Peace and Reconciliation

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION Establishing a shared identity is an important part of any process of peace and reconciliation. This book discusses issues and theories of identity formation that can be implemented for peace and reconciliation from the perspectives of theology and religious studies, whilst interacting with politics, socio-cultural studies and economics. By focusing on the theme of peace and reconciliation, and employing an interdisciplinary approach, this volume will make a significant contribution to the discussion of the situation of the Korean peninsula, and wider global contexts. The volume explores theoretical issues such as political and economic implications of reconciliation; interfaith and biblical perspectives; and the role of religion in peace making. Furthermore the contributors examine practical implications of the theme in the contexts of Germany, Northern Ireland, South Africa, India, East Asia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Korean peninsula. The book offers invaluable insights for policy-makers, academics, and lay leaders, besides being an important tool for researchers and students of theology, religion, sociology, politics and history.

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Peace and Reconciliation In Search of Shared Identity

Edited by

SEBASTIAN C. H. KIM, PAULINE KOLLONTAI and GREG HOYLAND York St John University, UK

© Sebastian C. H. Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg Hoyland 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Sebastian C. H. Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg Hoyland have asserted their moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity 1. Reconciliation – Religious aspects – Christianity – Congresses. 2. Reconciliation – Religious aspects – Congresses. 3. Group identity – Congresses. 4. Religions – Relations – Congresses. 5. Korean reunification question (1945–) – Congresses. 6. Korea – Church history – 21st century – Congresses. I. Kim, Sebastian C. H. II. Kollontai, Pauline. III. Hoyland, Greg. 261.8’73 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kim, Sebastian C. H. Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity / Sebastian C. H. Kim, Pauline Kollontai, and Greg Hoyland. p. cm. Includes index. (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Peace – Religious aspects. 2. Reconciliation – Religious aspects. 3. Identification (Religion). I. Kollontai, Pauline. II. Hoyland, Greg. III. Title. BL65.P4K56 2008 201’.7273–dc22 2008008217

ISBN 978-0-7546-6461-1

Contents Contributors Acknowledgements Introduction Sebastian C.H. Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg Hoyland 1

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Establishing a Shared Identity: The Role of the Healing of Memories and of Narrative Robert Schreiter What Does Common Identity Cost? Some German Experiences and Provocative Questions Gerhard Sauter

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Truth and Reconciliation: An Interfaith Perspective from India Israel Selvanayagam

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Peace and Reconciliation: Biblical Themes in the East Asian Context Choong Chee Pang

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Religion as a Tool for Waging Peace: Theoretical Perspectives in the Context of Bosnia-Herzegovina Pauline Kollontai

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Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland Cecelia Clegg

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Towards Reconciliation and Justice in South Africa: Can Church Unity Make a Difference? Nico Koopman

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7

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Korean War: The Origin of the Axis of Evil in the Korean Peninsula Jooseop Keum

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Towards Peace and Reconciliation between South and North Korean Churches: Contextual Analysis of the Two Churches In Soo Kim

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Strategies for Peace and Reunification in Korea Jong-Sun Noh

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Reconciliation Possible? The Churches’ Efforts Toward the Peace and Reunification of North and South Korea Sebastian C.H. Kim

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Appendix 1: July 4th North-South Joint Statement

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Appendix 2: North-South Joint Declaration

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Appendix 3: Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity

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Appendix 4: Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace

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Index

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Contributors Choong Chee Pang is a Singapore citizen and was educated at Singapore, London, Aberdeen, Harvard and Oxford Universities. He served for many years as Principal and in other capacities at Trinity Theological College, Singapore as well as at the South East Asia Graduate School of Theology. He is currently the Academic Consultant for Christian Studies in China of the Lutheran World Federation. He is also a Visiting Professor of Peking (Beijing) University and Fudan University, Shanghai, teaching Biblical and Theological courses. He writes and publishes both in Chinese and English. Cecelia Clegg is Director of the Centre for Theology and Public Issues and Manager of the MTh Ministry programme Divinity School, University of Edinburgh, UK. Educated in theology and psychological counselling, Cecelia Clegg was a member of the staff of Trinity College Dublin (Irish School of Ecumenics) before coming to the University of Edinburgh. Dr Clegg’s current research is on faith communities and Civil Society, Religion and conflict and conflict transformation. Recent publications include: Faith Communities and Local Government in Glasgow (with Michael Rosie; 2005) and Moving beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict, and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (with Joseph Liechty; 2001). Greg Hoyland is Senior Lecturer in Theology and Religious Studies in York St.. John University’s Faculty of Education and Theology. An ordained Anglican he has spent several years teaching Christian and Biblical studies in higher education after parish work in Bradford and the Yorkshire Dales. His research interests focus on contemporary Christianity with a particular emphasis on issues of Anglican ecclesiology and identity. He contributed to the volume Common Identity: Dynamics of Religion in Context published by T&T Clark in 2007 and was co-organiser of the Conference on Peace and Reconciliation in 2006. Jooseop Keum is Programme Executive on Mission and Evangelism of World Council of Churches based in Geneva, Switzerland. He is also the editor of International Review of Mission, which is the missiological journal published by the Commission of World Mission and Evangelism of WCC. He is an ordained minister of Presbyterian Church of Korea. He received PhD at New College, University of Edinburgh and served Council for World Mission in London as the Executive Secretary of Mission Programme. Dr Keum’s main focus of research is Christianity in North Korea, Christianity in Asia and development of ecumenical missiology in the 21st Century. In Soo Kim is Professor of Church History and Dean of the Seminary at the Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary, South Korea. He is President of

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the Society of Church History of Korea; General Secretary of the Northeast Asia Accredited Theological Schools; and General Secretary of the Korea Association of the Accredited Theological Schools College and Professor In Soo Kim’s recent publications include: A History of the Christian Church in Korea (2005); Protestants and the Formation of Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920 (1996); and Documentary History of the Korean Theologians’ Thoughts (1997). Sebastian C.H. Kim is Professor in Theology and Public Life at York St John University. Previously, he taught World Christianity and was Director of the Christianity in Asia Project at the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Cambridge. Kim is a Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society and is the Editor of the International Journal of Public Theology (Brill). He is the author of In Search of Identity: Debates on Religious Conversion in India (OUP, 2005) and co-author of Christianity as a World Religion (Continuum, 2008). Pauline Kollontai is Deputy Dean in the Faculty of Education and Theology at York St John University. In 2008 she was invited as a visiting scholar to Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan, in relation to her work on religion, identity and peace. Previously she worked at the University of Bradford in the Department of Peace Studies which is the largest and one of the leading academic centres for the study of peace and conflict in the world. Currently, at York St John University Pauline teaches in the area of world religions and religious studies. Her research covers various aspects of religion in the contemporary world. Nico Koopman is Professor of Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology, and also Director of the Beyers Naudé Centre for Public Theology at the University of Stellenbosch. His research focuses on various themes in the field of theology and public life. He reflects from a Trinitarian theological perspective on themes like globalization, economic and gender justice, human rights, human dignity, moral formation and ethical leadership, reconciliation, global peace, congregations and public life, civil society, public opinion formation and public policy. He is a member of the Society of Christian Ethics in the USA, a founding member of the Global Network for Public Theology and chair of the Theological Society of Southern Africa. Jong-Sun Noh is Professor of Christian Social Ethics and Peace Strategy at Yonsei University. He received his M.Div. from Harvard University, Ph.D. from The Union Theological Seminary in New York, and was a Research Fellow at Yale Divinity School in 1979. He was an advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister on Reunification of Korea in 1993-4. Noh’s publications in English include: Religion and Just Revolution (1984), First World Theology and Third World Critique (1983), Liberating God for Minjung (1997), The Third War (2000), The Story God of the Oppressed (2003). Gerhard Sauter is Professor of Systematic and Ecumenical Theology and Director of the Ecumenical Institute, Faculty of Protestant Theology, the University of Bonn, Germany and is an ordained minister. He is an extraordinary member of the Faculty

Contributors

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of Theology, University of Oxford. He is editor of a number of series including Theologische Bücherei (Christian Kaiser Verlag München) and the New Critical Thinking in Theological and Biblical Studies (Ashgate). His most recent publications in English include: Gateways to Dogmatics: Reasoning Theologically for the Life of the Church (2003) and Protestant Theology at the Crossroads: How to Face the Crucial Tasks for Theology in the Twenty-Fist Century (2007). Robert Schreiter is Professor of Theology at the Catholic Theological Union in Chicago, USA. He also serves as the theological consultant for reconciliation and peace building programmes to Caritas Internationalis, the umbrella organisation for 162 relief and development agencies in the Roman Catholic Church. Dr. Schreiter is an internationally-recognized expert in the areas of inculturation and the world mission of the church. Among his books are: Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order (1992) and The Ministry of Reconciliation: Spirituality and Strategies (1998). Israel Selvanayagam is Principal of the United Theological College, Bangalore, India and a minister of the Church of South India. Previously he was Principal of the United College of the Ascension and Hon. Lecturer in the Department of Theology and Culture of the University of Birmingham. His research looks at the changing understandings of sacrifice in the Hindu tradition and Hindu-Christian dialogue and has published extensively both in Tamil and English. He has been a practitioner of interfaith dialogue for about 30 years and this was recognised in his new appointment as the Interfaith Consultant in Birmingham District of the Methodist Church in 2006. He has association with a number of worldwide organisations/groups committed to interfaith relations including the Office on Interfaith Relations of the World Council of Churches.

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Acknowledgements The Editors wish to acknowledge particular contributions which have made this volume possible. The vision and concern for peace and reconciliation in Korea of the Revd Chulshin Lee of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, Seoul made this volume a reality. We would like to thank Elder Jungtaek Goh, the Revd In Kim and other members of the church for their support and participation. We appreciate the Revd Chung Yueb Ha and other members of the Korean committee (Chang Wan Son, Dae Keun Min, John Seol, Chong Sam Kim, Jong Il Kim, Woo Seung Hwang and Young Kee Byun) for their willingness to help both before and during the conference on peace and reconciliation at York St John University in August 2006. We also would like to express our appreciation to Mr Young Tae Kim, Chairman of Daesung Group, Seoul for his generous support. Many colleagues at York St John University including Porters, Security, Print Services, Catering Staff and the Finance Office all helped make the conference a success. We are particularly grateful to colleagues in the Theology and Religious Studies Section of the Faculty of Education and Theology, York St John University under the leadership of the Dean, Dr. John Spindler for their support. Administrative assistance from Kathryn Dunn, Sian Henderson and Jenny Sykes was invaluable. The University Vice Chancellor Prof. Dianne Willcocks, and the Deputy Vice Chancellor Prof. David Maughan-Brown gave us unstinting support and encouragement. We appreciate the directions and advice given by Sarah Lloyd, Kirsten Weissenberg, Anne Keirby and their colleagues at Ashgate Publishing.

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Introduction Sebastian C.H. Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg Hoyland

In August 2006 Dr John Sentamu, Archbishop of York, held a personal vigil in York Minster, England to pray for world peace and to draw attention to the plight of innocent people caught up in conflicts around the globe. It was a spontaneous decision by Sentamu and involved abandoning a long-planned family holiday. Coinciding with this event and planned many months before was an International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation held in the same city at York St John University, for which the Archbishop had written a letter of welcome to those attending. In it he described the search for peace and reconciliation as ‘one of the most urgent topics of the day’. In any international or regional conflict situation, there is no simple explanation for the causes and process of the conflict – social, economic, territorial, political, ethnic and religious factors play important roles in any conflict – it is, in most cases, a matter of degree. Religion is a contributing factor in many conflicts – past and present – for various reasons, and the critics of religion are right in pointing out that religious leaders and religious communities have contributed to some of the most devastating conflicts throughout history. In particular, religion has promoted the distinction between those who are in and out of their religious traditions: ‘too often, religion has promoted an “us versus them” attitude as with the Greeks and the barbarians, the Jews and the goyim, the Muslims and the infidels, the Christians and the pagans, the true faith and the heretics, the good people (us) and the bad (them)’.1 However, in spite of these negative affects of religions on the history of humanity, religion could and should be able to contribute in the conflict situations by utilising the strengths and positive aspects of religion. Religion both unites and divides2 and ‘promotes both intolerance and hatred,… as well as tolerance of the strongest type – the willingness to live with, explore, and honour difference’.3 This notion of the importance of implementing religions in conflict resolution is based on some distinctive aspects of religion. First, peacemaking is integral to the faith and practice of most religions. For many believers, ‘peacemaking is simply not a choice. It is a sacred duty’,4 and is part and parcel of what it means to ‘fulfil the will of God or the gods or the spirit world’.5 In this regard, religious enthusiasm and inspiration can be utilised to bring about peace and reconciliation in 1 H. O. Thompson, World Religions in War and Peace (London, 1988), p. xiv. 2 E. O. Hanson, Religion and Politics in the International System Today (Cambridge, 2006), p. 315. 3 H. Coward and G. S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peace Building (New York, 2004), p. 2. 4 D. Little (ed.), Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, 2007), p. 9. 5 H. O. Thompson, World Religions in War and Peace (London,1988), p. xiv.

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the conflict zones as well as encouraging involvement in social justice for reasons of religious inspiration and activism.6 That religious motivation for peacemaking is a powerful tool in dealing with conflict situations is attested to, for example in the volume Peace Makers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution, which records how religiously motivated people have effectively contributed to peace and reconciliation. The core reasons for these contributions is that ‘pursuit of justice and peace by peaceful means is a sacred priority’ of religious traditions and the ‘hermeneutics of peace’ drawn from one’s own religious tradition (sacred texts, doctrines, and practices) acts for many believers as a guidance in implementing their commitment to peace.7 Second, religion offers critical understanding of the process of peace making. Because religious traditions provide some of the fundamental explanations for and insights into both war and peace, utilising these resources for peace is vital for peace making.8 As Daniel Smith-Christopher has argued, ‘if religious values and symbolism are potential weapons (as well as essential to understanding a conflict), then surely the resources for reconciliation must also come from a more creative analysis of the religious cultural resources of the societies which are involved in the conflict itself’.9 In the Christian tradition, for example, the concept of war and peace has been drawn out from both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. From this, the idea of ‘just war’ was initiated by Augustine of Hippo and then developed by Thomas Aquinas, and has been influential in the conduct and ethics of war, rightly and wrongly, in the West for centuries. At the same time the pacifist tradition, following certain teachings of Jesus, has also made a significant impact on peace movements both within and outside Christian traditions.10 Third, religious traditions possess unique authority and capacity among the followers of the particular religion to deal with conflicts, particularly by preventing conflict and making sustainable peace. Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN, insists that ‘religious organizations can play a role in preventing armed conflict because of the moral authority that they carry in many communities’.11 In the context of ‘conflict transformation’ – replacement of violent with non-violent means for settling disputes, religiously motivated people play a role as advocates, observers and mediators. Conflict transformation leads into ‘structural reform’ – efforts to build institutions and enhance civic leadership that will not only address the 6 H. Coward and G. S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peace Building (New York, 2004), p. 2; D. L. Smith-Christopher (ed), Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of Non-violence in Religious Traditions (Maryknoll, NY, 1998), p. 2. 7 D. Little (ed.), Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, 2007), p. 438. 8 P. Schmidt-Leukei (ed.), War and Peace in World Religions: The Gerald Weisfeld Lectures 2003 (London, 1989), p. 3. 9 D. L. Smith-Christopher (ed), Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of Non-violence in Religious Traditions (Maryknoll, NY, 1998), p.11. 10 See L. S. Cahill, Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory (Minneapolis, 1994). 11 K. A. Annan, Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan (New York, 2002), p. 78.

Introduction

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causes of the conflict but also develop long-term strategy for peaceful, non-violent relations in the society. In this process, religious people have served as educators and institution builders.12 An example of collective effort for peace is the World Council of Churches programme on the ‘Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation’ (JPIC). They emphasised the positive employment of the ‘creative power’ of God as empowerment for building communities of the poor and oppressed, and as the power of resistance for the sake of peace and justice. The group has pledged that the community is the key aspect of this struggle for peace and justice since people gain inspiration from one another, share sufferings, and gain strength against any forms of oppression or conflict.13 Fourth, religious traditions can be effective in practical ways, particularly in reconciliation. For example, in the case of Northern Ireland, in order to move beyond sectarianism, religious communities made significant contributions to the peace process by taking practical steps such as naming and exposing sectarian dynamics, breaking the cycle of antagonised division and developing a vision of reconciled community. One of the key tools for this was the renewal of the ‘expanded and enlivened inner spirituality’ of the people involved.14 Discussing the importance of the way justice is done in the process of reconciliation in the case of South Africa, Russel Botman argues that the ‘restorative justice’ drawn from the biblical understanding of reconciliation which involves memory, confession and forgiveness, and that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has demonstrated this and ‘invites people into a certain memory of the past that also frees them from it’, and furthermore it ‘frees people for the future, for each other, and for God’.15 This is the conviction of Desmond Tutu who led the Commission: ‘God wants to show that there is life after conflict and repression – that because of forgiveness, there is a future’.16 In both the above cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa, different forms of Christianity contributed significantly to the conflicts but at the same time, they have made important contributions to the processes of reconciliation. The relationship between religion and peacemaking is ambivalent: religion has contributed to both conflict and peace, and scholars and practitioners are in agreement that religious resources have to be examined and utilised both in order to prevent conflict and in order to make a sustainable peace in a post-conflict situation. With this consideration in mind, the contributors to this volume examine the issues and theories of peace and reconciliation with special emphasis on the theme of shared identity, which is an important part of any process of reconciliation. This book is a result of the conference on peace and reconciliation held at York St John University 12 D. Little and R. Scott Appleby, ‘A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peacebuilding in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict’ in H. Coward and G. S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peace Building (New York, 2004), pp. 1-23. 13 F. R. Wilson (ed.), The San Antonio Report - Your Will be Done, Mission in Christ’s Way (Geneva, 1990), pp. 37-51. 14 J. Liechty and C. Clegg, Moving beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict, and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Dublin, 2001), pp. 337-46. 15 H. R. Botman, ‘Truth and Reconciliation:The South Africa Case’ in H. Coward and G. S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peace Building (New York, 2004), pp. 243-60. 16 D. Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (London, 1999), p.230.

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in 2006, incorporating keynote addresses given at the conference as well as material commissioned subsequently. The nature of the volume is interdisciplinary but perspectives from theology and religious studies will be particularly to the fore. A major focus is on the Korean Peninsula but other contexts, which include China, Northern Ireland, Germany, South Africa, India, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were addressed and that is reflected in the balance of this volume. The contributors are academics who are also deeply involved in the search for peace and reconciliation in very practical ways. Furthermore, there is a direct and fundamental link between their scholarly work and their activism. Kollontai’s chapter highlights the fundamental question the different contributors tackle. How can religion be used as a tool to promote peace rather than as a weapon to inflame conflict? The approaches taken by the other writers offer two very distinctive perspectives from the disciplines of theology and religious studies. The first is to examine vocabulary and concepts and the second is to examine processes. Sauter, reflecting on the German situation, recognises that there is a necessary and important emphasis on political and economic processes in reunification but argues that the theological notion of atonement carries with it the need for both compassion and mercy. These are not words which readily come to mind in political dialogue but they represent a fundamental level of reconciliation which involves a change of heart and mind as well as a change of political system. In Soo Kim presents a challenge to the churches in the Korean contexts arguing that too often the church has modelled itself on the world’s systems and standards rather than offering a prophetic alternative. The church in both North and South Korea has been shaped by the respective political ideologies and these are hampering the churches’ reconciliation. Koopman, writing from a South African context, makes a similar plea in his reflection on ‘ubuntu’. The church, he argues, needs to model peace and reconciliation as well as preach it. If the churches cannot incarnate their message within their own community then their message has no authenticity and consequently no authority. Both Noh and Schreiter pick up on specific vocabulary and concepts. Noh asks if ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ have been emptied of meaning in current discourse and are used uncritically or without real understanding. Can they be rescued, and if so what meaning should they carry? Schreiter does something similar with ‘memory’ and ‘hope’. Hope can have a very passive, almost fatalistic sense – we hope for things but whether they come about is beyond our power. But Schreiter argues that hope is a much more powerful tool than this and needs a solid foundation if it is to sustain all our efforts in working for peace and reconciliation. In overcoming differences there will also be the need for the healing of memories. Schreiter asks what this might mean and how it might come about. Selvanayagam offers some critical reflections on the idea of truth. Drawing on the search for truth and reconciliation in South Africa, he draws attention to the idea that ‘truth hurts: silence kills’. There is a fundamental need to break the cycle of reprisal and counter reprisal in the search for reconciliation and, whatever the vocabulary used, it is the notion of truth telling and truth listening which lies at the heart of the process. Selvanayagam argues that nonreligious people as well as religionists of different creeds come together in recognising this as essential for peace and justice.

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Clegg and Choong offer some very pragmatic reflections based on deeply held religious convictions. Choong challenges those in the Korean, Japanese and Chinese contexts to reflect on their shared identity as much as, if not more than, on their differences. Extending that principle to other conflict and post-conflict contexts, there is a reminder (present in several of the other chapters in this volume) of the need to recognise our common humanity rather than focusing solely on our differences. Again the challenge for the religions of the world is to balance their beliefs with the common good and to do so with integrity and generosity. Clegg brings much wisdom and experience to the debate from the context of Northern Ireland. Political and societal peace will only come about if it is pursued at all levels of society. It cannot be left to any one section. Whilst political reconciliation is vital, she argues that the pivotal level is group to group reconciliation where the will to co-exist must be present. This entails a radical willingness to renegotiate identities and embrace the threatening other. Clegg reminds us that peace and reconciliation are not won cheaply. Keum, having discussed the political situation surrounding the Korean War and various perspectives presented by WCC and some political leaders and theologians, alludes to Karl Barth’s work on reconciliation in Church Dogmatics. Reconciliation is at one and the same time a theological and a political concept. In the Christian tradition he is reflecting on, Barth argues that peace comes about at great cost and Keum argues that it will be no less costly in the political realm. Sebastian Kim draws many of these ideas together and concludes the volume. He identifies the differing Christian attitudes to the issue of peace and reconciliation and suggests three theological themes as emerging: applying the jubilee principle and calling for a restored sharing community; overcoming han through building up trust and hope; and bringing about the process of reconciliation by forming shared identity. He then asks if peace and reconciliation is possible and hopes that the answer will be affirmative but both parties must tread together carefully, circumspectly and gently – and also boldly, positively and hopefully – like walking on thin ice. By focusing on the theme of peace and reconciliation, and employing an interdisciplinary approach, this volume aims to make a contribution to the discussion of the situation in the Korean peninsula and other contexts. In addition, presenting some practical implications for the church, which is a major religious group in South Korea, will not only show a direction for the Christian church, but also suggest common ground with various other religious groups in the shared cause of peace and reconciliation. Bibliography Annan, K. A. Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2002). Botman, H. R. ‘Truth and Reconciliation:The South Africa Case’ in H. Coward and G. S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peace Building (New York, 2004), pp. 243-60. Cahill, L. S. Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory (Minneapolis, 1994).

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Coward, H. and G. S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peace Building (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004). Hanson, E. O., Religion and Politics in the International System Today (Cambridge: CUP, 2006). Liechty, J. and C. Clegg, Moving beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict, and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001). Little, D. (ed.), Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: CUP, 2007). Little, D. and R. Scott Appleby, ‘A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peacebuilding in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict’ in H. Coward and G. S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peace Building (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 1-23. Schmidt-Leukei, P. (ed.), War and Peace in World Religions: The Gerald Weisfeld Lectures 2003 (London: SCM press, 1989). Smith-Christopher, D. L. (ed), Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of Non-violence in Religious Traditions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998). Thompson, H. O., World Religions in War and Peace (London: McFarland & Company,1988). Tutu, D., No Future Without Forgiveness (London: Rider, 1999), p.230. Wilson, F. R. (ed.), The San Antonio Report - Your Will be Done: Mission in Christ’s Way (Geneva: WCC, 1990).

Chapter 1

Establishing a Shared Identity: The Role of the Healing of Memories and of Narrative Robert Schreiter

Introduction Building toward social reconciliation is a long and complex process, requiring attention to many different aspects and issues. One of the most important issues is establishing a shared identity between the two aggrieved or separated parties. This is of course a complex undertaking in itself, involving an analysis of current identities— both as they are narrated within a community and to those outside the community—as well as adjudicating the different versions of history maintained by each party. Moreover, the purpose of a shared identity is not just to create a common past, but also to provide a platform for a different future. When seeking a shared identity after conflict for the sake of reconciliation, it is important to recall that there is no formula or strategy for reconciliation that will be applicable in every instance. Indeed, there is a temptation to look only at the contested issues as the matter that must be addressed in reconciliation. There are however two other areas that need attention as well. One of these is the cultural patterns that form the context in which the process of reconciliation is to be worked out. Are there rituals of forgiveness and reconciliation already available within the culture that can be utilized in the process? What are the rules about silence and the saving of face that can constrain certain kinds of reconciliation efforts? These and other questions about cultural processes are important to keep in mind. The second has to do with larger issues of context and time. The impact of outside forces beyond those internal to the world of the two separated parties themselves may either enhance or impede reconciliation efforts. The passage of time can also play a role, especially when the wound that opened the division slips beyond living memory. Let me mention just two examples of how culture and time will have an impact upon how processes of reconciliation are pursued in the Korean situation. First of all, the Korean Peninsula has been one of the most homogeneous societies in the world in that there are virtually no cultural or linguistic minorities within its boundaries. That has changed somewhat for the South through the presence of foreign troops on its soil for more than half a century, and the more recent arrival of foreign workers from Central Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Because of this cultural homogeneity, overcoming ethnic differences does not figure

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in the challenge of bringing about reconciliation. People are freer to concentrate on social and ideological issues rather than ethnic ones when it comes to establishing common identities. A common Confucian and Buddhist heritage can also provide a cultural framework for pursuing reconciliation. To be sure, Communism in the North and Westernization in the South have attenuated the common cultural heritage, but it is still far from being beyond reach as a resource for the process of reconciliation. This cultural parting of ways since 1948 ushers in consideration of both contextual and chronological factors. The division of Korea that occurred in the mid-twentieth century came on the heels of a traumatic occupation of the country by Japan that had lasted more than three decades. A significant aspect of that military occupation was policies and actions intended to destroy Korean language, culture, and institutions themselves. The consequences of this experience could not be resolved in any measure before the tragic events following 1948, and still linger to the present time. Most notable are unresolved issues of Korean women forced into sexual slavery in Japan. Thus trauma is compounded by further trauma: clearing away the debris of the experience of separation of the two parts of Korea reveals yet another trauma underneath. The passage of time adds an additional burden to the process of reconciliation. Because more than fifty years have passed since the end of the armed conflict, and sixty years since the division of the Korean peninsula, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a vision of a united Korea since the great majority of the population on both sides of the thirty-seventh parallel does not remember a united country. We have witnessed the continuing difficulties in Europe that have arisen in the reuniting of the two parts of Germany after forty-five years of separation. The division in Korea is now approaching sixty years, and the lengthening of time will make any reunion only more difficult. At the same time, however, experience elsewhere has taught us that it is often the next generation that finds the way toward reconciliation. They do not bear the full burden of injury that those who experienced the separation as adults do. While being faithful to the suffering of their parents, they often find new ways forward that are not open to the older generation. A current example of this can be found among Catholics in China. The younger generation is blurring the distinction between Catholics who remained openly loyal to the Vatican (the so-called Underground Church) and those who accommodated themselves— at least publicly—to the Communist government (the so-called Patriotic or Open Church). A significant number of younger clergy and nuns have received education outside China as well, opening up other perspectives that may lead to a reconciliation between the two parts of the Catholic Church in China. I have noted all of this—information familiar to anyone familiar with the Korean situation—to say that reconciliation always has a context that involves history, culture, outside forces, and the passage of time. Establishing a shared identity, after more than fifty years of separation, is a distinctive and daunting challenge. I will focus upon two elements that figure in reconciliation, in the Korean situation and elsewhere. These elements are memory and the narration of memory. More specifically, I want to explore how memory is shaped and the place it occupies within identity, and how the healing of memories contributes to the process of reconciliation. Regarding narrative, I will pursue especially its role in the truth-telling

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that is necessary to come to reconciliation, that is, how narrative is both witness to the past and constructive of the truth that emerges as reconciling and restoring for divided communities. The building of common memory and the quest for truth that heals and restores is not done in a vacuum. It occurs first in those hospitable social spaces where trust is built, a sense of belonging is restored, and a renewed sense of common purpose and destiny can be nurtured. In this presentation I will also try to look at how religious traditions can foster such a social space, as people are forged into communities of memory and communities of hope. I will concentrate here on the contributions that Christian faith can make to this process. These elements of memory and narration will be explored here in three parts. In the first part, memory’s role in establishing identity will be examined, under the headings of the shaping of memory and the healing of memory. The second part will turn to narrative in its dual aspects: as witness to the past and as creating healing and restoration in the community. In the third and final part, memory and its narration will be placed within a religious context of communities of memory and hope. I am not in any way an expert on Korean history and culture. But I hope that these remarks—growing out of a familiarity with reconciliation elsewhere and combined with some limited knowledge of Korea—will contribute to a greater understanding of the challenges that the Korean situation poses, as well as offer some thoughts to situations beyond Korea where communities are seeking a way of reconciliation and peace. The role of memory in establishing common identity Memory, as is well known, is an essential part of identity. At the individual level, the heartbreak of seeing an elderly family member lose memory through dementia or Alzheimer’s disease has become a regular feature of wealthy societies where people live much longer. The loss of memory both diminishes an individual and makes relationships difficult with persons who have shared those memories. For societies to be cut off from memory makes them myopic. For societies to suppress memory can make them dangerously explosive, especially when those suppressed memories burst forth in a displaced manner, cut off from their original source. A common example of such cutting off of memory arises in decisions to protect children from the horrific events that affected their parents, but happened before the children’s birth. When youth are ‘protected’ from the traumatic events that occurred before their births, they find it hard to come to terms with the larger identity of their people and the histories that have shaped their own selves. The many accounts now being published of children of the victims of the Jewish Holocaust are replete with the dilemmas that arise: on the one hand, the children are given little direct knowledge of what happened in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. But on the other hand, they are never permitted to forget what happened to their parents’ and grandparents’ generations. Cambodia, for example, is struggling with this at this very moment. In an effort to spare the young from the horrific events of the Pol Pot years and the genocidal activities of the Khmer Rouge, parents and indeed the entire

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nation conspired to keep this history from the children born after the demise of the Khmer Rouge. Now that a Truth Commission is beginning its work investigating the events of the 1970s, efforts must be made to convince university students—born after those years—that such atrocities even occurred. Many of these students think this Commission is part of an international conspiracy to defame Cambodia. At times the reconnecting or resurgence of memory can have explosive social consequences. The ferocity of student uprising in Germany in 1968 was caused in part by the fact that their parents had—to their children’s minds—suppressed the memory of the Holocaust and their own complicity in it. Forgetting or hiding memories of the past can be a well-intentioned (although ultimately misplaced) way of protecting a younger generation. More insidious and more dangerous has been the suppression of memory by wrongdoers to hide their own responsibility for past misdeeds. In the 1980s, for example, the leaders of the military junta in Argentina used the word ‘reconciliation’ as a way of “overcoming the past,” i.e., erasing any memory of it. To this day, such forgetting has made it hard to use the rhetoric of reconciliation in many parts of Latin America. When there are calls to forget or overcome the past, it is always important to listen to who is asking for this: the perpetrators or the victims. Erasure of memory is a tool used by perpetrators to domesticate erstwhile victims into accepting injustice and to forego investigating wrongdoing and punishing wrongdoers. Memories can be considered discrete objects that are held in the mind. A closer examination reveals a more complex reality. Memory turns on relationships, the relationship of the present to things and events past. Memory is continually shaped by a dialectic of remembering and forgetting. As some authors have noted, we do not, cannot, and even should not remember everything.1 To do so would keep us frozen in the past, as creatures who have no future. When we invoke the adage “time heals,” we are in effect acknowledging that our relationships to the past change over time. That does not necessarily entail a rejection of the past, but rather an altered relation to it. The emotional intensity surrounding a memory may weaken, and new perspectives on the memory emerge as it is set in a different web of relationships. Especially in traumatic events such as the death of loved ones or having to flee one’s home, there are losses that can never be regained. To insist on only one way to relate to those losses can keep us in the orbit of those losses, forever caught in the toxicity of disappearance. The fact that we can come to terms in some measure with loss and get on with our lives is evidence of how memory changes. Forgiveness is perhaps the most salient dimension of this change of relationship, especially to a toxic past. In forgiving we do not forget, for how could we forget something that has so irrevocably changed our lives without diminishing ourselves and undervaluing the loss we have incurred? To forgive is not to forget, as the old saw goes, but to remember in a different way.2 1 See the digressions on this topic in P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago, 2004). See also M. Volf, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids, 2006). 2 I have explored this in The Ministry of Reconciliation: Spirituality and Strategies (Maryknoll, 1998), pp. 66-68.

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It is precisely this possibility of remembering in a different way, in coming into a different relationship with the past, that I wish to explore here. For it is these changing relationships that make possible the establishing of a new, common identity between parties that have become estranged or divided in whatever way. I will do this by looking first at the shaping of memory and then at the healing of memory. The shaping of memory The American philosopher and political scientist W. James Booth has recently put forward some thought-provoking ideas on the shaping of memory, especially as it relates to social identity and to justice.3 He is particularly interested in how national memories are developed and transformed. His work takes as its point of departure the development of the nation-state as it emerged in the eighteenth century. In that historical period, nations—traditionally understood as cultural or ethnic unities—were bundled together into states. The new state had to seek a common coherence and commitment from communities that had heretofore never been together in any political unity nor saw themselves as having a special bond with one another. In order to do this, nationalism was born: it was an attempt to give states as political entities a coherence like that of a tribe: hence the concept of the nation-state. Sometimes a mythic past was invented in which all parties were to be able to recognize themselves. This happened in the case of Germany where Bismarck forged a single state out of dozens of principalities. In other instances, commitment to a set of ideas as a kind of social contract was intended to be the mortar that held together the national edifice. Post-revolutionary France saw its commitment to republican ideals as setting it apart from any previous history (hence the ideology of the five ‘republics’). Booth notes that the nationalism of the first type—one that sees coherence arising out of shared ethnicity and traditions—creates a “thick” kind of memory, whereas the second type—constructed from a set of ideals or an ideology—creates a “thin” kind of memory.4 The so-called thick memory is enmeshed in a long history of historical relationships that are acknowledged and appropriated by the citizens of a state. The thin memory feels free to disavow any responsibility for a state that existed prior to the assumption of this ideology. Booth holds up as examples here the different relationships West Germany and East Germany had to the Nazi past. West Germany acknowledged its continuity with that past even as it struggled to move beyond it— an example of thick memory. East Germany, on the other hand, saw its embrace of Marxist Communism as a clear break—even liberation—from the past and refused to acknowledge any responsibility for the Nazi period. This is an example of thin memory. In a similar way, France has been loathe to accept responsibility for the Vichy government and its collaboration with the Nazis, because it represented a

3 W. J. Booth, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca, 2006). 4 The “thick” and “thin” metaphor seems to be drawn from C. Geertz’s proposal in his book, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973).

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betrayal of republican ideals. This has continued, even though complicity in the lives of Fifth Republic political leaders has now been connected to the Vichy period.5 I offer Booth’s distinction because it may provide a way of establishing a new common identity between the two Koreas when such a moment will present itself. The Republic of South Korea rebuilt the royal complex in the center of Seoul after the Japanese Occupation had destroyed it, completing the work in 1995. In doing so, it allied itself with the pre-1910 history of the peninsula, making a bid for a thick or traditionalist understanding of memory. North Korea under its socialist leadership has adhered more to the liberal or constructivist understanding of thin memory. (The terms ‘traditionalist’, ‘liberal’ and ‘constructivist’ are all Booth’s). Should the time come when North Korea would set aside its socialist ideology, would not the point of rapprochement between the two Koreas be better situated in the thick memory of a two-thousand-year history than in the nearly sixty years of socialist-capitalist divide? Might not a rereading of the history of the twentieth century be better taken from this longue durée rather than from a century marked by foreign occupation and subsequent ideological division? I can only propose this as a non-Korean, but suggest that looking at the different ways memory is shaped will have a lot to do with the possibility of bringing them together or merging them in some way. The point here is not to choose between traditionalist and constructivist—thick or thin—memory. Both have their bright and shadow sides. Traditionalist approaches to memory have sometimes given countries great stability as have constructivist ones. On the other hand, both have been destructive as well, as Nazi and Communist forms of socialism have shown. The ‘imagined communities’ whose historical identity hangs on a slender thread and the ‘new communities’ that repudiate allegiance or responsibility for their past have both shown their faces in recent years. Both kinds show considerable ambivalence. In the struggle in religious communities today, we can find those who try to embrace the ‘world church’ or the global ‘ummah’ as the memory of Christianity and Islam, respectively, even as sectarian rivalries can splinter both. My point here is that how we approach the question of memory will shape potential trajectories as to where they can move. A globalized world may seem to favor thin memory, even as local communities cry out for a thicker variety. How we approach the thick and thin varieties will shape what we call ‘communities of memory.’ The healing of memories The “healing of memories” has become the accepted term for how memories must be transformed if victims are to have any future beyond remaining hostages to the past. ‘Healing’ here does not mean forgetting, for to urge victims simply to forget is to make them victims yet another time. But what does that ‘healing’ actually entail? How does one embrace the past without being swallowed up by it? Or how does one move on from a captivity to the past without abandoning it? 5

W. J. Booth, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice, pp. 57-68.

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To be sure, some healing can take place with the passage of time. As one generation leaves the scene and is replaced by the subsequent one, the burden of the past is necessarily shifted. Those without direct memory of the trauma of the past cannot carry it in the same way as their forebears have, even when out of fidelity and solidarity they try to do so. Indeed experience is showing that any national healing of memories takes more than a generation to accomplish. The generation that inherits the traumatic memory will make moves that might have been unthinkable for that generation’s immediate predecessor. Some of those repositionings, however, may be necessary to be at once faithful to the past and open to a different kind of future.6 Rather than focusing upon how memories may heal through the passage of time and generations, however, I would like to recall three stages through which the process often moves. These are: (1) acknowledging loss, (2) making connections, and (3) taking new action. Acknowledging loss and engaging in rituals of grieving for that loss are ways of admitting that the past is no longer in our grasp. We are caught with a sense of absence, an absence that seems to erase and hollow out the core of our being. To acknowledge loss is to move beyond pretending that what is happening is but an illusion or a temporary setback. It is to allow the venting of anger, the feelings of betrayal and abandonment and violation. It is only in acknowledging loss that we can position ourselves to have a new relationship with the past. Acknowledging loss does not mean abandoning the past; it means, rather, a new relationship to it. Before there can be a memorial or monument to the memory of what is lost, the hollows left in our souls and in the landscape of our country must be confronted. To point to absence is to be reminded of the incompleteness of the world, of the co-presence of the seen and the unseen.7 We are still here, even though the beloved dead or our beloved country8 are now absent and beyond our reach. Yet we are bound together by invisible and elusive ties. The rhythms of ritual allow us to reverberate with this unseen world yet not be swallowed up by it. It is only by admitting that loss that a space can open up between ourselves and those whom we have lost and the displacement we have experienced from a certain kind of lived world. It is in that space, where our relation to the past is no longer immediate but dialectical, that new connections can begin to be made. This is the second stage of the healing of memories. By making connections is meant here the emergence of new meaning, of new bonds of sociality that do not consign past relations to erasure and oblivion, but allow new and more immediate ones to 6 This appears to me to be implicit in the autobiographical parts of F. Keshgegian’s Redeeming Memories: A Theology of Healing and Transformation (Nashville, 2000). The author recounts her grandmother’s stories of the Armenian genocide in 1914-15. This book is an attempt to see how such memories are healed. While remaining connected to her grandmother’s Orthodox faith, the author has become an Episcopal priest. One sees how the frameworks that help her come to terms with these memories differ from those of her grandmother’s. 7 Both of these thoughts come from W. J. Booth, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice, p. 75. 8 This type of loss is the experience of exile. In the case of Korea, it affects those who fled to the South.

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emerge. As a psychologist might put it, we need to recast our relations with God, with ourselves, with others and with the world.9 If we are not to follow the dead across that great divide, we must devise new ways of maintaining our connections with them even as we rebuild the world in which we now stand. Something that often keeps us from making those new connections is our loyalty to the dead—be those loved ones or persons we have respected, or the homeland we have lost. To move on seems like betrayal or abandonment. To understand what must be done, we must return to the idea of remembering in a different way. What often paralyzes us is that we are transfixed by the experience of the death of those we have loved and respected, and the history of our relationship with them gets focused at that very point. What we need to recover is the full extent of our relationship with them over time, and come to place the moment of their deaths within that larger history. In this way, the moment is not forgotten, but it does not become a millstone that threatens to draw us too into the abyss. That capacity to change our relation to the dead often requires the assurance that they are now at peace, however violent or unreconciled their exit from our world may have been. This is the troubling experience of the unrequited dead. When we do not know where their bodies are located, when the rituals of passage into death have not been carried out, their souls and ours wander around as lost. That has been why the exhumation of mass, unmarked graves and the identification of their contents have been so important for social reconciliation. This is why setting up monuments and memorials to the dead provide a place for survivors to mourn and remember. Sometimes those memorials are places and sites for such remembering. At other times they take the form of action of the type that would have characterized the moral vision of the deceased. To remember them by way of doing what they would have done, by enabling others to follow in their path creates a special kind of living memorial in their honor. It is out of this that a new vision can emerge. This is the third stage of the healing of memories. This new vision may be an extrapolation of the vision of the dead, something that will allow the living to continue to participate in that heritage. It may, on the other hand, be something completely new. When one thinks of the economic transformation of South Korea in the last two decades, one sees that a shared basis for identity will have to reach more deeply than the economic achievements or the acceptance that Korean pop culture has found in China and elsewhere in East Asia. Again, finding a new reading of Korean history, and threading together a new set of meanings, will be important to achieving a shared identity that can make for reconciliation. Even as memories are healed, the wound remains. It remains as testimony to history, as a sign of absence. We cannot erase wounds, but we can relate to them in such a way that they become sources of life. A poignant story in this regard is that of Jesus appearing to his disciples in the Gospel of John (ch. 20). There his transfigured body still carries the wounds of his torture. But these wounds become resources for the healing of the wounds of others, specifically those of Thomas. Might the shared 9 This has been done by R. Grant, The Way of the Wound: A Spirituality of Trauma and Transformation (Privately printed, n.d.).

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wounds of the Japanese Occupation, the parallel wounds of dramatic changes in society—as hardship and famine, as the struggle to overcome authoritarian rule and adjust to a very different kind of society—be a new source of life for Korea? These are some aspects of memory that play into the processes of social reconciliation. The place of narrative in coming to the truth Narrative plays a special role in the shaping of identity. Narrative allows us to explore different dimensions of our identity, by seeing ourselves and others in interaction with different actors and situations. The healing that occurs in reconciliation results from a new perspective on the trauma we have suffered. This is exemplified in the narrative of the road to Emmaus in Luke 24 (24:13-35). Here Jesus listens to the narrative of trauma that the two disciples have experienced in the death of Jesus, and recasts that story within the larger narrative of the history of God’s dealing with Israel. Here I wish to focus on but two aspects of narrative: narrative as witness, and narrative arriving at healing and restoring truth. Narrative as witness Narrative as witness keeps the past present to us.10 It is often barely articulate, wracked as it is with the pain and suffering that has come about by the evil deed. It tries to guard the event from slipping into oblivion. Luke’s Gospel gives us only a fragment of the disciples’ narrative: the anguish and disappointment of an unfulfilled promise. When one listens to narratives of victims, they often display this broken, unfulfilled character. They are fraught with strong emotion—either directly expressed or dissociated from the narrative itself (the latter is the experience of the “flat” emotionality of a severely traumatized victim). However, even in its inarticulate form, its power can become evident. There are volumes of such narratives in the records of the many Truth and Reconciliation Commissions that have been put in place in post-conflict situations around the world. The Chilean report, while it took a largely analytic form, concluded in its fourth volume by saying that their analysis could never convey the anguish in the stories of the survivors of those who had been killed in the early years of the Pinochet regime. For that reason, they provided fragments from those narratives. Victims at this stage in the reconciliation process often find themselves repeating this witnessing narrative over and over again. This is not only to keep the past in the present, but is also sometimes a result of the victims’ being ‘stuck’ in their own relationship to what has happened. In order for them to be able to move to a new relation with what has been lost they need a safe and hospitable social space in which to give their narration. The safety of that space helps restore the capacity to trust—at once the most fundamental aspect of human relationships beyond survival itself, and that which is most sorely broken in trauma. Hospitality conveys reciprocity in trust,

10 W. J. Booth, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice, p. 92.

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important to assure victims that they will not be victimized again, that they may come out of themselves, that others share their anguish. It is only then that the narrative can begin to change and open up new possibilities for meaning. Those new possibilities are fundamental for the new relations needed with the self, with the past, with others, with the wider world, and with God. Narrative as revealing the truth Truth-telling is now seen as fundamental for reconstructing divided societies. This is so because conflict, especially armed conflict, often can only be maintained by distorting the truth to maintain one’s position, hence the saying that “the first victim of war is the truth.” What has become clearer as a result of the reports of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions is that there are different dimensions of the truth that all play roles in the healing process. South African theologian John De Gruchy describes four such dimensions: (1) objective or forensic truth, (2) personal or narrative truth, (3) dialogical truth, and (4) healing or restorative truth.11 Briefly, objective or forensic truth is the kind of truth which Truth and Reconciliation Commissions try to establish: to narrate exactly what did happen, who perpetrated the crime, and what were the consequences for the victims. Personal or narrative truth situates the truth within the identity of those who tell the story. In so doing, it re-situates the truth of the event in the larger web of truth and meaning of individual lives. Dialogical truth is what emerges as the different parties probe the story together in order to explore the meaning of their respective narratives. This is rarely able to be achieved, since the conflicted parties are almost never able or even willing to face each other. Healing and restorative truth is the wisdom that emerges from the exchanges in dialogical truth, carrying with it lessons about the past and for the future. It can also emerge from reflections on personal or narrative truth as well. I want to focus briefly here on the second and third kinds of truth, personal or narrative and dialogical truth. As divided parties seek to establish a common identity, they must pursue especially these kinds of truth. In personal or narrative truth, the traumas of the past become situated in personal and collective histories. A certain amount of healing may take place already at this stage, as people come to grips with the causes and consequence of the traumas they have experienced. With that (if the narratives have indeed moved from the stage of witness to one seeking meaning in the events of the past for personal or collective identities), there is a certain level of confidence in and commitment to the truth of those narratives. They can now be narrated without fear, albeit still with considerable emotion. One has to have reached this stage before one is able to engage with the other, who has a different version of the same story. To be able to sustain the dialogue, one has to be able to have the selfconfidence in one’s own version of the story in order to be able to confront the quite different versions that others may propose. What this could mean for Korea is that the South, at least, can prepare for the possible moment of reunification by preparing its own narrative, and try to anticipate 11 J. De Gruchy, Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (Minneapolis, 2002), p. 155.

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the elements in the narrative of the other that might be quite different. We typically tend to generalize about the other, and in so doing miss the complexity of the other. But by going beyond our generalizations, we start to enter into a new relationship with those others from whom we have been alienated by past events. This was evident in 2006-2007 as Cuban exiles in Miami were being interviewed about their sense of the future, with the news of the serious illness of Fidel Castro. It is also coming out in Cambodia, where people from the northern region speak favorably about Pol Pot and Ma Tok—a very different narrative about these two leaders of the Khmer Rouge than what is experienced elsewhere in the country. Ultimate truth, however, will require moving through dialogical truth before a full restorative truth can be reached. All along the way, it is not the concepts, but the stories that will matter. For within those narratives we find how the events of the past have threaded their way through the lives of individuals and of the whole society. Communities of memory, communities of hope12 I turn in conclusion to the social spaces that religious traditions can provide for the building of reconciliation. My focus here will be on Christianity. The “religions of the Book” all place great value on the gathering of believers in synagogue, church, or mosque. While the value placed can be quite different in each of these traditions (and in their smaller subsets), in some measure being so gathered places individuals in a better relationship with God than they can achieve alone. In so doing, gathered communities are open to the transcendent in a way those most individuals cannot be. Within the context of social reconciliation, I want to focus here on two aspects: that of memory and that of hope. As has already been stated, without a commitment to remember, and to the transformation and healing of those memories, there cannot be reconciliation. Memory is central to identity, both the past and the present. Hope is required in the long, difficult, and often ultimately incomplete work of reconciliation. Most efforts at reconciliation undergo setbacks, roadblocks, and disappointment. Without hope that reconciliation is possible, we will not be able to continue. Communities of memory The religions of the Book are all religions of memory, since they look to past events as defining who they are. Remembering Abraham coming out of Ur, and Moses out of Egypt, are central to Jewish identity. The memory of the suffering Christ is at the center of the Christian tradition. Despite various recent theological attempts to displace it (for both legitimate and doubtful reasons), one cannot imagine Christianity without the cross. The story of the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ has been from the beginning at the heart of its preaching.

12 The pairing of these two concepts goes back to the work of Josiah Royce, a U.S. philosopher who wrote at the turn of the twentieth century.

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The memory of what happened to Jesus has been plumbed over and over again to help make sense of contemporary suffering, and to find a way through and out of it. One of the central ways of looking to the memory of the suffering of Jesus is to place the narrative of our own suffering in the narrative about Jesus. While this can be misused to legitimate unjust suffering (this has been a salient topic among Korean Christian women who have suffered abuse from their husbands and even from their churches), there is also another dimension that cannot be overlooked. Suffering can come upon us for no reason that we can palpably discern. The tragedies that Korea has had to face over the last century can certainly be connected to evil acts, but that does not remove their heinous consequences. As we have experienced in the end of Communist rule in many European countries, lifting the burden of oppression does not bring automatic liberation. Resignation to suffering can dehumanize people and societies. But sometimes resistance brings little surcease either. We must find a path through suffering. I had a personal experience of that recently. Over the past number of years, I have been working from time to time with groups in the Cuban exile community in Miami who are trying to work for the healing of their community from the trauma of exile. There has been a couple among these interested people who were enthusiastic and active participants, and came to be at the center of some of this work. Early in 2006, they were arrested by federal authorities in Miami for being agents of the Castro government, charges to which they have admitted. (They have been subsequently convicted and are now in federal prison.) The news of betrayal swept through the community, and was especially difficult for these groups working toward healing and reconciliation. In a visit shortly after the event, I met with some of those involved in this work, and was asked to preside at the Eucharist as a conclusion to our meeting. In the sermon, I took the familiar words of the narrative that precedes the consecration of the elements in the Eucharistic Prayer, ‘On the night he was betrayed, Jesus took bread in his hands, blessed it and gave it to his disciples.’ In this narrative Jesus’ reaction to his being betrayed was reaching out to create a more closely bonded community, a ‘new covenant,’ rather than striking back in anger or revenge. This helped those present place their own suffering in the larger narrative at the center of Christian memory. It helped begin some measure of healing. The German theologian Johann Baptist Metz has been exploring this ‘dangerous memory’ for more than three decades. In his most recent book, he notes once again the power of the memoria passionis, the memory of what happened to Jesus Christ.13 At least for Christians who work toward the healing of memories, the story of the cross and resurrection of Jesus is a narrative that continues to shape us as a community of memory.

13 J.Baptist Metz, Memoria passionis. Ein provozierendes Gedaechtnis in pluralistischer Gesellschaft (Freiburg, 2006).

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Communities of hope The daunting work of reconciliation requires stamina and determination. The level of burnout among workers is extremely high. The obstacles to overcome are many. One of my own preoccupations has become how to sustain people spiritually and morally in this difficult work. A key element is hope. Hope theologically understood among Christians is a theological virtue that comes to us as a gift from God. It differs from optimism, which grows out of an assessment of our own capacities to act and bring about change. Hope for Christians is grounded in the belief that the Lord will come again, and will at that time judge the living and the dead. The resurrection of the dead prior to that judgment has come to be seen by theologians of liberation as the moment when all unrequited acts of wrongdoing will be brought to light and punished. Whatever measure of reconciliation we manage to attain now remains incomplete. Living with that sense of unfinished work, we need to find ways to celebrate what has been achieved even as we strive to move ahead. The hope that comes to us from God is the source of that strength to continue with the struggle. Those of other faiths or of no faith may find sources that give them hope as well. My own experience with such people can attest to this possibility. For those of us who are Christians, however, God is our hope—hope that one day God will utterly reconcile the world, and God will be ‘all in all’ (1 Cor 15:28). As a gathered community, Christians nurture the hope that is given them in Christ. The Eucharist points back in time to the death of Jesus, but also points ahead to the banquet table of heaven, when every tear will be wiped away and we will be reunited with our loved ones. The thanksgiving which is the very meaning of the word “Eucharist” reminds us to celebrate the small victories, the small steps forward that come to us in reconciliation process: these small victories must be acknowledged and celebrated, because sometimes there will be no big ones. But they keep us moving together in hope as the author of the Letter to the Hebrews recounts in chapters 10-11. Without hope we cannot remain open to new possibilities. And without new possibilities we remained locked in the past. South Korea has the largest percentage of Christians in its population of an Asian country except the Philippines. Might that not be a leaven of hope for the reconciliation process between South and North? As was said at the beginning, reconciliation is a complex enterprise, and that building shared identities is an important moment in that process. Memory and narrative are key in the building of those identities. The communities that sustain this work must think about themselves as sources of transforming memory and sustaining hope. May we all see the day when those shared identities are more proximate realities for the Korean people. Bibliography Booth, W. J. Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

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De Gruchy, J. Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002). Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Grant, R. The Way of the Wound: A Spirituality of Trauma and Transformation (Privately printed: n.d.). Keshgegian, F. Redeeming Memories: A Theology of Healing and Transformation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2000). Metz, J. B. Memoria passionis. Ein provozierendes Gedaechtnis in pluralistischer Gesellschaft (Freiburg: Herder, 2006). Ricoeur, P. Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). Schreiter, R. The Ministry of Reconciliation: Spirituality and Strategies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998). Volf, M. The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006).

Chapter 2

What Does Common Identity Cost? Some German Experiences and Provocative Questions Gerhard Sauter

Unexpected and surprising events On November 9 1989, the day the Berlin Wall collapsed, I was in Princeton as a guest lecturer. In the late afternoon, by chance I switched on the television set. To my surprise I saw people cheering and waving flags while standing on the wall. I assumed it was a new American movie and admired the excellent scenery in what I took to be a set. Then other guests of the house entered the room, embraced me, and congratulated Germany on this miraculous event. I felt as if I was dreaming. Throughout the weeks before, many others and I had been afraid of political unrest and bloodshed. After all, there had been brutal repression in China some months earlier. In October I had just visited friends in East Germany. They were very concerned, particularly about the reaction of the government to the demonstrations and to the refugees trying to escape to West Germany via Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and even Poland. Now the Wall had fallen; the symbol of the Cold War had been removed. Some days later at the meeting of the American Academy of Religion, I heard an American theologian remark that he had had his doubts about the second coming of Jesus Christ, but not any more. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, he considered all things to be possible. Was this an appropriate conclusion to draw from this event? As an event, it was no doubt both contingent and basically inexplicable. Of course, there were many attempts to account for what had happened. But I do not know of any serious politician, political expert, or journalist who can honestly claim that he or she had foreknown or predicted this event. After all, it is reasonable to have thought that there would have been an omen of some sort. To be sure, the end of the Cold War did not come down from heaven. A great many people played parts in very different and divergent ways, often unsuspectingly or even contrarily to their own intentions and plans. Which developments and changes had been thought to really be possible? It seemed sensible to expect at most a series of reforms in East Germany coming step by step and being politically achieved by opening the frontiers to the West with limited freedom for travelling, by allowing individuals to establish small businesses, by permitting independent workshops and trade, by increasing freedom of speech,

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and by ceasing political suppression of serious critics of the political system and of minorities, such as committed Christians. The vision was called ‘democratic socialism’ or ‘socialism with a human face’. That meant the ability for and openness to a truly friendly coexistence with East Germany’s neighbours, especially with West Germany. West Germany would recognize the new democratic state, formerly called ‘East Germany’, as a relatively independent and reliable, self-sustaining state, but, as such, further integrated into the Eastern European distribution of production directed by the Soviet Union, and even incorporated in the military union of the Warsaw Pact in the hope that through reform this would become a purely defensive alliance. This was the vision of many East German citizens who were active in the movement for civil rights [Bürgerrechtsbewegung] that created many local groups and networks of resistance against the suppression of civil rights nationwide during the late 1980s. These people were in fundamental agreement with socialism as a hopeful experiment for a world with more justice, but they opposed the repressive, even totalitarian, political system. At the same time, they did not want to be dependent on the Western system of a free market economy; instead, they wanted to search for an alternative to both inhumane capitalism and the communist regulation of all parts of life. Many church groups shared this vision, and local churches such as the Nikolai Church in Leipzig and the Gethsemane Church in East Berlin became prominent as places that gave opportunity for a kind of public voice urgently demanding reforms. Many politicians in the West, even Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Christian Democratic Union, had the same or a similar opinion concerning the desirability of the political development of two German states, with that of the East based on democratic socialism. It was hoped there would be a gradual economical stabilization and improvement, because East Germany had nearly been bankrupt already in 1987 and had survived only because West Germany had given enormous credits or loans and had paid a lot of fees for the Eastern highways and train connections between West Germany and West Berlin as well as for other facilities. The Western government had been prepared to provide this and other kinds of support as the price of stabilization and peace in the middle of Europe. These were the main ingredients of the hope for an economic reform side by side with a gradual reform of the political system based on truly free elections with secret ballots. It was further hoped that these would be coupled with a shift of mindset in the way people conceived of social justice and with freely accepted and genuine democratic values, as against those merely propagated by the Communist Party and the state authorities. In hindsight, we can say that this vision underestimated the enormous costs of operating a vague, somewhat loose common identity divided into two German states. This vision required not only high economic costs but also changes in thinking and a farewell to the ideology of the Cold War and to the mutual condemnation of the different economic and political conditions. Were the people in both the East and the West prepared for such a kind of common identity? In fact, most of them were not at all prepared for, nor capable of, this move. In November 1989 and during the following months, there was a public outcry in the East: ‘We are one people!’ It was not said, ‘We are one country’, or even more, ‘We are one nation’. When Chancellor Kohl heard the crowd in Dresden proclaiming,

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‘We are one people’ he perceived it as a cry for political, even national, unification but without any kind of nationalism or even chauvinism. Kohl realized that the vision of two German states had failed, and from that point he worked for political unification, accepting that an economic unification, or, at least, the introduction of a common currency, would precede political change. It may be argued that Kohl and many others only reacted to developments that seemed unavoidable. Afterward, they saw that events had happened in a quite different way than they had intended. There seemed to be no time to spare on trying to unify minds. This unification was thought of as a fruit or side effect of the economic and political merger. A former chancellor, Willy Brandt, a prominent Social Democratic politician and previous mayor of West Berlin, phrased the quasi-biological slogan ‘It must grow together what belongs together!’ [‘Es muss zusammenwachsen, was zusammengehört!’] But in what respect did Germans in 1989 really belong together? After all, in 1949, they had been finally divided in a way that many thought of as the price of the lost war and a requirement for the complete collapse of National Socialism and German imperialism. Many Christians had seen the division of Germany as God’s punishment of the German people. But others asked, ‘Why are the East Germans more punished and have to pay a much higher price than the West Germans?’ Subsequently, they viewed the political and economic, the psychological, and even the spiritual costs of unification as a kind of compensation for the different burdens of East and West Germany. Many prominent economists and trade and banking specialists – for example, the chief of the state bank of the Federal Republic [Deutsche Bundesbank] – warned against a premature economic unification that would neglect the immense differences between social systems and conditions of productivity and trade in East and West Germany. They preferred a smooth transition from the socialist economy toward a moderate form of free economy. But the majority of the politicians in West Germany were afraid of a mass flight from the East to the West after the frontier had been opened, with the total collapse of East Germany as a consequence. Many were too optimistic or even euphoric regarding the real costs to be paid by the West German citizens, trusting as they were in a widespread enthusiasm about the unification, enormous economic growth following the bringing down of the Iron Curtain, and the change from the Soviet Union’s being an enemy to being a partner of the ‘free West’. Accordingly, in October 1990, Germany was initially united economically, and political unification only came after some months full of excitement and turmoil. It was not at all a simple ‘reunification’, as many called it, comparing growing together with a somewhat natural healing process, but a ‘welding together’ of an apparently stable political system with a state in rapid transition (or even in agony). Instead, it was a fusion of two populations manifesting two different psychological realities and two different cultures but with one apparently common language. After the first free election of the parliament of the unified Germany, sceptics said, ‘The East Germans elected the hard West German currency, the Deutsche Mark, hoping that nearly all other conditions of life would remain the same, especially the closeknit social security, the absence of unemployment, and other social achievements. They choose the Western economic standard without knowing its price’.

