Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation
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Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation
This key text brings together a team of leading contributors to address the complex issues of security, reconstruction, and reconciliation in postconflict societies. Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation is organized into four main parts: ● ● ● ●
the social, political, and economic dimensions of conflict; the impact of conflict on women and children; reconstruction and past human rights violations: healing the nation; and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, post-war reconstruction, and the building of a capable state and the role of the international community in the peace process.
The chapters offer a detailed and succinct exposition of the challenges facing postconflict societies by articulating the vision of a new society. Throughout the book the experienced authors discuss the issues in the context of possible solutions and lessons learnt in the field. The book also has a foreword by Francis Deng, the Former UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. This new book is a valuable resource for researchers, policymakers, and students in the fields of conflict resolution, security studies, law, and development. Muna Ndulo, LLB (Zambia), LLM (Harvard), DPhil (Oxon), is Advocate of the Supreme Court of Zambia. He is also Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and Director of the Institute for African Development at Cornell University, USA.
Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation When the wars end
Edited by Muna Ndulo
First published 2007 by UCL Press The name of University College London (UCL) is a registered trade mark used by UCL Press with the consent of the owner Taylor & Francis 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA by UCL Press 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” UCL Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 Muna Ndulo for selection and editorial matter; the contributors for individual chapters All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-96573-6 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10: 1–84472–116–7 (hbk) ISBN10: 1–84472–117–5 (pbk) ISBN10: 0–203–96573–6 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–1–84472–116–0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–1–84472–117–7 (pbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–96573–3 (ebk)
Contents
List of illustrations List of contributors Foreword Acknowledgments List of acronyms Introduction
ix x xv xxvii xxviii 1
M UNA N D ULO
PART I
The social, political, and economic dimensions of conflict 1 Arms trafficking and the local political economy of conflict
11 13
WILLIAM RENO
2 HIV/AIDS, conflicts, and security in Africa
26
O B I J I O FO R AGINAM
3 Transparency and accountability in the use of petroleum revenues: a fundamental ingredient for security, reconstruction, and reconciliation in Africa’s booming petro-states
38
I AN GARY
4 Protecting and reintegrating displaced women and children postconflict ERIN MOONEY
58
vi
Contents
PART II
Impact of conflict on women and children 5 The impact of civil war on women and children in Africa
83 85
M E R E D I T H T U RSHEN
6 Security and reconstruction in Africa: role of Security Council Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security
97
S H E R R I L L WHIT T ING TO N
7 Progress and hurdles on the road to prevent the use of children as soldiers and to ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration
108
ILENE COHN
8 Enhancing the role of women in electoral processes in postconflict countries: constitutional and legislative measures
117
M UNA N D ULO
PART III
Reconstruction and past human rights violations: healing the nations 9 Truth commissions versus prosecutions: an African perspective
131 133
M AR K S. K END E
10 Justice for whom? Assessing hybrid approaches to accountability in Sierra Leone
145
C H AN D R A LEKHA SRIRAM
11 Victims’ responses to truth commissions: evidence from South Africa DAV I D BAC KER
165
Contents
vii
PART IV
Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, post-war reconstruction, and the building of a capable state and the role of the international community in the peace process
197
12 Reconstruct governance to rouse Liberia, long forlorn
199
BYRO N TAR R
13 The postconflict security gap and the United Nations peace operations system
247
P E T E R H. GANT Z
14 Africa’s security dilemma: national stability versus world security
276
M A RC E L K I T I SSO U
15 US security assistance and Africa: challenges of weapon sales and military aid
284
M AT T HE W S C HRO ED ER
16 Concluding thoughts: after the fighting stops
307
M I LTO N J. E S M AN
Bibliography Index
310 339
Illustrations
Figures 11.1 Victims’ evaluations of the TRC process (pooled sample) 11.2 Victims’ evaluations of the TRC process (Cape Town sample) 11.3 Victims’ evaluations of the TRC process ( Johannesburg sample)
183 184 184
Tables 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 15.1 15.2
African women and children War dead Deaths in wartime Widowhood Household heads who are women Under five mortality in war-torn countries Children and HIV/AIDS in war-torn countries Poverty in war-torn countries Food insecurity in war-torn countries Health profiles Female life expectancy in war-torn countries Maternal mortality rate Births attended by skilled health staff Public expenditure Characteristics of Johannesburg survey respondents Characteristics of Cape Town survey respondents Survey respondents’ exposure to political violence Perpetrators identified by survey respondents TRC status of survey respondents Factors in statement submission Sequence of assessments State Department Section Defense Department Section
86 87 87 88 88 89 89 91 92 92 93 93 93 95 174 175 176 177 177 180 182 300 301
Contributors
Obijiofor Aginam, LLB (University of Nigeria), BL (Nigeria Law School), LLM (Queens, Ontario), PhD (British Columbia), is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa. He teaches public international law, global governance and human rights, environmental justice, and the law of international institutions. His research interests include: globalization and global governance of infectious diseases, environmental justice and multinational oil corporations in the third world, south-north relations, law and development, and sustainable conservation of ecological and biodiversity resources by local communities. Professor Aginam practiced law in Nigeria 1993–96. He has worked as a Legal Officer for the World Health Organization, and as Research Fellow for the Social Science Research Council. David Backer, BA (Amherst), MA (Michigan), PhD (Michigan), is an Assistant Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary. During 2005–06 he was a Post-doctoral Scholar at the Stanford University Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law. His research interests include: comparative politics, African politics, human rights, elections in sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic conflict, democratization, and authoritarian regimes. Ilene Cohn, BA (Amherst), JD (Ohio), MIA (Columbia), is an international human rights lawyer and is currently Chief of Policy, Information, and Resource Mobilization with the United Nations Mine Action Service, in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. Previously, Ms Cohn was the Legal/Child Rights Adviser with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict at the United Nations. From 1997 to 1999 she was a Visiting Fellow at the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program. She served as a Legal Officer with two United Nations Human Rights Verification/Peacekeeping Missions, ONUSAL in El Salvador and MINUGUA in Guatemala, and was Research Director of the Project on Children and War at Columbia University’s Center for the Study of Human Rights from 1988 until 1993. Francis M. Deng, LLB (Khartoum), LLM (Yale), JSD (Yale), is Research Professor of International Politics, Law and Society at the John Hopkins
Contributors xi University School of Advanced International Studies (SAES) where he is also the Director of the Center for Displacement Studies and Co-Director of the Brookings-SAIS Project on International Displacement. From 2001–02 he was Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and Co-Director of the Brookings-CUNY Project on Internal Displacement. From 1992–2004, he served as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. Dr Deng also served as Human Rights Officer in the United Nations Secretariat; scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Distinguished Fellow at the Rockfeller Brothers Fund; and as the Jennings Randolph Distinguished Fellow of the United States Institute for Peace. He was Visiting Lecturer at Yale Law School and from 1996 to 2000 acted as Chairperson of the Africa Leadership Forum during the imprisonment of its Chairperson Olsegum Obasanjo. Dr Deng has also served in his country’s diplomatic service. He served as Sudan’s Ambassador to Canada, the Scandinavian Countries and the United States and as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He resigned in 1983 in protest to the Islamic Fundamentalist Orientation of the government which triggered the resumption of the civil war. Milton J. Esman, BA (Cornell), MA (Princeton), PhD. (Princeton), is Professor Emeritus, Department of Government, Cornell University. He specializes in development politics and administration. He served as Director for the Einaudi Center for International Studies at Cornell. Peter H. Gantz, BA (Keenesaw State University), MS (George Mason), is an advocate with Refugees International, where he manages advocacy in the areas of peace operations, postconflict rule of law operations, and related foreign policy issues. Mr Gantz also serves as the Executive Coordinator for the Partnership for Effective Peace Operations (PEP), a Washington, DC-based policy working group of nongovernmental organizations, academics, practitioners, and others that supports public policy initiatives to improve the capacity of national and global peace operations. Before joining RI, Mr Gantz worked with Citizens for Global Solutions in Washington and the Carter Center in Atlanta. Ian Gary, MA (Leeds), is the Strategic Issues Advisor for Africa, Catholic Relief Services (CRS). He is the lead staff person for the CRS Extractive Industries in Africa Initiative. Prior to joining CRS, he was with the Human Rights and International Cooperation unit in the Ford Foundation in New York. Gary has worked with local nongovernmental organizations in Ghana and Zimbabwe and has conducted field missions to 15 African countries, including Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville. Mark S. Kende, BA (Yale), JD (Chicago), is a James Madison Professor in Constitutional Law and Director of the Drake Constitutional Law Center at Drake University Law School. Prior to entering academia, he clerked for a federal judge and worked as an associate for a Chicago law firm. He formerly served as Visiting Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School where he taught
xii
Contributors Constitutional Law and Civil Rights. In 2003, he served as Chair of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Africa. In 2000, Professor Kende was a Senior Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa. While in Africa, he conducted a workshop on constitutional law topics for a group of civil society leaders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In March 2004, Professor Kende served as a Fulbright Senior Specialist in the former Soviet Republic of Moldova teaching constitutional law and training young professors on teaching techniques.
Marcel Kitissou, BA (Benin), PhD (Bordeaux), PhD (Syracuse), is Professor at George Mason University. He formerly served as the Executive Director of the Africa Faith and Justice Network in Washington, DC. Professor Kitissou taught at the University of Benin, Togo, 1991–92; and at Oswego State University (NY) where he directed the Oswego University’s Peace Institute. Marcel’s research interests include: peace and conflict resolution, US policy toward Africa, nonviolent strategies for social change, politics and conflict in Africa, and decision making in public administration. Erin Mooney, BA (Toronto), MPhil (Cambridge), PhD (Cambridge), is Deputy Director of the Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement and Senior Adviser to the United Nations Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. Her research interests focus on protection of the rights of internally displaced persons. Muna Ndulo, LLB (Zambia), LLM (Harvard), DPhil (Oxon), Advocate of the Supreme Court of Zambia, is Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and Director of the Institute for African Development at Cornell University. In 1986, he joined the United Nations and served as Legal Officer in the Secretariat of the United Nations Commission on International Trade in Vienna, Austria. He has served the United Nations in various roles in relation to institution-building in postconflict situations and election monitoring. He has served as: Chief Political Adviser to the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA); Legal Adviser to the United Nations Mission in East Timor 1999 (UNAMET); Legal Adviser to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 2000 (UNAMIK); and Legal Expert to the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, 2003 (UNAMA). He served as Dean of the University of Zambia School of Law and as Editor-in-Chief of the Zambia Law Journal and of the Zambia Law Reports. William Reno, BA (Haverford), MA (Chicago), PhD (Wisconsin), is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. He is a specialist in African politics and the politics of “collapsing states.” His current work examines violent commercial organizations in Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the Balkans and their relationships to state power and global economic actors. Reno’s research takes him to places such as Sierra Leone, Congo, and Central Asia where he talks to insurgents (including so-called warlords), government officials, and foreigners involved in these conflicts.
Contributors xiii Matthew Schroeder, BA (Wittenberg), MA (Columbia), is a Research Associate with the Arms Sales Monitoring Project. He received a Masters in International Affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs in 2002 and has served on the National Council (Board of Directors) of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). He recently completed a term as the Chair of the Arms Transfers Working Group. Chandra Lekha Sriram, BA (Chicago), MA (Chicago), JD (University of California, Berkeley), PhD (Princeton), is a lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews. Her areas of specialization include international relations, international law and organizations, peacekeeping, and human rights. She was Senior Associate at the International Peace Academy in New York, directing its conflict prevention project, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. She is a member of the California State Bar Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Society of International Law, and is a core advisory group member of the International Law and International Relations project of the Social Science Research Council’s Global Security and Cooperation program. Byron Tarr, BA (Cuttington), MA (Illinois), PhD (Illinois), is an Economist. He served as Minister in various capacities under the Tolbert Government in Liberia and as Finance Minister in the Amos Sawyer Interim Government, Republic of Liberia. Meredith Turshen, BA (Oberlin), MA (New York), DPhil (Sussex), is a Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Community Health, in the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University. Her research focuses on political science, with special interest in the politics of health and healthcare in Africa. She serves as the Editor of African Women’s Health, Political Co-Chair of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, Treasurer of the Committee for Health in Southern Africa, contributing editor of the Review of African Political Economy, and is on the editorial board of the Journal of Public Health Policy. Sherrill Whittington, BA (Newcastle), Dip. Ed. (Newcastle), MA (New England), MA (Australia National University) is a consultant on gender, security, and peace-building. She is currently with Emergency Programs at UNICEF Headquarters, New York, where she returned after a three-and-half year appointment to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. During this period she was head of the Gender Affairs Unit in the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in East Timor (UNTAET), and then project manager on gender and peacekeeping. Prior to that she served at UNICEF headquarters, focusing on gender, humanitarian crises, and postconflict situations. She also worked with the Conference Secretariat for the Fourth World Conference on Women, the Commonwealth of Learning (Vancouver), and the Australian government in defense and security issues.
Foreword
The crisis and the challenge The premise of the 1951 UN Convention on refugees was that refugees, by crossing international borders, had lost the protection of their own state authorities, and therefore needed international protection. Those uprooted within their own national borders were denied such protection because they were assumed to be protected by their governments, who, in any case, would keep the international community at bay to safeguard their sovereignty. Initially, the refugees who were guaranteed such protection were confined to Europe and the crisis was expected to be of a short post–Second World War timeframe. While the refugee crisis has spread across the globe and the African and Latin American conceptual and practical contributions have broadened the definition of a refugee, a large category of those uprooted within their own borders has emerged, in particular after the end of the Cold War. Over the last decade, the international community has been confronted with this new global crisis of internal displacement, involving some 25 million people in over 50 countries around the world, who have been forced by internal armed conflicts, communal violence, and egregious violations of human rights, but have not crossed international borders.1 Had they moved across the borders, these uprooted people would be considered refugees for whom the international community has well-established legal and institutional frameworks and mechanisms for their protection and assistance. But because they remain within their state borders, there is no legal or institutional basis for providing them with international protection and assistance, even though they are exposed to severe threats to their physical and psychological security, gross violations of their human rights, and denial of their basic for needs to shelter, food, medicine, sanitation, potable water, occupation, and education.2 The assumption that these people are protected by their own governments is belied by the fact that often they are victims of neglect and even persecution by their own governments. A personal observation confirms the identity crisis behind the conflicts that generate displacement and the response of the governments concerned. On my country missions as Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992 to 2004, I would, in addition
xvi
Foreword
to discussing with national authorities and representatives of donor governments, international agencies, and national organizations, meet with the displaced people themselves. At the end of my discussions with them, I would ask them what message they wanted me to take to their national leaders. In one Latin American country, the response of the community leader was that they did not consider those in government their leaders. “To those people,” he said, “we are not citizens but criminals and our only crime is that we are poor.” In one of the former Soviet Republics, now an independent state, the response was virtually the same, though on the basis of an ethnic rather than economic class basis: “Those are not our leaders,” the leader of the group said. “None of our people are in that government.” And in Africa, a Prime Minister said about the displaced of his country, “Those are not my people. In fact, the food you the international community give them is killing my soldiers.” Although the crisis is global, Africa, with over half of the world’s refugees and displaced persons, is the worst hit. In addition, the plight of the internally displaced refugees often overflows into porous borders of neighbors through refugees who enter with their political baggage and an agenda of return with vengeance. Until now, the problem has been perceived as a humanitarian crisis and, to a more controversial extent, a human rights issue. It is, however, becoming increasingly apparent that what is involved in most cases is a fundamental crisis of national identity that goes to the heart of social, ethnic, cultural, and religious cleavages within a country. These cleavages determine who is in as a recognized citizen, and who is out, denied a sense of belonging on equal footing, with dignity and pride in the national identity framework. The challenge this situation poses for the affected countries is profound. It demands a fundamental restructuring of the equations of power sharing and resource allocation. What is required is a framework of peace with justice and a mutual sense of belonging and participation on equitable bases, without discrimination based on divisive factors of identity. Such factors as gender and age also often figure as grounds for discrimination that merit special attention and remedial action. Beyond the pressing need for protection and assistance, this is a long-term challenge of human security and nation-building that ultimately must be confronted by the nationals of the country in question, but in which the international community can and should play a constructive role in accordance with the universalizing norms of human dignity.
International response to displacement The United Nations Commission on Human Rights decided in 1992 to place the issue of internal displacement on its agenda and requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Representative on Internally Displaced Persons to study the problem and recommend ways in which the United Nations system and the international community in general might respond to the needs of the internally displaced. I was honored to have been appointed by the Secretary-General as his representative
Foreword xvii on the issue, a position I held until 2004, when I was succeeded by a Swiss Professor of International Law, Walter Kalin, who had been a close collaborator in our work.3 Since 1992, significant progress has been made in this area. Various studies have been carried out under the mandate and normative and institutional frameworks for protecting and assisting the internally displaced have been developed. More specifically, working in close collaboration with a team of international legal experts, chaired by Professor Kalin, and in a broad-based process of consultation involving representatives of relevant UN agencies, regional organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, we developed the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. These principles restate the relevant standards in existing international human rights law, humanitarian law, and analogous refugee law, with a degree of reform to clarify gray areas and bridge gaps in the law.4 We have also made recommendations for institutional arrangements, presenting various options ranging from the creation of a specialized agency for the internally displaced, to the designation of an existing agency to assume full responsibility for them, to a collaborative approach that utilizes the capacities of existing agencies. This last option proved to be the preferred one. Since the Guiding Principles were presented to the Commission on Human Rights in 1995, and taken note of by the Commission, they have been well received by the agencies of the United Nations, regional organizations, governments, and nongovernmental organizations, far beyond the expectations of all those who were involved in their development. While a number of governments have questioned the manner in which they were developed and launched, and would prefer their submission for formal adoption by the United Nations system, the Principles, though persuasive and not legally binding, appear to be firmly established.5 The coordination needed for the collaborative institutional arrangements to be effective has also evolved significantly. The reform agenda of the Secretary-General designated the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs as the head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to function as the focal point in the system charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the displaced are protected and assisted. A series of other measures included initially, the establishment of an interagency Working Group on Internally Displaced Persons, later succeeded by the more high profile Inter-Agency Network, which, though not operational, mobilizes the specialized agencies to be more effective on the ground. An IDP Unit established at OCHA to facilitate the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator was elevated in 2004 to a Division within OCHA to assist the Emergency Relief Coordinator in discharging his responsibilities on behalf of the internally displaced.6 Within the UN system, as Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, I played the catalytic role of advocating the cause of the IDPs and engaging governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and all other pertinent actors in a dialogue on their behalf. In that connection, I focused the activities of my mandate in five interconnected areas: promoting the dissemination and application of the Guiding Principles at all
xviii
Foreword
levels, from local to global; appraising the performance of the operational agencies and how they can be made more effective on the ground; undertaking country missions to assess the conditions of the displaced and plead their case with governments, organizations, donors, and all those whose mandates and scope of activities impact on them; collaborating with regional, subregional, and civil society organizations in programs and activities aimed at protecting and assisting the internally displaced; and conducting studies into various aspects of the crisis of internal displacement and the response to it at various levels, from national, through regional, to international.7
The responsibility of sovereignty Perhaps the approach that has emerged as the most powerful in the dialogue with governments, whether on a bilateral basis or in the pertinent bodies of the UN system and other regional organizations, is to recognize the problem of internal displacement as inherently internal and therefore under state sovereignty, to affirm respect for the sovereignty of the state and its policies, but to uphold sovereignty positively as a concept of responsibility for ensuring the protection and the general welfare of the citizens and all those under state jurisdiction. Sovereignty must not be seen negatively as a barricade against international solidarity with people in need. This approach to sovereignty as responsibility was initially developed in the African Studies Program at Brookings which I established and directed from 1988 to 2001, with a focus on conflict resolution, human rights, democracy, and development.8 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are indeed grounded in the responsibility of the state toward its citizens, with the international community playing a supportive role. In this positive conception of sovereignty as responsibility, governments are expected to provide protection and assistance to their needy populations, and when they cannot for reasons of lack of capacity, should invite or at least welcome international assistance. But when governments lack the requisite capacity or the political will to discharge their responsibility, whether on their own or in cooperation with the international community, and masses of their people face severe hardships and even the threat of death, they cannot expect the international community to remain aloof and not get involved. Such involvement can range from diplomatic dialogue, to various forms of coercive sanctions, to military intervention in extreme cases. The best way to protect national sovereignty is therefore to discharge the responsibilities associated with it and to seek the assistance of the international community, as needed.
Opportunities in crisis Many of the conflict situations that generate internal displacement involve acute crises of national identity based on severe racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious cleavages. How groups define themselves or are defined by others and how the national framework is perceived, leave serious gaps of identification with the nation. Oftentimes, the populations that are affected by the conflicts are seen not
Foreword xix as fellow citizens who have the right to be protected or assisted by the state, but, through association with a warring party, as part of the enemy, if not the enemy itself. As a result, instead of being protected and assisted, they are neglected and even persecuted.9 During the Cold War, many of these internal contradictions and actual or potential conflicts were overshadowed by the bipolar control mechanisms and support systems of the superpowers and their alliance networks. As long as a government was seen as ideologically aligned with one of the superpowers, that government was shielded, protected, and assisted. Governments therefore had the capacity to oppress and repress internal dissention and the self-assertiveness of minority and other marginalized groups. When the warring factions in an internal conflict had the competing support of the two superpowers, the stakes became much higher and the balance of power tended to perpetuate the conflict, much to the suffering of the affected populations on both sides. The Cold War polarization of the world, therefore, meant that internal conflicts tended to be associated with the proxy confrontation of the superpowers and their domestic roots not well understood. The end of the Cold War removed this distortion and external support from the outside. The result was that the roots of internal conflicts as embodied in unmanaged or badly managed situations of diversity, with acute disparities or inequities, became exposed. Furthermore, in the conflicts, major powers no longer had vested geopolitical interests to justify their involvement in support of one side or the other or to welcome refugees. With governments weakened as a consequence, insurgent movements seeking various forms and degrees of autonomy, separation, or fundamental reform of the system became more effective in challenging the status quo. Consequently, the number of internally displaced persons increased exponentially.10 Equally important is the extent to which the resulting displacement alters the configuration of the settlement patterns in the country with the poor rural communities, normally the most affected, moving en masse to towns and cities and becoming exposed to the services and opportunities to which they had been denied in the prevailing national distributive system. Although many displaced communities find discrimination and the indignities they suffer in the new situations intolerable and wish to return to their areas of origin, as soon as the security conditions permit, many others no longer wish to return to the status quo. Whether they return to areas of origin, integrate into communities where they move, or seek resettlement elsewhere, these people can no longer be satisfied with their old position in the country. To the extent that peace, unity, stability, and viability of the nation are overriding objectives, a responsible and wise leadership must not only accept, but indeed initiate and lead a major reform with the view to establishing a new basis for sharing power, national resources, services, and opportunities for equitable development.
