School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses

SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZING GOVERNANCE

SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZING GOVERNANCE International Comparison of Grassroots Responses

Edited by

HOLGER DAUN

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN-10: 1-4020-4699-5 (HB) ISBN-13: 978-1-4020-4699-5 (HB) ISBN-10: 1-4020-4700-2 (e-book) ISBN-13: 978-1-4020-4700-8 (e-book)

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Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter 1 Globalization and the Governance of National Education Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The National State and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. National Policies in the Context of Globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. The New Mode of Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 5 6 7 8 17 20 21

Chapter 2 How Does Educational Decentralization Work and What Has it Achieved? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Reasons for and Forms of Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. State Governance and Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27 27 28 36 38 46 47

Chapter 3 The State Gives, the State Takes: Educational Restructuring in Norway . . . . . . . 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The Norwegian Welfare State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The Tradition of Education Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. The Package of Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Case Studies. Glimpses from Five Schools in Three Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55 55 56 57 59 61 66 71 73

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Chapter 4 Steps of Educational Decentralization in Greece: between Delegation and Deconcentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Greece and the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The Education System and Education Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Teacher and Parent Participation in Decision-Making: Two Case Schools . . . . . . . . . . 6. Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77 77 78 80 83 86 87 89

Chapter 5 School Autonomy in Nicaragua: Two Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 2. The Country Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 3. National Education System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4. Educational Decentralization in the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 5. Decentralization Reform in the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 6. Two Case Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Chapter 6 Decentralization in Senegal – Ambiguous Agendas for Community Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 3. Educational Decentralization in Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 4. Ambiguous Intentions of BCE Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 5. BCE in Diatafa – A Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 6. Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Chapter 7 Technocratic School Governance and South Africa’s Quest for Democratic Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 2. Using the Theories of Action Framework to Examine School Governance . . . . . . . . . 135 3. Theory of Action in School Governance Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 4. Theory-in-Use at the National Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 5. Theory-in-Use at the Provincial and District Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 6. School Actors’ Theories of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

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Chapter 8 Educational Decentralization in Mozambique: A Case Study in the Region of Nampula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 3. The Education System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 4. The Origins and Roles of the Zones of Pedagogical Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 5. Potential for Educational Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 6. The Case of the Nampula Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Chapter 9 Decentralization and Community Participation: School Clusters in Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 3. Cambodia Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 4. Educational Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 5. Evidence of Community Participation in Cluster Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 6. Defining Khmer Community and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Chapter 10 People’s Participation in School Governance? Realities of Educational Decentralization in Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 2. Nepal – the Country Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 3. Educational Decentralization in Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 4. The Workings of Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 5. Local Views of and Responses Concerning Participation in School Management . . . 206 6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Chapter 11 Educational Governance: Comparison of Some Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 2. World System, Globalization and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 3. The New Mode of Educational Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

List of Tables and Figure Table 1.1 Table 1.2

Core Elements of the World Model for Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Four Educational Frameworks Including Different Ideological Orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 8.1 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 10.1 Table 11.1

Varieties of School Site Councils or Boards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Decision, Administrative and Operational Levels in Basic Education . . . . . . . . 65 Administrative Levels of Educational Services in Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Mixed Model of Involvement in Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Access to Education, 1994 and 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Cambodia – Country Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Changes in Rural Cultural and Social Characteristics in Cambodia . . . . . . . . 190 Educational Agencies at the District and Village Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Some Indicators of Development for the Eight Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Figure 11.1 Approximations of the Degree of Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Appendixes Appendix 7.1

SASA and the Espoused Theory of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Appendix 7.2

Summary Description of Selected Schools/Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Appendix 9.1

Interviews and Group Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Appendix 11.1 Some Forces and Mechanisms of Governance and Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

viii

List of Abbreviations

AEA Adult Education (Mozambique) ASP Autonomy School Program (Nicaragua) BCE Community-based basic education (Senegal) BPEP Basic and Primary Education Program CC Commune Councils (Cambodia) CFPP Primary teacher Training Centre (Mozambique) CFR Regional Training Centre (Mozambique) CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CLEC School Community Council Link (Mozambique) CONFEMEN Conference des Ministres de l’Education Nationale (Conferences of Ministers of National Education) (Africa) CPP Cambodia People’s Party (Cambodia) DAEB Direction de l’Alphabetisation et de l’Éducation de Base (The Direction of Literacy and Basic Education) DDC District Development Committee (Nepal) DDC District Development Committee (Nepal) DEC District Education Committee (Nepal) DEO District Education Office (Cambodia) DEO District Education Office (Nepal) DEP DK Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) DOE District Education Office DOE Department of Education (South Africa) DOE Department of Education (South Africa) DOS/MCEO Skoledirektøren (Municipality education chief officer - Norway) EDO Education District Office (Mozambique) EDSU Education Department Support Unit (South Africa) ix

x EMDG EMIS EQIP ESP ESSP EU GNP GTZ RDP GTZ HDI HMG HPI IDEKE IEK ILO INE INEADE INGO KEE KR LSGA MBO MCE/MCS MCEBLN MCEO. MCER MoE NECC NGO NNSSF NPC NPM OECD OEDB OEEK OLME OSK