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In the West, many people were convinced that their own position would endure unchanged and that people in the East would be better off if they imitated the Western values. Some people in West Germany thought the East German people must follow them if they were to share some of their achievements with them. It was a mentality typical of glorious victors, but these winners had not really fought the decisive battle. These attitudes were a source of many misunderstandings and mistakes. In addition, most people in the West were not prepared for changes that happened all over Europe and worldwide. As far as I can see, only very few expected the extent of another surprising, profound, and far-reaching event: the implosion of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Soviet and Eastern European common market. Afterward, it was mostly misjudged as a victory of Western expansive liberty, capitalism, and free market economy. In fact, it was the result of inner paralysis, because the Soviet system had become hopelessly entangled in its own contradictions. One very important impact was a fading away of the mutual antagonism between the West and the East. This antagonistic orientation toward each other had influenced so much inner policy on both sides and had shaped the mentality of many people. Now there was a certain void. Some German left-wing politicians talked of a ‘peace dividend’ that would be realized as military expenses were reduced. This was only a single error among many, but it showed the growing predominance of economic rationality. It may be that catastrophes and defeats frequently lead to self-criticism and subsequent attempts to change previous behaviour, but why could not such a delightful surprise like the unification of Germany have encouraged a grateful amazement that would constitute a new basis for a common identity? What prevailed and what failed? Helmut Kohl, the first chancellor of the unified Germany, expected ‘blooming landscapes’ in the ‘new lands’ (regions) of the Federal Republic. He obviously hoped that common identity would be based on economic achievements in East Germany that would support the political unity. The main political goal was to bring the basic living conditions of the East in line with the level of the West, or, at least, to bring them closer together. In order to reach this goal, first the East German economy, trade, administration, jurisdiction, and higher education system had to be reorganized, mainly with the help of experts from the West. In this difficult, even dramatic process, Western standards often clashed with East German self-esteem. The East German economy and administration had employed many more people than would be usual in other contexts. Let me give one example: A friend of mine worked as a photographer in the university hospital of Halle. In the hospital there was no facility for developing film. This meant that an employee had to bring each film to a photo shop in downtown Halle and to collect the pictures there the next day. After 1990, this person was no longer needed, because the hospital equipment had all been modernized. Again, in the large farms, the so-called agricultural collectives, and in all levels of administration, inspectors had controlled the working people. The so-called state security police [Staatssicherheitsdienst,‘Stasi’] had needed a lot

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of people, officials, officers, and contact persons to deal with all sorts of information that needed to be registered, checked, and combined with information from other sources. After the reorganization, most of these people were out of work. Often they acted with great hostility toward the new political order. This kind of unemployment was inevitable, but the reorganization of the industry according to the principle of rationalization meant that for many employees the value of their labour no longer counted the way it had in the socialist system – according to its ideology at least. Now the leading questions included: How much does it cost? How much is the profit? To a certain degree, this disrespect for labour as a social value contributing to the common good led to a disintegration of common identity. As far as I can see, this caused a disharmony of minds that has not yet been overcome. On the other hand, economic freedom encouraged others to create a business or a trade, to establish a shop, to use new job opportunities, to strengthen individual responsibility, and to be prepared for risk. The reorganization demanded a lot of personal flexibility and mobility. It gave many people advantages, especially those younger and better qualified; others felt themselves to be at a disadvantage. Let me give one example of a typically unrecognized problem: A young man who had been discriminated against during his education because of his church membership, who had never been a member of state organizations, and who had not joined the Communist Party or another ‘conformed’ party, applied for a better job in a big company after the unification. His application was rejected on the grounds that his curriculum vitae did not show any adaptability! A special office, called State German Trust [Deutsche Treuhand], reorganized factories and businesses, especially big ones, formerly owned by the East German authorities – they had called them ‘owned by the people’ – and sold most of these to companies from West Germany or other countries. The Trust’s representatives tried to do their best, perhaps sometimes too quickly, but most often the factories were rapidly downsized in order to compete or were eventually closed. This was called ‘winding up’ [Abwicklung], a term that carried the connotation of a mechanical procedure that many felt to be cruel. The first manager of the Trust, Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, was murdered on April 1 1991, probably by members of a West German left-wing terrorist group. Many employees lost their jobs because of this process of winding up. Those who were elderly were put on a pension much earlier than expected. Many of them were now better off than before, especially if both members of a marriage got a pension, but they nevertheless felt themselves obsolete. Of course, many employees in West Germany also lost their jobs during this period. But it was the East German unemployed and pensioners who largely attributed their fate to the side effects of unification. Thus, they had an underlying aversion to this process, as they saw it as being primarily responsible for their forced resignation. The costs of social security and pensions grew rapidly, and a large amount of it – as well as investments in the infrastructure (streets, highways, railroad installation, public transportation, and so forth) – had to be paid by western Germany. Downtown areas that were near to falling into disrepair were renovated at the very last minute. In order to transfer large sums of money for at least partial support (these days this would amount to between 80 and 90 billion euros, equivalent to about $100 billion every year), an additional ‘contribution of solidarity’ tax was introduced.

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What then is the cost of common identity, not only politically and economically but also psychologically? This question leads me to a second observation in connection with what followed the urgent reorganization: the often-disregarded feelings of the majority of the East German population. During the split caused by the Cold War, many felt blocked off from West Germany and foreign countries and were even less welcomed in the ‘brother countries’ of Eastern Europe than West Germans and others because of the ‘hard currency’ these latter visitors would bring. Except for senior citizens and privileged members of the authorities, East Germans had been allowed to visit relatives in West Germany and other countries only on very special occasions. After the opening of the frontiers, East Germans received ‘welcoming money’ (100 Deutsche Mark), which many used to book a bus tour to Paris or Vienna, cities of which they had only dreamt. They regarded highly the ability to travel without restrictions; for them, this betokened liberty. But in spite of that and the improved living conditions, many mourned the loss of the former strong social security system and wanted to keep other social advantages such as kindergarten for the very young or all-day schooling. Today, in eastern Germany these day care facilities are often still much more developed than in western Germany, but that is not conceded by the dissatisfied. I like to mention this only as one example of what was a widespread and farreaching state of thinking, namely, that a Western lifestyle could simply be added to socialist advantages without due recognition of what attempts to approximate similar conditions must cost. The underlying conviction was that not all things had been worse under the socialist regime. Although many Eastern citizens would have been willing to contribute their experiences to the new common identity, they felt such a contribution would not have been valued. I am not a psychologist and cannot sufficiently diagnose this mentality, nor have I a recipe for curing wounded selfesteem. But I deeply regret that we Western citizens in general did not take much more serious account of this way of thinking. As far as I can see, there was, and continues to be, a lack of mutual respect as well as an insufficiently developed sense of reality in its various aspects. In East Germany, there has been too much wishful thinking, partially as a result of the fact that most people in East Germany were able to receive West German television programs, in some parts of the country at least during the last decade prior to the unification. Watching mainly the advertisements, they absorbed dreams of an ideal world without being able to test them in daily life. In Korea, by contrast, the North Korean people – as far as I know – generally cannot receive much substantial information from the South and the frontier between North and South is much more strict.1 Therefore, the problem of incorrect information is possibly less severe than was the case in the former East and West Germanys, with the exception of propagandistic disinformation from both sides. In West Germany, the predominant mentality was the illusion of being superior, caused partially by superficial visits and focusing on the well-known burden of many Eastern citizens. We must consider these problems as one of the constituents of the ‘wall in the minds’ 1 Pak Wanso dramatically describes this in her short story, ‘Im Sumpf steckengeblieben’ (‘Got Stuck in a Marsh’), in H. Picht and H. Kang (eds), Am Ende der Zeit: Moderne koreanische Erzählungen vol.1 (Bielefeld, 1999), pp. 7–31.

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after the breakdown of the physical barrier that had divided Berlin and the two German states. The mental wall can be much more durable than an Iron Curtain. Another obstacle to common identity was the difficulty in communicating the German language. Bärbel Boley, a prominent member of the East German civil rights movement, once said, ‘We wanted justice, and we got the state under the rule of law’ (which in German is a play on words: ‘Wir wollten Gerechtigkeit und bekamen den Rechtsstaat:’ here ‘law’ does not answer the rigid quest for justice). People like Bärbel Boley had often experienced the gap between constitutional rights and the administration of justice. She upheld the necessity for a correspondence between a fundamental sense of justice and the system of law, and she was deeply disappointed to see that, in fact, the administration of justice and jurisdiction of the united Germany protected many former oppressors from retribution – in the name of law. Conclusive proof of their guilt was required, and often this evidence was hard to adduce. That Boley’s view of justice was contrary to that of the legal administration of justice was not simply a matter of semantics. She expected much more from the state under the rule of law than merely a formal legal procedure. In East Germany, the meanings of many everyday words were reshaped or recoined by the government and by the Communist Party. The wall was called the ‘protective wall to keep out fascists’ [antifaschistischer Schutzwall]. In fact, the wall was built to stop the escape of East German citizens into West Germany. ‘Solidarity’ was restricted to meaning ‘the support of communists and socialists’ or ‘the strengthening of the power of the working class’. ‘Peace’ was understood as a rigid defence of socialism and, if necessary, as aggressive protection of the state of affairs of the socialist ‘brother countries’. There were other rather more comical examples. For example, in an atheist state angels cannot exist, so for Christmas an artificial term was coined: ‘figure of the end-time of the year’ (Jahresendzeitfigur). When an invitatory poster for a regional church meeting contained the text “‘I am the Α and the Ω,’ says the Lord God” (which means ‘I am the beginning and the end of the alphabet’), the police forbade this poster, arguing, ‘The A looks like ‘anarchy’ and Ω is the abbreviation for ‘ohm,’ the symbol of one unit of electric resistance; therefore, the whole is an invitation to revolution!’ The policemen did not know how right they were, but in quite another sense than they thought. These examples are out of date. But there are other semantic and syntactic differences between the German spoken in the East and that spoken in the West, mostly due to contextual peculiarities. For common identity to be finally achieved, fundamental agreement in the use of common language is required. As recent research shows, it will take a long, long time until this agreement is reached in the unified Germany.2 This agreement is even more urgent because of the flow of many refugees and immigrants to Germany over the last decades. The difficult process of 2 See Von “Busch-Zulage” und “Ossinachweis”: Ost–West–Deutsch in der Diskussion, (eds), R. Reiher and R. Läzer (Berlin, 1996); R. Reiher and A. Baumann (eds), Vorwärts und nicht vergessen: Sprache in der DDR – was war, was ist, was bleibt, (Berlin, 2004). Horst Dieter Schlosser, Die deutsche Sprache in der DDR zwischen Stalinismus und Demokratie: Historische, politische und kommunikative Bedingungen, 2nd ed. (Cologne, 1999). K. Welke, W. Sauer and H. Glück (eds), Die deutsche Sprache nach der Wende (Hildesheim, 1992).

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integrating immigrants today provokes much more hostility in the eastern part of Germany than it does in the western area. One reason for this is that the East German authorities would only accept refugees from socialist countries and immigrants who were invited to work there, and both groups had mostly been segregated from the German population. Today, racism and hostility against foreigners is much more overt there (as in Russia, for instance) than it is in the western parts of reunified Germany. To round off my second observation regarding different ways of thinking and the costs of these incurred by unification, when East Germany was integrated into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990, while there were some amendments to the constitution, mainly concerning the new size of Germany and its new frontiers, there was no new constitution as such. The same is true with regard to the system of law and rights and duties (only one or two of the traffic regulations that were used in East Germany were adopted). Western firms and businesses, publishing houses, and many newspapers took over their Eastern competitors. As I have noted, West German specialists and officials were the guides for the new arrangement, at least for the first few years. Public prosecutors and judges came from West Germany, because the departments of law in the eastern universities had to be built up from scratch. In addition, in higher education many teachers and professors needed to be replaced, especially in the fields of history, social affairs, and philosophy. All these side effects of integration must be regarded as a part of the cost of common identity under the historical circumstances. But we must ask the question: Were these costs a load for many but not all East German citizens? And if so, has the integration indeed happened in a spirit of solidarity more emphatic than that which has been described above? Be that as it may, while the unification of Germany did not include occupation of the East by the West, it seemed to be, at least to many, a kind of annexation that caused more disappointment and wounded self-esteem. There was a special term coined in East Germany to signify the mental bias and prejudice of the West Germans. They were called ‘Besserwessis’, another play on words [Besser(wissende)Wessis]: ‘West German know-all people’. There were other effects of this ‘annexation’. One far-reaching side effect is that younger eastern German couples are now no more concerned with having children than are their western German counterparts. In former times, East Germans used to marry at a very early age because marriage was the only chance to get housing. Additionally, the extensive day-care provisions allowed for the upbringing of children at relatively little cost. After this pressure and these provisions ceased, couples became less interested in having children. This diminution of the birth rate in both eastern and western Germany is now a growing problem in Germans’ quest for common identity. Sometimes it seems that younger Germans are no longer interested in the survival of the German people. Quasi-annexation occurred the other way around too – a subversion of the western by the eastern in the forging of common identity. The atheism required and promoted by the leading political powers of the Nazi and Communist regimes had shaped many East German regions. There, those people who regard themselves as Christians are today not more than 25 percent of the population in general, and even less in cities. Therefore, the majority of Germans today are uninterested in

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Christianity and in the Christian heritage of Germany. That is an enormous task for Christian common identity in the unified Germany. Common identity demands mutual respect and a sharp sense of reality, especially if this identity has to be built upon very different historical presuppositions. German unification was only partly based on a common German history; moreover, it was not supported by a common cultural memory of the most recent German history. This is my third point. People in East and West German states differed significantly with regard to their conception of German history after World War II, at least according to the extent to which they were influenced by the official interpretation. East Germany convinced itself that it had eradicated fascism root and branch. As it established a totally new political order, it did not feel any burden about the past, not even the guilt caused by the Holocaust. Astonishingly enough, in the 1970s and 1980s, there were signs of a rebirth of German nationalism in the East, made manifest in some patriotic attitudes that harked back to the advantages of Prussia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. East German officials might secretly have criticized the regime’s faults in private, but in public they were tough apologists for the true path of world socialism. In West Germany, from the late 1950s, there were often harsh disputes about what was happening during the first decade after the war. Given the heightening awareness of the burden of National Socialism and the Holocaust, many were aggrieved that elements of the previous regime were being restored. This concern became radicalized after 1968 in extreme forms, such as a generalized anti-patriotism or support only for a ‘patriotism of the constitution’ (with all other kinds of identification with Germany and its history being blamed as nationalism). The orientation toward Western Europe and the USA, and especially the integration into NATO, was controversial until the late 1980s. Until the World Cup, which was hosted by Germany in 2006, German flags were only seen on administrative buildings. Now little flags on cars and at private houses probably signal a second national resurgence. Hopefully, this might be a sound sign. But is it already an ingredient of common identity? In addition, there are, roughly speaking, two different conceptions of East German history, which still divide people in the eastern part of Germany today. Some weeks ago, a group of former Stasi officials visited a camp once used for political prisoners. One of the ex-prisoners served as the guide. He told them of the cruel suppression and the total lack of human rights in the camp. The visitors tried to refute this report saying, ‘All that is not true. It is just a distortion of history. Soon we will gain the power again, and then we will rewrite German history’. This may be an extreme example. But there is a growing tendency to gloss things over, especially those relating to everyday life in the former German Democratic Republic. A typical example is the movie Good Bye, Lenin (2002), which was well received in Germany and abroad. It is a kind of fairy tale about a mother who lies unconscious in a coma in a Berlin hospital and does not realize the wall has fallen. After she awakes, she cannot come to grips with things that she watches on TV or out of her window, including a bust of Lenin ready for consignment to the rubbish. Her son tells her that the German Democratic Republic had opened itself to the bankrupt West and is now able to spread the blessings of socialism all over the world. Her daughter, her son, and his friend lead the mother to believe, even to the extent of using visual

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tricks, that the socialism they wanted has come to pass. But many eastern German moviegoers affirmed that this utopia was substantially real, even if treated with a bit of irony in the film. It will be very challenging to convince the younger generation of the truth about the split of consciousness in recent German history and to establish (not to construct!) a common cultural memory of this history within the context of the many changes all over Europe and in other parts of the world. In this respect, it was probably providential that the unification of Germany took place alongside the broadening and unification of Europe. It shows that the German unification was not an isolated event but rather was woven into deep and far-reaching developments that promote the possibility of common identity on a much larger scale. Spiritual perspectives of realistic hope On October 3 1990, the unification of Germany was realized. Germany was once again one nation. The German government tried to make the celebration as magnificent and solemn as possible. They asked that church bells should ring out in thanksgiving, as they had in former times for victories and for peace. But most representatives of the churches in the western part were very reluctant to accommodate the government’s request. They voiced their disagreement, recalling that in recent German history, during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, churches too often affirmed government actions. Now church authorities wanted to avoid the mistake of confusing religion and politics. They refused to start another civil religion. But unwittingly, they contributed to the intricate relationship between church and state that had previously existed in the eastern part of the country. They were prepared to be critical not so much of political matters as of actions conducive to the wellbeing of the state. By contrast, many church people in East Germany had tried very hard to be constructive in affairs of state and to engage themselves in matters of common interest, respecting the state at least to the extent that it provided a framework for living and for working together for the public welfare. Therefore, the mood was very mixed. Finally, many parishes decided to ring the bells as an invitation to a special service, although some people would not have known how to distinguish this from other ceremonies. It was a good chance to have an ecumenical service and to celebrate unity in Christ as a focus of national unity. I wonder what was said in these evening services. Some sermons were published later or documented in other ways. An article dealing with the main topics of these sermons has appeared.3 For the most part, these sermons expressed thankfulness for the surprising political solutions that emerged. They also reflected a spontaneous gratitude to God, who was seen as having done a good job by ending all troubles and bringing about peace often understood as a chance to achieve a more equitable economic life. Often people said that unification was a gift. On a number of occasions, the German chancellor Helmut Kohl said that this event was a gift of history. What does it mean to say that unity is 3 M. Dutzmann, ‘Untesdienst am Nationalfeiertag?’, in P. Cornehl, M. Dutzmann and A. Strauch (eds), In der Schar derer, die da feiern: Feste als Gegenstand praktisch-theologischer Reflexion, (Göttingen, 1993), pp. 200–11.

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a gift? What does the givenness of the gift tell us about what was said, thought, and done four decades earlier? And how could the givenness of the event point to a future where what was previously unthinkable now seemed possible? I would like to suggest that an emphasis on being grateful only for surprisingly positive events in history reveals a strange fear of speaking of God’s action and sharply contrasts with emphasizing God’s ongoing will. During the previous decades, many had appealed to God’s will – not in the sense of God’s purposes but in the sense of declaring what God demands of us. They asked, ‘What does God want us to do to ensure that there is not another historic catastrophe akin to the terrible last world war, which must be the last, for God’s sake! What are we obliged to do when it seems that God did not intervene at the concentration camp of Auschwitz or at other places which mark the horrors of totalitarian regimes and genocidal wars?’ God seemed to remain silent. Perhaps he fell silent in the face of the terrible things human beings were and are able to achieve. In Hungary, after the futile uprising of 1956, this attitude led Protestant church officials to a concept of theologically interpreted history. It was called a ‘theology of service’. This term meant Christian stewardship as service to the people and, as such, a support of the policy of the state.4 In East Germany, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s phrase ‘Church for other [people]’5 was used by many theologians and clergy there in order to interpret ‘Church within Socialism’.6 Mostly, there was significant reservation about any kind of simple as well as sophisticated identification of God’s providence with the course of history, even a certain speechlessness concerning the doctrine of providence. That was one of the main insights during the German church struggle in 1933 and in the following years (when the so-called German Christians asserted that God acts within and through the historical presuppositions of nations that share a racially common identity or through the common heritage of the leading spirit of a nation). Was the collapse of the Berlin Wall a sign pointing to a God of a different kind who works seemingly by accident, taking us by surprise with such positive 4 Cf. I. Szabó, ‘A Long Period of Inner Bleeding: The Theology of Service as the Reflection of the Miseries of the Reformed Church in Hungary’, Zeitschrift für kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 2 (1989), 190–98. 5 ‘for others, through participation in the Being of God’. Prisoner for God: Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. E. Bethge (New York, 1954), p. 179. ‘The Church is her true self only when she exists for humanity’, p. 180, corrected in the 3rd ed. (London, 1967), p. 211: ‘The Church is the Church only when it exists for others’. Cf. Wolf Krötke, ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer als ‘Theologe der DDR’: Ein kritischer Rückblick’, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik 37 (1993): 94–105. 6 Theologians introduced this slogan about 1971 in order to claim the Church’s opportunity of being involved in forming the society neither opposing socialism on principle nor acclaiming it. The state officials misused the formula to commit the Church to the socialist regime. Nonetheless the slogan promoted some compromises and a limited acknowledgement of the Church’s activities until 1987 when the state blocked all endeavours to reform. W. Thumser, Kirche im Sozialismus (Tübingen 1996). D. Pollack, ‘Kirche im Sozialismus’, in H. D. Betz et al. (eds), Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart [RGG4], vol. 4 (Tübingen, 2001), cols. 1033–1035.

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events? Or does the decisive point of post-war history provoke us to question our very understanding of history, especially with respect to our concepts of agency in history? The challenge is consistent with the observation that in 1989 most leaders or people in power reacted to events rather than acting in their own right. After World War II, many Christians in Germany tried to orient themselves to the profession of God’s acting in history that Dietrich Bonhoeffer had written in his prison cell in 1943: I believe that God both can and will bring good out of evil, even out of the greatest evil. For that purpose he needs men who make the best use of everything . . . I believe that even our mistakes and shortcomings are turned to good account and that it is no harder for God to deal with them than with our supposedly good deeds. I believe God is no just timeless fate, but that he waits for and answers sincere prayer and responsible action.7

This is no less true today, more than sixty years later. The doctrine of God’s providence can prepare us to listen and to search for new criteria. It may be that an element of such a profession is that we are reminded forcefully that God has the generosity and the sense of humour to know what to do with our doing, even with our wrongdoing, with our best prognoses, and with disappointment when these prognoses fail. God also knows what to do with our best intentions, even those that often have the opposite effect of what we intend. Do we not have reason to be surprised that we are still here, despite our doing? In recent years, I have often been reminded of Lamentations 3:21–23: ‘But this I call to mind, and therefore I have hope: The steadfast love of the LORD never ceases’. Martin Luther’s translation reads even more strongly: ‘The loving-kindness of God keeps us from being totally extinguished, his mercies never come to an end; they are new every morning; great is your faithfulness’8. With ‘your faithfulness’ the reflection turns into a prayer. All this is part of a struggle with both retrospective criticism and attempts to justify one’s own predictions after the fact. But God can make use of us if we are faithful and confident, open to surprises and capable of new beginnings. That is probably the most adequate understanding of divine providence. With respect to the unified Germany, one of the most burdensome factors that continues to hinder the achievement of a common identity is that it is extremely difficult – almost to the point of impossibility – for most Germans to become really reconciled to the reality of the twelve cruel years of terror, murder, and segregation caused by the Nazi regime, together with the consequences of this for the next four decades. After a civil war, reconciliation might be easier though difficult enough. We can see that, for example, in the aftermath of the American Civil War (1861–1865) as well as with respect to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In a more contemporary vein, I urgently hope that North and South Korean Christians will contribute decisively to achieving an identity not on the basis of an economic merger 7 D.Bonhoeffer, Prisoner for God: Letters and Papers from Prison, enlarged ed., (ed), E. Bethge (London: 1971), p. 11. 8 Luther refers to God’s tireless acting that not only promises the continuity of God’s creation but also revives deadly afflicted or even dying people and creates ‘a new thing’ (Isaiah 43:19).

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of a political union with all the complications and psychological costs that the German experiences show but rather on the basis of their participation in God’s atonement and mutual reconciliation. This would include not only being compassionate but merciful with each other in the light of their different and complicated recent stories to the point of being able to hear and to confirm in a reconciling way to each other the apostolic message ‘In Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us. So we are ambassadors for Christ, since God is making his appeal through us; we entreat you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God’ (2 Corinthians 5:19–20) – in order to become reconciled with one another. Bibliography Bonhoeffer, D. Prisoner for God: letters and Papers from Prison, enlarged ed.,Bethge, E. (ed.), (SCM: London 1971). Bonhoeffer, D. Widerstand und Ergebung: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft in Werke, vol. 8, Gremmels, Ch. et al. (eds), (Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1998). Dutzmann, M. ‘Untesdienst am Nationalfeiertag?’, in P. Cornehl, M. Dutzmann and A. Strauch (eds), In der Schar derer, die da feiern: Feste als Gegenstand praktisch-theologischer Reflexion (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp. 200–11. Krötke, W. ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer als ‘Theologe der DDR’: Ein kritischer Rückblick’, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik 37 (1993): pp. 94–105. Pollack, D. ‘Kirche im Sozialismus’, in Betz, H.D. et al. (eds), Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart [RGG4], vol. 4 Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2001 cols. 1033–1035. Reiher, R. and Baumann, A. (eds) Vorwärts und nicht vergessen: Sprache in der DDR – was war, was ist, was bleibt (Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag: Berlin, 2004). Reiher, R. and Läzer, R. (eds), Von “Busch-Zulage” und “Ossinachweis”: Ost– West–Deutsch in der Diskussion, (Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag: Berlin, 1996). Schlosser, H.D. Die deutsche Sprache in der DDR zwischen Stalinismus und Demokratie: Historische, politische und kommunikative Bedingungen, 2nd ed., (Cologne, 1999). Szabó, I. ‘A Long Period of Inner Bleeding: The Theology of Service as the Reflection of the Miseries of the Reformed Church in Hungary’, Zeitschrift für kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 2 (1989): 190–98. Thumser, W. Kirche im Sozialismus (Mohr Siebeck: Tubingen 1996). Wanso, P. ‘Im Sumpf steckengeblieben’, (‘Got Stuck in a Marsh’), in H. Picht and H. Kang (eds), Am Ende der Zeit: Moderne koreanische Erzählungen, vol.1 (Bielefeld, 1999), pp.7–31. Welke, K., Sauer, W. and Glück, H. Die deutsche Sprache nach der Wende (Olms Verlag: Hildesheim 1992).

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Chapter 3

Truth and Reconciliation: An Interfaith Perspective from India Israel Selvanayagam

A new ecumenical mission paradigm Preliminary observation Reconciliation seems to be the topic of the season. This is evident from the number of conferences organised recently and materials published in ecumenical circles of the Christian Church. But the concern is not new since programmes of the World Council of Churches such as ‘Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation’, popular two decades ago, included reconciliation in their explorations. Vertical, horizontal and environmental dimensions of reconciliation have been discussed at different levels, ranging from harmonious living to perfect integration and fullness of the whole of life. As such, merely repeating the slogans of unity, communal harmony, respect for others and cooperation in common welfare will be boring to the utmost limit of weariness. However, we cannot ignore the recent re-emergence of the concern for reconciliation, the insights it provides and the questions it raises. No explanation is necessary about its background, a global situation marked by communal and political conflicts, which are differently termed as ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘clash of fundamentalisms’. There are efforts ‘in search of identity’ while there is recognition of ‘dangerous identities’. We hear of ‘axis of evil’ and its antidote ‘axis of peace’; and so on. The Decade to Overcome Violence (2001 – 2010) is focused in parallel with issues like globalisation and new forms of imperialism, each being addressed in different ways. In this paper we will point out examples of some serious explorations into the question of truth and reconciliation, and draw out insights for a fuller understanding of the dynamics of interfaith relations. Reconciliation is a crucial New Testament term and so is popular in Christian circles. One has to struggle to find it in other religious traditions. The reason is simple. According to a major theme of the Bible, the fundamental human predicament is alienation between at least three spheres: God-humanity, human-human and human-nature. Other religious traditions have perceived the predicament differently. Therefore we may be criticised for superimposing our idea on others without their permission. We will try to be aware of this all through this reflection.

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Significance of the South African experience Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s award winning book No Future without Forgiveness (1999) contains moving stories recorded in the course of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, of which he was the Chair. After many long years it was in 1994 that South Africans achieved participation in a general democratic election in the country involving all people without any discrimination. Of course the iconic figure in the whole episode was Nelson Mandela, the first president of the new South Africa who emerged saintly and magnanimous. It was amazing that several years of harassment before his arrest and twenty-seven years of hard life in gaol did not diminish his humanity. Tutu observes: Nelson Mandela did not emerge from prison spewing words of hatred and avenge. He amazed us all by his heroic embodiment of reconciliation and forgiveness. No one could have accused him of speaking glibly and facilely about forgiveness and reconciliation.1

Mandela’s stand sent a wave of new thinking all over the world. Those who had shared in his suffering found a new meaning in their lives and a new impetus to construct a new South Africa. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission set the scene for new life for both the victims and the victimisers. Amnesty was granted for truth-telling by the victimisers and adequate reparations and rehabilitation was offered to the victims. There were sober moments of confession and declarations of forgiveness. The whole experience was healing too in a remarkable way. For instance, one who had been blinded could declare after the confession of his perpetrator, ‘It feels like I have got my sight back’. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was inter-religious in its composition. Tutu as a Christian leader had the credentials of full respect and trust from his colleagues. He did not hide his Christian identity and belief and was able to talk about God’s love spontaneously. At times his words about God bring out stunning insights. For example, Tutu writes: Each person is not just to be respected but to be revered as one created in God’s image. To treat anyone as if they were less than this is not just evil, not just painful – it is veritably blasphemous, for it is to spit in the face of God. And inevitably and inexorably, those who behave in this way cannot escape the consequences of their contravention of the laws of the universe.2

Though the immediate context was interracial and ethnic conflict, these words are applicable to interfaith contexts as well. Our common humanity has been affirmed in ecumenical discussions on interfaith dialogue. In particular, those who believe in one God as the creator of the whole world and humanity, if they are conscious about the implications of their belief, cannot but share the above affirmation of Tutu. Moreover, despite certain unavoidable limitations, what the Truth and Reconciliation Commission achieved in South Africa cannot be taken lightly. Those 1 2

D. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (London, 1999), p. 39. Ibid., p. 154.

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who are committed to interfaith dialogue gain great inspiration and valuable lessons for promoting dialogue as a new attitude and ethos. It is not surprising that the TRC is referred to in discussions on reconciliation in other contexts. Fruitful reflections in the UK On the anniversary of 9/11, the British and Irish Association for Mission Studies (BIAMS) held a day conference in Birmingham with the theme ‘Faith in the world after September 11th’. In the following year (2003), BIAMS organised a residential conference in Edinburgh on the theme ‘Reconciling Mission, Overcoming Violence’.3 Professor Robert Schreiter, an eminent Catholic theologian who had reflected profoundly and written extensively on these issues gave three lectures, followed by reflections coming from different contexts. In the first lecture he summarised the New Testament message of reconciliation in five theological affirmations.4 If taken seriously and applied to practice, they would motivate Christians to take initiatives for reconciliation and to follow them through with hope, even in suffering. Reconciliation as a paradigm, for Schreiter, exists alongside other paradigms of mission. They include dialogue, inculturation, and liberation of the poor. It is dialogue that concerns us most here. Schreiter writes: Dialogue was most evident in the many interreligious dialogues which had come about since the middle of the century. Dialogue was not understood as an alternative to proclamation or a subterfuge to proselytise where proclamation was not possible. It was seen rather as an honest and soulful communication with the religious ‘other’ which could lead to a deepening of commitment on both sides.5

‘In the case of dialogue’, Schreiter further notes, ‘there is clearly now a greater imperative to dialogue not just to get to know the religious other, but to form bonds of interreligious solidarity against the hijacking of religion to legitimate violence’. This informs a new missionary ethos for Christians, which he elaborates in his second presentation. At the end of his third presentation, on spirituality, Schreiter briefly mentions reconciliation in inter-religious settings. He recognises that the vision of reconciliation he presented has been one deeply informed by Christian faith. But he does not fail to 3 It is of interest to note that the General Assembly of the Lutheran World Federation also took the theme of reconciliation this year. 4 (1) Reconciliation is first and foremost the work of God. Christians are only agents of reconciling activities as, ‘ambassadors for Christ’s sake’. (2) God’s reconciling work begins with the victims. This is irrespective of any action by the wrongdoer although such action does happen in most cases. (3) God makes of both the victim and the wrongdoer a ‘new creation’. This provides the surest guide to reconstruction of a society after conflict. (4)The Christian places suffering inside the story of the suffering and the death of Christ. A destructive suffering is transformed into a constructive process of new life. (5) Full reconciliation will happen only when God will be all in all. That is our future hope.R. Schreiter, ‘The Theology of Reconciliation and Peacemaking for Mission’, in H. Mellor & T. Yates (eds), Mission – Violence and Reconciliation (Sheffield, 2004), pp.15-18. 5 R. Schreiter, ‘The Theology of Reconciliation and Peace-making for Mission’ p. 25.

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note how reconciliation is viewed differently in other religious traditions. According to him, ‘In Judaism, more attention is given to the conversion of the wrongdoer than to the role of victim. In Islam, more emphasis is given on the role of the mediation of the dispute than on either of the contending parties. Buddhism emphasizes the role of self-awareness within the situation.’6 Further, Schreiter notes that in different cultures there are rituals of reconciliation such as a communal meal. He also notes that in inter-religious situations there are two different major scenarios. In the first one religious difference has been part of the conflict itself. And in the second religion can be the resource for reconciliation. Generally, all religions talk about peace. But it is a fact that different religions either justify violence or condone it on various grounds. Sometimes religion is taken to cover up socio-economic interests. Again, there must be space, which guarantees safety and trust, so that representatives of different faith communities can analyse their situations openly and honestly. Following Schreiter’s three presentations that form part one of the book, there are five shorter reflections that constitute part two. It is not surprising that three of them cover different aspects of the conflict situation in Northern Ireland. Most ideas in this section resonate with Schreiter. Most notably, one writer concludes by very succinctly stressing the primary movement from blame to responsibility. Truthtelling and truth-listening in a community context is part of this process, and the key ‘theological task of this movement is repentance’. Then there is the movement from opposition to forbearance, a lengthy process of finding ways to help to heal wounds. This is not only one group identifying and acknowledging their own wounds but also doing the same with the wounds of the other group. Christian practice and ritual play their own symbolic and creative role. ‘The key theological task of this axis will be forgiveness’. The third axial movement is from separation to positive engagement and, passing through the previous two movements, this facilitates the modelling of newness of relationship. This newness will be present in relationships within each tradition as well as in the crosstradition sphere. The key theological task of this process is kenosis, self-emptying; allowing God to radically reshape identities in conformity to Christ. This will mean a painful pruning away or hollowing out the parts of our communal identities that do not serve God’s mission of reconciliation, of bringing everything into life-giving relationship.7

The grounding for this transformation, it is affirmed, is living dialogue. It presupposes that instead of absolutising particular identities, we need to relativise and subordinate them to the emergence (or return) of greater common identities. The other two contributions on Northern Ireland and the further two, one on Malawi and the other on Nicaragua, complement these central ideas.

6 Ibid., p. 55. 7 C. Clegg, ‘From Violence to Peace: Reflections from Northern Ireland’, p. 71. A recent thorough analysis of identity as the key to both faith and human community, and the need for faith’s reshaping of our manifold human identities, is E. Lott’s Religious Faith, Human Identity: Dangerous Dynamics in Indian & Global Life (Bangalore, 2005).

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The final two chapters of the book talk especially about the multi-faith context. Kenneth Fleming’s Buddhist story of a legendary monk named ‘Never Disparaging’ is presented with its critical challenge for today’s world where, in the name of protecting and promoting freedom, immoral wars have been waged and they are called in terms of some ‘great mission’. In response to curses and abuses the monk ‘Never Disparaging’ would bow in obeisance and tell the wrongdoers, ‘I would never dare disparage you for you are all certain to attain Buddhahood’. We will come back to this story later. The last article in the book, entitled ‘Inter-religious Dialogue, Conflict and Reconciliation’ by Andrew Wingate provides stories of making peace and building of communities in the contexts of Birmingham and Leicester in which he has lived. Reflections on the need for friendly encounter, balanced education, cooperative efforts in tackling common problems and rejoicing in our handling of differences within the context of the search for truth are interwoven with concrete examples. Before these chapters in the third part of the book under review come reflections on reconciliation in ecumenism and interfaith relations. Jacques Matthey, the coordinator of the Mission and Evangelism team of the WCC and the editor of the International Review of Mission, gives a survey of ecumenical thinking on missio Dei, God’s mission and our participation in it. He also notes that reconciliation as a theme gave renewed importance to WCC mission thinking, particularly towards the end of the eighties and early nineties. This is expressed in various ways ranging from the unity and unification in Christ to a deeper unification in the triune God himself. He connects the survey with the theme of WCC world mission conference in Athens in May 2005. The theme of the conference was ‘Come Holy Spirit, Heal and Reconcile’. The subtitle is put as ‘Called in Christ to be reconciling and healing communities’. Preparatory studies for this conference represent a wide range of reflections offered by Christian theologians and workers from different parts of the world.8 It should be pointed out that, both in the preparatory reflections and in the presentations of the conference itself, the main focus was intra-ecclesial reconciliation and reconciliation between different segments (such as women, poor and victims of injustice) of the Christian communities, although passing remarks were made on the importance of a holistic understanding of the universe and the human community. And also having the Holy Spirit as key in the conference theme, understandably, representatives from the Pentecostal and ‘Evangelical’ churches were represented in unprecedented numbers. As a backdrop to the above mission conference, discussions were taking place in different parts of the world. For example, the United College of the Ascension, one of the Selly Oak mission colleges in Birmingham, organised a series of seminars on different aspects of reconciliation that resulted in the production of a book.9 The chapters show conscious efforts to distinguish between a pact of convenience and true reconciliation, between plurality and distinction within the Trinitarian reality and between ‘witnessing to our deepest convictions and listening to those of our 8 See articles in International Review of Mission, 94/ 372, January 2005. 9 See K. Kim (ed), Reconciling Mission – The Ministry of Healing and Reconciliation in the Church Worldwide (Delhi, 2005).

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neighbours’. There are stories of interfaith reconciliation attempted at various levels. The pioneering work of the Henry Martyn Institute Obviously there has been overlapping of emphases and issues relating to reconciliation. The South African experience of truth and reconciliation has been often referred to. What is most heartening in this connection is that the Henry Martyn Institute was a forerunner in focusing on reconciliation as a paradigm shift following the earlier phases of evangelism and dialogue in a ‘transformative journey’.10 The watershed was the Hindu-Muslim riot in the old city of Hyderabad in 1990. Subsequently, it led to profound reflections centred on a ‘Theology of Relationship’.11 More remarkably, reconciliation was seen not as simply peacemaking but as related to the question of justice and corporate efforts to achieve it in different spheres of life. For example, what emerged in a workshop held in 1997 was a working definition of reconciliation, which has been quoted in most recent ecumenical discussions: In the context of existing oppression in India, we understand reconciliation as a process of struggle of the people to bring together estranged persons leading towards transformed relationships and structures based on justice.12

To this important combination, namely truth and justice, we turn our attention as it has been a serious concern in discussions on reconciliation. Truth and justice Insights from South Africa In the name of reconciliation the truth of oppression must not be glossed over. The South African Kairos Document, for example, stated that no reconciliation was possible without justice, without the total dismantling of apartheid; otherwise the plea for reconciliation would have played into the hands of oppressors and it would be sin as the victims were in a way asked to become servants of the devil. Then the question is whether truth was established and reconciliation achieved in full measure by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is interesting to note that there have been complaints about the neglect of the lower- and working-class blacks, particularly women, as ‘reconciliation is largely a discourse of a few Black elite and

10 D. D’Souza, Evangelism, Dialogue and Reconciliation: The Transformative Journey of the Henry Martyn Institute (Hyderabad, 1998). 11 A. De Souza, ‘Theology of Relationship’, Forum in-Focus, The Canadian Churches’ Forum for Global Ministries, 2002/2003, No. 14. 12 Also quoted from D. D’Souza’s, ‘Multi-religious Convivence and Mission: the Indian Experience’ by K. Schäfer, ‘Come Holy Spirit, Heal and Reconcile! Called in Christ to be Reconciling and Healing Communities: On the Way to the Twelfth World Mission Conference’, IRM, p. 154.

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13

White males’. However, it is not far from the truth to say that a reverse trend has certainly been set and the process towards fuller reconciliation continues. Justice is relational and therefore it has to be worked out carefully and with nuance. Tutu was fully aware of this when he expounded the achievements of TRC to the world. He says: We certainly could not have afforded the tenacity of the Nazi-hunters who are still at it more than fifty years later. We have had to balance the requirements of justice, accountability, stability, peace and reconciliation. We could very well have had retributive justice, and had a South Africa lying in ashes.14

The alternative of retributive justice to him is ‘restorative justice’, characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence, which would include ‘the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees ‘the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is rupture in relationships’. This restorative justice ‘is being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation’.15 Sufficient reparation is part of this restoration and the TRC committed the South African government to deploy resources ‘imaginatively, wisely, efficiently and equitably, to facilitate the reconstruction process in a manner which best brings relief and hope to the widest sections of the community’. Where there was irreplaceable loss of life, the reparation was seen as bringing out wounded memories and cleansing them, as balm, an ointment, ‘being poured over the wounds to assist in their healing’. Memories cannot be erased but the poisonous toxin within them could be removed. Tutu openly admits that members of the TRC were not infallible but flawed mortals with faults. But no one can deny that the Commission has notable achievements and their full effect on the nation will be realised gradually. Most remarkable is the new trend that has been set in the name of forgiveness and reconciliation, thus breaking the chain of vengeance, which is a danger in any tense and explosive context. Tension in the Indian context It is observed in India that reconciliation in the context of oppression of the Dalits by Hindu society is nothing less than ‘blasphemy’.16 While nobody can deny the divisive power of the caste system and the inhuman nature of untouchability, some might feel that truth requires speaking in more particular terms since the terms ‘Hindu society’ and ‘Dalits’ overlap significantly. In other words, we need to acknowledge the fact

13 See Puleng Lenka Bula, ‘Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A South African Woman’s Perspective’, in IRM., p. 105. 14 D. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, p. 27. 15 Ibid., pp. 51f. 16 M. Larbeer, quoted by K. Schäfer., pp. 150f.

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that there are those from the ‘Hindu’ society who show solidarity with the Dalits, and there are Dalits who are comfortable to be identified as Hindus. Furthermore, theologically we have to recognise that God alone is the most innocent victim and all the human victims should move forward looking to him because there is always the possibility for today’s victims to become tomorrow’s perpetrators. At one level, in concrete contexts, we must speak in terms of victims and victimisers. Yet at another level, one notices a shifting combination of the powers of evil taking advantage of physical and mental power, economic wealth, gender and age. Therefore, reconciliation is possible, at least in the sense of admitting the tyranny and being committed to work together for its removal in whatever form and in whichever religious community it manifests itself. The question of violence Pursuit of truth and justice in any context is not free from intense moments of struggle and dilemma. For example, let us take up the question of violence. The ideal of non-violence is elaborated in discussions on peace, justice and reconciliation. The advocates of non-violence maintain that there is no war and no violent conflict that is unavoidable. What some of these discussions fail to note and explain are the dilemmas involved. For example, they do not distinguish between the ideal of non-violence and the actual moments of desperation experienced by victims who spontaneously use some form of force. Think of a mother’s reaction when her child is snatched away or tortured before her eyes. Even if she becomes violent, that is different from the calculated show of structural violence with its usual amassing of weapons of destruction. Perhaps Christians need to review Jesus’ position in this regard. Was he a total pacifist? Remember his cleansing of the temple. Also, while he was on trial, for his answer to the High Priest, a soldier struck him on the face and Jesus’ reply was, ‘If I was wrong to speak what I did, produce evidence to prove it; if I was right, why strike me?’ (Jn 18:23). Though it was not a direct act of violence, Jesus did not act like the monk of ‘Never Disparaging’. Should we expect all the victims of oppression today to be like this monk, taking upon themselves insult after insult? M. Gandhi, the most famous champion of non-violence, deserves our special attention at this juncture.17 Though a key strand in the teachings of the Gita is ‘fight and kill for the sake of safeguarding an ancient dharma’, Gandhi picks up four passing references to the virtue of non-violence and interprets this as the quintessence of the book, indeed as the Hindu ideal. Yet Gandhi was assassinated by a person who took very seriously the other strand of the Gita. Also, many have been perplexed by the fact that, soon after independence, when a group of Pakistani tribal people occupied part of Kashmir and the Indian Army was immediately sent in, Gandhi condoned the action. Here our point is not to justify any form of violence nor to undermine either the Gita or the ideal of total non-violence, but to acknowledge the dilemmas 17 For a detailed treatment of the topic, see I. Selvanayagam, ‘Gandhi on Non-Violence – Does Merton’s Appreciation have any Appeal today?’ The Merton Journal, EASTERTIDE, 14/1, 2007, pp. 2-14.

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and struggles involved in particular situations. It may be a good exercise to bring together such dilemmas faced by people in different faith traditions and see how they have tackled them. Truth and truths Clarity about terms and meanings Elsewhere I have demonstrated the important need to distinguish between truths and Truth and shown how ambiguous can be the term Truth in interfaith dialogue.18 Very often the actual truths are covered by the sweeping blanket called Truth. Compared to other types of truth in the fields of philosophy, art and science, I have pointed out the scholarly recognition of religious truth as ‘infinitely complex and endlessly diverse’. In conclusion, I have suggested that ‘Truth’ is an unhelpful term to communicate ‘the full truth’ of religious life, which includes visions and stories, ideals and actual facts. Also I have noted that anything perceived as truth or an aspect of Truth should be spoken in love, otherwise it cannot be truth at all. It is a pity that this is rarely recognised by those who claim to represent repositories or regimes of Truth. Bigotry, wars, sectarian divisions, etc. that have taken place in the name of Truth continue to fill volumes. Honesty requires Christians, along with others, to confess openly that all too often, on the basis of their claims to possess the Truth, and because they have believed their very identity to be threatened by other truth-claims, they sought to destroy the identity of their perceived enemies. Violent conflict has all too often been the result. In a moment we shall look more closely at what it should mean to be people committed to Jesus as the Truth. How Truth is perceived and claimed by religious traditions could be a valid question as the basis for a piece of fruitful research. In order to counter the claims of ‘one Truth – one Religion’ by Christians and Muslims, Hindus and adherents of other Indian religious traditions put forward forcibly the view of ‘one Truth – many religions’. There have been sects and denominations that have seen their primary task as needing to create proper confessions of faith and structures of the church as embodying the one gospel Truth. Yet Christian history exhibits such great diversity. In Islam, one of ninety-nine beautiful names of God is Truth (Al-Haqq). And it is a popular claim by Muslims that theirs is the religion, which is the perfected one and absolute Truth is revealed in a most simple and straightforward way. But history shows that sects, divisions and different interpretations of the law and traditions could not be avoided even in the history of Islam and the practices of Muslims. The four Noble Truths found by the Buddha have been the subjects of several debates in Councils and caused the emergence of different schools of thought and traditions of practice. The all-absorbing strategy of what is often called ‘neo-Hinduism’ with its slogan of ‘One Truth – many religions’ has made an impressive impact on Hindu

18 I. Selvanayagam ‘Truth and Truths in Interfaith Dialogue’, Religion and Society, 46/ 1 & 2, March-June, 1999, pp.37-64.

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consciousness. As part of this reshaping of Hindu consciousness, the Rig Vedic text, ‘Truth is one and the wise call it by different names’, is made central, though it is invariably taken out of context, which is that of a mysterious form of sacrifice. The reality is that Hindu tradition, Hindu ‘truth’, is highly diversified. Even the Upanishadic declaration of One Truth that is the Brahman-Atman unity has been interpreted so very differently in the Vedantic tradition. The bhakti traditions, countercultural movements and diverse popular cults within the Hindu fold compound the complexity of the reality, all of which is ignored by the proponents of the Hindutva movement. The primacy of truthful living Sikhism, the youngest of the ‘major’ religious traditions of India, seems to provide a key for understanding Truth in both visionary and practical senses. Truth is God’s name (Sat Nam) according to this tradition. While we should readily accept Sikh claims not to be merely an amalgam of strands of Hindu and Muslim religions, Sikh understanding of the nature and characteristics of God can be seen as integrating insights from both. Most remarkably, the tradition gives more importance to practical ethics than to creedal forms. The guiding principle is a verse from the Guru Granth Sahib: ‘Truth is Highest, but Higher Still is Truthful Living’.19 One of the characteristics of truthful living in a multi-faith context is being open to admit the struggles and problems of one’s own life of faith and being eager to know how others experience and deal with them. In my thirty years’ experience in the ministry of interfaith dialogue, the most fruitful moments have been when friends of different faith communities came together to discuss tragedies in their life and how their faith was helpful or unhelpful in coping with them. This happened in such diverse contexts as Tamilnadu’s Madurai and Britain’s Birmingham. Also, it is a mark of truthful living to distinguish between what we know and what we do not know and between the ideals of our faiths and the actual facts of the life of faith communities. In modern times Gandhi has called his life journey ‘Experiments with Truth’. Whatever reservations we might have regarding these ‘experiments’, key aspects of them are extraordinarily helpful for those who seriously seek to explore the nature and meaning of their life. Such seekers declare (with Gandhi) that ‘the truth will win’ not by shouting at and provoking others with their partisan views, but through reciting their ‘truths’ in utter reverence and complete openness. I am aware that for those Christians who are enthusiastic about sharing the gospel as the absolute Truth such an approach is unsatisfactory relativism. Therefore I want to touch upon the sensitive nerves of their position with pastoral and pedagogic concern while leaving the matter for other religious friends to tackle in their own way.

19 For a discussion on theological method in Sikhism centred around this verse, see John Parry, ‘Truth is Highest, but Higher Still is Truthful Living – The Nature of Sikh Theological Method’, I. Selvanayagam (ed.) Moving Forms of Theology – Faith Talk’s Changing Contexts (Delhi, 2002), pp.84-90.

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Jesus and truth The question ‘what is truth?’ should not be asked like Pilate, the embodiment of bureaucratic indifference and lack of love for truth. He addressed this question to Jesus as he stood on trial, a trial based on distorted truth and false accusation and who yet courageously confessed, ‘I have come … to bear witness to the truth’. Earlier, in response to the question of a curious disciple, Jesus declared, ‘I am the way, the truth and the life’ (Jn. 14:6). In discussions on interfaith relations, one of the questions Christians repeatedly ask is, ‘What about this declaration? Is this not a clear absolutist claim to the Truth, over against all other truths?’ An exegetical study20 of the verse would show that Jesus made this claim in an intra-Jewish context of competing claims. It is not made with reference to other faiths. Nor is there any reason to take ‘truth’ as a prescribed pill to be swallowed; it is rather a pathway to be followed, a pathway offering a vision of life in its fullness. Further, the same Jesus said that ‘When the Spirit comes he will lead you into all truth’ (Jn 16:13). Jesus’ commitment to truth and reconciliation found vivid expression in his responses to people from faith-traditions other than his own, such as the Roman Centurion, the Syro-Phoenecian woman, and suchlike. Similarly, we need to explain the journey of the early church as crossing various new boundaries and growing in the knowledge of Christ and of the depth of God’s love that he manifested. The Bible presents the future in terms of vision, anticipation and hope, but there is no detailed blueprint for our journey. Accepting the truth of Jesus and all he revealed should not be an easy way or a shortcut for Christians. Accepting Jesus as one’s personal Lord and Saviour means being subjected to the reign of someone crucified and risen, the Lion-turnedLamb, having all authority yet bleeding, and to participate in his saving process as portrayed, for example, in the Book of Revelation. Christians are called to share this vision not with a ‘crusading mind’ but a ‘crucified mind’, to use the wise words of Kosuke Koyama. Christians, then, have a long way to go to realise fully the cost of discipleship while being healed as well as healing, a witnessing church needing to be reconciled as well as reconciling. Truth shines out when believers are humble enough to distinguish between what they know and what they have yet to know, between what they are and what they have yet to be. When Christian believers accept this orientation to a new future, other believers may likewise be inspired to do so. Then, together, they can bear witness to the truth of reconciliation and the reconciliation of truth. Then they can move towards the future with serious commitment and honest openness. The dilemmas in secular India At this juncture, it is a relevant question to ask if the secular polity of India provides sufficient impetus to search for Truth while leading a truthful life. It is often claimed 20 See, for example, I. Selvanayagam Relating to People of Other Faiths - Insights from the Bible (Tiruvalla, 2004), pp. 228-239. Also, K. Cracknell, Towards a New Relationship: Christians and People of Other Faith (London: 1986), pp.75-84.

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that the secular policy adopted in multifaith India with a Hindu majority represents generosity of hearts and commitment to live harmoniously. A kind of dogmatic secularism, which has led to secular bigotry has been criticised by a new generation of thinkers who analyse the prospects and problems. For example, Rustom Bharucha, a cultural artist, vividly presents how the dove of peace in modern India is pierced through by the Hindutva trident.21 Bharucha finds a contradiction between the principles of ‘impartiality to religion’ and ‘equal respect for all religions’ and this can be manipulated by communally minded politicians. Consequently, there is a plethora of definitions of secularism often meant by one group for the other. Basically Bharucha affirms ‘Secularism is one of the strongest forces in mobilizing public culture. It has the potential not only to consolidate political struggle against the Hindu Right and other communal forces, it also has the capacity to create a more interactive participatory public space with a greater respect for differences of religion, culture and community’.22 He analyses some of the recent popular films and plays and points out how their seemingly ‘secular’ imagery in actuality are ‘soft-Hindutva ones couched, disguised, and dissimulated in secularist terms’. He also points out many levels of oppression and class interests and the shifting combinations of various self-interests. He shows how the State and other patriarchal forces legitimise caste discrimination, economic exploitation and the oppression of women (one might add children, as they are the most vulnerable) and demonstrates how the present-day victims can become victimisers in the future. Quoting an interesting observation (‘History is witness to innumerable instances where those who have fought authoritarianism have themselves turned authoritarian thereafter, but what they have fought is not oppression as such but the oppression of the Other that has hurt their interests’), he concludes: Thus, when ‘brahminization’ is replaced by ‘dalitization’, without altering the epistemic frame of oppression, there is no real transformation in the politics of the self. Reversing the polarities of oppression does not remove oppression; it merely perpetuates a form of self-tyranny. 23

Of course, this is not to condone caste oppression in any form, but to remind us of typical tendencies about which we need to be careful. On the whole, for Bharucha, ‘secularism remains a search, at once related to the politics of the self, and to the emergence of a non-sectarian culture based on a respect for differences at multiple levels’. Within this search, in spite of all limitations and fragility, pushing the barriers of difference, he opens himself to as many questions as possible, ‘while learning to 21 See the picture on the front cover of his book In the Name of the Secular: Contemporary Cultural Activism in India (New Delhi: 2001). Lott, op.cit. especially pp.190-210 discusses issues of secularisation at some length, including a summary and critique of the position of the Indian sociologist of religion, T.N.Madan, who is on some points in agreement with Bharucha. 22 R. Bharucha, In the Name of the Secular: Contemporary Cultural Activism in India, p.99. 23 R. Bharucha, In the Name of the Secular: Contemporary Cultural Activism in India, p.99.

