BOOKS OF RELATED INTEREST TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 1774-2000 By William Hale SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC Edited by Sylvia Kedourie
POLl leAL PARTIES I
TURKEY
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS:
200 YEARS OF DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE Edited by Mustafa Aydlll and c;agn Erhan THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF EURASIA AND TURKEY'S POSITION Edited by Blilent Aras TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS: ESCAPING FROM THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE AEGEAN Edited by Mustafa Aydm and Kostas Ifantis
Editors
BARRY RUBIN METiNHEPER
iSTANBUL BfLCi UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
FRANKCASS LONDON· PORTLAND, OR
First puhlished in 2002 in Creat Britain hy FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London NI4 5BP, England and ill the Ullited States o(America hy FRANKCASS clo International Specialized Book Serviccs, Inc. 5824 N.E. Hassalo Strcct, Portland, Orcgon 97213-3644
Copyright (0 2002 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd British Libraty Cataloguing in Publication Data Political parties in Turkcy I. Political parties Turkcy 2. Turkey government - 1980I. Rubin, Barry II. I-leper, Metin 324.2'561
Politics and
ISBN 0 71465274 1 (cloth) ISBN 0 7146 8247 0 (paper)
Contents Preface
Vll
Introduction-Turkey's Political Parties: A Remarkably BarlY Ruhin Important Issue The Democratic Left Party: Kaplkulu Politics Par Excellence
Suat Kllllkhog!u
4
The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, Alev (mar and Burak Arrkan the Nation or the Nationalists?
25
The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization Ersin Ka!ayclOg!u in a Charismatic Leader Party
41
}'e.~·i1ada
62
Oll1it Cizre
82
The Republican People's Party
Ay,~'e Ciine,~'-Ayata
102
The People's Democracy Party
Aylin Ciiney
122
Conclusion-The Consolidation of Democracy versus Metin Hefler Democratization in Turkey
138
Abstracts
147
Notes on Contributors
150
Index
153
Librmy of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Political parties in Turkey I editors, Barty Rubin and Metin I-leper. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5274-1 (cloth) - ISBN 0-7146-8247-0 (papcrj I. Political parties-Turkcy. I. Rubin, Barry M. II. Heper, Metin. JQ1809.A795 P654 2002 324.2561-dc21 2001007614 This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue of Turkish Studies (ISSN 1468-3849), YoU, No.1 (Spring 2(02) [Political Parties in Turkey]. Turkish Studies is a project of the Turkish Studies Institute (TSI) of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC).
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The Virtue Party From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party
Biro! A.
Preface This special issue of Turkish Studies has its origin in the idea of Barry Rubin and Metin Heper to hold a conference on Turkish political parties. The effort to strengthen and broaden democracy is one of the key issues for contemporary Turkey, but it is very difficult to achieve this goal without open and viable political parties. In general, politics is held in low repute in contemporary Turkish public and elite opinion. Parties are generally perceived as unresponsive, undemocratic, inefficient, and corrupt. We wanted to examine how accurately such views reflected reality and to see if such factors varied among the different parties. In particular, we sought to analyze problems such as those of party leadership, structure, inner-party democracy, attitudes, and abilities to gain popular support, stands on major issues, coherence, self-image, ideology, and comparison to party systems in other countries. Each of the authors was asked to examine a specific party within the context of comparison. The conference, entitled "Political Parties, Society, and Democracy in Turkey," was held at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey on April 27-28, 200 I. It was co-sponsored by Turkish Studies and by the Bilkent University Center of Turkish Politics and History. We believe the authors have produced an original and high-quality survey of Turkey's political parties and hope that you will agree. We wish to thank the following people for their help with the conference and the preparation of this book: Cameron Brown, Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, Ann Welden, Francis B. Ward III of the Public Affairs Section of the US Embassy in Ankara, and the Turkish Academy of Sciences for financial support. We would also like to thank Semiha Aleybeyi, Ba~ak ince, and Aylin Topal for helping to organize and run the conference and Vicky Johnson of Frank Cass for her assistance in publishing this project.
INTRODUCTION
Turkey's Political Parties: A Remarkably Important Issue BARRY RUBIN
The Turkish political party system stands as a key issue in that country's strange mixture of successes and failures during the half-century in which Turkey has been a multi-party democracy.~ ~On the one hand, Turkey has retained its basic democratic form. Yet, on the other hand, this structure has repeatedly broken down due to a perception that either a ruling party was breaking the rules of the system, or that bickering parties and leaders were unable to form a stable government, or that radical parties threatened the regime's very existence, or that incompetent parties were unable to make the decisions needed by the country's interests and people~ ...jI
2
Political Parties in Turkey
A Remarkably Important Issue
parties by serving as a crutch for them. How can the politicians be expected to act responsibly, the argument goes, if they know that the patcrnalistic military will stcp in and clean up their mess? Still, the officers havc no shortage of legitimatc complaints about the politicians. It is important to point out that by accusing the military of being an excuse, obscrvcrs provide them with the best excuse of all by blaming the soldiers rather than the politicians for Turkey's shortcomings. Indeed, the armed forces are only interested in a limited set of issues and prefer to leave the politicians in charge of running the country. Nevertheless, the shape of the contemporary party system is partly due to past military interventions and, perhaps, to the expectations of future ones. On the one hand, Turkey's economy is a success story, but on the other hand the country has suffered a series of setbacks and shortcomings in this sphere. Political parties have not had the courage and ability to make necessary reforms because of their own entanglements with the state, the bureaucracy, and a network of patron-client relationships, among other tllctors. Whatever the longer-term reasons for the recession that began in the year 2000, the machinations of the party system and its lcaders played an important role. The lack of privatization and inability to root out corruption are only two examples of the parties' poor performance in making and implementing laws. On the one hand, Turkey has retained its democracy and overcome extremist threats to its unity and stability. However, at the same time, the party system has driven voters to more militant parties through frustration and unrespon ~'veness. Its leaders allowed an Islamist party to take power due to thdr own venality and readiness to battle for personal and partisan gain even at the risk of the country's future. On the one hand, Turkey's people have improved their living standards, educational levels, and wellbeing over the decades. On the other hand, they are alienated from the political system and disgusted with the party system. It is easy to decry apathy and discouragement, but the public's perception of politicians and politics is a fairly accurate one. So while Turkey has enjoyed many successes and overcome many threats, the party system, parliamentary politics, and the character of political leaders deserve only very limited credit for such achievements. There have certainly been bright spots-Prime Minister Blilent Ecevit's management of his coalition and the relatively moderate transformation of the MHP (Milliyet('i Hal'eket Partisi-Nationalist Action Party) spring to mind. Yet it is hard to dispute the fact that the party system is in bad shape, more often endangering rather than producing effective government.
In general, the parties have no significant internal democracy. Leaders who make bad mistakes in government or elections survive. Corruption does not lead to a political fall. Ideas are not generated within parties where debate is discouraged. Obedience rather than competition governs the parties' political culture. The centrist parties have done especially badly in these categories, encouraging activists and voters to migrate to the fringes of the system. I-low did these problems come about, how can they be defined, and how can they be resolved? The essays that follow tackle these questions. Each party is a world in its own right, yet the themes run clearly throughout the different groups and across the political spectrum. The goal we set for this volume was to provide a useful basis of facts on the cun~elltstateof Turkey's political parties, to encourage and aid furtl1er research, and to analyze the particular forms of the malady each of them faces. I think the authors have succeeded admirably.
3
The Democractic Left Party
---------------------- 2----------------------
The Democratic Left Party: Kaplkulu Politics Par Excellence SUAT KINIKLIOGLU
... arc wc going to bc thc fi·cc mcmbcrs of a party that is rcspcctful to its bylaws or arc wc going to bc /((IJJlkll/lls [palacc scrvants]? Biilcnt Ecevit challcnging iSl11ct inonii Rcpublican Peoplc's 1972 Parly Congrcss
The Democratic Left Party (Demo/(ratik So! Parti-DSP) is by and large a big question mark both for the student of Turkish politics and society at large. For years it has been viewed as an outcast, outsider, and underdog, and even labeled as a "divider."l Indeed, in the past it has been questioned whether it was a pmty at all. Under any circumstances this constitutes an anomaly. It is an anomaly because the DSP obtained the highest vote in thc 1999 general elections, it is currently in office leading a three-party coalition, and its leader is prime minister of Turkey. Little, if any, academic work has been done about the party, and had it not been for my personal involvement as a party activist in 1995 and 1996, I doubt very much that I would have written this contribution. I-Ience, this contribution is not only the product of traditional research, but also draws on personal expericnces. It attempts to shed light on how the DSP is organizcd, how its internal affairs are conducted, what motivates its leadership, and how it has positioned itself in relation to civil society. That said, this contribution focuses on the state of intra-party democracy within the DSP and attempts to provide a detailed analysis of how it is curtailed.
5
DSP also has a party caucus (Parti Mec!isi) and all the other usual organs which are required by the law. Nevertheless, Turkish parties, while being formally organized around these guidelines, tend to accentuate their preferred type and level of organizations. That said, the party organs of the DSP exercise no iniluence. Power rests solely with Biilent Ecevit and his wife Rah~,U1 Ecevit. All other persons and organs are nothing more than formalities and carry no political weight whatsoever.] The secretary-general is an insignificant figure" who rarely delivers public speeches. When he does so, they are most likely written by Rah~an Ecevit, deal with trivial issues, and involve only threeminute appearances on TRT-I's prime-time news. Neither does he participate in any civil society activity. The intellectual and or~anizatio11alcaJiJJ.ex Of the g~neral headquarters andit~-execlitives cOllld wejl~be described as lacking. Yet they are extremely loyal and playa significant role in the Ecevits' maintenance of power. They performthesecretarial work and allow no one else to enter this. small andl;l:iyate-crrcfe:TI1~DSP "i~ sin1ilar to oil~~r Turkish parties which prefer to keep loyal people around them rather than experts. As Suavi Tuncay has noted, the party is not run by those who are liyakatli (qualified), but by those who are sadakatli (loyal).l There is no doubt that this feature of Turkish political parties seriously obstructs the widening of their popular bases and their elite recruitment potentials. That there are limited alternatives within political parties also leads to governance by a limited and narrow circle.
The Party Caucus Ifany governing body but that of the Ecevits carries any significance, it is the party caucus. Its impOitance does not derive from its own weight, but from the fact that Biilent Ecevit symbolically consults this body from time to time. The party caucus is comprised of 40 members although often only 10-20 members participate in its meetings." bmer Faruk Slrakaya, a former secretary-general of the DSP, summarized the nature of the DSP's party's caucus as follows:
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY
Thc need for a party to respond to a mass electorate "has a great impact on how that party is organized, how its internal affairs are conducted, how it manages relations with its supporters, and how it finances its activities.'" To a large extent the formal organizational structure of the DSP resembles other Turkish parties. This is to no surprise as the Political Parties Law in Turkey lays out in detail how political parties are to be structured. The
The DSP's caucus mectings are not discussion or decision-making meetings. They are meetings where Ecevlt in/hrms the caucus about his decisions. Obviously, an important feature of social democracy is the practice of discussion and reaching at a decision by common deliberation. This is certainly not the case in the DSP [emphasis added]. 7
7
Political Parties in Turkey
The Delllocractic Left Party
Ecevit publicly countcrcd such allegations. On the DSP's fourteenth anniversary in November 1999, for example, he rejected claims of poor intra-party democracy by saying: "we discuss evelything freely among ourselves. But once we have come to a conclusion we become one heart and one voice."H Undoubtedly, this state of affairs confirms Michels' observations that "it is only a minority which participates in party decisions, and sometimes that minority is ludicrously small.'''' Another of Slrakaya's observations sheds further light on the nature and functioning of the caucus:
Bcing on good terms with his coalition partners, or being able to compromise with the opposition and/or his coalition partners, has been a recurring theme throughout Eeevit's publie discourse. II This discourse has sometimes been over-optimistic. For instance, during the FiHh Grand Congress held on April 29, 200 I, Ecevit claimed that the DSP had "devcloped the a culture of compromise [in Turkey], which is an important requisite for democracy."12 By November 2000, the party held a comfortable majority in the parliament; it had established relative economic stability and was following a successful foreign policy as signified by the European Union Helsinki summit in 1999, which was marked by the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country. Despite many unexpected policy initiatives and subsequent public criticism of the performance of the party, all of these were defended on grounds of the party's critical role in providing relative success and stability in the economy. However, things were soon to change. Following the first economic crisis in November 2000 and the subsequent economic depression in February 200 I the hearts and minds of party functionaries came to face the painful facts of the streets.1J Particularly, the role of Biilent Ecevit in his personal clash with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on February 19 and the widespread public belief that Ecevit was wrong in making his clash with the president public on national television, has loaded considerable regret, if not guilt, onto the party. The radical devaluation of the Turkish lira and the complete withdrawal of public support from the government has seriously discredited the party and its functionaries. 1·\ As if the difficulties of the post-economic crises era were not painful enough, the DSP suffered another heavy blow during its Fifth Regular Congress held on April 29, 2001. 15 The Congress marked an important milestone for the party. For the first time in their history, the DSP's convention was subject to great scrutiny. II, The refusal to let a leadership candidate speak, and the ensuing physical attacks on her supporters, drew widespread media reaction as exemplified by the daily Hiirriyet's headline: "Demokratik Sopah Parti" {"Democratic Armed Party"). 17 Although such scenes are not all that unfamiliar in Turkish party politics, heightened interest in the shortcomings of the Turkish polity precipitated an unusual level of public reaction. IX The convention badly tarnished the image of the party and has reportedly become an inspiration for a radical re-questioning of internal party politics in Turkey.I" Indeed, while the initial limelight was on the DSP and the disgraceful behavior of the party's militants, the Congress actually brought about extensive and surprisingly 211 enduring examination of the internal affairs of Turkish parties.
6
Prior to the meetings many caucus members would say that they would inquire about this or that issue from Blilent Bey [Blilent Esquire]. Some of them would voice their opposition or doubts about a position Biilent Bey adopted. However, when a meeting stmis they would all listen attentively. At the end of the meeting Blilent Bey would ask if anyone has a question. None of them would dare to voice any sort of criticism; all of them would say that they fully agree with him.1O
Curren! Situation Naturally, the current situation of the patiy is very much linked to the performance of the fifty-seventh government (April 1999-) and its leader Prime Minister Biilent Ecevit. Given the stark difference of public perceptions about the party's performance before and after the two economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001, it is sensible to examine these two periods separately. The pre-economic crises party boasted the relatively successful implementation of the IMF-sponsored economic restructuring program. Annual inflation was decreasing and the Treasury had succeeded in extending its domestic borrowing terms up to 14 months. Despite grassroots concerns about policies in contradiction to the party's ideological tenets, the DSP-Ied coalition government was able to establish some SOli of economic stability. Politically risky legislation such as the raising of the pension age and the international arbitration law were passed early on in office. During this period the party boasted its perceived role in the passage of an unprecedented number of legislation through parliament and the gradual lowering of consumer inflation, and stressed that the countIy was introduced to respectable governance. Ecevit was seen as a leader who had harmonious relations with his coalition partners, thus effectively putting an end to the painful discord of the mid-1990s, particularly exemplified by the long-lasting YIlmaz-(:iIIer feud.
9
Political Parties in Turkey
The De1l1ocractic Lefi Party
Ironically, it appears that the extremes of the DSP's intra-party democracy actually served as a positive reminder to the Turkish public that there is something seriously questionable in the way Turkish parties have been operating. In this sense, the Congress contributed to the ongoing momentum towards amending the Political Parties Law and the Constitution to facilitate more intra-party democracy. Unfortunately, a recently passed Constitutional Amendment package failed to include reform to the Political Parties Law.
his wife. He has been undoubtedly overwhelmed by the problems his government has been encountering in office; there are clear signs that his energy is no longer adequatc to focus on the party, too.
8
LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS
For some time now, Ecevit's age and physical faculties have been an issue of public concern. The DSP deputies energetically argue that Ecevit's mental faculties are superb and that hc is fully capable of performing his prime ministerial duties and responsibilities.'1 The party's past secretarygeneral went as far as to argue that in terms of working capacity Ecevit was younger than all other DSP deputies." Yet, despite such "reassuring" claims, the fact that there was a need to make these statements is indicative of a distinct defensive psychology within the DSP, which attests to the dilemma of a 76-year-old man leading an extremely complex and dynamic country. Although speculations about Ecevit's weak physical appearance were somewhat thwarted after the capture of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan and the Helsinki summit in December 1999, they never fully subsided.'} Tn November 2000, just prior to the tirst economic crisis, diplomatic circles in Ankara were speculating about contingency plans prepared by the General Staff in the event of the death of the Prime Minister. Needless to say, speculation about Ecevit's health has been increasing since the two devastating economic crises in November 2000 and February 200!. Ecevit also seems to be in a quandlY about an apparent dislike between Deputy Prime Minister Hiisamettin Ozkan and his wife Rah:;;an Ecevit. Ozkan, who is largely in control of the DSP's governmental presence, is engaged in a personality clash with Rah~an Ecevit, who runs the party organization. Needless to say, the tension at the top of the party has implications on Ecevit's performance as Prime Minister. Ecevit contides in Ozkan on all major issues, with the exception of foreign affairs, and Ozkan has been named as a potential Sllccessor to the party leadership. Ecevit is frequently torn between his wife and Ozkan. Ecevit's leadership is most problematic on the grassroots level. He has all but abandoned the party organization to the general headquarters and
INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY
As Geoffrey Debnam has eloquently underlined, "Intra-party democracy is an ideal that continues to exert an influence, and party activists continue to seek new ways to curb their leaders' appetite for power."'-I Intra-party democracy has been criticized more than other issues in the DSP. From its very foundation, the party has been criticized as some sort of political sheikdom of Ecevit, that any voice but the Ecevits' was not tolerated, and that it differed signiticantly in this regard from the social democratic tradition symbolized by the Republican People's Party's "congress culture" (kongre kiiltiirii). Indeed, from its establishment to this day, if anything is consistent about the DSP it is its nature of intolerance to any voice but that of the leader and his wife. How was such central control and manipulation made possible in the DSP? What sort of tools were employed by the DSP leadership in order to attain such complete control of the party? This author has identified three main tools employed to hinder the development of intra-party democracy. All three areas are closely intertwined with each other; however, categorization was deemed necessary to facilitate a better understanding of the subject matter. The primary tools for hindrance of democratic practices in the DSP have been the following:
Selective MemberS/IIi) The most important means employed by the Ecevits to curtail any alternative voice within the party is the consistent denial of the right to membership.25 The party administration effectively obstructs membership in the party in astoundingly clever ways. The general headquarters limits the number of party members in the district and provincial branches, and thus exerts full control over the provincial units and consequently over the composition of conventions of the party. The system operates as follows: The DSP sympathizers who wish to be registered as party members apply and submit documentation to their local branch offices. The local offices then forward these applications to the provincial branches, which in turn send them to the party's general headquarters where the applications are approved and routed back through the same channels. However, problems arose in 1996 when a number of party members in Ankara could not obtain membership cards, despite
Political Parties in Turkey
The Democractic Lefi Parly
unreasonably long waiting periods. Several inquiries were made, but still the membership cards failed to appear. This situation was explained by evasive responses blaming bureaucratic oversight and the like. The then applicants turned to the local election councils and/or prosecutor offices and inquired about their status in the party. They discovered that the general headquarters had never officially registered thousands of party "members." The rationale behind this practice was to limit membership only to extremely trusted people in as many districts and provinces as possible. The membership problem has been taken up by several scholars of politics in Turkey, including ilter Turan who has summarized the problem thus: Party "membership is a vague concept [in Turkey]. There are no proper membership lists, membership dues are not paid regularly and members arc not registered in a proper fashion. Who is a member and who is not, is not certain."2h It is this vagueness and the non-institutionalized character of membership that allows the party administration to manipulate it for its own ends. The DSP's Fifth Regular Congress once again testified to this discriminatOlY membership policy. Prior to the Congress a not very well-known member of the party announced hIs candidacy to the leadership of the party. Although this individual was the headquarters' candidate in the 1991 national elections and represented the party at various local and provincial levels, he was denied the opportunity to run for leadership on the grounds that he was not a member of the pmtyF7 In other words, the DSP leadership has argued that this individual was declared as a candidate to parliament in 1991, and served as party executive both at the local and provincial level, but was not a member.
membership always remained below 150. 2H A leeway of three to four members is almost always maintained in order to avoid any last-minute embarrassments. 29 For example, districts such as Baklrk6y in Istanbul or Yenimahalle in Ankara have populations in the hundreds of thousands, but their DSP membership equals that of any trivial district in Central Anatolia. In other words, regardless of the size of any given district, the policy of" 149 is beautiful" is applied throughout the country. Whereas delegates can only be changed by new congresses at localities, in practice members can be manipulated at any time and at any sequence by the general headqumters. The DSP local Congresses are always convened with less than 150 members under complete central control. The party functionaries know that Rah~an Ecevit is behind such "operations."J() It is not permitted to run for an alternative list in these "staged" district congresses. Normally, the list sponsored by the general headquarters is put to a vote. The most trusted members on these lists are then placed on the list of provincial congress delegates, and the delegates for the Grand Congress (Kuru/tay) arc "elected" from among these. Much to the chagrin of the general headquarters, these pre-arranged voters sometimes fail to produce enough votes for the single lists provided, and new elections have to be hastily organized. Despite such rigid control over procedural details in some districts, normal elections actually do take place. In some cases alternative candidates win against the headquarters lists; however, they are quickly removed from their elected positions. Experience has shown that the removal of such "rebel winners" usually occurs within 48 hours. Such removals are communicated in the form of a fax or letter sent to the district branch in question signed by Rah~an Ecevit. Usually, it notes that the newly formed executive council has been "disbanded" and that the following-the general headquarters' list that lost the last election-will constitute the new executive council. An explanation as to why the democratically elected executive council was disbanded is never given. Combined with the denial of the right to membership, this practice is the very essence of central manipulation, which makes a complete mockery out of grassroots democracy.
10
"149 is Beallli/it!" The second tool employed by the party leadership is a practice that takes advantage of a loophole in the Political Parties Law. The issue pertains to the nuance between a delegate and a member and how that nuance becomes important in terms of intra-party politics. In Turkey political parties register their members at the district level. This is the most basic administrative unit recognized by the Political Parties Law. It was first discovered in Ankara, and later throughout the country, that DSP membership in each district was deliberately kept below 150 members. Why was this so important? The Political Parties Law requires delegate elections to take place once the number of members in a given district exceeds 150. Interestingly, the DSP's membership did not extend beyond 150 in any single municipality or province throughout the whole country. In fact, regardless of the population of a given district the
II
The De(/icaliol1 ofEcevil Intra-party democracy is also hampered by the deliberate deification of the leadership. As the party is a virtual creation of Biilent and Rah:;;an Eeevit and lacks any institutional identity, the party's character is very much embodied in Bi.iIent Ecevit himself. Equally responsive to this situation
12
Political Parties in Turkey
The Democractic Left Party
Ecevit also treats the party as his own creation, which can survive only under his personal guidance. It naturally follows that criticism of the creator is out of question.'! The mere hint or rumor of criticism, or any sort of dissatisfaction with policy or any impiementation of the general headquarters is quickly punished by the irrevocable removal from favor. It must be stressed that an overall trend in party politics has also contributed to this state of affairs. There is increasing evidence that "the party leader is more important than the party's political views, ideology, cadre, targets, and program in shaping preferences of party members" in Turkish politics. l2 An empirical study carried out in 1996 has most aptly demonstrated the dominance of Ecevit's personality among DSP party members. According to the findings, among all parties represented in the parliament, "loyalty to the leader [was] considered important by DSP members," which indicated that they would not stay as DSP members if Ecevit was no longer part of it." Furthermore, the same survey made it clear that DSP members care least about who holds power in the party. It has been concluded that the relationship between the party and the party cadre is least evident in the DSP.J.I Not surprisingly, bmer Caha, Metin Toprak and ibrahim Dah11J~ concluded that the DSP "identified almost completely with its leader."); This author recently spoke to a number of the DSP deputies about the party's then upcoming Congress. Five days prior to the Congress, some of the deputies did not even know the venue; others did not know what the agenda was, and another group expressed complete lack of interest.!" One of the younger deputies retorted, "Someone will surely call us and let us know what we are expected to do." Another DSP deputy was more iorthcoming and frankly described the party's disregard ior the deputies: "The DSP is a two-person show. It is Biilent and Rah~an Ecevit's party. They decide and run what show is put on play. All of us are mere extras who are happy to perform our roles.")7 A good example of complete subservience and total lack of initiative among the DSP deputies is Mustafa YIimaz. YIlmaz was recently approached by a television journalist and asked whether he could comment on a trivial issue in the parliament; Yilmaz said that he was not so stupid to say anything without consulting his leader. He added that in any case he had no opinion, and that opinions would come from the leader of the party and not from deputies.)R Also, quite frequently the DSP deputies can be seen in hysterical crying sessions, particularly in their parliamentary group meetings. Such displays of solidarity with their leader seem to have increased in the aftermath of the two major economic crises faced by the Ecevit government.
Undoubtedly, such episodes testify to a peculiar sense and perception of Ecevit as a messianic missionary figure by the DSP deputies. The deification of the leadership is largely due to the undemocratic internal structure of the party. The Ecevits handpicked their deputies; they did not go through intra-party or primary elections to qualify for candidacy. Their source of legitimacy does not derive from grassroots support or political performance, but rather from their personal obedience and loyalty to the leadership. This bilateral relationship feeds into the deification process as both sides are engaged in an unpronounced covenant, confirming the Turkish proverb alan relZl veren raZ1 (literally, "since both sides are willing to go along with the transaction it is nobody's business"). What needs to be underlined for the purpose of a better understanding of the DSP is that this state of affairs also illustrates the true nature of the party. As Eric E. Schattschneider has rightly argued, the candidate determination process of a party is very much reflective of the party's character. Whoever holds the power to determine the candidates is also the person who owns the party.)" It is only fair to note that the rise of political leaders in Turkey has generally been "from above" in an environment with very limited scope for competition. Turkish political culture traditionally breeds leaders who have raced up the party ladder. It tends to import leaders from a narrow pool of individuals. Accustomed to think of themselves as servants rather than pro-active actors, Turkish citizens have an ingrained attitude toward obedience to leadership. In this regard, Republican Turkey's political culture exhibits remarkable continuity with its Ottoman past.·10 The only important difference between the DSP and other political parties in Turkey is that while the other parties are run primarily by the leader and secondarily by an oligarchy at the top, the DSP is run exclusively by the Ecevits. Intra-party democracy has also assumed particular significance III the Turkish context due to the astounding durability of political leaders in that polity. As observed by iltcr Turan, "The inability to change leaders is truly a feature that degenerates the quality of our democracy."I! Yusuf Ziya bzcan has argued, "the successive election of the same political leaders who are considered unsuccessful by the majority is a phenomenon unique to developing countries,",!2 it appears that the root-cause of the problem in Turkey is somewhat di fferent. The impact of individualization of social and political preferences, compounded by the developmental tensions exerted on the political system, may be the cause of the durability of Turkish party Icaders:1I
13
14
Political Parties in Turkey THE DSP AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
The DSP's approach towards NGOs is rather peculiar. The party virtually ignores their existence as it avoids any interaction with them. Three civil society areas may serve as pertinent examples here.
Alevite Associations/Foundations The party has no organic links with Alevite associations/foundations. This is despite the party's vocal rhetoric prior to coming to power about the injustice the Diyanet iij/eri Baijkanhgl (Religious Affairs Directorate) commits, namely the exclusion of the members of the Alevite sect from this Directorate. In the pre-April 1999 period, the DSP branches were covered with large posters with quotes from Blilent Ecevit promising to rectify this injustice and bring about Alevite representation in the Directorate. The most prominent of these read: The DSP is in favor of a pluralist structure of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, embracing all sects and religious orders. In the meantime Alevites, which constitute a large and dynamic section of Turkish society, should find the an opportunity to be justly represented within this organization:1ol Neither in opposition nor in office has the DSP moved in this direction. The DSP prefers to distance itselffrom any Alevite association/foundation activity regardless of their distance vis-ci-vis the state. Neither has the DSP delivered on its promises to re-structure the Directorate of Religious Affairs nor has it proposed to its coalition pminers to examine the issue. The DSP's hands-otT policy towards the Alevites has not gone unnoticed:' Turkish Alevites have criticized Ecevit's lack of interest towards them and his lenient approach towards the Sunni Fethullah Glilen movement on a number of occasions:l!> They appear to have lost all hope of change led by the DSP in this regard.
Labor Unions Similarly, the DSP avoids any dialogue with labor unions whatsoever. It does not support any candidates or pmiicipate in any union activities. Neither in opposition nor in office the DSP has interacted with any labor union. Union members are welcomed as pmiy flll1ctionaries or members, but not with their union member identity, only as ordinmy workers. Rldvan Budak, the outspoken leader of the Confederation of Revolutionmy Worker Unions (DISK) was once elected to parliament on a DSP ticket. Ecevit must regret this choice, as Budak has become a vocal opponent to Ecevit and the party:17
The Dell/oemetie Lep Parzv
15
Bar Associations Bar association elections have become platforms where candidates of various political convictions openly compete for chairmanship. Such elections often also receive wide media coverage. In the past, there have been "democratic left" candidates in these elections. However, such democratic left candidacies had no organizational links with the DSP, but rather dated back to the "democratic left movement" within the CHP of the 1970s. Nowadays candidates generally belong to certain groups, which mayor may not have affinities to the current representative of the "democratic left," but certainly do not have any organizational links with the DSP. The account given above clearly demonstrates that the DSP does not wish to be seen interacting with NGOs. The rationale behind such an approach is difficult to understand but appears to bc motivated by a deliberate effort to distinguish itself as a national leftist party which differs sharply from other leftist parties. Henceforth, the DSP views the NGOs as elements of opposition and wants to avoid being seen supporting any sort of opposition in any platform whatsoever. Obviously, the DSP's policy of non-involvement with the NGOs also provides insight into the party's perception of civil society organizations as agents of division. This preference is in tandem with the party leadership's paranoia of faction, division, and any sort of opposition. STANDS ON KEY ISSUES
The KlIrdish IsslIe The DSP denies the existence of a "Kurdish issue" but argues that there is a "southeast" issue. The party carefully avoids defining the problem as a "Kurdish" issue or "Kurdish" problem. The DSP's 1999 general election declaration treats the issue as part of Turkey's broader "national unity" problem:l" In this declaration and many other DSP publications, Ecevit primarily explains the problem by stressing the "feudal social structure" of the region. Hence, the Kurdish issue is couched into a simplified socioeconomic framcwork without any reference to its ethnic dimension: I" While drawing attention to the dangers of separatist currents which are provoked by external forces, Ecevit has also entertaincd more philosophical questions such as the meaning of the term "Turk" and its usage as an "upper overall identity" (iist kimlik). For instance, in 1990, Ecevit pointcd to the need that "national unity should be consoliclated without having recourse to theories of ethnic unity."'o Needless to say, the
Political Parties ill Turkey
The Democractic Lefi Party
DSP is not receptive to demands for ethnic cultural rights. In tandem with this particular diagnosis of the problem, Ecevit's cure is in the form of economic investment and land reform, which would break the "feudal system."51 From this perspective, the DSP's views on the Kurdish issue are very much attuned to those of the National Security Council (NSC). The DSP is keen to emphasize that its "national unity discourse" and "national leftist approach" to the Kurdish issue has major differences from that of the Social Democratic People's Party (Soc\~val Demokrat Halkp PartiSHP)/CHP approach. In fact, on a number of occasions Ecevit accentuated that his party's approach to the Kurdish issue constitutes a major point of divergence from the SHP/CHP approach and is a critical dimension in the self-defining process of the DSP.'" Ecevit was extremely critical of the 1991 election pact between the Kurdish People's Labour Party (HEP) and the then Sl-1P, That said, Ecevit's views on the Kurdish issue have changed over time. By 1990, when the level of violence was relatively low, Ecevit advocated the dismantling of the village guard system and the withdrawal of the armed forces from the conflict. However, as the conflict intensified he shifted towards a more nationalist position, for instance, no longer advocating the eradication of the village guard system. 53 Ecevit was quite fortunate when Turkey's most wanted man, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, was captured during his short term in office in February 1999 just prior to the April 18, 1999 general election. To his credit, Ecevit acted in a most responsible manner by not engaging in a partisan exploitation of the capture. Subsequently, he was seen as an allembracing Prime Minister who accomplished the capture, but also advocated an end to the violence and urged for national reconciliation. 5,\ Indeed, Ecevit's refusal to use the capture for partisan ends in all probability served him well in the April 18, 1999 elections. 55
warmer approach towards believers, or miitedeyyin citizens, constitutes a major difference from the traditional intellectual-bureaucratic approach to secularism in Turkey. 57 Reflecting the party's self-confidence on the matter, in 1999 the chairman of the Antalya provincial branch of the DSP claimed that "In the past believers were against leftists because for them leftist politics meant atheism. The DSP has saved the left from this big shame and inadequacy."'" Ecevit's somewhat liberal approach towards Islam was symbolized by his sympathy towards the Fethullah GUlen movement and particularly the Fethullah colleges abroad. Until the National Security Councilmotivated purge against Islamist elements started in 1997, the Fethullah colleges enjoyed considerable popularity in Turkey for their apparent success in the Caucasus, Central Asia and other regions throughout the world. The colleges became true success stories administered by an idealist cadre of the Fethullah sect. 5<J Although Ecevit appears to have bowed to widespread pressure from the military and radical secularists against the Fethullah colleges, it remains to be seen if he will differentiate himself from the CI-IP's confrontational approach to this issue. Ecevit's flexible stance in relation to political Islam has steered the party into a moderate position between the two extremes of political Islam and strict secularism. Unlike his lack of initiative on the Kurdish issue, his policy of "laicism respectful to beliefs" not only represents a creative alternative between these two poles, but has also opened up a viable ideological space for a large number of moderate citizens.
16
Political Islam The DSP is quite vocal against what it perceives to be representatives of political Islam. It views itself as the only true remaining defender of a realistic interpretation of secularism in Turkey. On the one hand, it has taken a confrontational approach against the RefalilFazilet Party. 56 On the other, it favors "laicism that is respectful -to religious beliefs and aspirations" (ina/1l;lara saygill laiklik). This is a notion of secularism that aims to soften the perception of a cold and insensitive approach to Islam, largely said to be projected by the CHP in the past. The DSP's somewhat
17
ECONOMY~~PRIVATIZATION
The DSP's vision of the Turkish economy is based on a mixed economy that strikes a balance between the private and public sector. The party also advocates social security and social spending. Ecevit has traditionally been against the speedy privatization of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). Instead, the party program advocates the "autonomization" of the strategic SEEs. However, just as he had a change of heart on the Kurdish issue, he also changed his views on the economy. Throughout the first two years of its term in office, the fifty-seventh Republican government, led by Ecevit, passed an unprecedented number of laws aimed at liberalizing the Turkish economy. Remarkably, his position has moved primarily in the direction of supporting the privatization of SEEs too.1>O Ecevit did not make his decision
18
The Democractic Left Party
Political Parties in Turkey
voluntarily. Due to the economic downturn of late 2000 and early 200 I and the consequent need to introduce radical measures, he had no choice but to follow a succession of the IMF-sponsored economic reform programs, which have dictated policies in stark contrast to the DSP's earlier policy line convictions. This state of affairs has alienated some prominent figures such as former Minister of Foreign Affairs Miimtaz Soysal and former Minister of Finance Zekeriya Temizel.
19
$iikrii Sina Giil'el (State Minister Rec\1JOnsible./i)f" Cyprus) Giirel is said to have leadership aspirations. He is at odds with Ismail Cem. He would be a surprise winner; all factions, except ismail Cem's, are likely to seek his support. Rah.~an
Ecevit
Probable contenders for DSP leadership in the post-Ecevit era are as follows:
Mrs Ecevit may become an interim leader but she is unlikely to be able to suppress the tide of reaction towards her once her husband is out of the way. Although she currently holds the strings within the party organization, her power is based on fear. If she decides to hold on to what remains from her husband's party she is bound to face insurmountable opposition to her leadership.
imwil Cem (Minister (?lForeign ~flair.\)
Kemal Dervi,\' (State Minister andfbrmer World Bank Deputy DirectOl)
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: POSSIBLE LEADER CANDIDATES
Lacks solid support within the party. He has a weak base, but is said to be in close contact with Hiisamettin Ozkan. His public popularity rose particularly after the European Union Helsinki summit in 1999. He is refined and efficient and works behind the scenes. As a man with a vision, a politician, and a foreign affairs expert, he is a perfect candidate for leadership. However, his family background-rumored Sabetayl Jewish descent-is a handicap.
Hiisamettin Ozkan (Deputy Prime MinisteJ) Ozkan is expected to try hard, but he is largely discredited in the eyes of the public, particularly because of his fight with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, which precipitated the second economic crisis in February 2001.(01 However, he is said to have a financial backing and a strong network within the bureaucracy. Ozkan is hoping that Ecevit will nominate him as likely successor prior to his "departure."
Zekeriya Temizel (Former Minister qlFinunce) Temizel is extremely popular in the public opinion, but was always seen at odds with Ecevit. It is likely that he will be asked to join one of the factions that will inevitably struggle for dominance in the post-Ecevit turmoil. His only handicap is that he is no longer a DSP member. He may join forces with Miimtaz Soysal, another formcr DSP member who has established a nationalist-leftist grouping. Lately, his name has been mentioned in the formation of a new center-left party led by ismet inonii and thus he may no longer qualify for the DSP leadership.
Dervi~ lacks any political base within the party but is extremely popular with the public. His prominence is bound to rise if his economic program will normalize the economy. He may become an important player, particularly if he is able to join a powerful faction-i.e., that of Cem or Ozkan. The media appears to be willing to promote him to leadership status, but he is a newcomer to Turkish politics and it appears unlikely that he would be able to hold on to power in the intricate corridors of party politics. He would help the party if his public popularity continues.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Unfortunately, not much can be said about the DSP in relation to the advancement of the consolidation of democracy. Its fundamental flaw is its lack of an institutional identity. The DSP remains a party whose existence seems to be limited to the longevity of its leader.('" The sheer dominance of the personality aspect of the leadership has become the primary obstacle to its growth. Still, the DSP has been able to attract a stratum of untainted men and women free from corruption. It has provided access for new personalities into Turkish politics, although in a very conservative manner, and sometimes unintentionally. There is a direct relationship between the requirements of a participatory democracy and an intra-party democracy. Political parties remain the most important legitimate actors that provide access to political power. Although they were absent during the early stages of Turkish constitutional life, they have become, and remain, the only legitimate means for national governance. The absence of intra-party democracy in
Political Parties in Turkey
The Democractic Lejl Party
Turkey is by and large due to the absence of democracy in our daily lives, in other words due to the non-development of a "democratic culture."!>' It is for these very reasons that intra-party democracy should be valued and safeguarded by constitutional means. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the Political Parties Law was devised with a "reactionary outlook" and not with a view to advancing participatory politics. Although it tries to promote internal democracy within political parties, its implementation actually served the exact opposite purpose. However, consolidating Turkish democracy also necessitates the careful implementation of constitutional safeguards provided by the 1982 Constitution and the provisions of the Political Parties Law. Yet parties that breach the Political Parties Law arc rarely held accountable. For instance, the DSP violated this law when it did not hold its congress within the maximum three years stipulated. The leadership announced the convening of the Congress only after the media reported this violation and could be charged by the Constitutional Comi."" Party functionaries, including DSP deputies, found out about the congress via a newspaper adveli. The DSP's electoral success in the April 1999 elections has set a bad example for other parties. For instance, the current CHP leadership has chosen to emulate the excessive manipulation and strict central control mechanism of the DSP leadership with the hope of creating a completely obedient party. This comes at an unfortunate time as Turkey's increasingly apolitical electorate is seeking the exact opposite. Perhaps the DSP's most important contribution to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey has been to set an example of how a political party should not operate. Its Fifth Regular Congress on April 29, 2001 blatantly illustrated how critical it has become for a political party to institute an acceptable level of intra-party democracy. The denial of a democratic right, namely the right to speak of a leadership candidate at the congress, drew the wrath of Turkish public opinion. The extent of the ensuing reaction not only signified a genuine public yearning for more participatory party politics, but also sent a critical message to all political parties. There are also other-mainly dysfunctional-implications in the DSP's performance in Turkish politics. For instance, although the rise of the DSP exemplifies a phenomenal eomeback for its Ieadel~ it also signifies an intense personal rage. As Rah~an Eeevit eonfided to a prominent journalist, there was anger in the very foundation of the DSP('; against the military coup of September 12, 1980, which had effectively delegitimized Biilent Ecevit, and the extremist faetions whom Ecevit had to deal with in the CHP of the late 1970s. Despite Ecevit's personal victory over the
organizers of the September 12 coup and the former fractions of the CHP -namely, the HP, Social Demoeracy Party (Sm:val Demokrasi PartisiSODEP), SHP and the new CHP-his political marathon appeared to have reached its zenith on the morning of April 19, 1999. The implications of Ecevit's personal rage for Turkish democracy has been the continuous division within the Turkish center-left, particularly the relentless feud between the HP/SODEP/SHP/CHP wing and the DSP. As this division brought about a weak left, the center-right also found the time to engage in bitter personality feuds and this situation essentially rendered the whole political spectrum unstable. Turning to ,the positive contributions, in terms of the functional eontributions of thc'bsP it must be stressed that the post-April 1999 coalition government has been the most stable and internally harmonious coalition sinee 1961. Since 1961, Turkey has been ruled by suceessive coalition governments, which were far from harmonious. However, in large part duc to Ecevit's statesmanship and sensitivity to internal harmony, eoalition governments have become more acceptable in the Turkish pQlity. The Ecevit-led coalition government established a working relationship with the Turkish military, which is based on mutual respect rather than total agreement on all issues. Subsequently, the probability of another extensive military intervention in polities has considerably decreased. Further, having adopted a moderate stance on the issue of secularism Ecevit tried to open a dialogue between the Islamists and seeularists, thus perhaps softening the religious-seeularist e1eavage in Turkey, which is of course a sine qua nOll of a viable demoeracy. A dynamic consensus is impossible to achieve in a polity torn with cultural e1eavages. A democracy needs a dynamic consensus on critical issues otherwise the polity would faee a series of legitimaey crises. There is no doubt that Eecvlt has contributed positively on these critieal issues. Throughout the post-1980 era, new groups have emerged within the middle elass, demanding more partieipatory political structures and a change of foeus on policy issues. Modern urban Turks are increasingly better educated than earlier generations. They are less prepared to accept the narrow and exclusive cire1es of political parties regardless of their place in the political spectrum. A review of the political developments of the last decade illustrates the faet that intra-party democracy is too critical to be left to political parties alone. It eannot be treated merely as an "internal issue" of politieal parties, but should be seen as an indispensable aspect of Turkish democracy and a barometer for the development of healthy democratic values.