Addressing the root causes The response of the international community to the crisis of internal displacement continues to be seen largely as a humanitarian challenge, focusing on assistance
xx Foreword and to a more problematic extent, physical security and human rights protection. And yet, in many conflict situations, unless the root causes are addressed, which means not only ending the conflict, but also remedying the conditions of gross inequity, real or perceived, that generate the conflict in the first place, durable peace is unlikely to be achieved. An effective response to the crisis of internal displacement beyond the challenge of humanitarian assistance and protection must go to address the deeper, root causes that lie in the structural problems of nation-building: mismanagement of identity conflicts, gross inequities in the shaping and sharing of power, national wealth, opportunities for development, and chronic abuse of power resulting in egregious violations of human rights. With the end of the Cold War and the strategic withdrawal of the major powers, crises began to be perceived in their proper national and regional contexts, instead of being distorted as part of the proxy confrontations of the Cold War era. This was indeed a positive development. Commensurate to this was the need to reapportion responsibility, with the state concerned assuming the primary role, countries of the region, who are affected by the overflow of internal crises, coming next, with the international community still needed to play a supporting role as the ultimate guarantor of universal human rights and humanitarian standards. The tragic events of September 11 changed the world in a dramatic way. The United States successfully mobilized a united international front against terrorism, not only by staging a massive attack on the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda allies in Afghanistan, but also by setting in motion a global antiterrorism campaign. This new dynamic presents two potential directions for the world. The unity of purpose against terrorism, which the United States is championing, could bring the world together around fundamental values and principles of security, stability, and global law and order. Pursued in close collaboration with allies around the world and within the framework of the United Nations, this could be a monumental accomplishment for global governance and public order. On the other hand, there is the potential that the world could revert back to the Cold War divide between ideological camps, those committed to the war against terrorism and those outside this circle. What is even more ominous is that such a division could lead to accepting and supporting those who are, or purport to be, allies in the war against terrorism, irrespective of their domestic record in terms of democracy and respect for human rights. The challenge for the post–September 11 world order is whether the United States and its allies, indeed the international community, beyond welcoming the alliance of all nations against terrorism, will define terrorism universally and fight it wherever and by whomever it is practiced, including when it is inflicted by a state against its own citizens, as was the case in Afghanistan. The risk is that the world may be drifting back to the Cold War polarization of the world into those who are seen as partners in the war against international terrorism, and be accepted and supported, whatever evils they commit against their own population, and those who are classified as terrorists, and be condemned and countered whatever the legitimacy of the cause they may exploit to unacceptable ends.
Foreword xxi Ironically, displacement often exposes the affected rural population to the opportunities which citizens in urban centers enjoy and which they have been denied. It can have the effect of increasing their resentment and hostility. Unless effectively remedied, this may sow the seeds of further conflict in the country. Indeed, the crisis of displacement should be seen as a wake-up call and an opportunity for addressing the deeper, structural ills of the country to forge a national common ground and collective vision for nation-building.
A call to action Along with the current efforts at assisting and protecting displaced populations, it would seem that the time has come to urge and assist governments to begin addressing the root causes of displacement by seeking in earnest a constructive resolution of the conflicts through a just and lasting peace. Beyond that, the challenge of nation-building calls for the establishment of a constitutive process that ensures democratic participation, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and equitable opportunities for sustainable development. This new focus on the challenges posed by displacement will require a more strategic approach to in-depth studies of specific country situations, sharing the results with opinion-shapers and policy-makers, national political and administrative authorities, and international partners. The Guiding Principles could provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the country situations in terms of prevention, response, and solutions. Several questions corresponding to this three-phase approach would provide the appropriate framework for research and dialogue, and outreach activities, involving concurrently both analysis and advocacy: ●
●
●
First, what in ideal and practical terms is needed to create a constitutive national political, economic, social, and cultural framework with which all citizens can identify and which would provide them with a sense of belonging with pride and dignity as citizens and on more or less equal footing with national or other groups? Second, should a conflict or a crisis occur that displaces populations or otherwise affects civilian populations, what humanitarian and human rights principles should the government and other parties to a conflict observe to ensure that innocent citizens and civilian populations are protected and assisted without discrimination based on the identity factors behind the conflict? And to what extent should refugees and internally displaced persons continue to be treated separately when the causes for the displacement and their needs are almost identical? Third, what constructive measures could the parties to the conflict take to facilitate solutions for the displaced and other affected populations to ensure for them alternative options, including return to areas of origin in safety and with dignity, resettlement in other areas of their choice with appropriate protection and assistance, or otherwise integration into the communities where they happen to be according to their wishes?
xxii Foreword ●
Fourth, what are the main issues in the conflict that need to be addressed, the positions of the parties in conflict that need to be reconciled, and the principles that are likely to be accepted as the basis for a constructive system that guarantees peace with justice, as prerequisites for security and stability?
The search for answers to these questions could be the objective of research agendas, teaching programs in academic institutions, intellectual and policyoriented discussion groups, and outreach activities in which policy recommendations are widely disseminated and advocated.
Developing an African response Plans are underway in the African Union (AU) to develop an appropriate AU response to internal displacement focusing on an instrument for the internally displaced. To that end, it would seem appropriate to build on the experience within the United Nations, but with a natural orientation to the situation on the continent. As I have already explained, work on the Guiding Principles was a protracted, incremental process that involved initially requesting legal scholars to produce drafts, building on the three sources, human rights law, humanitarian law, and analogous refugee law. These drafts were then thoroughly discussed by a team of senior legal scholars over several sessions, with each session advancing the text and raising issues for further research and consideration. The discussion groups that considered the texts began to broaden to include representatives of relevant UN agencies, regional organizations, and NGOs. In these sessions, we tried to ensure African participation in a variety of capacities, but obviously, in retrospect, considering that the Continent is the worst affected, African contribution could and should have been stronger. Once the draft was finalized and endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, comprising the heads of all the UN humanitarian, human rights, and development agencies, it was submitted to the Commission on Human Rights and later to the General Assembly. The response the Guiding Principles have received has already been presented earlier. It should be emphasized that in our cooperation with the regional organizations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was in the lead in organizing with us meetings on the Guiding Principles and called in strong language for their dissemination and application. In view of this experience, the question that poses itself is whether the AU should start from scratch or build on what has so far been achieved. It would seem that focusing on what has been achieved, but relating it to the African context would be the most constructive way to proceed. Indeed, since Africa would not be reinventing the wheel, the process would be less protracted. This, in my view, would mean commissioning a small team of legal experts to look at the Guiding Principles in comparative reference to relevant AU instruments, such as the Charter and the Convention on Human and Peoples Rights, to ensure that the provisions of the Guiding Principles conform with the African normative outlook and meet the needs of the displaced on the Continent. Their report would then
Foreword xxiii be presented to an enlarged team of regionally representative experts to consider and come out with an integrated text. An even broader forum involving pertinent stakeholders would then be organized to finalize the text before presentation to the relevant authorities for formal adoption. A group of experts, which should be regionally representative, would be convened to discuss the text at its various stages, before formal submission to the appropriate AU body for adoption. While there is a clear preference to see this as an African initiative and to use African expertise, it would be wise to utilize collaboration with non-African experts with experience on the international response to the global crisis of internal displacement.
The challenge in perspective It should be reiterated that the displaced populations are a microcosm of the wider communities affected by conflict and that their plight is therefore the plight of the communities to which they are an integral part. Often, the affected countries suffer from acute crises of national identity which creates cleavages within the populations and between the dominant groups and the marginalized sections of the country. The differences involved are not the source of the problems, but rather the implications of the differences in terms of disparities and discrimination. The marginalization of the affected groups becomes tantamount to virtual statelessness. Oftentimes, perspectives on the conflicting identities involve elements of subjectivity and objectivity, with a gap between how people perceive themselves and the objective facts about their respective identities. In Burundi, I asked the Foreign Minister whether one could always tell a Hutu from a Tutsi. The answer was, “Yes, but with a margin of error of 35%.” In the Sudan, between the so-called Arabs and Africans, the margin of error would be roughly the same, if not greater. There is a tendency in Africa to vacillate between, on the one hand, denying ethnicity as a myth that was constructed by the colonial powers in their divide and rule policies and has no basis in objective reality, and, on the other hand, a subjective exaggeration of the differences and their conflictual implications. The crisis of national identity is then reflected in two sets of discrepancies. One is that subjective, strongly felt views of self-identification do not always reflect objective factors of identity. The other is that differences are denied as a justification for imposing the dominant identity on the nation as a homogeneous entity, despite objective facts of diversity. Equally striking are conflicting versions of historical memory of interethnic relations. One version has it that the groups involved have always lived together in peace and harmony, have shared their happy and sad occasions, and have indeed intermarried. The other version is one of perpetual competition, tension, and conflict. In a way, both versions are valid. When communities live as neighbors, they are bound to come into conflict every now and then. But, by the same token, they develop conventional ways of managing their differences and resolving their conflicts when they occur. Whenever conflicts break up again, old wounds get opened and hostile memories surface.
xxiv Foreword The choices for resolving intercommunal conflicts are limited. Assimilation is often not acceptable to groups that are different, self-respecting, and obviously undervalued. The inequities of marginalization and exclusion are equally unacceptable and provide grounds for conflict. Partition threatens the unity and integrity of the nation and could lead to endless fragmentation and disintegration on the continent. The only real viable option is to develop a national framework with decentralized power so that all groups can manage their own affairs through a system of self-administration, while also participating equitably in the national power process. The objective must be to make every individual and group feel a sense of belonging on equal footing and with all the rights and dignity of citizenship. What this means with respect to the challenge of internal displacement is that while the immediate needs of the displaced should be addressed in terms of humanitarian assistance and protection of human rights, the goal must be to find lasting solutions that would allow for their return in safety and with dignity, their reintegration in their areas of origin, or their choice of alternative areas of settlement. But, even when the conflicts that had displaced them end and peace is achieved, there are often still contingencies. Conditions must be created that provide the type of services that the displaced become introduced to in the urban areas into which they often gravitate. These include education, health services, safe water, sanitation, infrastructure, and other social amenities. Indeed, often, the desire to return is more an expression of nostalgia for the homeland than a fully considered option. The critical issue is not only to identify the problem and what needs to be done to remedy it, but also to determine who is to do what about it. In line with the normative principle of sovereignty as responsibility, the first line of action in the apportionment of responsibility must rest with the governments of the affected countries. Since the problems of these countries often spill over the borders to neighboring countries in the form of refugees, the next step in the process of displacement is for the countries of the subregion to assume the second tier of responsibility. Continental organization, primarily represented by the African Union, but involving also members of other entities such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), can also play an important role through the peer review mechanism to promote appropriate reforms. Ultimately, however, the promotion of human dignity with all the human rights that it implies must be a global responsibility. To conclude, as a symptom of the structural problems that generate conflict, displacement is a national challenge that ultimately calls for creating an environment in which all citizens feel a sense of belonging on equal footing: an environment in which their human rights and fundamental liberties are respected without discrimination on the grounds of race, national origin, ethnicity, religion, culture, gender, or other grounds; a framework in which the state will respond effectively to their needs for protection and humanitarian assistance; and a system of governance under which, in the end, they are guaranteed lasting solutions to return to their homes, or are resettled and assisted in resuming self-reliant and integrated development as citizens on par with all other citizens, individuals, and groups. Otherwise, gross inequities will always breed tension, conflict, and instability. Francis M. Deng
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Notes 1 Initially, the working definition of the United Nations described internally displaced persons as “persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or manmade disasters, and who are within the territory of their country.” Analytical Report of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/1992/23 (1992). For a preliminary discussion of definitional issues on the basis of this definition see Report of the Representative of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, U.N. ESCOR, 51 Sess., Agenda Item 11(d) 116-27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/50 (1995). Further points for consideration and the rationale for refining the definition appear in Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998, p. 10. The present definition in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Principle 2, is: “a person or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular as a result of, or to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed internationally recognized State borders.” 2 For a detailed overview of the crisis of internal displacement, see Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, and The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998. See also Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993 and David Korn, Exodus Within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement, 1999. Other publications on the global crisis of internal displacement include: Norwegian Refugee Council, Global IDP Projects, Rights Have No Borders: Worldwide Internal Displacement, 1998. See also, Norwegian Refugee Council, Global IDP Project, Internally Displaced Persons: A Global Survey, Second Edition. London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 2002. 3 In 1994, Roberta Cohen and I cofounded and codirected The Brookings Project on Internal Displacement to assist my mandate with research and outreach activities, including collaboration with regional organizations and nongovernmental organizations. When I left Brookings in 2002, to join the City University of New York Graduate Center and then the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the project changed names to reflect Brookings’ collaboration with these institutions. In 2004, when Professor Walter Kalin of Bern University in Switzerland succeeded me, the Project became Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. 4 Work on the Guiding Principles began with the compilation of existing standards in human rights law, humanitarian law, and analogous refugee law that were pertinent to the protection of IDPs. This resulted in Compilation and Analysis: Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/1996 add 2 (1996), submitted pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/57. See also Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection Against Arbitrary Displacement, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 9(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/add 1 and Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess. Agenda Item 9(d) U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53. Add 2 (1998). The Guiding Principles were finalized in January, 1998. For a comprehensive review of how the Guiding Principles were developed, see Simon Bagshaw, Developing the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: The Role of a Global Public Policy Network [available online at www. globalpublicpolicy.net] (last accessed May 20, 2005). 5 For responses to The Guiding Principles within the United Nations see Strengthening of Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations,
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6
7 8
9
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U.N. Doc. A/53/139-E/67 (1998); Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 409 1st mtg. U.N., U.N. Doc. SC/RES, 1286 (2000); and G.A. Res. 167, U.N., GAOR, 54th Sess. U.N. DOC. A/RES/54/167 2000. For a study of the sources of the law that guided the development of The Guiding Principles, see Walter Kalin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations. Washington, DC: The American Society of International Law and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement, 2000. For other publications on The Guiding Principles, see Susan Forbes Martin, The Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles, the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2000 [available online at http:/www.reliefweb.int/ocha ol/pub/IDPprinciples.PDF], and Manual on Field Practice in Internal Displacement, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper Series No.1, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [available online at http:/www.reliefweb.int/ocha ol/pubIDPmanual.pdf]. For reports on how NGOs around the world have made use of the Guiding Principles, see The Brookings Institution, The Brookings Project on Internal Displacement, Report on the International Colloquy on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 2002. See the report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Program for Reform, U.N. Doc. A/51/950 (1997); The Inter-Agency Standing Committee policy paper, Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, 1999 [available online at http:/www.idpproject.org.pdf_files/protectionpolicypaper]; and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Supplementary Guide to Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators on Their Responsibilities in Relation to Internally Displaced Persons [available online at http:/www. idpproject.org.pdf_files/suppguidance.pdf]. My reports on my activities, including country missions, were presented to the Commission on Human Rights annually and to the General Assembly biannually. Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991 and Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons (eds.), African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance. Washington, DC, 1998. This concept has since been reinforced and vigorously promoted by The International Commission on Intervention and State Responsibility. See The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2000. See also The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility, 2005; and Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking Africa in the New State Sovereignty and Regional Security. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1996. See Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. University of Wisconsin, Madison Press, 1970; Fredrick Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Differences. Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1969; and Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991. See, in particular, the chapters by Ted Gurr, Donald Rothchild, Otieno Odhiambo, I. William Zartman, Crawford Young, and Stephen John Stedman. See also Joseph V. Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. Washington, DC: Heath and Company, 1991. When IDPs were first counted in 1982, it was estimated that there were 1.2 million internally displaced persons. By 1992, when the issue was considered by the Commission on Human Rights, the number had increased to between 20 and 24 million. With the end of the Cold War, super power rivalry ended and Western governments’ geopolitical advantage in accepting refugees began to wane, which led to the desire to find solutions that would keep potential refugees within their own borders. Today, the number of IDPs in estimated at 24 million in about 50 countries. Norwegian Refugee Council, Global IDP Project, 2004.
Acknowledgments
This book is a collection of papers given at a symposium entitled Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation: When the Wars End held at Cornell University from April 23–24, 2004. The conference was sponsored by the Institute for African Development (IAD) in collaboration with Africa Faith and Justice Network (AFJN). The conference focused on examining the challenges that conflicts present to the state, its institutions, development, and the welfare of its people. It was driven by the underlying belief that our understanding of conflicts and their consequences is directly related to our ability to manage, resolve, and prevent them. The symposium participants reflected the symposium’s interdisciplinary focus. It brought together an interdisciplinary group of experts in comparative constitutionalism, conflict resolution, governance, development, gender, and security. The conference would not have been possible without the hard work of Jackie Sayegh, IAD’s Program Coordinator, and Jackie Cervantes, the Assistant Program Coordinator. They handled the logistics of the conference and the book with patience, a dexterity, and unconditional support. The book could not have been written without the help and work of many people. In addition to the participants who contributed their symposium papers to the volume, I would like to thank my research assistants Sonia Gioseffi, Tamika Bent, Nalaamle Amissah, Alexis Boyce, and Joanna Hooste who helped me research, edit, and in various other ways in the preparation of the manuscript for publication. I would also like to thank Thomas Mills from the Cornell Law Library for help with citations.
Acronyms
ACCORD ACS ANC AZAPO CEDAW CSVR DRC ECOMOG ECOWAS ERC ESCOR EU FARC GA HIPC ICC ICGL ICTR IDP IFP KSFOR LTTE LURD MODEL MONUC NPP OAU OCHA OSCE
African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes American Colonization Society African National Congress Azania Peoples Organization Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation Democratic Republic of the Congo Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group Economic Community for West African States Emergency Relief Coordinator Economic and Social Council Report European Union Revolutionary Forces of Columbia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) General Assembly Highly Indebted Poor Countries International Criminal Court International Contact Group on Liberia International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Internally Displaced Persons Inkanta Freedom Party Kosovo Stabilization Force The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Movement for Democracy in Liberia United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic the Congo National Patriotic Party Organization of African Unity Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
Acronyms PAC PRC PTSD RPF RUF SAIS SFOR SPLA TRC UN UNAIDS UNAMISIL UNCJS UNDP UNHCR UNICEF UNMIK UNOB UNTAC USAID WOMEN
Pan African Congress People Redemption Council Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Rwanda Patriotic Front Revolutionary United Front School of Advanced International Studies Stabilization Force Sudan Peoples Liberation Army Truth and Reconciliation Commission United Nations United Nations AIDS United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for Peace Keeping Police United Nations Development Program United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Operations in Burundi United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United States Agency for International Development Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation
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Introduction Muna Ndulo
This volume is an interdisciplinary study of conflict with the overriding focus being an in-depth examination of ways and means to promote reconciliation and reconstruction in postconflict societies. Armed conflicts continue to occur in many parts of the world and have escalated over the last two decades.1 In Africa, over one quarter of the continent’s countries were embroiled in conflict in the late 1990s.2 At the end of 2002, a total of 25 countries were experiencing ongoing or sporadic conflict. Thirty countries are emerging from recent conflicts.3 The United Nations report has observed that today’s armed conflicts are predominantly internal, with regional and subregional repercussions; and the victims of those conflicts are disproportionately civilians. While during the First World War, only 5 percent of all casualties were civilians, during the 1990s civilians accounted for up to 90 percent of casualties.4 The causes of these conflicts comprise a complex, interlocking web of factors that are sometimes steeped in both history and contemporary realities, including economic, social, and political conditions. The conditions of capturing and maintaining political power in many parts of the world is a key source of conflict. Frequently, the candidate who wins a political victory assumes a “winner-take-all” mentality with respect to patronage, wealth, and resources as well as prestige and prerogative of office. A feeling of communal sense of advantage or disadvantage is often closely linked to this phenomenon, which is heightened in many cases by reliance on centralized and highly personalized forms of governance. The stakes for political control become dangerously high in jurisdictions with insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of regime transparency, inadequate checks and balances, nonadherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights. Whoever captures power can dispense the spoils of office to his or her followers. The situation of political control is exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the economic pie to be shared is small and the state is the major source of accumulation. Often political conflict, given the multiethnic character of most African states, leads to a violent politicization of ethnicity. In extreme cases, rival communities believe that they can ensure their survival only through control of the state power and thus conflict becomes inevitable.
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Conflict is intensified as there is usually no countervailing force, given the limited existence of a middle class due to lack of industrialization to blunt the excesses of warlords, or the state itself. The World Bank in a study entitled “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy”5 concluded that the roots of civil strife are more economic than ethnic. According to the report, in a given five-year period, a low income country has a 17.1 percent chance of falling into civil war. That risk drops to 12.3 percent if 2 percent of economic growth is sustained. Economic diversification is also an important factor. If primary-commodity exports (oil particularly) account for 10 percent or less of the GDP, the risk is reduced to 11 percent but rises to 33 percent when such exports exceed 30 percent of the GDP. During the Cold War, external interference in the internal affairs of developing country governments was a familiar feature of superpower rivalry.6 Today, external interests continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing and in sustaining conflict in the competition for oil, diamonds, timber, and other natural resources.7 A number of other factors are especially important in particular subregions. These factors include the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas. In oil producing areas, conflict often arises from local complaints that the communities, where the resources are located, do not adequately reap the benefits from the oil exploitation, or do not receive compensation from the environmental degradation and pollution. In yet other situations, conflicts result from tensions between different factions holding opposing visions of the nature of society and the state. For instance, in the Sudan, a clash of vision between the Arab Islamic north and the culturally and religiously more diverse black south threatens the state’s territorial integrity. Increased access to inexpensive and lethal weaponry fuels and perpetuates armed conflict. These weapons are used by state and nonstate actors, irregular forces, private militias, guerillas, warlords, and civilians. Conflicts weaken the authority of the state, breed insecurity, and erode institutions of civil society. They result in mass displacements, use of child soldiers, violence against ethnic/religious groups as well as gender-based and sexual violence. Postconflict societies are characterized by lack of respect for the rule of law, gross human rights violations, impunity, and economic devastation and decay. The end of conflict does not automatically bring peace, security, or an end to violence. Demobilization is typically accompanied by an upsurge in criminality and other forms of violence. There is always a continuing risk that the conflict might resume. A country that has just emerged from conflict runs a 44 percent risk of return to conflict within five years. In such societies, some of the most difficult tasks include articulating a vision of a new society, dealing with past human rights violations, defining the fundamental principles by which the country will be transformed, distribution of power within the country among the various segments of the population, engaging in effective reconstruction, reconciliation, and establishing and securing enduring peace. The manner in which these processes are handled can play an important role in the consolidation of peace. Many of the issues if not handled properly can accentuate fundamental differences and lead to renewed conflict. Reconciliation, for example, if not dealt with properly, may open old wounds or reignite ethnic or other rivalries.
