Securing Europe: European Security in an American Epoch

Securing Europe European Security in an American Epoch

Lisa Watanabe

New Security Challenges Series General Editor: Stuart Croft, Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, and Director of the ESRC’s New Security Challenges Programme. The last decade demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations, and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges Series reflects this pressing political and research agenda. Titles include: Jon Coaffee, David Murakami Wood and Peter Rogers THE EVERYDAY RESILIENCE OF THE CITY How Cities Respond to Terrorism and Disaster Christopher Farrington (editor) GLOBAL CHANGE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS Implementing the Political Settlement Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill and Frank Webster ANTI-WAR ACTIVISM New Media and Protest in the Information Age Andrew Hill RE-IMAGINING THE WAR ON TERROR Seeing, Waiting, Travelling Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin TELEVISION AND TERROR Conflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse Bryan Mabee THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITY State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy Janne Haaland Matlary EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY DYNAMICS In the New National Interest

Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (editors) CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING Brian Rappert and Chandré Gould (editors) BIOSECURITY Origins, Transformations and Practices Brian Rappert BIOTECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS An Inquiry into Research and Methods Brian Rappert (editor) TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY Governing Threats in the New Millennium Lisa Watanabe SECURING EUROPE European Security in an American Epoch

New Security Challenges Series Series Standing Order ISBN 978-0-230-00216-6 (hardback) and ISBN 978-0-230-00217-3 (paperback) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Securing Europe European Security in an American Epoch Lisa Watanabe Research Officer, Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalisation and Transnational Security, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

© Lisa Watanabe 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-57989-7

hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents Preface

vii

Acknowledgements

viii

List of Abbreviations

ix

Part I Europeanization: Analytical Framework 1 Introduction A sociological institutionalist framework

3 10

2 A Sociological Institutionalist Approach to Europeanization Introduction Review of existing approaches A sociological institutionalist approach Europeanization The co-determination of national and European institutional orders Conclusion

14 14 15 29 37 42 49

Part II The Case Studies 3 The European Security and Defence Policy Introduction Reframing defence: The emergence of the ESDP Europeanization of military security Transatlantic security relations Conclusion

53 53 55 59 77 87

4 Justice and Home Affairs Post-September 11 Introduction Europeanization of ‘Internal’ security prior to 9/11 Europeanization of ‘Internal’ security post-9/11 Reshaping of domestic institutional orders Transatlantic security relations Conclusion

91 91 93 108 112 119 123

5 The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Introduction From reactive crisis management to long-term conflict prevention

127 127

v

129

vi

Contents

Europeanization of Germany’s policy preferences Transatlantic security relations Conclusion

135 150 151

6 Conclusion: Socio-Functional Europeanization

154

Notes

167

Index

191

Preface Cooperation between European Union (EU) member states has grown steadily over the last decade. The EU is now active in crisis management, policing, intelligence, and border management. Several decades ago, this would have been taboo given the importance of these areas to traditional conceptions of state sovereignty. This book is an attempt to account for how these developments were possible. In it, I employ the concept of Europeanization to account for increased institutionalization of cooperation between member states in the area of security. Europeanization implies that changes in institutional practices take place not as a result of the rational egoism of states, but as a result of the reworking of perceptual and normative frameworks. The implications of Europeanization in each of these areas for the transatlantic security relationship are also explored. The book would never have come to fruition without the constructive comments and support of Prof. Dr. David Mutimer (York University, Toronto), Prof. Dr. Leo Panitch (York University), Prof. Dr. David Dewitt (York University), Prof. Dr. David Leyton-Brown (York University), Prof. Dr. Alexander Moens (Simon Fraser University, Vancouver), Nicolas Plattner and Youssef Ouadi. Each deserves special thanks. Lisa Watanabe

vii

Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan for its support in realizing the book project. I am also grateful to all those who generously gave up their time to participate in interviews, and to Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger (ETH Zurich), Mr. Kurt Kunz and His Excellency Robert Mayor, Ambassador of Switzerland in Belgium and head of the Swiss Confederation’s Mission to NATO, and His Excellency Patrick Villemur, Special Advisor to the Director and faculty member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), seconded from the French Government for assisting me with interview arrangements.

viii

List of Abbreviations AD

Action Directe

AEPC

Association of European Police Colleges

AET

Agency Establishment Team

AFJS

Area Freedom, Justice and Security

AFSOUTH

Allied Forces Southern Europe

BAe

British Aerospace

BfV

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz

3

Command, control and communications

4

CI

command, control, communications, computers and intelligence

CATS

Article 36 Committee

CEE

Central and Eastern Europe

CEPOL

European Police College

CESDP

Common European Security and Defence Policy

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

CINCENT

Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe

CJTF

Combined Joint Task Force

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

COREPER

Committee of Permanent Representatives

CRW

Counter-Revolutionary Wing

DEA

Drugs Enforcement Agency

DST

Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire

DTIB

Defence Technology and Industrial Base

EADS

European Aeronautic, Defence, and Space Company

EAPC

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EC

European Community

C

ix

x

List of Abbreviations

ECAP

European Capability Action Plan

ECJ

European Court of Justice

ECOFIN

EU Finance

ECST

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

EDA

European Defence Agency

EDC

European Defence Community

EJN

European Judicial Network

EMU

European Monetary Union

EMPF

European Multinational Protection Force

EPC

European Political Cooperation

ERI SEE

The SEE Education Reform Implementation Initiative in view of the Accession and the Stabilisation and Association Processes

ESDI

European Security and Defence Identity

ESDP

European Security and Defence Policy

ESRP

European Security Research Programme

ESS

European Security Strategy

EU

European Union

EUMC

European Union Military Committee

EUMS

European Union Military Staff

EUPM

European Union Police Mission

EUROPOL

European Police Office

EUROJUST

European Judicial Cooperation Unit

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCO

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FTAs

Free Trade Agreements

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYROM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

FRG

Federal Republic of Germany

HLG

High Level Group

List of Abbreviations

HTF

Headline Goal Task Force

IMF

International Monetary Foundation

IR

International Relations

G8

Group of Eight (leading industrialised nations)

GAD

Global Approach Deployability

GAERC

General Affairs and External Relations Council

GIGN

Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale

GPS

global positioning system

GSG9

Grenzschutzgruppe 9

IAG

Informal Advisory Group

ISTAR

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaisance

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

MAPE

Multinational Advisory Police Element

MEPA

Central European Police Academy

MI5

British Secret Service

xi

MoD

British Ministry of Defence

MRAV

Multi-role Armoured Vehicle Programme

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NACC

North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NAD

National Armaments Directors

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons

NBPA

Nordic Baltic Police Academy

NEBEDACPOL

Cooperative arrangement between chiefs of police of The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany

NRF

NATO Response Force

OCCAR

Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en Matière d’Armament (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation)

OCTN

Organised Crime Training Network

xii List of Abbreviations

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OMC

Open Method of Cooperation

OSCE

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCTF

EU Police Chiefs Task Force

PfP

Partnership for Peace

PJHQs

Permanent Joint Headquarters

PPEWU

Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

PNR

Passenger Name Record

PSC

Political Security Committee

PWGOT

Police Working Group on Terrorism

QMV

Qualified Majority Voting

RAID

Recherche, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion

R&D

research and development

RELEX

External Relations Directorate General of the European Commission

RMA

Revolution in Military Affairs

SACEUR

Supreme Allied Command Europe

SDECE

Direction de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage

SEA

Single European Act

SECI

South-East European Co-operative Initiative

SEE

South Eastern Europe

SEEI

South Eastern Europe Initiative

SEK

Specialeinsatzkommandos

SHAPE

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SIRENE

Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry

SIS

Schengen Information System

SIS II

Second generation SIS

List of Abbreviations

xiii

SO13

Scotland Yard’s Anti-Terror Squad

SP

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

SPTF

Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings

TACIS

EU Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

TEU

Treaty of the European Union

TREVI

Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence Group

TWG

Trade Working Group

UAV

Unmanned aerial vehicle

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNPROFOR

United Nations Protection Force

US

United States

VISA

Visa Information System

VISION

Visa Inquiry System In an Open-border Network

WEAG

Western European Armaments Group

WEU

Western European Union

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Part I Europeanization: Analytical Framework

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1 Introduction

As one night of riots followed another in Paris suburbs and elsewhere in France in late 2005, the enormity of the problem they reflected soon became evident. The impoverishment and marginalization of immigrant communities has reached a crisis point. This is, of course, not a specifically French problem. As Timothy Garton Ash argues, it is an all-European problem: ‘Unrest in Germany, bombings in London, and assassinations in The Netherlands are all signs of the façade of European multiculturalism cracking under the pressures of its underlying realities.’1 To some extent there is recognition that most member states of the European Union (EU) have large, dissatisfied communities of immigrant dissent. The 2004 Hague Programme, which is nothing short of a project in the area of ‘internal’ security comparable to that of the Single Market, calls for a European framework for the integration of immigrants to be drawn up. Were this to lead to greater cooperation in this area, it would be highly unlikely that we would see identical responses to the problem. Different forms of nationalism within member states would determine the precise way in which governments react to and transpose such a framework, just as the French government responded in a particularly ‘French way’ to the crisis, informed by its egalitarian form of nationalism. Indeed, integration in the areas of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security is characterized by such a two-way process or co-determination of national and EU-level institutional orders. This co-determining dimension of European integration cannot, however, be perceived by simply looking at measures agreed at European Council summits. It is necessary to examine the construction of common ‘ways of going 3

4

Securing Europe

about things’ at the EU level and to discern corresponding institutional adaptation within member states. In the security field, which I define in broad terms along with the EU as extending beyond military threats from a state to include a number of transnational threats including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, regional conflict, and state failure,2 cooperation between EU member states has grown steadily since fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The 1992 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) put in place the legal provisions with which to enable this development by establishing a framework for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).3 While the issue of defence was set aside at that time, the Treaty left open the possibility of framing a common defence policy. Lacking military capabilities of its own, the TEU envisaged that the EU would call upon the Western European Union (WEU)4 to plan and implement military measures on its behalf, thereby making the WEU the effective defence arm of the EU, at least for the time being.5 However, the crises in the former Yugoslavia dealt a harsh blow to the aspirations of the EU’s CFSP and the WEU, and had the effect of propelling the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the fore. The dependence of Europeans on NATO for out-of-area contingencies, as well as the Alliance’s rapid reconfiguration of its military structures, resulted in NATO and not the EU playing a leading role in crisis management in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Moreover, attempts that were made to enhance the EU’s role in this area took place within the framework of NATO, by means of the WEU’s participation in Alliance operations, rather than within the context of the EU. Since the late 1990s, the EU, nevertheless, has made significant progress towards consolidating its role in the security domain. While it was over-shadowed by NATO in the area of crisis management to its east and southeast, the EU has engaged in long-term conflict prevention. As the crisis in Kosovo came to a head in 1999, the EU launched the Stability Pact (SP), conceived along similar lines to an earlier initiative that focused on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, which encouraged their respective governments to work together to settle political problems, such as the treatment of minorities, and by investing heavily in economic reconstruction. The SP has vastly augmented the EU’s role in the Balkans and represents a significant development in its overall role as a security actor.

Introduction

5

In addition, the late 1990s saw the EU create the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which led to a transfer of competency from the WEU to the EU in the conduct of crisis-management operations. The governments and heads of EU member states committed themselves to supporting such a policy with institutions and capabilities designed to permit them to act on behalf of shared security interests, autonomous of the US and NATO when necessary. To this end, the EU has established a number of supranational bodies with which to support the ESDP, as well as initiated a process through which to establish the military capabilities with which to carry out a range of missions. Improving European military capabilities in light of advances in weapons technology and post-Cold War reductions in defence budgets has also increased the momentum behind common procurement and arms programmes, which inevitably have become linked to defence industrial issues, as well as the broader economic considerations. The EU’s ‘strategic’ objectives also have undergone further elaboration with the EU’s Security Strategy (ESS), published in 2003.6 Increased cooperation has not only taken place in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management. Formalized cooperation in the area of policing, intelligence and criminal justice got underway somewhat earlier, within the context of the removal of internal frontier controls within the Schengen area in the early 1990s. Cooperation in these areas experienced their most significant advances with the 1992 TEU, which created a new pillar of EU competence in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), thereby increasingly involving Brussels-based officials and the Council of Ministers in law enforcement matters. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty ushered in a new treaty chapter on the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ). As a result, all member states’ police, customs and judicial authorities now fall under one, clearly defined, legally based authority framework that has responsibility in this field. Not only does the EU have a legal basis for common action, but also more systematic regulation of the configuration and deployment of ‘internal’ security apparatuses. It also extended the degree of influence that Brussels-based policy practitioners have in this policy area. The September 11 attacks and the subsequent agreement upon a common definition of terrorism have helped further to strengthen police and judicial cooperation, notably with the creation of a

6

Securing Europe

European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which has given the EU a role in the area of criminal justice that it hitherto lacked. The EU’s intelligence function has also been expanded. The exchange of information and intelligence between member states’ police and intelligence services now takes place via a newly created anti-terrorism unit within the European Police Office (EUROPOL), as well as in an informal network. In addition to this expanded intelligence capacity, EUROPOL has also been given the power to participate in pre-criminal investigation intelligence gathering, as well as full-blown, multi-national criminal investigations. In addition, measures aimed at guarding the EU’s external borders have also been reinforced. These developments have not only brought significant changes within the EU, but also have inevitably modified the EU’s relationship with the US. As a result of the ESDP, NATO’s monopoly on decision-making and political control of military operations carried out by European states is no longer as assured as it once was. This tends to cause considerable unease in Washington, despite US calls for increased burden-sharing. The traditional bases of institutionalized US power in the Euro-Atlantic security arena, long-dominated by NATO, appear to be politically more difficult to maintain as new institutional ties are being formed between EU member states in the political-military domain. Moves to consolidate a European defence industry and to further joint procurement are also likely to follow. The EU is now the strongest force for change in the Balkans due to the creation of the SP, whereas the US had overshadowed its role in the early 1990s. Yet EU–US collaboration is also growing and, in some instances, becoming more formalized in the areas of anti-ter rorism intelligence, law enforcement, and border management. The fight against terrorism appears to be providing a common moral imperative for the national security state in the Atlantic area, as well as a basis for cooperation between European and American states in the absence of the Soviet Union and the decline of state socialism. These developments represent a significant shift in emphasis when compared with the greater part of the post-Second World War period. The intersection of the rehabilitation of Europe, the revival of liberal capitalism and the East-West stand-off produced a high degree of consensus about the general interest and a similarity between European and American state practices in political-military and political-economic fields. In the military sphere, NATO provided a

Introduction

7

framework within which US leadership and European states’ dependency in the political-military field was largely accepted. Military ties developed within the context of the Alliance were complemented by an immense network of both formal and informal ties between European and American intelligence agencies, which also served as an instrument for the expansion of US power and influence abroad.7 The strength of these linkages, of course, depended on the extent to which the notion of Atlantic unity resonated with the strategic cultures of individual European national contexts.8 No direct organizational link existed between the EC/EU and the US in these areas of ‘internal’ security. During this time, the EU also had no security or defence policy of its own. A number of attempts to strengthen the EC’s role in international politics were made, however, and these did begin to establish a spirit of cooperation. The 1950 Pleven Plan envisaged the creation of a European army attached to the political institutions of a united Europe. The participants of such an army would commit themselves to the defence of Europe under a Supreme Allied Commander in times of conflict. In accordance with this, the creation of the post of a European defence minister was proposed. The Plan also anticipated a European Council of Ministers with a single defence budget and joint arms procurement. However, the plan met with sufficient opposition to prevent it from being realized. What eventually emerged in the European Defence Community (EDC) treaty was less supranational than the Pleven Plan. The EDC was to have a close relationship with NATO. The explicit link between NATO and the emergent EDC was established through Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which implied a commitment to consult together. The plan, however, failed and it was not until a decade later that defence would again come under discussion. In the early 1960s, France made various proposals, some involving a common foreign and defence policy, with the aim of breaking Europe’s dependency on NATO/US assets, as well as reconstructing Europe by transforming it into a voluntary union of independent states. However, these proposals also failed to garner enough support to get off the ground. In the 1970s, a renewed interest in the issue of security and defence was stimulated by the Genscher-Colombo proposals, which arose from increasing dissatisfaction with US leadership and subsequent concern to reinforce Europe’s capacity to act as a single force in world affairs.

8

Securing Europe

The concept of European political cooperation (EPC) was, therefore, defined as an attempt to align the foreign policies of the EC member states, while respecting their national sovereignty. It had no legal basis in treaty and was thus an exercise in cooperation and coordination, rather than the creation of a common foreign policy. As a consultative platform, it did, nevertheless, encourage a ‘habit of consultation’ between member states on foreign policy matters, though defence was still left aside. Legal status was conferred on EPC by its inclusion in the 1986 Single European Act9 and it was, in many respects, the forerunner of the CFSP. The EU also lacked a formal role in the area of ‘internal’ security, though cooperation between EC member states’ law enforcement, intelligence and border control authorities did take place and grew out of informal, ad hoc arrangements that existed outside the EC framework. The majority of cooperation took place within intergovernmental coordinating networks, which were set up to facilitate political cooperation between interior ministries, as well as cooperation between police forces at an operational level. The 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen Implementation Agreement were concerned with short-term ways of counteracting the relaxation of border controls, as well as provisions for cross-border ‘hot pursuits’ and the exchange of information, and were also agreed outside the EC framework and failed to include all of the EC member states. Intelligence links were also informal. Where a limited degree of judicial cooperation existed, political differences, particularly in relation to the definition of terrorism, prevented the EU from developing a criminal justice function of its own. How then were developments since the end of the Cold War made possible? Many observers, as well as practitioners, interpret them in terms of states joining forces in order to fulfil fundamental tasks made more difficult in the context of altered regional and global contexts. This is particularly marked in relation to the discourse on ‘internal’ security. An increasingly ‘borderless’ world in which criminal networks can flourish by escaping the control of individual states is, for example, frequently cited as justification for greater coordination of policing across Europe, especially against the backdrop of the removal of internal borders between the majority of EU member states. Viewing these developments as the result of the rational calculations of states, however, obscures a number of

Introduction

9

crucial dimensions of the European integration process. Contrary to what one might expect, informal and/or decentralized networks, even in areas of ‘high’ politics, such as defence, have played an important role in framing cross-border cooperation between EU member states. They have been able to do so due to the nature of the EU governance structure, which has enabled fragments of the state to affect the evolution of the integration project in areas deemed paramount to state sovereignty. Cooperation within the second pillar – the CFSP and the ESDP – and parts of the third pillar – JHA – of the EU is governed by socalled soft law, i.e. by the establishment of ‘best practices’ and peer reviews. This governance structure brings together officials from member states and, to some extent, the Commission, in combination with a variety of private or semi-public bodies to discuss common ‘solutions’ to perceived problems and to evaluate progress in relation to the implementation of treaty provisions. Within these committees and working groups the ‘technical’ details of treaty provisions, which often initially remain vague for practical reasons, are worked out and recommendations for further cooperation are made. In addition to these policy networks, new EU-level bodies, such as EUROPOL and the European independent legal body (EUROJUST) have also been established to facilitate further cooperation by creating a network of representatives from national police and judicial authorities, facilitating exchange of information and, in the case of EUROPOL, intelligence. The key actors are thus not just governments acting on behalf of states, but mid-level officials active in decentralized policy networks. These are, in fact, the actors engaged in forming common sets of social practices, which help to form a new institutional order. Once this is recognized, it becomes possible to ‘see’ an aspect of the integration process that cannot be captured merely by looking at provisions enshrined in treaty. The establishment of an institutional order takes place not only at the EU level, but it also implies modifications at the national level. Greater institutionalization of cooperation at the regional level leads to the creation of common ways ‘going about things’ that help to shape the evolution of institutional orders at the national level. This co-determining aspect of integration is related to the way in which actors involved in institution-building within transnational networks conceive of the

10

Securing Europe

challenges facing the EU economy and emerging polity, and how they act on them. Transnational networks of security practitioners oriented towards finding ‘solutions’ to common ‘problems’ help to direct developments that eventually lead to greater standardization of working practices and the deployment of resources within some of the most sensitive areas of state practice. While this implies a reduction in the differences between national institutional orders, the process of transformation underway should not be confused with convergence. Responses to commonly-defined problems vary, as alluded to at the outset of this chapter; embedded conceptions of the role of the military and the police, civil liberties, and the nature of a particular country’s relationship with the US, for example, condition the processes by which state security apparatuses are maintained or changed and thus the specificities of a country’s response to ‘Europe’. In short, depicting European integration in the field of security as the result of unitary member states, coherently pursuing preformulated national interests would simply not allow us to comprehend the importance of security professionals, the incremental formation of national preferences within the context of integration and the co-constitution of European and national institutional orders. Yet accounts of post-Cold War developments in this domain that rely on the preferred, traditional terms of International Relations (IR) theorizing tend to do just that. In addition, many of these accounts fail to examine the impact of the framing of the relationship between economic and security issues, for example, on the institutionalization of cooperation in the security domain.10 Analyses that do highlight the way in which various understandings of the altered regional and global economic environment may be encouraging further cooperation between EU member states in the area of security are largely found in law enforcement, intelligence and police studies and, consequently, they tend to focus solely on developments in the area of JHA.11

A sociological institutionalist framework This study attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the integration process in the European security field. Developments in this area are particularly interesting, because they affect aspects of the state that are considered fundamental to traditional conceptions

Introduction

11

of state sovereignty and, in the case of the ESDP, involve ‘high’ politics. The rapidity of developments is all the more suprising, since the second and, until fairly recently, third pillars of the EU are intergovernmental, concerning institutionalized cooperation between member states. Yet, as I seek to demonstrate, the shape that agreed-upon measures take is part of an ongoing process that takes place within a decentralized governance structure comprising a number of actors. It is precisely the nature of governance in the policy areas concerned that has played an important enabling role. I therefore explore which actors play an important role in transforming policy spheres that are central to state sovereignty and involve high politics within a decentralized governance structure. Having identified these actors, I then attempt to discern the frameworks of thought determining the evolution of European security. I will, therefore, examine the way in which actors’ ‘knowledge’ of their environment and their social identities contribute to the creation of common understandings of security threats and appropriate responses to them. In other words, I hope to discern the manner in which their institutional embeddedness has contributed to altering the politics of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security within the EU, as well as the impact of this course on the domestic institutions of EU member states. This, I believe, will help to shed light on the relationship of co-determination between institutionalization at the EU level and changes in member state security apparatuses or, as I term it, Europeanization, since these actors are active in both national institutional orders and emergent European level institutional orders. Finally, this study examines the implications of developments in the security realm for the EU–US security relationship. Given the previous dominance of the Atlantic institutional order in Europe, increasingly formalized cooperation between EU member states and accompanying changes in security policies, associated practices and deployment of resources also have important implications for transatlantic security relations. I therefore reflect on the significance of developments for EU–US relations. The approach I employ is outlined in greater detail in the following chapter. In brief, I conceive of institutionalized cooperation and Europeanization as co-determining, simultaneously involving national and European institutional orders. I concentrate on institution-building

12

Securing Europe

at the European level, since this allows one to discern the institutional order being constructed at the EU level by the activities of practitioners active in the decentralized governance structure prevailing in these areas, as well as to briefly trace the impact of this process on the state security apparatuses at the national level. The latter is necessarily brief due to limited space, though changes within member states certainly merit greater attention from other scholars. I argue that analyses that assume rationally calculating states fail to capture important aspects of European integration that would alter the way in which it is conceived. Cooperation does not necessarily derive from a convergence of pre-defined national positions, but may also emerge out of gradual, iterative action. Europeanization in connection to the ESDP and JHA has been driven less by periodic, intergovernmental summits in which states acting as monolithic entities bargain than by transnational policy practitioners within decentralized policy arenas. I maintain that the way in which these practitioners conceive of ‘problems’ and seek common ‘solutions’ to them are vital to creating an expansive ‘logic’ and to the modification of perceptual schemes and norms that lead to the institutionalization of cooperation and, in turn, to the eventual Europeanization of member states’ security apparatuses. This co-determining aspect of Europeanization was also important in shaping domestic policy practitioners’ capacity to influence developments within the EU. Once this dimension of the integration process is recognized, developments in European security can no longer convincingly be interpreted as the result of states rationally pursuing their interests and preferences. This casts a different light not only on European integration, but also on European–American security relations. US relations with European member states are not simply being affected by the establishment of the new institutional order, as one might assume; they also help to shape it. Thus, even when the EU appears to be developing as a significantly different security actor from the US, the two entities are far more intertwined than is often imagined, suggesting a need to exercise caution when speaking of the EU as a counterweight to the US, as some observers are inclined to do. In order to explore the process by which EU member states are ‘turning towards Europe’ and its relevance for transformation of transatlantic security relations, I first examine the capabilities development process taking place in support of the ESDP. This policy area is

Introduction

13

important because it is central to augmenting the EU’s role in the area of conflict management and, therefore, a key development in relation to the EU’s growing role as a security actor. It has also been chosen because it demonstrates the way in which participants of decentralized policy networks are important agents in the integration process. This is significant, since progress in this area is helping to transform the armed forces of EU member states, which are perceived as vital to the expression of state sovereignty. Given that the ESDP will give the EU a greater capacity to undertake crisis management operations, it also has considerable significance for EU–NATO relations. I then examine increased cooperation in the area of JHA, since the ‘internal’ security arm of the EU is to an even greater extent characterized by an array of committees and working groups set up to further cooperation between police forces, judiciaries, border management authorities, etc. Practitioners within these networks have been central to developing a common understanding of the European ‘internal’ security environment and legitimizing EU action in this field. Again, what is significant about advances in this domain is the way in which they are modifying expressions of state sovereignty. Developments within the context of exceptionalism following September 11 are particularly interesting, as they have given a significant boost to formal cooperation between member states, including that between the EU and the US in the area of police and judicial cooperation. Finally, I look at the establishment of the SP, which constitutes a major dimension of the EU’s activities in the area of conflict prevention in the Balkans. It has been chosen because of its relevance to the EU’s ‘external’ security role and because it demonstrates how member states’ security practitioners, informed by their institutional contexts, can help to shape important dimensions of the EU’s activities. To this end, it shows the importance of member states’ domestic institutional orders on the process of European integration. Since the Pact has significantly increased the EU’s role in South Eastern Europe (SEE) compared to the early-to-mid 1990s when it was overshadowed by the US, it also has relevance for European–American security relations.

2 A Sociological Institutionalist Approach to Europeanization

Introduction Formal cooperation in areas such as defence, intelligence, and judiciaries have tended to be taboo until comparatively recently, due to their centrality to state sovereignty and their sensitivity. Yet, institutionalized cooperation occurs in all these areas today. How are we to understand such developments? As explained earlier, they have taken place within a governance structure that leaves considerable room for actors involved in decentralized and sometimes informal networks to play a role in shaping the form of institutionalized cooperation at the EU level. How this was possible is a key question that needs to be addressed. Moreover, how does institutionalization of cooperation affect member states’ security apparatuses? In other words, what is the relationship between further institutionalization of cooperation and the ‘turn towards Europe’ at the national level? In addition, cooperation in the areas of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security is likely to have implications for the EU–US security relationship given the US presence in Europe and institutional linkages maintained with European states through NATO as well as bilaterally in the area of military security and intelligence within the context of the Cold War. We therefore need to ask what impact increased institutionalized cooperation between EU member states has on the transatlantic security relationship.

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Review of existing approaches The process of transformation underway in the field of European security has been approached in a number of ways. Realists and neo-realists have sought to explain increased security cooperation in Europe since the end of the Cold War as a result of power relations. Christopher Layne, for example, has provided a realist account of developments in the post-Cold War European security field. He views the ESDP as a manifestation of Europe’s desire to balance the US. Commenting on tensions between the US and the EU over the ESDP, Layne argues that current discord stems from a fundamental clash over the aspirations of the EU integration project and American ambitions in Europe. According to Layne, this situation portends a return to the realist ‘norm’ in Europe: ‘One of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one state becomes too powerful in the international system – as China, Russia, India and Europe believe the United States became in the unipolar decade following the Soviet Union’s collapse – others act to create geopolitical counterweights to it.’1 An unparalleled degree of US hegemony within the transatlantic alliance, in Layne’s view, will sooner or later draw its European allies into balancing behaviour. Neo-realism stresses the international distribution of power, largely defined in material (military) terms, as a causal variable of order emerging out of the behaviour of self-interested actors. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer thus forecast in the early 1990s an erosion of both the transatlantic alliance and EC/EU institutions in the absence of the Cold War. Their pessimistic assessment rested on the assumption that the absence of war in Europe since 1945 had been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles of Europe, the US and the Soviet Union; and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal. In other words, the distribution and character of military power were the most important factors in shaping past events. Since both Waltz and Mearsheimer assume their continued centrality, a multipolar world is believed to portend a conflict-prone future as a result of the increased number of ‘dyads’ across which war could break out. Militarily weaker states surrounding a reunited

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Germany might, for instance, find it difficult to balance German aggression.2 More recently, Seth Jones has explored the increase in security cooperation in Europe since the end of the Cold War from a neorealist approach. Structural shifts in the international and regional systems are believed to be important in accounting for increased European security cooperation. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity is also believed to have increased the likelihood of more intense security cooperation between European states in an attempt to aggregate power against the US. In addition, European powers are believed to have been motivated by concerns about the growing power of Germany and the perceived need to ‘bind’ Germany to the European integration project.3 While the dynamics of Cold War rivalry and the security guarantee provided by the US certainly encouraged the initial drive for European integration in the 1950s, transatlantic military integration cannot be understood solely by reference to the global distribution of military power. The nature of American power and the minimal degree to which it relied on coercive, military power within Europe during the Cold War was fundamental to the success of the Alliance – a point acknowledged by Jones.4 With the revival of the global capitalist system under American leadership, embodied in the establishment of the Bretton Woods System, European states took on responsibility for ensuring that their internal constitutions were favourable to the management of the revived, American-centred capitalist order. The network of military and intelligence relations underpinning their integration with the US in the political-economic arena similarly imposed largely accepted limits on the sovereignty of European states in external security and defence policy domains.5 As Mark Webber notes, American leadership in Europe helps to explain, but does not fully account for, security cooperation in Europe.6 Moreover, the demise of the bipolar context does not appear to have resulted in a return to the neo-realist ‘norm’ in Europe. While Germany has emerged as a major European power since unification and is increasingly participating in international military operations, reflecting a significant evolution in German security policy, other dimensions of its security policy indicate very different definitions of the national interest and identity than those prevalent in earlier times. While Germany has become more and more involved in

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international military operations, crucial elements of its strategic culture, such as an attachment to multilateralism, European political integration, and the constraint of the use of force through national and international norms, remain fairly constant.7 Indeed, it is in exercising these values that Germany has been able to situate itself at the forefront of efforts to advance political union in Europe in recent years. Realists tend to neglect the continued success and density of institutions within Europe. The end of the Cold War coincided not with the erosion, but the deepening and expansion of the EU. European integration has advanced not only in the economic field, but also in the area of security. Europe remains the world’s most densely institutionalized region and an example of a region in which understandings of sovereignty have, to some extent, been altered and supranational governance extended. Moreover, the EU constitutes not merely a security community among its own members, but also a powerful and prosperous core to which peripheral states do not respond with balancing behaviour, but by aspiring to membership. Enlargement of the Union has, in fact, become an important vector for change on the EU’s periphery and underpins the EU’s approach to conflict prevention, as will be seen later in the chapter on the Stability Pact. It provides a medium for restructuring economies and state institutions in a way that dilutes national identities and exclusive notions of sovereignty. In short, enlargement serves as a mechanism with which both to stabilize and tie neighbouring countries to the EU, demonstrating that order can be achieved through the transfer of particular norms reflecting the experience of European integration, based on political consensus and compromise, an incremental pooling of sovereignty and an attachment to formal rule-making. While there is an inherent tension built into the Alliance, due to the disparity in responsibility between European states and the US, it would be too simplistic to interpret European states’ search for greater autonomy within the transatlantic relationship as reflecting balancing behaviour alone. To be sure, EU member states have sought a more autonomous role in the political-military sphere in the context of an altered international political situation. Yet it must be remembered that security and defence dimensions of the European integration project never entirely came off the agenda during the Cold War years, even after the failure of the EDC. Furthermore, emerging

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cooperation in the political-military sphere has been largely realizable because it was initially seen as supporting crisis management activities, which reflects an understanding of security that departs from that contained in the realist vision of the world. Literature specifically dealing with developments in the politicalmilitary sphere has tended to suffer from similar weaknesses. Being largely descriptive, it has seldom been self-reflective about the assumptions it has made about the nature of EU member states and the formation of their preferences and interests. This burgeoning body of literature tends to address a number of specific issues deemed significant for the success of the ESDP and the future of transatlantic relations: the gap in capabilities, responsibilities, and priorities between European states and the US inevitably feature in one way or another in these analyses.8 As with neo-realist and realist accounts, EU member states are often depicted as rational, purposive actors, whose preferences and interests are formed prior to the creation of institutions. These assumptions also tend to inform studies that attempt to account for increased cooperation in the political-military field. Moreover, agreement on substantive issues is often assumed to precede institutionalized cooperation.9 Some accounts that have attempted to recognize the normative and cultural dimensions of Atlantic and EU institutions have drawn upon regime theory. Gülner Aybet, for example, argues that the web of relations that developed during the Cold War as a result of interlocking institutions within the ‘Western security community’ evolved into a regime, within which a sub-regime comprising European NATO members developed.10 Here, principles and norms are central to institutionalized cooperation within a regime. Interests emerge within specific normative and historical contexts rather than simply being assumed to exist a priori. The assumption of rational, self-interested actors is relaxed. There is, therefore, a sense in which community exists prior to the emergence of a regime. Aybet’s approach allows for a broad definition of institutions that includes informal, extra-legal arrangements, as well as formal institutions. This is important since formalized cooperation in the field of security has, to a great extent, grown out of informal arrangements. Nevertheless, he assumes that unitary states are the principal actors constituting a regime, when formalized cooperation in this area between EU member states often grew out of regular interaction

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between sub-state actors in the aforementioned informal arenas. This highlights the significance of sub-state actors in the process of institutionalizing cooperation. It is also the case that when it emerges, institutionalized cooperation does not necessarily imply a convergence of positions, which Aybet seems to take for granted. While differences may be reduced as a result of standardization of practices and deployment of resources, the precise manner in which structures of meaning are acted on will vary according to the specificities of each national context. Indeed, regime theory in general is limited in the extent to which it can capture the processes driving European security cooperation in that it also assumes a convergence of expectations, which has not been the case in relation to the field of security. Nevertheless, institutionalized cooperation advanced in this area. Moreover, cooperation often grew out of ad hoc, sometimes informal, networks rather than formal arrangements. While not directly dealing with developments in the security field, neo-functionalism has some interesting insights into the process by which institutionalized cooperation takes place, particularly the identification of an expansive ‘logic’. Neo-functionalism conceptualized integration as a result of an institutionalized pattern of interest politics, played out within international organizations. It envisaged the gradual reorientation of interest groups seeking to influence policy outcomes towards the regional level as supranational decision-making capacities increased.11 One of the central pivots of the neo-functionalist argument rests on the notion of ‘spill-over’, which is employed to characterize the mechanisms through which regional integration is thought to occur. In the late 1950s, Ernst Haas employed the notion of spill-over to refer to the way in which the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector creates pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector, as well as increasing transfer of authority to regional-level authoritative bodies.12 Neo-functionalism has the advantage of being less state-centric than regime theory, identifying the central actors as the political elites in participating countries, conceived as the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually participate in public decision-making, whether as policymakers in government, as lobbyists or associations, the spokesmen of organized labour, higher civil servants or active politicians. The emphasis on elites in the study of integration derives

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from the perceived bureaucratized nature of European organizations, as well as the perceptible difference in attitudes thought to exist between leadership levels of significant groups and those of their mass memberships.13 However, their pluralist underpinnings led them to emphasize political elites connected to competing groups within member states. This is partly due to the time in which they were writing. Neo-functionalism was developed during the early stages of European integration. Political integration has significantly advanced since then and the governance structure of the EU is now discernable. It is now evident that mid-level officials engaged in decentralized policy networks play an important role in the process of integration. Neo-functionalism also suggests a gradual increase in supranationalism. While supranational institutions, such as the Commission, certainly attempt to play a role in shaping developments in the area of security, their role has been fairly limited, due to the fact that these are overwhelmingly second and third pillar issues, i.e. they are not subject to Community law and, instead, belong to inter-governmental areas of the EU.14 Moreover, the very narrow conception of governance in Europe that this suggests, i.e. one based on the choice between the nation state and supranationalism, would create additional problems for a neo-functionalist argument. It does not provide the conceptual tools with which to address the connection between spatial levels. The more recent multi-level governance approach provides a more complex conception of the EU governance structure. Within this approach, authoritative decision making is believed to be dispersed across several levels as a result of authority being shifted to European level institutions on the one hand, and to subnational levels of government as a result of regionalization on the other.15 The result is a vision of European integration as a polity-creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared among subnational, national, and supranational levels. While recognizing that the national level continues to play an important role within the European integration process, multilevel governance acknowledges that the state does not monopolize European governance and that it has now become necessary to analyse the role of European and subnational level actors in order to comprehend European integration.16 Thus, instead of being

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superseded, states are conceived as an integral part of a multi-level polity due to the activities of national leaders, as well as sub-national and supranational actors. This approach, therefore, recognizes that the choice is, therefore, not simply between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. It also recognizes that the process of European integration is contingent. Given that it is the result of formal treaties that set out institutional competences that are constantly being built upon, the EU is thought of as being created step-by-step.17 Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks, moreover, note in general that developments in European integration were partly linked to a shift in the debate to practical matters.18 To this end, the overall importance of framing issues in ‘functional’ or ‘technical’ terms is acknowledged as having been important in enabling European integration as a polity-creating process to advance. The importance of committees and working groups in the policymaking process is also acknowledged by Hooge and Marks.19 The stakes involved for the participants of these gatherings are also recognized as factors shaping their role. However, Hooge and Marks are primarily concerned with identifying how authority and influence over the policymaking process is shared among a variety of actors from different territorial levels rather than identifying how these actors come to frame issues helps to legitimize and define areas of operation for the EU. In this latter respect, Michael E. Smith’s institutional approach to EU foreign and security policy is highly insightful. He argues that there is a two-way relationship between institutional development and shifts in the behaviour of states, which has an important impact on cooperation. Cooperation is believed to facilitate institution building, which, in turn, helps foster greater cooperation, which goes on to shape future efforts at institution building. Causality is thus conceived as running in both directions. In order to analytically capture the feedback mechanisms this entails, Smith evaluates the causal paths separately. Examining these stages individually allows him to show that cooperation is encouraged by institutionalization, and that cooperative outcomes also generate debate and reforms related to institution building and design.20 In order to capture both cooperation and institutional change, Smith engages in an analysis of dynamic rather than static institutions and one that attempts to

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capture cumulative rather than single cooperative outcomes. This approach also has the advantage of not assuming that cooperative outcomes are the result of key intergovernmental bargains.21 Smith suggests three mechanisms of institutionalization: (1) a functional logic; (2) a logic of normative appropriateness; and (3) a logic of socialization. The first mechanism identified is based on the assumption that institutional change is likely to be encouraged by the recognition that institutional arrangements may help actors further their objectives. This ‘logic’ is also present in the neo-functionalist notion of spill-over, as discussed. The second mechanism is based on the idea that new norms are likely to be informed by already established norms. The third and final mechanism identified by Smith refers to a process by which actors learn to adapt their mindsets and behaviour to those dominant within an institution. All three mechanisms, as well as traditional aspects of power, are believed to be important internal dynamics behind institutional change. While external events such as crises or major intergovernmental conferences are recognized as having an impact on institutional arrangements and may prompt change, they are not believed to explain the particular form that institutional change takes. In order to shed light on the latter, Smith maintains that the focus must be on internal sources of institutional modification.22 Webber’s security governance approach also highlights the role of internal dynamics, such as elite socialization and identity formation, in maintaining a security community. Webber’s conceptual framework aims to account for a tendency toward cooperation among sovereign states that is based on institutionalization, democratic domestic political systems, shared values, and a common sense of identity. He does so by drawing on the idea of security community, composed of states among which there is a common understanding that disputes will be settled by non-violent means. A security community also possesses a collective identity, premised on shared democratic values. Yet it is also reproduced by a dynamic of inclusion/exclusion. Security governance is conceived as the practical manifestation of security community. Governance here relates to the regulation of cooperative and peaceable relations between states on the basis of trust and shared norms and objectives. Webber is eager to stress that governance does not imply a lack of direction; it is believed to involve structure and process in the form of institutions

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and policy formulation and outcomes. Interaction between actors may also involve rivalry, contestation, and power relations.23 Webber identifies three key dimensions of security governance: (1) the idea of region; (2) institutionalization; and (3) compliance. Institutionalization and compliance are thought to be related to structure and process, while the idea of region implies that security communities and governance are likely to be more intense in geographically specific areas. Institutionalization is conceived of in terms of the density of institutions and the complexity of formal arrangements in a particular setting. Compliance, resulting from shared norms, is believed to be connected to the process of institutionalization. Socialization of representatives of member states is believed to take place through their involvement in governance networks, and organizations are also conceived as capable of norm projection and socialization. In the case of the EU, this occurs through conditionality in the context of enlargement.24 Webber’s approach is important in that it recognizes the importance of elite socialization in explaining increased security cooperation within the EU. Again, in relation to the reproduction of the security community, Webber acknowledges the importance of shared values, part of which stem from member states mutual recognition as democratic states and the status of new members. Webber also notes that the development of JHA signifies that borders within the EU are not longer contested and, moreover, that transborder communities are in the process of developing. Yet this is based on the distinction made between a secure ‘inside’ and an unsafe ‘outside’ that helps to reproduce the security community comprised of EU member states, and, at the same time, it implies the construction of a harder external border.25 As we will see, this is something that is certainly occurring as a result of the expansion of cooperation in the area of JHA. Regarding the relationship between institutionalized cooperation in the field of internal security and transatlantic security relations, a number of neo-Marxist scholars’ approaches are useful.26 With respect to new domestic practices and legal measures adopted in the name of the ‘War on Terrorism’ in Europe, as well as in Canada, Leo Panitch has recently argued that ‘The United States is now requiring all states to restructure their coercive apparatus to fit America’s strategic concerns.’27 It was certainly the case that Washington exerted considerable pressure on the EU following the September 11 attacks.

