societal affairs, nationalism acts as a dominant ideology and maintains its presence as such. In this sense, the democratic deficit and nationalism are in fact two sides of the same coin: state-centric modernity.
THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONALISM IN TURKEY
In light of the foregoing analysis of the Turkish experience of nationalism, a number of important insights should betaken into account in delineating the way in which nationalism operates and remains one of the dominant ideologies of modernity. First, Turkey is a postimperial social formation with strong historical, philosophical, and cultural imperial legacies. In analyzing nationalism in Turkey, we cannot ignore the impact of the Ottoman imperial past on the connection between nationalism and modernity, especially within the context of the nation-state building process. Given that Turkey has not experienced prolonged periods of direct foreign rule, it is important to underline that its nation-state building process took place not in the postcolonial but in the postimperial context. Second, Turkey has a strong-state tradition, in which the practice of the ideology of nationalism has been embedded in the active and major role of the state as the sovereign subject of the process of top-down modernization and transformation of traditional society. In order to understand the prevailing dominance of nationalism in the history of Turkish nationalism, it is useful and necessary to explore the linkages between nationalism and the production and reproduction of the strong state tradition. Third, the state-building process and the continuing presence of the strong-state tradition provide an adequate theoretical and political ground for analyzing the historically and discursively constructed relation between modernity and nationalism in Turkey. Moreover, this relationship has been determined to a large extent by the secular state aiming to create a modern society with a strong desire to reach the level of contemporary civilization. Therefore the Turkish experience has revealed that the state can employ the
Nationalism in Turkey
31
ideology of nationalism to secure its territorial existence, to establish the necessary institutions of Western modernity, and to create a modern society through a homogeneous secular national identity. Fourth. the spatial construction of nationalism in Turkey takes place at the intersection of domestic and international politics. In this sense nationalism is an integral element in Turkish modernity and Turkish foreign policy. Nationalism has constituted the ontological foundation for the state-centric formulation of Turkish foreign policy and its ties to the Western world (yelik 1999). Furthermore, nationalism functions as a dominant ideology of the state and its power not only in its governance of society but also in shaping and reshaping its foreign policy regionally and internationally. It is here that the geopolitical context and the need for a constant search for security playa special role that helps nationalism gain its power in shaping the formation of Turkish modernity in relation to the dominance of security concerns over the societal calls for democracy and human development. Finally, as has been pointed out earlier, the discourse and practice of nationalism are not static but rather dynamic, in that it has the capacity both to transform itself in different historical settings and to be integrated into their own political strategies and societal visions by different political actors. In the early republican era. when the rapid modernization of what was regarded as a backward and traditional society was the main motto of the governing elite, nationalism functioned as a dominant state ideology in linking modernity, security, and Westernization through the construction of a homogeneous and secular national identity. The idea of this identity, both as a carrier of the will to reach the level of contemporary Western civUization and as republican citizen-subjects who are supposed to give normative primacy to the realm of duties and responsibilities over rights and freedoms, and the protection of the security of the state and its territorial existence together defined the discourse and practice of nationalism in this era as well as its connection with modernity. Given the significant changes that the formation of Turkish modernity has faced throughout its history (such as the transition to democracy after World War II, the post-I980 economic liberalization. globalization, European integration. and the emergence of religious and ethnic identity-based conflicts since the 1990S). nationalism has nevertheless remained influential and effective. It has been articulated by different and even contrasting political actors and movements in their claims to
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identity and demands for recognition. The endurance of nationalism has to be analyzed critically and thoroughly not only to understand modern Turkey but more importantly to transform it into a just, democratic, and multicultural social formation.
NOTES
Mandelbaum (2.002.), cited in Lal (2004, p. 174)" 2.. For a detailed analysis of the modernization paradigm. see Mardin (2.006) and Keyman (2008). ,. The methodological problems confronting the paradigm of modernization have been explored in Keyman (2.008) and Aydln"{200s). 4. For a detailed analysis of the identity paradigm, see Keyman and i-Sduygu (2.005). 5. The paradigm of modernity was employed by Serif Mardin even in the 1970S, especially in his important work on the history ofideas in Turkey as well as the role of religion and ideology. For his use of modernity. see Mardin (2.006). 6. Foucault (1979. p. 18) defines governmentality as a way of subjugating differences to the domain of subjectivity. As he putS it. "In this sense. 'to be subject' is therefore 'belong to: in other words to behave as both an element of and an actor in a global process whose development defines the current field of possible experiences, inside of which the fact of being subject can only be situated." 7. Campbell (1992) demonstrates such performative construction with reference to security discourse "and foreign policy practice in the United States. 8. For a more detailed analysis of this point about nationalism. see Ay§e KadlOglu's chapter in this book. 9. For a detailed analysis of the New Left and its relation to Kemalism, see Samim (19 81). 10. Similarly. the New Left discourse had no alternative vision of economic development. In fact. the vision of economy that it put into discourse against capitalism was based upon imporr substitution industrialization through the state as the primary agent by which inequalities and uneven development were to be coped with in the name of dominated classes.
I.
3
THE TWIN MOTIVES OF TURKISH NATIONALISM
MODERN REALITY IS FRAGMENTED BY NATION-STATES THAT EVOLVED
along with various nationalisms in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Various definitions of "us" and "them;' reflected in the concepts of "citizen" and "foreigner;' respectively, emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response to the flight of French refugees from France (Plender 1972.). In America and Switzerland, too, immigration control began as a reaction to the French Revolution and fears that Jacobin emissaries had infiltrated immigrant groups. The processes that converted "peasants into Frenchmen" (Weber 1976) were quickly being exported to the rest of the world and increasing the levels of participation in ways that shaped the contours of modern politicS. The French Revolution Signaled a connection between the concepts of the nation and the people. The nationalist ideology, insofar as it was based on the idea of self-determination as the supreme political good, went hand in hand with the notion of popular sovereignity. The argLlment by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that individuals needed self-detemina:tion in order to be truly human was a great source of vitality for nationalism in that it paved the way to an understanding that the nations toO aspiredtoaritonomy and
33
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Ay~e Kadloglu
free will (Reiss 1970). The idea of national self-determination empowered the people who constituted the nations. As the notions of nationalism and popular sovereignity converged, nations became the source of sovereignity and the level of popular political participation increased. Thus at the beginning the nation-state and political participation did not contradict each other. National identity, and hence the nation-state, was rather a precondition for political participation. In setting out to write an essay on a particular nationalism, it is appropriate to clarify the actors that advocate that nationali$,m. References to I "German nationalism:' "French nationalism; and "Turkish nationalism" are misleading because they assume the existence of one national project that is embraced by everyone in that country. The concept of the nation does not contain a homogeneous group, so many nationalisms exist in each national context. In the Turkish context, Tanu Bora (1994) paved the way to the possibility of studying Turkish nationalism as a plural notion. His analysis is mainly about the Turkish nationalisms in the 1990S; yet it harbors the tools for mapping the Turkish nationalist projects in other periods (see Bora and also Ozkmmh in this volume). Bora (1994) delineates five currents of nationalism in Turkey in the 1990S: official nationalism (or what he also calls Ataturk nationalism), Kemalist nationalism based on the leftist discourse of the 1960s, liberal nationalism that glorifies Turkish youth and the popular culture, radical Turkist nationalism based on the cultural connections among the Turkish-populated lands of the former Soviet Union, and Islamic nationalism. He refers to official nationalism as the "root-language" of all the other nationalisms in Turkey. In other words, all the other nationalisms can be mapped in reference to the official nationalism. When I refer to Turkish nationalism in this chapter I am referring to the nationalist discourse as it was formulated especially by some Young Turks at the turn of the twentieth century. Here I specifically refer to the ideas of two thinkers, Yusuf Ak<;ura (1876-1935) and Ahmed Agaoglu (1869-1939), as "advocates" of Turkish nationalism. Living in the same period, these twO thinkers became leading figures in formulating the twin themes of the Turkish nationalist discourse. While Ak<;ura promoted nationalism in order to address the problem of the preservation of the Ottoman state, Agaoglus main reason for embracing nationalism was his ideal of Westernism. In this chapter I argue that the ideas of "preservation of the state" as well as
The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism
35
"Westernism" as spelled out by these two critical thinkers became the twin motives of Turkish nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century. Accordingly, they constituted the root-language of all the subsequent nationalisms in Turkey. While the motive of statism remained a constant in the official nationalist discourses throughout the republic, the relative significance of Westernism fluctuated according to the changes in the domestic and international environment. The flrst motive of Turkish nationalism, which was spelled ou[ as a political project at the turn of the twentieth century, was the preservation of the unity of the Ottoman Empire rather than heightening political participation. This unity was threatened by the nationalisms of the non-Muslim millet within the Ottoman Empire, especially during the reign of Sultan Mahmut II (1808-37). Hence Turkish nationalism from the very beginning opted for the preservation of the unity of the state. The main contention of this chapter is that this feature of Turkish nationalism paved the way to a conception of citizenship in Turkey as a notion that does not necessarily opt for the empowerment of the people. In other words, Turkish nationalism was serving the state rather than the citizens. As shown below, such a feature of Turkish nationalism was also evident in the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. the founder of the Turkish Republic.' Second, Turkish nationalism embraced Westernism. which culminated in the republican project oflaicism and subsequently had an impact on the formation of Turkish national identity (KacilOglu 2010). In the first part of this chapter, I portray the essential importance of these two motives of official Turkish nationalism-preservation of the state and Westernism-at the turn of the twentieth century in the works of Akc;:ura and Agaoglu.. In the second part, I focus on how the sequence of the emergence of the entities of the nation and the state shaped nationalisms in Europe and how this analysis can be used in studying the nature of Turkish nationalism at the time of its emergence. Finally, I briefly consider whether the twin motives of Turkish nationalism at the time ofits emergence are still relevant today in understanding new nationalist discourses.
PRESERVATION OF THE STATE AND WESTERNISM
The root-language of Turkish nationalism was largely f~rmulated by intellectuals who were mainly interested in preserving the· unity of the
Ay~e
Kadloglu
disintegrating Ottoman Empire as well as Westernism at the turn of the twentieth century. The years 1904 to 1913 were crucial in giving shape to the Turkish national identity. This was the period when certain ideological divisions among the Young Turks were played out. The Young Turks first became visible in Europe after the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progre§s (CUP) in 1889. 3 Until the Second Constitutional Monarchy (1908), pofitical dynamics were determined to a great extent by the struggle between the monarchists and the CUP as well as the cleavages among the Young Turks. Ahmed Rlza led the positivist, Unionist wing within the CUP. It was during the First Young Turk Conference (convened in Paris in 1902.) that the division between the Unionists and the Liberals within the CUP became quite visible. 4 The Liberal wing was led by Prince Sabahattin, who espoused individual initiative as a way of reviving a market economy, with the goal of creating a capitalist structure and decentralization (KadlOglu 2.007b). The Liberals within the CUP were upper-class, well-educated, Westernized Ottoman intellectuals. They expected Britain to back the regime that they defended, a constitutional monarchy led by high-level bureaucrats. s The Liberals within the CUP were backed by a number of religious groups. The Unionists within the CUP, led by Ahmed Rlza, also defended a constitutional monarchy. Yet they opposed any intervention by foreign powers; hence they had a nationalist potential. The Unionists wanted to vest all authority in an assembly that they wanted to control. Contrary to the Liberals, they were from the lower middle classes and thus included, for example, schoolteachers, state officials, and junior military officers. The Unionists instigated a "revolution from above" to be carried out by the state authorities. Mer 1908 the Unionists strengthened their position within the CUP. The following years witnessed an increase in the number of Turkists within the CUP cadres (Hanioglu 1985, p. 1397). In sum, the victory of the Unionists over the Liberals within the CUP by 1908 signaled. the beginning of a nationalism that was largely constructed from above in an effort to preserve the state. From this point onward, Turkish national identity placed itself in the service of the Turkish state. Turkish nationalism and national identity acquired a "statist" character. The first motive of Turkish nationalism, the need to preserve the Ottoman state, was nowhere better expressed than in the works ofYusuf Ak~ura.
The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism
37
Aks:ura was descended from a Tatar family of Kazan in Russia. He became acquainted with the Young Turks in Paris, where he studied political science. Initially he was closer to the Ahmed Rtza wing of the CUP. Yet Aks:ura parted with him too in 1897. In 1904 he published an article entitled "Os: Tarz-l Siyaset" (Three Ways of Policy) in a newspaper called Turk in Cairo. It was this article that turned him into a pioneer in going beyond signifying the common cultural traits of Turks and pointing to the necessity of the emergence of Turkism as a secular political project opting for a modern nation-state (Ak~ura 1987 [1904); Thomas 1978). Aks:ura evaluated all the possible policies that could be followed by the Ottoman state (Ottomanism, Isiamism, and Turkism) from a utilitarian perspective. His main interest was to ensure the "power and progress" of the Ottoman state (Georgeon 1999, p. 38). He pointed to the inadequacies of Ottomanism and Islamism in quelling the prevailing ethnic disturbances and in ensuring the unity of the empire.6 AkCfura thought the most rational policy to follow was Turkism. In his opinion, the only difficulty in following this policy was the lack of a national consciousness among the Turks within the empire (Georgeon 1999, p. 39). The year 1904 signaled the Russo-Japanese War, which brought glory to Japan and shattered the racist myth about the second-class character of the "yellow race."7 Akc;ura's article was published a few weeks after the Japanese forces attacked the Russian fleet. It praised the merits of the Japanese over the Russians in that war (Georgeon 1999, p. 45). In his scrupulous analysis ofYusuf Akc;ura's life and works, Franc;ois Georgeon (1999, p. 42.) maintains that "[t]he entire article was devoted to delineating those measures that would prevent the downfall and fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire:' Hence it is possible to argue that what was probably the first manifesto of Turkish nationalism opted for the preservation of the Ottoman state rather than the empowerment of the people. Georgeon maintains that Aks:ura was not a romantic nationalist. His nationalism was rather a utilitarian dictum that placed Islam in the service of a nationalist current: Turkism. The second motive of Turkish nationalism examined in this chapter was Westernism. The reforms geared toward Westernization within the Ottoman Empire began by reforms within the military institution at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Westernizing reforms of the Ottoman rulers acquired some momentum at the turn of the nineteenth century and began to
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involve areas ocher than the military. The Tanzimat reforms, which were introduced by the Tanzimat Charter in 1839, involved a major reorganization at the levels of provincial administration, education, and the judiciary. Turkism was latent in the thought of the Unionists who embraced Westernism. Ahmed Agaoglu's Turkism, for instance, is quite revealing in this sense. He was born in 1869 in Karabag, Azerbaijan, and went to Paris in 1888 to study law, history, and political science. He returned to the Caucasus in 1894, worked for the unification of Russian Muslims, and participated in activities against the tsar (Shissler 2003). Agaoglu immigrated to Istanbul with his family in 1909 in the aftermath of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, because he was facing political pressures in Russia. He became one of the founders of a Turkist organization called Turk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) in 19II. In those years, he wrote for the organization's journal. In his articles he tried to portray the compatibility of Islam and Turkism. Since Agaoglu did not think ofIslam as the cause for the backwardness of the Ottoman society, he looked elsewhere to account for underdevelopment. In comparing the Indian and the English societies, for instance, he argued that the cause of the enslavement and the imprisonment of the Indian society was the inability of the Indians to constitute a national conscience (Agaoglu 1992b [1924 D. He argued that the Eastern societies were distinguished from the Western ones because they lack~d national sovereignty (hakimiyet-i milliye) (Agaoglu 1992a [1923], p. 85). Hence he professed the need for the establishment of national sovereignty in the East as a prelude for development and progress. Agaoglu's nationalism was a step that he envisioned for achieving the larger goal of Westernism. His nationalism was a type that precluded a nativist culture and embraced Western civilization. Agaoglu thought that the principle of national sovereignty was compatible with early Islamic principles. His nationalism was laden with motifs of Westernism, civilizationism, and Islamism. Agaoglu did not accept a distinction between the. concepts of culture and civilization, which was quite prevalent at the time. In fact, ever since the beginning of the modernization reforms in the Ottoman Empire there had always been a concern about the need to adopt the good (material) aspects of the West while avoiding its bad (spiritual) aspects and retaining native cultural traits. According to Agaoglu, this was not possible. Western culture had to be adopted along with its civilization.s
The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism
39
Although Agaoglu insisted on wholesale Westernization by adopting both the culture and civilization of the West. at the same time he distinguished between culture and religion. In his earlier writings he pOinted to compatibility between Islam and Westernization. In the Turkist journal Turk Yurdu. for instance, Agaoglu (1989 [1327/2.8]) saw compatibility between Islam and national feelings. Although Islam constituted a common bond among the Turks, Arabs. Persians. Indians, Circassians, Kurds. and Albanians, it was never capable of rising above such national differences. According to Agaoglu. one of the reasons why Islam became such a powerful religion was its flexibility in adapting to the internal structure of each nationality that embraced it. Such flexibility contributed to the progress of Islam as a religion. Agaoglu, in fact. pointed to the need for the nationalization (Turkification) of Islam. In sum, one of the fundamental pillars of Agaoglu's thought was his Westernism. This Western ism constituted an outer lens through which all his other thought passed. His Turkism and Islamism as well as the traits of individualism in his thought reflected a particular form of Westernism that remained a constant in his writings. He regarded the principle of national sovereignty as a prerequisite to being Western. Hence his Turkism was laden with Westernist motifs (Agaoglu 1992a [192.3]). Ironically, efforts to uplift a national identity in an effort to become Western have led to the exclusion of non-Muslims. Turkish nationalists grew increasingly critical of the lifestyles of the non-Muslims within the empire. This was expressed by one of the most prominent nationalist thinkers in Turkey. Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924): "There is in our country a class, the so-called Levantines or Cosmopolitans. who try to adopt the aesthetic, moral, phil~ osophical tastes and entire customs, ceremonies. and behavior of the West rather than its scientific methods and industrial techniques. That is, they try erroneously to imitate the cultures of other nations under the name civili~ zation" (cited in Aktar 1996a, p. 2.72.). As the Ottomans lost territory to the Russians, Austrians, and the Greeks, migrations of Muslims from these lands into the center of the empire started. These in-migrations of Muslims were soon accompanied by the forced deportation and massive massacre of the Anatolian Armenians. The hardening of the nationalist stance of the Unionists within the CUP coupled with the presence of these newly arrived Muslims in Istanbul led to tensions in relations with the Greeks living in the
40
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western coastal towns of the empire. In fact, the thought of exchanging pop~ ulations was entertained for the first time in 1914. at the end of the Balk.a~ Wars (Aktar 2.005). The onset of the Turkish War of Independence prompted further exchange of populations involVing the Greek Orthodox Christians in Anatolia and Muslims from Rumeli. These were made mandatory via the Lausanne accords Signed between the Turkish and Greek delegates between January and July of 1923. In the years 1922.-24 about 1,200,000 Greek Orthodox Christians from Anatolia and 400,000 Muslims from Rumeli were displaced from their homes (Aktar 2.005, p. 125). The thought behind the forced exchange of populations was to create a nation-state with a homogenized population structure. In 1913 one in every five persons in the lands that constitute contemporary Turkey was a non-Muslim. At the end of 1923 this ratio was down to one in forty (Keyder 1989, p. 67). In the aftermath of the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the unifying power ofIslam among various ethnic groups ended. This led to the marginalization of the non-Turkish-speaking Muslims such as the Kurds (Yegen 1996). After 1924 the idea of Westernization via laicism gained momentum. This eventually uplifted a laicist, Westernist Turkish identity at the expense of Islam (KadlOglu 2.010). After this point the formation of Turkish national identity continued via the adoption of both exclUSionary and assimilatory practices toward the non-Muslims and non-Turkish-speaking Muslims within the Turkish Republic. The assimilatory practices took the form of national campaigns imposing the use of the Turkish language, such as the campaigns of "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" (Vatandas, Turkfe Konuj!). which were unleashed in January 1928 by the student association of the Faculty of Law in Istanbul. Accordingly, languages other than Turkish were forbidden in public places such as movie theaters, restaurants, and hotels. Posters declaring "Citizen. Speak Turkish!" were posted in public transportation vehicles. These practices were acc01Ilpanied by legal measures aimed at Turkifying names. There were also Turkification measures in the realm of education and economics via newly adopted legal codes making Turkish classes mandatory in minority schools and making the use of the Turkish language mandatory in economic institutions (Ylldlz 2001, pp. 2.81 and 286).
The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism
41
The Turkish national identity was primarily statist. While it was predominantly forged via the exclusion of non-Muslims, it was mostly assimilationist coward the non-Turkish-speaking Muslims. Turks were transformed from subjects of an empire to citizens of a nation-state via both exclusion and assimilation of various distinct cultures. In the course of such transformation, citizenship status was granted not as a result of demands coming from below but by policies from above.' Since the concept of the "people" is associated with such demands, it is possible to say that Turks became citizens without enjoying the possibility of becoming and acting like the "people:'JO In such a route to nationhood, the preservation and glorification of the state were quite distinct. This paved the way to a view of citizens as dutiful servants of the state rather than people who demand rights. All the rights pertaining to citizenship in Turkey were given from above by the republican elite after the proclamation of the republic in 192.3." Establishment of national unity was the main raison d'etre of citizenship in Turkey. The republican elite tried to forge a national union by making use of duties associated with citizenship. These duties were mainly opting for defining and uplifting Turkishness. Turkish nationalism was constructed from above by the state elite. Hence the ensuing Turkish citizenship evolved in a statist manner. The founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, defined a nation as a community that is based on common political existence, language, territory, descent, historical affiliation, and morality (Tezcan 1996, p. 20). Religion was not included in the common bond that constitutes a nation. Instead he put great emphasis on common morality as well as the will to become a nation. Mustafa Kemal stated that "nations that are unaware of their national selves are the prey of other nations" (Tezcan 1996, p. 26). He also pointed to congruence between the notions of the nation and the state when he said: "the Turkish nation-ruled by a republic. which is the rule of the people-is a state." The emphasis laid on the state can be seen in the following statements by Mustafa Kemal: The instrument and rules of a society are the state ... the ambition of a state has a different quality than that of an individual. A state thinks about the common interests and progress of the public. How individuals can be removed from the ambition of private interests is really worth thinking about. (Tezcan 1996, p. 52.)
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It is obvious that some economic and social endeavors are pardy related to the interests of individuals. Therefore liberals see the state's interference with these as interference with the liberties of individuals. Nevertheless, these endeavors also include moments that touch the interests of the entire nation indirectly. As a result, it is appropriate to accept the valid arguments made by the etatists." (Tezcan 1996, p. 51) In February 1932 the People's Houses (Halkevleri) were founded in fourteen cities in order to promote the core principles of the republic. They aimed at creating the ideal republican citizen who had embraced these core principles represented in the insignia of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP): nationalism, laicism, populism, republicanism, etatism, and revolutionism. It was through the activities of the People's Houses that the republican elite attempted to define citizenship in Turkey (Soyank 2000). The main aim of the journal of the People's Houses called Ulkii. was providing the six arrows with a theoretical framework as well as teaching them to the people. The function of the People's Houses was further supported by the formation of two other institutions: the Turkish History SOciety (Turk Tarih Kurumu) and Turkish Linguistic Society (Turk Dil Kurumu) in 1931 and 1932, respectively. The Tur~sh History SOciety researched the history of Turks in the pre-Islamic period and attempted to spread the view that all the civilizations in the world stemmed from the Turkish civilization that was rooted in Central Asia. The Turkish Linguistic Society, in turn, tried to bring out the beauty and richness of the Turkish language as the mother of aU languages. The Peoples Houses as well as the Turkish History SOciety and Turkish Linguistic Society aimed at creating a Turkish citizen prior to the emergence of an individualist ethos in Turkey. Hence they were instrumental in forming a notion of citizenship that emphasized obligations instead of rights. Turkish nationalism therefore served the function of generat~ng obligations for Turkish citizens rather than empowering them. Turkish nationalism did not lead to a language of rights, as in the French case, but rather to a language of obligations that was geared toward the preservation of the state.'l Article 3 of the Constitution (1982) maintains that "the Turkish State, with its country and nation, is an indivisible whole. Its language is Turkish:"" This chapter shows the significance placed on the "indivisibility of the state»
The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism
43
in Turkey. A preoccupation with the preservation of the state is a fundamental feature of Turkish national identity. The debates pertaining to the civil, political, and social rights of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish-speaking groups as well as Muslim women wearing the headscarf have constituted the most salient issues of citizenship in Turkey over the past decade. Issues of citizenship in Turkey involve the minority rights of those people who are legal citizens and hence can participate in local, regional, and national elections.'s Citizenship certificates mask the absence of minority rights. Thus state officials and ordinary people take a false pride in saying that they are all Turkish citizens, without realizing that such homogenization masks difference and therefore is discriminatory. The Turkish national anthem begins with the words "do not fear."·6 Yet it seems that the "different" Kurdish and Armenian identities and the visibility of Muslim women with headscarves generate apprehension on the part of military officers and bureaucrats in terms of the indivisibility of the state. Turkish citizens are burdened with duties toward the state. The fundamental fear that shapes the contours of citizenship politics in Turkey is fear of the disintegration of the state.
A STATE IN SEARCH OF ITS NATION The years between 1789 and 18IS signaled the emergence of both French and German nationalisms (Kohn 1967).'7 German nationalism emerged alongside a literary tradition called Romanticism. One of the most distinguishing features of this tradition was its critical attitude toward French cosmopolitanism. German Romantics thought that the rationalism of the eighteenth century was artificial. They relied on intuitions and emotions rather than on rationality and intellect. The German Romantic tradition reveals the dark and antirational aspects of German nationalism. The notion of a German nation that evolved in the course of the nineteenth century stemmed from a Volkisch ideology that later formed the basis of the National Socialist worldview. The German Romantic literature became the medium for the expression of German nationalism in the course of the nineteenth century. prior to the formation of a German nation-state. German nationalism preceded the nation-state. so it was expressed in ethnic and cultural terms. Accordingly, Rogers Brubaker (1989. 1990, 1992) refers to an
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ethnocultural conception of nationhood in Germany. In comparing the German and French conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. Brubaker (1992. p. 8) says: It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian. and quite another to want to make all Utophiphones citizens of Utopia. Crudely put. the former represents the French. the latter the German model of nationhood. Whether juridical (as in naturalization) or cultural. assimilation presupposes a political conception of membership and the belief. which France took over from the Roman tradition. that the state can turn strangers into citizens. peasants-or immigrant workers-into Frenchmen. Hence the French conception of citizenship evolved in an assimilationist and state-centered manner. while the German conception acquired an organic. differentialist, dissimilationist. and JIOlk-centered character. The French nationhood evolved in a predominantly political way. while the German one became predominantly ethnocultural. As Brubaker (1992., p. 10) puts it:
In fact, traditio~).s of nationhood have political and cultural components in both countries. These components have been closely integrated in France, where political unity has been understood as constitutive, cultural unity as expressive of nationhood. In the German tradition. in contrast, political and ethnocultural aspects of nationhood have stood in tension with one another. serving as the basis for competing conceptions of nationhood. One such conception is sharply opposed to the French conception: according to this view, ethnocultural unity is constitutive. political unity expressive, of nationhood. The temporal distance between the state formation and nation-building processes as well as their sequence gave shape to the conceptions of nationhood and citizenship in France and Germany. This observation can guide analyses on Turkish nationalism (Kadloglu 1991. 1992, 1993a, 1993b. 1996a). Because French nationalism appeared at about the same time as the French nation-state. political and social unity was the work of statesmen. German
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nationalism preceded the formation of the German nation-state by half a century. The German Romantic tradition was laden with motifs of yearning for a national state. Such a temporal distance between nationalism and nationstate made ethnic and cultural unity constitutive of German nationalism. This paved the way to the significance placed on blood ties and/or descent as the basis of modern German citizenship. It is obvious that this ethnocultural view of nation and citizenship was a compensation for political backwardness via the utilization of a claim to spiritual superiority that revived interest in the German medieval past. German nationalist ideology is best explained by the distinction between "Culture" and "Civilization," "which was constantlyon the lips of its adherents" (Mosse 1964, p. 6). "A Culture, to recall Oswald Spengler's words, has a soul, whereas Civilization is 'the most external and artificial state of which humanity is capable'" (cited in Mosse 1964, p.6). The acceptance of culture and the rejection of civilization had a followinglong before the emergence of National Socialists in Germany. Those who advocated a return to culture did not come from the lower classes but rather from the middle classes (middle-class bourgeoisie, artisans, and landowners), who were disadvantaged by the Industrial Revolution. German nationalists opted for a spiritual revolution that would revitalize the nation without revolutionizing its structure, that is, a revolution of the soul (Mosse 1964). The distinctions between the French and German nationalisms and conceptualizations of citizenship are Significant in understanding Turkish nationalism on two grounds.'8 First, Turkish nationalism displays the characteristics of both French and German nationalisms. It embraces both civilization and culture; hence it has a paradoxical nature (KadlOglu 1996b). The paradox of Turkish nationalism resulted in both a hostility toward and an imitation of the Western civilization. Turkish nationalism was not the awakening of Turks to a national consciousness. Rather, it was a project undertaken by intellectuals whose discourse was laden with the dilemma of a choice between imitation and identity. The superior material qualities of the West, its science and technology, could only be synthesized with the spirituality of the East through a project from without. Hence the coexistence of civilization and culture within the Turkish nationalist discourse was the work of intellectuals who took upon themselves the task of transforming a popular consciousness "steeped in centuries of superstition and irrational folk religion"
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(Chatterjee 1993. p. 51). Turkish nationalist discourses. then. endeavored to preserve the unity of the Turkish state by a constructed synthesis. A preoccupation with this balance between modernity and tradition, Western materialism and Eastern spirituality, and civilization (based on the premises of the Enlightenment) and culture (based on the premises of Romanticism) is a recurring theme accompanying Turkish modernization. The desire to achieve such a balance is nowhere better expressed than in the works ofa prominent nationalist thinker, Ziya Gokalp. The type of nationalism that Gokalp mentioned in his writings was critical of the adoption of a Western culture while at the same time advocating an imitation of the Western technological advances (Western civilization). He espoused the retainment of a local, pristine identity. The concepts of civilization and culture were not antithetical, mutually exclusive entities in Gokalp's thought. Rather he tried to synthesize them. In his analysis of Gokalp's thought. Niyazi Berkes (1959, p. 23) maintains: Ifhis analyses are taken as a whole, however, these two concepts [culture and civilization] do not represent antithetical and mutually exclusive entities, but rather two closely related and complementary traits of social reality.... Civilizational elements assume meaning and function in the life of ~en only when they enter into the service of culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes merely a matter of mechanical imitation; it never penetrates into the inner life of a people and never gives fruit of any kind. Gokalp's ideas were wavering among the three trends of Islamism, Turkism, and Westernism and hence reflecting the political climate of the context in which he was located. As Berkes (1959, p. 20) puts it: "He was fighting within himself the battle that intellectuals and politicians were raging on other levels." Gokalp embraced the idea that "<:mly the material civilization of Europe should be taken and not its non-material aspects" (Berkes 1959. p. 21). Berkes (1959, p. 22) sums up Gokalp's convictions: "As the ultimate reality of contemporary society is the nation, and as national ideals are ultimate forces orienting the behavior of the individuals, so the most urgent task for the Turks consisted of awakening as a na,tion in order to adapt themselves to the conditions of contemporary civilization." Gokalp placed a lot of
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emphasis on the concept of the "nation» in coming to terms with the adjustment of culture and civilization. While Ahmed Agaoglu embraced an idea of wholesale Westernization with its culture and civilization, Gokalp was convinced that culture and civilization could be balanced via nationalism.'9 If nationalism is a modern Janus, the Turkish version had two faces as well. While in most instances Turkish nationalism looked similar to the civic French nationalism, the organic, ethnic face that is akin to German nationalism became more pronounced during certain periods in the founding years of the republic. In a study that attempts a periodization of Turkish nationalism in the early years of the republic, Ahmet YtldlZ (2001) brings out into the open the pronounced ethnocultural dimension of Turkish citizenship especially in the period from 1929 to 1938. His book is aptly titled "Ne mutlu Turkum Diyebilene" (How Happy to Be Able to Call Oneself a Turk), pointing to a subtle distinction between "to call oneself a Turk» and "be able to call oneself a Turk:' The latter expression, citing the ability to call oneself a Turk, makes references to ethnic, ascriptive qualifications and was an expression used by one of the ideologues of the Turkish revolution, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, in 1934 (Ytldlz 2001, p. 212). In unraveling the mostly neglected "evil" face of Turkish nationalism, Yddlz refers to legal and political arrangements, the records of parliamentary proceedings, and the proceedings of the Republican People's Party as well as memoirs and texts of the leading ideologues of the early republican period. According to his periodization of the early republican years, the fundamental references of Turkish nationalism evolved from religiOUS (1919-23) to laicist (1924-29) themes and then became suffused with ethnocultural (1929-38) motifs. The citizenship practices evolved in accordance with these core elements in respective periods,>o Second, it is important to point to the sequence of the emergence of the state and nation in Turkey. Whereas in the German case it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state (a nation in search ofits state), the historiCal order of things is reversed in the Turkish case. In the instance of mOdern republican Turkey, we can refer to a state preceding a nation (a state in search of its nation) {KadlOglu 199s).The Turkish nation was constructed by means of certain measures that were undertaken by the republican ~lite.jn the words of~erifMardin (1981, p. 196): "Mustafa Kemal took upolla hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life in it." In this: construction, political unity appears as the constitutive unit of the Turkiskhati()n~state. In
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short, the indivisibility of the Turkish state and its nation and the irreversibility of its borders-contrary to the case in Germany-constitute the cornerstone of Turkish national identity.
TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989 signaled the end of the Cold War. This has gradually led to the irrelevance of the ideological divisions between the Right and the Left in world politics. The 1990S bore witness to the increasing visibility of Islamic and Kurdish identities in Turkey (KadlOglu 1998b). This was accompanied by the increasing visibility of the Turkish military on the domestic political scene. Moreover, in the course of the 19905 the "Western" attributes of the Turkish society were increasingly being questioned by European Union (EU) officials. In fact Turkey's endeavor to join the EU was facing a serious crisis by 1997. The end of the Cold War dynamics generated doubts as to the Western character of the Turkish SOciety. Omer Ta~pmar (2.005, p. 89) describes the changing status of Turkey in the 1990S: Turks were utterly disappOinted with the fact that their countries [sic] Western identity went unchallenged as long as the Soviet threat existed. It became bitterlY,clear that affiliation with the anti-communist alliance in the framework of NATO membership was at the heart of Turkey's perception as part of the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Turkey's identity as a "Western'" nation came to be subject to the much more complex and decisive test of "liberal democracy:' Turkey'S relations with the United States were continuing in favorable terms mainly due to the dynamics generated by the Gulf War. In fact Bill Clinton's administration lobbied in favor of Turkey's candidacy for membership in the EU from 1997 to 1999. By 1999 the direction of the course of events had changed: with the help of the German Social Democrats, Turkey became an official candidate for the EU at the Helsinki summit. From this point onward Turkish governments and specifically the government formed in 2.002. by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi, AKP) became increasingly interested in the reforms that were preconditions for EU membership. There were significant constitutional amendments in
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49
and 2.004 as well as various "packages" containing amendments of other legal codes that were geared toward realizing such reforms. Some of the constitutional and other legal amendments made it possible to teach and broadcast in "forbidden" languages such as Kurdish (Oran 2.004; Ozbudun and Yazlcl 2.004). Other legal amendments pertained to the civilian control of military institutions. All of these amendments pointed to the acceleration of democratization processes in Turkey. In the meantime the United States had experienced the September II, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon. The US. government was getting ready to engage in a war in Iraq. At that historical juncture the Turkish parliament refused to give permission for the utilization of its border with Iraq as the base to launch the attack against Iraq by a historical decision on March 3, 2.003. Thousands marched in a square not far from the parliament, shouting slogans such as "Yankee go home."" This was the beginning of a serious deterioration ofUS.-Turkish relations and increasing public expression of anti-American sentiment by the Turkish people. These sentiments reached a climax at the time of the humiliation of the Turkish Special Forces at the Iraqi border. US. soldiers detained them and covered their faces with hoods on July 4, 2.003. This episode culminated in the 2.006 blockbuster Turkish movie called Kurtlar Vadisi-Irak (Valley of the Wolves-Iraq). Polat, the hero in this movie (the Turkish version of a paramilitary Rambo character), goes to Iraq to humiliate the American soldiers in order to satisfy raging feelings of revenge stemming from the hood episode. By April 2.004 the pictures of torture ofIraqi prisoners by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison were in the world press and media. They generated disgust among the people and escalated the existing levels of antiAmericanism in Turkey. Hence it is not surprising that the fantastic novel Metal Ertma (Metal Storm), which depicted a series of events in northern Iraq leading to a U.S.-Turkish war, became a bestseller in Turkey in 2.004 2.001
(Turna and U~ar 2.004). ...... Westernism had always been a distinguishing feature of the root-language of Turkish nationalism. Anti-imperialist sentiments had traditionally been displayed not by the nationalists, who embraced ideologieS thatvVere on the right side of the political spectrum, but by the socialists in Turkey." The most widely remembered socialist anti-American demonstration wa:s held in 1968,
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against the American soldiers who arrived in Turkey on the Sixth Fleet. The slogan "Yankee go home" was popularly used at that time. In 200" after the outbreak of a war in Iraq, the same slogan had apparently returned to Turkey. Yet this time it was on the lips of the nationalists from both the right and left of the political spectrum. This shift signaled a move away from the anti-imperialist stance of the socialists to a brand of nationalism that was harboring not just anti-imperialist but more specifically anti-American and anti-EU sentiments. The years 200, and 2004 signaled the divorce of Turkish nationalism from one of its original and long-lasting motives: advocacy of Westernism. The anti-Americanism of the popular movie character Pol at was beyond the shadow of any doubt. Yet it was also implied in the movie that those who became the archenemies of the United States were created by the U.S. governments themselves in the course of the Cold War dynamics in order to fight the Communists. Polat personified those who waged a dirty and illegal war against the Communists in Turkey. With no Communists left to fight, Polat was ready to take on the United States by making use of the anti-imperialist discourse of the Communists. In sum, anti-Americanism and anti-EU sentiments have become the distinguishing feature of the new nationalist discourse in Turkey after 2003. Preservation of the state still continues to be one of the motives of Turkish nationalism. Yet the state is increaSingly defined in reference to the military and bureaucratic establishment at the expense of the political actors. In fact it is possible to argue that Turkish nationalism has become more militaristic in the course of the past few years. This militarism mainly stems from a criticism directed at the political realm in general and the main political actor, the AKP, in particular. John BreuUly (1992, p. 16) points out the incompatibility between national identity and the parliament in times of crisis: "[I]n times of crisis the national idea-an idea which was almost universally accepted in some form or another-could be turned against government and parliament. The national idea meant national unity whereas parliament meant division." AKP presents itself as the political party that wUl defy the "clash of civilizations" thesis that foresees an inevitable clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations (Huntington 1993). After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government discovered a new reason to ally with Turkey and began to refer
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to Turkey as a "model" for the Middle East due to its adherence to a "moderate Islam" rather than "radical Islam." Tawmar (WOS, p. 91) expresses this shift in the focus of the interest toward Turkey as follows:
u.s.
In effect, Turkey became important for the foreign policy in the aftermath of September II for the first time, not because of "where it was located;' but because of "what it was." In other words, Turkey's importance was increasing not only in geo-strategic context, but also due to its political and civilized identity. In an environment where the Arab geography appeared as a fundamental problem, Turkey's democratic, secular and Western presence was accepted as a "model" by the neoconservative group. Yet Kemalist laicist groups in Turkey were increasingly skeptical of a government with a Muslim base that was at times described as "moderate Islamist." Since 192..4 Turkish governments have followed quite radical laicist policies and regarded laicism as one of the pillars of the Kemalist regime. Any statement in the opposite direction has generated an unprecedented fury in certain segments of the society that have a view of the AKP as a political party that is weakening the laidst foundation of the Kemalist state. In 2..006 the AKP ended up surrendering to militaristic policies, in an effort to establish a strong state. In November 2..00S a bookshop in the predominantly Kurdish town of ~emdinli was bombed. Two low-ranking gendarmerie officers of the Turkish armed forces were arrested as assailants by the people in the area. The owner of the bookstore was an informant of the Kurdish organization PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kiirdistan: Kurdish Workers Party). The public prosecutor of the dty of Van prepared an indictment that pointed a finger at Ya~ar Biiyiikafllt, who was commander of the Land Forces (and became the chief of the General Staff in July 2..006), for trying to prevent the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict and aggravating the tensions in the region by getting involved in such bombings. In a few months the public prosecutor was not only dismissed from office but also barred from the legal profession by the High Council ofJudges and Prosecutors (Milliyet June 2..2.., 2..006; Kaya 2..009, pp. 104-5). Theminister of justice
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went along with this decision. The AKP did not have the determination to protect the prosecutor. By the end of March 2.006 riots broke out in DiyarbakIr during the funerals of PKK militants who were killed by the security forces. Riots spread to other cities such as Batman, Siirt, and Istanbul. In the midst of this increasing violence and death toll, the opposition parties began to blame the AKP for its inability to address the situation and for having a soft posture in the fight against terrorism. At the end of June 2.006 an Anti-Terror Law with draconian measures was passed by the parliament. The law made imprisonment possible for anyone shouting slogans and carrying banners in demonstrations in favor of terror groups. It constituted a major setback in freedom of expression. The law made it possible to imprison minors over the age of fifteen and allowed the security forces to shoot suspects who failed to cooperate (Milliyet, June 30, 2.006). In sum, it reduced Tutkey's Kurdish problem to an issue of terror. By the end of 2007 the PKK had increased its attacks on the Turkish soldiers at the Iraqi border. The loss of hundreds of lives generated great public fury in Turkey. The parliament passed a decision on October 17, 2007, allowing the government to pursue military action against the PKK on the other side of the Turkish border, in northern Iraq. In late February 2.008 Turkish military forces crossed the border into northern Iraq in order to engage in combat with the PKK. As a result of such escalation of conflict at its southeastern border, Turkish nationalism began to be expressed in a more militaristic fashion. In one of the demonstrations against the PKK and in honor of the slain soldiers who became martyrs, for example, people who gathered in a football stadium before a game in Bolu all wore the blue berets of the Special Forces (the commando units) of the Turkish army and recited the military oath. In other such demonstrations women expressed their wish to join the ranks of the military. In 2007 and 2008 the Turkish nationalist language was increasingly motivated by an effort to preserve a more militarist state. By 2008 the relations between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists had entered a stage that made the characterization "symbiotic antagonisms" all the more relevant. It is quite clear that these developments will strengthen the raison d'etat and the military institutions in Turkey at the expense of political processes. They could also severely damage Turkey-EU
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relations. While nationalists on both sides rejuvenate their livelihood through their mutual antagonisms, the resulting military clashes between them have already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and continue to generate the deaths of many others. AKP's "Kurdish opening" policy that was unleashed in the summer of 2009 had the potencial to reverse this militarist-nationalist trend in Turkey. Yet the closure of the main Kurdish political party, the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). by the Constitutional Court in December 2009 Signaled the end of the opening. The negative developments worsened when some of the PKK militants who arrived in Turkey in October 2009 from various camps in Iraq with the expectation of a pardon were arrested in the summer of 2010. Whether political processes can prevail over raison detat in light of these recent developments and against all odds remains to be seen.
NOTES I.
1.
,.
'The text that compiles the ideas of Mustafa Kemal on citizenship was Originally edited and published by Afet inan in 1930 with the title Vatandaj Jfin Medeni Bilgiler (Civic Information for Citizens). She also published an extended version in 1969 (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu). I benefited from a recent edition of this text in highlighting Mustafa Kemal's views on citizenship (Tezcan 1996). I have accounted for these features ofTurkish nationalism in an article in which I compared the formation of national identity and related issues of citizenship in Greece and Turkey. 'The account presented here benefited a lot from that comparative analysis (KadlOglu 2oo9). 'The Committee of Union and Progress was called the Committee of Ottoman Union (lttihad-l Osmani Cemiyeti) at the time of its foundation. In 1895 its name was changed to Committee of Ottoman Union and Progress (Osman" Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti). 'The committee was divided into two after the First Young Turk Conference in 1901. which was convened in Paris. While the liberal wing founded a separate organization espousing individual initiative and decentralization as well as being ruled as a mandate under the ~uthority of Britain. the more centralist wing began to advocate Turkism as opposed to Ottomanism. In the period between 1902 and 1906 the Young Turk activities in Europe lapsed to a certain extent. 'The movement was rejuvenat~d in 1906 with the arrival of new members fleeing from the Ottoman lands. Following the Second Young Turk Conference in 1907, again in Paris. thecentr3.J.isr. Turkist wing began to acquire prominence. The road to the Secon4c;onstitutional
54
4. 5.
6.
7.
AY<je Kadloglu Monarchy was opened through the activities of this wing. The organization reclaimed the name "Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress· after the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. The information regarding the parameters of the conflict between the Liberals and Unionists here is informed to a great extent by Ahmad (1993. pp. 33-51). Although Prince Sabahattin opposed the invitation of Western powers to back the regime at the beginning. he then-most likely-succumbed to British intervention in order to "prevent other haphazard. unwanted interventions" that might be forced upon the Ottoman regime during a crisis moment. Hence he embraced the idea of "intervention by those free and liberal Western powers whose interests match our interests" (Ak§in 1980, p. 40). Ak.'fura's historically significant article raised some criticism at the time of its publication. Criticisms by Ali Kemal and Ahmet Fedt also published in the same newspaper pointed to the dangers of prompting the nationalist feeling among the Turks in the belief that this would have a domino effect on various other nationalisms and would bring the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the disintegration came not from the Turkist political nationalism but as a result of various other nationalisms of both the non-Muslim and Muslim groups within the empire. The emergence of these nationalisms pointed to the inability of the Ottomanist vision to keep the empire intact and hence the inevitability ofits disintegration. See YlldlZ (2.001, p. 72.). Such racial claims had already been rampant in late-nineteenth-century Europe. One of the pioneering works classifying the races was by Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816-82.), enticledEs-sai sur l'inegalite des races humaines
(18 53-55)' Agaoglu's thought in this sense was in line with extreme Westernist thought currents led by Abdullah Cevdet and Celal Nllri. On Agaoglu's insistence on the adoption of Western civilization and culture as a whole. see Bakxrgezer (1997: 41). 9. This should not give the impression that no movements in the society were expressing demands from below. For an account of a women's independent organization with such demands, see Toprak (1988). This organization was suppressed by the republican elite. 10. I have argued that Turks became citizens prior to becoming individuals (Kadloglu 1998a, 1999). Il. This should not make us blind to the existence of many Significant societal demands from below that were thwarted by state policies. See, for instance. Toprak (1988) and also Zihnioglu (2.003). regarding women's demands from below geared toward founding a women's political party.
8.
The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism
55
12. I have used the expression "etatists" instead of "statists" in translating this sentence into English due to the apparent emphaSiS laid on the "economic" interference of the state. 13. In a study surveying the books utilized in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools throughout the republican era. Fiisun Uste! (2002. 2.004) underlines the evolution of a militant citizen burdened with duties in Turkey. 14. Interestingly. in 2.004 a report on minority issues in Turkey suggested that the expression "nation" should be deleted from article 3 of the Constitution. which refers to the "Turkish state" as an "indivisible whole with its country and nation" (Oran 2.004). It was also suggested that the phrase "its language is Turkish" be replaced by the expression "its officiallanguage is Turkish" in order to allow for the utilization oflanguages other than Turkish. These suggestions were geared toward making it possible for multicultural identities to coexist in Turkey in an effort to envision a Turkey that does not only belong to Turks. Legal charges were brought against the authors of this study on the basis of "denigrating T urkishness." IS. Such minority rights. insofar as they refer to rights geared toward integration through the maintenance of religious. ethnic. and language differences. are called "multicultural rights." These rights represent "willingness" on the part of governments "not jllst to tolerate but to welcome cultural difference" (Kymlicka and Norman 1995. p. 307). See also KadlOglu (2.007a). 16. I was reminded of the importance of these words in the national anthem by my colleague Ayhan Aletar. who mentioned this in the paper that he presented at the conference on the Ottoman Armenians during the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire held in Istanbul on September 2.4-2.5. 2005. 17. The expressions "French nationalism" and "German nationalism" are used here in reference to the nature of these nationalisms at the time of their emergence. in an effort to emphasize some of their birthmarks. 18. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See KadlOglu (200S). 19. For an analysis of how Ziya Gokalp's views on religion differed from the views of the leading republican elite. who were successful in instigating radical policies oflaicism in the 192,OS. see KadlOglu (2.oro). 20. For a review of practices pertaining to Turkification such as those regarding the obligation to speak Turkish in public places (1931). utilization of Turkish family names (1934). the law on settlement of the minorities (1934). and talCes on the property of Muslims. non-Muslims. foreigners. and converts (1942). see Aktar (2.000), Soyartk (2000). and Ylldlz (2.001). 21. I was in the United States before the voting in the Turkish parliament. Most U.S. television news programs assumed that the Turkish parliament would vote
u.s.
2.2..
"yes" and allow the military to use the Turkish border as a base for launching the attack on Iraq. I clearly remember one commentator who was broadcasting live from Tuckey who referred to the Turkish parliament vote as a "mere formality." Hence the "no" vote in the Turkish parliament was a big sur- . prise in the United States. It seems important to underline the differences between anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism and study their interplay in various manifestations of nationalism in Turkey.
4
NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN TURKEY
TANILBoRA
AT THE END OF THE 19805 TuRKISH NATIONALISM, PARALLEL TO THE
nationalist waves rising throughout the world (especially in the Balkans. Middle East. and Caucasus), gained an accelerated momentum. This era of globalization encouraged and even incited nationalism in various ways. First, especially with the collapse of the bipolar world system of the Cold War, altering frontiers through military conflicts became possible. Second, minorities and human rights issues have evolved as diplomatic matters. Third, transnational processes of economic-and geographical-deregulation have upset the structures of the nation-state. All these factors have affected the ideology of Turkish nationalism in ways that ratified its reactionary patterns. Modem Turkey has a nation-state tradition that bears the marks of a concern for saving and preserving the state. This concern arose in part due to the grave crises threatening the very existence of the Ottoman state of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century_ Subsequently the surrounding countries were perceived as a severe threat. This perception was indeed rectified by the Cold War. Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity had been substantially influenced by both this concern for saving andl'erpetuating the state and the perception of threat. Furthermore. the challenges th.at globalization brought to the structures of the nation-state are easily perceived in
57
58
Tanll Bora
this context as the modern version of a centuries-old threat to Anatolia!Turkey. This threat is traced back to the Crusades and is regarded as reaching its zenith with the Treaty of Sevres, which temporarily buried the hopes to found a new state that would rise from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish issue no doubt has played the leading role in this perception, which equates the challenges posed by globalization with an ongoing threat to Anatolia. The Kurdish issue, which came to the fore in the mid-1980s with the armed propaganda campaign of the Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kiirdistan, PKK) and was transformed in the 1990S to a "low density war," increased the fear that had been implanted in Turkish nationalism concerning violation of the very existence of the state. The escalation of this old fear was also related to the social destabilization and disorientation caused by the rapid economic, social, and cultural changes that Turkey underwent as part of the globalization (or, in other words, capitalist modernization) process. This destabilization and disorientation was further deepened with the disintegration of the social state. In this atmosphere. as the Kurdish issue was reduced to a "problem of terror;' the ideological mobilization against the Kurdish issue focused on emphasizing ethnic Turkish identity. Yet after the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 a new tendency emerged. Anti-Kurdish resentment became widespread, and signs of polarization started to be observed. Such a tendency developed largely because public opinion, affected by Turkish nationalism, was disillusioned with and reacting against two things. First, the PKK continued to exist despite being defeated militarily and reinitiated armed struggle after 2.003. Second, Kurds continued to demand rights on the basis of their identity. This disillusionment and reaction was nourished by the state. which presumed that the Kurdish issue was in fact "solved" and refrained from taking the steps it would! could take by adapting to the European Union (EU) norms. Under these circumstances, a discourse that defined not only the PKK but also the "Kurds" (taken as a homogeneous subjectivity) as the enemy became prevalent. This banal nationalist discourse, which defines the Kurds as barbarians while criminalizing them not only politically but also socially and ethically, signifies the dangerous replacement of assimilationist optimism with a violent nonassimilationism.
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey
59
Another factor affiicting the Turkish national conscience was that the rise in the perception of a threat as well as the crisis regarding the very survival of the state occurred immediately after an era of self-confidence. Turkey, in fact, entered the 1990S with a boom of self-confidence. During the 19805 the country had accumulated capital with the economic policies of the New Right and became increasingly merged in the flows of global capital: consumption had become modernized and Widespread. All these developments fostered hopes of moving up to the "world's tOP league" (as popular media commentators call it). By the end of the 1980s, when Turkey applied for full membership to the EU, the prevailing feeling was "elevating the country to the level of modern civilization." This feeling had indeed been cherished since the founding of the republic. Finally, it seemed that this elevation had been realized-or at least this was the belief that was shared by the proWestern elites and the urban middle classes. The new economically oriented pan-Turkist perspective, espoused by the newly independent the Central Asian Turkic republics in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's disintegration, reinforced this feeling (Bora and La~iner 1995). The historical and cultural legacy of the Turkic republics, regarded as a hinterland from the point of view of official nationalism, was considered to be an additional guarantee for Turkey as it sought to bond with the West without losing its own authentic identity. Turgut Ozal, the prime minister of the strong liberal-conservative government of the 1980s formed by the Motherland Party (Anavatan Pardsi, ANAP), was also a symbol of this period's wind of optimism and self-confidence. The party and the government put forth a conception of Turkish-Islamic-Western synthesis that was far more forceful than its previous formulations. Ozal had the opportunity to repeat the Turkish right-wing politicians' buzzwords such as "great Turkey" and "powerful Turkey" in a relatively "realistic" conteXt. At the beginning of the 1990S the assertive popularized claim that the "twenty-first century will be the Turkish century" was added to such catchphrases. The Gulf War can be seen as a turning point in the transition from this atmosphere of self-confidence and optimism to one defined by the perception of threat. On the one hand, in Turkey the Gulf War led to national strategy plans aspiring to "development" in terms of influence, prestige, and geography. On the other hand, the war invigorated the existing fears; it was argued
60
Tanll Bora
that the existing threat surrounding Turkey would tighten and that the Western hegemony, both in the region and in the country, would increase. The formation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War as well as the new momentum of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey proved the pessimists right and gave the fundamentalist/essentialist factions the opportunity to raise their voices. As Turkey's policies on the Kurdish issue have been restricted to the military solution, its entire democratization program remained under the embargo of these policies. The subsequent pressure it faced on the European platform was used by the radical nationalists to corroborate the argument that Turkey was confronted with a conspiracy. Two other factors also played a part in the erosion of Turkey's national self-confidence and the growing national concern with survival and preservation. One was the gradually increasing awareness that the Turkic republics were not primitive and loyal states that considered Turkey to be their unconditionalleader. Turkey was indeed eqUipped with nothing other than Orientalist prejudices in terms of knowledge about the Caucasus and Central Asia. The second factor was the spiral of economic crises that engulfed Turkey. The country had become entirely dependent on the whims of free-flowing international capital, and in 2.001 it was on the verge of a disaster comparable to the one Argentina had experienced. Despite having entered the decade with the slogan "The twenty-first century will be the Turkish century:' in the mid1990S Turkey eventually came face-to-face with a chronic crisis that has been marked as the gravest depression in the history of the republic. At the beginning of the 2000S, following countrywide impoverishment and the erosion of the urban middle classes, economic stabilization was achieved. A peaceful state of affairs was also established as the neo-liberal/ conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi, AKP) came to rule. But this was a temporary lull. Subsequendy nationalism was again on the rise; the main triggering factor was Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. Following the initiation of Turkey's negotiations for full EU membership in 2002, the anti-Western reactions in nationalist-conservative, Islamist, and Kemalist camps took on a more agitated tone. According to these interpretations, which were shaped through the particular discourses of politicalideological camps (with some of the specific arguments being transferred
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey
61
among them), the EU was using Turkey's will to "join Europe" to force Turkey into making concessions regarding the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. Furthermore, Europe was attempting to bring to life its eternal plan to divide and destabilize Turkey. Those who ruled Turkey supported this neo-imperialist plan either because they were imprudent or because they were traitors. Such arguments brought to life images such as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, weak "collaborative" governments that hoped for Western aid, and economic and legal capitulations. These comparisons popularized the idea that the country was secretly being invaded. The traumatic effect of the 2.001 economic crisis on the middle classes should indeed be taken into consideration in analyzing the dissemination and appropriation of such a paranoid discourse. The economy's total dependence on global finance flows, and its concurrent fragility, made it possible for the individual career traumas to be reflected to the national level and combined with the collective loss of confidence. Another important element in the appropriation of the above-mentioned anti-Western discourse was the reaction of the bureaucratic elite. The privileged status of this elite would be weakened by the structural reforms that Turkey would undertake for EU membership. In this context the following paradox emerged. The AKP, though instrumentally, supported the politico-legal framework of the ED. The party indeed partly saw this framework as a tool with which the status of the bureaucracy and the army could be weakened. Yet the same AKP whose founders and leaders came from an Islamic tradition that referred to the EU as a "Christian club" was insulted as a EU collaborator by Kemalist-republicans, who have always been situated as pro-Westerners in Turkish political scene. What makes this situation striking is that the traditional anti-imperialist discourse ofKemalist nationalism has been supplemented by ethnocultural cliches and accordingly attained an anti-Western tone. Kurdish female poet and author Bejan Matur (2.007) made an interesting observation regarding the "Republican Rallies" that were organized as a part of this reactionary nationalist atmosphere and took both the AKP and the EU as targets. According to Matur, republican-Kemalist-secular-Westerner groups fell into an abyss as they came close to joining Europe, which they have identified with and yearned after for so long. What nourished this desire and transformed it into a kind oflove relationship was in fact "the inability to be
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united" with Europe (Matur 2007); yet now the circumstances were changing. Moreover, as these groups increasingly felt unable to manifest the necessary authenticity to grant them an identity that would differentiate them iJ;1/ from Europe, they became vulnerable. Meanwhile the AKP followers, coming from an Islamist tradition, were already regarding Europe as an "other" with which they would only come together on pragmatic terms and referred to their relationship as a kind of trade encounter. This view made them free from these complexes of the republican-Kemalist-secular-Westerner groups in their relations to Europe. This interpretation, which has a socio-psychological component, is worth discussing. Before initiating such a discussion, however, it should be noted that within the Kemalist-republican ideological framework (which also determines the national education curriculum) homogenizing judgments and forms regarding the West had existed before. Nationalism in fact is the common ground of nationalist-conservative, Islamist, and Kemalist-republican discourses and manifests itself as the real Turkish fundamentalism. From the 1990S to the beginning of the twenty-first century two dynamics have been at play in the shaping of Turkish nationalism. One is a reactionary nationalist movement that uses the theme of national survival in a dramatized way. This movement not only strengthens the opposing radical nationalist movement but al$O influences the center/right-wing politics and even, increasingly, the center/left wing. Furthermore, it dominates the state elite and above all the army. The second is a pro-Western nationalistic movement (reminiscent of the nationalism of the late 1980s and early 1990S), which believes that the nation's best interest lies in merging with the globalization process. This movement has found its proponents among the rising segments of the new urban middle classes. the globalizing sectors of big capital, and the media elite. In order to analyze the interplay between these two movements. one must consider Turkish nationalism not as a homogeneous discourse but as a series of discourses with a vast lexis. I distinguish four main nationalist languages that use this lexis. The first is the root-language of Turkish nationalism: in other words. the language of the official Kemalist nationalism. Atatiirk nationalism, which focused on the mission to build and perpetuate the nation-state. The second. which can be considered a dialect of this root-language, is the "left-wing" Kemalist nationalism: Kemalist ulUSfuluk.
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey
The third is the language of a pro-Western nationalism advocating "civilization" and prosperity. While being a liberal dialect of the Kemalist rootlanguage. this version grows and develops under the spell of the promises held forth by the era of globalization. The fourth. a deviate dialect of the Kemalist root-language. is the language of the racist-ethnicist Turkish nationalism that derives its elementS from neo-pan-Turkism and from the reaction to the Kurdish nationalist movement. In the event that the currently expanding Islamism merges with a nationalistic discourse. another dialect will be entering this family of languages. In the following pages. I discuss these nationalistic dialects as well as their verbal and visual elements.