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Women and children constitute the majority of victims and are disproportionately affected in contemporary armed conflict. Where cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls exist prior to conflict, they will be exacerbated during conflict. If women do not participate in the decision-making structures of a society, they are unlikely to become involved in the decision to end the conflict or the peace process that follows.8 A continuing problem in peace processes is how to mainstream women’s concerns in the postconflict processes. Countries emerging from conflict will almost always need to depend upon the international community to varying degrees for resources (financial, technical, and human) in order to conduct effective reconciliation, institution-building, and reconstruction. Typically, the international community plays its role through the United Nations. International intervention may contribute to the legitimacy of the peace process. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the peace process may be undermined where the international community is perceived as attempting to impose a result. A matter of considerable importance, therefore, is a consideration of the appropriate role for the international community and regional organizations in the resolution of conflicts and reconstruction in postconflict societies. This book brings together an interdisciplinary group of experts to explore issues identified above. The book attempts to draw common lessons learnt; identifies pitfalls to be avoided; and articulates issues and guidelines to be considered in the design of postconflict processes. In this way it attempts to contribute to the determination of the variables that underline success in the approaches adopted to achieve reconciliation and reconstruction in postconflict society. It is organized into 16 chapters. In Chapter 1, William Reno discusses arms trafficking and the local political economy of conflict. He discusses the problem within the current analytical framework of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Reno argues that the current debate fails to take into account variations in the correlation between the acquisition of small arms and light weapons and the eruption of widespread violence. Reno notes that there are certain situations where widespread violence has not erupted in the presence of small arms and light weapons. He proposes three explanatory hypotheses and explores several conflict situations involving small arms that demonstrate varying degrees of conflicts. In sum, the issue of arms trafficking cannot be resolved by using social categories or by assuming that legitimacy runs along state-defined boundaries. Rather, it is important to pay attention to legitimate authorities, regardless of whether those authorities are members of formally recognized states or not. In Chapter 2, Obijiofor Aginam considers HIV/AIDS, conflicts, and security in Africa. First, Aginam highlights the increase in multilateral declarations and commitments – the UN Security Council, World Health Organization, G8 Summit, and the African Union – on the security implications of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. The various declarations acknowledged HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases as a global security threat. Second, Aginam argues that with the development of a new challenge comes the need for new techniques – analytical and policy tools – to battle these challenges. The crisis of HIV/AIDS, he argues, should be explored in the context of the debate
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between the traditional school of security that focuses on external military threat to geopolitical boundaries of a nation-state and the new school that explores security from the perspectives of nonmilitary threats to the nation-state and its citizens. Third, Aginam argues that globalized health threats require a global policy universe and humane global health governance framework, involving a multiplicity of actors – international organizations, private and corporate actors, and civil society – and built on the notion of state and human security as complimentary paradigms. In Chapter 3, Ian Gary discusses transparency and accountability in the use of petroleum revenues as fundamental ingredient for security, reconstruction, and reconciliation in Africa’s petro-states. Gary observes that the oil boom in developing African countries is both a moment of opportunity and peril for countries plagued by wide-scale poverty. According to Gary, this failure is due to a lack of government transparency, accountability, fairness, mismanagement of oil wealth, poor democratic institutions, and administrative capacity. Gary argues that we should look at how revenues are raised, what percentage remains inside the producing country, and how the government utilizes these revenues. He looks at the economic and political problems involved in managing petroleum and suggests that a reformation of Africa’s government and a big push by relevant actors can improve a transformation that will benefit the poor. All actors need to change some of their practices and work together in a more concerted manner to change the incentive structure surrounding the management of Africa’s oil wealth. In Chapter 4, Erin Mooney examines the protection and reintegration of displaced women and children in post-conflict societies. Mooney observes that by stating that displaced women and children are at high risk during conflicts and during periods of settlements and reintegration, the “one-size fits all” solutions overlook their particular needs. She discusses the positive effect of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in addressing problems of internal displacement. Mooney notes that problems persist and proposes seven key issues related to the protection and reintegration of displaced women and children in the aftermath of conflict: engagement in the decision-making process, participation in the peace-building process, creation of conditions enabling the safe return or resettlement of the displaced, enactment of particular efforts to protect girls and women from sexual violence and abuse, improving understanding and overcoming the barriers to education, the creation of economically meaningful opportunities, and finally, the security of the right of women to inherit, own, and purchase land and property. In Chapter 5, Meredith Turshen examines the long-term impact of war on women and children with specific reference to Africa. After a brief introduction differentiating the effects of liberation struggles, interstate wars, and civil conflicts, she focuses on civil wars, which are particularly destructive of society. Looking at gender dimensions of conflict, Turshen notes that higher mortality rates for men shifts the burden of death to women and children. The author proposes three levels of analysis to explore the impact civil conflicts have on women and children: the familiar fallout of war, the historical legacies of conflict, and the
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altered political environments in which women in war-torn societies live. These perspectives highlight dramatic demographic changes in size and structure of populations, historic wars as roots of contemporary conflicts, and the long-term consequences that alter women’s lives, from physical health to economic environment. To resolve the collective traumatic effect of conflicts, Turshen advocates engendered treatment that also accounts for prolonged, repeated, and collective trauma. In Chapter 6, Sherrill Whittington examines the position and role of women in peace keeping and peace processes. Whittington first notes that women’s rights, needs, issues, views, and voices are often not equally represented during peace negotiations. Although the Security Council Resolution 1325, Women, Peace, and Security, was intended to prevent the marginalization of women’s concerns, Whittington argues that there is still a need for high-level executive commitment that supports integrating gender equality into all stages of the peace process. She posits that the real value of a resolution lies in its implementation, from the security council chambers to field level personnel, not rhetoric. Whittington identifies gender-based violations that disproportionately affect women as a major problem in conflict and postconflict situations and looks to the terms of Resolution 1325 as a tool to obtain gender equality during repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, and postconflict reconstruction. Whittington also looks at several countries that have implemented remedial measures. In countries such as Burundi. Democratic Republic of Congo, and other West African countries, partnerships with local women’s organizations ensure their direct involvement in national reconstruction. In Chapter 7, Ilene Cohn examines the intractable problem of child soldiers. Cohn commences by noting that despite a strengthened legal regime governing child rights – the Optional Protocol, domestic legislations, and country-specific tribunals – children still continue to suffer from armed conflict and violence. Despite the Secretary-General’s attempts to have countries comply with their international obligations to stop recruiting child soldiers and using them, there continues to be a huge gap between law and reality. Cohn presents four tendencies that need to be addressed in order to narrow the gap between progress in the law and progress on the ground. First, that there is a tension between human rights impulse to strengthen norms and humanitarian rights impulse to assist waraffected children, which exacerbates the gap. The second advocates more of an analysis of the political, social, economic, and military dynamics of particular conflicts to generate compliance with commitments and obligations. The third suggests that more credible, long-term program evaluations will better implement or guide the demobilization process of child soldiers. The fourth suggests that we focus even greater attention and resources on appropriate reintegration measures that will ensure the former child soldier the chance to function as a member of his or her community and individual accountability for child soldiers who commit egregious crimes as a form of rehabilitative interventions. In Chapter 8, Muna Ndulo examines ways and means of enhancing the participation of women in postconflict elections. First, Ndulo looks at the constitutional and electoral processes and describes elements of the process by which to
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attain a legitimate electoral process, including formulating a suitable legal framework, selecting an election system, delimitating constituencies, ensuring voter participation and campaigning. He then examines factors that prevent the participation of women in the electoral process, such as poverty, male-dominated power structures, disparity between equality in law and practice, lack of education, and gender-role stereotyping. Ndulo looks at legislative measures that can be taken to increase women’s participation in the electoral processes, noting that the problem is at the implementation level and suggesting both legislative and nonlegislative remedies. From a legislative perspective, he suggests the implementation of true democratic structures and the use of quotas – gender-quotas, gender-neutral quotas, or double quotas as affirmative measures in improving women participation in the electoral process. From a nonlegislative perspective, the author suggests measures such as civic education programs, gender-awareness in national legal systems and institutions, media portrayals, and improved female representation in the statutory bodies that administer elections and election officials. He advocates cooperative efforts between government agencies and NGOs in order to increase women’s participation in postconflict elections. In Chapter 9, Mark Kende examines whether truth commissions or prosecution are best suited to deal with past human rights violations in a postconflict society. Kende describes divergent views on the benefits and disadvantages of both approaches by exploring issues of truth-finding, restorative justice, forgiveness, selectivity in granting amnesty and in prosecuting, notions of justice, and speed of resolution. He then looks at the case of Rwanda and describes the advantages and disadvantages of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), noting that despite its success in prosecuting many human rights violators, the process remains slow and ineffective in gaining cooperation from national governments. He then looks at Sierra Leone’s hybrid court, noting that although it is very promising, it has not gotten off to a smooth start. Kende emphasizes the importance of context – societal goals, social geography, the nature of society – as essential to transformational justice. He concludes that neither approach can fully remedy massive human rights violations and suggests that countries would be better served with truth and amnesty and only prosecuting for deterrence rather than retribution. In Chapter 10, Chandra Lekha Sriram examines the question of how to deal with past human rights violations in the context of Sierra Leone. She begins her discussion by looking at what is at stake in transitional justice and suggests that discussions take a look at the needs of each transitional context. These needs include: stability, democratization, and the rule of law; the needs of victims; social and pedagogical effects of trials; and national reconciliation. Sriram looks at the flaws of externalized justice, justice elsewhere, and domestic justice, arguing that externalized justice will be even less likely than domestic justice to achieve all of its putative goals. She looks at the alternative of internationalized tribunals and their limitations in meeting the flaws of internal and external justice. Sriram compares the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and argues that the court’s shortcomings are likely to limit successful judicial contribution to postconflict countries.
Introduction
7
In Chapter 11, David Backer examines the question whether truth commissions offer advantages relative to blanket amnesties, in as much as past human rights violations are investigated and exposed and whether victims of violations accept this compromise. If not, what are the implications for political legitimacy, social stability, and democratic consolidation? The chapter is based on research carried out in South Africa. Backer argues that the South African process demonstrates that even the victims who participated in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission process perceived a strong sense of injustice. He argues that there are three ways victims could act upon these sentiments. One is to exact retribution, which presents a risk of ongoing cycles of conflict. Another is to become disillusioned by the new political dispensation, thereby disposing victims to antisystem activities. The third is to organize and advocate for further redress: an acceptable exercise of democratic freedoms. In this chapter, Backer evaluates the prevalence of these responses in South Africa. He tests the hypothesis that participation promotes organized advocacy while reducing the inclination toward both vengeance and alienation. In Chapter 12, Byron Tarr examines the challenges of reconstructing Liberia. Tar begins by offering an explanation as to why the Liberian state failed. He argues that it failed because its governance structure originated in and remained faithful to the peculiarities of its founding and the nineteenth-century governance philosophy that underlay its constitution and legal regime. He notes that previous unsuccessful reform efforts were very limited-purpose reforms or sector-specific reforms and advocates long-term commitment to comprehensive governance reform to resolve endemic political, economic, and humanitarian crises. The necessary reforms to be successful must be implemented within the historical and cultural context of Liberia. He advocates a “participatory approach” led by competent and experienced Liberians and friends of Liberia (to catalyze commitment) to reform the constitution and legal regime to specify policy instruments and reduce overlaps to attack dysfunctional governance. He details the benefits of several aspects of the program, its assumptions, methodology, strategy, and program outputs and impact. Tar discusses the role of civil society in the transformation of Liberia. He talks about the Liberia that it seeks to reform as opposed to the Liberia of historic past. It is an oligarchy whose elitist ruling parties disavow interest in recruiting the masses. Tar also outlines the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the fourteenth peace agreement accord signed by the warring factions, generic and specific limitations toward emphasizing the necessity of early commitment to comprehensive governance reconstruction, the irreducible requirement for resolving Liberia’s endemic crises. In Chapter 13, Peter Gantz takes a look at the role of civil police in peace keeping operations. First, Gantz identifies a public security and safety gap and suggests that the civil police (CivPol) element of peacekeeping operations may be enhanced with additional constabulary police. Despite the CivPol’s role and importance in the peace-building process, there are numerous problems (its quality and recruiting, quality and training; a time gap; operational difficulties; management and mandate issues; and a lack of accountability) with the UN CivPol system, which result in an inability to establish effective public security in
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postconflict environment. The United Nations and the United States have increased efforts to enhance CivPol so as to prevent the military from having to perform a policing role. One particular UN reform is the Brahimi Report, which calls for numerous system-wide changes, but fails to fully implement them due to UN budgetary problems and member states’ inability to build or enhance their own capacity to conduct rule of law operations. The US Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71) calls for various reforms, but the political process prohibited its implementation. Notwithstanding this problem, the US assistance to civilian police operations is limited considering its lack of national police capacity. However, the EU’s constabulary police (highly professional and capable police) capacity benefits peace operations as it has existing institutions to promote stability and security in countries in and outside of Europe. This alternative is not without problems, such as maintaining a working distinction between military and police. He argues that a review of the EU constabulary force can benefit peace operations. Gantz explores both the difficulty and benefits of European deployments of constabulary police by looking at the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo experience. He recommends the establishment of a permanent UN CivPol capacity by creating a UN civilian police reserve force or a permanent standing UN police force. In Chapter 14, Marcel Kitissou examines Africa’s security dilemma. He notes that studying the security dilemma of Africa is difficult because issues that are central at one time may become secondary at another time and vice versa. Kitissou begins by stating that Africa has three traditional roles, which are related to its strategic advantages to other powerful countries. He identifies these as: France’s strategic use of Africa to respond to the triple menace of communism expansion; US complacency with African nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism in and following the period of decolonization and; the US use of Africa as a war strategy. Kitissou also examines the UN peace keeping efforts in Africa. In Chapter 15, Matthew Schroeder looks at the US military assistance to Africa and the challenges it poses. Schroeder notes that the type of military aid provided to African countries through US security assistance programs is very diverse – not limited to combat training and arms sales but extending to material aid, training, and other forms of nonmilitary assistance. He notes that there are tensions and conflicts surrounding the US security assistance programs and a lack of coherent and effective security assistance policies and consistency in the use of security assistance as a diplomatic tool. Schroeder advocates creative policymaking, vigilant watchdog organizations, and rigorous reporting requirements to ensure some degree of harmony among, and the simultaneous advancement of, important foreign policy objectives. In the concluding chapter, Milton Esman offers some thoughts on lessons learnt from conflicts. He summarizes the devastating effects of wars in the past decade and suggests that even when the fighting finally ends, hostilities persist and postconflict agreements may be inherently unstable. From an economic and infrastructural perspective, external assistance is usually necessary to help return to normalcy. Healing psychological wounds is more difficult, especially with regards
Introduction
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to truth and reconciliation where residual distrust and hatred are intense. But, he observes that a peaceful coexistence may eventually heal the psychic wounds among peoples. The book would have achieved its overriding objective if it contributes to the determination of the variables that underline success in the approaches adopted to achieve reconciliation and reconstruction in postconflict societies and identifies ways in which those most affected by war could be empowered.
Notes 1 Report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of a durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (A/52/871-S/1998/318) para. 4. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms Gracia Marchel. Impact of armed conflict on children (A/51/3006), para. 24. 5 World Bank. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, DC, 2003. 6 Yoweri Museveni. What is Africa’s Problem? 185 (1982). 7 Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Security Council Document S/2001/1072, November 2001, p. 22. 8 Women, Peace and Security, study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), p. 2.
Part I
The social, political, and economic dimensions of conflict
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Arms trafficking and the local political economy of conflict William Reno
Introduction An influential United Nations report argues that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons plays a major role in promoting violent conflicts. It shows how groups that previously would have been inclined to settle their differences through negotiations or other nonlethal means now find more options to arm themselves.1 The increasing availability of hardware “demilitarizes war” in the sense of enabling quite small groups, not just state militaries, to organize for combat.2 Thus easily available small arms help to change the organization of conflicts and creates a new role for small-scale military entrepreneurs who may have vested interests in continuing violence. The decentralized nature of their militias in turn disrupts the efforts of more peaceful groups to resolve underlying causes of conflict.3 The proliferation of small arms plays a deeper role in the increasingly predatory and fragmented conduct of contemporary internal wars beyond simply empowering violent entrepreneurs. Easily accessible weapons undermine local social orders as groups acquire arms out of fear that the others will do the same. Neighbors cannot distinguish with certainty the defensive preparation of other groups from apparent preparations to attack. This kind of security dilemma is more severe than those between states. This is because as weapons become cheaper and more readily available, starting up new armed groups that can act as spoilers in conflicts becomes easier. This in turn creates pressures for otherwise peaceful people to arm for self-defence and seek protection from predatory groups that would find little place in a war between big state armies.4 These concerns drive most policy debates that now focus on how to define and enforce global norms to govern the trade in small arms and light weapons to prevent illicit trafficking. Major debates emerge over whether control of illicit transactions is inextricably linked to tighter limits on legal possession, and the degree to which keeping arms out of the hands of nonstate actors requires regulating all civilians’ access to weapons, and not on whether weapons can play a positive political role in conflicts. Most who engage in this debate tend to lump all armed groups in the category of illicit, including them in the same category as the weapons that they use. They contrast such armed groups’ activities to those of existing sovereign states, which are the main interlocutors in international
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regulatory efforts and thus provide the reference point for defining other armed groups as illicit, including those that might enjoy local legitimacy. This uniform application of international norms independent of local opinion carries over into prosecutions for human rights violations, as the Deputy Prosecutor of the UN-backed Special Court in Sierra Leone noted: “I’m afraid you can fight on the side of the angles and nevertheless commit crimes against humanity.”5 While the study of the incentives that small arms generate for individuals provides important insights into how some conflicts intensify and how entrepreneurs of violence emerge, they often ignore substantial factors that shape how armed groups manage relations with local societies. Some recent political economy approaches do take seriously the dynamics of contention between state and nonstate armed groups, however. They identify causes of violence in particular types of politics and in the availability of resources, especially those that are valuable and portable and thus easily looted.6 But neither approach explains why abundant supplies of small arms, along with resources and political contexts commonly associated with violence, leads to serious conflict in some cases but not in others. Some groups with access to small arms in these contexts use them to prey upon local people while others in similar contexts do not. An explanation for this variation needs to take account of the dynamics of individual behavior within the broader context of political economy and social relationships to understand how small arms availability influences the courses of conflicts.
The argument This analysis links changes in the organization of violence and differences in its intensity and fragmentation to the nature of local institutions. Douglass North broadly defines institutions as “rules of the game in a society” that form legitimate authority and therefore are not limited to state bureaucracies.7 They can include customary practices that are not recognized in law, the patronage networks of informal political control, and the structures of clandestine economies. Neither military hardware nor other material resources at hand necessarily determine whether the conduct of conflicts will become widespread and indiscriminate, or focused and disciplined, or even whether it fails to materialize in the midst of all sorts of risk factors usually associated with violence and disorder. This is because communities may create their own structures for providing order and may even use access to small arms in the process of doing so. Focusing on these institutions casts violence and weapons as subordinate to the key question of whether local administrations can maintain their claims to the monopoly of force. When local armed groups choose to do this and are successful at convincing people around them to accept their maintenance of order, this process comes very close to satisfying a crucial element of Weber’s definition of government, regardless of whether that authority gains global recognition of its existence or not.8 A comparison of the different ways that armed groups use small arms and other weapons helps to illustrate the limited utility of identifying these weapons as principal causes that shape the natures of conflicts. This approach also helps
Arms trafficking and political economy of conflict 15 identify some flaws in the global regulations that many groups advocate. It also avoids analyzing only the instances where violent conflict has occurred. Limiting analysis to the worst conflicts masks important counterfactual events in which outcomes do not fit common predictions about the impact of weaponry or other resources on conflicts. This is especially true if weapons are abundant in instances where fighting has not occurred or it suddenly stopped. Individual cases of intense conflict can provide valuable insights about the relation of small arms and violence too. But if policymakers rely only on those cases for evidence, they may design strategies that really respond to that particular set of consequences rather than to the primary causes of armed conflict. Even amidst violent conflict in Bosnia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Chechnya, one finds local communities that share political and social features and that have accumulated large stockpiles of small arms and light weapons, yet some of them manage to limit the emergence of widespread violence. Those communities retain a measure of order while their close neighbors participate in predatory violence. Thus outwardly similar regions such as northern and southern parts of Somalia have very different experiences with violence, even though both societies are very well-armed. Likewise, fighting has been limited in the autonomous republic of Ingushetia, where people share many of the grievances, history, and resources of their Chechen neighbors and where many households maintain private arsenals. Nor did violence spread readily to Dagastan on Chechnya’s eastern border, despite concerted attempts by Chechen fighters and local Dagastani allies to militarize serious social divisions there. Congo’s eastern provinces host many predatory groups seeking diamonds and other loot, while Congo’s most productive diamond-mining region in Kasai manages to get by with much less violence. The surprise about Kosovo and Macedonia was the extent to which armed groups there did not fight through most of the 1990s, despite the central role of armed ethnic Albanian gangs in trafficking illicit weapons. Likewise, young men in some diamond-mining communities in Sierra Leone used guns to protect their communities while those in similar circumstances in other diamond-mining communities joined predatory gangs to loot their own hometowns. Few nonspecialists in North America and Europe pay attention to these places, mostly because they confound expectations of more sustained conflict, and thus fail to appear in conflict data sets. Moreover, the experiences of individual communities are submerged in studies that take states or ethnic units as primary units of analysis. Enterprising strongmen have tried to mobilize armed groups around personal agendas, and have actively sought to polarize communities with violence in both types of cases, though they do not always succeed. A primary concern of policymakers should be why they do or do not succeed, along with the role that regulation of illicit trading in weapons may influence these different outcomes. Considering variations in outcomes casts some doubt on the proposition that the presence of small arms and light weapons is a primary cause of violent conflict, and that its regulation, whether of legal or illicit trade, plays a predictable role in managing these conflicts. People in some societies already manage conflicts, even with small arms present and in the hands of diverse groups. In fact,
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the existence of such cases is compatible with the proposition that possession and even illicit trafficking of weapons can play a role in key political actors’ strategies to control violence. The section “Cases of contrast” provides several brief overviews of key points of variations in patterns and intensities of violence in otherwise similar cases. (This is derived from a more extensive argument that I have developed for a comparative study of conflict.) These comparisons develop two hypotheses that build on this broader definition of institutions and point to the main variables that appear to be responsible for differences in outcomes. First, informal institutions, including local community “clandestine” markets that are responses to increased marginality, may play a role in reducing risks of local social fragmentation that come with weakened state capacities. Terms such as clandestine that are accepted in many analyses of conflicts usually take laws of states and perspectives of global norms as paramount when applying this label. But this can mask the legitimacy that local communities may accord to these activities, especially if they help them to survive in the midst of wider conflicts. If combined with local mediating institutions and social practices that defuse intragroup security dilemmas, these informal institutions may provide new ways for local authorities to provide order that harness elements of the global economy that some scholars identify as causes of disorder. Second, if these new frameworks favor old patronage networks and clandestine economy channels over the interests of elites based in the capital, they limit the impact of interventions of violent entrepreneurs and reduce risks of predatory armed conflict. This is most likely where preconflict governments relied most heavily on patronage networks to assert authority. Those groups that were most marginal to preconflict patronage networks had the most at stake in using local social practices and informal institutions to shelter their activities from predatory elites in the capital. This practice becomes a crucial resource in shaping the capacities and interests of some armed groups to provide their communities with order instead of looting them.