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In this respect, it highlights the importance of the US in European security developments. Nevertheless, new measures introduced by the EU after these incidents took place had been on the agenda for some time. In Europe, a growing number of threats to security have been identified as transnational and often criminal in origin. As noted, the creation of the Single Market, particularly against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War and instability on Europe’s periphery, has intensified this trend. The externalization and criminalization of perceived threats to European ‘internal security’ has provided a common perceptual framework upon which to reorganize structures and redefine the roles of the state’s coercive apparatus, resulting, inter alia, in the employment of controversial, pro-active policing and border controls. It has also provided a common framework for increased cooperation between European law enforcement agencies. The reorganization of member states’ security practices that may be linked to their changing character has a specifically European dimension. If the state’s ‘repressive functions’ are becoming dominant in Europe, this development is occurring as part of a complex process of renegotiating the terms of statehood and political community within the context of regional integration. Hence, September 11 and the ‘War on Terrorism’ may have elaborated and amplified tendencies that were already taking shape in Europe within the context of the Single Market and on a less formalized level before that. This highlights the importance of gaining a better understanding of the transformative process occurring in Europe. With regard to integration in the area of ‘external’ security, Peter Gowan’s work on the socio-economic structural foundations of transatlantic tensions in the politico-military field is indicative of the issues at stake for the EU and the US in this area.28 US ambiguity about the EU’s greater engagement in the security sphere, according to Gowan, is linked to the threat it poses to US grand strategy in Europe. Gowan argues that the defining feature of world politics since the end of the East–West confrontation has been the ‘American state’s campaign to rebuild and expand the protectorate systems that formed the basis of American global political dominance during the Cold War.’29 The ‘American protectorate system’, as described by Gowan, comprises the security alliances established between the US and other states, in which the US occupied

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a dominant and determining position by virtue of the centrality attributed to its coercive apparatuses by the complementary tasks of reviving global capitalism and guarding against a perceived Soviet menace.30 According to Gowan, the collapse of the Soviet bloc made the maintenance of the protectorate system a paramount strategic goal for the US policy establishment.31 In the early 1990s, the major challenge facing the renewal of the US-dominated protectorate system lay in Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that US dominance would be perceived as less legitimate by West Europeans, who might seek to create a West European caucus within the Alliance.32 Gowan’s argument bears similarities to regime theory insofar as it identifies the US as having played an essential role in reviving and maintaining an open world economic system. Yet Gowan’s account recognizes that the US-dominated Euro-Atlantic military alliance system was fundamental to the hegemon’s capacity to foster favourable conditions for the expansion of US capital. In this sense, he points to an important dimension of US global power. Institutionalized political alignment was underpinned internally, as well as externally, by the moral imperative of fighting Communism. This ‘imperative’ was crucial to the reviving of global capitalism following the Second World War, this time under US dominance. In Gowan’s favour, he also acknowledges that this alignment was never absolute, because of the specificities of European domestic orders.33 Taking into account the role of the alliance system in undergirding the linkage between social systems and US capitalism is also evocative of the source of US ambiguity towards greater European engagement in the ‘military security’ domain. Greater military autonomy for European states does imply greater decision-making authority within the Euro-Atlantic security arena, as mentioned at the outset. Since Washington was more accommodating to greater European autonomy as long as it took place within a US-dominated, NATO framework, it seems reasonable to conclude that what is at stake for the US is its continued political dominance. Gowan’s contention that the impact of the end of the Cold War has also been crucial in creating an opening in which some European states have been able to reorient their foreign and security policies is also correct. These factors notwithstanding, the pursuit of greater political autonomy cannot be fully comprehended without reference to cognitive-normative

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aspects of institutionalized cooperation. ‘Europe’ is increasingly framing member states’ response and adaptation to the changed international political, as well as economic environment, resulting in institutional ties between EU member states being developed in the political-military domain, and moves to consolidate a European defence industry and further joint procurement. Rather than simply providing an opportunity for unitary states to pursue their preferences, the EU governance structure has, as mentioned earlier, enabled fragments of the state to affect the evolution of the integration project. The absence of a strategic culture conducive to acceptance of US leadership within the Alliance as an expression of the general interest is only part of the story. European drive to attain greater autonomy within the transatlantic alliance and related institutional developments are partly stimulated by geo-strategic calculations. However, one has to be careful not to overestimate the importance of this factor. The process of European integration is itself partly reshaping the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ orientations of Europe states.34 It is this transformative process that needs to be better understood and incorporated into analyses of European integration in the security field. There is a very specific cognitive dimension driving deeper integration in this area, as well as in others. Much of the momentum behind cooperation in the political-military sphere is connected to the ongoing project of ever-closer political union. The ESDP, for example, is intimately linked to developing crisis management capabilities. Some states’ very notion of statehood, such as Germany’s, are deeply connected to regional integration. This dimension of change has, of course, been intensified as globalization has made exclusive notions of national sovereignty problematic. Acting collectively with other European states has in some cases been seen as a response to perceptions of declining state capacities. Also important here are the dominant structures of thought and the manner in which they are acted on. Moreover, the overwhelming focus on US efforts to retain its leadership position within the alliance system, leads to a failure to capture important aspects of the international political dimension of US global power that are perceptible when the predicament of European states is considered in more detail. In addition to the structuring role attributed to the coercive apparatuses of the American

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state, linkages between US military and intelligence agencies also played an important ‘socialising’ role within the alliance system. ‘Institutionalised political alignment’ came not only from dependence on the US coercive apparatuses in relation to the creation of permissive conditions for the expansion of European capitalisms, but also as a result of working together, to the same standards, and, in some instances, working on joint projects. Of course, the perceptual framework underpinning these relations is important, but it is not irreplaceable. If the collapse of the strategic culture that facilitated Atlantic unity during the Cold War has had serious consequences for the US capacity to lead, the ‘War on Terrorism’ seems to be providing a new foundation for ties, though this time most intensively in the field of internal security. This development appears to have been largely overlooked by Gowan, due to his focus is on the geostrategic motivations of states. Working from within a Gramscian-inspired framework of analysis, Alan Cafruny also characterizes European–American security relations as a ‘hub and spoke’ relationship. According to Cafruny, relative geopolitical weakness reduced West Europeans’ capacity to challenge US hegemony or to retain primacy in their former colonies, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa. Despite its comparative geopolitical weakness, Western Europe nevertheless possessed a strong position in the domain of the international trading arena, giving rise to its self-definition as a civilian power. This gap in military power has been further widened, due to the mutually reinforcing structures of economic and political domination that the US enjoys. Cafruny insists that the ESDP is evolving under the umbrella of the US and serves to institutionalize Europe’s subordinate position in the transatlantic relationship. Such a development is perceived as benign and consistent with the US desire to limit the costs of geopolitical dominance while ensuring that the European ‘pillar’ is fixed within the framework of Atlanticism. Three factors point in this direction: first, the continuation of European rivalry and conflicts of interest; second, the technological and economic realities of military procurement; and third, the success of the US in extending deep into Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of the War in Iraq, the improvised Franco-German initiative did not constitute a pan-European ethico-political alternative to US-led Atlanticism. In Cafruny’s view, European states lack the commitment required

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to realize their ambitions in the political-military domain and, by default, acquiesce to American supremacy.35 Cafruny is correct to point out that the EU’s failure to respond adequately to the wars in the former Yugoslavia did cause Europeans to realize that they lacked the military capacities with which to respond to crisis in their own backyard, and that their initial efforts to improve this situation within the framework of NATO were testimony to this. Nevertheless, the framework, as mentioned earlier, shifted to the EU. Moreover, while the ESDP is dependent on US military assets and Europe has been reluctant to increase defence expenditure, there is a growing momentum behind consolidation of Europe’s defence industrial base. What Cafruny identifies as a lack of commitment is better conceived of as divergences in member states’ institutional orders and political identities vis-à-vis European integration and the Atlantic alliance. The ESDP is not underpinned by a pan-European ethico-political alternative to US-led Atlanticism. The extent to which it represents a greater degree of political autonomy for Europeans should, nevertheless, not be underestimated. Moreover, while a geographic division of labour is likely to emerge, with Europe focusing on SEE, the Caucusus and Africa, and the US focusing more on Central Asia and the Far East, the division of labour in terms of tasks is not necessarily as clear cut as Cafruny suggests. The 2003 EU operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo was hardly a peacekeeping mission, but involved, inter alia, securing the town of Bunia in the Congolese province of Ituri.36 The ESDP will also allow the US to reduce the cost of geopolitical dominance. However, if this reorganization reflected only US national interests, surely the ESDP would be much less controversial in Washington. To sum up, then, neo-realism, realism, and regime theory tend to consider politics as the outcome of interactions between rational agents, understood to be unitary states. However, the institutionalization of cooperation between EU member states was not based on the convergence of pre-defined state interests; instead, it has tended to emerge out of iterative interaction, often guided by transnational policy elites. A concept of cooperation that can better capture the relationship between interest formation and the European integration process is required. In many respects, neo-functionalism was perceptive in that it identified political elites as the central actors driving integration and the integration process as a two-way process.

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What it failed to recognize, however, was that interests are socially defined and that actors are institutionally-embedded. This is remedied by the more recent approaches of European cooperation that emphasize elite socialization and dimensions of identity formation. With regard to the impact of institutionalized European cooperation on the transatlantic security relationship, a number of neo-Marxist scholars have provided some useful insights. Nevertheless, they tend to account for state activities in the external field in terms of balancing behaviour, i.e. vis-à-vis the US. The cognitive-normative dimension is underemphasized and agency is assumed to belong to states and to be constructed pre-socially. The emphasis on the politico-military sphere has also obscured the sense in which the ‘War on Terrorism’ is providing a new perceptual framework and moral imperatives with which to underwrite the post-Cold War configuration of political and economic forces. Understanding the processes by which EU member states respond and adapt to a changed global environment through integration involves exploring reorientation towards ‘Europe’ as a process of transformation in which institutions play a critical role. New institutionalist literature provides useful conceptual tools with which to do this and it is to this that I now turn.

A sociological institutionalist approach New institutionalist literature offers some useful concepts with which to explore the reorientation of EU member states towards ‘Europe’ as a process of transformation. Before setting out my own analytic framework, it is worth recapping the key tenets of new institutionalism. New institutionalists are essentially concerned with the role that institutions play in the creation of a social and political order. Several variants of new institutionalism can be identified. I follow Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor’s specification of three institutionalisms – rationalist, historical and sociological.37 Rational choice institutionalists tend to characterize institutions as formal, legalistic entities and sets of decision-making rules. The role attributed to institutions by rational choice institutionalists is linked to a particular understanding of preference formation. Rational choice theorists deal with preferences at the level of assumptions. Actors are assumed to have fixed preferences and to behave instrumentally, as well as

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strategically, so as to maximize the attainment of their goals. This is where institutions enter the analysis. The strategic calculus of actors is believed to be deeply affected by actors’ expectations about the likely behaviour of others. Institutions are believed to affect outcomes by structuring such interaction – either by affecting the range and sequence of possible outcomes, leading actors towards particular calculations, or by providing information that reduces uncertainty about the behaviour of others, enabling potentially better outcomes. Rational choice institutionalists explain the existence of institutions by reference to the value that those affected by them attribute them, which is frequently understood as the gains from cooperation accruing from the reduction of the risks and penalties.38 This type of new institutionalism resembles regime theory. As in regime theory, actors are assumed to have fixed preferences based on rational calculations of their own interests. These calculations are similarly thought to be determined by actors’ expectations about the behaviour of others. Institutions are perceived to be intervening variables, located between causal forces, i.e. the pursuit of self-interest and outcomes. Rational choice institutionalism is, however, potentially less state-centric than regime theory, which was formulated to answer a specific question, namely how institutionalized cooperation in an open, world economy governed by sovereign states was possible. In mainstream Political Science the second variant of new institutionalism, historical institutionalism, was employed by scholars who sought to recast the study of the state.39 Like rational choice institutionalists, historical institutionalists assume that institutions provide the context in which political actors define their strategies and pursue their interests. Yet in historical institutionalist analyses institutions are attributed a much greater role in shaping politics than suggested in the narrow, rational choice model.40 Peter Hall and John Ikenberry define institutions as both formal and informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy. These institutions are believed to distribute power unevenly across social groups. They are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along particular paths. Some analysts emphasize the role that policy legacies play in influencing choices, while others choose to

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emphasize the way in which past policies condition subsequent policies by encouraging societal forces to organize in particular ways, to adopt particular identities, or to develop interests in policies that are costly to alter. As a result of ‘rigidity’, historical institutionalists stress the unintended consequences and ‘inefficiencies’ generated by existing institutions, which contrasts with the rational choice view of institutions as more efficient. Historical institutionalists are also inclined to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in fairly broad terms, particularly those historical institutionalists who employ a ‘cultural approach’ and emphasize the extent to which preferences are socially defined. In this instance, institutions are believed to have the capacity to influence the preferences and goals of actors and, in doing so, structure outcomes by providing moral or perceptual templates that equip individuals with filters for the interpretation of both the situation and oneself, from which a course of action is constructed. In historical institutionalist terms, actors are not fully aware of the full implications of participating in institutional venues. Actors do not, therefore, act upon pre-defined interests. While historical institutionalism is better able to capture the role that institutions play in structuring behaviour, it tends to exhibit a structural bias. Martijn Konings makes this point specifically in relation to ‘the bringing the state back in’ school. His argument, however, helps to highlight similar weaknesses found in later elaborations and applications of historical institutionalism. Structural bias, according to Konings, stems from a failure to take into account the element of co-constitution contained in the relationship between human agency and institutional structures. Once this co-constitutive dimension of the structure-agency relationship is taken note of, he argues, the structuring quality of institutions cannot be properly apprehended without incorporating into the analysis agents’ capacity for interpretation.41 In other words, structures are properly understood as both the medium and the outcome of the (re)production of practices.42 This dimension of the relationship between human behaviour and institutions is entirely obscured by historical institutionalists (as well as rational choice institutionalists) employing a rational choice, ‘calculus approach’, since they assume exogenous preference formation. While attributing a greater constitutive, structuring role to institutions, those historical institutionalists who employ a ‘cultural

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approach’ ultimately fail to fully grasp the mutually constitutive aspect of the relationship between individual behaviour and institutions, which tends to result in institutional determinism. Sociological institutionalism, which emerged as a result of growing interest among sociologists in the capacity of cultural and organizational practices to shape the preferences, interests and identities of actors in the social world, is better equipped to capture this co-constitutive aspect of the agent–structure relationship than other strands of new institutionalism.43 Like historical institutionalists, sociological institutionalists define institutions in broad terms. However, they include not only formal rules, procedures or norms, but also cognitive and moral templates that frame the construction of meaning informing human behaviour. Actors’ preferences, interests, and identities are not assumed to be exogenous to institutions. Instead, they are thought to emanate from interaction shaped by institutions. For some sociological institutionalists, institutions are believed to affect individual action as a result of the socialization of individuals. Others have closer affinities with social constructivists working in the field of IR and tend to emphasize the way in which institutions provide the very terms through which individuals make sense of the social world. Accordingly, the influence of institutions on behaviour implies more than simply specifying what one should do in a given situation; it also defines the limits of the possible. This does not, however, mean that individuals are not goal-oriented or rational. What sociological institutionalists stress is that what individuals view as rational is itself socially constructed. Hence, rational, strategic action cannot be understood outside the institutional context in which that action takes place. Similarly, constraints or pressures experienced by individual actors are understood as the result of engagement in socially meaningful acts. When actors engage in such acts, i.e. when they act according to social convention, individuals simultaneously constitute themselves as social actors and reproduce the conventions informing their behaviour.44 Institutions in this view are, therefore, understood as established social practices that govern interaction, rather than simply formal entities, such as organizations. They are both the means and the outcome of action. Perceiving individual actors and structures as co-constitutive of one another has the advantage of making process the object of

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analysis, rather than a study of comparative statics. Moreover, by drawing attention to the ‘unconscious motivation’ of actors, rather than merely assuming that they only act upon preconceived, rational intentions, sociological institutionalists are better able to capture the structuring properties of institutions. The approach allows for a cluster of agents specific to certain situations to have an impact on the constitution of social and political structures. This means that the unitary actor assumption with regards to states is overcome.45 This is important from the viewpoint of this study, since developments in European security occur not simply as a result of intergovernmental summits, but also as a result of day-to-day, regular interactions between transnational security practitioners. Moreover, understanding individual actions and institutions as coconstitutive suggests that the outcome of individuals’ actions may not be fully comprehended by the agents themselves. It is the unconscious effects of engaging in socially meaningful behaviour that gives institutions their structuring quality. Recognizing the co-constitutive relationship between actors and institutions is, however, not enough to break with a structuralist mode of explanation. Enough theoretical room must also be left to allow actors to be innovative and thus potentially subversive of prevailing institutional norms. Sociological institutionalists contend that institutional practices are modified, not because of means–end efficiency of an organization or its participants, but as a result of when an individual ‘reworks’ such perceptual and moral templates. This implies that structures, while constitutive of the political life of the individuals that reproduce them, are, nonetheless, subject to change if and when the practices of actors change. The question then becomes one of how the schemes with which actors order social practices are modified. Some sociological institutionalists suggest that individuals adopt new institutional practices because they are considered appropriate in a broader cultural environment. Here, the stress is placed on the effects of collective interpretation and social legitimacy. However, since institutional formation has power effects that create social or political ‘realities’, reform of those institutions necessarily entails power struggles among actors, which an emphasis on processes of diffusion risks obscuring.46 In such instances, experienced as pressure, actors may take purposive action (based on established schemes), as they respond to a changing context.

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This question appears to be underexplored by sociological institutionalists. Roger Friedland and Robert Alford argue that the content of an institutional order shapes the mechanisms by which organizations are able to conform or deviate from established patterns that need to be explained. These institutional orders, and specific relations between them, delimit the types of organizational fields, and, thereby, shape the rules by which rationality is perceived and preferences are formed. Particular institutional settings may render some changes more rational than others. Friedland and Alford also remind us that it is not only change, but also the stability of interests that must be explained. To this end, institutional sources must be identified for the stability and routinization of interests as much as their transformation.47 A focus on social practices can also help us deal with the relationship between different spheres of social life, as well as the relationship between different spatial levels, i.e. the national, regional, and global, if a set of practices can be understood as informing the practical knowledge of actors in different fields, and thereby form the basis of a set of socially- and historically-informed and shared dispositions that govern political and economic life in various contexts. It suggests that an increased focus on the framing of issues, the construction of identities, and of interests in different spheres and analytic levels may be helpful.48 In order to assist in thinking further about these relationships, it is useful to look at Anthony Giddens’ treatment of the subject. His structuration theory is based on the premise that the study of human activity in the social sciences is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of the societal totality, but the duality of social practices ordered across space and time. The dualism between subject and object has, according to Giddens, to be reconceptualized in such a way as to capture them as a duality, rather than as phenomena constituted independently from one another. According to this concept, the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and outcome of the practices they repeatedly organize. That is, repeated social practices constitute both the subject and the object. Giddens conceives of this mutual constitution in the following way: the recursive ordering of social practices implies that actors exhibit some degree of reflexivity, i.e. they monitor their own behaviour, as well as that of others. This monitoring depends upon

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rationalization, understood by Giddens as ‘a process rather than a state and as inherently involved in the competence of agents. … [A]ctors – also routinely and for the most part without a fuss – maintain a continuing ‘theoretical understanding’ of the grounds of their activity.’49 This reflexivity or ‘knowledgeability’ of agents, i.e. what they know about what they are doing and their reasons for doing it, is partly driven by a tacit knowledge, or in Giddens’ terminology ‘practical consciousness’. This tacit form of knowledge largely informs things that are done habitually, on a day-to-day basis, or ‘routinization’. The routinization of activities is believed to constitute the material basis of the structured properties of social activity, which – via the duality of structure – are constantly recreated through actors’ habitual behaviour. Thus, while structures are not brought into being by social actors, they are continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities, agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible.50 ‘Structure’, according to Giddens, can therefore be understood as rules and resources recursively implicated in social reproduction. Rules, for Giddens, are not understood as formalized prescriptions, but ‘methodical procedures’ of social interaction. They comprise both codes of signification and normative elements, i.e. the constitution of meaning and the sanctioning of modes of behaviour. These two aspects of rules can only be separated for the purpose of analysis. In everyday life, the two are intertwined. The notion of accountability, for instance, expresses an intersection between interpretive schemes and norms. To be accountable for one’s actions implies a capacity to explain the reasons for them, as well as to supply the normative groundings justifying them. Resources too are believed to have two aspects: authoritative resources, which derive from the coordination of the activity of human agents, and allocative resources, which stem from the control of aspects of the material world. Structures of domination depend upon the successful mobilization of these two forms of resource, whereby ‘power “flows smoothly” in processes of social reproduction.’51 Authoritative resources are thus just as important as allocative resources. They cannot be developed without supporting authoritative resources.52 Structure thus refers to the structuring properties that make it possible for discernibly similar social practices

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to exist across varying instances of time and space, and that lend them ‘systemic’ form. The most deeply embedded structural properties or institutionalized features of social systems, implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities, Giddens refers to as ‘structural principles’. Institutions in structuration theory are those practices that have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities. By definition, they are the more enduring features of social life. Social identities and the practices associated with them are conceived of as ‘markers’ in the virtual time-space of structure. They are associated with normative rights, obligations and sanctions that, within specific collectivities, form roles.53 According to Giddens, the application of structuration theory would, first, imply analysing how actors draw upon structural properties when engaging in purposive action. Actors would be assumed to know tacitly a great deal about the context in which they act, as well as to be able to justify their actions. Primacy would thus be given to the discursive and practical consciousness of actors. A hermeneutic approach would be required in order to elucidate the frames of meaning or schemes of perception informing actors’ reasoning and the formation of interests. Studying practical consciousness implies investigating what agents already know, but do not necessarily express discursively. Their knowledge is, however, ‘bounded knowledge’, because they cannot be aware of the entirety of the conditions informing their behaviour, and because unintended consequences may result from their essentially purposive behaviour. In order to make out the boundedness of their knowledge, it would be necessary to attempt to identify the main features of the institutional components of the social systems in which they operate.54 When it comes to the transformation of social relations, Giddens suggests that we conceive it as the result of routinized intersections of practices. Since repeated social practices are both the medium and the outcome of structuring properties, which shape social relations, their intersection also implies an intersection of structuring properties. At this intersection, modifications take place. What would this imply for the transformation of institutions? As a result of the duality of structure, this would imply that the institutional orders along with social practices undergo transformation at points of intersection. Since change is conceived as the result of a conjuncture of circumstances, institutional change in various domestic settings may be expected to

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differ. Within the context of globalization, for example, pressures for increased ‘flexibility’, the specific institutions that have come under attack, as well as their significance for the labour movement, differ from country to country.55 Here, as Giddens notes, the notion of human reflexivity is important. Presumably actors attempt to order social practices based on their knowledge of how ‘to go about’ things in their immediate context, leading to diverging ‘responses’ to the influence of the same factors. Social identities and practices associated with institutions similarly would be expected to undergo some degree of transformation.56 To summarize, then, while each type of institutionalism conceives of the nature of institutions and their relationship to actor behaviour in its own way, the basic premise informing all new institutionalist analyses is that institutions affect actions and outcomes, as well as contain biases that can have power effects, i.e. distributional consequences. In this sense, they take issue with the idea that institutions simply mirror social activity or are the outcome of rational competition among disaggregated units.57 Institutions should be thought of more in terms of their cognitive-normative functions, rather than in terms of their causal capacities. I argue that sociological institutionalism provides useful tools with which to capture the process of Europeanization. In particular, it offers the conceptual tools with which to conceive of the relationship between agency and structure as co-constitutive. This, it was argued, shifts the focus to process and allows the analyst to avoid the pitfall of assuming a rational, unitary state. It was also suggested that it provides a means of conceptually linking different spatial levels and spheres, since social practices, which are identifiable, are the interface between them. The relationship between agents and institutions has to be capable of allowing for processes of social learning, i.e. adjustments in perceptual and normative schemes, as well as strategic action. However, it is the content of an institutional order that shapes its capacity to deviate from established patterns. Thus, it is the identification of this content that needs to be discerned where variations in national institutional orders bear upon a particular problem.

Europeanization Given the co-constitutive dimension of the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour set out above, it is clear that

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rational choice institutionalism would provide an inadequate conceptual framework with which to examine the relationship between the institutionalization of the EU and domestic institutions. Rational choice institutionalists would most likely seek to model the causality of the domestic ‘response’ by looking at a series of snapshots of strategic interactions between member state governments, thus favouring an intergovernmental approach. They would tend to view a national government’s behaviour in negotiations as designed to optimize its bargaining position vis-à-vis other member states. While it is undeniably the case that strategic calculations of this sort occur, the previous discussion points out that this kind of purposive behaviour has to be understood in particular institutional contexts, making it essential to grant a more meaningful shaping role to institutions than rational choice institutionalism would allow. Historical institutionalists, by contrast, would be inclined to take a longer view and to try to capture less quantifiable factors, such as informal rules and norms, as they stabilize over time, inducing the reproduction of certain patterns of behaviour. Consequently, they would tend to view the national ‘response’ to the European integration process in terms of incrementalism, with institutional change occurring largely in line with existing institutional formats, rather than as a result of rational calculations designed to maximize the government’s bargaining position within EU arenas. Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch, for example, have employed a historical institutionalist framework to examine the response of German and British national governmental systems to EU membership. They claim that in both German and British responses to ‘Europe’, historical and cultural contexts matter. They contend that the different national governmental systems have managed the European dimension of policy in ways appropriate to their national patterns of government. They also found culture and belief systems of post-war elites in the two states to be embedded in these institutional arrangements. Historical institutionalists’ emphasis on ‘path dependency’ also provides them with an explanation for the de-nationalization of some of the state’s traditional functions. They argue that the very creation of Community institutions, with identifiable competencies and powers, set in motion a path of development that could not necessarily have been predicted at the outset. On the one hand, institutional bodies, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), developed their own

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agendas. The ECJ, for example, became a vigorous supporter of the expansion of European-level policy competence and the supremacy of Community law over that of member states. On the other hand, informal patterns of interaction and norms of behaviour developed that tended to persist, and subsequent actors have had to operate within these self-reproducing scripts.58 Sociological institutionalists would share some of these concerns, but attach a greater importance to cognitive and cultural mechanisms. Transformations of national level institutions would also be viewed over the long term. Yet, the character of that agency would tend to be seen as reflective of the state’s collective identity as defined by its relationship to the integration process. Sociological institutionalist approaches are evident in various constructivist contributions of EU studies.59 Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond, for example, have attempted to map the range of discourses of globalization and European integration in contemporary Europe and to chart the strategic deployment of such discourses in various EU member countries and their linkage to European integration.60 Sociological institutionalist concerns are also evident in approaches that draw on Giddens’ structuration theory, such as that of Thomas Christiansen and Knud Erik Jorgensen’s structurationist perspective on EU treaty reform. They emphasize the way in which political actors and social structures are co-constitutive, and thereby put the stress on process. As a result, the crucial object of analysis is not member states’ interests, but the process by which these are constructed, allowing them to examine treaty reform as a continuous, open-ended process structured by institutions that are established and reproduced in the course of reform by a variety of actors.61 In this perspective, agency, including that of national governments, continues to make a difference. However, in contrast to traditional studies of treaty change, their perspective recognizes that governmental agency should be viewed in the context of institutional environment – the trajectory of past decisions, the multilateral generation of reform agendas, the institutionalized patterns of negotiation and decision-making, the constitutionalization of the EU order – which severely compromises the ability of national governments to negotiate on the basis of their ‘national interests.’62 This would clearly be well-suited to the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security fields of the EU, due to the governance structures prevailing in the second and third pillars.

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In order to characterize the integration process specialist literature on European integration often employs the concept of ‘Europeanization’ in order to draw attention to a transformative process. Europeanization is distinguished from convergence in that the latter is a consequence of Europeanization and Europeanization can sometimes lead to divergence. It is also deemed to be distinct from harmonization, since it does not necessarily reduce regulatory diversity.63 As Robert Ladrech points out, no consensus exists among those scholars that employ the concept of Europeanization as to whether it denotes a process of domestic change resulting from the impact of European integration or the emergence of EU institutions themselves. Europeanization has, for example, been employed to refer to the de jure transfer of sovereignty to the EU level, the sharing of power between national governments and the EU, the emergence and development at the European level of a distinct political system, and the extension of the boundaries of the relevant political space beyond member states. Ladrech, who was the first person to coin the term Europeanization, defined it as ‘an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.’ ‘Organizational logic’ refers to the ‘adaptive processes of organizations to a changed or changing environment.’64 The role of adaptation, learning, and policy change are thus emphasized. Ladrech clearly conceives of Europeanization as a top-down process of change. His definition, as Claudio Radaelli notes, is broad enough to accommodate processes involving policy networks, but risks obfuscating the role of the cognitive-normative dimension of change. This is important to avoid, since it is considered essential from the viewpoint of this study to understand recent developments in the European security field. Drawing upon Ladrech’s definition, Radaelli puts forward another definition of Europeanization: Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.65

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This definition was broad enough to allow for the inclusion of both structures of thought and organizations in analyses. Moreover, it does not mention EU laws or decisions of a similar level, referring instead to ‘EU public policy’ in order to include modes of governance that are not aimed at law making, such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), in which agreement often takes the form of declarations or rules of conduct that are not legally enforceable. It stresses the making of policy, without assuming there is a coherent layer of EU decisions that triggers Europeanization at the national level. As a result, it is capable of encompassing a vertical, top-down mode of Europeanization, as well as horizontal one, in which the cognitive-normative dimension plays a vital role. It is helpful to distinguish between these two types of Europeanization by situating them within the context of different forms of EU governance. In a recent article, Bulmer and Radaelli do just that. They link the vertical, top-down mode of Europeanization with ‘governance by hierarchy’, which refers to those circumstances where the supranational institutions of the EU have a considerable amount of power delegated to them to ensure that an agreed policy template is implemented by member states. There is both a hierarchical and a coercive dimension to this form of Europeanization. Here, changes in institutional practices resulting from purposive, ‘rational’ calculation can be envisaged. The horizontal mode of Europeanization involves a rather different form of adjustment to ‘Europe’ that is not brought about by pressure to adjust national policy to conform to that of the EU. This type of Europeanization obtains in situations where inter-governmental cooperation dominates and transnational policy practitioners are the major actors, and where supranational institutions have a limited capacity to promote integration. Such situations exist where the policy process is not subject to European law; where decisions are subject to unanimity among governments; where the EU is simply an arena for the exchange of ideas; or in cases of ‘facilitated coordination’. As Bulmer and Radaelli note, this kind of Europeanization has occurred in association with the CFSP, where a strong ‘impulse’ to coordinate has developed and shared policy principles have, at least to some extent, emerged as a result of ‘horizontal’ exchanges between representatives of member governments.66 Here, change is thought to occur as a result of social learning. Kerry Howell, along with Bulmer and Radaelli, identifies a third type of Europeanization that takes place during the negotiating

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stage of EU policy construction. This dynamic is thought to involve the projection of national-governmental preferences. The extent to which member governments are successful in projecting their concerns at the stage of policy formation or because of early membership may later have an impact on the extent of change at the national level in relation to top-down mode of Europeanization. When this dynamic is incorporated into the analysis, Europeanization becomes an interactive process, which involves bottom-up, as well as topdown processes. If the domestic level initiates change in the EU and affects European integration, the relationship between European integration and Europeanization is best thought of as interactive. This, in turn, suggests a repetitive and co-constitutive relationship between the EU and the institutional order of member government institutions, implying incremental change over the long term, in this instance.67

The co-determination of national and European institutional orders Given the interactive character of Europeanization, it is essential to employ a conceptual framework that can capture the interplay between different spatial levels. To this end, I employ a sociological institutionalist-inspired conceptual framework, since it is best suited to capture the co-constitutive dimension of interaction between human action and institutions – in the context of this study, between security practitioners and institutions, through the concept of social practice. In an attempt to lend greater precision to this process, I make use of a number of concepts formulated by Giddens. Firstly, I similarly assume that actors are embedded in their institutional contexts. That is to say, they draw on the rules of the structure they help to reproduce through those very actions. In doing so, they display an implicit understanding of their immediate environment and possess some notion of the consequences of their actions. This practical form of consciousness is central to the reflexive monitoring and organization of social practices and thus to the (re)production of societal structures, including institutions. Actors are likely to be capable of rationalizing their action, i.e. of explaining what they are doing and why they are engaged in doing it. In this sense, actors are purposeful and engage in strategic action. They may, however,

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have only a limited understanding of the conditions informing their action, as well as of the full consequences of their action. This observation is an important one to make, because it avoids attributing the consequences of actions to coherent intent. It may be that the full consequences of particular activities are simply not anticipated or known to the actors involved. To this end, the knowledgeability of human actors is bounded knowledgeability.68 Secondly, in carrying out their activities, actors reproduce the structures informing their action. Thus, while structures cannot be said to be brought into being by social actors, due to bounded knowledgeability, they are continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors, i.e. how they draw on institutions. ‘Structures’ are understood as rules and resources recursively implicated in social reproduction. Like Giddens, I conceive of rules as comprising both normative elements and perceptual schemes. Similarly, resources within the context of structure imply authoritative resources, which derive from an ability to coordinate the activity of human agents, and allocative resources, which are the material results of authoritative resources. Structure, then, can be conceived as the structuring properties that permit similar social practices to exist across differing spans of time and space. Institutions, in turn, refer to those practices that have the greatest time–space extension within social life. Institutions, like structures, are thus both the medium and the outcome of human action. This is particularly important in the context of this study, since it enables an examination of the creation of an institutional order at the EU level, while remaining sensitive to the consequences for and the influence of institutional orders of member states.69 While historical institutionalism would, in principle, be able to capture this through the concept of path dependency – i.e., the impact of past policies on subsequent choices as a result of societal forces organizing along certain lines rather than others, adopting particular identities, or developing interests in policies that are costly to alter – there is another dimension to embeddedness that is likely to play a significant role in informing how the policymakers of member states respond to pressures resulting from a highly institutionalized EU context, namely that of political identities formed vis-à-vis the European integration process, as well as the Atlantic Alliance. The circumstances of Germany’s involvement in the European integration

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process, for example, have been quite different from those of Britain. When Britain finally joined the EC, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had already experienced twenty years of integration. Moreover, the FRG was not treated as a fully sovereign state when it became a member of the EC, and was able to gain sovereign status through the integration process. Germany’s less exclusive notion of sovereignty is thus intimately related to its rehabilitation within the context of the European integration project. This contrasts quite starkly with the British case, in which the perceived surrender of sovereignty creates controversy at almost every formal step of integration. This is likely to be relevant to bottom-up Europeanization, as well as the responsiveness of national institutional orders to common European ‘solutions’, i.e. how they are incorporated into domestic practices. Concepts borrowed from Giddens are also likely to be of help when conceiving of horizontal Europeanization. Social identities, and the position-practice relations associated with them, are indicators of the virtual time-space of structure informing security practitioners’ activities. They provide actors with the tools to comprehend the social world and are associated with normative rights, obligations, and sanctions within particular collectivities. Horizontal Europeanization involves actors developing a common set of rules in a specific time-space environment. This implies developing a common understanding of their environment, as well as normative rights and obligations. When confronted with comprehending their new context, they are likely to draw on their respective institutional orders in order to make sense of the new situation. In doing so, one may assume that they gradually assist in creating a new set of rules common to their new collectivity, which is reflected in their purposive action and practical consciousness. This could be thought of as reflecting the new time-space positioning of actors, leading – via social practices and the duality of structure – to alterations in institutions. Certain structural features – those with the widest timespace spans – are likely to be common to all, though coloured by different domestic institutional orders and collective identities, to exist in national, regional and global contexts. Global restructuring, for example, is likely to be experienced at all levels, though perhaps instantiated differently at each level because of the specificity of institutions. As these sets of rules become institutionalized and influence practices and the allocation of material resources at the national

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level, horizontal Europeanization might be said to be taking place. Thus, in order to discern whether horizontal Europeanization has occurred or is occurring, it is necessary to examine whether the discourse and behaviour of actors, i.e. altered practices visible through the allocation of material resources, changed as a result of concepts and procedures conceived within transnational European-level policy networks. The ESDP and JHA fields of European integration are characterized by facilitated cooperation. We should, therefore, expect actors’ activities in informal arenas to play a significant role in the institutionalization of cooperation in security at the EU level. To this end, the mode of Europeanization most relevant to this study is likely to be horizontal and is most likely to occur through changes in schemes of perception and norms, or ‘learning’. While learning is important at all stages of Europeanization, it becomes especially important where the EU does not work as a law-making system, but instead as a platform for the exchange of ideas between security practitioners from member states and, in some cases, private and public bodies. In policy areas that are considered too politically sensitive to agree on an EU-level policy, such as asylum policy, the OMC allows policymakers to engage in the process of defining what constitutes ‘best practice’ and accept peer review of developments within their own member states. In doing so, they develop common understandings about the nature of the ‘problems’ at hand and about good or bad practice in relation to achieving common ‘solutions’ to them. As Bulmer and Radaelli point out, older examples of intergovernmental policymaking have also produced similar types of dynamic. Where European law is absent, soft law and political agreements are frequently used. Here, as in the case of the OMC, national ministers and officials play prominent roles, with the supranational institutions playing only a minimal one. Europeanization occurs as a result of learning among national elites, with the EU simply providing a common platform and, in instances where representatives from EU bodies participate, a clear input. Indeed, this type of Europeanization may occur when only a subset of EU member states engage in cooperation outside the formal EU framework, as was the case with the Schengen Agreements. Europeanization stemming from facilitated cooperation is, however, difficult to assess. Research on this mode of Europeanization

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needs to take care not to assume a linear relationship between the emergence of shared perceptual schemes and norms at the EU level and changes in domestic practices and subsequent deployment of resources. Claudio Radaelli points out that the difficulty lies in determining whether changes in domestic policy and practices are the result of European integration processes or the product of other forces at work at the domestic level. Therefore, when examining the impact of institution-building via facilitated cooperation, one needs to be especially attentive to the local dimension.70 One way of doing this would be to look at the various factors influencing policymakers’ thinking and then examine the degree to which ideas provided through the process of facilitated cooperation appear to matter in altering the politics of surrounding the various European security policies. However, we might more usefully conceive of ‘other forces’ as broader institutional contexts in which actors move, but are not fully aware of. To put it another way, employing the concept of bounded knowledge will help to avoid such linearity. Vertical Europeanization taking place during the negotiation phase of European policy formation is relevant to the case study on the Stability Pact. As mentioned earlier, it refers to instances in which security practitioners of particular states are successful in promoting national-governmental preferences and interests. Here, representatives of a particular member state are successful in projecting domestic institutional orders through social practices and shaping approaches at the EU level. We might, therefore, think of this type of Europeanization as occurring when one time-space structure, specifically an institution, disproportionately informs the emergence of another. This seems likely to transpire as a result of the way in which issues are framed and of perceptions of appropriate behaviour within particular institutional contexts. To summarize, sociological institutionalism seems particularly wellsuited to examine the transformational process of Europeanization. Earlier, I defined Europeanization as a process of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies. Within this definition, institutions are broadly defined. They include not only formal rules, procedures and norms, but also cognitive and moral templates

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that frame the construction of meaning-informing behaviour. Actors’ preferences, interests, and identities are not assumed to be exogenous to institutions. Similarly, sociological institutionalism defines institutions broadly and views actors’ preferences, interests, and identities as deriving from interaction governed by institutions. In this sense, there is a co-constitutive dimension to the relationship between structure and agency. Perceiving individual actors and institutions as co-constitutive of one another has the effect of emphasizing process, rather than prejudging the outcome. Stucturationism, moreover, elaborates further on the role of institutions in an important way. It suggests that the outcome of individuals’ actions is not fully comprehended by the agents themselves and that it is these unconscious effects of engaging in socially meaningful acts that gives institutions their structuring qualities. Europeanization, as defined above, implies that changes in institutional practices take place not as a result of rational egoism, but as a result of the reworking of perceptual and normative frameworks. From a sociological institutionalist perspective, institutions are modified in the same way. In the structurationist framework outlined here, institutions undergo change if and when the practices of actors change. Given that social practices are both the medium and the outcome of structuring properties, which shape social relations, their intersection implies an intersection of structuring properties. At the point of intersection, modifications are likely to occur. This means that institutional orders, along with social practices, undergo transformation at the points of intersection. Since change is conceived as the result of a conjuncture of circumstances, institutional change in various domestic settings is likely to vary. This is because actors are reflexive; they attempt to order social practices based on their practical knowledge, resulting in diverging responses to the same factors. Since their practical knowledge reflects their institutional embeddedness, institutional orders shape the mechanisms by which organizations are able to conform or deviate from established patterns, which suggests that the institutional sources of stability, as well as change, are important. In relation to change, structurationism’s focus on and specification of social practices also helps us to deal with the relationship between different spheres of social life, as well as that between different spatial levels. In terms of the ‘mechanisms’ of Europeanization, it

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implies an increased focus on the framing of issues, the construction of identities and interests in different spheres of social activity and analytical levels is required. Applying this conceptual framework in the case of horizontal Europeanization requires, firstly, identification of the actors involved in informal networks in order to discern the position-practices of these actors. Secondly, having done this, it is possible to make suppositions about the way in which the issues are most likely have been framed by them. This is helpful in discerning their knowledgeability. Thirdly, it is important to ascertain the ‘boundedness’ of their knowledgeability in order to make out the unintended consequences of their practices. This is important because it is likely to illustrate the sense in which their practices are more closely linked to their more immediate contexts, thereby avoiding attributing too much coherence to developments. Fourthly, I identify the extent to which common ‘rules’ (perceptual schemes and norms) have emerged in the context of informal/decentralized networks. I then show how the ‘rules’ established by these practitioners gain authority and begin to inform policy and determine resource allocation at the national level. Here, I look for the creation of common ways of understanding ‘problems’ that are distinctly European, rather than reflecting particular national institutional orders. Fifthly, I identify the diffusion of those rules to the national level and show how they are affecting resource allocation. Here, I look for signs of European ‘solutions’ elaborated in these decentralized policy networks informing policy and resource allocation. Sixthly, I consider other factors that could have influenced shifts in cognitive-normative frameworks and the deployment of resources. I demonstrate how domestic institutions were responding to broader issues and encouraging further formal integration, particularly in relation to the end of the Cold War. In relation to the kind of vertical Europeanization examined in this study, it is necessary, firstly, to discern what position-practices and identities appear to play a role in policy formation. In the case of the SP, this implies showing how German security practitioners, in particular, understood the problem and how to go about dealing with it, and how their way of apprehending the problem reflected German collective identity and German strategic culture. Secondly, it means identifying how the EU’s shift in approach to SEE has been shaped by the practical knowledge and identities of German practitioners.