20
21
22
Political Parties in Turkey
The Delllocractic Lefi Party
NOTES
21. Intcrvicw with DSP Antalya deputy, Sancar SaYIl1, April 24, 200 I. 22. "DSp Gcnel Sckrctcri neden tanllll11!yorT' ("Why is the DSP Seeretary-GeneralunknownT'), CUII/fruriyet (Istanbul daily), March 26, 200 I, p.S. 23. For cxample, see CUneyt Ulscvcr, "A Psychological Analysis ofEeevit," 7itrkisfr Dailv NCII's (Ankara daily), May 1,2001, p.4. 24. Geoffrey Debnam, "Overcoming the Iron Law'? The Rolc of Policy Committees of the Ncw Zcaland Labour Party," 111 Kay Lawson (ed.), lloll' Political Parties Hfr"'k (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1980), p.SS. 2S. Mehmct Kabasakal in Anadolu Stratejik Ara~ttnllalar Vakfl, Partl-I"i /)ell/okrasl (The Proceedillgs (!t'a COIl/i'rellce frd" Oil May 2, /997) (Ankara: n. p., 1997), pp.778. 26. liter Turan in Vakfl (1997), p.80. 27 Thc individual in qucstion was Dr Ertan Kutluean who is said to be leading a "Restructuring Movemcnt" within the party. 28. See Suat KlIlIldloglu, "Biilcnt Ecevit: The Transformation of a Politician," 7itr/ash Studies, Vol.I, No.2 (Autumn 2(00), pp.I-20; and Ta~kll1 Senol, "Can the Prime MinIster's Party be Closed'?," 7itrkish Nell'S (Istanbul daily), March 27, 2001, p.6. 29. From timc to tllllC some "mcmbers" emerge at party convcntions whose names mayor may not appcar on the general headquarter lists. Thesc "surprisc mcmbers" usually appear due to bad record keeping and bureaucratic slackness. They arc included or cxcluded from conventions depending on their suitability. 30. Interview with Ne~e Hasipek, fortller executive member of the DSp Ankara Yenllllahalle district branch, May 12, 200 I. 31. For more about leadership, see Selim Oktar, "Bir Liderin Ozellikleri" ("Qualities of a Leader"), Yelli Tarki)'e, Vol.2, No.9 (May-June 1996), pp.160-62; and Aytekln Yllmaz, "Siyasal Liderlik" ("Political Leadership"), Yelli Tarki}'e, Vo!.2, No.9 (May-June 1996), pp.163-82. 32. Omer Caha quoted in Yusuf Ziya Ozc
47 FollOWing Budak's critiCIsm of the government, Ecevit accused Budak of "not having come lI'om wlthll1 a democratIc left culture." For more detail on Ecevlt's speech, sec "Ara rejim la 1'111 I duymak Istemiyorum" ("I don't want to hear any mention of IlIterregnum"), Mill~I'et (Istanbul daily), March 30, 200 I. For an analysis of the amm, sec Hasan Pulur, "Demokratik sol kiiltUr ve bedel" ("DemocratIc Left Culture and Price"), MiII~l'ct, April 4, 200 I. 48. For further details, see the DS!"s 1999 Election Declaration at , 49. Ecevit's perception of the southeast/Kurdish issue was amply demonstrated dUring hIS trip to the area 111 .lune 2000. His Diyarbaklr speech eontall1s many of his convIctIons. Sec
I. Throughout the late 1980s, Eccvit and the DSp were labeled as e1cmcnts of division due to the split they brought about in the center-left. For more detail on this dimension, sec Fikrct Bila, Phoenix: EceviI'ill Yelliden /)ogu.)·u (Phoellix: 7/le Re-Birth (~/Ecevit) (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap~lltk, 200 I), p.1 n 2. Alan Ware, "!'arties under Electoral Competition," in Alan Ware (cd.), Political Parties (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p.2. 3. The party caucus constitutes an exception, albeit due to an exccptional reason. This body is examined below. 4. Comments about the position of the secretary-general refer to former Seeretmy-General Zeki Sezer. A new s~cretary-general, Hayri Diri, was appointed following thc Sth Regular Congress held on April 29, 200 I. S. Suavi Tuneay, Parti iri Dell/okl'llsi ve Tiirki)'e (Ankara: Giindogan YaYll1lart, 1996), p.18S. 6. Personal conversations with several former and current mcmbcrs of the Caucus lI'om 1996 to present. 7. Interview with fOrtller secretary-general of the DSP Omer Faruk Slrakaya, Dec. 16, 1999. 8. "Salt 90gunlukla iktldar" ("A Majority Government"), fIilrr~V!'t (Istanbul daily), Nov. 29, 1999, p.29. 9. Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications, 19S9), p.50. 10. Interview with former secretary-general of the DSP ()mer Faruk Slrakaya, Dec. 16, 1999. II. There IS no doubt that Ecevit's reactionary psychology towards the illctionalism of the CHI' of the late 1970s remains a pervading element in his outlook for the party, as well as national politics. For examples of this discourse, sec his speech of .lune 12,2000 in Diyarbaklr and his speech at the Sth Regular Congress on April 29, 200 I. 12. Transcript of speech distributed at the Sth Regular Congress on April 29, 200 I at ASKi Sports Centcr, Ankara, p.2. 13. Interview with various party executives fl'om the Ankara-Yenimahalle branch, April 5, 200 I. See also "DSP'li i~adaml vekillerin isyalll" ("The Outcry of DSP's Businessmen Deputics"), Cum/Illriyet (Istanbul daily), April 26, 200 I, p.S. 14. Interview WIth party ollicials lI'om thc Ankara-Mamak branch, April 7,2001. IS. The Congress and the parliamentmy vote in relation to an investigalton about the energy mlllister increased the number of dissatisiied DSP deputies. Sec "DS!"de rahatslzlar artlYor" ("Dissatisfied Deputies arc Increasing in the DSp"), CUII/hurlyet (Istanbul daily), May 2S, 2001, p.19. 16. The coverage of all Turkish daily newspapers of April 30, 200 I is indicative of this scrutiny. For instance, Hiirri.l'ct's coverage on that day extended to more than three full pages. 17. Both the electronic and printed media lashed out agall1st the DSP's undemocratic practices, which were witnessed livc on national television. As noted, a fcmale deputy who announced her leadership candidacy a number of days before the Congress was not allowed to speak, ostentatIously on grounds of not applYll1g prior to the Congress. Pm1y militants physically harasscd her son and accused her of being a "traitor." However, the episode backfired as the party image was badly tarnished following days of IlItensive media criticism of the undemocratic nature of the party. Although velY fcw in numbers, there were also those who viewed the Congress as a symbol of Ecevlt 's ascendancy in his di llicult struggle of the last decade. Sec, for example, Fikret Bila, "Ba~kaslllin giilgesi" ("Someone Else's Shadow"), Milli)'ct (Istanbul daily), April 30, 200 I, p.16. IS. In filct, the pre-eongrcss coverage of the DS!' was suggesting that there would be extensIve media focus on the Congress. Sec, for example, Adnan BostanelOglu, "DSP iGin bir ftrsat" (" An Opportunity for the DSP"), at [April 27, 2001]. 19. For a detailed analysis of the Congress and subsequent developments, see "Democratic Left Party Convention Rings Warning Bells for Entire Nation," Brie/illg, May 7, 2001, pp.II-·IS. 20. A series of articles were published III the immediate aftermath of the Convention right across the political spectrum. For an example of the early uproar, see Emin (:iila~an, "Bizde biiyle olur siyaset dedigin!" ("This is How Politics arc Practiced Herc!"), Hiirnyet (Istanbul daily), May 1,200 I, p.S. The dust never really settled until mid-June. For instance, on .lune 9, 200 I the Hiirriyet published a news report undcr the headline "DSP'liler DSp'li degilmi~" ("It turns out that the DS!' deputies were in filct not DSp mcmbers").
~ "!
23
'STANBUL BILG! UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
24
50. 51.
52. 53. 54. 55. 56.
57.
58. 59.
60.
61.
62. 63. 64. 65.
Political Parties ill Turkey "Ba~bakan Ecevit: Dogu ve Giincydogu'da Kalkll1ma Sefcrberligi Ba~latmaya KararliYlz" ("Primc Minister Ecevit: We arc determined to start a development drive in thc cast and south cast"), Haher Allado/II, June 12, 2000 at . Bila, Plioellix (200 I), p.24H. The DSP members havc similar views on the Kurdish issue. The study by Caha, Toprak and Dah11l~ shows that whcn askcd what werc Turkey's most important problems in 1996, only 2.5 percent of DSP mcmbers considered "separatism" as an important problem, and "terrorism" was not mentioned at all. [n contrast, CHI' members replied to the same questions With 10.5 percent and 2.6 percent respectively. For more dctail, sec (:aha, Toprak and Dah11l~ (1996), p.237. . For his pOSition in 1990, sec the "The Southeast Package" approved by the 2nd Extraonilnary Congress held on May 27,1990,111 Bila, Pllol'lIix (2001), pp.247-R. Ibid. Bulent Ecevit's speech announcing the capture of Gcalan live on national televiSIOn 111 the . . earfy hours of February 14, 1999. Yet, as evidenced by hiS speech at the 5th Regular Congress, it appears that post-economic crisis politics has compclled him to soften IllS self~discipline on this issue. Sec the text of Eccvit's spcech at the 5th Regular Congress on April 29, 200 I, p.l. This selt~perception is prnnarily rooted in the absence of the CHI' 111 the Turkishparliament and was lilOSt cxpresslvely demonstrated during the "Mcrve Kavak<;1 turban affair" in 1999. Kavak"l, a young turban-wearing fcmale deputy of thc pro-Islamist Virtue Party, was not allowed to takc her oath of of1ice during the opening days of the Turkish parliamcnt primarily due to the DSP's active opposition to her presence in a turban. Kavak<;1 was later stripped of her Turkish citizenship and subsequently lost her scat in the parliament as a result of the turban affair. Evidence for this diversion can be seen in the aforementioned study by ('aha, Toprak and Dah11l~, which {(.)lInd that DSP members scored 5.3 percent for "religiosily" as a primary quality of their leader whereas the True Path Party and CHI' members scored 7Cro and the Motherland Party members a mere 2.6 percent. For 1110re detail, sec Table 9 in Caha, Toprak and Dah11l~ (1996), p.227. "DSP'nin 14. kurulu~ ylldiiniil11ii" ("The DSP's 14th Foundation Anniversary"), CIIIII/I1I1"1),e/ (Istanbul daily), Nov. 29, 1999, p.5. There is widespread disagreement over the collegcs. Secularists and the military arc skeptical about their success abroad and view them with much suspicion. Many others believe II1Juslice has been done by associatlllg them with fundamentalists and believe that they arc usefuf schools raislI1g Turkey's prolile abroad. The party's 1999 electIOn declaration IS almost a eonfcssion that nothing but the privatization of the SEEs was a viable option. For further details, see DSP Se<;im Bildirgesi (DSP Elec/1011 MOllites/o) particularly the section "Kamu Iktisadi Kurulu~lafi Deviete Yiik Olmamahdlr" ("The SEEs should not become a liability to the State"l. It IS noteworthy that Ozkan received the lowest vote among those .who were elected to the party' caucus in the last Convention. For more detail, sec "En az oy Ozkan'a" ("Lowest votes for Ozkan"), Milliye/ (Istanbul daily), April 30, 200 I, p.16. . Sec Aydll1 Englll, "Siyasal Harita YClliden Cizilirken" ("While the Political Map is Redrawn"), Cilm/lllriye/ (Istanbul daily), May 25, 2001, p.5. Giikhan (:apoglu, in Vaki'l (1997), p . 3 . . . . "Gazeteyle kongre" ("Convention via a Newspaper"), Ozgiir Giilldem (Istanbul dally), March 28,2001. Bila, Pho(,lIix (200 I), p.ll.
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The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists? ALEV (:INAR and BURAK ARIKAN
Mi/liyetr,:i f/areket Partis; (Nationalist Action Party-MHP) has managed to keep its name, emblem, main organizational structure and basic ideological premises more or less intact since its establishment in 1969. There was only one brief interruption during the post-1980 coup period, when it went by the name MillI)Jefr,'i r;ah.~I1/{/ Partisi (Nationalist Work Party-MeP), This consistency is most probably due to the fact that the MHP has remained the only party on the far right of the ideological spectrum in Turkey. Even though the MHP started to move towards the center with Devlet Bah<;eli's leadership in 1997, it remains the only party in Turkey that spans the range of right-wing nationalist ideologies of racial, ethnic, and cultural varieties, I The extremist' tendencies within the party do not currently constitute the majority, nor are these views reflected in the party program. However, the MHP harbors such extremist groups, thereby remaining the only option for political formations of the far right. This essay examines the MHP's ideological and organizational structure. It is argued that the MHP's version of nationalism IS predicated on an ambiguous definition oscillating between a cultural and an ethnic definition of the nation. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to situate the MHP in anyone particular position on the spectrum of nationalist ideologies. This ambiguity seems to serve the MHP well, allowing it to take milder positions and put on a more moderate face when the situation requires, appealing to the center-right electorate, and to take on more extremist stances when it wants to appeal to more radical nationalist demands. This flexibility has also allowed the MHP to almost monopolize nationalist positions on the political spectrum and to present itself as the only party that best represents the national interest and not just a particular ideology. It might have been this strategy that brought the MHP the second highest percentage of votes in the 1999 general election.
.1'
I
. '"'
Political Parties in Turkey
The Nationalist Action Party
Even though the MHP monopolizes the right-wing nationalist end of the political spectrum, the principlc identifying the movement is its own version of nationalism referred to as Wkiiciiliik (idcalism). This identification dates back to the formation of Ulkii Ocaklart (Idealist Hearths) in 1968, which were youth organizations formed to fight Communism. Throughout the 1970s, Ulkii Ocaklan became the most active party group to recruit new members, especially university students, and served as a school where future MHP leaders and activists acquired organizational and leadership skills. Indeed most if not all the current MHP leaders and parliamentarians began their political involvement as members of Ulkii Oeaklan However, it should be noted that one off-shoot of Ulkii Oeaklart were the notorious idealist militant groups/ whose skills of a different (mainly criminal) kind, were acquired during the iilkiicii activities of thc 1970s that involved atrocities toward leftist and Marxist .. groups. Ulleii Oealelan also set the tone ofthe party's ideological basis. UlIdiciiWk, understood as the ideal of serving one's state, has a slightly different connotation than nationalism. The latter signifies a commitment to the prosperity of a paIticular community, whereas iilkiiciiliik significs a devotion to the wellbeing of the state seen as the utmost embodiment of the nation, identifying the state's interests as inseparablc fi'om the nation's interests.
In 1965, Alparslan Tiirke~ was elected as paIty chair and, with his friends, put Turkist and virulent anti-Communist features into the party rhetoric. Ti.irke~' Turkism gradually combined Turkish nationalism with Islamic features. During this period the party was in close contact with extreme right organizations such as Tiirkiye Milliyet{:iler Birligi (Turkish Nationalists Union),' Aydm/ar Kuliibii (Intellectuals Club), Vatansever Tiirk Te.~'kil([tl (Patriotic Turkish Organization), and KomiinizlIlle Miicadele Demekleri (Struggle Against Communism Clubs)," These organizations were fascist in their extreme nationalism, rejection of pluralism, and opposition to liberalism, capitalism and Communism. Most of them supported the use of violence against Communists.' The new party ideology adopted in 1967 was primarily shaped by the influences of these organizations. In the party congress of 1967 a new program was accepted based on "communitarian nationalism" and the Dokuz i,I'lk Doktrill; (Nine Lights Doctrine). nirke~ was declared Ba~bl1g (the "great leader"), and coined the well-known statement, "Whoever joins the cause and then becomes a traitor, kill him." It was not only nationalist ideologies that were turned into a violent political tool in the hands of the MHP, Islam was also politiCized as a force that could be manipulated against rising Marxist currents. In the 1970s, Tiirkq and his aides referred to Islam as an indispensable part of Turkish culture. This new combination was known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (TIS)," nirke~ articulated this synthesis in the following words: "We are as Turkish as the Tengri mountain [located in Central Asia, the place where the MHP believes the Turks' ancestors migrated from], and as Muslim as the Hira mountain [which is located in the Muslim Holy Lands in Saudi Arabia], Both philosophies are our principles."7 Within the framework of the TIS, Islam was interpreted as a cultural trait that reinforced Turkish identity. It was also a political strategy since the MHP wanted to mobilize the conservative-religious electoratc of central Anatolia in its fight against the revolutionary groups. These significant changes in ideology advanced the CKMP's transformation into a new political force. In this regard the party's 1969 Adana congress marked a turning point. The name of the party was changed /i'om CKMP to MHP; the rank-and-file Turkists who opposed the Turkish-Islamic synthesis were expelled; and a hierarchical structure that augmented Tiirkef power was institutionalized. The party's anti-capitalist and anti-masonic rhetoric was also jettisoned, making the MHP more acceptable to the establishment as a legitimate force because of its strong anti-Communism sentiment"
26
HISTORY
or
THE MHP
The first extreme right-wing party of Turkey, ClIl11huriyetr;i f(i~}'/ii Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Farmer's Nation Party-CKMP) was founded in 1948 by General Fevzi <;akmak. At the time <;akmak was the most significant representative of religious nationalistic ideas in Turkey. He was a conservative person recruited because of his name. The paIty itself was founded by the coalition of small fascist and proto-fascist forces in Turkey. After Osman B61i.ikba~1 was eJected the party chair, it acquired a popUlist, conservative nationalist stance, which was primarily supported by peasants and the middle classes. The first pmty program, valid until the 1960s, contained a corporatist, developmental-modernist ideology which claimed to restore a proper Kemalist standpoint. The party supportcd state corporatism believing that this would create an organic, homogcnized nation under strict state control. Neithcr its support base nor the ideology ofthe party changed until the mid- I 960s, and it remained a relatively unpopular party without any significant presence in thc political arena.
27
28
29
Political Parties ill Turkey
The Nationalist Action Party
Still, between 1969 and 1974 the party remained a marginal force in Turkish politics, receiving only three percent of the electoral vote. The party's fortunes changed in 1975 when it was invited to join the MiII~}'etv'i Cep/ze (Nationalist Front) government with the right-wing Adalet Partisi (Justice Party-AP) and the [slamist Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party--MSP). The long-divided right realized it was time to unite against the rising power of Biilent Ecevit's Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party-CHP). Ecevit's popularity was on the rise particularly due to the successful 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, conducted under his premiership. Although the MHP almost doubled its vote share in the 1977 elections, the party leadership was far 11-om happy. It had hoped the coalition experience would integrate the pmty into the system as a legitimate actor and broaden its base of SUppOit. Even though the party was successful in attracting an increasing number of marginalized middle-class voters who faced difficulties in adapting to the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism, economic hardship, and inflation, the pmty's inl1exible attitude toward change constrained its electoral prospects. Rather than adopting a new strategy and a program that would tackle the problems of the Turkish society, it remained a single-issue party whose only concern was anti-Communist propaganda. Consequently, the MHP failed to gain the support of larger sections of society. However, before it could evaluate its electoral limitations, the MHP (along with other political parties) was banned as a result of the 1980 military coup. While the left was the army's main target, the MEP was also hard hit by the harsh measures of the intervention. Many MHP supporters and members were given prison sentences. This was a period during which those supporting iilkiidiler found themselves having to question their unconditional support of the Turkish state for the first time in their history. A book written by Alparslan Tiirke:;; at the time, entitled BasIlan KerVal11111lZ (Our Suppressed Journey) expressed this sense of betrayal by the state. It was also at this time that one of the prominent leaders of the party, Agah Oktay Giiner, said "We are in prison, yet our ideology is in government," which became a popular slogan among the iilkiicii circles, reflecting their disillusionment and sense of betrayal by the Turkish state. The period after the military intervention witnessed a further rise of Islam in the ideology of some MHP cadres and supporters, who saw it as a more reliable ideal for devotion than the state and a better answer to their search for identity. This re-orientation towards Islam became the main source of tension within the rank and file of the party, especially when the iilldicii movement entered a revival period as the effects of the military
coup were winding down. On the other hand, the radical Islamists (who began to support political [slam) were forced to resign from the party. At the time, Tiirke:;; was pursuing policies that aimed to make peace with the state forces and to direct the party toward the center of the political spectrum. To achieve these goals, the expulsion of the political Islamist cadres from the party was a necessity since the state in general and the military in particular were extremely sensitive about the rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism. In the 1987 general, and 1991 local, elections the party showed no particular gain at the polls and its performance was almost identical to the pre-1980 period (see Table 1). TABLE I Mill' VOTES IN TURKISH ELECTIONS
Elections CKMI' Mill' Mill' Mill' M('p· Mel' M(,p+RI''' Mill' Mill' Mill'
1965 1969 1973 1977 19X7 1989* 1991 1994* 1995 1999
Votes ('%)
Number or Scats
~
II I 3 16
~
L..L.
3.3 3.4 6.4 2.9 4.1 16.9
19 (RI'43)
8 8.6 17.9X
129
Noles: * Local elections a Since all pre-1980 political parties wcre banned ii-OIn politics by the military Junta, the Idealists named thcir newly rounded party as the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyel("i ('lIh~'lIIlI PlIl'li.\·I--M(,I').
b
In order to pass the natIonal threshold of ten percent, an electoral pact between RI', Mill' and a minor third party was formed before the 1991 general elections. Therefore, the results represents neIther the electoral strength of the RP nor the Mill' alone.
The MHP entered the 199 I elections in a coalition pact with the Isiamist Re/clh Partis; (Welfare Party-RP) in order to circumvent the ten percent threshold restriction, which it could not pass on its own. As a result, the MHP won 19 seats in the parliament. Contrary to the expectations of many, Tiirke:;; was not elected. Parliamentmy representation seemed to have been beneficial for the pmty. In the 1994 local elections its vote share rose to eight percent, and further increased 0.6 percent in the parliamentary elections in 1995. This time, however, the MHP could not enter the parliament due to the election barrier. The party had the potential to pass the threshold, but due to Tlirke:;;' moderate secular policies that primarily aimed to attract the urban electorate, voters in the conservative rural areas were alienated:' It was the RP that won the rural periphery in 1995.
Political Parties ill Turkey
The Nationalist Action Party
In 1997, Tlirke~ died at the age of 80. The iilkiieii movement was in sl10ek at the loss of their eharismatie leader and faced an uncertain future. Indeed, at the May 1997 party congress, convened only a month after the loss of Tlirke~, rivalries surfaced within the party. Eight candidates, including Tiirkef son, Tugrul Tiirke~, ran for party leadership. In the first round, Devlet Balweli won the second-highest support from the delegates after Tugrul Tlirke~, but none of the candidates were able to gain the necessalY majority. In the second round, the remaining six candidates withdrew their eandidacy and decided to support Bah<;eli, whieh guaranteed certain victory for him. Tugrul Ti.irke~, realizing that his chances of winning the congress were minimal, organized a putseh and, with the support of his armed iilkiieii militants, invaded the congress and seized the chair. The eongress was postponed, but Bah<;eli won the leadership when it reconvened in November 1997, opening a new era in the MHP's history. The election of Bah<;eli to the party chair was almost universally approved by party supporters who believed he would reunite the party around its founding principles. There was great enthusiasm toward the MHP in the long-forgotten rural areas. Aware of this potential, Bah<;eli and his aides quiekly restructured the party's policies and strategies in order to appeal to the expectations of the MHP's electorate in the countryside as well as to its urban supporters. The party core rapidly concentrated its energy to the re-establishment of links with the conservative electorate in eentral Anatolia. lIl This strategy was very successful both in rebuilding support in the eountryside and in guaranteeing the new leader's control over the party structure. Local branehes, which had gained autonomy in previous years due to Tlirke~' Kemalist seeular policies, were once again brought under the strict control of the core leadership. Those branches that refused to accept party directives were immediately dissolved. The foundation of a party school and a Researeh and Development Department (ROD) restored the party core's domination and trained members for a fresh approach to politics. Through various publications, including a pamphlet on "How to Behave in Publie,"" the party school educated its members. As a result, the autocracy of Bah<;eli was established, ideological standards were tightened, and links with the rural electorate were strengthened. During this period, which went unnoticed by the mass media, Bah<;eli and his aides traveled throughout Turkey (almost 60,000 kilometers by road) listening to the electorate's demands and presenting their ideas on an almost one-to-one basis. As the results of the 1999 general elections revealed, this policy turned out to be velY successful (see Table 2).
TABLE 2 THE RISE OF THE MIlP VOTE IN TIlE COUNTRYSIDI, ('Yn)
30
31
Traditional Strongholds
1994
1995
1999
Amasya Tokat Corum Cankm Kayseri Yozgat Aksaray Isparta
14.0 12.0 10.8 20.8 21.8 17.4 14.1 14.4 19.3 18.0
12.1 12.9 11.5 18.7 17.R 13.9 14.9 15.7 19.9 14.7
24.9 29.1 30.0 38.2 32.8 39.R 35.3 29.3 33.6 26.1
Klr~chir
Erzunnll
Source: A & G Research Company.
While the party systematically courted the rural electorate, it was also able to recruit a significant number of academics. This achievement, along with the school and the ROD, raised the party's profile among the urban population, which also increased support for the MI-IP. Bah<;eli's image as a man of integrity who respected the people's aspirations and values was another key factor. Younger people began to consider the MHP as a serious alternative to the other parties. J-Jence the MHP established a miraculous bridge between the urban nationalist electorate and their rural counterpart. Consequently, the MHP crossed the electoral threshold by a large margin and emerged as the second largest group in the parliament, exceeding even the party leadership's expectations.
NEW TRENDS UNDER DEVLET BAH<;:ELI'S LEADERSHIP
As a result, voters' support for the MI-IP more than doubled between 1995 and 1999. For the first time in its history, the MHP emerged as the secondlargest recipient of votes and became the main partner of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP)-MHP-Motherland Party (ANAP) coalition government, with 129 seats in parliament. What was it about Bah<;eli's leadership that made such a big difference to the MI-IP's electoral performance? How was Bah<;eli able to bridge the gap between the urban nationalists and rural electorate in such a short period of time? The most apparent difference between the MHP of Alpaslan Ti.irke~ and that ofBah<;eli is the striking contrast of the images each of these two leaders pOItrayed to the public. While Tlirke~ came across as a paternalistic and paltisan leader, Bah<;cli projects the image of a leader who seems to honor the interests of his country over the interests of his party and his personal
32
Political Parties in Turkey
The Nationalist Action Party
interests. While Tiirke~ was devoted primarily to ideology, as shown by his expulsion of members who deviated from the party line, Bahc;eli makes it very clear that he is primarily devoted to serving the interests of the state, even if these interests may go against particular party policies. This stance was most evident when Bahc;eli personally asked one of his popular ministers, Enis Oksiiz, to resign from his post as Minister of Transportation in July 200 I when Oksiiz's policies regarding the privatization of the stateowned Telecom Company contradicted the coalition government's overall economic recovelY program. Bahc;eli repeats his slogan "Once iilkem, sonJ'{l partim. SOIlI'Cl ben" ("first my country, then my party, then myself') at every opportunity. In contrast to Tiirke~, who was quoted in a party publication as saying, "Tek hedef Tiirk if'in Tiirk tarqfindan" ("The main goal is for the Turk and by the Turk"), Bahc;eIi appears in the same publication asserting his goal is the wellbeing of "Tiirkiye"-emphasizing the country at large rather than a particular community.12 The difference between a devotion to the Tiirk as opposed to devotion to Tiirkiye highlights the crucial diiTerence between the ideological stances of these two leaders. More importantly, in the eyes of the public, Tiirke~ was much more closely associated with the ultra-nationalist, militant MHP of the 1970s which was responsible for many killings and atrocities. Whereas Bahc;eli, who had an academic background and had scrvcd in the party as an educator rather than as a militant activist, came across as a much more reliable and trustworthy leader whose claim to clear the MHP of its negative image was taken seriously by the media. Indeed, when Bahc;eli announced his new program of renewal emphasizing democracy and human rights, which was approved at the Sixth Congress in November 2000, most popular columnists, even those writing in leftist newspapers, acknowledged his attempt as genuine, even if they thought it unrealistic considering the MHP's past. 1l Devlet Bahc;eli's credibility and the new positive image he brought to the MHP's leadership was not only a result of his academic background or his personal image. Since he replaced Tiirke~ in 1997, he has shown a consistent devotion to the renewal of the party, which has involved structural changes within patty organs and some crucial shifts of emphasis in party idcology, all of which were articulated at the Sixth Congress and brought to life afterwards. One of the most radical steps was severing ties with the Ufldi Ocaklan (Idealist Hearths), the party's infamous youth branch. This organization had a reputation of involvement with criminal activity in the 1970s and
continued covert association with the l'ilkiica mafia groups (formed by former members of Ulkii Ocaklan and believed to have been involved in clandestine operations of the state against the Kurdistan Workers PartyPKK). A new youth organization was formed to start with a clean slate and direct the youth towards artistic and cultural activities rather than political activism. Accordingly, the number of Ulkii Oeaklan decreased and were brought under the umbrella of a foundation. This was one of the most significant steps toward rebuilding a new and cleaner image for the MHP under Bahc;eli. However, it should be noted that former members of Ulkii Ocaklan, some of whom have disturbing criminal records, are still active members of the party ranks although they are instructed to keep a low public profile. For example, when party member Yavuz Ceylan, who was convicted of involvement in the murder of Abdi ipekc;i (a prominent author and journalist assassinated in 1979), wanted to run for leadership of the Istanbul branch of the party organization, Bahc;eli personally asked him to withdraw his candidacy. Bahc;eli's concern with public image makcs him\ willing to alienate some groups within the party. . Other related measures that Bahc;eli adopted involved the abandonment of several patty gestures and other symbols associated with the iilkiieii movement. Moustaches running down to the chin, the special iilkiieii greeting that involved the banging of each other's heads, refusal to wear ties, wearing of white socks, and other markers of being a "true iilkiicii" were all banned. I•1 Indeed, at the Sixth Congress in November 2000, all delegates were wearing tics, none had long moustaches, and there was no extensive head-banging. In contrast to the scandalous congress in May 1997 when Tugrul Ti.irke~ and his men invaded the hall with guns; this convention took place in utmost discipline, evelyone was clean-shaven, appropriately dressed and well behaved as if to defy the image of militancy that had tarnished the MHP for so long. It was certainly a display ofBahc;eli's success in having achieved full control over his party and implementing his policy! of renewal. . New courses were initiated at the party school. Members and activists, including the parliamentarians, regularly attended classes that included instructions on topics such as dining etiquette, how to greet each other, how to speak in public, and so on." All of these measures involved the building of a new image for the MHP, one that would sufficiently distance the party from its previous militant image and its association with the iilkiicii mafia.
33
I
34
THE MHP'S IDEOLOGY: REDEFINING NATIONALISM
The changes the MHP faced with the new leadership were not limited to public image. While the policy changes mentioned above seemed cosmetic, they actually incorporated deeper ideological concerns. The change of leadership in 1997, the unprecedented increase of voter support in 1999 (which even surprised the MHP itself), and its experience as a major coalition partner after this increase, forced the MHP to review its main ideological principles, reinforcing some of the changes that had begun since the last years of Alpaslan Ti.irke~. The main ideological tenets of the MHP arc built upon the principles of iilkiiciiliik (idealism), nationalism, and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. While iilkiiciiliik is best translated as idealism, it has a very speeific meaning in the Turkish political context which is only used in association with the particular ideological movement that has nourished the MHP. As noted, iilkiiciiliik most accurately means "the love and ideal of serving the state." Indeed, serving the interests of the state is the most fundamental defining cause of the iilkiicii movement and the basic ideological tenet of the MH P. Such idealism has been the raisoll-d 'eIre of the MHP to such an extent that MHP activists did not sec any difference between the party and the state, and whoever was the enemy of the state was also deemed the enemy of the party. For this reason, MHP militants believed they fought against all enemies of the Turkish state, be it the Communists and Marxists of the 1970s or the PKK of the 1990s. For this reason, the closure of the MH P after the 1980 coup, and the sentencing of many of its activists, came as a major shock. However, towards the end of the 1990s, it became increasingly apparent to the MHP circles that the "state" as they understood it may not agree with their ideological principles and that the MHP and the state's official ideology may indeed contradict each other. One of the first signs of this was the Susurluk incident where MHP circles celebrated the notorious victim of a traffic accident, Abdullah Catil, as a hero and "true patriot" who died serving his country. An Istanbul delegate of the party, Mehmet Yellice, claimed that CatII was their fellow idealist and that they respected him. The slogans at the Sixth Congress also declared support for Abdullah CatlI: "CatII is not dead; he lives in our hearts."I(, Yet in the eyes of the state (at least officially), CatII was nothing more than a cold-blooded criminal, involved in drug dealing, murder, and atrocities. A second incident that was particularly revealing of the MHP's new approach toward [slam occurred during the oath-taking ceremony at
35
The Nationalist Action Party
Political Parties in Turkey
parliament just after the April 1999 elections. One party member, Nesrin Onal, removed her Islamic head scarf before giving her oath. This event facilitated the way for the current coalition partnership of the party. However, Bahyeli's commitment to adjust the MHP's ideological position toward a more statist and centrist line did not mean that the rest of the party and its supporters would placidly follow. The party's compliance with the state's official position against the Islamic headcovering, as demonstrated by the case of Nesrin Onal, was met with serious criticism both within the party and from the voters. The MHP was accused of hypocrisy and selling out on a promise made to its electorate. One of the successful slogans used by the party during the 1999 election campaign was "The head-covering issue will be resolved not by cowards but by real men." This slogan targeted voters who had previously supported Re/ci/lIFazilet (Welfare/viltue) with the hope of reversing the ban on the Islamic head-covering, and were disillusioned with Relah's failure to make any progress on the issue. This compliance not only cost MHP a substantial amount of voter support (see Table 3), but also elicited reaction from within the ranks of the party. On the other hand, that Balweli repositioned his party on the head-covering issue in particular, and Islam in general, despite a heavy cost, shows the degree to which he is committed to realigning his party's ideological stance toward a more centrist and statist line. TABl.E 3 ISLAMIC IIEAD SCARF ISSUE IN UNIVERSITIES
Parly Sympalhizers
ANAl'
CHI'
DYP
DSP
FP
Mill'
Olher
Should be allowed 10 wear Should lake il ofT No idea
39.7 55.1 5.1
18.3 77.7 4.1
76.8 16.6 6.6
18.2
99.4 0.6
96.3 3.7
75.0
81.8
25.0
Sou rei': 1\ & G Research Company.
The third basic MHP ideological principle is nationalism. Heavily inlluenced by Ayd/lllar Ocagl (Hearth of Intellectuals) 111 the 1970s, the MHP is careful to define Turkish nationalism in terms of "national culture" rather than ethnicity or race. 17 According to the party, in its narrowest definition, Turkish nationalism is "the love of Turkish nation, and loyalty and service to the Turkish state."IK In the new program formulated with instructions from Bahyeli and approved at the party Congress in 2000, nationalism is defined as a principle that "forms the basis and the
37
Political Parties in Turkey
The Nationalist Action Party
mobilizing energy of the social, economic and cultural developments toward making the Turkish Nation ... take its place among the larger community of nations as a powerful, respectable and mighty society."I" This sense of nationalism implies that citizens' utmost duty is to sacrifice themselves and their interests for the wellbeing of the national community.20 For the MHP, devotion to such nationalist ideals is expected not only of its members but from all citizens, regardless of their particular political opinions and preferences. This understanding of nationalism empowered the MHP to impose its ideology as if it is a duty of all Turkish citizens, as illustrated by the slogan that was popular in the 1980s and early 1990s: "f(l sev ya terket" ("love or leave the country"). Katherine Verderey draws attention to two different meanings of nation and nationalism, namely civic and cultural nationalism. In the former case, "nation" is understood as a relationship of citizenship "in which the nation consists of collective sovereignty based 111 common political participation."21 In its second meaning, "nation" is taken as a relation of ethnicity, "in which the nation comprises all those of supposedly common language, history, or broader cultural identity."22 As noted, the MHP has becomc particularly skilled in playing upon the ambiguity between these two meanings of nationalism. The MHP nationalism, with its cmphasis on common culture and history, leans more toward a form of cultural nationalism. 21 However, in several MHP publications, nationalism is even more frequently defined as a love of one's country and loyalty to the state, therefore evoking the other meaning of nationalism that takes it as a relation of citizenship. Capitalizing on the ambiguity between these two meanings of nationalism, the MHP is able to tap into feelings of patriotism and presents itself as the only party-being the only nationalist party-that represents the true interests ofthe nation and the state. In other words, this confluence of the two meanings of nationalism allows the MHP to give the impression that representing the national interest is under the monopoly of this one and only nationalist party. This ambiguity worked to the advantage of the MHP particularly during the 1999 elections, when the electorate had become highly sensitized on issues of patriotism and nationalism in the face of the PKK terrorism and the capturing ofthc PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. As a result of demonstrations celebrating the capture of Ocah1l1 headed by the families of soldiers who had died during confrontations with the PKK, sentiments of patriotism and nationalism were running high. This conjuncture allowed the MHP to present itself as thc only truly patriotic party owing to its
nationalism. Coupled with Bahc;eli's image as a new leader primarily devoted to the interests of his country rather than his party, this rhetoric must have played a significant role in more than doubling the party's votes. However, some of the voters who had expeeted the MHP to ensure that Ocalan was hanged were disillusioned when the coalition government, of which the MHP was a member, failed to carry out the death penalty. This was seen as another failure by the MHP to keep its election promises and resulted in further unrest and criticism from the ranks of the party.'·1 Another important ideological theme is the issue of economic liberalism. Economic programming is not one of the MHP's strengths. Perhaps because economic policy is among the weakest issues on the party's program and agenda, there is no real consensus within the party on economie liberalism or, particularly, on privatization. Immediately after the 1999 election the MHP's leading economists declared in the party's official publication that the MHP was devoted to economic liberalization and to a thorough and rapid privatization program. 25 As if to contradict this declaration, the MHP appointed Enis Oksiiz, known for his views against privatization, as Minister of Transportation with control over two of the most significant public enterprises-Turkish Airlines and Turkish Telecom -both at the top of the privatization list. As already noted, Oksliz's stubborn attitude against full privatization proved to be a major impediment in the much-needed legislation facilitating privatization during the economic crisis of April 200 I. However, as also noted, seeing that Oksiiz's attitude was seriously jeopardizing the MHP's position in the DSP-MI-IP-ANAP coalition government, Bahc;eli finally asked for Oksiiz's resignation in July 2001. In summary, under Bahc;eli's leadership, a gradual shift is taking place in party ideology, not necessarily a radical change of basic principles but still an important shift of emphasis that is most apparent in the issues of political Islam, the Kurdish question, and economic liberalism. These shifts are being met with resistance and criticism from among party ranks and supporters. As such, they reveal an unspoken divide within the partythe "academics," on the one hand, and the te.>'kilat (party organizations) on the other. The academics are basically the current leaders of the party, including Bahc;eli himself~ most of whom have had experience in the edueational and training branches of the party. Some-but not all--have academic degrees. On the other hand, the te.}·kilat refers to lower-ranking leaders who come from the pmiy organizations, mostly Ulkii Om/dan and other activist groups. Since the latter are more directly conneeted to the rank and file of the party, as well as the constituents, they reflect the views
36
38
39
Political Parties ill Turkey
The Nationalist Action Party
of party circles that tend to resist the changes being implemented by ( Bah<;eli. However, such reactions are not made public, since there is a r strong sense of loyalty in the party that strives to confine all criticism to within the party circles and away from the public. 2" Bah<;eli is able to bridge the gap between these two groups, owing to his leadership skills which depend less on democratic means than on an ability to establish tight discipline and control over the party as well as a confident demeanor that elicits respect and loyalty within the party ranks. As mentioned above, Bah<;eli was able to establish the authority of the core party leadership over the rest of the party and its organs much more tightly than Alpaslan Tiirke~ had ever done. During board meetings under Tiirke~, matters on the agenda could be openly discussed and differences of opinion easily articulated; there is much less discussion under Bah<;eli and all party members and parliamentarians are expected to fully comply with the decisions and directives of the leadership. An example that illustrates the degree to which Bah<;eli takes party discipline seriously can be found in the discharging of his close friend and associate, Ali GUngor, from the party. At the time the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government was about to pass the controversial General Amnesty Law in 2000, Ali Giingor made a speech that publicly criticized amnesty and placed the party in a difficult position during critical negotiations on the issue. Bah<;eli did not hesitate to have him summarily discharged. Likewise, when the MI-IP's Minister of Agriculture, Hiisnii Yusuf Gokalp, publicly criticized Prime Minister Biilent Ecevit for incompetence and ANAP's leader Mesut Yilmaz for corruption, Bah<;eli issued a written statement to all the MI-IP's ministers warning them not to give any public statements on issues outside of their ministry's affairs. 27
The main points of contention revolve around the issues of political Islam (namely, to what degree will the MHP endorse the ban on headcovering and other restrictions on political Islam); the Kurdish question (namely, to what degree will the MEP back down on the insistence on executing PKK leader Abdullah bcalan and the use of the death penalty in general); and the endorsement of economic liberalism (namely, to what degree will the MHP support and assist the implementation of full scale privatization in particular and the cessation of clientelist policies in general). While the party leadership takes more centrist policies on these issues, different circles of MH P sympathizers continue to express discontent with such policics and some top-ranking MHP politicians and party officials continue to act in dissension to the party's main policy lines. Despite the resistance and lack of intra-party consensus toward the party's transformation into a center-right party, the MHP leadership under Balweli thus far has been quite successful in meeting these challenges while maneuvering the party through a difficult coalition partnership that started in 1999. Immediately after the coalition government was formed, the MHP found itself facing some of the most difficult challenges and crises in Turkey's history. Starting with the worst natural catastrophe that Turkey ever experienced, namely the August 1999 earthquake, the DSP-MHPANAP coalition government then faced the challenge to carry Turkey into a candidacy to European Union membership and the ensuing preparations of the National Program. In 200 I, the same governmcnt found itself in the midst of Turkey's worst economic crisis. Throughout these trying times, the MHP's ability to remain as a stable coalition partner and adapt itself to government policies that sometimcs went against party traditions and principles has no doubt contributed to the persistence of the coalition government and the maintenance of political stability. This adaptability has not only demonstrated Devlet Bah<;eli's success in leading his party through the transformation of the MHP toward a more centrist position, but also significantly contributed to the perseverance and stability of democracy in Turkey.
<
CONCLUSION
The MI-IP has undergone a substantial evolution since it was formed in 1969. It gradually moved away from the far right to approach the center of the political spectrum, a trend that had begun in the latter years of Alpaslan Tiirke~' leadership and accelerated under Devlet Bah<;eli. It is this transformation that allowed the MI-IP to enter into a successful coalition partnership with the centrist ANAP and the center-left DSP in i 999. Thus, the MHP gradually took on the position of not a far-right but a center-right party. However, this transformation is far from being complete and is met with substantial resistance and confusion from the party and its supporters.
NOTES I. These terms refer to ideologies that take nationalism (membership to a particular commullity connected by national as opposed to kinship or religiOUS tics) as their constitutive basis, but have differing degrees of emphasis on race and etlll1lclty as the core delinlllg clcment of the national connectIOn. Whilc cultural nationalism emphaSizes languagc and shared cultural traits as the baSIS of the national connection, racism and ultra-nationalism take race and pl'lmordiallbiological traits as thclr basis. The latter two forms of nationalism arc also referred to as extremism in thiS article. For a detailed account of nationalist ideologies, see Llah
40
Political Parties in Turkey
Greenfield, NatiollalislII: Five Road,' to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex, Tfle Etflllidtv Reader: Natiollalism MuiticulturalislII alld Migratioll (Cambndge: Polity Press, 1997). . 2. For a detailed account of the idealist militants, sec Tarlll Bora, and Kemal Can, Devlet. Omk, Dergah: 12 Eylii/'dell 1990 'lara Vlkiicii Hareket (Istanbul: ileti~im YaYllllan, 1994), pp.377-406. 3. This organization was the continuation of the TiirkGliIer Dernegi (Turkists Club), which was founded in 1963 by grass-root racists, such as Nihal Atslz and ismet Tiimtiirk. 4. E. Burak Artkan, "The Programme of the Nationalist ActIon Party of Turkey: An Iron Hand in a Velvet Glove," Middle Eastern Stlldies, VoL34, No.4 (Oct. 1998), 1'1'.120-34. 5. For a minImum definition of fascism, see Geoffrey Harris, The Dark Side of' Europe: 7he E,·treme Right 7i)(la), (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, (990), p.16. 6. For a detailed analysis of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, see Ankan (199H), pp.120··-34; Bora and Can (1994), pp.147-89. 7. Bora and Can (1994), p.54. 8. Ibid., p.46. 9. Ta 111 I Bora, "18 Nisan- Zifiri karanltk seGimleri: Mill' ve digerIeri," Birikilll, No.121 (May 1(99), p. I 6. 10. According to an opinion poll conducted by A & G Research Company, the parents of 30 percent of the MHP supporters were born in central Anatolia. I I. Murat $efkatli, Be~'eri Miillasebetler (Ankara: MHP Siyaset Okulu Egitim Serisi No.5, 1(99), pp.25-30. 12. Both of these quotes appeared in the same booklet published by the party: MHP Parti YaYllllan, /lIHP Milli 7(I/'IIII-Orlllall Politikalan (Ankara: Sarglll Ofset, 1(99). 13. Sec, lor example, CUlllhllrlyet (Istanbul daily), Nov. 8, 2000; Okay Giinensin, lellibilll'll (Istanbul daily) Nov. 7, 2000; $ahll1 Alpay, Milli)'et (Istanbul daily), Nov. 9, 2000; Ertug;'ul Ozk(ik, Hiirri)'et (Istanbul daily), Nov. 7, 2000. 14. Somc of the mcanings ofthesc gestures and symbols arc obscurc, even to thc party members themselves. For whatever reason they originated, they became the marks that distingUIsh followers or the iilkiidi cause. 15. Burak Ankan, "The Nationalist Action Party or Turkey: Extremists Under Transition'!," typescript. 16. Nllrriyet (Istanbul daily), Nov. 24, 1997, For a more detailed account, sec MarvlIl l'lowe, 7i1l'key Today: A Natloll Divided 01'('1' Islalll~' Revival (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 20(0), I1p.122-3. 17. For Aydllllar Ocagl and its influcnce on the MHP ideology, sec Ankan (199H). J 8. A. Tiirkc~, Milliyet;'ilik (istanbul: Hamle Baslll-Yay III , 1996), p.16. 19. MiIIi),etri Flareket Partisi Program I (Ankara: pamphlet produced by MHP Part I YaYll1lan, Nov. 5, 2(00) (trans. Alev (lIlar). 20. Milliyet~1 Harcket Partisi, Lider Tiirkiye :ve Dolfi'll: Serim Beyallllalllcsi, April 18, 1999, p.28. 21. Katherinc Verdery, "Wither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism "i," in Gopal BalakrIshnan (cd.), Mappillg tlte Natiotl (Ncw York: Verso, 1(96), p.227 22. Ibid. 23. Metin Heper, '''Ba~kala~madan' Degi~en MilliyctGi Harckct Partisi," 7ilrki)'£' Giill!tl~ii, No.55 (March-April 1(99), pp. I 2-23. 24. Intervicw with Diizgiin Karada~, Star daily MHP correspondent, April I, 200 I. 25. Emin ('ankGI, "Tiirkiyc'de Ekonomik Geli~melcr ve MHP'nin iktisadi Giirii~leri," (,'are, Vol. I, No.3 (May 19(9), pp. I 9-20. 26. Interview with Diizgiin Karada~, Star daily MI-IP correspondent, April I, 200 I. 27. IIllrri},et (Istanbul daily), March 24-26, 2001.