THE OFFICIAL NATIONALISM: ATATURK NATIONALISM
The official nationalism of Turkey. Atatiirk nationalism. has been characterized since the founding of the republic by both a French-style conception of nationalism. based on the principle of citizenship and territoriality. and a German-style nationalism. which has ethnicist assumptions. As such it bears the marks of the tension between these two different conceptions of nationalism. Ziya Gokalp's synthesis. based on cultural identity. rested on an extremely delicate balance between a territorial conception of nationalism based on citizenship. which was handed down from Ottoman patriotism. and the conceptions of nationalism that emphasize the nation's uniqueness and eternal existence. The official ideology may well be in line with a kind of nationalism that is based on the territorial notion of citizenship. But in foreign disputes. in "national causes:' and even. for instance. in the domains of popular culture such as international sports competitions an ethnicist, essentialist. aggressive language of nationalism can easily make itself felt. It can be argued that the instinctive. if not conscious. inclination of the advocates of the official ideology has been toward keeping this duality latent and yet keeping it as it is, for this duality and tension help extend their margin of political and ideological maneuvering. Official nationalism, with its ideological ambiguity, thoroughly depends on the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state-its symbols and rituals, its pomp and omnipresence. The army, as the crystallized evidence of the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state, takes on a central role in the reproduction of the official nationalism. Owing to
Tanll Bora
the requirements of the ideology of vigilance and the automatic system of perceiving threat (which are in fact internalized by all armies) and specifically as a consequence of the state-founding military character of the Tur~ ish Armed Forces, identified with Mustafa Kemal and his mission, the army considers itself to be the true owner and personified symbol of nationalism. The official nationalism, with its core being the army, focuses specifically on the state itself in addition to the populist attributions of heroism. The definition of "nation" (as stated in a publication by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council) as "one of the constituent elements of the state" as well as the expression "the state's indivisible identity with the country and the nation" (a favorite among official refrains) constitute avowals of the statecentered conception of nationalism.' An important feature of the language of official nationalism is that its ritualism is far too rigid, cold, and stereotyped and its enthusiasm remains artificial. Official nationalism is indeed exhibitionist. It invades political rhetoric with its cliched vocabulary. In public life there is a frenzied consumption of symbols of the nation-state, such as the national anthem, the effigy of Atatiirk. the flag, and the star and crescent. Although this situation is not always directly related to the pressures or incitements of the state, it is at any rate encouraged by the rigid control that the state has over civil society. During the 1994 cri$is the symbols of the nation-state and the phraseology and images of official nationalism were diffused to an even greater extent. The Turkish flag was ubiquitous. During the mid-2.ooos, when nationalism shifted gears. planting "disproportionate" flags (90-100 square meters) became a practice of psychological warfare. This campaign was supplemented by installations such as the painting of a 6oo-square-meter flag (using a ton of paint) on a hill near Ankara. People attached stickers of the Turkish flag to their license plates. Star-and-crescent necklaces and badges became especially popular. Some singers and models decked their costumes with the star and crescent. Pretexts to sing the national anthem multiplied. For instance, the spectators started to stand and sing the national anthem before every football match instead of the usual practice of singing it only at games in which the national team appeared. It could even be heard before pop concerts and at the opening of fashion shows in luxury hotels. Facing the economic crises of 1994 and 2.001, both the government and business circles evinced a heroic nationalist discourse. National-progressivist slogans such as "the economic
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey
War of Independence, " "all for Turkey," "striving for Turkey," and "for Turkey, willingly" were coined. The rise of the "Islamist" movement also compelled the official nationalism to emphasize the image of Atatiirk; the portrait of Atatiirk became a kind of logo and was displayed at every opportunity. Without a doubt, this discourse was and is affected by the racialization and fanaticization of Kemalist ulusfuluk. In fact, these discourses are symbiotically related, and the folloWing analysis focuses on the latter.
KEMALIST ULUS<;:ULUK
Kemalism, which was questioned to a great extent in leftist circles during the J980s, flourished anew among the social democratic intelligentsia of the 1990S. The neo-Kemalism of the 1990S, besides constituting a reaction against the hegemony of the New Right and the Islamist movement, had been incited by the anti-Kemalism that these movements shared. NeoKemalism maintained that Kemalism was no longer the official ideology; it had been cast out by the right wing as it tOok control of the government after the September 12, I980, coup. Thus in the beginning the neo-Kemalist movement was relatively distant from the state and attained a more civil character compared to the 19605. The secularist reaction opposing the rise of Islam ism stood on the axis of this movement. The perception of threat regarding a possible reinstitution of the Shari a (the rule of Islamic law) caused the neoKemalist movement to embrace nationalism during the last two years with the realization that it could serve to popularize secularism. This functional and pragmatic embrace of nationalism also depended on the need to seek support from the state and the army and on the renewed interest of some circles in the authoritarian, state-controlled solutions based on the army. The Atatiirk motif became incredibly widespread as the official nationalism became excessively demonstrative, which gave rise to the hopes of spreading Kemalism by way of nationalism. Kemalist uluSfUluk discourse that the neo-Kemalist movemerit acquired from the left-wing Kemalist discourse of the 19605 and 19705 is indeed a version of official nationalism (Atatiirk nationalism) that claims to be left-wing. This claim is founded on the neo-Kemalists' appropriation of the humanistuniversalist branch of Turkish nationalism that is based on territoriality and citizenship. But this neo-Kemalist discourse overlooks and even cloaks the
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ambivalent character of Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, to the extent that it insists on the dissimilarity of Kemalist uluSfUluk and the other nationalist movements, it regenerates the nationalist ideologies of essentialism and uniqueness. During the 19605 and 1970S the chief principles of left-wing Kemalist nationalism as well as the fundamental basis of its claim to be left-wing were anti-imperialism and the stand for independence. In the 19905 these were replaced by secularism; and at the beginning of the twenty-first century the motifs of anti-imperialism and independence once again became marked by the influence of the discourse of antiglobalism. 'This left-wing nationalist discourse reduces both Arabs and Iran to symbols of political Islam; while expressing its opposition to them, it exhibits a stance that is racist, disparaging, and Orientalist. Biilent Ecevit, the prime minister of the "social-liberalnationalistic" coalition government formed after the 1999 elections, typically represents the stance of pro-independence left-wing nationalism; the antiWestern motifs, autarkist national pride, and xenophobia in this posture are striking. The Kemalist uluSfUluk discourse construes nationalism as the advocate of the process of secularization/modernization. The fact that the term ulUSfUluk is preferred to milliyetfilik is part of the design that equates the concept with modernization and sec,ularization. The terms ulu$fUluk (derived from the word ulus) and milliyetfilik (derived from the word millet) are synonymous and both translate into English as "nationalism." Although millet is used in modern Turkish synonymously with ulus (and both words signify "nation"), it was used in Ottoman times to refer to the religiOUS communities of the empire. Ulu$, the modernized term for "nation:' disavows the connotations of the Ottoman times (especially the connection with the Muslim community: ummet).1n the newly formed nation-state of Turkey, nationalism cook over and replaced the monopolized sacredness of religion. 'The efforts to "nationalize" religion are an even clearer indication of this desire. Kemalist ulusfuluk follows this line; by recalling the Single-party Kemalist period when the call to prayer was given in Turkish and considering the Alevi religion a kind of Turkish Islam, it tends toward a kind ofIslamic-Lutheranism. As previously discussed, the upheaval in nationalism in the 2.000S has been nourished by reactions against integration into the EU. 'This integration
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey
was led by a party with Islamist roots, which also caused unrest. The most explicit manifestation of this upheaval is the entrance of Kemalist ulUSfUluk into a new phase: ulus{al}ctbk. The difference is that the "ism" is attached to the adjective form of the word "nation" (ulus) instead of the noun form. The ideological increase, however, is much greater than a mere verbal difference.
Ulus{al}czbk distances itself from Kemalist ulUSfUluk by its fanaticism; it does not appropriate the left-wing Kemalist nationalism's (at least formal) valuation of universal values and humanism and its understanding of nationbuilding as a "success of civilization." This new discourse of ulus{al}ctltk speaks with a language of war provoked by a perception of threat; it accuses opposing political stances of "betraying the nation." As noted in the summary of the new gear of nationalism in the 2..000S, the analogy with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the mythology of the War of Independence also play a prominent role. The best-selling novel $u
Plgtn Turkler
(The Crazy Turks), which dramatically constructs this war as the Turkish nation's resistance against imperialism under the leadership of Atatiirk and despite the conditions of deprivation, provides popular heroic images in this atmosphere.' The ulus{al}ctltk discourse interprets imperialism and globalization not as a part of the material rationality and dynamic complexity of the capitalist system but as a part of a web of intrigues stemming from a single center. As such, a conspiracy mentality forms the building block of this discourse, which reduces politics to an act of "deciphering:' All possible actors are deciphered in accordance with their position in the war between the national forces and the puppets and/or collaborators of the United States and the West; all discourses are deciphered in accordance with the secret messages they convey on the basis of this war. Not surprisingly, this mentality, which produces fanaticism, is also in line with the anti-Semitic patterns of thought and behavior. In fact, ulus{al}ctltk, unlike the traditional line of Kemalist ulUSfuluk, has established a discourse that does not avoid the ethnic implications of"Turkishness" -on the contrary, it refers to racist motifs. Without a doubt, it can be argued that the "old" Kernalist ulusfuluk accommodated the seedsof this nationalistic fanaticism: ulus{al)ctltk. Nevertheless, ulus{al)czltkhas6pened a new phase.
68
Taml Bora THE LIBERAL "NEO-NATIONALISM"
The official nationalism in Turkey has a strong modernist-Westernizing vein. Besides Kemalist ulUSfuluk, liberal nationalism is also an offspring of this vein. Yet it provides an interpretation of modernization from an economic perspective; as such it emphasizes the progressivist-developmentalist aspects of the process of modernization. The ideology of liberal nationalism matured toward the end of the 1980S, through the progress of the capitalist modernization process in Turkey. The discourse of liberal nationalism defines national identity in terms of the fervor and ability to attain the level of the "developed" or wealthy countries of the world-in other words, to attain the level of the West. It explains national pride not through the nation's unique, authentic characteristics but through its capacity to harmonize with universal standards. Yet the essentialist discourse of nationalism, of course, fancies this harmony to be an inborn trait "intrinsic to us." Such a nationalist conception, which is tied to the Kemalist goal of attaining the level of "modern civilization:' was potentially present in the liberal and social-democratic circles in Turkey. The dazzling aura of the globalization discourse made this conception more manifest and turned it into an ideological discourse. The discourse of liberal nationalism emerged following the self-confidence boom that Turkey experienced in the early 1990S. The most influential advocates of this discourse are the media, which are intertwined with big capital. Economics holds a privileged position in liberal nationalism. Creating a national market can be regarded as the most important function of nationalism, and it is in fact natural that a liberal type of nationalism emphasizes this function. This cold and scheming aspect of nationalism, however, does not really befit its enthusiastic character. As a matter of fact, even the National Economy movement, which emerged in the early years of the republic, transformed the economy into a vehicle and justified its goals through factors external to economics. The economic dimension of nationalism has been able to become a verbalvisual entity through the populist progressivist discourses of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). This dimension has been strengthened only recently as the ideology of economics has became hegemonic and as Turkish capitalism's progress in interfusing with the global economy has been ingrained into the collective consciousness as a national achievement. The liberal discourse can now speak of"the market
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey
69
and cultural unity of frozen foods, telephone ads, and soccer games" with enthusiasm and pride (Uluengin 1993a). Now the rise in exports, consumption, and standard of living and the fact that "the bonds of our government are eagerly bought on the Tokyo stock exchange"-in short, the dynamism of the economy-are treated as factors that flatter Turkish national pride most (Hurriyet, May 13, 1993). The enterprising energy of the "Turkish people;' which has been revealed with the liberalization of the economy. is lauded as an extremely valuable national characteristic. Even the anomie and vandalism generated by the inconsistencies of sacralizing economic entrepreneurship are tolerated and are considered to be the side effects of a healthy development. A radical variation of liberal nationalism. interfused with the ideology of economics, is the neo-liberal chauvinism of prosperity. This attitude. which violates the idea of social solidarity by its reluctance to share with the "underdeveloped" regions or communities the prosperity that it produces, is akin to class racism, which stigmatizes and discriminates against the lower classes by viewing them as backward and "of no breeding" and segregates them as a different "race" (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). Certain elements of this prosperity chauvinism and class racism can be seen in the liberal nationalism in Turkey. For instance, in 1994 Aegean business leaders demanded financial federalism because they were unhappy about having Ankara laying hands on the wealth they were producing. The villagers who owned land in the economically developing regions had been acting as the strongest advocates of privatization because they considered workers and civil servants parasites. The Europeanized urban upper middle classes (the Euro-Turks) have supposedly caught up with the EU norms not only educationally and professionally but also in terms of consumption, manners, cultural interests, and even in terms of biological standards such as light complexion, tall stature, and other physical attainments. They distinguish themselves as the elite group that represents the nation's essence as opposed to the impoverished lower classes, which they see as a hindrance in entering the ED. When the reactions of class egoism are shaped into nationalist patterns, they can form the nuclei of class racism. The stance that sees the Kurdish immigrants, who come to the western regions in search of jobs and/or as refugees from the war, as parasites gnawing at economic prosperity can easily ally the chauvinism of prosperity with ethno-nationalist radicalism.
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Tanll Bora
One very important source of pride for liberal nationalism is the de~ gree to which the domestic market merges with the global market and be~ comes identical to the world markets. This integration best manifests itself in the patterns of consumption. The consumer culture in this day and age is the main signifier of "modern civilization" and "universal culture." Neo~ nationalism has indeed buried the slogan of old~style nationalism: "Local goods are Turkish goods, every Turk should use them." Instead it takes pride in seeing in Istanbul "the brands that one can see in Paris, in Washington, in Tokyo" and in catching up with the universal "aesthetics of store windows and shopping" (Ozkok 1993C). It glorifies providing in tourism "not just na~ ture and history, as it did in the past, but also entertainment" and in haVing achieved an "international lifestyle" with credit cards, bars, discos, McDon~ aId's, and international pizza chains. For these all mean that Turkey is a "country that has attained a phUosophy equivalent to that of the West, and a similar level of institutionalization" (Civaoglu 1993). This language of na~ tionalism indeed resembles the language of advertising, the sine qua non rite of consumer culture. The civilizationist discourse of liberal nationalism adapts the ideal of attaining the level of "modern civilization" inherited from Atatiirkism as well as market fetishism and defines the cultural identity in terms of the ability to achieve and catch up ~ith the modern lifestyle. Benefits such as being open to the world, enjoying the pleasures of life, and mastering the tOols of the in~ formation society (such as computers and the English language) are lauded as the values of the "new Turkish" identity. In this context, for instance, when extOlling the victory of the Efes Pilsen basketball team over Panathinakos in Athens, arguments such as "basketball without hesitation is the sport of urbanites and of the cities" become commonplace (Uluengin 1993b). In his eulogy, Hadi Uluengin maintains that "my country has cast off its fanks [rawhide sandals] and become a dynamic society in basketball shoes; it has graduated from the stagnant soilta the swishing bask~t. " The national hero figure of the "new Turk" or "Euro-Turk" is the youth, particularly urban upper- and middle-class youths. l The urban youth is indeed the most dynamic consumer of the modern/globallifestyle and of its distributor and simulator, the media. As it is generally pointed out, the urban youths in Turkey are integrated with the modern culture as much as their Western counterparts are. The physical appearance of urban youths
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71
is also underlined as a source of pride. Ertugrul Ozkok, the editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Hurriyet and one of the biggest supporters of liberal neo-nationalism, is also the apostle of the good tidings that "the Turkish populace is becoming more comely" (Ozkok 1992). Even in describing a soldier who lost his leg in the southeast. Ozkok draws attention to "his very slender face set offby thin wire-framed glasses" and calls this "the portrait of the changing, modernizing new Turkish youth" (Ozkok 1992). He describes Sabahattin Oztiirk, who won Turkey its first world championship in wrestling in twenty-three years: "Contemporary and good-looking. No mustache. strongly built, young and modern .... Our Sabahattin is more handsome, more modern. more contemporary than his counterparts in the West" (Ozkok 1993b). It should be noted here that the eugenic tendencies of this civilizationist discourse of nationalism may well lead to neo-racism if it gets carried away by the enthusiasm embodied in the assertion that "the populace is becoming more comely:' As consumer culture increasingly becomes the most valid signifier of the level of modern civilization, high culture is replaced by popular culture, and various forms of mass culture come to dominate the national culture. Liberal nationalism gives its due to this change; it transfers the fervor of nationalism to the world of popular culture. The position that Turkish pop music has acquired in the ritual economy of neo-nationalism reflects this tendency. The narcissism that manifests itselfin the "I love you so much" messages that stars and admirers exchange as a credo in pop music rites is transferred to a national narcissism through the discourse of liberal nationalism. Furthermore, this narcissism intermingles with hedonism. Ozkok, while advocating liberal neo-nationalism, preaches a "civil," entertaining national self-confidence that appeals to everyday life and has no business with "gray colors, grave speeches:' or politicS: "Turkey's indestructible strength, its somehow persisting stability. lies in this passion to live [which also manifests itself in pop music]" (Ozkok 1993a). . . . . . During the 2000S we have witnessed various events tha.t;.h~V'ef~is~dna tional confidence by nOUrishing this national narcissism~Ir12~.o6t1lel.inion of European Football Associations (UEFA) Cup was won'~y¥t¥kishteam (Galatasaray) for the first time, and in 2002 the Turkislt~~ti().~alfootball team attained third place in the World Cup. In 2oospop~ing#~S~l'ta~Etener won the Eurovision Song Contest. In 2007 Olker; a ~aj§t'f()#4gl'()~ucer in
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Turkey, purchased one of the most prestigious chocolate brands in the world, Godiva. Finally, a "Turk" (Muhtar Kent) was promoted to the position of chief executive officer in Coca Cola. The discourse of liberal nationalism is nourished with these selfconfidence serums. With its narcissistic and hedonistic character, it stands aloof both from the rigidity of official nationalism and from the fanaticism of ethno-essentialist nationalism. In contrast to the anachronisms of these types of nationalisms, liberal nationalism presents itself as the nationalism of the twenty-first century: a sterile nationalism without complexes that is not formalist, that has dissociated itself from populism and the rural world, and that does not transform national altruism into masochism. The leading exponents of this discourse support terminologies such as "constitutional citizenship" and "Turkish nationalism" that have nothing to do with the ethno-essentialist line; but while doing this, they continue to embrace the aura of sacredness that is part and parcel of traditional nationalism. Ozkok, for instance, used the story of the guitarist of a heavy metal group from Istanbul who died while fighting the PKK in the southwest as the proof that neo-nationalism is not lacking in patriotism. The discourse of liberal neo-nationalism is not only compatible with such causes and taboos of the official nationalism but can even transform and appropriate its basic themes. For example, the "renaissance of Turkish music:' which pop music is believed to have achieved, is celebrated as the realization ofZiya GokaIp's East-West synthesis on the "civil" level. In the words of6zkok (1993a): "Turkey has finally found the magnificent synthesis that it had been looking for since the nineteenth century. We are discovering how to experience the East with the rhythm of the West." This East-West synthesis was attained not through the cultural policies of the state but through the dynamics of the market. Again quoting Ozkok (1994): "[The pop star Tarkan] is the first full-blown megastar of the East-West synthesis, uniting Turkish people of all ages .... The new music that gushes forth from Tarkan's unbuttoned shirt gives the first signs of the transition to sedentary life in the aftermath of an exodus, a mental migration. an aesthetic nomadism that had rejected the East without being able to set foot in the West." In fact, the language of liberal neo-nationalism is a loose discourse. For this reason, it can easily succumb to the hegemony of other nationalist discourses. Due to its capacity to address a large audience. however, it has a chance to assert its domination
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in the modernization process. Turkey's goal of entering the EU also introduces the necessary grounds that encourage the growth of this language of nationalism.
PAN-TuRKIST RADICAL NATIONALISM
The pan-Turanist/Turkist nationalism is a perverted branch of the official nationalism. It is a fascistic ideology founded by the pan-Turkist intelligentsia, which has pursued the racist-ethnicist vein of the official nationalism to its extreme. It departs from the patriotic/''Anatolianist'' line of Atatiirk nationalism and instead refers to the entire territories inhabited by people from the Turkic descent as the homeland. Yet with respect to cultural essentialism and the conception of an organic and authoritarian society, one may argue that the difference between this type of nationalism and the official nationalism of the period remains on a quantitative level. It can be defined on a scale of extremeness-moderateness. The historical conception based on imagining an eternal national existence and the conception of a "national religion" are the points where pan-Turkist nationalism and official nationalism coalesce. The tension between the pan-Turanist/Turkist movement and the official nationalism reached its peak during the World War II years. In 1944, as Turkey joined the Western alliance with urgent haste, the pan-Turkist movement was reduced to a marginal intellectual movement. In the 19605 a new course was plotted by the idealist (itlkiteu) movement and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetc;i Hareket Partisi, MHP). Both the movement and the party rested upon an anti-Communist fanaticism and were formed by Alparslan Tlirke~ through merging the legacy of the pan-Turkist movement with the nationalist-conservative reactionary potential of the 1950S. On the ideological level the racist motives lost ground, and a new discourse of nationalism based on cultural-historical essentialism has developed. This development intensified in the 1970S, and during the late 1970S and early 1980s it went so far as to assert Islam as the principal element of national identity. Following the military coup of September 12, 1980, the dominance of Islamic identity increased to a great extent. The instances in which the state undertook the mission of acting as a de facto militia prior to the coup were also questioned. During this period the pan-Turkist themes became blurred (Bora and Can 1999). In the 1990S a new transformation took
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place as pan-Turkism become "rational:' The reactionary nationalist wave that arose against the Kurdish national movement was part and parcel of this transformation. The idealist movement, both by acting as the original defender of pan-Turkism and by supporting the state morally and materially against the Kurdish "secessionism;' rehabilitated its relationship with the official nationalism. Accordingly, it drew closer to the political center. Yet at the same time it strengthened its cultural and popular ties (Bora 2.001). It distanced itself from its extremist outlook and became "normalized." Along with this development. the MHP rapidly grew stronger. The party increased its votes from 2...9 percent in 1987 to almost 10 percent (which is the threshold required to enter the parliament) in the general elections of 1995. Finally. it took part in the coalition government by gathering close to 18 percent of the votes in the 1999 elections. One aspect of the ideological change that the idealist movement underwent in the 1990S was "re-Turkicizing." The pan-Turanist/Turkist literature. which had become marginalized since the mid-1970S. was revived during this period. References to Turkish mythology and ancient Turkish history multiplied. The totem of original Turkism. the bozkurt (gray wolf). regained esteem both as a symbol and as the name of the young idealist movement Bozkurtlar (Gray Wolves). The books written by Nihal AtSlZ. a prominent racist-fascist author of the 1930S and 19405. were reprinted. Various websites promoting AtSlZ and his works emerged. Another development that occurred on the ideological level as a consequence of this re-Turkicizing was the reduction of Islamism to the position of a subordinate. secondary component of national identity. This transformation of course included other factors: (1) the rivalry between the Islamic and the nationalist movements became more severe as the Islamic movement grew and became a hegemonic power; (2..) the Islamic movement (and the Islamic countries) came to compete in the Turkic republics with the influence that Turkey enjoys there; and (3) the new relation of the MHP with official nationalism drew it closer to a secular position. Even though the MHP did not strongly support the February 28. 1997, process, in which the Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Parrisi, RP) was removed from the political power on the initiative of the army, it nevertheless gave implicit approval to this process with the aim of winning the truSt of the regime. This approval reinforced the secular tendency of the MHP, which paralleled the party's appropriation of Atatiirk by depicting
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him not only as an uncompromising Turkish nationalist but as a pan-Turkist. a ba;bug (chief leader) who espoused the pan-T urkist utopia. Since the beginning of the 1990S the idealist-nationalist youth movement. which had a fanatical and harsh character, has reached out beyond the limits of its traditional constituency and has begun displaying its repertory of symbols outside of its inner circle. The movement started finding sympathizers among the young urban upper-middle classes and reaching modern youth who listened to rock and pop music. The popularization of the idealist/panTurkist symbols and the modernizing tendencies of the idealist movement's young constituency enabled links to be formed between this movement and liberal nationalism. While this expansion opened a new area of influence for the MHP, it also brought problems for the party. From an organizational point of view, it was difficult to absorb the conflicts between the traditional constituency, which had stronger religiOUS proclivities, and the new urban-modern constituency. From the ideological point of view. the party felt anxiety that the rigid essentialism of the pan-Turkist movement could be destroyed by the different identity-perceptions of official and liberal nationalisms. The identity conceptions of the latter were indeed more "lax" and carried the risk of shifting toward cosmopolitism and becoming non-national in character. The problems caused by this tension undoubtedly played a part in the MHP's poor performance in the 1995 general elections; the party was not able to pass the 10 percent threshold. After the death ofTtirke~, who emphasized the modernizing image of his party somewhat exaggeratedly, Deviet Bah
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the labeling of local plant and animal species with Turkish names, and the cool reception given to the foreign aid provided during the major earthquake of 1999, out of concern that it was a vehicle of foreign interference or even espionage. Apart from these, two important matters that challenged the MHP's own specific conception of nationalism were the death sentence of Abdullah 0calan and the legal measures necessary for Turkey to become a member of the ED. The MHP leaders supported the execution of 0calan, because they saw him as personifying the "Kurdish problem:' which in any event they codified as the problem of terrorism. Nevertheless, they consented to not having the sentence executed. They justified this consent in terms of not wanting to put Turkey in a difficult position on the international arena. It was part of the MHP's strategy of earning trust in the eyes of the establishment by showing the party's absolute loyalty to supraparty state policies. As for the goal of entering the EU, which the establishment also designated as a supraparty policy, the MHP did not oppose it. But it interpreted the EU membership as a transitional step in Turkey'S march toward the status of great power or world power. On the one hand, the party insisted that the EU must not prevent Turkey from pursuing its eternal historical aspirations. On the other hand, the MHP spokespersons continued to interpret the legal arrangements undertaken toward integration with the EU's supranational framework as undermining the foundations of the nationstate. These measures were even referred to as a natural continuation of Europe's ancient plans aimed at partitioning Turkey. In the summer of 1.002. the MHP voted against the EU harmonization laws in parliament, going against the nationallefi:-winglliberal-conservative majority of the government of which it is a part. Afi:er the 2.002. general elections the MHP developed a strategy based on reacting against the policies implemented for the EU integration. The MHP cadres continued to provide the main ground for the reactionary nationalist potential in Turkey, while attempting to hold it back from the streets and provocative events and to keep it under control. This stand was a result of both the MHP cadres' worries about being used in provocations outside their control and the plan to continue to be regarded by the regime elite and the people as a responSible party with common sense. The groups affected by this movement. however, played prominent roles in various lynching attempts
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that were carried out during the nationalist upheavals that took place between 2.006 and 2.008. It should be mentioned here that movements that considered the MHP inadequate have emerged within the idealist-nationalist circles. The MHP was not seen taking the necessary active stance against the developments that threatened national existence. This opposition emerged particularly after the Kurdish movement's reinitiation of armed struggle and developed as a result of the spreading of the aforementioned anti-Kurdish resentment. The Unity of Patriotic Forces (Vatansever Kuvvecler Giis: Birligi), established by the retired officers who left the MHP, attracted attention in 2.006 after organizing a mass march in Mersin-a city where mass Turkish and Kurdish populations coexist. During the march a Turkish flag some kilometers in length was carried and threatening slogans were heard. In the same year a small racist group in izmir called the Tribalists (Buduncular) initiated a signature campaign that demanded the implementation of measures to prevent Kurds from reproducing and migrating to the western regions. Furthermore, the Grand Unity Party (Biiyiik Birlik Partisi, BBP), established in 1992.. reinforced this racist-fascist stand. Although the party Originally embraced an Islamist"civil SOciety" discourse, it soon transformed into a racist-fascist discourse that attracted the radicals who were unhappy about the MHP's approach to the center.
NATIONALISM IN ISLAMISM
After the 1980S Turkish modern Islamist intellectuals developed a radical criticism of the nation-state and of nationalism. In the traditional Islamist discourse, the Muslim community (ummet) stands above the nation. Yet one cannot overlook the strong nationalist implications in the discourse of the Islamist movement in Turkey, whose core is formed by the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi. MSP), Welfare Party (RP), Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP). Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), and Justice and Development Party (AKP). This type of nationalism envisages Turkey as the potential leader of the Islamic world. Within this context the nostalgia for the Ottoman past translates into a modern and nationalistic imperial (or irredentist) fantasy (Bora 1999). Anti-Western xenophobia is the common denominator of pan-Turkist nationalism and Islamism. The specific point of Islamism is
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that it assumes religious identity to be the differentiating element and the backbone of the nation and of nationhood. In view of this, Islam is viewed as the authentic core of the Turkish national identity. Another ideological denominator linking the main Islamist movement with the official modernist nationalism is progressivism-developmentalism. The RP leadership, composed of the Muslim technocratic elite and the new Muslim bourgeoisie, lauded heavy industry as opposed to financial speculation and has been a faithful disciple of the "cause for national progressivism." This makes it possible to form a bond between the nationalist elements within the RP-centered Islamist movement and the discourse of liberal nationalism. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister and the leader of the AKP, occasionally approximates the discourse of liberal nationalism through using the phrase "positive nationalism." In Turkey we observe this trend in the liberal-right tradition, which sees economic development and the ability to attain prosperity as the ultimate sources of national pride. The pragmatist and utilitarian AKP, however, does not embrace this stand once and for all. It either flirts with the reactionary nationalism or parries or stalls the nationalist reactions, not rejecting them outright. The SP, on the contrary, maintains the tradition of orthodox Islam and solidifies the anti-EU and anti-Western stance of this tradition. But this party is being increasingly marginalized. More significant is the ethno-religious populism represented by the newspaper Vakit (Time), which sells almost sixty thousand copies daily. Using macho slang and anti-Communist cliches dating from the Cold War, the newspaper creates a fascist mental universe for its Islamist readers. It declares the secularists, "Westernists," the entire "West:' Masonry, Jews, Zionists, apostates, non-Muslims, and above all the "leftist mentality" -which the newspaper sees as the common denominator of all- to be enemies and incites hatred toward them. All enemies are attributed non-Muslim or non-Turkish origins and defined accordingly by their ethno-religious identities.
HYBRID LANGUAGES AND THE PROBLEM OF HEGEMONY
In addition to tensions, each type of nationalism contains articulations, osmoses, and syntheses among its "Eastern" and "Western," ethno-essentialist
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and civil faces. Such cross-breedings prove to be fruitful and complex in Turkey, where the nationalist language and its different dialects are in continuous progress. Positions known as left and right can come together on the common ground of nationalism. Yet the most striking fusions result from the transfer of the verbal-visual universe of nationalism to the field of popular culture. Many national symbols become a kind of "pop" coat of arms; as such they can be worn relatively independent of a specific political meaning. National symbols become trademarks, engendering their consumption. Thus a dual process begins. The nationalist "exhibitionism" comes to dominate the everyday life and public arenas, yet it is tamed through becoming popularized. This broad and disorganized lexicon created by the plurality of nationalist discourses gives rise to a great swarm of words, becoming a nationalistic hubbub. Nationalism's tyrannizing discourse dominates politics and everyday life. Furthermore, its monopolizing logic expands to the utmost, generating fervor and violence, turning all the political opposition into enemies, insisting on national unity as a dogma, and turning the "shared good" into something otherworldly. The struggle for hegemony that arises among the different nationalist discourses above all reinforces the pressure of nationalism's structural logic. As already noted, the new gear of the 2.000S has increased this pressure. The discursive hybridizations have multiplied. Grotesqueness and fanaticism have surfaced as the results of the chemical reactions between various nationalisms. Despite the short life span of the Ktztlelma Coalition, which brought together Kemalist-nationalists, idealists, and pseudo-leftists with nationalsocialist ideologies, the symbiosis between the ulus{al}ct and idealist groups continued to devel0p.4 This symbiosis has popularized the ethnicist-racist mind-set and conspiracy theories. The murder of Hrant Dink, a prominent Armenian-Turkish journalist and intellectual, in 2007 is an unfortunate example of the outcomes of such a symbiosis. The only thing that is clear about this murder, which is otherwise marked by unanswered questions, is the web of relations of the young assassin. The assassin, a young lumpen, has been influenced by the daily ulus{al}ct and nationalist agitation, which is fueled primarily by the webpages that instigate racist violence and has found himself in the midst of an intricate web of relations (involving the BBP's local organizations, gendarmerie and police units, and "unknown" provocateurs). As a
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result, he volunteered to "kill the Armenian" (the first words of the assassin when he was caught after the murder). At this point the ulus{al}a conspiracy attempts should also be noted. After :2.005 the ulus{al}c~ circles, which include retired military officers as active members, made attempts to topple the AKP government. At the ideological base of these attempts lay the ulus{al)c~ theses. It was argued that the AKP government was not adequately attending to the "national sensibilities" and due to its antisecular, Islamist hidden agenda was willing to carry out the United States' "moderate Islam belt" project directed toward the Middle East. We know that these groups. who have used psychological warfare methods in the media and in nationalist campaigns. have attempted to motivate the army to intervene against this threat. We can now return to the discussion of the struggle for hegemony among nationalisms. As liberal nationalism is far from having a complete ideological doctrine, it has a power that may not be visible but is actually very influential. This is why it permeates most of this chapter; this dialect indeed tends to form the hegemonic discourse of Turkish nationalism. All the languages of nationalism are apt to join this discursive system, regardless of the themes and material they use. As mentioned before, the discourse of "pOSitive nationalism" at times referred to by AKP also displays a tendency to be part of this system. But a handi~ap of the language ofliberal nationalism is that it appeals to the "winners" of this process; it is not likely that this language can convince the underclasses in difficult economic situations. This is why the discourse of liberal nationalism will probably become fused with other nationalist languages, making concessions from its own discursive system along the way. Under these circumstances, the official nationalism and pan-Turkist nationalism, as well as the ulus{al}cz hybrids, wUl come to the fore as they provide more complete discursive systems. They will continue to exert influence especially because of the "maturity" of their reflexes in the face of burning national issues.
