EMPIRE ON THE HUDSON
The Columbia History of Urban Life kenneth t. jackson, general editor
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EMPIRE ON THE HUDSON
The Columbia History of Urban Life kenneth t. jackson, general editor
The Columbia History of Urban Life Kenneth T. Jackson, General Editor Deborah Dash Moore, At Home in America: Second Generation New York Jews 1981 Edward K. Spann, The New Metropolis: New York City, 1840–1857 1981 Matthew Edel, Elliott D. Sclar, and Daniel Luria, Shaky Palaces: Homeownership and Social Mobility in Boston’s Suburbanization 1984 Steven J. Ross, Workers on the Edge: Work, Leisure, and Politics in Industrializing Cincinnati, 1788–1890 1985 Andrew Lees, Cities Perceived: Urban Society in European and American Thought, 1820–1940 1985 R. J. R. Kirkby, Urbanization in China: Town and Country in a Developing Economy, 1949–2000 a.d. 1985 Judith Ann Trolander, Professionalism and Social Change: From the Settlement House Movement to Neighborhood Centers, 1886 to the Present 1987 Marc A. Weiss, The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning 1987 Jacqueline Leavitt and Susan Saegert, From Abandonment to Hope: CommunityHouseholds in Harlem 1990 Richard Plunz, A History of Housing in New York City: Dwelling Type and Social Change in the American Metropolis 1990 David Hamer, New Towns in the New World: Images and Perceptions of the NineteenthCentury Urban Frontier 1990 Andrew Heinze, Adapting to Abundance: Jewish Immigrants, Mass Consumption, and the Search for American Identity 1990 Chris McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in the City 1993 Clay McShane, Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City 1994 Clarence Taylor, The Black Churches of Brooklyn 1994 Frederick Binder and David Reimers, “All the Nations Under Heaven”: A Racial and Ethnic History of New York City 1995 Clarence Taylor, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New York City Schools 1997 Andrew S. Dolkart, Morningside Heights: A History of Its Architecture and Development 1998 Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant with Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn 2000 A Scott Henderson, Housing and the Democratic Ideal 2000
EMPIRE
ON THE HUDSON Entrepreneurial Vision and Political Power at the
PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY
Jameson W. Doig
Columbia University Press, New York
Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 2001 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Doig, Jameson W. Empire on the Hudson : entrepreneurial vision and political power at the Port of New York Authority / Jameson W. Doig p. cm.—The Columbia history of urban life Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-231-07676-2 (cloth : acid-free paper) 0-231-07677-0 (pbk. : acid-free paper) 1. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey—History. 2. Harbors—New York (State)—New York—History—20th century. 3. Harbors—New Jersey—History—20th century. 4. Harbors—Economic aspects—New York (State)—New York History—20th century. 5. Harbors—Economic aspects—New Jersey—History—20th century. HE554.N5 D65 2000 386.1/09747/1 21 00-031609 Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 credits All the maps have been prepared by J. Wayman Williams for use in this book and are owned by the author. The background for maps 2-1, 3-1, 4-1, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-3, 6-1, and 11-1 is taken from the MapArt City Series (www.map-art.com), courtesy of Cartesia Software, Lambertville, NJ 08530. Maps 2-2, 4-2, 5-2, and 14-1 are based on drawings owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and are used with the permission of the Port Authority. Figure 11-2 is used with the permission of the New York Post (NYP Holdings, Inc). In the photo insert, photo 1 is reproduced courtesy of the South Street Seaport Museum, New York City. Photos 10 and 20 are used with permission of the New Jersey State Archives. Photo 13 is courtesy of Scientific American (June 4, 1921 issue). For photos 18, 19, 22, and 31, I am indebted to Margot Ammann Durrer. Stacy Tobin Carmichael and Farley Tobin have granted permission to use photos 40–45 and 52, as well as 86–89. Photos 58, 59, and 60 are used courtesy of the Special Archive, Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority. Photo 69 is used courtesy of AMR Corporation; photo 70 courtesy of the Auburn University Archives; and photo 71 with the permission of Pan American World Airways Records, Archives and Special Collections, University of Miami. All other photographs and illustrations are reproduced with the permission of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
To Joan, with love, and with thanks for 48 years of companionship
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Contents
list of illustrations in the text ix elected and appointed officials: years in office xi foreword xv preface: Hopes and Judgments xix chapter 1. A Wilsonian Hybrid The Powers of Government and the Spirit of Capitalism 1
PART ONE. CREATING A NEW INSTITUTION chapter 2. The Tensions and Opportunities of Federalism Commercial Conflict in the New York Region 27 chapter 3. Designing a New Organization An Uneasy Marriage of Planning and Politics 47
PART TWO. FAILURE AND A NEW BEGINNING chapter 4. Modernizing the Rail System Contending Strategies for an Expanding Metropolis 77 chapter 5. Negotiating with the Railroads Regional Planning Confronts the Wary Capitalist 97 chapter 6. Politics and Engineering Passion Expanding the Port Authority’s Dreams 120 chapter 7. A Web of Bridges, Tunnels, and Political Intrigue 143
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PART THREE. DRIFT AND THE SOURCES OF RENEWAL chapter 8. Near Bankruptcy and the Loss of Vision 181 chapter 9. Federalism as a Lawyers’ Playground 192 chapter 10. The Threat to Municipal Bonds as Danger and Opportunity 214
PART FOUR. EXPANDING EMPIRE chapter 11. To Claim the Skies and the Seas 247 chapter 12. Breaking an Airline Monopoly 288 chapter 13. More Than “A Humdrum Job of Engineering” Creating a Giant Bus Station in Manhattan 315
PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS chapter 14. A Regional Empire in American Politics Local History and Its Impact, Leadership Strategies, and Ethical Dilemmas 359 epilogue: Triumphs and Travails of an Aging Empire 373
appendix: the port compact of 1921 403 notes 411 acknowledgments 555 index 561 photo insert appears after page 200.
List of Illustrations in the Text
2-1.
Main waterways, inner counties, and important cities in the New York–New Jersey region 29
2-2.
Rail lines in the New York region, 1920 36
3-1.
The Port of New York District 70
4-1.
The Narrows Tunnel plan (1920s) 82
4-2.
Lindenthal’s 57th Street Bridge (1920 ff.) 83
4-3.
New Jersey’s maritime cities, existing and potential 87
4-4.
The Port of New York Authority’s rail-freight plan (1920s) 91
5-1.
The Port Authority rail-freight plan 105
5-2.
Belt 13, with associated piers and railroad links 107
5-3.
The three New Jersey–Staten Island bridges and the Holland Tunnel 113
6-1.
Proposed bridges and tunnels across the Hudson River 135
10-1. Cartoon: Julius Henry Cohen and Austin Tobin 223 11-1.
Airports and marine terminals in the New York region (1940s) 253
11-2.
Cartoon: a creative solution to the air traffic problem 275
11-3.
Cartoon: Austin Tobin and Meyer Ellenstein 283
13-1.
Eight bus stations vs. Union bus terminal 318
13-2. Proposed ramps and overpasses, Lincoln Tunnel to the bus terminal 319 14-1.
The Port Authority in 1950: bridges, tunnels, airports, bus and truck terminals 360
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Elected and Appointed Officials, with Years in Office
New Jersey—Governors Woodrow Wilson, 1911–13 James F. Fielder, 1914–17 Walter E. Edge, 1917–19 Edward I. Edwards, 1920–23 George S. Silzer, 1923–26 A. Harry Moore, 1926–29 Morgan F. Larson, 1929–32 A. Harry Moore, 1932–35 Harold G. Hoffman, 1935–38 A. Harry Moore, 1938–41
Charles Edison, 1941–44 Walter E. Edge, 1944–47 Alfred E. Driscoll, 1947–54 Robert B. Meyner, 1954–62 Richard J. Hughes, 1962–70 William T. Cahill, 1970–74 Brendan T. Byrne, 1974–82 Thomas H. Kean, 1982–90 James J. Florio, 1990–94 Christine Todd Whitman, 1994–
New York State—Governors John A. Dix, 1911–12 William Sulzer, 1913 Martin Glynn, acting, 1913–14 Charles S. Whitman, 1915–18 Alfred E. Smith, 1919–20 Nathan L. Miller, 1921–22 Alfred E. Smith, 1923–28 Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1929–32
Herbert H. Lehman, 1933–42 Thomas E. Dewey, 1943–54 Averell Harriman, 1955–58 Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1959–73 Malcolm Wilson, 1973–74 Hugh J. Carey, 1975–82 Mario M. Cuomo, 1983–94 George E. Pataki, 1995–
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officials
New York City—Mayors William Jay Gaynor, 1910–13 John Purroy Mitchel, 1914–17 John F. Hylan, 1918–25 James J. Walker, 1926–32 John P. O’Brien, 1933 Fiorello H. LaGuardia, 1934–45 William O’Dwyer, 1946–50
Vincent R. Impelliteri, 1950–53 Robert F. Wagner, Jr., 1954–65 John V. Lindsay, 1966–73 Abraham D. Beame, 1974–77 Edward I. Koch, 1978–89 David N. Dinkins, 1990–93 Rudolph W. Giuliani, 1994–
Port Authority Commissioners (selected) Eugenius H. Outerbridge, NY 1921–24 (chairman, 1921–24) Alfred E. Smith, NY 1921–23 John F. Galvin, NY 1923–33 (chairman, 1928–33) Julian Gregory, NJ 1923–26 (chairman, 1924–26) Frank C. Ferguson, NJ 1924–45 (chairman, 1934–45) George S. Silzer, NJ 1926–28 (chairman, 1926–28) Howard S. Cullman, NY 1927–69 (chairman, 1945–55) Alexander J. Shamberg, NY 1930–41 Joseph M. Byrne, Jr., NJ 1934–53 (vice chairman, 1945–53) Charles S. Whitman, NY 1935–42 John Borg, NJ 1938–45, 1948–53 Bayard F. Pope, NY 1944–55, 1959–67 Donald V. Lowe, NJ 1945–69 (chairman, 1955–59) S. Sloan Colt, NY 1946–68 (chairman, 1959–68) James C. Kellogg, III, NJ 1955–80 (chairman, 1968–74) William J. Ronan, NY 1967–90 (chairman, 1974–77) Alan Sagner, NJ 1974–86 (chairman, 1977–85) Robert F. Wagner, Jr., NY 1976–91 Philip Kaltenbacher, NJ 1982–93 (chairman, 1985–90) Richard C. Leone, NJ 1988–94 (chairman, 1990–94) Kathleen A. Donovan, NJ 1994– (chairperson, 1994–95) Lewis M. Eisenberg, NJ, 1994– (chairman, 1995–)
officials
Port Authority Staff Members (selected) Julian Henry Cohen, General Counsel, 1921–42 John E. Ramsey, 1921–42; CEO, 1926–30; General Manager, 1930–42 B. F. Cresson, Jr., Chief Engineer, 1921–23 W. W. Drinker, 1921–27; Chief Engineer, 1923–26 Walter P. Hedden, 1922–52; Director of Port Development, 1942–52 Othmar H. Ammann, 1925–39; Chief Engineer, 1928–39 Austin J. Tobin, 1927–72; Executive Director, 1942–72 Lee K. Jaffe, Director of Public Relations, 1944–65 Peter C. Goldmark, Jr., Executive Director, 1977–85 Stephen Berger, Executive Director, 1986–90 Stanley Brezenoff, Executive Director, 1990–95 George J. Marlin, Executive Director, 1995–97 Robert E. Boyle, Executive Director, 1997–
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Foreword
Kenneth T. Jackson
N
ew York City owes its location, its growth, its prosperity, and even its very existence, to its port. It is a natural site for a transportation break, for an entrepot of incredible variety, and for a great city. Indeed, the southern tip of present-day Manhattan was already a centuries-old trading post in 1524, when Giovanni da Verrazano, an Italian in the employ of France, became the first known European to sail into the magnificent bay. Located at the point where the Hudson and Passaic Rivers mingle with the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and Long Island Sound, the harbor is the finest in the western hemisphere and is usually ice-free in all seasons. In 1609, Henry Hudson sailed into the Upper Bay and soon reported to his Dutch employers that the natives were friendly, that the river was broad, and that the climate was moderate. Thus encouraged, the Dutch established a fort there in 1624 and made it the center of their trading operations in North America. In 1664, the English took the city away from the Dutch and renamed it New York. In the centuries ahead, the cornerstone of Gotham’s growth was commerce, and the backbone of its economy long remained at the water’s edge, from which the settlement expanded and waxed rich. Soon after the winning of American independence in 1783, New York began to surpass its major rivals. By 1789, it was the leading city in the coasting trade, and ten years later it had surpassed all its competitors in tonnage and in the value of both exports and imports. Its protected waterways were ideal for ocean-going vessels, and for smaller boats, whose number swelled after the Erie Canal opened in 1825. Between the Civil War and 1960, when Rotterdam overtook it, the Port of New York usually ranked as the world’s busiest, and it typically handled more goods and passengers than Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore combined. Even experienced seamen were awed by the vast traffic of tramp steamers, sailing vessels, barges, ferries, and warships which jockeyed for position in its crowded waters. Meanwhile, behind the docks stretched acres of warehouses, storage tanks, coal dumps, sugar mills, breweries, and dry docks. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, xv
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the vast harbor was responsible for hundreds of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in commerce. By 1920, the port was, however, in decline. Its problems became evident during World War I, when freight trains destined for New York backed up as far as Pennsylvania because of congestion and overcrowding in the harbor. One problem was that the ramshackle docks and piers were simply unable to handle the modern vessels that lined up along the Hudson and East Rivers. Another difficulty was the very geography that had made Gotham prosperous. In 1920, for example, 90 percent of the docking facilities were located in New York City, but most railroads terminated in New Jersey. The irony bordered on the incredible: The world’s busiest harbor was not designed for direct rail–water shipment. Boxcars had to be loaded on and off barges, which shuffled back and forth across the Hudson River and New York Bay. This added to the cost of doing business in the metropolitan region. Meanwhile, competing ports were constructing modern terminal facilities and garnering an increasing share of the nation’s maritime trade. In 1921, in response to these and related problems, the states of New York and New Jersey undertook a cooperative effort to create an institution unlike anything ever before seen in the United States. To be known as the Port of New York Authority, it would improve terminals and associated transportation facilities in the great harbor and be empowered to issue bonds and to charge fees for its services. During the next several decades, it became a huge enterprise and constructed bridges, tunnels, airports, bus terminals, and office operations of almost unparalleled size. Along the way, it became the model for hundreds of similar quasi-governmental institutions across the land, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which together changed the face of a giant nation. Empire on the Hudson, then, is a big book about a big topic and represents a major contribution to our understanding of several broad themes that have been crucial in American history and politics. First, it is about the political, economic, and physical transformation of the first metropolitan region in the world to reach a population of fifteen million. Second, Empire on the Hudson examines the tensions between the demands that government be efficient and effective and that it be responsive to the wishes of the electorate. Third, Empire on the Hudson is unusual in its focus on individuals—Austin Tobin, the lawyer who rose from a marginal position in the Port Authority to become its executive director and the real “power broker” in the bi-state region; and also Julius Henry Cohen, the attorney who more than anyone else made the Authority a paragon of Progressivism, and Othmar H. Ammann, the brilliant
foreword
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Swiss engineer who was responsible for the George Washington Bridge, the Bayonne Bridge, and the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge. Finally, Empire on the Hudson offers persuasive evidence that a writer can examine and analyze even the most complex urban institutions without adopting a prose style that is full of jargon and unreadable sentences. Jameson Doig writes in a fashion that both entertains readers and respects their intelligence. One important contribution of this volume is to recall us to a time when Americans had confidence that government could confront great problems with imagination and decisiveness and that bureaucracies could be at once honest, effective, and competent. Indeed, the Port Authority, in Doig’s view, was founded as the very embodiment of the Progressive approach to politics— that is, to rely on experts, to insulate them from the narrow interests and patronage needs of elected office-holders, and to give them the power to get things done. As Robert Fishman has remarked, “Now that governments seem paralyzed in confronting problems far less complex than reorganizing the Port of New York, it is well to be reminded of a faith in government and in the future that once moved mountains, or at least built bridges and tunnels.” No one other than Jameson Doig could have written this book. A respected scholar and a prodigious researcher who is familiar with the best social science literature and who has devoted most of a long and distinguished career to examining the challenges and crises of the modern metropolis, he has written a tour-de-force that will remain for generations the definitive study of this major institution. It is an important contribution as well to our general understanding of the role of government in modern society—and of the conditions under which governments can act to meet important social problems, and with what benefits and costs.
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Preface
Hopes and Judgments
The States recognize that a wise co-operation is . . . imperative in the common interest . . . but they lack the means, the instrumentalities that would serve them in their new community of action. —Woodrow Wilson, Governor of New Jersey, “An Address to the Conference of Governors,” Nov. 29, 1910; in Arthur S. Link et al., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, volume 22, pp. 104-105. The Port of New York Authority is authorized and directed to proceed with the development of the Port of New York . . . and is vested with all necessary and appropriate powers . . . except the power to levy taxes. —Julius Henry Cohen, counsel to the Port of New York Authority, “Developing the Port of New York,” address before the National Rivers and Harbors Congress, Dec. 22, 1922, p. 9. The Port Authority . . . is in fact one of the most interesting and potentially one of the most formidable political agencies America has yet produced. — Archibald Macleish, “Port of New York Authority,” Fortune, Sept., 1933, p.119. We are proud of the work that we have accomplished through this bi-state agency. . . . What I would like to stress more than the physical accomplishments . . . is what has been accomplished in the way of the restoration of faith in our representative system of government, our working Federalism. —Alfred E. Driscoll, governor of New Jersey, as quoted in the Port of New York Authority, Annual Report for 1951, p. 6. Some special-district governments have so much power that they dominate the social and economic life of an entire region. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey exemplifies this domination. . . . Once appointed, its members are almost beyond removal and are thoroughly insulated from popular control. —Lawrence J. R. Herson and John M. Boland, The Urban Web (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1990, p. 254).
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T
he creation of this “most interesting” agency, its evolution during its first several decades, and the significance of that history for our understanding of politics in the United States are explored in the fourteen chapters below. An Epilogue provides a critical review of the agency’s evolution since its heyday in mid-century. Jameson W. Doig May 2000
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EMPIRE ON THE HUDSON
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1 A Wilsonian Hybrid The Powers of Government and the Spirit of Capitalism
F
rom lakes and streams high in the Adirondack Mountains, the river named for Henry Hudson flows south for 300 miles, past Schuylerville, and Troy, and Albany, and then, on its east bank, past Dutchess County and Putnam and Westchester—all cities and counties of New York State. And now, less than twenty miles from the Atlantic Ocean, New Jersey bustles forward, and occupies the west bank, and demands to be recognized as joint owner of the Lower Hudson and of all the commercial opportunity of the great New York Bay. To this smaller state, its demand for recognition is a matter of economic necessity, of political sovereignty. Above all, perhaps, it is a matter of pride. Like other great waterways in the United States and abroad—the Nile, the Tennessee, and San Francisco Bay, for example—the Hudson River and her associated streams and inlets have long been a prime source of commercial activity and economic growth for shore and hinterland, and the arena also of political conflict among the states and cities in its environs. In these regions too we find creative efforts to fashion new instruments of government to meet economic and social needs: a Tennessee Valley Authority; semi-independent port authorities in San Francisco and Oakland; development agencies along the Nile; and the Port of New York Authority—as it was known until 1972, when the bi-state agency was retitled the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, in deference to that smaller state’s political power and sensitivities. Now close to its eightieth birthday, the Port Authority is one of the oldest and largest of the world’s specialized regional governments. Created in 1921 at the urging of business and political leaders on both sides of the Hudson, the Port of New York Authority would, its founders hoped, replace conflict with cooperative effort in the region’s search for economic growth on and near its 800 miles of waterfront. Because of opposition from politicians in both states, however, the Authority was given very little formal power, and for several years it floundered in the muddy waters of New York Bay and local politics. Yet 1
2
a wilsonian hybrid
within a decade of its creation the Port Authority had evolved from an agency of vague and toothless charter into a vigorous engine of economic vitality—a public organization both marvelous and disturbing to behold. Marvelous, because it had accomplished great feats of engineering and carried them forward under a banner of interstate cooperation, with unexpected speed and without direct burden to the taxpayer. Yet disquieting, when measured by important American values, because the new agency avoided close democratic controls and symbolized—indeed endorsed, showed the benefits of—efficiency as a goal, a goal that might best be achieved if democracy in its usual forms were put “on hold.” To those who compared its striking achievements with the faltering efforts of other governmental bodies, the Port Authority’s success seemed to flow from its independence of local politics, its stated ideology of “businesslike efficiency,” and the competence and public spirit of the men and women who were attracted to an agency with these distinctive characteristics. Franklin Roosevelt emphasized these themes in 1931, when he saluted the Port Authority for completing the George Washington Bridge ahead of schedule and “at a cost well below the original estimate.” “To my mind,” FDR concluded, “this type of disinterested and capable service is a model for government agencies throughout the land. Their methods are charting the course toward the more able and honorable administration of affairs of government—a course they have proved can be safely steered through political waters with intelligence and integrity at the helm.”1 With Roosevelt’s backing, the Port Authority became a partial model for the Tennessee Valley Authority, created in 1933, and the model for the hundreds of semi-independent public authorities constructed by American state and local governments in the 1930s. Its design and experience were crucial influences on Robert Moses, as he developed an array of public authorities in the 1930s and 1940s. Its strategy for financial independence—issuing revenue bonds rather than relying on legislative funding or voter-approved bonds—was adopted by major public-works agencies in the West, turning them into independent authorities in fact if not in name. The continued successes of the Port Authority also made it an important prototype for the several thousand public authorities created in the United States and other nations since the end of World War II.2 This is the story of how Democracy was put “on hold” in the New York metropolis—of how the passion for greater efficiency in transportation and for rapid economic growth, combined with some antipathy toward local political leaders, led state officials and civic leaders to drop their democratic
government and the spirit of capitalism
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guard and yield responsibility for an important part of their destiny to an agency insulated from direct popular control. It was a yielding that occurred incrementally: First there was a study commission, followed by a modest agency with a duty to survey and recommend; then there were small bridges that might be built, followed by a larger span, and plans for a freight building tucked away in lower Manhattan. Soon the Port Authority expanded its domain by wresting control of the Holland Tunnel from the competing agency that had constructed it; and then a second tunnel was needed, and soon approved. Later there were municipal airports that had to be modernized, and decaying piers that might be rescued from long neglect at the hands of city officials, and large terminals that should be constructed for trucks and interstate buses, so the Port Authority argued, in order to permit the region’s transportation system to operate more efficiently. And it is a story of how this bi-state agency was able to exploit widespread desires for economic growth, together with concerns about the abuses and inefficiencies often found in local politics, to turn wary state officials into loyal allies, and to overcome opposition from local citizen groups and elected leaders, gaining their support or sending them down to defeat. In the chapters below, I concentrate on the early conflicts that led to the creation of the Port Authority in 1921 and the three decades that followed. These were crucial years, filled with strife and with decisions that set the Port Authority firmly on its long-term course. In this period, the agency steadily broadened its mission—expanding from rail-freight planning to gather in a wider and wider range of tasks, becoming the nation’s first multipurpose regional authority. By 1950, most of the activities which would absorb the Port Authority’s energies through the rest of the twentieth century were underway. Led by the George Washington Bridge, and the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, its bridges and tunnels were generating large toll revenues for the Authority; the Port agency had a dominant role in air transportation, with its airports at Newark, LaGuardia, Teterboro, and Idlewild (Kennedy); its inland rail-freight terminal was operating and two truck terminals had been completed; Newark’s marine terminal, which would be the cornerstone for its continuing activities in maritime transport, was a thriving Port Authority enterprise; and at the end of the year its gigantic bus terminal opened its doors in mid-Manhattan. In proposing, constructing and expanding these enterprises, the Port Authority frequently had to grapple with opposition—from elected officials in New York City and Newark, and from their legislative representatives at the state capitals; from railroad and bus company executives; from Robert Moses
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a wilsonian hybrid
and his allies in the region and at Albany; from residents and business groups opposed to the disruption or competition the agency’s programs would bring. While confronting the hurdles placed in its path by these opponents, the Port Authority developed and honed a variety of “entrepreneurial skills” and overcame many (though not all) of its opponents. Even Robert Caro’s famous anti-hero, Robert Moses, was driven into defeat when he sought to block two major Port Authority programs. By 1950 the Authority had fulfilled Archibald Macleish’s prediction: it had indeed become “one of the most formidable political agencies America has yet produced.”3 Most of the agency’s energies were employed within the bi-state region. But on two occasions it reached out to lead campaigns which directly shaped national policies: when it fought successfully, in the 1930s and 1940s, against the plans of Franklin Roosevelt and the Internal Revenue Service to tax municipal bonds; and when its leaders led a campaign, in the late 1940s, to organize the nation’s airport operators and challenge the monopoly strategies of the major U.S. airlines. These regional and national events and themes are examined in this volume. Certainly the Port Authority’s evolution since 1950 is not devoid of interest or importance. In the 1950s, the agency constructed a third tube at the Lincoln Tunnel, and worked on a plan which led to an expanded regional highway system, including a lower deck on the George Washington Bridge. In the 1950s and 1960s, it expanded the Newark marine terminal and turned the enterprise into a large containerport; and it also took control of piers in Hoboken and Brooklyn. Its executives fought to gain approval for a new jetport in New Jersey; and they fought to avoid taking on rail transit projects but finally agreed to buy and operate an important interstate line (now known as PATH). In the 1960s and 1970s, the Port agency built the World Trade Center, a second bus station near the George Washington Bridge, and a bus/rail terminal in Jersey City. More recently, it has constructed modest industrial parks in the South Bronx, Yonkers, and Elizabeth, N.J., built a satellite communications center (the Teleport) on Staten Island, and constructed the Newark Legal Center and a waste disposal facility in Essex County. Except for the failed effort to build a fourth jetport and the agency’s rail transit forays, none of projects of the past forty years has involved complex political conflicts on a scale with the battles analyzed in the chapters below. Also, with the exception of the Newark expansion into a large containerport, none of the more recent projects has shaped the region’s development as significantly as those whose political story was essentially settled by mid-century.
government and the spirit of capitalism
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By these measures, then, 1950 is a reasonable point at which to close the main analysis in this volume. An Epilogue offers a compressed history of the past five decades, and some judgments on the lessons of that history and prospects for the future. The evolution of the Port Authority during the first half of this century illustrates basic themes and tensions in American politics, and the next section of chapter 1 reviews the Port Authority story in relation to this wider context. The chapter then outlines the general perspective on leadership and political accountability which is central to organizing the materials in the chapters below.
Government Without Politics: The Heroic Search Four general themes of American political development are exemplified by the Port Authority story: the recurring effort to construct “nonpolitical” agencies of government, whose activities would be shaped mainly by expert analysis and a passion for efficiency; a public willingness to encourage and applaud vigorous executive action by government officials, when such action appears necessary to overcome the extensive fragmentation of the American political system and to meet important social problems; a partially contradictory tendency to rely on the incentive systems of capitalism and individual self-interest for economic development, with government programs designed mainly as handmaidens to these market forces; and a widely felt optimism that however complex and daunting the problem, the American people and the American political and social system could marshal the energies and inventiveness needed to find an elegant solution. Well, perhaps not always elegant; but all important societal problems could and in time would be solved! As to whether those four themes can be joined to form a clear and parsimonious explanation of American political development—this may be doubted. Their sometimes divergent paths suggest S. E. Morison’s interpretation of “the American character,” which he found “so complex . . . that the excess of one quality was balanced by the excess of its reverse.”4 At the Port Authority, these four horses were maintained in harmonious tension through most of the decades of our story. Only occasionally did an undue emphasis on one quality or another send the Port Authority tumbling, as it scrambled over the rocks which economic interests and political opponents scattered in its path.
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The Demand for Efficiency and Energy In designing and then operating the new agency, its creators and executives could draw on political ideas that were prominent in the first years of the twentieth century. For the Port Authority was an offspring of the Progressive Movement, as that movement evolved during the years before the United States entered the First World War. Its origins and history illustrate two major themes particularly well. The first was the campaign of the early reformers— which had begun in the decades just after the Civil War and extended into the Progressive years of 1900–1916—to eliminate political corruption and obtain honest, efficient, “businesslike” government. One of their goals was the creation of career civil-service systems in national, state, and local governments; and some reformers also favored multiheaded regulatory commissions, whose members would be appointed for fixed, overlapping terms on a nonpartisan basis, and would be able, it was hoped, “to make decisions on the basis of expert knowledge and impartial judgment.” Their campaigns often met with success; by 1916, civil-service laws and new independent regulatory bodies dotted the American landscape. With these changes, the reformers imagined, government programs would be effectively insulated from narrow political pressures and political expediency.5 For some Progressives, honest and efficient government was not enough. They also sought an expansion of governmental activity, in order to achieve a better society. This theme was embodied in the political campaigns and programs of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and urged by some of the movement’s leading writers. Herbert Croly’s influential book, The Promise of American Life, developed these views at length and called attention to the future role of state governments, which, Croly argued, should engage in a “continual process of experimentation.”6 Wilson was also a proponent of vigorous activity by the states, and as governor of New Jersey in 1911–13, he undertook a wide-ranging program of innovation. Moreover, Wilson’s public statements in this period emphasized several Progressive themes that would be crucial in the bi-state reform efforts a decade later: He argued that each state must “try its own vital experiments” without waiting upon the “slow and cumbrous movement” of the national government; he noted the great advantage of cooperative action among states and in interstate regions, and the need to create “instrumentalities that would serve [the states] in their new community of action”; and he advocated clear, centralized responsibility for programs carried forward by local and state governments. It was time, Wilson argued, for the reformers to extend
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their vision beyond the “mere elimination” of patronage and the spoils system, and to urge that the principles of “business administration” be applied to government, rendering its efforts more effective.7 During his two years as New Jersey’s governor, Wilson also drew attention to issues of transportation and economic development that would be important in the creation of the Port Authority a decade later. He predicted vast expansion in national and world commerce, and he argued that “every harbor of consequence must be repaired and united with each other.” Wilson pointed to the need for great improvements in the Port of New York, and he urged that New Jersey take the lead in meeting this challenge.8 These concerns of the reformer—that government programs should be efficient and nonpolitical, that governmental action should be vigorous and experimental—would shape the world of rhetoric, and ofttimes of reality, at the future Port Authority.
To Aid Capitalism and Individualism Equally important in the birth pangs of the new agency, and in its activities in subsequent decades, is a cluster of quite different themes long prominent in American culture—the importance of capitalism, of individualism, and of intense competition as crucial to personal achievement and a healthy society.9 The primary support for creating a semi-autonomous regional authority in the New York region came from leaders in the business world, who hoped that the new agency would be able to overcome political and geographic obstacles which, in their view, depressed the opportunities for commercial expansion and profits.10 These concerns also generated active business support for the Port Authority’s early plans, which would aid commercial vitality and individual mobility by building rail and marine terminals and constructing new bridges and tunnels. The same economic-development goals—together with a desire to reduce “government inefficiency”—motivated business leaders in the 1940s and beyond, as they applauded Port Authority proposals to take control of the region’s airports and its marine terminals, displacing city operations in Newark, Hoboken, and New York City. For similar reasons, the publishers and editors of New York’s influential daily newspapers usually endorsed the Port agency’s plans and programs. Throughout these decades, the competitive challenge that faced the New York metropolis—from Philadelphia, Boston, and other regions which tried to divert shipping and industry to their shores—was a powerful motivator for action, both within the Port Authority staff and among its strong supporters in the business world.11
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The debate over whether a regional enterprise of this sort should be created, and the subsequent conflicts surrounding its efforts to take control of marine terminals and airports from local politicos, brought to the fore a major theme of modern capitalism: a desire to reduce the influence of small-scale neighborhood and community concerns in shaping government’s activities in the economy, and to operate government programs according to “rationallegal values”—that is, with a primary focus on efficiency, and an intolerance toward patronage and other traditional uses of government power and funds. Inevitably, pressures to create and make use of a regional agency, insulated from local political controls, would raise the question of whether adequate safeguards—to ensure “democratic accountability”—could be maintained. This concern has always been part of the Port Authority’s history.12 The Port Authority’s activities are also closely associated with the American belief in individualism, especially as that trait is illustrated in the restless urge for geographic mobility—for individual choice in travel patterns and in place of residence.13 One of the Authority’s first projects, the George Washington Bridge, opened northeastern New Jersey to a wave of suburbanization by New York office workers in the late 1920s; and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels also contributed to the westward search for homes in the years before and after World War II. The Manhattan Bus Terminal, built in 1950, increased the attractiveness of suburban living for those willing to travel by bus to their jobs in New York City; and the airports emphasized individual mobility and commercial efficiency as twin goals to be celebrated, and from which profits—for the region’s businesses, and for the Port Authority—could be extracted.
The Faith in Rational Planning Finally, to its creators and its champions in the business world and beyond, the Port Authority idea was stamped with the Progressives’ coin of optimism. As Arthur Link and Richard McCormick point out, the wide range of reforms in the Progressive arsenal “reflected their faith in progress—in mankind’s ability, through purposeful action, to improve the environment and the conditions of life.” The Port Compact evolved out of this general attitude toward the human condition, which was, perhaps, embraced with special enthusiasm by professionals in the New York region.14 Within the Port Authority, the same faith that progress could be achieved through rational planning—to which systematic political strategies could then be harnessed—grew large and endured through most of its first three
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decades. This positive view was reinforced by evidence in these years that faith could be borne out in works: Overcoming large engineering and political obstacles, the wide Hudson River was at last conquered by the world’s longest spanning bridge; in Newark, a decaying seaport was extracted from the clutches of patronage and marvelously revived; jealous cities yielded up their favored offspring—the airports of Newark and New York City—against the promise of efficient planning and modernization; and after long political battles, an immense airfield was created from grassland in outer Queens. Moreover, the Port Authority’s commissioners, though often from a background of active politics, were generally persuaded to avoid making narrow patronage demands; in fact, the commissioners often entered the fray to defend the Port Authority’s independence from patronage and political opportunism. And despite the lure of larger corporate salaries, the agency found it could attract and retain planners, program directors and legal strategists of high quality—men and women who were ready to employ their skills in grappling with complex problems that reached across engineering, urban planning, finance and politics in this large and challenging interstate region. For a time, during the Depression years of the 1930s, the commissioners and some executives did seem to lose their way; but “incubators” out in the field—in the Port Authority’s planning bureau and in the law department— then produced men and women and new ideas that would soon revitalize the agency and propel it into the expansion years of the 1940s. The energetic optimism of the Port Authority’s creators and many of its officials was nourished by their perception that their bi-state agency filled a crucial niche in this large metropolis, and that its plans would ultimately win wide support. Pendleton Herring captures important elements of this perspective as it was held by the agency’s executives: “A democracy inclines toward chaos rather than toward order,” Herring wrote; “the representative principle, if logically followed, leads to infinite diversity rather than ultimate unity.” Therefore “the impulse for positive political action must be deliberately imposed at some strategic point, if democracy is to succeed as a form of government.”15 To the leaders of the Port Authority—as they faced the chaotic political structure of two states and the region’s hundreds of cities and towns—their agency embodied that essential “impulse for positive political action.” Moreover, the projects that they sought to carry out often required longrange planning, and actions that would yield positive results only after many years. Even those elected officials who wished to achieve these same goals often could not afford to give them high priority; they would need to show
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accomplishments before the next political campaign. So the Port Authority, with its insulated decisionmaking and funding sources, again filled a crucial niche when long-term capital investment and planning was needed. At times, certainly, other interests with “narrower” views—or simply with different views—formed coalitions that could defeat the Port agency’s rational schemes. But those defeats might be only temporary; careful analysis, continuing efforts to educate the region’s publics and their leaders, and the building of complex alliances would often bring victory—perhaps in months, perhaps in years, and on occasion a decade or more after the planners had proposed ways to meet a challenging problem. Sometimes, as we will see, the Port Authority’s optimism was misplaced; but often, beyond the expectations of its friends who gave up hope, its efforts were rewarded with success.
The Course of the Story The events analyzed in the chapters below can be briefly summarized. Chapter 2 reviews the history of conflicts between New York’s economic and political leaders and their counterparts in New Jersey, regarding the use and misuse of the waterways that both divide and join them. These concerns largely centered on the question of whether benefits and burdens were being unfairly distributed, as shipping and associated economic activities expanded in New York Bay and along adjacent rivers and harbors. In 1916 New Jersey filed a legal challenge, aimed at increasing commercial development west of the Hudson, at some possible cost to New York’s own economic well-being. The two states then created a joint commission to explore ways out of the escalating political and legal conflict; and the commission turned to its counsel, Julius Henry Cohen, in the hope he could devise a cooperative solution. In 1918 Cohen put his proposal on the table: he favored creating a powerful bi-state agency, which would both regulate and encourage development guided by a “comprehensive” plan, throughout a Port District extending across all the waterways and dozens of cities in the New York-New Jersey metropolis. In Chapter 3, we follow that proposal as it confronted the American political system, with its suspicious local officials and wary state legislators. Cohen’s design was largely dismantled during the years 1918–21, and a powerful engine of rational economic development was transformed into a nearly empty shell, called “The Port of New York Authority,” which saw the light of day in April 1921.
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The new agency was given a very general mission—to enhance cooperative planning in the bi-state region, and a specific mandate—to develop and implement a plan to improve the region’s rail-freight system; but it was provided with little power or funds to carry out that plan. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the Port Authority’s efforts to devise the railroad plan and to obtain agreement from the rail corporations. For ten years the agency struggled to win over the rail officials to its preferred program; but by 1931, no real progress had been made toward that goal, and the “comprehensive” railroad scheme was essentially abandoned. The rail executives’ vision of competitive capitalism, which gave little weight to cooperative planning, had won out. The failure of its railroad program might have spelled the end of the Port Authority, had the agency been designed narrowly as an instrument to rationalize the rail system. But its creators had constructed it quite differently—as a sort of empty vessel, into which various ideas for interstate cooperation on transportation issues might be tossed, and allowed to incubate. And so it became a target of opportunity, and an object of affection, for individuals and groups in the surrounding communities—and inside the agency—who saw the Port Authority as an instrument to use in achieving their own goals.16 The open character of the Port Authority’s mandate also meant that its activities could be reshaped to fit modest and even radical changes in technology: As automobiles and trucks challenged railroad dominance in freight and passenger transport, as interstate buses began to congregate on Manhattan’s narrow streets, and as airplanes attracted travelers and freight, the Port Authority might reach out and take a leading role in improving each new facet of the region’s transport system. But only if the Port Authority’s leaders had the vision and the Machiavellian skill to seize the opportunity, and to construct alliances with regional and national groups which might benefit from new Authority projects. The scheme to rationalize the railroad system was still trudging slowly toward its unhappy ending when the new drama—of the Port agency as flexible vehicle of regional expansion—had its first stirrings; these developments are set out in chapters 6 and 7. The story began with an assault on the Port Authority’s limited role as instrument of the railroad era, a challenge led by an independent engineer, Othmar Ammann. Ammann organized a public campaign to expand the Authority’s horizons, and by 1925 the agency had agreed to construct four large bridges for motor vehicles; these new ventures would soon stamp it as a leading player in the automotive age. During the
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next several years, the agency fended off political pressures that threatened to undermine the engineering integrity of its bridge-building; and its officials also moved adroitly to neutralize the threat from another bi-state group, the independent Holland Tunnel commissioners. By 1931, where chapter 7 closes, the Port Authority had completed the George Washington Bridge and three bridges to Staten Island, the money-making Holland Tunnel was under its control, and the bi-state agency was celebrated (to quote Franklin Roosevelt) as a model of “skill and scientific planning” in action.17 The Port Authority was lionized, and its success shaped the conception of the TVA and the string of local housing authorities established across the country in the 1930s; but even as its reputation rose, the agency itself faltered and went adrift. The Depression cut its toll revenue sharply; a conservative banker from Jersey City took the helm; Ammann’s famous engineering department was dismantled; retrenchment was the order of the day. By 1941, one careful study concluded, the Port Authority was on “dead center”; it seemed to be “frightened by the specter of controversy,” and its approach to the region’s problems was “receptive rather than aggressive.”18 This sad but instructive tale is told in chapter 8. Now, however, the pressure for change emerged from within the Port agency itself. The intellectual center for thinking about new Port Authority projects was in the planning bureau; but the motivation and strategic calculations needed to challenge the conservatives in the central office arose in the law department, where the leading role was taken by a young real-estate attorney, Austin Tobin. In chapters 9 and 10, Tobin’s early history and activities at the Port Authority are summarized, and we then follow the campaign in the late 1930s, led by Tobin, to challenge Franklin Roosevelt on the issue of tax exemption for municipal bonds and to create a nationwide coalition that ultimately defeated the president. Tobin emerged as the embodiment of a new “entrepreneurial spirit” for the sleepy agency; and in the spring of 1942, the Port Authority’s governing board chose him as executive director, despite the opposition of the chairman, Frank Ferguson, who held on to the agency’s executive power. The battle lines were soon drawn, and (as we will see in the first part of chapter 11) Tobin joined forces with the agency’s own planners to develop a range of possible new programs for the Port agency, while battling the antiSemitism and other tactics Ferguson employed to attack Tobin’s aides and his ideas. Tobin then constructed an alliance with the “progressive” forces on the governing board who, with a valuable assist from New Jersey’s governor, forced the chairman out of office early in 1945.
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After the internal battle had ended, the Port Authority’s governing commission and its staff achieved a state of harmony that would endure for more than a decade. Led by Tobin, the Authority team devised analytical and political strategies which would permit them to expand beyond the “bridge and tunnel outfit” which the agency had been for twenty years. They targeted the major airports of the New York region—which might be brought under the Authority’s control, if the elected officials of Newark and New York City could be persuaded to part with these symbols of municipal pride. The decaying piers of Newark, Hoboken, and New York City should, they thought, be added to the Authority’s domain and modernized to meet postwar needs. The thousands of North Jersey buses which flowed through the Lincoln Tunnel and clogged Manhattan roadways could be removed from city streets and brought directly into a gigantic new terminal. The efficiency of the region’s truck traffic could be greatly enhanced by creating union terminals in Newark and Manhattan; so the planners argued. Rail services in the bi-state region might also be improved. To accomplish these tasks, the Port Authority would require the support of newspapers, business leaders, elected officials, and the average citizen in the cities and towns on both sides of the Hudson—who would need to be educated regarding the advantages of “regionalism,” and the great drawbacks of old-time political machines and local parochialism. Chapters 11, 12, and 13 describe the strategies through which Tobin and his aides identified a preferred array of regional projects, grappled with resistance from local officials and some business executives, and devised strategies to reeducate or defeat those who did not share their vision of efficient regional development. By the close of 1950, the Port Authority had largely emerged victorious. New York’s two major airports had been extracted from city control— and from the grasp of Robert Moses. Newark’s airport had been added, to give the bi-state agency direct responsibility for all of the region’s major air terminals. A national coalition, to challenge the airlines’ monopoly over landing fees and other charges and to help modernize airport management, had been created and had scored its first victories. Newark had yielded up its harbor and piers to the Port agency; but New York City and Hoboken still resisted Tobin’s entreaties. Two regional truck terminals were in place; and, despite the opposition of Commissioner Moses, the world’s largest bus terminal was in operation, removing more than 2,000 buses a day from congested Manhattan streets. By mid-century, then, the Port Authority had become an interstate agency with crucial planning and operating responsibilities in the fields of
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air, land and marine transportation in the nation’s largest metropolis. An institution criticized by some for its independence of local control, yet praised by the governors of both states and by business leaders, and emulated at home and abroad.
Leadership and the Biographical Perspective In the early pages of this chapter, I identified several broad themes in American political history, which were exemplified in the creation of the Port of New York Authority, and which helped to shape the Port Authority’s rhetoric and its behavior in its first three decades and beyond. In this final section, I want to highlight three perspectives which have seemed to me especially important in thinking about this organization and about the behavior of political institutions generally. The first is the importance of leadership in shaping an agency’s origins and its activities; the second is the advantage of a biographical perspective in analyzing the nature of leadership in complex organizations and policy arenas; and the third is the challenge of public accountability in a democratic society.
The Role of Leadership The Port Authority was an offspring of the Progressive Era, as I noted earlier, and of the efforts in those years to insulate government agencies from patronage and other narrow political pressures, and to encourage efficiency in public programs, sometimes coupled with designing new initiatives as well. But insulation, efficiency, and new programs are not achieved simply through the enthusiasm of business leaders and other hopeful citizens. Attaining these goals requires skilled and sustained public leadership. In his writings in the late nineteenth century, Woodrow Wilson explored this issue, which he framed in a way that underscores the close linkage between the quality of leadership and the kinds of Progressive reform illustrated in the Port Authority’s history. Efficient, honest operation of government programs, Wilson argued, can be attained best—perhaps can be attained only—under three interlocking conditions: if those programs are insulated from the vagaries of party politics and patronage; if very able men and women can then be attracted to shape and direct such programs; and if these leaders are given clear-cut responsibility for action, and “large powers and unhampered discretion” in carrying out their duties. In fact, Wilson argued in his 1887 essay, only if agency lead-
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ers are given clear responsibility and wide discretion is it likely that we can attract to government service those individuals with the talents and energy needed to meet complex economic and social problems. Wilson warned against the opposite tendency—to distribute power widely in the hope of ensuring democratic accountability. If power is “dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured,” he argued, “and if it be obscured, it is made irresponsible.” As Wilson commented in concluding this line of analysis: “If to keep his office a man must achieve open and honest success, and if at the same time he feels himself entrusted with large freedom of discretion, the greater his power the less likely is he to abuse it, the more is he nerved and sobered and elevated by it.”19 Wilson’s way of framing the problem of leadership draws our attention to several issues which are important in analyzing any complex organization and crucial in this study. The history of American public institutions is littered with examples of power divided and obscured, precluding effective and responsible leadership: the Interstate Commerce Commission through most of its 100 years, for instance, as well as many other federal and state regulatory commissions; the Port of San Francisco and some other multiheaded public authorities in the 1960s and 1970s; NASA, with its stumbling efforts on the space shuttle in the 1980s; the embarrassing misadventures of the savingsand-loan regulators in the 1980s and beyond. In some of these agencies, one also finds illustrations of other Wilsonian concerns—the use of patronage in making appointments, the awarding of contracts based on political criteria, and the easy bending of policy to narrow political demands, all of which weaken the structure of responsible leadership and drive away able people who prefer to be judged by their professional competence.20 In organizations which succumb to these political pressures, the capacity of the enterprise and its executives to make significant contributions to society is likely to be undermined. Moreover, the working life of an individual caught in the web of political favoritism and expediency is not likely to be a source of personal pride; a job in that environment will often contribute little to one’s sense of self-esteem, or one’s sense of contributing to a broader purpose. The best will leave; the others will hunker down, unhappy, or embrace the political virus as it infects the agency. Maintaining clear-cut responsibility is, therefore, a crucial element of professional leadership. But there are other important dimensions too—especially when a leader, or leadership team, wishes to take the organization in novel directions, creating new programs or devising innovative administrative strategies. Such executives can be called “entrepreneurial leaders,” and
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their leadership task can be examined in relation to six important dimensions. To what extent, and how, do they: (1) identify new missions and implementation strategies for the organization; (2) develop and nourish external constituencies to support the new goals and programs, and to support the organization generally, while neutralizing existing and potential opposition; (3) create internal constituencies that support the new goals (while overcoming internal resistance), through changes in organizational structures, in recruitment systems and key appointments, and in reward and penalty systems; (4) enhance the organization’s technical expertise (through recruitment of skilled personnel and addition of new equipment) in order to improve its capacity to identify and develop interesting program options, and to implement new goals and programs; (5) motivate and provide training for members of the organization so that they will have the skills to work efficiently in old and new program areas, and the desire to extend their efforts beyond standard levels of performance; and (6) systematically scan organizational routines, and points of internal and external pressure, in order to identify areas of vulnerability (to mismanagement and corruption, and to loss of the leaders’ own power and position), followed by remedial action.21 A major task of the chapters below is to analyze the efforts of the Port Authority’s leaders, as they used these six strategies in order to lead the Port Authority into new fields of activity during the agency’s first three decades. There we will explore the dynamics of entrepreneurial leadership; and we will consider the Port of New York Authority as an example of the possibilities for innovative programs inherent in a federal system.22
The Uses of Biography In analyzing the Port Authority’s origins and its expanding range, I will explore the activities of a number of governors, mayors, and other elected officials, the tactics used by a variety of organized groups and private corporations, and the efforts of a range of Port Authority officials. (The main participants, with their years in office, are listed at the front of the book.) However, three individuals emerge as preeminent in breathing life into the bi-state enterprise and giving it several decades of vigorous activity. To understand the values that shaped their behavior and the leadership strategies they employed, as well as their influence on the agency’s development, we
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need to reach back to the years before they attained high rank, and indeed before they were involved with the Authority at all. Then we will follow their evolving goals and strategies through their Port Authority years. So this study is in part a triple biography, of three men whose importance to the Port Authority and its influence in the New York region has been without parallel: Julius Henry Cohen, the agency’s general counsel for two decades; Othmar Ammann, the agency’s first bridge engineer; and Austin Tobin, who served as the Port Authority’s executive director for many years. The three together, and perhaps one or two of them individually, rank with the legendary Robert Moses—if one’s measure is the influence of an individual on the pattern of regional development in the New York metropolis. A biographical perspective may add significantly to our understanding of how and why government policies are created and altered. As Charles Goodsell points out, it can provide a “key to unraveling causality” in the pattern of complex human events. Biographical analysis can also offer insights into the ethical choices and tradeoffs that confront those in public life and suggest strategies that can be useful in resolving ethical dilemmas. And a biographical approach may underscore a point often lost to sight in the late twentieth century: that a sense of “dedication and commitment” to a mission can animate those in public life; a desire for monetary wealth and a “thirst for power” are not the only important forces that motivate the leaders of large organizations.23 In the case of the Port of New York Authority, a much-studied organization, it turns out that biographical probing of our three main characters adds new information on crucial aspects of the agency’s development, aiding us in understanding the policies adopted and the strategies used to surmount opposition, as well as the motivations that animated the agency’s leaders. Brief summaries suggest the importance of these three men in our wider story: Julius Henry Cohen was born in 1873 in lower Manhattan, son of a garment worker who was a member of the Tammany political machine. He attended law school at night and was active in the Progressive reform movement in New York City, 1900–1917. Cohen joined with Louis Brandeis in devising a compact between management and workers that ended a general strike in the garment industry in 1910, and he took a leading role in the creation of new business-arbitration systems in New York State, in 1915 and later years. At the request of the New York Chamber of Commerce and state officials, he devised a bi-state compact, based substantially on the principles of his earlier mediation efforts, to create the Port of New York Authority in 1921. Cohen then served as general counsel at the agency from 1921 until 1942. While at the Port Authority, in collaboration with Governor Alfred Smith (an
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ally in earlier reform campaigns in New York City), he constructed the legal arguments that established the Port Authority’s independence, and he devised the political strategies that permitted the agency to take control of the money-making Holland Tunnel, thus assuring the Port Authority’s long-term financial viability. Othmar H. Ammann was born in Switzerland in 1879, trained as a civil engineer, and came to the U.S. in 1904 in the hope of work in the bridgebuilding field. He was chief assistant to Gustav Lindenthal in constructing the Hell Gate Bridge, 1912–1917, and managed a clay pottery mine in 1917– 20, where he became acquainted with one of the mine’s investors, local politician George Silzer. Ammann returned to Lindenthal in 1920 to work on plans for a railroad-vehicular bridge across the Hudson River at 57th Street, and he left Lindenthal in 1923 over conflicts on bridge plans. He then organized local support for a Hudson River bridge at 179th Street and took a leading role, in alliance with Silzer (who had been elected New Jersey’s governor), in persuading the Port Authority to take on vehicular projects. He joined the Port Authority as bridge engineer in 1925, designed the George Washington Bridge and Bayonne Bridge, and supervised their construction as well as that of two other Staten Island bridges, 1925–1931, and the Lincoln Tunnel, 1934–1937. On loan part-time to Robert Moses’s Triborough Authority, he designed the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge and supervised the construction of that span and two other bridges. Ammann left the Port Authority when the engineering department was disbanded in 1939, and entered private practice; in the 1950s he designed the second deck of the George Washington Bridge and the Throgs Neck and Verrazano-Narrows spans. Austin J. Tobin was born in Brooklyn in 1903, son of an active member of the McCooey Democratic machine. He attended Catholic schools in Brooklyn, graduated from Holy Cross College in 1925 as salutatorian, and joined the Port Authority in 1927, while taking classes at Fordham law school at night. Tobin served as real estate attorney and as an assistant general counsel at the agency, 1928–1942. From his third-tier position at the Port Authority, he organized a national campaign to block President Roosevelt’s plan to tax municipal bonds. Tobin was appointed executive director of the Authority in 1942. For the next three years, he confronted opposition from influential members of the Port Authority board. Tobin consolidated his power in 1945 and led the Port Authority until he departed at the end of 1971. In probing the motivations and behavior of these three central characters, and of their associates, the observer is struck by the powerful streak of ration-
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ality that appears to shape their efforts. As we trace the evolution of this institution, we will follow men and women at the top of the Port Authority, and indeed salted throughout her ranks, who could grasp the structure of complex political and economic forces in the New York region, scrutinize them closely for weak points and for opportunities (where the bi-state agency might construct alliances or take separate initiative), and then plan and execute artful strategies to disarm the savage beast of (other) vested interests—while the Port octopus made off with a large tunnel, airports, and city docks and piers, and while it constructed bridges and tall buildings and other projects of possible benefit to itself and to the wider region. At times, the Port agency’s leaders also championed projects that only seemed attractive when aided by the visions of regional planning and the heat of battle, but which turned out to be of little real value. So rational calculation at the Port Authority, during the thirty years and more of this study, was not coldly clinical but rather laced with human aspiration, passion, and sometimes human failings. Joseph Schumpeter, in his classic analysis of the role of the private entrepreneur in economic development, identifies several motivations that enliven and modify the behavior of entrepreneurs as they succeed and fail in the world of business. All apply as well in the world of government—and especially in the world we enter in this volume: “First of all, there is the dream and the will to found a private kingdom. . . . “Then there is the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself. . . . “Finally, there is the joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply of exercising one’s energy and ingenuity. . . .”24
Lest this summary suggest that our entrepreneurial leaders were too narrowly self-interested, it should be noted that all three grappled with difficult moral issues during their years at the Port agency, and that on important occasions they embraced the more ethical course of action, even if it made their general task more difficult and put their careers at risk. We will see examples of these tensions and choices in Cohen’s resistance to possible graft by one of his board members, and to patronage in the law department; in Ammann’s fight to maintain the independence and integrity of the engineering department; and especially in Tobin’s conflict with the Authority’s chairman on the issue of anti-Semitism, his battle on behalf of small airlines
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against the monopoly tactics of their larger brethren, his efforts to aid those displaced by construction in Manhattan, and his resistance to awarding contracts to the politically influential. And we will see contrasts in the ethical stance of Tobin and his colleagues, compared with that of Robert Moses, as Moses is portrayed in Robert Caro’s The Power Broker. Drawing substantially on a biographical perspective, the chapters below explore the dreams and impulses to do battle of our three entrepreneurs and their associates, and the impact of their efforts in shaping the Port Authority’s policies and the development of the bi-state New York region.
The Challenge of Democratic Accountability In focusing on the role of leadership in “getting things done,” and on the activities of specific entrepreneurial leaders, I may appear to downplay the problem of accountability. However, that issue will be continuously before us, as text or subtext, throughout the volume. A few preliminary observations may be useful. The Port Authority was created in a society generally described as “democratic,” which has traditionally placed much emphasis on decentralization of governmental power—on the ability of the separate states, and their individual cities and towns, to determine their own priorities for public action and to act separately or cooperatively, as their citizens prefer. To create a governmental institution not directly accountable to the voters, or to elected officials, is in some sense to undercut this structure of democratic responsibility. So, in its initial design as an “insulated” agency of government, and in its subsequent behavior, the Port of New York Authority can be viewed as weakening the fabric of democracy. The same charge can be levied at its many insulated cousins—the Tennessee Valley Authority, the West Coast port agencies, the Newark Housing Authority, and now hundreds more.25 This concern regarding democratic control was, as we will see, crucial in the debate at the state capitals in 1918–1921 on whether the bi-state agency should be created, in the decision by New Jersey’s governor to veto the compact legislation, and in New York City’s effort in 1921 to block the compact via court suit. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, New Jersey’s politicians raised one version of the banner of democratic accountability—the right of each state to act independently and competitively—in their recurring attempts to break free from the Port Authority’s philosophy of regionalism. And in the 1940s, political leaders in New York City and Newark employed the rhetoric
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of local control, as they fought against the Authority’s campaign to take charge of their airports and marine terminals. In response, those who admire organizations founded on the principle of insulation from politics frame the issue in this way: “Are different methods of accountability appropriate for distinct kinds of institutions?” Is public operation of an airport (for example) much like that of a public school, where active involvement of the local citizenry in shaping the curriculum and perhaps in setting standards for teacher qualification may be desirable? Or is an airport more like a manufacturing plant, where decisions on product lines, inputs, and price are determined by staff experts in marketing, engineering, and other special fields, and whose output is judged by customers when they decide use the service (or go elsewhere), not by the voting public? Those who have sought to insulate the Port of New York Authority and its cousins from political pressures respond to these questions by arguing, in effect, that a public authority—at least in the field of transportation and terminals—is more like a factory than a school. The decision on where to place an airport, and how large it should be, certainly should depend in part on the attitudes of elected officials and the region’s voters—with highway congestion, aircraft noise and other costs being debated in the public forum against the benefits of an airport at location X or Y. However, even on issues of location and size, technical factors and customer demand would be very important; and the advocate of insulation argues that other matters—how to construct the airport, bring aircraft in and out safely, route ground traffic inside the airport, and provide adequate security—should be decided mainly by experts, not by public vote, and certainly not by public officials based on promises made in the heat of an electoral campaign. In twentieth century America, this has not been a question simply of theoretical concern. Experience in the transport field has shown that airports and marine terminals which are directly accountable to elected officials have often become staffed with patronage appointees, whose decisions are shaped by the patron’s needs and other political pressures; and contracts for jobs large and small are handed out to firms with close ties to agency officials and the political party in power. At least, this was the conclusion that one could draw from the staffing and investment patterns in the years before World War I at New York City’s shipping terminals and piers, at Port Newark, and at the Port of San Francisco. These same patterns would frequently reappear at cityowned airfields as they were developed in the 1930s and 1940s.26 For Julius Henry Cohen and others who fought to create the Port of New York Authority and then to expand its role in the region, the lesson of this
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history seemed clear: If government was to have an effective role in improving transportation and thus aiding regional economic development, a specialized kind of public agency would be needed—an agency insulated first from the influence of local political officials (for example, Tammany in New York City and the Hague machine in New Jersey), and also from the sporadic political pressures state legislators and other influential politicos might bring. Such an agency, an “independent” public authority, would meet the test of democratic accountability mainly through its deeds—rather than via its sensitivity to immediate public clamor, coupled with sidebar payments to elected officials and their political friends. It would succeed, and be accountable, primarily through the speed with which it could develop far-seeing plans for the region’s development, the quality of those plans (as judged by experts and by the public), and its ability—once public support was obtained—to carry out agreed-upon plans efficiently; and by the quality of the results: Does the airport, the marine terminal, the bridge or tunnel system work effectively? These were the standards of accountability that the Port Authority’s staff, and its supporters in the media, the business world, and beyond, applied to the agency in its early decades. They are still central guideposts against which the Port agency, and a wide array of transportation and development agencies that now populate the American landscape, have measured their success and failings in more recent years.27 That perspective on accountability has been under recurrent challenge, from the early debates on whether to create a bi-state agency to the present. The critics of the “efficient and effective” school of responsibility do not dismiss the importance of effective action; rather, they would strip away some of the political insulation, so that the public and its elected officials can have more influence over what projects a public authority undertakes, and how it carries out its tasks. They do not argue that the quality of a project should be weakened in order to obtain greater democratic responsiveness; the failure of a bridge, or dangerous flight patterns at the airport, are not acceptable tradeoffs. The critics would, however, accept some delays in deciding on new programs and in completing large projects, so that broader public sentiments and values are given greater weight. They are inclined to be suspicious of “technocratic solutions to social problems,” and to argue that community “bargaining, as well as analysis and information,” are essential to providing public services. They would find ways to limit insulation in order to curb what Erwin Hargrove calls (in his recent study of TVA) the “unilateral adventurism” of public authority executives.28
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Criticisms of the New York-New Jersey port agency have been particularly sharp. Reviewing the Port Authority’s first several decades, Annmarie Walsh concluded that as it “achieved stable management and financial prestige, it sacrificed the perspectives of urban planning and local democracy.” In 1990, Herson and Boland found the agency’s commissioners “thoroughly insulated from popular control.” In 1995–96, the mayor of New York City adhered to a long tradition by criticizing the Port Authority for policies that benefit New Jersey “unfairly,” and urged that the agency be broken up, so his city could take responsibility for Kennedy and LaGuardia airports and perhaps other programs now operated by the bi-state agency. In 1997, New York State’s governor, George Pataki, sharply attacked the agency’s operations and suggested that perhaps it should be carved into several pieces.29 As we enter the twenty-first century, the question of whether government programs can be efficient and effective, while being responsive to public needs and influence, is a matter of widespread debate. The story of the Port Authority in its first several decades can offer valuable insights in understanding this issue and in suggesting strategies that might work. Here we find evidence that rational planning, effective action, and a due sensitivity for public concerns and public involvement can coexist. But it is an unsteady brew, requiring that supervising officials, in this case the two governors, demonstrate a kind of disciplined oversight—resisting the natural tendency of elected leaders to use the agency for short-term political gain, while at the same time actively monitoring the agency’s proposals in relation to the governors’ broad policy goals. These elected officials can offer support for “entrepreneurial leadership” that may yield important benefits, even as the agency skirts close to “unilateral adventurism.” An unsteady brew, certainly, but one that in fact existed, with advantage to the nation’s largest region, during much of the first half of the century just completed. It is a combination that has been lost in the New York metropolis in recent decades, but that might, if its benefits and risks are rightly understood, again reappear.
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Part One
Creating a New Institution
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2 The Tensions and Opportunities of Federalism Commercial Conflict in the New York Region
Lay down that old hostility Fostered between you since long, long ago. Turn on the real foe your common strength, Else heaven will at length Deny you the right to any force, Seeing that pious zeal in you has run its course. —N. Machiavelli, Carnival Songs
T
he year 1917 was a critical time in the long history of intermittent conflict and wary cooperation between New Jersey and New York State, and the most important individual in shaping the cooperative prospects for that year and for many years that followed was a lawyer of modest reputation, Julius Henry Cohen. When the year began, the two states were sharply divided, locked in a bitter conflict over railroad freight problems and over the conditions that might ensure—or jeopardize—economic prosperity throughout the bi-state New York region. New York City’s rise to the first rank of world cities, and much of the economic growth of the region that extended 25 miles and more beyond her borders, were crucially linked to international and coastal trade. With its rivers and bays extending into two states, the Port of New York could count nearly 800 miles of waterfront, dwarfing Boston with its 140, Philadelphia with 37, and Baltimore with 120. By 1915, nearly half of the nation’s international commerce—counting both export and import commodities— passed through the Port of New York, and a vast system of steamship lines and railroad companies converged on the harbor. More than 75 million tons a year were processed through a complex array of rail and marine terminals in both states, generating thousands of jobs directly tied to the transport system, and thousands more in retail commerce, home and office construction, and industrial development.1 27
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The economic benefits linked to vigorous international, coastal, and intraregional trade were not evenly distributed across the cities and towns of the metropolis, however, and there was a sharp contrast between the economic strength of New Jersey and her sister state. Manhattan was the dominant center for corporate decisionmaking and office activities associated with international commerce, and most of the thriving marine terminals were located along the shores of Manhattan and Brooklyn. On the western side of the Hudson River were hundreds of miles of rail track running across Northern New Jersey to large rail terminals on or near the Hudson shore in Jersey City, Hoboken, and smaller towns; but the modest economic vitality generated by the railroads and associated activities in New Jersey was far outstripped by the activity and impact on the New York side. It was not surprising that political and business leaders in New Jersey wondered if the existing pattern might be modified, to the benefit of the Western Provinces. A strategy that could attract major shipping lines to Jersey City, Hoboken, and Newark Bay, for example, would reward the Garden State, bringing new industries, more jobs, and residential growth. However, any strategy that threatened the existing commercial dominance of New York was sure to be met—from the Eastern side of the region—with cries of perfidy, and with strong defensive measures. And so it was, in the second decade of the twentieth century, that each side sought its own advantage, and volley and counter-volley roiled the waters of the wide Hudson. The immediate concern in 1916–17 was a conflict over the rates and costs that should be assigned for delivering freight to the two sides of the River. The traditional system treated the bi-state region as a single unit. The railroads would charge a manufacturer in Ohio, for instance, the same amount to ship goods to Europe whether they were sent via docks in Manhattan or at Jersey City. However, the cost to a railroad to carry those goods over to Manhattan piers (or to Brooklyn) was considerably higher; most of the railroads terminated their rail tracks on the Jersey shores of the Hudson, and they maintained an expensive system of ferries and large barges (called lighters) to float the goods across to New York City docks, where they could then be loaded on ships bound for abroad. In addition, Manhattan was congested, so that trucks and horse-drawn vehicles could carry goods to and from the piers only with great difficulty; this added to the real cost of freight transport on the New York side. In treating the New York–New Jersey region as a single zone in setting freight rates, therefore, the railroads actually neutralized the natural low-cost advantage of the New Jersey side of the harbor.2
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2-1. Main waterways, inner counties, and important cities in the New York– New Jersey region. (New York City includes the Bronx, Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, and Staten Island.) The Hudson River, the Kill van Kull, and the Arthur Kill serve as the boundaries of the two states.
The strategy the New Jersey interests decided to pursue had become focused by 1916 on this issue of “rate discrimination.” Jersey City, Hoboken, Newark, and Elizabeth filed a formal complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission in May, arguing that the ICC should compel the railroads to charge lower rates for freight services to Northern New Jersey terminals. The state government in Trenton joined in the complaint.3
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East of the Hudson, public officials prepared for legal battle. It seemed clear that a victory for New Jersey in the New York Harbor case (as it was called) might be calamitous, leading to “an exodus of a very large amount of trade and commerce” from New York.4 However, some of New York’s business leaders could see that New Jersey’s challenge might also offer an opportunity—to reach beyond the direct issue in the suit and grapple with the inefficiencies, congestion, and high cost which had long burdened the Port, and which were, in fact, accurately portrayed in the New Jersey challenge. On this issue the initiative was taken by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, which had a long history of campaigning for improvements in streets, docks, and other transport facilities, and for more centralized government power to ensure that such advances could be accomplished.5 Two officials of the New York Chamber, Eugenius Outerbridge and Irving Bush, had commercial interests which stretched across both sides of the Hudson, and they took the lead in seeking ways to pursue a complex strategy—one that would use the New Jersey suit as leverage to reshape the region’s freight delivery system, thereby increasing its efficiency, lowering the cost of food and other goods, and generating economic growth for the entire bi-state area. To devise a strategy that might attain these ends, Outerbridge and Bush turned to the Chamber’s legal counsel, Julius Henry Cohen.6
Odyssey of a Reformer In the summer of 1916, Cohen knew very little about the technical and political issues involved in freight delivery. But he could look back on two decades of personal experience in politics and political reform, and on several years of work—with Louis Brandeis and others—in devising ways to substitute cooperation for conflict in resolving business and labor disputes. This background would influence Cohen’s approach to the New York Harbor case and would shape the design of the first public authority in the United States. Moreover, since Cohen later worked with Governors Alfred E. Smith and Franklin D. Roosevelt in fashioning public authorities to grapple with problems of water power and housing, and since FDR carried these ideas and experiences from New York to the White House in 1933, Cohen’s thinking was a crucial part of the heritage that led to the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 and housing authorities across the country in the 1930s, and to the wide use of the authority as a governmental device after World War II.7
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Strategies for Social Progress: A Personal History Cohen was born in 1873, in Brooklyn. His family soon moved to lower Manhattan, where his father worked as a tailor and as captain of his Tammany Hall district, while Julius Henry was growing up.8 After graduating from public school, Cohen attended the Metropolis night law school in Manhattan, and he worked as a stenographer and law clerk during the day. He passed the bar examination in 1897 and then practiced law, while taking part in reform politics on the West Side. In 1904, Cohen was named chairman of the Legislative Committee of the reform-oriented Citizens Union; the committee’s role was to evaluate state legislation and monitor the performance of state legislators representing the city. Through his work with this committee during the next dozen years, Cohen became familiar with important political figures in the city and state.9 Early in his law career, Cohen also served as counsel for the garment industry, and in 1910 he and Louis D. Brandeis, who represented the garment laborers, worked out a “Protocol of Peace” which ended a major strike. The Protocol created worker-management boards to resolve future differences between the two sides, and thereby brought a measure of labor peace during the years 1910–1917. Meanwhile, in 1911 Cohen became general counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, where he joined with business executives in developing a new system of arbitration to resolve local business disputes. And a few years later, Cohen took a leading role in the Bar Association’s efforts, jointly with the Chamber of Commerce, to develop state and national systems of commercial arbitration.10 Through these activities, Cohen had by 1916 developed a distinctive perspective on public policies and on ways to grapple with social conflict. He believed that governmental power should be used to meet important social problems, and that public programs should be developed and carried out mainly at the local and state level. Also, based on his experience with machine politics in New York City, he preferred that government programs be insulated from the vagaries and potential corruption of party politics. More generally, Cohen was a strong believer in finding ways to resolve disagreements through cooperation, and he thought that the route to a healthy economy would often be found in collaborative planning, rather than vigorous competition.11 As Cohen reviewed the history of economic growth in the region, and of conflict and cooperation between the two states, he found other historical lessons that bore on the 1916 case; and Cohen began to extract from
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these materials a strategy that could beat off the New Jersey challenge— and perhaps also win the antagonists on both sides of the Hudson to a common cause.12
Hazards of a Federal System: A Century of Experience Historically, the New York Harbor, though divided by a state line running through its waters, developed and flourished as a single port. This was evident, for example, in the impact of the Erie Canal, a 360-mile waterway that connected the Great Lakes to the Hudson River in 1825, providing a water route between the old Northwest and New York Harbor that was far superior to the continental links to Philadelphia and Baltimore. Foreign trade through the Port of New York then expanded rapidly, and both sides of the Harbor had benefited substantially. In Cohen’s reading, later trade expansion had aided New Jersey as well as New York, and if there were further improvements the benefits would again be widely felt across the bi-state region.13 But it was also clear that the state line had provided an inspiration for hostile thrusts across the Hudson. In the first years of the nineteenth century, Robert Fulton’s steamboat was granted a monopoly by the State of New York, covering the steamboat trade on the Hudson and all its shores. By 1810, Fulton’s boats carried passengers and goods between New York City and New Jersey, and New York State law prohibited steamboats licensed by New Jersey from competing for this thriving trade. When Trenton legislators retaliated in 1811 with a law penalizing New York steamboats, the level of hostility between the two states escalated. The issue finally reached the U. S. Supreme Court, and in the celebrated 1824 case, Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed the freedom of interstate commerce from state interference and held that New York had no power to grant a monopoly on navigable waters.14 That case did not end the controversy, however, for New York State still asserted that it had controlling authority in the entire harbor, and New Jersey sharply dissented. Finally, in 1833 the governors of the two states agreed to appoint study commissions which would work together in seeking a formula to resolve the controversy; within a year the commissions’ proposals were adopted as the Compact of 1834, which brought 75 years of peace between the states, and a vast expansion of trade and commercial development on both sides of the Hudson.15 From the 1834 Compact story, Cohen drew a lesson which would influence his own approach to the controversy of 1916–17: A long-term, stable so-
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lution for a regional problem might be achieved through joint action by the major parties, involving the creation of study commissions which could analyze the issues objectively and propose constructive mutual action. Such an agreement might then be sealed in perpetuity by a compact between the states, approved by the national government.16 The positive lesson of the 1834 Compact was combined, as Cohen reviewed the historical situation, with recent evidence of a more negative cast—but containing some interesting ideas that might be helpful in resolving the current conflict. One major example, productive of much heat but also a little light, was the controversy over water pollution. As population and industry expanded during the late nineteenth century, New York and New Jersey cities dumped increasing amounts of sewage into the Bay and the rivers that emptied into the Harbor. In 1903, New York State created a commission to examine ways to control water pollution, but New Jersey refused to cooperate; then, in 1908, New York brought suit to halt construction of a major sewer line in Northern New Jersey that would carry still more sewage into the Bay. In response, New Jersey argued that the pollution problem was caused largely by untreated waste from New York City’s outflow pipes. By 1916–17, this conflict had generated mountains of testimony and large legal fees, and the end was not yet in sight.17 Within this sad tale, however, there were still some nuggets which Cohen and his allies might use. An early report by the New York Commission, in 1905, had suggested that the pollution problem should be solved through cooperative action: a permanent bi-state agency should be created and given power to regulate sewage discharge throughout a metropolitan sewage district, which would include portions of both states. The new agency would also develop a “comprehensive plan” for proper sewage disposal across the region. This approach—a permanent administrative agency, operating in all parts of a bounded district that ranged across portions of two states, and responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for action— would be embraced by Cohen as he sought ways to meet the freight controversy a decade later.18 A second illustration of the need for cooperation between the two states was the long struggle to construct a vehicular bridge or tunnel across the Hudson River. To the east, Manhattan Island had been joined to Brooklyn, Queens, and Long Island by a series of spans—the Brooklyn Bridge in 1883 and three other bridges in 1903–1910. These large crossings were major stimuli to the economic development of the eastern boroughs of New York City and the towns of Long Island.19
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To build similar connections between New Jersey and Manhattan, however, involved more difficult challenges—in both engineering and political terms. In 1906 both states created commissions to work together in devising a plan for spanning the Hudson. Cooperating intermittently, the two commissions grappled with difficult technical problems and finally reported in 1909 that it would be desirable and feasible to construct a bridge across the Hudson—either at 57th Street, 110th Street, or 179th Street. Then sentiment among members of the two Bridge and Tunnel Commissions split; some commissioners continued to advocate a bridge, provisionally at about 57th Street, but in 1913 the New York Commission concluded that a vehicular tunnel from Jersey City under the Hudson to lower Manhattan would be more desirable—and much cheaper—than a bridge.20 By 1913–14 there was considerable public sentiment both in Northern New Jersey and in New York for some sort of crossing to Manhattan, displacing the ferries with their long waiting lines and sometimes hazardous journeys. However, the New Jersey legislature was reluctant to take on the financial burden (estimated at $11 million or more), and in 1914 the Trenton legislators passed a law permitting any three counties to join together in order to build a tunnel or a bridge—if they were willing to pay for it. Local officials were also wary of the cost and its impact on local taxes, and no action was taken during the next two years. Now, as Cohen reviewed the issue in 1916, public sentiment across the region seemed to favor pressing ahead with a tunnel, the lower-cost option; and officials in both states were once again trying to create a joint agency to carry out the project. The “bridge and tunnel” story underscored to Cohen the difficulty of moving ahead if the representatives from the two states were motivated and controlled by different perspectives and priorities. A single bi-state agency, or two parallel commissions created under similar laws and dedicated to working as a unified body, would be far preferable.21
The Bi-State Harbor: Competing Strategies for Success The third major thread in the struggle for interstate cooperation was centered on the problem of economic development in the New York region, and brought Cohen directly to the issues handed to him by the Chamber of Commerce executives in 1916. In 1911, Governors Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey and John Dix of New York created study commissions to work together on ways to improve efficiency in the harbor area. As Wilson remarked, the commissions were
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expected to examine “the whole future development of the great port of New York.”22 A number of major problems in the region’s transport system were soon identified by the two bodies; and before the end of 1911 many of the strands Cohen would later weave together to design a Port Authority had been identified. The most useful contribution was made by Calvin Tompkins, one of Dix’s appointees to the study group and also Dock Commissioner in New York City. In a series of speeches and papers, Tompkins identified competition among the region’s railroads as a crucial cause for the “inefficient” use of the waterfront in both states, and for the general pattern of transportation congestion and high cost for which the Port of New York was legendary; and he sketched out a plan to reorganize pier arrangements in Manhattan and to construct new shipping facilities in less congested areas of Brooklyn and Staten Island. Tompkins concluded that the improvements would cost $173 million and that they could be self-supporting (that is, financed out of increased revenues). He also argued that tunnels large enough to carry freight railroads from New Jersey under the Hudson River to New York City should be constructed, together with extensive freight yards on the New Jersey side. Finally, Tompkins concluded that this was a problem requiring region-wide action, and that a cooperative bi-state program was needed.23 The two state commissions worked together intermittently in 1911–1913, but by 1914 the New Jersey group had begun to see the issue in a quite different way than that envisioned by Woodrow Wilson and by New Yorkers Dix and Tompkins. To the New Jersey commissioners the primary challenge was to remedy their state’s second-rate position in reaping benefits from the nation’s largest port. As their 1914 report argued, an efficient freight system for foreign trade required that goods be transferred directly from the trans-continental railroads to waiting ships. Since most of the rail lines terminated on the Jersey side of the Hudson River, the shipping lines should also be docking there; yet only seven shipping companies used New Jersey piers, while 70 landed at docks on the New York side. The result was expensive lighterage, which added to the cost of goods traveling into and through the region, as well as generating heavy congestion in the harbor and at the New York terminals. Most important, the present system undercut the industrial development of their own state.24 The best solution to the problem, the New Jersey commissioners concluded, would be to construct the needed piers on the west side of the harbor. This had not been done because the New Jersey waterfront was fragmented
2-2. Freight from the West was deposited by most railroads at their own New Jersey piers and floated across the Hudson to Manhattan and Brooklyn docks. The main exception was the New York Central, which came from Chicago through New York State and crossed the Hudson at a narrow point far north, traveling south to New York City. (The PRR and H&M tracks under the Hudson were devoted to passenger traffic.)
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among many cities and towns. Meanwhile New York City, with its unified control over much of the Eastern harbor, had invested heavily in piers and other improvements, and had attracted most of the traffic; by 1914 it owned 230 piers, while New Jersey’s cities held only two. Now it was time for New Jersey to act—creating a “central port authority” which would reach from the Hudson waterfront west to Newark Bay. This port agency would supervise the construction of modern piers by local communities and provide regulatory control over all waterfront development. Its aim would be a “scientifically planned market and distributing system in New Jersey as well as in New York.” A state-sponsored port authority, the commissioners concluded, was most likely “the only plan by which New Jersey can reap its proper share of the benefits from commerce.”25 The 1914 document contained a few references to cooperative efforts with New York, but the main thrust of the report favored independent action to win out in the competitive struggle against its larger but vulnerable neighbor, the New York Goliath. New Jersey legislators reaffirmed their go-it-alone policy in 1915, creating a new state body, the Board of Commerce and Navigation, to lead the modernization effort. Cities and towns along the Hudson and other waterways were wary of the spectre of state power, however, and the new agency was not given the power of condemnation or funds to construct new docks or carry out other large capital improvements.26 Blocked from taking vigorous direct action on the “supply side” (by constructing modern ship terminals and rail spurs), the Board of Commerce and Navigation turned to the “demand side”—the use of the pricing system as a way to obtain more pier space in the New Jersey sector of the harbor. By the late summer of 1915, the Board had sketched out the argument—outlined earlier in this chapter—that freight rates for rail deliveries to Northern New Jersey locations should be lower than charges for freight delivered to marine terminals in Manhattan or Brooklyn. The Board’s logic appeared to be that lower rates would increase the demand for modern pier facilities on the New Jersey waterfront, and that Jersey City and other localities could then respond with capital improvement programs, confident that the new piers and rail connections would more than pay their way.27 The logic was not without its flaws, as Cohen and his associates pointed out later. But in 1915, the Board’s stratagem—criticize New York and the railroads for “unfair discrimination” in railroad rates, and threaten legal action as a route to lower rates—was an immediate political success. The Board’s plan not only permitted New Jersey’s public officials to attack two of their favorite ogres (the rail corporations and the gorged but still grasping city); it
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also meant that local and state officials could defer for another day some financially and politically difficult issues: ■
■
■
■
which harbor areas in northern New Jersey should receive major investments? what kinds of improvements would be needed in order to attract rail and shipping services from the New York side, and from Baltimore and other competing ports? what sort of coordination would be needed in order to restrain the New Jersey cities from competing destructively against each other as well as against New York? who would bear the cost if large capital investments failed to pay their way?
New York City’s recent battles over subway costs and routes, and its problems in modernizing its own docks, suggested there were no easy answers to these questions; and New York’s capacity to plan and to generate investment dollars was far beyond that of New Jersey’s small and middle-sized cities.28 With its strategy determined, the New Jersey agency convened a public meeting in September 1915 and outlined its conclusions. The Board found much support among local public officials and tradespeople for its proposed litigation; and Woodrow Wilson’s successor as governor, James F. Fielder, also endorsed that strategy. During the next several months, the state’s major waterfront cities—Newark, Jersey City, Elizabeth, and Hoboken—worked with state agencies and with the New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce in preparing a challenge to the traditional rate system. On May 27, 1916 the New Jersey interests submitted their brief to the Interstate Commerce Commission and urged that the ICC require the railroads to charge lower rates to marine terminals in New Jersey.29 Meanwhile, the tenuous alliance that held New York City and state officials at Albany in a common front—favoring bi-state cooperation—was crumbling. Business and political leaders in Brooklyn and Staten Island had long been sensitive to the local disadvantages that could result from vigorous bi-state collaboration. Under such a program, waterfront areas in New Jersey would be improved, while investment in marine terminals in Brooklyn and other parts of New York might be disregarded. Equally important, especially for city politicians, a bi-state effort posed the danger that state officials would usurp the city’s ability to control its own destiny. In this case, New York City’s ability to deter-
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mine its own future as a world maritime power might be lost—transferred to officials at Albany and to their allies in the Manhattan business community, who seemed to undervalue political accountability whenever that democratic value clashed with claims of business efficiency and business profit.30 So it was predictable, once the New Jersey commission had issued its 1914 proclamation of separatism, that some of New York City’s public officials would move away from regionalism. They could argue that more than half of the region’s entire waterfront lay within the borders of the city, and that during the past three decades its Department of Docks had been modernizing its harbors and piers. New York City’s marine facilities were the busiest in the world. If there were problems, Gotham could solve them, reap the advantages in reputation and in funds for municipal use, and maintain New York’s position as the world’s premier port. In pursuit of this view, in 1914 the city’s Board of Estimate created a committee to prepare plans for reducing congestion along Manhattan’s West Side waterfront, which was viewed as a major contributor to delays and high costs in the New York region. This committee issued one report in 1915 and another in 1916, but at that point conflict broke out among the several groups in the city on the best way to solve the West Side problem.31
From this Nettle, Pluck a Rose In 1916, the issue was in Cohen’s hands. As the general counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, facing New Jersey’s suit, Cohen had a client to defend. Indeed he had two clients, for the governor of New York and his aides had also designated Cohen to represent the state’s interests. But how could his clients’ interests be best served? The answer was not immediately clear.
The Dangers of Litigation If the New Jersey challenge were fought out toe-to-toe, it was not at all certain that Cohen would win. He could argue—and he did—that the bi-state region had been treated historically as a single rate zone, and that dividing it into a New Jersey (or western) zone and a New York (or eastern) zone would disrupt railroad rates and shipping patterns which had evolved over decades. But how much influence would the weight of history have with the ICC and the courts, if “efficiency” favored the New Jersey position? In an age of scientific management and rational planning, Cohen could not be sure. In-
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deed, under the influence of Brandeis, who had acted as a close adviser to the Interstate Commerce Commission in the recent railroad rate cases, the ICC’s inclination to embrace efficiency seemed especially strong. And when the issue of freight rates was looked at from the perspective of rational planning, the New Jersey argument—that costly lighterage operations ought to be separately charged, that such charges would reduce the tendency of shippers to send goods to overcrowded dock areas in Manhattan and Brooklyn, and that the result would be lower freight costs in the New York region and nationally—might command wide support.32 But there was a flaw in the New Jersey stance. If the ICC required that the railroads charge higher fees for shippers sending their goods to the New York side of the port, that would almost certainly drive many shippers to cheaper locations. They would shift to the less expensive “New Jersey zone,” however, only if modern shipping piers and rail-pier connections existed there; and it was not clear that the state and its cities had the political will and organizing capacity to take control of the waterfront and modernize their port facilities. If the New Jersey port areas did not respond quickly, the traffic leaving the New York side might instead depart for other major ports—Baltimore, New Orleans, Philadelphia. That result would not only hurt New York; it would also damage the economy of Northern New Jersey, which benefited from the commercial activities carried out on the eastern side of the Hudson.33 The local fallout from a change in freight rates was not the major concern at the ICC. If economic analysis showed that the efficiency of the national freight system would be improved through separate charges for lighterage, and if as a result shippers favored Baltimore and New Orleans, so be it! However, even if Cohen had felt confident that his New York clients could win the case, neither he nor his Chamber of Commerce associates were inclined to rely on litigation as the primary route to a solution. The court battles might drag on for years—as the ongoing interstate conflict on the water pollution problem illustrated—and that would interfere with modernizing the Port, which required cooperative bi-state action. Moreover, by temperament and experience, Cohen was inclined to avoid protracted conflict and litigation; he preferred to bring the contending parties together to work out a solution.34
From Danger to Opportunity How, then, should he proceed? Cohen first had to file a response to the New Jersey challenge, and in October 1916 he submitted a brief which opposed
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splitting the region into two freight zones, and which emphasized the historical unity of the Port of New York and the great economic advantages which had accrued to Northern New Jersey as well as New York under the existing system.35 Meanwhile, Cohen considered how he could redirect the controversy along a more positive tack. The lessons of history suggested that a bi-state study commission might be a constructive first step; that approach had worked in the early nineteenth century, leading to the 1834 Treaty and seven decades of tranquility. More recent efforts to reach a common plan of action through joint study commissions—on the bridge-and-tunnel issue, and on harbor problems—had been disappointing; but the weaknesses seen there might be overcome if the two states appointed members who were firmly committed to a regional perspective, and who eschewed jockeying for narrower advantage. And that positive step might be taken if the two governors were publicly committed to bi-state cooperation. If the governors could be persuaded to take the lead in pressing for cooperative action, the ICC might then be willing to hold the litigation in abeyance while the two states tried to reconcile their differences. This pause in litigation would meet Cohen’s short-term goal, since New York would be left temporarily with the existing unified rate system. But an ICC decision to defer final action would also have a further impact: Hanging like a sword of Damocles over the heads of New York’s political leaders and her more parochial business executives in the outlying boroughs, the New York Harbor case would provide a needed prod toward cooperative action. Meanwhile, across the Hudson, Cohen could seek support from business and government leaders who might prefer a cooperative program of modernization to continued litigation. In the winter of 1916–17, as Julius Henry Cohen thought through his strategic plans, the fortunes of politics created an almost perfect combination for his designs. In Albany, Republican Governor Charles Whitman had known Cohen for years and shared his interest in reform. Cohen had been active in the Committee of 100 which had fought successfully, in the 1910 reform campaign, to elect Whitman as District Attorney on an anti-Tammany slate. In 1914, Whitman had been elected governor, and in 1916 he had been re-elected to a second two-year term. It seemed likely that Whitman would support a cooperative approach to meeting the harbor problem.36 In New York City, Cohen also had a friend and fellow reformer in power. In 1910, John Purroy Mitchel had been elected president of the city’s Board of Aldermen, and in 1913, he had won a four-year term. Mitchel’s main con-
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cern was “the modernization and integrity of administration,” and he was likely to favor a study which took a broad view of harbor problems and economic development strategies. But Mitchel’s political future was precarious; a Democrat elected on a reform “fusion” ticket with Republican support, he lacked the talent for political negotiation and coalition-building, and the forces of Tammany were organizing to reclaim the mayor’s office in the fall 1917 election. If Cohen and his allies could establish a firm basis for cooperation across the Hudson before that fall campaign, the impact of Tammany’s obstructionism would be much reduced.37 When Cohen had surveyed the political scene in the summer and early fall of 1916, the major hurdle to going forward quickly with a plan of cooperation had been the governor of New Jersey, James Fielder. A Democrat from Jersey City, he had embraced the ICC litigation strategy. However, in the November 1916 election, the victor was Walter E. Edge, a wealthy Republican businessman from the southern regions of New Jersey, who took a very different view. Edge had served as state senator during the years 1911–1916, taking a leading role in securing legislation to protect industrial workers, and to reorganize government agencies in order to reduce duplication and inefficiency. In his campaign for the governorship, Edge adopted the slogan, “A Business Man with a Business Plan”; and he urged that state highways be improved and that transportation facilities between New Jersey and New York be modernized. Since the state’s road system was under the control of county political officials, was a frequent source of corruption, and was in poor shape—especially under the onslaught of the growing number of horseless carriages—Edge also pressed for state action to “remove the highways from political control and place them under non-partisan, technical control.” As Cohen weighed his plans for the new year, these were themes that could not but warm his heart: New Jersey was led by a man whose central values were those of the New York Chamber of Commerce, the Citizens Union, and Julius Henry Cohen himself!38 Oral arguments in the ICC case were scheduled for early in 1917, and on January 10, Cohen confronted the opposing lawyers in the first day of the hearing, held in New York City. During the next several weeks, the two sides laid out their very different views. New Jersey’s testimony emphasized that if the true cost of lighterage across the harbor were added to New York’s shipping charges, “steamships would move their docks to the Jersey shore” to avoid paying the extra costs; and they thought it likely that a migration of manufacturing plants would follow. However, ICC hearing examiner Wilbur La Roe extracted a damaging admission from one of New Jersey’s major wit-
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nesses, chief engineer B. F. Cresson of the State Board of Commerce and Navigation, in the following colloquy: La Roe: “Is it your understanding as an engineer that the failure of the west side of the port to develop is due in great part to the lethargy of the people . . . and that if the proper spirit were manifested, necessary funds provided, and a co-ordination of authority and central control substituted for the present division, a very material advancement could be made on the west shore without a change in freight rates? Cresson: “I think that is so.”
The New York Times ran its report on this exchange under the headline, “Engineer Admits at Federal Hearing that Lethargy of People Has Arrested Development.”39 When New York’s physical separation from the continent (and its railroads) was combined with New Jersey’s indolence, might the economic future of the region—dependent as it was on foreign trade—be in jeopardy? Cohen’s fears, that opening up the rate issue might lead to unwelcome challenges, was soon confirmed: a spokesman for Baltimore appeared at the hearing to say that once the New York Harbor case was concluded, his city would ask the ICC to take the next step—lowering rail freight rates to that major seaport.40 While the public controversy went forward, Cohen and his associates at the Chamber of Commerce—Outerbridge and Bush—were moving in other directions. Informal contacts were made with Governors Whitman and Edge; both favored a cooperative approach, and both agreed to attend a public meeting and to press for joint action. That session was held in the Great Hall of the New York Chamber of Commerce on March l, with business groups and local public officials from both states on hand. Governor Edge told the assembled regional leaders that he wanted to see “industrial New York and industrial New Jersey co-operating” and “a joint commission appointed representing the two states,” which would devise a unified strategy to improve commerce in the port area.” As Cohen observed later, Governor Edge had “in substance repudiated the isolationist policy of his predecessor.”41 Meeting later that day with Cohen, the two governors agreed to create a study commission and to appoint members who were committed to working in harmony. Cohen then drafted legislation to establish a joint body to study conditions in “the entire Port of New York” and to recommend policies the two states might adopt in order to reorganize and modernize the bi-state port. Both governors endorsed the bill, and within a few weeks, legislation author-
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izing the joint agency—the New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission—had been passed in both states.42
The Study Commission and the ICC Now Julius Henry could use these March maneuvers to serve both his narrower and his broader purposes in the ICC case. On April 14, 1917, he submitted his final brief on behalf of New York State and the Chamber. Opposing the division of the Port into two rate zones, Cohen acknowledged that service in the New York region must be improved. “But how is it to come about?,” he asked rhetorically. Recent events encouraged Cohen to tender a wide-ranging response: Governors Whitman and Edge have given the answer. Let all hands turn to and cooperate in the solution of this great problem. Its final engineering solution will require the constructive mind of a great engineer . . . and hundreds of millions of dollars. . . . [And] there must be provided better political organization of the municipalities of New Jersey and legal power on all sides of the harbor.