Cases of contrast The regions of former Somalia All regions of former Somalia – all heavily armed – shared multiple risk factors for conflict by the late 1980s. Central state authority collapsed everywhere as armed factions battled one another for the right to form a new government and for loot. Assault rifles reportedly could be bought in the capital in the early 1990s for as low as US$15.9 Political entrepreneurs throughout the country took advantage of the easy access to weapons and recruited displaced young men to consolidate their positions. Prominent figures such as Mohammed Farah Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and Omar Jess headed factions fighting in the south. Northern politicians formed armed factions too. Fighters of Abdirahmaan Ali Tuur, the first interim President of the unilaterally declared northern Republic of Somaliland, looted ports and businesses in his home region in 1992. Another round of
Arms trafficking and political economy of conflict 17 violence broke out in 1994–95 as fighters of Jaama Mahamed Ghalib looted the northern towns of Burao and Hargeisa, reportedly while taking bribes from Aideed in Mogadishu. Seen from a perspective of events in the early 1990s, the north should have experienced continued serious fighting and not the relative peace that prevailed later. By 1990, the dying regime had killed over 50,000 Somalis in the north in organized attacks that instigated internecine fighting by arming rival factional groups.10 In subsequent years, however, it was the south that lacked a central government and continued to suffer from protracted fighting. In 2003, some 40 militias contended for power in the southern two-thirds of the country.11 Continuous international efforts to facilitate negotiations failed to bolster a nominal interim government, which by early 2005 still had not relocated from a Nairobi hotel. That was for good reason: “The city has been tense because clans controlling different parts of the city are loyal to rival groups involved in the Somali national reconciliation process,” UN officials reported.12 Northerners declared their independence (though no other country recognizes it), restored order with a new police force, issued currency, held regular contested elections, and rehabilitated some public services. Their first President, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former Somali government official who headed his own militia over the better part of 40 years, upbraided politicians and warlords in the south for their servility to factional conflict. His administration boasted that their community “applies a version of liberal Islam[,] . . . [has] established a government of law and order[,]” and regulates and taxes orderly trade with other countries.13 Even outside observers who are critical of the Somaliland authorities recognize that institutions of political order such as those related to electoral exercises and policing distinguish this area from the southern region.14 Closer examination of the organization of conflict and the social histories of entrepreneurial politicians and militia leaders reveals major differences between the two regions. Observers noted that southern clan leaders, the primary legitimate local authority in many places, “found themselves attempting to negotiate with young militiamen and bandits from distant clans rather than with ‘peer’ elders.”15 The inability of local authorities to exercise control over fighters – especially in Mogadishu where they drew fighters from impoverished young migrants from the countryside – created numerous security dilemmas for communities. As many scholars would predict, people had to raise their own militias or ally themselves with another militia to protect them from predators, since in the absence of central administration neither formal law nor shared social customs could make these outsiders suffer social consequences for their misuse of violence. Even where local social institutions among pastoralists near the Kenyan border have helped revive local cattle trading in the south, the absence of a central authority has imposed a considerable risk premium on these transactions. Part of the difficulty in organizing large-scale structures to ensure order is due to the intrusion in the late 1980s of pastoralists from outside the region that were allied with the political networks of former President Siad Barre. These operators have been able to call upon fighters from outside the region to compete for business
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and resources.16 Therefore, the south is not bereft of small-scale organization that is capable of reviving some elements of commerce. It is not, however, able to incorporate local social mediators and legitimate authorities to guarantee contracts and reliably adjudicate disputes between communities on a regular basis, which are core elements of a more comprehensive and larger-scale political order. Northern entrepreneurs and authorities, on the other hand, have experienced a greater revival of the stock trade based on local notables who have been more successful in helping to mediate conflicts and organize trade.17 Why is the north different? Local authorities in the north weathered the collapse of the old regime with their authority intact more than among their southern counterparts. This was partly due to unintended consequences of former President Barre’s political strategy in the 1980s. As state revenues declined amidst mismanagement and Barre’s fear of independent bureaucratic initiative grew, he tried to rule through increased reliance on patronage. Unable to provide many resources on his own, Barre built an “official illicit economy” around selective exemptions from trade and currency controls, and permission to loot massive aid inflows, the country’s largest source of income by the mid-1980s. With a few exceptions, local leaders in the north had a harder time accessing these opportunities, and had to survive in a “clandestine illicit economy” that they operated without the President’s consent. This took the form of organizing clandestine transit trade and financial networks to transfer remittances of overseas Somali workers at informal market rates. Though Barre encouraged a few northerners to build their own militias to repress local political groups that he considered politically unreliable, he mostly recruited more violent “outsiders.” These strongmen were outsiders in the sense of being from other geographic zones and in not having deep roots in the informal social structures – including the “unofficial” local clandestine economy – that characterized the incumbent power structure. As a result, when central authority finally collapsed in the early 1990s, most northerners in positions to form militias held authority – formal and informal alike – based on deeds that predated the 1980s Barre-organized predation or to protect themselves against the designs of the old dictator. Their record in the 1980s was one of defensive efforts to preserve their access to resources, including a clandestine trade in small arms. To do this, they had to rely upon the protection of local authorities, especially clan elders. These people protected their transactions in the 1980s when they were forced to the margins of the President’s political network. Back then, these local strongmen could not call upon Mogadishu to guarantee their corrupt transactions. Instead, they had to rely upon clan elders to help organize smuggling operations and illegal remittances from Somalis working abroad. Notions of legality associated with recognized states are not very relevant in this context. Degrees of local legitimacy are a better guide to the consequence of these transactions. In the eyes of local people, local regulation of these transactions resembled something akin to governmental processes by enhancing local economic opportunities while providing some measure of security. This illicit/legitimate dichotomy could extend to transactions involving weapons,
Arms trafficking and political economy of conflict 19 which current international definitions would consider illicit, and have important policy implications, as the section “Implications for policy and strategy” discusses. The shared control over local resources by the late 1980s hindered efforts of other would-be political entrepreneurs to raise armies. When local strongmen like Tuur tried to offer fighters the prospect of loot in return for support, local authorities used their autonomous control over resources and connections to business and smuggling networks outside the country to raise opposing forces in order to protect their communities. This defeat of would-be warlords prevented the influx of outside fighters that plagued the southern regions and gave local youth alternative structures into which to integrate. This meant that when armed, unruly young men appeared in the north amidst generalized chaos and insecurity in the early 1990s, it was hard to recruit them into predatory militias. Some pestered communities as bandits, but one visitor noted “the difficulty of shooting young apprentice-shiftas because their clan and family backgrounds had to be taken into account and the same holds for any person they might kill.”18 This relationship works in reverse too; local armed youth also suffer the consequences of socially unsanctioned uses of violence, since they and their families are more accessible for retaliation. This condition creates a possibility in which the ubiquitous presence of small arms is compatible with the preservation, or, in northern Somalia’s case, the imposition of order. The survival of social constraints on violence and of the ability of legitimate local authorities to enforce the social constraints explains why violent predatory organizations were difficult to form in Somaliland. Northern leaders have evicted or arrested politicians and notables that participate in externally organized conferences, less for fear of a loss of independence as from recognizing that negotiating weight correlates to the success of violent entrepreneurs. Ethiopian diplomats appear to recognize and value the tendency of conferences to sustain conflict and keep Somalia divided, and have thus become primary backers of continued international mediation to ensure that they will not face a united Somalia on their eastern border. The defeat of Tuur’s first strategy to build militias and allow them to loot their own communities sheds further light on the relationship between social control and weapons. The persistence of foreign conflict resolution efforts may be a cause of Tuur’s shift toward a more violent strategy. Once he and other strongmen with ambitions to form a central government for all of Somalia found that no single group could prevail; externally sponsored mediation offered a more attractive route to power. Tuur realized that his only leverage would be to join UN and Egyptian sponsored negotiations. Negotiators saw that since he could use his militia to threaten local order, they needed to include him in a comprehensive agreement. Since outside intervention suggested that his future rewards would come from access to the international community and control of a distant city, he may have calculated that he could safely loot his own community to recruit followers with promises of even more loot once he became part (or head) of a new government. Thus northern leaders prohibit politicians from participating in externally organized conferences on their own account and cite this disruption of local social control as a reason for their action.19
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The north Caucasus regions Chechnya and Ingushetia, two culturally similar and heavily armed north Caucasus regions, yield comparable insights. Both regions were centers of corruption during the Soviet era.20 Chechen authorities in the early 1990s realized that they could use alliances with local and foreign Islamists to assert their independence from old Soviet political networks to which they had belonged. Foreign connections provided them with alternate means of purchasing arms and buying local political support. As a result, a new “official illicit economy” replaced what now had to become a “clandestine illicit economy” built upon old Chechen mafia networks. Many observers blamed this mafia for fuelling violence, and indeed many were violent organizations like other criminal networks in Russia. But those Russian networks differed from the new networks that Chechen politicians were fashioning in that they could not offer this elite from local social structures of vendetta and reciprocities of obligation to pursue their ambitions in a much more violent manner. Meanwhile, their old criminal associates remained bound by these rules and thus faced constraints on the manner in which they exercised violence. New armed groups formed around leaders such as the Jordanian (of Chechen ancestry) Sheikh Mohammad Fatih who recruited fighters to battle Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Fatih brought others such as the Saudi Afghanistan war veteran Khattab to organize Chechen militias. Financial support from Arab organizations abroad enabled this group to function independently of Chechnya’s informal institutional rules governing violence and freed them from having to bargain with local criminals for a share of their illicit business. In the fall of 1999, they made their own military strikes against Dagestan in conjunction with foreign and local supporters in hopes of sparking an uprising. By that time, the Chechen separatist movement had split into two main factions, with the initiative going to those who had contacts with foreigners and socially autonomous sources of funding that enabled them to recruit unemployed youth to their cause.21 Chechnya shows the important role of the intrusion of outsiders that local social conventions in their uses of violence kept relatively unrestrained. The local political networks involved in Soviet era corruption were so marginal to centers of power in Moscow that they had to seek protection from local power brokers. Some of the local power brokers came to prominence in the early 1990s as Chechen separatists asserted their claims. Their choice of protection, however, played a decisive role in shaping the conduct of the first separatist regime in the 1994–96 war and authorities in the conflict since 1999. A journalist noted that Chechen authorities employed local tough guys that worked elsewhere before going to Chechnya to, in the words of one, “work as a bandit . . . but now I am a bandit for my country.”22 The Yeltsin administration in Moscow gave covert support to many of these strongmen. They broke with the separatist regime in Chechnya to engage in predation in the local underground economy, which gave Chechen separatist leaders little means to control their rank-and-file, especially the
Arms trafficking and political economy of conflict 21 enterprising among them who would behave like predators. The up-and-coming strongmen controlled their own violent followers and did not need a central administration to access economic opportunities.23 This left Chechen leaders with few resources to build a centralized administration on patronage, unlike Afghanistan’s Ahmed Kharzai, who controlled enough resources to build a patrimonial structure to hold together his precarious alliance of local warlords. After 1997, Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov grasped at the rhetoric of Islamic revival to hold together his administration, which brought with it more outsiders willing to fight, but only on their own terms. The Republic of Ingushetia, which borders Chechnya, demonstrates a peculiar absence of conflict, at least relative to its neighbor. Given the abundances of weapons in all north Caucasian communities and shared social tensions similar to Chechnya’s (author’s field research observations, 2004), conventional approaches that link illicit weapons, especially small arms, with violence would expect much greater turmoil. But in 1998, the President of Ingushetia, General Ruslan Aushev, expelled foreign guests, and closed new mosques and schools associated with Arabs and other foreign Afghan veterans. Since he had a meagre official budget, he had to accept financial assistance from the deeply rooted local criminal networks, the region’s main source of capital, to help local young men set up their own businesses. Aushev also tolerated the customary practice of vendetta, which had reappeared in the last decade of disorder. Many desperate relatives of hostages abducted for ransom bought guns on the illicit market and sought hostages of their own. In many cases, the hostage-takers tried to justify their crimes with the fatwa of an Arab warlord in Chechnya who blessed the abduction of “bad Muslims” to finance the operations of righteous warriors. The real threat of vendetta, as in northern Somalia, made abduction a risky business, especially after Aushev decided to let police operate in conjunction with wronged relatives. Violence spilled into Ingushetia since the replacement of Aushev with Murat Zyazikov in 2002, a former officer in the KGB and a political ally of President Vladimir Putin. Zyazikov’s security forces have cooperated more closely with Russian authorities since the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow. This has resulted in more arbitrary abuses of local people, and has drawn more Chechen attacks on Ingushetia’s territory.24 Russian efforts to control the region in the wake of the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis worsens this situation. The shift in the local organization of violence appears to have disrupted the fragile arrangements that Aushev created in the 1990s, and shows an impact of outside forces on local efforts to build order when large-scale political structures are absent or weak. Sierra Leone Some of Sierra Leone’s authorities also have tapped into locally legitimate networks of social control to manage violence. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters commonly forced captives to commit atrocities against their own communities and families as a way to sever young abductees from local social constraints. In 1994, Dr Alpha Lavalie, a history professor at the University of
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Sierra Leone, organized a home guard militia from the same social stratum of young people in his home community, which was then under attack. While a student in the 1970s and early 1980s, Lavalie studied how Sierra Leone’s President instigated violence in his hometown to keep his opponents divided. The President had encouraged local uprisings against local authorities that he feared opposed his rule. These young men would join paramilitaries that regime favorites from the capital and their local allies organized. This process rewarded young fighters with opportunities to loot resources in their own communities. This included giving the young fighters a (small) share in the “clandestine illicit” diamond-mining activities that the President was replacing with his “official illicit” operations under his personal direction.25 Professor Lavalie’s militia drew resources from the same clandestine economic networks that its opponents tapped, but it did so through mediating legitimate local authorities. Local elders were able to mobilize these young “traditional” fighters in order to drive out attackers to defend clandestine operations that they felt benefited their communities. These youth turned out to be reliable defenders of their homes and (generally) refused entreaties from RUF fighters to join them in looting. This was because initiation ceremonies integrated outsiders that migrated to those communities to engage in illicit mining into community social structures. Local chiefs had few other options but to encourage this practice. Earlier, they had backed a political party that had been turned out of office. The long-serving prewar President suspected their loyalty, and did not give them easy access to his patronage networks based on control of illicit mining and other economic activities. Thus, these chiefs needed to protect “their” migrants to fend off pressure from the President’s allies and to organize their “unofficial” illicit mining, much as northern Somalia’s strongmen needed legitimate community authorities to protect their rackets during President Barre’s rule. In contrast, politicians in areas upriver from Professor Lavalie’s militias enjoyed easier access to the former President’s commercial networks. Former President Stevens had used access to business operations in mining areas that were run out of the capital and benefited from army protection and activities of militias associated with the ruling party to reward his allies. This released local strongmen from having to deal with incumbent community authorities and local ideas about how to exploit diamond resources. Thus, well-armed young men in those areas could be more abusive of local people, a reflection of their bosses’ political position in the relatively centralized segment of the prewar political economy of patronage. This gave local strongmen the option of more freely using gangs of illicit miners against their local opponents and others that they felt threatened their control of resources. Once the war started in 1991, the differences in organizing violence meant that downriver communities continued their defensive consolidation of control, while control fragmented upriver and the decentralized structure of the RUF incorporated the local violence. Elements of Professor Lavalie’s militia continue to occupy diamond-mining areas where they illicitly dig gems. Like their RUF counterparts, they are targets of international sanctions against “blood diamonds,” which both groups sell to
Arms trafficking and political economy of conflict 23 buy guns. Nonetheless, they enjoy greater local legitimacy than former combatants associated with the RUF. This complicates international efforts to promote disarmament and prosecute commanders who used violence during the war, which is part of the policy dimension that the following section considers.
Implications for policy and strategy The earlier examples illustrate the danger of framing conflict and evaluating armed groups by social categories and distinctions rooted in the legal cultures of legitimate states and the western-based international community. For example, the notion that licit and illicit practices occur along relatively static state-defined boundardies may confuse distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate authority. If transactions contribute to the stability and well-being of a community and support respected authorities, then they are legitimate in the eyes of those who participate in them. Externally organized peace negotiations have been especially deficient in this regard, rewarding violent entrepreneurs that use armed young men to control markets and to fight their way to bargaining tables. Meanwhile, Liberians protested the exclusion of groups that they regarded as legitimate authorities from negotiations. Sierra Leone’s media have been outspoken in their criticism of peace negotiations, not only because they dislike RUF fighters, but because they believe that negotiations conducted in this fashion undermines community efforts to entice unemployed young men away from violent and socially destructive behavior. Somaliland’s authorities explicitly identify peace negotiations as a cause of conflict. Armed groups that do not enjoy broad legitimacy and that rely upon outsiders rather than local communities to stay in power play a major role in the use of small arms and light weapons against these communities. Interdiction may reduce the power and attractiveness of these groups, but simultaneously engaging them in the framework of restoring order to the entire state enhances the risk that the state will use weapons against local communities. Thus, peace negotiations can have the opposite impact than what is intended in terms of limiting violence, though this strategy often accompanies arms reduction and demobilization efforts. A deeper problem lies in the inability of international organizations and formal diplomacy to deviate from support for the existing framework of states and incumbent institutional structures to engage more deeply in what may be more legitimate alternative governance structures. Somaliland authorities recognize what this threat poses to order in their own region, and seek to manage this problem by integrating themselves into this framework as a new, separate state. They seek their political destiny in terms of inoculation against neighbors’ threats against their own internal order, a strategy that the international community has yet to accept. For them and for many other authorities in the midst of war that successfully uses control over violence to support their claims to legitimacy, recourse to old colonial boundaries in order to claim a separate sovereign status is not an option. They remain caught in an international system that differentiates between the rights of sovereign associations and nonsovereign ones, with
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relatively little regard to the legitimacy of the former in societies. United Nations and other efforts to regulate small arms occur within this framework too, defining success in terms of a cessation of fighting within existing borders and a return to a political status quo ante in broad institutional political terms. While acknowledging the problem of odious governance, this framework does not leave room for internationally recognized notions of legitimate rebellion in the manner of the Cold War-era African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African States, which aided and influenced anticolonial and anti-apartheid insurgencies. The above analysis also means that illicit commerce, which is a central target of those that regulate small arms as well as current “blood diamonds” campaigns, under certain conditions may contribute to stabilizing communities and reducing the risk of armed conflict. This does not mean that one should reject regulation wholesale. Rather, it may be advantageous to be less concerned with a legal or cultural definition of particular transactions as licit or illicit. Instead, the international community should identify the relationship of particular transactions to legitimate authorities, regardless of whether or not such authorities are members of formally recognized states. In most cases, regulating the trafficking of arms and resources related to their purchase may be a very important component of conflict resolution. Instead, the problem lies in the nature of its application. An alternate approach focused on making choices about legitimate authorities and reinforcing them would be difficult. Improvised policies of Somaliland authorities may survive and find a place in a globally recognized new state. The policies of Professor Lavalie’s militia in Sierra Leone and Ingush President Aushev’s legalization of vendetta may seem dubious from a western perspective, but local desperation to win peace and shape their own political destinies drives both policies. But where local or regional concerns for order become a basis for coinciding interests with western governments, as in Afghanistan in 2001, or to the extent that the current US administration learns from Iraq, novel structures and new ideas about social control of violence are quickly learned and applied, which results in discarding straightforward approaches to regulate the flow of illicit arms.
Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
UN 2001; UN Group of Experts 1999. Ploughshares 2001. de Figuerdo and Weingast 1999: 261–303. Kasfir 2004: 60–64; Mueller 2004: 8–23. BBC 2004. Pugh and Cooper 2004; Karen and Sherman 2003. Douglass North 1990: 4. Weber 1970: 78, 1978: 904–908. ICRC 1999: 18. Africa Watch 1990: 218. UNSC 2003: paras. 23, 25. UNSC 2004: para. 27. Republic of Somaliland 1996: 16.
Arms trafficking and political economy of conflict 25 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
International Crisis Group 2003. Menkhaus 2000: 191. Little 2003: 39–44. Hoffman 2002. Prunier 1991: 108. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004. Grossman 1977; Frisby 1998. Lansky 2004. Lieven 1998: 81–82. Derluguian 2003. Human Rights Watch 2003: 6–7. Lavalie 1983.
2
HIV/AIDS, conflicts, and security in Africa Obijiofor Aginam
And we should broaden debate to accept that health is an underlying determinant of development, security, and global stability. We must consider the impact of armed conflict and, perhaps more importantly, the silent march of diseases that devastate populations over time. . . . The explosion of conflict immediately brings to light the links between health and security – soldiers and civilians wounded and displaced by war. The medium-term impact is felt when people are uprooted and forced to live in camps with little sanitation or health services. (Gro Harlem Brundtland,1 Former Director-General, World Health Organization) Throughout history, the deadly comrades of war and disease have accounted for a major proportion of human suffering and death. The generals of previous centuries knew that disease was a bigger enemy than the army they would face across the battlefield. (Gro Harlem Brundtland,2 Former Director-General, World Health Organization)
Introduction In both times of peace and war, history is replete with deadly battles fought between humanity and disease. Throughout recorded history, the menace of disease, especially during conflicts, has left indelible fingerprints in the complex interaction between humanity and microbial forces. The decimation of a significant percentage of humanity by infectious diseases has led to the collapse of states and empires during conflicts. Thucydides wrote that the plague that devastated Athens during the Peloponnesian War originated from Ethiopia and spread through Egypt and Libya before it arrived in Athens in 430 BC because of troop movement.3 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, small pox, measles, influenza, and other exotic diseases decimated Native American populations in their contacts with European forces during the imperial battle to conquer the Americas.4 These exotic diseases led to the collapse of the Aztec and Incan empires.5 During the American Revolution in 1776, smallpox prevented the American forces from capturing Canada, then known as British North America.6 It has been argued that, throughout history, soldiers have rarely won wars;
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microbes have.7 The epidemics get the blame for defeat; the generals get the credit for victory.8 The emergence of HIV/AIDS, its prevalence in Africa, and the complex interaction between the epidemic and conflicts have reinforced both the human and state security dimensions of disease. In a world order founded on the statecentric Westphalian system, threats to the geopolitical territories have dominated the global security discourses within and outside the United Nations system. This chapter explores the need to broaden security discourses to link HIV/AIDS, the state, and human security in mutually reinforcing ways. Rather than repeat the statistics of HIV/AIDS prevalence in individual states that now litter the reports of leading multilateral institutions,9 this chapter focuses on the epidemic’s implications in conflicts as a microcosm of the overall strategic implications of AIDS to human and state security in the post-Cold War Westphalian international system.
The normative relevance of “soft-law” declarations of commitment on health-related aspects of global security The end of the 1990s witnessed a surge in multilateral declarations of commitments by multilateral institutions within and outside the United Nations system – the UN Security Council, World Health Organization, the G8 Summit, and the African Union – on the security implications of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. Blazing the trail on July 17, 2000, the UN Security Council, bearing in mind its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, passed Resolution 1308. The Security Council expressed a concern at the potentially damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel.10 Although the Resolution focused narrowly on United Nations peacekeeping operations, it was remarkably innovative as the Security Council’s first express endorsement of a health issue as a global security threat. In a special session of the UN Security Council dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic on January 10, 2000, the then US Vice President Al Gore stated, For the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, AIDS is not just a humanitarian crisis. It is a security crisis – because it threatens not just individual citizens, but the very institutions that define and defend the character of a society. This disease weakens work forces and snaps economic strength. AIDS strikes at teachers and denies education to their students. It strikes at the military, and subverts the forces of order and peacekeeping. AIDS is one of the most devastating threats ever to confront the world community. The United Nations was created to stop wars. Now we must wage and win a great and peaceful war of our time – the war against AIDS.11 In July 2000, the G8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan pledged a global fund on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The fund will sustain political engagement
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and financial support in countries where the morbidity and mortality of these diseases are the highest as well as commit new partners to the battle against microbes. In April 2001, at the Organization of African Unity Summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases, held in Abuja, Nigeria, UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan called for the establishment of a global fund on HIV/AIDS and health.12 Annan identified five broad objectives in the global battle against HIV/AIDS and other related infectious diseases. These objectives include, among others, prevention to reverse the spread of the virus in order to safeguard present and future generations. The Summit led to the Abuja Declaration and Plan of Action, which categorized infectious diseases as global security threats, and called on the international donor community to complement Africa’s resource mobilization efforts to fight the scourge of infectious diseases in Africa.13 In May 2001, the World Health Assembly (the highest policy-making organ of the World Health Organization) passed Resolution WHA54.14, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response. Resolution WHA54.14 recalled that communicable diseases are major burdens in human mortality and morbidity, and noted the speed at which globalization of trade and the movement of people, animals, goods, and food products takes place. The World Health Assembly recognized that an upsurge in cases of infectious diseases in any given country is a potential concern for the international community. Resolution WHA54.14 urged the member states to participate actively in verifying and validating surveillance data concerning health emergencies of international concern. Further, the Resolution requested that the World Health Organization Director-General devise relevant international tools, and provide technical support to member states for developing and strengthening preparedness and response activities against risks that biological agents pose.14 The global security threat of infectious diseases received its most visible multilateral imprimatur at the UN General Assembly Special Session in New York, June 2001. In a declaration of commitment on HIV/AIDS, Global Crisis-Global Action, the General Assembly categorized the devastating scale and impact of the global HIV/AIDS epidemic as a “global emergency”; one that constitutes a formidable challenge to human life, dignity, and the full enjoyment of human rights.15 The General Assembly noted that leadership by governments in combating HIV/AIDS is essential, and that the full and active participation of civil society, the business community, and the private sector at national, regional, and global levels should complement government efforts. The General Assembly observed that conflicts and disasters contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS. It urged countries to begin implementing national strategies that incorporate HIV/AIDS awareness, prevention, care, and treatment elements into programs that respond to emergencies. These strategies should recognize the populations that are subjected to armed conflicts, humanitarian crisis, and natural disasters, including refugees and internally displaced persons – particularly women and children have an increased risk of HIV exposure.