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Lastly, I attempt to discern how the broader institutional contexts were influential in enabling the promotion of their preferences and interests during the policy formation stage. The questions informing the case studies dealing with the ESDP and JHA are, thus: (1) what actors are involved in policy networks?; (2) what position-practices have they brought to bear on institutionbuilding within these contexts?; (3) what common understandings and norms have they developed in decentralized policy networks?; (4) to what extent do these new rules appear to have diffused to the national level?; and (5) how have broader institutional contexts influenced the ‘turn towards Europe’? In relation to the case study on the establishment of the SP, the relevant questions are: (1) what were the position-practices and identities of German practitioners involved in the creation of the SP and how have they helped to shape the EU’s current approach to SEE; and (2) what role have the broader institutional contexts of actors played in bringing about this outcome?

Conclusion This chapter began by outlining the shortcomings of the literature addressing developments in post-Cold War European security. It was argued that descriptive accounts, as well as those self-consciously theoretical accounts drawing on neo-realism and realism, and regime theory, tend to suffer from a number of weaknesses. Firstly, states are often assumed to be unitary actors rationally pursuing their preferences and interests, which are taken as given. Secondly, in many analyses, a narrow conception of EU governance, which views the continuation of the nation state and the growth of supranationalism as mutually exclusive, fails to provide the tools with which to address the connection between different spatial levels. In the absence of the emergence of a supranational state, many observers have sought to explain European cooperation as a result of unitary states coming together because of shared interests, when the EU governance structure, in fact, allows fragments of the state an important role in driving the direction of integration. The neo-Marxist accounts discussed tend, for their part, to give insufficient weight to the cognitive dimension of the European integration process. In addition, this has led Gowan and Cafruny to somewhat overlook the importance of the

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‘internal’ security domain for the future of the European-American security relationship. In view of these shortcomings, I suggested that new institutionalism could provide useful concepts with which to account better for recent developments in the area of European security. I discussed the various strands of new institutionalism. Common to all variants – rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism – is the assumption that institutions affect actions and outcomes, and that they can have power effects with regards to the distributional consequences. To this end, new institutionalists, with the exception of the rational choice version, contest the notion that institutions simply reflect social activity and are the result of rational competition between disaggregated units. Lastly, I set out a sociological-institutionalist-inspired analytical framework in order to be better able to capture the co-constitutive character of the European integration process. It adopts an understanding of actors as embedded in their immediate institutional contexts. These actors draw on the institutional orders they help to create when taking purposive action. Yet their practical knowledge is bounded in the sense that they cannot be aware of the entirety of factors influencing their actions, or the full consequences of those actions. Unconscious motivation and unintended effects thus enter into the analysis. The focus on agency and institutions is important in relation to horizontal Europeanization because it helps to avoid depicting the state as a unitary actor and can accommodate a wider conception of governance within the EU than those accounts discussed in Chapter 1. In addition, it provides the conceptual tools with which to address the connection between different spatial levels while focusing on developments in both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security fields. Drawing attention to the embeddedness of actors also helps to account for variations in the way in which different EU member states respond to pressures resulting from a highly institutionalized context. And, finally, it allows us to capture the impact of the position-practices and identities of security practitioners during the construction of policies, which provides insight into the ‘mechanisms’ of vertical Europeanization.

Part II The Case Studies

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3 The European Security and Defence Policy

Introduction In the early 1990s, the politics of European security was characterized by divergences between major members of the EU. On the one hand, some countries, like Britain, were in favour of the Alliance’s primacy and opposed to any transfer of competence in security matters to the EU. On the other hand, France was reasserting its desire to strengthen its relationship with Germany, and suggested raising its military collaboration with Bonn to a European level.1 During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, European politicians and officials were painfully reminded of their dependence on American military assets provided via NATO, as well as the need to develop the tools with which to respond effectively to crises. The wars acted as a catalyst for the development of the CFSP. At the 1992 Maastricht European Council meeting, it was decided that the CFSP would replace EPC as the second pillar of the EU.2 As a result, the 1992 TEU was the first treaty to contain provisions anchoring the Union’s responsibilities in the field of security. Lacking military capabilities of its own, the Treaty envisaged that the EU would request the WEU to plan and implement military measures on its behalf.3 The defence aspect of political union was, nevertheless, put on hold. Pursuing greater autonomy within a NATO framework proved unsatisfactory, however. In 1999, the governments of EU member states agreed to create an EU security and defence policy to support its common foreign and security policy. This was a significant development, since it gave the EU a military role that it hitherto lacked, even though it stopped short of common defence. 53

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As mentioned, accounts of the ESDP that draw on the traditional terms of IR theorizing explain increased cooperation in this area as the result of states acting as coherent, undifferentiated units, rationally pursuing their interests. This, however, would have failed to capture the governance structure in the area of ESDP, which gives actors in informal and/or decentralized policy networks a fundamental role in driving developments. Having neglected this, they would have been unable to detect the way in which national interests are formed and modified through the interaction of practitioners active within specific institutional contexts. This suggests that the focus should be on practitioners engaged in the policy-making process and their position-practices, rather than on monolithic states and their interests. Moreover, when these dimensions are taken into account, interpretations of the significance of the ESDP for transatlantic security relations that explain developments as the result of balancing behaviour vis-à-vis the US are left wanting. In this chapter, I first briefly outline the reframing of the defence issue and emergence of the common ESDP. I discuss how the ESDP developed in response to ‘technical’ requirements or ‘capability needs’, rather than any grand ideas about military integration as such. Secondly, I contend that even though the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy area, largely Brussels-based political and military bodies play an important role in the ongoing capabilities development process. Thus, instead of being driven by inter-state bargains, struck on the basis of pre-defined interests and identities, the ESDP is to some extent being elaborated within a decentralized policy network. I therefore look at the way in which actors within these networks, which are embedded in particular institutional contexts and possess a specific knowledgeability, have come together to form common ways of viewing the ‘problem’. I then show that while they consciously pursue certain ‘technical’ objectives, the consequences of their activities extend far beyond those immediate ‘technical’ questions and have significant political consequences. ‘Filling the capabilities gap’ is, in fact, leading to the integration of European militaries and defence industries, as well as the growth of Brussels-based institutions with responsibility in these areas. There is thus a sense in which an expansive logic is created, leading to a re-orientation towards ‘Europe’. However, as will be shown, the emergence of a common security identity, which is based on some notion of the ‘common good’, is also beginning to

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drive developments that affect state sovereignty as it is expressed in the deployment of armed forces. Finally, I look at the significance of increased military cooperation within the context of the ESDP for transatlantic security relations, particularly with respect to EU–NATO relations.

Reframing defence: The emergence of the ESDP As mentioned in Chapter 1, a number of initiatives were taken prior to the establishment of the ESDP to encourage military cooperation between EC member states, none of which got off the ground. They included the 1950 Pleven Plan, which envisaged the formation of a European army attached to the political institutions of a united Europe, and the EDC treaty, which was less supranational and envisaged a close relationship with NATO. In the early 1960s, France also put forward several proposals aimed at reducing Europe’s dependency on the defence and military assets of NATO and, therefore the US, as well as reforming Europe by transforming it into a voluntary union of independent states. Following the end of the Cold War, greater autonomy within the Alliance was once again sought by Europeans. This necessarily implied developing more autonomous military capabilities, since NATO’s military capabilities were essentially those of the US. The issue was thus framed in terms of ‘capability requirements’. Efforts were made both informally and formally to reduce Europeans’ dependency on US military assets. A low level of integration with the US in the field of intelligence, compounded by the Gaullist tradition, placed France in the vanguard of efforts outside the EC/EU framework to strengthen Europe’s military autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the US at this time, specifically in relation to intelligence and C4I capabilities.4 Dependence on the US during the 1991 Gulf War and Bosnia peace implementation force (IFOR) from 1995–6, for example, convinced the majority of French security practitioners that Europe needed to improve its autonomous collection capabilities, particularly with regard to space-based assets.5 Germany has tended to share French concerns about relying on US intelligence.6 During the Kosovo conflict, German defence officials complained that on three occasions, the US provided inadequate or misleading material that had implications for German forces on the ground.7 Consequently,

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Germany has also, albeit sporadically, been involved in efforts to enhance Europe’s intelligence capacities. In relation to Europe’s imagery intelligence capabilities, French policymakers have also worked hard to strengthen the European capacity to interpret the resulting intelligence data. A major part of this effort was the creation of the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejon in Spain, which became operational in March 1993. The Centre is funded by France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain, Belgium, and Holland. It initially purchased French SPOT satellite images, later obtaining images from India’s IRS-1C, Hélios 1 and Russian satellites. It also orders images from ERS-1 and 2 (European Space Agency), Landsat 4 and 5 (USA), and Radarsat (Canada).8 The Torrejon Satellite Centre has since been transferred to the EU in support of the ESDP. In order to reduce Europe’s dependence on NATO and US C4I capabilities and infrastructure, France showcased a C4I capability during a multinational exercise involving France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal by using command and information systems with intelligence assets such as Hélios. Work is also underway on a Franco-German successor to the Sycaruse II network, which presently provides French forces with virtually global connectivity.9 The European desire for greater autonomy was, however, initially formally accommodated within the framework of NATO. At the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, member states approved the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) – an instrument aimed at facilitating European efforts to develop ‘separable but not separate’ capabilities through the WEU.10 WEU-led crisis management operations were to be enabled by the US-inspired concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The idea behind the CJTFs was to provide a framework within which NATO could continue to provide the command and organizational means necessary for multi-national, wide-ranging missions that would not always include the entire NATO membership. They thus implicitly provided the US with a way of maintaining control over decision-making within the transatlantic alliance and enshrined the EU’s dependence on NATO/US capabilities, without guaranteeing that those capabilities would be available in the event of a crisis situation.11 The ESDI, therefore, provided a means of strengthening a ‘European pillar of defence’ within the framework of NATO. Improving European capabilities within a NATO framework, however, failed to provide sufficient incentive and, as far as some

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in Europe were concerned, did not go far enough towards allowing greater European autonomy. Difficulties of coordination within NATO and the degree of control exerted by the US during the intervention in Kosovo appeared to galvanize European governments into taking further steps towards developing greater autonomy in terms of political decision-making and military capacity – this time, however, within the framework of the EU. Two significant events took place in December 1998. At Potsdam, on 1 December, the French and German governments issued a joint statement, which declared that they were in the process of defining a CFSP and a common defence policy, that they continued to be committed to integrating the WEU into the EU, and that they recognized the importance of equipping the EU with its own military and operational capacities. These capacities were to be created either from within the WEU framework, from multinational forces, such as the Eurocorps,12 or via capabilities made available by NATO, as agreed at the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996. The Franco-German meeting was followed by a Franco-British meeting on 3–4 December. The outcome of the latter was the much heralded St Malo Declaration, which affirmed that the EU required ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by a credible military force, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’ so that the EU could ‘take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.’13 What is important here is that military cooperation was framed in terms of supporting crisis management, rather than common defence, making it much easier for all states, including neutrals, to agree on. In addition, at the time, and perhaps still, framing ESDP as dealing with crisis management alone was probably the only way forward for the EU in order not to duplicate NATO. The St Malo Declaration was clearly aimed at the European objective of gaining greater political and military autonomy within a restructured Alliance.14 Doing so by engaging the EU in common external action in the area of crisis management logically led to the construction of a common European security and defence policy as a distinctive part of the CFSP. The ESDP, however, lacked a treaty basis, since the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty still provided for the WEU to be called upon to plan and implement military action on the EU’s behalf. At the European Council summit in Cologne in June 1999, member states made it known that they were determined to see the

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Union play a greater role on the international stage and that they intended to give the EU the ‘necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.’15 Not unsurprisingly, the St Malo Declaration focused on the question of capabilities development. Specifically, EU member states set themselves the so-called Headline Goal at the Helsinki summit. The aim was to put at the EU’s disposal a military force, specified as the creation of a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days, with additional air and naval capabilities as needed, and sustainable in the field for up to one year.16 The missions assigned to this rapid reaction force are those defined at Petersberg in 1992 by the WEU and inscribed in the TEU – the so-called Petersberg tasks. These include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.17 In order to be able to carry out these operations, particular attention was given to the means necessary to fulfil them, notably deployability, sustainability, interoperability, mobility, survivability, and command and control. At Laeken in December 2001, the ESDP was declared operational. However, it was emphasized that the continued development of means and capabilities would allow the Union to take on more demanding operations.18 As part of the ESDP, EU member states also committed themselves to strengthening the Union’s civil component of crisis management capabilities. With the experience of Bosnia, particularly the civil administration of Mostar by the WEU, the European Multinational Protection Force (EMPF) in Albania and the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Operation Alba, also Albania, the Union has acquired considerable expertise in civilian crisis management, making it an obvious area to be developed further within the ESDP. At the Santa Maria da Feira European Council summit in June 2000, member states agreed on an Action Plan aimed at improving capabilities in the areas of police cooperation, the rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. The Action Plan declared member states’ intention to create, by 2003, a pool of 5000 police officers, 200 judges, prosecutors, and other experts, assessment teams to be dispatched within 3–7 hours, as well as intervention teams consisting of up to 2000 people for deployment at short notice, able to assist in humanitarian actions through emergency operations.19

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In order to achieve this objective, it was decided at the European Council summit in Helsinki in December 1999 that permanent, mostly Brussels-based, political and military bodies should be established within the Council structures. These included a Political Security Committee (PSC) – the EU’s equivalent of NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC)20 – the EU Military Committee (EUMC) – an EU military authority – and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) – a military staff tasked with implementing the decisions of the EUMC, performing early warning, situation assessments, and strategic planning for crisis management, including identification of relevant forces. These institutions were established under the 2000 Nice Treaty. The Treaty also transferred a number of institutions that were previously part of the WEU acquis to the EU, namely the WEU’s Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, and its Institute of Security Studies. These institutions were added to two other bodies that were established within the Council under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (as part of the CFSP): the post of Secretary-General of the Council, currently held by Javier Solana, who also acts as high representative for the CFSP, and a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), tasked with monitoring, analysis, and assessment of international developments. It also provides policy recommendations to the Council and assists the high representative.21

Europeanization of military security Analyses of the ESDP that rely on the assumptions of conventional IR theorizing would lead us to believe that the growth in cooperation in this domain is the result of states rationally pursuing their interests at summits. It is true that, in formal terms, the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy, based on consensus. Qualified majority voting (QMV) does not yet exist in this policy domain. This means that member states can neither be outvoted nor compelled to contribute forces or funds for operations against their will. If no member state wishes to contribute capabilities, operations simply cannot take place. The only way of bypassing the requirement of unanimity lies in the option of abstaining in a vote, not participating in an operation, and not contributing funds to it. Denmark, for example, has even negotiated an explicit ‘opt-in’ (rather than ‘opt-out’) clause, whereby it is automatically exempt from participating in the

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implementation of the policy unless it decides to do so. In comparison to member states, the Commission, European Parliament, and European Court of Justice have rather limited formal roles.22 Official decisions related to the ESDP are taken at the highest Council level, be it the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of EU ministers or, whenever appropriate and necessary, the European Council itself. Even proposals entailing first, or even third, pillar measures – which lie in the competence of the EU Finance (ECOFIN) or JHA ministers – are formally agreed and adopted by heads of state or government. At present there is no Council of Defence Ministers. EU ministers of defence can only meet either informally – i.e., without taking decisions – or in conjunction with the GAERC.23 However, assuming that states are the principal actors, bargaining with each other on the basis of their national interest to achieve desirable outcomes, would make it impossible to ‘see’ the decentralized nature of the policy framework in this area of European integration. The set of bodies tasked with implementing the Petersberg tasks and supporting capabilities are beginning to develop a greater capacity to influence the policy process as a greater degree of decentralization takes place.24 The Council Secretariat has, for instance, an improved capacity to shape developments, which essentially means that an EU administrative body is gaining in prominence, alongside the intergovernmental military and political structures. The role of the High Representative has evolved significantly. While it has remained minimal in those areas where there is either no consensus or open dissent about developments, it has broadened its scope and visibility in others. The High Representative has also gained some room for autonomous initiative in policy formulation. His office was, for instance, responsible for the formulation and elaboration of the European Security Strategy (ESS). Perhaps most importantly, the gradual increase in the number and technicality of issues dealt with under the banner of the ESDP means that a number of actors, including military experts acting in an international capacity, the Council secretariat, and national experts from the member states have been taking part in different working group formations in Brussels and have been central to the development of common ‘rules’ – both symbolic and normative – that have had an important influence on the policy process and the resulting allocation of resources.25 Defence ministers have only recently become more directly involved in giving

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guidance to these working groups. Thus, while officially designated as an intergovernmental policy area, the ESDP is largely driven by the activities undertaken by transnational policy practitioners within decentralized policy networks. These actors are, moreover, gaining an ever greater ability to influence the policy process as more and more decentralization takes place. Rather than rationally acting states being the principal actors driving integration in the domain of security policy and military planning, mid-level officials and military representatives active within this Brussels-based policy network have a significant role to play in the policy process. The influence that these actors have on the development and implementation of the ESDP is intimately related to their knowledgeability and their framing of the ‘problem’. Initially, the capabilities development process was predominantly framed in a ‘technical’ manner, the emphasis being on building up the capabilities with which to carry out the Petersberg tasks as outlined in the first Headline Goal.26 The capabilities review process nevertheless acted as a platform for the development of common understandings about best practice at this stage. Some capabilities issues have become common European ‘problems’ and common solutions to them have been sought within this decentralized framework. To this end the capability development process contains efforts to harmonize military requirements, amounting to a form of regulative effort at the European level, driving Europeanization, although it is ‘soft’ and bottom-up in its approach. Framing issues as ‘technical’ also created a type of expansive ‘logic’ as issues became linked and as new EU-level bodies had to be created. As the process went on, however, and the second 2010 Headline Goal was established, a common understanding of the security environment and appropriate responses to it, as embodied in the ESS, began to inform the process and, specifically, to influence force structures. In this section, I look more closely at the capabilities development process in order to gain a better understanding of how Europeanization in this field is occurring. First, I examine how actors most heavily implicated in the Capabilities Development Mechanism establish a common set of ‘rules’. I look at what understandings and norms emerge from these decentralized policy networks, or, put another way, the way in which actors, embedded in particular institutional orders have come together and formed common ways of viewing the ‘problem’

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and responding to it. I then consider how these ‘rules’ are, at least in some cases, altering the institutional orders and thus ‘external’ security apparatuses of key member states. The capabilities development mechanism The implementation of the Headline Goal got underway soon after it was agreed in late 1999. It involved the development of capabilities in the absence of firm agreement on the kinds of missions the EU might undertake. A Headline Goal Task Force (later to become the EUMS), comprising national defence planning experts, began to work on the capabilities question in late 2000, supported by an interim body that would later become the EUMC. Thus, the major participants were defence officials and military representatives. The Task Force drew up an inventory of the projected capability requirements of the future EU crisis management force. Based on this inventory – the Helsinki Headline Catalogue – member states specified what they were able to contribute to the Headline Goal Force and, at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000, they agreed, on a voluntary basis, to earmark these military forces for the creation of a crisis management force. While the target number of troops was declared met at the conference, qualitative shortfalls remained, particularly in the areas of strategic lift, deployable operation headquarters and C4I. In order to address these ‘gaps’, a review mechanism was initiated. Its objective was to evaluate EU capability goals, monitor the force catalogue, identify and harmonize national contributions, as well as to review progress towards already agreed contributions, both in terms of interoperability and availability.27 In November 2001, member states agreed to set up a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), with a view to providing a framework within which the remaining shortfalls could be addressed. The ECAP contained 19 panels of national defence planning experts, each tasked with developing strategies with which to close the ‘capabilities gap’. The panels met independently and were composed of at least one ‘lead nation’ per panel. Panels reported to EUMC, their work being validated by the Headline Goal Task Force (EUMS), which is composed of military staff.28 Again, participants would have been drawn from the defence establishments and armed forces of member states. These actors were thus concerned with developing European military capabilities based on a number of operational scenarios. In

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other words, they conceived of the ‘problem’ in ‘technical’, military terms. The ECAP panels presented their final reports in March 2003, in which they made recommendations for rectifying shortfalls. Some of these shortfalls could be met by revising member-state contributions. Others, however, would require large-scale procurement projects. Based on these findings, ECAP launched a second phase in the spring of that year, aimed at implementing the recommendations of the panels. A number of Project Groups (PGs) were established by the EUMC and the PSC to develop measures to tackle shortfalls.29 According to a source interviewed by the author, technical issues were discussed in the project groups, which were comprised of military representatives and engineers.30 The PGs focused on the implementation of concrete projects. Many had a qualitative focus and concentrated on multinational solutions. The NBC PG, for example, aimed at the creation of a multinational NBC battalion, and Strategic Air Lift PG aimed at the creation, in 2005, of a multinationally coordinated air transport resource. Different types of EU Coordination Centres, for example regarding strategic sealift, were also discussed, as well as the creation of a pool of experienced staff officers.31 The capabilities question was thus not only becoming a European rather than a national issue, but was also giving rise to common European solutions. In other words, closing the ‘capabilities gap’ was leading to greater military integration. In terms of these actors’ knowledgeability, this is most likely to have been viewed as a ‘logical’ outcome of improving European capabilities, given the cost of procuring military equipment and the fairly limited defence budgets of individual member states, even if it was not their intent. A number of other consequences, however, are unlikely to have been foreseen. To the extent that they were not, this illustrates the bounded nature of their knowledge. While the ECAP process was originally intended to operate on a bottom-up, voluntary basis – i.e. member states themselves were responsible for the delivery of military capabilities through the direction of the ECAP PGs – greater coordination at the EU level quickly became necessary. With pressure upon member states to offer capabilities, and overcoming deficits being a political issue rather than a legal requirement, the PGs lacked coherence, which in turn threatened to jeopardize the realization of the Headline Goal.

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According to a source interviewed by the author, the PGs were quite wild at first.32 The fact that some PGs requested greater guidance is an indication that a great deal was left to military experts to work out rather than having been decided beforehand at summits. This eventually led the EU Council to establish a means of monitoring the PGs’ progress vis-à-vis attainment of the Headline Goal. The EUMS was subsequently tasked with developing an ECAP ‘road map’ intended to provide greater guidance to the groups, and to assist them in bridging the gap between the voluntary basis on which ECAP Project Groups operate and the attainment of the Headline Goal. Defence Ministers are also likely to become more involved in the capabilities development process.33 A Capabilities Development Mechanism was created in early 2003. While the capabilities process had already been informally institutionalized, with force catalogues being produced on a yearly basis and progress catalogues every second year, and Capabilities Commitment Conferences held regularly, the Development Mechanism further formalized the relationships between the actors involved in the process, and also between the EU and NATO through consultative channels. To this end, it provides an obvious example of how iterative contact creates trusted relations and how soft law has practical implications. There have, of course, been other consequences of meeting a ‘capabilities gap’. As mentioned, the capabilities process has increasingly involved defence research and procurement issues, which themselves are linked to questions of national as well as European economic growth. The interrelationship between these issues has resulted in the inclusion of the defence industrial concerns in deliberations: whereas the first phase of the ECAP process did not involve a defence industry dimension, National Armaments Directors (NADs) and representatives from the defence industry have since become involved in the ECAP framework, particularly in relation to the establishment of the defence capabilities and acquisition agency. This is testimony to the expansive ‘logic’ created by the framing of the issue as an ‘objective need’, creating additional ‘requirements’ leading to the expansion of the issue. In order to encourage cooperation in the area of procurement, as well as in joint development, in June 2003 in Thessaloniki, the European Council tasked the relevant bodies of the Council with

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taking the necessary steps towards the creation of an intergovernmental agency, the European Defence Agency (EDA), dealing with capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments during 2004. In February 2004 an Agency Establishment Team (AET) was set up to prepare the conditions for the creation and the operational dimensions of the Agency. In particular, the AET took forward work on the financial, legal and administrative aspects of the Agency’s creation and specified missions. Based on the final report of the AET, RELEX counsellors and COREPER34 worked out a ‘Joint Action on the Establishment of a European Defence Agency (EDA)’, which GAERC adopted in mid-June. The precise role of the Agency will be to: (1) develop defence capabilities in the field of crisis management; (2) promote and enhance European armaments cooperation; (3) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implement policies and measures aimed at strengthening the European Defence Industrial Base; and (4) promote, in liaison with the Commission where appropriate, research aimed at fulfilling future defence and security capabilities requirements. The agency will initially act as a coordinating point for existing armaments bodies (OCARR, LoI, Framework Agreement, WEAG/WEAO),35 and will assist the Council in the capabilities development process. When fully operational, it will be responsible for coordinating operational needs and capability acquisition and development, and will incorporate relevant elements of pre-existing arrangements.36 A link between military planning and defence research and procurement has thus been brought within the EU framework, as well as strengthened. This is perceived as particularly important for harmonizing capability requirements, fostering standardization of equipment, and translating common capability needs into procurement projects.37 EDA operates under the supervision of the Council. The High Representative provides the link between the agency and the Council. The Steering Board, the decision-making body of the agency, is composed of Defence Ministers from the 24 participating states, i.e. all EU member states except Denmark. A representative from the Commission and the chairman of the EUMC also participate in twice-yearly steering board meeting, as well as attend meetings at all levels.38 The relationship between the agency and the Commission is one of exchange of expertise and advice in those areas where the activities of the Community have a bearing on

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EDA’s mission and where the activities of the agency are relevant to those of the Community. The agency therefore consults with the Commission on issues related to strengthening the Defence Technology and Industrial Base (DTIB) and creating an internationally-competitive defence equipment market, as well as maximizing complementarity and synergy between defence and civil or security-related research programmes. The Commission representative’s objective is to bring to the table what is being done within the Community.39 As a result, it is likely that an economic imperative will constitute an increasingly important part of the way in which the issue is framed. It is probable that the Steering Board will also meet at the level of National Armaments Directors, national Research Directors and national capability planners. The agency will also consult representatives from the defence industry.40 Day-to-day business will be carried out by European and national civil servants working within the agency. This means that officials from the Commission, senior defence officials from member states, as well as representatives from the defence industry, will have a significant influence on EDA’s activities, suggesting that the agency will propel the creation of a continental defence industrial and procurement market forward. The framing of the ‘problem’ in ‘technical’ terms has thus given Brusselsbased security practitioners greater influence in directing developments. One of the major initiatives of EDA thus far has been the establishment of a voluntary code of conduct designed to increase peer pressure in the area of procurement.41 This was based on the belief that there is a need for common standards. In the absence of a legal mechanism with which to do this, employing peer pressure to bring about greater standardization is perceived as a must. The agency also seeks to establish a set of benchmarks and milestones with which to evaluate progress, particularly in the area of interoperability, deployability, and other critical requirements, the end goal being to provide the capabilities that the ESDP ‘requires’. It will increasingly participate in the Capabilities Development Mechanism. It may also translate Council capabilities guidelines into specific plans of action for ECAP PGs. In practice, this will mean that experts from EDA will assist the ECAP PGs. Over time, the initiatives and projects of EDA will feed into the ECAP process. In fact, some of the PGs became Integrated Defence Teams (IDTs) within EDA, which is indicative of the degree of synergy between EDA and

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the Capabilities Defence Mechanism.42 If successful in its mission, the agency will encourage closer defence industrial cooperation, aimed at strengthening Europe’s industrial potential in the area of strategic industries, and establish a link between military planning and defence research and procurement, which will also result in a greater harmonization of capability requirements, standardization of equipment and, thereby, increasing common European procurement projects.43 A Brussels-based organization will thus increasingly coordinate the research and procurement activities of EU member states – something that would have been anathema to member states several years ago and continues to be a sensitive issue for some. A second headline goal – the 2010 Headline Goal – which was put together following the divisions over the war in Iraq, as well as in view of impending enlargement of the Union, has been guided by the EU’s security strategy, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, which was formulated by the High Representative’s team. This means that an emerging EU security identity is now advancing developments further. The ESS’s emphasis on the need for a comprehensive approach to security, i.e. one that is able to address both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of security, suggests that the capabilities issue will gradually become more and more linked to concerns about how to make the most of Europe’s technological base. In many instances civil, security, and defence applications draw upon the same technology. Technologies initiated for US defence purposes, for example, have led to significant commercial developments – the Internet and the Global Positioning System (GPS) being among the best-known examples. This implies the need for increased coordination in the development of other capabilities in order to encourage not only cost-effective and interoperable solutions, but also commercial benefits. A report, entitled ‘Research for a Secure Europe’, produced by the Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research – an informal body, set up outside of the EU framework comprising academics, European Commissioners and parliamentarians, representatives from industry, members of the network armaments bodies, and the EU High Representatives – has recently put forward this exact argument, stressing the additional commercial benefits of promoting a common technological base. During the negotiations of the EU budget for the period 2007–13, the Commission promoted the establishment of a security research

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programme, which would focus on security threats that affect a broad range of policy areas. For example, the security programme could fund new technologies, such as iris scans, that would be linked to attempts to identify people involved in terrorist activities at border checkpoints.44 Moreover, by identifying threats to Europe as a whole, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, and organized crime, the ESS45 has led to more detailed defence planning at the European level. Whereas the first Headline Goal was framed in terms of reducing a ‘capabilities gap’, i.e. in ‘technical’ terms, the 2010 Headline Goal is largely informed by the ESS, which calls, inter alia, on member states to ‘voluntarily transform their forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability, both at technical, procedural and conceptual levels’.46 It is also informed by the ‘evolution of the strategic environment and of technology.’47 The emphasis is much more on military integration than was the case in the previous Headline Goal and identifies a list of desired milestones within the period up to 2010. It envisaged, for example, the creation of a civil-military cell within the EUMS in 2004, in accordance with the December 2003 European Council Conclusions; the establishment of EDA in the course of 2004; the implementation of EU Strategic lift joint coordination by 2005, with a view to achieving necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift by 2010; improvement of the performance of all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based by 2010; and the development of rapidly deployable battle groups by 2007.48 An important dimension of the 2010 Headline Goal originates from a Franco-British initiative, both of which countries have strategic cultures in which the use of force to attain security policy objectives is an established principle, presented as the so-called battle group concept in February 2004 to address the shortfall in highly mobile, specialized forces, rapidly deployable and able to carry out operations in difficult terrain. Specifically, the battle group concept envisages the creation of tactical groups, comprising approximately 1500 troops, including support, to be deployable within 15 days. These forces will be designed specifically, though not exclusively, in response to UN requests, and could be used to stabilize failing states.

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The aim was to establish two to three high-readiness battle groups by 2005, and seven to nine groups by 2007. In early 2007, the EU announced the ability to undertake two concurrent battlegroup-sized operations. As regards the composition of these groups, a member state may form a group alone, in cooperation with other member states as the ‘lead nation’ or in cooperation with several states. The reference to the UN and the explicit mention of failing states is an indication of the influence of the ESS on the capabilities-development process, suggesting the emergence of shared understandings of the threats facing Europe and appropriate means of responding to them, as well as norms establishing standards of best practice relating to integrative efforts.49 The implementation of solutions designed to meet these exigencies are currently being worked out by the ECAP Project Groups. The work of the ISTAR Information Exchange Framework Project is, for example, working towards the development of an EU Information Sharing Policy and associated framework, which was due to be implemented by 2010, with an interim architecture established by 2006. The Space Based Assets Project Group is contributing to the establishment of an EU Space Policy. The Global Approach on Deployability (GAD) results from the work of Projects on Strategic Transport and will lead to the establishment of a coordination cell for EU-led crisis management operations. Taken together, these PGs are playing a key role in improving overall military cooperation and interoperability between EU member states. Facilitated cooperation is thus acting as a platform for the institutionalization of European military cooperation. It is important to remember that bounded nature of practitioners’ practical knowledge implies that they are unlikely to have been fully aware of the influence of broader institutional contexts on their behaviour, i.e. the extent to which connections being made between issues resonated with concerns informed by broader institutional contexts. Specifically, the end of the Cold War prompted a reformulation of security and defence policies in many European states that, given the domestic institutional orders of member states, was favourable to their reorientation towards ‘Europe’ in several prominent states prior to enlargement.50 This not only raised a number of defence planning concerns, but also arms development and procurement issues. The cost of new, technologically intensive weapons systems, pioneered

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by the US as part of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), meant that European governments could only conceive of procuring and developing such systems by combining their resources and developing joint defence programmes.51 Institutional adaptation within member states The construction of ‘rules’ (perceptual schemes and norms) at the EU level is not only leading to increased authority being ceded to transnational security practitioners, but is also altering domestic institutional orders and, therefore, security apparatuses. In other words, Europeanization as a result of ‘diffusion’ is taking place. This can be seen by looking at the way in which perceptual schemes and norms are diffusing to national institutions in terms of policy discourse, behaviour, and the allocation of resources. According to the structurationist framework I set out at the end of Chapter 2, change occurs when two or more institutional orders intersect. However, because actors are embedded in domestic institutional orders and are reflexive, responses will necessarily vary. In other words, in this process of co-determination of national and regional-level institutional orders, actors will try to order social practices based on their practical knowledge, or their understanding of how ‘to go about’ things, which will necessarily be variable. The 2010 Headline Goal, particularly the battle group concept, is likely to have a significant impact on the reorientation of small- and medium-sized member states’ force structures. To this end, a type of European military ‘model’ could be said to be in the process of being established.52 This is a significant development, since military integration has been a taboo for so long, and because it points to the modification of an important dimension of the expression of state sovereignty. National policy discourse and defence and procurement planning appear to indicate such a development. The latest defence planning papers of Britain, France, and Germany are, to varying degrees, informed by the ESS and capabilities development process. The German 2003 Defence Policy Guidelines are clearly influenced by the country’s commitment to the ESDP and the ESS. They speak of the need for ‘prevention and containment of crises and conflicts’. An out of area dimension is also evident: ‘The necessity of the Bundeswehr to participate in multinational operations may arise anywhere in the world at short notice and may extend across the

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entire mission spectrum down to high-intensity operations’. There is also a strong commitment to a rule-based global order: ‘The proliferation of mass destruction can only be prevented and contained by comprehensive non-proliferation policy measures and a regulatory framework put in place by the international community and shaped in accordance with transparent rules’. ‘The fight against terrorism is based upon international law and in particular the Charter of the United Nations’. ‘According to the Charter of the United Nations, the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security’. In relation to the transformation of its force structure, the Defence Policy Guidelines state that ‘[c]ompatibility with the build-up of capabilities under the ESDP will be ensured’. They make specific reference to the Defence Capabilities Mechanism: ‘The achievement of European force goals and the elimination of identified capability deficits at national and European levels, as well as the commitment of reported military capabilities and means are the yardstick for the degree to which Germany and its partners are fulfilling their obligations within the framework of the EU.’ They also mention that ‘[a] capability-oriented overall approach integrating all the armed services and areas is being developed for procurement and equipment planning. Armaments cooperation within a European and transatlantic framework has to be given precedence over the realization of projects under national responsibility’. ‘Procurement and equipment planning will be oriented even more stringently to a capability-focused, overall approach across all services and organizational areas, coordinated at multinational level.’ On armaments cooperation, they state that ‘[t]he progress of political integration in Europe as well as the limited financial leeway enhance both the necessity and opportunities for greater multinationality ... as a prerequisite for this ability to cooperate, Germany will maintain an efficient and competitive industrial base in core areas of technology affording it some leverage in the development of key weapons systems.’53 The 2006 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr confirms Germany’s continued commitment to engaging multinational military operations and the accompanying changes this implies to its force structure.54 The French 2003–2008 Military Programme Bill of Law, which constitutes the second part of a revision of the French defence apparatus

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launched in 1998, is more specific about the precise ways in which it is intended to support the ESDP and is heavily informed by the Defence Capabilities Mechanism. It specifically states at the beginning of the text that it ‘contributes to the achievement of an extremely important political objective, the construction of European defence, in which our country must continue to play a major role’. Moreover, it makes it clear that with the exception of deterrence the decisions taken from Helsinki to Laeken provide the ‘general lines of the European orientation of which our defence is a part’. The Military Programme Law is, therefore, compatible with the efforts to address persistent shortfalls in areas identified by the ECAP panels, namely command, intelligence and communication, projection and force mobility, deep action means and the means with which to deploy forces in foreign theatres.’ The outline for improvements in command, intelligence, and communication capacities, moreover, show evidence of being influenced by the battle groups concept: ‘France will produce a complete chain of command from strategic level through to tactical level, including the joint forces theatre (operative) command. ... It will be capable of acting as “Lead nation” for political-military consulting, planning and control tools of a wide scale of operation by the European Union.’55 In terms of procurement the Military Programme Law foresees that ‘acquisition of certain future capacities will require cooperation at the European level, in particular for space-based observation, space telecommunications and drones.’56 With regard to intelligence in the theatre, joint procurement/development is clearly envisaged: ‘capabilities will be improved toward the end of the programme commissioning, new airborne sensors … and long endurance and tactical drones offering the possibility of almost permanent observation of certain zones. These drones should be a privileged field of action for European cooperation’.57 The ‘logic’ underpinning the need to encourage the development of a European defence industrial and technological base is present in the Military Programme Law: ‘compared with the effort undertaken by the United States and the size of the American industrial groups, only a competitive defence industry of the European scale will leave European countries with freedom of choice in their equipment. ... Lastly, the research effort will be amplified to prepare for the integration of technical changes that will make it possible to face the new threats effectively.’58

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In the British 2004 Command Paper Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, the influence of the ESDP is less striking, largely because British security and defence policy emphasizes the need to act in coalitions of the willing, most notably alongside the US.59 It does, nevertheless, specifically refer to the need to be able to support three concurrent small- and medium-size operations, as opposed to two envisaged in the earlier 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the update to it, including the capacity to lead or be a framework nation for European (and other coalition) operations where the US is not involved.60 This is a clear allusion to the battle group concept. It goes on to state that ‘[f]or some of our assets such operations have now become the principal driver in determining the size of force structure needed.’ 61 We should also expect the establishment of EDA to lead to increased Europeanization of procurement and member states’ defence-industrial and technological bases. This, along with the establishment of an EU space policy, has fairly significant implications for the allocation of resources aimed at research and technology, particularly taken in conjunction with the Commission’s linkage between economic growth and the creation of a common technological base. The report produced by the Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research stresses the additional commercial benefits of promoting a common technological base: Europe has high quality research institutes and a substantial and diverse industrial base from which to address technology requirements in the security domain. A significant part this industrial base specializes in the defence, aeronautic, space and professional electronics sectors, with capabilities running right through the supply chain from systems integrators/prime contractors to equipment and component suppliers, including a large number of innovative small and medium size enterprises, Europe also has world class expertise in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and telecommunications. Each of these sectors is knowledge-based and enjoys significantly higher productivity levels than the industrial average for Europe. Targeted research investment in these areas will therefore not only enhance security but also contribute to EU productivity and growth.62

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Referring to the need for the establishment of a European Security Research Programme (ESRP), the report argues: An ESRP developed along these lines is of strong social interest and can give significant added value. It would help enhance Europe’s security, which is in itself a precondition of numerous Community policies (transport, energy, telecommunications, etc.). It would foster cross-border cooperation, increase European industrial competitiveness and strengthen Europe’s research base. What is more, it would contribute significantly to the EU policy on growth and competitiveness as established in Lisbon and Barcelona.63 In order to gain greater competence within the defence industry issue, the Commission is framing the issue of capabilities development as complementary with defined economic objectives.64 The Commission underlines cost efficiency of defence spending and the maintenance of a competitive defence and technological industrial base as important issues when considering EU defence equipment policy. As more and more operations are undertaken, we might also expect Europeanization at the strategic and operational level to increase.65 To sum up, then, the late 1990s saw EU member states decide that the Union required the means with which to play a greater role on the international stage. This necessarily implied the creation of a common European security and defence policy as a distinctive part of the CFSP. Had descriptive accounts of developments in this field or selfconsciously theoretical analyses that draw on realism been employed, the focus would have been on states rationally pursuing their preferences and interests at summits. This would, as I pointed out, have led to an inadequate depiction of the EU governance structure. In the absence of a supranational state, European cooperation does not result simply from states rationally pursuing their preferences. As the capabilities development process demonstrates, fragments of the state, in this case defence and civilian officials, as well as military staff, constitute important agents of change with regards to European military integration, given that many details of broad agreements get worked out within decentralized networks in between summits. Their position-practices meant that meeting military capability needs

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based on defined security threats, operational scenarios and available resources was their overwhelming concern. Their knowledgeability was, however, bounded to the extent that a number of political consequences ensued as a result of their activities that would have been unlikely to have been intended. In the capabilities development mechanism, the framing of the issue as an ‘objective need’ has led to increased authority being ceded to Brussels-based institutions, such as the EDA. This expansive ‘logic’ was in large part linked to the way in which the issues were framed. The institutional contexts of practitioners involved in decentralized policy networks ought, therefore, be considered when attempting to account for progress in this area. More traditional accounts of the ESDP would also have failed to capture the connection between different spheres of social life, specifically the impact of the economic environment on institutionalized cooperation in the field of security. Some analysts have identified economic factors in their accounts of developments in the political-military field. They point to the linkage between capabilities improvements and economic growth within the EU, and the way this is favouring defence industrial cooperation, in addition to capabilities improvements. Yet what they failed to recognize was that framing the issue provided the impetus for greater integration. Law enforcement and police studies are more helpful in this respect. They emphasize the general shift in the discourse on security within the context of globalization related to assessments about the state’s capacity to effectively control its borders. In the case of the EU, the notion of a ‘permanent security deficit’ was given added emphasis within the context of the removal of internal controls and instability in Eastern Europe. To this extent, it seems possible to say that those responsible for providing security perceived the state’s security functions as being in danger without further measures being undertaken. The importance of the knowledgeability of these actors is thus pointed to. While this body of literature provides useful insights in this respect, its focus is obviously on developments in ‘internal’ security. To some extent, a neo-functionalist approach would have been helpful in comprehending the relationship between economic and security questions. In contrast to neo-realist accounts and those relying on realist assumptions, neo-functionalists were justified in identifying the central actors as the political elites in participating

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countries. However, their pluralist underpinnings would have led them to emphasize political elites connected to competing groups within member states. As mentioned earlier, this is partly because European integration was in its early stages when neo-functionalism developed. Since then, political integration has advanced into new and more sensitive areas of state sovereignty and the governance structure of the EU has altered. It is now possible to identify midlevel officials engaged in decentralized policy networks as central actors in the process of integration. Neo-functionalists have also been sensitive to the way in which apparently ‘technical’ issues can have an expansive ‘logic’. An examination of the development of the ESDP suggests that activities framed in a ‘technical’ or practical manner played an important role in the constructive dimension of Europeanization. Brussels-based bodies did see their competencies increase in line with the expansion of a conscious task, as unintended consequences arose from earlier tasks. This was partly related to the coordination needs at the EU level. Expectations among defence industrialists, for instance, also added impetus to integrative efforts in related fields. Indeed, ‘spill-over’ potential, which is used by neo-functionalists to characterize the mechanisms through which regional integration occurs, cannot simply be characterized as the result of the pursuit of interests; it greatly depended on the framing of the issue. Moreover, at a certain point perceptions of the common interest are required to enable fundamental developments to occur. In relation to the ESDP, threats to common, European security came to inform the direction of developments. Another weakness of neo-functionalist arguments would have been the assumed gradual increase in supranationalism. While supranational institutions, such as the Commission, were shown to have some influence on the capabilities development process, for example, their role has been fairly limited due to the fact that they are not subject to Community law and belong to inter-governmental areas of the EU. Moreover, the governance structure within the EU does not imply a choice between the nation state and supranationalism, as neo-functionalism would suggest. Neo-functionalism is forced to adhere to this dichotomy because it defines institutions too narrowly and fails to capture adequately the co-constitutive relationship between individual action and institutions. Actions driving

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integration are assumed to be the outcome of individual or group perceptions of their interest. Essentially, as the process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that interests will be redefined in terms of regional, rather than purely national terms. This does, as indicated, take place. However, the principal actors are mid-level officials rather than groups. Moreover, rather than the supranational supplanting the ‘national’ level, institutional contexts at the national and regional level appear to undergo a process of transformation, suggesting the co-determination of national and regional levels.