To proceed in this way, Cohen continued, will require “a liberal spirit on all sides” in order to “break down political barriers [and] put aside petty rivalries.” Cohen then noted that the ICC hearings had helped to encourage cooperation by state leaders, making the ICC suit “a blessing in disguise.” But, he warned, if the ICC were now to accept the argument of the New Jersey interests and create a New Jersey zone, that action “would destroy the newborn spirit, would paralyze the initiative and palsy the hands of those who would put endeavor into this great work.”43 During the next several months, while the ICC deliberated, it was important to demonstrate to that august group that the new spirit of cooperation was more than a passing zephyr, that real accomplishment might be attained despite the recent unhappy experiences in interstate friction and inaction. Governor Whitman ensured that the Chamber of Commerce’s desire for bistate cooperation would be embedded in the bi-state commission by naming Outerbridge as one of his three appointees; and the governors chose five other appointees who were thought likely to support a regional approach. On August 1, the six members held their first meeting and agreed to organize as a unified body, with William Willcox of New York as chairman and J. Spencer Smith of New Jersey as vice chairman. They signaled their interest
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in nonpolitical expertise by naming George Goethals, of Panama Canal fame, as consulting engineer to the Commission. To head the engineering staff, they chose New Jersey’s B.F. Cresson. And to maintain a balance between the states, the bi-state Port and Harbor Development Commission selected, as its general counsel, Julius Henry Cohen.44 Once the bi-state Commission was organized, its members saw that the wartime traffic situation offered a ready-made opportunity to demonstrate not only the weaknesses in the existing transport system, but also the strengths of a system of stronger control. Intermittently since the war began in 1914, the slow and inefficient lighterage system had been unable to cope with the flow of goods bound for Europe, and loaded rail cars had backed up across New Jersey and into Pennsylvania. After the United States entered the war, in April 1917, conditions worsened, with waiting railroad cars extending for hundreds of miles. The Commission leaders made contact with the White House, and on October 3, Outerbridge, Willcox, and Cohen met with President Wilson and recommended that he create a War Board, composed of top officials of all departments engaged in shipping goods through the Port of New York. The bi-state Commission’s staff would serve as the staff for the Board in coordinating shipping and ending the backlog. Wilson accepted the idea, Irving Bush was designated as chief executive officer in devising and carrying out a plan, and Cohen was named secretary to the Board. A program was developed to coordinate rail-maritime traffic passing through the terminals at Hoboken, Manhattan, and Brooklyn, and by early 1918 the backlog was largely eliminated. Two years later, the Commission reflected on this experience: “This War Board for the Port of New York represented the first successful co-ordination in a single body of all possessing authority in the Port, and is believed to have been a working agency of great value in the prosecution of the war.” The Commission members had a taste of a possible future, and it worked!45 On December 17, 1917, the Interstate Commerce Commission handed down its decision in the New York Harbor case, and Cohen found his strategy vindicated. The ICC agreed with the argument in the New York brief that “historically, geographically, and commercially” New York City and industrial North Jersey “constitute a single community” and that New Jersey had prospered from its close association with New York. The Commission also agreed with the contention that the existing freight distribution system in the region needed to be drastically altered; but it declined—for the present—to accept New Jersey’s argument that giving New Jersey a lower rail rate would bring about a more efficient system. Instead, the ICC argued, the railroads
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now terminating on the New Jersey shore should be extended, through tunnels under the Hudson River, to Manhattan, so that freight could be transferred there to trucks bound for New York’s vast system of piers, thus eliminating the delays and cost of lighterage. And the Commission noted that the two states were now cooperating in order to modernize the rail and pier system across the Port.46 The ICC went further, however, creating Cohen’s Sword of Damocles over the heads of those New Yorkers who might be content with the existing system, which had brought wealth to the Greater City. For the ICC noted that half of the nation’s total export and import traffic was carried through the Port of New York, and that more than 85 percent of this total had to be conveyed on lighters to or from piers in Manhattan and Brooklyn. It then suggested that this method might involve “a huge economic loss which is in a sense an unjustifiable burden upon the people of the whole country” and concluded that the New Jersey position was “in a measure justified from an economic viewpoint.” If the burdens of lighterage and other inefficiencies could not be solved through positive action by the two states jointly, the Commission warned, the ICC might reopen the case: “There may come a time when the burden of handling the enormous tonnage in and out of the port will be so onerous that Manhattan itself may need such relief as lower rates to and from the New Jersey shore would in part afford.”47 Gently phrased, the ICC’s soft glove contained within it a mailed fist; and Cohen could hope that this authoritative opinion would contain just the right mix to encourage the narrower interests in New York to reach out in a cooperative spirit toward New Jersey, while ending the tendency in that combative state to rely on litigation as the main route to a modernized pier system and further economic growth. So a year of contention and renewed cooperation came to an end, and Julius Henry Cohen could look forward to building upon this constructive spirit in the new year of 1918. Only one small cloud could be seen on the horizon at December’s close. But the name of that cloud was Tammany; and its wrath would soon break over the head of the bi-state commission and her chief legal strategist.
3 Designing a New Organization An Uneasy Marriage of Planning and Politics
History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions, Guides us by vanities. . . . Gives too soon Into weak hands. . . . —T.S. Eliot, Gerontion
I
t may well be, as Elting Morison has observed, that men and women who grew to maturity in the years between 1870 and the First World War came to understand the possibilities for social progress, and the obligations of personal responsibility, in quite distinctive ways. To the members of those generations, each individual seemed to be in “full control” of his or her own behavior, with some obligation to be “up and doing in the cause of righteousness.” Moreover, one thought not of “how little time there was,” but rather that there was time enough—time for the survey of causes and the measurements of effects . . . time for things to work themselves out, time for the cumulative results of selected small changes to take hold, time in which one slow, increasing purpose could work onward, and probably upward and possibly forever.1
Julius Henry Cohen grew up in that time of optimism, and so did others who took important roles in the efforts to encourage regional cooperation during the years before and after the Great War. Indeed three of the leading men in this story were born in the same year, 1873, and so reached 40 before the war began—Cohen himself, New Jersey’s Walter Edge, and a New Yorker who would soon enter the Port Authority saga and in time be revered as one of the nation’s great governors, Alfred E. Smith. For some from that generation, the Great War was a devastating event, shaking their sense of competence and their hopes for progress. “The war 47
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that began in August 1914,” Morison writes, “destroyed all the carefully controlled arrangements that held a serene and innocent time together. . . . It broke up the process by which men had been accustomed to learn essential things about their environment. Intruding suddenly, like the act of some angry or indifferent god, upon the affairs of competent and responsible men, it befuddled . . . the senses of competence and responsibility. . . . Those who had prepared themselves to live in 1910 had little to bring down with them that could be made to fit the life of the twenties.”2 In contrast, Cohen and Edge and Smith maintained their optimism and their willingness to do battle, with the hope that their efforts would, in time, bring success. For Cohen, faith and a strong pair of rose-colored glasses were essential if he were to persevere during the next few years, as the prospects for a vigorous new system of regional control and port modernization seeped away. Without the nourishment of those earlier decades, Cohen and his colleagues might have lost hope and left the fray, as their enterprise trudged slowly from the modest success of 1917 through the gray and uncertain years of 1918, 1919, and 1920, to the pallid achievements of 1921 and 1922, and then to the complete failure of the “comprehensive” solution they had envisioned—until Cohen’s bi-state agency could finally emerge a decade later, transformed from stolid railroad buffalo of the 1920s to lean and opportunistic gazelle of the motor age.
A Planner’s Vision Before Cohen was compelled to feel the sharp teeth of Tammany, and the emasculating scalpels of jealous legislators, he enjoyed a few months of peaceful contemplation and creative legal writing. In January 1918, the bistate Commission issued its preliminary report, which asked the two states to finance an extensive survey of the region’s complex transport problems; both governors strongly endorsed the request, and within a few weeks the states had provided money for a two-year study.3 Most of the funds were allocated to a team of engineers and statisticians who analyzed the patterns of rail, truck, and waterway traffic and examined a range of possible solutions. But a small chunk went to Cohen, so that he could devote the summer and fall of 1918 to analyzing the legal issues and devising some mechanism through which New York State and New Jersey could work jointly and in harmony—in carrying out the engineering projects and other tasks needed to convert the Port of New York from one of the most
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backward to one of the most modern of the world’s large ports. Cohen drew upon several ideas that were embedded in earlier reports on the New York region, he studied the legal and operating designs of port agencies in London and Liverpool, and he added a few distinctive contributions of his own. By early December 1918, he had a tentative draft to lay before the bi-state Commissioners, the two governors, and the general public. Cohen’s 1918 proposal was a planner’s dream. A bi-state “Port of New York Authority” would be created, with the responsibility to shape development across an area embracing more than 50 cities and towns in two states (encompassed in a “Port of New York District”). After initial approvals by the state legislatures, and a two-thirds vote by the region’s citizens (through their local governments), the new agency would have extraordinary powers: the power not only to issue regulations governing construction, commercial transactions, and other activities in the Port District (rules that would be binding on private corporations and local governments); but also the power to block state actions inconsistent with a plan for “comprehensive development” of the Port area. Ultimately, Cohen anticipated, the agency might also be given the power to grapple effectively with the pollution problem; then it could regulate the waters of New York Bay, and development along the hundreds of miles of waterfront, so that the region’s growth potential—and the water and air pollution generated by that growth—could be controlled and shaped harmoniously. This was a bi-state agency designed for independent action—its commissioners appointed for six-year overlapping terms, so that neither state could alter the Authority’s policies abruptly by replacing these top officials; its revenues drawn from its own self-supporting projects, so that the states could not use the traditional power of the purse to control its programs; its actions safeguarded from executive controls, as the governors were given no review or veto power over the Authority’s decisions.4 With these safeguards for its independence, coupled with its substantial regulatory and operating powers, the Port of New York Authority would be an exemplar of the reformer’s vision: insulated from intraregional jealousies and the many vagaries of politics, the Authority’s skilled staff of engineers and planners would analyze, monitor, and shape the modernization of the Port and the economic growth of the surrounding region, guided only by principles of efficiency and the public interest.5 Once Cohen’s initial plan was exposed to the light and heat of local and state political forces, many of its crucial provisions could not survive. State officials and their local counterparts raised the banner of “democracy” and the necessity for “public accountability” against the offending document;
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and the Port Authority idea was hammered through three more drafts before it emerged, a much altered animal, and received final approval more than two years later. However, it is useful to examine his initial draft in somewhat more detail, as an illustration of a significant Progressive impulse—toward both insulating and concentrating political power.6 Then we can turn to the evolution of that draft during 1919, 1920 and 1921, and to the associated debates on how a new agency with regional aspirations might be aided and shackled—debates which exemplify the mix of worthy and unlovely motives that march under the banner of “democracy.” To understand Julius Henry Cohen’s initial plan, we can begin with an essay he wrote in 1920 for the Cornell Law Quarterly. There he explained that his goal had been to design a bi-state agency “vested with broad legal powers to build, maintain and operate port facilities” and to “improve commerce and navigation”; the agency would be given “adequate power” to shape Port activities whether under “public or private ownership.”7 Cohen’s December 1918 draft attempted to achieve this result through a series of steps, many of them built upon earlier decisions and proposals: 1. The two states would create a “Port of New York Authority,” an agency of the two states which would operate within a Port District that embraced New York Bay and the nearby waterfront and land areas of both states.8 2. The new Port Authority would be established via the Compact Clause of the U. S. Constitution, by amending an existing treaty, the 1834 Compact between New Jersey and New York State. Here Cohen made a distinctive contribution; his proposal to root the new agency in the Compact Clause was carried over into the final draft and has provided a crucial base for the continued stability of the agency over the years. Until Cohen’s 1918 suggestion, the Compact Clause had been used to settle boundary disputes and other jurisdictional issues among the states, but not as a basis for a permanent interstate body. When continuing, cooperative action between states was needed, they had instead created separate state commissions which would work in collaboration—or sometimes in disharmony. The traditional tendency not to use the Compact Clause is understandable, since it is phrased as restriction on the states, not as a route to collaborative state power; and it was Cohen’s creative insight to see the positive potential for continuing cooperation in that negative language.9 Cohen located a distinct advantage in creating an agency via the Compact Clause, rather than using joint commissions. An interstate compact must be approved by Congress; and once that step has been taken, it is very difficult for any party to withdraw its participation. In an era when New Jer-
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sey and New York might at any point be led by elected officials who, in a fit of hostility, could simply abrogate cooperation by their half of a joint commission, the firmer bonds provided by the Compact Clause were no small benefit—at least to those, like Cohen, Outerbridge, Edge, and Whitman, who favored vigorous and sustained cooperative action.10 3. The Port Authority would be governed by a board of six commissioners, three appointed by each state; these board members would serve for six-year overlapping terms. This provision was consistent with an American tradition; multi-headed commissions, with overlapping terms, were used frequently when board members were expected to use independent judgment and nonpartisan expertise in carrying out public policies. For Cohen and his colleagues, a major concern was continuity of leadership; six-year overlapping terms would serve that goal, which had been undercut by the tradition of bringing in new people and new policies every time a new mayor took office.11 4. Under Cohen’s plan, the commissioners would receive no salaries or other payments. From his experience in New York politics and discussions with officials of the Liverpool and London port authorities, Cohen had concluded that a salaried commission post would be attractive as a reward for party service, and the governors would be under continuous pressure to allot these positions to the party faithful. If the posts were unsalaried, the two governors could more easily appoint individuals who were able and knowledgeable about port and economic conditions, regardless of party service.12 5. In Cohen’s draft, the duties and salaries of the Port Authority’s staff would be determined solely by its commissioners. Thus the new agency would not become enmeshed in the narrow constraints that were part of local and state civil-service systems, and the ability of the two states to exercise close control through review of positions and salaries would also be excluded. This provision entailed some risk, of course; if the states appointed commissioners who were politically motivated, the Port Authority could become riddled with patronage appointments. Cohen was willing to take that risk, for he expected that he and his associates could persuade the two governors to appoint distinguished members of the business and legal communities—men and women who would have the fortitude to defend the agency’s integrity against pressures from state officials. 6. The new agency would have “full power and authority” to purchase, construct, and operate “any terminal or transportation facility” within the Port District, and to charge rents and tolls to pay for the use and modernization of its piers, warehouses, and other structures. Also, the Port Authority could float bonds secured by the income from its operations. These powers,
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combined with the structure of independence outlined above, might permit the Port Authority to overcome a serious weakness found in many port-development agencies. In New York as in many cities, much of the revenue from public docks and harbor activities was siphoned off and applied to unrelated city and state purposes. Critics argued that these revenues should instead be plowed back into modernization, which would repay the investment by attracting more commerce and more jobs, and serve as an engine of economic progress for the wider region. By giving the Port Authority the ability to issue bonds backed by its own revenues, Cohen’s proposal would make it more difficult for cities and states to divert the agency’s surpluses.13 7. Cohen did not attempt to give taxing power to the new agency. State officials seemed unlikely to grant that power; and it was doubtful a taxing district would have the political independence which Cohen believed the Port Authority required.14 This was Cohen’s preferred model. But he was not content to rest the financial health of his offspring, and its future prospects for benefiting the region, on its ability to develop an array of harbor projects so clearly self-sustaining that conservative bankers would buy its bonds, secured only by its own revenues. There was a fall-back position tucked away in the inner reaches of his 1918 draft treaty. If the banking community would not endorse bonds based only on these revenues, the Port Authority’s leaders could ask the states to guarantee its bonds. Albany and Trenton might then agree to do so, since ultimately the whole package of projects and activities carried out by the Port Authority could in time be self-supporting; that prospect was suggested by experience at London, Liverpool, and some American ports. This was not Cohen’s preferred option, of course, since state credit would carry with it some risk that the states would use that step as a route to control the Port Authority’s activities. But it was available if needed.15 These provisions would give the new agency some independence; but would it be able to take a leading role in meeting the Port’s problems of congestion and its need for modernization? Its financial powers, and therefore its capacity to act on its own, were limited. Moreover, the Port’s problems, as Cohen and others understood them, were largely caused by the behavior and misbehavior of others: the large cities and small towns which went their own way in building piers or letting them fall into disrepair; the states (especially New Jersey), which sold waterfront land rather than developing it as part of a region-wide plan; and the railroads, steamship lines, and other private corporations, which needed to be led from competitive inefficiency in transportation and waterfront use into the path of righteousness.
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To meet these crucial problems, Cohen’s draft treaty provided his Port Authority with a second, and rather sharper, set of teeth: A. Once the state legislatures approved “any plan or plans for the comprehensive development of the Port of New York, or for “any part of the District,” “no change in such plans shall thereafter be made except by and with the approval of the Port Authority.” (Article IX; emphasis added) The Commission’s engineering and planning staff was hard at work preparing detailed physical plans for new marine terminals, railroad tunnels under the Hudson, and other improvements; Cohen’s provision would give continuing control over development in the region to the Port Authority, once the two states had given initial approval to these plans. B. Substantial parcels of land in the port area were owned by the states themselves; under the treaty both states would henceforth be barred from making any grants of land within the Port District “without the approval of the Port Authority” (Article VIII). C. In addition to constraining the states, Cohen sought to exercise some control over the dozens of local governments in the Port District. Under Article XVII the Port Authority could propose “orders, rules and regulations” in order to improve “navigation and commerce” in the District; and unless the governing bodies of municipalities with a population of at least one-third of the District’s total population formally objected in 90 days, the Port Authority regulations would be “binding within the District upon all persons and corporations” (emphasis added). Cohen’s proposal was innovative in providing for a voting role for cities and towns in relation to policies of a semi-independent public corporation. But the reality was that only New York City, with more than half the population of the Port area, would be able to block the Authority’s policies on its own; no other city, alone or with a dozen of the largest cities other than New York City, could stay the Port Authority’s hand. Nor would New York City, or an alliance of many cities that reached the one-third figure, necessarily be protected. For if opposition reached the magic one-third mark, the Port Authority could then apply to the courts, which would be asked to inquire into “the facts and circumstances” and determine whether the regulation “is reasonable and of public necessity.” The finding of the court would be binding on all cities, villages, and other local bodies—even if half, or two-thirds, or all of them were opposed. D. But suppose an individual, corporation, or city were to violate an approved regulation issued by the Port Authority? Under Article XVIII, the offender would be liable for a fine of up to $5000, or imprisonment—“for not more than one year.”
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E. Finally, the Port Authority would be given the right to apply to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and to state regulatory bodies, in order to obtain their support—and enforcement powers—in compelling changes in the way freight was handled by the railroads and others, and in altering freight rates, whenever such changes would “in the opinion of the Port Authority” be likely to “improve or better the handling of commerce” in the Port District (Article XII). In the years between 1900 and 1920, reformers from across the United States often found that “a patchwork government” could no longer meet the problems of a complex society with the “expertise and economy” that seemed essential. The reformers then “reached out for the power to reorder the government themselves.”16 Some of their schemes insulated the agents of government power—city managers, regional park boards, state utility commissions—from local politics, with the hope that these officials could eschew political expediency and rely mainly on their own broad vision and specialized knowledge in carrying out their mandates. Cohen’s Port Authority plan stood at the outer reaches of this movement: power would be taken from the neighborhood and the ward, and from the city and the state; it would be given to a group of six independent citizens who could think widely, use the skills of an able technical staff to plan wisely, and then act benevolently to improve the economic conditions for 8 million people and dozens of cities and towns; and if the citizens of these cities and towns could not directly affect the steady march of progress as the Port Authority carried out its plans, they would receive just compensation, in Cohen’s view, in the increased economic vitality of a vast bi-state region, and lower prices paid for food and the other necessities of life. Though it contained elements of the Progressive movement, Cohen’s offspring harkened back also to an earlier reform era, when Woodrow Wilson had argued—three decades before—that government agencies should be insulated from “the hurry and strife of politics” in order to apply businesslike principles to their work, and that their top officials should be given “large powers and unhampered discretion” in carrying out their duties. These were the powers that the Port Commissioners might attain, Cohen hoped, for the benefit of the region and the nation.17
Embraced by Reformers Julius Henry Cohen’s draft was made public in mid-December, and it was greeted with expressions of support by business and civic groups, by major
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newspapers in New York City and across the Hudson, and by Governors Whitman and Edge. Whitman saw the Port Treaty as an essential first step, to be followed by a plan requiring “the expenditure of many millions of dollars” in order to “make this port efficient.” The Brooklyn Daily Eagle agreed, and in its editorial the Eagle laid bare the underlying philosophy of Cohen’s initial draft: The powers of this body over terminal and transportation facilities seem . . . to be well nigh absolute. . . . If any far-reaching plan of harbor development is to be carried out quickly enough to maintain the commercial supremacy of this harbor, . . . the work must be in the control of an autocratic head vested with power. This ‘Port of New York Authority’ . . . would have such powers. . . . Its work could not be upset, as city improvement plans are continually upset, by changes of local administration.18
The New York Chamber of Commerce, however, thought Cohen had not gone far enough in insulating the new agency from local sentiment. Objecting to his proposal that the agency’s regulations would be subject to local referenda, the Chamber argued that municipal review “can only produce delay.” The “reasonable desire for local home rule,” the Chamber concluded, should give way to the “more important” need of improving port facilities. “Full power [should be] vested in the Port Authority itself.”19 Had Cohen’s draft treaty been available a year earlier, it might have survived in its original form. The mayor of the city most affected by the new agency—New York City—probably would have endorsed it; and Governors Whitman and Edge, Republicans with much influence in their GOP-dominated state legislatures, might have converted their personal enthusiasm into legislative victory. But in 1918, the tides of politics had turned against Cohen and his vision of regional leadership and cooperative action. In January, reformer John Purroy Mitchel had been succeeded as mayor of New York City by John F. Hylan, a Brooklyn politician who had campaigned against government reform and “efficiency experts” and had trounced Mitchel with strong support from Tammany. Hylan was soon at odds with the Citizens Union and other reform groups, and he expressed little interest in cooperation with New Jersey.20 This shift in local leadership might not have been a serious blow to Cohen’s plans if Charles Whitman had remained in the governor’s chair. A Republican in the reform tradition, he and his party majority at Albany were unlikely to defer to Hylan, even on a matter crucially affecting the city. But
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in November 1918, Whitman had been upset by Alfred E. Smith, a longtime member of Tammany Hall. While Smith was likely to take a broader view than Hylan, he could be expected to be sensitive to the rights of the city’s people, as expressed through the local officials they had chosen. Meanwhile, New Jersey’s Governor Edge had decided to run for national office, and in the fall of 1918 he had won election to the United States Senate. Although Edge would not resign from the governorship and take his place in the Senate until May of 1919, his ability to lead a cooperative effort was now weakened, and would soon end. Cohen did what he could to mend his unraveling coalition. Although Al Smith was supported by Tammany, Cohen knew that Smith was not a “Tammany man” at heart: His interests and his goals ranged far beyond a narrow calculation of how to gain votes through patronage and public posturing. During a dozen years in the state Assembly, Smith had supported reform legislation concerned with workers’ compensation, reorganization of state agencies to improve efficiency and executive control, and other matters. After criticizing Smith’s early performance in Albany, the Citizens Union in time came to support him; in this evolution Cohen played a leading role, and in time he became friends with Al.21 Smith then moved rapidly up the political ladder. In 1915 he was elected Sheriff in Manhattan with the support of both Tammany and the Citizens Union; in 1917 he was elected President of the city-wide Board of Aldermen; and in the fall of 1918 Smith was the first Democrat associated with Tammany Hall ever to win the governorship. Meanwhile, he had developed a deep concern about the problems of freight congestion in the New York region. So Cohen decided to take the initiative and see his friend: While he was putting together the first draft of the treaty in the fall of 1918, Cohen went to Smith’s home and discussed his plans, and he found Al ready to work for cooperative measures to meet the Hudson River problem.22 A few weeks later, with his draft treaty under public discussion, Cohen crossed the River and met with Walter Edge. He knew that Edge was strongly interested in prompt action on two crucial parts of his own highway improvement program—a bridge across the Delaware River to Philadelphia, and a tunnel from Jersey City to lower Manhattan—so that they would be underway before he left the State House in May. To achieve these goals, he needed the support of the new Democratic governor in Albany, and Cohen suggested that Edge propose a meeting in Albany to reach agreement on the underwater vehicular crossing, and on the Port Authority treaty. Edge agreed to take the initiative, and in late January 1919, he traveled to Albany to meet
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with Governor Smith, joined by Cohen and Outerbridge from the bi-state Commission, and by legislative leaders from both states.23 The Hudson River crossing was the first topic of discussion. A New Jersey study commission had sketched out plans for a tunnel from Jersey City to Canal Street in Manhattan, and Edge and some of the legislators favored prompt action. Smith appeared less certain. Cost was one consideration. The previous year both states had attempted to obtain a federal grant of $6 million, which would have covered half the estimated total of $12 million, but the U. S. Senate had blocked that option.24 Now the two states would have to foot the entire bill. In view of the cost, Smith was interested in discussing local sentiment and political risks and benefits before taking a firm position. Most of the evening was devoted to the tunnel project, while the Port treaty lay unattended. To Cohen, this seemed a strange way to proceed: The Hudson tunnel was only a small matter, a single project. Far more significant was the creation of a new bi-state Port Compact, with all the improvements in the region’s economy that would follow. Yet this important step was left to the hind end of the meeting.25 Finally discussion turned to the draft treaty. Some of the state legislators were interested in exploring what would happen after the Port Authority was created—what projects would it undertake, and what recourse state officials would have if they disagreed with its plans. Cohen knew that an attempt to go into these issues would simply raise the size of the Port Authority target, providing more reasons to stifle his creation before it emerged into the world. With the able collaboration of Al Smith, Cohen attempted to deflect questions that went beyond the “simple matter” of creating a bi-state agency. Ultimately, however, the legislators’ concerns were not surmounted; before the evening was over, a bi-state legislative commission had been appointed to review the treaty, and Cohen’s text was submitted to its tender mercies.26
Hobbled by a Bi-State Commission After a series of public hearings and private meetings held by the review commission, Cohen’s proposal emerged a pale shadow of its former self.27 All of the regulatory and enforcement powers (listed above as A through D) were stripped from the proposed Port Authority, and some were converted from powers to shackles. In Cohen’s draft, for example, no change in any Port development plan, once approved by the two states, could be made except “by and with the approval of the Port Authority”; in the revised version, no
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changes were permitted except “by and with the approval of the Legislatures” of the two states (new Article IX).28 The revised Article VIII no longer gave the Port Authority power to block the states from making land grants; instead, Article VIII provided that all terminal or railroad activities of the Authority would be under the control of the utility commissions of both states, which would treat this government agency as if it were simply a “private corporation.” Also, the new agency could no longer propose regulations which would be binding through local inaction or court approval; both state legislatures would need to approve any such regulations, and the two states would decide on penalties for violations (Articles XVII and XVIII). Finally, the bi-state commission modified two sections of Cohen’s draft which focused on the Port Authority’s ability to acquire and operate transport projects. Under revised article VI, the new agency was barred from exercising any of these powers until the two state legislatures approved a “comprehensive plan” for port development; so Cohen’s wall—separating approval of the Port Compact from discussion of specific Port Authority projects—had been breached. And Article VII, which provided that the new agency would have such additional powers and duties “as shall hereafter be delegated to it” was modified to read “as shall hereafter be delegated to or imposed upon it” (emphasis added). While of little import legally, the new phrase conveys a sense of punitive intent by a legislative body bent on ensuring that Cohen and the bi-state study commission got the message: the new Port Authority would be commanded by the two legislatures and the states; it would not give the commands. Other elements of Cohen’s original draft—creating the new agency under the Compact Clause, for example, and permitting it to petition state and federal regulatory commissions—remained; but these seemed to offer little threat to the existing pattern of state powers and prerogatives.29
Attacked by Tammany The revised draft was completed in late February, and during the next several weeks there was a flurry of activity which included elements both promising and foreboding. The most positive happening was the steady progress of the bi-state effort to construct a vehicular tunnel—or a “wagon tunnel” as the New York Times persisted in calling it—under the Hudson. By the end of March the legislatures of both states had approved bills authorizing an underwater crossing between Canal Street in Manhattan and Jersey City; it would be built under the supervision of two state commissions, working together. Al Smith still hesitated, however; and in early April he convened a
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public hearing in order to gauge sentiment for the tunnel and its twelve-million-dollar cost. The project was widely supported by city and state interests, although the fervid opposition from Queens served as a reminder that New York City was a house divided, when cooperation was proposed with that alien land across the Hudson. On April 8 Walter Edge signed the bill providing funds for the tunnel, and Al Smith concurred three days later. By early June, the two commissions, meeting jointly, began their preliminary work, and in July they organized as a single body and appointed Clifford M. Holland as Chief Engineer. The cause of bi-state cooperation had received a significant boost.30 Far less encouraging were the fits and starts on the Port Development plan itself. When the revised draft was completed in late February 1919, Mayor Hylan’s representatives on the bi-state review commission tried to delay publication of the new draft so that New York City officials could undertake a “further investigation.” But other commission members rejected that ploy, and the legislative commission released the modified draft, which had the support of most commission members, on March 1. However, the bi-state treaty faced a complex political situation. In the business communities of both states, and among Republican leaders in the state legislatures, traffic congestion and the declining portion of national freight attracted to the New York region were major concerns. The modified Port Authority proposal seemed an important step toward meeting these problems, and it won their support.31 But New York City’s elected officials were still unwilling to endorse the treaty, and while their opposition could be overridden in the state legislatures, that was not an attractive step politically. For 40 years, Gotham had engaged in active planning along its waterfront; it had built and financed major improvements; and it owned more than half of the waterfront area in the entire Port District. A state bill that appeared to strip away important development powers from New York City might provide an excellent campaign issue for the opposition; for there was some doubt that local voters in New York City and beyond were ready to embrace the political philosophy of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle and the New York State Chamber of Commerce—that vigorous action to modernize the port was more important that home rule. Moreover, the Republican legislators now faced a Democratic governor, whose strong political ties to New York City made him reluctant to override the city’s elected leaders. So the joint review commission decided to refer the March 1 draft to Mayor Hylan and his city colleagues. The commission’s letter of transmittal was in some ways an extraordinary document. Sent by a bi-state group that
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wanted to take prompt action to create a Port Authority, it went to a group of local officials who were known to be adamantly opposed to any ceding of municipal powers—and yet the letter was so phrased that it could easily be viewed as giving those local officials a veto power over creation of the bi-state agency: “The members of the Legislature of this State are unwilling to proceed . . . until the City of New York, through its elected officials, has made its position . . . definitely known. The responsibility of the acceptance or rejection of the proposed comprehensive scheme must now rest with the City of New York.” It was not surprising that Hylan and his aides thought they were in control and could throttle the dangerous babe aborning.32 In late March, the Board of Estimate—the city’s governing board—held a hearing on the revised draft. Julius Henry Cohen urged the Board to endorse the treaty. If the bi-state compact were not approved, he argued, New Jersey would proceed on its own with a plan of port development, in time draining commercial traffic away from the eastern side of the Hudson; in addition, the ICC might decide to reopen the New York Harbor case and grant New Jersey a lower freight rate, which could be calamitous for New York’s economic vitality. But Mayor Hylan and his Tammany associates were not in a cooperative frame of mind. They argued that the city Board of Estimate should have a controlling voice over all actions of the Port Authority, perhaps by giving them two or three of the six seats on the Authority’s governing board. Moreover, Hylan noted that the New Jersey portion of the proposed Port District included only 2 million people, while the New York portion had 7 million; therefore it seemed unreasonable to him that New Jersey should have equal representation with its bigger brother. The Board promised to provide a fuller statement of its views soon after the hearing.33 In early April, Hylan and his associates responded in detail to the bi-state Commission’s plans, in effect kicking sand in the eyes of those who were seeking cooperative relations across the Hudson. They pointed out that New York City had made “great progress,” acting on its own, in developing its waterfront; meanwhile, the cities of New Jersey and the state government had been inactive, neglecting their harbor resources. The Hylan team urged that attempts to cooperate with New Jersey be expanded to include ways to end “the poisonous fumes generated in the factories or plants situated on the New Jersey shore.” Finally, city officials opposed any action to create the Port Authority—and to grant it “such vast powers for all time”—until the detailed plans for physical improvements in the region could be studied with care.34 As these unproductive negotiations trudged forward, Walter Edge resigned as governor and departed for Washington to take up his seat in the
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United States Senate; and so Cohen and his colleagues on the Port Commission lost the final member of that triumvirate which had strongly encouraged their efforts in the happier days of 1917.35 Meanwhile, the two state legislatures had concluded their sessions for the year, and the fate of the treaty and bi-state cooperation was deferred once more—until the lawmakers convened again in Albany and Trenton, early in 1920.
Tied to the Masts of Local Politics As Cohen and his bi-state study commission looked to the new year, the fate of the Port Compact—and all the improvements in the region’s economy that would follow—appeared to rest largely in the hands of Al Smith. Smith was a friend of Cohen’s and a friend of regional cooperation and the “Port Authority idea”; but he was also partial to home rule, especially for New York City. He believed the city had the right to decide how its own resources would be developed, particularly on the issue of harbor development— where the long record of city involvement was active and constructive, a matter of much civic pride. The issue, then, was whether Al Smith could, in collaboration with Cohen and state legislative leaders, persuade city officials to accept some version of the Port treaty. In 1919, Smith had appointed Hylan’s Dock Commissioner, Murray Hulbert, as a member of the bi-state Commission, in the hope that this step would help to bring a rapprochement between the city and the bi-state agency. Then, in the waning months of 1919 and early 1920, Smith and Cohen and the legislators worked out changes in the 1919 draft which would meet the objections raised by Hylan and his colleagues. Two crucial modifications were made in the treaty, in order to protect the city’s interests: 1. Article IV was altered to give City officials substantial influence in selecting New York State’s members on the Port Authority governing board. In making the three initial appointments, the governor would be required to select two from a list of five names provided by the City’s Board of Estimate; and thereafter, two of the three would always be chosen from “resident voters of the city of New York and recommended by the municipality of the city of New York.” 2. Article X was altered in order to permit New York City and all other cities in the District to control Port Authority activities within their borders. “No city . . . shall be bound by the comprehensive plan,” said the
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new draft, “unless and until” it had approved of the plan; and no change in the Port Authority’s plans could be made unless it had obtained the approval of the municipalities “directly affected by such modifications.”36
In March 1920 the bi-state Port commission forwarded this revised version to the governors and legislatures at Albany and Trenton; they asked that the Port Compact be approved in this form. The commission argued that the proposed treaty “now safeguards the interests of all the municipalities and recognizes the principles of local self-government that are applicable,” and they urged that “local jealousies, fears and policies” should “give way to the good of the whole.” However, Hulbert, Hylan’s ally, refused to sign the report.37 Now Governor Smith broke with his city compatriots and asked the legislature to approve the revised treaty. The latest changes, he believed, provided reasonable safeguards to New York City and the region’s other towns; and unless a bi-state compact was approved promptly, the economy of the state and the region would suffer great harm. “Action,” he concluded, “is imperative.”38 But to Mayor Hylan and some of his colleagues, a plea for cooperation was like waving a red flag before a bull. Hylan attacked the new bill as “simply another method of grabbing the Port of New York” from its citizens; he was sure that “foreign interests” which wanted to buy up the waterfront were behind the plan; and his colleagues from Queens and Brooklyn urged the city to resist, lest a bi-state treaty be the death blow to great port improvements in their own Jamaica Bay.39 Meeting on April 16, the Board of Estimate voted unanimously to reject the proposed treaty, which would create a “wholly independent commission or corporation” with “unlimited powers”—an agency freed from “all responsibility . . . to those over whose property, money, rights, and conduct they are given jurisdiction.” The Board denounced the two concessions made in the latest draft: the opportunity for city officials to nominate two of the three New York State commissioners was “of little value,” the Board argued; and local approval of Port Authority plans would mean “nothing whatever” on the crucial issue—the question of “when the parts vitally affecting the City of New York would be carried into effect.”40 In general, Hylan and his allies objected to the creation of agencies which are partially insulated from control by elected officials as “contrary to the very fundamentals of our government”; on this issue, the city position was sharply different from that of Julius Henry Cohen.41 The Hylan Administration also took this opportunity to underscore its attitude toward that smaller state to the west. “The principle of co-operation is
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flouted” by the proposed treaty, the Board of Estimate argued, because harbor and river pollution are not included. So New Jersey would retain “the right to continue to pollute the waters of the harbors and rivers around New York with undiluted and unlimited sewage, and for its acid factories and oil refineries to pour forth without restraint the fumes and gases that are so highly objectionable and injurious to the citizens of New York.” Moreover, the Port Authority might sell its bonds, “secured by mortgage upon property in the City of New York,” and use the proceeds to make improvements in railroads and to carry out other major projects only in New Jersey. Thus the Port agency might do great and continuing injury to New York City in its competitive battle to remain the nation’s premier port. Finally, advancing an argument that would frequently be heard 30 and 40 years later, the Hylan Administration pointed out that the treaty provided no means by which “the surplus profits” amassed by the Port Authority in its regional projects could be distributed to the city and the two states. Instead, the Port Authority might continue to gather profits “without limit” and use them in any way its officials saw fit.42 By this time, Al Smith and the Republican legislative leaders were losing patience. They had made important changes in the bill in order to meet New York City’s earlier criticisms; they had delayed acting on the issue for more than a year; and now Hylan and his associates had responded to their efforts with scorn. Meanwhile, the New Jersey legislature had carried out its part of the bargain; the revised treaty was approved by the Senate on April 12, 1920, and the Assembly concurred on April 15. In Albany, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on April 20, where they heard vociferous attacks on the Port Compact from Mayor Hylan, together with the Borough Presidents from Queens, Staten Island, and Brooklyn, and other city officials; and strong endorsements by the New York Chamber of Commerce, the Citizens Unions and other civic groups. State officials now appeared ready to approve the legislation.43
Blocked by New Jersey’s Democrats Before Albany officials could vote, however, a swift blow from Trenton brought proceedings to a halt once again. Walter Edge’s successor as governor, Edward I. Edwards of Jersey City, sharply criticized the Port Compact—and then he vetoed the bill. To some New Yorkers, it must have seemed as though a measure of John Hylan’s gall and brimstone had wafted across the Hudson. But in fact the
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causes of the new attack, which was centered in Jersey City, were deep-seated. With 300,000 souls and a location on the River directly opposite Manhattan, the state’s second city (behind Newark) had traditionally been a hotbed of resentment toward New York City’s economic dominance, her cultural imperialism, and her view that the harbor was New York property. In 1916, one of its native sons—James Fielder—had been in the governor’s chair, and Jersey City and Fielder had led the attack in the New York Harbor case. During the next three years, however, that urban center and its Democratic majority had little voice in shaping state policy, as Republican governor Walter Edge and his party’s legislative leaders carried forward a policy of cooperation with New York’s mercantile class. Meanwhile, Frank Hague had gathered the reins of power in Jersey City, and in 1919 he supported Edwards for the governorship. Edwards’ win in November helped to give Hague a dominant role in Democratic state politics, a position he would hold for 30 years.44 Edwards, Hague, and a large segment of the vocal Jersey City community objected to the Port treaty. Narrow political concerns played some part in their opposition, for the opportunities for Jersey City political leaders to obtain jobs and contracts would be constrained if major public works were controlled by a bi-state authority. However, what was true in New York City was also true in this smaller but proud municipality as well: a fair portion of Jersey City’s leaders preferred independent action, and saw the city’s economic potential and political vitality threatened by a bi-state agency whose leaders were chosen in Albany and Trenton. As Frank Ferguson, a leading figure in the local Chamber of Commerce, later commented, he was convinced at the time that it would be far better for Jersey City and her sister communities to develop their own waterfront areas; following that route, New Jersey “would come into . . . her destiny.”45 The Republican-dominated legislature had listened more closely to the business and civic groups from the suburbs and cities, and there they had found widespread support for the Compact and the economic benefits it might bring; so they had endorsed the bill now vetoed by Edwards. In his veto message of April 21, Edwards argued that the treaty and the Comprehensive Plan should be considered together; if there were objections to specific parts of that plan, they should be worked out before the Port Authority was created. Edwards was urging exactly the approach that Cohen was anxious to avoid; to consider the detailed physical plans jointly with the Port Compact would be likely to stimulate more criticism of the entire enterprise, reducing the prospects that the Port Authority would ever be created.46
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“Faint heart ne’er won fair lady,” but the New York Times quickly succumbed to Edwards’ opposition. “The battle of the port is ended,” the Times concluded after Edwards’ veto. “It will be in vain to start anew next year with the New York bill; New Jersey must be wooed anew, and with remoter prospects of winning.” The “harm that they have done will live after their official lives are ended,” concluded this modern Marc Antony; “New York will have a rival where it needs a partner, and the nation will lose a port which should be the world’s greatest.”47
Revived by a National Election The Times’ pessimism did not infect Cohen, or Al Smith, or their friends on the bi-state commission. They could see that pressure for action would continue to build, as traffic congestion in the New York area generated complaints of high cost and also diverted foreign trade to other ports. In fact those problems did continue to occupy the attention of business associations and the press; and during the fall of 1920, Cohen took to the hustings, urging action. Invading the sometimes hostile territory of Queens, he pointed out to the local Chamber of Commerce that New Jersey was preparing to develop its own piers; “unless New York City and Queens Borough in particular take immediate steps” to provide modern docks and transfer systems, Cohen concluded, “the business will go to New Jersey.” The best solution was support for the Port Compact, he argued, which would keep the Port of New York united and prevent traffic from going not only to New Jersey but to “Montreal, Galveston, New Orleans and other ports.”48 Then national politics, and perhaps national malaise, lent a hand to Cohen and his bi-state band. In the November 1920 presidential election, Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge were swept into office by large margins, carrying with them Republican candidates of various hues for national and state offices. In New York, Al Smith was running for his second two-year term as governor, and with widespread support across the political spectrum he ran 1,090,000 votes ahead of the national ticket. But that was not quite enough; in the Harding landslide, Smith lost to a moderate Republican, Nathan L. Miller, and both houses of the legislature in Albany returned solid Republican majorities. Across the River, Democrat Edwards would remain in office until early 1923; but as a result of the 1920 election, he would now confront an overwhelmingly Republican legislature.49 Looking ahead to the 1921 legislative term, the bi-state commission could now see more promising prospects. Al Smith might be hesitant to take power
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away from New York City’s elected officials, but the new governor was from upstate New York and had no ties to Hylan and his Tammany cohort. Miller would have to be convinced of the value of a bi-state treaty, and then the Albany legislature could be expected to follow his lead. In New Jersey, Edwards was still an obstacle, but suburban and downstate Republicans had enough votes to override his veto. During the past two years, Nathan Miller apparently had not followed the debate on the problems of the Port and the proposed bi-state treaty. Soon after the election, however, he did attend the annual dinner of the New York Chamber of Commerce. In view of the Chamber’s abiding interest in the problem of bi-state cooperation, it may have been natural—and it was surely opportune—that during the banquet the Chamber’s president asked its general counsel, still Julius Henry Cohen, to “take half an hour to outline the plan of the Port Compact and the Port Authority.” As Cohen recalled the situation, Miller then asked him to “come to Albany and go over this thing with me.” Cohen did so, soon after Miller took office in January, and the new governor expressed his strong support for the Port Authority idea.50
What Survived: A Toothless Giant In January, 1921, the bi-state Port and Harbor Development Commission released its final report.51 The Commission noted that a bi-state Port District had been proposed years earlier, in 1905, to solve the problem of harbor pollution, but that idea had led to “no practical results”—only to endless litigation. It expressed the fear that its own studies might be no more productive, unless a permanent Port Authority were soon created, and the two states were committed in a “firm, resolute and definite understanding” to meet the complex challenge of modernization in the Port region. The Commission pointed out that its initial proposal, two years before, had been to construct a Port Authority with “adequate powers to carry out a comprehensive plan” once the two states had approved the plan. But that proposal had met with “considerable opposition,” especially from New York City officials, and so the current proposal would create a more modest agency, which would “leave the local authorities with large freedom.” The study commission suggested that the legislatures might wish to “restore some of the powers originally proposed and remove some of the limitations” added in 1920; then a “more efficient Port Authority” would emerge—one which could provide “unified and rationally directed effort” to improve the nation’s premier port.52
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While the Republican leaders in both states reviewed the Commission’s final report and the draft legislation, Cohen and his fellow advocates for a bi-state treaty were now joined by Al Smith. Having been relieved of his duties as governor, committed still to finding ways to overcome the problems of congestion and cost that burdened the New York region, Smith spoke before business groups in the city and urged them to support the Port Authority idea.53 In mid-February, following discussions among Governor Miller and legislators in both states, the Port Compact once again made its appearance. To the disappointment of Cohen and his Commission colleagues, none of the regulatory powers in Cohen’s December 1918 draft were restored, and all of the constraints the Legislative Commission had imposed on the Port Authority’s work in the spring 1919 version were retained. On the other hand, those who redrafted the Compact were even less sympathetic to Mayor Hylan and his cause. Having resisted compromise, having attacked those who were reluctant to cede the city full control over the port, having scorned the efforts of Al Smith to give them some power over the selection of the Port Authority’s leaders, Hylan and his allies now faced hostile legislators and an impatient Republican governor. The new legislation stripped away the concessions that had been made to New York City and other cities in the 1920 bill. The 1921 version was essentially the same as the draft agreed to by the bistate review commission in the spring of 1919.54 On February 16, Governor Miller sent a special message to the state legislature, urging that “no narrow or provincial view . . . be permitted to delay action,” and that the Port Compact be quickly approved, despite the city’s opposition. Miller and his aides also criticized the Hylan Administration’s operation of the city’s rail transit lines, and they urged the creation of a State Transit Commission which would take over responsibility for planning and regulating the transit system. These twin assaults against home rule provided Hylan and his colleagues with much to rail against. The City Controller complained that the governor and his legislative allies “seek to supplant the regularly elected officials of the city” by state commissions which would “exercise unlimited powers without regard to the rights of the city.” One of Hylan’s allies in the state senate compared Miller’s approach to self-government to that of Lenin and Trotsky. And Hylan threatened to sue the state in order to block the loss of the city’s rights.55 Meeting with a delegation of business and civic groups from New York City, all of them asking for prompt action to approve the treaty, Miller defended state intervention in municipal affairs. “I believe in the greatest mea-
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sure possible of local self-government . . . compatible with good government,” Miller explained. But the citizens of New York City were now burdened, he argued, with a local government which suffered from “inefficiency and incompetence.” Governor Miller concluded: The municipalities have been created by the States. They are the mere creatures of the States, and when it becomes necessary for the State to step in to rescue those people in their own interests, the State not only has the power, but, in my judgment, it is the moral duty of the State to do it.56
By mid-March the Republican leaders in Albany had lined up their colleagues behind this moral duty, and the New York bill was passed by the Assembly on March 16; a week later, the Senate followed suit. The Democrats in the legislature voted in a bloc against the bill, and all the Republicans in both houses supported the Compact, with two exceptions: finding their local constituencies in opposition, the Republican state senators from Brooklyn and Queens voted to reject the bi-state treaty. Meanwhile, across the Hudson Governor Edwards once again opposed the Compact, but the Senate and Assembly passed the bill almost unanimously; and when he vetoed the measure in early April, they promptly overrode his veto. To prevent Edwards from undermining the new agency by naming commissioners who opposed bi-state cooperation, the New Jersey legislation listed the three men who would hold office in the first years; they were the three New Jersey members of the bi-state study commission.57 By early April both states had completed action on the Port treaty, and as they prepared to join together in signing the Compact, Governor Miller still had a decision to make: whom should he appoint to the Port Authority board? One choice was easily made—Eugenius H. Outerbridge, leader of the Chamber of Commerce campaign for a bi-state effort, and the most active commissioner on the study commission during the past four years. For the second place he chose a Brooklyn businessman, Lewis H. Pounds; the local Chamber of Commerce had opposed the treaty, and Pounds might persuade that Borough’s wary business leaders to accept a bi-state approach to port improvement. The third New York position on the six-member Board should, Miller thought, go to a Democrat from New York City; but should he ask the study commission’s only Democrat, Hylan associate Murray Hulbert, to take that appointment? The governor conferred with Cohen, who advised against it, since Hulbert and the New Jersey commissioners had often been at loggerheads, and since Hulbert had thus far refused to endorse the
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Port Compact in its final form. Cohen suggested that Miller ask a “bigger Democrat”—Al Smith. Miller asked Smith if he would accept appointment, and Smith said he would.58 On April 30, 1921, public officials and business leaders from both states again converged on the Great Hall of the New York Chamber of Commerce in downtown Manhattan—as they had in March 1917, when Governors Edge and Whitman had urged the creation of the bi-state study commission, and as they had in December 1918, when Edge and Whitman had urged prompt action on Cohen’s proposed treaty, with its sharp regulatory and planning teeth. Now the occasion was the signing of the Port Compact, and Walter Edge returned from Washington to take part in the ceremonies. His successor, Edward Edwards, declined to attend, and the state’s Attorney General signed for New Jersey. From New York, Governors Miller, Smith, and Whitman were all present. But New York City’s major officials—the Mayor, the Borough Presidents, the other members of the Board of Estimate—refused to take part.59 The Port Compact was signed that day, and the Port of New York Authority takes its birth date as April 30, 1921. The treaty then went to Washington with Senator Edge, where it received the consent of Congress under Article I, and President Harding signed the joint resolution of consent on August 23. Now the two states and the nation had agreed to a policy of cooperation in a Port District reaching far into New York and New Jersey, and a new agency stood poised to carry that policy into execution.60 But what kind of an agency had been created? Something far less powerful than Julius Henry Cohen had intended. Perhaps it was no more than a toothless giant. A giant it surely was, at least in geographic scope. The Port Authority would operate in a Port District extending roughly 25 miles in all directions from the Statue of Liberty—across 1500 square miles of land and water in two states. The District included the nation’s largest city, plus two others with populations exceeding 300,000—Newark and Jersey City—and more than 300 smaller cities and towns in 17 counties (the five counties of New York City, plus portions of 12 others). The Port District included the most populous parts of both states, with a 1920 census exceeding 8 million. In terms of shipping, railroading, and commercial activity generally, this was the nation’s premier area, and its international trade made up more than 40 percent of the nation’s total. What powers did it have as it watched and patrolled this terrain, and made plans to modernize the piers and lighterage system, improve efficien-
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3-1. The Port of New York District, created in April 1921. The district includes the region's main waterways, the five counties of New York City, and portions of nine counties in New Jersey and of three counties in suburban New York State.
cy, and so reduce congestion and the cost of food and other goods and stimulate economic growth? Under the Port Compact, the Port Authority had the power to build, buy, and lease terminal and transport facilities throughout the Port District, the power to operate these facilities, and the right to levy charges for the use of any piers, rail lines, ferries or other facilities it controlled. It was prohibited from levying taxes, however, so it was not clear how it would obtain the resources to build and buy.
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The most promising route was to issue bonds—another power granted to the Authority—and use the proceeds to acquire or construct the needed freight tunnels, modernized docks, and other projects. But Port Authority bonds could be sold only if investors believed the agency would be able to operate the new enterprises on a break-even basis with a slight surplus; and that could be expected only if the railroads and other private interests agreed to use these new and modernized facilities, and if the cities of the region agreed not to build competing piers and rail lines. In Cohen’s 1918 draft, the Port Authority was provided with the regulatory powers which might have encouraged and even forced the railroads and the cities to yield their narrow, competitive perspectives—so that their energies would be guided by a rational plan for port and regional development. But those sharp teeth had been pulled out, in the dental operation executed by the review commission in 1919. Under the 1921 Compact, the Port Authority had lost the power to block new piers and other developments by local interests that might compete with its own plans; and if they wanted that power returned, they would have to appeal once more to the state capitals. Moreover—regarding the crucial issue of cooperation by the railroads—the Port Authority could make progress only if it could persuade them to abandon the philosophy of individually owned, competing terminals and rail lines by which they had traditionally lived, or if the Authority could persuade the ICC to step in and force the railroads to set aside their individual profit-seeking strategies in order to achieve the common good. And all this must now be done in a new era, the Harding era of laissez faire. The Port Authority’s teeth were hard to find, and it was not clear that a stronger set would be provided, at least in the years just ahead. But the new agency did have, at least, some advantages in vision—some ability to see further than the next election, some capacity to consider policies which might serve a wider interest than that of Jersey City alone, or Brooklyn alone, or New York City, or the counties of Northern New Jersey viewed in isolation. Perhaps, however, the system for selecting Port Authority commissioners was more unhinged from local sentiment than was desirable. An argument might be made that New York City’s elected officials deserved a direct or indirect role in selecting New York’s Board members—so that they could feel confident the Port Authority would pay due regard to the city’s long record of achievement, and so that the city’s own constituents would not greet Port Authority plans with suspicion. At other times, with other leaders, New York City might have obtained what its officials sought, what Al Smith and at one time even Republican leg-
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islators seemed ready to give it—an authoritative voice on the Board. But John Hylan and his Tammany-bound colleagues sacrificed that goal, with its prospects for combining effective action with responsible governance, to their immediate concerns. By championing the particular fears of the city’s outlying boroughs, they had gained some advantage in their short-term quest to stay in office. And in the short run perhaps they felt vindicated. A few months after the Compact was signed, in November 1921, Hylan and his team were reelected; and before and after that election they were able to use the Port Authority and its plans as a sort of bogeyman, whose dangers to the Greater City permitted City Hall to show its own redeeming courage.61 Only later, when Al Smith blocked Hylan’s plans for a third term as mayor, and his hopes for higher office were scuttled too, could one say that Hylan may have misread History’s lessons for his own career and power.62 Meanwhile, by their rhetoric and behavior Hylan and his colleagues had conveyed the message to business and civic leaders in the city, and to Republican leaders in Albany and beyond, that they could not rely on the city’s politicians or the majority sentiment of her voters if they hoped to achieve effective and responsible political leadership. Reformers like John Purroy Mitchel would be turned out of office, the record showed, and men like Hylan would take their place, and then—by posturing, by denigrating their opponents and even those who sought compromise—be reelected. So effective action to meet complex issues—the city’s transit difficulties, the harbor problems of city and region—required that the city be denied a leadership role. This was the lesson for Governor Miller, for the Citizens Union and the New York Chamber of Commerce, for Julius Henry Cohen. And the Republican leadership at Trenton saw similar weaknesses in Jersey City’s politicians and their state representatives.63 Of course Cohen had hoped for much more than simply insulating the Port Authority from the vagaries of local politics. His mind had been commanded by a vision of vigorous police powers over local development plans and over railroad operations; he had sought a port authority with wide-ranging powers, like those at Liverpool and London. If he thought that those histories offered feasible models for the politically complex New York region, he was deceived. But he was not, really, deeply disappointed. Child of an age of optimism, Cohen could see that some useful step had been taken, and that a new agency would now bestride the Hudson and seek harmony across states and cities, among private corporations and public agencies, and so in time help to modernize the Port and its hinterland. And if important powers
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had been cut off in the four-year struggle to bring this new creature into being, perhaps they could be reclaimed. It is not surprising, then, that hopefulness—perhaps aided by some rosetinted glasses—is what the Port Authority’s parent of law conveyed when he rose to speak at the Bar Association meeting, four months after the Compact was signed. Acknowledging that the Port Authority had been given no power to create regulations within the Port District, no power to veto any local plans, no power to tax and no power of eminent domain, Cohen saw the power to “borrow money upon its own bonds” as the agency’s great advantage. He envisioned a Port Authority that would encourage and finance, and perhaps itself build, great new piers and other projects, to be paid for by leases “that will insure a revenue adequate to pay off operating expenses . . . and amortize the principal in from thirty to fifty years.” Moreover, the Port Authority would be “the cooperating agency of all of the railroads” and with their agreement “build and operate a joint terminal system.” Indeed, that important step seemed very likely to Cohen; for he reported that the railway executives “of the twelve great trunk lines . . . already indicate that they appreciate the great opportunity afforded through . . . the Port of New York Authority for a scientific handling of the problem . . . .” And, looking west, Cohen could see that the principles of interstate cooperation set forth in the Port Compact would encourage similar steps in other regions; already seven states were moving to establish a Compact on the Colorado River.64 So Cohen’s restless imagination, and his search for signs that constructive cooperation might in time rule large portions of the world, won out over partial defeat. And he could look forward to the coming decade hopeful that the modest victory gained so far would be followed by still greater victories in the battle of New York harbor. And so it would. But not quite in the way that Cohen imagined. The 1920s would see complete failure of all of the Port Authority’s plans for coordinating rail freight, and for modernizing the piers and constructing rail tunnels that could join Manhattan and Brooklyn to the mainland. And while Cohen and Outerbridge and their planners were occupied in that frustrating arena, the 1920s would see another pair reaching out to claim Cohen’s bistate agency as engine and beneficiary of a new automotive age.
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Part Two
Failure and a New Beginning
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4 Modernizing the Rail System Contending Strategies for an Expanding Metropolis
[There were] two competing political systems in modern America. On the one hand, the spirit of science and technology, of rational system and organization, shifted the location of decision-making continually upward so as to narrow the range of influences impinging upon it and to guide that decision-making with large, cosmopolitan considerations [and] technical expertness. . . . On the other, however, were a host of political impulses, often separate and conflicting. . . . Their political activities sustained a more open political system, in which the range of alternatives remained wide and always available for adoption, in which complex and esoteric facts possessed by only a few were not permitted to dominate the process of decision-making, and the satisfaction of grass-roots impulses remained a constantly viable element of the political order. —Samuel P. Hays1
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his was the tension—between the ideals of rational planning and the jumbled play of local political forces—which shaped much of the Port Authority’s experience throughout the 1920s. The new agency itself embodied the ideal of technical rationality, of relying on experts who focused on complex technologies and on large regional and national needs, and who gave little weight to the parochial interests of individual towns and cities. With its commissioners chosen only by the two governors, and with its funding not dependent on local appropriations, the agency had a significant degree of formal insulation from local officials. And the Port Authority’s Comprehensive Plan, handed down in late 1921, would underscore “the spirit of science and technology, of rational system and organization” even more dramatically; for that plan was a blueprint for vast new rail and freight-terminal investments across the bi-state region, affecting the economic growth and social patterns of hundreds of local communities and thousands of people—a blueprint to be shaped mainly by general principles of coordination and efficiency. 77
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On the other side stood an array of political officials and other citizens in Brooklyn and Staten Island, in Jersey City and Hoboken and the other towns of Hudson County, in Newark and Elizabeth and beyond. These community leaders and their allies at the state capitals viewed the Port Authority as a threat to local democratic control, and a danger also to local economic vitality. Deeply suspicious when they saw Cohen’s artful designs, they had reached out to curb his expectations, and their jealous grasp had nearly throttled the menacing babe at birth. They fought sporadically against the agency and its plans in the 1920s, as they would battle the Authority’s forays into airports and waterfront development through the 1940s and into later decades. It would be inaccurate, however, to view the tension as a simple conflict between those who favored centralization and expertise (here represented by the Port Authority) and those who embraced localism.2 To the champions of Brooklyn and Jersey City—and to those who fastened on the special development opportunities of Jamaica Bay and Newark’s waterfront—the Port Authority was a centralizer, using plans devised by specialists to strip from local citizens the power to decide their own economic and political fate. But throughout the 1920s, the bi-state agency also fought to wrest control of rail policy from the national centralizers—the Interstate Commerce Commission in Washington, with its stable of experts and its allies in the railroad industry—so that the New York metropolis could take responsibility for its own regional transportation system, and thereby strengthen its own economy. From this perspective, the Port Authority was an advocate of decentralization. Moreover, the spirit of “rational system and organization” which animated the Port agency’s staff was directed most vigorously and critically against the national and regional railroads, whose resistance to more efficient ways of operating seemed (to the Port Authority, and to some outside observers) to weaken the New York-New Jersey economy, and to provide an unparalleled example of self-interested, parochial behavior. Furthermore, in constructing the Comprehensive Plan the Port Authority had consulted with a variety of local officials and civic bodies, and the plan proposed by the bi-state agency appeared to be sensitive to their concerns. Many of its later plans—in the 1920s and beyond—would also win support from some local officials and citizens. At times, this applause simply showed a readiness to embrace economic-development gains, even if they were coupled with a loss of democratic participation in shaping the projects that would fundamentally alter the local community. But on other occasions, local enthusiasm was grounded in an expectation that better rail facilities, new bridges, and modernized marine terminals would also mean a growing
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population and a stronger financial base, which together would stimulate constructive community planning—on ways to improve local highways, parks, schools, and hospitals. And so local citizens might have more scope for their own thinking, and more opportunities to shape their expanding towns and cities. Many of these complexities in the relationships between community initiative and wider regional planning, between popular preferences and analysis by experts, were not yet evident as the Port Authority began its life in the spring of 1921. Nor could the new agency’s officials pause to reflect on these issues, for they were at once confronted with a specific task, and a deadline only a few months away. In approving the bi-state legislation, the state legislatures had agreed that the Port Authority’s most general mission was to enhance cooperative planning and economic development in the bi-state region; but they had commanded the agency as its first priority to prepare a detailed set of proposals to improve the railroad freight system, and thereby to help reverse New York’s deteriorating position in international trade. And they had put the Port Authority on a very short tether: It was required to produce an explicit plan in less than nine months—by January 1, 1922.3
Alternative Blueprints for an Expanding Metropolis Even before the agency’s first meeting, in April 1921, there was wide agreement among the staff and commissioners as to the major weaknesses in the region’s freight transport system. These had been examined with care in the work of the bi-state study commission, and set forth at great length in the commission’s “Red Book,” published in 1920; and most of those who had worked on that study continued on, as leaders and staff of the agency they had urged be created. Also, there was a substantial consensus—within the Port Authority and among other observers of New York’s chaotic transport system—regarding the two general principles that should be applied in order to solve the region’s problems: 1. The massive array of railroad lines, rail terminals, and marine terminals in the region should be reorganized into a single, unified system, so that freight could move efficiently from Chicago and other western points to and from any of the communities in the Port District along the fastest and most economical route—avoiding the delays and high costs that now occurred, as each railroad tried to maximize the distance
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that freight traveled on its own line (and thus maximize its individual corporate profit).4 2. Because much of the freight traveling from across the continent into the New York region was bound for final destinations in Manhattan and Brooklyn, or for ship terminals along those shores, any plan for improvement would need to include ways to overcome the wide rivers and bays that interfered with efficient freight movement from the Jersey shore to New York’s shops, industries, and piers. This would almost certainly require large capital investments—probably to construct tunnels or bridges across the Hudson River and New York Bay, so that railroads could go directly from northern New Jersey to destinations in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Long Island.5 If these were the general principles for improving transportation and economic vitality in the New York region, there were only a few plans which might achieve those goals, and four deserve at least brief attention here. As it would turn out, not one of these plans has ever been taken beyond the drawing board: they have become casualties of the jealousies that rippled across the cities and states of the region, of the unwillingness of the railroads to cooperate for the region’s benefit (and possibly their own), and finally of the insweep of a new technology, which quickened and consorted with the American passion for mobility. Victims of these recurring themes of American history, the four plans deserve mention because they illustrate quite different images of what the New York-New Jersey region was, and conflicting priorities for her future. One plan was championed by those who saw New York City as a beleaguered contender for regional and national preeminence, and who sought a strategy that would strengthen the economic vitality of her undernourished boroughs of Brooklyn and Staten Island, while keeping competitors from northern New Jersey at bay. A second proposal would have concentrated further development in Manhattan, disregarding the demands of the other boroughs and of New Jersey for larger shares of the regional pie. A third offered the chance to shift future economic growth substantially to the cities and towns of New Jersey. And the fourth, which the Port Authority eagerly embraced, appeared to be the most comprehensive and balanced— though a Newarker might reasonably see it as a New York wolf in rational sheep’s clothing. Four plans headed for the dust bin. But one of them would also serve as a crucial stimulus for a very different project, which would be constructed in
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the next ten years—propelling the Port Authority reluctantly into a unexpected role, as handmaiden to the automotive age, and as powerful engine of that new wave in reshaping New York and its environs. And two others, with their focus on rail-freight tunnels, would rise again at the close of the twentieth century, and capture some corner of the public imagination.
The Narrows Tunnel Plan One of the four schemes would join Gotham’s isolated eastern communities to the rest of the metropolis via a railroad artery under New York Bay at the Narrows. First suggested by William Wilgus, an eminent engineer, and championed by New York’s mayor John Hylan and his political and business associates in Brooklyn and Staten Island, the plan was to construct a 10-mile tunnel under New York Bay, joining the rail lines of Brooklyn and Long Island to the Baltimore & Ohio rail tracks on Staten Island. From the B&O line, which crossed over the narrow Arthur Kill waterway to New Jersey, freight could be transferred to other railroads. Perhaps the plan’s greatest advantage was that it would provide direct rail connections from the rest of the nation to the industries and growing communities of Brooklyn and Nassau County. Moreover, the Narrows rail line would also handle passenger travel, and so it might stimulate considerable residential growth on Staten Island as well. And the rail system could also bring freight directly to Jamaica Bay, where Brooklynites had long urged that extensive marine terminals be constructed—to ensure New York’s continuing preeminence in coastal and overseas trade, and to strengthen Brooklyn’s role in that good effort. But the Narrows plan had some disadvantages too. Its most vociferous advocate, Mayor Hylan, was one of them; in his speeches and in public hearings, he managed to convey a sense that his efforts were motivated less by the benefits of the project than by a passionate desire to block the activities of the Port Authority (whose creation he had opposed), and by antagonism to the “foreigners” of New Jersey (as he called them). Since the Narrows project could not be linked to the nation’s railroads without cooperation from New Jersey, Hylan’s rhetoric undermined prospects for its success. Moreover, the railroads said they would not be willing to use the tunnel— at least not at the level of charges needed to amortize very large capital costs. Despite these difficulties, the city began construction of tunnel entrances in the early 1920s. But Al Smith wearied of Hylan’s attacks on the Port Authority and his bumbling efforts on the tunnel and in other areas; and in 1925,
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4-1. The Narrows Tunnel plan (1920s)
Smith forced him from office. By then, two large and expensive shafts had been dug in the dirt of Staten Island and Brooklyn, using city funds. The tunnel scheme received no further attention in that era, except perhaps as a reminder to the city’s business leaders of the dangers of relying on elected officials for leadership in carrying out complex projects.6 The Narrows tunnel would rise again, however, in the 1980s and 1990s. Then it would be viewed not only as a route to economic vitality in Brooklyn and Staten Island, but also as an important step in alleviating traffic congestion and air pollution, by reducing truck traffic between Brooklyn and points west.7
A Great Bridge at 57th Street A railroad-vehicular bridge across the Hudson River was the centerpiece of the second plan, which had the longest and most distinguished heritage of all the proposals. In 1888, a young engineer, Gustav Lindenthal, had proposed
4-2. The proposed 57th Street Bridge, showing its connections with railroads in New Jersey, and with rail lines to Manhattan piers.
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that a large bridge be constructed to carry the railroad trains that converged on the Jersey shore across the Hudson; the bridge would touch down in Manhattan at 23rd Street. During the next 30 years, Lindenthal had been given a central role in constructing New York’s East River bridges and he had designed the great Hell Gate railroad span. Now one of the world’s distinguished bridge builders, Lindenthal proposed in 1920 that his gigantic Hudson River crossing be moved up to 57th Street, and that it be designed to carry twelve railroad tracks and 16 lanes for motor vehicles. The automotive lanes would enter Manhattan’s streets around 57th Street and 7th Avenue, but most of the railroad tracks would turn south after reaching the Manhattan shore, where they would run near the Hudson River marine piers, and be connected to a series of two-story terminals for off-loading freight to the streets and ships.8 Based on his unhappy immersion in New York politics during his work on the East River bridges, Lindenthal doubted that government agencies were reliable, efficient instruments to carry out large projects. So he had organized a private corporation to implement his plan, and he had obtained a federal charter authorizing him to go forward. The direct connections the Bridge plan would provide between railroads and Manhattan’s distribution systems was a strength of Lindenthal’s scheme. Moreover, there was no vehicular route across the Hudson in 1920 (the Holland Tunnel having been started only in 1919); so the 16 lanes for cars and trucks would offer a real advantage over the slow, overburdened ferries that plied the wide river. With these attractions came some difficulties. A bridge of the size and strength needed to carry railroads across the Hudson would be very expensive, and the cost could be justified only if all the railroads agreed to end their tug-and-lighterage system for bringing freight into Manhattan; but the railroads were wary of making that commitment, in view of the huge cost of the new span. Also, the bridge’s real benefits to the freight distribution system would depend on new freight terminals on the Manhattan side; and the cost of land and construction for those edifices would add millions more to the burden the railroads would have to bear.9 Lindenthal’s proposal might be characterized as a Manhattan-oriented plan, since in operation it would enhance the access to Manhattan businesses and marine terminals from the rest of the nation, allowing the continental railroads to bypass New Jersey terminals, while contributing very little to meeting the interests of Brooklyn and points east. But the offering was too rich even for Manhattan’s blood. Lindenthal’s railroad trains and their associated terminals would have to go somewhere, and it was already a crowd-
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ed island. Also, those 16 lanes of cars and trucks would add measurably to traffic congestion that—even in the early 1920s—was a matter of concern to businesses and civic leaders in the central commercial district. The major business organizations in Manhattan, and the new breed of traffic planners who now worked for the city and for private groups, studied the Lindenthal plan, and they all said it was a bad idea. And when Lindenthal appealed in 1921 to the new Port Authority to endorse his plans, the agency noted that “such a project makes an alluring appeal to the imagination because of its imposing character,” but concluded that its cost, disruption of existing buildings, resulting congestion, and other factors were too great. “We could not adopt it as part of the comprehensive plan in the solution of the freight problem,” the Port Authority’s chairman explained toward the end of the year, as his agency prepared to announce its own preferred program.10
To Give New Jersey Her “Natural Rights” The third alternative, which might be called the North Jersey Development Plan, is but a shadowy figure—a sort of brooding presence offstage, which the Port Authority referred to occasionally, but only as a threat, not an opportunity. The underlying ideas had been sketched out during the work of New Jersey’s own harbor study commissions in 1914–1917, and in New Jersey’s unsuccessful effort to win the New York Harbor case. From those materials and debates, we can give some substance to this ghost which might endanger New York’s dominance in the region’s economy.11 From New Jersey’s perspective, the crucial problem was how to connect the nation’s railroads most effectively to the region’s marine terminals, where freight brought in by the rail network was loaded onto the great fleet of steamships—8,000 of them in 1920—that handled the vast coastal and overseas freight trade. The “New Jersey plan” involved constructing modern rail and ship terminals at Newark and Elizabeth, and along the Hudson River at Hoboken, Jersey City and Bayonne. To carry out this important planning and construction effort, New Jersey might create its own port authority, which would stimulate and guide development along the state’s extensive waterfront; as a result, that underdeveloped land could construct “ample dockage for ships” and “direct all-rail connection with the railroads of the country.” Then the nation’s freight traffic could be handled using direct railto-ship facilities in northern New Jersey—without the expense of building trans-Hudson crossings to send railroad freight across the waters to New York City’s piers.12
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If the New Jersey plan were adopted, some freight deliveries to and from New York’s industries, shops, and piers would still have to be floated across the Hudson and New York Bay. However, that problem would become less important in time, since the major marine terminals for the nation’s goods would be on the New Jersey side of the River, and the new transport system should attract to that state much of the industry that had struggled for so long in the isolated island enclaves of Brooklyn and Queens. Besides, New York’s shops and industries already had some direct rail service, via the Pennsylvania, the Long Island Rail Road, the New York Central, and the New Haven; that might be enough to handle New York’s needs, if the growth of industry and the construction of modern piers, in the 1920s and beyond, emphasized the low-cost, potentially more efficient New Jersey side. The theoretical advantages of this plan to New Jersey, and possibly to the nation, seem evident. Moreover, it might have been beneficial to New York as well; at least the ICC suggested this was so. In its report on the New York Harbor case in 1917, the ICC expressed concern regarding the nearly intolerable congestion and inefficiency surrounding delivery of freight to New York’s docks; if the region’s citizens did not soon find a solution to the problem, the ICC warned, the Commission itself might be compelled to take steps to reduce congestion in New York and the burden to the national economy which flowed from such congestion. What steps? The ICC might agree with New Jersey’s argument in the New York Harbor case and require the railroads to set lower transport rates for goods shipped to and from New Jersey terminals than for goods shipped to New York’s piers and shops. This differential would generate an economic incentive for industries to locate in the low-cost western zone, and for New Jersey’s cities and railroads to construct large, modern terminals at Newark Bay and along the Hudson coast. New York would benefit from less cluttered streets and piers, while “underdeveloped” communities in northern New Jersey would prosper.13 Those who have walked the dilapidated piers of Brooklyn and Manhattan in recent decades, and who followed the modernization and expansion of Newark and Elizabeth’s thriving marine terminals in the 1950s and beyond, might conclude that important elements of New Jersey’s arguments were correct. Moreover, since these New Jersey terminals are Port Authority enterprises, Brooklynites might credit Mayor Hylan with uncommon foresight in warning that the bi-state agency would transfer Brooklyn’s wealth to the “foreign” lands of New Jersey. Several factors have shaped the Port Authority’s investment strategy and the rise and fall of these several marine terminals; a crucial element has been the relative ease with which freight from Newark
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4-3. In northern New Jersey, the main candidates for developing marine terminals were Newark and Elizabeth on Newark Bay, together with Bayonne, Jersey City, Hoboken, Weehawken, and West New York, all communities in Hudson County which had already constructed some piers along the Hudson River.
and Elizabeth can reach the railroads and highways which fan out to the rest of the nation.14 In the early 1920s, however, the obstacles that confronted the New Jersey plan were immense. The railroads would not voluntarily shift their freight arrangements away from New York until they saw modern ship terminals rising in Newark Bay and along the Hudson shores; and it seemed unlikely that
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the ICC would force the rail lines to set reduced rates for delivering goods to marine terminals on the west side of the harbor, until there were large and modern piers on the Jersey shore to receive such goods. The crucial element that was needed, then, was a massive program of capital investment in docks, cargo-handing equipment, and associated rail spurs, carried out by the cities of northern New Jersey, perhaps with financial aid and planning assistance from state officials. This program would have to be premised on the hope that the railroads and steamships would make heavy use of the new piers, and that the ICC would ensure the railroads would do so, by compelling the rail lines to set lower rates to New Jersey points than to New York. The prospects for success would also depend on New Yorkers, who—it would be hoped—might sit quietly, watching New Jersey prepare to take away its commerce, rather than undertaking a vigorous competitive effort to modernize its own piers and lighterage system. Since New Jersey’s cities were not large (the two largest, Newark and Jersey City, had a combined population about one-seventh of New York City’s), state aid seemed likely to be a major factor in local terminal development. But could the state find enough money to help all the cities that appealed for help? Alternatively, did it have the political courage to focus only on one or two, and disregard cries of anguish from the rest? Taken together, these difficulties were too large to permit one to say that the “New Jersey plan” was a real possibility in the early 1920s, requiring only modest guidance from Trenton to assure success. In fact, more than two decades would pass, before the state could find some way to overcome these obstacles; then, as we will see in chapter 11, it would turn to the Port Authority, with its insulation from the competing demands of local interests and its independent funding, and ask that agency to take responsibility for modernizing its decaying ports.
A Vast Network of Rails and Terminals In 1921, however, the Port Authority rejected all three of these plans, and several others of more limited scope, and in late December announced its own decision. What the New York region needed, its officials proclaimed, was a Comprehensive Plan for the Development of the Port District—a program of action to extend rail freight service into every part of the large bi-state region, and ultimately to replace all the tug-and-lighterage operations with direct rail service from the Jersey shore across to Brooklyn, with an electric rail spur from New Jersey twisting and looping through Manhattan.15
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While the Comprehensive Plan would ultimately join the other plans for railroad development in history’s trash bin, we should allot some space to describing its main elements. For this was the scheme that would absorb much of the Port Authority’s intellectual and emotional energy throughout the 1920s; indeed, to some staff members deeply involved in thinking about freight problems and about the great inefficiencies of the railroad system, the Comprehensive Plan would continue as a live possibility—and the only way to obtain a modern, efficient transport system for the nation’s largest port— throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s.16 Moreover, the philosophy underlying the Comprehensive Plan shaped the Port Authority’s views in its first decade on all major issues of regional transportation. The need to solve the region’s freight transport problem had been the primary motivation for creating a Port Authority, and it was widely understood that this was primarily a railroad problem, requiring a railroad solution. In solving this problem, there was a place for motorized trucks, but it was a secondary role: they would mainly serve as feeder vehicles, carrying goods from railroad stations and terminals to nearby stores and residences.17 The Port Authority also acknowledged that passenger automobiles ought to be able to cross the Hudson River without waiting in long lines for ferries. However, that was a different task, as the Port Authority’s chairman pointed out, and it had been assigned elsewhere—to the tunnel commissions which, since 1919, had been laboring to construct a tube from Jersey City under the river to Canal Street. He also noted that public policy did not favor tolls on bridges and tunnels for motor vehicles—which seemed to preclude action by his agency. The tunnel commissions were supported by legislative appropriations, so they would not need to rely on tolls; but the Port Authority had no continuing access to tax revenues, and therefore its projects would have to be self-supporting, via tolls and rents.18 A review of the several parts of the Port Authority’s 1921 plan will underscore how fully the agency’s efforts to imagine future possibilities (“as far ahead as the process of reasoning could foresee”) were anchored in the technology of the past, how modest a role was given to motorized trucks despite their growing numbers on the roads, and how the Port agency attempted to modify “scientific knowledge” with some sense of political realism. The Port Authority’s Comprehensive Plan included five major elements: 1. A rail line—called Belt No. 1—would intersect all twelve of the railroads that came into the New York–New Jersey area; see figure 4-4. More than 60 miles long, it would be the keystone of the region’s entire freight system; goods would be collected from the twelve railroads and then sorted in “break-up
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yards,” so that all freight bound for the same destination would be grouped together (regardless of which railroad had brought it into the region). It would then be shipped in rail cars, along Belt No. 1 and connecting spurs, to freight terminals across the sprawling metropolis. Horse-drawn wagons and motor trucks would distribute the goods from these terminals to shops and stores. Belt No. 1 would start inland in New Jersey at Secaucus (five miles west of Manhattan’s Central Park), and sweep south to Jersey City and then down to Elizabeth, with a spur going east from Elizabeth across Staten Island. However, the primary element of Belt No. 1 would turn east in Jersey City, and then plunge under New York Bay and run a distance of four miles through the mud, emerging at Bay Ridge in Brooklyn. Then it would swing north through Queens, cross the Hell Gate Bridge into the Bronx, intersect the New Haven and all the New York Central lines, and terminate at the Hudson River. 2. A crucial inner rail line—called Belt No. 13—would begin at Fort Lee in Bergen County (roughly opposite 175th Street in Manhattan) and run south, close to the Jersey shore, through Hoboken and Jersey City to Bayonne. All parts of Belt No. 13 were already in existence, as were many parts of Belt No. 1; but various pieces of the two belt lines were controlled by different railroads, which would now need to agree on an efficient, unified arrangement. However, the tunnel under New York Bay would have to be constructed, and this would be a major capital expense.19 3. Thirteen other rail lines would be constructed or upgraded, ranging from a two-mile spur in Queens to a vast “outer beltline,” 71 miles in length, that would extend across northern New Jersey.20 4. Freight would be brought into Manhattan via a new rail loop, with two tunnels under the Hudson. This line would not carry regular railroad cars, since switching cars would take up too much space in this congested center. Instead, freight bound for Manhattan would be transferred—at railroad yards in northern New Jersey—to a set of electrified rail cars that would run under the Hudson and under the streets of downtown and midtown Manhattan, and then loop back into New Jersey to the railroad yards, and then back into Manhattan again, bringing freight efficiently to all commercial centers of the Island. 5. A series of twelve gigantic inland freight terminals would be constructed in Manhattan; the underground electric railroad trains would deposit freight at these stations, and motor trucks would then distribute goods to stores, residences and factories.21 An array of projects of this kind, the Port Authority argued, would meet the goal of “a well devised and comprehensive plan,” which would ensure that
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4-4. The Port of New York Authority’s rail-freight plan (1920s)
the region’s “natural advantages be properly developed and coordinated.” However, many parts of the plan involved extensive construction, and the Port Authority recognized the need for short-term changes that would provide some measure of “prompt relief.” These would include unified operation of Belt No. 13, which had existing connections to several lighter terminals on the Jersey shore; and unified lighterage from all piers, which would reduce congestion and the cost of floating freight across to Manhattan.22 The Comprehensive Plan announced in December 1921 was very similar to the plan sketched out by the Port Authority’s predecessor study commission,
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in its report of December 1920. Since the new agency’s personnel were mainly drawn from the study commission, and since the Authority was required to send a plan to the legislatures within a few months, that result should not be surprising. In fact, the earlier commission had already given close study to the Lindenthal bridge, the Narrows tunnel, and other possibilities, so the Port Authority’s position could reasonably be viewed as the result of three years of continuous study (1918–1921) of a wide range of options.23
The Impact of Local Sentiment and Railroad Vigilance Three years of continuous study, and the application of “scientific knowledge”—these were important ingredients in the plan the Port Authority announced in December 1921. However, its Comprehensive Plan also reflected other calculations, less clearly scientific, but more crucial, perhaps, to short-run political success. Most prominent among these was a willingness to include in the Plan practically every spur or other rail improvement that seemed likely to appeal to one local community or another. In a variant on the classic strategy of legislative logrolling, rail lines were drawn with modest abandon across the bi-state region, and to most of them was appended the comment, praiseworthy in early twentieth century America: “It will open up territory for commercial and industrial development.”24 For businesses and citizens in New York City’s outer boroughs, for example, who were fearful that the Port Authority’s plans would concentrate economic growth in Manhattan and northern New Jersey, such “development” rail lines were sketched out for The Bronx (an eight-mile set of spurs) and Queens (12 miles). Brooklyn would benefit from a 12-mile line connecting the major railroads—and the rest of the nation—to Jamaica Bay (where avid Brooklynites envisioned modern piers and commercial activity competing with Manhattan’s shipping terminals). Antagonism to the Port Authority on Staten Island, where sentiment was strong for the Narrows Tunnel alternative, would be quieted by 27 miles of new and improved rail lines, opening up most of the rural island for “commercial and industrial development.” Over in New Jersey, where critics of Manhattan’s dominance had sought lower railroad rates as a way to encourage development along the western bays and streams, the Port Authority held out the prospect that its own plans could provide the needed stimulus to economic growth. An improved Belt No. 13 might have an immediate effect on waterfront development in Hoboken and Jersey City; another line running along Raritan Bay and then to New Brunswick would “open up new territory” in that area; and Newark Bay, which some
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viewed as the proper center for future marine terminals and commercial vitality for the entire region, would be served by Belts No. 1 and 12, providing fast rail connections from piers in Elizabeth, Newark, and Bayonne to the rest of the metropolis, and to the rest of the nation. Taken all together, the vast construction projects offered by the bi-state agency promised more than 160 miles of new rail lines across the region—plus an extensive electric-train system and a dozen gigantic new freight stations for delivering goods throughout lower and midtown Manhattan. It was a program to warm the heart of every citizen who believed in economic growth and in stirring plans to achieve such growth— particularly since none of these great projects would be underwritten by the taxpayer. The railroads and commercial users—who would find the economic efficiency of their operations greatly enhanced—would foot the entire bill.25 One possible source of criticism, as the Port Authority prepared to ask the two state legislatures to endorse the Comprehensive Plan in early 1922, was the matter of priorities. Surely all these improvements could not be carried out at once; and if rail improvements near Newark’s waterfront or at Jamaica Bay should be slated for an early start, the rival across the region might cry out against an unfair advantage. To avoid the danger that its plans could become embroiled in such conflicts before receiving legislative blessing, the Port Authority decided that it would make “no recommendations as to the sequence of work to be undertaken. This must be developed step by step, by subsequent study and negotiation.”26 Although the bi-state agency may be criticized for creating a Comprehensive Plan that seemed to be an undisciplined “wish list,” without clear priorities or a timetable for action, the context in which it operated during this first year perhaps made this strategy inevitable. The two states had required that the agency submit a Comprehensive Plan by the end of 1921, and the bi-state Compact prevented the Port Authority from exercising any operating powers until both states had approved such a plan.27 The sad experience of the past three years—when its powers to shape development in the region had been stripped away because of local and legislative criticism— suggested the advantage of a program full of benefits and short on pain, lest one of the states fail to endorse the Plan and so stop the Port Authority from all useful activity. In addition, the two states had required the Port agency to consult widely in constructing its Plan—to meet with all the local governments in the region, and with business groups and civic associations. Its many meetings with these organizations increased the tendency of the Authority to think about additions to its possible projects, rather than about tightening and focusing the Plan.28
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The Port Authority’s strategy did have the crucial advantage of permitting it to undercut the political strength of the three major alternative schemes. The Comprehensive Plan seemed to meet the major aims of Lindenthal’s 57th Street Bridge, without the Manhattan traffic congestion threatened by that project. The proposed rail lines might well provide an important step toward stimulating economic growth across the counties of New Jersey. And in Brooklyn and Staten Island, where the Narrows Tunnel had great attractions, the cross-Bay tunnel and the array of belt lines in the Port Authority’s plan also seemed likely to set the stage for economic expansion in both of those large boroughs. In meeting its own short-term political needs, then, the Port Authority also muted, at least for a time, the suspicions and jealousies that had prevented Brooklyn, Manhattan, Staten Island and New Jersey from thinking together about regional developments that might promise joint benefits.29 The text of the announced plan also reflected a second political calculation. Port Authority officials recognized that they would need cooperation from the railroads in order to carry out the Comprehensive Plan. In the immediate future, railroad endorsement would help assure prompt legislative approval of the Plan; more important, opposition from rail executives might doom the Plan, especially in the New Jersey legislature, where the railroads had traditionally been an influential force. Within a few weeks after the signing of the 1921 Compact, the Port Authority’s counsel, Julius Henry Cohen, and other agency officials began a series of meetings with railroad executives. They soon found resistance, particularly to the Port agency’s underlying philosophy—that jointly operated and coordinated rail lines and terminals were desirable. Meetings with railroad representatives continued during the fall, and finally, in late December 1921, the Port Authority agreed to state in its report that the various projects would be carried out only “so far as practicable.” The railroad executives then endorsed the Comprehensive Plan.30 The advantage of this apparently slight concession was that the railroad interests would not attempt, in the coming months, to block legislative approval of the Port Authority’s activities. However, the cost exacted by this concession would be etched into Cohen’s brain, and those of his equally optimistic colleagues, in a slow and painful process which continued during the next ten years.
Victory at Trenton and Albany In the short run, the Port Authority’s strategy was successful. In New Jersey, the railroads interposed no objection, and public sentiment across Bergen and Hudson counties and in other western communities was favorable. Gov-
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ernor Edwards, who had vetoed the Port Compact a year earlier, surveyed local opinion and the wide-ranging projects now sketched out for northern New Jersey’s benefit and urged favorable action in the legislature. By midFebruary, both houses had voted to endorse the Comprehensive Plan, and Edwards signed the bill on February 23.31 Across the Hudson, the display of new rail lines and terminals, with their promise of economic development, generated enthusiastic support from the business community and mollified those whose first choice was a different plan.32 But New York City’s mayor was not pleased. To John Hylan and his associates, the Narrows Tunnel was far preferable to the Port Authority’s scheme, which threatened to stimulate growth in New Jersey at the cost of New York’s economic strength. And behind that flawed plan lay a more deeply flawed institution—an agency of government which would shape development policy within New York City, but whose leaders were not responsible to the voters of the city, or even perhaps to the voters of New York State. This was a denial of home rule, the mayor and his allies exclaimed, a denial of the principles of democracy.33 Gotham’s officials were fighting a losing battle, however. For three years, they had campaigned against any legislation creating a bi-state Port agency; by the third year, their virulent attacks had generated widespread antipathy to their cause, and the provision which would have given the city government the right to name two of New York State’s three Authority commissioners was stripped out of the bill. To many of Hylan’s opponents, the benefits of home rule were outweighed by his irresponsible attacks, and by a suspicion that city officials wanted control over port development as a route to Democratic patronage, not economic revitalization.34 Now, as he sought to gain support from the Republican-controlled legislature at Albany, Hylan also faced the persuasive oratory of his fellow Democrat and former ally, Alfred E. Smith. As governor of New York State in 1919–21, Smith had supported Julius Henry Cohen and the New York Chamber of Commerce in their efforts to create a bi-state Port agency. After losing the governorship in the Republican landslide of 1920, he was appointed by his successor, Republican Nathan Miller, as a commissioner of the new agency in April 1921. During the summer and fall, he had been actively involved in developing the detailed plans and in meeting with local groups to urge their support. Finally, in the legislative hearing at Albany in January 1922, Smith underscored his break with New York City’s Democrats, laying out the argument for the Port Authority’s bi-state program of rail lines and terminals in detail, and with a persuasive power that few could match.35
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On February 21, both houses of the New York legislature approved the Comprehensive Plan, and Governor Miller signed the bill on February 24. The vote highlighted the division between New York City’s demand that it control its own future, and the position of the business community in the metropolis, supported by the state Republican leadership, that a regional strategy would be more productive—especially if it could be insulated from Hylanism. The Democrats, following the lead of their large contingent from New York City, overwhelming opposed the Port Authority’s plan, with but one favorable vote in the Senate and four in the Assembly. But all the Republicans in both houses supported the Comprehensive Plan, except for the senator from Staten Island—where the business community was divided on the issue of which rail plan to champion to bring their isolated island into the region. So the Port Authority’s distinctive brand of Progressivism—a “spirit of science and technology, of rational system and organization”—had won out over “grass-roots impulses,” at least as those impulses were understood by New York City officials and some of her citizens. And perhaps this was also a victory for those who were anxious to preserve Manhattan’s dominance, against those on the eastern side of the region and in the western suburbs, who hoped to capture some part of her concentrated commercial energies. If Belt No. 1 and the 70-mile outer rail belt were finally constructed, their impact could tend to decentralize the region’s commerce. However, the centralizing force of the giant freight terminals and the underground freighttrain system in Manhattan might be much stronger. And the Port Authority’s short-term projects—to consolidate freight along Belt No. 13 and bring it across to Manhattan in well ordered groups of lighters—could be expected to increase the efficiency of the traditional Manhattan-dominant system. If the Comprehensive Plan was not a New York wolf dressed up in rational clothing, perhaps it was at least the work of a wily fox, who shared the sentiments of his former employer, the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. For Julius Henry Cohen, like the Chamber, saw the region’s economic strength, and its ability to fight off outside challenges—from Boston and Philadelphia, Baltimore and New Orleans—as crucially dependent on improving the system through which goods were conveyed into and out of its vital commercial center, which was the glory of Manhattan.36
5 Negotiating with the Railroads Regional Planning Confronts the Wary Capitalist
The transportation systems of this country . . . have been built up upon the theory of individualistic control, development and advantage. The executives and managers have reached their positions after years of service, in which they have become imbued with that theory. —Port of New York Authority, 1924 Annual Report1
It should be the effort of all civilized societies to substitute cooperative for competitive methods, whenever cooperation can prove its efficiency. . . . The essential condition of efficiency is always concentration of responsibility. —Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life2
T
he Port Authority’s plans for coordinating rail and water transport, constructing new rail lines, and digging a four-mile tunnel under New York Bay were applauded across the bi-state region. To accomplish these great tasks, however, public approbation was only the first step, and it was not the most important step. The Port Authority’s goal was to improve freight movement, and in the United States this was a province of private enterprise. So the private railroad corporations would need to cooperate in carrying out the immense program. Otherwise, the Comprehensive Plan could not be carried forward, and the primary motivation for the Port Authority’s existence would seemingly be lost. The pages below describe the Port agency’s negotiations with the railroads, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the War Department and other interested parties. This effort began in May 1921, a few weeks after the Compact was signed, and continued on several fronts for the next seven years, with recurring expectations at the Port Authority’s offices that victory was “just around the corner.” A clear-eyed observer might have concluded quite early that victory was never likely around any corner; but there were 97
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reasons to be hopeful, and to admit defeat might exact a heavy toll on the Port Authority’s reputation, and on individual egos. And not the smallest of those egos was that of Julius Henry Cohen, who led the long campaign to convince the rail lines, the ICC, and the national government that a cooperative approach, under the guiding hand of the Port Authority, would result in improved efficiency and enhanced economic growth. In 1928, the ICC handed the bi-state agency a setback which traumatized and largely ended the main negotiation effort. Even so, its leaders continued to champion their ideas for improving rail freight service; and as the Depression weakened the rail corporations, the Authority hoped those recalcitrant advocates of self-interest would in time embrace the main elements of the Comprehensive Plan. Often the Port Authority’s motivation and behavior in the 1920s have been described in this highly critical way: Finding its rail plans blocked, and searching for some strategy to survive, the Port agency turned its back on its fundamental raison d’être and on the rail system, and found salvation in catering to motor vehicles.3 The reality was more complex: Cohen and his associates were involved for many years in a variety of efforts to collaborate with or to outmaneuver the railroads. The early legislation which sent the Authority into building bridges for motor vehicles came in 1924–25, when its rail-improvement activities were in their most energetic phase. In those years and beyond, the senior staff focused on the rail problem, and those efforts expanded from freight to embrace rail passengers as well. The highway-bridge engineers were set off in their own division, where they could carry out several distinct and bounded projects that, as Cohen had suggested some years earlier, constituted a narrow part of the region’s transportation problem.4 Even in the late 1920s, as two vehicular bridges to Staten Island were completed, the Port Authority’s deeper hopes remained with that fading relic, the Comprehensive Plan. The annual reports for 1928, 1929, and 1930 opened with discussions of belt-lines, railroad-freight terminals, and possible railroad cooperation in making the region’s transport system more efficient. Progress on the great bridge across the Hudson, which would soon mark the Port Authority as a leader in the use of expertise and scientific planning to solve the region’s problems, was relegated to later sections of these reports. As we will see, the initiatives that took the Port agency into the automotive age came more from outside demands than from the Authority’s own inclinations; and those pressures were politically persuasive while the Authority still had reason to expect that its major task—the Comprehensive Plan—would be carried forward.
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There is a final argument that can be directed against the criticism that the Port agency abandoned its proper focus, on railroad improvements, to embrace the siren song of the motor vehicle. As chapters 2 and 3 make clear, the 1921 Compact that established the Port Authority was not limited to rail problems. While the Comprehensive Plan approved in 1922 was focused on a range of specific proposals for rail and water freight movement (with a modest role for trucks as local feeders), the Compact emphasized wider themes— the need for “faithful co-operation” between the two states “in the future planning and development” of the Port District, and the central role of the Port Authority in providing “better coordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce” in the region. This broad purpose could be used to justify Port Authority action that extended to motor vehicles and airplanes. Indeed, Cohen and his colleagues had designed the bi-state agency so it could take on a wide range of problems involving interstate cooperation, including water pollution.5 Notably, however, the wide scope suggested by the phrasing in the Compact was not uppermost in Cohen’s thinking, once the Comprehensive Plan had been endorsed by the legislatures, early in 1922. Cohen and his associates then cited the rail-oriented Plan (rather than the Compact) as the structure under which all its activities should be justified. We see this focus, in a remarkable way, in the legislation in 1924–25 authorizing the Port Authority to construct the George Washington Bridge and two Staten Island crossings (the Goethals and the Outerbridge). All three statutes empowered the Authority to build these spans “in partial effectuation of the comprehensive plan for the development of the port of New York, and of section four thereof.” Section four of the Plan referred only to projects that would carry meat, milk, and other goods from New Jersey to Manhattan, preferably by underground rail. It was an unusual way to justify a vehicular span, and a most unusual way to justify building bridges from New Jersey to Staten Island.6 In 1927, Cohen indicated that his focus was still on the Comprehensive Plan, not on the broad purposes that shaped his earlier crafting of the Port Compact: Those who have watched the progress of the Port Authority have seen what, on first examination, looked like a change in its program, and anxious friends have worried lest it be diverted from its original task. . . . It was originally created to coordinate the rail and water freight transportation facilities of the district. This work it is doing, not, in the case of rail
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terminals, with the same rapidity as in the building of bridges, but it is doing this work.7
So it was that Cohen and his colleagues carried the banner of railway freight improvements against the bastions of the railroads throughout the 1920s, pausing now and then to take on new duties—here a bridge, there a role in solving rail passenger problems—until they emerged in the 1930s, somewhat to their surprise, almost cleansed of their railroad passion, and applauded for their skill in carrying out tasks that once they had considered useful, but quite secondary.