NOTES I.
2.
Such expressions pointing to the indivisibility of the Turkish state were incorporated into the opening statement of the 1982. Constitution. The novel. published in 2005, has sold almost I ~illion copies since then.
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey 3. 4.
In the words of those who critically oppose this discourse: the "white Turk." Ulus(al}cl is the adjective form of the term ulus(al}a1tk. For the ulus(al}czltk discourse, see the section "Kemalist Ulusfuluk" above.
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5
THE CHANGING NATURE OF NATIONALISM IN TURKEY
Actors, Discourses, and the Struggle for Hegemony
UMUT OZKIRIMLI
ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1982 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
states: "The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity." This is of course. a reiteration of the famous French revolutionary formula "la Republique une et indivisible:' first used by the National Convention on September 25, 1792, and incorporated in every French constitution starting with the Constitution of June 24, 1793. The key word here is "indivisible:' which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as "incapable of being divided (actually, or in thought); incapable of being distributed among a number; incapable of being separated or detached, inseparable." A republic or a state is only one and indivisible, "incapable of being divided (actually, or in thought);' if it contains no fault lines along which it can fracture-in other words, if the nation it harbors is homogeneous and devoid of any cleavages, social, cultural, or political. The aim of this chapter is to deconstruct the myth of the "homogeneous nation" with particular reference to the case of Turkey. It does this by drawing together a Gramscian reading of nationalism and the topographical approach ofJean Pierre Faye and integrating this with the broader debates on nationalism in Turkey that have been taking place over the past two decades
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or so. In this context, I first propose a conceptual and theoretical framework that takes the plural and heterogeneous character of nationalism into account. I then provide a topography of nationalist discourses in Turkey with a view to throwing light on the dynamics of the ongoing struggle for hegemony over the nation by various social and political forces at the turn of the twenty-first century. This particular reading places the emphasis on the protean nature of nationalism, the diversity of its discourses, and their respective operationalization. Nationalism is presented as a field of positions in which different and often competing narratives circulate, a field that defies the straitjacket of neat categorization, where osmosis and exchange are the norm.
THE MYTH OF THE "HOMOGENEOUS NATION"
Homogeneity is nationalism's ultimate dream, the quintessential characteristic of the "immaculate nation:' as the oft-quoted definition of nationalism as "a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" by Ernest Gellner (1983, p. I) reminds us. Yet such correspondence has been an aberration not a constant in human history. Ethnic and cultural pluralism has been the norm, and the content and the boundaries of the nation have been ceaselessly contested by those who were not considered to be and in most cases did not consider themselves to be part of the officially defined nation. National homogeneity, in the sense of a complete congruence between national and political units, is and has always been a pipe dream. Yet nationalism never relinquishes its claim to homogeneity and continues to turn a blind eye to the fractures, divisions, and differences of opinion that exist within the nation. Even when the differences are acknowledged. nationalism claims that the interests and values of the nation override all other interests and values. It divides the world into binary categories; into "us" and "them; "friends" and "foes," positing a homogeneous and fixed identity on either side. Nationalism produces and legitimates hierarchies among actors, authOrizing particular formulations of the nation.· against others. There is only one "authentic" culture. in which all the·mernbersofthe collective "us" are presumed to share. This transforms the lang11~ge()fnational ism into a language of morality and renders nationalis.lllthevery h~rizon of
Umut Ozklrlmll
political discourse (for similar views. see Billig 1995; Calhoun 1997; Herzfeld 1997; Finlayson 1998; Suny 2.001; Brubaker 2004). Needless to say. this conception of "us" and "culture" is very problematic.
as there is no single narrative of the nation. As Prasenjit Duara (1996. pp. 16162) notes:
[TJhe way in which the nation is imagined. viewed and voiced by different self-conscious groups can indeed be very different. Indeed we may speak of different "nation-views" as we do "world-views:' which are not overriden by the nation, but actually define or constitute it. In place of the harmonized. monologic voice of the Nation. we find a polyphony of voices, overlapping and criss-crossing; contradictory and ambiguous: opposing, affirming and negotiating their views of the nation. The same goes for national cultures that are constructed through a multiplicity of relations, which reflect existing social hierarchies, hence particular structures of power and control. As the configuration of power in a given society changes, so do cultures. In the words of Bhikhu Parekh (:2.000. p. 52). "culture ... is not a passive inheritance bur an active process of creating meaning, not given but constantly redefined and reconstituted." The process through which nations. and national cultures are constructed is a complex one, with no sense of closure. Echoing E. P. Thompson (1980) in his foray into the process of the making of the English working class, we might argue that the making of nations can be likened to a journey of discovery, of coming together and parting, of osmosis, exchange, struggle, and confrontation. The myth of the "homogenous nation" is not the preserve of nationalists, however, and informs media reporting and popular-even academic-commentaries that ignore the dynamic and contentious nature of nation-formation and continue to talk of nations as "monolithic" entities. According to Rogers Brubaker, who has provided the most elaborate analysis of this problem to date, most discussions of nationalism begin with the question "what is a nation?" This question, Brubaker (1996, pp. 13-14) argues, is not as theoretically innocent as it seems: "the very terms in which it is framed presuppose the existence of the entity that is to be defined." Accordingly, we casually "reify" ethnic and national groups in our everyday talk and writing, speaking of "the Serbs;' "the Croats;' or "the Turks" for that matter, as if they
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were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes (Brubaker 1998, p. 2.93). Brubaker (1998, p. 2.9, 2.004) introduces the term "groupism" to refer to "the social ontology that leads us to talk and write about ethnic groups and nations as real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring. internally homogeneous and externally bounded collectivities." The problem with the treatment of nations as real entities, according to Brubaker, is that it adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. It takes a conception inherent in the practice of nationalism and makes it central to the theory of nationalism (Brubaker 1996, p. IS). Yet the problem is not only intellectual. Reification, Brubaker notes, is also a social process. As such, it is central to the practice of ethnic politicS. Reifying groups is precisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, who may live "off" as well as "for" ethnicity, are in the business of doing. By invoking groups, these entrepreneurs seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being: When they are successful, the political fiction of the unified group can be momentarily yet powerfully realized in practice. As analysts, we should certainly try to account for the ways in which-and conditions under which-this practice of reification, this powerful crystallization of group feeling, can work .... But we should avoid unintentionally doubling or reinforcing the reification of ethnic groups in ethnopolitical practice with a reification of such groups in social analysis. (Brubaker 2.002, pp. 166-67) This last point is crucial, says Brubaker, and needs to be emphasized more than ever at a time when groupist language prevails in everyday life, journalism, politics, and much of social research. We should treat "group ness" as variable, "as emergent properties of particular structural or conjunctural settings" (Brubaker 1998, p. 298): We should not ask "what is a nation" but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within anda.tnong states? How does nation work as practical category, as· classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that categ~ry by or against states more or less resonant and effective? (Brubaker 1996, p. 16)
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This suggests that we should think of nationalism in the plural or as a site where different constructions of the nation contest and negotiate with each other. Nation-building is not a "teleological" process, tending toward a pre~ determined outcome; it is a social process that involves diverse intentions, a struggle for hegemony between different social and political forces, competing over the final definition of the nation. What is more, the struggle for hegemony does not end after the establishment (or consolidation) of an independent state. Evidently, the victorious nationalist project enjoys considerable advantages over its competitors: it can now employ the "ideological apparatuses" of the state for the cultivation of its values among the medley of populations that inhabit its territories (Althusser 1971). The state monopolizes all channels of socialization from the family and schools to the army and the media. It leaves its imprint on a host of cultural practices, including sports, common pastimes, and holidays, thus permeating everyday life in a myriad of small and taken-for-granted ways. This is in a way a process of "selfreproduction:' whereby nationalism perpetuates its hegemony. At this point, we should recall that in the formulation of Antonio Gramsci (1971) hegemony entails a complex combination of "coercion" and "consene' No ideology, including nationalism, can maintain its hegemony through coercion alone. The fact of hegemony "presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies ?f the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equUibrium should be formed" (Gramsci 1971, p. 161). Reproduction is the main channel through which nationalism attains the "compromise equilibrium." Yet the achievement of hegemony is never total. However potent the victorious nationalist project may be, the society, precisely due to its internal diversity, produces alternative projects (identities, values, even cultures) in defiance of the much-desired homogeneity. Sometimes these projects consist of the reawakening of the failed aspirations of the earlier nation-building process; at other times, they are fresh projects bred by changing conditions. These alternative projects stand in a complex relationship to the nationalism imposed and reproduced by the state, oscillating between conflict and compromise. Here we might return to the concept of hegemony and use it, as William Roseberry (1996) suggests, not to understand the unity of coercion and consent in situations of domination, as Gramsci originally intended, but to understand struggle or the ways in which the words, images, symbols,
The Changing Nature of Nationalism in Turkey
organizations, and institutions of the subordinate populations used to talk about or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself: What hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting about social orders characterized by domination .... The common material and meaningful framework is, in part, discursive, a common language or way of talking about social relationships that sets out the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can occur. (Roseberry 1996, p. 80) The image of "hegemony" that Roseberry portrays fits in perfectly with the way in which nationalism is conceptualized in this chapter and enables us to understand both the process of reproduction of nationalism and how (and the extent to which) it can be resisted. When a common discursive framework, such as nationalism, achieves hegemony, certain forms of activity are given the official seal of approval, while others are declared offensive and inadmissible. In such a context, even "forms and languages of protest or resistance must adopt the forms and languages of domination in order to be registered or heard" (Roseberry 1996, p. 81). This is also what James Scott (19 85) argues in his classic f.Veapons of the f.Veak, which recounts the story of everyday peasant resistance in the small village of Sedaka (Malaysia) in the 1970S. According to Scott, resistance to a system of domination is indeed possible; subordinate groups can and otten do penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology. But the ideological struggle takes place within the normative framework of the existing hegemony: The crucial point is rather that the very process of attempting to legitimate a social order by idealizing it always provides its subjects with the means, the symbolic tools, the very ideas for a critique that operates entirely within the hegemony. For most purposes,. then, it is not at all necessary for subordinate classes to set foot outside the confines of the ruling ideals in order to formulate a critique of power. (Scott 1985, p. 338; emphasis in the original)
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The wider picture will be dearer if we distinguish between two levels of hegemony: the hegemony of state nationalism and the broader hegemony of nationalism as a horizon of political discourse. As alluded to earlier, much of the opposition to state nationalism acknowledges its hegemony to a degree: alternative forms of nationalism are continually using the values of state nationalism in order to press their claims or disparage the claims of their opponents. This is the case, for example, with dissident nationalisms in Turkey, which do not openly question the principle of secularism or more generally Kemalism. Yet certain alternative projects will manage to go beyond the first hegemony and question the foundational principles of the state. Cases in point are variants of Kurdish nationalism striving for independent statehood or a federal structure in Turkey. They will do this, how~ ever, by employing the "universal" language of nationalism. In other words, they will propagate an alternative "nationalist" project against the State and its principles; they will substitute a given set of "national" principles and values with alternative "national" principles and values. But the projects that seek to go beyond the second hegemony, the broader hegemony of na~ tionalism (say, cosmopolitan or multiculturalist projects), are very few in the current "national order of things" (Malkki 1996); what is more, they are weak, lacking in mass support, as they are commonly perceived to be "state~ subverting." The merit of this conception of hegemony is that it helps us draw a more complex map of a field over which a particular ideology or discourse, in this case nationalism, reigns. It also points to the need to develop a new language that does not treat nations as homogeneous, unitary wholes. As Katherine Verdery (1993, p. 39) suggests, the nation is better seen as a symbol, "and any given nationalism as haVing multiple meanings, offered as alternatives and competed over by different groups manoeuvring to capture the symbol's definition and its legitimating effects." Groups orienting to the nation all take it to be the paramount symbol, Verdery contends, but they have different in~ tendons for it. Treating the nation as a symbol increases our sensitivity to the social tensions and struggles within which it has become a Significant idiom-"a form of currency, used to trade on issues that may not be about the nation at all" (Verdery 1993, pp. 41-.42).
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TURKISH NATIONALISMS AND HEGEMONY
Atatiirk nationalism, Kemalist nationalism or Kemalism, Turkism, uluStuluk (literally "nationalism;' derived from the modern Turkish word ulus [nation] instead of the more religiously loaded millet, used by the antiimperialist, Third-Worldist Left in the 1960$ and 1970S), ulusalczlzk (again literally "nationalism," derived from the adjective ulusal [national], used by a broad coalition of social and political forces sharing a staunchly secularist, anti-West/EU-skeptical outlook), patriotism~if there is one single Turkish nationalism, which one is it? The answer to this question would probably vary according to the historical period in which it is raised or the person it is addressed to. For the Constitution of 1982., it is Atatiirk nationalism; for the late Biilent Ecevit, the former leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP), it was uluSfuluk; for the socialist or Communist Left, it is patriotism; for a member of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), it is Turkism or simply Turkish nationalism; for a Kemalist, it is, at least today, ulusalctlzk. More importantly, the contours of what each term means are not fixed or static. Hence the patriotism of the 1960s, which was mixed with a strong dose of anti-Americanism, is different from contemporary patriotism, which defines itself more on the basis of EU-skepticism. The members of what has been commonly referred as the "red apple coalition" (inspired by the term "red apple;' denoting the mythical Turkish land in Central Asia) in the media define ulusalctlzk differently, depending on whether they are affiliated with the MHP or the Workers Party (ip). And in due process, certain terms are removed from circulation, as in the case of ulustuluk, which is Widely replaced by ulusalctlzk today (on Turkish nationalisms, see KadlOglu 1996; Poulton 1997; Aydm 1998; ytldlz 2.001; Bora 2.002.; Gagaptay 2.006). To go back to our introductory question, which of the above is Turkish nationalism? In a sense, they all are. In fact, no single Turkish nationalism exists; there are Turkish nationalisms. This attests to the transitional character of any articulation of Turkish nationalism, which is the end product of a continuous struggle for hegemony where existing formulae are tested and transformed and novel elements are added to make up new articulations of what it means to be a ''Turk:'
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Not surprisingly, nationalist historiography inaugurated by the republican regime in the I930S does not accept such a reading, preferring instead to present the emergence of Turkish nationalism as a process of "awaken.ing," belated yet inevitable. The key actor in this narrative is a mystical, atemporal, even transcendental "Turkishness" whose survival is more important than the survival of its individual members at any given time. Yet, as many studies on the genesis and historical development of Turkish nationalism have shown, the Ottoman elites were torn between at least three broadly discernible political projects at the turn of the nineteenth century, not all of them national, let alone nationalist. Even a cursory glance at the widely cited but rarely properly read manifesto Three Types a/Policy by Yusuf Ak~ura (one of the twin founding fathers of Turkish nationalism with Ziya Gokalp) will prove the point: It seems to me that since the rise of the desires for progress and rehabilitation spread from the West, three principal political doctrines have been conceived and followed in the Ottoman dominions. The first is the one which seeks to create an Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second seeks to unify politically all Muslims living under the governance of the Ottoman S~ate because of the fact that the prerogative of the Caliphate has been a part of the power of the Ottoman State (this is what the Europeans call Pan-Islamism). The third seeks to organize a policy of Turkish nationalism [Turk Milliyet-i sryasryesi] based on ethnicity. (Ak~ura 1998 [1904], p. I; translated by David S. Thomas) "The idea to bring about a policy of Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity," Ak~ura (1998 [1904], p. 2.3) hastens to add, "is very recent ... [it] is still in its infancy and not widespread." Nationalist historiography, in contrast, posits the$e projects as different stages in the development of Turkish nationalism; thus it presents the emergence of nationalism as a teleological process, culminating in the establishment of an independent "Turkish" state. But not all these political projects (namely Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism) set for themselves the goal of independent statehood; rather, they constituted responses to the agonizing question of "how to save the defunct empire" (for a detailed discussion, see
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Ozkmmh and Sofos 2008). Moreover, as recent studies have suggested, the projects in question did not follow one another in a chronological fashion but were selectively and interchangeably used by political actors, depending on the political conjuncture: [T]he new leaders viewed Turkism, like Ottomanism and Panislamism, as a tool to be used to fulfill their supreme political goal: the salvation of the empire. By early 1908 the CPU [Committee of Progress and Union, the Young Turks] had begun to employ Turkism. Ottomanism, and Panislamism interchangeably in its propaganda. sometimes simply replacing the term "Turk" with "Ottoman" in its appeals. (Hanioglu 2001, p. 296; see also Kayah 1997; Hanioglu 2006)
In short. the emergence of Turkish nationalism was not a foregone conclusion but the product of a protracted process during which a number of alternative projects contested each other. The outcome of this competition among the various projects was not predetermined; it depended on a complex combination of historical and political factors and of contingency. In this sense, the establishment of a "Turkish" nation was less a conscious choice than a historical/practical necessity. Naturally, alternative projects have not JUSt vanished into thin air after the establishment of the republic. They have continued to incubate inside society. waiting for the right moment to hatch out. In examining nationalism in contemporary Turkey. it is important to understand the struggle for hegemony, the ways in which the numerous participants in making the nation promote it, defend it, and challenge it. In other words, we need to construct a topography of Turkish nationalisms that brings together and provides the common thread for the diverse contribution of various actors and ideas while depicting this very diversity. This is akin to what the French poet. historian. and philosopher Jean Pierre Faye (1972) does in his grouridbreakirig Langages totalitaires: Critique de fa raison/l'economie narrative; .astlldyof the narratives produced by right-wing groups in the Weimar Republi~.Accordingto Faye. the field of positions where narratives circulate c()nstlt\ltesanunderlying structure or "topography," "in the sense of a map whichtep.resents the relations of opposition between the principal narratorsariddl'c\uriscribes the spaces of their operation" :
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The field of positions is a ~deep structure" which generates-that is, both limits and renders possible-the kinds of narratives which appear in the historical domain. It renders possible and renders acceptable: this mise en acceptation is the outcome of a process which underlies the production and circulation of narratives. (Thompson 1984, pp. 20910; see also Faye 1972, pp. S-6, 9)
Taml Bora's stimulating article "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey" (2003) provides an excellent point of departure for charting the topography of nationalisms in contemporary Turkey (see an extended version of this article in chapter 4). Bora identifies five nationalist discourses in the Turkey of the 1990S: (I) official nationalism or Atatiirk nationalism, (2) Kemalist nationalism or ulusfUluk, (3) liberal neo-nationalism, (4) Turkist radical nationalism, and (S) nationalism in Islamism. According to Bora, official nationalism or Atatiirk nationalism, with its focus on the mission to build and perpetuate the nation-state, is the root-language of Turkish nationalism. Despite its pretensions to be "civic," official nationalism puts on a rather "essentialist" and aggressive garb in foreign disputes and in the domains of popular culture such as international sports competitions. Pervaded by a perception of constant threat that feeds into a state of vigilance, this nationalism leans ultimately on the army, which it takes as its guardian/protector. Bora argues that official nationalism has a language "far too rigid, cold and stereotyped," a weakness that it tries to compensate with "a frenzied consumption of symbols of the nation-state such as the national anthem, the effigy of Atatiirk. the flag, the star and the crescent" in public life (Bora 2003, pp. 437-38). Kemalist nationalism (uluSfuluk) is a derivative of official nationalism with a "leftish" coloring. It replaces the anti-imperialism and Third Worldism of its predecessor with an uncompromising secularism, yet maintains its general anti-Western outlook, combining it with a strong dose of xenophobia. Its obsession with secularism also explains its privileging of the Turkified term ulus for "nation" over the Arabic millet, given the latter's religious connotation (Bora 2003, pp. 439-40). The third nationalist discourse in Bora's analysis, liberal neo-nationalism, springs from the modernist-Westernist fountainhead of official nationalism and defines "national identity in terms of its fervor and ability to attain the level of the 'developed' or wealthy countries of the world." Its emphasis
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on economic success often turns intO "market fetishism:' "welfare chauvinism;' and "class racism." In its fondness for the youth and popular culture, it presents itself as the nationalism of the twenty-first century (Bora 2.003. pp. 440 -45). Turkist radical nationalism. diverging from official nationalism with its broader conception of homeland covering all territories inhabited by people ofTurkic descent. has been given a new lease of life in the 1990S following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cleansing its ideology of racist elements and turning it into an exotic cocktail of cultural-historical essentialism with Islamic accretions, Turkist radical nationalism has managed to broaden its electoral base and to gather the support of the urban upper-middle-class youth. Yet this variant is still haunted by the image of its belligerent past and has not succeeded in dosing the rift between its traditional rural and its new urban constituencies (Bora 2.003. pp. 445-48). The nationalist discourse of the Islamists gives pride of place to Turkey's potential leadership of the Islamic world. Its conventional stance in "national causes" and its traditional anti-Westernism frequently take the form of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. It shares with official nationalism an emphasis on "progressivism-developmentalism"; its Achilles' heel, however, is its support for ummah, the unity of the Islamic "community of believers" (Bora 2.003, P·449). Bora's attempt at "mapping nationalism" during the
provides us with several dues for navigating through the complex terrain of nationalisms in today's Turkey. It needs to be pointed out at the outset that most of the discourses of nationalism identified by Bora have survived into the twenty-first century. The most Significant difference between the Turkey of the 1990S and Turkey today is the rapprochement between some of these nationalist discourses and official nationalism-a "partnership of fate;' a coming together, even a coalescence between forces that had a checkered relationship in the past. Bora also refers to the cross-breeding and fusion among discourses. noting that the various nationalisms are "hybrid" rather than purebred (Bora 2003, pp. 449-50). We may suggest that such cross-breeding has intensified today to the extent that we can now talk about a synthesis between official nationalism and some ofits rivals that is at once polyphonic andmulticentered. The synthesis in question is the so-called ulusalcdJe, which has been at the forefront of public debate during the last few years. The omnipresence of the 1990S
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symbols of the nation-state and the elevation of the cult of Atatiirk into one of its pillars clearly demonstrate the centrality of official nationalism in the new synthesis. StUl, not all the factions and interest groups who appropriate the term ulusalczltk receive a warm reception from the state. For this reason, official nationalism continues-at least publicly-to use the term CCAtatiirk nationalism" to describe itself. It can thus be argued that Atatiirk nationalism still constitutes the rootlanguage of nationalism in Turkey. The earlier emphasis of this constitutive nationalism on modernization has tilted toward secularism at the expense of the former (c£ Navaro-Yashin 2.002). On the other hand, a perpetual concern for survival continues to be the defining characteristic of official nationalism, as manifested by the credo "Turks have no friends but Turks:' which in turn gives birth to a thriving industry of conspiracy theories and a laborious process of inventing enemies, both within and outside. This perception of imminent threats leaves its imprint on the psyche of official nationalism in the form of what has been commonly called the "Sevres syndrome:' This involves the belief that the West, more precisely the European Union, is bent on dismembering Turkey, as it attempted in the past through the infamous Sevres Treaty signed by the victorious powers of World War I (except the United States and Russia) and the Ottoman Empire on August 10, 192.0, carving up the imperial territory into various zones of influence. In this view, every social, political, and economic development, domestic or international, is treated as part of a master plan whose perpetrators vary-foreigners purchasing land in Turkey, Christian missionaries, foreign nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and foundations and their domestic collaborators, or "liberal intellectuals." The fear of extinction is so strong and real for those who believe in it that it often takes the form of a collective paranoia; at this stage, the truth hardly matters-no one, in any case, bothers to pursue it. Its claim to be "civic" notwithstanding, however, official nationalism continues to define citizenship on the basis of a vague "Turkishness." In fact, as stated in the memorandum of April 27, 2007, posted on the website of the Turkish General Staff, «[a]nyone who rejects the view 'how happy to call oneself a Turk!' is an enemy of the Republic of Turkey and will always remain so" (this attempt by the army to intervene in the process of the election of a new president by the parliament ultimately led to the early general elections on July 2.2.,2.007, in which the Justice and Development Party [AKP] secured
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4 6,S percent of the votes). The Turkish Armed Forces, which made this dec-
laration, remain the "guardian/protector" of official nationalism. Needless to say, official nationalism itself is not fixed; the autocratic stance of the early 19 80s that aimed to bring all sections of the society under the purview of the state has been relatively softened during the 1990S and early 2.ooos. It would not be wrong to suggest that this trend has been reversed and official nationalism's stance once again stiffened in the last couple of years with the impact of the acceleration of membership negotiations with the European Union, among other things. As noted above, the other two discourses of nationalism identified by Bora, "Kemalist nationalism" (ulus{uluk) and "liberal neo-nationalism;' merged with official nationalism to form a new synthesis: ulusaletltk. The protean nature of nationalism, the osmotic tendencies among its constituent elements, is definitely reaffirmed in the case of ulusalctltk. The actors who utilize it are many and tend to use this label inconsistently, often oblivious to the incoherences and tensions that the stitching together of their narratives may entail. Broadly, we can see that much of the anti-imperialist tone ofKemalist nationalism (especially of its 1960s-70s version) has been traded for secularism and a sweeping anti-Westernism in the new amalgam; Kemalism, however, continues to preserve its sanctity as a vague, ambiguous, and openended set of principles. The price that liberal neo-nationalism had to pay in the new amalgam is its modernist-Westernist face and its emphasis on economic success: for ulusalctltk, the West is the colonizer, not the modernizer. The market fetishism of the 1980s has given way to a vocal antiprivatization stance. The proponents of ulusalctltk argue that Turkey's assets are being sold at fire-sale rates and that foreigners are taking over the country through financial means, a goal they could not achieve with military means in the past. The "class racism" of liberal neo-nationalism, however, does not disappear in the new amalgam. This time the "others" -as opposed to "white Turks"are "those men scratching their belly" (Co~kun 2.007), those "black Turks" "with short legs, hairy and long arms, ruminating, burping, and scratching" (Kmkkanat 2.005). Ulusalczltk employs the symbols of official nationalism; moreover, it popularizes them, as the fetishization of Turkish flags and Atatiirk portraits and the record-breaking sales of popular culture items like the nationalist novel fju plgm Turkler (200S) demonstrate. The enemy figures in their arsenal
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provide a common framework of interpretation and self-identification for the proponents of ulusalctlzk and official nationalism; it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the "villains" of the new synthesis, at least in the current conjuncture, are the European Union, Islam, the Kurds, and their internal collaborators, in particular the "liberal intellectuals." Traditional figures like the Greeks, the Greek Cypriots, and the Armenians still retain their highranking positions in the list of enemies. But today the prime suspect is the European Union, which not only supports the claims of Turkey's traditional enemies but turns them into a prerequisite for possible membership in the Union. While the European Union is trying to divide Turkey from the outside, the Islamists, the Kurds, and the intellectuals are giving a helping hand to the EU from the inside, to demolish or transform the republic, in accordance with their respective agendas. The particular discourse of ulusalczlzk enlists the support of a wide range of actors, including political parties like the Republican People's Party (CHP), Workers Party (tp), Democratic Party (DP), and Motherland Party (ANAP), allegedly located at different poles of the political spectrum. It is also endorsed by a significant portion of the media and by the relatively affluent urban upper-middle classes. It is possible to identify three other discourses of nationalism in today's Turkey: Turkist radical nationalism, the Islamist movement, and Kurdish nationalism. What Taml Bora identified as Turkist radical nationalism still exists today, though not without internal fractures and differences of opinion. It may be argued that the gap between the discourse embraced by the MHP under the leadership of Devlet Bahcreli and "official-ulusalcz" nationalism is rather trivial. This last point has been given further credence by the thesis of a new, more moderate MHP propagated by some of the opinion leaders of the ulusalcz current. Even so, it might be contended that the MHP resorts to a more rigid and uncompromising attitude when "national causes" are at stake. In that sense, the rapprochement between the MHP and the political center is less a product of the transformation· of the former than of the radicalization of the center. On the other hand, we also know that a section of the nationalist movement is discontented with the way Devlet Bahcreli runs the party, conSidering him to be "soft" and somewhat "dovish." This internal dissent reached the level of posing an open challenge to Bahcreli's authority in the person of Omit Ozdag. With all this in mind, it might be more useful to keep the official-ulusalcz nationalism and radical Turkish
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nationalism separate for the purposes of this analysis. Yet the difference between the tWO discourses is not one of kind but of degree. As a final note. it needs to be pointed out that radical Turkist nationalism preserves much of its newly acquired electoral constituency. The main political representative of the movement. the MHP, managed to retain its support within the urban upper-middle classes in the July 2007 elections. despite yielding its traditional constituencies in Central Anacolia to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The Islamist movement has experienced a major split within its ranks that was not yet fully apparent at the time of Tam! Bora's writing. The National Outlook (Milli Gorii~) movement, represented by the Felicity Party (SP) in the political arena, retains many of its traditional characteristics summarized in Bora's 2003 article above: anti-Westernism. developmentalism, and an emphasis on Turkey's potential leadership of the Islamic world. Their social base. however, has shrunk considerably, following the establishment of the AKP in 2001 by the "reformists" who parted ways with the traditional line. Although adherents of official nationalism have considered the AKP an adversary and accused it of being "un-national:' the AKP's discourse is not situated beyond or outside the nationalist parameters. This can be seen in the nationalist language employed by the leaders of the movement (especially by prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan), the nationalist symbolism they fall back upon, and their National Outlook background. But a more fundamental indicator of this movement's "symbiotic" relationship with nationalism is that it has to a great extent shed its elements advocating Islamic unity (ummah). Both the wider Islamist current and its political arm, the AKP, may harbor different goals and aspirations; they may indeed be on a collision course with official nationalism. But they aspire to an alternative Turkey, not for an "unnational" or "supranational" order. The movement in this sense is nationalist, even Turkish nationalist; yet its conception of Turkish nationalism is different from that of official nationalism. Thus the relationship between the Islamist movement spearheaded by the reformists and official-ulusalct nationalism is a struggle for hegemony par excellence. At times the two nationalisms reach a modus vivendi and coexist peacefully; at other times they clash. It might be argued that the controversy that surrounded the latest presidential elections was the harbinger of a trend toward conflict. But the increasing support that the movement gets from all sections of society makes the task of
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official-ulusalct nationalism harder. fordng it to become ever more aggressive and uncompromising. The second nationalist project that openly challenges official-ulusalct nationalism is the Kurdish movement. Taml Bora leaves the Kurdish nationalist movement out of his analysis. claiming to focus on "Turkish" nationalisms. But if the objective is to analyze "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey" (which is indeed the title of Bora's article), Kurdish nationalism cannot be excluded from the map. as it is a crucial actor in the struggle for hegemony. Although it is almost impossible for Kurdish nationalism to win this struggle due to a variety of mostly structural and geopolitical reasons. it nevertheless plays an important role as a counterhegemonic project, constantly disturbing and threatening offidal-ulusalcz nationalism. In this COntext. the ultimate objective of Kurdish nationalism does not really matter. The objective might be an independent state. a federative scheme, or simply more autonomy. The Kurdish nationalist movement is neither homogeneous nor monolithic: it includes various groups with different objectives. But whatever the objective. it wUl oppose the project imposed by official-ulusalcz nationalism, with a view to either transforming the structure of the state or threatening its territorial integrity. In this sense, Kurdish nationalist movement is. in all its forms. the real or imagined "anti-Christ" of Turkish nationalism.
