Stopping the Plant: The St. Lawrence Cement Controversy and the Battle for Quality of Life in the Hudson Valley (Suny Series, an American Region)

Stopping the Plant

SUNY series, An American Region: Studies in the Hudson Valley Thomas S. Wermuth, editor

The St. Lawrence Cement Controversy and the Battle for Quality of Life in the Hudson Valley

Miriam D. Silverman

S TAT E U N I V E R S I T Y O F N E W Y O R K P R E S S

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2006 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Cover photograph by Terrence DeWan “Existing Red Barn, Route 23, Greenport” and Photo Simulation “Red Barn with Summer Plume” by Berkshire Design Group and Terrence J. DeWan & Associates. Cover images from promotional postcard produced by Concerned Women of Claverack; reprinted by permission of Concerned Women of Claverack. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, address State University of New York Press, 194 Washington Avenue, Suite 305, Albany, NY 12210-2384 Production by Marilyn P. Semerad Marketing by Fran Keneston Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Silverman, Miriam D. Stopping the plant : the St. Lawrence Cement controversy and the battle for quality of life in the Hudson Valley / Miriam D. Silverman. p. cm. — (Suny series, an American region: studies in the Hudson Valley) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6961-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7914-6961-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6962-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7914-6962-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Cement plants—Environmental aspects—Hudson River Valley (N.Y. and N.J.) 2. St. Lawrence Cement (Firm)—Public opinion. 3. Hudson River Valley (N.Y. and N.J.)—Environmental conditions. I. Title. II. Series: SUNY series, an American region. TD888.C4S55 2006 338.7'62418330974739—dc22 2006004619 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

List of Illustrations

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Foreword by Mark H. Lytle

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Acknowledgments

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Introduction

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1

The Place, the Plant, the People, and the Permits

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Aesthetics and the Search for Quality of Life

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Differing Visions for Hudson’s Economic Future

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“Why Would Anyone Oppose Healthier Air for Our Children?”

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Defining Community

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“Cement Plant’s Demise Concrete”

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Conclusion

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Appendix: New York State Department of State Objection to Consistency Certification

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Notes

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Bibliography

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Index

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Illustrations

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Hudson Valley in Winter, from Olana, by Frederic Edwin Church

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2

Concerned Women of Claverack promotional postcard

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3

Photograph “Looking southwest above Becraft Mountain”

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Photograph “Looking northwest over SLC quarry”

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Friends of Hudson Advertisement, “The Northeast Has Spoken”

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Photograph “Looking southeast over school”

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“The Results Are In!”

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SLC Greenport Project: Size Comparison Chart

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Photograph “Existing Red Barn, Route 23, Greenport” and Photo Simulation “Red Barn with Summer Plume”

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Photograph “Existing Historic City Cemetery in Hudson” and Photo Simulation “Proposed SLC Plant from Historic City Cemetery in Hudson”

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Photograph “Existing Powerline” and Photo Simulation “Powerline with Plume”

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Photograph “Existing View from Olana Near Ridge Road” and Photo Simulation “Future Ridge Road Vista”

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Photograph “Over Hudson looking south, Hudson River at right”

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Friends of Hudson Stack Test Overview: St. Lawrence/ Holcim North American Plant Sites

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Foreword

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aving lived for more than thirty years in Rhinebeck, New York, served on the school board, run for election to county government, and helped write a history of the town, I still feel like a newcomer. Yet, when tragedy struck my family, our neighbors arrived at our door with meals and sympathy. People newer to town than I am now see me as part of the local establishment. So which am I: an oldtimer or a newcomer? That question is at the heart of Miriam Silverman’s impressive exploration of the controversy that rent the Hudson community twenty-five miles to the north of Rhinebeck. In the late 1990s St. Lawrence Cement Company proposed to build a massive new plant on the edge of the town. The ensuing battle forced people to ask: What kind of community did Hudson want to be, and, even more problematic, who would make the decision? What values would they embrace—cement and “progress,” or aesthetic values and small proprietary businesses? In the battle over the cement plant, clashing values and contested identities generated intense acrimony. All the parties to this conflict saw the stakes as so high that to lose was to see their local world destroyed. The dispute was not limited to Hudson since the potential consequences—visual blight, air pollution, and heavy traffic—had serious implications for the entire area. “Stop the Plant” signs appeared throughout the mid-Hudson Valley region, including in my neighborhood in Rhinebeck. To those of us who saw our small towns as havens from the ills of urban and suburban America and the landscape as a reminder of the nation’s colonial heritage, the villains seemed obvious. St. Lawrence Cement and its supporters proposed to Lytle, Mark H., Professor of History and American Studies, Bard College, author of America’s Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon (2005) and Gentle Subversive: Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, and the Rose of the Environmental Movement (forthcoming, Oct. 2006).

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despoil our region in the narrow pursuit of profit. Mammon would seduce Gaia. To most of the Mid-Hudson region, whether for or against the plant, this was a battle about good versus bad, right versus wrong, oldtimers versus newcomers, as well as about the nature of community and local control. Rhinebeck had already rehearsed its own version of the cement plant controversy. In the late 1990s the administrators of local Northern Dutchess Hospital proposed a merger with two hospitals in nearby Kingston, one of which, Benedictine, was governed by the Catholic Church. Under the new management, Northern Dutchess would have to follow the dictates of the church to restrict the delivery of women’s reproductive services. Many of us who settled in Rhinebeck as veterans of the 1960s’ uncivil wars saw this as an attack on hard-won women’s rights. Others of our neighbors viewed the merger as a blow for moral values or, more simply, as a bow to economic necessity. Given the seriousness of the issues and the partisanship of the contestants, we could hardly imagine how the conflict would ever be reconciled. In the end, economic and political realities scuttled the merger and peace returned to Rhinebeck. Nonetheless, we had discovered the thinness of the veneer of civility that prompts a cordial “hello” even to strangers we pass on the streets. Rhinebeck shares some of Hudson’s view shed, and the open spaces of Columbia County to our north act as a buffer against the southward encroachment of Albany and the capital district. We could hardly be indifferent to a project that proposed to reverse the process of de-industrialization that has enhanced the magnificent vistas essential to our quality of life. All the same, the fight was not ours to fight. We might be partisans, but we would not be participants. The same could be said for my second local community, Bard College, where I have taught American and Environmental History for the past thirty years. Situated on the Hudson River, between Rhinebeck and Hudson, Bard shares all the aesthetic and historic qualities that define the region. But, unlike Hudson or Rhinebeck, Bard is something of an exotic species. It is more in the region than of the region. Our students, decked out in black with the occasional lavender Mohawk, are conspicuous when they shop in the local stores. They are largely transients who may appreciate the beauty of the college setting, but seldom become deeply involved with the area. Thus, I was particularly interested in the challenge Silverman set for herself. She clearly had a predisposition to side with the opponents of the plant. Her travels had sensitized her to the way that outside agencies, multinational corporations in particular, could exploit the human and physical resources of small communities without much

Foreword

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regard for local needs and sensibilities. Nonetheless, she needed to keep an open mind. After all she was as much interested in the dynamics of the Hudson community as it squared off over the plant proposal as she was in the merits of the project itself. You now have the results of that inquiry before you. Silverman has proven herself remarkably even-handed in peeling back the layers of meaning that expressed themselves in “Stop the Plant” and “Support the Plant” signs. She discovered, to her surprise and mine, that reasonable and civic-minded people could stand on either side of the issue. The facts of the proposed project were not so much the cause of the dispute but rather what conclusions the two sides might draw from those facts. The plant controversy was not simply about economics and politics. It was more significantly about the future and the past. There were those seeking to protect the landscapes that inspired Thomas Cole and Frederic Church, and those who hoped to revive Hudson as a bustling blue-collar town, its streets crammed with Saturday shoppers and new cars. In her book Silverman reveals to us how this fascinating saga played itself out. She links the battle over “the plant” to romantic visions of the nineteenth-century Hudson River Landscape School and the earlier fight to save Storm King Mountain. She illuminates the technical data on which the State Department of Environmental Conservation decided the case, as well as the aesthetic and historic issues that informed the opponents. Anyone who thinks of home as a special place threatened by forces both distant and close at hand will find a profound connection to the people of Hudson as they struggled to define the soul of their community. We have Miriam Silverman to thank for that. Mark H. Lytle Bard College

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Acknowledgments

I

would first like to express my respect and appreciation to the thousands of individuals who committed their time, energy, and money, their hearts and souls, to fighting this battle over many years. Their passion and dedication to claiming their community as their own are inspirational. I would also particularly like to thank those who took time out to share their thoughts and experiences with me—Andy Bicking, Cyndy Hall, Linda Mussmann, Dan Odescalchi, and Sam Pratt, as well as others who have chosen to remain anonymous. Many thanks to those who contributed images to enrich this text—Concerned Women of Claverack, Terry DeWan, B. Docktor, Friends of Hudson, and Mark Teague. Thank you to Diana Brown and Yuka Suzuki for their help and support during the research phase of this project. I offer my deepest gratitude to Professor Mark H. Lytle for contributing the Foreword, and for his detailed comments and suggestions. And finally, a million thanks to my mother, for her patience, love and unending assistance. Without her neither this book, nor I, would be here.

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Introduction

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hat you have in your hands is an incredible story with above all one important message—yes, it is possible. It is possible to have a say in the nature of development in your community. It is possible to fight back against the forces, the companies, however large they may be, that threaten a community’s quality of life for the sake of their own profit. In the Hudson Valley, confronted with a proposal by the world’s second-largest cement producing company to build a massive coalpowered cement plant, what began as a handful of local concerned citizens did not sit back and accept that millions of tons of air pollution would be brought to their beautiful upstate New York community. They did not resign themselves to what many saw as the inevitable processes of development necessitated by ever-increasing demands for cement. They did not passively leave it to the government regulatory agencies to decide what was best. Instead, they took the future of their community into their own hands, and with extraordinary dedication and inspirational perseverance, they achieved what many had thought impossible—they won. In a world where every day there is new environmental destruction—another river poisoned, another forest decimated, another factory smokestack erected—it is easy to feel powerless and overwhelmed. Just before I began the research that led to this book, I had been traveling in several countries around the world, studying environmental and social movements. I returned burdened with confusion and despair. I was angry at my own country for the destruction it has wrought on economies, environments and cultures around the world. I felt frustrated and unsure as to how to proceed with my own life, when American society is constructed in such a way as to make it extremely difficult to live without damaging the environment or contributing to someone’s exploitation. But I also had a glimmer of hope, the beginning of a formulation of a solution. In all the countries I visited, from India to New Zealand to xv

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Mexico (and, it would turn out, upstate New York), the underlying struggle was the same: the desire for self-determination, or autonomy—the ability to have a say in one’s livelihood, health, community and destiny. In the global capitalist system, with wealth and power consolidating into fewer and fewer hands and the interests of government intertwined with the interests of big business, control has been ripped from the hands of the people. In response to globalization taking control away from the people, in part what is needed is the cultivation of its opposite: a process of localization. This could include a localization of food, money, and community—in essence what community planner Doug Aberley (1993) calls a “reinhabitation of place,” by reinstituting dependency on the local environment. For me, what the concept of localization inspired was a desire to understand what was going on in my own backyard. I had spent so much time looking at other people’s problems and yet knew very little about the place I lived. When I moved back to my home in Red Hook, New York, eager to stay in one place and to process the overwhelming experiences I had had, I began to notice signs sprouting like dandelions on lawns throughout the area, emblazoned with the words “STOP THE PLANT.” I quickly learned that St. Lawrence Cement (SLC) was proposing to close its plant in Catskill, New York and open a much larger and more technologically-advanced plant across the river in Greenport, just outside of Hudson, New York. For some local residents, hoping the plant would stimulate the economy and the new technologies would improve the regional environment, the proposal was a welcome one. To others it was nothing less than a death threat to the environment, beauty, small-scale economy, and quality of life in the region. Before beginning my investigation into the SLC controversy I knew a bit about environmental issues in the area, and the country more generally, but I had never delved into the deeper aspect of the stories of the people fighting around those issues. Most of the environmental movements I examined internationally were made up of lower economic classes and were often tied to basic survival needs. I wondered, what would an environmental movement look like in a postindustrial country, in one of the wealthiest countries in the world? Would it be based in elitist desires for a beautiful landscape? Would it rely on the idea that economic needs are secondary to environmental ones? What these questions may make clear is that I began this project with biases on both sides of the argument. I am an environmentalist. I believe our society needs a dramatic restructuring of its priorities and way of life, taking into account that every aspect of our natural environment is in grave danger from human greed and ignorance. I am also cognizant, however, that the belief that environmental concerns should have precedence over all other concerns can have extremely detrimental

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consequences when imposed on those whose beliefs, or needs, are different. I think that change needs to happen from within a community— that outside economic interests should not overrule local environmental ones nor outside environmental interests overrule local economic ones. What I learned in the course of my research on the SLC dispute, however, is that none of these categories is easily definable. Sometimes both sides have both economic and environmental concerns, and sometimes it is hard to identify just who is really the outsider. It is not my goal in this book to determine or persuade the reader as to who was right and who wrong. Instead I have chosen to engage in discourse analysis, focusing on the people involved in the dispute and on how the process of public discourse both constructed and represented previous constructions of the worldviews of the individuals involved. Cultural geographers Trevor Barnes and James Duncan, articulating a common element of postmodern thought, state that the discourse about our world “reveals as much about ourselves as it does about the worlds represented,” and thus “when we ‘tell it like it is’ we are also ‘telling it like we are’” (1992: 3). From this perspective, the discourse on the SLC plant can only be said to represent the participants in the debate, not the facts of the plant itself. In addition, as anthropologist Stephen Tyler describes, discourse is both the object and means of postmodern anthropology (1987: 171). Thus, to continue with the postmodern framework and turn the lens on myself, it must be acknowledged that in presenting discourse I am also engaging in discourse, and therefore am also representing my own subjectivities—“telling it like I am.” But while my depiction of the controversy is undoubtedly influenced by my own values and perspective, my goal was to avoid, as much as possible, placing judgment on the “facts” provided by each side. Instead, my desire is for the discourse of the controversy to speak for itself, for the reader to experience the full force of the polarized dialogue in all its confusions and contradictions. But my even greater desire is that you will use this story as inspiration. That you will develop compassion for those with whose beliefs you do not agree, and understand them as based in their experiences of the world, just as yours are based in your experiences. And that you will be motivated, encouraged to fight for change within your own community, to fight for a community that reflects your values, your definition of quality of life. Because although this battle has ended, the war continues. As long as there is a demand for cement, there will be a supply. Maybe the plant will be built in another country where there are fewer environmental regulations, fewer labor laws. Or maybe it will be in your backyard. But whatever the challenge is that you face in your community, my hope is that you use the message of this story to know that no challenge is insuperable. Change is possible, is necessary, and is up to us.

Figure 1. Hudson Valley in Winter, from Olana, 1871. Frederic Edwin Church (1826–1900). Oil on paper, mounted to canvas. OL.1981.14. Courtesy of Olana State Historic Site, New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation.

CHAPTER 1

The Place, the Plant, the People, and the Permits When I first moved to the Hudson Valley people said, “You’re going to see all the problems with the environment that you would find in the country, but you’re also going to find all the solutions.” —Andy Bicking, volunteer coordinator and outreach manager for Scenic Hudson

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he Hudson Valley, the land surrounding the Hudson River from Albany to Manhattan, is one of the most beautiful regions in the United States. From the time Henry Hudson “discovered” the area in the seventeenth century, it has inspired exploration—into its mountains and waterfalls, and into the self, through art, literature, philosophy, and all passions of the human soul. For many, the Hudson River is a respite, a playground, a shelter for birds, fish, and wildlife, and a magnet drawing city-weary homebuyers to a life of serenity and rejuvenation. They believe that the river has the potential to revitalize the Valley and relieve the poverty and high unemployment rates that have plagued its communities for the past several decades. When others watch the river as it flows from high in the Adirondack Mountains down to New York City and the Long Island Sound, they see first and foremost a transportation route—a beautiful one, but primarily a means to carry goods from the industries along its banks to the population and shipping centers to the south. Particularly following the building of the Erie Canal and the population boom in New York City, the river was critical to the economies of towns in the Valley. Then, in the 1960s, industries in the Valley, as in the rest of the country,

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began shutting down and moving to the southern United States or to other countries with cheaper labor and fewer regulations, littering the abandoned Hudson Valley landscape with shuttered factories. In recent years, however, industry has been attempting a comeback in the Valley. A New York Times front-page article, from March 2000, describes, “Decades after smokestack industries largely disappeared from the Hudson River Valley, leaving behind an environmental and economic mess that took years to reverse, plans are afoot to build more than a dozen industrial plants in the region” (Rozhon 3/13/2000, A1). It cites as examples the proposals for a $680 million paper recycling and power plant in the town of Ulster, a $500 million power plant in Athens, and the $300 million St. Lawrence Cement plant in Greenport. Many Hudson Valley residents have welcomed the return of industry to the region and have faith that the river can again become their economic salvation. Though questions about the effects of industry on the spiritual and aesthetic values of nature had begun to be raised as early as the mid-nineteenth century, for the most part, the region’s economic and aesthetic assets coexisted with few major conflicts. Beginning in the 1960s, however, the relative harmony between these two worlds began to dissolve. The first, and still most famous, environmental controversy in the Hudson Valley was the battle to prevent Consolidated Edison from building what would have then been the world’s largest pumpedstorage hydroelectric facility, on and in Storm King Mountain, located on the River in Cornwall. Horrified by an artist’s rendering of the proposed facility cutting away a massive chunk of the mountain, conservationists and outdoor enthusiasts rallied to oppose the project (Card 2005: 13). In 1963 they came together to form the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, and achieved their first major victory in 1965 when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged their interest in protecting the site’s recreational and aesthetic qualities and granted them standing as “aggrieved parties” to oppose the project in court (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)). In 1980 the case was finally settled and Con Edison abandoned the project. The 1965 decision to protect aesthetic interests under law is seen by some as the beginning of the modern environmental movement and the spark that led to an increase in national environmental consciousness. It also motivated many local citizens, fearful of the consequences of a return of the manufacturing days along the river, to take a stand for their vision of local planning and development. Numerous grass-

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roots organizations emerged in the Hudson Valley, addressing various environmental, economic, and political issues in the region. From its grassroots origin focusing solely on the Storm King proposal, Scenic Hudson has since grown to become a major voice in regional planning and conservation. The organization currently has a total of forty-three employees and a budget of more than $5,000,000, which comes from its more than 8,000 individual donors, as well as foundations and government grants. The organization now includes four main program divisions: land preservation (safeguarding farms, parks, and valuable areas), environmental quality (cleaning the air and water, including PCB cleanup and the St. Lawrence Cement plant), riverfront communities (creating partnerships to encourage sustainable development), and communications and public outreach (increasing environmental awareness). According to its own description, it is guided by three main principles: “Outstanding quality of life is achievable only when a clean, healthy environment is a key component of economic development;” “All citizens have a right to outstanding quality of life, including access to our Hudson River, to open space and to participate in community decision-making;” and “Our natural environment is an irreplaceable source of spiritual and artistic vitality and must be preserved forever.” Friends of Hudson, another Hudson Valley grassroots environmental organization, emerged in January 1999 from the living room of Sam Pratt, a national journalist who had written for such publications as Esquire and New York Magazine. Pratt, along with Peter Jung, the owner of Peter Jung Art & Antiques, which deals in paintings, furniture, and musical instruments, and Claudia Bruce, co-director of the Hudson arts and cultural center Time and Space Limited, brought together forty residents of Hudson to combat Americlean, a Canadian company proposing to truck millions of gallons annually of perchloroethylene, or “perc,” a highly toxic solvent used in dry cleaning, to a waste plant on the waterfront in downtown Hudson. However, following a public hearing in which a company executive said he “could not remember” the location of the company’s pilot plant, the company was forced to retreat. Then, just as Friends of Hudson was energized by its victory, the St. Lawrence Cement Company, the second-largest cement producer in the world, announced to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation that it intended to move its cement operations from the west side of the Hudson River, in Catskill, New York, to a new, much larger manufacturing facility at its quarry in Greenport, New York, just south of the City of Hudson. The proposed facility

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would have covered 1,800 acres, an area twenty percent larger than the City of Hudson. After thoroughly examining St. Lawrence’s proposal, Friends of Hudson, followed shortly by Scenic Hudson and others, ignited a movement to oppose the permitting of the proposed plant. The opposition movement sparked a countermovement, and the debate soon became a conflagration that would last almost six years. It inflamed environmentalists, politicians, celebrities, wealthy homeowners, laidoff blue collar workers—just about everyone in the Hudson Valley and many in the surrounding states. The dispute would invade front lawns and car bumpers with ubiquitous “Stop the Plant” and “Support the Plan(e)t” signs and would dominate letters to the editor and bar-stool conversations throughout the region. What was this behemoth that stirred such passion, and what was the road that led from the initial confident announcement to the plant’s ultimate demise? The Proposal St. Lawrence Cement (SLC) is a branch of Holcim (US), Inc., a subsidiary of Holcim Ltd., which is based in Switzerland and Canada. As of 2003, SLC owned and operated thirteen cement plants in the United States, one of which is located on the Western side of the Hudson River in the town of Catskill, New York. It proposed to close down most of its operations at the Catskill plant in order to build a much larger, more modern, coal-fired facility just across the river, increasing its cement production capacity threefold. SLC chose this location for several reasons. It had owned the land where it planned to build the new plant, on Becraft Mountain in the town of Greenport (outside the city of Hudson on the eastern side of the river in Columbia County), since 1976. In addition, there was a large source of available limestone, a necessary ingredient in cement manufacturing; the Hudson River was available for transport of finished cement product; and the location was close to important consumer sources throughout the northeast, including New York City, Albany, and Boston. The cement production of New York State declined significantly in the second half of the twentieth century—from over five million metric tons per year (mty) in the early nineteenth century to only three million mty in 1997. Despite this decrease in production capacity, demand for cement increased, leading to an increase in the use of imported cement. Importing cement, according to SLC, is problematic for several reasons. It takes away potential benefits to the domestic economy that

Figure 2. Promotional postcard produced by Concerned Women of Claverack composed of various regional lawn signs expressing opposition to the SLC plant; reprinted by permission of Concerned Women of Claverack.

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Stopping the Plant

would result from new sources of employment and tax contributions, and it necessitates the transportation of goods over long distances, using resources and creating unnecessary sources of pollution. Further, many of the overseas plants do not have the same degree of environmental regulation that exist in the United States, thereby creating more avoidable damage to the global environment. The proposed plant in Greenport would have produced two million mty, more than double the production levels in the Catskill plant, and would have “decrease[d] the country’s dependence on imported cement by seven percent (assuming the 1998 level of about 20 million mty in finished cement imports)” (DEIS: 1.3). The proposed plant, which is described many times throughout the SLC Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) as a “state-ofthe-art” facility, would have included three main components: the manufacturing plant and limestone mine on Becraft Mountain, the Hudson River dock facility, and the conveyor system connecting the two.1 One of the most conspicuous elements of the plant was to have been a 406-foot (forty-story) tall smokestack, surrounded by twenty facilities over twenty stories high. Even according to the company, the plume from the smokestack could have stretched more than six miles. The plant complex would also have included a two-and-a-halfmile tube conveyor system to transport the finished cement product from the plant to its dock on the river, which would have been expanded from its current size to accommodate the increased activity. The dock area would have served as the shipment site of the finished cement to cement distribution locations throughout the northeast, which in turn ship the cement to concrete producers.2 It was estimated that eighty percent of the cement produced in Greenport would have been transported from the dock facility by barge. The dock would also have been used as a receiving site for the delivery of items needed in the manufacturing process. The waterfront would have been made accessible to the public by pedestrian walkway, shielded from views of the railroad tracks and the waterfront industrial activity. The walkway would have culminated at a lookout area, with signs describing the natural features of the landscape, the nature of the Hudson Valley as a historical heritage area, the cement-making industry, and the nature of the SLC dock activities.

The Opposition More than thirty local, regional, and national groups organized to oppose the building of the proposed plant. They raised numerous con-

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Figure 3. Photograph by B. Docktor “Looking southwest above Becraft Mountain.”

cerns about the impacts the plant could have on the region. One prominent theme in the opposition discourse was the potential visual impact on the beauty of the Hudson Valley resulting from the immense size of the proposed project. Second, many opponents doubted the economic benefits of the plant and believed the plant would harm other aspects of the economy, such as tourism and real estate. The third principle concern was environmental and health damage resulting from the plant, particularly from air emissions, including, among others: nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, lead, mercury, volatile organic compounds, and fine particulate matter. The plant opposition also feared noise pollution, truck traffic, effects of blasting on building foundations, impact on historic resources, harm to wildlife, and the bad track record of other SLC and Holcim plants in complying with pollution regulations. Friends of Hudson and Scenic Hudson were on the front line of the battle against the SLC Greenport plant. Friends of Hudson had two full-time staff members, a full-time volunteer executive director, as well as many other active or occasional volunteers from the community, and focused almost solely on the SLC issue during the six-plusyear span of the controversy. The organization collected 15,000 signatures opposing SLC and raised more than $2 million to finance the challenge against SLC, sixty percent of it from individuals in the

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Figure 4. Photograph by B. Docktor “Looking northwest over SLC quarry.”

region and the remainder from various foundations. Most of the funds raised were spent on expert consultants, the high caliber of which is generally unheard of for small grassroots organizations but which it felt was necessary in order to defeat such a huge, wealthy corporation. Scenic Hudson had one person working full-time exclusively on the SLC issue as well as five or six working on the issue part-time. Scenic Hudson was also part of a larger coalition of organizations, called the Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition (HVPC), formed early in the SLC struggle as a larger, united front against the plant. At the time of the defeat of the SLC proposal, the Coalition was made up of twenty-one organizations: the New York Chapter of the American Lung Association, Citizens’ Environmental Coalition, Citizens for a Healthy Environment, Citizens for the Hudson Valley, Clover Reach, Concerned Women of Claverack, Environmental Advocates of New York, Environmental Defense, Friends of Clermont, Germantown Neighbors Association, Historic Hudson, Inc., Historic Hudson Valley, Hudson Antiques Dealers Association, Hudson River Heritage, Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, New York League of Conservation Voters, Riverkeeper, Inc., Scenic America, Scenic Hudson, and the Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club. In addition to the official members of the coalition, numerous

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other New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut organizations came out in opposition to the project.3 Another group active in opposition to the plant was The Olana Partnership (TOP). TOP is the nonprofit segment of the Olana State Historic Site, which includes the home and gardens of Frederic Church, a member of the Hudson River School of painters. In the midnineteenth century, the landscape painters made the beauty of the Hudson Valley known nationally through their artwork. TOP feared that the visual blight from the SLC plant would damage its “viewshed” and worried that emissions from the stack would impact the buildings and grounds of the historic site. Olana, just three miles from the site of the proposed plant, is one of the top tourist attractions in the region, and TOP was apprehensive that the plant might deter tourists from visiting the area. With so many different groups working closely to oppose the plant, the potential certainly existed for conflicts to arise. Several participants described how there were, at times, disagreements about strategies or priorities, as can be expected in any type of coalition work. Andy Bicking, volunteer coordinator and outreach manager for Scenic Hudson, explained that each group had a different “culture”—different missions, organizational structures, budget constraints, and attitudes or perspectives on the issue—that led to some minor conflicts among them. He described some problems that arose when one group was publicly recognized and another felt like its thunder was wrongly stolen, perhaps because it had provided greater funding or staffing for the project or had been involved for a longer period of time. He also recognized, however, what many others opposing this project observed— that everyone involved was so dedicated to fighting this issue that those conflicts were minimal, and any disagreements merely served to make their arguments stronger. Alix Gerosa, director of environmental quality at Scenic Hudson, stated that when it came to the big picture there was total consensus: “Everyone denies the entire plant.”

The Permitting Process In order to build and operate a new plant in Greenport, St. Lawrence needed a total of seventeen permits granted by local, state, and federal public agencies, including Greenport, Catskill, the City of Hudson, Columbia County Planning Board, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT), New York State Office of General Services

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(NYSOGS), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE), New York State Department of State (NYSDOS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Numerous and extensive documents were required, most significant of which were the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), the Air Permit Application, and the Joint Permit Application. The long and arduous process began in early 1999 when SLC announced to the DEC its intention to build the new plant. This announcement precipitated the most critical aspect of the permitting process—the State Environmental Quality Review (SEQR), performed by the DEC as the “lead agency.” This review process is guided by the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), part of the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) and Title 6 of the New York Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations (6 NYCRR). In addition to a thorough examination of a proposed project for determination of its consistency with existing environmental law, the SEQR process also provides an opportunity for citizens’ groups to participate in the permitting process, an opportunity that would dramatically alter the nature, and arguably the outcome, of the SLC controversy. The first step in the SEQR process, once an “action” has been identified as subject to SEQR, is to identify whether the action is a Type I, Type II, or Unlisted action, according to the severity of its impact on the environment. On April 8, 1999, the DEC identified the SLC proposal as a Type I action, meaning it “may have a significant impact on the environment,” and required the company to produce a DEIS. Though not mandatory, often the next step in the process is a procedure called “scoping,” intended to focus plans for the DEIS on “potentially adverse impacts and to eliminate consideration of those impacts that are irrelevant or nonsignificant” (6 NYCRR §617.8). The “project sponsor,” in this case SLC, was required to complete a draft scope that was submitted to all involved agencies. Scoping must also include a chance for public participation, either through written comments or an open meeting. A public scoping meeting for the SLC project was held on June 24, 1999. According to Dan Odescalchi, SLC’s Greenport Project Representative, public concerns voiced at this initial scoping meeting, particularly those in reference to perceived visual impacts, influenced certain company decisions about the plant, and the DEIS reflects changes from the original design plans. The next critical step in the SEQR process was the submission of the DEIS to the DEC for review. The St. Lawrence DEIS is a 1,600-page document describing the plant’s expected operations as well as what impacts these operations would have on the economy, environment, and general “community character” of the region.4 The first draft of the

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Figure 5. Friends of Hudson Advertisement, “The Northeast Has Spoken,” listing anti-plant sentiments from eight regional newspapers; reprinted by permission of Friends of Hudson.

DEIS was submitted on March 7, 2000. After some communication between SLC and the DEC, the final DEIS was submitted on May 2, 2001, almost two years after the initial scoping meeting. During this period SLC had been busy compiling all the plans and research for the extensive document, while Friends of Hudson, soon joined by Scenic Hudson and others, was working hard to gather information and spread knowledge about the proposal. Both sides were working actively to gain support for their position through advertisements, lawn signs, and public forums. As early as February 22, 2000, an article appeared in Hudson’s Register Star with the headline “St. Lawrence foes pick up momentum” and Friends of Hudson’s membership increased significantly from 300 in 1999 to 1,500 in 2000 to 2,400 in 2001. The debate was beginning to be loudly featured in the local community discourse. Once the DEIS was deemed a complete document by the DEC, a public comment period began in May 2001 and lasted until July 2.5 A public hearing was held at Columbia-Greene Community College on June 20, which was attended by more than 1,000 people. During the hearing—which lasted from 1:00 p.m. until after midnight on June

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21—121 people spoke, only fifteen of whom spoke in favor of the project. In addition, 982 written comments were submitted (561 in opposition and 421 in support) and petitions presented containing 16,576 signatures (11,342 in opposition and 5,234 in support) (ALJ Ruling 12/7/2001). The next significant event was the Issues Conference, held from July 18–31 and August 15, 2001, which was presided over by two Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) from the DEC Office of Hearings and Mediation Services (OHMS), Helene Goldberger and Maria Villa. The conference was attended by all groups or individuals intending to apply for “party status,” which would give them the ability to participate fully as “intervenors” in the permit hearing process. The DEC and the applicant, SLC, were automatically parties to the hearing. All other prospective intervenors, to secure full party status, had to prove that they would “raise a substantive and significant issue or be able to make a meaningful contribution to the record regarding a substantive and significant issue raised by another party” and had to “demonstrate adequate environmental interest” (6 NYCRR § 624.5, cited in ALJ Ruling 12/7/2001). The purpose of the Issues Conference, in addition to determining which groups were able to make a “meaningful contribution,” was to look into concerns that had emerged, in order to determine which issues required adjudication. An issue is adjudicable if “it is proposed by a potential party and is both substantive and significant” (6 NYCRR § 624.4, cited in the First Interim Decision 12/6/2002). An issue is “substantive” if “there is sufficient doubt about the applicant’s ability to meet statutory or regulatory criteria applicable to the project, such that a reasonable person would require further inquiry,” and is “significant” if “it has the potential to result in the denial of a permit, a major modification to the proposed project or the imposition of significant permit conditions in addition to those proposed in the draft permit” (First Interim Decision 12/6/2002). In December 2001 the ALJs issued their decision regarding party status and issues for adjudication. At 138 pages, plus attachments, it is the longest ruling in the history of the DEC. Three groups were given full party status by the ALJs—Friends of Hudson, The Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition, and the Olana Partnership. In addition, more limited amicus status was granted to the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Preservation League, and the village of Athens, which allowed them to contribute information on individual issues in which they had particular interest and knowledge, but without the responsibilities of party status. The ALJs denied the petitions for amicus status from Columbia Hudson Partnership, Natural Resources

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Defense Council, the town of Greenport, and Columbia County, stating in regards to the latter, “The County has played virtually no role in these proceedings. It has made two submissions that state its support for the project generally and its view that the county encompasses diverse land uses. We do not find that the county has shown expertise or a special perspective through these submission that would warrant its further participation as an amicus” (ALJ Ruling 12/7/2001). (According to Citizens for a Healthy Environment, “The judges’ words are chilling when one realizes that they are applied to the leadership of the county” (2002: 66).) Of the issues addressed at the Issues Conference, a total of eight were deemed adjudicable: air dispersion modeling, short-term limits for Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Lowest Achievable Emissions Rates (LAER) with respect to Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter (PM 2.5), noise impacts, riverine habitat mitigation plan, visual impacts, and economic impacts (ALJ Ruling 12/7/2001). In addition, supplementation of the record was required on nine topics and twenty-eight amendments were mandated for the draft permit. Even though both sides expressed satisfaction with the ALJs’ ruling, extensive appeals were filed, as well as briefs responding to the other side’s appeals. Following examination of the appeals, briefs, and the ALJs’ ruling, DEC Commissioner Erin Crotty, who had the final say in granting or denying DEC permits, released the First Interim Decision of the SEQR proceedings on December 6, 2002. Crotty upheld the ALJs’ decisions to adjudicate noise impacts and added air pollution impacts to Olana to the list of issues requiring adjudication. She also reversed their decisions to adjudicate air modeling and economic impacts, stating in regard to the latter that economic impacts may prove to be adjudicable later in the decisionmaking process once more information was obtained regarding other environmental impacts. In addition, Crotty added to the list of issues to be adjudicated an examination of SLC’s proposed mining operations. According to SLC, the Greenport project’s mining operations should be “grandfathered” in the permitting process, that is, should not be subject to SEQR because its initial mining approval predated the effective date of SEQRA. However, according to New York State’s Environmental Conservation Law (ECL § 8-011), SEQRA grandfathers all actions approved before September 1, 1976 except “in the case of an action where the responsible agency proposes a modification of the action and the modification may result in a significant adverse effect on the environment.” Since SLC proposed to increase its mining operations from their

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approved rate of 1.8 million metric tons per year (mty) to 6.1 mty (an increase of 338 percent), Crotty decided that it could not be assumed that the proposed mining operations were grandfathered, and thus adjudication was required. Adjudicatory hearings began at the Greenport Town Hall in 2003, beginning in March with hearings on grandfathering of the mine, presided over by ALJs Goldberger and Villa. On June 12 of that year, the ALJs issued a decision recommending that SLC’s mining operations be ungrandfathered, stating that “[w]hile the applicant’s argument that current mining methods reduce impacts even when extraction rates are greatly increased is persuasive, such facts are more appropriately assessed during a hearing on the specific environmental issues that are identified for adjudication” and “it would be remiss on the part of this agency to bind its review based upon mining activities that never reached the dimensions proposed by SLC and which were never subject to the scrutiny SEQRA requires” (ALJ Ruling 6/12/2003). Adjudication continued later that year with hearings regarding traffic impacts held in November and hearings addressing noise impacts held in late November and early December. Commissioner Crotty issued the long-awaited Second Interim Decision on September 8, 2004. It upheld the ALJs’ decision regarding the ungrandfathering of the SLC mine and called for full adjudication of all remaining issues, such as air impacts and impacts on visual and historic resources. Opponents of the plant lauded Crotty’s decision and described it as a strong message to SLC about the reality of its situation. According to a statement by Sam Pratt, executive director of Friends of Hudson from 1999 to 2005, “We have always said that on a level playing field, St. Lawrence Cement will lose. That’s why St. Lawrence Cement has tried to tilt the process in its favor with lobbying, public relations, and saturation advertising. What the Commissioner has done today is to give opponents that level playing field we’ve asked for—and made clear to the company that it’s got a long, hard road ahead, with little certainty of success.” And according to Friends of Hudson, “This ruling today validates years of work by our lawyers, engineers, and other experts, and the strong commitment of thousands of citizens to stop this dangerous project. It also demonstrates that St. Lawrence Cement no longer calls the shots in Albany, and that opponents have an opportunity to stop SLC on the merits.” Another significant event occurred in 2004 when SLC announced several design changes to the plant, intended to address some of the concerns raised during the permitting process. The most significant element of the change was a shift of the forty acres of buildings onequarter mile south, and thus seventy-two feet lower in the proposed

Figure 6. Photograph by B. Docktor “Looking southeast over school.”