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trust a provisional, fluctuating centre’ within himself. In the pursuit of Truth and truths in secular yet multi-religious India such a position provides ample scope for people of different faiths and ideologies to engage in conversation with commitment and openness. Concluding pointers In this paper we have illustrated the working out of truth and reconciliation in a particular context and identified the issues of true reconciliation and reconciled truths. This we have done against the backdrop of the new emphasis on reconciliation as an ‘ecumenical mission paradigm’ and various attempts at peacemaking in different contexts. While Peace Studies, Forgiveness Studies, etc. are increasingly becoming popular in the academic world, those committed to the movement of interfaith relations and dialogue need to investigate how they tackle the question of truth and reconciliation. Nominal adherents of faith traditions, whose primary goal is social, political, economic, secular or psychological gain, should not be confused with people with commitment and openness. It should be acknowledged that there may be committed people of faith in every religious tradition who cannot accept that reconciliation with others is the same as reconciliation or union with God or Reality. Lack of acknowledgement of this due to either negligence or fear of absorption into another tradition’s framework, will lead to the emergence (or persistence) of aggressive fundamentalism. Interfaith understanding, therefore, is an important corollary to interfaith reconciliation. Christian education needs to focus on proper approach to people of other faiths based on the scripture. It is more common among Christians at popular level to repeat those biblical passages that present exclusive claims. We need to draw their attention to crucial moments when harmony and reconciliation was emphasised in stunning ways. For example, Isaiah had a vision of bringing together the archenemies of his time for a new position in God’s reign. Consequently, he looked for pronouncement of a new blessing of the Lord: ‘Blessed be Egypt my people, Assyria my handiwork, and Israel my possession’ (Isa. 19:25). Similarly, prophet Micah, in the midst of exclusive claims for the centrality of Jerusalem, following a vision for the transformation of the weapons of war into agricultural tools and for peaceful existence of every individual without any fear of threat, declared: ‘Other peoples may be loyal to their own deities, but our loyalty will be for ever to the Lord our God.’(Mic 4:5). Even if such declarations are not to be taken as the final statement of faith (particularly if it is monotheistic), they are important as they convey the spirit of generosity and tolerance in a multi-faith context where reconciliation and harmony is the immediate need. India is a vast country with a strange combination of a multi-faith reality and a secular polity. We have noted that, in the name of communal harmony and unity, the issue of truth, in the sense of actuality and of ultimate reality, is either sidelined or distorted. A simple call for peace is not enough and, according to the Bible, such superficial peace breeds false prophesy. The more challenging call is to

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a commitment to truth-telling and truth-listening within a creative space of safety and trust. ‘Truth hurts, silence kills’, as propagated in the context of TRC in South Africa, but it is truth that leads to healing and restoration of justice and authentic humanity. Justice and peace must embrace as a psalmist longed for (Ps. 85:10); ‘repentance bringing the forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed to all nations’ as a gospel imperative (Lk. 24:47). In whichever religious or secular language it is presented, this alone seems to promise to break the chain of reprisals and counterreprisals and to establish restorative justice as opposed to retributive justice, as Tutu affirms. It calls for the setting of a new process towards reconciliation by crossing all sorts of boundaries and barriers, a process in which victims and victimisers find a new avenue to participate in a new creation and grow together within it. Communication plays an important role in establishing truth and reconciliation. False rumours, manipulation of issues and distortion of truths contribute to conflicts. We have stories of religious broadcasting and menace of loud- speakers inciting violence; of using religious symbols and gatherings for political gains; of using political power to achieve the vested interest of particular religious communities; of political and religious groups influencing the judiciary; of unjust dealing of communally minded bureaucrats; and so on. To check such acts and to communicate the truth we need interfaith organs, which can win the confidence of the public. Commitment to truth and reconciliation requires more than joining the ambulance services, or the police and army, in controlling situations of conflict. It is, rather, a commitment to maintain public health through sustained efforts to educate and establish truth or lead to greater dimensions of Truth. Such efforts might include activities ranging from providing interfaith nurseries to initiating and maintaining a network of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions at various levels. The sharing of actual stories of truth and reconciliation and of interreligious cooperation for common wealth and health will motivate others. Such commitment to truth and reconciliation requires greater conscientisation and an intentional lifestyle marked by speaking the truth in love. It is the restoring of just relationship, or relational justice, that is to be our focus in such a process of reconciliation. Yet, in our search for our common humanity, the distinctive ways in which we have experienced the divine-human relationship are an equally crucial part. Bibliography Bharucha, R. In the Name of the Secular: Contemporary Cultural Activism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000). Bula, P.L. ‘Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A South African Woman’s Perspective’, International Review of Mission, 94/372, pp. 723-728. Clegg, C. ‘From Violence to Peace: Reflections from Northern Ireland’, in (ed.), H Mellor & T Yates, Mission – Violence and Reconciliation (Sheffield: Cliff College publishing, 2004). Cracknell, K. Towards a New Relationship: Christians and People of Other Faith (London: Epworth, 1986).

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D’Souza, D. Evangelism, Dialogue and Reconciliation: The Transformative Journey of the Henry Martyn Institute (Hyderabad: HMI, 1998). De Souza, A. ‘Theology of Relationship’, Forum in-Focus, The Canadian Churches’ Forum for Global Ministries, 14 (2002/2003). Kim, K. (ed.), Reconciling Mission – The Ministry of Healing and Reconciliation in the Church Worldwide (Delhi: ISPCK, 2005). Lott, E., Religious Faith, Human Identity: Dangerous Dynamics in Indian & Global Life (Bangalore: ATC/UTC, 2005). Parry, J. ‘Truth is Highest, but Higher Still is Truthful Living – The Nature of Sikh Theological Method’, in Selvanayagam, I. (ed.), Moving Forms of Theology – Faith Talk’s Changing Contexts (Delhi: ISPCK, 2002), pp.84-90. Schäfer, K. ‘Come Holy Spirit, Heal and Reconcile! Called in Christ to be Reconciling and Healing Communities: On the Way to the Twelfth World Mission Conference’, International Review of Mission, 2005. Schreiter, R. ‘The Theology of Reconciliation and Peacemaking for Mission’, in , (ed.), H Mellor & T Yates, Mission – Violence and Reconciliation (Sheffield: Cliff College publishing, 2004). Selvanayagam, I. ‘Gandhi on Non-Violence – Does Merton’s Appreciation have any Appeal today?’, The Merton Journal EASTERTIDE, 14/1, (2007). Selvanayagam, I. ‘Truth and Truths in Interfaith Dialogue’, Religion and Society, 46/ 1 & 2, (1999), pp. 37-64. Selvanayagam, I. Relating to People of Other Faiths - Insights from the Bible (Tiruvalla: CSS – BTTBPSA, 2004) Tutu, D. No Future without Forgiveness, (New York Rider 1999). Various articles in International Review of Mission, 94/372, January (2005).

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Chapter 4

Peace and Reconciliation: Biblical Themes in the East Asian Context Choong Chee Pang

Introduction The concept of peace (shalom) is central to Biblical theology. The creation narratives in the Book of Genesis are characterized by peace. Human rebellion and fall brought disharmony, enmity and broken relationships between three parties: the CreatorGod, humans and the rest of creation. Peace and reconciliation have thus become the preoccupation of Biblical theology. In resolving tension, hostility and war between peoples or nations, absolute fairness and justice are virtually impossible. A true spirit of give and take is often required of the parties concerned. In Biblical theology, peace and reconciliation have been brought about by the sacrifice of ‘the suffering servant’ of God. This sacrificial act went infinitely far beyond the general spirit of give and take. It is therefore a great challenge to cases where a certain measure of sacrifice is required of both or one of the parties involved, yet doing it without disregarding the important issue of justice altogether. The concept of peace and reconciliation in the Old Testament As has already been noted earlier, the concept of peace (shalom in Hebrew) is central to Biblical theology. The Hebrew word shalom generally means the state of ‘wholeness’ or ‘health’ which a person or a community possesses or enjoys. It could either refer to material things or spiritual matters or both. In the context of a community, peace is only meaningful in terms of healthy social relations. The expression ‘formless void (tohu)’ in Genesis 1.2 seems to suggest certain primeval chaos and the absence of orderliness. It was the divine act of creation that brought about wholeness and orderliness (Gen. 1:31; 2:1-3). Human rebellion and fall brought disharmony, enmity and broken relationships between the Creator-God, humans and the rest of creation. The restoration of broken relationships is largely conceived in terms of peace and reconciliation. Universal peace is promised, for instance, in Isaiah 2:1-4. The coming Messiah is described as ‘the Prince of Peace’ (Isa 9.6), who is concerned, not with peace alone, but also with justice and righteousness (Isa 9:7). This is a very significant point to note. A highly idealized portrayal of general peace and reconciliation (or ‘paradise re-gained’) is found in Isaiah 11:1-9.

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In terms of regional security, peace is essentially the absence of war and the guarantee of safety and material abundance (I Kings 4:24-28). Peace may also mean entering into an agreement of non-aggression and non-violence between neighbouring nations (I Kings 5:12). In Biblical terms covenant means the restoration of divine-human relationship to its original wholeness. It is essentially a covenant of peace. The same concept is applicable to the human community. In eschatological vision universal peace is portrayed very much in terms of the restoration of cordial relationships between nations in the complete absence of war and hostility (Isa 2:4). In the atonement theology of Isaiah the restoration of a healthy relationship between God and sinful humanity is brought about by the paying of a very great sacrifice. As Isaiah 53:5 puts it, ‘upon him [‘the suffering servant’] was the punishment that made us whole’. Although the text refers primarily to the restoration of peace and reconciliation between God and sinful humanity, the same is often true in human situations where genuine and lasting peace could only be achieved by true sacrifice by the parties involved in the true spirit of give and take. As has already been noted earlier peace and reconciliation are often inseparable from justice and righteousness which involve divine judgment and arbitration. Thus, in Isaiah 2:4, ‘He [the coming Messiah] shall judge between the nations, and shall arbitrate for many peoples’. And in Isaiah 9:7, ‘the Prince of Peace’ will establish and uphold his kingdom ‘with justice and righteousness’. Justice is such an indispensable part in the restoration of peace and reconciliation that it could even be said that the latter is unobtainable without the former. It is therefore not surprising that the prophet Amos in his address to a strife-stricken community should require justice and righteousness from the oppressors and offenders ‘let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream’ (Amos 5:24). The concept of peace and reconciliation in the NT The Hebrew word shalom is generally represented by the Greek term eirene in the Septuagint (LXX). In classical Greek eirene is commonly used to describe the cessation of war or the absence of hostilities. In the New Testament, the word acquires a far wider range of meaning, due largely to the background and influence of Hebrew theology. The first Christmas proclamation is essentially a message of universal peace (Luke 2:14). Disciples of Christ are asked to be peacemakers (Matthew 5:9), and the Christian ministry is primarily a ministry of reconciliation (2 Corinthians 5:19). In Pauline theology a very clear focus is put on peace and reconciliation obtained through the sacrificial work of Christ (Romans 5:1; II Corinthians 5:19; Ephesians 2:14,15; Colossians 1:20). While salvation in and through Christ is freely available to all who accept it by faith and are thereby justified (John 3:16; Romans 1:16,17; 3.:21-26; Ephesians 2:8-10), genuine repentance of one’s past sins and misdeeds is required or assumed (Mark 1:14,15; Acts 2:37,38). In some cases, repentance (metanoia) is not simply a drastic change of mind in relation to one’s sin and in expectation of God’s forgiveness, it also entails tangible compensation made to the

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offended party or parties, in order to demonstrate one’s sincerity and seriousness (Luke 19:8-10). For the purposes of the present paper, the peace and reconciliation that Christ has brought between two formerly estranged and hostile peoples is of particularly great significance: ‘But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups into one and has broken down the dividing wall, that is, the hostility between us…that he might create in himself one new humanity in place of the two, thus making peace’ (Ephesians 2:13-15). In Biblical context, peace and reconciliation between God and sinful humanity take priority over all human relationships. The divine-human restoration could even be said to be the prerequisite of peace and reconciliation between human individuals or between peoples. In East Asia, however, where Christians are in the minority and where the great majority of the people could not be expected to believe in the Creator-God of the Bible, it might be more meaningful to look at the Biblical understanding of peace and reconciliation, repentance and forgiveness largely, although not exclusively, in terms of human relationships. Peace and reconciliation in and through the sacrificial death of Christ was a divine initiative. While it is universally available, it could only be appropriated by humans through repentance and faith. The Biblical concepts of repentance and forgiveness are particularly relevant to the Korean-Japanese as well as the SinoJapanese relations. More than sixty years after the end of World War II both the Koreans and the Chinese still feel very strongly that they cannot forgive the Japanese for the crimes and atrocities they had committed against them, because the Japanese have not seriously and sincerely shown clear repentance. Japan’s unwillingness to repent is sometimes compared or contrasted unfavorably with Germany who had repented of their war crimes, especially against the Jews, under the Nazi regime. Germany’s readiness to repent is sometimes thought to be, at least partly, due to their Christian background, whereas Japan is sometimes said not to have a ‘repentance culture’, although a ‘shame culture’ is deep-seated in the Japanese psyche. Whatever the case might be, the Biblical principle is clear and simple: without repentance there can be no forgiveness. The Sino-Japanese tension Millions of people in Europe, especially the Jews, suffered enormously under the Nazi regime, just as millions of Asians, especially the Chinese, did during World War II under Japanese militarism. Germany, however, was quick to admit its guilt, but not Japan. Japan’s refusal to repent in the way that Germany did remains a great obstacle in the country’s relation with its East Asian neighbours. Mr Ma Yinjiu, Chairman of Taiwan’s Kuomintang Party and currently mayor of Taipei, and who stands a very good chance of becoming the next President of the island in 2008, has also urged Japan in his recent visit to the country to learn from Germany in its

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attitude towards its war crimes.1 In strong reaction to North Korea’s recent missile tests, Japan has threatened to resort to a pre-emptive strike. Such threat has been described by South Korea as ‘reckless’ and ‘arrogant’ as well as being a clear sign of Japan’s intention to return to its past militarism.2 China also opposes Japan’s call for sanctions against North Korea for its recent missile tests and favours six-party talks and wants all parties to take steps conducive to peace.3 In the last few years Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi must justly be said to be mainly responsible for failing to help remove the obstacle between Japan and its neighbours, particularly because of his insistence on the controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. He has already made five visits to the Shrine since taking office in 2001. Such insensitive and provocative behaviour has not only outraged China and South Korea, but has also drawn a lot of fierce criticism from many Japanese. This is because Koizumi’s repeated visits have been rightly perceived as a lack of remorse for Japan’s wartime atrocities in Asia, especially in China and Korea. The Yasukuni Shrine honours 2.5 million war dead, including 14 Class A war criminals, among them Japan’s wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, who were found guilty by a 1948 war tribunal of crimes against peace. The Yasukuni Shrine also runs a museum defending the country’s past militarism. Relatives of Chinese and Korean war dead as well as Japan’s own critics, including academics and religious leaders, have also filed more than ten lawsuits in recent years against Koizumi, challenging the constitutionality of his visits to the Shrine. In fact, the Fukuoka District Court in April 2004 and the Osaka High Court in October 2005 had already ruled in separate suits that the visits violated the constitutional separation of the state and religion. These suits are still pending at higher courts. Even Mr Taku Yamasaki, a close Koiumi ally and a senior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmaker, believes that Koizumi is suspected of violating the Japanese Constitution by visiting a war shrine that is commonly seen as a symbol of Japan’s militaristic past. China and South Korea have consistently regarded the visits as the key obstacle to improving relations with Japan. On the other hand, Koizumi has defended his visits, arguing that it is a matter of his own ‘personal freedom’, although it is clearly absurd for him to think that being the top political leader of a nation, such controversial issue could ever be separated from his public office. As his term of office will be terminated in September 2006, it is unrealistic to expect that Koizumi would repent of his past acts. The hope of any possible reconciliation between Japan and its immediate neighbours will thus depend very much on his successor. 4 Koizumi’s successor, whether it is Mr Abe or Mr Fukuda, is expected to try to resolve the thorny Yasukuni issue. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew thinks that resolving the Shrine issue would lead to a ‘greater comfort level’ between Japan and its close neighbours. This crucial step could then pave the way for significant improvement in relations between the concerned parties. However, Mr Lee qualifies by saying that 1 2 3 4

The Straits Times, 12 July 2006, p.14. The Straits Times, 12 July 2006, p. 7. The Straits Times, 23 July 2006, p. 7. The Straits Times, 3 July 2006, p.8.

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even if the Yasukuni issue were resolved, other war-related problems such as Japan’s revisionist history textbooks as well as the sovereignty over the disputed islands of the region would continue to be a source of trouble in East Asia.5 Although China is keenly aware of the importance of Japanese investment in China and the on-going trade and other activities between the two countries, the Chinese as well as the Koreans are peoples who have long memories about their sufferings inflicted by the Japanese invasion. In Mr Lee’s opinion, it is unrealistic to expect Japan to follow in Germany’s footsteps with full accounting of the war. However, he still hopes that Japan will be realistic and courageous enough to accept its wartime responsibility. This is his advice: ‘If I were a Japanese, I would say, let’s draw a line, admit all these and have a meeting with the Koreans and the Chinese and say, yes, all these things happened, it is deplorable, and [have a] genuine change of heart for the future’. 6 What Mr Lee has said is in fact very close to the Biblical understanding of ‘repentance’ (metanoia). His advice is also very much in line with the opinion of the Secretary General of the United Nations who, in his interview with NHK TV on May 17 during his last visit to Japan, quite bluntly said that Japan must face historical facts ‘thoroughly and justly’ and must be able to learn painful lessons from it, so that history would not repeat itself. 7 United States: The Peacemaker In serious peace and reconciliation process, the role of the peacemaker is very crucial. Kent E. Calder has contributed a significant article in the March/April 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs. In his article, entitled ‘China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry’, Calder has identified the United States as the most likely candidate for the crucial and much needed role as a peacemaker. And why not? Since it is the nation which openly claims that it is “in God” that it trusts! In Christ’s Sermon on the Mount, ‘Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God’ (Matthew 5:9). The US has been a most important player in East Asia both during and after WWII in both war and peace. Peace and security in the Korean Peninsula, in the cross-straits relation between Mainland China and Taiwan as well as in the Sino-Japanese ties, all depend to a very large extent on the American foreign policy and decision. The US could either be a major contributor to the region’s instability by siding too heavily with Japan and/or Taiwan and thus angering China, or by strengthening its military presence in South Korea to the grave concern of the North. In fact, the strategic USJapanese defence alliance in recent years has already caused great worry and concern for China. On the other hand, the US also has all the means and resources to play a most effective role as a respectable, even indispensable, peacemaker in the region. 5 In direct response to Japan’s revisionist history textbooks Chinese, Japanese and Korean historians have just recently published The Contemporary and Modern History of the Three Nations of East Asia (Beijing, 2006) in the Chinese language and it has been very well received in the three countries. 6 The Straits Times, 27 May 2006, p. 17. 7 Shanghai Evening Post, 18, May 2006, p. 17.

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In fact, it is also in the United States’ own interest to do so. For example, there seems to be no way for the United States to handle North Korea’s nuclear issue without the support and mediation of China. Similarly, the United States’ fight against global terrorism and its handling of Iran’s nuclear problem could never be truly effective without China’s goodwill and support. In this particular case, China could also be a most important and much needed peacemaker, especially when it enjoys relatively cordial relations with North Korea and Iran as well as those who have been dubbed ‘evil’ states by President Bush. For China, the role of a peacemaker in the most recent Korean Peninsula crisis is an extremely difficult one. Faced with growing calls to be tougher on North Korea over the recent missile tests, China and Russia on 13 July 2006 took a rare move of jointly stepping up pressure against their ally with a new draft of the United Nations resolution, while resisting the American-Japanese led attempt to resort to sanction, even possible military options against North Korea. China has thus been walking a tightrope as it seeks to preserve its international image as a respectable mediator while protecting its close ties with North Korea. On the other hand, the international community appears to be getting rather impatient with North Korea’s uncompromising position as well as China’s seemingly fruitless efforts. As far as the United States and its allies are concerned, the time for diplomacy is not endless. However, despite all the difficulties and apparent impasse in the present Korean crisis, the Sino-US cooperation could only be a win-win situation, not only for the interest of the two countries, but also for the East Asian region as well as for the whole world community. The United States’ role as a peacemaker has been summed up by Calder: ‘Stabilizing the Sino-Japanese relationship is crucial for both region and the world. Doing so is a matter primarily for China and Japan, but there is an important role for the United States as well. The United States must honor its vital alliance with Japan. Yet it will also have to transcend its ‘hub and spoke’ diplomacy and recognize that many issues need multilateral treatment. If it can do so, the United States will indeed be the ‘essential power’ in Asia, as its diplomatic rhetoric has so often claimed’.8 Christians and churches in East Asia as peacemakers In both political and military terms the respective roles of the United States and China as peacemakers for the world community could hardly be replaced. However, human communities and organizations, even individuals, other than countries, could also have a role to play in peacemaking, including churches and individual Christians in the East Asian region. South Korea has a population of about 46 million, of which more than 25% are Christians. Both in percentage as well as in solid figures it is one of the largest in Asia. It is therefore not surprising that Christianity has very considerable impact and influence in practically all aspects of Korean life, including top political leadership. In 1997, Kim Dae Joon, a Roman Catholic, was elected President of the country, and the current Prime Minister, Ms Han Myeong Sook,

8 K.E.Calder, ‘Sino-Japanese energy relations: Prospects for deepening strategic competition’, Foreign Affairs, 3 (2006): 1 – 11.

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nicknamed ‘Gentle Charisma’, is a committed Christian who has a strong background in theological education. While the number of Christians in China is still rather small in proportion to the huge Chinese population of 1.3 billion, its estimated figure of about 40 million is clearly one of the largest, not only in Asia but also in the world. However, for obvious socio-political reasons, its role is presently very limited. In terms of statistics, the Japanese Christians constitute only 1% of the total population. However, in social reform and many sectors of Japanese society and life, Christian influence and presence are very significant and considerable. What has been said is simply meant to indicate that in peace and reconciliation, Christianity in East Asia, whether as communities or individuals, could have very significant and much needed roles to play as peacemakers. Some hopeful signs Despite China’s great displeasure with Koizumi’s provocation which is largely responsible for the estranged relations between China and Japan, the Chinese leadership is still committed to improving it. On July 4 Chinese President Hu Jintao called for serious joint efforts by the two countries to remove political obstacles and bring bilateral ties back on track ‘as early as possible’. Hu expressed his wish at a most recent meeting in Beijing with Mr Ichiro Ozawa, leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party of the country. Mr Hu believed ‘it is of extreme importance’ that the two estranged countries ‘strengthen dialogue and exchanges between politicians and political parties … and advance mutual political confidence’. During the meeting, China’s top leader again singled out Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which remains a symbol of Japanese militarism, as the main obstacle between the two countries.9 Mr Lin Chong-Pin, a former Deputy Defence Minister of Taiwan, currently the president of the Foundation of Cross-Straits and International Studies in Taipei, expressed his hope for improvement in the Sino-Japanese relation in an article he contributed to The Straits Times, ‘Sino-Japan Ties: An Optimist’s Viewpoint’.10 The article held that military and other tensions would eventually wane and give way to economic cooperation between the two countries, as China had already replaced the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner since 2004. The article also believed that Japan’s recent trade with China ‘probably pulled Japan out of its decade-long recession’. It cited some examples to show that the economic and other factors had been ‘reshaping Japanese opinion – away from hostility and towards accommodating China’. Tsuneo Watanabe, Japan’s media baron and publisher of the influential Yomiuri Shimbu, who had earlier advocated the Shrine visits, already began voicing opposition to it in June last year. Even Nippon Izokukai, the organization for offspring of the soldiers interred at the Shrine, had also indicated its willingness not to insist on any more visits by the Japanese Premier. Keizai Douyukai, one of the country’s leading business associations, also pleaded against the visits in May this year. More

9 The Straits Times, 5 July 2006, p. 8. 10 The Straits Times, 5 July 2006, p. 21.

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political leaders had joined in, including eight former Japanese Prime Ministers. Even Koizumi’s loyal supporter, the allegedly ‘hawkish’ Foreign Minister, Taro Aso had told NHK on February 20 that if elected Prime Minister in the coming September, he might not visit the controversial Shrine. In search of a common identity? Peace and reconciliation are presently very pressing issues between the two Koreas, between Mainland China and Taiwan, between Japan and the two Koreas, and between Japan and Mainland China. A great deal of obstacles obviously has to be dealt with and overcome before peace and reconciliation can be realized in the region. Some of the obstacles are essentially historical, such as the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula and its invasion of China, including its occupation of Taiwan, before the end of World War II. Some are basically ideological, such as the Korean situation. Some are both historical and ideological, such as the cross-straits conflict between Mainland China and Taiwan. Others are clearly military and security matters, such as the military alliance between the United States, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, so that North Korea’s nuclear capability and the most recent missile test-firing (early July 2006) have caused such great alarm, not only to the region, but also to the entire world community. In the midst of all these tensions and conflicts, it is significant to observe that in the cases of Mainland China and North Korea, and of Japan and Taiwan respectively, ideological or political considerations have obviously taken priority over the ethnic factor. And the present cordial relations between Mainland China and South Korea seems to suggest that certain realistic and pragmatic considerations are more important than ideological and ethnic differences. Whatever differences there are, one crucial reality does fortunately and clearly exist in the East Asian region, which holds out a great deal of hope in our ‘search of a common identity’. This is the cultural heritage shared between the Chinese, Koreans and the Japanese, especially in language, religion, philosophy, literature and arts. A common identity in these areas already began to emerge as early as the early centuries of the Christian era. Cultural exchanges and mutual enrichment between the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese reached its great heights during the T’ang period (7th to 9th centuries). This is a great historical reality that no one could possibly deny or ignore. A joint exhibition of Chinese and Japanese calligraphies was held at the Shanghai Museum in the spring of 2006. Like John Wesley’s experience on 24 May 1738 in Aldersgate Street in London, as an overseas Chinese, the present writer also felt his ‘heart strangely warmed’ while reading the Preface of the Director of Tokyo’s National Museum to the Exhibition Catalogue, in which the Japanese Director generously acknowledges Japan’s indebtedness to China for the gift of the Chinese written characters (respectively known as kanji in Japanese and hanbun in Korean), including the Chinese calligraphy which is still very much being cherished by educated Japanese as well as Koreans today, besides the Chinese themselves. The influence of the written Chinese language on the East Asian Region has been so widespread and abiding that even to this very day it is completely possible for the educated Chinese, Koreans and Japanese to communicate quite intelligibly and

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effectively together simply by writing down the Chinese characters without uttering a single word! Such ‘common identity’ is obviously very hard to find in other contexts. Although the Japanese and the Koreans have already been using their own respective scripts for a relatively long period of time now, young Japanese and Koreans who are keen to acquire the Chinese language are clearly on the rise for reasons which require no further elaboration. It is to be hoped that this old lingua franca of the past could once again serve as a positive bond of the region, rather than a divisive force, just as the English language is doing in an increasingly globalized world. Some concluding remarks This paper seeks to provide a Biblical perspective for discussion on peace and reconciliation. The Biblical perspective provided in this paper would have served a purpose if it could simply cause people not to forget that there is a spiritual or religious dimension to those issues for which we are profoundly concerned. In all the bilateral and multilateral relations of the East Asian region, the United States and China have been deeply involved, not only as major players, but hopefully as crucial peacemakers as well. Despite the complexity of relations between the countries of the region and certain formidable obstacles which are extremely difficult to remove, they are still signs of hope for peace and reconciliation. For one thing, and happily for the region, there is in fact no real need for the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese to search for a common identity. A common identity in history, culture and language already exists between these peoples, and for more than a thousand and two hundred years it has permeated many aspects of their life. What is needed is therefore not the search of an entirely new common identity, but the appropriation, cherishing, renewal and reinterpretation of those things they already have in common, thereby giving it a new lease of life. I am inclined to think that the prospect of lasting peace and reconciliation in the region depends, to a considerable degree, on the attitude of the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese towards their common identity. Bibliography Calder, K.E. ‘Sino-Japanese Energy Relations: Prospects for deepening Strategic Competition’, Foreign Affairs, 3 (2006), pp.1 – 11. Huy-Tak, Y. (ed), The Contemporary and Modern History of the Three Nations of East Asia (Beijing: China Social Sciences Academic Press, 2006). Shanghai Evening Post, 18 May 2006. The Straits Times, 27 May 2006. The Straits Times , 3 July 2006. The Straits Times, 5 July 2006. The Straits Times, 12 July 2006. The Straits Times, 23 July 2006.

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Chapter 5

Religion as a Tool for Waging Peace: Theoretical Perspectives in the Context of Bosnia-Herzegovina Pauline Kollontai

Introduction Today in many parts of the world people are divided from one another on the basis of nationalist, ethnic and/or religious rivalries. These rivalries are frequently passed from generation to generation as seen in the examples of Northern Ireland, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Religion is often present in various ways in conflict situations. There are various schools of thought regarding religion and its function in society generally. One perspective is expressed by Karl Marx who argues that religion is an expression of material realities and economic injustice. Religion is not the disease, but merely a symptom. It is used by oppressors to make people feel better about the distress they experience due to being poor and exploited. This is the origin of his comment that religion is the opium of the people. 1 A contemporary thinker, Richard Dawkins, also sees religion as dangerous because it can cause divisions between people. 2 He argues ‘To fill a world with religions of the Abrahamic kind, is like littering the streets with loaded guns. Do not be surprised if they are used’. 3 Other perspectives which are much less critical towards the function of religion within society will be discussed in the first section of this chapter. Since 9/11 in the United States and 7/7 in the UK there has been a growing recognition that religion can have both a negative and positive influence in domestic and international politics. That it has taken such extreme events to awaken the Western powers to the influence of religion in times of crisis is perhaps an indication of a failure that they have failed to appreciate that the process of modernisation and secularisation has not made religion an insignificant factor. In reality, according to specific context, religion in the modern era is seen by many as a potent force in times of both peace and war. Religion helps to construct a ‘perspective’, a system of meaning, through which people view both the micro and macro aspects of their own life experience, that of their tribe, community, nation, in relation to the ‘other’. Religion can be used as a legitimising force both in national and international 1 K. Marx, (written in 1844) Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Cambridge, 1970), p. 6. 2 R. Dawkins, The Devil’s Chaplain (London, 2004). 3 R. Dawkins, ‘Religion’s Misguided Missiles’, The Guardian, 15 September 2001.

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politics: religion is a double-edged sword. Religions are complex in nature and content which means, ‘that they can be used to support both violent warlike policies as well as peaceful benevolent policies’. 4 So, what are the aspects of religion that can be utilised towards the prevention or resolution of conflict, or in the aftermath of war, or as a force for peace? This chapter will begin by exploring some of the thinking about the dual nature of religion and the facets of this dualism which can be utilised in war or peace. These views will be looked at to help identify how religion can contribute to peace building and what are the major obstacles to this role being fulfilled. Examples of the peace work of people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, motivated by their religious belief, will be explored in relation to this issue. Overall the purpose of this chapter is to take up the challenge and help ‘overcome one-sided perspectives on religion, acknowledging not only its darker sides, but also its potential for contributing positively to peacemaking’.5 The dual nature of religion In the area of peace studies it is recognised by Boulding and Galtung that there are two contrasting cultures in religious traditions. Boulding speaks of ‘the holy war and peaceable garden culture in religion’,6 whilst Galtung says, ‘Every religion contains, in varying degrees, elements of the soft and the hard’. 7 This dual nature of religion is described by Scott Appleby: ‘Religion is a source not only of intolerance, human rights violations and extremist violence, but also of non-violent conflict transformation, the defence of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided societies’. 8 This dualistic nature is argued by Appleby to result from the fact that most religions are by nature internally pluralistic.9 Therefore, religion can be a source of social cohesion and conflict. Social cohesion has been the focus of attention in the areas of sociology, anthropology, political science and psychology. The classical Structuralist view of religion in society presents religion as having a social basis which is a function and/or reflection of material circumstances and interests. Durkheim’s view is that religion expresses social forces and ideas. He argues that religion in its very essence is social. 4 J. Fox, and S. Sandler, (eds), Bringing Religion in International Relations (New York, 2006), p. 43. 5 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking ( Oslo, 2005), p. 7. 6 E. Boulding,‘Two Cultures of Religion as Obstacles to Peace’,in Zygon, 21/4, Dec 1986, p. 507. 7 J. Galtung, ‘Religion, Hard and Soft’ in Cross Currents, 47/ 4, Winter 1997-98, p. 2. 8 R. Scott Appleby, ‘Religion as an Agent of Conflict Transformation and Peace Building’, in C.A. Crocker, A. Chester, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall, (eds), The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington D.C. 1996), p. 821. 9 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (New York, 2000), pp. 30-32.

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Religious belief and rituals are collective behaviour which relates and incorporates the individual into the larger group and expresses a collective identity. But McGuire points out that religious belief and rituals ‘articulate the unity of the group and serve to separate that group from others’. 10 This is particularly the case for some individuals11 where membership of a religious group provides them with a place where there is a degree of separation from the influences of the dominant society and an environment which provides mutual protection from hostility they may encounter from wider society. Durkheim also argues that religion provides a social group with a basis of moral cohesion. 12 In summary then, Durkheim’s view is that religion helps to sustain society because it emerged out of cultural and social beliefs; religion forms part of the collective conscience; and religion offers people a sense of belonging and identity. According to this perspective religion contributes to social cohesion and integration and may help facilitate the expression of nationhood through a civil religion. However, religion can participate in the destruction of social cohesion because it does assist in accentuating differences and divisions between people in times of crisis when their survival is under threat. Others who have followed the Durkheim perspective include Parsons, whose view of religion’s role in social cohesion is that it had one main function, that of maintaining social order. 13 He explains that religion did this by providing people with answers to why bad things happen in life; by providing comfort when people face difficult events; and by giving people a sense of there being a higher purpose to their existence. Althusser took this a stage further considering religion to be a tool used by the state to control the population.14 Weber was of the opinion that religion could contribute to massive social change, e.g. the Industrial Revolution, and that state religion gave legitimacy and power to government. 15 An example of how religion interacts with the social, economic and political can be seen in the Balkans: Religion is generally considered to be one of the earliest and most fundamental forms of collective distinction. Religious dimension also represents one of the most important factors in the creation of consciousness and politics, especially in the absence of other, more compelling factors. Indeed, religious dimension is considered one of the most enduring factors, persisting even when other factors weaken and vanish.16

10 B.M. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context (Belmont, CA, 1997), p. 189. 11 McGuire is speaking about immigrant groups in particular but I would argue that there are numerous religious groups in society who also face varying levels of rejection and hostility. It can also refer to groups such as the Amish, New Age Groups, Charismatic Christian Groups, Messianic Jews, Hasidic Jews. 12 E. Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York, 1965) p. 22. 13 T. Parsons, The Social System (New York, 1951). 14 L. Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays (London, 1971). 15 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 2nd edition, (London, 1976). 16 M. Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Texas, 2003), p. 12.

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What these latter groups of thinkers highlight is that religion and its influence over people can be used for the purposes of the State. Sometimes religion supports the State by openly aligning itself with government policy, thereby providing the State with a sense of Divine legitimacy. Believers are encouraged to be good citizens by adhering to state policies even if these result in the repression of people’s rights. Religion can also act as a mediator between the State and the people with the aim of creating mutual respect. So the argument that religion has a dual nature in the context of peace and conflict is evidenced throughout history. It is unfortunate that more often than not it is religion’s role in conflict that has dominated the media. What is often overlooked has been the potential of religion to contribute to peace. As Gopin observes, ‘There is an infinite set of possibilities associated with religious institutions and their behaviour in terms of peace and violence. I never cease to be amazed by how the seemingly most violent religious institutions or texts in history give way over time to the most exalted values and moral practices’.17 A realistic perspective must be retained, as Gopin expresses when he writes, ‘At the same time, the most pacifist foundations of tradition can be turned toward the service of the most barbaric aims. It all seems to depend on the complex ways in which the psychological and sociological circumstances and the economic and cultural constructs of a particular group interact with the ceaseless human drive to hermeneutically develop religious meaning systems, texts, rituals, symbols, and laws’.18 So, what is it within religion that can be used for peacemaking? The next section looks at the work of Harpviken and Roislien who identify three primary aspects of religion which they argue can feed both conflict and peace. The triangular aspects of religion Religion as a normative system Religion provides a system of meaning and a framework for action. Religion constitutes a normative system which ‘when accepted, serves as a directive for how each individual believer should live his/her life’ which is presented as the will of a divine transcendent being whose laws, commands, and teachings appear to give life meaning and a framework in which to live.19 There is a cognitive aspect to this normative system in that it can shape the believer’s world view which can then shape or be shaped by aspects of the social order in which he/she lives. So, religion provides an explanation of why things are the way they are and, through its normative aspect, sets out how things should be and what adherents need to do to achieve this ‘divine’ order of things.20 The relevance of the normative system argument to this discussion 17 M. Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking (New York, 2000), p. 11. 18 Ibid., p. 11. 19 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking (Oslo, 2005), p. 8. 20 M. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context (Belmont, 2002), p. 13.

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is that depending on the degree to which the religious system of meaning is closed or open it will affect the individual’s response to potential and actual conflicts. On the face of it this point of view, (taking into account that within a religion and between religions the closed or open factors can vary considerably), seems to provide a convincing argument. However, does this mean that a Muslim, Christian or Jew who has been exposed to strict, traditional religious teaching will want to support or participate in the dehumanisation or death of ‘the other’? The same question needs also to be asked of the religious believer who has been exposed to a more liberal practice of their religion. Are they less likely to support or engage in the dehumanisation or death of ‘the other’? This question is raised because sometimes the world of the theoretician creates a perspective that appears to provide answers but which in reality does not take into account the complexity of religious faith functioning within the life of an individual who exists in a social environment that influences to varying degrees people’s attitudes and actions. In the case of the 1992 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are examples where Muslims who had not been schooled in the teachings of Islam were definitely not practising Muslims, but during the war began to study their religion, attend the Mosque and found teachings in the Qur’an for engaging in war. In this instance it was not the case that these individuals had been indoctrinated over a period of time with traditional Islam but the circumstances they faced radicalised them and drove them back to their religious roots. An example of this is told of Irfan who was in his late twenties when Milosevic came to power in 1987. He had not been brought up with teachings from the Qur’an but with the ‘Crypto-capitalism of Tito’s third way’. 21 Irfan was one of the many Muslims in the former Yugoslavia who witnessed a growth of Milosevic’s political power rooted in a brand of nationalism that particularly exploited Serb fears of Muslims and Islam. It was during the war that Irfan began to engage in depth with his religion by learning Arabic, studying the Qur’an, doing salat, attending the mosque, and observing key Muslim festivals. For example, on the first day of the festival of Eid al-Adha he is seen at the mosque assisting with the ritual slaughter of sheep: ‘Irfan had finished cutting up the first ram ... Irfan brandished his own bloody knife and grinned, ‘Milosevic!’ He mimed hanging the Serbian leaders, headless, from a walnut tree’. 22 The fact that Irfan was not schooled in religious teachings and could be at best described as a nominal Muslim until his late teens shows that in some cases even a short exposure to religious teachings in a particular context can help produce this type of response towards Milosevic. Consider also the example of Friar Ivo Markovic, a Catholic Franciscan Bosnian Croat who was in Sarajevo when the war started in 1992. Friar Ivo, brought up with the traditions and teachings of the Catholic Church, considers himself a practical theologian who initiated various activities during the 1992 war with the Serb and Muslim communities to help restore the positive relationships between religious communities that existed before the war and to use religions as a counterforce 21 B. Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (London, 1994), p. 284. 22 Ibid., p. 285.

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against the hostility and violence. His work was in response to religious leaders whom he saw helping to mobilize for war. ‘Many imams were military leaders, while a number of priests in the Catholic and Orthodox churches blessed weapons. Moreover, religious figures were there to give strength to the armies, moral strength for soldiers to be strong enough to kill.’ 23 Friar Markovic has continued to work in various ways with the Serbian Orthodox and Muslim communities since the end of the war to assist post-war reconciliation in Sarajevo. The importance of his religion is expressed when he states that living a devout, spiritual life, being obedient to God and practising his religious faith is the source of his peacemaking: I always tried to cooperate with people and bring in religious inspiration to our cooperation. I find it is my mission to help people not to forget God. Never have I suggested to people to change their religious community. It is important to obey God, but I find that it is God who gives different roads to people, and He decides who will go on what road ... I cooperated with Christians, Muslims and Vaishnavists without any problems. We prayed together and confessed our faith ... During the war, believers from different religions organised actions inspired with faith.24

The example of Friar Ivo also challenges Harpviken and Roislien’s argument that being exposed to a dogmatic normative system of religion makes it more likely that such individuals will be relatively inflexible to other religions and their followers. Friar Ivo, from the age of five, was schooled in the traditional ways and beliefs of the Catholic Church but this did not produce the response which he witnessed in some of his fellow Catholic colleagues. So why such differences? Perhaps part of the answer lies in the observation that ‘Faith is a personal experience, and not the passion that comes from belonging to a group. In my opinion, the tragedy of the Balkans stemmed from replacement of personal faith with the passions of the group’. 25 A non-religious analysis of this observation is made by Velikonja: From the second half of the nineteenth century, the evolution of the three major national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina was strongly influenced by three major religions – Islam, Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism… Religious affiliation and nationalism often proved to be convenient bedfellows and drew strength from each other. Religious affiliation became the badge of nationalism and nationalism became a sacred duty. 26

What both Markovic and Velikonja are identifying is the second aspect of Harpviken and Roislien’s aspect of religion: religion as identity-forming.

23 I. Markovic, ‘Would You Shoot Me You Idiot?’ in Little, D. (ed), Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, 2007), p. 108. 24 Ibid., p. 115. 25 I. Markovic, ‘Would You Shoot Me You Idiot?’ p. 116. 26 M. Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 15-16.

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Religion forming identity The argument is that ‘Religious belief systems have a particular identity-forming potential. Religion is social, offering the individual a belonging to an experienced or sensed community of fellow believers.27 Religion can also serve as a link with nationhood and nationalism as it provides non-religious events and rituals of a nation, known as civil religion, with a sense of the transcendent. Many civil events or ceremonies (e.g. official opening of the UK parliament each year; Fourth of July celebrations in the USA; Founding of the State of Israel celebrations) have a definite religious sense and quality. There are places of historical and political interest that have become shrines to an individual or an event in the history of a people. Symbolically such places represent ‘the transcendence of the nation as a ‘people’ that inspires awe and reverence’. 28 Civil religion also has its sacred objects, such as the national flag, it has historical figures who are considered to have made a significant contribution to the nation, and it has myths and legends ‘upon which citizens may draw, for both personal meaning and for mobilizing collective sentiment’. 29 Civil religion can provide an overarching sense of collective solidarity and cohesion even in a diverse society. How does it achieve this? According to McGuire it does this by providing ‘a national vision’, giving ‘national solidarity and identity a religious quality’; this then provides a ‘central, unifying cultural experience’ that facilitates the coming together of people from ‘diverse tribal, regional, ethnic and religious groups’.30 The key factor for this to happen is the creation of a firmly grounded sense of cultural nationhood which transcends the boundaries of diversity. If however, civil religion is rooted in some form of tribalism, then social cohesion and collective solidarity is unlikely to take place. Unfortunately, most if not all religion falls into this trap. Despite the Golden Rule concept present in religion, which should facilitate a sense of unity and respect among people, there is also a tribal character embedded in most religions. In the case of Judaism this is a religion that emerges initially with a model of God that is tribal in the way he chooses his people and makes them into a nation. Religion can be linked with nationhood and national identity. According to context and interaction with other identity-forming elements (language, ethnicity, politics, culture etc.) religious belief systems are said ‘to have a particular identity forming potential... Religion tells you where you belong and where to proceed’. 31 On this basis religious identity can be on a variant between inclusive and exclusive. In both cases it would appear that distinct boundaries are present between the insider and the outsider. These boundaries relate to issues of identity – national and ethnic. Religion can nurture nationalism, which in its most negative application can dehumanise, expel or destroy those considered as outsiders within a nation. ‘Religion 27 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, p. 9. 28 B.M. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context, p. 193. 29 Ibid., p. 194. 30 Ibid., p. 196. 31 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, p. 9.

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is a strong basis for identity, particularly when religious difference coincides with other demarcation lines such as ethnic, economic or geographic’. 32 This can be seen in the case of the former Yugoslavia. Throughout its history it consisted of a number of different ethnic peoples, each having their own history, culture, language and religious heritage. Within Yugoslavia the area of BosniaHerzegovina has been throughout its history characterised by conflict and upheaval. It is at a cultural crossing point between East and West, and it is a country coloured by its Islamic, Catholic and Eastern Orthodox heritage. The area now called BosniaHerzegovina had a history of being invaded and conquered. The Romans arrived in the second and first centuries BCE, followed by the Goths in the fourth and fifth centuries CE, and in the sixth century CE the Byzantine Empire claimed it. Slavs began settling the region during the seventh century. Around the year 1200, Bosnia won independence from Hungary and was an independent Christian state for some 260 years. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Balkans in the fourteenth century introduced yet another cultural, political, and religious framework. Many Christian Slavs became Muslim. As the borders of the Ottoman Empire began to shrink in the nineteenth century, Muslims from elsewhere in the Balkans migrated to Bosnia. Joffe argues that as a result, ethnic divides emerged that eventually led to the destruction of the Republic of Yugoslavia. 33 However, throughout the nineteenth century the term Bosnian commonly included residents of all faiths. Eventually Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed to Serbia as part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on October 26, 1918. The name was later changed to Yugoslavia in 1929. After the Second World War, Yugoslavia underwent a political revolution with the establishment of a communist government under the premiership of Tito. Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the six republics and described as ‘a kind of Yugoslavia in miniature with a very mixed national and religious composition’. 34 Under Tito the concept of ‘brotherhood and unity’ became the keystone of creating a Yugoslav identity and a Yugoslav spirit that was aimed to act as a counterweight to ethnic nationalism.35 In one of his speeches Tito stated, ‘You must keep brotherhood and unity as the apple of your eye’. 36 Lydall believes that the concept of brotherhood and unity assisted in the development of a new nationality, the Yugoslav national 32 Ibid., p. 3. 33 J. Joffe, ‘‘Britain’ or ‘Bismarck’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity’, International Security, 19, Spring 1995, p. 82. 34 C. Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath (Westport CT, 2004), p. 10. 35 Ethnicity is usually based on a common sense of ethnic identity, belonging to a particular group or community, usually with historic origins of culture, religion and language. Klemencic and Zagar writing on the diverse peoples of former Yugoslavia point out that in Europe ethnic identity usually includes ‘the traditional territory of settlement of a certain ethnic community. In this context, the autochthonous settlement is usually considered an important element in defining a certain ethnicity’. M. Klemencic, and M. Zagar, The Former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples (Santa Barbara, California, 2003), p. xvi. 36 Cited in V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York, 2002), p. 101.

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identity, amongst these diverse ethnic and religious groups. But Ramet argues that unity amongst the Yugoslavs was maintained through varying degrees of force and manipulation exercised by Tito and the Communist Party over all areas of life.38 The relevance of building a new national identity in the Yugoslav context was that for centuries there had been a ‘traditional conjunction between religious and ethno-national identities’ that in its worse expression exploited the nationality issue, often leading to hostility and war between the various groups.39 The new Yugoslav national identity was intended to replace this conjunction. Building this new identity was accompanied by the development of the Tito Cult and a Civil Religion which appeared to diminish, some said eradicated, the ethno-religious factor. Under the communist system in Yugoslavia a common language and culture was developed but McGuire argues that this did not produce a national sense of self. 40 I would disagree with McGuire and suggest that some degree of a national sense of self and identity did exist but that in the context of political and economic crisis this Yugoslav identity could not withstand the historic allegiance to ethnic and religious concepts of self which appears to have remained dormant. The fight for survival in the Balkans between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians reemerged during the 1990s and allegiance to ethnicity was re-invoked along religious lines. As Little recalls during one of his visits to Bosnia in 1996, one religious leader explained to him, ‘Brother, you must understand, here religion is nationality, religion is ethnicity, religion is everything’. 41 The initial part of the 1990s conflict saw Serbs and Croats fight each other for territory and political power underpinned by the difference in religious allegiance. The Serbian sense of self was historically tied to Eastern Orthodox Christianity whereas the Croatians identified with Roman Catholicism. The Bosnian case was slightly more complex. Although predominantly Muslim, Bosnia was the most mixed area of Yugoslavia in terms of ethnicity and religious affiliation. But the perceived dominance of Islam amongst Bosnians reinvoked the historical Serbian role as protecting Eastern Europe from the spread of Islam. The Yugoslav example confirms how religious identities are either particularly exclusive or inclusive which promotes the concept of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. ‘A religion is meaningful to its insiders, to ‘Us’, and important dimensions of the religion and the religious community are not necessarily accessible to the outsider, to ‘Them’. 42 Fuse this with a context where national and/or ethnic difference in identity is under question or being threatened, then it is clear to see how religion becomes a tool to enforce and exacerbate such differences. The religious history of south Slavic people is an example where the merging of the concept of nation with religion produced 37 H. Lydall, Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice (New York, 1984), p.282. 38 S. P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1991 (Bloomington, 1992), pp. 42-48. 39 V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, p. 101. 40 B.M. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context, p. 196. 41 USIP Research Briefing, Can Religion Heal Bosnia ? (Washington D.C., 1996), p. 1. 42 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, p. 10.

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the nationalisation of religions ‘or the subjection of religious universalisms to tribal or ethnic ideas’. 43 Characteristic of religion in Bosnia is ‘its synthetic and eclectic nature’ which resulted at times in ‘the evolution of heterodoxy rather than religious orthodoxy’, but during times of difficulty people of the same religion would combine forces. 44 In the Balkans even territorial divisions were often identified with a particular religion: the Drina River served as a demarcation line at different points in Balkan history between Eastern and Western Christendom.45 Therefore, religion provides a value system of how to think and act. This value system can be seen as the ultimate understanding of the Divine Truth. This can then provide believers with a world view that establishes the concept of the ‘Outsider’ or ‘The Other’ in relation to ‘Us’. For religion and its value system to be experienced within a society there has to be a vehicle for delivering the teaching and values. This is done through some form of organisation. This leads us to the third aspect of religion identified by Harpviken and Roislien. Religion as organisation This may be a formal or non-formal expression of religious organisation. The key issues are the type or form of organisation through which a religion is presented and the level of dependence that an individual believer has on the religious organisation. As with any organisation the structure can vary greatly from being very hierarchical, where decisions are made by the leaders with little if any input from the people at grass-roots level to a much more devolved or ‘entirely flat structure’.46 Often the hierarchical form of organisation is predominantly patriarchal in its character, role and function. Within the world of religion the traditional structure of the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches are two examples. Within Judaism, Ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox types of Judaism are managed and expressed through a hierarchical and patriarchal organisation of leadership. Linked to the character of the organisational form is how the individual member relates to the organisation. The issue here is ‘the extent to which religion becomes all-encompassing to the members, overshadowing all other aspects of their lives, or whether it is seen as separate from other aspects of life, which tends to moderate the role of religious commitment’. 47

43 M. Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 12 . 44 M. Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 16. 45 Ibid., p. 14. 46 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, p. 11. 47 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, p. 11.

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Using these two dimensions of structure and dependence Harpviken and Roislien propose four general organisational types: (a) Sectarian organisations;48 (b) Cultic organisations;49(c) Denominational organisations;50 (d) Churchly organisations.51 Looking again to the role of religious organisations in former Yugoslavia there is evidence to support Harpviken and Roislien’s perspective. A growth of interest in religion occurred from the 1970s onwards and in some cases the face of religio-ethno nationalism was visible. In Croatia during the early 1970s the Croatian National Movement found support amongst the clergy of the Catholic Church. Then in 1981 the Marian apparitions at Medjugorje fuelled deteriorating Catholic-Orthodox relations. Serbs and the Orthodox Church felt that the apparitions represented Croatian nationalism as expressed particularly through returning to the Ustasism of World War II. The Serbian Orthodox church and its adherents, who were a minority, felt under threat in Kosovo from the late 1960s onwards as ethnic Albanians staged protests against the extension of the Serb minority rule in Kosovo. The Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade made a public protest in Belgrade on behalf of its Kosovo Serb brethren which the Yugoslav government described as a ‘Nationalistic provocation’ which was opposed to ‘government policies of national equality in Kosovo and Macedonia’.52 The Orthodox Church leadership identified Islamic fundamentalism as the driving force behind the Kosovo crisis. So, despite the fact that during the 1970s the Orthodox Patriarch Germanus expressed in many of his public addresses support for Tito’s idea of and tolerance to all Yugoslavs, the Communist Party at its Central Committee League meeting in 1972 expressed its concerns about what was seen as nationalistic tendencies in the Serbian Orthodox Church: The Church resents the policy of a greater equality among Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic minorities... Now the Serbian Orthodox Church claims that is has been for centuries not only a religious but also a political organisation and is being called upon, one more time in the history of the Serbs, to defend and lead its people, because no one else seems capable of defending Serbian national interest. The Church actually wants to lead, that is, 48 Sectarian organisations described as: ‘exclusive; having a normative virtuosity in its character; based on a strong feeling of dissent against the rest of society; members are highly dependent on the organisation; the beliefs and values of the organisation encompass all aspects of life; the structure varies from extremely hierarchic to a devolved structure which in either case has one dominant leader’. Ibid., p. 11. 49 Cultic organisations described as: ‘pluralist and not promoting exclusiveness; no assertion of unique legitimacy; members’ dependency varies; the beliefs and values of the organisation do not encompass all aspects of members’ lives; the structure is the same as for the Sectarian organisation’. Ibid., p. 11. 50 Denominational organisations described as: ‘pluralist and inclusive in character; separation of the religious from other aspects of life; members have a moderate dependency on the organisation; the structure is usually hierarchical’. Ibid., p. 11. 51 Churchly organisations described as: ‘promoting ‘mass standard religiosity’; the role of religion within the context of a general religious commitment, is incorporated with everyday life; members have a low dependence on the organisation; the structure is hierarchical’. Ibid., p. 11. 52 V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States , p. 45 .

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By the late 1980s tensions between the three religious groups had intensified. Both Islam and Catholicism were perceived by the Serb Church and political leaders as a growing threat to the Serb people and their religious beliefs. The Serbs perceived a threat from Islam from the late 1960s onwards because of a visible expansion of Islam in terms of the building of numerous new mosques, the opening of Islamic Schools in Sarajevo and Macedonia and a growing presence of imams, hafezs and other religious teachers. Then during the 1980s there was a rise of religious nationalism amongst a section of the Bosnian Muslims led by Alija Izetbegovic which promoted anti-communist sentiments. By the late 1980s the articulation of Serb fears of Islam and Islamic expansionism was expressed by politicians and the press. At the meeting in 1989 of the Committee for Religious Affairs of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia it was claimed by the Serbian politician Stankovic that ‘the Sarajevo movement of imams is dominated by Islamic extremists and under the influence of the international Islamic factor’. 54 The tensions and fears between Serbia and Bosnia increased in 1989 when Izetbegovic founded the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), an Islamic national party in Bosnia. Despite the more cautionary voices from within the Bosnian Muslim community against the PDA and its nationalist agenda dedicated to the idea of ethnic nationhood and an Islamic Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic continued his rise to power. In November 1990 at the first democratic multi-party elections Izetbegovic was elected to the eight-member presidency and he was appointed its head by the other seven members in December 1990. The apparent harmonisation of ethnic relations and the presence of a panYugoslav nationalism was less rooted in the minds and hearts of the Yugoslavs than was thought to be the case. This became all too apparent after the death of President Tito in 1980, as a political vacuum emerged aggravated by economic uncertainty, triggering once again the suspicions and fears between the various ethnic groups. As uncertainties grew among the various groups about their status and security so did the political struggle. It was in this context and against the disintegration of the Eastern Communist bloc that demands for independence initially came from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. In 1990 Serb uprisings spread throughout Croatia, backed by the Serbian-led government of Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade. In December 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia and asked for recognition by the European Union (EU). In a March 1992 referendum, Bosnian voters chose independence, and President Izetbegovic declared the nation an independent state. Unlike the other former Yugoslav states, which were generally composed of a dominant ethnic group, Bosnia was an ethnic mix of Muslims (44%), Serbs (31%), and Croats (17%). Attempting to carve out their own enclaves, the Serbian minority, with the help of the Yugoslav army, 53 V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, p. 54. 54 Ibid., p. 84.

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began its campaigns of ethnic cleansing, which involved the expulsion or massacre of Muslims. Croats also began carving out their own communities. By the end of August 1992, rebel Bosnian Serbs had conquered over 60% of Bosnia. During the 1992-1995 war Bosnia’s complex religious and cultural heritage became a target for destruction by those wishing to enforce a mono-ethnic country. It involved a programme of ethnic cleansing and a systematic attempt to eliminate the cultural inheritance and symbols of a particular group (Muslims) with the intention not only of denying their historic existence but of discouraging their return. The three religious groups in this example show, as Harpviken and Roislien state, that the sectarian, cultic and denominational can be present within a churchly organisation. To some extent this may be already obvious. In some sense all Harpviken and Roislien have done with this part of their theory is to remind us that within a religion ‘there are a number of various interpretations and congregations with different types of organisational structure and varying degrees of dependence’. 55 However, in stating the obvious they have laid bare the reality of the complexity of religion when placed in context alongside other aspects of life and that religion does have a dual nature in terms of the capacity to promote war and peace. The section which follows looks at two religious organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to examine how religion can be used against violence and conflict. La Benevolencia and Merhamet: caring for the religious other In the break-up of Yugoslavia and the hostilities waged between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians between 1991 and 1995, religion is generally identified as not being a root cause of the situation but was a significant factor because of the nationalisation of religion.56 The role of religion in the Bosnian war is described as ‘both and obvious and invisible’.57 The obvious dimension was that ‘both perpetrators and victims of organised atrocities were identified by their religious tradition’, and the invisible dimension was ‘that the religious manifestations were viewed either as incidental or as masks for deeper, social, political and economic issues; or else categorised exclusively as aspects of ethnicity’.58 The warning is against allowing religion to be co-opted by, or aligning itself to any form of aggressive nationalist ideology that

55 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, p. 11. 56 See N. Herzfield, ‘Lessons from Srebrenica: The Danger of Religious Nationalism’, in Journal of Religion and Society, Supplement Series 2, 2007, pp. 110-116; V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States; G.F. Powers, ‘Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia’, in Journal of International Affairs, 50, 1996, pp. 20-26; M. Sells, ‘Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion and Violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, in Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 1-22. 57 Sells, M. ‘Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion and Violence in BosniaHerzegovina’, p. 20. 58 K.B. Harpviken and H.E. Roislien, Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, p. 20.

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seeks the exile or destruction of the other because of religious, ethnic or national difference. For here lies a pathway of suffering, pain and even genocide. More could be said about how certain prominent people within the Serbian Orthodox church and the Croatian Catholic church used religious rhetoric, mythology and language which stirred the historical fears about how they saw each other across the religious divide, and in particular how both viewed the Bosnian Muslims. However, the aim of this section is to focus on those members of religious communities who refused to engage with the agenda of prejudice and fear of the other and instead reached out in practical ways across the ethno-religious divide. The first example is of La Benevolencia, founded in 1892, as a Jewish educational, cultural and humanitarian society.59 During the Bosnian war it provided aid to all people in Sarajevo, regardless of religion. The Jewish community in Sarajevo maintained relatively good relations with both types of Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs, and had much more freedom of movement in helping people in and out of the city and in the delivery of aid than did some of the other groups. Its main activities at this time was operating a soup kitchen, a pharmacy, delivery of mail, and distributing food, clothing and other forms of aid. Some aspects of the work of La Benevolencia placed its members in difficult situations as with the monthly collection of food, medicine and other supplies from Split, in Croatia. This was the nearest place to which international aid could be flown into the region as the main airport in Sarajevo had been completely destroyed. The two-truck convoy involved a journey on roads that were hazardous because of the war and getting through numerous checkpoints either controlled by Serbs, Croats or Muslims. Jakob Finci recalls these journeys: ‘Unexpectedly they all agreed on one thing: they had nothing against the Jews. Moreover, even the soldiers knew we were helping everyone. It was very difficult. There would be about 38 checkpoints held by different militias, many of them drunk... You had to pull out the right piece of paper with the right authorisation - or you’d be dead’. 60 Dragiva Levi, a member of La Benevolencia recalls how with the help of Jews and their communities across Europe and beyond that some relief was provided for everyone - Jews, Muslims, Croatians and Serbs: For example, in 1993 La Benevolencia in Sarajevo distributed more than 50 percent of the medicine. We opened soup kitchens, we had a First Aid Department with physicians and nurses, three pharmacies in the town and a home care programme for old people people really in need, who without our help for sure wouldn’t have survived. One other interesting thing: In the beginning of the war some Jewish children, members of the community, came and we suddenly started a Sunday school. Now they asked: ‘I have my best friend nearby, he is Muslim or he is Croatian. May I bring him too?’ Our answer was

59 The existence of a Jewish community in Bosnia can be traced back to the sixteenth century consisting of both Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews. 60 B. Mooney, ‘Imprisoned in Paradise: The Jews of Sarajevo’, The Times Magazine, 30 November 1996, p. 8.