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The emergence of multilateral declarations of commitments on health-related aspects of global security indicates new challenges to our collective well-being. The international community needs new techniques to battle these new challenges. If infectious pathogens constitute new challenges to global security, then the international community needs new analytical and policy tools to understand these linkages. Notwithstanding the linkages of disease and global security in the emerging multilateral declarations of commitment, pessimism, rather than optimism, remains the dominant characterization of the normative trajectories of these soft-law declarations. In a study that normatively assesses the effectiveness of the UN Security Council Resolution on HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping, Bratt, echoing the traditional school of thought on security, observed, Declaring AIDS to be a threat to international peace and security trivializes the concept of security. It also paves the way for using military apparatus – like peacekeepers – to rectify the problem. . . . In addition, stressing the security aspects of AIDS will obscure the more important health and development aspects. . . . Defense departments and military personnel may be convinced that deployment to an AIDS-infected region does constitute an additional risk to their troops, but they remain skeptical that AIDS is actually a significant security risk.16 It is in the context of the debate between the traditional school of security, which focuses on external military threat to a state’s geopolitical boundaries (state security), and the new school, which explores security from the perspectives of nonmilitary threats to the nation-state and its citizens (human security), that the international community will explore the HIV/AIDS crises in African conflicts.17
HIV/AIDS, security, and conflicts in Africa: analysis of the crises and the crises of analysis The superpower rivalry between the United States and former USSR dominated international relations and international law in the United Nation’s first 45 years (1945–90). Bipolarity drove the threat of nuclear cataclysm and led to a narrow conception of security based on military threats to territorial boundaries. After World War II, international relations, foreign policy and security studies often blended together. What they had in common was their primary focus on the Cold War between the USA and the USSR. Most scholars in the field of security studies were concerned with Soviet-American relations and, more importantly, the prevention of nuclear war. The preoccupation was understandable given that most of the world had split between the two superpower camps, with some states vacillating between the two. The bipolar nature of the international system provided a restricted basis for building the field of security studies, particularly as it pertained to the developing world.18
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In the 1980s, security discourses started shifting gradually from military to other threats: economic, health, environmental, and political. Buzan, although one of the pioneer scholars to challenge the obsession of international security with military threats, nonetheless subjected the “individual” to the “system” and the “state” in his delineation of three levels of security.19 The expansion of security discourse accelerated in the 1990s, mainly because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Major conflicts were no longer between but within states.20 Security no longer presumes a principal concentration on challenges to a state from outside its borders, defense no longer presumes that military force is either the first or the most appropriate instrument. Many scholars now construe environmental degradation, illicit drugs, epidemic diseases, and terrorism as part of the global security agenda.21 Expanding the notion of security, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) popularized the notion of human security in 1994 by recognizing the emergence of new security threats: safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression.22 Based on four essential characteristics – universalism, interdependence, early prevention, and people centeredness – the UNDP identified categories that may threaten human security. These include economic security, community security, food security, health security, environmental security, and political security.23 Although the concept of human security is hotly contested,24 contemporary efforts to articulate its normative and policy parameters have always included communicable diseases, especially the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Influenced by the UNDP report, the Commission on Global Governance stated, Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the planet. . . . The security of people recognizes that global security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive state interests to include the protection of the people.25 The Commission on Human Security, in its recently released report, Human Security Now, defined human security as the protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.”26 In its broadest sense, the Commission noted that human security embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, and access to education and healthcare, and it ensures that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his potential.27 One of the Commission’s core policy conclusions focuses on the three key areas of health challenges for human security: global infectious disease, poverty-related threats, and violence and crisis.28 HIV/AIDS neatly fits into these three categories because it is a global pandemic; it is poverty-related, at least in the African context, and the violent conflicts and civil wars that are marked by rape of women by combatants, breakdown of health infrastructure, and sexual relations between peacekeepers/combatants and commercial sex workers exacerbate the
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pandemic in complex ways. The Commission on Human Security rightly observed, HIV/AIDS will soon become the greatest health catastrophe in human history – exacting a death toll greater than two world wars in the 20th century, the influenza epidemic of 1918 or the Black Death of the 14th century. . . . The connection between infectious diseases and human security has been forcefully validated by recent developments – the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the accelerating spread of contagious diseases, the looming threat of bio-terrorism, epidemics that weaken already fragile states.29 Discussing the report of the Commission on Human Security, Ogata and Cels noted, “[T]he spread of deadly infectious diseases, massive forced population movements, human rights violations, famine and chronic conditions of deprivation threaten human security and, in turn, state security.”30 Although human security is primarily people-centered and not state-centered, it complements state security in four essential respects: its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state; menaces to people’s security include threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security; the range of factors is expanded beyond the state alone; and human security includes not just protecting people, but empowering people to fend for themselves.31 The complementary nature of human and state security makes HIV/AIDS less recondite in African security discourses in two clear ways. First, the disease strikes soldiers and civilians in war situations because of the breakdown of infrastructure, the indiscriminate deployment of rape as a weapon of war by combatants, and the attraction of commercial sex workers to areas where international peacekeepers are deployed. Second, it weakens the capacity of national armed forces, assuming that we adopt the traditional notion of security, to perform their national duties to protect the state’s geopolitical territories, and their ability to contribute to international peacekeeping obligations. The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that many African military forces have infection rates that are as much as five times that of the civilian population.32 [T]hese higher prevalence rates result from a variety of factors: Soldiers, for example, are of a sexually active age; they are highly mobile and away from home for long periods of time; they often valorize violent and risky behavior; they have greater opportunities for casual sexual relations; and they may seek to relieve themselves from the stress of combat through sexual activity.33 Ostergard similarly observed, “war-torn regions promote an indiscriminate sexual culture among soldiers. Military presence attracts sex trade workers, which promotes the spread of the virus to soldiers who may return home to their families.”34
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Nigeria’s role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars is a case in point. Many Nigerian soldiers that were part of the intervention force tested HIV positive on their return from Liberia and Sierra Leone. Although people intensely debate the exact time of the infection – whether before or after the dispatch to Liberia and Sierra Leone35 – the links between HIV/AIDS and conflict remain very strong.36 A conspicuous feature of the link between HIV/AIDS and conflict is the deployment of rape as a weapon of war. Soldiers raped an estimated 200,000–500,000 women during the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.37 Soldiers have also deployed rape indiscriminately in conflicts in Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, and Sierra Leone. Although the accuracy of the data that point to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in African military forces is questionable, Nigeria and South Africa, the regional powers in western and southern Africa respectively, are in danger of a diminished military role in their regions because of the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in their armed forces.38 The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the armed forces of African states, if unchecked, could lead to a massive state collapse in most countries with already very high infection rates. As the Commission on Human Security observed, HIV/AIDS is a global emergency. In an era of globalization, we must strike the necessary balance between individual, state, and international responsibilities for health and health security. Responsibility for health security is shifting from the national level downwards to individuals, communities, and civil society organizations – and upwards to international institutions and networks.39 A formidable group of scholars considers this global health governance.
Africa within a global health policy universe: AIDS and security in the evolving global governance architecture Global health threats require a global policy universe and a humane global health governance framework involving multiple actors – international organizations, private and corporate entities, and civil society. There are two reasons why global security in the twenty-first century needs a governance framework built on state and human security as complimentary paradigms. First, the collapse of the Cold War, which had crippled most international organizations like the United Nations from 1945 to the fall of the Soviet Union. Second, globalization is transforming geopolitical boundaries in dynamic ways. Economic globalization carries with it the globalization of health risks and threats. New global interdependence issues such as pollution, currency crises, HIV/AIDS, and the drug trade have profoundly changed the tasks and goals of foreign policy officials.40 Diverse perspectives must holistically explore global governance of the HIV/AIDS pandemic: from developmental, health, human, and state security dimensions. Albeit the traditional security community continues to be averse to broadening the security agenda to include HIV/AIDS and other nonmilitary
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threats, the complementary nature of human and state security, as the Commission on Human Security argues, provides one way to explore security in the twenty-first century. Of what essence would it be to continue to be wedded to the narrow conception of security as military threat when African militaries are unable to perform their traditional function of protecting the state from external attack because of the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the armed forces? Categorizing HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security could catalyze humane global governance interventions with indelible fingerprints of genuine allegiance to humanity. Given the security implications of HIV/AIDS in Africa, the continent needs effective local, national, regional, and global strategies to stem the tide of the epidemic. In the local and national arenas, African governments must devise the best ways to develop effective policies in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly’s Special Session on HIV/AIDS and the Security Council Resolution on HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping. While the efforts of some African states toward voluntary and confidential HIV/AIDS testing of soldiers before dispatching soldiers are commendable, training manuals should strive toward the highest ethical standards in the field.41 These manuals must have a strong international human rights and criminal components that criminalize reprehensible conduct. States, for instance, must never tolerate rape as an instrument of war; it is not merely a crime against the victim, but a crime against humanity punishable under international law. The security implications of HIV/AIDS should not impede progress on the developmental and public health dimensions of HIV/AIDS. Regional and global initiatives on access to antiretroviral drugs and generic versions of essential medicines, which UNAIDS and the World Health Organization have already undertaken, must continue. Civil society organizations like MSF (Doctors without Borders) and Oxfam must continue with the high-level momentum of their activism. The most important task is to reconstruct the global health order to be receptive of emerging transnational health initiatives in the African context. As Held and McGrew remind us, cosmopolitan social democracy postulates that [p]olitical communities can no longer be considered . . . as simply “discrete worlds” or as self-enclosed political spaces; they are enmeshed in complex structures of overlapping forces, relations and networks. . . . The locus of political power can no longer be assumed to be simply national governments – effective power is shared and bartered by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels.42 Reconstructing world order based on cosmopolitan social democracy revolves around respect for international law, greater transparency, accountability, and democracy in global governance as well as a more equitable distribution of the world’s resources and human security; the protection and reinvention of community at diverse levels; the regulation of the global economy through the public management of global financial and trade flows; the provision of global
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public goods; and the engagement of leading stakeholders in corporate governance.43 The pertinent question is whether emerging global health accords like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria are cosmopolitan enough to catalyze a change in the sovereign mindset of poor and wealthy states. The future of global security must build on complementary state and human security as the Commission on Global Governance (1995) and the Commission on Human Security (2003) observed.44 The soft-law declarations of relevant global actors like the World Health Organization, the Security Council, General Assembly, and the G8 Summit on health-related threats to global security must now catalyze hard-power actions and interventions from state and nonstate actors in the governance of AIDS in the world. African states must take the lead by integrating HIV/AIDS into the emerging governance mechanisms of the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and the regional economic groups. The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health correctly observed, “the AIDS pandemic represents a unique challenge of unprecedented urgency and intensity. This single epidemic can undermine Africa’s development over the next generation.”45 Africa has become an increasingly marginalized player in global economics and politics. The industrialized world’s response to Africa’s AIDS crisis brings into question the extent to which AIDS and other emerging diseases – even if formally acknowledged to be a security threat – rank as an absolute priority in national security agendas.46 As the United States and most European powers continue to be disinterested in peacekeeping in African conflicts, the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan and other future conflicts will be placed on the shoulders of the African Union. The conundrum remains – how can African states discharge this onerous burden vis-à-vis the perceived or actual marginalization of the continent in the global governance of HIV/AIDS? Problems such as illicit drug trade, pollution, and global ecological changes place in dire peril not only the state, but also subnational units and transnational and regional areas. These problems are not amenable either to military intervention or to unilateral action. If a cooperative and constructive undertaking does not address them, they may lead to traditional forms of military violence, thereby threatening, in a classic sense, the state, its governance structure, and its society.47 The security dimensions of HIV/AIDS in African conflicts fit neatly within this urgent paradigm shift in twenty-first century security discourses.
Notes 1 “Global Health and International Security,” Global Governance 9 (No.4), 417 (2003). 2 “Bioterrorism and Military Health Risks” (Unpublished), speech delivered at the G20 Health Ministers Forum, World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 25, 2003 (on file with the author). 3 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War (R. Warner, trans.). Penguin Books, 1954. 4 A.W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: The Biological and Cultural Consequences Of 1492. Greenwood Press, 1972; Sheldon Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism. Yale University Press, 1997.
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5 Crosby, The Columbian Exchange; W.H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples. New York: Doubleday, 1976. 6 A. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change and their Effects on National Security and Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002, p. 12. 7 H. Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History. London: George Routledge, 1937. 8 C. Coker, War and Disease (Unpublished), Senior Fellow’s Report, “Disease and Security” Conference, 21st Century Trust, Varenna, Lake Como, Italy, April 23–May 1, 2004 (On file with the author). See also Stefan Elbe, Strategic Implications of HIV/Aids, Adelphi Paper 357. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 at p. 13 (stating that “American microbiologist Hans Zinsser advanced the provocative thesis that soldiers have only rarely won wars; rather they mop up after a barrage of epidemics. And typhus, with its brothers and sisters – plague, cholera, typhoid, dysentery – has decided more campaigns than Caesar, Hannibal, Napoleon, an all the inspector generals of history. The epidemics get the blame for defeat, the generals the credit for victory.”). 9 On the statistics of HIV/AIDS prevalence in Africa, see the successive Aids Epidemic Update, and The Report on the Global Hiv/Aids Epidemic published by Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 10 United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1308 (2000), July 17, 2000. 11 Quoted in A. Price-Smith, The Health Of Nations, pp. 123–124. 12 Speech by Kofi Annan to the African Summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases, Abuja, Nigeria, April 24–27, 2001 [available online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SGSM7779R1.doc.htm] (last visited May 10, 2001). 13 Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases, OAU/SPS/ABUJA/3, made pursuant to the African Summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases, April 24–27, 2001. 14 Resolution WHA54.14, Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Geneva, May 21, 2001. 15 Global Crisis-Global Action, Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Special Session, New York, June 25–27, 2001; also [available online at http://www.un.org/ga/aids/coverage/FinalDeclaration HIVAIDS.html] (last visited July 4, 2001). 16 Duane Bratt, “Blue Condoms: The Use of International Peacekeepers in the Fight Against AIDS,” International Peacekeeping 9 (No.3), pp. 67, 83 (2002). 17 I juxtapose “state security” with “human security” here not to suggest that they are standard clear-cut paradigms in the discipline of either international law or international relations, but as a guide to understand the differences between the traditional school and the emerging school of security thought. 18 Robert L. Ostergard, Jr, “Politics in the Hot Zone: AIDS and National Security in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 23 (No.2), 333 (2002). 19 People, B. Buzan, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983. 20 K. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 21 David B. Dewitt, “Introduction: The New Global Order and the Challenges of International Security,” in David Dewitt et al. (eds.), Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 2. 22 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions Of Human Security. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 23 Ibid., pp. 24–25. See also the 2001 International Crisis Group Report, HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue. Washington, DC/Brussels, 2001 (categorizing HIV/AIDS as a personal security issue, economic security issue, communal security issue, national security issue, and international security issue); and the chapters in Lincoln Chen et al. (eds.), Global Health Challenges For Human Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2003. 24 For a discussion of human security, see Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Protecting And Empowering People. New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003,
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Obijiofor Aginam United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; Fen Osler Hampson, Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder. Oxford University Press, 2001; R. McRae and D. Hubert (eds.), Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001; B. Ramcharan, Human Rights and Human Security. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002; Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First,” Global Governance 7, 19–23 (2001). For critique of human security, see R. Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air,” International Security 26, 67 (2001). On health and human/state security, see A. Price-Smith, The Health Of Nations; Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: Reconciling U.S. National Security and Public Health Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. Our Global Neighborhood: The Report Of The Commission On Global Governance. Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 78, 81. Human Security Now: Protecting And Empowering People. New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. S. Ogata and J. Cels, “Human Security: Protecting and Empowering People,” Global Governance 9, 273 (2003). Human Security Now, p. 4. UNAIDS, AIDS and the Military, May 1998. See generally Stefan Elbe, “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa,” International Security 27, 159 (Fall 2002). Ibid., at p. 163. See also Virginia van der Vilet, The Politics of Aids. London: Bowerdean, 1996 (“Wars and anarchy create ideal conditions for the transmission of HIV. Soldiers and civilians, many moving without partners or families for extended periods, live outside of conventional morality, many resort to satisfy their needs. War brutalizes human relationships . . . and brings sexual violence in its wake.”); Duane Bratt, Blue Condoms. (“[M]ilitary personnel are a high-risk group when it comes to STDs. . . . Soldiers joke about the ‘500 K’ rule which means that when you are over 500 km from home, sex with someone other than your wife or girlfriend is acceptable.”) Ibid., p. 342. Duane Bratt, Blue Condoms, at p. 75. (“In the case of ECOMOG, Sierra Leone argues that it was Nigerian peacekeepers who brought HIV/AIDS to their country. Nigeria, not surprisingly, argues that their military was not highly infected until it went to Sierra Leone.”) UNAIDS, Aids and the Military, May 1998 (highlighting the military’s professional ethos of risk-taking, which extends to the sexual arena and may involve unprotected sex. Military and peacekeeping personnel spend lengthy periods away from home and their camps attract local sex workers because they are perceived as having more money than local populations). Elbe, HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa, at p. 168. The US National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for he United States, January 2000 has the following prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS in selected African armed forces: Angola 40–60 percent, CongoBrazzaville 10–25 percent, Cote d’Ivoire 10–20 percent, Democratic Republic of Congo 40–60 percent, Eritrea 10 percent, Nigeria 10–20 percent, and Tanzania 15–30 percent. Data from South African intelligence sources is as follows: Angola 50 percent, Botswana 33 percent, Democratic Republic of Congo 50 percent, Lesotho 40 percent, Malawi 50 percent, Namibia 16 percent, South Africa 15–20 percent, Swaziland 48 percent, Zambia 60 percent, and Zimbabwe 55 percent cited in Lindy Heinecken, “Living in Terror: The Looming Security Threat to Southern Africa,” African Security Review 10 (No.4), 7–17(2001).
HIV/AIDS, conflicts, and security in Africa
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39 Ibid., p. 108. 40 James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World. Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 5. 41 See, for instance, Nigeria’s recent policy on HIV/AIDS and the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Hiv/Aids Control Guidelines (Issued Under the Authority of the Hon. Minister of Defense, October 2003); Sylvia Adebayo et al., Knowledge, Attitudes, and Sexual Behaviour Among the Nigerian Military Concerning HIV/AIDS and STDs, Armed Forces Program on AIDS Control/Policy Project, Nigeria, 2002. 42 D. Held and A. McGrew, Globalization/Anti-globalization. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, p. 123. 43 Ibid., at p. 131. 44 For an improved understanding of the linkage between health and human security in the global context, see Lincoln Chen et al., Global Health Challenges for Human Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2003. 45 World Health Organization, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development, Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001 p. 1. 46 David L. Heymann, “Evolving Infectious Disease Threats to National and Global Security,” in Lincoln Chen et al. (eds.), Global Health Challenges For Human Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2003, pp. 104, 111. See also Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Future of AIDS,” Foreign Affairs 81 (No.6), 22 at 23 (November/December 2002) (stating that the sub-Saharan African states are not well-positioned to influence events much beyond their own borders under any circumstances, good or ill – and the cruel consequence is that the world pays them little attention). 47 Dewitt, “Introduction: The New Global Order,” p. 5.
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Transparency and accountability in the use of petroleum revenues A fundamental ingredient for security, reconstruction, and reconciliation in Africa’s booming petro-states Ian Gary
Introduction Last October, the first oil tanker left the waters off Kribi, Cameroon, its belly filled with 950,000 barrels of crude oil and the hopes of millions of Chadians to whom the oil belongs. With this shipment, Chad joins the growing ranks of African countries exporting “black gold.” More than US$120 million in oil revenues will flow into Chad this year. But who will these new riches benefit? Will President Idriss Deby, who came to power in a 1990 military coup and has stayed in power through dubious elections, keep his promises to use the money wisely? Decades of conflict have left Chad as one of the poorest countries in the world – will oil revenues do anything to foster security, reconstruction, and reconciliation? Similar questions and scenarios are playing out across Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is in the midst of an oil boom as foreign energy companies pour billions of dollars into the region for exploring and producing petroleum. African governments, in turn, are receiving billions of dollars in revenue from this boom. Oil production on the African continent is set to double by the end of the decade and the United States will soon be importing 30 percent of its petroleum from the region, making this new oil supply an issue of “national security.” Over US$50 billion, the largest investment in African history, will be spent on African oil fields by the end of the decade. The oil industry views the Gulf of Guinea region, which covers west and central Africa, as the world’s premier “hotspot,” soon to become the leading deepwater offshore oil production center. Almost every month an industry conference in Houston, London, Luanda, or another African oil capital extols the opportunities to be found in this “new El Dorado.” Dramatic improvements in exploration and production technology, especially in offshore and deepwater drilling (5,000–10,000 feet), have opened up vast acreage off the African coast. For the United States and other consumer countries, Africa is an important source of oil. With this growing importance comes growing attention from policymakers. The US National Energy Plan highlights African oil as an important alternative to Middle East oil, and military planners are looking at ways to protect
Transparency in petroleum revenues 39 these energy sources – the Wall Street Journal recently reported Defense Department plans to deploy troops to Nigeria, and perhaps to other African states. In recent presentations at the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, General Wald, deputy commander, US European Command, has emphasized the need to develop coast guards and a forward US military presence to “combat terrorism” and protect oil production centers in Africa. This new African oil boom – centered on the oil-rich Atlantic waters of the Gulf of Guinea, from Nigeria to Angola – is a moment of great opportunity and great peril for countries beset by wide-scale poverty. On one hand, revenues available for poverty reduction are huge; Catholic Relief Services conservatively estimates in its recent report, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor, that sub-Saharan African governments will receive over US$200 billion in oil revenues in the next decade.1 On the other hand, the dramatic development failures that have characterized most other oil dependent countries warn that petrodollars have not helped developing countries reduce poverty and conflict; in most cases, they have actually exacerbated poverty and conflict. How can Africa’s new oil boom be different from past development failures associated with petroleum? What policy changes should be implemented, both domestically and internationally, to promote the efficient management and fair allocation of oil revenues in a manner that benefits the poor? These questions are most important for Africa’s oil exporters, but they are also vital for neighboring countries and the global community. US well-being, in part, depends on whether Africa’s oil exporters become regional engines of stability, democracy, growth, and job creation, or whether they will be regional vortexes of destabilization, decline, and war – generating the human and environmental disasters characteristic of failed states. Presently, Africa’s oil revenues are inserted into governments that lack transparency, accountability, and fairness. Mismanagement of oil wealth causes simmering resentment that sometimes boils over into protest, coup attempts, and outright conflict. Poor management of oil revenues is a major factor in the extremely limited reconstruction and reconciliation efforts in countries such as Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, or Chad. Transparent use of oil wealth will remain a key question in any postconflict dispensation. Struggles over oil wealth threaten to tear Nigeria apart. Wealth sharing in Sudan has been a key sticking point in negotiations between the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement and the government. Without improving their democratic institutions and administrative capacity, it is unlikely that African oil exporters will be able to use petrodollars to fuel poverty reduction; instead, oil monies are more likely to make matters worse for the poor. A first step toward the goal of improving conditions is to build transparency. Oil is a natural resource that all Africans own. Nevertheless, many aspects of the African oil industry are concealed or shrouded in mystery; and governments often treat oil as state secrets. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to track how much money oil generates, or how governments spend these revenues. Transparency
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depends on multinational oil companies publishing what they pay, and governments revealing what they spend.