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mine quarry. According to the company, this change, along with the proposed elimination of one section from the smokestack, would have resulted in lowering the stack height from 406 feet to less than 290 feet. While the change would have mitigated some of the visual impacts, opposition groups expressed concern that lowering the smokestack would lower the plume and thus would result in an increase in the volume of toxic pollution dispersed locally. Given that the plant was within a mile of a hospital, a nursing home, a school, and a densely populated area, increasing the level of pollution was a great concern. Opposition groups insisted that a new environmental impact statement would be required. The controversy finally came to a close in April 2005 when the Department of State (DOS) issued a decision objecting to SLC’s certificate of consistency, in essence denying SLC one of the permits it needed to build the plant. Despite the fact that the focus during the dispute had been mainly on the DEC permits, SLC needed to obtain all seventeen required permits in order to proceed with construction. Only a few days after the DOS decision, SLC announced its decision not to appeal and officially withdrew its proposal. The plant had been stopped.

Gauging Success Interestingly, throughout the permitting process, both sides seemed completely sure that they would prevail in the end. An opponent of the plant stated that he hoped the process would not go on for fifteen to twenty years like it did in the Storm King case, but even if it did, he was prepared to see it through to the end. He was optimistic about the outcome: At this stage I’m so fully convinced, not just in my bones, but because of the information our experts and our attorneys have researched, that this project cannot be built. . . . I think St. Lawrence is going to be in the situation of appealing and then losing on their appeals if they decide to waste their time on it, because the facts don’t back them up. And I don’t by the way that think the DEC will approve the project anyway. . . . Basically St. Lawrence’s argument was that there should be no hearing, that there should be no proceedings, that the State should give them their permits based on the application that they filed and they should just take it at face value. . . . They cried bloody murder when we applied for party status and

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then we got party status. They said that even if there’s parties recognized, there should be no issues adjudicated. Then the judge ordered the issues adjudicated. Then they started adjudicating the issues and they started losing. Every major decision that’s come up they haven’t appeared very confident and that ratifies the fact that they’re not telling the truth in their application. . . . As I said, all we need is to win on one issue, on one permit. . . . I also should say the longer it goes on the less support they have because the more people know about it the less they like it. If a decision were made in the first three months it would have been permitted. This observer believed that the state was parceling out the project bit by bit, sending people to do more and more reviews of various topics, because it wanted to avoid making a decision. He thought that, if pushed, the State would deny the permits but it hoped that either the project or the opposition would disappear, “because what politicians like to avoid is anything controversial sticking to them, so why make a decision until you absolutely have to.” Although some new information was revealed or clarified after the project was first proposed, other than the quarter mile location modification made in 2004, the basics of the proposal remained largely unchanged. Thus, the belief that the proposal would have been permitted in the first few months carries with it an important conclusion about the crucial role the opposition played in this process. Without opposition, the proposal would not have been examined nearly so carefully, and thus it was the dedication and perseverance of the opposition that forced the ultimate denial of the permits. Conversely, Dan Odescalchi, a representative for SLC, stated that he was sure the project would be approved: They’ve been at this for a while, and if there were any doubts of us meeting any of these requirements I think we would have tossed in the towel. I don’t think that’s really an option for us. We’re pretty much ready to see this through and seeing as we’re not going to have any problems meeting any of our regulatory requirements, we don’t see this as a problem. A representative of the Hudson Valley Environmental/Economic Coalition, a local organization supporting the plant, also believed that the permits would be granted by the DEC.6 He was certain that SLC would meet the regulatory requirements and that there was “overwhelming support” for the plant throughout the county. He stated that

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Figure 7. “The Results Are In!” Cartoon by Mark Teague.

any minimal increases in the size of the opposition was due to a strategic switch from emphasizing aesthetic concerns about the landscape to using scare tactics regarding toxic emission. Both he and Odescalchi stated that three surveys were done that all showed majority support

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for the plant and they cited recent elections, in which plant supporters were overwhelmingly successful throughout the county. Odescalchi displayed an article from a local newspaper with a large headline declaring “Anti-Cement Plant Candidates Paved Over.” According to Cyndy Hall, one of the founders of Concerned Women of Claverack, a grassroots organization opposing the plant, the assertion that the plant was the determinative issue in the local elections was an example of the arrogance of SLC and its supporters. She thought the election results were not an accurate representation of the size of the opposition. Many members of the opposition also expressed the opinion that the polls to which Odescalchi was referring did not accurately represent the breakdown. A leader of the plant opposition went so far as to call these polls “unethical” because they only surveyed certain segments of the population and worded the questions in such a way as to sway the objectivity of the answers. A cartoon published in the Hudson Valley Record shows a drawing of SLC representatives doing a poll and asking questions such as, “Which would you prefer: SLC’s ‘replacement plant’ or being poked in the eye with a sharp stick?” (Teague, Spring 2003: 2).

Hostilities, Suspicions, and Stereotypes The relative size of the two opposing camps is not, at least for the purpose of this discussion, the most critical issue. What is extremely significant, and indisputable, is that the issue deeply divided the region, and most dramatically the local Hudson community, causing tremendous hostility. Oftentimes the way the disagreements were expressed was not pretty. Cyndy Hall described how she had a sign on her front lawn that read “TLC, not SLC.” When someone broke the sign in half, Hall left it on her lawn as a statement. She also told a story of a time when she went away on vacation around Easter and returned to find huge chunks of cement on her front lawn and a note on her door that said “Happy Ether.” At another point all the “Stop the Plant” signs in Claverack were spray painted black and two anti-plant billboards were ripped down, frightening many of the local residents. According to Hall, since the plant supporters were capable of defacing property, people began to wonder what else they might be capable of doing. In Red Hook, a town close to the proposed site, one local restaurant owner who had a large “Stop the Plant” sign up in the window of his restaurant told of having a bullet shot through his restaurant window. The police investigating the incident believed that the attack was probably due to the presence of the sign in his window. He

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expressed some doubt, but for the police even to have made such a suggestion reflected the depths of the hostilities. One of the biggest complaints expressed by members of the opposition concerned not just the actions of plant supporters in the community but also the tactics of employees of SLC itself. In April 2000 SLC’s public relations representative was caught trying to steal the sign-in sheet at a Friends of Hudson event in Chatham and was subsequently fired.7 Residents opposed to the plant cited numerous examples of SLC either blatantly changing its position on various facts regarding the plant or attempting to conceal inconsistencies. And, the most often cited example, SLC was caught “ghostwriting” a number of letters to the editor in support of the plant, an action viewed by the opposition as evidence of the unethical nature of the company and the lack of community support for the plant. Friends of Hudson described how SLC claimed as an excuse that “its ghostwriting was a ‘service’ performed on behalf of supporters” (5th Anniversary Commemorative Edition: 10). Conversely, plant supporters also questioned the honesty of some of the opposition’s statements and the ethics of their strategies. For example, one supporter accused Scenic Hudson of telling a number of lies at a presentation given at Bard College in December 2003. For example, he noted, Scenic Hudson stated as “fact” that SLC would not hire local construction workers to build the new plant, when SLC had already signed a Project Labor Agreement that would have hired all local builders. A second example he gave was the response to a question one student asked about what type of industry, if any, Scenic Hudson supports. Scenic Hudson cited, as an example, Athens Generating, a new power plant in the town of Athens, just across the river from Hudson and Greenport, while failing to mention that they were opposed to Athens Generating until they were given $2.2 million in a settlement with the company. Several supporters of the plant also cited the high salaries of the employees in the organizations opposing the plant as a reason to question the ethics of their positions. One person claimed that Scenic Hudson employees made “well into six-digit salaries” and several others emphasized that Scenic Hudson was essentially a company, in that its fundraising was merely to support its employees’ salaries. The implication was that many of the organization’s employees were involved in this issue as a way to make money, not because they genuinely believed in the cause. However, despite any conclusions they may have wished to draw about the motives of the organizations’ paid employees, it must be recognized that many of the people working against the plant were volunteers and Sam Pratt himself worked full-

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time as a volunteer, putting in by his own estimate over 15,000 pro bono hours. In addition, there is no way to deny that SLC itself was involved purely out of economic self-interest. These hostilities both fostered and were exacerbated by stereotypes about the opposing sides, which increased polarization of the issue and decreased the two sides’ ability to communicate openly. Plant supporters were portrayed as being less intelligent, less educated, or having a “bizarre nostalgia” for the days of industry. Plant opponents were often stereotyped as all being rich, gay antiques dealers from New York City. These stereotypes distracted from the real issue: How can a harmonious community be built in which everyone’s interests are satisfied and visions fulfilled to the greatest extent possible? Now that the Department of State has rejected SLC’s permit application, this question remains. But during the years of the controversy itself, the discourse focused much more on the specific issues arising from the proposal—its aesthetic, economic, and environmental impacts and who was entitled to weigh in on those issues. It is only through an examination of the opinions of the various constituencies on these questions—an exploration of the discourse surrounding the plant itself—that an understanding can be reached about the conflicting worldviews that allowed for polarized interpretations of the facts. By focusing specifically on the facts asserted by each side, we can piece together the puzzle that will answer the bigger question: How do such dramatic polarizations occur, and what does this say about the place and the people involved?

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CHAPTER 2

Aesthetics and the Search for Quality of Life Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty. It expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values as yet uncaptured by language. —Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac

O

ne important theme of the St. Lawrence Cement dispute among the residents of the Hudson Valley and the other participants in the debate was the importance of aesthetics to quality of life. The Hudson Valley has long been celebrated for its extraordinary beauty, and the opposition to the plant made use of this in its arguments. Although both sides of the debate recognized the beauty of the region, the use of beauty as a rationale for conservation is complicated. The discussion of aesthetics in the SLC debate must first begin with some historical background about how aesthetics and nature first came to be connected, how the beauty of nature has played a role in conservation, and how the aesthetics of nature eventually came to be protected under law. I will then examine the arguments about aesthetics and visual impacts given by both sides of the debate, and lastly move to a greater discussion about whether or why, apart from issues of health or economics, beauty and the preservation of nature for its own sake are values to be respected.

Developing an Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature For the first few centuries of European settlement in America, the dominant attitude toward nature was one of fear and abhorrence. The 23

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vastness of the American wilderness was something inconceivable in the highly populated European mainland. The Europeans who made the voyage across the Atlantic of course already had their own conceptions of nature, and the dominant ideology in Europe at the time was one in which wilderness was viewed as mysterious and dangerous. Upon entering the New World, however, this wilderness could not be avoided. The colonists’ safety depended on their ability to conquer the wilderness for food, shelter and protection from the native Americans, whom they viewed as dangerous savages, part of the nature to be conquered (Nash 1982: 24). Nature was viewed as something that must be transformed from evil to good, or chaos to order. This view was encouraged by the belief that nature existed solely for use by men, or more specifically, white men. The sheer size of the American wilderness encouraged the belief that natural resources were inexhaustible, and could therefore be used in any way that served mankind (Nash 1989: 35). As civilization in America grew, this view became closely tied with economics by the increased demand for resources and increased technology available for larger-scale resource extraction. Tremendous wealth was available to those who acquired and sold natural resources. Despite the fact that this view of nature as an economic resource for the well-being of humankind continued full force, and to some extent still exists today, slowly new views of nature emerged along with it. Beginning in the nineteenth century the ideological, literary, and artistic trend known as the Romantic Movement began developing a more favorable attitude toward nature. Although nature was still viewed as chaotic or mysterious, those once negative traits took on a positive meaning. According to environmental historian William Cronon, two cultural constructs were responsible for this transformation—the sublime (the religious or spiritual power of natural beauty) and the frontier (independence, vigor, and American nationalism): “The two converged to remake wilderness in their own image, freighting it with moral values and cultural symbols that it carries to this day” (1995: 72). In the Hudson Valley, this transformation is often identified with the Hudson River School of painters, a group of artists who were among the first to paint nature untouched by mankind. It is said that the artists of the Hudson River School were united less by a common artistic style than by a common view of nature, a view in “perfect synchrony” with the current Romantic trends (Dunwell 1991: 51). Their paintings projected the Romantic notions of mystery and beauty onto Hudson Valley landscapes with the simultaneous implication that the sublime could disappear if mankind continued its

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unchecked development and abuse of nature. The most famous member of this school, and the one who is thought to have inspired its other members, was Thomas Cole. Born in England, Cole moved to Ohio as a teenager, and “discovered” the Catskills when traveling in New York a few years later. He was deeply moved by the beauty of the region and returned many times, eventually moving there permanently (Nash 1982: 78). Part of the tremendous popularity of the works of Cole, and others of the School, was their role in developing a sense of American nationalism. Post-independence, Americans were searching for something uniquely American, something on which they could base national pride and “justify” their freedom (Nash 1982: 67). America needed to create a distinctly American culture. Since other countries also had extraordinary flora, fauna, and bodies of water, but wilderness was scarce in Europe, and particularly in England, Americans focused on the wildness and expanse of nature as their country’s unique characteristic. The Hudson River School furthered the belief in wilderness as a positive asset, something to be embraced. Art based on the glory of the American wilderness both encouraged this sense of national pride and contributed something further to the search for American uniqueness—a distinctly American art form contributing to a distinctly American culture. In Bill Moyers’ 2002 film about the Hudson River, America’s First River, he notes that painters were particularly important because they were the stars before there was television and radio. They provided an important mirror, giving America a particular view of itself. Thus, the Hudson River School of painters was a significant influence on the development of an American identity, in relation to other nations, and a human identity, in relation to nature. It only makes sense that the newfound “appreciation of wilderness led easily to sadness at its disappearance” (Nash 1982: 96). Conservation efforts began towards the end of the nineteenth century, first with the designation of ten square miles in the Yosemite Valley to be set aside for use as a park in 1864, followed shortly thereafter by much larger areas such as Yellowstone, at two million square miles in 1872, the Adirondacks in 1885, and a larger area of Yosemite in 1890. Aesthetics were not the only motivation for these early conservation efforts, however. The creation of national parks was inspired as much by the recognition of the damage of reckless, widespread logging practices as it was by desires for human enjoyment of nature. Though the movement at its beginnings was fairly united, tension began to rise during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, when conservation became more and more associated with a business necessity for the continued availability of resources. This view, often personified

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by the forest management and appropriate-logging or “wise use” philosophy of Gifford Pinchot, the first head of the U.S. Forest Service, slowly revealed itself to be in conflict with those who placed a value on nature untouched by humans, a position advocated by John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club. Muir became increasingly frustrated by the way the logic of conservation could in fact be used to destroy wilderness when it was deemed necessary for industry.

Hetch-Hetchy: Exemplifying the Divide The followers of Pinchot succeeded in appropriating the term “conservation” for their utilitarian philosophy of the “wise use” of resources, while Muir’s contingent became associated with the term “preservation.” The split between these two early camps of environmentalists is exemplified by the most famous environmental controversy of the period, the debate over the construction of a dam in the Hetch-Hetchy Valley, in the preserved area of Yosemite National Park. Conservationists saw the dam as a necessity to meet the water demands of San Francisco, while preservationists saw it as a clear case of wilderness destruction. Pinchot wrote to President Roosevelt that although he understood the desire to preserve Yosemite, “the highest possible use which could be made of it would be to supply pure water to a great center of population” (quoted in Nash 1982: 164). After deliberation Roosevelt sided with Pinchot, inspiring Muir to begin a campaign to raise public awareness about the issue, focusing mainly on the aesthetic qualities of the valley and the spiritual necessity of wilderness. Preservationists portrayed the issue as a clear question of right or wrong. They gained the support of many scientists, newspaper editors, and nature lovers, and eventually were able to publicize the issue with such fervor as to make it a major national topic of concern. Despite their attempts, the Senate voted in support of the dam, and President Wilson upheld the decision, signing the bill in December 1913. For the time being, economic interests won out over aesthetics. According to environmental historian Roderick Nash, however, although “the preservationists lost the fight for the valley, . . . they had gained much ground in the larger war for the existence of wilderness” (1982: 180). The value placed on the aesthetic and recreational value of nature continued to expand, particularly after the First World War, when the possibility of automobile touring caused the numbers of people visiting national parks to increase tremendously. Before the age of the

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automobile, which allowed for easier access to the parks, national parks were what environmental writer Robert Gottlieb describes as “playground[s] for the wealthy” (1993: 31). Many national parks were also game reserves, geared to the interests of the wealthy. These early environmentalists “tended to be affluent white Protestant males eager to protect wildlife for hunting and fishing and to preserve open space for aesthetics and recreation. Several early national conservation groups, including the Sierra Club, were for a time largely social organizations that existed to provide outdoor excursions for their members” (Shabecoff 2000: 3). With the availability of automobiles, however, wilderness recreation became a possibility for the less elite segments of the population, and its popularity continued to grow through the Great Depression, when more expensive types of tourism were no longer an option.

The 1960s: The Right to Quality of Life Aesthetics and recreation also played an important role in what former chief environmental correspondent for The New York Times Philip Shabecoff (2000) calls the “second wave” of environmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s, but they were portrayed in a different manner. Though recreation was still a significant issue, and these decades saw a dramatic rise in public interest in outdoor activities such as hiking and camping, the issue had shifted from an appreciation of nature to viewing nature as part of a democratic right to quality of life. The years after the Second World War saw a tremendous economic boom and, consequently, an increased standard of living. Where the necessities of daily life once consumed most incomes, affluence allowed people to move beyond necessity to acquire things that became associated with the term “quality of life” (Hays 1987: 4). Echoing the Romantic and Transcendentalist notions that contact with nature is good for the spirit, the quality of the environment was seen as a key aspect of a good life. More leisure time opened the way for increased recreation in nature, which led to a greater appreciation for the aesthetic value of nature. This appreciation in turn led to the desire to preserve such beauty from harm. Thus, while the early preservation movement was elitist in that only the wealthy could afford recreational adventures into national parks, as wealth spread to greater segments of the population, access to nature spread as well. It took a tremendous struggle, however, to have the preservation of aesthetic qualities protected under the law.

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Aesthetics in the Storm King Controversy The birthplace of the legal recognition of aesthetic interests, and viewed by some as the birthplace of the modern environmental movement, was the fight to save Storm King Mountain from development, a fight that lasted eighteen years. This controversy is particularly significant to the discussion of the SLC plant because of its place as one of the most important environmental battles of the Hudson Valley, as well as its role as the motivation for the creation of the environmental group Scenic Hudson. The Storm King saga began in 1963 when Consolidated Edison submitted a proposal to the Federal Power Commission to build an enormous hydroelectric facility at the base of Storm King Mountain, “a beautiful and historically significant promontory” on the Hudson River in Cornwall, New York (www.riverkeeper.org). The plant would have been able to suck up to six billion gallons of water from the river daily through a massive tunnel and pump it into a storage facility and would have generated electricity by releasing that water, sending it down through the tunnel, through turbines and then back into the river. At the time it was proposed, it would have been the largest pumped storage facility in the world. Opposition to the project began immediately with the creation of the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, and was originally based on two main arguments—the project would deface the side of Storm King Mountain and would open the way for more large-scale developments in the region (Boyle 1969: 155). Scenic Hudson immediately began fundraising and hired a public relations firm from New York City to combat Consolidated Edison, which was attempting to denounce its opponents by calling them “old ladies in tennis shoes watching birds” and “militant adversaries of progress” (Francis Reese, cited in Moyers 2002). Despite the growing opposition and the publicity generated for Scenic Hudson when it was granted “intervener” status in the Federal Power Commission (FPC) hearing, in 1964 the FPC decided in favor of Con Ed, three to one. But the case was far from over. In 1965 Scenic Hudson gathered more funds and hired lawyers to take the case to the Federal Court of Appeals in New York. According to Raymond O’Brien, in his 1981 book on the scenery of the Hudson Valley, “Although technical and scientific considerations were eventually drawn into the legal fray, the original concept was to save natural splendor; implicit in the organization’s title” (1981: 29). Similarly Allan R. Talbot, in his 1972 book on the Storm King controversy, states, “The Scenic Hudson coalition raised every conceivable objection . . . but the central argument was the plant

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would destroy the scenic beauty of the mountain” (1972: 3). The implication is that the scientific evidence that was gathered by the opponents about the impact the plant would have on the health of the environment was, in part, used as a strategy in order to achieve their aesthetic goals. They had to base their arguments on the potential damage to the fish, for example, because their arguments about the potential damage to the view were not yet legally cognizable. However, in December 1965 the court made a groundbreaking decision, legitimizing the aesthetic concerns by declaring that the Federal Power Commission’s renewed proceedings “must include as a basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and national historic shrines, keeping in mind that in our affluent society, the cost of a project is only one of several factors to be considered” (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965)). Though the court also required the FPC to examine a few other issues, such as potential impacts to fisheries and possible alternatives to the project, the decision to require the consideration of scenic concerns was the first of its kind. In the second round of FPC hearings, in which Scenic Hudson was joined by several other interveners, the natural beauty of Storm King continued to be a prominent topic, with numerous witnesses for the opposition citing the Hudson Valley Highlands as some of the most beautiful scenery in the country. Even Con Ed attempted to argue the issue by claiming that its water storage facility, which would be located at what was then a small pond, would increase the beauty of the site because “any large lake is handsomer than a small lake” (quoted in Boyle 1969: 171). Such dialogue continued for many years, and the battle did not end for another decade, when Con Ed finally abandoned the proposal in the face of rising costs, changing technology and the unrelenting opposition, and gave up rights to the mountain, which eventually became a public park. The most significant aspect of this entire controversy was the decision made by the court early in the fight that aesthetic concerns had sufficient value to warrant legal protection. The battle over Storm King was an important precedent for all subsequent environmental issues involving aesthetic concerns and the public’s right to participate in decision-making about the development of their community. The Storm King controversy resulted in the creation of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), which details the procedures and confirms the ability of citizens to contribute to environmental impact assessment processes. It also inspired a number of pieces of legislation designed to safeguard environmental aesthetics. In addition, it was the event that created the organization

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Scenic Hudson, which has been a crucial voice in many environmental issues on the Hudson Valley and was one of the leaders in the fight against SLC.

Using Aesthetic Values in Opposition to SLC The aesthetic resources of the Hudson Valley and the perceived effects the plant would have had on these resources were constant and explicit themes in the SLC debate. Many plant opponents described the extraordinary beauty of the Hudson Valley as one of the main reasons the plant should not be built in this location. Friends of Hudson described the area as a “unique repository” of scenic resources (FOH Issues Overview), and Citizens for a Healthy Environment claimed the valley was “world-renowned for its sweeping vistas.” In America’s First River, Bill Moyers frequently points to the beauty of the region as one of its defining characteristics, and states that in the early years of European arrival to the United States, the Hudson Valley was thought of as a Garden of Eden, paradise discovered. He claims that the Hudson is a river “celebrated for its history, its commerce, but most of all its beauty.” Andy Bicking, Scenic Hudson’s public outreach coordinator, liked to summarize his opinion about the SLC plant as “the wrong plant in the wrong place.” The “wrong place” refers both to the aesthetic and to the historical importance of the Hudson Valley1 and, therefore, the necessity to avoid any damage to it. According to Citizens for a Healthy Environment (CHE), a member of the Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition and author of a book on the impacts of the Greenport plant, the “industrial site would detract from all other features in the landscape.” As CHE describes the visual impacts: If the project were built, the facility would dwarf Olana, obliterate the hill line, and replace a significant patch of wooded land, the horizon, and sky with industrial stacks and structures. The stack plume would often stretch for miles parallel to the coast, and there would be an increased general haze reducing visibility, especially on warm days. All views would have less clarity and on some days would disappear altogether. (CHE: 21–22) The greatest source of the aesthetic impacts would result from the massive size of the plant. CHE begins its book by asserting, “The

Car Catskill stack

SLC Greenport Proposal

406-foot stack and 386-foot preheater

SLC Greenport Proposal Conifer House

Olana

Red Maple St. Charles Hotel Liberty Car

Figure 8. Height comparison of proposed Greenport facility with structures such as Olana and the Statue of Liberty; produced by Sam Pratt; reprinted by permission of Friends of Hudson.

Old Atlas silos and stack

NOTE: The image of the facility below is scanned directly from the SLC Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). This image shows only a portion of the structures which would be located on Becraft Mountain, rising from a 285-foot plateau. The elevation of the top of the stack above the river level would thus be 691 feet. SLC’s depiction of the height of the stacks (406 feet) was used to render other items and structures in scale. As such, this visualization is accurate to the extent that the image provided by SLC in Table 1-12 can be assumed to be accurate.

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proposed St. Lawrence Cement plant would not be a plant, it would be a vast industrial complex. . . . If built, it would be on a physical scale unprecedented in the Hudson River Valley” (CHE: 9). The preheater tower would have been sixty-seven stories and the smokestack seventy stories above the river level. From these measurements, CHE deduces that that “the stack would be the highest structure between New York City and Albany.” Friends of Hudson and Scenic Hudson both used the excessive size of the plant as one of their main arguments against the proposal. Friends of Hudson described the proposed facility as “sprawl.” They compared the size of the proposed plant, 2.8 square miles, with the size of the City of Hudson—only 2.3 square miles or just seventy-five percent the size of the proposed plant (FOH Issues Overview). A dramatic depiction of the size of the plant can be found in a visual simulation, used both in Friends of Hudson advertisements and in Scenic Hudson public presentations, which compares the proposed plant with the size of SLC’s Catskill plant as well as with other known landscape markers such as trees, houses and the Statue of Liberty. To say the least, the plant dwarfs all the other examples featured.2 Scenic Hudson described the plant as “an outrageous monolith by any standard, an industrial city. . . . This plant, to be located 300 feet above the Hudson River, will become the dominant and discordant feature in one of our country’s most famous viewsheds—the landscape surrounding Frederic Church’s Olana” (“About the Campaign,” www.scenichudson. org/stcp/campaign.htm). Thus, it was not merely the size of the plant but its incompatibility with the Hudson Valley landscape, or “viewshed” that enraged opponents. A few selections from the local newspapers’ Letters to the Editor sections also serve to demonstrate the extent to which this issue became a theme in the debate: “Heavy mining industry does not belong next to a population center in the midst of an historic and scenic heritage which goes back to the beginnings of this country” (Independent/Register Star,3 von Pein 7/31/2000). “People live, visit and spend money here to be in the land of mountain views, green fields, wildlife and a better life, not to be in a country where the land has been raped of its resources with 400-foot industrial stacks in the horizon” (Independent, Companik 4/24/2000). Another writer describes how, with the increasing population, rural landscapes are becoming increasingly threatened: “This is a part of the people’s rights. . . . the pursuit of happiness. The generations to come will need this place in the ever-burgeoning population tide that will overtake Columbia County. Caretakers must take a stand now to preserve this piece of America the beautiful for all coming generations.

Figure 9. Photograph by Terrence DeWan “Existing Red Barn, Route 23, Greenport” and Photo Simulation “Red Barn with Summer Plume” by Berkshire Design Group and Terrence J. DeWan & Associates.

Figure 10. Photograph by Terrence DeWan “Existing Historic City Cemetery in Hudson” and Photo Simulation “Proposed SLC Plant from Historic City Cemetery in Hudson” by Berkshire Design Group and Terrence J. DeWan & Associates.

Figure 11. Photograph by Terrence DeWan “Existing Powerline” and Photo Simulation “Powerline with Plume” by Berkshire Design Group and Terrence J. DeWan & Associates.

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They are going to need it” (Independent/Register Star, Williamson 7/25/2001). This letter touches on two important themes. One is the Hudson Valley as a “piece of America the beautiful,” which is reminiscent, though undoubtedly unintended, of the role the Hudson Valley played in the creation of American nationalism, through the art of the Hudson River School. The author invokes the beauty of the region to resonate with readers’ sense of patriotism. The second is the role of natural beauty in the pursuit of happiness, or quality of life. The writer draws an interesting parallel between the rights put forth in the Declaration of Independence and the belief in the democratic right to quality of life that emerged in the 1960s, implying that the building of the St. Lawrence plant would be fundamentally undemocratic and would contradict the rights our nation’s founders fought to achieve. There is also a reference to our duty to future generations, a common position held by environmentalists and inherent in definitions of sustainability, though it is generally made in reference to health. In this case the argument is that as those before us had a duty to preserve our right to happiness, we have a duty to preserve future generations’ right to beauty, since beauty is an important source of happiness.

Quality of Life: Connecting Aesthetics and History The scenic and historic resources of the Hudson Valley were often tied together in the opposition to the St. Lawrence plant under the heading “the significance of the Hudson Valley,” and both of these had a substantial influence on the sense of identity of the residents of the Hudson Valley. According to the Scenic Hudson Web site, “Aesthetic issues are real and evoke strong reactions from people. . . . Both in its built and natural features, the Hudson Valley’s rich visual environment is a valuable asset that creates a sense of identity and well-being for residents of the area.” To a degree, the beauty of the region has contributed to its historical significance, as exemplified by the Hudson River School, whose painters were drawn to this area because of its scenery, and therefore it was the scenery that inspired what is now considered an important historical asset of the region. The beauty of the place was the reason that the historical events happened there. Conversely, the historical nature of a region can help contribute to its beauty. This connection was adopted by the State Commissioner of Environmental Conservation in 1979 when pressing for the Hudson Valley to be designated a “scenic area.” In his argument as to why it deserved such a designation, he cited the valley’s role in American lit-

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erature and arts, thus implying that the historical nature of the region contributes to its beauty. One author, in a discussion of the aesthetic issues involved in the Storm King controversy, points to Scenic Hudson’s use of nineteenth-century lithographs in its brochures to advocate “Scenic Preservation,” the goal of which is “saving landforms that are beautiful today, still beautiful in fact because they were sanctified and mythologized in our romantic past” (O’Brien 1981: 29). This scenario was repeated in the St. Lawrence case in the use of historic resources in order to preserve scenic ones. Literature distributed by the Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition (HVPC) entitled “Our Concerns” connects the valley’s beauty and history when it claims, “This St. Lawrence Cement plant will be a hideous new landmark in a region whose legendary scenery has been immortalized in the paintings of the Hudson River School.” Olana, the former home of Hudson River School painter Frederic Church, and the most visited historic site in the county, became involved in the issue in large part because of the visual effects the plant would have on the historic site. The Hudson Valley was also recognized nationally as a particularly important historic region when it was designated a National Heritage Area in 1996 and the Hudson River was recognized as an American Heritage River in 1998. The location that was proposed for the new plant is at the center of a high concentration of historic properties, including the town of Hudson itself, which was designated one of the ten most historic towns in America (CHE: 11). The region has approximately 1,500 properties listed, or eligible to be listed, on the National Register of Historic Places and was voted one of the top eleven Most Endangered Sites in the country by the National Trust for Historic Preservation in 2000. According to the National Trust (2002), “With a mix of scenery and history unmatched anywhere else in the country, this region is one of America’s greatest treasures. There are fewer than 2,300 National Historic Landmarks in the entire United States, and 46 of them are concentrated along this 125-mile stretch of the river.” Two important conclusions can be drawn from these various designations and proclamations. The first is that in connecting the beauty and the history of the Hudson Valley, a connection is also drawn between its historical resources and quality of life. Not only are the historical sites often pointed to as important places for recreation and tourism, their very presence seems to be a source of tremendous pride for the residents of the Hudson Valley, contributing greatly, as Scenic Hudson describes, to their “sense of identity and well-being.” The second conclusion, which emerges from the first, is that one’s defini-

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Figure 12. Photographs by Terrence DeWan “Existing View from Olana Near Ridge Road,” one of the historic pathways laid out by Frederic Church to give visitors to Olana a panoramic view of the surrounding countryside, and Photo Simulation “Future Ridge Road Vista,” with the current forest removed and the view restored, as planned as part of the approved restoration of Olana.

tion of quality of life is inextricably linked with one’s sense of identity. The elements and experiences of our lives that we find valuable, which contribute to our personal contentment, are integral to the construction of our individual identity. Similarly, the elements of communal life that the community finds important, which contribute to the contentment of the community at large, are invaluable for the creation and maintenance of a collective identity, or regional culture. The beauty and history of the Hudson Valley have affected the current state of both the regional culture and landscape and, the opposition proposed, must guide our decisions about the future state of the landscape and the community: the creation of a desired quality of life in the Hudson Valley.

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Figure 13. Photograph by B. Docktor “Over Hudson looking south, Hudson River at right.”

SLC’s Statement of Visual Impact In St. Lawrence’s Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), the company admits that the “height and mass of the proposed cement plant would be disproportionate in scale to other elements of the regional landscape,” would be a “highly dominant visual element” (5.6.3) and would “clearly alter the visual impression of the study area” (5.1). However, the DEIS emphasizes a number of strategies for the reduction of visual pollution caused by the plant (i.e., it’s not as bad as it could have been). The most significant of these mitigation strategies was the decision by St. Lawrence to move the plant from its original proposed location, at the site of the abandoned Atlas cement plant, into the eighty-foot-deep mine. Dan Odescalchi, St. Lawrence’s project spokesman, explained that this decision was made prior to the submission of the DEIS to the DEC because of concerns that were voiced by the public in 1999 at a scoping meeting about the plant. He emphasized that although this plant would be taller than SLC’s Catskill plant, most of it wouldn’t be visible because its new location in the quarry would hide all structures under eighty feet tall from view at a distance. According to the DEIS: After conducting a preliminary visual impact assessment, it was determined that such a location [at the site of the former

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Universal Atlas plant] would result in an unacceptable degree of visual impact from sensitive receptors . . . including the Village of Athens, the Hudson River and Olana. Subsequent analysis revealed that relocating the cement plant within the existing mine would maximize the use of surrounding topography and vegetation to substantially screen the facility from these highly important receptors. (5.7.1) In addition, a second change in location was proposed several years later, in 2004, when SLC announced plans to move the plant a quarter mile south and thus deeper into the quarry. According to the company, this change, as well as plans to lower the height of the plant’s smokestack, would significantly reduce the visual impact of the proposed plant. Visibility of other structures, the DEIS claims, would be minimized by vegetation, by clumping the facilities so that one structure may block the visibility of others, and by the use of blue, gray, and white paint colors. SLC had lessened the height of certain structures from the original design plans. The waterfront facilities were redesigned so as to function without several planned storage units that were deemed “unacceptable visual intrusions.” The original conveyor system was modified to reduce its visual impact. Lastly, since this would have been a twenty-four-hour facility, lighting was also an important consideration; SLC claimed that areas requiring frequent night usage would be shielded from view, all unnecessary lights would be shut off, and light impact would be mitigated by “shielding mechanisms” and the use of “low reflectance materials” (5.7.1). In addition to the mitigation of the effects of the new plant, SLC also included in its proposal the elimination of some current visual pollutants, such as SLC’s Catskill plant just across the river. In response to Olana’s concerns about the effect the new plant would have on its view, Dan Odescalchi stated, “If we take down part of Catskill, the view from Olana will be nicer. Today you go up to Olana and you look down to the left and there’s our Catskill plant. That plant is almost right on the river. This is going to be two miles away from the river.” He is also quoted in a letter to the editor written by someone opposing the plant as saying that the view from Olana is “going to look closer to when Henry Hudson sailed up the river. . . .When Church was painting there was much more industry present than there is today” (Independent/Register Star, Fone 4/9/02). Thus, for some important views, SLC described the project as actually improving the visual character of the area. Some other examples of the aesthetic benefits of the project are found in the DEIS, including

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landscaping along Route 9 “to present an attractive facility entrance and gateway to the city of Hudson;” “architectural stabilization/ enhancement of existing site structures . . . for aesthetic benefit and future reuse;” the removal of unused parts of the Catskill plant, “thus offering a significant visual benefit within the scenic Hudson Valley;” and the removal of many of the remaining unused structures of the old Universal Atlas plant (5.1). Despite SLC’s claims about visual impact mitigation, the opposition was not appeased. The Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition claimed the visual impacts would be “massive” and that the mitigation proposed by SLC were “minimal fig leaves that hardly offset the tremendous costs to this world-class scenery” (HVPC “Cement PlantOpposition Update, July 2003: 4).

The Significance and Ethics of Aesthetic Conservation An historical goal of the American environmental movement has been to protect what are judged to be the country’s most beautiful places— the Grand Canyon, the geysers of Yellowstone, waterfalls, valleys, and expanses of forest. Beauty captures our attention, brings us enjoyment, and enhances quality of life. The beauty of a landscape is often cited by environmentalists as a reason we must protect a given area and, as described earlier, phases of public appreciation of nature have been the main catalysts of phases of government protection of nature. Romantic sentiments led to the first wave of preservation at the turn of last century, and the 1960s “back to nature” mentality inspired the beginning of the modern environmental movement. Although the field of aesthetics has long been concerned with the arts and objects of human construction, many are beginning to draw together the previously distant worlds of aesthetic analysis and the ethics of human interactions with wilderness. There are, however, many who still question whether beauty is a valid motivation for preservation. One of the most common arguments given against aesthetic conservation is that aesthetics are inevitably subjective, as in the expression “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Beauty is not an inherent aspect of the landscape; rather, “beauty in nature is always relational, arising in the interaction between humans and their world” (Rolston 2002: 130). If the experience of beauty requires human consciousness, and all humans have different tastes and interpretations of the visible world, then the aesthetic experience is inherently subjective. What one person finds beautiful, another may not.