Transatlantic security relations Increased military cooperation between EU member states clearly has implications for transatlantic security relations, notably with regard to the NATO–EU relationship. Since increased EU autonomy within the area of crisis management necessarily implies a reduced US capacity to monopolize political decision-making within the transatlantic security field, the issue has been highly controversial. Realist and some neo-Marxist accounts of the implications of the ESDP for transatlantic security relations view European efforts to increase military capabilities as an instance of balancing behaviour. However, national institutional orders informing definitions of interests and preferences have been and are still shaping the politics surrounding the question of greater EU autonomy within the transatlantic alliance. In this section, I examine the influence of member states’ institutional contexts on the creation of the ESDP and its implications for the NATO–EU relationship. I first look at how the reformulation of security policies and defence planning, informed by the strategic cultures and collective identities of member states, facilitated the emergence of the ESDP. I then go on to examine the manner in which the specific institutional orders of the key member states are decisive factors shaping influencing issues, such as operational responsibility in the area of crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area, and command and defence planning. The reformulation of security policies and defence planning Changes in the global order following the end of the Cold War brought about a reformulation of security policies and defence planning in EU member states. The precise manner in which they were

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reformulated greatly depended on the strategic cultures and collective identities vis-à-vis the European integration process. In France, these changes necessitated a redefinition of the Gaullist synthesis that had previously informed French security policy. Attaining grandeur and rank through the pursuit of national autonomy, a belief in French exceptionalism and the universalism of French values, as well as the value of military force as a tool of state power and prestige in pursuit of European and global security was rendered anachronistic with the end of the Cold War. The demise of the East–West standoff had effectively eliminated the context in which France could play the role of a third diplomatic force and called into question the value of deterrence. Europe, hence, came to be seen as the most appropriate forum in which France could best exercise its influence and adjust to the changed international political environment. Fostering greater Franco-German cooperation within the context of European integration also, it seems, was regarded as a way of containing German influence and, at the same time, facilitating the achievement of stated French national objectives within a European framework. As John Gaffney notes, ‘French influence in Europe has been historically based upon and almost completely fashioned by, its relationship to and proximity to Germany.’ 66 During the Cold War, France’s independent nuclear capability – force de frappe – was viewed as an essential tool in the pursuit of national autonomy and influence. With the end of the East–West arms race, the possession of nuclear weapons no longer served France in the pursuit of these ideals. Moreover, the paramount importance that had been placed on French nuclear independence was further challenged by security threats, such as civil and ethnic wars, terrorism, and weapons proliferation, that appeared to require a different set of military capabilities. The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the first Gulf War made French security practitioners particularly aware of France’s need to restructure its force base in order to be able to engage in crisis management and, moreover, to make this a cornerstone of a common European security policy under French leadership. The wars also made it apparent that Europe needed, at least for the time being, to keep the US engaged in light of Europe’s lack of military capabilities with which to respond to crises. This change in thinking set the stage for the new flexibility in the Franco-US/NATO relationship that emerged in the early- and mid-1990s, and played

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a key role in the acceptance of the CJTFs framework within NATO. Yet, frustrated with their attempts to restructure NATO from within, French policymakers soon shifted their focus away from the WEU and CJTFs as the appropriate means to strengthen the ‘European pillar of defence’ and towards the EU. In 1998, when the WEU Brussels treaty was due to expire, the French took the opportunity to initiate a debate on the future of the organization. In the summer of that year, Jacques Chirac publicly suggested that the WEU’s functions be absorbed by the EU. This move coincided with the policy turn around in the UK.67 While UK governments have traditionally supported strengthening the European pillar of the transatlantic alliance, the St Malo Declaration marked a turning point in the official British position vis-à-vis the development of a European pillar of defence in that it posited the need for the EU to develop the capacity for autonomous action within a EU framework and to develop the appropriate structures in support of this objective.68 Prior to the Anglo-French declaration, Britain had staunchly supported the American-inspired ESDI within NATO. However, rather than representing a fundamental re-assessment of the centrality of the transatlantic alliance in foreign and security policy thinking, ‘Europe’ came to be viewed as an appropriate context in which to improve European capabilities, as well as to safeguard the long-term health of the Alliance. As Alister Miskimmon observes, ‘Strategic culture has not remained static in the British case, but has gone through a process of incremental change to meet new challenges and new circumstances. British strategic culture, especially since 1945, has also emerged from a series of often conflicting pressures which British policy makers have had to balance – namely, the pull of Europeanist and Atlanticist visions of security and defense policy, coupled with the incremental reconceptualization of the role of the armed forces in British foreign policy.’ 69 Against expectations, the WEU had failed to develop significant political will to develop Europe’s operational capabilities. According to one British official, key policy figures within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) were pushing for a change in the status quo.70 This movement for change intersected with concerns within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The majority view within the FCO was that in order to keep the US engaged in Europe, Britain had to play a bridging role between its European allies and the US.71

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This implied, on the one hand, persuading European allies to build up their own military capabilities in order to achieve a more equal partnership within the Alliance and, on the other hand, communicating to Americans that greater European capabilities need not imply a threat to the NATO. Developing the capabilities for ‘autonomous action’ appears in no way to have been equated with duplicating NATO assets in order to carry out EU-only operations. As Miskimmon observes, ‘[t]he dramatic loss of relative power which UK suffered as a result of the costs of fighting two world wars within a 30 year period, necessitated a foreign policy in which the UK sought to punch above its own weight.’72 Britain’s intimate relationship with the US has enabled it to retain some degree of its rank as a major power with global interests. Britain enjoys privileged access to American space-based capabilities, which are essential in creating ‘strategic effects’73 and for projecting force far afield – both of which are regarded as crucial for responding to security threats at their point of origin – an objective specified in the 2003 Defence White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changed World.74 This means that policymakers in the MoD, as well as those in the Treasury, are generally opposed to duplicating these capabilities through joint programmes with other European states. Their reluctance is matched by FCO concerns about the political ramifications of such duplication, since the US is not eager to see Europe develop space-based technology for commercial reasons. Taking a lead role in the area of military crisis management also seems to have been perceived as serving the need to boost Britain’s role in the EU following its decision not to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). British policymakers had not anticipated the impact that Britain’s non-accession would have on its influence. Despite efforts to get Britain included in the institutional structures overseeing the Euro, British officials were only allowed to participate as observers. Having been rebuffed in this field, another area in which Britain could retain its influence and play a leadership role in Europe had to be found.75 As one of the few EU member states capable of projecting military power beyond Europe’s borders, demonstrating leadership in the field of security and defence provided the Blair government with an opportunity to play a greater role in European affairs. Other than Britain, only France was considered a ‘serious’ military power, used to acting globally and with a high threshold for

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casualties. However, French reforms to force structure were less complete than those of Britain and, perhaps more significantly, France’s non-membership of NATO’s integrated military structure and its awkward relationship with the US gave Britain an advantage in terms of reassuring the US that NATO would not be undermined by an EU framework for increased military capabilities.76 Much as in the French case, the changed global environment prompted an adaptation of Germany’s security policy. Germany’s Cold War situation saw its security policy heavily bound to the US/ NATO’s strategic priorities and the constutionalization of the notion of Selbstbindung (self-restraint). For almost half a century, Germany’s security policy was heavily circumscribed by East–West antagonism, ‘rehabilitation’ through the pooling of its sovereignty and a preference for non-military solutions to security problems. The demise of East–West confrontation, the re-unification of Germany and the new understanding of the use of military force in a globalizing world helped to initiate the reshaping of the contours of German security policy. The perception of Germany as a fully sovereign partner of the US and a heavyweight in Europe set off a domestic debate about the country’s role as a security actor.77 Enhancing Germany’s role in the context of the redefinition of threats to security and NATO’s reinvention inevitably led to a debate over the need to change Germany’s constitution to enable participation in NATO’s military operations. For the best part of four decades, the role of the German Federal Army was shaped by the strategic calculations of the Cold War and the concerns of Germany’s European Allies: the Federal Army was itself created in 1955 when the US became convinced that a German land force contribution to NATO was necessary in order to deter Soviet conventional forces; it was subsequently commanded by NATO’s Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT);78 and the circumstances under which it could be employed abroad were confined to the selfdefence within the Alliance context. As NATO broadened its mission in the early 1990s to enable it to undertake multiple and wide-ranging operations, including peacekeeping,79 Germany’s membership in the Alliance impelled policymakers to reconsider the circumstances under which military force should be projected. After a fractious internal debate following US criticism of Germany’s refusal to participate in direct military action during the 1991 Gulf War, the German

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Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that Germany could participate in military operations within the framework of a collective security system – for example, as a member of NATO, the WEU or the EU.80 Despite the lack of firm consensus about the country’s role, there is an overriding desire to be an active partner in NATO and to assume what many in Germany consider to be the country’s responsibilities. This, at least some of the time, seems to imply a readiness to get involved in international military operations. A certain degree of continuity in the close German–US/NATO relationship thus continues in the post-Cold War period. Awareness of the need to keep the US engaged as a ‘European power’ was even more keenly felt in Germany, as a consequence of its immediate borders with former Soviet Eastern European satellites. Germany was, therefore, a prime mover behind NATO’s 1990 London Declaration, which aimed at greater cooperation between NATO and Central and Eastern European countries. The scope of the Declaration was expanded by former US Secretary of State James Baker and former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 1991 when they presented their vision of a Euro-Atlantic Community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok and further gave greater form to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) during NATO’s Rome Summit in November 1991.81 While German policymakers wished to maintain US involvement in Europe and supported NATO’s redefinition, there was also a general consensus among the German political elite that Europe needed to work towards a genuine European security and defence capability as part of progress towards greater political union. Accordingly, German policymakers played a key role during the negotiations of the TEU, advocating a Political Union and a CESDP. They also played an important role in negotiating the link between the EU/CFSP and the WEU. From the German perspective, the WEU was the pivot upon which to strengthen the CFSP through a European security and defence policy, as well as to Europeanize NATO. Therefore, Germany supported both the Petersberg Declaration of 1992, which aimed at strengthening the WEU by endowing it with competencies in the sphere of crisis management, and NATO’s ESDI/CJTFs initiative. When the time came to negotiate the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, Germany pushed hard for more concrete provisions for the development of a European security and defence policy. At the IGC in June

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1997, which led to the Treaty, Germany proposed, inter alia, incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the EU and inserting a timetable in the Treaty for the integration of the WEU into the EU. Alongside these proposals, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced their vision of a three-phased model in which cooperation between the EU and the WEU would first be enhanced, then the WEU’s activities and structures would be transferred to the EU and, finally, the Article 5 commitments of the WEU would be included in the revised TEU. The rationale behind these proposals was, on the one hand, the inclusion of common defence in the EU, the development of crisis management capabilities and the creation of a second, European Pillar of Defence within the framework of NATO.82 At the same time as security policies were being reformulated, reductions in defence spending following the end of the Cold War meant that defence ministries tended to warm to regional integration as a means of reducing costs and saving commitments from finance ministry attacks.83 The end of the Cold War had also led to the restructuring of defence industries and the end of defence companies’ exception with regard to internationalization. The perceived need to adapt to global market forces has led to large-scale concentration and rationalization, as European firms seek to compete with their rivals in the US.84 As a result of the changing defence industrial landscape and their desire to see capabilities in Europe improve, French and German policymakers, in particular, have been keen to promote common procurement and to reduce the amount of regulatory frameworks within which European defence firms must operate – in other words, to create a European defence industrial base. Britain’s defence industrial linkages and special relationship with the US, which involves collaboration on weapons programmes – both nuclear and conventional – make its policymakers supportive of increased coordination, but extremely weary of politicizing the joint armaments organization in any way that might lead to the creation of a common European defence industrial base. Operational responsibility Operational responsibility for missions is currently governed by the so-called Berlin-Plus arrangement, which allows the EU access to NATO military assets when NATO as a whole does not wish to act. This means that NATO has the right to decline involvement in a

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mission before the EU can decide to get involved. This arrangement is the result of a considerable degree of compromise between both EU and NATO member states. This agreement has been crucial in making the ESDP viable and reassuring the US. In effect, it gives the US a de facto veto over EU operations, so long as the EU is dependent on NATO/US military capabilities. Gaining greater political autonomy within the transatlantic alliance is thus dependent on developing autonomous military capabilities and support elements. The official positions of Britain, France, and Germany, respectively, reflect the different and prevailing preferences in each state regarding the role of the EU and the corresponding degree of autonomy it should have in relation to NATO, which are linked to perceptions of US leadership within the transatlantic security arena. Britain tends to share the US view of operational responsibility, namely that NATO should have the right to decline intervention in a conflict before the EU can decide to act. This leads to two possibilities for operational responsibility: either NATO or the EU with NATO assets.85 From the viewpoint of many British policymakers, the political and monetary cost of duplicating expensive assets and capabilities – something that EU-only missions could ultimately imply – is simply unwarranted. The French, by contrast, take a rather different view. While the positive experience of operational involvement with NATO on the ground has brought the French military around to further rapprochement with NATO, most within the French establishment share a general preference for the ESDP,86 because of the limitations of gaining greater autonomy within the NATO framework. This is particularly the case in the French Foreign Ministry, where the Gaullist tradition is particularly strong, as well as in the Elysée Palace. Indeed, both Chirac and French foreign ministry officials are the most active in promoting the development of the ESDP. In line with their desire to see a European Pillar of Defence equal that of a ‘North American Pillar of Defence’, the French were initially dissatisfied with the Berlin-Plus arrangement. They feared that the EU would be regarded by the US as a ‘sub-contractor’ to NATO. While the French conceded to pressure from other EU member states to accept the arrangement, the French persist in their efforts to undermine the US monopoly on political decision-making within the Euro-Atlantic security arena by emphasizing that the EU will mostly

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act on its own – the effective veto wielded by non-EU NATO member states as a result of the EU’s dependence on NATO assets would clearly be avoided if the EU were carrying out operations using its own capabilities and infrastructure.87 Nevertheless, the French also accept that Europeans may have to call on NATO assets and infrastructure for ‘high-end’ missions. The differences in emphasis that exist between Britain and France with regards to ESDP operations reflects their different approaches to the purpose of the project and the weight the EU should carry relative to NATO and the US within the Euro-Atlantic order. As Medcalf notes, the French view the ESDP, above all, as a European project that involves, under some circumstances, making use of NATO. The British, by contrast, see it as the best means for safeguarding the Alliance, which will increasingly involve making use of a European instrument for tasks the US would rather not undertake as it focuses its efforts on the Middle East and Asia. Germany, for its part, tends to give equal weight to both the ESDI and the ESDP and regards them as entirely complementary projects.88 Accordingly, it has always stressed that the ESDP is not intended to undermine NATO, but to complement it. The Berlin-Plus agreement is viewed as buttressing the EU–NATO relationship. If importance is attached to Europeanonly missions, it is not done so with a view to undermining the US as a ‘European’ power. Preferences related to the capabilities required for ‘autonomous’ action reflect these various dispositions. From the French perspective, eroding the US monopoly on political decision-making is dependent on the EU’s ability to reduce its reliance on NATO capacities. Accordingly, French initiatives and diplomatic manoeuvres have been conceived with this in mind. One year after issuing the St Malo Declaration, Chirac presented France’s EU partners with an Action Plan that envisaged an EU, able to act autonomously, even in the absence of US consent, and the development of a fully-fledged European chain of command, full multilateralization of existing French and British Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQs), autonomous intelligence, power projection and C3 capabilities, and the establishment of a technological and industrial base.89 France has been able to find some common ground with Germany on a number of these issues, while Britain, predictably, has been lukewarm about what its policymakers view as unnecessary duplication.

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Command and defence planning In the aftermath of the Anglo-American-led war against Iraq, the French, along with the Germans, actively pursued the idea of an independent EU command and planning cell. Together, they proposed the creation of an independent military headquarters in Turveren, near Brussels, Belgium. Not unsurprisingly, this proposal caused intense concern in Washington because of the greater autonomy it implied for the EU. Unease in the Pentagon was further intensified because of the timing of the initiative: the idea surfaced when Tony Blair was trying to repair relations with France and Germany following their falling out over the war in Iraq and shortly after a tripartite summit in Berlin in September 2003 between Blair, Schröder and Chirac.90 Washington feared that some kind of deal on greater military cooperation had been made by the three statesmen. The US reacted vigorously – the US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, is on record as claiming that the Franco-German proposal represented ‘one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship’ – calling an extraordinary meeting in NATO the following month to challenge the initiative.91 While the idea of an independent headquarters at Turveren has been buried, due to lack of Anglo-American support, a compromise deal was reached. At a meeting in Naples in November 2003, EU foreign ministers agreed to the creation of a small independent military planning cell in the EUMS for EU missions independent of NATO and an EU planning cell in SHAPE to be employed for missions undertaken with NATO or with recourse to NATO assets.92 Britain, which was in favour of the idea of an EU presence at SHAPE, was clearly key in negotiating the compromise. Indeed, according to one British official, Britain worked closely with the US on its negotiating position. The compromise solution was also likely to have been facilitated by Germany’s flexibility on the issue. Germany, apparently, was also in favour of an EU presence at SHAPE93 and most likely supported the French position out of gratitude for France’s solidarity in opposition to the war in Iraq.94 The rift created by divergent positions on the War in Iraq between European countries, as well as that within the transatlantic alliance, in effect created an impetus for greater European cooperation in the area of security and defence, partly as a result of the German security practitioners’ opposition to the War and the difficulties Britain

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experienced in Europe as a result of its support for Washington. The Turveren plan was but one element of proposed measures for deeper cooperation in the security and defence fields. At the Brussels summit France, Germany, and Belgium also called for greater cooperation among those EU member states ready to form a ‘core’ Europe in the area of security and defence. In light of Britain’s bid for leadership in this area, Blair had little choice but to cross some of his previous ‘red lines’, given the objective of balancing Atlanticist and Europeanist visions of security. According to a number of diplomats in Brussels, the feeling in Whitehall and the Cabinet was that Britain had to make a greater effort to play a constructive role in Europe.95 To sum up, then, the strategic cultures and collective identities in relation to the European integration process in key member states were crucial in bringing about the creation of an EU crisis management capacity. While seeking greater autonomy from the US was clearly a central motivation to launch the ESDP within an EU framework and the politics surrounding the question of how much autonomy the EU should have, the ESDP is not best understood as the result of balancing behaviour by EU member states. Relying on realist assumptions would not have captured the role that the interplay of national institutional orders of key EU member states, particularly perceptions of US leadership and EU integration, played in the emergence of the formation of this policy. While the War in Iraq exposed divergent institutional orders within Europe, it also appears to have rather ironically boosted EU military planning capabilities as a result of the imbalance it created for the UK government’s ‘balancing act’, as well as the way in which the Anglo-American use of force without a UN mandate clashed with German security values.

Conclusion A review of the capabilities-development process and associated developments, such as the establishment of EDA, illustrates that the ESDP is not simply leading to a Europeanization of national security policies and defence planning, but is likely to gradually involve the increased Europeanization of procurement, as well as defence force structures, and is likely to encourage the Europeanization of member states’ defence industrial and technological bases. Accounts of the ESDP that rely on the traditional terms of IR theorizing would have

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suggested that increased policy coordination was the result of states rationally pursing their interests at summits. The principal mode of Europeanization in this area has been horizontal, since interaction is mainly guided by soft law. Due to the technicalities of some the issues, it has been impossible to direct this work in any detail from the political level, which means that the direction of the ESDP has been guided less by a series of periodic summits than by a fairly decentralized framework for coordination. In this policy network, mid-level officials and military representatives play an important role in the transformation of state sovereignty as expressed in the deployment of the military. The development of the EDA, which represents an effort to construct a more formalized system of regulation by supporting member states in their development of capabilities for Petersberg tasks and encouraging closer defence industrial cooperation will, moreover, give Brussels-based officials, armaments and research directors, as well as perhaps representatives from the defence industry, a greater role in the capabilities-development mechanism, suggesting an increasingly decentralized governance structure, as well as the rise in influence of defence industrial and economic growth issues. The role of practitioners in the process of Europeanization is intimately linked to their knowledgeability. In the initial phase of the capabilities process, the ‘problem’ was framed in ‘technical’ terms, with the emphasis being placed on ‘filling a capabilities gap’. Framing the issue in this way initiated a type of expansive ‘logic’, as a number of other factors appeared relevant to fulfilling this ‘objective need’, and greater direction at the EU-level seemed necessary. To some extent this would seem to validate neo-functionalism’s concept of spillover. Neo-functionalism would not, however, have given sufficient weight to the way in which the interests leading to such spillover are dependent on practitioners’ specific institutional contexts. Moreover, the fact that the second phase of the capabilities improvement process – the 2010 Headline Goal – is largely informed by the ESS signifies that a sense of the ‘common good’ or, in other words, an EU security identity is beginning to make its way into the capabilities-improvement process. Neo-functionalism would also have led us to expect a gradual increase in supranationalism. Yet while supranational institutions, such as the Commission, were shown to have some influence on the capabilities-development process, for example, their role has been

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quite limited due to the absence of Community law in this field. Moreover, the governance structure within the EU does not imply a choice between the nation state and supranationalism, as neofunctionalism would imply. Neo-functionalism is obliged to stick to this dichotomy because it defines institutions too narrowly and fails to capture adequately the co-determining relationship between individual actions and institutions. Actions driving integration are assumed to be the outcome of individual or group perceptions of their interest. Essentially, as the process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that interests will be redefined in terms of regional, rather than purely national terms. This does, as shown, take place. Yet the principal actors are mid-level officials rather than groups, and a transfer of loyalty toward regional-level authorities from national governments is not necessarily required; instead, both institutional contexts at the national and regional level are transformed, pointing to the co-determination of national and regional levels. The emergence of ‘rules’ within the EU-level policy framework is helping to modify institutional practices in member states. The fact that it is increasingly guiding EU member states’ policies, practices, and the deployment of resources suggests the emergence of an ‘EU model’ in relation to force structures. The ESS is also increasingly likely to guide domestic policy linked to research and technology. Once the ESDP was established, facilitated cooperation played an important role in altering policies, defence planning, and procurement, as well as force structures, a number of other factors linked to the broader economic and political environment clearly influenced security practitioners’ security policy thinking. The end of the Cold War prompted a reformulation of security policies in EU member states that was favourable to their reorientation towards ‘Europe’. This raised a number of defence planning, as well as arms development and procurement issues, given the specificities of the institutional orders guiding policymakers in key EU member states. The shared commitment to establishing the capabilities with which to back up EU crisis management was, however, tempered by the cost of new weapons systems. EU governments could only conceive of procuring and developing such systems by combining their resources and developing joint programmes. While geo-strategic calculations form part of the purposive behaviour of member state security practitioners in relation to the ESDP,

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the implications of the ESDP for transatlantic relations are not best understood through the prism of balancing behaviour, as realist and some neo-Marxist interpretations suggest. The creation of the ESDP and the politics influencing the impact of the ESDP on transatlantic security relations, i.e. those linked to the ‘autonomy question’, are better understood in relation to the institutional contexts of security practitioners in EU member states, especially as they relate to perceptions of the European integration process and US leadership, and, of course, the resulting degree of European integration with the US and the type of defence industrial linkages.

4 Justice and Home Affairs Post-September 11

Introduction The sense of being engaged in a new kind of war pervades a great deal of thinking post-September 11. The qualitatively new feature of the struggle implied by the ‘War on Terrorism’ is attributed, on the one hand, to its asymmetry, insofar as it involves non-state actors, and to the scale of destruction the adversary is willing to inflict on civilian targets – interpreted as an affront to liberal democratic values – on the other. The belief that something fundamental has changed in terms of the type of conflicts states could find themselves engaged in today, and the sense that the ‘War on Terror’ epitomizes this new kind of vulnerability, has led to a series of measures aimed at reducing this perceived ‘security deficit’. Despite the current sense of exceptionalism associated with ‘9/11’, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London attacks in 2005, international terrorism is not new to the security policy agenda in Europe. In fact, it has been an issue of concern for some 30 years. Over the last three decades, however, its potency as a challenge to stability and security capable of inducing greater intra-European cooperation waned with its inclusion in a continuum of externalized (though traditionally conceived as) internal threats to security. Emphasizing the transnational, the foreign element of threats to ‘internal’ security has permitted a series of measures that further reinforce the security dimension of both member states’ state–citizen relations and the EU’s area of ‘freedom, justice and security’ (AFJS) and, ultimately, modify state sovereignty as expressed in the production of public order. 91

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Accounts of these developments that rely on traditional IR theorizing would not have been able to account for growing institutionalization of cooperation in the field of JHA over the last 20 years. Firstly, they would not have ‘seen’ the creation of a European ‘internal’ security domain, since the focus would have been on military threats to security in the external realm of inter-state relations. Secondly, emphasis on the centrality of the state would have led to the conclusion that cooperation between states is the result of states rationally pursuing their preferences, when the principal actors behind the process of Europeanization in this area were representatives from interior ministries and police forces, brought together in informal policy networks in between moments of treaty reform. Examination of the development of the JHA field also indicates that common conceptual schemes and norms developed by transnational policy practitioners were vital to the institutionalization of cooperation in this area, since the focus would have been on cultural practices and norms unique to the international system. This suggests that accounts of developments in the area of European security that have attempted to recognize normative and cultural aspects by drawing on regime theory would also have been inadequate. The importance of practitioners’ knowledgeability is, however, reflected in law enforcement and police studies that focus on the institutionalization of JHA. Informal and decentralized policy arenas, established in response to the removal of internal border controls within the Schengen area, were thought to provide policy practitioners with opportunities to pursue their own agendas, which were essentially concerned with law enforcement. These analyses, moreover, suggest that their knowledgeability is bounded in that a number of the political consequences ensuing from their activities are unlikely to have been intended. Increased authority being ceded to Brussels-based institutions, such as EUROPOL, and its expansive ‘logic’ were linked to the way in which the issues were framed. The institutions that were crucial to this phase included informal ‘rules’, both cognitive templates and norms. Neo-functionalism would also have been more able to ‘see’ that political elites involved in decentralized policy networks are important actors in the integration process, even if it would not have captured the role of mid-level practitioners in Brussels-based policy networks, largely due to the period in which neo-functionalism developed

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(see the discussion of neo-functionalism in Chapter 2). It would also have provided a more adequate framework of analysis insofar as it also recognized that ‘technical’ issues can have an expansive ‘logic’. What it would have failed to show, however, was that the framing of issues was essential to ‘spill-over’ and to the constructive dimension of Europeanization. Transfer of loyalty to regional organizations on the basis of calculations of interests would not have captured the role that perceptions of the ‘common good’ came to play in the development of JHA, as well as the variations in national responses to ‘rules’ established at the EU level. In this chapter I explore, in particular, how measures taken in the name of the ‘War on Terror’ are encouraging the further extension of the European ‘internal’ security field and, thereby, the Europeanization of the related functions of EU member states. I also examine the implications of this process for transatlantic security relations. I first begin by outlining how the externalization of challenges to ‘internal’ security has gradually legitimized the EU’s role in the area of JHA. Secondly, I show how the integration process in this policy area has been largely driven by practitioners in informal policy networks, rather than by inter-state bargains negotiated on the basis of pre-defined interests and identities. I then look at the specific knowledgeability of these actors and the common understanding of ‘problems’ that they have established. I then show how this knowledgeability is bounded by demonstrating that some of the consequences of actors’ practices are unlikely to have been intended. Thirdly, I consider the implications of measures underway to increasingly formalize the regulation of this process for the re-organization and Europeanization of member states’ internal security apparatuses prior to September 11. I focus in particular on how the co-determination of national and EU institutional orders takes place as common ‘rules’ are established by practitioners within the JHA policy framework affect the domestic institutional orders of member states. I then discuss the impact of the September 11 attacks and the ensuing measures taken in the fight against terrorism on Europeanization of ‘internal’ security and EU–US cooperation in this area.

Europeanization of ‘Internal’ security prior to 9/11 Accounts of post-Cold War developments in the area of European security that draw on the assumptions of traditional IR theorizing

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would have led us to conclude that the EU’s burgeoning field of JHA is the result of the rational pursuit of the pre-defined interests of EU member states. While it is true that JHA is an intergovernmental policy arena, employing a structurationist framework reveals an array of actors other than states that are vital to progress in the area of ‘internal’ European security. European cooperation within this area, in fact, got underway within the context of ‘Euro-terrorism’ in the 1970s. The international and, in some cases, transnational dimensions of terrorist incidents tended to frustrate attempts to successfully counter terrorist campaigns and, consequently, became emphasized in both policy and operational circles.1 In addition to national legislation enabling more intrusive and aggressive policing in the field of antiterrorism,2 police reform led to the creation of special, paramilitarytype, anti-terrorist response units. According to John Benyon, the professionalization of policing and the accompanying emergence of specialist units helped to bring about the growth of informal networks and groups.3 These tactical response groups were at the forefront of early, informal cooperation in the operational field.4 Benyon argues that specialist-practitioner demands essentially provide momentum for cooperative networks and initiatives. Tougher legislation implying police reform was indeed accompanied by efforts to improve intra-European police and judicial cooperation. Informal arrangements were established to facilitate contacts between member states. On the basis of an Anglo-Dutch initiative, the 1975 Rome European Council decided to set up an informal, intergovernmental coordinating network – TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence) Group – to facilitate counter-terrorist cooperation among the (then) EC member states’ interior ministries.5 This network reflected the political sensitivity of cooperation in the area of internal security that prevailed at the time, insofar as it was created outside the Community legal framework as an informal forum for the discussion of anti-terrorist cooperation, rather than high-profile cooperation enshrined in treaty.6 The system operated at three levels. It comprised a Ministerial Group of ministers of justice and ministers of the interior brought together to discuss matters coming within their competence in the regard of law and order; a Group of Senior Officials, composed of police chiefs tasked with preparing the agenda and reports, as well as monitoring the progress of working groups;

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and a series of Working Groups.7 Commission officials did not take part in these discussions until 1987 and, even now, their participation is limited.8 A number of operational groups were also important in developing practical measures undertaken in the area of internal security. One example is the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT), which was created in 1979 to fill the perceived gap on the operational side of police cooperation. PWGOT sought to promote closer working relations between member states’ police forces in relation to antiterrorism, promoting the exchange of intelligence, the secondment of officers to different countries, and the organization of specialist seminars.9 It thus constituted an important point of contact between individual police officers. It also established provisions for the rapid deployment of liaison officers to the scene of terrorist incidents in other participating states, as happened in the case of the 1988 bombing of the Pan Am flight 101 over Lockerbie, Scotland.10 Other examples include the Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference, comprising Kent County Constabulary, France, Belgium, and regional police forces in The Netherlands, and NEBEDACPOL, a longstanding cooperative arrangement between chiefs of police in The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, as well as cooperation between all Scandinavian states that belong to the Nordic Union, the Kilowatt group and the so-called Club of Bern.11 The fact that TREVI and PWGOT were informal, ad hoc arrangements reflected legal and political differences between member states, principally with regards to approaches to anti-terrorism. French authorities, for example, were at the time often unwilling to cooperate with their neighbours in extraditing terrorist suspects, in denying political asylum for suspected perpetrators, and exchanging information, particularly concerning incidents connected to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Successive Bonn governments were also reluctant to act against the originators of extraterritorial terrorist acts linked with conflict in the Middle East or to disrupt relations with states that openly supported or sponsored ‘terrorist’ activities. In addition to these essentially political considerations, representatives of the state have been wary of increased judicial cooperation, because of the legitimating role judiciaries play in state–citizen relations and their resulting significance for statehood.12 It is also unlikely that

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formalized intra-European cooperation in the intelligence domain would have been met with enthusiasm by those working in the area of human intelligence. The fear that informants and intelligence sources will be compromised is compounded by the lack of trust and perhaps existing working relations between some agencies, as well as professional rivalries. Reservations about the inclusion of sensitive anti-terrorist intelligence within EUROPOL’s ambit, for example, have been particularly pronounced in Britain, where the fear is that the intelligence will be ‘compromised (or even destroyed) by “untrustworthy” police officers from certain EU states.’13 Informal though they were, these networks brought together police and intelligence chiefs dealing with anti-terrorism and facilitated the day-to-day liaison activities of national police and counter-intelligence coordinating bureaus. This enabled trusted personal relations to grow. This is, however, not the only way in which informal policy networks are an important dimension of the European integration process. As Didier Bigo points out, different lines of reasoning have been brought closer together, leading, despite diverging official ‘national’ positions and many internal controversies, to agreement and the adoption of texts.14 The evolution of the TREVI Group demonstrates how the knowledgeability of practitioners was important in driving forward integration in the area of law enforcement in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. While the initial focus of TREVI was on anti-terrorist operations and disturbances to public order,15 the network’s remit expanded to include two additional areas of activity during the mid-to-late 1980s. In 1985, a third working group, concerned with strategies for coordinating action against serious international organized crime, especially drug-trafficking, was established. This was followed four years later by the creation of a fourth working group, known as TREVI 92, which focused on issues related to the freedom of movement of persons and compensatory measures to combat the relaxation of intra-European border controls,16 something that was being negotiated at the time in the context of the SEA. In addition to the Working Groups, four ad hoc groups were established to promote cooperation in related areas. The Ad Hoc Working Group on EUROPOL was established in 1991 to work on the idea of a European Criminal Police Office. Its mandate, however, became less ambitious and it was agreed that it should focus initially on the creation of a European Drugs Unit. The

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other three ad hoc groups – the Working Group on International Organised Crime, set up in 1992, the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, established in 1986, and the Judicial Cooperation Working Group on Criminal Matters – were not formally integrated into the TREVI structure. The Ad Hoc Group on Immigration nevertheless assisted in drafting the Dublin Convention on Asylum and the Convention on External Borders and was involved in setting up two centres tasked with monitoring immigration flows, asylum applications, forged documents, illegal immigration and related issues, and promoting the exchange of information and intelligence. The Judicial Co-operation Working Group on Criminal Matters provided a forum for the discussion of extradition, legislation against terrorist funding and fraud, and the mutual recognition of court decisions.17 What is particularly interesting in the evolution of TREVI from the point of view of this study is the change in the rhetorical justification for increased police cooperation reflected in the extended focus of TREVI. The focus shifted from terrorism to a whole series of phenomena, such as organized crime, the financing of terrorism, clandestine immigration networks, and the mafia – issues that were initially treated separately, but came to be more often than not treated together under the all-encompassing concept of ‘transnational threats to internal security.’18 As Bigo notes, ‘[b]y breaking down certain boundaries between issues, they changed ways of thinking and approaches to immigration and asylum rights, unaware that they were engaged in a philosophical experience. Thus, the issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.’19 Essentially, practitioners participating in informal networks were developing common ways of conceiving of the consequences of removing internal borders and appropriate measures to be taken in response to this. Bigo stresses, however, that the creation of a ‘security continuum’ and the adoption of new rules and procedures in the area of ‘internal’ security was carried out by agents who were not fully aware of the consequences of their activities, but were fully aware of the stakes involved for them. In other words, while they were acting in accordance with their roles and frames of references, they were perhaps unaware that they were laying the foundations for

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later cooperation through the ‘rules’ they were elaborating.20 Insofar as this was the case, they possessed a bounded knowledge of their environment. In fact, the shared understanding and measures developed within TREVI were formalized in the Schengen arrangement, which was also originally agreed outside a formal EC legal framework, due to opposition within Britain to granting it a treaty base. In 1985, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries signed an agreement to remove controls at internal borders between participating member states. The 1990 Schengen Convention implemented and elaborated on the earlier agreement. The agreement was concerned with goods and services, and dealt with short-term ways of compensating for the relaxation of internal borders. As in the case of TREVI, the Schengen structure also operates at three levels. Overall supervision is provided by the Executive Committee of ministers. At the mid-level, the Central Group oversees the implementation of the Executive Committee’s decisions and supervises a number of working groups, focusing on police and security, free movement of people, judicial cooperation and external relations, with sub-groups working on a range of issues, such as asylum matters, visas, firearms, drugs, telecommunications, and external and internal frontiers and airports. ORSIS, the Steering Committee responsible for the Schengen Information System (SIS) also reports to the Central Group.21 The Schengen structure therefore comprises ministers at the highest level and officials from member states at lower levels. Again, what is significant here is that officials charged with law enforcement tasks are able to frame issues in fairly technocratic ways according to the perceived ‘objective’ needs of emergent European polity, and these are the very people who play a key role in shaping developments, due to the prominence of informal networks in the field of justice and home affairs.22 These officials have been principally concerned with the implications for law enforcement agencies of a world in which boundaries appear to be being replaced by networks and flows and the state’s capacity to produce internal order and security is being eroded.23 The perceived difficulty of spatially compartmentalizing civil and criminal functions of both the state and the EC led to a more comprehensive attempt to facilitate cross-border police and law enforcement cooperation. As mentioned, creating an internal European market and removing internal controls – a move largely driven by corporate

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interests – created a number of new pre-occupations for law enforcement agencies. Again, given their function within the state structure and their associated frames of reference, preventing the abuse of relaxed border controls became their major concern, and doing so seemed to necessitate increased cross-border collaboration. Regular contact between different ministerial services within the Schengen framework (mainly Ministries of the Interior, Transport and European Affairs with little involvement of Foreign Affairs) also helped to consolidate further the new way of looking at the issue. As Bigo points out, the treatment of issues related to migration and asylum with other concerns, such as political subversion, terrorism, and organized crime, became merged in a ‘security continuum’ in which threats to security were characterized as essentially criminal in character and, more often than not, ‘imported.’24 These concerns resonated with the dominant political discourse, which identified the SEA as a major achievement, though one that had some negative implications. The removal of controls and restrictions to the free movement of capital, goods, and persons, it was claimed, would generate new opportunities for criminal and other kinds of illegal activities. Threats to internal security, which had until now been dealt with at the national level, would now have to be tackled at the European level. ‘Internal’ security thus became defined as a legitimate area of European cooperation and, as Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap point out, increased emphasis was placed on non-European, transnational components of the variety of issues subsumed within this new field of cooperation.25 This new moral imperative for cooperation took on a specific, common significance within the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and globalization and fears about illicit immigration and the internationalization of criminal organizations. The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe prompted widespread anxiety in Western Europe about ‘tidal waves’ of illegal immigrants and resulting social and political instability.26 As Malcolm Anderson notes, the image of migratory flows jeopardizing internal security was (and still is) essentially integrated into the discourse on law and order. In effect, the old external threat of Communism was being replaced by an external threat of mass migration and organized crime, as well imported terrorism, the penetration of which would, like the old threat, lead to the destabilization of Western societies.27 In such a climate, ministries of the interior and governments in general could

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adopt measures that political constraints might otherwise have hindered, such as intensified employment of controversial, pro-active policing and border control techniques28 that not only facilitated, but indeed required further coordination and cooperation by pushing their efforts outwards, beyond national borders. What is noteworthy is that these measures were not taken principally in relation to terrorism, which itself was somewhat ‘demoted to a position amidst other internal security concerns,’29 but largely in relation to setting up new borders to stem the flow of ‘undesirables’. While the Schengen Agreement remained outside the EC framework, it nevertheless encompassed a much more comprehensive attempt to facilitate cross-border police and law enforcement cooperation than its perceived forerunner, the TREVI Group. The ‘flanking’ measures that accompanied the provision for the free movement of people were more ambitious, in that they were aimed at creating a standardization of practices designed to ‘compensate’ for the removal of internal border controls and to facilitate joint action against a series of challenges to internal security, including terrorism. As the result of a seemingly practical measure, such as eliminating border controls between participating states, greater cooperation in other areas followed. Measures introduced to increase security included: strengthening border controls at EU external borders; the establishment of a common visa policy for short stays of up to three months; the creation of pan-European coordination of asylum proceedings; the improvement of cross border police cooperation, particularly though the exchange of information on wanted and ‘undesirable’ persons; and improvement of cooperation in the area of criminal justice.30 Moreover, with these provisions a number of new modes of cooperation were put in place, deepening integration in relation to these issues. The Convention enabled police to pursue someone who has been caught committing a crime, or who has escaped custody, into a neighbouring member state, though stopped short of enabling a formal arrest. It also established rules on surveillance and operations, and included detailed provisions for mutual assistance between law enforcement authorities in criminal and extradition matters. In order to facilitate cooperation, the Schengen states also agreed to set up the SIS, the purpose of which is to allow any Schengen member access to information on people and property for the use in both