----------------------4 -----------------------
The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party ERSIN KALAYCIOGLU
It was the decision of the military government that came to power in the wake of the September 1980 coup, to ban all the previously existing parties and their leaders from multi-party politics of the 1980s, which gave Turgut Ozal the opportunity to establish a new political party. As well as working in the private sector, Ozal had spent a lifetime in the highest echelons of the Turkish civilian bureaucracy, functioning as a technocrat working in electrification projects, in the directorship of the State Planning Organization (OPT), and finally as underseeretary of the prime minister's office in 1980. The military coup of 1980 catapulted him to a position of political power. He was appointed as state minister in charge of the economy in the military government. His years in the public bureaucracy and at the helm of thc state's economic affairs helped give him an image as an able technocrat. He had worked out the famous January 24, 1980 decisions to liberalize the Turkish economy under the leadership of Prime Minister Siileyman DemireL It was his technocratic performance and acumen in the winter and spring of 1980 that secured his place in the coup's military government. Ozal also took credit for reducing the triple-digit inl1ation of 1979 down to 23 percent in three years as a cabinet minister of the military government. His credentials as an economic wizard were soundly established in the eyes of the public when he launched his campaign in spring 1983 to establish a new political party. It was the determination of Ozal and the tolerance of the militaJY government, which enabled the Motherland Party (Anal'atall Partisi-ANAP) to establish itself and to participate in the national elections of J983. It was Ozal's civilian technocratic credentials, combined with the fllCt that only two other parties establishcd by the military government were permitted to take part in the 1983 elections, that contributed to ANAP's stellar success at thc polls, The other parties were seen by many
42
Political Parties ill Turkey
as the emanations of the military. In addition, Ozal introduced a clear-cut economic program. By obtaining the plurality of the votes and thc majority of the seats in thc Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) through a pseudo-competitive and unfair transition election of ! 983, Turgut Ozal became prime minister, and ANAP became the governing party.' For the next eight years ANAP governments ruled the country, making the party a major force in Turkish politics. It also provided a unique example of a brand new party which managed to establish a big enough niche among the previously established parties in the Turkish party system to rule the country alone or in coalition for most of the post-I 983 period. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF A NEW PARTY
Each party organization has its own birthmarks. The genetic characteristics gained at the initiation of the party playa major role in determining how the party defines its political mission and identity, how it establishes its structures of political decisionmaking, and the style of leadership it develops.2 Therefore, one variable that influences the shape and function of the party organization is its genetic code. However, there is little evidence that all there is to analyze about a political party organization is determined by the genetic code alone. Every political party is ruled by a central decisionmaking body, which is usually led by the party leader. Such a central dccisionmaking body often hosts a number of power holders (fraction leaders) in the party. Therefore, it has bcen suggested that it is plausible to assumc that political parties are run by a coalition of sub-units which Giovanni Sartori calls "fractions.'" Such a coalition is often reflected in the central decisionmaking organ(s) of thc party, which Angclo Panebianco calls the "dominant coalition" of ~the party." When we speak of party organization, we refcr to fractions, \ their interactions among themselves, and the dominant coalition, which \constitute the authority structure, and emboc!y the po,:?r relations in the /\ party. The structure and functIon of the "domll1ant coalItIOn" that rules the r party determines how the power relations between its fractions are \ shaped. Corollary to the preceding argument is that the level of fractionalization constitutes another important defining characteristic of the party organization. Sartori argues that parties cannot be monoliths, and hence they are replete with fractions which take many shapes. s Parties with a single faction, which dominates the structure of opportunities in thc party to the dctriment of all others, are easily managcd by a single leader alonc,
The Motherland
p(1r~)I
43
and often have a compact and uniform dominant coalition. However, party organizations divided by fractions, factions, and cliques require that dominant coalitions are more sensitive and more responsive to the fractions." Such party organizations are harder to govern by the single party leader, or even by a compact and uniform dominant coalition. Creating a cohesive and coherent structure that will have stability over time in a complex organization is often more difficult than creating a coherent organization from onc where there are few and relatively powerless fractions. Therefore, the methods of governance employed by the leader and the dominant coalition, the style of rule and the internal calm of the party organizations are iniluenced by the extent of fractionalization of the party organizations. Consequently, how coherent and stable a party organization becomes, and how the dominant coalition deals with the fractionalization of the party organization depends on the number and the power of the fractions in the organization. Finally, it is the nature of the political environment in which a political party functions that determines its chances for institutionalizatlon. 7 In the long run the survival of a political party, just like any other system, is dependent upon its environment. The number and nature of other political parties in the system, their vote shares, and their ideological positions have been among the most critical determinants of how a political party organization operates in the party system.' This contribution examines how each of these factors have iniluenced ANAP as a political organization in the Turkish party system, and determined its chances of survival, or in short, the party organization's ordeal of institutionalization. PARTIES AND THE GENETIC PHASE
It was Robert Michels who first emphasized that every party is destined to go through a genetic phase." In turn, Panebianco has argued that "in the genetic phase the organization is entirely dedicated to the rcalization of its 'causc',"'" and the party is eventually oriented "to a later phase in which (a) the growth of the party's size; (b) its bureaucratization; (c) the apathy of its supporters after their initial participatory enthusiasm; and (d) the leaders' interest in preserving their own power, transform the party into an organization in which the real cnd is organizational survival."" Hence, the ultimate goal of a political party organization becomes survival in a precarious environment of opponents and competitors. It is small wonder that Michels defines a political party as a fighting organization, or an army, constantly ready for battlc. 12
Po/;tical Parties in Turkey
The Motherland Party
It is not only Michels, however, who has emphasized the importance of the role that the genetic phase ofpolitical parties plays in their survival and their long-term performancc in the precarious environment of the party system. Maurice Duverger has argued about the direct and indirect origins of the political parties and the intra- and extra-parliamentary origins of the parties are also important as they leave indelible birthmarks that influence their performance or even survival in a competitive party system. 13 Direct parties are autonomous for they do not depend upon any other organization or social category that established them, whereas the indirect parties, such as the Labour Party in Britain, are fully dependent on the mother organizations that sponsor them. The latter tend to become weak institutions in the long run. Duverger has further argued that intraparliamentary parties are moderate organizations, whereas the extra-parliamentary ones are radical organizations, for the latter usually fight their way into the system. lo1 The composition of the dominant coalition, and the status of the leader within the party organization, playa critical role in the genetic make-up of a political party organization. It makes a big difference whether a political party is established by a group of political elite, among whom there are some who control structures of opportunity in the party, or by an outside sponsor, such as a businessmen's association or a trade union, or simply by a charismatic \eader. In the last case, the former two possibilities will be totally absent. Charisma may come in various forms. It may be of a messianic quality possessed by the leader in the eyes of the members of the dominant coalition, as well as the rank-and-file members of the party organization. £t may be charisma emerging out of a non-messianic personality, yet under the influcnce of the situation it may still be perceived as charisma; this is what Robert Tucker has called "situational charisma."I; According to Tucker, "a leader-personality of a non-messianic tendency evokes a charismatic response simply because he offers, in a time of acute distress, leadership that is perceived as a source and means of salvation from distress."I" Panebianco argues that pure charisma has no autonomous existence apart from the \eader, and the organization is at the mercy of the \eader. Most such parties fail to survive beyond the lifetime of their leaders. However, a party established through situational charisma is not simply a leader's creation, but it is also the product of other forces. Other actors and conditions also maintain some inlluence over the organization, and it is not only dependent upon the charisma of the leader; hence, a change of leadership does not
necessarily lead to a severe existential crisis for the party, and it enjoys the chance of either routinizing the charisma of the leader, or changing its identity into some other form of party organization. Hence, such an organization has some chance of institutionalization after all. 17
44
45
THE GENETIC CODE Or: ANAl'
ANAP is the brainchild of Turgut Ozal. In fact, Ozal established the party almost single-handedly, after experiencing difficulties in finding the necessary number of founding members. IX In the beginning the party was tolerated by the military government/) but had no sponsors. Technically it was established externally, that is, outside of the parliament, but also prior to the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy in 1983, However, it experienced no hindrance or frustration in getting represented in the TBMM immediately after it was established. Therefore, there was little reason for it to become a radical movement. Nevertheless, Ozal had espoused some radical ideas at thc time of the initiation of ANAP, which will be examined shortly. Ozal as the founding leader symbolized the political party during his leadership, and his shadow remained cast over the party in the years that followed. It was Ozal who often argued that ANAP was established to represent a new beginning in Turkish politics. In this sense, ANAP had no antecedents, and definitely 110 roots that extended il1to the past struggles of Turkish politics. 20 Ozal definitely believed that he had established a political party substantially difTerent from any other party organization ever founded before.'1 Some critics mildly disagree and argue that ANAP was "both a continuation of the Democratic Party tradition of the 1950s and also a renewal of the conservative liberal legacy, attempting to synthesize market modernism and Muslim identity."" However, Ozal was keen on stressing that ANAP represented the interests of the Orla Direk (the "main pillar" of society, broadly speaking the middle classes of society) as a social category, and hosted four different and seemingiy irreconcilable ideological strands of conservatism (traditional Sunni) Islam, nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy within its ranks. Gale interpreted all that as a combination of "engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism [and it] can be termed 'Islamic social engineering. "'23 It was Ozal's vision that was reflected 111 (he party program, oricntation, ideology and, once in government, on government policy. His vision was welcomed as a fresh start by (hc business
46
Political Parties in Turkey
community, and was cven labeled revolutionmy by big business and some academics alike.2-I During the formative years, fi'om 1983 to 1987, ANAP's image was influenced by Ozal's soft-spoken, cool arguments of an "engineer politician who calculates and then carries out projects,"25 which promoted liberal economic rationality for rapid change through export-led growth in a globalizing world. He stood for opening up the Turkish markets to the challenges of free trade and foreign competition. He seemed to argue for a traditional society, a social structure that will still be dependent upon moral-religious (Sunni) values of the past, while simultaneously proposing dramatic changes to the economy and prosperity of the country. The majority would still be Allah-fcaring, mosque-attending souls, taking pride in the competitive strength of their companies in the international market, and care for the downtrodden through charitable contributions to the newly established autonomous funds of the state. Ozal wanted a modern society held together by conservative values. These idcas were further corroborated by the policy behavior of the ANAP governments under Ozal as prime minister. Most critical in this regard was the idea of reforming the public bureaucracy, diminishing the extensive entanglements of the state in the economy, and making the state apparatus smaller but more eiTiciene6 Ozal argued that this would necessitate privatization of the state enterprises and decentralization of the state services.27 Ozal developed those ideas throughout his career as a high-ranking bureaucrat in the I 960s and 1970s, and as politician in the early 1980s and beyond. His personal charm attracted many from different walks of life to join his party. In fact, the velY founders of the paTty were relative unknowns in Turkish politics. Kaya Erdem, who had served as Minister of Finance in the former military government, and Mehmet Kec;eciler, who had been the Mayor of Konya from the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet PartisiMSP) in the 1970s, were the only two founding members known to the public. The rest were young, mostly right-of-center politicians, who had started their political careers in the former Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) of the I 970s. 2H In the full sense of the term, ANAP was a brand-new party with a dominant coalition in which Ozal, the leader, appeared to be the only political celebrity, projecting a new program and his credentials as an economic miracle worker. This form of a birthmark is a clear indication of a (--party built by one man according to his own image. Therefore, one refers to ! ANAP as a party that possessed the quality of being a "charismatic leader 't party" at its inception.
\
The Motherland Party
47
Initially ANAP functioned more as a charismatic leader party based on situational charisma. As noted, Ozal made sure that the party displayed four different strands of ideas at the same time. He tried to strike a balance between the members of the dominant coalition who represented liberal, _"religious conservative, nationalist, or social democratic ideas and interests. Therefore, the party central administrative organs looked as if they were I constructed out of multiple fractions, each controlling its turf in the party. I It deceptively appeared as if there was not only the party leader, but also I others who mattered in the party. I Appearance and reality did not match, and those who mistook one for \ the other paid a high p~·ice. I~Iasan ~elal. Glizel challenged ~he leadership and, as a result, found hnnseif embroIled 111 a sex scandal, whIch constItutes the most certain cause of resignation from public office and cven sudden I political death for a member of the Turkish p~litical class. No onc scemcd to have any countervailing power vis-ci-vis Ozal, or commanded enough autonomous resources, to challenge or contest the power of the leader.
I
I
FRACTIONS. FACTIONS, AND THE DOMINANT COALITION
The ANAP leadership tried to use the image of Ozal as a visionary to \ reinforce the party's claim to the charismatic qualities of its founding, leader, with increasing difficulty. As a charismatic leader party, ANAP was established at the national level and extended its local organizations throughout the country in less than six months (1983). Such a form of organization tends to emphasize the central organs over the local ones, and empowers the leadership over the local party organizations. Under such circumstances it has been argued that "The founding elites can control the form that organization takes from the start."29 Such party organizations enjoy enhanced chances of evincing the coherent structures that contribute to organizational stability. The dominant coalition of ANAP has tried to show strands that extended from moderate left to moderate right of the ideological spectrum in Turkey. Its main goal has always been to dominate the ccnter of the Turkish left-right spectrum, as broadly as possible. Such an identity was relatively easy to project because at the time the only other parties were the Populist Party (Halkl Parti-HP) and the Nationalist Democracy Party (Miliyet r;i Demokrasi Partisi-MOP), both of which had been established by the military government, and stood as stooges for the military. The results of the 1983 elections showed a party on the left (HP) and another on the right (MOP), and in between the winner of the competition
The Motherland Party
Political Parties in Turkey
48
TABLE I ANAl' AT TilE POLLS AND IN TilE TIlMM
Parties
(I<)X3~9'l)
1983
1987
Elections 1991
1995
1999
Vote (%,)
45. I
36.3
24.0
19.6
13.2
Scats (%,)
52.8
64.9
25.7
24.0
15.6
DYP Vote (%J)
0.0
19.9
27.2
19.2
12.0
Scats (%,)
0.0
13. I
39.7
24.5
15.5
DSP Vote C%)
0.0
8.5
10.8
14.6
22.2
Scats (%,)
0.0
o.n
0.2
14.6
24.7
liP/SliP/CHI' Votc C:;',)
30.5
24.4
20.6
10.7
8.7
Scats (%)
29.5
22.0
19.7
8.9
o.n
RP/FP Votc(%)
0.0
7.2
16.7*
21.4
15.4
Scats (%)
0.0
0.0
13.1
28.7
20.2
M<;:P/MIIP Vote(%)
0.0
2.9
O,()"
R.2
18.0
Scats (%)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
23.5
Source: Ersin KalayclOgIu, "The Shaping of Party Prefcrences in Turkey." Nell' Per,lpectil'es Oil 7ilrkey, Vo1.20 (Spring 19(9), p.4R; and Ustiin Ergiider. "Thc Motherland Party I 9R3-·- I 989," 11\ Mctin IIcper and Jacob Landau (cds.), Political Parties alld Delllo('rIICT ill 7ilrkey (London and New York: 1.13. Tauris, 199 I), p.159 Notes:
four strands" in the party ideology, it became increasingly difficult to substantiate that claim, as desertions from the party elite as well as the rank and file started to occur after 1991 By 1987 ANAP's electoral performance gave clear indications of a downward trend. The political ban imposed upon the political leaders of the pre-1980 era was lifted by means of a referendum. The national elections took place in that same year, and ANAP lost a sizable part of its mandate. However, it clung on to power thanks to the electoral law, which was amended before the 1987 election by the ANAP majority in the TBMM to favor the front-runner. ANAP received 36 percent ofthc vote, a fall from 45 percent in 1983, but thanks to the new electoral arrangements it managed to obtain a higher percentage of the seats in the TBMM (see Table I). The 1989 local elections further reinforced the downward trend of ANAP at the polls. The newly emerging political parties of the left and the right successfully challenged ANAP. It could no longer claim to be the power occupying the center that extended from the moderate left to the moderate right. An identity crisis started to deepen in the party as the rhetoric of the "four strands" and the reality of the diminishing national support became increasingly apparent. Announcing that he would never serve in the opposition, Ozal declared his candidacy for the presidency of the countly in 1989 in an unprecedented move. The leadership succession process always contains the seeds of a crisis, and it is always more critical for a charismatic leader party. What complicated matters was that the charismatic leader himself was still around and continued to wield enormous political power despite the fact that he had resigned from the leadership as required by the Constitution. In fact, he personally picked his immediate suceessor, Yilchnm Akbulut, then speaker of the TBMM. Akbulut assumed the duties of ANAP leadership and prime ministry simultaneously. No one seriously challenged his role in the party, although he failed to appear powerful enough to control the dominant coalition in the party. Akbulut looked more like a caretaker fulfilling the necessary role in a transition. The party simmered for another two years, during which time Mesut Y I1maz and other hopefuls vied tor power. In the end, in .June 1991, Yllmaz challenged Akbulut in the party convention, while Ozal seemed to playa neutral role, as the president of the country legally should. He did not openly give his blessing to either of the candidates, although there were many rumors as to whom he "really" supported-Akbulut. The party convention voted for Yilmaz in 1991, and he has been the leader ofANAP >
ANAl'
"Vote" refers to the percentage of the national vote obtained by thc parties in the corresponding ycar's gencral election in Turkey. "Scats" relcr to the perccntage of scats the parties obtained in the TBMM immediately after the elections. '" RP and Mel' participated in the elections as an alliance, and had a single, joint list of candidates who ran on the RP ticket in every electoral district.
(ANAP). It fitted well with the identity of ANAP representing the center, the moderate-left, and the moderate-right voters of Turkey. The rhetoric of the "four strands" and the eleetoral outcome seemed to fully coincide. However, by 1987 it had become increasingly difIicult to successfully project such an identity. Although the rhetoric continued to emphasize "the
49
50
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Italy
Netherlands
Germany
Turkey
The Motherland Party
TABLE 2 POLARIZATION OF TilE TURKISII PARTY SYSTEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Re/all Partisi-RP)-Nationalist Work Party (Mi/~vetri (:ahfill1a Part/siMCP) chaIlenge was gaining momentum, as ANAP continued to slide at the polls in the early I 990s. Most of the religious conservative celebrities in ANAP started to desert the party, as did close friends and relatives of Ozal, 1110st of whom had belonged to the same fraction. In the meantime, by the mid-I 990s Turkey was experiencing voter realignment as the center of the left-right spectrum started to give way and the voters shifted their preferences mainly toward the extreme right, thus increasingly polarizing the system}O (see Table 2). Blilent Eeevit's Democratic Left Party (Dell/okratik Sol Partisi-DSP) also managed to increase its vote share in the national elections during the 1990s. ANAP seemed to move towards a more right-wing position to follow the voters' trend and further distance itself /i'om the moderate-left ideas. It is no wonder that students of Turkish politics continued to refer to it as a right-of-center or a moderate right party;" and the electorate seemed to concur with their perceptions.}2 It seemed as if those committed to free market capitalism and nationalism generally stayed in the party ranks of ANAP in the late 1990s. However, those ideological positions were challenged, and even successfully hijacked by Siileyman Demirel's new party, the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP). Especially under its new leader Tansu Ciller (who ascended to the party leadership when Demirel was elected as president of the country in spring 1993), the DYP tried to champion the cause of free market capitalism. Simultaneously, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyet(,-'i Hareket Partisi-MHP) and the DSP exploited nationalism in the late 1990s much more effectively than ANAP could. The original pluralist outlook of the dominant coalition ofANAP began to lose its flair after the 1991 elections. It became much less plural in outlook as the liberals and nationalists were the only major fractions left in the party. The dominant coalition of Ozal's time had been constructed upon his own image of the party, therefore it was only natural that YIlmaz's dominant coalition would also be constructed on his own image of the party. Unlike Ozal, Y Ilmaz was not equidistant to all the fractions in the party. His image, a blend of liberalism and nationalism, led to the downfall or alienation of the notables of the other fractions, which failed to see the charisma of Ozal reincarnated in Y Ilmaz. The original pluralist dominant coalition fell apart in the 1990s, as the party dwindled in size both electorally and in the TBMM (see Table I). The dominant coalition of ANAP seems to have moved from a multifractional structure to a bi-fractional one. However, in practice there was
---_._-_.------ -_.-
Austria
Spain
Political Parties in Turkey
Year
Polarization
1979 1983 1986 1981 1985 1987 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1979 1983 1987 1981 1982 1986 1989 1979 1982 1986 1989 1980 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
2.19 2.20 2.39 4.27 3.94 4.18 4.41 4.54 4.29 4.16 4.44 4.31 4.73 4.29 4.50 5.21 4.09 4.39 3.69 5.04 5.15 5.23 3.14 3.36 3.33 1.22 (2.55) 2.97 (3.86) 3.13 (4.27)
Source: KalayclOglu (1999), pp.47-76; Reuvcn Y. Hazan, Celltre Parties: Polarizatioll alld Competitioll ill Europeall Pariiamcllltll:\' Democracies (London and New York: Continulllll, 1997), p.43. The figures in parentheses are polarization figures based upon the distribution of the national votes. All other polarization measures are based upon parliamentary seat distributions of the parties.
ever since. In the meantime, much before the non-renewable term of presidency was up, Ozal suddenly died of a heart attack in spring 1993. Hence, another showdown between the charismatic leader/founder of ANAP, and his successor Yllmaz was avoided by divine intervention. The party survived the leadership transition from its charismatic founder to his suecessor-Y Ilmaz. Nevertheless, the transition was only partiaIly successful. The original identity of the party started to fade and no new one could be easily established. The "four strands" started to come apart at the seams. The traditional conservatives in the party started to think that the Welfare Party
51
52
Political Parties in Turkey
no evidence of any member of the dominant coalition controlling resources autonomously enough to be reckoned with by the leader of the party. Neither Ozal, nor Ylimaz had to deal with any fraction in the party that wielded any power independent of the leadership and that also controlled a constellation of "safe seats" or any other form of indispensable political resource. The "four strands" argument was an identity-defining myth, rather than the practiced reality in the party. Under those circumstances, the party has been ruled with a style of "democratic centralist leadership"-a deliberative practice in decisionmaking, the aim of which is to reach the ear of the leader. There is frank debate in the dominant coalition over the political issues and choices facing the party, but the deliberation continues until the leader makes up his mind. Once the leader adopts a position, it becomes the party position. Once that position is announced it is converied into party policy, which is to be loyally carried by all, including the members of the dominant coalition. It was small wonder that a recent study by Ali Carkoglu, Tarhan Erdem, and Mehmet Kabasakal discovered that 44 percent of the local party elites of ANAP believed that their leader dominated the party organization.\) The same response rate was 37 percent in the DYP, 30 percent in the DSP, and 33 percent in the Republican Peoples' Party (Cum/1lIriyel Halk ParlisiCHP), and less in all the other parties. What is striking in these findings are not the results for ANAP, but for the DSP, the MHP, and the RP. Carkogiu el al. concluded that the iocal party elites of those parties did not even dare to admit the hegemonic role of the leader in the party.'" According to the same study, only four percent of the local party elites of ANAP believed the party's leader should be replaced; the same response rate was one percent for the DYP, four percent for the DSP, three percent for the CHP, one percent for the MHP, and three percent for the RP." Flllihermore, 31 percent of the local party elites in ANAP believed that their party failed to function as a democratic organization. The same rate was 27 percent in the DYP, 19 percent in the DSP, a mere nine percent in the MHP, and II percent in the RP'J(, Carkoglu el al. have argued that the meaning of "democracy" should vary dramatically across the political parties. 17 Another survey conducted on the party deputies in the TBMM yielded velY similar results." In short, both the local patiy elites and the deputies of ANAP were not disillusioned with the party leader, but they believed that he both domin~ted the organization and t!mt it was managed .democratica!ly at the . same time. Although those proposItIons soundrrreconcilable, I consIder them as another way of referring to the "democratic centralist leadership" of ANAP, which operates with the culture of a charismatic leader party.
!
The Mother/alld Party
53
Under those circumstances, the fractions played an important part in defining the identity of the party and clarifying its ideological position in the Turkish patiy system. However, in terms of power relations within the party, fractions, factions, and cliques have been dismally weak to challenge the leader. Unless, the leader opts to resign, as Ozal did in order to become president, or becomes incapacitated, slhe is free from challenge by the opposing groups within the party. [n fact, even when the party'/) performed very poorly in every election from 1991 to 1999, there was nq serious challenge to Ylimaz's status as leader. ANAP AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
Finally, [ would like to turn to the last defining characteristic of the party organization-its relations with its environment. I have noted above how easy it was for ANAP to project a powerfiJl image of "four strands" in the 1983 elections and how difficult it became to market such an image in the 1987 elections and beyond. Indeed, by 1987 ANAP had begun to look more and more like the urban version of the rural party of Demirel (DYP). The left-of-center was fully claimed by the SHP and the DSP, and the right-of-center was occupied by the DYP. Thus ANAP began to be squeezed out of its own turf. By 1991 it had become apparent that the voters were presented with virtually duplicate parties at the polls. Hence, the party system began to experience two different types of competition between the parties. Some parties occupied different ideological positions and hoped to attract the votes and allegiances of different kinds of voters. ANAP occupied a right-of-center position and vehemently defended free market capitalism. The Social Democratic People's Party (So.\yal Demokral Halkp Parli-SHP) and its successor after 1995-the Republican People's Party (CHP)-occupied a left-ofcenter position, and defended a mixed economy where the statc continued to playa major role. Thus, ANAP and the SHP-CHP were Ideological opponents. However, the CHP competed with the DSP for the votes of the secular-minded and the lower classes, and ANAP competed with the DYP for the votes of the conservative masses. Most voters failed to see how and why, for example, ANAP and the DYP opposed each other; after all they both shared the same liberal economic and social conservative ideological mix. For many there seemed to be no ideological difference, only the gender of their leaders and their characters seemed to have differed. ANAP and the DYP competed to control the same electoral turf: and thus they were no longer just opponents, but also competilors.
54
TABLE 3 GOVERNMENT POTENTIAL OF ANAl' VERSUS TilE COMPETITOR AND THE OPPONENTS
It is clear from survey research findings that the SHP/CHP-DSP, ANAP-
DYP, the MCP/MHP-RPlVirtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP), and, in southeastern Turkey, the People's Democracy Party (Hall(fll Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP)-RP/FP act as competitor parties.]<) The environment of ANAP became increasingly complicated as the party system started to host both opponent and competitor parties, which turned competition into a twodimensional game. As if such a complication were not enough, the voters started to vacate the center of the len-right spectrum and move toward the far right and also slightly to the len, increasingly polarizing the system:'" ANAP continued to champion the values that were targeted to attract the voters occupying the center of the ideological spectrum, yet was unable to deliver its promises. In the meantime, it seemed to have neglected its opponents to the far sides of the ideological spectrum, the electoral performance of the party took a nosedive in the 1990s (see Table I). I I' the voters had stayed in the center, perhaps ANAP would have obtained more of the national vote. In a sense, the carpet had moved from under the feet of ANAP. Loss of votes brought about a process of reckoning, which eventually brought about a leadership inquiry into the very identity of the party. The party went through many soul-searching activities, which nevertheless failed to clarify its new identity. In the meantime, it failed to cope with its competitor, opponents, and the changing tide of voting behavior, which combined to bring about an existential challenge to ANAP. Under those circumstances, in the 1990s, ANAP only succeeded at holding its competitor at bay in the national elections and dropped in the polls. Indeed, a similar picture emerges when we turn our gaze to the party system in the Turkish parliament. ANAP was able to hold off the challenge of its competitor and control enough seats to bid for coalition partnership from 1991 to 1999. ANAP was in government from June 1991 until November 1991, and briefly in coalition with the DYP for three months in 1996, and with the DSP from June 1998 to November 1999 (while supported by the CHP from outside), and with the DSP and the MHP alter May 1999. ANAP managed to participate in governments of the 1990s, and, during this period, served significantly longer than the DYP (see Table 3). However, in the same period the DSP, an opponent but also another charismatic leader party, experienced a stellar rise to power (see Table I) as did the RP and MHP in the latter half of the 1990s. If those performances mean anything, ANAP's electoral performances vis-d-vis its opponents were dismal. ANAP now gives the impression of a small political party squeezed in a turf battle with another small party (DYP).
55
The Motherland Party
Political Parties ill Turkey
Party of the Prime Minister
Number of Days in Offiee
Percent ofTimc (4) (3)
( I)
(2)
ANAl'
3515
1404
56.5
35.0
DYp
1185
1185
19.0
29.5
oSP
707
7()7
11.4
17.6
RP
367
367
5.9
9.1
ANAl'
4088
1977
65.7
49.2
oyp
1552
1552
24.9
38.7
oSP
1259
1259
20.2
31.4
CHI'
1034
1034
16.6
25.7
MHp
573
573
9.2
14.3
Rp
367
367
5.9
9.1
Party in Coalition or Party Government
SOl/reI': Calculations are made by the author Hum the data presented at <www.tbmm.gov.tr>.
No/eoi':
(I) represcnts the number of days party spen( in government during December 13, 1983 through Decembcr 31. 2000. (2) represents the numbcr of days party spent in government during January I. 1990 through Deccmber 31. 2000. , ". (3) represents the percentage of (lIlle party spent 111 government 111 pCrlod ( 1 J. (4) rcpresents the pcrcentage or time party spent 111 government 111 period (2).
Unfortunately for ANAP, that turf diminished in size as the 1990s progressed. However, ANAP's parliamentary performance and government potential have been a completely different story. Neither its, competitor, nor its opponents could come close to the remarkable performance of ANAP in participating in coalition governments or forming p~rty governments (see Table 3). ANAP's leaders have occupied the pnme ministry 56.5 percent of the time between December 1983 and December 2000. During that period ANAP's competitor, the DYP, occupIed that office only about one-third as much. What ANAP lost in the electoral competition it compensated in government formation. However, there IS a strict constraint to this strategy-the ten percent natIOnal threshold 111 the
56
Political Parties in Turkey
elections. Any party that fails to obtain ten percent of the national vote is automatically eliminated from the TBMM and is therefore excluded from government formation. ANAP and its competitor dangerously approached that threshold in the 1999 national elections. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OR BUST?
ANAP has managed to replace its founding charismatic leader Ozal for a successor without creating a breakdown of the organization. For a charismatic leader party this should be considered as a remarkable success of adaptability. However, in the process of leadership succession the party stumbled into an identity crisis from which it has never managed to recover. Indeed, a recent survey of the local party elite argued that the inability to inform them what the party program was about was the major ;,impediment to success at the polls:" Hence, ANAP paid a very stiff price 4/01' the lack of clarity of its identity in the elections of the 1990s. In recent years, ANAP has become a small party of Europhiles, believers of free market capitalism, and nationalism. However, at the elections all of those characteristics are sharcd or exploitcd by the competitor or the opponents, with no less effectiveness than ANAP. Hence, ANAP fails to provide a characteristic to differentiate itself from its competitor or opponents. When Demirelled the DYP, the youth ofYIImaz as the leader of ANAP and the party's urbane look (as opposed to the DYP's peasant roots) seemed to be a clear distinction between the two parties. However, with Giller's ascendance to the leadership of the DYP, neither age difference nor urban credentials could function as the differentiating factor. The gender of their leaders emerged as the only remarkable difference between the two parties. If that factor had any impact, it probably contributed to sway more votes for a while away from ANAP to the female Prime Minister Giller's party, the DYP. In short, ANAP could neither hang on to its previous identity, nor could it successfully demonstrate a new one, which would substantially differentiate it from its competitor and even some of its opponents in the electoral race. In the meantime, ANAP has been charged with a long list of corruption activities by its competitor and opponents, from which it has never been able to successfully extricate itself. Actually, except for a few members such as ismail Ozdaglar of the first cabinet ofOzal, no member of a parliamentary party group has been found guilty of corruption by the judiciary. Only some of the local party notables, especially the mayors,
The Motherland Party
57
have been charged with corruption, and the courts found only some of them guilty. Neveliheless, in the eyes of the public ANAP never managed to successfully remove doubts about its operations in government. Fortunately for ANAP, its competitor has not bcen in any better shape; yet that did not help ANAP to obtain more votes. Short of re-inspiring the masses by projecting a new identity, its chances of survival do not look very promising. If the voters realign themselves once more and shift away from the poles to the center of the left-right spectrum, ANAP's chances may improve, providing it polishes its corrupt image. A coherent and stable organization, which verges on stagnation, has been established in ANAP. It is possible to argue that ANAP managed to survive the most stringent test of adaptability and went through two leadership succession processes. However, it failed to adapt to the changing environment of the party system and electoral behavior. Unless some dramatic changes occur in its relations with its environment, its future remains unceliain. Hence, we cannot conclude that ANAP ha~ i passed all tests of adaptability as an organization. It has established '\,i, stable and coherent national organization that works no worse than most. \ other parties. The question is whether that performance is enough to \ alleviate the doubts about its survival. Its electoral performance must improve before we can plausibly conclude that stability and coherence of the national and local organizations of the pmiy alone would insure its institutionalization.'" ANAP has managed to survive longer than its detractors predicted. It should also be considered as a relatively adaptable organization, which demonstrated some capability for survival and thus institutionalization. \ However, with the danger of losing some more votes and/or not winning enough to earn representation in the TBMM still looming large, it is llnceliain whether ANAP's dominant coalition or the organization can manage to exist outside of the TBMM for a four-year period. If the organization survives such a crisis of adaptability, then it will be easier to argue that ANAP has taken solid strides in the direction of being institutionalized. Othelwise, it will provide anothcr example of a political ( organization that fails to institutionalize in the Turkish party system.
58
Political Parties ill Turkey CONCLUSION
ANAP provides an interesting and exceptional example of a new political party organization that made a signifieant impact on the Turkish political system for almost two decades. It showed a remarkable ability to participate in governments, although its mandate shrank dramatically over the course of five consecutive national elections. ANAP also managed to change its founding charismatic leader and endured a second leadership succession process between 1989 and 1991. All of that should have made the party adaptable to rapidly changing conditions, but it is hard to argue that point. ANAP was able to establish a coherent and disciplined political party organization. A compact dominant coalition strictly controlled by its leader also led the party in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the dominant coalition and the leader seemed not to be challenged by any fraction, clique or group in the party. Hence, there was no history of fissure or internal strife among the ranks of the party organization, as it had been the case with other parties, such as the SHP. ANAP has also managed to organize in all the provinces in Turkey and keep those organizations active most of the time, especially when they were critically needed. A recent survey indicates that ANAP was among those political parties most inclined to hold its local party congresses on time:1J In convention and election times, the party has showed no less ability than its competitor. The diminishing success at the polls should not be taken as an indication that the central or local party organizations failed to perform as much as its competitor DYP, or the other charismatic leader party, the DSP, which seems not to have any more robust organization than ANAP, ANAP's vote loss is more to do with the failure of its dominant , coalition to solve the identity problem or routinize the charisma of its founder. ANAP's failure to provide a clean image devoid of corruption and give the impression that it is able to fulfill its campaign promises while in government, also did not assist its performance in the elections. ANAP failed to successfully routinize the charisma ofOzal, or develop a new identity to successfully ignite the imagination and support of the voters. Instead it found itself surrounded by competing and opposing parties, and a volatile, fragmented, and polarized electorate. Under those circumstances, it failed to copc with the challenges of its environment, and failed to adapt to the changes in the party system and in the electoral behavior of the country. It demonstrated capabilities of adaptability in certain realms of the organization, yet failed to show any capability to adapt to the changing tide of its environment. I-fence, as yet it has failed to solve its problem of survival.
The Motherland Party
59
ANAP has managed to establish a stable and coherent centralized, national, and local organization, which has failed to help it win elections, when and where it mattered. Such stability and coherence t~liled to contribute to its institutionalization, and led to lack of flexibility in dealing with changing environmental conditions of the party. Just like other I I political parties in Turkey, ANAP also failed to circulate clites in its '/ dominant coalition. A leader who had not won a single election was neither challenged, nor faced with a serious threat of replacement. As a charismatic leader party, ANAP seems to have institutionalized a personalistic leadership style, which enables one individual to govern both \~h~ d~min~,nt coalition and the organization. A ."democratically centralized ~eddel shIp has become the modus operandI of the orgal1lZatlon. In a bharismatic leader party it is only natural to observe the leader playing an exaggerated role, far beyond the dominant coalition or the rank and file of ,the organization. The problem with ANAP is that the founding charismatic ( leader experienced a downfall when he failed to make his chan sma deliver \ miracles, and suffered from a loss of credibility by 1989. The leaders who succeeded him had no direct claims to charisma. ANAP seems to have lost its ide~ltity beca~lse its id~ntity was so closel~ linked, to the charisma of itSJ founchng leadel, who failed to prove that 1m chansma actually worked even when he was alive and leading the party. Under those circumstances the party is faced with an obvious identity crisis. The various exercises of identity search carried out by the party produced a mass of literature, but little in the way of answcrs to questions. Short of a new call that docs not fall on the deaf ears of the voters, and constructing an image that is "whitcr than white," the party might receive even fewer votes in the next general election. It may even be sidelined for a while (like the CI-IP) if it fails to obtain ten percent of the national vote. Can it avoid such an electoral performance? Can it survive such a blow? Can it make a comeback? If so, how? The answers to these questions will determine whether or not ANAP will manage to survive and become a stable and valued political organization in the Turkish party systcm, and thus become a long-lasting political institution. NOTES I,
The 1983 general elections were part of' the transItIon process fhllll military ~overnment to l~llIltl-partydemocracy, The military govcrnment of' the time not only banncd S(~l1C politiCians irom partIcIpation 111 party politICS, but also disapproved or all political partics (except for the Motherland. POPUlIst, and NatIOnal Democratic partiesi fielding candidates in thc 1983 elections, :rhe military government screened the candidates and vetoed those who they thought wcre not itt to run 111 the electIons. Consequently, the 1983 electIons wcre nClthcr il'cc nor filiI'.
60
Political Parties in Turkey
2. Maurice Duvergcr, PoliliCIJI Parties: Theil' OJ;!~{/Ilizalioll alld Activity ill Ihe Modem Siale (London: Methuen, 1(54), pp.xxiv"xxv; Angelo Panebianco, Political Parlit's: Oigalllzalioll alld Powt'r (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1(88), p.50. 3. Giovanni Sartori, Parlies alld Parly 5)'slt'lIIs: A Fralllework .fiJI' Alla~vsis. Volllllle f (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1(76), p.75. 4. Panebianco (l9X8), p.37 5. Sartori (1976), pp.104-6. 6. Panebianco (1988). pp.39·AO. 7 Ibid .. pp.114 and 205-12. 8. Ibid., pp.214-15. 9. Robert Michels, PolillC{iI Parlies: A Sociological Slll{~l' o/Ilw Oligarchical Telldellcit's of" Modem Delllocracy (New York: Dover Publications, 1(59), pp.365-·92. 10. Panclmmco ( 1(88), p.17. II. Ibid., p.17. 12. Michels (1959), pp.4I-4. 13. Duverger (1954), pp.xxiv-xxxvii and 3-38. 14. Ibid., pp.xxxii···xxxvii. 15. Cited in Panebianco ( 1(88). p.52. 16. Panebianco (1988), p.52. 17. Ibid .• p.S3. Iil. Turgut Ozal, "Welcoming Speech by Turgut Ozal." in KlIrlllll~' Yildiilliillliillde Tl'irk S~)I{lsi Havalllltia Sivasi Kiilllir ve Ekollolllik Politika Bakllllllldoll Allavalall Parlisi (May 20-21) (A;lkara: AN'AP Propaganda ve Sosyal Faaliyetler I3a~kanltgl, 1(89), p.IO. As previously explained, the general elections of 1983 were transitional elections, where the military government screened each founding member of the newly established party. Ozal also found himself faced with the same thorough screening process. In order to be accepted as a legal party organization and participate in the 1983 general elections, he needed many founding members and had to establish party organizations in 37 out of67 provinces of the country in 1983. However, ANAl' was not popularly perceived as one of the "/llvored" party organizations at the tUlle. Furthermore, he tried not to alienate the "banned" leaders of the moderate right and create an Image of a leader poaching on followers in a manner which can only perceived as unl11ir. Therefore, there was some tUllidity on the part of many people to join ANAl'. 19. Ozal's own account, Ozal (1989), p.IO. 20. Ustlin Ergiidcr, "The Motherland Party, 1983-1989," in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (cds.), Polilical Parlies alit! DelllO{'/'{/(Y 111 Turkey (London: I.I3. Tauris, 19(1), p.153. 21. Ozal (1989), p.6. 22. Niliifer Giile. "Authoritarian SecularIsm and Islamist Politics: Thc Case of Turkey," 111 Augustus Richard Norton (cd.), Civil Socil'l)' ill Ihe iVliddle Easl (New York: E..l. Brill, 1(96), Vo1.2, p.30. 23. Ibid .. p.31. 24. Ergiider (1991), p.156. 25. Giile (1996), p.31. 26. Metll1 Heper. "Country Report: Motherland Party Governments and Bureaucracy in Turkey. 1983-1988," Govt'mallce. Vol.2, No.4 (Oct. 1(89), pp.463-6. 27 Ibid .• pp.463-8. 28. Ergiider (1991), pp.ISS-6. 29. Alan Ware, Polilical Parlies alld Parly 5:1'.1'11'111.1' (Oxford: Oxli:ml University Press, 19(6). p.99. 30. Ersll1 KalayclOglu, "The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey," Nell' f'erspecllves 011 Tllrkey, Vol.20 (Spring 19(9), pp.57-8 and 74-S. 31. Ergiider (1991), pp.IS5-6. 32. KalayclOglu (1999), pp.57-9. 33. Ali <,~arkoglu. Tarhan Erdem. and Mehmet Kabasakal, "Tiirkiye'ttc Yeni Bir Parti Sistcmine Dogru: Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, Parti ()rgiitleri ve Parti IGi Dcmokrasiden I3eklentiler," in Ali (arkoglu (cd.), S~vasi Parlilerde Re!iJrlll (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 20(0), p.SS.
The Motherland Party 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.
43.
61
(arkoglu ('/ Ill. (2000). pp.87·9. lind., p.91. Ibid., 1'.80. Ibid., pp.79-80. Omer Faruk GenGkaya, "Siyasi Partilcrc ve Adaylara Devlet Destegi, 13agl~lar vc SeGim Giderlcrinin SumlandIrllmasl," in (arkoglu (2000), pp.246-66. KalayclOglu (1999), pp.58 and 60. Ibid .. pp.58-9 and Table 2. (arkoglu 1'1 al. (20()O), p.91. For the definition and analysis of institutionalization proposed by Samuel Iluntington, SCI' Samuel Huntington, Polilical Order o{ClulI1gillg Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 1(68), pp.12-90. GenGkaya (2000). p.247.