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In addition, if something serves an important purpose in one’s life, even if it is unattractive its aesthetic qualities can often be overlooked. One supporter of the plant, responding to the opposition’s argument about visual impacts, stated, “Visual impacts are very subjective. Does our opposition think the high wires across the river are ugly? Maybe, but they accept them because they need power.” The implication was that if the opposition understood the importance of cement in their lives, they would be less apt to see the plant as so unsightly. Thus, subjective interpretations of the physical appearance of a scene are also dependent on perceptions of necessity. If perception cannot be disentangled from other individual considerations, it may be that ethics should not be dependent on aesthetics, that the decision to build or not build the plant must be based on more “factual” determinants. Environmental aesthetics theorist Emily Brady (2003: 248) describes two opposing viewpoints in traditional aesthetic philosophy: moralism and autonomism. Moralists claim that aesthetics and ethics are necessarily connected; if a work of art (or in this case, a landscape) has ethical defects, it must be seen as having aesthetic defects as well. In the SLC debate moralists would argue that the opposition’s belief that the plant was unethical (because of the health and environmental impacts it would have) would lead to, or support, their belief that it was unattractive. Autonomists, on the other hand, claim that ethics and aesthetics are two different concerns and one need not affect the other. According to this logic, the effect the plant would have on the region’s beauty would not make it an unethical decision to build it. A thought-provoking quote from author Cheryl Foster (1992: 212) can help to frame this debate: If I am witnessing a spectacularly-coloured sunset from my kitchen window and am taking great pleasure in its beauty, how shall I respond when a friend drops in and informs me that the reason for all the colour is the proliferation of sulphur dioxide in the air? Suppose that the friend also tells me that the sulphur, the result of a factory opening up river, is a pollutant, one with grave consequences for the creatures in the marsh downstream. According to moralists, one is required to view the sunset as aesthetically displeasing if one finds the source of its beauty to be unethical. According to autonomists, the beauty of the sunset should be enjoyed because it has a value separate from the unethical source of the beauty. Although the example Foster gives happens to be a reversal of

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the issue in the SLC debate, in that the plant she describes is increasing the beauty of the natural environment, the question it raises is still a relevant one: In what ways can or should our ethical inclinations affect our aesthetic perceptions, or our aesthetic inclinations affect our ethical perceptions? What these various examples reveal is the inability to separate aesthetic assessments of a particular object from other considerations, such as the object’s usefulness or its connection to things one deems unethical. However, despite the difficulties of locating a universal aesthetic, there are undoubtedly cultural norms, many of which flood us on a daily basis through advertisements and subliminal or not so subliminal messages. We live in a culture that accepts, in fact is obsessed with, aesthetics in the personal spheres of life. The American Dream involves the quest for the most beautiful house, car, spouse, self. Industries centered on self-beautification are thriving, from hair and makeup products, to the dieting craze, to cosmetic surgery; people are trying to perfect their appearances and to maximize their adherence to what they consider to be the ideal aesthetic. Beauty is a value, an extremely important one to some, and we attempt to give our lives and selves as much value as we can. However, despite advances that have been made since the 1960s and Storm King, in the public sphere aesthetics are still frequently preempted by what are considered to be more pressing utilitarian concerns, especially economic ones. The beauty of the landscape is thought less immediately significant than getting food on the table. For this reason—and this brings us to the second argument against the use of scenic arguments by SLC’s opposition—aesthetic conservation is often thought to be an elite priority. It is seen as a concern possible only for those who do not need to occupy their minds with the fulfillment of daily necessities. This class distinction can be seen on an international scale, in comparisons of the environmental movements of different countries. Indian environmentalist Ramachandra Guha (1997) sets up a parallel between what he calls “environmentalism of the North,” or the “First World,” generally wealthier countries, and “environmentalism of the South,” or “Third World,” developing countries. Environmentalism of the North, he claims, is based on luxury—the ability to travel to “untouched” wilderness in the leisure time provided by living in a post-industrialist, consumerist society. Environmentalism of the South, by contrast, is more closely tied to the relationship between nature and survival, often taking the form of direct action because of the “sheer immediacy of resource shortages” (Guha 1997: 8). People of all

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economic classes may be involved in the protection of the environment, but what motivates their desire for that protection relates to their economic level. The implication of Guha’s categorization is that environmentalists in the North, or higher income level, are more inclined to protect the environment for aesthetic reasons. Environmentalists of the South, or lower income levels, are more likely to protect the environment because its health is indispensable to their survival. A related division can also occur within societies. In the United States, despite the fact that there has been an effort since the 1960s to connect aesthetics with quality of life, J. Douglas Porteous, an environmental aesthetics historian, sees this as precisely the problem—the ability to focus on quality of life is inherently tied to a level of economic stability. According to Porteous, with increasing affluence one’s principal concerns move from standard of living, to the quality of the environment, to quality of life. Standard of living involves “having” (“the accumulation of tangible things”) while quality of life involves “being” (“the more sophisticated, qualitative, enjoyment of aesthetic intangibles”) (Porteous 1996: 6–7). While Porteous does not go so far as to argue that lower classes have no appreciation of beauty, he is suggesting that their priorities must be centered on the preservation of the self before the preservation of the beautiful. This is supported by the traditional aesthetic philosophy that describes the inherent necessity of a level of detachment for aesthetic appreciation to occur: “Assuming a disinterested attitude frees us from the distractions of practical purposes and permits us to dwell freely on an object or a representation, which we can then regard as beautiful” (Berleant 1992: 162). Genuine aesthetic appreciation, therefore, can only result when we are able to divorce an object from any usefulness it may have to us. Thus, despite the earlier claim that aesthetic concerns became less elitist as the standard of living rose after the Second World War, this does not by any means lead to the conclusion that all members of our society suddenly became affluent. There is still great poverty in this country, allowing for a continued disparity, in Porteous’s terms, between those constrained to focus on standard of living and those privileged to focus on quality of life. However, the environmental justice movement, a movement that encourages environmentalism in more impoverished areas of the population (and recognizes the inherent prejudice that allowed such areas to become so environmentally damaged), argues somewhat differently. It claims that there is a democratic right, and a health necessity, to move from standard of living to quality of the environment. Therefore, the move from the first to the second levels on Porteous’s list of priorities may be based on matters of

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necessity, and the ability to organize lower-class communities around environmental issues is challenging the social paradigm that imposes this priority hierarchy. The move from a focus on the quality of the environment to “aesthetic intangibles,” however, often has an implicit requirement of a level of affluence. While aesthetic considerations may currently be elitist, this does not necessarily imply that such considerations are unethical. Some would argue that it is the obligation of those who have the luxury of fighting for preservation to do so for the benefit of all. Though lower classes may not be able to focus on aesthetics over economics, the ability to appreciate beauty is not tied to class. In the Hudson Valley, people on both sides of the St. Lawrence debate acknowledged the beauty of the region, and the nature of the landscape plays an important role in individual and collective identities, or what may be termed a Hudson Valley culture, no matter what economic class or where the focus of one’s priorities lie. Bonnie Marranca, in an article for the Hudson Valley Regional Review, states that while “regions themselves are usually defined by dialect, cuisine, by music or dance, by furniture, costume and art forms . . . the people of the Hudson Valley are unified by one earthly fact: geography” (1991: 77). It is, therefore, understandable that aesthetic issues were an important part of the opposition to the SLC plant, and that St. Lawrence included such a lengthy section in its DEIS about the visual impacts of the plant, and its attempts to mitigate the negative impacts. Despite claims of subjectivity or elitism, aesthetic and quality of life concerns play a great role in a community’s happiness. But as Porteous described, before one can get to quality of life, one must first deal with economic and basic environmental health issues. These comprise the remaining two central issues in the St. Lawrence debate. Thus we must step back to examine the way the debate split on the first two of Porteous’s stages of human focus: standard of living and quality of the environment.

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CHAPTER 3

Differing Visions for Hudson’s Economic Future In the mid-’70s there were three cement plants just in Hudson operating at one time. Everybody was familiar with cement. Cement put most of the people through college around here, bought most of the homes around here, paid for most of the weddings. —Dan Odescalchi, St. Lawrence Cement spokesman

W

hile the beauty of the Hudson Valley undoubtedly has a tremendous influence on the lives of its inhabitants, economic sustainability remains an element critical to their quality of life. As J. Douglas Porteous asserts in his book Environmental Aesthetics: Ideas, Politics and Planning, the path to having quality of life as a focus must be preceded by the search first for an acceptable standard of living and then for a basic quality of environment. In order to be concerned with quality of life, which implicitly includes elements beyond absolute necessity, it is important to first provide for those elements of necessity. Thus emerges one of the most fundamental arguments in all environment-versus-development controversies: whether basic economic needs must be met before “luxuries” like environmental quality can be addressed. In the SLC controversy, the most fundamental argument in support of the plant was the need for high-paying jobs in the region, which has been economically depressed since most local manufacturing plants closed down in the 1960s and 1970s. In constructing their position, supporters of the plant were simultaneously constructing a version of history by emphasizing the region’s industrial past and the benefit to the local economy and community provided by cement plants. The opposition, however, believed that the plant would not 47

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actually provide jobs and economic benefits, and claimed that alternative forms of economic growth were available that were more compatible with the region’s beauty and its residents’ well-being.

Looking towards an Industrial Past Many of the supporters of the St. Lawrence Cement plant pointed to the long industrial history of the Hudson Valley in response to the claims from the opposition that the plant would be “incompatible” with the region. From the beginning of the eighteenth century the City of Hudson and the surrounding region became an important center of industry and commerce, to a large extent because of the convenience of the river for transportation, a reason that still draws industries such as SLC today. However, these industries went through extreme periods of success and depression. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century industries in Hudson included soap- and candle-making from whale oil, tanneries, and the manufacturing of goods such as rope and textiles. With the decline of the whaling industry in the 1840s, the town of Hudson went into a serious decline (Piwonka 1985). At the end of the nineteenth century, there was some relatively minor growth resulting from the local transportation industry and light manufacturing industry, which became the foundations of the local economy. But these, too, declined and were quickly replaced by prostitution, which flourished in Hudson until the mid-twentieth century (Hall 1994). In the early twentieth century, the cement industry began to thrive as well, and by the middle of the century numerous industries were present in the region around Hudson, including a brick-making establishment, a pocketbook factory, a mushroom factory, a dress factory, and several cement plants (Roling 1997). The first chapter of the SLC Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) begins with a description of the historical context of the proposed plant, focusing specifically on the history of cement production in the region. Serious demand for cement in the United States began in the nineteenth century with the construction of the canals, such as the Erie Canal that was built largely with cement made from stone mined outside Kingston, New York, across the river from Hudson. New York State has played a significant role in the history of cement production in the United States, and in the early days it ranked second among the states in total production. The Hudson Valley was a particularly important area for the cement industry because of its rich limestone and clay resources, its convenient transportation source—the Hudson River—and its location between two large sites of cement consump-

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tion, New York City and Albany. The mineral and transportation resources of the region gave rise to various industries, such as iron manufacturing, mining, and lime production. By the late nineteenth century, however, cement was the dominant industry, and by 1920 there were five cement plants operating in the Hudson Valley. According to the DEIS, “From about 1903 to 1975, mining and production of cement were integral to the prosperity of the Town of Greenport and the City of Hudson” (1.2.2). The specific location for the proposed SLC plant was Becraft Mountain in Greenport, a location that “has been used for cement production for more than 100 years and for mining for at least three centuries” (DEIS: 1.2.2). The property and the cement production upon it has gone through many different stages of ownership, operated by the Universal Atlas Cement Company from 1930 until it was bought by SLC in 1976. SLC shut down the cement operations, as did other companies during this period because of the economic difficulty of meeting increasingly stringent environmental regulations and technological standards, but continued to mine limestone on the site. In 2002 SLC commissioned the making of a film entitled Etched in Stone: Cement Workers Remember Hudson and a Shared Past, which was aired several times on local television. The film begins with a description of the important role of cement manufactured in the Hudson Valley in, for example, the construction of the Erie Canal and numerous buildings in New York City. But the main purpose of the film was to demonstrate, most likely to those opposed to the plant, that working in a cement plant was a good job and having a plant nearby did great things for the community and, by implication, that this would again be the case. One of the obvious benefits of working in a cement plant is the decent income. According to one worker, “Everyone that worked in a cement plant could buy a home. Everyone.” Another claimed that one year’s wage at the plant could buy three brand-new Chryslers. Another benefit often cited was the excitement of working in the plant. One scene in the SLC film details the process of blasting the limestone, of dropping the dynamite and running for cover (though the narrator made sure to add that the process is much safer these days). But the main emphasis of the film is on what the community of Hudson was like during the period when a number of cement plants were operating, a time they label “Hudson’s Heyday,” a time, they say, when everyone knew everyone else. The town was a “thriving community,” where, according to one woman, you never had to leave town to get anything you needed. There were four grocery stores, four shoe stores, a department store, and five theaters, among other amenities. The town was “alive,” whereas today, according to the film, it’s only

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alive on weekends and there’s only one type of store—the antiques store. The film highlights the reciprocal relationship between the stores and the workers of the cement plants, with the stores accommodating the workers and the workers contributing significantly to the businesses. It was the cement plant, one man claims, that kept the Columbia Diner, several taxi companies, the hardware store, the lumberyard, and the tire shop running. According to the film, the cement companies also encouraged a sense of community. A few times every summer they would collaborate in arranging picnics that served as collective get-togethers for the community. Families would come with their “cement children,” and there would be baseball games between the different cement companies, Atlas versus Lonestar. The companies would also encourage worker involvement in the community, for example, by allowing employees to leave work to fight fires for the volunteer fire department, while still getting paid. What the film seems to exploit is a sense of longing in Hudson for the days when it was a company town, when the plants employed large numbers of people and contributed to a sense of community, a sense of identity. When the cement plants, as well as almost all other industries in the area around Hudson, closed down in the 1960s, Hudson went into a deep economic depression for many years. Storefronts emptied along the street of downtown Hudson as businesses began to suffer from the opening of shopping centers in surrounding towns such as Greenport. In 1966 a study by the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal reported that Hudson had an 11 percent unemployment rate and a 20 percent vacancy rate, and that 34 percent of the housing was overcrowded and extremely substandard. During the same year it was designated New York’s most distressed city (Roling 1997). Though Hudson may have been labeled the most distressed, the economic depression during that period was widespread in factory towns across the state and the country, due to tremendous regional and national moves toward deindustrialization. With the increasing productivity of other nations and the increase in international trade, international competition began to lessen the profit rates to which many companies were accustomed (Bluestone and Harrison 1982: 15). In addition, the tremendous increase in environmental regulations during the same period made it necessary for companies to invest in modernizing their plants, an extremely costly process. Bluestone and Harrison, in their classic book on the subject, The Deindustrialization of America (1982), describe how the process of deindustrialization took many forms, from the subtle and more hidden forms of capital disin-

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vestments, such as taking profits from one plant and investing them elsewhere, to the more drastic form of total plant closings, often by packing up the plant and literally moving it piece by piece to another location (1982: 7). Capital was generally moving from investments in smaller national industries to either conglomerates formed from mergers and acquisitions or to foreign investing. In the 1960s the national economic growth rate was 4.1 percent per year, but by the 1970s it had dropped to 2.9 percent, the majority of which had occurred in the first half of the decade. By the second half growth had almost stopped completely. According to Bluestone and Harrison, in the 1970s alone between 32 and 38 million jobs were lost in the United States because of private disinvestments in American industries. New York State, in fact, fared worse than the national averages. According to historian Morton Schoolman (1986), in the 1970s the total nonfarm employment in the country increased by 26.4 percent, while in New York State it increased by a meager 1.5 percent. New York State’s unemployment rates were higher than the national average, reaching their maximum of 10 percent in 1976, and its wages were lower. In 1970 more than 25 percent of industrial manufacturing was done in New York State, but by 1981 that figure had dropped to 18 percent. Any growth that occurred in the state after 1975 was due to an increase in high-tech industries like IBM and increases in the social services sector.1 The decrease in manufacturing jobs is considered to be part of the development of a “mature” economy; therefore New York’s manufacturing jobs were gradually, or not so gradually, moved first to the “sunbelt” states in the southern United States and then often moved out of the country altogether, to less developed countries (Goldstein 1986). Manufacturers that remained had to modernize (having the added result of reducing labor costs): “Whether industry manufactures high-technology products or manufactures products through high-technology processes, the decisive factor in both cases is continual technological advance” (Schoolman 1986: 37). Today Columbia County has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the state, which many members of the community opposed to the SLC plant saw to be the result of demands for carpenters, painters, and other craftsmen to serve the economic boom occurring in Hudson, connected to the antiques and real estate industries. Despite the low levels of unemployment, the average income in the region is lower than the state average and dramatically so in the City of Hudson, where as of the year 2000, the average household income was $24,000, just over half the state average of $43,000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Thus, many people were looking to the St. Lawrence plant to provide the return of secure, higher paying jobs. According to Dan

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Odescalchi, “Typically the average cement employee stays at the job for 30 years. We don’t have a high turnover. That’s not the cement industry. It’s a damn good place to work. The benefits are good, pensions are good, the health care is good, the wages are good. A kid who just gets out of high school can come here and be making fifteen or sixteen dollars an hour just for starters.” For people in Hudson or surrounding towns living in poverty, a company offering high-paying jobs without requiring high levels of education was obviously an attention-getting offer. For the poorer segments of the population, any beneficial economic impact was seen positively.

The DEIS on the Economic Benefits of the Plant SLC’s DEIS analyzes the economic benefits of the plant under two main categories—the construction phase and the full operation phase. This strengthening of the economic base would in large part be due to the money spent on new equipment and construction costs during the building phase and tax contributions once the plant was in full operation. The total construction costs were estimated at $320 million, but because some equipment would have been brought from external sources, the estimated investment in the local economy was $121.7 million. The economic effects of the construction process were divided into “direct effects” (the costs of labor and materials) and “indirect effects” (expenditures made off-site by employees involved in construction). The direct employment during construction was estimated at approximately 406 workers per year, with an estimated construction time of about two years. Additional jobs would result from an increased demand on businesses supplying goods and services to the construction process. These indirect jobs were estimated at 274 jobs per year in Columbia and Greene Counties and 364 jobs per year in all of New York State. Wages calculated for the two-year period amounted to $31.57 million for direct employment and $16.12 million for indirect employment in Columbia and Greene Counties. The total for wages all of New York State was estimated at $56.55 million. The total economic benefit predicted for the two counties (including direct and indirect labor, equipment costs, and all indirect benefit—due mainly to increased spending) was $181.58 million: $121.7 million in direct benefits and $65.85 million in indirect ones. The total for all of New York State was $231.45 million. Economic benefit to the region during the construction period would also have taken the form of tax revenues, both from sales taxes

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on items purchased for construction, which would go to Columbia County, and sales tax and income tax, which would go to New York State. The estimated total for all construction phase tax revenues was $6.6 million, 2.8 percent of the total economic benefit to be received by New York State. Columbia County would receive $974,000, and New York State would receive about $6 million. It must be remembered, however, that the construction phase would have lasted for only two years. The DEIS also addresses the economic benefits in relation to the postconstruction phase, or full plant operation. At the time of its submission, SLC employed 144 people at the Catskill plant and ten at the Greenport mine, totaling 154. If the new plant had been built, the employment ratios would have shifted to 130 jobs at the Greenport plant, three of which would be in the “performance testing laboratory,” and twenty-five at the Catskill plant, totaling 155 workers, an increase of one over the current job total. SLC further anticipated that around 80 percent of the Catskill workers would switch location to Greenport: “Since the workforce already resides throughout the Columbia and Greene County area (and to a lesser extent even beyond the two counties), the transition is not expected to result in significant hardship” (DEIS, chapter 3: 16). Eighty percent of the 144 Catskill workers equals 115, and since ten were already employed in Greenport, the resulting estimated total would have been five new job openings in Greenport to create the 130 needed. The plant was also anticipated to create indirect employment, at levels of 242 jobs in the two-county region and 257 in New York State. Several economic analyses of the plant were conducted by independent researchers. Both the Ernst and Young IMPLAN model analysis (July 2002) and the Capital District Regional Planning Commission (CDRPC) RIMS model analysis (March 2000) projected significant economic input to the community as a result of the Greenport project. The Ernst and Young study estimated a total of $320.2 million for construction costs, of which $122.7 million would have been spent in Columbia County, and once the plant was in full operation it would have had annual operating costs of $53 million, of which $22.2 million would have been spent in Columbia County. According to the CDRPC study, the construction phase total was $219 million, while the operating phase was estimated at $48.7 million. Ernst and Young estimated 1,610 construction jobs in the county, and CDRPC estimated 1,933. Both studies projected the creation of 270 jobs in the community as a result of the plant in full operation. According to Dan Odescalchi, this included everything from landscaping to machine maintenance to tire manufacturing.

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The Opposition Despite these studies, the plant opposition maintained that the plant would not provide significant economic benefit to the local community. Many acknowledged that there would be some economic input as a result of the construction phase, but this was estimated to last only two years. That made the long-term impacts the more crucial focus, as the full operations phase was expected to continue for up to 100 years. In referring to the economic impact of the plant in full operation, the most common opposition mantra was that the new plant would provide only one new job. They often cited SLC’s own DEIS, “The proposed project would result in little net change to SLC employment.” While there would be an increase in jobs at Greenport from ten to 130, according to the DEIS most of the Catskill SLC workers lived throughout Columbia and Greene Counties, and were expected to transfer to fill the positions in the new Greenport location. Thus, “it is anticipated that there would be no appreciable change in the workforce necessary to accommodate the new facility” (DEIS, 3: 16). In response to the economic study done by the Columbia Hudson Partnership, Elizabeth Nyland of the Concerned Women of Claverack wrote a letter to the editor of the Register Star articulating many of the opposition’s concerns with the way the economic impact of the plant was being analyzed and depicted (9/25/2000). She saw two main ways the plant could have had an impact on economic growth in the community. The first was based on the presence of new jobs to the area: “First, someone has to get paid who has not been paid before. Then, they spend that new money at a place that is getting money they had not received before because that person never had that money to spend with them. Then, they spend that money and so on and so on and so on. That is the basic premise of the RIMS II model used.” However, since the presence of the plant in Greenport would create only one new job, this new income would not be created to begin the multiplier effect, and thus the results of the study were inaccurate and misleading. Money could also have been added to the community if the 127 workers in Greenport were to spend more money in the area. First, ten of those workers had already been working in Greenport and therefore their spending in the region was not expected to change. Fifteen of the workers in Catskill were already Columbia County residents, so their spending was not expected to have much effect, except for small amounts in lunch or gas money that used to be spent in Catskill. Therefore, if all fifteen of those workers transferred, added to the ten already working in Greenport, that would leave 102 remaining who live in

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Greene County but would transfer to work in Columbia County. In reference to these workers, Nyland cites the DEIS, which states that since most of the employees would not have to move their residences because of the shift in employment location, “larger shopping purchases would remain unaffected by the proposed project” (3.4.4). Thus, what Nyland identifies as the basic error in the Columbia Hudson Partnership analysis is that it calculated the impact on the local economy assuming that all the jobs in Greenport would be new, when, in reality, “the study simply means that this is the impact these jobs already have on the economy.” In other words, the study’s figures portray a false economic situation when compared to the “reality” portrayed by SLC in the DEIS. Many members of the community opposing the plant strongly objected to the disparities among the various depictions of the plant given by SLC. They cited the inconsistencies between what SLC stated in the DEIS and what it told the public. Many of its advertisements in the Register Star and the Independent stress the benefit to the economy that would result from the plant being built, and yet in the DEIS SLC states that “in total, there is no net new spending in the regional economy in the future,” because the “labor and production costs are similar to the existing operation” (3.4.2). In a discussion about why people might support the plant, a representative of Scenic Hudson said she thought that many people supporting the plant have not read the DEIS because those who have jobs and a family don’t have the time to go through a 1,600-page document. Cyndy Hall, one of the founders of the Concerned Women of Claverack, concluded that plant supporters based their opinions on what St. Lawrence told them. But she believed St. Lawrence lied; it said different things in public than it did in the DEIS. The DEIS repeatedly states that the plant won’t help the economy, but “people have been sold a bill of goods and they accept what they’re told. They think there will be jobs and they won’t listen to the evidence otherwise.” The implication is that the DEIS should be regarded as the more reliable source of information, because it was written to be analyzed by the DEC, which has the power to reject the permits if SLC supplies false information, whereas the only people critically analyzing SLC’s public statements are the opposition. Two explanations are given as to why people were so willing to accept SLC’s claims about the economic impact. The tax contributions and the other money that would have been contributed by SLC under Hudson’s Host Agreement appealed to many residents. For example, in the Host Agreement, which was unanimously supported by Hudson’s Common Council at a meeting on March 8, 2004, SLC agreed to offer the city $200,000 a year for twenty years (a total of $4 million)

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and then $125,000 a year for the remaining life of the plant (Register Star, 3/9/2004). One plant opponent said that “to some, that feels like big potatoes and that’s a reason to let them in.” At a public meeting held on March 2, 2004 to address public concerns with the Host Agreement, one man spoke up and said that there hadn’t been an offer of this type made in Columbia County for many years and we should “take it before it leaves the station.” Another resident stated her opinion that it was time to sign the agreement because “you need the revenue and you need the jobs.” A large number of people speaking against the Host Agreement, however, seemed to think that the amount St. Lawrence was offering the city was insubstantial. One woman pointed out that the money SLC offered would not even buy a house in Hudson anymore. A few people cited the size and wealth of the corporation, saying that given the amount of money SLC was going to make off the plant, the city deserved a bigger share. One man said, “This isn’t about who’s for or against, it’s simply a bad business deal. . . . You should start negotiating at $5 million.” Despite this statement, it seems that it was about who’s for and who’s against, because all who spoke in favor of the plant seemed to think the compensation SLC was offering was significant and that the city should not risk losing it by engaging in further negotiations. A second reason given for some people’s acceptance of SLC’s claim of economic benefit was based in the industrial history of the region. According to plant opponents, recollections of the 1950s and 1960s when there were a number of cement plants in the region exerted a significant influence on the opinions of those who were supporting the plant. Several people described how each week, after everyone at the plant received their paychecks, all the workers would come into town and spend money and convene along the promenade. The difference, however, between the way the opposition and the supporters talked about this period was that the people who opposed the plant tended to use the term “nostalgia” to refer to the historical precedence for the plant described by its supporters. Nostalgia is a term that has embedded in it an implication of remembering only the good things; it is a “commodity that colors our view of the past . . . and, when we draw upon and recycle elements from that supposedly more preferable past, it often conditions the way we deal with the present” (O’Brien 1981: 11). Nostalgia did more than color memories of the past; it also affected the way plant supporters interpreted the effects of the plant. According to one member of the opposition, “[SLC’s] support is very soft. It’s not support for this project. . . . It’s generalized support for industry, nostalgia for a time when industry of this type created real jobs, which it

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no longer does. A plant this size in the 1940s would’ve employed thousands of people. Here you’ve got one new net job.” People have memories of how Hudson used to be and the strong sense of community fostered by large numbers of the population working at the same place. They associated this plant with a vision of what it used to be like having industry in Hudson, and they expected things to be the same, despite the efforts of the opposition to convince them otherwise. In addition to bringing communities together, the old cement plants created bonds within families when fathers, sons, brothers, and uncles would all work together, as captured in the SLC film Etched in Stone. It was also mentioned by Linda Mussmann, co-director of the Time and Space Limited art gallery and cultural center in Hudson, candidate for mayor of Hudson in the 2001 and 2003 elections, and chair of the Hudson City Democratic Committee: The Hudson Valley has a long history of cement companies constructing cities like Hudson, and Hudson is in many ways a company town. It has a company mentality, like somebody’s going to take care of you. Somebody will always take care of somebody. It has a long history of the fathers bringing on the sons who bring on the sons. . . . It’s the same thing in every industry. My father is a farmer, my brother is a farmer and [my parents’] hope when they had a child was to have a boy so the farm could go on. It’s not an uncommon dream and it’s in a sense that eighteenth-, nineteenth-century dream, which isn’t very real today because the cement plant is not going to hire many people because it’s high-tech, big machines, just like every other industry. But the nostalgia is sold because it’s an easy sell. Again, the implication is that the nostalgia, the idealized vision of the past, touches a chord in people that is strong enough to affect their expectation of what this plant would be like. As several opposition members said, SLC supporters do not give solid reasons as to why people should support this plant specifically, only why people should support industry generally. In addition, some opponents said, most supporters have not really looked through the DEIS. The implication from the opposition, therefore, was that their own arguments were based more in rational analysis, while support for the plant was based in emotion, in a longing for a time that had passed and could not return because modern industries do not employ the same numbers of people as they did up until the mid-twentieth century. And, in playing on that longing, SLC made false promises.

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Alternative Industries: Antiques, Tourism, and Real Estate But whether or not the promises for economic growth were valid, the real question, according to the opposition, was whether the kind of economic growth promoted by SLC was the type of growth that the community needed. Opponents of the plant acknowledged that Hudson was an industrial city and suffered a serious economic depression after the industries closed down in the 1960s, but they proposed that the solution to that depression lay in the move toward a different type of economy, not in a return to industrialization. According to Scenic Hudson, today’s Hudson can be seen as a “model for smart growth—sustainable development that builds upon and supports a community’s existing resources and character.” Some examples given of this sort of “sustainable development” include tourism; the rapidly expanding second-home market, which has greatly increased property values; and the substantial antiques market in Hudson (www.scenic hudson.org/stcp/campaign.htm). The City of Hudson Web site describes the city as “the most important Antiques Center in the Northeast,” and in 1997 a Hudson advertising brochure touted fortythree antiques shops within a five-block area (cited in Roling 1997). Many members of the plant opposition describe these shops as indicative of a positive transformation in Hudson in recent years and point to small-scale businesses as more sustainable economic solutions than big industries like SLC. In addition to their contribution to local quality of life, the scenic and historical resources of the Hudson Valley can also be important assets to the local economy. The types of economic solutions that were encouraged by the opposition—arts, antiques, and tourism—are all based on aesthetics and the search for quality of life. In fact, connecting the quality of life to economic growth is also seen as a way to preserve such quality of life, from which large industries like SLC would seemingly detract. Thus, the future economy should reflect what the residents currently see as contributing to their well-being. Andy Bicking of Scenic Hudson suggests that the way to generate more sustainable economic growth is through: building on existing environmental and historic assets and using them to leverage more economic activity. This sensitive, historic landscape has the potential to generate large amounts of tax ratables and income over time, if you do your community planning properly. . . . The Valley is one of the oldest settled spots, in terms of European settlement, nonindigenous

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settlement, in the entire country. There are maybe one or two other locations that can claim a 400-plus-year-old history. That is incredibly significant culturally, historically, in terms of what you can do with tourism, getting people to come here and invest in the region. New York City, the major financial capital of the world, is two hours away from where we are now. That’s an incredible opportunity. No one is saying we can’t have industry or businesses, but it should be industry that’s sensitive to that, sensitive to the landscape, to the historic resources, to the ecological resources. Thus the two sides of the debate became extremely polarized in the way they interpreted the concept of development. One side noted the sizeable investment in the local economy promised by SLC, an opportunity that should not be turned down. The other side, confronted with the same numbers, either questioned their validity and/or significance or simultaneously saw other possibilities for economic growth. According to Cyndy Hall, of Concerned Women of Claverack, the two sides had very different ideas of development— industrial growth or “development that makes sense.” She cited Route 9 in Greenport as an example, where there is a long strip of “box stores,” fast food, and, of course, Wal-Mart: “It’s an evolution that is happening in small cities around the country, but that’s not the kind of development we’re looking for.” Many of the proponents of the plant claimed that the opposition was “anti-development,” but she, and others, resented this characterization. She emphasized that they were not anti-development; they merely had a different definition of what development should be. Citizens for a Healthy Environment suggested that the local economy did not even need any help. Even if the plant were to be beneficial economically, this organization claimed that Hudson’s economy was thriving due to an increase in small-scale retail businesses, such as antiques, tourism, real estate, and restaurants: [P]resently Hudson is a lively town with an active and growing cultural life. Since 1976, jobs in Columbia County have grown by 13,000. It ties with Putnam County for the lowest jobless rate in New York State. A recent look at the classified section of a local paper showed two work-wanted ads and over 30 job offerings. (CHE: 48) Friends of Hudson (FOH) also argued that Columbia County’s economy did not need SLC’s help. It cited New York State Department

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of Labor unemployment statistics that over the previous five years, unemployment rates were lower in Columbia County than in Greene County, where the current Catskill plant is located. For example, in 2002, unemployment in Greene County was 5.2 percent, while in Columbia County it was 3.1 percent. FOH cited these statistics along with the statement that Greene County had an SLC plant while Columbia County did not. The statistics were not discussed further, leaving it up to the reader to decide if FOH was implying that Columbia County needed the jobs less than Greene County did, or that the Catskill plant somehow played a role in the increased unemployment rates in Greene County. Either way, FOH rejected the claims that the county needed any boost to the economy that it could get. One plant opponent summed up the position well when she said, “SLC is giving nothing back. There won’t be any economic boom; the economic boom is happening right now.” The region’s history, commerce, and beauty all converge at Olana, once the home of Hudson River landscape painter Frederic Church, now a historic site that attracts more than 150,000 tourists every year (CHE: 60). Olana, which overlooks the Hudson River and the Catskill mountains, is just one example of how the beauty of the environment can be a potential source for a different type of economic growth than that proposed by SLC. Citizens for a Healthy Environment, in a discussion of possible alternative land uses for SLC’s Greenport location, proposed the creation of a large public park that would tie together the historic attractions of Olana and the City of Hudson and provide “meaningful employment” for the local economy (CHE: 85). The park would be for the use of local residents but could also potentially result in increased tourism to the area. The economic benefits of tourism would flow directly to the local population, whereas the proposed plant would funnel profits to an already huge corporation. At times this group went even further to say that not only were there other ways to help the economy, or even that the economy did not need help, but that, in fact, the plant would end up hurting the economy because of the detrimental impact it would have on the “sustainable” or “smart growth” industries such as tourism and real estate. According to CHE, the plant would “jeopardize the very foundation of the local economy” by discouraging or “eliminating” the current growth patterns (CHE: 48). CHE believed that if the plant had been built, it would have stopped people from buying homes or vacationing in the region. One letter to the editor expresses this position clearly:

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If you have the choice between buying a house with a tree in the backyard next door and buying one with a smoking garbage incinerator next door, most people would choose the one with the tree and without the incinerator. The incinerator might be state-of-the-art, not bad to look at, hidden behind a fence, and give off only little puffs of smoke, and pollute only a little bit, but you’d be safe in assuming that the tree wouldn’t smoke or pollute at all. (Independent/Register Star, Fone 5/18/2001) Thus, according to CHE, no matter what SLC claimed to be true about the plant, it would still have had a huge negative effect on the economy by forcing down property values. And according to another submission, the decreased property values would also affect the tax base: “Take away the rural nature of the area by such foolhardy enterprises as SLC and you will deter a sizeable, investing group of people from coming here. This in turn will affect the tax base of the area, even extending to a reduction in sales tax revenue if there are fewer people to buy things” (Independent/Register Star, Smyth 6/1/2001). Another letter says that not only would regular citizens be deterred from the area, but the plant would also discourage businesses, doctors, and teachers from coming to Hudson (Independent/Register Star, Pickett 7/3/2001). Many opponents also claimed that even with SLC’s small tax contributions, because of increased health and social costs resulting from the plant, “the community would find itself, in effect, partially subsidizing the corporation” (CHE: 49). CHE also asked, “What will happen to the economy when SLC closes, having first hurt many local businesses?” It is not unusual for large industries to move locations or to go bankrupt and end all operations, leaving the communities in a post-industrial depression. CHE advocated, therefore, smaller businesses that would be more flexible, employ different types of people, and not have such a devastating impact on the economy were they ever to close. Not surprisingly, SLC had responses to each of these opposition arguments. Dan Odescalchi expressed his agreement that different types of businesses are necessary for a healthy economy. But, he said, it is not only small businesses that can provide that stability: “It’s healthy for a regional economy to have a diverse group, big and small businesses; they do feed off one another. To just go with one versus the other is a very fragile economic situation.” In response to the opposition’s argument that the plant would scare away these other

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businesses, Odescalchi noted that in Peekskill, a town further down the river, there were “the arts galleries, the antique shops, the nice restaurants that are a stone’s throw from the stacks and you sit there on the river and look at the Indian Point nuclear power plant. I just don’t see those people running away. I don’t see people stop going there.” But according to Andy Bicking of Scenic Hudson, the arts industries in Peekskill were not doing as well as SLC claimed. In a discussion of the potential effects on community character, the DEIS points to the history of the plant’s location for industrial uses. Because the land is zoned for commercial and industrial uses, there would be no “significant” impacts on land use or zoning. Use of the river for transportation would minimize any increase in truck traffic and would be consistent with the river’s “long-standing role in commerce” (DEIS: 2.5.1). The historic character of Hudson would not be affected because neither the plant nor the conveyor system would be visible from the center of the city. Therefore, the trend toward increased tourism and the second-home market in the region was not expected to be affected because “the presence of old and new manufacturing industries . . . has not hindered the growth of the real estate or tourist markets in the area” (DEIS: 2.5.1) and “the history of the town of Greenport and the city of Hudson demonstrates the success these communities have had in responding to inevitable change. . . . These trends [of the increasing tourism industry] are likely to be longterm and independent of the future of the Greenport facility, yet the facility would strengthen and coexist with the existing revenue base” (DEIS: 2.5.1). On the subject of encouraging more “sustainable” businesses, Dan Odescalchi stated that when the economy is failing, businesses based on luxuries, like arts, antiques, and tourism close first, “but they still need to build bridges, still need to build homes, still need to pour foundations.” In addition, he pointed out that although the opposition constantly cited tourism as a possible economic alternative, tourism jobs pay as little as retail jobs, except they are seasonal. The point he was making was that these businesses can continue with the plant in Greenport, but they should not be touted as a solution to all the economic problems. Still another perspective, offered by a member of the Hudson Valley Environmental/Economic Coalition, was that maybe it wasn’t up to the community to make such decisions about the nature of economic development; rather, those decisions are within the purview of politicians and public officials. Despite all these definitive statements from both sides of the debate, according a member of Friends of Hudson, when it comes to economics, “it’s all fortune telling and prediction.” We cannot know

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exactly what would have happened if the plant were built. In some ways it may have helped the local economy; in other ways it may have hurt it. The real conclusion, I would argue, is not that one side was right and the other wrong, but that they merely had two very different visions of how they wanted the area to grow. The plant proponents favored the economics of an older way of life. The opposition was making an active effort to go beyond saying “no” to the plant to saying “yes” to a new vision for the future of the Hudson Valley.