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‘Yes.’ So together they learned about Jewish tradition and history. And then we did the same with the young people of our community. 61

These examples of the work of La Benevolencia shows that this small Jewish community refused to take sides in a war between Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Instead they turned their Sarajevo Jewish community centre into a non-sectarian aid agency with over fifty volunteers – Serbs, Croats, Muslims and Jews operating humanitarian services. This apolitical stance was demonstrated with an incident which occurred in July 1995. A mortar shell hit the top floor of the Jewish community centre in Sarajevo. Fortunately no one was hurt. Jacob Finci, president of La Benevolencia and Ivan Ceresnjes, community president, received telephone calls from both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government. Each blamed the other side for the attack. Finci and Ceresnjes refused to speculate on which group was responsible for the assault and stated that in spite of the mortar attack, ‘We're still feeding people every day, whether they are Jews, Croats, Serbs or Muslims’. 62 The President of La Benevolencia, speaking after the end of the war emphasised the importance of justice, forgiveness and reconciliation: We have to tell people that reconciliation is the only way. The war criminals have to be punished; justice must be done and they will be punished. But we cannot wait for that. In all the holy books it says you have to forgive. Nor forget. But forgiveness is necessary if we are to live together. Without that - maybe there will be partition. Bosnia will be divided into three ghettos - and through Jewish history we know that the ghetto cannot bring happiness. 63

Since the end of the war in 1995 La Benevolencia continues to offer some of its services, e.g. visiting sick and elderly people, doing laundry or shopping and just talking with them; operating the health clinic; offering educational and cultural activities; and participating in inter-religious forums. It is described as having ‘gained enormous respect’ for the help it provided during the conflict and ‘is perceived as a positive actor in the process of reconciliation.’ 64 The second example is of Merhamet, a Muslim humanitarian organisation originally founded in Sarajevo during 1913. It had been banned by the Yugoslav government during the 1960s but after the democratic elections in 1990, the activities of Merhamet were once again set in motion in 1991. During the war Merhamet was involved in many of the same activities as La Benevolencia, e.g. food distribution, running a soup kitchen, bringing in food convoys and visiting the sick and elderly. It also ran a prosthetic centre, funded by a number of international bodies, for people who lost limbs during the conflict. The types of devices it offered included 61 D. Levi, ‘La Benevolencia: A Multi-Religious Jewish vision’, Bet Deborah, 2, 2001, p. 89. 62 E. Serropta, ‘Sarajevo’s Jewish Centre Damaged in First Shelling’, in Jewish News Weekly of Northern California, 14 July 1995. 63 B. Mooney, ‘Imprisoned in Paradise: The Jews of Sarajevo’, The Times Magazine, p. 9. 64 Peuraca, B. Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Washington D.C., 2003), p. 7.

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prosthetics for arms, feet, hands, legs, and devices for vision. It also offered a range of physical therapy such as movement exercises, gait training, care for residual limbs and occupational therapy. It was also recognised that people having been physically maimed may require and benefit from the help of social workers and psychologists. Another area of Merhamet’s work which grew after the end of the war was helping individuals to re-build their lives through administering Relief Loans provided by the international organisation Islamic Relief. These loans are examples of microfinance used within the context of Islamic teaching on economics found in the Qur’an which categorically prohibits charging interest on loans or cash advances. 65 One example is that of Sida, a Bosnian woman whose husband and son were killed during the 1990s war. Her two-storey house was also destroyed but Sida was determined to return after the war and rebuild her life. With a Relief Loan she has built a small wooden house for her and her daughter and begun to grow fruit and vegetables on a small plot of land that provides her with food and the excess products she sells which generates a small income. 66 Merhamet works closely with Caritas, the Catholic Relief Organisation run by Franciscans in Sarajevo, and also La Benevolencia. Merhamet’s policy is to work across the ethno-religious boundaries, as staff explained: ‘We never ask the name of the person in need. Everybody is welcome here. It is in the Muslim tradition that when you give, you should not pay attention to whom you are giving and you should never expect anything in return’.67 A worker at Merhamet was on one occasion questioned by Serb soldiers who wanted to know who Merhamet was helping. Was it only Muslims or others as well? From the lists he had the Serbs could see that Merhamet was helping everyone. ‘And they could see what my opinions were, that is, that we are all children of God and that we are all brothers and sisters. And as such, we are required and obliged to help each other and to help those who are in need’. 68 Evidence of Merhamet’s work across the communities is told by Vladimir Srebov,69 a Bosnian Serb in Sarajevo during the war. He is reported as saying that many of the 80,000 Serbs who remained in Sarajevo survived because of the work 65 C. Segrado, Islamic Microfinance and Socially Responsible Investments, (Torino, 2005), pp. 8-9. 66 Islamic Relief, Annual Report (Birmingham, 2005), p. 5. 67 B. Peuraca, Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 7. 68 International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) for the Former Yugoslavia, Tribunal Transcript for 13 May 2003, New York, UN Archive, p. 2930. 69 Valdimir Srebov was one of the founding members of the Serbian Democratic Party. After Karadzic became leader and began pursuing his policy of building a Greater Serbia, Srebov distanced himself from the Party and at one point met with Karadzic to try and get him to stop the policy of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. In an interview in 1995 he remembers, ‘I had come under tremendous pressure to accept a plan which, as I was subsequently to learn, had been drawn up not in 1990, but in the 1980s. This was the famous ‘Ram Plan’, the aim of which was to destroy Bosnia economically and completely exterminate its Muslim people. I was terribly shocked. I am not exaggerating when I say that I felt terrible pain when I heard about this from people who had been my friends for almost twenty years. The plan was drawn up in the 1980s by the General Staff of what was then the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). It

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of two organisations in particular: Merhamet and Caritas. Since the end of the war Merhamet has continued with some of its services because there is much poverty not only in Sarajevo but throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also involves itself in interreligious forums to promote the process of reconciliation. A new development in the work of both La Benevolencia and Merhamet is their public advocacy both at home and internationally of the needs of the Bosnian people to help the process of reconciliation to move forward. The presidents of both these organisations are active in the Truth and Reconciliation Committee set up after the war in Sarajevo. Both organisations committed themselves to continue to help in practical ways to reduce the continuing poverty which the Bosnian people face ten years after the Dayton Peace Agreement. At an International Conference held in Sarajevo in October 2005 the Presidents of Benevolencia and Merhamet were amongst a number of other religious-based organisations that discussed the ongoing economic crisis and signed a document making recommendations to the Bosnian government and authorities. The key sentiment of the document was that all government policies should aim to promote the wellbeing of all people and protect a person’s human dignity through a process of social, economic and political reforms that ‘should be based on the guarantee of a functioning democratic structure, the application of the rule of law, and the provision of equal opportunities for all citizens, regardless of their national, religious or other forms of affiliation’. 71 This brief look at the work of these two religious-based organisations shows that it is possible for religion to contribute to reducing the effects of war and in the aftermath play an important role in the reconciliation and peace-building process. Their work, whilst predominantly practical in nature, is contributing to inter-religious dialogue and interpersonal reconciliation. But the members of both organisations realise that achieving a lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a task fraught with difficulties and that it is a daunting one given the physical and economic damage as well as the psychological trauma left as a consequence of the 1991-1995 conflict. Conclusion The aim of the chapter was to reflect on the nature and character of religion in relation to its presence and contribution either to conflict or peace. The reality that religion has a dual nature and has three key triangular aspects is of significant importance if we are to understand how, why, when and where religion is more likely to be a tool used to support war or a tool used to support peace. There is not space here to analyse the work of La Benevolencia and Merhamet to clarify in what conflict-situations religious-based peace-building is more appropriate envisaged a division of Bosnia into two spheres of interest, leading to the creation of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia. 70 A. Kulenovic,‘An Interview with Vladimir Srebov: A Founding Member of the Serbian Democratic Party’, in Vreme, 30 October 1995. 71 Caritas Europa, Caritas BK BiH, Merhamet, Dobrotvor, La Benevolencia, International Conference on ‘Poverty in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten tears after the Dayton Peace Agreement’, Final Document and Recommendations, (Sarajevo, 2005), p. 7.

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and influential than the work of secular-based peace-building. However, what is shown is that the individuals who worked for both organisations did not use their religion to create and enforce divisions between the various communities in Sarajevo during the conflict. Both organisations demonstrate that religious-based organisations of this kind can rise above their religious and ethnic identities, bring groups together, and make an effective contribution to reconciliation through the building of long-term relationships which are absolutely critical to post-conflict peace in the country. Using the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to explore the potential of religion as a tool to wage peace helps to challenge the perspective that religion can only exacerbate or sometimes cause conflict and is therefore dangerous. Hopefully the presentation of the peace work of religiously motivated Bosnians helps also challenge the stereo-typing of Bosnia and the wider area of the Balkans as, ‘a realm of preternatural barbarism, ludicrous ambitions, congenital perfidy, inveterate cruelty and unfathomable complexity’.72 Such stereotyping can breed a response from the rest of the world, to some extent expressed by European states in the Bosnian conflict of 1992-1995, of being ‘ill equipped’ to prevent or stop the various wars in this region and of adopting an attitude that ‘south eastern Europeans are unworthy either of serious attention or of sympathetic consideration’.73 The work of those presented in this chapter shows that such stereo-typing is unfounded. Therefore, the challenge to the rest of the world, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other areas of the former Yugoslavia, is to actively help support the process of reconciliation and peace-building in ways considered appropriate by the Bosnian people themselves. Bibliography Althusser, L.‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays,( London: New Left Books, 1971). Appleby, R. Scott. ‘Religion as an Agent of Conflict Transformation and Peace Building’, in Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, F.O., and Aall, P., (eds), The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996. Appleby, R. Scott. (2000), The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). Boulding, E. ‘Two Cultures of Religion as Obstacles to Peace’, in Zygon, 21/4, Dec 1986, pp. 501-518. Caritas Europa, Caritas BK BiH, Merhamet, Dobrotvor, La Benevolencia, International Conference on ‘Poverty in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten tears after the Dayton Peace Agreement’, Final Document and Recommendations, (Sarajevo: 2005). Dawkins, R. The Devil’s Chaplain,( London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2004). Dawkins, R. ‘Religion’s misguided missiles’, The Guardian, 15 September 2001.

72 M. Wheeler, ‘Not so Black as it’s Painted: the Balkan Political Heritage’, in F.W.Carter, and H.T. Norris, (eds), The Changing Shape of the Balkans ( Boulder, Colorado,1996 ), p. 1. 73 Ibid., p. 2.

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Durkheim,E. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Tr. Swain, J.W. (New York: Free Press, 1965). Fox, J., Sandler, S., (eds), Bringing Religion in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Galtung, J. ‘Religion, Hard and Soft’, in Cross Currents, Winter 1997-98, 47/4, pp. 2-8. Gopin, M. Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking ( New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000). Hall, B. The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (London: Minerva Press, 1994). Harpviken K.B. and Roislien, H.E. Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking, (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, State of the Art Paper, 2005). Herzfield, N. ‘Lessons from Srebrenica: The Danger of Religious Nationalism’, pp. 110-116, in Journal of Religion and Society, Supplement Series 2, 2007. International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) for the Former Yugoslavia, Tribunal Transcript for 13 May 2003, New York, UN Archive. Islamic Relief, Annual Report, (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide Publications, 2005). Joffe, J. ‘‘Britain’ or ‘Bismarck’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity’, International Security, 19, Spring 1995, pp. 79-88. Kulenovic, A. ‘An Interview with Vladimir Srebov: A Founding Member of the Serbian Democratic Party’, in Vreme, 30 October 1995. Klemencic, M. and Zagar, M. The Former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2003). Levi, D. ‘La Benevolencia: A Multi-Religious Jewish Vision’, Bet Deborah, No.2, 2001, pp. 89-90. Lydall, H. Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984). McGuire, B.M. Religion: The Social Context (Belmont, CA,: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997). McGuire, M. Religion: The Social Context, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002) Marx, K., (written 1844), Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970 edition). Markovic, I. ‘Would You Shoot Me You Idiot?’ in Little, D., (ed), Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). Mooney, B. ‘Imprisoned in Paradise: The Jews of Sarajevo’, The Times Magazine, 30 November 1996. Parsons, T. The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951). Perica, V. Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Peuraca, B. Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Special Reports, 2003).

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Powers, G.F. ‘Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia’, in Journal of International Affairs, 50, 1996, pp.20-26. Ramet, S.P. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1991, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). Rogel, C. The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath, Revised Edition, (Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 2004). Segrado, C. Islamic Microfinance and Socially Responsible Investments (Torino, MEDA Project publications, 2005). Sells, M. ‘Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion and Violence in BosniaHerzegovina’, in Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 1-22. Serropta, E. ‘Sarajevo’s Jewish Centre Damaged in First Shelling’, in Jewish News Weekly of Northern California, 14 July 1995. USIP Research Briefing, Can Religion Heal Bosnia? (Washington D.C.: USIP publications, 1996). Velikonja, M. Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Texas: A & M University Press, 2003). Weber, M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976). Wheeler, M. ‘Not so Black as it’s Painted: the Balkan Political Heritage’, in Carter, F.W., & Norris, H.T., (eds), The Changing Shape of the Balkans (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 1-8.

Chapter 6

Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland Cecelia Clegg

Introduction The process of making peace in conflict and post-conflict situations is complex and fraught with difficulty. It also has to happen at a number of different levels, if it is to be sustainable. The arguments that I will put forward in this article are: first, that societal reconciliation rather than political reconciliation is the key to sustainability and secondly, that a process of societal reconciliation after prolonged division and violent conflict requires a renegotiation of identities and the courage to embrace the threatening other. Of course, the simplicity of these statements masks a myriad of complexities. At the very least they invite the questions: what is societal reconciliation; what is entailed in re-negotiating identities; what might embracing the threatening other mean in practice? Teasing out some of the elements of a response to these questions will be my task for the rest of this article. I want to begin, however, by recounting two experiences from Northern Ireland, one very specific and one more general. These have shaped my thinking about a practical theology of reconciliation and about societal reconciliation in particular. The first occurred in a group of Catholics and Presbyterians from a part of North Belfast that had experienced a lot of violence and deaths. The group had agreed to meet to talk about sectarianism and identity in a bid to move beyond the situation in which they found themselves. At the first meeting I could sense huge tension and electricity in the room. I wondered if this was because of the risk people were taking in even attending the meeting. Members were being verbally and sometimes physically attacked as they came or went from the venue, but it seemed to be a more immediate fear than that. Eventually, in the course of the next couple of sessions I discovered that on one side of the room was the parent of a young man who was in prison for killing the brother of a person on the other side of the room. Neither had known who would be attending the meetings and to their credit neither left the process. For a while, they did not interact at all, but gradually as we worked together and they heard snippets of one another’s stories they began to communicate; at first non-verbally - a smile, a nod - and then they talked together. The courage of those two people has remained etched in my heart, courage to face their own pain and courage to reach out to the other. These are the peacemakers whose faces we do not see on the television news, but without whom

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societal reconciliation is impossible. Every conflict zone has them and they are the people who carry forward the task of overcoming enmity and beginning the costly process of healing in divided societies at local level. The second experience happened to me on a number of occasions when I was talking with people who had had a close family member killed by the ‘other side’, and who had nonetheless taken up active work for peace and reconciliation. They would say: ‘don’t ask me to forgive the ones who did the killing because I can’t, but I can see that there is no way out of this unless we learn to live together here’. These people were living out in a very concrete way what I will call the ‘will to co-existence’ which is so crucial if any kind of reconciliation is to be contemplated. None of us should underestimate the courage and the pain it takes these people to keep working for peace, especially in the face of political and other setbacks. With those stories from Northern Ireland in the forefront of our minds, I want to turn now to the concept of reconciliation and social reconciliation in particular. First, I will make some general reflections about the nature of reconciliation and then I will outline a typology of reconciliation. Towards a typology of reconciliation Reconciliation is recognized as both a process and a goal.1 The term is used to describe both the processes needed to move forward and the place towards which, as Christians, we think people and the cosmos ideally should be moving. It is important, therefore, to be clear about the sense in which the term is being used in any given context. In order to correctly situate societal reconciliation I want to locate it in a typology of reconciliation that has four elements: political, societal, interpersonal and personal.2 For the purposes of this article I am limiting my reflections to that which is appropriate to reconciliation within a state or between closely related states. I am deliberately leaving aside the issues of wider inter-political reconciliation and cosmic reconciliation. Political reconciliation is about managing the macro level of society. It deals with issues of re-establishing order, governance and justice.3 At this level peace agreements are crafted and ratified. It is an indispensable overall context in a state or small cluster of related states within which other types of reconciliation can take place. This level profoundly affects the other levels of reconciliation as can be seen by the rise in community violence in Northern Ireland each time there has been a hiatus in the political process. In this type of reconciliation, forgiveness and repentance are

1 R. Schreiter, ‘Reconciliation: The Model for Mission’, in Quarterly Review of Mission (April 2006), 3, [accessed 7 July 2006]. 2 For diagram see Figure 1. 3 See D. W. Shriver Jr., An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics (New York, 1995) and D. Tombs and J. Liechty, (eds), Explorations in Reconciliation: New Directions for Theology (London, 2006).

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not necessary, but questions about who can apologize or express regret and the role of ritual and memorialization are important. Societal reconciliation is about managing the group to group level of society. It focuses on people, in their corporate aspect, learning to share a formerly contested space and is more concerned with relationship than with justice per se. Harold Saunders, former diplomat and conflict transformation theorist, notes that while diplomats and politicians may agree peace accords, it is citizens who make peace.4 Societal reconciliation tries to establish or re-establish the possibility of people coexisting without violence in a shared space. In this type of reconciliation forgiveness and repentance may be present, but are not necessary. What is needed, as a prerequisite, is a will to co-existence, of which I will say more later. Interpersonal reconciliation is about an individual to individual or small group to small group (such as family to family) level of relating. Here forgiveness and repentance are paramount. This is directly about personal hurt and healing. It requires suitable grieving processes as well as reconciling processes. It depends to some extent on the state of personal reconciliation; that is, human growth of the person or persons concerned. Personal reconciliation is about a person reconciling the parts of her/himself that are, or have become, alienated since conception. It includes, but is not limited to, psychological personal growth work and developing personal and spiritual awareness. In this type of reconciliation compassion and forgiveness are paramount. The temptation in conflict situations is to focus much energy on the political and interpersonal levels of reconciliation without recognizing the import of Harold Saunders’ insight that it is citizens who make peace and citizens who can make or break accords. This was evident in some of the difficulties surrounding the implementation of the Belfast Agreement. Much of the public energy and debate in the lead up to that agreement had been about constitutional issues, with little or no attention given to more social issues such as the early release of prisoners and what came to be known as section 75, the good relations clauses. Yet it was these provisions that touched directly the lives of citizens and communities at the group to group level which evoked such strong resistance that it almost derailed the agreement. Societal reconciliation is pivotal in the creation and embedding of transformed relationships in a post-conflict society. It is intimately linked outwards to political reconciliation because, as we have seen, it can be affected by the political sphere. Conversely, the lack of it has the potential to de-stabilize political peace agreements. We need only think of the way in which the Northern Ireland power-sharing Executive established by the Sunningdale Agreement in December 19735 was brought down by the Ulster Workers Council strike and widespread civil disobedience of May 1974. We can only speculate on what Northern Ireland might have been like today had the

4 H. H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts (New York, 1999). 5 For text of the Sunningdale Agreement see [accessed 14 July 2006].

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citizens been prepared to receive the Sunningdale Agreement.6 More recently, the devolved assembly in Stormont was suspended for five years, from 2002 until this year, amid allegations of spying by people alleged to be associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Societal reconciliation is also linked inwards to interpersonal reconciliation because although forgiveness and repentance may not be necessary to achieve reconciliation at this level, the diminution of negative reactions rooted in anger and hurt is crucial. The legacy of hurt and resentment on both sides after the years of violent confrontation over the parade at Drumcree, Co Armagh still blights attempts to establish peaceful settlements of other disputes over marching. What is societal reconciliation? In my current working definition, societal reconciliation is a complex of processes and structures at personal, communal and institutional levels, necessary to bring all the elements of the society into a positive and life-giving relationship with God and with one another. Societal reconciliation arises as the highest aspiration of human needs for identity, belonging and community; it is expressed in holistic patterns of relating: responding without resort to physical, verbal, or emotional violence; letting go of prejudiced or bigoted attitudes and beliefs; mitigating the divisive effects of core beliefs which cannot be surrendered; recognizing differences and seeking or creating common ground; dialoguing in the expectation of changing and being changed by others; promoting inclusive processes, language and participation; respecting self, others, and the natural world; challenging injustice and other destructive patterns of relating; dealing fairly with all; reflecting critically on one’s own and one’s own communities’ behaviour and calling to account oneself, one’s community and others. Explaining this definition in detail is beyond the scope of this article. I will simply give pointers to some of the key aspects of it. Societal reconciliation is a complex not a system; that is, it is a set of interconnected or interwoven parts. Unlike the systemic nature of issues such as sectarianism, racism and sexism, whose processes are woven into the fabric of society, I know of no systemic sense of reconciliation. This should give all theists, especially Christians, pause for thought. Why has societal reconciliation never had enough scope to develop systemically, not even within our faith communities? Whatever the reason, it means that the task of achieving societal reconciliation always begins from a very low baseline; it takes a great deal more energy and effort to achieve than that needed to produce its opposite: sectarian, racial or other types of violence. Similarly, relatively small setbacks can retard or destroy fledgling reconciliation movements. Positive and life-giving relationships in this definition are characterized by openness and honesty; they entail goodwill towards the ‘other’, whoever and wherever the other is. Goodwill, however, does not presuppose liking or loving 6 The Belfast Agreement of April 1998 was famously described by the then deputy leader of the SDLP Seamus Mallon as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’ because it enshrined many of the principles of the Sunningdale Agreement.

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or agreeing with the other, nor is it premised on the good behaviour of the other. Goodwill is more than ‘do no harm’; it requires that people seek the welfare of the other for the love of God, for the other’s own sake and because the welfare of all is interdependent. Such positive and life-giving relationships are possible only through grace and appear in limited ways and for limited periods; there is always a provisionality about them. The need for identity is about recognizing and building a firm place to stand as individuals and as groups, and recognizing them as who they say they are.7 Identity is the secure point for relating with others which allows people to be open to the other and to risk being changed by, and in turn changing, the other. The need for belonging is about human beings coming to self-understanding and ultimately to completeness in relationship with others.8 This is lived out in belonging to one another through intimate relationships, friendships, families, groups, clubs and shared interests. The need for community here means the progressive realization of the radical interdependence of human beings: physically, intellectually, and spiritually. Community in this sense is an ecological concept, which can involve close or loose groupings. Discussing the holistic patterns of relating would take a whole paper in itself; suffice it to say that these indicate key patterns of behaviour that I would expect to find in a society moving towards reconciliation. Before turning directly to the issue of re-negotiating identity, I want to close my reflection on societal reconciliation by exploring one of its pre-requisites: a collective will to co-existence. This is undoubtedly one of the most difficult elements of societal reconciliation. It requires a conceptual shift from thinking of ‘them and us’ to ‘us and us’ and an emotional shift to deal with affectively harsh realities. For example, the recent agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein means that many ordinary citizens in Northern Ireland, who might well be relieved that peace, devolution and therefore hopefully stability are returning, nevertheless face the reality of seeing people whom they regard as ‘terrorists’ or ‘oppressors’ in positions of governance and power in the state. Such a collective will is usually based on one of three stances: either religious conviction or pragmatism or a mixture of the two. Religious conviction can have a variety of foundations, typically these would include that ‘in Christ, God was reconciling the world to himself’ (NRSV, 2 Cor. 5:19) or that they ‘may all be one’ (Jn. 17:21). Pragmatism usually takes the form of a judgement that a space has to be shared with others who may be, or have been in the past, threatening. In addition to religious conviction and pragmatic judgement a will to co-existence also entails the determination and energy to make 7 One of the most pernicious forms of sectarian violence is claiming that people are not who they say they are; that is, the attempt to re-write their identities. See J. Liechty and C. Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Dublin, 2001) pp. 271-2. 8 R. F. Baumeister and M. R. Leary, ‘The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation’, Psychological Bulletin, 117/3 (1995), p. 522.

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it happen. In the examples from Northern Ireland quoted earlier, one person in the group had to accommodate herself to the fact that she was going to keep meeting the killer of her brother or his family in their local area and to the need to find a way for all to live together. The other people that I mentioned expressed the pragmatism of the need to share space, recognizing that the alternative is to let continual strife dominate and destroy individual and communal lives. During the six year ‘Moving Beyond Sectarianism Research Project’, which I co-directed with the Mennonite church historian, Joseph Liechty, we discovered that more than seventy percent of the five thousand or more people we worked with preferred some form of what we came to call ‘benign apartheid’ rather than true coexistence. Benign apartheid designates a situation where two communities, while formally one state, exist in separate, parallel worlds and only interact when strictly necessary. This option not only falls far short of any Christian sense of reconciliation, it is also politically and socially unstable and risks simply bequeathing the violent struggle to the next or succeeding generations. Even with the March 2007 agreement to restore devolved government it is likely that provisional and patchy co-existence over many years may be the best that can be achieved in Northern Ireland. So far I have dealt only with individual instances of the will to co-existence; more problematic is a collective expression of that will. This can take a number of forms. It is most easily recognized in Northern Ireland, which is famous for its painted kerb stones, displays of flags and wall murals, through positive changes to the physical surroundings. Moves to de-escalate tension by neutralizing the civic environment, however, often involve actions which can feel to some groups like a betrayal of their tradition, such as removing the union flag from some public buildings. Nonetheless, there are encouraging signs, for example, the negotiated agreement between the Belfast City Council Good Relations Committee and Loyalist paramilitaries for the removal of paramilitary flags from the main roads in the city. Changes in the ambience of the physical environment are very important in a situation where the space has been so violently contested, but such changes at the visible level are complex to manage because they tap into wells of emotion and response connected to the issue of identity. Re-negotiating identity A pivotal task in a process of societal reconciliation is a re-negotiation of group identities in order to move towards a situation where peaceful co-existence can be sustained. If we look at the nature of group identities in conflict, it is clear that identity is often distorted into what conflict theorist Marc Gopin calls ‘negative identity’.9 This is identity which is formed over against the ‘other’ in such a way that the other becomes a ‘threatening other’. One of the tragedies of this type of identity formation is that it generates a need to maintain the other as threat in order to keep a stable sense of identity.

9 M. Gopin, ‘The Heart of the Stranger’, in Tombs and Liechty, (eds), Explorations in Reconciliation (London, 2006), pp. 3-21.

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The process which began with the IRA ceasefires of August 1994 and culminated in the Belfast Agreement in 1998 brought the main hostilities to an end.10 In the aftermath of the peace, one experienced peace activist reported that while groups had known who they were when they were fighting one another, they were not sure who they were any longer.11 This identity crisis provoked by the cessation of hostilities affected the Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist communities to different degrees. Catholic/Nationalist groups had a wealth of positive resources in the Irish Gaelic tradition - music, poetry, sport, spirituality and so on - to help them maintain a sense of their identity. So while they have undoubtedly been re-negotiating aspects of their identity such as its relationship to the physical force tradition, and I do not underestimate how hard this has been, they have done so from a relatively secure identity base. The Protestant/Unionist community, on the other hand, had traditions centred politically on a Union with Britain to which the British appear less and less committed12 and culturally on the events associated with the celebration of the Battle of the Boyne and marching, which were becoming more and more contentious. They entered the identity crisis brought about by the peace process without a particularly secure place to stand corporately. This has significantly limited their ability to adjust to the new political arrangements. It would have been difficult even if they had begun from a secure identity base; it has been a monumental task given their lack of identity clarity. The collapse of the power-sharing executive in Stormont in 2002 amid a ‘spying’ controversy came as a welcome relief for Protestant/Unionist leaders and has given them and the peace agencies more time to work further on developing a stronger, positive sense of Protestant/Unionist identity. It was not a coincidence that around the time of the Belfast Agreement, the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council (NICRC), a body charged with promoting peace and reconciliation work between the communities, put in place a significant programme to help develop and sustain Protestant/Unionist groups. Nor was it a coincidence that in the recent Northern Irish elections the DUP, which manages to convey a clear, strong sense of Protestant/Unionist identity, exemplified in the person of their leader Ian Paisley, made significant gains at the expense of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) whose identity has always been less well defined. Paradoxically then, one of the key lessons about re-negotiating identities is that it must, if possible, begin before a peace accord is signed. At the very least there needs to be a lot of work done at the group to group level of society to develop 10 Though the violence did not end, it decreased significantly. The main paramilitary organizations, however, were on ceasefire at an official level. 11 B. Lennon, ‘Community Dialogue’, personal communication (June 1998). 12 The overt sense of unease in the Protestant/Unionist community about Britain’s commitment to the Union began in 1985 with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. ‘Unionists regarded the Agreement as the beginning of the end of the Union’, [accessed 6 July 2006]. The unease deepened in November 1990 after comments by the then Secretary of State, Peter Brook, that Britain had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland and would accept unification if the people wished it’, [accessed 19 July 2006].

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a positive and stable sense of identity on all sides of the divide prior to a peace agreement. Moreover, this work is best done in intra-tradition groupings and not cross community, in order to allow people the freedom to speak openly. What is in play in the re-negotiation is a twofold movement. First, finding a way to help people, corporately as well as individually, to connect or reconnect with what is positive in their identities; by which I mean language, culture, heritage and so on. Allied to this is the need to learn to express their identity co-operatively and not in an oppositional way. Second, encouraging them to identify and let go of parts of their identities which have become negatively framed. For example, Catholic/Nationalists had, for understandable reasons, developed an implicit and often explicit sense of their community as oppressed victims of British power. This led them to develop a group identity which had neither power nor responsibility in the running of the state. In its most extreme and militant form it sought to overthrow the state by force. In its more ordinary expression at local level it was obvious in the semi-detachment of a majority from the working of government. A strong, positive sense of their identity as citizens of the North of Ireland offers them liberation from the shackles of distorted identity in victimhood. While this looks like a huge gain, it comes at the cost of a new equal responsibility for the decisions and actions of the state, which does not necessarily sit well with those who are used to sniping, verbally or physically, at the government. The Protestant/Unionist community, on the other hand, having had power from the time of the partition of Ireland in 1922 developed an implicit and often explicit sense of superiority. This led them to develop a group identity as those who were always in charge of the affairs of the state of Northern Ireland. Recovering a positive sense of their identity is tricky because it appears to involve a loss of status, moving from superiority to equal citizenship. It is, in reality, only a necessary and painful re-balancing which opens up the possibility of the Protestant/Unionist community rediscovering the unique contribution they can make to the new shared future of Northern Ireland. Methodologically, helping groups to re-negotiate their identities in any situation is difficult. It is made more problematic in conflict and post-conflict scenarios by the immediate history of hostility and the ever present threat of a return to the fighting or separation. There are many possible elements in such a methodology of which I want to highlight only five: safe spaces; affirmation; a sense of being one of a number of stakeholders; new knowledge; new contact. Asking groups to engage in potentially life-changing dialogue requires that the facilitators provide and maintain ‘safe’ spaces where people can feel respected and heard. One of the great blessings in Northern Ireland has been that there have been groups like Corrymeela,13 some of the Christian churches, the Centre for Contemporary Christianity in Ireland (CCCI)14 and the Irish School of Ecumenics 13 Corrymeela is a community of reconciliation which has a residential base in Ballycastle, Co Antrim and a centre in Belfast both of which have hosted sensitive conversations. See [accessed 14 July 2006]. 14 This group was formerly known as the Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI) and has convened and hosted many important dialogues. See [accessed 19 July 2006].

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(ISE) who have been able to provide such spaces. It is important to recognize that whatever their denominational, ecumenical or evangelical perspectives each of these groups has a fundamental commitment to dialogue, justice and peace which underpins its work. The sense in which I use ‘affirmation’ is that of recognizing and honouring the positive identity of a group and what they contribute to society.16 The importance of this was graphically illustrated for me when I was working, alongside a colleague from ISE, Yvonne Naylor, with a group of young people who had been studying the outcomes of the Moving Beyond Sectarianism project. I asked what they found most helpful about our work and one teenage Protestant/Loyalist said, ‘that you didn’t blame us’. He went on to explain that the fact that he sensed that we honoured his tradition and were not blaming them for all that had gone wrong, gave him the courage to explore his identity and what needed to change. He was bright enough to realize that change was needed and relieved to find an approach in which he did not feel he had to remain trapped in defending his community’s name and actions. Re-negotiating identities is a vulnerable, painful and confusing time for groups. It is crucial, therefore, that they have a strong sense of the value of their place in society. They need to know that they are stakeholders in the new vision and that they are not alone in struggling to bring about societal change. It is at this level that the strength of group to group reconciliation activity is most pronounced. I noticed in the inter-group work that I facilitated on identity in Northern Ireland that the experience of interacting with a struggling group from the ‘other’ side and sharing stories and feelings honestly and openly can produce an energy and focus that no amount of expert facilitation in single tradition work can generate. The sense of common cause in building a new way of being together in society can be a powerful mechanism for the bonding of groups and a catalyst to further action. Ignorance, half-truths and myths are a potent source of fuel for conflict, when groups are locked in negative identity formation. Exposing groups to new knowledge about the other and the other’s story is an important element of helping people to renegotiate their identity. The will to find out the truth about the ‘other’ is an essential dynamic in any reconciling process. The knowledge can come in many forms and does not depend upon direct inter-group contact. For example, the 2006 film The Wind that Shook the Barley17 offers a sympathetic but harrowing account of the suffering of the people in the South of Ireland which led many to join the IRA. Using a tale of two brothers, it traces the events of the period from 1920 to 1922 through the treaty which established the Free State and the civil war that followed. 15 Founded in 1975 by Michael Hurley SJ, this is a post graduate teaching unit which specializes in education for reconciliation and has provided facilitators for sensitive meetings. See <www.tcd.ie/ise> [accessed 19 July 2006]. 16 It is close to the meaning given to ‘recognition’ by psychologist and conflict theorist, Vern Neufeld Redekop, but Redekop is talking of individuals and limits his description to acknowledging and appreciating. I would want to assert a more positive affirmation through the sense of honouring groups’ identities. Vern Neufeld Redekop, From Violence to Blessing: How an Understanding of Deep Rooted Conflict Can Open Paths to Reconciliation (Ottawa, 2002), pp. 43-7. 17 K. Loach, director, The Wind that Shook the Barley (London: Pathe Pictures, 2006).

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Its shocking portrayal of the brutality of both the British forces and the IRA and its unflinching account of the tragedy of the civil war, which pitted brother against brother, will bring a new level of understanding of some of the deep background of the present conflict in the Republican Irish psyche. While knowledge gleaned from sources other than meeting directly with the ‘other’ are important, there is no substitute for contact. In the Moving Beyond Sectarianism research, a sustained level of new contact, the act of deliberately seeking out a meeting or encounter with the ‘other’, was a consistent indicator of people, individuals and groups, who were likely to have significantly re-negotiated their identity. The effect of new knowledge and new contact is usually gradual but can also be more dramatic. In a series of meetings of a diverse group of women leaders, which I was facilitating in Derry/Londonderry, we spent some time focusing on the event known as ‘Bloody Sunday’.18 Some of the women from the Catholic/Nationalist group had been on the street that day. They told of how British troops had fired on unarmed civilians killing thirteen people. One of the Protestant/Loyalist women in the room responded that, if she was to believe what they said, she would have to question the whole basis of her understanding of life. It was clear from her shocked reaction that, having got to know the Catholic/Nationalist women over a period of weeks, she was inclined to believe them, but to do so was to put in question one of the key tenets of her worldview; namely, that British troops and police uphold the law. Such encounters are crucial in helping individuals and groups to at least question some assumptions that shape their identity. Embracing a threatening other The journey from contact towards ‘embrace’ is a long and difficult one. The act of embracing someone is both intimate and vulnerable. It signifies a closeness of relationship or a common bond. The act of genuinely embracing a threatening other, individually or corporately, is likely to be a rare event. I chose to borrow this metaphor from Croatian theologian, Miroslav Volf, because it, more than any other, epitomizes the act and state of reconciliation as portrayed in Christian literature: ‘while we were still sinners Christ died for us’ (Rom. 5:8). In his seminal work on Exclusion and Embrace, Miroslav Volf argues that the will to embrace ‘precedes any ‘truth’ about others and any construction of their justice’.19 Such a will is effectively a decision to refuse ‘to let the rifle butt do its work on their 18 ‘‘Bloody Sunday’ refers to the events that took place in Derry on the afternoon of Sunday 30 January 1972. A Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march had been organised to protest against the continuation of internment without trial in Northern Ireland … Soldiers of the Parachute Regiment, an elite regiment of the British Army, moved into the Bogside in an arrest operation. During the next 30 minutes these soldiers shot dead 13 men (and shot and injured a further 13 people)’, [accessed 19 July 2006]. 19 M. Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation (Nashville, 1996), p. 29.

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souls after it is finished doing its work on their bodies’. Further it entails a turning towards the ‘other’ in an attitude of openness. Volf reflects on this mainly for the individual, but it is also a key process for groups. Paradoxically, embrace is easier and more likely to happen in communities and groups that have relatively strong, stable identities, because they have the internal strength to reach out to the other at least in imagination, if not in fact. Three of the pre-requisites for developing a will to embrace are: first, empathy for the other; secondly, recognizing that others have also suffered and thirdly, admitting that ones’ own community has wronged the other. All of these pre-requisites have been in short supply in Northern Ireland. In our research we found an extensive and serious lack of capacity not only to empathize with the other community, but even to empathize with ones’ own communities’ pain. It is possible that this is the result of the prolonged conflict which has indirectly traumatized large swathes of the population.21 Whatever the reason, it is clear that a major mental health initiative and extensive opportunities for interpersonal and personal reconciliation are needed to support any effort to bring about societal reconciliation. These are beginning to be addressed through formal work with ‘victims’ and through centres dealing specially with trauma. The problem is that many ordinary people do not think of themselves as either traumatized or as victims. Helping people to reduce their traumatization and increase their capacity to enter into reconciling processes could be one key role for the Christian churches in post-conflict Northern Ireland. Members’ denial or justification of their communities’ violence is more than just the human instinct to deny guilt; it has at least two significant functions. First, it is a strategy to maintain the strength of the community in the face of the enemy. Secondly, it is a mechanism for distancing themselves from the grim reality of the conflict. Not recognizing a communities’ violence allows a group to exist, if uneasily, within an illusion that they are morally superior and that their world is of a different order from those who very obviously perpetrate violence. This is a particular temptation for Christians. It is an uphill but crucial struggle to help groups to see that everyone is implicated in the conflict and that, therefore, everyone has a responsibility to work for its resolution. Conclusion The need for what I have called societal reconciliation has, in Northern Ireland, been underplayed in the scramble to bring about a cessation of violence and in the search for a more lasting peace. Attention to political reconciliation is crucial because it sets the context and attention to interpersonal reconciliation is important because it is about healing wounds. But the pivotal level is group to group reconciliation with 20 M. Volf, ‘A Theology of Embrace for a World of Exclusion’, in Tombs and Liechty, (eds), Explorations in Reconciliation (London, 2006), pp. 22-33. 21 David Bolton, director, Centre for Trauma and Transformation, Omagh estimates that more than forty percent of the general population of Northern Ireland, whether or not directly caught up in violent events, is likely to be showing signs of trauma. Unpublished lecture, Irish School of Ecumenics, Belfast, Spring 2002.

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its pre-requisites of a corporate will to co-existence, a willingness to re-negotiate identities and a corporate will to embrace a threatening other. This is not a secondary activity; some measure of it must precede political settlement and then it must be a significant focus in the medium-term, post-conflict period. It is underplayed because it is extraordinarily difficult and demanding. It requires all parties to change; and in perceiving that call from God to change, to metanoia, we suddenly become aware that, in some paradoxical way, the other whom we perceive as threatening and whom we are invited to embrace is not only my Protestant/Unionist or Catholic/Nationalist neighbour, it is Godself.

Political

Societal

Interpersonal

Personal

Figure 1

A Typology of Reconciliation

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Bibliography Baumeister, R.F. & Leary, M.R. ‘The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation’, Psychological Bulletin, 117/3 (1995). Gopin, M. ‘The Heart of the Stranger’, in Tombs, D. & Liechty, J. (eds), Explorations in Reconciliation: New Directions for Theology (London: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 321. Liechty, J. and Clegg, C. Moving Beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001). Saunders, H.H. A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999). Schreiter, R. ‘Reconciliation: The Model for Mission’, in Quarterly Review of Mission (April 2006), 3, [accessed 7 July 2006]. Shriver Jr., D.W. An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Sunningdale Agreement see [accessed 14 July 2006]. Tombs, D. & Liechty, J. (eds), Explorations in Reconciliation: New Directions for Theology (London: Ashgate, 2006). ‘Unionists regarded the Agreement as the beginning of the end of the Union’, [accessed 6 July 2006]. Vern Neufeld Redekop, From Violence to Blessing: How an Understanding of Deep Rooted Conflict can Open Paths to Reconciliation (Ottawa: Novalis, St Paul University, 2002). Volf, M. Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996). Volf, M. ‘A Theology of Embrace for a World of Exclusion’ in Tombs, D. & Liechty, J. (eds), Explorations in Reconciliation: New Directions for Theology (London: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 22-33.

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Chapter 7

Towards Reconciliation and Justice in South Africa: Can Church Unity Make a Difference? Nico Koopman

Introduction The history of apartheid can be described as a history of the violation of human dignity in South Africa. Not only was the dignity of victims violated through oppression and various injustices, stereotyping and discrimination, stigmatization and humiliation, demonization and violence, but the dignity of the perpetrators of these evils also did not remain intact either. Your own humanity cannot remain untouched if you dehumanize others. To be created in God’s image is to be a relational being, is to live in relationship with God, with other humans, with the rest of creation and with yourself. And where you deal in an inhuman way with others, your own humanity is under threat because of your interrelatedness with and even interdependence upon God’s other creatures.1 Apartheid dehumanized the beneficiaries of this system as well. Some beneficiaries did not know (or only vaguely knew) about the political crimes that were committed, because of the powerful propaganda machinery of the apartheid regime, which misinformed, insulated and anaesthetized beneficiaries. After they had heard on what evil their wellbeing really rested, they were shocked and today still struggle to trust authorities in all walks of public life. And since churches, whom they had trusted, supported apartheid, they even distrust ecclesial authority. A number of beneficiaries did know about some evils being committed, but agreed with the measures of the regime. They believed these measures were necessary to keep communal enemies like communism who wanted to destroy Christian convictions (the so-called Red Danger), and the blacks who wanted to destroy white people (the so-called Black Danger) under control. Other beneficiaries did know and kept quiet out of fear of opposing the regime and being victimized and rejected. A smaller number of beneficiaries did know and actively opposed apartheid. This last group, however, tell how even their active opposition of apartheid, and their consequent rejection by the 1 For a discussion of the relational interpretation of the confession that we are created in God’s image, see N.Koopman ‘Trinitarian Anthropology, Ubuntu and Human Rights’ in H.R. Botman and K. Spörre (eds.), Building a Human Rights Culture. South African and Swedish Perspectives (Falun, 2003), pp.194-206; ‘Theological Anthropology and Gender Relations’ in Scriptura 2004, 2/86, pp.190-200.

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communities in which they grew up, did not take away their embarrassment, pain and guilt about the comfort and wellbeing that they could enjoy, while their fellowcitizens lived in dehumanizing circumstances. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1996 with the mandate to investigate politically motivated gross human rights violations during the period March 1960 to December 1994. The TRC aimed to bring the truth of human rights violations to light, to deal with the process of amnesty, to enhance and facilitate reparation, and to foster the process of national reconciliation. These processes of truth, reconciliation and justice stand in service of the restoration of the dignity of millions of traumatized and dehumanized South Africans. The TRC and reconciliation and justice – the unfinished agenda This section of the paper does not attempt to offer an exhaustive assessment of the TRC. It rather aims to highlight some of the most important achievements of the Commission on which we can build now and in the future. And it aims to identify some shortcomings and unfinished work of the Commission which also serve as challenges to South Africans. One helpful assessment of the outcomes of the TRC is the work of Canadian theologian, Russell Daye. He investigated various responses to the TRC from work in theology and a variety of other disciplines, reports and letters in newspapers and the electronic media, and comments of various leaders and opinion makers in different spheres of South African public life. He also utilized data from an empirical study that was carried out in 2001 by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa, and in which the views of 3,727 South Africans on the outcomes of the TRC were established. This sample was reasonably representative of the South African population. Daye discusses the achievements and shortcomings of the TRC with regard to the themes of truth, amnesty, reparations and reconciliation.2 He argues that 2 R. Daye, Political Forgiveness. Lessons from South Africa (Maryknoll, New York, 2004), pp. 166-171. A less sympathetic assessment of the TRC is offered by South African historian, R.W. Johnson. See R. W. Johnson, South Africa. The First Man, the Last Nation (Johannesburg & Cape Town, 2006), pp. 215 – 216. He writes that the TRC was politically biased as was expressed in the majority ANC members in the Commission and in the bad behavior of commissioners towards former president FW de Klerk; that it consisted of too many clergy; it did not have enough people with historical, legal and research skills, and it did not pay sufficient attention to the 1990 – 1994 period when most deaths had occurred. For helpful theological reflections on the TRC, see H. Botman and R. Peterson (eds), To Remember and to Heal. Theological and Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation (Cape Town, 1996); J. De Gruchy, J. Cochrane and S. Martin (eds), Facing the Truth: South African Faith Communities and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Cape Town, 1999); D. Smit ‘Confession – guilt – truth – and forgiveness in the Christian tradition’, in E. Conradie (ed), Essays in Public Theology (Stellenbosch, 2007), pp. 309-323; D. Smit, ‘Shared stories for the future? Theological reflections on truth and reconciliation in South Africa’, in Essays in Public Theology, pp.325-341; C. Villa Vicencio and W.Verwoerd (eds), Looking back reaching forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa

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the exposure of the truth of what had happened during the apartheid regime is the biggest achievement of the TRC. Families of victims, as well as the broader public were informed about the human rights violations during 1960 to 1994. Since the truth is a crucial component of the foundation upon which a new nation can be built, Daye concludes that the TRC indeed made an indispensable contribution in laying this foundation.3 This painful storytelling process of the TRC might serve as model for the creation of forums for the ongoing sharing of truth, of pain and anger, fear and anxiety, shame and guilt in all walks of life in South Africa. This truth indeed contributes to dignity, justice and reconciliation. With regard to amnesty, the achievements of the TRC were more ambiguous. One benefit of the amnesty hearings was that it contributed to the process of truthtelling. Those members or former members of the security forces, for instance, and, to a lesser extent, members of liberation movements who had armed wings, and applied for amnesty, shared information that would otherwise not have come to light. The granting of amnesty, according to some commentators, even helped to prevent civil war in South Africa. And a last benefit of the amnesty process is that it secured some form of accountability amongst perpetrators.4 The amnesty process of the TRC, however, also had serious limitations. It did not succeed in eliminating the necessity of prosecution and punishment for political crimes. Most of the senior members of the apartheid security apparatus did not apply for amnesty. Those senior members of the African National Congress who did apply rendered inadequate information. Moreover the public opinion on amnesty seems to be divided. The empirical research of the IJR indicates that a majority of their sample reckon that the granting of amnesty was unfair to the victims of apartheid. A significant number of those surveyed, however, felt that the granting of amnesty was an unavoidable consequence of the choice that South Africans had made for a negotiated settlement.5 Churches and other institutions in society are challenged to build on this work of the TRC. This entails fostering a sincere process of confession of guilt to each other, individually and communally. Recently Adrian Vlok, former Minister of Safety and Security in the apartheid government, confessed his guilt by washing the feet of Frank Chikane, former secretary-general of the South African Council of Churches. It was during Vlok’s term of office that an attempt was made by the security police to kill Chikane by poisoning his clothes. Vlok also washed the feet of a few black women to express remorse and contrition. Where these processes are done in a sincere way and without ulterior motives, they build on the legacy of the TRC. And churches and other organisations can reach and involve people who the TRC could not reach.

(Cape Town, 2000); and for other helpful theological discussions of amongst others the TRC see D. Shriver, An Ethic for Enemies. Forgiveness in Politics (Oxford/New York, 1995); Honest Patriots: Loving a Country enough to Remember its Misdeeds. (Oxford, 2005). 3 R. Daye, Political Forgiveness. Lessons from South Africa, pp. 166-167. 4 Ibid., p. 167. 5 R. Daye, Political Forgiveness. Lessons from South Africa, pp.167-168.

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The component of its work for which the TRC received the most criticism is the challenge of reparation. At the conception of the TRC concern was expressed about the potential achievements of the TRC in this regard. The TRC would, in terms of its mandate, reach only a small sector of the victims and disadvantaged people. They were to investigate only politically related violations of human rights, and they were to focus only on a limited period. Victimization and injustices that do not fit this definition would not receive attention. Moreover, the TRC would also have a limited life span. A fair assessment of the achievements of the TRC should keep this limited mandate and powers in mind. Where this limited mandate is not taken adequately into account we can end up with very fierce criticism of the work of the TRC. Daye6 states that the government refused to implement the recommendations of the Commission on Reparations and Rehabilitation of the TRC. The TRC recommended an amount of 17,000 to 23,000 rand per annum over a period of six years for those who were approved for reparation. The government eventually decided upon a onetime offering of 30,000 rand. However, more work needs to be done to help specific people directly and to redress the injustices that they had suffered. This can be done in a variety of ways, e.g. cash payments, and assistance with their education and health care needs. Churches and other institutions in society, especially the business sector and individuals that benefited from apartheid, can play a crucial role in this process. The work of the TRC regarding reparation and restitution was flawed in so far as the law mandated them to focus on reparation in a narrower sense, i.e. reparation in the form of cash payments to clearly identifiable individuals. Although the TRC discussed so-called broader, communal and long-term recommendations about reparation, these fell outside their mandate.7 It is with regard to this broader restitution that churches and other institutions are called to make a contribution. Those many wronged people who were excluded by the definition of the law can now be included. Compensation need not be in the form of cash only, but should entail restorative measures like addressing poverty, inequalities, unemployment, health care, housing and educational needs, affirmative action measures that also address the plight of the most wronged and vulnerable ones, and land reform, amongst others. The responsibility of this broader restitution is not only that of the government, but this work is done in partnership of government and institutions in the business world, in civil society, in the media, in churches, in all walks of life. And those who benefited from apartheid are appealed to, to make strong contributions to these initiatives. Daye8 lastly comments about the TRC’s achievement regarding forgiveness and reconciliation. He is clear about the continued existence of alienation amongst South African racial groups, but also notes that especially the wonder of forgiveness shared

6 R. Daye, Political Forgiveness. Lessons from South Africa, pp.144, 168-169. 7 South African theologian, Tinyiko Maluleke, offers one of the best theological evaluations of the TRC process regarding amongst others restitution. See T. Maluleke, ‘Dealing Lightly with the Wound of my People?’ in Missionalia 3/25 and ‘Truth, National Unity and Reconciliation in South Africa’ in Missionalia 3/25. 8 R. Daye, Political Forgiveness. Lessons from South Africa, p.169-171.

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at the TRC hearings by victims and/or families, serve as pathway to reconciliation and justice: By offering pardon to their oppressors, sometimes even before it had been asked for, they were calling out the humanity of perpetrators and apartheid supporters. The TRC can similarly be seen as an exercise that, through its forgiveness discourse, called out the decency, the empathy, and the moral courage of all South Africans who had become embittered by apartheid and the struggle to end it.9

Daye10 is of the opinion that the TRC process has reduced racial fears in South Africa. Confessions during hearings and amnesty applications assure black people that there is no hidden white power that prepares for a take-over of the country. And the gift of forgiveness that white people experienced assures them that they would not be persecuted and dispossessed. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chairperson of the TRC, portrays forgiveness as the pathway to a new future. He believes that the work of the TRC does give hope to people in South Africa as well as in other parts of the world where there are conflicts. The growing culture of forgiveness and reparation, to which the TRC contributed, can convince peoples in conflict that a new future of life in peace and friendship is possible. The archbishop attributes the achievements of the TRC to the work of the triune God, and does not view it as a human achievement: We were destined for perdition and were plucked out of total annihilation. We were a hopeless case if ever there was one. God intends that others might look at us and take courage. God wants to point to us as a possible beacon of hope, a possible paradigm …Our experiment is going to succeed because God wants us to succeed, not for our glory and aggrandizement but for the sake of God’s world. God wants to show that there is life after conflict and repression – that because of forgiveness there is a future.11

This brief analysis makes it clear that, despite various limitations, the TRC did make progress regarding the enhancement of reconciliation and justice in South Africa. The TRC would have missed its purpose if it did not serve as inspiration and model for reconciliation and justice initiatives. It would be totally unrealistic to expect that the TRC should correct in a few years the wrongs of centuries of colonialism and apartheid. The value of the TRC resides, on the one hand, in the concrete work that it did complete, e.g. the creation of spaces for truth-telling, public forgiveness, restitution and reconciliation. But it also serves as symbol and paradigm for continuous and sustainable work for reconciliation and justice. Some of the initiatives that take inspiration from and complement the work of the TRC are the creating of a human rights culture which entails amongst others the development of theories to enhance the fulfilment of especially social and economic rights; the formulation of public policies and laws that foster the implementation of human rights and the moral formation of citizens of public virtue and character who embody human rights values. Other initiatives are the quest for economic, social 9 Ibid., p.171. 10 Ibid., p.170. 11 D. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (London, 1999), pp.229-230.

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and gender justice in the context of globalization; the efforts to overcome poverty; to create jobs and to protect the environment; the building of cultures of peace and a love for life; the development of inclusive and embracing social identities as well as the fostering of public health. The list of challenges posed by the quest for the restoration of dignity can be extended. Perhaps one under-estimated and neglected process that might serve the quest for reconciliation and justice is the unity of churches in South Africa. There are people who say that churches had missed the bus to make a contribution to the healing of South Africa. This accusation is made against those churches that are still racially divided, e.g. the so-called Dutch Reformed Church family. But the complaint is also levelled against churches that are structurally united, but that still experience division along racial and socio-economic lines on the organic level and in the sphere of the daily living of its members. Despite these objections, one can offer sociological reasons why church unity might play a role in realizing reconciliation and justice. Most important of these are the fact that more than eighty percent of South Africans confess to be Christians. By far most of them belong to a church. Churches therefore can reach most South Africans. Churches also enjoy relatively high levels of trust in South African society. A significant number of South Africans in all walks of life, also political life, do expect churches to make a contribution in public life. Besides these sociological reasons, there are theological reasons to be offered for the argument that church unity can enhance reconciliation and justice in society. These reasons are discussed in the following paragraphs. It is firstly argued that the disunity of churches is, amongst others, due to the fact that churches deal with social categories like nationality, race, ethnicity, socio-economic position and gender in the same alienating and unjust way that broader society deals with them. This statement is illuminated through a discussion of the famous work of Helmut Richard Niebuhr on the causes of church division and the formation of different denominations. We want to conclude from this discussion that since churches are mainly divided along these social lines, it will be a powerful sign of hope in society if we can overcome these divisions, alienations and injustices. Church disunity as embodiment of social alienation and injustice Helmut Richard Niebuhr12 made a classic analysis of the etiology of denominationalism. He describes various so-called non-theological factors that lead to the formation of separate denominations. He explains that the formation of different denominations like Roman Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, and in the midst of Protestants various denominations, is mainly attributed to sociological, not doctrinal and theological factors. This position might be viewed as a reductionist understanding of the etiology of denomination formation. It can also be argued that in the end all factors, even so-called pure sociological factors, do have something to do with theology, with God. Despite these and other reservations

12 1954).

H.R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (Michigan,1929, repr.

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about his theory, his analysis remains very helpful for understanding church division in various parts of the world and in various phases of the history of the church. His analysis is especially helpful in the context of the Dutch Reformed Church family in South Africa, which is divided along class, ethnic, racial and cultural lines, despite its common rootedness in the Dutch Reformed tradition. His analysis helps to demonstrate how church disunity is a reflection of, and feeds social division and injustice. Niebuhr13 reasons that whenever the ideals that we confess are to be implemented and embodied, we are vulnerable to inadequate forms of embodiment of the ideals. Compromises seem to be unavoidable. Although these compromises are unavoidable they are not right and something with which we can make peace. They are not something to be proud of and cannot be viewed as an achievement, because they constitute a betrayal of the essential gospel. The compromise embodied in the formation of various Christian denominations is for Niebuhr unacceptable: The fact that compromise is inevitable does not make it less an evil. The fault of every concession, of course, is that it is made too soon, before the ultimate resistance ‘to the blood’ has been offered. Even where resistance have gone to the uttermost the loyal man (sic) remembers that it might have been begun earlier, that it might have been continued a little longer, and that any compromises of the absolute good remains an evil. At last men (sic) must continue to condemn themselves not only for their failure to do what they could, but also for their failure to perform what they could not, for their denial of the absolute good whose categorical demands were laid on their incapable will. But compromises are doubly evil when they are unacknowledged, when the emasculation of the Christian ideal remains undiscovered and when, in consequence, men (sic) take pride, as in an achievement, in a defeat of the essential gospel.14

Niebuhr mourns the fact that the disunity of churches is a portrayal of the divisions in society: ‘the organization which is loudest in its praise of brotherhood (sic) and most critical of race and class discriminations in other spheres is the most disunited group of all, nurturing in its own structure that same spirit of division which it condemns in other relations’.15 He argues that churches had abandoned the ethics of the gospel of Jesus Christ for the social ethics of a divided society. Churches either adapt to this caste ethics of division, or at least try to show that this ethic is actually in accord with Christian ethics.16 This ethics of division renders churches ineffective in public life: The domination of class and self-preservative church ethics over the ethics of the gospel must be held responsible for much of the moral ineffectiveness of Christianity in the West. Not only or primarily because denominationalism divides and scatters the energies of Christendom, but more because it signalizes the defeat of the Christian ethics of brotherhood (sic) by the ethics of the caste.17 13 14 15 16 17

Ibid., pp.3-6. H.R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, p.5. Ibid., p.9. Ibid., pp.22-23. H.R .Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, pp.21-22.