Oil, poverty, and conflict As the African oil boom draws oil industry and US policy attention, the promise that oil will boost the African standard of living has echoed repeatedly throughout the Gulf of Guinea, raising popular expectations to sometimes-soaring heights. As Ed Royce, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the US House of Representatives says, “African energy is critical to African development. It provides a revenue stream . . . to break the cycle of poverty that plagues the continent.”2 In West Africa, one can palpably feel the hopes of people watching companies build new pipelines through their communities or seeing the impressive installation of offshore platforms. They believe that oil will bring jobs, food, schools, healthcare, agricultural support, and housing. “We were told by the company that we would have a new school, with books, and electricity and water,” a Cameroon village chief reported.3 Oil rich, dirt poor The lived experience of oil-exporting countries over the past several decades, though, tells a story which differs radically from the promise of petroleum.4 When taken as a group, all “rich” less-developed countries dependent on oil exports have seen the living standards of their populations drop – and drop dramatically. For most countries, including Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad Tobago, the development failure has been severe, plunging real per capita incomes back to the levels of the 1970s and 1980s.5 For a few countries, most notably Nigeria and Venezuela, the failure to develop has been catastrophic; in these cases, real per capita income has plummeted to levels not seen before 1960. In Nigeria, which has received more than US$340 billion in oil revenues, more than 70 percent of its population lives on less than a dollar a day, 43 percent lack sanitation and clean water, and infant mortality is among the highest in the world.6 Even more worrisome, the gap between the expectations that oil riches create and the reality they produce is a dangerous formula for disorder and war. Countries that depend upon oil exports, over time, are among the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and the most conflict-ridden states in the world today. Poor development outcomes are not inevitable Such grim development results are not inevitable. Resource booms can be beneficial. Norway (a relative newcomer on the oil scene) has used the benefits from North Sea petroleum to earn the highest place on the United Nations Development Program’s list of best development performers.7 Thus, the country
Transparency in petroleum revenues 41 where people live best is an oil exporter. This means that the underlying development problems around petroleum are not inherent in the resource itself – oil is merely a thick, viscous black substance. What matters for determining whether the poor will benefit over the long run from oil exploitation is how revenues are raised, what percentage remains inside the producing country, and how the government utilizes these revenues. Whether countries succeed in “sowing their petroleum,” that is, turning oil revenues into long-term benefits for their people, ultimately depends on the quality of public policy. Simply stated, given the right incentives for making good policy choices, petroleum revenues can be “black gold” rather than “the excrement of the devil,” as Juan Pablo Alfonzo, the founder of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, so poignantly warned.8 Why managing petroleum is not an easy task Successfully managing any mineral-based economy is especially difficult, but petroleum may be the hardest resource to utilize well. Countries dependent on oil exports seem particularly susceptible to policy failure. One must factor this into the set of unique security, reconstruction, and reconciliation challenges that Africa’s oil exporters face. Concentration of power and resources The difficulty in successfully managing petroleum lies in the interaction between economic and political power. Because the petroleum industry is more capitalintensive than any other economic activity and involves very extensive knowledge, skills, and technology, only the biggest players, either multinationals or states, are able to exploit this resource. At the same time, because profit margins are so huge, the oil rents generally overwhelm all other revenue sources. Thus, oil-led development has a strong tendency to concentrate both production and revenue patterns, and this often occurs in countries where economic and political power is already very concentrated. In effect, only large and powerful global and state actors can get into the oil game. Only those who control political power can grant the opportunity to make money from oil, and only those who receive this opportunity can provide the revenues to keep regimes in power. (CongoBrazzaville during the 1990s is a good example of this dynamic.) Angola, for example, ranked the third worst out of 102 countries that Transparency International surveyed in 2002. The US State Department said, “The country’s wealth continued to be concentrated in the hands of a small elite who often used government positions for massive personal enrichment, and corruption continued to be practiced at all levels. . . .”9 This creates a partnership of mutual interest (though often fraught with tensions). This does not occur to the same extent in more diffuse wealth-generating activities based on, say, fertile soil or fisheries, where the barriers to entry are far lower, the actors are more numerous, and the benefits are more dispersed.
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The prevalence of rent-seeking The result is what economists call a “vicious” development cycle based on rent-seeking. Rent-seeking is widespread behavior aimed at capturing petrodollars through unproductive and even corrupt means. In oil-exporting countries, all actors (whether public or private, domestic or foreign) have overwhelming incentives to seek links with the state in order to make money; governments, in turn, reward their supporters by funneling petrodollars, tariff protections, contracts, or subsidies their way. In the end, productive economic activity is actually penalized, growth is hindered, and economies become distorted. Parties can sustain political power only as long as oil revenues flow. The absence of counter-pressures Several factors compound the difficulty of managing oil revenues. Most important is that most developing countries lack the type of political institutions necessary to counteract rent-seeking. Democratically accountable executives, efficient civil services and tax authorities, independent legal systems, active and informed civil societies, and open and transparent policy-making processes are simply not in place. Furthermore, because profits are so huge in oil, a growing reliance on petrodollars can quickly disrupt and replace even healthy pre-existing economic activities. Perverse incentives from the international policy environment Finally, the external policy environment rewards overdependence on petroleum, overly centralized power, and even rent-seeking – merely by pursuing business as usual. Oil companies, for example, may not make transparent deals with governments, and some pay secret bonuses that civil society cannot trace. This makes it difficult to assess their contracts, know what revenues actually accrue to governments, and judge whether the proportion accruing to countries is fair. It also makes it very difficult to hold governments accountable for their revenue management. Home governments, acting in perceived national security and economic interests, have formed strong alliances with authoritarian rulers who happen to sit on top oil deposits and have winked at their records of human rights violations. At the same time, they have failed to insist that multinational oil companies operate with the same standards abroad as the governments hold the companies to at home. Finally, international financial institutions also support oil’s perverse development cycle by routinely encouraging development strategies based on the “comparative advantage” of petroleum, thereby helping to lock countries into a perverse pattern. At the same time, they support lending to deeply indebted oil exporters, along with private commercial banks, even when it is clear that debt only supports unproductive activities or papers over rent-seeking behaviors.
Transparency in petroleum revenues 43 Such practices prolong the ability of governments to mismanage their oil resources and help defer critical but painful development decisions necessary to bring about change. When business lacks transparency, governments are accountable to none, economies are weak, administrative capacity is lacking, and participation is absent or wanting – yet investments and lending continue to pour in without restrictions – rent-seeking and corruption results. Over time, the government squanders earnings, extraction depletes a precious asset, and widespread poverty remains. The “resource curse,” or how oil dependence produces decline10 Negative development outcomes associated with petroleum and other minerals is known as the “resource curse.”11 Essentially, this refers to the inverse association between growth and natural resource abundance, especially among minerals and oil. Resource-poor (without petroleum) countries grew four times more rapidly than resource rich (with petroleum) countries from 1970–9312 – despite the fact that they had half the savings. The greater a country’s dependence on oil and mineral resources, the worse its growth performance,13 a finding that economists in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have confirmed.14 Under the current policy environment, oil dependence hurts development in eight ways. Oil booms raise expectations and increase appetites for spending. The promise of oil wealth dramatically expands the horizons of governments in oil-exporting countries. A boom mentality not only affects the way that governments behave, creating grandiose plans and ideas, but it also shapes how people respond. Work ethics are undermined, and productivity sinks. Governments dramatically increase public spending based on unrealistic revenue projections. In all OPEC countries, windfalls increased both public spending and the appetite for transfers by a factor that was a greater proportion than the size of the boom itself.15 This meant that spending quickly surpassed revenues. Nonetheless, different interests and groups continued to demand large shares of national income when petrodollars became scarce. Booms decrease the quality of public spending and encourage rent-seeking. The concentration of fiscal resources from an oil boom fosters excessive and imprudent investment, and it leads to the maldistribution of resources, a decline in productivity, and massive corruption. Grandiose “white elephant” projects, characterized by enormous corruption in awarding import quotas, industrial licenses, trade franchises, low-cost credits, and access to foreign exchange, become the normal way of doing business. Examples are abound: a mountaintop resort in Venezuela, the largest airport in Saudi Arabia, a man-made river in Libya, the Trans-Railway in Gabon, and a new capital city, Abuja, in Nigeria. Transparency International’s World Corruption Index ranks oil-exporting countries as among the lowest, and considers them especially corrupt.16 In Gabon, a small elite
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connected to the government indulged in lavish spending and a cosmopolitan lifestyle. The country once garnered the title of “world’s largest per capita importer of champagne.”17 Even in countries where a nominal amount of oil revenues are budgeted for health, education, and other important poverty reduction sectors, the quality of spending means that it often has little impact on improving indicators in these sectors. Gabon is a case in point. The country’s relatively high per capita income masks large inequalities, and some social indicators are comparable to those of lower-income African countries.18 In 2001, the World Bank noted that “pockets of extreme poverty are growing in urban areas,” and that more than half the population in the three main cities lack access to electricity or running water.19 Declining productivity associated with the presence of “easy money” has hurt social services. A 1997 World Bank report noted that there “is a striking imbalance between the mediocre outcomes in health and education and the relatively high level of public spending for these sectors. The health sector presents a demographic and epidemiological profile typical of a poor country. Public health indicators are only average for sub-Saharan Africa.”20 Gabon spends more per pupil than most African countries, but the outcomes do not reflect this. The World Bank notes, in the “absence of a sectoral strategy and efficient budget procedures, budget allocations are simply renewed each year without rigor and control.”21 The volatility of oil prices hinders growth, distribution, and poverty alleviation. The volatility of oil prices makes planning extremely difficult, and it hampers exchange rate unification and trade liberalization – all of which have a detrimental effect on growth. In OPEC, oil price volatility exerts a strong influence on government finances and the patterns of national balance of payments, which subsequently means that performance deviates from planned targets by as much as 30 percent. Furthermore, scholars have shown that volatility is bad for investment, income distribution, educational attainment, and poverty alleviation.22 And because oil price volatility has been getting worse, especially since the 1990s, countries can expect even greater detrimental effects on economic performance. Booms encourage the loss of fiscal control and inflation, further hampering growth, equity, and poverty alleviation. In the context of pressures to overspend, corruption, poor quality spending, and uncertain revenues, the loss of control over public spending accompanies oil booms. Because there is no transparency in managing oil revenues, this creates parallel budgets. As a result, price stability and budgetary discipline suffers. Thus, even as oil money is pouring in, deficits and double-digit inflation characterize government accounts. Almost all OPEC members incurred budgetary deficits year after year, with Algeria topping the list, followed by Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, Libya, and Qatar. Even the capital surplus Persian Gulf countries eventually began to run serious budget deficits. Foreign debt grows faster in oil-exporting countries, mortgaging the future. In most oilexporting countries, external debt, which was negligible (except for Mexico) before the 1973 oil boom, has grown rapidly. As pressure on spending rises,
Transparency in petroleum revenues 45 governments borrow more, even mortgaging future oil payments to banks. Astonishingly, pushed by rent-seeking and the loss of fiscal control, oil countries have borrowed faster and more than non-oil exporting less-developed countries, despite benefiting from petrodollars. This borrowing is both demand and supply driven. Governments seek to borrow to cover shortfalls in expected petroleum revenues, but bankers also especially favor lending to oil exporters because petroleum backs their loans. Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Nigeria, and Cameroon all have huge debts, while being enriched by oil wealth. Cameroon has even qualified for the World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Country program for debt relief. Dutch Disease adversely affects non-oil productive activities, like manufacturing and agriculture. The “Dutch Disease” occurs when oil windfalls push up the real exchange rate of a country’s currency, which tends to render most other exports noncompetitive. At the same time, persistent Dutch Disease provokes a rapid, even distorted growth of services, transportation, and construction, while simultaneously discouraging some industrialization and agriculture.23 The exploitation of petroleum sets off economic dynamics that adversely affect agricultural exports – a labor-intensive activity that is particularly important to the poor – in particular.24 The languishing of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors of oil countries not only makes them more dependent on petroleum, thereby exacerbating other problems of dependency, but it can also lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness.25 Gabon exhibits the classic symptoms of Dutch Disease. There is practically no local food production, which (contrary to that of neighboring Cameroon) has always been deficient, but oil dependence has virtually ended.26 Only about 1 percent of total land area is under cultivation so that, according to the Africa Research Bulletin, “Gabon depends entirely on imports for its food, consumer goods and equipment . . . the tomatoes are South African and the potatoes from France.”27 Despite employing an estimated half of the workforce, the agricultural sector’s contribution to the gross domestic product is only 7 percent.28 Meanwhile, the oil sector cannot make up the shortfall. Because oil is an enclave and highly capital-intensive activity, it provides little employment and relatively few linkages with the rest of the economy.29 Petrodollars replace more stable and sustainable revenue streams, exacerbating the problems of development, transparency, and accountability. Over time, oil revenues decrease reliance on non-oil taxes, and can actually replace prior tax systems. This frees oil-exporting governments from citizen demands like fiscal transparency and accountability that arise when people pay taxes directly to the government. Thus, petrodollars actually sever the link between people and their government that is the essence of popular control. Reconciling the government with the people is all that more difficult in petro-states. The oil/poverty/conflict syndrome The story gets worse – more than any other group of countries, oil and other mineral exporters demonstrate the perverse linkages between skewed economic
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performance, poverty, injustice, and conflict. Countries dependent on oil and other mineral wealth are far more likely to have civil wars than their resourcepoor counterparts, and war disproportionately harms the poor.30 The gap between expectations and the dismal economic performance of oilexporting countries is politically explosive. Because oil governments funnel petrodollars to their own friends, family, military and political supporters, social class, and ethnic or religious groups,31 their populations see foreigners and favorites getting rich, but their own lot does not change. In the context of apparent oil riches, it may even get worse. Over time, this is not a formula for stability. This pattern of spending has kept President El Hadj Omar Bongo (formerly Albert) in power in Gabon since 1968. Ruling the country as a one-party state since the early 1970s based on a policy of ethnic inclusion through his Parti Démocratique du Gabon, the decline in oil revenues forced him to resort to a measure of political opening in the 1990s, which, in turn, led to reconfiguring presidential rule. But there has not been a substantial reframing of internal politics, which President Bongo still dominates.32 The oil in Gabon, though, is starting to run out. Thus Gabon, once the regional role model of a successful “oil emirate,” is now likely to become the poster child for the harsh reality of life after the oil boom. While high oil prices give the president some room to mask the looming economic and financial crisis due to falling oil production, economic problems are severe.33 Gabon has never been able to broaden its productive base, and has not implemented a strategy for a post-oil economy. A highly urbanized population used to consumer luxuries, imported food, and profligate government spending will now have to make harsh and unpopular economic adjustments, including restraining government spending. As those inside the patronage circle, as well as those left out from oil riches in the past, understand that there will be no future benefits, this will put Gabon’s much vaunted “stability” to the test. Militarizing oil countries. As petrodollars fail to keep pace with demands, oil-based governments often increasingly rely on repression to keep themselves in power. Not surprisingly, oil dependence is closely associated with militarization. As a group, oil exporters spend much more money and a greater percentage of their revenues on their military and security forces than nonmineral dependent countries.34 The extent of militarization is stunning. From 1984 to 1994, for example, OPEC members’ share of annual military expenditures as a percentage of total central government expenditures was three times as much as developed countries, and 2 to 10 times that of non-oil developing countries. From the perspective of poverty alleviation, the sheer waste of this military spending is staggering. Petrodollar support for authoritarian rule. Not surprisingly, given this pattern of spending, oil rents have tended to impede democratization and have sustained a long line of authoritarian rulers35 – from the Shah of Iran to Nigeria’s Abacha to the House of Saud to Saddam Hussein. These regimes prohibit the types of organizations that provide a voice for the poor, create an informed civil society, and permit their people to influence the management and allocation of oil wealth.
Transparency in petroleum revenues 47 Furthermore, oil dependence tends to impede democratization, and it may even erode democratic rule where it previously existed, as the dramatic case of Venezuela demonstrates. This is especially unfortunate because democracy, when combined with merit-based civil services, reduces the corruption and mismanagement oftentimes associated with oil dependence.36 Oil and civil war. Fights over oil revenues may increase the level of preexisting conflict, and oil may become the rationale for starting wars.37 This is especially true as economies move into decline. Petroleum revenues are also a central mechanism for prolonging violent conflict, and are rarely a catalyst for resolution.38 Think, for example, of Sudan, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, and Nigeria. Recent events have shown more reminders of oil’s destabilizing effects. These include the 2003 coup in São Tomé and Principe, coup plots in Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria, and the continued violent conflict in the Niger Delta. Maritime boundary disputes and the scramble for more oil The desire to capture more oil revenues has also sparked off a round of sometimes amicable and sometimes acrimonious discussions concerning never-defined or illdefined maritime borders across the region. Reminiscent of the Berlin Conference that drew up Africa’s colonial boundaries, licensing rounds, joint development agreements, and international disputes at the World Court are rapidly carving up Africa’s offshore oil fields.39 Joint development agreements exist between Senegal and Guinea Bissau; Angola and Congo-Brazzaville; Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea; Nigeria and São Tomé. Negotiations involving states and their oil company backers are done in secret, and disputes over lucrative oil acreage are likely to lead to tensions if not outright conflict in the coming years. The following examples highlight the tensions involved in this scramble for state ownership of offshore oil fields. ●
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São Tomé/Nigeria. São Tomé’s new president, Fradique de Menezes, sacked his cabinet in October 2002 after a fall out over a Joint Development Zone agreement signed under the previous president. The agreement had highly favorable terms for Nigeria and a Nigerian owned company, Chrome Energy. A planned licensing round was delayed until late 2003 as São Tomé renegotiated the Joint Development Zone with Nigeria. Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips, and others have been eyeing the fields, which have potential reserves of 4 billion barrels. The dispute has caused tension between the two countries, with São Tomé looking to the United States for protection.40 Cameroon/Nigeria. In late 2002, Cameroon won a long-running case at the World Court in The Hague concerning control over the potentially oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Both sides told the United Nations and others that they would accept the verdict, but tensions have continued. Equatorial Guinea/Gabon. Ownership of acreage near the island of Annobon, which belongs to Equatorial Guinea, is unresolved. An accord has been
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The responsibility for change Like oil exporters in other regions, long-time African oil producers such as Nigeria, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon, and Gabon have been largely unable to convert their oil wealth into broad-based poverty reduction. Nor have these countries been able to diversify their economies or prepare for a post-oil future. To the contrary, petroleum has become a magnet for conflict and, in some cases, civil war. New oil producers, such as Equatorial Guinea, appear to be repeating some of the mistakes of their more experienced neighbors. ●
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In Nigeria, over US$350 billion has accrued to governments in the past 30 years, but the majority of the population lives on less than a dollar a day. In Angola, even though the war is over, more than 2 million internally displaced people depend entirely on humanitarian assistance. The United Nations, in its 2003 appeal for Angola, has asked for 327 million Euros (US$384 million) for humanitarian and development operations, warning that the situation could worsen if it does not secure funding.42 The reality, though, is that the Angolan government, awash in oil revenues, could probably pay for the UN appeal in about a month – except that very little is known about the true amount of Angola’s revenue from oil, how it is spent, or even where it is. In Equatorial Guinea, sudden oil wealth has served to reinforce authoritarian rule. Direct flights now connect Malabo, once a classic “tropical backwater,” with Houston and European capitals. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema won a new term in elections last year with 97.1 percent of the vote. He told a campaign rally, “Like the Scriptures say when the Pharaoh of Egypt had a dream of lean cows and fat cows, we have passed the time of lean cows that represent hunger, and we are now in the time of fat cows which is prosperity.” Unfortunately, there are too few fat cows in the country of 500,000. Earlier this year, the Los Angeles Times reported that over US$300 million in oil earnings was deposited in a private bank in Washington, DC and that the account is under the sole control of President Nguema.43
Fixing the problem – promoting transparency and accountability in Africa’s oil exporters The primary responsibility for managing Africa’s oil wealth in a transparent, fair, and accountable way lies with Africa’s governments. Building democratic states capable of focusing on reducing poverty is one of the key challenges facing Africa in the twenty-first century.
Transparency in petroleum revenues 49 Africa’s governments, though, are only one part of a web of interests and relationships in the African oil boom. Other key interests are foreign oil companies, international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Export Credit Agencies, and northern governments. The World Bank Group has played a catalytic role by supporting changes in legal frameworks and investment environments, financing projects, and providing risk insurance. Export credit agencies have provided additional finance in risky environments, with few strings attached. The need for a “big push” Many international actors are now making tentative steps to address the “paradox of plenty” problem that Africa’s oil boom has generated. They have begun to recognize that improving the distribution of benefits from oil production is not only an ethical mandate, but also an essential ingredient toward a more stable and sustainable world. The IMF and World Bank are taking steps to increase transparency in Africa’s oil economies. Corporate actors are increasing their philanthropic programs and engaging in dialogue with civil society on ways to increase transparency in the sector. And northern governments, such as the United States and United Kingdom, are beginning to acknowledge the need to address the perils of oil-led development. These actions, while welcome, are not enough. Because developing oil fields and building pipelines happens faster than the construction of efficient states and good governance, only a sustained, coordinated, and coherent international effort – a “big push” to change the policy environment – by the relevant actors can improve the prospects for transforming Africa’s oil wealth into improving the lives of the poor. Only a concerted change in the incentive structure surrounding oil can help ensure that states will manage petroleum revenues to benefit the poor. The Chad experiment The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, inaugurated last October, is the biggest international effort to date to focus an oil development project on a poverty reduction outcome. Multinationals, international financial institutions, and governments are working to increase the benefits and minimize the harm of this oil project to local populations. International and local civil society groups are closely monitoring the project. The explicit goal in Chad, Africa’s newest petrostate, is to build government capacity to manage massive new oil wealth in a transparent and fair manner. Until the government allocates and effectively spends oil revenues to make concrete improvements in the lives of the poor, this project will remain an untested “model.” The project includes a World Bank-required revenue management law that mandates Chad to funnel oil revenues into the following four areas: a future generations fund; priority development projects such as health, education, and water; a special fund to compensate the oil-producing Doba region in the south;
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and general government coffers. The law also establishes a Petroleum Revenue Oversight Committee, made up of government and civil society members, which will oversee and approve the spending of the oil monies. The project is promising on paper, and the World Bank’s involvement is an innovative experiment that deserves close attention. But even if Chad follows the project exactly as designed, the US$3.7 billion project that built 1,000 kilometers of pipeline from Chad to the coast of Cameroon has major flaws and gaps. The project must address these problems if the petrodollars are to benefit the people: ●
●
●
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The revenue management law only covers three oil fields in the Doba region, even though the project has high expectations of finding more oil elsewhere that companies will export through the pipeline. Thus, a significant amount of oil revenues may soon fall outside this mandate. The international community must hold oil exploration and production – which would use the same World Bank backed pipeline – to the same social and environmental safeguards as the Doba fields. Presidential decree five years after the law’s passage ( January 2004, which coincided with the flow of oil revenues) can change the mandate targeting funds for development programs in the Doba oil region. The Revenue Oversight Committee has limited capacity to perform its role. It needs capacity building, training, and an independent funding source, particularly for civil society members. Regional development plans and spending plans for priority sectors still are not in place. Neither are democratically chosen local governance institutions that would enable quality spending of Chad’s petrodollars. Cameroon does not have a revenue management system in place. While Cameroon’s earnings are lower, without a revenue management system, the country lost its opportunity to improve overall budget transparency. Transparency International’s corruption perception index in 1998 and 1999 listed this country as number one.