List of Abbreviations Education Management and Governance Development directorate Department of Education’s Management Information System Education Quality Improvement Programme (Cambodia) Education Strategic Plan (Cambodia) Education Sector Support Program (Cambodia) The European Union Gross National Production GTZ Rural Development Programme (Cambodia) Gesellschaft für Technische Zussammenarbeit (Cambodia) Human Development Index His Majesty’s Government of Nepal Human Poverty Index Institute for continuing adult education (Greece) Institute for vocational education (Greece) International Labour Organization National Institute of Statistics (Mozambique) Institut Nationale de l’Étude de d’Action pour le Developpement de l’Éducation, International Non-Governmental Organisation Centre for Educational Research (Greece) Khmer Rouge Local Self-Governance Act (Nepal) Management By Objectives Ministry of Church and Education/Ministry of Culture and Science (Norway) Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (Senegal) Municipality education chief officer - Norway Ministry of Church, Education and Research (Norway) Ministry of Education (respective country) National Education Crisis Committee (South Africa) Non-governmental Organisation National Norms and Standards for School Funding (South Africa) National Planning Commission (Nepal) New Public Management Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for the publication of school-textbooks Organization for vocational education The Greek Federation of State School Teachers Organization for School buildings

List of Abbreviations PaCC PAP PAPA PDEF PEO PRK PTA RGC SASA SGB SIDA SMC SMC SNC SOC UDEBA UNDP UNESCO UNICEF UNTAC USAID WB VDC VEC VEC ZIP

Pagoda Associations Coordination Committee(Cambodia) Priority Action Plan(Cambodia) Projet d’appui au Plan d’Action (Project of support to the action plan – Senegal) Plan Décénnal d’Éducation et du Formation (Ten year plan for development of education and training – Senegal) Provincial Education Office(Cambodia) People’s Republic of Kampuchea(Cambodia) Parents Teacher Association(Cambodia) Royal Government of Cambodia South African Schools Act School Governing Body (South Africa) Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency School Management Committee School Management Committee (Nepal) Supreme National Council(Cambodia) State of Cambodia Union for Basic Education Development (Mozambique) United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Culture Organization United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia United States Agency for International Development World Bank Village Development Committee (Nepal) Village Education Committee (Nepal) Village Education Committee (Nepal) Pedagogical Zones of Influence (Mozambique)

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Introduction Since the beginning of the 1980s, decentralization has become a globalized policy and catchword in education: a large number of countries around the world have formulated such a policy and many have also implemented it. The policies and the changes at the national level have been researched but what has taken place and is taking place at the grassroots level has not received attention until recently. This book presents “grassroots cases”from different countries against the background of the overall changes in governance philosophy and applications. It uses case studies from countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and describes what is occurring at this level. The book gives an account of different types of decentralization and their impact. The first two chapters describe principally structural and organizational educational changes in the broader context of globalized models and the pressure to create a competitive education system and changing governance. Decentralization is one of the strategic aspects of this new mode of governance. The subsequent chapters of the book analyze how the grassroots actors respond to decentralization programs. The countries in this book have been selected according to the following criteria: they have at least started to implement some type of decentralization suggested by influential international organizations, they represent different cultural, economic and political settings, and findings from field studies on the workings of decentralization at the school level have been available. Of course, findings from single case schools cannot be generalized to the whole education system of a country; rather, the findings should be seen as illustrations of what may happen to the centrally defined and implemented policies. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the administrative and organizational restructuring implied in the new mode of governance, while the subsequent chapters describe actions and processes as well. Chapter 1 gives an overview of the world wide economic, political, cultural and educational changes that have occurred since the beginning of the 1980s and presents the new type of educational governance. It describes the processes of globalization and gives some examples of how national states have responded to these processes. States have increasingly faced difficulties in financing and running mass education. One important feature of globalization is the spread of models, suggested by the most important international bodies such as OECD, Unesco, the 1 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 1– 4. © 2007 Springer.