What Is Efficiency? Two Conflicting Views Underlying the conflicts between the Port Authority and the railroads in the 1920s was an important difference in perspective. Drawing upon values of the Progressive Era, Cohen and his associates viewed government as having an important mission as social planner, whose wider vision could moderate the inefficiencies of untrammeled competition. In contrast, the rail executives embraced the view that vigorous competition was the best route to efficiency and social progress, although their competitive ardor was admittedly constrained by the regulatory edicts of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Value of Rational Planning To the Port Authority’s leaders, the purpose of any transportation system was to serve the user, with maximum efficiency. An efficient transport system was one which met high standards of speed and reliability, at minimum cost. In a concentrated commercial center like the New York area, particular emphasis might be given to the needs of manufacturers, retailers, and other heavy users. Believing in “competitive capitalism,” the agency’s top officials thought competition was an important route to high levels of achievement. If the ports at Baltimore and Philadelphia and New York competed vigorously, that would stimulate each metropolis to search for ways to improve speed and reliability in moving goods; the cumulative effort would be to lower the cost of goods to the producer and the consumer, and to encourage economic growth across the nation. But competition was not always a reasonable route to greater efficiency. Under some conditions, competitive impulses could generate inefficien-
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cies—wasteful duplication of freight terminals, for example, and circuitous routing of goods so that each individual rail line could extract the maximum payment from the shippers and consumers. At the nation’s largest freight centers—inland cities like Chicago, and the large coastal ports—a pattern of duplication and unnecessary costs was a common complaint.8 The New York region was a striking illustration of these concerns. Its piers and steamships handled by far the largest share of the nation’s freight, including 40 percent of all foreign trade in the years before World War I; and this massive commercial activity had attracted twelve railroads to the bi-state metropolis. By 1920, rail lines laced throughout the region, large portions of the shoreline had been bought up by individual railroads to use for their own lighterage piers, and the waters of the Hudson and New York Bay were crowded with tugs and barges carrying freight around the region. Each railroad jealously guarded its own facilities—piers, segments of rail lines, bridges across the East River and other waterways—which it viewed as crucial to reliable service. And if costs for the 12 lines were compared, each railroad could note that its charges were no higher than its competitors’; which was true, but all of them were higher than freight-service costs in any competing city and—according to objective studies—much higher than they needed to be. This meant that slowly the New York-New Jersey area was losing foreign and coastal trade to its competitors; and the high costs of transport might lead some manufacturers to relocate their activities out of the region.9 The Port Authority’s officials could see how individualism and competitive ardor had brought the New York metropolis to its current unhappy state.10 But now the rail system, and the freight transport system in general, must be reorganized, duplication ended, speed of movement increased, and the entire arrangement governed by high standards of coordination and general efficiency. The Port agency essentially embraced a public utility conception of the private freight transport system, as it operated within the bistate region; like the systems of water supply and sewers in any large city, competition in freight transport was inefficient, and a single system should be instituted, under the supervision of a public agency concerned with safeguarding the public interest.11 As they entered into discussions with rail executives in 1921 and 1922, the Port Authority’s senior officials hoped that they could persuade the railroads to accept the Port agency’s views on the proper remedies. But they recognized that at some point, if the railroads were intransigent, coercion might be required—either through the regulatory powers available to the ICC, or preferably through a grant of power made directly to the bi-state agency. And
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so, toward the end of their first report to the states, they sounded a clarion call to arm the region’s own Port Authority: With natural advantages unparalleled, not heretofore developed as science and invention would have dictated because of diverse interests; with continuity of policy essential if any great comprehensive plan is to be achieved for the future; . . . it must be apparent that only through a coordinating agency, clothed with adequate powers . . . can there be brought to fruition the great benefits that can be foreseen.12
The Benefits of Competitive Capitalism and “Self-Interest” The railroads had a somewhat different view. Each sought to maximize its own freight traffic and profits, as its stockholders would expect, year by year. History had shown that competition in rates led to cut-throat price-cutting, which destabilized markets and threatened profits even for the strongest roads. Under the regulatory umbrella of the ICC, the railroads had during the first two decades of the twentieth century determined to co-exist in a reasonably stable environment by avoiding sharp rate competition, and by assigning freight territories which each line (or set of partly competing lines) would serve. The railroads competed mainly through reliability of services, and through advertising their individual advantages—direct rail service to Manhattan, for example, or fast lighterage service from the Jersey shore to Brooklyn steamship piers.13 To force the individual railroads to open up their lines and piers to their competitors would erase much of the distinctive advantage of each railway; and to replace individual freight services across the water with joint lighterage operations would indeed convert that crucial part of the region’s freight system into a publicly regulated utility. A publicly owned railroad tunnel or bridge joining New Jersey and New York City might have much the same result. Future profits on each railroad could not be predicted if these changes were made; and if the Port Authority’s campaign to reduce freight costs by limiting the present circuitous routing of freight around the region were successful, lower profits seemed likely. Given this perspective, the rail executives found it easy to reject out of hand the suggestion that they should enter into a joint agreement to pay for and use Mayor Hylan’s proposed rail tunnel under the Narrows—or a massive railroad bridge at 57th Street. They had been rejecting such notions for decades.14
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The Port Authority’s plans could not be dismissed so easily. Unlike Hylan’s tunnel and the Lindenthal bridge, the Port Authority offered a credible threat. Because the bi-state Compact had been approved by both states and by the federal government, the new agency might in time use governmental authority, including subpoena and condemnation powers, to open the railroads’ books to public scrutiny and perhaps force the rail lines to operate their own facilities for each other’s benefit. Also, the origins of the Port Authority were closely tied to the ICC’s scrutiny of railroad rate patterns in 1916–17; and in the New York Harbor case, decided late in 1917, the ICC had suggested that it might intervene more actively to shape railroad rates and rail competition if the inefficient New York rail system was not soon improved. Moreover, in 1920 the federal government had approved a new Transportation Act, which seemed to give the ICC the power to force each railroad to permit competing rail lines to use each other’s tracks, terminals, and lighters, if that step would improve service to the general public.15 An alliance between the Port Authority and the ICC might, therefore, prove dangerous to the competitive philosophy under which the railroads had long operated. The challenge facing the railroads in the early 1920s was to assume a cooperative guise toward this bi-state enterprise, while affirming the principle of corporate independence. Meanwhile, they would need to work with state legislators to ensure that the Port Authority did not receive any new enforcement powers; and they would monitor developments in Washington, in the hope that the activist ICC seen in the New York Harbor opinion might evolve into a less vigorous agency, which accepted the right of business people to run their own affairs. How the Port Authority attempted to implement its “public utility” philosophy, and how the railroads whittled away at its initiatives and its hopes, are the main themes of the events analyzed below. It was a sort of “cat and mouse” game: The railroad cat would permit the Port Authority mouse to run a little this way, and then a little that way, but each time a large railroad paw would block the way to the promised land. In the end, though, it was a friend of the cat in a Washington top hat that brought the mouse’s hope to its final, sad end.16
Ten Years of Travail Once the Comprehensive Plan had been approved by both states, in late February, 1922, the Port Authority’s leaders turned their attention to the ini-
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tial steps needed to carry out the program. In New Jersey, the first target was to unify Belt Line 13, which included several pieces of existing rail line that ran from Fort Lee south through Jersey City to Bayonne. The railroads that owned these pieces would, the bi-state agency concluded, have to place them under unified control, so that freight could be moved along the congested shore without delays and duplication of routing. Also, one section of that rail line (called the Hoboken Shore Line Railroad) had been acquired by the U.S. Government during the World War, and that segment would need to be recaptured from Washington. On the New York side of the Hudson, the first goal was to unify the operation of the existing segments of Belt No. 1, which ran from Brooklyn north through Queens into the Bronx. And in between, where an underwater rail tube would in time join the two sides of the region, the first priority was to bring all the railroads together to agree upon a unified interim plan for handling the cross-Bay floating of freight, rather than relying on 12 separate and overlapping patterns of barge movement.
The First Two Years: A Large Mouse with Powerful Friends? Presumably the proposed changes could save millions of dollars a year in shipping costs, including a substantial benefit to the railroads in their lighterage expenses. Rather than applauding the advantages of the Authority’s plans, however, during 1922 the railroads unanimously rejected all its proposals as unnecessary, and as violating appropriate standards of managerial discretion and business efficiency.17 The assurances of cooperation, which the Port Authority’s leaders thought they had received in 1921 from the railroads, had now, less than a year later, “turned out to be a mirage.” Cohen and his colleagues then responded aggressively, employing a three-pronged strategy. First, they asserted that the Comprehensive Plan, having been approved by both states and by a resolution in Congress, was “now the law of the State of New York, of the State of New Jersey and of the Congress of the United States,” with the Port Authority being fully empowered to execute the law. Second, the Port Authority turned to the ICC, asking that it hold a hearing on steps that the railroads should be required to take in order to carry out the Comprehensive Plan. And third, Port Authority commissioners took to the hustings in order to convince the public of the railroads’ intransigence and the need for action.18 In April 1923, the ICC opened hearings on the issue of unifying rail service along Belt Line 13. The ICC commissioners invited the Port Authority’s
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5-1. The Port Authority’s rail-freight plan
board to sit with them at the hearings, and the Authority’s staff then presented the agency’s case, describing the “inefficiencies” in current railroad practice and the advantages of the proposed beltlines. The railroads were sharply antagonistic. One speaker argued that unification of rail terminals violated the American way, which entailed individual, privately owned railroads competing for traffic. “That is the basis of it all,” he concluded; “it is either government ownership or that.” The counsel for the New York Central argued that “as long as we are engaged in a private business . . . , there is only one factor which gives the public a return, and that is self-interest.”
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Joint operation of terminals and other port facilities was not consistent with that self-interest.19 The ICC adjourned its hearings and asked both sides to return in September to provide their views on the ICC’s powers, especially as they had been expanded by the 1920 Transportation Act. Cohen soon directed his attention to the ICC’s recent Hastings decision. In that case, business interests in Hastings, Minnesota, had asked the ICC to compel the Milwaukee Railroad to open its terminal rail tracks to a competitor, because of the advantages that would accrue to the city’s shippers. The Commission had concluded, in its 1922 decision, that the 1920 act “gives us a direct and explicit power” to require such joint use when that would serve the “broader interest” of the general public. Cohen prepared a brief which linked the Hastings case directly to the situation in the New York region.20 Apparent progress. These hints that the ICC and the Port Authority might develop an alliance did not elude the railroads’ strategists. When the ICC hearings resumed in September, the railroads declined to challenge the Port Authority’s evidence on circuitous routing and excessive costs; instead, they asserted they were bowing to an “overwhelming public opinion that traffic conditions in this Port must be radically improved as soon as possible.” Representatives of all twelve rail lines announced that they would provide unified service along Belt 13, appoint a neutral director for the line, and create a new system of rates that would eliminate the inflated charges identified in the Port Authority’s study. They also agreed to join with the Port agency in a study of the New Jersey section of Belt Line 1, an important part of the overall Plan.21 Meanwhile, with the Hoboken Shore Line—a key element of Belt 13— still under federal control, Cohen saw an opportunity for the Port Authority to reach beyond its advisory and planning role. He urged that the agency purchase the Hoboken line and then operate it directly, as part of the modernized rail-to-ship program. At their meeting in October 1923, the Commissioners endorsed the plan and offered one million dollars in 30-year bonds for title to that rail line.22 Cohen and his associates also took action on other elements of the Comprehensive Plan. They began a study of the complex lighterage system, in collaboration with the rail executives, in the hope of recommending ways to consolidate the thousands of freight trips across the bays and rivers that occurred each day. Another staff analysis focused on freight movements by horse-drawn wagon and motor truck in Manhattan, with the aim of identify-
5-2. Belt 13, with associated piers and railroad links
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ing the best sites for the inland freight terminals which had been proposed as part of the Comprehensive Plan. Port Authority officials also joined with the transit commissions from several parts of the region, in order to begin studies of ways to improve commuter rail service from northern New Jersey, Westchester, and Long Island into the central business district.23 Pressure to aid motor vehicles. Interstate tunnels and bridges for motor vehicles seemed to be partly in the Port Authority’s field of interest, and partly outside it. If a bridge, for example, were to carry rail freight cars as well as motor vehicles between New Jersey and New York, it clearly fell within the agency’s domain, as the debate over the Lindenthal Bridge illustrated. A bridge or tunnel for vehicular traffic alone, however, did not initially seem to be a part of its regional planning mandate. The bi-state agency had been asked to focus its attention on freight traffic, and freight across the Hudson moved almost entirely by rail and lighter; moreover, the states had agreed earlier to create a separate set of agencies to build vehicular crossings.24 By early 1923, however, vehicular traffic in the bi-state region was expanding, and automobiles and trucks typically waited in long lines for the ferries connecting New Jersey to Manhattan. The Holland Tunnel would not open until at least 1926, seven years after construction had begun, and there was growing pressure to build additional tunnels. During the spring of 1923, the legislatures in both states had approved bills to permit private corporations to begin tunnels at 125th Street and other locations, and the Holland Tunnel commissioners were developing their own plans to construct three or four tunnels under the Hudson.25 The Port Authority then modified its earlier position. Writing to the two governors in March, Outerbridge referred to the spate of bills “providing for various tunnels . . . some vehicular, some railroad,” and he argued that trucks using interstate tunnels would have an important impact on freight movement in the region. Therefore, he concluded, any new tunnels should be approved only if they would be constructed under the supervision of a “single coordinating agency,” presumably the Port Authority.26 In Albany, Outerbridge’s letter landed on the desk of the state’s newly reelected governor, Alfred E. Smith. New Jersey also had a new governor, George Silzer, a Democrat who favored an activist government and rational planning of public projects, and whose interest in a vehicular bridge across the Hudson had been whetted by an engineer-adviser, Othmar Ammann. Both governors vetoed the private-tunnel bills, with Smith adopting the Outerbridge-Cohen perspective and extending it. Not only should the
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Port Authority have supervisory authority over the location and operation of any new tunnels, Smith argued; it should build them as well. Smith and Silzer then issued a joint statement in August urging “the construction at the earliest possible moment of additional vehicular tunnels or bridges between New York and New Jersey to be determined upon, constructed and financed by the Port Authority.”27 If the joint announcement did not catch Cohen and his colleagues unaware, it did find them unable to respond promptly. Preparations for the September ICC hearing, discussions on whether to float bonds to buy the Hoboken railroad, and other matters closely tied to the Comprehensive Plan occupied Cohen and his associates during the next three months. Finally, in late November, the Port Authority agreed to hold a public hearing on the issue of building “additional vehicular tunnels.”28 The hearing was held on December 5. While others favored a Hudson River bridge far north of mid-Manhattan, for automobiles and trucks, the Port Authority focused on tunnels for trucks to the main business district. The Authority concluded that the growth of traffic would justify as many as four additional tunnels during the next 20 years. Moreover, trucks traveling in these tunnels could carry goods to the large inland freight terminals, to be constructed as part of the Comprehensive Plan. Later, as freight traffic into Manhattan expanded, the Plan’s underground electric rail system would be constructed and would probably replace this trans-Hudson trucking.29
The Mid-1920s: Optimism on Several Fronts The Port Authority’s plate was full at the start of 1924, with passenger rail transit and vehicular crossings added to its range of tasks. However, Cohen and his key associates kept their main attention directed to the railroad freight problem. In their 1924 report, they pointed out that the railway executives were now less inclined to treat all issues in terms of narrow rivalry and individual advantage, and were actively cooperating with the Authority.30 During the next two years, that collaborative approach continued in three important areas. First, freight exchanges along the several pieces of Belt Line 13 were integrated, and by the end of 1925, that belt was operated as a coordinated system, resulting in substantial savings to shippers. While the railroads had not yet agreed upon a neutral director of operations, the Authority was now able to announce that “the first part of the Comprehensive Plan” had been “put into effect.” Second, the joint study of ways to combine lighterage in the harbor continued, with the rail operators absorbing half the
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cost. The Port Authority anticipated that this study would be finished in 1926, and barge services could then be consolidated, with large savings to the rail lines and to shippers.31 Finally, with cooperation from the rail executives, the bi-state agency completed its study of consolidated freight terminals in August 1925. The Authority announced the need for at least nine large freight buildings in Manhattan; goods brought from all the region’s rail lines would be sorted by neighborhood and block, and the organized freight would then be delivered by truck. The agency estimated that the new system would save the railroads $2 million and shippers $12 million a year, while reducing the number of trucks on congested Manhattan streets.32 Expanding its legal powers and buying a rail line. Meanwhile, Cohen tried to use his legal skills to strengthen the Port Authority’s capacity to shape the region’s future. In 1924 he crafted a bill which would give the agency the power to subpoena witnesses and to gain access to records needed for its studies, ostensibly to ensure that the Authority could obtain information on costs and traffic patterns. However, the bill went much further. Tucked into the final sections of the “Investigation and Subpoena Act” were provisions that would authorize the Port Authority to determine what steps involved in carrying out the Comprehensive Plan were “economically practicable,” and then to issue “an appropriate order,” which could be enforced in a court of law. The result would be to shift such crucial matters as what freight movements should be consolidated, and which railroad terminals would be opened up to competitors, from an arena for negotiation between the Port Authority and the railroads to a matter on which the Authority’s decision— subject to due process constraints—would be decisive. Thus the new law would restore some of the powers which had been included in Cohen’s 1919 draft, and which the legislative committees had stripped away before the Compact became law in 1921. Cohen’s bill brought the railroad lobby to life in both states, but despite its vigorous efforts in Albany, the measure was passed by the New York State Senate and Assembly, and Al Smith signed it in May. It did not win approval in Trenton during the 1924 session, but Cohen planned to bring up again the next year.33 As soon as the New York bill was signed, Cohen found an opportunity to use it in pursuit of the Plan’s principles. In April 1924, the Queens Chamber of Commerce, pointing out that the railroads had agreed to cooperative use of rail track on the west side of the Hudson (Belt 13), asked that the same
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principles be applied to rail freight entering Long Island. The business leaders hoped to open up the Hell Gate Bridge, which had been built by the Pennsylvania Railroad, so that the New York Central could use the railroad bridge as well, and so give its Long Island customers faster service. The Hell Gate was also a crucial piece of the eastern side of Belt Line 1, and success in this effort would advance the principles of the Comprehensive Plan.34 Cohen and his colleagues contacted the railroads, in the hope that agreement could be obtained informally. Finding resistance, the Port Authority then issued its first order under the Investigation and Subpoena Act and held a set of hearings in the fall of 1924. Cohen urged his commissioners to follow the principle that all rail lines in the New York region should be available to all carriers, so the region’s public could have the most efficient service possible. The commissioners agreed, and in February 1925 they announced that the Hell Gate should be opened to the New York Central’s trains. The Pennsylvania objected to permitting its ardent competitor to use the Hell Gate crossing, and Cohen then appealed to the ICC and the New York State Public Service Commission.35 While crafting the legal strategy for Hell Gate, Cohen was also occupied with a crucial set of negotiations in Washington. In the fall of 1923, the Port Authority had offered the War Department $1 million in bonds for the Hoboken Shore Line, backed by its prospective earnings on Belt 13 and any other facilities it might acquire. The Department had appeared to indicate that it would transfer ownership of the railroad on this basis, but once the offer was made, it was rejected; the War Department preferred cash and said it would accept Port Authority bonds only if sanctioned by Congressional action. The Authority appealed to friendly members of Congress, and early in 1924 the necessary bills were introduced. During the next year and a half, Congressional committees debated and then endorsed the legislation, while the War Department tried to sell the property to private interests before Congress could take final action. Finally, in February 1925, Congress authorized the Department to accept Port Authority bonds and Cohen went to Washington to work out the final contract for sale. Negotiations were nearly completed by the end of 1925.36 Political pressures and new duties. During 1924–25, the Port Authority also found itself swept into the automotive age. After its December 1923 hearing on bridges and tunnels, the Authority had suggested that several additional tunnels might be built north of the Holland. What happened next, however, moved the Authority in unexpected directions—committing it to build not tunnels but bridges, and not to Manhattan but to Staten Island.
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In the decades before 1920, there had been recurring demands from Staten Island’s citizens for bridges across the Arthur Kill, a narrow waterway that separates the island from New Jersey’s mainland. Public sentiment in nearby Elizabeth (in Union County) and Perth Amboy (in Middlesex County) also supported the idea. In 1919, the states created the two bridge and tunnel commissions, which planned the Holland Tunnel. However, their mandate was not limited to that crossing, and Staten Island political leaders soon pressed for state funding which would allow the two commissions to plan bridges across the Arthur Kill. By early 1923, local groups on Staten Island lobbying for a bridge study were joined by their New Jersey colleagues from Union and Middlesex. Both states then appropriated funds, the joint commissions carried out a preliminary study, and in the fall of 1923 they reported that a bridge at Perth Amboy was “desirable and practicable.” Traffic conditions for those crossing by ferry had become “intolerable,” they concluded, as population increases on both sides of the Arthur Kill had led to long delays at ferry terminals, and the commissioners recommended “immediate remedial action.”37 Meanwhile, Governors Smith and Silzer had announced in August 1923 that they preferred to have the Port Authority take responsibility for any further interstate tunnels or bridges. In their annual messages five months later, both governors reaffirmed this position, and they coupled it with a vigorous attack on the Holland Tunnel agency, which they criticized for delays and cost overruns.38 At this point, State Senator Arthur Pierson of Union County brought together those active in the local campaigns to work out a joint strategy. They soon agreed to ask that the Port Authority build and operate two Staten Island crossings. The governors supported this move, and by April 1924 legislation authorizing action by the Port agency had been approved at Albany and Trenton. The Port Authority did not oppose this sudden addition to its duties, but it did not take an active role in urging passage of the legislation, for its staff was largely occupied with the complex rail freight issues described above.39 The Port Authority’s first step into the automotive age was followed by a more significant commitment, a year later, to study and build a gigantic span across the Hudson River. That complex story, which also found the Port Authority in a relatively passive role until the project was near to approval, is told in the next chapter. In 1924–25, Cohen also had to devote a portion of his energies to blocking another foray from an old foe, John Hylan. As mayor of New York City since 1918, Hylan had long opposed the Port Authority and its plan to construct a railroad freight tunnel under New York Bay, extending from Jersey
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5-3. The three bridges built by the Port Authority between Staten Island and New Jersey in the 1920s: the Outerbridge span at the southern end of Staten Island (to Perth Amboy, in Middlesex County); the Goethals (to Elizabeth in Union County); and the Bayonne (to the city of Bayonne in Hudson County). The Holland Tunnel, nine miles north of the Bayonne span, is also shown.
City to Brooklyn. Rail freight from the west should be brought instead, he argued, from New Jersey across Staten Island and then through a railroad tunnel under the Narrows to Brooklyn.40 By the spring of 1924, Hylan had gained the support of civic and business associations in Brooklyn and Staten Island, and he decided to use city rev-
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enues to build his tunnel. The Port Authority, the Citizens Union, and other Manhattan-oriented groups attacked that competitor to the Comprehensive Plan; and Governor Smith and his allies in the state legislature then introduced legislation that would limit any Narrows tunnel to a small-bore passenger transit line. During the controversy, which extended into the spring of 1925, Cohen was surprised to find that the Committee on the Regional Plan, which he had counted as friendly to the Port Authority’s plans, supported the Hylan plan. But the Port Authority soon won the battle at Albany; in late April, Al Smith signed the bill ending Hylan’s freight-tunnel hopes. The Port Authority was left with a clear field: its own tunneling efforts could begin as soon as the railroad executives were ready to cooperate.41 Finally, at the end of 1925, Cohen and his colleagues could anticipate a new spirit of cooperation with New York City officials. For eight years Mayor Hylan had preached relentless hostility to cooperation with New Jersey and to the plans of the Port Authority. In time, he wore out his welcome with Al Smith and with the voters. Smith, still the most influential political leader in New York City, withdrew his support as Hylan opened his bid for a third term as Mayor in 1925; and Hylan was defeated. The Port Authority now looked forward to working with Mayor James J. Walker, who took office in January 1926, and who promised that he would cooperate with the bi-state agency.42 As 1926 opened, the Port Authority could marvel at the continued growth of commerce in the New York metropolis, despite the great weaknesses in its transportation system. And it could see that those weaknesses would soon be overcome—the Hoboken Shore Line controlled by the Authority and integrated into Belt 13; joint lighterage established, cutting down the heavy costs of transferring freight across the Hudson and New York Bay; the first inland terminal constructed, beginning a new era in consolidated freight delivery in Manhattan; and the Hell Gate Bridge opened to all traffic, thus cutting freight costs for Long Island businesses and residents. As these and other steps in the Comprehensive Plan were carried out, the region’s extraordinary vitality would be advanced still further. Of course “some sacrifice of individual advantage may be required,” the Authority noted, but great benefits would also accrue, and these benefits “will be shared by the railroads as well as their patrons.”43
Decline and Fall of a Railroad Vision During the next several years, most of the Port Authority’s rail-freight hopes and regional designs crashed to earth, victims of the reluctance of the private rail corporations to change their habitual ways, reinforced by doubts in the
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era of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge that governmental power should be permitted to tamper with the benefits of laissez faire. The first to tumble to the ground was the agency’s hope of purchasing the Hoboken line, a crucial link in the Authority’s plan to fashion modernized rail-to-ship facilities along the New Jersey shore. After several years of negotiations and delays, the War Department raised its demands early in 1926, essentially ending the Port agency’s ability to buy the line. The Port Authority regretfully broke off discussions, and in 1927 the War Department sold this important piece of the rail system to the Lackawanna Railroad.44 Next came the goal of unified operation of the entire Belt Line 13 under a “neutral” director, who would ensure that freight movement along the Hudson shore would be guided by general principles of efficiency—not by short-term profit goals of each railroad. After agreeing in the fall of 1923 to “provide a unified service over the line,” the railroads assigned members of their staffs to work on the problem, offered hints of real progress soon to come, and led the Port Authority to believe, for a time, that a truly integrated system, serving all the region’s railroads, would shortly be created. By early 1927 a neutral director of operations had still not been appointed, and the Port Authority then insisted that the railroads live up to their 1923 agreement. And so they did in March 1927, appointing an operating official of a railroad affiliated with the New York Central to the post—while he retained all his duties with the Central. His possible bias was not of concern to the railroads, however, for he was given no control over the routing of freight. That remained as it had always been, under the control of four competing railroads.45 A sharper blow landed a few weeks later, when the railroads abandoned their cooperative efforts on the lighterage problem. In 1923, all the rail corporations had assigned staff members to work with the Port Authority and the steamship companies, in order to analyze the thousands of trips each month of tugs, barges, and lighters. By the end of 1926, a major part of the study had been completed, and the Port Authority concluded that the present system— with each railroad sending its own tugs and barges across the waters with small loads of freight—was far too inefficient. In the short term, until the railroad tunnels between New Jersey and New York could be constructed, the railroads should pool their equipment and run an integrated service, saving themselves and the shipping public many millions of dollars.46 The railroad executives scrutinized this sharp attack on their traditional efforts, and in April 1927 flatly rejected the Port Authority’s plans—and its underlying perspective, that joint operation should replace the efforts of each
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rail line to outdo the others in speed of delivery and quality of service. To “eliminate the competition which now exists” in freight deliveries across the harbor, the executives argued, would undermine the pressures for efficient delivery which were an important part of the industry’s vitality.47 By now it seemed clear that the rail lines would carry out their own plans, without entangling alliances or the guiding hand of an “expert” planner. This position was underscored by the railroads’ new projects in 1927: While the Port agency was extolling the benefits of union freight terminals, the Pennsylvania opened two new freight stations to serve its own needs in Manhattan, and the Lehigh Valley opened a third, restricted to its own freight bound for New York factories and stores. However, the Port Authority thought it had a powerful card, if it could but play it in time. If the rail executives did not appreciate the value of planning and acting cooperatively in a complex urban region, they might still be forced to act more broadly, through the intervention of the ICC. An alliance with the ICC seemed plausible to Cohen in the early and mid-1920s, when that regulatory body was led by men like Joseph B. Eastman—commissioners appointed by Progressive-Era presidents and willing to employ the powers of government to carry out great tasks. The potential for activism seemed to be reinforced by the federal Transportation Act of 1920, which encouraged the Commission to take a leading role in improving efficiency, and by the ICC’s first decision in the Hastings case, discussed earlier; in that 1922 opinion, the ICC concluded that the 1920 Act gave it “direct and explicit power” to compel joint use of terminal facilities. But the Port Authority did not grasp and use that alliance in its early years; instead, seeking cooperation with the railroads, Cohen and his colleagues had endeavored to persuade them of the mutual benefits of joint terminals and other changes. And the rail executives, realizing that the Port Authority might proceed in that softer way—as long as success seemed in time likely— had assigned some of their staff members to the Port agency’s projects and made encouraging comments as the studies proceeded. By 1925–26, however, it was evident that the troubling ICC zeal suggested by the 1917 New York Harbor and 1922 Hastings decisions was not likely to shape future ICC actions. A hint of what this might mean for the Port Authority’s plans was provided in 1926, when the Commission reversed its 1922 decision in the Hastings case.48 Then, early in 1927, an ICC examiner rejected the Port Authority’s argument that the Commission should force the Pennsylvania Railroad to open its Hell Gate Bridge to competing railroads. Cohen appealed to the full Commission in outraged terms:
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If the Hell Gate Bridge is . . . to be regarded as a private facility to be given only such restricted use as the selfish requirements of the Pennsylvania and the New Haven may dictate, then these complaints should be dismissed. If, on the contrary, shippers . . . are entitled to adequate transportation service . . . and if consideration is to be given to the declared policies of the two States and of Congress, then the relief sought . . . must be granted.49
But the appeal fell on deafened ears, and in the summer of 1928 the ICC rejected the Port Authority’s position. Expressing concern that opening the Hell Gate route to all comers would undermine the property rights of its owner, the ICC voted unanimously to leave the bridge under the control of the Pennsylvania. What the ICC had offered in 1917 in the New York Harbor case—a readiness to use its influence to end the “unrestrained competition” among the rail lines and to unify terminal operations in the Port of New York—was a prospect no longer.50 To the railroads, in the 1920s as in earlier decades, competition to retain and gain freight traffic on their own lines, under the mild monitoring hand of the ICC, seemed to offer the best route to profits and to abiding success. It was “the American way.” To be sure, competition entailed some duplication of tracks, terminals, and barge trips, and perhaps therefore some increase in freight costs—compared with an ideal design for “efficient” freight movement. But there was little sympathy in railroad quarters with the view that a Great Coordinator would actually be able to create and operate a better system than the railroads and their allies had hammered out through long experience.51 In addition, the inefficiencies which encumbered the rail freight system were of little consequence to the railroads themselves. There might be higher charges to the shippers and to customers, who had to absorb in freight bills the costs of operating these many, overlapping facilities. But what options did the shippers and their customers have? The railroads had won out against the canal systems some 80 years before. For short hauls, horse-drawn wagons and motor trucks could supplement the rail lines, but the overwhelming bulk of freight moving into and through the New York area must move mainly by rail cars. If costs were a little higher than they would be in an “ideal system,” and if delays were occasionally encountered in getting freight to factories, stores, and homes, there was really no alternative for shippers and customers. They would wait for deliveries, and they would pay a little more, because they had to. And the railroads could prosper, as long
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as the ICC did not attempt to force the rail corporations to change their competitive ways.52 By 1928, the railroad executives could see that they were now free from the possible incursions of a hyperactive ICC. They then agreed to cooperate with the Port Authority in its plans to construct a large freight building in Manhattan. And this led the Port agency to wax enthusiastic: “We have,” the agency announced, “entered upon a new era in our relations with the railroads,” an era of “mutual confidence and good will.” In reality, however, the optimism of Cohen and his colleagues was nearly all that remained of the wide-ranging Comprehensive Plan. In return for railroad support for the freight terminal, the Port agency agreed to set aside all its other plans and projects for the foreseeable future, and to take no further steps that would challenge existing railroad policies, either in court or in the bar of public opinion. Its days of stirring plans and public jousting with the rail executives were at an end; and its stable of engineers with railroad expertise was soon dispersed.53 Moreover, once the Inland Freight Terminal—a huge building at 15th Street and Eighth Avenue—was completed and opened, in 1932, it soon became clear that the railroads’ competitive strategies were essentially unchanged. Their information and pricing policies gave little incentive for shippers to route freight through the new facility, which therefore made only a modest contribution to reducing congestion or improving efficiency of freight transfer in Manhattan. What had once been heralded as the first of nine great freight terminals in Manhattan was reduced to a projected three, and then to only this one, which limped along in the 1930s, victim of the railroads’ attitudes and of the Great Depression.54 After ten years of energetic effort, little had been accomplished toward meeting the long-term goals of the Port Authority and her allies in the two states. In 1931–32, the complex system of carrying raw materials, manufactured goods, and foodstuffs into and out of the New York region was just as time-consuming and inefficient as it had been a decade before. The proportion of the nation’s foreign trade passing through the Port of New York was slipping, relative to New Orleans, Baltimore, and other competitors, as it had been in the years prior to the Great War. Meanwhile, dissenters in the sometime breakaway province of New Jersey had recognized that the promise of the Comprehensive Plan for their side of the region was not likely to be achieved. So it was not surprising that in 1929 the arguments of the New York Harbor case were revived, as the State of New Jersey brought suit against the railroads, demanding that they reduce their charges to deliver goods to the
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New Jersey side of the harbor, compared with tariffs for Manhattan and points to the east. The destructive conflicts between the two states, which Julius Henry Cohen and his colleagues had thought they had laid to rest in 1921, were once again in center stage.55 What the dissenters in the Garden State had missed, however, and the railroads too, was the declining relevance of all these battles. The proportion of freight traffic handled by motorized trucks, a trickle in the early 1920s, was growing steadily, and within a few years trucking had become a significant alternative for shippers who wished to send goods cheaply and quickly into and out of the New York region. The rail executives had resisted the pleas and pressures that they improve efficiency and reduce costs; and while they dragged their feet and turned their backs, the trucks took their traffic away. And so the railroads provided a serviceable example of Freeman Dyson’s historical observation: A technology during its phase of rapid growth and spectacular success is usually small, quick and agile. As it grows mature it becomes settled and conservative, prevented by the inertia of size from reacting quickly to sudden shocks. When a technology has grown so big and sluggish that it can no longer bend with the winds of change, it is ripe for extinction.56
By the early 1930s the Port agency’s main interests were no longer with that aged technology. Her leaders had at last embraced the benefits of the motorized truck and the automobile, whose efficiency of travel was now greatly aided by an array of new bridges and tunnels operated by the Port Authority; and this bi-state enterprise had become, as Archibald Macleish observed in 1933, “one of the most interesting and potentially one of the most formidable political agencies America has yet produced.”57 The steps by which the Port agency achieved that distinctive position have been touched on in this chapter, but the turns and twists of its early automotive ventures deserve a larger place in this analysis of the Port Authority’s complex history.
6 Politics and Engineering Passion Expanding the Port Authority’s Dreams
The giant project for which I have been sacrificing time and money for the past three years, today lies in ruins. In vain, I as well as others have been fighting against the unlimited ambition of a genius who is obsessed with illusions of grandeur. . . . However, I have gained a rich experience and have decided to build anew on the ruins with fresh hope and courage—and, at that, on my own initiative and with my own plans. . . . —O. H. Ammann, letter to R. L. Ammann, Dec. 14, 1923
W
here rational planning yoked to an old technology could not succeed for the Port of New York Authority, the march of technological change—salted with individual ambition and great entrepreneurial skills— might give new life to that struggling babe. And so they did, in a pattern of causal linkages that was as complex as the slow winding down of the railroad waltz examined in the last chapter. In a pattern whose main lines of influence were not clearly visible, so that they were soon lost from historical sight. Then, as I noted in chapter 5, the story of the 1920s would be reduced to a simpler tale, whose main elements are captured and endorsed in Carl Condit’s authoritative work on the Port of New York. The Port Authority commissioners, he writes, “quickly lost interest in the railroads and turned to the construction of trans-harbor arteries for automotive vehicles, which offered an immediate, abundant, and ever increasing revenue from tunnel and bridge tolls.”1 That story omits much that was important in the Port Authority’s history. In the last chapter, we saw how reluctant the Port Authority was to abandon its Comprehensive Plan and the range of economic-development benefits it saw as linked to improvements in rail transport in the New York region. We also caught glimpses of the Port agency’s interest in other areas—commuter rail projects, automotive spans to Staten Island, and a bridge over the Hudson at 179th Street. In this chapter we explore in more depth the process 120
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through which the Port Authority came to embrace the automotive age during the 1920s. Here a major role must be given to an outsider—Othmar Ammann—whose vision of the New York region and its transportation needs was crucially linked to individual aspirations, distinctive engineering talents, and political skills of unexpected dimension. Without Ammann, the Port Authority might in time have built and operated a series of bridges and tunnels across the Hudson River. However, it might instead have drifted into a secondary role. Its Staten Island bridges would turn out to be money-losers, providing no financial base for wider entrepreneurial reach, while the bi-state commissions, which were constructing the Holland Tunnel and would achieve great financial success once it opened in 1927, might have seemed the more successful enterprise. They might then have taken charge when the next tunnel, to midtown Manhattan, was considered a few years later. So the Port Authority would have been left to expand its developing career as a research and advisory body on regional transport needs, and as defender of the region’s interests at ICC rate hearings. Had those events occurred, it is not clear whether any government agency with the independence, financial strength, and political savvy to take control of the region’s airports and major seaport terminals would ever have emerged. Instead, the New York region might have gone the way of the San Francisco Bay Area, where separate authorities operate competing airports and marine terminals, and where internecine warfare and inefficiency in port and air terminal programs have been in ready supply.2 Using Ammann’s political, engineering, and administrative talents, the Port Authority was able to outperform the Holland Tunnel commissioners, and to make a plausible case that its distinctive political design, as an independent authority in control of its own revenue, was crucial to its success. By 1931 the bi-state agency had taken charge of the Holland crossing and its growing toll revenues, and it was then asked to plan the Lincoln Tunnel. Now the Port agency was regarded as a premier example of the advantages promised by the Progressive doctrine of independence, expertise, and entrepreneurial energy.3 With its reputation thus made, the Port Authority could expect that its regional vision and its planning skills would become steadily more influential in shaping transport improvements and economic development plans across the bi-state metropolis. Moreover, the Port agency would control all future profits from the Holland, the George Washington Bridge, and the Lincoln; and in time its officials would realize that those funds might be invested in airports and other new enterprises—so that the Port Authority
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could serve as a wide-ranging and flexible engine of economic growth throughout the New York region. Although Ammann was a pivotal contributor to this array of happenings, he did not, of course, act alone. An alliance with New Jersey governor George Silzer was crucial in persuading the Port Authority to take on vehicular projects. The attitude of Governor Alfred E. Smith was also important, especially on the question of whether private corporations would be able to build competing tunnels under the Hudson. At the Port Authority, Julius Henry Cohen and the chief engineer, W. W. Drinker, contributed modestly in the early stages; and toward the end of the decade Cohen again displayed his considerable tactical skills to bring the lucrative Holland Tunnel under the Port Authority’s wing. Civic boosters and developers in northern New Jersey also pressed for action at critical points, and their efforts helped to tip the balance toward the Port agency. And Gustav Lindenthal, once Ammann’s mentor and later his antagonist, played a part as well. But the central figure in the revolution at the Port Authority was Ammann; and we need to begin with him, many years before there was a Port Authority.4
Origins of an Entrepreneur Othmar Ammann was born in 1879 in Switzerland. In 1902 he graduated from the Polytechnic Institute in Zurich, where he studied with Wilhelm Ritter, a distinguished engineering teacher. Ammann worked as a structural draftsman in Europe for two years and then, at the urging of one of his former professors, left for America.5 Arriving in New York in the spring of 1904, Ammann found employment with a local engineering company. During the next several years he worked as an engineer in Manhattan, Chicago, and Pennsylvania, and he worked on several major bridges, including the Queensboro in New York City. The possibility of a bridge across the Hudson also attracted his early attention.6 In 1912 Ammann joined the firm of Gustav Lindenthal, the well known railroad-bridge engineer, and Lindenthal soon appointed him as his chief aide in work on the Hell Gate Bridge. Much of Ammann’s time during the years 1912–1917 was devoted to the Hell Gate, where he was in charge of all office and field operations, supervising a large team of engineers.7 After the Hell Gate Bridge was completed in early 1917, Lindenthal had very little engineering work to occupy his staff. He suggested that Ammann
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take a temporary position managing a pottery mine in which Lindenthal had invested, the Such Clay Pottery Company in Middlesex County, New Jersey. With his managerial skills, Ammann was able to turn a shaky financial enterprise into a healthy firm, earning a modest profit for Lindenthal and other investors. Then, in 1920, Lindenthal called him back to assist in developing plans for his proposed Hudson River span, which would carry railroad trains across the River and land them in Manhattan at 57th Street.
Lindenthal’s Great Bridge This railroad plan had its origins in the 1880s, when Lindenthal, recently arrived in New York, proposed that a massive bridge be constructed over the Hudson from Hoboken to 23rd Street.8 The span would carry ten railroad tracks, enough to allow all the New Jersey lines to cross the Hudson at that point; once in Manhattan, their passengers and cargo could be distributed throughout the central business area and beyond, into Brooklyn and points to the east and north. The Pennsylvania Railroad was strongly interested; that rail line carried thousands of rail passengers bound for Manhattan each day, and at New Jersey’s Hudson shore, they had to transfer to ferries to complete the trip to New York. In 1890 Lindenthal’s company obtained the approval of the federal government to construct a span over the Hudson. The Pennsylvania then tried to work out arrangements with the other railroads, with a view to sharing the costs of the new crossing. Finding them unwilling to cooperate, the Pennsylvania then embarked on a less expensive project that would fit its own passenger needs, and in 1910 it completed a tunnel which brought its New Jersey trains under the Hudson to a new passenger terminal at 33rd Street. Lindenthal never lost his interest in spanning the Hudson, however, and with the Hell Gate completed and World War I at an end, he began to develop new plans for the great crossing. Now, in 1920, he moved it uptown, to cross the Hudson at 57th Street. He then brought in Ammann as his principal assistant, and, noting the increasing importance of automobiles and trucks, he redesigned the bridge to carry rubber-tired vehicles as well as rail traffic. By the early spring of 1921, Lindenthal was able to display his new scheme: A Hudson River bridge at 57th Street which would be 6,600 feet in total length, with a central span across the Hudson of 3,240 feet—more than twice the length of any bridge span yet constructed. One bridge deck would carry ten railroad tracks, and a second deck, above it, would have four rapidtransit tracks and 16 lanes for automotive traffic. The bridge would cost 100
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million dollars, and the entire project might total $210 million. As the Scientific American noted with admiration, this “vast bridge . . . could easily take care of the whole of the traffic which surges to and fro between Manhattan and the mainland.”9 Not only would the new bridge take care of all the traffic, it would do so at a profit, Lindenthal argued, on the basis of an estimated traffic and a toll structure that would generate revenues of $45 million or more each year. Consequently, the entire project could be accomplished without burdening the taxpayer; his North River Bridge Company, a private corporation which had held a federal charter for a Hudson bridge since the 1880s, would raise the needed moneys from the capital market. It was this environment—of a marvelous engineering project, to be carried out under one of the world’s premier bridge designers, in an atmosphere of optimism—that enveloped Ammann in his early months of work. As he wrote to his mother in Switzerland early in 1921, just after the Scientific American article appeared, “The new project brings me great satisfaction, it is a great noble structure, and . . . the concept and modeling of the project demand intense attention and work . . . . The towers will be as high as the tallest skyscraper in New York.”10 The Lindenthal plan soon faced important hurdles, however. One of the earliest was the attitude of the Port Authority. As Lindenthal, Ammann, and their staff were completing the general plans for the 57th Street bridge, the bi-state Study Commission issued its final report, in January 1921, recommending the creation of the Port Authority. In the same report, the Commission outlined a preliminary physical plan to solve the region’s freight transport problem—an approach that emphasized the need for rail tunnels from New Jersey under the Hudson to Manhattan and under New York Bay to Brooklyn. In its essentials, the Commission’s scheme would soon be adopted as the Port Authority’s Comprehensive Plan. Lindenthal quickly recognized that his 57th Street Bridge and the railtunnel plan were in direct competition, for both were concerned with the crucial problem of transporting freight more efficiently between New York City and the rest of the continent. Soon after the Study Commission released its final report, Lindenthal attacked its proposals, arguing that it was unwise to rely on tunnels to handle freight, since tunnel size would limit the ability of rail cars to transport coal and bulky machinery to the New York side of the region. He also pointed out that the Commission’s plan was aimed only at the freight side of the issue—disregarding the pressing need for better passenger service.11
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Once the Port Authority had been created, in April, it reviewed the Lindenthal arguments but, as noted in chapter 4, the bi-state agency was not persuaded. With the potential advantages of the Lindenthal plan came great disadvantages. A bridge with many lanes that exited at 57th Street would add thousands of cars a day to Manhattan traffic congestion; also, a number of buildings would have to be torn down to make way for the passenger railroad terminal, which Lindenthal’s plan required, and for the freight line from 57th Street south to the Battery. Because of these problems, business leaders in New York City strongly opposed the scheme. In December 1921, the Port Authority rejected Lindenthal’s bridge and embraced the Comprehensive Plan, with its reliance on rail tunnels and belt lines. Lindenthal fought on in 1922, urging that business leaders adopt his approach, and asking the rail corporations to agree to use his new bridge— commitments that were crucial if it were to have any prospect of financial success. He also met with potential investors in an attempt to raise the funds needed to get the bridge started. Meanwhile, Ammann and his small staff continued to work on design issues associated with the project.
Ammann’s Divergent Views, and Conflict By the fall of 1922, Lindenthal had made little progress, his financial situation was very rocky, and his company could afford to pay Ammann only part of his monthly wages. Now the close alliance between Lindenthal and his chief aide began to sunder; and it soon became clear that their underlying values and their world-views were quite different. The two men shared the enthusiasm for the great project that Lindenthal had created in his mind and on paper. For both were civil engineers on a grand scale—bridge-builders who came from Europe to the United States because the young nation had the vast expanse, the wide rivers and deep ravines, that could provide challenges to skilled engineers for years to come. Moreover, America had the commercial vitality and urge for mobility that would require large bridges to be cast across the East River, the Hudson, the Mississippi and other waterways; and she had the wealth to ensure that vast resources—great amounts of manpower and materiel—could be gathered and orchestrated and used according to the designs of imaginative engineers. More generally, the nation which in the nineteenth century had built the Erie Canal and the transcontinental railway seemed imbued with a philosophy about planning and building that fit the hopes and aspirations of these two engineers and thousands of their compatriots. The planner Daniel Burn-
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ham expressed the basic American value that attracted Lindenthal and Ammann from their home countries: Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men’s blood. . . . Make big plans; aim high in hope and work, remembering that a noble logical diagram once recorded will never die. . . . Remember that our sons and grandsons are going to do things that would stagger us. Let your watchword be order and your beacon beauty.12
To Lindenthal, there was no alternative to the massive and expensive project he had proposed. Neither tunnels under the Hudson, nor bridges farther up-river, nor a bridge limited to motor vehicles (and therefore much cheaper than a bridge with huge girders to carry railroad trains) could possibly meet the need for improved transportation between Manhattan and the western regions. Moreover, Lindenthal had been New York City’s bridge commissioner in the first years of the twentieth century, and there he had had a taste of engineering work in a government agency; he was strongly averse to relying on that political and conflict-filled route. The rational working environment, the corporate sponsorship, the freedom to design, and the international acclaim accompanying his Hell Gate project—these had demonstrated the right way to do it. In Lindenthal’s mind, insulation and professional integrity were crucial; and the engineer could be relied upon to work out the best way to meet the collateral goals all great engineering projects must achieve—principles of economy in construction, the aesthetic quality of the project itself, and an understanding of how the project would fit into the broader patterns of economic and social relationships within the metropolis.13 Ammann’s perspective was different. Lindenthal’s great bridge, in its original dimensions, would be wonderful. To Ammann, however, the substantive arguments and the political strength of those opposed to a project deserved the same steely-eyed analysis that a good engineer devoted to understanding the stresses on bridge cables and the stability of the ground under proposed bridge towers. If influential opponents thought the bridge too large, or badly located, Ammann could draw on his engineering experience and perhaps find ways to modify the plan, rather than let it go down to defeat. And as to the financing problem, private funding would be welcomed, since that would reduce the chances of the project becoming mired in the uncertainties of politics. But if private investors could not be
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attracted, then a great bridge sponsored and financed by government was better than no bridge at all. Nor did it make sense, in Ammann’s view, to wait patiently until the public demand for a bridge across the Hudson was overwhelming, for that time might never come. Instead of a magnificent bridge over the Hudson, the next decade might see a series of vehicular tunnels burrowed into the River mud. That danger was real, Ammann could see, for by 1922 the Holland Tunnel commissioners were beginning to suggest that they might construct additional tunnels—possibly one at 40th Street in Manhattan, another at 125th Street, and several in between. On the issues of location, type of bridge, sponsorship, and financing, Ammann was a pragmatist. His main goal was to bridge the Hudson. Of course he had the psychological advantage, in thinking about alternative ways to achieve this goal, that the original design was not his plan; Lindenthal had been working on a railroad bridge which would cross the Hudson to the Manhattan business district since 1888—for more than 30 years. And Ammann was a mere 42, nearly 30 years younger than his boss; possibly youth also encouraged greater flexibility. Perhaps most important, however, Ammann—in contrast to Lindenthal— could encompass political obstacles, and strategies to overcome them, within the analytic framework of his engineering mind. Any good engineer knew, for example, that you had to design your bridge in relation to the character of the terrain where the towers would sit. Therefore, if preliminary studies suggested the tower footing would be solid rock, while closer exploration revealed softer ground, adjustments and even major redesigns would then be necessary; and sometimes long weeks and months of arduous work would be needed to solve the problem and ensure that the towers and the bridge would hold. Moreover, bridge engineering was not an armchair activity; you had to go into the field continuously, marshal and motivate your workers, and modify your preliminary designs as the land and the weather and the impact of human mischance required. So too, close exploration of the political terrain associated with any large project was essential; and this might require meeting with local politicians and business people and interested citizens, in towns and county courthouses across the region, in order to work through the proper combination of engineering, aesthetic, and political designs. When Ammann pondered the problems that confronted Lindenthal and the 57th Street bridge in the fall of 1922, he concluded that the size and cost
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of the proposed bridge should be sharply reduced. If the bridge were limited to motor vehicles and light rail transit, the heavy, expensive structure needed for freight trains could be replaced by a lighter span, at much lower cost— and private investors might well be attracted to invest in a moderate-cost toll bridge for vehicles. Also, if influential citizens opposed a bridge at 57th Street, why not build it farther north, away from the congested midtown area? Once that crossing proved successful, a bridge at 57th Street might also receive wide support. During the fall and winter of 1922, Ammann urged Lindenthal to reduce the size of the 57th Street project, and to consider shifting his short-term goal to a bridge limited to autos, trucks, and light rail transit, which would cross the Hudson several miles north of the midtown area. But Lindenthal thought a crossing that far from the main business district would not attract sufficient vehicular traffic; moreover, rail freight also needed better access to New York, and only a combined railroad/motor vehicle bridge could bring freight and passengers to mid-Manhattan with marvelous efficiency. To Lindenthal, the 57th Street project was the only satisfactory way to solve the intertwined problems of freight and passengers—at one stroke joining New York City’s vast economic strength with the economies of New Jersey and the rest of the continent. As 1922 drew to a close, it seemed evident to Ammann that he would have to take some initiative on his own. His diaries and other writings during these months do not provide clear evidence that he was deeply distressed, and his letters to his relatives are guarded. But a year later, Ammann expressed his feelings on Lindenthal, the 57th Street Bridge, and the possibilities for a brighter future, in a frank letter to his mother: In order for you to understand my situation for many months, in fact for a whole year, I will no longer conceal from you that the giant project for which I have been sacrificing time and money for the past three years, today lies in ruins. In vain, I as well as others have been fighting against the unlimited ambition of a genius who is obsessed with illusions of grandeur. He has the power in his hands and refuses to bring moderation into his gigantic plans. Instead, his illusions lead him to enlarge his plans more and more, until he has reached the unheard of sum of half a billion dollars—an impossibility even in America. However, I have gained a rich experience and have decided to build anew on the ruins with fresh hope and courage—and, at that, on my own initiative and with my own plans, on a more moderate scale. It is a hard battle. . . .14
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But if Ammann felt compelled to strike out on a different course at the end of 1922, perhaps breaking free of Lindenthal, he would need to forge a new alliance which could help him achieve his goal. And this brought him to George S. Silzer.
The Alliance In November 1922, George Silzer, Democrat from Middlesex County, was elected Governor of New Jersey. He would serve as the state’s chief executive from January 1923 until January 1926, with the state legislature controlled by the Republicans throughout those years. Silzer was an activist in his philosophy of government, a Wilsonian Democrat. Indeed Silzer had been a state senator and one of Woodrow Wilson’s chief supporters in the legislature when Wilson was governor in 1911–13. One of Silzer’s strongest interests before and during his years in the state house was the improvement of highway transportation; he viewed this goal as crucial to the state’s economic growth. Thus he supported extensive road-building programs, as well as bridges connecting his own Middlesex County to nearby Staten Island.15 Consistent with his reputation as a Wilson Democrat, Silzer denounced the patronage traditions and inefficiencies of the existing county highway agencies, he created a new state highway body to devise an efficient road system, and he urged “scientific planning” in all areas of state government. Silzer could see the economic advantages that would flow to northern New Jersey if transportation to New York City were improved, and he could see the advantage to his own political prospects that might follow if a bridge across the Hudson, with its stimulus to development, were commenced during his term in office. So Silzer might be in a receptive mood if a feasible plan to dissolve the Hudson barrier were laid before him. Silzer’s victory in the 1922 election provided Ammann with just the opportunity he needed, as he tried to extricate himself from Lindenthal’s fixation. Ammann was already acquainted with the new governor, because Silzer had been an investor in the Such Clay Pottery Company, where Ammann had served as manager in 1917–20. Moreover, it seems clear that Silzer’s attention had been drawn to the challenge of bridging the Hudson through discussions with Lindenthal, another Such Clay investor, regarding the 57th Street span.16 At some point in the weeks before Silzer took office in mid-January, Ammann talked with him about the need for a Hudson River crossing, the eco-
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nomic and political problems that surrounded the Lindenthal bridge, and the advantages of a bridge farther north, joining vast and rural Bergen County to the urbanized New York shore. A northern crossing could be limited to motor vehicles and light trolleys, which meant that its cost would be far less than the Lindenthal colossus. Ammann had studied various sites, and he preferred a bridge that swept from the Palisades cliffs, in the town of Fort Lee, across the River to 179th Street in Manhattan.17 We have no direct account of the views Silzer expressed at this meeting, but as we will see below, later evidence clearly indicates that he was enthusiastic about Ammann’s proposed bridge, and that he hoped it might be financed by private capital. Moreover, Silzer was wary of the alternative “low cost” way to overcome the Hudson barrier—a series of tunnels under the Hudson.18 If a Fort Lee bridge was a promising idea, what role should Silzer take in advancing the cause? Silzer was a Democrat, and the area of his state that would be most directly affected by a new bridge at Ammann’s preferred location was Bergen County, a major Republican stronghold. Silzer and his party were not much loved in that northern suburban area, nor in the state legislature, which was also controlled by the party of Lincoln. If he hitched his political future in a public and sustained way to a campaign to build a great Hudson bridge, neither would be likely to benefit. It would be better for Silzer to leave the visible organizing efforts to community interests in northern New Jersey and New York; local business and political leaders would probably mount a vigorous campaign once Ammann had demonstrated the engineering and economic feasibility of the great design.19 However, Silzer could offer guidance on how Ammann and others interested in the Fort Lee bridge might gain local support. Also, he could contact leaders in the financial community confidentially, in the hope that private capital might be attracted to the scheme; and he could approach the recently created Port of New York Authority to ask if it would endorse such a bridge as consistent with its general goals.20 The major burden, then, fell to Ammann, and as the new year opened he faced a difficult task. He would need to develop local interest in his Fort Lee bridge—within the communities of Bergen County and nearby Passaic County, and across the River, in northern Manhattan and The Bronx, and perhaps further north in Westchester and southwestern Connecticut. Indeed, he would need to persuade local business leaders and elected officials not only that his bridge was an interesting idea, but that it was the best solution for the near future—better for the communities and for the economic
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growth of the region than the alternatives, which were already being actively discussed. Two of these alternatives—underwater tunnels at 110th Street and at 125th Street—also promised economic benefits for Bergen and Passaic, and for New York City; moreover, a private association had already been created to press for the 125th Street tunnel, and editors at Bergen’s major daily newspaper, The Bergen Record, were supporting that plan.21 Then there was the 57th Street Bridge. Ammann had not yet broken with Lindenthal. He still hoped the great man might be persuaded to join forces with Silzer and Ammann, and perhaps take a leading role in attracting the private capital and political support needed for the Fort Lee plan. But if Lindenthal stood firm, the prominent civic leaders and investors who had joined his board of directors would probably stand with him; and while that combined force might never produce a real bridge at 57th Street, its opposition might doom Ammann’s uptown scheme. How best to proceed? For Ammann, the answer came in three parts: He would need to sketch out a bridge design that was so dramatic, so arresting, that it would claim the attention and approval of the attentive publics of northern New Jersey and New York. And he would need to work out the probable cost for the bridge, so that it would strike a chord as financially feasible—in contrast to Lindenthal’s expensive scheme. Then he would need to take this design, and his ideas on how the bridge would benefit the region, directly to public officials and local groups on both sides of the Hudson. The first two steps were, for Ammann, comparatively easy. Trained in the great Swiss tradition, and apprenticed with Lindenthal, Ammann’s developed engineering skills were matched with considerable aesthetic instincts. And he had many years’ experience, with Lindenthal and earlier, in working out the detailed costs associated with bridges large and small.22 Ammann’s study of the problem led him to conclude that it would be possible to construct a bridge over the Hudson at 179th Street with a center span as wide as the entire River, even though such a span would nearly double the length of any bridge span yet constructed. That feat would permit Ammann to overcome a major obstacle to bridges across the lower Hudson—the concern that bridge piers would have to be placed in the River itself, providing a hazard to navigation and thus prompting a veto by the national government.23 Moreover, Ammann’s years of training and analysis led him to conclude that bridges with very long spans might carry sufficient deadweight to make extensive trusses unnecessary. Ammann’s own careful analysis supported this intuition, and he was then able to design a bridge which was strikingly light
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in appearance, and which carried a cost estimate proportionately lower than other long-span bridges.24 In addition, the expanding use of automobiles and trucks across the New York region—exemplified by long lines of vehicles waiting to use trans-Hudson ferries between Bergen and northern Manhattan—suggested to Ammann that traffic across a bridge at that location might, if a toll charge were levied, make the project financially self-supporting. The third step—knocking on doors, trying to convince skeptical and preoccupied local officials, newspaper reporters, and shopkeepers to embrace his scheme—that was a different story. Ammann had confidence in his professional abilities, and in the value of a great bridge at Fort Lee. But he was a modest man, and one who did not talk easily of his interests and his passions, especially when those interests would be linked to advancing his own career.25 However, in order to make any headway in developing public support for a bridge between Fort Lee and 179th Street, Ammann would have to break through his natural reticence and champion his own plan—until a civic organization could be formed to take the leading role in this public relations effort. This third step would also mean that Ammann would have to break formally with Lindenthal—unless he could convince Lindenthal to join him— so that Ammann could campaign openly for the uptown bridge. In the short run, this break would almost certainly mean that Ammann would have to join the ranks of the unemployed: to carry out the engineering studies for the Fort Lee crossing, and to campaign for approval, would absorb almost all his waking hours. There would be no time available to work on other projects with another engineering firm. In addition to these three dimensions of the campaign, he and Governor Silzer would have to find an operating organization which could take Ammann’s designs, raise the funds needed, and actually build the bridge. If Lindenthal were to change his views, his North River Bridge Company could do the job. Otherwise, Ammann and Silzer would need to explore ways of creating a separate private corporation, or alternatively of identifying a governmental agency that might undertake the complex project.
Into the Political Arena In the first months of 1923, the two men began their joint campaign. It was an effort that would extend through the next two years, with the engineer taking the lead. Ammann frequently spent his days in the political trenches, his
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nights bent over engineering drawings and calculations.26 Silzer was absorbed largely in other policy issues, accompanied by recurring political battles with an unfriendly state legislature; but he provided constant encouragement to Ammann and occasional guidance on political strategies. At several important points he also intervened directly to promote Ammann’s interests, which he made essentially his own. On January 9, Ammann reported to Silzer that he had met with the governing board of Bergen County, and that their initial reaction was to support “the bridge at Fort Lee.” They also agreed with Silzer’s view that no new vehicular tunnels under the Hudson should be constructed until the Holland Tunnel was in operation.27 A week later, Silzer was sworn in as Governor, and in his inaugural address, he referred to the great advantages of northern New Jersey: “It is especially attractive to those who find the congestion of New York City unbearable, and who seek to live in a section at once high, healthy and accessible.” But this high and healthy land was not really accessible, Silzer pointed out, especially to motor vehicles, which had to wait for hours to cross the Hudson by ferry. It was now time, Silzer argued, to give close consideration to building a bridge across the Hudson, a bridge “of ample size to care for vehicular and passenger travel, and for railroad terminal service.”28 During the next few months, Ammann met with several local groups in New Jersey, described his idea for a great span at Fort Lee, and received some encouragement; but no one offered to take on the major task of organizing support across the counties that would benefit from the crossing. Meanwhile, Silzer contacted Dwight Morrow, a Wall Street expert, for his view on whether Lindenthal’s bridge could be built with private capital; Morrow’s response, sent to Silzer on March 2, was decidedly pessimistic. And Ammann, noting that there was still much concern in Manhattan regarding traffic congestion that would be generated by a midtown bridge, and that the cost of the 57th Street Bridge was a major obstacle, urged Lindenthal to cut down the size of the bridge and move it northward. But Lindenthal was adamant, and by the end of March, Ammann had left his firm.29 Through the spring and summer of 1923, Ammann made little progress in gaining support for his own bridge. The possibility of a vehicular tunnel at 110th Street or at 125th Street, financed by investors, appeared to be of greater interest in the Bergen area, and that enterprise would almost certainly kill any prospects for a Fort Lee bridge. Other investors began to look at 40th Street as a possible site for private undertakings. However, during these months the tunnel investors, and their supporters in the New Jersey legisla-
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ture, found that they faced triple-barreled opposition—from the Port Authority, and from the chief executives of both states. The Port agency wrote to the governors, pointing out that its Comprehensive Plan included a set of tunnel projects, and it argued that no interstate crossings should be undertaken unless they were consistent with its program, which had the approval of the state legislatures. Both governors were sympathetic to the Port Authority’s position and vetoed the private-tunnel bills. At the time, Silzer was willing to consider private financing, but not of a tunnel which would undermine prospects for a bridge at Fort Lee.30 Smith, however, was adamantly opposed to having private corporations build and control any major highway arteries across the Hudson. He was also skeptical of relying on the existing interstate commissions, for they would need an infusion of state funds to construct additional tunnels. Smith’s clear preference was to place the development of all interstate crossings for motor vehicles as well as railroads entirely in the hands of the Port of New York Authority, which was authorized to use toll revenues to pay for its own projects—potentially sparing Al Smith and other state officials from the political burden of raising tax revenues for these expensive bridge and tunnel projects. By August, he had persuaded Governor Silzer to join him in issuing a statement which endorsed “the construction . . . of additional vehicular tunnels or bridges between the [two states] to be determined upon, constructed and financed by the Port Authority.”31 Smith’s views were important, but they could not be determinative. The Port Authority could assume these wider duties only if New York and New Jersey agreed jointly on new legislation; but there was strong sentiment in the Republican-dominated legislatures in both states to rely on the tunnel commissions or on private ventures, while Silzer continued to explore the privatefunding option. Through 1923 and perhaps well into 1924 the Port Authority’s own staff did not appear much interested in adding vehicular bridges to its duties. During most of this period, it was reasonable to foresee that the Holland Tunnel would be followed by a series of other tunnels under the Hudson built by the joint commissions, possibly with one or two others financed by private investors.32
The Port Authority Redefines Its Goals Concerned about the possibility that private tunnels uncoordinated with its own plans might be approved, and aware also of the governors’ August state-
6-1. Crossing the Hudson by motor vehicle: bridges and tunnels proposed during the early 1920s—tunnels at 40th, 110th and 125th Streets, bridges at 57th and 179th. The Holland Tunnel between Jersey City and Canal Street, underway since 1919, is also shown.
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ment, the Port Authority’s commissioners decided in November 1923 to hold a public hearing on “the proposed additional vehicular tunnels.” Now Governor Silzer and his bridge-building adviser saw an opportunity to enlist the Port Authority in their own campaign. The Port commissioners and staff had viewed their concern mainly in terms of tunnels for rail freight. But bridges as well as tunnels were plausibly within their domain; and though they thought mainly about railroads, they also had some interest in freight movement by truck—and trucks, of course, could travel on bridges as well as in tunnels . . . . On November 20, George Silzer met with Julian Gregory, an influential member of the Port Authority board of commissioners, and argued that it would be unwise for the Authority’s hearing to be limited to tunnels. That restriction, Silzer argued, “might be construed as limiting him [the governor], and the Port Authority, exclusively to tunnels,” whereas he was “open-minded to any bridge proposition that might come forward.” Indeed, the governor told Gregory, “he understood there was a strong sentiment on the part of some in favor of a bridge across the Hudson River.” At the Board meeting the next day, Gregory summarized Silzer’s views and suggested that the December hearing be expanded to include the question of bridges across the Hudson as well as tunnels—and the Port Authority board agreed.33 The Port Authority’s hearing was scheduled for December 5, and during the intervening weeks Ammann worked furiously to strengthen the analytical case for a bridge at Fort Lee. His calculations indicated that a single-span bridge at that location would cost no more than $30 million—in contrast to several hundred million for the Lindenthal project. Moreover, the immediate cost could be reduced to $25 million, if the electric railway tracks he had included in the design were deferred until later. On the basis of existing ferry traffic and studies by the recently formed Committee on the Regional Plan, Ammann then estimated that three million vehicles would use the Fort Lee bridge in the first year—enough to meet all annual charges, if a reasonable toll were levied. Assuming continued increases (“in a few years the traffic should treble,” he told Silzer), capital costs could also be paid off, and the bridge would surely become self-supporting.34 He then suggested to Silzer that they talk with “some of the prominent bankers” to see if private investors might be willing to underwrite such a bridge, and Silzer sent Ammann to confer with Dwight Morrow of the J. P. Morgan firm. Meeting in early December, Morrow and Ammann agreed that the bridge might well be self-supporting, but Morrow doubted that adequate private capital could be attracted; both wrote to Silzer to recommend
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that public funds be used—either state moneys, or bonds floated by the Port of New York Authority. The Port Authority’s public hearing strengthened Ammann’s position. Most speakers agreed that more vehicular crossings of the Hudson were needed; and while there was support for new tunnels below 57th Street, the prestigious Committee on the Regional Plan and other speakers argued for a bridge farther north. The crucial question was, who would take responsibility for such a bridge, and here Ammann’s own views were clear. “The most practicable way” to proceed, he wrote to Silzer the day after the hearing, would be to have the Port Authority take on the challenge—which would also allow that agency (so far with no construction or operating projects at all)—to “test its working ability.” Therefore, he urged Silzer to place Ammann’s Fort Lee plan “at the earliest possible moment before the Port Authority.” A few days later, the two men talked by telephone, and Ammann suggested that the Port agency should be asked to make definitive studies not only of the Fort Lee plan but also of other interstate crossings that had been proposed—bridges from Perth Amboy and Bayonne to Staten Island, for example, and a scaled-down version of the 57th Street span. If the Port Authority were to conduct such studies, Ammann noted, it would need an expert bridge engineer, and “I shall be frank in stating that I should be glad to occupy such a position.”35 Ammann and Silzer had agreed that Ammann would put together an extensive report on the Fort Lee project—covering technical engineering issues, traffic projections, financing questions, and probable impact of the bridge on regional development—and on December 17, Ammann’s 22-page analysis reached Silzer’s desk. That afternoon the governor forwarded the report to the Port Authority, with a letter from Ammann which concluded that the Fort Lee bridge could be paid for in 20 years. Silzer also released a public statement on his actions, noting that the Ammann plan was consistent with his own 1923 inaugural statement on the need for more Hudson crossings, and suggesting that the Port Authority could finance the Fort Lee bridge by issuing taxexempt bonds—with “ample security” provided by tolls on the bridge. The governor’s efforts for the day had not yet ended. He also wrote a private letter to Commissioner Julian Gregory at the Port Authority, suggesting that, in carrying out its studies of the various bridge plans, the Authority might want to secure the services of “such a man as Mr. Ammann, who is thoroughly skilled in this kind of work.”36 Gregory responded quickly, expressing his personal preference for bridging the Hudson at some point north of 125th Street. He also noted that Port
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Authority officials were now considering whether they should devote some attention to the role of trucks in moving freight in the region, and therefore to the need for vehicular tunnels and bridges. The Authority’s staff then reviewed Ammann’s report and on December 21, 1923, the Commissioners reported to the two governors that they would carry out a detailed study of the Fort Lee plan. Perhaps the Port Authority would now join Ammann in embracing the new automotive age!37 Ammann’s efforts were beginning to bear fruit. But the events thus far brought a measure of pain as well as pleasure. Most hurtful was the behavior of Lindenthal. Silzer had sent him a personal copy of Ammann’s detailed report on the Fort Lee plan, and on December 20 he responded with a letter to the governor, alleging that Ammann had stolen Lindenthal’s own ideas, and condemning his former associate for unethical behavior.38 Meanwhile, since the Port Authority had now agreed to make a close study of Ammann’s proposal, he waited for a call to join the Authority’s staff—and take part in that study—but in vain. Christmas came, and went, and Ammann was still an unemployed engineer.
On the Campaign Trail Unemployed, but with much to do. The Port Authority would study his Fort Lee plan and, he hoped, find that his engineering design and his analysis of costs, traffic flows, and financing were sound. But Ammann knew that the bistate agency—created to solve railroad problems, and staffed by railway engineers and statisticians—would be far more likely to take the next step and agree to build the great bridge if it found a groundswell of popular support for Ammann’s 3500-foot span. Moreover, legislative approval and initial state funding would be needed to get the project underway; here again, Trenton and Albany would be more willing to commit their funds and the Port Authority’s efforts to this project, if local groups in the nearby counties demanded action, for a bridge that “the public” felt was sorely needed. However, by the fall of 1923, the local terrain had become more complex, for a group of Bergen citizens had formed an association to lobby for Lindenthal’s 57th Street bridge.39 So Ammann once again threw his energies into the effort to organize popular support for the Fort Lee enterprise. Between late December and April 1924, he held dozens of meetings with chambers of commerce and other groups in Bergen and nearby Passaic and Morris counties in New Jersey; he wrote to and visited similar associations in The Bronx, Harlem, Washington
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Heights, Westchester, and Yonkers in New York State; and he traveled into Connecticut and explained his arguments for the Fort Lee Bridge before the Civil Engineering Society of that state. By December, Ammann had developed working sketches of the proposed bridge—with its thin, graceful roadway, and its great towers, which would be vast metal structures, sheathed in monumental stone. And now, when he spoke, Ammann could show his audiences some visual hint of his own deep motivations, which lay beyond engineering technique, beyond matters of practicality. It was true that the bridge would be a major engineering achievement; moreover, it would have a great impact on the efficiency of travel across a wide region, and so it would provide real benefits for residential choice, and recreation, and economic growth. But a vast structure like this could also be—should also be—a work of art, and here was a large part of Ammann’s incentive as he worked, without pay, to design and encourage the building of the Fort Lee Bridge. Years before, reflecting on the Hell Gate crossing, a monument to Lindenthal’s own aesthetic imagination and engineering skill, Ammann had argued that a great bridge in a great city, although primarily utilitarian in its purpose, should nevertheless be a work of art to which Science lends its aid. An elaborate stress sheet, worked out on a purely economic and scientific basis, does not make a great bridge. It is only with a broad sense for beauty and harmony, coupled with wide experience in the scientific field, that a monumental bridge can be created.40
Now he might have the opportunity to create such a bridge, if the public and the state legislatures would approve it—and if some other engineer, of “greater reputation,” were not chosen! By the first months of 1924, Ammann’s campaign had sparked enough interest in Bergen County that its influential state senator, William Mackay, was impressed. In March, meeting with Ammann, Mackay said he would champion legislation authorizing the Port Authority to construct a bridge at Fort Lee, as well as smaller spans between Staten Island and New Jersey. During the spring of 1924, the New Jersey legislature took the first bite, endorsing Port Authority surveys and construction of two Staten Island bridges, and New York State approved similar legislation. Soon after, Governor Silzer sent a brief note to the Port Authority’s general counsel, Julius Henry Cohen: “It has just occurred to me, in connection with the two bridges over
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Staten Island and your other bridge work, that the Port Authority ought to avail itself of the services of Mr. O. H. Ammann. . . . I understand that just at the moment he is available. . . .”41 Just at the moment, and for more than a year now. But still the Port Authority did not call. Although Ammann was willing to continue his organizing efforts, he had hoped that the various local groups might form a citizens’ association to press for the bridge project. In April, the Englewood Board of Trade and other business groups in the Fort Lee area seemed ready to create such an organization to coordinate efforts throughout northern New Jersey. Ammann then took his case across the River and was gratified when, early in May, the Harlem Board of Commerce—which had been a strong supporter of a tunnel at 125th Street—shifted its position and unanimously endorsed the Ammann Bridge. Back in New Jersey, Ammann met with a committee of northern New Jersey mayors formed to press for action on the Bridge, and he drafted a strategic plan which the committee could use in gathering further support.42 Unfortunately, neither the business associations nor the mayors mounted the needed campaign. And Silzer told Ammann that he still did not think it desirable for him—a Democratic governor—to become actively involved in trying to organize support in Republican territory. So Ammann once again found himself taking the lead, holding a series of meetings with local groups and state legislators.43 During the fall of 1924, the Port Authority sought bids for design work on the two Staten Island crossings, and Ammann responded. As he wrote to Governor Silzer on November 21, “I have submitted to the Port Authority a bid for the preparation of plans for the Arthur Kill Bridges and am now anxiously awaiting their decision.” And while he waited, his political efforts produced significant results. In November, State Senator Mackay urged prompt action on a bridge over the Hudson, and he endorsed Ammann’s plan as the most feasible. In the same week, the influential Bergen Record, which had favored a tunnel, endorsed action by the Port Authority to construct a bridge to upper Manhattan. By mid-December, the “Mackay Hudson River Bridge Association” had been formed, with the Record’s publisher and other county leaders as members. Finally, in late January 1925, the New Jersey Senate passed a bill authorizing the Port Authority to construct a bridge across the Hudson at Fort Lee, and the State Assembly soon followed suit. Ammann then journeyed to New York, where companion legislation had been introduced, and met with local and state officials, urging favorable action; in late March, New York State approved the bill.44
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From Political Entrepreneur to Bridge-Builder The Port Authority would now move forward to construct a bridge from Fort Lee to 179th Street, and to build the two spans between New Jersey and Staten Island. But would Ammann have any role in their design and construction? In a letter on March 27, Ammann conveyed his concern to the governor. He expressed his hope that he would be asked to “take charge of the working out of the preliminary plans” for the Fort Lee Bridge, but he thought there would be opposition, and that an engineer “with long practice and wide reputation” might be selected instead. Reviewing his many activities on behalf of the bridge project, Ammann concluded that he would appreciate “anything you may be able to do to help” achieve a favorable outcome. Two weeks later, with the Port Authority bills now signed in Trenton, Governor Silzer once again wrote to Julian Gregory, who was now Port Authority chairman. Noting that the Authority would soon be proceeding with the Fort Lee Bridge, Silzer suggested that “you take into consideration for the doing of this work the name of O. H. Ammann.” Silzer continued, “Mr. Ammann was one of the pioneers in this project, has spent two years of his time in advising the public of its advantages, has drawn freely upon his own ability as engineer, and in every way has probably done more than any other one man to bring this bridge into being.”45 Silzer also sent a copy of this letter to Chief Engineer William Drinker at the Port Authority; and he sent a copy to Ammann, with a note: “I have it in the back of my mind somewhere that Mr. Drinker had an impression that you were an able assistant, but that you had not had the experience to independently undertake work of this kind.” The governor suggested Ammann talk with Drinker about this impression. A few days later, Ammann met with Drinker. He thought it was an “encouraging interview,” though it contained disappointing news: Drinker told him that the Port Authority had concluded that their first projects—the two Staten Island Bridges—should be awarded to “an engineer of long established reputation.”46 The job went to Waddell & Hardesty, a firm led by the prominent engineer J.A.L. Waddell. However, in its short life the Port Authority had already begun to develop a few traditions—and one of these was a preference for hiring its own engineers and other experts as regular members of the staff, rather than relying heavily on outside contractors. By late April, the chief engineer (himself a railroad man) concluded that the Authority ought to hire a staff engineer with
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bridge-building experience; and Drinker recommended Othmar Ammann for the post. The Commissioners soon concurred with Drinker’s recommendation, and on July 3, 1925 Ammann sent a letter to Silzer noting that he had assumed his duties as “bridge engineer on the Port Authority staff” two days earlier, and thanking the governor for his “goodwill and efforts on my behalf.” The long and active campaign ended on a restrained note, with the governor’s final letter to an engineer who had at last landed a job and who would now have to show that he had the capacity not only to fight for—but also to build—a great bridge. July 15, 1925. My dear Mr. Ammann: I have your letter of July 3d, and am, as you know, pleased at your appointment, because I am sure that you will be of much service to the two states. Yours very truly, s/George S. Silzer Governor Mr. O. H. Ammann Boonton, N.J.
7 A Web of Bridges, Tunnels, and Political Intrigue
A democracy inclines toward chaos rather than toward order. . . . Since the “voice of the people” is a pleasant fancy and not a present fact, the impulse for positive political action must be deliberately imposed at some strategic point, if democracy is to succeed as a form of government. —Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest1
This bridge is evidence of what can be accomplished when true efficiency is applied to civic projects. . . . [It] presents a gratifying contrast to the story of delays, procrastination and endless disappointment which have been often the fate of great public enterprises in the past. —Franklin D. Roosevelt, essay in the New York Times (1931)2
W
hat Othmar Ammann had accomplished through his years of campaigning for a bridge across the Hudson was a striking achievement: the two states and their Port Authority had at last endorsed his plan for a span twice the length of any yet constructed, they had agreed to place some portion of their money and their reputations in the service of Ammann’s plan, and they had hired him to carry out the job. Yet in a longer view, what had been achieved by the summer of 1925 was but a first and modest step. For Ammann would now need to carry out a range of complex engineering calculations and grapple with design and construction issues that were likely to be far more difficult than his confidential early assurances had suggested.3 As he carried forward these analyses, he would have to thread his way between the two rocks that might bring disaster: On the one hand, he could design conservatively, relying on heavy trusses and other means of assuring safety; but that option would generate large costs that might require state subsidies and so expose Ammann and the Port Authority to the kind of criticism—of undue cost and inefficiency—that the Holland Tunnel and other 143
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public projects had often faced. Or he might design a bridge of spare materials and low cost, which—especially given the uncertain behavior of a span far beyond human experience—could collapse, a recurring fate of much shorter bridges through the years.4 Ammann would also need to gather and organize a large staff of engineers and mechanics who would carry out the many activities required to construct the Hudson River bridge, a task extending for five or six years. At the same time, he would need to supervise teams of engineers and others who would build the several crossings between Staten Island and the mainland.5 Moreover, Ammann could not look forward to carrying out these complex engineering and administrative efforts in an environment largely free from political and technical conflict—in the sort of benevolent atmosphere that he and Lindenthal had enjoyed while constructing the private Hell Gate Bridge a decade earlier. Public agencies attempting to carry out large engineering projects face an array of dangers, which flourish in the hothouse politics of New York and its environs. These hazards were amply displayed in the ongoing saga of the Holland Tunnel: an idea widely applauded when it was approved by both states in 1919, the Canal Street tunnel had been expected to cost less than $29 million and be completed by 1924. In the first three years, however, members of the tunnel commissions from the two states fell into dispute regarding patronage appointments to the staff, the engineering plan, and the question of who would pay for widening the Jersey City streets leading to the water crossing. In addition, construction funds from New Jersey were delayed for more than a year because of the need for a state-wide referendum. In 1924, five years after the enterprise was begun, most of the authorized moneys had been spent, the tunnel was only partly finished, and the commissioners asked for another $14 million. Meanwhile, patronage issues continued to affect their work, Governor Silzer denounced their “quarrels and bickering,” and New York’s Governor Smith urged that the commissions be abolished and their project be turned over to the Port Authority.6 If Ammann had consulted a reliable crystal ball as he began work in the summer of 1925, he would have discovered that the next six years in the Port Authority’s life would be filled with clouds almost equally dark: Ammann’s analysis of design issues regarding the great bridge would be sharply criticized by engineers in New York and by a politically influential manufacturer in Trenton; labor leaders with political clout in New Jersey would challenge a major construction contract for the Staten Island spans; and Silzer’s successor as governor of New Jersey would denounce the Port agency as a “super-state” and would join forces with Republican legislators in an attempt
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to influence Ammann’s design decisions, and to gain control over the Port Authority’s contracts. Ammann and his agency would also face criticism from those who opposed locating the tower and anchorage for the giant bridge in a Manhattan park; and a New York member of the Authority’s board would be embroiled in land speculation near the Hudson River bridge site and forced to resign. Then the Port Authority’s chief engineer would depart abruptly, and Ammann would be faced with the question of whether he could count on the loyalty of the engineering staff. And the Port Authority’s wider hopes for its multifaceted Comprehensive Plan—still bright in the minds of the commissioners and staff in 1925—would all be dashed by decade’s end. So it would be a future filled with obstacles and doubts, which might have retarded the completion of the Hudson River span and its three smaller cousins, generating spiraling costs and damaging the reputation of the untested Port Authority and its little-known bridge engineer. That conclusion would have demonstrated once again a recurring theme of political analysis—that “great expectations” at the start of a government project are likely to be overwhelmed by greater obstacles, leading to results that fall far short of our initial hopes, and often, as with the Comprehensive Plan, to outcomes that should be recorded as failures.7 But none of these difficulties, ultimately, undermined the regional and “nonpolitical” focus which seemed to motivate Ammann and the wider Port Authority team, or their capacity to move their projects forward. Unlike the tunnel commissioners, who often behaved as suspicious guardians of provincial rights, the Port Authority commissioners acted with some broader sense of the metropolitan region and grasped the banner that Julius Henry Cohen held out—which urged cooperation as the route to economic growth. Moreover, as part of Cohen’s original design, the Port commissioners had the power to finance construction by floating bonds; so they did not confront the political uncertainties of statewide referenda or yearly legislative appropriations. In these ways the Port Authority attained some political insulation denied the tunnel commissions. As we will see, the Port Authority leaders were not so unwise as to turn their backs entirely on the political forces linked to immediate public concerns, or the narrower traditions of political favoritism. Throughout the late 1920s, despite the opposition of Al Smith, they took a leading role in championing better passenger rail transit in northern New Jersey, an issue of great interest to commuters and local politicians in that province. And here and there, the Port Authority found room to build connections to wary political
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leaders by considering and sometimes accepting patronage appointments to its staff. However, the most important factor in providing integrity to the Port Authority’s efforts, and in keeping them on schedule through these six years was, undoubtedly, the agency’s bridge engineer. Ammann utilized his technical abilities and his administrative skills to press ahead with all four bridges at a surprising pace. And as each new bridge foundation was dug, each tower raised, each span completed, the press drew attention to the accomplishment, adding to the reputation of the bi-state agency and her Swiss-American engineer. So the contrast between the two bi-state agencies was immense: The tunnel commissions’ project stumbled forward finally to completion, after eight years of travail, in the autumn of 1927—more than three years behind schedule and $20 million over budget, its chief engineer dead from exhaustion. Ammann finished his four bridges ahead of schedule and under budget, the first two Staten Island bridges in 1928 and the Hudson River and Bayonne spans in 1931. As we will see toward the end of this chapter, that comparative success then prepared the way for the final victory of the Port Authority’s first decade, as Al Smith’s successor as governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, joined forces with Cohen and the bi-state agency to oppose the expansionary interests of the tunnel commissioners. By 1930, they had wrested control of the Holland Tunnel from those worthy adversaries. The next year, the Authority swallowed the commissions as well, and it was then granted a monopoly over all bridges and tunnels that might in the future be constructed between the two states. So technical expertise was married to political strategy, to the greater glory of the bi-state agency—and perhaps to the benefit as well of economic development across the metropolitan region.
Engineering Judgment and Democratic Accountability The technical deliberations which triggered the early political battles in Trenton began innocently enough. In his early months as bridge engineer, Ammann hired a staff and began to grapple with the range of design issues that would have to be resolved before the Hudson River span could be started. How strong would the bridge need to be, to carry the maximum expected load of trucks, cars, and buses? Should it have one or two decks, and how many lanes should be included? Where, in view of rock and soil conditions, should the towers be placed, and (therefore) how long would the main span
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be—3900 feet, 3500, or somewhat less? Should the towers be bare steel, or covered with stone? How should the bridge deck be suspended from the towers—with wire cables or solid eyebar chains? The answers to these questions would have important implications for safety, aesthetics, and cost. On most of these issues, Ammann and his aides reached preliminary conclusions during the final months of 1925. But the decision on what suspension system should be used—eyebars versus wire cables—was more complex technically, and he decided that it deserved further study.8 Meanwhile, Ammann began preparations for constructing the first two Staten Island bridges, while he consulted with his supervisor, Chief Engineer W. W. Drinker, on design issues regarding the Hudson River span. By the end of the year, he saw substantial problems in the way that responsibility for carrying out these projects was distributed. Before Ammann joined the staff in the summer of 1925, the private firm of Waddell & Hardesty had been hired to provide designs for the Staten Island spans; and during the fall they continued to carry some responsibility for working out the details of the two projects. Meanwhile, Drinker began to second-guess the work of his bridge engineer, in ways that made it difficult to press ahead with plans for the Hudson River project. Moreover, the administrative structure of the Port Authority did not provide clear lines of central authority, so that differences could be hammered out and decisions made quickly: the chief engineer, the chief of the statistics bureau, and the general counsel all reported to the Chairman, who was a part-time unpaid official. This arrangement may have been satisfactory while the agency was devising broad regional plans and negotiating with the railroads; it did not seem to be working well as the agency attempted to get its own large construction program underway.9 Early in 1926, these problems were swept away in a major reorganization. John Ramsey, who had headed the statistics bureau, was named by the Board to be chief executive officer; and Ammann would now report directly to him, serving as bridge engineer, in charge of a new Bridge Division. Drinker was shifted out of the line of responsibility, as “chief consulting engineer”; and Waddell and his associates were limited to an advisory role.10 Ammann was now fully responsible for carrying out the bridge projects, and by March 1926 he completed a report to Ramsey and the Board on detailed plans for the Hudson crossing. Within a few weeks, his plans for the gigantic span had drawn favorable attention to the project and to the Port Authority.11 A few weeks later, Ammann’s position was further strengthened: George Silzer had completed his term as governor in January, and in May he was appointed to the Port Authority Board. Silzer’s fellow commissioners at
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once named him chairman, so that this crucial position in shaping the agency’s future was now held by Ammann’s main political adviser and supporter. During the summer, Ammann pressed ahead with plans for the two Staten Island spans, and in September, the Port agency again was a center of laudatory media attention as ground-breaking ceremonies were held for the two bridges. These signs of a beneficent providence were soon followed by less happy events, reminding us that even a “successful” government agency could not long be insulated from the discipline of “democratic accountability” and from its cousin, patronage politics. The political conflicts affecting Ammann’s work became the subject of public attention early in 1927, but their origins go back to the transfer of gubernatorial power in Trenton a year earlier. To Governor Silzer, who held office in 1923–26, the Port Authority was a benevolent “supergovernment,” created by the two states to meet important social needs, and endowed with the independence required to accomplish those tasks. Limited to one three-year term by the State Constitution, Silzer stepped down in January 1926. He was succeeded by A. Harry Moore, a fellow Democrat and a close ally of Frank Hague, who was mayor of Jersey City and head of the Democratic political machine of Hudson County. To Moore (and to Hague), the Port Authority’s independence appeared to violate appropriate standards of democratic control, and in his early months in office, Moore encouraged Republican efforts in the state legislature to craft a bill that would give him veto power over the agency’s decisions. By the summer of 1926, Moore was expressing doubts about the concept underlying this “super-State.”12 When the state legislature returned to work in the early weeks of 1927, the Moore-Hague Democratic forces and those Republican legislators who were hostile to the Port Authority’s independence found their concerns quickened by a debate from the world of engineering: Would wire cables or eyebar chains be used to suspend the roadway from the massive towers of the Hudson River bridge? (Eyebars are metal bars with eyelets at both ends; they are joined via bolts through overlapping eyes. Wire cables are composed of thousands of individual steel wires spun across from tower to tower and then bound together.) If the answer turned out to be wire cables, Trenton was the home of a leading manufacturer, and new jobs and economic vitality might be added in New Jersey’s capital; but it was rumored that the Port Authority’s bridge engineer was inclined the wrong way—toward eyebar chains. The contest on this question, which soon became intertwined with the general issue of political control over the Port agency, provided the strongest challenge to engi-
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neering integrity and general autonomy that the agency had faced in its first decade, and that it would confront during the next twenty years. In his early months as bridge engineer, Ammann had indicated to his engineering associates that he thought eyebar chains might be the better choice for suspending the roadway from the great towers, and in December 1925 he met with the contractor which had recently constructed a long eyebar suspension bridge in Brazil. As Ammann explained at some length in one staff memorandum, eyebars seemed to have some advantage in terms of cost, reliability, and aesthetic considerations; but he planned to carry out detailed studies of wire cables as well.13 Throughout 1926, Ammann continued to weigh the relative advantages of eyebars and cables, and no decision had yet been made by early 1927. Then, on March 16, New Jersey’s leading manufacturer of wire cable decided to enlist political pressure in support of its campaign for the Hudson bridge contract. Writing to Governor Moore, the Roebling Company’s vice president urged that eyebars not be considered further, since wire was clearly superior in terms of reliability and aesthetics. He also noted that, unlike the Roebling Company, neither of the eyebar manufacturing plants “is located in the State of New Jersey.”14 Now Moore and his Republican allies had a specific issue to accompany their general unease. The antagonism of Moore and his Hudson County associates was heightened further in mid-March, when chairman Silzer appointed Larry Keefe, a journalist who had written critically of the Hague machine, to be the Port Authority’s director of public information.15 By late March, Democratic legislators from Hudson County had joined forces with a group of Republican lawmakers to pass a bill requiring that the “State House Commission” review and approve all Port Authority bridge contracts; the State House Commission had traditionally been used to monitor patronage distribution in the state. Moreover, the explanatory statement accompanying the bill showed a “protectionist” philosophy at work.16 The Port Authority and its champions in New York State were suitably alarmed. In Albany, Al Smith issued a statement threatening to sue New Jersey for violating the Port Compact. To safeguard his state’s interests, he also sent an emergency message to the legislature, asking that the governor of New York be given the power to veto decisions of the Port Authority. At the Port agency, chairman Silzer issued a public warning to Moore, urging him not to sign the bill. If the State House Commission were given the right to review and block Port Authority contracts, Silzer asserted, the Authority would “face litigation over every contract from now on”; moreover, all four
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bridges would be delayed a year, costs of construction would rise, and the “era of good feeling” between the two states might be destroyed.17 But Governor Moore saw greater dangers if he did not act. Releasing the Roebling letter to the newspapers, he argued that the Port Authority favored eye-bars over wire cable, and therefore that New Jersey firms would be “excluded from bidding,” thus “depriving hundreds of our people of the work which this gigantic undertaking would supply.” There was also a broader issue. “In the Port Authority we have created a superstate,” the governor complained, “which may act without regard to the governing body of either State.” To Moore, the State House Commission bill was an essential step in safeguarding both New Jersey’s economy and democratic accountability. On March 30, he signed the bill into law.18 If the Port Authority had been the creature of a single state, the Hudson County Democrats and their Republican allies would have won this battle. However, the wider war—to control the Port Authority as though it were a regular state agency—might still have been in doubt, since the bond houses may have shied away from securities whose value could be undermined by political intervention.19 But now the advantage of the Port Authority’s structure could be seen: Because the agency was accountable to two masters—the two states—it was less accountable to either. What one state wished to do, its partner could resist; and so the bi-state agency might retain much of its independence against the slings and arrows of outraged politicians and advocates of localized democracy.20 Once Moore had signed the State House Commission bill, New York’s Governor Smith picked up New Jersey’s gauntlet. He threatened to take the issue to the U. S. Supreme Court, where he would ask that the new statute be set aside and that the Court “restrain New Jersey from interfering with the Port Authority”; and he instructed New York’s Port commissioners to refuse to send any bridge contracts to Trenton for review. Meanwhile, Ramsey, Cohen, and their aides suspended all activities associated with the four interstate crossings.21 Smith’s challenge, coupled with the Port Authority’s abrupt halt in its work, had the desired effect. Business leaders in New Jersey protested, arguing that the conflict threatened economic growth in the northern part of the state, and urging that the Port Authority resume work on the four bridges. Bergen County’s Senator Mackay, a leading Republican who had fought unsuccessfully against the State House measure, now introduced a bill to repeal the law. Governor Moore distanced himself from the measure he had signed, arguing that “it was not my idea” and that he would prefer to vest the veto
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power in the governor. And Ammann undercut the argument—which had been used to rally support for the State House bill—that his plans would block the Roebling Company and New Jersey workers from a major contract; wire cable as well as eyebar chains were still being considered, he said, and the Roebling Company was still in the running.22 Within 48 hours, the State House Commission law had been repealed at Trenton, and in its place the state legislature approved a bill giving veto power over Port Authority actions solely to the governor. Al Smith had always opposed any veto power, preferring to leave the Port agency as an “independent” body, but he now signed a bill in Albany giving him similar control over the Authority’s actions.
Ammann’s Plans: “Unduly Experimental and Out of Harmony” By the spring of 1927, the Port Authority and its bridge engineer had won a crucial battle to maintain professional control over engineering decisions. No “state house commission” would have the power to bend the Port Authority’s contracts to achieve narrow political goals; and for the next several years, no governor would risk another uproar by using the veto power to interfere with the bridge-building program. But Ammann and his staff faced a series of other challenges. Some of these came from his professional colleagues, who questioned his view that the Hudson River bridge “presents no unusual engineering or construction problems.” At a gathering of civil engineers to discuss the project, R. S. Buck said that he found Ammann’s design “unduly experimental and out of harmony with . . . the preponderance of engineering opinion.” Buck argued that several alternative designs should be considered, particularly since Ammann’s plan seemed to be based on “novel and inadequately tested concepts.” He criticized Ammann’s proposal to place the Manhattan anchorage in Fort Washington Park, where it would provide a “high barrier of masonry,” detracting from the park. He offered an extensive critique of eyebar chains, which he argued were not a sensible way to suspend the bridge. And he attacked Ammann’s plan to cloth the steel towers in masonry as poor engineering, unnecessarily costly, and “an architectural crime.”23 Buck’s colleague, C. W. Hudson, agreed with these criticisms and argued that the Port Authority’s plans seemed to be unwisely tilted in favor of eyebar chains. Even sharper were the comments sent to the Port Authority by Fred-
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erick Stuart Greene, a prominent New York engineer who had been asked to serve on an advisory committee on bridge design and location. In March, Greene wrote privately to John Ramsey, now the Authority’s chief executive officer, to comment that: Among engineers generally the conviction prevails that the present design is uneconomical; that it is at variance with the best modern practice in suspension bridges; . . . that the design for the towers is wholly wrong; that the omission of a stiffening truss is too radical a departure; and that the use of eye-bar chains in place of wire cables would be not only more costly to erect and maintain, but that they cannot produce as good a bridge.