The Virtlle Party
------------------------ 5 ------------------------
The Virtue Party BiROL A. YE$ILADA
Political parties provide a crucial link between the electorate and the elites as well as between citizens and government in functioning democracies. I For over a century, political parties have played this role in the evolution of the Turkish political system under the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. During this time, Islamist political parties and interest groups (such as tarikat-religious orders) played important role in this process. Political parties in Turkey have served crucial functions identified by Samuel Eldersveld, Robert Michels, and Elmer Schattschneider. Party adaptation has occurred at different times through dynamic and abrupt processes. Since the beginning of multi-party politics in 1946, the Turkish political system has experienced a turbulent history, ridden with ideological polarization and factionalization of political parties and interest groups, periods of social and political unrest, and four militmy interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. The first and third of these interventions were the most serious as the officers completely changed the constitutional order of the country in an attempt to end socio-economic and political crises. By contrast, the 1971 intervention only resulted in some revisions of the Constitution. The final intervention, known in Turkish media and scholarly circles as a "son coup," involved pressure from the military to force the resignation of the Prime Minister. Thus, it is fair to say that with each intervention, the armed forces attempted to reestablish a reformed political order where liberal representative democracy could flourish. However, their efforts have been debated as each successive post-coup period brought new challenges and problems to the Turkish political system. The permanent closure of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) by the Constitutional Court on June 22, 200 I, is the most recent episode in Turkey's religious parties' ongoing struggle to find themselves a place in Turkish politics. The former State ProsecutOl~ Vural Sava~, fiied a case with the court on May II, 1999, asking that the FP be closed on the grounds that it had become a center of anti-secular activists and that it was a mere continuation of the previously closed Welfare Party
63
(Refah Partisi-RP). In its ruling, the court sided with the prosecutor on the first point, but did not rule that FP was a continuation of the RP. If we consider that the Turkish secular institutions, led by the military, repeatedly closed Islamist political parties during Turkey's republican history and that each closure has been followed by the formation of a new Islamist political party staffed almost exclusively by the same political elite, it becomes quite apparent that this political force is not going to disappear from the Turkish political scene any time soon. This in itself is a remarkable success and highlights the determination of the Islamist political elite to playa significant role in the countty's political life. What , could explain this success of the Islamist political parties in Turkey? To what extent have religiously-oriented parties become system-oriented and thus contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey? A look at the ieadership, organizational strategies, and tactics of the Islamist parties can help in this regard. LEADERSHIP, STRATEGIES, AND TACTICS
; The continuous rise ofIslamist political parties in Turkey is truly a success , stOlY in party organization at national level. Against the backdrop of the secular state, the religious political clite has maintained a meticulous grass-roots organization under the guidance of religious clergy and entered the political arena during multi-party politics in Turkey.2 Since then, the parties' success in reorganizing under a new name after each closure owes much to Necmettin Erbakan and his supporters' sheer determination and strategic skill in building a network of nation-wide support. Despite being banned from politics for five years in 1998, Erbakan was involved in the reformulation of FP. The Islamic Democratic Party (islam Demo/a'at Partisi-IOP) was the first Islamist political party to enter into politics during the multi-party period in 1951. Established by Cevat Rifat Atilhan, known for his anti-Jewish views and publications, the party lasted for only six months. It is true that the center-right Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti-DP), under Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, attracted the support of the Islamist voters with policy decisions that reversed some of the Kemalists' bans on Islamic practices like the call for prayer in Turkish and the ban on Koran schools. However, it was the lOP that set the first campaign slogan for the Islamists to follow: "The sun of welfare and happiness will rise when [we] take the Koran into our hands. Believers unite and form your own regime."" It is important to note the symbolic reference to "re/clh" (welfare) in this slogan.
64
Political Parties in Turkey
In the ensuing years, those who played important roles in the establishment of other religious political parties made use of similar phrases of religious significance. During the 1960s, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) came to represent the "home" of the democratic Islamists in Turkey. Those who followed the NurCli (Disciples of Light) movement supported this party especially because the founder of the movement, Said-i Nursi, prophesized the bilih of a child named Si.iIeyman from islamk6y and his rise to a position of political leadership. Nurczl followers believed this person to be Si.i1eyman Demirel who succeeded Menderes as the leader of the center-right in Turkey. While Demirel at the head of the AP was attracting the support of the system-oriented Islamists, including political leaders and intellectuals, an influential religious figure was busy formulating the political agenda of a group of far-right Islamists affiliated with his congregation. This individual was Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotlen, a leading figure of the Nak~ibendi order (tarikat) and head of the related iskender Pa~a congregation (dergah). The significance of religious orders in Turkish politics will be discussed below. Here, it is important to note the role Kotku played in the formation of the next Islamist party in Turkey. At Kotku's encouragement, Necmettin Erbakan entered the political scene. His first confrontation with Demirel occurred when Erbakan was elected chairman of the Turkish Union of Chambers (Tiirkiye Odalar Birligi), under accusation of voting irregularities during his election. Demirel ordered Erbakan's removal from office and thus started a long and costly confrontation with the far-right lslamists in Turkey. In a response to Demirel's action, Erbakan supporters met and decided to back the latter's candidacy for the 1968 national elections from the Justice Party. Erbakan submitted his candidacy to the party's election committee only after he received the blessing of his mentor, Sheikh Kotku. Demirel promptly vetoed Erbakan's candidacy. The events that followed set the stage for direct pmiicipation offar-right Islamists in Turkish politics. It is important to examine this period and the individuals involved in the process in order to gain a better appreciation for RelahlFazilet (WelfarelVirtue) phenomenon in Turkish politics. Following Demirel's veto, Erbakan ran as an independent candidate from Konya and was elected to parliament. Soon aller, several influential Islamist figures met at the home of the AP Senator Ahmet Tevfik Paksu to discuss whether or not a new political party should be formed. Among those present at this gathering were key Islamist figures such as Hasan Aksay, Mustafa Yazgan, Arslan Top<;uba~l, Osman Yliksel Serdengeyti,
The Virtue Par(v
65
and ismaii I-lakl
JI
The Virtue Party FIGURE I AKINCI NETWORK OF THE MSP
AKINCI ORGANIZATIONS
~1 LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS
ILLEGAL ORGANIZATIONS
I, Aklllcliar DCl'llcgi (Raiders Association·~ AK-DER)
I, AklllCI Lise/i/cr (Raider High School Students)
2, A/(lIICI Me/llur/ar (Raider Civil Servants-AK-MEM)
2, 7i'irkiye is/a/ll Kurtu/u" Ordusu (Islamic Freedom Army ofTurkcy-iKO)
Workers-AK-i~)
3, ?i'irki)'e is/alii Kurtu/u,I' Ccp/Il'si (Islamic Freedom Front of Turkey --TiK/C)
4, AklllCI Sporcu/ar (Raider Athletes~--AK SPOIO
4, is/a/ll DCl'ri/llillill Aei/
3, A/(lIICI iKilcr (Raider
Mllcahit/eri (Rapid Freedom Fi~hters of
Islam-~~IDAM)
Organizations that broke away from MSP since 1977
I, AK-GOC (Pure Force)
is/alii Kllrtu/u,~ Partisi Ccplicsi (Islamic Freedom Party Front·~-iKP/C)
5, Diillya SCI'/at Kurtu/u" Ordusu (Sheriat Liberation Army of the World-D~KO)
fi, El'rclIsd Kardq'lik Ccplicsi .~criatci illtiliar Mallgasl (Global Brotherhood Front Suicide Squad of Shari'a -ECK/~iM)
7, EI'rclIsei is/alii Kurtu/u~
,','(/\'a,I'11lI1I 7)'irkil'!! Miicahit/a! (TurIZey's Fighters of the Universal Islamic War of Liberation-EiK/TM)
Source:
2, 7i'irk!!'l' is/a/ll I'>'fiicaliii/eri Ordu,l'u (Army of the IslamiC Freedom Fighters~ TiMO) 3, istallhu/ Kiiltiir Om.!;1 Is/a/ll Kurtu/u~ Ordusu (Islamic Freedom Army of Islamic Hearth of Culture .. -·iKO)
Turkish Gcncral Staff, Tiirki,l'e'de Allllr,)'i I'C 7£'I'I)riill Ge/i,>llIesi v(' Gilt'ell/ik KUl'vefll'rillce (jll/ellll/esi (Tlie Rise of'AII{/rclil' alit! Termr alld flidr Prevelltioll ill'tlte 5'ecllri/y Force ill 7llrke,l') (Ankara: C;cnel Ku;'may Ba~kanltgl, 19S I), '
67
Erbakan and his team acted rationally in forging coalition governments with both the center-left, and later center-right, political parties. During "J this time, the MSP used its position in government to organize an extensive network of activist groups (known as the Raiders-Akll1cilar) that were to become the grass-roots organizations for the future. Figure 1 provides the organizational breakdown of the AkmCl organizations. In addition to these grass-roots organizations, the MSP successfully infiltrated public bureaucracy and positioned its supporters in key positions in such crucial ministries as the ministry of the interior and the ministlY of education. During this time, the Nak~i and Nurcu clites were in serious competition for control of the Central Administrative Board (CAB) of the party. Soon after the party's third national congress, the Nak~i members, backed by Sheikh Kotku, emerged victorious, and the Nurcu group bcgan to leave the MSP. Paksu resigned from his post as the minister of labor and member of the party's CAB. Within two months of his resignation, 16 Nurcu parliamentarians resigned from the party. In the national elections of 1977, the Nurcu followers gave their suppOli to Demirel's AP and Ti.irke~' Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetri Hereket Partisi-MHP). This resulted in a substantial loss of votes for the MSP and from then on the MSP drew its support primarily from the Nak~ibendi order and its followers. Other smaller tarikats did support Erbakan, but their number was dwarfed next to that of Nak~ibendi. The MSP experiment ended with the coup of 1980 when the generals banned all political parties. During the next three years, the militmy rewrote Turkey's Constitution and tightly controlled new political party formation and the transition to civilian rule that occurred in October 1983. 7 Since the transition from militmy rule in 1983 onwards, Islamists have followed a multi-track strategy in re-entering political life. Under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, the Motherland Pmiy (Anavatan PartisiANAP) initially attracted many former MSP followers. However, the return of Erbakan ended thc Islamist voters' mass support of ANAP. Starting with the 1991 national elections, Erbakan and the RP began the gradual process of writing a success stOlY. The party leadership expressed views and policy positions sympathetic to the conservative and disenchanted voters and created a nation-wide network of devoted activists and elites. The party succeeded beyond its leaders' wildest dreams in the 1995 national elections and local elections. Yet, this initial success was SOOI1 followed by their downfall. The party leaders failed to prevent junior party officials and activists from pronouncing provocative statements. As if
68
Political Parties il1 Turkey
The Virtue Party
drunk with electoral victory and coming to power in a coalition with the True Path Party (Dogrll Yol Partisi-DYP), the irresponsible actions of some Refah members led to the "soft coup" of 1997 and the subsequent closure of the party on January 16, 1998. Following the RP's closure, Erbakan's closest allies in the party established the FP, and atten1J)ted to tone down their criticism of secular reforms by embarking on a cm~paign to present a new image for their party. The younger elites of the party, led by individuals such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former Mayor of Istanbul, and Abdullah Glil, went so far as to emphasize the need for a system-oriented political party and openly challenged the old guard led by Recai Kutan, the then leader of the FP. However, it was quite clear that Erbakan, although banned from politics for five years, continued to call the shots in the party. Erbakan's influence on the FP became clear during the first grand congress of the party in May 2000. Fed up with the old guard's tight control of the party and its unwillingness to consider the new ideas of a young generation of dynamic leaders, Reformists (Ycnilik(?iler), led by Abdullah GiiI, challenged Kutan for the leadership of the party. These individuals were upset by the Traditionalists' (Gclcnck(?iler) domination of the pmiy's CAB and by Erbakan's continuing control of the appointment of new members to the FP. In 1999, a number of leading reformists (Giil, Cemil (:i<,:ek, Ali Co~kun, and Abdiilkadir Aksu) resigned from the CAB. Other key individuals in this power struggle were Tayyip Erdogan and Melih Gok<,:ek, the Mayor of Ankara. However, the Reformists did not consider Gok<,:ek a reliable ally. Erdogan was removed from office in 1998 after the State Security Court found him guilty of inciting domestic unrest and religious hatred for, among other things, having quoted from a poem by Ziya Gokalp in a speech given in Siirt in December 1997, As a result of this decision he was also barred from politics for life. Until that time, Erdogan was viewed as the most likcly challenger to Erbakan and Kutan. Erdogan was hand-picked by Erbakan for his oratory skills, as noted, and was elected Mayor of Istanbul in 1994 on the RP ticket. In addition to having recited Gokalp's poem, the court cited a statement in which Erdogan had identified society as having "two fundamentally di/Terent camps"-thosc who blindly follow a charismatic leader, sllch as the Atatiirkists, and those who follow justice and are Muslims who unite Islam with Shari'a." In the summer of 2001, Erdogan was engaged in a legal controversy with the state prosecutor's office after he became a founding member and chairman of a new reformist political party, the Justice and Development Party (Ae/alcl )Ie Kalkll7/1/a Parlisi---AKP).
GiiI's challenge of Kutan had clearly demonstrated the division within the party. At the First Congress of the FP on May 14, 2000, Giil received 521 votes to Kutan's 633. At the time, Kutan and other Traditionalists emphasized the need to keep the party intact. Relations between the two camps soon worsened. Following a meeting between GiiI and Deniz Baykal, leader of the new CI-IP, Traditionalists in the FP decided to send Giil and his reformist followers to the disciplinary committee of the party." Following the closure of the FP, the Reformists and Traditionalist split and began to chart their separate ways. Erbakan chose his close ally, Kutan, as the chairman of their camp's new party, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP). The SP's emblem is a white crescent with five stars on a red background; the five stars represent (1) love, peace of mind, and peace, (2) human rights, freedom, and democracy, (3) justice, (4) welfare (refah), and (5) self-respect and honor. Interestingly enough, the number 'five' also represents the number of political parties that the National View established over the years-the MNP, NSP, RP, FP, and SP, Initially, 51 former FP parliamentarians joined the Traditionalists, but left quickly. Consequently, the new party started its life with a 48-member presence in the National Assembly. On the Reformist front, Erdogan and his colleagues' party (AKP) received 51 former FP and other members of the National Assembly. Powerful names from the FP (such as Abdullah Giil, Biilent Arm<,:, Cemil (:i<,:ek, Abdiilkadir Aksu, and Ali Co~kun) decided to join Erdogan.1O As noted earlier, Erdogan's founding membership and chairmanship of this new party caused a legal problem with the authorities. The State Prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to issue a warning to the AKP to the effect that: (I) Erdogan is not eligible to be a founding member of a political party; (2) he cannot be chairman of a political party; and (3) six female founding members who wear the turban are violating the state laws that govern dress code. The complicating factor surrounding Erdogan's political future was his prior conviction. According to Turkish Penal Code 312/2, he cannot be elected to the National Assembly even after receiving amnesty. In the event of his being granted amnesty, the High Election Council would need to address this issue and clarify whether or not Erdogan's full rights are returned to him on the basis of the court's decision and the Amnesty Law. As for the female members who wore the turban, the prosecutor argued that the wearing of the turban was a sign of challenge to the state since the Constitutional Court's previous decision on the closure of the RP and FP
I
69
Political Parties in Turkey
The Virtue Party
citcd this practice as an anti-secular activity. Furthermore, additional charges wcre brought against Erdogan for his anti-secular political statcments in intervicws in 1992 and 1994. Some of thcse statements were found on a campaign video of thc former RP, Erdogan rejected the argument that he was engaged in the practice of dissimulation (takiyye).11
RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORDERS AND
70
71
ISLAM 1ST POLITICAL PARTIES
ELITE-MASS LINKAGES
The RP and FP, like all other political parties, were set up in accordancc . with the Political Parties Law. Their national, provincial, and district lev~1 organizations met the requirements of the law. Party membershIp \! increased from a mere 180,000 in 1991 to over 4 million in 1995. 12 Yet its real success was in the informal support network of the party. The informal party organIzation was exter~sive; itrelied on a tightly controlled network of activists and volunteers. The party maintained a divan (council) in every district comprising 50 regular and 50 alternate members. In addition, there were neighborhood representatives who maintained a database of information on everyone living in that area, including details of each family unit. There was also a network of headmasters and teachers (lwlipler ve (jgretmenler), who engaged people in discussion at the local coffee-houses and other gathering places. During the 1995 national clections, Refah had more than 300,000 such volunteers working for the party, but that number fell to less than 250,000 during the 1999 elections. I] Another informal network came from the Koran courses and the Preacher and Prayer Leader Schools (imam Hatip Okul1al'l). The latter schools were shut down by Atatiirk but re-opened under the Democratic Party government in 1951. Since then the number of these schools, which have been considered as the traditional hotbeds of anti-Kemalist indoctrination, gradually increased, and had reached alarming levels by 1995. By the latter date, 492,809 students were enrolled in those schools. 14 The RP/FP attracted new members from amongst the graduates of these schools. This serves to pinpoint the infiltration of the education system by Islamists in Turkey. Finally, these parties drew strong support from some of the religious orders. Thc religiously-oriented parties' connection to religious orders is important because these orders provide bloc votes.
i
U
Since the first days of the MNP, the support base of Islamist .political parties has been deeply rooted in religious orders (tarikats).15 TradItIOnally, religious orders, which Atatiirk shut down and were later re-o,pened un~er the Democratic Party government, supported the center-nght partIes, seeing them as security against the secular stat.e. This wa~ clearly the case during the multi-party period until the establIshment oj the. MNP, Even then, not all religious orders rushed to support this party as Illustrated by the uneasy coalition between the Nalq;i and Nurcu followers. H.oweve,l~ ~) since 1983, rei igious orders have become increasingly open III the~r " support of anti-secular political forces like the Tu.~·kish-Isiamic syntheSIS (Tiirk-islam Selltezt) of ANAP during Turgut Ozal's rule and, more recently, the RP, While it is wrong to state that tarikats as a ,whole came t,o support Erbakan's party, quite a number of them have JOllled R.efah ~ campaign in recent years. Among these religiou~ ord~rs, ,the Nak~lbendl order is one of the most influential and well orgal1lzed, Its ties to the RP/FP dates back to late 1960s.
The Naksibelldi Order Sheikh Muhammad Bahaattin AI-Bukhari established this order in Horasan, Persia, in the fourteenth century. Its entry into Anatolia dates back to the fi1leenth-century teachings of Sheikh ilahi Nak;;ibcndi. Soon a1ler, the order spread throughout the Ottoman Empire and became an inl1uential force. This tarikat periodically involved itself in subversive political activities and o1len violently opposed state reforms. For e~atnple, it played a central role in the defeat of Tanzimat reforms dunng the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. II. There were 15 branches of this order in the Ottoman Empirc and some are still present in modern Turkey: Ahrariye, Camiye, Dehleviyc, Halid~ye, Kasaniye, Mazhariye, Melamiye, Muradiye, MUjeddidiye,. Naci.ye, Nunye, Re~idiye, Sadiye, and Tayfuriye. Nowadays the Nak~lbendl. me~11bers involve themselves in activities within the framework of relIgIOUS congegrations (cemaat). The !skender Pa.~a Congregation Sheikh Mehmed Zahit Kotku of the Halidiye branch established the iskender Pa~a congregation. His rise to influence parallcls that of Bediiizzaman Saidi Nursi (1876-1960) who founded the Nursi Movement (NurclIlar). Sheikh Kotku trained students to be influential in politics and
73
Political Parties ill Turkey
The Virtlle Party
the media in order to expand Islamic values among the masses. He encouraged Erbakan to develop an Islamic factory that manufactured irrigation pumps and also influenced the founding of a conservative daily, Sabah (1968), which was to take up the Islamic cause. The current leader of this congregation is Nurettin Co~an who is the son of Professor Dr Esad Co~an and the son-in-law of Kotku. Esad Co~an led the congregation until his death in a car accident in Australia on February 4, 2001, Co~an was a member the Faculty of Theology of Ankara and headed an association that publishes Islamic periodicals, including the influential ilill1 ve Sal/at (Science and Art). The congregation is most influential in such major cities as Istanbul, izmir, Kayseri, Konya, and Adapazan. During the 'last two decades, the iskender Pa~a congregation increased its innuence in other parts of central Anatolia. It is estimated that this congregation of the Nak~ibendi tarikatl has over 800,000 followers.l? The political activities of religious orders do not all fall into one general category of anti-systemic activities. This issue of religious orders versus the secular state is not a simple one. Many orders are simply Sufi establishments devoted to the advancement of Islamic values among the pcople and do not engage in active politics to undermine the state. Others, however, do have political ambitions. Yet even here the issue is rather complicated. For example, the origins of Erbakan's entry into politics arc directly connected to Sheikh Kotku, yet when Erbakan and his MSP followers crossed the line of attacking the secular nature of the state, Kotku withdrew his support from the party. The leadership of the congregation continued to withhold its support for Erbakan after Co~an replaced Kotku as the leader of the congregation. Howevel~ the followers gradually increased their support lor the RP despite the quarrel between their leader and Erbakan. It seems that Co~an was not winning the struggle with Erbakan and decided to give tacit backing to RP in the March 26, 1989 local elections. In an interview with Halil Necatioglu, Co~an asked his followers to lend their support to those who subscribed to Islamic values. IX Some of Co~an 's pupils, like Halil 0 riin and Temel Karamollaoglu, were presented as candidates in these elections on the RP ticket. In his victory speech after being elected Mayor of Konya, Oriin acknowledged that he owed his success to Co~an 's support. HoweveI~ the importance of these developments is illustrated in how the members of the Nak~ibendi order established ties to political parties and educated party activists for the purpose of undermining the strict secularism of the Turkish political order. Erbakan, founder of MNP-MSPRP-FP (the last indirectly) and Korkut Ozal, brother of the late President
and Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who played a pivotal role in bringing Saudi and other Gulf states' capital into Turkey during the 1980s, are among the activists who eventually attained prominent positions in Turkish politics. I'> Turgut Ozal was a student of Yusuf Hirel who in turn was a student of Sheikh Kotku. Hafize Ozal, the late mother of Turgut Ozal, Tayyip Erdogan, Oguzhan Asiltiirk, one of the elosest aides of Erbakan, Recai Kutan, the current chairman of SP, and Mehmet $evket Eygi, publisher (briefly in 1988) of the then most influential Islamic daily Zaman (not to be confused with the eurrent daily of the same name) may also be mentioned here. Over the years, the Iskender Pa~a congregation supported the MNP, MSP, WP, FP, and ANAP (though less now than during Turgut Ozal's rule). The congregation's interaction with the party operates as a trade-otl'between bloc support by the followers of the Sheikh for submission of party leaders to the wishes of this religious leader. In the past such wishes have included the lists of individuals to be included on the election roster of the party candidates; both Turgut Ozal and Erbakan received such requests lI'om Esad CO$an. The other intluential congregations are Menzil, Ismail Aga, Kibrisi, Erenk6y, and Car~amba. With the exception of Menzil, which supported the Grand Unity Party (Biiyiik Birlik Partisi-BBP), the congregations have predominantly supported the RP/FP. Menzil is the largest congregation operating in eastern Turkey. It is estimated to have a following of around 1.5 million people. Among the above, the Ismail Aga congregation is one of the most radical in its Islamist views. Its followers in Istanbul number 500,000 and there are believed to be another 500,000 or so dispersed throughout the country. It only takes a quick glance at the people living in the Car~amba and Fatih neighborhoods 0 f Istanbul, where the residents' dress code resembles that found in Tehran, to realize how radical this congregation is. The congregation is lead by Sheikh Mahmut Hoca.
72
The National View Organization (Milli G6rii.>' Te.~·kil([tl)
As noted, Erbakan established this organization when hc was in Switzerland in the early 1970s. His goal was to rally support among the Turkish expatriates in Europe. Since that time, the organization grew to include educational centers (based on the strict Nak$ibendi teachings of Islam) in 252 cities in Western European countries, mostly in Germany. At these centers, re-named the National View Association of Muslim Community aslam Toplul11l1 Milli G(jrii~' Te.>·kilatl-iTM), over 14,000 students receive Islamic education that frequently attacks Atatiirk's secular principles. The association has 1,091 divisions with 2,137 centers
74
employing 17,841 administrators and over 83,000 members.20 In Germany, the association is registered as a civic association that provides much needed extra-curricular education and activities for youths. The importance of the association is illustrated by its close link to Erbakan. This becomes even more significant when we consider recent reform efforts within the FP: an organizational reshuffle in the iTM resulted in Erbakan's nephew, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, becoming the chairman of the association. Furthermore, there is a related company that handles the ITM's finances-the European Construction Finns for Mosque and Community (Avrupa Cemaat ve Camii jn.~·aat Firl11asl). Akgiin Erbakan, the son-in-law of Erbakan's late brother, and the father of Mehmet Sabri, heads this company. When we consider how reformers in the FP attempted to distance Erbakan from the party, the reshuffling of administration in the iTM looks like a counter move by the conservatives to maintain their hold on the rank and file of the party in Europe.
75
The Virtue Party
Political Parties in Turkey
TABLE I ELECTORAL RESULTS IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS. 19R7 ,q'J .~.,.-----
Political I'at·ty
'}'tJ
-
Motherland (ANA!') True !'ath (DY!'l Republican Peoples (R!'!') Democratic Left (DS!') WelfilrclVirtue (R/F!') Nationalist Movcmcnt (MH!') Kurdish nationalist (HADE!') Others Vacant Total
- -
-- - - ---
1991*
1987
Oricntation
1995
1999
votes . .·eals 'Yo vole.\' seats % voles seals
Ij,,(~
,'oIl'S scal,. .·
----~.------
moderate right
36.3
292
23.3
115
19.6
131
13.2
86
moderate right
19.1
59
26.2
178
19.2
135
12.0
85
moderate len
24.8
99
20.l
XX
10.7
50
X.X
0
moderate len
8.5
0
10.4
7
14.6
76
22.1
136
Islamic right
8.4
0
16.4
62
21.3
158
IS.4
107
nationalist
2.9
0
NA
8.1
0
17.9
129
NA
0
NA
0
4.1
0
4.7
0
0 0 100
0 0 450
3.6 0 0 0 100 450
2.4 0 100
0 0 550
S.9 6 0 I 100 550
38.8 25.3 29.6 21.3
266 126 158
8.3
Ii
25.2 173 30.9 136 33.8 241 15.-1 III 18.-1 129 1
Kurdish
SOCIAL SUPPORT BASE "'Wei fiu'e and MH!' joined together for these electIons.
The RP and its successor the FP have both benefited from a shift in voter alignment during the 1990s. Data in Table ! c1eariy demonstrates that the votes of the RP/FP and MHP increased as those of the traditional centerright parties (e.g., ANAP and DYP) decreased. The combined vote share ofthe right of the political spectrum where the nationalist M I-I P, a much smaller Islamist-nationalist Grand Union Party, and the Islamist parties (RP/FP) increased from a mere II A percent in 1987 to 33.8 percent in 1999. The Islamists' share in these figures is 8.5 percent in 1987,21.3 percent in 1995, and 15.4 percent in 1999. This is an important development for the center-right because consolidation of these votes in the t11r-right political parties, which began to move to the center, means that the traditional center-right were unable to rely on the support of its traditional religious and nationalist supporters. This shift to the far right is a trend also observed in other European democracies. The difference in the Turkish case is that the shift is more dramatic. As the voters showed their dissatisfaction with the traditional center-right parties, both the MI-IP and FP began to make moves towards the center-right to capture these voters' support. Data from the World Values Survey (WVS) studies conducted in Turkey in 1996 and 1999 provide some insight into this development. When asked how they position themselves on the political spectrum (0 = 111r left and 10 far right) and how they place political parties on this spectrum, respondents gave FP 8.5 and MI-IP 9 on the scale. According to
Parliamcntlll'y Group
Moderate Right Moderate Len Radical Right Islalllic Flllulllllll'lItlllist Natiollalist IlIdl'pelldellt
55.4 33.3 11.4 8.5 2.9
361 99 0
49.5 293 31.6 95 16.9 62
158
Source: High Electoral Board of Turkey.
the WVS of 1996 and YJlmaz Esmer's post-election study in 1999, supporters of the FP tended to be individuals with relatively low educational backgrounds (see Table 2). Only two to four percent of the RP/FP supporters were university graduates and around 17-20 percent had no formal schooling. These figures were the lowest among all political parties' followers. The RP/FP voters also emphasized the importance of religiolls values in their lives far more than other parties' followers. In an earlier study examining the WVS data, the present author concluded that: when this information is analyzed on a ten point scale (I not important and 10 = vcry important), those respondents who identified religious party as their first choice, group around 8-10. On
76
Political Parties ill Turkey
The Virtlle Party
a relative measure of conservatism (new ideas versus old idcas as bcing best desired), Refah supporters chose older ideas by 41 percent while 31 percent said that new ideas were needed. The average for the survey sample for these two responses was 33.2 and 36.3 percent, respectively. In comparison, the followers of the most leftist political party on the political spectrum, CHP, responded with 32 percent in favor of old ideas and 47 percent in favor of new ideas."1 The same study also found a high degree of conformity between the values and beliefs of party supporters, party activists, and party elites. The activists were the most dedicated to the support of the party and its· leadership and more rigid on the need to devote oneself to Islamic ideals in order to achieve a meaningful life and emancipation. However, surveys conducted after the closure of the FP show a significant change in peoples' views about traditional versus new ideas, and choice of leader for the successor political party. They show that the grass roots of the FP support the current split between the reformists and the traditionalists. According to the survey conducted for the Mil1iyet newspaper by A&G Research, of 822 individuals who voted for the FP in the last national elections in the provinces of Ankara, Adana, Istanbul, izmir, Konya, Manisa, Malatya, and Samsun, 68.8 percent preferred Erdogan to lead the new political party; Giil was the second choice,
TABLE 2 VOTER PROFILE IN 19% AND 1999
CHP DSP DYP ANAl' Rcfllh Fazilct MHP 1996 1999 1996 19991996 1999 1996 1999 1996 19991996 1999 Gcndcr: Malc Fcmale
9 10
9.4 12 lU 9
Education Lcvel: No f(Jrlllal school ing Primary school Junior H.S. High School Somc univcrsity Univcrsity
17 40 15 18 I 11
5 5 5.1 62 10.6 13 13 13 18.2 I 17.6 7
SOllrcc:
20.6 23.5
9 7
13.8 10 10.8 13
9.1 16 17.6 17
13.8 10 16.4 3
21.6 14.4
20 15 22.4 65 20.7 8 20.7 8 21.8 I 21.6 3
20 R 18.560 16.2 II 11.4 15 3.6 I 3.9 9
21.1 17 11.8 58 11.7 8 14.2 12 16.4 I 12.4 2
20 2 18.5 52 16.2 24 11.4 20 3.6 2 3.9 5
11.7 19.7 25.1 20.7 12.7 7.8
/I~)JM Va/III's SIII'1'''),: nlrkl'Y (Ann Arbor: ICPSR) I(lr 1996 and Y tlmaz Esmcr Itlr 1999 (data obtaincd li'Om Ytllllaz ESIllCL Thc 1999 data arc Ii'olll the most recent but unpublished I(lllow up study Itlr the 1996 World Valucs Survcy).
77
followed by Ann<;.22 In the direct comparison of Erbakan and Erdogan, the respondents overwhelmingly, 76.4 to 14.4 percent, preferred the latter as the logical choice for the new lslamists party. Similar results were obtained in another survey by the Ankara Social Research Center (Ankara So.\)yt! Ara.>·/rmalar Merkezi-ANAR)."J The sample of 1,342 randomly selected individuals were from Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbalor, Erzurum, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, and Samsun provinces. Support for Erdogan was 40.8 percent among all respondents and 63.8 percent among former FP supporters. Once again, Giil was the preferred second choice as leader of the party. In this survey, the interviewees were also asked to identify themselves as being close to the Reformists or the Traditionalists or both. They were then asked to indicate their preference for the successor party to the FP-should it follow the National View or be a more moderate poiitical party? As expected, those who felt close to the Traditionalists preferred the National View by 78 to 18.3 percent. The pro-Reformists chose the more moderate approach by 85.2 to 11.8 percent. Those in the middle split their choice: National View (44.8 percent) and moderate (44.6) percent. The above findings clearly show a division within the social support base of the FP. Furthermore, the current split between the Traditionalists who established the SP and the Reformists who formed the AKP under Erdogan's leadership will receive considerable support from former FP followers. In the ANAR survey, 64 percent of former FP supporters said that they would not vote for any other political party that did not represent either the National View or the Reformists. TIlE BUSINESS SUPPORT BASE
During the last two decades, an important support base of Islamists, both in terms of political parties and interest associations including religious orders, has been Islamic capital in Turkey. This capital was not an important factor in Turkish politics prior to Turgut Ozal's liberalization programs. 2'1 [t became an increasingly important force following the Ozal government's decision to introduce Islamic banking as an alternative method of financing the Turkish economy. Islamic banks entered Turkey with this decision in 1983 and assisted in the establishment of a powerful network of Isla111ist businessmen. The network included inlluential members of Ozal's government, key members of the Nak~ibendi OrdeJ~ and Saudi and Kuwaiti finance houses such as the Al Baraka Group, Dar al-Maal AI-Islami, and Faisal Finance. 25 Businesses that benefited from
Political Parties in Turkey
The Virtue Party
these channels attracted investment from Turkish workers in Germany and other Europcan countries, and built large commercial empires in Konya and other urban centers of Anatolia. At present there are over 50 Islamic-oriented companies, known as "Anatolian Tigers," that have openly challenged the way business is done in Turkey. These companies, such as Kombassan Holding and ihlas Holding, present a formidable economic force in Turkish political economy. The Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (Miistakil Sanayiciler ve j~'adaml(/n Dernegi-MUSiAD) brings these enterprises together. MUSIAD's membership grew from five in 1990 to 2.300 in April 2000 (it reached 2,900 in 1997 but declined somewhat after the earthquake in 1999), and has offices in 27 cities in Turkey as well as representatives in 20 countries. Business practices follow Islamic rules such as l11udaraba or qirad, lII11sharaka, l1lurahaha, and (jam.'" It is estimated that over 3 million workers in Europe have sent $5 billion to Turkey in the last five years through unofficial channels.'" Many Islamic companies are not registered with the state and trade their shares informally rather than being listed on the [stanbul Stock Exchange. The Turkish military views these channels as part of a greater plan to establish powerful, anti-system capital in Turkey and therefore has many companies on its blacklise" The militmy also suspects that Islamic capital is used to finance religious fundamentalism in Turkey.
FP's program differed from that of the RP and to assess the implications of the new Islamist parties on Turkish politics. The Turkish experiment in democratic politics is indeed complex and often comes close to being bizarre. The rise of Islamist political parties is a success story in party adaptation because despite constant attacks from the secular establishment, especially the military, they keep returning to politics-albeit under new names. The choice of party leaders is perhaps one area where the RP/FP can be criticized for not meeting thc criteria of successful adaptation of political parties to changes in their milieu. The recent Gelenekr;i- Yenilikr;i (Traditionalist/Reformist) divide among party elites clearly supports this conclusion. Despite their track record of causing serious trouble for the party cause, the old guard insisted on holding on to key party positions. They successfully defended their position against the reformists at the last party congress and paved the way for the split that followed the closure of the FP, It seems that the Islamist political elites face a historic opportunity to reform Islamic politics in Turkey and establish true liberal Islamic political parties. As Turkey looks at reforming its entire economic and political system to meet the European Union's Copenhagen criteria, closure of political parties does not go well with the required reforms. However, this does not mean that any political party is permitted under the EU legislation. Anti-system oriented parties can be banned from entering politics (e.g., the Nazi and Communist pmties in Germany). The ruling of the European Court of I-Iuman Rights on the closure of the RP seems to support this view. 2>J To be a legitimate system-oriented political party, party leadership must carry out far deeper reforms within the future [slamist political party (e.g., increased mobility channels for junior elites to attain leadership positions) and rid themselves ofintluences of hostile, and often radical, religious orders and congregations as well as some isolated members. Perhaps the Reformists will make this change and contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.
78
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Starting in 200 I, the FP party attempted to present a less confrontational and more reform oriented stance than its predecessor, the RP. Initially, Kutan attempted to hold things together until Erbakan could rejoin the party. When it became clear that the secular establishment were in no hurry to pardon Erbakan for his anti-secular activities, Kutan became the "new" leader and "caretaker" of the Traditionalist group in the FP. This group faced a serious challenge from the "Reformists," led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Giil. The closure of the party by the Constitutional Court further complicated this picture. As compared to the SP, is the AKP truly a Reformist party? Or is this an internal struggle for control between the followers of different religious groups portraying an image of being reformists? If the latter is true than we have nothing more than another dissimulation. There is no simple answer to this dilemma. Only the future actions of the players will tell us if indeed a system-oriented Islamist party has emerged in Turkey. In the meantime, it is important to note how the
79
NOTES
I. Samucl.!. Eldcrsvcld. PolilicalParlies ill Americall Sociely (Ncw York: Basic Books. 19X2); Robert Michels. Political Por/les: A Sociological SllId), or Ihe Oligarchical 71'IU/ellcies ill Modem Democracies (Ncw York: Dover. 1959. lirst published in Gcrman in 1911): and Elmer Schattschncldcr, PariI' (JOl"('rIllllelll (New York: HoI!, Reinhart and Wiston. 1941 I. 2. Much has been written abo~lt the roots of thc religiOUS parties 111 Turkey. Sec. for example. I-[oward Reed, "[slam and Educallon in Turkey: Their Roles 111 National Development:' Tllrkish SllIdil's Associalioll BIII/elill, Vo1.l2. No.1 (March 19RR). pl'.3-4: Unci Heyd. "Revmil of [slam 111 Modern Turkey," Ullil'(!rsilics Field SlaflR(!porl (March I96X). \1p.I-27: MustHill [-[aki Okutlicli. /slik(/mel Serial: Refitfl I'ar/isi (Dir"clioll Sheri '0: 711l' Rr:fidl 1'01'1.1')
80
Political Parties ill Turkey (Istanbul: Yeryiizli YaYll1lan, 1(96); Sabri Sayari, "Turkey's Islamic Challenge," Middle Easl Quarler~v, VoU, No.3 (Sept. 1(96), pp.35-43; Mchll1et Ali Soydan, Diilldell Bugiille Tt'irk~ve 'llill
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
8. 9 10. II. 12. 13.
14.
15.
Re/iTiI G<'I'\,ei!.i (Fro111 lb'lerday
10
Ihe Presellt: Thc Welfilrc Realill' o( Turkev)
(Erzurull1: Birey Yay 111, 1(94): and Birol A. Ye~ilada, "The Refah' Party Ph~no;l1enon 'in Turkey," in idem (cd.), C0111paralive PolitiCllI Parties alld Partv Eliles: Essavs ill HOllor of' Sa111uel.!. Elder.l·pcltl (Ann Arbor: University of' Michigan Pres;, 1(99), pp.1 23-50. " C1IIu/111rivet, AUQ. 2R, 1951. Okutucu' (1996):p.29. Ibid. For a detailed discussion of this period, sec Yc~ilada (1999), pp.I27-·35. Birol Yc~ilada, "Problems of' PolitIcal Devciopment in the Third Turkish Republic," Po/ily, Vol.2l, No.1 (Winter 19R8), pp.345·-72. All major Turkish dailies, April 22, 1998. MiII~vel, Jan. 7, 200 I. MilliyCI, July 10, 200 I. /-liirriyel, Aug. 27, 200 I. Ye~ilada (1999), p.134. Ibid. See also Adenauer Foundation, Refilll Parlisi G::enlle Hir A1'II'III/'/1/(/ (A Slll(lv ou Ihe RefiTiI Parly) (Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1996), pp,45-8 and Yer/estk Siyasi Parliler Araslir111l1si (A SI1/{~V o(the Estahlished Political Parlics) (Ankara: Korand Adenauer FoundatIOn, 1(96), pp.50-55. For a detailed discussion of the lslamist political activitIes in Turkey, sec Harp Akadell1ileri KomutanlIgI, 71lrkZve 'de lrtim /-larekelleri I'e Teriiri::mm ili.ykileri (Religious Reac/iollarl' MOl'e111ellls ill Turk£,\' lIlIIl Their 711'.1' 10 Terroris111) (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Basllll Ev'i, 1(98), For inftmllation on these orders and their world view, sec Zeki Eyiiboglu, Giiuiill ISlR111da
7ilsavI'u/: 7iIl'ikallm: Me::hepler 7ilriM (The lfi.I·IOIY o(Sufis111, Sects. alld Religious h;ders)
16. 17.
18. 19.
20. 21.
22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
(istanbul: Ge<;it YaYlllevi, 1987); and AbdUlkadir GiilplllariI, 100 Some/a Tiirkir£' 'de Mez/U'pler ve Tarikat/ar (Religious Orders a11d Secls i11 7ill'key: IO() Queslio11S) (lstt;nbul: GerGek YaYlllcvi, 19(9). Erik J. ZUrcher, 7ilrk!',\'.' A Modern HiSt01:J' (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1(98), pp.IOO-4. TurkIsh Gencral Staft: Tllrkil'c'de frtiCII /-/(Ircketleri I'£' Teriiri::1I1i11 ili.)·kileri (7711' Relatiol1ship Bel1l'(,(,l1 Religious Reacliol1m:v l'vIo\,('111e11f (II/(I Terronsm il1 Turkey) (Istanbul: War College Publications, 1996 l. Isla111 Delgisi, March 1989. Birol Ye~ilada, "Islam, Dollars, and Politics: Thc Political Economy of' Saudi Capitaf 111 Turkey," paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Middle East Studies Association in Toronto, Canada, November 1989. For details, see thc IGMG wcbsite at . Birol Ye~ilada, "Realignment and Party Adaptation: The Case of Rdilh and Fazilet Parties," III Yilmaz Esmer and Sabri Sayari (cds.), Elecliol1.l· al1d Political Parties i11 71o'kel' (Boulder, CO: Lynnc RienneI', 2002). . Mi//Zl'et, July 27, 2001. ANAR, /-/azira11-2001 Tt'irkiye Gt'i11dc1I11 AI'lJ,I'llm1{1SI (Ju11c-200 I 7ill'k(:1' :1' Age11da Resl!llrch) (Ankara: Anarara~tll'llla, 200 I), pp.14-15. Ye~ilada (1989). Ibid. UncleI' 11111dam/w or qimd, an investor entrusts capital to an entrepreneur who puts this into production and then returns a pre-specified share of his revenue to the investor. The remaining share is kept by the entrepreneur. If' the investment lilils. the capital loss is borne entirely by the investor. Under 111us/wraka, the entrepreneur adds some of his own capital to the previous arrangemcnt. Mumba/Ill is the most popular financing mode of' Islamic banks. For example, an ll1dividual wIsh111g to purchase a ton of a given commodity submits this request to the bank.The bank buys that coml11odity, marks up the price and then transfers ownership to the individual. The buyer receives a bill at thc inflated price to be paid at SOl11e mutually agreed date. The transaction is legItimate li'ol11 the Islamic pOlllt of view bccause the bank was
The Virtue Party
81
exposed to nsk during the bnef timc It was in possession of the commodity. The second most popular financing scheme for Islamic banks is ija/'ll, also know as a leasing arrangement. The bank rents assets to the client for a specified period of time at a mutually agreed upon rental (cost of the goods plus time-value of money). The client may have the opllon of purchasing those goods. Such lease financing satisfies the risk-sharing reqUIrements of Islamic economics since the bank owns these goods for a pcriod of time and would suffer a loss if the goods nre damaged. See Clement H. Moorc, "Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in the Arab World and Turkey," Middlc East Joumal, Vo1.44, No.2 (Sprlllg 19(0), pp.248-9 27 Associated Press, Nov. 5, 2000. 28. Ibid. 29. Associate Press, July 31, 20tll.