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World Bank to be implemented governance.Thus, components of the world models (decentralization is one example) have been borrowed, imitated, imposed, and so on, when different countries have reformed the administration and management of their primary and secondary education systems. It has not been investigated why and how different governments adopt elements of the world model, but this is inferred from the similarities between the content of the reforms and the content of the world model. How all this takes shape in different types of educational decentralization and their outcomes are described in Chapter 2, on the basis of an extensive review of research and evaluation studies conducted in different parts of the world (Australia, New Zealand, the USA, China, Kyrgyz Republic, Czech Republic, Sweden, England, Mozambique, South Africa, Senegal, Nicaragua, Brazil – just to mention some examples). The different case countries and case schools within these countries are then presented in the subsequent chapters of the book. These case studies are attempts to show what happens at that level, when the elements of the world model are implemented. Focus is directed towards the outcomes in terms of local participation in school decision-making. It is evident that different ideological, cultural, economic and other forces are involved, and the encounter between the intended reforms and the local forces results in hybridization or glocalization. That is, the outcomes are often different from the stated intention and goals of the decentralization reforms. It seems that the larger the cultural and economic distance between the world models ideal and the local contexts, the more the results deviate from the normative expectations at central level. Educational decentralization in Norway is described in Chapter 3. The governance of the education system in this country has shifted due to the tension between the central and the local levels. The system was – in response to humanistic demands – decentralized to such an extent that OECD suggested the central state to take back some of its steering of education. During the 1990s, new arrangements were implemented, combining central steering and decentralization of the type common around the world. At the case schools, the opinions about decentralization are mixed, and parents do not have any real influence. Greece has been among the last countries in Europe to implement the decentralization policy, and this has been a response more to the requirements from international agencies and bodies (such as the European Union and OECD) than to pressures from within the country. Since the processes of decentralization only started in 1997, the description in Chapter 4 is based on rather fresh experiences among the country’s educational actors.The field study at school level indicates, for example, that parents play very different roles from one school to another. Like other countries in Latin America, Nicaragua (Chapter 5) has implemented educational decentralization. However, the Nicaraguan case is somewhat different from some other countries in that the program, called the “School Autonomy Program”, implies a transfer of decision-making over certain issues, mostly finance, to the school level. Parents and teachers are

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in most cases ambivalent to the decentralization reform; they are positive about the space left for local initiatives but negative about the costs that they now have to bear.Also, as far as the parents are concerned, their opportunities to participate are limited by their work loads. Senegal in West Africa inherited a centralized state and education system from the French colonialists. This system has to a large extent been preserved, but like several other countries in Africa, Senegal started to introduce a new type of schools – community schools – in the beginning of the 1990s. These schools were given considerable autonomy. The implementation of the community school reform was to a large extent left to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with regard to finance and running of the schools. The NGOs were also supposed to leave space for local participation. The outcomes have not yet been what was hoped for and the local population blames the central state, which used to take detailed responsibility for educational matters, while the state and NGO representatives blame the “illiterate” population. This is described in Chapter 6. There were great hopes when the racist government resigned and apartheid was abolished in South Africa in the beginning of the 1990s. Free elections followed and the biggest party (ANC) came into power. The whole education system was reformed in that a new curriculum was gradually introduced in schools, decentralization to regional and school levels was implemented and market forces (choice and school fees) were introduced. Although the racial barriers have been abolished, socio-economic inequalities between regions, districts and parents from different groups persist and make it difficult for schools to function in democratic ways. Also, policy makers often take for granted that policy practice is shaped by policy intention, and they tend to have a simplistic understanding of individuals’ motivations for participation or nonparticipation. From the central level and in the policy documents, local people are expected to react in specific – sometimes undemocratic – ways in relation to schools and schooling. Chapter 7 describes how the schools and local level people act in this context of new ideologies and old socio-economic structures. Mozambique in southeast Africa had, like Senegal very centralized state and education systems, first inherited from the Portuguese colonialists and then further centralised during the Socialist period (1975-1990). Due to the fact that the Ministry of Education was unable to supervise and support the schools and to resist pressures from international bodies, the country started to decentralise some decision-making to the regional, district and school levels. First some initiative was left to traditional chiefs (in bodies linking schools and local communities) and to Pedagogical Priority Zones (ZIPs), which are bodies for teacher cooperation and in-service training. From the mid-1990s, further steps towards decentralization have been taken in that some decision-making and finance has been delegated to regional and district bodies and to schools. Due to the low technological and economic level of the country and the insufficient competence among teachers and administrators, remote rural schools tend to be isolated and do not even have information about the latest decisions made by the central education ministry,