From his attack on Ammann’s design, Greene turned to Ammann himself. “It is a bad policy for the design of a bridge that goes so far beyond anything yet undertaken to be left to one man,” Greene argued, “especially to one who has not had the advantage of actually building an important suspension bridge.” Greene urged the Port Authority to turn over responsibility for designing the Hudson bridge to a Board of Engineers, composed of “not less than three men of known experience and ability.”24 Ammann paused in his engineering efforts long enough to inform the Port Authority commissioners that both wire cables and eyebars were still under consideration, and that their own “eminent consulting engineers” agreed with him that existing plans for the Hudson crossing were the best available. He also responded to the criticisms by Buck and other defenders of Fort Washington Park with a vigorous counterattack, arguing that shifting the bridge tower out of that park might result in a “monstrous monument to the lack of aesthetic sense.”25 With construction already underway at the two Staten Island bridge sites, and with ground-breaking expected at the Fort Lee site early in the fall of 1927, Ammann also took steps to reorganize the Bridge Department, dividing the staff into separate divisions for traffic studies, design, contracts, construction, and planning of approaches. Plans were circulated among all sections, and Ammann and his assistants encouraged continuous communication among office staffs and the field. His management strategy was innovative, offering lessons that would be rediscovered by administrative theorists decades later. And despite the complexities of putting this new plan into effect, and the external attacks on Ammann’s designs, the engineering staff seems to have responded favorably to his leadership.26
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Soon, however, the chorus of outside critics was joined by a more formidable opponent—Ammann’s former mentor, Gustav Lindenthal. In August, 1927, Lindenthal attacked the proposed design of the towers for the Fort Lee span, which he argued would generate unbalanced stresses and produce a bridge of questionable safety. Ammann responded forcefully, asserting that the critique by his former boss was couched in “vague, generalized and unqualified terms,” and that Lindenthal had failed to examine Ammann’s design closely.27 So Ammann asserted his independence, a stance that was underscored that same month in a press release issued by Chairman Silzer, who endorsed Ammann’s position that “both eyebar and wire cables” were still under consideration, and that the choice would depend on which contractor offered the best proposal. (Silzer’s press statement had an odd twist worth noting; while he endorsed engineering independence and efficiency as guiding lights at the Port Authority, Silzer also included in this Port Authority press release a statement of his hopes that Al Smith would soon become president and that a Democrat would win the New Jersey gubernatorial election in 1928. No wonder the Republican legislators had the impression the Port Authority was a “Democratic agency”!28) Ammann was forced to grapple with one more foray from that creative political strategist, Governor Harry Moore, before the year was out. During the spring campaign on the veto-power question, the Port Authority and its friends had argued that it would be unwise for a governor to attempt to second-guess the agency’s decisions, because they were based on technical studies, outside the ready ken of elected officials. Now that he had the veto power, Moore thought he would take advantage of that implied advice and designate his own engineering consultant to monitor the Port agency’s work; in July he asked the agency to add Joseph Strauss to the engineering staff, so that Moore could have independent technical advice in evaluating Ammann’s activities. The board acquiesced, and Strauss, an engineer from Chicago, was formally appointed to the board of advisory engineers in early August.29 Within a few days, Strauss urged that the steel contracts for the Hudson span be delayed “until I could complete my investigations”; but Ammann and his consulting team disagreed and went forward with the contracts. During the next several weeks, Strauss seems to have been largely excluded from meetings of Ammann and his staff, and from Ammann’s discussions with the other consultants, which now included bridge designer Leon Moisseiff, General Goethals of Panama Canal fame, and William Burr of Columbia University. However, Strauss carried out an independent review of Ammann’s
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plans, which he found deficient in several ways, and he delivered a critical analysis to Ammann in late September. Expecting to be called in to discuss his report with the other consultants, Strauss waited in New York until a meeting time was set. And he waited. And while he waited, Ammann and his consultants met, reviewed Strauss’s ideas, and rejected every one. In mid-October, the Port Authority awarded the major contracts for the towers, floor, and cables for the Hudson River span, based on the specifications defined without Strauss’s help. In frustration, the governor’s man sent a lengthy confidential report to Moore, laying out his various ideas, which if accepted might still save “many millions” of dollars. Strauss also hinted that Governor Moore could in time be “subject . . . to embarrassment,” if the public later learned that Ammann had failed to take action on these cost-saving ideas, and that “those in superior authority” had allowed his inefficient plans to go forward.30 But Moore was now beyond Strauss’s help, and probably glad to be so. The issue that had focused his political energies was swept away with the Port Authority’s announcement in mid-October that wire cable, not eyebars, would be used on the Hudson bridge—and that the Roebling Company of Trenton was the low bidder and had therefore won the contract. To the Port Authority, the drawn-out process had been justified, for the competition between wire and eyebar manufacturers appeared to have produced cost savings of several million dollars.31 And to Moore, whose labor supporters would be pleased with the prospects of new jobs in the Trenton area, the outcome was a political blessing. Moreover, it was part of a rain of pro-Port Authority sentiments that swept the state and the New York region during the fall of 1927 and continued into the next year. Moore found it easier to associate himself with a winner than to battle a “superstate” whose friends might harm his future political career. So it was not surprising that even before the wire-cable decision, Governor Moore agreed to take part in the formal ground-breaking ceremonies for the Hudson River bridge. At that event, Ammann received a medal which was inscribed “His Genius Made It Possible”; Moore heard his fellow Democrat in Albany praise the Port Authority’s efficiency and call it “the modern agency for progress in public works”; and the mayor of New York City said that his city no longer viewed the Port agency as “some superpower actuated by selfish purposes” but instead as the “best” instrument to solve regional problems. Then Moore himself rose to acclaim this giant bridge as “another link in the strong bond which binds us in friendly and business relations with the great Empire State.”32
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Moore had already seen the Port Authority and her bridge engineer praised for their efficient efforts in completing the first two Staten Island bridges, which would soon be opened, months ahead of schedule; and its reputation had reached the nation’s capital, where the Port agency was described as offering a model for financing a new bridge across the Potomac. The day after the ground-breaking salute, the Newark Evening News saw in the Hudson River span and its builders the promise of a “new day of concord which leads men of differing aims to seek and find agreement by the way of common sense and common brotherhood, instead of remaining apart and nurturing misunderstandings, jealousies and rivalries boding no good to either.”33 Indeed the days of interstate acrimony—the lifeblood of John Hylan and his suspicious counterparts in Hudson County—seemed to be at an end in the gentle autumn of 1927; the cooperative philosophy of Julius Henry Cohen held sway, at least for now. So Harry Moore sent Joseph Strauss and his disruptive ideas packing. And when the Port agency’s unflagging critics announced new charges, alleging unfair contract procedures at the Staten Island bridges, Moore acted quickly to lay those allegations to rest.34
Engineering Victories The “new day of concord” which the Newark News envisioned in the fall of 1927 did not bathe all the Port Authority’s proceedings with its gentle light; during the next four years there were battles to be fought, and won and lost, across most of its endeavors. But Ammann and his activities were now freed from political incursions; and from the winter of 1927 until the George Washington Bridge was completed in 1931, the Port Authority’s engineering division served as an exemplar of the Progressive theme—demonstrating what government could do, if individuals of talent were brought together, given a clear mission, and insulated from the uncertainties of politics while they carried out their assigned tasks. We may call this Progressivism, but its American heritage extends back to the civil-service reform movement of the late nineteenth century and before.35 The highlights of these four years can be set down in a few paragraphs. In the fall of 1927, an article in the Scientific American nicely captured the linkage between the new bridge and the expansive public thinking of the 1920s; in this “age of superlatives,” the essay began, the Hudson River crossing “will be incomparably, on completion, the greatest suspension bridge, or bridge of any kind, for that matter, in the world.” In addition, Ammann’s creative en-
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gineering and management strategies in constructing the Staten Island spans were examined by the Engineering News Record and praised for their flexibility and effectiveness.36 Early in 1928 Ammann was promoted from bridge engineer to chief engineer at the Port Authority. With construction proceeding rapidly on the two Staten Island spans and the Hudson bridge, he began to design a fourth span, approved earlier by the two states, which would join Staten Island and Bayonne, New Jersey. In April, the Port Authority announced that the first two bridges—to be called the Goethals and the Outerbridge Crossing—would be completed by the end of June, six months ahead of the original schedule; and during the spring newspaper articles emphasized the great economic stimulus for Staten Island that would result from these projects joining the Island to the mainland. Ammann’s crucial role in the Hudson River enterprise was featured in a long magazine article in June.37 During the summer, with construction on that bridge ahead of schedule, and with the two Staten Island spans opened to traffic, Ammann completed his design for the Bayonne crossing, which would become the longest arch bridge in the world. Ground-breaking ceremonies on September 18 were led by that convert to the Authority’s ways, Governor Harry Moore. For a while, the Port agency, and those who reported on its efforts, attempted to treat these automotive bridges as though they were integral pieces in the Authority’s 1921 Comprehensive Plan, with the rest of that great program then to follow. A closer look, however, in time convinced even the optimists at the New York Times that all the elements of that plan were in disarray—at best in “the blueprint stage,” where they had languished since 1921. In contrast with “this gray background,” as the Times explained to its readers in 1929, the four bridges “stand out in shining colors,” and the agency’s strategy of financing those projects by selling its own bonds offered “the most constructive approach yet afforded” to the problem of funding large public projects “without overburdening the taxpayer or straining municipal credit.”38 With its bonds finding eager buyers in the halcyon days of the late 1920s, and its chief engineer orchestrating the work of his staff and contractors with striking efficiency, the Port Authority was able to press steadily toward completion of those two landmark structures—the longest suspension span and the longest arch bridge ever built. By June 1929, the two towers of the Hudson River crossing were finished, and the Port agency then began to spin the Roebling wire cables over the chasm. At the end of the year, 10,000 wires had been strung from tower to tower, leaving 95,000 to go. Meanwhile, Ammann constructed a large testing laboratory building in Jersey City, housed his in-
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spection force there, and set them to work testing all the materials that were being used in the Bayonne and Hudson crossings.39 During the first months of 1930, the Port Authority reported that construction on the two spans was on schedule, and that both would open early in 1932. However, cable spinning above the Hudson proceeded at an unusually rapid rate, and the operation was completed in August 1930, establishing a new record for speed in stringing wire cables on large suspension bridges. By the end of the year, all the steel floor panels were in place, and the Port agency announced that the Hudson River crossing would be opened for traffic in the fall of 1931. At Bayonne, 18 miles to the south, the two sides of the great arch were joined in October 1930, and this bridge too seemed likely to be finished well ahead of schedule. In these final months, the only real controversy arose over the naming of the Hudson crossing: should it be called the Palisades Bridge, the George Washington, or simply the Hudson River Bridge? After active public debate, the Port Authority commissioners finally made their choice, by a divided vote, in April 1931.40 These two vast enterprises then moved steadily to completion. On October 25, 1931, the George Washington Bridge was dedicated, and it was opened to traffic at 5 a.m. the next day. The Bayonne crossing followed on November 15. Both were celebrated for speed and efficiency of completion, for low construction costs (both were well below estimates), and for their world-setting length and elegance of design. The comments of the Engineering News-Record on the Hudson River project capture the impact Ammann’s efforts in those years had on his fellow professionals: The Fort Lee Bridge . . . marks an epoch in the annals of civil engineering. In virtually every element, from its towers and anchorages to its cables, its unstiffened deck, its ingenious floor construction, its provision for double-decking, and not least its unprecedented traffic-distributing approaches, which will make the operating efficiency of the bridge a match for its efficiency and economy of construction, it establishes a new datum from which future bridge engineering will take its measure.41
Yet Politics High and Low If Ammann’s efforts in these four years demonstrated the benefits of Progressive insulation, the rest of the Port Authority’s endeavors were nicely laced
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with politics, suggesting how large a gap remained between the hopes of the agency’s creators and the realities of political culture in America. Once the railroads and the ICC had finally rejected the major tenets of the Comprehensive Plan, in 1928, those who had favored a “go it alone” policy for New Jersey revived the old lighterage issue, which then generated recurring political tension between the two states into the 1930s. Meanwhile, the Port Authority’s efforts to apply its expertise to other fields of transport—rail transit and air—came to naught, with its passenger transit forays leading to conflict with Al Smith. In addition, patronage and favoritism nibbled at the doors in the late 1920s, and Republican opponents labeled the Port agency as a “socialistic” enterprise and sought to bring it to its knees. Under the leadership of its general counsel, however, combined with the efforts of two New York governors, the bi-state agency managed to turn some of the challenges into victories, using its dramatic successes in bridge-building together with a modicum of tactical ingenuity to emerge in 1931 as a potentially powerful engine of future regional growth.
The Lighterage Issue Once Again Least successful were the efforts of Cohen and his colleagues to reorganize the railroad patterns in the bi-state region, and to maintain unified support from both sides of the Hudson as they pressed for improved efficiency in the region’s freight rail system. As we have seen in chapter 5, the Port Authority’s Comprehensive Plan had been blocked by the railroads, and its efforts to use the ICC’s powers to break that resistance had failed—most dramatically in the Hell Gate Bridge case in the summer of 1928. A few months later, the Port agency did win support of the rail executives for a single project which might improve efficiency in distributing goods in the region—an inland freight-transfer building in Manhattan. At this point, however, the fragile alliance which supported its “regional” efforts began to fray. Defenders of New Jersey’s interests had already expressed concern that the state’s economic growth would be harmed by creating a large freight transfer station on the New York side of the River.42 Once the Hell Gate case was lost, there was much doubt that the bi-state agency could accomplish any important part of its vaunted development plans for the New Jersey side of the Harbor. Advocates of vigorous economic-development strategies in that smaller state now urged that its officials pursue its own interests, and in March 1929, New Jersey reopened the long-dormant lighterage case.
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The 1929 campaign—to force the railroads to charge less for freight delivered to New Jersey terminals—appears to have been more broadly based than the effort a decade earlier. In addition to elected officials and business executives from Jersey City and nearby towns, the new initiative had wide support among Republicans in the legislature, which appropriated $50,000 to finance the lighterage battle. It had support from officials of several regional industries, and from the Newark News, perhaps the state’s most important newspaper. And it had the vigorous endorsement of the new governor, Morgan F. Larson—the first Republican chief executive since Walter Edge had left the statehouse in 1919.43 Larson set the tone of the campaign in a major address in October 1929, when he described New York and New Jersey as “two great giants with limitless possibilities.” “All I ask,” Larson continued, “is that the giant New York which has prostrated New Jersey give this giant of ours a chance to rise.” He viewed the lighterage suit as the way to remove that oppressive weight. By the first weeks of 1930, a group of municipal officials and chambers of commerce in northern counties had organized support for the state’s position before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the ICC was once again preparing for hearings on this contentious issue.44 The Port Authority was placed in an awkward position. In its first several years, the Authority’s commissioners had used the mission of the agency—as enunciated in the Compact, in briefs before the ICC, and in speeches by its leaders—as a touchstone for its opposition to any efforts to break the Port into two parts. In 1927, however, the governors had obtained the power to veto the commissioners’ actions, and now, with Larson as governor, they faced an announced opponent of the idea of cooperative, regional development. Moreover, in his early months in office, Larson demonstrated that he might block the Authority if it attempted to act against his wishes. Meanwhile, the Port agency was locked in a struggle, described below, to wrest the Holland Tunnel away from its owners, and in that battle it needed Larson’s support, not his enmity.45 Therefore, the Port’s leaders decided not to confront the latest New Jersey challenge head-on. Instead they spoke generally of the great advantage of a unified Port of New York (and New Jersey): “objective cooperation is today the keynote of commercial success.” They conferred with manufacturers in New Jersey who benefited from “free” lighterage, and those businesses then took the lead in opposing the effort to alter the traditional system of freight charges. And they emphasized the need for modern, efficient marine termi-
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nals throughout the region, and described their plans for constructing steamship piers at Jersey City and at Hoboken.46 Meanwhile, the ICC began the laborious process of reviewing freight rates in the New York region. More than three weeks of hearings were held in the summer and fall of 1930, and the ICC then moved with its usual speed toward a conclusion. The year 1931 went by, without word from the Commission; and then 1932 followed in graceful silence. It was not until 1934 that the ICC handed down its opinion—which essentially denied New Jersey’s request and retained the Port of New York in its unified, if somewhat decrepit, state.47 So the Port Authority escaped the worst possibilities that had been threatened by the revival of the lighterage case: the New Jersey suit had failed, and the region would not face the economic warfare that might have followed, had the Port been split in two; moreover, the Port agency had managed to avoid taking a central role in opposing the New Jersey suit, so it could still wave a credible banner as representative of both sides of the harbor. Beyond these largely negative achievements, however, the Port Authority had little to show for its first ten years of work on rail and marine-terminal modernization. The varied parts of the Comprehensive Plan were in tatters, with a single freight building in Manhattan—to be completed in 1932—as the only clear step toward “greater efficiency” in the region’s rail freight system. The proposals for marine terminals at Hoboken, Jersey City, and Jamaica Bay remained paper plans, victims of the economic downturn.48
Passenger Rail and Air Transport: Halting First Steps In its role as expert analyst and long-range planner for the region, the Port agency also devoted some attention in its first decade to passenger rail transit and airport development. In the short run, the most important outcome of these efforts was to demonstrate once again that the Port Authority was not a Trojan Horse of Manhattan business—that it was able to champion New Jersey’s interests as well. In addition, the two forays were preludes to a range of vigorous political battles that would absorb the Authority’s energies after World War II, when it would fight with Robert Moses for control of the region’s airports and resist pleas that it take responsibility for the region’s decaying rail transit system. In 1926, staff members at the Port agency began a study of possible sites for commercial landing fields in the New York region, and the next year this group joined a wider committee appointed by U. S. Secretary of Commerce
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Herbert Hoover to “investigate and report on a New York Metropolitan Airport.” Its report at the end of 1927 identified two sites in northern New Jersey and six in New York City, and urged the cities and states to develop several of these. There seemed to be little prospect that airports would be self-supporting operations in the near future, however, and the Port Authority did not view itself as having an important role in airport development.49 The efforts of the Port agency to advance the cause of rail transit were more sustained, although they produced only planning documents and political conflict, not visible change. During the 1920s, the number of New Jersey residents crossing the Hudson River to work and shop in New York expanded rapidly, and most of these travelers had to rely on ferry service to reach their destinations. Planners and political leaders in the northern part of New Jersey urged that the 28 miles of streetcar lines which ran through their communities be expanded and linked across the Hudson barrier to New York City’s vast passenger rail system. The Port Authority’s duties already embraced rail lines used for freight; and Ammann’s early designs for the George Washington Bridge included streetcar rail trackage. Therefore, the Port agency was a natural place to look for plans to improve passenger rail travel; regional planners on both sides of the Hudson viewed it as an important player in their efforts to overcome the limitations of relying on ferry service across the Hudson and, more generally, to strengthen transit systems joining northern New Jersey, Westchester, Long Island, and the region’s center.50 In 1925 a legislative committee suggested that the Port agency might take on a central role in grappling with the rail passenger problem. Publicly, the Port Authority’s general counsel responded cautiously, suggesting that his agency could be asked to study the situation and recommend plans, and that it could later “be directed to effectuate the plans”; but he emphasized that he was taking no position on whether rail transit should be added to the Port Authority’s duties. Privately, however, Cohen took an expansive view and attempted to persuade Al Smith to endorse broadening the Port Authority’s mandate.51 Early in 1927, the state legislature in Trenton directed the Port Authority to study the interstate transit issue, recommend solutions, and consider whether it might then take the central role in carrying out the transit plans. Officials from New York’s suburban counties asked that the study be expanded, and staff members of the Port agency soon joined with representatives from all parts of the region to create the Suburban Transit Engineering Board. During the next year, this team studied rail passenger travel,
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new rail lines under the Hudson and in other parts of the region, and financing issues.52 Although these efforts were widely supported in the suburbs, New York City leaders objected, arguing that the Authority’s efforts seemed to infringe on their own control over transit planning; and Al Smith thought these passenger transit efforts were a distraction from its work on the freight issue. Early in 1928, Albany legislators passed a transit-study bill matching New Jersey’s, but Smith then vetoed it. Now the Port Authority resisted Smith’s judgment; having devoted a year to working on the passenger problem, and seeing possibilities for real improvements here that had been denied in the field of freight transport, the agency was unwilling to abandon the project. Instead, the Authority’s commissioners spoke out in words that would warm the hearts of idealistic planners everywhere, and they set forth a perspective that the Port Authority’s own planners would later abandon: “No adequate or effective interstate transportation development can take place, without taking full account of passengers as well as of freight throughout the Port District.”53 During the next three years, the Port agency continued to devote staff resources to possible improvements in passenger transit. Finally, in the fall of 1931, as the Depression deepened and passenger traffic dwindled, the Port Authority and its regional colleagues suspended their activities. So the bistate commission was again frustrated in its hope for a grand regional solution. It had clearly demonstrated, however, that it was no pawn of New York interests—that the Port Authority was ready to champion regional programs which New Jersey held in high priority despite resistance across the River.54
Favoritism, Patronage, and the Veto Power The Port Authority’s forays into rail freight and passenger transit generated some political heat, but no real accomplishments. Meanwhile, the agency became the object of thoughtful attention by those who viewed public construction projects as a convenient way to line their own pockets and as a source of patronage jobs for their friends and the party faithful. This perception of government was honored with long tradition in New York City and nearby cities—extending back to the days of Boss Tweed and beyond. It was a tradition that Julius Henry Cohen had long opposed—in his early work with reform groups in New York, and in his design for the Port Authority, which he hoped would be effectively insulated from patronage and other forms of special dealing.55
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The capacity of Cohen’s agency to withstand the pressures of favoritism depended, however, on the willingness of governors to appoint “men of integrity” as commissioners of the Port agency. (There were no women on the Port Authority board until the 1970s.) And it depended on how the governors used the veto power; if the veto became a route to forcing patronage and special construction deals upon the Port Authority, that agency would soon find its public reputation, and the quality of its staff, sadly eroded—a fate which would befall many public authorities in later decades. Moreover, the governors and the board of commissioners would have to resist incursions from the legislative branch; in Trenton and Albany were legislators who cared little about the urban-development goals of the Port Authority and its supporters, and who cared a great deal about contracts and jobs that would help their friends and themselves.56 We have already had a glimpse—in the battles in early 1927 regarding the State House Commission—of the political pressures that might be activated by government contracts, and of the strategies the Port Authority might use to rebuff those efforts. As that conflict suggests, during the Port Authority’s early years the governors of both states selected commissioners who valued regional development and “business-like efficiency,” and whose political interests were not determined by Tammany Hall or Frank Hague. Businessmen all, with two exceptions, and with reputations for personal integrity to protect, they were inclined to adopt the sort of independent stance—even toward the governors who appointed them—that had been one of Cohen’s aims in designing the new institution.57 Those early appointments were not entirely free from problems, and the behavior of one of Al Smith’s appointees, Otto Shulhof, generated a near scandal. Shulhof was appointed by Governor Smith in 1924 to succeed Eugenius Outerbridge, who retired because of the demands of his other work.58 Smith apparently acted without consulting Cohen, or Belle Moskowitz, his chief adviser on Port Authority issues. Cohen had become familiar with Shulhof during Cohen’s work with the garment industry and held him in low regard; “he was known throughout the industry,” Cohen later commented, “for his consistent and steadfast devotion to his own interest.” Cohen conferred with the governor, expressing his sense that the appointment hurt the Port Authority’s reputation. Smith responded by filling the next vacancy with a prominent banker who had no political connections; this “almost instantly erased the stain” of the Shulhof choice, in Cohen’s view. From the sidelines, Outerbridge wrote to Smith, urging him to select men of only the “highest standard” for appointment to the Port Authority. Then, early in 1927, it
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seemed clear that speculators were buying land near the Manhattan terminus of the Hudson River Bridge based on confidential Authority documents; evidence indicated that Shulhof was involved, and Smith quietly forced him to resign.59 Meanwhile, the Port Authority issued its first bonds, to help finance construction of its Staten Island and Hudson River bridges; and the bonds were quickly sold. This success, coupled with the Shulhof episode, offered Cohen a valuable opportunity to issue a reminder—to the governors and the wider public—of the need to keep the Port Authority free from favoritism and other forms of narrow politics. “To borrow money” in order to carry out the Port Authority’s projects, Cohen argued, requires “public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the men in the institution.” To maintain this confidence, the governors must choose as commissioners those who “primarily consider port and transportation problems from the point of view of their economic soundness,” and they in turn must select a staff based on their “expert qualifications” in engineering, administration, and other fields. Those were just the standards that had been used and should continue to be used at the Port Authority, Cohen emphasized, in order to show “whether or not government can do things efficiently. It can do so if it will trust governmental powers to men who will apply the same standards of efficiency to the public’s work that they would apply in private business.”60 The message was not lost on Al Smith, or on Harry Moore; their other appointments to the board appeared to meet Cohen’s high standard. It would be going too far, however, to conclude that Moore, steeped in the Hague tradition of patronage and favoritism, was able to view the Port Authority as entirely outside his political reach. Among lower staff, Moore occasionally sought places for friends and political associates; and the Port agency was willing to cooperate at this level, while they stressed “expert qualifications” as the crucial factor in appointments to senior positions.61 Once the State House Commission fracas of 1927 was concluded, Governor Moore refrained from using his new veto power to shape Authority policies or appointments to the staff. His successor, however, seemed ready to employ that lever to bend the bi-state agency to his will. Soon after Morgan Larson took office in January 1929, he temporarily blocked construction of the Manhattan freight terminal. Given his expressed support for the revived lighterage case, it seemed likely that Larson would in time use the veto to block the Port agency’s joint regional ventures. Anticipating that prospect, Cohen began to lay the groundwork for defending the Port Authority’s independence. In a confidential memorandum to
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the senior staff and commissioners, Cohen raised the question, Does the governor’s veto power extend—as the language of the 1927 statutes seems to say— to “any action” taken by commissioners from his state, or is it a highly restricted power? Cohen concluded that the veto power was sharply limited in scope: “the Governor may veto the action of a particular Commissioner . . . because of malfeasance or misfeasance, but . . . he may not for any other reason veto the action of any . . . Commissioner taken in pursuance to . . . the powers granted to the Port Authority under the Compact.” So the governor would have the right to intervene only when the board member has committed fraud or “when he has in some other manner violated his duty.” To interpret the veto power more broadly, Cohen argued, would be to permit one governor to block action to carry out that “carefully defined plan” approved by both states—the Comprehensive Plan. Here Cohen staked out an advanced position, asserting that his agency could disregard any gubernatorial effort to use the veto in order to alter the Port Authority’s policy decisions or its ongoing programs; the Comprehensive Plan and other jointly approved legislation would provide a stalwart shield to protect the agency’s autonomy against such interference. When Cohen first expressed these views, in 1929, he was educating the commissioners regarding the challenge they might face from Larson or a later state executive. It was a position that would not be tested for another decade, when the Port Authority would face its first gubernatorial veto—and then back away from Cohen’s aggressive stance for independence.62
“They May Think the Time Has Come for Vengeance” At the beginning of 1929, the Port Authority lost its greatest champion, as Al Smith left the governor’s chair; and that departure set the stage for the decade’s final and perhaps most crucial battle. Since 1918, when he had first considered Cohen’s plan for a cooperative bi-state agency, Smith had been a fervent advocate of the general idea and then of the young institution. In the past ten years, Smith had been governor of New York State for all but two, and during those two years he had been a commissioner of the Port Authority. At Albany and in the Port District he had negotiated with Republican legislators, battled Mayor Hylan, and worked with four governors from New Jersey to build and strengthen this “thoroughly modern method” of financing public improvements and coordinating regional development. Having chosen to run for president in the fall of 1928, Smith had bowed out of the gu-
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bernatorial race, and now he would have to leave the executive mansion. His place would be taken by another Democrat who shared Smith’s positive view of the role of government, but who was viewed by some associates as “an essentially frivolous character, . . . too deficient in willpower and serious purpose actually to govern a great state,” and who had barely defeated his Republican opponent.63 When Al Smith turned over the executive reins to Franklin Roosevelt, he also bequeathed to the new governor the need to resolve the long-standing, if often muted, controversy between the Port Authority and the tunnel commissions. Ten years before, Smith had signed the bill that established the New York State tunnel commission, and he had watched it begin its work, jointly with the New Jersey body, to build a vehicular tunnel under the Hudson. Later, he had become a firm champion of the Port agency, with its wide-ranging mandate, as the best instrument for grappling with interstate transport problems. The political bickering that delayed the tunnel commissions, and the fact that his tunnel agency had to tap state tax revenues in order to build the Holland Tunnel, reinforced Smith’s preference for the Port Authority.64 In the summer of 1923, Smith joined forces with his fellow Democrat, Governor Silzer of New Jersey, to argue that all future bridges and tunnels between the two states should be built by the Port Authority, not the tunnel commissions. A few months later, Smith urged that the Holland Tunnel, then partly completed, be transferred to the Port Authority; and in 1924 and 1925, Smith worked with Cohen on a scheme that would allow the Port Authority to divert most of the Holland Tunnel’s anticipated revenues in order to underwrite the Port agency’s bridge-building bonds. Meanwhile, in discussions with the Authority’s commissioners, Cohen pointed to the danger to the agency’s credit rating if the tunnel commissions, or any other body, could construct Hudson River crossings that might siphon off toll revenue from the 179th Street bridge.65 These early efforts to give the Port Authority a dominant position ran into opposition from Republican legislators in both states. The GOP majorities at Albany and Trenton tended to prefer the tunnel commissioners, most of whom were Republicans; and they also favored allowing private corporations to float their own bonds and build vehicular tunnels under the Hudson. For the next several years, that political division held firm, as one joint agency completed the Canal Street tunnel, while the other worked on the 179th Street bridge. Once the Holland Tunnel opened, in November 1927, its builders turned their attention to the possibility of constructing a series of five more tunnels
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under the Hudson River. With traffic during the first year running far above predictions, it was likely that the Holland would reach its capacity by the early 1930s, so the tunnel commissions thought it essential to begin planning promptly for new crossings, in order to avoid heavy congestion around the Holland a few years hence. Moreover, it appeared certain that “profits” from this first crossing could pay for the additional tunnels, which would be built during the next quarter century. At the end of 1928, the tunnel commissioners recommended that the two states empower them to commence the new building program at once. The Port Authority countered by urging instead that it be authorized to construct a series of interstate vehicular tunnels, and Cohen carried a draft statute to Albany.66 The Authority’s counter-proposal provided a stimulus to its critics, who hoped to cut off the expansive reach of that struggling child before it could do more damage. The attack was led by upstate Republicans, who brought a variety of motives to the fray. Some found the Port agency, with its Democratic party stamp, far less appealing than the tunnel commissions; and Roosevelt’s announcement, early in 1929, that he would appoint an inexperienced political aide to the Port Authority board fanned their antagonism. Others thought that profit-making bridges and tunnels should be the province of private operators. And many viewed the Port agency as a “socialistic” enterprise—and as the opening wedge in a campaign to create government bodies that would sponsor water-power projects across New York State, and build public housing, and do other things inconsistent with American capitalism. A Port Authority with its ambitions sharply curtailed might put an end to that sort of thinking; abolition of the bi-state anomaly would be an even more certain antidote.67 In January 1929, the Republican majority in Albany introduced a bill which would authorize the tunnel commissions to go forward with their program. The GOP leadership also contacted their Republican brethren at Trenton, in the hope of developing a joint strategy to abolish the Port Authority and turn over some of its duties to the tunnel commissioners. New York City’s Democratic representatives in the state legislature joined the attack, criticizing the Port agency’s insulation from close accountability, and arguing that its projects were retarding development in Queens and other outlying parts of the city.68 The counterattack on behalf of the Port Authority was led by New York City business leaders who had pressed for its creation ten years earlier and had defended its efforts since, against critics on both sides of the River. The State Chamber of Commerce warned that abolishing the Port agency would
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be harmful to economic development in the region. The Chamber and a dozen other business associations praised the Port Authority for its great bridge projects, which were the result of “the most efficient staff of engineers and experts dealing with transportation and terminal problems ever organized in one body”—and of its ability to resist “political interference in the acquisition of real estate [and] in the letting of contracts.” To these business executives, the use of revenue bonds to finance a large government program, planned and carried out by an independent agency, was now referred to as “the Port Authority method,” not as creeping socialism. It was an approach which gave great weight to the judgment of bond investors in assessing a government agency’s expertise and independence from politics, and which for large projects “should prevail.”69 The New York Times picked up the Port Authority cause, arguing that the Republican plan to abolish the agency was nearly incomprehensible, in view of its great successes in bridge building. The attack from Albany could only be understood, the Times argued, as a belated effort by “the Old Guard” to undermine the record of Al Smith as governor. “They may think,” the Times concluded, that “the time has come for vengeance, if not on him, then on some of the institutions which he cherished.”70 Republican legislators from Manhattan soon broke away from the upstate contingent and introduced a draft statute that Julius Henry Cohen had prepared, giving the Port Authority the power to “construct, operate or lease tunnels for vehicular traffic” under the Hudson. And Governor Roosevelt, resisting the criticism from New York City Democrats, said that he thought the Port Authority “has done a darn good job”—although he said he had yet not made up his own mind on the competing bills. Sounding two themes often associated with Republican philosophy, he suggested that bond financing of the new tunnel via the Port Authority might be preferable (since it would keep the project from being a burden on the taxpayer), and that no action should be taken which might harm the bonds already issued to finance the Port agency’s first four bridges.71 Meanwhile, the anti-Port Authority moves at Albany failed to provoke similar action among Republican legislators at Trenton. Despite Governor Larson’s sometime skepticism, and occasional grumbling from Hudson County, the Port agency’s four bridge projects had generated extensive political support for its work; and its continued efforts to champion rail transit and marine terminals enhanced its reputation in the Garden State. Faced with these obstacles to their anti-Port Authority plans, the Republican leaders in Albany backed away from their efforts to abolish the agency and to put the expanded
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interstate program in the hands of the Holland Tunnel commissioners. However, they were unwilling to support the bill that would have authorized the Port Authority to begin that task. When the state legislature adjourned in the spring of 1929, both bills still languished in committee.72
The Holland Tunnel Captured No further action was taken during the rest of the year, but it became clear that the stand-off between the two agencies could not be allowed to continue. Traffic through the Holland continued to expand rapidly throughout 1929, and it seemed essential to begin another crossing. In the first days of 1930, the tunnel commissioners reported that their staff had carried out extensive engineering and traffic studies, and that they were ready to proceed with a new crossing from New Jersey to 38th Street in Manhattan. This time the Port Authority did not respond with its own proposal. Instead, after consultations with Cohen and the Port Authority board, Governor Roosevelt announced a new approach: Rather than choosing one or the other of these fine agencies, FDR suggested, why not have “a wedding between the two bodies,” permitting a united body to go forward at once with the midtown tunnel?73 A close look at his proposal made it clear that the new agency would be the Port Authority, with its name, its bond-issuing powers, and its wide-ranging mandate intact. Some tunnel commissioners would be added to the Port agency’s board, however, and their staff would be appended to the team headed by Cohen, Ramsey, and Ammann. The merger plan was readily accepted by the Port Authority commissioners; and Governor Larson soon endorsed it and persuaded his GOP legislative majority to accept the scheme. Seeing no viable alternative, the Republican leadership in Albany also endorsed the plan. The New York Times added its voice in support; but it also suggested that the Port Authority be prevented from siphoning off the profits from its vehicular projects to advance its other interests: There has been some apprehension lest the Port Authority, if left to its own devices, use the proceeds . . . to bolster its other port enterprises. Such fears could easily be allayed by setting up a separate bridge and tunnel fund. If at any point in the future it should show a surplus not required for new crossings, it could be devoted to the reduction of tolls on those already in operation.74
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It was just that strategy—the use of bridge-and-tunnel profits to extend the Port Authority into other domains—that Cohen’s successors would propose a decade later, and that the New York Times would then fervently endorse. But in these early years, the imaginative reach of the “Port Authority method” was only a vague goal, not fully understood, except perhaps by Julius Henry Cohen. In the face of the growing enthusiasm for a merger, only the beleaguered tunnel commissioners held out. In early March, they issued a staff report which outlined a tunnel plan that would cost $61 million, well below the Port Authority’s estimate. And they again urged that the two states permit them to go forward alone, using the same financing methods they had employed on the Holland Tunnel. But that would have required New York State to finance its share from tax revenues, which was unattractive to Republicans and Democrats alike in the Depression year of 1930; and New Jersey, which had funded the Holland with a state-wide bond issue, would again need a state-wide referendum, a sure cause of delay. The Port Authority’s ability to float its own bonds and its strong record in completing its bridges under estimated cost—plus Governor Roosevelt’s reluctance to support the tunnelcommission alternative—had already won over wary Republicans in both states, and the new plea gained little support.75 Meanwhile, Cohen and his colleagues added another nail to the tunnel commission’s coffin, warning against any compromise that would leave that body in charge of the Holland, while the Port Authority built a new tunnel nearby. With divided control, they argued, the two organizations might then compete for traffic by lowering tolls; and if that occurred, the ability of both agencies to repay their debts would be endangered.76 These several arguments were persuasive, and by the middle of April, 1930, both states had enacted legislation which turned over operation of the Holland Tunnel to the Port Authority, and which directed the Port agency to study the feasibility of a second tunnel. Several months later, the Port Authority reported that a midtown tube could be constructed without recourse to tax funds; the entire $96 million would be paid for out of the receipts from the Holland. At that point the two states found it easy to take the final step: The bi-state agency was authorized to build the midtown tunnel, and to control the revenues from all the interstate crossings; this approach was justified, said the statute, “in partial effectuation” of that distinguished relic, “the comprehensive plan.” Moreover, the states agreed that they would not authorize any new interstate crossings in the Port District, unless they were also placed under the control of the Port Authority. There was, however, one exception—
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the bridge approved by Congress in 1890, which might at some point be built by Gustav Lindenthal’s North River Bridge Company. And so Lindenthal’s great enterprise was not yet quite dead.77 But the joint commissions that had built the world’s longest underwater tunnel, and grown wealthy on its proceeds, were. In the legislative package which transferred the operation of the Holland Tunnel to the Port Authority, the number of Port commissioners was increased from six to twelve, permitting several tunnel commissioners to be added to the Port Authority, and the New York and New Jersey tunnel agencies were thereupon abolished. So the “wedding” of the two bodies which FDR had proposed turned out to be the funeral of the senior bi-state agency, which was then just over a decade old.78
Triumph Before the Fall As the two states were moving toward embracing the “Port Authority solution” to the problem of bridge and tunnel crossings, the agency also took a significant step in the rail field. In 1930, it reached a firm agreement with the railroads to go forward with the freight terminal at 15th Street in Manhattan, and construction began in the spring of 1931. The gigantic building would not only make freight distribution more efficient, said the Port Authority, it would actually be a break-even proposition: the bottom two floors would handle rail freight packages, and the Port agency would add 14 more floors on top, in order to generate rental income.79 Early in 1931, the Port Authority added to its political credit by announcing that it could now repay a large portion of the advances given by the two states for the interstate crossings, and in March it delivered checks for $25 million to Albany and Trenton. Governor Roosevelt warmly thanked the Port Authority for its timely “gift,” which he said averted a tax increase.80 Three months later, the Port Authority’s chairman announced that the George Washington Bridge would be ready sooner than expected—probably within a few months.81 And so October 1931 was a time of great celebration at the Port Authority and across the metropolis, as the two halves of the region were joined by the elegant structure created in Othmar Ammann’s mind, and then on paper, and now over a great expanse of water. Writing shortly before the span opened, New Jersey’s Governor Larson emphasized a contribution of Ammann’s span that, while no doubt true, might seem to some a reminder of interstate competition rather than a cooperative spirit—the Hudson span as a route to escape: “The verdant hills and valleys of North Jersey will prove a
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veritable paradise to hundreds of families who have heretofore been compelled to live in cramped quarters.” His New York counterpart stressed a theme that was more Progressive than competitive. The bridge was “evidence of what can be accomplished when true efficiency is applied to civic projects . . . a gratifying contrast to the story of delays, procrastinations and endless disappointments which have often been the fate of great public enterprises in the past.” Referring to Ammann as the individual most responsible for the design and rapid completion of this “monument . . . to this motor age,” Governor Roosevelt concluded that “his work marks a new high standard in public service.”82 On October 24, 30,000 citizens of the two states gathered at Fort Lee and Washington Heights for the formal dedication ceremonies. Governors Larson and Roosevelt again extolled the staff and commissioners of the Port Authority, and FDR stressed a theme that he would later attempt to apply on the national scene: “Their methods are charting the course toward the more able and honorable administration of our nation’s affairs—a course they have proved can be safely steered through political waters with intelligence and integrity at the helm.” At this festive occasion, there were many rounds of applause, the New York Times reported; but “probably the greatest” was that “accorded to Mr. Ammann and Gustav Lindenthal . . . dean of American bridge builders, who came to the grandstand in the same automobile.” So, in an act of generosity, Ammann was reconciled with his mentor, from whom he had departed in despair more than eight years earlier.83 The sunny weather which enveloped the Port of New York Authority did not end in October of 1931. Three weeks later, its Bayonne Bridge was opened to vehicular traffic, again to widespread acclaim; and at the close of the year, the bi-state agency reported that it was in “a stronger position financially than it has ever enjoyed.” But the storm clouds were gathering: Traffic across the Goethals and Outerbridge crossings declined in 1931, as a result of the Depression, and revenues were barely sufficient to meet the annual expenses of the two bridges. Meanwhile, the two states approved the midtown tunnel in the spring of 1931, but the bond market had weakened, so the Port Authority decided not to issue bonds or begin construction until economic conditions improved, hopefully in 1932. Fortunately the revenues from the Holland Tunnel continued to expand, more than meeting the costs of the agency’s other projects.84 Within a few months, however, the Great Depression would unleash a chilling rain on the Port Authority and all its expansive hopes—for a thriving
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system of inland freight terminals, for modern piers at Jersey City, Hoboken, and Jamaica Bay, and for more vehicular tunnels under the Hudson, as well as improved rail transit and those fabled railroad belt lines. It was a rain that would last for ten long years.
The Construction and Dangers of Myth A myth is . . . a set of missions and aspirations that guide a bureaucracy and give it legitimacy. . . . Myths bind the members of the organization together, give them direction, and foster external support. —Erwin C. Hargrove85
In any society which maintains contested elections and other ingredients of democracy, its government agencies will face recurring demands that they be “accountable to the people” and “responsive to individual citizen needs.” The citizenry will make other demands as well—that public agencies take vigorous action to solve social problems, for example, and that government programs be conducted “efficiently.” As Herbert Kaufman has shown, these various goals will often be in conflict, and one set may dominate in one era, to be supplanted some years later by another.86 The Port Authority was born in an era when political insulation, coupled with the use of experts, was a lively—if contested—strategy in designing public programs. Progressive impulses permitted Cohen and his allies to create a regional enterprise, outside the ready control of traditional municipal and state electorates, and to provide it with a mandate to improve efficiency in transport; yet the new agency was given very modest tools with which to carry out its mission. It could gather a coterie of planning experts and engineers, and they could sketch out paper plans to modernize the region’s transportation system and so strengthen the economy of the metropolis. And so they did; and the Port Authority was soon viewed as objective planner, whose ideas held a crucial key to the region’s economic future. But could it do more? Could it take effective action to reorganize the complex and inefficient freight system of the region? Perhaps—if it had been provided with some coercive power. At its creation, however, state officials stripped away the elements of coercion Cohen had sewn into the fabric of the draft charter; and though the bi-state agency pleaded for several years thereafter for subpoena power and other useful teeth to apply to railroad flanks, none were supplied. Nor did the ICC provide the missing
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goad through the collaborative efforts that Cohen sought; in the Harding/ Coolidge era, that national agency was reluctant to tie its future to a vigorous campaign, led by Cohen’s reformers, which seemed antagonistic to the “rights of private enterprise.” As we have seen in chapters 4 and 5, the promise of the Port agency’s rhetoric could not, under these conditions, be converted into effective action. Yet the Port Authority still flew the banner of Progressive efficiency and might draw some comfort from its waving. For the banner had two distinct sides, each of complex design. The first was “regional efficiency,” with its emphasis on outcomes—on better transportation and terminal systems. Initially the agency concentrated on the Comprehensive Plan, with its concern for improving railroad and marine-terminal efficiency via a scheme of rail belt lines and tunnels, capped by freight terminals to improve local efficiency in distributing goods. However, when Ammann and Silzer challenged the bistate agency to expand its domain, and include major vehicular projects, the basic source of legitimate action—though little acknowledged by the Authority—was the original Compact, which captured a wider vision of ways to improve regional efficiency and was far more open-ended than the Plan. The Compact provided the perspective that would later be given wide employment as the agency expanded into airports, bus stations and truck terminals. The second part of this Progressive banner was focused on the “efficiency of means”—on the design of institutions whose officials would have the incentives and capacity to think creatively about ways to achieve regional or outcome efficiency. This side of efficiency, as seen in the Port Authority, had two facets. First, there was the formal design of the institution: its commissioners were appointed for fixed and overlapping terms, in order to mute the impact of electoral politics and partisan conflict on the agency’s leadership and to encourage its members to think in long-range terms. Of course the governor’s veto power might pierce this shield, so it was not surprising that Cohen, the Port commissioners, and even Al Smith resisted that measure in the late 1920s. The Port agency was also insulated from the complexities of politics through its distinctive method of raising funds. In contrast to most government agencies, the Port Authority could not depend upon tax revenues to undergird its programs; it would have to rely almost entirely on floating bonds to be repaid from its projected earnings. Therefore the agency would face the scrutiny of potential bondholders, and this scrutiny would generate a continuing pressure toward “integrity and efficiency” in the agency’s programs; that was the hope of Cohen and his colleagues, and to some extent, as the battles of the late 1920s suggest, it was a hope realized.87
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Moreover, if bonds could be sold based on predicted future performance, a stable flow of funds might be expected, and this stability would aid careful planning and efficient action in carrying out complex projects. Thus the Port Authority’s capacity to float its own bonds gave Ammann a great advantage in the 1920s, in striking contrast to the financial uncertainties that plagued the Holland Tunnel builders. Because the Port agency was identified from its early years with efficiency—efficiency of outcomes and of means—it attracted skilled engineers and planners and lawyers, who thought this was a place they could ply their trades without “extraneous” (political) interference. The same banner of efficiency then led the agency’s commissioners, despite their political roots and connections, to keep “hands off”—to allow the experts they had hired to follow their own professional strategies for action; and at times, as we have seen in chapters 6 and 7, this led to interesting elements of administrative and engineering creativity. So there was much reality in the view that the Port Authority was an exemplar of a major Progressive theme—that governmental action should be based on careful analysis by experts, and directed toward the efficient achievement of programs which would have long-term social benefits. In an important sense, however, this theme was also myth. Not in the sense that it was fanciful or false. Rather, it was mythical as the term is used by Selznick and Hargrove; it provided “a set of missions and aspirations” that could shape the common understanding of the organization’s members and inspire them to greater achievement; and that could also encourage citizens, interest groups, and public officials to offer aid and comfort to this Progressive champion as it sought the region’s greater glory.88 And with these apparent strengths came some important dangers. On the positive side, the Comprehensive Plan provided a sense of coherent purpose, which shaped the efforts of the Port Authority’s early engineers and planners and educated the commissioners to think in long-range terms throughout the 1920s. As noted in chapter 4, the Plan did have some elements of a pork barrel—rail spurs here and there to gain local support, without a sense of ordered priorities. Yet it offered a distinctive vision, based on analysis by experts, of how the region’s economy might be made more efficient and more vigorous. On the negative side, the Plan and its implicit imperative—that the railroads must be persuaded or forced to cooperate—seem to have become an ideological stance to Cohen and his associates, rather than a provisional strategy for economic growth. As the discussion in chapters 4 and 5 suggests, the
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Port Authority’s leaders were so committed to the assumptions underlying the 1921 Plan that they failed to understand the depth of the railroads’ commitment to their own familiar world—a world oriented toward attracting and holding freight shippers in competition with other rail corporations, in the hope your own railroad would thereby maximize traffic and profits. So it was that the Port agency badly underestimated the difficulty of imposing Cohen’s “public utility” concept on rail executives who had grown up in that quasicompetitive world.89 Once the Port Authority had been persuaded to add motor-vehicle projects to its slate, its commitment to the myth (and mission) of regional and procedural efficiency proved to be of real benefit. It seemed evident that the new bridges would make travel across the region more efficient. To achieve that goal, the commissioners and senior staff were willing to give the engineers much room to maneuver; and we have seen that the commissioners were also willing to fend off politicians and professional kibitzers whose demands would have caused delay—and might have yielded the Port Authority only a weak reputation as mere replica of the slow-moving tunnel agency. Shielded by this high-level team of in-house Progressives, Ammann and his aides were able to organize their tasks with some confidence that Moore, Strauss, and others who battered at the gates would not interfere with staff judgments; and the engineering staff could then experiment with new technical methods and with innovative ways of organizing their tasks, and so achieve stunning levels of efficiency—as measured by speed, cost and quality of results—in completing the four bridge projects. It would not be accurate, however, to describe Ammann’s leadership during the six-year effort to build these bridges as a simple application of principles of efficiency. His activities involved a more complex dynamic: In their public statements, the Port Authority’s commissioners and top executives emphasized that their construction efforts must adhere to the banner of efficiency; and this rhetoric served as a shield, partially emancipating Ammann and his top aides from the need to divert their efforts in order to grapple with sporadic political pressures. As a result, they were able to devote their energies to leading their technical staff and contractors, and to encouraging them to meet the challenges of construction in innovative ways. That creative effort broadened the texture of the Progressive myth, converting it from a simple focus on efficient ways of utilizing men and materials to a set of aspirations that could capture and hold staff loyalty over a period of years. A similar broadening would occur in the 1940s and 1950s under Austin Tobin and his senior staff.
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These experiences raise some doubt that Philip Selznick is accurate in denying the stamp of creative leadership to those who work in organizations with “narrow, practical aims.” The “Ammann Bridge” was a narrow and practical goal; yet the administrative methods used by its builder probably rank with the best examples of creative leadership as this theme has been articulated by Selznick, Peter Drucker, and others.90 Following Pendleton Herring, one may say that the Port Authority’s partial insulation allowed the agency to take the “positive political action” needed to overcome the “chaos” of varied and conflicting schemes that had been put forward to solve the problem of regional traffic congestion. Its insulation—a partial reality reinforced by myth—did carry with it the danger that the agency would be viewed as too isolated, as arrogant, as a “superstate” outside the legitimate traditions of a democratic society. On occasion during the 1920s, as we have seen, this was the complaint of New Jersey’s governors, state legislators at Albany and Trenton, and some local leaders. More objective observers have also seen a touch of arrogance in Port Authority behavior during that era; for example, the agency’s sharp criticism of the Committee on the Regional Plan, when the leaders of that distinguished group endorsed the Narrows Tunnel, might justify the charge. That criticism would seem more persuasive three decades later, however, when the Port agency, despite widespread criticism, constructed the World Trade Center and fought for years to spread a gigantic airport across northern New Jersey.91 Finally, the Port Authority’s emphasis on expert analysis and efficient action carried with it the danger that it would give too great emphasis to the views and needs of bondholders, who (as Cohen pointed out) provided an external test that the agency’s work was achieving high standards of “integrity and efficiency.” The bondholders and their bankers held a narrow perspective, focused on protecting the security of their investments. To use that view as the standard for achievement, as Cohen at times appeared to, would limit and probably cripple the Port agency’s contribution to regional development. In fact, within a year or two that “banker’s mentality” would dominate the bistate agency, and in the dark period of the Depression, the Progressive myth seemed almost to disappear, though it continued to be nourished in the byways and corridors of the agency. From these byways, in the 1940s, some broader possibilities for regional action would then emerge.
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Part Three
Drift and the Sources of Renewal
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8 Near Bankruptcy and the Loss of Vision
One has the feeling of going it blindly . . . because we’re in a tremendous stream, and none of us knows where we’re going to land. —Eleanor Roosevelt, March 19331
Construction work remaining uncompleted but which is not absolutely necessary has been deferred. . . . During the year a total of 235 positions have been abolished. . . . Conditions beyond the control of the Port Authority necessitated the derangement of an organization which had taken so many years in its formation. —Commissioners of the Port of New York Authority, March 1, 19332
T
he enviable reputation the Port Authority had achieved by the fall of 1931 was not lost in a day, or in a year. Indeed, one might argue that it was not lost at all during the Depression years, as close observers regularly praised the agency for its wide-ranging activities and successful projects. Archibald Macleish wrote admiringly of the Port Authority’s efforts to overcome the region’s railroad and shipping problems; he thought it “one of the most interesting and potentially one of the most formidable political agencies America has yet produced.” The New York Times commended the Authority for its “immense program of bridge building and tunnel digging” and its “fiscal prowess.” In the late 1930s, the governors of both states applauded the agency for its accomplishments—which matched “our highest standard of industrial efficiency”—and for its efforts to champion cooperative action to end “petty rivalries and narrow sectionalism.” At the end of the decade, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, once a vigorous critic of the agency’s efforts, surveyed its work through the 1930s and extolled the Port Authority for its “splendid record of achievement.”3 The reality, however, was quite different. Whether measured by new projects undertaken and completed, by its financial strength, or by the vision 181
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of its leaders, the Port Authority’s performance in the decade following completion of the George Washington Bridge fell far short of the hopes expressed at its dedication in 1931. Perhaps the applause visited on the agency during the next ten years was deserved—but mainly as acknowledgement that the projects finished in its first decade were continuing to yield valued fruit. In its second decade, the Port Authority skirted close to bankruptcy, Ammann’s famous engineering department was nearly abolished and its leader departed, and the agency devoted much of its political effort to fending off attacks from hostile elements in New Jersey and in the Roosevelt Administration. Despite the praise from the New York Times and others, by 1941–42 its closest sympathetic observer could conclude with good reason that the agency’s activities had become “totally receptive rather than aggressive,” and its energies were devoted mainly to monitoring traffic and “collecting tolls to pay off its debt.”4 A major factor in this malaise was the Great Depression; as Eleanor Roosevelt’s comment suggests, it was difficult to explore new ideas and programs when the economy was in chaos. However, energetic and imaginative public officials could still find interesting and useful strategies for action, as Fiorello LaGuardia and Robert Moses demonstrated during these same years. So the Port agency’s weaker record in the 1930s was the result of a mixture of external forces and its own leadership, constraints, and policy choices. The first task of Part Three is to analyze the problems the Port Authority encountered and the responses of its top officials during the years from 1931 to 1942, and chapter 8 is devoted to that set of concerns. The larger task, which occupies the next two chapters, is to locate and examine the sources of the Port Authority’s later revitalization. After 1942 the bistate agency would emerge as a major political and economic force, in the New York region and nationally, with an agenda far broader than the bridgeand-tunnel focus of its first two decades. An important reason for that metamorphosis is found in the organization’s quasi-bureaucratic character, for it had begun life as a loose aggregation of specialists, and the attempts to centralize control had succeeded only partially. In the counsel’s office in particular, a sense of intellectual play was permitted by the division’s leadership throughout the 1930s, and the assaults which private corporations and the Roosevelt Administration directed at the Port Authority challenged staff members to stretch their minds, so that they could devise complex legal and political strategies in response. By 1942 the battleground was strewn with old legal doctrines and new cases; and a national coalition, led by an entrepreneurial team of Port Authority lawyers, had defeated FDR’s attempt to strip
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tax exemption from state and local bonds. Meanwhile, a few planners tucked away in the agency’s catacombs had begun to think expansively about the agency’s future role, and in 1940–41 they sketched out ideas for new projects that could augment the agency’s modest reach. In chapters 9 and 10, we explore the mixture of bureaucratic traditions, strategic opportunities, and individual skill and passion which made the 1930s a period of renewal as well as decay at the Port Authority. And which set the stage, by the summer of 1942, for the Port Authority to enter new domains, and for the battles we will examine in later chapters.
The Decline and Fall of Many Plans When Ammann’s great bridges were completed in the fall of 1931, the Port Authority looked forward to new opportunities, in the field of motor vehicles and beyond. Early in 1932, the Port Authority reported that it would shortly begin work on a new two-tube vehicular tunnel to midtown Manhattan, and that both tubes would be completed by 1937; it also expressed confidence that traffic demand would continue to increase and identified the locations for three more tunnels and two additional bridges across the Hudson. However, its leaders’ optimistic hopes soon confronted the deadening impact of the Great Depression. Traffic on most of its facilities declined in 1932 and 1933, and the bond market collapsed, compelling the Port agency to apply for a loan from the federal government to begin work on the new tunnel. The loan would permit the Port Authority to construct only a single tube, but that was better than stopping the project altogether, and the agency began digging in the spring of 1934. Ultimately a federal grant of $4.8 million subsidized completion of this first tube of the Lincoln Tunnel, which opened in December 1937.5 Meanwhile, traffic increased in 1936–37 and the Port agency gave the green light to a second tube. Then the 1938 recession struck. It was soon clear that the first tube was piling up a large deficit; and as the Port Authority’s general economic condition weakened, work was indefinitely suspended on the second project. Three years passed before construction was again resumed, early in 1941, and the second tube would not open to traffic until 1945.6
The End of Railroad “Cooperation” Plans for a series of Manhattan freight terminals also entered the 1930s in a spirit of optimism, which was soon eroded, as the railroads retreated to their
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traditional pattern of antipathy. The Port Authority’s original scheme called for nine stations, where freight from all the rail lines would be sorted; it would then be delivered in efficient batches to local stores and factories, thus eliminating thousands of pickups and deliveries by the individual rail carriers. When the railroads resisted in the late 1920s, the plan had been whittled down to three Manhattan terminals, and in 1930 the rail executives had endorsed the Port Authority’s plan to construct the first inland freight terminal at 15th Street. The Authority staff designed a huge 16-story structure, extending from Eighth to Ninth Avenue, with the lower two floors devoted to receiving and sorting railroad freight and the rest of the building available for commercial and industrial rentals. Construction was started in the spring of 1931, and by October 1932 the lower floors were completed and the freight sorting operation was underway. Port Authority officials asserted that the terminal would make the New York region a leader in the efficient handling of freight, and Herbert Lehman, New York’s acting governor while FDR was campaigning for the presidency, viewed the structure as impressive evidence that “unplanned and wasteful competition” was at an end. There is “no finer example of sound and able cooperation between government and private agencies than Inland Terminal No. 1,” he declared. With eight railroads committed to using the new system, the bi-state agency looked forward to taking an important stride in meeting the “efficiency goals” of the Comprehensive Plan. It also expected to generate a brisk rental business on the upper floors, which would help to pay for the freight operations below.7 The new era of cooperation lasted only a few months. By early 1933 it was clear to the Port Authority that the railroads were still relying mainly on their individual delivery stations and trucks; despite their weakened financial condition, the rail lines seemed reluctant to embrace a cooperative system as a way to save money and improve service. The bi-state agency responded by ending the truce they had accepted in the late 1920s. With President Roosevelt and his aides searching for ways to improve the railroad situation, the Port Authority attacked “waste and inefficiency” in the rail industry and joined the growing band of critics who urged that a federal coordinator be named, and given the power to compel the railways to consolidate their terminal operations.8 During the spring, Congress responded by creating the position of Federal Coordinator of Transportation. Roosevelt then appointed a reform-minded member of the ICC, Joseph B. Eastman, to take the post. However, when Eastman urged the railroads to consolidate their terminals in several cities,
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they resisted; and when he tried to order consolidation of competitive terminals, railroad management and labor joined forces in opposition, and in 1936 they persuaded Congress to eliminate Eastman’s position. Even in the Depression, with some of the carriers in bankruptcy, competitive capitalism was alive, if not well, in the American railroad industry.9 Throughout the 1930s, the railroads continued to use the Port Authority terminal for only a small portion of their traffic, and even with the upper floors nearly fully rented, in most years the terminal building barely broke even. In 1939 and 1940, the Port Authority again called attention to “wasteful” railroad practices and urged the rail lines to take steps to unify their terminal operations; otherwise, the agency warned, federal legislation would soon compel them to act. But Washington was always occupied with other matters. The Port Authority’s hopes for an extensive system of rail freight terminals limped into the 1940s on one shaky terminal leg, and the second and third terminals never would be built.10
Financial Decay and the New Bonds The traffic and revenue problems at the inland terminal and the Lincoln Tunnel were part of a pattern of financial deterioration which infected all the Port Authority’s projects except the Holland crossing, and which tended to move its leadership away from a broad concern with regional challenges and toward a narrow focus on its own money problems. Early in 1932 staff salaries were reduced 5–10 percent, and as revenues declined during the year, the agency deferred scheduled construction work, laid off dozens of employees, and announced that all staff members would be ordered to take two weeks extra vacation without pay. Bridge and tunnel traffic dropped still further in 1933, and despite a modest upturn in 1934, the Port Authority faced a clear danger that its reserves would be too depleted to pay off the bonds that were due to mature in 1937 and 1938.11 To overcome this problem, the agency decided to issue new bonds with 35-to-40 year maturities and low interest rates (due to the depressed bond market), and to use these issues to refund the outstanding securities; in 1934 these totaled $152 million. The new “General and Refunding Bonds” would also gather all the Port agency’s debt into a unified reserve, which could then be used to underwrite any authorized project. The refunding program was begun in March 1935, and the agency overcame the immediate crisis. In the long term, however, the Port Authority’s viability would depend on a sharp upturn in vehicular traffic, on new projects which might generate extra rev-
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enue to offset the drain of the Staten Island spans, and perhaps on further grants from federal and state governments.12 The uncertain condition of the Port agency’s finances, combined with the region’s general economic malaise, halted further studies of several projects that had once appeared highly promising. Plans for a modern marine terminal in Jersey City were completed by the end of 1931, with the prospect that construction might soon begin; the following year, the effort was suspended indefinitely. The Port Authority’s proposal to buy and modernize Hoboken’s piers was derailed by a purchase price that exceeded its means. The question of a regional food terminal for the Newark area, carefully studied in 1930–31, was dropped from further consideration as the Depression proceeded. Extensive studies of regional rail-transit needs, begun in 1927 as a joint project of the Port Authority and other public agencies, were suspended late in 1931, and the regional study group never reconvened.13
Patronage and Political Conflict Meanwhile, because the Port Authority was no longer actively engaged in major new projects of visible benefit to the region, the agency became more vulnerable to patronage incursions and political attacks. Like a ship adrift in the harbor, the bi-state vessel became an attractive home for barnacles of various sorts and for salvos launched from unfriendly shores. Throughout the 1930s, the usual trickle of patronage demands continued from both shores of the Hudson. More troubling was the decision of the Port Commissioners to appoint Morgan Larson as “consulting engineer” to the Port Authority, with a substantial salary, shortly after he completed his term as New Jersey’s governor in 1932. Although Larson was a certified engineer, his appointment suggested to some that the agency wanted to curry favor with Larson’s Republican colleagues in the New Jersey legislature, and this impression undercut the Port Authority’s reputation as a nonpolitical enterprise.14 Democrat A. Harry Moore returned as New Jersey’s governor in 1932, and he soon named John Milton to the Authority board; Milton was a close associate of Jersey City mayor Frank Hague, and the appointment suggested that Jersey City’s political machine would now have a direct route to Port Authority jobs. Then, late in 1933, John Galvin, a long-time Port Authority board member and active Tammany Democrat, resigned from the board at the age of 71 and was immediately appointed to the staff at $12,000 a year, one
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of the agency’s highest salaries. Galvin’s title was “Director of Port Development” and he held that post until 1936. The title and salary suggested a position of importance, but port development issues were handled by staff members who did not report to Galvin, and his role was described as “advisory” with unspecified duties.15 The Port Authority also attracted renewed and unwanted attention from those who doubted that its regional projects would help to raise all local “boats.” In 1932, the Queens Borough president attacked the agency’s efforts as mainly beneficial to New Jersey and urged the state legislature to force the Authority to “end, once and for all, the development of another State at the expense of the New York section” of the metropolis. The Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce criticized the Port agency for devoting its energies to vehicular projects that would benefit New Jersey and Manhattan, while neglecting its long-promised tunnel, which would bring the nation’s railroads directly into Brooklyn. And a few months later, the Brooklyn group joined forces with the Queens Chamber of Commerce in opposing construction of the Lincoln Tunnel.16 On the New Jersey side of the Hudson, the bi-state agency came under fire during the 1930s on issues old and new. The most prominent old issue involved the “lighterage problem.” In 1929, as noted in chapter 7, New Jersey officials had revived their dormant campaign against New York City, urging the ICC to force the railroads to charge more to shippers who floated their goods across the Hudson than to those whose goods were destined for factories and ship terminals on the New Jersey side. In 1933, the ICC examiner agreed with the New Jersey position, rejecting the arguments of the Port Authority that freight rates throughout the port should remain unified and dealing the bi-state agency and its New York compatriots a stunning defeat. “Free lighterage has retarded the development of shipping facilities and business on the New Jersey shore,” he concluded, and rail lines that floated goods across the harbor must levy an additional charge for this service. Abandoning their reluctant silence of the Larson years, Port Authority officials joined with New York business leaders in condemning the report. The extra charge, they argued, would cause shippers to divert traffic to Baltimore and other rival ports, not to the undeveloped shorelines of Newark, Jersey City, and Bayonne.17 At this point, the conflict of two decades earlier was sharply revived, as Newark business leaders and state politicians endorsed the examiner’s recommendation. Governor Moore praised the decision, which he thought would “stimulate enormously industrial and commercial development on
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the New Jersey side.” If the full ICC accepted the examiner’s verdict, said the Newark Chamber of Commerce, “hundreds of manufacturing enterprises” would shift their operations from New York to the Garden State. New Jersey leaders also attacked the Port agency for showing favoritism toward New York; it had demonstrated “vicious partisanship” in supporting free lighterage to New York destinations, said the state’s attorney general. The Port Authority then bowed to political pressure and formally withdrew from the case, when it was heard on appeal by the ICC.18 In July 1934, the full Commission reversed the examiner, endorsing free lighterage services as part of an integrated New York port. But this did not quell the competitive fires in New Jersey, and a few years later, Jersey City, Newark, and state officials again urged the ICC to compel the railroads to charge more for deliveries made across the Hudson. During this round, in 1939–40, the Port Authority board decided not to take part, and it was then attacked by Brooklyn officials for failing in its duty to protect the unified port. Once again, the full ICC endorsed free lighterage, and after a quarter century the issue was finally laid to rest.19 A continuing headache throughout the 1930s was the matter of tolls on Port Authority’s bridges and tunnels. The basic rate, when the first transHudson crossings were opened in the late 1920s, was 50 cents for each automobile. In the next few years, there were recurring complaints about the toll level, and by 1937–38 the Port Authority was criticized widely for its “excessive toll barrier” for cars and trucks. These criticisms attracted a strong public following in the northern counties of New Jersey, whose residents traveled frequently to Manhattan to work and shop. “Toll reduction” associations were formed, and motorists were urged to “boycott all Port Authority bridges and tunnels.” The agency’s leaders fought back, vigorously if not always wisely. Chairman Frank Ferguson attacked the groups which demanded toll reductions, accusing them of “malicious propaganda” and arguing that they were publicity-seekers, mainly interested in attracting more members in order to increase their associations’ income. The Port agency would not reduce existing tolls, Ferguson asserted, “regardless of petitions, publicity, personal appearances, or pumped-up pressure.” Another member of the Authority board was equally sensitive to public sentiment, urging New Jersey residents to use “good sense and business judgment” and “cease their irritating agitation for a reduction” in tolls.20 The Ferguson brand of public relations was not likely to soften the antitoll fervor, and in response to growing complaints, the state legislature created a special committee in 1940 to investigate trans-Hudson tolls. The Port Au-
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thority then adopted a more effective strategy. It prepared a 97-page report which opened with praise for state officials who took an active interest in the Port agency’s work. The report then described the agency’s great difficulties in maintaining a sound credit balance during the Depression and argued that any toll reduction in the near future would undermine its ability to pay off its bonds. If toll rates were “subject to political expediency,” the Port Authority concluded, “the credit of the agency would cease to exist.” Moreover, if tolls were reduced very far, the existing debt could only be paid off by “shifting the burden to the taxpayers.”21 Having raised these fears, the Port agency adroitly placed the problem back in the legislature’s court: If the state of New Jersey would allocate funds to provide “adequate arterial highways” to the Lincoln Tunnel, so that more automobiles and trucks could reach that undernourished facility, permitting the second tube to be constructed on a break-even basis, then it might be “prudent” for the Port Authority to consider reducing the toll rate—at some point in the future. The agency’s educational effort won over the special committee, which issued its own report at the end of 1940. The legislators endorsed the Port Authority’s position against immediate reductions in the toll level, and they also urged the state highway department to construct the feeder highways needed to serve the Port Authority’s crossings.22
Agency Adrift Buffeted by all these troubles—weak traffic revenues, railroad noncooperation, and political incursions—the Port Authority found it hard to retain the expansive and optimistic outlook which had stamped its activities in its first decade. Moreover, those who led the agency during the 1930s were disinclined to positive action, and their attitudes dampened whatever fires of change still burned in scattered portions of the staff. The bi-state agency had been fortunate in its first years, attracting venturesome leaders from business and political life—Outerbridge, Gregory, and Silzer—to chair the board. However, these men were succeeded by those with narrower concerns. John Galvin, a Tammany Democrat and a Queens businessman, served as chairman for five years, ending in 1933. The next year, the commissioners elected Frank Ferguson to chair the board, and he remained in that post until 1945. A fiscally conservative banker from Hudson County, Ferguson was actively involved in devising the Port agency’s refunding strategy in 1934–35, and throughout the financial ups and downs of
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the next seven years he held the executive reins and tilted the agency toward a focus on reducing expenditures and paying off the debt. The vice chairman, Howard Cullman, was energetic and a risk-taker; but he did not get along well with Ferguson and was given no executive responsibilities. His most visible activity in the 1930s was his advocacy for the construction and wider use of the inland freight terminal.23 The conservative stance offered by Ferguson was not much moderated by John Ramsey, who was appointed to the top administrative post in the late 1920s and continued as General Manager throughout the 1930s. Ramsey worked closely with Ferguson on the refunding issue and followed the banner of fiscal constraint under the chairman’s leadership. Meanwhile, the staff members who had led the agency’s efforts in the 1920s to think imaginatively about complex port-planning issues, and about modernized piers, regional food terminals, rail transit, and other new projects, were brought under the firm hand of Billings Wilson in the 1930s, as a part of his Development and Operation Department. Wilson, who viewed the efficient operation of the bridges and tunnels as his primary task, ran all his units as elements of a wellorganized quasi-military enterprise, and he was also an enthusiastic member of the cost-cutting team of Ferguson and Ramsey. By the late 1930s, the planning staff, headed by Walter Hedden and labeled the “Bureau of Commerce,” had dwindled to a few men and women. Wilson often marshaled the Bureau’s troops and sent them out to make traffic counts at the bridges and tunnels.24 Much effort was devoted to thinking up ways to generate more traffic; for example, baseball schedules were distributed at the crossings in the hope that they would prompt wary New Jerseyites to venture more often to Yankee Stadium or even as far as the Dodgers’ Ebbetts Field. It was a time to encourage desperate chances. However, the wider planning interests and talents of its staff were not encouraged, and the planners had little influence in agency thinking.25 In the 1920s Othmar Ammann had brought large amounts of entrepreneurial energy to the Port Authority’s tasks, but his impact was diminished in the early 1930s, as the agency’s financial uncertainties weakened prospects for new construction projects; and then Robert Moses captured Ammann’s attention and energies as Moses’ own projects won approval.26 For a time in the early 1930s, Julius Henry Cohen brought a wider perspective and thoughts of new initiatives into central policy councils, but after a heart attack in the mid-1930s, he rested for several hours each workday and largely confined his energies to legal issues confronting the Authority. Cohen had managed to attract into his legal enclave several assistants with imaginative
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energy and a willingness to think in nontraditional ways; but as we will see below, their energies were focused on a range of legal and political challenges which for many years seemed peripheral to the Port agency’s main mission. Not until the 1940s would Port Authority officials, led by Commissioner Howard Cullman and General Manager Ramsey, make the connection between a peripheral “game,” which occupied some of Cohen’s best aides, and the ability of the beleaguered agency to recast its mission and shake loose from the burdens of ten years of drift. With Ferguson taking the leading role in shaping Port Authority policies from 1934 onward, it is not surprising that the staff moved warily in exploring new lines of activity for the bi-state agency. In 1936, the New Jersey legislature asked the Authority to study once again the prospects for improved rail transit between New Jersey and New York City. The agency did so and submitted a report, but it concluded that the Port agency itself could take no responsibility for improving the transit situation because any improvements would generate deficits. Urged to study the prospects for international commercial aviation in the New York region, the Port Authority completed a detailed analysis in 1937 which found that “overseas air transport” would soon become “a commercial reality,” but that airports operating “on a self-supporting basis will be extremely unlikely.” Therefore, the Authority concluded, “such projects are not suitable as Port Authority financial undertakings.”27 Studies of marine terminals in Jersey City, Hoboken, and Brooklyn, once viewed as important to economic development in the region, were not pursued after 1932. Surveys of possible new projects—for a series of union truck terminals and for some solution to the problem of bus congestion—were begun in the late 1930s at the urging of New York City officials and others, but they did not in those years generate much staff enthusiasm.28 So the Port Authority seemed to wander through the decade, buffeted by the winds of economics and politics, its own wary leaders steering only fitfully. And even when traffic and net revenues turned sharply upward, as they did in 1939, 1940, and 1941, the bi-state agency held to the vision captured by a prominent heading in its Annual Report for 1940: The Debt Must Be Repaid.
9 Federalism as a Lawyers’ Playground
You moonshine revellers, and shades of night, You orphan heirs of fixed destiny, Attend your office and your quality. —Shakespeare, Merry Wives of Windsor, V,vi
N
o part of the Port Authority was entirely immune to the malaise of the 1930s. By virtue of its special tasks, however, combined with the incurable optimism of its chief, the Law Department was less prone to infection than most branches of this weakened body. The peculiar place this bistate agency occupied in the American federal system generated continuous legal challenges; and these challenges, together with Julius Henry Cohen’s reputation as a creative thinker, attracted and held able young lawyers who had a taste for battle and a readiness to play the legal game under his shrewd tutelage.1 Cohen and his team hoped to use the legerdemain of the law to ensure that the works of this governmental enterprise were placed on a sound legal footing, despite the opposition of those—a melange of private real estate interests, local government officials, and the U. S. Treasury’s thirsty tax agents—who sought to shackle the agency. But these legal efforts could also serve further purposes, not fully intended or perhaps even fully understood by Cohen and the agency’s executives—encouraging staff members to think imaginatively about ways of using the powers of government; and providing them also with opportunities to act on their imaginings, as they learned how to build political coalitions across the region and across the nation, as a route to achieving their preferred legal and policy goals.
The Protection of Precarious Values A crucial problem facing any organization is the safeguarding and nourishment of its “distinctive values, competence, and role”—and particularly of 192
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those core values that may be lost when the organization’s financial strength deteriorates, or because of jealousies among competing divisions inside the organization and beyond. At the Port Authority, imaginative thinking in matters of engineering and the law had been central to its early life, and the capacity of its champions to think regionally and to build political alliances had been equally important to its creation and during its first decade. Cohen and Ammann had shown exceptional abilities across these realms. As we have seen, the experience of lively challenge and creative, successful response was lost in much of the agency’s offices during the 1930s. In resisting the general malaise, the Law Department was able to safeguard the distinctive values that had made the Port Authority a leader in the field of public enterprise; thus it could serve as an incubator for the kind of entrepreneurial leadership that the Authority would need once the dreary days of the Depression were at an end.2 Yet “incubator” does not provide quite the right image. In the 1930s the legal terrain became a sort of playing field, which permitted those with a taste for combat and an eye on creative possibilities to develop and test their political skills and their leadership capacities. On this testing ground, the Port Authority’s real-estate attorney, Austin Tobin, emerged from the lower ranks of the agency to fight wider legal battles and then marshal a national coalition to oppose the taxing plans of Franklin Roosevelt. By 1942, the majority of the Port Authority’s board was convinced that the veteran of these wars should lead the Port agency into the postwar world; and that conviction set the long-term course for the agency, which would remain under Tobin’s direction for the next thirty years. To understand how Tobin used the legal challenges of the 1930s to vault into a position of major influence, and what values and skills he then brought to the top post at the beginning of the 1940s, we need to proceed through several stages. First, we will examine Tobin’s early history, before he joined the Port Authority in 1927; for his family life and college experiences, in Brooklyn and at Holy Cross, would shape his interests and reveal the passion for inventive play and the organizing talents that he would later use at the Port Authority. Then we will follow the steps by which Tobin moved himself from the periphery of the Port Authority’s concerns to a central position. His strategies during these years (1927–1938) again show a creative mind at work, coupled with a strong dose of playful contrariness. Finally, in chapter 10, we will explore the strategies used by Tobin and his associates to challenge FDR and his Congressional allies on the issue of taxing municipal bonds. This was a campaign that began in 1938 and was still continuing in 1942, when a sharply divided board chose Tobin to be executive director of the agency.
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A Son of Brooklyn and the Church In these artificial days, there are only a few compelling people who become so sincerely bound up in every task to which they are assigned, that they positively fill the atmosphere with their determination. Austin is of that rare and valued type. . . . —Holy Cross College yearbook, 1925
Politics and the docks of New York harbor were part of the heritage of the Tobin family, which in the late nineteenth century made its home near Prospect Park in Brooklyn. Austin’s grandfather, who had emigrated from Ireland, worked at the Brooklyn docks while the great bridge was under construction. Killed in a dock accident at the age of 30, he left a son, Clarence, and a daughter. To help support the family, young Clarence became a messenger boy, but he soon caught the eye of a member of the Brooklyn Democratic organization, who urged him to “go to school; become a stenographer.” And so he did; and through his political connections Clarence gained appointment, beginning in 1901, as stenographer to local public officials. In 1907 he was named to the staff of the state trial court in Brooklyn, where he served as court stenographer for 42 years, until his retirement in 1949.3 In 1902 Clarence married Katharine Moran, whose family was in the funeral business in Brooklyn, and they had four sons. Austin Joseph was the first. Born on May 25, 1903, Austin received an education that was in a formal sense thoroughly Catholic but, when mixed with Tobin’s personal chemistry, was also thoroughly emancipating. Austin attended the parochial school of St. Francis of Assisi Roman Catholic Church, and he then entered St. John’s Catholic preparatory school, graduating in 1921. His next four years were spent at Holy Cross College in Worcester, Massachusetts, from which he graduated near the top of his class in 1925. Later that year he began the study of law at Fordham. Holy Cross was, a college classmate of Tobin’s recalls, a “very rigid Catholic school.” Austin liked parties and he was not averse to a little drinking and gambling; so he sometimes broke college rules, and he accumulated a large number of demerits in his four years at school. At times, he seemed to relish the challenge of breaking the rules, as he worked out complex strategies to defeat the college’s efforts to monitor student behavior.4 But his challenge to authority was more intellectual than social. Tobin loved reading, and he was a highly rational being (“as his Jesuit teachers had taught him to be,” one friend commented). And he was stubborn; once Austin had thoroughly explored a question and reached a clear position, he
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was unyielding. When he discovered that some of his class assignments were excerpts and that he was forbidden by the Catholic Index to read other parts of great works, he argued with his teachers, and the arguments were sometimes heated.5 And when he pursued the assumptions of his religion with teachers and fellow students, as well as introspectively, he found that he could no longer make the needed leap of faith. Austin broke with the Church during his college years, and he was steadfast in refusing to take part in Catholic services during the next four decades. Although he left the Church, Tobin’s intellectual development showed clear marks of his Jesuit training. Not only was he highly rational, he also loved classical literature and the rhythm of language, and these loves were encouraged by his teachers and his fellow students. At St. John’s Prep, he won awards for oratory, and sixty years later, high school companions could still recall the subjects on which he spoke.6 At college he walked with friends on the campus hills, reciting Virgil and Horace, and debating with them the great and small issues of the day. And he could write; this talent too was encouraged by Holy Cross, where Austin penned essays and poems for the literary magazine. Like the poet Hart Crane, Tobin was touched by the romance of the harbor and the sometimes destructive intensity of the growing cities.7 Tobin’s most distinctive qualities during these years were great personal energy, organizing talent, and commitment to a cause, combined with a playful, risk-taking approach to life. The first three of these attributes are illustrated by his fervent support of the football team and other athletic endeavors, and by his leading efforts in organizing college dances in the New York area.8 These dimensions are also captured in his yearbook entry, whose opening lines are quoted in the headnote to this section. The yearbook comment continues: “No half-way measures for him; do it well, or don’t do it at all—with a vengeance. In fact, we would be inclined to smile at his earnestness, if he had not a wealth of genuine talent to justify his actions.” These sentences capture not only the Tobin of four years at Holy Cross but important elements of his next four decades as well. The playful and risk-taking aspects of Tobin’s character were also on display in much of his college life. Both elements are seen in the stratagems he devised to outwit the watchful Jesuit monitors, and in his enthusiastic response to gambling opportunities.9 However, the playful side of his personality was most clearly displayed in his half-time activities during football games and in related capers. For one football game during his senior year, he organized and produced a half-time show which parodied British royalty.
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(Austin assigned himself the role of “Lady Mountbatten or Lady Somebody.”) For the Fordham game, he organized a burlesque Spanish dance, and for the St. John’s game, he and other upperclassman planned a half-time entertainment in which “fifty innocent freshmen” were introduced onto the field and asked to capture two well greased pigs. During November of his senior year, Tobin wrote “insane snatches of verse” for the New Jersey Club dance; and he and a compatriot put on a skit for the Freshman Reception.10 After graduation in 1925, Austin returned to Brooklyn and married Geraldine T. Farley, who had graduated from Adelphi College the same year. That fall he enrolled at Fordham Law School, attending classes in the evening while working as a clerk at Miller & Otis, a New York law firm, and casting about for what he should do next. His father was active in Brooklyn politics, but Austin had no interest in that field. He visited the local Democratic club with his father once or twice, but he felt uncomfortable in the society of party members who kept their hats on indoors and chewed cigars, while they exchanged news about local political issues and devised strategies for the next campaign.11 Although Tobin was reluctant to throw his energies into local politics, his view of government was highly positive. Like his father, Austin held Woodrow Wilson in high regard, and this favorable view had been reinforced by a brief meeting with the president at the White House.12 In the tradition of Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and young Robert Moses, Austin viewed government as an appropriate instrument in meeting broad social goals, he favored a strong civil service along British lines, and he was optimistic that American society, effectively led, could meet the challenges ahead.13 One of the newest experiments in active government was the Port of New York Authority. Tobin had heard about the “port authority idea” in 1919–20, when Governor Alfred E. Smith campaigned across the region for the creation of the bi-state agency. As Tobin later recalled: “My father . . . took me to hear Al Smith make the closing speech of one of his campaigns in the [Brooklyn] Academy of Music, and it was there that I first heard about the idea and concept of the Port Authority.”14 In 1925–26 the Authority was still negotiating with the railroads, but it had just received approval to construct three bridges between New Jersey and Staten Island, as well as the vast span across the Hudson River. Ground-breaking ceremonies for the first of these projects took place in September 1926 with much publicity, and the future of this fledgling bi-state enterprise looked promising. Moreover its General Counsel, Julius Henry Cohen, had a national reputation for his innovative approach to important legal and substantive problems.
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Here was a natural place for an aspiring lawyer interested in the New York region and in complex legal issues. In 1926, a friend of Tobin at Miller & Otis, John Stuart Dudley, was hired by the Port Authority as a real estate attorney, and he soon urged his compatriot to join him. Austin applied for a position, and Cohen liked what he saw. A demand that the position be used to meet patronage needs postponed a decision temporarily, but Cohen resisted that foray. On February 14, 1927, Tobin joined the Port Authority’s small staff as a law clerk. A year later he had his Fordham law degree and was promoted to Assistant Attorney in Cohen’s office.15
The Rise of a Real Estate Lawyer If it wasn’t nailed down, he would grab it. —A colleague, reflecting on Tobin’s activities in the Law Department
Although there is some risk of oversimplification, it would not be far wrong to say that in the 1930s the Port Authority and Austin Tobin were on divergent trajectories—the Authority slipping slowly downward, Tobin spreading his wings, moving up. For the Port Authority, as we have seen, the decade opened with great achievement and much promise. In 1930–32, the agency completed the Bayonne and George Washington bridges, took control of the Holland Tunnel with its lucrative toll revenues, built the “first of nine” inland freight buildings in Manhattan, and began plans to construct the Lincoln Tunnel and to modernize the region’s shipping terminals. As the Depression took its toll on revenues, the Lincoln project was cut in half, and an array of other plans was shelved. By the end of the decade, the main goal of the agency was simply to retire its debt as quickly as possible. Its policy had become essentially passive; the sense of vision and imaginative action seen in the 1920s had departed from the planning division, the engineering force, and the commissioners’ offices.16 In the Port Authority’s law department, however, the atmosphere was not one of prudent investment and caution, but of lively challenge and legal inventiveness, which seemed to grow as the decade progressed. Cohen was the intellectual leader and chief strategist in the early 1930s, although a heart attack in the mid-1930s reduced his energy and his ability to direct the work of the legal staff. Austin Tobin was one of Cohen’s small band of assistants; and in Tobin’s efforts in these years we see many of the characteristic traits that shaped his later career and the Port Authority’s direction for decades to follow.
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The challenges that confronted the law department arose from the distinctive position of the Port Authority as the first semi-autonomous, self-financed public authority in the United States, and as the “first instrumentality with continuing administrative functions to be created by an interstate compact.”17 Consequently its staff was continually faced with complex problems of legal drafting, and many of its actions generated court suits by those who argued that the agency was exceeding its appropriate—but not yet clearly defined—powers. The activities of Cohen and his staff described below should also be examined with some sense of the broader issues of governmental power embedded in their work. These can be summarized in terms of three sets of questions: 1. In a complex federal system, what steps are needed to protect a government agency from assaults on its discretion by rival centers of power? Specifically, should the national government be barred from taxing the property and revenues of state agencies, in order to ensure that the taxing power is not used to undercut the capacity of the states to function? Similarly, should state governments be prohibited from taxing the activities of the national government? Building on the early warning by Chief Justice John Marshall that “the power to tax involves the power to destroy,” a long line of cases had insulated both state and national agencies from the burden of taxes levied by each other. In the 1930s, the issues were to be argued again, with the Port Authority in the forefront both as target of taxation and as organizer of the antitax forces.18 2. If a government operates a “business,” generating significant revenues from customers or other users, is that activity exempt from the tax burdens that would have to be paid by a comparable private business? In grappling with this question, the U. S. Supreme Court had divided government activities into two categories—“governmental” (those which are “essential” to the functioning of the government), and “proprietary” (i.e., “businesses” and other activities not essential to a functioning government). State courts, for example, were placed in the first category, and the federal government was barred from levying taxes on state judicial salaries. If a state operated a liquor store, however, that enterprise could be taxed by the national government.19 3. Can state and local governments experiment with new kinds of public agencies and new types of governmental programs, without those creative efforts being blocked or hamstrung because of antagonism from private enterprise and jealousy from other levels of government? This general concern was a broader implication of questions 1 and 2 above. Much of the Port Author-
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ity’s legal energies in the 1930s and into the 1940s would be directed toward ensuring that its own evolving history would support a positive response to this question.
The Threat of State and Local Taxes During the 1920s, Julius Henry Cohen had begun to think about these issues, and particularly about the impact local, state and federal tax burdens might have on the Port Authority’s ability to function. Except for some “start-up” grants from state government, it seemed probable that the Port agency would have to meet the capital and operating costs of all its activities out of project revenues. Moreover, some—perhaps most—of its projects would be financially marginal; and any substantial tax obligations might therefore block the agency’s ability to undertake and finance these improvements. Yet it was likely to be a primary target for legal attack from the world of private enterprise, whose representatives could argue that the Authority was a business—whose “proprietary” activities should be subjected to the same tax burdens as those faced by its private competitors. Although the 1921 Compact creating the Port Authority said nothing about tax exemption, within its first year Cohen had begun to build defenses against the tax threat. In the spring of 1922, both states passed legislation, drafted by Cohen, which endorsed the agency’s detailed Comprehensive Plan, and embedded in those laws is a sentence which exempts any bonds issued by the Port Authority from state taxes.20 The issue of local taxation of Port Authority operations was a matter of greater concern to Cohen and his colleagues, since city officials might try to levy heavy imposts on the agency, in order to reduce the taxes to be paid by local voters. Moreover, a hostile administration, such as that of New York City’s Mayor Hylan, might use the taxing power as an intentional strategy to drain the agency’s coffers, undermining its ability to purchase city piers and terminal buildings. In 1924, when the bi-state agency explored the possibility of buying the Hoboken Railroad from the federal government, the issue of tax exemption was visible and contentious. Once privately owned, the Hoboken line had been taken over during the First World War by the national government, which paid local taxes on the railroad to the City of Hoboken. City officials demanded that the Port agency do the same, if it took control of the rail line; and Hoboken was then joined by Jersey City, Bayonne, and Newark in arguing that the Port Authority should be required to pay local taxes on its various
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projects. Their basic argument was that rail lines, piers, and other terminals were business operations (in the court’s terms, “proprietary,” not essential government functions), and that they should be taxed like any private business. The Port Authority said that it would be willing to pay some amount “in lieu of taxes,” but it resisted any agreement that would undermine its position that all its activities were essential public functions, and therefore immune from taxation by local governments. The tax issue was left unresolved at the time, since the Coolidge Administration and the Port Authority could not agree on arrangements for purchase of the rail line.21 To Cohen and the commissioners, the Hoboken conflict underscored the need to insulate the Authority from local taxes by engraving its tax exemption permanently in state law. In 1925, when the agency obtained state approval to issue bonds to finance the Staten Island bridges, the legislation stated that in constructing these spans the agency was performing a “governmental function,” and it barred local and state taxes on those facilities. The same phrasing was included in the George Washington Bridge legislation in 1926 and in the 1931 laws which brought the Holland Tunnel under the Port Authority’s control.22 Vehicular roadways, including bridges and tunnels, were commonly constructed and maintained by government, and therefore this activity might reasonably be labeled an “essential” function. However, public operation of rail spurs, freight terminals, and other facilities typically operated by private businesses was not so readily exempted from tax burdens under the standards suggested by the 1905 South Carolina case (note 19, above). In the fall of 1929, the Port agency and the railroads finally agreed that the Port Authority should construct a massive freight terminal in lower Manhattan, and the tax issue then emerged as a major legal and political problem. The basement and first floor of the building would be devoted to receiving, sorting, and sending out railway freight; but the rest of the building—14 floors, each a city block in size—would be rented to tenants engaged in warehousing, manufacture, and other activities. In 1929–30, the Manhattan rental market was already showing signs of distress, and private interests protested, arguing that the Port agency should not be allowed to add 14 floors for general tenants, especially if the terminal building were given the advantage of exemption from real-estate taxes.23 However, a two-story building could not be made self-supporting in itself, given the uncertainties of freight traffic and other factors. Therefore, it was clear to Cohen, and defensible to more objective observers, that the Port Authority must have the power to build and rent commercial space above the
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inland terminal. As Cohen argued, the Port Authority could develop a unified freight station—a crucial element in the Comprehensive Plan—only if it could offset the terminal deficit by renting space (at a “profit”) above the freight station.24 The issue of whether the entire building should be tax exempt was more challenging. As the Hoboken case had demonstrated, local officials would protest if property were simply removed from the tax rolls when the Port Authority purchased it, especially if the project had some earmarks of a “business,” as this building surely did. The protests might block the agency from obtaining state legislation which placed the terminal on the same (tax exempt) footing as the bridges and tunnels. On the other hand, Cohen and his associates could not accept the position that some Port Authority property should be fully taxable—treated as no more important a governmental duty than, say, a state liquor store. All of the Port agency’s activities were essential to its role as a regional development agency, in their view; and tax burdens which might increase year by year could block the Port Authority’s efforts to experiment with financially marginal projects to aid the region’s economy. What was needed was an imaginative compromise, and in the early months of 1931 Cohen and the states’ lawmakers found one. Rather than asking the states to endorse the position that the Port Authority would not pay local taxes, the new legislation would permit the agency to provide payments to local governments. So the Port Authority was now “authorized and empowered” to enter into a “voluntary agreement” whereby it would provide an annual payment to any county, city, or town, in connection with “any marine or inland terminal property” owned by the bi-state agency. The payment could not, however, exceed the sum “last paid as taxes upon such property” prior to purchase by the Port Authority. In this way the agency won state endorsement on the crucial issue, that the improvements made by the agency—modern buildings, new piers, marine equipment—would be protected from the burden of rising taxes. The Authority at once showed wary local officials the benefit of the new law, by announcing that it would begin paying to New York City “in lieu of taxes” $60,064.10 each year, the exact sum that the city had previously received on the inland-terminal property.25 The statute proved to be an important step in reducing local objections to the Port Authority’s activities; if the bi-state agency took over and modernized a pier or constructed a freight terminal, the town would not suffer tax losses—and it would probably be better off financially compared with state and federal programs, which generally provided no taxes or in-lieu payments. In addition, the law provided some financial predictability for Authority plan-
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ners, who, in considering whether to go forward with a project, could now calculate the continuing “tax burden” with some certainty. The new statute had another effect, difficult to see on first glance, but readily grasped by the creative and artful brain of Julius Henry Cohen. Authority officials could now point to the new law and argue that the two states had, by passing it, endorsed the position that the Port Authority was exempt from taxation on all its activities. Indeed, Cohen argued, that is why the states passed the new law—since otherwise the bi-state agency would be barred from paying local taxes. What could not readily be obtained by direct statute, tax exemption on all its works, was now a “necessary implication” of the 1931 act! At least that was Cohen’s interpretation, and among public officials it went unchallenged in the coming years.26 While Cohen wove these enticing chains around his state and local colleagues, his very junior assistant, Austin Tobin, was occupied with other aspects of the inland terminal project. Once the top staff had determined the location for the terminal, in 1928–29, they decided to create “dummy corporations” which could buy up parcels of land before the terminal’s site was publicly identified, thus obtaining the land at lower cost. Tobin took part in this effort. By 1930, it was clear that complex negotiations and perhaps legal condemnation procedures would be required to obtain some portions of the site; now two years out of law school, Tobin was named to the new post of Real Estate Attorney and given responsibility for pursuing these actions. Joined by another young lawyer, William Pallmé, and a legal assistant, Paul Reilly, Tobin carried out more than 80 negotiated purchases and condemnations in 1930–31, displaying the same drive and commitment to success that his classmates had seen at Holy Cross. For many months the legal team worked from 9 in the morning until 11 p.m. weekdays, plus half-day on Saturday; they were assisted by two stenographers, one on the regular day shift, the second arriving each day at 5 p.m. Tobin’s personal style combined intense concentration on the task with thoughtful treatment of his staff, and they accomplished much, enjoying the effort as well.27 Tobin and his aides learned that the standard cost of land to be used for large buildings (whether by purchase or condemnation) was one-tenth of the total cost of the project. He decided to aim well below that ratio, with the goal of saving 20 percent of the usual cost of land acquisition. In the condemnation cases, Tobin acted as trial attorney in almost all instances, and in the courtroom, the counsel for the property owners were “astounded by what they had to face”; instead of the usual “dreary proceedings” of modestly pre-
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pared lawyers struggling through complex documents, they found Tobin thoroughly prepared and ready to do battle. The condemnation team completed its task in 1931, with some realized cost savings, and excavation at the Eighth Avenue site commenced during the spring. By the fall of 1932, the lower two floors were completed and rail freight began to flow into the building, while construction continued on the upper floors.28
The Bush Terminal Sues to Block Tax Exemption At this point, some of New York’s business interests were stirred into action. They attacked the plans to add 14 stories above the two railway-freight floors, for that would bring the Port Authority “in direct competition” with tax-paying businesses that provided warehouse and manufacturing space. They also found the Port agency’s proposed $60,000 annual payment “wholly inadequate,” and they urged the city to levy taxes based on the full valuation of the completed building. Early in 1933, several private firms prepared to file a suit in Brooklyn to block the Port Authority’s claim of tax exemption. These plans came to the attention of that veteran employee of the Brooklyn court, Clarence Tobin, who at once alerted his son.29 Now Austin saw his chance to break free from the narrow box within which he had been operating. Generally cases outside traditional real-estate concerns would be assigned by Cohen to Leander Shelley, a very able lawyer who was ten years Tobin’s senior and who headed the Law Division. But as soon as he learned about the planned suit, Tobin said to Pallmé, “Let’s take it!” He asked Pallmé to gather information on all issues likely to be involved in the case, and the two of them then prepared a detailed memorandum which laid out the Port Authority’s position on the various points. On the same day in March that the Bush Company filed its complaint in Brooklyn, Tobin presented their analysis of the case to Cohen, with the comment, “since this case is related to our real estate concerns, I assume you want me to handle it.” Cohen agreed, and Tobin took the lead in preparing the brief. In devising a strategy to circumvent the usual assignment of cases, as in grappling aggressively with the condemnation challenge, Tobin illustrated his tendency to be a nonconformist.30 The court challenge was led by two of the largest freight transfer and warehousing firms in the region, the Bush Company and the New York Dock Company, which argued that tax exemption would permit the Port Authority to compete unfairly, since its costs would be less than those of private firms, whose heavier tax burdens would compel them to charge higher rents.