CONCLUSION
The alternative. admittedly schematic and incomplete, reading provided above suggests that the terrain of nationalisms in today's Turkey is much more complex than nationalist accounts, official or otherwise. would claim. To simplify. it might be contended that the topography of nationalism drawn here consists of two principal axes: a horizontal axis that represents a polarity along the line of Western ism/anti-Westernism and a vertical axis that juxtaposes secular and antisecular discourses. Various nationalist discourses identified and explored above are scattered around the "topography, depending on the position they occupy on the Westernism/anti-Westernism and secularism/antisecularism axes (see figure S.l). It would be reasonable to say that these tWO axes to a large extent form the main social and political dividing line in today's Turkey, as the results of the July 2.2., 2007, general elections and the mayhem that ensued over a host of sensitive issues like the election of
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Kurdish Nationalism/BDP
Secularism
Official Nationalism (u/IIsa/cflik)/CHP, DSP, DP, ANAP, ip; Civil-Military
Bureaucracy
Anti·Westernlsm
AKP: Justice and Development Party ANAP: Motherland Party BOP: Peace and Democracy Party CHP: Republican People's Party DP: Democratic Party DSP: Democratic Left Party ip: Workers Party MHP: Nationalist Action Party SP: Felicity Party (inheritor of the National Outlook Movement)
new president have demonstrated, It is thus not surprising that the varinationalist projects that are engaged in a struggle for hegemony position themselves in accordance with these polarities, trying to straddle the dividing between competing universes, Needless to say, the struggle for hegemony far from over, as the static conception of the nation that the nationalists to inculcate and impose on their putative co-nationals is otten disrupted
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by the reality on the ground, which continues to defy the nationalist logic of a homogeneous nation. It is my contention here that only through a topographical approach that underlies the production and circulation of various nationalist projects can we make sense of the plurality and heterogeneity of nationalisms in Turkey-or in each particular case-and the complexity of the struggle for hegemony among them.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This chapter is derived from a wider project on nationalism and EU-Turkey relations supported by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Open Society Foundation-Turkey, and Friedrich Ebert Stinung-Turkei. I am grateful to the TESEV Foreign Policy Program for allowing me to use material from the monograph that contains the findings of this research. I would also like to thank LSEE (Research on South East Europe. London School of Economics); the Department of Global Political Studies. Malmo University; and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Lund University. for supporting my research over the last year.
PART II
Conservative Manifestations of Turkish Nationalism
6
THE GENEALOGY OF TURKISH NATIONALISM
From Civic and Ethnic to Conservative Nationalism in Turkey
UMUTUZER
POLITICAL THEORIST HARVEY MANSFIELD POINTS OUT THAT IN OUR
quest for the understanding of politics we should bring in feelings and sentiments as analytical tools. In his judgment, anger, hate, and dignity are important motivations for the explanation of political behavior (Mansfield 2007). I would like to add love as far as the phenomenon of nationalism is concerned. Love of the nation is a key factor in all forms of nationalism. Conversely, hatred is directed to other nations as objects of danger and threat against whom the nation should coalesce. Sentiments occupy a pivotal place in the minds of the people, especially when they feel that their identities are being threatened. Hence love, hate, anger, enmity, feelings of injustice, and desire to be great once again are all factors in the articulation and propagation of nationalism. It is possible to describe Turkish nationalism as reactive and defensive. This is so because Turkish nationalism emerged out of necessity. The political events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century forced Turkish intellectuals to embrace the creed of nationalism. The desire to prolong the existence of the Ottoman body politic proved futile; hence contingencies brought about the imagining of a Turkish nation-state. As 103
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numerous Turks involuntarily adopted nationalism due to political expediency, it is my opinion that many Turks never truly internalized it. 'The three main paths of Turkish nationalism that I analyze in this chapter are all considered to be under the banner of Turkish nationalism because they put the idea of nation and nationalism as paramount among political loyalties. In that sense I define nationalism as a political ideology that argues that a particular group of people living on a specific piece of territory constitutes a nation. Furthermore, according to the adherents of nationalism, each nation should possess a state of its own, as the master in its nation-state. 'Three typologies of Turkish nationalism, territorial-civic, ethnic, and conservative, are useful in analyzing the birth, development, and evolution of Turkish nationalism. It will become manifest from the discussion below that ethnic, civic, and cultural elements playa role in official nationalism, whereas ethnic nationalism does not shy away from offering a coherent ideology based on kinship amounting to nationality. Culture and religion seem to be more important than ethnicity in the definition of Turkish nationalism. 'These typologies should be seen as ideal types (Weber 1997, p. 89) that do not correspond directly to political phenomena existing in the real world and should rather be taken as mental tools to categorize different forms of nationalism. According to this categorization, official nationalism has elements from territorial-civic and ethnic typologies, whereas nationalists such as Hiiseyin Nihal AtS1Z can be labeled as purely ethnic nationalists, and the thinkers who devise a Turkish-Islamic synthesis can be classjfied under conservative nationalism. Anthony Smith (1991) describes the Western or civic model of the nation as entailing a historic territory that is inhabited by a people that is a legalpolitical community possessing a civic culture and an ideology. Any individual can choose his or her nationality, which makes it a voluntary process. In this kind of nationalism citizenship determines nationality in a well-defined territory. A common culture and civic ideology are. developed through education and the media. According to the non-Western or ethnic mode4 the nation is defined as a group of people, which attains nationhood from common descent and not from territory. It is based on the native culture and is a "community of birth" (Smith 1991, p. 9). Smith is quick to point out, however, that all nationalisms usually contain both ethnic and civic-territorial elements (Smith 199Io pp. 9-13).
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Ethnic nationalism and cultural nations employ objective factors such as religion, language, and ethnicity. whereas civic nationalism and political nations use subjective elements such as voluntary expression of nationhood by the citizens. French and American nationalisms, which are characterized as civic, also depend on ethnic cores (Lecours 2.000, pp. IS3, ISS), which require cultural assimilation to be part of the nation. And therein lies the continuing significance of nationalism: as a historically embedded phenomenon that is based on ethnidty. Ethnies, described as loose cultural entities, have existed throughout history, although nations in "mass, legal, public and territorial form" are novel phenomena (Smith 1998, pp. vii-viii, 57). In other words, all nations have a dominant ethnic core on which the state builds itself. In fact, without a dominant ethnic group the establishment of a territorial nationstate is extremely difficult (Smith 1991, pp. 39, 116). Nationalism and occasionally religion, much more than other collective identities, bring dignity and immortality (belonging to an entity that supposedly existed from time immemorial and will exist until eternity) to the common people. It can be a positive force promoting democracy and solidarity, but it can also lead to hatred (Smith 1991, P.176) and regional instability. In addition to dvic and ethnic nationalisms. what I characterize as conservative nationalism exists in the Turkish context. I define conservative nationalism as a form of nationalism in which the nation cannot be conceived except in terms of the religion to which the majority of the members of that nation belong. Usually religious and ethnic identities are complementary and strengthen each other (Smith 1991. pp. 7-8). It follows that religious and national identities reinforce each other and are perceived as constituting an indivisible whole. It should be added that national conflicts also have a religious dimension; the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Indian-Pakistani tension, Northern Ireland. and Cyprus are a few examples pointing to that observation. It should also be added that Polish, Irish, and Arab nationalisms have strong religious elements as well (Smith 1991. p. 62.). This form of nationalism became increasingly important in Turkish nationalism after the 19505, with the triple processes of modernization, democratization. and Islamization of the society and their ramifications for the body politic. This can be explained in the definition of the Turkish nation, in which religion plays a significant part. After the Turks converted to Islam, they "sank their national identity in Islam
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as the Arabs and Persians had never done" (Lewis 1995, p. 88). It should also be added that despite the secularism of the new republic only the Muslims of Turkey were considered true Turks (<;agaptay 2.006, p. I); non-Muslims were at best identified as citizens of Turkey. Needless to say, the reality was much more complex. While the 192.4 Constitution defined Turkishness as territorial, most Muslims were considered potential Turks. An ethnoreligious Weltanschauung crept into daily policy decisions, however, as non-Turkish Muslims were also viewed with caution (<;agaptay 2.006, p. 159). In sum, republican Turkey was characterized as a Turkish state defined to a large extent as Muslims residing in the country yet subject to qualification and occasionally bordering on a more literal meaning of the Turk. The historical background of the Turks' conversion to Islam and the loss of their national identity within Islam, coupled with their role as the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, which precluded the possibility of advocating nationalism, prepared the groundwork for the advent of religious nationalism. The religious content of official nationalism and ethnic nationalism was deficient, so these could not have deep roots among the populace. Turkish nationalism was transformed from an ethnically based Turkism, represented to some extent by Kemalist nationalism and by Hiiseyin Nihal AtSlZ, into an ideology putting m~re emphasis on religion. This can be seen in the writings of Necip Faztl Klsakiirek and the infusion of Turkish-Islamic synthesis into the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyet<;i Hareket Partisi, MHP), with growing intensity in the 1970S and the 1980s. In fact, this state of affairs was the main reason leading to the departure of AtSlZ from the ranks of the MHP and the growing role that Klsakiirek began to play in the ranks of the party, such as campaigning for the MHP in the 1977 elections. This transformation of Turkish nationalism toward embracing religious motifs started in the 1950S but became more important in the 1970S and 1980S. After the 1980 military coup. the Turkish-Islamic syntheSis was adopted to some extent by the military regime and the ruling party. the Motherland Party (1983-91). It should be pointed out that the emergence of a new form of nationalism did not replace Kemalism; rather it complemented it by creating an ideology that would be more acceptable to the common people. The ideologues of conservative nationalism were not confronting the Kemalist state identity
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and were trying to argue that what they were articulating was compatible with Kemalism. making it more responsive to conservative values.
THE ADVENT OF TURKISM: AWAKENING OR CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY?
Turks were latecomers to nationalism. Despite manifestations of nationalism throughout Turkish history, they were rather reluctant to adopt and propagate the nationalist ideal. This state of affairs can be explained by the fact that the Turks of the Ottoman Empire were the masters of a multUingual empire and by their self-perception as the sword of Islam-in other words. the defender of what they believed to be the true faith: Islam. Endorsing a nationalist program would have destroyed the raison d'etre of the Ottoman Empire. They would have been dismantling their own empire with their own hands. Just as the subjects of the empire began to demand independence one after the other. starting with the Serbs and Greeks and then the Bulgarians. Macedonians, and finally (and more shockingly for the Ottoman establishment) the Muslim Albanians and Arabs. the Turks themselves had difficulty in adapting to the new nationalist mind-set. Turks became nationalists as a result of expediency, meaning that the circumstances necessitated their embrace of nationalist thought. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire destroyed the prospect of allegiance to the Ottoman polity; as Turks became the only believers in the empire. transformation into a Turkish state was the logical next step. Bernard Lewis (1968, pp. 2..7-9) argues that the "sense of Turkishness" was retained by ordinary people in the folk literature but that the ruling elite did not have the same amount of national identity felt by the Persians and Arabs. He also argues that a Turkish national consciousness began to emerge in the nineteenth century as a consequence of Turcological studies, through the influence of Turkish emigres from the Russian Empire and the emergence of nationalism among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. While the pre-Islamic past was to a large extent forgotten and Turks "submerged their identity in Islam" much more than other Muslim nations, there were at times efforts to resuscitate Turkish national identity. The Ottoman sultans in the fifteenth century adopted the old Turkish title "khan" and established their genealogy all the way back to the legendary hero Oghuz Khan, who was
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believed to have been the forefather of all western Turks, including those in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, to be part of the ruling elite an individual had to convert to Islam and learn the Turkish language as it was spoken and written by the educated classes (Lewis 1968, pp. 2., 7-9, 13). The feeling of Turkish ness was never strong, however, and its impact decreased with the conquest of the Muslim lands of the Middle East, which led to the image of the sultan as the protector of the Muslims. Niyazi Berkes concurs with Lewis by arguing that Arabs and Albanians preserved their ethnic identity, in contrast to the Turks. The latter were more inclined to identify themselves as Muslims and consequently renounced their national identity, emphasizing the Islamic ummet (religious community). in the process becoming "a people without a sense of nationality." It was the political developments that made it clear that the Ottoman polity with its millet system and its self-conception as an Islamic state has become anachronistic (Berkes 1998 [1964]. pp. 318-19) and that almost all nationalities except the Turks have become nationalists. In other words. nationalism became the only viable ideology for the Turks to survive in the age of nationalism. But even with the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress. which was instrumental in the outbreak of the 1908 revolution (promulgating the 1876 Constitution and convening a parliament), Turkish nationalism did not replace Ottomanism. The Young Turks were erroneously described as Turkish nationalists, even though they were following a policy of Ottoman nationalism and centralization (Berkes 1998 [1964]. PP' 32.9-30). Only with the Balkan Wars of 191I-13 and more importantly with the outbreak of World War 1. which made it absolutely clear that even the Muslim nations of the empire were opting for the choice of "exit" (Hirschman 1970, p. 4) from the empire. did the Turks see more clearly that they were the only ones calling themselves Ottoman. Cemal Pasha, who was one of the members of the ruling triumvirate between 1913 and 1918. also admitted that he personally as the minister of the navy and as the commander of Ottoman armies in Syria (that is. as the de facto ruler of Syria) and the ruling Committee of Union and Progress followed an Ottomanist domestic and foreign policy. The CUP tried to increase the powers of the center, however, at the expense of the periphery (Cemal Pa~a 2.001. p. 385), which in fact meant a policy ofTurkification for the subject peoples.
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Turkism has passed through scientific, literary, and political phases (Kuran 1968, pp. m-16), starting with scholarly works on the history and language of the Turks and culminating in the desire to create a Turkish polity. Works of Leon Cahun, Arminius Vambery, and the Turan Society in Hungary contributed to a sense of pride among the Turkish intellectuals who followed their European counterparts in the study of Turkish history and culture. Mustafa Ce1aleddin Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, and Suleyman Pasha could be counted among the Turkish scholars who have written on Turkish history and language. In fact Ziya Gokalp described the latter two as the founders of Turkism (Gokalp 1994, pp. 4-6; Oba 1995, pp. 122-30). Another factor contributing to Turkism, besides political expediency and academic works, was the migration of an influential number of Turks from tsarist Russia, such as Zeki Velidi Togan (Bashkir), Sadri Maksudi Arsal (Kazan Tatar), Ahmed Agaoglu (Azerbaijani), and Yusuf Ak~ura (Kazan Tatar). Pan-Turkism developed among the Turks of Russia as a reaction to panSlavism. Their influence on Turkish scholars can be seen by the fact that the Azeri writer Huseyinzade Ali was the first to propagate Turkification, Islamization, and Europeanization, which had a direct influence on G6kalp (Oba 1995, pp. 142, 154-55)' Thus immigration of external Turks to the Ottoman Empire was a significant development in the history of Turkish nationalism. The impact of the Turks of Russia was particularly important, because they had a more secular and less Islamic conception of nationalism emanating from their interactions with the Russian intelligentsia and the ideas that were floating among those circles, even though Islam also constituted part of their identity. Furthermore, in Russia being Muslim to a large extent meant being Turkish, for the overwhelming majority of the Muslims in Russia were Turks. In fact, even on the eve of the Turkish War ofIndependence there was little manifestation of nationalism among the masses (Oran 1997, p. 78). The feeling of nationalism was articulated and inculcated in the masses by the Kemalist state with its centralized education system and the bandwagon effect that the conversion of the majority of the intellectuals to nationalism had on educated people and hence on the Turkish society. Furthermore, the soldiers in the new Turkish army led by Mustafa Kemal increasednational pride among the masses serving in that army. It should also be pointed out, however, that there was opposition to the War of Independence and the reforms
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that followed from many quarters. including religious circles. those loyal to the ancien regime. and ethnic separatists. In the next section I dwell in depth on the rise of Turkish nationalism a~d its early propagandists. It should be kept in mind that for the nineteenthcentury and to a lesser extent twentieth-century thinkers Turkism usually operated hand in hand with Ottomanism and Westernism.
BIRTH OF AN IDEA: TURKlSM AND ITS RIVALS
The nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire experienced a series of national revolts that culminated in Greek independence in 1830. Romanian autonomy in 1861, and Serbian independence in 1878 with the Congress of Berlin. Attempts were made to counter the centralization of the Ottoman state machinery and the endeavor to inculcate a feeling of Ottoman nationality with the reforms known as the Tanzimat (Kuran 1968,p. 109). Being the cosmopolitan empire it was, however, the Ottoman Empire dissolved as a result of nationalism and war. Ottoman state nationalism tried to create national feeling based on territorial nationalism (Ortayh 2.002.. p. 113), but none of the major ethnic groups felt allegiance to a political entity that was considered alien in the age of nationalism. It was particularly Ali Suavi among Young Ottomans who wrote about Turkish national consciousness and expressed concern about the fate of Turks in Turkistan as these became common themes in Young Ottoman publications. In this sense he can be characterized as one of the precursors of Turkish nationalism (<;elik 1994). According to one scholar of Turkish nationalism, a hidden feeling of Turkishness has always existed throughout Turkish history, manifested in the Orhun scriptures, dating back to the sixth or seventh century AD. Other examples of nationalism could be seen in the Divanu Lugat-ut Turk ofMahmut from Kashgar (the dictionary in which Mahmut argued the superiority of the Turkish language) and Karamanoglu Mehmet Bey, who made Turkish the official language of his princedom (Oba 1995. pp. 13-15). Charles Warren Hostler (1957). who believed that Turkish history included an element of nationalism, pointed out that the Turkification of Anatolia from the eleventh century onward proved that the Turks were not assimUated by Greeks,
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Armenians, Arabs. or Persians. ~te the contrary, they encouraged the assimilation of other peoples into their nation (Hostler 1957, pp. 88-89). But the Turks largely identified themselves with their religion-although there might have been a national awareness-and only in the late nineteenth century did Turkish nationalism begin to emerge with vigor. While the Turks were dominant on the political plane as rulers of the empire, the feeling of Turkishness was latent on the level of consciousness (Ortayh 2.002.. p. 64). The Young Turks, who ruled Ottoman Turkey between 1908 and 1918 by the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). were ambivalent as far as their ideological orientation was concerned. They started to understand that Ottomanism was becoming obsolete, but they were not ready to substitute another ideology. In fact many Young Turks felt double patriotism. For instance, Ibrahim Temo was both an Albanian nationalist and an Ottoman patriot. Abdullah Cevdet was calling all the nationalities to be loyal Ottoman citizens while at the same time writing for the Kurdistan newspaper of the separatist-autonomist Bedirhan family. Even when the CUP turned to Turkism. its official line was still Ottomanism (Hanioglu 1986, pp. 7, 627-28, 649). In fact we should call the manifestation of Turkish nationalism among Young Turks protonationalism. In other words, most Unionists were ambivalent about the role of Turkish nationalism and embraced Islam and Ottomanism (Mardin 1992. p. 264) almost until the very end of the Ottoman Empire. But the absence of an Ottoman language and the consolidation efforts of the empire necessitated depending on the Turkish language and to some extent on the Turkish ethnicity. The bottom line was that the Young Turks had a very primitive notion ofTurkism; in fact they were more interested in saving the state (Mardin 1992., pp. 268, 305) than in articulating a nationalist doctrine. Among the prominent members of the Young Turks, MizanCl Murat, who published the Mizan newspaper, emphasized Turkish identity besides Ottomanism and Islam: he was aware that Islam was no longer the unifying factor for the Muslim peoples of the empire. In contrast. Sultan Abdiilhamid II, Ahmed Rlza, and Abdullah Cevdet perceived Islam as an instrument of solidarity for the people (Mardin 1992., pp. 18, II3, IIS)' Although Abdullah Cevdet was one of the most ardent advocates of Westernization in Ottoman Turkey. he found a functional role for Islam in Turkish society. Ziya Gokalp also instrumentalized Islam and articulated it with nationalism.
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As far as the rival ideologies of the time-Ottomanism. Islamism. Turkism. and Westernism-were concerned. the latter two gained the upper hand. Yet the Islamist movement had its precursor in the person of Said-i Nursi. Even though he had affiliations with Kurdish nationalists like the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (Kiirdistan Teali Cemiyeti). he advocated a state based on Islam and autonomy for the Kurds within the Ottoman body politic. It should be made clear. however. that Said-i Nursi always condemned nationalism in his publications and speeches (Mardin 1994. pp. 100.141,147). Yet he had ethnic consciousness. which was undoubtedly Kurdish. 'Therefore. it can be said that he possessed loyalty to the Kurdish people as well as to the state and religion. 'The failure of the Islamist and Ottomanist ideologies at a practical level as well as the works of the Turcologists in Europe helped facilitate Turkish nationalism. First of all. it became evident that fellow Muslims in the empire were seceding from the empire and that a nationality based on Ottomanism was rejected by both the Muslims and the Christians of the empire. Thus what was left consisted mainly of Turks. the backbone of the empire. During the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the CUP's relations with Armenians and Greeks deteriorated. It became clear that Greeks were becoming proGreece and the Armenians were trying to put their grievances on the world agenda. It was at this point that the leaders of the CUP decided on or implemented the creation of a national economy and a national bourgeoiSie composed of Muslim Turks and to a lesser extent Jewish business leaders by co-opting the latter. They had no outside patron; nor did they follow a separatist policy, unlike Greeks and Armenians (Keyder 1987, pp. 60-61, 65). Hence they were considered trustworthy and loyal. Later on, however, the Jews were also subjected to exorbitant taxes together with other non-Muslims during the Wealth Tax incident of 1942-44, when non-Muslims were targeted for very high taxes whereas the Muslims got away with much smaller sums (Aktar 2004, p. 144). In fact this taxation policy had been a continuation of the CUP policy, which aimed at creating a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie. Furthermore, this incident together with the September 6-7, I9SS, incidents (when shops and businesses belonging to non-Muslims in Istanbul and izmir were attacked) demonstrated that despite declarations of secularism in Turkey the national identity was very much defined around Islam. In other words. it was much easier for a Kurd, Circassian, Laz, Acara (Muslim
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Georgian), or Arab to assimilate to the Turkish society than for a Greek. an Armenian. or a Jew. And the Muslim groups were less suspect than nonMuslims when they entered the bureaucracy or military. The non-Muslim entrants into the bureaucracy were very limited. if any at all. As a culmination of these factors. nationalist organizations such as Turkish Society (Turk Dernegi) and Turkish Hearths (Turk Ocaklan) were established in 1908 and 1912. respectively. They conducted scholarly studies on the history and language of the Turks, which was to have political ramifications (Ak~ura 1990, pp. 171-77). Hamdullah Suphi Tannaver, the president of Turkish Hearths, was an influential figure in the Republican People's Party, being a member of parliament and minister of education in the republican era. While the society tried to preserve its independence from the Committee of Union and Progress, it gradually lost its autonomy vis-a-vis the CHP, as many members of the society were also members of the party. Besides the chairman, Re~it Galip, Ziya Gakalp, Halide Edip, Yusuf Ak~ura, Ahmed Agaoglu, and many other members of parliament were prominent members of the society. As Hamdullah Suphi pointed out, unity of language, religion. and heart would be enough to define the Turkish nation, not "race" or genealogy. There was also much interest in the Turkic world that lay outside the borders of Turkey. and he advocated the unity of the dialects spoken in various areas of the Turkic world (OstelI997, pp. 60-61, 71, 131, 134, 147, 164). So the society was influential in the creation and dissemination of Turkish national consciousness and national identity in the late Ottoman and early republican periods. Turkishness was to a large extent forgotten in the Ottoman Empire, leading to a total rejection of pre-Islamic Turkish history. Intellectuals such as Ebuzziya Tevfik, Siileyman Nazif, and Babanzade Ahmet Nairn argued that the Ottoman people consisted of Arabs, Greeks, and Armenians and that members of the Ottoman dynasty were probably the only Turks in the empire. Instead of nationalism, they supported Ottoman and Islamic solidarity. Ahmed Agaoglu as well as other Turkists defended the Turkish character of the country and argued that nothing in Islam precluded nationalism (Arai 1994, pp. 106-7)· Yusuf Akt;:ura (1876-1935) believed that the emergence of nationalism among the Kazan Tatars was due to the existence of a bourgeoisie that benefited from the trade between Russia proper and Central Asia. The same was
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also true for the Azeris, who flourished as a result of the oil trade (Georgeon 199 6, pp. 8,78). Hence, according to Akc;:ura, economic factors gave rise to the emergence of nationalism in the sense that the rising middle class became the propagators of the nationalist ideology. Akc;:ura, influenced by his uncle ismail Gasplrah. had a secular outlook manifested in his "Oc;: TarZ-l Siyaset" (Three Styles of Politics, published in 1904) in the journal Turk in Cairo. in which he argued that Islam was to be at the service ofTurkism (ibid., pp. 2.7, 47). It is hard to label this article the manifesto of Turkism: even though it was a manifestation of political Turkism and advocated a policy based on the Turkish unity, it did so in an ambivalent way. He defined Ottomanism as the attempt to create an Ottoman nation from all the ethnic groups living in the empire. This idea was formulated in the nineteenth century during the Tanzimat era. Akc;:ura labeled this a futUe endeavor. Young Ottomans advocated the policy of Islamism. which Akc;:ura characterized as an ideology in which religion was equated with nationality. In comparing Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. he favored Turkism. A Turkish political nationality based on "race" had numerous benefits. It would be welcomed by the Turks in the Ottoman Empire and help assimilate non-Turkish Muslims. This policy, however. had the danger of losing those elements, mostly non-Muslims, in the Ottoman Empire who would resist Turkifica1;ion. More importantly, on the positive side, a Turkish world would be created through the policy of Turkish unity. Akc;:ura was critical of Western Turks for not giving enough attention to Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. Even the journal Turk only focused on the Ottoman Empire rather than on Kazan, the Caucasus, or Turkistan. Akc;:ura concluded the article by pointing out that both Islamist and Turkish policies have their positive aspects and ended with a question: "Which one of the Islamist or Turkist policies would be more beneficial and applicable for the Ottoman State?" (Akc;:ura 1998, pp. 2.0-2.3.31,33-36). Akc;:uras Turkism in "Three Styles of Politics" is equivocal; while he seems to have expected a more pan-Turkist coverage in the journal, he found the publication to be concerned only with the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. This is a hint that he would have preferred a pan-Turkist policy from the journal. While he does not openly call for the unification of all Turks, his proclivities are clearly on the Turkist side.
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Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) is usually accepted as one of the most influential ideologues of Turkish nationalism. He based the definition of the nation on cultural unity, not on racial or political considerations. He talked about the cultural unity of all Oghuz (Western Turks) and enumerated the stages ofTurkism as Turkeyism (Turkiyecilik), Oghuzism (Oguzculuk), and lastly Turanism (Turanclhk), the last stage being the unity of all Turks (Gokalp 1994, pp. 18, 21-24). Thus pan-Turkism, but not racism, was an integral part
of his ideology. In the final analysis Ziya Gokalp was promoting a Turkish/Muslim/Western synthesis in which Turkishness would predominate while the beneficial aspects of Islam and the West would also be adopted and internalized. Gokalp advocated national policies in every sphere of life from politics, economics, and ethics to language, music, and architecture. He even supported Turkism in religion and wanted to eradicate all forms of theocracy and clericalism. This would include prayers being recited in Turkish (Gokalp 1994, pp. 154-55). His main objective was to create a modern Turkish-Islamic culture under the guidance of science and technology (Gokalp 1988, p. 34). His ideas were mainly oriented toward Turkism, however, with Islam and the West playing only secondary roles. Islam was to be a force of solidarity among the people, whereas the West was seen as a source of technology and development; in other words, they were instruments used for the exaltation of the Turkish nation. Just like other nationalists, Gokalp was apologetic in his approach to nationalism and tried to prove that Islam was not against nationalism. He did not reject the idea of pan-Islam but said that for the time being different Muslim groups were to go their separate ways to achieve political independence. In fact nationalism would be a force that would facilitate the independence of different Muslims; hence nationalism would strengthen the Islamic community (ummet in Turkish) (Gokalp 1988, pp. 76-80). It should be made dear that Gokalp did not openly reject Islam but gave it a secondary role in his thinking. He emphasized the importance and power of nationalism and hence became the most eminent advocate of Turkish nationalism. Gokalp also advocated equality between men and women and expressed opinions against the veiling of women. Along with his belief in the separation of religion and state and prayers in Turkish (Heyd 195 0 , pp. 88, 95-96,
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102.), Gokalp was very much a precursor of Kemalist nationalism, although
there were a number of differences between Gokalp's and Atatiirk's understandings of nationalism. As discussed below, Atatiirk dropped all demands for unification of Turks, focusing instead on the internal development within the borders ofTurkey. Furthermore, he did not accept the culture-civilization dichotomy of Gokalp. Instead he adopted Western ways in their entirety. Turkish nationalism as articulated in the late Ottoman period was the direct precursor of both Kemalist nationalism and pan-Turkist/racist nationalism. Hence offidal nationalism and pan-Turkism should be seen as derivatives or different types of Turkish nationalism. The main difference was that KemaHst nationalism tried to create a nation-state within the borders of the republic, whereas pan-Turkism tried to unite all the Turks wherever they lived. Irredentism and expansionism characterized pan-Turkism, while Kemalist nationalism, although inward looking, managed to annex Hatay from Syria in 1939 (Uzer 2.007). The Kemalist education system and the historical thesis that was devdoped in fact created an atmosphere conducive to the emergence of the pan-Turkist movement. Constant reference to Central Asia as the motherland of all Turks and the popularization of ancient Turkish symbols such as the gray wolf were to have a direct effect on ethnic nationalists (6zdogan 2.001, pp. 16-17. 23. 86). As far as the main actors of the three currents of Turkish nationalism are concerned, I should point out that the civilian and military branches of the bureaucracy to a large extent succumbed to KemaHst nationalism. The social democratic parties such as the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Left Party and center-of-right parties such as the Democratic Party, the Justice Party. and later the True Path Party all followed official nationalism. A faction in the Motherland Party adopted Kemalist nationalism, but the nationalist-conservative faction (the so-called Holy Alliance composed of former members of the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party), which advocated conservative nationalism, was stronger than the Kemalist or liberal factions. Ethnic nationalism to a large extent ceased to exist except among a few members of the MHP, such as Abdulhaluk <;ay. It is a distinct possibility that such a nationalism might reemerge as a reaction to the ethnic nationalism followed hy the political wing of the PKK, the Halkm Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party, HEP), Demokratik Emek Partisi (Democratic Lahor Party, DEP), Hallo.n Demokrasi Partisi (People's
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Democracy Parry, HADEP), Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Sodety Party, DTP), and Barx~ ve Demokrasi Partisi {Peace and Democracy Party, BDP}. Overall it is safe to say that Kemalist nationalism until recently was the most influential form of nationalism in Turkey. In fact it occupies a dominant or almost hegemonic position among its rivals. It is the only form of nationalism that is the offidal ideology of the Turkish state, so it has more impact than ethnic or conservative nationalism on Turkish domestic and foreign policy.