The T!'lIe Path Party
-----------------------6 -----------------------
From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party OMiT CiZRE
The historical conditions surrounding the birth of the True Path Party (Dogru Yo! Part;si-DYP) on June 23, 1983 are identical to the labor pains of its predecessor, the Justice Party (Ada!et Partis;-AP), on November 20, 1961. The AP had established itself as the principal heir to the Democratic Party (Del1lokrat Parti-DP) which was closed down by the 1960 military coup. The militmy rulers rooted the emergence of both the AP and DYP in the closure of their predecessor parties. More importantly, this time the crisis coincided with the challenges and uncertainties posed by new global trends, a generalized political phenomenon of democratization, and free market economy being the most significant ones. This contribution will consider the life and times of the DYP essentially in terms of the language, method, and logic of its reluctant change over time. I HISTORICAL LUGGAGE AND CONJUNCTURE
For a political party, change is never simply a matter of summoning the political will necessary to put the correct formulas into practice. On the contrary, it is a process involving historical baggage, and characterized by connict and bargaining. In general, transformation of parties is understood in the literature as being caused by electoral environment, a dramatic economic crisis, and such intra-party factors as leadership.' In this case, however, change came in part due to the military COLlP and the subsequent closing and opening of political parties by the decisions of a junta. Neither the pre-1980 left nor right could readily embrace the ideas, values, assumptions of nco-liberalism, the dominant paradigm of the 1980s. A free market was alien to their tradition. But, while the ideological baggage of the left was more democracy-friendly, the AP and DYP tradition was more on the side of the state from a conservative and illiberal position. Therefore, attitudinal and legal shifts in post-transitional Turkey
83
brought to the fore the tensions, limitations, contradictions, and fault-lines of the Turkish right more so than those on the left. Add to that the fact that as the AP was the senior partner of the coalition government at the time of the military coup of 1980, the successor party especially suffered the ideological bias built into the transition regime. The cluster of motivations from global transformations is also central to understanding the DYP's change. The global agenda of marketization narrowed the room for choice and removed the boundaries between old ideological positions. In the 1980s, private economic power, new ideas built arollnd democracy and quality of life, and social change eroded traditional tics and institutional channels of representation and put pressure on governments. Under this global agenda, social class, though still operating incognito, became an uncertain motive in organizing political life. Ethnic and religious affiliations were advanced by increasingly activist proponents of subcultural identities. Historically, Turkish political pmties were strongly oriented to control their supporters and would-be adversaries through public funds, patronage networks, and an absence of intra-party democracy.' Under these conditions, it was not easy for political parties to address the new electoral trends including, notably, disenchantment with politics, increasing voter volatility, and defections ii-om political parties. These are global trends and not just peculiar to the Turkish political scene:1 The DYP did try to adjust to such changes. With the advent of 1. Tansu CiUer as leader of the party in 1983, the DYP can be said to embrace " two such adjustments in response to globally induced electoral trends. The first is the increasing personalization of political representation by individual leaders, expressed by the rise in "personal vote" or "Americanization of political competition." Given that even the leader-shy post-war Italy went through a period in the 1980s of emphasizing the character of the prime minister, particularly Silvia Berlusconi and Romano Prodi, it is not at all surprising to find an increasing incidence of "personal vote" among the voters of a party like the DYP where the leader-based image is stronger than most. Secondly, and more importantly, Turgut Ozal, fonner leader of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP), which was the ruling party of the post-military era from 1983 to 1991, had already emulated the global trend of shifting emphasis from competition and interest articulation to "effective governance." Under Ozal ANAP politicized issues that had direct relevance for day-to-day life (e.g., telecommunications, energy, and value-added tax), which had not been given priority by
84
Political Parties ill Turkey
The True Path Party
the previous governments. As these issues camc to dominate the public debate, the language of appealing to the voter was also greatly democratized, moving from an abstract vocabulary to an issue-based concrete, everyday language. Effective governance involved a new kind of policymaking in which elected representatives brought in their own team of experts from outside the bureaucracy as heads of agencies or advisers. In this "political enterpreneurship," the elected politician either appropriates an existing issue or ereates a new policy issue and builds his/her own career on its promotion. Under both Siileyman Demirel and Tansu Giller, the DYP also adopted the strategy of "effective representation" and "politieal enterpreneurship" in differing degrees. Giller turned to solving the Kurdish problem and integration with the European Union (EU) through the Customs Union to promote her "personal" rather than party's support. Her policymaking style, which rested on economic teams and managerial skills, was designed to address the voters' shi ft of preference for effective governance. The return to competitive politics in 1983 was shaped by the military's desire to avoid the destructive instability and confrontations of the past, caused, thc generals belicved, by political actors more interested in selfgain than securing collectivc interests. The military rulers (1980-83) and the ruling party of the 1980s, ANAP, altered the social bases of politics and the institutional framework for competition' and undermined the power of the old parties and political class. It is important to emphasize that as a result of the depth of the state crisis on the eve of the coup, the armed forces had greater autonomy from the social forces than had previously been the case. The shift to economic liberalism was predicated on the creation of a socially disciplined and depoliticized society. In other words, economic liberalism was promoted through a conservative-authoritarian political agenda. This entailed a new phase of modernization and entry into the global economy and politics. The process of restructuring the political system unleashed two maior dynamics that prevented the DYP from recapturing the leadership of the eenter-right, which the AP, its predecessor, held in the two decades preceding 1980. The most pressing problem for the DYP was the increased consolidation of the right within ANAP. Ironically, the second problem was the fragmentation of the right beginning with the conspicuous emergence of the DYP in the local elections of 1989. The rise of ANAP as the dominant party of the right was given impetus by the vetoes and bans employed by the military before the first post-coup elections in 1983 in which the DYP was not allowed to run." In the first half of the 1980s, the
DYP's inherited support from the AP thinned, its appeal declined, and its isolation grew. This was due in a real sense to the political engineering of the ruling military and ANAP: the latter tried to prevent the DYP from revitalizing itself and mobilizing its traditional clientele. In a political climate where the ruling elite "exploited the issue of pre-1980 anarchy,"7 the DYP was faced with the difficult prospect of gaining electoral support and legitimacy as true heir of the center-right tradition. While ANAP engendered Turkey's transition into the new economic and international era the DYP remained on the defensive and focused on political survival. The 1989 local elections marked a turning point in the development of the DYP's political profile as it confirmed the trend of fragmentation and increased heterogeneity within the Turkish right. B Yet the DYP managed to increase its 1987 share of the votes by six percent. This generated hopes to capture power through elections and injected self-confidence into the rank and file. Thereafter, the party was able to turn its energies to the goal of defeating ANAP, In order to achieve this it felt driven to articulate an identity distinct from that of its predecessor and not built around a defensive posture. However, this transformation did not prove to be an easy one. Hiisamettin Cindoruk, an old guard who is a loose cannon but an eloquent speaker, was elected as the party's third leader at its First Congress on May 14, 1985, and stayed in power until the political ban on Demirel was lifted in 1987. Cindoruk was one of the first to voice the need for changes in ideology and leadership practices to gain popular support lor the DYP. His suggested proposal for renewal was prompted by "a developed and changed constituency since 1980.''') His call to end the leader-based structure and develop "a more qualified and intellectual party management"lC) estranged the Demirel die-hards. Cindoruk's appeals were seemingly focused on an organizational reform based on more internal democracy and a changed system of leadership recruitment and decisionmaking. However, since a struetural renewal could not be considered independent of a change in ideology and discourse, it was, in t~lCt, a call for a new identity for the DYP. One central difficulty for the DYP in coming to terms with the dominant paradigm was that its political roots were not liberal, since statism rather than liberalism had been Turkey's historical route toward establishing capitalism. Neither the DP nor the AP was unambiguously liberal. As parties of the periphery, they depended on the most significant cleavage within the existing power balance: between the central bureaucratic elite and the rural periphery. The appeal of both parties was
85
86
Political Parties in Turkey
similar to that of the Democratic Party of the 1950s, which "was not ideological but ... rooted in the social structure of Turkey." I I Liberalism for this core constituency of small peasants and for the rising urban commercial groups was relevant only to a very limited extent. They were organically linked to the state by statist subsidies and protections. The cold war anti-Communist ideology of the state further reinforced the conservatism of the periphery. The rising Turkish bourgeoisie wanted freedom from the straitjacket of the statist public bureaucracy rather than a liberal statc ideally understood as a limited state. The DP and AP tradition incorporated the popular resentment against the State into a basically pro-state discourse. The DP-AP line helped to moderate the center-periphery antagonism by integrating the peasantry and rising business into the circle of populist beneficiaries. The DP's and AP's containment as well as of peripheral clements can be said to have reduced the uncertainties of democratic politics and increase the integrative power of the state. However, by the mid-1980s there was a sizeable and complex middleclass that questioned these ideas; the members of this class were more individualistic and opposed the state and state-oriented capitalistic development models. As far as they were concerned the DYP's approach was too mild. DEMIREL'S "TWO-NATIONS" STRATEGY AND IDENTITY ISSUE
(1991-93)
Being conditioned by its traditional statist and populist outlook and constrained by its ambivalence towards liberalism, the DYP faced serious difficulties in articulating free-market orthodoxy. On becoming the party's leader at the extraordinary general congress of September 14, 1987, Demirel developed a vision that combined two strategies. The first was an attack on the softest flank of the ANAP-its social policy deriving from its free-market approach. The economic reforms of the ANAP governments that shi ned from the state's traditional "wealth distribution" to "wealth creation," adversely affected the key social groups. In order to address the dislocating effects of Ozal's marketization, the DYP under Demirel revived its state-friendly posture and developed a "social state" discourse directly appealing to its suffering core-supporters, "the other Turkey." The latter was comprised of lower-middle classes, small and medium-sized businesses, and the peasantry, which, after 1980, had turned their backs on the AP's tradition.
The True Path
Par~)J
87
To appeal to "the first nation," the educated urban groups that were not unhappy with the new phase, the party appropriated some aspects of market liberalism and advocated greater democracy, which it accused ANAP of neglecting. It also introduced new, young, and dynamic faces to the party, including Ciller, who had tics to urban and business clements in its bid to broaden its base of support. Demirel called the new formula "combining societal ism [loplulIlculuk] and liberalism."12 For Cindoruk it was the adoption of a more egalitarian distribution of economic resources by state dirigisme alongside the commitment to some clements of market economy so that "the public economic enterprises would be used to implement an economic policy with social content."1.1 But was it feasible to combine the goal of rolling back the state and discarding populist policies with the goal of reviving the patrimonial role of the state? Realizing the incompatibility of these divergent goals, Demirel was quick to point a way out of this dilemma: the growthinducing potential of the free-market economy paying for the costs of the social services. 1·1 The social welfare emphasis of the party reached its culmination with the Election Manifesto of 1991, which combined a commitment to a true market economy with the promise of an extensive list of social welfare provisions. IS The party received 27 percent of the votes in the elections in comparison to ANAP's 24 percent. Between the 1991 and 1995 general elections, DYP became the senior partner of a series of coalition governments with the Social Democratic Populist Party, first under the leadership of Demirel and, from 1993 to 1996, under Ciller. However, despite increasing social polarization and declining living standards, the coalition government of the DYP-CHP failed to implement any significant changes in the social policy area to expand its support among pre-1980 core supporters. A complete reversal came with Ciller's state-shrinking discourse, which promised to set up economic liberalism. Social welfare, democratization, and support for the free market were all designed to build the party's popularity. Democratization referred to anti-militarism, the rule of law, and expansion of political participation. This anti-militarist stance and rhetoric was probably the most radical any political party had adopted in Turkey. It questioned the constitutional role of the National Security Council (Milli Giiven/ik Kurulu--MGK) and expressed its concern over the changed power relations between the armed forces and the political class in the former's favor. The party hierarchy demanded the establishment of the principle of civilian control over the military. ANAP was portrayed as "the emanation [kuyruk] of the
88
Political Parties in Turkey
The True Path Party
coup: ... :Ising , .. the political influenee of the military for furthering its polItleal fortunes. "II> ?till, Demirel's appeals on this front did not prompt popular support at a t.lI~le when the military still enjoyed a phenomenal prestige and legitimacy. The restrictive provisions of the 1982 Constitution which emphasized "the consolidation of the democratic authority of th~ state," were essenti.ally in tune ~ith the pre-I 980 party line. Demirel's fluctuating stance on this Issue contll1ued during the later years. In 1990, while he was still in the opposition, Demirel vocally demanded a reorganization of the civil-military rclations to establish civilian control over the military as it was the case in thc West. I? Two years later, as prime minister, he introduced a bill placing the chief of general staff under the minister of defense which was defeated under the vote of his party members in the Parliamentmy ~efense Commission. The same bill was again rejected eight months later 111 the same commission by the same members. IX Thc issue of the chief of general staff being accountable to the minister of defense, rather than the prime.minister, i~ o.f great significance in Turkey for those advocating the establIshment of lIberal democracy along the lines suggested by the ~U1:opean UI,1ion an~ those who see this type of division of authority as II1dICatlve. 01 subordll1atlOn of the militmy to the civilian authority along Western lInes. The second pillar of the party's democratization rhetoric was the leader's conversion to a "human rights" emphasis based on the Paris Charter signed on November 21, 1990 under the auspices of the Conference, on Secl~rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The party's 1991 ElectIon Mal11festo, the Coalition Protocol signed with the Social Democratic Populist Party on November 19, 1991, and the coalition government's program all incorporated this particular theme. The last item of the democratization agenda was the DYP's promise to revise, abolish or improve domestic laws impeding political participation. It meant th~ removal of Provisional Article 4 of the Constitution that banned the former ~eader~ ~nd ?ther cadres of the pre-1980 parties from taking an active part 111 polItIcs tor ten years. The strategists of the DYP tried to enlist the support ofliberal elements for lifting the political ban on Demirel with the message that "Demirel had changed,"I" but the credibility of this effort was undermined since it was seen as a way to abolish Demirel's own banning.
confidence in the party by showing that it was truly liberal. What made her accession extraordinmy was that she was not only the first woman elected to the leadership of a political party in Turkey, but to a right-wing party where the top cadres were always occupied by male politicians. This was also the case in left-wing parties. To prove his neutrality as the country's President, Demirel refused to follow his predecessor Ozal's example of meddling with his party's affairs. But as a party conditioned by the tutelage of a powerful leader since 1964, the date Demirel assumed the leadership ofthe party, the DYP was driven into confusion by its leader's silence. The expected aspirants to power could not obtain the necessary support and confidence to achieve victory and Ciller was able to slip through the cracks of indecision. She galvanized the imagination of her countrymen and women via the media. From June 1993 until her social democratic coalition partner left the government and forced her to hold early elections on December 24, 1995, Ciller's stand on party identity and core problems differed from those adopted under Demirel in three senses. First, while Ciller subscribed to economic liberalism in the tradition ofOzal; her predecessor's commitment to it was never unconditional. Second, having come to power with a promise of democratization, Demirel could not take a conservative stance on democracy issues. However, as explained below, Ciller took an antiliberal, conservative position with regard to issues regarding the state, individual, civil society, and democratization. Third, contrmy to Demirel's cautious and piecemeal policies, Ciller was committed to flagship achievements such as entering the Customs Union and delivering a catastrophic militmy defeat to the insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karakaren Kurdistan-PKK). Her goal was to score a major electoral victOlY so as to unite the Turkish center-right under her leadership. By returning to Ozal's version of competitive market economy, Ciller seemed to end the historic eclecticism of the DYP manifested in the 1980s by Demirel's embrace of a two-nations strategy. In so doing, she attempted to lift the shadow of Demirel from the party. Although she was expected to be the carrier of a multi-class strategy, Ciller chose to follow a different course, which seemed motivated by an instinct of sheer political survival. She aimed to build a narrower constituency through patronage and discretionary control over public funds. With Ciller at the helm, the political position of the DYP moved from the center to the center-right. She focused on themes of Turkish nationalism, religion, and culture. The AP had moved to the right in the 1970s in reaction to Communism, but with Communism gone from the list
THE DYP UNDER TANSU (ILLER (1993-96)
Ciller succeeded Demirel as leader in the Extraordinary Congress on June 13, 1993. Demirel had brought in Cillcr to engender the urban sectors'
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Political Parties il1 Turkey
of available threats, why did (iller articulate the same fear-oriented strategy? Was this a sign of ideological crisis in the country or in the party or in both? What were the root causes of this drift? The rcasons for this shift can bc bracketed under two hcadings, one global, the other domestic. ANAP's free-market policies, though limited, brought tremendous volatility to the social base of the center-right. Within ANAP's once-secure constituency of middle classes, the incomes of white-collar workers declined sharply, driving them in even greater numbers into disenchantment and frustration with the status quo. This created conditions conducive to a call for a more disciplined and authoritarian regime to protect the citizens from dislocations of globalism. On the other hand, sizeable sectors of the population consisting of Turkey's youth, big and medium business, relatively well-off white-collar strata in the cities, and intellectuals were all bubbling with enthusiasm for an improved quality of life to be gained from global democracy and information society. The notions of liberal democracy and individual responsibility for wealth creation continued to gain momentum in the 1990s, but the almost metaphysical essence of the state also dominated their minds. The free-market discourse of Turkish business clashed with economic praxis as it was still dependent on profitable connections with state economic enterprises. It is one thing to accept liberalism as a protection of business's share of an economic pie against labor, but quite another to support a political project when its ideological proposals threaten to dismantle an intricate array of state-business relationships. The same sector demonized the social state as the cause of public deficit and inHationary policies and, at the same timc, fed on this inflation to fatten itself. When we add to this conjuncturc the decline in the ideological functions of the parties and the alteration in their social bases, the period pushed thc DYP under (iller to seek more security by moving to a conservative discourse articulated with free-market policies. Moreover, because the context pushed for both change and continuity, this generated ideological and tactical Hexibility greater than had been available to (~Demirel in the past. Indeed, (iller became renowned for simultaneously subscribing to diametrically opposite positions or embracing incompatible positions. She could be seen to be fully dedicated to integration with the EU, while defying the European standards for democracy. A sense of need for (iller's conservative shift was also created by the existence of some tension within the party between her supporters and the die-hard Demirel followers. To emphasize her difference from Demirel without creating large-scale resistance and defections and to maximize her
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personal-if not the party's-chances for political survival, she created an authoritarian system of ruling. Moreover, the large-scale war being waged against the PKK represented a major factor in rendering the party's strategy and rhetoric more conservative. The presence of the religiously oriented Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) and the sympathy of ANAP for traditional values also prompted the rightward drift of the DYP under (iller. The RP, with a growing power base including the protest vote of those having sutfered under competitive market conditions since 1980, was the most serious center-right competitor to the DYP,20 (iller's conservative-populist appeal was also an attempt to recapture those sectors lost to the RP, In addition, it can be claimed that the disappearance of the Turkish left and the ideological and structural crisis in ANAP also contributed to (iller's abandonment of political liberalism. As ANAP left behind its earlier emphasis on liberal rights and freedoms, market economy, and limited powers for bureaucracy, the DYP would have no longer lost its supporters to ANAP even if it failed to implement such policies. Not surprisingly, when a democracy package by the coalition government was brought before the parliament on May 18, 1994, deliberations on it became deadlocked. Even for the items passed, right-wing conservatives in the party who lacked the political will to translate the constitutional amendments into reality blocked synchronization between the laws and the Constitution. (iI1CI"S strategic choice at this point was not to push them any further. Finally, there were the conservatizing effects of (iller's complete reversal from Demirel's reluctance to embrace the market economy. However, despite her commitment to curb inflation, bring fiscal balance, reduce the high interest rates, and achieve market and public sector reforms, since 1994 was a year oflocal elections, her administration issued TL21 billion in 15 days. Combined with the volatility in the domestic markets of speculative foreign capital, which financed the economic growth, the economy collapsed nine months after (iller took over at the helm of the party (January 1994).21 A stability package was introduced on April 5, 1994. To cope with the corrosive effects of the distributional deterioration the crisis caused, she turned to an even more conservative approach. The names she placed on the deputy candidate lists she prepared for the 1995 elections consisted of former police chiefs, bureaucrats, regional governors of the state of emergency zone in the southeast, and conservative-nationalist-religious figures whose orientations were totally set against the themes of change she sometimes used.
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THE KURDISH QUESTION AND THE CUSTOMS UNION AS
countries on March 6, 1995, which formalized fl~r~her economic integration between the EU and Turkey, the troubled coalItIOn government between the DYP and its social democratic partner came to an end on September 20, 1995. (iller launched her election campaign on the issues of Turkey's membership of the Customs Union and her unflinching struggle against Kurdish separatism. Mindful of her domestic failures on many issues, (iller referred to the union with the EU as the crowning achievement of her term in office and projected an image of "greater Turkey" stretching from the Balkans to the Transcaucasus and acting as the locomotive for the Middle East. This, she thought, would lead to a political union between Turkey, Bulgaria, and even Romania, capable of solving the Balkan problem.'!> Another issue she campaigned on was the abuse of religion by the Welfare Party (RP) for its own political and economic interests: "They have maintained their politieal supper by exploiting religion ... the more Turkey is distanced from Europe and pushed into loneliness and Middle Easternized, the more these people could act with success."" In stark contrast to her vocation of integrating with Europe and despite her strong attacks on the RP that went so far as accusing the party of collaborating with the PKK," she formed a coalition government with the RP on .June 28, 1996, with the RP's leader as prime minister and herself as deputy prime minister and foreign minister. The forging of this coalition was the beginning of the party's and the leaders' debacle.
WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY
The escalated war against thc PKK and the prospective entry into the Customs Union opened windows of opportunity for (iller as a politieal entrepreneur. She began her leadership with a permissive outlook toward Kurdish cultural expressions. During a meeting with Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of ANAP, a month after she became the leader of the DYP and prime minister, (iller was reported to have suggested broadcasting in Kurdish on the state radio for one hour a week, making Kurdish language an elective course in high schools, and producing civilian solutions to the problem in parliament. When Yllmaz offered to take the issue to the MGK (iller responded: "What have issues on domestic politics and foreigl~ policy got to do with the MGK?"" A month later, she denied any initiatives along these permissive lines. V When she sensed that scoring a decisive military victory against the PKK would help greatly assist her political fortunes, she became the architect of an uncompromising stand with regard to the Kurdish problem that had lasting effects on the quality of Turkish democracy, the economy, and social life. Involving 30,000 security forces and absorbing 20 percent of the national budget, the escalated scale of the armed conflict exacerbated a chronic inflation and helped set the precedence of security forces collaborating with ultra-nationalist crime syndicates to hunt down the PKK sympathizers. Connected with the Kurdish problem, (iller's approach to the military represented a radical departure from the traditional party line. As she hoped to score a political victory on the Kurdish issue by a military gain, she abandoned any pretense of supporting civilian control over the I military. Indeed, (iller refrained from undertaking any initiative that , would displease the high command and, instead, endorsed their wishes on any issue. Dogan Giire~, the chief of general staff who was later elected as deputy on the DYP ticket (1995), has reiterated the accord between his prime minister and the high command: "The armed forces has regard for the prime minister because she acts like a tiger. I worked with ease with all prime ministers, with Ozal, Akbulut, Yllmaz, and Demirel. But with (iller I worked with more ease."'" The result was that the civilian initiative on the Kurdish question was relegated to the sidelines. Moreover, while the defense and security expenditures rose to 17.3 percent of the 1996 budget, the ratio for education was half of that figure and health spending was three-four percent. 25 Similarly, after the historic signing of the Customs Union with the EU
93
REFAHYOL COALITION: DEMISE OF THE LEADER AND THE PARTY
The Refahyol era (the popular name for the DYP-RP coalition) ended in disaster for both coalition partners when, on Februmy 28, 1997,' the MGK handed the government a list of measures to clamp down political Islam, causing its eventual resignation. ,<) At first sight, it seems that the breakdown, defeat, decline, and humiliation of the DYP, (iller, and the political system were precipitated by the Turkish political leaders' "style of power holding," which was characterized by short time horizons, lack of self-confidence and trust in their political base, and an unscrupulous mode of promoting political rent-seeking networks. On the other hand, a political class threatened by the formal and informal role of the military as the ultimate guardian of the regime has critical problems in relinquishing patronage resources. In that guardianship model, the political class constantly weighs the political pay-off derived from a reform in the
Ii
'I
95
Pohtical Parties in Turkey
The True Path Party
system-to put an end to powerlessness, incapacity, corruption and stasis-against the costs of giving up power based on patronage. It is more than likely that the civilian political class will not choose to terminate the rent-seeking networks by reforms that would reduce the prominence of military in politics. Its foremost concern will be a short- rather than longterm one. Precisely the same motives were at work in (iller's and Erbakan's drive toward RefahyoL (iller needed the RP's support against corruption inquiries tabled in the parliament against her;") while the RP's leader Erbakan wanted to reap the benefits of being in power by building his own patronage network. The Refahyol episode today impedes the effective functioning of the party, having dclivered a deadly blow to the secular and modern, Western-oriented image the DYP had been trying to develop for itself since 1991. (iller's personal integrity, leadership style, character, family, entourage, and the sources of her wealth also came under close scrutiny, causing a further decline in public support for the party. There were resignations and defections, ending up in the formation of the Democratic Turkey Party (Demokratik Tiirkiye Partisi-DTP).') By forming a coalition government with Erbakan, renowned for his rentdistributing tendencies, (i lIer tarnished her image of having a commitment to a free-market program, her only claim to legitimacy and popularity in the absence of her engagement with political liberalism. The DYP's earlier harmonious relationship with the military also changed radically after the Refahyol experience. (iller made a complete U-turn from a position of regarding the armed forces as the best guarantor of democracy,'" to challenging the military's role in safeguarding secularism on the basis of popular sovereignty and "national will." At some point, she even built up "her own" civilian security forces within the ministry of interior. The military'S consequent wrath against (iller was serious and the struggle between them took the character of life and death." The High Command and (iller exchanged harsh words daily. (iller stated, "Turkish people love and trust their army. But this trust is bestowed on them not as politicians, but as soldiers ... for control in democracies is in the hands of parliament. It is not in the hands of those outside the national wilL"") The military's spokesman responded the same day by saying, "(iller is like a sinking ship ... It is (iller who emboldens the reactionary forces ... The Turkish armed forces enforce a constitutional duty to protect the secular democratic Republic. It is always above politics and subscribes to democracy."'5
The most profound damage Refahyol inflicted on the DYP's image was to bring the most unprincipled and unreliable aspects of the leader's political profile into the limelight. (iller suffered most with regard to her "credibility" as a person and as a leader. This stemmed from the discrepancy between her 1995 election campaign, which was based on lashing out against the RP, and her subsequent behavior. Although by 1997 (iller was already known for false statements aimed at self-promotion, the fear and insecurity combined with her growing insecurity during Refuhyol drove her to pronounce statements that she could not substantiate and promises she could not fulfiL'"
94
LEADERSHIP AS LIABILITY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
The tradition of the leader's iron control on and total autonomy from the rank-and-file members has underpinned the operation of the Turkish political parties. Deregulation, considerable liberalization in the market, privatization, and abandonment of protective restraints in the economy since 1980 have not weakened leaders' absolute hold over thc patronagebased intra-party SUppOlt networks. A key component of this leadership style has been the monopoly power to impose herlhis will over deputy candidate selection so as to bring any potential dissidence within the party under control and deter would-be challengers. Another common clement explaining unquestioning obedience to the leader is the supply of politicians who grow up with a culture of c1ientelism and leader worshipping so that in their eyes even the mildest crticism of the leader is either illegitimate or unthinkable. If there are serious challenges based on discontent in the party, the views are almost always articulated ambiguously and timidly. In any case, there is usually no consensus over an alternative leader. (iller retained power in the party through similar tactics that ranged . from cooptation to divide-and-rule and expulsion. In the minority , government she formed on October 6, 1995, which failed to receive a vote of confidence, she gave eight ministerial posts to her ardent critics in the party. Cindoruk, the former party chairman and speaker of the parliament remarked, "It becomes clear that there is no organized opposition to [(iller] because the colleagues who claim to oppose her rushed to accept cabinet posts."J7 Equally effective was her strategy of "divide and rule." During the Refahyol government, when she faced the most difficult time of hying to quell the disquiet in the pmty, she weakened a faction by excluding the leader but including his followers in the party's top policymaking body.-'" When it came to coping with potential challengers for her seat, like Yahm Erez and Cindoruk, (iller opted for expUlsion. Mass
96
Political Parties ill Turkey
expulsions were also resorted to at the provincial level to ensure that Ciller sympathizers were elected as delegates to the national convention.J~ As a result, the essential element in this heavily patronage-based system, which enabled Ciller to sustain her power without serious challenges, has been that those seeking to keep or advance their careers knew they must be on good terms with the leader who controls access to the coveted state resources. Ailer falling out with Ciller over the leader's responsibility for reduced electoral support following the 1999 elections, Meral Ak~ener, Ciller's long-time confidante and former minister of interior, explained that there was no internal critique of her leadership despite widespread disafTection because: "Decisions were imposed on us. Nobody could risk being the black sheep. If you didn't agree with the decision, you kept silent ... The biggest problem of the DYP was insecurity and fear."·10 While Ak~ener characterized this state of affairs in the party as "crony democracy," Onal Erkan, a former regional governor of the southeast and a one-time favorite of the leader, described Ciller's leadership style as "sultan like," meaning its personalistic and authoritarian nature:" The most serious challenge to her leadership came in the National Congress on November 20, 1999, This Congress was regarded as critical for the party and the leader after they had suffered their worst electoral defeat in the April 1999 elections, scoring an all-time low of 12 percent. It was impossible for the party members not to be affectecl by the intense anti-Ciller public sentiment that held her responsible for having pulled the party into a dangerous game with the Islamist Welfare Party. As it was widely believed that Ciller's and Erbakan's parties would no longer be entrusted with executive power by the military even if they scored sufficient electoral victories, both patties fell into an ineffective existence. Ciller decided to use this crisis as an instrument to recover her popularity, achieve a comeback, and ward off the threat of a take-over by her opponents in the party. Thus, to prevent the supporters of possible challengers from attending the Congress, she embarked on a massive and relentless campaign to dismiss all provincial level party officials who were against her. Furthermore, her opponents were again split, unable to agree on a common candidate and kept up bickering among themselves:" As a result, Ciller won the leadership again. A WAY OUT OF PARIAH-PARTY STATUS (19972001)
After the February 28, 1997, MGK initiative, the DYP's image disintegrated alongside that of the leader's. It also suffered from the loss of support by opinion makers, newspaper editors, and television journalists. Its
The True Path Par(v
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inetTeetiveness in influencing the public debate and policymaking process was exacerbated by its own sense of weakness. The leadership adopted a platform of support for democratization and reform to recover from the pariah-party statlls and to counter the military. This was reminiscent of the post-1960 AP's emphasis on political freedoms and "national will" over the militmy's will in order to develop a power base from the ruined Image ofthe Democratic Pmty. This new line highlighted the fact that in Turkey it is only \ when a political pmty is in opposition it becomes a champion of democracy, \ the rule of law, and major political change. Similarly, when she fell into opposition in June 1997, Ciller too turned to these issues in order to survive the defeats the party suffered since February 1997. She argued that her party had put priority on economic liberalism and struggle against terrorism when in power and, consequently, n it could not pay attention to the problem of political liberalization: In a further effort to legitimize this omission, Ciller connected democracy with a robust economy:'" She suggested that the small and medium-sized holdings her 1991-93 administration promoted would help provide the economic prerequisite for a stable liberalism to flourish. The reforms listed in the "Second Democracy Surge,""; as Ciller's package was called at the time, contained three elements. First, just as after the post-1980 coup, "national will" and "supremacy of the pari iament" became the bases of an anti-militarist posture. Second, the new democratization program focused on the otlicial ideology of the state, which Ciller now considered an impediment to democracy:'" The third was free-market economy. Ciller did not fully apply a free-market strategy when in government. Faced with the realities of coalition politics, which required concessions, and with fear of losing electoral support, she attempted to change the fundamental parameters of state-economy relations, but nevertheless continued the populist policy of income transfer. However, compared to Demirel's social state welfare policies, her engagement with distributional state policies was more reluctant, less systematic, and more a transitional phase, while her commitment to free-market orthodoxy was far stronger. Under her administration, which shared power with Social Democrats (l'om 1993 to 1995, Turkey's political atmosphere was marked by a moderate optimism with regard to the eontinuatiOl~. of market-oriented economic policies, without the extremes followed by Ozal's marketlzatlon. By 1996, however, there was no economic policy to speak of. From then on all Ciller's efforts concentrated on retaining power by whatever means were available.
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Political Parties in Turkey
The chief paradox was the irreconcilability between her emphasis on dem~cracy and the excessively conservative and authoritarian policies. By steadily moving in a religious-nationalist direction, it was hoped that the party would attract some disaffected voters from the RP and the Nationalist Action Party. However, the April 1999 elections illustrated the falla~y of this assumption. Perhaps the most deadly blow to the credibility of th~s democracy campaign that revealed her administration's unsavory practices was the scandal that emerged in the aftermath of a road accident on November 6, 1996 in Susurluk, a small township in northwestern TUI:ke~. This scandal revealed the existence of a criminal triangle of politICianS, mafia bosses, and security forces engaged in the war against 17 the PKK: As the public outcry turned into an immense societal pressure to reform the justice system, police, and bureaucracy, Ciller's DYP was among those that opposed a "clean hands" operation to secure transparency in the system. Ciller gave unequivocal support to dubious state practices involving illegal murders: "Those who shoot bullets or those who are the targets of bullets in the name of the state are both honorable. They all are heroes. "·1" The dilemma that the DYP faces lies in the party leadership's failure to understand the changing political and social reality in Turkey and all over the globe. Despite Ciller's attempt to respond to the dcmand for effective (' representation by developing a model of political enterpreneurship, by and J large the par.ty ~eadership still considers politics as influence-peddling, patronage clistnbutlOn, and the making and breaking of coalition governments. The fact that governments continued to be formed according to electo~'al results misled the politicians of the late 1990s into thinking that pa~tIes could contlI1ue to operate much as before without change. More Importantly, democratization is considered a process that is e.ompleted when the leader holds a press confcrence and reads out a long list of promises of political reforms: l Among other things, bottom-up democracy IS not envisaged outside the traditional party machines and in non-electoral areas. Policy issues such as political violence, massive internal migration, the ne",:, f~ces of urbanization connected to the southeast question, global capItalism, the military's political autonomy, and the media's new role in shap!ng culture and society are not thought to be worth looking into despite the fact that they underpin the workings of the party. Political debate revolves around simpler matters, like comparing current prices of goods to those prevailing under the previous DYP government as "proof' of that party's superiority. 50 The DYP, like other parties, talked extensively
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about comprehensive reforms after the February 200 I economic collapse. It was perhaps the only party that specifically called for the reform of the Political Parties Law to end the leadership tutelage in the parties, as a stmting point before new elections are held. However, it is doubtful whether the party possesses the willingness or ability, and whether the leader has enough credibility to take such steps. The rules of the political reality in Turkey underwent major changes in the 1980s and 1990s, but the DYP has been unable to adjust to this situation. How could a political party born and bred in a heavily statecentered political environment control government expenditure and build social peace in the face of a widening gap in the distribution of income, especially acute for its corc base of small and medium-farmers? How again could it bow to a massive global inflow of capital without hurting its chances of winning the battle against inflation faced by the lower-middle classes? Defeated at the polls and humiliated by the Februmy 28 process, the party tries to make a comeback based on the Februmy 2001 economic crisis. Yet, in all probability, the pmty's flaws-or at least those of the Ciller leadership-cannot be overcome even in the face of such a potential opportunity for the opposition at a time when the problems are so great and those in power are so heavily criticized.
NOTES I.
2. 3.
,!
4. 5.
6.
7. 8.
This contribution draws on some Ideas presented in Omit Cizre, "Liberalism. Democracy and the Turkish Centre-Right: the Identity Crisis of the True Path Party," Middlc IOilslem Sll/(lics, Vol.32, No.2 (April 1996), pp.142-(1); and idem, "1hnsu Ciller: Lusting for Power, Undermining Democracy," in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayan (cds.), Po/iliCIII Leadc!"s alld De/J/ocracy ill Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, forthcoming). Angelo Panebianco, Polilical Purlies: OrgullizaliOlI alld Po\!'cr (Cambridge: Cambridge Univcrsity Press, 1(88), pp.242··6. For a brief historical account of some important maladies of the Turkish party system until 1995, see Ergun Ozbudun, COlllc/J/l'0rm:1' Turkish Polilics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinncr, 20(0), pp.73-I03. Klaus von Beymc, "Party Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a Postmodcrn Party State?," GIJ\'cmll/elll olld OpposilllJlI, Vo!.31, No.2 (1996), pp.135··59. liter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," III Mctlll Heper and Ahmct Evin (cds.), SIalC'. DCII/oemc\, alld Ihe Mililw:\,: 7)lrke)" illlhe I 980s (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1(88), pp.63-80. Thc DYP faced a scries of vetoes by the military rulers within 7R days from its l(llIncialion. Fifty-seven of its 88 founding members and one leader were vetoed. Worse still, although by July 22, 1983 it was able to pass the required threshold of 30 founders by one, through the deliberate delaying of the Council of National Security (the transitional body set up to execute the military's policies until the transition to civilian rule in 1(83) to endorse the list. the party was precluded jJ'om running in the 1983 elections. Slileyman Dcmirel, Dl'P 2. Hiiyiik KOllgresi IIp,' KOIIII.)/J/asl (Ankara: n.p .. 1(88), p.29. The DYP and ANAl' received 25.1 and 21.8 percent of votes respectively. Two of the parties on the right, the pro-Islamic Wellilre Party and the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Work Party,
100
9. 10.
11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16. 17
18. f 9.
Political Parties in Turkey
~cored 9.8 and 4.1 percent of votes, respectively, representing a 2.7 and a 1.2 Jlereent increase from the prevIOus elections though they were unable to pass the threshold. By entering into an electoral alltance. the two parties were able to win 16.7 percent of the votes in the 1991 elections. Nok/a (Istanbul weekly), May 29. 1988, p.18. Ibid. WB. Sherwood. "The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey," World Po/itics, Vol.20 (1968). p.55. Siileyman DemireI, "Artlk Demokrasiler Tezsizdir," in Ih(ltr G6kta~ and Ru~en Calm (cds.), IiI/ali. Millet. PraglllalizlII-T,lrk Saglllda Ide%ii I'e Po/itilw (Istanbul: Metis YaYlillan, 1991 ), p.21. "Cindoruk'ia Sol, Sag ve Militarizm Sorunu," Yelli Glilldelll (Istanbul weekly). June IS, 1985. Dogl'1l Yo/ Par/isi Gelid Ba~'kall1 Sii/eYlllulI Delli ire/ 'ill Bas1l1 TiJp/all/ls/, Oct. I, 1991. 21 Ekilll Saha/II }tmi Bir 7ill'kiye-SeplII Bi/dil:~esi. 1991. Siileyman Demirel, Tiirk Delllokrasisi kfeydall Okllyor (Ankara: DYP Baslll ve Propaganda Ba~kanltgl), p.133. Siileyman Demirel, "12 Eyliil Vaadleri Tutulmadl," Milliye/ (Istanbul daily), May 28, 1990. In tillS IIlterv/Cw Demirel openly stated, "In Turkey, the place of the chief of general stal1' is, In fact, above the millister of defence. Is Turkey a military republic? ". The place of the chief of general staff should 111 filct be below the millister of defence ... In which country in the world, every week the chief of general staff sees rthe] president and gives briefin~s to him?" Sec Ihlrriye/ (Istanbul daily), Jan. 15, 1993. ~ Mchmet Ali Birand, "Demirel Cok Ki~iYI Utal1(ltraeak," Miffive/ (Istanbul daily)' Sellt. 6 1991. . ,. ,
20. The RP scored the fargest increase of votes (9.2 percent) among the Turkish political parties between the 1989 and 1994 focal elections. 21. "Ho~ Geldin SeGim Ekonomisi:' l-liirriye/ (Istanbul daily), Jan. 19, 1994; Giineri Clvaoglu, "Kara ('ar~amba," Sa/Ja/i (Istanbul daily), Jan. 20, 1994; Enis Herberoglu, "Llnl Katili Ayaga Kalk," Ihl/,l'Iye/, Jan. 19, 1994; and Erdal Saglam, " Bunun Adl Sta~llasyon," 1111/,/,/1'('/ Dec. 7, 1994. ~ . , 22. Sedat Ergin, "Ciller ve Ordu I-liikiimet ili~kisi," Hiirr~]'C/ (Istanbul daily), Nov. IS, 1993. 23. Sedat Ergin, "IGirt Sorununda Kendisinin Bile Gerisinc Dii~lii," Hiil'l'iye/ (Istanbul daily), Aug. IS, 1994. 24. Intervicw with Dogan Giire~ by M. Ali KI~lah, "Giire~: Ordu Darbe Yapmaz," Tiil'kiye (Istanbul daily), Nov. 27, 1995. 25. "Merhaba Asker," ffii/'/'/yc/ (Istanbul daily), Jan. 28, 1995. 26. Tansu Ciller, 7/'i/'kiyell/ (publisher and date unspecified. However, it is widely known that the book was prepared and published by the prime millister's otlice two months prior to the December 24. 1995 gcneral ciectlons), p.11 O. 27 Ibid., pp.90-91. 28. Ibid., p.153. 29. The ultimatum consisted of a 20-point list of measures ranging fi'om tighter restrictions on religiOUS drcss 111 public places to banning Islamic broadcasting channels, Koran courscs, Islamist organizations and ,:sking _the government to pass a new bill to extend compulsory pnmary school education lrom live to eight years. On .June IS, 1997, ("iller persuaded Erbakan to resign in order to sonen the military'S reaction against the government and have the premiership transferred to hersell'. However, President Demirel called the game olf bv asking Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the rival center-right party ANAl', to head the ne\~ government consisting of ANAl', Democratic Len Party and the Democratic Turkey Party (Dell/okl'll/ik 7ilrkiye PlIl'/isi·[)TP, a splintered party fh)!l1 the DYP). 30. The two parliamentary inqlllries concerning ('iller had already been lI1itiated in April and May 1996 by the ANAl' (with which the DYp ftmned a coalition government in the altennath of 1995 elections on March 3. 1996, which lasted for four months) and the RpP. On .June 1996, the ANAl' and the Rp and the two center-len parties co-opcrated in another motion, which was tabled to. invcstigate ('iller's wealth. Altcr the formation of the Re!il!Jyol government, these motions were defeated by the Rp's defection to ('iller's sidc.
The True Path Party
101
3 I. Thc dcfectors, led by the old guard ismet Sezgin and joincd by such prominent names as Emre Glincnsay, Yailin Erez «('iller's mentor), Needet Mcnzir, and Ylldlrlm Aktuna formed the Democratic Turkey Party in Jan. 1997, under the chairmanship of Hiisameltin Cindoruk. 32. In an interview With Mehmet Barlas on TGRT TV Channel on Feb. 22, 1997, Ciller openly stated: "Our army can do the civilianization and democratization very well." Excerpts 1i'0I1l this interview were published the next day m Istanbul daily Tiir!aye. 33. Yavllz Giikmen, SlIl'/.~1I1 Giize/ Kadlll (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap<;lhk, 1999), pp.124, ISO-52, 160-61. 34. Ahmet Sever and HarGill inanG, "('iller Orduya (,attl," MilI(ve/ (Istanbul daily), .June 28, 1997 35. Yusuf Ozkan, "Genel Kurmaydan Cillere Jet Yalllt," MilIiye! (Istanbul daily), .June 28, 1997 36. For instance, when she spread the rumor that the military supported her malilly because the United States was behind her and that the real target of the military was not her but the Rp, the commanders immediately denied it. While she tried to convince Prime Minister Erbakan to transfer his office to her, she simultaneously sought the active support of the military. However, the military indicated that this was the business of parliament. Aller a while the commanders decided not to have any interaction with her. Sec Sedat Ergin, "90 Sicak Giiniin I-likayesi: imza Sorunu Krize D()nii~iiyor," l1iirriye/ (Istanbul daily), Aug. 27, 1997. 37. "Cindoruk, Muhalefet Organize Degil," I-fiirriye/ (Istanbul daily), Oct. 8, 1995. 38. Ayvaz Giikdemir was the leader of the group. Unal Erkan, Cihan PaGacl, and Osman Cilsal joined forces with Giikdenlll' but were brought to the General Executive Board. See $ebnem Giingiir, "DYp B61iinmc E~iginde," Yelli Yiizyil (Istanbul daily), July 23, 1996. 39. Between 1996 and 1999, ('iller expelled 65 of the eXlstlllg 80 elected party heads of provinces. In Istanbul, 126,000 registered members of the party have been expelled. Sec Bilal ('etin, "Eski DYP'lilerin Yuvaya Diinli~ IhlZlrhgl," MilIiye/ (Istanbul daily), ,1une 23, 1999. 40. Erciiment i~leyen, "Ak~ener: Cillcr Yalancl," Milliye/ (Istanbul daily), July 28, 1999. 41. "Erkan, 'Ciller Padi~ah Gibi'," [(adika/ (Istanbul daily), Jan. 9, 1999. 42. The strongest candidates ftlr leadership in the Congress were the two senior members, Necmettin Cevheri and Kiiksal Toptan. A tilll'd candidate was pro-Demirel Mehmet Diilgcr. By November, they disagreed on who would declare his candidacy, when, and how. In the end, Cevheri withdrew his name from the race and Toptan and Diilger became the two contestants, unable to agree which should be the proposed candidate. 43. Taha Akyol, "(:iIler'in Peneeresinden," Milliye/ (Istanbul daily), Aug. 16,1997, 44. IlJl(I. 45. "The First Surge of Democracy" is expressed as the ascent of the DYP in 1946. Sec the 2. De/llokm.\·/ K()/II/~'III11/{f1'l leaflet (publication details unidentified), which became the blueprint for the 1999 elections. 46. Perihan ('akll', "('iller'den Imam I-Iatip itlrafl," MilIiye/ (Istanbul daily), Aug. 16, 1997 47_ One of the passengers who died was Abdullah Catli, an ultra-nationalist IIlvolved 111 political killings in the 1970s and who was on the run. The others were a civilian secunty etHel' in Istanbul and a young woman taken lor a joy nde. The only survivor was a tribal chief /i'om the southeast who was also a DYP deputy and whose tribe was on the Side of the state. 48. This was hardly a surprising statement as It is now known that she and her thcn Police Chief: Mchmet Agar, had been IIlvolved in this triangle since 1995. when Agar had agreed to arrange to hunt and eliminate Abdullah Ocalan, then leader of the I'KK, so as to enable Ciller to capitalize on the event for the Dec. 1995 elections. 49. Sec]. De/llok/'{/si KO/lll.)·ma/al'l. 50. DYP Grup Ba~'k(flll Prf!{ 71111.1'1/ ('ilIe/' 'ill ](}(}() Yil/ BII/resillill Kaf1(//II.~lIIda }(II)/Il/.~ ()fdl/klal'l KO/lll.)·mll, Dec. 28, 1999, .