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checks at external borders and for investigations within the countries concerned. In line with the identification of illegal immigration as a security issue, i.e. its ‘securitization’, the Convention also brought issues of asylum and conditions for admission at external borders – including visas and harmonized methods of supervision and deportation – into cooperative arrangements.31 A separate electronic email system, the Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry (SIRENE), was also set up to facilitate the rapid transfer of information. In order to facilitate common treatment of asylum and visa applications, a shared information system, known as the Visa Inquiry System In an Open-border Network (VISION), was also created.32 While cooperation prior to the Maastricht Treaty was predominantly informal, comprising national, regional and local politicians, executives, and practitioners (police, judiciary, immigration, and customs at local and regional levels), the 1992 TEU further expanded and formalized the role of the EU in developing and implementing policies in the field of justice and home affairs, and, in doing so, increased the importance of Brussels-based practitioners. The Treaty set up a pillar system with the European Community (including the single market and the single currency) as the first pillar, the CFSP as the second and JHA cooperation as the third.33 The horizontal, network- or project-oriented governance arrangements were thus transformed into more formal structures, though JHA policymaking remained intergovernmental. This did not, however, imply that rationally calculating states would guide the policy process from now on as approaches drawing on the traditional terms of IR would suggest. Some of the key actors driving developments remained those active in a decentralized framework for policy coordination, which involved exchanges between mid-level representatives from member states as well as Commission officials. In fact, the Treaty significantly increased the role of such officials. One of the most important negotiating structures and platforms for the elaboration of objectives and related measures was the K4 Committee, in which the preparatory work related to JHA developments took place. The K4 Committee incorporated the TREVI Group, as well as a number of its ad hoc working groups. It thus drew on the work of these groups and, one can assume, incorporated many of the same participants. It consisted of senior representatives from the relevant ministries of

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member states and an observer from the Commission. It has three steering groups, each of which had a number of working groups. Steering Group I on Immigration and Asylum had working groups on migration, asylum, visas, external frontiers, and forged documents. Steering Group II on policing and security matters had working groups on terrorism, police cooperation, drugs and organized crime, customs cooperation, training, scientific matters, crime analysis, combating environmental crime, public disorder, and EUROPOL. Steering Group III on Judicial Co-operation had working groups on extradition, international organized crime, criminal and European Community Law, the Brussels Convention, and the transfer of documents. It also dealt with the legal dimensions of attempts to counter terrorist funding and fraud against the Community.34 With respect to its stress on the importance of ‘technical’ tasks setting in motion an expansive ‘logic’, leading to greater authority being ceded to ‘central’ institutions, neo-functionalism would have been suggestive. However, the ‘spill-over’ occurred, here, as a result of the redefinition of issues and, most importantly, because of the redefinition of these issues as common issues, suggesting an emergence of a conception of the ‘common good’. By officially recognizing terrorism, organized crime, and the trafficking of drugs as matters of common interest and providing the Council of Interior and Justice Ministers and the K4 Committee with responsibility in these areas, the Treaty gave the EU a legal basis for common action and paved the way for more systematic regulation of the appropriate configuration and deployment of security apparatuses. The creation of a third pillar for JHA marked a watershed in the Europeanization of the policies, practices and structures associated with the blurring of the traditional, conceptual division between internal and external security challenges. As in the case of the Schengen flanking measures, the underlying rationale for increased cooperation under a third pillar was closely linked to the association of illegal immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers with threats with ‘internal’ security within the EU. The elaboration of political union provided the opportunity to give cooperation in this field a solid political and legal base, and include all of the (then) 12 member states within its ambit.35 The Treaty thus called for greater cooperation between police forces. One of the perceived major achievements in this respect was

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the creation of a union-wide system for exchanging information: the EUROPOL Drugs Unit, established in January 1994. The idea for this, it will be recalled, was originally worked on by one of the TREVI Working Groups. It was, therefore, not simply the result of interstate negotiations between states at the time of treaty reform, but the result of repeated interaction between officials within an informal policy network. EUROPOL differed from the SIS in that it served as a liaison body between national criminal intelligence units, collecting, analysing, and sharing operational and strategic intelligence information on transnational organized crime and terrorism. Liaison officers from national units in member states were seconded to EUROPOL. It was, therefore, not operationally independent of national criminal intelligence units and depended on their cooperation in the supply of information and intelligence, which is stored on an information system. In March 1995, its functions were expanded to cover smuggling of nuclear materials, illegal immigration networks and illicit trafficking of stolen vehicles.36 What is noteworthy is that European-wide intelligence and security functions were initially created in the name of fighting organized crime, specifically the trafficking of drugs. The reason why terrorism was not, at first, included in EUROPOL’s agenda, even though the provision for the body’s creation mentioned terrorism, was due to the absence of a common appreciation of the ‘risk’ posed by terrorism and, therefore, a common definition of terrorism. It would have been extremely difficult for member states to establish whether or not action by EUROPOL was justified without such a definition.37 Despite the inability of EU member states to agree on a common definition of terrorism, efforts were made to define a common working terrain. On 25 October 1995, ministers of justice and the interior drafted the so-called Gomera Declaration, which was based on a minimal consensus on reinforced cooperation against terrorism. As Monica den Boer notes, the wording in the declaration indicates that the definition of terrorism was moving closer to that of international organized crime, indicating the breaking down of the boundaries between issues. The language of the Declaration used key words that apply to both terrorism and to organized crime, such as ‘organizations’, ‘transnational’ and ‘threat to economic and social stability’. Both threats were, therefore, regarded as phenomena requiring joint action, as well as a preventive, proactive approach, with support of intelligence

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gathering and/or covert policing strategies, and stepped-up judicial cooperation. The Declaration also showed signs of an attempt to identify terrorism as a threat to the core principles of the EU – democracy, human rights, and social and economic development – and specifically identified fundamentalism as a cause of increased terrorist activities. According to den Boer, fundamentalism mentioned in the text replaced the ‘old’ external threat of Communism and signalled an attempt to construct a common European security identity. Rhetorical attempts to frame terrorism as a common external threat, she maintains, however, failed at this time to translate into identification of a common threat to the EU itself, since terrorist activities still tended to be aimed at influencing individual government policies rather than at the EU as a whole.38 This was linked to the reflexivity of domestic actors. Domestic institutional orders did not enable officials to deviate from established practices at this point. As a result, counter-terrorism was not yet perceived as a legitimate basis for judicial cooperation in criminal affairs. This was reflected in the difficulty of securing agreement on even a very limited convention covering the extradition and prosecution of suspected terrorists.39 Attempts at facilitating judicial cooperation were, nevertheless, taken during this time. Member state governments adopted an EU Extradition Convention in September 1996, the aim of which was to supplement the functioning of both the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST). The controversial political offence exception, which was built into the ECST,40 was also partially watered down after the insertion of an article stating that conspiracy or membership of a criminal organization that commits terrorist offences may no longer be defined as a (non-extraditable) political offence. The Convention also provided for the possibility of greater legal assistance among different state authorities.41 Efforts to increase contacts between magistrates were also undertaken. By means of a Joint Action of 22 April 1996, a framework for the exchange of magistrates with expertise in the area of judicial cooperation procedures was established. It, however, only laid down guidelines for member states that chose to exchange liaison magistrates. Following a Belgian initiative, a European Judicial Network (EJN) was established by a Joint Action of 29 June 1998 in order to further cooperation between member states’ judicial authorities. The

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EJN is a network of contact points comprising, for instance, lawyers and judges of member states. These contact points are supposed to provide, in accordance with their own state’s laws and division of responsibilities, information requested from judicial authorities or other contact points so that they may prepare an effective request for cooperation or to improve cooperation in general, particularly in relation to serious forms of crime. The network also organizes meetings of member states’ representatives and provides background information on lists of judicial and local authorities in other member states and the procedural systems of other member states, for example.42 In December 1996, the European Council commissioned a socalled High Level Group (HLG), composed of high-ranking police officers from member states, to formulate a plan of action in relation to combating organized crime. The plan was approved by the European Council in April 1997. Among other things, the HLG called for a further extension of EUROPOL’s remit, making it an offence in all member states to ‘participate’ in a ‘criminal organization’, as well as further reflection on the principle of ‘double criminality’, according to which a requested state must grant assistance to the requesting state only if the offence concerned is punishable also in the requested state. The Action Plan also advocated centralization and coordination as an effective means of combating crime, as well as the creation of ‘multidisciplinary integrated teams’. The HLG proposed that each member state designate an agency with ‘overall responsibility for the coordination of the fight against crime’ to act as a single contact point for mutual assistance between the member states, providing access to all national law enforcement agencies responsible for the fight against organized crime.43 Here again, officials within informal policy arenas were engaged in Europeanizing activities in relation to the judiciaries of member states. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which set the EU the objective of maintaining and developing the Union as an AFSJ, further formalized and extended the influence of Brussels-based practitioners. Significantly, the K4 Committee was renamed the Article 36 Committee (CATS), which now coordinates the work of the various working groups on police cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, SIS, as well as the activities of other agencies working in the area of police and judicial cooperation, such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST, the

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European Judicial Network, CEPOL, etc. The Commission also shares the right of initiative and, therefore, has a greater role in the policy formation process.44 In addition to attempting to improve operational cooperation between national police authorities through the establishment of an EU Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF),45 which constitutes a means of enabling the further development of trans-European police network,46 the Treaty further clarified and expanded EUROPOL’s potential role. It gave EU member states five years to enact legislation enabling EUROPOL ‘to facilitate and support the preparation, and to encourage the coordination and carrying out, of specific investigative actions by the competent authorities of member states, including operational actions of joint teams comprising representatives of Europol in a support capacity’. Member states were also required to establish rules allowing EUROPOL to ‘ask the competent authorities of member states to conduct and co-ordinate their investigations in specific cases.’47 As Ben Hall and Ashish Bhatt point out, the latter role represented a significant extension of EUROPOL’s power, signalling a shift from an information resource or database towards a body that instigates and coordinates investigations carried out by national authorities. Furthermore, the Treaty gave EUROPOL the legal base with which to carry out operations itself, in conjunction with national authorities, signifying a strengthening of its law enforcement role. What is noteworthy is that ideas developed within the informal HLG were now being institutionalized, indicating horizontal Europeanization. An agreement on the Convention for the creation of EUROPOL, as it exists today, was signed by representatives of the member states in June 1998 and came into force in October of that year. EUROPOL commenced its first activities under the Agreement on 1 July 1999.48 Despite the fact that EUROPOL was furnished with a legal base for anti-terrorism activities, little was done in terms of implementing the treaty’s provisions, due to the lack of consensus on the issue of terrorism.49 Attempts were also introduced to facilitate judicial cooperation. Most countries within the EU space have ‘dual criminality’ requirements, whereby an offence must be the same in each country in order for a court to comply with requests from abroad. In order to overcome this, the Amsterdam Treaty provided for the establishment of minimal rules relating to the definition of criminal acts and to penalties in

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the areas of organized crime, terrorism and drug-trafficking; in other words, the approximation of criminal law. Member states agreed to create the same offence for participating in a criminal organization.50 In October 1999, an EU summit dedicated to discussing the implementation of JHA provisions in the Treaty took place in Tampere, Finland. Some commentators have characterized the resulting work plan as equivalent in its scale to the creation of a single market.51 Attention focused on action in the areas of asylum and immigration, criminal and civil judicial cooperation, and combating cross-border organized crime. The European Council Presidency Conclusions also mentioned the creation of a new judicial cooperation agency (EUROJUST). A timetable for the implementation of measures, plus a ‘scoreboard’ with which to keep progress made towards implementing the measures and meeting agreed deadlines for the creation of AFSJ under constant review, was also established, an instrument that had been used for the implementation of the internal market and signifies an effort at increased regulation in the absence of legal obligations. In particular, the speed with which member states respond to requests from another’s law-enforcement authorities was placed under scrutiny. A formal review process on the Tampere agenda was later undertaken at the 2001 EU summit in Laeken, Belgium.52 This is an instance of Europeanization through soft law, even though the identification of terrorism as a truly common threat to EU member states continued to prevent criminal law from being considered a legitimate area of European action. In sum, then, we can say that the field of JHA has been characterized by horizontal Europeanization. Informal networks, the first of which was established in relation to ‘Euro-terrorism’ in the 1970s, provided a platform for the common understanding of the new ‘internal’ security environment between ministers of the interior, senior officials, and police officers. For the most part, Europeanization in the area of ‘internal’ security has been propelled by the inclusion of other issues, such as transnational organized crime and illegal immigration, which had become identified as common threats to security and elevated to a special category status requiring joint action within the context of the creation of an Internal Market. Put another way, largely practical issues related to the enabling to the free movement of goods, services, and people, led to increased cooperation in numerous other policy areas. Thus, not unsurprisingly, the most significant

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developments took place in relation to police cooperation, as well as management of the external border. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters proved much harder to achieve, though best practices had been established with the creation of the Tampere ‘scoreboard’ and the subsequent development of a formal regulatory process. More significant strides were not made in this area, however, because EU member states had not as yet identified terrorism as a common threat to EU ‘internal’ security.

Europeanization of ‘Internal’ security post-9/11 On 21 September 2001, less than two weeks after the attacks in New York and Washington, the European Council convened an extraordinary meeting to discuss measures to be taken in response to 9/11. At this meeting, the Council decided to draw up a common definition of terrorism. The subsequent Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism defined terrorist offences as those acts ‘committed with the aim of intimidating people and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country (murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks, threatening to commit any of the above, etc.).’53 Terrorism was thus reframed as a common, European threat. Not surprisingly, greater weight has been placed on the Islamic fundamentalist dimension of terrorist activities, rendering the ‘foreign’ dimension an acute threat to the economic well-being and stability of Western societies and making increased European cooperation seem all the more imperative. The definition is so broad that it could even include hackers against information systems, antiglobalization activists, etc. The heightened sense of danger and crisis associated with terrorism’s ‘asymmetric’ character has also made an EU response to it seem all the more urgent. The way was thus paved for the creation of a number of new instruments and agencies aimed at increasing intelligence, police, and judicial cooperation. In addition, the Council called upon the EU’s institutions to prepare specific measures for dealing with the terrorist threat, including those aimed at strengthening the control of the common external border and air transport security. As a result, EUROPOL’s investigative capacities were augmented as several procedural instruments were introduced to facilitate

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cooperation in criminal matters. The European Council initially responded to the attacks by ordering all member states to surrender any relevant information and intelligence to EUROPOL. Based on information and intelligence provided by police forces (ordinary police, criminal investigation, and special branches) and intelligence services (domestic and foreign) via a Counter Terrorism Unit, EUROPOL was granted the power to open and expand analysis files on terrorism. The Council Decision of 28 February 2002 established EUROJUST. The fact that it was created on the basis of a Decision and not a Convention, which would have required ratification by national parliaments, reflects the sense of urgency and perceived exceptional circumstances following September 11.54 It was also, it will be recalled, outlined by the HLG, as well as mentioned in the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 1999 and the Nice Treaty. Composed of one national member from each EU member state (prosecutor, judge or police officer), its mandate is to improve the coordination of investigations and prosecutions in member states, to facilitate the execution of international mutual assistance and extradition requests and to support investigations of the competent authorities in member states. Its actual involvement in investigations is excluded. Under the Decision on the Implementation of Specific Measures for Police and Judicial Cooperation to Combat Terrorism of 19 December 2002, all member states are required to establish national contact points responsible for collecting all relevant information concerning and resulting from national investigations and prosecutions with respect to terrorist offences and passing that information onto EUROJUST, as is the case with EUROPOL.55 The Decision establishing EUROJUST also envisages close collaboration with EJN, to the point of giving it privileged access to the EJN’s centralized information and integrating the latter’s secretariat into that of EUROJUST.56 The Council has also expressed the wish that national criminal records become more interlinked through the creation of a European network.57 The European Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Joint Investigation Teams enables members of EUROPOL to partake (if requested) in joint investigation teams, comprising national police officers and magistrates of EUROJUST that specialize in counter-terrorism, established for a specific purpose and a limited

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time period in order to carry out criminal investigations in one or more of the member states responsible for establishing the team. The purpose of such a team is to identify obstacles to mutual legal cooperation. Its members may also be asked to participate in multinational ad hoc teams for the exchange of information on suspected terrorists in the pre-criminal, investigative (i.e. intelligence) stage under the Council recommendation of 26 April 2002 on multinational ad hoc teams for exchanging information on terrorists in the pre-criminal investigative phase.58 This instrument enables investigations taking place in two or more EU states to work together to tackle crossborder criminal activities. The decision to create joint investigation teams stems partly from the work of the HLG, the 1999 Tampere European Council Conclusions and from the not yet fully ratified 2000 EU Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance;59 the concept is, therefore, not new. As a result of the creation of a Union-wide crossborder intelligence function, as well as the intensification of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, they also mean that EUROPOL now resembles a hybrid, FBI/CIA-type agency with law enforcement, counter-intelligence, and foreign intelligence functions.60 Heads of Security and Intelligence Services were also requested to meet regularly and to include members of domestic security agencies and foreign intelligence agencies in their cooperative efforts. They were also tasked with compiling an inventory of legal competences of the intelligence services in the field of anti-terrorism. This is essentially a new, ad hoc group that stands alongside the PCTF. Information between the group and EUROPOL is also likely to be exchanged, despite the fact that the group has no legal status, no provision for data protection, and no mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. A first meeting was held on 11 and 12 October 2001, while the Heads of EU Counter-terrorist units met on 15 October 2001. The latter meeting was held as part of an effort to improve operational cooperation between member states and third countries, to coordinate anti-terrorist measures being undertaken in member states and to consider the tasks to be assigned to counter-terrorist specialists within EUROPOL.61 The 9/11 attacks have also acted as a catalyst for greater judicial cooperation. Here, the fact that the response to the crisis was regarded as a response to a common threat to security of member states is paramount. The common definition of terrorism enabled

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increased cooperation in this area to move forward. The most significant development in this domain is the common arrest warrant, which will apply to serious, organized crimes, as well as to ‘terrorist’ offences. The aim of The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on European Arrest Warrant and Surrender Procedures Between Member States was to replace old extradition procedures with faster, simpler ones, involving national judicial rather than political authorities. Essentially, the arrest warrant is based on the mutual recognition of the court decisions of EU member states. This means a warrant for an arrest in one EU state will be enforceable in all others. While judges in the state surrendering a suspect will be able to question the procedure used by requesting judges, they will not be able to challenge the substance of the charge. A tight timetable will also make the ‘surrender’ of suspects quicker than under the old system of extradition. What is significant about this instrument is that it gives the EU a role in criminal justice by applying the principle of mutual recognition – a principle that the Tampere European Council had already identified as a cornerstone of judicial cooperation, but was slow to be implemented due to the perceived importance of criminal justice to state sovereignty.62 Efforts have also been made to combine the principle of mutual recognition with the same kind of access to information between member states.63 The Framework Decision on Terrorism, proposed by the Commission and adopted at the JHA Council at a meeting on 6–7 December 2001, is aimed at facilitating judicial cooperation through the approximation of criminal law by employing the key concept of terrorist offences to establish minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts, compiling a list of offences, and aligning the level of sanctions against those convicted of committing acts of terrorism. Moreover, a peer review system involving mutual evaluation of terrorist measures has been put in place to monitor the effectiveness of national systems and their implementation of anti-terrorism measures.64 Peer evaluations of national structures on combating terrorism were to be completed by 25 September 2005.65 The governments of EU states have also intensified measures aimed at guarding the EU’s external border. The Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council of 19–20 June 2003 called for ‘a coherent approach to biometric identifiers or biometric data, which would result in harmonized solutions for documents for third country

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nationals, EU citizens’ passports and information systems (VIS and SIS II).’66 The Commission has since been asked to formulate legislative proposals with respect to biometric identifiers and data, as well as the development of a VIS (visa information system) and an SIS II (second generation SIS).67 The Commission has also proposed a Council regulation to create an additional EU level body, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Border. This agency is now in operation. Its purpose is to coordinate the operational activities of member states at external borders and to facilitate the application of the Schengen acquis, in order to ensure a high level of control of persons, to surveillance of the external borders, and to provide training for border guards and carry out risk assessments.68 This implies further decentralization of the policymaking process in this domain. In addition to these proposed measures aimed at the control of external borders, the EU has engaged in more pro-active border control measures conceived as an expanded first line of defence against challenges to internal security. At the end of September 2001, for example, EUROPOL co-ordinated an operation comprising 10,000 police officers from both EU and central European candidate states in order to obtain intelligence about routes used to smuggle illegal immigrants, drugs, arms, and explosives into the EU.69 In sum, then, the September 11 attacks, as well as more recent attacks in Madrid and London, have increased the Europeanization of police forces, intelligence agencies, and judiciaries within member states. This appears to have occurred largely as a result of a sense of crisis, as well as the identification of terrorism as a common, European threat to security and thus a threat to an emergent European political order. This enabled a number of measures, many of which had already been worked out prior to 2001 by the K4 and Article 36 Committees, to be taken. The establishment of ‘internal’ security as a legitimate area of European cooperation in the 1990s has helped to transform member states sovereignty as it is expressed in the creation of public order and, as a result, their interests.

Reshaping of domestic institutional orders As alluded to above, through a process of co-determination of national and regional institutional orders, institutional practices within member states have been modified in response to ‘rules’

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constructed at the EU level. This can be discerned by looking at the way in which they are informing policy discourse, organizational structures and the subsequent allocation of resources. We can see this, for example, by examining alterations to policing, border management and criminal law. According to the structurationist framework I set out at the end of Chapter 2, change occurs when two or more institutional orders intersect. However, as I stressed, the response of actors embedded in domestic institutional orders would be inclined to vary. This can be detected in the different reform activities underway in Britain, France and Germany. This lack of uniformity is connected to the reflexivity of actors, i.e. the way in which they attempt to order social practices according to their practical knowledge of how to ‘go about things’. In some institutional contexts, changes intended to bring domestic practices and laws into line with ideas formulated within the decentralized policy frameworks of the EU, for example, will be more easily realized than in others. Turning first to modifications underway in policing, techniques, roles, and organizational structures have been undergoing changes that reflect the breaking down of barriers between issues and the emphasis on the external dimension of perceived threats to ‘internal’ European security. Policing has become more ‘pro-active’ or surveillance-based as a result of the increased emphasis on serious crime that has more than local ramifications. In relation to human smuggling, for instance, investigative approaches are based on the premise that victims of trafficking are unlikely to be prepared to testify and, as a result, evidence is gathered from using techniques such as intelligence gathering and undercover work.70 Efforts to facilitate cross-border cooperation between police forces have also brought about an extension of their geographical area of operation, formally allowing police services to be active on other member state’s territory, as a result of the establishment of JITs. In general, implementation of the Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams has required the adoption of new legislation or, at least, adjustments to existing legislation. However, the precise transposition of the Framework Decision has varied. France, for example, amended existing legislation and was responsible, along with Spain, for the creation of the first JIT in September 2004, set up to investigate attacks by ETA against tourist interests in 2003.

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In Germany, no specific legislation was deemed necessary to accommodate the Framework Decision.71 Britain has been identified by the Commission as being in non-compliance with the Framework Decision, since it claimed to have transposed the relevant provisions by means of a non-legally-binding circular. Considerable variations, therefore, exist in the way in which member states have implemented the Framework Decision. The European Commission claimed in January 2005 that only one member state (Spain) has adopted measures that are fully compliant with the Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams.72 As an ever greater number of transnational challenges to ‘internal’ security were merged together, central units set up to deal with ‘specialized policing’ tasks began to appear. In Britain, where the traditional emphasize has been on the decentralization of policing, a new ‘security supremo’ to act as a coordinator between Britain’s national anti-terrorist agencies and those of its European counterparts has been appointed. The move was part of an overall review aimed at establishing an integrated anti-terrorist unit under the overall control of MI5. In France and Germany (as well as most other EU member states), such centralized anti-terrorist agencies, dependent on respective ministries of the interior, were already created in response to Euroterrorism in the 1970s.73 Germany was, in fact, at the forefront of this development. German law enforcement agencies had been ill-prepared for the transnationally-organized underground campaign of the radical Baader-Meinhof ‘Red Army Faction’ (RAF) that grew out of the 1968 student revolution and developed connections with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).74 After a failed attempt to free Israeli athletes at Fürstenfeldbruck Airport in 1972, reform of the German police force was initiated. The Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG9) was founded within the framework of the border police force, as a special, anti-terrorist unit. At the state or local level, reaction teams were set up by patrol divisions, named ‘Specialeinsatzkommandos’ (SEK), which were to deal with terrorist activities of all kinds as long as the case remained under the jurisdiction of the state or city government. Similarly trained and equipped as the GSG9, the SEKs became the bastion of tactical police operations in Germany. While they are more widely accepted than the GSG9, the tactics of SEK units are, nonetheless, of a paramilitary type. In France, an intervention group within the paramilitary

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Gendarmerie Nationale – Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) – and the Recherche, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion (RAID) were established. At the time of these developments, the less centralized nature of the British police force made it less suited to the creation of national-level, paramilitary police unit specifically designed to deal with civil disorder and terrorist acts. As a result, the specialized central unit dealing with terrorism, the 22 Special Air Division (SAS) Regiment’s Counter-Revolutionary Wing (CRW), is dependent on the military rather than the police.75 In connection with serious and organized crime, a National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was created. This agency will, moreover, shortly be amalgamated with the National Crime Squad, as well as parts of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Immigration, to form the new Serious Organised Crime Agency, reflecting the further the impact of the merging of internal security ‘threats’. In Germany, Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) is the national central agency for crime-fighting. Its role is to support the federal and state police forces in the prevention and prosecution of serious and transnational crimes, such as trafficking in weapons, drugs, ammunitions, explosives, the manufacture of counterfeit currency, money laundering, etc. It is also the central point of contact for international and regional cooperation. In France, the Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire is the central agency responsible for criminal investigations.76 Police forces have also become increasingly implicated in policing the EU’s external border. Similar centralizing tendencies are evident in relation to border management. The Schengen arrangement, for example, requires that one leading authority hold the responsibility for national border security. This authority is to consist of one national non-military and specialized organization that is to be responsible for border security and the organization should operate under the auspices of either ministries of the interior or justice.77 In France, the border police central directorate (DCPAF), which steers and coordinates the action of all national police departments on illegal immigration control and is dependent on the ministry of the interior, was created in 1999. It is in charge of the operational aspects of international cooperation. In Germany, the Federal Border Guard (BGS) is a federal branch of the police force and falls under the authority of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. In Britain, no such

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central agency exists as yet and border control is carried out through close cooperation between the police, the Security Service (MI5), and Immigrations and Customs.78 Cooperation between border guards is, however, producing a countertendency. A key development aimed at facilitating the operation of cooperation ‘in the field’ following the Schengen arrangement is the creation of the Police and Customs Cooperation Centre in Offenburg in 1997 that oversees the Franco-German border zone. French and German customs and police agencies have been brought together ‘under one roof’ to work together. This centre, moreover, aims at becoming a focal point for all regional cooperation cases. According to A. Maguer, the border area is developing into an ‘identifiable security administration bloc’. She claims that this type of intensive interaction is influencing French and German national systems: ‘The introduction of new work methods and new techniques and the development of new competences and work-related knowledge have made border services into sources of information for the overall reform of police agencies in general.’79 There is, thus, a sense in which border management is being developed outside of the traditional state framework. As Derek Lutterbeck notes, a tendency toward militarization of border management is also observable.80 This, however, has been less marked in Germany, where, for historical reasons, strong opposition to the army is playing a role in border enforcement exists. Moreover, semi-military, gendarmerie-type agencies have come to play a predominant role in the area of border and immigration control. As Lutterbeck points out, as security agencies, which have traditionally been located between internal and external security, were well situated to profile themselves as the predominant borderland immigration agencies, thus relegating those agencies formally responsible in this area to a secondary role. Moreover, with their implication in border and immigration control, these intermediary agencies have also witnessed a reinforcement of their military or quasi-military characteristics. They have, thus, been increasingly employing military technology, and have resorted to more military-type tactics to control the border. In line with the securitization of immigration, Lutterbeck also observes that guarding the borders against unwanted migration no longer simply takes the form of strictly guarding the line, but involves going beyond the line, into the countries of source and

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transit, as well as further within the physical border.81 Some EU member states have established mobile border police forces, which operate in a large zone behind the internal border, some authorized to carry out checks without giving a reason for so. Since 1998, for example, the German Federal Border Guard has had an extended brief enabling it to check peoples’ papers beyond the 30-kilometre zone.82 Fears that criminals will take advantage of disparities between different legal jurisdictions have also led to efforts to minimize such differences through the approximation of criminal law. What is noteworthy is that this goes beyond traditional mechanisms for combating crime. It represents a step towards establishing common criteria for public order, particularly in relation to punishable offences. It has been sought largely through Framework Decisions or, in other words, through soft law. Prior to 9/11, Framework Decisions on counterfeiting in relation to the Euro, combating fraud and counterfeiting of noncash means of payment, money laundering, combating terrorism, as well as the trafficking of human beings, were, for example, developed. In relation to the Framework Decision on the trafficking of human beings, the UK has been developing legislative frameworks with which to implement the Framework Decision on trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. A new offence of trafficking in persons for the purposes of prostitution was introduced as a stop-gap measure under the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. A more wideranging offence covering trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation was later introduced in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.83 The Act made new provisions for the offence of trafficking for prostitution, which now carries a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. New laws on trafficking for labour exploitation have also been proposed, and are reportedly at policy development stage, which is dealt with at present under civil (rather than criminal) law.84 In France, forced labour is now identified as an offence, which was not the case prior to the adoption of new legislation in March 2003. Changes have also been made to the German Penal Code in February 2005 implementing the EU (as well as UN) guidelines. These amendments criminalized forced labour trafficking, and aiding and abetting trafficking.85 Member states have been more reluctant to approximate sentencing, which tends to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, and minimum rather than maximum levels of sentences are generally approximated.

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Changes in national laws are also being altered to enable member states to comply with the Framework Decision on the EU Arrest Warrant (EAW), which is based upon the principle of mutual recognition, i.e. recognition of the right to retain differences in criminal law. One of its most controversial aspects is the removal of the requirement of dual criminality, which allows the responsible judicial authority to refuse extradition if the conduct for which it is requested is not considered criminal in its own jurisdiction. Whether the conduct for which extradition is requested falls within the 32 categories of offence outlined in the Framework Decision is a matter for the issuing authority, except where any part of the conduct takes place in the surrendering authority’s territory. The Extradition Bill, currently being debated in the British House of Lords, encompasses the EAW. In France, domestic legislation was changed in 2004 to incorporate the provisions of the EAW.86 A German EAW Act already exists, though it has been contested. Challenges to the EAW indicate that mutual trust among judicial authorities and sufficient protection for individual rights is still lacking. This is likely to hamper the implementation of the EAW, since it relies on judges’ interpretation of the Framework Decision, which means that judicial authorities in member states will determine the scope of the instrument. At the moment, national practices differ. There is still, for instance, a discrepancy between judicial definitions of crimes within the EU, rendering the abolition of the dual criminality requirement problematic. It is, therefore, not clear whether a de facto reinstatement of the dual criminality requirement and the development of jurisdictional rules that lead to the non-extradition of nationals will hamper the implementation of the EAW. In fact, grounds for non-execution of the EAW have already been specified in many EU states. In Britain, extradition will be refused if a person acted ‘in the interests of national security.’ On 18 July 2005, the German Constitutional Court declared the EAW null and void on the basis that it gave insufficient weight to the constitutional right of Germans not to be extradited. As a result, German citizens cannot be extradited under the EAW until new legislation is adopted. While the principle of mutual recognition is vital to the preservation of diversity between national legal jurisdictions, practitioners concerned with the ‘correct’ functioning of the EAW may conclude from these difficulties that greater approximation of national laws is unavoidable if increased

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cooperation premised on the mutual recognition principle is to be made to work.87 Ironically, its application will, therefore, lead to increased harmonization of criminal law. In sum, then, the merging of numerous security challenges, such as terrorism with illegal immigration, and their identification as common, European risks has translated into the greater merging of the roles of ‘internal’ security agencies: emphasis on intelligencebased, pro-active policing has grown, greater provisions for use of the military in support of the police are observable, and police forces have also become more involved in border management. The geographical scope of policing has also expanded beyond the nation state with the advent of cross-national investigative teams, as has border management. In Germany, the external border zone has further expanded towards the interior as well as outwards into source and transit countries. A centralizing tendency can also be observed in relation to policing, as specialized policing units are being set up within the member states. A similar development is also visible in relation to controlling the border and can be observed in the establishment of central coordination units, though counter-centralizing trends are also developing as a result of ‘in the field’ cooperation between border management agencies. The drive to increasingly standardize criminal justice within the EU is also beginning to have an impact within the member states, largely through the approximation of criminal law, as well as through the application of the principle of mutual recognition. Developments in this area are, nevertheless, less pronounced than in the area of policing, since considerable differences exist still in relation to the definition of offences and sentencing, which is considered crucial to national sovereignty, is in the hands of judges.

Transatlantic security relations Neo-Marxist insights into the relationship between institutionalized cooperation in the field of JHA post-9/11 and transatlantic security relations are useful in pointing up the role of the US in the development of JHA. It was certainly the case that the US exerted considerable pressure on the EU to take a number of measures following the September 11 attacks. However, while US demands and the climate of exceptionalism may have hastened their adoption, these measures

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had been on the agenda for some time in Europe. It cannot be said, therefore, that these measures were taken as a direct response to US pressure. Prior to 9/11, cooperation between the US and Europeans tended to take place within multilateral forums such as Interpol, the UN, the G8 Financial Action Task Force, and via the EU–NATO New TransAtlantic Agenda. Bilateral relations between the US and many EU states, of course, also existed (and still do). Indeed, the US had taken great care to foster strong working relations with the law enforcement and government agencies of many EU states, stationing liaison officers from, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice in those states, and deploying US personnel to assist with anti-terrorist investigations in Europe. The US had also sought more formalized anti-terrorism cooperation with the EU. The EU, however, had not shown the same level of enthusiasm for intensified cooperation in this area, largely due to the difficulty of reaching an agreement on the issue among all representatives of member states – a difficult task resulting from the varying threat perceptions and responses to terrorism that until recently acted as an obstacle to further counterterrorism cooperation among EU states themselves. The US has, however, been a benefactor of increased law enforcement and intelligence cooperation between EU states. Developments at the EU level provided an ‘added value’ to existing arrangements from the point of view of many within the US. Increased collaboration with the US in the field of law enforcement and intelligence, in turn, allowed the EU to contribute to countering terrorism in a way that would have been more problematic for a variety of political and practical reasons. After September 11, the EU brought forward a range of measures to facilitate transatlantic cooperation in the area of ‘internal’ security. First, cooperation between the EU and the US in the area of information and intelligence sharing in relation (though not limited) to counter-terrorism has been intensified and institutionalized with the signing of an ‘interim’ cooperation agreement between the two parties on 6 December 2001. This agreement, which has since been made a full agreement, was aimed at facilitating information and intelligence sharing by enabling exchanges of liaison officers between EUROPOL and US federal law enforcement agencies. The first EU liaison office was opened in the European Commission offices in Washington on 30 August 2002. The liaison

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officers stationed there are tasked with exploring, developing and ensuring contacts between EUROPOL and the US. Their mandate also includes promoting and facilitating information exchange with specific US agencies, such as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), in the areas of gathering and providing information and intelligence, and communicating relevant changes taking place in investigative methods, as well as the development of organized crime.88 The cooperation agreement was designated ‘interim’ because it envisages the transmission of personal data between EUROPOL and the US, though the US has no federal data protection law. The provision was withdrawn from the interim agreement as a result of concern about the exchange of data surpassing EUROPOL’s remit and the terms set out in the EU Charter of Rights, for example by precluding rights of access to data being exchanged, and the exchange of information on race, political opinions, religious beliefs, and a person’s health and sexual life in the absence of an identified data protection body on the US side.89 Many within the EU feared that data exchanged could be used to sentence someone to death in the US, in spite of there being no death penalty within the EU. US and EU authorities have subsequently negotiated mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties that provide for ‘extensive provisions for data protection and the provision of evidence and information.’90 The cooperation agreement represents a significant achievement for the US, particularly for the representatives of US federal law enforcement agencies, who initiated the agreement, given that EUROPOL now constitutes a focal point for the gathering of criminal and terrorist intelligence among EU member states, and also because its competencies add to the police investigative relationship they already have with member states. It is also an achievement, since inadequate US data protection laws had previously prohibited a relationship with EUROPOL developing.91 The fact that the agreement was negotiated so rapidly and with a minimum amount of controversy owed much to the reigning climate of urgency in which these measures were taken and the subsequent circumvention of their parliamentary scrutiny. The EU–US legal assistance and extradition treaties, which were negotiated under Articles 38 and 24 of the TEU allowing the EU to negotiate and conclude agreements with a non-EU state without

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requiring consultation with national or European parliaments, were signed on 25 June 2003. The most significant provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty include giving ‘US law enforcement authorities access to bank accounts throughout the EU (and vice versa) in the context of investigations into serious crimes, including terrorism, organized crime and financial crime’, and enabling the EU and the US to set up joint investigation teams to carry out undercover police operations. The extradition treaty permits extradition for a broader range of offences punishable within both the requesting and surrendering states by allowing extradition for offences punishable by more than one year in prison.92 In addition EUROJUST, like EUROPOL, has been asked to intensify cooperation with anti-terrorist magistrates in the US. An agreement has also been reached for the exchange of liaison officers between US federal law enforcement officers and EUROJUST. According to the (then) President of EUROJUST, facilitated liaison between EU and US magistrates would not involve the direct exchange of information between them.93 Increased emphasis has also been placed on cooperation in relation to border controls and transport security. The Commission’s proposals in response to Council calls for harmonized solutions for documents for third country nationals, EU passports, and information systems highlighted the importance of the verification and identification of travellers and the vulnerability of current travel documents. These proposals were presented as a response to the September 11 attacks.94 They met with considerable opposition. On 13 March 2003, the European Parliament widely adopted a resolution regretting the joint declaration by the US and EU officials of 19 February 2003, which allowed European airlines to transfer data to US customs officials on passengers flying to the US. In the opinion of the European Parliament, this would infringe the 1995 European Directive on data protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Furthermore the European Parliament was not informed about the talks with US officials. As result, it called upon the Commission to suspend the joint declaration as soon as possible, and instead implement a coherent EU policy on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data95 for transport and border purposes, which would fully respect the human rights framework under EU law. There are a number of concerns in relation to the transfer of the sort of data that

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the US authorities have requested from the EU. The most relevant of these concerns is the potential abuse, or rather non-proportional use, of ‘sensitive’ information. The Commission, which has a mandate to make findings of adequate data protection in third countries, declared itself committed to further discussions with the US Customs Border Protection Bureau, which has provided some assurances.96 In May 2004, the US and the EU reached an agreement allowing airlines operating flights to the US to provide US authorities with PNR data in their reservation and departure control systems within 15 minutes of a flight’s departure. This accord formalizes a practice in place since March 2003.97 In April 2004, the US and the EU also signed a customs cooperation accord, which, inter alia, calls for extending the US Container Security Initiative throughout the EU. This would involve US customs officers being placed in EU ports to help pre-screen cargo bound for the US. The US and the EU are also discussing the use of ‘armed marshals’ on transatlantic flights. In November 2004, US and EU officials agreed to exchange information about aviation security technologies, such as airline countermeasures against shoulder-fired ground-to-air missiles.98 In sum, 9/11 has resulted in an intensification and formalization of EU-US anti-terrorism cooperation. As a direct result of the September 11 attacks, the EU has also established a direct organizational link with the US. Whereas anti-Communism once represented the principal moral imperative behind transatlantic unity in the past, terrorism now appears to have emerged as a fertile terrain for transatlantic cooperation. Moreover, as Monica den Boer has highlighted, ‘there is a spill-over from terrorism to other security and mobility-related issues. Border controls, criminal justice, immigration and asylum policy have thus become elements inserted in a wider transatlantic security policy continuum.’99 ‘Internal’ security is, therefore, likely to become an expanding terrain for EU–US cooperation.

Conclusion The transformations that have taken place over the last two decades in relation to the creation of a European ‘internal’ security field have brought about a change in the nature of sovereignty as expressed in the maintenance of public order. The role of informal policy arenas

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has been crucial to this process of transformation, understood here as Europeanization. Accounts of recent developments in the field of European security that rely on the traditional terms of IR would have been unable to grasp the significance of growing cooperation in this domain. In the most obvious sense, this is because the focus would have been on military threats to security emanating from the realm of inter-state relations rather than ‘internal’ security. Emphasizing the centrality of the rationally calculating state would also have led one to expect cooperation to result from the rational pursuit of preferences and interests by EU member states. However, prior to the TEU, cooperation in the area of JHA was predominantly informal and ad hoc, comprising ministers of justice and ministers of the interior brought together to discuss matters of law and order, as well as police chiefs tasked with preparing the agenda, writing reports and monitoring working groups comprising mid-level officials focusing on issues of police and security, free movement of people, judicial co-operation and external relations, etc. These actors have been central to the process of Europeanization. The TEU further formalized and extended the influence of transnational policy practitioners through the creation of a third EU pillar for JHA. It essentially resulted in the extension of horizontal, network- or project-oriented governance arrangements into more stable institutionalized structures. It brought all EU member states’ police, customs, and judicial authorities under one clearly defined, legally based authority framework – the K4 Committee. The participants of the K4 Committee are mid-level representatives from member states and Commission officials. With the ratification of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the K4 Committee was renamed the Article 36 Committee (CATS), which now coordinates the work of the various working groups on police cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, SIS, as well as the activities of other agencies working in the area of police and judicial cooperation, such as EUROPOL, EUOJUST, the European Judicial Network, CEPOL, etc. As law enforcement and police studies suggest, the knowledgeability of these actors, informed by their immediate institutional contexts, has also been central to the consolidation of a European field of ‘internal’ security. Officials charged with law enforcement tasks tended initially to frame issues according to the perceived ‘objective needs’ of the European polity. These officials have been principally

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concerned with the implications for law enforcement agencies of a world in which boundaries are being replaced by networks and flows and the state’s capacity to produce internal order and security is being eroded, making European-wide cooperation essential from their point of view. While cooperation between EU police forces and the establishment of informal networks, such as TREVI, were initially concerned with counter-terrorism, other challenges deemed to have a transnational, foreign dimension to them gradually took precedence. Indeed, the redefinition of the national security state during the 1990s was largely linked to the securitization of immigration and associated phenomena, such as organized crime. Their knowledgeability was, however, bounded in the sense that a number of subsequent political consequences of the expansive ‘logic’ set in motion, such as increased authority being given to Brussels-based bodies, are unlikely to have been intended. While neo-functionalism would have recognized that ‘technical’ issues can have an expansive ‘logic’, it would not have stressed the importance of the framing of issues to any subsequent ‘spill-over’. For the same reason, the significance of conception of the ‘common good’ would have been obscured. Yet the definition of these issues as common security risks led to the Europeanization of policing and border management, in particular. Terrorism, at this stage, was not identified as a common, European threat, since terrorist activities were for the most part aimed at individual governments. The lack of a common definition of terrorism meant that cooperation between EU member states’ judiciaries was comparatively slow to develop, though regulative norms were, nevertheless, established in this area with the creation of the Tampere ‘scoreboard’ and the development of a formal regulatory process. The ‘War on Terrorism’ has helped to further institutionalize and intensify police, intelligence, and judicial cooperation within the EU. The climate of exceptionalism that followed the attacks, in effect, further consolidated the ‘internal’ security field. In particular, the formulation of a common definition of terrorism has enabled the further cooperation in the area of criminal law and intelligence. One of the most significant developments in this regard is the creation of the EAW, which replaced old extradition procedures. What is significant about this instrument is that it gives the EU a greater role in criminal justice by applying the principle of mutual recognition

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between judiciaries and relies upon member states’ judicial systems applying an identical scheme. Cooperation in the area of intelligence is being encouraged within an informal network, which may in time lead to more concrete measures being taken. The climate of exceptionalism following the attacks has also enabled a number of measures to be introduced more quickly than they might otherwise have been. A number of decisions based on earlier proposals were taken, notably in relation to the creation of EUROJUST, an Agency for the Management of Co-operation at the External Border and an extension of EUROPOL’s competencies. All these bodies have extended the influence of Brussels-based officials and will undoubtedly raise the profile of those professionals based in member states that are networked with them. While neo-Marxist insights into the relevance of growing cooperation in JHA for transatlantic relations are helpful in drawing attention to the role of the US in the development of this field, measures taken by the EU post-9/11 cannot be solely attributed to US pressure. Increased and formalized intra-European cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence, and border controls has also shifted EU member states’ relations with the US. As noted by den Boer, ‘[i]t is clear that the transatlantic axis against terrorism has opened the EU-door to the USA far more widely than before, and that there is a spill-over from terrorism to other security or mobility related issues. Border controls, criminal justice co-operation, immigration and asylum policy have thus become elements inserted in a wider transatlantic security policy continuum.’100 In effect, it has further unlocked an abundant area of transatlantic collaboration – one that is likely to expand with a ‘transatlantic internal security continuum’ – and this deserves further scrutiny.