The project may prove to have some positive lessons for Chad and other exporters in Africa or, as some speculate, in Iraq. But as the pipeline is officially inaugurated, there will be little but moral suasion to keep Chad from making the same oil-revenue mismanagement mistakes as its neighbors. The World Bank is testing the revenue management plan in a country with serious governance and human rights problems. In late 2000, the government of Chad spent the first US$4.5 million of the international oil consortium’s US$25 million signing bonus, not on health or other development priorities, but on military weapons. Recently, President Deby’s party declared its intent to change the constitutional two-term presidential limit,44 independent radio stations have been closed down, and President Deby’s brother-in-law has been appointed to the Revenue Oversight Committee, among other worrying developments.
Transparency in petroleum revenues 51 It will take continued high-level effort and attention from the World Bank, IMF, the United States and other northern governments, the Chadian government, and civil society groups to ensure that this project meets its stated objective: reducing poverty in one of the poorest countries in the world. No more “business as usual” While the Chad experiment is a start, to improve outcomes for the poor across Africa’s petro-states, all actors need to change some of their practices and work together in a more concerted manner. Unless the main players make specific policy changes, as discussed in the section on “Oil, poverty, and conflict,” Africa’s oil boom is unlikely to foster any significant poverty reduction. Instead, oil riches will most likely continue to produce corruption and mismanagement, environmental destruction, human rights violations, and conflict. It is urgent that states make improvements to emphasize transparency and fairness, construct capable and accountable institutions, and ensure respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic space in oil-producing countries. Catholic Relief Services believes that a “big push” for transparent oil-revenue management in Africa is both achievable and vital. Many outsiders will benefit greatly from Africa’s oil boom – oil companies will make large profits, and northern governments and consumers will secure new supplies. But these benefits cannot be at the expense of millions of Africans. The responsibility for ensuring that Africans themselves benefit is a collective one. Successfully managing the wealth that Africa’s oil boom is creating is one of the major challenges the international community faces in its relations with Africa. The alternative will be much more than an opportunity lost, but a disaster for millions of Africans. A dismal scenario A US National Intelligence Council report in 2000 described one dismal scenario. In Africa, “the pattern of oil wealth fostering corruption rather than economic development will continue. The quality of governance, rather than resource endowments, will be the key determinant of development and differentiation among African states.”45 This prediction will come to pass if African governments, northern governments, oil companies, and international financial institutions maintain their current policies. “Business as usual” would mean, for example, that: ●
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African governments continue to lack accountability and treat key information about oil revenues as state secrets. Oil companies pursue their commercial and competitive objectives, and seek only to keep cordial relations with host governments. The United States and other northern governments prioritize commercial interests over transparency, human rights, and democracy in their relations with African petro-states.
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Ian Gary The World Bank and IMF pursue continued engagement with African petro-states without sufficient attention to transparency, human rights, and democracy. Civil society remains weak, and lacks information and resources to hold governments accountable.
In this scenario, popular anger at the mismanagement of oil wealth and the lack of visible improvements in the quality of life results. This anger, at times, boils over into sabotage, rebellion, and conflict. A helpful scenario A more hopeful scenario involves a concerted change in the incentive structure surrounding the management of Africa’s oil wealth. A sustained, coordinated, and coherent effort among all relevant actors will increase the benefits and minimize the harm from oil development. In this “big push” scenario, actors within each sector and across sectors will work together rather than at cross-purposes. This “big push” approach would mean, for example, that: ●
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Oil companies work collectively to address problems that threaten the reputation and sustainability of their business. Corporations do not sacrifice “best practice” in publishing revenue payments to the altar of competitive pressure. Western governments work together to promote a common policy on transparency, governance, and human rights. Rather than using diplomatic resources solely to expand market opportunities for oil companies operating in Africa, these governments would direct their export credit agencies to adopt common policies that promote transparency and accountability in oil projects. The World Bank and the IMF work with the common purpose of leveraging their influence to promote transparency and accountability in managing oil wealth. African and international civil society groups work together, strengthened by better information, to improve the management of oil wealth for poverty reduction.
In this scenario, oil revenues become more transparent, democratic space increases, and an empowered civil society helps to ensure that petroleum revenues are well managed to benefit the poor. Changed external incentive structures and demands from their own people will encourage African governments to improve their management of oil wealth. Only collective and coordinated action can make a difference. Whether actions within and between sectors will be reinforced or undermined depends on what others do. One oil company cannot step out in front of others without the fear of losing business. The World Bank and IMF will not be successful in promoting
Transparency in petroleum revenues 53 reform efforts if the United States and other major powers do not support them. In bilateral relations, all western governments will need to adopt the same policies toward African oil exporters. Only this way will incentive structures change to promote transparency and accountability in managing oil wealth. At the signature bonus ceremony in São Tomé, President Fradique de Menezes promised not to repeat the mistakes of other oil exporters. We have committed ourselves to the publication of oil revenues, and to regular and effective auditing of those revenues according to internationally accepted standards. We will implement a revenue management plan linked closely to the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations. We will implement the best practices drawn from countries around the world. But in and of itself, oil is not the solution. It is just a means to an end. The key to our future is our democracy and our democratic values, basic rights for all our citizens, good governance and sound economic policies. This can only come from within.46
Recommendations Oil-exporting governments should: ●
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remove legal and extralegal obstacles to transparent disclosure and monitoring of the oil sector; guarantee respect for human rights, including freedom of expression, association, and the press; and collaborate with citizen groups monitoring the management and allocation of oil wealth.
Oil companies should: ●
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support the international “Publish What You Pay” campaign by publicly disclosing, in a disaggregated, regular, and timely manner, all net taxes, fees, royalties, and other payments made to African states, at any level, or to local communities, including compensation payments and community development funding;47 and fully respect human rights in their operations.
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund should: ●
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use their leverage with both companies and countries to promote transparency, fair and accountable revenue management and allocation, and respect for human rights; properly sequence their leverage, so that significant steps toward building good governance take place prior to assistance for developing the oil sector; and ensure that the extractive sector aligns all activities with the World Bank’s poverty reduction mandate.
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Export credit agencies should: ●
require private sector companies wishing to access loans, guarantees, and risk insurance to disclose publicly, in a disaggregated, regular, and timely manner, all net taxes, fees, royalties, and other payments made to African states.
The United States and other northern governments should: ●
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emphasize the respect for human rights, the promotion of good governance and democracy, and the transparent, fair, and accountable management of oil revenues in their bilateral relationships with African petro-states (state visits by President Dos Santos of Angola to the White House or President Bongo to the Elysée Palace send exactly the wrong signals about their management of oil-rich states); make trade benefits, such as the US African Growth and Opportunity Act, conditional on transparency in oil revenues; support international efforts to increase transparency in oil payments by companies to developing countries; and use their influence to prioritize transparent, fair, and accountable revenue management within the World Bank and the IMF.
Will all these, even if implemented, be enough to avoid the oil-fuelled disasters of the past? Perhaps not, but without these crucial first steps, the outcomes of Africa’s oil boom will be grimly predictable.
Notes 1 Strategic Issues Advisor for Africa, Catholic Relief Services. Much of this chapter is drawn from Ian Gary and Terry Karl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor. Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services, June 2003. Ian Gary is Strategic Issues Advisor for Africa with Catholic Relief Services. Terry Lynn Karl is Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. 2 From the January 25, 2002 symposium “African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development” sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Washington, DC. The full quote is: “It provides a revenue stream that should supply capital to grow African economies and to break the cycle of poverty that plagues the continent.” 3 Interview near Ngoumou, Cameroon, September 23, 2002. 4 Unless otherwise cited, the argument in this section and the statistics on the performance of oil-exporting countries is from Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997 or Terry Lynn Karl, “The Impact of Oil Booms on Oil-Exporting Countries: Reflections on The Paradox of Plenty,” in Fueling the 21st Century: The New Political Economy of Energy, special edition of The Journal of International Affairs 53 (No.1) (Fall 1999). These works should be consulted for a more complete explanation of the oil phenomenon described here. In addition to works cited earlier, see Richard M. Auty, Sustaining Development in the Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge, 1993. Jeffrey Sachs and Andres Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, Development Discussion Paper (No.517). Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995.
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5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Michael Ross, “Extractive Sectors and the Poor,” An Oxfam America Report, 2001, Richard M. Auty and Alan G. Gelb, “Political Economy of Resource Abundant States,” in Richard M. Auty (ed.), Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 126–144, and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Policy Research Working Paper 2355, Development Research Group, World Bank, May 2000. Indonesia was the only large less-developed oil exporter avoiding this pattern, but this too changed after 2000. Human Development Report 2001, pp. 150 and 168. Witness also the positive impact of natural resource wealth on Canada, Australia, and the United States during the first wave of fossil fuel development. But these countries had competitive manufacturing sectors prior to the development of their mineral resources, unlike oil exporters in less-developed countries where the sequence is reversed. And oil was not a primary export commodity; countries used it internally. Interview with Terry Lynn Karl, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, Caracas, Venezuela, summer, 1976. US Department of State, Angola Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002, March 31, 2003. Much of the information in this section is from Karl, The Paradox of Plenty and Jahangir Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC’s Windfalls and Pitfalls. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999. This is the phrase used by economists. See for example, Gobind Nankani, “Development Problems of Nonfuel Mineral Exporting Countries,” Finance and Development 17 ( January 1980); Alan Gelb, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? New York: Oxford University Press, 1988; and Auty, Sustaining Development. For more recent quantitative studies, see Richard M. Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1998 and Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Growth (Revised Version). Harvard Institute for International Development Discussion Paper, 1997. See Richard Auty, “Natural Resources, the State and Development Strategy,” Journal of International Development 9, 651–663 (1997). A comprehensive study by Harvard economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andres Warner demonstrates that countries whose natural resource exports composed a high percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) had abnormally slow growth rates between 1971 and 1989 when compared to nonresource based development models. Drawing on data from 97 developing countries, these researchers confirm that there is a negative relationship between a country’s dependence on natural resource exports and its subsequent growth. Thus, countries that base their development on resources like petroleum grow more slowly than those that follow other development models. See Natural Resource Abundance. See for example, Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,” IMF Working Paper WP/99/85. See Alan Gelb, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1988. See Thorvadur Gylfason, “Nature, Power and Growth,” and Leite and Weidemann, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt,” IMF working Paper, WP/99/85. See Howard Schissel, “Champagne: Top of the Pops,” West Africa 3 ( June 1985). World Bank, Gabon: Poverty in a Rent-based Economy. Washington, DC ( June 27, 1997). Social Development Notes (No.54), March 2001, World Bank, “ ‘Bottom-Up’ CommunityBased Development: Gabon Urban Development Project.” World Bank, “Gabon: Poverty in a Rent-Based Economy,” Washington, DC ( June 27, 1997). In 1994, public spending still reached US$337 per student at the primary and secondary levels.
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22 See Ricardo Hausmann and Michael Gavin, “Securing Stability and Growth in a Shock Prone Region: The Policy Challenge for Latin America,” IDB Working Paper 315, 1996; Garey Ramey and Valerie A. Ramey, “Cross-country Evidence on the Link Between Volatility and Growth,” American Economic Review 85, 1138–1151 (1995); Karnit Flug, Antonio Spilimbergo, and Eric Wachenheim, “Investment in Education: Do Economic Volatility and Credit Constraints Matter?,” Journal of Development Economics 55 (No.2), (1999). 23 See W.M. Corden and P.J. Neary, “Booming Sector and De-industrialization in a Small Open Economy,” Economic Journal 92, December 1982 and Peter Neary and Sweder van Wijnbergen (eds.), Natural Resources and the Macro-economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986. 24 See Mohsen Fardmanesh, “Dutch Disease and the Oil Syndrome: An Empirical Study,” World Development 19 (No.6), (1991). 25 See Paul Krugman, “The Narrowing Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competitive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher,” Journal of Development Economics 27, 41–55 (1987). 26 Roland Pourtier, Le Gabon, 2 vols, Paris: Karthala, 1989, 274. 27 Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Technical and Financial Series 37 (No.1), 14206 ( January 16, 2000). 28 Africa Review World of Information (2002). 29 For example, in Angola, a country of over 11 million people, the oil industry employs fewer than 10,000, while the industry accounts for almost half of Angola’s GDP. See Global Witness, A Crude Awakening, 1999, p. 6. 30 Both statistical work and case studies are clear on this point. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Policy Research Working Paper 2355, Development Research Group, World Bank, May 2000. This study shows that states dependent on the export of oil and minerals face a risk of civil war of 23 percent for any five-year period, compared to a risk of 0.5 percent for a country with no natural resource exports. 31 In some years, for example, subsidies in the Persian Gulf have run as high as 10 to 20 percent of GDP. Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth, p. 101. 32 President Bongo’s marriage to Congo-Brazzaville’s President Sassou Nguesso’s daughter is but one of the intimate links that bind regional political relations. 33 Economist Intelligence Unit, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea Country Report, January 2003. 34 Where the average developing country spends about 12.5 percent of its budget on the military, Ecuador in contrast spends 20.3 percent, and Saudi Arabia spends a whopping 35.8 percent. Ross, “Extractive Sectors and the Poor,” p. 15. 35 See Karl, The Paradox of Plenty and Karl, Lynn and Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,” World Politics 53, 325–361 (April 2001). 36 See Karl, The Paradox of Plenty; Auty, “Natural Resources, the State, and Development Strategy,” pp. 651–663; and Auty and Gelb, “Political Economy of Resource Abundant States,” pp. 126–144. 37 Pipelines are the special focus of violence, as events in Burma, Indonesia, and Colombia demonstrate. 38 See James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” Paper presented at “Civil Wars and Post-Conflict Transition,” University of California, Irvine (May 18–20, 2001). This study includes data from 122 civil wars between 1945 and 1999. 39 “Africa Energy Intelligence,” Paper presented at “Gulf of Guinea: Berlin Conference for Oil” (September 11, 2002). 40 See Ken Silverstein, “Sinking its Hopes into a Tiny Nation: Obscure Texas Oil Firm, Amid Claims of Bribery, Secures a deal with Poor São Tomé,” Los Angeles Times
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41 42 43 44 45 46 47
(May 24, 2003) and Jon Lee Anderson, “Our New Best Friend: Who Needs Saudi Arabia When You’ve Got São Tomé ?,” The New Yorker (October 7, 2002), pp. 74–83. “Africa Energy Intelligence,” Paper presented at “Gulf of Guinea.” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, November 19, 2002, Johannesburg. Ken Silverstein, “Oil Boom Enriches African Ruler,” Los Angeles Times ( January 20, 2003). The National Assembly of Chad agreed in May 2004 put the constitutional amendment on a third term to a national referendum in late 2004. National Intelligence Council, National Foreign Intelligence Board, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernmental Experts, December 2000. Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, New & Trends Africa, vol. 18 (No.24), Thursday 11, 2003. www.publishwhatyoupay.org
4
Protecting and reintegrating displaced women and children postconflict Erin Mooney
Introduction In Africa and around the world, the overwhelming majority of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), some 70–80 percent, are women and children. Women and children have particular protection and assistance needs beyond the needs and vulnerabilities that men suffer. In many conflicts, displaced women and children are specifically targeted for abuse, including rape and other forms of sexual violence. Children, whom armed groups increasingly rely upon to fill their ranks, are at heightened risk of abduction and forced recruitment by armed groups to serve either as soldiers or in roles such as porters, guides, and sexual slaves. Conflict, as well as the separation of families that often occurs in the course of displacement, also thrusts many women and children into new roles. There are dramatic increases in the number of women who become heads of households and are suddenly burdened with the primary responsibility of protecting and providing for their families. For displaced women and children, moreover, an end to conflict does not necessarily end the risks to their physical security and well-being. Indeed, they face additional challenges in the context of return or resettlement and reintegration. Too often, a “one-size fits all” solution overlooks the particular needs and vulnerabilities that displaced women and children experience. For example, a 1994 assessment of the reproductive and health needs of women and girls in conflict situations in Africa found that many operational agencies considered the integration of gender considerations into the planning and implementation of their programs and activities “an irrelevance, or at best an optional extra, to be bolted on if there is time.”1 Ten years later, the reality on the ground has not significantly changed. To be sure, there is much greater awareness that displaced and other war-affected women and children are among those most adversely affected by conflict and displacement, and have particular protection, assistance, and reintegration needs that require special attention.2 Even so, a perspective that takes into account the particular risks, needs, capacities, and views of women and children is seldom applied as a priority or in a serious and systematic manner. It may be that programs addressing women and girls’ particular protection and assistance needs are eventually developed and undertaken. But, as one observer has pointed
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out, “new ideas cannot simply be added onto existing programming that structurally resists them. It would be like adding eggs on top of a cake after it has already started to bake.”3 Ensuring protection and assistance for displaced women and children is not a marginal issue, but is central to the effectiveness of the overall response. If displaced women and children are not receiving the protection and assistance they need, this means that most displaced persons are not being protected and assisted. This chapter focuses on seven key issues of concern for the protection and reintegration of displaced women and children in the aftermath of conflict. Specifically, these concerns are: (1) engaging women and children in the decisions that affect their lives; (2) peace-building; (3) protection during return or resettlement; (4) protection from sexual violence and exploitation; (5) education; (6) skillstraining and income-generating opportunities; and (7) land and property rights. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but these are among the most critical areas that need greater attention and could yield important results. While these concerns are relevant both to refugee as well as to internally displaced women and children, this chapter gives particular emphasis to internally displaced women and children. There are two main reasons for this. First, the vast majority of women that conflict in Africa uproots are displaced within their own countries: 13 million of the world’s 25 million internally displaced persons uprooted by conflict and communal strife are in Africa; by contrast, the continent has 3.5 million refugees.4 Second, and most importantly, when their own government denies them protection, IDPs, unlike refugees, have no established international regime to turn to for protection and assistance. As a result, many IDPs do not receive adequate protection, healthcare, food, shelter, or other assistance during their displacement. Indeed, internally displaced populations, specifically in Africa, suffer the highest mortality and malnutrition rates in humanitarian emergencies.5 Moreover, the disparities in treatment continue during return or resettlement; while refugees can expect some support for reintegration from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IDPs do not necessarily receive the same assistance and often are left to fend for themselves. In addition to being discriminatory, as one long-time advocate for both groups has pointed out, this discrepancy also risks creating new tensions and undermines the very purpose of reintegration, which is to resolve, not encourage, resentments and conflict.6
Guiding principles to protect and assist the internally displaced The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding Principles), the first international standards specifically for internally displaced persons, set forth the rights of internally displaced persons and the responsibilities of states and other actors toward them.7 Developed by the Representative of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons, at the request of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly, the Guiding
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Principles compile and restate the various relevant norms of international human rights and humanitarian law and indicate what they mean in situations of internal displacement. The Guiding Principles cover all phases of internal displacement, addressing protection against arbitrary displacement, protection, and assistance during displacement, and safe and voluntary return or resettlement and reintegration. The Guiding Principles contain many provisions of particular importance for internally displaced women and children. To begin with, there is recognition that addressing the particular needs of certain internally displaced persons, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, and female heads of household, may require special attention (Principle 4). The Guiding Principles prohibit gender-specific violence, with explicit reference to rape, forced prostitution, and indecent assault. They also prohibit slavery or any contemporary form of slavery, such as sale into marriage, sexual exploitation, or forced labor of children (Principle 11). Principle 13 unequivocally asserts that in no circumstances shall displaced children be recruited or take part in hostilities. Displaced children, especially unaccompanied minors, are at heightened risk of forcible recruitment and of becoming child soldiers. In Liberia, where an estimated half of the 50,000 fighting forces were child soldiers, internally displaced children in the camps were particularly vulnerable to abduction and forced recruitment. In northern Uganda, children are believed to make up more than 80 percent of the ranks of the insurgent forces of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Tens of thousands of children flee their homes each day at dusk into the city and sleep in the streets in an effort to escape abduction by rebel forces. The Guiding Principles pay special attention to the integrity of the family. Especially for children, the family is the most basic unit of protection and psychosocial support. For internally displaced persons, the right to respect family life includes the right for family members to remain together during displacement and that separated families be reunited as quickly as possible, particularly when children are involved (Principle 17). Furthermore, Principle 16 provides that internally displaced persons have the right to know the fate and whereabouts of missing relatives. The Guiding Principles also underscore the importance of internally displaced persons having all the necessary documents to exercise their rights. They specify women’s equal rights to personal identification and other documentation, and their right to have this documentation issued in their own names (Principle 20). Issuing documentation directly to and for women is important in order to avoid situations where women heads of household or single women have to struggle to be recognized in the exercise of their rights, including in obtaining access to relief assistance and medical care. Moreover, special attention is to be paid to the health needs of women. Women should have access to female healthcare providers and services, including reproductive healthcare, and victims of sexual and other abuses should have access to counseling (Principle 19). Internally displaced children, like all children, have the right to education. Special efforts are to be made to ensure the full and equal participation of women
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and girls in educational programs (Principle 23). The authorities need to ensure that internally displaced children receive free education at the primary level and that further education and training facilities are available, in particular to adolescents and women, whether or not they live in the camps. As stated in their introduction, the Guiding Principles are specifically intended to provide guidance to states faced with the phenomenon of internal displacement. They also provide guidance to other authorities and groups, which includes insurgent groups; this is important as millions of internally displaced persons are in areas that are under the control of nonstate actors and to which humanitarian access often is very difficult. Moreover, when governments are unable or even unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities toward internally displaced populations, the international community has a role. Accordingly, the Guiding Principles provide guidance to intergovernmental organizations, international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Above all, it is an important document for internally displaced persons themselves, providing them with awareness of their rights and a tool to buttress their advocacy efforts. Since their presentation to the United Nations in 1998, the Guiding Principles have gained significant international standing and recognition as a tool and standard to address situations of internal displacement.8 All regions of the world, including in Africa, are widely using them. In 1998, a UN regional seminar on internal displacement in Africa, cosponsored with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), recommended the wide dissemination of the Guiding Principles in Africa and called for particular attention to be paid to protect, assist, and reintegrate the needs of internally displaced women and children.9 The following year, the OAU Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons took note of the Guiding Principles “with interest and appreciation” and recommended to the OAU Council of Ministers that member states cooperate with the Representative of the Secretary-General in their implementation. The African Union has carried on this commitment to the Guiding Principles: at a seminar in 2003 on migration in East Africa, the Horn, and the Great Lakes, governments reaffirmed their commitment to the Guiding Principles as a useful tool and standard for addressing situations of internal displacement.10 Subregional bodies also have recognized and are promoting the Guiding Principles. For instance, the Accra Declaration on War Affected Children in West Africa, which member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted in 2000, welcomed the Guiding Principles and called on ECOWAS member states to provide full protection, access, and relief to internally displaced persons in accordance with the Guiding Principles. In September 2002, ECOWAS member states at a seminar on migration further recommended the development of national laws on internal displacement and the training of regional peacekeepers, using the Guiding Principles as a framework.11 The following year, countries in the East African subregion covered by the InterGovernmental Authority on Development agreed to direct particular attention to develop policies that ensure the protection of the internally displaced and address the needs of especially vulnerable groups, such as women heads of household and children, and took note of the Guiding Principles as a useful tool
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for developing and evaluating appropriate national policies and legislation on internal displacement.12 A number of countries have adopted national legislation or policies on internal displacement that make use of the Guiding Principles, and Africa has led the way. In 2000, Angola became the first country to enact legislation expressly based on the Guiding Principles, in its “Norms on Resettlement.” The following year, the Government of Burundi signed a “Protocol for the Creation of a Permanent Framework of Cooperation for the Protection of Displaced Persons,” which has the promotion and application of the Guiding Principles as a key objective. Uganda developed a national policy on internal displacement based on the Guiding Principles, and a similar initiative is underway in Nigeria. Liberia, in November 2004, became the first government to formally adopt the Guiding Principles. Nonstate actors also are making use of the Guiding Principles: the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement and Army developed a policy on internal displacement that spells out the standards for the return or resettlement and reintegration of the displaced.13 The Guiding Principles provide a common reference point for governments, regional organizations, international agencies, civil society, and IDPs themselves to monitor the rights of IDPs and assess the effectiveness of national and international responses, including finding durable solutions to their plight. To reach IDP women and children in Africa, their wide dissemination and use is important. To facilitate this, the Guiding Principles have been translated into several local African languages, including Dinka, Kirundi, Nuer, and Swahili. Ensuring that the message of the Guiding Principles reaches the large numbers of IDPs, given that many women are illiterate, may require creative dissemination techniques, such as drama and radio programs. The IDPs themselves perhaps best convey the importance of doing so. In the words of an Angolan widow and mother of four, who was trained at Salga Camp in Luanda province, I knew that we had rights, just like any other person. Now that I know exactly what they are, it is my responsibility to ensure that my community understands them too. I am thankful for this opportunity to learn and teach about our rights. If we know about the Guiding Principles and [n]orms [on resettlement based on the principles], we know our lives can improve.14
Key protection and reintegration concerns When wars end, specific attention to the particular needs of internally displaced women and children continues to be required. Within the scope of this chapter, it is possible to discuss only selected aspects of the required response. Seven specific areas where greater attention is needed and could yield important results are: (1) engaging IDP women and children in the decisions that affect their lives; (2) peace-building; (3) protection during return or resettlement; (4) protection from sexual violence and exploitation; (5) education; (6) skills-training and income-generating opportunities; and (7) land and property rights for women.