The Republican People :s' Party
-----------7-----------
The Republican People's Party AY$E GONE$-AYATA
Will all or only some political parties die'? This contribution adopts a historical perspective and argues that parties are products of modern industrial society. The post-modern forms of participation are incompatible with the hierarchical and well-structured forms of political parties. FolIowing the same argument, cleavage politics anchored in long standing socio-cultural differences are declining, and more fluid value groupings are emerging as the basis of political representation. Some parties might find a way to adapt to the new environment where image, personality, and policy issues have become more important. In such a case, the activities within the organization itself will weaken. The membership will become ad hoc-based, but the party will continue to exist as a superstructure. In this case, parties cannot rely on either old solidarity links or material links, but must reestablish loose connections in every election. As a result, old-style politics and old forms of political participation begin to be regarded with suspicion. Thus, the parties of the modern industrial nation-states arc changing, to be replaced by postmodern formations. 1 This contribution attempts to find answers to the above questions. It begins with the analysis of the present form of organization, its voting structure and ideology as reflected in the Republican People's Party (CulI1huriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (
\ On April 19, 1999, newspapers in Turkey had two kinds of headlines, one announcing the winners of the elections, the other displaying astonishment . at the CI-lP t~liling to pass the voting threshold. The following week, there were as many articles discussing and interpreting the election results from a CI-[P perspective as there were on the winning coalition. Why did it attract so much attention? After all in 1995, the party had scored 10.8 percent, passing the threshold by only 0.8 percent. Every informed columnist, political scientist, and politician predicted some loss
103
of votes prior to the elections. However, the fact that the CHP was not able to send any representatives to the parliament came as surprise. The "supporters of the CI-IP were faced with a reality that they despised. There were three basic reasons for this. First was the shock of not seeing Atatiirk's party in the political arena. After all, the CHP was the founder of the Republic, the mother of several parties and of democracy. Second was the discomfort of not having a secular leftist stronghold in parliament. Third, and most important, was the fall of a party which had achieved major victories in the 1970s. Supporters questioned what had happened to lead to such a dramatic loss. Nostalgia for the 1970s is also a predominant discourse in the party itself. - Most of this study is devoted to this question, and argues that the loss was caused by defects in all three components of the party-its ideology and program, organizational structure and leadership, and its inability ~o hold the support bases in society. However, it is appropriate to start thIS discussion with a brief analysis of the CHP's major ideological and structural change in the I 960s, which led to victories in the 1970s. The ideological and programmatic changes finalized in 1972 were the end product of deliberations that had started in 1957 with the Declarati~n of Primary Goals (ilk Hedefler Beyal1llamesi). This declaratIOn IS a baSIC document that laid the foundations for the contents of the 1960 Constitution. The search for a new interpretation of the CHP ideology continued after 1960 even though the new Constitution did allow the 1961 inoni.i government a chance to realize some of the institutional reforms proposed by the party, such as collective bargaining and striking rights, associational freedoms, and planned economy. A further search for new ideas was deliberated by the intellectual circles around the party such journals as Yiin, Ozgiir insC/n, and Forum and within the party rank and file. The basic issues discussed were the extent of state control on the economy, individual freedoms and associational rights, problems concerning the further democratization of the political regime (equality and equity, social justice, class conflicts), and the role of the party organization (especially the peripheral organization's members and leadership) on the decisionmaking structures. 2 The CI-IP WIshed to propose a full welfare state, in line with many social democratic/socialist parties of Western Europe; this would lead to a new interpretation of the populism principle of the CI-IP, which was highlighted in the 1970s. The CI-IP proposed to defend those who could not benefit from the welfare system of the society, did not exploit others, could not obta111 undue .. ·privileges, and could not defend their own interests and nghts. They
104
Political Parties in Turkey
argued that these unprivileged groups should unite and the party should serve as their means of participating in thc politics of the country.' The ideological changes that took place between 1965 and 1972 constituted an arduous process. Within the party itself there were not only ideological debates, which included major accusations of Communism, atheism and anti-Kemalism, but there were also two waves of resignation from the party by the opponents of proposed changes, the second of which included inonii, the party leader. In 1972 these discussions culminated in Biilent Ecevit being clected to the leadership. Ecevit was very active from 1960 onwards and played a primmy role in this shift of ideology. By that time, despite major deficiencies that later proved to be significant, the party had established itself as a social democratic pmiy dedicated to a welfare economy and society. This ideological shift was demanded and made possible by the newly emerging groups in Turkish society that came into being as a result of the growth and transformation experienced in the 1950s and 1960s. This constitutes the next component, that is, the support basis of the party. The CHP was the party of the establishment until the 1960s. The economic growth of the 19508 and 1960s transformed agriculture by opening up the markets for the peasants. This led to signi ficant amounts of rural-urban migration. Meanwhile there were parallel attempts of industrialization, which meant that most of the migrants could be absorbed into industrial plants, constituting an organized working class. There were leaps in education, extending the university-educated professionals to the periphery. The export of workers to Germany increased the knowledge of Europe in the periphery and made it possible to disseminate the European experience of welfare state to a wider public. These groups constituted the new support base of the changing CHP. The party had major electoral victories in big cities, and increased its votes in 1973 by fO~lr percent in cities numbering over 400,000 persons:' In major cities, these shifts mainly originated in the squatter settlement areas where the working classes lived.' Similarly, in such working-class towns as Zonguldak, major victories were experienced. In areas that were known to have small capitalist farmers and peasants opening up to the market (such as the Aegean, Marmara, and the Thrace) there were significant increases of votes from 1969 to 1973. Two voter groups in this shift should be highlighted. The first was the working class and the poor living on the periphery of big cities. Amongst the working class, the unionized groups, especially those in manufacturing industries, were the leading force and constituted the activists of the party. The second group was the market-
The Republican
People:~
Party
105
oriented small peasantry in the most developed agricultural areas. These were the areas where the living standards had been rising significantly since 1960 and the benefits of rapid growth were being distributed. [n addition to these groups, there were the young urban professional middle classes, some of which were influenced by the leftist waves in the universities during I 960s. With inflow of support from these newly ascending groups, the CHP was able to increase its votes from 27.4 percent in 1969, to 33.3 percent in 1973, and 41.4 percent in 1977. The third component was a change in organizational structure. The CHP was founded ~s the party of the center ane! the elites. Even though the pmiy continually held regular congresses and went to great lengths to have some form of peripheral input in these congresses, the majority of decisions were made in the center. Up until 1972, the opposition movements in the pmty were either suppressed or the leaders had to leave the party to form another one of their own. [n the provinces, the party retained "agents" among local notables, heads of well-established families who had been known to support the party since 1923. The families in question were well respected in their towns, proud of their connection with the party, dissemll1ating the necessary information coming from the center, having signi ('leant traditional ties with peasants, and mobilizing votes when necessary. The left-of-center movement radically altered this peripheral organization. The representatives of the supporting groups demanded further partiCipation in the decisionmaking processes. Through struggles in local congresses, the party experienced a shift of local power from the local notables and their adherents to a group of young professionals who had support from members and delegates that were either from working-class or small peasantry backgrounds. This new group of activists was not only in rigorous search of votes to get themselves into power, but was also expecting their share of resources from the incoming government. The Ecevit movement extended the basis of clientelism within the party. As the members became instrumental in deciding who would rule the party, they began to convert this power to demands for resources, whether subsidized credits, jobs, or preferential treatment in bureaucracy. These demands were easy to ~atisfy while the party was close to power between 1973 and 1980 (locally and nationally), and the growth in the economy was continuing. So in short, the power and the expectation of party actiVists increased aner 1972, bringing in a new interpretation of organizational structure where very young groups (in their thirties) dominated" and there were active youth and women's auxiliaries.
106
Political Parties il1 TlIrkey
A young leader completed the picture. Biilent Ecevit was then in his early fifties, but he had about 20 years of political experience to add to his charismatic personality and poetic style of speech which were highly effective in mobilizing the masses. In 1980, the CHP experienced two traumatic events, both of which shaped the party's future. The generals who conducted the coup closed down the CI-IP alongside the other parties. This was totally unexpected since the party saw itself as the descendant of Atatiirk. It was not a simple closure, the military sent the party archives for recycling, searched almost all of the branch offices, and detained many of the local leaders and supporters. The second blow came from the party \eader, who renounced the party all together. The party rank-and-file members were still young and ambitious and felt their mission was incomplete. They began a vigorous search for a new party, which later became the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosya/ Demo/mit /-/alkfy'l Parti-SHP) under the leadership of Erdal inonii. inonii was the son of the venerable ismet inonii, who had led the party from 1938 to 1972. Erdal inonii drew a sharp contrast to Ecevit. He was a man of reason, with neither deep emotional nor idealistic commitment to the party, nor was he a man of great political ambition. He believed he was responding to a call of duty, trying to hold the party together. The SHP won 24.5 percent of the votes in the first general election it entered in 1987, lost votes in the 1991 elections (20.8 percent), but was able to obtain power as a coalition partner from 1991 until 1995. The parties were allowed to re-open under their traditional names in 1993, and the SI-IP and the CI-IP merged in about a year's time. In the 1995 elections, that they entered as the CHP but with a new leader, Deniz Baykal, they scored 10.8 percent of votes. After winning only 8.6 percent of the votes in thc 1999 national elections, the party is currently out of parliament. The party that was on the top of the up-tide in the 1970s was certainly a major failure in the 1990s. This failure will now be discussed, starting with an cxamination of voter support, the inconsistencies in party ideology and the disarray in party organization. THE VOTING SUPPORT FOR THE CHI'
The CHP has continuously lost votcs from almost all regions of the country. Even in its strongholds, such as the mining town of Zonguldak, migrant attraction poles such as Istanbul and izmir, coastal towns sllch as Antalya, the regions of progressive farmers such as the Thrace or Aegean,
The Republican
People:~
Party
107
and the Alevi strongholds such as I-Iatay or Sivas, the party has lost votes to parties ranging from the Democratic Left Party (Dell1okratik Sol PartiDSP) to the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP). In the 1999 elections, the party lost up to five percent of its votes in 58 provinces (including previous strongholds such as Hatay, Istanbul, izmir, Sinop, and Sivas). In four provinces where the CI-IP had been the top party for long periods of time (Amasya, Ardahan, Erzincan, Tunceli), they lost between five and ten percent of their votes. The greatest loss (10.8 percent) was in Antalya, the constituency of the party leader, Deniz Baykal. The party scored higher than its national average in 29 provinces, 19 of these are of some significance, meaning more than two percent of the average. Most of these are provinces where Alevi and Sunni populations live side by side, such as Amasya, Corum, Sivas, and Tokat. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in such provinces has led to a polar voting structure during the last decade. In the 1995 elections, the religiously-oriented Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) saw a significant increase in votes in central Anatolian towns of mixed sects. Similarly, in the 1999 elections in those provinces there was a shift to the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyet((i Hareket Partisi-MHP). Even in those regions where the threat upon the Alevi popUlation was great, the CI-IP lost votes to the DSP. This shift in Alevi votes is significant and deserves mention because it happened despite the DSP's ambivalent position towards religious identity. The Democratic Left Party has argued for a new interpretation of secularism, which they labeled "secularism respectful of religIOus values." Many Alevi groups have criticized this new approach.7 The Alevis' fear is that this approach will lead to a legitimization of the Sunnification of the left, incorporating religious (Sunni) values into Turkish political culture through the "back door." For the Alevis, who claim to be progressive, the concepts of tradition and culture have to be approached with care because they may contain oppressive elements." Even though this new approach was not particularly attractive to the Alevis, the CHP lost many Alevi votes because it was unable to provide security against the fundamentalist threat. The events in Sivas in July 1993, when 37 Alevis were burnt alive in a hotel while the SHP was in power, accentuated this feeling and created alienation ii-om SI-IP/CI-IP politics. The Alevi vote in the CI-IP is still of some significance. All of the three provinces where the CHP has more than doubled its votes are provinces with dominant Alevi populations: Erzincan (18.9 percent), Hatay (19.5 percent), and Tunceli (18.3 percent). The Alevi population in Erzincan and Tunceli is of Kurdish origin, in Hatay it is of Arabic origin. It has been
108
Political Parties in Turkey
argued elsewhere that the basic pattern for the combination of ethnicity with religious differcnces is a centrifugal tendcncy in Turkey, where the ethnicity has a strengthening effect on the religious voting." That is to say, the Alcvis have a tendency to vote for the left. For the Kurdish Alevi, this strengthens both voting ratios and an inclination to vote for the far left. Similarly, a Sunni Kurd will be more inclined to vote for the Virtue Party on the right, which is basically following a religious orientation similar to the Welfare Party. The above three provinces may be seen as good examples of such ethnic voting, but these figures may be of some significance in indicating the vote losscs of the provinces in Tunceli where the CI-IP had 66.3 percent of the votes in 1977 and the SI-IP had 54.8 in 1987. Another group of constituencies where there is a significant loss of votes is working-class towns. Strongholds of the 1970s such as Zonguldak have witnessed major losses. Instead of increasing its voting base amongst the increasingly impoverished working classes and new migrant groups of the big cities, the CHP was losing its voting base, mainly to the DSP and FP which used honesty, justice, and closeness to the people to appeal to voters. Similarly in the rural areas, where there were small capitalism-oriented farmers opening up to the market (such as the Thrace and Aegean), the DSP has made major advances. The party scored 41.8 percent in the Thrace (CHP 9.4 percent), 27.9 percent in Southern Marmara (CHP 6.1 percent), 34.3 percent in the Aegean (CHP 9.1 percent), 19.5 percent in the inner Aegean (CI-IP 7.3 percent), and 19.7 percent in the Mediterranean (CI-IP 12.2 percent). I" The vote shifts in those areas are very clear. Where the CH P lost, the DSP gained; its argument of rcspect to religious values, honesty and nationalism, besides leftism, has held an appeal to the small farmers and developed regions of the country. One very important dimension regarding thc CHP votes in the 1999 elections was that the party did nlr better in local elections than in national elections. Even in the elections for provincial administrative councils, which are very similar in nature to national elections, the CHP scored 11.1 percent, doubl ing its votes for metropolitan municipalities (16.5 percent) and winning three metropolitan and 370 town/city mayoralties. 11 Even though the party had experienced major vote losses in the last decade, the vote bases have remained fairly stable. The Social, Economic, and Political Studies Foundation of Turkey (TUSES), which aims to promote social demoeracy in Turkey, conducted three political participation polls in an attempt to assess the voting potential for Social Democratic Parties in 1993,1995, and 1998. All of these conveyed similar results for the CHP/SHP. In 1993, the typical SHP/CHP voter was urban,
The Republican
People~'
Party
109
middle-aged (35-45), had more than a secondary education and was a white-collar worker. The unemployed and blue-collar workers wcre more inclincd to vote for the DSP.12 TUSES carried out furthcr research in the squatter settlcment areas of Ankara and Istanbul, and found that 26 percent of the workers, 33.9 percent of the state employees, 13.3 percent of small businessmen, 17.8 percent of housewives, and 16 percent of the unemployed or marginally employed voted for the CHP/SHP. IJ Similar structures prevailed in 1995. There are a few items in this research that deserve further attention. The CHP vote was doubled amongst working women in comparison to housewives and more than three times in comparison to peasant women. I .1 Thc CHP has always been a party that defended women's rights. Not only had it initiated suffrage for women and changed the civil code, but it also encouraged women to take an active part in education and working life. Working and cducated women have appreciated this. Moreover, the increasing Islamic fundamentalist threat may have led to furthcr support of the CHP amongst educated women who have always been sensitive to secularism. Similarly, we saw a high Icvel of support for the CI-IP amongst the professional middle classes where it more than doubled its national average. This was also due to progressive Republican idcology, which claims to give priority to education. We can assume that some of thcse professionals might have been at university while leftism was on thc rise, and perhaps their vote derived from nostalgia for the past. In summary, we can conclude that the CHP's decline of votes is distributed evenly between all sections of its supporters. The C/-IP retained a catch-all party character, but most of its votes have come from sections of society that would typically vote for the lell--workers, small larmcrs, minor state employees, minorities, and the educated middle classes (albeit on a reduced scale). Thc following section, discusses the reasons lor this dramatic loss of votes. It is argued that the loss is related to ideological inconsistency, inability to formulate practical policies and programs, inability to appeal to the daily economic problems of the voters, as well as the disintegrating organization and unending leadership struggles. There probably has not been any single subject more discussed in Turkish political scicnce and political intellectual life than the CHP ideology. One feels that the average university graduatc understands the concept of "the CHP mind," which is oJten mentioned in the essays, as if it is standardized. On the other hand, many of the scholars focusing on the party criticize the CI-IP for its lack of clarity, systematized ideas, and policies.
Political Parties in Turkey
The Republican People :\. Party
Discussions on thc nature of the CHP's leftism started in the 1970s. The genesis of the ideology has always been controversial: the extent of Kemalism's influence. the significance of European socialism, and the indigenous inputs specific to Turkish society have long been debated. Still, the widespread dissatisfaction with the present party program is mainly due to the expectations of different sides of this debate. Unlike the parties of the center and the center-right, the CHP is affected by the intellectual circles of the country and many of the intellectual discussions are carried over to the party by the politicians linked to these groups. Moreover, there are many journals and periodicals published by groups that want to influence the CHP from a distance. There are at least four organizations that claim to have a direct impact on the social democratic movement within the country. These are the Social Democracy Foundation (Sos)Ylf Demokrasi l/Cilf/i-SODEV), the Social. Economic, and Political Studies Foundation of Turkey (Tiirkiye Sosyal Ekonomik ve Siyasal Ara,\·tmnalar l/ctlc./i-TOSES), the Social Economic and Political Research Foundation (ToplulI1sal Ekollomik Siyasal Ara,\·tl1'1l1alar Va1c./i- TESAV), and the Social Democratic Movement (Sos)YII Delllokratik Hareket-SDH). There are many other formations of smaller nature and also some ad hoc groups. All of these groups, some with direct or indirect relations with European Socialist Parties, seek to discuss topics ranging from party discipline to privatization. The daily newspapers, having many columnists who feel close to the CI-IP, frequently give advice to the party. Some nongovernmental organizations and pressure groups, such as labor platforms and unions, offer their help and make demands on the party. The local party organizations carry demands from the periphery. All of these put the party under pressure, which is contradictory, inconsistent, and unreliable as experienced by the center. The unpredictable nature of the ideological pressure leaves the party in an indecisive limbo. Moreover, as the party loses votes, it becomes even more difficult to make choices for fear of alienating more of its voters. The party itself attempts to write reports, form ad hoc committees, and establish a permanent research office. Still, neither the informed public, nor the party activists, nor the intellectuals find this satisfactory. The content of criticism concerning the CI-IP ideology and program is concentrated in two areas. The first is not making ideological choices,15 and the second is not having a detailed program indicating policy measures to be taken in each problem area. I', The first kind of criticism comes from the intellectual circles, the second from journalists, the voters, and activists. The party tries to diffuse this second criticism by publishing
pamphlets on current issues. However, these go largely unnoticed by the public and are left on the shelves of the party documentation center. Decisions on the issues of ideological debate are avoided by the party center, even though the leaders tend to oscillate from one conceptual framework to the other depcnding on the favored social group of the day. The basic questions deliberated within this framework concern the nature of secularization, the nature of state-society relationships, the role of the nation-state, the outlook on civil society, the current meaning of the Six Arrows (the symbol of the party), and the approach of the party to globalization and minority rights and liberties. However, most of these areas are within the political realm where the CHP has been imprisoned during the last two decades. The most significant issue is that of secularization. Many scholars argue that the CI-IP adequately represents one side of the political culture of society. 17 Within the dichotomy of secular-Islamist, the CI-IP is clearly a hardliner in the secular camp. This is the source of its remaining votes, which it is accused of obtaining through threats offundamentalism. IX There has been a continuous call to the CHP, starting even in 1970s during the coalition with National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partis!-MSP), to change this. Bi.i1ent Ecevit adopted a milder outlook on religion, which left the CI-IP in a more hardliner position. However, pressure for change continued. The first of such attempts came with a book by Deniz Baykal and ismail Ccm entitled Yen! Sol (New Le/i), which discusscd a new restructuring of state-society relations, including the principle of secularization. When the CI-IP was refounded in 1993, the revised party program was deeply influenced by tics with the New Left notion. For example, it contained items opposing bans on religious communities and impli~d abolishing the Directorate of Religious Affairs.I" The ongoing discussion of Anatolian Len (Anadolu Solu) has also been inspired by this cultural dichotomy. trying to overcome it. Here the central concept is tolerance, which is used in two parallel senses: on the one hand it means tolerance of religious piety and, on the other, tolerance of the Alevi community's religious practices. Even though the party tries to reshape its views on secularism in many cases of discourse, during election times it becomes the party of Atatiirk that will defend the country against the Islamic fundamentalists. In both the 1995 and the 1999 elections, party propaganda basically revolved around hardline secularism which enabled it to attract whatever has been len of Alevi and middle-class votcs in the cities.
110
III
112
Political Parties in Turkey
The Republican People :\' Party
The CHP has been a committed proponent of democratization since the 1960s. Previously, it championed rights for the working class, associational freedoms, and freedom of speech. Since 1980, it has committed itself to making democracy a way oflife that could be practiced in all aspects of daily experience. Democratization is perceived as a culture where the right to be difTerent and tolerance of that right are considered important preconditions for coexistence. The party proposes major advances in this, including rights for minorities and oppressed groups such as women. It is significant to note that the CHP is the only party that recognizes Turkey as a patriarchal society and aims to radically change it. The party also has a section in its program where cultural pluralism is taken as a major objective, it clearly states its intention to give cultural rights to minorities, and promises to be sensitive to ethnic identities. 20
It is interesting to note, however, that nowhere in this new discourse of the Anatolian Left was there any mention of socio-economic inequalities. What is notoriously absent in the CI-IP discourse is the egalitarian politics that are expected of a Social Democratic Party. On the other hand, basic issues of a welfare state are present in the party program. The CHP proposes universal education, health care, and social security reforms. In the sections on the economy (which are rather brief in comparison to political sections), we see a shy acceptance of the market economy, which it proposes to control by organized labor and consumers. Priority is given to industry and technological investments, by which it hopes to increase efficiency and productivity.21 In recent years, the CHP's emphasis on development, growth, progress, profitability, efficiency, and productivity has increased. Baykal himself has repeatedly stated that there is no way of distributing resources without growth. 24 This has been the discourse of the center-right throughout the last four decades. In short, this demonstrates a policy of adaptation in the CHP. The election results indicate that the countly is leaning to the center-right. Meanwhile the pmty is going through a major identity crisis and loosing votes. Baykal, a master of political tactics, is moving to the right by adopting some of the discourse of the center, without necessarily admitting this.
Another dimension of the Social Democratic Left in Turkey has been the genesis of this very ideology of Anatolian Left. The Anatolian Left draws parallels between the two Muslim groups (Alevi and Sunni) as well as non-Muslims coexisting throughout the period of the Ottoman rule." In December 2000, Deniz Baykal initiated a radical shift by introducing this new approach.22 Until then, the CHP had largely maintained that its identity was based on universal rules of social democracy, with a strong emphasis on Westernization, whereas the Democratic Left Party of Ecevit emphasized national and cultural values, renounced universalism and refrained from membership in the Socialist International. Deniz Baykal has argued that the CHP had to have a deeper and more correct analysis of Turkish culture and history so that it could properly place itself in the political spectrum. He argues that humanism, with its focus on the human being, love, tolerance and solidarity, can be considered the basis of a new vision of social democracy. Baykal believes that on the basis of authentic Anatolian culture and its values and traditions, this new interpretation of social democracy would break the ice between the leftist elite and people. He continues by arguing that society should have priority over the state. Here Baykal aims to effect two basic changes. The first target is the etatist tradition of the C I-I P, which has been criticized for imposing modernization to the society and for being anti-democratic. By returning to the Anatolian roots and claiming a nationally authentic navor to his social democracy, Baykal tries to overcome the dichotomy between the elite and the masses. His second intention is to direct the focus from a class analysis to a human-centered analysis. Despite changes in recent years, class analysis has been the basis of social democratic idcology in Europe.
113
THE ClIP AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION'S ORGANIZED GROUPS
The CHP had maintained good relations with some of the organized interest groups. Labor unions have been a significant target for CHP politics. In fact, the party established amicable relations with both of the leftist unions: the Turkish Labor Union (Turk~)ie i,w;i Scndika/an Kon!edara.\)J(}/1u-TURK-iS) and the Confederation of Revolutionmy Labor Unions (Devrimci i.>·vi Sendika/an Kor?!edara,\)'onu-DiSK). It invited them to participate in policy discussions, providing a medium for presenting their demands. It aimed to carry these demands to election platforms. However, as the party shrunk, unions found less means of direct representation amongst the party leadership. This made the unions adopt an equal-distance policy both to the DSP and the CI-IP. As for the business organizations, neither direct representation nor a policy convergence were possible on most issues. The leader of the small business organization, Confederation of Turkish Craftsmen and Tradesmen (nirkiye Esnaj've Sanatkarlar KOI!tedara'~Tollu- TESK) is a leftist himself, but his membership structure does not allow for a Social Democratic Policy. The
115
Political Parties in Turkey
The Republican People :\' Party
Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Tiirkiye Ddalar ve Borsalar Birligi-TOBB) is known for its center-right inclinations, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Tiil'kzve Sanayicilel' ve i,wdamla,., DernegiTOSiAD) is appealing to the CHP for its commitment on European Union and democratization, but the cconomic policies and the nature of the organization's membership make them incompatible, The CHP established very close ties with some of the identity groups, and supported each other on many issues, It had close ties with secular women's associations, such as the Association for the Support of Contemporary Lifestyle «(:agda,>' Yc/~'aml Destekleme Dernegi-CYDD), and parts of the women's movement. Being a strong defender of women's rights, the party was very active in women's associations and frequently invited feminists from the movement to its platforms, committees, and public meetings, The CHP participated in the "Women's March against Shari' a" in 1996 organized by secular women's groups and, since 1991, has been trying to promote the demands from the feminist movement in the parliament and government, including changes in the Civil Code, The Alevis' relations with the CHP/SHP had been supportive until the 1993 Sivas events, The Alevi groups saw the CHP's secularist policies as a safe haven that protected them from fundamentalist threat. Lately, the Alevis have been organized under associations differentiated on the basis of ethnicity and class, However, all of these aim at the preservation of their identity, which they claim to be closely associated with communitarianism, humanism, and leftism, They have argued that these were the basic ideological principles of the left and the CHP, The party has a considerable proportion of Alevi members and activists, and had quite a few Alevimember parliamentarians when it was in the parliament. The frustration of the 37 deaths in Sivas has led many Alevis to search for a new political representation, including a party of their own. The CHP had full sympathy for the identity search amongst the people of Kurdish origin, even though it tried to demonstrate a clear distinction between ethnic separatism and identity politics. The SI-IP's attempt at political representation of Kurdish identity by allowing the People's Work Party (Halkll1 Emek Partisi-HEPr; candidates on its own lists failed, Soon after the HEP group entered parliament, these candidates withdrew from the party and created their own group, Many of them were later charged with Kurdish separatism and some were even sent to prison. However, as described above, the CHP continued to allow for identity politics. Recently the political representation of Kurdish identity has been
through the People's Democracy Party (Hal/all Dell/okrasi PartisiHADEP), but the CI-[P's sensitivity to human rights has continued to attract some urban middle-class Kurdish votes to the party.
114
THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
The CHP is known to be the party of congresses, political struggles, and internal strife. The reasons for this quarrelling image can be found in the pre-1980 CHP, the foundation of the SHP, and the changing forms of politics since 1980. After the 1976 Congress, when some leftist groups began to play an active role, the CHP was faced with the problem of defining where it stood within the left of the political spectrum, This was more of an organizational than ideological problem. While the party was getting bigger, the organized leftist groups, some of which had even been involved in street fights, sought refuge in the party. There were two basic routes to this infiltration. One was through family members, fathers being members of the CHP and sons being involved in ultra-left activities, Fathers would expect the party to provide a safe haven for their sons, arguing for democratic rights of speech and political participation of all groups. Secondly, these organized groups were mobilized by party activists against their rivals within the party. Some of the groups had informal links with MPs, local patty leaders, or even the members of top leadership, As many of these leftist groups had significant Alevi participation and the CHP also had parallel Alevi support, such alliances were seen as part of daily politics. The power struggle within the party center after 1976 also made use of these groups, Associating them with ideological cleavages, groups fought for power in the National Congresses. The 1980 coup was harsh on these groups in the center and the periphery, and put many of them in prison. When the SHP was founded in 1983, it too became a shelter for these leftist groups. It has already been argued that clientelistic politics were extended after 1972, Many groups saw the party politics as a means of partIcipating in resource allocations with preferential treatment. As soon as the parties were allowed to ti.ll1ction, these people joined the SI-IP in order to ensure their share of future resources, However, a very important change took place amongst the active members in the periphelY during the period of the military regime (1980-83), Until the 1980 coup, a local politician could survive through his/her ties with the state, When the party was close to or
116
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Political Parties in Turkey
The Republican People :S' ParOl
in power many local politicians were able to find jobs in and around political offices. For example, they became Mayors and municipal council members, were employed in the state economic enterprises, or were given positions within the bureaucracy. The military regime not only sacked them but also persecuted them. After this experience, local politicians began to distance themselves from the state and many became small entrepreneurs. This embourgeoiscment had major consequences for the future of the party, and radically altered the resources and their allocation patterns. The SHP was founded as an umbrella party, where the groups agreed to coexist, as by that time Ecevit would allow neither clientelism nor ideological groups to take part in his party. The SI-IP did not attempt to propose a new participation model that would overcome the old weaknesses. On the contrary, as the party lost votes, the problcms became more profound and acute. In general, factionalism is closely associated with clientelism. 2(' Clientelistic groups within afi'amework of rivalry can easily develop into factions, closing their boundaries and strengthening internal loyalties with extra measures such as personal bondage, tribalism, and ethnicity. In the case of the C I-I P, factions and ideological wings coexist, sometimes leading into tactical alignments; however, factionalism, rather than ideological debate, is the predominant factor. The domination of factionalism is due to two factors: first, the existence of a strong factional leader, Baykal, and second, the increasingly ficrce intraparty competition due to the shrinking of the party. A shrinking party means fewer positions, less access to resources, and less power. The logic off11ctionalism in this case is to limit the potential demand by defining a limited in-group, rather than trying a more risky solution by increasing the resources to be distributed to everyone. The in-group is defined through strengthened loyalty that is secured with internal control, gossip, espionage, and by developing extra bonds through traditional means. Here family ties and ethnic and religious bonds become significant. Many members originate from the same family; ethnic and religious groups are mobilized to be part of local party organization.27 In the case of the CI-IP, the Alevi groups provide a readily available political community. The problem here is that once the party begins to draw predominantly from one ethnic group, then the others are alienated and this in turn creates the image of an ethnic party. Even though the party was out of power most of the time, the 1991-95 coalition of SHP-DYP and many municipalities provided good sources of funds for the party rank and file. The majority of party members saw this
opportunity as a ehanee to obtain some tangible benefits such as jobs, licenses for building houses, or legalizing buildings in squatter settlement areas. In times of great resources, this could go mainly unnoticed, but as the country was experiencing economic difficulties, favors for party members attracted the attention of neighbors and created the image of a party of favoritism. The embourgeoisement of local leadership after 1980 added corruption to this problematic mix. There developed a list of contractors who were active party members with the ability to mobilize votes in local congresses. They demanded that mayors and cabinet ministers gave them contracts in return for power. Thus, after 1991 there came a wave of corruption allegations, the most well known being that against the Istanbul Water and Sewerage Agency (istanbul Su ve Kanalizm:von Maresi-ISKi). The same trend continued until the 1999 elections when the party lost all its parliamentary scats. Nowadays it is limited to a few municipalities. The above problems had been anticipated by BUlent Ecevit, and encouraged him to establish a new model when founding his partyminimal party organization. Deniz Baykal has also come to recognize the defects of the party organization. In his case, minimal organization is difficult because the CHP already has an elaborate formation and network. He is now attempting to form a party without any internal opposition, where his faction, strengthened with bonds of loyalty, will become the party. The role of this organization will be limited to internal elections, which may include the primaries. Baykal believes that vote mobilization will be accomplished by the leader through the extensive use of the media. The old forms of the door-to-door campaign canvassing, meetings, and rallies are considered passe. Baykal is developing a model of organization working exclusively for the leader, instead of Ecevit's minimal organization. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AFTER 1980 AND THE CliP
Since 1980 the SHP/CHP tradition has remained mainly in the opposition, except for the four-year period between 1991-95. While both in power and in opposition, the main emphasis of the social democrats has been on liberties, and particularly on lifting those restrictions imposed by the military government. Since its establishment the SI-IP has made human rights the primary focus of its discourse, attacking sllch violations of human rights as the torture of convicted persons and long detainment by the police. One of the primary legal changes passed by the party when in power was an alteration
119
Political Parties in Turkey
The Republican People :\. Party
of the Penal Code that rendered the police more accountable and liberalized rules of detainment. The SHP has also tried to appeal for the rights of minorities and attempted an electoral alliance that would enable the Kurdish identity to be represented in the parliament. Furthermore, the party played a crucial role in amending the Constitution and expanding the right to participate in political parties for groups such as women, youths, university lecturers, and union activists. Since the 1970s, the CHP has played a very important role in the consolidation of "the left" as part of the political spectrum in Turkey. The legitimacy of being on the left had been secured by ismet inonii, one of the founding fathers of the Republic, declaring himself to be on the left of center. This was reinforced by the nationalist deeds of Ecevit, and the democratic struggles of Erdal inoni.i. Even the military government of 1980s, after allowing the political parties to open in 1983, proposed that one of the parties should be on the left. This legitimacy enables groups from the left to argue for more egalitarian policies without facing the old accusation of Communism. The new CI-IP has played another positive role in consolidating secularism. In the! 990s, which saw the significant rise of political Islam, the CHP became the stronghold of secularism. The party not only brought the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the forefront in the 1991 and 1995 election campaigns, but also promoted the civil society movement against the 1996-97 RP-DYP (True Path Party) coalition. The central and local party organizations took active part in the anti-fundamentalist protests, including such activities as "Women's March against the Shari'a." This is why the greatest worry came from secularist groups, when the party could not enter the parliament in 1999. Although the SHP/CHP tradition was able to playa significant role in improving the process of democratization in Turkey, it was unable to replicate similar positive input in the area of political economy. The decisions made on January 24, 1980 started a new era in Turkish politics. This was the first of a chain of changes that would alter the form of political participation in Turkey. In the past, participation meant taking part in decisions for resource allocation. In a growing economy, the parties would compete for more resources to be distributed to voters. Since then the resources to be distributed decreased because of the shrinking economy and the concentration of available resources for a limited few. Political parties with extensive networks like the DYP and the CHP found it extremely difficult to cope with this new situation. The role of party organization was also altered by the communications revolution. Media, especially television, replaced the role of local
branches for information dissemination. Consequently, a new role model for the peripheral party was not developed. The political environment became slippery once the Soviet Union was demolished, bringing a totally new world into existence. Globalization means outside forces have a highly effective impact on changing the country. In this new context, the CHP could not develop a New Turkey vision. For example, it never discussed the role of Turkey in Europe, within its own region, or what kind of an integration with the European Union (EU) was appropriate. The CHP does not have a clear worldview on globalization; there is an oscillation of ideas in the leadership that range from xenophobic perspectives to full integration with the globe, even abolishing the borders of the nation-state. For a long while, the party remained oblivious to economic problems. The decisions of January 24 were almost disregarded because the party was trying to make up for the loss of democratic rights, which accompanied the neo-liberal reforms. The "opposition" to the party had been defined in the political realm. Even though there have recently been attempts to formulate an economic program, the party has already established an image of disinterest in the chores of daily life. In a country where the income distribution is distorted almost daily and where there is large-scale unemployment and poverty, it is difficult to understand the existence of a "social democratic" party that does not even tackle the questions of social justice, equality, and social welfare. In this non-policy stance, the CHP has been under the influence of the media, which has criticized all distributive mechanisms as '''populism.'' Not being able to propose a new distribution policy itself, the CHP refrained from talking about poverty or social justice so that it would not be a target for the media. Thus, the CI-IP could not be a spokesperson for the losers of thc post-1980 structural adjustment programs. The party did not speak up for them, so they lost faith in thc party and gave their votes largely to the DSP, which gave the impression of defending the subaltern. As noted, as the party got smaller, its organization beeame more closed, there were fewer resources, which made sharing more difficult. A close scrutiny of who constitutes "us" became the criterion to deterl11l11e who qualified to benefit from resources. This alienated new groups from participation in the party and the CI-IP found itself in a vicious circle. Yet it is not alone in this vicious circle. The parties of the center, on both the left and the right, have found it difficult to adapt to the new world and new forms of politics. The effective new actors in Turkish pol itics, from social movements to the media, have developed outside the realm of political
118
120
parties. The proposed structural adjustment reforms and changes in the fiscal policies of the state will add further difficulty. The old forms of political participation cannot continue because the form of state intervention in the economy will no longer be the distribution of resources to the voters. None of the existing political parties realize what is in store for them. The CI-IP is in danger of further marginalization if, like all the parties of the center, it cannot find a way of restructuring its ideology, support bases, and organizational structure together with the forms of participation. The CHP has some advantages in this struggle. but old forms of cleavage are very important in Turkey. The CI-IP has an organization that can speak up for some of the class interests, religious groups, and a welfare economy, and it also has links with the new identity groups, such as ethnic minorities and feminists. However, it could neither achieve an organizational reform to articulate these interests nor formulate a new ideology. The CHP was reborn in 1972, and saw its votes increase from 27 percent in 1969 to 42 percent in 1977. Whether it still retains that kind of a potential remains to be seen. If not, it will certainly be a glorified party of modernization in history books.
NOTES I.
2.
3. 4.
5. 6.
7.
H. 9. 10.
The Republican
Political Parties ill Turkey
For a further discussion of anticipated changcs in political partics, sec Alan Ware, Political Parlies alld PilrZI' '~I'SICIIIS (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Prcss, I (96); Richard Hof'tCrberl, Parlies alld DCllloc/'{/c:1' (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 1998); Klaus von BeYlllc, Polilicol Parlies ill Wesll'1'II DClllocracies (Aldershot: Gowcr, 1985). Elizabeth C)zdalga, "On thc Footstcps of Atallirk" (unpublished Ph.D. thcsis, Goteborg UniverSity, 1978); Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Diil/emil/de CIIIII/lllr~)'cl Halk Parlisi 'lIde Cieli,I'IIIe/er-S~)'asel [Mill1i Arlsllldalll3ir il/celelllc (Istanbul: 13ogazi9i Oniversitesi YaYllllan, 1(76). Clllllllllr(l'el Halk Parli.l'i Prograllli (Ankara: l1.p., 1977). p.12. ilhan Tekcli and Ra~it Giik"cli, 1973 I'C 1975 Se(,ill1leri Sq:ill1 Cograji'{/.I·I (j;:cril/l' HiI' Del/ellle (Istanbul: MiIIiyet YaYllllan, 1977), pA2. Ergun C)zbudun, "TUrI(\yc'dc Sosyal Dcgi~llle vc Siyasal Katllllla," AI/kol'll (jlliversilesi 1111fillk FalaUlcsi }J:IYIIII, No.363 (1975). Ay~c Glinc~-Ayata, CHP-(}rglll 1'(' idcol(!ii (Ankara: Giindogan YaYllllan, 1(92); Ay~c Glinc~-Ayata, "Idcology, Social Bases and Organizational Structurc in the Post 19S0 Political I'm-tics," in Birol Yc~ilada (ccL), Polillcal al/d Socio-ecollolllic 7hllls/i}/'/l/alillll (IF 71ll'kcy Sil/ce 1980 (Prcager, 19(3), pp.3 I--5 I. Harald Sehlilcr, "Alcvilcr ve Sosyal DCllloknltlann ittifilk AraYI~I: DilscI vc DinscI Tanlllllal1llll~ Gruplann Sosyal DCl1lokrat-Laik Ortam vc PartiIIerdekl Rolli," III Stcphanos Ycrasllllos (ccL), 7l'irkil'e 'de SiI'i1 7bpllllll I'e Mil/(I'CI('ilik (Istanbul: ileti~11ll YaYll1lan, 19(9), pp. I 33-84_ Ay~c Glinc~-Ayata, "Wolllcn as Idcntity Markers: The Case of Urban Alevi in Turkcy," Zeilscllriji ill 7ilrkeisllldiclI, No.1 (2000), pp.57-69. Glinq-Ayata (1992). Ernl Tuncer, SCPIII '99-18 Nistlll 1999 Millcll'ekili Gellel .)'''rim/eri Sa),lslIl I'e S~\'as{/I Dc.~e,.lelldi,.mc (Ankara: TESAY Yakfl, 1999), p.93.
I I. 12.
13. 14. 15.
16.
I7
IS. 19. 20.
21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.
People:~
Party
121
Erol Tunecr and Co~kun Kasapba~, Se('illl'99-~I(I Nisall 1999 il Gencl Meclisi 1'1' Belediy!! Serimlai-SaYI.l'(//l'c S~\'osol DeiJ,erlellllil'mc (Ankara: TESAV Vakfl, 20(0), pp_IO 1--28. Neiat Erdcr. Sczgin TUzlin. Ahlllct Kcrdclll and Filiz Kcrdclll, Tiil'kiyeye Sil'ilSI l'al'lilel'ill Se('mellleri I'e Sosyal Demokrasillill Toplumsal Tahmll (Ankara: TUSES YaHI, 1995), pp.42-58. Erdcr (1995), ]1.141. Ncjat EHlcr, Tiil'kiye 'de S~\,{lsi Pal'li SI'('1I1I'III1'l'illill Nil1'liklel'i, Kimliklel'i I'e 1:/J,ilimf,!l'i (Istanbul: TOSES Yakfl, 1996), p.155. Hasan BUlcnt Kahraman, "OGUncU Yol Politikalan, Klircscl1e~mc vc TUrk Sosyal DClllokrasisi," in Murat YalGlIltan (ccL), (jriillcii Yol Al'llYI.)·lol'I Fe Tlll'kiye (Istanbul: BUkc YaYllllan, 20(0), pp.115-33_ Erdogan Y lid Il'I Ill, CHP ve DSP' Sosyal Delllokrasill;1I 'Belil'sdik SOruIlU' (Ankara: Birikim YaYllllan, 1996). Andrcw Mango, "The Social Dcmocratic Populist Party, 1983---1989," in Mctin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (cds.), Polilical Pal'lies olld Dem()cl'll(l' ill 7lirkey (Ncw York: 1.13. Taw'is, 1991), pp.170-XS; Aylin Chman and Simten Co~ar, "1990'larda TUrkiyc\le Sag ve Sol Siyasetin C)ncliIleri," Bil'ikim, No_139 (2000). pp.1 I 1--20; Hasan Blilent Kahraman. Sos,l'al Dcmokrasi. 7l'il'kil'e I'e ['ol'lila; (Ankara: Imge YaYlllcvl, 1993). Taml Bora and N~cmi Erdogan, "CHI' vc DSP'de Solun Bal(lyesi Ncdir? ," Hil'ik;m, No. I 20 (1999), pp.28-35. Cumlluriye/ Halk POl'lisi Pmgl'(JI11I (1993). Murat Bclgc, "Sol uk Anadolu Yolu," Radikal (Istanbul daily), Fcb. I I, 200 I ;Hasan I3lilcnt Kahralllan, "Baykal'lIl <,::arcslzligi," Radikal, Feb. 12, 200 I; Hikmct C.·ctlllkaya, "CHI' Ncrcyc," CIIIII/lllriy('l, Feb. 16,2001; Ergin Yllcllzoglu, "Escamotagc," ('1111111111'1\'('(, Jan. 19, 20(lI. Speech by I3aykal, CiiilldclII, Dcc. 9, 2000; undatcd Icaflct distributed by the party. CHP 28. ()Ia,~all Kllmlla,l' Rapo/'ll (199H). Nccllli Erdog,m, "Dclllokratik Sol ve Sosyal Dcmokrat Portrclcr," I3irikilll. NoA4 (1992), pp.27-32. HEP (I'cople's Work Party) is known fiJI' its Kurdish nationalist inclinations. Yon BCYlllc (1985), p.226. Schiiler (1999). Ertugrul Glinay, "CI-IP Nercyc," ClIlI1l1l1r;yel, March 29, 2001.