OFFICIAL KEMALIST NATIONALISM AND KEMALIST STATE IDENTITY
K.emalism or Atatiirkism (in Turkish Kemalizm and Atatiirkcriiliik, respectively) is the official ideology of Turkey. The "six arrows" represent the six principles of Kemalism: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, etatism, populism, and reformism. The six arrows were accepted in the Third CHP Congress. held on May 10-18,1931. The party secretazy general, Recep Peker. was an azdent advocate of a centralized state, etatism. and state-party amalgamation. In time Kemalism was to have connotations similar to a religion and to substitute for Islam. In fact a member of parliament wrote a book on Kemalism in which he ar~ gued that Kemalism is beyond Marxism. fascism, and all sorts of ideologies and that it is a religion based on life itself (Tuncay 1992.. pp. 308-9. 32.0, 32.537).
Kemalist nationalism as opposed to Turanism was a territorial nationalism. which entailed forgetting the Ottoman past and remembering the glorious pre-Ottoman Turkish past. Getting rid of the Arabic script and Arabic-Persian words was also part of this policy of forgetting and remembering (<;olak 2.000, pp. 146. 2.2.6. 2.71-72.. 2.92.) the pre~Ottoman Turkish past. Baskm Oran argues that Atatiirk nationalism is the successor to European nationalism and precursor of colonial peoples' nationalism. It followed a revisionist policy vis-a-vis the Versailles system; but once a national Turkish state was established. Kemalist nationalism advocated the status quo. Furthermore. it was an anti-imperialist struggle that lacked an irredentist dimension, rejecting racism and advocating cultural nationalism for those living on the same piece of territory. Atatiirkist nationalism was peaceful when contrasted with
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the Young Turk era, which had a "racist and expansionist" nationalism. Attachment to the Turkish culture was presented as a major criterion for belonging to the Turkish nation, and the Republican People's Party program excluded outside Turks within its political concern even though they wished them all the best and expressed fraternal love toward them (Oran 1997, pp. 40, 4 8-5°, 64-65, 177). Atatiirk, however, expressed his interest in "captive Turks" and his hope
that one day Turks under the rule of the Soviet Union would gain their independence. Turkey had to prepare for such an eventuality. He pointed out that historical and linguistic studies were conducted with this objective in mind (Oran 1997, pp. 168-69). The Turkish history thesis and the Sun Language Theory, devised at the 1932 Turkish Historical Congress and 1936 Language Congress, argued that Turks were the creators of almost all known civilizations, including ancient Egyptians, Hittites, and Sumerians. and that the Turkish language was the root of all languages. These studies were used to holster the legitimacy of the regime and create a single identity among aU the citizens (Behar 1996, pp. 13, 92, 104, 179-80). While numerous serious academic works were written within the general atmosphere supportive of scholarly work, it should be noted that many of the arguments of the Turkish historical thesis cannot be substantiated by evidence. By trying ~o prove that Anatolia was Turkish from antiquity on, the Kemalist regime tried to increase the sense of pride and belonging among the people living in Turkey at the time. While Central Asia was presented as the fatherland of the Turks, pan-Turkist tendencies were to be curbed by focusing on Anatolia as the present motherland. Contrarily, these arguments created an environment conducive to pan-Turkist movements. In fact, during the trials of the 1944 Racism-Turanism incident (when the government arrested a number of nationalist officers, bureaucrats. and intellectuals), defendants such as Alparslan Turke~ and Hiiseyin Nihal AtSlZ argued that it was the government and the educational. system that propagated racism (Turke~ 2000, pp. 38-40); hence what they were doing, in their judgment, was very much in line with state policies. hmet inonii, prime minister for most of Atatiirk's rule, argued that the primary precondition for those who wanted to serve the country was that they had to be Turks and Turkists. Non-Turkish groups in the country were
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to be assimilated (Ostel 1997, p. 173). Such statements demonstrate the extreme/ ethnic nationalist character of the regime. Kemalist nationalism gave equal citizenship to the people residing in the territory of Turkey, however. Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution stipulated: "The people of Turkey without any regard for religion or race are called Turks through citizenship" (my translation). In that sense it can be described as territorial-civic nationalism. The efforts to assimilate the non-Turks in the country with campaigns such as "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" and restrictions on state employment indicate that it also had strong ethnic elements (6zdogan 2001, pp. 297-98). In fact, one scholar (ytldlz 2001) divides the evolution of Kemalist nationalism into three phases. The first phase (191923), corresponding to the war of national liberation, is characterized by ethnic pluralism and the nation is defined according to religion. In the second era (1924-29) a militant secular outlook is imposed on the people and all the citizens of the country are considered Turks. In the last phase (1929-38) more emphasis is put on ethnocultural elements. KemaBst nationalism is identified not as racist but rather as ethnicist and discriminatory toward ethnic and religious groups that remain different from the official identity (ytldlz 2001, pp. 16-18, 139): the secular, Westernized Turk. Oran argued that linguistic and historical studies, together with the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign and the requirement of being ethnically Turkish in order to be able to enter military academies, bordered on chauvinism and racism. He still believed, however, based on the CHP program, that all citizens living in Turkey who spoke Turkish and accepted Turkish culture and ideals, no matter which religion or sect they belonged to, were considered Turks. So he argued that territorial and subjective qualifications prevailed over objective criteria such as ethnicity or religion, making Kemalist nationalism similar to French-type nationalism (Oran 1997, 204-S, 221). The key here was that anyone who accepted the principles of Kemalism and did not insist on keeping the ethnic or religious identities that might be considered anathema to the Kemalist regime could be a Turk. Nobody was excluded from politics or social life provided that person was in line with Kemalism. Among the ideologues of Kemalism, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined this ideology as an authoritarian democracy, which was based on the people. The Turkish nation was likened to a pyramid, with the leader at the top and
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the people at the base. Defining himself as a Turkish nationalist, Bozkurt expressed his belief that Turkish unity would be realized in the future. He pointed to the absolute necessity that the Turkish Revolution should stay in the hands of "genuine Turks." While describing the Turkish regime as being based on culture and language rather than race, he also quoted Atatiirk as having warned the Turks not to trust anybody who was not of their own blood (Bozkurt 1995, pp. 107, 142, 160, 228-29, 267). The duality continues between the ethnic and territorial-cultural sides ofKemalism; but even if the latter aspects are emphasized, it is stU! based on the dominant ethnic: hence to be a Turk one has to assimilate into Turkish culture and language. Bozkurt (1995) praised republicanism as superior to monarchy. Furthermore, he argued that the six arrows had totally eradicated the past, but he concluded his book by saying that the Turkish nation has a past much superior to those of other nations (Bozkurt 1995. pp. 53, u8, 288). Undoubtedly he was talking about the pre-Ottoman past. Even though the Ottoman Empire was the strongest and best-institutionalized state among Turkish states in history, its culture was equated with fanaticism and discarded due to its defeats in the past tWO centuries and replaced by a new Turkish state with a novel ideological outlook. Munis Tekinalp (Moiz Kohen), another proponent of official nationalism. argued that Turkish language and culture were under invasion from Arabic and Persian and had to be liberated. The new Turk found a new spirit. a new history. and even a new God because of the use of the Turkish ~Tann" instead of "Allah." Turkish nationalism, contrary to other forms of nationalism. was peaceful and humanitarian and emerged from an instinct to protect itself-hence it was defensive and also secular. A racial or religious background had no place in the definition of the Turkish nation. which was instead based on sharing the same language. culture. and ideal. Those who were not "racially" Turks could become Turks by culturally aSSimilating. Having said that. however. Tekinalp added that this did not mean that they had to forget their ethnic background. be it Circassian, Kurdish. Laz, or Jewish (Tekinalp 1998. pp. 166, 176, 180, 277, 281, 289, 301). As a matter of fact, Tekinalp was jewish and never changed his religion, though he changed his name. He was a propagator of first pan-Turkism and then Kemalist nationalism, and his religious background was not an issue throughout his intellectuallife.
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Tekinalp argued that the Kemalist revolution introduced the Western civilization to the Turks. Religious law and Islamic ties were superseded, and national identity was constructed in the new Turkey. The new Turk was created by the leader (onder), who represented the nation in its entirety without distinction of class. In sum, Tekinalp contended that Kemalism was democratic in its essence but that a more centralized and strong state was created due to some problems of implementing democracy. He gave the active parliament and elections as examples of a functioning democracy. He assumed that the people of Turkey were not mature enough to accept the intricacies of democracy at that time but envisaged the gradual emergence of a democratic political system. Tekinalp also argued that Turkey could not accept classical democracy together with its individualism and economic liberalism, because it would mean exploitation of national sources by foreign capital. This was the reason why Turkey adopted etatism in order to try to provide capital and services for its populace. The establishment of state factories and state economic enterprises was achieved by credits from the Soviet Union. He quoted Atatiirk as saying that etatism emerged from Turkey's needs and hence was created according to the special conditions of the country. Etatism was not only aimed at the economic sphere, however, but was also implemented to shape the society and culture (Tekinalp 1998, pp. 33, 35. 90, 205-6, 213, 224. 228-29. 233. 252). The aim was to free the society from the shackles of the past through a project of social engineering and transform it into a modernized Western society. The ideas of Atatiirk clearly present a nationalist worldview. He pointed out that he was a Turkish nationalist and that the more Turkish the country became. the stronger the republic would become. Many of his speeches also dealt with pride in being a Turk and praise for the noble blood that ran in the nation's veins, the beauty of the Turkish "race;' and the strength of the Turks, which were expressed to increase national pride among the people (YlldlZ 2001, pp. 154. 163, 170). But this should not be construed as Atatiirk using nationalism as an instrument to manipulate the masses. To the contrary. throughout his military and political career he expressed patriotism and undertook national policies when he had the power. It should be pOinted out, however. that Atatiirk specifically condemned irredentism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism in the long speech he made in the second Republican People's Party Congress in Ankara between October
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IS and 20, 1927. He argued that those ideologies had never succeeded in his-
tory and that it would not be possible to unite all the Turks in one state. Instead a national policy within the borders of the Turkish Republic was to be followed (Atatiirk 1963, p. 436). The ruling circles, including the secretary general of the CHP, Recep Peker, in fact displayed sympathy toward the outside Turks but no political interest because they did not share the fate of those Turks (Aydemir 1965, p. 448; ytldlZ 2001, p. 202). The Republican People's Party, which was established in 1923, restricted membership to Turks and those that accepted Turkish citizenship and culture. In 1927 the party declared the dissemination of Turkish culture and language to be one of its foremost objectives (BUa 1999. pp. 42• 55). Leftist Kemalist writers, such as Turhan Feyzioglu. Toktaml~ Ate§. and Ahmet Taner Kr~lah, argued in the late twentieth century that Kemalist nationalism is territorial, modern, progressive, and peaceful and that it pays no attention to ethnic-racial factors. In fact, official nationalism has an ethnic face as well, which remained latent for a long time (Y11dlZ 2001, pp. 12.3-24). WhUe it is true that it contains territorial-civic factors, Kemalism also includes ethnic nationalism, which tries to create a Turkish nation-state based on the pre-Islamic and pre-Ottoman Turkish culture. In the parlance of Atatiirk, "Religion was relegated to the mosques and consciences" (YtldlZ'200I, p. 318). Islam was portrayed by Afet inan, a scholar who was one of Atatiirk's adopted daughters, as having stifled Turkish national identity and weakened Turkish national consciousness. Some of the prominent members of the ruling elite also argued that Islam was a hindrance to progress (YlldlZ 2001, p. 3(8). These statements were aimed at superseding the Ottoman and Islamic heritage and were no doubt condoned by the Turkish political leadership. In sum, Kemalist official nationalism, also known as Atatiirk nationalism, had both territorial and ethnic elements; while the roots of the Turks were found in Central Asia, Anatolia itself was portrayed as being Turkish from time immemorial. These efforts were made to sidestep the Ottoman and Muslim legacy of the Turkish people and create a new Turkish nation that was Western. Granting full equality to all citizens, the Kemalist regime required assimUation in the new political identity to be able to participate in the political affairs of the country.
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ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND ATSIZ
Hiiseyin Nihal AtSlZ (1905-75) was one of the few nationalists who explicitly articulated and propagated racism together with pan-Turkism. AtSlZ argued that Turkism consisted of racism and Turanism, the former addressing the internal sphere and the latter related to the Outside Turks. He was critical of the older generation of nationalists, including Gokalp, for not being racists. He was also critical of materialism in a puritan and secular way. What makes him unique is that very few people· expressed a view that was outside the scope of Islam within the rightist circles. He did not reject Islam in his writings but counted Islam among foreign ideologies, such as communism and fascism, which were antinational (Uzer 2002, pp. 125-28). AtSlZ'S views, including racism and his quaSi-shamanistic themes, were repulSive in an Islamic mUieu. He did not gain support either among the masses or among the elite. Even the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), for which he voted, was too Islamic for AtSlZ. So he supported the party but was critical of the party's Islamic leanings. This proves the point that a non-Islamic idea has very little or no appeal to the Turkish political Right. In other words, AtSlZ found that the MHP had moved toward Islamism and in return the party's leadership as well as the grassroots perceived his ideas as repulsive and costly during elections. According to one account, Ats1Z's ideas appeared un-Islamic in Central Anatolia, even among nationalists, and hence were not widely followed (Deliorman 1978, p. 362). It should be emphasized that Hiiseyin Nihal Atslz is one of the few openly racist Turkish nationalists, a state of affairs that clearly differentiates him from his predecessors such as Yusuf Akcrura and Ziya Gokalp and successors such as Erol Gungor and tbrahim Kafesoglu. He does, however, share the idea of pan-Turkism with most of the earlier thinkers. His form of nationalism did not attract many followers in a Muslim milieu, which is one of the reasons for the transformation of nationalism into a more Islam-oriented ideology. And in this sense KlSakiirek played a role in making Turkish nationalism more responSive to its environment by declaring that it should be dependent on and shaped by Islam. AtSlZ'S brother, Nejdet Sancrar, similarly emphasized the significance of race in the definition of Turkish as well as Hungarian and German national
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identities. whereas it was not relevant for the French and Americans. But he defined Islam as the national religion of Turks. Like AtSlZ, he argued that panTurkism and racism were the twO pillars ofTurkism (Sanerar 1995. pp. 13,· 17. 34. 46). Other pan-Turkists such as Reha Oguz Turkkan and RIza Nur also emphasized the :mportance of race in the makeup of the nation at the expense of culture (Ozdogan 2.001. pp. 2.30-39). What characterized AtSlZ and other racist-Turanists or simply Turkists in their jargon was the identification of ethnicity with nation. Any person who was not ethnically Turkish was suspect in their eyes and should not playa role in the political affairs of the country. Their ultimate objective was the unification of all Turks. and naturally their ideas were not confined to Turkey. Their nationalism was purely based on race; citizenship was irrelevant. Furthermore. AtSlZ wanted to Strip certain ethnic groups of citizenship (Uzer 2.002. p. 12.6). His kind of nationalism had a very weak influence on Turkish politics. Unless Turkey is radically transformed due to the Kurdish problem, the popularization of ethnic nationalism is unlikely. Of course. Kurdish nationalism. which is an ethnic form of nationalism, could very well invite a reciprocal form of ethnic nationalism.
THE TURKISH-IsLAMIC SYNTHESIS: THE EMERGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISM
The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was formulated and articulated by the Intellectuals' Hearth (IH: Aydmlar Ocagl), a right-wing organization influential in Turkish politicS. The IH was established in May 1970 by a group of professors. politicians. bureaucrats. and politicians. Among the founders of the organization were the founding chairman ibrahim Kafesoglu, Siileyman Yalerm, Salih Tug, Muharrem Ergin. Nevzat Yalermta~. Kemal lilcak. Ahmed Kabakh. and Said Bilgi<; (Giivener et aI. 1994. pp. ISS-56). The association was instrumental in the creation of Nationalist Front governments (1975-78) (Bora and Can 1994. p. IS3; Sakalhoglu 1993. p. 124) and was influential during the military regime (1980-83) as well as during the Turgut Ozal premiership (1983-89) within the Motherland Party. In fact the rightist parties contained quite a number of members or sympathizers ofIH. Members of the IH were so close to the establishment. however. that the assertion that they were Islamists (Giivener et aI. 1994, pp. 34-35) was quite problematic. An analysis of
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The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis by ibrahim Kafesoglu. who was the first person to articulate the concept in question. dearly proves the point that they supported secularism (Kafesoglu 1996. pp. 18;-86). ibrahim Kafesoglu referred to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis for the first time in a conference in 1972 and later wrote his thoughtS on the subject in a book in 1985 (Bora and Can 1994. pp. 169-70). The book focused on Turkish history from the time of the Huns to the present day. It contained little analysis of the Turkish culture/Islamic civilization nexus. the relative importance of pre-Islamic Turkish culture. or the Islamic religion in the makeup of the contemporary Turkish identity. Kafesoglu tried to prove that the pre-Islamic Turkish religion was very similar to Islam; thus when the Turks converted to Islam. they quickly adapted to their new religion. 'The commonalties between the ancient religion of Turks and Islam included belief in one God. the creator of the universe. who is present everywhere at all times and is omnipotent. the nonexistence of the clerical class. and the desire to impose Turkish law (tore) throughout the world. which is similar to jihad (Kafesoglu 1996. p. 161). Another scholar argued that the belief in martyrdom during the pre-Islamic and Islamic phases was identical (Giingor 1996. p. 136). Deciding whether the parallels are accurate demands expertise in theology but what is important is that Kafesoglu tried to prove that Turkishness and Islam are baSically the same or are very similar. Actually he and the Intellectuals' Hearth tried to solve the religionnation problematic in Turkish nationalist thought by determining the place of Islam in nationalist discourse. 'The Turkish-Islamic synthesis is a conservative form of Turkish nationalism; thus. branding it as Islamist (Guvenc et al. 1994) is false. It should be seen within the main parameters of Turkish nationalism. Hence conservative nationalism would be a better characterization of the phenomenon. 'The main problem in Kafesoglu's thought is the relative importance that he gives to Islamic values on the one hand and the pre-Islamic Turkish culture on the other in the makeup of contemporary Turkish identity. In one place he sees the Hun state as the model for all Turkish states as well as having influenced all the Turkish empires. states. and princedoms (Kafesoglu 1996. p. 10). and later he argues that after the Turks became Muslims the institutions that were created were substantially different from those that had existed during the time of pre-Islamic states. In fact a new Turkish-Islamic synthetic
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culture was created as a result of the Islamization process (Kafesoglu 1996, p. 162). Thus the desire to see Turkish history as an undivided whole (like Zeki Velidi and Atslz) on the one hand combined with willingness to emphasize the unique culture that emerged as a consequence of the conversion to Islam on the other hand is the biggest contradiction that exists in Turkish nationalist thought. As Bernard Lewis mentioned, the Turks were integrated into Islam at the expense of the loss of some aspects of their national characteristics. It became inconceivable for a Turk to think of the existence of a non-Muslim Turk, being totally ignorant of the Gagauz in Moldova and the Chuvash and the Yakut Turks in Russia, who are all Christians. The same conception does not apply to Arabs or Albanians, who are used to seeing Christian Arabs or Albanians who speak the same language and have the same culture as the rest of the society. According to those who advocated the synthesis ideology, Islam was seen as a central or the central component of Turkish culture; but it should be stressed that the Sufis Hoca Ahmed Yesevi, Mevlana Celalettin-i Rumi, Yunus Emre, and Hac! Bekta~ were mentioned as the carriers of Turkish Islam and the creators and facUitators of national unity (Gungor 1996, pp. 177.181). The problematic nature of their thoughts regarding Islam and Turkish culture can be seen from this quotation: "Undoubtedly, the Islamic faith is the central source of our national culture; but our national culture is not composed of only that; we also had cultural values that did not emanate from Islam" (Kosoglu 1996, p. 186). This remains the major source of uncertainty and lack of clarity in nationalist thinking. Turkish nationalist thinkers are often confused about the relative importance of pre-Islamic Turkish culture and Islamic Turkish culture in the articulation of their thoughts because of what I call the religion-nation problematic. For intellectual clarity in Turkish nationalism, religion needs to be relegated to a secondary role at the service of nationalism because in nationalist thought the hierarchy ofloyalty is reversed: from religion or tribe to the nation. In other words, international, transnational, or subnationalloyalties are suppressed, giving way to nationalism. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the Intellectuals' Hearth, whether consciously or unconsciously, tried to address and resolve the affinity between Turkishness and Islam. But they too were confused about the relative
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importance ofIslam and Turkishness in the makeup of contemporary Turkish identity. The Nationalist Action Party was the only party that emphasized nationalism as its raison d'etre and was an ideological parey just like the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) and the Communist Turkish Workers Party (Trirkiye l~
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Gokalp as racist and his ideas as kavrniyetrilik (ethnic nationalism). In his judgment, nationalism (milliyetplik) was an Islamic concept in which the nation was defined by its religion (Klsakiirek 1993. pp. 89, 2.79. 308). In other words. Necip Fazll saw nationalism as racism and described Islamism as true nationalism. He totally subjugated Turkish identity to Islam so that. according to him. Turkish national identity emerged solely as a function of the conversion to Islam and the only legitimate historical concerns were Muslim history and the Ottoman era. In a brief formulation, a Turk became a Turk only through Islamization and a non-Muslim Turk was an anomaly in Turkish Islamist thought. He defined Turkish identity as having developed only after the conversion to Islam and saw in Islam a civilizing mission for the uncultivated Turks via language and philosophy. Furthermore, Necip Fazll advocated an Islamic worldview and called for the centralization ofIslam in all facets of political and social thought (Klsakiirek 1993. pp. 301-2). Nationalism in Klsakiirek's view should be dependent on Islam; hence Islam should be the source to which al1loyalty and aspirations were directed. He cited the hadith to the effect that people cannot be blamed for loving their nation but called for a restrictive nationalism shaped and delimited by Islam (Ktsakiirek 1993. p. 33.64.238.402-4). In his criticism of Nihal AtS1Z and nationalism in general Necip Fazll put forward the argument that his premise was Islam whereas Ats1Z's was Turkism. No ideology could be confined to a nation alone. Only a worldwide ideology encompassing all of humanity would be a correct approach. Furthermore, Turks became Turks only when they became Muslims; in fact "our institutionalization as nation and state is only after Islam:' Thus nationalism must be based on religion (Klsakiirek 1990a, pp. 393-94, 1997. p. 72.. and 1992.b, p. 33). Furthermore, he attacked Ziya Gokalp for advocating a Turkish ~ran. Necip FaZlI said: "I wish Arabic had been our language:' He also did not believe in the strategic and emotional importance of Cyprus (Ktsakiirek 1991. pp. 45. S2, 92-93, 1990b. p. 90 ).The Cyprus issue was defined by nationalists and by a significant section of the Right and Left as the national cause of Turkey. Hence his position makes Klsakiirek the odd man out in Turkish politics. It would be highly problematic to characterize such ideas as "nationalist;' and it is ironic that Kisakiirek has been considered a nationalist both by nationalists themselves and by independent scholars. His ideas are more fitting
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to what Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) calls religious nationalism, defined as movements trying to link religion with the nation-state. In movements such as the Hamas in Palestine and the BJP (BharatiyaJanata Party) in India, "[r] eligious and ethnic identities are intertwined" (Juergensmeyer 1993, p. 2; also pp. 4, 6,4 0 ,47,199). With the establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Panisi, MNP) and then the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), Necip Fazd supported this political movement in- the 1973 elections and saw it as a genuine Islamic current. But his criticisms started when the MSP entered a coalition with the CHP and failed to stop inflation, leftist infiltration into the Ministry of Education, and Bulent Ecevit's exploitation of the Cyprus issue. The MSP should not have entered the coalition with the CHP but should have articulated its thesis while it was in opposition. Necip Fazrl was highly critical of the leader of the MSP, Necmettin Erbakan, for being conceited and incapable of leading such a party and called for his resignation. He described heavy industry and National Outlook (Milli Gorii§) as utopias. Thus in the 1977 elections he backed the MHP, the party that he tried to move away from "racism." He tried to influence the MHP toward becoming an Islamist party. In 1977 Necip Fazll urged the voters to vote for either the MHP or the AP so the two parties could form a coalition government and discouraged everybody from voting for any other party, including the MSP. He also rejected any ideological similarity between his ideology, the Grand East (Biiyuk Dogu: BD), and the MSP, which he called a bad imitation of the BD and a hindrance to the Islamic ideal. Yet he concluded by saying that his criticisms of the party came from a fellow Muslim and that he would reject any criticism coming from unbelievers (Klsakurek 1992b; p. 103, 1993, pp. 26-27, 68-69, 29 0 , 1990b, pp. 1[4-19, 1992a, pp. 276- 83: Tercuman, June 4 1977). He also supported the Nationalist Front governments (see Milti Gazete, April 9, 1975). One scholar argued that Necip Fazd was particularly successful in solving the "ambivalence of the Kemalist modernizers by advocating a (national) identity defined by total rejection of the West;' emphasizing "the folk character of national identity" and hence creating an Islamic form of nationalism that addressed the religious emotions of the people. In that sense, he contributed more to nationalism than did Kemalism. which had an artificial side in its nationalism (Ozdalga 1992, pp. 81-83).
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It might be true that Necip FazIl.K.tsakiirek influenced Turkish nationalism and the Turkish~Islamic synthesis that came after, but his impact can best be described as indirect and minor. From an outline of his ideas it should be evident that his views had very weak nationalist connotations and very strong Islamic leanings. In fact Islam was central, the beginning and the end, in his ideological orientation. Regarding his impact on the MHP, it is clear that this influence was more on the religious faction in the party, culminating in the Grand Unity Party (Biiyiik Birlik Partisi, BBP), which is more Islamist than nationalist in my judgment. The Turkish~Islamic synthesis (conservative nationalism) makes the point that Turkishness had a meaning only after the Turks converted to Islam around the tenth century AD. Its adherents are proud that Turks became the sword of Islam, first serving the Abbasid caliphate and then establishing independent states such as the Seljuks and the Ottoman Empire. The Ot~ tomans, in particular. ruled most of the Arab Middle East and very much defined the state identity in Islamic terms. This concept of nationalism un~ doubtedly would not be attractive to those people with secular leanings and the Alevis living in Turkey. The Alevis are a religious sect originating from Shiism but have followed a very different trajectory than that of the Twelver Shiism ofIranians. They are usually critical of the Ottoman past because they suffered during that time and have a very different understanding of Islamic religion. They perceive Sunni Islam as Arab Islam and believe that they fol~ Iowa Turkish form of Islam. Therefore they would have difficulty in accept~ ing the main arguments of conservative nationalism.
CONCLUSION: DIVERGING PATHS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM
The nation~religion nexus in which Turkish nationalism is formulated is a highly problematic area that needs to be understood and analyzed. For clarity in nationalist discourse a rejection of religion is .t:lot necessary. What is essential is putting religion in its proper place: below the nation in the hierarchy ofloyalties. Thus in nationalist thought the nation supersedes all other forms of allegiances such as religion, tribe. family, class, and gender. In other words, religion should be seen as a source of solidarity. which is functional for nationalism. Needless to say, such thinking is anathema to "fundamental~ ists" in all religions.
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Not pursuing such an intellectual endeavor leads to a blurring of the difference on the issue of religion between the nationalists and the Islamists, which remains vague. The Islamists are clear in their rejection of nationalism, but the nationalists are muddled in their approach to religion. On the one hand, they try to emphasize the importance of Turkish culture from the time of the Huns and their impact on contemporary Turkish culture. On the other hand, they try to prove the indivisibility of the Turkish-Islamic culture. In other words, they are trying to keep both cultures as the central component of Turkish culture. This problem arises from their thinking in an Islam-oriented fashion and their lack of ability to formulate their thoughts in a nation-centered way. It should be evident from these arguments that Turkish nationalism has moved away from the secular nationalism ofKemalism and pan-Turkism toward a more religion-oriented conception of the self and the nation. This can be explained by the democratization of the polity, starting in the 19SOS with a government that was more responsive to the demands of the populace and coupled with increased education, leading to the emergence of intellectual cadres with an Anatolian background for whom religion was an essential part of their lives. Nonetheless, eclecticism seems to be common in Turkish political thought, and none of the nationalist strands are withering away. Territorial, ethnic, and religious elements continue to play various roles in the definition of Turkish national identity. It should be pointed out, however, that it is no longer possible to find the pure Turanism of AtSlZ and eclecticism seems to be preferred by nationalists, who take elements from Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism (Ogiin 2.000, p. 150)' In other words, nationalism as it came under the influence of conservative nationalism became more responsive to Islam and the Ottoman past. In fact one of the reasons why members of the Nationalist Action Party preferred Islamic symbols to racism and pan-Turkism was that they realized that they would not be successful in elections with non-Islamic slogans (Ogiin 2.000, pp. 142.-43). Particularly after the 1960S, the Nationalist Action Party monopolized nationalism, whereas the Republican People's Party monopolized Kemalism. The nuances of nationalism and the fact that Kemalism itself was a form of nationalism caused confusion. In fact, throughout the 1960S, the CHP
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increasingly became a center-of~le.ft party, as the young and energetic secre~ tary general of the party, Bulent Ecevit, advocated social democracy. The election of the Justice and Development Party in 2.002. and 2.007 without an expressly nationalistic discourse or program heralded the "emer~ gence of a new Turkey" (Yavuz 2.006) with a less significant role for nationalism in Turkish politics. There is also a nationalist backlash nowelectorally, however, confined to a minority and pretty much represented in the Nation~ alist Action Party and the Republican People's Party. In the 2007 elections the two parties' discourses converged in such a manner that they discussed forming a grand coalition. This proved to be a futile project because they were defeated by the AKP, which garnered 47 percent of the national vote. Even though nationalism in Turkey has become more marginal, national~ ists are still a strong minority in the state bureaucracy and civil society. The pro~republic demonstrations, reactions to the rising activities of the PKK, the humiliation experienced in Iraq since 2003 by America and the Kurdish regional government, and the discriminatory policies of EU toward Turkey have culminated in the emergence of reactive nationalist feelings, besieged by "forces of evil." The rise in the display of flags in the three major cities ofTur~ key (Istanbul, Ankara. and izmir) as well as in other cities is a result of this feeling of weakness and fear that a Kurdish state is imminent. To return to the beginning of this chapter, positive or negative sentiments are sources that feed nationalist theory and practice. This is the reason for the continued relevance of nationalism for contemporary politicS.