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CHAPTER 4

“Why Would Anyone Oppose Healthier Air for Our Children?” How long does it take you to come to understand that a Happy Meal is cheap but it will kill you? It’s the same problem with the cement plant. It’s another Happy Meal. How long until you come to the point when you understand that your child will get asthma if that plant is built? —Linda Mussmann, co-director, Time and Space Limited

O

bviously, no one questions the importance of human health. Instead, the SLC debate centered around a number of questions about whether the plant would be a source of serious risk to health, what its impact would be as compared to the current pollution levels from the Catskill plant, and how the impact might change if the best technologies were used. The discussion of the environmental and health impacts of the plant reveals two important facets of the SLC dispute. First, that the scientific information about emissions levels can result in opposing conclusions (that the plant will either be good or bad for the environment) raises questions about the nature of “fact” and its relationship to individual subjectivities. Second, in seeing the plant as beneficial to the local environment, plant supporters altered the conventional paradigm of industry and environmental interests as necessarily opposed. To understand this change, it is important to examine this conventional paradigm and how it developed.

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Connecting Environmental and Human Health One catalyst for the modern environmental movement was the tremendous increase in knowledge about the dangers to human and environmental health caused by various human practices, in particular industrial pollution. As early as the nineteenth century, severe sanitation problems, such as solid waste management, were understood to be connected to widespread epidemics, such as cholera and typhus (see, e.g., Engels 1845). This problem was exacerbated by the rapid growth of industrial capitalism, which set up a difficult conflict of interests between the desire for economic growth and the increasing recognition of its significant dangers. During the early twentieth-century period of industrial expansion, new environmental problems began to develop that could not be addressed by traditional conservationist strategies of resource management or preservationist strategies of creating nature reserves. Air and water pollution, urban sprawl, industrial expansion, and agricultural activities all began to have obvious negative effects on the environment (Shabecoff 2000: 4). In addition to the increased visibility of these issues, the new scientific field of ecology emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, giving support to the idea that all parts of nature are connected, and thus that destruction of one part of the environment can have greater impacts than might first be perceived (Nash 1989: 55). Thus, concern over the environment was expanding beyond the confines of national parks as broader environmental issues began to find a place in American consciousness. During the early part of the twentieth century, however, that place remained a minimal one because of the distraction of huge pressing concerns such as two world wars and the Great Depression. Advances were made in recognizing environmental hazards, but the health of nature was far from the nation’s first priority. The post-Second World War economic boom brought with it a host of new environmental problems, as well as distractions from these problems. Affluence led to an explosion in consumption, fueling economic growth, which then furthered consumption. New goods were constantly being created, which led to the creation of new “needs,” strongly encouraged by the advertising industry, which was emerging as a significant influence in American society. New products became popular during this period that would later prove to be environmental nightmares, such as plastics and pesticides. The sudden and dramatic increase in automobile production and use led to greater urban sprawl, and leaded gasoline emitted high levels of lead into the atmosphere. Energy consumption rose rapidly, leading to the creation

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of nuclear energy to meet growing needs. According to author Robert Gottlieb, the 1950s were a period of “political contentment and acquiescence to the system, where problems such as pollution were seen as minor irritants to be solved by appropriate technological interventions” (1993: 79). It was believed by many that advances in technology could outrace any problems of resource exhaustion or environmental degradation. But the effects of new developments in production and consumption did not go completely unnoticed. Despite the dominant ideology that economic and industrial progress could fix all problems, a few examples serve to indicate that an undercurrent was developing to challenge the logic of the postwar system. Aldo Leopold, often deemed an environmental prophet, published his famous Sand County Almanac in 1949, in which he advocates a shift in thinking from man as dominator of nature to man as equal citizen by extolling the extraordinary beauty of nature as well as the ecological principles of stability, integrity, and community. Perhaps the most important precursor to the environmental revolution that began in 1970 was the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962. This book, which exposes the negative effects of pesticides, particularly DDT, on many plants and animals other than the “pests” they were intended to control, provided a dramatic wake-up call to Americans about the tremendous and potentially irreversible damage that careless human actions can have on all life. Public concern over environmental issues continued to mount, encouraged by the counterculture’s questioning of dominant American values and way of life. The birth of the modern environmental movement is often traced back to the first Earth Day, April 22, 1970, when millions of people filled the streets across the country to express their demands that environmental issues be addressed. Despite conflicts among environmental groups about exactly what message Earth Day would and should send, the huge numbers of people who turned out for the event and the extensive media coverage sent a message to politicians, industry leaders, and the rest of American society that an environmental movement had arrived. This “second wave” of environmentalism differed distinctly from the first wave of conservation and preservation in many ways. In addition to the tremendous increase in the size of the movement, the focus had changed from a concern about resource availability and the recreational benefits of nature to a focus on pollution and environmental externalities. Though the aesthetic and recreational values of nature retained their significance, they were no longer seen as an elitist luxury, but rather as a component of the democratic right to quality of

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life, a concept that also implicitly necessitates a healthy self and environment. As described in Chapter Two, the desire for a quality of life based on “luxuries” like aesthetics presupposes the achievement of both a basic standard of living and an adequate level of environmental and personal health. Hence, environmental quality, in keeping with the other social justice movements of the period, began to be regarded as a basic human right, and pollution, therefore, was seen as an expression of social injustice (Shabecoff 1993: 116). Shortly before Earth Day, reacting to mounting public pressures, President Richard Nixon gave a speech in which he declared that the most important question of the 1970s would be how we dealt with the environmental concerns facing us. Thus began an important period of environmental legislation, the sheer scale of which, according to Philip Shabecoff, “must be regarded as one of the great legislative achievements of the nation’s history” (1993: 129). On the first day of 1970, Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act, which made the government responsible for examining the results of its actions on the environment and making those findings public. In that year three important governmental agencies were created—the Council on Environmental Quality (a watchdog to ensure federal agency compliance with regulations), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Over the next decade hundreds of pieces of environmental legislation were passed on the federal, state, and local levels, including the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972, the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act of 1972, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, the Clean Air and Water Acts revisions of 1977, and many others (Shabecoff 1993: 131–32). The desire to protect environmental health was entering the mainstream. However, despite the enormous public support for the issues addressed by these regulations, there was by no means a consensus. By the end of the 1970s a “counterrevolution” was becoming more and more visible, challenging both the premises and the consequences of the environmental movement. Two major issues dominated this “antienvironmental” movement. The first was the notion that perhaps the environment was not in quite as much danger as its advocates claimed, or even that the whole crisis was a hoax. Anti-environmentalists further argued that economic needs were more important than the environment and that new regulations were continually putting more limitations on the possibility of the most cost-efficient business practices. This backlash helped to elect Ronald Reagan in 1980 and halted

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the environmental legislative process in favor of a more conservative hands-off approach to industry (Shabecoff 1993: 205). The counterrevolution embodied in the Reagan administration did not, however, halt the environmental movement. In fact, environmental organizations had their highest rates of membership during this period (Edmondson 2001: 31). Massive public pressures helped to mitigate the setbacks in environmental regulation that threatened to occur during the Reagan years. In addition to the growing size of the environmental organizations, their tactics began to change as well. In January 1981 a group of ten representatives from some of the largest environmental organizations in the country—known as the “CEO gathering” or the “Group of Ten”—met to discuss possible strategies for confronting this new administration. This meeting, and subsequent ones, represented the general feeling that a more unified approach and mainstream identity were needed. According to Robert Gottlieb (1993: 120), the clash of the movement with the Reagan administration encouraged the institutionalization of environmental organizations because it unified them against a common enemy and forced them to develop their organizational abilities. Many of these large, mainstream environmental groups increasingly began to rely on the professional expertise of lawyers, to draft legislation and participate in the policymaking processes, and of scientists, to supply evidence to support their positions. This professionalization was made possible by the increased funding of the organizations resulting from higher levels of membership, more extensive fundraising, and greater support of the movement by large foundations such as the Ford Foundation. Many environmentalists during this period also began to look for ways to make environmental protections more compatible with market interests. Gottlieb describes how the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), a prime example of the professionalization of the movement, also became a prime example of the market-driven mindset: “The [EDF economic] model sought to demonstrate to the utility industry that a conservation-oriented or demand-based approach, linked to certain incentives, would be more profitable in the long run than the volumeoriented, expansionary policies that had characterized the utility industry approach for more than sixty years” (1993: 140). The niche-market for environmentally friendly products also expanded, leading companies to either change their practices or launch extensive “green-washing” campaigns to give the impression that they had changed their practices. Effective corporations must be in tune with the public demands in order to sustain their reputations and their revenues. They must also, as we will see in the example of SLC, be in tune with the demands of the communities surrounding them in order to enable production to occur at all.

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Environmental Health in the SLC Controversy Not surprisingly, one of the main issues in the St. Lawrence controversy was the effect the plant would have on the environment, and, more specifically, on human health. What is surprising, however, is the drastic difference in how the two sides of the debate portrayed the issue, with even greater disparity than with the other issues surrounding the plant. In simplified terms, the opposition saw the plant as an enormous threat to the local and regional environment and human health, whereas SLC and its supporters saw the plant as the source of a great benefit to the area because it would be cleaner than the plant that would be closed. How can such polarized views both be seen as unchallengeable “facts?” For much of the history of the environmental movement the clash between environmentalists and industry has taken a very different construction than it did in the SLC debate, where both sides claimed to be acting in the best interest of the environment. Conventionally, on one side is the idea that the needs of industry, as a source of jobs and support for the economy, are more pressing than those of the environment. As discussed in Chapter Two, many people in the past, and to some extent still today, see the mainstream environmental movement as elitist because it focuses on such priorities as the health of the natural world over other more pressing concerns, such as getting food on the table.1 Simply put, critics charge that environmentalists—derisively labeled “tree huggers”—favor trees over people. From the time of the early preservationist struggles for national parks to the Greenpeace fight to save the seals, many have argued that the environmental activists in the United States have been mostly made up of the more privileged segments of the population. Shabecoff characterizes the membership of the mainstream national environmental organizations as composed of “mostly white, well-educated, relatively affluent middle-class professionals” (1993: 233). Thus, those on the side of industry often use the concept of economic “necessity” as the prime justification for their position (and, by extension, as the excuse for industrial pollution). Conversely, environmentalists express the opinion that some things—environmental health being one of them—are more important than economics. Though concerns such as pollution, deforestation, or species extinction may not seem pressing at the moment, environmentalists argue that we will realize soon enough that we have caused ourselves tremendous and irreversible harm. The SLC controversy exemplifies a divergence from this paradigm in several ways. First, the groups involved were local, not national,

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organizations with a direct and personal stake in what was going on around them, not in a more removed concept of ecosystem functioning. In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of grassroots environmental organizations in this country. Though there certainly have been many grassroots environmental groups throughout the modern environmental movement, some of which have had extremely important victories, their number has been increasing rapidly since the mid-1990s. Even many of the large mainstream groups are beginning to decentralize in order to focus more narrowly on local grassroots issues (though some of the local groups question their dedication). One important difference between the grassroots and the national organizations is the local organizations’ extraordinary persistence and inability to compromise, because the issues they are addressing affect them personally. As one member of the opposition stated, “I’m only involved because I felt there were so many problems in our community that it was either fight or flight. I either had to get involved or I had to move away. My family continues to live less than twenty miles downwind from the St. Lawrence project and others I’m concerned about so I didn’t really feel that flight was an option.” In contrast to the conventional notion of industry as a necessity and environmentalism as a luxury, in this and other grassroots struggles the environmental perspective is often portrayed as one of absolute necessity. This controversy also broke the mold of classic environment versus development splits in that the company was not arguing that the health of the environment was not an issue and the opposition was not arguing that economics were insignificant. In this way this controversy exemplifies a transition from the denial of environmental problems by the counterrevolution of the 1980s to an acceptance by corporations of the need to embrace the demands of an environmentally conscious market as well as an acceptance, to some degree, by environmentalists that the greatest success will involve making environmental conservation economically viable. Although SLC emphasized the need for jobs and an economic boost to the region, it did not argue the acceptability of sacrificing environmental health for this cause; in fact, it argued that the building of the new plant would be extremely beneficial to the local environment because it would replace the plant in Catskill with newer, “state-of-the-art,” environmentallyfriendly technology. SLC’s advertisements focused on two main themes—the benefit to the economy and the benefit to the environment. A few examples of the ads on the latter topic can help to explain its position:

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New Technology = a cleaner world! According to the EPA, from 1970 to 2002, emissions of lead decreased 95 percent, sulfur dioxide 52 percent, volatile organic compounds 51 percent, carbon monoxide 48 percent, particulate matter 34 percent and nitrogen oxides 17 percent. During this same period the U.S. population increased 38 percent and gross domestic product rose by 165 percent. When St. Lawrence Cement builds its replacement plant, this trend will continue. —Register Star, October 2, 2003

e Support the Plan^t How can technology help? Since 1970, smog has declined by a third, even as the number of cars doubled. Acid rain has fallen 65 percent, though the United States now burns twice as much coal. New, better technology has made the difference. Supporting the planet means supporting new, cleaner technologies. St. Lawrence Cement will use new technology at its replacement plant that will reduce acid rain causing sulfur dioxide by 85 percent and total acid rain causing emission by 45 percent. It will also reduce lead and mercury emissions by 95 percent. —Register Star, 7/28/2003, 7/31/2003

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Environmentally Friendly from Start to Finish You’ve been hearing about the environmental benefits that will result when St. Lawrence Cement’s Greenport Replacement Plant begins operation and the present plant is shut down. But, you probably don’t know about the long chain of environmental advantages of using cement in the construction of roads, bridges, buildings and homes. • Building with concrete helps save our precious forests. Concrete far outlasts wood construction and uses far less land in its production. • Concrete structures promote a healthier indoor atmosphere. Concrete requires no volatile organic based preservatives like wood does. This eliminates the release of those volatile solvents into the atmosphere when these preservatives are manufactured and into home interiors when they are applied. • Concrete is naturally waterproof and fire-resistant. • Structures built with concrete are more durable. Concrete does not rot and decay, can’t be eaten by termites and is more resistant to natural disasters, reducing the wasteful cycle of disposal and replacement. • Concrete uses recycled materials. Fly-ash from coalburning power plants as well as crushed concrete from demolition are incorporated as aggregates in concrete. Concrete’s near inert matrix of materials make it an ideal recycling medium. —Register Star, 8/22/2002, 9/12/2002, 9/18/2003) A final example consists of a series of advertisements of the same layout, each with two columns—one titled “Why live with this?” and the other, “When you can have this,” with images under each. Some examples include: “Why live with a gramophone when you can have a

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modern stereo?” (Register Star, 6/16/2003) “Why live with washing clothes in a barrel when you can have a washing machine?” (Register Star, 6/9/2003, 6/12/2003) “Why live with an abacus when you can have a calculator?” (Register Star, 6/2/2003, 6/5/2003) “Why live with a sundial when you can have a watch?” (Register Star, 3/19/2003, 5/22/2003) “Why live with a typewriter when you can have a laptop computer?” (Register Star, 5/29/2003) The implicit conclusion of course was, “Why live with an old SLC plant when you can have a new one?” All these examples encouraged the conclusion that the Greenport project represented progress, the evolution of industry to a modern, “state-of-the-art,” facility. Not only were the newer technologies more efficient but, as some of the first ads express, they would also contribute to a healthier environment. In an advertisement for the plant put out by the Hudson Valley Environmental/Economic Coalition, the connection to human health was made explicit: “Why Would Anyone Oppose Healthier Air for Our Children?” This rhetorical query implies that environmental benefits would result from the new SLC plant and thereby presents the issue in a way that is seemingly nonnegotiable. The nonpartisan reader was left thoroughly confused: Is this really a debate between environmentalists and environmentalists?

The DEIS: Air Emissions and Mitigation Strategies In order to understand the position of the plant supporters that the plant was going to be beneficial for the local environment, it is important to examine the information described in SLC’s applications regarding the expected levels of pollutant emissions from the proposed plant. The DEIS and Air Permit Application’s figures for the effect of the Greenport plant on air quality were based on dispersion models approved by the EPA and the DEC. The results were then compared with the applicable air quality regulations, which include the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and New York State Ambient Air Quality Standards (NYSAAQS), the Prevention of Serious Deterioration (PSD) regulations, and the New Source Review (NSR), among others. The NYSAAQS includes all the regulations of the NAAQS, with the addition of certain pollutants considered particularly important to regulate in New York State. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act designated New York as among the eleven states included in the Northeast Ozone Transport Region (OTR) because it is “nonattainment” for ozone,2 meaning it does not meet the NAAQS for ozone levels. Therefore, New York State has particularly stringent

358 245 488 350 850 474 4121 3011 3718 3011 3983 3125 129 63 e 0.01 e 0.0004 e 0.0037 1.37 1.37 e 0.8 40 35

potential typical

177 350 3136 4086 4086 317 38 0.22 0.0002 0.06 0.26 56

permitted actual

1163 1368 5646 7166 7166 495 c c c c c c c

Future Greenport Facility

Existing Catskill Facility 15 Yes 25 Yes 40 Yes 40 Yes 40 Yes 100 Yes 40 Yes 0.6 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 No 1 No 7 Yes

threshold review?

PSD/NSR Significance Threshold 99 250 1 1 1 1 1 -

24 122 1 1 1 1 1 -

potential typical

Future Catskill Facility 457 738 851 4122 3719 3984 130 e e e 1.37 e 40

269 472 475 3012 3012 3126 64 0.01 0.0004 0.0037 1.37 0.8 35

potential typical

Future Operation Total

(706) 92 (630) 122 (4795) (2661) (3044) (1074) (3447) (1074) 3489 2809 26 (0.21) - 0.0002 (0.06) 1.11 0.8 (21)

potential typical

Total Net Change of Project

e) NECHAP MACT for Portland Cement applies.

d) Emissions of vinyl chloride are often non-detect in cement kiln stacks. Periodic detection may be a result of background ambient levels or due to the ubiquitous nature of vinyl chloride.

c) No permit limit.

b) Kiln emissions only. Catskill facility emissions estimated from AP42. Actual Catskill facility mercury emissions expected to be less. Lead, beryllium and mercury are regulated persuant to NESHAP for Portland Cement MACT particulate standard.

a) Pollutants listed are criteria pollutants except for VOCs, which together with NOx are a precursor to ozone, a federal criteria pollutant. Pollutants not expected from a cament kiln include asbestos, hydrogen sulfide, total reduced sulfur and reduced sulfur compounds.

PM10 PM (TSP) SO2 NO2 (first 2 yrs) NO2 (after 2 yrs) CO VOC Leadb Berylliumb Mercuryb Flourides Vinyl chlorided H2SO4 Mist

Regulated Pollutant

Table 4. 1. SLC Hudson Valley Operation. Summary of regulated pollutants expected from cement operation annual emissions (tons per year)

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regulations when it comes to ozone-causing emissions, such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) such as nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Other pollutants that are of concern are sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter of ten microns diameter or less (PM10) and 2.5 microns or less (PM2.5), lead, arsenic, mercury, and others. Included in both the DEIS and the Air Permit Application is a table (see table 4.1) that lays out the permitted and the actual air emissions levels of eleven pollutants at the current Catskill plant, as well as the potential and typical emissions at the proposed Greenport plant. According to this chart, when comparing the actual Catskill emissions with the presumed typical Greenport emissions, CO, VOCs, and PM10 would increase with the proposed project. Two of the largest pollutants (in terms of total emissions tonnage), SO2 and NO2, would both decrease—SO2 would decrease from 3,136 to 474 tons per year, and NO2 would decrease from 4,086 to 3,011 tons per year.3 The main pollutants in this debate were SO2 and NOx, because of their role in the formation of smog and acid rain, damage to the ozone, and damage to plants and buildings, and PM2.5 and PM10, which cause acute asthma and other respiratory problems. In addition, PM2.5 is both difficult to measure and small enough to be absorbed from the lungs into the bloodstream, thus increasing risk of heart attack and stroke. Despite the threefold increase in total cement manufactured at the proposed plant and increases in a few of the pollutant emissions levels, according to the DEIS, “The air quality impact analysis determined that airborne emissions from the Greenport Project would not result in exceedances of any of the applicable ambient air standards or guidelines, therefore, the Greenport Project would not result in any significant adverse air quality impacts” (14.1). The DEIS outlines the features of the proposed plant that were designed to minimize negative environmental impacts, stating, “Where reasonable and applicable, measures to avoid, minimize, or mitigate potentially significant adverse effects are presented” (DEIS: 2). Thus, it seems that SLC recognized that there were “potentially significant adverse effects” of the proposed plant, though the DEIS focuses on the ways they would be minimized. The DEIS points to a number of “state-of-the-art” strategies that would be used in the new plant to keep the plant’s air emissions below the legal limits. The first strategy was to minimize the energy demands of the plant by reusing the heat created in the manufacturing process and by using what is called a “dry process kiln,” which is 40 percent more energy-efficient per ton of clinker than a wet process kiln. Dry process plants use 2.8 to

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3.0 million British Thermal Units of energy (BTUs) per metric ton of clinker, while the wet process plants (such as the one in Catskill) consume 5.0 million BTUs. The dry process kiln would also use significantly less water (DEIS: 1.3). The second strategy, and one that was much debated after the DEIS was submitted, was the use of coal as fuel for the plant. Citing information from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the DEIS claims that because of the high heat needed for cement production, the use of coal would result in lower levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) than would the use of natural gas, which is generally deemed a “cleaner” fuel choice. A number of other strategies are described that purport to reduce NOx emissions, including a low NOx burner, flame and process optimization, and the installation of a new technology—selective noncatalytic reduction. The DEIS identifies two processes designed to minimize the emission of SO2—a wet scrubber, which would remove SO2 from the kiln and preheater exhaust, and a dry scrubber, which would also help to remove SO2 from the exhaust. According to SLC, “No cement manufacturing plant in the world operates a similar parallel scrubber configuration” (DEIS: 6). With these technologies there would be a “significant net emissions decrease of more than 2,000 tons per year [of SO2] from the existing SLC Hudson Valley Operation” (DEIS: S.3.2). The DEIS discusses a number of planned environmental controls, in addition to those related to air pollution. For example, the Hudson River was not intended to be a source of water for the plant or a discharge location from the plant. Instead, two stormwater collection systems would have diverted rainwater from the plant grounds to a retention pond where sediments would settle. This collected stormwater would have been used for all the water needs of the plant, such as the cooling of gas streams, and therefore “there would have been no discharge of industrial water” (DEIS: S.3.2).

The Opposition Plant opponents stressed the environmental havoc the plant would wreak on the surrounding region, including noise, trucks, visual blight, and the long list of expected plant emissions. Although extensive discussion about the negative health effects that can result from exposure to these chemicals is beyond the scope of this book, substantial evidence links exposure to toxic air pollutants to carcinogenic, respiratory, developmental and reproductive effects. It is instructive to

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examine some of the information given by the opposition groups about the expected levels of pollutant emissions in comparison with the information and interpretations provided by SLC. Wherever possible, Friends of Hudson would strategically cite information provided by SLC itself. For example, in a statement on the total emissions from the plant, FOH cited SLC’s Draft Air Permit Application as seeking permission for the Greenport plant to emit 43 percent more “regulated pollutants” than were currently allowed at the Catskill plant. The total would have been an average of 55,000 pounds of pollution each day, or about 20 million pounds per year. According to FOH, “If these emissions from the proposed project were divided evenly between every Columbia County resident at the end of each year, every man, woman and child would get a 300-pound sack of pollution for the holidays” (FOH Issues Overview). Citizens for a Healthy Environment made the most detailed examination of the different pollutants and the changes in emission rates that would have resulted from the change in operations from Catskill to Greenport. They analyzed a number of the pollutants that were expected to result from the proposed plant, including lead, mercury, arsenic, cadmium, volatile organic compounds, methane, benzene, dioxin, furans, nitrogen oxide (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone, and fine particulate matter. CHE concluded that NOx would increase 1,844,000 pounds per year over the current level to a total of 8,244,000 pounds. SO2, one of the pollutants SLC pointed to when it described the reduction of emissions at the new plant as compared to the old one, would be emitted at a rate of 1,702,000 pounds per year, a rate which CHE claimed “could be lower still if SLC used the better technology available or an alternative fuel” (CHE: 39). CO levels might increase 7,332,00 pounds per year, from the Catskill rate of 634,000 pounds to the proposed 7,966,000 pounds. Emissions of fine particulate matter could double from the current Catskill levels, to a total of 716,000 pounds of particulate matter annually, although because of the size of these molecules they are impossible to measure accurately (CHE: 38–44).

Exploring the Discrepancies So how can we account for such completely opposing conclusions drawn from the same information? How was it possible for two sides to look at the chart of past and projected emissions and then one side to claim that the future emissions would be lower and the other side to

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predict that future emissions would be much greater? Or were they not looking at the same numbers? First, there are in fact different ways to interpret the information from the chart. As described above, both the Catskill and the Greenport emissions totals are reported in two lists—permitted annual emissions and actual annual emissions (in the case of Catskill) or potential and expected typical emissions (in the case of Greenport), of which the permitted/potential are always the greater of the two. There are, therefore, different numbers to compare. The information given by CHE regarding the change in emissions levels was calculated by comparing the actual Catskill levels with the potential Greenport levels, and thereby displaying the maximum discrepancy between the two plants. SLC calculated its statistics regarding the 85 percent reduction in SO2 or the 95 percent reduction in lead and mercury by comparing the actual emissions in Catskill with the expected typical emissions in Greenport. In addition, the two sides chose different ways to represent the numbers—SLC used tons and the opposition used pounds— thereby representing the same information with larger or smaller figures, perhaps to manipulate the impression given to people reading it. When the figures given by SLC, described above, are multiplied by 2,000 in order to convert to pounds, they are, for the most part, equivalent to those given by the plant’s opposition. In addition to representing the figures in different ways, each side raised a number of additional points as to why their conclusion (of increased or decreased pollution) was more valid. For example, SLC emphasized that the DEC’s comparison of the Greenport emissions with the state and national regulations would be based on the higher of the two categories provided on the emissions chart—the potential to emit (PTE). This is the maximum amount the plant would be legally allowed. According to an engineer for SLC, the PTE can be compared with the highest level on a car speedometer. The car will very rarely run at its maximum possible speed, but manufacturers put that number there anyway. Again, as with a car that needs an occasional oil change or new muffler, it was anticipated that the plant operations would be down approximately 15 percent of the time for maintenance. Despite this probability, all engineering calculations were made at 110 percent capacity levels. Thus, SLC argued that even its overly cautious emissions figures would be within the levels permitted by the DEC. However, despite SLC’s claim that the actual emissions would have been significantly less than the maximum PTE, the plant opposition frequently cited examples of other plants owned by SLC and Holcim (SLC’s parent company) that had exceeded their permitted

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emissions levels. The message was that even if the new plant was approved based on its assurances of an acceptable level of pollution, the company could not be trusted to comply with those assurances. In 2001 Friends of Hudson compiled a document entitled Stack Test: The Track Record of St. Lawrence Cement—Holcim, which examines twenty Holcim–SLC plants in the United States and Canada that had a variety of problems over the previous decade, including price fixing, civil rights violations, accidents, and, most common and most pertinent to the present discussion, air emissions violations. The plant most often cited by the opposition was located in Midlothian, Texas. The Midlothian plant was originally chosen by SLC to be used as a model for the Greenport plant, and in 1999 SLC brought a Community Forum to Texas to inspect it. After information came out in the Greenport discussion that in 1993 the plant was fined $135,000 for emissions 50 percent over permitted levels, SLC renounced its affiliation with the plant, emphasizing that it was a Holcim, not an SLC, plant. New problems emerged in 2002 when the Midlothian plant was charged $223,000 for fifteen categories of pollution violations (FOH Issues Overview). The opposition also questioned SLC’s reliability as a result of its doubts about the accuracy of the information presented by the company in the DEIS. A significant portion of the adjudicatory hearings was focused on attempts by the opposition to prove both the incompleteness and the inaccuracies of the permit applications. For example, would the plant truly be “state-of-the-art” as claimed by SLC? SLC frequently touted the technologies it would use as the most modern available, and therefore a key safeguard against any health problems. And, according to Dan Odescalchi, because the technologies were state-ofthe-art when the permit was first submitted, other plants had since had the time to implement the same technologies, so “no longer is it just based on modeling and assumptions; now we can actually prove it.” But opponents of the plant thought otherwise. They questioned the use of coal as the fuel source and the use of a Selective Noncatalytic Reductor (SNCR) as the most modern technology for NOx emissions mitigation. According to an engineer for SLC, these disagreements by the opposition and its contract engineers were based on their “ignorance” about the nature of cement manufacturing. Regarding their opinion on the use of coal she stated, “They think combustion is combustion is combustion.” She described a big difference between, for example, a boiler where there is nothing between the heat and the exhaust to change the process chemically, and a cement kiln where the exhaust comes into contact with limestone, which neutralizes the acidity of the combustion exhaust. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the processes of heating with coal or heating with natural gas are neces-

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Figure 14. Friends of Hudson Stack Test Overview Showing Emissions and Labor Violations from other St. Lawrence/Holcim North American Plant Sites; reprinted by permission of Friends of Hudson.

sarily interchangeable and, by extension, that one will always be superior to the other. Odescalchi elaborated on this issue by explaining that coal ash is actually an important ingredient in the cement product, and that because of the intense heat of the cement manufacturing process, the use of natural gas rather than coal would, in fact, produce greater NOx emissions. To produce clinker, which becomes cement, limestone must be heated in a kiln environment of 3,000 degrees in order for the necessary chemical transformation to take place,. The hotter the temperature, the more NOx is produced. Therefore, the goal is to hit 3,000 degrees without exceeding it, because higher temperatures make unnecessary NOx. According to Odescalchi, excessive temperatures, and excessive NOx, are less likely when coal is used as fuel because the temperature of coal is much easier to control than that of natural gas. The second plant component questioned by the opposition was the use of a SNCR as opposed to a selective catalytic reductor (SCR). The opposition identified SCR as the best available control technology (BACT) for the lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER). However,

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according to SLC, the company did extensive research into the SCR and discovered that there was only a single functional SCR unit in the world, currently used in Germany, that had been analyzed for a total of only six hours. SLC gave two reasons as to why a SCR would not be the BACT for the Greenport project. First, it was necessary to have a repeatable experiment in order to reach any valid conclusions, and testing for only six hours was insufficient. An SLC employee stated, “Even the manufacturer said to us, if you apply SCR to the Greenport project, it would be a research and development project, not a control technology.” Second, not all technologies are transferable from one situation to another. The United States has regulations about secondary plumes, plume opacity limitations, and carbon monoxide (CO) levels. Germany can drive down NOx levels because they have no CO regulations, and when NOx is reduced, CO increases. At Greenport, it would have been necessary to strike an equilibrium between NOx and CO emissions. Another source of differing interpretations of facts and figures was the uncertainty about the qualifications of those hired as experts on each side of the debate. To enhance its credibility, each side needed to discredit the sources of evidence for the opposite side’s position. Odescalchi was particularly vehement on this issue. He said, “Everything that we say gets scrutinized by the regulatory agencies. We have to be responsible for everything we put forward and say. Our opposition does not have to live with that. They have a little bit more freedom, shall we say. They can exercise their first amendment rights more than we can. Everything that we put forward has been backed up by scientists.” He cited two situations in which SLC agreed to debate its opponents publicly as well as one example from the adjudicatory hearings: Once we agreed to do it on National Public Radio, the only thing we asked is that they bring a scientist. That’s all we asked them to do. We’ll bring a scientist; you bring a scientist. If you’re a scientist you’re going to be guided by your ethical responsibility to not say outlandish things. We showed up with one of the nation’s premier toxicologists; Sam Pratt showed up with an antiques dealer. There was nothing for my scientist to really get into with this person; basically he spent a half hour trying to control whatever they said. Later on we agreed to a public hearing in Rhinebeck, and the same thing, we brought one of the air experts from the Harvard School of Public Health . . . and we debated two people doing fundraising for their organization. So, we’re not going to get involved anymore because it’s just futile. They can say anything and our

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guys . . . it’s frustrating. They’ve yet to put anyone forward. They claim they do but every time we thought we were going to put two scientists on the radio or in public they’ve never bothered. Unfortunately, you weren’t at the mining hearing— that was just priceless. They had a mining expert who was a retired person from the DEC and he was going on about how we shouldn’t be allowed to keep our grandfathering for our mine, or at least that’s what he thought he was doing, and you get cross-examined under oath in the hearings and when it was our time for our attorney to get up, he said, “Sir, what did you think when you saw their existing permit?” and the guy looked shocked, he said, “They have a permit? Then why are we here?” It costs a lot of money to do this. An active member of Friends of Hudson, when asked about these concerns, became extremely angry: It’s just typical St. Lawrence bluster. [The Friends of Hudson office] is full of thousands of pages of expert testimony. St. Lawrence has lost every time there’s been a decision. They claimed that it was inconceivable that their mine in Becraft Mountain was not a grandfathered mining operation. St. Lawrence has apparently forgotten that we had about two weeks of testimony on that, with mining experts on both sides and at the end of it the judge said Friends of Hudson’s experts are right. We are ungrandfathering St. Lawrence’s mine because it has been demonstrated by these experts that not only what they proposed to you is far outside the ground of the existing permit, but we are were able to show that their mining permits had lapsed in the late ‘70s and they were mining there illegally for many years. So one can say we’ve never shown anything, but . . . it’s typical St. Lawrence; they just want to revise history and pretend. We met the same two judges in 2001 with fourteen days of hearings. . . . We had to offer hundreds of pages, we had to bring our experts in and have them explain what their background was. And less than six months later the two judges said Friends of Hudson and our allies have met their burden of proof. We’re giving them full party status and we’re going to adjudicate all these issues. If St. Lawrence wants to tell you that that didn’t happen, it doesn’t even merit a response. But that’s the way they do it. They just throw out the sound-bite that sounds like it discredits the other side and there’s nothing behind it and that’s why

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they’re losing. Their arguments do not hold up in court. I mentioned fine particulate matter. Our allies in the Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition have hired not just an expert, but the world’s foremost expert on the health impacts of fine particulate matter, Dr. George Thurston, who’s published in the past five years two groundbreaking studies in arguably the most reputable medical journal in the country, and these studies covered fifteen to twenty years of data and were published in not just every medical publication but every major publication in the country. If St. Lawrence wants to tell you that Dr. George Thurston doesn’t exist and isn’t an expert, it’s so preposterous. I think it’s just a good illustration of their approach to the issue. These conflicting views can help to illuminate a few important aspects of this controversy. As discussed earlier, the SLC debate was marked by stereotyping. Here, too, in the discussion of experts, each side focused on specific aspects of the other side’s character or arguments to support its own perspective. It would have been contrary to Odescalchi’s purpose if he had described FOH’s hired experts as being of a high caliber, and vice versa. Instead, he focused on the NPR incident where he claimed FOH brought an antiques dealer instead of a scientist because, in the context of the SLC debate, “antiques dealer” was a provocative label, a code word that SLC could use to try to discredit the opposition. Secondly, the extensive use of experts was remarkable. It is extremely rare that small grassroots organizations such as Friends of Hudson have the resources to hire big-name scientists and engineers. A representative of the organization stated that about 75 percent of its funding was used to hire experts because, given the size of the company they were up against, they felt that they needed experts of the caliber that citizens groups cannot normally afford. Only in that way could they both win the case and make a statement to SLC and the DEC that they were equally well-equipped to fight the battle. For example, Camp, Dresser and McKee, the engineering firm hired by Friends of Hudson, is a nationally recognized firm that had, in fact, never before worked for a citizens’ group, only for industry. Third, it is interesting to examine the role that experts played in the search for “truth,” in seeking to disprove the other side’s facts. In Odescalchi’s opinion, as quoted above, the most persuasive evidence is that of a well-respected scientist. Since science is conceived of as a discipline of facts—the search for unquestionable statements about reality—scientists have (or at least are perceived as having), as Odescalchi

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said, an “ethical responsibility to not say outlandish things.” However, this debate over the two sides’ experts demonstrates that almost nothing is purely objective. Even though it is often depicted as the ultimate source of objective “fact,” science, too, is responsive to cultural (and often economic) influences. According to anthropologist Sarah Franklin, the process of “knowing is inseparable from being, imagining, or desiring” (Franklin: 173), and thus what is deemed “fact” is actually individual and cultural construction. It may also be precisely because science is cultural that it is defended by scientists so fervently (Franklin: 165), and in the case of SLC, it was also defended by those relying on the scientific knowledge to support their position. It is curious and somewhat ironic to note that when each side of this controversy hired researchers to examine various aspects of this plant, the experts always validated the position of those who hired them. It may be that those are only the studies that became public, but in either case the experts’ conclusions were inevitably swayed by their own perceptions—both from past experiences and opinions about the present situation. And, as the above exchange reveals, even the definition of who is and who is not a “reliable” expert on a particular topic is subject to interpretation based on one’s own situation and desires. The groups recognized the subjectivities related to these issues, but only in the other side’s experts. For example, Odescalchi described how the doctors at Columbia Memorial Hospital who opposed the plant were biased because they never came to SLC to hear the company’s side of it, or to really understand how a cement plant works. Many of them, he claimed, merely “took the information lock, stock and barrel from the opposition. As a matter of fact they belong to that group, some of them, so I think it was a bit biased.” And on the other side of the debate, Cyndy Hall expressed the opinion that the doctors at Harvard Medical School supporting SLC were, first of all, only two people with PhDs, not medical doctors, and secondly, they were biased by the large sum of money SLC paid them. She noted that all of SLC’s experts were paid, whereas Sam Pratt and Peter Jung (Friends of Hudson’s executive director and board president, respectively) had “never taken a dime.”4

Conclusion Unlike just a few decades ago, it is now generally accepted that industrial pollution is harmful. Though the counterrevolutionaries of the 1980s still leave their mark in the ideologies of the Wise Use movement,5 concern for the environment, and its impacts on human health,

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has reached the mainstream. In addition, many members of the Wise Use movement claim that they are in fact the “real” environmentalists because they actually depend on the functioning of the environment for their livelihood, as opposed to their elitist urban counterparts who oppose pollution from an ideological and safely distanced position (Arnold 1996). In this way the Wise Use activists could be said to reflect elements of what Ramachandra Guha (1997) calls the “environmentalism of the South,” which is based on the need for access to and local control of natural resources for survival, as opposed to “environmentalism of the North,” which is based more on aesthetic and recreational considerations. The supporters of the SLC plant, like the Wise Users, were in a way representing themselves in the public discourse as environmentalists by continually depicting the plant as a benefit to the local environment. The plant supporters never expressed the opinion that human health is insignificant, or that the economy should trump all other concerns. They did think, however, again echoing the Wise Use perspective, that the opposition drastically overstated the potential adverse impacts of the plant as a strategy to gain support. According to one supporter of the plant, the opponents changed their focus from the visual impacts to toxic emissions to scare up a larger, more vocal support base. He himself lived only three miles from the proposed plant and he, like others, reasoned, “Why would I support it if it’s going to kill me?” Dan Odescalchi drew a connection between health concerns and the length of time one has lived in the community, stating that the plant supporters “know it’s not a death knell to the area. Their grandfathers, their fathers, their aunts and uncles have worked here and to them they don’t see why all commotion over this. Let’s just build the thing and get on with life.” But the opponents of the plant could have said in response, “Let’s just not build the thing and get on with life.” Many commented that even if the plant resulted in minor decreases in emissions of some pollutants from the Catskill levels, it would still produce a total of almost twenty million pounds of pollution every year. As clearly stated in this letter to the editor, less pollution does not mean no pollution: Most people think that “cleaner” is better than “clean” and that “better” is better than “good.” . . . St. Lawrence Cement, in its current romantic TV spots, compares its proposed new plant (“cleaner”) to its old plant (“less clean”), but the company clearly avoids comparing it to no plant at all (“clean”). Even if it is true (and this is hotly disputed) that the company’s proposed new plant will be cleaner than the old one, it is cer-

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tainly not true that the biggest cement plant in America will make Hudson and its environs clean, an absolute term which you will never hear from St. Lawrence. Clean is better than cleaner. —Independent/Register Star, Richardson 5/26/2002 Therefore, even if the two sides were to agree on two fundamental premises—that the plant would decrease emissions and that environmental health is important—they would still come to two separate conclusions: Either they wanted the plant or they didn’t. In this case, the interpretation of the “facts” about the air pollution impacts of the plant became inseparable from the perspective of the interpreter, allowing for two diametrically opposed conclusions, each supported by “expert” testimony. Though there was enough evidence to raise considerable doubt about SLC’s claims that the plant would have been beneficial to the regional environment, the opinions of the plant supporters must be understood to have been based in a greater context of faith in industry, trust in technology, and, as will be seen in the next chapter, reaction to changes in land use and community demographics.