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Niebuhr argues that churches had lost a leading moral ideal, a common moral telos and purpose. Divided churches rather sing hallelujah choruses to the dominant morality of the national, racial and economic groups with which they are allied. They proclaim the nobility of a morality of acquisition, national and racial prestige which rest in the ‘common purposes and common fears of mankind (sic) at its lower levels’.18 The division in the Dutch Reformed Church family was inaugurated in 1857 when the synod of the DRC opted for a compromise, in this case even an avoidable compromise. The synod made a decision in favour of separate worship services for congregants of different ethnic groups. This was not a theologically motivated decision. In 1829 the same church decided against such division. Such a separation would theologically not be viable was the argument. The 1857 synod, however, though still adhering to this theological position, decided in favour of separation due to sociological reasons of race, class, cultural expression etc. Some of their so-called weaker white brothers and sisters could not worship with people from these other backgrounds. The compromise of 1857, the concession made there, was a betrayal of the essential gospel. Though the synod did not attend to create separate congregations and even less separate denominations, this decision paved the way for separate congregations and separate denominations along colour lines. In 1881 the Dutch Reformed Mission Church (DRMC) for mainly coloured people was established. Since 1910 separate churches were established for various black indigenous groups. They later unified and became known as the Dutch reformed Church in Africa (DRCA). And in 1968 a separate church was established for Indian people (the Reformed Church in Africa – RCA). As if this church apartheid was not sad enough, apartheid theology developed early in the twentieth century. This theology provided theological legitimacy, not only for apartheid in churches, but also for apartheid in broader society. Apartheid was portrayed as God’s solution for dealing with diversity. The theology was not unity in diversity, but division, alienation, hierarchism and dehumanization in diversity.19 The so-called daughter churches opposed this church division. In 1994 the DRMC and the biggest part of the DRCA re-united to form the Uniting Reformed Church in Southern Africa (URCSA). At the moment the four churches (URCSA, DRC, DRCA and RCA) work hard to re-unite. It is however clear that they struggle to overcome sociological, economic and psychological differences. Matters like language, culture, socio-economic position, style of worship, lifestyle of communality and lifestyle of individuality play a role in keeping them apart. Political differences might also still play a role. Voting patterns in South Africa indicate that people are politically still divided, as during apartheid. To a high extent they still vote along colour lines. These political differences, though they are not expressed explicitly, might subtly inhibit 18 Ibid., p.22. 19 For an outline of the establishment of separated churches in the so-called Dutch Reformed Church Family, see J. De Gruchy (with S. De Gruchy,), The Church Struggle in South Africa (London, 2004), pp.1-50; N. Smith, Die planting van afsonderlike kerke vir Nie-blanke bevolkingsgroepe deur die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika (Stellenbosch, 1973).

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the quest for re-unification. So-called non-theological factors separated the member churches of the DRC family. And the same factors, though in different manifestations in a new context, seem to at least slow down our re-unification process. The sociological differences among members of the DRC family should not be ignored. They are real. This family is constituted by members of a diversity of political, economic, ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds. We do worship in different ways. Some of us are more individualistic whilst others tend to be more communalistic. Some are more cause-orientated whilst others are more personorientated. We are a family of diversity. The challenge for us is to cherish diversity, to give priority to our unity amidst diversity, to give expression to unity in diversity. This is a central theological notion as indicated above. And this unity in diversity is a reality that we already possessed in the triune God. United in the triune God Unity is a gift and mandate. It is a gift from the triune God. In God unity is a reality. This unity is also a mandate. Believers are invited to accept it with gratitude, to embrace it, to celebrate it, to embody it through the power of the Holy Spirit, who is at work to actualize and operationalize the unity that is a Trinitarian reality. John Douglas Hall20 bases the unity of the church in the unity of the triune God. The unity of the church is a necessary consequence of the unity reflected in creation, redemption and consummation. All that is created is created by the one God. Humans and all other creatures are created by one substance, Adamah. This God is one. Polytheism is resisted by the Christian church. Monotheism is sustained, and therefore also the unbreakable ties with the parental faith of Israel. Unity is also reflected in Christological faith. The Formula of Chalcedon rejects duality, division and separation within the body of Christ. It confesses the unity of the one Christ, who is fully God and fully human. The unity of the church also resides in pneumatological faith. The telos (inner aim) informing all creation, and the grace of the fulfilling eschatos (consummation), that the Spirit actualizes ‘is a reunification of all that is now divided, separated, and alienated, an ultimate harmonization of the whole that, without obscuring difference, overcomes the sting of difference under the conditions of sin and death.’ Against the background of this trinitarian basis of unity, Hall reckons it would be highly extraordinary if we end up with an ecclesiology which fails to reflect it: That community could hardly be regarded as the creation of the one triune God, living in discipleship vis-a-vis the ‘one Lord Jesus Christ,’ and in its life anticipating the ultimate reconciliation of all creatures, thus restoring the intention of their Creator, were it to consider its own unity incidental or merely desirable.21

20 D. J. Hall, Confessing the One Faith. Christian Theology in a North American Context (Minneapolis,1996), pp.72-73. 21 D. J. Hall, Confessing the One Faith. Christian Theology in a North American Context (Minneapolis, 1996), pp.72-73.

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Based on this trinitarian understanding of the unity of the church one could describe some features of the unity of the church. This unity is not a unity in sameness, but in difference. It is not a unity in uniformity, but it is unity in diversity. Father, Son and Spirit is diverse, but one. Unity is also not a forced unity, but it is unity in freedom. The unity, perichoresis, inter-relatedness and interdependence, unity within the trinity is a unity in freedom. The Persons in the trinity are connected through the bond of love. The Holy Spirit of communion is this bond within the trinity and between the trinity and all of creation (cf. 2 Corinthians 13:13). In freedom the triune God created, sustains, redeems and renews all of creation for the sake of joyful communion. Unity is not unity from a distance, but unity in nearness, unity in proximity. There is interaction, exposure, growing knowledge of each other, sharing in each others’ experiences. This proximity paves the way for developing sympathy, when one member suffers, all suffer with. When one member is honoured, all rejoice (2 Corinthians 12). This sympathy flows from empathy, from living in each other’s skin and looking at the world through each others’ lenses. And in contexts where people have been alienated from each other, or where they are from different ethnic, cultural and national backgrounds, they develop interpathy.22 They feel with each other over all types of divisions. Christian unity, trinitarian unity is unity that develops oneness in thinking, feeling, willing and acting. That is true solidarity and cohesion. The structural model that we decide on for church unity should serve this unity in proximity. South African theologian, Dirkie Smit,23 who is also co-author of the Belhar Confession, also pleads for an understanding of unity as unity in proximity. Continued disunity implies the separation of people of different socio-economic groups with different levels of privilege, training, skills and participation and influence in society. Disunity constitutes the perpetuation of classism. Smit argues that these socioeconomic factors were the main cause of the original church divisions. Theological reasons for separate churches were only offered at a later stage. Other South African theologians like Beyers Naudé and Jaap Durand also refer to this strong connection between disunity and the perpetuation of alienation and injustice in society. Beyers Naudé24 pleaded that members of structurally unified churches, like URCSA, who come from a variety of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds, be brought into contact on a congregational level. Apartheid has deliberately estranged people from different language, cultural, ethnic and economic groups. In the quest for unity 22 D. Augsberger makes a helpful distinction between sympathy, empathy and interpathy. ‘Sympathy is a spontaneous affective reaction to another’s feelings experienced on the basis of perceived similarity between observer and observed. Empathy is an intentional affective response to another’s feelings experienced on the basis of perceived differences between the observer and observed. Interpathy is an intentional cognitive and affective envisioning of another’s thoughts and feelings from another culture, worldview and epistemology’. See D. Augsberger, Pastoral Counseling across Culture (Louisville, 1989), p.31. 23 See D. J. Smit ‘… op ‘n besondere wyse die God van die noodlydende, die arme en die veronregte …’, in: G.D. Cloete en D. J. Smit (eds.), ‘n Oomblik van Waarheid (Kaapstad, 1982), pp.60-62. 24 See C.F.B. Naudé, Support in word and deed in: P. Réamonn (ed), Farewell to Apartheid? Church Relations in South Africa (Geneva, 1994), p.71.

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deliberate efforts should be made to bring together people who were separated before. Jaap Durand25 argues that structural unity helps to address problems of practical and attitudinal nature that exist amongst a diversity of people, and especially amongst people who were for long estranged from each other. In concluding this part of the paper it needs to be said that the unity of God which is to be reflected by a united church does not imply an ontological resemblance between God and his church. The unity of God should, however, be reflected by the church because of the work of the merciful triune God in this world. He creates and cares, He redeems and renews. This trinitarian work equips his church for the life of concrete, visible, caring, unity, and for solidarity and cohesion. Church unity in service of public reconciliation and justice Church unity rests in Trinitarian faith. Unity is a gift from the triune God. Niebuhr paints a picture of the impact of a united church on reconciliation and justice that is extremely relevant many decades later. A re-united church is a church where the enmity between nations is overcome: A church is needed which has transcended the divisions of the world and has adjusted itself not to the local interests and needs of classes, races or nations but to the common interests of mankind (sic) and to the constitution of the unrealized kingdom of God ... The church which can proclaim this gospel must be one in which no national allegiance will be suffered to infringe upon the unity of an international fellowship.26

These nationalisms take on the form of xenophobia and terrorism by terrorist organisations and oppressive governments in contemporary societies. A re-united church on local and global levels can help society to overcome these forms of violation of dignity. A re-united church is a church where the growing gap between rich and poor on local and global levels are overcome. Such a church practices Christian communism like the early church in Jerusalem: This communism differs as radically from the dictatorship of the proletariat as it does from the dictatorship of capitalism. The principle of harmony and love upon which it alone can be established requires that each contribute to the community according to his (sic) ability and receive from it according to his (sic) need, not according to some predetermined principles of quantitative equality or of privilege.27

A re-united church transcends and heals the division between races and models a new way of living, i.e. a life of unity amidst diversity. This, according to Niebuhr28, will happen when this united church of love practices complete fellowship within the 25 See J. Durand ‘Church Unity and the Reformed Churches in Southern Africa’, in: P Réamonn (ed), Farewell to Apartheid? Church Relations in South Africa (Geneva, 1994), p.66. 26 H. R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, p.280. 27 Ibid., pp.280-281. 28 Ibid., p.281.

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church, and when it extends this practice into all the relationships of life. The united church overcomes racism and other divisions, it restores dignity through members who are willing to sacrifice privilege and pride and who encourage each other to count the other – from the other nationality, race, socio-economic group, culture, ethnicity (and we can add gender and sexual orientation) – better than yourself. In conclusion, according to Niebuhr, a re-united church is a church where the universal fears of human beings are overcome and where the common dreams are fulfilled. These fears which seem to be so familiar decades after Niebuhr’s29 writing include: ethical stupidity and wrong use of science that feed holocausts in the world; nationalisms that nurture hate and passions; decline of intellectual, religious, artistic and economic activity; the killing of millions of young people in wars; the exclusion of the powerless from economic growth and prosperity; the co-modification of life and the dictatorship of the machine; the growth of consumerism and a culture of greed; the destruction of noble values. In this context of division, conflict and injustice Niebuhr pleads for a vision of unity: The problem of the world is the problem of a synthesis of culture – of the building up of an organic whole in which the various interests and the separate nations and classes will be integrated into a harmonious, interacting society, serving one common end in diverse manners. Such a synthesis of culture can be built only upon a common world-view and a common ethics. Without these no civilization has flourished or left a contribution for the future. And every civilization which has possessed itself by possessing such a synthesis has received it from its religion.30

Now, more than ever, the need is immense for a re-united church on local and global levels – a church that contributes to this synthesis, organic whole, common worldview and common ethics, to this harmonious, integrating society, a church who, through its confession and embodiment and celebration of unity, helps to build all over the world a culture of social cohesion, social compassion and social solidarity, a culture and ethos of what Africans call ubuntu (one person is a person through other persons). Where churches live in unity, in proximity, in sympathy, empathy and interpathy, in solidarity and social cohesion, there churches serve reconciliation and justice amongst God’s people and the rest of God’s creatures. Conclusion In South Africa we see new signs of hope in the re-unification process of the DRC family. An attempt is made by the 2007 synod of the Cape Synod of the DRC to express remorse about the 1857 synodical decision which, perhaps unintentionally, paved the way for the eventual theological legitimization of church apartheid. The synod attempts to publicly confess guilt about this compromise of the truth. This noble and courageous gesture will serve church re-unification and reconciliation and justice in South Africa. 29 H. R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, pp.265-266. 30 Ibid., pp.265-266.

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In the quest for re-unification in the DRC family consensus has been reached that the Confession of Belhar 1986 will form part of the confessional basis of the new church. The envisaged joint confession of faith in the triune God, unity, reconciliation, justice and obedience to Christ the Lord as articulated in Belhar, will give theological and confessional impetus to re-unification, reconciliation and justice. On the various levels of synodical commissions and ministries, presbyteries and congregations, the DRC family is currently making progress on the road of re-unification. The envisaged re-unification of these churches, whose continued separate existence still serves as the prime example of the theological legitimization of apartheid, alienation and injustice, could serve reconciliation and justice in South Africa, perhaps like no other church. Bibliography Augsberger, D. Pastoral Counseling across Culture (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989). Botman, H. and Peterson, R. (eds), To Remember and to Heal. Theological and Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1996). Daye, R. Political Forgiveness. Lessons from South Africa (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2004). De Gruchy, J. Cochrane, J. and Martin, S. (eds), Facing the Truth: South African Faith Communities and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Cape Town: David Philip, 1999). De Gruchy, J. The Church Struggle in South Africa (London: SCM Press, 2004). Durand, J. ‘Church Unity and the Reformed Churches in Southern Africa’, in Réamonn, P., (ed), Farewell to Apartheid?Church Relations in South Africa (Geneva: World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 1994). Hall, D.J. Confessing the One Faith. Christian Theology in a North American Context (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996). Johnson, R.W. South Africa: The First Man, the Last Nation (Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2006). Koopman, N. ‘Trinitarian Anthropology, Ubuntu and Human Rights’ in H.R Botman and K Spörre (eds.), Building a Human Rights Culture. South African and Swedish Perspectives (Falun: Stralins, 2003), pp.194-206. Koopman, N.‘Theological Anthropology and Gender Relations’ in Scriptura 2004, 2/86, pp.190-200. Maluleke, T. ‘Dealing Lightly with the Wound of my People?’ in Missionalia 3/25. Maluleke, T. ‘Truth, National Unity and Reconciliation in South Africa’ in Missionalia 3/25. Naudé, C.F.B. ‘Support in Word and Deed’ , in Réamonn, P., (ed), Farewell to Apartheid? Church Relations in South Africa (Geneva: World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 1994). Niebuhr, H.R. The Social Sources of Denominationalism (Michigan: Henry Holt and Company, 1929 repr. 1954).

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Shriver, D. An Ethic for Enemies. Forgiveness in Politics (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Shriver, D. Honest Patriots: Loving a Country enough to remember its Misdeeds (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005). Smit, D. ‘Confession – guilt – truth – and forgiveness in the Christian tradition’, in Conradie, E., (ed), Essays in Public Theology (Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2007), pp. 309-323. Smit, D. ‘Shared Stories for the Future? Theological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa’, in Essays in Public Theology, (Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2007), pp.325-341. Smit, D.J. ‘… op ‘n besondere wyse die God van die noodlydende, die arme en die veronregte …’,in: Cloete, G.D. en Smit, D.J. (eds.), ‘n Oomblik van Waarheid (Kaapstad:Tafelberg Uitgewers, 1982). Smith, N. Die planting van afsonderlike kerke vir Nie-blanke bevolkingsgroepe deur die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika (Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch, 1973). Tutu, D. No Future without Forgiveness (London: Rider, 1999). Villa Vicencio, C. and Verwoerd, W. (eds), Looking back reaching forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2000).

Chapter 8

Korean War: The Origin of the Axis of Evil in the Korean Peninsula Jooseop Keum

Introduction On 29th January 2002, George W. Bush condemned Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil,’ when he was delivering the State of the Union Speech to both the Senate and the House of Representatives of the US Congress. The Bush statement came as a tremendous shock to those Koreans and US diplomats who were engaged in the peace talks between North and South Korea and which included finalising the Geneva Agreement of dismantling North Korea’s Nuclear Programme. This is why Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, launched the first attack against George W Bush’s new policy on North Korea. She pointed out that Bush has ‘single-handedly destroyed’ the initial relationship she had established with North Korea during the Clinton age. She said that the principle Bush currently uses in handling foreign affairs has caused the international community to think that the United States is doing things ‘in an utterly disorderly way’ and has ‘lost reason’.1 Of course, it was not surprising that a severe response came from North Korea. North Korea understood Bush’s accusation as declaring a war against them.2 Mr Bush’s understanding of the ‘Axis of Evil’ was rooted in the attacks on the US which took place on September Eleventh. But why did Bush include North Korea, which has no relation with September Eleventh, in the same category of evil as Iran and Iraq? He insisted that North Korea is an evil regime because it is arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. However, there are other countries armed with missiles in spite of extreme poverty in the name of self-defence in the world. Why was only North Korea particularly selected among them? Was it simply a mistake of a simple-minded leader as Albright suggested? It is my interest to trace the origin of the Axis of Evil in the Korean peninsula, with special reference to the notion of Police Action during the Korean War. We will examine the way in which the Christian ideological struggle with Communism developed during the Korean War. It will be shown that not only the Korean churches but also the World Council of Churches (WCC), due to its ideological preference, supported the Allied Army during the war in the name of the Police Action. It will

1 2002. 2

‘Interview with Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State,’ ABC, 1 February, Beijing Times, 1 February, 2002.

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be argued that this Police Action has been the conceptual origin of the Axis of Evil in the history of US diplomacy. Who really started the Korean War? In 1948, two separate governments were established in the Korean peninsula. From this point onwards, both of them campaigned for the reunification of the two Koreas. Both of them claimed political legitimacy for their government, and their ideology, to rule over the whole peninsula. In this process, they were also tempted to unify the nation by military force rather than by peaceful means. Finally, the worst national tragedy in five thousand years of Korean history, the Korean War, broke out in 1950. The official South Korean position on the origin of the Korean War has been that ‘in the early morning of 25th June 1950, the North Koreans suddenly opened a general invasion all along the 38th Parallel against a sleepy, unprepared South’.3 In the western world, it has also been accepted that the Soviets and North Koreans stealthily prepared an attack that was completely unprovoked.4 However, North Korea has asserted that South Korea started the war with the support of the US, while North Korea was making efforts to reunify the country by peaceful means. The USSR and China supported this account. However, South Korea and the US have continued to believe that Kim Il-sung simply told a lie to justify his attack.5 In the field of Korean War studies, only recently has documentary evidence been produced to demonstrate that the responsibility for making a ‘general invasion’ across the 38th Parallel lies with the North. Myung-rim Park examined Russian secret documents on the Korean War, to which access has been allowed after the end of the Cold War, and came to this conclusion.6 However, Cumings claims that although North Korea opened a ‘general war’, South Korea had first made a ‘local attack’ in the Ongjin peninsula on 23rd June 1950, before the outbreak of the general war, and had occupied Haeju city in the North.7 According to Cumings, this local 3 Ki-baik Lee, Hankuksa Shinron (A New History of Korea), (Seoul, 1984), p. 480. 4 Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Korea, London, November 1958, Quote No. R.3965, Classification 1.2d, 9. This report was based on the report of the UN Commission on Korea. However, B. Cumings criticizes the Commission’s work, ‘UNCOK’s report was drawn together on the morning of June 26, then finalized in Japan on June 29, based exclusively on American and South Korean sources and on the military observer’s report, on which some preliminary work had been done on June 24 before hostilities commenced’. B. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, (New York, 1997), p 265. 5 D. Muccio, US ambassador in Korea made the first official report: ‘North Korean Forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning’, ‘From Muccio to State’, 25th June 1950, taken from, www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1953/ muccio. htm. 6 See, Myung-rim Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, vol. 1, (Seoul, 1996). 7 In addition to B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, vol. 2 ( Nebraska, 2000), pp. 568-588; the following scholars also admit this local attack. See, I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1952; K. Gupta, ‘How did Korean War Begin?’, The China Quarterly, 52, 1972, pp.

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attack suddenly spread eastward and developed into a general war on 25th June. As a matter of fact, however, this was not the first ‘local attack’ on the North by the South. The first fighting lasted four days in May 1949, and took an official toll of 400 North Korean and 22 South Korean soldiers, as well as upwards of 100 civilian deaths in Kaesung, according to South Korean figures. Kim Il-sung reported that the ‘South Korean army made 432 armed attacks across border’ in 1949.8 There is evidence that this border fighting was mostly caused by the South Korean attacks. The US ambassador in Korea, Muccio, reported that the border battles in 1949 began at Kaesung on 4th May, in an engagement that the South started,9 trying to invade further northward.10 The war that started in June 1950 followed nine months of battles along the 38th Parallel in 1949. The border conflicts in 1949 caused the preparation of a civil war between the two Koreas. In the South, President Syngman Rhee developed the policy of Bukjin Tongil or Reunification by Invasion of the North, based on the limited victories gained in border fighting in 1949. South Korean attacks across the border in 1949, and the intention of war, made Kim Il-sung nervous because North Korean army forces were far smaller than those of South Korea. The situation changed fundamentally in early 1950. Due to the success of the Chinese Revolution, Korean soldiers who had fought in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army returned to North Korea in large number. Their return dramatically increased North Korean army strength to 95,000 by June 1950. Kim Il-sung also started to consider liberating the South Korean peoples’ ‘suffering’ under the ‘Pro-Japanese and Pro-American traitor Syngman Rhee’ by military means. He pointed out that ‘because of American colonial policy, the former pro-Japanese landlords continued to monopolize the land, and the majority of people had been exploited by them without land reform’.11 Based on this understanding, Kim planned the Chokuk Habang Junjaeng or National Liberation War, which meant a military attack on the South. Stalin advised Kim to wait until a South Korean attack occurred and then counter-attack. This would provide a justification for the war.12 Mao promised Kim: ‘If the US army becomes involved in the war and invades North Korea across the parallel, China will send military forces to support

699-716; D. W. Conde, An Untold History of Modern Korea, vol. 2, (Japan, 1967), and tr. J. Choi, Hankuk Chunjang: Ttohanaeui Sigak, (Seoul, 1988); N.B., According to Myung-rim Park, ‘Because the CIA prohibited the publication of Conde’s book in the US, it was published in Japan in 1967 and translated in Korea in 1988. 8 DPRK National Security Department, ‘Jungchi Bodo mit Damwha Jaryo’, (Materials of Political Press Release and Statements), unpublished Paper, July 1950, 21. 9 US National Archives, 895.00 file, box 7127, ‘Muccio to State’, 13th May 1949. 10 ‘The military urged (the) mounting (of) an immediate attack north towards Charwon (sic, Chulwon)’. US National Archives, 895.00 file, box 946, Muccio, ‘Memos of Conversation’, 13 and 16 August 1949. 11 Nagak Kongbo, (The Bulletin of Cabinet), 1949, 216. 12 D. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, tr. H. Shukman, (Rocklin, 1992), p. 158.

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you’. He did not want to face the US army on the Chinese border, so Kim had the support and assurances he needed. On the other side, Rhee also got a clear message from Washington that he would get American support when South Korea was attacked.14 Myung-rim Park maintains that South Korea and the US also prepared a counter-attack scenario, similarly waiting for the North Koreans to launch the first attack. The scenario set out three stages in the case of a North Korean invasion: firstly, retreat; secondly, counter-attack; finally, occupy the whole of North of Korea.15 The same logic was being followed in Seoul and Pyongyang, and also in Washington and Moscow, regarding the outbreak of the war. By mid-1950, things were tense, with each side waiting for the other to start it. The US, the USSR and China all wanted a ‘limited war’, outside their own territory. Each hoped the war would be to their own ‘geopolitical benefit in East Asia’, by imposing their own ‘ideological hegemony in third world countries’.16 Police action and UN’s intervention The UN’s intervention in the Korean War was the first military action in its history. From the beginning of the War, the US had participated, as promised to Rhee. However, President Truman sent American air and naval power to Korea ‘without congressional approval’. The lack of such approval meant that Truman could not call for general mobilization. Therefore, he brought the issue to the UN on 27th June, to cover the shortage of ground soldiers. Truman called his intervention in Korea ‘police action’17 so that he would not have to get a declaration of war. The Security Council of the UN met on 27th June 1950. The US delegate submitted a draft resolution, which recommended that ‘the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area’.18 On the other hand, the Yugoslavia delegate presented a draft resolution, which suggested introducing mediation between the two Koreas and inviting a North Korean representative to the Council. This was to ensure that the North Korean

13 Myung-rim Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, vol. 1, p. 158. 14 M. P. Goodfellow, a US State Department official, indicated what he delivered to Rhee: ‘The U.S. Govt. position is this: avoid any initiative on S. Korea’s part in attacking N.K., but if N.K. should invade S.K. then S.K. should resist and march right into N.K…and Am(erican) people would understand it’. Wellington Koo Papers, Colombia University, box 217. 15 Park’s evidence is a top secret order of South Korean army, the Operation Order No. 38, 25 March 1950 and US army order, LD-SL-17. 16 Heung-soo Kim, A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in Korean Churches (Seoul, 1999), p. 21. 17 According to B. Cumings, this ‘police action’ inaugurated the pattern for subsequent conflicts in Vietnam and Persian Gulf, in which wars were declared by executive decision rather than through proper constitutional procedure. B. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 265. 18 UN Document S/VP 474, 5.

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view on the outbreak of the war would also be heard. The Yugoslav draft resolution received no support from the Western representatives.20 It was fortuitous for the USA that the USSR was deliberately absenting itself from the Security Council at this time in protest against the non-representation of Communist China in the UN. It is likely that had the USSR been present, it would certainly have vetoed the US resolution. On 29th June, North Korea rejected the decisions of the Security Council as ‘unlawful’, principally on the grounds of the absence of the USSR, one of the permanent members of the Security Council. North Korea was supported by the USSR and by all other ‘Soviet-orbit’ states, which declared the Council’s decision unlawful and accused South Korea of aggression.21 In spite of this declaration, the UN Secretary-General transmitted the Council’s resolution the same day to all member states and asked their assistance for South Korea. Due to the resolution, in addition to the US army, 15 other nations sent their armies, including 12,000 British soldiers. Thus, a civil war in Korea developed into an international war. When the allied army eventually crossed into the North, it can be said that it was the beginning of a new war, because this action definitely went beyond that defensive ‘Police Action’ which the UN had agreed. J.F. Dulles, who was ‘a key advocate of the rollback’,22 emphasized that it was ‘the first opportunity to displace part of the Soviet orbit’.23 However, this ‘rollback’ brought another international intervention in the war, with the Chinese becoming directly involved. In mid-December 1950, the allied army had been driven back to the 38th Parallel. The battle line was eventually stabilized along the parallel in spring 1951. On 10th July 1951, truce talks started. The negotiation dragged on until after the US presidential election in the autumn of 1952. D. D. Eisenhower, who strongly criticized the unpopular war, won the election and rapidly developed an armistice, which was concluded on the 27th July 1953. The battle line was accepted as a de facto new boundary between North and South Korea. The dream of reunification resulted in a nightmare of killing. The Korean conflict brought about a tragic internecine war on the peninsula, which also intensified the international conflict. More tonnage in bombs was dropped on Korea than on the whole of Europe in the Second World War, reducing the entire peninsula to ashes. The Korean War resulted in 220,000 South Korean, over 600,000 North 19 UN Document S/1509. 20 The US draft resolution was finally adopted by a vote of 7 against 1 (Yugoslavia) with 2 abstentions (Egypt and India). UN Document S/1511. 21 Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Op. Cit., 9. 22 B. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p.276. Dulles asked J. Allison to report in a top-secret memo to the National Security Council. Allison justified the rollback by saying that the parallel was agreed upon ‘only for the surrender of Japanese troops and that the US had made no commitments with regard to the continuing validity of the line for any other purpose’, National Archives, 795.00 file, box 4265, Allison, ‘The Origin and Significance of the 38th Parallel in Korea’, 13 July, 1950. However, there was a logical contradiction because if the parallel was not valid in 1950 and the US Army could freely cross it, how could the US condemn North Korea to the UN as an invader, when it crossed the parallels? 23 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United State, 1950, 7. (Korea, Washington, D.C.,1976), pp. 386-387.

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Korean, 1,000,000 Chinese, 140,000 American, and over 16,000 other UN military casualties.24 It should be also remembered that the Korean War killed millions of civilians. There were 1,000,000 South Korean and 3,000,000 North Korean estimated civilian casualties.25 About 100,000 civilians were listed as killed or missing in the South26 and 1,200,000 in the North.27 That means that, including soldiers, over one sixth of the whole Korean population, which was about thirty million in 1950, were killed during the war. In addition to this, ten million people became separated from their own closest family members, and have remained unable to meet each other from the end of this war until now.28 During the war, 43% of Korea’s industrial facilities were destroyed and 33% of its homes devastated.29 From the above statistics, two things stand out: first, that the number of civilian victims was enormous, and second, North Korean damage was much greater than that of the South. There were three reasons for this. Firstly, in the North, one of the major reasons for the vast number of civilian victims was the massive indiscriminate bombing carried out by the US air force. From the beginning of the war, the US was superior in air power. The B-29 planes dropped the recently introduced napalm bomb like ‘monsoon rain’ in North Korea. For example, on 29th August 1952, 1,403 sorties were flown; an official communiqué said that 10,000 litres of napalm were dropped ‘with excellent results’; 62,000 rounds of ammunition were employed in ‘strafing at low level’; 697 tons of bombs were dropped in seventy-eight North Korean cities and towns.30 North Korea reported 6,000 civilian deaths in Pyongyang from one raid alone.31 According to Halliday, ‘this indiscriminate bombing strained relations between the USA and its allies, especially Britain’. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was openly critical of the bombing of civilians.32 However, the US army refused to listen to Eden’s advice and the policy of ‘torching’ villages continued. In addition to human casualties, 600,000 houses, 5,000 schools, 1,000 hospitals and surgeries and 8,700 factories were destroyed by bombing from 19501951 in the North.33 There were also considerable numbers of civilian massacres during the War, carried out by the US ground army. The famous painter, Pablo Picasso, drew 24 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropedia, vol. 10: Knowledge in Depth, (London, 1978), p. 513. 25 Ibid., p. 513. For more detail statistics, see, D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War, (New York, 1964), pp. 460-461. 26 D. Rees calculates 117,000, see D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 460. 27 The Hankyoreh, 25 June 2001, reported this figure quoting from Russian secret military documents of the Korean War. 28 Man-kil Kang, Kocheo Ssun Hankuk Hyundaesa, (The Revised Modern History of Korea), (Seoul, 1994), p. 226. 29 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 10, p. 513. 30 J. Halliday and B. Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, (New York, 1988), p. 189. 31 A total of 420,000 bombs were dropped on Pyongyang during the war, which had a population of 400,000 before the war. Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, p. 188. 32 J. Halliday and B. Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, p. 188. 33 Kyungje Kunsul, (The Economic Reconstruction), September 1956, 5-6.

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a picture entitled Massacre en Corée in 1951. He portrayed the US army killing Korean civilians, mostly pregnant women and children. Recently, two Associated Press (AP) correspondents proved that Picasso was correct. The AP writers report states that about 400 civilians, who were largely elderly people, children, infants and women, were killed by the US army at Nogunri on 28th July 1950.34 An American soldier was reported as saying ‘But, hell, they’ve all got on those white pajama things and they’re straggling down the road. Women? I wouldn’t know. The women wear pants, too, don’t they? They’re troops. Shoot’em’.35 Americans thought anyone in ‘white pajamas’ might potentially be an enemy. According to a sensitive British war correspondent, American troops usually began their hunting operations with burning and firing villages in enemy area. He said, ‘There were few who dared to write the truth of things as they saw them’.36 The Korean peninsula was indeed a ‘killing field’ during the war, especially in the North. The war and the World Council of Churches WCC Toronto Statement As a civil war in a Far Eastern country expanded into an international collision between the East and the West, not only the Korean churches but also churches around the world split into two positions on the Korean War, according to their ideological preferences. The WCC issued what was called its Toronto Statement on the Korean War on 13th July 1950, and this brought an ideological conflict between eastern and western churches. The statement influenced the Communist understanding on Christianity in North Korea as well. Therefore, it is necessary to examine it in detail. From the beginning of the war, the recently established WCC had paid deep attention to the war. On the morning of 26th June 1950, C. Ranson, General Secretary of the International Missionary Council (IMC) received the following cable from H. Namkung, General Secretary of the NCCK: ‘Large invading forces are pressing all around us. Begging immediate help from USA. Use your best influence’.37 Replies were sent on the same day by Ranson (IMC) and Nolde (CCIA) to Namkung and G. Paik as follows: ‘Moved by Korean tragedy, CCIA maintaining contact with United Nations and conferring with church leaders about representation to United 34 See, S. Choe, C. J. Hanley and M. Mendoza, ‘Bridge at No Gun Ri’, AP Press, 30 September 1999. These three reporters won the Pulitzer Prize in 1999.They found 120 names of victims. Among the 120, 70 were women and most of the men were over fifty. There were also 25 children and infants under five. However, Major General H. R. Gay told a lie that North Korean troops killed the civilians at Nogunri at that time. 35 E. Larrabee, ‘Korea: The Military Lesson’, Harper’s November 1950, 51-57. 36 R. Thompson, Cry Korea (London, 1951), pp. 39; 42. 37 ‘From H. Namkung to International Missionary Council’, cable on 26 June 1950. This cable was delivered to US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson by Dr. Brumbaugh representing the Methodist Division of Foreign Mission. ‘From Brumbaugh to Acheson’, cable on 27 June 1950.

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States government’. After consultation with officials of the WCC and the IMC, the director of the Commission of Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) addressed a letter to the Secretary General of the UN on 26th June.39 ‘The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, in seeking world peace with justice, emphasizes the duty of Christians to support negotiation rather than primary reliance upon arms as an instrument of policy’. 40 The CCIA began by calling for peaceful measures to be used to solve the Korean conflict. Its initial letter to the UN was similar to the Yugoslav resolution at the Security Council. However, this stance of the CCIA’s was dramatically reversed within a week. At the executive committee meeting of the CCIA, which was held from 3rd – 5th July, in Toronto, prior to the third Central Committee Meeting of the WCC, the drafts of a letter ‘to all Christians in Korea’, which gave a statement on the Korean situation and a prayer were submitted.41 At the debate on these drafts, Reinhold Niebuhr strongly insisted on the necessity of a ‘police measure’ in Korea, and M. Niemöller supported it.42 R. M. Fagley, who also favoured Truman’s ‘police action’, had drafted the statement.43 The Central Committee of the WCC then met from 9th – 13th July 1950, also at Toronto, and appointed Niebuhr and Niemöller to revise the draft statement. It then adopted unanimously the final version of the statement, which was published as ‘The Korean Situation and World Order’. The statement was immediately considered controversial, even within the WCC. There were serious arguments over the second sentence of the third paragraph, which read: An act of aggression has been committed. The United Nations Commission in Korea, the most objective witness available, asserts that ‘all evidence points to a calculated, coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy’ by North Korean troops. Armed attack as an instrument of national policy is wrong. We therefore commend the United 38 ‘From Nolde to G. Paik’, cable on 26 June 1950. 39 The CCIA was a commission co-founded by the IMC and the WCC. For that reason, the consultation was necessary. Concerning the CCIA, see, N. Lossky et. al. ed., Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, (Geneva, 1991), pp. 203; 487; 525; 530; 532; 681. 40 ‘From Nolde to the Honorable Trygve Lie’, 26 June 1950. 41 O. F. Nolde, ‘The Korean Situation from the Standpoint of Certain Actions by the CCIA and related Christian Bodies’, 24 June 1953, International Affairs Archive, WCC, pp. 2-3. 42 ‘Minutes and Reports of the Third Meeting of Central Committee of the World Council of Churches’, Toronto, 9-15 July 1950, 26-27. 43 R. M. Fagley was the co-secretary for the Department of International Justice and Goodwill, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. He was a close advisor to Dulles and Nolde on Korean matters. See, ‘From Nolde to Fagley’, 14 May 1947. Just before the statement, he wrote, ‘United Nations Memorandum: The Korean Situation’, Series 3, No. 9, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. In this report, he strongly supported the US and UN positions on the Korean War. He also sent a secret memo to Nolde as follows: ‘A unified Korea under the Soviet domination would be a grave menace to Japan. A Korea under Western control would be regarded as an intolerable threat to Vladivostok. It might be that some division of Korea would be necessary for an eventual settlement’. R. M. Fagley, ‘Confidential Notes on Interview’, 21 July 1950, 1.

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Nations, an instrument of world order, for its prompt decision to meet this aggression and for authorizing a police measure which every member nation should support. 44

The main argument was whether the church could support the use of world military forces for a civil war. Niemöller said, ‘We in Germany do not think of what is happening in Korea as war, but police action against armed violence in defiance of authority’.45 Niebuhr went on, further emphasizing its significance, ‘This is the first time in the modern world that a police action has been taken by the community of nations. We support it in this statement, as we should’.46 However, Haslam gave a counter-argument: ‘A world organization speaking for Christ should not make such a statement as this. I doubt whether this action in Korea can rightly be called a police action’.47 T. C. Chao from China, one of the presidents of WCC, had doubts about the political transparency of the police action and also protested against the Statement arguing that it ‘sounds so much like the voice of Wall Street’.48 As we will see later, this was merely the beginning of the argument within the WCC about whether the statement was proper or not. Finally, the Statement was adopted by a vote of 45 to 2. Only two pacifists opposed the resolution, including a representative of the Quakers. However, the vote was taken in the absence of the delegations from the Eastern European churches, who were not able to take part in the Central Committee meeting, due to their being unable to obtain entry visas to Canada.49 It is mysterious how the WCC, which had originally urged negotiation rather than military action, suddenly altered its stance to that of supporting the UN’s ‘police action’. Within a mere nine days, they were approving the use of military force in Korea. How was it possible for the WCC to justify military action, and support the call for ‘all UN member nations to support it’, so very quickly after the outbreak of the Korean War?50 There were two reasons behind this change in attitude. Firstly, the CCIA was influenced by the UN. After sending the letter to the UN on 26th June, the CCIA received the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), which condemned only North Korea as the invader in the war.51 No blame was laid at the door of South Korea. The WCC did not realize at all that South Korea had also intended an invasion towards the North, and had launched local attacks. The 44 WCC Central Committee, ‘The Korean Situation and World Order’, 13 July 1950, Toronto, Canada. 45 The Christian Century, 26 July 1950. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Quoted from W. A. Visser’t Hooft, W. A. Visser’t Hooft: Memories (London, 1973), p. 224. 49 The Living Church, 30 July 1950. 50 The UN sent a letter of appreciation to WCC: ‘Your approval and support of the United Nations is very much appreciated indeed’. ‘From Francoise Dony to O. F. Nolde’, 7 August 1950. 51 Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, A/1350, Part One: Aggression. The CCIA mainly depended for their information on the war on UN sources. See, CCIA, ‘Development in Korea: As Reported in United Nations Documents’, January 1951.

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WCC did not perceive that the credibility of the UNCOK report was problematic because parts of it had been written before the war.52 The approval of ‘police action’ was altogether too hasty a response to the war on the part of a council representing churches throughout the world. It was based on one-sided information of the Korean situation, and those involved in drafting or approving the WCC resolution had insufficient knowledge of what was really happening. Secondly, after the Security Council adopted the US resolution on 27th June, the American voice dominated both the CCIA executive committee and the WCC Central Committee Meeting.53 Fagley drafted and Niebuhr revised the statement.54 Both of them were strong supporters of Truman’s slogan of ‘police action’ against the Communists.55 Behind this domination of the American voice, which led the WCC to support the ‘police action’, promoted first by Truman then by the UN, there was J. F. Dulles,56 who had an awareness of the importance of the ‘churches’ functions’ in the ideological struggle with the Communists. J. F. Dulles: An invisible hand J. F. Dulles was a politician, diplomat, lawyer and an important leader in the early history of the CCIA, and had addressed the inaugural assembly of WCC in 1948, at Amsterdam.57 The elder son of a Presbyterian minister, he was born in 1888. He was educated in Princeton (Philosophy), the Sorbonne (International Law) and George Washington Law School, and started his career as a lawyer. After participating in the Paris Peace Congress, he became a diplomat. He was US ambassador and delegate to the UN before becoming a Senator and Truman’s advisor in 1950. He was appointed as US Secretary of State during the Korean War. In Guhin’s opinion Dulles provided the moral and philosophical basis on which US diplomacy has rested since the beginning of the 1950s.58 Dulles was a religious man, with a strong sense of missionary zeal, which he had received from his home environment.59 In the ecumenical movement, he started his 52 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 265. 53 US had the largest number of commissioners including Dulles, one of the strongest leaders and Nolde, the Director of CCIA. See, The Living Church, 16 July 1950. 54 In fact, Niebuhr was not a Central Committee member. He was invited as an alternative member. ‘From Fagley to Benedict’, 3 April 1970. 55 ‘I do not think that a Christian who is not a pacifist can possibly advise a particularly Christian solution for Korean conflict. It is a part of our total struggle with world Communism…’, R. Niebuhr, ‘No Christian Peace in Korea?’, The Christian Century, 4 February 1953, p. 127. 56 M. A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times (New York, 1972), p.119. 57 In Amsterdam, Dulles emphasized that WCC should be in the frontline of antiCommunism, See, J. F. Dulles, ‘The Christian Citizen in a Changing World’, WCC ed., The Church and the International Disorder (London, 1948), pp. 73-114. 58 Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, pp. 11-57. 59 ‘Almost every work on the subject of Dulles draw some attention to the idea that an understanding of the man and his policy preferences involves considerations of his religious

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journey by participating in the Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State in 1937 where he experienced an ‘intellectual conversion’. At this conference ‘he had wondered if Christianity would survive such formidable rivals as Communism and fascism’.60 He had a sort of ‘utilitarian view of religion’, especially in terms of social utility.61 His conversion meant an awakening to the possible Christian contribution to the development of international order.62 Dulles maintained that ‘to create the moral foundation for world order is the task of the churches’.63 Later, in the cold war context, Dulles started to combine his conservative faith, moralistic internationalism and anti-Communism.64 He emphasized that ‘churches’ functions’ should ‘coincide’ with ‘the particular interest of the United States and the West’ against Communism.65 He understood that the US, a leading Christian country, had the moral power to fight against the atheistic Soviet Union, as a crusade.66 For him, Christianity and Communism were ‘irreconcilable’.67 Dulles not only exercised powerful leadership in the field of international diplomacy but also in the ecumenical movement.68 For example, when the CCIA was established in 1946, he influenced

home environment, strong religious convictions, a sense of Christian mission, and a subsequent universalization of missionary zeal.’, Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, p. 1. 60 Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, p. 119. See also, D. McCreary, ‘John Bennett on Oxford ’37’, Christian Century, 28 October 1987, pp. 942-944. 61 Concerning his thought at Oxford, see, J. F. Dulles, ‘The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World’, Marquess of Lothian et al., The Universal Church and the World of Nations (London, 1938), pp. 145-168. 62 J. F. Dulles, ‘The American Churches and International Situation’, Biennial Report of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (New York, 1940), p. 22. 63 J. F. Dulles, ‘Dulles Statement for Manual of Layman’s Missionary Movement’, Unpublished Paper, 4 April 1945, The J. F. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 64 Concerning the development of Dulles’ thought in international politics, see, M. G. Toulouse, The Transformation of John Foster Dulles, From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism (Macon, Georgia, 1985). 65 Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, p. 119. 66 J. F. Dulles, ‘Address by United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, before the Associated Press in New York, 22 April 1957’, in The Department of State Bulletin, 6 May 1957, pp. 715-719; see also, ‘America’s Role in the Peace’, Christianity and Crisis, vol. 4, 1945, pp. 2-6. N.B., Dulles had a strong tendency towards ‘McCarthyism’. In the senate election, he used traditional McCarthyist attacks on his rival, the nominee of the Democrats. See, Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, pp. 124-128. 67 J. F. Dulles, ‘The Christian Citizen in a Changing World’, p. 91. 68 George Bell, the first Chairperson of the Central Committee, WCC recognized his leadership in founding CCIA. The Bishop of Chichester, ‘Opening Address at the Meeting of the Central Committee of the WCC at Lucknow’, The Ecumenical Review, 5, 1953, pp. 229-232: Concerning his leadership in international affairs of ecumenical movement, see also, R. M. Fagley, ‘The Churches and the Peace Patrol’, Christianity and Crisis, vol. 10, 27 November 1950, pp. 158-159; J. C. Bennett, ‘Mr. Dulles Proposal’, Christianity and Crisis, 12, 9 June 1952, pp. 73-74.

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the election of the Chairman and the appointment of the Director.69 It seems that most CCIA members were eager to be close to him, even Visser’t Hooft, because of his influence in international politics. Visser’t Hooft invited him as one of the main speakers at the Amsterdam Assembly. When he used his speech to emphasize the idea of Christian anti-Communism he faced a serious counter-argument by another speaker, J. Hromàdka, who criticized Western capitalistic civilization from a biblical perspective.70 After a long debate, the WCC criticized both Communism and Capitalism, and suggested in their place the notion of the ‘responsible society’.71 Dulles was expected to be absent from the Toronto meeting of the WCC in 1950 because he had just returned from Korea.72 However, although he was an extremely busy person, being one of three key decision makers of US foreign policy,73 he still went to the Toronto meeting.74 At the meeting, the influence of his presence was enormous because he had visited Korea from 18th June until the outbreak of the war both as the head of UN Field Observers and as the US special envoy to Korea. Moreover, he was the main figure involved in drafting UNCOK’s report on the Korean War on 26th June in Japan. Dulles was the only person who could give a detailed description of the war at the Toronto meeting. He also encouraged the American CCIA members, Nolde, Fagley and Niebuhr, to support the UN’s ‘police action’ in the statement they drafted. Chinese church leaders criticized the role Dulles played with regard to the WCC’s Toronto Statement. ‘The person who was actually directing the World Council of Churches to pass this resolution (The Toronto Statement) was no other than Dulles’.75 Even in the West, there was also criticism of Dulles’ role in the CCIA, especially with regard to the Toronto statement. Bishop E. H. Burgmann, a CCIA commissioner, voiced the criticism that Dulles was dangerous to the CCIA, because he used the CCIA for the purpose of US international politics and for his

69 ‘I am glad that Baron van Asbeck will act as Chairman, and I greatly hope that Grubb will be a Director’. ‘From J. F. Dulles to Visser’t Hooft’, 23 September 1946. 70 ‘The speaker preceding him was John Foster Dulles, later US Secretary of State. Their respective addresses represented two opposing views on the international situation as a whole. That sparkling exchange and the discussion it provoked have been recalled ever since as one of the highlight of the first WCC Assembly’. M. Opocensky ed., Josef L. Hromàdka: The Field is the World (Prague, 1990), p. 253; See also, J. L. Hromàdka, ‘The Church and Today’s International Situation’, in M. Opocensky ed., Josef L. Hromàdka: The Field is the World, pp. 253-260. 71 Concerning the Responsible Society, see, WCC ed., The Responsible Society, Christian Action in Society: An Ecumenical Inquiry, (Geneva, 1949). 72 ‘From O. F. Nolde to J. F. Dulles’, 28 June 1950. 73 According to P. Lowe, they were President Truman, State Secretary Acheson and Special Advisor to the President, Dulles. See, P. Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, (London, 1986 ), pp. 183-187. 74 ‘The members from US are following: John Foster Dulles, Dr. O. Frederik Nolde…’, The Living Church, 16 July 1950, p. 5. 75 ‘A Joint Statement from the Representatives of Protestant Churches and Organizations of China’, 21st April 1951.

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own business. Burgmann warned the WCC that if it did not cease its relationship with him, it would find itself in difficulty.76 We can conclude that behind the American delegates who led the WCC into changing its stance on the Korean War, there stands the influential figure of J. F. Dulles. It is clear that Dulles desperately wanted the WCC to support the ‘police action’ in Korea. Indeed, he thought WCC support so important that he took the time and trouble to go personally to Toronto to ensure that he got it, in spite of all the other pressing business he had. This demonstrates how much his ‘utilitarian view’ on Christianity mattered to him, and how essential it was to his overall political strategy. It should also be remembered that he gained his diplomatic reputation by leading the establishment of UN as the US delegate. He had also demonstrated himself as an expert on Korea and Japan.77 It was also Dulles’ intention to use the WCC’s support as a moral weapon in the propaganda war. After the Security Council had decided, on 27th June, to support the ‘police action’, the UN faced two serious challenges. One was a legal criticism because the Council reached this decision without Soviet approval. The other was that it was predicted that China would intervene in the war in reaction against the UN’s intervention. In this circumstance, Truman and Dulles needed a strong moral justification for the police action.78 Finally, Dulles, with his functional view of Christianity’s role in international order, intended to utilize the WCC for this justification, by getting it to issue a supportive statement for the ‘police action’.79 Indeed, Dulles regarded the WCC as one of the best international organizations for the moral justification of Truman’s police action. The WCC recognized later that its statement had been biased towards the Western and South Korean position, and acknowledged that the CCIA had worked closely with the UN for authorizing the police action.80 All this was admitted years later, in the Central Committee Meeting of the WCC in 1989. In fact, Dulles was directly involved in the Korean War, and most academic writings on the subject emphasize his role in its outbreak.81 Some authors focus on his ‘mysterious’ visit 76 E. H. Burgmann, ‘World Council Group Wants China in UN’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951, p. 32. 77 See, Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, pp. 183-186. 78 Interview with the former Bishop of Oxford, Patrick Rodger, former Associate General Secretary of WCC, 5th February 2001, Edinburgh. 79 There was another case that Truman tried to utilize WCC for his anti-Communist international politics. Myron Taylor, another Truman man suggested to WCC in 1950: ‘The President would invite the heads of the Christian churches to come to Washington and to work together on a joint statement concerning peace and concerning resistance to Communism’. Truman also wanted to have US government ambassador to WCC in Geneva. W. A. Visser’t Hooft, W. A. Visser’t Hooft: Memories, pp. 225-227. 80 See, ‘Peace and the Reunification of Korea, Part One: Background’, WCC Central Committee, Moscow, USSR, 16-27 July 1989 Document No. 2.4. 81 E.g., Tae-ho Yoo, The Korean War and The United Nations: A Legal and Diplomatic Historical Study (Belgium, 1965), pp.122-124; Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, pp. 64-67; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, pp 586-588; 601; 608-609; W. Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton,

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to Korea just before the war. P. Lowe pays attention to his appearance at the 38th Parallel: ‘Dulles was shown wearing his characteristic Homburg hat, peering intently across the 38th Parallel at the Communist hordes to the north. This was regarded in Pyongyang as demonstrating Dulles’ aggressive intentions’.82 Cumings, by contrast, focuses on the meeting between Dulles and Rhee on 19th June. After investigating US secret documents, he maintains that Dulles agreed to Rhee’s intention to march towards the North.83 Cumings also indicates that Dulles was ‘a key advocate’ of roll back.84 Halliday claims ‘During Dulles’s visit to Seoul Rhee not only pushed for a direct American defense but also advocated an attack on the North’.85 A North Korean source also insists that ‘Dulles delivered Truman’s order to Rhee to attack the North’.86 However, it is difficult to conclude what exactly Dulles did with Rhee during his visit to Korea, because the most important documents concerning the truth of the war still remain top secret in the USA. It is also not the main purpose of this paper to examine how much Dulles was involved in the outbreak of the war. The important point to note is that the alteration of the WCC’s position on the Korean War from one of ‘negotiation’ to that of supporting the ‘police action’ was initiated and led by Dulles. It was surely ‘dangerous’, if not ‘mysterious’, that a politician so deeply and one-sidedly involved in the dispute was able to have so much influence over such a sensitive ecclesiastical agenda, within a world ecumenical body like the WCC. Controversial responses The Toronto statement also brought serious ecclesiastical tension within the WCC. In fact such tension emerged immediately after the statement was made because of its one-sided view of the issue. At Toronto, there had been no opportunity for the churches from the Communist countries to deliver their opinion of the war. As soon as the WCC announced the Statement, the churches in the Communist countries bitterly criticized the WCC’s support for the police action in Korea. Bishop A. Bereczky, the President of the Reformed Church of Hungary, who had not been permitted to enter Canada, sent an open letter to the General Secretary of WCC. Bereczky’s criticism was focused on the credibility and objectivity of the UNCOK report on the Korean War, on which the WCC relied. He also pointed to illogicality of the Statement in supporting the ‘police action’ and, at the same time, expecting 1997), pp. 54-57; M. Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, vol. 2, (Seoul, 1997), pp. 454-455; Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, pp. 183-186; Kim, A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches, pp. 69-71. 82 Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, p. 184. 83 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, pp. 257-258. 84 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 276. 85 Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, p.65. 86 H. Moon, Mije eui Chosun Chimryak Jungchak eui Jungchae wa Naeran Dobal eui Jinsang eul Pokroham, (The Nature of American Imperialist Invasion Policy to Korea and Truth on the Outbreak of Civil War: A Disclosure), (Pyongyang, 1950), pp., 75-76. N.B., Hak-bong Moon, the Special Advisor of Intelligence Department of USAMGIK and Political Advisor of Rhee, wrote this book in June, just after Dulles’ visit.

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peaceful solution. Bishop J. Peter of the Hungarian Reformed Church also criticized the WCC resolution, claiming that it supported the real aggressors in Korea.87 It was also a surprise for the WCC to hear the response of the Slovakian church from Rev. Matasik, General Secretary of the Reformed Church of Slovakia. Matasik questioned not only the Statement but also the decision making process of the WCC. He warned that his church was considering withdrawing its membership of the WCC because it had excluded the voice of the churches in Eastern Europe from participating in such an important decision. In Asia, the Chinese Church also bitterly criticized the statement. As we have noted, T. C. Chao had doubts about the role of Dulles in the matter. From 16th – 21st April 1951, 151 representatives of Protestant churches and organizations assembled in Peking, having been called there by the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Political Administration of the Central People’s Government.88 A week later, on 28th April, T. C. Chao resigned his presidency of the WCC to express his protest against the Toronto Statement and against the WCC’s position on the Korean War.89 The Chinese Church not only criticized the WCC but also organized ‘The Resist America and Help Korea Movement’,90 led by Y. T. Wu. Hromàdka vs Niebuhr The WCC, which was faced with serious criticism from the East on not only the statement but also the decision-making process, tried to justify its position. The Ecumenical Review published the Toronto Statement and justified it under the title of ‘What the Korean Resolution does, and does not, mean’. O. F. Nolde, the CCIA Director, justified the statement on the grounds that it was based upon the report of the neutral international commission on the origin of the war, and emphasized that the statement was adopted by the Central Committee.91 However, these justifications were not sufficient to persuade the churches in the East, who questioned the credibility of the report on account of the fact that it had been adopted in their absence. Therefore, WCC openly argued the issue in another volume of The Ecumenical Review, 3/2, 1951, which was entirely devoted to the Toronto Statement. Grubb, the chairperson of the CCIA, maintained that the WCC must listen to the criticisms from 87 Editorial, ‘Bishop Peter at World Peace Council’, The Protestant, April-May-June 1951, p. 6. 88 Before this meeting, in the autumn of 1950, more than 1,527 Chinese Christians from various denominations including T. C. Chao, Y. T. Wu signed a manifesto warning against imperialism especially US imperialism in the Korean War. See, ‘Chinese Christians Sign ‘Anti-Imperialism’ Manifesto’, Christianity and Crisis, X, 1950, pp. 151-152. 89 See, ‘Letter from Dr. T. C. Chao’, Minutes and Reports of the Fourth Meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, Rolle, 4-11 August 1951, p. 55. 90 For the details of movement, see, Y. T. Wu, ‘A Summary of the Eight Months’ Work of the Movement for the Protection of Self-Government, Self-Support, and Self-Propagation in Chinese Protestantism’, Unpublished paper, April 1951. 91 ‘From E. P. Eastman to B. Asbeck, O. F. Nolde, K. G. Grubb, W. A. Visser’t Hooft and C. W. Ranson’, 22nd November 1950: see also, O. F. Nolde, ‘The Christian Witness to the World of Nations’, The Ecumenical Review, 4, 1952, pp. 378-384.

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the East because ‘the first job of the Council is to maintain its own fellowship’.92 He insisted that the WCC should not directly quote the UNCOK’s report because it had not been written from a Christian perspective.93 Thomas questioned what was meant by world order, which the WCC had emphasized in its statement, i.e. world order for what and for whom. He pointed out that the notion of ‘the international order and rule does not elicit the same reverence in Asia as (it) does in western Christians’.94 For him, it was not just the question of who started the Korean War that was the important issue, but also where social justice lay. Garret also argued that in Asia, the WCC should not be linked with the names of Bao Dai and Syngman Rhee, who led anti-Communist tyrannies. Instead, it should listen to voices from China, because Communism in Asia had been accepted as a means of social ‘righteousness’ and national liberation.95 However, it was Hromàdka, who thoroughly criticized the statement as a theologian. Hromàdka sent a letter to Visser’t Hooft on 30th November. Firstly, he pointed out that the WCC supported the action of a secular power too simply, without deep reflection on the contemporary situation. ‘Today, when the peace of the world is at stake, and every self-righteous word can strengthen the aggressive and destructive forces in one’s own nation, and prompt a catastrophe, the World Council of Churches should speak in a way that does not pour oil into the fire, and does not encourage one side to a self-righteous Crusade’. 96 Secondly, Hromàdka, was also worried that the WCC had become ‘an instrument of one international power-group’ by supporting the ‘police action’ in Korea: It is difficult to understand how a finding of the Korea commission which represents just one power-group within UNO could have been taken as a ground and justification of such a far-reaching statement. We are really disturbed by the fact that, in one of the most decisive and tragic moments of world history, the World Council of Churches identified itself, self-assuredly, with one side. Instead of challenging the responsibility of all statesmen it condemned, in an out-spoken and specific way, one of the two groups. 97

What Hromàdka said here can be interpreted as continuing the line he had taken answering the speech by Dulles at Amsterdam in 1948: ‘The ecumenical movement

92 K. Grubb, ‘The Responsibility of the Churches in Politics’, The Ecumenical Review, 3/2, 1951, pp. 115. 93 Ibid., p. 119. 94 M. M. Thomas, ‘The Churches in the Political Struggles of Our Day’, The Ecumenical Review, 3/.2, 1951, p.125. 95 J. Garrett, ‘The Words and Deeds of the Churches’ The Ecumenical Review, 3/2, 1951, p. 130. 96 ‘From Hromàdka to Visser’t Hooft’, 30 November 1950, 1-2. Hromàdka also wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Security Council. ‘I cannot understand the fact that the Security Council submitted to the American request for ‘police action’ against Northern Korea with all the raids and destroying of the lives of civilian population’. ‘Dr. Hromadka on American Aggression in Korea’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950, p. 160. 97 ‘From Hromàdka to Visser’t Hooft’, 30 November 1950, 2, WCC Archival No. 301. 437. 1/5.