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A wide array of business associations also joined the suit. These included traditional opponents of the Authority’s regional approach—the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, the Queens Chamber, and the Long Island Real Estate Board—as well as the Lower Manhattan Industrial Association and Manhattan’s West Side Association of Commerce, groups generally friendly to the Port Authority. This extensive opposition illustrated the concern in the Depression that the agency’s “proprietary” activities might further undermine the shaky edifice of private enterprise.31 In countering their argument, Tobin and Pallmé prepared the kind of extensive analysis, replete with rhetorical flourishes and historical allusions, that had marked Cohen’s legal writings. Cohen then added further arguments and citations, and in October 1933, the Port Authority filed a document of 181 printed pages with the New York trial court. The brief argued that interstate treaties are “sacred obligations,” to be controlled “by the principles of international law”; here the authors paused to explain the relevance of the U.S.-British Treaty of 1783, which protected the liberty of Americans “to take fish of every kind” out of Newfoundland waters, and they asked the judge to contemplate Aix la Chapelle-Maastricht R. Co. v. Thewis, in which the Supreme Court of Cologne upheld the sovereign rights of the Royal Dutch Government “over certain mines within Prussian territory.” They found relevance as well in the United States Constitution; if either state should “become recalcitrant” in carrying out its obligations under any interstate treaty, those duties would be enforced by a “higher power,” the Federal Government.32 What the Bush suit was attempting to accomplish, argued the CohenTobin team, was to force New York City to levy a tax on the Port Authority; but such a tax would be unconstitutional, since the Authority was an agency not only of New York State but of New Jersey as well. Therefore, if Bush won the suit, and New York City levied a property tax, the federal courts would be compelled to nullify the tax, under the principles followed by American courts since McCulloch v. Maryland.33 Moreover, the system of federalism provided a second line of protection, separate from McCulloch. The Port Authority Compact should be viewed, Tobin argued, as a contract between the two states; and any effort to tax the agency’s activities would violate the “obligation of contracts” clause of the U. S. Constitution. Again, the federal courts would have to step in and protect the bi-state agency.34 Next the legal team turned to the question of “legislative intent.” Here the 1931 state legislation approving “in lieu” payments to cities with Port Author-
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ity projects offered just the ammunition needed. Those laws “constitute express legislative recognition” that the inland terminal was tax exempt, Cohen and Tobin argued; “could any language more clearly express the intention of the legislature?” A skeptic might answer that such clearer language could be found, simply by looking at other Port Authority legislation. One could also see in this Port Authority argument some echoes of Tobin’s earlier life in disguise: “What could be clearer than that I am Lady Mountbatten?”35 Finally, the Port Authority’s extensive brief challenged the argument that its new building should be described as “proprietary”—a business, such as a liquor store, which under court standards was subject to taxation. The upper floors might appear to have a profit-seeking goal, but that aim was only an element in the overall purpose of the building—to aid in achieving the Comprehensive Plan, which was an “essential function” of government (Port Authority brief, pp. 125 ff., 140 ff.). The trial took place in December 1933, with Cohen taking the lead in oral argument. Lawyers for the private terminals argued that the state legislatures knew what language to use if they wished to exempt an agency’s works from local taxes—as the 1925 bridge laws demonstrated—and that the involuted language of the so-called “in lieu” acts offered no such clear message. And they urged the judge to protect them from unfair competition generated by this tax-free real-estate entrepreneur. But the trial judge marched to a different drummer. As the Port Authority’s legal staff pointed out, after the decision was handed down, the court’s opinion “is really a digest of the Port Authority’s brief. It follows the sequence of the Port Authority’s argument, adopts our reasoning and cites the cases in support of the law that are cited in our brief.” The agency’s exemption from local taxation was fully upheld.36 While the Port Authority was fighting demands that it pay local taxes, and threatening to call upon a “higher power” to shield it from local incursions, the agents of that higher power were preparing their own assault on the Authority’s tax immunity. The first shot in the campaign from Washington arrived in the fall of 1933, as Cohen, Tobin, and their colleagues were finishing their Bush Terminal brief. Writing to the Port agency in early October, the Bureau of Internal Revenue said it had “tentatively reached the conclusion” that previous legal decisions, which exempted the salaries of Port Authority employees from the federal income tax, were incorrect. “If you care to be heard upon this question,” the letter concluded, the Bureau would meet with Authority officials before it started collecting taxes from the agency’s staff.37
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Here was an opportunity for Tobin to expand his domain. He went to see Cohen and suggested that since he was already involved in (real estate) tax litigation, and this was “another tax case,” he would be glad to take it too. Cohen assented, and Tobin now moved into a legal and political arena that would absorb most of his waking hours for the next eight years.
Prelude to the Washington Attack: Conflict in the Federal System Although the 1933 letter was the first shot in a new campaign, it grew out of a long history of efforts by the national government to collect taxes from state and local officials and agencies. In preparing their response to the Internal Revenue letter, Tobin and his aides reviewed court opinions and other materials relating to these earlier efforts, and that history deserves brief summary here. Traditionally, a major concern for state and local agencies has been the possibility that the national taxing power, vigorously wielded, could undermine their capacity to act as independent members in a federal system. As noted earlier, a line of cases from McCulloch (1819) through Collector (1871) to Pollock and beyond had, taken together, obviated that threat, blocking Washington from taxing state and local agencies and their employees, as well as providing reciprocal immunity for national officials. Pollock (1895) had a very wide reach. In this case, a group of taxpayers had challenged the income-tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1894, and the Supreme Court responded in part by barring the federal government from collecting taxes on personal income received from state and local bonds (generally called “municipal bonds”); the Court also concluded that all the income-tax provisions in the 1894 Act violated the U.S. Constitution.38 To overcome this obstacle to raising revenue, Congress passed legislation amending the Constitution, and it was signed by the president and ratified by the states, becoming effective in 1913. The wording of the 16th Amendment, which would become crucial to the debate in the 1930s, follows: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
Although the national government now had the clear power to levy an income tax, it was not certain whether Congress could include state and local salaries and bonds in its new revenue plans. Did the 16th Amendment only
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displace Pollock’s conclusion prohibiting a federal income tax, or did it also strip away state and local tax immunities? Despite the straightforward wording of the Amendment, Congressional and state debates surrounding ratification were ambiguous on the immunity issue. Some thought the 16th Amendment left reciprocal immunity intact, while others concluded that Congress, if it wished, was now free to tax all government salaries, and all municipal bonds as well.39 Once the 16th Amendment had been ratified by three-quarters of the states, an income levy was enacted by Congress and signed by President Woodrow Wilson. However, this 1913 law did not mention municipal bonds.40 Meanwhile, in the early years of the new century, cities and states had been borrowing extensively, issuing bonds in order to build highways and transit lines, to construct water and sewer systems, and to make a range of other capital improvements. As a consequence, by 1917–18 outstanding “municipals” exceeded $4.5 billion. The new income tax was progressive, setting higher rates on the wealthy; and as the top rate increased under the pressure of war financing to 10 percent and then in 1917 to 25 percent, these bonds, which continued to be exempt from federal taxes, became an attractive investment for those with large incomes. It seemed clear to many observers that municipal securities were permitting wealthy persons to escape their “fair share” of the nation’s tax burden, and Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo led a campaign to tax municipal bonds. “Tax exemption is wrong in principle,” he argued. However, the provision was defeated in Congress in 1918, because of opposition from state and local officials and doubts as to whether it could survive scrutiny by the Supreme Court.41 In the early 1920s, opposition to tax-free securities gathered force from another quarter, as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Investment Bankers Association attacked the “unfair competitive advantage” of municipal bonds. Private utilities were especially anxious to stop the issuance of exempt securities, which were being used by government bodies to construct electric power systems and other utilities. Because these bonds were tax free, government agencies were able to offer them with lower interest rates, saving large sums in interest costs. Were it not for these lower costs, those large capital projects might be undertaken by private enterprise, which, the utilities argued, was the preferred American way. Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge, led the new effort to end tax exemption of bonds, and in 1924, the House approved a Constitutional amendment which would permit reciprocal taxation of government securities; but the Senate took no action.42
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The recurring campaigns against tax exemption made investors wary, and it seemed likely that Port Authority bonds would be highly vulnerable—challenged by opponents as bonds issued by a “proprietary” agency, taxable like state liquor-store sales. In 1925, when the Port Authority prepared to sell its first securities (to finance the Goethals and Outerbridge spans to Staten Island), Cohen asked Charles Evans Hughes, a former member of the U.S. Supreme Court, to review the Authority’s legal status. Hughes’ detailed analysis concluded that the agency was not a proprietary agency but was engaged in crucial public functions, and that its bonds were exempt from federal taxes. This finding aided the Authority in selling its bonds at a moderate interest cost throughout the 1920s.43 Treasury officials then opened a second front, focused on salaries, hoping to enmesh the Port Authority and other similar agencies. Treasury’s general concern was that the salaries of state and local public officials were exempt from federal taxes. Perhaps moneys paid to officials in traditional government agencies were immune under Collector v. Day, but the expanding array of autonomous agencies might not be equally protected; possibly the courts could be persuaded that these were “proprietary” enterprises, whose employees should be required to pay federal income taxes. Moreover, it seemed likely that the “salaries” allotted to some of their engineers were really fees paid to independent contractors, and thus taxable under settled court opinion. To explore the limits of salary immunity, the Bureau of Internal Revenue targeted engineers employed by the Port Authority and other semi-independent agencies, to compel them to pay back taxes. The leading case, against Leon Moisseiff, was in a sense brilliantly conceived. During the early 1920s he had worked part-time as Engineer of Design at the joint commission which was constructing a major span over the Delaware River (later named the Benjamin Franklin Bridge), and in the late 1920s he moved to the Port Authority, where he had served as Advisory Engineer of Design. Moisseiff had a distinguished national reputation. In the tradition of engineering, these facts suggested that he would have the flexibility in hours and the discretion in using his own judgment typical of an independent contractor, and Treasury had previously won the battle to collect taxes from engineers under contract. Moreover, in selecting Moisseiff as a prime test case or “guinea pig,” Internal Revenue was also targeting the Port Authority, perhaps the leading example of the new breed of semi-independent agencies. A victory here might provide publicity and momentum to the Treasury campaign.44
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This first assault from Washington failed. The case came before the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals in 1930, and Julius Henry Cohen defended Moisseiff. Cohen persuaded the Tax Board that the Port Authority and the Franklin Bridge commission were “engaged in essential governmental functions” (not “proprietary” activities), and that Moisseiff was indeed a salaried employee. Internal Revenue continued to press a related case, to collect taxes from a “part-time” chief engineer of the Ben Franklin Bridge commission; but the Tax Appeals board rejected that plea as well, in a decision handed down in August 1933.45 However, Treasury was prepared to challenge the Tax Appeals findings, and with Franklin Roosevelt now in the White House, those who advocated ending tax exemption—and thus striking a blow for “tax fairness”—might anticipate enthusiastic support from the new Administration. And so, early in the fall of 1933, the Port Authority received the letter that brought Austin Tobin into the federal tax battle.
The Roosevelt Administration Takes Aim at the Port Authority [This is] a gigantic enterprise earning millions of dollars of annual revenues. —U.S. Department of Justice, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gerhardt, 1938 brief
Cohen and his associates responded to the October 1933 letter by asking for a meeting to explore Treasury’s intentions. At that conference, it became clear that the new attack would be the first step in an effort to eliminate all tax exemptions for government salaries.46 Tobin took the lead in preparing an analysis which might convince Treasury to abandon its plans and, if that were unsuccessful, which would lay the groundwork for the bi-state agency’s defense in the coming court battles. The Port Authority’s argument began by challenging the view—long influential in Supreme Court decisions—that the proper test for immunity from federal taxes was whether a state agency was engaged in “essential” governmental functions (if so, it was exempt), or in “proprietary” activities such as selling liquor (then its employees and all its operations were subject to federal taxes). The continued use of the essential/proprietary distinction would place many of the Authority’s operations at risk, since its efforts to build and operate inland terminals, to modernize piers, and to carry out other projects would depend on generating substantial revenues from these operations.
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Under current judicial thinking, this “businesslike” search for profits would expose the Port agency to recurring demands that it pay federal taxes. The proper criterion for tax exemption, argued Tobin and his colleagues, is whether the tax would cause a burden on the governmental agency, retarding its ability to carry out its duties. Using this perspective, Internal Revenue—and the courts—should be able to see that “any attempt by the Federal Government” to tax the Port Authority’s work would “damage, if not frustrate wholly, the efforts . . . to provide self-liquidating public improvements” in the Port District.47 A substantial federal tax on the Port Authority’s bridge and tunnel revenues, or on its struggling inland terminal project might well undermine the agency’s ability to survive. But would the modest step urged by Treasury— that Port Authority employees should pay the regular federal income tax, then at a maximum rate of 10 percent—have any such effects? That modest first step would lead to ruinous consequences, Tobin and his associates argued. “We cannot think of any theory of law by which it can be claimed that the property of the Port Authority and its bonds are immune from taxation,” their brief asserted, once the salaries of its employees were subject to the federal income levy. To tax salaries would inevitably lead to taxing the bonds and activities of the agency, and so “prevent the carrying out of the comprehensive plan as a self-liquidating public enterprise”; the work of the Port Authority would “substantially come to a halt.” Tossing all the tax immunities into the same legal basket in this way had the advantage of providing support for their claim that the power to tax any aspect of the Port Authority’s efforts risked disaster. However, it was a hazardous tactical step, which Cohen and Tobin might later come to regret and would certainly abandon if they lost the salary case.48 The bi-state agency submitted its brief early in 1934, and a few months later, the trial court decided the Bush Terminal case. As noted earlier, the court endorsed the Port Authority’s view that the inland terminal was exempt from taxation; it also concluded that the Authority was carrying out a “most important governmental function” and that its tax immunity was equal to that of the two states. These judicial views will be “of immense help,” Tobin and his colleagues noted in an internal staff memorandum, “in the tax cases which lay before us.”49 When the Bush Terminal coalition decided to appeal, Tobin took responsibility for the appeal brief. By the summer of 1934, Tobin was occupied with the federal tax issue, the Bush appeal, and a variety of real estate matters. He worked days, nights, and weekends. Tobin and his main assistant, William Pallmé, needed help and
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they realized there was a community of high-quality legal talent from which they could draw—the pool of young Jewish lawyers who were blocked from major Manhattan law firms. Pallmé proposed Sidney Goldstein, who had been a clerk in Pallmé’s old firm, and he was soon hired, mainly to work on real estate matters. It was not long, however, before he was spending time on the federal tax issue as well.50 Tobin and Goldstein soon became close friends. “Often Sidney would come home with him,” a family member recalls, “and they would talk through dinner and after dinner, for hours.” One of Tobin’s children remembers: “When I was young I thought my father was in the luggage business. He and Sidney were always talking about ‘briefs’ and ‘cases.’ ” The long hours that Tobin devoted to his Port Authority activities were no burden. “I’m the luckiest guy in the world,” he would tell his friends, “I love my work!” To some who knew of his sharp break with the Church, a connection seemed apparent; as one commented: “Austin adopted the Port Authority as a religion; it was his whole life.” However, particularly in the 1930s, the Port Authority was not quite his whole life, though it was a substantial chunk; he enjoyed parties, he would take long walks with Geraldine and his children—often across Brooklyn Bridge and into Manhattan from their Brooklyn home—and he and Gerry went on several trips, including a long cross-country sojourn, which was planned with the same energy and completeness that marked his other efforts. In all these activities, Austin demonstrated not so much the impact of a break with the Church as the impact of lessons learned at home and in school, on the value of hard work. And he demonstrated too the perspicacity of the anonymous writer who had drafted his biographical sketch for the Holy Cross yearbook.51 As expected, the Port Authority argument defending tax exemption of employee salaries did not persuade the Roosevelt Administration, and its lawyers soon singled out three Port Authority employees who had not paid federal income taxes on their salaries. Tobin took charge of preparing the staff members’ defense, as they faced a hearing in 1935 at the Board of Tax Appeals.52 By 1935, Tobin had responsibility for all tax litigation involving the Port Authority, and he was anxious to shed the “back-water” image of a “real estate lawyer.”53 Cohen accepted the argument that a change of title was appropriate, and Tobin was promoted to Assistant General Counsel. With the salary cases absorbing much of his time, Tobin then sought another aide, and Daniel Goldberg joined his staff that year. Because the issue of tax exemption for salaries affected many municipal and state agencies, Tobin, Goldberg and Cohen contacted attorneys general in several states as well as other
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public authorities across the country, and obtained supporting briefs; indeed Tobin and Goldberg had central roles in drafting the briefs submitted by New York State and by the American Association of Port Authorities.54 In October 1936, the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals handed the Port Authority and their allies a victory in the employee tax case. As expected, the Administration appealed, but once more the Port Authority won, as the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld tax exemption for state employees and for governmental operations generally. Now the federal government appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Port Authority should be stripped of tax immunity because its activities were “proprietary,” not governmental. At this point Tobin and his colleagues faced a turn in the wheel of fortune that would bring defeat in the salary cases—and in so doing, set the stage for revitalizing the Port Authority.55 Although the Supreme Court had affirmed tax immunity of salaries in several cases decided in 1937, its decisions in the previous ten years provided no clear criteria for determining when salaries of public officials should be taxable by other governments and when they should be immune. The Court’s 1938 decision in Gerhardt might have been no more than another contribution to this hodge-podge. Through happenstance, however, responsibility for drafting the opinion landed in the lap of Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, who used the opportunity to take an important step in cutting down the tradition of tax immunity.56 Stone had long been concerned about the erosion of the tax base, as state, local and national governments reached into new fields of activity.57 However, he was doubtful the government’s position in Gerhardt—that the Authority’s operations were “proprietary”—was a clear basis for ending tax immunity. He argued instead that only activities “essential to the preservation of state governments” should be protected from federal taxes; and even when “essential” activities are involved, immunity from taxes should be allowed only if those taxes would be an “actual and substantial” burden in carrying out state programs. Combining these “guiding principles,” Stone managed to gather the endorsement of three of his colleagues for a draft opinion which endorsed the Treasury position and stripped tax immunity from Port Authority employees. Applying the federal income tax to those officials, Stone wrote, “neither precludes nor threatens unreasonably to obstruct any function essential to the continued existence of the state government.” The Gerhardt decision was announced on May 23, 1938, and soon after, in Graves v. O'Keefe, the Supreme Court endorsed the Administration’s general argument—that personal in-
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come taxes do not in any significant way burden the activities of the employee’s government. At last the Court agreed that no government salaries should be immune from taxation, ending the protection offered by that ancient bane of thirsty tax officials, Collector v. Day.58 From the perspective of Cohen, Tobin and their colleagues, the Gerhardt decision was a disappointment, and perhaps a surprise too, in view of the Supreme Court opinions in Rogers and Brush, only a year earlier, which had endorsed salary immunity.59 Moreover, the strategy which Cohen and Tobin had adopted—to argue that tax immunities for salaries and bonds and operations formed a seamless web (to end immunity for one would imply that all should be taxed)—now seemed a poor choice; if Treasury next pressed the argument that federal taxes should be paid on municipal bonds as well as salaries, much intellectual effort would have to be devoted to disentangling the threads of that web. Meanwhile, there was a small portion of energy available for play, and when newspaper columnist Westbrook Pegler applauded the Gerhardt decision, combining it with one of his recurring attacks on government employees as “parasitical functionaries,” Tobin and his associates had their cue. At the annual Port Authority summer garden party, “we celebrated our defeat,” Cohen later recalled. The lawyers appeared wearing sandwich boards, which proclaimed in large letters, “I am a Parasitical Functionary,” and other staff members sang a fitting Gilbert and Sullivan melody. The scene seemed to echo Tobin’s frolics at Holy Cross.60
10 The Threat to Municipal Bonds as Danger and Opportunity
For more than twenty years Secretaries of the Treasury have reported to the Congress the growing evils of these tax exemptions. . . . A fair and effective progressive income tax and a huge perpetual reserve of tax-exempt bonds cannot exist side by side. —Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 25, 1938
A
lthough the most visible Treasury effort in the early and mid-1930s was directed toward stripping tax exemption from government salaries, municipal bonds were not forgotten. The 1932 election added to the number of House and Senate members sensitive to the charge that wealthy individuals put their money into tax-exempt securities in order to escape their “fair share” of federal taxes. In 1933 and again in 1934, efforts were made in both houses of Congress to enact legislation that would tax municipal bonds, but these initiatives failed. A major hurdle was the widely held sense that such legislation would be thrown out by the courts—declared unconstitutional under the standards of tax immunity the Supreme Court had hammered out across several decades, extending from Pollock to Indian Motocycle. In 1934, Treasury officials in the new Administration suggested that this difficulty be overcome via a Constitutional Amendment, and the next year, conveying his own antagonism to wealthy individuals who avoided paying taxes, Franklin Roosevelt endorsed that strategy.1 Response to that approach was lukewarm in Congress, and in 1937 FDR and his Treasury aides explored the alternative of simply ending tax exemption by Congressional legislation. This shift was encouraged by the sharp change in direction at the Supreme Court, as Court majorities began to overrule long-standing precedents and endorse New Deal initiatives. If Congress were to extend the income tax to municipal bonds, the Court might now acquiesce, using an expansive interpretation of the 16th Amendment.2 214
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While the Supreme Court was still considering the salary question presented in Gerhardt, Roosevelt announced his new strategy for municipal bonds. In a message to Congress on April 25, 1938, he argued that tax-exempt securities undermined a “fair or effective” tax system, “giving greater advantage to those with large incomes.” FDR urged that “a short and simple statute” be approved, subjecting “all future state and local bonds to existing federal taxes” and giving reciprocal taxing rights to the states.3 In late May the Supreme Court announced its Gerhardt decision. FDR and Treasury could now proceed with some confidence that a legislative strategy to strip tax immunity from municipal bonds would win endorsement from the Court.
An Adroit Mixing of Politics and Expertise “We had fought hard” to protect salaries, Daniel Goldberg recalled, because “we knew that Treasury would jump to municipals” once the salary battle was resolved. Now Cohen and his aides devised a two-part response to FDR’s attack on municipal bonds. Cohen and Tobin developed a legal argument defending tax-exempt bonds; and Tobin and his assistants began to construct a political strategy to block FDR’s plan. The legal argument required a bit of intellectual revisionism, since the Port Authority’s initial position had been that there was “not the slightest basis in the law” for distinguishing between salaries and bonds; either both were tax-exempt, or both were taxable.4 There was, however, a silver lining in Justice Stone’s Gerhardt opinion, since he appeared to endorse one argument developed in the Port agency’s 1934 brief—that taxation should be barred by the Court if it would “burden” government functions. Within a few days Cohen handed the commissioners and the press a legal opinion which offered some modest comfort for Port Authority bondholders. The salaries paid to Philip Gerhardt and other Port Authority employees were not exempt, as Cohen interpreted the Court opinion, because the “burden on the State” if they were required to pay a personal income tax was “speculative and uncertain.” If, however, the Court were faced with a law that stripped exemption from Port Authority bonds, Cohen was certain that the “burden” criterion would lead the Justices to a very different conclusion: “A tax upon Port Authority bonds or revenues would directly burden and impair (and perhaps entirely nullify)” the ability of the States to build interstate bridges and carry out other important functions.5
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Cohen wrote with his usual confident flourishes, but the evidence that a tax on bonds would actually interfere with the ability of the states to carry out their duties was nowhere in Cohen’s opinion. Indeed, a close student of municipal bonds might have found his assertion quite speculative, and therefore vulnerable to the lens of skepticism Stone had used to put an end to tax-exempt salaries.
Tobin Constructs a National Coalition However, Tobin was not inclined to rely solely upon arguments made in the judicial arena. Motivated by personal ambition and energy not yet fully occupied, and by the shrewd insight that this was primarily a political rather than a legal issue, Tobin took the first steps to meet Roosevelt on his own ground. Working with Goldberg, he sketched out a plan to create a national organization which could lead the fight to keep municipal bonds taxexempt, and he readily obtained Cohen’s support to carry out this strategy. (Cohen had “great confidence in Tobin and his judgment,” Goldberg recalls.) Then Tobin went to John Ramsey, the general manager, and argued that since the Roosevelt plan was a major threat to the Port Authority’s ability to sell bonds and carry forward its program, the Authority should “bankroll the idea” he had developed. Ramsey agreed, and so did the Port Authority board. Tobin then urged Cohen to enlist Henry Epstein, a distinguished lawyer and Solicitor General of New York State, in the cause. Recognizing the danger FDR’s threat posed to New York’s extensive bondissuing program, Epstein readily signed on, and Connecticut’s Attorney General agreed to join too. With their concurrence, Tobin then sent telegrams to attorneys general and officials of public authorities across the country, asking that they attend a meeting in Washington, D.C. at the end of May.6 In attempting to gather support for a national campaign to oppose Roosevelt’s plans, Tobin could draw upon two concerns growing out of the Gerhardt decision. The first was that the federal taxing power might, as FDR hoped, be extended to municipal bonds—an action that could weaken the ability of states and cities to finance new capital programs. However, that negative impact was conjectural, and it was not clear that this conjecture would provide sustained motivation for busy officials around the country to devote their energies to a national campaign. The second issue was far more salient. Stone’s Gerhardt opinion declared, in effect, that salaries paid to Port
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Authority officials (and those working in similar agencies) had always been taxable; as a result, thousands of state and local employees suddenly owed ten years or more in back taxes, plus interest, and Congressional action would be needed to cancel those extensive liabilities. So it was this issue— the need for prompt action “to protect state employees from retroactive taxation”—that Tobin stressed in his call for the meeting.7 In response, more than two dozen attorneys general and executives from several public authorities met in Washington on May 31, 1937 to consider the problem, and the next day their representatives conferred with Treasury officials in the hope the Administration would agree to support Congressional action to waive back taxes. At this point, Morgenthau and his aides made what turned out to be an important tactical error: They refused to endorse a bill which would waive tax liabilities, and in early June Treasury pressed its advantage by sending tax agents to demand back taxes from officials of public agencies in New York, Pennsylvania, and California. Then, when sympathetic members of Congress introduced bills that would waive payment of back taxes, Administration officials persuaded their own allies on Capitol Hill to block action, leaving the threat of large tax payments hanging over the heads of state and local government employees.8 Treasury’s intransigence provided just the motivation that Tobin and his associates needed. By late June, a formal “Conference on State Defense” had been organized, with a steering committee that included a dozen top state officials drawn from all parts of the country, and with Tobin in the key administrative role. Funds as well as staffing were provided mainly by the Port Authority. Then Tobin persuaded Mortimer Edelstein, who worked in another division of the law department, to join his campaign; Edelstein was delighted. During the fall, Tobin, Goldberg, and Edelstein made contact with state officials and local employees across the country. They constructed a mailing list and sent out frequent reports, summarizing developments in the campaign and emphasizing the need to fight against “the crushing burden” of back taxes, which would be “ruinous to almost every state, county and municipal officer and employee.” As one member of the team later recalled, the series of reports was “a great tool—to keep all the people around the country informed and to unify their efforts.”9 The proposal to tax government bonds was also included in the grassroots campaign, as a second “real danger” that could undermine the financial strength of state and local governments. However, local sentiment was divided on this issue, and Tobin’s mailings in 1938 sought to keep even those who favored taxing municipal bonds as active members of his coalition.10
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Meanwhile, Tobin and other Conference leaders spoke before finance experts and other specialized groups, where they argued that taxing municipal bonds would increase the costs of state and local governments. Moreover, they interpreted the Treasury attack on salaries and bonds as part of a wider trend toward centralized government, which would squeeze out the valuable role of state experimentation.11 By the end of the year, the Conference on State Defense included 39 of the 48 attorneys general, and its campaign had won support from the United States Conference of Mayors, the American Municipal Association, the Council of State Governments, national organizations of police, firefighters, and teachers, and a wide range of other governmental bodies and related interest groups.12
The Impact of Research and a Grass-Roots Strategy As Tobin took the lead in organizing the campaign against FDR and his Treasury associates, several motivations shaped his perceptions and his actions. First, he was ambitious; and here was an opportunity to demonstrate his range of abilities, which might lead to interesting new opportunities at the Port Authority or beyond. Second, he was a “natural organizer,” who enjoyed gathering people together, endowing their efforts with a common purpose, and orchestrating their activities as they marched toward ends he had chosen. We saw these talents in campus activities at Holy Cross; now he employed them on a larger canvas. And third, he enjoyed combat, especially if he could do battle against well-armed opponents. The Jesuit fathers had been worthy adversaries, and their successors were now Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Morgenthau, and the hungry folks at Internal Revenue. Then there was the substantive issue—defending tax exemption, especially for municipal bonds. Tobin’s attitude toward this issue was more complex than it might appear. At first glance, he seemed to be motivated mainly by a concern that ending tax exemption would sharply increase the costs to the Port Authority and other public agencies for financing capital improvements. But was this really a significant problem? As we will see, the evidence on the financial impact of taxing municipal bonds was mixed, and there is some doubt that Tobin and his aides were as concerned as their rhetoric suggests.13 For Tobin there was, however, a deeper issue embedded in the Roosevelt attack on municipal bonds. As a Wilsonian Democrat—an advocate of an “activist” government, whose efforts should be directed toward improving the economy and reducing social inequalities—Tobin had been a
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supporter of FDR and his early New Deal plans. These same values led him to view sympathetically the basic goals Roosevelt articulated when he attacked exempt bonds—to make the tax system more equitable, and to provide the moneys needed to carry out major New Deal programs. But FDR’s 1937 “court-packing” plan had shocked Tobin, as it had many others. Now he was more sensitive to the dangers that might follow, if an activist government meant centralized power in the White House. If the Constitution no longer protected tax exemption, for example, the national government could decide to discourage investment in some fields by taxing those bonds, while leaving others exempt. In this way, state and local development strategies might be manipulated from Washington; the benefits of permitting diverse approaches to complex problems could be lost. And there were larger dangers to individual liberty that might come with centralized power, if it were unprincipled; this concern was underscored by Treasury’s punitive approach to collecting back taxes, in the weeks after the Gerhardt decision was announced.14 The November 1938 election moderated the political climate somewhat. FDR lost the overwhelming Democratic majorities in Congress the 1936 landslide had given him, but there was still much support for the effort to change the tax system.15 The Senate had created a Special Committee on Taxation of Governmental Securities and Salaries, and that Committee was planning to hold hearings early in 1939, as a first step toward Congressional legislation to tax municipals. It seemed clear that Treasury would open the assault by labeling municipal bonds as beneficial primarily to the rich, permitting them to evade taxes. What Tobin and his allies needed was solid evidence to counter Treasury’s assertions—evidence that tax-exempt bonds were more beneficial to states and cities than they were harmful in undercutting a progressive tax system. Toward the end of 1938, Tobin found the opening wedge he needed, a 1926 study that identified savings which the states had obtained in their interest payments, because their bonds were exempt from federal taxes. “This is assigned reading for everyone!” he said to his staff. “Let’s update it. We need a professor.” Most public finance experts, including prominent faculty members at Columbia and Yale, were opposed to tax-exempt bonds, but Tobin approached a well-known Princeton economist, Harley Lutz, who agreed to develop the case for exemption, building on the 1926 analysis. Cohen and Ramsey endorsed Tobin’s plan, and in December the Port Authority board agreed to pay Lutz $2500 for a detailed study, while adding another $5000 to support the national campaign.16
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Lutz had once been a sharp critic of tax exemption, and to some his conversion to the cause illustrated the persuasive power of Austin Tobin combined with a handsome fee. What is clear in retrospect is that Tobin had made an excellent choice; Lutz’s 200-page report, which was packed with arguments and evidence supporting Tobin’s position, would be a major force in countering Treasury’s contentions at the Senate hearings and beyond.17 In the first weeks of 1939, President Roosevelt opened the campaign with a cleverly worded message to Congress. He extended his sympathy to public employees who would be compelled to pay back taxes on their income under the Gerhardt standard, unless Congress acted. To meet their plight, FDR urged “immediate legislation,” which would protect salaried employees, and investors in exempt securities as well. The new law would ensure that courts could not impose tax liability “on these innocent employees and investors for salaries heretofore earned, or on income derived from securities heretofore issued.” However, while ending all past tax liabilities, the statute would “at the same time . . . make private income from all government salaries hereafter earned and from all government securities hereafter issued subject to the general income tax laws of the Nation” and of the states.18 Tobin and his allies ground their collective teeth and growled at FDR’s attempt to intertwine past tax liabilities with his campaign to end bond exemptions—holding the first hostage to the second—but they turned their primary attention to the Special Senate Committee, which would begin its hearings on taxing salaries and municipal bonds in mid-January. As they surveyed the political terrain, it was clear that the ominous cloud of back taxes had served Tobin’s purposes well. During the fall and winter of 1938, that danger, combined with the more complex issue of municipal-bond interest, had allowed the Conference staff to gather support from an array of national and regional groups willing to testify in opposition to the Roosevelt plan. Tobin orchestrated the opposition testimony, and during the hearings, which extended into February, the members of the Senate committee met the full force of his strategy. On the opening day, the Committee heard from six senior Administration officials, who offered detailed arguments—based on Constitutional law, democratic theory, and economic analysis—in support of the FDR plan. One speaker pointed out that every U.S. President since Warren Harding and almost every Treasury official since the 16th Amendment was enacted in 1913 had opposed tax exemption of government bonds. Exempt securities helped wealthy taxpayers far more than middle-class citizens, the Administration
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team argued; and investors whose capital should be used to modernize American industry instead diverted their funds to these low-risk bonds. Moreover, taxing these bonds was almost certainly Constitutional under the Income Tax Amendment; Gerhardt and other recent Supreme Court decisions were consistent with this view, they argued, and if there was any doubt “a simple statute” could be passed and then tested in the courts.19 The next five days, however, were occupied with reports, testimony, and resolutions in opposition, in a continued procession devised by Tobin.20 The first speaker in the opposition phalanx was Professor Lutz, armed with his voluminous report, which cast doubt on the argument that tax-exempt bonds were mainly held by the wealthy, and which argued that making municipal bonds fully taxable by the federal government would increase interest costs by 20–30 percent. Tobin had suggested to Lutz that the political impact of his analysis would be enhanced if he cited specific cities across the country, and Lutz had calculated the increases in the local tax rate, and in total local taxes, if Roosevelt’s plan were enacted. Detroit would have to raise an additional $2.5 million in local taxes; Boston and San Francisco would need to raise more than $1 million each; in Miami, Indianapolis, and Dallas the burden would be more than $230,000 a piece in new taxes; and the increases in smaller cities such as South Bend and Tacoma and Trenton were also displayed in Lutz’s tables.21 Next came Fiorello LaGuardia, New York City’s mayor and the president of the U.S. Conference of Mayors. LaGuardia brought resolutions opposing FDR’s plan from 70 cities across the country, and he presented his own arguments against the proposal.22 Then the Senators heard from a representative of North Carolina’s league of cities and towns, with 171 active members, followed by his counterparts from California, representing 258 cities, and Kentucky (186 cities), and Alabama (104); all opposed the president’s plan. Tobin spoke briefly and brought resolutions in opposition by leagues of cities in 23 other states and by several dozen other local and state groups. He quoted from a letter sent by Robert Moses, who in the late 1930s was head of six bridge and roadway authorities in New York; Moses concluded, on the basis of his experience in selling millions of dollars in bonds, that without tax exemption “the bonds probably could not have been sold at all” and the vast highway network then under construction would only have been possible by “resorting to taxation and large Government subsidies.” These speakers were followed by an official of the American Municipal Association, representing 7,300 cities and towns across the nation, and speaking also for separate leagues of cities in more than 20 states, all in opposition.23
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During the several days of testimony marshaled by Tobin and his aides, the directors of pension funds, city legal officers, the national association of municipal finance officers, and dozens of others also lent their voices to the demand that local and state bonds remain tax exempt. All viewed with alarm the extra interest cost which cities and towns would have to pay if their securities were taxable; and some thought it likely that the bonds of weaker municipalities could not be sold at all if that burden were added. Although the Lutz study had not been completed until shortly before the hearings began, several of the resolutions and testimony drew on his analysis to provide the kind of detail that made the criticisms and arguments more pointed.24 Tobin also brought in Frank Ferguson to testify, but when the Port Authority chairman departed from his prepared text, he stumbled, providing ammunition for the opponents of tax-exempt securities. Julius Henry Cohen more than made up the slippage, however, as he spoke at length—beginning on Friday afternoon and continuing on Saturday morning—casting doubt on the constitutionality of taxing municipal bonds, and arguing that if tax exemption were eliminated, bonds to provide low-cost housing, public power, and highway facilities such as the Port Authority’s own Staten Island and George Washington bridges might often not find a buyer.25 Although a majority of Senators on the Special Committee favored the Roosevelt plan, the first six days had been dominated by the opponents. Three more days of testimony were scheduled, and the Administration fought back, bringing in economists from New York University, City College of New York, and Wesleyan, as well as Treasury experts, to challenge the arguments of Tobin’s coalition. Their efforts were aimed mainly at dismantling the extensive analysis in the Lutz report in favor of tax exemption, and in this task they made some headway. When pressed, however, they had to admit that, if municipal bonds were subjected to the federal income tax, cities and states across the country would find their borrowing costs raised by 10–20 percent, an increase that translated into higher local property taxes and excise taxes. If tax exemption were ended, the nation as a whole might be better off in terms of economic justice and tax efficiency; but for members of the Senate who were concerned about the economic problems of their individual states, and their own prospects for re-election, the debate raised disturbing prospects. And when the Administration team “assumed away” these economic and political realities, they did little to help their cause.26 As the ninth and final day of testimony drew toward a close, with Treasury officials hammering away at the testimony of Lutz, Cohen, and their allies,
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10-1. Tobin and Cohen at the 1939 Senate hearing (a sketch made in 1952)
Cohen suddenly emerged again almost as though he were a member of the Senate committee. While one Treasury lawyer was testifying, Cohen spoke up from the audience, cross-examining the witness and forcing him to explain why his Department was altering its argument on an important issue; Chairman Prentiss Brown (who supported FDR’s plan) sat silent. Later, Senator Brown interrupted Administration testimony to obtain the views of Cohen and Tobin on a historical issue, and in response Cohen then offered a lecture on legal issues which undermined the chairman’s attempt to add weight to the Administration position.27 Meanwhile, as the Special Committee pondered the issue of municipal bonds, legislation to end the threat of back taxes on employee salaries had moved ahead—despite FDR’s and Treasury’s hope that such legislation might be deferred until it could be coupled with taxes on future bond sales and future salaries. Speaking for the Conference on State Defense and for public employees generally, Tobin urged that relief from back taxes be treated separately from those other issues and enacted promptly, and his position was widely shared on Capitol Hill.28 By late February 1939, favorable committee action
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had been taken in both houses. In late March, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Graves v. O’Keefe, reversing Collector v. Day and permitting taxation of all government salaries. A few days later, both houses passed legislation barring liability for back taxes and, though reluctant to lose the advantage of linking that action to a tax on bonds, Roosevelt signed the bill on April 12. With the salary issue laid to rest, the two sides would now turn their full attention to the problem of municipal securities.
Roosevelt Defeated In his book on political influence, The Power Game, Hedrick Smith contrasts the traditional methods of Washington pressure groups with what he calls “new-breed lobbying.” The older approach emphasizes one-on-one discussions with members of Congress, and with other government officials, by lobbyists who can use their specialized knowledge—as well as a pool of funds for the next electoral campaign and other individualized benefits—to help sway Congressional votes and other decisions. In new-breed lobbying, those who want to shape action in Congress go to the grass roots, swaying votes by demonstrating “that the home folks are with them.”29 In Smith’s interpretation, the “new-breed” strategy began with citizen protest directed at the Vietnam War and other issues of the 1960s. However, a quarter of a century earlier, the lobbying effort aimed at the 1939 Senate Committee demonstrated very similar characteristics. And when Tobin turned to the House of Representatives, he then added a dimension which even more clearly suggests that the Conference on State Defense should be viewed as an early exemplar of “new-breed lobbying.” The battle in the House began in late March, while the Senate Committee was still pondering the Administration’s plan. Shortly after the O’Keefe salary decision was handed down, FDR announced that he would ask Henry Morgenthau, the Treasury Secretary, to include in his new revenue bill a provision that would make the income from all state, municipal, and federal bonds fully taxable. The tax proposal would go first to the House Ways and Means Committee, so Tobin extracted an additional $3000 from the Port Authority budget and began to work out a strategy to counter Administration pressure on that body.30 The first step was to scrutinize Ways and Means in order to determine which members were likely to favor Roosevelt’s plan, and of these which might change their views if protests were heard from their home districts. As Tobin, Edelstein, and Goldberg reviewed the cast of characters, they con-
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cluded that the 10 Republicans on the committee were not likely to support the president; the criticisms voiced at the Senate hearings in February would, it seemed clear, reinforce their general antipathy to Rooseveltian schemes. There were, however, 15 Democrats on Ways and Means, and most of them would probably support FDR if the home front remained silent. Tobin decided to concentrate on the cities and towns of those 15 Congressional Districts, and especially on the localities that could quickly be reached by train and automobile—those in the East, Midwest, and Upper South. It was now early May, and they had perhaps six weeks before hearings would begin.31 They divided the districts into two groups. Goldberg was assigned Robert Doughton, chairman of Ways and Means, whose district was in the western part of North Carolina, and A. Willis Robertson, who was from the Shenandoah region of Virginia. “I took my new car and Moody’s publications, with their listings of tax rate and outstanding bonds,” Goldberg recalled, “and drove to a motel in Front Royal, Virginia.” There he took the information in Moody’s, computed the increase in the local tax rate if the outstanding bonds were taxable, and brought this information to City Hall. Finding a town official who seemed interested, Goldberg explained the danger of the Roosevelt plan, and he urged that the city council adopt a resolution against the FDR scheme and send it to Willis Robertson. He stopped at other towns in the Virginia District, and then drove south and met with finance officers and other city officials in Doughton’s region. Later he motored to Pennsylvania and Indiana. Edelstein’s assignment took him to Richard Duncan’s district in Missouri, and then to Oklahoma, where Congressman Wesley Disney held a seat. He traveled to Paul Maloney’s district in Louisiana, and then north to the districts of Raymond McKeough (D-Illinois) and John Dingell (D-Michigan). “We went to tiny towns, like Enid, Oklahoma, and large cities,” Edelstein recalled. “We talked with state officials and city councils—or the city manager, or whoever would talk with us.” Tobin joined Edelstein in Chicago as he carried the campaign north, and back home Tobin contacted city officials in California, Massachusetts, and New York State, which were also represented on Ways and Means.32 Many of the local people did not know anything about the issue, or the likely impact of the Roosevelt plan on their tax problems, and they had to be persuaded to listen and then to send letters or telegrams to their Congressmen. “Tobin had tremendous energy,” Goldberg recalled, and his enthusiasm infected his staff in Manhattan and their allies across the country. They entered the fray with the impression that FDR was strongly in favor of the bill,
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and that the odds were against them; but they kept working through May and into June. “We put in hundred-hour weeks,” one of his aides recalled. “Tobin worked as hard as anyone, and he gave us opportunities to try out our own ideas, and he gave credit when one of us made a useful contribution,” another remarked. “Austin inspired great loyalty. We loved to work for him.”33 And their efforts paid off. Letters and telegrams and resolutions greeted Missouri’s Congressman Duncan and his colleagues from Virginia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Illinois, and California, and other states represented on the Committee. When the hearings were held in late June and early July 1939, local and state officials were on hand too. During six days of testimony, three speakers defended the plan, and all of them were officials of the Administration. Another 46 spoke in opposition. A close reader of the hearings record could find hints that Roosevelt’s idea had some appeal in the country at large, but these were but tidbits in a feast of discontent. For example, FDR and his advisers could be heartened by the news from Earl Warren, California’s attorney general, that the governor of his state favored ending tax-exempt bonds; but Warren’s telegram went on to say: “However, all the port authorities, the League of California Municipalities, and the individual communities that have been in contact with me, seem to be unanimous in opposition.” Warren closed by stating that he too was opposed to the FDR plan.34 On July 13, two days after the hearings ended, Ways and Means voted to delay action on the president’s proposal. No further steps were taken in either the House or Senate during the summer and fall of 1939. However, looking to the possibility of action early in 1940, Roosevelt and his advisers could point to favorable omens. Although the Senate and House hearings conveyed a sense that there was widespread public opposition to ending tax-exempt bonds, a Gallup poll in 1939 carried a dramatically different message: 75 percent of those who responded endorsed the general approach in FDR’s plan, while only 25 percent were opposed. Newspaper editorials also favored ending exempt bonds: of 705 newspapers which took a position on the issue in 1939, 77 percent urged removing tax exemption at once by Congressional action; 14 percent favored such action via Constitutional Amendment; only 9 percent supported tax exemption as a continuing policy. Sensitive to the widespread opposition to government bonds which might permit the rich to evade their “fair share” of taxes, the Republican Program Committee also took up the cudgels in February 1940, arguing that “prompt consideration” should be
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given to eliminating “all tax exemption of future issues of federal, state, and municipal securities.”35 The campaign of the Conference on State Defense had, however, taken a considerable toll. Facing hundreds of well-placed local and state officials in opposition, led by the attorneys general from 45 states, neither the Senate nor House champions of the president’s scheme were anxious to bring the issue to a vote. With sentiment on his Special Committee split 4–2 in favor of ending exemption, Senator Prentiss Brown finally introduced a bill in September 1940, to eliminate tax exemption on future municipal bonds. In urging favorable action, Brown said that he hoped his fellow Senators would “not be overpowered by the very effective campaign which has been carried on by the attorneys general. . . .” His colleague Robert La Follette (R-Wisconsin), a strong proponent of ending tax exemption, observed that “this bill has been under more pressure than any important piece of legislation in all my legislative experience.”36 As the FDR bill headed for a vote in the Senate, the impact of the states’ campaign, and of Professor’s Lutz’s focus on local tax burdens, could be seen in the concerns of Senators who had not been involved in the Committee deliberations; and the bill’s champions found themselves underscoring those fears even as they argued that the overall tax impact would be beneficial— that a larger local tax bite would be accompanied by a smaller federal tax bill, so the average taxpayer would see a reduction overall. Thus when Senator Bailey of North Carolina expressed concern about Prentiss Brown’s tax bill, this colloquy emerged: Mr. Bailey. If we . . . impose interest upon its bonds, then we shall drive the people of North Carolina and the legislature thereof to impose higher taxes on my real estate, on my farm down there, on the mules of the farmer, and the crop on his land. Yet it is said this would be a good thing . . . that this scheme of things is relieving the poor man and vindicating him against the favors given to the rich. Mr. Brown. Certainly the State and Federal taxpayer, as one individual, pays his Federal and State taxes out of the same pocketbook. To his mind the total of those taxes is the important thing, whether it be a tax on real estate, an income tax, or a tax upon personal property. Mr. Bailey. This policy of taxing the credit of my city of Raleigh and my State of North Carolina would drive the city of Raleigh and the State of North Carolina into further real-estate taxes.
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To which Senator Brown, perhaps responding too hastily, answered: “Exactly.”37 On September 19, 1940, the Brown amendment to the pending Revenue Act was called for a vote—and the State Defense forces had cause to cheer. Only 30 senators endorsed his proposal, and 44 senators registered disapproval. For the present, at least, state and local bonds were free from the reach of federal tax agents. Describing the victory at a Port Authority board meeting a few days later, Julius Henry Cohen warned that the Administration and its allies might renew the assault when Congress reconvened early in 1941.38
FDR Appeals to the Courts for Help As Cohen predicted, the Administration did revive its legislative effort early in the new year. It began with an adroit move, introducing legislation that made all future bonds issued by the federal government fully taxable. With the strong backing of Treasury officials, that bill was quickly passed by the House and the Senate. Roosevelt’s allies urged that similar legislation be approved for municipal bonds, under the principle of equity: why should purchasers of federal securities be treated less favorably in tax terms than those who invested in state and local bonds? However, they quickly learned that the state and local coalition was still alert and influential. Congressional action remained an uncertain prospect.39 But Roosevelt and his advisers had another string to their taxing bow. Why not bypass Congress on this contentious issue and rely instead on a judiciary which had in recent years turned a friendly face to the Administration and its creative designs? Since 1937, the Supreme Court had reconsidered its traditional positions in several fields, and it might now be expected to read the 16th Amendment in the straightforward way that had long appealed to the president. A judicial strategy had been successful in stripping tax exemption from salaries paid to Port Authority employees in Gerhardt, paving the way to a complete victory in O’Keefe, which abolished forever the protected category of tax-exempt salaries. Now a similar strategy could be used for taxevading bonds.40 On March 14, 1941, Internal Revenue sent notices to Port Authority commissioner Alexander Shamberg, vice-chairman Howard Cullman, and five others who held Port Authority securities, demanding payment of back taxes. Treasury announced that it would use this test case in order to clarify the right of the national government to tax state and local bonds under the 16th
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Amendment. With Port Authority officials once again singled out as a target of Treasury attacks, some of those involved concluded that there was a personal element in the decision to go after Shamberg and Cullman. But there were other and better reasons for that action. First, the Administration’s legal experts still held the view that the Port Authority and other “public corporations” were more vulnerable than traditional government agencies, under the rule set forth in the 1905 South Carolina liquor store case. Second, the Port Authority was a worthy adversary; in view of Cohen’s reputation and the briefs which he and his staff had submitted on tax issues in the 1930s, the Administration could expect that the issue would be clearly framed and fully explored as the suit proceeded to the Supreme Court. If Treasury won, therefore, it could anticipate that the opinion would set a firm legal foundation; and building on that decision, if it favored Treasury, the Administration might then take on the wider concern, soon eliminating the entire category of tax-exempt.41 One of the Administration’s targets, Alexander Shamberg, was angered by this attempt to reverse what he viewed as settled law. As Cohen later recalled, “he was ready to fight.” While the other bondholders paid the back taxes under protest, Shamberg agreed to resist, and the case, then titled Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shamberg, was underway.42 Now Tobin and his staff developed a three-pronged strategy. First, they looked closely at Treasury’s experience in floating its new issues, which after late February 1941 carried no tax exemption, and they found that Treasury was now paying much higher rates of interest. Examining the new federal issues in late March, Tobin calculated that the net cost had already reached more than $1.6 million. That information was promptly sent out in a newsletter to more than a thousand state and local officials and members of Congress. This “federal experiment with taxable securities,” he argued, showed how burdensome it would be to local cities (and “the home owner and rent payer”) if municipal bonds were subjected to the same tax exposure. So the Administration’s attempt to take the initiative in reducing tax inequity was converted into evidence that dire consequences must follow from taxing any government bonds.43 Second, they continued to stir up opposition by meeting with influential groups. In March, Tobin conferred with leaders of the American Bar Association during their midwinter meeting in Chicago, and the ABA then passed a resolution which condemned the effort to tax municipal bonds without a constitutional amendment. A few weeks later, he spoke at the na-
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tional conference of county officials in Louisville, focusing on the increases in local tax rates that would be visited on their citizens if the Administration’s efforts were successful. The coalition’s chairman, Henry Epstein, was at hand when the National Tax Association met in St. Paul, where he argued that the Administration’s scheme would add “a further and unsupportable burden” on local taxpayers. And at the annual meeting of the Investment Bankers Association of America in early December 1941, Tobin was on the podium to warn the members that a federal tax on municipal bonds would give Washington control over local financing, and ultimately over local government.44 Tobin’s December address provided extensive reflections on the relationship between federalism and democracy, a concern which was central to his view of Roosevelt’s scheme. He began with a critique of “the classroom texts in economics” which “for many years” had attacked the immunity of municipal bonds. Those texts focused on the issue as though it were “simply a problem in abstract economics,” involving the “principles of progressive taxation.” Academic economists have examined the matter, Tobin argued, “as if their Universities had Departments of Economics but no Departments of History, or Philosophy or Government.” The real issues in the case, in his view, were the “pressing problems of federalism, local self-government, and the nature of the democratic process,” for if Congress imposed a tax on municipal bonds, “it has, inevitably, the power to control state and municipal financing.” And “without the independent control of its own financing, no government can continue as a free and independent state.”45 Drawing upon his training at Holy Cross, he reviewed the close relationship between local self-government and democracy as they had been explored in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and experienced in Greek and Roman cities; and he noted that democracy in Rome was strangled when the emperors tightened supervision over localities, which “finally broke down the autonomy of local government.” Taking aim at the church he had left in discouragement, Tobin then drew upon his knowledge of the eleventh and twelfth centuries to argue that “the primitive democracy of the early Italian cities and the early church” had been “smothered in its turn by the successive centralizations” of power. In modern times, Tobin pointed out, Weimar had begun to nourish democracy by giving “large measures of self-government” to German cities; “the first swing of the Nazi axe” was aimed at that local vitality, with every city soon controlled from Berlin. Tobin also turned to the writings of Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist, and to the views expressed by Franklin Roosevelt and Charles Evans
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Hughes—when they were serving as state governors—to support the argument that centralization of governmental power would undermine political vitality and individual liberty. Then he cited a recent speech by an Administration official who argued that the tax system must be used not only to raise revenue but also to attain “social and economic objectives.” This was the danger, Tobin concluded; a federal tax on municipal bonds could be manipulated in order to exempt activities favored by the administration then in power, and to lay a heavy burden on those it did not endorse. In that event, the viability of a federal system, with its wide variety of programs and experiments, would be “wiped out,” and the country would be left with “an omnipotent national state.”46 To strengthen the case against Congressional action, Tobin sought the views of investment bankers who regularly entered the municipal bond market. He anticipated that their concerns would underscore the Conference arguments—that a federal tax would sharply raise the cost of borrowing, and that weaker governments might be blocked altogether from raising capital funds to improve their local schools, roads, and hospitals. Some of the investment bankers did underscore these fears, with special concern for smaller cities whose bonds might not find any buyers if they lost the tax-exempt feature. But other letters would have warmed the hearts of Treasury’s tax advocates, and it was evident that this effort did not generate the vigorous antitax response that Tobin and his aides had uncovered (and in part created) in their earlier campaign. This initiative was quietly dropped.47 The final prong of the Conference effort was its legal response to the Shamberg suit. During the spring of 1941, Tobin and Goldberg conferred with Cohen and developed a strategy to counter the Treasury attack. The defense would be based primarily on a distinction which Stone had used in marshaling majorities for his opinions in Gerhardt and O’Keefe—that a federal tax on income from municipal bonds would be a significant burden on the operations of state and local governments. However, the Port Authority’s brief would also need to respond to the Administration’s argument that public corporations were prime meat for federal taxing, since they were engaged in activities akin to private business. In challenging this view, the Authority again argued that all its works were “essential” governmental programs in pursuit of the goal of regional economic development. Finally, Tobin explored the essays and court opinions written by Justice Stone, whose role in these immunity cases had become crucial to the Supreme Court’s decisions, and he identified a line of defense which he thought “might be particularly appealing to Stone.” In this context as in his Congressional activities, Tobin
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demonstrated his ability to devise strategies that were focused on the values and incentives of his targeted audience.48 While Roosevelt’s aides hoped that Shamberg would provide a victory over tax-free bonds, they could not expect final approval in the courts until 1943 or 1944, and therefore they decided to try the Congressional route one more time. In the weeks before Congress reconvened in January, 1942, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee agreed to insert a provision ending tax-exemption into the new revenue act. FDR and Morgenthau then spoke out publicly, with Morgenthau urging action to “close loopholes” which allowed wealthy individuals to avoid federal taxes; “it is high time,” he asserted, “to tax the income of state and municipal securities.”49 The new effort produced the predictable counter-fire, with Tobin, Epstein, and Mayor LaGuardia taking the lead, joined by representatives of state and municipal associations. In May 1942, the House Ways and Means Committee once again rejected the Administration proposal, and after a longer fight the Senate also defeated the plan. During 1942, it became clear that Tobin and his colleagues had won a solid political victory over Roosevelt and his aides. And FDR would soon find the judicial route, via Shamberg, closed off as well. Then the issue of tax-exempt securities would fade as a Roosevelt priority, and more than forty years would elapse before the Congress and the Supreme Court would finally take significant action to curb the tax insulation of state and local bonds.50 Meanwhile, in the Port Authority’s lair, the battle over tax exemption was largely supplanted in the early months of 1942 by another conflict—this one for the future of the agency itself.
From Drift to Divided Leadership These were exciting years in the Law Department, and especially in Austin Tobin’s domain. Julius Henry Cohen had been suffering from health problems for several years, and by the fall of 1941, when he turned 68, he was no longer very active. He gave plenty of leeway to his younger colleagues, however, and the group that worked with Tobin was filled with enthusiasm and committed to their boss. Most of their energies were devoted to battling the Roosevelt Administration and their allies in Congress, and a measure of effort was allotted to grappling with the Bush Terminal appeal, which, as noted earlier, was finally and successfully concluded in 1940.
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As we have seen, the main problem facing Tobin and his associates was that they were joined to a large organization that seemed to be going nowhere. Soon after the first tube of the Lincoln Tunnel had been completed, in December 1939, Ammann retired to enter private practice, and his famed engineering staff was largely disbanded. Meanwhile, the regional planners and other visionaries of the agency’s first years had been pushed off to one side, a small band with little influence in Billings Wilson’s operations department; and the agency’s commissioners were dominated by conservative banker Frank Ferguson. His preference, and the Port Authority’s ruling policy, was to “retire debt in all haste.” As historian Erwin Bard concluded, writing at the end of 1941, the bi-state agency sat passively “on dead center.”51 One candidate who inquired about a job at the Port Authority early in 1942 received much the same impression. It seemed to be doing “nothing more than collect tolls on various bridges and tunnels,” and the staff was headed by general manager John Ramsey, “a relaxed, elderly, avuncular man, sitting in semi-retirement.” At one point, she was interviewed by Austin Tobin; “bright guy,” she thought, “but he has no future in this place.”52 Yet there were some stirrings within the Port Authority’s ranks during the first two years of the new decade, and there were occasional challenges from outside as well, pressing the agency to do more. Truck traffic, for example, became a subject of increasing interest to the agency’s planners. Despite the Depression, freight carried by motorized vans had steadily expanded in the late 1930s, and by 1940 dozens of small truck terminals were operating in the region; the loading and unloading process, together with thousands of trips by small trucks to shops and factories, cluttered the highways and side streets, especially in Manhattan. In July 1940, Walter Hedden’s Bureau of Commerce completed a report on the congestion problem and suggested that “a union terminal or system of union terminals” might be constructed, perhaps by the Port Authority, in order to improve the efficiency of truck deliveries and reduce street congestion. The benefits which Hedden and his fellow planners had once hoped would flow from a series of inland terminals for rail traffic were now directed toward the burgeoning field of truck transport.53 Meanwhile, bus travel into Manhattan by commuters and shoppers had also increased sharply, with hundreds of buses arriving each day from New Jersey via the Port Authority’s Lincoln and Holland tunnels. Interstate buses lined the curbs near Greyhound’s 34th Street bus station and around smaller bus terminals scattered in midtown, and Mayor LaGuardia urged the Port agency to think about ways to remove the New Jersey buses from cluttered Manhattan streets. By the summer of 1940, Hedden’s planners were examin-
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ing the feasibility of building a union bus terminal on the west side of Manhattan, near the Lincoln Tunnel.54 The nudge to consider new projects which LaGuardia supplied in the summer of 1940 was followed by a much more aggressive statement out of Trenton a few months later. In response to complaints that Port Authority tolls were too high, a state legislative committee had begun an investigation early in 1940, and the committee completed its work in December. After listening to citizen groups which urged that bridge and tunnel tolls be reduced, and to Port Authority arguments that its bonded debt should first be paid off and then tolls reduced, the legislative leaders in effect rejected both approaches. The crucial question, the committee concluded, was whether the Port Authority should have a “static role”; if so, “the principal function of the Authority would simply be the retirement of debt incurred in connection with the present facilities.” The committee then rejected that view and argued instead that the Authority must be “a dynamic agency,” ready to initiate new projects “as the need for such facilities is indicated from time to time.”55 By the end of the year, General Manager Ramsey was ready to take at least a modest step to recast the Port Authority’s image. After enduring two decades of annual reports whose covers and contents were decidedly grey in tone, Ramsey turned to an imaginative member of Tobin’s legal team, Mortimer Edelstein, and asked him to take on the task of creating a distinctive annual report to mark the Port Authority’s 20th anniversary.56 Ramsey also asked Marion Sanders, a member of Hedden’s bureau who had public-relations talents, to join Edelstein, and the two developed an impressive publication. Published in the early spring of 1941, The Port of New York ran 95 pages and was filled with striking photographs, interesting maps and useful tables. In a concession to the Ferguson theme, one section emphasized the important of repaying the bond debt (the banker’s somber visage graced that page); and in another section, the railroad tunnel under New York Bay was endorsed, a measure of Walter Hedden’s abiding faith in the faltering rail system. But there were hints of newer projects as well—a bus terminal for Manhattan, and possibly an interstate rail transit system which would make several stops on both sides of the River.57 A few months later, Hedden and his planning staff prepared an internal document for circulation to the staff and commissioners, and this paper went much further—suggesting that the Port Authority should reclaim its 1920s role as active agent of reform. The Authority had been created as a “central unifying agency with broad powers to function aggressively in improving the port,” the planners argued. It should engage in regional planning, and in ad-
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dition “finance, construct and operate . . . needed improvements,” borrowing funds to carry out this “major duty.” The Port Authority might own and operate steamship and rail terminals, and “any other type of port facility, including passenger service.” It might finance and construct a “union market terminal or a suburban transit line”; and perhaps the region would be better served if the Port Authority operated those facilities as well.58 In this confidential document, the authors warned their fellow staff members that the Authority “dare not fail to grapple with the problems it was created to solve,” and that an effort to “shift its responsibility to others” risked losing control to “agencies with greater initiative.” In a striking contrast to Ferguson’s caution, the report asserted: There is no room for misgivings because a venture appears new, unconventional or involves some degree of risk. There is a point where caution has the appearance of inertia; where conservatism can be mistaken for ineptitude; and where inaction can be interpreted as evasion of . . . public duty. Clearly the Port Authority has ample power and direction to proceed. (p. 15) The planners then argued that the agency presently had the financial capacity to construct two new union freight terminals in New York City, and marine terminals in Jersey City and Hoboken, and that it could add other projects, which might run deficits, by asking for “a substantial contribution” from those local governments which had “the power to tax.” (pp. 15–16) Through the end of 1941 and into the early months of 1942, these aspirations for expanded duties were but a minority view, nourished in the Bureau of Commerce, resonating with Edelstein and a few others outside the planning unit, and probably receiving encouragement from a few commissioners. The agency’s dominant profile remained, however, the abiding concern with paying off the debt, while operating the bridges and tunnels with brisk efficiency. Reinforcing that image, the commissioners re-elected Ferguson as chairman in January, 1942; it would be his ninth consecutive year in that executive office. The commissioners also announced that John Ramsey would continue to serve as General Manager, the top-ranking staff post; he had held that position since 1926.59 Then, a few weeks after the board meeting, John Ramsey announced that he wanted to retire. The Port Authority had been operating under tight financial constraints for more than ten years, and with World War Two now underway, gasoline rationing would soon be in force. Traffic would probably
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decline again, and more Authority staff members might have to be laid off. As one associate recalls, “Ramsey really didn’t want to tackle a whole new round of problems.” He looked forward to going back to Kentucky, where he had a farm, as soon as a successor could be chosen by the Board.60 But who should replace him? The Board appears to have been sharply divided. One group of commissioners, led by Frank Ferguson,wanted a top staff officer who would exert strong managerial control—reducing expenses while ensuring that the bridges and tunnels were maintained in good repair. Overall policy would continue to be set by Ferguson and his colleagues, with excess revenues used to pay off the bonds. Their candidate to replace Ramsey was Billings Wilson, Assistant General Manager for Operations. After graduating from Yale and spending three years as a U.S. Army officer, Wilson had joined the Port Authority’s staff in 1922 and risen quickly; he had now been one of Ramsey’s top aides for fifteen years. Wilson ran the Operations Department in an energetic, military style; looking ahead to years of reduced wartime travel, when toll revenues might be expected to decline, his reputation for efficiency generated confidence that he could be relied upon to squeeze out unnecessary costs. From the staff perspective, Wilson was seen as the most likely choice, but not an attractive one, because of his autocratic demeanor. He was, as one of his subordinates later recalled, “more feared than loved.”61 To another group of commissioners, Ramsey’s departure offered an opportunity to break free from the cautious approach of the previous decade. What was needed, from this perspective, was an executive team which would look ahead to the economic challenges and opportunities facing the New York metropolis once the war was over. The new staff director and his aides should identify projects that the Port Authority might undertake to aid the region’s economic growth, and then they would develop strategies to gain wide public acceptance for the Authority’s plans. This faction was led by Howard Cullman and Joseph Byrne. Cullman was a member of a wealthy family who had decided on public service rather than a business career, and he had been an active fund-raiser for the Democratic Party in New York since the early 1920s. Cullman had worked with Al Smith when Smith was governor, and he had welcomed appointment to the Port Authority board in 1927 as a way to help to maintain New York’s role as a vital commercial center. In the early 1930s, he had taken a leading role in pressing for construction of the first inland terminal, and he looked forward to other projects that might advance the cause of civic betterment. But the 1930s was a slow period at the Port agency, and Cullman found the cautious approach of Ferguson and his allies uncongenial. Byrne, a New Jersey Com-
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missioner since 1934, was an elected member of Newark’s governing body and, in the early 1940s, director of the city’s Department of Public Works. Byrne was alert to the possible benefits that a reinvigorated Port Authority might bring to his own city’s commercial vitality.62 From this perspective, Walter Hedden was an attractive candidate to succeed Ramsey. After attending Williams College and obtaining graduate training in economics, Hedden had joined the Port Authority staff in 1923, and within a few years he had risen to the top planning position; since the early 1930s, his title had been Chief of the Bureau of Commerce. Hedden had an incisive and wide-ranging mind, he worked long hours, and he was known to be frustrated by the banker’s caution that pervaded much of the agency. In Hedden’s opinion, the New York region needed to “gear up” to meet the transportation challenges that the war would bring, and that would continue after the war ended, and he thought the Port Authority ought to take a leading role in this regional effort. The July 1941 staff document displayed Hedden’s views and suggested his impatience. Then, in the summer of 1941, the Port Authority took the lead in creating the Metropolitan Defense Transport Committee, which would respond to the growing threat of war by organizing defense preparations for the tri-state region. Hedden was appointed to chair the regional subcommittee on food supplies. As a result, he emerged from the obscure position that his boss, Billings Wilson, assigned to the Bureau of Commerce, and he began to appear at Board meetings to discuss regional issues and strategies. Hedden soon emerged as a contender for the top staff post, in competition with Wilson.63 When staff members—in planning, in law, and in operations—learned that John Ramsey was planning to retire, they identified Wilson as his likely successor, and Hedden as an alternative, if the board wanted new ideas more than it wanted spit-and-polish efficiency. And they learned also that the commissioners were becoming impatient with Julius Henry Cohen—the intellectual creator of the agency; once the master strategist, but now a man in poor health who sometimes rambled at board meetings, and whose egotism seemed a match for his grasp of issues legal and political. So the mill of conjecture turned to candidates for General Counsel as well, and here Leander Shelley was the probable winner. His important work on the bond refunding problem in the 1930s, his position as solid adviser to Cohen on legal distinctions, and his predictable behavior on all matters seemed to fit the agency’s dominant style. To Goldberg and others who had worked on the tax fight, Tobin also seemed a possible candidate for General Counsel, but he was ten years Shelley’s junior and lacked his sustained experience as legal craftsman.64
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When Tobin considered his own future, in the spring of 1942, he doubted that he would stay with the Port Authority if Shelley were chosen to succeed Cohen. Based on discussions with Edelstein and from his own encounters with that meticulous intelligence, he knew that working under Shelley would be a cramped experience. Meanwhile, with the United States now at war, Tobin began to think seriously about military service, and early in 1942 he applied to the U.S. Navy for a commission.65 Within the board, Tobin was seen by Cullman and Byrne as an attractive alternative to Wilson and Hedden. They liked the young man’s style, his enthusiasm and his capacity to develop a dedicated and able staff, and his ability to devise and carry out complex strategies in the political arena. It seems likely that Ramsey also urged the board to consider Tobin, whom he thought had done a fine job in the anti-Treasury campaign. Through his work on tax-exempt bonds, Tobin was known and well regarded among government officials in both states and in the investment community, and this was an added benefit.66 He lacked the intensive immersion in administrative duties which was central to Wilson’s life, but that would not be a significant problem if Wilson could be persuaded to stay on as head of operations. Tobin also lacked the wide experience in regional and project planning which Hedden offered, but he far outdistanced Hedden in his experience in devising political and legal strategies to overcome obstacles and implement new ideas. Here again, if Hedden stayed and was brought closer to the executive office, the mix of strengths—Tobin plus Hedden— might work well. By early April, Wilson and Tobin had emerged as the main contenders, and the lines of battle were sharply drawn. Then Tobin gained support of a majority of the board; and Ferguson, who had been championing Wilson, suddenly threw his own hat into the ring, offering to resign his bank presidency and take on the full-time executive post at the Port Authority. But Ferguson was rebuffed, and the majority held firm for Tobin. Ferguson retreated to his Jersey City bank, nursing his wounds and waiting for the time—soon to come—when he could use the power of the Chairman’s post to shackle this upstart, or force him out.67 When Tobin was called in by the board and informed that the commissioners had agreed to name him as John Ramsey’s successor, it was, by all accounts, a surprise to Tobin and astonishing to his family and close associates. “It was a shock to me,” Goldberg recalled. In consultation with Tobin, the board then had to construct the rest of the team that would work under him, and by the end of May that complex task was completed.68
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On June 4, 1942, the Port Authority announced that Austin Tobin had been chosen as Ramsey’s successor—the title now being Executive Director of the agency. The announcement was far from a ringing endorsement of the Cullman-Byrne philosophy, however, for it emphasized the need for “retrenchment” and “managerial caution” in the face of “potential declining revenues.” So the entrepreneurs conceded the initial public-relations victory to the conservative cause. In return, Ferguson and his allies agreed to announce that Tobin was the “unanimous choice” of the Board. Cohen’s retirement was also announced, and Leander Shelley would succeed him as General Counsel.69 In addition, the commissioners approved one other important change: the Bureau of Commerce was set free from Billings Wilson’s tight managerial control and retitled as an independent Department of Port Development, which reported to Tobin; and Hedden was named to direct the new department. When he heard the news, Wilson swallowed his disappointment, went to Tobin’s office to offer congratulations, and agreed to stay on as Director of the Operations Department, ensuring that the bridges and tunnels would “run on time” while Tobin and Hedden explored new opportunities and new projects.70 The significance of these changes seemed lost on a sleepy metropolitan press, which wrote not a word of the conflict in philosophies or the battle that preceded the change in regime. Its meaning was clear, however, to perceptive members of the Authority staff. As David McKay, a senior official at the agency, commented to a colleague on hearing the news: “Now we’re going to see things zing!”
Democracy, Federalism, and the Freedom to Experiment It would be some years before the real impact of the board’s decision in favor of Austin Tobin could be seen. Until early 1945, the primary executive power would stay with Frank Ferguson; during those years, a mixture of fiscal conservatism and old-fashioned anti-Semitism would block Tobin’s initiatives and force one of his key aides from office. And not until 1947 would the Port Authority begin to take on major new duties—airports, marine terminals, and other projects—at last meeting the standards for aggressive action suggested by New Jersey legislators and the Hedden reports in 1940–41. Those developments are discussed in the next chapter. In the paragraphs below, we explore the main themes illustrated by the extensive conflicts and modest victories that marked the years between 1931 and 1942.
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First, it is important to underscore the signal contribution of the Law Department in encouraging a sense of playful experimentation and in maintaining the Port Authority’s distinctive values, through a decade in which those patterns of thought and action found little encouragement elsewhere in the agency. During the 1930s, the imaginative thinking and political coalition-building which had marked the Authority’s first ten years seemed to depart from the executive offices and most of the agency’s divisions—casualties of external forces and of leaders who preferred stability in goals and efficiency in execution to forays into uncertain waters. But the legal branch retained much of the older entrepreneurial spirit, encouraged by Cohen even as he became personally less active in the division’s work. One might argue, perhaps, that the Port Authority’s efforts to grapple with legal issues involved in tax immunity, and to organize political alliances in defense of immunity, were simply the result of external challenge—a necessary response to the gauntlet thrown down again and again by FDR and his allies in Treasury. But that undervalues, I think, the tone of legal and political innovation which marked the Authority’s responses through these years. In his heyday, from about 1910 through the early 1930s, Cohen had demonstrated unusual talents in matters both legal and political, and men of similar inclination had been attracted to his team. With his distinctive personal history, Tobin could readily respond to Cohen’s career as a model, salting in his own style in challenging authority and his considerable abilities in organizing men as well as legal principles. A “moonshine reveller” in his years at Holy Cross, a spittoon thrower at the Port agency, Tobin demonstrated that he could convert even humdrum cases of real-estate condemnation into lively challenges to the intellect. Making good use of the freedom Cohen encouraged, Tobin employed a playful approach in his relations with his colleagues and in thinking about how to beat Roosevelt at his own political game.71 Of course Tobin and his aides faced an opponent whose own inclinations were also distinctly playful and intellectually complex, as illustrated in Roosevelt’s expression of “sympathy” for those who would be required to pay back taxes after Gerhardt was decided in his favor. Possibly both sides were strengthened by this nine-year battle: FDR’s financial and legal teams were kept on their toes as they sought new revenue, while the contest nourished a vital spark—otherwise failing—at the Port Authority. Certainly the bi-state agency benefited from the challenge Roosevelt and his aides laid down from 1933 into the 1940s, though this was probably a benefit unintended by the
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president. Or was it entirely unintended? In 1931, Roosevelt had argued that the Port Authority’s leaders and its policies were “charting the course toward the more able and honorable administration of affairs of government,” and in 1933 he had used that agency as a partial model in creating TVA. Why should he not, in some deeper crevices of his mind, see the advantage of intellectual and political combat in keeping his once-favored government body alert and able to entertain new ideas?72 So, during these years, the Law Department protected some of the Port Authority’s distinctive values. Meanwhile, Hedden and his assistants kept alive in the peripheral offices of the Bureau of Commerce the weakened spirit of regional planning and action, until they could find allies in the new decade in Mayor LaGuardia and the New Jersey legislative committee. And until they could join forces with Tobin and his associates from the legal division in the summer of ’42. Another theme illustrated in this story comes in two parts: First, the dangers to a vigorous federal system of government, to social experimentation, and perhaps to individual liberty which are presented by the forces which press—especially in modern society—for centralized control in the name of national efficiency, or social equity. And second, the important role which the Port Authority undertook in the 1930s in leading resistance to that centralizing tendency out of Washington. As Tobin pointed out in his speeches and in Conference newsletters, the pressures to centralize governmental power have challenged cities and other semi-independent public bodies since the Greco-Roman era, throughout the Medieval period, and conspicuously, in the 1930s, in Hitler’s actions which stripped local governments of any independent power. In the United States, the Port Authority stood as a visible example of the benefits that could flow if states and urban regions were permitted to try differing approaches to organizing and using the powers of government, insulated from the controlling hand of Washington. Certainly this had been FDR’s view, when he sat as governor of New York State and applauded the important projects of this bistate agency and the effective execution of its plans. In the United States, the danger of centralized authority emanated not only from the executive and the Congress, but also from a Supreme Court which could block state and local forays in new directions. The importance of releasing state energies from oppressive central control had been expressed forcefully by Brandeis in 1932, when the Court majority rejected a new initiative by the state of Oklahoma. In dissent, Brandeis wrote:
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It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. . . . But . . . we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles.
Cohen had responded to the Oklahoma case, endorsing Brandeis’s argument and urging Congress to pass new laws to protect the right of states to experiment.73 However, when Roosevelt and his Treasury associates took aim at municipal bonds, Tobin and his associates then turned to the courts as an important line of defense for state and local initiatives. Ending tax exemption might raise financing costs by 25 percent or more, they argued, and that would prevent cities and towns from floating bonds for many projects that were financially marginal. Of course the federal government might still permit tax exemption for selective types of bond issues; in that way, Tobin pointed out, the tax power could be used as a weapon “to impose the social and economic objectives of those in control of the national government upon every state and city in the country.”74 Treasury’s judicial strategy—using the Shamberg case to break the back of tax-exempt bonds—was in its early stages when Tobin was named executive director, but he and the Port Authority team continued to work on the case, and two years later they were rewarded with an important if partial victory. In August 1944, the Court of Appeals agreed with the bi-state agency that its securities were protected from federal taxes by Congressional Revenue Acts. The victory was only partial in that the court rooted its decision in federal laws, not in the basic protections of the U.S. Constitution. However, in January 1945, when the Supreme Court announced that it had denied Treasury’s appeal in the case, Tobin and his associates in the national coalition could leave the field of battle, assured that FDR’s initiatives had been defeated. The right of state and local governments to issue bonds for whatever purposes they thought desirable—unburdened by the federal taxing power—was still protected.75 The third point underscored in chapters 9 and 10 is the crucial importance of grass-roots political activity, in safeguarding the ability of state and local governments to finance new initiatives and other programs by issuing bonds. The grass-roots theme was illustrated forcefully by the efforts of Tobin and his aides in 1938 and 1939, and this campaign then provided the intellectual and political nourishment for continuing efforts to defend municipal
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bonds during the next forty years. That subsequent history can be summarized briefly. Although defeated in the courts, in the postwar years Treasury and its allies continued to press for Congressional action to strip away tax exemption; and the Conference on State Defense stayed on the alert, with Daniel Goldberg holding a key position, through the 1940s and into the 1950s. In 1949, for example, opponents of tax exemption attempted to eliminate exempt bonds by attaching an amendment to pending housing legislation, and Goldberg teamed up with the Conference of Mayors to block that effort. The next year, a spokesman from the business community took the lead in attacking tax-exempt bonds, and Tobin and his allies quickly responded with a series of counter-attacks. By the 1960s, the task of defending municipal bonds had passed to the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), and Goldberg and other Port Authority staff members continued to hold central roles in that effort. Their work was made more difficult when local governments stretched the opportunity to experiment too far, issuing large amounts of “industrial development bonds” to attract or keep private corporations in their cities, and passing on to those private firms the benefit of tax-exempt low interest rates. When Congress passed legislation to restrict that practice, Treasury saw an opportunity to sweep away all tax-exempt bonds; and a coalition of national groups, reminiscent of the 1938–39 coalition, emerged again in political strength, frustrating Treasury’s hopes.76 During the 1970s, city and state use of tax-exempt bonds expanded further, and Treasury argued that these bonds were being used to avoid estate and gift taxes. Congress responded with a new law in 1982 which limited tax-exemption to bonds whose ownership could be monitored, through registration. State and local interests saw this as another effort to undermine the municipal bond market and sued, and Goldberg emerged from retirement to work on one of the briefs.77 But the result was, from a legal perspective, a stunning defeat for the states. In a decision handed down in 1988, the Supreme Court not only upheld the registration requirement but reached further, concluding that the U.S. Constitution provides no protection to municipal bonds; if Congress and the president wish to eliminate tax-exempt bonds, they are free to do so. The lone dissent, by Justice O’Connor, echoed the fears expressed by state and local interests through half a century of successful defense: The Court shirks its responsibility because it fails to inquire into the substantial adverse effects on state and local governments that would follow from federal taxation of the interest on state and local bonds. . . . If Con-
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gress may tax the interest paid on state and local bonds, it may strike at the very heart of state and local government activities.78
A stunning defeat in legal terms, but from another perspective just the stimulus needed to remind the states and cities that their best defense lies not in judicial analysis but in the political process. The Court opinion points in that direction. And that decision “galvanized state and local government” to become more active politically, led to the creation of a special national commission which endorsed tax exemption, and resulted in the creation of a new version of the Conference on State Defense, now called the Public Finance Network, to “coordinate the efforts, on a grass-roots basis, of all of the public interest groups” working to keep broad Congressional support for tax-exempt bonds. The political lessons that can be drawn from the campaign which defeated Roosevelt in the 1930s still apply, and perhaps with even more relevance now that the Constitutional argument of Pollock has gone to its grave.79
Part Four
Expanding Empire
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11 To Claim the Skies and the Seas
The Golden Age lies ahead of us not behind us. Everywhere new possibilities beckon and arouse courage and effort. . . . Man is capable, if he will but exercise the required courage, intelligence and effort, of shaping his own fate. —John Dewey1
There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success . . . than to introduce a new system of things: for he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old system as his enemies, and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from the new. —Niccolò Machiavelli2
N
ow it is July 1942. John Ramsey has departed for his farm in Kentucky. Julius Henry Cohen is on the sidelines, serving occasionally as a consultant. Austin Tobin, the surprise choice of the Board of Commissioners, has just been installed as executive director. There he would stay for the next 30 years—through the administrations of six Presidents, four governors in New York State, and five chief executives in New Jersey—until the battles with Governors Cahill and Rockefeller led at last to his abrupt decision to retire in December 1971. The task of part four is to describe and analyze the first eight years of this extraordinary reign. These were crucial years—when the Port Authority expanded from a bridge-and-tunnel agency to embrace a wide range of new goals and projects, including three major airports, a massive bus terminal in Manhattan, and its first important marine facility, at Port Newark. During this period, as he searched for new tasks and marshaled the staff to take on new burdens, Tobin also transformed the agency from a loosely connected organization, somewhat adrift, into a coherent institution with 247
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a clear sense of mission and a staff dedicated to that mission and loyal to the new leader.3 To bring about these changes, Tobin needed the optimism of John Dewey wedded to the strategic skills of a Machiavellian. Within the bi-state agency, he was opposed in the early years by a powerful executive, the Authority’s chairman, whose hostility, laced with anti-Semitism, he was forced to abide and circumvent, until Fortune combined with adroit maneuver to cast that enemy out. Beyond the agency, Tobin’s expansive plans also faced resistance—from elected officials in New York City and Newark, from influential state legislators in Albany and Trenton, and from Robert Moses and his allies. To overcome these opponents, he had to construct a regional coalition which included planning and economic experts, important business and government officials, and influential newspaper editors and reporters. Moreover, in order to ensure the viability of his newly acquired airports, he was prompted to take the lead in creating a national coalition to break the monopoly power of the airlines. And, facing the need to displace those who lived near the bus-terminal site, Tobin and his aides met the challenge by creating relocation policies that weighed the rights of the dispossessed against “development efficiency.” In chapters 11, 12 and 13, we examine an array of questions regarding the challenges, obstacles, and strategies seen in these crucial years of Tobin’s leadership. How did Tobin and his associates identify new directions for the agency? What strategies did they use to gather support for their preferred choices, and how did they anticipate and neutralize possible criticism? When opposition had to be met openly, what tactics were used and with what effect? What steps did Tobin and his aides take to enhance the agency’s technical expertise, to motivate his expanding staff, and to overcome the tendency toward fragmentation and conflicting goals within the agency? What factors were most important in determining success and failure of the Port Authority’s new initiatives?4 In the course of exploring Austin Tobin’s leadership strategies and style during these years of transformation, we will inevitably touch on portions of his “inner life”—his personal values, motivations, hopes, and biases. In particular, we will want to consider how well Tobin fits Schumpeter’s suggested personality profile for the entrepreneur—whose actions are shaped by “the impulse to fight . . . the will to conquer,” by the “joy of creating, of getting things done” and, perhaps, by “the dream and the will to found a private kingdom.” In exploring these various issues, we can also cast some wider light on the nature of “entrepreneurial leadership” in public life.5
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Reviving the Entrepreneurial Spirit Let us resolve to sin no more. —Austin Tobin, urging the staff to read Erwin Bard’s book, fall 1942.
When Erwin Bard was completing his major study of the Port Authority in 1941, he saw little sense of creative energy at the top of the agency. Working in an office next to that celebrated legal visionary, Julius Henry Cohen, Bard found him inclined to talk mainly about challenges and achievements of the past. Cohen had suffered a heart attack several years earlier, and his modest work schedule was combined with a long nap each afternoon. Ramsey appeared no more inclined to seek new challenges. “The Port Authority seems to have become frightened by the specter of controversy,” Bard concluded. Its policy had become “totally receptive rather than aggressive” in confronting the region’s transportation and port commerce problems.6 The Port Authority’s announcement in June 1942 that Austin Tobin would succeed John Ramsey as the top staff official was surrounded with warnings of declining tolls at the agency’s bridges and tunnels, and of the need for “retrenchment” and “managerial caution” at the beleaguered agency. By early July, however, Tobin had found his own voice, as he reminded the staff that the Port Authority had in its first twenty years “bested one crisis after another.” With “your trust and confidence,” he commented, “we will take the war in stride and set our sights for the great part which the Port Authority will play in the post-war development of the Port of New York.”7 Until he was chosen to be executive director, Tobin had been absorbed in matters of law and politics. He had devoted little attention to the transportation or economic-development problems facing the New York region, or to the possible initiatives which the Port agency might take in meeting those challenges. During the summer and fall of 1942, Tobin spent long hours reading about these issues, and he gathered about him staff members who could help devise strategies to respond to regional needs. From the Law Department he brought a key associate, Mortimer Edelstein, to the front office. Edelstein had been a leading member of the team which battled FDR in the tax-exempt bond fight, and he had also co-authored the Port Authority’s 1940 annual report, which described in dramatic form the region’s challenges and identified several projects the Port Authority might undertake. A central role was given to Walter Hedden, who had been freed from Billings Wilson’s yoke and named director of the new Department of Port Develop-
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ment. In the months to follow, Hedden worked closely with Tobin in developing plans for the postwar era.8 During the fall, Tobin read Bard’s newly published volume on the Port agency’s achievements and failings, and he then sent copies to the senior staff with a cover note: This book is a must! It is no sugary review of our progress, rather it will prick you with the barb of criticism. However, it is a healthy thing to see ourselves as an unprejudiced scholar found us and to have him opening long-forgotten doors in search of the family skeleton. After all, it profits us very little to be told how well the job was done. Rather, let us resolve to sin no more.9
By mid-November, Hedden was able to circulate to his colleagues a confidential memorandum which sketched out a postwar program the Port Authority might aim to achieve, through its own actions and in cooperation with other agencies and groups; expanded rail transit, air cargo terminals, more regional highways, and the mainstays of the Comprehensive Plan— union rail terminals and the cross-bay tunnel—were all included.10 A few weeks later Edelstein spoke out publicly, challenging the conservative perspective which had shaped his agency’s culture under Ferguson and Ramsey. Addressing a meeting at the Cornell Law School, Edelstein warned that the Port of New York Authority and other public authorities faced the danger of “hardening of the administrative and financial arteries.” If his own agency adopted as its sole function “the collection and disbursement of revenues,” it would “fail . . . to justify its existence.” Moreover, Edelstein argued, neither the Port of New York Authority nor other public authorities which can stand on their “own financial feet” should limit their activities to projects which individually will be certain to pay their own way. Instead, “a broader concept of economic self-sufficiency can be substituted,” placing “all of the Port Authority credit and resources” behind a project that might not pay its own way but is needed “in the public interest.” Unless this perspective is embraced, Edelstein concluded, and the public authority is willing to add functions “to meet the changing needs of all of our people,” the authority “has no justification.”11 Edelstein’s comments provide some sense of the aggressive approach, threaded with a readiness to take risks, which Tobin encouraged within the staff in his first few months in office. By early spring of 1943, Tobin had also convinced the Port Authority Board to take a forward-looking position. In
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their annual report to the governors and legislatures of New Jersey and New York, the Commissioners first pointed out that the Authority was “in a period of severely declining revenues and curtailed expenditures.” Even so, they urged that “prompt and constructive measures” be taken to meet the competitive challenge from other regions. The Port “must plan now,” their letter of transmittal stated, for the development of airports and efficient marine terminal facilities in the postwar world. “It is not too early,” they concluded, “to shape joint plans and a common approach” to the region’s trade and transport problems.12
New Goals for an Aging Enterprise Early in the summer of 1943, Tobin and Hedden completed a confidential 40-page report which outlined their own philosophy for regional action. One of the Port Authority’s primary responsibilities in the postwar world, they argued, would be to “channel and harness” the new forces of technology and transport organization so that the Port area would maintain its position as “the gateway for world commerce.” The report then listed a number of projects which were “proposed for possible financing, construction and operation by the Port Authority.” These included a large union bus terminal in Manhattan (a project initially studied by the agency in 1939–40), truck terminals in both states (also the subject of earlier studies), and bulk commodity and produce terminals.13 In addition, the Tobin/Hedden report described initiatives the Port Authority itself might take in the fields of air and marine transport. “An extensive system of air terminals will be needed,” they argued; the combination of Newark and LaGuardia airports, plus the new [Idlewild] airport planned by New York City, would still “not be adequate” to meet the postwar air cargo and passenger demands. So the Port Authority “must be prepared to assist municipalities” in planning and developing airfields; such assistance might include “financing, construction and operation by the Port Authority” of an array of airports in New Jersey.14 The 1943 paper also suggested that the Port Authority take an active part in maintaining shipping as a vital commercial enterprise in the New York region. The agency could, for example, analyze property costs “at several sites on the New Jersey waterfront” which might become “available for lease or purchase by the Port Authority after the war.”15 The June 1943 report was only slightly more cautious than Edelstein’s speech regarding the issue of economic practicality. Perhaps each of the pro-
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posed projects could become financially self-supporting, and this question should be carefully explored, the authors argued. However, where a deficit operation seemed likely, the Port Authority would examine what financial assistance would be required—from the federal government or other sources— to permit a needed project to go forward.16 Once the planning report was completed, Tobin and his aides turned to the tasks of evaluating each program area in greater depth, and of winning regional acceptance for any projects the Port Authority itself decided to undertake. Tobin knew that he would probably face difficult political challenges from New York City’s mayor and other officials, and he soon found that he faced a wrenching battle within his own agency as well.17 The first step was to gain approval by the Board of Commissioners for the general approach taken in the June report, and for the hiring of economists, engineers, and other specialists to carry out the detailed evaluations needed in each project area. In addition, an active public relations program would be required. The agency would need to develop close rapport with reporters, and with editorial writers and other opinion leaders throughout the region, in order to gain their support for the Port Authority’s plans. “We’re getting terrible publicity,” Tobin commented to an associate at the time, “especially in New Jersey. It gets worse and worse.” Press relations were in the hands of Larry Keefe, a former newspaper reporter who had joined the Port Authority in the 1920s, and by the late 1930s he showed little imagination or energy; senior officials had been trying to get rid of him for years.18 The approach that Tobin and his aides would take in two areas—motor truck terminals and a proposed interstate bus terminal in Manhattan— seemed straightforward. Both had been identified publicly as appropriate fields for Port Authority action, and no competing government initiatives existed. Locational and economic studies were required, and New York City would have to agree to new regulations regarding bus movements in Manhattan, but in 1943 these steps seemed to raise no real hurdles. Later, Robert Moses would attempt to block the bus project, but at this point he was counted as a friend of Tobin’s plans for expansion.19 Airport and seaport operations raised more difficult issues. The region’s two largest cities each owned a major air terminal (LaGuardia in northern Queens, and Newark Airport situated near Newark’s marshes and harbor); moreover, New York City had identified an area in southern Queens where it planned to create a vast new airport (Idlewild, now Kennedy Airport). Newark also had a substantial city-owned marine terminal, and New York City
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11-1. Engines of economic growth? On the New York side of the region, Tobin and his aides studied LaGuardia and Idlewild airports, and the shipping piers along the Manhattan and Brooklyn shores. West of the Hudson, Newark’s airport and seaport, and Hoboken’s piers, attracted their close attention.
was a major owner and developer of pier facilities along the Manhattan and Brooklyn waterfront. To the mayors and other civic leaders in the two cities, these sea and air terminals were symbols of municipal independence and civic pride, as well as potential engines of postwar economic growth. In addition, the marine terminals on both sides of the Hudson provided hundreds
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of patronage jobs for loyal party workers, and local officials looked forward to construction contracts and job expansion at these transport terminals as a route to strengthening party fortunes. From the perspective of the Port Authority’s leaders, however, these municipal facilities were a source more of consternation than of pride. Neither city had allocated enough funds in the past two decades to maintain their harbor facilities in good repair, and the patronage system had not attracted a band of energetic and efficient workers and supervisors. Moreover, the postwar world would surely require large investments in technological improvements in marine facilities, and great expansion of the region’s airport system. Yet Newark and New York City faced growing pressures for major capital investments in schools, hospitals and other projects, and with those needs added to existing indebtedness, it seemed unlikely to Tobin and Hedden that either city would be able to dedicate the funds required for modern, efficient air and harbor facilities. And even if adequate funds were made available, could these municipal governments be expected to replace patronage with merit in hiring workers, and could they attract and hold the kind of managerial talent needed to make these air and marine terminals vigorous competitors in the world market? To Tobin and his colleagues, and to other close observers and officials, those changes seemed both revolutionary and unlikely.20 Finally, even if these two cities had possessed the funds and managerial talent to meet the postwar challenge aggressively, history suggested that they would employ their energies in trying to divert traffic from each other, rather than developing cooperative plans which would strengthen the overall quality and efficiency of the bi-state Port region. The same narrow perspective appeared likely to animate smaller cities, such as Hoboken, which owned portions of the region’s waterfront. Certainly the previous decades had seen competitive antagonism among the region’s cities; that tradition seemed destined to continue as long as municipal control held sway.21 However, if detailed economic studies showed that modernized airports and marine terminals in the region could be developed and operated on a self-supporting basis, one possible solution to this problem and to the region’s needs seemed reasonably clear: the Port Authority itself could take on the task. Indeed, there was no other public agency which extended across the bistate metropolis and which had the potential funds to develop air and marine facilities on an integrated basis. Perhaps these terminals would not be fully self-supporting during the next decade or two; even then, a federal grant might allow the Port Authority to operate the terminals on a nearly breakeven basis, and the Authority’s own growing reserves could be used to meet
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a modest deficiency in operating and capital funds. Thus the “Edelstein principle” might be employed to help strengthen the region’s transport system and its economy. In addressing the issue of airport and seaport improvements, Tobin and his associates realized that a carefully crafted political and public-relations strategy would be crucial. Even if widely accepted planning standards, bolstered by careful economic analysis, offered convincing evidence of the advantages of Port Authority operation, the bi-state agency could not simply ask New York City and Newark to hand over their terminals. Such a request would expose the agency to vigorous attack from city elected officials, political party leaders, and others who benefited—or who thought their individual cities benefited—from city ownership and policy control. The attitude of New York’s Mayor LaGuardia was likely to be especially antagonistic to a Port Authority takeover.22 Instead, the request would have to come the other way—from local leaders persuaded that the most sensible solution, from the viewpoint of their own city and the wider region, was to rely on the Port Authority to modernize and operate their major airports and seaports. To nudge wary officials of Newark and New York City to make such a request would require an extensive campaign of education. The effort might begin with informal discussions which would bring newspaper editors, local business leaders and civic organizations to see the merit of the Authority’s perspective on the problem; and their energies could then be enlisted to persuade city commissioners and mayors to set aside their parochial inclinations and embrace a regional solution. Meanwhile, Tobin and his aides could also develop and publicize the agency’s expertise in general air-traffic planning, and argue publicly that modern air and sea terminals would be needed to aid economic growth. But they would avoid any direct actions that might suggest the Port Authority was anxious to swallow those piers and airfields which generated such municipal pride and patronage. To carry forward these efforts, particularly the crucial work of establishing close contacts with newspaper editors and reporters, the work of a skilled practitioner in public relations seemed essential.