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CHAPTER 5

Defining Community Indications of a broader shift [in Columbia County] are mounting fast: ballooning real estate prices, a nascent night scene, high-design party invitations where a phone message once sufficed and menus that have swapped turkey and mashed potatoes for Pan-Asian grilled chicken. . . . The first wave that arrived in the area about 15 years ago didn’t seem to mind the lack of couture-cuisine restaurants and the local custom of treating sunset as curfew. They came for the solitude. Now a younger generation of artists, architects, publishing and media people are beginning to demand the kind of cultivated comfort without which weekend sojourns can never be entirely satisfying: an indie film theater and imported coffee beans. . . . The social scene has been galvanized as well by two years of fundraisers to stop the St. Lawrence Cement company from building a plant with a 40–story smokestack at the edge of Hudson. —The New York Times, Iovine 8/22/2002

A

s should be amply evident by now, the two sides of the St. Lawrence debate held extremely polarized views on almost all aspects of the dispute—aesthetics, economics, and environmental quality—with one side asserting that the plant would benefit these facets of life in the Hudson Valley, and the other, that it would be extremely harmful to them. But from where did these markedly different perspectives come? In some cases the information could be interpreted in different ways or individuals could focus on the aspects of the data that supported their position, but in either case there were previous experiences, thoughts, or values that informed their decisionmaking. One important underlying theme of the debate was the stereotypes and hostilities that developed between the different groups, 89

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stemming in part from the gentrification that had occurred in Columbia County. It seems that these stereotypes affected both individual opinions about the plant and public discourse about the controversy. Sometimes economic class was cited as a possible source of the split. Linda Mussmann, of Time and Space Limited, stated: I would say it is a class issue, because the class that understands the problems of the environmental disasters that we are facing now generally don’t filter to the classes that are less educated or less wealthy. Somebody in Hudson who lives on welfare or a modest income and struggles just to put food on the table, is not going to be thinking about the air that they breathe, even though most of the poor children in Hudson have asthma problems already. Mussmann’s implication here is that the ability to focus on environmental issues is contingent on a base level of economic stability and is encouraged by higher education levels. But the most common way the division was characterized, also sometimes related to social class, was as one between those who had lived in the area for a long period, “old-timers,” and those who moved to the area more recently, “newcomers.” The persistence of this theme in many letters to the editors of local newspapers and in conversations with those on both sides of the dispute, arguing both for and against this characterization, revealed a serious divide in the community between the old-timers and the newcomers. Whether this division followed the same lines as the division between plant supporters and opponents was highly debated, and is important to explore further.

Insiders and Outsiders in the History of Environmentalism The role of “outsiders,” people not “native”1 to an area, has long been a significant issue in the environmental movement. Many of the historical examples cited throughout this book are interesting to examine in this light. The changing views of nature in the nineteenth century, from fear and disgust to admiration and awe, began not in rural areas, but in cities whose inhabitants longed for a connection to the natural world that had been severed by the modern lifestyle. According to one author, the nineteenth-century “back to nature” movement “combined Romantic idealism and urban income in a movement that was hardly unsophisticated or anti-intellectual, however much it encouraged ‘the simple life.’” (Schmitt 1969: 5). The urban residents who became part

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of this back-to-nature movement were inspired by the artists and intellectuals who first reexamined the dominant views of nature: “The literary gentleman wielding a pen, not the pioneer with his axe, made the first gestures of resistance against the strong currents of antipathy” (Nash, 1982: 44). It was the separation from nature that inspired this new perspective. The Hudson River School of painters, which was discussed in Chapter Two as an example of the emergence of Romantic views of nature in the United States, is often described as being largely composed of artists not native to the area, and their work was supported mainly by the New York City elite. For example, Thomas Cole, often viewed as the founder of the Hudson River School, moved from England to Ohio as a child and then moved to the Hudson Valley from New York City after being drawn to its beauty while on a vacation in the Catskills (Nash 1982: 78). Others, such as Frederic Church, Cole’s student and original resident of Olana, moved from various parts of the country to New York City to be closer to the center of the art world and then spent time traveling and painting in the Hudson Valley, inspired by Cole and other early members of the School (Lassiter 1978: 68–69). The very origin of the preservation movement was also, to a large degree, based in the desires of outsiders. Much of the motivation for the early pressures to designate state and national parks came from wealthy families desiring sites of “untouched” nature to visit on vacations or from hunting organizations desiring game reserves (Gottlieb 1993: 31). The changing views of nature in the nineteenth century led many to see contact with nature as an important source of spiritual rejuvenation, and wilderness excursions became increasingly popular among those who could afford them. Those who lived in the wilderness and depended on it for their survival, however, often held a less sanguine view of the value of huge tracts of park land that limited human economic or subsistence usage of the land’s resources. Still today the whole concept of nature reserves has an implication for the insider versus outsider dichotomy, because often the national park designation forces locals out of their homes or at least places huge limitations on their autonomy. For example, in her book Living With the Adirondack Forest (1998), Catherine Henshaw Knott describes the deep-rooted conflict about land use in the Adirondack Park. The park is the most populated biosphere reserve in the world, with 52 percent of land labeled as private property in 1998, when the book was published. There has been a longstanding quarrel in the reserve between the local “Adirondackers” and the preservationists about the appropriate degree of state control over private land. Years of heated battles between the locals and the state

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agencies have limited each side’s ability to come to the discussion with an open mind and to genuinely listen to the arguments of the other. Polarization has increased through assumptions and stereotyping about the opposing group. Preservationists often assume the locals are unintelligent and either do not care about or do not know what is best for the forest. The Adirondackers often feel the preservationists are trying to force them out of the forest altogether and care more about the wildlife and the tourists than about the park’s human residents. Though it seems at first a conflict between the interests of nature and the interests of humans, this is complicated by the fact that the Adirondackers question whether preservation and tourism are in nature’s best interest, while the preservationists, in their focus on increasing the park’s recreational attraction, are also focusing on the interests of humans—they are just accused of focusing on the interests of tourists and wealthy second-home owners rather than the local residents. Similarly, in the controversy over Storm King Mountain in the lower Hudson Valley, some observers argued that the driving motivation for preservation came from outsiders: “the local ‘mountain people,’ who lately formed a core of opposition to Con Edison’s Storm King project, are in no sense hardscrabble Appalachian Folk types, but actually well-to-do New York City businessmen and attorneys with private weekend retreats in the highlands” (O’Brien 1981: 16). Other sources make no mention of the opponents to the Storm King project being outsiders, but what many people do describe is how the support of “outsiders” such as hired lawyers and public relations firms from New York City helped to publicize concerns about the project. Moreover, pressures came from New York City residents to stop the project, when evidence revealed that the plant would impact the City’s water supply. That outside support strengthened the case of the local opponents. In addition, the boundary between insiders and outsiders may not be so clear-cut. Raymond O’Brien writes in his examination of the Hudson Valley landscape: Yet, the line blurs because many of them may truly be “insiders”—families whose vested property interests there go back generations. It might be concluded that, in a very real sense, the Hudson, as “America’s River,” had and has no “outsiders.” . . . However jealously guarded by those who consider themselves privileged fifth or more generation “valley folk,” the river is such that appreciation and criticism of its landscape and of policy decisions affecting its use are of regional and national scope. (O’Brien 1981:16)

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Many questions emerge from these various examples that can be applied to the St. Lawrence controversy: To what extent are the opposition members outsiders or newcomers to the area? If they are in fact outsiders, should that negate their right to have a voice in what happens in the region? To what extent is the insider/outsider distinction even a valid one? As O’Brien notes above, the importance of the Hudson Valley has expanded the sphere of those who should have a say in its development, and therefore the insider–outsider distinction becomes less meaningful. According to Knott, however, the two categories can be extremely significant in individuals’ worldviews, their sense of the “other,” and the representation of the nature of the battle for self-determination. In the Hudson Valley and the SLC controversy, there appears to be a merging of these two viewpoints. The categorization of the members of the two sides of the debate is extremely problematic. However, particularly in the City of Hudson, the division runs deep and plays a significant role in community dynamics.

SLC and the Split in the Community Both sides of the SLC debate recognized that the City of Hudson and Columbia County have gone through significant demographic changes in the previous decade, representing a process of ruralization or, some would say, gentrification. An increasing number of people bought second homes, a purchase that carries with it an almost implicit connotation of a middle- or upper-income status. Even those who had recently become full-time residents in rural areas of the region could be assumed, for the most part, to be of middle- or upperincome, benefiting from the mobility provided by money or education and moving to the countryside for an increased quality of life, rather than for economic reasons. Simultaneous with and as a result of the changing population came a change in the nature of the region, including an increase in tourism, the opening of fancier restaurants, and, particularly in the City of Hudson, an increase in art galleries and antiques stores that cater, for the most part, to tourists and wealthier members of the population. In part this change resulted from efforts of local development strategists to help the economy. After the industries began to close in the 1960s and 1970s, and the region entered a serious economic depression, local planning boards attempted to develop alternative strategies for economic growth. In the late 1970s renovations on Warren Street, the main business street in Hudson, led to a few new businesses opening, but by the late 1980s the economy was still failing. One of the main

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development strategies of this period was to try to encourage residents of New York City to buy second homes in the area, which, as this strategy began to succeed, led to a rise in property values. Then, in 1994 when Wal-Mart opened a store in Greenport, Hudson looked to the antiques industry as an alternative form of development, because small local stores could not compete with Wal-Mart in sales of clothing, housewares, and other inexpensive, everyday items. Another more extensive development plan, entitled the Hudson Vision Plan, sought to increase tourism and make Hudson a more attractive place to live. Its list of objectives included developing the waterfront with restaurants, trails, and river recreation; encouraging the opening of specialty and gourmet shops; expanding cultural and recreational programs; building on Hudson’s historical assets; and, lastly, increasing the general quality of life through greater control of noise levels and traffic flow and improving public transportation and vacant building facades. Though the bulk of the Vision Plan was abandoned after a conflict regarding the Vision Plan’s newsletter endorsement of a mayoral candidate, the goals laid out in the Plan’s description help to illustrate the direction of Hudson’s development envisioned by its economic and community planners. According to Caylor Roling, who conducted a study of the City of Hudson entitled Whose Future Lies in Antiques?: A Participatory Appraisal of Hudson, the development strategies of the city planners did not address the needs of Hudson’s low-income population: Millions have been poured into Hudson and still people lack jobs, money, and safe and healthy housing. These millions have been channeled into projects planned by outside consulting firms and implemented by local development boards with little or no input by the city’s low-income residents. The current planning focus is on the development of the waterfront and antiques trade that will attract wealthy tourists. No current projects address the needs of Hudson’s low-income population. (1997: 33) Thus, tremendous hostilities have arisen in the community between those who feel the community is developing in a way that fits their needs and those who feel they are being ignored in favor of wealthier segments of the population. The antiques industry, which has been blossoming in the past decade to the point where more than a dozen antique shops can be found on every block of Warren Street in downtown Hudson, is often used as the symbol to represent this divide. The antiques sold in these shops are generally more expensive

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than the low-income population can afford, and antiques themselves are clearly luxury items. Roling’s research revealed that those who supported the development of the Hudson antiques market were all middle- to upper-class (1997: 92). Many of the Hudson residents Roling interviewed described the need for stores in the city filling basic needs, like a supermarket or inexpensive clothing stores.2 At the time she was writing, there were no food markets in the city and people had to travel to the neighboring town of Greenport to buy groceries, a major inconvenience for those without a car or without the money to take a cab. Many described how every store that closed down on Warren Street was replaced by an antiques store, leading some to feel that antiques were taking over the city. Though some recognized the role played by gentrification in making Hudson a more beautiful place to live, many of these same people also saw the type of development associated with the changing population as merely a facade not addressing the underlying problems of poverty: “Hudson is a beautiful paper landscape that, if you break through, you find a sewer” (Jill, cited in Roling 1997: 93). Both antiques and tourism, the two main strategies for economic growth promoted by the plant opposition as an alternative to SLC, are industries based around aesthetics and geared toward outsiders to the community. Therefore, even if the plant opposition was not composed of outsiders, their proposed solution for the economy was still mainly centered around the desires of outsiders and not, as Roling discovered, around the interests of the low-income population. However, according to many on both sides of the debate, the opposition was in fact mainly composed of outsiders, including both newcomers and secondhomers. Dan Odescalchi of SLC described how the number of people from New York City buying second homes in the area has increased dramatically over the past decade and, to a large degree, it is these people who are opposed the plant: They can come up and buy property very cheap, and they’re very vocal, so their influence shifts this region as well. And how that plays into the St. Lawrence issue, they perceive the region as one way and they don’t want it to change. Most of these people’s economic situation is not tied to this region. Which is why there is, and often people don’t talk about it, but there is a different perception among those whose economy is tied to here and those whose aren’t, those people that want to see a little more development here and some stabler jobs and those that want it to stay the way it is now so they can come up on the weekend and enjoy it. . . . If you’re trying to make ends

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meet locally, you’re going to be more focused on making sure there’s a vibrant local economy, not just making this a better community. If you’re just looking at this as a place to escape, you’re going to have different priorities. And they’re both legitimate concerns. They’re both totally understandable. Odescalchi makes an important connection between the economy, aesthetics, and the insider/outsider split. Those who do not depend on the local economy for their sustenance, such as the second-home owners, are more able to focus on aesthetics. They view the area as a source of enjoyment, whereas those who are from this region are less likely to have actively chosen to live here. It is not that they don’t enjoy the attributes of the region, but their experience is based on more than emotional fulfillment. Odescalchi is also referring to the concept, explored in Chapter Three, that the plant supporters thought that the plant signified progress and saw those opposing the plant as desiring to keep things as they were, whereas those who opposed the plant see it and its supporters as limiting progress. A similar opinion on insiders and outsiders was expressed by an active supporter of the plant who stated that people with deep roots in the community overwhelmingly supported the project. He mentioned as a converse example Sam Pratt, executive director of Friends of Hudson during the SLC controversy, who, he charged, did not have children in the local school system who would benefit from SLC’s tax contributions, was not a member of the volunteer fire department, and was not involved in community events: “Friends of Hudson is all he does.” The debate around SLC became a forum for the expression of many hostilities that had been building for several years. Many plant supporters expressed a sense of frustration that people they saw as “outsiders” to the community were attempting to dictate the nature of local economic development. Roling’s 1997 study discovered that many people at that time felt that they had no outlet for communicating their opinions and desires, and thus their hostility probably continued to fester over time. The SLC controversy was, for many, a perfect opportunity to vent these frustrations. One letter to the editor, in a rare nonpolarized perspective entitled “There’s plenty to dislike on both sides of SLC fight,” describes how although the author agrees with some aspects of the plant opponents’ argument: “Throughout the controversy over the plant, it’s been hard to shake the feeling that some of its more vocal enemies, often relative newcomers to the area, are attempting to impose on the rest of us a vision of Hudson and Columbia County we may not share” (Independent/Register Star,

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Murphy and Puleo 5/17/2001). Another entry addresses the opposition directly, saying, “We do not want you telling us what we need, or don’t need. And what we need is a cement plant” (Register Star, Shader 3/29/2000). Another goes so far as to accuse Friends of Hudson of being dismissive of the opinions of others, such as minorities: I think FOH has its own group of friends and if you don’t fit in that group, your opinion does not matter, nor do your views. Undoubtedly, Hudson’s minority population is more significant than someone who signs a petition and lives in California or someone who maybe will buy a home here someday. . . . I think Friends of Hudson fears we do have an opinion and that it may be not in their favor. Or they just don’t care what we, as people of the city, think. Nevertheless, being a minority of the city, I say we want good paying jobs, not highly paid snobs. (Independent/Register Star, Hughes 3/16/2001) All of these letters question who should be allowed to make decisions regarding the future of the community. The last letter, in particular, charges the opposition with being exclusive—somehow separate from the rest of the community, and yet thinking their opinions matter more than those of others. The writer also seems to dramatically exaggerate the outsider characterization by stating that everyone who signed the opposition’s petitions were from other states with no connection to the community. In addition, the writer refers to race issues in the City of Hudson, which has a high African-American population, and connecting race, economic interests, and support of the plant. Though poverty in Hudson is a cross-racial issue, there is a significant correlation between the low-income and African-American populations, as is common throughout this country, and thus the hostilities about gentrification can also be connected to race, another source of divisiveness. Despite the opportunity for venting frustrations that this controversy provided for those unhappy with the direction of recent demographic changes in Hudson, Dan Odescalchi and others described how the newcomers, and hence the opposition, were more vocal, which gave them disproportionate influence in the debate. Odescalchi stated that those who are opposed to something are always more vocal than those who support it; another plant supporter pointed to the relatively higher education level of the newcomers and the articulateness of the antique dealers as reasons they were more influential. One employee of SLC stated that she thought the split was more along class lines than between newcomer and old-timer, mentioning that she herself is a

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relative newcomer to the area. But in describing the class divisions, she observed that more wealthy or more educated people have much greater mobility, whereas lower classes tend to stay in the area where they were raised, thereby conflating class and education with length of time in the community, and then with opposition to the plant. The implication is that newcomers tend to be members of middle or upper classes, because few blue-collar workers would choose to move to the Hudson Valley, as blue-collar jobs become increasingly rare. Higher education helps newcomers to be more vocal or more articulate and also allows them a bit more freedom to attempt change, because if they are not successful, they have the ability to move elsewhere. Some members of the opposition also expressed the belief that the split of opposition versus supporters fell along the same lines as newcomers and old-timers. One stated explicitly that of “the people who are against the plant, the majority are relatively new residents, while the people who support the plant maybe have lived there for a generation or two.” (It is important to note, however, that even living in a place for a generation may not automatically make one an old-timer. The category is not necessarily so easy to define, as there is not a set length of residency required to become part of the old-timer category.) Several letters to the editor also demonstrate that the newcomer/old-timer categorization was not a stereotype used solely by the plant supporters. For example, numerous letters opposing the plant praise the newcomers for what they had done for the community. One letter writer from Hudson asks the plant supporters, “Will you be pleased to see the town abandoned by the ‘newcomers’ and returned to the welfare slum it was before we came along?” (Register Star, Swope 9/20/2000). Another praises the newcomers for their environmental activism: “If it takes recent residents to prod us out of our apathy, more power to ’em” (Independent, Crispell 5/4/2000). As described earlier in reference to the Romantic Movement and the Hudson River School of painting, environmental consciousness often begins in cities because of the recognition of the harm, spiritual or emotional, that can result from alienation from nature. In addition, it is often easier to notice and appreciate the value of something from an outside perspective—“the grass is always greener.” Thus, when city people, often with higher education, move to the Hudson Valley in search of a beautiful and healthy lifestyle, they are both more apt to recognize the need to preserve the landscape and more motivated to do so. It may be that the outsiders who have appreciated the beauty of the Hudson Valley throughout history have done much to preserve that beauty for the enjoyment of both insiders and outsiders today:

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National aesthetic attitudes and the appraisal of the valley as merely a scenic mask—a prerogative supposedly the domain of nonresidents—has had more lasting impact upon the spatial transformation of the land than all the local decisions regarding what crops to plant, where to place a road or mill, or which town supervisor to elect. This perhaps is a fact seldom appreciated or conceded to by the “residents” when conflicts of land use or resource allocation arise today. (O’Brien 1981: 17) As one Hudson resident clearly articulated, “Outsiders have come in, and they appreciate what Hudson has. They’re the movers and doers who’ve gotten the politicians moving. They have the expertise to get things done. Change is not coming from the inside; it’s coming from the outside” (Fran, cited in Roling 1997: 98). Therefore, many members of the SLC opposition argued that even if the divide followed the lines of newcomers and old-timers, that did not mean the newcomers’ opinions should necessarily be ignored. The length of time one has lived in the community, they claimed, should not be a determinant for what say one should have in that community, for some old-timers welcomed the influence of the newcomers. But in general, the majority of the plant opponents seemed to want to quash the newcomer stereotype. Friends of Hudson was particularly adamant that its organization did not fall along those lines. According to surveys of its membership, 80 to 85 percent of its 3,800 members were full-time residents of the Hudson Valley, two-thirds of them from Columbia County and the remainder from neighboring counties, and only between 15 and 20 percent were weekenders. A representative of the organization also emphasized the diversity of classes, professions, and political affiliations of its members, including doctors, nurses, teachers, former cement workers, economic experts, homemakers, mechanics, carpenters, stonemasons, fishermen, hunters, as well as Republicans, Conservatives, Libertarians, Democrats, Green Party members, Right to Lifers, Pro-Choicers—“you name it.” Many of the letters written to Hudson’s Register Star and the Albany Independent by the opposition express a similar outlook—that the two sides could not be so easily categorized. A significant number of the letters include reference to the author’s long-term residence in the Hudson Valley, the fact that they were not weekenders, or the fact that they were not antiques dealers, as if this somehow made their perspective more valid. Such postures reflected the plant supporters’ attempts to stereotype the opponents as “outsiders” as a way to deligitimize their opinions. Many also saw the “us” versus “them”

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dichotomy as distracting from the important issues at hand and often described how SLC encouraged this dichotomy. One opposition member said: St. Lawrence has caused a split. They’ve actively tried to divide people, preying upon prejudices, arbitrary or imaginary divisions between blue-collar and white-collar jobs, how long you’ve lived here. They’ve grossly overstated and fabricated divisions and differences in demographics and deliberately tried to inflame resentments that exist in all small towns. He recognized that antagonisms existed within the community but asserted that SLC exploited those antagonisms to its strategic advantage to gain support for the plant based on unrelated issues. A letter to the Independent echoes this belief: “[SLC has] put forward a campaign to divide and conquer the Citizens of Columbia County—an old technique of the powerful” (Brownfield 4/24/2000). Many described how SLC encouraged these hostilities to distract people from looking at the real issues surrounding the plant. They claimed that the SLC supporters focused on making derogatory remarks about the other side, while the opposition tried to stick to the facts (see Independent/Register Star, Johnson 3/6/2000, Lebar 3/16/2000, and Steele 7/20/2001). One mailing sent out by the Hudson Valley Environmental/Economic Coalition that greatly angered many people in the community was often cited as an example of SLC’s divisive strategy. The mailing consisted of a drawing of an overweight, red-nosed man with a huge bag of money and the words, “Don’t let a group of millionaires from New York City deny Columbia County good-paying jobs and a stronger economy.” Cyndy Hall of the Concerned Women of Claverack used this as an example to support her belief that SLC deliberately tried to drive a wedge through the community: “It’s a tactic used by large corporations to pit family against family, town against town, individual against individual.” Others also referred to this mailing as an example of why SLC lost support over time, claiming that SLC had, in the words of one opposition member, “shot themselves in the foot” by making such offensive statements. To cite one incensed response from the Register Star: I am not a New York City millionaire, as SLC, parading under HVEEC, would like you to believe. I am outraged at their opportunistic attempts to pit Columbia County neighbors against one another. Columbia County is an economically diverse community. Many of us work hard in our local com-

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munities to overcome these stereotypes built on fear and mistrust. A rich fabric of “old-timers” and “newcomers,” young and old is evolving. Each person’s participation strengthens the fabric. St. Lawrence’s attempt to destroy the neighborly spirit here is reprehensible. (Stern 7/10/2001) By associating newcomers with the opponents and old-timers with the supporters, SLC encouraged those who considered themselves oldtimers to automatically support the plant, based on hostilities toward the newcomers rather than on the merits of the plant. According to Cyndy Hall, many people who supported the plant had a desire to be a part of what she called the “good old boys club,” a brotherhood of sorts among people who had lived in the valley for a long time, many of whom were Republicans, often members of the Volunteer Fire Department. Supporting the plant united them under a common issue and gave them a sense of identity as the “true” residents of Hudson. This camaraderie linked them to SLC’s invocation of the “good old days” of Hudson when there were many cement plants around, before the newcomers arrived. The unity created among supporters of the plant was reminiscent of the unity, as suggested by SLC, that existed when the majority of the male community worked in the plants. By emphasizing the fact that it had owned the Greenport property for many years, SLC also placed itself in the category of old-timers. As one letter states, “It’s been hard not to think unfair the proposition that a company so long present in the community . . . so long one of our neighbors, no longer has a place among us” (Independent/Register Star, Murphy and Puleo 5/17/2001). Many members of the plant opposition, however, attempted to reverse this categorization and turn the outsider argument against SLC. As one letter to the Independent proclaims, “It is not just ‘out-oftowners’ who oppose the plant. This is not a class war. Many people who oppose this project live here full-time, pay taxes here, raise families here. It is the owners of the St. Lawrence Cement plant who are the outsiders” (Trapanese 7/17/2001). And according to another local activist, “Our beef is not against people who work for St. Lawrence, who’re trying to make a living. . . . Our beef is with the company management, who are not, if you want to play that game, from the area.” Opponents of the plant often emphasized the fact that SLC is a Swiss and Canadian-owned company, and thus its interests were not centered on the Hudson Valley. This plant was merely one of dozens of SLC plants around this country and around the world. Some critics of the plant expressed the opinion that they might feel differently about the project if it were being proposed by a small, local company. But

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SLC’s multinational identity implied that it did not have the interests of the local community at heart: “They’re not part of our community, never have been, and they couldn’t care less about our health, our children, or our schools” (Independent/Register Star, Barker 9/28/2000). Another member of the community agreed, adding that SLC was a business, with the business mentality to make as much money as possible, and thus the company was willing to make miniscule gestures to appease the community and would go to all extremes to convince the community that it desired what’s best for them (Independent, Benziger 5/4/2000). But the overriding question, to which there is not always an easy answer, is who gets to determine the direction of development in the community. One avid plant supporter stated his belief that it was up to the politicians to decide. Many members of the opposition, however, echoing a commonly held position of radical environmentalists, expressed the opinion that politicians cannot be trusted to do what’s best for the community. They felt that even the DEC regulations should not go unquestioned, citing as an example the absence of regulations restricting particulate matter of 2.5 microns or less (PM 2.5), which has the potential for serious health damage. Thus, they argued that members of the community must take control of matters affecting their own lives. Although participatory conservation may be less time-efficient, and certainly more difficult, in the end it can be argued that it is both the only way a conservation strategy can be effective and the only ethical option—all communities have a right to self-determination. But what if the community is torn between two visions of selfdetermination, two opposing ideas for the future? A general strategy would include attempts at mediation, a search for an acceptable compromise. But in the SLC dispute both sides expressed an inability to find a compromise in what they believed was an all or nothing situation—the plant was either going to be built or not. Someone had to decide, and if it was up to the community (which it both was and wasn’t) then the question remained: What defines a member of a community? Did rules exist as to the length of time someone must live in a place, the number of community organizations to which he must belong, the type of job she must have? Or maybe it was a self-defining category—if you feel like you belong to the community, you do. The opponents of the plant clearly felt that they were part of the community and cared about the area, or they would not have spent so much time fighting for it. But maybe it is possible to have two communities existing in one physical space. Though some people mentioned that they had a friend, neighbor or relative on the other side of the dispute, in general it

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seemed the two groups ran in different circles. Andy Bicking of Scenic Hudson hypothesized: The era we’re living in now, by my reading of history, is not like the Civil War where you had families against families or maybe the Vietnam War where you had kids protesting the war whose parents who had been in the military and were supporting it. It’s a much more black and white world than how I see history presented to me, at least. These people generally don’t run together. What informs their choices, their friendships and relationships is probably deeper than a cement plant. The decision to support or oppose the plant was not isolated from other aspects of one’s self and one’s life. People tend to be drawn to those who have similar lifestyles and values. Individual and collective decisions about the plant, therefore, were based on both individual and collective worldviews, making compromise and compassionate communication that much more difficult. Therefore, although many members of the opposition claimed that it was SLC that caused the split in the community (or between the two “communities”), the ideological differences between the groups were bound to be exposed at some point. The issues were there; they just needed a catalyst, and SLC proved to be a tremendously powerful one. And perhaps this was not a bad thing. Although expressing anger may not make it go away, at least it’s honest. As explained by Linda Mussmann, [SLC] is a good thing in the sense that it pushes a community further and faster than it ever would have gone, . . . pushing it to actually have to face more things than it would’ve faced in a normal sense of time. It’s like putting an elephant in town. You can’t avoid it. You’ve gotta do something with it. You have to make a decision. The inevitable is right there. It’s like bringing the horse into Troy. What’s inside there, you all have to figure that out. And I think then you deal with the real estate issue; you deal with poverty; you deal with class; you deal with outsider versus insider, gay versus straight, black versus white. You deal with all of the dynamics that are being discussed in private, they all become public. Everything becomes just one kind of bashing contest, going at each other full speed, whereas before the plant it was a subtler, quieter debate. So in that sense I think it’s good. You actually force the hidden fears,

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longings and desires out onto the table. I don’t know if it’ll be discussed any better or worse, it’s just out there. The SLC controversy undoubtedly precipitated many hostilities and exacerbated existing divisions in the community. Although many members of the opposition believed that the split in the community was instigated by SLC as a strategy to gain support, for many these hostilities were rooted in previous stereotypes or resentments. In that way, this controversy was an important, if dramatic, way to force these sentiments from the living room to the newspaper and street corner, from unspoken or private to a hugely vocal debate, even if the sentiments were (generally) thinly veiled behind other concerns. Once the specific controversy came to an end, as we will see in the next chapter, these divisions remained to be addressed.

CHAPTER 6

“Cement Plant’s Demise Concrete”

A

fter more than six years of Sturm und Drang over the building of the St. Lawrence Cement plant, the battle finally came to a close in April 2005. The end of the road for the Greenport project actually took the form of two separate events. First, on April 19, Randy A. Daniels, Secretary of State of the New York Department of State (DOS), issued his decision objecting to SLC’s certification of consistency with the policies of New York’s Coastal Management Program (CMP), which had been submitted by SLC on October 22, 2004 (see Appendix). This decision in essence denied SLC a necessary state permit. The plant opposition was obviously elated over the DOS decision, calling it “phenomenal” and “better than could ever have been expected.” However, as Cyndy Hall of Concerned Women of Claverack described, initially they were “ecstatic, but only guardedly so,” because St. Lawrence still had the opportunity to appeal the DOS decision to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce or to resubmit the permit applications to the State, to extend the process and hopefully burn out its opponents. But then, on April 23, only four days after Daniels’s decision, the other shoe dropped when St. Lawrence stated publicly its intent to withdraw its application from the DEC, making the opposition’s victory a permanent reality. Daniels’s decision is a twenty-page document outlining eight of the policies of the CMP that the DOS found to be incompatible with the

The title of this chapter comes from a headline in the Millerton News on April 28, 2005, page A1, signifying the end of the SLC proposal.

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SLC proposal and detailing the specific nature of these inconsistencies. The decision was based on an in-depth six-month review process in which the DOS analyzed all of the information submitted by St. Lawrence to the department; information collected or observed by the DOS during site visits, balloon flight demonstrations (to visualize the height of proposed structures), and demonstrations of St. Lawrence’s visual simulation software; more than 13,000 comments received by the DOS from local citizens, organizations, businesses, elected officials, and other interested parties; and the decisions previously made by the DEC’s Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). A significant message in the decision is the State’s agreement with the plant opposition about the plant’s incompatibility with this specific region. The decision is based on the facts not about the plant generally but, as Daniels states in the first paragraph, about the relationship between the plant and the specific proposed location. According to Daniels’s decision, “the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) authorizes a coastal state to review activities requiring federal agency authorizations for their consistency with the enforceable policies of the state’s approved CMP wherever those activities are or would be located and their affect [sic] on resources or uses of the coastal area.” Thus, it is because New York is a coastal state, causing it to have CZMA, and the plant was proposed for an area near the waterfront, that the permit was ultimately denied. In addition, as the opposition had been stressing all along, the decision notes the plant’s incompatibility with this specific region because of its unique cultural, historical, and scenic resources. Among the CMP policies with which Daniels finds the proposed plant inconsistent are the following: NYS CMP Policy #23: Protect, enhance and restore structures, districts, areas or sites that are of significance in the history, architecture, archeology or culture of the state, its communities, or the nation. NYS CMP Policy #24: Prevent impairment of scenic areas of statewide significance. NYS CMP Policy #25: Protect, restore or enhance natural and manmade resources which are not identified as being of statewide significance but which contribute to the overall scenic beauty of the coastal area. Daniels concludes simply, “It is clear that the SLC proposal . . . would affect historic resources and visual quality of the area,” and that this is a reason not to permit the building of the plant. Thus, despite claims by St. Lawrence and its supporters that visual impacts were subjective or should not be a determining factor in the analysis of the

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plant, the decision makes clear that NYS has laws specifically designed to protect valuable aesthetic resources. The decision also disputes SLC’s assertion that the proposed plant would be a “water-dependent use.” CMP Policy #2 requires the State to “facilitate the siting of water-dependent uses and facilities on or adjacent to coastal waters.” Despite SLC’s claim that the plant would be dependent on the Hudson River, as Daniels explains, “The cement manufacturing facility proposed does not use river water, and it is not nor need be located on, in, or over the water. It is, therefore, not water dependent.” He further explains that cement plants are often situated on the waterfront because of the cost-savings provided by the water as a means of transportation. This implication, therefore, is that the “dependency” on the water that St. Lawrence claims is in fact merely a profit-motive for the company, not a necessity. Some of the most interesting and significant aspects of the decision can be found in its discussion of CMP Policy #1, which requires the State to: “Restore, revitalize, and redevelop deteriorated and underutilized waterfront areas for commercial, industrial, cultural, recreational, and other compatible uses,” and states in guideline B for the policy that actions proposed should “enhance existing and anticipated uses.” First, although the decision is meant to concern “coastal resources,” which one might think refer to physical resources such as clean water and a healthy marine ecosystem, in fact the resources to which the policies and decision refer are centered on issues of economics, tourism, aesthetics, and quality of life. Throughout the decision Daniels repeatedly returns to the issue of the changing nature of the local Hudson and regional Hudson Valley riverfront communities, from an industrial area in the 1960s to more mixed and “higher economically valued” uses such as “commercial, residential, tourism, retail, office and water-dependent recreational uses.” According to Daniels, because there has been a movement away from industrial uses of the waterfront to a focus on projects of waterfront revitalization such as waterfront recreation, retail, and private investment, the proposed project would have been inconsistent with “existing uses” of the waterfront and therefore inconsistent with NYS policy. The concept of “consistency” with the region is additionally significant because it played a key role in the dispute itself. One prevalent theme in the controversy was a debate over whose vision for the Hudson Valley was consistent with its history. Both St. Lawrence and the groups opposing the plant invoked the history of the Hudson Valley, and the plant’s consistency with that history. St. Lawrence stressed the industrial and cement-manufacturing history of the region

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to prove that this plant would be a natural extension, a fitting and appropriate development in the economic reality of the regional community. The plant opposition and, it seems, the DOS, focused more on the way the community has changed since the 1960s. They did not deny the previous industrial nature of the region, but to them “consistency” with the more recent development was required, and the proposed plant would mean a reversion to a time long passed. Thus, what proved to be one of the most important determinants of the outcome of this controversy was the DOS’s agreement with the opposition in their construction of the history of the region, and therefore their definition of “consistency.” Perhaps even more significant is the concept of “anticipated uses.” Because the future cannot be definitively predicted, any discussion of anticipated uses inevitably relies on a degree of guesswork. In finding the Greenport plant inconsistent with anticipated uses, Daniels is siding with the opposition on what proved to be the most important factor guiding their position (as discussed in the following chapter)—a vision for the future of the Hudson Valley. He rejects the vision the plant supporters held for an industrial revival in the region and instead supports the vision for an alternative, mixed economy. In addition, by citing local planning documents such as the 1996 Hudson Vision Plan and the 2002 Comprehensive Plan, he recognizes the power of the local citizens over local development, stating that the citizen-produced community vision plans can have an impact on decision-making at the state level. The previous actions of local citizens to generate these development plans created a precedent that allowed their current desire, the denial of the permits to St. Lawrence, to prevail because the denial could be seen as consistent with the “existing and anticipated” nature of the community. As the termination of this controversy and several points in the DOS decision make clear, the defeat of St. Lawrence would not have been possible without the dedication of members of the community to guiding the direction of community development. Additionally, Daniels’s decision validates the importance not just of the creation of those planning documents but also the fact that the community had in fact implemented many of its proposals. Daniels mentions several actions that occurred in the few years preceding the decision as a result of the proposals for the Hudson waterfront in the Vision Plan and Comprehensive Plan, including the creation of a waterfront park on the site of the previous Best Oil tank farm and the acquisition of several additional plots of land along the water for the expansion of the park and other revitalization measures. He concludes by saying:

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Based on this review of Hudson’s past planning and implementation activities, it is clear the City’s waterfront has been and will continue to be transformed from a private industrial waterfront to a public waterfront for boating, tourism, commercial and other compatible uses. These uses are in direct competition with SLC’s proposed industrial riverfront facilities. Given the extreme limitation of space along the Hudson waterfront, this is not a suitable location for the proposed SLC industrial facilities and uses. In essence what Daniels concludes is that because the local community had followed through with its proposals in the above-cited development plans, the community had validated those visions. New York State law requires state decisions to be consistent with those visions once they have been put into action as the “existing and anticipated uses” of the waterfront. Taking a stand regarding the development of one’s community allows future desires to be fulfilled more easily (though clearly not without a struggle). By emphasizing issues of community development plans, aesthetics, and economic vision, Daniels is essentially highlighting what proved to be one of the most significant results of this controversy—a means for the community to form an image of itself. What does it mean to live in the Hudson Valley? Of what is its quality of life made? The construction of community identity simultaneously constructs a definition of “consistent” development. By taking control of their vision for the future of the Hudson Valley, the plant opposition also clearly explicated the “consistency” of that future with the present and past. Daniels, in basing his decision on those very same issues of development consistent with a specific type of economy and environment, is in fact making a radical statement about the legitimization and protection of quality-of-life issues under State law. Like the Storm King controversy in the Hudson Valley in the 1960s and 1970s, which was a groundbreaking step toward the legal protection of aesthetic resources, the SLC controversy has proved to be a groundbreaking step in the legal protection of quality of life. Though the policies of the CZMA and CMP have been in place for many years, the resolution of the St. Lawrence controversy has publicized these policies and clarified the ability (and perhaps the necessity) of the State to have a direct say in the types of communities it supports. One question that remains is why the decision took so long. Even a superficial analysis shows the proposed St. Lawrence plant to be in direct violation of several New York State policies. Why did it take over six years for the State to tell the company so?