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cannot be identified with one political position if it wants to remain credible’. He saw the problem of Korea as closely connected with the tension between East and West. Thirdly, Hromàdka drew attention to economic factors, which played a great part in the Korean War. ‘It was also essential to lay a finger upon the fact that economic expansion tends always, sooner or later, tangibly or intangibly, to military aggression. The church groups are apt to overlook it since the economic expansion does not look, at first sight, as dangerous as a direct political and military domination’.99 Hromàdka also thought the Toronto Statement had been a frightful handicap to Christian churches. The direct result of it was the resignation of Chao, and withdrawal of Chinese member churches from active membership in the WCC. Contact with the Christians in North Korea was also lost. Hromàdka promoted a theology of dialogue with atheism, and this was one of the motives of his response. He sought to make a bridge between Christianity and atheism through dialogue because he believed the Gospel seeks to embrace the whole of humankind. This meant that ‘no one should be excluded from dialogue’.100 He tried to interpret atheism to Christians as the judgment of history on their lack of moral and social sensitivity to the suffering of human beings.101 Hromàdka was unable to accept the Toronto Statement because it ignored the necessity of a dialogue with the Communists in North Korea. Visser’t Hooft responded to Hromàdka’s criticisms in his letter on 21st December 1950 saying he had little confidence about the ‘police action’. Later, he recognized that ‘in that resolution we had failed to show, in line with whole tradition of the ecumenical movement, the struggle against the easy conscience of the West’.102 However, in the context of the early 1950s, Hromàdka was blamed as a ‘Red Stooge’ or ‘Agent of Moscow’.103 It was Reinhold Niebuhr who bitterly criticized Hromàdka and strongly defended the statement.104 It was natural for Niebuhr to do so because he had been involved in formulating the statement. Niebuhr gave his assessment of Hromàdka and the ecumenical leaders from the East:

98 For the detail of the argument between Dulles and Hromàdka, See, J. F. Dulles, ‘The Christian Citizen in a Changing World’, in WCC ed., The Church and the International Disorder (London, 1948),pp. 73-114; J. L. Hromàdka, ‘Our Responsibility in the Post-War World’, in Church and the International Disorder, pp. 114-142. 99 Hromàdka, ‘Our Responsibility in the Post-War World’, p. 3. 100 Ibid., p. 9. 101 See, J. Hromàdka, ‘The Significance of Socialist Atheism’, in M. Opocensky ed., Josef L. Hromàdka: The Field is the World, pp. 310-316. 102 W. A. Visser’t Hooft, W. A. Visser’t Hooft: Memories, (London, 1973), pp. 221-222. 103 R. T. Hitt, ‘Hromadka: Red Stooge or Saint’, Eternity, September 1954, WCC Archival No. 301. 437. 1/1. 104 Concerning Niebuhr’s thoughts on the Korean War in relation to his anti-Communism, see, ‘The World Council and the Peace Issue’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950, pp.107-108; ‘Editorial Notes’, Ibid., 130; ‘Editorial Notes’, Ibid., 170; ‘Ten Fateful Years’, Ibid., 11, 1951, 1-4; ‘The Two Dimensions of the Struggle’, Ibid., 65-66; ‘The Peril of War and the Prospects of Peace’, Ibid., 129-130.

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Peace and Reconciliation There are not many Christians who are prompted by purely Marxist ideology, though there are men like Y. T. Wu in China, who have been pretty pure Marxist long before the Communists came to power. But there are many Christians, particularly in Asia, who know little of one of the most tragic facts of contemporary history, which is that an alternative to some form of historic injustice may turn out to be more grievous than the system which it challenges. Failure to recognize this fact has undoubtedly greatly influenced the thought of men like Dr. Hromadka in Czechoslovakia. 105

Hromàdka had argued in detail about the statement, but Niebuhr only criticized him in a general way, and portrayed him as a simple-minded or naïve theologian. In contrast to Hromàdka, Niebuhr evaluated the statement as a remarkable one: The two most important emphases in the document are: (1) the commendation of the action of the United Nations, as an instrument of world order in resisting the aggression in Korea; and (2) the insistence that this conflict need not be the beginning of another world war if both the military pressures of totalitarianism are resisted and the injustice and disorders, which Communism exploits, are corrected…The question is not how to appease Communism but, in the words of the World Council, to achieve enough justice to render the world morally impregnable to totalitarian infiltration. 106

Here, Niebuhr understands Communism as totalitarianism. Therefore, for him, it is impossible to sit together with Communists for a dialogue. He also justifies a US military intervention in the life of a nation experiencing Communist infiltration. In fact, Niebuhr had once been a pacifist and a Christian socialist.107 However, he changed his view after 1940 and argued for what he called ‘Christian realism’.108 Niebuhr tried to suggest a realistic re-evaluation of human moral capacity. In doing this, he believed that human beings could devise realizable ethical standards for themselves. In his realistic and pragmatic view of ethics, the pacifists as well as Hromàdka were seen as naïve in relation to the Korean War and against those who were trying to find a ‘Christian solution’ to the Korean War, which meant reconciliation and mediation, Niebuhr insisted that the solution would have to be political to be realistic. In an interview with The Christian Century his response to the question ‘What can Christians contribute to peace in Korea’?, he stated: I do not think that a Christian who is not a pacifist can possibly advance a particularly Christian solution for the Korean conflict. It is a part of our total struggle with world Communism, and I do not think there are particularly Christian insights for the strategic

105 R. Niebuhr, ‘The Captive Churches’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950, pp. 146. 106 R. Niebuhr, ‘The World Council and the Peace Issue’, Christianity and Crisis, pp.107108. 107 N.B., He was a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. However, he withdrew his membership later. Concerning his ethics before 1940, see, R. Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York, 1931); An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York, 1935). 108 Concerning his Christian realism, see, R. Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York, 1952); Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York, 1953).

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problems involved. There are large issues for which Christian faith is relevant. But it could be pretentious to offer a ‘Christian’ solution for the special problem of Korea. 109

In this interview, Niebuhr stated his conviction that although Christian resources could be utilized for peace in Korea, Christians should be honest and realistic about Christianity itself. Trying to offer a ‘Christian solution’ for the special problem of Korea would be pretentious. The solution for Korea should be a political and economic solution rather than a Christian one.110 From this ethical and theological standpoint, he supported the ‘police action’ as a practical and realistic means for achieving the desired result. Unlike Hromàdka, he was an advocate of military measures. Niebuhr also believed that ‘in Asia there is little historic, social or economic basis for the democratic society we are defending. Colonial peoples, whether still under tutelage or recently emancipated, have not achieved social or political stability’.111 Therefore, he stated,‘a great deal of moral and political imagination and courage will be required if we are to prevent Asia from sinking into Communism’.112 For him, it was America which had the moral power to establish an international order. He used this idea to justify the US intervention in the Korean War.113 However, the problem of his ethic of intervention was that it left unanswered questions about who would judge a particular situation, and what kind of morality might be necessary in Asia? Niebuhr seems to have thought that the USA should be the judge and caretaker of Korea. Both Niebuhr and Dulles shared exactly the same logic. Both had participated in the Oxford Conference in 1937, and they became good friends, sharing the same utilitarian view of the role of the churches in the international order. Through his connection to Dulles, Niebuhr became the Special Advisor to the US State Department, and ‘developed one of the most important philosophical basis of US diplomatic policy’.114 Although Niebuhr changed his mind to an antiwar position during the Vietnam War, the notion of ‘Police Action’, remained in US policy. It reappeared as ‘Evil Making Policy’ during the Reagan Administration and as the ‘Axis of Evil’ under George W. Bush, underpinned by the same philosophical framework. Hromàdka responded to Niebuhr saying that the USA and its allies merely formed ‘one group of great power’, and therefore its policies should not be seen as an international moral crusade. The police action he said was ‘aggressive imperialism of a police state’ which was ‘seeking world domination’.115 Therefore, for him, the Toronto Statement supporting the police action was irrelevant and inadmissible as a statement of the world churches. 109 Editorial, ‘No Christian Peace in Korea?’, The Christian Century, 4 February 1953, p. 126. 110 See, R. Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics, p. 9. 111 R. Niebuhr, ‘Editorial Notes’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950, p. 130. 112 Ibid., p. 130. 113 See, R. Niebuhr, ‘Ten Fateful Years’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951, pp. 1-4. 114 See, A. J. Van der Bent, ‘Reinhold Niebuhr’, Ecumenical Dictionary, p. 729. 115 J. Hromàdka, ‘A Voice from the Other Side’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951, p. 28.

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Conclusion From our study on the Korean War and the position of the WCC on the War, firstly, we can conclude that the origin of the Axis of Evil in the Korean Peninsula was rooted in the notion of ‘Police Action’, which was developed by Niebuhr to justify US intervention to the war. Secondly, the world churches were divided into two ideological options. In general, pro-capitalistic, pro-American and pro-South Korean voices of the Western churches dominated in issuing the WCC Toronto Statement, which supported the ‘police action’. In this statement, the voice from the churches in North Korea and the Communist countries was ignored. By doing this, the statement caused a serious ecclesiastical tension to arise, which continued in the theological debate that followed between churches in East and West. Hromàdka opposed the statement and emphasized the necessity of dialogue with atheists. On the other hand, Niebuhr supported the ‘police action’ in order to preserve the international order and punish the invader, North Korea, based on his ethic of Christian realism. Lastly, the WCC debate, and the mistakes that were made, already indicated some of the ways in which both the Korean and the world churches would have to approach the issue of the reunification of Korea. When there were two Koreas both fighting to reunify the peninsula by force, and churches around the world supported one side or the other, the results were disastrous. It became evident that neither reconciliation nor an authentic reunification could be achieved in this way. As a concluding remark, I would like to quote the warning of Barth in the whirlpool of the Korean War: ‘Anti-Communism is not Christian faith. Rather, reconciliation is a core of Christian faith’. This statement is especially relevant to the divided Korean context. Bibliography Beijing Times, 1 February, 2002. Bell, G. ‘Opening Address at the Meeting of the Central Committee of the WCC at Lucknow’, The Ecumenical Review, 5, 1953, pp. 229-232. Bennett, J. C. ‘Mr. Dulles Proposal’, Christianity and Crisis, 12, 9 June 1952, pp.7374. Burgmann, E.H. ‘World Council Group Wants China in UN’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951. Chao, T.C. and Wu, Y.T. ‘Chinese Christians Sign ‘Anti-Imperialism’ Manifesto’, Christianity and Crisis, vol. X, 1950. Choe, S., Hanley, C.J. and Mendoza, M. ‘Bridge at No Gun Ri’, 30 September 1999, AP Press. Conde, D.W. An Untold History of Modern Korea, vol. 2, (Japan:1967), and tr. J. Choi, Hankuk Chunjang: Ttohanaeui Sigak, (Seoul: Sakyejul, 1988) Cumings, B. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, (New York: 1997).

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Cumings, B. The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, vol. 2. The Korean Institute of Military History, (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000). DPRK National Security Department, ‘Jungchi Bodo mit Damwha Jaryo’, (Materials of Political Press Release and Statements), unpublished Paper, July 1950, 21. Dulles, J.F. ‘Address by United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, before the Associated Press in New York, 22 April 1957’, in The Department of State Bulletin, 6th May 1957, pp.715-719. Dulles, J.F. ‘Dulles Statement for Manual of Layman’s Missionary Movement’, Unpublished Paper, 4 April 1945, The J. F. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. Dulles, J.F. ‘The American Churches and International Situation’, Biennial Report of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York, 1940 Dulles, J.F. ‘The Christian Citizen in a Changing World’, WCC ed., The Church and the International Disorder (London: SCM Press, 1948), pp. 73-114. Dulles, J.F. ‘The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World’, in Marquess of Lothian et al., (eds), The Universal Church and the World of Nations (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938) pp. 145-168. Dulles, J.F. ‘America’s Role in the Peace’, Christianity and Crisis, 4, 1945, pp. 2-6. Editor, ‘Editorial Notes, ‘The Peril of War and the Prospects of Peace’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951, pp. 129-130. Editor, ‘Editorial Notes, ‘The Two Dimensions of the Struggle’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951, pp. 65-66. Editorial, ‘Bishop Peter at World Peace Council’, The Protestant, April-May-June 1951. Editorial, ‘No Christian Peace in Korea?’, The Christian Century, 4 February 1953, p. 126. Fagley, R.M. ‘The Churches and the Peace Patrol’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 27 November 1950, pp.158-159. Garrett, J. ‘The Words and Deeds of the Churches’ The Ecumenical Review, 3/2, 1951. Grubb, K. ‘The Responsibility of the Churches in Politics’, The Ecumenical Review, 3/2, 1951. Guhin, M.A. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times (New York: Colombia University Press, 1972). Gupta, K. ‘How did Korean War Begin?’, The China Quarterly, 52, 1972, pp. 699716. Hitt, R.T. ‘Hromadka: Red Stooge or Saint’, Eternity, September 1954, WCC Archival No. 301. 437. 1/1. Halliday, J. and Cumings, B. Korea: The Unknown War ( New York: Pantheon, 1988). Hromàdka, J L. ‘The Significance of Socialist Atheism’, M. Opocensky (ed), Josef L. Hromàdka: The Field is the World, (Prague: Christian Peace Conference, 1990), pp.310-316. Hromàdka, J. L. ‘Dr. Hromadka on American Aggression in Korea’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950.

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Hromàdka, J.L. ‘A Voice from the Other Side’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951. Hromàdka, J.L. ‘Our Responsibility in the Post-War World’, WCC ed., The Church and the International Disorder (London: SCM Press, 1948), pp. 114-142. Hromàdka, J.L. ‘The Church and Today’s International Situation’, in Opocensky, M. (ed.), Josef L. Hromàdka: The Field is the World (Prague Christian Peace Conference, 1990), pp. 253-260. Interview with the former Bishop of Oxford, Patrick Rodger, former Associate General Secretary of WCC, 5th February 2001, Edinburgh. Kang, Man-kil, Kocheo Ssun Hankuk Hyundaesa (The Revised Modern History of Korea) (Seoul: Chanjak kwa Bipyungsa, 1994). Kim, Heung-soo, A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in Korean Churches, (Seoul: IKCH, 1999). Larrabee, E. ‘Korea: The Military Lesson’, Harper’s, November 1950, pp.51-57. Lee, Ki-baik, Hankuksa Shinron (A New History of Korea), (Seoul: Ilchoak, 1984). Lossky, N. et. al. ed., Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement (Geneva: WCC, 1991). Lowe, P. The Origins of the Korean War, (London: Longman, 1986). McCreary, D.‘John Bennett on Oxford ’37’, Christian Century, 28 October 1987, pp. 942-944. Moon, H. Mije eui Chosun Chimryak Jungchak eui Jungchae wa Naeran Dobal eui Jinsang eul Pokroham, (The Nature of American Imperialist Invasion Policy to Korea and Truth on the Outbreak of Civil War: A Disclosure), (Pyongyang, Joongang Tongsinsa, 1950). Muccio, D. ‘From Muccio to State’, 25 June 1950, taken from, www.geocities.com/ Pentagon/1953/ muccio. htm. Niebuhr, R. ‘Editorial Notes’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950, p. 130. Niebuhr, R. ‘No Christian Peace in Korea?’, The Christian Century, 4 February 1953. Niebuhr, R. ‘Ten Fateful Years’, Christianity and Crisis, 11, 1951, pp. 1-4. Niebuhr, R. ‘The Captive Churches’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950. Niebuhr, R. ‘The World Council and the Peace Issue’, Christianity and Crisis, 10, 1950, pp.107-108; Niebuhr, R. An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1935). Niebuhr, R. Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953). Niebuhr, R. Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952). Niebuhr, R. Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931). Nolde, O.F. ‘The Christian Witness to the World of Nations’, The Ecumenical Review, 4, 1952, pp. 378-384. Opocensky, M. (ed.), Josef L. Hromàdka: The Field is the World (Prague: Christian Peace Conference, 1990). Park, M. The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, vol. 2, (Seoul: Nanam, 1997).

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Park, Myung-rim, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, vol. 1, (Seoul: Nanam, 1996). Rees, D. Korea: The Limited War (New York, St. Martin’s: 1964) Stone, I.F. The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1952). Stueck, W. The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropedia, vol. 10. (London: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1978). Thomas, M.M. ‘The Churches in the Political Struggles of Our Day’, The Ecumenical Review, 3/2, 1951. Thompson, R. Cry Korea, (London: MacDonald, 1951). Toulouse, M.G. The Transformation of John Foster Dulles, From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1985). Van der Bent, A. J. ‘Reinhold Niebuhr’, Ecumenical Dictionary, (Geneva: WCC, 202), p.729. Visser’t Hooft, W.A. W. A. Visser’t Hooft: Memories (London : SCM Press, 1973). Volkogonov, D. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, tr. H. Shukman, (Rocklin: Prima, 1992). Wu, Y.T. ‘A Summary of the Eight Months’ Work of the Movement for the Protection of Self-Government, Self-Support, and Self-Propagation in Chinese Protestantism’, Unpublished paper, April 1951. Yoo, Tae-ho, The Korean War and The United Nations: A Legal and Diplomatic Historical Study (Belgium: University of Louvain, 1965). Manuscript sources Central Office of Information, London, Korea, November 1958, Quote No. R.3965, Classification 1.2d, 9. UN archives: Letter ‘From Francoise Dony to O. F. Nolde’, 7 August 1950. UN Document S/1509. UN Document S/1511. UN Document S/VP 474, 5. Fagley, R.M. ‘United Nations Memorandum: The Korean Situation’, Series 3, No. 9. Report of the UN Commission on Korea. Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Korea, London, November 1958, Quote No. R.3965, Classification 1.2d, 9. Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, A/1350 and CCIA, ‘Development in Korea: As Reported in United Nations Documents’, January 1951. US National Archives, 895.00 file, box 7127: Cable ‘From Brumbaugh to Acheson’, 27 June 1950.

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US National Archives:, 895.00 file, box 946: Letter ‘From Nolde to Fagley’, 14 May 1947. Muccio, ‘Memos of Conversation’, 13 and 16 August 1949. Letter ‘From J. F. Dulles to Visser’t Hooft’, 23 September 1946. WCC Archives: Cable ‘From H. Namkung to International Missionary Council’, 26 June 1950. Cable ‘From Nolde to the Honorable Trygve Lie’, 26 June 1950. Cable ‘From Nolde to G. Paik’, 26 June 1950. Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, May 1947. ‘Letter from Dr. T. C. Chao’, Minutes and Reports of the Fourth Meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, Rolle, 4-11 August 1951, p. 55. WCC ‘Minutes and Reports of the Third Meeting of Central Committee of the World Council of Churches’, Toronto, 9-15 July 1950. WCC Central Committee Report, ‘The Korean Situation and World Order’, 13 July 1950, Toronto, Canada. WCC Central Committee, The Living Church, 16 July 1950. WCC Central Committee, ‘Peace and the Reunification of Korea, Part One, Background,’ Moscow, USSR, 16-27 July 1989 Document No. 2.4. WCC ed., The Responsible Society, Christian Action in Society: An Ecumenical Inquiry (Geneva: WCC, 1949). WCC ed. ‘A Joint Statement from the Representatives of Protestant Churches and Organizations of China’, 21 April 1951. Nolde, O.F. ‘The Korean Situation from the Standpoint of Certain Actions by the CCIA and related Christian Bodies’, 24 June 1953, International Affairs Archive, WCC. Letter ‘From E. P. Eastman to B. Asbeck, O. F. Nolde, K. G. Grubb, W. A. Visser’t Hooft and C. W. Ranson’, 22 November 1950: Fagley, R.M. ‘Confidential Notes on Interview’, 21 July 1950, 1. Letter ‘From Nolde, O.F. to Dulles, J.F.’, 28 June 1950. Letter ‘From Hromàdka to Visser’t Hooft’, 30 November 1950, 2, WCC Archival No.301. 437. 1/5. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 7: Korea, Washington, D.C.: US Government publications,1976). Wellington Koo Papers, Colombia University, box 217. ‘From Fagley to Benedict’, 3 April 1970.

Chapter 9

Towards Peace and Reconciliation between South and North Korean Churches: Contextual Analysis of the Two Churches In Soo Kim

Introduction The Koreans have believed in idols and superstitions for thousands of years. Buddhism and Confucianism settled in the Koreans’ minds from a long time ago. But these merged as the national religion in limited areas because each dynasty changed its religion. The Roman Catholic Church was introduced into Korea 220 years ago and the Protestant Church 120 years ago, thus, the two churches have a short history compared with the existing religions in Korea. The Roman Catholic Church has a history of martyrs because the Korean government forbade the introduction of foreign religions into the Kingdom, but the Catholics and French priests spread the Gospel secretly, thus, they were arrested and sentenced to death. Many tens of thousands of the laity and more than ten French priests were killed. The Protestant Church was introduced just after Korea had treaties with western countries, thus the church could escape from persecution of the government. However, the young church was suppressed by Imperial Japan before the church had a chance to grow. After emancipation, the country was divided into two parts, the North and South. In the North, the communist regime suppressed all churches and only the South churches survived. In this paper, I will focus on the introduction of Christianity, the rapid growth of the Protestant Church, suffering under the Imperial Japanese regime and the persecution and vanishing of the North churches. The paper will consider the growth of the South Korean Protestant Church, examine meetings and communications between churches of the North and finally how the two churches should prepare for reunification.

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Past: One church Introduction of Christianity The first contact of Christianity was the arrival of an English gun-ship to make a sea-map of the western coast in the Korean peninsula in 1816. Mr. Basil Hall, the captain of the ship, gave a Chinese Bible to Joe, Dae-bok, a Korean officer. It was the first time the Bible was received in the history of Korea. Sixteen years later, the Rev. K. Gützlaff, a German missionary to China, came to the same place on the Lord Amherst, a trade ship of the Netherlands. He also handed over several Chinese Bibles and taught the people of the island how to plant potatoes.1 In 1866, the Rev. R. Thomas who was affiliated with the London Missionary Society and worked in China came to Dae-dong River in Pyengyang in North Korea on the General Sherman, a trade ship of the U.S.A., to preach the Gospel. While fighting occurred between the crew and the Korean soldiers due to the arrival of the foreign ship, the ship burned down. Thomas jumped into the river with some Chinese Bibles and swam to shore. Before he was killed by a soldier, he threw the Bibles onto the riverbank. Thus, he became the first martyr of the Protestant Missionary history of Korea. Some youngsters who lived in Eujoo in the North-West part of Korea went to Manchuria to trade Jinsengs in the 1870s. They met the Rev. J. Ross who was affiliated with the Scotland Bible Society and worked there. Offering to give more money than they were earning from their trade, Ross asked them to teach the Korean language. They accepted his proposal and went to Simyang where Ross’ mission compound was established. While they taught Korean to the missionaries there, they translated the Chinese Bible into Korean at Ross’ request. Finally they accepted the Christian faith and were baptized in 1876. Therefore, they were the first Protestants ever in Korean church history. When they returned to their homes, they secretly brought numerous (Bible) tracts and sold these and preached the Gospel. Thus, before the missionaries came to Korea, there were already Christians and the Bibles were translated by the Koreans themselves. In the 1880s, many missionaries came to Korea. Mr. H. Allen, M. D., the missionary of the Northern Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A, landed in Korea as a permanent medical missionary in 1884. Just after he arrived, the Capsinjungbyon, the political riots, occurred and he had a chance to show Western medical techniques to the royal families and the public by treating Min, Young-Ik, nephew of the queen, who was seriously wounded during the riots. Immediately Allen was appointed the King’s physician and permitted to open a clinic, Jejung-won (later renamed Severance Hospital), and openly began his medical mission in Korea. The following year, the Rev. H. Underwood arrived in Korea and many other missionaries followed. They initiated the preaching of the Gospel, founding churches, translating the Bible, 1 H. H. Lindsay, Report of Proceedings on a Voyage Northern Part of China, in the Ship Lord Amherst, (London: 1833), p. 237. Also see, K. G. F. Gützlaff, Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China, in 1831, 1832, and 1833, with Notices of Siam, Corea, and the Loo-Choo Islands.

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editing the hymnals, publishing newspapers, and establishing the Bible society, Christian Literature society, YMCA and YWCA.2 Many missionaries of various denominational churches came to Korea and began their mission works and as a result denominational churches were planted in Korea. Explosive church growth After the mission era began, churches grew rapidly, mainly in the North-Western part of Korea. When J. Mott, the president of the W.S.C.F. visited Korea, he said that Korea would become the first Christian country among non-Christian countries: During my recent tour in the Far East, I formed the deep conviction that if the present work on the part of the cooperating missions in Korea is adequately sustained and enlarged in the immediate future Korea will be the first nation in the non-Christian world to become a Christian nation. I know of no mission field where larger or more substantial results have been secured, in proportion to the expenditure, than in Korea.3

There were many reasons for the rapid growth of the church.4 While many Asian countries have strong national religions which have lasted for many thousands of years and were an obstacle to the growth of Christianity, Korea had had a number of different national religions in succession. This is one reason why the new religion of Christianity was able to be rooted into the people’s hearts. Also, the modern medical treatment and education offered by Christian missionaries could penetrate into the people’s hearts and touch their common lives. Another reason is that, whereas many Asian countries were colonised by Western countries, Korea was occupied by Imperial Japan. Thus, the people did not have so much antagonism towards Western culture. Furthermore, the missionaries helped with the Korean patriotic movement which encouraged the people to accept the faith. One of the most important elements of rapid growth of the church was adopting the Nevius Methods of mission methodology.5 The Rev. J. Nevius, missionary of Northern Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. to China, visited Korea to lecture to the young missionaries in 1890. He lectured about the ‘Three self Principles,’ ‘self-support,’ ‘self-government,’ and ‘self-propagation.’ By these methods, the church became selfsupported and self-propagated without receiving financial help from the missions. The great revival movement broke out in Pyengyang in 1907 and Christians began to repent and make the Christian faith their own. This great movement caused not only individuals, but also families, communities, and the wider society to change. This

2 L. Underwood, Underwood of Korea (New York, 1918). 3 J. R. Mott, Annual Report of the Board of Mission Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1908, 10, The Korea Mission Field, May 1908, p. 67. 4 More details see, In Soo Kim, Hankookkidogiohoeeui Yoksa (History of Christianity of Korea) (Seoul, 2002), pp. 206-15. 5 Cf. C. A. Clark, The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods (New York,1930).

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movement brought explosive growth of the church: the Presbyterians grew 34% and the Methodist church grew 118%.6 Rapid growth of churches resulted in each church establishing an organisational structure. The Presbyterian Church organized the Independent Presbytery in 1907 and the General Assembly in 1912. The Methodist Church also established the Annual Meeting. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church decided to send the foreign missionaries to China and sent three ministers in 1913. As Martin Marty of the University of Chicago said, ‘the national identity and mission are intertwined.’7 Even though the country was annexed by Japan in 1910, the church could keep its national identity by sending missionaries to foreign countries. The church under the Japanese occupation: Resistance and suffering While the church grew rapidly and explosively, the country was weakened politically and exposed to imperial nations in the late 19th century. Imperial Japan invaded Korea and made it a colony in 1910. Japan thought that the church was the centre of resistance, thus began to tighten the church from the first time. They concluded that the church was the most difficult obstacle to achieving a permanent colony in Korea, thus they harassed the church. The church established various schools at every corner of the country where the church was established and reared the children as responsible persons and Christians. To be a Christian meant to be a patriot, a person that was anti-Japan. After decades of Japanese occupation the Great National Resistance Movement, wanting independence from Japan, broke out in 1919 and millions of Koreans joined the demonstrations. Among the thirty-three signers of the Independence Declaration, sixteen were Christians (thirteen pastors, and three laypersons). After this movement, a government in exile was formed in Shanghai, and seven of the eight key leaders were Christians. Missionaries wrote that ‘The Koreans are ready to become Christians.’8 During the end of its regime, Japan forced Koreans to worship at the Shinto shrines. Most of the churches surrendered to the Japanese demand except for the Presbyterian Church, which initially refused but eventually it too succumbed to Japanese pressure. However, many Christians including the Rev. Joo, Gee-Chul, refused to adhere to the Japanese policy and as a result were imprisoned. Before emancipation from Japanese rule in 1945, approximately fifty ministers were martyred in prison. Japan sold many church buildings and used the proceeds to support the war effort. They also forced the church to worship the Japanese king as a living god, forbade reading of the Bible except the four Gospels, let only the hymns they permitted to be

6 H. G. Underwood, ‘The Growth of the Korean Church,’ The Missionary Review of the World , February 1908, p. 100. 7 Quoted from W. S. Hudson, Nationalism and Religion in America, Concept of American Identity and Missions (New York, 1970), p. 54. 8 The Missionary Review of the World, July 1919, p. 551.

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sung, and compelled the church to donate money to buy machine guns and fighter planes. Dividing the country, people, and church The thirty-five years of exploitation and plundering from Imperial Japan was ended by the unconditional surrendering to the allied nations in 1945. However, the people soon realized that emancipation was not real because it was not obtained on their own but it came as one of the spoils of war of the allied nations. Unfortunately, just a week before the end of the war, Soviet Russia declared war against Japan and also advanced into Korea. After the war ended, the U.S.A. and the USSR agreed to disarm the Japanese between them, and occupied the peninsula South and North of the 38th parallel of latitude, respectively. In North Korea, Kim, Il-sung, who was supported by Soviet Russia, initiated the communist government and slowly began to suppress the church, for example by arranging the election on Sunday. Kang, Yang-wook, a former Presbyterian minister, became a communist and formed the ‘Chosunkeedokyodo Yonmaeng’ (the League of the Christians in (North) Korea (now called Chogeerion) and compelled ministers to join the organization otherwise they would suffer persecution. As a result numerous ministers and Christians fled to the South. On the other hand, the U.S. military came to the South and secured absolute freedom of religion. They regarded it as one of the most valuable virtues of a democratic society. The ministers and Christians from the North began rapidly to establish churches in all parts of the South of the country. In 1950, Kim, Il-sung ordered the North Korean armies to invade South Korea in full force with the support of Mao in China and Stalin in Soviet Russia. Within three months they occupied most of the South. However, a United Nations force was mobilized and recovered most of the land lost. After three years of fighting, the war was stopped by the armistice, but irrevocable hurts remained in both the South and the North. During this war hundreds of thousands of servicemen and millions of civilians were killed and wounded. After the armistice, the churches in the North were suppressed completely and vanished under the communist regime. The Christians who could not escape to the South hid themselves underground. In the South, numerous churches were established but divisions and splits occurred. For example, the Presbyterian Church split three times. The first division happened in 1951 due to the aftermath of worshipping at the Shinto shrine during the Japanese occupation. The separated body is called Kosin Presbyterian Church. The church split for the second time because of the conflict between the conservatives and the progressives over theological matters in 1953. The divided body is called Kijang Presbyterian Church. The third split occurred when the church divided for and against Park Hyung-nyon, president of the Presbyterian Seminary of the General Assembly. The anti-Park party is called ‘Tonghap’ (the united body) and the pro-Park party is called ‘Hapdong’ (the union body). These divisions still exist.

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Present: Trial of fellowship between the two churches Rebirth of the North church For thirty years after the Korean War there was no official communication between North and South Korea. However, an unexpected event occurred in 1972. The representatives of the Red Cross of the South and the North met in Seoul and Pyengyang. However, this event was an isolated one and the situation returned to one of non-communication between North and South. In February 1974, a statement from the Council of Churches in North Korea was announced through the Pyengyang Broadcasting Station. The churches in the South reacted sharply and criticized the statement, arguing that the organization must be a puppet of the regime because they believed there was no freedom of religion in the North.9 Under such circumstances, it was not possible for the churches in the South and North to engage in dialogue. In 1985, the South and North government agreed to meet each other in Seoul and Pyengyang. Following this agreement, the South church formed the ‘Committee for the Preparation of the Problems of the South and North Churches in Korea’. The purpose of the Committee was ‘for the dialogues between the South and the North towards reunification ... to prepare with one body of Christ’.10 The churches in the South tried to work together for this purpose, realising that to be effective they should include as many denominations as possible and try to gather the collective opinions. Meeting of the representatives of the South and North church - Beginning of the dialogue on peaceful reunification During the 80s, through various ways, the two regimes and churches began to talk about peaceful reunification. The initiative came from the ‘Council of Korean and German Churches’ in 1981. The Council decided to establish a ‘Committee for Study of Reunification’ in K.N.C.C. In 1984, a meeting was convened to study and discuss how the church can contribute to the peace of North-East Asia, especially for peace and reunification of Korea. In this meeting, many Christians gathered together from South Korea, the United States, Japan, and other countries however, the North church tried to attend but could not and instead sent a message of congratulations.11 In September 1986, the first meeting of the Christians of the South and the North was held in Glion, Switzerland, by the arrangement of the Committee of International Relations of the W.C.C. At this meeting, the eleven representatives of the North church attended, and participated in the worship service and the Lord’s Supper. It truly was a great event for the two churches after the division of 50 years.

9 The Kidokgongbo (The Bulletin of Christianity), 16 February 1974. 10 The Christian Sinmoon (The Christian Times), 4 April 1985. 11 Won-sik Kim, ‘Discussion for Reunification of the Korean Church,’ The Yearbook of Christianity (1989), pp. 48-51.

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Even though there were no concrete results, the meeting of the two churches was considered important. In April 1987, ‘The World Congress of the Christians for the Peaceful Unification of Korea’ was held with 300 priests and laypersons from many countries in Inchon, South Korea. At this conference, many churches agreed to do what was best for the peaceful settlement of Korea, but there was no agreement between the churches about how to proceed.12 The ten representatives of the N.C.C. (U.S.A.) had been in Pyengyang by the invitation of the ‘Committee of Peaceful Reunification’ in the ‘League of Christianity in Korea’ (called Chogeerion) in June 1987. After their visit, they reported that there was no church in the North but visited a so-called ‘Home Church.’ Mr. Koh, Tae-u, instructor at the University of Foreign Language in Seoul, said at the meeting of the anniversary of the ‘Council of Religion and Society’ that North Korea had published the Bible and hymnal. These had been presented to those who visited the North and they had been shown ‘house-churches’, which were similar to those in China at the time.13 The Rev. Park, Kyung-seo, officer of the W.C.C, had been in Pyengyang in 1998 and reported that a church building was being constructed at Bongsoo Dong in Pyengyang. It was surprising news to the South church because it was the first happening of this kind after the Korean War. Also, the Rev. Hong, Dong-keun, minister who served the Korean church in the U.S.A., had been in Pyengyang and reported that a new church building which could accommodate about three hundred people was being constructed at Bongsoo Dong and would be completed in October.14 Not only a church building, but also a cathedral of the Roman Catholic Church was being constructed at Jangchoon Dong which could gather around two hundred. Later these two sanctuaries were completed and many Christians who visited Pyengyang attended and participated in worship services on Sundays. Later still, Kim Il-sung ordered the re-building of the memorial church at Chilgol that his mother Kang Bansuk had attended.15 Of course, these churches are strictly monitored by the North Korean government, but nevertheless it is significant that churches do exist in the Communist North.

12 The Kidokkiosinmoon (The Christianity Newspapers), 17 April 1988. 13 The Hankookilbo (The Korea Daily Newspaper), 15 June 1988. Details cf. Taewoo Koh, Bookhaneui Jongiojeungchek (The Religious Politics in North Korea), (Minjok Moonhwasa, 1989). 14 Hong, Dong Keun, ‘Bookeui saeyebaedang, saesungdangeul Bogo (Seeing the New Church Building and New Cathedral in the North Korea), Haebanghoo Bookhangiohoesa (History of North Korea, after Emancipation) (Dasan Gulbang, 1992), p. 411. 15 The Donga Ilbo (Dong A Daily Newspaper), 3 October 1995. Dong-min Sung wrote in his article of ‘Reality of the Religions in the North Korea,’ he said ‘Mr. Duk-sin Choi who had been several times in the North Korea and met Kim, Il-sung. When they passed this point of Chilgol, Choi said that ‘when you (Kim) left home at the age of 14, your mother prayed at the church which was here.’ And he urged him to build a church building there in memory of his mother, thus Kim gave the order to build.

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Conflict between the Conservatives and the Progressives The second meeting at Glion was held secretly in November 1988.16 The Rev. Goh, Gee-jun, representative of the North, at the meeting said: In world history, only we, one culture, one language, and one blood, cannot meet and worship service in the state of division. Even though we gather together a far country, I felt various notions. We must not hand over the divided nation to our descendant, and I hope that we should make reconciliation and love as the peaceful military and work together with prayer in Christ.17

At this meeting, the churches of the North and South announced the ‘Declaration of the Korean Church for the Reunification and Peace’. They also agreed to announce the year of 1995 as Jubilee and to observe the Sunday just before 15th August (the memorial day of emancipation) as the Sunday for Peace and Reunification. The two churches also agreed to enforce cooperation to exchange the data and information through the W.C.C. After the statement was announced not only the churches which were affiliated to the N.C.C but also non-affiliated churches raised strong opinions about aspects of the statement. They especially criticized the reference to American military retreat in this statement since it was such a sensitive issue between the conservatives and the progressives. The conservative side made a statement which said that the N.C.C. is not representative of the South church, and the statement of the N.C.C. is just an opinion of the progressives. Naturally, there emerged serious conflicts between the two groups. In July 1986, at the time of the closing of the Sixth Conference of the W.C.C., the statement of ‘Peace and Reunification of Korea’ was adopted in August 1989 and the Twenty-second Conference of the W.A.R.C. also adopted a statement of ‘Reunification and Peace of Korea.’ The Seventh Conference of the W.C.C. was held in Canberra, Australia, in February 1991, and four representatives from the North church attended as observers. The matter of peaceful reunification is the common task which should be achieved not by one religion or organization but by the whole nation and people of Korea. To achieve this task, some leaders of the Protestant churches, the Roman Catholic Churches, and the Buddhist organizations gathered together for ‘The Peaceful March for the Achievement of Reunification’ from July 2 to July 4, 1988. After this event, some Protestant churches, Roman Catholic churches, and Buddhist leaders formed the ‘Council of the Religions for the National Reconciliation and Reunification’ in July 1993. They selected the representatives from each of their religions and established a cooperating body. However, there was no consensus between the conservatives and the progressives. This problem is not yet solved and remains as one of the most difficult problems which the South church should resolve.

16 The Christian Sinmoon (The Christian Times), 3 December 1985. 17 The Bokeum Sinmoon (The Gospel News Paper), 30 November 1988.

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The South church helping the North Hearing of the news of a serious lack of food in the North, the organization ‘Love Rice Sending’ was formed under the ‘United Council of the Whole Protestant Churches in Korea’ (shortened name is Hangeechong). The organization sent ten thousand Gama (one Gama is 80kg) of rice to the North in July 1990. In December 1992, Christians from both the conservatives and progressives agreed to establish the ‘Movement of Sharing between the South and the North for Peaceful Reunification’. It is also called the ‘Third Movement of Reunification of the Korean Church.’18 This crisis encouraged the South church to accelerate in having hope of reunification and stimulated to help the people in the North. Furthermore, the entire North was devastated by the big flood in 1995, thus lives of the North people became more difficult. At first, the North was reluctant to receive aid from the South church, but later they accepted. In the meantime, a historical event took place when President Kim, Dae-jung of the South visited the North and had meetings with Chieftain Kim, Jung-il. After this event, the two parties of the conservatives (Hangeechong) and the progressives (N.C.C.) began to cooperate together to help the North. Just before the meeting of the two summits, there was a special united worship service for peaceful reunification of Korea. The worship service began with repentance for not being active towards reunification and standing by as spectators. These circumstances led the two organizations of N.C.C (South) and Chogeerion (North) to agree and issue a joint prayer on Easter Sunday, April 2001.19 On March 1, 2003, the joint worship service of the South and the North for the memorial of the March 1st Independent Movement Day was held at the So-mang (hope) Church in Seoul, and in March 2005, a joint worship service for the sixtieth anniversary of emancipation from Japan was held at Mt. Diamond in the North. In November 2004, the Rev. Suh, Kyung-suk who had been in the North several times, said that the Bongsoo Church was a ‘puppet’ organisation of the North Korean government. Even though his words may be true, we have to say that a Christian church is a gathering of Christians. When Christians sing hymns, pray in the name of Christ, deliver sermons, and administer the Lord’s Supper, it is still a church of Christ. At the present time, the church of the South and the North are communicating through various channels towards a constructive direction. Future: Towards peace and reconciliation of the two churches Problems of the South church There are two different ideological divisions in South Korea; the conservatives and the progressives. Generally speaking, the conservatives are those who are over 60 years of age and who experienced the Korean War, while the younger generation, 18 Sung-han Chung, Hankook Kidokkio Tongil Undong-sa (History of the Movement of Reunification in the Korean Church ), p. 352. 19 The Rev. Kang, Young-sup, president of the Chogeerion, reported the statistics in 2002; churches - 511, members - 13,000.

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aged below 60, are the progressives. The progressives insist that the North should be thought of as one race over ideology and value, but the conservatives say that keeping free democratic values is more important. The progressives plead that we should be equal with the U.S.A. and have the U.S. Military retreat from the South, but the conservatives persist that it is profitable to the South to cooperate with the U.S.A. to achieve reunification. These ideological conflicts have been transferred to the church; Hangeechong sides with the conservatives and the K.N.C.C. follows the progressives. This conflict confronts the methodologies of the North missions. It seems almost impossible to adjust and harmonize between the two parties. Under this situation, it is questionable whether the South and North church can make peace and reconciliation. Unless the two parties harmonize and cooperate, it is an empty ideal to achieve different ideological systems while keeping healthy relationships. To narrow down the gap between the two parties is one of the most important tasks for the South church. The problem of fundraising for the North church The North church cannot do anything financially independent of the government. If missionary activity was allowed in the North, then it would require substantial financial resources. The most urgent thing is to build a church building in every part of the entire North, ensuring that where a church building has been demolished, a new one is re-built in its place. But currently in order to construct a building the government, who owns all land in North Korea, must agree to give land to the church for this purpose. The construction of church buildings must be followed by the construction of schools and other educational establishments, including mission schools of Elementary, Middle, High, and College levels. Also, the construction of mission hospitals and social welfare facilities is needed. It is impossible for the South church to support all these funds. Of course, it is impossible to carry out these works all at once, therefore, it is necessary for the South church to have a short- and long- term plan for fundraising. Cooperation for the North Mission – the problem of establishment of the denominational churches Currently there are only two churches in the North; the Bongsoo and the Chilgol. If permission is given by the North Korean government to build church buildings, then the aim is to have them located throughout the North. This problem connects directly with what kind of church will be established; in other words, what church and what denomination. In the South, there are numerous denominations and separated churches within one denomination. For example, the Presbyterian Church has four different denominations; Kosin, Kijang, Tonghap and Hapdong. If all these different branches and denominations establish their own churches in the North, it is inevitable that there will be confusion and conflict. To avoid this, a suggestion would be to establish one church in each village without a denominational name, like the present Bongsoo Church and the Chilgol Church. For this to happen, the South church must make an agreement to establish churches without denominational

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names. For instance, in the beginning of the Korea church history, H. Underwood of the Presbyterian missions and H. Appenzeller of the Methodist missions consented mutually to establish one church in Korea without a denominational name.20 But this failed because the home mission boards rejected this proposal. They raised the following questions: It is a surprising suggestion to establish one church without denomination names in Korea. Then, what is the confession of faith, the politics of new church, and how to overcome the differences of the Presbyterian Church and the Methodist church?21

Consequently, they gave up this plan. As we can see above, every church agrees with the principle but the practical application is not so easy. If an independent church is established, then how would this church relate to other various denominations; does it relate to all denominations or have entirely no relations at all? Which denomination will send a minister to this church, Presbyterian, Methodist, or Salvation Army? And what kind of church politics should be adopted, Presbyterian, Episcopal, or Congregational? How will the church members be baptized, sprinkling like Presbyterians or immergence like the Baptists? Those kinds of problems are not easy because all of these are directly connected with doctrinal principles. Problems of the small denominations and the heresies Another difficult problem to solve is the small denominational churches. These churches have unique church systems and doctrines. For example, the Salvation Army has a military-style organization, the Church of Christ does not use any musical instruments, and the Brethren Church has no clerics. Another issue is the evangelistic activities of sects which are not regarded as orthodox by the mainline churches, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Mormons, the Adventist Church, and the Unification Church. The North Church: The legal problem – freedom of religion For the establishment of churches in the North, there are certain legal issues that have to be dealt with. First, presently, there is no freedom to choose from or to practice religion. Also, nobody can go to their own church or temple, to build religious buildings, and to set up schools for the training of future leaders. These activities are strictly forbidden by the government. If there is no legal guarantee for these works, cooperation between the South and the North will run into a wall. If this problem is not resolved, then the church in the North can only remain as 20 Underwood’s wife Lillias wrote the memoirs of her husband and said, ‘The great aims of his life were: The conversion of the Korean nation to Christ, the organic union of all evangelistic sects on the field, the establishment of self-support in the whole native church and general study of the Bible by all Korean Christians, but ‘Union’ was his great ideal.’ Mrs. Horace G. Underwood, ‘Horace Grant Underwood-Missionary, A Sketch of His Life and Work for Korea.’ The Missionary Review of the World, 16 December 1916, p. 909. 21 S. H. Chester, ‘Church Union in Korea,’ The Missionary, March 1906, p. 207.

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a government-controlled church and cannot be fully the true church of God. The way forward would be for the government to amend the laws by establishing the separation of state and church. Security for exchange of personnel and materials Another problem to resolve is to secure safe and permanent exchange of personnel. If one cannot go anywhere and cannot meet anyone, then peaceful reconciliation cannot be achieved. The time for meetings, worshipping together, and sharing friendship between the South and the North church has long passed. It was a very meaningful and hopeful event when the South church attended the Bongsoo Church to worship and participate in the Lord’s Supper together, but this first stage has long gone. Now, exchange of personnel should be more concrete, namely, any ministers of the South can go to the Bongsoo Church and deliver sermons and lead the Bible classes, while ministers of the North can come to the South and do so as well. The professors of the South can go to the seminary in the North and lecture to the seminarians and vice versa. During the summer, any students in the South can go to the North and serve the rural communities and preach to the non-Christians with students in the North and vice versa. The exchange of materials should also be promoted, from simple food, clothes, and medicines to a higher level. For instance, exchange of theological and churchly materials and documents. The two churches must help each other to discover, keep, and utilize the hidden documents and confessions of persecuted Christians into authentic historical writings. The problem of self-support of the North church In the North, according to the principles of the communist system, the government provides everything to each individual and family. The government provides not only food, housing, and clothes but also education, medical, and social welfare. Therefore, the economic affairs are the responsibility of the government and not the individual. However, the present situation of the North is far from this ideal situation. In these circumstances, the North church confronts two issues. First, so far, the people have lived in the system of a providing government which in many ways is becoming less and less feasible to sustain. Therefore, the North should consider exploring the Chinese model: a communist political system combined with an economic system which allows some degree of private ownership and business. Next, the problem is the self-supporting nature of the church. For a while, the South church can provide everything for the North church. However, the funds of the South cannot support it for a long time. Therefore, the North churches need to find ways to sustain themselves. Education for the younger generation Like the South, the younger generation of the North never had experience of the Korean War and were born under the communist society and educated under the

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system. Thus, they have not experienced a democratic society and religious freedom. From childhood, they were socialised in ‘Jooche-sasang’ (Kim, Il-sung religion), thus they have been educated that the U.S.A. and Christianity is absolutely evil. Many North Koreans have never heard of the word of Jesus Christ, the church, or the Bible. Thus, it is an extremely difficult task for the North church to educate them. Conclusion The rapid growth of the early church of Korea was called ‘another miracle of the modern mission’.22 Under the severe persecution by Imperial Japan, the church persevered and survived, and some Christians were even martyred for their resistance to Shinto shrine worship. Although the people got freedom by emancipation, due to setting of the two different regimes, the people, land, and church were divided into two. This bitter separation of the families and the churches has remained for the last fifty years. After armistice, the church vanished entirely in the North. After a period in which there was no visible church at all, the regime in the North established two churches in Pyengyang. Although these are government-sponsored churches, churches in the South and around the world began to communicate and have dialogue with them. Now we have to think about reunification. The time is entirely dependent on God’s will, but we believe that it is not too far away. There are numerous problems that should be solved by the two churches. However, these are not impossible tasks and we can overcome these through the power of God. Let us await His works. We have to look into and prepare for keeping peace and reconciliation between the two churches for reunification. Each church, the South and the North, should think about what problems confront them. To assure peace and reconciliation, we have to wait on God and pray for His grace. Bibliography Chester, S. H., ‘Church Union in Korea’, The Missionary, March 1906, p. 207. Chung, Sung-han, Hankook Kidokkio Tongil Undong-sa (History of the Movement of Reunification in the Korean Church (Seoul: Greesim, 2003). Clark, C. A. The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods (New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1930). Gützlaff, K. G. F., Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China, in 1831, 1832, and 1833, with Notices of Siam, Corea, and the Loo-Choo Islands. Hong, Dong-Keun, ‘Bookeui saeyebaedang, saesungdangeul Bogo (Seeing the New Church Building and New Cathedral in the North Korea), Haebanghoo Bookhangiohoesa (History of the North Korea after Emancipation) (Seoul: Dasan Gulbang, 1992). Hudson, W. S., Nationalism and Religion in America, Concept of American Identity and Missions (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). 22 The Missionary Review of the World, II, April 1889, p. 312.

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Kim, In Soo, Hankookkidogiohoeeui Yoksa (History of Christianity of Korea) (Seoul: Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary Press, 2002). Kim, Won-sik, ‘Discussion for Reunification of the Korean Church’, The Yearbook of Christianity 1989, pp. 48-51. Koh, Tae-woo, Bookhaneui Jongiojeungchek (The Religious Politics in the North Korea (Seoul: Minjok Moonhwasa, 1989). Lindsay, H. H., Report of Proceedings on a Voyage Northern Part of China, in the Ship Lord Amherst (London: B. Fellowers, 1833). Mott, J. R. Annual Report of the Board of Mission Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1908, p. 10 Sung, Dong-min, ‘Reality of the Religions in the North Korea’, The Donga Ilbo (Dong A Daily Newspaper), October 3, 1995. The Bokeum Sinmoon (The Gospel News Paper), 30 November 1988. The Christian Sinmoon (The Christian Times), 4 April 1985. The Christian Sinmoon (The Christian Times), 3 December 1985. The Hankookilbo (The Korea Daily Newspaper), 15 June 1988. The Kidokgongbo (The Bulletin of Christianity), 16 February 1974. The Kidokkiosinmoon (The Christianity Newspapers), 17 April 1988. The Korea Mission Field, May 1908, p. 67. The Missionary Review of the World, July 1919. The Missionary Review of the World, II, April 1889, p. 312. Underwood, H. G., ‘The Growth of the Korean Church’, The Missionary Review of the World, February 1908, p. 100. Underwood, Lillias, ‘Horace Grant Underwood-Missionary, A Sketch of His Life and Work for Korea’, The Missionary Review of the World, December 16, 1916, p. 909. Underwood, Lillias, Underwood of Korea (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1918).

Chapter 10

Strategies for Peace and Reunification in Korea Jong-Sun Noh

Introduction In Korea people of all religions – Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, Won Buddhists, Confucians and followers of Chondogyo – are working together with many nongovernmental organizations to prevent war and to make peace and justice. In this chapter I argue that, contrary to the view of most Western observers, the main obstacle to peace does not lie with North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; DPRK) but with the USA and its allies and their nuclear policy. Since 2002 US leaders have referred to North Korea is part of the ‘axis of evil’1, an ‘outpost of tyranny’2 and a ‘rogue state’3, together with Iraq and Iran. But from the point of view of North Korea, it is the US that is belligerent, irrational and warmongering. As evidence for this they would point to the testing of the hydrogen bombs in the Marshall Islands on 1 March 1954, which destroyed the livelihood and the health of islanders, the death of at least 2 million in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975, and many other cases where innocent people have been killed by US forces for the sake of their concept of so-called free democratic market economy. For North Koreans, continued US weapons testing, such as the Marshall Islands-Alaska nuclear missile test in 2005, is a justification for other countries having the right to have nuclear missiles tests to defend themselves. US president Dwight D. Eisenhower went some way to recognizing the fears of smaller nations of the more powerful nuclear ones when, in his farewell address to the nation in 1961, he identified the ‘militaryindustrial complex’ as the enemy of the peace. Furthermore, it was Eisenhower who promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy and, through what became the International Atomic Energy Agency, encouraged the building of nuclear power plants to meet the energy needs of poorer and weaker nations. On 11 May 2005, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang announced that North Korea would re-start the construction of the 50,000 KWe and 200,000 MWe nuclear power plants at Youngbyun and Taechun, which had originally begun in the 1980s but was halted at the end of 1994 on the basis of the 1 This term was first used by US president George W. Bush in his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002. 2 This term was first used by US secretary of state, Condoleeza Rice before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2005. 3 A term used by US administrations since the 1990s.

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‘Agreed Framework’ signed between the US and North Korea in Geneva by which the US would meet North Korean energy needs and help it develop safer light water reactors in return for the closure of the other plants. However, the US did not honour this agreement and continues to block nuclear power plant constructions in North Korea. The US is therefore partly to blame for critical shortages of energy which eventually became one of the causes of hunger and starvation in North Korea. North Korea badly needs electricity and energy, for agriculture and industry, and she has the right to have light water reactors in the Shinpo area in 2003 according to the agreed framework at Geneva. The international community should understand the nature of the cause of the poverty, malnutrition, hunger and death of the people and its direct relation with electrical power shortage. Surely North Korea has the right to have nuclear power plants to supply energy for industry and agriculture for food? ‘Freedom’ must mean the freedom to have peaceful nuclear energy and power from a nuclear power plant in North Korea. Furthermore, the application of economic sanctions against the DPRK for nearly 60 years, since January 1950, has threatened the life, security and human rights of the people. North Koreans have became one of the most ‘endangered species’ on earth and some, including Rev. Kang Youngsup, the Chairperson of the Korea Christian Federation, estimate that 3.5 million people died of hunger in the famine of 1996-1999. The mismanagement of the North Korean economy under the globalized free market system may be one of the reasons, but it is not the only reason, for the poverty and famine. Applying economic sanctions against the North Korean people and the nation is a violation of human rights. In my view, further violations of human rights and suffering in Korea should be prevented by education and wisdom. The leaders of powerful nations need to understand how their values of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ are seen by other nations as only applying to the wealthy, who are accumulating even greater wealth out of warmongering which is supposedly for the ‘peace and life’ of the world. Possible solutions for peace on the Korean peninsula I see a number of ways to solve the current problems on the Korean peninsula. The first, ideal solution would be denuclearization. The US insists on the ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible’ dismantling of the nuclear capabilities of North Korea but morally the dismantling of the weapons of the USA, Russia, China, UK and France should come first. The dismantling of Japan’s nuclear capabilities, including its reprocessing plants where it is accused of accumulating excessive amounts of plutonium (estimated at between 8 and 43 tons)4 for future nuclear weapons production, should be the second stage of nuclear peace. Then the National Assembly of South Korea (the Republic of Korea; ROK) should assert ‘war-time power’ over its armed forces. (At present the South Korean military is obliged to surrender power to the US Combined 4 Selig Harrison visited North Korea and met Kim, Il Sung, former president of North Korea in 1975, as a reporter for the New York Times, and since then, he has been one of the most convincing analysts of the conflict between US and North Korea. He writes regularly in The Hangyurae Shinmoon.

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Forces Command in Korea and the United Nations in the event of war). Under these conditions, the DPRK should disarm its nuclear weapons, multi-laterally, together and at the same time with the other nations having nuclear weapons, such as Israel, India and Pakistan. The ROK should be allowed to accumulate the same amount of nuclear materials and reprocessing plants for the future potential energy shortages as Japan, to deter potential invasion, first strikes or nuclear attacks by Japan in the future. In my view, Japan, which occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945, is one of the major threats, in the past and now, to peace in the region of Northeast Asia including the peace of North Korea. The second, more practical solution could perhaps be termed ‘the Pakistan model’. Pakistan clandestinely developed nuclear weapons until eventually in 1998 it responded to Indian nuclear tests with its own. It is believed to have been helping North Korea develop nuclear weapons capability. Given that a major aspect of the human right of free economic activity for survival of the people of North Korea has been violated by the blocking of its nuclear programme and the threat to regional stability of Japan, North Korea should be recognised as a nuclear regime. A practical way to achieving this would be for the US to grant North Korea ‘most favoured nation’ status, as it did in the case of China, which would de facto allow it nuclear status. At the same time, South Korea should be allowed the same nuclear capabilities as Japan. At present the US applies double standards in applying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and developing the uranium enrichment programs of Japan, Germany, Netherlands, Brazil and Argentina through the ‘New Agenda Group’. South Korea should have the uranium enrichment plants and plutonium reprocessing plants for future energy needs and be allowed to join the New Agenda Group. To complete the triangle of relationships, North Korea should pay compensation, make reparation and apologise for abducting at least fifteen Japanese between 1977 and 1983. In return, Japan should pay compensation and make reparation for the 150,000 to 200,000 young Korean women who were abused as ‘comfort girls’ – a euphemism for slaves for the sexual entertainment of the Japanese soldiers – during the Pacific War and return the bones and remains of the dead. Japan should also pay at least 10 billion Euros to North Korea for war-related crimes toward the Korean men ill-treated and killed in the Pacific War. In view of the lessons of Vietnam, a third possible ‘solution’ should not be tried. The invasion of North Korea by US and Coalition forces would be making the same mistake as in the case of Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s. Millions of people, mostly innocent and non-combatants, would be killed and there would be gross violation of human rights. It is of particular concern that these atrocities were committed by the nominal Christians and/or countries with largely Christian populations. US operational planning for the defence of South Korea in the event of aggression by North Korea is also flawed and should not be attempted. As set down in OPLANs 5026, 5027, 5029, and most recently 5030, which verges on psychological warfare, these plans are not practical or rational; they are unacceptable to many South Koreans for two reasons: first, because they involve cooperation with Japanese forces and, second, because they can be initiated without Korean consent. There is a fear that

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Koreans, in both North and South, will simply become the scapegoats and victims of the nuclear super powers. In my view the so-called defence of human rights by the US and its military operations worsen the quality of peace and seriously endanger, rather than enhance, the human rights of the people of Northeast Asia and of the world. Therefore, perhaps Koreans should together defend themselves from threats from outside the peninsula. Following this line of argument, a fifth solution would be for South Korea to develop thermonuclear energy by nuclear fusion for future energy needs and for the defence and comprehensive security and peace of both Koreas. South Korea is already pursuing the KSTAR (Korean Superconducting Tokamak Reactor) project in cooperation with partner institutions in the US, and is a partner in the EU-based ITER project to develop fusion power. This is well worth the investment of some 5 billion Euros by the South Korean government to defend the people of Korea. Koreans are neither angels nor devils, nor the main threat to peace, and North Korea is not the axis of evil. A sixth solution is to stop what appears to be a witchhunt against North Korea and consider instead the potential threat from Japan. First, Japan’s excess of plutonium could be used to kill between 70 million and 700 million and should be subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) and the NPT. Second, Japan should be made to confront its history. One cause of the tragic history of Korea in the twentieth century was the secret agreement made in 1905 between the prime minister of Japan, Katsura Taro, and William Howard Taft, then US Secretary of State, by which the United States agreed to let Korea become a colony of Japan while Japan allowed the Philippines to become a colony of the US. Japan has still not owned up to the atrocities carried out against Koreans under its imperial power or made any reparations, and therefore it remains a moral danger to Koreans, in both North and South. North Korea is not a serious threat to peace in the US but Japan’s believed nuclear capabilities are a clear threat to both Koreas. Peaceful reunification and scapegoating The accusation that North Korea is part of an ‘axis of evil’ – as opposed presumably to an ‘axis of good’ – is a theological statement, and it should be judged by God, the Creator, the God of Justice and Peace, and not by some political leaders for the egocentric interests of their small group of people. North Korean nuclear capabilities have been largely exaggerated by some people intentionally, and she has become the victim of manipulation, misinformation and the witch-hunting kind of theologies of the powerful. In 2005 North Korea withdrew indefinitely from the Six Party Talks set up between the US, Russia, China, Japan, North and South Korea to resolve the tension over its weapons programme because of the hostility of the USA, also supported by Japan. The North Koreans argued that it was ‘self-contradictory and unreasonable for the U.S. to urge the DPRK to come out to the talks’ while at the same time calling it an ‘outpost of tyranny’ and ‘threatening it with a nuclear stick’. In the face of this ‘negation’ of its identity, while North Korea expressed its ‘ultimate goal to

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denuclearize the Korean Peninsula’, its statement said that it felt compelled ‘to take a measure to bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal in order to protect the ideology, system, freedom and democracy chosen by its people’.5 Later that year it rejoined the next round of talks, but it continues the policy of its founding president, the ‘Great Leader’, Kim Il Sung, that disarmament would only be possible given the right atmosphere and the respect of the US. Victimization of the weak In my view, the treatment of North Korea is an example of US victimization of the weak. North Korea is not the most dangerous nation on earth with the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. The most dangerous weapons like hydrogen bombs, plutonium bombs, uranium bombs, and bio-chemical weapons have been produced by the USA, Russia, UK, China, France, Israel, India and Pakistan. Even after the testing of a nuclear device in 2006, North Korea’s capacity on nuclear weapons is ambiguous. Some worry that North Korea may someday sell nuclear weapons but those who most proliferate nuclear weapons are the ones who have had nuclear bombs since 1945. Who are the most dangerous nations with the most dangerous weapons? The labelling of North Korea as one of the most dangerous nations with the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction is an example of the way people make an artificial enemy of their own. It is an illusion which needs to be overcome, and the US administration needs help to learn to make friends rather than enemies around the world. On 19 November 2003, the YMCA of Korea had the chance to host US Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard at a roundtable for dialogue. On that occasion, I made a keynote speech in which I was strongly critical of President Bush’s labelling of North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and his justification of pre-emptive strikes against it, which would result in massive killings of Korean people in both North and South Korea, and the large-scale destruction of cities. Democracy and freedom cannot be the result of massacres of tens of thousands of people with super-advanced bombs and weapons that indiscriminately kill non-combatants, children, the elderly, the differently-abled, the blind, mothers, and those of other faiths. I argued that North Korea is not part of the ‘axis of evil’ but that the people of North Korea have their own very high standards of morality in their own sense and should be viewed as friends not enemies. I explained that North Korea was trying very hard to make friends with the Americans, the South Koreans and the Japanese and that she was ready to join the ‘axis of good’, immediately. And I urged that the USA should seize the opportunity to make a non-aggression treaty and peace treaty, or at least some written forms of a statement of non-aggression, and then lift economic sanctions and normalize diplomatic relations with the DPRK. It would be to the advantage of the USA to have 23 million North Koreans as friendly trading partners. I pointed out that although 2-3 million people were killed during the French occupation of Indochina and subsequently by the American forces during the Vietnam War, there 5 KCNA, 10 Feb 2005; published on 11 Feb 2005. Available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/ index-e.htm.