5 The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

Introduction On 10 June 1999, the day that the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1244 mandating intervention in Kosovo was issued, the foreign ministers of the EU, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Turkey, the US, Canada, and Japan met in Cologne, Germany, with representatives from numerous international organizations, to formally endorse the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.1 As an EU initiative, the establishment of the Pact signified a new phase of the EU’s approach to the Balkans. Its earlier approach had been overwhelmingly reactive. It had also responded separately to successive crises in the Western Balkans rather than attempting to stabilize the region as a whole. The EU’s first attempt to remedy these deficiencies with a ‘Regional Approach’ failed to address comprehensively the causes of conflict and to capitalize on the stabilizing potential of the two EU candidate states, Romania and Bulgaria. The Regional Approach was, moreover, uncoordinated with other initiatives and programmes aimed at stabilizing the Balkans, producing overlap and, in some instances, competition. The SP represents an effort to overcome these shortcomings. It was created as a framework to support a multilaterally coordinated endeavour to address the sources of the conflicts on a regional basis. It aims to do so, above all, by connecting the process of stabilization with preparation for accession to the

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EU, as well as linking this to complementary initiatives undertaken by other international actors. Given the association of conflict prevention with eventual EU membership, the SP plays a significant role in terms of orienting SEE states towards ‘Europe’. However, this dimension of the SP is beyond the scope of the present study and is more directly relevant to Europeanization of the policies, practices and structures of the Balkan states themselves. This chapter focuses, instead, on the way in which the SP demonstrates the influence that member state institutions can have on the process of Europeanization. At the time of the Pact’s inception, Germany held the EU Presidency and German security practitioners were particularly important in bringing about the EU’s new approach to SEE. Their preferences were informed by German collective identity vis-à-vis the European integration process and strategic culture.2 In this sense, institutions, broadly defined, not only include formal rules, procedures, and norms, but also cognitive templates that frame the construction of meaning informing the behaviour of actors played a significant role in establishing the SP and thus bringing about a shift in the EU’s approach to the region. The SP, therefore, represents a case of vertical, bottom-up Europeanization in that German security practitioners were able to successfully project their policy preferences to the EU-level during the policy formation period. In order to capture the role of institutions during this phase, I focus on the manner in which the preferences, interests, and identities of German security practitioners shaped the nature of the Pact. These preferences, interests, and identities are themselves derived from interaction governed by domestic institutions. What is particularly interesting is that these institutions are themselves the product of Germany’s Europeanization. This provides another instance of the process of co-determination of national and regional institutional orders. The way in which German security practitioners viewed the problem and went about dealing with it was, thus, in many respects distinctly European. To this end, the establishment of the SP is particularly useful in demonstrating the co-determination of national and regional institutional orders during the process of Europeanization. In what follows, I first discuss the EU’s approach to SEE prior to the establishment of the Pact. I outline the transition from reactive

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crisis management to long-term conflict prevention, highlighting the novelty of the SP with respect to earlier approaches. I then consider how more traditional accounts of developments in European security would interpret its creation under German leadership. I argue that these accounts fail to capture the role that institutions played in the inception and adoption of the Pact. I then employ the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2 in order to show how Germany’s domestic institutions in fact had a significant impact on the construction of the EU’s common strategy towards SEE. Specifically, I attempt to discern what role the practical knowledge and identities of German security practitioners had in the policy formation stage. This implies looking at how they understood the problem and how they went about responding to it. Given the co-constitution of social practices and institutions, it also implies ascertaining how this knowledgeability was informed by German collective identity and strategic culture. I argue that this specific practical knowledge was crucial in bringing about the EU’s new approach to SEE. A number of other factors facilitated the promotion of their preferences during the policy formation phase. In particular, the framing of issues by international donors was important. Finally, I consider the significance of the SP for transatlantic security relations, since the Pact implied a significant boost in the EU’s role in the SEE, whereas the US had hitherto been the major force for change in the region.

From reactive crisis management to long-term conflict prevention The EU’s involvement in the Western Balkans has gone through a number of phases. Its initial approach, which can be characterized as reactive crisis management, concentrated on the consequences instead of the sources of conflict. It also dealt with problems in the Western Balkans on a case-by-case basis rather than developing a strategy to stabilize the region as a whole. The EU subsequently adopted a Regional Approach, which aimed at stabilization through regional cooperation. The Regional Approach was, however, flawed in that it applied only to a limited number of fields and ran parallel to other major initiatives aimed at stabilizing SEE, causing overlap and competition. Created during the German chairmanship of the EU to address these shortcomings, the SP constitutes a long-term

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approach to conflict prevention in the region through the process of EU enlargement. The EU’s approach to SEE prior to the Stability Pact Before the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia began, the EC had neither the instruments nor sufficient common ground to launch a comprehensive strategy towards stabilizing SEE. Its approach was, therefore, faltering, reactive, and ultimately overshadowed by the role assumed in the later phase of the crisis by the UN and, in particular, NATO under American aegis. While EU member states, including Britain, France, and Germany, contributed most of the units comprising the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in Bosnia, these units were, nevertheless, coordinated by NATO, with significant American political and military leadership. In addition, the NATO bombing campaign played a significant role in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to make concessions. The US also sponsored diplomatic talks and negotiated the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. In short, the US was by far the most important international actor and the main agent of change in the Balkans during this period, and American ‘coercive diplomacy’ appeared to be more decisive than the ‘soft’, diplomatic tools available to the EU at the time. Despite being overshadowed by the US, the EU nevertheless came to play a more prominent role in Bosnia, and in SEE in general, following the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement. In Bosnia, the EU provided economic assistance and took on some security-related (policing) and administrative tasks in the country. In Albania, the EU sent troops to stabilize a crisis situation that had resulted from the collapse of pyramid saving schemes in 1997. The WEU also organized international police operations to help restore law and order. It also arranged a de-mining operation in Croatia and helped monitor the situation in Kosovo as from 1998 through satellite imagery provided by the (then) WEU Satellite Centre. However, the most important dimension of the EU’s involvement in SEE was the conclusion of association agreements or ‘Europe Agreements’ with Bulgaria and Romania, which were regarded as a first step towards full EU membership. These agreements were aimed at achieving tangible progress towards developing a stable market economy and liberal democracy in these countries. This amounted

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to a case-by-case approach, given that only some SEE countries had signed such agreements, and reflected the absence of a comprehensive strategy towards stabilizing the region as a whole. However, the fact that they were not encouraged to cooperate with each other, but to direct their efforts out of the region toward Western Europe, tended to produce competition between governments of SEE countries in their relations with the EU. It also meant that transnational issues troubling the region, such as refugee return, border, and minority issues, were inadequately addressed and that an opportunity to alter relations between the states of SEE through encouraging regional cooperation was being missed.3 In an attempt to overcome these shortcomings, the EU adopted a Regional Approach in February 1996, as part of the Royaumont Process on Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South Eastern Europe, which was established to support the implementation of regional aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The Process aimed to facilitate the implementation of the peace plan by providing economic and political support to the former countries of Yugoslavia (except FYR) and FYROM through a range of instruments, including financial assistance under the PHARE and OBNOVA programmes,4 autonomous trade preferences and Co-operation and Association Agreements. The Co-operation Agreements concluded with Albania and FYROM and the extension of PHARE and OBNOVA assistance to both countries, as well as the trade preferences given to BosniaHerzegovina and Croatia, were made dependent upon conditions set by the Commission and, to some extent, made EU cooperation with the Balkan countries conditional on their mutual cooperation. However, the emphasis on regional cooperation was largely restricted to the promotion of civil society, culture, and human rights, and, as such, did not encompass other dimensions that were later considered crucial for the stability of the region as a whole. In addition, this particular combination of instruments failed to exploit the stabilizing potential of Bulgaria and Romania, resulting from the Europe Agreements.5 In addition, the Regional Approach overlapped with the South-East European Co-operative Initiative (SECI), the US strategy towards stabilizing the region. The SECI was created to promote concrete projects to support the development of market economies in SEE. The programme – which is still in operation, but is now run in cooperation

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with the SP – primarily focuses on facilitating regional cooperation in combating transborder crime in order to make SEE more attractive to investors. To this end, the SECI Centre, in Bucharest, Romania, has been providing, inter alia, assistance to SEE countries in order to harmonize their law enforcement legislation with EU requirements, to support the joint training of law enforcement officers, national efforts to improve domestic cooperation between law enforcement agencies, and the creation of a mechanism to assist cooperation in preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting transborder crime. Activities undertaken under the auspices of the SECI were uncoordinated with those of the EU and were, at least to some extent, in competition with them.6 The creation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe As another war in the Balkans seemed imminent, EU member states agreed to develop a Common Strategy on the Western Balkans at the Vienna Summit, which took place on 11 and 12 December 1998, during the Austrian Presidency of the EU. The Common Strategy was one of the new instruments designed to strengthen the CFSP under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. While agreement among EU member states on a common strategy constituted a positive step forward it was, nevertheless, in an indeterminate state until the Treaty came into force on 1 May 1999.7 In the Presidency Conclusions, discussion was made of the EU’s contribution to ‘political and economic development’ and ‘prosperity and stability’ in South Eastern Europe through, on the one hand, the enlargement programme, involving a number of countries of the region and, on the other hand, the regional approach involving countries of the Western Balkans. As would be expected, there appears to be very little indication of a change in the EU’s approach at this stage, and no mention of anything approximating the Stability Pact.8 The European Commission was still very much focused on preparing Central European countries for accession to the EU.9 The shift in approach would come during Germany’s EU Presidency, which began in January 1999. The presidency of the EU, in particular, provided German security practitioners with an important diplomatic tool with which to set the agenda and to give a strong impetus to the initiative. According to a German official, this partly explains the very short timeframe in which developments occurred: NATO

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airstrikes began in late March and in early June everything was on track and agreed within the EU. This was only possible because the German presidency was able to determine the agenda of the meetings in Brussels and to push its initiatives at every level.10 The first step was taken on 1 April 1999 when Germany hosted a conference of EU representatives with the foreign ministers of ‘front-line states’, which led to the proposal of a comprehensive ‘stability pact’ for South Eastern Europe.11 Joschka Fischer presented a text at the Council meeting in Luxembourg on 8 April 1999, which called for a ‘clearcut and repeated declaration … of the EU that the countries of the region have the perspective of membership, even if that looking from today lies in an unspecified future. … The perspective of EU membership is, as developments in the Central and East European countries have demonstrated, a crucial stimulus for transformation’. Criteria or conditions for entering into negotiations on membership were not included in the text, in order to leave some room for discussion of the issue. In the Council Conclusions, the governments of the member states stated that ‘[a] political solution to the Kosovo crisis must be embedded in a determined effort geared towards stabilising the region as a whole. South Eastern Europe needs a Stability Pact opening the door to a long term political and economic stabilization process. Such a broad based strategy should take advantage of existing regional initiatives.’12 The German initiative of a long-term, broad-based stabilization process was envisaged for South Eastern Europe as a whole was thus backed by other governments. At the General Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 26 April, the Council agreed to begin with preparations for a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. It stated that ‘[t]he Stability Pact will give all countries in the Balkans region a concrete perspective of stability and integration into Euro-Atlantic structure.’13 Again, a strategy aimed at the whole of South Eastern Europe is considered and the mention of a ‘concrete perspective’ in relation accession to the EU and NATO is alluded to. The knotty issue of offering EU membership to Western Balkan countries was, as mentioned, not agreed upon initially. Among the major EU members, the initial proposal stating that a clear cut and repeated commitment to offering the countries of the region an EU perspective some time in the future was strongly backed by the governments of the UK and, of course, Germany. However, French

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representatives had grave reservations about giving some countries an EU perspective for fear that they might be admitted ill-prepared for membership.14 While the final text of the Pact refrained from creating a direct link between conditionality and accession,15 reflecting the concerns of some states, it nevertheless held out the possibility of eventual EU membership. Thus, from their initially divided positions over the perspective of giving the countries of the Western Balkans an EU perspective, a common position had finally been formulated among EU members, as well as within the Commission. While Britain and France, as well as other EU member states, backed the German initiative at the Council meeting on 8 and 26 April 1999, the language of the text was watered down in the following weeks, due to serious reservations about granting an EU perspective.16 In early May, correspondents had already reported from Brussels that a full perspective of membership was not planned by the Commission. During the next Council meeting on 17 May 1999 in Brussels a ‘Common Position’ by the European Commission was submitted, which was leaked, reporting French, Spanish, and Dutch objections against offering countries like Albania and FYROM a real perspective for accession.17 While differences existed regarding the extent to which such a pact ought to be linked to EU membership,18 the EU Council of Ministers nevertheless supported the initiative and endorsed a Common Position on 17 May 1999. The version that was finally endorsed stated that ‘the EU will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures … with a perspective of EU membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty once the Copenhagen criteria have been met’. This was a clear modification of the Fischer team’s language. For the first time, full integration of all the countries of SEE in the EU was envisaged. However, the perspective of membership was now explicitly tied to the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 and the Amsterdam Treaty, indicating that there would be no short cut to EU membership. At the Petersberg meeting of the EU Political Directors (senior officials) on 27 May, the Stability Pact was finalized. Fischer now conceded that there would be ‘no short cut into the European structures’. However, he added, ‘if the very idea of Europe shall unfold its full potential also in South Eastern Europe, the stabilization process will need to promise a clear cut EU accession perspective for the

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countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania, even if the realisation will only be very long-term.’19 The Pact was formally adopted at the Cologne European Council summit on 10 June 1999.20 The wording that EU governments finally agreed on was, again, more reserved: The EU will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures. In case of countries which have not yet concluded association agreements with the EU, this will be done through a new kind of contractual relationship taking into account the individual situations of each country with the perspective of EU membership, on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met. We note the European Union’s willingness that, while deciding autonomously, it will consider the achievement of the objectives of the SP, in particular progress in developing regional co-operation, among the important elements in evaluating the merits of such a perspective.21 A long-term approach to conflict prevention in the region had, nonetheless, been adopted, signifying a shift in the EU’s approach to SEE.

Europeanization of Germany’s policy preferences Realist accounts of developments in European security interpret Germany’s central role in the Pact’s creation in terms of balance of power politics and interests: Germany had an interest in the region, and its relative power, especially following unification, enabled it to impose its agenda within the Council. When it met with opposition from other EU member states, it compromised and accepted a watered-down version of its original idea for the Pact. Institutions would not be considered relevant to the development of a common EU strategy towards SEE. Instead, the German state would have been assumed to be acting according to rational calculations guided by pre-defined interests. The manner in which these preferences and interests are informed by institutions would not be taken into consideration. Yet an important part of the knowledgeability guiding the behaviour of practitioners reflected Germany’s own relationship

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to the European integration project and the extent to which its own strategic culture was ‘Europeanized’ over the post-Second World War period. Hegemonic stability theory would have failed to sufficiently emphasize the importance of the practical knowledge of mid-level security practitioners. Cooperative behaviour came about, at least in part, because of German practitioners’ understanding of how to go about things in a multilateral setting. There is a reflex to work multilaterally at an unconscious level.22 Compromise and consensusseeking was crucial in winning the support of member states that were reluctant to envisage giving some states in SEE an EU perspective.23 Liberal cooperation theory would have provided a slightly more adequate frame of analysis insofar as egoistic governments are thought to adhere to the rules and principles of international regimes even when short-sighted assessments of self-interest may counsel them not to, because regular, intensive interaction can lead to cooperative behaviour between states. It would, nevertheless, have viewed the importance of such interaction in terms of reducing uncertainty and the marginal costs of negotiating new issues between states, rather than in terms of norms guiding practitioners in multilateral policymaking environments. Even the modified version of regime theory advanced by Aybet, which employs a Gramscian conception of hegemony in order to escape assumptions of rational action, as well as to better account for the interaction between preference formation and institutions, would still take states to be the principal agents of institutionalized cooperation. The European security ‘architecture’ would be understood as a cultural practice. However, according to Aybet, in order to make sense of such a regime, it is necessary to adhere to a distinct realist/English school perspective that views the international system as a unique phenomenon that functions via institutions which are unique to it, such as the balance of power. Thus, the European way of doing things would be understood as a culture of state practice rather than one also involving the social practices of individuals implicated in the policy process. By employing a structurationist framework to examine the establishment of the SP the role of institutions in shaping the EU’s approach to South Eastern Europe through the establishment of the SP becomes visible. When the new German government took over

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the EU Presidency, one of its main objectives was to enhance the EU’s profile in the area of external relations. The Red/Green coalition government had committed both parties to strengthening the CFSP.24 This commitment has to do with Germany’s collective identity vis-à-vis the European integration process: the Pact reflected a strong trust in regional integration, as well as a strong belief in the intrinsic value of ‘process’, which brings various players to the same table.25 Many German political actors have a predisposition towards a European approach and solution to foreign and security policy issues. West Germany’s foreign policy has been established within a multilateral framework and Europeanized from the start. Indeed, the Preamble of the Basic Law (the German constitution) stipulates that Germany should work towards European integration as a means of stabilizing Europe. German governments have thus consistently tried to advance greater foreign and security policy coordination. The idea was to strengthen the CFSP by improving the EU’s capabilities in civilian conflict prevention and peaceful conflict management. This is in line with the principles guiding German foreign and security policy, namely a culture of restraint towards the use of military force in conflict resolution, the goal of multilateral cooperation (if possible within the framework of international institutions),26 and a strong normative, value-based orientation (protection of human rights and development of international law).27 The proposed Stability Pact was clearly an expression of these principles. Given the government’s proclaimed commitment to peaceful conflict resolution and established foreign and security policy principles informing officials in the Foreign Ministry, the NATO air strikes brought the governing coalition, which was deeply divided over the strikes, to the point of crisis. While the beginning of the NATO bombardment of Serbia created a sense of urgency for the government as a whole, which had only taken office six months earlier, this was especially true for Fischer, the main cabinet figure of the smaller governing coalition partner, the Greens. With their strong pacific heritage, pressure built very quickly among their grassroots against NATO intervention. The civilian casualties, targeting errors, and lack of response from Miloševic´’s side all contributed to this opposition and to the perception that a political approach should be favored.28 It would also certainly have made a sizable number of officials in the Foreign Ministry uneasy. While involvement in NATO military

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intervention in Kosovo was testimony to the more relaxed stance towards the use of force that emerged over the 1990s, there was, nevertheless, a general preference for the restraint of the use of force.29 Negotiating a medium- to long-term solution to instability in the region was, therefore, perceived as all the more urgent. It would have seemed so not only because non-military solutions to conflicts were preferred, as well strategies for long-term conflict prevention, but also because it appeared to have provided a means of blurring the centrality of NATO in order to ease the domestic crisis in Germany provoked by NATO air strikes. Thereafter, as Marie-Janine Calic notes, ‘structural conflict prevention policy in South Eastern Europe became the leitmotif of the German approach towards the Balkans’ following the NATO intervention in Kosovo.30 As the situation worsened, the staff of the Foreign Ministry formulated the idea of a stability pact for SEE, based on a coordinated, multilateral approach that aimed at conflict prevention rather than conflict management.31 As Ambassador Dr. Michael Schaefer, who was Head of the Western Balkan’s Task Force in the Federal Foreign Ministry between 1999 and 2000 and was involved in setting up the SP, writes We knew that two processes would be indispensible here: a clear European perspective for all the states of South Eastern Europe and crossborder cooperation between all neighbours in the region as a central step on this road to Europe. … For us it was clear from the very outset: given the complex social and historical situation of the countries of the Western Balkans there can be neither simple nor quick-fix solutions. The vision of integration into the modern Europe was the only way to bring the region peace and freedom in the long term.32 While the idea for a more comprehensive strategy towards SEE had already been floated by the French prior to the Kosovo war, the new German initiative differed in a significant way: it called for such a pact to be established under the auspices of the EU rather than the OSCE. Moreover, it linked long-term conflict prevention in the region with EU membership.33 This reflected faith in regional integration, the commitment to work towards integration as a way of stabilizing Europe, and the strong belief in the value of ‘process’

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that is characteristic of Germany’s strategic culture.34 To this end, initiatives undertaken under the aegis of the SP are essentially aimed at constituting a particular type of state, namely through European integration. The idea governing European integration is that states can be more effective than they would otherwise be when they engage in close cooperation or even pool their sovereignty in order to achieve common objectives. The governments of states wishing to establish closer relations with the EU or become EU members themselves must demonstrate a willingness to adopt a similar approach. The SP supports this objective by coordinating national strategies and providing technical assistance aimed at facilitating cooperation among countries in the region, even if their relations were hostile. The SP was set up as an intergovernmental conference, with a permanent secretariat based in Brussels. The secretariat’s role is to help participants overcome political differences and to coordinate initiatives in the region. The main mechanism for doing so is the South Eastern European Regional Table, a type of general assembly that operates on the basis of consensus and oversees the activities of three working tables, each of which focuses on one of three sectors considered vital for the success of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, namely the promotion of sustainable democratic systems, the promotion of economic and social wellbeing, and the creation of a secure environment. Working Table I focuses on democratization and human rights. Initiatives undertaken within this working table are aimed at promoting media freedom and gender equality, strengthening parliamentary and educational structures, as well as overcoming the legacies of the past. In the area of media freedom, for example, the Pact’s activities aim to transform formerly state-controlled media into public service broadcasters outside of government control and with safeguards for editorial independence. The focus is thus on broadcast legislation, quality programming, and the training of journalists. Other initiatives include the Parliamentary Co-operation Initiative, which aims to strengthen the parliamentary structures of countries in the region in order to help them cope with domestic reform legislation and integration into an altered global environment, and The Reconciling for the Future initiative, which aims to help overcome the legacies of the past related to ethnic conflict in Kosovo and discrimination of the Roma, for instance.35

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Initiatives underway under the aegis of Working Table II are especially aimed at promoting the development of the private sector through the liberalization of trade and enhancement of the business environment. SEE countries are in the process of creating what is hoped will gradually become a free trade area, harmonized with EU’s internal market. Thus, in addition to supporting the implementation of the Free Trade Agreements, the focus of the Trade Working Group is on deepening and broadening integration with a view to accelerating the process of integration of the countries of SEE into EU structures, which means encouraging SEE governments to establish a timetable for harmonizing rules and procedures and ensuring their convergence with the EU body of relevant legislation (the acquis communautaire). In order to avoid technical barriers to trade, it will support efforts to advance towards the implementation of standards, technical regulations, accreditation systems that are in line with EU standards, and so on.36 Jointly with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the SP also develops packages of tailored measures to improve the investment climate, such as regular business missions for potential investors. The SP also attempts to involve the private sector in the political process through the SEE Business Advisory Council, which comprises senior executives from companies in the EU, the USA, Canada, Japan, Turkey, and Southeast European countries, and regularly injects feedback. Projects aimed at improving social cohesion, such as the Initiative for Social Cohesion, which aims to ensure improvement of the welfare systems of SEE countries, as well as regional infrastructure (i.e. transport and energy sectors, and border management), are also supported.37 Economic reforms are also intended to be underpinned by improvement of the education systems of SEE countries, leading to their eventual harmonization with those of the EU. Due to the lack of acquis in this area, harmonization is not based on any contractual arrangements. Instead, a Task Force on Education and Youth supports the incorporation of SEE into a European Area of Education and promotes this through regional cooperation and networking as instruments for wider participation in EU initiatives. The SEE Education Reform Implementation Initiative in view of the Accession and the Stabilisation and Association Processes (ERI SEE), aims to link national education reform in the sub-region with European trends, as outlined in respective EU programmes, such as the ‘Detailed Work

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Programme on the Follow-up of the Objectives of Education and Training Systems in Europe’. Priorities of the ERI SEE include, inter alia, adjustment of existing national legal frameworks in line with EU developments, widening access to education, and administrative reform (e.g. through twinning, decentralization, and information systems). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Initiative, demonstrating commitment to the ERI SEE’s reform agenda, was signed by the ministers of education of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Former Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia-Montenegro in June 2003, Albania and Moldova in December 2003, and Kosovo in February 2004. Croatia and Romania are also expected to sign the MoU sometime during 2004.38 Working Table III dealt with security issues. It was divided into two sub-tables: one on military issues and another on justice and home affairs. Through these two sub-tables, it aimed to establish a stable ‘external’ security environment in the region and to improve regional cooperation in fighting organized crime and corruption, and tackling migration issues. The Sub-Table on Security and Defence focused, primarily, on restructuring and ‘right-sizing’ militaries within the region by assisting, in cooperation with NATO, in the retraining of demobilized personnel, and the conversion of military bases and facilities to civilian use. In 2005, the Zagreb-based Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre took over these projects.39 Other activities are aimed at stemming the illicit flow and the destruction of small arms and light weapons (SALW), promoting arms control and confidence-building measures, and coordinating regional participation in the Ottawa process.40 Through the Ohrid Process, the SP, in partnership with NATO, OSCE, and the European Commission, also aimed to facilitate the development of well-managed borders in the Western Balkans.41 The Stability Pact’s Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative is designed to assist countries in SEE to improve the national disaster management systems as well as to facilitate the creation of a regional framework for cooperation in this area.42 The Sub-Table on Justice and Home Affairs aims to assist SEE countries in the incorporation of international treaties, such as the UN ‘Palermo’ convention on fighting organized crime and corruption, into national legislation. As Erhard Busek, the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact, noted, ‘some countries simply do

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not have “organised criminal acts” listed as punishable offences in their penal codes.’43 In order to assist countries in their efforts to adopt such legislation, two regional secretariats were established within the framework of SP initiatives: one in Bucharest, Romania, which focuses on organized crime, and one in Sarajevo, BosniaHerzegovina, which deals with anti-corruption. Police training and transborder cooperation between police and border forces have been supported, in cooperation with international actors, such as the Association of European Police Colleges (AEPC), the Central European Police Academy (MEPA) and the Nordic Baltic Police Academy (NBPA), by training courses, covering drugs and weapons trafficking, police management and crime investigation.44 As a result, cooperative relations linked to policing are being established. The Police Forum Initiative, established under Working Table III, involves regional police training, the establishment of an Organised Crime Training Network (OCTN) and a Stolen Car Project. All three initiatives essentially involve some degree of joint training, exchange of information and expertise, and an opportunity to network and reinforce relationships. The OCTN, for example, is intended to provide an opportunity to share best practices and to enhance common investigation activities by improving both formal and informal working contacts, and to introduce and support a process for the further development of the organized crime investigation units in the countries of SEE,45 as well as establishing cooperative links with EUROPOL. The SP has started to connect SECI centre with EUROPOL.46 The initiative has also established a project to connect major border check points with Interpol.47 Border management structures are currently in the process of being restructured in line with European standards. Through the main instrument of CARDs in the Western Balkans, as well as through the EU’s Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme48 in Moldova, the EU, as indicated, has committed considerable resources to border guarding issues, particularly in the areas of administrative reorganization (through twinning arrangements49) and infrastructure support (both provision of equipment and rehabilitation of facilities). Similarly, the World Bank’s Trade and Transport Facilitation in South East Europe project is providing support for the improvement of border infrastructure. NATO is also providing advice on the military aspects of reforming

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and restructuring border security, while the OSCE is active in relation to the civilian aspects of reform.50 The Stability Pact also created the Reay Group, which aims to facilitate a regional approach to mine action within the legal framework of the Ottawa Convention to which all countries in the region are party, with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, which has expressed its desire to accede. The establishment of a regional mine action support group acts as a focal point of information exchange and a vehicle for more synergistic approaches to mine action within the region.51 Thus, with very few resources of its own (approximately 2 million Euro per year, covered by EU funds), the SP is helping to alter the relations between states in SEE. To the extent that pressure is applied, it is done through the conditionality right of regional cooperation. Governments in the region either have to work together or forgo financial support for projects. As these examples demonstrate, this prerequisite for funding has encouraged cooperation at the ministerial and official level across a variety of sectors, and, as Busek notes, has become a ‘self-runner’. As regular contacts have become the norm in many areas, officials and ministers establish relationships and, moreover, realize that they can discuss topics within the SP framework that are domestically taboo. Effective communication and negotiation between governments and officials not only helps to create neighbourly relations, but also facilitates the resolution of concrete issues that affect individuals. Regional cooperation has, for example, helped to facilitate the resolution of refugee cases between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro.52 The Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings (SPTF) is also encouraging and strengthening cooperative efforts to combat human trafficking.53 The co-determination of national and EU-level institutions can also be perceived insofar as the SP constitutes a multilaterally coordinated effort at conflict prevention. At the time of the Pact’s creation, Germany expressed a clear preference for a multilaterallycoordinated response, partly informed by the belief that in order to overcome nationalist post-Soviet conflicts a model of regional coordination was required, drawing on the EU’s own experience and offering eventual EU accession as the major carrot. But EU association and eventual accession could only be offered by the EU itself. Therefore, it was conceived as important to turn the stability

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pact idea over to the EU and its institutions.54 While the SP was initiated and led by the EU it was, nevertheless, conceived as a multilateral effort. Other international actors or ‘donors’ include bilateral actors (such as USAID, the Government of The Netherlands and Switzerland), international organizations (such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO) and international financial institutions (such as the World Bank and the IMF), non-governmental organizations (such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) and expert institutions (such as the Centre for European Security Studies at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands), as well as the eight ‘target’ countries of SEE – FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Albania –, the two EU candidate states (Bulgaria and Romania), and Moldova. With neither financial resources nor implementing structures of its own, the SP is, above all, a facilitating mechanism, specifically mandated with coordinating assistance among these international actors.55 The preference for a multilateral approach to the problem was informed by Germany’s collective identity vis-à-vis the European integration process and strategic culture. While the German government was no doubt partly driven by short-term political calculations, i.e. the desire to blur the central role of NATO and, thereby, alleviate the domestic crisis by emphasizing the role of the OSCE, this kind of purposive behaviour has, nonetheless, to be understood in particular institutional contexts. A multilaterally coordinated approach also fitted with an established principle of German foreign policy. As Piotr Buras and Kerry Longhurst point out, ‘German strategic culture is rooted in Germany’s past and was constructed after 1945 in the formative years of the Federal Republic’s creation as part of West Germany’s broader domestic democratization and international rehabilitation. The emasculation of German sovereignty at the end of the Second World War, the international requirements placed upon Bonn in the context of the emerging Cold War … shaped the contours and provided the substance of Germany’s new strategic culture.’56 West German policymakers have always had to pursue their objectives within multilateral contexts. To this end, German practitioners were acting according to ‘appropriateness’ within a highly institutionalized multilateral context, i.e. within the EU Council.57 The multilateral character of the SP is heavily

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informed by the practitioners’ preferences, interests and identities, which themselves draw from the Europeanization of German foreign and security policy. As mentioned, the original idea for the Stability Pact was watered down, due to resistance to giving some states in SEE an EU perspective. In contrast to what some types of regime theory would lead one to expect, Germany did not play the role of enforcer of norms within a regime in which it acts as a hegemon. Instead, German practitioners were acting according to established understanding about how to go about things in multilateral setting, as well as being guided by a preference for European solutions to foreign and security policy questions. That other states accepted the idea of linking stabilization and conflict prevention in the region with EU membership, while still having doubts about doing so also demonstrates that member states’ policymakers also acted according to what was perceived as appropriate behaviour within the EU context, and this in itself demonstrates a certain degree of Europeanization. While the institutions guiding the actions of German security practitioners were of central importance in bringing about the EU’s common approach toward SEE, a number of factors also facilitated the promotion of their preferences in the policy formation phase. Firstly, the Europeanization of German policy preferences was bolstered by the redefinition of Europe’s boundaries.58 According to Fischer, a fundamental consequence of the Kosovo conflict that helped facilitate the adoption of the Stability Pact was the acceptance of South Eastern Europe as an integral part of the European continent for which the EU had responsibility.59 This boundary redefinition seems at least partly related to the border transgressing nature of the consequences of the conflict, particularly in terms of refugee flows and the connection between stability in the region and the EU’s own security.60 As discussed in Chapter 4, this would have struck a chord with foreign ministers. This association was, indeed, explicitly made by Chris Patten, European Commissioner for foreign relations at the time: ‘The Balkans are part of Europe. We are – as it were – in the same boat. Our past and our future are intimately bound together. Our peoples want the same things – peace, stability, high standards and decency of life, freedom, prosperity and opportunity. We have a shared interest in working together to combat organized crime, to secure respect for minorities and to help build strong states in the

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region which are capable of protecting the interest of all their citizens and of being dependable and good neighbours.’61 On this basis, in the document, the EU, which has assumed a leading role in the SP, undertakes to draw SEE ‘closer to the perspective of full integration … into its structures.’62 Once the Western Balkans was recognized as a part of Europe, the possibility of eventual accession to the EU was rendered more legitimate. The Fischer team’s success in bringing together a number of other international actors to back the Pact was undoubtedly facilitated by the convergence of a number of agendas during the 1990s. Shifting agendas in the areas of development, conflict prevention and postconflict rehabilitation, governance, and security fused nicely with the developments taking place in relation to the EU’s approach to SEE. NATO expansion, which constitutes a crucial element of the Pact, implied reform of SEE armed forces and their greater integration into Euro-Atlantic political-military structures. While the prospect of eventual NATO membership was not explicitly mentioned in the Constituent Document of the SP, being drawn closer to Euro-Atlantic structures is clearly intended. NATO and, within this framework, the US, have after all an interest in maintaining involvement in SEE. NATO has, accordingly, launched its own US-led South Eastern Europe Initiative (SEEI) that provides an instrument with which to undertake initiatives coordinated within the rubric of the Pact. The initiative built on structures already in place to facilitate cooperative relationships with other ‘Partners’, namely the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Specifically, an Ad Hoc Working Group on Regional Cooperation in South East Europe was convened within the framework of the EAPC, where issues such as crisis management, defence planning and democratic control of armed forces can be discussed. Within the PfP, initiatives and programmes that emerge from Alliance and/or EAPC discussions can be taken forward by countries in the sub-region, with the assistance of NATO expertise and/or political support. While there was some resistance, notably on the part of Russia and France, to giving NATO a prominent of a role in the SP, NATO constitutes the key international actor in the restructuring of the armed forces of the countries of SEE.63 As Michael Brzoska points out, the absence of the political constraints of the Cold War also gave the development donor community

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greater room for manoeuvre, including in the area of security-related issues. Initially, involvement by development donors in these areas was confined to purely fiscal matters, partly due to the dominance of neoclassical economists within donor institutions, who tended to view military expenditure was a pure waste, and partly due to the belief that the need for reductions in defence spending in light of the end of the Cold War would lend legitimacy to such activities. Reducing military expenditure thus became a major theme in development donor discourse and was particularly promoted by the IMF and the World Bank, as well as bilateral donors such as Germany and the US Congress. This stood in stark contrast to the Cold War situation, when geo-strategic calculations favouring a strong military in some countries swept aside development concerns.64 Recipient governments were, however, much less enthusiastic about what they perceived as development donor interference in internal military matters. Decisions on the level of military expenditure were seen as the prerogative of national sovereignty. Efforts by donor countries to have a say on this matter were, therefore, met with a uniformly negative response. While the issue of inappropriate military expenditure did not disappear from the development donor agenda, the emphasis shifted in the late 1990s. The focus on fiscal matters gave way to a broader view of security spending. Consequently, other elements of the security sector came into view, lack of security began to be recognized as a development issue, and governance over security spending became a central concern. The post-Cold War environment also presented the development donors with new challenges related to conflict prevention and postconflict rehabilitation. Security-related issues were an obvious target for development donor activity in the field of conflict prevention. A reformed security sector, incorporating armed forces geared towards regional cooperation, police forces serving all the people, and a judicial sector that delivers justice, was viewed as a contribution to conflict prevention. The gap between activities begun (or not begun) by peacekeepers and continued (or not) by development donors also opened up another area where development donors believed they could usefully contribute to conflict rehabilitation. Slowly, some development donors got involved in reform activities with a broader security relevance, such as reform issues related to police forces and, at least in a few cases, the democratic control of military forces.65

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Concerns about improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of public sector institutions increased. Accordingly, development policies became increasingly informed by the concept of governance in the early-to-mid-1990s. The major instrument for achieving improved governance was reform of state institutions. During this period, development donor discourse on ‘governance’ focused on down-sizing rather than improving the delivery in public services. For many donors, particularly the World Bank and IMF, the provision of a minimal set of public services at the lowest possible cost was considered a priority, though more transparency and accountability were also viewed as essential to improving efficiency in what were generally considered overstaffed public sectors.66 A shift in the development donor discourse, however, occurred in the late 1990s. Donors began to reduce the stress on cost cutting and, instead, emphasized the need to strengthen states’ capacity to govern ‘effectively’. Hence, programmes aimed at reducing corruption and improving accountability and transparency gained in importance towards the end of the 1990s. A good indicator of such change is the difference in discussion of the role of the state by the World Bank in its 1997 and 2002 World Development Reports. The World Bank now argued against a minimalist state and instead for a focus on state effectiveness in the context of changes in the global economy. Strengthening certain state powers was now encouraged as a means of enforcing market discipline and states’ credibility as ‘effective partners’ in development. One the hand, this entails creating the foundation of law and the protection of property rights; providing macroeconomic stability, avoiding price distortions and liberalizing trade and investment; providing basic services and infrastructure; protecting the vulnerable; and protecting the environment. On the other hand, it involves creating checks on arbitrary state action and combating corruption, improving performance and incentive structures within public institutions, and broadening participation and increasing decentralization.67 An expanded conception of security began to be promoted by some international actors in the development donor community. The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, for example, featured two central ideas, which had gained in prominence during the 1990s. The first was that threats to security were broader than classical military threats and included threats such as major ecological disasters or

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epidemics. The second idea was that security policy should not exclusively deal with the security of the state – the main unit of concern in traditional security policy – and, instead, should include the security of individuals. Human security, it was argued, was a complement to human development.68 These four concerns became connected by the concept of security sector reform (SSR), which can be understood as an attempt to link the expansion of development assistance into security-related fields and the new challenges to development donors in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation, and to provide them with a common vision, intended to promote human development, help to reduce poverty, and to allow people – including poor people – to expand their options in life.69 It also implies fostering particular kinds of states, considered ‘effective’ in their capacity to carry out public functions. To sum up, then, the establishment of the SP demonstrated the role that member state institutions can have on the Europeanization process. German security practitioners were important in bringing about a shift in the EU strategy towards SEE. In contrast to what realist approaches would suggest – i.e. that Germany was driven by rational calculations informed by pre-defined interests – institutions were shown to be crucial in shaping German preferences and interests. The manner in which Germany’s strategic culture and collective identity have been ‘Europeanized’ over the post-Second World War period heavily informed the behaviour of practitioners. As a coordinated, multilateral approach aimed at conflict prevention rather than conflict management in SEE, the SP reflected German strategic culture. The German initiative differed from other suggestions for a pact for SEE in that it called for such a pact to be established under the auspices of the EU rather than the OSCE. Moreover, it linked long-term conflict prevention in the region to EU membership. This reflected the commitment to work towards integration as a way of stabilizing Europe. To this end, initiatives undertaken under the aegis of the SP are essentially aimed at stabilizing SEE on the basis of the German experience or, in other words, through European integration. Moreover, Germany’s relative power does not appear to have been determinate in gaining acceptance of a stability pact for SEE in the face of resistance to the original idea for the Pact as realist

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accounts, including some versions of regime theory, would have led one to expect. Instead, practitioners’ understanding of how to go about things, informed by the preference for multilateralism and European ‘solutions’ to foreign and security policy problems, appears to have been decisive in that it encouraged compromise and consensus-seeking. In other words, conceptions of appropriateness, rather than compulsion of a dominant power, were important or even the desire to reduce uncertainty and the marginal costs of negotiating new issues as liberal cooperation theory would have it. Even Aybet’s version of regime theory, which draws on a Gramscian notion of hegemony to avoid assuming rational action and to more adequately capture the interaction between preference creation and institutions, would have failed to account for the emergence of cooperation. The European ‘way of doing things’ would be understood as a culture of state practice rather than one specifically guided by the social practices of practitioners. Their task was greatly facilitated by the fact that Germany held the EU presidency during a period of crisis. The Pact’s constitution and realization were unmistakably informed by the preferences of Germany security policy practitioners in particular, insofar as it is an effort aimed at long-term conflict prevention, which furthers the Europeanization of member states’ foreign and security policies, and is a multilateral effort at the stabilization of SEE. Germany’s successful use of the EU presidency as a diplomatic tool perhaps reflects Germany’s collective identity vis-à-vis the European integration process. The redefinition of Europe’s boundaries by EU member states was also essential for the success of the Fischer team’s efforts in promoting a common strategy among EU member states, as was the rise of governance concerns and the destabilization of the traditional conception of security for the coordination of a number of international actors, including the US and NATO.