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Engaging internationally displaced women and children in decision-making Internally displaced persons, the Guiding Principles affirm, have the right to request and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance. Moreover, as earlier noted, specific groups of IDPs such as children, mothers with young children, and female-headed households, are entitled to protection and assistance that takes into account their special needs.15 Involving displaced women in the decisions that affect their lives is the most effective way to provide this assistance. As providers for their families, women play a central role in reducing the vulnerability, not only of their family, but also their community affected by displacement. Agencies have found that involving women in program design and delivery to be particularly efficient and effective, as women are best placed to know what are their family needs. Often they introduce ideas or raise concerns that would otherwise go overlooked. Moreover, engaging women in the design and implementation of relief and reintegration assistance programs can be critical for their protection. Distribution of aid by women directly to women helps prevent the scenario where women trade sexual favors in order to obtain assistance for themselves and their families. The Guiding Principles underscore the importance of ensuring the full participation of women in planning and distributing assistance as well as when planning return or resettlement and reintegration processes.16 In addition, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the rights of women stipulates that states are to take measures to ensure the increased participation of women in all levels of the structures established for the management of camps and settlements for refugees, returnees, and displaced persons.17 Too often, IDP women are left out of decision-making processes and their views are ignored. In Burundi, when the UN Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons asked to meet with the leaders of an IDP camp housing several thousand women and 25 men, only men came forward to discuss the problems of the camp.18 More recently, human rights monitors seeking to consult with IDPs uprooted by the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, where rape of women and girls has been widespread and systematic, it was again men, who were a small minority of the displaced, who often spoke for the group.19 Even when displaced women are included in camp management structures, they frequently struggle to have their voices heard and their views taken into account. In Liberia, where there were provisions for a “women’s representative” on IDP camp management committees, IDP women reported great difficulty in getting the men on the committee to listen to their concerns; one woman expressed frustration that the men did not bother to inform her as to when the camp committee meetings would occur.20 It is therefore critical to also encourage and support the organizations that displaced women themselves form. Moreover, this assistance must continue after displaced women leave camps and settlements to return or resettle. Often there is a tendency to disband women’s organizations created during displacement crises.21 Yet, in postconflict situations, women’s groups that
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seek to empower women and promote their engagement in the economic and political arenas are essential to women’s reintegration as well as to rebuilding the country as a whole. Displaced children also should be engaged in developing programs to address their particular needs, for instance, as regards to education and how best to safeguard them from military recruitment. Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child affirms that children have the right to have a say in matters affecting their own lives. Peace-building Among the areas in which it is important for displaced women and children to have a say is in efforts to resolve the conflicts that uprooted them. Although women and children account for the vast majority of civilians that armed conflict uproots and otherwise affects, and indeed often are specifically targeted by combatants, those negotiating peace agreements seldom hear their voices even though women so often make important contributions to conflict resolution and reconciliation within their communities. All over Africa, grass-roots initiatives have sprung up whereby women, including displaced women, promote peace-building and national reconciliation. For example, in Burundi, where ethnic conflict has sought to pit ethnic Hutus and Tutsis against one another, a women’s network called Dushirehamwe (meaning “Let’s Reconcile!”) took internally displaced women to their areas of origin to speak with their former neighbors from the other ethnic group, thereby promoting reconciliation as well as confidence-building among the different ethnic communities.22 In another initiative, one of the women’s groups in this network, called Gatumba and whose members included Hutus as well as Tutsis, obtained land so that displaced women from both groups could work together in the field, discussing issues of mutual concern as they worked. The leader of the group traveled to Bujumbura once a month to get news about the peace process and reported the news back to the displaced women.23 In northern Uganda, a displaced women’s group created forums for IDP women to express their feelings and concerns about their experiences in the displacement camps by performing plays and dances, which provided psychosocial support to the women and promoted greater national awareness of their plight.24 In Liberia, the author witnessed a powerful performance by the Children in Reconciliation Program, which brings together children from the sixteen different ethnic groups to perform dances and plays promoting national reconciliation and peace. In contrast to the active role that women frequently play in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace-building, few women have seats at the negotiating table in formal peace-processes. The UN Secretary-General, in a report to the Security Council, pointed out that “[w]hile the impact of the contribution of women to informal peace processes is well known, obstacles to their participation and to the systematic incorporation of gender perspectives in formal peace processes remain.”25 Among the obstacles the Secretary-General identified
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were: the typically male-dominated leadership of political parties, which extends to the selection of the parties’ representatives at peace negotiations; the tendency to overlook women’s concerns and needs when “peace at any cost” becomes imperative; and practical obstacles such as the lack of resources to participate in lengthy negotiation processes.26 And yet, as African refugee women have pointed out, “[i]f any chance for effective resolution and for stabilization of the African continent is to be attained, women must be involved and embraced in the structure of leadership and peace negotiations.”27 In recent years, attention has begun to be drawn to women’s exclusion from peace processes and the need to ensure that their voices and concerns are in fact heard. In a particularly significant development, in October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution recognizing that the participation of women and girls in peace processes “can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,” and accordingly called for measures to be taken to support women’s involvement in negotiating and implementing peace processes.28 Since then, a number of initiatives have been undertaken to support women’s greater engagement in peace processes. These initiatives include training women in negotiation and mediation skills and providing support to women in specific countries to outline a common agenda of the concerns they expect to be addressed in the peace and reconstruction processes.29 Special attention needs to be paid to ensure that IDP women are part of peace and reconstruction process efforts and that their particular views and concerns are heard. One noteworthy example comes from Burundi, where, parallel to official peace negotiations, women, including refugee and internally displaced women, organized and took part in an All-Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference in Arusha, Tanzania in July 2000. Nineteen political parties, civil society, refugees, and internally displaced women were represented at the conference, which was aimed at focusing the attention of the peace negotiators on the particular concerns of Burundi’s war-affected women. The final peace agreement incorporated several recommendations made at the conference. These recommendations included special measures to guarantee the safe return and reintegration of refugee and IDP women and children; provisions to punish the perpetrators of war crimes and gender-based violence, including rape, sexual violence, forced prostitution, and domestic violence; and affirmed girls’ equal rights to education.30 Liberian women also lobbied actively for their voices to be heard in the peace process that ended the country’s devastating 14-year civil war in August 2003. The Women in Peace-Building Network played a pivotal role, staging demonstrations and marches that eventually succeeded in securing women’s representation at the peace talks. The presence of Liberian women’s groups at the peace negotiations was instrumental in ensuring that the resulting peace agreement devoted specific attention to the needs of women and children. Of particular note, the peace agreement specifies that the national authorities shall accord particular attention to the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups or war victims, including children and women, that the conflict severely affected as well as, with the assistance of the international community, shall mobilize resources to address
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their special demobilization and reintegration needs. It also specifies that the government design and implement a plan for the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, in accordance with international conventions, norms, and practices. In addition, the peace agreement specifies that “in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in the post-conflict period,” the government is to ensure the maintenance of gender balance in apportioning responsibilities for program implementation.31 Displaced and other women in countries in conflict should be encouraged and supported to press for their voices to be heard and their particular concerns taken into account in peace processes. The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has found that while many women are eager to participate in conflict resolution, they require training in negotiation and mediation skills, which ACCORD now provides.32 Women Waging Peace, a nongovernmental organization that advocates for women’s full participation in formal and informal peace processes around the world, recently published a toolkit to further assist such efforts. Entitled Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace, the toolkit provides practical strategies to support women peace-builders, and includes a chapter on protecting refugees and IDPs.33 Women Waging Peace also has been working to put the principles of the toolkit into practice. For instance, in the fall of 2004, the organization brought together a group of Sudanese women to develop a common set of recommendations to use in their advocacy work regarding both the peace process between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army concerning southern Sudan as well as the ongoing conflict and devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis in the western province of Darfur. Among the recommendations that the women formulated were: support for the voluntary and safe return, resettlement, and reintegration of refugees and IDPs; for the UN Security Council to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate reports of systematic rape of women and girls and to work with local women’s organizations in doing so; for donors to fund safe and effective delivery of reproductive healthcare to refugee and internally displaced women; and for the deployment of women police officers in IDP camps.34 Meetings were then organized for the Sudanese women with policy-makers in the United Nations and the US government (which was spearheading the peace process in southern Sudan) to help ensure that their recommendations reached those facilitating or otherwise engaged in the peace talks. The fact that women still faced challenges in having a seat at the table underscores the fact that far more work is needed to sensitize men and foster greater accountability to ensure women’s inclusion in the peace processes. While women did attend the peace talks, they were not part of the official delegations nor permitted to participate in the working groups. One of the parties to the talks reportedly gave the rational that “it would be embarrassing to include a woman in our delegation, when the government delegation does not have any.”35 Countries or organizations facilitating peace negotiations should be expected to insist that
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women have an equal opportunity to participate in the proceedings, and not only on subjects such as health and social issues that are often misrepresented as “women’s issues,” but in all aspects of the discussions. Following the signing of the peace agreement for southern Sudan on December 31, 2004, the next challenge for southern Sudanese women has been to press for participation in the various commissions being established as part of the peace agreement, including those that will address issues of land tenure, the distribution of oil revenue, and the drafting of the constitution, as well as to be well-represented at the donor conference being planned to discuss reconstruction needs.36 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa affirms that “[w]omen have the right to a peaceful existence and the right to participate in the promotion and maintenance of peace.”37 To this end, states are to take measures to ensure the increased participation of women, including “in the local, national, regional, continental and international decision-making structures to ensure physical, psychological, social and legal protection of asylum seekers, refugees, returnees and displaced persons, in particular women” as well as in all aspects of the planning, formulating, and implementing of postconflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.38 Children, too, must have a voice. An international conference on war-affected children has called upon states to establish channels to enable children to bring their perspectives and ideas directly to national leaders and their governments.39 As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has pointed out, ensuring a social climate conducive to sustainable peace requires that the peace process represents all sectors and elements of society affected by conflict – not just the fighting forces.40 Protection during return and resettlement The signing of a peace agreement does not always signal the end of hostilities or that it is safe for displaced persons to return to their places of origin or resettle in other parts of the country. It may be months, even longer, before combatants are demobilized and disarmed. Moreover, intercommunal tensions and protection concerns may persist, and can increase, in the postconflict period. There can be a risk of retributive acts and new disputes, in particular as regards to land and property ownership, will arise. At the same time, protection mechanisms may be weak or altogether lacking; in protracted conflicts, a functioning police and judicial system often becomes a casualty of war. As a result, women, especially single unaccompanied women and women heads of household, and children remain at a particular risk. To begin with, and as the Guiding Principles specify, return or resettlement must be voluntary. Women accordingly must have a say in the decisions about return or resettlement and should be actively engaged in the planning of return or resettlement as well as the reintegration processes. This planning should take into account the situation of groups who tend to experience heightened vulnerability, including women heads of household and unaccompanied minors.
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Return or resettlement must also occur in conditions of safety. National authorities have a responsibility to create the conditions that enable the safe return or resettlement of the displaced. This requires a range of actions from landmine clearance to measures that ensure the respect for human rights, restore the rule of law, and foster national reconciliation. Above all, it requires the protection of the physical security of displaced persons at all stages of the return or resettlement process; that is, during transit, at the reception centers as well as at the destination. Due regard must be given to ensuring the safety of women and children, with special attention to those at heightened risk. For example, arrangements must be made to protect the physical safety of unaccompanied women, women heads of household, and unaccompanied minors by establishing separate, secure areas for them with adequate security and lighting.41 Stationing international field staff in areas of return and resettlement can be a critical means of not only monitoring security conditions, but also increasing safety in such areas until national authorities can assume this responsibility effectively. Protection officers monitoring the safety of women and children must have a thorough knowledge of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, which in large part are relevant to IDPs, and of strategies to promote their implementation.42 Sexual violence and exploitation Particular effort must be made to protect girls and women from sexual violence and abuse, which are not only rampant in conflict situations, but also can persist long after the wars end. Overcrowded and poorly protected displacement camps and other settlements are notoriously dangerous places for women and girls, especially for women heads of household and unaccompanied girls. Women and girls also are particularly at risk of sexual attack when they venture outside of the camps to collect firewood or water. The displacement crisis in Darfur, where the rape of IDP women and girls, in particular when they leave the camps to collect firewood, has been widespread and systematic, underscores that this long-standing and reoccurring problem has yet to be effectively addressed.43 When wars end, sexual violence against women and girls can also persist. An April 2004 mission to Liberia of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (in which the author participated) found that eight months after the peace agreement ending the 14-year civil war, rape and sexual violence continued to occur, especially in IDP camps, where protection and assistance were minimal. Moreover, when displaced women are left in camps while their husbands and male relatives scout out prospects for return, they can be vulnerable to sexual violence and abuse.44 They may also face sexual violence and abuse in transit, as a form of retribution once they return, or when seeking access to reintegration assistance or to land and property. Particular mention must be paid to the children born to rape survivors, who risk being mistreated or even abandoned by their mothers and families and are therefore at particular risk of abuse and exploitation.45
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Gender experts have identified many steps that can be taken to mitigate the vulnerability of displaced women and girls to sexual violence and abuse. Camps and settlements should be designed with a view to shield displaced women and girls from these risks, for instance by secure and well-lit latrine areas, locks on bathing facilities, and community security patrols. Even something as simple as giving IDP women and girls lanterns and whistles can significantly reduce their vulnerability to sexual assault. The UNHCR’s guidelines to prevent sexual, gender-based violence, which apply also to IDPs, set out these and other practical measures.46 Several strategies can allow women to avoid walking alone in unsafe areas in search of firewood for cooking. Communal firewood collections can be organized. Alternatively, IDPs and refugees could be provided with firewood or alternative forms of fuel. In protracted crises, a cost-effective solution would be to plant fastgrowing trees close to IDP and refugee camps. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance could be designed with fuel efficiency in mind, for instance, by providing short-cooking beans that have the same nutritional value as beans that require two or three times the amount of cooking time.47 Sexual exploitation is another serious protection concern. Because women are often compelled to trade sexual favors to receive assistance, the distribution of aid directly to women and by women, which now is a standard operating procedure for the World Food Program, can greatly reduce women’s vulnerability to sexual extortion. Nonetheless, reports from the field underscore that much more remains to be done. A 2002 report by UNHCR and Save the Children exposed widespread sexual abuse and exploitation of refugee and IDP women and girls by peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel in West Africa. Indeed, the incidence of sexual assault, prostitution, and trafficking of women and girls often increases in postconflict countries when large peacekeeping forces are present. This is a particularly acute problem in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where there are widespread reports of UN peacekeepers sexually assaulting and exploiting young girls.48 International personnel have a responsibility not to engage in sexual exploitation and abuse of those they are supposed to protect and assist. In this connection, it is important to note that the Guiding Principles also apply to United Nations and other international staff and peacekeepers. Codes of conduct prohibiting sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers and UN staff now exist, but better training of staff on this issue and closer monitoring and enforcement of these standards is needed. It is also essential that victims of sexual abuse and exploitation have avenues for recourse when abuse is threatened or occurs. Even if a victim is ready to come forward, effective reporting systems are seldom available and there are little prospects of the crime being punished. Moreover, judicial reform may be required: in Liberia, women’s groups are pressing to amend national legislation that limits the crime of rape to incidences of penile penetration, and thereby excludes the various other forms of sexual violence that women and girls suffer during and after the conflict. Another concern in war-ravaged countries is the fact that survivors of sexual violence often have great difficulty getting medical attention such as treatment for
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sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, prevention of unwanted pregnancy, and confidential counseling and support. In Darfur, the organization Physicians for Human Rights reported that Sudanese doctors at health clinics and hospitals turned away IDP women who had been raped when they sought medical care.49 The Guiding Principles underscore that victims of sexual violence must have access to counseling and appropriate medical care, including HIV/AIDS prevention.50 Education War takes a terrible toll on children’s education. After 14 years of civil war in Liberia, which uprooted 70 percent of the population, more than 75 percent of the educational infrastructure in the country was destroyed or severely damaged. The prolonged nature of the conflict means that an entire generation has grown up with severe disruptions in education. Illiteracy rates are astoundingly high (estimated at 78 percent nationwide), especially for women. Months after the conflict ended, less than half of school-aged Liberian children had access to education, and of those who attended school, there were twice as many boys as girls.51 In the IDP camps, even higher percentages of children were without schooling. Many Liberians point out with deep concern that for the first time in the country’s history, children in Liberia are less educated than their parents, leading to a “lost generation.”52 Education, of course, is essential for children’s development. For displaced and other war-affected children, going to school can also be critical for their psychosocial well-being, as it provides a degree of stability and normalcy in their traumatized lives. It can also help reduce children’s exposure to threats of sexual exploitation, trafficking, and military recruitment. Displaced children in northern Uganda, for instance, have pointed out that being in school is perhaps the best way to prevent the recruitment and re-recruitment of children into armed groups.53 Classrooms, moreover, can also be effective forums to convey life-saving information about risks like landmines and HIV/AIDS. Moreover, access to education is an important element to integrate displaced children into the local community, as well as when they return to their home areas or resettle elsewhere. Access to education is a right. In line with established international human rights law, like the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement underscores the responsibility of national authorities to ensure that IDPs receive free and compulsory education at the primary level. In addition, the Guiding Principles urge authorities to make educational and training facilities available to the internally displaced, including adolescents and women, whether or not living in camps, as soon as conditions permit.54 Moreover, the minimum international standards on education in emergencies that recently have been developed emphasize that education must reach all groups in an equitable manner, with express reference to internally displaced populations.55 Too often, however, education is treated as a secondary need, addressed only after conflicts have subsided and the displaced have begun to return home.
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Yet, conflicts and emergencies can go on for years or even decades, leaving many IDP children to grow up without education as well as deprived of the protection and support that going to school can provide. Moreover, even when conflicts end, it may be months, even years, before IDPs are able to leave camps and other settlements and begin to rebuild their lives. Of the estimated more than 27 million children in emergencies worldwide who lack access to formal education, the vast majority are internally displaced children.56 Greater attention therefore needs to be paid to understanding and overcoming the barriers to education that IDPs so frequently face.57 These barriers include: Lack of infrastructure. In war-ravaged countries, schools often are destroyed or severely damaged. Because of conflict in Sierra Leone, for example, more than 40 percent of primary schools were destroyed, with 30 percent destroyed in the Kenema district alone. In Angola, fighting destroyed more than 1,000 schools and 24,000 classrooms during the war.58 Schools may even be specific targets for attack. In the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan, schools as well as teachers have been singled out for attack as part of what Human Rights Watch has characterized as an effort “to stop a culture and prevent people from being educated.”59 Inadequate facilities. When schools do exist in IDP camps, typically they are makeshift, underresourced, overcrowded, and limited to primary education. In IDP camps visited in post-conflict Liberia, less than half of the children had access to learning opportunities. Many of the schools that had been established – often by the IDPs themselves, without government or international assistance – lacked the most basic supplies, such as blackboards, chalk, books, and even roofs.60 Schools often also are in need of repair. In Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, children are sent home when it rains because of leaky roofs.61 Another serious problem in educational facilities is the lack of clean drinking water and adequate sanitation, which puts children’s health at risk. In southern Sudan, an assessment by the Africa Educational Trust found that only one-third of more than 1,100 schools visited had latrines, and of the schools with latrines, the facilities were severely inadequate: 1 latrine for every 186 students and teachers, compared to the recommended 1:25 ratio for girls and the ratios of between 1:40 and 1:60 for boys.62 Lack of funding. In conflict situations, education commonly tends to be among the most underfunded aspects of the humanitarian response. In 2002, of the US$46 million the United Nations requested to address educational needs in humanitarian emergencies worldwide (excluding Afghanistan), only $17 million was actually contributed or pledged. None of the countries in Africa – Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda – received even half of the funds requested, and most received less than a third. The most dramatic case was Liberia, where no funds were pledged for educational programs. In each case, the majority of the funding requests were to support education for internally displaced children and youth.63 There remains a tendency among many donors to consider education
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strictly a development activity, to be supported only when conflicts end and displaced persons return home. Such an approach can leave children in protracted emergencies without education as well as the protection and support it provides. Once a conflict ends, moreover, education is not necessarily a priority for donors. In Liberia, some eight months after the conflict ended, donors had funded only 15 percent of the education component of the UN appeal for Liberia.64 In Sierra Leone, support for education actually dropped in the first two years after the war ended, from 46 to 18 percent of the amount required.65 Safety. Where educational services are not available in IDP camps and settlements, the nearest schools may be a considerable distance, and walking to and from school may not be safe for IDP children. Traveling to school may require traversing areas strewn with landmines. It may also involve crossing checkpoints set up by military forces or other armed groups, where children may be subjected to harassment and abuse and are at greater risk of enforced military recruitment and abduction. Threats of sexual violence en route to school can make going to school too dangerous for girls. Once at school, additional safety concerns can arise. For instance, the risks of sexual assault associated with the lack of separate lavatories for girls can deter displaced girls from attending school altogether. Loss of documentation. Displacement often results in the loss or confiscation of identity documents, without which IDPs may be unable to enroll in state schools. Obtaining reissued documents can be very difficult and some countries require IDPs to return to their area of origin, even if the area is unsafe. Guiding Principle 20 affirms the right of IDPs to obtain reissued copies of documents lost in the course of displacement without having