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are now normal, diplomatic and friendly relations between Vietnam and the USA, and France. More important for peace than any written guarantee or assurance is ‘mutual trust’. And mutual trust does not come by ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantling’ (CVID) of nuclear programs in North Korea because CVID is based on mistrust. When people mistrust one another, they cannot trust CVID. Where there is no mutual trust, anything can be turned into more dangerous weapons than nuclear weapons. Mutual trust should be based on sacrificial love for others. If you cannot love your neighbour nearby, how could you say you love God who is far away? President George W. Bush once told the journalist Bob Woodward, ‘I loathe Kim Jong-il’. I told the Ambassador it was about time for Mr. Bush to say, ‘I love him’ in the spirit of Jesus Christ, who encourages us to love our enemy. This single statement of love would in fact solve most of the problems of war, terrorism and insecurity in Northeast Asia. A tragic history of errors of judgment in Korea This is how I and many Korean people understand the recent history of Korea and the historical struggle for justice and peace and the fullness of life there. My ancestors were the natives in the peninsula of Korea for thousands of years with strong indigenous traditions and ethos. In 1894 the leaders of the Tonghak movement fought for the oppressed people against the corrupt Korean government forces under the control of Japanese colonial forces, and they were defeated. Some 200,000 Korean people were killed. At that time US involvement in Korea was only just beginning and since then the US has made a number of fatal errors of judgment with regard to the peninsula. The first error was the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905. Korean Christians fought against colonial Japan, mostly by non-violent means, and some 27,000 people were killed on the March First Independence movement in 1919. Koreans were forced to support the Japanese war effort, including young Korean women who were abused as sex slaves by the Japanese military. In 1945, Japan should have been divided into two for their war crimes, but General MacArthur of the USA divided Korea into two, which was an unjust thing and which made Koreans double victims of both Japan and the US. More than 5 million Koreans were killed and/or wounded in the Korean War because of this unjust division. The second error was that after the division of Korea into two in 1945 in their strategic interests, the US military government in South Korea hired No Duksul as the head of the police force. No had been the notorious torture specialist for the Japanese Colonial Government and his appointment shocked Koreans, except those who had supported the Japanese. The administration reorganised the whole military and the government using pro-Japanese leaders. Nationalist leaders like Kim Ku, prime minister of the Interim Korean Government in Shanghai before the fall of Japan, were ignored. Later Kim was assassinated by An Dohee, allegedly a member of Bakweesa the White Dress Society of Assassins). The Bakweesa killed many other anti-Japanese Activists like Chang Duksoo and Yeu Woonhyung. Syngman Rhee, a graduate of Harvard and Princeton became the first president of

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South Korea. From 1961 to 1992 military generals, who took power by coups d’état, ruled the country and many people suffered under the dictatorial terrorism. It was a scandal that Park Chunghee, a coup leader who then became president, was formerly an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army who had pursued and killed the patriotic leaders of the independence movement. North Korea became a socialist country with leadership supported by the USSR. The core leaders of the country were Presbyterian Christians like Rev. Kang Ryangwook, whose ancestors had been slaves or servants, the lowly grave keepers, maybe for hundreds of years. Kang was a graduate of Pyongyang Theological Seminary, founded by the missionaries of the Presbyterian Church USA, and his professors were Rev. Samuel Moffett and other American missionaries. After graduating in 1928, Rev. Kang became the secretary of the land reform committee in 1946, and later the deputy prime minister.6 Another Christian leader, Rev. Kim Changjun, a Methodist minister, graduate of Garrett Biblical Institute and Evanston College during the time of Japanese Colonial Rule and a professor of Christian Ethics and Practical Theology at Hyupsung Methodist Seminary in Seoul, moved to North Korea and became a vice chairperson of the People’s Supreme Parliament. The third error of the US in Korea was in 1948, when 30,000 civilians were killed by Syngman Rhee’s regime and US interim military government forces during operation ‘red hunt’, but in fact only a few hundred were Communists, and almost all of those killed were innocent victims. After some 52 years, the South Korean government and parliament officially admitted the fact that the killings had been a mistake on the part of the government. A fourth mistake was when, in January 1950, Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, declared the Acheson Line excluding South Korea, for the defence perimeter of the US. Russia supported North Korean forces trying to conquer the South with the expectation that US forces would never join the defence of South Korea, and more than 2 million people were killed and countless people wounded in the Korean War. After the war Koreans were among the poorest in the world. The fifth error of judgment of the United States was to fight proxy wars, such as the wars in Vietnam and in the Gulf, and some strategists, like Casper Weinberger, former US secretary of defence, have said that the next war will be the war in Korea.7 Robert MacNamara, an earlier defence secretary admitted that the US had been misguided and confused in its decision to go into Vietnam. This confession was made after the death of some one million native people in Vietnam and Indochina, mostly Buddhists, and some 51,000 American young people in the war in Vietnam. What can be done to defend the weak from another war of massacre and annihilations? Samuel Huntington of Harvard University seems to suggest the future war against the United States would be the war between the Christian civilizations of the United

6 His second son, Rev. Kang Youngsup, is now the Chairperson of the Korea Christian Federation. His first son was killed in 1946 over the issue of land reform. The first son was killed by a hand grenade in January 1946 in his father’s bedroom because of his father’s support for land reform. 7 C. Weinberger and P. Schweizer, The Next War, 1995.

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States, Europe and the Confucian civilizations of China, North Korea and so on.8 Some counter-argue that there will be harmony, reconciliation and cooperation between civilizations instead of wars and conflicts and clashes. Sadly Christians have not played an effective role in defending the life and rights of weak native peoples, and have not developed effective strategies and praxis for the liberation of the victims. Rather most of the time, they have joined, intentionally or passively, in killing peoples of other religions, other ideologies and indigenous spiritualities. The sixth error was indulging in demon-hunting and witch-hunting theologies, such as making enemies of the USSR, China or North Korea. This attitude was summed up when, after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Colin Powell was quoted as saying, ‘I am running out demons. I am down to Castro and Kim Il Sung’.9 In the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church killed many women as witches who are now recognised as prophetesses with the spirits of justice and peace and liberation, based on the biblical teachings of Esther and Amos. Colin Powell’s concept of demons should be re-examined for deconstruction and reconstruction for alternative options. For the sake of the peace of the world, notions of demons and witches should be suspected and we should identify the causes of the enemy-making mentality. Why should not China, the USA, the DPRK, the ROK and other countries be friends for peace and welfare in the twenty-first century? The final error of the US was its hard utopianism, particularly that of the Bush administration. Neither ‘hard’ nor ‘soft’ utopianism are the answer to the world’s problems. Despite the operations and wars directed by the super-powers to bring about the perfect world order, the native peoples of the world are still working for the historical liberation of the oppressed, for their utopian world. Instead the task which the marginalized people should consider to be the most urgent one is to deconstruct the existing polluted concepts of peace and justice in the minds of the powerful people and reconstruct the positive and just concepts and strategies for the liberation of the weak, the aborigines, the mountain people, and the native Americans. People need to be organized for their own liberation and salvation by those who play the role of assistant, facilitator, and catalyst for building a world of life, peace and justice. The jubilee spirit in the book of Leviticus (chap. 25) and according to Luke 4:19 may give a clue to solving the problem of the liberal market economy of the exploitative economic giants. Spiritual solidarity of the oppressed people and the Christian universities will prevail in situation of war, massacres of the natives, exploitation of the weak, and oppression in the twenty-first century when churches and universities work together for the genuine experience and praxis of converting the oppressors. The Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu wrote the following poem about the best strategy for peace:

8 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, 1996). 9 Quoted in M. Gilliland and J. P. Kash, ‘Economic conversion, engineers and stability’. In A.-M. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke and R. Costanza, eds., Investing in Natural Capital (Washington DC, 1994), pp. 449-60, at p. 455.

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When the Empire is ruled by the Tao(the way), the swiftest horses are discarded like refuge. When the Empire is ruled without the Tao, War horses are kept everywhere in the countryside. Use uprightness to rule the state, Use strategy with the military, But the Empire is won by non-action. The more the people have of military equipment, The more disturbed will be the land. The sage said, ‘I practice non-action, and the people are transformed; I practice meditation, and the people become righteous’. This is the advice to the powerful. God of the victims and Christian leadership in North Korea Koreans have been wronged both by the colonial powers and by the new global powers. One of the gravest injustices is the plan for pre-emptive strikes against North Korea. Such strikes would devastate the country and annihilate millions of innocent people. The result would be worse than the Vietnam War, the Nazi killings, Japanese war crimes or Stalin’s massacres. In June 2006 the US Democrats Ashcroft Carter and William Perry, former US Secretary of Defence, said that the US should apply a pre-emptive attack on North Korea.10 This was in line with the ‘Bush doctrine’ formulated after Sept. 11, 2001, which justified pre-emptive strikes against ‘rogue states’.11 Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe also suggested that Japan should attack North Korea’s missiles on the launch pad.12 According to The Washington Post, the US has a contingency plan (CONPLAN 8022) to use mini nuclear weapons in such an attack.13 Operation Valiant Shield in June 2006 along the Pacific Rim was one of the largest military operations with nuclear capabilities since the Vietnam War. It would not be surprising if the missile tests conducted by North Korea on 5 July 2006 were for their own self-defence from the invading forces, as they claimed.14 Some say that there are no real, genuine churches in North Korea but only government-organised showcases, and there are no genuine Christian ministers but 10 A. B. Carter and W. J. Perry, ‘If necessary strike and destroy’, Washington Post (22 June 2006). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/ AR2006062101518.html. 11 National Security Council, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html. 12 ‘Editorial: In the Hearts of Leaders’, New York Times, 22 July 2006. 13 W. Arkin, ‘Not Just A Last Resort?’, The Washington Post, 15 May 2005. http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051400071.html. 14 ‘Outcry over N Korea missile test’, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/5149512.stm.

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only fake ones. The following example shows this is not true. Kang Seyoung is now 77 years old and she has a son and some daughters. She is one of the leading elders of Bongsoo Church in Pyongyang, North Korea. When she was 17, she was a dedicated member of the church where her father was the pastor. She loved the verses in 1 Corinthians and the hymn, ‘Follow the right way, the way of justice and the way of all people in the world’. In March 1946, her father went to a meeting about land reform and someone threw a hand-grenade into the room. He was seriously injured and eventually died the next week. Her father, Rev. Kang, supported land reform to benefit the tenants. He believed that the land is the Lord’s to be shared with the poor farmers. Land is not a commodity to make the rich richer or to make the land-brokers rich in the new global economy of neo-colonial containment. She still remembers that day, and she is still a Christian. She has been a key member of the National Planning Committee of the government. In the year 2006, she is one of the most important members and an elder of the Church. 15 Taking an example from the Christian church in Korea shows how people of faith are trying to bring about reconciliation between the North and South. In Arnoldshain, Germany on 15 March 2004 a consultation was sponsored by the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD), the Protestant Church in Hesse and Nassau (EKHN) and the Association of Protestant Churches and Missions in Germany (EMW) to discuss the Korean situation with Christians from both North and South. This meeting built on the discussions of previous gatherings sponsored by the WCC between 1986 and 2001. The 2004 meeting produced a statement16 which the author of this chapter was involved in writing. The discussion began by reflecting on the role which the German churches played in the peaceful reunification of East and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991. While recognizing that the German model of reunification is not applicable to Korea, it was important nevertheless to acknowledge the role which Christians could play in a reunification process according to context. Apart from the suffering that North Koreans were experiencing because of the division it was noted that: The division of Korea remains both a tragedy for the Korean nation and an extremely volatile threat to world peace. Along with the new U.S. national security strategy of preemptive first strike, the people of Korea feel insecure and threatened. Moreover, many view these steps as deliberate attempts by the U.S.A. to frustrate the Korean people’s movement towards national sovereignty and reunification. The participants urge the USA to change its confrontational and hostile policy against DPRK, in order to help create a climate conducive to peace and security in the region.17

15 From an interview in The Minjok 21 magazine (Jan 2006). 16 For the full statement :Joint Statement International Consultation of churches on the role of the churches in the process towards a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, Arnoldshain, Germany, 15 March, 2004. http://www.peaceforum.or.kr/download.asp?file=Joi nt%20Statement%20Korea%20-english.pdf&bid=eng_res. 17 Joint Statement International Consultation of churches on the role of the churches, Arnoldshain, Germany, 15 March, 2004, para. 3.1.

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The delegates at the meeting clearly stated that the ongoing disagreement with the US over North Korea developing its nuclear capacity has ‘dramatically decreased humanitarian assistance from the international community and has denied the DPRK the benefits of normalized relations with countries such as Australia, Canada, the U.K. as well as the European Union’.18 Despite this consultation, participants believed that ‘people-to-people contacts, communication and the mutual exchange of ideas between the northern and the southern parts of Korea can build an atmosphere of trust’. In this context they acknowledged ‘the role of the Churches on both sides of Korea in overcoming hostility and antagonism’.19 They suggested that ‘The Churches and their regional and international organizations could provide space for encounter, organize visits and contribute to overcoming mutual prejudices and fears’20 and ‘reinforce their advocacy for establishing Just Peace on the Korean peninsula and in the region’.21 A number of other recommendations were made by the participants both to political and religious leaders: • Sanctions against the DPRK must be immediately lifted. • The churches, their regional and international organizations as well as their development and aid agencies should endeavour to let emergency assistance become more and more available for self-help development projects. • The European Union and Germany, in particular, should play a constructive role in promoting the peace and reunification of Korea. They should increase their humanitarian and other aid to the DPRK, promote better ties and explore all possible exchange possibilities with the people and the government of the DPRK. • The Christian Conference of Asia and the WCC should initiate appropriate actions and responses as necessary in the international situation in Northeast Asia.22 The statement from the consultation in Germany recognized the complex and dangerous situation which the Korean people face and that, in spite of this adversity, they continue to work for peace and reconciliation. Conclusion The sin of killing the weak is sometimes globalized under the banner of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. Those who justify such atrocities need to be converted to the spirit of the sacrificial love of agape. South Korea has surplus energy and should be able to supply some 500,000KW(e) electricity every year to North Korea for peaceful reconstruction of the economy. Peace may come when the ‘haves’ share what they 18 19 20 21 22

Ibid., 15 March, 2004, para. 3.2. Ibid., 15 March, 2004, para. 4.1. Ibid., 15 March, 2004, para. 4.1.3. Ibid, 15 March, 2004, para. 4.2.3. Ibid., 15 March, 2004.

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have with the ‘have nots’, including nuclear power plants and nuclear electricity. Freedom could mean having an alternative economy, other than the western style of market economy, based on laissez-faire capitalism. Capitalism has been a liberating power from the feudal economy, yet capitalism can also enslave and exploit. People should have the freedom to have their own style of economy of sharing, as expressed in the spirit of jubilee in the Book of Leviticus (Lev. 25). The jubilee economy has the power to liberate the exploited and the oppressed people, who are known in Latin America as el Pueblo, in South Korea as the Minjung, and in North Korea as Ienmin. While South Korean Christian theologians have developed Minjung theology, in the North, particularly since 1945, they have been developing their own theology of people based on the concept of Ienmin. This theology of people (Ienminshinhak) should be properly recognized by the global theological community. 23 ‘Human rights are given by God’ was the last of the ten affirmations of the Justice Peace and Integrity of Creation World Convocation in Seoul in 1990.24 But the concept of human rights had been sometimes misused as a weapon to victimize the weak and the oppressed by the powerful. Human rights should be defined by the victims, not by the global oppressors. The United Nations has proved incapable of solving the Korean conflict and defending the people of North Korea. In my view we need to have a new international organisation, an Alternative United Nations of the Oppressed to achieve a genuine, just peace for the poor and the oppressed. In my view the UN is no longer a satisfactory instrument for just peace of God. God will make the ultimate judgment on everyone on the last day of the world. The oppressed in the world should be organized in solidarity with the spirit of Amos, Joel, Moses and Jesus. Joshua is many times misused to justify massacres for unjust causes of self-interests and collective egoism, an attitude we could call the Joshua Syndrome.25 The oppressors should repent the sins of the human suffering they have created all over the world because of their desire for economic, political and military power that they can use against the ‘other’. The hope in the hearts of Christians is that the God of justice and peace will transform the world of suffering into a world of just peace for the weak and the marginalized. In this transformation the divided Korea will be reunited. The people of Asia should act as a catalyst and facilitator for peace and justice in the new world of the twenty-first century. It is a matter of life and death for the people of Korea and for the whole world.

23 Cf. Noh Jong Sun, The Story God of the Oppressed, Seoul, Hanul, 2003. Leading theologians are Rev. Kang Rynag Wook, Rev. Kim Chang Joon, Rev. Dr Hong Dong Keun, Kang Ban Suk, Rev. Koh Ki Joon, Rev. Kang Young Sup, Rev. Yi (Lee) Sung Sook. 24 ‘Now is the Time: Final Document and Other Texts, World Convocation on Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 5-12 March 1990’ (Geneva, 1990), pp. 12-21. 25 Noh Jong Sun, The Story God of the Oppressed: The Joshua Syndrome and Preventive Economy (Seoul, 2003).

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Bibliography ‘Now is the Time: Final Document and Other Texts, World Convocation on Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 5-12 March 1990’ (Geneva: WCC-JPIC office, 1990), pp. 12-21. ‘Outcry over N Korea missile test’, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/5149512.stm. Arkin, W. ‘Not Just A Last Resort?’, The Washington Post, 15 May 2005. http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051400071. html. Carter, A. B. and Perry, W. J. ‘If necessary strike and destroy’, Washington Post (22 June 2006). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/ AR2006062101518.html. Editorial, ‘In the Hearts of Leaders’, New York Times, 22 July 2006. Gilliland, M. and Kash, J. P. ‘Economic conversion, engineers and stability’ in A.M. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke and R. Costanza, eds., Investing in Natural Capital (Washington DC: Island Press, 1994), pp. 449-60. Huntington, S. P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). Joint Statement International Consultation of churches on the role of the churches in the process towards a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, Arnoldshain, Germany, 15 March, 2004. http://www.peaceforum.or.kr/download.asp?file=Join t%20Statement%20Korea%20-english.pdf&bid=eng_res. KCNA, 10 Feb 2005; published on 11 Feb 2005. Available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/ index-e.htm. National Security Council, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html. Noh, Jong Sun, The Story God of the Oppressed: The Joshua Syndrome and Preventive Economy (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2003). The Minjok 21 magazine (Jan 2006). Weinberger, C. and Schweizer, P. The Next War, 1995.

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Chapter 11

Reconciliation Possible? The Churches’ Efforts Toward the Peace and Reunification of North and South Korea Sebastian C.H. Kim

Our desire is unification In our dreams, our desire is unification With all our effort, unification Oh, come, unification! Unification which saves our people Unification which saves this nation Come, unification! Oh, come, unification!1 The conflict between the two Koreas is certainly the dominant concern for its people, and has affected their lives ever since the division of Korea, which began in 1945 after the end of the Japanese occupation. Though the desire for reunification has been the most important agenda item for political leaders, the ways to achieve the goal has differed widely because the two Koreas have been at the forefront of the Cold War ideological conflict. In this context, the churches in South Korea have gone through various stages in attempting to deal with the issue of division and theological thinking has often made a significant impact on the wider society through Christian-initiated peace and reconciliation movements. In this chapter, I would like to look at some of the main political encounters between North and South Korea, discuss the churches’ efforts for reconciliation, and lastly, make some suggestions toward a theology of reconciliation. Divided Korea and political efforts for reunification – a brief historical account The Korean peninsula was divided by the decision of the leaders of the USA, the USSR and the UK in various discussions toward the end of the Pacific War. The key 1

Korean children’s song.

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decision for the Koreans was the occupation of the North by the Soviet Union and of the South by the United States for a period of five years. There were various reasons given for this decision, but the Cold War between the USA and the USSR lay behind it.2 Koreans have resented the fact that they were neither part of the decision-making, nor were their feelings taken into account. They did not see why they deserved yet again to be ruled by super-powers after they had gone through the humiliation of Japanese occupation for 38 years. The division has been the cause of what the Koreans call han - resentment or anguish that Koreans bear as a consequence of the action of others - and has been marked by high tension and sporadic conflict between the two Koreas. The following section will discuss the political encounters between North and South Korea, including the Korean War (1950-3), the NorthSouth Joint Declaration (1972) and the meeting of the two leaders of North and South in Pyongyang (2000). Soon after independence, North and South Korea, divided at the 38th parallel, established their own governments backed by the Soviet Union and the USA. Despite the efforts of many Korean political and civil leaders, the gap between the two governments widened as the ideological battle between them became intense, and eventually war between the two Koreas broke out. North Korean troops occupied Seoul within two days of the start of the war and pushed the South Korean army down to Pusan, the South-East coast city.3 Due to the efforts of the US and UN troops, the situation was soon reversed as the UN and South Korean troops pushed up to the North near the Chinese border, expecting to win the war imminently. However, Chinese troops then entered the war in support of the North Korean forces and again the UN troops had to withdraw. The war stagnated roughly along the original border and the talks on a ceasefire started in July 1951. The war was officially ended only on 27th July 1953, and during the proceeding two years of peace talks bitter conflicts continued along the border in order to gain an advantageous position in terms of both land and negotiating power. But the agreement was a ‘ceasefire’ and not a ‘peace’ treaty therefore technically the war between the Koreas is not yet over. The three-year war resulted in 1.2 million military personnel killed, 2.7 million wounded, and 1.6 million civilians dead or missing.4 The war caused a deep scar of resentment toward the other side in the hearts and minds of both South and North Koreans. And until today the memory of cruelty by both parties has haunted any attempt at reconciliation. During the brief period of occupation of the others’ 2 For discussion on this, see K. Pratt, Everlasting Flower: A History of Korea (London, 2006), pp. 241-47; Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea, trans. E. Wahner with E. J. Shultz (Cambridge, MA, 1984), pp. 379-85; J. Halliday and B. Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (London, 1988), pp. 15-69. See also K. Weatherby, ‘Soviet Documents and Reinterpretation of the Origins of the Korean War’ in Chung-in Moon, Odd Arne Westad and Gyoo-hyoung Kahng, Ending the Cold War in Korea: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Seoul, 2001), pp. 161-69; Yoshihide Soeya, ‘The Cold War in Asia: The Korean Peninsula as a Structure Nexus and the Role of Japan’ in Moon, et el., Ending the Cold War in Korea, pp. 147-59. 3 Discussion on the legal matter on the war, see Jae Sung-Ho, Toward the Peaceful System in Korean Peninsula: with Special Reference to Law (Seoul, 2000), pp. 5-22. 4 Encyclopaedia Britannica (2006), [accessed 16 Dec 2007].

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territory, both parties committed killings, torture and kidnapping of civilians, accusing them of being either ‘communist aggressors’ or ‘collaborators with the American imperialists’. Particularly for North Koreans, the indiscriminate bombing of North Korea, calculated to amount to more than the entire bombing of Western Europe during the Second World War, resulted in a great number of casualties and caused bitter animosity toward the Americans. Since the war, the two Koreas have remained divided for more than 60 years.5 The two nations have a total of more than one-and-a-half million troops under arms, and bitter conflict and propaganda against each other have continued until very recently. A typical propaganda song in the South was, ‘Let’s destroy communists, even millions of them… wherever brave Korean men go, there is nothing but victory!’ For North Koreans, the South Koreans are ‘puppets of the American imperialists’ and in need of ‘liberation by the People’s Army’. After the war, the South went through the political turmoil of a student-led revolution in 1960, a military coup in 1965, and then a succession of military-backed governments. The South Korean government blamed the unrest of society on minority groups, who were supported by the North to destabilise society; therefore any discussion toward peace and reconciliation was regarded with suspicion and harshly suppressed by the government. North Korea, on the other hand, also established a strictly controlled regime under the dictatorship of Kim Il-Sung, who suppressed the freedom of the people in the North and imposed the Jooche sasang, or the ideology of self-reliance. A major break-through in the relationship between the two nations took place when high-ranking officials from both North and South Korea announced a North-South Joint Statement on 4th July 1972.6 This Joint Statement has had a significant impact on the direction of the unification movement as it was based on the notion of self-determination, peace and grassroots unification: The parties have agreed upon the following principles for the reunification: First, the reunification must be achieved with no reliance on external forces or interference. It must be achieved internally. Second, the reunification must be achieved peacefully without the use of military forces against the other side.

5 There are numerous results of the War and the division: military tension between the two Koreas; loss of common identity as the same people, division into two sharply differing political and economical systems; a wide economic gap between the two, and ignorance of one another; and tension and conflicts with the neighbouring countries. See Yu Ho-yeul, ‘The Change of the Divided System in Korean Peninsula and the Generation of Reunification’ in Korea Association of North Korean Studies (ed), South-North Reconciliation and Reunification (Seoul, 2001), pp. 9-43. 6 There were numerous attempts at dialogue and peace initiated by the South: South Korean President, Park Jung-Hee announced the ‘8.15 Declaration’, which suggested the gradual removal of obstacles against reunification and peaceful coexistence in 1970; the South Korean Red Cross called for talks about reuniting separated families between the North and South in 1971; President Park declared a ‘Policy of Peaceful Reunification’ and in 1973 he called for North and South Korea to join together in the UN.

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The suggestions for the way forward included: the easing of tension, various ways of exchange, cooperating with the work of the Red Cross, establishing a hotline between leaders, and the formation of the North-South Joint Committee for unification. The initial response from the people in the South and the North was disbelief at this sudden and unexpected development, but they welcomed the move toward unification and there was a great sense of hope and an optimistic attitude toward the renewed relationship. However, this enthusiasm was soon quenched when the South Korean government declared martial law in the same year and the North stopped all communication channels abruptly in the following year. The leaders of North and South were both concerned with consolidating their political positions and the issue of reunification again became sidelined.8 Despite the shortlived implementation of the Declaration, it made a deep impact on both sides and gave confidence and a green light to those who were campaigning for the cause. The approach of the South Korean government toward the North again changed drastically in the late 1990s when President Kim Daejoong announced the ‘Sunshine Policy’, which had three principles: No armed provocation will be tolerated; the South will not attempt to absorb the North in any way; and reconciliation and cooperation wherever possible. This policy has two important dimensions: affirming the partnership of the nations rather than the merging of the North into the South along the lines of German reunification, and insisting that initiatives on the issue be taken by North and South Korea themselves, rather than by outside interference.9 As a result of this initiative from the South and a change of relationship between the North Korean and US governments, the first ever meeting of the heads of the two Koreas in Pyongyang in June 2000 was a landmark moment for divided Korea.10 The joint declaration at the end of the meeting was focused on the acceptance of others as partners in peaceful coexistence, dialogue rather than conquest, and attempting to find common solutions to unification step-by-step.11 This was followed by economic cooperation between the two Koreas, both at governmental and civilian levels, as well as an increase of humanitarian support from the South to the North. The succeeding government in South Korea has continued the policy of peaceful coexistence and the 7 , [accessed 13 Dec 2007]. 8 President Chun Doo-Hwan called for a meeting of two leaders in 1981; for trade and economic cooperation in 1984; in September 1985, for the first time 65 separated families met in Seoul and in Pyongyang. There were similar initiatives by President Noh Tae-Woo and President Kim Young-Sam. 9 For detailed discussion of the ‘Sunshine Policy’, see Chung-in Moon and D. I. Steinberg (eds), Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Seoul, 1999). 10 In the early 1990s there had been a series of talks about a possible meeting between the leaders of the North and South, Kim Il-Sung and Kim Young-Sam but this was cancelled due to the sudden death of the North Korean leader in 1994. 11 For the full text of the Declaration, see , [accessed 13 Dec 2007] and also the appendix.

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gradual reunification of the two Koreas but progress has been hampered by scandals relating to a large company’s unauthorised transfer of funds in order to support the North, and by objections raised by conservative sections of South Korean society. The talks between the two Koreas are like waves, sometimes raising high expectations but often disappointing people on both sides. This is particularly so due to a series of crises over missile and nuclear tests from the North in recent years, regional conflicts in the South Sea of the Korean peninsula, and other incidents.12 More recently South Korean President Noh Moo-hyun13 visited the North for the first time on foot across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), to meet the North Korean leader, Kim Jung-Il in October 2007. In their declaration, both leaders stated that they ‘uphold and endeavour actively to realize’ the North-South Declaration (2000) and agreed to ‘resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative’ on the basis of ‘mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems’. The Declaration further states that the two parties agreed ‘not to antagonize each other, to reduce military tension, to resolve issues in dispute through dialogue and negotiation’, and to promote economic cooperation and social and cultural exchange.14 The summit did not draw as much publicity as the previous one; there were concerns about whether the agreement would be continued by the new government (the presidential election was in December 2007, only a few months after the meeting) and also objections from conservative sections of society that there was no mention of the nuclear issue in the Declaration. Nevertheless, the summit was yet another practical and concrete step toward the peaceful coexistence and unification of the Koreans.15 Although the political relationship has often appeared tense and aggressive, the exchange of people and trade and the social and cultural cooperation have been steadily increasing, which is a very positive sign that there is growing reconciliation between the two Koreas.16 12 There was a series of conflicts and tensions: naval conflict on the western coast in June 2002; a North Korean missile test (Daepodong 2) in July 2006; and a North Korean nuclear test in October 2006. 13 Note that of the Noh government’s ‘Top 12 policy goals’ the first is: ‘To build a firm foundation for peace on the Korean peninsula’ and for this to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and develop military confidence-building with North Korea; to restructure the national defence posture, including a shorter term for draftee service and the development of elite armed forces; to maintain multi-dimensional dialogue channels for a structure of peace; and to conduct diplomacy of mutual cooperation and build a Northeast Asia consultative for peace. , [accessed 13 Dec 2007]. 14 See , [accessed 13 Dec 2007] also in appendix. 15 In another significant development, the commercial freight train line between the North and South (which was disconnected in June 1951) was re-opened on 11 December 2007 and now operates once a day. 16 According to South Korean government statistics, between 1989 and 2007 (October), there is significant interchange between the two countries in four areas: a) Exchange of people: visits to North Korea were 386,711 (in addition, 1,668,115 took part in tours to Mt. Kumgang between 1998 and 2007) and visits to South Korea were 6,946. b) Inter-Korea trade:

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Churches’ attempts toward peace and reconciliation in the peninsula As in the case of politics, the South Korean churches are deeply divided into conservative and liberal positions, and this has been a constant struggle for Christians as they grapple with the political situation. Christian attitudes on the issue could be classified in three ways: unification as part of an anti-communist campaign and mission agenda (conservative Christians), promoting dialogue between two nations (liberal Christians), and involvement in a supportive and sharing humanitarian campaign (both conservative and liberal Christians). Even before the Korean War, Korean Christians held a negative attitude toward communist ideology because of its anti-religious stance. This was confirmed by the persecution of churches by the government in the North and even greater suffering during the war. About 400 ministers were killed and more than 2,000 churches were burnt or damaged by the communists in 1950-53.17 As a result, during and after the war, Christians were at the forefront of anti-communist movements; they were against the ceasefire and regarded communists as evil. The immediate post-war reflections by Christians were more sombre. Some saw the war as a punishment of God toward Korean Christians for their unfaithfulness, including the way the church bowed to Japanese pressure to practise Shinto worship and the many divisions among Christians. Others understood the war as part of a sacrifice for the greater good of the nation in line with the sacrifice of Christ for human beings, which gave a salvific dimension to the tragedy.18 But the dominant interpretation by Christians in the South was that the war was the result of the communist aggression, and this needed to be responded to with decisive force and vigour, on the one hand, and with prayer and mission toward the people of North Korea, on the other. This response was particularly common since many of the senior leadership of the churches in the South were those who had escaped from persecution by the communist regime in the North during the war, and also because, on this issue, the conservative sections of the Christian church and the military-backed government shared the same attitude toward the communist government in the North. They believed regime change was the ultimate solution for peace and stability, and co-existence with the communist North was not an option. So, in this understanding, the evangelisation of North Korea was understood as prior to unification.19 This reached a total of US$ 8,837,237,000 (commission-based processing trade by South Korean companies: US$ 1,912,797). c) Cooperative projects: There were 402 cases of major economic, social and cultural cooperation (between 1991-2007). d) Humanitarian projects: 4,962 separated families were reunited and a total of US$ 1,960,350,000 in aid was given to North Korea (US$ 1,346,880,000 from the government and US$ 613,470,000 from NGOs). See , [accessed 14 Dec 2007] for detailed statistics. 17 Yi Man-yeol, Korean Christianity and Unification Movement (Seoul, 2001), pp. 37174. 18 Chung Shung-Han, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches (Seoul, 2003), pp. 150-73. 19 See detailed discussion on this: Chung, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, pp. 203-17 & 240-60. Yi, Korean Christianity and Unification Movement, pp. 371-74.

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This rigid and hostile attitude toward the North was soon countered by a more sympathetic acceptance of the people of the North as blood relations. This coincided with the rise of the democratic movement among the students and ‘progressive’ thinkers, increasing awareness of Christians’ role in peace and reconciliation, and the sustaining support of the World Council of Churches for peace and reconciliation. An initiative was taken by a group of overseas Korean Christians who met North Korean Christian delegates in the early 1980s, and this created fresh new beginnings.20 However, the declarations after the meetings were heavily critical of the South Korean and US governments and supportive of the North, therefore they were rejected by the South Korean media and the general public, and did not really make any impact. Meanwhile, in this period, the WCC took an initiative to bring dialogue between the two parties. The most significant direct dialogue was a meeting between representatives from the North and South Korean churches at a seminar on the ‘Christian perspectives on biblical and theological foundations for peace’ in Glion, Switzerland in September 1986.21 The meeting reached an emotional climax during the worship, when all the participants were encouraged to greet one another. The representatives of South and North first shook hands but soon embraced each other. By participating in the Eucharist together – the heart of Christ’s gospel of peace and reconciliation – they demonstrated the desire and hope of the people of divided Korea. Meanwhile, in the midst of a series of WCC sponsored meetings, in February 1988 the KNCC issued the ‘Declaration of the Korea National Council of the Churches toward the unification and peace of the Korean people’, which made a significant impact both within the church and on the whole nation.22 The KNCC declaration was welcomed by many Christians but also generated a heated discussion among Christians. It brought the issue of peace and reconciliation within the churches, which motivated conservative Christians to participate in the debate. The declaration starts with the affirmation that Christ came to the earth as the servant of peace and proclaimed the kingdom of God, which represents peace, reconciliation and liberation. It claims that, accordingly, the Korean church is trying to be with people who are suffering. In the main thesis, the declaration acknowledges and confesses the sins of mutual hatred, justifying the division of Korea, and accepting each ideology as absolute, which is contrary to God’s absolute authority: We confess that throughout the history of our national division the churches of Korea have not only remained silent and continuously ignored the ongoing stream of movements for autonomous reunification of our people, but have further sinned by trying to justify the division. The Christians of both North and South have made absolute idols of the ideologies enforced by their respective systems. This is a betrayal of the ultimate sovereignty of God (Exodus 20:3-5), and is a sin, for the church must follow the will of God rather than the will of any political regime (Acts 4:19).23 20 In Austria (Nov 1981), in Helsinki (Dec 1982) and in Vienna (Dec 1984). 21 See Yi, Korean Christianity and Unification Movement, pp. 382-88. 22 Ibid., pp. 389-414. 23 ‘Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’, KNCC (1988). See the appendix for full text.

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The declaration, while affirming the three principles expressed in the Joint Declaration (1972; self-determination, peace, and grassroots unification of the Koreas), added the priority of humanitarian practice and the participation of the minjung, who are the victims of the divided Korea, in the unification discussions. The document made practical suggestions to both governments, including the change from ‘ceasefire’ to ‘peace’ and, after a peace treaty is signed and the peace and security of the peninsula guaranteed by the international community, the withdrawal of the US army and the dismantling of the UN head office. The Declaration then proclaimed the year 1995 as a jubilee year for peace and unification when Koreans could celebrate the 50th anniversary of the liberation from Japan. Reflecting on the biblical pattern of restoration of a just community (Lev. 25), it set down practical steps toward the jubilee year including: church renewal – the church becoming a faith community for peace and reconciliation, and working together with all the churches, employing all the necessary means toward peace and reconciliation: The Korean churches proclaim 1995, the fiftieth year after Liberation, as a Jubilee Year, to express our belief in the historical presence of God, who has ruled over those fifty years of history – indeed, over all of human history; to proclaim the restoration of the covenant community of peace; and to declare our resolution to achieve this restoration in the history of the Korean peninsula today. As we march forward with high aspirations toward the Year of Jubilee, we should experience a revitalized faith in the sovereignty of God, who works within our people’s history, and renewed commitment to the calling of God’s mission.24

The declaration was welcomed by many South Korean churches and also by the Council of Chosun Christian Church in the North, but provoked severe criticism from conservative sections of the churches. They expressed deep concern over what they saw as naïve views toward the North with regard to the peace treaty, to the suggestion of the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and to the acknowledgement of the official Christian church in the North, which the conservatives saw as a part of the Communist Party. They viewed the Declaration as a theologically one-sided approach toward the issues, and politically in line with the North Korean position.25 However, the Declaration brought the issue of reunification onto the main agenda of Korean Christians and challenged many conservative sections of the church to rethink their traditional approaches toward the North, moving from evangelism or relief to partnership for the common goal of peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, the Declaration expressed the vital concerns, not only of Christians but also of the whole nation, on the issue, and set the future direction of the Korean church on the unification issue. In spite of its limitations and shortcomings, the Declaration was the most significant landmark in the Korean Christian attempt to bring peace and reconciliation. It seems the gap between the conservative and liberal approaches toward reunification has been as deep as that between North and South Korea. The situation 24 ‘Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’, KNCC (1988). See appendix. 25 See Chung, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, pp. 276-80.

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was aggravated especially when Moon Ik-Hwan, a Protestant minister and activist for the reunification movement, made his controversial visit to Pyongyang to meet the leader of North Korea in March 1989 and when the Christian Council of Korea (CCK), consisting of some 20 South Korean Protestant denominations, was founded in the following month.26 Since then the KNCC and CCK have often expressed sharply differing views, especially on the issue of reunification, and these have been reinforced by their theological positions, liberal and conservative respectively. However, more recently, this theological and ideological distance has been bridged by various ecumenical projects. ‘The South-North Sharing Campaign’, founded in 1993, is perhaps the best example of a common project participated in by both camps, and it has gained increasing support from the Korean church as a whole. In its founding declaration, the participants express a wish to accept both ‘prophetic mission’ and ‘priestly sacrifice’, and for this purpose they seek to commonly own and share spiritual and material resources for the task of ‘national reconciliation and peaceful reunification based upon a firm commitment to the Christian foundation of piety and temperance’.27 The changing policy of the South Korean government since the early 1990s, and also the increasing voices from younger generations mean that the church leadership is no longer saddled with the old pattern of a dichotomy of conservatives and liberals but has to work together regardless of denomination and theological differences. Theological quests for peace and reconciliation Peace and reconciliation is a vital theological concept: God reconciles himself with us through Christ, and likewise, we are called to become reconciled with one another. But how can this theological understanding be applicable to the peace and reconciliation between the two Koreas? As we have seen, there is a sharp division among Korean Christians on the issue of reunification, and this is clearly demonstrated in the recent survey on socio-political opinions of Korean Protestant Christians conducted by the Institute of Theological Research at Hanshin University in Seoul.28 However, it is important to notice that despite the differences, they are in agreement in three areas: the overwhelming majority of respondents desire the reunification of the two Koreas

26 For details of the formation of CCK, see Chung, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, pp. 276-99. Its main activities on North Korea include reconstructing the churches in North Korea, cooperating in mission to North Korea, supporting North Korean refugees and campaigning for human rights in North Korea. See , [accessed 12 December 2007]. 27 <www.sharing.net>, [accessed 12 December 2007]. In addition to this, many of the large churches – Young Nak Church, So Mang Church, Myeung Sung Church and Chung Shin Church – for example, are involved in humanitarian support of various projects in North Korea as well as in supporting North Korean defectors, recently renamed by the South Korean government, Saetemin, which means people who start home in a new context. 28 The Institute of Theological Studies, Research on Socio-Political Consciousness of Korean Protestant Christians (Seoul, 2004), pp. 40-52.

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(97.9%), believe humanitarian support to North Korea should continue (91.4%),30 and see the mode of reunification as gradual and with mutual consultation between the two nations rather than by means of the South absorbing the North or through violent means (80.6%). This survey reflects the desire and aspirations of Korean Christians for peace and reconciliation, the seeking of partnership and sharing of a common identity as the same people, which are important aspects of the Christian message. If Christian theology is to address this issue, it is necessary to explore further the meaning of jubilee, han and shared identity. The jubilee principle and the call for a restored sharing community The jubilee is most clearly presented in Leviticus 25:8-55 (see also Lev. 27:16-25; Num 36:4) which has a close textual relationship to the declaration of the sabbatical year in Exodus 21 and 23. Although there is no evidence whether the Jubilee principle was practised in the history of Israel, the idea has been a challenge to the people of Israel and to the Christians. This idea of Jubilee and sabbatical year was picked up by Jesus’ proclamation of the ‘Year of the Lord’ (Isaiah 61:1-2) in Luke 4:21. The jubilee principle has several dimensions: sabbatical year, restoration of land to the original owners, and liberation of slaves. When the KNCC declared 1995 as the Year of Jubilee, it focused on the third aspect of liberation and also more on the proclamation than the actualisation of unification in any particular year. Though many sincerely expected and wished that it could be achieved, the important point was that the Jubilee was proclaimed. It is the proclamation of the liberation of the Korean people from the bondage of ideological hegemony, and from political systems which hinder the formation of a common community.31 This theme is also related to the remembering of God’s grace in spite of the present situation, so that Christians are called to hold faith in confidence. Kim Chang-Rak, in his support of the employment of jubilee law in the unification of the Korean peninsula, argues that the difference between the jubilee year and the ‘year of the Lord’ is that the sitz im leben of the jubilee principle relies on and affirms the present system, whereas the year of the Lord requires God’s immediate intervention in a situation where there is no hope. The belief in God’s immediate intervention was why the author of the Gospel of Luke recorded that Jesus read the passage and declared that the passage was fulfilled today (Luke 4:21).32 Though 29 Reasons for the support of reunification are: because it enables the sharing of the Christian message to the people in the North (34.5%), the opportunity to recover a common identity as Koreans (24.9%), and to save the North Koreans from oppression (19.9%). Reasons given against reunification included: fear of social chaos (42.9%) and the economic burden (19.0%). 30 The support should continue regardless of political situation (57%) and support should be given but strategically (37.4%). 31 See Park Jong Hwa, ‘Theological and Political Task for Jubilee in the Church and People in Korea’ in Korean Association for Christian Studies (ed), 50 Anniversary of Liberation and Jubilee (Seoul, 1995), pp. 25-44. 32 Kim Chang Rak, ‘Jubilee in the Bible and Jubilee in the Korean Peninsula’ in Institute of Theological Studies, People’s Unification and Peace (Seoul: The Institute of Theological

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there are problems in applying the jubilee law directly to the situation of the Korean peninsula, and also in setting the year 1995 as jubilee year, the declaration exhibits the Korean Christians’ insistence on the agenda of reunification of the two Koreas as they trust God’s sovereign power over the problem of division, the slavery of hatred and the bondage of ideological conflict. Indeed, it was argued that the jubilee movement should be carried out in the form of creating a ‘people community’ of justice, restoring a common identity of Koreans sharing common struggle and pain33. The purpose of jubilee is bringing God’s justice into the Korean context.34 This is not only a religious notion but is manifested in socio-political reality, which requires participating in the justice and peace of God’s kingdom in Korea and together celebrating God’s works of liberation.35 The jubilee principle is also useful for Koreans in encouraging the search for a restored sharing community, employing the concepts of koinonia (community, sharing) and oikumene (household of God). The separation of the people in the North and South over 60 years into two very different socio-economic and political systems means that there are very few shared identities. What could be the contribution of theology in this context? Perhaps, as Ahn Byeung-Mu, a Korean minjung theologian insists, the early church in Acts was primarily a food community, which shared the basic needs of humanity with others, rather than a worshipping community.36 The restoration of this concept of koinonia between the South and North is most urgent, especially as this is a time of severe economic hardship and even starvation in the North. Sharing of resources is a theological imperative that the church should be actively engaged in. It is a central affirmation of Christian faith that the people of God is catholic or universal. It is in this sense that oikoumene has been taken up by the ecumenical movement to express its mission of unity of the church and humanity. Since God is one, the household of God must be one and this is not limited just to Christians but includes all – not least the people of North and South Korea. David Kwang-sun Suh, in his ‘theology of reunification’ sees restoration of community as creating a sharing community. He writes metaphorically of the cross of division and the resurrection of hope and expresses his resentment that, in spite of Korea being the victim of imperial aggression, Korea had to be divided again by the imperialistic policy of the superpowers, and in that sense Koreans are bearing the cross of division. He then argues that under this cross, Christians in the North and the South yearn for the resurrection which was demonstrated through Christ and promised to his disciples, and that this will be manifested through sharing at table together:

Studies, 1995), pp. 157-215. 33 Min Yong-Jin, Peace, Unification and Jubilee (Seoul, 1995), pp. 295-305. 34 Kang Sa-Moon, ‘The problem of Application of Jubilee Law to 50th Anniversary of Liberation’ in Korean Association for Christian Studies (ed), 50 Anniversary of Liberation and Jubilee, pp. 47-82. 35 Kim Yong-Bock, ‘Preface’ in Korean Association for Christian Studies (ed), 50 Anniversary of Liberation and Jubilee, pp. 5-14. See also Park Soon-Kyeung, The Future of Unification Theology (Seoul, 1997), pp. 106-17. 36 Ahn Byeung-Mu, The Story of Minjung Theology (Seoul, 1990), pp. 156-85.

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Peace and Reconciliation Resurrection is the hope of the community of the table; it is the search for people coming together at the Lord’s Table as a community. Resurrection is eating and drinking together at the same table with the Lord in a community… we believe in the resurrection of the divided people from the cross of division, in Korea…as the reclaiming of the community. In the resurrected body of Christ, we struggle for the community, the unity and commonwealth of peace and justice.37

The keys to seeking restored shared identity are: understanding, accepting and sharing of life together and this includes radical changes in past perception of each other. Welcome to Dongmakgol is a fine example of a film reflecting this dilemma of animosity and yet deep-rooted shared identity even between soldiers from the North and South. This film is a comedy set in a remote mountain village during the Korean War. The villagers are happily unaware of the war until one day two separate groups of soldiers – one from the South and one from the North – stumble upon the village and confront one another in the square. As the bemused villagers look on, and try to continue their normal lives, there is a stand-off between the soldiers, which lasts through pouring rain and all through the night. We discover that each group is bluffing – neither is as fearsome as they look, and neither really knows what is going on in the larger theatre of the war. Eventually one of the exhausted soldiers tosses away what he thinks is a dud grenade and accidentally blows up the store of food for the whole village for the winter. The distraught villagers round on the soldiers, forcing them to help to bring in more harvest. Eventually, they encourage them to take off their different uniforms and put on common village clothes. Working together for the good of the village, the soldiers gradually let down their guard and, living together, they become friends. When, eventually, the war catches up with them, they work together to save the village from being bombed. The film is very funny and seems far from present reality – but it is also very poignant. It touches the hearts of Koreans, who have been separated as enemies for over sixty years, and yet long to be reunited in one community. Overcoming han and building up trust and hope Koreans have experienced han through the constant cycle of hope and despair during the last half century and still there is no immediate sign of improvement in the relationship between the two nations. Koreans understand and identify in a national way with the story of Israel in Old Testament times, and with the meaning of the cross. The separation is understood as the cross which Koreans have to bear, and it is through these experiences of bitter conflicts and division that Koreans understand the reality of human nature and yet seek hope in the midst of despair. This concept of han was well articulated by minjung theologians, who struggled to find meaningful theological engagement in the context of the unjust society of the 1970s. Among the most well-known of minjung theologians, Suh Nam-Dong presented his thesis in 1975 that Jesus identified with the poor, sick and oppressed and that the gospel of Jesus is the gospel of salvation and liberation. For Suh, it is manifested in struggle with those evil powers, and liberation is not individual or 37 David Kwang -sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ (Hong Kong, 1991), p. 183.

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spiritual but rather communal and political. Suh systematized his minjung theology in the following years, seeing the minjung as subjects of history and the dealing with ‘han’ as the key theme for theology in Korean context: Let us hold in abeyance discussions on doctrines and theories about sin which are heavily charged with the bias of the ruling class and are often nothing more than the labels the ruling class uses for the deprived. Instead, we should take han as our theme, which is indeed the language of the Minjung and signifies the reality of their experience. If one does not hear the signs of the han of the Minjung, one cannot hear the voice of Christ knocking on our doors.38

The minjung theologians have further asserted that the minjung are the Koreans, both rich and poor, both North and South, who are struggling to be reunited, and that han is felt by every Korean in the yearning for reunification. David Kwang-sun Suh argues that the cross of division is the cross of han, and expresses his frustration with it: With a clear Christian conscience, we hear the agonizing cry on the cross of division, Eli Eli lama sabachthani? This cry of han is a cry to God from the forsaken people on the cross of division. Has God forsaken the Korean people on the cross of division? When we hear the cries of the cross of division, we feel numb and powerless. We are lost, we do not know how to respond to these cries…39

However, though the identification of the cross of division as the han of Koreans is vital in understanding the agony and despair, the hope of resurrection must be found and this seems to require a further development of the socio-political efforts for unification. In other words, the emphasis on political reunification without a concrete process of reconciliation between the two peoples may lead to further alienation of the one from the other. On the issue of the process of reunification, there has been ample discussion from political, economic, social and anthropological perspectives, but one of the deep problems of the relationship between the two Koreas lies in the deep sense of suspicion and distrust of the other – resulting from decades of conflict and the breakdown of dialogue. How can two parties establish mutual trust after having experienced so many incidences of hurt and hatred? Not only this, but how can the deeply divided opinions among the people in South Korea on the issue of unification be reconciled? Moon Ik-Hwan, the Protestant minister who made a controversial visit to North Korea in 1989 and was imprisoned by the South Korean government several times, has expressed his dream and hope for the future in his poem:

38 Suh Nam-Dong, ‘Toward a Theology of Han’ in Kim Yong Bock (ed), Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History (Maryknoll, NY, 1983), pp. 51-65. 39 Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, p. 181.

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Living in history means… Changing night into day and day into night, Changing sky into earth and earth into sky, Scattering rocks with bare feet and being buried under them, Surviving as soul only, waving the flag of freedom high. Living in history in this land means… Walking through a wall as a door, Refusing the separation with whole body, Shouting that there is no border line, Insisting on a railway ticket for Pyongyang from the stations in Seoul, Pusan or Kwangju. This person is crazy! Yes, I am crazy, truly crazy. You can’t live in the history without being crazy. You with a clear mind, If you can’t sell a ticket for Pyongyang, let it be. I shall walk. I shall swim Imjin River40 If I am shot, let it be, I shall go with my soul like cloud and wind.41 Bringing about the process of reconciliation by forming shared identity Reflecting on the South African situation, John de Gruchy, in his discussion on the ‘art of reconciliation’ in his book on reconciliation, makes the point that ‘creating space is critical, irrespective of the nature of the reconciliation we seek’ and that ‘reconciliation cannot be pursued without the alienated parties facing each other’.42 This idea of creating space is also affirmed in this present volume through the practical suggestions of many of the authors. Gerhard Sauter, reflecting on the German situation, insists that ‘common identity demands mutual respect and a sharp sense of reality, especially if this identity is having to be built upon very different historical presuppositions’. He regretted that German reunification was largely based on common German pre-War history and did not create a ‘common cultural memory’ of the most recent German history. So he urges his Korean counterparts:

40 This tributary of the Han River flows from North into South Korea. 41 Moon Ik-Hwan, I Shall Go Even on Foot (Seoul, 1990), pp. 18-19. 42 J. de Gruchy, Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (London, 2002), p. 148.

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the Korean Christians in the North and South will contribute decisively to achieving their common identity not on the basis of an economic merger of a political union with all the complications and psychological costs that the German experiences show; rather,… they contribute through their participation in God’s atonement and thus become reconciled with each other. This would include their not only being compassionate but merciful with each other in the light of their very different and complicated recent stories and so able to hear and confirm the apostolic message: ‘In Christ, God was reconciling the world to himself… (2 Cor 5:19-20)’43.

The ‘cultural common memory’ which Sauter has mentioned is also echoed by Robert Schreiter, who has been working on the issue of reconciliation for many years. He sees that building shared identities is an important part of the process of reconciliation, and that healing memory and sharing narrative are essential parts of forming shared identities. For him, the shaping of the ‘communities of memory’ is important and he suggests several steps toward this: first, acknowledging loss, which does not mean abandoning the past, but rather building a new relationship to it; second, making connections, creating a situation where our relation to the past is no longer immediate but dialectical, where new connections can begin to be made; thirdly, taking action to bring a new dimension to the situation.44 This process of forming shared identity for achieving reconciliation is further developed in Cecelia Clegg’s chapter entitled, ‘Embracing a Threatening Other’. This was the key she discovered in her research on the situation in Northern Ireland. She sees that if we look at the nature of group identities in conflict, identity is often distorted into ‘negative identity’, and this identity is formed over and against the ‘other’ in such a way that the ‘other’ becomes a ‘threatening other’. Therefore she suggests that there needs to be a ‘re-negotiation’ of identity, and sets down three steps: empathy for the other, recognising that others have also suffered, and admitting that one’s own community has wronged the other. She concludes that reconciliation requires all parties to change; and in perceiving that call from God to change, to metanoia, we suddenly become aware that, in some paradoxical way, the other whom we perceive as threatening and whom we are invited to embrace is not only my Protestant or Catholic neighbour, it is Godself.45

The hope of reconciliation is also well expressed by the Taiwanese theologian C.S. Song, who sees the reconciliation God has brought to this world through the image of the womb. He draws powerful pictures from poems from various Asian contexts to show the agony of the people, and yet he believes there is great hope for the future in the ‘seed hidden within the mysterious womb of humanity’ as a ‘new 43 G. Sauter, ‘What does Common Identity cost – not only economically and politically, but also spiritually and mentally? Some German experiences and provoking questions’ in S. Kim, P. Kollontai and G. Hoyland (eds), Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2008), pp. 21-33. 44 R. Schreiter, ‘Establishing a Shared Identity: The Role of the Healing of Memories and of Narrative’ in ibid., pp. 7-20. 45 C. Clegg, ‘Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland’ in, ibid., pp. 81-93.

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life is in the making to succeed the life that has just passed out of the community of the living’. Song bases his argument on the story of Sarah, Abraham’s wife in the Hebrew Bible. He argues that, though Sarah had already passed the age of having a child, the promise from God was delivered, that the ‘the seed of life that was to be conceived and to grow there through divine intervention was to bear the meaning of salvation’. And so ‘Sarah’s womb became an important point at which God’s salvation took on a historical manifestation.’ 46 So, in his analogy, the despair of han of the Koreans, in turn, could be the seed in the womb that brings forth reconciliation. The process and practical implications of creating ‘cultural common memory’, shaping ‘communities of memory’ and the ‘re-negotiation’ of identity is the on-going task of Koreans seeking for lasting reconciliation. Conclusion I have suggested three theological themes: Applying the Jubilee principle and calling for a restored sharing community; overcoming han through building up trust and hope; and bringing about the process of reconciliation by forming shared identity. By way of conclusion, I would like to tell a true story. One of the most telling aspects of despair and hope in the Korean situation is the experience of divided families and relatives, and the story of Kim Haksoo, a prominent artist and an elder of a Methodist Church in Seoul, is not an unusual one. He was married with four children and lived in Pyongyang just before the war broke out. After the short occupation of Pyongyang by the UN, when the UN troops had to withdraw from the city, he was advised to escape to the South with them, leaving the rest of the family behind. This was because of fear of communist retaliation and the fear that as a Korean man he would be forced to join the communist army, and also on the understanding that the UN troops would soon return to recapture the city. Just before the time to leave, his wife went out to borrow money for his journey to the South. Because he could not hold the last vehicle any longer, he had to say good-bye to his children only, and left to come to Seoul. When the war ended he could not go back and could not get any news about the family. For nearly forty years he was living with the guilt of not having said good-bye to his wife and, though many who fled from the North remarried in the South, he remained single. In 1989, he unexpectedly received news from his close friend, who had visited North Korea, that his wife and family were still alive and that his wife had also remained single. He had very mixed emotions – on the one hand, he rejoiced that they were still alive and well, but he very well knew that they could not yet be united. He continues to hold han deep inside his heart but he is able to deal with it through his faith in Christ and by his dedication to painting. Perhaps, as C.S. Song suggests, Elder Kim longs that the han he holds deep in his heart might be a seed in the womb for reconciliation, and that he will one day be united with his family.