The Chairman Dissents, and Departs With the June 1943 report in hand, Tobin and Hedden applied to the Board for approval of the next two steps—creation of a Port Planning Program,
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which would involve detailed locational and economic-feasibility studies of the several projects; and the appointment of a new director of public relations, to replace the long-time press aide, who had finally retired. For the latter position, Tobin recommended Marion K. Sanders, a member of Hedden’s staff who had held important posts in public relations before joining the Port Authority in 1937, and who had worked with Mortimer Edelstein in creating the distinctive 1940 annual report and in preparing his Cornell address on challenges and risk-taking at public authorities. The Board’s Vice Chairman, Howard Cullman, was enthusiastic about the Planning Program and the Sanders appointment, and most members of the Board favored going forward with Tobin’s recommendations.23 The Board Chairman, Frank Ferguson, felt differently. He had earlier criticized Tobin’s decision to appoint Edelstein as his top assistant, in terms that suggested he was motivated by ethnic prejudice. Now Ferguson vigorously opposed Sanders for the public relations post. The fact that she was Jewish seemed to be one reason for his animus; that she had personal ties to Howard Cullman, who loomed as a successor if Ferguson’s support weakened, may also have been a factor. Moreover, in view of his fiscal conservatism Ferguson could not easily endorse studies of projects (such as airports) that might run large deficits; nor could he feel enthusiastic about adding staff to carry out extensive surveys, in an era of reduced revenues and belt-tightening. Within a few weeks, reluctantly, Ferguson agreed to let the port studies proceed. However, he remained adamant on the public-relations appointment. In deference to his position as Chairman, the Board majority and Tobin held back.24 During the fall and winter of 1943–44, the division became sharper. Some commissioners supported Ferguson, out of respect for his long service with the Port Authority; having first been appointed in 1924, Ferguson was the senior commissioner in point of service, and he had been elected Chairman in 1934 and reelected annually to the top position every year since. Other commissioners, recalling that Ferguson had opposed Tobin’s appointment as executive director in 1942, viewed the chairman’s actions as an attempt to block Tobin from exerting leadership—and perhaps as tactical maneuvers which would lead him to resign. Ferguson also seemed motivated by a concern that an alliance to oust him from the chairmanship was in the making; he appeared to view Cullman as the leader of this group, with several of the New York commissioners and Tobin in the same camp.25 Tobin decided, for the present, to avoid a direct confrontation. It was clear, however, that his hopes for revitalizing the agency could not be re-
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alized unless the dominant sentiment on the Board was shifted from minimizing expenditures to a lively interest in finding new challenges for the Port agency. So Tobin set about to change their thinking. In his meetings with the commissioners and in his Weekly Reports, Tobin reminded them—perhaps “educated them” is the better phrase—as to the importance of thinking optimistically and aggressively about the future role of the Port and its Port Authority. Once the detailed planning studies were underway, he reported progress to the Board, week by week, again underscoring the range of projects the bi-state agency might undertake. And while the public relations job was left unfilled, Tobin and his aides made speeches and prepared press releases and articles which emphasized their broad regional concerns.26 The activities of Tobin and his staff, and the favorable press reports they generated, began to draw support away from Ferguson. Meanwhile, the Authority’s chairman set out to wound Tobin by attacking his long-time friend and top aide, Mortimer Edelstein. In the first weeks of 1944, Ferguson called Edelstein to his Jersey City bank office and accused him of having an affair with another Authority employee. Edelstein indignantly denied the accusation, but he soon concluded that he could not function effectively in the front office, in the face of the chairman’s hostility. Reluctantly, and despite his enjoyment in working with Tobin on the bond fight and now on plans to expand the agency’s scope, Edelstein decided to resign. By early spring he was gone.27 With Ferguson still blocking Marion Sanders, Tobin then advertised widely and interviewed a set of candidates from outside the agency. His first choice was Lee K. Jaffe, who had extensive experience in journalism and public relations. In April he sent her name forward, and most Board members were ready to approve the appointment. Again Ferguson objected, complaining openly that “she’s Howard Cullman’s cousin” (i.e., that she was Jewish). Now it was clear that the Chairman’s opposition was motivated by a streak of anti-Semitic prejudice, which Ferguson directed at Vice Chairman Cullman, at Sanders, and now at Jaffe. But the rest of the Board was reluctant to overrule their long-time leader. “There’s a problem in the Commission,” Tobin reported, in distress, to a close associate.28 Lee Jaffe’s friends in Washington were not willing to leave her fate to a weak-kneed Board. Informal contacts were made with Senator Robert Wagner (D-N.Y.), who reportedly called Authority commissioner Arthur Walsh. Both threatened to take the issue to the press. Ferguson relented partially, and in June Mrs. Jaffe was appointed Assistant Director. Within a few
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months, the stream of favorable stories that seemed to emanate from the Jaffe touch won him over, and in October she was named Director of Public Relations.29 As 1944 drew to a close, Ferguson had lost the support of most New York members of the Board, and his ability to retain the chairmanship depended on his allies among the six New Jersey commissioners—Frank Dorsey, John Borg, and Raymond Greer. Then Fortune and politics turned against Ferguson. In December Dorsey died; and by early January the other two New Jersey commissioners—Joseph Byrne and Arthur Walsh—had joined the New York members in supporting Cullman to replace Ferguson. But Ferguson could still block the appointment of a new chairman, as long as his faction held on to three of the six New Jersey seats. The vulnerable man was Borg, whose term had expired; and in January the blow fell, as Borg’s hopes for reappointment were dashed by Walter Edge, governor once again and now champion of a new state constitution, which Borg had opposed. It is likely that Edge was also intent on ending the conflict within the Board, which threatened to harm the effectiveness of an agency Edge had helped to create and of which he was proud.30 Early in February 1945, the commissioners reassembled, with Donald Lowe of Bergen County in place of John Borg, and Frank Abell as Dorsey’s successor. Abell and Lowe joined Byrne and Walsh in endorsing Howard Cullman as Chairman; Byrne, from Newark, was elected Vice Chairman. Both Cullman and Byrne were enthusiastic advocates of vigorous Port Authority efforts to reach out in new directions, and both were strong supporters of Austin Tobin. At last the Board was unified behind Tobin’s leadership and ready to support an aggressive Port Authority role in grappling with the region’s problems. It was a state of harmony that would last for more than two decades. Once he had lost in the February vote, Ferguson stopped attending Port Authority meetings, and in July 1945 he resigned from the Board and withdrew to the comfort of his Jersey City bank.31
Layers of Strategic Action It is true that people win politically because they have induced other people to join them in alliances and coalitions. But . . . typically they win [also] because they have set up the situation in such a way that other people will want to join
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them—or will feel forced by circumstances to join them. . . . [This is] structuring the world so you can win. —William H. Riker32
When the dust had settled in 1947 and the Port Authority had taken control of New York City’s air terminals and Newark’s airport and seaport, the Authority could argue—and did—that it had simply acted “in response to the City’s request” in studying and then proposing that it assume control of these major facilities. And when Herbert Kaufman prepared his extensive study of these events, “Gotham in the Air Age,” he pored through public documents and held interviews with top Authority officials and others, and he came away convinced that the initiatives leading to Port Authority operation lay elsewhere: “None of the evidence indicates that the officials of the agency contemplated or even considered upsetting the customary pattern of municipal airport development by moving directly into airport construction or operation..”33 What Kaufman had confronted, however, was not the reality of the Port Authority’s role but a carefully crafted strategy which helped to protect the Authority from the charge that it was an irresponsible “super-government,” reaching out octopus-like to grab control of important programs and squeeze the life from local government. Indeed, throughout the 1940s and the 1950s the Port Authority would only take formal action to study a problem and to propose that it take on new duties—in the fields of marine terminals and airports, bus and truck terminals, an occasional world trade center—if it first received a request from the mayors or governors or other responsible officials. The bi-state agency would then gather the best experts, study the request, and report the experts’ conclusions. Whether any action should be taken thereafter—requiring, for example, that the Port agency go forward with a project—would be the responsibility of the elected officials at the two state capitals. Behind these formal steps, however, lay a complex array of political calculations made in and around Tobin’s office, combined with extensive, often behind-the-scenes, negotiations. Central to these efforts were the “wait to be asked” criterion, together with three guidelines, which the Port Authority’s early history suggested were crucial to ensuring its continued political and economic vitality: 1. The need for new projects. In a friendly editorial in 1944, one local newspaper put the point in its most altruistic light, as the passion of an agency motivated by regional needs: “The port authority’s present prayer [is] ‘Please, God, give us some great new project which will keep us busy and popular,
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and useful.’ ”34 That passion did animate the staff; but another motivation also drove the search for new programs—the need to deflect political pressure to reduce bridge and tunnel tolls. The 50-cent charge per auto trip, established more than a decade earlier, had been under vigorous attack in New Jersey in recent years. With the likely expansion of postwar traffic, the Authority’s toll revenue would increase sharply, and pressure to reduce the existing toll level might become intolerable. However, if the agency gave in to that pressure, surplus funds required to reach out in new directions, and to maintain its independence, would be siphoned off; and the Port Authority might become simply a routine collector of tolls, a painter of bridges and tunnel roadways. Therefore it was important to develop a portfolio of useful projects, and to ensure that influential business and civic groups were ready and willing to press for action to carry out these plans. Then any campaign for toll reduction could be challenged, and perhaps defeated, because of the trade-offs involved: If the tolls were reduced, less money would be available to carry out programs which these civic interests thought were “urgently needed” to enhance the economic vitality of the region.35 2. A regional “balancing act”. The creation of the Port Authority in 1921 had been possible because business and political leaders had tentatively agreed to replace conflict with cooperation in seeking economic growth for the bi-state metropolis; but suspicion between the two states was not abolished by waving the Port Authority wand. Tobin and his associates realized that proposals to aid commercial vitality in New York must be balanced with projects to assist the cities of the Garden State, whose elected leaders would find a ready local audience if they denounced the agency for charging Newark and Hudson County citizens 50 cents a car to journey to Manhattan and points east.36 3. The “self-supporting” criterion. Under the “Edelstein principle,” a public authority should not be limited to projects which individually would pay their own way; a wider perspective, which weighed the importance of the project, and the agency’s ability to absorb any deficits from its more “profitable” programs, would be controlling.37 By 1945–46, a close look at political and economic realities convinced Tobin and his aides that they should retreat from Edelstein’s advanced position. They would still be in the “entrepreneurial business,” taking risks as they studied and embraced new projects: surely no one could be confident in 1944–45 and beyond that large bus terminals, union truck terminals, and airports would make money, even in the long run (and as it would turn out, some of them never would). But a rhetorical stance which
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favored taking on deficit projects “needed” by the region, to be underwritten by such money-makers as the Holland Tunnel, would provide no shield to protect the Port Authority from being forced to embrace pet projects of doubtful value all across the metropolis. The controlling hand would then shift to the bondholders, who might stop weak projects—and probably stronger but risky ones too—by threatening to sue. No responsible entrepreneur, in for the long pull at the Port agency, could look upon that unstable future with pleasure. Instead, the stated position of the Port Authority was that it would be willing to undertake construction projects, rehabilitation programs, and other activities in the field of transportation and terminals only if the new facilities could be expected, in the long run, to generate sufficient revenue to meet their total costs. Having no direct access to tax revenues—and very limited access to federal and state grants—the Authority’s leaders said they were unwilling to commit their funds and energies to any new project which seemed likely to become a permanent drain on the agency’s resources. This focus on self-support meant that the Port Authority would examine consumer demand for any project, other market factors, and construction methods and costs, with great care. Also, it would explore the possibility of federal aid or other outside funding which could reduce the financial burden to be met by revenues from the project itself.38 These guidelines, which were a complex mix of real constraints and public-relations stratagems, were ingrained in the thinking of all Authority staff members who had lived through the interstate conflicts of the 1930s and the Bush Terminal, Gerhardt, and Shamberg court battles. Now, in the postwar world, they would have to be applied in new terrain—where technological uncertainty was greater, and where a tradition of municipal control meant that initiatives by the Port agency would be more hazardous politically. Using the confidential 1943 report as a basic inventory of possible Port Authority targets, Tobin marshaled and deployed the agency’s resources for action. A flow of analytical studies, extensive negotiations, and public battles then followed, as the bi-state agency moved to construct two massive truck terminals and the world’s largest bus terminal; to lease and operate Newark’s marine terminal; to take control of New York City’s piers (an effort that was blocked by the city fathers); and to wrest the most glamorous transportation projects of the postwar era—the airports—from Newark’s political legions, from New York City’s elected officials, and from Robert Moses’ competing agency. In the remainder of this chapter we will focus on Tobin’s initiatives that involved the most complex strategies—those which brought the Newark and New York City airports, and Newark’s seaport, into the Port Authority’s
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lair. They nicely illustrate William Riker’s theme—structuring the world so you can win.
Airports and Marine Terminals: Strategies of Capture Although the Port Authority’s interest in constructing and operating airports and marine terminals had been set out in the confidential report prepared by Tobin and Hedden in June 1943, important questions remained to be answered: Could those facilities be made self-supporting? And if so, how could the cities of Newark and New York be persuaded to part with these sources of jobs and municipal pride? To answer these questions, the Port Authority carried out a threepronged strategy. First, Tobin and Hedden would need a careful economic analysis. Economist James Buckley was recruited along with a small staff to work with Hedden in analyzing the prospects for air traffic in the postwar years, together with the costs of developing major air terminals and the estimated income from airline leases, terminal shops, and other sources. By early 1945, it seemed clear to Hedden and Buckley that several large airports could be operated in the New York region on a break-even basis, assuming that initial development grants were provided by the federal government. The Port Authority followed the airport-aid legislation being considered in Congress in 1945 and testified in favor of such aid in March and June of that year. In addition, the Buckley team analyzed the prospects for ocean shipping and marine terminals in the postwar years and concluded that the Port Authority might operate one or more major seaport projects on a selfsupporting basis.39 The second element of Tobin’s strategy was to ensure that its studies and other activities—especially those concerned with improved air and marine terminals—were reported widely. As a result, his agency would be viewed as having expertise in air transport as well as maritime commerce, and it might then find it easier to take a leading role in shaping regional strategies in both fields. Here Tobin turned to the considerable skills of Lee K. Jaffe, his chief public-relations aide since the summer of 1944. When Tobin interviewed her in the spring of 1944, they “hit it off immediately.” Hired over Ferguson’s objections, she was soon included in policy meetings with Tobin, Hedden, Buckley, and Chief Engineer John Evans. Building on a decade of experience as a reporter and government press officer in Washington and New York, Jaffe established close working relationships with editorial writers and
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reporters on all the region’s daily newspapers, kept them constantly informed of new studies and human-interest stories in the Port Authority’s domain, and suggested ways of making a story newsworthy. And whenever a reporter or member of the editorial staff called with a question, she provided detailed information on issues and developments. “She was ingenious; she knew a good story and how to develop it,” recalled one of the region’s best veteran reporters. “And if you needed more [facts], she would get them and call you right back. . . . She was head and shoulders above anyone else in the publicrelations field.”40 The combination of new studies being conducted at the Port Authority with newspaper interest in “glamour issues” like air transport (and dull but economically vital ones like New York’s maritime commerce) provided a fertile field for Jaffe’s talents. Stories and editorials on the agency’s work on air and marine transport appeared with increasing frequency in late 1944 and 1945. This successful effort laid the groundwork for the wide press coverage and favorable editorial comments that soon would be needed, as the battle for control of the region’s airports was carried forward against vigorous criticism by the Port Authority’s opponents in 1946 and 1947.41 In addition to a careful economic analysis and a skilled public-relations program, the Port Authority strategy involved a crucial third element—developing close working relationships with experts who were engaged in related studies in the New York area. A natural candidate for cooperation was the Regional Plan Association, a civic organization with a regional perspective and a long tradition of collaboration with the Port Authority. In 1944–45, Hedden and his associates worked with the RPA and with the federal Department of Commerce to develop a plan for airports in the New York area. During the same years Buckley established close working relationships with staff members of the Civil Aeronautics Board and several of the major airlines, and these contacts helped the Authority in gaining CAB approval for additional airline routes for the New York region, and in obtaining information on the economic performance, past and prospective, of airline terminals.42
The Bartholomew Connection: Planners and Politics As the Port Authority’s leaders considered how the potential hostility of local leaders might be overcome—so they would ask the bi-state agency to take over their air and sea terminals—the most important connections were those with Harland Bartholomew & Associates, a national group of planners called
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in by the City of Newark in 1943. Bartholomew and his aides were the most significant because of the quality and influence of their analysis, and because their team was the first to recommend that the Port Authority be asked to take over and operate the region’s air and sea terminals. The steps through which this recommendation was developed deserve more detailed attention—because of its intrinsic importance to our story, and because that evolution illustrates some of the strategies available to the public entrepreneur, when the political ground is complex and potentially treacherous. In the fall of 1943, Newark’s Central Planning Board engaged Bartholomew to carry out a thorough survey of the city’s planning and development problems. He was no stranger; a planner and planning director in Newark in 1912–1919, Bartholomew then went to St. Louis, where he established his own firm. By 1943 he was one of the nation’s premier urban planners, working on studies across the country, but he readily threw his energies into the problems of his old city. That fall he met with members of the Newark Planning Board and worked out arrangements for an extensive study; and during the next four years the firm completed more than a dozen surveys covering Newark’s major physical development and fiscal needs.43 One of the Planning Board’s members was Joseph M. Byrne, Jr., who served also as an elected member of the city’s governing body, the City Commission. Byrne’s specific responsibilities included oversight of the city-owned piers and its airports. Fortuitously, he was also a Commissioner of the Port Authority and an active member of the Tobin-Cullman faction which favored expanding the Authority’s responsibilities. In November 1943, Byrne brought Tobin and Hedden together with Bartholomew and members of the Newark planning board, and they discussed areas of cooperation between the Port Authority’s planning staff and the Newark study group. By early 1944, two of Bartholomew’s associates, Harry Alexander and William Anderson, were living in Newark and devoting full time to analyzing population trends, housing conditions, and other facets of the city. When information on traffic potential and development costs for maritime and air transport in the region was needed, they found the Port Authority’s staff ready to help and its files a valuable resource.44 Newark’s seaport had been opened in 1917; its airport began operation in 1928. Neither had been a sparkling success in economic terms, and the harbor area was badly run down. Because of the city’s other needs, it seemed doubtful that Newark could allocate the large sums needed to modernize and expand the sea and air terminals so that they might, in time, become selfsupporting. Moreover, the planners found, there were “hundreds of patron-
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age jobs” at the two facilities; and some employees listed on the port rolls “had never even seen the port.” Efficient operation and energetic management seemed very unlikely if the facilities continued as regular departments of city government. Visiting Newark in the summer of 1944, Bartholomew thought about possible sources of revenue to rehabilitate the seaport. “It was a very dreary prospect,” he later recalled, but he wondered if the Port Authority “might have an interest.” He called Tobin. “I got to see him right away,” he later recalled. Bartholomew inquired whether the Port Authority would consider taking over Port Newark, and they talked about that; Tobin asked some questions about the airport too. Tobin said he would talk with the Board and asked, ‘Could you come back in two weeks?’ And I said, ‘Yes, I could.’ “It was a terrific proposal that he gave me right away in the second interview. . . . He outlined the whole thing. . . . He was more interested in the Newark airport than he was in the seaport. That took me by surprise. I remember he was very specific that they would be willing to take over the port and the airport and make an agreement for a 40-year lease. . . . They would enlarge the airport. He then was talking about what they would do at the airport. The thing was so comprehensive—his proposal—that I remember going back to Newark on the train, I was just on cloud nine; the idea of a proposal like this was fabulous, fabulous.”45 Bartholomew understood that Tobin’s strong interest in the two Newark projects would have to be treated as confidential for the present, and the formal initiative would remain with the city’s planners. If Bartholomew and his colleagues analyzed the situation and concluded that operation by the Port Authority would be the best solution for Newark, they would recommend to the planning board that the Authority be asked to submit a detailed proposal. One of his staff members, William Anderson, then looked more closely into the costs of rehabilitation and development and into the ability of the Port Authority to undertake the large expenses that seemed necessary. In addition, in consultation with the Port Authority staff and the Regional Plan Association, they considered the advantages of regional coordination in developing marine and airport facilities, compared with the tradition of competitive conflict that had shaped relationships between Newark and New York City.46 On October 8, 1945, Bartholomew sent to his colleagues a draft set of conclusions, and within a few weeks, the firm’s entire 106-page report was circulated privately to the Central Planning Board. Copies were also sent to the Port Authority’s staff.
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The Bartholomew report was crucial in framing the public debate on what role the Port Authority should have in the development of the region’s air and marine terminals. The report described the investments needed to rehabilitate Newark’s facilities; it set forth the financial results of past decades, which had cumulatively cost local taxpayers $9.6 million for Port Newark and $7 million at the Airport; and it noted that the city faced heavy demands in the postwar years to rehabilitate its schools, hospitals, and other facilities. Moreover, the report pointed out, other regions had moved away from municipal operation of seaports and air terminals, turning instead to specialized public authorities for marine terminals, and to regional agencies for airports. After examining the alternatives, which included continued city operation, private operation, or creation of a new public agency, Bartholomew was emphatic in his conclusions: The Port of New York Authority . . . is peculiarly well constituted to handle facilities of this type and has a large staff with long experience in all forms of transportation. . . . [It] is in a position to finance further construction. . . . Continuity of policy and other good business practices would be applied as they have been with other Port Authority enterprises.
His report also reached beyond Newark to frame the issue in a perspective consistent with the Port Authority’s own views and long-range hopes: Since the location and the traffic of both the seaport and the airport are so completely integrated with the remainder of the New York metropolitan area, it is unwise for Newark to attempt to further develop these facilities by itself. Their greatest usefulness and the maximum volume of traffic to be expected will be attained only through their coordination with other facilities in the New York metropolitan area.47
By early December 1945, the Newark Central Planning Board had reviewed the Bartholomew report, and on the 14th the Board endorsed the report and released it to the public. The planning body, whose leaders included prominent business and civic officials in the city, urged the Port Authority to take the initiative in exploring with Newark’s elected officials the possible takeover of the airport and seaport. Tobin and his allies had taken a major step in “structuring the world” so they could win.48 But this was only the first step, and nearly two more years would be required for the Port agency to emerge with victories on both sides of the Hudson.
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“Our Statutory Duty”: The Reluctant Dragon Stretches Her Wings The marine and air terminals and the revenues therefrom to be the property of the Port Authority . . . and the Port Authority’s decisions to be controlling as to all matters. —Port of New York Authority, Development of Newark Airport and Seaport: a proposal to the City of Newark, July 1946
Tobin and his colleagues were not inclined to rush forward in response to the planners’ invitation. Eight months earlier, Vice Chairman Joseph Byrne had publicly stated his personal view—that Newark ought to place its airport and seaport under Port Authority control. City commissioner John A. Brady had reacted to this trial balloon with a vigorous attack, calling it “municipal suicide.” Such a move would cause Newark’s destiny as a great seaport and aviation center to “vanish into the stratosphere,” he argued. Brady criticized the Authority for “its notorious leanings toward New York, as against Newark and New Jersey,” and for its “powerful, arrogant administrative staff which has always treated Newark as a service station for Manhattan.” Most of Newark’s other elected officials were known to share Brady’s aversion to losing the terminals.49 Therefore Tobin moved cautiously. Before the Port Authority could propose taking responsibility for the airport and seaport, “a thorough study” would be needed, Tobin said, requiring “the expenditure of substantial public funds.” Such an effort should be taken only if the city really wanted it done; if an “official request” from the entire City Commission were made, the Port Authority would be “willing to undertake such a study.”50 This placed Newark’s elected officials in a position that ill suited their preferences. Several of them were vigorously opposed to ceding Port Newark and the airport to any outside agency; such a step would be a blow to the city’s pride, and it would also undermine their own influence in awarding contracts and finding jobs for loyal friends and party workers. However, with the city’s business leaders on the Planning Board urging that the Bartholomew proposal be explored actively, the commissioners could hardly boot this unwelcome guest out the door. On December 27, 1945, they voted to ask the Port Authority to study the possible takeover; and the Authority responded at once that it would be glad to do so. Within a few weeks, Tobin had hired additional staff members and consultants, and a detailed survey of Newark’s airport and marine facilities was
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underway, with Walter Hedden in charge. Now the Port Authority could turn to larger game: New York City’s two airports and those who guarded their gates, the city’s mayor and its longtime chancellor, Robert Moses. Mayor LaGuardia had spent much of 1945, his final year in office, trying to advance his own plans—to improve LaGuardia Airport and complete a vast new airfield at Idlewild. His aides had negotiated long-term leases with the major American airlines that would, the mayor hoped, lead them to view New York— rather than Newark—as their main base of operations in the region. And the outgoing mayor urged the City Council to appropriate $45 million for expanded construction at Idlewild.51 However, other local officials did not share LaGuardia’s commitment to developing the airports with local tax moneys. The City Council deleted the $45 million appropriation in late December, and in January 1946 the new mayor, William O’Dwyer, endorsed an alternative suggested by Robert Moses—turning the airports over to an independent New York City Airport Authority, so that the city’s own capital funds could be used for schools, streets, and other urgent needs. Legislation to create an Airport Authority was prepared with Moses’ guidance and introduced in Albany in early January.52 In order to block the Moses-O’Dwyer plan, the issue would have to be redefined for the region’s business and political leaders, and for the general public. This would require close contact with journalists and editorial writers, and discussions with citizens groups and other opinion leaders, so the issue of airport development (and, if possible, marine development too) could be understood in its “proper light”: as a long-term development and investment program, requiring large amounts of funding over a period of years before the terminals could be self-supporting; as an immensely complex package of engineering and administrative issues, which should be undertaken by an organization with a high-quality staff and a proven track record; and, in particular, as a regional problem, best resolved through coordinated planning and action, not through narrow competitive actions of individual cities. The central challenge, then, was to bring these perspectives, and the facts that underlay them, to the attention of the media and the public. The opening salvos in the campaign for “regionalization” of the airport issue were launched by the press, with assistance from the Port Authority, soon after Newark’s city officials asked the Authority to carry out a study. On December 30, the Herald Tribune published a long essay which concluded that the Newark survey suggested to “aviation experts” that the region’s entire airport system “might be best coordinated and operated by the Port Authority.” An article on Newark’s airport in the Christian Science Monitor on Janu-
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ary 3, 1946 referred to “many experts” who “feel the time is coming soon . . . when air facilities must be planned regionally.” The same theme was echoed in the Newark News and the Star-Ledger during the following week.53 Discussions with staff members at the Port Authority, the Regional Plan Association, and the airlines helped to shape these stories and those that appeared in the next several months. The tracks of Tobin, Jaffe, and their aides could be seen clearly, for example, in reporter Cecile Hamilton’s feature article in the Herald Tribune, which suggested that the best answer might be to place airports in the hands of an region-wide authority which would finance its activities on a “self-supporting . . . and revenue-producing basis.” Only the Port Authority staff advocated the self-supporting concept for airport development.54 The advantages of placing all of the region’s airports in the hands of this particular authority might be demonstrated, Tobin and his aides thought, by evidence of their striking visions for the Newark airfield. In mid-March, they provided reporters with a detailed briefing on their Newark plans, and a few days later the agency released a “progress report” which indicated that it would be recommending vast improvements in marine cargo sheds, airline hangar space, and runways. Early in April, Lee Jaffe arranged a meeting which brought together Tobin, Hedden, and Vice Chairman Byrne with the editors of the Newark News and the Star-Ledger to discuss the Port Authority’s plans for the airport and seaport. Soon thereafter, in an editorial praising the Port Authority on its 25th anniversary, the Star-Ledger referred to the studies in Newark and argued that the “best interests of the metropolitan area call for an integration of all airports in the area into a single system.”55 By early May, Tobin and Jaffe decided the Port Authority could send its own Commissioners forth to preach the gospel. Asked by the Herald Tribune’s editors to comment on the airport problem, Chairman Howard Cullman urged that the “barriers of provincialism” be cast down and that airport development go forward on a regional basis. Addressing his fellow New Jersey citizens, Vice Chairman Joseph Byrne pointed to the advantages which the Port Authority would bring—in financial resources and staff expertise— if it were given responsibility for airports throughout the New York area.56 It was one thing to advocate regional coordination in airport development and to generate media applause for the Port Authority as the way to achieve such coordination. It was quite another, requiring a more variegated strategy, to meet the challenge posed by Robert Moses’ City Airport Authority. Taking office in January 1946, Mayor O’Dwyer endorsed the Airport Authority as the best way to develop LaGuardia and Idlewild, and he sent legislation to Al-
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bany for state approval. O’Dwyer and Moses won an early endorsement from the New York Times, which thought “a new Authority charged solely with building and managing” the city’s airports “to be a wise delegation of responsibility.” And when a citizens group proposed Port Authority operation as a better solution, O’Dwyer attacked that view. The mayor said he was “astonished” by the proposal, for it would involve “an abject surrender of the city’s planning powers” to an agency subject to control only by the two governors, thus giving New Jersey’s governor the ability to “determine whether Newark instead of Idlewild” would be the region’s international air center. The fine hand of adviser Moses could be seen in the phrasing of O’Dwyer’s rejection and in his sharp attack on the Port Authority, which he said should use its financial strength to reduce its “exorbitant” bridge and tunnel tolls, rather than reaching out for the city’s airfields.57 By early April, Moses had guided the bill through both houses of the state legislature and Governor Dewey had signed it; and on April 6, three commissioners selected by O’Dwyer and Moses were installed. The Airport Authority now stood poised to take responsibility for the New York fields and for guiding their development.58 To reverse the “go it alone” New York policy advocated by Moses and O’Dwyer, the Port Authority would need to find allies beyond the editorial writers and newspaper reporters. Three groups were potentially of great importance: the airlines (would they view the City Airport Authority as a satisfactory way to meet their airport needs, or oppose it and favor the Port Authority?); the investment banks (would they accept airport-development bonds issued by the new Authority?); and New Jersey business and political leaders (if they endorsed the Port Authority’s Newark plans, the threat that Newark Airport might modernize and drain traffic away from the New York airfields would be far more salient). During the spring and summer of 1946, Tobin and his aides began to knit together a coalition that included all of these potential allies. It was not difficult to persuade the airlines to cast doubt on Robert Moses’ new creation. Even before the Airport Authority legislation was signed, Moses had announced that the agency would tear up the LaGuardia leases with the airlines, and that far steeper lease rates would be put into effect in order to finance the development of Idlewild and LaGuardia airports. The airlines opposed any changes in the favorable terms they had received from LaGuardia’s negotiators and they stood ready to defend the leases in a court suit; at the same time, they recognized that without massive contributions from the city treasury or some other source, the Airport Authority would be unable to de-
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velop the facilities desperately needed to accommodate rapidly expanding air traffic in the region. In February, the airlines expressed “considerable anxiety” as to whether the Airport Authority was a viable strategy. The Port Authority then invited the airline executives to view the agency’s evolving plans for Newark Airport, and they expressed “great surprise and gratification” at the improvements planned by the bi-state agency.59 As their report moved toward completion, Tobin and Hedden held informal meetings with business leaders in Newark, and articles appeared in the local press suggesting that the city could expect thousands of additional jobs at the airport and seaport. Joined by Vice Chairman Byrne, Tobin then spent an hour with Governor Edge and emerged with his public support.60 Meanwhile, the New York City Airport Authority had run into trouble. Soon after the Authority’s three commissioners had been appointed, the Mayor’s airport adviser, Robert Moses, began to intervene in their affairs. At his behest, city appropriations to be used by the Authority in developing Idlewild were reduced by $15 million, and O’Dwyer rejected an Authority request that LaGuardia Airport be turned over to that agency. Then Moses urged the Airport Authority to issue $60 million in bonds to finance work at Idlewild, and to join him in denouncing the existing airline leases. But financial experts friendly both to the Port Authority and to city officials told O’Dwyer that any bonds issued by the Airport Authority probably could not be sold because of the uncertain revenue picture. Moreover, the Authority chairman, Harry F. Guggenheim, objected to Moses’ tactics, and on July 18 he resigned, advising Mayor O’Dwyer to “get the airports out of politics” and turn them over to the Port Authority.61 Now Tobin stepped across the Hudson, and in late July he convened a public meeting with Newark’s mayor and commissioners. The bi-state agency was ready, he announced, to take responsibility for modernizing and operating both the air and sea terminals. It would invest $11 million in Port Newark, and an additional $55 million in Newark Airport, in order to create “one of the greatest airports in the world.” The Port Authority would also pay $1 million annually to Newark for five years and $100,000 a year thereafter in lieu of taxes, and develop revenue sources that would ultimately make the airport and seaport self-supporting.62 With the New York City Airport Authority floundering, with pressures mounting to spend his city’s construction funds for other purposes than air terminals, and with the threat of a revitalized Newark Airport now emerging clearly, it seemed almost inevitable that O’Dwyer would ask the Port Authority to make an offer for the New York City airfields. But Moses was still
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a major influence at City Hall, and Moses was vehemently opposed to letting the bi-state agency expand its domain.63 An additional nudge seemed desirable, in order to ensure that O’Dwyer knew that the Port Authority stood ready to extend a “helping hand” to New York City as it had to Newark—if O’Dwyer would only ask. That nudge was provided by Eugene Black, a Vice President of Chase Manhattan Bank, who had worked closely with Tobin in the late 1930s on the battle to preserve tax-exempt bonds. Black telephoned O’Dwyer, whom he also knew, and after a series of calls involving Tobin, Cullman, O’Dwyer, and Black, the mayor agreed on August 2 to send a formal request to the Port Authority, asking that it “immediately” undertake studies to determine whether the Authority might be able to take responsibility for New York’s airports, and thereby “relieve the city of a tremendous burden of future airport financing.” The first step toward “abject surrender,” as the mayor had called it six months before, had been taken.64
The Port Authority Afloat and Aloft The fourteen months between O’Dwyer’s announcement on August 2, 1946 and the final steps in the regional airport negotiations were filled with announcements and denouncements, backing and filling by New York’s mayor, attacks by the Port Authority’s opponents in Newark’s City Hall, and resistance by Tobin and his colleagues, followed by compromise. At the end, the Port Authority and its expansion-minded executive director had won. In April 1947, the City of New York agreed to lease LaGuardia and Idlewild to the Authority; and in October, Newark and the bi-state agency reached agreement, with the Authority assuming control of the city’s airport and seaport several months later. The complex interplay of public rhetoric and less visible negotiations during this period illustrates the divergent perceptions and interests which make regional cooperation so difficult; and the Port Authority’s adroit maneuvers, described below, provide further illustrations of Riker’s thesis and suggest an array of strategies that can be used by agencies and leaders who aspire to be entrepreneurial. The Port Authority’s announcement in late July, setting forth the conditions under which it could assume control of Newark’s airport and seaport, was met with enthusiastic support by the region’s newspapers and Newark’s business leaders. However, the agency and its plans were the target of vigorous attack by Newark’s elected officials, and by September all four City Commissioners stood opposed to the Authority’s offer. Only the mayor, Vincent J. Murphy, ap-
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peared open-minded. He held meetings with Walter Hedden and with city business executives, and he carefully examined the severe fiscal demands facing the city.65 The editorial writers then attacked the city’s elected leaders, adopting a position that underscored the advantage of Tobin’s strategy of caution. Noting that Commissioner John A. Brady had criticized the Port Authority for proposing to take over the city’s terminals, the Newark News commented: “For Mr. Brady’s information, [the] Port Authority didn’t just barge in. It came in at the specific invitation . . . of the City Commission.” The Port Authority’s offer, observed the Star-Ledger, was now being treated “as though it were an unwarranted and impudent intrusion upon the city’s sovereignty,” although it “grew out of the initiative of the Newark City Commission.”66 However, the majority of the Newark Commissioners held their ground, and by October, Tobin was pessimistic as to the possibility of prompt action. “It would appear that some time must elapse,” he wrote to his own Board, “before the Newark proposal arises again for further consideration; time in which [the city] must face the expenditure of millions for the repair of the Newark Airport and Seaport and in which the services and revenues of the present obsolescent facilities will steadily decline; time in which the City Commissioners of Newark will be forced to public defense of the consequences to the City of their rejection of the Port Authority’s proposal.” By now, none of his commissioners, except for Chairman Cullman, had served as long as Tobin, and few had served even half as long. This seemed an appropriate opportunity to remind them that perseverance, not quick victory, was the hallmark of Port Authority tradition: “The history of every Port Authority project,” Tobin wrote, “is one of protracted effort, of temporary setbacks, of opposition that at the time seemed immovable. Years elapsed . . . between the preparation of the first reports . . . and the actual construction of the various bridges and tunnels.” The proposed takeover of Newark Airport and Seaport had been initiated less than a year ago, he concluded; “we have finished the first chapter but we have not closed the book.”67 But there were two strings to the Port Authority’s airport bow, and while Newark’s commissioners fumed, Tobin and his aides turned their attention to New York City and completed the proposal Mayor O’Dwyer had requested. By the middle of December 1946, a draft had been finished and reviewed with the Mayor, and on December 18 the Port Authority announced a $191 million proposal for rehabilitation and development of New York’s airports. A few days later, the city’s own Department of Marine and Aviation submitted a competing plan, under which it would develop Idlewild, using
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city funds; the program would cost but $70 million. And on January 13, 1947, the City’s Airport Authority—still alive though headless—threw its proposal into the ring: it would develop and operate the New York airfields for only $80 million.68 The editorial writers and financial analysts had no difficulty in choosing among the three plans. The Port Authority had outlined a far more ambitious program, which seemed more likely to meet the needs, or at least the hopes, of the business community and the city; moreover, the Authority had far greater financial resources and staff expertise, and a stronger general reputation, than the patronage-riddled city agency or the new Airport Authority. For those who thought in broader terms, the Port Authority also had the advantage of its bi-state range; airports, as these commentators concluded, are “a regional business.”69 To O’Dwyer and his fellow city officials, the advantages of ceding control over a major source of jobs, contracts, and municipal prestige were less clear. Moreover, some of the specific provisions in the Port Authority proposal— which included a profit-sharing scheme and a long lease period (99 years)— seemed unduly tilted toward the agency’s interests.70 During January and February, O’Dwyer appointed committees to consider the alternatives, public hearings were held, and those favoring various possible solutions marshaled what evidence and political support they could find. In these weeks, the Port Authority put its intellectual and strategic strengths to good use. Allies in the investment community and among Manhattan’s civic associations were called upon for support, and an important alliance with the nation’s major airlines was formed—and paid for in coin that would, less than a year later, leave a bitter taste. For American Airlines, United, and the other large U.S. carriers, two goals were paramount. First, they wanted rapid development of LaGuardia, Idlewild, and Newark airports—preferably on a coordinated basis. Second, they wanted access to these airports at the lowest possible rates—ideally, at the very favorable lease rates agreed to in 1945 by Mayor LaGuardia. With its ambitious development plans, its region-wide scope, and its expanding bridge-and-tunnel toll receipts to finance these plans, the Port Authority was in the best position to meet the airlines’ first goal. As early as August 1946, Eddie Rickenbacker and other airline executives had personally expressed to Tobin their enthusiastic support for the agency’s plans at all three airfields.71 However, the lease rates were a matter of real concern to the airline executives. Moses had denounced the LaGuardia-McGoldrick 1945 leases as too favorable to the airlines, and in view of his influence in the O’Dwyer
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11-2. As air traffic expanded in 1946–47 and the debate over how to complete Idlewild continued, a New York Post cartoonist suggested this interim solution.
Administration, it seemed possible that a city department and the Airport Authority would refuse to honor the 1945 agreements as applicable to the large new airport at Idlewild. Could the Port Authority assure the airline officials that it would abide by those rates? The airlines sought Tobin’s views, and during the fall of 1946 Tobin commissioned studies by outside experts to double-check the revenue and cost
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analyses which were being carried out by his own staff. Specifically, Tobin asked whether, under the proposed development plans, existing lease rates and other revenue sources would permit the New York City airports to be selfsupporting. Expert opinion inside and outside agreed: based on the “LaGuardia leases” and with added revenues from concessions and other sources, the Port Authority “would be able to place the airports on a self-sustaining basis within a very short period after the completion of construction.” Tobin then wrote to the airline executives in January 1947, setting forth his conclusions regarding the leases “covering activity fees and space” at Idlewild: The Port Authority is definitely of the opinion that these leases are valid. We have premised our revenue estimates on the rates set forth in those leases. Only details would require renegotiation, and these would not involve any increase in rates to the airlines for services or space at the airport.72
Spurred by Tobin’s assurance, and by their general preference for the Port Authority as airfield operator, the airlines threw their energies into the fray with enthusiasm, attacking the City Airport Authority and endorsing the Port Authority proposal in public letters and public hearings. They also “threatened to locate their maintenance bases elsewhere,” thus depriving New York of thousands of jobs, if the city government did not act quickly to ensure adequate development of New York’s airports.73 Tobin also called upon his associates in the investment banking community, who publicly stated that they would accept Port Authority bonds for airport development but that City Airport Authority bonds would never find a buyer. Spokesmen for the Regional Plan Association, the Citizens Union, and city business leaders endorsed the Port Authority as the best agency. And the Port Authority itself attacked the Airport Authority’s $80 million plan as inadequate, criticizing the idea that “Airport Authority bonds, backed by nothing more than the promise of revenues from a still uncompleted airport, would sell at a reasonable rate.”74 Moses’ Airport Authority was now dead, but Moses was not. Abandoning his stillborn offspring, Robert the Nimble met with O’Dwyer and urged him to keep the airports out of the hands of the Port Authority. The city could operate the airfields itself, he argued, using a “bare-bones” investment strategy at Idlewild. In late February O’Dwyer had expressed his personal preference—to newspaper editors, and to Tobin—for Port Authority operation. Two weeks later, an exasperated Tobin wrote to his Board that Moses “has swung Mayor O’Dwyer around again, full circle” to the posi-
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tion that the city could hold on to the airports, invest practically nothing, and “simply tell the airlines to use the facilities already installed and make the best of it.”75 Three sharp blows broke the back of the Moses stratagem. First, Tobin and Jaffe took their concerns to the press, which then attacked the MosesO’Dwyer position and endorsed the Port Authority proposal. “New York City is fumbling the ball of world airport leadership,” wrote Allan Keller in a twopart feature in the World-Telegram, by trying to use a “makeshift, patch-andragtag program.” Keller and his fellow journalists urged that New York’s airports be built instead “on a stable, long-term basis by the Port Authority.”76 Second, a close friend of Tobin’s in the investment community met with O’Dwyer and emphasized the financial difficulties the city would face if it continued to carry the burden of developing its airfields. The meeting apparently shook O’Dwyer’s confidence in the Moses plan.77 And third, Tobin agreed, albeit reluctantly, to modify the Port Authority’s December proposal. Initially, when city spokesmen had asked whether the agency could improve its offer, Tobin had resisted. The Authority had submitted the best offer it could make in view of its own financial constraints, Tobin felt; indeed, his general approach was to begin with a solid offer and oppose changes. By March, his colleagues at the Port Authority had convinced him that he would have to compromise if the deadlock was to be broken and the Moses strategy scuttled. In mid-March, Tobin and several of his aides met with O’Dwyer’s representatives; concessions were made by both sides, but “only after bitter argument, each party giving ground by inches.” Negotiations often threatened to break down, and here Juan Trippe, president of Pan American, took a crucial role. Trippe had acted as spokesman for the major airlines in their discussions with the Port Authority in 1946; he had developed respect and fondness for Tobin, and the feeling was mutual. Now, sitting in on the March negotiating sessions for the airlines, Trippe served as an informal mediator, softening Tobin’s stubbornness and the intransigence and suspicion that developed on both sides.78 As a result of these discussions, the Port Authority submitted a revised offer on March 26, 1947, and the mayor and Board of Estimate at once accepted it. The lease would run only 50 years instead of 99 years; the city’s share of any net profits at the airports was increased from 50 to 75 percent; and the Port Authority would provide its own police and fire protection, instead of relying on the city. So the revised lease, which was formally signed on April 17, gave more to the city than the December proposal. And in return, Tobin and his colleagues had taken a major step toward expanding the
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responsibilities of their bi-state agency—and a major step toward fulfilling the goals set forth in the Tobin-Hedden report of June 1943. But it was only half a step, at best, in terms of the 1943 plan and the evolving views of Tobin and his aides. A regional airport system had to include Newark’s major terminal; and a vigorous transportation system for the New York region required modernizing marine terminals as well as airports. Even before the New York agreement was signed, Tobin and Jaffe turned their attention again to Newark, where the near-rapprochement with O’Dwyer might help extract Newark’s airport, and its seaport as well, from the unhappy City Commissioners.
Closing the Noose at Newark Newark’s commissioners had opposed the Port Authority proposal in the fall of 1946, although it appeared unlikely that the city could finance development of Port Newark and the airport with its own funds. In the long run, Tobin felt certain, the city would have to turn to the Authority; but there were some steps that might be taken to increase the pressure produced by the Authority’s offer, and thus speed Newark toward the inevitable. The Planning Board’s chief consultant, Harland Bartholomew, returned to the city to urge that the air and marine terminals be transferred to the Authority in order to save Newark’s taxpayers from having to spend $47 million in needed capital improvements at the two facilities. “That money could be used to better advantage,” he argued, for streets, schools and other urgent needs. Meanwhile, Tobin and his New Jersey Board members journeyed to Trenton to confer with Republican Alfred E. Driscoll, who had been elected governor in November 1946. By January, they had his support, and in his first message to the legislature, Driscoll urged favorable action on the Authority’s proposal to take over the two Newark terminals. “The time has come,” the governor declared, “when the people of that city can no longer be expected to underwrite huge capital investment outlays of this kind.”79 The Newark News, a vigorous supporter of Port Authority operation, immediately pointed to one implication of the governor’s comments, warning Newark’s elected officials that they could hardly expect Driscoll to respond sympathetically to their pleas for greater state financial aid, if they continued to reject the Port Authority’s offer to remove the seaport/airport albatross from their necks.80 Still the Newark commissioners resisted, but the noose was tightened further when negotiations with New York’s mayor moved toward success in
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March. It was now time, the Newark News argued, for the city fathers to approach the Authority offer “in a reasonable spirit of compromise,” as O’Dwyer had done. Otherwise, Newark Airport would face far worse competition than it had in the 1930s, for it would now confront not the uncertain investments and managerial quality of New York City’s government, but instead “a rich, interstate agency” operating two “enlarged and improved” airfields. Speaking a few weeks later, Howard Cullman outlined the Port Authority’s $190 million plans for the New York airports and stressed the same point. When the Authority’s plans are completed, he declared, Idlewild and LaGuardia would far outstrip other air terminals in the nation, which would then be little more than “whistle stops on a suburban line.”81 By May, under pressure from Newark’s business leaders, local newspapers, and the governor, the city commissioners resumed negotiations with Tobin and his aides. The Authority improved its original offer to make it comparable to the terms of the April agreement with New York City. The new offer guaranteed a minimum of $6 million in rental payments during the 50-year lease; and if the Authority were able to operate the seaport and airport at a profit, as anticipated, rental payments to the City of Newark might total as much as $38 million during the 50-year period. In the hothouse of New Jersey municipal politics, “negotiations” has a different flavor than it does in the canyons and boardrooms of Manhattan; political rhetoric is somewhat less graceful, but it may stir the blood of a suspicious citizenry far more. Commissioner Brady reviewed the Port Authority’s revised offer and led the attack. The Authority’s rental figures, he exclaimed, “are the most distorted figures I’ve seen since my childhood;” the estimates were “a deliberate attempt to befuddle the people.” His colleague, Meyer Ellenstein, noted that no airport in the country had yet been able to operate at a profit; so, he concluded, Newark could expect no more than the $6 million minimum from the Port Authority. A former amateur boxer, Ellenstein continued to punch away at the bi-state agency, urging his fellow Commissioners not to be “hoodwinked” by the Authority’s numbers.82 As the Star-Ledger commented editorially, Brady and Ellenstein seemed to approach these negotiations more as a matter of generating headlines than engaging in serious bargaining. They appeared to consider it “good politics” to profess that the Port Authority is a “monster seeking to devour the city and its people.”83 However, the reality of Newark’s fiscal needs, combined with the business and editorial interests arrayed in favor of the Authority proposal, isolated Brady and Ellenstein. During the summer of 1947, the other two city
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commissioners joined the mayor in an effort to reach an accommodation with the Port Authority, and negotiations on an acceptable lease went forward. Ellenstein, Brady, and their allies then mounted a last-ditch effort, gathering signatures on a petition which would demand a referendum on the lease agreement. The Port Authority and its friends fought back. Having taken over LaGuardia Airport in July, the bi-state agency announced that in its first three months of operation, airport revenues had increased sharply. These conclusions were promptly conveyed to the Newark News editors, who summarized the Authority’s interim report and concluded that “while Newark Airport continues to be a drain on the taxpayers,” creative management strategies introduced by the Authority had made a striking difference at the New York field and showed what the agency could do once it had rehabilitated Newark’s air terminal.84 Meanwhile, after consulting with Tobin and his aides, Newark’s business leaders issued a detailed report countering the Ellenstein faction, and endorsing the Port Authority’s program. The Authority would approach the airport problem “from a regional rather than a narrow local viewpoint,” these business allies argued, thus eliminating the “competitive squabbling” which had shaped airport development in the past.85 And the airlines once again weighed in on the Port Authority’s side. In a meeting sponsored by the Regional Plan Association in early October, American Airlines president Ralph Damon congratulated New York City for its “wisdom in assigning control of its airports to the Port Authority,” an agency with the “financial strength and business acumen” required to develop needed airport facilities with “speed and dispatch.” Damon urged Newark to turn its airport over to the Authority, which would receive “complete cooperation” from the airlines in going forward in the new air age. In praise of the Authority’s potential, Damon concluded that “no other cities in the United States are so fortunate in having such an agency capable and prepared to provide . . . their immediate and long range airport requirements.” A few days later, Eddie Rickenbacker of Eastern Airlines spoke before the Newark City Commission and expressed the same position.86 Editorial acclaim for the Port Authority’s position on air and marine terminals was widespread; reinforced by favorable attitudes toward the Authority’s other activities, newspaper support for the agency’s general contribution to the region was extensive. In early October, Lee Jaffe counted up the editorials since her arrival in 1944, and Tobin reported to the Board that there had been much improvement since the mixed editorial reviews of 1942–43. The tallies were summarized for the Commissioners: In 1945 there were 29
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favorable editorials, in 1946, there were 280, and in 1947 there had been 317 to date. “The only unfavorable editorials” in the past two years, Tobin reported, “appeared in one newspaper, the Bayonne Times.”87 Still, the Newark Commission minority pressed forward with its anti-Port Authority rhetoric and gathered 20,000 signatures on a petition urging a citywide referendum on the plan. Reviving an ancient antagonism, the railroads joined the battle, arguing that Newark ought not permit the Port Authority to expand its “tax-exempt operations.” Then Cullman hinted that the Port Authority might establish a major airport elsewhere in New Jersey if Newark barred the door. And, working in consultation with Tobin and the New Jersey members of the Authority Board, Governor Driscoll stepped forcefully into the situation. Driscoll reminded the Newark commissioners that he had been supporting programs which would provide more state aid to Newark and other older cities, and that city officials must now “help themselves” by eliminate deficit-generating activities. In four days of intensive discussions with the Newark officials, Driscoll pressed them to accept the Port Authority offer without further delay.88 Finally the combined forces of local, regional and state pressures overcame the attractions of municipal independence and patronage. On October 22, 1947, Newark and the bi-state agency signed an agreement leasing the city’s airport and marine facilities to the Port Authority for 50 years. Air transport services would now be planned and developed on a “truly regional basis,” Tobin reported to his board; and in adding Port Newark, the Port agency had taken a substantial step toward “unification of pier and waterfront activities.”89
Wider Dreams and the Creation of a Dedicated Staff In the summer of 1943, Tobin and Hedden had sketched out a range of new projects the Port Authority might undertake in the postwar era. Now, four years later, important steps had been taken in two arenas. Constructing alliances with business leaders and newspaper editors in the region, and with the nation’s airline executives, Tobin and his colleagues had outmaneuvered and neutralized their opponents in New York City and across the Hudson. Their coalition-building strategies were aided by an early and sustained effort to define the airport problem as a regional issue; in this way, they structured the world, as Riker suggests, so as to give them a significant advantage over those who wished to define airports in “city” terms—as an
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important part of how a city defines itself and of the visions and strategies its officials might have for economic development. That “regional” definition was hardly inevitable; witness the early and continuing conflicts over airport development in the San Francisco-Oakland area and in the bi-state St. Louis metropolis.90 New airport projects in two states, together with marine terminals in Newark, entailed a tremendous change for an organization that had focused for a decade on collecting bridge-and-tunnel tolls, while offering only studies and advice on other transportation matters. However, once the airports and Newark’s seaport had been absorbed, Tobin and his colleagues were ready to reach out more widely. The Authority’s growing financial resources would permit them to explore other possibilities, where revenues might in time match investment; and by the close of 1947, several additional projects seemed to be within their grasp. One major target, of great interest to Tobin and his seaport planners, was New York City’s waterfront. In the postwar world, the local administration faced the problem of modernizing the city’s 200 docks and piers, while handicapped by the same financial and managerial limitations that had blocked its airport hopes. Once again, as with the City Airport Authority, a separate government entity—dubbed the World Trade Corporation—had been created by state legislation; and in the summer of 1947 it proposed a $200 million rehabilitation program at the docks, financed with its own revenue bonds. The Port Authority, while declining to study New York’s pier situation unless asked, expressed serious doubts about the World Trade Corporation. Chairman Howard Cullman thought it unwise to have a second port-development body in the New York region; that might lead, he said, to “cut-throat competition” between the two agencies.91 Although some city officials objected to offering the Port Authority a chance to carry off New York’s fabled piers along with her airports, O’Dwyer finally approached Tobin and on October 20, 1947 formally asked the Authority to study the problem of pier modernization and come forward with an offer.92 O’Dwyer’s letter arrived on Tobin’s desk as the Newark agreement was signed. Now Tobin and his aides could look in a sustained way at the immense challenge of New York’s marine terminals, and consider it also in the light of other projects underway and other tasks that might soon be added to the Port Authority’s ledger. As Tobin looked about the Port District in the fall of 1947, he could count—in addition to the airports, the Newark seaport, and the New York waterfront study—three major programs in various stages of negotiation and development.
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11-3. Austin Tobin and Meyer Ellenstein
First there was the Hoboken pier study. In December 1946, the city fathers of this small New Jersey community, directly across the Hudson from Manhattan, had asked the Port Authority to consider whether it could take on the job of revitalizing the Hoboken waterfront. Responding with enthusiasm, Tobin and his aides had put together a $17 million proposal involving rehabilitation of three piers, and construction of a large new double-deck marine terminal—which would become the “most efficient and modern pier” in the New York harbor. The plan was laid before the Hoboken Commissioners in September 1947, and since it offered lease terms similar to those agreed to in Newark, there was hope of prompt approval by the City.93 Then there was the gigantic bus terminal the Port Authority wanted to build in Manhattan, to remove interstate buses from the congested midtown area. By 1947 the number crossing the Hudson into Manhattan exceeded 2,500 each day, and there had been demands since 1940 that these large buses be kept off city streets. In 1945 Tobin had sketched out a specific proposal, but the Greyhound Corporation had opposed the Port agency’s plan, and Robert Moses had taken the lead in 1945–46 in attacking the project.
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The Port Authority responded by building another coalition to advance its cause, and by the fall of 1947 all the roadblocks to “the world’s greatest Union Bus Terminal”—which would cover 160,000 square feet of mid-Manhattan and bring buses directly in from the Lincoln Tunnel—appeared to be removed, and construction, it was expected, would soon begin.94 Finally, there were two truck terminals—immense structures, one in Manhattan and one in Newark. Before the start of the War, Hedden and his staff had explored the possibility of constructing giant truck stations, which could gather over-the-road freight brought from around the nation, for delivery in the New York region; and the Tobin-Hedden 1943 report included these and the bus terminal as important postwar projects. In 1945, the Board and both cities had approved plans for the truck terminals, and during 1947 construction began. The Manhattan terminal would occupy three city blocks near the Holland Tunnel, include 144 truck bays, and have a freight platform 800 feet in length. But the Newark truck station would exceed even those dimensions and be “the largest in the world,” with 160 truck parking spaces and a freight platform 1,000 feet long, extending across 29 acres in all. Tobin and his colleagues expected the two terminals would be self-supporting financially, and there was some hope that these would be the first in a “series of union truck freight stations” which the Port Authority might build across the region.95 Behind the airport and seaport plans, the bus and truck terminals, and other possibilities that Tobin and Hedden and their associates sketched out in their heads and on paper stood the immense and growing revenues of the Port Authority. Fueled mainly in these early years of the Tobin regime by automobile, truck, and bus traffic across the George Washington Bridge and through the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the Authority’s revenues responded to the growing rush of postwar travel. In 1941, the last peacetime year, 30 million vehicles had crossed Port Authority facilities, and though traffic dipped during the wartime doldrums, that total had been reached again in 1945. The 1946 figures were 41,200,000, an all-time high, and in 1947 another record was set with 44,500,000. At the end of 1947, operating revenues broke all records with a total of $28.6 million. And since operating expenses absorbed $8 million, and interest and related payments $10 million, more than $10 million remained—from 1947 revenues alone—to provide backing for existing bonds and for new bond issues in support of new Authority initiatives.96 The Port agency’s large revenues and wide-reaching plans made it vulnerable to critics—the Newark commissioners, for example, the editors of
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the Bayonne Times, and Robert Moses—who charged it with self-serving ambitions. But the Authority’s friends had a plausible response. As the Newark Star-Ledger commented in weighing criticisms of the agency’s airport and seaport plans: “The Port Authority is not a profit-making, private enterprise. It is a public agency, and has no selfish motive. . . .” The Port Authority was also vulnerable to exorbitant demands; if it was so wealthy, why should not Newark, and Hoboken, and New York City and others hold out for much higher lease rates and other benefits than those offered by the agency? Here the Port agency found it advantageous that it used bond financing, for the bondholder could provide a ghostly caution—and, if pressed, a real constraint—against emptying the agency’s “profits” into the treasuries of eager cities and towns. Again, the Star-Ledger made the point, in explaining why the agency resisted increasing its payments to Newark: “The Port Authority’s motive is to create a setup with respect to this new project that will not discourage prospective bond purchasers. If the Port Authority pays out too much money, it may find itself driving [them] away.”97 A crucial factor in any plan to extend the Authority’s responsibilities still further would be the attitude of the Board of Commissioners. During the spring of 1947, when Mayor O’Dwyer had finally succumbed to Tobin’s blandishments and yielded his airports, Tobin had taken the occasion to praise the commissioners—and to prepare them for new efforts and, when necessary, new battles. Since early 1945, he noted to the Board, the commissioners “have been unanimous” in rejecting “a static role as a toll collection agency” and in accepting “the dynamic challenge” of reaching out for new projects. “The bridges and tunnels are to be looked to not as an end in themselves,” Tobin wrote, “but rather as the credit basis of a vital and expanding program . . . throughout the greatest metropolitan area in the world.”98 Behind these projects and plans and financing stratagems—more important than any of them and more important perhaps even than the crucial support which Tobin received from Cullman, Byrne, the other Commissioners and the bondholders—was the Port Authority career staff. Numbering 1,030 when Tobin assumed the helm in 1942, the staff had grown to 1,500 in 1946, and during 1947 hundreds more were added to meet the engineering and operating tasks at three airports and the Newark seaport. More important than the numbers, now nearly 2,000, and their quality (which was judged strong by outside observers) was their energy, dedication, and morale. And those characteristics appeared to be connected closely to Tobin’s style of leadership. He worked extremely hard—night and day, it seemed—and he reached out and grappled with the complexities of engineering, finance, planning
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and operation that confronted his staff; and usually he could stay on top of the details as well as the broad issues. Tobin called upon his associates to work as hard as he did, and he was impatient of staff delays in completing assignments; but he applauded their efforts and successes, and he told the commissioners and the public, through the press, of their work. He learned the names of traffic officers, secretaries, and other staff members at positions high and low throughout the organization, and he spoke with them—not just to them—as he visited offices, bridge crossings, and construction sites.99 In 1944, Tobin and the commissioners had established Port Authority Service Emblems to be worn by employees who had been with the Authority for five years or longer, a Medal of Honor for employees who had carried out meritorious acts at personal risk, and the Distinguished Service Medal “to recognize exceptional service of employees on the job.” The commissioners awarded these medals at large staff gatherings, and Tobin often spoke too. There he would avoid the somewhat stiff set speech that was becoming his hallmark in public ceremonies. He spoke informally of the medal winners, and of the importance of the staff, and of his aspirations for the Port Authority and the New York region, and those who listened could hear the energy and enthusiasm that had made him a leading orator in high school 25 years before; and his voice and hopes were infectious.100 “Morale was very high,” recalls one of Tobin’s close associates in the late 1940s. “People at the Port Authority were not only very respectful of Austin Tobin; they loved him dearly.”101 Those outside the agency, who worked with staff members on planning or legislative or engineering tasks, also came to recognize the attitude that seemed to pervade the Authority, and their perceptions helped to clear the way for Tobin and his aides as they sought cooperation and support in the region and in Albany and Trenton. As a top aide to Governor Dewey recalls: “I did not have much direct involvement with Austin Tobin then. But I worked closely with a few staff members and I talked occasionally with others. I could see that they had tremendous esprit, and that Tobin was the spirit that moved them. He was deeply revered.” “So I became biased toward the Port Authority,” he remembered. “With that kind of leadership and dedication their great powers didn’t worry me. Their independence seemed to me better than permitting political control and political inroads.”102 In Selznick’s terms, large portions of the Port Authority staff no longer viewed their work simply as a “job.” It had become a “valued source of personal satisfaction”; an organization was evolving into an institution. For some
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who knew of Tobin’s painful break with the Catholic Church, the Port Authority seemed to be his re-creation of that community, now lost to his sight.103 With many projects now underway and on the drawing board, with the strong support of the commissioners and the dedicated efforts of his staff, it was not surprising that Tobin was in an expansive mood when he spoke to the state-wide meeting of New Jersey realtors near the end of 1947. Reviewing the several marine terminal projects before the Authority, Tobin said that they would “embrace all our dreams” regarding the “historic development of the entire area as a seaport.” And he spoke too of yet another opportunity— a rapid transit line between Bayonne and Jersey City. A close study of that project had been deferred in recent months, Tobin explained, because the engineering staff had been absorbed in airport and seaport issues, but he hoped to have a report ready quite soon. The Authority’s annual report expressed the same optimistic tone: “Perhaps never before have the fundamental purposes and usefulness of the Port Authority been so fully recognized by the people of the Port District.” And the Authority’s credit position—the “best in our history”—would “enable us to go forward with the further development of great terminal projects.”104 Even as they inventoried their strengths and weighed the opportunities before them, Tobin and his colleagues were suddenly caught from behind, dragged into a conflict they had not expected. Through all of 1948 and much of 1949, large portions of Tobin’s emotional energy and the work of the agency’s top leaders would be absorbed in an exhausting battle with Juan Trippe and his fellow airline executives. Those valued members of the alliance that had wrested the airports from Newark and New York would now be enemies; and the Port Authority would be compelled to construct another national coalition, drawing on its political experience in the 1930s, in order to defend its avowed principles of independence, efficiency and equity. That wrenching battle, which ended only when Governor Thomas Dewey forcefully intervened, is the subject of the next chapter.
12 Breaking an Airline Monopoly
The big airlines want special privileges and special rates at Idlewild in unfair competition with the small airlines. . . . Having barnstormed and blitzed every city in the country for one of the greatest free rides in transportation history, their appetites at the public trough are insatiable. —Howard Cullman, Jan. 17, 19491
Leaders, whatever their professions of harmony, do not shun conflict; they confront it, exploit it, ultimately embody it. —James MacGregor Burns2
B
y the late 1940s, it was a central principle at the Port Authority that no new project would be undertaken unless it was expected to become financially self-supporting. In pursuit of that commandment, at every stage Tobin urged the staff to find ways to reduce project costs and to increase project revenues. However, the Port Authority’s goal was “self-supporting in the long run,” and so the staff was encouraged to look beyond the current year, and even beyond the current decade in achieving that goal. In addition, since technological change seemed a crucial aspect of twentieth-century transport, thinking at the agency tended to focus on ways to use evolving technology—and even to help create new technology—in order to improve service, attract more customers, and thereby reduce unit costs. Pursued in a disciplined and unremitting way, the agency’s efforts would in time yield more revenues than expenditures, and the project would more than cover debt service, becoming truly self-sustaining. At least that was the hope which Tobin and his engineers, his management experts, and their compatriots held in the 1940s, the 1950s, and far beyond. The term efficiency was often used to capture this perspective: what the Port Authority sought was an efficient transportation system—composed of an effi288
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cient system of air terminals, an efficient highway system, and so forth; and through strategies to improve efficiency, the project or program would become economically self-supporting. Activities that could not be expected to achieve that result in the long run must be allocated to public agencies that could use tax revenues to meet continuing deficits, not to the Port Authority.3 From the Port Authority’s vantage point, one important route to a more efficient transportation system was the creation of consolidated terminals— places where goods and people could be gathered from across the vast region and beyond, and then sorted and dispatched in common groupings to their destinations. Stated in this abstract way, the concept seems especially to apply to freight; and of course the Port agency had its origin in the campaign to create union terminals, with unified sorting yards and tunnels, for rail freight. In a large and congested region, consolidated truck terminals might also be attractive as a way to reduce traffic congestion in making freight deliveries. The concept could be applied to people as well; consolidated bus terminals could be viewed as desirable projects for gathering and sorting passengers bound for different places, and desirable too in reducing street congestion caused by waiting buses and passengers. By the 1940s air terminals had become yet another centralized approach for “processing” people and goods. And in the 1950s, the world trade center proposal would be promoted as a way to improve the efficiency with which information regarding regional commerce could be gathered and exchanged, advancing the New York region’s position as a central player in world trade. However, in the 1940s (as in the 1920s) the bi-state agency demonstrated an understanding of how to achieve transport efficiency that was quite at variance with the views, and the working habits, of leading figures of American industry. As noted in chapter 5, the Port Authority’s leaders adopted what they sometimes called a “public utility” concept of their enterprise. They applied principles of rational planning, viewed regionally, in order to identify the transport networks and terminals which should be designed, constructed, and modified and then used cooperatively by shippers and manufacturers. This approach had shaped the Port Authority’s 1921 Comprehensive Plan and its related campaigns to open the Hell Gate Bridge to all comers and to substitute a unified service for the hundreds of railroad barges that criss-crossed the harbor. The public-utility perspective also motivated its efforts to construct the Manhattan rail-freight terminal at 15th Street in the 1930s, and justified its bridges and tunnels to serve trucks and other motor vehicles as part of the public highway system. In the 1940s, the two truck terminals, the Man-
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hattan bus station, and the three air terminal projects marched under the same public-utility banner. In contrast, the leaders of the nation’s airlines breathed the air of free enterprise that had sustained the railroad executives before them. Both were committed to the view that the search for individual benefit, and vigorous competition for advantage, would best serve the cause of progress and the mission of American capitalism.4 If we look more closely at the “capitalist ethos” which shaped the behavior of leaders of the large airlines and bus companies, we will discover that they sometimes advocated “competition” while fighting for privileges that would undermine that ideal. One of the key strategies for those who wish to monopolize an industry is to erect barriers to entry—enforced, if possible, by the power of government—so that new competitors are blocked out or, if they are admitted, are forced to compete at a severe disadvantage. This is one way to understand the extended battles against Tobin’s Port Authority by Pan American, United, and the other large airlines, and by the Greyhound Bus Company. These large private firms were fighting to maintain special advantages that would undercut competition; and the Port Authority emerges, in this interpretation, as the defender of competition—urging policies that would encourage new airlines to enter the field and that would allow bus companies to expand and compete on equal footing. Perhaps this theme is consistent with some of its arguments in the 1920s, when it advocated opening the Hell Gate Bridge to all competitors, and favored union rail terminals and public (not private) bridges and tunnels across the Hudson. But the Port agency’s advocacy of open competition is even clearer in the cases examined below. It is ironic that the Port Authority, an advocate of competitive vigor in the wider economy, also sought and received safeguards against competition in its own sphere within the region. Yet, in the Port Authority’s understanding, the intertwined goals of self-supporting enterprises and efficiency required that it be provided with some monopoly protection. The need for legislation to provide the Port agency with selected “monopoly powers” became evident in the 1920s, when it explored the possibility of issuing securities to pay for building the Staten Island spans and the George Washington Bridge. Prospective bondholders were concerned that competition from the Holland Tunnel and from private bridges or tunnels might lead to competitive toll reductions, undermining the agency’s ability to meet bond payments; to moderate this concern, the two states passed legislation guaranteeing that no competing private or new public spans would be permitted. The monopoly question was also
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raised when the Port agency made plans to take over the Newark and New York City airports; in this case, those who spoke for the bondholders hoped for the protection of state laws, similar to the bridge legislation, but they had to be satisfied with city guarantees in 1947 that competing airports would not be created in Newark and New York City. The Port Authority also demanded monopoly protection before it constructed the Manhattan bus terminal, a controversy examined in the next chapter.5 Drawing upon its Progressive Era heritage, the Authority argued that it could operate efficiently only if it were granted a high degree of political insulation. The importance of safeguarding the Port Authority’s activities from local politics had become evident to its friends in the long battle to create the agency against the opposition of the mayors of New York City and Jersey City. Then, during the 1920s and 1930s, patronage had made inroads at the agency. However, the new leadership of the 1940s—Cullman, Byrne, and Tobin—repaired the rents, and they fought successfully, under the dual banners of “regional cooperation” and “nonpolitical efficiency,” to capture the region’s three major airports. The destructive competitive actions of individual cities undercutting one another could be ended, they asserted, by yielding control to the nonpolitical experts of the Port Authority. So could the heavy burden of patronage and special dealing seen in the city departments that ran Newark’s (and New York’s) marine terminals. Moreover, they argued, it was essential that the Port agency be permitted to select its staff, set rental rates to recover costs, and award contracts without interference; only with this freedom could it attain the level of efficiency that was essential for achieving that long-term goal—self-supporting programs to aid the region’s development, provided “without adding to the tax burden.” Indeed the pressure to make airports and other facilities self-sufficient was driven significantly by political realities associated with these themes. If the Port agency were compelled to ask for continuing financial contributions from state or local governments, its actions would be subjected to the vagaries and political bartering of the legislative appropriations process. Then its image as a “nonpolitical” government actor would almost certainly be compromised.6 Throughout the 1940s and beyond, the Port Authority and its friends pressed these arguments for political insulation against the concerns of those who found the Port Authority, as they did Robert Moses and his enterprises, too independent to meet appropriate standards of democratic accountability. The search for efficiency, the belief in large publicly operated terminals, the demand for monopoly powers, and the resistance to political incursions—
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all these were major themes of Tobin’s first ten years in power. There were two more motifs as well: the attempt to use equity and general principles of fairness, in setting policies for modern airports, in relocating tenants, and in awarding construction contracts; and the issue of whether Tobin and his aides were too naive, too innocent, making unwise commitments and wasting essential political capital as they confronted crafty and sometimes abusive leaders from the airlines, in the labor movement, and along the corridors of political power in Albany, Trenton, and Washington. In this chapter and the next we examine these several themes, mainly by exploring two major battlegrounds of the late 1940s. The first is the sustained conflict between the Port Authority and the large airlines, focused on the airport leases that had been signed by Mayor LaGuardia in 1945. Here we will see the adroit tactics the airlines used to undermine Tobin’s moral independence; Tobin’s attempt to articulate a “public utility” view of air terminals, in conflict with the individualist views of Juan Trippe, Eddie Rickenbacker, and other airline pioneers; and Tobin’s successful effort to defend principles of equity for airport governance, reclaiming ethical leadership. During the conflict, the preemptive purchase of Teterboro Airport reveals significant weaknesses in the fabric of his staff expertise; and Governor Dewey’s active intervention reminds us of limitations on the Port Authority’s independence. We also follow the creation of a national alliance, using the political strategies hammered out in the fight with FDR in the 1930s, which in time would bring Juan Trippe and the other rugged individualists to their knees. Next we will explore the many-headed hydra that was the Manhattan bus terminal, reflect on the ethical issues raised by the bus-terminal case, and briefly summarize the unhappy results of the Port Authority’s attempts to add a series of truck terminals, and the seaports of Hoboken and New York City, to its string of successful projects.
From Allies to Enemies: Public-Utility Vision Meets Capitalist Ethos “The airline executives thought he [Tobin] didn’t know what league he was batting in. . . . He would be no match for an aggravated Rickenbacker or ex–two star [general] C. R. Smith.”7
In the Port Authority’s campaign to take control of the region’s airports, the bi-state agency had been fortunate enough to find friends who violated
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Machiavelli’s prediction.8 Eddie Rickenbacker, Juan Trippe, and their fellow executives had been no “lukewarm allies” to Tobin and his team, for those airline pioneers could see clearly how they might profit from a new system. The Port Authority would take airport development in the nation’s largest metropolis out of the hands of city agencies, with their uncertain funding streams and uneven management; instead, expansion and modernization would be the duty of a “nonpolitical” regional government, whose reputation for effective action was matched by its large and growing income. Moreover, that income was drawn mainly from the traffic across its bridges and through its tunnels; and the Port Authority had shown its willingness to use the “excess funds” from those vehicular money-makers to support other projects which might not meet their own costs—the inland freight terminal, truck stations, marine operations, and now, all the region’s major airports. As we saw in chapter 11, the airline executives also found the Port Authority far more attractive than the alternative championed by Robert Moses—a New York City Airport Authority which would have no pipeline to motor-vehicle tolls or other assured sources of revenue. Inevitably, that city authority would have had to find ways to extract more money from those who used the airports, and the airlines were an obvious source, even though they had the “LaGuardia leases,” which seemed to protect them from having to pay more. At this point, the brief comments on the “LaGuardia leases” found in chapter 11 need some elaboration, for the conflict that developed in 1948–49 between the airline executives and Austin Tobin focused on those agreements, and on misunderstandings and miscalculations that arose during the earlier harmonious alliance. The problem had begun in the 1930s, when Fiorello LaGuardia, mayor of New York City and former Army pilot, sought to attract the young airlines from Newark Airport to New York. Success would bring prestige to the mayor and his city, ensure convenient flight service for New York’s citizens (and voters), and add thousands of jobs—especially if American, United, and other airlines could be enticed to relocate their maintenance facilities from Chicago and other points. In LaGuardia’s calculus, the benefits in economic and psychological terms were worth the costs—the expense of building modern airports, and the “below cost” rental rates which he offered to entice the airlines to give priority to New York. His tactics, and the airlines’ demands for special benefits, will be familiar to those who have followed intercity and interstate competition in recent decades to attract corporate offices and plants. The “LaGuardia leases,” negotiated by the mayor and a key associate, Joseph McGoldrick, had finally been accepted by the city and the airlines in 1945;
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and as we will see, the airlines extracted admirable terms for their agreements to favor New York City airports over Newark and other airfields.9 What the airlines had achieved in low-cost leases and other benefits, by playing off Newark against New York City, they had also accomplished in an array of other cities around the nation. Operating as a unified coalition, called the Air Transport Association (ATA), the airlines had negotiated with Chicago and St. Louis, Omaha and Minneapolis, Denver and Salt Lake and other cities large and small, threatening to favor one city over another, and to bypass entirely any regions that were uncooperative. These tactics were successful in the short run, as the airline coalition employed its monopoly power to ensure that—in city after city—the municipalities would be committed to serving the airlines for fees that were below actual costs; federal grants and local taxpayers would have to make up the difference. In recent decades, the subsidy demands and successes of professional football and basketball teams, in negotiating with city governments, illustrate the same pattern.10 When Robert Moses attacked the LaGuardia leases, beginning in the first weeks of 1946, he was raising a matter of local concern, but for the airlines it was also an issue of tremendous national import. Moses argued that the existing leases should be torn up and new agreements signed, with flight fees increased by 20 percent and ground rentals at twice the existing rates; only then, he said, would his new City Airport Authority have the moneys needed to develop Idlewild. However, if the airlines were to yield to Moses, the New York precedent would cast into doubt their agreements in dozens of other cities, and the result might be a sharp increase in their costs nationally. So they rejected his demands. But they needed to ensure Idlewild was in fact turned from a pile of sand into a vast, modern airport, and the Port Authority, with its assured source of outside revenues, was an attractive alternative.11 During the summer and fall of 1946, Rickenbacker of Eastern Airlines and his fellow executives met with Tobin and offered their support for the Port Authority’s airport plans; but they also asked for assurances that the agency would not try to break the existing leases. Tobin’s chief adviser on airport planning was James Buckley, an economist, and he thought the 1945 leases were satisfactory, permitting the agency to develop Idlewild and LaGuardia on a self-sustaining basis. Tobin seemed convinced that the leases would pose no obstacle to his goals, but during the fall he hired outside experts to provide him with their independent judgments. In December he received the results of those assessments, which concluded that the agency had
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considered “all the factors necessary to make the project self-sustaining” and that the Port Authority’s plans should be “commended in that they point the way to relieving the taxpayers of a financial burden without imposing a burdensome charge on the airlines.”12 In response to the airlines’ request, therefore, Tobin had no difficulty in agreeing to send them a letter in January 1947 which affirmed his view: “The Port Authority is definitely of the opinion that these leases are valid. We have premised our revenue estimates on the rates set forth in those leases.” When pressed by Amos Culbert of Eastern Airlines to be more specific on the situation at Idlewild, he then agreed to add a sentence: “Only details would require renegotiation, and these would not involve any increase in rates to the airlines for services or space at the airport.”13 In return, as described in chapter 11, the airline executives took an active part in the campaigns on both sides of the Hudson—attacking the Moses airport authority and endorsing the Port Authority’s plans, working closely with Tobin and O’Dwyer’s aides in order to produce agreement in March 1947 on the takeover of LaGuardia and Idlewild, and then pressing Newark to embrace the Port agency’s plans when its officials hesitated in the weeks before the final agreement was signed in October 1947.14 Once the bi-state agency had captured the New York airfields, the airline executives began to worry anew about their leases. They had Tobin’s personal assurances; but if he were overridden by the Board of Commissioners, could the airlines appeal to the courts to compel the agency to adhere to the lease rates? They soon discovered, to their surprise, that the agency was immune from suit! In May, they tried to persuade Tobin and his aides that this was unfair, and that the Port agency should join with them in supporting legislation that would allow the airlines to sue, if the airport agreements were violated. But Tobin rejected that ploy.15 Meanwhile, Tobin made two crucial appointments, in order to add the skills needed to generate more revenue from stores and other nonflight activities at the airports, and to control costs of operation through efficient management. In May 1947, Robert Curtiss, an expert in concessions and real estate, joined the staff, and during the summer, Hervey Law was named director of the agency’s airports. Law was highly regarded in aviation circles for his operation of the Washington, D.C. airport, where he had added concession income and used management-control strategies to bring the airport to a break-even status. Neither Tobin nor Buckley had any direct experience in airport operations or finances; in estimating airport traffic, revenues and costs, Buckley had largely drawn on general principles of economics and on
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his wartime experience with lend-lease operations. Now Tobin had two men with extensive experience in the fields crucial to achieving the self-support goal; and soon after Labor Day the disaster embedded in the LaGuardiaMcGoldrick leases was uncovered.16
Bias in the System In late September, Tobin sent a dose of bad news to the commissioners. “We inherited a schedule of charges” at the airports, Tobin wrote, which “bears no relation to air carrier revenues, or to the weight of aircraft, or to the wear and tear on the runways, taxiways, and aprons.” Under the LaGuardia leases, which Tobin had endorsed eight months before, the rates were very low, and they were fixed for the next 40 years. In July 1947, for example, American Airlines had 4,500 domestic landings or takeoffs at LaGuardia, for which it paid the airport operator (now the Port Authority) only $4,400; Eastern had 1,800 flights and paid the agency just under $1,700. Moreover, each airline paid a fixed sum for its initial scheduled flights, and declining amounts per flight thereafter; as a result, the system “discriminates rather than encourages smaller carriers” which had only a few flights. The great differences among airlines were displayed in a table, reproduced in part below, which made clear why Eastern, American, TWA, and Pan Am had taken the lead in befriending the Port Authority and in pressing Tobin to sign the January letter. This system, which had been incorporated into the leases for Idlewild as well, violated the general principles to which the Port Authority was committed: “operation of the landing areas . . . along the lines of a public utility equally available to all at prices fair and equitable to all.”17 While the flaws in the airport leases seemed evident to Tobin and his colleagues, it was less clear what should be done to correct them. Eastern and the other large carriers resisted informal requests that they yield their advantage, and having signed the January letter Tobin was reluctant to adopt the Moses strategy and simply tear up the leases. Instead, once the Newark agreement was signed in October, he decided to apply a modest amount of public pressure. Speaking to business and civic groups, Tobin described the large capital investments the Port Authority planned to make in all three airports, and the plans to develop extensive nonflight revenues to meet 60–70 percent of airport costs; he also noted that the agency would spend $75 million for new “hangars and base facilities for air carriers”—“if and when” the airlines agreed to new leases that would cover the total costs of such improvements.18
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table 12.1 Flights Into and from LaGuardia Airport, with Costs per Flight (1947) Domestic flights Eastern American TWA
Plane movements (July)
Paymt to PA per plane mvmt
1,860 4,566 1,264
92 cents 98 cents $1.41
. . . [five airlines omitted; final two below paid highest rates] Trans-Canada Northwest
306 312
$3.92 $4.56
594 230
$4.72 5.01
Overseas Pan American American
. . . [six airlines omitted; highest rate below] British
54
$43.06
To the airline executives, however, Tobin’s concerns were only the grumbling of a government bureaucrat who had signed away his right to change the traditional ATA lease. The “rugged individualists” who ran the airlines had been driving hard bargains with inexperienced city officials for years, much to the advantage of the large carriers, and Tobin was simply the latest captive in the web. They considered Tobin’s view that his agency should treat “all our customers on the basis of equality” as “piffle . . . another big indication that he just didn’t understand what league he was batting in.” And if Tobin tried to “get tough with the airlines,” as one former airline executive recalled, he was viewed as a “non veteran” and “no match for an aggravated [Captain] Rickenbacker or ex–two star [general] C. R. Smith.” Besides, Tobin ran an agency with “ready access to untold millions from bondholders” who were “eager” to finance Port Authority projects, so he didn’t need more money from the airlines.19 But here the strategic sense of the “rugged individualists” went slightly awry. In pressing for Tobin’s commitment to the old leases, while he was unaware of the weaknesses in those agreements, they had won a tactical victory in January; but Tobin soon concluded that they had intentionally deceived him, and now they gained an enemy, in a deeply personal sense. As one of his long-term aides recalled, Tobin felt he had been “badly betrayed” by Culbert and his allies; he never fully trusted the airline executives and negotiators again.20
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If the airline executives were concerned that changes in the New York leases would set a precedent other cities might learn about and follow, perhaps it would have been wiser to work out improved leases with Tobin and his aides in the quiet of their boardrooms, rather than choosing the path of confrontation. For Tobin was unusually dangerous to the airlines. As Trippe and his colleagues knew from their own involvement in the recent battles with Newark and New York officials, Tobin relished a good fight, he was willing to speak out publicly, and he was stubborn. What they had missed, perhaps, was his deep experience in honing political tactics which could be employed against the airlines’ monopoly power. If pressed, Tobin might construct a national alliance of the kind that had defeated Franklin Roosevelt in the municipal-bond fight a decade before.
Strategies Local and National They seek to force upon us a new system, not contemplated in the leases, but borrowed from Europe. . . . It is an attempt to force on us at this critical stage an ideology never contemplated in the leases as they originally accepted them. —An attorney for U.S. airlines21
In January, 1948, Tobin wrote to executives of the twenty largest airports in the country, suggesting that they form a new organization which could serve as a “much needed medium for the exchange of information and experience” among government agencies that operated airports. This would, as it turned out, be the first step in constructing a nation-wide coalition that could challenge the airlines’ hegemony.22 Tobin still hoped that behind-the-scenes negotiations would lead the airlines to revise the old leases in a cooperative spirit—accepting the principles of self-supporting airport development and nondiscrimination in landing fees. The need to find a more equitable way to set landing charges and allot other costs among the various air carriers was, to Tobin, a simple matter of fairness; when the issue was made clear to upright men like Trippe, they would surely accept that view. Moreover, the goal of raising the general level of charges to the airlines was of crucial importance not only to the Port Authority but to the airlines as well, if they wanted to expand their business and profits. The traditional pattern, with city officials providing low-cost landing fees, hangar rights, and other facilities, meant that by the late 1940s, airlines were paying only about 10 percent of the cost of operating most air-
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ports around the nation. The deficits were met through taxes levied on the local citizenry, who had been eager to have air service; but there was increasing resistance to continuing that form of airport—and airline—subsidy. At the same time, airlines were adding more planes and larger planes in these early postwar years; to earn reasonable profits and expand their services further, the airlines needed airport operators which could invest millions of dollars in longer runways, new buildings, and other elements of a modern airport. Looked at in isolation, the airlines’ desire for modernized airports in the New York region seemed likely to be satisfied, for the Port Authority did have access to other revenues; moreover, it had attracted a corps of new staff members who were already, at LaGuardia in 1947–48, using imaginative methods to add to nonflight income. However, most airports were not operated with these advantages; if the airlines won their battle and kept the old tradition of low-cost, 40-year leases, they would find horse-and-buggy airfields in most cities, and no place to land the larger planes like the Stratocruiser that were about to be delivered to American and the other large carriers. What the airlines needed, and the airport operators too, was a system of flight charges and other fees that would—if combined with aggressive, entrepreneurial steps to expand concession revenue—render the nation’s airports self-supporting. This would allow air terminals to be expanded and modernized without relying on the hazardous annual trip to the taxpayer’s pocket. At least that was how Tobin and his aides viewed the issue, and so they entered into a sustained effort, in the first months of 1948, to persuade the airline executives and their lawyers to see principles of fairness and their own self-interest in this light.23 At a meeting in mid-February with airline executives and several of his own commissioners, Tobin laid out these views at length. He described the successful efforts by the Port Authority to increase income from stores, parking, and other sources, and he said that he hoped 60–70 percent of overall airport costs could be covered by such nonflight income. He argued that both the Port Authority’s general philosophy and political reality required that the airports in time be self-supporting. He expressed sympathy with the large airlines’ successful efforts to win special benefits in their earlier leases, but he insisted that could not continue.24 Tobin then pointed out that the “whole future of air transportation” depended on finding ways to make air terminals self-supporting financially. His assessment continued:
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there are 17 major air centers whose air traffic by 1950 should require greater airport capacity. . . . practically no construction going on to meet this demand—financial inability of the cities. . . . state and municipal enthusiasm for making up the deficits out of taxation is no longer evident. . . . we are mutually dependent—unless the airline industry prospers we will not have self supporting airports—unless the airports are self-supporting their inadequacy will stultify the great future of the airline industry.