Transatlantic security relations As mentioned, the EU’s role in the Western Balkans in the early- and mid-1990s was largely eclipsed by that of the US. US ‘coercive diplomacy’ appeared to yield better results than the ‘soft diplomacy’ of the EC/EU. Moreover, EU and US initiatives to promote the development of market economies were uncoordinated and, to some extent, in

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competition with each other. Yet the SP has greatly contributed to the transformation of this situation. The EU has now replaced the US as the most prominent actor in SEE and, what is more, has incorporated US activities into a broad framework in which it takes the lead. Since the SP associates stabilization of SEE with EU enlargement, the EU has paramount influence in terms of state-building within the SEE countries. If and when these countries become EU member states, the fact of having been implicated in the transformation and creation of institutions within and between these states is likely to have an impact on future transatlantic security relations. However, much will, of course, depend on the chances that these states will have of a real prospect of membership and how the EU manages this issue. Both realism and neo-Marxism would have read the establishment of the SP as an instance of balancing behaviour. Realism would have suggested that the US activities in the early to mid-1990s were driven by Washington’s desire for geo-political pre-eminence in SEE. The SP would be understood as a European, and perhaps specifically German, effort to balance the US’s influence in the region. While most of the neo-Marxist approaches discussed here do not treat states as hermetically sealed entities, Gowan does tend to depict the EU’s approach to SEE as an attempt to balance US interests in the region. He argues, for example, that the major concern for US security policy planners following the end of the Cold War was to prevent the rise of regional powers. Germany, along with Japan, was identified as a rising regional power that might be potentially hostile to US leadership. From this perspective, the EU’s activities in SEE would be understood in terms of power projection eastwards and the formation of a European caucus in the transatlantic alliance. Yet, if US presence in the region were linked to a grand strategy of domination in Europe, surely Washington would have demonstrated greater resistance to EU leadership in the region, particularly since the SP not only implies EU coordination of US activities in the region, along with those of other ‘stakeholders’, but also a major role in state-building in SEE.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have outlined the way in which the EU’s role in SEE has dramatically transformed over the last decade. It has gone from being a reactive and largely overshadowed actor in SEE to a

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major agent of change in the region, a role that had been played by the US in the first half of the 1990s. In the early- to mid-1990s, the (then) EC had neither the pre-disposition nor the foreign and security policy instruments with which to adopt a comprehensive, preventive approach to the region. As the EU has developed as an external actor and extended integration into the domain of ‘internal’ security, the underpinnings of a more coherent approach were put in place. The new contractual arrangements linking stabilization with enlargement and the creation of an EU pillar for JHA, for example, all helped to lay the groundwork for a regional approach to reform that included reform and restructuring of at least some security-related institutions and practices. Nevertheless, the role of Germany was important in bringing the Stability Pact into existence. Its institutional order informed not only the spirit of the Pact, but also the manner in which it was brought about. The SP clearly bore the mark of German security practitioners’ predisposition towards civilian crisis management and conflict prevention, support for the CFSP as a fundamental part of political union, and commitment to multilateralism. To this end, the Stability Pact demonstrates the impact that institutions within member states can have on the process of EU policy formation or, to put it another way, vertical, bottom-up Europeanization. The establishment of the Pact was, however, not solely related to the specific institutional context of German practitioners. In addition to a commitment to multilateralism, the redefinition of Europe’s boundaries bolstered the German role. A fundamental factor that helped facilitate the adoption of the SP was the acceptance of SEE as an integral part of the European continent for which the EU had responsibility. The border transgressing nature of the consequences of the conflict, particularly in terms of refugee flows, helped to shift the EU’s perception of its boundaries. As mentioned, the preoccupation with transnational threats to security has expanded the notion of interdependence to ‘internal security’ matters, particularly in light of the promotion of the freedom of movement, since it effectively increases the boundaries of the EU ‘internal’ space. Once the Western Balkans was recognized as a part of Europe, the possibility of eventual accession to the EU was rendered more legitimate. This is a crucial dimension of the EU’s role in conflict prevention. Thus, from their initially divided positions over the prospect of giving the countries of

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the Western Balkans an EU perspective, a consensus had finally been reached among EU members, as well as within the Commission. The changing agendas of other international actors during the 1990s, particularly in the development donor community, were also important in enabling the incorporation of a multilateral dimension to the EU’s initiative. The concept of security sector reform, which united security and development concerns, shared common ground with the connection being made between stabilization and enlargement in the EU’s direct relations with SEE countries. Coordinating major stakeholders’ activities under one roof has provided a framework within which the EU can extend its mandate into governance and conflict prevention. The model being indirectly transferred through the SP is one that encourages the dilution of exclusive national identities and state sovereignties. Reform and restructuring in SEE, therefore, draws heavily on the internal experience of gradual integration within the EU itself, based on political consensus and compromise, an incremental pooling of sovereignty, and an attachment to formal rule-making. The prominent role played by the EU in terms of institutionbuilding will impact on future developments in transatlantic security relations. Should remaining SEE states become EU member states, their involvement in shaping and creating institutions within and between states will have an implication for transatlantic relations. However, much will depend on the extent to which they have true chances of accession. The shift in the EU’s approach to SEE is, however, not best conceived as an effort to balance US interests in the region, but as the result of institutional contexts and identities informing the behaviour of practitioners involved in the SP’s creation, as well as changes in conceptions of security and development underway in broader institutional contexts.

6 Conclusion: Socio-Functional Europeanization

This study has examined the increasing institutionalization of cooperation between EU member states in the area of security – a process that I have termed Europeanization. As outlined at the beginning of the study, significant changes have occurred in European security since the early 1990s. The EU has established a security and defence policy, which has led to the transfer of competency from the WEU to the EU in relation to the military aspects of crisis management operations. As a result, the EU has engaged in the development of military capabilities designed to permit it to act on behalf of common security interests, and, at least some of the time, independently of NATO. Parallel developments have also been taking place in relation to ‘internal’ security, leading to increased cooperation between the police forces, intelligence agencies, and judiciaries of member states. This has led to the EU gaining intelligence and criminal justice functions – functions that, along with defence, are traditionally central to state sovereignty. The EU has also developed a fundamental role in conflict prevention on its periphery and is now the most prominent actor in the Balkans, coordinating the initiatives of international actors engaged in efforts to stabilize the region, including those of the US. This stands in stark contrast to member states’ reluctance to cooperate in areas deemed vital to national sovereignty during the greater part of the post-Second World War period. Until recently, insufficient consensus among EC/EU member states prevented the EU from developing a security and defence policy of its own, despite a number of failed attempts to do so. The defence policies and structures of most European member states were anchored in NATO and thus oriented 154

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towards the collective defence of the Alliance. While cooperation between EC member states’ police and intelligence agencies existed from the 1970s onwards, the sensitivity of these core functions of the state meant that cooperation took place only on an ad hoc, informal basis, with no legal base in EU treaties. Moreover, political differences regarding the definition of terrorism permitted only a limited degree of judicial cooperation to take place and, again, only outside the EC framework. The EU’s conflict prevention initiative in SEE is also widely divergent from its lacklustre role in the greater part of the 1990s, when the EU was largely overshadowed by the US as an agent for change in the Balkans. In short, recent developments reflect a significant reorientation of the European security state. Descriptive accounts of developments in European security, along with more self-consciously theoretical analyses, have tended to draw on the traditional terms of IR theorizing. Neo-realist and realist approaches, for example, account for increased cooperation in the domain of European security as the result of states acting as coherent, undifferentiated units, rationally pursing their interests. Descriptive accounts similarly assume that preferences and interests are formed prior to the creation of institutions and that cooperation is, thus, the result of the rational pursuit of those preferences and interests. This, however, I argue fails to capture the sense in which national interests are formed and modified through interaction between security practitioners within institutionalized settings. As a result, variations in member states’ responses to similar constraints and pressures cannot adequately be accounted for. Similarly, regime theories assume that states are rational egoists. Given that states are conceived as monolithic entities, the extent to which regime theorists are really able to break with state-centrism is limited. Despite efforts to incorporate perceptions and norms into their analyses, they continue to regard them in terms of state practice. Yet the European institutional environment in which states participate renders notions of states rationally pursuing their national interest difficult to sustain. The governance structures related to the ESDP and JHA are characterized by decentralized and, sometimes, informal policy networks, in which predominantly mid-level, transnational policy practitioners are active. The direction of change within the EU should, therefore, not be understood simply as the result of intergovernmental bargains at summits, but as the result of

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day-to-day technical, regulatory policymaking. This implies a need to avoid two fundamental caricatures of the EU: the focus on singular moments of change or crisis and the tendency to portray the dynamics of integration as resting on an opposition between the poles of nation state and superstate. In order to do so, a broad definition of institutions, capable of capturing the way in which participants of these informal and/or decentralized policy networks play an important role in Europeanization, is needed. A neo-functionalist approach would have correctly identified political elites as the central actors driving the process of Europeanization forward, as well as the two-way nature of European integration. However, the influence of pluralism on neo-functionalism means that political elites connected to competing groups within member states would have been identified as critical, rather than mid-level officials. Moreover, actors are assumed to redefine their interests for utilitarian purposes. In addition, while it presupposes that integration must have been driven by structural changes in the international political economy, neo-functionalism does not provide the conceptual tools with which to capture this. Again, the principal problem is that institutions are defined too narrowly, thus obscuring the way in which they frame the construction of meaning, create an expansive ‘logic’, and inform actors’ behaviour. This also leads to another difficulty. Neo-functionalism would have mistakenly assumed a gradual increase in supranationalism. Yet, while the Commission has played a role in security dimensions of the integration project, it has been fairly limited compared to that of security practitioners from member states participating in policy networks. The linkage between different spheres of activity was made by police and law enforcement studies insofar as they were sensitive to the impact of globalization on European security. Their focus has, unsurprisingly, been on developments in the area of JHA, rather than European security in general. They have also been predominantly concerned with intra-European relations and have tended not to consider the growing importance of the ‘internal’ security domain for the future of EU–US security relations. Some insights with regard to the relationship between institutionalized cooperation in the European security field and transatlantic relations have been offered by several neo-Marxist scholars. Yet they tend to view geo-strategic

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calculations as driving cooperation. Agency is thus assumed to belong to states and to be constructed pre-socially. Moreover, their focus on the political-military field also obscures the way in which the fight against terrorism is providing a new moral imperative for transatlantic cooperation in the absence of the traditional threat of Communism. In order to capture better the reorientation of EU member states towards ‘Europe’, I propose an analytical framework that is largely inspired by the insights of sociological institutionalism and, in particular, Giddens’ structuration theory. I argue that a sociologicalinstitutionalist framework would provide the conceptual tools with which to capture better the co-constitutive character of individual action and institutions, since institutions are viewed both as the medium and outcome of individual action. I define institutions in broad terms to include not only formal rules, procedures, and norms, but also cognitive and moral templates that frame the construction of meaning-informing behaviour. Actors are thus understood as embedded in specific institutional contexts, rendering the formation of their preferences and interests dependent upon institutions. This does not exclude purposive action. It simply means that purposive action is viewed as comprehensible only when the institutional contexts of actors are taken into account. The focus on the co-constitution of agency and institutions helps to place the emphasis on process, making the object of analysis not the preferences and interests of states but the process by which they are constructed. European integration is analysed as a continuous process structured by institutions rather than an end state arrived at as a result of the rational pursuit of preferences and interests by states. It also serves to avoid depicting the state as a unitary actor, since no prior assumption exists as to which agents and structures are major players in the constitution of social and political structures. A cluster of agents specific to certain situations are, instead, the focus of the analysis. Drawing attention to the institutional ‘embeddedness’ of actors also helped account for variations in the way in which different EU member states respond to pressures resulting from a highlyinstitutionalized context, as well as the construction of policies. It thus draws attention to the way in which responses are highly dependent upon institutional contexts.

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The broad definition of institutions supplied by the structuratonist framework is also able to accommodate a wider conception of governance, thereby providing the conceptual tools with which to address the connection between different levels affecting the European security domain as a whole. Put another way, it is able to shed light on the process of co-determination of national and European-level institutional orders. For the very same reason, the relationship between different spheres of social life can also be discerned. Specifically, the impact of a globalizing economy on institutionalized cooperation in the field of security can be detected, without assuming a linear relationship between economic integration and changes in European security. Instead of emphasizing the more fundamental ensemble of socio-economic relations that underlie an institutional order, it adopts an understanding of patterns of economic interaction as embedded in political institutions. This places the relationship between individual actors’ interpretations of the world around them and the constitutive role of institutions at the heart of the analysis. In order to illuminate further the transformative process underway in the area of European security, I employ the specific concept of Europeanization. Europeanization is defined as a process of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal rules and procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics, and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies. The definition stresses the making of policy without assuming that there is a coherent layer of EU decisions that triggers Europeanization at the national level, thus allowing Europeanization to occur in the absence of pressure to adapt to EU policy templates, as well as policy construction. It is therefore deemed capable of encompassing a vertical, top-down mode of Europeanization, as well as a horizontal one, in which the cognitive-normative dimension is essential. Each type of Europeanization examined in the study is linked to different forms of EU governance. Vertical, top-down Europeanization was more relevant in circumstances where the supranational institutions of the EU have significant degree of power delegated to them to ensure that particular policy provisions are implemented. In the absence of pressure to make particular adjustments to ‘Europe’ at the

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national level, a horizontal mode of Europeanization took place. This sort of Europeanization is likely to obtain in policy areas characterized by intergovernmental cooperation, where, in practice, transnational policy practitioners constitute the principal actors driving integration. A third possible type of Europeanization was also identified. This latter kind was thought most likely to occur during the negotiating phase of EU policy construction and would likely involve the projection of national governmental preferences informed by the domestic institutional order of member states. Because the CFSP, of which the ESDP is a part, and the dimensions of JHA relevant to the study are characterized by facilitated cooperation, i.e. cooperation in the absence of obligatory adaptation, I suggested that the mode of Europeanization most likely to occur in these fields would be horizontal. Besides the provisions contained in the treaties, which are often ambiguous for practical reasons, interaction is guided by soft law, i.e. agreement reached on the basis of declarations or rules of conduct that are not legally enforceable. Given this type of interaction, cooperation is most likely to occur through learning or changes in the cognitive and normative frameworks employed by security practitioners. This is likely to involve, for example, policymakers engaging in a process of defining common problems and what constitutes best practice in terms of addressing them, and, in so doing, developing common perceptual schemes and norms. This type of Europeanization allows for learning to occur outside the EC/EU framework, or even among a subset of EC/EU member states. This suggests that the direction of developments in European security would have been guided less by a series of periodic summits than by decentralized frameworks for coordination. This is particularly the case in functional/technical areas. In the absence of such platforms, policymakers are likely to learn through crisis and repeated debacles. The case of the SP posed a different kind of problem than that of the ESDP and JHA. While the initiative was established within the framework of the CFSP, it did not constitute a policy area that would later create pressures requiring adaptation on the part of EU member states. What was important in the case of the SP was the impact of the German domestic institutions on the establishment of a common approach to conflict prevention in SEE. Vertical Europeanization taking place during the construction of the Pact

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was, therefore, examined. This implied focusing on the way in which one set of time-space structures, or institutions, informed the emergence of others. In examining instances of Europeanization, it is important not to assume a linear relationship between the emergence of shared rules or policy at the EU level and changes in domestic policy and practices. The structurationist framework deployed in the study provided a means of avoiding this pitfall. Following Giddens, I suggested that actors’ knowledge should be understood as bounded knowledge to the extent that the entirety of the conditions informing their behaviour is unlikely to be known to them and that the outcome of individuals’ actions are not always not fully comprehended by the agents themselves. This, in turn, allows for unconscious effects of engaging in socially meaningful behaviour to be included in the analysis. This is especially relevant to the existence of an expansive ‘logic’ that appears to facilitate institutionalized cooperation in functional areas of activity, where ‘technical’ issues are often not conceived as being highly political. This helps to explain the important role that participants in decentralized and, in some instances, informal policy arenas play in the process of Europeanization. Employing a broader definition of institutions helped to reveal that rather than simply providing an opportunity for states to pursue their preferences and interests, the EU governance structure grants transnational security practitioners a significant role in the integration project and that European integration is better conceived as an ongoing process than the result of intergovernmental bargaining. The ESDP, for example, is officially an inter-governmental policy sphere. However, the technicalities of some issues have meant that its development has been difficult to direct from the political level, leading to developments being guided by various working groups comprised of representatives from the armed forces and defence ministries of member states. The establishment of EDA, which represents an effort to construct a more formalized system of regulation by supporting member states in their development of capabilities for Petersberg tasks, as well as encouraging closer defence industrial cooperation, will, moreover, give Brussels-based officials, as well as representatives from the defence industry and armaments and research directors, an even greater role in the capabilities-development mechanism. This suggests the continued growth of a decentralized

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governance structure. Similarly, cooperation in the area of JHA prior to the TEU was advanced in informal policy networks, comprising ministers of justice and ministers of the interior, as well as police chiefs and working groups comprising mid-level officials focusing on issues of police and security, free movement of people, judicial co-operation, and external relations, etc. Again, the formalization of these horizontal, network- or project-oriented governance arrangements by the TEU and Amsterdam Treaties, as well as the creation of EUROJUST, the Agency for the Management of Co-operation at the External Border and an extension of EUROPOL’s competencies following September 11, has extended the influence of transnational security practitioners. The way in which the participants of these policy networks have conceived of ‘problems’ and sought common ‘solutions’ to them, as well as how they have defined European fields of operation, has been crucial in directing the development of European security. Practitioners brought together in these decentralized and/or informal policy networks were initially concerned with issues that were understood in ‘technical’ terms, reflecting the specific knowledgeability of these actors. In the case of the ESDP, participants in the Capabilities Development Mechanism were, for example, concerned with military planning designed to support the EU in its execution of crisis management or, to put it another way, ‘filling the capabilities gap’. Similarly, practitioners involved in the informal networks preceding the creation of an area of JHA were preoccupied with ensuring law and order in a world in which boundaries were perceived as being eroded. Conceiving of these issues as objective needs of the EU polity necessarily created an expansive ‘logic’. In the case of the ESDP, developing the capabilities with which to back up crisis management tasks led to greater acceptance of defence industrial cooperation, due to the cost of weapons systems, for example. With respect to JHA, the removal of internal border controls led to a series of issues, such as illegal immigration and organized crime, becoming categorized as security concerns. Due to the bounded nature of these actors’ knowledge, the full extent of the outcome of their actions, i.e. the Europeanization of the security state, would not have been fully comprehended by them. Their concerns were to respond to the ‘objective needs’ of the emerging EU polity. This tends to support the neo-functionalist claim that uncontroversial, ‘technical’ tasks play an important role in driving European integration forward. In particular, it suggests that the framing of

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issues as ‘technical’, ‘objective needs’ does create a type of ‘spill-over’ effect, though this would only apply in more functional areas of EU politics. Yet, neo-functionalism would have led us to expect that this expansive ‘logic’ is due to key groups seeking to influence a regional authority. The actions driving integration would, therefore, have been conceived as purposive and inspired by individual or group perceptions of interest rather than conceptions of the ‘common good’. While it is certainly the case that actions taken by participants of informal and/or decentralized policy networks were, of course, purposive, the expansive ‘logic’ was also in large part the result of the unconscious effects of engaging in socially meaningful behaviour. This requires a different conception of the motivations of individuals/ groups, one that allows for the structuring qualities of institutions rather than the one employed by neo-functionalism. It is important to note that even in functional areas re-orientation towards ‘Europe’ was not really perceptible until issues were defined as common, European problems. In the case of the ESDP, this was especially notable during the capabilities improvement process, particularly during the second phase when perceptions of the international security environment and the EU’s role within it began to make its way into the capabilities improvement process and the subsequent deployment of resources at the national level. The transformations that took place in the field of JHA throughout the 1990s, affecting other areas of state activity also considered vital to state sovereignty, such as policing and justice, have come about as ‘internal’ security challenges and have been conceived as common, European security risks. Throughout this period, terrorism was not identified as a threat common to all EU member states, since terrorist activities were mostly aimed at altering individual governments’ policies during this period. The result was slow progress in the area of criminal justice and intelligence cooperation. September 11 and subsequent attacks – thus crisis situations – led, however, to the formulation of a common definition of terrorism. This enabled further cooperation in the area of criminal law and intelligence, in particular, to take place. The resulting cooperation between EU member states in the area of ‘internal’ security is altering the meaning and application of law enforcement and criminal justice within EU member states. Conceptions of the ‘common good’ were thus crucial to Europeanization in these policy areas.

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The establishment of the SP demonstrated this co-determining aspect of Europeanization further. The SP and thus the EU’s new approach to SEE were heavily informed by the knowledgeability and identity of German security practitioners. Its creation therefore represented a case of vertical, bottom-up Europeanization. The commitment to a European approach to foreign and security policy issues, the preference for restraint in the use of force in conflict resolution, the goal of multilateral cooperation, as well as a strong value-based orientation – all of which played a part in establishing the Pact – reflected Germany’s collective identity vis-à-vis the European integration process and its strategic culture. Germany’s status as a Europeanized state par excellence, moreover, informed not only the spirit of the Pact, but also the manner in which it was brought about. Practitioners’ understandings of how to ‘go about things’, informed by the preference for multilateralism and European ‘solutions’, were particularly important in guiding German practitioners in the direction of compromise and consensus-seeking, ultimately enabling the Pact to be agreed. The broader institutional contexts of actors, i.e. those linked to different levels and spheres of social life, captured by the concept of bounded knowledgeability, were also found to be crucial to Europeanization. In the case of the ESDP, a number of factors linked to the broader economic and political environment clearly influenced security practitioners’ thinking. The end of the Cold War prompted a reformulation of security policies in EU member states that was favourable to their reorientation towards ‘Europe’. In the area of JHA, the redefinition of the ‘internal’ security functions of member states during the 1990s was connected to fears about ‘floods of immigrants’ following the end of the Cold War. As pointed out, the creation of the Pact was, however, not solely related to the specific institutional context of German practitioners. Changes occurring in relation to other international actors during the 1990s, particularly in the development donor community, were also important in enabling the incorporation of a multilateral dimension to the EU’s initiative. In particular, the concept of security sector reform, which united security and development concerns, shared common ground with the connection being made between stabilization and enlargement in the EU’s direct relations with SEE countries. Finally, deploying a structurationist framework to examine developments in European security supplied a different way of viewing

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their significance for transatlantic security relations. Contrary to what accounts of the significance of the ESDP for EU–US security relations would suggest, European efforts to improve military capacity are not best understood in terms of balancing behaviour. While endowing the EU with military capabilities with which to undertake missions independently of NATO will have the effect of eroding the US monopoly on political decision-making within the Atlantic area, the process of Europeanizing military security has more to do with institutional contexts of practitioners, particularly those active in decentralized policy networks, than the balancing behaviour states. Another reason to be cautious about viewing the ESDP as a counterweight to the US/NATO is that cooperation between NATO and the EU in the context of the capabilities development mechanism, as well as operations, implies that evolution of the ESDP will also be influenced by the US and NATO institutional order. Similarly, in the case of the SP, the shift in the EU’s approach to SEE is better understood as the result of the institutional contexts of German security practitioners and modifications in the agendas of other international actors rather than as the result of the desire to balance the US in SEE. When the role of decentralized policy networks and institutions are taken into account, it is possible to identify the way in which increased and formalized intra-European cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence, and border controls is shifting EU member states’ relations with the US. As den Boer has noted, ‘[i]t is clear that the transatlantic axis against terrorism has opened the EU-door to the USA far more widely than before, and that there is a spill-over from terrorism to other security or mobility related issues. Border controls, criminal justice co-operation, immigration and asylum policy have thus become elements inserted in a wider transatlantic security policy continuum.’1 In effect, it has further unlocked an abundant area of transatlantic collaboration – one that is likely to expand with a ‘transatlantic internal security continuum’. The interaction between the EU and US law enforcement agents, in particular, should be the object of further scrutiny, though a certain degree of uneasiness in Europe is nevertheless likely to remain, due to the differences in emphasis, demonstrated by recent controversy over CIA cooperation with EU member states’ intelligence services. The study therefore suggests that Europeanization in relation to the ESDP and JHA has been driven less by a series of periodic,

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intergovernmental summits than by the participants in decentralized and/or informal policy arenas. Employing a broad definition of institutions demonstrates that the EU governance structure grants transnational security practitioners a central role in guiding the integration project, particularly in functional areas. Specifically, the way in which the participants of these policy networks conceived of ‘problems’ and how they sought common ‘solutions’ to them was vital to creating an expansive ‘logic’ as additional ‘objective needs’ were identified and boundaries between issues were collapsed. In terms of the modification of the ‘rules’ (perceptual schemes and norms), however, the definition of these issues as common, European security questions was vital in Europeanizing national security apparatuses. The process of Europeanization has, therefore, a co-determining dimension. The structuring qualities of the broader environment, captured by the concept of bounded knowledgeability, also contributed to the process of Europeanization. Employing a structurationist framework of analysis also suggested that the efforts of Europeans to improve crisis management and conflict prevention capacities are not best conceived as balancing behaviour vis-à-vis the US/NATO, but the results of the co-determing of EU and national institutional contexts. In order to provide a more complete picture of how specific institutional contexts produce variations in the responses of individual EU states to policy initiatives, one should inquire at the level of each service of each bureaucracy in each country to understand how ‘rules’ develop and change occurs. Undertaking such research would also help to illustrate that Europeanization does not necessarily imply convergence, thereby contributing to our understanding of European integration as a continual work in progress. Similarly, further examination of the institutional embeddedness of the participants in these networks and how they influence outcomes should be carried out. For example, in relation to the development of the ESDP, closer research ought to be done on the interplay between various networks consisting of parts of the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament (EP), the WEU, NATO, and the European defence industry in order to understand how issues enter the discourse on the ESDP. Similar work should also be carried out in relation to increasing cooperation and integration in the field of JHA. The importance of largely de-politicized ‘technical’ issues in creating an expansive ‘logic’ in particular policy areas also merits further study.

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Greater attention needs to be paid to the inter-play between the external EU environment and its internal dynamics. In relation to the changes in the transatlantic relationship, a more detailed study of the development of rules and linkages between the US and European militaries and defence officials, as well as the impact of NATO officials’ participation in the capabilities process, deserves further enquiry. This kind of examination would furnish a more adequate understanding of the way in which and the extent to which the US is able to influence the construction of the ESDP, despite the fact that the ESDP implies greater formal autonomy in terms of operations. With regards to developments in the area of JHA, further consideration of previous and present day cooperation between the US and EU law enforcement agencies, as well as intelligence officials and representatives from respective judiciaries, is also called for. As with the ESDP, these kinds of linkages indicate that developments in European security should not be viewed as providing a counterweight to the US. While they give EU member states a greater capacity to respond to identified security challenges, they are intimately tied to developments in US security policy and relevant institutions, and we should be aware of this for the sake of accountability as well as the comprehension of developments in European security.

Notes 1

Introduction

1. T. Garton Ash, ‘This Is Not Only a French Crisis – All of Europe Must Heed the Flames’, The Guardian, 10 November 2005. 2. Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 3. The 1992 Treaty of European Union contained provisions for a common foreign and security policy, though the CFSP is the product of a long evolution. 4. The European military entity prior to its incorporation into the EU structure. 5. J. Sperling and E. Kirchner (1997) Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and Economic Cooperation (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press), 32–3. 6. Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’. 7. The most striking example of what this implied for European states is in the field of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Under the 1947 UKUSA Agreement, to which Australia, Canada and New Zealand were also signatories, Britain’s SIGINT organization, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), was formally integrated into a global surveillance network. In addition to providing a division of SIGINT collection, the Agreement also institutionalized American leadership within the surveillance network. Under the Agreement, the United States’ four original partners, including Britain, appear as second parties; whereas NATO members that signed at a later date, including Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy and Norway, did so as third parties. The Agreement also served to institutionalize the presence of American facilities, directly managed by the National Security Agency (NSA), on British and German territories. European countries participating in the surveillance network were, moreover, obliged to adopt American security standards. See J. Richelson (1990) ‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 4, No. 3, 227–8; Whitaker, R. (1992) ‘Security and Intelligence in the Post-Cold War World’, in R. Milliband and L. Panitch (eds) New World Order? The Socialist Register 1992 (London: Merlin Press), 119; D. Campbell (2001) Surveillance Electronique Planetaire (Paris: Editions Allia), 21. 8. European states were not integrated into the Atlantic security network on the same basis or to the same extent. Among European states, Britain enjoyed (and, to great extent, still does) a privileged status and, as a result, developed particularly intimate military and intelligence links with the US. The armed forces of Britain and the US have developed close relations 167

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over the years. Britain and the US are also engaged in a number of collaborative weapons projects – both conventional and nuclear. The so-called special relationship is, however, at its strongest in the area of intelligence. In addition to their relations in SIGINT, there is a great deal of cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in the field of human intelligence (HUMINT); between America’s Defence Intelligence Agency and the British Defence Intelligence Staff on defence intelligence; and between America’s National Reconnaissance Office and Britain’s Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC) on ‘overhead’ intelligence from satellite data, reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This especially close relationship has led to similar practices and positions, and to a deeper level of US technological developments and capabilities compared to other European states. In stark contrast, France remained on the periphery of the Atlantic security network and a rigorous critic of institutionalized American hegemony in Europe, particularly during the late 1960s. The French government’s 1966 withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated military structure and rapprochement with Moscow represented a direct challenge to NATO’s legitimacy as an instrument for stability in Europe. This, combined with Germany’s Ostpolitik, which was launched in 1967 and premised on establishing long-term cooperation agreements between East and West as a way of forcing ‘normalcy’ on socialist states, severely strained Atlantic unity under American leadership. See C. Grant (2000) ‘Intimate Relations: Can Britain Play a Leading Role in European Defence – and Keep Its Links to US Intelligence?’ CER Working Paper, 2; A. Wenger (2004) ‘Crisis and Opportunity: NATO and the Miscalculation of Détente, 1966–1968’, Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 6, No. 1, 22–74; K. van der Pijl (1984) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso), 252–3. 9. G. L. Williams and B. J. Jones (2001) NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century: The Twenty-Year Crisis (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 32–3; 35; 40; 42. 10. A. Eriksson (2004) ‘The Building of a EU Capability – A Process of Europeanisation’, paper presented at the Fifth Pan-European Conference of the Standing Group on International Relations, The Hague, The Netherlands, 9–11 September; S. Duke (2000) The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press Ltd.; New York: St. Martin’s Press); J. Sperling and E. Kirchner (1997) Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and Economic Cooperation (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press); Also see L. Watanabe (2004) ‘European Security in an American Era: Between Estrangement and a New Partnership’, in A. Howell (ed.) Governance and Global (Dis)orders: Trends, Transformations and Impasses. Selected Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Conference of the Centre for International Security Studies in conjunction with the Fourth Annual Conference of the Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized

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Crime and Corruption (Toronto: Centre for International Security Studies, York University), 81–124. 11. Anderson, M. (2000) ‘Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, in F. Reinares (ed.) European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation (Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth), 227–43; D. Bigo (1994) ‘The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly Developing Area of Police Intervention’, in M. Anderson and M. den Boer (eds) Policing Across National Boundaries (London and New York: Pinter Publishers), 161–73.

2 A Sociological Institutionalist Approach to Europeanization 1. C. Layne (2001) ‘Death Knell for NATO? The Bush Administration Confronts the European Security and Defence Policy’, Policy Analysis, No. 394, 8. 2. G. Bono (2002) ‘European Security and Defence Policy: Theoretical approaches, the Nice Summit and Hot Issues’, Research and Training Network: Bridging the Accountability Gap in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/ESDP and Democracy, 6; A. Hurrell and A. Menon (2003) ‘International Relations, International Institutions, and the European State’, in J. Hayward and A. Menon (ed.) Governing Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 40; J. Mearsheimer (1990) ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 5–56; K. Waltz (1993) ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1. 3. S. Jones (2007) The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 4. Ibid., 23. 5. L. Panitch and S. Gindin (2003) ‘Global Capitalism and American Empire’, in L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds) The New Imperial Challenge: The Socialist Register 2004 (London: Merlin Press), 13; Gowan, P. (2003) ‘The American Campaign for Global Sovereignty’, in L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds) Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-nationalism: The Socialist Register 2003 (London: Merlin Press), 1–27. 6. M. Webber (2007) Inclusion, Exclusion and the Governance of European Security (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press), 51. 7. Hurrell and Menon, ‘International Relations, International Institutions’, 407. 8. See, for example, F. Heisbourg (1992) ‘The European-US Alliance: Valedictory Reflections on Continental Drift in the Post-Cold War Era’, International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4, 665–78; K. Schake (2003) ‘The United States, the ESDP and Constructive Duplication’ CER Working Paper. For transatlantic relations, see A. Moens (1992) ‘Behind Complementary Transparency: The Politics of European Security and Defence Identity’,

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10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

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Journal of European Integration, XVI, 1, 29–48; A. Moens (1998) ‘NATO’s Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 4, 463–75; Layne, ‘Death Knell for NATO?’ Among such analyses, a number of causal factors are regularly identified. The Kosovo war is frequently cited as turning point for Europeans vis-àvis the military dimension of European integration. For some authors, the war is attributed a major explanatory role. In particular, the way in which it exposed the size of the gap between Europeans and the US in the area of capabilities, responsibilities and in strategic priorities is stressed. According to such accounts, Europeans were resentful of the minimal influence they were able to bring to bear upon the operation, leading some policymakers to believe that a more assertive Europe, and hence a more balanced Alliance, would have been in a position to promote strategy that was better than the American one. Other observers, such as P. Latawski and M. A. Smith (2003) The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press), Chapter 2, see it as a ‘permissive facilitator’ rather than a chief causal factor. See, in particular, J. Howorth (2002) ‘The European Security Conundrum: Prospects for the ESDP after September 11, 2001’, Notre Europe Policy Paper, http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr. For many analysts, the most significant catalyst for the development of the ESDP was the change in British policy determined by the desire to assert British leadership with regard to EU military affairs, and France’s earlier dissatisfaction with the failure of NATO and the US, as French leaders saw it, to concede a sufficient degree of autonomy to the Alliance’s European members. These together are thought to have culminated in the St Malo Declaration. See Howorth, ‘The European Security Conundrum’; Latawski and Smith, The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security. Ibid., 19. See B. Rosamond (2000) Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Ibid., 60. E. Haas (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–57 (London: Stevens and Sons Limited), 17. M. Smith (2004) ‘Beyond the Stable State? Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe’, in W. Carlsnoes and S. Smith (eds) European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (Sage Publications), 28. L. Hooge and G. Marks (2001) Multi-level Governance and European Integration (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), xi. Ibid., 2–3. Ibid., 36. Ibid., 39. Ibid., 25. M. E. Smith (2004) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 11, 17–8.

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21. Ibid., 25–6. 22. Ibid., 33–4. 23. Webber, Inclusion, Exclusion and the Governance of European Security, 58–9, 62–3. 24. Ibid., 63–4, 66, 69–70. 25. Ibid., 126, 129, 131. 26. See especially L. Panitch (2000) ‘The New Imperial State’, New Left Review, 2 and Panitch and Gindin, ‘Global Capitalism and American Empire’. 27. L. Panitch (2002) ‘Violence as a Tool of Order and Change: The War on Terrorism and the Anti-Globalisation Movement’, revised version of a Keynote Speech to the Conference Protest, Freedom and Order in Canada: Finding the Right Balance, Institute for Research on Public Affairs, Concordia University, Montreal, 11–12 March, 13. 28. Gowan, ‘The American Campaign for Global Sovereignty’, 16. 29. Ibid., 1. 30. Ibid., 2. 31. Ibid., 8. 32. Gowan, ‘The American Campaign for Global Sovereignty’, 11. 33. Van der Pijl, ‘Atlantic Rivalries and the Collapse of the USSR’, 199. 34. Hurrell and Menon, ‘International Relations, International Institutions’, 407–8. 35. Cafruny, A. W. (2003) ‘The Geopolitics of US Hegemony in Europe: From the Break-up of Yugoslavia to the War in Iraq’, in A. W. Cafruny and M. Ryner (eds) A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), especially 95–104. 36. G. Lindstrom (2006) ‘The Headline Goal’, http://www.weltpolitik.net/ attachment/0644a930ba1074b5cca2acd4809cbed5/48828aaa68afabfba 388490f841bc996/05-gl.pdf, 2. 37. For a detailed discussion of the various strands of new institutionalist thought, see P. Hall and R. Taylor (1996) ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper, No. 6. 38. Ibid., 12–13. 39. Theda Skocpol’s book, State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), constitutes one of the most important work’s in the ‘bringing the state back in’ school. Also see P. Evans (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 40. Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, 7. 41. See M. Konings (2005) ‘Political Institutions and Economic Imperatives: Bringing Agency Back In’, RIPE 22. 42. B. Rosamond (2000) Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 5. 43. Ibid., 114. 44. P. Hall and R. Taylor (1996) ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung

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47.

48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59.

60.

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Discussion Paper 96/6, 6–16; Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 113–16, 119. Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, 10. Ibid.; W. W. Powell (1991) ‘Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis’, in W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio (eds) The New Intitutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press), 200. R. Friedland and R. R. Alford (1991) ‘Bring Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradiction’, in Powell and DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 244–7. Leander, A. (2000) ‘A Nebbish Presence: Undervalued Contributions of Sociological Institutionalism to IPE’, in R. Palan (ed.) Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories (London and New York: Routledge), 187–8. A. Giddens (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press), 5. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, 2, 5–6, 25–6, 29–30, 33. Ibid., 257. Ibid., 258, 260. Ibid., xxxi, 17–18, 23–4, 30, 282. Ibid., 288, 328–9, 304. E. M. Immergut (1998) ‘The Theoretical Core of New Institutionalism’, Politics & Society, Vol. 26, No.1, 22. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, xxxi, 251. S. Bulmer (1997) New Institutionalism, the Single Market and EU Governance, ARENA Working Paper, No. 25, www.arena.uio.no/publications/ wp97_25.htm 17/08/2004,7–8; G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall (2001) ‘Institutional Research on the European Union: Mapping the Field’, in G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall (ed.) The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press), 1. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 118; See, for instance, S. Bulmer’s major case study on the establishment of the Single European Market. S. Bulmer and M. Burch (2001) ‘The “Europeanisation” of Central Government: The UK and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective’, in G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall (eds) The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press), 73–4. For an example of reflective approaches, see T. Christiansen and K. E. Jorgensen (1999) ‘The Amsterdam Process: A Structurationist Perspective on EU Treaty Reform’, European Integration Online Papers 3, No. 1, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/, 1-23; C. Hay and B. Rosamond (2001) ‘Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives: A Question of Convergence?’ Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation 1, http://eiop.or./at/erpa/ queens.htm for an emphasis on the employment of discourses. Hay and Rosamond, ‘Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives.’

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61. See Christiansen and Jorgensen, ‘The Amsterdam Process’. 62. Ibid., 17. 63. C. Radaelli (2003) ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’, in K. Featherstone and C. Raedelli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 30–4. 64. Quoted in R. Ladrech (2001) ‘Europeanisation and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation 2, 3. 65. Quoted in K. Featherstone (2003) ‘Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’, in K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 17. 66. S. Bulmer and C. M. Radaelli (2004) ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy?’ Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation 1, http://eiop.or./at/erpa/queens .htm. 67. K. E. Howell (2004) ‘Developing Conceptualisations of Europeanization: Synthesising Methodological Approaches’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanization 3, http://eiop.or./at/erpa/queens.htm. 68. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, 281–2. 69. Ibid., xxxi, 2, 24–6. 70. Radaelli, C. M. (2003) ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’, in K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 50–1.

3 The European Security and Defence Policy 1. J.-Y. Haine (2004) ‘An Historical Perspective’, in N. Gnesotto (ed.) EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004) (Paris: EUISS), 37–8. 2. The Second Pillar of the European Union is intergovernmental as opposed to supranational in nature. 3. The German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009), ‘European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)’, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de, date accessed 21 March 2009. 4. C4I represents command, control, communication, computers and intelligence. 5. O. R. Villadsen (2000) ‘Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy’, CIA Report, 2. 6. In response to perceived shortfalls during the 1991 Gulf War, France spearheaded the Hélios project, which represented a significant leap forward in Europe’s imagery intelligence capabilities. Hélios 1 comprises two satellites, which were developed by the former Matra Marconi Space for the French armaments agency and co-funded by Italy and Spain – each holding 14 and 7 percent shares, respectively. Hélios 1 was launched in 1995 and has since contributed satellite imagery to the three funding states, as well as to that of the WEU. Despite Hélios 1’s contribution to European imagery capabilities, it cannot cut through cloud cover and lacks radar and infrared capabilities. This has led to the development of Hélios 2 – a French-led follow

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9.

10.

11

12.

13.

14. 15.

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up to Hélios 1 –, which includes infrared as well as electro-optical imaging capabilities. France attempted to get Germany involved in this project in return for French investment in Germany’s cloud-piercing Horus radar observation satellite programme. According to Charles Grant, the Clinton Administration tried to thwart these plans by trying to persuade Germany to buy an off-the-shelf Lockheed spy satellite rather than invest in Hélios 2. Kohl decided to support the French programme, because the French promised unlimited access to satellite imagery, whereas the US would have pre-selected the photos. However, German budgetary constraints, as well as concerns about the implications of these programmes for relations with US/NATO, caused Germany to pull out of the Hélios 2 programme a few years later and to abandon Horus altogether. See C. Grant (2000) ‘Intimate Relations: Can Britain Play a Leading Role in European Defence – and Keep Its Links to US Intelligence?’ CER Working Paper, 11; M. R. Gueldry (2001) France and European Integration: Towards a Transnational Polity? (West Point and London: Praeger), 169; S. Gregory (2000) French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.; New York: St. Martin’s Press, LLC), 139; Villadsen, Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy, 6. Grant, ‘Intimate Relations’, 11. S. Gregory (2000) French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd; New York: St. Martin’s Press, LLC), 140; Villadsen, Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy, 17–8. Gregory, ibid., 140; Villadsen, ibid., 8; Keohane (2003), ‘Making Progress in Space – The European Union’s Final Frontier’, EuropeanVoice.com,: www.cer.org.uk, 1–2. S. P. Davis (2003) ‘The Long-term Outlook for NATO and the ESDP’, in J. Krause, A. Wenger and L. Watanabe (eds) Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum (Bern, etc.: Peter Lang), 213. J. Howorth (2002) ‘The European Security Conundrum: Prospects for the ESDP after September 11, 2001’, Notre Europe Policy Paper, http:// www.notre-europe.asso.fr. Established in 1992, Eurocorps comprises military contributions from its five framework nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain. For further information, visit the Eurocorps website (http:// www.eurocorps.org). Bono, G. (2003) ‘Implementing the Headline Goals: The Institutional Dimension’, in J. Krause, A. Wenger and L. Watanabe (eds) Unraveling the European Security and Defence Policy Conundrum (Bern, etc.: Peter Lang, 2003), 28. Howorth, ‘The European Security Conundrum’, 2.; UK official 2003 L, interview, 11 December 2003. Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, European Council, Cologne, 3–4 June 1999. Davis, ‘The Long-term Outlook for NATO and the ESDP’, 215.