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According to one opponent of the plant, the Department of State permits are more difficult to obtain than those of the Department of Environmental Conservation. Because SLC was receiving such fierce opposition in the community, and the process had been going on for many years, the company decided to switch its focus from the DEC permits to the DOS ones in order to use the DOS decision as a “bellwether” for the DEC decision. The DOS decision-making process, unlike that of the DEC, has a set time span of six months. Therefore, in a relatively short time SLC could know, if the DOS decision was positive, that it had a good chance of receiving the DEC permits as well, and if the DOS rejected the proposal then SLC would know not to waste any more time in the DEC adjudicatory hearings. There may, however, also have been more hidden politics going on. Cyndy Hall of Concerned Women of Claverack suggested that all of the involved government agencies had known all along that the permits would not be legally grantable but nobody wanted to be tied to such a controversial decision. Governor George Pataki was committed to increasing investment and business growth in New York State, and he traveled all over the world during his years as governor to get businesses to move here. As a Republican, he was also generally hostile to regulatory burdens on business. Simultaneously, Hall described, he desired to leave a legacy as an environmental governor. Particularly because the proposal caused such a huge regional controversy, no executive agency wanted to have to take sides between those two influential sectors of the population (and between those two political ambitions of the Governor), and nobody would do it until forced.

Life after the Decision After six years of articles, letters to the editor, editorials, public forums, advertisements, petitions, and all possible forms of local discourse about the St. Lawrence plant, one cannot help but notice how the issue virtually disappeared from public discussion within days of the decision. As Cyndy Hall summed it up, “It happened. It was determined. It’s gone.” The day of the DOS decision the news was the cover story in many local newspapers. But after only a few days it was as if the controversy had never happened. Hall said this was a deliberate decision on the part of local activists who had decided before the decision came out that the most important action to take after the decision would be to change gears and try to heal the wounds in the local community. As soon as the decision was issued, these local activists were determined to get the “Stop the Plant”

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lawn signs down as quickly as possible and, as Hall described, not to “rub anyone’s nose in it or say ‘ha ha, we won and you lost.’ ” She described how in the small town of Claverack, when she ran into people in the post office, they would furtively whisper their congratulations and enthusiasm: “It was a very odd contrast after being so vocal for so long.” Different groups attempted in different ways to mend the divisions that had been either created or exacerbated by this controversy. According to Andy Bicking of Scenic Hudson, the most important strategy was education because it is only through knowledge of the problems that solutions will emerge. Scenic Hudson also began working in an informal coalition on issues of waterfront development, trying to prevent new developers looking to create large, gated waterfront communities once SLC was “out of the picture” and the real estate market was no longer under threat. They also started a program called “Hudson Valley Heroes,” in an attempt to empower local citizens to take action in their communities. Friends of Hudson began holding meetings in the year prior to the DOS decision in order to develop a plan of action for the day when the St. Lawrence issue was resolved. Would Friends of Hudson continue to exist and if so, in what form? What would the new focus be? How would they share the lessons they had learned during this struggle? The organization decided to continue to work in the community, with a new slogan expanded from the old “Stop the Plant” slogan to say: “Stop the Plant. Start the Plan.” The emphasis of the new plan was a move from saying “no” to the plant to a more positive approach, working toward their vision of a vibrant, sustainable local community. According to a statement by Friends of Hudson executive director Sam Pratt soon after the DOS decision: Thanks to a courageous stance taken last week by the Pataki administration, our communities can now put this controversy behind us. We will redouble our efforts to build a greener, more sustainable regional economy that all can participate in, without risking anyone’s health or quality of life. Now is a time to bring residents back together, healing the divisions that SLC tried to sow among us, and looking forward to making the Hudson Valley a model for regional revitalization. In June 2005, two months after the DOS decision, Friends of Hudson held a highly attended public symposium at the local Columbia-Greene Community College where its Strategic Planning Committee gave a presentation about the future of the organization. Then in

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early September, at its annual picnic, Friends of Hudson announced several changes within the organization. First, the Internal Revenue Service finally granted the group independent 501(c)(3) charitable organization status, allowing it to step out from its previous position “under the wing” of The Open Space Institute. Second, Sam Pratt, former executive director, and Peter Jung, former president, both moved into advisory roles, and previous deputy director Susan Falzon and previous vice president Christopher Reed assumed their respective positions. Concerned Women of Claverack, according to Cyndy Hall, hopes to focus on education and to provide continued and diverse community fora. Hall also described how the St. Lawrence controversy encouraged many individuals to assume a greater role in local politics, “because it is citizens who make the government work, and how we get there is called politics.” This controversy brought people to realize that what happens in government does affect their lives and that being a citizen means taking part in one’s community. Hall pointed out that until a few years ago there were no opposing Democratic candidates in the Claverack town board elections. Before she ran for the position for the first time four years ago, there was not even a Democratic Party— “no budget, no office, no nothing.” But in the 2005 elections, in which she ran again, there were four candidates and a Democratic Party with an executive committee, public relations, a budget, volunteers, and advertising. People have realized that politics is not something that can just be left in the hands of others and they are trying to find ways to stay involved with their communities and to have a say about issues beyond the cement plant proposal. Thus, even though the issue rapidly disappeared from public view after the decision and the discourse specifically surrounding the plant faded, the controversy has had a significant and lasting impact on the community. It has infused in local citizens a sense of responsibility for the local environment and the course of local development; it has created and strengthened networks within the community to allow that sense of responsibility to transform into concrete action; and it has articulated divisions within the community that can now be addressed through organizing a more unified and fulfilling community for all its members.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

T

hroughout the debate over the proposed St. Lawrence Cement plant, the public discourse centered on facts. Each side struggled constantly to prove that their side’s position accurately answered questions such as: What would the environmental impacts be? What would the economic impacts be? Would the taxes paid to the local community have a significant impact? Would the real estate market plummet from the presence of the plant? Would the beauty of the region be decimated by the smokestack and lengthy plume? Would the pollution increase cause a dramatic increase in regional health problems? We will never definitively know the answers to those questions. But the specific economic and environmental effects have never been what this controversy has been exclusively about. This is not to say that increases in respiratory problems and a local economic revival are not important issues. They are critical to the lives of every person in the Hudson Valley. But now that the issue has been resolved—the plant will not be built—we can take a step back from an analysis of the specific projections of the future to try to understand what issues lay hidden behind the debates. Because the real issue being debated, the unspoken issue, was the one that guided where people stood on the debates on the specifics. And this is the question of identity—both individual and regional identity—and more specifically, the desire for a reflection of one’s individual identity in the regional environment. In beginning my investigation, I imagined that the two sides of the SLC debate would differently value the four main themes outlined in the chapters of this book. I expected that the opposition would primarily value aesthetics and environmental health and the supporters 113

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would place a greater priority on the economy and the insider/ outsider split. What I discovered is that, in fact, the two sides merely articulated those values in different ways. Both sides appreciated the beauty of the Hudson Valley, but the plant supporters tended to claim that aesthetics are subjective and that the plant would have less visual impact than the opposition alleged. Both sides desired economic security, but the opposition had a different image of the preferred type of economy for the region. Both sides valued health, but the supporters in fact presented the plant as a benefit to regional health, given the consequential closing of the older plant across the river. Both sides acknowledged some insider/outsider divide, but the opposition saw the whole community as the insider and the multinational company as the outsider. Since the two sides, for the most part, based their claims about the plant on the same 1,600-page document outlining the components and effects of the plant, their drastically differing readings of the situation reveal the power of subjective interpretation—in essence, differing worldviews and differing visions of what kind of Hudson Valley environment would reflect those worldviews. Many groups opposing the plant used the concept of “quality of life” in their discussion of their vision for the future of the Hudson Valley. Both Friends of Hudson and Scenic Hudson based their mission statements on the creation of a high quality of life in the region. What they seek when they espouse quality of life, in essence, is a local community that reflects their idea of a “good life” and, thus, their values. In fact, both sides desire a community that embodies their values and, thus, their identity. The search for quality of life is actually a desire for one’s community to be a physical expression of one’s identity—a consistency between the internal and external worlds. Thus, the St. Lawrence controversy, as an arena to debate differing visions of the future of the Hudson Valley and definitions of what constitutes a quality life, was actually an arena to debate identity. This added level of meaning inflamed the controversy and intensified the debates. For newcomers to the area, their very presence in the region reflected a conscious decision based on desires for an environment and lifestyle that they felt reflected their identity, therefore making the proposed plant a significant threat to their dreams for a quality of life. For the old-timers, whose sense of identity as connected to an earlier period in the region’s history had been under attack in recent years, the SLC controversy proved to be the perfect forum to fight to maintain that identity. The acceptance and espousal of conclusions about whether the proposed SLC plant would be good or bad for the environment, econ-

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omy, or public health, even in the face of what appear to be contradictory or inconsistent information or data, can perhaps be explained by the notion that identity will often prevail over facts. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff in his 2004 book Don’t Think of an Elephant describes how values and identity affect people’s political decision-making. He states, “People think in frames. . . . To be accepted, the truth must fit people’s frames. If the facts do not fit a frame, the frame stays and the facts bounce off. . . . Concepts are not things that can be changed just by someone telling us a fact. We may be presented with facts, but for us to make sense of them, they have to fit what is already in the synapses of the brain. Otherwise facts go in and then they go right back out” (2004:17). In the SLC debate, each side was able to find and interpret facts in such a way as to support whichever position reflected their values and identity. The facts that did not fit with their conceptual understanding of the world and their visions for the future of the region did not have the power to change that mindset. This is what the activists opposing SLC were unknowingly referring to when they characterized the plant supporters’ position as based on “nostalgia” for the region’s cement-producing past. There may have been some whose identities and loyalties were split between the two groups, between the environmentalists and the “good old boys,” and thus an investigation into the “facts” about the plant may have swayed their ultimate conclusions. But for those whose sense of identity was so deeply connected to the industrial past of the Hudson Valley, any evidence that the plant might in fact have posed a serious health risk to the local community, for example, was dismissed because the memories of cement plants as positive assets to the community contributed to their sense of themselves and their community, and thus trumped any facts that may have challenged that identity. The struggle to have a say about the course of local development and the community is, in essence, a struggle to regain some control over our destinies. We live in a world where the forces that shape our lives have become increasingly more remote and, therefore, less tangible in our immediate realities. The process of globalization has increased the scale of all the forces that impact us. For example, in the arena of economics, no longer does one person collect the resources and do the labor necessary to make an object necessary for his or her life. In today’s world the scale of the labor process has exploded to the point where the sizes of some businesses rival the economies of many of the world’s nations. Under the rhetoric of capitalist “efficiency,” the labor process has become fragmented so that each worker specializes

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only in a very specific task and, thus, is alienated from the processes of planning, production, distribution and so on. The new, small-scale, localized economy encouraged by the opponents of the plant aligns itself with their sense of identity in part because it is an economy that directly challenges this alienation produced by economic globalization. It is an economy that deals with the individual—individual interaction and individual passions—as opposed to an economy dealing in the production of a good or material to be shipped thousands of miles away. It is an economy based on creative, spiritual, and cultural desires, not just monetary or material ones. In this, it is an economy more reflective of personal identity, particularly because of the encouragement of diverse types of businesses instead of only a handful of large plants as in the early 1900s. A second type of alienation that motivated the drive to oppose the plant is alienation from the land, which is occurring in several different ways. It is easy in “developed,” postagricultural societies to ignore our dependence upon the land, not directly needing its productivity for our livelihoods and survival. In addition, because we have become such a highly mobile society, we have lost to a great degree the connection between our sense of identity and our locality. We have come a long way from many indigenous societies, where family and personal history are inscribed in the local landscape through legends, stories, monuments, and memories. Our families are often fractured and spread across great distances. Our friends and our communities are not limited to those with whom we come in contact in our daily lives. We may not even know our neighbors of many years. Because the selected location of our homes does not necessarily reflect our family, history, or identity and has no claims of permanency, it makes it much easier not to invest energy in it. The problem thus becomes a cyclical one: We don’t invest energy into our communities, leading them to become less reflective of ourselves, making us less likely to invest energy into them. This process has also been greatly increased by the process of urbanization. According to geographic historian J. Nicholas Entrikin (1991), advances in communication and transportation associated with modernity have decreased the variations in regional ways of life (i.e., regional identity). Entrikin sets up a chronology in which technology led to capitalism which, combined, led to industrialization, which then led to urbanization. According to cultural geographer David Ley, “the modern city was a blueprint for placelessness” (1989: 52), and its legacy remains in an urban lack of sense of place. Thus, on top of Karl Marx’s belief that capitalism has caused alienation from one’s labor and “species being,” by leading to urbanization it has also caused

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alienation from place. Although Ley’s solution to this problem is focused on a postmodern reconstruction of the contemporary urban environment, for many the mobility made possible by what David Harvey (1989) calls the “time-space compression” of our postmodern society has caused an abandonment of urban centers altogether, in search of a reconnection with the land and an attempt to regain control over the forces affecting our lives. Thus, the mobility that contributed to our ability to live in communities alienated from our history also has the potential to present a solution to this alienation. Though the opposition to the plant definitely involved many people who had a long history in the Hudson Valley, it was also made up of a significant percentage of individuals newer to the area. The changing demographics of the Hudson Valley, which caused so much hostility in the SLC debate, are evidence of a desire among urban dwellers for a “reinhabitation of place” (Aberley 1993). While migration is most often based on economic necessity, and generally takes the form of a move from country to city, the Hudson Valley today represents the reverse—a process of “ruralization” based on lifestyle preferences, the search for “quality of life.” The fact that these individuals have moved to the region specifically for this purpose increases the likelihood that they will want to put energy into maintaining what they see as the aspects of the region contributing to that quality of life. This search for a sense of place and quality of life mimics a common theme of the environmental movement—the important role nature can play in helping individuals reestablish connections to places both internal and external (i.e., encouraging a sense of self in relation to the environment). But unlike previous back-to-nature movements that generally centered around agriculture, the new population of the Hudson Valley simultaneously encourages and is reflective of a change in rural land use from productive to “postproductivist.” “Post-productivism may signal a search for a new way of understanding the countryside. A space in the imagination is opening, whereby non-agricultural actors are given an opening to strive to create a rurality in their own image” (Halfacree, cited in Ebert 2001: 15). In working to create a community that reflected their values and identity, opponents of the plant were redefining traditional concepts of rurality and acting as entrepreneurs in their attempts to preserve the possibility of living a rural life despite America’s move away from productive rural environments. As the SLC controversy portrays, this transition evokes strong feelings of resentment from people who are either used to a particular kind of rural community or who see unworked, postproductivist, and

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postindustrial land as an elitist value. Thus, in response, it was in fact both sides of the SLC dispute that were fighting displacement through attempts at influencing the nature of local development. Both sides were attempting to reestablish a sense of place, identity, and community in response to the alienation of the contemporary global capitalist system. The “newcomer” contingent of the opposition attempted this through a process of ruralization enabled by the mobility of this postmodern system and the creation of a new “rurality” that reflects their definition of quality of life. Plant supporters attempted it by reacting against this ruralization (or as they would say “gentrification”) and striving to define whose “sense of place” belongs in the Hudson Valley, that is, who has a right to call this land their own. But whether a newcomer or old-timer, opponent or supporter, by being part of this controversy the members of the Hudson Valley were, perhaps unknowingly, engaging in a discourse that represents a new stage in the American environmental movement. Instead of traditional grassroots movements, generally emerging from lower-class struggles for survival, or mainstream American environmentalism, which is often accused of elitism because of its emphasis on environmental health over human economic needs, the SLC controversy represents the fusion of economic and environmentalist desires on both sides of the debate. Each side claimed its vision would bring a healthier local environment and an economic boom. The company’s position represents the realization by corporations that environmental values have become so mainstream that they must be reckoned with in any potential development plans. The plant opposition represents a new form of grassroots environmentalism—one that fuses a local sense of urgency, the funds and education of higher-income residents, traditionally elitist values of aesthetic preservation, and a quality of life vision based on economic sustainability. And the controversy as a whole, by being an arena for the development and interaction of these two sides, has been an important step in the development of a radical/mainstream environmentalism and in the articulation of a new Hudson Valley.

Appendix

April 19, 2005 Mr. David Loomes Director, Greenport Project St. Lawrence Cement Company, LLC 4303 Route 9 Hudson, New York 12534 Re: F-2004-0863 Army Corps of Engineers/New York District Permit Application #2000-00943-YN St. Lawrence Cement Company, LLC - Greenport Project -Hudson River Town of Greenport/City of Hudson, Columbia County and Town of Catskill, Greene County DEC #4-1040-000011 Objection to Consistency Certification Dear Mr. Loomes: The Department of State has completed its evaluation of your Federal Consistency Assessment Form and certification that the above The Department of State decision has been reproduced here exactly as issued, with no changes or corrections of typographical errors, etc.

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proposed activity complies with, and will be conducted in a manner consistent with, New York State’s approved Coastal Management Program. Pursuant to 15 CFR 930.63, and based upon the project information submitted, the Department of State objects to your consistency certification. This objection rests with the unique nature of the proposal. It does not stand for the proposition that the affects caused by a different siting, configuration and design of a manufacturing facility with a lesser visual impact and a riverfront shipping facility with a reduced level of activity and located so as not to compete and conflict with adjacent uses, would result in a similar finding. Subject of the Review: Pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, St. Lawrence Cement (SLC) has requested authorization from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to: (1) construct and operate elements of a new cement manufacturing facility in its presently active mine in Greenport; (2) to expand existing docking structures and construct a new dock in the City of Hudson; and (3) to construct a 2.5 mile long tube conveyor for transporting material between the dock in Hudson with the manufacturing facility in Greenport. The SLC facility includes a 1,222-acre mine and 547 acres of land contiguous to the mine in the Town of Greenport and a 14-acre riverfront industrial area in the City of Hudson. The new cement manufacturing plant would be constructed within SLC’s existing mine in the Town of Greenport. Construction of the proposed 2 million metric ton per year (mty) cement manufacturing facility would involve drainage of water currently occupying a portion of the mine site where the manufacturing facility would be located. The project would 2 include a preheater tower (337 feet in height), and attached main stack (363 feet in height); eight blending silos (20 feet in diameter by 174 feet tall and 207 feet to the top of the bucket elevator); 2 clinker silos (140 feet in diameter by 189 feet tall); and 8 cement silos (66 feet in diameter by 171 feet tall ,with 228 feet to the top of the bucket elevator). The 2.5 mile-long tube conveyor between the Greenport facility and riverfront industrial facilities in Hudson would travel primarily at grade, and would be completely enclosed. The cross section of the enclosure traveling at grade would be approximately 4 feet wide by 10 feet tall. At road crossings, the conveyor would rise to 28 feet above grade; at the CSX rail tracks it would rise to 45 feet above

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grade and these enclosures would have a cross section of 8 feet wide by 10 feet tall. To accommodate deep-draft HudsonMax vessels, the proposed project would involve dredging approximately 62,000 cubic yards of material from the nearshore area of the Hudson River near the dock. The area to be dredged would be 5.71 acres in extent, including 5.45 acres of subtidal habitat and 0.26 acres of intertidal habitat. Stone revetment would be placed along the newly dredged slope, filling approximately 1180 linear feet over 1.09 acres of Hudson River intertidal and subtidal area. Steel sheet piling would be driven waterward approximately 420 feet of existing bulkhead on the northern portion of the property. To the south of the bulkheading, an open-pile, T-shaped dock for barge breasting and mooring would be constructed and a portion of industrial fill would be removed and relocated eastward. In this area, submerged stone rip-rap would be placed along the contours of approximately 900 feet of shoreline, filling approximately 0.06 acres of Hudson River intertidal zone. Proposed in-water work includes the construction of 2 dolphins to be used in the berthing of HudsonMax vessels. Each dolphin would be connected to the shoreline by a 4 foot wide fixed steel grate gangway. A breasting barge (250 feet long by 63 feet wide) would also be moored at the bulkhead to hold the HudsonMax vessels away from the dock, in water deeper than water adjacent to the bulkhead. A new 260 feet long steel grate dock parallel to the shore is proposed to be constructed approximately 500 feet south of the existing SLC dock, for berthing of cement barges. The dock would be approximately 15 feet wide, supported by 4 dolphins, and connected to the shore in the center via a fixed steel grate gangway (20 feet wide by approximately 50 feet long). The cement barges that would use this dock are approximately 400 feet long and 72 feet wide, and weigh approximately 12,000 tons. Existing structures on SLC’s dock property include a stock house, a large concrete storage building (315-feet, by 115-feet, by 65-feet high), and an inactive 147-foot tall silo and barge-loading tower on the northern portion of the property. Proposed on-shore structures at the riverfront industrial facility include an 82 foot tall pump house, a 75 foot tall conveyor-reversing structure, a dock conveyor and a raw material stockpile area. The dock conveyor system would be used in the transfer of raw materials at the dock. The system would run approximately parallel to the riverbank, rising at a 10-degree angle to a height of 56

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feet above ground to a transfer point within the 75 foot tall conveyor reversing structure, where material would be fed into the tube conveyor for transport to the Greenport manufacturing facility. This dock conveyor would be approximately 3 1/2 feet wide. Loading of finished cement onto a barge would be performed using a pneumatic loading system. This system would connect the 82 foot tall pump house to a cement barge. Additionally, a public walkway leading to a landscaped area on the southern end of the dock facility would be created along the landside boundary of the riverfront industrial facility, adjacent to the CSX railroad tracks. Activities at the riverfront industrial facility in Hudson would include the loading and unloading of cement products and raw materials. HudsonMax vessels would dock 16 to 22 times per year, operating 24 hours per day for up to 3 days each time, or 48 to 66 days annually. The largest class of ship capable of navigating this portion of the Hudson River, HudsonMax vessels are up to approximately 754 feet long, 80 feet wide, and have a 32 foot draft. Large cement barges would also transport finished material from the dock up to 4 times per week. The raw materials that would be unloaded at the riverfront industrial facility include coal/petroleum coke, gypsum, or granulated blast furnace slag (GBFS). Since raw materials can be unloaded from the HudsonMax vessels faster than they can be transported via the conveyor, material would stockpiled at the Hudson facility. A containment area would be constructed to house stockpiles of raw materials (54 to 60 feet high) for time periods ranging from 10 to 100 hours, estimated by SLC to be used up to 56 days a year. Post manufacturing at the Greenport facility, the finished cement product would be transported to the Hudson facilities via the tube conveyor and loaded onto barges for shipment. SLC currently operates a cement kiln in Catskill, approximately 13 miles south of Hudson on the west side of the Hudson River in Greene County. As part of the proposed project, the existing cement manufacturing operations at the SLC facility in Catskill would cease. SLC would retain ownership of and continue to rely upon the Catskill site for materials handling and other logistical support for the Greenport facility. Continued activities at the Catskill site would include some grinding, packaging, storage, and shipping, as well as cement kiln dust (CKD) landfilling, to the extent that CKD generated at the Greenport facility would not be beneficially reused or recycled. SLC would dismantle or otherwise remove several structures in Catskill made obsolete by the cessation of certain existing cement manufacturing

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operations, including diminution of a plume resulting from the cessation of manufacturing at Catskill, removal of six 100 foot tall cement loading silos currently located on a jetty in the Hudson River, and removal of an 82 foot tall kiln stack located upland. Twenty-two silos (100 feet tall) and a stack (200 feet tall) would be demolished at the former Atlas site in the Town of Greenport, and a silo (147 feet tall) and barge loader would be removed from the SLC dock in Hudson. In addition to the fixed components to be constructed as part of the Greenport facility, activities at the proposed plant would also generate noise and plumes of visible vapor and particulate matter. These plumes would be visible for many miles from areas in and beyond the coastal area. Particulate matter, not readily visible from surrounding areas, would travel greater distances. The proposed cement manufacturing facility would employ 155 individuals. There are currently 144 employees at the Catskill facility, and 10 at the Greenport facility. The proposal would result in a shift of labor, with 25 employees remaining in Catskill, and 130 at the Greenport facilities. Construction of the Greenport manufacturing facility and the Hudson riverfront facilities would employ 1500 people over 2 years. Factors Relevant to the Review In accordance with the federal and State consistency provisions of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and Article 42 of the State Executive Law, respectively, certain federal and State agency actions and activities requiring agency authorizations are required to be consistent with the enforceable policies of New York’s federally approved Coastal Management Program (CMP) and Local Waterfront Revitalization Programs (LWRP). The proposed activities, requiring authorization from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, are subject to the consistency provisions of the CZMA. A federal consistency certification and supporting information for this proposed activity was submitted on October 22, 2004, and the Department’s review began on October 23, 2004. In conducting this consistency review, DOS considered all supporting information submitted by the applicant relative to the October submission, including relevant information submitted prior to that date. DOS participated in site visits, balloon flight demonstrations, and a demonstration by the applicant’s consultant of the software used in visual simulations submitted by the applicant. DOS issued a public notice for the proposed activity in accordance with 15 CFR Part 930.61, and over 13,000

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comments were received and considered. Comments were received from interested citizens, organizations, businesses, community groups, professionals, union representatives, elected officials in New York State and neighboring states. Testimony from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) issues conferences, rulings by DEC’s Administration Law Judges (ALJ), and decisions made during the DEC issues conferences were also considered. The CZMA authorizes a coastal state to review activities requiring federal agency authorizations for their consistency with the enforceable policies of the state’s approved CMP wherever those activities are or would be located and their affect on resources or uses of the coastal area. (16 USC § 1456). Therefore, the geographic scope of the DOS review depends upon the nature of activities and their effects on coastal resources and uses. In determining whether activities requiring federal agency authorizations affect the coastal area, the term “affect” is construed broadly. The term includes “direct effects which are caused by that activity and occur at the same time and place as the activity, and indirect (cumulative and secondary) effects which result from the activity and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects are effects resulting from the incremental impact...when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions, regardless of what person(s) undertakes(s) such actions”. (see 15 CFR 930.11(g); Conference Report, Congressional Record, September 26, 1990, H. 8076) A state can review for consistency an activity requiring federal agency authorization located in one portion of the coastal area, for its effects on another portion of the coastal area. The potential affects from the SLC, as will be discussed, reach beyond the project site. Accordingly, the DOS review of the SLC project relies upon a regionwide approach because of the proposed project’s potential far-ranging effects. Regional Factors and Patterns of Development From a regional perspective, most communities along the Hudson River are reconnecting with the river through a mix of residential, commercial and recreational development that maximizes public access to the river. Tourism is the leading industry in the Valley, employing one of every ten workers and generating approximately two billion dollars a year. The Valley is a recreational resource for the 8

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million people who live in and near the region (Hudson River Valley Special Resource Study Report. National Park Service. 1996.). DOS has been working with 35 riverfront communities in preparation and implementation of Local Waterfront Revitalization Programs (LWRP). In the past decade, the DOS has awarded 116 Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) grants totaling over $25 million to waterfront communities in the Hudson Valley. The majority of this funding has been focused on revitalizing urban industrial waterfronts. Waterfront revitalization provides the catalyst for these riverfront communities to enhance their economic vitality, revitalize downtown areas, and provide public recreation opportunities on the waterfront. Through the Hudson River Valley Greenway and the Hudson River Valley National Heritage Area, waterfront communities are also planning for and implementing plans to create a recreational corridor for residents and visitors to explore. The Hudson River region is recognized as a vital and changing area. Here, one large project located in two municipalities, such as SLC’s project, may have significant regional effects. Because of this, the geographic scope of DOS’s consistency review of this project includes not only the City of Hudson waterfront, but coastal resources and uses in the Village of Athens across the Hudson River from part of the project site, and other locations in the coastal area, such as the Olana Historic Site and certain designated Scenic Areas of Statewide Significance in the Hudson Valley. The riverfront industrial area is visible from the Hudson River, portions of the City of Hudson, and portions of the shoreline areas within the Village of Athens. Considerations such as scenic views and vistas, absence of pollution-based haze or other pollution, or water resources may be components, where appropriate, of the character of the coastal area of a community. The Athens LWRP was approved and incorporated into the CMP in accordance with Article 42 of the Executive Law and the CZMA and the potential effects of SLC’s proposal on the policies and purposes of the Village’s LWRP were considered by DOS. Effects on those resources and their characteristics and uses of those resources and the coastal area may be considered. In recent decades there has been a shift in many urban waterfronts from water-dependent industrial uses, to a mix of compatible, higher economically valued mixed uses that include commercial, residential, tourism, retail, office and water-dependent recreational uses. Such a shift has been occurring in the Hudson River region. Historically, the urban centers along the Hudson River began as transshipment points

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for agricultural products to reach market. In the late 18th and the 19th centuries, the river became the focus for intensive industrial activity – from whaling to brickworks to iron manufacturing. Industries lined the waterfront in the cities and villages of the Hudson Valley. In the mid-19th century, railroad lines were extended into the Valley. While the lines hugged the riverbank for long stretches, the tracks were located away from the shoreline in areas where substantial industrial uses occupied waterfront acreage. By the mid-20th century, industrial activity along the river, especially in urban centers, was in decline. The result was outdated industrial structures, brownfields, as well as derelict land fronting a severely polluted river. As New York State invested millions to clean the Hudson River, communities began to rediscover their waterfronts. Since the 1980’s, urban centers along the Hudson have experienced a dramatic shift, moving from industrial uses and brownfields to mixed use redevelopment, recreation, cultural activities, and, increasingly, high-tech businesses. This shift in land use coincides with a shift in the Valley’s economic engine from industrial uses to tourism, office, high-tech and retail activities. These new uses have generated spin-off businesses and a wide range of stable and growing employment and revenues, including significant public revenues that include property, sales, business and other taxes. In developed waterfront areas on the Hudson River, land for new economic activity is at a premium. The most significant acreage available is underused industrial land between the river and the railroad tracks. Redevelopment of large parcels between the river and the railroad tracks for non-industrial uses is now occurring in nearly every major urban area in the Hudson Valley and is being supported by millions of dollars in federal and state grant funds and private investment. Throughout the Hudson Valley, these projects are transforming industrial sites into retail commercial uses, restaurants, parks, marinas and other tourist destinations, giving a needed boost to the local economy. Waterfront revitalization is providing the catalyst for these riverfront communities to enhance their economic vitality, increase tax revenues, add jobs, revitalize downtowns, and provide public recreation opportunities to the waterfront. This is particularly the case in Hudson River areas such as Yonkers, Irvington, Poughkeepsie, Sleepy Hollow, Tarrytown, Peekskill, Newburgh, Kingston, and Hudson. This Hudson Valley trend – converting riverfront industrial land to higher economically valued multiple mixed uses – started in the City of Hudson more than 2 decades ago. Since then, governments and the private sector

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have moved forward by denying approval for an oil refinery on the site of what is now the waterfront park, removing oil tanks and discontinuing other industrial uses, and creating a vision for a recreational and mixed use waterfront. Applicable Policies and Policy Analysis NYS CMP Policy #1: Restore, revitalize, and redevelop deteriorated and underutilized waterfront areas for commercial, industrial, cultural, recreational, and other compatible uses. This policy provides guidance for the restoration, revitalization, and redevelopment of deteriorated and underutilized waterfronts for certain compatible uses. The explanation of Policy 1 includes standards for determining whether uses are compatible and appropriate in deteriorated and underutilized waterfront areas. The explanation of policy also includes guidelines that must be followed when determining whether or not a federal or State action proposed for a specific urban waterfront area is suitable. The action should: (a) give priority to uses which are dependent on a location adjacent to the water; (b) enhance existing and anticipated uses; c) serve as a catalyst to private investment in the area; (d) improve the deteriorated condition of a site and, at a minimum, must not cause further deterioration; (e) lead to development which is compatible with the character of the area, with consideration given to scale, architectural style, density, and intensity of use; (f) have the potential to improve the existing economic base of the community and, at a minimum, not jeopardize this base; (g) improve adjacent and upland views of the water, and, at a minimum, not affect these views in an insensitive manner; and, (h) have the potential to improve the potential for multiple uses of the site. The explanation for this policy also states that revitalization of underutilized waterfront areas is one of the most effective means of energizing economic growth and that waterfront redevelopment is one of the most effective means of rejuvenating and stabilizing residential and commercial districts adjacent to the redevelopment area. The SLC waterfront comprises 14 acres and is currently the site of limited industrial activity. The SLC dock receives 2 to 3 HudsonMax bulk cargo ships each year. Other bulk cargo ships that come into SLC’s dock to deliver materials are generally smaller. Coast Guard icebreakers and buoy tenders tie up at the SLC docking facility, which is also used seasonally for storage of navigational buoys. The Coast Guard has advised DOS that they consider the SLC dock a “critical” buoy staging

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area, the only one currently available to them north of Bayonne, New Jersey. According to SLC, the dock is also used by 6-10 pleasure craft during the summer, and by tug-directed barges, which are typically 60 feet wide and 300 feet long. The present use of the dock area for small scale shipping and recreational boating certainly comports with the nature of this small harbor area. The SLC proposal represents a dramatic expansion in industrial activity at the SLC dock in Hudson. The proposed riverfront industrial facility, immediately adjacent to the City’s waterfront parks, would serve as the shipping center for one of the largest cement manufacturing facilities in the nation, producing 2 million metric tons per year. Under the proposal, HudsonMax vessel activity would increase to 1622 stops per year at the docking facility, a 433 - 1000% increase in the presence of a HudsonMax vessel at the Hudson waterfront, and include mooring for up to 3 days at a time. Unloading and loading operations, including the transport and stockpiling of road salt, gypsum, and GBFS, would occur on a 24-hour basis. Cement barges of twelve-thousand metric ton capacity, which are about 400 feet long and 72 feet wide, would be used to transport finished material up to 4 times per week. Loading of these vessels takes up to 14 hours. In addition to the increased activity of HudsonMax vessels, tugs and barges, and associated loading and unloading operations, the proposed project would also entail the construction and operation of an enclosed conveyor system connecting the riverfront industrial activity to the Greenport facility. The product transfer and storage associated with the proposed SLC riverfront industrial facility would transform the existing dock into a major shipping terminal. Rather than revitalize the waterfront, at its proposed scale, this shipping complex will dominate this and surrounding waterfront areas for the 50 to 60 year useful life of the industrial complex. Policy 1 guidelines and conclusions: (A) Priority should be given to uses which are dependent on a location adjacent to the water: An extensive discussion of water dependent uses appears in Policy 2. (B) Actions proposed should enhance existing and anticipated uses: Waterfront revitalization depends upon location, circumstances and proposed use. A large-scale heavy industrial facility is not appropriate

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in all waterfront locations but requires the right setting. In the state’s urban areas, particularly major ports, the introduction of large new industries and expansion of waterborne transportation of cargo can serve as a source of economic rejuvenation. Not all areas however benefit from the introduction of heavy industry. At one time in the City of Hudson, cement manufacturing was a significant local industry. Beginning in the late 19th century, with improvement and expansion in railroads, waterborne movement of cargo and people declined. The economy of Hudson worsened and the slower economy served to preserve much of Hudson’s history and architectural heritage. A recent newspaper article described the city’s economic revitalization: “City administrations maintained the historic integrity of Hudson while upgrading the infrastructure . . .’They kept our main street intact,’ [Mayor] Scalera said” (Times-Union, 1/09/2005). Beginning in the 1960’s, the City’s development trend moved toward non-industrial uses. Significant effort has been made by the private sector, state agencies, the City of Hudson, and the Village of Athens to attract a broad base of users to waterfront parks, retail areas, and recreational facilities, such as marinas and boat launches. Along with other State agencies, DOS has been involved with the City of Hudson for more than 20 years in the redevelopment of its waterfront. In 1984, DOS objected to the consistency certification for the proposed expansion of an existing oil storage terminal facility on the City of Hudson waterfront. The proposed oil facility relied heavily on waterborne transportation and it was the Department’s position that the increased industrialization of the City of Hudson’s waterfront represented an incompatible use (DOS consistency decision letter, July 6, 1984). Today, using, in part, State financial assistance, that the largest former oil facility in the City, has been transformed into Hudson’s newly completed waterfront park, while plans are being advanced to add adjacent mixed-use development on the river to anchor the west end of the Warren Street revitalization. A $10 million cleanup of another riverfront brownfield is being completed, which will enable the City of Hudson public waterfront to expand until immediately adjacent to the proposed significantly expanded SLC riverfront industrial uses. The 1996 Hudson Vision Plan and 2002 Comprehensive Plan are the most recent completed planning documents guiding development efforts in the City. As noted in the City’s adopted 2002 Comprehensive Plan, the Vision Plan as the guide for waterfront development projects. (See Hudson Comprehensive Plan (HCP) Executive Summary pp.