The People :\' Democracy Party
------------------------ 8 ------------------------
The People's Democracy Party AYLiN GUNEY
The Kurdish problem has existed in Turkey since the inception of the Republic (1923), yet the formation of opposition parties, which brought the problem to the public space, did not take place until the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, Turkish law has always insisted that all political pmiies embrace the whole nation, J)~I1~i~~h among othClJ things, patiies based on regionalism and ethnicity. It was after the first military coup in 1960-61 that some political parties began to assume specifically religious or ethnic colors, thanks to the liberal 1961 Constitution. i In this relatively free political environment, such rightwing political parties as the New Turkey Party (Yent Ttlrkiye Partisi-YTP) and left-wing political parties such as the Turkish Workers' Party (Tiirkiye j~'(:i Partisi-TiP) began to exploit ethnic issues for political benefit. Most of the members of the YTP were local landlords in southeastern Turkey where Kurds (read "Kurds" as "Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin") live in great numbers. In the early I 960s, the party received more than 30 percent of the votes in that region. In the 1970 party Congress, the Tip took up the Kurdish problem, and appeared as the first \ legal party to recognize openly the existence of Kurds in Turkey. 2 In March 1971, the military intervened in politics and all Kurdish nationalist activity was repressed. The coup-by-pronunciamento was an attempt by the military to defend what it perceived to be a weakened state under assault by Leftists, Islamists, and Kurds. The coup tried to maintain the hegemony of the Republican political philosophy.' This was considered a must for safeguarding national unity and the territorial integrity of the country. The political discourse of the late 1960s stressed underdevelopment as the primary cause of the Kurdish problem. In the 1970s, despite the 1971 military intervention and the subsequent amending of the Constitution in an authoritarian direction, one that focused on ethnicity replaced the discourse of underdevelopment. The Tip and some student groups kept the Kurdish issue on the political agenda. They argued that by pursuing
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capitalist and imperialist policies the state had denied the existence of Kurdish identity and, furthermore, had not made a genuine effort to develop the Southeast economically. Initially, the Tip and other groups aimed at persuading the government to recognize the Kurdish language and grant cultural rights to the Kurds. Later, however, their rhetoric became revolutionary and even secessionist." This led to armed confrontations between the radical Marxists and rightwing ultra-nationalists, bringing serious political and social instability to Turkey. The ideological turmoil and political instability as well as the worsening of the economy in the 1970s culminated in another military intervention (September 1980). The indivisibility of the Turkish state and nation was reiterated in the 1982 Constitution, which was the handwork of the interveners. The Constitution defined being a Turk in a non-ethnic sense, stipulating that "everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk."5 Still, this provision implied that the] recognition of a separate Kurdish ethnic identity was not admissible. Clearly, the military sought to revitalize Turkish nationalism, through civic nationalism based on citizenship. The military and some members of the intelligentsia viewed religion as a political tool to boost national unity and weaken the influence of the Marxist and separatist ideas, an approach that was known as "Turkish-Islamic synthesis."" Nevertheless, these policies did not prevent the radical Kurdish groups from intensifying their activities under the banner of an illegal party, the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kiirdistan-PKK), which was led by Abdullah bcalan. From the beginning, the PKK described itself as Marxist-Leninist. It adopted the left-wing anti-imperialist rhetoric of the period. The PKK opposed "Turkish imperialism," which, it argued, was prevalent in "Turkish Kurdistan." The party consequently declared its goal \ to be the creation of a unified and independent Kurdish state, 7 and engaged J in terrorist activities. After a while, the PKK perpetrated its terrorist activities from its headquarters in Lebanon and Syria. By the end of 1992, the PKK terrorist campaign had taken more than 5,000 lives. Thc situation deteriorated as years went on. Before the hostilities came to a lull in early 1999, that number had climbed to 30,000. In the meantime, that is from 1990 onwards, legal Kurdish-oriented political parties, planing to run for elcction in the parliament, began to form in Turkey. The People's Democracy Pmiy (Hal/all Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP) is such a political party in present-day Turkey. Concerning HADEP, as well as the political parties that preceded it, there
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is not much information on such issues as leadership patterns, and the internal structure and functioning of the party. Ailer briefly discussing its predecessors, this contribution takes up first HADEP's electoral support, its approach to the issue of the Kurdish question, and its views on the state and democracy. Finally, it attempts to assess the degree to which HADEP would contribute or obstruct the consolidation and deepening of democracy in Turkey. In order to place this narrative on the Kurdish oriented political parties, including HADEP, into context, it is important to note that the unitary state in Turkey has always been suspicious towards the issue of ethnicity. The first and foremost factor here was the intermittent Kurdish riots from 1925 to 1938. The second, and the more immediate factor, was the terrorist activities of the PKK, and the latter's ultimate aim of founding an independent Kurdish state. The sensitivity on this issue lessened somewhat following the Gulf War. Some political leaders appeared to be willing to give legal Kurdish parties a chance. Turgut Ozal, prime minister from 1983 until 1990 and president from 1990 until 1993, openly acknowledged the "Kurdish reality." In 1987, he even persuaded the parliament to remove from the statute book the provision that in 1983 had indirectly banned the use of Kurdish. H Yet, the death ofOzal marked a return to the earlier stance on the Kurdish issue. That approach has lingered to this day, despite the fact that in the early 1990s Siileyman Demirel as president, and Erdal inonii as leader of the Social Democratic People's Party (So,\~val Demokrat Halkf'l Parti-SHP), had spoken publicly of the "Kurdish reality."
grounds that the party had become a focus of illegal political pursuits and was engaged in activities against "the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and people.'''' HEP was succeeded by the Democracy Party (Delllokrasi PartisiDEP), which was generally viewed in political circles as a replica ofHEP. 1O DEP was founded in May 1993 by a group of politicians that included many prominent HEP parliamentarians. The latter had resigned from I-IEP because of the probability of the closure of their party in the near future. Under DEP, the leadership cadres became increasingly divided over the question of how much support to give to the PKK. Eventually, a division emerged between a moderate flank and a radical group. I-Iatip Dicle, a deputy from the city of Diyarbalm in the southeast, was the leader of the radicals. II DEP acted in an even more adversarial manner than its predecessor. It showed much less sensitivity towards mainstream Turkish public opinion. In February 1994, a PKK bomb killed a group of young militmy cadets in a railway station near Istanbul. Dicle publicly declared, "In war, everyone in uniform is a target."12 At a DEP Congress, he also argued that the PKK is a political, not a terrorist, organization. I) Another leading member of DEP referred to the PKK's terrorist activities as a struggle for "an independent and unified Kurdish state," and demanded a political solution to the Kurdish question. 14 Consequently, the( parliamentary imml.l11ity of the DEP deputies of Kurdish origin was removed in March 1994. Six DEP deputies were arrested, found guilty and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The party was closed in Junc 1994 by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that Dicle and other DEP members had made provocative statements against the Turkish Republic. As noted, HADEP emerged as the next Kurdish-oriented party. In May 1994, Murat Bozlak, a lawyer, founded the party. Initially, HADEP seemed to have a moderate stance towards the Kurdish question and kept its distance from the PKK. It also chose not to join the parliament-in-exile in the Netherlands. Therefore, HADEP avoided the limelight until its disastrous party Congress in .June 1996. At the said Congress, masked men let the Turkish flag drop on the floor and raised the PKK banner in its place. As a result of this incident, all HADEP members, including the party's leader, were arrested. All but one of the defendants was charged with belonging to or leading an illegal armed group, under Article 168 of the Turkish Penal Code. The public prosecutor argued that HADEP had acted as a front for the PKK. The press releases of the PKK's news agency and pro-PKK journals and magazines found in the offices ofHADEP members were presented as evidence of the
FROM HEP TO HADEP
The first of the pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey was the People's Work Party \ (Hal/un Emek Partisi-HEP). This party was formed on June 7, 1990 by seven members of parliament who had been expelled from the SHP for ./ attending a conference in Paris on the Kurdish question. At the October 1991 national elections, HEP and the SHP merged and former HEP deputies ran on the SI-IP ticket and won the elections. Then, while taking their oath in the parliament, several former HEP deputies switched to the Kurdish language and displayed colors associated with the PKK. Soon ailer this incident, they left the SHP to re-establish HEP. Due to the overt promotion of Kurdish political and cultural rights, albeit formulated within the larger fi'amework of "the right to self-determination," HEP was banned \ \ by the Constitutional Court in July 1993. The court's decision was on the
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close relationship between HADEP and the PKK. The insult committed against the Turkish flag at the HADEP Congress seems to have been the last straw. The public prosecutor argued that the HADEP leadership had done nothing to put an end to those acts. Bozlak later denied it, pointing out that they had immediately denounced that provocative act. 15 One gets the impression that in HADEP, as in its predecessor, DEP, there was a tug-of-war between the moderates and the radicals, and the above acts were the handwork of the latter. At HADEP's November 1998 party Congress, leaders advised calm to the delegates. In fact, they worked closely with police to insure that incidents similar to those in the 1996 Congress would not take place. Mehmet Satan, a member of the Central Committee of HADEP, stated at a news conference that "there were efforts to create hatred between Kurds and Turks [read 'Turks' as 'Turkish citizens of Turkish origin ']. We called on everyone to act in a responsible manner and refrain from acts that would incite enmity between the Turks and the Kurds. "I<, The arrest of the PKK leader, Abdullah (kalan, in February 1999 put a strain on HADEP's efforts to remain "moderate."'7 Until recently, HADEP had not openly denied its association with the PKK. In January 1999, the public prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to close the party on the grounds that there had been an organic link between HADEP and the PKK. The prosecutor argued that the HADEP Congresses had turned into an arena of support for (kalan. He added that the seminars held by the local branches of the party were used as a means of inculcating enmity towards the state and the constitutional order the latter rests upon. According to the prosecutor, "the PKK threatened to kill people who did not vote for HADEP."'H As if to support the last accusation, in his trial Ocalan stated that the PKK had made monetary contributions to HADEP; it nominated HADEP's candidates in the national elections; and, in turn, HADEP trained militants for the PKK.''l As a result of these statements by Ocalan, the prosecutor called for preventing HADEP from competing in the April 18, 1999 national elections. The prosecutor argued that "If political parties that are established with ties to terrorist organisations are allowed to participate in the elections ... we will have in this country thousands of terrorist parliamentarians, mayors, and members of local government bodies."20 Nevertheless, HADEP entered the 1999 national elections when the Constitutional Court, which still has not come up with a ruling on the closure case of the party, rejected the prosecutor's call. 21 The party had also competed in the 1995 national elections. It has been claimed that although
HADEP had not achieved its goals in the 1995 or 1999 national elections, the party succeeded in legitimizing itself for two reasons. First, it proved that despite the long years of war and violence it was the preferred choice of the people in the southeast. Second, its poor electoral results in the major cities in other parts of the country were received with a collective sigh of relief by the Turks who had feared all along that the party would score electoral victories in regions other than the southeasf.22
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HADEP'S ELECTORAL SUPPORT
HADEP did not participate in the 1994 municipal elections, claiming that the state's intimidating tactics made it very difficult for the party to stage a free campaign.2J However, as noted, the party patiicipated in the 1995 and 1999 national elections. Before the 1995 elections, HADEP also doubted whether the elections would be conducted in a free and fair manner. The patiy thought that the ten percent nationwide clection threshold, the presence of the military security forces in most martial law areas wherc I-IADEP had strong political suppOli, the insufficient time allowed for the displaced Kurds 2<' and the newly-eligible 18-year-olds to register to vote, and the heavy snows in December, which made roads impassable in most areas in the southeast, would have worked against it. In fact, the patiy called for observers from the "democratic peoples of the world" to monitor the elections. 25 In the 1995 national elections, I-IADEP garnered 4.2 percent of the ) votes. Since its votes remained below the nationwide threshold of ten percent, it was not able to gain representation in parliament. In the southeast, HADEP tried to appeal to its Kurdish voters by seeking the support of the tribal leaders and large landowners and recruiting religious leaders as candidates. It has been suggested that in the southeast, the Kurds tilted towards the Welfare Party (Refah Parlisi-RP) because they perceived it as the most anti-system party in the recent pase" Additionally, the Islamic stance of the party was appealing to some Kurds, for traditionally Islam had been more important than ethnicity to the Kurdish communities in the southeast. 27 The tribal and religious leaders in the region were conservative in the political, economic and social sense and, furthermore, tended to view HADEP as being close to the PKK. Many of thosc leaders had been alienated by the radical leftist discoursc of the Kurdish parties like DEP and HADEP.'H Still, in the 1995 elections, relatively speaking, I-IADEP did quite well in the southeast. The three provinccs where it did exceptionally well were
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Hakkari (54.2 percent), Diyarbalm (46.3 percent), and Batman (37.2 percent).2" However, HADEP was defeated in largc cities in other regions of the country where large numbers of Kurds lived. This was in part becausc the religiously oriented RP was extremely successful in garnering the votcs of the Kurds who lived in the squatter settlement areas of large cities in those regions. One of the best examples of such a squatter settlement area was Sultanbeyli at the outskirts of Istanbul. In the 1995 elections, the RP obtained 56 percent of the votes in SuJtanbeyli while HADEP won only 8.5 percent. In comparison to the situation in the southeast, the most important reason behind HADEP's losing votes in such neighborhoods was the RP's successful populist and c1ientelist policies. ( . Distribution of food and fuel and arranging circumcisions, weddings, and funerals were among the means through which thc RP successfully won the "hearts and minds" of the Kurds in those places. 3 For instance, the mayor of Van, Aydll1 Talay, a member of the Virtue Party (Fazilet PartisiFP),3! said: "Ethnicity is not the issue here; our problem is poverty. People need help and they'll vote for the party that meets their expactations."J2 He added: "Some speak Kurdish, some speak Turkish, but we serve them all We have paved their roads and built scwers for everyone, regardless of ethnicity or political views. We delivered what they needed; that's why people voted tor us."]] Being unorganized and not commanding large sums ( of funds, HADEP could not compete with the RP when it came to t patronage politics. In the 1999 national elections, HADEP's overall votes increased from 4.2 percent to 4.7 percent. However, since it was still unable to pass the nationwide threshold, again the party was unable to return representatives to the parliament. On the othcr hand, the party was still successful in the southeast. It won municipalities in seven citics there, including the biggest city of the region, with more than I million Kurds, Diyarbalm. In Diyarbalm, Feridun Celik, a 33-year-old lawyer from HADEP, obtained 62.5 percent of the vote. This time too HADEP complained of the disadvantages it faced in the elections. In an interview, the party's Deputy Chairman Ali I-hellr Dogan claimed that the party would have approached the ten percent threshold in the southeast if the state had not pressured the voters so heavily. He pointed out that before the elections, security officers stranded some 100 HADEP buses, HADEP election offices were closed down, and the party members were not able to freely conduct their campaigns except those made on a face-to-face basis. Dogan also criticized the state for refusing to acknowledge the existence ofa Kurdish problem. He said: "If you say that 1)
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there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey, you create an atmosphere for the repetition of unwanted incidents ... The problem exists and a solution for this problem should be found ... If you deny the existence of the problem, you legitimize its sources."J·! THE HADEP AND THE KURDISH QUESTION
Not unexpectedly, one of the major issues that HADEP has addressed in its party program is the Kurdish problem. It is stated that the Kurdish problem remains one of the most important problems that Turkey should resolve. The party program argues that Turkey has been facing this problem because of the wrong policies that not only prevented democratization, but also impeded economic and social development by channeling a large par~. of the resources to military expenditures. 35 It points out th~t the Kurdi~h \ problem should be resolved by peaceful means, achievll1g economIc) development and improving democracy.J(, HADEP has certain policy proposals for solving the Kurdish problem. First it underlines the need for the adoption of "con~titutional citizenship." The ~mty points out that one should not ~fiy to promote natiol1al1111ifY-on the basis of cultural affinity or blood ties, but rather on the foundation of the voluntmy loyalty of citizens to the state. Therefore, Kurdishness or other cultural identities should not be viewed as incompatible with the overarching identity of Turkish citizenship. Secondly, the party suggests that some special provisions adopted with a view to the Kurds should be abolished. These include the ban on non-Turkish names for persons and towns, the ban on education and broadcasting in Kurdish, and the restrictions on political activities carried out in Kurdish. Thirdly, the pmty proposes that some specific economic and social measures should be adopted for the southeast, through a Regional Economic Development Plan. J7 HADEP sees] land ref01111 as a must because a great majority of the peasants are landless, and draws attention to the fact it is impossible to improve agriculture in the border areas of the region to the south since they are full of mine-fields. HADEP perceives reviving animal-breeding in the region as a necessity since it used to be the major source of income for the inhabitants. The party is also in favor of forming free trade zones and re-stmting trade across the borders. Turning to social issues, HADEP notes that the government should pay greater attention to the issues of unemployment insurance, social security, education, health, and cultural services. In addition to all of the above, the party argues that the local governments should be financially strengthened, with their debts covered by the TreasUly.JH
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The People 50 Democracy Party
The most important reason behind the closure of the earlier Kurdish parties was their perceived links to the PKK. Therefore, it is important to note here how HADEP approaches the PKK issue. HADEP calls for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the military and the PKK. As noted, for a long time the party hesitated to deny its linkage to the PKK. [n recent years, however, HADEP has adopted a different discourse on this issue. In June 1999, HADEP's mayor in the town of Klztltepe in Mardin province visited the family of a policeman killed by the PKK terrorists and expressed his condolences. His statement, "Enough is enough. We all suffered a great dea["W may be taken as a sign of willingness on the part of HADEP to disassociate itself from the PKK. The mayor of Diyarbalm, Feridun Celik, also made similar statements. On one occasion Celik stated: "From now on we should leave this debate behind and start to think how we shall be able live together as Turks, Kurds, Lazes, and Circassians, so that we can jointly work for this countIy.""" Regarding a new project initiated by his municipality, Celik said: "This [new project] will be a sign that we are neither separatists nor against the state."'!! Most recently HADEP leader Bozlak stated:
This particular perception of HADEP frequently led the state authorities to take stern measures against the party. In February 2000, four Kurdish mayors (of the cities of Diyarbaklr, Siirt, Bingo!, and Agn) were charged with promoting the Kurdish cause by providing funds for the PKK and taking instructions from it. The mayors were summarily removed from their posts by the MinistIy ofInterior, and then taken into custody:'4 While HADEP Deputy Chairman Ahmet Turan Demir discussed this development at a press conference, one journalist asked: "It is claimed that the PKK is trying to politicize the Kurdish problem. What are your views on this?" Demir replied:
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It was claimed that HADEP has been the political arm of the PKK. It is not true. This is not something we claim today. We made the same point in 1996 .,. Let me point out in all my sincerity: HADEP is not a separatist party. Neither is it a vulgar national ist party. Ours is a leftist mass party. We have never perceived ourselves as a Kurdish Party ... All of those who died [in the armed conflict] are our children ... [In one of our meetings in Istanbul] ... [w]e brought together the mother of a soldier who had died with the mother of a young man from the Southeast who also lost his life on top of a bus, and pleaded with everybody that from now on we should put an end to the loss of lives ... Yet we are still seen as a Kurdish party:12 Indeed, HADEP continues to be perceived with suspicion by the state authorities. A recent report entitled "The Domestic and International Institutions and Power of the Terrorist Organization PKK,"4J prepared by the Turkish Intelligence Agency, stated that after bca[an's capture, the PKK tended to slide towards a po[itieal platform, starting an intensive propaganda campaign along those lines through its broadcasting channels in Europe. The report listed HADEP as one of the organizations that provide support to the PKK; it claimed that the PKK aimed to supervise the activities of the municipalities controlled by HADEP.
We want everyone to have the right to freely engage in politics. If the PKK wants to engage in politics in a way that accords with Turkey's laws and regulations, then the necessary legal and constitutional groundwork should be prepared for this. If the creation of an environment that will preclude a return to violence is desired, then we should welcome this. Whoever wants to participate in politics in accordance with the State's laws and the regulations, the ground should be prepared for this. This is one of the criteria for democracy:" HADEP does not seem to have been demoralized by the four-mayor incident. Its DiyarbakIr Provincial Chairman, Ali Urkiit, recently declared: "Despite everything, we will continue our struggle for peace and democracy. ""I> The removal of the mayors from their posts was contested by such European countries as Switzerland and Germany as well as by Amnesty International and the European Parliament. Some circles in Europe viewed the mayors as the very persons who could start a non-violcnt Kurdish political movement:') However, President Siileyman Demirel stated that "each and every state has the right to implement its own laws and regulations, and Europe has no right to pressure Turkey not to apply its laws."·'K HADEP, STATE, AND DEMOCRACY
HADEP has severely criticized the political regime in Turkey, noting that it is an "oligarchic Republic," and that a "democratic Republic" should rep [ace it.-''! The main target of criticism has been the state, which is perceived as an authoritarian and centralist state that disregards the rule of law.5I' HADEP also criticizes the state for always having pursued an
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"assimiliationist policy" towards 110n-Turks by being engaged in an "imperialist, racist, and chauvinist-nationalist oppression upon the cultural life of the people.",1 As noted, HADEP saw democracy and democratization as the only way to solve, among others, the Kurdish problem. According to the party, the ending of the armed conllict betwecn the government forccs and the PKK is a golden opportunity for democratization. It proposed some concrete reforms for democratizing the political regime in Turkey. Among other things, the party considers the "problcm of civilianization" as an important issue of Turkish democracy. Under this heading, two issues are emphasized: One is the question of which ministry the chief of the general staff should be accountable to. In Turkey, the chief of the general staff reports to prime minister, the rationale being that if he reported to the minister of defense that office would be politicized. HADEP is critical of this arrangement, noting that in parliamentary systems of government, the chief of the general stafT is responsible to the Minister of Defense. The second issue is the role the National Security Council (Mi11i Giivenlik Kurulu-MOK) plays in Turkey.'2 The MOK was made up ofthe prime minister, the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, and defense, the chief of the general stafj~ and four force commanders, and was chaired by the President. It made recommendations to the government on matters of internal and external security which the government had to give top priority. In HADEP's view, the fact that the number of the civilian members of the MOK, other than the President, was less than the number of the military officers in that body was unacceptable. (Following the recent constitutional amendments, the number of civilians in the MOK is less than the members of the military, and government "assesses" rather than "gives top priority" to the recommendations made by that body.) HADEP is also against the MOK's dealing with a wide scope of issues, ranging from economy, foreign policy, education, and human rights to universityadministration. 53 According to HADEP, in addition to the problem of the civilianization of the political regime, a judicial reform is necessary. This reform should include such matters as abolishing the death penalty, a just electoral law, the removal of the threshold in the election laws, making election coalitions possible among political parties, a wider recognition of syndical rights and freedoms, the removal of legal obstacles to freedom of expression and association, freedom of conscience, and putting an end to the widespread practice of torture. The party states that the existing internal security concerns constitute the main impediment to further
democratization but the 1982 Constitution is an additional obstacle. It suggests that that the Constitution should be replaced by "a constitution befitting a democratic civil society."'·1 Furthermore HADEP places emphasis on the decentralization of government, proposing the strengthening of local government and the promotion of political participation. According to the party, the supervision of the central government over the local government should be removed and government in the localities should be conducted by the "active participation of the people." In addition, the municipal, city, and town councils should be elevated to the status of "local parliaments." In line with these changes, mayors, police chiefs, and district governors should be elected rather than appointed. HADEP calls municipalities "People's Municipalities" and argues that these should be the places where the people and the municipality would embrace each other." The party would like to see local governments engaged in a wide range of activities, from providing animal shelters to building town museums.'" HADEP also plans to transfer responsibility for education, health, and local security services from the central government to the local governments. 57 Concerning education, which, as noted, it intends to entrust to local governments, HADEP emphasizes the importance of the democratization of education. It sees the present system as being under the influence of an ethnic and chauvinistic approach. The party argues that education in Turkey produces one-dimensional persons. The party envisages an enlarged role for local governments and civil societal associations in order to overcome the inequalities the present educational system perpetuates in different regions and classes. The party intends to render universities "autonomous. "5R HADEP adopts a secular and democratic stance regarding religion. It does not approve of the present policies, which, in its opinion, discriminate between different religions and sects. The party argues that the state should withdraw fi'om the sphere of religion. 5" HADEP draws attention to "the pluralist nature of Turkey's historical heritage," and proposes that it should be preserved and, in fact, further deepened by the active participation of all segments of society. HADEP indicates that "People's Municipalities" would contribute to the maintenance and development of local and cultural identities. The party would like to see municipalities set up radio and television stations that would broadcast in ditferent languages and present local, cultural, artistic, literary, and folkloric programs."" HADEP is in favor of the names of streets, squares, and institutions that fall under the jurisdiction of local governments being re-named in order to reflect local characteristics.
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HADEP draws attention to the fact that the European Union (EU), imposes certain standards for democracy and human rights. It states that "parallel to the global developments, ... [the EU] aims to institutionalize j11l111an rights and democratization ... [evelywhere]."61 The party strongly SUPPOl~s Turkey's jo.ining the EU, since "~he .tie with the EU means that standatds ... stated 111 the Copenhagen cntena would be adopted ... [in Turkey, toO]."62 Upon the release of the EU Accession Partnership Document, HADEP mayors expressed their support for the entry of Turkey into the Union in a joint declaration. They were pleased that the points the document emphasized were considered prerequisites for full membership of the EU. They included the freedom of expression, democratization, the prevention of torture, respect for human rights, the rule of law, independentjudiciaty, the abolition of the death penalty, education in one's mother tongue, and the like. The mayors also indicated their wish to see such reforms as the abolition of the death sentence and ending the Emergency Rule in the Southeast as soon as possible. 6J
I(
HADEP AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Ji.irgen Puhle have noted that a democratic regime is consolidated "when all politically significant groups regard its political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation, and adhere to the democratic rules of the game."',·1 They have further pointed out that one broad indicator of consolidation is the absence of either a politically significant anti-system party, or a semi-loyal party with the same status. An anti-system patty is unequivocally opposed to the existing regime. A semi-loyal party does not oveltly reject the institutions or norms of a political regime, but nevertheless maintains an ambiguous stance towards it. 65 Along the same lines, Ronan Paddison has suggested that the existence of regional political parties clearly is a sign of the fact that a national political integration has not taken place. Paddison states that such patties are by definition tied to a telTitOlY, embracing only part of the state, their objectives being generally to mobilize support across ethnic, religious or class lines and winning concessions, including autonomy, or even the right to secede from the state."" In his opinion, regional parties pose a threat to the state, especially when the state is a unitary one. Another scholar, Donald Horowitz, states that "democracy can not survive in the face of serious ethnic divisions" and that "unless precautions are taken, democratic atTangements tend to unravel in ethnically divided societies in the form of ethnically based patties."67
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Henri J. Barkey and Graham Fuller have argued that Turkey does not possess any of the problematic characteristics noted by the above authors for two reasons. First, the Kurds constitute a minority (though a large one) and second, and more importantly, whenever they were given the opportunity to vote for a distinctly ethnic party or a mainstream party Kurds tended to split their votes between those two parties.'" Andrew Mango has claimed that if the ban on ethnic parties were lifted, it would be reasonable to expect the emergence of not one but several Kurdish parties, reilecting the deep divisions within Kurdish society."'! Michael Gunter has concluded that the deep divisions among the Kurdish population prevent them from acting politically as a homogenous group. Kurdish language is divided into three major dialects (Kurdi, Kurmaji, and Zaza); Kurdi is further divided into distinct sub-dialects. 7o The Kurds are also divided in the religious sense. Although most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, others are Alevis or attracted to various Dervish orders. The \ existence of feudal landlords, tribal chieftains, and sheikhs (religious) leaders) are the basic obstacles on the way to form a regional nationalism. 71 : Turning to HADEP itself, the 1999 elections seem to have made ani important impact upon the party's discourse and praxis. As a consequence of the Constitutional Court's decision to allow it to enter the national elections, the party gained a new dynamism and motivation. Despite the internal divisions within the party, HADEP in general seemed to be moving towards a more politically moderate stance. The party has pointed) out that its candidates are technocrats rather than militants and that it is a sign of HADEP's willingness to change.72 Also, the party no longer wants to be perceived as a one-issue, that is a solely Kurdish-oriented, patty. Furthermore, the I-JADEP has underlined the fact that its party program encompasses a wide range of issues and addresses all the major problems Turkey faces. 7J Here it must also be noted that the recent statements of HADEP leaders give the impression that they are indeed after normalization in politics. On the other hand, leading rebel commanders of the PKK are said to have played a decisive role in the selection of I-IADEP's list of candidates in the recent elections. Many HADEP officials still openly voice SUppOit for the PKK and some have taken part in hunger strikes staged in support of Abdullah ('kalan. Some patty supporters in the southeast see a link between HADEP and the PKK, claiming that "voting for HADEP is like voting for the PKK."7.' HADEP's contribution to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey depends on the degree to which their wish for normalization claimed by its leaders is genuine, and on the extent to which they will be able to convince
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the political class in Turkey that their discourse is not just double-talk. HADEP would not pose an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey if it indisputably separates itself from the PKK and becomes a ~party that addresses itself to all the major problems Turkey faces, including \ the Kurdish issue. If HADEP successfully fulfils both of these : requirements, that is, if it becomes a system party, it would usefully contribute to the deepening of democracy in Turkey.
NOTES
I. Andrew l\1ango. 711~'ke)': The Cliallenge (!f"a Nell' Ro/e (WestpOll, CT: Praeger, 1994), pAl. 2. Kemal Kn'l~vl and (,areth M. Wmrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. All Emmple ora TrallsSlale Elhlllc COIl/licl (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), pp.1 07-8. . 3. Henri Barkey, "The Stmgglcs ofa 'Strong' State," Joumal o/1l1lemaliol1aIAllilin.• VoI.54.No.1 .. (Fall 2(00), p.92. 4. Kiri~<;i and Winrow (1997), p.1 09. 5. Mango (1994), pA2. 6. Ki[i~<;1 and Winrow (1997), p.112. 7. Henri .f. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, 7lIrkey:\' Kurdish Queslioll (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), Ch.2. 8. Mango (1994), p.47. 9. Nicole F. Watts, "Allies and Encmics: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-1994," IlItematiollalJoumal orMiddle EllS! Studies, Vol.3l, NoA (Nov. 1999), p.639. 10. Mark Muller, "Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: Thc Elimination of Kurdish Representation during thc 1990s," in Robcll Olson (eel.), The KUrt/ish Natiollalist Movemellt ill the 1990.1': Its Impact Oil 71trkey alld the Middle East (Lcxington, KY: University of Kentucky Prcss, 1996), p.187. 11. Watts (1999), p.638. 12. Sabah (Istanbul daily), Fcb. 17, 1994. 13. Watts (1999), p.648. 14. Mullcr (1996), p.188. 15. IHirr~)'Ct (Istanbul daily), Scpt. 3, 200 I. 16. Reuters, Nov. 18, 1998. 17. Watts (1999), p.649. J8. Reutel:\" April 7, 1999. 19. Hllrriyet (Istanbul daily), March 18, 1999. 20. Relllers, April 9, 1999. 21. Milliyet (Istanbul daily), March 9, 1999. At the prescnt time of writing (Deccmber 20(1) the HADEI' leaders havc been aquitted by the State Security COlill. However, the {::onstituti~nal Court's verdict is still pending. 22. Barkey and Fullcr (1998), p.87. 23. Ibid., p.86. 24. HADEI' expected to capture lion's share of the Kurdish vote of thc pcople displaecd by the Illsurgency III thc southeast and moved to coastal citics like Adana, Mersin, and Istanbul. However, most of these people were unable to vote because they could not register at sueh a short l1olicc. Sec Hcnn Barkcy, "The People's Democracy pally (HADEP): The Travails of a Legal Kurdish Pm1y m Turkcy," Journal (!/Muslim Millori(v Allilirs, Vol. 18, No.1 (199H), pp.133-4. 25. HADEPStalem('1II Concerning Upcoming Electiolls ill 7llrkev, Dec. 4, 1995. 26. Barkey (1998), p.132. . 27 Ibid. 28. Barkey and Fuller (1998), pp. 78-9. 29. Barkey (1998), p.132.
The People :\' DelllOcraGY Party
137
30. Ibid., p.133. 31. Virtuc Party (Fazilet Partisi) was thc successor party to thc RP. 32. Susan Gusten, "Political misfits main contcnders tt)r power in Turkey's troubled cast," . 33. Ibid. 34. 7llrkish Dai~v News (Ankara daily), April 29, 1999. 35. HADEP~Halklll Demokrasi Partisi. Parti Programl, 1995, p.l. 36. Ibid. 37 Ibid.,p.12. 38. Peoplc's Democracy Party, HADEI', Year 200() Perspectives o( HADEI', . 39. Metin Hcper, "Turkey's European Vocation and Key Domestic Issues." unpublished manuscript (April 20(0). 40. Hiirr(FCt (Istanbul daily), Jan. 10, 2000. 41. Ibid. 42. Milliye! (Istanbul daily), Sept. 3. 2001. 43. Hiirriyet (Istanbul daily), Aug. 8, 200 I. 44. Agcnce France-Presse. Fcb. 25, 2000. 45. Nell' l'l)rk 7/mes, Fcb. 25, 2000. 46. Ibid. 47 Nell' York Times, Feb. 21, 2000. 48. 7llrkls/t DaiZv News (Ankara daily), Feb. 24, 2000. 49. HADEP-Halklll Demokrasi Partisi, lear 2000 Pe/:\'p('ctives (!f'HADEP. p.2. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid., pA. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid., ppA-5. 55. HADEP-Halklll Demokrasi Partisi. lerel Y611etimler Plalll. . 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid., p.3. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., p.l. 62. HADEP-I-1lllkul Demokrasi Parli.l'i. Year 2000 Per.lpeclil'es otHADEP. p.2. 63. Hiirriyet (Istanbul daily), Nov. 9, 2000. 64. Richard Gunthcr, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jlirgcn Puhlc, "Introduction," in idem (cds.), The Politics (!f" Democratic COllsolidatioll: SOlllhern Ellrope ill Comparalive Perspective (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.7 65. Ibid., pp.13-14. 66. Ronan Paddison, Tlte Fragmented State: The Political Geography 0( Pml'e!' (Ncw York: St. Martin's Prcss, 19R3), p.74. 67. Donald L. Horowitz. Ethllic Grollps in COIl/liet (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1(85), p.68 I. 68. Barkcy and Fuller (1998), pp.193-4. 69. Mango (1994), p.50. 70. Michael M. Gunter, The Kurd, in 7llrkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p.5. 71. Ibid., p.6. 72. Milliyel (Istanbul daily), Sept. 21. 1998. 73. lI11d. 74. Economist, Vo1.351, No.8113, March 4,1999, pA5
The Consolidation qf Democracy vs. Democratization
----------9---------CONCLUSION
The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey METiN HEPER
Demo~ratization is attaining greater pol itical participation. The consohdatlOn of democracy is democracy becoming "the only game in town." The preceding contributions indicate that in recent years Turkey has made good progress in preparing the ground for consolidating its den.l0cracy. .on the other hand, the country's success in democratizing its pohtlcal regime has been less than adequate. It may sound paradoxical, but at least III the case of some political parties inadequate democratisation seems to have been functional for the progress Turkey has registered towards the consolidation of its democracy The first prerequisite /01' the consolidation of democracy is a consensus among the membel~s of the political class on the rules of democracy- /1 freedom ?f expreSSIOn, absence of restrictions on political participation, fre~ ~nd fmr electIOns, and the like. Second, there must be national unity; poiItlcal actors must act in unison when democracy faces a critical threat. ') For them to act in such a manner there would be need for trust and harmony among political actors. , the c~nsolidation of democracy in Turkey, political actors' acting III a re~l~onslbl,e as well as responsive manner is also an important prereqUIsite. TIllS means paying attention to the long-term interests of the count~·~. In TU,rkey, the interests in question are those defined as critical by the milItary, slllce the 1982 Constitution and other relevant legislation has saddled the military with the task of protecting the county from intemal as well ~lS external threats. During recent years, the military has perceived the. Kurdish questIOn and political Islam as two critical internal threats. The military fulfils its task of protecting Turkey from the internal as well as external threats via the National Security Council (Milli Giivenlik Kl~rlllll~MGK). The MGK is made up of the prime minister, the deputy pnme mlllister, the ministers of defense, interior, justice, and foreign
I
"1
I 1
139
affairs, the chief of the general staff, and four force commanders, and is chaired by the President of the Republic. According to the Constitution, the Council of Ministers must assess the recommendations made by the MGK. For this reason, if politicians do not pay adequate attention to the said interests not only do their parties lose political support (as was the case in the 1999 national elections), but the political regime itself also faces a crisis of legitimacy. In the past, such crises of legitimacy have thrice resulted in military interventions (1960-61, 1971-73, and 1980-83). More recently (1997), when the military again perceived an internal threat to the secular-democratic state, declined to take power into its own hands, and. instead initiated a process that led to the non-voluntary resignation of the Prime Minister. It is important to understand exactly what happened in this instance. Upon the insistence of its military members, the MGK recommended that the government adopt a number of measures against political Islam. The coalition government of the religiously-oriented Welfare Pmiy (Refah Partisi-RP) and the secularly-oriented True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP) led by Necmettin Erbakan was not willing to adopt some of the measures recommended by the MGK, and only adopted condensed versions of others. Consequently, the military increased its pressure on the government. The military successfully mobilized the judiciary, universities, some civil societal associations as well as the people at large against the government. Afraid that the military might intervene, Erbakan rcsigned. Until the 1980s the militmy wished to see "rational democracy" in Turkey, where political actors primarily seek what is best for the countly through intelligent and patriotic debate, i.e., act responsib(v. They do not solely pursue special interests through adversarial politics, i.e., act responsively. Since the early 1980s, the militmy increasingly softened their approach to democracy. Officers now grant that in democratic regimes politicians are expected to act responsively to particularistic interests. However, as noted, they continue to be rather sensitive on the issues of the Kurdish problem and political Islam. Also, since they still prefer intelligent and patriotic debate with a view to find out what is best to the country, they wish to see politics focused on policy issues rather than on politics, that is, on activities to capture and maintain power. Officers also want political actors to value merit over and above blind political loyalty. When political actors do not measure up to their expectations the militmy is disturbed and tempted to interfere in politics. It is patent that democracy cannot be consolidated in Turkey if the military continues to act in this manner.
140
, ,
i
f \
Political Parties ill Turkey
Does all this mean that it will never be possible to consolidate liberal democracy in Turkey? The opening sentences of this conclusion must have made it clear that the present author does sec light at the end of the tunnel. For one thing, whenever the military in Turkey intervened, officers did not intend holding power indefinitely; they only wished to "save democracy from itself' and re-install "a more rationally functioning democracy." However, as noted, they have gradualIy come to the conclusion that "rational democracy" is a utopia. More significantly, the military realized that politics could not be successfully restructured by their interventions. The military now believes that its interventions adversely affect morale in the ranks; when the military takes power into its own hands the line of promotions are distorted and, soon after every intervention, the military faces the danger oflosing prestige in the eyes of the people. Consequently, the military prefers not to intervene if it can help it. As noted, over the years, what the military has expected from the political actors has become less and less. Given Turkey's aspirations to become a full member of the European Union, in all probability, those expectations will decrease further in the near future. However, presently they are there and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey continues to depend upon their reasonable fulfillment by political actors. Turning now to the problem of democratisation, here it is necessary to emphasize the fact that democracy in Turkey was introduced in the 1940s by state elites (read "politicians, bureaucrats, and officers who considered themselves as the only guardians of the long-term interests of the country") rather than by political clites that represented socio-economic groups. Being subscribers to "rational democracy," by making a transition to democracy the state clites aimed to expand the scope of the intelligent debate to find out what was best for the countly. Consequently, the immediate goal of the introduction of democracy was not informed by a concern to expand political participation. In any case, as socio-economic groups had not played a significant role in the transition to democracy, there were no effective demands for increased political pmticipation. As a result, for a long time democracy in Turkey developed as a conflict between the state elites and political clites. The state elites tended to act basically as the guardians of the long-term interests of the country and held a condescending attitude towards the pmticularistic interests; political elites in turn perceived themselves primarily as the defenders of the particularistic interests. The state clites' expectations of democracy and the consequent rift betwecn them and the political elites came to havc critical implications for Turkish politics.