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17. Cited in Haine, ‘An Historical Perspective’, 44. 18. C. V. Balis (2003) ‘The State of the European Defense and Security Policy after the Leaken Summit’, in J. Krause, A. Wenger and L. Watanabe (eds) Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum, 26. 19. B. Schmitt (2004) ‘European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?’, in N. Gnesotto (ed.) EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999– 2004) (Paris: EUISS), 91. 20. The PSC comprises representatives at senior ambassadorial level and one representative from the Commission. It prepares policy options in anticipation of events and is charged with the strategic direction and political control of EU activities in crisis situations. Its definition within the Treaty effectively replaces previous references to the WEU’s Political Committee. 21. Bono, ‘Implementing the Headline Goals’, 70. 22. A. Missiroli (2004) ‘ESDP – How It Works’, in N. Gnesotto (ed.) EU Security and Defence Policy, 57. 23. Ibid., 59. 24. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. 25. A. Eriksson (2004) ‘The Building of a EU Capability – A Process of Europeanisation’, paper presented at the Fifth Pan-European Conference of the Standing Group on International Relations, The Hague, The Netherlands, 9–11 September, 11. 26. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. 27. Haine, ‘An Historical Perspective’, 45–6; Schmitt, ‘European Capabilities’, 92. 28. Schmitt, ‘European Capabilities’, 93. 29. Ibid., 93–4. 30. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. 31. Eriksson, ‘The Building of a EU Military Capability’. 32. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. 33. Schmitt, ‘European Capabilities’, 95. 34. RELEX refers to the Commission’s External Relations Directorate General and COREPER to the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 35. Council Joint Action on the Establishment of the European Defence Agency, 12 July 2004; In addition to attempting to establish a common set of rules for cooperation, a Franco-German inspired joint programme management agency – the Joint Armaments Co-operation Organisation (otherwise known by the French Acronym (OCCAR) – was established. OCCAR was directed at improving the efficiency of joint European procurement by establishing one set of guidelines for joint programmes, giving participating firms a central reference point instead of several national teams. While many of OCCAR-managed programmes have been Franco-German, Britain is involved, along with France and Germany, in a cobra programme to produce a long-range battlefield radar, and has also joined forces with Germany and the Netherlands on a multi-role armoured vehicle programme (MRAV). See Schmitt (2002) ‘European

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45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

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and Transatlantic Defence-Industrial Strategies’, paper prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 25 November, www.iiss .org/eusec, 36; D. Keohane (2002) ‘The EU and Armaments Co-operation’, CER Working Paper, 24. Eriksson, ‘The Building of an EU Military Capability’, 13–14. Schmitt, ‘European Capabilities’, 101. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. Joint Action on the Establishment of the Agency. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. Brussels official 2006, interview, 10 October. Eriksson, ‘The Building of a EU Military Capability’, 13–14. D. Keohane (2004) ‘Europe’s New Defence Agency’, CER Policy Brief, 4; Research for a Secure Europe (2004) Report of the Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 7. See Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 2003. Eriksson, ‘The Building of a EU Military Capability’, 11. Headline Goal 2010. Ibid., 2010. Schmitt, ‘European Capabilities’, 98–9; Eriksson, ‘The Building of a EU Military Capability’, 10; EU Council Secretariat, ‘EU Battlegroups’, EU Council Secretariat Fact Sheet, February 2007, 1. Brussels diplomat 2003, interview, 23 October; German official 2004, interview, 16 April; British official 2003, interview, 11 December. Keohane, ‘The EU and Armaments Co-operation’. Eriksson, ‘The Building of a Military Capability’, 14, 17. See P. Stuck, German Defence Minister (2003) ‘Defence Policy Guidelines’, Berlin, 21 May, 4–7, 10, 11–14. German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006), White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. French Ministry of Defence, The Military Programme Bill of Law 2003– 2008, 3 of Chapter 3. Ibid., 3, Chapter 1. Ibid., 4, Chapter 3. Ibid., 80, Chapter 4. D. Keohane 2003, interview, 17 December. British Ministry of Defence (2003) Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defence White Paper, 2–3. Ibid., 3 Research for a Secure Europe, 13. Ibid., 7. See U. Mörth (1999) ‘Framing the Defence Industry Equipment Issue – The Case of the European Commission’, SCORE Report, No. 1. Ibid.

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66. Gaffney, J. (2005) ‘Highly Emotional States: French-US Relations and the Iraq War’, in K. Longhurst and M. Zaborowski (eds) Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda (London and New York: Routledge), 77. 67. P. Latawski and M. A. Smith (2003) The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press), 136. 68. See Howorth, ‘The European Security Conundrum’. 69. Miskimmon, A. (2005) ‘Continuity in the Face of Upheaval – British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government’, in K. Longhurst and M. Zaborowski (eds) Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda (London and New York: Routledge), 87–8. 70. Latawski and Smith, The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security, 126; British official 2003, December 11. 71. Brussels diplomat 2003, interview, 23 October. 72. Miskimmon, ‘Continuity in the Face of Upheaval’, 90. 73. This refers to network-enabled capabilities designed to perform a wide-range of military tasks. 74. British Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World. 75. Latawski and Smith, The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security, 130. 76. L. Freedman (2001) ‘Defence’, in A. Seldon (ed.) The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997–2001, (London: Little, Brown and Company), 295. 77. See M. Takle (2002) ‘Towards a Normalisation of German Security and Defence Policy: German Participation in International Military Operations’, ARENA Working Paper, No. 10, http://www.arena.uio.no/ publication/wp02_10.htm. 78. S. Hürsoy (2002) The New Security Concept and the German-French Approaches to the European ‘Pillar of Defence’, 1999–2000 (Marburg: Tectum Verlag), 224. 79. Davis, ‘The Long-term Outlook for NATO and the ESDP’, 213. 80. Tackle, ‘Towards a Normalisation of German Security and Defence Policy’. 81. Hürsoy, The New Security Concept, 260–1. 82. Ibid., 273–5. 83. Forster, A. and W. Wallace (2000) ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Shadow to Substance’, in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds) Policymaking in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 471. 84. B. Schmitt (2000) ‘From Cooperation to Integration: Defence and Aerospace Industries in Europe. Institute for Security Studies of the WEU’, Chaillot Paper 40, 10, 16–17; In aerospace, there are now two major firms: EADS and BAe Systems (the former BAe) – the former being horizontally integrated with strong points in the civilian aerospace and the later being vertically integrated and highly specialized in the area of defence, where it has a wide range of activities. EADS (European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company) is a Franco-German entity, which originates from

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88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

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the merger of the German champion, Dasa, and its French counterpart, Aerospatiale-Matra, which took place in 1999, and the Spanish, formerly state-owned CASA’s integration into it. BAe Systems is the result of the British firm, BAe’s, acquisition of Marconi, the British group has gone from being a military aerospace platform builder to a real systems manufacturer that has important capabilities in defence electronics. At the same time, the integration of Marconi North America has made BAe Systems a major actor in the American market. Indeed, BAe Systems North America is one of the Pentagon’s main suppliers and the group’s turnover in the US is higher than that in Britain. Moreover, it has further strengthened its presence in the US by purchasing Lockheed Martin’s control systems business. The Pentagon also claims to treat BAe Systems North America like an American firm, which is a clear advantage when tendering for contracts, due to the ‘Buy American’ Act, ibid., 23–4, 32. D. Keohane 2003, interview, 17 December. Brussels diplomat 2003, interview, 24 October. J. Medcalf (2003) ‘Cooperation between the EU and NATO’, in ed. J. Krause, A. Wenger and L. Watanabe (eds) Unraveling the European Security and Defence Policy Conundrum, 104, 109. Ibid., 105. Hürsoy, The New Security Concept, 397. ‘US Dismay over Blair’s Stance on EU Defence’, Financial Times, 16 October 2003, A1. ‘US to Confront Brussels over Defence Policy’, Financial Times, 17 October 2003, A1. ‘NATO Divided over Separate EU Military Planning Unit’, Financial Times, 1 December 2003, A2. Brussels diplomat 2003, interview, 24 October. D. Keohane 2003, interview, 17 December. Brussels diplomat 2003, interview, 24 October.

4 Justice and Home Affairs Post-September 11 1. J. Lodge (1991) ‘Frontier Problems and the Single Market’, in R. Clutterbuck, A. Jamieson and A. Lodge, Counter-Terrorism in Europe: Implications of 1992 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism), 52. 2. The belief that police action against terrorism required exceptional measures led to a bout of legislation in several European countries, which effectively enlarged police powers in the sphere of pro-active criminal investigation. In Germany, police were empowered to search all apartments in a block if they suspected that terrorists and hostages were hiding out there, to set up roadblocks, and to establish the identity of people passing through neighbourhoods in the vicinity of terrorist incidents. The Bundeskriminalamt, the Federal Investigative Office (BKA), was also given a mandate to establish computerized files and search concepts. In

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Britain, the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act permitted police to demand evidence of identity and to arrest people without warrant if they were suspected of any offences covered by the Act. Police had the right to detain such persons without charge for 48 hours; this could be extended in any particular case by the Secretary of State by a further 5 days. Moreover, when the Act was reviewed in 1989, police were given extended access to bank accounts and business records anywhere in Britain: police were empowered to share information with each other and with the social security authorities, and the onus was placed on suspected racketeers ‘to prove that there was a legitimate source of their funds’. In France, police powers were increased in 1989 to permit police officers to prevent people leaving the scene of the crime if they required information. See D. Bigo (1994) ‘The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly Developing Area of Police Intervention’, in M. Anderson and M. den Boer (eds) Policing Across National Boundaries (London and New York: Pinter Publishers), 166; M. Anderson (2000) ‘Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, in F. Reinares (ed.) European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation (Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth), 236; D. T. Schiller (1987) ‘The Police Response to Terrorism: A Critical Overview’, in P. Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart in association with G. D. Smith, A. YaDeau and T. Schiller (eds) Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press), 546; R. Clutterbuck (1990) Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe after 1992 (London and New York: Routledge), 93. 3. J. Benyon (1996) ‘Building Police Co-operation: The European Construction Site Around the Third Pillar’, in I. Hampsher-Monk and J. Stanyer (eds) Contemporary Political Studies 1996, Vol. 2 (Belfast: PSA), 1058. 4. Schiller, ‘The Police Response to Terrorism’, 546. This is demonstrated by a few high profile cases in which informal and intimate relations played a crucial role in the respective outcomes. In 1977, for example, the German GSG9 assisted their Dutch counterparts in the rescue of passengers from a hijacked train near Gilmmen, The Netherlands. In the same year, cooperation between the British SAS and the German GSG9 took place during the final stages of shadowing a hijacked Lufthansa airplane through Dubai and Aden to Mogadishu Airport. Similar informal relations were also established between domestic intelligence agencies involved in anti-terrorist work. The officers of the British SO13 – Scotland Yard’s Anti-Terror Squad – and Secret Service (MI5) (that took over the anti-terrorist work of SO13 in 1992), the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, or the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, (BfV) and BKA, the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and the Direction de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), for example, have strong links as a result of their informal bilateral relations. Such contacts between the French DST and its German counterpart(s) were decisive in the DST’s destruction of the French group Action Directe (AD) – a left-wing,

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12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

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pro-Palestinian group. Similar cooperation also exists between officers of British Special Branch and the BKA, and MI5 and the German BfV. See Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe after 1992, 122; P. Chalk (1996) West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Ltd.; St. Martin’s Press, Inc.), 107. Anderson, ‘Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, 229. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 122. Chalk, ibid., 122; Benyon, ‘Building Police Co-operation’, 1050. Lodge, Counter-Terrorism in Europe: Implications of 1992, 53. Benyon, ‘Building Police Co-operation’, 1055. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 124. M. den Boer (2004) ‘Plural Governance and EU Internal Security: Chances and Limitations of Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, ARENA Paper, 25 May, 2; A. Podolski (2004) ‘European Intelligence Co-operation – Failing Part of CFSP and ESDP?’, Reports & Analyses 6/04/A. www.csm.org.pl. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 118–19; Schiller, D. (1988) ‘From a National to an International Response’, in H. H. Tucker (ed.) Combating the Terrorists: Democratic Responses to Political Violence (New York and Oxford: Facts on File), 186, 190. P. Chalk (2000) ‘The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-Terrorist Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability’, in F. Reinares (ed.) European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation (Ashgate: Aldershot Darmouth), 185. Bigo, ‘The European Internal Security Field’, 166. TREVI initially brought together professionals from member states in two operational working groups: one concerned with terrorism and the exchange of information/mutual assistance on terrorist activities, and the other with training and the exchange of scientific/technical information to facilitate the fight against terrorism and mass disturbances of public order. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 122–3. Benyon, ‘Building Police Co-operation’, 1050–1. Ibid., 163–4; Anderson, ‘Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, 228. Bigo, ‘The European Internal Security Field’, 164. Council of the European Union (2005), ‘Living in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, General Secretariat DG F – Communications, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1 January, 7. Benyon, Building Police Co-operation’, 1048. I. Loader (2005) ‘Policing, Securitization and Democratization in Europe’, 18 April, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article209.html, 7. Ibid., 1.

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24. Bigo, ‘The European Internal Security Field’, 163–5. 25. M. Anderson and J. Apap (2002) ‘Changing Conceptions of Security and Their Implications for EU Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation’, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 26, 3–4. 26. Bigo, ‘The European Internal Security Field’, 165; Benyon, ‘Building Police Co-operation’, 1044. 27. Anderson, ‘Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, 235. 28. Ibid., 230. 29. M. den Boer (2003) ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorist Policy: A Critical Assessment’, Notre Europe Policy Paper, No. 6, 1. 30. Swiss Federal Integration Office DFA/DEA (2005), ‘The EU Extension and the Extension of the Agreement on the Free movement of Persons’, http://www. europa.admin.ch, 15. 31. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 125–7. 32. Benyon, ‘Building Police Co-operation’, 1049. 33. Scottish Parliament. The Information Centre (2002) EU Justice and Home Affairs Policy. SPICe Briefing, 13 March, www.scottish.parliament.uk/ business/research/subject/criminal.htm, 3. 34. Benyon, ‘Building Police Co-operation’, 1052. 35. The TEU was able to do this because the third pillar did not start out from the premise that all internal borders should be abolished, as Schengen had, but instead reaffirmed the aim of facilitating the free movement of people. This was a key factor facilitating Britain’s further involvement in ‘internal’ security cooperation: Britain, along with Ireland, has been given a special dispensation that allows it to treat its ports and airports as external frontiers with respect to third country nationals. See Chalk, ‘The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation’, 186. 36. Benyon, ‘Building Police Co-operation’, 1054–5; Elise, ‘Institutional Building in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Mapping Specialized Committees and Agencies’, http://www.libertysecurity.org/elise/article149 .html, date accessed 22 March 2009, 6. 37. G. M. Segell (2004) ‘Intelligence Agency Relations between the European Union and the US’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 17, No. 1, 83; Lodge, Counter-Terrorism in Europe: Implications of 1992, 29. 38. M. Den Boer (2000) ‘The Fight against Terrorism in the Second and Third Pillars of the Maastricht Treaty: Complement or Overlap?’, in F. Reinares (ed.) European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation (Ashgate: Aldershot Dartmouth), 214, 221; also see Annex 3 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid European Council, 15–16 December 1995, which contains the Gomera Declaration. 39. Lodge, Counter-Terrorism in Europe: Implications of 1992, 49. 40. During the 1970s, the governments of EC states sought to remove the political offence exception that was built into the 1976 European Convention

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44.

45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56.

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on Extradition. A subsequent review of the Convention led to the drafting of the 1977 Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST), which entered into force in September 1978. In following year, the EC opened up for signature the Dublin Agreement, which ensured, without reservation or qualification, the application of the ECST among its members. While the Agreement itself failed to receive sufficient ratifications to allow it to enter into force, all of the then 12 members of the EU, as well as the four new members, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, have ratified the ECST. It essentially lowered the threshold for extraditable offences, though did not remove the political offence exception. See Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 123. Ibid., 129–30; Chalk, ‘The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation’, 182. Elise, ‘Institutional Building in the Area of Freedom, Security, Justice’, 1. Memorandum by Statewatch to sub-committee ‘E’ of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communitie’s Inquiry into ‘Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters’ (consideration of the draft Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters), Statewatch, http://www .statewatch.org. Council of the European Union (2005), ‘Living in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, General Secretariat DG F – Communications, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1 January. B. Hall and A. Bhatt (1999) Policing Europe: EU Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation, CER Pamphlet, 9–10; Scottish Parliament, The Information Centre, EU Justice and Home Affairs Policy, 6. Loader, ‘Policing, Securitization and the Democratization in Europe’, 6. Quoted in ibid., 31–2. Segell, ‘Intelligence Agency Relations between the European Union and the US’, 83. Ibid., 86. Hall and Bhatt, ‘Policing Europe: EU Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation’, 34. Loader, ‘Policing, Securitization and Democratization in Europe’, 8. Scottish Parliament, The Information Centre, EU Justice and Home Affairs Policy, 8; European Council, ‘Living in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 10–11; Hall and Bhatt, ‘Policing Europe: EU Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation’, 33. See the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. Elise, ‘Institutional Building in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 2. EU Institutions Press Release, ‘EU Counter Terrorism Efforts in the JHA Field’, 12 March 2004, 3; den Boer, ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Antiterrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment’, 12. Elise, ‘Institutional Building in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 5.

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57. Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 21/22 June 2007, 7. 58. Segell, ‘Intelligence Agency Relations between the European Union and the US’, 87–8; EU Institutions Press Release, ‘EU Counter Terrorism Efforts in the JHA Field’, 3. 59. Den Boer, ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorism Policy’, 13. 60. Segell, ‘Intelligence Agency Relations between the European Union and the US’, 82; EU Institutions Press Release, ‘EU Counter Terrorism Efforts in the JHA Field’, 3. 61. Den Boer, ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorism Policy’, 14. 62. W. Rees (2003) ‘Transatlantic Relations and the “War on Terror”’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol., No. 1, 88, H. Grabbe (2001) ‘Breaking New Ground in Internal Security?’ in Europe after September 11th, CER Pamphlet, 65; EU Institutions Press Release, ‘EU Counter Terrorism Efforts in the JHA Field’, 3. 63. European Commission (2005) Proposal for a Framework Decision on Exchange of Information under the Principle of Availability, MEMO/05/367, Brussels, 12 October. 64. Den Boer, ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorism Policy’, 6–7. 65. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 16–17 December 2004. 66. Quoted in J. Apap and S. Carrera (2003) ‘Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards a Permanent State of Emergency in the EU?’ CEPS Policy Brief, No. 41, 9. VIS and SIS II refer to the Visa Information System and the second generation Schengen Information System, respectively. 67. Ibid., 10. 68. EU Institutions Press Release, ‘EU Counter Terrorism Efforts in the JHA Field’, 4. 69. Grabbe, ‘Breaking New Ground in Internal Security’, 71. 70. See Anderson, ‘Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, 230; M. Candappa (2003) ‘Prevention and Fight Against Trafficking: Institutional Developments in Europe’, UK Report for the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, 13–4. See the UK Home Office website, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk, date accessed 29 March 2009. 71. For information on UK legislative changes, see Candappa, ibid. For further information on the Franco-Spanish JIT, see StateWatch Bulletin (2004), Vol. 14, No. 5, http://www.statewatch.org/ contents/swbul14n5.html. 72. Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission on National Measures Taken to comply with the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Joint Investigation Teams, COM (2004) 858 final, Brussels, 7 January 2005. 73. Chalk, ‘West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic’, 138. In relation to centralizing tendencies in Britain, see also the National Crime Squad’s website, www.nationalcrimesquad.police.uk, date accessed 29 March 2009.

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74. Schiller, ‘From a National to an International Response’, 187. 75. The group had established contact with the PLO by buying handguns from Fatah agents who were fundraising in Germany. In order to escape capture after freeing Andreas Baader from prison in 1970 and to internationalize their struggle, key members of the group flew from Berlin to Amman and hid in a PLO camp. Ibid., 197; Schiller, ‘The Police Response to Terrorism’, 538–40. 76. See Interpol’s website, http://www.interpol.int, date accessed 29 March 2009. 77. A. Niemenkari (2002) ‘EU/Schengen Requirements for National Border Security Systems’, DCAF Working Paper, Geneva, 5–7. 78. See French Ministry of the Interior’s website, http://www.interieur.gouv .fr, date accessed 29 March 2009; the German Federal Foreign Ministry’s ‘Facts about Germany’ webpage, http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland .de, date accessed 29 March 2009. 79. A. Maguer, ‘Cross-border Police Cooperation – Practical Manners, Institutions and Structures along the French-German Border’, Project Description (doctoral thesis), Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, http://www.libertysecurity.org, date accessed 13 June 2003, 4. 80. D. Lutterbeck (2003) The Fortress Walls: Policing the EU’s External Borders, 1990–2001, PhD thesis, 12–13, 208–11. 81. Ibid., 208–15. 82. See the German Federal Foreign Office’s Facts about Germany webpage http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de. 83. C. van den Anker, ‘Trafficking in the UK – A Country Report for the NEWR’, Workshop in Amsterdam, April 2003. 84. Candappa, ‘Prevention and Fight Against Trafficking’. 85. For information on France, see ILO (2005), ‘Forced Labour: Labour Exploitation and Human Trafficking in Europe’, http://www.ilo.org/ global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Feature_stories/ lang–en/WCMS_075554/index.htm, 12 May; for Germany, see US State Department (2005) ‘Sex Tourism, Human Trafficking and Sexual Abuse of Children in Germany’, Extract from the US State Department’s 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report, http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/ themen/Menschenrechte/mensschenhandel2005.html. 86. For information on provisions for the EAW in the UK, see R. Oulds, ‘The Extradition Bill’, The Bruges Group, http://www.brugesgroup.com/news .live?article⫽153&keyword⫽10, date accessed 29 March 2009; see also Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department (2004) ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’, 29 April, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ rls/pgtrpt/2003/31626.htm. 87. M. Leaf and W. van Ballegooij (2005) ‘Towards a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?’ Challenge Europe Online Journal 14; C. Gay (2006) ‘The European Arrest Warrant and Its Application by Member States’, European Issues, Fondation Robert Schuman Policy Paper, No. 16, 23 January, 6.

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88. Segell, ‘Intelligence Agency Relations between the European Union and the US’, 81, 89–90; Rees, ‘Transatlantic Relations and the “War on Terror”’, 86–8. 89. ‘Proposed Exchange of Personal Data between Europol and USA Evades EU data Protection Rights and Protections’, Statewatch News Online, 5 December 2002, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/nov/12eurousa .htm. 90. ‘Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance’, European Union Fact Sheet, http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Extradition/default.asp, date accessed 21 March 2009. 91. Rees, ‘Transatlantic Relations and the “War on Terror”’, 88; Segell, ‘Intelligence Agency Relations between the European Union and the US’, 89. 92. United States Mission to the European Union, (2003) ‘US, EU Sign Legal Assistance, Extradition Treaties’, 25 June 2003, http://useu.usmission .gov/Article.asp?ID⫽4C685933-563D-4DAA-85A9-F1ECECE0EE87; ‘Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance’; den Boer, ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorism Policy’, 16. 93. Den Boer, ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorism Policy’, 13; Rees, ‘Transatlantic Relations and the “War on Terror”’, 88. 94. ‘Biometrics – the EU Takes Another Step Down the Road to 1984’, Statewatch News Online, 19 June 2003, http://www.statewatch.org/ news/2003/sep/19eubiometric.htm. 95. PNR is a generic term for files created by airlines for each journey a passenger books. Files are stored on the airlines’ reservation and departure control databases. The US Aviation and Transport Security Act of November 2001 requires that airlines operating flights to the US, provide the US Customs and Border Protection Bureau (CBP), on request, with electronic access to their PNR data. For further information on PNR and the controversy over its transfer from EU airlines to the US CBP, see the EU’s website http://www.europa.eu. 96. The ‘US CBP has stated that no other foreign, federal, state or local agency has direct access to PNR data through the CBP. However, under US law, other enforcement authorities may specifically request PNR information from the CBP, and the CBP, at its discretion, may provide such information. The US CBP has undertaken, in exercise of this discretion, to provide PNR data to other law enforcement authorities only for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism and other serious criminal offences.’ See ibid.; Apap and Carrera, ‘Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards a Permanent State of Emergency in the EU?’ 11. 97. K. Archick, (2005) ‘US-EU Cooperation against Terrorism’, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 4. 98. Ibid. 99. Den Boer, ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorist Policy’, 16. 100. Ibid.

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5 The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 1. R. Biermann (1999) ‘The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – Potential, Problems and Perspectives’, Centre for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, Discussion Paper, 1; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999; Cologne Document, Cologne, 10 June 1999. 2. German official 2006, interview, 19 October; German official 2006, correspondance, 15 November. 3. V. Bilandzic (2002) ‘Regional Approach – An Obstacle or an Opportunity for an Early Integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the European Structures’, in Š. Alomerovic, ´ V. Bilandzic, E. Busek, S. Ergen, E. Hasani, U. Janz, M. Predrag Jurekovic, ´ S. Moser-Starrach, G. Murra, P. Pantev, B. Papenkort, D. Pilsel, D. J. D. Sandole, M. Staniˇc ic, ´ The Stability Pact for South East Europe – Dawn of an Era of Regional Co-operation (Wien: Osterreichs Bundesheer). 4. Prior to the creation of the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) in November 2000, the EU’s main channels of assistance to the Western Balkans and applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe were the OBNOVA and PHARE programmes, respectively. In 2001, the OBNOVA programme was integrated into the CARDS, which constitutes the Stability Pact’s principal aid instrument for institution-building, reconstruction, development and economic reform, and regional cooperation. For further details, see The German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Helping Countries Prepare for Accession’, Europe, Auswärtiges Amt, http://www.auswaertiges-amt .de/diplo/en/Europa/Erweiterung/UnterstuetzungsProgramm e.html, date accessed 21 March 2009. 5. Biermann, ‘The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, 9; Bilandzic, ‘Regional Approach – An Obstacle or Opportunity’, 112; European Commission (1999), ‘Building on the Model of European Integration’, Europe for BiH, No. 8. 6. Bilandzic, ‘Regional Approach – An Obstacle or Opportunity’, 113; see the SECI Center’s website, http://www.secicenter.org, date accessed 29 March 2009. 7. R. Biermann (1999) ‘The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – Potential, Problems and Perspectives’, discussion paper, Centre for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, 12–13; The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2004) The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 1. 8. Presidency Conclusions, EU Council summit in Vienna, 11–12 December 1998. 9. French official 2007, interview, 20 March. 10. Former German official 2006, correspondence, 15 November; French official 2007, interview, 20 March.

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11. W. Brauner, ‘Evaluation of the German Presidency’, Deutsche-Aussenpolitik .de., http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/index.php?/resources/dossiers/ eu_evaluation.php, date accessed 22 March 2009. 12. Communication Presse, Council, 8 April 1999. 13. Communication Presse, Council, 26 April 1999. 14. Former German official 2006, correspondence, 15 November; French official 2007, interview, 20 March. 15. H-D. Jacobsen (2005) ‘Economic Security and the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe’, www.studienforum-berlin.de/Economic%20Security2005.pdf. 16. Biermann, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 16; ‘Balkan Nations Could Join EU’, The Guardian, 9 April 1999. 17. Biermann, ibid., 17. 18. Former German official 2006, correspondence, 15 November. 19. Biermann, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 18. 20. S. Ergen (2002) The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe-Brussels, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Reform of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper, No. 34, 2; Cologne Document, 3. 21. Cologne Document. 22. German official 2006, interview, 19 October. 23. Former German Official, correspondence 2006, 15 November. 24. A. Miskimmon, ‘Europeanisation and German Foreign and Security Policy – The Case of Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe’, presented at a Workshop on Europeanisation of National Foreign Policies, European Foreign Policy Unit, London School of Economics, London, 5 June 2002, 2. 25. Former German official 2006, correspondence, 15 November. 26. Ibid.; French official 2007, interview, 20 March. 27. M-J. Calic (2003) ‘Germany’s Role in Conflict Prevention and PostConflict Reconstruction in South Eastern Europe’, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue: A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German Foreign Policy 4, No. 10, 21. 28. Former German official 2006, correspondence, 15 November; French official 2007, interview, March 20. 29. P. Buras and K. Longhurst (2005) ‘The Berlin Republic, Iraq and the Use of Force’, in K. Longhurst and M. Zaboroski (eds) Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda (London and New York: Routledge), 30; French official 2007, interview, March 20. 30. Calic, ‘Germany’s Role in Conflict Prevention’, 21. 31. German official 2006, interview, 19 October; Former German official 2006, correspondence, 15 November. 32. Amb. Dr. M. Schaefer (2000) ‘Regional Cooperation as the Road to the European Union. The Future of the Stability Pact’, Südosteuropa Mittelungen, 04/2000, Special Issue, 25. 33. The Guardian, ‘Balkan Nations Could Join EU’; Biermann, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 12–4; The Stability Pact for South Eastern

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34. 35.

36. 37.

38.

39.

40.

41. 42. 43.

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Europe, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 1; Former German official, correspondence 2006, 15 November. German official 2006, interview, 19 October; Former German official, correspondence 2006, 15 November. Ergen, The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe-Brussels; E. Busek (2004), Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, ‘Five Years of Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe: Achievements and Challenges Ahead’, Speech at the London School of Economics, London, 8 March, 3. See Working Group on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Strategy and Action Plan 2004, October 2003. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 6; Busek, ‘Five Years of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, 4. In the energy sector, for example, the groundwork was laid in Athens in November 2002 for the creation of a single electricity market in SEE in accordance with EU standards by 2005. The so-called Athens Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Electricity Market in South Eastern Europe and Integration into the European Union Internal Electricity was put in place to pursue the reform process in a predictable (i.e. legally binding) manner. The provisions contained in it, of course, imply opening national markets, as well as establishing independent electricity regulatory agencies and creating national transmission systems operators, for instance. The agreement has since been expanded to gas, which is expected to be reformed in line with the EU legislation in that sector. Once EU standards are met, signatories of the MoU relating to energy will gain access to the EU’s internal energy market, regardless of the status of their membership application. The EU aims to establish a free-trade area with its partners. See ‘EU Begins Talks with Region on Common SEE Energy Market’, Stability Pact Press Release, Brussels, 19 July 2004, http://www.stabilitypact.org; Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 6: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’s website www.stabilitypact.org. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 5; Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’s website, www.stabilitypact.org, date accessed 29 March 2009. ‘Defence Conversion’, Working Table III: Security Issues, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, www.stabilitypact.org/def-econ/default.asp, date accessed 29 March 2009. ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons’, Working Table III: Security Issues, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, www.stabilitypact.org/salw/ default.asp, date accessed 29 March 2009. ‘Ohrid Process on Border Security and Management’, Working Table III: Security Issues, www.stabilitypact.org/specials/030522-ohrid/index.asp. ‘Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative’, Working Table III: Security Issues, www.stability pact.org/dppi/default.asp. Busek, ‘Five Years of the Stability for South Eastern Europe’, 5.

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44. Ergen, The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe-Brussels, 6–7; ibid., 4–5. 45. See Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2003) Police Forum Initiative Report, 4 December. 46. Ibid.; Brussels diplomat 2004, interview, March. 47. ‘Police Task Force’, Working Table III: Security Issues, www.stabilitypact .org/police/default.asp. 48. The EU’s TACIS programme was launched in 1992. It is aimed at states of the former Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic States, which are covered by the PHARE programme), including Mongolia. It provides assistance for projects aimed at improving environmental protection, restructuring of state-owned enterprises, private sector development, energy, transport, telecommunications, institution-building and cross-border and regional cooperation. See The German Federal Foreign Ministry, ‘Helping Countries Prepare for Accession’. 49. Twinning was used as a tool for transferring administrative skills linked to institution-building in the candidate countries of Bulgaria and Romania. It involves seconding civil servants from EU member states to work as advisors in the SEE states. It has been available to the SAP countries since October 2002. To-date, twinning projects have been launched in Albania and Croatia and are currently being prepared for the rest of the region. See Commission of the European Communities (2003) The Western Balkans and European Integration, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 21 May. 50. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2003) Way Forward Document, 22/23 May, 15; Common Platform of the Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, 22/23 May 2003, 1–4; York University Centre for International and Security Studies, Preliminary Gaps Analysis, 2003, 4. 51. ‘Mine Action’, Working Table III: Security Issues, www.stabilitypact.org/ wt3/mineaction.asp. 52. Busek, ‘Five Years of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, 8. 53. See the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’s website (www.stability pact.org). 54. Former German official, correspondence 2006, 15 November. 55. Ergen, The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe-Brussels, 1; York University’s Centre for International and Security Studies. Preliminary Gaps Analysis, 2003, http://ssr.yciss.yorku.ca, 1. Busek, ‘Five Years of Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, 1, 3. 56. Buras and Longhurst, ‘The Berlin Republic’, 30. 57. Miskimmon, ‘Europeanisation and German Foreign and Security Policy’, 5; Jacobsen, ‘Economic Security and the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe’, 5; Brauner, ‘Evaluation of the German EU-Presidency’, 3; W. Brauner, ‘Evaluation of Germany’s Role in the Resolution of the Kosovo Conflict’, Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, date accessed 29 March 2009, 3; German official 2006, interview, 19 October. 58. German official 2006, interview, 19 October.

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59. Brauner, ‘Evaluation of the German EU-Presidency’, 3. 60. A. Bendiek (2004) ‘Europe’s Conflict Resolution: The Stability Pact in South Eastern Europe’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session Workshop, Uppsala, 13–18 April, 19. 61. Ibid., 18. 62. Cologne Document. 63. ‘South East Europe Initiative’, and ‘Partnership for Peace’, NATO Factsheets, http:www.nato.int/docu/facts.htm; Biermann, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 24–5. 64. M. Brzoska (2003) Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper, No. 4, 5. 65. Ibid., 10–13. 66. The World Bank (2000) Annual Report 2000, http://www.worldbank.org/ html/extpb/annrep2000/content.htm. 67. S. Gill (1998) ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy’, Pacifica Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 32–3. 68. Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, 19. 69. Ibid., 3–4.

6 Conclusion: Socio-Functional Europeanization 1. M. den Boer (2003) ‘9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-terrorist Policy: A Critical Assessment’, Notre Europe Policy Paper, No. 6, 16.

Index Albania 58, 127, 130–1, 134–5, 141, 144 Amsterdam Treaty (1997) 5, 57, 59, 82, 132, 134–5, 161 atlanticism 27–8 Belgium 56, 86–7 bipolarity 16 border management 6, 13, 113, 115–16, 119, 125, 140, 142 Bosnia-Herzegovina 127, 131, 141–4 Britain 44, 70, 79–81, 84–7, 130, 134 see also under United Kingdom Bulgaria 127, 130–1, 141, 144 C4I capabilities 55–6, 62 Central and Eastern Europe 27, 82 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) 56 Commission, The 20, 60, 65–6, 74, 76, 88, 131, 134, 153, 156, 165 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 4, 8–9, 41, 53, 57, 59, 74, 82, 132, 137, 152, 159 Communism 25, 157 conflict prevention 4–5, 13, 17 Copenhagen criteria 134–5 Council Secretariat 60 criminal justice 5–6, 8, 100, 111, 119, 123, 125–6, 154, 162, 164 criminal law 107, 111, 113, 117–19, 125, 162 crisis management 4–5, 13, 18, 26, 56–9, 62, 65, 69, 77–8, 80, 82–3, 87, 89, 129, 146, 152, 154, 161, 165 Croatia 127, 130–1, 141, 143–4

Dayton Peace Agreement 1995 130–1 Democratization 59, 65, 139 Denmark 59, 65 EU Charter of Rights 121 EU Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance (2000) 110 European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty (1952) 7, 55 EU Military Committee (EUMC) 59, 62–3, 65 EU-NATO relations 55 Berlin-plus arrangement 83–5 Eurocorps 57 European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 6, 118, 125 European Council 7 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 38–9 European Defence Agency (EDA) 65–6, 68, 73, 75, 87–8, 160 European Defence Community (EDC) 7, 17 European independent legal body (EUROJUST) 9, 11, 105, 107, 109, 122, 126 European Parliament 60, 122, 165 European Police Office (EUROPOL) 6, 9, 92, 96, 102–3, 105–6, 109–10, 112, 120–2, 124, 142 European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 56, 79, 82, 85 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 59, 62, 64, 68, 86 Petersberg tasks 58, 60–1, 83, 88, 160

191

192

Index

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (continued) Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) 59 Political Security Committee (PSC) 59, 63 St Malo Declaration 57–8, 79, 85 European Security Strategy (ESS) 5, 60–1, 68–70, 88–9 europeanization horizontal europeanization 44–5, 48, 50, 106–7 vertical europeanization 46, 48, 50, 159 extradition 97, 100, 102, 104, 109, 111, 118, 121–2, 125 EU Extradition Convention (1996) 104 European Convention on Extradition (1957) 104 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST) (1977) 104 Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) 132 see also under Serbia Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 127, 131, 134, 141, 144 see also under Macedonia France 3, 7, 95, 98, 113–15, 117–18, 130, 134, 146 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 60, 65 Germany 3, 16–7, 53, 55–6, 70–1, 78, 81–7, 95, 98, 113–16, 127–8, 130, 133, 135, 137–8, 143, 145, 147, 149–52 Gulf War (1991) 55, 78, 81 hegemony 15, 27, 136, 150 Holland 56 human rights 104, 122, 131, 137, 139 Hungary 127

identities national identities 17, 153 social identities 11, 36–7, 44 intelligence 5–9, 14, 16, 27, 55–6, 72, 85, 95–7, 103, 108–10, 112–13, 115, 120–1, 125–6, 154–5, 162, 164, 166 intergovernmentalism 21 International monetary Fund (IMF) 144, 147–8 Interpol 120, 142 Iraq 27, 67, 86–7 Italy 56 Kosovo 4, 55, 57, 127, 130, 133, 138–9, 141, 144–5 law enforcement 6, 8, 24, 75, 92, 96, 98–100, 105–7, 110, 114, 120–2, 124–6, 132, 156, 162, 164 Maastricht Treaty (1992) 101 see also under Treaty of the European Union Macedonia 127 see also under Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Moldova 141–2, 144 Multilateralism 17, 150, 152, 163 multi-level governance 20 multipolar 15 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (2003) 122 neo-functionalism 19–20, 28, 76, 88–9, 92–3, 102, 125, 156, 162 neo-Marxism 23, 29, 49, 77, 90, 119, 126, 151 new institutionalism 29–30, 32, 50 historical institutionalism 30–1, 43, 50 rational choice institutionalism 30, 38, 50

Index

sociological institutionalism 32, 37, 46–7, 50, 157; structuration theory 34, 36, 39, 157 Nice Treaty (2000) 59, 109 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 4–7, 14, 18, 25, 28, 53, 55–7, 64, 77–86, 130, 132–3, 137–8, 141–2, 144, 146, 150, 164–5 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 82 North Atlantic Council (NAC) 59 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 146 Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 41, 45 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 140 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 138, 141, 143–4, 149 Ottawa process 141 Passenger Name Record (PNR) data 122–3 Pleven Plan 7, 55 policing 5, 8, 24, 94, 100, 102, 104, 113–15, 119, 125, 130, 142, 162 Group Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT) 95 realism 49, 74, 151 neo-realism 15, 28, 49 regime theory 18–9, 25, 28, 30, 49, 92, 136, 145, 150 regionalization 20 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 70 Romania 127, 130–2, 141–2, 144 Russian Federation 15, 127, 146 Schengen acquis 112 Schengen Agreement 45, 100

193

Schengen Convention (1990) 98 security governance approach 22 security sector reform (SSR) 149 Serbia 137 see also under Former Yugoslav Republic Serbia-Montenegro 141, 143–4 Single European Act (SEA) (1986) 96, 99 Single Market 24, 101 Slovenia 127 small arms and light weapons (SALW) 141 socialization 22–3, 29, 32 South Eastern Europe Initiative (SEEI) 146 South-East European Co-operative Initiative (SECI) 131.2, 142 sovereignty 8–9, 11, 13–4, 16–7, 26, 40, 44, 55, 70, 76, 81, 88, 91, 111–12, 119, 123, 139, 147, 153–4, 162 Soviet Union 6, 15, 25, 99 Spain 56, 59, 113–14 strategic culture 17, 26–7, 48, 79, 128–9, 136, 139, 144, 149, 163 supranationalism 20–1, 49, 76, 88–9, 156 terrorism anti-terrorism 6, 95–6, 106, 110–11, 120, 123 counter-terrorism 104, 109, 120, 125 Euro-terrorism 94, 107 September 11, 2001 5, 13, 93, 112, 119–20, 122–3, 161–2 War on Terror 91, 93 The Alliance 4, 7, 16–7, 25–7, 55, 57, 79–81, 85, 154–5 see also North Atlantic Treaty Organization The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 44 The Netherlands 3, 95, 144

194

Index

transatlantic security relations 11–2, 23, 54–5, 77, 90, 93, 119, 127, 150–1, 153, 164 transnational networks 9–10 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) (1992) 4–5, 53, 58, 82–3, 101, 121, 124, 161 see also under Maastricht Treaty TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence) 94–8, 100–1, 103, 125 United Kingdom (UK) 56, 79–80, 87, 117, 133 see also under Britain

unipolar 15 United Nations (UN) 68–9, 71, 117, 120, 130, 144 Charter of the United Nations 71 UN Security Council 71 United States (US) 5–7, 12–8, 24–9, 94, 119–23, 126–7, 129–31, 146, 150–2, 154–5, 164–6 Western Balkans 127, 129, 132, 134, 138, 141–2, 146, 150, 152–3 Western European Union (WEU) 4–5, 53, 56–9, 79, 82–3, 130, 154, 165 World Bank 144, 147–8