At the conference, C. R. Smith and Rickenbacker expressed concern that Tobin’s approach to revision was so broad as to “constitute, in effect, a repudiation of the 1945 agreements.” But after the meeting and separate conversations in the next several days, Tobin seemed encouraged by the willingness of some airline officials to consider revising the old leases.25 Despite further meetings and exchanges of letters during the spring, however, the U.S. airline executives did not budge from their position that the low landing fees and other stipulations in the 1945 leases were inviolate. The firmness of the coalition was underscored when the Port Authority asked the domestic and foreign airlines what hangar space, passenger counters, and other areas they wished to lease at Idlewild, which would open in July 1948. All the U.S. carriers filed applications, but they included identical wording stating that they would sign on at Idlewild only if the Port agency would be using the principles agreed to in 1945. Several foreign-flag airlines omitted that condition, and they were then given “preferred choice of space” at the new airport, while the others were “advised what space remained available.”26
The National Coalition Takes Off Meanwhile, in response to Tobin’s January 1948 letter, the directors of the country’s largest airports had begun to organize and exchange information. The executives created an “Airport Operators Council,” which held its first full meeting in Boston in April, with 136 attending from 19 major airports. There was wide agreement that they had been at a disadvantage in negotiating individually with the airlines’ unified team (the ATA); and that lack of information about leases at other airports, and the fear of not having adequate service, had led most cities to sign agreements with the airlines that priced airport services well below cost. However, Tobin and his fellow airport directors were pleased to learn that the standard ATA lease, which had provided the basis for the LaGuardia agreements in 1945 and similar leases across the nation, was not everywhere in use; managers in San Francisco and
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Minneapolis–St. Paul had persuaded the airlines to sign leases that would be far more likely to permit those airports to become self-sustaining. A week later, both of those airport directors met with several Port Authority commissioners and staff in New York to describe the negotiating strategies that had resulted in better agreements with the ATA.27 During the AOC conference in Boston, Tobin also met with Governor Robert Bradford of Massachusetts, where the issue of how to pay for modernizing Logan Airport was being debated. Bradford said he was “meeting with the same line of intransigence from the airlines,” and the governor entertained the airport directors with a sharp attack on the airlines and their wily ways. The airport managers’ readiness to confront the ATA was also enhanced during the spring by the discovery that European airports extracted much larger payments, and that charges were adjusted regularly when inflation and other factors had an impact on an airport’s financial health.28 The evolving sense of community among AOC members was reinforced by another nation-wide effort, led by municipal legal officers. In 1947, their national association had begun an effort to protect the cities from ATA pressures by creating a “model” agreement that individual cities and other airport operators could use in negotiating with the airlines. The ATA objected to important parts of the draft, and during the early months of 1948 a revised draft, coupled with extensive commentary on the ATA model lease and ATA negotiating tactics, was prepared by a Washington lawyer, Charles S. Rhyne, in close consultation with Tobin’s legal staff. The report was sharply critical of the airlines, and the foreword included phrasing that would be quoted in Tobin’s reports to the commissioners and in newspaper reports during the next several years: The airlines have run roughshod over cities and have undoubtedly contributed in a large measure to the financial impotency of municipal airports by reason of inadequate compensation. . . . The so-called ‘Air Transportation Association’ model airport lease agreement is an infamous document that has been widely used by the airlines in their efforts to secure the terms which they desire.29
In June 1948, the Airport Operators Council created a series of committees to examine operating practices, rates and accounting, and other matters. By now, some media support for the AOC and the Port Authority’s organizing efforts was evident. The journal Airports and Air Carriers noted that “the cry has gone up” that the AOC “is the creation of the Port Authority” and that the bi-state agency was using the AOC “as a weapon to force the airlines”
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into new agreements at Idlewild; but the journal then endorsed the AOC as a needed counterweight to the ATA and suggested that ATA negotiating tactics may have compelled the airports to organize too. The New York Times offered a ringing endorsement of the Port Authority’s argument that American airports “must be self-supporting,” while commenting that the airlines “have been bountifully treated . . . by their municipal hosts,” an advantage which must now be ended. And the aviation expert at the Herald Tribune praised the Port agency’s successful effort to increase nonflight revenues, while asserting that “the ultimate test of the genius of the Port of New York Authority” would be the dual challenge of increasing flight revenues and reducing airport costs. Here the reporter took a position that echoed the Port Authority’s general philosophy, nurtured since its early efforts to reorganize railroad terminals: The airlines “have had individual services at the air terminals far too long for their own good,” he argued; it would be much more efficient to have passenger services, gasoline delivery, and other operations in the terminals under the control of the bi-state agency. With the cities no longer willing to subsidize airport operation, the terminals must become self-supporting, the reporter concluded. The alternative would be “nationalization of airports” and perhaps of the airlines themselves.30 In early July, the AOC campaign claimed a significant success, and the ATA saw an ominous portent, as Chicago’s city council adopted a schedule of flight fees and other charges for its new airport “patterned after those of the Port of New York Authority” at Idlewild. Boston and other cities soon followed.31
Counterattack The airlines did not stand by, silent and admiring, as the financial and political structure on which their success had been built began to crumble. In the spring of 1948, when the Civil Aeronautics Administration held a public hearing prior to setting air-traffic patterns for Idlewild, the ATA opposed opening the airport because of its “dangerous” proximity to LaGuardia; but the CAA rejected that plea. In May, a member of Congress from Long Island introduced a bill that would bar federal aid to any airports which charged airlines for supplying gasoline and other services; since the carriers were at the time resisting the Port Authority’s plans to impose such charges, the measure seemed ATA-inspired. The Port Authority attacked it sharply, and it died in committee.32 When the Port Authority proposed that foreign-flag airlines move their operations to Idlewild, the ATA sent out information alleging “unsafe” condi-
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tions at the new airport. Then, apparently at the urging of U.S. airlines, two European air carriers persuaded their embassies to file protests with the State Department, asking that the bi-state agency be prohibited from requiring them to shift from LaGuardia to Idlewild; but State conferred with the Port agency and rejected the protests.33 With Idlewild scheduled to open in July, the airlines had created a full boycott, in the hope that the new airport would open with no scheduled air service. However, once the State Department said it would not intervene, the Authority compelled Air France, and the other foreign-flag carriers that did not have long-term LaGuardia leases, to shift to the new and larger airport, and the boycott was undermined.34 The U.S. airlines also explored an alternative strategy which might weaken the Port Authority’s negotiating position. In his earlier discussions with airline executives, Tobin had indicated that the bi-state region needed four major airports, with the location for the fourth—in the northwest sector—not yet identified. If the carriers purchased and operated that fourth airport on their own, major freight and passenger services could be developed outside the Port Authority’s control, and the airlines could negotiate for reduced charges at the other three airports with greater leverage. Early in 1948, as one airline official recalls, “we took a long look at Teterboro,” a private airport in Bergen County; the airlines though it might be possible to “move entirely to Teterboro.” But the airport was too small; “it could never be adequate.”35 Once again, as it had in endorsing the LaGuardia leases in 1947, the Port Authority demonstrated that its staff expertise was not adequate to the challenge. In March, one of Tobin’s aides talked with Teterboro’s owner and learned that the airlines had been in for a visit. During the next three months, rumors of possible purchase by a group of major carriers surfaced, probably shaped mainly by Teterboro’s owner, who seemed to have just the right technique for encouraging the Port agency’s nervousness. In early August, the Port Authority bought Teterboro for $3,115,000. It would become “one of the four great” air terminals in the New York region, asserted James Buckley, now director of airport development.36 But in fact Teterboro would never become a major airport. Even when expanded, its runways would be difficult for large planes to use; and, more important, takeoffs and landings would conflict with airspace for planes using Newark Airport, especially when instrument landing was required. Although Teterboro would always be valuable for nonscheduled passenger service and cargo, its abrupt purchase at a large price in 1948 was the result of
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important miscalculations. Together with the erroneous revenue estimates linked to the LaGuardia leases, these could be laid substantially at the door of airport planner Buckley, and by early in 1949, he was gone. The press, however, dutifully treated the Teterboro purchase as another gem in the Port Authority crown of successes.37 Vexed by their failure to persuade Tobin to accept the ATA position, the airlines tried other ploys. As the first installment of Air Terminal bonds was issued in June, ATA aides allegedly spread rumors suggesting that those securities were not a sound investment. However, the Port agency had secured its new bonds directly to its large general-reserve fund and safeguarded them in other ways; so the first round of bond sales took place without difficulty. The airlines also appealed to Mayor O’Dwyer, asking that he endorse the LaGuardia agreements, but O’Dwyer criticized the old leases and rejected their request. Then Rickenbacker, Trippe, and their fellow executives demanded that O’Dwyer intervene to stop the Port agency from an “organized campaign of harassment” undertaken at the airports, which (they said) was forcing the airlines to shift maintenance work away from New York; but that tactic also failed.38 In the battle for media support in the summer of 1948, the Port Authority seemed to have the stronger hand. In August, the Wall Street Journal carried a long article which described the Port agency as a “trail-blazer” in the national effort to get air terminals “out of the red” and noted that its “new theories on airport management” were being applied in Chicago, Boston, and other cities. The airlines’ public appeals to O’Dwyer offered their antagonists another opportunity to attack the air carriers, and Howard Cullman, abetted by the region’s journalists, fired away, quoting the report by Charles Rhyne which labeled the ATA model lease as “an infamous document,” and asserting that the threat to move airline jobs was a standard ATA ploy being used not only in New York but also in Boston, Minneapolis, Chicago and other cities.39 The airlines’ attempts to bring the State Department into the fray on their side had an even less satisfactory outcome. When the European carriers had incited diplomatic protests in June, the ATA hoped that State would endorse the right of foreign-flag airlines to stay at LaGuardia, so that the full boycott of Idlewild might be maintained. That attempt was unsuccessful; and some weeks later the U.S. carriers realized that the actual result had been to weaken their position—for the State Department had endorsed the Port Authority’s preferred position, that all airlines must soon transfer their overseas flights from LaGuardia to the new airfield.40
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With Cullman and Tobin leading the attack, the Port Authority appeared to be a unified monolith. But was this really so? During the fall of 1948, the airlines tried another tactic, hoping to drive a wedge between Tobin and some of his commissioners. In October the airlines added A. Harry Moore to their legal team; as governor of New Jersey in the 1930s, Moore had appointed Vice Chairman Joseph Byrne to his initial term on the board, and there was some hope that he might persuade Byrne and one or two others to support the airlines’ position. The airlines’ chief negotiator, George Whiteside, apparently informed Tobin that he and Governor Moore would feel free to discuss their concerns about Authority policies in separate meetings with commissioners from both states. Whiteside then met with the commissioners in early November and urged that they endorse the general principles found in the LaGuardia leases. And when that step failed to break the agency’s unified stance, the airlines threatened to bring suit individually against each of the commissioners.41 But none of these efforts seemed to budge Tobin and his colleagues from their stubborn insistence that the old leases be replaced with new agreements, and that the new leases be based on the principle of equity for all airlines and on a schedule of fees which would make self-sustaining airports a realistic aspiration. In the fall, when the airlines asked to use Idlewild temporarily “under the terms of the existing leases,” Tobin rejected that request and emphasized the need for equity and adequate income at the airports. When they asked the Port Authority to abandon its plan to add a surcharge if airlines set up their own gasoline delivery or other services, they found that the Port Authority’s surcharge policy was now embedded in the agreement which the agency had made “with the United States of America” for federal aid at Idlewild. When they urged the commissioners to rethink their position, they received a letter from Cullman that assailed the carriers for demanding “rates and charges which would be frozen at non-compensatory levels for fifty years,” and which would give a “privileged status . . . to the larger airlines among your clients.” Cullman reminded Whiteside that the ATA model lease was viewed as an “infamous document,” and that some public officials thought the airlines’ unified negotiating strategy was “a conspiracy” which violated anti-trust laws. Progress could only be made, Cullman told Whiteside, by negotiations with “our Executive Director,” who had the board’s unanimous support. And the Port Authority then made the scathing letter public.42 Late in the fall of 1948, the airlines tried to persuade the interested public that Tobin and his agency should be condemned for unethical behavior,
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because they had reneged on Tobin’s 1947 assurance that there would not be “any increases in rates to the airlines” at Idlewild. That ploy failed to gain much attention, however, and the journalist who gave it most careful scrutiny found Tobin’s letter one of the “mysteries” of the affair, to be balanced against examples of puzzling airline behavior. With their stock of public support declining, and with few tactical strokes left, the major American airlines finally, in mid-December, filed suit against all twelve Port Authority commissioners and against Austin Tobin.43
Deadlock The suit charged the Port agency’s officials with “breach of their duties,” for failing to permit the carriers to use Idlewild under the guiding principles of the old leases. The airlines faced a specific crisis which impelled them to try legal action as the new year approached: three of the carriers were about to take delivery of a new generation of large planes, Boeing Stratocruisers, which were too heavy to land fully loaded at LaGuardia. The Idlewild field could handle the planes; but unless the Port Authority were forced to develop new terminal and service plans (arguably not covered in the old leases), the airlines’ staff and Stratocruiser passengers would find Idlewild’s facilities distinctly limited.44 As the court case opened in January, 1949, the conflict reached “new stages of bitterness.” Howard Cullman attacked the air carriers for their “insatiable . . . appetites at the public trough,” while Whiteside denounced “the dictatorship of the Port Authority” at the airports. After hearing opening statements, the judge asked the two sides to go away and resolve their differences. And Governor Thomas E. Dewey said that he was sure “ancient fetishes” would soon be abandoned and the case settled.45 But Dewey’s optimism was not well founded. Negotiations continued sporadically during the next several months, and neither side would budge on the issue of new leases.46 Meanwhile, the first Stratocruisers began to arrive. They were able to land at LaGuardia, but only if partly loaded. When Pan American asked for permission for one plane to take off with a weight 10 percent over the LaGuardia limit, the Port Authority refused and 10,000 pounds had to be removed before the plane could depart. Pan Am and the other carriers were informed that under the 1945 leases they also had the right to land the new Boeing plane (and other planes) at Idlewild, and to fly out of Idlewild; but that was about the extent of their rights. As Tobin explained to his commissioners:
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While those leases clearly permit the landing of Pan American’s planes and the use of the runways, they include no provisions whatsoever for passenger areas, counter space, or office space . . . nor for cargo handling . . . ; nor do they include any rights or privileges with respect to . . . hangars at the Airport. . . . None of these facilities will be made available to Pan American, or any of the lessee airlines, until the 1945 leases are renegotiated.”47
So Pan Am passengers wishing to take the great Stratocruiser from Idlewild could look forward to huddling together in spring rains, near a runway, waiting for the plane to arrive, ticket in hand, without access to information on any delays, and—for bathroom needs—looking for such trees and bushes as the Port Authority had, in its kindness, left standing along the roadways. In contrast, passengers willing to fly to Europe via KLM or Air France, which had signed new leases based on aircraft weight and equity principles, awaited departure in warm waiting rooms in the new temporary buildings, with coffee shops and other amenities at hand. And so the noose on the U.S. carriers was tightened, and Tobin took some measure of revenge on Trippe, Culbert, and their allies for that tactical victory of 1947. As conditions at LaGuardia grew more crowded in the late spring, and the airlines occasionally landed their Stratocruisers at Idlewild, the frustration of the carriers grew. In early June, Pan American’s president, Juan Trippe, joined with Eastern’s Rickenbacker and several other airline executives in an attempt to persuade Tobin and his colleagues to abandon their stand. Trippe said he was “quite distressed” about the Stratocruiser problem, and that he could not believe the commissioners and Tobin “realized what difficult and onerous terms were being imposed upon him” at Idlewild. Cullman said the commissioners were fully aware of those conditions and they would remain until new leases were signed. There was an extensive exchange of unpleasantries. After two sessions, the airlines broke off discussions and condemned the Port Authority. Whiteside announced to the press that the carriers had agreed to pay higher fees for landing their planes, to reduce the frequentlanding discounts, and to permit the charges to be altered every five years. But the Port Authority, Whiteside complained, “offered no concessions or compromises” during the previous five months. Instead, it has “gone barnstorming around the country setting up organizations and talking up changes in landing fee costs. If its plan is put into effect at [Idlewild], it will be a pattern for the rest of the country.” And that, of course, was what Tobin, and his colleagues, and the airport directors around the country now wanted!48
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As the large airlines struggled to operate at overcrowded LaGuardia and on unadorned Idlewild runways, the Port agency and its friends in the press turned the knife a little. In late June the Newark News reported that while the large carriers were pleading poverty, they were paying large sums to legal firms in an attempt to avoid paying their “fair share” of airport costs. In early July, the Herald Tribune noted that a large number of foreign-flag and nonscheduled airlines were now using Idlewild, and that the Authority had already spent $24 million in developing the airport and terminal buildings, which included a restaurant, a bookshop, and twenty other stores. The Port agency “is steadily building Idlewild Airport to a high peak of perfection,” exclaimed a Long Island newspaper; and “the new airport will continue to grow more and more attractive” because of its “unparalleled facilities.” But Trippe and C. R. Smith and Rickenbacker were not allowed in.49
Governor Dewey Intervenes He thought it was a public scandal for the Port Authority to follow such a policy of harassment . . . that the airlines which were being harassed were headed by outstanding businessmen and that they had valid leases which should be honored. —Port Authority memorandum50
During the early months of 1949, Governor Thomas E. Dewey had become increasingly concerned about the conflict between the airlines and the Port Authority. In January, he had said publicly that the issue would soon be resolved, and six months later no real progress had been made. Meanwhile, he had heard that air traffic to New York was declining, that conditions at Idlewild might be unsafe for the giant Stratocruisers now trying to land at that airport, and that the Port Authority had been using “harassment tactics” against the major airlines. On July 19 or 20, Dewey called Commissioner Bayard Pope, a long-time acquaintance whom he had appointed to the Board, expressed these concerns, and said he was going to “settle the airlines dispute.”51 On July 21, Dewey and his Counsel, Charles Breitel, held the first of three long meetings with the Port Authority commissioners, joined by Tobin and a few members of his staff. At this first session, Dewey “delivered a strong and critical statement” about what he called the “harassment policy” of the Port agency. He asked for a copy of the 1945 leases, and he and Breitel scrutinized them and said that they were certain the Port Authority was obliged to provide “some type of terminal facilities” at Idlewild.52
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Commissioner Pope took the lead in responding, arguing that the airlines “had acted in bad faith on the 1945 leases,” and that the Port Authority was “fighting the airlines in the only fashion it knew how,” which was to “withhold services to which the airlines were not entitled under the 1945 leases.” He pointed out that “this same fight was being carried on all over the country.” He disagreed with the Governor’s view that the Port Authority effort was a “public scandal”; rather, it was what must be done, if airports were to become self-supporting. Tobin then asserted that the 1945 leases accepted by New York City were “the most vicious kind of monopolistic documents ever signed by a public agency.”53 Dewey then appeared to modify his views. He agreed the airports should be self-financing, and he opposed “discriminatory landing fees that were noncompensatory”; but he wondered if New York should try to establish a new approach to airport charges on its own. This allowed Tobin to describe the national scope of the problem and to indicate that “all of the forward-looking airport operators” were now rethinking their landing fees and other policies. He also argued that the Port Authority was “making progress” in persuading the airlines to accept new leases, and he suggested that there was no need for Governor Dewey to intervene; and Commissioner Pope agreed. Now Dewey took a critical stance. He said “he did not believe the agency was sincere in wanting to settle the dispute”; and when Pope suggested that Dewey and the Commissioners really did not disagree on desirable policies to end the conflict, Dewey countered, “But I do disagree.” He then argued that “there was plenty of evidence” the Port agency’s position was “wrong”; the newspapers, for example, “have been against the Port Authority.” Not so, Tobin responded, describing supportive editorials. In any event, Dewey concluded, “this argument could not go on any longer,” and he was going to resolve it quickly. It seemed clear that Dewey was committed to piercing the agency’s independence in negotiating with the airlines; the question was, how far would he go in protecting the airlines and therefore, in effect, in forcing the Port Authority to use its funds to meet airport deficits—limiting its ability to take on other projects. The first meeting had lasted only two or three hours, but the second session, held eight days later, took 13 hours. Dewey placed Juan Trippe, C. R. Smith, and other airline executives in one room, and several Port Authority commissioners and Tobin and his aides in another, and Dewey moved back and forth between the hostile groups.54 When Pope and his colleagues argued that “the Commissioners must have the responsibility for deciding how much money would be spent” to operate the airport, the gov-
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ernor resisted. He thought this “did not provide adequate protection to the airlines,” which were concerned that they would be burdened by airport expenditures that “might not be prudent and efficient.” Then the airlines would have no appeal to any outside regulatory body, Dewey argued; unlike the railroads and the airlines, the Port Authority was “answerable only to God.” Tobin’s general counsel disagreed, noting that the governor had the veto power. Dewey responded that “the veto power was more apparent than real.” Shuttling back and forth, Dewey probed the issue of whether the specific fees the Port agency wanted to levy were justified. He told Tobin and his colleagues that the airline executives were “fine, outstanding businessmen”; and when they described the “methods and tactics” which the airlines had been using, Dewey said “he believed the Port Authority was biased in this matter.” Even so, he accepted the general principle that charges to the airlines should be based on actual costs of developing Idlewild over the coming years, not on flat fees that would be fixed for several decades. Finally the governor brought the two sides together to review the “real progress” that he thought had been made, and to “make sure that everyone was in agreement.” But everyone was not in agreement, and the day’s final meeting lasted four more hours. At 11 p.m., Dewey said there was now sufficient consensus that the issue could be concluded in a final session in early August.55 And so it could—in a meeting at Manhattan’s Hotel Roosevelt that began at 2:30 p.m. on August 4, continued through the night without a break, and concluded finally with a draft agreement signed 23 hours later, at 1:30 p.m. on the 5th. At most points, the agreement was a victory for the Port Authority. C. R. Smith, Trippe, and their colleagues agreed to sign new leases with flight fees determined by the actual weight of the planes, and with no discounts for the major airlines linked to their large numbers of flights. And the airlines accepted basic charges for flights, gasoline, and hangars that were far above the 1945 levels, although low enough that for some years the airports were unlikely to be fully self-supporting.56 For Tobin and others familiar with the railroads’ resistance to joint terminals and services, the airlines’ reactions offered an echo of the Port Authority’s early years. For example, when Dewey brought the two sides together, and Tobin’s aides described the plans for consolidated handling of airline baggage, porter services, and incineration, the airline executives objected—arguing that “they should not be consolidated and that the airlines should have the opportunity of providing these services for themselves.” In
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response, Tobin and his staff said that “such consolidation was both efficient and economical and provided the best type of service for the air passengers and the airlines.” Dewey agreed with the Port Authority, as long as the airlines had the right to appeal to an arbitrator if they thought the charges too high.57 In return for the airlines’ willingness to pay higher fees, the Port Authority agreed to seek legislation which would permit it to be sued. The airlines considered this an important step, since their effort to compel the bi-state agency to adhere to their interpretation of the 1945 leases had been frustrated by its immunity to suit. As Tobin understood, however, immunity would soon be eliminated in any event, since both Dewey and his counsel were strongly committed to that change.58 Dewey announced the agreement that afternoon. He noted that the airlines “will pay very much more” under the plan, which required the same fee for every flight, undercutting “the tendency to monopoly” found in the 1945 sliding scale. “I believe,” said the governor, “the rest of the country will follow the pattern of our airport agreement.” Tobin endorsed the result as “a fine, workable agreement.” Juan Trippe praised Dewey for his efforts to bring the two sides together; but the airline executives did not have warm words for the agreement, nor did they express hope that the rest of the nation would embrace the Roosevelt Hotel treaty. However, the New York Times and the Newark News agreed with Dewey that the Idlewild agreement was likely to have a major impact on airport financing and development nationally.59 As it did. Soon after the August 5 settlement, Tobin sent copies of the agreement to airport managers across the country and to federal officials; and their responses suggested that the principles of the “Dewey leases” were likely to govern future bargaining with the air carriers. By September, the airlines had abandoned their old position. O. M. Mosier, who had negotiated the 1945 leases at LaGuardia for American Airlines, acknowledged that the sliding scale was inequitable, and said that perhaps airport contracts should now be set “on a poundage charge . . . such as that used in the recent renegotiation” of the Idlewild leases.60 Reflecting on the conflict decades later, participants were still able to recall the airlines’ misjudgment of Austin Tobin as “at best a talented lawyer . . . pretending ingenuity and courage while . . . engaged in a simple operation of tunnels and bridges,” as well as Tobin’s “sometimes blind hatred for the airlines, because he felt he had been double-crossed.” Beyond these personal tensions and institutional conflicts, however, they could also see, as one airline official put it, that
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settlement of the bitter Port Authority/Airlines dispute literally revolutionized airport development throughout the United States and many countries overseas. . . . It did sever tradition by placing the airport operator as the dominant force. Second, it made possible and encouraged every major airport to become self supporting by requiring the airlines to pay for their own facilities plus a share of the airport’s cost of administration. Third, it meant that financing of large new airports or rebuilding and expanding of old ones was now readily available.
No one lost.61
Legacy of the Progressive Impulse? Somehow . . . it seemed, ruthless men had usurped the government and were now wielding it for their private benefit. . . . Scientific government, the urban reformers believed, would bring opportunity, progress, order, and community. —Robert H. Wiebe, Search for Order, pp. 6, 170
While Wiebe’s comments are addressed to the reform movement of the decades before World War I, his observations seem to apply as well to the airport dramas of three decades later. The Port Authority, created in the Progressive Era, had been designed to function “above politics” and with rational planners and experts at the helm. Unleashed in the mid-1940s from the control of conservative leaders, it had soon joined in a coalition with the airlines, using their preferences and threats to help beat down the resistance of local elected officials, and so gather up the large air terminals—which might then be separated from the patronage, starved resources, and narrow perspectives of their city owners. Now, with three airports in their pocket, Tobin and his associates were able to construct a national coalition of like-minded local officials, and combine that alliance with the Port Authority’s powerful monopoly position—as owner of all the large airfields in the nation’s major air-traffic center—to break the power of the airline monopolists. In this campaign, as in the battle to win control of the region’s airports, the Port Authority showed that its brand of Progressivism was composed of more than a dose of expertise and a portion of political insulation; its leaders seemed to gain strength from adversity, and to exploit political conflict in order to build wider alliances in support of its preferred goals. This was, in Galbraith’s phrasing, an exercise of countervailing power. In the short run it benefited the airports
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and their cities, and in the longer run, as Robert Tuttle points out, the industry as a whole.62 One of the themes of Progressivism is the replacement of untrained officials, often chosen because of their local party service, by well-trained experts; and here the campaign for change, led by Tobin, Buckley, and the emerging AOC, was closely intertwined with the battle against the airlines. Prior to 1948, the typical airport operator was appointed politically and constrained by local political forces; but within the first few months of the AOC’s formation in 1948, its members were exploring issues of cost allocation and other specialized subjects, while pressing for “businesslike” independence for their airfields and their future profession. These aspirations, nurtured by the AOC fellowship, increased the probability that the new funds made available under Idlewild-type leases would be effectively used to develop modern air terminals.63 The spirit of adventure and the “rugged individualism” of Juan Trippe, C. R. Smith, and their fellow airline pioneers have won the admiration of journalists and other writers for decades.64 By the late 1940s, perhaps those individualists had grown too comfortable with measurements of “success” that were more bureaucratic than adventurous: How small could we keep our payments to the airports, so our yearly profits would be nourished from the taxpayer’s pocket? How large would be the mail payments extracted from Uncle Sam? How sharp could we keep the sliding scale and how firm our control over favored hangar space, so competition could be limited to a cozy few? Perhaps the virus of noncompetitive dozing, which infected the American automobile producers in the 1960s, had a trial run at the airlines in the 1940s. If so, the entrepreneurial energy of the Port Authority’s aggressive staff seemed to provide just the right antidote. It is a further irony that the Port Authority’s valued political insulation had to be pierced, in order to end the contentious stalemate that ran for more than a year and a half. Possibly, as Tobin thought, Trippe and his Stratocruiser allies would soon have capitulated without Dewey’s intervention, and then the other air carriers would have fallen into line. But perhaps Tobin would have been mistaken; with a nation-wide pattern at stake, a conflict that had turned personal, and a short-sighted view of how to expand freight and passenger travel, C. R. Smith and his allies might have held out another year or more, with the air travel industry dragging far below its promise. In any event, as the excerpts from the meetings suggest, Dewey’s intervention in this case appears to have been motivated by a desire to locate and
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enforce the “best decision,” one that would allow the airports to be modernized, without depriving the airlines of moneys they needed to fulfill their part of the bargain—expensive new airships, and advertising which would bring throngs of passengers and freight to those new air terminals. The first Republican governor of New York since Nathan Miller had signed the bill creating the Port Authority in 1921, Dewey was basically an admirer of the agency, and an advocate of efficient and effective government generally. So Tobin and his colleagues had a sort of “thirteenth commissioner” in this case, and the result was one they could embrace.65 A few months later they would feel quite differently, when Dewey’s intervention appeared to be—and probably was—motivated by “low politics”; then his position had to be confronted and if possible overturned. But that is a portion of the Manhattan bus terminal story, to which we turn in chapter 13.
13 More Than “A Humdrum Job of Engineering” Creating a Giant Bus Station in Manhattan
The Port Authority Bus Terminal will promptly be taken for granted, with little thought that this piece of progress did not happen quite automatically. It took years of struggle. —New York Herald Tribune, editorial, Nov. 3, 1950
T
he campaign for a large interstate bus terminal began as a fairly straightforward problem of urban and regional planning. By the early 1930s, with the Hudson River now spanned by bridge and tunnel, bus routes offering direct service from the suburbs of New Jersey were established, and several hundred travelers entered Manhattan by bus each day. They either crossed the Hudson via the George Washington Bridge, six miles north of midtown, or they came through the Holland Tunnel, far below the midtown area; then the buses proceeded slowly for several miles along congested streets to bus stops scattered between 34th Street and 51st Street. For those who lived near suburban railroad stations the rail option was faster, and for many others, the automobile was far preferable. Once the first tube of the Lincoln Tunnel was completed in 1937, and connecting highways in New Jersey were improved, bus travel to midtown Manhattan became more attractive. By 1939, the earlier trickle of interstate buses had grown to 1,500 buses each day, most of them emerging from the Lincoln tube at 39th Street and Tenth Avenue; then they spread across the midtown area to eight separate bus stations, with street stops enroute, blocking traffic and adding to the general congestion visited upon mid-Manhattan by automobiles and trucks. Soon after the Lincoln opened, traffic planners for the city and at the Port Authority began to realize that these problems could be dramatically eased if a single bus station were constructed near the Manhattan mouth of the Tunnel, and if all the interstate bus companies terminated their trips at the unified station, abandoning their scattered bus terminals. Working initially with 315
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Mayor LaGuardia and Robert Moses, the Port Authority studied the idea of building and operating a unified bus terminal, agreed to build it, and then found itself embroiled in a series of battles over five years with those who opposed its efforts—including the Greyhound Bus Company, Robert Moses, key legislators in Albany, and New York’s Governor Dewey. In 1950, the project was finally completed. The result was, in Lewis Mumford’s view, a building that is “a humdrum job of engineering concealed behind a mask of wholly perfunctory masonry.”1 But that aesthetic judgment should not conceal the bus terminal’s strengths—providing faster trips into Manhattan for commuters and others traveling by bus, reducing traffic congestion on midtown streets, and intermixing passenger waiting areas with a variety of stores and other concessions, which would generate revenue needed to help the huge terminal become self-supporting. The evolution of this complex urban structure from concept to reality allows us to examine important facets of the mixture of rational planning and adroit political maneuvering that became the Port Authority’s hallmark in the Tobin era. And it brings into focus once again the complex ethical/ political terrain government officials must often traverse when they seek support from state legislators and others whose lives are heavily immersed in patronage politics, diverting them from the efficient achievement of some larger public purpose.
From Many Terminals to One? We believe that the [traffic] problem can and will be measurably relieved by a midtown union bus terminal. —Robert Moses, 1944
The steps leading to the Port Authority bus terminal began in 1939, when Mayor LaGuardia responded to concerns about growing bus traffic and congestion by appointing a Committee on Interstate Buses. That committee recommended that those behemoths be banned from the midtown area, and that their street routes and stations be limited to locations west of Eighth Avenue. Since offices and shopping areas were located mainly between Third and Seventh Avenues, this restriction would make interstate buses less convenient for bus travelers. However, the time lost by the typical passenger would be quite modest, and the interstate bus companies would see benefits
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in time savings and labor costs if they could drop off all passengers near the Lincoln Tunnel exit.2 After further study, New York City’s governing body passed a resolution in 1940 temporarily banning construction of new bus stations in the midtown area, and private entrepreneur Harold McGraw said his firm might construct a large bus terminal for interstate passengers, west of Eighth Avenue. Gasoline rationing and curtailed wartime traffic blocked that effort for the next three years, and early in 1944 McGraw announced that even with postwar traffic recovery, he did not believe a union bus terminal would be economically feasible for private capital.
The Port Authority’s Plans Mayor LaGuardia then turned to the Port Authority, which had taken part in the 1939 study, and asked that it carry out a full analysis of the union terminal idea. Tobin and his colleagues agreed to do so, and New York State provided funds to underwrite the planning effort. The project won the warm endorsement of the City’s top transportation official, Robert Moses: “We believe that the [traffic] problem can and will be measurably relieved by a midtown union bus terminal to be carried out by public enterprise through the joint co-operation of the City of New York and the Port Authority.”3 By June 1944, the Port Authority had sketched out plans for a large bus station between Eighth and Ninth Avenues, with a connecting set of ramps and bridges over four streets, leading from the Lincoln Tunnel; the system would permit most interstate buses to go directly to the terminal, without crossing city streets (see map). It was estimated that shifting all the interstate buses from existing routes and scattered midtown stations would reduce traffic congestion equal to adding two or three additional crosstown thoroughfares.4 To persuade all the bus companies to move from their separate stations into the new terminal, the city would have to agree that no bus terminals could in the future be built or expanded in the midtown area. Without that prohibition, the Port agency argued, the interstate bus companies would be reluctant to sign contracts to use the Eighth Avenue terminal, since their competitors might later be able to build or enlarge terminals in more centrally located areas. Moreover, this restriction was essential to ensure that the Eighth Avenue terminal would have enough passengers to generate substantial rental and concession income—in time making the giant project selfsupporting. That goal was crucial to the Port agency’s thinking about this project, as it was in airport planning.5
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13-1. Before: the eight bus terminals in mid-Manhattan in the 1940s, and the streets (shown in gray) which were heavily used by buses from the Lincoln Tunnel. After: the route that all interstate buses would use to reach the terminal proposed by the Port Authority in 1944.
Greyhound Dissents Mayor LaGuardia agreed with the Port Authority’s approach, and the only significant obstacle was the Greyhound Corporation, the nation’s largest bus company. Greyhound insisted that it retain, and later have the option to expand, its bus terminal at 34th Street between Seventh and Eighth—a location convenient to much of midtown. Though concerned about the loss of income
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13-2. Proposed ramps and overpasses, Lincoln Tunnel to the bus terminal
if Greyhound were not included, Tobin said that his agency could still build the union terminal, as long as Greyhound agreed not to compete with the Port Authority’s project by attracting other bus companies to use the Greyhound station. But Greyhound resisted that restriction on its competitive opportunities, and Robert Moses, representing Mayor LaGuardia, endorsed the Port Authority’s position and criticized Greyhound’s “go it alone” stance.6 During the winter of 1944–45, Greyhound explored the question of leasing space in the Eighth Avenue terminal but decided not to do so. Meanwhile, the Port Authority met with more than two dozen other bus companies that carried interstate passengers into mid-Manhattan, and by late April, most had agreed to take space in the new bus station. Greyhound’s continued status as a “hold out” led Mayor LaGuardia to criticize its actions and to reaffirm his position—that only one terminal, west of Eighth Avenue, should be used by interstate buses.7 At this point, in the spring of 1945, a straightforward planning and construction project began to mutate into a complex array of political endeavors, whose three main phases are described below. The first and longest was the battle to win the city action needed to make the project financially feasible, against the sustained opposition of Greyhound—which soon persuaded Robert Moses to reverse his position and become Greyhound’s ally. The sec-
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ond was the effort to relocate those who lived and worked in the large block where the bus terminal would be built, so the existing buildings could be demolished. And the third, focused on construction of the terminal, involved a campaign led by influential legislators to coerce the Port Authority to award construction contracts to those with political influence, rather than using objective performance criteria. All three phases, in different ways, pressed against the “efficiency and economy” standards to which this child of the Progressive Era attempted to adhere.
Commissioner Moses Tries to Block the Terminal And to Greyhound’s aid came Bob. As a result, the City Planning Commission, a body that is very often the object of special Moses pressure, yesterday voted down the zoning proposal and upheld the cause of private enterprise and traffic congestion. —New York Post, editorial, May 2, 1946
Until the spring of 1945, Robert Moses had been counted as a friend of the Port Authority’s bus-terminal plans. In early May, however, he used his position as a member of the City Planning Commission to begin a complex set of maneuvers that in time threatened to destroy the project. His first step, in May 1945, was to propose to his fellow Planning Commissioners that the City’s zoning regulations be amended: the power to review bus-terminal expansion proposals, then held by the Board of Standards and Appeals, would be transferred to the planners’ office. In view of the wide impact of bus routes and terminals on the City’s development, this change appeared logical; and LaGuardia, who was firmly committed to the Port Authority’s approach, described it as “the initial step” in accomplishing that project. But here LaGuardia misjudged his Machiavellian adviser; to Moses, this was the first step in a very different direction.8 After a public hearing, the Planning Commission then adopted a zoning resolution which would give it control over designating “exceptionally congested traffic areas,” in which new or enlarged bus terminals would be prohibited; and the City’s governing board (the Board of Estimate) approved that new power in an October vote. A few weeks later, the Planning Commission held a hearing to gather information on which areas should be given the new designation, and the Port Authority urged that the midtown area east of Eighth Avenue be included. The Commission then sat down to work out its bus-exclusion plan.9
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Greyhound Benefits Meanwhile, Greyhound prepared a new proposal to expand its terminal and sent a copy to the Planning Commission for its review. Now Moses emerged in a new light. Writing to the Port Authority chairman in October 1945, Moses asserted that the Greyhound project would reduce traffic congestion and therefore the bi-state agency should not oppose it. Moreover, to block Greyhound would be “grossly unfair,” he argued, since it was “merely proposing to extend a non-conforming use” already authorized by the courts. In a public meeting two days later, Moses also suggested that it would be foolish for the Planning Commission to oppose Greyhound’s expansion by using the new zoning standard, since the bus company would take the case to court and quite possibly win.10 Moses now thought he might be able to bend Tobin to his will by using his considerable persuasive skills. So he invited the Port Authority’s staff director to his office, where Tobin also found two officials of the Greyhound Corporation on hand. “This is the way we’re going to do it,” Moses reportedly explained; and he outlined a plan which would give the Port Authority all the small interstate companies, while Greyhound expanded its terminal (presumably with the option to rent space to the other long-distance carriers). Moses also proposed that, in constructing its large terminal, the Port Authority make use of his own preferred engineering firm. Tobin rejected the division with Greyhound, since it would undermine the economic feasibility of the Eighth Avenue terminal, and he turned down the second proposal as well.11 Moses’ motivations in pursuing this campaign are not entirely clear. It is possible that he was genuinely aggrieved for Greyhound; that was the interpretation he suggested in 1978, when he handed me his October 1945 letter to Cullman (quoted above). It is likely that Moses was also motivated by displeasure with the prospect that the Port Authority would be expanding further into “Moses country.” The bi-state agency wanted to build the world’s largest bus terminal in mid-Manhattan; during the fall it began construction of a huge truck terminal in lower Manhattan; and in October 1945, the Bartholomew Report suggested that the Port Authority consider taking control of Newark Airport and of New York City’s air terminals as well. A close acquaintance of Moses stated this point more strongly, in a confidential interview a few years later: “He hates the Port Authority because it does, and does well, all the things he would like to do himself—builds bridges, tunnels, bus terminals. Hence, he always tries to block it and get those functions for himself.”12
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Some of those who were directly involved in the battle saw evidence that led them to believe there was a more personal motivation still—that those friendly to the Greyhound interest had provided some benefits to Moses, in return for his support for their cause. Nor did they think this was the only lapse from principle in Moses’ recent record; senior Port Authority officials believed that Moses obtained payments from engineering firms and banks, in return for giving them contracts and other benefits generated by his many construction jobs. Those with evidence of these allegations would describe them to Port Authority officials, but “nobody will say anything publicly” because Moses is “so powerful.” Perhaps this is an area in which Robert Caro is too generous to the great man.13
Lee Jaffe and the Newspapers Counterattack Whatever mix of motives engaged Moses, the Port Authority knew by the fall of 1945 that it faced a battle. Austin Tobin called in several of his top aides— chief planner Walter Hedden, chief engineer John Evans, and the agency’s director of public relations, Lee Jaffe—and explained that “Bob Moses is against us. I’m not sure we can beat him.” The main strategy agreed upon was to marshal evidence on midtown traffic conditions and present it in face-to-face meetings with reporters and their editorial boards. Hedden’s staff compiled information on traffic congestion on various streets, as well as police reports of accidents and delays; and Lee Jaffe’s staff took photographs that dramatized street congestion and other scenes (“long lines of people waiting on sidewalks and in the street, for the buses, often in rain and snow,” as one member of the team recalls). With these materials in hand, Jaffe now turned her attention to educating the newspapers—and through them the general public—on the benefits of the bus terminal. Detailed reports of congestion, photos of snow-encrusted commuters at bus stops, and other materials of interest were sent to “the editors, the drama critics, the columnists.” Jaffe and her aides met with members of the editorial boards and reporters at the New York Times, the Herald Tribune and other newspapers, and in these sessions they reviewed in detail the advantages of the proposed bus terminal, and they also discussed Moses’ change of heart and his close ties to Greyhound.14 The results of these efforts began to appear in the early weeks of 1946, while the City Planning Commission deliberated on the bus-exclusion issue. In January, the Herald Tribune, the New York Times, and the Sun endorsed the Port Authority’s plan, and the Bergen Evening Record soon followed suit.15
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However, on December 31, 1945, LaGuardia’s term as mayor had ended, and with it his ability to shape city policies on bus-traffic congestion. The delays at the Planning Commission had strengthened Moses’ hand; with LaGuardia gone, he might find it easier to persuade his fellow Commissioners to accept Greyhound’s plans. Moreover, LaGuardia’s successor, William O’Dwyer, had already shown his willingness to rely on Moses’ advice, endorsing his plan to create a separate City Airport Authority; so his ideas on traffic congestion and bus terminals might also win O’Dwyer’s support. Early in January, 1946, the City Planning Commission appeared to be moving toward a vote favorable to the Port Authority, with Moses as a lone dissenter; and the Herald Tribune expressed confidence that Mayor O’Dwyer would “soon speak up” in support of the midtown bus prohibition. The Port Authority’s allies in Albany and Trenton then introduced legislation to permit the bi-state agency to construct the Eighth Avenue terminal. But the Planning Commission did not act during February, and it did not act in March; and Mayor O’Dwyer remained in limbo, perhaps hoping—like Dickens’ Mr. Micawber—that “something would turn up” to save him from a difficult situation. The New York Times protested his silence, arguing that “the city’s business and citizens have a right to know how the Mayor stands on this issue,” and urging that O’Dwyer take “a strong position of leadership” in order to advance this “project of tremendous benefit.”16 Meanwhile, bills authorizing the Port Authority to build a bus terminal ran into vigorous opposition in both states. In Albany, the railroads—which viewed the bus station as a competitor with unfair tax advantages—sought to block it until the Port Authority was forced to pay full taxes on this terminal and its other properties. They were joined by one business group from New York City, and it appeared that Moses and Greyhound were active in encouraging these opponents. The Port Authority marshaled support among other business associations, and with the leadership of key Republican legislators and Governor Dewey, the New York bill was finally approved in both houses in late March.17 Railroad interests also protested in Trenton, and the opposition was led by a state senator whose main source of income was his job as a salaried railroad employee. With support from Governor Edge, and assistance from the Port agency’s own commissioners, the legislative leaders fought off the railroad lobbyists, and final approval was assured when the State Senate passed the bill by a one-vote margin in early April. By mid-April, both governors had signed the new law, and the Port Authority stood poised to act, as soon as the midtown prohibition was approved.18
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The Planners Succumb The City Planning Commission met three times in April, but Commissioner Moses successfully urged that it delay a vote while he tried to find a “compromise.” Mayor O’Dwyer still remained silent; his position on the issue was viewed as “something of a mystery.” The new mayor was already showing signs of the “Hamlet-like introspection and indecision” that would mark his six years in office.19 And then, on May 1, 1946, the City Planning Commission did act—voting 5–2 not to designate any areas in Manhattan from which bus terminals would be excluded. Following that vote, the Commission scheduled a public hearing on a new proposal, which would give it the power to approve expansions of bus terminals in “congested areas.” Moreover, O’Dwyer now reclaimed his voice, offering an elusive, partial endorsement for the Moses/ Greyhound position.20 At the Planning Commission hearing, held June 12, no witnesses endorsed its proposal to enlarge its own powers, and a dozen appeared in opposition. However, Moses now commanded a majority at the Commission, and it soon adopted the proposal. The Board of Estimate then blocked the plan, and the Commission responded by hiring two consultants with longstanding ties to Moses, asking them to provide a new assessment of traffic congestion in the City. Their report, completed in November, endorsed the Greyhound expansion plan, which might (they said) actually reduce congestion in the midtown area.21 Moses and his fellow Planning Commissioners promptly forwarded that report to the Board of Estimate, with their endorsement. Meanwhile, Greyhound reaffirmed its plans to spend $10 million to modernize and expand its 34th Street terminal.22
The Mayor Shifts His Allegiance Once the City Planning Commission had embraced the Moses position, the Port Authority’s friends in the newspaper world took direct aim at both. “Moses Wins, We Lose,” the New York Post proclaimed. The New York WorldTelegram, which Moses had contacted in the hope of generating some support for his cause, argued that “public confidence in the City Planning Commission has been dealt a bad blow”; the newspaper questioned in its headline whether these were “Planners for City or Bus Companies.” The Times and the Sun agreed, and the Herald Tribune called the decision “a major blunder.”23
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A few hours after the Commission’s May 1 vote, Port Authority chairman Cullman announced that his agency was suspending its studies of the bus problem and returning the state planning funds to Albany. “Evidently O’Dwyer does not seem to want a bus terminal,” he commented.24 Soon LaGuardia joined the attack, characterizing the May decision of Moses and his fellow commissioners as a “flip-flop” and a “betrayal of the public interest.” And in mid-June, the World-Telegram pressed the issue further, wondering whether the issue of “where Greyhound gets its special power and influence” should become a matter for a special investigation.25 The drumfire of newspaper attacks on the City Planning Commission and its concern for the Greyhound Company’s interests continued in the summer and into the fall. Meanwhile, the Port Authority’s commissioners and staff made contact with the Regional Plan Association and other civic and business groups which monitored development in Manhattan, and they too joined in criticizing the Moses approach and the passive attitude of the city administration.26 Mayor O’Dwyer found it uncomfortable to disagree with Commissioner Moses; but relying on Moses to resolve the bus-terminal issue had damaged O’Dwyer’s reputation. The mayor had remained silent as the conflict built during the spring; and then, just before the crucial May 1 vote, he had flown to California for a golfing vacation. In the weeks after that Moses victory, O’Dwyer had been castigated personally by newspaper editorial boards for remaining “aloof” when leadership was needed, for lacking the courage to “stand up against the opposition” of Greyhound and Moses, and for a “ridiculous” stance in calling for “more traffic surveys” instead of action. The behavior of the Planning Commission suggested to some that O’Dwyer was not in charge; Moses appeared to be the “Super Mayor of New York City.”27 Meanwhile, O’Dwyer’s faith in the vision and adroitness of his chief policy adviser was shaken during the summer by Moses’ failure in the airport battle, and during the fall O’Dwyer began to confer with the Port Authority on modernizing the City’s air terminals.28 As those discussions went forward, the bus-terminal issue came up as well, and by early December O’Dwyer told Tobin he was ready to endorse a resolution prohibiting bus-terminal expansion in midtown. Learning of the mayor’s “defection,” Moses’ aides then tried to convince a member of the Port Authority board to break ranks with his fellow commissioners and work out a new proposal which he and Moses could take to O’Dwyer. But that ploy was unsuccessful.29 By the close of 1946, the flow of interstate buses which struggled through midtown streets had grown to 2,500 a day, and the Moses approach had gained
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little support among the city’s other elected officials. O’Dwyer decided it was time to abandon this battle, and Moses’ decision to take a vacation abroad in late January offered the mayor an opportunity to act without Moses’ heavy hand on his shoulder. Interrupting the regular agenda of the Board of Estimate meeting on January 30, 1947, O’Dwyer introduced a resolution which would override the Planning Commission, and which would block future Greyhound expansion and any other bus-terminal construction east of Eighth Avenue. The resolution was adopted without dissent.30 O’Dwyer had conferred with Cullman and Tobin before the meeting, and they were ready with a statement as soon as the vote was announced. The Port Authority would “go forward immediately” with plans to construct a $17 million terminal at Eighth Avenue, Cullman said, and he felt sure that the terminal would be operating “inside of two years.” The infectious optimism of Julius Henry Cohen still survived.31 And so did O’Dwyer’s reputation, aided by the Port Authority’s readiness to give thanks to the Mayor for ending the period of drift. The New York Times thought that the Mayor deserved “much of the credit” for the Board’s action, and the Bergen Record praised the way he “quietly took command” and “planned his coup.” His leadership was extolled by the other newspapers as well.32 But Commissioner Moses was not pleased.
Greyhound’s Faithful Friend The defeat Moses experienced in January 1947 might have seemed final to most political leaders. But Moses suffered defeat much as he suffered fools, which was not gladly. After all, the Board of Estimate action was a mere resolution, not one of those famous bond contracts which were protected by the U.S. Constitution. So Moses and his allies pressed ahead again and again, seeking ways to undermine the city’s midtown prohibition. Even as the Port Authority relocated the tenants, and demolished the structures on the site, and floated bonds to finance the enterprise, even as it constructed and completed and began operating the Eighth Avenue Bus Terminal—for those four years and two more beyond—Moses and his favorite bus company fought with all the cunning he could muster, hoping to win approval for Greyhound to expand its 34th Street bus station, perhaps doubling its capacity. The Moses-Greyhound efforts from 1947 to 1953, and the countering tactics by Tobin and his colleagues, deserve brief review. They illustrate a range of strategies that skilled infighters can use to gain their goals, and the importance of sustained “political intelligence” in neutralizing the political strength of
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one’s opponents—a factor which can yield success even against the tactical skills of a Robert Moses. The place to begin, however, is with incentives. Once the city’s top governing body, the Board of Estimate, had endorsed the midtown prohibition on bus terminals, and the Port Authority had begun work on the project, why did Greyhound and Moses continue the fight? The Greyhound Company appears to have been motivated mainly by a brand of individualistic, competitive zeal. To stand alone, operating its own major terminal in the center of the nation’s largest city, would underscore its position as the nation’s premier bus company. In contrast, to accept a position in the Port Authority’s terminal would suggest that Greyhound was merely one of 30 bus carriers, a tenant in a government building. Moreover, the Port agency would design the bus terminal to maximize efficiency in passenger and bus movement, and it would try to maximize the revenues that it—not Greyhound—could obtain from passengers, stores, and other businesses in the terminal. Most important, if Greyhound accepted the move, it would lose the crucial advantage of proximity to Macy’s and the shopping areas near Herald Square.33 Greyhound’s reluctance to accept the Port Authority’s rational-planning model—which the agency thought was essential for this massive project—is reminiscent of the attitude of railroad executives toward the Port Authority’s union-terminal scheme and unified lighterage plans in the 1920s, as well as the efforts of Pan Am and other air carriers to maintain their preferred gate locations and other advantages at LaGuardia and at airports across the country. It was the capitalistic ethos at work.34 Greyhound’s resistance was enlivened and its chances for success made promising by its alliance with Moses, whose ability to work his wiles had been demonstrated time and again in New York’s recent history. But what persuaded Moses to carry on the fight? His primary motivations have been suggested already: Possibly he felt that Greyhound, having constructed the 34th Street station and then having purchased nearby lots for expansion, was justified in its request to build the larger terminal. Also, as he argued, it was conceivable that an expanded Greyhound terminal could reduce congestion in midtown. Then there were the special benefits which Greyhound may have provided to Moses and his favored engineering firm, benefits that would increase if that firm could take charge of constructing the larger building. Perhaps, however, the antagonism that Moses felt toward the Port Authority by 1948 overwhelmed all other reasons and drove him most fiercely. That conclusion has to be based on conjecture, but it is reasonable conjecture:
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When Moses first teamed up with Greyhound, in 1945, the Port Authority was no more than a potential invader in “Moses country”; it had begun to sketch out plans to build a Manhattan bus terminal, and a consultant to the City of Newark had suggested it might be the best agency to operate the region’s airports. But during the next two years, its incursions had become more salient. While fighting to win approval for the bus terminal, its agents had undercut Moses’ influence with Mayor O’Dwyer and with Moses’ own allies among newspaper editors. In Albany, where Moses’ ability to win was widely acknowledged, the intruder had teamed up with leading Republicans to undermine his effort to kill the bus-terminal legislation; and the combined Port Authority/newspaper campaign had made one of Moses’ influential arms, the Planning Commission, a laughing-stock among serious students of city planning. Moreover, in 1947 the Port Authority took control of LaGuardia, Idlewild, and Newark airports; and Moses’ own competing creature, the City Airport Authority, had first been ridiculed and then killed. Would it not be fitting retribution if Moses could find some way for Greyhound to build its great new terminal at 34th Street near Seventh Avenue? Would it not be an even greater pleasure if Greyhound won that right after the Port agency had invested millions in the Eighth Avenue structure—only to see that project plunge toward financial disaster as Greyhound and the companies it could attract to its modernized 34th Street station stayed away from the distant Port Authority terminal, and then, faced with law suits by other bus firms which wanted the same right to build that had been accorded Greyhound, the city fathers abandoned the midtown restriction altogether? This might be motivation enough to drive a man who hated to lose—to keep him working on the task while the Port Authority terminal was constructed and then opened, at the end of 1950, and then onward into the early 1950s, until Moses finally abandoned Greyhound in 1953 and silently admitted defeat. Turning from motivations—and conjecture—to actions, the evolution of this bus-terminal conflict can be briefly summarized. In 1947, once the Board of Estimate approved the bus-exclusion zone, the Port Authority purchased all the parcels in the block between 40th and 41st Streets, running west from Eighth to Ninth Avenues, sold $16 million in bonds to finance the project, and completed detailed construction plans. That fall, apparently bowing to the inevitable, Greyhound’s president announced that his company was abandoning its plans to build a larger bus station on 34th Street.35 During 1948 and 1949, the Port agency cleared the site, poured the foundation, and began to erect the steel skeleton for the huge building. In these two years, Greyhound raised its head only once, in 1948, sending Mayor
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O’Dwyer an informal proposal which outlined a plan for improved off-street parking for the buses near its 34th Street terminal. Asked to comment, Tobin pointed out that the proposal would in effect double the bus capacity of the terminal, and the trial balloon was quietly withdrawn. Early in 1950, Moses opened a new campaign, sending to the Board of Estimate a Greyhound proposal to close its smaller bus station at 50th Street and to consolidate operations at 34th Street; that terminal would therefore need to increase its bus berths from 8 to 19. To make the proposal more appealing, Greyhound said it would add 770 parking spaces for cars on the roof, thus helping to meet the City’s severe parking shortage; Moses thought the plan deserved careful study. Tobin dispatched his chief legal aide on New York City problems, Rosaleen Skehan, to talk with city officials; Lee Jaffe made contact with the editors of the Herald Tribune and other newspapers; and the agency’s top planner, Walter Hedden, met with officials of the Regional Plan Association and other civic groups. The Moses-Greyhound plan soon faced a barrage of public criticism, and O’Dwyer and his colleagues were urged to adhere to the “promise solemnly voted” in 1947; if they allowed Greyhound to proceed, “their pledged word of honor would be suspect from that day forward.”36 Caught between his 1947 commitment to the Port Authority and Moses’ insistence that the benefits of the new Greyhound plan deserved close study, Mayor O’Dwyer struggled. He asked the City Planning Commission to look at the proposal; he thought the Traffic Commission should consider it; he met with Port Authority officials and explained that he didn’t want to break his earlier pledge but he thought the parking problem was so severe that he needed to look at every option. And while he struggled, the Traffic Commission—of which the ubiquitous Moses was a member, by appointment of Mayor O’Dwyer—held a confidential session in early March and invited Greyhound to present its plan. By then the chorus of opposition in the media and business community was too great, however, and the Traffic Commission rejected the Greyhound plan in late March. The Planning Commission did the same in the middle of April, and the Board of Estimate followed suit in late April, 1950—with O’Dwyer commenting ruefully on the impressive support which the news media had given to the Port Authority’s position. Even Moses joined the opposition, because, he said, it seemed clear that the new Greyhound plan would increase traffic in the area around 34th Street. The 1947 pledge weighed not at all with him or the majority of the Traffic Commission, so a different Greyhound expansion plan, which might reduce traffic in the area, was still a possibility.37
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Meanwhile, with public attention focused on the Greyhound plan, Moses searched for another way to defeat the Port Authority. In the early weeks of 1950 he drafted a bill to create a New York City Parking Authority, which would take control of parking-meter revenues and parking fines and use the funds to build “badly needed” parking garages. As introduced by his allies in the state legislature, the bill gave the new agency the power to build garages and “any kind of terminal,” and its projects would be exempt from existing zoning laws and from review by the Board of Estimate. Monitoring draft legislation in Albany, Tobin’s aides located the bill and realized that it could be used to achieve the Moses-Greyhound goal: Greyhound could sell its 34th Street property to the new agency at cost, and the Authority could then lease it to Greyhound, which would agree to build a parking garage for automobiles—with room for a large flow of buses as well! Created as an independent state agency, the Parking Authority could argue that it was not bound by any pledges given by the Board of Estimate.38 When he learned about the bill, Tobin called O’Dwyer’s deputy mayor, who agreed that the Parking Authority’s activities ought to be reviewable by the Board of Estimate; but the deputy later called to say that it was too late; an attempt to add an amendment now “might endanger the passage of the Parking Authority bill.” Alerted to the problem by the Port Authority, the New York Times agreed that the legislation was “very broad in its terms.” But “surely,” the Times opined, “men of good will can sit down for an hour or two . . . [and] take the bugs out of the bill.”39 Such men seemed in short supply in city government just then, so Tobin and his commissioners appealed to Governor Dewey and their own legislative allies in Albany. Before passage, the Parking Authority bill was modified, requiring that its projects conform to the January 1947 bus-restriction resolution. Thus ended Moses’ 1950 efforts on behalf of Greyhound.40 The state legislature reconvened in January 1951, and Moses then tried to insert phrasing in the Parking Authority law that would lift the bus restriction. When they learned about the stratagem, Tobin and Jaffe alerted their friends at the World-Telegram and Sun and the Herald Tribune, which publicly attacked the Moses maneuver; then Tobin and Commissioner Bayard Pope, who was influential in state Republican politics, met with the mayor, who soon disavowed the proposal and ensured that it was dropped in Albany.41 Moses attempted to insert the same kind of amendment to the Parking Authority law in 1953, but that ploy was blocked by the Port Authority’s friends in the state legislature. By now Moses and Tobin were beginning to confer on more promising ground, holding the early discussions that would
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lead to a large, cooperative highway program in 1954–55. It was time for Moses to leave the field of battle, and in 1953 he abandoned Greyhound to its own terminal efforts. Cast adrift, Greyhound tried for several years to persuade the city’s elected leaders to permit it to expand its 34th street station or build a new terminal nearby. On each occasion, newspaper editorials and major business associations in Manhattan would sound the alarm, and the bus-exclusion resolution was reaffirmed. Finally, in May 1962, Greyhound agreed to abandon both its 34th and its 50th Street bus stations, and to began life at new quarters, in the Port Authority Bus Terminal. By the summer of 1963 Greyhound’s buses were no longer struggling down city streets; they had joined the crowd, moving swiftly up the special ramps from the Lincoln Tunnel to 15 new berths in the Port Authority building.42 A decade later, when Robert Caro described Robert Moses’ long career, and analyzed in rich detail his battles, victories, and defeats, he paused at the year 1953 and reflected on the encounters thus far between the Port Authority and Moses. Caro wrote: “Since O’Dwyer had handed it Idlewild in 1946, every ensuing confrontation between the two giant ‘public benefit corporations’ had resulted in a Moses victory.”43 The defeat for Moses in the bus-terminal confrontation is not counted in this assessment; indeed, that long battle does not appear to be mentioned in Caro’s book at all. Yet this struggle was a crucial chapter in the relationships between these two regional governments in the 1940s and early 1950s. The other important conflict during those years, providing some measure of the ability of each side to get its way, is the contest over control of the region’s airports, described in chapter 11, where Moses lost again. There was not much else for Caro to tally.44
What To Do with the Families Argument, bonus offers and pleas have made no impression upon the residents of the rickety tenement houses in the district. They say they have no place else to go and they have refused to move. —Newark News, April 30, 1948
Once the Board of Estimate had approved the bus-exclusion resolution, in January 1947, the Port Authority’s real-estate and legal staffs began the task of acquiring the property in the large block where the bus terminal would rise, as well as the land needed for the ramps and roadways from the Lincoln Tun-
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nel, several long blocks to the west. Portions of the land and buildings were occupied by a utility substation and by 140 other industrial and commercial shops and plants (a meat store, for example, laundries, and a tailor shop). To gain control of these properties at reasonable cost, the acquisition team used a variety of negotiating and condemnation strategies, recalling the TobinPallmé efforts of the early 1930s. By the fall of 1947, most of the area was in the hands of the bi-state agency, and the shop-owners and other enterprises had moved to other quarters.45 Far more challenging was the problem of relocating the 640 families who lived in buildings to be demolished and replaced by the terminals and approach ramps. During the spring, the Port Authority offered $150 to those who agreed to move, plus the equivalent of two months rent. Tobin and his aides had expected these tenants would soon find alternative apartments, which would permit demolition of the old structures late in 1947 and completion of the bus terminal by the early weeks of 1949. However, months went by with few departures, and at the start of November, only six of the 640 families had found new apartments. The others, pleading lack of alternative housing at rents they could afford, were still living on the site and resisting the pleas to move.46
The Moses Strategy During the late 1940s, Robert Moses and other highway-builders developed an effective array of tactics to put an end to this kind of resistance, and they applied the strategy both in road-building and in urban renewal programs. The basic approach was to send eviction notices to tenants, giving them a few weeks to move, together with a modest sum to assist with relocation costs— and a warning that they would be forced out if they did not leave voluntarily, and soon.47 Because of his impatience to “get things done,” his wide-ranging influence with New York City’s elected officials and at Albany, and the control over construction funds available through his Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, Moses became the exemplar of “slum clearance efficiency.” In these years, most of his efforts were aided and abetted by the press, and passively accepted by the region’s business organizations. For when Moses sought to clear poor people from “slum housing,” he faced no organization with the financial and intellectual resources of the Port Authority, and no adversary with the press contacts and the public-relations skills of Lee Jaffe.48 During the years 1945–52, thousands of New York City residents, mainly poor, were evicted from their homes, so that new highways, housing, and of-
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fice buildings could be constructed. Sometimes the eviction notices were sent through the mail, but not always. In the Manhattantown project, on the Upper West Side, families learned about Moses’ plans via notices tacked to their doorways which carried this message: demolition of this building will be started at once. tenants must vacate. for information, call relocation office, cor. of west 100th street.
But that office had no information regarding vacancies in existing apartments or other help in finding where else one might live. In East Tremont, in The Bronx, the 1,500 families in the path of the proposed Cross-Bronx Expressway received eviction notices which gave them ninety days to vacate, and no assistance in finding new living quarters.49 When tenants resisted leaving by the announced date, Moses applied the next stage of his strategy. As individual housing units were vacated, demolition teams were sent into the apartments, and windows and walls were smashed. If this did not persuade those living above and next door to depart, boards were hammered across doorways and windows, forcing the tenants onto the street. Where they went was “of no concern” to Moses and his aides.50
Tobin Tries a Different Way Tobin and his aides were impatient to begin construction of the bus terminal, but when monetary incentives failed to budge most of the tenants, they searched for an alternative to the traditional route of eviction notices followed by court-enforced ouster. During the fall and winter of 1947–48, Tobin’s staff made contact with realty firms which had experience in the low-income rental market and negotiated contracts with 92 agents, providing them with $100 for every tenant they successfully relocated to a new apartment. The Port Authority also agreed to redecorate the new apartments at its own expense.51 These steps had some effect, but at the end of March 1948, more than 550 tenants and their families still remained. “Many of them were very old,” Lee Jaffe recalled; “many never went out onto the street.” There were rats; the walls were dirty; but this was “all they had and they were afraid to leave it.” Also, there were ‘’38 houses of prostitution,” one staff member commented, and persuading the prostitutes to move any distance from their familiar source of clients was not easy. Moreover, there was an acute housing shortage in New York City in the late 1940s, and the real-estate agents were able to locate few apartments within the rental range that most of the tenants could afford. In
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early May, the Port Authority announced that the “difficulty in relocating tenants” had now caused a year’s delay in completing the terminal.52 Meanwhile, Tobin had asked Harvey Quigel, who directed the agency’s real estate department, to explore other strategies the agency could use. Quigel suggested that the Port Authority purchase a number of vacant apartment buildings, rehabilitate them, and offer them to the tenants. Tobin and the commissioners agreed with this plan, and by the end of May, both state legislatures had authorized the bi-state agency to make a temporary foray into the real-estate business.53 Quigel and his staff then identified 200 abandoned buildings and tried to figure out which would be satisfactory to the tenants, based on access to “schools, churches, public transportation, proximity of food stores” and other factors. However, the Engineering Department was anxious to clear the terminal area, and, under pressure, Quigel made what one of his aides later called “a terrible mistake,” including in the program some buildings that were “miles away” from the terminal site. “People didn’t want to move out of their neighborhood,” and their reluctance slowed the entire effort.54 During the summer and fall of 1948, eleven of the buildings were purchased and rehabilitated, central heating was installed, and apartments were provided with new stoves, refrigerators, and bathroom fixtures. Quigel’s assistant, Douglas Tuomey, then developed a close relationship with the tenants and worked with them to identify neighborhoods and apartments that met their needs. Slowly the remaining tenants began to move. By late November about 180 had either found their own places or moved to the Port Authority apartments. But 370 families remained, half of them on the bus-terminal block, and half in the path of the approaches from the Lincoln Tunnel. So the engineers worked around the tenants, demolishing buildings on one section while Quigel and his aides moved families to other apartments in the large block and in the ramp area.55 Meanwhile, the Port Authority began to face pressure from the bus companies which had agreed to move to the new terminal. With leases at their current sites expiring, some of the bus firms were concerned that their service would be disrupted. So, with Tobin’s agreement, the engineers began excavation on part of the site late in January 1949. The Port agency then bought three more buildings and pressed ahead with refurbishing apartments. At the end of May, the last tenant on the terminal block moved out, and during the fall, excavation was completed and the basement concrete was poured. As construction on the terminal proceeded, tenants who remained in the way of the approach ramps were then moved into the new apartment complexes.
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By the time the last tenants had left, at the end of 1949, the Port Authority had moved more than 270 families into renovated apartments in fourteen of its own buildings, and it had paid real-estate agents for locating housing for 65 families. Another 200 had found their own apartments, accepting the Port Authority’s cash-payment offer. Some of those who were forced to move were clearly unhappy, but the program offered a sharp contrast to the traditional relocation strategy. The judge with the power to order evictions on the site commended the agency for its innovative approach, and the Port Authority built on this experience when it carried out later relocation programs. By the mid-1950s, the Port agency’s relocation efforts set a standard which experts in the housing field urged New York City and state agencies to follow.56 But the relocation effort had delayed the bus terminal, which was initially scheduled for completion in early 1949, for more than a year and a half. As the Port Authority obtained bids for construction of the massive aboveground portion of the terminal in the fall of 1949, only an optimist could expect it to be completed by the end of 1950. And then disaster, in the form of vetoes from both state governors, struck.
Patronage Demands and the Progressive Legacy The Port Authority and its engineering advisers have given a very serious setback to the orderly processes of doing public work by contract. . . . Once the door is opened to awarding a public contract to other than the low bidder . . . , it is easy for favoritism or political considerations to enter. The Port Authority has opened that door. —Engineering News-Record, Jan. 19, 1950
On December 15, 1949, the Port Authority’s commissioners rejected the lowest bid for the main bus-terminal contract, voting to award the job instead to the second lowest bidder, Turner Construction Company. A few days later both Governor Dewey and Governor Driscoll vetoed the award; that negative action was almost unique in the agency’s first three decades, when hundreds of Port Authority programs and contracts had passed across the governors’ desks and only one or two had been formally disapproved. Both governors challenged the decision to bypass the lowest bidder, and so they appeared as champions of objectivity and economy in contracting, and as opponents of favoritism. The Port Authority, in contrast, was por-
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trayed as acting so as to encourage favoritism, a charge spread across the engineering profession nationally by a leading engineering journal (in its editorial, quoted above). But the reality was almost the exact opposite of these conclusions. The paragraphs below first examine the Port Authority’s rhetorical stance as “nonpolitical” and then show that even in the Tobin years a salting of patronage and other political favors accompanied the dominant effort—which was to uphold merit in awarding contracts and in appointing and promoting staff members. Turning next to the bus-terminal contract, we will follow, step by step, the political pressures brought against the Port Authority by influential state legislators, and the Port agency’s attempt to uphold Progressive principles while permitting a modest bow to patronage politics in its various contracts. When this attempt at compromise failed, the agency appealed again to the two governors and won; but this denouement gave the Port Authority a victory at some cost to its reputation for professionalism.
The Reality of “Nonpolitical Efficiency” State and local government in the New York region had endured a long tradition of political favoritism—in appointments to governmental posts, in the awarding of construction contracts and legal business, and in a variety of other ways. As we saw in earlier chapters, the Port Authority was structured so the pressure to use narrow political criteria in awarding contracts and making other decisions might be lessened. Instead, expertise and the proven capacity to “get the job done efficiently” would be controlling, as the bi-state agency hired and promoted staff members, awarded contracts for construction and for insurance on its large facilities, and carried out its expanding range of duties. At least these were the hopes of Julius Henry Cohen and his collaborators, drawing upon principles of the Progressive Era, and by and large, their hopes were realized.57 Even so, during its first two decades the Port Authority did encounter patronage’s embrace. The long-time personnel director, Joseph Carty, saw appointments as a key route to maintaining public support for the Port Authority; and at lower staff levels political contacts were an important route to jobs. As a close student of the agency concluded, “Tobin inherited a system of political appointments,” which included “a large number of police and maintenance men, as well as office workers.”58 Among Tobin’s chief goals, when he assumed control in 1942, was to strengthen the merit system for staff appointments and to ensure that contracts
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were awarded to the best qualified, not the best connected. By 1946, the Port Authority’s general policies included the stipulation that “merit . . . shall govern advancement and promotion,” and the warning that “preferential consideration will not be accorded any employee on account of political or other influence.” The next year Tobin decided to replace Carty, whose primary strength was his friendly relationships with New Jersey politicians; he then carried out a nationwide search for an executive whose professional career had been in the private sector. The new personnel director, John D. Foster, had worked for the Nestlé Corporation and other private firms, and he at once moved to strengthen the agency’s programs for training and evaluating employees. Foster later recalled that Tobin “insisted on a nonpolitical organization,” and that he supported Foster’s efforts with enthusiasm.59 In Tobin’s campaign to squeeze out patronage and other narrow criteria, public rhetoric had a crucial role. In speeches, interviews, and testimony at legislative hearings, Tobin proclaimed the importance of keeping the Port Authority free from political favoritism; in this way he reminded his own staff that they had been chosen based on merit, not because of their political connections; moreover, he stiffened the resolve of his managers, who were sometimes under pressure to find a job for a legislator’s relative or to give a contract to a worthy campaign contributor. Perhaps most important, through his emphatic public statements Tobin signalled to politicians, and to others who might like to capture portions of the Port Authority’s largesse for their own pockets, that such efforts would meet with no success, and therefore should not be attempted. Two examples from Tobin’s speeches illustrate his rhetorical strategy: I do not believe that an Authority can possibly be successful if political interference plays any part in its management or internal affairs. (1945) No private corporation could survive if its personnel were to be selected or its business conducted on the basis of political preference. That is an accepted . . . proper standard for the regular departmental units of our democratic government. But it is the death-knell of sound authority management. (1953)
And in 1956, when he was interviewed for a cover story in Business Week, Tobin stressed the “nonpolitical” theme as crucial to the agency’s success. “You can’t be ‘just a little bit political’ or ‘do a little favor,’” Tobin explained. “Once you slip, it’s the end. You’ve got to be completely nonpolitical, or become a complete creature of the politicians.”60
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Annmarie Walsh’s scholarly study of public authorities underscored Tobin’s approach. In order to “fend off patronage pressures from the outside,” she argued, Tobin “made good use” of the convention that authorities are nonpolitical. For example, “employees circulated a story about a person of note who approached Tobin” to seek promotion for a specific staff member. “Don’t tell me his name or I’ll fire him,” Tobin is alleged to have responded, emphasizing the view that outside political influence would not help employees to advance in the agency.61 But matters are not always what they seem, and during the late 1940s and beyond, Tobin did sometimes adopt a more cooperative tone with influential outsiders than his own rhetoric or Walsh’s assessment would suggest. For example, in the fall of 1948, the son of a newspaper editor in the region applied for a job at the Port Authority, with the support of one of the agency’s commissioners. Tobin wrote to the editor, explaining that there were no openings at present, but that the personnel department was “placing his name at the head of a list” for consideration when an opening in his line of work existed. Early in 1950, an aide to Mayor O’Dwyer asked Tobin to consider a friend for a laborer’s job at the New York Truck Terminal, and Tobin, in response, wrote that his personnel director would call in the friend for an interview, and that Tobin personally would then inform the mayor’s aide whether a job would be forthcoming. Later that year, a state senator in New York wrote to Tobin, supporting a specific applicant to operate a stationery store in the bus terminal, and Tobin wrote back to say that “Mr. xxx will soon receive a call from our Department of Concessions.” And when Commissioner Borg urged Tobin to hire one of Borg’s friends, Tobin pointed out that the individual could not be hired unless the Board waived the agency’s rule that new staff members should be under 50 years of age; “I assume they would do so,” he wrote to Borg, “on your recommendation.”62 In addition to these random events, the Port Authority had a long tradition of allocating some of its insurance commissions to brokers who did no actual work, an approach called insurance “patronage.” The practice, which had begun long before Tobin headed the “nonpolitical” agency, was viewed as a way to maintain political support at the state capitals and in the region; the brokers were politically connected, and indeed some were directly linked to influential state legislators. In the late 1940s the top staff finally confronted the issue, and in 1950 the commissioners discussed the problem at a confidential session. The “past practice was indefensible,” some members of the board argued, and the Comptroller then led an effort to eliminate commis-
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sions which were given to brokers who “had little or nothing to do with the work of actually placing and servicing the insurance.”63 Despite these examples of favoritism, the predominant policy at the Port Authority emphasized decisions based on merit and on effective performance, coupled with resistance to special political favors. Thus when one commissioner inquired whether a bank official, who had been helpful in persuading O’Dwyer to yield up the airports, might be rewarded by having a Port Authority deposit placed at his bank, Tobin’s notation on the letter was “file and forget.” When the mayor of a New Jersey town asked for a free pass for the Lincoln Tunnel, a request endorsed by a Port Authority commissioner (his “lifelong friend”), Tobin turned down the appeal. And when an influential New Jersey state senator challenged the agency’s decision to award a contract for Holland Tunnel iron plates to a company outside the region (rather than a local competitor), he was treated to an extensive analysis of the quality of past work and financial soundness of the firm selected, together with a list of six cities which had found its work of high quality. In conclusion, Tobin wrote, he was sure the senator “will agree with me that based on these facts our action . . . was the proper course for us to follow.” On rare occasions, Tobin himself suggested to staff members that they bow to political pressures; but by the late 1940s the staff had become committed to the patronage-free environment that Tobin enunciated publicly, and they resisted his suggestions.64 During the years 1948–1950, Congressman Emanuel Celler (D-Brooklyn) made several attempts to secure favored treatment from the Port agency, but without success. In the spring of 1948, Celler wrote to Chairman Howard Cullman, and then met with him and Tobin, to urge that the agency’s decision to award the clock concessions at the three airports to the Bulova Watch Company be overturned, with the concessions going to Celler’s own client, the Benrus Watch Company. A few months later, Celler pressed Cullman and Tobin to award a theater concession at the bus terminal or at one of the airports to one of his clients. And in 1950, Celler attempted to persuade Cullman to recommend another of his private clients for a parking concession at the Bus Terminal; he allegedly coupled this with a threat, if Cullman were not cooperative, to “investigate the Port Authority.” In all three cases, Celler and his clients were rejected.65 So the reality was not quite as pristine as Tobin’s rhetoric or Walsh’s interpretive summary would suggest. But it was, on balance, far more “nonpolitical” than the patterns of appointments and contract awards at many large governmental bodies in the New York region and beyond.
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A Challenge to Engineering Integrity In December 1949, the Port Authority’s emphasis on objective criteria in awarding construction contracts came into sharp conflict with the interests of one of Albany’s most influential politicians, Mallory Stephens. A member of the New York State Assembly from Putnam County, Stephens chaired the Ways & Means Committee. Most legislation affecting the Port Authority was handled by that committee, and Stephens had been instrumental in gaining legislative approval for Port Authority projects. In 1945, for example, the Port agency’s truck-terminal legislation was introduced by Stephens, and with his guidance it moved quickly to approval. In 1946, Stephens introduced bills which would authorize the bus-terminal project, and he then worked with the Port agency’s legal staff to strengthen the bill in order to overcome Greyhound’s effort to block it. And when the Greyhound team introduced a bill to subject the Port Authority terminal to full real-estate taxes, Stephens’ committee took control of the measure and killed it. The next year, he introduced the draft legislation needed to permit the Port agency to take over the region’s three major airports.66 These important efforts were not entirely uncompensated. Evidence brought to light a decade later showed that Stephens was also an insurance broker, and that he received modest commissions throughout the 1940s from the Port Authority, though all the work was often done by another firm. It was, as Tobin acknowledged during Congressional testimony, an example of insurance patronage.67 The Bus Terminal contract to be awarded in December 1949, was potentially much more lucrative. By mid-November excavation of the site had been completed and the steel framework was being erected; the December contract would cover all the other construction required before the terminal was ready for use—concrete work, brick and masonry, plumbing, electricity, the setting of the escalators, and the finishing needed to prepare the waiting areas and shops for occupancy. Because most bus companies had leases at their existing terminals which would expire at the end of 1950, the Port Authority decided it was essential to complete all the work (except for the shops) by November 1, 1950, with the stores ready by the end of December. The agency’s chief engineer estimated that the bids for this complex array of work should come in under $9.7 million.68 On December 8, bids on the General Building Contract were opened. The low bid, $8.94 million, was submitted by Merritt-Chapman & Scott; next came a bid of $9.19 from the Turner Construction Company; and there
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were eight others, ranging to a high of $10.7 million. Merritt-Chapman & Scott (MCS) had a strong reputation for its construction work on dams and paper mills, but it had little experience in erecting and finishing other kinds of large buildings. Turner, however, was experienced and highly regarded in constructing large office buildings; it had built the Port Authority’s inland terminal station in the early 1930s, for example, and it had carried out a major project at the United Nations complex. In addition to its position as low bidder, MCS had one other distinctive quality: it had recently added Mallory Stephens to its board of directors. The Port Authority’s general policy for contract work was to select the lowest bidder, if the agency was confident that this firm would meet high quality standards and complete the building by the specified date. In order to evaluate the low bidder against its near competitors—in terms of these performance criteria, together with cost—the Port Authority now followed its standard procedures. The first step was to ask each of the three lowest bidders to meet with the Port Authority’s chief engineer and his staff in four days, with a detailed schedule for the project, a list of proposed subcontractors, and information on the firm’s other current projects. On December 12, Chief Engineer John Kyle and several members of his staff held meetings with representatives from MCS, Turner, and the third lowest bidder. The discussion with Turner reinforced the chief engineer’s impression that it had very good experience in the field and ought to be able to meet the performance goals for the Bus Terminal. Turner planned to use its own forces for several key elements of the work; this would give the firm greater ability to control timing of the complex project. Moreover, the list of subcontractors was viewed as of high quality, and subsequent checks indicated that Turner’s current work on other projects was on or ahead of schedule. However, the December 12 meeting with MCS raised alarm bells. Senior MCS officials seemed uncertain that they could meet the November 1 completion goal; two of the three projects that MCS listed as indicating its ability to complete large, complex building structures were several months behind schedule; and MCS was planning to rely entirely on subcontractors for the actual work, with its staff effort limited to supervision. Moreover, some of the contractors were viewed by Chief Engineer Kyle and his staff as having done “inferior work” in the past and as being incapable of “finishing this complicated job within the time specified.”69 Kyle then followed his usual practice, sending his men into the field in order to examine the projects which MCS and Turner had underway. Two of the MCS projects were veterans hospitals, being constructed under contract
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with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and when Kyle’s assistant called, he found that the Corps had “ ‘orders from the White House’ that no information was to be given to the Port Authority.” Off the record, however, he managed to learn that the Corps had awarded the larger hospital project to MCS only reluctantly, because it had little previous experience in such building, but that “tremendous pressures were brought to bear upon the Corps. . . . These pressures involved the White House, Senators, and Congressmen.” Kyle’s aide also learned that the Corps was very unhappy with the project; it was nine months behind schedule, MCS had organized the effort in a way that was “entirely inadequate,” some of the subcontractors were “below accepted standards,” and their work was “just sufficient to get by inspection.”70 The third job which MCS had listed was a state mental hospital at Poughkeepsie; and the state engineers had also been ordered not to discuss the project. But Kyle was able to break through the wall of silence, and he learned that construction was “substantially behind schedule,” and that MCS had organized the operation badly and was using “poor sub-contractors.”71 Under standard Port Authority procedure, information gathered in these inquiries next went to its Engineering Board, which included five independent engineers plus the bi-state agency’s former chief engineer (then in semi-retirement). Because of the pressure to get construction started so the November deadline could be met, the board convened on the 13th, only one day after Kyle’s conferences with the low bidders. Several of the board members had direct experience in working with MCS and Turner; based on that background and the information gathered by Kyle, the Engineering Board voted unanimously to recommend that the Authority’s commissioners award the contract to the Turner Construction Company, even though its bid was a quarter of a million dollars above that of Merritt-Chapman & Scott.72 When the Engineering Board reported its recommendation to Tobin, he realized that he faced a difficult political situation, especially in view of Mallory Stephens’ position at MCS. He telephoned Chairman Cullman and Commissioner Bayard Pope and explained the reasons for the decision in favor of Turner. Then he called the president of MCS, C. H. Cotter, met with him that afternoon to explain why the Engineering Board had voted for Turner over MCS, and offered to permit MCS to provide “any additional facts or information” which might lead the Board to reverse its position.73 Meanwhile, Mallory Stephens had called Tobin and arranged to meet with him on Wednesday morning, December 14. At that session, Stephens said that he had an important role in reorganizing MCS, that the firm was anxious to land the bus-terminal job as a way to “move into the New York
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City building field,” and that he was sure they could complete the terminal on time. He said he would work with Cotter in putting together the information needed to persuade the Engineering Board to endorse MCS. Later that day, Stephens met with Kyle and described his own “wide experience” in the construction field, “how much he was personally interested in seeing” that MCS broke into the New York market, and “his personal connections in various high places in local, State and Federal agencies.”74 That afternoon, Tobin received a telephone call from Walter Jones, Assemblyman from Bergen County, and sponsor of most Port Authority legislation in the New Jersey legislature during the late 1940s. Jones, who had a private law practice, said he had just been hired by MCS and that he would be at Tobin’s office on Thursday, with MSC president Cotter and several of his staff members, to meet with the Engineering Board.75 At the Thursday meeting, Cotter and Jones defended the construction plan set forth in the MCS proposal. Cotter argued that he had recently reorganized the company, so it was now a “hard-hitting, well integrated . . . organization” which could certainly complete the bus terminal, a “relatively simple job,” by November 1. The Engineering Board was not persuaded, however, and after Cotter and Jones departed, the Board unanimously reaffirmed its support of Turner. Tobin then phoned Stephens to give him the bad news. In previous discussions, Stephens had seemed to understand that MCS faced a difficult hurdle if the Engineering Board concluded that Turner was the better choice. Now, in Tobin’s perception, Stephens’ tone altered sharply. The decision of the Board was a “damned outrage,” he exclaimed. The situation “is a catastrophe,” he argued, “and it’s a catastrophe for the Port Authority too.” He said that he was going to appear personally at the meeting of the Port Authority’s commissioners and argue that MCS deserved the job; but after discussion, he agreed that Cotter, who knew the MCS staff and capabilities best, should make the case.76 Late on Thursday, December 15, the Port Authority commissioners assembled to make the final decision on the General Building Contract for the bus station. Cotter was given time to plead for their endorsement, and after he left, the commissioners called in the Engineering Board. Asked to give their individual views, the assembled engineers expressed strong support for the Turner Construction Company; and several, who had experience with MCS and its subcontractors, expressed dismay at the record of that firm.77 Now the discussion took a surprising turn. One New York commissioner, a lawyer with close ties to Governor Dewey, suddenly produced a list of construction jobs which, he said, had been carried out by Merritt-Chapman & Scott and “to the best of his knowledge . . . had been performed satisfacto-
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rily.” In fact, the commissioner reported, he had just talked with an official of one firm which had used MCS for a job in Florida, and this gentleman had been so enthusiastic that for similar work in the future he “would not consider any contractor but Merritt-Chapman & Scott.” The commissioner asked why the Port Authority had not examined those other projects. Because, Tobin responded, MCS had not listed them. Members of the Engineering Board then argued that the new list included mainly paper mills and other projects that did not require close coordination of many building trades. The bus-terminal project was, in their view, much more difficult.78 Two Port Authority commissioners then sought another way to avoid the political fall-out from rejecting MCS. Was the November 1 deadline essential, they asked. If MCS fell behind, would that really make much difference? An extended discussion followed, as planner Walter Hedden described the pressure then being exerted on some bus companies to extend their current leases for several years, and the need for some weeks of trial operation and staff training before the terminal began to receive passengers at the beginning of 1951. Once the terminal opened, he pointed out, breakdowns in the ventilation system, the fire protection plan, or the bus communication system could be disastrous.79 At this point, Tobin acknowledged that the staff recommendation to reject MCS was “a most unpleasant one,” which would “lead to most unpleasant consequences for the Port Authority” during the coming months. But he wondered if embracing MCS, with the likelihood of delays and commuter unhappiness to follow, would not lead to an outcome that could be even worse. Finally, reluctantly but unanimously, the Port Authority commissioners voted to award the contract to Turner.80 Early the next day (Friday, December 16), Tobin and two of his commissioners met with Cotter and Walter Jones and asked if their firm might want to withdraw before the award was announced, so that MCS would not be stamped publicly as the low bidder, judged unacceptable on quality grounds. Cotter declined that offer, but Jones then proposed that Turner include MCS as a sort of joint partner, sharing the work and the responsibility. The Port Authority team agreed to take that offer to Turner, and Tobin said that he would be “very happy if such a solution could be worked out.” They then left to meet with Turner’s officials, deciding enroute that they would make “an earnest and all-out plea” for a joint venture, as a solution to the Port agency’s political problem. However, they also conferred with Chief Engineer Kyle, and at his urging they agreed that there had to be “one central responsibility” for the contract, and that responsibility had to “be centered in Turner.”81 Cullman and Tobin then met with H. C. Turner, Jr., the company’s pres-
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ident. By Tobin’s account, they described the joint venture scheme, urged that he accept it, and argued that his acquiescence would be “a great service,” demonstrating “the cooperativeness and bigness of his company in remarkable fashion.” Tobin explained that to reject MCS from participation in the project would expose the Port agency to “the possibility of grave difficulties on many scores,” and so Turner, if he could agree to a joint venture, would provide a “happy solution” both for MCS and for the Port Authority.82 Turner responded favorably, indicating that he was “willing to do everything in his power to work out a joint venture,” and Tobin telephoned Cotter, who had been waiting for the call. Turner and Cotter met for two hours, with Turner offering MCS “a percentage of the contract,” but with Turner retaining overall supervisory control of the entire project. Cotter now dug in his heels, raising the banner of engineering integrity—in place of the aura of patronage politics which seemed to have enshrouded Merritt-Chapman & Scott as it had sought contracts to construct government hospitals, added Mallory Stephens to its board, and hired Walter Jones to plead its case. Cotter insisted that his firm must have supervisory control of “all the work that was apportioned to them”; anything less would be “demeaning to [his] company.” So the tactic had failed. Turner called Tobin to report on his meeting with Cotter, and Tobin, after thanking him for his efforts, then said that the Port Authority was relying entirely on Turner to complete the bus terminal and that “he should start to organize it at once on that basis.” But Mallory Stephens and his MCS team had not yet given up hope. On Saturday, when Tobin called him to report what had happened, Stephens was “bitter and vehement.” He criticized the Engineering Board as a “bunch of old fogies” who didn’t realize the important strides that MCS was making in industrial building, and he insisted that MCS be given some “voice” in managing the project. Reluctantly, Tobin said he would talk with Turner again and attempt to work out an acceptable solution.83 Tobin then called Turner and asked if he could make a joint offer to MCS which would be more palatable; perhaps Turner could agree to use some MCS subcontractors and in that way give MCS a supervisory role. Now it was Turner’s turn to dig in his heels. If his firm was to take full responsibility for the project, he argued, they could not delegate any managerial responsibility to people at MCS or to any others whose abilities they did not know well; he would rather turn down the contract than proceed as Tobin was suggesting. Turner also explained that “these joint venture contracts” typically did not involve dividing the work but only the profits and the risks, and that was the kind of offer he had made to Cotter.84
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A short time later, Walter Jones called on behalf of his “law firm client” and asked if Turner could be persuaded to increase the “percentage arrangement” with MCS. Grasping at that straw, Tobin said he thought perhaps 15–20 percent was possible, and he urged Jones to press that position directly with Turner. Before Jones could do this, however, Cotter intervened and asked that no further efforts be made to persuade Turner to accept a joint venture. It was clear, Cotter said, that Turner was not going to turn over any managerial responsibility to Cotter’s firm, and therefore “it would not be honorable” for MCS to accept a portion of the fees.85 Jones and Tobin conferred and agreed that they had “reached the end of the road” on the Turner-MCS negotiation, and Tobin then approved a news release for December 17, announcing that Turner Construction had been awarded the contract. The “unpleasant consequences” that Tobin had feared emerged five days later, when both Governor Dewey and Governor Driscoll vetoed the contract award, blocking Turner from getting started and raising doubts that the terminal could be completed by the fall 1950 deadline. The formal reason given was the Port Authority’s failure to award the contract to the low bidder; but the agency’s unwillingness to meet the demands of Mallory Stephens and Walter Jones, key Republican legislators and allies of the Republican governors in both states, seems a more persuasive explanation.86 Now Tobin and his colleagues mounted an appeal to Dewey and Driscoll, urging them to accept the award to Turner as the best choice in professional terms, and wiser in political terms as well. They could argue that— if the Port Authority were compelled to reverse its judgment and award the contract to the low bidder—the project would probably be marred by delays in completion; and then there would be possible chaos for bus commuters, and more severe street congestion in Manhattan, as the bus companies were forced to search for places to load and unload once their leases expired at the end of 1950. Several days after the vetoes, the commissioners and Tobin met personally with both governors and pressed their case. Meanwhile, Tobin took an important step to mollify that hungry seeker of commissions, Mallory Stephens. During the heated discussions on the bus contract, Tobin raised the possibility that Stephens might be given the brokerage commissions for the next five years on one Port Authority facility, the Columbia Street Pier. The next week, before the commissioners met with the governors, Tobin persuaded the Port Authority’s main broker, which held the Pier account, to continue “to service this policy in its entirety” while giving all the commissions to Stephens’ firm.87
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A few days later, the governors agreed not to block the Port Authority’s decision, and at a meeting on December 29 the board again voted to award the contract to Turner Construction.88 But now there were only ten months left for Turner to complete the major work on the huge building.
Reverberations and Forward Motion The “unpleasant consequences” which Tobin had forecast did not end with the governors’ actions. In January 1950, MCS lobbied in Albany and Trenton for an investigation of the Port Authority’s practices, and that idea found a ready audience among legislators antagonistic to the Port agency. But Mallory Stephens’ financial prospects had improved, courtesy of the Port Authority, and his wrath had abated; the bills did not emerge from his committee.89 However, the firestorm over the bus-terminal contract made the agency wary of applying its preferred standard—low cost plus a strong performance record—in awarding contracts. Therefore, when the bids for a construction project in Newark were opened in January, and doubts were raised about the quality of the low bidder, Tobin and the Board decided to accept the low bid anyway—“in the overall interest of the organization”—and to “do the best we can” in working with the contractor. The agency also faced sharp criticism from the widely respected Engineering News-Record. The thrust of its editorial argument, quoted in the opening lines of this section, was that the Port Authority had, in bypassing the low bidder, “opened the door” to favoritism and political pressure. The low bid should only be rejected, the News-Record sensibly argued, “when there was good reason to question the low-bidder’s ability to handle the work.” But ENR was on shakier ground when it concluded that rejecting MCS “on the grounds of incompetence” was “obviously impossible.” Moreover, it seemed unable to grasp the link between having Stephens on the MCS board, joined with Walter Jones pleading its case, and the danger of political favoritism. And Tobin, Kyle, and their brethren were in no position to enlighten ENR and its readers.90 But the Port agency soon received signals that it had balanced the demands of effective action and of patronage politics reasonably well. Shortly after Turner was given the green light by the governors, Senator David Van Alstyne, the key figure in the New Jersey legislature when Port Authority business was involved, called Tobin and offered his congratulations for the agency’s firm stance. And Mallory Stephens returned to his traditional role, as reliable helmsman when the Port Authority needed legislative action in Albany.91 Meanwhile, Turner and its subcontractors moved ahead briskly, using
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close managerial control and some innovative methods in the hope of finishing by the first of November. To construct the four levels of structural concrete floors, Turner used its own men, who made 212,000 square feet of forms, which they shifted rapidly as concrete with steel reinforcement was laid down in one section after another. Floor construction was completed on schedule, but when Turner’s team began to erect the walls, in the summer of 1950, they ran into a major hurdle. The bus terminal would use 1.4 million bricks, and New York City was in a building boom, taxing the limited supply of bricklayers. Now the project began to fall behind schedule, and Turner superintendents revised the order of bricklaying, so that priority was given to putting up walls which had to be in position before plumbing and other subcontractors could carry out their tasks.92 For an array of other tasks—terrazzo floors, marble wainscoting, ceiling tiles, finishing of shops and stores, installation of escalators and elevators, etc.—Turner drew upon 34 subcontractors, who employed workers in 26 different trades. Turner assigned its own officials to work closely with the subcontractors and to search for ways to expedite completion, while coping with a myriad of changes needed to meet tenant requirements.93 An especially challenging task was the problem of escalators: with 31 flights of moving stairs called for in the specifications, the bus terminal would include perhaps the largest escalator installations ever placed in one building. Normally, moving stairs were shipped from the manufacturer in small pieces and put together on site. But Turner and the subcontractor decided that time would be saved if a novel approach were used: Each of the 35 flights was completely assembled in a plant in Kansas, then shipped by truck, lifted into the bus terminal by crane, and quickly connected to the driving head and installed. Through a variety of strategies, then, Turner and its several teams made up the time that had been lost due to the bricklayer shortage, and on November 1, the scheduled deadline, the work was completed. The Port Authority’s chairman, Howard Cullman, congratulated Turner for a job well done and announced that the Port Authority Bus Terminal would be open to receive the vehicles of 32 bus companies, and the feet of 120,000 daily bus passengers, earlier than expected—by December 15.94 As Tobin and his colleagues approached that day, they could look back with satisfaction at other pieces of the complex puzzle that had been locked into place during the construction year. In July Cullman and Tobin had persuaded Mayor O’Dwyer to visit the vast structure emerging from the ground near Times Square, and O’Dwyer then shook off the Moses virus and embraced the project with enthusiasm. “The improvement in traffic circulation
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will be tremendous,” he exclaimed. The same day, O’Dwyer gave the several bus companies which had not yet signed contracts for the new terminal just the push the Port agency wanted, announcing that once the new terminal was open, all interstate bus companies would be prohibited from loading and unloading on city streets.95 A crucial part of the plan to make the bus terminal self-supporting was revenue from stores and other services, and during the year, 2,500 applications flowed into the agency’s Department of Concessions. By early December, Robert Curtiss and his staff had allotted space for 42 shops, with another 20 or more locations likely to be available in 1951. Tobin and Curtiss calculated that concession revenue could generate more than half of the total income needed to operate the terminal on a break-even basis.96 The agency also faced engineering challenges beyond those included in the contract with Turner. One of the most important, from the standpoint of safety, was the problem of bus movement up and down the ramps into the upper section of the building. During the winter, snow and ice could lead to dangerous sliding; but to use a team of snow plows during the rush hours would be sure to cause great delays for the hundreds of buses, moving close together. Instead, Engineer Kyle and his staff embedded piping in the rampways, so the road surface could be heated in icy weather.97 In time, the bus terminal might be regarded in Lewis Mumford’s terms, as a “masterpiece of mediocrity,” and as a building to be “taken for granted.”98 But in the final weeks of 1950, it was not taken for granted; the giant bus station was the center of attraction for thousands and then tens of thousands. At the dedication on December 14, Governor Dewey put aside his recent history of tense relations with the Port Authority over airline leases and the bus-terminal contract, as he commended the agency for its “brilliant engineering and planning work.” Governor Driscoll spoke of the bus terminal as a “fine accomplishment” which demonstrated that Washington could with benefit turn more responsibilities back to the states and cities; so he was an optimistic herald for the decentralization campaigns of later decades.99 The region’s major dailies also waxed enthusiastic, embracing a different muse than Lewis Mumford. Rather than a “humdrum job” of engineering or of architecture, the Herald Tribune concluded that the terminal “is a thing of beauty. While built for utility, it instantly impresses the eye. There is nothing ugly. The magnificent expanses, harmonious colorings, flush lighting, graceful arrangement are all part of the inviting whole. This is functional design, to make traveling a pleasure, travel at its very best.” The New York Times agreed, and both praised the terminal’s contribution to saving time for bus
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passengers—an average of twenty minutes per trip—and to reducing street congestion as well. It was a time for celebration.100 More than forty years later, in his sequel to Catch 22, Joseph Heller would imagine the Port Authority Bus Terminal as one of the world’s “great catering halls,” graced at one party by 1,122,000 champagne tulips and 3,500 dinner guests.101 The actual celebration on opening day in 1950 offered some premonitions of Heller’s later tale. A giant cake, eight feet wide and 16 feet long, was unveiled in the main concourse; and 5,500 hungry men and women and children descended on the confection and in three-quarters of an hour consumed it, all 800 pounds. Another 20,000 had to go hungry, but at least they had the comfort of knowing that all 20,000 could ride the new escalators at one time. Then, if they were patient, and waited until Saturday, they might see Lady Iris Mountbatten take her weekly exercise in one of the Port Authority’s thirty bowling alleys.102 And in the opening days, the planning and the drills which Walter Hedden and his associates had carried out, in preparation for the gathering throng, seemed to pay off. The Times’ reporter caught the rhythm: “The crowds at rush hours were tides moving in orderly procession through the immense concourse and the buses rolled in a bumper-to-bumper stream, loading and unloading masses of travelers.”103 Fiorello LaGuardia, that early and fierce champion of the bus-terminal idea, had died a few years earlier. Unhappy as he was to see his airports carried off by the Port agency, he would have found the new building, which now removed from city streets more than 2,000 of those buses he hated, at least partial compensation.