7
ON THE QUESTION OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN TURKEY Sources and Discourses
BERRIN KOYUNCU-LORASDAGI
THE INTRACTABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND NATION-
alism-whether incompatibility or coexistence-has long been the object of academic interest. Views concerning this relationship in the literature can be broken down into twO basic groups. The first includes the proponents of the modernist approach to nationalism, who assume a fundamental incompatibUity between religion and nationalism: because nationalism is a modern phenomenon, the impact of religion on people's lives is expected to fall in line with the processes of modernization and secularization.' According to the second group, however, religion and nationalism can coexist. The writings of Anthony Smith (1991) and John Hutchinson (1987) point [0 the importance of religion for building a national identity! Transcending these dichotomist views placing either no emphasis or [00 much emphasis on the role of religion in the formation of nationalism, Barbara-Ann Rieffer (2003) makes a useful classification of the interplay of religion and nationalism by taking into account the extent to which religion can influence nationalism. She comes up with three types: secular nationalism, instrumental pious nationalism, and religious nationalism. As examples of secular nationalism she cites the French, German, Italian, and Turkish cases 133
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(in fact the secular. official one). which allow no place for religion in the construction of national identity. Based on the institutionalization of religion in the law and governing institutions and the degree of its role in nationalism. Rieffer makes a distinction between religious and instrumental pious nationalism. She regards religiOUS nationalism as a political movement by a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs and aspiring to political selfdetermination to establish national unity under their own independent political units. which are governed according to religious beliefs institutionalized in laws and procedures (Rieffer 2003. p. 225). Religion has an essential significance for these nationalist movements. so they are based heavily on religious language and modes of communication. This type includes the nationalisms of the Irish. Polish. Iranians, and Indians (twentieth century). In contrast, she defines instrumental pious nationalism as a movement in which religion occupies an influential position as an element supporting national identity. This category includes Russian and Iraqi nationalism from the 1980s to the present (Rieffer 2003. p. 224.). This chapter provides an overview of the interplay of Islam and nationalism from the late Ottoman era onward from a historical perspective by focusing on the discourses of key Turkish nationalist figures who have incorporated Islam into their nationalistic views and traces how this interaction has been articulated in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis since the 1980s. My goal here is to explore the nature of the relationship between Islam and nationalism in Turkey. Excluding some brief periods since the mid-nineteenth century {such as those of secular Kemalist nationalism and extreme versions of nationalism}. I contend that Islam and Turkish nationalism have had a symbiotic relationship in Turkey that is most appropriately conceived as instrumental pious nationalism. not as Islamic nationalism. At this juncture. two important points should be noted. First. although this chapter does not directly address the issue of modernization in the views of these figures. it should be kept in mind that focusing on the relationship between religion and nationalism necessitates viewing this issue within the context of Turkish modernization. Mid-nineteenth/eady-twentiethcentury modernization efforts concentrated on the question of how to save the unity of the empire and prevent its decay vis-a.-vis developments in Europe while holding onto its Islamic identity. Second, this chapter is concerned with (modernist/reformist) Turkish nationalists who contended
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that nationalism is compatible with Islam. They argued pragmatically that the best path in the age of nations was to establish unity under the name of the "nation" with the help of Islam, which would further the interests of both the Turkists and the Islamists (Tunaya 2.003. pp. 73-74). This chapter consists of four main parts. In the first part I outline the roots of the symbiotic relationship between Islam and nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire. In the second part I examine the discourse of the key Turkish nationalists of the late Ottoman and early republican period and the official discourse concerning the role of religion in Turkish nationalism. The discussion briefly touches upon the interplay of Islam and nationalism in the multiparty period between 1946 and 1980. In the third part I delve into the Turkish-Islamic synthesis by focusing on the views of the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydmlar Ocagl) and Fethullah Giilen since the 198oS.In the fourth part I discuss the limitations and prospects of the conceptualization of the symbiotic interplay of Islam and nationalism in Turkey as instrumental pious nationalism.
THE INTERPLAY OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN THE LATE OTTOMAN ERA: PAN-IsLAMISM AS THE SOURCE OF PROTO-NATIONALISM
The Ottoman Empire was first confronted with nationalist sentiments at the beginning of the nineteenth century, during the Greek revolt, which became a watershed in Ottoman history. This was no simple loss of territory: at that time the empire was alarmed to face independence movements in addition to the secession of its non-Muslim provinces in the Balkans (Ogiin 2.000, p. 99; Zubaida 2004, p. 408). This period also included nascent modernization efforts to seek a way out of the empire's deterioration and strengthen it against the European powers. The main concern was how to modernize and become more civilized while holding Onto its Islamic identity. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha. a leading statesman of the Tanzimat period, was the first figure in Turkish political history whose discourse on nationalism included Islamist themes (Ogun 2.000, p. 103). He advocated a political-legal modernization based on the Islamic values strictly embraced by the Muslims, who made up the majority of the Ottoman population. At the center of his political thought was the assimilation/Islamization of the empire's nonMuslim population (Ogiin 2.000, pp. 103-4). To Cevdet Pasha, the empire's
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success and longevity was attributable to the Turks' contributions through their culture of solidarity. But it should be underlined that what he meant by the expression "Turks" was very much associated with being Muslim. He also adhered to the policy of Ottomanism. While the concern of the Tanzimat state elites, whether they were Islamist or Turkist, was preserving the empire, they could not conceive of any alternative to Ouomanism, meaning the attempt to create an idea of territorial nationhood. They believed this was the best strategy to cope with the empire's diverse population (Arai 1994, pp. 1819; Giilalp 2002, p. 23; Thomas [978, p. 130). This attempt to unite the empire's diverse population regardless of religion and ethnicity did not work, however. It was under these circumstances that Young Ottoman thought emerged. Although the Young Ottomans supported the modernizing efforts of the Tanzimat elite, they also reacted against the privileges given to non-Muslim minorities (in the 18s6 Reform Edict) under the guise of formal equality between Muslims and nonMuslims. They highlighted Islam's importance as one of the primary factors uniting the Muslim population and an important pillar of the Ottoman state and society. Moreover, conceiving of the Islamic community as a modern nation, the Young Ottomans adopted the idea of ittihad-l Islam (unity of Islam) as referring to Islamic nationalism. The writings of Namlk Kemal and Ali $uavi, in particular, put the emphasis on being a Turk, although they did not have political goals and mainly remained Ottomanists (Berkes 1954, p. 381; Ogiin 2000, p. 106; Yavuz 1993, p. 198). Three main influences paved the way for nationalism supported by Islam to thrive in Turkey: the nationalist movements in the Balkans supported by (Christian) European powers; Persian intellectual Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), who championed the idea of ittihad-l Islam as a protonationalism;J and Turk-Tatar modernism (Cedidism), which served to fuse Turkish nationalism and Islamic modernism.4Starring with the way in which nationalist movements in the Balkans affected the evolution of nationalism with Islamic themes, Turkish nationalism is rooted in the proto nationalistic strain of Islamic political consciousness that developed as a result of the centralization and mass expulsion of Muslims from the Balkans (Kara 1997, p. 30; Yavuz 1993, p. 180). In addition, due to the empire's loss of territory in the Balkans and the rising threat posed by Christians to Ottoman unity, Sultan Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909)
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realized the need to rethink the significance of religion. In this regard, Abdiilhamid II decided to change the empire's main policy from Ottomanism to pan-Islamism, which is a progressive Islamic and nationalist movement whose main goals are modernization and transformation (Karpat 2.001, pp. :/.7-2.8). In this vein, he llsed Islam "as a lever which would instill some con" sciousness of a collective goal into his subjects" (Mardin 1981, p. 201) and to cere-strengthen the social foundation of the weakening state" (Giilalp 2002., /\ p. 26). It is important to stress that the adoption of pan-Islam ism by Abdiilh\i , amid II as an instrumental tool to keep the Ottoman Muslims of the empire i· united cannot be regarded as the consequence of his piety; it was a part of his \. political plan. He led "a national awakening" process by glorifying and moi, bilizing Islamic identity under "Muslim nationalism" (Karpat 2001, p. 32.0). "• •'.,• "• ," The second influence thought to have had an impact on the evolution .itionalism would serve Islamic unity by strengthening the individual elements >(Muslim nations) that were the constituents of that unity. Although his in«fiuence on political ideas within the Ottoman Empire has always been sub-
i'
• • •.',".".'.', ject to debate, it is hard to discount Afghani's impact on the views of Muslim i intellectuals of the Russian Empire such as Ahmed Agaoglu. As Nikki Ked> die (1968, p. 40) states, this impact was not due to a well-developed religious Sireformation program on the basis of theological questions. Instead, Afghani's \iattempts to find an appropriate way to absorb technical advances from Europe without letting Western cultural values enter Muslim lands and his idea \.that religion plays a critical role as a cohesive social force for forging group • solidarity inspired those intellectuals as well as Ziya Gokalp (Kara 1997, \pp. 41-42; Shissler 2.003, p. 103). ?> The third influence on the evolution of pan-Islamism as protonationalism .iwas the impact of Tatar-Turk modernist nationalism. This was a kind of relii:gious nationalism that reinforced the reconciliation ofIslam, modernism, and
:ii
\ Turkish nationalism, as represented by ismail Gasprinski (18S1'-1914). With a \ Worldly emphasis on the significance ofIslam, Gasprinski appropriated Islam
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as a useful tool for promoting group solidarity and leading a national and intellectual revival among Russian Muslims (Georgeon 1996; Karpat 2001, p. 550; Ogiin 1995> 2.000). The next part of this chapter deals with the influence of Tatar-Turk nationalism in detail through the thoughts of Yusuf Ak~ura and Ahmed Agaoglu. As A. Holly Shissler (2.003, p. 8) claims, the significant contributions of these two emigrants from the Russian Empire to the articulation of Turkish nationalism and Islam stemmed from the specific circumstances of Muslims under Russian rule. This led them to appropriate a particularly ethno-national interpretation of modern society that was unknown for Muslim Turks in the Ottoman Empire. 6
THE DISCOURSE ON NATIONALISM AND ISLAM BETWEEN THE LATE OTTOMAN AND EARLY REPUBLICAN ERAS
There are three important figures of Turkish nationalism in its formative period whose discourse on nationalism included Islamist themes: Yusuf Ak<;ura (1876-1935). Ahmed Agaoglu (1869-1939), and Ziya Gokalp (1876192.4).
After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the main question occupying Turkish political thought was how to halt the Ottoman Empire's decline. Here the discussions revolved around three main political currents: Ottoman ism (the drive to establish an Ottoman nation on the basis of common territory), Islamism (the drive to establish an Islamic state), and Turkism (the drive to establish an ethnic political nationalism). In 1904 Yusuf Ak~ura, known as the first leading modern Turkish nationalist, wrote an article entitled "D<; Tarz-l Siyaset" (Three Types of Policies) in the Cairo-based magazine Turk in which he analyzed these political currents in terms of their potential to help save the empire from deterioration. Whereas he regarded the policy of Ottomanism as impracticable, the other two policies, he argued, did have the potential to save the empire, so long as the possible internal and external threats to them were eliminated. At the end of the piece, Ak<;ura posed the choice between Islamism, which could cause problems by sowing antagonism among non-Muslims in the empire, and Turkism but did not make clear his preference. Suavi Aydin (1993), Fran<;ois Georgeon (1996), and David Thomas (1978) contend that Ak~ura's choice was Turkish nationalism, a political
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
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understanding of a Turkish nation based exclusively on ethnic collectivity free from religious influence. They regard Ak<j:ura as a secular nationalist who did not give religion a sizable role in constructing national identity, thus making him the founding father of Kemalist nationalism. 7 In this vein, Aydm and Georgeon stress that Ak~ura intentionally dissociated religion from nationalism because he saw Islam as taking a merely supporting role in Turkish national culture to strengthen the soul of unity. They assert that Ak~ura is different from Agaoglu and Gokalp in the sense that he did not attempt to reconcile Islam and nationalism by citing the ~ran and hadiths to prove the existence of nationalism in Islam (Aydm 1993, pp. 214IS; Georgeon 1996, p. 47). Ak~ura adopted a historical approach to the role of religion in Turkish nationalism and asserted that Islam had to accept nationalism due to the changing laws of history. In Ak~ura's conception, Islam should be in the service of the Turkish "race" (Aks:ura 1976, pp. 19, 30; Georgeon 1996, pp. 43,47), Some works point to the significance of religion in Ak~ura's nationalist discourse, however, stressing that he made no clear distinction between the two but tried to prove that Islam could play an important role in the development of Turkish nationalism (Aks:ura 1978, p. 173; Yavuz 1993, p. 196; also yetinsaya 1999, p. 356). Like Georgeon, Yavuz (1993) contends that Aks:ura treated Islam as a social, in fact historical, phenomenon that can change in light of different circumstances.8 Due to his historical approach to religion, Ak~ura did not see Islam as hostile to nationalism; in fact it is argued that he endorsed a kind of religious nationalism (Oglin 1995, p. 182; Yavuz and Esposito 1993, p. :W3). In terms of Rieffer's categorization of the relationship between religion and nationalism, two things are clear at this point: on the one hand, it is not possible to ignore the significance ofIslam in Aks:uras nationalist views, as Oglin and Yavuz assert; on the other, it is not proper to caU Ak<j:uras articulation of Islam and nationalism a religiolls one, as Aydm and Georgeon argue. Instead, it is more appropriate to regard it as an instrumental pious nationalism. Under the influence of ismail Gasprinski, whose approach to Islam was determined by the extent to which Islam contributed to the national life, Ak<j:ura's articulation ofIslam and nationalism was based on his belief that Islam could help nationalism flourish and gain strength by providing symbolic tools that enhance unity and solidarity (Aks:ura 1978, p. 99; Bora 1999; Georgeon 1996, p. 47).
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As Shissler (2.003) states, Ahmed Agaoglu, with his Russian background, is an important figure in Turkish nationalism in terms of the role he played in the development of attitudes toward identity, particularly Islam, among Muslim Turks.? He believed that religion and nationalism are mutually supportive elements of national identity. In this delicate and complex relationship each element both serves and feeds off the other. In a series of articles entitled "Turk Alemi" (Turkish World), "one of the manifestos of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis:' Agaoglu explored how Islam and Turkish nationalism could be reconciled (Ogiin 1995, p. 196; Shissler 2003. p. 173).'0 While the shared Islamic consciousness is an indispensable element in the creation of national unity among Muslims as well as in giving that consciousness a particular shape, in Agaoglu's view, Islam's well-being depends upon the wellbeing of the nations in which it exists (Shissler 2003, p. lSI). Agaoglu pointed to the articulation of the nation and religion in Turkey, arguing that the 900-year history of the Turks as the principal defenders of Islam had created a connection between the nation and the religion so deep that no element or institution of Turkish life was not permeated by Islam. Thus Islam may justly be called the national religion of the Turks (Agaoglu 1914). At this point he believed that the spread ofIslam could only be good for the Turks and that they were dedicated to eradicating religious ignorance and inculcating the Tur~sh nation with Islamic truths (Shissler 2003, p. 173). In addition to Agaoglu's emphasis on the significance of Islam for nationalism, he attempted to prove that Islam is not hostile to nationalism. He based his contention on two arguments. One is that nationalism does not pose a challenge to Islamic unity. In 1914-15 he wrote a lengthy two-part article for the premier journal of the Turkists, Turk Yurdu, entitled "tslamda Dava-Yl Millet" (The Nationalist ~estion in Islam). This article was a response to a 1914 piece by Babanzade Ahmet Naim (1872-1934), a leading Islamist, in Sebilu'refad. Naim analyzed the question of nationalism in Islam on the basis of the hadiths and the ~ran and concluded that nationalism, an illness borrowed from the West, was not acceptable in Islam because it harmed the Islamic world by damaging Islamic unity (Nairn 1914; Tunaya 2003, p. 7 1). Rebuffing Naim's claim that nationalism is rejected in Islam, Agaoglu argued that Islam's original purpose was to establish unity among the Arab nations. He asserted that the Prophet Muhammad worked hard to overcome
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asabiyyet (tribal feeling), "a feeling of attachment to a group of agnates directed towards a narrow, concrete circle of individuals," and to establish an Islamic consciousness among the Arabs that would lead to Arab unity (Shissler 2.003, pp. 178-79). Here he underlined the Significance of religion as one of the most important principles of nationality due to its vital role in "the establishment of the national language, the national customs and convictions, and the national mode of thought and way of life" and argued that religion has always played a key role in the formation of nations if a nation is defined as a group of people who feel the same way (Shissler 2.003, pp. 174-75). In that regard, Agaoglu presents nationalism and Islam as having a kind of symbiotic relationship. Religion, an integral part of a nationalist program and vision, is needed to overcome asabiyyet, and national unity is needed to create "a worthy vessel for the transmission ofIslam" (Shissler 2.003, p. 179)' Therefore he stressed that Islam and nationalism are not only compatible but indeed complementary. Agaoglu's second argument to prove that nationalism is not hostile to Islam was based on his historical perspective on religion. He conceived of religion as a dynamic force that constantly remakes itself through the historical process and in light of changing circumstances as part of a complex and dynamic process of interaction between revelation and context (Kara 2.003; Oglin 1995, p. 199; Shissler 2003). He highlighted the flexibility of Islam in terms of adapting itself to "the requirements of the environment, social conditions and spiritual circumstances in which the nation found itself, together with preserving its own fundamental truths and essentials" (Shissler 2.003, p. 17). Therefore Agaoglu tried to refute that Islam and nationalism cannot coexist. It is evident that Agaoglu had an instrumental attitude toward Islam: he thought that it was a form of discourse that could be effectively used to promote the goals of nationalism. While he believed that Islam contributed to the establishment of national unity, he contended that nationalism also advocated the progress of Islam by enhancing Islamic unity. Like Ak~ura and Agaoglu, Ziya Gokalp worked on the best way to establish a national identity in the context of the impending disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Westernization efforts of the nascent Turkish republic." Like Ak~ura, Gokalp saw Ottomanism as an ineffective policy for creating a nation due to the coexistence of several different nationalities and religions. He believed that for decades Turks had become alienated from
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Koyuncu-Lorasdagl
their own national traditions and instead appropriated the cultures of other peoples. It was the Turks' neglect of nationalism that had led to their demise (Berkes 1981, p. 73). Gokalp wrote: As the non-existence of the ideal of nationalism among the Turks resulted in the lack of any national economy, so the same factor has been an obstacle to the development of a national language and to the appearance of national patterns in fine arts. And, again, because the ideal of nationalism was not present Turkish morality remained only a personal and familial morality. The notions of solidarity, patriotism, and heroism did not transcend the confines of the family, the village, and the town. As the ideal of ummet [religion] was too large and the ideal of family too narrow, the Turkish soul remained a stranger to the sot[ of life and to the intensive moral feelings that should be the bases of sacrifice and altruism. The disintegration seen in our economic, religious, and political institutions is the consequence of this state of affairs. (Berkes 1981, p. 74) Therefore what Gokalp referred to was a nation-based unity through a synthesis of the three ideals on which a Turkish nation should be founded: Islamism, Turkism, and modernism. Gokalp maintained that these three ideals were not irreconcilable but rather complementary, because they appealed to different needs. For example, modernism stood for the pursuit of the scientific, technological, and industrial civilization of the West, not the adoption of a European way of life. While culture represents the moral and aesthetic aspect of civilization, science and technology represent the cognitive and material aspects (Parla 198), p. 27). In fact this synthesis is very well expressed in his saying "The Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic ummet, and to Western internationality" (Berkes 1981, p. 76). For the purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to note the relevance of this synthesis to the relationship between religion and nationalism in Gokalp's nationalist discourse. Like Agaoglu, Gokalp rejected the view that Islam and the idea of nationalism are contradictory by pointing to the distinction between "the universally valid truths in Islam and those aspects which were only socially and temporally relevant" and claimed that Islamists' failure to see this distinction
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
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led them to see nationalism and Islam as irreconcilable (Berkes 1954. p. 387; Heyd 1950. p. 98). Turkism. "a scientific. philosophical and aesthetic movement to elevate the Turkish nation" by awakening "national culture:' which included both non-Islamic evolving national traditions and historically variable Islamic traditions that had over time become part of the Turkish national identity. and Islam ism are complementary (Berkes 1981, p. 2.88). He regarded Turkism as a nationality and cultural norm and Islam ism as an internationality and moral norm (ParIa 1985. p. 2.6). In this respect. as Berkes (1954, p. 383) notes, Gokalp transformed the Turkism of the purist pan-Turks from a political movement into a cultural one. Gokalp contended that religion constituted one element of the national culture and added that, as Turks were Muslims. Islam would naturally be an indispensable element in their culture (Berkes 1981, pp. 2.85-86). He stated that what was irreconcilable with Western civilization was the culture of religious community, because it refused to view religion as a sphere of life that changes and evolves alongside the mores of the people (Berkes 1981, p. 2.86). Hence. like Ak<;ura and Agaoglu, Gokalp conceived ofIslam as a historical phenomenon that is subject to change and dependent on social circumstances and sought to employ it to enhance Turkish nationalism (Heyd 1950, p. 82). In that regard, Gokalp rejected the view that the sources of Islamic law (Sharia) should be found solely in divine revelation (nass), meaning the Quran and the Sunna (the sayings and the doings of the Prophet Muhammad). He claimed that or/(the mores or social circumstances of various Islamic societies) should also be taken into account as sources of Islamic law (Davison 1995, p. 195). Gokalp did not regard Islam as a civilization and demanded the purging of Arab traditions from Islam in Turkey, arguing that they did not accord with the Turkish national soul. In doing so, he attempted to combine Islam with Turkish nationalism. Gokalp's nationalist discourse entails an instrumental adoption of Islam, the most significant constituent of Turkish national culture, to revive national pride and consciousness in establishingTurkish national identity. In tracing the roots of the relationship between Islam and nationalism, it is clear that pan-Islam ism fi.mctioned as a protonationalism in the formative period of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire. The nationalist discourse throughout this period and the following early republican period, in which constructing a national identity was the main concern, endorsed a
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symbiotic and instrumental articulation ofIslam and Turkish nationalism on the basis that nationalism could be enhanced through the help ofIslam."
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSE OF THE EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA
During the Turkish War of Independence, religion was employed as the ultimate glue holding the nation together against the invading foreign powers. Here a kind ofIslamic nationalism was used to justify the nationalist struggle (Poulton 1997; Bora 1999). When it was realized that Islamic nationalism's traditional aspects were impeding reforms toward modernization, however, the secular Kemalist ideology did not hesitate to subordinate the role of religion vis-a.-vis language and history for Turkish nationalism (Poulton 1997, pp. 91, 98; Zubaida 2.004, p. 413). Dmit Cizre Sakalltoglu (1996. p. 2.35) explains this subordination: Islam was being a threat to the Kemalist project of Western-style Enlightenment. which primarily aimed to cause a fundamental change in terms of "the attitudes of individuals whose communal self-identity and emotional security had been provided by Islam." Rejecting any close affinity with pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism as acceptable policies for the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal adopted language and history as the main co~tituents of the Turkish nation. To him, a nation was based on political. territorial, linguistic. and cultural unity (unity of lineage and roots. shared history. and shared morality). In that regard. Mustafa Kemal also rejected Perso-Arabian and Ottoman cultural elements and instead endorsed Turks' Asiatic roots. By claiming that "the Turks were a great nation before adopting Islam:' he stressed the need to focus on the pre-Islamic history of the Turks and the puriflcation of the language as prominent goals for strengthening the idea of Turkish national identity (Landau 1995, p. 74; also <;etinsaya 1999, pp. 362.-63; Poulton 1997. pp. 100-102., 12.8)." This strictly secular Kemalist nationalism can be said to have changed the discourse of Turkish nationalism by being strongly against the idea that nationalism should be enhanced or established through the help of Islam (Ogun 1995; Poulton 1997; Zubaida 2.004). Although religion was replaced by language and history as the main elements of Turkish nationalism during this era through the transfer of sacredness and legitimacy from religion to the national state, religious symbols were being used in the official discourse to cope
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with the problem of the illegitimacy of secular nationalism (Bora 1999; Cizre Sakalhoglu 1996).'~ This discourse lasted until the end of World War II.'!
THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE MULTIPARTY PERIOD (1946 TO 1980)
During World War II a revival of the symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism, in which Islam and Turkism were seen as indispensable for the Turkish national identity, took place for three main reasons. First, due to the weakness of the republic in understanding the role played by Islam in the building of personal identity and providing ontological security, a resurgence of religion rose to fill this void (Mardin 1981). The second reason was the political liberalization that freed religion, and the third was the threat of communism. As Cizre Sakalhoglu (1996) contends, Islam became a powerful weapon against communism. Parallel to these developments, the state revised its position that Turkish nationalism should be based on history and religion. Another important development was the emergence of a new generation of "nationalist-conservative" intellectuals made up ofTurkists and Islamists such as Necip Fazrl KIsakiirek, Nurettin Top~u, Peyami Safa, and Yahya Kemal, all of whom emphasized the symbiotic relationship between Islam and nationalism by arguing that there is no conflict between the two. Furthermore, they contended, both are the essential components of Turkish national identity (yetinsaya 1999, p. 368). From their point of view, the secular policies of the Kemalist regime led to the corruption of the youth and the only way to save Turkish youth from the Communist threat was the reconstruction of the place ofIslam. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed as a political vision in this climate during the Democratic Party rule throughout the 19S0S (yetinsaya 1999, p. 369; Poulton 1997)' A noticeable attempt to reconcile Islam with Turkish nationalism occur-
red in the liberal environment created by the 1960 Constitution (Poulton 1997, p. 174). The Turkists, with the help of academics such as Miimtaz Turhan, Erol Gungor, lbrahim Kafesoglu, and Osman Turan, began to redefine Turkish nationalism by stressing the coexistence of Islam and Turkish nationalism.16 As Gokhan yetinsaya (1999. p. 370) argues, the significance of the 1rnamHatip schools and the nationalist youth (Olkiicii) movement, which played
Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl
critical roles in sowing the seeds of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, should be noted because Islamists and Turkists flourished in these places. In addition, in the period starting in 1967 and lasting through 1980, the National Turkish Students' Union contributed to the reinforcement of the Turkish-Islamic' synthesis by acting as an important defender of the idea that it was impossible to think of Turkish nationalism without Islam (Okutan 2004, pp. 14243, 14S).'7 Their idea was again based on the belief that Turks served Islam and that Islam included principles vital for Turkish nationalism. A parallel development in the 1970S was the attempt to reconcile Islam and nationalism for political reasons in political party discourse. It advocated a kind ofIslamic nationalism where Islam was seen as a vital factor of the Turkish nation and Turks were seen as the foremost soldiers of Islam (Poulton 1997, p. 178). We encounter this reconciliation in both Alparslan Tlirke§'s Nationalist Action Party and Necmettin Erbakan's National Order Party (Poulton 1997, p. 179)' The emergence of the Intellectuals' Hearth in 1970 was the most striking attempt to reconcile Islam and Turkish nationalism, because the TurkishIslamic synthesis then gained an institutional ground. In the 1980s this position of the nationalists in terms of Islam did not see any necessary change; Islam continued to be one of the utmost elements of national culture upon which nationalism was based.
THE SYMBIOSIS OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD: THE TURKISH-ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS The doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was formulated by the Intellectuals' Hearth in the late 1970S and then adopted as the policy of the interim military government during 1980-83.'81he main theme of this doctrine was that the reason behind the collapse of the regime prior to the 1980 military intervention was a cultural crisis experienced by Turkish youth. who were deprived of moral and religious values as a result of the replacement of national culture policies by humanist ones,'9 Muharrem Ergin. an ideologue of the Hearth, blamed the humanist movement undertaken by "cosmopolitan intellectuals" who glorifled Greco-Roman civilization for having developed the roots of Anatolian culture. According to him. this contention provided a breeding ground for the development of communism as a threat
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against the national culture (Ergin 1975, pp. 179-88). The Hearth's main concern was therefore to find a way out of the cultural depression that Turkey faced at this time by reviving Turkish national culture and empowering the elements that constituted national existence with the help of Islam (The Hearth Regulation 1970). They believed that Islam would act as an antidote to four group of enemies: atheists (materialists), Communists and humanists, dividers (meaning Kurdish separatists), and fundamentalists and sectarians (Ergin 1975)' The Hearth's ideologues made strong efforts to highlight the significance and uniqueness of Turkish culture in order to promote a revival of national pride. As Elisabeth 6zdalga (2006, p. 556) states, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis narrative is concentrated on origins, "the great historical event." In this regard, it highlighted two periods and the related striking features of Turkish culture, one related to pre-Islamic history and the other to the Islamic history of the Turkish nation. As the ideologues of the Hearth argued, the first feature was the Turkish nation's uniqueness in terms of establishing several pre-Islamic states. This itself was seen as one of the highest activities of humankind, producing outstanding personalities (mythic figures) such as Alp Arslan (the sultan of the Seljuk dynasty who, by defeating the Byzantines in Eastern Anatolia in 1071, contributed to Anatolia's Turkification and Islamization) and Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk (the founder of the Turkish Republic) (Ergin 1975, p. 29). In addition, Turkish culture was lauded as being unique in initiating an original steppe culture with the distinguishing characteristics of possessing a monotheist view as well as resolve, courage, and military skill from birth. The domestication of certain animals. most notably the horse, and the use of iron increased the potential of Turks to expand militarily and conquer new places to spread Islam (Kafesoglu 1999, pp. 49-S1). According to the Islamic history of the Turkish nation put forward by proponents of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the second unique feature of Turkish culture was its merging with Islam, which. they believed, originated in Central Asia and was transmitted to the Anatolia region and other areas that were later established as Turkic states by the Turks. They emphasized that Islam and Islamic thought did not come to the Turkic states directly from the Arab world. Instead they came via Central Asia, matured, and were then transmitted by the dervishes to the Turkic states (Ergin 1975; KafesogIu 1999). Trying to establish a distance from both other Muslim countries such
Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl
as Arab ones and the idea of the ummah, the Hearth claimed that the present era was not an age of religious states but one of nation-states based upon national culture (Ergin 1975, pp. 2.09, 2.11,2.19). According to the Intellectuals' Hearth, culture is the most important component of the nation, with its main elements of language, mores and traditions. worldview, religion, art. and history (Ergin 1975, p. 6). They underlined its significance by stating that it is culture that actually makes the nation a nation and distinguishes the people of one nation from others (Ergin 1975, p. 6: ~aylan, Tekeli, and Turan 1994. p. 134). In fact the main reason why they attributed so much significance to culture is that national consciousness, seen as an indispensable constituent of a nation's establishment. requires the existence of a culture (Ergin 1975. pp. 12.-13). The Hearth's ideologues highlighted the significance ofIslam as the most appropriate religion for Turks and placed it at the center of Turkish culture. Their most influential activity in this regard was to prepare reports, mainly on the issues of education and culture.'" One such report entitled "A Query into the Responsibilities and Methods to Be Applied in Determining Cultural Policies and Cultural Aspects (June 2.0, 1986)" stressed the role of religion in determining the norms and values of society and the Significance of Islam for the existence of the Turkish nation (Sarak 1987). Accordingly, being a Turk and being a ~uslim have equal weight in terms of national identity. Charging that Turkey had been experiencing a serious cultural crisis due to "the irresponsibility of the country's intellectuals' interest in a humanistic movement:' the Hearth pOinted to a need for the reformation of the education system. It called for the nationalization of education by injecting basic constituents of national culture such as Turkish morality. religion. and Turkish art and history and its redemption from humanist. materialist, and Communist influences as the best solution to all the problems facing Turkey in the 1970S (Ergin 1975. pp. 393, 396). The ultimate goal of education should therefore be to raise Muslim Turks!' Like the other Turkish nationalists mentioned before, adherents of the Hearth argued that Turkish nationalism and Islam are inseparable (Ergin 1975, pp. 2.0 7-9: Kafesoglu 1999, pp. 93. 144-45). They contended that this unification was to the advantage of both sides. After they adopted Islam, Turks (particularly the Seljuks and Ottomans) served Islam by defending and expanding it, and Turks easily adopted Islam because their belief
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
149
in Tann (God) closely resembled Islam's belief in Allah (Ergin 1975, p. 208; Kafesoglu 1999, pp. 144-45)' Their intention was to prove that ''Turkish nationalism begins and ends with Islam," because Anatolia was first Islamicized and then Turkified (Kafesoglu 1999, p. 23). At this point, as Siileyman Seyfi Cgiin (1995, p. 183) underlines, they tried to emphasize the symbiotic nature of Turkish nationalism and Islam, which is thought to be a more acceptable alternative to Islamic feelings. In the 1990S the influence of the Intellectuals' Hearth began to decline. It is an open question whether this happened because it had completed its mission or whether it underwent a transformation in the political and social context of that time. It is believed that the mission of the Hearth was inherited by Fethullah Giilen, a charismatic retired Islamic preacher and the leader of the education-based Giilen movement, who spelled out a new concept of "Turkish Muslimhood" with clear kinship to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.