The Consolidation of Democracy vs. Democratization
141
For one thing, politics in Turkey tended to revolve around "high politics" rather than the day-to-day needs of the county and its people. Democracy and secularism became far more important problems than economic policy, environmental policy, foreign policy, and the like. In comparison to the latter problems, the former were more difficult to resolve, resulting in considerable tension in politics and, therefore, in the absence of harmony. Under the circumstances, political leaders were seen as heroes defending their parties against their adversaries, which gave them extensive leverage over the rank and file in their political parties. IThiS state of affairs was an impedime.nt to the development of intra-party ( democracy which was also made dIfficult because, as mentIOned, the , primary preoccupation was with "politics" rather than policy. This meant that those who aspired to powerful positions could not show their mettle in policy debates. If they challenged the leader on issues relating to "high politics" or, worse still, on a personal basis, they were summarily discharged from their parties. I The second important implication of the rift between the state clites and I political elites had been the salience of political patronage and clientelism I in Turkish politics. Being defenders of only particularistic interests with little regard to the long-term interests of the country seems to have created a tendency to attend to the specitk needs of the people at the expense of the wellbeing of the economy as a whole. This tendency was reinforced by political patronage demands from the party rank and file. In the absence of an opportunity to shine in politics through their contribution to policymaking, the latter could only survive in politics if they managed to satisfy their constituents by fulfilling some specific services. The third important implication of the ongoing rift between the state elites and political elites was that because the former perceived democracy as an end-that of finding what was best for the country-and not as a means-that of promoting the interests of social groups-democracy itself was not seen as the guilty party. That is, whenever the military intervened, they blamed the politicians, but not democracy. It was for this reason that the military did not consider staying 111 power indefinitely. I-Iere the Turkish case differed significantly from the events in Europe between the World Wars. In the latter context, the workers were seen as a threat to bourgeoisie interests and, as a consequence, several countries drifted towards authoritarian regimes that lasted far longer than the military regimes in Turkey. The European authoritarian regimes, in contrast to the military regimes in Turkey, faulted democracy, and not politicians. In contrast, even in the single-party period in Turkey (1923-45) democracy
142
Political Parties in Turkey
The Consolidation (dDemocracy vs. Democratizatiol/
became the ultimate, if not the immediate, goal. It was for that reason that the single-party-the Republican Peoples Party-itself introduced a multiparty regime, and the military continuously gave power back to the politicians.
formed a separate party of their own-the Grand Union Party (Biiy£ik Tiirkive Partisi-BTP). The MHP is responsive to the religious and cu1tu;'al sensitivities of the people; unlike the military, the party's view is that women university students should be able to attend universities with their headscarf, if they so choose. Yet the party does not press the issue, instead hoping that time will persuade the military in this regard. The MHP does not think that those women deputies of the party who eover their head should tIy to enter parliament with a headscarf. From 1980 to the present, particularly during recent years, the MHP has shed its ultra-nationalism and moved to the center of the political spectrum. Not unlike Ecevit, the MHP leader Bahyeli has impeccable personal characteristics; he values harmony in government and believes that the country's interests should be the party's primary concern. Like Ecevit, Bahyeli played a significant role for the harmony in the post-1999 coalition government, in whIch he was Deputy Prime Minister. There is a tension between Bahyeli and ANAP leader Mesut YIImaz, who is also a deputy prime minister; however, Bahyeli and YIImaz, with some help from Ecevit, do not allow it to escalate to crisis proportions. In the 1980s, the Motherland Party (AnClvatan Partisi-ANAP), under its then leader Turgut Ozal, tried to represent four strands of thought-conservatism, economic liberalism, social democracy, and nationalism-and underlined the need for a synthesis of liberal economic rationality with social unity based on religious-moral values. The party stood for three freedoms-of conscience, expression, and entrepreneurship. It is true that today's ANAP, under the leadership of Mesut Yilmaz, does not have a clearly anchored identity and failed to adapt to the changing cultural and political circumstances. Yet, the party successfully holcls together economic liberals and nationalists, and has a strong proWestern stance. Ytlmaz also contributed to the post-1999 coalition government, although he is prone to pronouncing statements offensive to the military. Also, in the eyes of many, his personal characteristics are not as impeccable as those of Ecevit and Bahyeli. The original rationale behind the formation of the post-1969 religiously-oriented political parties in Turkey did not evince anti-system characteristics. The goal was to foster moral development based upon religious values, not to establish a state based on Islam. However, Necmettin Erbakan failed to suppress disparate pro-political Islam voices in these parties and, consequently, they were closed one ailer another. Yet, during this long saga the notion of secularism cherished by these political parties underwent an important evolution. While earlier, secularism and
Yet, as noted, perceiving democracy as an end and not as a means was a mixed blessing. In Turkey, democracy did become the only game in town, but the rules of that game did not resemble the rules of liberal democracy. In the Turkish case the military continued to assume the role ?f final arbiter. Consequently, although in recent years Turkey has taken Important steps towards consolidating its democracy, it failed to completely democratize its political regime. Thus, it is not surprising that the preceding contributions in this volume focus on this velY dilemma in Turkish politics. Let me now tum to some observations made in these contributions that makes one think that Turkey has made good progress towards consolidating its democracy in recent years. The gist of the analyses contained in the said contributions is that in recent years three govemment and three opposition parties (out of seven p~Iitical parties in Turkey) have in different degrees become more systemorIented. In recent years, the odd party out has been the True Path Party (Dogru Yo! Partisi-DYP). The Democratic Left Party (Demokratik So! Parti-DSP) came to adopt a moderate stance on Islam. The party leader, Biilent Ecevit, has prevented ideological groups joining the party, and has also shunned c1ientelism and political patronage. Since 1999, Ecevit, as Prime Minister, led the most internally harmonious coalition government Turkey has ever had. Ecevit had always been a man of integrity. The (old) Republican People's Party he had led bordered being an anti-system party with its leftist rhetoric. His present political party (DSP) has a more balanced approach to politics. The DSP tries to blend social democracy with moderate nationalism. On Islam, Prime Minister Ecevit's ideas are somewhat different from those of the militmy and he makes them known. For instance, unlike the military, Ecevit thinks that religious groups such as FethullayIlar--one arm of the Disciples of Light (Nurcular) Movement led by Fethullah Giilen-does not pose a threat to the Republic and, in fact, Giilen may play a galvanizing role vis-d-vis the secularists and Islamists. However, Ecevit's stance is not openly confrontational. Under Devlet Bahyeli the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetr;i Hareket Partisi-MHP) left behind its anti-capitalist, anti-West orientation, and took effec~.ive steps to cleanse itself of its militant youth group-Idealist Hearths (Ulkii Ocak!an)-as well as its Islamist-nationalists-that have
143
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Political Parties in Turkey
Islam were seen as incompatible, more recently it was only demanded that the state and Islam should not interfere in each other's affairs. Furthermore, the latest of the religiously-oriented political parties in Turkey-the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkll1ma Partisi-AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan-is resolved not to use even religious symbols in politics. Tansu Ciller's True Path Party has greatly sutTered fi'om its leader's personal characteristics and her conduct in politics. The party's misfortune was substantial because Ciller adopted a personal rule. Therefore it would not be inappropriate to talk about the DYP and Ciller interchangeably. It is true that Blilent Ecevit and his wife Rah~an Ecevit also had close control ?v~r the DSP; yet in the Ecevits' case, the close control they exercised was mt~rmed by certain principles, one of them being keeping the radical leftIsts out of the party. In the case of Ciller, there were no principles to speak of. Bahc;eli gave first priority to the countly, second to the party, and tlmd to his own political fortunes. For Ciller, only her personal interests were important, nothing else mattered. She therefore resorted to political patronage and clientelism in the most unscrupulous manner. Also, as she had no principles, she was inconsistent, did not keep promises, and often adopted diametrically opposed views and policies in velY short order. For instance, while in power, she in efTect transferred the government's decisionn:aking . prerog~tives on the Kurdish issue to the military; however, 1I111neciIately after falling from power she exchanged harsh words with the military. Not only was Ciller devoid of any principles, but her personal integrity also was always in doubt. Until recently, the (new) Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Par~i:s'i-CHP), under Deniz Bayka!, was ridden with factional politics. In ?ddl~IOn, . the party was too rigidly secularist, equating religion with IrratIOnality and, therefore, overlooking the fact that Islam was an important sociological reality for the people in Turkey. This led to elitist tendencies in the party. Furthermore, the CHP discourse focused on the R~public~n principles and, consequently, the party was unable to come up wIth poliCies m other areas and in harmony with the requirements of ~hanging times. However, lately there have been signs that the CHP mtends to adopt a brand new orientation. The party's current aim is to overcome the state-society dichotomy. Baykal's new discourse of "~nat~lian Le~t" not only calls for tolerance towards, but also appreciation of, reiJglous piety. The CHP is also for the deepening of democracy in Turkey; it defends the rights of minorities as well as such traditionally oppressed groups as women. On the socio-economic front, the CHP on the
The Consolidatioll o{Democracy VS. De1l1ocratizatioll
145
one hand accepts the reality of market, though with some reservations and, on the other hand, it underlines the universal rules of social democracy. Its discourse is now human- rather than class-centered. Turning finally to the ethnically-oriented political parties, the antisystem characteristics increased from HEP to DEP, but decreased from DEP to the People's Democracy Party (HADEp). Initially, HADEP too manifested an ethnically-oriented approach to politics. However, after 1999, following the Constitutional Court's allowing the party to compe~e at the national elections held in that year, the party leaders began to act II1 a more responsible manner, even asking for the public authorities' help in keeping their radical elements at bay. They now openly declare that theIrs is a "Turkey-party." While six of the seven parties considered in this volume have recently undergone different types of transformation that would facilitate the consolidation of democracy in Turkey in the foreseeable future, as noted, their recent record in terms of democratization in general and mtra-party democracy in particular has not been promising. None of the seven parti~~n ~ have sh~wn a :villingne~s to allow socio-economic groups t? playa rolem \ )the publIc decislOnmak1l1g process. Only the CHP worked 111 tandem wI~IL, social groups, but those were identity groups, and not socIO-eC01?O,I1:IC groups. Furthermore, not all parties have paid attention to the sensltIvltI~S of the people on key issues like Islam and the need for a basic harmony 111 the polity and society. Exceptions here were the Democratic Left. Party (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the religiously-oriented parties. Not unexpectedly, the religiously-oriented parties tried to take mto account the wishes and aspirations of the people with regard to Islam, but remained oblivious to the people's wish to sec a basic harmony in the polity and society. . ' Intra-party democracy did not exist in any of the partIes exammed. 1Leaders dominated all of the parties, and were intolerant, of not only dissent, but also of constructive criticism. The one party that presented a semblance of intra-party democracy was ANAP, with its democratic centralism. YIimaz took others' advice, but his decisions were final; anybody who did challenge the leader would have found him/herself out in the wilderness. The True Path Party stood at the other end of the continuum, and was expected to promote only the personal political fortunes of the leader. In such political parties as the DSP, MHP, and the religiously- and ethnically-oriented parties, to a large extent leaders acted in accordance with celiain ideals. In such parties as ANAP and the CI-IP, references were made to certain goals, but the leaders did not inspire
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Political Parties ill Turkey
confidence. In the True Path Party, there was neither an ideal nor confidence in the leader. As a final note it may be suggested that the lack of intra-party democracy in some political parties lead to increased mainstream tendencies in those parties, but this was not the case in others. As examples of the political parties where leader domination was functional (as far as the present problematic is concerned), one can cite the DSP, MHP, CHP, HADEP, and the new Justice and Development Party (AKP). In DSP and AKP, the leaders leant their weight early in the game, and injected systemoriented characteristics into their parties. In the MHP and CHP, the leaders tried hard to remove anti-system characteristics from their parties, and were to a great extent successful. In HADEP, the leader seems to have made an effort similar to the MHP and CI-IP leaders'. However, the extent to which he has been successful is an open question. In the religiouslyoriented parties from the National Order Party to the Welfare Party, the leader Erbakan did not even try to make such an effort because he was afraid of losing the support of the radical Islamists. ANAP's leader YIlmaz's record is mixed: he was not strong enough to engender significant changes in his party and his own views did not clash with those of the establishment, however, the establishment was alienated from him to some extent because of his personality traits and his political conduct. (iller was the worst case; she turned the party he had inherited from Slileyman Demirel into a "pariah." ( Turkey's experience with democracy has been one of considerable \ progress towards the consolidation of democracy in the absence of a \diffusion of democratic values among the political elite. The progress ( towards the consolidation of de.mocracy has be~n. a ~onseq~\Cn~e ol~ th~ \ fact that democracy was perceived as an end I athel than as a means. When Turkey faced political legitimacy crises, democracy was not seen as the guilty party; rather, the blame was heaped upon politicians. In turn, the failure in the diffusion of democratic values has been an upshot of the fact that the state-centered political regime was replaced not by a civil-society-centered political regime, but by a polity-centered one. Turkey did not make a transition to democracy because social groups came to have increasing political efficacy and asked for a more open regime. The decision to make the transition to democracy was taken by the political elite themselves who have, however, shown reluctance to democratize themselves.
Abstracts The Democratic Left Party: Kapllmlu Politics Pal' Excellellce by Suat KllllklIoglu
The Democratic Left Party's (DSP) roaring success in the 1999 general election has made it the largest party in Turkish parliament. Yet, the DSP is a party that is almost coterminous with its leader - Biilent Ecevit. Far from developing an institutional identity, the DSP has failed to install intra-pmty democracy. Its organization, internal functioning, and relations with non-governmental organizations are far from contributing to the consolidation of democracy. That said, its role as a stable partner in successive coalition governments, its moderating stance towards Islam, and its tendency towards careful relations with the military have made it functionally an impOitant actor in Turkey's turbulent polity.
The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists? by Alev C;lI1ar and Burak An/alii The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) has undergone a substantial evolution since it was formed in 1969, gradually moving away from the far Right toward a centrist position. It is this transformation that allowed the MHP to enter into a successful coalition partnership with the centrist Motherland Patty and the center-Left Democratic Left Party in 1999. This contribution examines the MHP from a number of perspectives. The historical development of the party, the reasons for its electoral success, and the role Devlet Bahc;eli, the new leader of the party, played in this outcome are explored in detail. The question whether the party represents the state, the nation or the nationalists is also raised.
The Mothe."land Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Pa."ty by Ersil! KalayclOg/u The Motherland Party (ANAP) was established by TUll'gut Ozal in 1983 as a new political movement that represented its leader's vision, charisma, and perspective on Turkish politics and modernization. Though its popular support diminished drastically over time, ANAP has survived five
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Political Parties in Turkey
elections and managed to participate in many coalition governments since 1991. Nevertheless, ANAP continues to face existential problems.
The Virtue Party by Birol A. Ye.yilada This contribution examines the Virtue Party (FP) and attempts to answer two questions: what seems to explain the relative success of Islamist political parties in Turkey, and to what extent have religiously-oriented parties become system-oriented and thus contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey? The analysis covers the history of the Virtue Party, elite-mass linkages, Virtue's organizational structure and other support bases, intra-eilte rivalries, and the reasons behind the recent split into two rival political parties.
From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party by Omit Cizre
This contribution deals with the politics of change for the True Path Party (DYP) since its inception in 1983 until the present day. The DYP's ideology, heavily based on populism and the unchallenged rule of the leader, became a challenge for the party when confronted by global neoliberalism, change, and marketization. The contradictory forces of globalism enabled the party to follow both conservative and reactionary policies simultancously with economic liberalism. The DYP has steadily declined since it joified the Rej'ah government coalition, tarnishing the image it wished to portray of having a commitment to a free-market program and secularism.
The Republican People's Party by Ayse Giinq'-Ayata This contribution provides a historical review of the Republican Peoples Party (CI-IP), the oldest party of the Turkish Republic. [n the last decade, the CHP failed to find a way of restructuring its ideology, support.bases and organizational structure in an era of dramatic international, national, and local change. This failure lead to dramatic vote loss, resulting in fewer positions to share among supporters and creating a vicious circle resulting in more losses in vote.
Abstracts
149
The People's Democnlcy Party by Aylin Giiney People's Democracy Party (HADEP) is the latest in a series of legal proKurdish parties in Turkish politics. It has survived despite the sensitivity of the Kurdish issue and the controversy provoked by its pro-Kurdish rhetoric, but has not been able to win enough votes to gain parliamentary representation. Despite the tug-of-war between radicals and moderates within the party, HADEP in general seemed to be moving toward a politically more moderate stance. The degree to which HADEP will contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey depends on its sincerity for normalization, its distance from the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and its transformation from being a one-issue party to one that addresses itself to all the major problems Turkey faces.
Notes
Notes on Contributors
011
Contributors
151
Suat Kmlkhoglu is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Political Science at Bilkent University, Ankara. His research interests include the Democratic Left Party, intra-party democracy, Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey's regional role in the Caucasus and Black Sea region.
Burak Ankan acquired his BA and MA degrees from Bilkent University, Turkey, and completed his Ph.D, at Exeter University, UK, in 1995. He is currently teaching at Sabancl University as an Assistant Professor. He specializes in extreme right-wing partics in Europe and Turkey.
Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and of its Institute for Turkish Studies. Hc is editor of Turkish Studies and of the Middle East Review (~l International A/Tairs (MERIA).
Alev <;mar teaches politics in the Depmtment of Political Science at Bilkent University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, has been a fellow at the New York University International Center for Advanced Studies, and taught at the University of Massachusetts.
Birol A. Ye~ilada is a Professor of political science and international studies at Portland State University. I-Ie is also holder of the endowed chair in Turkish Political Economy and Trade, and is Executivc Director of PSU's Northwest American Turkish Research Institutc.
Umit Cizre is an Associate Professor at Bilkent University. She was a Fulbright Research Scholar at Princeton University, and a Jean Monnet Research Fellow at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence. Ay~e Giine~-Ayata
is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the Middle East Technical University. She holds a Ph.D. in the )deology and organization of Republican Peoples Party, and specializes in political parties and forms of political participation, especially clientelism. Aylin Giiney (Ph.D.) is an Instructor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Bilkent University. She has published articles in journals such as Armed Forces alld Society and Le Trimestre du flIfonde.
Metin Hepel" is a Professor of Political Science and Director ofthe Centre of Turkish Politics and History at Bilkent University, Ankara, and a Founding Member of the Turkish Academy of Sciences. Ersin KalayclOglu is Professor of Political Science at Bogazici University. He is the author and editor of several books in Turkish on comparative political participation, Turkish political life, and contemporary political science.
Index Adana congress of CKMP (1969) 27 adaptability 57 Akbulut, Yl,lchrnn 49, 92 AKP 68--9,78, 144, 146 Aksay, Hasan 64-5 Ak~cner, Meral 96 Ak~u, Abdulkadir 68-9 Al Bm'aka Group 77 Alevi groups 14, 107-8, 111-12, 114-16 "Americanization of political competItion"
83 Amnesty International 131 ANAP 38, 41-2, 48, 55, 73, 83-7 challenge of RP-MCP 51 charismatic leader party 47, 49,52,59 coalition partnership (1991 to 1(99) 54-5 corruption 56-7 "democratic centralist leadcrship" 52, 59 cmanation (kuyruk) of the coup 87 environment of 54, 58 Europhiles 56 example of new political party 57-8 "four strands" of 47-50,52-3, 143 Iree-market policies 90 gcnctic code of 45--7 identity problcm 58-9 institutionalizatIon 57, 59 mtra-party democracy 145 local electIons (1989) 49 MSP followers and 67 Orla Direk ("main pillar" of society) 45 party system and 53-6 political organization 42-3 TIS and 71 traditional values 91 Yllmaz, Mesut as leader 92, 143, 146 Anatolian Len (AI/ado/u SO/II), discussion of
111-13,144 "Anatolian Tigers" 78 Ankara Social Research Centre (AI/kara S().\ya/ Am,I'irma/ar Merkezi-ANAR) 77 anlt-Kemalist indoctrination 70, 104 anti-systcm oriented parties 79, 146 AP 28, 46, 82-3, 84, 86, 89 Demlrci and 67 Islamists and 64-5 political /I'ect/oms and national will 97 Arin<;, Blilent 69, 77 Asilliirk, Oguzhan 73
Association for the Support of Contempormy Lifestyle (~'ai!;da,I' Yasal/I/ Dcslek/clllc Demegi--CYDD) 114 Atatlirk 68, 70, 73, 103, 106, III Atilhan, Cevat Rilllt 63 "autonomization" of strategic SEEs 17 Aydlll/ar Ku/iihii (Intellectuals Club) 27 Aydlll/ar Ocagi (Hearth of Intcllectuals) 35 Bahc;eli, Devlet 25, 30-31,35-9, 142-4 new trends under 31-3 Baklrkoy (Istanbul) II Barkey, Henri.l. 135 Basllal/ Kerl'alllllll:; (Our Supressed JOllmey)
28 Bayar, Cclal 63 l3aykal, Deniz 69,107,111-13,116-17,144 Beriusconi, Silvio 83 Bijliikba~l, Osman 26 Bozlak, Murat 125-6, 130 Budak, Rldvan 14 AI-Bukhari, Sheikh Muhammad Bahaattill 71 Caha, Omcr 12 ('akmak, General Fevzi 26 capitalism 85, 98 ('arkoglu, Ali 52 ('ar~amba congregation 73 Catlt, Abdullah 34 (~elik, Feridull 128, 130 Cemaal (congregations) 71 Cem, ismail (MinIster of Foreign Affairs) 18-19, III Central Administrative Board (CAB) 67-8 central Anatolia, conservative-religIous electorate 27, 30, 107 central decision-making body, party organization and 42 centrist parties 3 Ceylan, Yavuz 33 charisma 29, 44-5, 47, 49, 52, 59, 106 Chief of General Stall: MinIster of Defense and 88, 132 CHP 20-21, 52-3, 55, 59, 76, 102 advantages 120 Alevi groups and 107-8, 111-12, 114-16 anti-fundamentalist protests II X Baykal, DeniZ 69, 144, 146 changmg environment after 1980 and
117--20
154
Political Parties in Turkey
congress eulture (kollgre kii//lirii) 9, 105, 115 Ecevit and 28, 65 history 102-6 identity groups and 145 ideology and program 110-11 Kurdish votes 115 laicism of 17 multi-party regime 142 NGOs and 113--15 organizational fhullework 115-17 (}zgiir Illsall Journal 103 reality of market 145 voting support for 106-13 women and 144 YlllI journal 103 CHP/SHP, Alveis' relations WIth 114-15 CI-IP/SI-IP voter 108-9 CiGck, Cemil 68-9 Ciller, Tansu 83-4, 87, 98 Customs Union 89, 92 DYP under (1993-96) 51,56,88-93, 144, 146 European standards for democracy 90 expulsion policy 95-6 National Congress (Nov. 20, 1(99) 96 in opposition 97 personalizatIon of political representation 83 I'KK and 89, 91-3 power retention 95 RP support against corruption inquiries 94 "Second Democracy Surge" 97 stability package (April 5, 1(94) 91 Cindoruk, Hiisamettin 85, 87, 95 civil society movement, RP-DYP and liS clientelist poliCies 39, 95, 105, 115-16, 128, 141-2, 144 cold war anti-Communism 86 "combining societalis111 (tOp/IIIIICII/llk) and liberalism" 87 communications revolution. party organization and 118 Communism 27, 34, 89, 104, 118 eommunitarianism 27, 114 competitive politics (1983) 84 competitor parties 53-4 Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (Dcl'rilllci iKi SClldika/ari KOII/edal'l/,lyo/l/I-DiSK) 14, 113 Confederation of Turkish Cratlsmen and Tradesmen (Tiirkiyc Ema(vc Salla/kar/ar KOl(/edal'l/,I)I{)ltIl-TESK) 113 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europc (CSCE) 88 consolidation of democracy 19--22
democratization in Turkey and 138--46 Constitution ( 196 I) 122 Constitution (1982) 20, 88,123,133,138 ConstttutlOnal Amendment package 8 "constitutional citizenship" 129 ConstItutional Court AKP and 69 closure of MNP 65 closures of FI' 79 DEP closed (June 1(94) 125 HADEP and 126, 135 HEI' banned (1993) 124 corruption 2--3, 56-7, 94, 117 Co~an, Esad 72--3 Co~an, Nurettin 72 Co~kun, Ali 6R-9 "crony democracy" 96 Cumalloglu, Fehmi 65 Customs U111on, signing with EU countries (March 6, 1(95) 92-3 Cyprus, military intervention (1974) 28 DaIIl11~, ibrahim 12 Dar al-Maal al-Islami tinance house 77 death penalty, abolition of 134 Debnam, Geoffrey 9 decentralization, state services 46. 132 DeclaratIon of Primary Goals (i/k Hedc/ler BCYlIIlIllIllu'si) 103 Demir, Ahmet Turan 131 Demirel, Siileyman 41, 56, 64, 67, S4-5, 92 Ciller and 90, 146 DYP and 51, 53 "Kurdish reality" 124 party affairs and 89 social state welfare policies 97 Turkey's laws and 131 two-nations strategy and identity issue 86-8 democracy as an end not as a means 141-2 CHI' and 144 global 90 liberal 90 politteians blamed 141-2, 146 secularism 141 state elites and politIcal clites 140-41 Democracy Party (Dell/okrasi Par/lsi) see DEP Democratic Len Party (J)cII/okra/ik So/ Par/i) see DSP Democratic Party (Dell/okra/ Pal'li) .1'('(' DP Democratic Party Government 70 Democratic Party tradition (1950s), ANAP and 45 Democratic Turkey Party (lJelllokl'll/ik
Index TtI,.kl}'e Pal'lisi-DTP) 94 democratization 82, 84, 97 anti-militarism 87 CHI' and 114 Ciller's position on 89 detinitions 98, 112 education and 133 HADEI' and 133-4, 136 Kurdish question and 129, 132 political participation 138 problcm of in Turkcy 140 record in Turkcy 145 SHP/CHP 118 "IJelllokratik Sopa!t Par/i" (Democrallc Armcd Party) 7 DEP 125, 127, 145 Dcrvi~, Kcmal (State Minister and former World Bank Deputy Director) 19 Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos 134 Dicle, Hatip 125 dissimulation (lokiye) 69 divoll (council) 70 Diyalle/ hied Ba~'koll/igi (ReligiOUS Affairs Directorate) 14, III Dogan, Ali I-IIdlr 128 J)okuz h'ik Dok/frillf (Ninc Lights Doctrine) 27 "Domestic and International Institutions and Power of the Terrorist Organization PKK" 130 DP 63, 82, 85-6,97 DP-AP line, efrect of 86 DSP4,38,51-5.58, 107-8, 109, 119 believers or lIIii/edeXl'ill citizens 17 CHI' and 108 contribution to consolidation of democracy 19-22 culture of compromise 7 current situation 6-8 Ecevits and 8,13,112,146 economy and privatization 17-18 Finh Rcgular Congress (April 29, 20(1) 7, 10,20 HP/SODEP/SHP/CHP and 21 internatIonal arbitration law 6 intra-party democracy 9 "149 IS beautiful" 10-11 deification of Ecevit 11--14 selective mcmbership 9-10 Islam, moderate stance 011 142, 145 leadership problems 8--9 NGOs 14 Alevite associations/foundations 14 bar associations 15 labor unions 14, 113 party caucus 5-6
155
possible future candidates 18-19 raising of pcnsion age 6 seculansm and 107 stablc and harmonious governmcnt 21 stands on key issues kurd ish issue 15-16 political Islam 16-17 structurc of 4-5 DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government 31, 37-9 Duverger, Maurice 44 DYP 51-6,58,67,82-6,99,119,142 Ciller and (1993-96) 51, 56, 88-93,144, 146 democratization and 88 Election Manifesto (1991) 87, liS Extraordinary Congress (June 13, 1993) 88 First Congress (May 14, 1985185 fortunes of leader and 145-6 image disintegrated 96-7 insccurity and fear 96 Erbakan as leader 139 panah-party status (1997-200 I), way out of 96-9 scandal in atiermath of road accident 98 Eccvit, Biilent 2, 4-7,11-12.14--17,21,65, 104-6 attitude to religion III clientelism and ideological groups 116 cntlcizcd for 1l1cOmpete11ce 38 Cyprus intervention, cffect of 28 DSP leadership and 142, 144 Erdal Iniinii and 106 tifty-seventh Republican govcrnment and 6, 17 minimal party organizatIon 117 national and cultural values 112 nationalist dccds 118 personal characteristIcs 143 vote share in elections (1990s) 51 worry about his health 8-9 Ecevit, Rah~an 5, 8,11-12,19,21,144 economic crisis (April 200 I) 37, 39 cconomic crisis (February 200 I) 6-8, 18, 99 economic cnsis (November 20(0) 6-8, 7, 18 cconomic investmcnt and land reform, "fcudal system" and 16 economic liberalism 37, 39, 45, 84 Edip, E~ref 65 education 2, 21, 33, 104, 129, 133 ellective governance 83-4 effective representation 84 Eldersveld, Samuel 62 elections (1977) 28, 67
156
Political Parties ill Turkey
(1983), unfilir transition elcction 42 ( 1987-(9) 74 (1995) 70, 1278 (1999) 25, 56, 98, 135 Emergency Rule 111 Southcast 134 Emre, Slileyman Arif 65 energy 83
cnvironmcnt, survival of political party and 43
cnvironmcntal policy 141 Erbakan, Akglin 74 Erbakan, Mehmct Sabri 73-4 Erbakan, Nccmcttin 63-9, 71--3, 76, 96, 139 anti-secular activities 7R Islamist partics and 143, 146 Refilhyol and 94 Erdcm, Kaya 46 Erdcm, Tarhan 52 Erdogan, Rccep Tayyip 68-9, 73, 76-8, 144 Erenkiiy congrcgation 73 Ercz, Yahm 95 Erkan, Onal 96 Esmcr, YJimaz 75-6 ethnicity 107, 122, 124, 127-8 "nation" and 36 European Construction Firms for Mosque and Community (Avrupa Celllaal ve Call1ii [I/.)'aal Firlllasi or Europeiselie Moscliee lIlId Gellleillde Ball c, I') 74
European Court of I-Iulllan Rights, closurc of Rl' and 79 European Parliament 131 European Union, liberal democracy and 88, 114,134
European Union Hclsinki summit (1999) 7-8, 18
extra-parliamentary parties, radical orgalllzations 44 Eygi, Mehmet Scvket 73 liletionalism 62, 116 Faisal Finance 77 Fazilet, Iskcnder Pa~a and 73 Felicity Party (Saadel Parlisi) see SP FethullacJiar, Disciples of Light (NlIrclIlarj Movement 142 Fethullah colleges 17 Fl' 62-3, 68--70, 72-9, 107, 128 IhIctionalization, party organization and 42-3 fragmentation 84-5 lice market economy 82, 90, 94, 97 free trade zoncs 129 Fullcr, Graham 135 Gelcllek~'i- Yellilik,'i
clitcs 79
divide among party
Gcneral Amncsty Law (2000) 38 genctlc codc, party organization and 42, 43-5 Germany 73, 104, 131 globalization 119 Giikalp, Hlisnli Yusuf 38 G()kalp, Ziya 68 Giik~ck, Mclih 68 Grand Congress (KlIrllllay) II Grand Union Party (Biiyiik Tiirkiye Parlisi-BTl') 143 Grand Unity Party (Biiyiik Birlik ParlisiBBP) 73, 74 Glil, Abdullah 68-9, 76, 78 Giilcn, Fcthullah 142 Gulf War, Kurds and 124 Gliner, Agah Oktay 2S Giingiir, Ali 38 Guntcr, Michacl 135 Gunthcr, Richard 134 Glircl, Slikrli Sina (Ministcr of State for CypruS) 19 Giirc~, Dogan (ChicI' of Gencral Stall) 92 Glizel, Hasan Cclal 47 HADEI' 54, liS, 123--4, 146 Congrcss (Junc 1(96) 125-6 Congress (November 19(8) 126 consolidation of democracy and 134-5 electoral support ft)r 127-9 Kurdish question and 129-31, 136 people 111 southeast 127 state and democracy 131--4 "Turkey-party" 145 HADEI'-RP/FI' 54 headmasters and teachers (llIIlipler ve 6grellllel11erl 70 HEP 16, 114, 145 HADEI' and 124-7 High Election Council 69 Hoca, Sheikh Mahmut 73 Horowitz, Donald 134 humanism 112, 114 lhirr(wl 7 ihlas Holding 78 ijam business rules 78 flilll ve Sal/al (Seiellce alld Art) 71 IMF-sponsored economic reform programs 18 Independent Association of Industnalists and Businessmen (lvliislakil Sallaviciler ve i~'adalll/([rr Demegi-MOSiAD) 77-8 individllali:::alion 13 IIldustnalization 104 int1ation 41, 92 information society 90 iniinii, Erdal 106, 118, 124
Index iniinii, ismet 19, 103-4, 106, 118 intra-parliamentary partics, moderate organizations 44 intra-party democracy 4,9-14,20-22,83, 141, 145-6
ipekci, Abdi 33 iskender Pa~a congregation (dc/gali) 64,71-3 iSKi (l.I'tal/blll SII ve Kallali:::ll.\yoll idaresi----Istanbul Water and Sewage Agencyi 117 Islam 27, 127, 142-4 Islamic Democracy Party (/.1'1(/111 Delllokrasi Parlisi-IOP) 63
Islamic fundamentalism 107, III, 118 Islamic head-covering issue 34-5, 39, 143 "Islamic social engineering" 45 Islamist political parties 2, 62-3 business support base 77-8 elite-mass linkages 70 leadership, strategies and tactics 63--9 relations between tarikats and 70-71 iskender Pa~a congregation 71-3 Nak~ibendi order 71 National Vicw Organization (lv/illi Giirii,I' Te,)'kilalli 73-4 rise of 79 social support base 74--7 Islamists, secularists 142 ismail Aga congregation 73 Istanbul Stock Exchange 78 iTM 73--4, 77 Justice and Development Party (Adalel vc Kalkillll/a Parlisi) scc AKP Justice Party (At/alet Parlisi) see AI' Kabasakal, Mehmet 52 Karamollaoglu, Temci 72 Ke~ccilcr, Mehmet 46 Kemalistsecularpolicies 26,30, 63, II 0 Kibrisi congregation 73 Kombassan Holding 77 KOllliillizlllle Miicadele Demekleri (Struggle Against Communism Clubs) 27 Koran schools 63 Kotku, Shcikh MeRmet Zahit 64-5, 67, 72--3 Kurdish Alevi 108 Kurdish problcm 15-16, 37, 39, 122-5, 127-8
Ciller and 84, 92 HADEI' and 129---32, 136 military and 138-9, 144 Si-iP and 114, 118 Kurdish riots (1925 to 1(38) 124 Kurdistan Workcrs Party (Pari/yo Karkarcl1 Kiirdislall) see I'KK Kutan, Rccai 65, 68-9, 73, 78
157
Labour Party in Britain, indirect party 44 "laicism respcctliil to religious beliefs and aspirations" (illtllll:lam sayglll laiklik) 17 land reform 129 leadership, liability in ncw millcnnium 95-6 leadership succeSSIon, charismatic leader party and 49 leader worshipping 95 leftism 114 liberalism 85-7 Iiving standards 2 liyakalli (qualified) 5 "local parliaments" 133 Mango, Andrew 135 markctization 83, X6-7 Marxist-Lcl1llllst, PKK and 123 MCp/MHP-RPlVirtue Party (Fp) 54 Mendcres, AcliulI1 63 Menzil congregation 73 MGK 16-17,87,92-3,96,132,138-9 MI-I!' 2, 25-6, 38-9, 52, 54-5, 74-5, 98 "academiCS" and le,~kilal 111 37 Balweli, Devlet and 142, 144 coalitIOn with ANAl' and DSp ( 1(99) Congress (2000), nationalism and 35 elcctlons (1999) and 107 headscarf issue 34---5, 39, 143 history of 26-31 "How to Bchave 111 Public" pamphlet 30 ideology: redefining nationalism 34-8 Islam and 145 party school fiJr members 30-31, 33 rural areas and 30-3 I Sixth Congress (November 20(0) 32--4 Tiirke~ Party 67 votes 29, 31 Michels, Robert 6, 43--4, 62 military, ratl
(March 1971) coup-by-prollllllciolllclllo 122
military interventions (1960-61, 1971-73, 1980-83, 19(7) 62, 139
military regime (1980-83) 116 Milli Glirii.)' (National Viewi organization 65 Milliyell'i Cephe (Nationalist Front I governmcnt 28 MiIlZvel newspaper 76 Ministry of Interior, Kurdish mayors and 130-31
MNI' 65, 69-70, 72-3, 146 Motherland Party (AII(/\'(/11II1 ')al'lisi) sec ANAl' MSP 28, 46, 65-7, 72-3, III
158
Akmci network and 66 IIIIIc!araba or qirat/ business rules 78 IIIlIshaboha business rules 78 Nak~i 65-7, 71 Nak~ibendi order
Index
Political Parties ill Turkey
(tarikat) 64-5, 71-3, 77
Nak~ibendi, Sheikh ilahi 71
"nation," relationship of citizenship 36 Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP) 47 nationalism ANAl' 45 definition 35-6 Islamic features and 27 MHP and DSP in (1990s) 51 MHP's version 25, 37 redefinmg by MHP 34-8 Ulkllciiliik (idealism) and 26 Nationalist Action Pm1y (Milliyet('i Hereket Partisi) see MHP Nationalist Work Party (Milliyet(:i (:altsllla Partisi-MCP) 25, 29, 54 National Order Party (Milli Nizalll Partisi) see MNP National Salvation Party (Milli Selalllet Partisi) see MSP National Security Council (Milli Giivenlik Kllrulll) see MGK NatIOnal Security Council-motivated purge against Islamist elements (1997) 17 Nallonal View, political parties and 69 National View Association of Muslim Community (islolll 7iJpllllllll Milli G(jrii~' Te,)'kilatl) sec iTM Necatioglu, Halil 72 Netherlands parliament-in-exile 125 new party, political organization 42-3 New Turkey Party (l'
Ozal, Turgut 42,51-3,56,72-3,92 charisma of 47,58 competitive market economy 89 death of(l993) 50 "effective governance" 83 inflation reduction and 41 Kurdish reality and 124 leader of ANAl' (1980s) 45, 67, 71, 143 liberalization programs 77 marketization of 86, 97 lIIodern society but conservative values 46 Ozcan, Salih 65 Ozcan, Yusuf Ziya 13 Ozkan, Hiisamettm (Deputy Prime Minister) 8,18-19 Paddison, Ronan 134 Paksu, Ahmet Tevfik 64-5, 67 Panebmnco, Angelo 42-4 Paris Charter (Nov, 21, 1(90) 88 party caucus (Pam Meclisi) 5 party organization, status of leader 44 party system 2-3, 50, 53-6, 62 paternalistic military, politicians and 2 patriotism, nationalism 36 People's Democracy Party (Halkin DClIlokrasi Parlisi) see HADEI' People's Labor Party (Halkin ElIlek Partisi) see HEP "People's MuniCipalities" 133 PKK 8, 33-4 capture of leader 16 Ciller and 89. 91-3 DEI' support and 125 HADEI' and 127, 129-30, 135-6 Marxist-Leninist party 123 scandal of crnmnals in war against 98 terrorist activities 36, 124 political clites, particularistic interests 140-41 "polillcal entreneurship" 84 political Islam 37, 39 military and 138-9 radical Islamist and 28 strict secularism and 17 Political Parties Law 4, 8, 10. 20, 99 Populist Party (HI') 21,47 Preacher and Prayer Leader Schools (illlam Hatip Okullal'l) 70 privatization lack of in Turkey 2 MHP and 37, 39 SEEs 17,46 socialist parties and 110 state-owned Telecom Company 32 "problem of civilianization" 132
Prodi, Romano 83 Puhlc. Hans-.!lirgen 134 radical Marxists, right-wing ultra-nationalists 123 Raiders (Aklllcz/ar) 67 ReJil/zIFllzilet Party 16. 35 Re/ilh Partisi see RP "Replh" (weI/lire) 63, 70-71, 73, 75 Refllhyol era (DYP-RP coalition) 93-5 Reformists (Yel1ilik~'iler) 68 Regional Economic Developmcnt Plan, southcast and 129 regionalism 122 rent-seeking nctworks 93-4 Republican Peasant Farmer's Party (ClllII/zllriyet(:i Kliylii Millet Pllrtisi-, CKMP) 26-7, 29 Republican People's Party (Clllllhllr~vet Halk Parlisi) see CHI' Republican Turkey. Ottoman past and 13. 62 Rescarch and Development Departmcnt (RDD) 3(HI routinizing the charisma of the leader 45, 58 RP 50-52, 54-5, 68-72, 74, 78, 91. 98 Ciller attacks for abuse of religIOn 93, 95 closure of 62-3.67,69 increase in votes in central Anatolia 107 Kurds and 127-8 religion and moral values 79. 139, 146 RP/FP (Islamist parties) 70-71, 73-5, 79 rural-urban migration 104 Saha/z 72 slldaklllli (loyal) 5 Sartori, Giovanni 42 Satan, Mehmct 126 Sava~, Vural 62 Schattschneider, Elmer 62 Schattschnclder, Enc E, 13 scculansm 107, 111-12. 118, 133, 141-4 Serdcnge<;ti. Osman Yiiksel 64 Sezer. President Ahmet Necdet 7, 18 SHP 16,21,53,58,87,106.115--16,124 human rights and 117-18 SHP/CHP approach. Kurdish issue and 16, 117 SHP/CHP-DSP, ANAP-DYP 54 SHP-DYP coalition (1991-95) 116 Sirakaya. Omer Faruk 5. 6 "situational charisma" 44, 47 Sivas events (1993). Alevis and 107, 114 social democracy, ANAl' and 45 SOCial Dcmocracy Foundation (Sos)'al Delllokrasi iilkfi-"SODEV) 110 Social Democratic Movemcnt (SOSYll!
159
Democratik Hareket-SDH) 110 Social Democratic Populist Party (S!J.\~l'lll Delllokrat /lalk(:i Parli) see SHP Social Economic and Polillcal Research Foundation (Topllllllsa! Ekol1olllik SiYllSlll Ara~'tirlllalar iilk/i-TESAV) 110 Social Economic and Political Studies Foundation of Turkey (Tiirkiye Sosya! Ekollomik \'e SiYllsal Am,)'llrlllalar iilk/iTOSES) 108-10 SOCial security 17. 129 social spending 17 SODEP 21 "soli coup," military coup (1997) 62, 67 southeast issue 15, 98. 127. 129, see a/so Kurdish problem Soviet Union 119 Soysal, Miimtaz 18 SP 69. 72, 77--S State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) 17,90 state elites, guardians of country 140-41 State Planning Organization (DPT) 41 Suli establishments 72 Sunni Fethullah Giilen movement 14. 17 Sunni licatlon of the left 107 SlInlll Kurd, Virtue Party and lOS Susurluk incident 34 Switzerland 65, 131 Talay, Aydlll 128 tarikat (religious orders) 62, 67, 70-72. 77 TBMM 42. 45, 49, 51,,,2, 56-7 7!di Nizam (Sole Order) ncwspaper 65 telecommunications 83 Temizel, Zekcriya 18-19 tq'kilal (party orgalllzations) 37 TIS 27. 34, 71,123 Top<;ulnl~l, Arslan 64 Toprak. Metin 12 torture 132. 134 TraditIOnalists (Gelellekriler) 68 traditional SlInni Islam 45-6 TRT-15 True Path Party (f)ogl'll lfJ! Portisi) sce DYP Tuckcr, Robert 44 Tuncay,SlIavi 5 Turan, ilter 10. 13 turban wearing, state laws and 69 Tiircl, Yusllf 73 "Turk," mcanlllg of tcrm 16 Tiirkc~, Alparslan 27-32. 34. 38, 67 Ba~bug (the "great leader") 27 Tlirke~. Tugl'ul 30, 33 Turkey apolitical electorate 20 baSIC democratic form 1-2
160
Political Parties in Turkey
consolidating its dcmocracy 142, 145--6 dcmocracy in 52, 79--80, 145 dcvaluation of lira 7 earthquakc (August 1999) 39. 7X cconomy of2. 17-18.41,77 cthnically-oricnted political parties 145 ethnicity and religious differences 107. 124 European Union membcrship 39. 140 European Union's Copenhagcn criteria and 79. 119, 134 globalizatIOn, clfect of 119 "high politics" 141 Islamic capital 77 laicist principlc 16 military and anti-systcm capital 78 "oligarchic Rcpublic" 131 polarization of party systcm 50 rc-cstablishmcnt of parliamcntary dcmocracy ( 1983) religiously-oricntcd political partics (post19(9) 143-5 religious-secularIst c1cavagc 21 shifts in post-transitional 82 Turkish Airlines 37 Turkish armed forces I Turkish citizens. obcdience to Icadcrship 13 Turkish Grand National Assembly see TBMM Turkish cxpatriatcs 73 Turkish Industrialists' and Busincssmcn's Association (71/rkive Sallavieila ve I,Wldamlan Deme.~i-TOSIAD) 114 Turkish Intelligcnce Agcncy 130 Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Tiirk-islam Selllezi) see TIS Turkish Labor Union (Tiirkiye i~Ti Selldikalan KOII/Cdllrt1,IYOIIII-- TORK-i $) 113 Turkish parliament, party systcm 54 Turkish Pcnal Code 312/2 69 Turkish politics. ReJilhlFazilel phenomenon 64 Turkish public opinion. leadership candidate and 20 Turkish Telecom 37 Turkish Union of Chambers (7i'irkiye Odalar Birligi) 64
Turkish Workcrs' Party (7/,irk~ve iKi Parlisi-TiP) 122 Tiirkiy£! Milliyelriler Birligi (Turkish NatIOnalists Union) 27 z'ilkiiciiler 28 iilklleiihik (idealism) 26. 34 iilklidi militant groups 26, 33 iilkiicii militants. Tiirkcs and putsch 30 IIIkiidi movcment 28--9, 34 Ulldi Ocaklan (Idealist Hcarths) 26. 32-3. 37. 142-3 Onal. Nesrin 35 Union of Chambcrs of Commcrce. Industry, Trade and Commodity Exchangcs of Turkey (Tiirkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi-TOBI3) 114 unions. political partics and 14-15, 113 Orkiit. Ali 131 Oriin. Halil 72 valuc-addcd tax 83 f1J1allsever 71'irk Te,~kilall (Patriotic Turkish Organization) 27 Vcrdcrcy, Kathcnnc 36 Virtue Party (Fazilel Parlisi) see FP votcr profile (1996 and 1999) 76 Welfare Party (Re/hh Parlisi) see RP "Women's March against Shari'a" (1996) 114.118 World Values Survey (WVS). Turkey (1996 and 1999) 75-6 sev ya lerkel" ("Iovc or leave thc country") 36 Yazgan. Mustafa 64-5 Yell icc. Mchmct 34 Ycnimahalle (Ankara) II Yelll Sol (Nell' Leji) III Yllanoglu. [smail Hakki 65 Ytlmaz-Cillcr feud 6 Ytlmaz. Mesut 38. 49-53. 56, 92. 145--6 Ytlmaz. Mustafa 12
"fit
Zaman 73