46 C.S. Song, Third-Eye Theology: Theology in Formation in Asian Settings (London, 1980), pp. 146-47.

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Koreans, like Elder Kim, from both sides of the border still sing a song, ‘… even in our dreams, our desire is unification… Oh, come, unification…’ Is reconciliation possible in the Korean peninsula? The answer has to be affirmative, yet the road to peace and reconciliation is as fragile as walking on a half-frozen lake; we tread it with great care as we hope to reach the shore together. Bibliography ‘Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’, KNCC Archives. ‘Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity’, (4 October 2007), , [accessed 13 Dec 2007]. ‘July 4th North-South Joint Statement’ (4 July 1972), , [accessed 13 Dec 2007]. ‘Korean War’, Encyclopaedia Britannica (2006), , [accessed 16 Dec 2007]. ‘North-South Joint Declaration’ (15 June 2000), , [accessed 13 Dec 2007]. ‘The Christian Council of Korea’, , [accessed 12 December 2007]. ‘The South-North Sharing Campaign’, <www.sharing.net>, [accessed 12 December 2007]. Ahn, Byeung-Mu, The Story of Minjung Theology (Seoul: Institute of Theological Studies, 1990). Chung, Shung-Han, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches (Seoul: grisim, 2003). Clegg, C. ‘Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland’ in, S. Kim, P. Kollontai and G. Hoyland. (eds), Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008). De Gruchy, J., Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (London: SCM, 2002). Halliday, J. and Cumings, B. Korea: The Unknown War (London: Viking, 1988). Jae, Sung-Ho, Toward the Peaceful System in Korean Peninsula: with Special Reference to Law (Seoul: Jipyeoung Soewon, 2000). Kang, Sa-Moon, ‘The problem of Application of Jubilee Law to 50th Anniversary of Liberation’ in Korean Association for Christian Studies (ed), 50 Anniversary of Liberation and Jubilee (Seoul: Kamshin, 1995), pp. 47-82. Kim, Chang Rak, ‘Jubilee in the Bible and Jubilee in the Korean Peninsula’ in Institute of Theological Studies, People’s Unification and Peace (Seoul: The Institute of Theological Studies, 1995), pp. 157-215. Kim, Yong-Bock, ‘Preface’ in Korean Association for Christian Studies (ed), 50 Anniversary of Liberation and Jubilee (Seoul: Kamshin, 1995), pp. 5-14.

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Lee, Ki-Baik, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward Wahner with Edward J. Shultz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1984). Min, Yong-Jin, Peace, Unification and Jubilee (Seoul: Christian Literature Society of Korea, 1995). Ministry of Unification, ‘Monthly Report Inter-Korean Exchange & Cooperation’, , [accessed 14 Dec 2007]. Moon, Chung-in and David I. Steinberg (eds), Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Seoul: 1999). Moon, Ik-Hwan, I Shall Go Even on Foot (Seoul: Silchun Monhwasa, 1990). Park, Jong-Hwa, ‘Theological and Political Task for Jubilee in the Church and People in Korea’ in Korean Association for Christian Studies (ed), 50 Anniversary of Liberation and Jubilee (Seoul: Kamshin, 1995), pp. 25-44. Park, Soon-Kyeung, The Future of Unification Theology (Seoul: Sakyejul, 1997). Pratt, K., Everlasting Flower: A History of Korea (London: Reatkion Books, 2006). Sauter, G. ‘What does Common Identity cost – not only economically and politically, but also spiritually and mentally? Some German experiences and provoking questions’ in S. Kim, P. Kollontai and G. Hoyland (eds), Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008). Schreiter, R. ‘Establishing a Shared Identity: The Role of the Healing of Memories and of Narrative’ in S. Kim, P. Kollontai and G. Hoyland (eds), Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008). Soeya, Y. ‘The Cold War in Asia: The Korean Peninsula as a Structure Nexus and the Role of Japan’ in Moon, et al., Ending the Cold War in Korea: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Seoul: Tonsei University Press, 2001), pp. 147-59. Song, C.S., Third-Eye Theology: Theology in Formation in Asian Settings (London: Lutterworth Press, 1980). Suh, Kwang-sun David, The Korean Minjung in Christ (Hong Kong: CCA, 1991). Suh, Nam-Dong, ‘Toward a Theology of Han’ in Kim Yong Bock (ed), Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1983), pp. 51-65. The Institute of Theological Studies, Research on Socio-Political Consciousness of Korean Protestant Christians (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2004). The Office of the President, ‘Participatory Government Top 12 Policy Goals’, , [accessed 13 Dec 2007]. Weatherby, K. ‘Soviet Documents and Reinterpretation of the Origins of the Korean War’ in Chung-in Moon, Odd Arne Westad and Gyoo-hyoung Kahng, Ending the Cold War in Korea: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Seoul: Tonsei University Press, 2001), pp. 161-69. Yi, Man-yeol, Korean Christianity and Unification Movement (Seoul: Institute of Korean Church History, 2001). Yu, Ho-yeul, ‘The Change of the Divided System in Korean Peninsula and the Generation of Reunification’ in Korea Association of North Korean Studies (ed), South-North Reconcilation and Reunification (Seoul: Eulyoo Munhwasa, 2001), pp. 9-43.

Appendix 1

July 4th North-South Joint Statement Seoul’s KCIA Director Lee Hu Rak visited Pyongyang from May 2, 1972 to May 5, 1972 and met with Pyongyang’s Director of Cadre Organization Kim Young Ju; and Pak Sung Chul, the 2nd Vice-premier, on behalf of Director Kim Young Ju, visited Seoul from May 29, 1972 to June 1, 1972 and met with Director Lee Hu Rak. The parties have exchanged their views on the mutual desire for the early peaceful reunification of Korea and made progress in mutual understanding of the other side’s points of view. The parties have reached a unanimous agreement on the following items for reducing North-South tensions caused by the lack of mutual communication for so long, and for promoting the reunification of the fatherland. The parties have agreed upon the following principles for the reunification. • First, the reunification must be achieved with no reliance on external forces or interference. It must be achieved internally. • Second, the reunification must be achieved peacefully without the use of military forces against the other side. • Third, both parties must promote national unity as a united people over any differences of our ideological and political systems. 1. The parties agree to implement appropriate measures to stop military provocation which may lead to unintended armed conflicts, to cultivate an atmosphere of mutual trust between North and South by refraining from vilifying the other side. 2. The parties agree to restore the severed national lineage and promote mutual understanding by implementing multi-faceted North-South exchange of information. 3. The parties agree to expedite the North-South Red Cross meetings, currently under negotiation, ardently longed for by the Korean people 4. The parties agree to establish direct phone contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang in order to prevent accidental military clashes by prompt and accurate resolution of any urgent potential problems. 5. The parties agree to establish the North-South Coordinating Commission, co-chaired by Director Lee Hu Rak and Director Kim Young Ju, in order to implement the items agreed upon above, to resolve North-South issues, and to

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promote the reunification of our fatherland. 6. The parties solemnly swear to faithfully abide by the agreement, as desired by all of our countrymen. July 4, 1972 By the wish of our respective superiors Lee Hu Rak / Kim Young Ju Source: http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/74js-en.htm.

Appendix 2

North-South Joint Declaration True to the noble will of all the fellow countrymen for the peaceful reunification of the country, Chairman Kim Jong-il of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea had a historic meeting and summit in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000. The heads of the North and the South, considering that the recent meeting and summit – the first of their kind in history of division – are events of weighty importance in promoting mutual understanding, developing inter-Korean relations and achieving peaceful reunification, declare as follows: 1. The North and the South agreed to solve the question of the country’s reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it. 2. The North and the South, recognising that a proposal for federation of lower stage advanced by the North side and a proposal for confederation put forth by the South side for the reunification of the country have elements in common, agreed to work for the reunification in this direction in the future. 3. The North and the South agreed to settle humanitarian issues, including exchange of visiting groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, as early as possible on the occasion of August 15 this year. 4. The North and the South agreed to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchanges in all fields, social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and so on.

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5. The North and the South agreed to hold dialogues between the authorities as soon as possible to implement the above-mentioned agreed points in the near future. President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited Chairman Kim Jong-il of the DPRK National Defence Commission to visit Seoul and Chairman Kim Jong-il agreed to visit Seoul at an appropriate time in the future. June 15, 2000 Kim Jong-il , Chairman of the National Defence Commission, DPRK Kim Dae-jung, President of the Republic of Korea Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/791691.stm.

Appendix 3

Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity In accordance with the agreement between President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, President Roh visited Pyongyang from October 2-4, 2007. During the visit there were historic meetings and discussions. At the meetings and talks, the two sides have reaffirmed the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration and had frank discussions on various issues related to realizing the advancement of South-North relations, peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of the Korean people and unification of Korea. Expressing confidence that they can forge a new era of national prosperity and unification on their own initiative if they combine their will and capabilities, the two sides declare as follows, in order to expand and advance South-North relations based on the June 15 Joint Declaration: 1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavour actively to realize the June 15 Declaration. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of ‘by-the-Korean-people-themselves.’ The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Declaration to reflect the common will to faithfully carry it out.

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2. The South and the North have agreed to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems. The South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other and agreed to resolve inter-Korean issues in the spirit of reconciliation, cooperation and reunification. The South and the North have agreed to overhaul their respective legislative and institutional apparatuses in a bid to develop inter-Korean relations in a reunificationoriented direction. The South and the North have agreed to proactively pursue dialogue and contacts in various areas, including the legislatures of the two Koreas, in order to resolve matters concerning the expansion and advancement of inter-Korean relations in a way that meets the aspirations of the entire Korean people. 3. The South and the North have agreed to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula. The South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other, reduce military tension, and resolve issues in dispute through dialogue and negotiation. The South and the North have agreed to oppose war on the Korean Peninsula and to adhere strictly to their obligation to non-aggression. The South and the North have agreed to hold talks between the South’s Minister of Defence and the North’s Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in Pyongyang in November to discuss ways of designating a joint fishing area in the West Sea to avoid accidental clashes and turning it into a peace area and also to discuss measures to build military confidence, including security guarantees for various cooperative projects. 4. The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war. With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks.

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5. The South and the North have agreed to facilitate, expand, and further develop inter-Korean economic cooperation projects on a continual basis for balanced economic development and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the principles of common interests, co-prosperity and mutual aid. The South and the North reached an agreement on promoting economic cooperation, including investments, pushing forward with the building of infrastructure and the development of natural resources. Given the special nature of inter-Korean cooperative projects, the South and the North have agreed to grant preferential conditions and benefits to those projects. The South and the North have agreed to create a ‘special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea’ encompassing Haeju and vicinity in a bid to proactively push ahead with the creation of a joint fishing zone and maritime peace zone, establishment of a special economic zone, utilization of Haeju harbour, passage of civilian vessels via direct routes in Haeju and the joint use of the Han River estuary. The South and the North have agreed to complete the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex at an early date and embark on the second-stage development project. The South and the North have agreed to open freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong and promptly complete various institutional measures, including those related to passage, communication, and customs clearance procedures. The South and the North have agreed to discuss repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use. The South and the North have agreed to establish cooperative complexes for shipbuilding in Anbyeon and Nampo, while continuing cooperative projects in various areas such as agriculture, health and medical services and environmental protection. The South and the North have agreed to upgrade the status of the existing InterKorean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee to a Joint Committee for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation to be headed by deputy prime minister-level officials. 6. The South and the North have agreed to boost exchanges and cooperation in the social areas covering history, language, education, science and technology, culture and arts, and sports to highlight the long history and excellent culture of the Korean people. The South and the North have agreed to carry out tours to Mt. Baekdu and open nonstop flight services between Seoul and Mt. Baekdu for this purpose.

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The South and the North have agreed to send a joint cheering squad from both sides to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The squad will use the Gyeongui Railway Line for the first-ever joint Olympic cheering. 7. The South and the North have agreed to actively promote humanitarian cooperation projects. The South and the North have agreed to expand reunion of separated family members and their relatives and promote exchanges of video messages. To this end, the South and the North have agreed to station resident representatives from each side at the reunion centre at Mt. Geumgang when it is completed and regularize reunions of separated family members and their relatives. The South and the North have agreed to actively cooperate in case of emergencies, including natural disasters, according to the principles of fraternal love, humanitarianism and mutual assistance. 8. The South and the North have agreed to increase cooperation to promote the interests of the Korean people and the rights and interests of overseas Koreans on the international stage. The South and the North have agreed to hold inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks for the implementation of this Declaration and have agreed to hold the first round of meetings in November 2007 in Seoul. The South and the North have agreed that their highest authorities will meet frequently for the advancement of relations between the two sides. Oct. 4, 2007 Pyongyang Roh Moo-hyun, President, Republic of Korea Kim Jong Il Chairman, National Defence Commission, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Source:http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/archive/archive_view.php?meta_ id=en_press_release&page=2&m_def=&ss_def=&category=&navi=issues&sel_ty pe=1&keyword=&id=31562dfdebe49c4ec54de626.

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Appendix 4

Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace We first offer praise and thanks for the grace and love of God, who has sent the Gospel of Christ to the Korean peninsula, making known to us the death of Christ on the Cross and his resurrection, and enabling us, through our faith in Christ, to be accepted as God’s children and granted salvation. We also give thanks for the presence of the Holy Spirit in the history of the Korean peninsula and in the lives of all of our brothers and sisters in faith, filling us with the mission commitment that will unify the whole church in our efforts for the liberation and salvation of our nation. We trust in one God, the Creator of the heavens and the earth (Genesis 1:1), and we believe that all people are invited to become the children of God (Romans 8:14-17, Galatians 3:26, 4:7). Jesus Christ came to this land as the ‘Servant of Peace’ (Ephesians 2:13-19), proclaiming God’s kingdom of peace, reconciliation and liberation to a world torn by division, conflict and oppression (Luke 4:18, John 14:27). To reconcile humanity to God, to overcome divisions and conflicts, and to liberate all people and make us one, Jesus Christ suffered, died upon the Cross, was buried and rose again in the Resurrection (Acts 10:36-40). Jesus blessed the peace makers, declaring their acceptance as children of God (Matthew 5:9). We believe that the Holy Spirit will reveal to us the eschatological future of history, will unite us, and will make us partners in God’s mission (John 14:18-21. 16:13-14, 17:11). We, the churches of Korea, believe that all Christians have now been called to work as apostles of peace (Colossians 3:15); that we are commanded by God to overcome today’s reality of confrontation between our divided people – who share the same blood but who are separated into south and north; and that our mission task is to work for the realization of unification and peace (Matthew 5:23-24). Based on this confession of our faith, the National Council of Churches in Korea hereby declares before the churches of Korea and the world ecumenical community, our position and national unification and peace. At the same time our appeal is directed in a spirit of prayer to all our Korean compatriots and to the leaders of government in both south and north. The Mission Tradition of the Korean Churches for Justice and Peace It has been more than a century since Protestants first preached the Gospel in this land, and during this period the churches have committed many errors before the Korean

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people. And yet, through the proclamation of God’s Kingdom, Korean Christians have made great efforts to realize the true hopes of our people for liberation and independence. Our forebears in the faith, strengthened by the Holy Spirit and guided by the Scriptures (Luke 4:18-19), preached the Gospel to the poor, planted the hope of liberty and independence among our oppressed people, and pursued the mission of national liberation and independence as they shared the suffering of the whole Korean people under the slavery of the Japanese imperial rule. Korean Christians, however, could not find the true meaning of peace in the complacency and security of a life bowed down in obedient slavery. Peace had to be the fruit of justice (Isaiah 32:17), and a peace without national independence or human liberty was only a false peace (Jeremiah 6:13-14). The peace movement of the Korean churches during the Japanese imperialist rule over our land was necessarily a movement for national independence which shared the pain of our enslaved people – a national liberation movement which proclaimed the Kingdom of God and strived to realize this faith within history. The Christians of Korea stood in the forefront of the March First Independence Movement of 1919, resisted the policy of national annihilation by the Japanese imperialists, and shed martyrs’ blood for their defiance of the enforcement of shinto worship, a deification of Japanese nationalism. After the division of Korea in 1945, the Christians of South Korea cared for the refugees, orphans and victims of war who were suffering under the reality of national separation. The churches received into their midst the members of churches and of separated families who had fled from the north, offering them love and support. As the division became a fixed reality, dictatorial military regimes emerged to repress human rights in the name of security and to oppress labourers and farmers under the logic of economic growth; but the churches of Korea mounted resistance to such oppression, through a faith which sought justice and peace. The human rights and democratization movement of the Korean churches in the 1970s and 1980s is direct heir to this mission movement tradition for justice and peace. The Reality of a Divided People The division of the Korean peninsula is the sinful fruit of the present world political structure and existing ideological systems. The Korean people have suffered as a sacrificial lamb caught in the midst of the military and ideological confrontations and conflicts of the world’s superpowers. In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the Korean people were liberated from their slavery under the Japanese imperial colonial rule, but were again shackled by the new fetters of the division into north and south. The line of division which was established in the name of disarming the aggressive Japanese imperialist forces became fixed by the Cold War structure of the Soviet Union and the United States. The northern and southern parts of Korea separately established different governments, and over the last forty years their military, political and ideological antagonism and conflict has become ever more severe.

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The Korean Conflict which began on June 25, 1950, brought about the tragedy of internecine war and intensified the international conflict. The quantity of bombs dropped on Korea during this conflict exceeded the amount dropped on the whole of Europe during World War II; the entire peninsula was reduced to ashes. This war resulted in 220,000 South Korean, over 600,000 North Korean, 1,000,000 Chinese, 140,000 American, and over 16,000 United Nations military casualties, and if the number who died from disease during the war is included, a total of 2,500,000 soldiers’ lives were sacrificed. If the 500,000 South Korean and 3,000,000 North Korean civilian casualties are added to this total, the blood of six million persons was spilled upon the earth of this land (statistics from the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1970 edition). In addition, three million refugees and ten million separated family members were produced by this conflict. In the time both preceding and following the Korean Conflict, Christians of North Korea who confronted the North Korean communist regime endured suffering and death, while hundreds of thousands of Christians from the north left their home communities and churches and underwent the hardships of refugee life as they fled to the south. During the Korean War a considerable number of South Korean Christians were kidnapped or subjected to cruel, tragic executions. Communist sympathizers became victims of ideological warfare and were ostracized from society as ‘traitors’. The Korean peninsula, reduced to ashes by the war, continued to be entangled in the international political conflict of the east-west Cold War structure, and as a result there was a steady escalation in military competition, mutual vilification, distrust and hostility between the north and the south. Peace on the peninsula was destroyed, and the general belief grew that national reconciliation would be impossible. With the hardening of the ‘armistice line’ – originally intended as a temporary measure following the signing of the Armistice in 1953 – into a ‘dividing line’, the wall between north and south loomed ever higher, and in this context of separation and confrontation the two systems in the north and south became ever more hostile and aggressive toward one another. The mutual military rivalry has been accelerated to a state of armed readiness that counts 840,000 troops in the north and 600,000 in the south, for a total of some 1,500,000 troops on the peninsula; and the nuclear weapons now deployed here or targeted upon the peninsula constitute a destructive force more than sufficient to obliterate the whole Korean people. The prolongation of the division has led to violations of human rights under both systems, in the name of security and ideology; thus we have seen repression of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association. And the complete suspension by both sides of postal service, travel, visitation and communication has turned the two halves of Korea into the two most distant and different countries on earth. The education and propaganda activities of north and south share the goal of mutual vilification, each perceiving the other as the most hated enemy to be weakened and eliminated through the competition of the two systems. As a result the people of both north and south are not only ignorant of the life and culture of their fellow Koreans, but have been trained to believe they must not know

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about one another. Both systems are teaching their people to see their blood brothers and sisters as their most feared enemy. Dialogue between north and south was begun in 1972, and the July 4th Joint Communiqué of that year raised hopes for an opening that would lead to further dialogue, cooperation and exchanges. The Red Cross talks between north and south were reopened in 1985, and although some separated families were able to visit their home communities, their numbers were extremely limited, and dialogue and negotiations remain fruitless. Up to the early 1980s, South Korean Christians were unable even to verify the existence of a church or Christian believers in the north; and their long-standing, deep-seated mistrust and enmity toward the communist regime – intensified and hardened as the division itself became hardened – kept Christians blindly attached to an anti-communist ideology. A Confession of the Sins of Division and Hatred As we Christians of Korea proclaim this declaration for peace and reunification, we confess before God and our people that we have sinned: we have long harboured a deep hatred and hostility toward the other side within the structure of division. 1. The division of the Korean people is the result of the structural evil reflected in the world’s superpowers in their east-west Cold War system, and this reality has also been the root cause of the structural evil present within the societies of both North and South Korea. Due to the division we have been guilty of the sin of violating God’s commandment, ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’ (Matthew 22:3740). Because of the division of our homeland, we have hated, deceived and murdered our compatriots of the same blood, and have justified that sin by the political and ideological rationalization of our deeds. Division has led to war, yet we Christians have committed the sin of supporting rearmament with the newest and most powerful weapons, plus reinforcement of troops and expenditures, in the name of preventing another war (Psalm 33:16-20; 44:6-7). In this process the Korean peninsula has become dependent upon outside powers, not only militarily but politically, economically and in other ways as well: it has been incorporated into the east-west Cold War structure and subjugated under that structure. We Christians confess that we have sinned during the course of this subjugation by abandoning our national pride and by betraying our people through the forfeit of our spirit of national independence (Romans 9:3). 2. We confess that throughout the history of our national division the churches of Korea have not only remained silent and continuously ignored the ongoing stream of movement for autonomous reunification of our people, but have further sinned by trying to justify the division. The Christians of both north and south have made absolute idols of the ideologies enforced by their respective systems. This is a betrayal

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of the ultimate sovereignty of God (Exodus 20:3-5), and is a sin, for the church must follow the will of God rather than the will of any political regime (Acts 4:19). We confess that the Christians of the south especially have sinned by turning the anti-communist ideology into a virtual religious idol, and have thus not been content to treat just the communist regime in the north as the enemy, but have further damned our northern compatriots and others whose ideologies differ from our own (John 13:14-15; 4:20-21). This is not only a violation of the commandments, but is also a sin of indifference toward our neighbours who have suffered and continue to suffer under the national division; it is, moreover, a sin of failure to ameliorate their suffering through the love of Christ (John 13:17). The Basic Principles of the Churches of Korea for National Reunification So that God’s Kingdom of justice and peace may come, we Christians must practise the Gospel of peace and reconciliation (Ephesians 2:14-17) by sharing in the life of suffering of our own people. It is only through such sharing that national reconciliation and reunification can be accomplished; thus we recognize that our concern and efforts for unification are an issue of faith. By overcoming the division which threatens the life of the Korean people and endangers world peace, reunification becomes the path leading us from conflict and confrontation to reconciliation and coexistence, and finally to one peaceful national community. Through a series of consultations beginning in 1984, the National Council of Churches in Korea has established the following basic principles of the churches toward national reunification. The National Council of Churches in Korea believes that the three broad principles articulated in the first north-south negotiated Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, namely 1) independence, 2) peace, and 3) great national unity transcending the differences in ideas, ideologies and systems should provide the guiding spirit for our nation’s reconciliation and reunification. In addition to these, we Christians believe that the following two principles also should be honoured in all dialogue, negotiation and action for reunification. 1. Reunification must bring about not only the common good and benefit of the people and the nation, but must provide the maximum protection of human freedom and dignity. Since both nation and people exist to guarantee human freedom and welfare, while ideologies and systems also exist for the sake of the people, primary consideration must always be given to humanitarian concerns and measures, which must never be withheld for any reason. 2. In every step of the discussion process to plan for reunification, the full democratic participation of all the people must be guaranteed. Most importantly, participation must be guaranteed for the minjung (common people), who not only have suffered the most under the division, but who – despite the fact that they constitute the

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majority of the population – have consistently been alienated and excluded from the decision-making processes in society. The Proposals of the Churches of Korea to the Governments of South and North Based upon the above principles, the National Council of Churches in Korea urges the responsible authorities in the governments of both north and south to exert their utmost efforts for dialogue so that the following may be accomplished as soon as possible. 1. For the healing of the wounds caused by division: a). First of all, the separated families, who – as the victims of the division – have endured all sorts of suffering during the past 40 some years, must be reunited and allowed to live together, and must be guaranteed the right to move freely to whatever place they choose to live. b). Even before reunification is achieved, all persons living in separation from family members in north or south must be freely permitted to visit their relatives and home areas for definite periods, on an annual basis (perhaps at Chusok or some other holiday season). c). The unjust social discrimination which still prevails against some persons because of their momentary errors or the past records of their families or relatives, problems which inevitably arose during the solidifying of the national division, must be ended at once. 2. For the promotion of the people’s genuine participation to overcome the division: a). Neither government, north or south, may exercise a monopoly over information about the other side, nor monopolize the discussion on reunification. Freedom of speech must be guaranteed so that the people of both north and south may participate fully and freely in the process of discussing and establishing policies for reunification, and there must be systemic and realistic guarantees of the activities of civilian organizations engaged in research and discussion of the reunification issue. b). Both North and South Korea must grant maximum freedom for people who oppose either system or ideology to criticize freely according to their conscience and faith, and both must abide by the International Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations’ Human Rights Covenant. 3. For a great national unity of the Korean People to transcend the differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.

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If Korea is to realize national autonomy, the people of both north and south will have to transcend their differences in concepts, ideologies and systems, and both populations must be able to clearly confirm for themselves that they are one people sharing a common fate. For such a mutual confirmation, north and south must be able to put firm trust in one another. It follows that those things which enable mutual trust must become the most basic starting point for all efforts directed toward reunification. To foster such trust, all factors giving rise to mistrust and hostility must be eliminated, while mutual exchanges should be expanded to broaden our base of mutual understanding and rapidly restore our sense of common ethnic identity. Because all such measures aimed at fostering trust are the most essential part of the process of overcoming division, even in the case that discussions between the official representatives of the two governments do not show progress, or agreement are not forthcoming, there must nevertheless be non-governmental channels through which the citizens themselves may seek progress: a). North and South Korea must put an end to all mutual hostility and aggressive inclinations, and must eliminate the exclusionism which leads to the slandering and vilification of one another. In addition, each must modify its extreme, emotional censure of the other’s differing ideology and system and offer in its place mutually constructive criticism. b). For the promotion of mutual understanding, north and south need unprejudiced, objective information about each other’s situation; therefore exchanges, visits and communications must be opened. c). In order to restore the sense of common ethnic identity, north-south exchanges and cooperative research must be promoted in such academic areas as language, history, geography, biology and natural resources; while exchanges must also be carried out in the areas of culture, the arts, religion and sports. d). Since economic exchanges between north and south will not only benefit the people but will also provide opportunities for mutual understanding, they should be opened to the greatest possible extent. 4. For reduction of tensions and promotion of peace between North and South Korea: a). In order to prevent war and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, a peace treaty must immediately be concluded to terminate the existing state of war. To this end, it is urgent that negotiations be opened by the governments of North and South Korea, the United States, China which participated in the Korean Conflict, to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty which also includes a non-aggression pact. b). At such time that a peace treaty is concluded, a verifiable state of mutual trust is restored between North and South Korea, and the peace and security of the entire Korean nation is guaranteed by the international community, then the United States troops should be withdrawn and the United Nations Command

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in Korea should be dissolved. c). The excessive military competition between North and South Korea is the greatest obstacle to peaceful reunification and is moreover counter-productive to economic progress. Therefore, following negotiations between north and south, mutual military strength must be reduced and military expenditures must be cut, with a switchover to industrial production for peace. d). Nuclear weapons must never be used under any circumstances. North and South Korea together must block from the start any possibility of the use of nuclear arms on the Korean peninsula. This means that all nuclear weapons deployed on the peninsula or aimed in its direction must be removed. 5. For the realization of national independence: a). There must be no foreign interference or dependency upon neighbouring superpowers in negotiations, conferences, or international agreements between north and south; the Korean people’s self-government and subjecthood must be protected. b). Both North and South Korea must either revise or abrogate all diplomatic agreements and treaties which undermine rather than support the life and interests of the Korean people. North and South Korea must also reach mutual agreement in regard to all international alliances and associations, examining them to make certain that the common good of all Koreans is their primary objective. The Task of the Churches of Korea for peace and Reunification We believe that Jesus Christ is the ‘Lord of Peace’ (Colossians 1:20), and that God’s mission of salvation and liberation for humankind is being realized also within societies that have ideas and systems different from our own. Even though the confession of faith and the appearance of the churches of Christians living in other social systems may be unlike ours, we believe that since they are bonded to the one God and the one Christ, thereby they are members with us in the same Body (Corinthians 12:12-26). Within the last few years, in an amazing development, the world ecumenical community has greatly strengthened this conviction of ours, by making contacts with our sisters and brothers in faith in North Korea, and bringing us news of them. Again we give thanks for God’s liberating action in the history of the Korean peninsula, and pray for God’s grace and blessing upon our sisters and brothers in the north who are steadfastly keeping the faith even under difficult circumstances. Based upon this confession, the National Council of Churches in Korea, in order to fulfil its mission for peace and reconciliation, to share in the suffering that division has caused, and to respond to the historical demand to overcome the division, now

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in a spirit of repentance and prayer announces plans to initiate a movement for a Jubilee Year for Peace and Reunification, as follows. 1. The National Council of Churches in Korea proclaims the year 1995 to be the ‘Year of Jubilee for Peace and Reunification’. ‘The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord’. (Luke 4:18-19) The ‘Jubilee year’ is the fiftieth year following the completion of a cycle of seven sabbatical years totalling 49 years (Leviticus 25:8-10). The year of jubilee is a ‘year of liberation. The proclamation of the year of jubilee is an act of God’s people, which reveals their complete trust in God’s sovereignty over history and their faithfulness in keeping God’s covenant. The jubilee year is the overcoming of all the social and economic conflicts caused by the repressive and absolutist political powers, internal and external: the enslaved are liberated, the indebted have their debts forgiven, sold land is returned to its original tillers, and seized houses are returned to their original inhabitants (Leviticus 25:11-55); the united covenant community of peace is restored through the establishment of Shalom based on God’s justice. The Korean churches proclaim 1995, the fiftieth year after Liberation, as a Jubilee Year, to express our belief in the historical presence of God, who has ruled over those fifty years of history – indeed, over all of human history; to proclaim the restoration of the covenant community of peace; and to declare our resolution to achieve this restoration in the history of the Korean peninsula today, As we march forward with high aspirations toward the Year of Jubilee, we should experience a revitalized faith in the sovereignty of God, who works within our people’s history, and renewed commitment to the calling of God’s mission. 2. As a part of the ‘Great March toward the Jubilee Year’ the Korean churches will carry out a vigorous church renewal movement aimed toward peace and reunification: a). In order to fulfil their mission responsibility for peace and reunification, the Korean churches must overcome their self-centredness and their preoccupation with ecclesiastical power, while greatly strengthening mission cooperation for church unity. b). The churches of Korea, proclaiming the Year of Jubilee, must reform their internal structures which have restricted broad participation. Accordingly there must be a resolute opening and expediting of full participation in lay

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mission activity which will include women and youth. c). In order to bring about economic and social justice in our society, the churches of Korea must continue to perform a prophetic role. 3. As a part of the proclamation of the Jubilee Year, the churches of Korea, as a community of faith resolved to achieve peace and reconciliation, will carry out a broad programme of education for peace and reunification: a). The churches of Korea will widely disseminate Biblical and theological peace studies and peace education materials, and will promote research and exchange of information among the various theological and Christian educational institutions. b). To increase concern among the churches for the national reunification issue, the Korean churches will promote unification education which will foster recognition of the historical, social and theological validity of national reunification through an understanding of the structure and history of the division, as well as through a deeper theological understanding of the problem. c). Through theological reflection and commitment to the Christian faith, the Korean churches will seek a broader scientific understanding of the communist ideology and will promote research and education on ideology as needed for substantial dialogue. 4. Through the proclamation of a Jubilee Year festival and liturgy for peace and reunification, the Korean churches will seek to bring about a renewal of faith and genuine reconciliation and unity: a). The churches of Korea will establish a ‘Sunday of Prayer for Peace and Reunification’ to mark the Year of Jubilee, and will develop a form of worship for this purpose, which will include prayers for reunification, confession of the sin of division, recognition of calling and commitment for unification, prayers of intercession for the victims of division and the divided people, a confession of faith for national reconciliation, proclamation of the Word (proclaiming the Jubilee Year), hymns and poetry, and a sacrament for peace and reconciliation. b). Until the time when communication between the churches of north and south becomes possible, we will seek the cooperation of the world churches to enable the joint proclamation in both north and south of the Jubilee Year for Peace and Reunification, and will promote the common observance of the ‘Sunday of Prayer for Peace and Reunification’ and the joint preparation and

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use of ‘prayers for peace and reunification’. c). With the cooperation of the world churches, the churches of Korea will search for ways to confirm the status of separated family members, explore the possibility of exchanging letters, and develop a movement to search out relatives, church members and friends separated between north and south. 5. The churches of Korea will work continuously to develop a solidarity movement for peace and reunification: a). The proclamation of the Jubilee Year for Peace and Reunification, as an act of confession of faith, will be developed into a continuously expanding ‘solidarity movement for peace and reunification’. This must be a comprehensive movement embracing all the churches at local, denominational and ecumenical levels. The National Council of Churches in Korea especially will make efforts to include not only its member churches, but also non-member denominations and the Roman Catholic Church in this movement for confessional action and practice for peace and reunification. b). As the mission calling to peace and reunification is the universal task of all Christians on the Korean peninsula, the churches of South Korea will pray for the faith and life of the Christian community in the North and will work for North-South exchanges between our churches. c). Because peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula is a key to peace not only in Northeast Asia but throughout the world, the churches of Korea will consult closely and develop solidarity movements with Christian communities in the four powerful countries related to the region – the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, as well as with churches throughout the world. d). The Korean churches will expand and deepen dialogue with other religious groups and movements, and through joint research and cooperative activities, will work to promote ever stronger solidarity for the realization of peace and the reunification of this nation. February 29, 1988 The National Council of Churches in Korea Source: NCCK archives.

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Index

Agreement 3, 27, 46, 52, 83, 85–7, 93, 138–9, 142, 148, 162, 165, 170, 180–3, 191 Anglo-Irish 87 America 116, 127, 129, 131, 155, 159 America, Latin 10, 158 American Imperialist Invasion Policy to Korea and Truth 130 Amnesty 36, 96–7 applications 99 hearings 97 process 96–97 Amsterdam 118, 124 Assembly 120 Ancient Dharma 42 Anniversary of Liberation and Jubilee 170–1, 177–8 Anti-communism 119, 125, 128 Anti- imperialism manifesto 123, 128 Apartheid 40, 95, 97–9, 102, 104–5, 107 Apostolic message 33, 175 Aquinas, Thomas 2 Argentina 10, 149 Armageddon 64, 79 Asia vii, 7, 54, 56–7, 123–4, 126–7, 157–8, 162, 178 northeast viii, 149–50, 152, 157, 165, 195 Association of Protestant Churches and Missions 156 Atheism 28, 125 Augustine 2 Australia 140, 157 Axis of evil v, 35, 109–10, 127–8, 147, 150–1 of good 150–51 Balkan Idols 68, 71–3, 79 Balkan political heritage 78, 80 Balkans 63, 66, 68–70, 78, 80 Bangalore 38, 49 Barth 5, 128

Beijing 55, 57, 59 Belfast 88, 91 Agreement 83, 87 Belgium 121, 131 Belgrade 71–2 Belhar 107 Confession 104, 107 Belmont 63–4, 79 Benedict 118, 132 Benevolencia 74–5, 77–9 Berlin 27, 33 Berlin Wall 21, 31, 156 Besserwessis 28 Biblical understanding of peace and reconciliation 53 Bismarck 11, 68, 79 Board of Mission Methodist Episcopal Church 135, 146 Bongsoo church 141–2, 144, 156 Bonhoeffer 33 Bookeui saeyebaedang 139, 145 Bosnia 68–70, 72–3, 75–8, 80 Bosnia-Herzegovina i, 4, 61–2, 65–6, 68, 72–3, 75–9 Bosnian conflict 78 Muslim community 72 people 77–8 Serbs 75 war 73–4 Bosnians 69, 73 Boulding 62, 78 Boundaries 7, 48, 67, 113 ethno-religious 76 Brahman-Atman unity 44 Brahminization 46 Buddhism 38, 133 Buddhist heritage 8 leaders 140 Bush administration 154

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doctrine 155 statement 109 Bush’s accusation 109 Cape Town 96–7, 107–8 Caritas 76–7 Catholic-Orthodox relations 71 Catholic-nationalist groups 87, 90 Catholics 8, 66, 68, 70, 81, 133, 147, 171 Charismatic Christian groups 63 China vii, 4, 8, 14, 21, 54–9, 110–2, 117, 121, 124, 126, 128, 134–7, 145–6, 148–51, 154 Chinese vii, 53–5, 58–9, 113–4, 187 Chinese bibles 134 Christians 123 church 123 leaders 120 Protestantism 123, 131 Christ, church of 141, 143 Christian Action 120, 132 Christian church in Korea viii Christian churches 5, 35, 88, 91, 103, 121–2, 125, 141, 156, 166, 192 Christian Foundation of Piety 169 Christian ideological struggle 109 Christian leadership in North Korea 155 Christian realism 126, 128 Christian solution for Korean conflict 118 Christian Theology 103, 107, 170 Christianity iv, vii, viii, 3, 12, 17, 29, 56–7, 101, 115, 119, 121, 125, 127, 133–5, 138, 145–6 and crisis 119, 121, 123–30 and power politics 126–7, 130 Christians, Liberal 166 Orthodox 100 Western 124 Christians of North Korea 187 Church apartheid 102, 106 disunity 100–1 divisions 100, 102, 104 politics 143 reunification 106 Church relations in South Africa 104–5, 107 Church renewal 168 Church struggle in South Africa 102, 107 Church unity v, 95, 100, 104–5, 107, 194 Church within socialism 31

Church Worldwide 39, 49 Churches American 119, 129 Canadian 40, 49 Catholic 8, 65–6, 71, 154 of Christ 116, 129, 131 chung Shin 169 denominational 135, 142–3 disunity of 100–1 early 45, 105, 145, 171 Evangelical 39, 156 government-controlled 144 government-sponsored 145 international consultation of 156, 159, 167, 185–6, 189, 194–5 Methodist ix, 136, 143, 176 National Council of 185, 189–90, 193, 195 of Korea 167, 185–6, 189, 195–5 Orthodox 66, 70–1, 74 re-united 105–6 separated 102, 142 united 105–6 Churches on International Affairs 116 Churches of Korea 190, 192 for National Reunification 189 on National Reunification and Peace 168, 177 Civil disobedience 83 Civil society vii, viii, 98 Civilizations 106, 154, 159 Confucian 154 Coexistence, peaceful 163–5 Cohesion 67, 104–5 Moral 63 social 62–3, 67, 106 Cold War 26, 161 east-west 187–8 in Korea 162, 178 Colossians 52, 185, 192 Committee, inter–Korean economic cooperation promotion 183 Committee of Peaceful Reunification 139 Common identity 11–2, 16, 22, 24–32, 38, 58–9, 163, 170–1, 175 Communism 8, 95, 105, 109, 119–21, 124, 126–7 Communist countries 122, 128 Communities Christian 39, 195 human 38–9, 52, 56

Index of Memory 11–3, 15, 19 Muslim 65–6 Conflict 1–3, 5–7, 37–9, 48, 62, 64–5, 68–9, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80–1, 88–91, 99, 140, 185–7 resolution 1, 62 transformation 2 Conflict and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland 85, 93 Contemporary Cultural Activism in India 46, 48 Context i, vii, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 36–7, 39–42, 44, 47–8, 64–5, 67–9, 71–3, 82, 100–1, 103–4, 156–7 Cooperation 35, 66, 140, 142–3, 149–50, 154, 164, 182–4, 188, 195 cultural 165–6 interreligious 48 Cooperative projects 166, 182–3 inter-Korean 183 Corinthians 33, 52, 104, 156, 192 Corrymeela 88 Council International Missionary 115, 131 Northern Ireland Community Relations 87 of Korean and German churches 138 of Religion and Society 139 Creation 3, 32, 35, 51, 63, 67, 77, 83, 95, 97, 99, 103–4, 158–9, 183 Croatia 71–4, 77, 80 Croatian Catholic church 74 Croatians 69, 71, 74 Culture ix, 7–9, 11, 20, 23, 38, 46, 59, 67–9, 88, 100, 102, 104, 106–7, 140, 183 constructs 64 expression 102 homogeneity 7 patterns 7 non-sectarian 46 public 46 synthesis of 106 Dalits 41–2 Dalitization 46 Dayton Peace Agreement 78 Delhi 39, 44, 49 Democracy 4, 148, 151, 157 Democratic Action 72 Democratic Party of Japan 57 Democratic People’s Republic 147, 180

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Democratic Unionist Party 85 Denominationalism 100–1 Deur die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk 102, 108 Development agencies ix political 22 Dialogue 16, 37, 40, 47, 49, 88–9, 125–6, 128, 138, 145, 151, 163–7, 173, 180, 182, 188–90 inter-religious 39, 77 Dietrich Bonhoeffer 31, 33 Dignity 95–7, 100, 105, 189 Dimensions, religious 59, 63 Divided societies 62, 82, 101 Division 7, 8, 23, 43, 61, 63, 77, 78, 100–1 137–8, 140, 152, 156, 161–3, 166–7, 171–3, 185–191, 193–4 ideological 12, 141 national 167, 189–190 of Korea 8, 116, 152, 156, 161, 167, 186 sectarian 43 social 101 of societies 62, 82, 101 Document, South African Kairos 40 Dublin 3, 6, 85, 93 Dulles 113, 116, 118–25, 127, 129, 132, Proposal 119, 128 Statement 119, 129 Durkheim 62–63, 79 DRCA (Dutch Reformed Church in Africa) 102 East Asia i, 14, 53, 55–6, 59, 112 Germans 23, 26, 28 Germany 11, 21–2, 24, 26–8, 30–1 East and West German states 29 Eastern Orthodox Christianity 69 Ecclesiology viii, 103 Economic cooperation 57, 164–5, 180, 183 Inter-Korean 183 reconstruction 114 sanctions 148, 151 Economy 157–8 Ecumenical 36, 89, 130–2 Ecumenics vii, 88, 91 Egypt 17, 47, 113 Emmaus 15 Enemies 2, 6, 23, 82, 91, 93, 97, 108, 115, 147, 151–2, 154, 172, 189

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Ephesians 52–3, 185, 189 Ethics 2, 44, 82, 93, 97, 101, 108, 126–8 caste 101 common 106 social 101 Ethnic 1, 8, 61, 67–9, 74, 101, 103–4 Albanians 71 cleansing 73, 76 identities 68, 78 identities, common 191 nationalism 68 nationhood 72 unities 11 Ethnicity 67–9, 73, 100, 106 Ethno-religious factor 69 Eucharist 18, 167 EU (European Union) 72, 157 Europe 8, 9, 22, 24, 30, 53, 74, 113, 154, 187 European Union 72, 157 Evangelische Ethik 31, 33 Evangelism vii, 40, 49, 168 Exchanges implementing multi-faceted north-South 179 north-south 191 north-South 195

Gegenstand praktisch-theologischer reflexion 30, 33 Generation of Reunification 163, 178 Geneva vii, 3, 6, 104–5, 107, 116, 120–1, 130, 132, 148, 158–9 agreement of dismantling north Korea 109 German church struggle 31 churches 156 Christians 31 civil rights movement 27 Democratic Republic 29 economy 24 history, recent 29, 30, 174 Reunification 164, 174 Germany reunified 28 unified 23–4, 27, 29, 32 Geschichte 31, 33 Globalisation viii, 100 God of Justice and Peace 150 peace of 158, 171 Gospel 14, 44, 48, 101–2, 105, 125, 133–4, 136, 173, 186 Group identities iv, 86, 88, 175

Faith 1, 19, 37–8, 43–5, 47–9, 52–3, 66, 68, 103, 107, 135, 151, 156, 185–6, 189–90, 193–5 Christian 9, 38, 127–8, 134–5, 171, 194 communities 38, 44, 84, 107, 168, 194 Faith-Based NGOs advance interfaith reconciliation 75–6, 79 Families, separated 163–4, 166, 180, 186, 188, 190 Federal Republic 23–4 of Germany 28 Federalism 69, 80 Forgiveness 3, 6, 7, 10, 36, 38, 41, 48–9, 53, 75, 82–4, 93, 96–9, 108 Forums, inter-religious 75, 77 France 11, 148, 151–2 Franciscans 76 French occupation of Indochina 151

Hangeechong 141–2 Hankook Kidokkio Tongil Undong-sa 141, 145 Hankuk Chunjang 111, 128 Healing 9, 12–8, 20, 36, 39, 41, 45, 48–9, 82–3, 100, 190 communities 39, 40, 49 of memories 7, 175, 178 Hebrew Bible 2, 176 Hindu-Christian dialogue ix Hindu consciousness 44 Hindu society 41–2 Hindus 42–4, 46 History of Christianity of Korea 135, 146 of Unification Movements in Korean Churches 166, 168–9, 177 Holocausts 22, 41, 118 Holy Spirit 39, 40, 49, 103, 185–6 Hong Kong 172, 178 Human rights viii, 29, 62, 95, 98–9, 107, 148–50, 158, 169, 186–7, 191

Galatians 185 Galtung 62, 79 Gandhi 42, 44, 49

Index ICT (International Criminal Tribunal) 76, 79 Identity v, vii, viii, 4, 7–9, 11–7, 19, 29, 32, 38, 43, 63, 67–9, 81, 84–90, 92–3, 174–7 Christian 36 collective 16, 63 crisis 87 ethno-national 69 national 67, 69, 136 religious 67, 69 social 11, 100 Yugoslav 68–9 Ideological 58, 164, 179 Ideologies 11, 22, 25, 47, 63, 78, 110, 142, 151, 154, 163, 165, 167, 182, 187, 189–91 IMC (International Missionary Council) 115–6, 131 Imams 66, 72 Immigrants 27–8 Imperialism 55, 123 Independence 42, 68, 72, 162, 186, 189 national 186, 188, 192 India i, v, viii, ix, 4, 35, 40–1, 44–48, 113, 149, 151 multi-religious 47 secular 45 Integration 28–9, 63 Integrity of Creation 158–9 Interfaith dialogue ix, 36, 43–4, 49 nurseries 48 relations ix, 35, 39, 45, 47 International order 119, 121, 124, 127–8 International Organisation Islamic Relief 76 Interpretation of Christian ethics 126, 130 of cultures 11, 20 Intervention 112, 127–8, 171 Iran 56, 109, 137 Iraq viii, 87–89 Ireland viii, 87–9 Northern 88 Isaiah 32, 47, 51–2, 170, 186 Islam 12, 38, 43, 65–6, 69, 72 Islamic microfinance 76, 80 National Party, Bosnian 72 Relief 76, 79 Israel 15, 47, 103, 149, 151, 170, 172

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Japan viii, 8, 53–8, 110–1, 116, 120–1, 128, 136–8, 141, 148–50, 152, 155, 162, 168, 178, 195 Japanese Christians 77 Japanese and Korean historians 55 Jeremiah 186 Jews of Sarajevo 74–5, 79 Jubilee 140, 168, 170–1, 177–8, 193–4 Law, application of 171, 177 principle 5, 170–1, 176 spirit 154 year 168, 170–1, 193–4 Jubilee Year for Peace and Reunification 193, 195 Justice v, 2, 3, 11–3, 27, 40–2, 48, 51–2, 75, 89, 90, 95–7, 99, 100, 105–7, 154, 158–9, 171–2, 186 administration of 27 international 116 relational 48 restorative 3, 41, 48 retributive 41, 48 Justice and Reconciliation in Post-apartheid South 41, 48 Kingdom of God 186 of justice 189 Kirche 31, 33 im Sozialismus 31. 33 Korea vi–viii, 8, 9, 12–3, 15–6, 110–4, 116–7, 120–41, 143, 145–8, 150–3, 156–8, 161–5, 167–73, 177–9, 185–7, 189–95 Christian Council of 169, 177 Federation 148, 153 divided 152, 158, 164, 167–8 peace and reunification of 138, 157 united 116 Korean Christians 143, 166–8, 170, 175, 186 Christianity and Unification Movement 166–7, 178 churches v, 109, 115, 133, 139, 167–9, 186, 193–5 the Growth of the 136, 146 churches proclaim 168, 193 conflict 113, 116, 118, 126, 158 nation 143, 156, 180, 192 peninsula i, 5, 8, 109–10, 115, 134, 148, 157, 161, 165, 168, 170–1, 177,

202

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185–8, 191–3, 195 people 148, 151–2, 157, 167, 170, 173, 179, 181–4, 186–9, 192 position, official South 110 Reunification question iv Korean Christianity and Unification Movement 166–7, 178 Korean Churches for Justice and Peace 186 Korean Minjung in Christ 172–3, 178 Korean Situation and World order 116–7, 132 La Benevolencia 74–6 Leaders, religious 1, 54, 66, 69, 157 Leviticus 154, 158, 170, 183 Liberation 19, 37, 88, 154, 163, 167–8, 170–1, 173, 177–8, 187–8, 192–3 Living church 117–9, 120, 132 Luke 15, 52–3, 154, 170–1, 185–6, 193 Lutheran World Federation vii, 37 Matthew 52, 55, 185, 188 Mediation 38, 56, 112, 126 Memories v, 3, 4, 7–15, 17–20, 41, 117, 121, 125, 131, 139, 162, 175, 178 common cultural 29, 30, 174 communities of 9, 12, 175–6 healing of 4, 8, 9, 11–4, 18 shaping of 9, 11 thick 11–2 thin 11–2 Merhamet 73, 75–8 Messiah 51–2 Metanoia 52, 55, 82, 175 Ministry of Healing and Reconciliation 39, 49 of Reconciliation ix, 10, 20 of Unification 178 Minjung theologians 172–3 Minjung Theology 158, 171, 173, 177 Movement of Reunification 141, 145, 169 Muslims 1, 43, 65–6, 68–9, 72–6 Narratives 15–7 National reconciliation and reunification 189, 194 National unity 30, 98, 107, 164, 179, 189, 191 Nationalism 23, 29, 65–9, 71–2, 80–1, 105–6, 119, 131, 136, 145 religio-ethno 71

Nationality 68–9, 100, 106 Nationhood 63, 67 Nature of group identities 86, 175 NICRA (Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association) 90 NICRC (northern ireland Community Relations Council) 87 Niebuhr 100–2, 105–7, 117–8, 120, 123, 125–8, 130 North Korea vii, 12, 54, 56, 58, 109–11, 113–5, 117, 125, 128, 137–9, 146–51, 153–8, 163, 166, 169 North for Peaceful Reunification 141 North-South declaration 165 North-South Joint Declaration 162, 177 North-South Joint Statement vi, 163, 179 North and South Korea 109, 162–3, 169, 190–2 Northern ireland i, v, vii, 3–6, 38, 48, 61, 81–3, 85–91, 93, 175, 177 post-conflict 91 Office of Interfaith Relations ix Organisations Catholic Relief 76 Denominational 71 Muslim humanitarian 75 religious 70–1, 73 religious-based 77–8 Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism 66 Pacifism 6 Pacifists 117–8, 126 Pakistan 149, 151 Peace i, 1–6, 37–9, 46–8, 51–5, 57–9, 61–2, 81–3, 124–7, 147–50, 154, 156–9, 165–72, 177–8, 185–9, 191–5 accords 83, 87 agreement, Dayton 77 axis of 35 Christian-initiated 161 covenant community of 168, 193 movements 2, 186 post-conflict 78 process 2, 3, 87 servant of 167, 185 studies viii, 47, 62 sustainable 2, 3 treaty 151, 162, 168, 191–2 universal 51–2 work 62, 78

Index and reconciliation 1–2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 51–2, 132–4, 174–8 and reunification 193, 195 Peace Building 1–3, 5, 6, 62 religious-based 77 secular-based 1–3, 5–6, 62, 78 sustainable 2–3 Peace Patrol 119, 129 Peaceful national community 189 Peaceful reunification 138–41, 150, 156, 159, 169, 180, 192 policy of 163 Peaceful settlements 84, 139 Peaceful System in Korean Peninsula 162, 177 Peaceful Unification of Korea 139 Peacemakers 1, 2, 6, 52, 55–7, 59, 66, 79, 81 Peacemaking 1–3, 37, 40, 47, 49, 56, 62, 64, 66–7, 69, 70, 73, 79 Perspectives 14–5, 8, 10, 15, 61, 64–5, 78 anthropological 173 biblical 59, 120, evangelical 89 South African woman’s 41, 48 theological viii Political forgiveness 96–8, 107 Political systems 4, 22, 144, 164, 170–1, 179 Politics, international 61, 119–21 Power 3–4, 15, 18, 27, 29, 32, 63, 65, 72–3, 80, 85, 88, 98, 103, 126, 145 creative 3 divisive 41 ecclesiastical 194 liberating 158 moral 119, 127 secular 124 Presbyterian church vii, 136, 142–3 Christians 153 northern 134–5 Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution 1, 2, 6, 66, 79 Protestant churches 120, 123, 132–3, 140 in Korea 141 Protestant unionist 92 community 87, 88 identity 87 Psychological counselling vii Psychological personal growth work 83

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Psychological realities 23 Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation 96, 107 Psychological warfare 149 Pyengyang 134–5, 138–9, 145 Quakers 117 Reconciliation iii–ix, 1–10, 16–20, 35–42, 44–9, 51–4, 52–9, 72–8, 80–6, 88– 93, 95–100, 104–8, 161–4, 166–70, 172–8, 192–5 interfaith 40, 47 interpersonal 77, 83–4, 91 and Justice in South Africa v, 95 in Northern Ireland vii, 3, 6, 93 political 5, 81–3, 91 process of 3–5, 7, 8, 15, 19, 48, 55, 75, 77–8, 174–6 social 7, 14–5, 17, 82 Reconciliation commissions iii, 16, 32, 36, 40, 48, 96, 108 Reconciliation in South Africa 98, 107 Reconciliation, typology of 82 Reconciling 9, 33, 39, 45, 85, 175 Reconstruction 37, 154 peaceful 157 Reformed churches in Southern Africa 105, 107 Refugees 21, 27, 28, 186 Religion civil 30, 63, 67, 69 cultures of 62, 78 dual nature of 62 and Nationalism in Yugoslav States 68, 71–3, 79 and violence in Bosnia Herzegovina 73, 80 Religious conviction 5, 85 Religious and ethnic conflict 3, 6 Religious nationalism 72–3, 79 Religious peace-building 3, 6 Religious politics in North Korea 139 Re-negotiating identities 85–7, 89 Reparation 36, 41, 96, 98–9, 149–50 Repentance 38, 48, 52–3, 55, 82–4, 141, 193 Republic of Korea 112, 147–8, 158–9, 180–1, 184 of South Korea 12 Restoration 9, 41, 48, 52, 86, 100, 168, 170–1, 193

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Restitution 98–9 Resurrection 17–19, 171–173, 185 Reunification vi, viii, 4, 16, 23, 110–1, 138, 140–2, 145–7, 156–7, 161, 163–4, 168–71, 173, 178–80, 188–95 autonomous 167, 189 Righteousness 51–2, 124 Roman Catholic churches ix, 133, 139–40, 195 Sarajevo 65–6, 74–8 Secularisation 46, 61 Seoul xi, 12, 110–2, 114, 122, 130, 138–9, 145–6, 158–9, 162–4, 166, 170–1, 174, 176–9, 181, 183–4 Serbian 66, 71–2, 74 Shared identity i, iii–v, 5, 7, 8, 14, 19, 170–1, 175, 177–8 forming 5, 174–6 restored 172 Sharing community, restored 5, 170–1, 176 Sikh 44 Sikh theological method 49 Sikh understanding 44 Societal reconciliation 81–5, 91 process of 81, 86 South Africa i, v, 3, 4, 36, 40–1, 48, 95–102, 104–8 South African council of churches 97 theologians 98, 104 South Korea vii, 4, 5, 14, 19, 54–6, 58, 109–13, 117, 138–9, 141, 149–53, 157–8, 161–5, 168–9, 173–4, 190–2 South Korean Protestant 133 denominations 169 South and North church 138 South-North Joint Declaration 181 South-North Korean Relations 177, 181 South-North Sharing 177 Soviet Union 22–4, 162, 195 Statement, Toronto 115, 120, 122–3, 125, 127 Stormont 84, 87 Strategies for peace and reunification in Korea vi, 147 Sunningdale Agreement 83–4, 93 Systems 61, 64, 84, 95, 126, 144–5, 151, 165, 170, 182, 187–92 normative 64, 66 religious belief 67

value 70 Taiwan 55, 57–8 Theology i, vii–ix, xi, 4, 31, 44, 49, 81–2, 93, 96, 100, 102, 125, 150, 158, 178 of Reconciliation 37, 49 Theologians 5, 19, 31, 65, 124, 158 Canadian 96 Croatian 90 Catholic 37 Taiwanese 175 Theological reflections on truth and reconciliation in South Africa 108 Theology vii–ix, xi, 4, 31, 44, 49, 81–2, 93, 96, 100, 102, 125, 150, 158, 178, in formation in Asian settings 176, 178 of healing and transformation 13, 20 of reconciliation 37, 49 of relationship 40, 49 of service 33 Third Movement of Reunification 141 Trinity vii, 104 Triune God 39, 99, 103–5, 107 Trust, mutual 152, 173, 179, 191–2 Truth v, 3–5, 9, 15–6, 30, 35–6, 39–45, 47–9, 77, 89, 90, 96–8, 106–8, 115, 122, 130 absolute 43–4 dialogical 16–7 forensic 16 religious 43 restorative 16–7 TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) 41, 96–8, 107 Ubuntu and human rights 95, 112 Unification 23, 25–6, 28, 30, 39, 87, 161, 164–8, 170–1, 173, 177–8, 181, 185, 189, 194 of Germany 24, 28, 30 Unification 23, 25–6, 28, 30, 39, 87, 161, 164–68, 170–1, 173, 177–8, 181, 185, 189, 194 economic 23 education 194 of Germany 24, 28, 30 grassroots 163, 168 national 185 political 23 step-by-step 164

Index Unification Movements 163, 166, 168–9, 177 Unification Theology 171, 178 Unikorea 166, 178 United nations 55, 115, 117, 121, 126, 131, 137, 149, 158, 191 United States 55–6, 78, 113, 131, 153, 162, 187 Unity 30, 35, 39, 47, 63, 67–9, 100, 102–7, 171–2, 194 Universal Church 119, 129 Vatican 8 Vedantic tradition 44 Victims 9, 10, 12, 15–6, 36–42, 48, 73, 91, 95, 97–9, 115, 150, 154–5, 158, 168, 171, 186–7

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Violence 37, 38, 42, 48–9, 62, 64, 66, 73, 78–81, 83–4, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95 emotional 84 sectarian 85 structural 42 World Council of Churches vii, 5, 6, 39, 109, 115–25, 128–30, 132, 156–7, 167 World Alliance of Reformed Churches 107 World Convocation on Justice 158–9 World Order 117–8, 119, 124, 132, 154, 159 Yugoslavia 65, 68–9, 72–3, 79, 80, 113 Yugoslavs 68–9, 71–2