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xii - xiii). Many of the recommendations contained within the plans have been implemented. One project that is largely completed is the development of the new waterfront park on the site of the former Hudson Petroleum parcel, complete with landscaping, walkways, docking facilities and a gazebo. The State is also considering relocation of the public boat launch from the Hudson waterfront’s northern edge to a site at its southern edge, just north of, and directly adjacent to, the proposed SLC riverfront industrial facility. The Hudson Power Boat Association will relocate to the current State Boat Launch site, with proposed redevelopment of the current Hudson Power Boat Association parcel to include a new restaurant, mixed use retail/office, river café and a new ferry terminal office. Other uses proposed for the Hudson Power Boat Association site include docks, shoreline improvements and open space for use by visitors and residents. Improvements for nearby Promenade Hill, located on the waterfront just to the north of the waterfront park, include the construction of a new visitor amenities building, the incorporation of new landscaping, and development of a promenade walk to connect with the waterfront. The Vision Plan also recommends the development of a bicycle lane along Front Street to strengthen the link between Hudson’s downtown, its waterfront and the regional network of transportation paths. The magnitude of industrial activity proposed at the SLC dock would compete with the revitalization of the City’s waterfront and surrounding area. Over the past 20 years, the City has experienced a resurgence in private investment with individual owners and proprietors funding building restoration projects and establishing new businesses. This investment has led to development of antique shops, galleries, gift shops, home furnishing stores, sporting goods stores, clothing boutiques, restaurants, cafes, bars, a concert hall and cabaret theater all on Warren Street, Hudson’s main street. This investment has created new jobs in the City and resulted in the adaptive rehabilitation of many of Hudson’s historic buildings. The economic revitalization is expanding outward from Warren Street, continuing along several streets, including Allen, Union, Columbia, and State Streets anchored at the west end by plans for waterfront mixed use immediately adjacent to the proposed SLC riverfront industrial facility. These redevelopment projects on the river would function as the riverfront anchor of the Warren Street revitalization. SLC’s proposed riverfront industrial facility also does not comport with the City’s 1996 Hudson Vision Plan and the 2002 City of Hudson

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Comprehensive Plan (see discussion under Policy #2). The introduction of SLC’s proposed large riverfront industrial uses in close juxtaposition will not enhance, but instead would detract from, these existing and anticipated uses. (C) The action should serve as a catalyst to private investment in the area; As previously mentioned, the City of Hudson is enjoying a significant revitalization of its waterfront and community. It relies on a diversified economy in which tourism, commercial, retail, recreation and second home purchases play a large role. Hudson relies on the area’s high quality of life, contributed to by the visual appeal of the area, its historic fabric and texture, its pastoral setting, and attractions such as its waterfront park and Olana as the basis for continued economic growth. The SLC facility will not advance or serve as a catalyst for the type of private investment and the kind of commercial development that has been unfolding in Hudson in the past twenty years, and as envisioned in the Hudson Vision Plan significantly expanded riverfront industrial activity, contrasts with the continued economic growth in the City and region based, in part, on a revitalized mixed-use waterfront development or other more compatible light industrial options. It can be anticipated that the proposed increase in scale and intensity of industrial operations at the Hudson dock will not encourage future retail and tourism-focused investment, and may diminish future private investment for these types of activities in the City or adjacent areas. (D) The action should improve the deteriorated condition of a site and, at a minimum, must not cause further deterioration As part of its project, SLC has proposed several significant site improvements and mitigation measures. At the dock facility, SLC plans to remove a dock tank and barge loader. At the Catskill facility, SLC proposes to remove six bunker silos on the jetty in the Hudson River. SLC proposes to close the Catskill kiln, and remove portions of the plant, and silos on its jetty in the river. Elimination of the plume resulting from the plant closure and removal of several substantial structures would result in a major visual improvement in the Hudson Valley, particularly since it is in the primary southern viewshed from Olana. All of these actions will improve the conditions at its waterfront property.

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(E) Action should lead to development which is compatible with the character of the area, with consideration given to scale, architectural style, density, and intensity of use: The proposed project represents a tremendous increase in the scale of local and regional cement manufacturing operations. The new plant, if built, would be the largest in the State and one of the largest in the nation. According to the DEIS, “construction of the 2 million metric ton per year Greenport cement plant and a net increase in production of 1.4 million mty would decrease the country’s dependence on imported cement by 7 percent.” Dock activities and vessel operations would generate potentially significant dust and noise impacts on a relatively continuous basis. This would occur through constant transit of ships to transport 80% of the cement plant’s product to market, utilization of heavy equipment on the dock to load and unload materials, the pneumatic loading system, and storage dockside of large quantities of raw materials. There would be significant noise, fumes and dust associated with these activities which would likely impair recreational use on the adjoining waterfront park, neighboring areas and on the Hudson River. The increased industrial activity on the waterfront described above would be out of scale and character with the surrounding pedestrianoriented parks, small-scale historic architecture and the City’s Historic District, recreational boating activities, commercial retail, and tourismoriented uses on the City’s waterfront, as envisioned in its Vision Plan, and other planning documents. The Village of Athens has also determined the proposed project would have similar negative impacts on the character of their waterfront development (Village of Athens, letter, 3/16/05). Despite the fact that the proposed riverfront industrial structures would have historic industrial facades, the overall scale and intensity of use would not be compatible with the character of the area. (F) Proposed actions should have the potential to improve the existing economic base of the community and, at a minimum, not jeopardize this base: The City of Hudson is experiencing an economic upturn, with nearly a 5 percent rise in private sector jobs between 1998 and 2002. The economic engine driving revitalization in the City of Hudson and elsewhere in the region is commercial, retail, tourism, residential real estate and business support services. The resurgence in local investment has led to a dramatic expansion in the development of retail uses, restaurants, arts, and recreational opportunities. This investment has

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spurred new jobs, has resulted in the adaptive rehabilitation of historical structures, and is fueling mixed retail and recreational uses of the waterfront. The proposed increase in scale and intensity of industrial operations at the Hudson riverfront would not encourage future retail and tourism-focused investment, and may jeopardize the base of the current revitalization effort. The City of Hudson’s waterfront capacity for siting and implementation of the public recreational and access uses, as well as the ability of the waterfront to host mixed commercial uses is hindered, not improved, by the nature, intensity, and scale of SLC’s proposed riverfront industrial facility. The proposed riverfront industrial facility would be situated across the Hudson River from the Village of Athens’ historic waterfront district, which is listed in the National Register of Historic Places and includes more than 270 historic structures, and would present a significant level of intense industrial activity in an area where an emphasis is placed on recreational, tourist-related, and waterfront-related retail commercial activity. With financial assistance from DOS, the Village is presently completing a $1.2 million restoration project to refurbish its historic ferry slip and Riverfront Park, resulting in increased waterfront park area and development of new dockage, walks and promenades. The Deputy Mayor of the Village of Athens submitted a letter strongly opposing the proposed project. (G) Actions should improve adjacent and upland views of the water, and, at a minimum, not affect these views in an insensitive manner: The Hudson River viewshed in this area is important. The Hudson Valley was the setting for the Hudson River School of artists and the geographic center of the American Romantic Movement, a cultural movement that took place during the first half of the 19th Century. The region is also a significant resource for tourism and recreation. Portions of the landscape are included within Scenic Areas of State-Wide Significance (SASS) as designated by the New York State Coastal Management Program (CMP)—the Catskill-Olana SASS and the Columbia-Greene North SASS, as fully discussed in Policies 23, 24 and 25. As part of its project, SLC proposes to refurbish and expand the existing dock facility on the Hudson River. The SLC project incorporates an access area from which the public can observe the working waterfront. The dock area impacts depend upon ship traffic, loading, unloading, and stockpiling activities at the docks. Although current use of the dock area involves some stockpiling of materials, the proposed project will significantly increase the level and intensity of

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material handling operations at the site, with accompanying noise, dust and light impacts. The current outstanding scenic views of the water from adjacent and surrounding areas, however, will be profoundly changed. Views of the water from the City park, which adjoins the SLC site, will be marred by a steady parade of large ships and barges maneuvering in and out of the docking area. Diesel emissions and plumes from ship and barges while in transit and when engaged in loading operations can be expected to have an adverse effect on views of the water from the park. Across the river, views of the water from the Village of Athens will change. The Village has expressed strong concerns about the negative visual impact the project would have on the Athens Riverfront Park and the Hudson-Athens lighthouse, and the Village’s plans to refurbish its historic ferry slip and Riverfront Park. The impact on visual quality will be to impair, not to improve adjacent and upland views of the water. (H) The action should have the potential to improve the potential for multiple uses of the site. SLC’s project is a cement plant operation occupying more than 1000 acres with almost no provision for creating multiple uses at the site. The current use of the dock for Coast Guard operations and recreational boats may not be available at that location. No other commercial uses consistent with the economic development trend occurring in the City of Hudson are planned for the site. As noted, SLC has offered to construct a public pathway along the waterfront. The City of Hudson’s waterfront capacity for siting multiple uses may not be improved by the proposed riverfront industrial facility. In conclusion, the proposed increase in industrial activity at this location, as described above, does not enhance existing and anticipated uses, lead to development which is compatible with the character of the area, with consideration given to scale, architectural style, density, and intensity of use, serve as a catalyst to private investment in the area, or improve adjacent and upland views of the water. For these reasons, the proposed activity is inconsistent with this policy. NYS CMP Policy #2: Facilitate the siting of water-dependent uses and facilities on or adjacent to coastal waters.

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This policy provides guidance for facilitating appropriate siting of compatible water dependent uses. SLC states the proposed cement manufacturing facility in Greenport is a water dependent use. This position, however, is not consistent with Executive Law Section 911(7), which provides: “Water dependent use” means an activity which can only be conducted on, in, over or adjacent to a water body because such activity requires direct access to that water body, and which involves, as an integral part of such activity, the use of the water. Key to this definition is that the activity can only operate if conducted on, in, over or adjacent to a water body. Activities which can be carried on elsewhere are not water dependent. Also, the definition provides that as an “integral” part of the activity, the use must involve water. The cement manufacturing facility proposed does not use river water, and it is not nor need not be located on, in, or over the water. It is, therefore, not water dependent. The proposed method of transportation of certain raw materials and some of the product, however, is water dependent. The NYSCMP makes it clear that water dependent uses are not intended to be facilitated in all locations. Not only do the guidelines for this policy make this clear, but in a section of the CMP, describing “changes the program will make,” it is clear governments must do this only in existing major ports, “Within existing major ports, State agencies and local governments with approved local waterfront revitalization programs must site land uses and development which are essential to or in support of waterborne transportation of cargo and people.” (I- 6) Further, the NYSCMP states cement is one of a limited group of waterrelated, not water-dependent industries that benefit from water transportation, and “cost savings for water shipment are directly responsible for the location of those industries [particularly gypsum and gravel, not cement] along the Hudson.” (NYSCMP II-29) The proposed, new significantly large shipping facility in Hudson, is water dependent. NYSCMP Policy #1 states water dependent uses

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“must be given priority in any redevelopment effort. (Refer to Policy 2 for the means to effectuate this priority)”. The applicable Policy 2 guidelines, state, when choosing a site for a water dependent use, the potential for competition for the space must be considered, as well as its compatibility with adjacent uses. The City of Hudson’s limited waterfront space includes public parks, a public boat launch that will be relocated to the parcel immediately adjacent to the proposed SLC riverfront industrial facilities, boat association dockage, and other recreational opportunities discussed in Policy 1. Current zoning along Hudson’s waterfront is industrial (I1) and residential (R4), covering both the SLC property and riverfront park space. The Comprehensive Plan states: “For all intents and purposes, the 1996 Hudson Vision Plan outlined recommendations for Hudson’s waterfront that are consistent with the goals and objectives of this comprehensive plan. However, the existing zoning districts are not consistent with these preferred future land use patterns.” (2002 Hudson Comprehensive Plan, p. 52) The 1996 Hudson Vision Plan lays out the preferred future land use patterns for the waterfront. The plan states: “The area defined as the ’waterfront’, for purposes of this study, extends from South Bay to North Bay - south to north....” (Hudson Vision Plan, p. 88). This area includes all of the SLC riverfront property. The Vision Plan articulates the intent of the City in revising the existing zoning along the waterfront to include a mixed-use district: The waterfront is currently zoned for industrial use....The current zoning is far too broad and does not recognize the value of the waterfront as a historical, cultural, commercial and recreational resource for the City. The zoning classification also does not encourage the highest and best use of the land and thus reduces potential tax revenues to the City. It is recommended a new “Waterfront Zone” be created that addresses the goals of the Vision Plan and the specifics of the Master Plan. The zone should be created immediately. To minimize conflict existing property uses could be grand fathered, but if they change ownership,

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the new owners would be subject to the new provisions. Permitted uses should include: recreation/open space, parking, residential (second story and above), retail, galleries, studios, office, restaurants, museums, outdoor markets, outdoor performances, street vending, marine stores, marine fuel and boat storage. Conditional uses could include: electronic transmission towers, public utility uses, transportation centers, railroad, ferry terminals. Accessory Uses should include: signs, outdoor cafes. Prohibited Uses should include: manufacturing, assembling, storing and processing products or facilities, outdoor storage of lumber, construction and building materials, contractor’s equipment, trucks, vans, buses, retail or wholesale of vehicles or boats. Building heights should be limited to 45 feet from ground elevation to ridge or parapet line. (Hudson Vision Plan, pp. 85-88) Further, the Vision Plan states that the land now owned by SLC, “has good development potential for a variety of public and private uses. The City should try to secure an option on the land or should have a letter of understanding expressing its interest.” (Hudson Vision Plan, p. 89) Indeed, Hudson has steadily pursued this waterfront vision, beginning with a waterfront development plan for the Best Oil tank farm site in 1995. In 1997, the City of Hudson acquired and remediated the tank farm, subsequently developing the site into a waterfront park with a lawn, gazebo and comfort stations. Moving steadily southward, in 2003 the City acquired the former Lockwood parcel, directly south of the former Best Oil site, which will be used to expand the park once site remediation has been completed. The most recent acquisition, the former CSX parcel, closed in late 2004. This parcel, directly south of the former Lockwood parcel and adjacent to the SLC property at its northern boundary, is the proposed location for the upgraded and expanded State boat launch facility that is described in the Vision Plan. Acquisition and redevelopment of the SLC property, as recommended by the Vision Plan, could conceivably continue the City’s ongoing waterfront transformation. The uses expressed in the Vision Plan are also reiterated in the City’s only adopted planning document, the 2002 Comprehensive Plan. This plan states that in changing portions of the industrial zoning to a new zoning district to promote a mixed use waterfront environment, “permitted uses should be a variety of water-dependent and waterenhanced activities such as marinas, public boat launches, restaurants,

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parks and residential uses. Design standards, similar to those recommended for downtown, should also be developed and incorporated for this district.” (Hudson Comprehensive Plan, pp xiii - xiv) The Comprehensive Plan identifies the new zoning as the Urban Waterfront District, and states that “the general limits of the district should be the area west of the railroad tracks, north perpendicular to Warren Street and south perpendicular to Broad Street.” In 2002, Broad Street represented the southern extent of the publicly owned waterfront. Since that time, as described above, the City of Hudson has acquired both the former Lockwood and CSX properties south of this artificial boundary, moving steadily southward along the waterfront. From these activities it is clear that additional phases of waterfront redevelopment would target the City’s southern waterfront, including the SLC property, according to the Hudson Vision Plan’s recommendations for this area. Based on this review of Hudson’s past planning and implementation activities, it is clear the City’s waterfront has been and will continue to be transformed from a private industrial waterfront to a public waterfront for boating, tourism, commercial and other compatible uses. These uses are in direct competition with SLC’s proposed industrial riverfront facilities. Given the extreme limitation on space along the Hudson waterfront, this is not a suitable location for the proposed SLC industrial facilities and uses. Policy 2 guidelines and conclusions: (1) Competition for space: Competition for space, or the potential for it, should be indicated before any given site is promoted for water-dependent uses. The intent is to match water-dependent uses with suitable locations and thereby reduce any conflicts between competing uses that might arise..... The choice of a site should be made with some meaningful impact on the real estate market anticipated: The proposed project would not reduce any conflicts between competing uses. Instead, it would result in greater conflict between two water dependent uses by substantially increasing industrial activity in the City of Hudson’s existing public waterfront space which provides water dependent recreational access to the Hudson River. Currently, the SLC dock is used for 2-3 shipments per year of granulated blast furnace slag and gypsum that are 12 stockpiled on site and then trucked to Catskill for use in the cement manufacturing process. The

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Catskill cement manufacturing plant produces 600,000 metric tons per year (mty) of cement. The proposed Greenport facility would be one of the largest cement plants in the United States, and would produce 2 million mty, a 230% increase in production activity. This would result in significant increases in the level of operations at the SLC dock in Hudson. Shipments via HudsonMax vessels would increase between 433% and 1000% with the proposed expansion of the riverfront industrial facility. Additionally, the proposal includes the construction of a new Tshaped dock which would serve as the berthing area for 12,000 ton cement barges visiting up to 4 times per week. Loading and unloading operations would occur on a 24-hour basis as would the operation of the proposed conveyor connecting the dock in Hudson to the plant in Greenport. Overall, the proposed activities would result in a significant increase in the scale and scope of material handling activities, and would substantially increase the level of operations at the Hudson dock. The physical presence and operation of the Hudson Max and other vessels, and the 24-hour continuous loading and unloading operations at the dock adjacent to the City parks, would directly conflict with the use of the parks and the River, as described above. Further, the City of Hudson has experienced an increase in selling prices of both downtown buildings and single family homes in recent years. The value of Warren Street properties increased over 400% from 1993 to 2004. This is not only due to rising market conditions, but reflects the significant public and private investment in deteriorated downtown property and existing and planned recreational and commercial waterfront amenities. Introducing significantly increased industrial activities at the waterfront would adversely impact this real estate market and would also be contrary to this guideline. (2) Compatibility with adjacent uses and the protection of other coastal resources: Water-dependent uses should be located so that they enhance, or at least do not detract from, the surrounding community. Consideration should also be given to such factors as the protection of nearby residential areas from odors, noise and traffic. The proposed new significantly large shipping facility is adjacent to an existing and expanding public waterfront space in an area being revitalized into the previously described mix of compatible, higher economically valued mixed uses that include commercial, residential, tourism, retail, office and water dependent recreational uses. This economic rejuvenation is occurring not only in Hudson, but in waterfront

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communities throughout the Valley. The massive size of the operation renders it out of scale in relation to its surroundings. The level of increase in heavy marine traffic, and the duration of that traffic in a narrow reach of the navigable Hudson River is a significant change in scale and scope of operation. The proposed significantly increased level of industrial activity would not be compatible with adjacent uses, nor would it enhance the surrounding community. The presence of the heavy industrial activity, typified on the waterfront by the 24 hour operation of HudsonMax vessels, would also pose direct conflicts between that proposed use and the anticipated ferry service (described in the Athens LWRP) between the Village of Athens and the City of Hudson. According to the DEIS, among the principal noise sources from the facility are those which would originate from the operation at the dock area and of the conveyor system. DEIS at 15.1. As noted, the dock facility will operate twenty-four hours a day, the noise levels are not expected to decrease on Saturdays or Sundays, days when greater public activity along the waterfront can be expected. With respect to noise at the dock area, SLC represented at the DEC Issues Conference that it would design and construct its facilities at the dock area to comply with the City of Hudson’s noise code and certain unspecified best management practices as part of a DEC permit. DOS has reviewed substantial evidence concerning potential noise impacts at the riverfront industrial facility. SLC has indicated that it expects an increase in the sound level of 5 to 10 decibels (dBA) and deemed that satisfactory for daytime operations. (DEC Issues Conference). While those noise levels may be appropriate in an industrial area, there are residential and recreational areas in proximity to the dock facility, including those across the river in Athens. DEC’s Noise Policy states that noise levels for receptors in non-industrial settings should not exceed an increase of 6 dBA. (DEC Noise Policy, Feb. 2001 at p. 14). The current dockside setting is one of waterborne recreation and limited commercial uses and not heavy industrial uses. SLC has not shown that its dockside noise would not exceed an increase of the 6 dBA level. Based on the evidence before DOS, the noise levels identified by SLC would in many instances exceed DEC’s Noise guidelines for non-industrial settings. It is additionally noted that the DEC Commissioner has found noise to be of sufficient concern and not adequately attenuated by SLC’s proposed mitigation measures as to require that the issue of noise be submitted to adjudication. (DEC Commissioner’s First Interim Decision, December 6, 2002)

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Additionally, the loading and unloading of cement products and raw materials would create fugitive dust emissions that could also be incompatible with the surrounding community. Given the existence of the water dependent riverfront park adjacent to the proposed large riverfront industrial facilities, the impending relocation of the State boat launch to a site immediately adjacent to the St. Lawrence Cement dock, the conflict between the proposed SLC industrial expansion on the river and the existing and future water-dependent and water-related uses, and the potential impact on the anticipated real estate market for compatible, higher economically valued nonindustrial mixed uses, it is clear the project would result in unacceptable impacts to the existing and anticipated future Hudson waterfront. The proposed large riverfront industrial facilities would be inconsistent with this policy. NYC CMP Policy #4: Strengthen the economic base of smaller harbor areas by encouraging the development and enhancement of those traditional uses and activities which have provided such areas with their unique maritime identity. Policy 4 recognizes that traditional activities occurring in and around smaller harbors contribute to a community’s economic strength and attractiveness According to the policy, state efforts should center on promoting such desirable activities as recreational and commercial fishing, ferry services, marinas, historic preservation, cultural pursuits, and other compatible activities which have made smaller harbor areas appealing as tourist destinations. “Particular consideration will be given to the visual appeal and social benefits of smaller harbors which, in turn, can make significant contributions to the State’s tourism industry.” The City of Hudson enjoys a unique maritime heritage and relationship to the water. Beginning with its founding in the late 18th century by displaced New Englanders, Hudson prospered as it developed its shipbuilding, whaling and sealing, sailmaking, blacksmithing and cooperage industries. The City was reputedly the home of one of the largest whaling and shipping fleets on the Atlantic coast until the mid1800’s, by which time political and technological change had steered the City onto a new course. The explanation for Policy 4 provides guidelines that shall be used in determining consistency. The following is a discussion of the applicable guidelines:

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(1) The action will enhance or not detract from or adversely affect existing traditional and/or desired anticipated uses: The City of Hudson has been experiencing a resurgence in local investment that has helped the City in its evolving waterfront revitalization and has lead to a dramatic expansion in the development of retail uses, restaurants, arts, and recreational opportunities. This investment has spurred new jobs, has resulted in the adaptive rehabilitation of historical structures, and is fueling mixed retail and recreational uses of the waterfront. City efforts on the waterfront include recreational boating activities immediately adjacent to the proposed SLC dock and conveyor, as well as many active and passive recreational uses associated with the City parks, as identified in the 1996 Hudson Vision Plan. The proposed SLC waterfront facilities and activities would adversely affect the desired anticipated uses as expressed in the adopted comprehensive plan and the Hudson Vision Plan, they would directly conflict and compete with those uses that are in place and that are being promoted and expanded. (2) The action shall not be out of character with, nor lead to development, which would be out of character with, existing development in terms of the area’s scale, intensity of use, and architectural style: The proposed project conflicts with the community character of the City of Hudson, which has evolved significantly in recent years, away from industry toward mixed commercial and residential uses with an emphasis on riverfront recreation. This is a desired trend and is reinforced in local planning documents such as the 1996 Hudson Vision Plan and the adopted 2002 City of Hudson Comprehensive Plan. The City’s revitalized core, centered on Warren Street, and anchored on the west by the City’s waterfront park, borders the proposed SLC riverfront industrial facility, which would serve as the shipping center for one of the largest cement manufacturing facilities in the nation. The dock is currently used 2-3 times per year by HudsonMax sized vessels for shipments of raw materials. The proposed project, however, would result in periods of 24-hour per day industrial operations up to 66 days per year. The intensity of the industrial operations, the size and scale of the structures and stockpiles proposed on the dock, and the size and scale of the vessels and their operation, would frequent the dock would be out of character with the area’s existing development in terms of scale, intensity of use, and architectural style.

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(3) The action will not adversely affect the existing economic base of the community: The local economy in Columbia County has been growing steadily, with nearly a 5 percent rise in private sector jobs between 1998 and 2002. This economic growth has been fueled by real estate, retail and wholesale trade and business support services. The City of Hudson in particular has enjoyed a boom in its residential and commercial real estate market which could be threatened through the introduction of increased industrial activities affecting the quality of life. The proposed expansion and change in industrial activities on the river directly competes with the previously mentioned plans for recreational and commercial activities immediately adjacent to the proposed dock and conveyor and the current revitalization in Hudson. It could also jeopardize the possibility of tapping into the Hudson River’s multi-million dollar recreational boating industry which, as noted by Hudson City Alderman Colum Riley (Riley, letter, 3/18/05) could provide much needed revenue for the City. The increased SLC industrial activities would impact the recent economic growth felt as their downtown has revitalized and may adversely affect the existing economic base. It may also lead to diminished marketability of the planned uses, and adversely impact the tax revenues anticipated from those uses. Further, the relocation of SLC operation from Catskill to Greenport would have a negative impact on Catskill. Direct job loss would be 119 jobs and about 257 secondary service jobs. The proposal will adversely affect the existing economic base of Hudson and Catskill. (4) The action will not detract from views of the water and smaller harbor area, particularly where the visual quality of the area is an important component of the area’s appeal and identity: The presence and operation of the Hudson Max vessels, 82 feet tall pump house, a 75 feet tall conveyor-reversing structure, 56 feet tall trough conveyor system, 82 feet tall pneumatic loading system, stock piled raw materials, lighting would detract from views of the water and smaller harbor area both in the City of Hudson, and from the Village of Athens. The Village of Athens, also a small harbor area rich in maritime history, identifies “enjoying the view” as one of the most

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important recreational activities of its residents, in its LWRP. The visual quality of this region of the Hudson River is a very important component of the area’s appeal and identity, and would be negatively impacted by the introduction of the proposed riverfront industrial activities. The proposed plant, and its increased industrial use at the waterfront, would not promote activities that would make the small harbor areas of Hudson and Athens appealing to residents and tourists. The project would not enhance planned redevelopment activities, and would detract from views of the water, in an area where the visual quality of the waterfront is an important component of the area’s appeal and identity. Therefore, the proposed project is inconsistent with this policy. NYS CMP Policy #18: To safeguard the vital economic, social and environmental interests of the State and of its citizens, proposed major actions in the coastal area must give full consideration to those interests, and to the safeguards which the State has established to protect valuable coastal resource areas. The purpose of this policy is to ensure that proposed major actions do not significantly impair valuable coastal waters and resources, thus frustrating the achievement of the safeguards which the State has established to protect those waters and resources. Proposed actions must take into account the social, cultural, economic and environmental interests of the State and their citizens in such matters that would affect natural resources, water levels and flows, shoreline damage, hydro-electric power generation, and recreation. As previously discussed, in the last 20 years, communities in the Hudson Valley have been moving away from waterfront industry, toward a more diversified economy with higher valued economic uses. Increasingly, Hudson River communities such as Hudson and Athens rely upon the area’s high quality of life, contributed to by the visual appeal of the area, its historic fabric and texture, its pastoral setting, and attractions such as Olana as the basis for continued economic growth. This community character would be jeopardized by the proposed plant and riverfront industrial facility. The proposed project could negatively impact Catskill and would diminish the current revitalization trend in Hudson. The change in

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direct employment regionally is only one position. Catskill would lose 119 jobs directly, and potentially lose 257 secondary service jobs in the area as a result. The new Greenport facility would directly employ 155 individuals after construction. There are currently 144 employees at the Catskill facility and 10 at the Greenport facility. The proposal would result in a shift of labor, with 25 employees remaining in Catskill, and 130 at the Greenport site. The total estimated gain in property taxes is $563,964 for the Hudson/Greenport area. This includes the total change in taxes in the Town of Greenport, Greenport Fire District, Greenport Lighting District, Greenport Water District, the City of Hudson, Hudson School District and Columbia County. However, SLC stated in the DEIS that there would be no change in the existing property tax assessment or tax revenues generated by the project at the Catskill facility. Therefore, SLC claims the current annual tax levy of about $275,000 to county town and school districts would be the same. Given that the economic engine driving the revitalization in Hudson and elsewhere in the region currently is commercial retail, real estate, tourism and business support services, it can be anticipated that the proposed increase in scale and intensity of industrial operations at the Hudson dock will not encourage future retail and tourism-focused investment, and may diminish future private investment for these types of activities in the City and adjacent areas. The City of Hudson’s waterfront capacity for siting and implementation of public recreational and access uses and ability of the waterfront to host multiple uses is hindered, not improved, by the proposed riverfront industrial facility. The proposed plant, and its resultant shift in jobs, tax base, and increased industrial use at the waterfront, would adversely impact the social, cultural, and environmental interests of the region’s citizens. The project will not enhance planned redevelopment activities and may adversely affect the economic activity generated by current redevelopment efforts. Given the foregoing, the proposed activities are inconsistent with this policy. NYS CMP Policy #19: Protect, Maintain, and Increase the Level and Types of Access to Public Waterrelated Recreation Resources and Facilities.

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One of the purposes of this policy is to guide the protection, maintenance, and enhancement of the level and types of access to public water-related recreation resources and facilities, particularly in urban coastal areas. The explanation for this policy identifies the following guidance to be used in determining the consistency of a proposed action with this policy: The existing access from adjacent or proximate public lands or facilities to public water-related recreation resources and facilities shall not be reduced, nor shall the possibility of increasing access in the future from adjacent or proximate public lands or facilities to public water-related recreation resources and facilities be eliminated... An elimination of the possibility of increasing public access in the future includes... construction of private facilities which physically prevent the provision of convenient public access to public water-related recreation resources or facilities from public lands and facilities. As described earlier, both the City of Hudson and the Village of Athens have made substantial efforts in recent years to promote and develop their respective waterfronts in an effort to attract a broad base of users, particularly recreational users, to the waterfront. Related to this redevelopment, a number of capital improvement projects and development plans for the waterfront have been funded through a variety of public finance vehicles. The NYS Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation operates a publicly accessible boat launch in the City of Hudson and is planning to relocate the facility from its present location to a site, reclaimed and rehabilitated with public funds, immediately adjacent to the north of the SLC dock in the City of Hudson. DOS is currently funding the feasibility study for the new launch location under Title 11 of the Environmental Protection Fund. The significant increase in the presence and operation of HudsonMax vessels and other craft associated with the proposed increase in industrial activities immediately adjacent to the public waterfront would likely interfere with, and thereby reduce, public use and vessel access of the Hudson River and of the City of Hudson’s waterfront recreational opportunities. Even with the proposed “warning” agreements in which SLC employees would advise park users of the anticipated movement of HudsonMax vessels, the public’s ability to access the River and use of navigable waters by recreational boaters. Additionally, the 24-hour loading and unloading of cement products and raw materials would create noise, fumes, and fugitive dust emissions that would also impact the public enjoyment of the neighboring parks. The

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construction of the proposed private facility and its associated uses would reduce existing access from adjacent or proximate public lands or facilities to public water-related recreation resources and facilities, and would physically prevent the provision of convenient public access to public water-related recreation resources or facilities from public lands and facilities. As a component of the proposed project, SLC proposes to develop a “semi-naturalized public park and promenade” between the landside boundary of the riverfront industrial facility and the CSX railroad. While improving public access on a private site is encouraged, the quality of the experience of using the footpath through a heavy industrial area, as proposed, is not comparable to the recreational access from the City’s adjacent waterfront park to the River, and use of the River, which would be diminished by the physical presence of the HudsonMax vessels and other industrial activities at the site such as 24-hour loading and unloading operations. The public access park proposed by the applicant is not in itself compatible with the increased industrial activities proposed at the same site, and those increased industrial activities and presence of massive ships would not be compatible with the adjoining uses of the City parklands. Despite the trail access proposed by SLC, the increased industrial activities would negatively impact the existing access from the parks, and future access-related development opportunities would be reduced, the proposed activity is inconsistent with this policy. NYS CMP Policies 23, 24 and 25 address protection of historic sites and visual quality NYS CMP Policy #23: Protect, enhance and restore structures, districts, areas or sites that are of significance in the history, architecture, archaeology or culture of the state, its communities, or the nation. The explanation of Policy 23 states that: The structures, districts, areas or sites that are of significance in the history, architecture, archaeology or culture of the State, its communities, or the Nation comprise the following resources: (a) A resource, which is in a federal or State park established, among other reasons, to protect and preserve the resource.

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(b) A resource on, nominated to be on, or determined eligible to be on the National or State Registers of Historic Places. (c) A resource on or nominated to be on the State Nature and Historic Preserve Trust. The explanation goes on to say “all practicable means to protect structures, districts, areas or sites that are of significance in the history, architecture, archaeology or culture of the State, its communities or the Nation shall be deemed to include the consideration and adoption of any techniques, measures, or controls to prevent a significant adverse change to such significant structures, districts, areas or sites.” A significant adverse change includes, but is not limited to, “3. All proposed actions within 500 feet of the perimeter of the property boundary of the historic, architectural, cultural, or archaeological resource and all actions within an historic district that would be incompatible with the objective of preserving the quality and integrity of the resource. Primary considerations to be used in making judgement about compatibility should focus on the visual and locational relationship between the proposed action and the special character of the historic, cultural, or archaeological resource.” NYS CMP Policy #24: Prevent Impairment of Scenic Resources of Statewide Significance. Scenic Areas of Statewide Significance (SASS) were designated in accordance with Article 42 of the NYS Executive Law, 19 NYCRR Part 603, and the NYS CMP. These areas were designated in order to implement Policy 24 of the CMP. Prior to that designation, DOS performed an extensive assessment of the State’s most scenic coastal areas in the Hudson Valley. The resulting SASS report identified a number of coastal landscapes, that through their unique composition of scenic, geologic, historic, and cultural components, merit special protection through SASS designations. The guidelines to Policy 24 state: “When considering a proposed action...first determine whether the action could affect a scenic area of statewide significance. This determination would involve: (a) a review of the coastal area maps to ascertain if it shows an identified scenic resource which could be affected...and (b) a review of the type of activities proposed to determine if they would be likely to impair the scenic beauty of the identified resource.” Further, the explanation for Policy #24 states “impairment [of a SASS] will include: (I) the irreversible modification of geologic forms; the

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destruction or removal of vegetation; the modification, destruction, or removal of structures, whenever the geologic forms, vegetation or structures are significant to the scenic quality of an identified resource; and, (ii) with the addition of structures which, because of siting or scale, will reduce identified views or which because of scale, form, or materials will diminish the scenic quality of an identified resource.” NYS CMP Policy #25: Protect, restore or enhance natural and manmade resources which are not identified as being of statewide significance but which contribute to the overall scenic beauty of the coastal area. The explanation of policy states when considering a proposed action, “the action will be undertaken so as to protect, restore or enhance the overall scenic quality of the coastal area. Activities which would impair or further degrade scenic quality are the same as those cited under the previous policy [NYCMP Policy 24].” Policy Guidelines and Conclusions Based on the guidelines above, it is clear that the SLC proposal including the riverfront industrial facility and portions of the Greenport manufacturing facility and its associated plume, visible about 39% of daylight hours would affect historic resources and visual quality of the area. The proposed riverfront industrial facilities would be located on the City of Hudson’s waterfront, located within close proximity to Parade Hill, the City of Hudson’s Historic District, and the historic rail station, among other historic resources that are listed or eligible to be listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The proposed project would also be situated across the Hudson River from the Village of Athens. The Village’s coastal area includes the Athens Lower Village Historic District; the Brick Row Historic District; and four individual historic structures including the Hudson-Athens Lighthouse. Each is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The proposal would present a significant increase in the level of intense industrial activity. As stated above, “Primary considerations to be used in making judgement about compatibility should focus on the visual and locational relationship between the proposed action and the special character of the historic, cultural, or archaeological resource.”