The Ethical Dimensions of Public Programs As many several ways meet in one town; As many fresh streams meet in one salt sea; . . . So may a thousand actions, once afoot, End in one purpose, and be all well borne Without defeat. —King Henry V, 1.2
And in the thousand actions which were needed to create this massive building with its rampway and social tributaries, we can see how complex may be the art of governing in a large urban region.
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Most of the discussion in this chapter has focused on strategies and tactics employed by major actors in this bi-state metropolis—by Robert Moses and Greyhound, by Turner and MCS and Assemblyman Stephens, by Tobin and his aides. This final section uses Stephen Bailey’s distinctive perspective to highlight the ethical issues found in this case. In the next chapter, I will examine normative and strategic issues that are threaded across the several decades of the Port Authority’s creation and early history. In his essay, “The Ethics of Public Service,” Bailey argues that an understanding of ethical principles and pressures in public affairs must begin with a recognition of the “moral ambiguity of all men and of all public policies.”104 We see this ambiguity in government activities described in this chapter—and in particular, in the use of government power to force individuals and families from their homes, in order to achieve some “larger benefit.” Whether a huge bus terminal, or a new highway, or a downtown office complex actually does provide a larger benefit depends, however, on one’s perspective. For example, it seemed very likely that the bus terminal would reduce traffic congestion in Manhattan, and make bus travel more efficient (and therefore more attractive) for commuters and shoppers who might otherwise use automobiles, with some likely further benefits in reducing air pollution in the region. Whether those gains outweighed the losses of familiar neighborhoods and living patterns, for those displaced, is less clear. And when those forced out of their homes are among our poorer citizens, whose political leverage is least, we should pause longer before declaring that these plans and their execution generate a clear net benefit. To take another illustration of “moral ambiguity,” one can argue that the system of “insurance patronage” practiced by the Port Authority in the 1940s was not ethically defensible, viewed in isolation; to provide money for no work, fearing that otherwise the claimant’s political power will be used to harm you, suggests acquiescence in extortion. Then, when Tobin specifically authorized brokerage payments to Stephens in December 1949, while the Port Authority was trying to get Stephens’ heavy foot off its back, we seem to have an indefensible mix of extortion and bribery. Yet, in view of the culture of favoritism which infested New York State politics in that era, perhaps brokerage patronage can be defended as a necessary evil—necessary to permit public officials to assemble the political energy required to carry out large tasks. As citizens and political activists, we can debate the policy issues central to the case: should a union terminal be constructed? should Greyhound be blocked from expanding its own terminals? how should the concerns of those who would be displaced be valued in
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setting policy? But at the end of the day, if we want the decisions that evolve from a thoughtful debate to lead to action, our public leaders may sometimes need to employ the instruments of patronage politics in order to bend the narrow interests of Mallory Stephens and his political bedfellows to a wider cause. Even principled professionals like Thomas Dewey came in time, if reluctantly, to agree.105 In addition to pointing to the moral ambiguity that attends important public decisions, Bailey also argues that there are three essential moral qualities needed by those who would work in government: optimism, courage, and “fairness tempered by charity.”106 All three are displayed in the bus-terminal case. Optimism, as Bailey uses the term, combines a capacity to see the obstacles in the way of achieving a desired goal, joined with a willingness to seek ways to overcome those hurdles and a readiness to act—with some expectation that action may lead to success. “True optimism” is seeing “the worth of taking risks.”107 In this sense, Tobin, Jaffe, and their colleagues were surely optimists. It was the hope, their guarded expectation, that they might emerge with victory which motivated them to press their case—month after month, and then year after year—against the intransigence of Greyhound and the maneuvering of Robert Moses, despite the feckless leadership of Mayor O’Dwyer and the eroded professionalism at the City Planning Commission, and then around the narrow opportunism of Mallory Stephens and his discredited engineering firm. And finally, against the casual irresponsibility that seemed to characterize Dewey’s and Driscoll’s vetoes. Why did they retain a sense of optimism? No doubt it helped that they received enthusiastic support from some of the major daily newspapers and a few civic associations. Perhaps more important, however, was a perspective on public problems that they shared—a sort of virus from the Progressive Era, captured in the original compact, carried forward by Julius Henry Cohen and by that most optimistic of all Port Authority commissioners, Howard Cullman—and passed onward to Tobin and his generation, where it was honed in battles against FDR and the New York region’s airport operators and the airlines.108 That Progressive virus called for systematic analysis of the transportation problem, using the “best scientific understanding,” followed by equally rational analysis of political obstacles and of Machiavellian strategies that might surmount those hurdles. With these intellectual tools, together with the favorable reputation and financial resources that by the mid-1940s at-
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tended all Port Authority proposals, Tobin and his associates could with some confidence settle (in Bailey’s apt phrase) “on the sunnier side of doubt.” And with those tools, they could build coalitions against Robert Moses and his own Machiavellian schemes, scrutinize the fine print in such Moses creations as the “Parking Authority bill,” find the records of trips paid for by Greyhound, and think through new policies that might ease the moral dilemma of forcing the poor out of old tenements. Then they could select a contractor whose own efficiency and creative efforts could dig them out of a potential scheduling disaster; and finally, they could make adroit use of a Progressive tradition—the board of independent engineers—to provide political cover, as they fought against New York’s long tradition of patronage and low-quality performance in construction projects, a tradition which extended back to the building of the Brooklyn Bridge and beyond. Even when Austin Tobin and his colleagues embraced the cause of optimism, however, and employed systematic technical analysis, and built coalitions in support their plans, they did not always win. The New York truck terminal, begun in 1947, finally opened in the fall of 1949, but in the first year of operation it became clear that the trucking companies and drivers were reluctant to rely on an integrated operation run by the Port Authority—echoing the problems seen earlier on the railroad front. Over in Newark, the companion truck terminal was completed in 1950; but the teamsters’ union refused to use it because of disagreement over the Port agency’s labor contract, and the trucking firms which had favored the new facility would not resist the union. Early in 1951, the Newark building was leased to the Air Force for use as a military depot. Within a few years, both terminals were leased to private firms which provided space for trucking companies, allowing them to consolidate local deliveries and perhaps make a modest reduction in local truck traffic. Tobin and his aides were glad to be out of the truck-terminal business and made no effort to go forward with the series of additional terminals that had once been envisioned.109 In addition, the Port agency’s vigorous efforts to expand its seaport operations beyond Newark met with failure in 1949–50 and only a very modest success in the early 1950s. Ironically, within a few years Tobin and his fellow entrepreneurs could see that Machiavelli’s Fortuna well smiled on them, in blocking their strenuous attempts to capture New York’s piers. In sum, the short-term developments were these: As noted in chapter 11, Mayor O’Dwyer asked the Port Authority in the fall of 1947 to study the possibility of taking control of and modernizing the city’s piers. Early in 1948, Tobin submitted a proposal for financing, rehabilitating and operating the vast city waterfront at
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a cost of $114 million in Authority funds. But that proposal was opposed by other city officials; and a revised plan in 1949 was rejected by the Board of Estimate. Behind this resounding defeat for the Port Authority were several factors—reluctance of New York City political leaders to lose control over an historical engine of economic growth and a great source of municipal pride; their desire to maintain control over contracts and jobs on the waterfront; opposition by the longshoremen’s union; and only lukewarm support from the mayor and his aides. The city of Hoboken held out for several years, prompted by a similar mix of motives, but in 1952 the city agreed to turn over its modest waterfront to the Port agency.110 The long-term benefit of the defeat in New York was that the Authority did not invest millions in modernizing that city’s finger piers, which a few years later would be of little use because of the “containership revolution.” In the late 1950s, when it seemed possible that Port Newark could be converted into a containership terminal, the Port Authority had both the funds and the entrepreneurial impatience needed to carry out that experimental and expensive task.111 The second moral quality, courage, comes in several dimensions. The facet best illustrated in the bus-terminal case is “the courage to decide.” There is a strong tendency in government agencies and perhaps in organizations generally to avoid hard decisions, often leading to a sense, and a reality, of organizational drift. Few men in public life illustrated that tendency better than Mayor O’Dwyer, as we have seen in the bus-terminal case. In contrast, Tobin and his colleagues had the courage to decide, to act, and so to endure the arrows of those who felt aggrieved—Greyhound, Robert Moses, Mallory Stephens, and their close cousins in corporate and public life. It was a kind of courage that Tobin shared with his sometime nemesis, the ubiquitous Moses. The willingness of these two public officials to act vigorously in the face of opposition was, quite possibly, a result of important similarities in personality. Both Tobin and Moses appeared to fit the personality profile which Schumpeter identifies as marking the entrepreneur—an “impulse to fight . . . the will to conquer.” Their actions appeared to be shaped substantially by the entrepreneur’s “joy of creating, of getting things done.”112 Bailey’s third moral quality is “fairness tempered by charity.” In the busterminal case, Tobin offers an instructive contrast with Moses and other urban-renewal champions. The willingness of Tobin and the Port Authority commissioners to purchase apartments and slowly move residents away from the terminal site, and to delay the bus project for a year to carry out that pro-
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gram, was striking. It is notable, though, that the relocation program had not only costs but some benefits for the Port Authority as well. News articles carried stories which conveyed the sense that this large public agency could treat the powerless with some respect; and, building on the Port Authority’s relocation work in this and later cases, a New Yorker article in 1954 would offer a detailed and persuasive description of an agency which attempted to exercise power with a sustained sense of compassion.113 If we look across the various pieces of the bus-terminal story, we can, finally, note an interesting contrast which illustrates Tobin’s ethical compass. Facing the challenge of moving tenants out of the way of the terminal, Tobin and his colleagues were willing to delay the project for up to a year. However, when Tobin’s own commissioners asked, during the bidding negotiations with MCS and Turner, whether some delay in finishing the project would be acceptable, so that the contract might go to MCS, Tobin dug in his heels: flexibility during the relocation phase was replaced by rigid commitment to the 1950 deadline. Why? In part, because the time clock had been ticking; the delays during tenant removal increased the impatience of city officials and the Port Authority staff to complete the project, as well as increasing the pressure on the bus companies to sign long-term leases at alternative bus stations. Also, Tobin and his engineering staff were concerned not only about MCS’s reputation for missing deadlines, but also about quality problems that attended that firm’s recent projects. However, Tobin, Jaffe and their colleagues also found an ethical difference between the two causes of delay. The tenants were “deserving” of charity. Mallory Stephens and his engineering confederates were undeserving. Given this view, the “efficiency and economy” face of Progressivism could be directed more sharply against that unworthy band, moderated only by concessions that political prudence seemed to require.
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Part Five
Conclusions
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14 A Regional Empire in American Politics Local History and Its Impact, Leadership Strategies, and Ethical Dilemmas No one who contemplated the course of American politics during the half-century after 1890 could doubt that the teachings of evolution and pragmatism had practical consequences. . . . The pragmatic attitude encouraged scientific planning. . . . Long suspect because associated with notions of regimentation and of socialism, some form of planning was nevertheless imposed on governments by the growing complexity of modern economy and by the fragmentation of administration in the United States. —Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind, 1950, pp. 336, 340
W
hen the construction dust had settled at the Port Authority bus terminal in December 1950, the residents of the nation’s largest metropolis could look with wonderment—and perhaps with some pride—at what had been accomplished in the past three decades: a new kind of public agency had been designed and put into operation, the hostility of local and state officials and influential corporate groups had been overcome, an impressive set of bridges, tunnels, and land terminals had been constructed, and major improvements in the region’s seaport and air transportation systems were underway. By 1950 the Port Authority’s facilities served millions of travelers and shippers a year and were a vital force in the region’s transport system and its general economy.1 In reaching these goals, scientific analysis and political pragmatism had been combined in interesting ways through three decades; and taken all together, the cluster of planning, engineering, and political achievements across these years comprised, perhaps, one of the most creative and successful slices of America’s urban history. But was its success purchased at too large a cost? Some thought so; some think so still. In the paragraphs that follow, I offer some reflections on three aspects of this Port Authority story. First, what contribution does the agency’s creation and evolution make to our understanding of American history in the 359
14-1. The Port of New York Authority’s aiports, marine terminals, bridges, tunnels, and other facilities in 1950. See also Note 1.
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twentieth century? Second, what can we learn from this experience about the nature and conditions of public leadership? Finally, what lessons does this story offer regarding the tension between effective action and democratic accountability?
The Port Authority and Political Reform The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics. . . . This discrimination between administration and politics is now, happily, too obvious to need further discussion. —Woodrow Wilson, Political Science Quarterly, 18872
Wilson’s argument is normative, not descriptive. Administrative activities should be insulated from political pressures and deal-making, he argued; and a major challenge for those who would improve the American system of government was to find ways to achieve that difficult goal. During the first years of the twentieth century, that Wilsonian theme became an important aim for Progressive reformers in the New York region and across the country. In this volume, we have concentrated on the branch of Progressivism which sought to bring the standards of insulation and efficiency to regional issues; and whose adherents, led by Julius Henry Cohen and his associates, directed their attention toward the need for improved transportation as a crucial route toward ensuring economic growth in New York City and its hinterland. One contribution of this volume, then, is to provide a slice of political history, focused on this bi-state metropolis. Here we have followed the forces that led to the creation of a new kind of governmental agency, the modern public authority, and the strategies through which the New York progenitor was able to carry a distinctive banner of Progressivism into the 1920s and beyond. The struggle to persuade the nation’s railroads to embrace cooperative planning in the name of efficiency; the efforts to overcome localism and interstate antagonisms in order to build a series of major bridges and tunnels in the 1920s and 1930s; and the sustained campaigns in the 1940s for airport development and an interstate bus terminal—all these can be viewed as extensions of the Progressive thesis that scientific expertise and rational planning should be applied to important social issues, and that this could best be done through special public agencies which are insulated from “the hurry and strife of politics.”
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Moreover, as already noted, those activities—and indeed the wide range of initiatives by the Port Authority during its first three decades and more— were also enlivened by the sense of optimism which suffused the Progressive campaigns in the years before World War I, and which for the next several decades animated this new public agency under Cohen, Ammann, and Tobin.3 Two nation-wide campaigns in which the Port Authority had a crucial role illustrate this sense of optimism—as well as the lively possibilities, inherent in a federal system, for marshalling regional energies to challenge national power, and to respond creatively to social problems when the national government fails to act. Again, Woodrow Wilson captured this theme in his 1887 essay, as he sought principles which would be “congenial to American habit”: “Our duty is to supply the best possible life to a federal organization, to systems within systems; to make town, city, county, state, and federal governments live with a like strength . . . keeping each unquestionably its own master and yet making all interdependent and co-operative.”4 That happy result would be possible, as Louis Brandeis and other Wilsonians warned, only if each state were permitted to “remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.”5 These intertwined arguments for experimentation and interdependence are exemplified by the Port Authority’s successful fight to defend tax exemption for municipal bonds, and by the campaign against the airlines’ monopoly power—a campaign carried out by a nation-wide coalition of state and local agencies, while the federal government sat on the sidelines. For those who would look to our states and cities for new ways to improve efficiency in public projects and programs, the planning and execution of the bus-terminal project also offers an encouraging example. And to advocates of compassionate policies when our most vulnerable citizens are affected, the relocation methods devised by Tobin’s aides, and later emulated by New York State and other public bodies, are instructive.6 In the current era of renewed attention to state and local initiatives and energy, the patterns described in this study should be of particular interest. As Justice Anthony Kennedy recently observed, the states can still be “laboratories for experimentation,” trying out a variety of strategies when “the best solution is far from clear.”7 The Port Authority story is important, as these comments suggest, not only to those who have a local interest, directed toward understanding the causal forces that shaped transportation developments in the New York re-
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gion during the first half of this century, and the patterns of regional job movement and residential change that were influenced by those transportation improvements. Beyond its own region, the agency’s leadership in the campaign to protect tax-exempt bonds has been a key force in protecting the capacity of cities and states across the country to finance their preferred capital needs. And the airport coalition which its leaders knit together was an important factor in speeding the modernization of air travel throughout the United States. Moreover, the Port of New York Authority was the first governmental agency in the United States to be called an “authority” and the first public agency which relied on revenue bonds and user payments (rather than general taxes) to carry out large capital projects. Therefore, once its first decade’s activities were viewed as successful, and its accomplishments were heralded as linked to its “nonpolitical” and “businesslike” demeanor, the “port authority model” was propelled into widespread use; dozens, then hundreds sprouted in the cities and regions of America and then abroad.8 In addition, as I suggested in chapter 4, the Port Authority story can contribute to our understanding of the continuing tension between localism and the forces of rationalism and national centralization. Samuel Hays points out that the political evolution of modern America can be viewed in terms of a sustained conflict between “grass-roots impulses,” on the one hand, and “the spirit of science and technology, of rational system and organization,” whose champions would shift the locus of political decisionmaking away from communities, and toward the preferences of national actors intertwined with large technological changes. The Port Authority’s battles in the fields of air transport and maritime projects illustrate the argument that “rational system” joined with technological change may try to undermine localism—and sometimes win out. And it is true that the Port agency tended to calculate benefits and costs for the region as a whole, valuing less than local leaders the negative impacts that might be felt in Jersey City, or Fort Lee, or Brooklyn.9 However, the Port agency’s cudgel was also used to battle against national interests—the organized railroads and the air transport monopolists— on behalf of regional priorities (and regional efficiency), and even, in the AOC fight, on behalf of localism joined to professionalism. Nor does the busterminal story fit the Haysian generalization; in that long campaign against Robert Moses and his friends, described in chapter 13, the Port Authority’s “spirit . . . of rational system” seemed in some harmony with the preference of city residents and other localized interests.
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Leadership in American Politics Government management tends to be driven by the constraints on the organization, not the tasks of the organization. . . . Whereas business management focuses on the “bottom line” (that is, profits), government management focuses on the “top line” (that is, constraints). —James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 1989, p. 115
A crucial argument in Bureaucracy is that public agencies are burdened by heavy shackles placed on their activities by legislatures, courts, politicians, and interest groups. As a result, their leaders must devote much of their energy to meeting “the demands of these external entities.” This is the fate, Wilson concludes, of “all government agencies.”10 No reader of the stories analyzed in this volume would find Wilson’s generalizations adequate to the Port Authority’s history. In part, the explanation is that some government agencies—the Port Authority among them—have been designed so that their officials can exercise greater control over their program goals, financing, and other factors than is true of line departments in municipal and state governments.11 So perhaps Wilson is correct about government organizations generally; and one solution might be to design more public agencies as semi-autonomous authorities—so that they can focus more fully on their tasks and how to achieve their goals efficiently. In fact, building on the experience of public authorities in the early postwar decades, this has been a prominent argument in recent years. We see it, for example, in the creation of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority in 1987; in the recurrent campaign to place major functions of the Federal Aviation Agency in a new “Federal Aviation Corporation,” which might be given the kind of autonomy in financing and in modernization strategies associated traditionally with the strongest port authorities; and in the proposal by New York City’s mayor to create an Infrastructure Financing Authority, which would have an independent source of income and be expected to place high priority on ensuring construction integrity coupled with disciplined cost control.12 But this response would not satisfy James Q. Wilson’s standard. In fact, he uses one of the existing government corporations—the U.S. Postal Service— to illustrate his general and pessimistic argument. Wilson does refer to some positive results from creating this semi-independent agency. For example, he notes that the old department rarely closed a small local post office (because of opposition from the local member of Congress), but that once it was trans-
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formed in 1971 into the “semiautonomous” USPS, it was able to close inefficient offices at a rate which reached 200 per year in the 1980s. The new agency also determined to set postage rates high enough so that each class of mail would be self-supporting; and though some interest groups opposed that change, the agency emerged victorious. Moreover, the USPS was given the power to raise capital by issuing bonds, as Wilson notes, and therefore it has been able to move ahead rapidly to automate mail sorting. But it has not won every battle: Congressional pressure has blocked the USPS from ending Saturday mail deliveries and raised new hurdles to closing rural post offices. To Wilson, the bottom line of the Postal Service story is that it illustrates his general argument—“political supervision of the factors of production leads managers to become constraint-oriented rather than task-oriented.”13 However, his description could be interpreted quite differently—focusing on how much has been accomplished by USPS executives, who surely must have been at least partly oriented to task, in order to carry out the closings and modernization that Wilson and his sources have praised. Perhaps the difference in how one evaluates the Postal Service story—and how, more generally, one views the prospects for energetic leadership in government—can be captured by a familiar image: Is the glass half full or half empty? The government executive (or observer) who focuses on constraints will find them endlessly, and may be rendered immobile. Even the semi-independent Port Authority could (like the Postal Service) be blocked by its political supervisors—by gubernatorial vetoes, legislative action or inaction, and the refusal of local governments to yield up their airports and marine terminals. It could be, and sometimes it was—by the ICC leaders and other federal officials whose failure to act in the 1920s doomed the Port agency’s regional rail plan; by New York City, which refused throughout the 1940s and beyond to turn over the city-owned piers; and for several years, by those who stood in the way of the bus-terminal project. To the Port Authority’s leaders, however—to Cohen, Ammann, and Tobin, and to Commissioners Outerbridge, Cullman, Byrne, and a few other key members of the Board—the glass was viewed as half full, as they focused their efforts on tasks that needed to be done to satisfy their own energy and ambition, and often to serve the wider needs of the metropolis as well. Of course energy and ambition would not serve alone; the Authority’s leaders in those decades also required strategic skills of a high order: they had to be able to thread their way through the political fragmentation and hostilities of a complex region, to build alliances in support of their plans, and (to paraphrase William Riker) to “structure the world so they could win.”
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This is not a perspective and set of strategies that is unique, among government organizations, to the Port of New York Authority. “Entrepreneurial” leadership—as defined by Schumpeter and employed in this study—can be found in many government agencies. We find it at various times in the semiindependent authorities of Los Angeles, Oakland, and Washington state, in the metropolitan regions of Boston and Washington, D.C., and in the Tennessee Valley. A similar brand of leadership appears at times in state and national line agencies concerned with public health. At the national level, we can also see the main elements of entrepreneurial action in NASA under James Webb, in Hyman Rickover’s adroit leadership of the nuclear ship program, in Nancy Hanks’ skilled efforts at the National Endowment of the Arts, and in the strategies of Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball to create and maintain the Social Security program.14 The selective nature of the pessimistic (or “half empty”) perspective is illustrated in Wilson’s treatment of some important changes in military programs. In a gloomy discussion of the aversion of government agencies to embracing “real innovations,” Wilson argues that “many important changes in the military” were “reactions to political demands: Some key air force generals were at first reluctant to develop the intercontinental missile; the navy for a long time was unsure about the desirability of a submarine-launch missile program.”15 Would it not be possible to use a similar tone in describing the Port Authority’s history between 1921 and 1950? The agency’s leaders were reluctant to expand the agency’s mission to include projects for motor vehicles, and external pressures were crucial in bringing about this major change. Moreover, the Port Authority’s decision to propose a large bus terminal in Manhattan was, certainly, a “reaction to political demands” from officials in the LaGuardia Administration.16 However, the relationship between any public agency and its surroundings is likely to be interactive and dynamic. The challenge for entrepreneurial leaders is to respond in creative ways to external demands, and on occasion to help create such “external demands” so that they can serve as tools on behalf of the leader’s own goals. Wilson’s argument sharply underplays this dynamic. Yet Wilson is too good an observer and scholar to miss entirely the optimistic possibilities for leadership that inhere in government agencies and their environments. His own analysis includes striking examples of leaders who were focused on task and who have had a major impact in changing organizational missions and behavior—in the Marine Corps in the 1930s, for example, in the FBI under Clarence Kelley in the 1970s, and at the Federal Trade Commission under Caspar Weinberger.17 To Wilson, however, em-
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ploying his lens of dubiety, the prospects for such entrepreneurial behavior in government are very rare. But when he finds those rare “gifted political executives,” Wilson embraces them with a modest passion. They are able to succeed, he observes, because they “do more than merely acquire constituency support; they project a compelling vision of the tasks, culture, and importance of their agencies.” The “greatest executives,” Wilson concludes, “infuse their organizations with value and convince others that this value is not merely useful to the bureau but essential to the polity.”18 In these moments of enthusiasm, Wilson may reach too far. His prominent examples of this high state include J. Edgar Hoover and Robert Moses, whose entrepreneurial skills are generally seen as deeply intertwined with abuse of power. In a democratic society, surely, the true measure of “greatness”—of both public agencies and their leaders—must take us beyond the rhetorical and strategic strengths Wilson emphasizes; we need to examine the ethical dimension of leadership as well.19
Accountability, Integrity and Prudence In the ethical realm, the entrepreneurial model confronts massive resistance. The principal obstacle . . . is its apparent conflict with democratic theory. —Colin Diver, “Engineers and Entrepreneurs,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (1982), pp. 403–404
As Colin Diver suggests, the kind of leadership needed to meet complex social problems—requiring flexibility and initiative, the capacity to marshal resources quickly, and the ability to act with vigor and sustained attention to long-term goals—will often conflict with the traditional standards used in the United States to ensure democratic accountability. This tension is especially evident in the public authority, which is consciously designed to be “insulated” from partisan politics and the direct control of elected officials. Yet the conflict is a continuing challenge for all public executives whose agencies operate in an environment with changing societal needs and whose employees must use judgment and discretion.20 In our public discourse, as in the scholarly literature, the tension between accountability and effective action is often framed as a zero-sum game: to achieve high levels of efficiency and effectiveness requires insulation from the normal play of democratic politics. The New York Times, looking back in
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1950 at the Port Authority’s record, cast the issue in this way: “It is independent, or autonomous, because it was planned that way, for only in the independence from political pressures, from selfish unilateral greeds and from the appetite for patronage or favor could the improvement of the port district go forward to the general good.”21 The newspaper reporter who followed the Port Authority’s work most closely during the 1930s and 1940s, and who often wrote critically about its activities, underscored the apparent trade-off, as he reflected on the agency at mid-century: There are two things that strike the casual observer upon stepping from a City Hall into the 15-story building which houses the authority. . . . The first is the private-business atmosphere in which the public agency conducts its operations. The second is the incredible vigor and efficiency of the authority organization, as contrasted with the slumberland of the average City Hall.22
Stressing the downside of the agency’s energy and autonomy, the Daily Mirror attacked the Port Authority as “virtually a sovereign entity within itself” and argued that the state legislatures must “define the precise limits of its powers. . . . It is perilous practice in a democracy to build up a super-state however noble its administration and monumental its accomplishments.”23 Perhaps, however, there is a more nuanced way to consider these issues of insulation and effectiveness. In their recent writings, Philip Selznick and Patrick Dobel grapple with this problem in a particularly helpful way. In The Moral Commonwealth, Selznick observes that the “conflicting demands of autonomy and responsiveness” are present in every public agency, but that they are “especially important” in public authorities which have substantial financial autonomy, coupled with “broad discretion to use their resources as they see fit.” He acknowledges the tendency for officials of these enterprises to frame their goals narrowly and then define their options as if only technical requirements need be considered. The challenge as he sees it is to find ways to enlarge accountability “without giving up the main benefit of autonomy: long-range, flexible, purposive, ‘nonpolitical’ management.”24 The solution, for Selznick, comes in two parts—external standards which elected officials and courts can use to monitor and evaluate the agency’s activities; and the development, inside the agency, of an “inner commitment to moral restraint and aspiration.” This internal ethical structure should be derived, he argues, from a careful analysis of the long-term functions which the
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agency is expected to serve in its city or wider region. An adequate moral structure requires that the organization’s leaders and other members continually engage in “moral reasoning”—asking, “Are the postulated ends worth pursuing, in the light of the means they seem to require? . . . What costs are imposed on other ends and other values?” This reflective ethical stance should properly have a deep influence on the culture and programs of the agency—especially in the independent authority, and most likely in every government body.25 Selznick’s way of framing the issue alerts us to important questions that should be asked in determining whether the policies and programs of the Port Authority—or of any government agency—adequately meet the test of “democratic accountability.” Do clear standards exist, and can they actually be used by the public and its elected officials to monitor the agency’s activities? Also, do the agency’s leaders define their mission broadly—or do they focus on technical matters, coupled with efforts to persuade their staff (and the wider public) that engineering and economic calculations are the only legitimate measures, in evaluating the agency’s work? More generally, does the government agency meet the standards of accountability and responsiveness sufficiently to justify its current level of autonomy, or should changes, small or large, be made to bring it under tighter control? In “Integrity in the Public Service” and his other works, Dobel constructs a framework for assessing the ethical behavior of public organizations which is compatible with Selznick’s perspective and which expands our understanding further, directing our attention to dimensions of the Port Authority’s ethical stance which should be crucial in our assessment. Dobel’s account identifies three models which might be used (and often are used) by executives in making policy decisions and in justifying their actions. However, each model “standing alone generates abuses inherent in its logic,” and to operate at a high ethical standard, leaders must make conscious use of all three, holding “each of them in tension as they frame judgments and actions.”26 The first of the three perspectives (the legal-institutional model) requires that laws and rules be clear, that discretion be highly limited, and that agency officials carry out their tasks under those tight constraints; thereby, “democratic accountability” would be assured. Applied to the field of public authorities, this standard would ask that legislatures provide detailed laws and compel authority executives to obtain approval from elected officials before undertaking new program initiatives or making modest changes in existing programs.27 If carried too far this strategy might, as Dobel suggests, produce a set of public officials who are “timid, reactive, and rule-bound”; the benefits of autonomy which Selznick describes would be lost.
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The second approach emphasizes personal responsibility. Officials are expected to be alert to the implications or results of existing programs and plans which would violate their personal sense of a moral society; they should then use that standard to shape their own behavior—leading (when that personal standard is violated) to dissent from existing policy, to efforts to alter programs, and to resignation when necessary. However, to embrace this as the predominant guide for individual action may lead to abuses, Dobel warns, as the strongly motivated but illegal actions of Iran-contra participants illustrate.28 Dobel’s third model directs our attention to the “effectiveness” side of the tension with accountability. But his way of exploring this perspective broadens it beyond the usual definition, which emphasizes the ability to achieve the agency’s goals—to build bridges and tunnels, for example; to take control of and modernize the region’s airports; to construct a massive bus terminal in crowded New York. Instead, Dobel frames the third perspective as prudential action, which should be guided not only by a search for program effectiveness (does the airport function well?) but more: “Public officials have added responsibilities beyond their immediate policy goals. They are charged to preserve and protect the legitimacy of [democratic] political authority. Every official act builds or tears down regime legitimacy, and these realities should be factored into political prudence.”29 For Dobel as for Selznick, then, the leaders of complex organizations should be sensitive to wider social values and potential costs; they must be concerned, for example, with the question of whether new policy initiatives and program changes will strengthen or weaken the citizen’s confidence in the institutions of governance. How well did the Port Authority—in the era of Cohen, Ammann, and Tobin—meet the criteria set down by Selznick and Dobel? We can begin by noting that all three officials embraced a Progressive standard of the use of public power to meet important social needs: If long-term planning and investment were required, the design for action should place responsibility very substantially in the hands of experts. The public should have a voice, certainly, but that voice should be muted, expressed through filters, kept at bay so it does not lead to meddling in the daily details of action—so that (as the New York Times argued in 1950) “selfish unilateral greeds” and “the appetite for patronage” would not erode the quality of decisions or the capacity to take action with skill and energy. Who, among those who have followed the travails of public agencies in the 1980s and 1990s, would deny the relevance of the Times’ warning for today? Moreover, the Port Authority’s early leaders could not embrace accountability via the legal-institutional model. As we saw in chapter 2, Cohen hoped
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to give to his new enterprise almost unrestricted control over development decisions, and the laws that were finally accepted at Albany and Trenton did give wide discretion to the agency. He resisted plans to give veto power to the governors; and he was ready to challenge the veto power in court if it had been used in ways that Cohen considered in conflict with the independence that he thought the Port Authority must have. But Cohen was a product of his own times, too deeply engaged, perhaps, in battles against New York’s Tammany Hall and the Hudson County machine of Frank Hague to appreciate the benefits of a vigorous and observant local polity—and the advantage too of disciplined oversight by the states’ governors.30 Austin Tobin held a more complex view. Political prudence, as Dobel defines it, motivated much of his action. Tobin accepted the governors’ veto power, where Cohen did not, as essential to the legitimacy of the whole Port Authority enterprise; to resist that control would not only be politically risky, it would also undermine the connection between entrepreneurial public action and the appropriate supervision by elected officials. Similarly, in the tax-exempt bond fight, Tobin campaigned in defense of the ability of local governments to carry out their own programs, against what he thought were oppressive actions by the national government. For those who judged that he acted mainly to advance his own reputation, it is useful to note that the viability and the quality of local government were also his concern a decade later in the battle against the airlines. And if skeptics respond by arguing that the municipal-bonds battle and the fight for airports were led by Tobin and his Port Authority mainly because those campaigns strengthened their own political power, might we answer: Then perhaps the Port Authority was well designed, if its “self-interested actions” led to outcomes that were socially beneficial. In the case of the national airport alliance, at least, that is almost certainly the right answer.31 As one looks more closely at the 1930s and the 1940s, the “Tobin dimension” is almost endlessly instructive. His strategy for grass-roots activity to shape Congressional action, described in chapter 10, broke new ground in political campaigning on national issues. But does that dimension advance or tear down the quality of our democracy? The issue is worth pondering, and in the 1990s it was still unresolved. What of his strategic actions to take control of the region’s airports, which undercut the power of Robert Moses and the preferences of New York’s mayor and Newark’s elected officials? Did they damage the vitality of democracy in those cities? My own sense is that they probably did; had the airports and Newark’s seaport been more directly accountable to local elected officials in the 1940s and 1950s, their citi-
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zens might have been forced to confront the pros and cons of allowing short-term patronage advantages to overwhelm the economic-development potential of their undercapitalized airports and marine terminals. But would political reform and more effective city programs have followed? Perhaps not. Note that New York City successfully resisted the Port Authority’s efforts to take control of the City’s marine terminals; and during the next two decades the City’s maritime facilities, continuously under-funded and patronage-ridden, fell into the harbor while the Port Authority’s Newark and Elizabeth seaport thrived.32 Or to take another slice of the Tobin story: When he resisted the antiSemitism of his boss, Frank Ferguson, he displayed the kind of personal integrity which Dobel identifies as a distinctive ethical stance. However, perhaps Tobin should have pressed the issue even more strongly in his first months in office, threatening to resign. His willingness to endure Ferguson’s behavior lasted from 1942 until early 1945, and led to the loss of two of his most imaginative associates. On the other hand, he kept fighting and ultimately won a victory—which might have been lost had he forced the issue earlier.33 A few years later, as described in chapter 13, Tobin faced an array of ethical issues—the Moses stratagem to undermine the Port Authority’s plans for a bus terminal, the problem of relocating the tenants in the path of the terminal, and political pressures to award the main construction contract to the firm which was most influential politically. Here, his standards of personal integrity and the criterion of prudence were mutually reinforcing, producing an array of battles and administrative actions that while fraught with risk offered great potential benefits as well. In a recent essay, Gertrude Himmelfarb reminds us that, rightly understood, politics consists of more than “the struggle for money, power, privilege, position.” Political action also embraces “the attempt to restrain those self-serving motives, to create out of them, or to impose upon them, a structure of government that will serve society as a whole.”34 The story told in this volume illustrates both the narrow and the wider view of what politics is about, and one lesson of this history is that conscious and sustained efforts in the public arena can sometimes yield a positive result. Narrowly self-interested behavior will be part of the mix, and chance will make its contribution too. But with energy, optimism and skill, entrepreneurs in government can ofttimes achieve real benefits both for the citizens they are directly charged with assisting and for the wider society.
Epilogue
Triumphs and Travails of an Aging Empire
N
early half a century has passed since the Manhattan bus terminal received its first passengers and the Port Authority turned to the challenges of the 1950s and beyond. Like the first 30 years of the Port Authority’s life, these decades have been marked by sharp political conflicts, by impressive accomplishments and significant failures, and by periods of drift—when patronage and pork-barrel demands have eroded the agency’s financial and human capital. In the pages below, I review the major developments since 1950, which tend to illustrate and reinforce the main themes considered in chapter 14— the tensions between insulation and close accountability to elected officials; the optimism and readiness to try new initiatives embodied in Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs; and the challenge of maintaining a coherent mission and staff esprit in the face of daunting political pressures. This compact summary is delivered to the reader’s plate in two servings. The first extends from 1950 to 1971, when Austin Tobin left the bi-state agency; and the second stretches from 1972 to the present, as the Port Authority’s leaders and the governors have struggled with the issue of how best to use the agency’s energy, and its profits. Today, the Port Authority’s array of activities still contributes in important ways to economic growth across the bi-state metropolis, and, effectively led, it has the ability to do more. Whether that potential can be realized will depend, as it has throughout its history, on the capacity of the states’ chief executives to provide the kind of disciplined policy oversight offered by Al Smith in the 1920s and by Governors Dewey and Driscoll in the 1940s. As the final pages of the Epilogue will show, the recent history of gubernatorial inattention to the regional mission and potential of the Port Authority indicates that the necessary political will—and sense of vision—required at the state capitals is notable by its absence, as it has been for much of the past three decades. With a dose of Julius Henry Cohen’s optimism, however, we might anticipate that the new century will offer greater opportunities to this tethered empire, still one of the nation’s most interesting regional governments. 373
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1950–1971: Creative Energy, Missteps, and Austin Tobin’s Final Conflicts These were Tobin’s years; and the institution, both in its strengths and in its weaknesses, largely illustrated Emerson’s aphorism that “an institution is the lengthened shadow of one man.” During the 1950s, an array of initiatives and accomplishments at the Port Authority showed Tobin at his best—and illustrated as well the advantages of insulation and of a wide field of choices across which an entrepreneurial leader might roam. Throughout these years, and into the 1960s, Tobin and his team exemplified Schumpeter’s classic entrepreneur, as they had in the 1930s and 1940s, in their “joy of creating, of getting things done” and their readiness to do battle against those who stood in their way.1 Yet in the 1950s, we see also evidence of vulnerability—in Tobin’s impatience with democratic oversight as it was embodied in the governors’ demands; in his preference to fight when compromise might better serve the interests of the Port agency; and as to two major projects—the World Trade Center and a proposed new airport—in a thinning of the strategic skills displayed in the 1940s, together with a willingness to set aside expert analysis when it conflicted with the pursuit of monumental projects. These weaknesses extended into the 1960s and beyond, undermining the Port Authority’s reputation and Tobin’s ability to lead the agency. Finally, in December 1971, he suddenly departed, in frustration and anger, leaving an extraordinary legacy of achievements—but an agency which no longer commanded wide support at the state capitals, or among local leaders, or in the press. It was an agency already going adrift. The two most important accomplishments of these decades were the Port Authority’s role in developing containerport operations, and the joint effort with Robert Moses to expand the region’s arterial highway system. Innovations in Shipping The story of containerization, with its revolutionary impact on freight transport in the U.S. and around the world, began at Port Newark in the mid-1950s. Until 1955, the Port agency had pursued a strategy of trying to take control of traditional pier operations on both sides of the Hudson. In 1947, as recounted in chapter 11, Tobin and his aides had taken responsibility for Port Newark. In 1948 and 1949, they had also submitted proposals to capture New York City’s 200 docks and piers, but those plans had been rejected by New York City’s governing body. The agency was more
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successful at Hoboken; after five years of arduous negotiations, the city fathers signed an agreement in 1952, and the Port agency soon began building and operating new terminals along the Hoboken waterfront, across the Hudson River from Manhattan.2 By 1955, freight tonnage handled at Port Newark and Hoboken was increasing by more than 15 percent a year, and it seemed clear to Tobin and his marine terminals director, Lyle King, that more pier space was needed. Again, the well-honed approach was used: New Jersey’s governor, Robert Meyner, was prompted to ask for a study; the Port agency quickly responded; and in December 1955, Governor Meyner announced that the Port Authority would extend its Newark facility to the south, into the city of Elizabeth; the ElizabethPort Authority Piers would be built on 640 acres of tidal marshlands.3 The Authority’s plan seemed initially to be no more than an expansion of the standard marine terminal (with break-bulk loading and unloading, and the use of storage sheds on the docks), but informal discussions were already underway that would make Elizabeth a major project in revolutionizing the nation’s cargo-handling system. Those conversations began during the early months of 1954, when Malcom McLean, the president of McLean Trucking, approached Tobin and Lyle King to inquire whether the Port Authority would join forces with his firm to create a new system for transferring freight from trucks to ships. Rather than unloading truck freight into dockside storage sheds, and then hoisting it “break-bulk” onto ships, the entire truck trailers (all but the motorized cab and flat body on wheels) would be lifted by cranes and stacked on specially designed ships. Tobin, King and McLean soon reached an agreement: one of Port Newark’s docks was modified so that trucks could be brought near ship berths, and cranes then lifted the truck trailers (or “containers”) on board. On April 26, 1956 the first “container ship,” owned by McLean’s Sea-Land firm, was loaded at Newark with 58 truck trailers for its maiden voyage, to Houston. Sea-Land added service from Newark to Puerto Rico in 1958, and McLean then sought to extend service to the West Coast and to Europe. However, the McLean innovation encountered skepticism from steamship companies and some port executives, who doubted that the large capital investments needed to redesign piers and storage areas could be justified. Realizing that the Newark/Elizabeth innovation would be successful only if other ports could send and receive containers, Tobin, King, and the Port Commerce staff under Clifford O’Hara worked with port officials in Oakland, Rotterdam, and other cities to overcome their reluctance. Meanwhile,
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the initial phase of the Elizabeth project was redesigned for container service, and in 1962 Sea-Land became its first tenant. By then, Oakland’s port officials had invested in container facilities, and Sea-Land added service to that port; and in 1966 service was initiated to Rotterdam. During the next decade, with its open docks and its vast upland storage area for containers, Elizabeth became the centerpiece of the Port agency’s innovative effort, and the largest containerport in the world. What had once seemed a risky venture for the Port Authority was, by the 1970s, a widely acclaimed success.4 New Bridges and Highways The second major achievement of the 1950s and 1960s was the arterial program devised by the Port Authority, jointly with Robert Moses, which led to the construction of the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge joining Staten Island and Brooklyn, the Throgs Neck crossing (from The Bronx over the East River into Queens, east of LaGuardia Airport), and the lower deck of the George Washington Bridge—as well as a new interstate highway, Route 80, in New Jersey and an array of related highway projects. That complex effort had its origins in the early 1950s, when Moses and Tobin overcame their earlier history of conflict.5 As traffic congestion built up throughout the region in these years, new arterial roadways seemed essential. Since the Port Authority was limited to interstate crossings, while Moses’ agencies had to operate entirely within New York State, neither could meet this region-wide problem by acting alone. If they cooperated, however, they could enhance the opportunities available to both, including possible additions to the magnificent string of bridges which had brought acclaim to Moses and the Port agency in earlier decades.6 A joint program did emerge in 1954. But how? There are two distinct and plausible explanations, and both are summarized below. According to Moses’ biographer, Robert Caro, Moses conceived the entire plan, laid the program before a surprised Austin Tobin and his commissioners, and persuaded them to help Moses carry out his proposals. More specifically, Caro’s history goes this way: During 1953, Moses thought about his grand dreams—for new bridges and highways and other enterprises—and he looked at his resources, which were “nowhere near as vast as his dreams.” He thought about a great bridge over the Narrows, and he also envisioned a span across the East River at Throgs Neck, which he “must get underway as soon as possible.” Then he thought about the advantages of joining forces with “his old foe,” the Port Authority.7 The Port Authority had even more surplus funds available to invest in new projects than Moses’ Triborough Authority; but while it was “long on cash,” Caro writes, the bi-state agency was “short on dreams.” The “vision-
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aries who had created it” were “long gone from its councils.” They had been replaced by “money men like Cullman and Colt and Pope, whose eyes were brightened by the balances in the Authority’s ledgers, not by the potentialities for improving the common weal that those balances represented.” Of course the Port Authority did have some plans, but they were “unrelated plans, plans for individual projects, joined by no link” other than the prospect for more profit. Though the Port agency had more money than Moses, it had “no more than a fraction of his creative vision.” So, in Caro’s version, Moses worked out a detailed arterial program before he conferred with the bi-state agency. Then, “sometime late in 1953 or early 1954, over luncheon at Randall’s Island, he broached to the Port Authority board a plan of staggering scope.” By February 1954 the Port agency had agreed to join forces to carry out “Moses’ plan”; a joint study was then carried out, and in January 1955 the joint report was released to the press. The highways and bridges which “Robert Moses had laid out under the Joint Program” were, Caro concludes, “the creations of a single individual, public works sprung from that individual’s private creative vision, financed and approved as a result of his unique political genius.”8 A stirring story. But is the history accurate, the flattery deserved? Based on evidence available in Port Authority documents, and through interviews, an alternative history seems much closer to the mark.9 By early 1953, traffic congestion at the Lincoln and Holland tunnels and the George Washington Bridge had become severe, especially during rush hours, and business leaders and others urged the Port Authority to construct additional tunnels or bridges between New Jersey and Manhattan. A second tube at the Lincoln Tunnel had been opened in the late 1940s and a third tube would be completed in 1957. There was pressure from influential business executives to move forward quickly with plans to add a third tube to the Holland Tunnel, which entered Manhattan near Canal Street. However, when the Port agency’s staff studied traffic patterns in 1951–52, it seemed clear that any additional crossings into Manhattan would be useful only during rush hours and would not, therefore, generate enough traffic to pay for construction and operation. Moreover, when the planning staff under Roger Gilman (Walter Hedden’s successor), analyzed the traffic patterns of those who used the trans-Hudson vehicular crossings, it became clear that many of these automobile and truck drivers started their trips outside the congested center of the region and also wanted to reach destinations outside the core—out on Long Island, or in Westchester and New England to the north, or in suburban New Jersey, and points south and west.
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Gilman and his planners then conferred with Tobin, and it seemed to them far more sensible to design ways to permit these travelers to go around the clogged centers of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Newark and Hudson County, rather than forcing additional roads through those densely populated centers—as Moses wanted to do with his proposals for new expressways in the heart of Manhattan.10 A southern route around Manhattan could send travelers from New Jersey onto Staten Island (happily over Port Authority bridges, which were lightly used and not paying their own way), and then across a new bridge over the Narrows—the waterway that links the Atlantic Ocean to Upper New York Bay. That bridge would land near the southern end of Brooklyn, where trucks and automobiles could continue to destinations in the outer boroughs and Long Island suburbs. In the first weeks of 1953, Tobin conferred with George Spargo, general manager of Moses’ Triborough Authority, who said that Triborough “might be in a [financial] position to go forward with such a bridge” by the late 1950s.11 During the spring and summer of 1953, Gilman and his staff sketched out a set of highway routes that could respond to these growing “circumferential” traffic patterns and discussed them with Tobin and the Port Authority commissioners. In addition to the southern bypass over the Narrows, the planners proposed a northern bypass, which would include a new highway (Route 80) bringing traffic from New Jersey to the George Washington Bridge, a second deck on that bridge, and (on the New York side) the CrossBronx Expressway, which was already underway, and the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge (built in the 1930s), which carried traffic across the East River to Queens and Long Island. Tobin obtained the approval of his board for detailed surveys of the possible northern and southern routes, and in the fall of 1953 he visited his old enemy and outlined his proposal for a cooperative study. (“I left the door open behind me when I went in,” Tobin later recalled, “in case I had to make a fast exit.”) But Tobin was welcomed with something close to open arms, for his proposal offered the possibility that Moses could at last create the jewel of the region’s arterial system—the longest single-span bridge in the world across the Narrows. Moses had for years wanted to construct that bridge, but he had been compelled to defer it until Triborough tolls produced the needed money; now Tobin said that the Port Authority could at once advance the funds, which Triborough could later repay.12 During the next year, the two agencies carried out a detailed study of traffic flows and highway congestion. In the spring of 1954, one of the Port agency’s senior planners, Nathan Cherniack, realized that increased traffic over
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the northern bypass route would face a critical bottleneck at the BronxWhitestone span, and he suggested the study be expanded to consider a second crossing to Long Island, parallel to that bridge. With Moses’ consent, a possible span at Throgs Neck was then added to the surveys. By the end of 1954, Moses and the Port Authority had agreed on a detailed region-wide plan, and in January 1955 they announced that they were ready to join forces and construct bridges across the Narrows and at Throgs Neck, double-deck the George Washington span, and with state and federal highway funds go forward with a range of related highway projects, at a total cost of $600 million. In this version of the story, which I find more plausible, the “Moses program” was primarily shaped by the Port Authority’s planners, and Moses and his aides helped to fill in the details, as the two agencies worked together closely throughout 1954.13 During the joint study, the two agencies turned again to their favorite bridge engineer, Othmar Ammann. In the 1920s and 1930s he had had primary responsibility for constructing all the Port Authority’s bridges and the Lincoln Tunnel; and, on loan to Triborough in the 1930s, he was also the chief engineer for the Bronx-Whitestone and Triborough spans. Since leaving the Port Authority in 1939, Ammann had worked on bridge and highway projects as partner in Ammann & Whitney. He now returned to the site of his early triumphs and took charge of the design and construction of all the new bridge projects—the second deck of the George Washington Bridge, the Throgs Neck span, and the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge. All three were completed by 1964, a year before Ammann died, at the age of 86. The arterial program had a modest impact in reducing traffic congestion in the region; but its influence in promoting suburban growth was more significant—especially on Staten Island, which would for the first time have direct vehicular access to Brooklyn and Long Island. Once the two agencies announced that the Narrows Bridge would be part of the joint program, land values and population on the Island began to increase, and they soared in the 1960s and 1970s.14 Rail Transit: an Unloved Visitor Who Would Not Leave In two other important project areas—commuter transit and the World Trade Center— the Port Authority’s efforts proceeded in a series of intertwined steps that revealed important weaknesses as well as continued strengths in the agency’s strategic arsenal. This complex tale began in the late 1940s, when Tobin and his staff explored the possibility of constructing a new rail line to serve commuters and other passengers along the New Jersey shore, op-
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posite Manhattan; the line might also have been extended to Newark Airport. Preliminary studies showed that the transit line would generate continuing deficits, and the Port Authority proceeded no further, adhering to its guideline that it should undertake a project only if it would be selfsupporting in the long run.15 By the early 1950s, however, the Port agency’s coffers brimmed with auto and truck tolls, while suburban rail lines faded financially; and now commuter groups and local elected officials began to target the Port Authority as both a cause of the transit problem and as a solution—particularly if it would transfer a substantial share of its “profits” to the needy rail lines.16 In responding to the public demand for action, Tobin and his aides showed elements of the strategic skill displayed in the earlier airport and bus-terminal battles: They encouraged the creation of a bi-state commission that could study the transit problem; and then they provided most of its funds, but only after the commission agreed to give the Port Authority an important role in shaping the studies. As a result, its officials were able to ensure that the reports would not propose that the Port Authority have a major role in financing the commuter rail system. Instead, the 1957 and 1958 commission reports recommended that the citizens of the 17 counties in the study area form a transit district and tax themselves in order to subsidize and improve the commuter rail system. Unfortunately for Tobin and his colleagues, that stratagem was unsuccessful. New Jersey’s state legislature rejected the tax district, and critics of the Port agency introduced a bill that would direct the Port Authority itself to “develop, improve and coordinate” rail passenger operations in the bi-state region. Testifying at a hearing in Trenton in November 1958, Tobin argued that his agency did not have the funds to take on that large task, and in a desperate plea for absolution, he concluded, “I think the Port Authority has done everything that it can to help try to find a solution. . . . We have nothing more to contribute to this problem.”17 Traditionally, the state’s governors had accepted the Port Authority’s position that it should not throw its energies and cash into rail transit. By 1958, however, several of the commuter railroads were heading toward bankruptcy, and the states were under pressure to find a way to save commuter service. In the fall of 1958, Nelson Rockefeller was elected governor of New York, after campaigning on a pledge to take action to meet the commuter crisis; and with service on the New Jersey rail lines deteriorating, its governor, Robert Meyner, also began to look for ways to use surpluses from road-building authorities to help underwrite rail transit deficits. Since the
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governors could use the veto power to force the Port Authority to allocate resources to the rail crisis, the agency now faced a far more credible threat than it had in recent decades.18 Meanwhile, the Port Authority’s yearly reserves had been growing at an alarming rate—alarming because large surpluses would make the agency especially vulnerable to demands that its “excess” funds be siphoned off to pay for rail commuter service. In 1956, the agency’s reserves had totaled $37 million; by 1958 they had reached more than $64 million; in 1960 they would be nearly $80 million. As those totals continued to rise, the pressures to use its funds to meet rail deficits might become overwhelming; and, once the agency’s revenues were directed toward the “bottomless pit” of rail transit deficits, would there be anything left for new projects in other areas, where the Port agency could see greater benefits for itself and for the region? One might reasonably wonder. In 1958 those rail deficits probably totaled more than $140 million a year, and to saddle the Port Authority with substantial portions of that total was a gloomy prospect.19 With this rail-transit cloud overhead, what could the Port Authority do? There were at least two possible lines of response. First, Tobin and his aides could have drawn upon their experience in the 1930s, when they had constructed an alliance to meet FDR’s challenge on tax-exempt bonds, and in the 1940s, when they had built a coalition which could ensure adequate financing for airport modernization and operation. From this perspective, they might have sought to persuade state officials to join in a wide-ranging coalition to maintain the region’s rail service—offering to use some Port Authority moneys, with restrictions so the agency could still act energetically in other areas, if the governors also agreed to use substantial state and local tax funds. Prospects for success of such a joint venture were uncertain—but in its battles against FDR, and against the airlines in the 1940s, the Port Authority had also faced large odds.20 Alternatively, Tobin and his aides could seek new projects outside the rail-transit area—projects large enough that they might absorb a major portion of those surpluses, thus undercutting the argument that the states could rely on the Port agency’s funds to solve the rail problem. Embracing this option, they directed their energies to two projects that were likely to absorb the agency’s growing revenues, and that were also viewed as beneficial to the region’s economy—a world trade center in New York, and an immense new airport in New Jersey. In the paragraphs below, both developments are summarized. I begin with the trade center, which soon became intermeshed with the rail issue.
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A Trade Center in Manhattan? By 1950, Roger Gilman and his port commerce staff had become concerned about the increasing efforts in New Orleans, Miami, and other cities close to Latin America to divert trade from the New York region. In response, the Port agency had opened its first overseas trade office in 1951, in Rio de Janeiro. New Orleans had already constructed a “world trade center” with exhibition space and other services, and in 1956 Gilman sent a proposal to Tobin, suggesting that a similar center might be useful in New York. Tobin and Gilman were heavily occupied in the arterial studies and other projects, and the issue was set aside.21 In 1957–58, however, David Rockefeller and other business leaders in lower Manhattan began exploring ways to revitalize the downtown area; and in their first report, in the fall of 1958, they recommended redevelopment of the East River section below Brooklyn Bridge, to include housing for workers in the Wall Street area plus an expansion of the financial district. The business group conferred with the Port Authority in the course of completing its 1958 report, but those discussions focused on the location for a downtown heliport.22 Within a few months, however, consultations with Roger Gilman and other Port Authority staff members had led the business coalition to modify its plans. The housing component was eliminated, and the expansion of the financial district was now described in informal discussions as a “World Trade and Financial Center.” Port Authority officials thought it might be able to play some role in this development, but its General Counsel warned that under the 1921 Compact, the agency’s contribution must be “closely tailored to the concept of the trade and promotion function” and that it must “exclude from our responsibility the acquisition of property, the financing and construction of facilities such as the Office Building and the Finance Building.” By January 1960, the business leaders were fully committed to advocating a World Trade Center and, through their Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association, they publicly expressed their hope that the Port Authority would study the planning and financing of this project. The Authority promptly complied, and its report, completed in March 1961, concluded that a Trade Center would offer “greatly improved coordination” of world trade activities, and that it would achieve “an annual break-even position” five years after beginning operations; however, the Center’s surpluses would be so marginal that the project could be undertaken “only by a public agency.” The trade center would be located on the East Side below Brooklyn Bridge, and it would include several buildings, the tallest 72 stories and another of 30 stories, with
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large areas for the display of goods in international trade. The total cost would be $355 million. As to which public agency should undertake this important project, the report was silent.23 . . . And a Breakthrough on Commuter Transit Even as the Port Authority took the first steps toward committing its reserves to a world trade center (and to a giant jetport, as described below), it faced increased pressure on the commuter railroad issue. In April 1960, New Jersey’s transportation commissioner proposed that the Authority purchase 90 rail cars and lease them to the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad (the H&M), an important rail line that carried more than 140,000 commuters a day from Newark, Jersey City, and Hoboken to Manhattan. Since the proposal would have required the Port Authority to use its own reserves for rail projects, and since it contained no restriction on future use of the agency’s funds for other rail projects, Tobin and his aides were alarmed. Rather than resisting the proposal in his usual absolute terms, however, Tobin asked his most creative legislative bill drafter, Daniel Goldberg, if he could find a way to respond to the state’s need for help at the H&M, while protecting the Port Authority so that all its reserves would not be at risk. Within a few months, Goldberg had met that challenge, and Tobin and the Port commissioners had endorsed his strategy. In September 1960, Tobin announced to a surprised group of legislators in Trenton that his agency was prepared to abandon its historical opposition to applying its own funds to the rail problem—if certain conditions were met. The Authority would purchase the H&M Railroad if the two states would agree, via restrictions (or “covenants”) in bondholder agreements, that the agency would not become enmeshed in other large-scale rail programs. After further negotiations, New Jersey state officials agreed to the kind of permanent restriction the Port agency proposed.24 A Combined Solution At this point, in the spring of 1961, the differing priorities of the two states emerged sharply. New Jersey’s legislators wanted the Port Authority to take over the H&M, which was in bankruptcy and might otherwise shut down; but they were not enthusiastic about the trade center, which appeared to be an immense real estate project to add office space in Manhattan. New York’s political leaders were willing to approve the H&M project, but their stronger interest was in the Trade Center, with its possible impact in generating wider reinvestment in lower Manhattan. Not surprisingly, Rockefeller and his legislative leaders thought the Port Authority was
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the best agency for the Trade Center project; and the “world trade” theme was used to justify its central role, thus overcoming the concern of the agency’s counsel, in 1959, that such a large real-estate project might violate the principles of the 1921 Port Compact. To protect their priorities, Albany leaders combined both the H&M and the Trade Center project in a single bill, and the bill was passed and signed by Governor Rockefeller on April 6, 1961. To New Jersey legislators, however, with their traditional wariness of New York’s economic and political power, this effort to prevent them from weighing the trade center as a separate (and perhaps dubious) enterprise was as a red flag to a bull. Several months of recriminations and inaction followed. Then, in the fall of 1961, a planner in the Port agency suggested that the Trade Center be shifted from the east side of Manhattan to the west side, near the Hudson River; then it could be combined with the rehabilitation of the H&M, which already had its major downtown station and two office buildings in that area. The proposed location would provide much better access for workers and visitors, since the west side was better served by New York’s subway lines as well as the H&M. With the two projects linked together, and the trade center now close to their own shores, New Jersey’s legislators accepted the new plan; and in the spring of 1962, the two states enacted legislation permitting the Port agency to proceed both with the trade center and with the purchase and rehabilitation of the H&M. The modernized commuter line would be called the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, or PATH.25 Into the Sky Now Tobin and his trade-center planners broke free from the business-leaders’ modest expectations and sharply recast the building plans. In 1964 Tobin and the commissioners unveiled an entirely new design, which featured “twin towers of gleaming metal, soaring 110 stories,” displacing the Empire State Building as the world’s tallest skyscraper. The initial response was largely favorable, with the New York Times exclaiming, “No project has ever been more promising for New York.”26 The extraordinary structures were endorsed by the two governors, though in fact Rockefeller was taken aback when he first learned of their size.27 However, several key staff members were concerned that the expanded plans for the trade center had no clear linkage to the issue of improving the New York region’s position in international trade, and that the great size of the structure would expose the Port Authority unnecessarily to political attack.28 As planning for the giant project went forward, there was increasing public attention to its cost. By 1966, the price tag had risen from $355 million to $575 million, and the New York Times expressed concern that the trade cen-
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ter would divert the resources of the Port Authority from other important issues such as rail transit. A few months later, the Times joined the chorus of harsher critics, arguing that the project was “enormously expensive and grandiose” and that it should be cut down to “realistic and efficient size.” Otherwise, the Times warned, the trade center would only be a monument to “the city’s former glories as a port and to the Authority’s audacious ability to get its own way.” But Tobin and his aides turned a deaf ear to these complaints, and the World Trade Center went forward, its costs rising year by year until they exceeded one billion dollars.29 A Solution to the Air Traffic Problem? During 1957–58, aviation department director John Wiley and his staff concluded that burgeoning air traffic would soon exceed the capacity of the region’s three major airfields, and a task force was created to examine the problem. By the fall of 1959, the working group had identified a solution which was soon embraced by Tobin and the Port Authority board, and then made public: an great new airport— 10,000 acres in size, twice as large as Idlewild (Kennedy Airport)—would be built in the Great Swamp area of northern New Jersey. This project would also absorb a sizeable portion of the agency’s growing surplus. Governor Meyner endorsed the plan, and Tobin and his aides then turned to the problem of gaining support from the region’s business leaders and major newspapers, in order to neutralize the opposition that might be expected from local residents in the Great Swamp area of Morris County.30 During 1960–61, opposition to the jetport proposal arose, but that was not surprising. Tobin and his associates were used to battling critics of their new plans. What was surprising here was that Tobin and his aides failed to comprehend the range and depth of resistance and that—as they took steps to “neutralize the opposition”—they misplayed some of their hands. In previous decades, major Port Authority projects had been compatible with widely held public values—for example, the view that better airports and more highway facilities were essential in order to reduce congestion and improve the efficiency of commerce and individual travel; or the argument that large investments in marine terminals were desirable not only because of the jobs directly created but more broadly because of their positive impact on the regional economy. These projects would garner support from those who took a “wide” view of the region—prominent business and civic leaders, the New York Times and other major newspapers, most state legislative leaders, and, most important, the two governors. The pockets of opposition that arose could be viewed as narrowly self-interested and parochial, and they
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usually were defined in those terms by the region’s newspapers and civic groups; and then they were politically marginalized and defeated.31 The opposition to the new airport was different. Many of those who objected to a massive new jetport in the Great Swamp in Morris County were local residents, and no doubt they were as parochial as the residents in the path of the Manhattan Bus Terminal. But some of them were wealthy and highly influential politically; prominent among the opponents was Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen, whose estate would be graced with a jetport runway. And they were soon joined by others, who, as part of the new wave of environmentalism, objected to destroying the wildlife and wildflowers of the marshlands. Moreover, the Port Authority was more exposed as it began the Battle of the Great Swamp than it generally had been, for it had failed to follow its traditional rule. Rather than asking civic leaders or elected officials to take the lead, the Authority itself had cast the first stone, opening the public debate by proclaiming that a gigantic new airport was needed and that there was no place for it except in the middle of New Jersey’s Great Swamp. The Unbending Leader Frelinghuysen and his fellow New Jersey members of Congress soon opened another, broader line of attack, urging Congressman Emanuel Celler of Brooklyn, the powerful head of the House Judiciary Committee, to undertake a general investigation of the Port Authority. As noted in Chapter 13, Celler had previously sought contracts from the bi-state agency for his law-firm clients and had been rebuffed, and he responded with alacrity to the suggested inquiry. In the spring of 1960 Celler launched a probe into the Authority’s policies and integrity, and he demanded that Tobin open all the agency’s files to his investigators. When Tobin protested that the Port Authority was a state agency, whose internal files should not be subjected to close federal control, and, with the governors’ support, refused Celler’s demands, Celler asked the House to cite Tobin for contempt. Tobin was indicted in August 1960, and in June 1961 a federal judge found him guilty of criminal contempt of Congress.32 That verdict was overturned on appeal in 1962, vindicating Tobin in his refusal to permit Celler to roam through the Port Authority’s files. However, the effort to grapple with the House investigation absorbed a vast amount of Tobin’s time and energy—and the sustained attention of several of his best people—in 1960, 1961, and 1962. As a result, less attention and creative energy were available to monitor and assess the possible impact of a set of new values beginning to sweep across America—the environmental movement; the increasing resistance to large development projects with their traumatic
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impact on local communities; and the effort to nourish “community control” as a central political value in suburban towns and larger cities.33 Moreover, the Celler probe had other, more direct effects. Celler’s aides publicized several cases in which Tobin and his aides appeared to have used bank-deposit accounts and insurance contracts to curry favor with state legislators; and the investigators located one staff member who had obtained payoffs in connection with Authority contracts.34 So the Port Authority’s nonpolitical image was challenged in an effective if limited way. Moreover, the Celler hearings conveyed the impression—to some members of his committee, as they heard Tobin stubbornly refuse to open his files, and to others outside the hearing room—that the Port Authority was efficient, immensely knowledgeable on issues of law and project development, and arrogant. Arrogance always was—always is—a danger for the Port Authority. The agency could offer higher salaries to the top college graduates than could New York City government or the best state agencies, and it “got things done”; so for those interested in public service, the Port Authority had long been a premier employer. Yet in planning and carrying out complex projects, this large and able staff had seemed to some observers too insulated, too unwilling to respond to the concerns of those who questioned its programs and policies. And now Austin Tobin, unyielding and combative, had stood before the Judiciary Committee and said he had no regrets and that he still supported all the programs and policies that his agency had pursued over the years. In that battle, he won, in the courts. But Tobin’s public stubbornness, and the agency’s recurring advocacy of immense projects, reinforced the theme of arrogance. The continuing jetport saga underscored the point. Despite widespread local opposition throughout 1960, and a 20–1 vote in the New Jersey state senate that year against the Great Swamp site, Tobin and his aides continued to defend this location as the only feasible one. The agency’s next report, in May 1961, reaffirmed that position and concluded that all other possible locations—16 were studied—were unsuitable. The local coalition then sought to block the Authority permanently by appealing to Washington to protect the site, and their political efforts met with success, as federal officials declared the Great Swamp a national wildlife refuge in 1964, and a national landmark in 1966. By then, several large airlines had decided to make public their doubts that a new airport was needed, a concern shared by some of the Port Authority’s own experts.35 Yet Tobin responded by issuing another report at the end of 1966 which declared again that a gigantic jetport was needed, and that the Great Swamp
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was the best, indeed the only, place to construct it. To residents of New Jersey and other observers, the entire seven-year battle suggested that Tobin and his agency were strikingly insensitive to local concerns and to political reality. This was a jetport that would never, at least in the twentieth century, be built. By the late 1960s, Tobin and his associates had spent a decade advocating several large projects which had generated vigorous opposition, and these battles left a legacy of wariness and ill feeling among some of the agency’s supporters as well as its long-standing critics. And while the critics may at times have been unfair in their allegations, perhaps they touched on a basic problem. In a tradition now decades old, the Port Authority’s leaders responded to complex challenges by seeking large-scale, dramatic solutions, solutions that would reach beyond the immediate problem and meet the needs of the next generation. In seeking to “make no little plans,” Tobin had gathered around him planners and specialists in all fields who shared this general perspective, and together they had created the largest bus and truck terminals in the world, developed three of the busiest airports in the nation, and reached out with massive investments to expand the region’s highway system and to lead the “containership revolution.” And with few exceptions, this approach had been strikingly successful. By the 1960s, it was difficult for men and women reared on this rich diet to look with skepticism at great new plans, and to gather and understand evidence that sometimes might suggest that smaller could be better—in political, in social, and even in economic terms. As Machiavelli argued, “One who has prospered by following one kind of policy will not be persuaded to abandon it.”36 Final Conflicts of the Tobin Era For a short while, the good will generated by the PATH modernization effort seemed to balance the pockets of opposition to the Port Authority’s less happy adventures. Moreover, Tobin had managed to keep a staff of real ability and to maintain high morale during the difficult years of the Celler inquiry and the Great Swamp foray—and despite doubts among his aides as to the wisdom of the jetport plan and the Trade Center’s dimensions. During the 1960s, Tobin also led an important and successful challenge to racial discrimination in the construction trades.37 Quite possibly he and the Authority could have gone forward to new initiatives and new accomplishments in the 1970s, were it not for two developments. The first was the growing cost of rehabilitating and operating the PATH system. The Port Authority staff directed their energies toward reviving that ancient line with as much vigor as they had employed in modernizing La-
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Guardia Airport and Port Newark. The rail tracks, stations, and lighting were improved and the entire fleet was replaced with 250 air-conditioned cars; by 1969 the cost of this revitalization was more than $175 million. The changes attracted more patrons, but in paying for the capital costs and operating the railroad, the Port agency placed an increasing burden on its surpluses. In 1968 the PATH deficit had reached $11 million, largely absorbing all the funds available to meet rail needs under the bond covenants. Once again, commuter groups and suburban officials in northern New Jersey began to criticize the Authority for its limited contribution to solving the transit problem.38 The second event was the election of William Cahill as governor of New Jersey in the fall of 1969.39 Cahill had been a member of Congress from the southern part of the state, and when he decided to run for the state’s highest office, he focused his attention on the more populous northern counties, where he was less known. As he campaigned in Morris, Essex, and Bergen counties in the summer of 1969, he found that crowds responded enthusiastically when he attacked the Port Authority—for its jetport plans and its trade center towers, for its limited efforts to solve the rail problem, and for its alleged insulation and disdain toward the concerns of local communities. Cahill’s gubernatorial victory brought together several major strands of conflict that Tobin and his allies had faced during the previous ten years. Responding to public sentiment as he sampled it during his campaign, Cahill entered office firmly opposed to a major new airport anywhere in northern New Jersey; and he was equally certain that Tobin and his agency must throw their energies and their reserves more fully into the battle to save rail commutation. Moreover, Cahill was doubtful that vast sums should be used from the Authority’s treasury to construct a complex of office buildings in Manhattan, especially while the New Jersey rail crisis needed its attention and money. And finally and unluckily, William Cahill was not only a former member of Congress; he had also been a member of the House Judiciary Committee, and in 1960 he had been a member of the subcommittee through which Emanuel Celler had investigated the Port Authority. One of the votes to cite Tobin for contempt of Congress had been cast by Cahill, and neither he nor Tobin could forget that division. So when Cahill took office in January 1970, two stubborn Irishmen, with a history of conflict on matters both of policy and prerogative, squared off. In his first months in office, Cahill pressed Tobin to undertake further rail studies and to find a way to devote more Authority funds to rehabilitating and extending the region’s rail system; but Tobin resisted, arguing that with the
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large PATH deficits, the bond covenant of 1962 barred the agency from additional rail operations. Then, meeting with Cahill and his aides to review the Port Authority’s other activities, Tobin mentioned that the agency was planning to add a hotel to the Trade Center complex. The governor was outraged at Tobin’s willingness to throw more funds into what he saw as a dubious “commercial enterprise,” while resisting action on the commuter rail problem. Cahill then barred Tobin from meetings on rail issues, though he called in Tobin’s subordinates, and he pressed the New Jersey commissioners on the Authority board to gather support from their New York counterparts and reverse Tobin’s policies in the rail field.40 Meanwhile, New York’s governor, Nelson Rockefeller, had appointed his chief transit aide, William Ronan, to the Port Authority board in 1967, and beginning in 1970 Ronan joined some of the New Jersey commissioners in challenging Tobin and his policies, both during and between board meetings. By early 1971, the sense of mutual regard and unified support from the commissioners which Tobin had experienced since Frank Ferguson stalked out in 1945 had broken down. Tobin and his views still commanded a majority on the board, but there seemed to be continual, often carping, criticism. Moreover, he could no longer expect active support from the two governors for new programs and other innovations, and Cahill had begun to attack him publicly.41 By the Fall of 1971, the job was more a burden than a series of challenging opportunities. Finally, he felt he had had enough, and on December 12, Tobin telephoned his top aides and then announced he was leaving, immediately turning over the reins of office to his deputy and formally retiring in March 1972. Now 68 years of age, Tobin soon joined an executive service corps and spent the next several years advising governments in Israel and other lands on port development and management strategies. In the mid-1970s, he declined an invitation to attend the dedication ceremonies for the World Trade Center, but in 1977, ill from cancer, he went by taxi from his Manhattan apartment to the Trade Center, stepped out on the plaza, and looked up admiringly at the twin towers, now complete, rising far above and symbolizing the aggressiveness and the dominance of the New York region in worldly matters, an attitude and a position for which Tobin had fought during his 45 years at the Port Authority. On February 8, 1978, Austin Tobin died in his Manhattan apartment, of cancer. In 1982 the plaza area, a summer place for noontime crowds and playful concerts, was named the Austin J. Tobin Plaza.
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1972–2000: Drift, Political Incursions, and a Search for New Missions The Port Authority’s experience during the past quarter century and more can be captured in terms of a few themes—drift, patronage and favoritism, and the search for new goals. The agency has experienced some periods of drift, when vulnerability to patronage and other short-term political demands has been high, and then spurts of vigorous leadership, which its staff and friends have hoped would lead to greater things. Ideally, as the Regional Plan Association and other observers have suggested, the Authority might in the new century occupy the important role in economic growth for the bi-state region that it held during the Cohen and Ammann years and through much of the Tobin era. But this will require changes in attitude at Trenton and Albany, and coalition-building strengths not easily obtained in this era of negative political rhetoric and distrust of government. Some further observations on the Port Authority’s future follow, at the end of this section. First, however, a compressed review of the years since Austin Tobin departed, in anger and frustration. The 1970s Malaise With Tobin gone, the two governors hoped to divert large amounts of Port Authority funds to rail-transit needs. Within a few months they had succeeded in persuading the agency’s commissioners to allot more than $250 million of Authority moneys for two rail projects—to extend the PATH system to Newark Airport and then into Union County to the west; and to connect Kennedy Airport to Manhattan by rail. Cahill also took aim at the agency’s title, The Port of New York Authority, as suggesting that New Jersey was not an equal partner, and in 1972, the name was changed to The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. And he demanded that the states repeal the 1962 bond covenant, so the agency’s rail activities would no longer be limited by the 10 percent rule.42 Rockefeller had worked in moderate harmony with Tobin and his aides during the previous decade, but he now found the hostile stance of his fellow Republican governor to be contagious. “We don’t want a continuation of the Tobin structure,” he asserted, “which as everyone knows was a very tight, political structure and opposed to mass transit.” Rockefeller urged that William Ronan, who served the governor as head of New York State’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority, be appointed to Tobin’s old job so that he could lead the Port Authority “from a rubber to a rails orientation.”43
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During the next year, the governors could not agree on who should replace Tobin; and then both suddenly departed—Cahill defeated in his bid for re-election in 1973, and Rockefeller to serve as Vice President in Washington, under Gerald Ford. However, their successors, Brendan Byrne at Trenton and Malcolm Wilson in Albany, pressed ahead with the campaign to draw the Port Authority more deeply into rail transit. In 1974 both states repealed the 1962 bond covenant retroactively; Port Authority bridge and tunnel tolls were then raised sharply to help pay for the expanded rail activities; and the governors looked forward to being able to rely on the bi-state agency for an increasing array of mass transit projects. Unfortunately, their hopes were tied to a dubious legality, and in 1977 the Supreme Court concluded that the repealer violated the obligations-of-contract clause of the U.S. Constitution. With the PATH deficit at $37 million in 1975 and still rising, and with the covenant in force, almost no Port Authority funds would be available for other rail activities in the foreseeable future. The rail projects announced with fanfare in the early 1970s would have to be financed in some other way.44 The long battle to increase the Authority’s role in rail transit which Governor Cahill ignited in 1969 had other results, beyond encouraging the chimera that the region’s mass-transit problems would soon be solved. For nearly thirty years, a sense of institutional purpose, effective leadership, and strong staff morale had been crucially linked to Austin Tobin’s energy and his intensive engagement with all major issues, and to staff expectations that he would make funds available to permit them to devise and carry out ambitious programs. As Tobin’s energies had become absorbed in the struggle with Cahill, the separate enterprises—airports, world trade, marine terminals— began to drift apart; and once Tobin left, some staff members worked less for the institution and more for their own units in isolation, and for themselves. The change in attitudes and behavior was uneven: in some areas, a lively interest in the future and in the agency’s wider purposes remained. But in department after department, a sense of forward motion disappeared, the focus turned inward, and staff morale fell.45 If Austin Tobin had been succeeded by an executive who had deep experience in leading a complex enterprise, this weakening of the fabric of the institution might have been less severe. However, unless the governors were willing to install a strong executive and give that leader an opportunity to identify new missions and act to achieve them, a decline in staff morale and energy would seem inevitable. But the governors and the Port Authority’s commissioners could not agree on who should lead the agency, and so the agency drifted. When Tobin departed, his deputy, Matthias Lukens, took
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over; he was designated as “acting” while the governors and the commissioners tried to reach agreement on a permanent executive. Lukens retired in the fall of 1973, and the agency’s director of finance, Gerdes Kuhbach, was recruited to take his place, also as “acting” head of the agency; and in 1974 the board agreed to install him as executive director, a post which he held, with little independent discretion, for the next three years. Had Rockefeller’s first choice to succeed Tobin—William Ronan—been accepted by Governor Cahill and the New Jersey board members in 1972, power might again have flowed into the staff director’s office. But Ronan was too deeply involved in deficit transit operations in New York to win wide support from the commissioners, many of whom shared Tobin’s fear that rail projects might drain the Port Authority’s funds, leaving it as only an efficient housekeeper of existing bridges, tunnels, and airports and docks. They had seen this result, courtesy of Rockefeller and Ronan, at Robert Moses’ once vigorous Triborough Authority; that chilling prospect for their bi-state agency could not win the hearts of commissioners or staff who had been nourished by Tobin’s entrepreneurial energy.46 In 1974, with strong pressure from Rockefeller, Ronan was elected by his fellow commissioners to chair the Port Authority board. He attempted to use that position to lead the agency, supplanting the executive director’s role, but his tendency to comment disparagingly about his fellow board members and a sometimes arrogant style undercut his efforts. By the end of the year, New Jersey’s Governor Byrne was chastising Ronan for failing to make progress on rail transit projects, while his colleagues on the board were openly in distress. “Nothing is getting done,” one commissioner admitted to a New York Times reporter, who concluded after two years of following the agency in its downward spiral that the Authority was “dead in the water.” His plaint was an echo of Erwin Bard’s judgment on the agency thirty years earlier, as Tobin was about to assume power.47 In reality, some things did get done in the early 1970s. More than a million square feet of cargo space was added at Kennedy Airport, enhancing that terminal’s position as a major employment center in Queens. In 1975, the Journal Square Transportation Center, an integrated terminal for PATH trains and buses, was opened in Jersey City. And in 1975–76 a major expansion of the Manhattan bus terminal was underway. But the absence of central leadership was a sharp contrast with the Tobin years.48 Goldmark Expands the Agency’s Mission The internal tension on the Port Authority board faded somewhat, once the Supreme Court had reaf-
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firmed the validity of the 1962 bond covenant in April 1977; and the governors soon agreed that the agency needed new leadership. In June, Ronan was replaced as chairman by Alan Sagner, a New Jersey commissioner who had been an effective head of the state’s transportation agency. At the same time the Authority board named Peter Goldmark, a top official under New York’s governor, Hugh Carey (1975–82), to be executive director. Goldmark was a highly regarded executive with government experience in New York City, in Massachusetts, and at Albany, where, as the state’s budget director, he had been a key player in grappling with the New York City fiscal crisis. His selection, in the summer of 1977, suggested that power would flow to the senior staff position, and the Goldmark-Sagner team soon returned some degree of harmony to the Port Authority board. The key issue Goldmark faced was this: What should be the primary goals of the Port Authority? This was the same question Austin Tobin had confronted in his first years as executive director, and in 1942–43 he had gathered a small staff to explore the range of possibilities and to set priorities for action. Drawing from that survey, as we saw in chapter 11, Tobin and his aides had identified the airports and the region’s marine terminals as primary targets for the agency’s expansion. In 1977–78, Goldmark used a similar strategy, creating a Committee on the Future which could examine the wide range of areas in which the agency might focus its funds and energies. To Goldmark, the main attraction of a position at the Authority was the agency’s potential to strengthen the economy of New York City and its wider region. Crucial in this effort, he thought, would be to reverse the loss of manufacturing jobs in the older cities. He also realized that the Port Authority had developed a reputation, in the later years of the Tobin era, of acting too independently, rather than cooperatively with local communities; Tobin’s jetport foray was a dramatic illustration of this theme. Goldmark expected that the Committee on the Future might find ways to meet these several concerns.49 Out of the work of that committee came a set of proposals which might give the Port agency a new sense of mission, and a basis for working collaboratively with local leaders. The most prominent was a plan to create industrial parks in several older cities, together with active efforts to attract manufacturing firms to come into the region and locate in the identified areas. As this set of proposals evolved in 1978–81, the plan included industrial parks in the Bronx (at Bathgate Avenue), in Elizabeth (near the Elizabeth marine terminal), and on Staten Island. In addition, the Port Authority would develop a plant in Essex County where waste could be incinerated and electricity
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generated, a commercial fishing complex (or fishport) in Brooklyn, and a satellite communications center (teleport) on Staten Island. To Goldmark and his supporters, this expansion of the agency’s role—to focus on strengthening manufacturing in the region and providing more efficient energy and better satellite communication—could readily be justified, since they would contribute to the economic vitality of the bi-state region and were ventures that private entrepreneurs were not likely to undertake. To some staff members and observers, however, the new projects fell outside the Port Authority’s proper domain—transportation—thus diverting its energies from core tasks, and the likelihood that industrial parks and the other new projects would contribute significantly to improving the regional economy seemed highly doubtful.50 By the time that Goldmark left the Port Authority in 1985, several of these initiatives were well advanced. Bathgate Industrial Park in the South Bronx employed more than 1,000 workers in its manufacturing plants, and several hundred worked at the Elizabeth park. Plans for the third industrial area had been shifted from Staten Island to Yonkers, in Westchester County, and by 1985 that park employed more than 500 workers in a dozen plants. The Essex waste disposal facility had not yet been started, but regulatory approval was expected soon; and the Teleport on Staten Island was in operation. Some staff members expressed a concern that Goldmark had placed so much emphasis on these new activities that not enough focus or funds had been directed to maintaining the existing facilities. There was little doubt, however, that the morale of the agency’s staff, and the agency’s reputation among political leaders and in the wider community were stronger in the mid-1980s than they had been in the early 1970s.51 Returning to “Basics”: Renovations and Belt-tightening In 1986, the Board named Stephen Berger to be executive director. Berger, an expert on financial issues, had worked in New York City government during the 1970s fiscal crisis, and he had also been an official of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which was responsible for mass transit on the New York side of the bi-state region. With Goldmark’s economic-development initiatives underway, Berger directed his main attention to the existing plant in a campaign he titled, “back to basics.” During the next four years, Berger directed staff energies and funds to an array of unglamorous but crucial renovations and improvements. The entire ceiling of the Holland Tunnel’s south tube was replaced; PATH’s ventilation system was upgraded and a new transit-car repair shop was constructed to replace one in use since 1910; and the Outerbridge
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Crossing roadway was refurbished. In addition, the central terminal at LaGuardia Airport was expanded; additional escalators to PATH trains were constructed at the World Trade Center; and automated bus-schedule information was put on-line for passengers at the Bus Terminal in Manhattan. Perhaps the most distinctive additions to the Port Authority’s domain during Berger’s years were a new office building, completed in 1989, and a trans-Hudson ferry route. The building, called the Newark Legal Center, was undertaken by the Port Authority staff reluctantly, as a result of sustained pressure from New Jersey’s governor Thomas Kean (1982–90), who argued that it would help stimulate economic growth in downtown Newark. Since the 18-story building would house law firms and banks with no clear linkage to transportation or world trade, it sat as an illustration that Goldmark’s argument could be readily expanded to justify, at least politically, almost any project that had a plausible relationship to economic development in older cities. More positive, at least for those who think of transportation as the Port Authority’s central mission, was the opening of a ferry route across the Hudson, running from Hoboken to Battery Park City, near the World Trade Center. The service, begun in the fall of 1989, was provided by four 20-knot ferry boats, and carried travelers who would otherwise take the overcrowded PATH trip to and from Hoboken. Within a few months, the ferry service was attracting more than 4,000 passengers a day. It was the first trans-Hudson water service since the ferries operated by the commuter railroads had closed down in 1967.52 Berger was succeeded in 1990 by Stanley Brezenoff, who had extensive management experience in New York City government. Brezenoff opened his tenure by asserting that “the principal job” of the agency was to “move people and goods into and through the vast bi-state . . . region.” Working with the agency’s new chairman, Richard C. Leone, Brezenoff focused mainly, as had Berger, on rehabilitation efforts at the agency’s aging terminals, bridges, and tunnels. As Leone argued, “It’s a less romantic time. . . . In the past, your goals were usually built around some bold, important new project. . . . Most everything projected for the next 5 to 10 years is simply to keep everything running.”53 Yet they also explored possible new projects in the transportation field. One was a $380-million monorail to connect the terminals and parking lots at Newark Airport. A second was a rail connection between that airport and the New York-Trenton-Philadelphia railroad line; that project might cost $400 million or more. A third, which was far more expensive and complex,
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was a rail line through densely developed Queens; this rail project would connect Kennedy and LaGuardia airports with the Long Island Railroad and the New York City subway system, so that airline passengers could travel to and from the airport by rail, rather than enduring a ride on congested roadways that often, for Kennedy passengers, took more than two hours from Manhattan. Its estimated cost was $1.6 billion. And a fourth, which had a history that stretched back to the Port Authority’s origins, was a new rail line which would carry both passengers and freight between New York City and the New Jersey hinterland. The 1990s version would begin in Queens, with a tunnel under the East River to stations in Manhattan; it would then continue under the Hudson River, emerging in New Jersey, where it could connect with both the commuter transit lines and the nation’s freight railroad system. Another suggestion that seemed to deserve close study was a new bridge between New Jersey and Staten Island near the Goethals span, which was heavily congested during and beyond rush hours. In addition, led by Leone and Brezenoff, the senior staff gathered experts from outside as well as inside the agency and explored other possible initiatives that might aid regional growth, such as job-creating enterprises directly linked to the three large airports.54 The monorail at Newark Airport was approved, and within five years it was in operation. However, none of the other proposals was taken beyond the stage of preliminary planning during Brezenoff’s tenure. The main hurdles facing the proposals were two. First, the PATH deficit continued to increase and, despite pleas from the agency’s executives, New Jersey’s governors were unwilling to raise the fare; as New York’s subway fare was increased to $1.25 and then to $1.50, the threat of a veto from Trenton kept the PATH fare at $1.00, where it remained through 1999. As a result, by 1994 the PATH operation was drawing off more than $190 million a year from the agency’s coffers. Second, the strong regional economy seen in the Berger years had weakened by 1990; the recession cut into the Port Authority’s revenues and so reduced funds available for new activities. In the early 1990s, the agency was under sufficient financial pressure that it began to cut staff and limit expenses in “nonessential” areas, such as economic forecasting and regional planning. Even with these actions, the agency faced the prospect of an overall deficit each year. So belt-tightening would have to continue.55 Regional Tensions, the Governors, and Patronage Games The leadership at the Port Authority in these years was generally of high quality. Confronting an economy that had been slow to recover, and gubernatorial reluctance to
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permit the agency to raise fares and other fees, Brezenoff and his staff had reduced expenses, pressed ahead with modernization efforts at PATH and the airports, and begun to explore projects that, when the region’s economic strength permitted, might improve the efficiency of passenger and freight transport in this congested metropolis. There were, at the same time, some examples of management error; a highly visible one, due to press attention, was the expensive tunnel at Kennedy Airport, which absorbed millions of dollars even as it became clear that the underground facility was not needed.56 Most notably, perhaps, the Port Authority had continued to attract and hold able and dedicated staff at senior and middle levels—individuals in engineering, finance, planning, law, and administration who were among the best in public service and in the private sector. Their ability could be seen in the efficiency with which the marine terminals, airports, and other facilities were operated, and it was demonstrated more distinctly in the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing of 1993—when the staff worked overtime and, through an immense effort, returned the damaged structure to reasonable operating levels within a few weeks.57 Moreover, in this era, as in the previous decades, the career staff continued to operate almost free from corruption or other scandals, even though opportunities for payoffs and other personal benefits were always present in an agency that awarded millions of dollars in contracts every year. There had been a few notable cases identified in the Celler inquiry, as well as two dozen in the leadership hiatus of the mid-1970s; but the Port agency avoided the recurrent patterns of serious corruption found in New York City and other government and private organizations in recent decades.58 However, in the metropolitan domain within which the Port Authority operated, interstate jealousy and antagonisms had sharpened in the 1980s and early 1990s. During those years, New Jersey officials offered tax concessions to businesses willing to move to New Jersey, and they were able to entice some corporate offices to migrate from Manhattan and Brooklyn. Moreover, the successful efforts to extract the New York Giants and the Jets from their traditional homes to play in New Jersey’s Meadowlands was a continual reminder to New York patriots that the smaller state could not be trusted to defer to the region’s dominant power. New Jersey’s 1993 suit, which claimed sovereign authority over much of Ellis Island, put salt into these wounds, and seemed to revive the kind of legal and political conflict seen nearly 80 years before—in the contest which had led to the creation of the Port Authority.59 Of course, the activities of the Port Authority itself had long been embedded in this interstate battling, and the shift of marine cargo from New York
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piers to New Jersey in the 1960s as part of the container revolution heightened the distrust of New Yorkers who viewed economic gains west of the Hudson as a grievous loss to their local interests. When Berger and then Brezenoff proposed that $90 million be spent to lengthen Newark runways, the New York commissioners balked, bowing to the arguments of New York City’s elected officials that the Port agency was neglecting Kennedy Airport and that traffic was wrongly being shifted to Newark’s air terminals. By 1994, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was attacking the Port Authority’s alleged bias toward New Jersey on all fronts, and he urged that the agency be broken up, so that New York could take control of its own airports and its seaport destiny. The spirit of Mayor Hylan’s antagonism toward the agency, a spectre from the 1920s, seemed to have returned to City Hall in full force.60 More important, for the long run, was the shift in the attitude and behavior of the state’s two governors. Through the 1960s, they had almost invariably been strong supporters of the Port Authority as an exemplar of the best in Progressive values—an agency that used expertise and careful factfinding to identify regional needs and carry out complex programs, whose leaders planned with a long-range view, not in terms of short-term goals to benefit one city or one state. The governors from Al Smith and George Silzer to FDR and Driscoll, Dewey, Hughes, and Rockefeller had valued the agency, whose staff had the kind of integrity and competence they wished they could find in every state department, and whose executive director had extraordinary leadership ability and management skills. From time to time, the governors might challenge the agency’s decisions, as Dewey did in the airport conflict of the 1940s, or even try to press the staff to award an occasional contract to political favorites, as New Jersey’s Governor Moore did in the early 1930s. However, they almost always appointed commissioners with a reputation for independence, and they permitted the board to decide who would lead the agency; and they expected that the commissioners and senior staff together would use expertise and “businesslike methods” in identifying new programs and carrying them forward. The conflict between Cahill and Tobin, followed by Tobin’s departure and the years of uncertain staff leadership, broke the tradition of independence from the governors’ offices; and the political problems involved in setting the PATH fare in the 1970s and 1980s gave the governors an opening for greater involvement in how the Port Authority’s moneys would be raised and spent. Moreover, when Goldmark was selected from outside the staff by Governor Carey, rather than by the commissioners, staff leadership became a political post, though for the present to be filled based on proven leadership
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skills. Then Goldmark made what might be called a fatal decision: In advocating that the bi-state agency devise economic-development plans, in close collaboration with local communities, he signaled that political negotiations would sit at the table as an influential partner with the Authority’s experts, in identifying possible projects and how they would be selected and shaped. It was a short step for Byrne’s successor as governor, Thomas Kean, to press the Port Authority not only to build the Newark Legal Center, but also to persuade the agency to create a “Bank for Regional Development,” which might receive a portion of the agency’s surpluses. The bank would be controlled by appointees of the two governors, the moneys could be used for projects unrelated to the Port Authority’s own programs, and the projects would be chosen “in consultation with” local and county officials. In this way, a substantial chunk of the Port agency’s surpluses would be allotted to meet the governors’ perceived needs, whether to stimulate economic development in a creative way or simply to finance pork-barrel operations. By the end of 1994, more than $600 million in Port Authority revenues had been diverted to the bank and other “regional programs” outside the Port agency’s control.61 The erosion of the Port Authority’s independence in these several ways laid the groundwork for the disastrous decisions of 1995. With the Port agency facing difficult financial and policy issues as the year opened, it also confronted a new governor at Albany, George Pataki. To Pataki and his advisers, replacing the executive director offered an opportunity to gain control over an agency that he thought had been too independent of Albany interests. But that defensible goal was overwhelmed by the attraction of using the job to reward a crucial political supporter with a $170,000 annual salary. No one was more deserving, in Pataki’s view, than George Marlin, a bond salesman and a leader of the state’s Conservative Party, which had helped Pataki win the governorship. New Jersey’s governor, Christine Whitman, expressed some doubts that Marlin was qualified, and most of the commissioners were unhappy with his lack of experience. After a month’s delay, however, Whitman and a majority of the commissioners succumbed, and Marlin was named executive director in February 1995. Marlin soon forced most of the agency’s top career staff to leave, and he laid off hundred