THE INTERPLAY OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM SINCE THE 1990S: FETHULLAH GOLEN'S "TURKISH MUSLlMHOOD"
Fethullah Giilen (b. 1941) was a state preacher who reSigned from his POSt in 1981." He received public attention in Turkey in the mid-1990S!1 The movement he led became a large, well-known religious movement both in Turkey and worldwide!4lt was involved in a wide range of activities, education being the most important!S In the 2000S, particularly after the 9/U incident, he gained international fame and support, being depicted as the "most reasonable" and "moderate" religious leader, in fact as a "religious scholar" (Carroll 2007). His movement is praised as a tolerant and liberal religiOUS network that is far from extremism!6 Giilen's stay in the United States since 1999 also contributed to this international popularity of the movement, which is regarded as an agency of "transnational ism" through educational activities and interfaith dialogue.·7 What makes the Giilen movement distinctive vis-a.-vis other religiOUS movements in Turkey is the accent on educational mobilization, interfaith dialogue and tolerance, and the nationalist tones This is expressed as "Turkish Muslimhood;' which stresses the uniqueness of Islam practiced in the Turkish context"~ In fact Giilen owes his "positive image" to this
15°
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conceptualization of Turkish Muslimhood, which is regarded as a safeguard against radicalism both in Turkey and in the world. This part of the chapter concentrates mainly on Giilen's Turkish Muslimhood, a synthesis of Turkish nationalism, a nationalized Islam, and modernism. Giilen's Turkish Muslimhood refers to the tolerant and moderate reinterpretation of Islam in light of the dynamics, traditions, and character specific to the Turkish nation in its current circumstances but maintaining the universal principles and criteria of religion (Milliyet [daUy], April IS, 1997).30 This conceptualization based on the tradition of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is based on the Turks' unique and superior understandingofIslam, "which is also superior to other cultures" (Ozdalga 2.006, p. 552.). To emphasize this uniqueness and superiority of Turkish culture, contrary to his tolerance and interfaith discourse, Giilen's discourse on nationalism is constructed on the Other, "the fanatic and intolerant" exercise of Islam practiced in Arab countries and Iran (Turgut 1997).3 1 Giilen argued that since Iran exported a fanatical, sect-based understanding ofIslam (Shiite) in the name of religion, it adopted a reactionary attitude toward societies dominated by Sunni groups (Sevindi 1997). From this perspective, he tried to show that Turkey has a different climate, with freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and freedom of enterprise (Turgut 1997). Giilen based the distinction between the "good Turkish model" a~d these "negative examples" on the variation in the culture of other Muslim countries. As the Intellectuals' Hearth pointed out, Giilen also claimed that a nation's culture plays a key role in the interpretation of religion. He here referred to the two historical periods in Turkey: Turkish culture whose roots went back to Central Asia and Turkish culture that witnessed the coexistence of peoples with different ethnic roots during the great Ottoman Empire. Relatedly, his nationalism has two constituents: neo-nationalism and neo-Ottomanism. Giilen advocated neo-nationalism, whose roots go back to pan-Turkism, shaped by the desire to he dose to the Turkic states (Narh 1997). He saw Asia as very important, arguing that Turks spread all over the world from Asia. If they were to cut their ties with this ancestral homeland and ignore its role as the foundation of their existence, they would lose their roots and suffer a sharp drop in status (Turgut 1997). He maintained that Turkey should cooperate with this region, whose people are very close to the Turks, rather than with people "who consider themselves more Muslim than Turks and despise
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
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them" (Giindem 2.005 [January 2.6]; Sevindi 1997 [July 2.3]), referring to the Arabs. Giilen stated that Middle Eastern countries always close their doors to his movement's education activities, whereas in Central Asia and Africa people allow them to open schools, hang Turkish flags in their doorways, and sing the Turkish national anthem (Gundem 2.00s). He highlighted that his childhood dream was to create a powerful Turkish world together with Turks in Central Asia (Giindem 2.005). He backed up this aspiration by glorifying the Turkish past in that region. Giilen mentioned two characteristics of Central Asian Turkish culture previously stressed by the Intellectuals' Hearth, which made it possible for Turkey to produce a moderate local interpretation of Islam without posing a challenge to its universal character: the influence of Sufi tradition and the unique historical experience of Turks. In Giilen's thought, the most significant feature of Turkish culture is a moderate, tolerant interpretation of Islam blended with Sufism.)' Its origins go back to Central Asia because Islamic jurisprudence, hadiths, and ~ranic commentary developed there. Like Hearth adherents of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, Giilen argued that Islam practiced in Turkey did not take its sources from Arab Islam, as lived in Mecca or Medina. The Turks living in Central Asia totally accepted Islam at the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the Hegira. Giilen claimed that some pans of the Islamic constitution are open to interpretation and were tolerantly interpreted by Turks under the influence of Sufism (Can 1995; Gi.indem WOs). From there it was carried to Anatolia by dervishes. In the fifth and sixth Islamic centuries, it was handed down to the Great Seljuks and then passed to their heirs, the Ottomans (Turgut 1997). To him, the distinguishing feature of such Islam as practiced in Turkey was being open to interpretation and to the spiritual life ofIslam: mysticism. ll This unique version of Islam can have "praiseworthy characteristics" such as being tolerant and moderate, keeping a distance from politics, advocating the coexistence of science and faith, and embracing values like love for humanity, democracy, and secularism. He stated that under these conditions he preferred to use the term "Turkish Islam" or "Turkish Muslimhood" (Turgut 1997). Like the Intellectuals' Hearth, Giilen maintained that Turks accepted Islam because they saw it as the religion most appropriate to their nature. He believed that the decision of Turkish tribes to convert to Islam was natural and that Turks served Islam by defending, preserving, and spreading its
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message through the states they established over the centuries. He underlined that Turks not only contributed to Islam's historical surviving and indeed thriving but also interpreted its message more deeply and suitably to its spirit than any other nation, including the Arabs (Ugur 2004, p. 336). Thus, according to Giilen, the universal character of Islam did not constitute an obstacle for Turks to accept it while retaining their customs and traditions (Giindem 200S). Like the Intellectuals' Hearth, Giilen contended that the Turks' experience in developing close relations with Sufism and founding states made it possible for Turks alone to contribute to the universality ofIslam by the appropriation and spread of it through love and tolerance (Turgut 1997). He highlighted the intertwined relationship of religion, nationalism, and culture that continually fed each other in the Turkish context. In one interview he stated: For me. being Muslim is an essential because it encompasses my happiness both in this world and in the afterlife. But among my general thoughts and perceptions I believe, as expressed by one of our famous poets, that the Turkish nation put its true values on a solid foundation after becoming Muslim. Turks reached their zenith as a nation only after becoming Muslim. I look at myself as a Muslim Turk from this perspective .... I d~dn't think of my Turkishness as separate from my Muslimness. At the same time, I am very, very far from racism. (6zkok 1995)
As Narh (1997) argues, the other component of Giilen's nationalism is neo-Ottomanism. a nationalism based on the legacy of the Ottoman Islamic state with a desire to revive the glOrious past of the Ottoman Empire. Giilen praised the Ottoman heritage. asserting that the mosaic structure of the Ottoman Empire also had a positive impact on the practice of Turkish Islam. He contended that the diverSity of the ethnic and sectarian backgrounds of the people in the empire made Turks open to change. whereas Muslims in other countries lived in closed. isolated worlds, which meant that they easily became fanatics who focused on the secondary details of Islam (Bayramoglu 1996). Giilen's hope for the future. even as a child. was for Turkey to be a powerful global power as it was during the Ottoman era. He highlighted his aspiration by saying that he looked at a map when he was twelve and asked
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
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himself when Turkey would regain the power to influence world politics. He stressed that he was brought up with this yearning and had no other goals in his life, such as material goods or having children (Turgut 1997)' At the outset Gtilen endorsed a symbiotic relationship between Turkish nationalism and Islam under the name "Turkish Muslimhood;' as a combination of the Hanifa sect and the Turkish understanding of Islam. He wanted to export this "unique" articulation to the Turkic Central Asian countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990S to revive their ethnic identities. Berna Turam (2.003, p. 190) states that Gtilen aimed to employ a pragmatic Islam that would help to establish a network at the international level based on its primary loyalties to the nation. In the late 1990S the movement extended to the Western European countries with a large number of Turkish immigrants (such as the Netherlands and Germany) through educational and economic activities to reinforce the Turkish and Muslim identity of people who were regarded as being under threat.34 The expectation was that an instrumental articulation of Islam and Turkish nationalism would serve to build a transnational network among the Turks around the world. It is noteworthy that the establishment and extension of the Giilen schools did not confront any difficulty in the Western European countries with large Turkish immigrant populations, which have been very sensitive to Islam, particularly since 91 n. As stated above, this silent support on the part of the host countries is related to the Turkish Islam model of Gillen. It constitutes an example of the Euro-Islam idea, a kind of "soft Islam" that is presented as a prescription for revealing how to deal with the unrest within those European countries concerning the negative image ofIslam. In the late 1990S, as Bekir Agai (2.003) argues, a change occurred in the nationalist discourse of Giilen: a decreasing emphasis on the nationalist tone and an increasingly global one. This change cannot be read as Giilen's total abandonment of his aspiration for Turkish nationalism, however, which still stands at the center of his thought. His positive stance toward the Western world and globalization is grounded in a pragmatic decision based on the need to survive in a global world. ll In the twenty-first century Gillen envisions a Turkish world that has a tight hold on Muslim identity hut at the same time has established good relations with the West (Sevindi 1997). Thus, under the impact of globalization, his approach to nationalism is inclusive toward relations with the West. In addition to urging Turkey to forge closer ties
154
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with the Central Asian Turkic states, Giilen has acknowledged that taking an antagonistic stance toward the West would end up excluding Turkey from the modern world. In this regard, he is a supporter of Turkey's EU membership, which he believes will not threaten Turkey so long as the values, traditions, and dynamics of the Turkish nation are kept intact (Giindem 200S).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter explores the symbiotic relationship between Turkish nationalism and Islam in the Turkish nationalist discourse, which points to the coexistence ofIslam, nationalism, and modernism. The nature of this symbiotic and instrumental interaction between religion and nationalism in Turkey should be distinguished, I contend, from religious nationalism with a political orientation. Thus I argue that references to Islamic nationalism in Turkey like the nationalism in Iran are mistaken. Instead this ideological thread should be regarded as an instrumental pious nationalism, in which Islam has not had a dominating role over nationalism. Instead it has endorsed the mutual benefit of both sides, Islam and Turkish nationalism. At this point, however, the prospects and hazards or limitations of conceptualizing the relationship between Islam and Turkish nationalism in Turkey as instrumental pious nationalism should also be discussed. The most significant limitation of such a conceptualization pointing to the difference between religious nationalism and instrumental pious nationalism is the danger that it could unintentionally result in attributing a positive connotation to instrumental pious nationalism. In the current context of hysteria over Islamic fundamentalism, this could seem like praising instrumental pious nationalism for being "less threatening" than religious nationalism. A related handicap is that being embedded in a cultural orientation rather than a political one should not mean that instrumental pious nationalism has an inclusive approach toward the differences, as is evident in the Intellectuals' Hearth and Giilen cases. In terms of its prospects, employing this category of instrumental pious nationalism to grasp the nature of the relationship between Islam and nationalism will help show that Islam has always been an indispensable element of the discourse of nationalism in Turkey, although it has never completely subjugated nationalism, as happened in religious nationalism. A related but
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
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more important prospect is that conceiving the incorporation of religion into nationalism in Turkey from its inception as instrumental pious nationalism forces us to rethink the role of religion in Turkish society and politics. A point that deserves to be elaborated here is why the interplay of religion and nationalism in Turkey has had a symbiotic nature. Although this is a complex question needing a lengthy treatment of its own, here are a few points for consideration. First, attention should be paid to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in terms of the prominent role that religion played in society and politics. As Binnaz Toprak (1981) points Ollt, Islam had entrenched itself so thoroughly in the social, political, and legal system of the Ottoman Empire that the basic concern of Ottoman reformers throughout the nineteenth century was how to Westernize/modernize in a Muslim society where Islam had penetrated all substructures of the Ottoman political system. Even during the secular Kemalist period religious symbols were used to win public support and provide social integration, as noted above. Second, as Cizre SakalllOglu (1996) contends, Islam was never completely abandoned but in fact has been continuously and strategically used in Turkish political life for pragmatic reasons. From my point of view, this is deeply related to Islam's "symbolic power" (Keyman 2.007). the potential to provide a sense of belonging and cohesion as well as present a code of ethics to work as "a cultural code or cultural frame of reference for a community of people that think of themselves as sharing a way of life" (Giilalp 2.003, p. 383). Thus it is no exaggeration to claim that any successful worldview. ideology, or political trend in Turkey must include a noticeable dosage of Islamic themes. though it need not be solely based on Islam. This role of Islam in Turkish society makes it possible for Turkey to be regarded as a Muslim and laik (not secular) country with problems. This particular function ofIslam in the Turkish society has an important repercussion for the question of secularism in Turkey. Due to the strong position ofIslam in the Turkish context, the issue of secularism, defined as the first and foremost significant principle of (Kemalist) modern Turkey, has always remained on the national agenda as the most polarizing political problem. It is believed to be under a continuous threat from Islam in the competition for "political and ideological primacy" (Giilalp 2.005, p. 352.). In fact, as Haldun Giilalp (2.005, p. 352.) very rightly points out, this is the reason why the Turkish case is peculiar in terms
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of "appearing to be perennially caught in a dilemma between secularization and democracy." In light of these considerations we have to rethink the role ofIslam in Turkey at the axis of secularization and democracy.
NOTES 1.
2..
3.
4.
S.
6.
7.
8.
While Ernest Gellner (1983) places considerable importance on the impact of culture on nationalism and pays specific attention to Protestantism in the formation of nationalism, he does not approve of religion's role in nationalism. Eric Hohshawm (1992., pp. 47, 68; Mihelj 2.007, p. 2.67) also believes that religion cannot be identified with modern nationalism, because it may constitute a challenge to "the nation's monopoly claim to its members'loyalty." Anthony Smith (1991, p. 49) argues that, though nationalism is a fundamentally secular ideology, there is "nothing unusual about religiOUS nationalism." He contends that nationalists have found it necessary to appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses. Afghani, who was regarded as an influential Islamic reformer, traveled extensively in the Middle East and Europe to encourage the strengthening of the Muslim world against Europe. Cedidism refers to the "New Method," whose appropriation was endorsed in an educational movement among the Muslim Turks/Tatars of the Russian Empire. !.smail Gasprinski advocated the adoption of modern instructional methods to make the Turks of Russia learn modern subjects such as mathematics and geometry in their native languages as well as traditional subjects such as ~ran recitation, Persian, and Arabic. What was specific to Cedid schools was the prohibition of blind memorization and recitation, to be replaced by a more comprehension-based method of instruction (Shissler 2.003, pp. 107-8). See also Afghani and Abduh (1987). Both ~ura and Agaoglu were part of a tradition of reformist and modernizing Muslim intelligentsia. much like Ismail Gasprinski, Mirza Fethali Ahundzade, Seyid Azim ~irvani, and Hasan Melikov Zerdabi (Shissler 2.003, p. 103). For this reason Thomas (1978. p. 136) and Jacoh Landau (1995. p. 14) see Akc;:uras pOSition on nationalism as the first significant (political) challenge to the other policies of the Ottoman Empire. namely, Islamism and Ottomanism. Masami Arai (1994, p. 19) also points to the statement of Ahmet Ferit, one of Akc;:uras closest friends, that he could not accept the main thesis of any manuscript rejecting the idea of an Ottoman nation. ~ura believed that the logic of history was moving in a certain direction: in order not to be left behind. everyone had to keep up with this evolution. Thus
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
157
he saw religion as a phenomenon within the flow of history (Shissler 2.003, P·176 ).
9.
10.
II.
12..
I3. 14.
15.
Agaoglu, a Turkic emigrant from Russia, was an influential figure of Turkish nationalism, particularly through his work in 1911 in founding the highly influential Turkist journal Turk Yurdu as well as the Turkist institution Turk Ocaklan (Turkish Hearths) the same year. He also worked as an editor and regular contributor to many daily newspapers and journals. For detailed biographical information, see Shissler (2.003). Shissler (2.003, p. 173) claims that "Turk Alemi" can be regarded as a typical nationalist manifesto in terms of defining the Turkish world very broadly and stating his hope for a future lying in a unified, forward-looking Turkish nation. But more important was the degree of emphasis and importance given to Islam in Agaoglu's articles in this magazine, because they demonstrate how religion remained a very basic, irreducible element of identity for him. In that regard, he was heaVily influenced by Afghani, who argued that the emphasis on science and the principles of consultation and consensus during the classical age ofIslam demonstrate that Islam is not hostile either to science or to representative institutions (Ak<;:ura 1975). See, for instance, Berkes (1954, pp. 375-76). There was an implicit alliance between the Turkists and the Islamists. Turkists such as Ak<;:ura and Agaoglu wrote for lslamist journals, and Islamists such as Mehmet AkifErsoy and ~emseddin Giinaltay never raised a serious challenge to the Turkists and also contributed to Turkist journals. In this vein, while the idea of Islamism was replaced by the idea of nationalism supported by Islam in the discourse of the Islamists, the Turkists strongly emphasized the elements of "Islamic nationalism" in their writings (<;etinsaya 1999, pp. 356, 361; Ogiin 1995, p. lSI). To comprehend this symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism in the Turkish context, it is helpful to mention "the paradox of adopting religion as proto-nationalism" (Hobsbawm 1991, p. 2.4.). On the one hand Islam helped to establish Turkish national identity by functioning as an adhesive bond, but on the other hand it was thought to pose a serious challenge to the modernist mission of nationalism. Therefore the antidote to this paradox was conceived to be the instrumental nationalization of religion. See also Nutuk 2-Ig27 (Atattirk 2.007, pp. 6-7). Here Cizre Sakalhoglu (1996) points to the distinction between enlightened (secular) Islam. which was promoted by the Kemalist elite. and reactionary Islam, which was completely prohibited. Apart from an opposition to religion within the official discourse. some attempts were made during this era to reconcile Islam and nationalism by construing religion as one of the crucial pillars of a nation. Without going into
Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl
details, it is adequate to mention a few prominent figures in this regard, such as Hamdullah Suphi Tannover, Yahya Kemal, and ~emseddin Giinaltay. Their views remained isolated in the Kemalist ideology until the 1940S (Bora 1999, p. 12.4). In addition to these figures, there was also the Anatolianism movement, which included Remzi Oguz Ank and his journal Millet (Nation), Nurettin Top~u and his publication Hareket (Movement), Hilmi Ziya Oiken, and Ziyaeddin Fahri Fmdikoglu. Their main argument was that Turkish nationalism based on the thousand-year history of AnatOlia, the phase beginning with the Battle of Malazgirt (1071), should stay within the borders ofIslam, freed from its Turanian content and ethnic elements (Bilir 2.004, p. 2.61). 16. See Turk MilliyetFzliginin Meseleleri (The ~estions ofTurkish Nationalism) (Kafesoglu 1970) and TUrk Cihan Hakimiyeti MeJkuresi Tarihi (The History of Turkish World Domination Ideal) (Turan 1969). 17. The National Turkish Students' Union was established in 1916 and was active until its closure in 1980. Its ideological stand was determined by nationalism, racism, Turanism, and conservatism (Okutan 2004, pp. 6-7). For the views of the Union. see Milli GenFligin Sesi (1970, p. 8); MTBB 48. Donem Genel Ku-
ruluFaaliyet Raporu (1966). 18. The Hearth was established on May 14, 1970, by right-wing Turkish intellectuals as a reaction against the 1960S ideological conflicts between the Left and
Right, which, the Hearth members argued. had resulted in a crisis in the national culture. It was preceded by the Intellectuals' Club, which was established in 1962 to serve as a platform for the conservative and nationalist intellectuals to discuss a wide range of social and political issues. 19. See Yal~m (1988); and Devlet Planlama Te§kilatl (1984, p. 543). 2.0. This articulation of religion and nationalism formulated under the name "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" was believed to exert considerable influence on the culture and education policies of governments of the time. For the influence of the Intellectuals' Hearth on culture and education policies, see Bilir (2004, p. 263); Bora and Can (1990, pp. 32-33); ~aylan, Tekeli, and Turan (1994, p. 34). 2.1. Such an articulation of the relationship between religion and nationalism was championed by the military rule of the time because the Hearth advocated the spread of Islam, which was depicted as being in line with secularism. Within this context, Tantl Bora and Kemal Can (1990, p. 2.8) argued that the practical use of the Hearth was to legitimize the military rule by integrating Islam into the official ideology while retaining Turkic and Western elements. 22. Gulen was born in Erzurum, a culturally conservative city of Eastern Anatolia that is characterized by dadar culture determined by the frontier conditions and oriented by the security concern (Yavuz and EspOSito 2.003). His hometown is said to have had a Significant influence on the nationalist discourse of Gii.len.
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
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2.3. In that period Gillen was celebrated by those (secular) people who regarded
him as an antidote to the political Islam of the Welfare Party, which was closed in 1998. The Gwen movemellt was also exposed to serious criticisms, however, for twO reasons. One criticism has been raised by fierce secularists, who are suspicious about the "sinister" intentions of the movement with regard to the secular establishment of the Turkish Republic. Gillen was indicted by the chief prosecutor of the Ankara State Security Court in 2000 because his activities under the name of "moderate Islam" allegedly undermined the secular structure of the state with the aim of replacing it with a state based on Sharia law. On March 8, 1008, the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the acquittal of Gillen, first issued by the Ankara Eleventh High Criminal Court in May 1006. On April 7, 2008, the court declared the acquittal to be null. The second criticism concerns the financial sources of the movement and the wide extension of the educational activities (from the Central Asia to Africa, Australia, and Latin America) undertaken by the sympathizers of the movement. Gillen claims that the schools are supported by business leaders in Turkey and local businesses where the schools operate (Gilndem 1005). For detailed information about the Gillen movement, see Yavuz and Esposito (2003) and Koyuncu-Lorasdagl (2.007). 24. No concrete information about the size of the movement is available. Ali Yurtsever, one of the influential members of the movement, however, stated that the high circulation of Gillen newspapers and large number of Giilen schools give an idea of its size. The circulation of the Gillen newspapers is around 750,000 daily. The Gillen schools and universities include about 300 private schools in Turkey as well as about 500 other educational institutions and approximately 600 schools all over the world in about 100 countries. Interview by Katherina Marshall, Berkeley Center, November 23, 2.007. 2.5. The Gillen movement is based on educational mobilization. In the late 1970S he started his educational mobilization by initiating summer camps, lighthouses (tflkevleri), and dormitories to support successful students who cannot afford to pay for their educational and accommodation needs. In those places they prayed together and received religious and moral education by readingRisale-i Nur (Epistles of Light) and listening to Gillen's sermons on tape. These .. children inculcated with both scientific and moral values are expected to act in the service (hizmet) of the movement by teaching at the Gillen schools volun~ ... tarily and becoming members of the "golden generation" that Gillen aiIIiilto . . . create. It is noteworthy that the teaching in Gillen-inspired schools is secular. Instead of giving a religious education, the goal here is to instill Islamic ethics and a "Turkish way of life" through socialization. The Australian Catholic
160
2.6.
2.7. 2.8.
2.9.
30.
31.
32..
33.
Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl
University in Melbourne launched the Fethullah Giilen Chair in the Study ofIslam and Muslim-Catholic Relations to "note his sensivity to education" (http://www.intercultural.org.au/events_2oo7/gulen_chair/index.htm.December 3, 2.007). In January and March 2.008 the leading economy magazines Economist and Forbes allocated pages to Galen, claiming that his movement should be endorsed and comparing it favorably to religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), and Tablighi Jamaat chat demand isolation from Western political life. The papers noted that the Galen movement embraces scientific beliefs and modern and democratic values and prefers to keep close ties with the Western world within an Islam-based ethical framework (Forbes,January 2.3, 2.008; Economist, March 8, 2.008). They exaggerated Giilen's significance to the point of depicting him as a "prophet:' Carroll (2007) treats Giilen as a scholar or philosopher, trying to show the similarities between Gwen's views and those of philosophers such as Plato, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Paul Sartre, John Stuart Mill, and Confucius. For the Gwen movement as a transnational phenomenon, see Park (2.007). Yavuz and Esposito (2.003. p. 16) argue that the Gi.llen movement utilized the discourse of nationalism by indicating its contribution to national culture to seek its legitimacy before the state. For detailed information about the difference between the Galen movement and other religiOUS movements with Turkish origins such as the Siileymancl community and the National Outlook movement in the Western European countries, see Demir (2.007). Giilen stated his belief in the universality of Islam with respect to its principles but at the same time underlined the need to reinterpret Islam in terms of the details in today's world, noting that some aspects ofIslam may change due to time and circumstances (Can 1995; Ozkok 1995). For the treatment of Arabs as Others by advocates of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, see Ozdalga (2.006); for the treatment ofIranians as Others in Galen's views. see Kosebalaban (2.003, pp. 179-80). Giilen's way of life and interpretation ofIslam are heavily determined by Sufism. The interviews portray Galen as a modest person who strictly observes his religious obligations and prefers to have a modest lifestyle, without any desire to own material things. For Galen's appropriation of Sufism, see Samoprak (2.003, pp. 15 6- 69). According to Sukuti MemiogIu (1997). an influential writer on Islamic society, Giilen utilizes the functional dimension of religion in constructing national culture by stressing mysticism as one of the significant elements of national culture.
On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey
161
34. On the educational activities of the Gillen movement in the Western European
countries, see Demir {:W07). 3S. For detailed information about Giilen's views on Turkey's relationship with the West, see Kosebalaban (2.003) and Koyuncu-Lorasdagl (2.007).
8
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND SUNNIISLAM IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL PARTY IDENTITIES
SIMTEN CO~AR
IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOURSE ON NATIONALISM, CRAIG CAL-
houn (1999) notes that "national identity" is taken for granted in referring to the category of individual and/or citizen. Calhoun offers a critical analysis of the public and social scientific implications of the nation as a "discursive formation," which in the final analysis involves the adoption of nationalist rhetoric to different degrees and/or a delimitation of the social scientific imagination in the public space within the contours of nationalism. Calhoun's argument can be taken as a reference point in understanding current debate on the rise of nationalism in contemporary Turkish politics. Especially after the assassination of Armenian intellectual Hrant Dink, publisher of Armenian fortnightly Agos, in early 2.007, the debate has accelerated both in public and in academic circles. Within the frame of Calhoun's theoretical scheme, however, one can argue that nationalism has never decreased and/or been outside the political agenda in Turkey. More than any other ideology, it has functioned as the discursive reference point for different political parties on the left and the right, as competitors or rivals. In this respect, it has taken multiple forms, ranging from liberal nationalism to integral nationalism.
162
Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam
In this chapter my aim is to reveal the manifestations of these forms in party politics at the "official level" (Smith 2.003, p. 28), with reference to Adalet ve Kalktnma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP), Biiyiik Birlik Partisi (Grand Unity Party, BBP), and Milliyetcri Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP). These political parties are important for elaborating the different compositions of nationalism in party discourses and uncovering the political significance of Sunni Islam as an unavoidable ingredient of Turkish nationalism.' In this respect, I take the three political parties as different versions of the "Turkish-Islamic synthesiS" of the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydmlar Ocagl), instituted in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'etat.' But each party represents the dominance of nationalism as a political discourse, with its different facets shaped in accordance with the party's place in power politics, defined by centrist priorities. To understand nationalist political identity and the discourse of each party, three channels of communication are functional: addressing the state, the "nation:' and the international community. In regard to its fluctuating discourse along these dimensions, the AKP-which has assumed institutional power for two subsequent general elections (2002., 2007 )-shifts between liberal nationalism and fascistic impulses (KadlOglu 2006). The MHP, as a parliamentary opposition party, is dearly representative of integral nationalism in terms of the discourse that it employs in addressing the nation, while still trying to accommodate the components of liberal nationalism in its official reading of global politics. The BBP, in contrast, is the pivotal example of Turkish-Islamist fascism, with its insistent appeal to the "heart of the masses" through an aggressive and violent discourse as well as its parochial conceptualization of the public space. It overtly denies differences in the definition of the nation and rejects any basis for an individual stance versus the community. The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part I provide a brief analysis of the institutionalization and socialization of the Turkish-Islamic synthesiS as a form of nationalism in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup d'etat. In the second part I analyze the different shapings of the TurkishIslamic synthesis in the AKP, the BBP, and the MHP discourses with a historical approach. In doing so I focus on three issue areas: the foreign policy dimension, particularly each party's approach to Turkey/EU and Turkey/ U.S. relations; the religious dimension (the place ofIslam in the definition
Simten Co~ar
of the nation); and the ethnic dimension, especially the interpretation of the Kurdish question. In analyzing the AKP's and the MHP's discourses, I also take into consideration the policies that the parties have pursued when in government. In the third and concluding part I outline relational aspects of the forms of nationalism in the three political parties' discourses.
UNDERSTANDING THE ISLAMIST-NATIONALIST CONNECTION IN TURKEY IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD The declared purpose of the 1980 military coup d'etat was to end the civil strife and political violence that had increased in the second half of the 19705. This provided a justification for the authoritarian measures during the interim government between 1980 and 1983, including those measures within the 1982 Constitution. Thus the narrowing down of the political sphere, the rapid execution of political activists from both the Left and the Right, and the emphasis on stability and consensus