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Consideration must be given to the proposal’s affect on scenic areas of statewide significance (SASS) and other areas which contribute to the overall scenic beauty of the coastal area. The Catskill-Olana SASS would be affected by the proposal. The Catskill-Olana SASS, unique in that it inspired the first indigenous American painting movement, consists of a portion of the Hudson River and its shorelands, an area approximately 51/2 miles long and 3 miles wide. The significance of this SASS is its unusual landscape variety and unity of major landscape components among striking contrasts. With a central unity established by the Hudson River and the topography of the two shorelands, the diverse landforms present in the SASS include flood plains and steep ravines that rise 250 feet above the Catskill and Katterskill Creeks; Rogers Island and Ramshorn Marsh; forested bluffs along the Hudson River and the Roeliff Jansen Kill; plateaus and rolling farmland south of Catskill Village and the promontory of the Olana summit. The water elements in the SASS are equally diverse, including the Hudson River and its coves, channels, and inlets; the Catskill and Katterskill Creeks; small streams that meander through marshes along the Hudson River; and tidal flats that lie adjacent to the Catskill Creek and the Roeliff Jansen Kill at their junctions with the Hudson River. The Olana subunit of the SASS encompasses approximately one square mile and consists entirely of the Olana State Historic Site. Olana is a renowned and beautiful Hudson River estate built by Frederic Church, a wellknown painter of the Hudson River School. The Olana subunit was included in the Catskill-Olana SASS not only for its own beauty but also for the beauty of its surrounding views, which Church often included in his paintings. The Olana subunit is unique. The Olana property is a designed landscape of extraordinary importance that recognizes its connection to the landscape beyond its borders. Olana’s viewsheds are some of the most dramatic and famous in the Hudson River Valley. The estate grounds and the views from the estate were represented in several of Church’s paintings, and they are highly recognized by the public for their scenic, historic, and artistic values. The site is considered one of the finest designed landscapes and a masterpiece of American landscape design. Olana’s landscape is recognized as one of national significance (Landscape Restoration Plan, Olana State Historic Site). The incorporation of the superlative views of the Hudson Valley in the design of both the mansion and the grounds establishes an intrinsic connection between the property and the land outside its borders.

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There are plans to restore sections of the Olana Historic Site to its original character. The Olana Landscape Recreation Plan includes as a fundamental goal recommendations to clear brushy and woody vegetation from much of Olana’s historic “North Meadow”, which has reverted to second growth woodland condition over the past several decades. Implementation of the restoration plan would significantly open up views northward, and thus increase the visibility of portions of the Greenport plant and plume from Cosy Cottage and other viewpoints within the SASS (Landscape Restoration Plan, Olana State Historic Site). Previous consistency decisions are often useful to inform subsequent decisions. In 2000, DOS objected to the consistency certification submitted by Athens Generating Plant due, in large part, to the visual impacts of the proposed plant’s plume upon scenic and historic resources. In that instance, the DOS objection was based in large part on a visible plume projected to exist for approximately 114 hours annually (Athens Generating Project, Federal Consistency Statement, February 2000). SLC reports that the cement manufacturing facility in Geenport would generate a visible plume approximately 1540 daylight hours annually. Even under “fair to clear weather conditions,” SLC estimates that a plume would be visible 811 hours per year, close to 600% more frequent than the plume predicted by Athens Generation to which DOS objected. The primary views recognized in the Catskill-Olana SASS document are toward the south. There are a significant number of discordant features in this view, of which the SLC Catskill facility is only one. These structures are discordant because of their scale, color, or materials in that they generally introduce an incompatible metallic or industrial element into the predominantly natural landscape. The SASS report states that “the addition of similar structures in the viewshed or within the SASS boundaries would impair the scenic quality of the SASS.” If the proposed project were constructed as planned, the existing Catskill facility, a discordant feature recognized in the SASS report, would cease operations, and therefore its plume would no longer be visible. The bunker silos associated with this facility would also be removed. The overall result would be a reduction of total discordant features within the southern viewshed of Olana. While the SASS document emphasizes the importance of the south and west views, the north/northeast viewshed, which contains the existing

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Atlas silos as the major discordant feature and where the manufacturing facility would be located, is also noted as important. Removal of the Atlas silos as planned would eliminate a significant discordant feature. However, the resulting viewshed would be impaired by the portion of the proposed Greenport plant visible above Becraft Ridge and the plant’s associated plume. The average annual plume estimated by SLC will be 1106 feet long x 588 feet high and is estimated by SLC to be visible about 39% of daylight hours. Whereas Atlas currently represents close to 100% of the discordant features in this view, and would be removed, the visible portion of the proposed plant with the plume visible about 39% of daylight hours, as depicted in the simulation for viewpoint #142, would result in a greater increase in discordant features, compared to what is present with the Atlas structures. Through a significant positive visual improvement, the removal of the Atlas silos does not depend upon completion of this project. The silos are not in use and can be removed at any time with no consequence to the applicant other than disposal. The proposed cement manufacturing facility, its large plume, and the riverfront industrial facilities and activities would also be visible from and would impact scenic resources of the Hudson River which are not within a designated SASS. In particular, the proposed plant’s plume, the proposed significantly expanded riverfront industrial facilities and activities would be visible from both the City of Hudson’s waterfront and the Village of Athens waterfront across the River. The Athens LWRP states “enjoying the view” as the most popular recreation activity identified in a survey of its citizens. In a discussion of its scenic resources, this document states: “The River can be seen from throughout the Village at the end of most of the streets. The Hudson-Athens Lighthouse, the Rip Van Winkle Bridge, Mount Merino and the lights of Hudson, wildlife in the marshes, and the myriad types of river traffic and trains on the eastern shore provide an active and varied scene.” In recent public comment on the Greenport project, the Deputy Mayor states “the Village of Athens has concluded that the visual impact of the proposed dockside facilities, plumes and conveyor would be inconsistent with the LWRP and the Village’s development objectives and priorities under coastal policies. The proposed SLC project is inconsistent in terms of scale and incompatible with the landscape..... The SLC project does not enhance the overall scenic quality of the coastal area.”

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Additionally, the Initial Rulings of the Administrative Law Judges on Party Status and Issues (p. 102) communicates the Village of Athens’ “concerns regarding negative visual impacts to the Athens Riverfront Park and the Hudson-Athens lighthouse due to the visibility of the conveyor system, plumes and structures from the main plant. The Village is currently undergoing a $1.2 million restoration project to refurbish its historic ferry slip and Riverfront Park. This will increase the waterfront park area and include the development of dockage, walks and promenades. The 24 hour use of the dock in Hudson for the project, and the lighting that will be required for nighttime activities, are seen as potential eyesores.” Athens Pet., IC Ex. 43, pp.1-5. SLC has indicated that it is not possible to provide a lighting plan prior to project approval (February 2005 SLC submission). The current proposal by SLC, while improving the southern viewshed of the SASS, would significantly impair the northern viewshed, by a portion of the plant being visible above Becraft Ridge and the associated plume being visible about 39% of daylight hours. The SASS report clearly states that “the addition of similar structures [incompatible metallic or industrial elements] in the viewshed or within SASS boundaries would impair the scenic quality of the [Olana] SASS.” Further, the impairment definition in the explanation of Policy 24 clearly states that “the scenic beauty of an identified resource” would be impaired by “the addition of structures which because of siting or scale will reduce the identified views...or diminish the scenic quality of an identified resource.” The proposal is inconsistent with Policies 23, 24 and 25, for the following reasons: -the significantly increased scale of activity and visual impact of the proposed, significantly expanded riverfront industrial facilities, including Hudson Max vessels and their frequency would not be compatible with the special character of Hudson and Athens historic resources, and would present a significant adverse change to the scale, proportions, compositions and enjoyment of nearby historic resources, and would not protect, restore or enhance the scenic riverfront resources.

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- the siting of the Greenport plant causes a portion of it to be visible above Becraft Ridge affecting the Olana historic site, and the scale of the associated plume visible about 39% of daylight hours would be incompatible with the objective of preserving the quality and integrity of the Olana historic resources and SASS. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the proposed activities are inconsistent with New York’s federally approved Coastal Management Program’s enforceable policies 1, 2, 4, 18, 19, 23, 24, and 25, and with the enforceable policies of the New York Coastal Management Program as they are expressed in the policies and purposes of the State and federally approved Local Waterfront Revitalization Program of the Village of Athens. This conclusion rests with the unique nature of the proposal. It does not stand for the proposition that the affects caused by a different siting of a manufacturing facility with a lesser visual impact and a riverfront shipping facility with a reduced level of activity and located so as not to compete and conflict with adjacent uses, would result in a similar finding. Pursuant to 15 CFR Part 930, Subpart H, and within 30 days from receipt of this letter, you may request that the U.S. Secretary of Commerce override this objection. In order to grant an override request, the Secretary must find that the activity is consistent with the objectives or purposes of the Coastal Zone Management Act, or is necessary in the interest of national security. A copy of the request and supporting information must be sent to the New York Department of State, which administers the New York Coastal Management Program, and to the federal permitting or licensing agency. The Secretary may collect fees from you for administering and processing your request. Given that the appeal process can be a lengthy one, if you would like to continue discussions with this office while pursuing an appeal, please call Mr. George R. Stafford at (518) 474-6000, or you may wish to have your counsel contact Mr. William Sharp of the Department of State’s Counsel’s Office, at (518) 474-6740. The U.S. Department of Commerce and the New York District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are being notified of this decision by copy of this letter.

Appendix

Sincerely,

Randy A. Daniels c: NOAA OCRM - John King USACOE/NY - Richard Tomer, Christine Delorier NYS DEC IV - William Clarke, Michael Higgins NYS OPRHP - Jayne McLaughlin, Robert Kuhn LLG&M - Robert Alessi

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Notes

Chapter 1. The Place, the Plant, the People, and the Permits 1. There are several stages in the cement-making process. The first step is blasting the raw materials from the mine, including limestone (for calcium), clay, and sand (for silica, aluminum, and iron). The raw materials are mixed with ingredients brought in from outside, including shale, bauxite, and fly ash. It is then brought to a “raw grinding building,” where it is crushed to approximately the size of gravel. It is all then brought to a laboratory where it is blended to the right proportions. Once it leaves the laboratory, it enters the main manufacturing plant, first in the “preheater tower,” where it is heated from gases leaving the kiln in order to save heat energy, and then to the kiln itself. In the “rotary kiln” the rock is heated to temperatures up to 3600˚F (1870˚C), which causes chemical and physical changes and results in an intermediate product called “clinker.” The clinker is then cooled in a “clinker-cooler building,” then ground to a fine powder in the “finish-grinding building,” and then stored in the “finished cement silos” (DEIS: S.3.1 and Portland Cement Association). 2. Concrete is a mixture of cement, water, sand, and gravel. 3. Opposition included: Berkshire-Litchfield Environmental Council, Berkshire Natural Resources Council, Berkshire Regional Planning Commission, Cancer Awareness Coalition, Inc., Columbia Action Now!, Environmental Advocates of New York, Friends of Clean Air, Housatonic Environmental Action League, Housatonic River Initiative, Hudson Valley GREEN, The National Trust for Historic Preservation, New York Rivers United, The Olana Partnership, Preservation League of New York, Regional Farm & Food Project, and S.T.O.P.P. 4. A complete list of the twenty-two topics covered in the DEIS are as follows: Purpose and Description of the Proposed Project; Land Use, Zoning, and Community Character; Socioeconomic and Fiscal 157

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Conditions; Community Resources; Visual Resources; Archeological Resources; Historic Resources; Physical Setting and Mining; Groundwater Resources; Surface Water Quality; Aquatic and Wetland Resources; Terrestrial Ecology; Traffic and Transportation; Air Quality and Meteorology; Noise; Infrastructure and Energy; Alternatives; Summary of Impact Minimization in Design and Mitigation Measures; Waterfront Revitalization; Growth-Inducing Aspects of the Proposed Project; Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources; and Effects on the Use and Conservation of Energy Resources. 5. Much opposition was raised to the brevity of this period—only two months to examine the 1,600-page document. 6. He expressed further that if the opponents tried, at that point, to delay the building of the plant any longer by filing an appeal, he thought they should pay SLC for every cent it lost by not being in operation. 7. SLC went through a number of PR representatives over the course of the controversy. Chapter 2. Aesthetics and the Search for Quality of Life 1. Andy Bicking recognized the location as the “right place” when looked at from St. Lawrence’s point of view, because of the large supply of limestone and the convenience of being situated between important consumer locations such New York City, Albany, and Boston. 2. It is important to note that the height used to make this simulation was the height above the river level, not the height of the structures, because the plant would be located on top of Becraft Mountain. 3. All newspaper references labeled as Independent/Register Star come from a collection of letters to the editor compiled by Friends of Hudson, in which it is not possible to discern from which newspaper the submissions came. It is also likely that a number of entries were submitted to both newspapers. Chapter 3. Differing Visions for Hudson’s Economic Future 1. Walter Goldstein (1986) points out, however, that social service jobs generally pay minimum wages and often go to non-unionized female workers who are paid significantly less than men.

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Chapter 4. “Why Would Anyone Oppose Healthier Air for Our Children?” 1. There are, obviously, numerous exceptions to this generalization, such as many of the “environmental” movements in the less industrialized countries in which the health of the environment is inextricably tied to people’s livelihoods, or in the emerging environmental justice movement of impoverished and minority neighborhoods in the United States, which is based to a large extent on the indeed pressing concerns of the effect of environmental damage to people’s health. These do not, however, generally fall under the category of “mainstream” environmentalism. 2. Ozone, which is a significant component of smog, can result in serious immune and respiratory disorders, and levels are particularly high in the Northeast because of wind patterns bringing pollution from the Midwest. 3. The DEIS also claims, “While the emissions of primary particulate matter (PM10) would increase with the proposed project, the reduction in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions would most likely result in a net reduction in regional PM” because they contribute to the “secondary formation” of PM (14.5.2). It is also important to note that the high CO levels are in part due to the fact that an increase in NOx contributes to a decrease in CO, so a balance needed to be reached while attempting to keep NOx low because of New York State’s ozone nonattainment status. 4. However, the experts hired for the hearings were paid, and Sam Pratt and Peter Jung were not hired as “objective” experts. 5. The Wise Use movement is a collection of organizations and individuals—often farmers, loggers or others who depend on natural resources for their livelihood—that maintain that the earth is in fact quite resilient and that environmentalists’ ideology is promulgated by the elite who have a desire to be “resource allocators for the world,” but don’t depend on the environment in their daily lives (Arnold 1996). According to one critic, though these groups claim to be “grassroots,” they are actually what some have termed “astroturf” groups because they are organized and funded by major corporations (Burke 1993). Some opponents to SLC have described the Hudson Valley Environmental/Economic Coalition as an “astroturf” group, claiming it is funded and influenced by SLC.

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Chapter 5. Defining Community 1. Native is being used here to mean living in an area for most of one’s life, or one’s family living there for more than one generation, rather than indigenous. 2. This is a similar complaint to that expressed in SLC’s film Etched in Stone, in which the current commercial situation of Hudson is compared with a time when there were numerous clothing and other types of stores.

Bibliography

Aberley, Doug, Boundaries of Home: Mapping for Local Empowerment. Gabriola Island, B.C.: New Society Publishers, 1993. Arnold, Ron, Overcoming Ideology. In A Wolf in the Garden: The Land Rights Movement and the New Environmental Debate, Philip D. Brick and R. McGreggor Cawley, eds. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996. Barnes, Trevor J. and James S. Duncan, eds., Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of the Landscape. London: Routledge, 1992. Benziger, Robin H., “SLC wants money, not community.” Independent, May 4, 2000. Berleant, Arnold, The Aesthetics of Environment. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1992. Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982. Bookchin, Murray, Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future. Boston: South End Press, 1990. Boyle, Robert H., The Hudson River: A Natural and Unnatural History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969. Brady, Emily, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2003. Brownfield, Irma, “SLC divides to conquer.” Independent, April 24, 2000. Burke, William Kevin, “Right Wing Anti-Environmentalism.” The Public Eye. June 1993. Card, Skip, “Scenic Standing; The 40th Anniversary of Scenic Hudson and the Birth of Environmental Litigation.” New York State Bar Association Journal Vol. 77, No. 7, September 2005. 161

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Index

Aberley, Doug, xvi, 117 Aesthetics: autonomism and, 42; class distinctions and, 43, 44; conservation and, 25, 41–45; elitism and, 43, 44, 45; historic resources and, 36–38; legislation safeguarding, 29, 30; moralism and, 42; nature and, 23–26; personal, 43; preemption of by utilitarian concerns, 43, 44; preservation of, 27; public awareness and, 26; and quality of life, 23–45; separated from usefulness, 44; in Storm King dispute, 28–30; universal, 43; used against St. Lawrence Cement, 30, 32, 36; visual impact subjectivity, 42 Air Permit Application, 10, 76 Alienation, 116, 117 American Lung Association, 8 Americlean dispute, 3 Antiques businesses, 51, 58–63, 93, 94, 95 Arnold, Ron, 86, 159n5 Athens Generating, 20 Athens (NY), 40, 152; amicus status granted to, 12; economic revitalization in, 2 Barnes, Trevor, xvii Berleant, Arnold, 44 Bicking, Andy, 1, 9, 30, 58, 62, 102, 111, 158n1 Bluestone, Barry, 50, 51

Boyle, Robert, 28 Brady, Emily, 42 Brownfield, Irma, 100 Bruce, Claudia, 3 Capital District Regional Planning Commission analysis, 53 Card, Skip, 2 Carson, Rachel, 67 Catskill plant: cement operations in, xvi, 3, 40; proposal to close, 4 Cement: decline in production capacity, 4; demand for, 48; imports of, 4; process for making, 157n1; production in New York, 4 Church, Frederic Edwin, xviii, 9, 37, 60, 91 Citizens’ Environmental Coalition, 8 Citizens for a Healthy Environment, 8, 30, 59, 60, 78 Citizens for the Hudson Valley, 8 Clean Air Act (1970), 68, 74 Clean Air and Water Acts revisions (1977), 68 Clover Reach, 8 Coastal Zone Management Act (1972), 68 Coastal Zone Management Program, 105, 120, 123, 133 Cole, Thomas, 25, 91 Columbia County: denied amicus status, 13; employment rates in, 51, 60; Planning Board, 9

169

170

Index

Columbia Hudson Partnership, 12 Communities: after decision, 110–112; change from within, xvii; defining, 89–104; divisions over development plans, 93–104; need to local control in, xv, xvi Concerned Women of Claverack, 5, 8, 19, 54, 55, 59, 100, 105, 110, 112 Conservation: aesthetics and, 25; as business necessity, 25, 26; differences with preservation, 26, 27; early efforts, 25, 26; ethics of, 41–45; significance of, 41–45; “wise use” philosophy and, 26, 85 Consistency certification: applicable policies, 127–149; denial of permit application by NYS Department of State, 119–155; description of facility for review, 120–123; economic base of smaller harbor communities and traditional uses of, 141–144; movement away from waterfront industrial usage, 144–145; NYS Department of State conclusions and analysis of, 149–154; patterns of development reviewed, 124–127; policy analysis in, 127–149; prevention of impairment to scenic resources of statewide significance, 148–149; protection of access to public water recreation resources, 145–147; protection of historically significant resources, 147–148; regional factors reviewed, 124–127; water-dependent usage in, 107, 125–126, 134–141; waterfront revitalization in, 107–109, 126–134 Consolidated Edison, 2; abandonment of project, 2, 29; in Storm King dispute, 28–30 Cornwall (NY), 2, 28 Council on Environmental Quality, 68 Crispell, Andrew, 98 Cronon, William, 24 Crotty, Erin, 13, 14

Daniels, Randy, 105–110 Deindustrialization, 50 Development: community divisions over, 93–104; determination of direction of, 102; differing views of, 59; economic, 58–63; environment and, 47–63; insider/outsider issues in, 96; polarization of sides over, 59 Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), 6, 10. See also Consistency certification; NYS Department of State; air emissions and mitigation strategies in, 74–77; on construction phase, 52; on economic benefits of plant, 52–57; on emissions, 159n3; on full operation phase, 52; location proposals, 49; submission to NYS Department of Environmental Conservation, 10, 11; topics covered, 157n3; visual impact in, 39–41 Duncan, James, xvii Dunwell, Frances, 24, 25 Earth Day, 67 Ebert, Rachel, 117 Economic: alternatives, 58–63; decline, 1, 2, 50, 51; globalization, 116; purported benefits from proposed plant, 52–57; stability, 44 Edmondson, Brad, 69 Endangered Species Act (1973), 68 Entrikin, J. Nicholas, 116 Environment(al): dangers to, xvi; development and, 47–63; and human health, 66–69; justice, 44, 159n1; new technologies and, xvi; pollution and, 65–87; public demands that issues be met, 67; quality, 68; regulations, 6, 50 Environmental Advocates of New York, 8 Environmental Conservation Law, 10 Environmental Defense, 8 Environmental Defense Fund, 69

Index Environmentalism: aesthetical, 44; based on luxury, 43, 44; basic survival and, xvi; counterrevolution in, 68, 69; economic stability and, 44; insiders/outsiders in, 90–93; international, xvi; mainstream, 159n1; of the North/South, 43, 44; postindustrial, xvi; public concern and, 67; second wave, 27, 67; tied to survival, 43, 44 Environmental movements, xvi; beginnings of, 2, 3; court decisions to protect aesthetic interests and, 2; grassroots organizations in, 2, 3; international, 43; protection of beautiful places as goal of, 41 Environmental organizations: changing tactics, 69; court victories for, 2; decentralization of, 71; funding for, 69; grassroots, 70, 71; Group of Ten, 69; institutionalization of, 69; opposition to hydroelectric station at Storm King, 2; persistence of, 71; professionalization of, 69 Erie Canal, 1, 48, 49 Ernst and Young IMPLAN analysis, 53 Falzon, Susan, 112 Federal Aviation Administration, 10 Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act (1972), 68 Federal Power Commission, 28, 29 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (1972), 68 Foster, Cheryl, 42 Franklin, Sarah, 85 Friends of Clermont, 8 Friends of Hudson, 3, 14, 20, 62, 63, 83, 96, 97, 111, 112; advertising by, 11; Americlean dispute and, 3; beginning of opposition to St. Lawrence Cement, 4; financing challenge to St. Lawrence Cement, 7, 8; on health issues, 78; member-

171 ship increase, 11; party status granted to, 12; size issue raised by, 32; views of regional economy, 59, 60

Germantown Neighbors Association, 8 Gerosa, Alix, 9 Globalization, 115; control issues in, xvi; economic, 116 Goldberger, Helene, 12, 14 Goldstein, Walter, 158n1 Gottlieb, Robert, 27, 67, 69, 91 Grandfathering, 13, 14, 83 Greenport (NY), 50; denied amicus status, 13; proposed new plant in, 3; size of new facility, 3, 4 Guha, Ramachandra, 43, 44, 86 Hall, Bruce, 48 Hall, Cyndy, 19, 55, 59, 85, 100, 101, 105, 110, 112 Harrison, Bennett, 50, 51 Harvey, David, 117 Hays, Samuel, 27 Health issues, 65–87, 159n2; industrial expansion and, 66; pollution and, 7 Hetch-Hetchy Valley, 26, 27 Historic Hudson, Inc., 8 Historic Hudson Valley, 8 Host Agreement, 55, 56 Hudson, Henry, 1 Hudson Antiques Dealers Association, 8 Hudson (NY), xvi; alternative industries in, 58–63; class issues in development of, 93–104; demographic changes and, 93–104; economic depression in, 49, 50; economic growth from antiques and real estate boom, 51; historic places designation, 37; sense of nostalgia for, 50, 56; state of housing market in, 50; unemployment in, 50

172

Index

Hudson River: American Heritage River designation, 37; economic need for, 1; transportation use, 1, 62 Hudson River Heritage, 8 Hudson River School of painters, 9, 24, 36, 91; role in development of American culture, 25 Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., 8 Hudson Valley: cement industry in, 48–52; designation as “scenic area,” 36, 37; economic future of, 47–63; economic recession in, 47; industrial decline in, 1, 2; as National Heritage Area, 37 Hudson Valley Environmental/Economic Coalition, 62, 100, 159n5; confidence in victory, 17 Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition, 8, 30, 37, 84; claims over visual impact of plant, 41; party status granted to, 12 Hudson Vision Plan, 94 Indian Point nuclear power plant, 62 Industry: alternative, 58–63; brickmaking, 48; candlemaking, 48; cement, 48–52; comeback in, 1, 2; decline in, 1, 2; effect of environmental regulations on, 50; effects on nature, 2; high-tech, 51; light manufacturing, 48; movement to southern United States, 1, 2, 51, 52; outsourcing and, 1, 2; past history in region, 48–52; smart-growth, 60; soapmaking, 48; sustainable, 60, 62; tanneries, 48; textile, 48; transportation, 48; utility, 69 Iovine, Julie, 89 Issues Conference: issues deemed adjudicable, 13; significant issues, 12; substantive issues, 12 Joint Permit Application, 10 Jung, Peter, 3, 85, 112, 159n4

Kingston (NY), 48 Knott, Catherine Henshaw, 27, 91 Lakoff, George, 115 Lassiter, Barbara, 91 Leopold, Aldo, 23, 67 Ley, David, 116, 117 Marine Mammals Protection Act (1972), 68 Marranca, Bonnie, 45 Marx, Karl, 116 Moyers, Bill, 25, 30 Muir, John, 26 Mussmann, Linda, 57, 65, 90, 102 Nash, Roderick, 24, 25, 26, 91 National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 74 National Environmental Policy Act (1970), 68 National parks: early conservation programs in, 26; as game preserves, 27 National Register of Historic Places, 37 National Trust for Historic Preservation, 37; amicus status granted to, 12 Natural Resources Defense Council, 8, 13 Nature: abuse of, 25; access to, 27; aesthetic/recreational value of, 26, 27; aesthetics and, 23–26; back to, 41; changing views of, 27, 91; early settlers and, 23, 24; effects of industry on, 2; ethics of human interaction with, 41; government protection of, 41; inexhaustible resources and, 24; interest in preservation of, 27; as mysterious and dangerous, 24; Romantic Movement and, 24; viewed as sublime, 24, 25 New Source Review, 74 New York: cement production in, 4; unemployment rates, 51

Index New York City: demand for cement in, 49; population boom in, 1 New York League of Conservation Voters, 8 Nixon, Richard, 68 Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 74 Nyland, Elizabeth, 54, 55 NYS Ambient Air Quality Standards, 74 NYS Department of Environmental Conservation, 3, 9, 74; Office of Hearings and Mediation Services, 12 NYS Department of State, 10, 105; conclusions and analysis of consistency certification, 149–154; decision objecting to certificate of consistency from St. Lawrence Cement, 16, 119–155; historic resources and, 106; plant inconsistency with anticipated uses, 108, 109; refusal to approve permit application, 105–112; specific policy decisions, 106–110; visual impacts and, 106, 107; waterdependent usage and, 107; waterfront revitalization and redevelopment, 107–109, 126–127 NYS Department of Transportation, 9 NYS Office of General Services, 9 O’Brien, Raymond, 28, 92, 93, 99 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 68 Odescalchi, Dan, 10, 17, 18, 19, 39, 40, 52, 53, 61, 62, 80, 81, 85, 86, 95, 97 The Olana Partnership, 9; party status granted to, 12 Olana State Historic Site, xviii, 9, 37, 38, 40, 91, 150–151 Open Space Institute, 112 Opposition to plant, 54–57, 113, 114, 115; accusations of “anti-development” against, 59; aesthetic ethics and, 42; beliefs on economic harm,

173 7; claims for alternative forms of economic growth and, 48; claims that company was untruthful, 55, 56; confidence in victory, 16, 17; criticisms of expert witnesses for supporters, 82–84; differing conclusions on health issues from supporters, 78–85; disbelief in economic benefits from, 47, 48, 54–57; doubt about economic benefits from, 7; environmental and health damage concerns, xvi, 7; on environmental health issues, 77–78; impact on historic resources and, 7; interpretations of information given in permit applications, 79, 80; organizational, 6, 7, 157n2; questions company reliability on accuracy of information in permit process, 80; questions on choices of control technology selected by company, 81, 82; stereotypes and, 21, 84; visual impact of plant and, 7

Pataki, Gov. George, 110 Permit process for proposal, 9–16, 13. See also NYS Department of State; Administrative Law Judges in, 12; air emissions and mitigation strategies in Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 74–77; Air Permit Application, 74, 76; consistency certification offering, 105, 119–155; dispersion models for air testing, 74; Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) and, 10; identification of type of action in, 10; Issues Conference in, 12; NYS Department of Environmental Conservation and, 9; NYS Department of State and, 10; NYS Department of Transportation and, 9; NYS Office of General Services and, 9; permits for “party status” in, 12; State Environmental Quality

174

Index

Permit process for proposal (cont.) Review and, 10; US Environmental Protection Agency and, 10; use of expert testimony in, 82–85 Pesticides, 67 Pinchot, Gifford, 26 Piwonka, Ruth, 48 Pollution: air, xv, 7, 66, 76, 77, 78; industrial, 66; as minor irritant, 67; pesticide, 67; as social injustice, 68; water, 66 Porteus, J. Douglas, 44, 47 Pratt, Sam, 3, 14, 20, 82, 85, 96, 112, 159n4 Preservation: of aesthic qualities, 27; differences with conservation, 26, 27; movement, 91; outsiders and, 90, 91, 92 Preservation League: amicus status granted to, 12 Prevention of Serious Deterioration regulations, 74 Quality of life: aesthetics and, 23–45; class issues, 44, 90; economic growth and, 58–63; historic resources and, 36–38; right to, 27, 68; role of beauty in, 36; and sense of identity, 38; threats to, xv Reagan, Ronald, 68, 69 Real estate businesses, 51, 58–63, 93, 95, 96 Red Hook (NY), xvi, 19 Reed, Christopher, 112 Reese, Francis, 28 Riverkeeper, Inc., 8 Roling, Caylor, 48, 49, 58, 94, 96, 99 Rolston, Holmes, 41 Romantic Movement, 41, 98; nature and, 24 Roosevelt, Theodore, 25, 26 St. Lawrence Cement and proposed new facility, 7, 13; aesthetic issues in opposition to, 23–45; air dispersion modeling and, 13; air emis-

sions and mitigation strategies in Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 7, 74–77; air pollution impacts, 13; alternative site uses, 60; announces plans to NYS Department of Environmental Conservation, 3; attempts to positivize elements of impact statements, 40, 41; Catskill plant, xvi, 3, 4, 40; as cause of deep community divisions, 19–21; changes in plant design and, 14, 16; choice of Becraft Mountain for, 4; claims for need for diversity in regional industries, 61, 62; Coastal Zone Management Program and, 106; comparison illustrations, 31, 33, 34, 35, 39; conclusions and analysis of consistency certification by NYS Department of State, 149–154; as a contradiction to rights of citizens, 36; conveyor system, 6, 40; denial of permits to, 16; described as “state-of-the-art,” 6; discrepancies in conclusions of opposing sides on health issues, 78–85; dispute centered in questions of identity, 113; dock facility, 6, 40; Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), 52–57 (See also Consistency certification; NYS Department of State); economic issues and, 47–63; effect on tourism, 9; emphasis by company on region’s industrial past, 48–52; employment issues, 53; environmental concerns and, 6, 7; environmental health and, 70–74; exploitation of community antagonisms for advantage, 100; grandfathering and, 13, 14; as health issue, 65–87; incompatibility with region, 32, 36; insider/outsider issues in, 93–104; Issues Conference for, 12; items offered to NYS Department of State for review, 120–123; lack of appreciable employment opportunities from, 54–57; lighting issues,

Index 40; location change proposals, 40; location in center of concentration of historic properties, 37; loss of support for, 100; manufacturing plant and mine, 6; noise impacts, 13; NYS Department of State objection to consistency certification, 119–155; permit denial by NYS Department of State (See NYS Department of State); permit process for, 9–16; Project Labor Agreement by, 20; propaganda film by, 49, 57; property values and, 61; proposal for new plant, 4–6; public comment period on, 11, 12; purported economic benefits due to, 52–57; quarry, 8; refusal of NYS Department of State to certify application, 105–112; regulated pollutants expected from plant, 75tab, 76, 77, 78; riverine habitat mitigation plan and, 13; scoping decisions of, 10, 11, 39, 40; size issues, 30, 32; split in community and, 93–104; stacks and plumes, 6, 32; support for industry in general, rather than company, 56, 57; tax revenues and, 52, 53, 61; unethical tactics by, 20; use of aesthetic values against, 30, 32, 36; use of misleading statements in advertising, 71–74, 86, 87; views of, 15; visual impacts, 7, 13; visual impact statement, 39–41; withdrawal of proposal, 16, 105–112 Scenic America, 8 Scenic Areas of State-Wide Significance, 133 Scenic Hudson, 20, 58, 62; advocacy of “Scenic Preservation,” 37; as “aggrieved party” in Storm King dispute, 2; beginning of opposition to St. Lawrence Cement, 4; creation of, 28; environmental quality issues and, 3; financing challenge to St. Lawrence Cement, 7, 8; formation of, 2; granted “intervener”

175

status at Storm King, 28; in Hudson Valley Preservation Coalition, 8; land preservation and, 3; in regional planning and conservation, 3; riverfront community division of, 3; size issue raised by, 32; in Storm King dispute, 28 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 2 Schmitt, Peter, 90 Schoolman, Morton, 51 Scoping process, 10, 39, 40 Shabecoff, Philip, 27, 68, 69, 70 Sierra Club, 26, 27; Atlantic Chapter, 8 State Environmental Quality Review, 10; citizen participation in, 10; First Interim Decision, 13; identification of type of action, 10; Second Interim Decision, 14; steps in process of, 10, 11 State Environmental Quality Review Act, 10; creation of, 29; as result of Storm King dispute, 29 Storm King Mountain: aesthetics in dispute over, 28–30; hydroelectric station dispute at, 2; outsiders and, 92, 93; scenic beauty as central aspect of dispute, 28, 29, 30 Support for plant, 113, 114, 115; benefit of for local economy and, 47, 48; confidence in victory, 16, 17; criticisms of expert witnesses for opposition, 82–84; differing conclusions on health issues from opposition, 78–85; economic stimulation and, xvi; emphasis on past community feeling, 49, 50; emphasis on region’s industrial past, 47, 48–52; income considerations and, 49; interpretations of information given in permit applications, 80; in propaganda film by company, 49, 57; questions of honesty of opposition by, 20; stereotypes and, 21, 84; surveys showing, 18, 19; use of economic “necessity” for justification, 70

176

Index

Talbot, Allan, 28 Teague, Mark, 18 Thurston, Dr. George, 84 Tourism, 9, 58–63, 93 Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), 68 Tyler, Stephen, xvii Ulster (NY): economic revitalization in, 2 Unemployment, 50 Universal Atlas Cement plant, 39, 40, 41, 49

Urbanization, 116 US Army Corps of Engineers, 10 US Environmental Protection Agency, 10, 68, 74, 77 Villa, Maria, 12, 14 Wilson, Woodrow, 26 Wise Use movement, 26, 85, 86, 159n5 Yosemite National Park, 26, 27

NEW YORK STUDIES / ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES

STOPPING THE PLANT The St. Lawrence Cement Controversy and the Battle for Quality of Life in the Hudson Valley

Miriam D. Silverman When the St. Lawrence Cement Company proposed building a massive coal-powered cement plant near the banks of the Hudson River in the town of Greenport, New York, in 1999 it ignited a controversy that dominated the discussion of community development in the entire Hudson Valley region. Stopping the Plant is a fascinating and detailed chronicle of how the proposal fired the passions of many local citizens, spawned the creation of numerous activist groups, and over the next several years spread to become a raging dispute throughout the Northeast. Miriam D. Silverman provides a thorough and balanced exploration of the positions of both sides of this highly polarized dispute, while at the same time places the controversy within a greater historical and regional context. For anyone interested in community organizing, the potentials and difficulties of modern grassroots environmentalism, and, ultimately, the future of the environmental movement, Silverman emphasizes the significance of the decision by St. Lawrence Cement to withdraw its application in 2005. “A vivid portrayal of citizens and environmental organizations joining together to win the first great fight for the Hudson in the twenty-first century, with important lessons for the coming struggle to save the ‘landscape that defined America.’” — Frederic C. Rich, Chair, Board of Directors, Scenic Hudson “This is a well-written account on an environmental conflict which, against long odds, citizens won. Stopping the Plant deserves wide readership, not least because the federal government is in retreat, which means that environmental protection will be done at the local and state levels or not at all. Miriam Silverman has pulled off the very difficult task of being evenhanded without losing her own voice. It is hard to fairly present views with which one disagrees, but she does this admirably. The result is a compelling and convincing analysis of how a powerful corporation, promising jobs and prosperity to hard-pressed communities, lost to a broad coalition that put forward a very different vision of what sort of future they wanted.” — Jan E. Dizard, author of Going Wild: Hunting, Animal Rights, and the Contested Meaning of Nature “Ms. Silverman’s calm dissection of a passionate local debate not only helps us understand the worldviews that recently collided in the Hudson Valley, but also enables us to recognize the complexities of similar controversies throughout the United States. This book should be read by anyone in the Hudson Valley whose awareness of the proposed cement factory was limited to the ‘Stop the Plant’ signs—and by anyone interested in what happens when local and global interests clash.” — Leon Botstein, President, Bard College MIRIAM D. SILVERMAN is an independent scholar born and raised in New York City. A volume in the SUNY series, An American Region: Studies in the Hudson Valley Thomas S. Wermuth, editor State University of New York Press www.sunypress.edu