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and still less do they have the economic resources to run the schools according to the standards established centrally.The Mozambican decentralization reform is described in Chapter 8, using one region as a case. In Cambodia, decentralization has been implemented in a traditionally hierarchical context, where all important decisions have historically been made by the king and his followers. In local affairs, also the pagoda associations have played and still play an important role. Case studies conducted in a rural area with cluster schools and community participation projects show that the common people have very little influence on educational activities, apart from the economic contributions they make to the schools (Chapter 9). Nepal is similar to Cambodia in certain aspects; the caste structure has given people different life conditions and different opportunities for participation in decision-making. Decisionmaking has been decentralized to district offices and to some extent to schools, but the steering from central level via the district offices still conditions local participation and school processes. Case studies make evident how the hierarchical social structure and poverty makes it difficult for village people to be involved in local decision-making in school matters (Chapter 10). The last chapter (11) draws different threads together, presents some comparative aspects and makes a conclusion. It is evident that we have to analyze at least three different levels, layers or phases: the policy discourse (what is stated to be implemented), that which is actually implemented, and the actual outcomes. Despite the uniform global educational discourse and the spread of the world model (arguing for decentralization), the outcomes seem to vary due to national and local conditions.

Chapter One

Globalization and the Governance of National Education Systems

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1. Introduction After a century of centralization of state and education systems, an opposite world trend of decentralization started in the 1980s. This chapter takes a broad perspective and attempts to locate decentralization within the context of globalization, governance and ideologies that argue for a decentralized role for the state in education. Globalization has direct as well as indirect effects on education; the former is the borrowing from or imitation of the world model and the latter are the societal changes that the schools, teachers and students experience related to pressure from globalizing economic and cultural forces 1. Although an important component of the new type of governance (NG), decentralization alone is not sufficient to make such governance complete. Therefore, decentralization often makes part of a larger package of reforms (educational restructuring) including introduction or reinforcement of freedom of choice, privatization and sometimes centralization of goal formulation, curriculum, and assessment. All this makes monitoring and evaluation an increasingly important task of the central state.

1.

The idea and perception itself that globalization is taking place is an important factor, whose impact is difficult to estimate.

5 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 5–26. © 2007 Springer.

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The chapter argues that a new mode of governance (NG) has emerged as a way for the central state to respond to (i) multiple and sometimes contradictory demands and requirements, some of which result from global processes and others from the inherent difficulties for the central state to finance and run large-scale systems such as education; (ii) re-orientation in policy and research from structuralism and state centrism to agent-orientation and an economic view of man and the concomitant elite assumption that rationalization (enlightenment) in society is growing 2 ; and (iii) unprecedented education budget cuts. The chapter gives an overview of the role of the state during the past decades and presents some aspects of globalization which are assumed to have contributed to restructuring of national societies and the emergence of the new mode of governance.

2. Background An analysis of the NG requires a historical and broad perspective including economic, political and cultural changes. Generally, states became hierarchically constructed so as to meet the requirements of warfare and national defense of territory and to implement national economic policies (often Keynesian or Leninist inspired). Certain functions, activities and items, once being handled by the local communities, were taken over by the central state, while others resulted from innovations and inventions initiated and implemented by the state. Also, centralization has tended to accompany industrialization and urbanization. Thus, education had in some countries been an issue for religious interests or local communities but finally became a responsibility of the central state. In the South, colonial patterns of state and education systems were inherited but also non-colonized countries, such as Afghanistan and Iran, constructed similar systems. As a result, in practically all countries in the world, education has – at least during the past five or six decades – been an issue for the state (central or regional levels). Therefore, attention will be given to the changing relationships between the world system, the national state, the national society and education.

2.

To place this in a historical perspective: until approximately a century ago, most of the people in today’s high income countries were seen by elites as not enlightened enough to vote in general elections.Today, people are seen as enlightened enough to be allowed to make choices in different situations.

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3. The National State and Society

3.1 The State Using a rather broad definition of the state, it includes all bodies that are funded mainly from public sources (Dale, 1989), and is the only actor legitimized by the international community to use coercion and violence (within its territory). Thus, elected as well as decision-making and executive bodies (from the national down to the local level) form part of the state to the extent that they are publicly financed and are in charge of a specific territory and its population This means that there might be contradictions and tensions within the state – between different levels as well as between bodies performing different functions. The fundamental task of the modern state has been to guarantee the principle of exchange relationships on markets; to make people willing and able to enter such relationships and to function efficiently as producers, consumers and citizens; and to provide opportunities of well-being (Habermas, 1976; Offe, 1984, 1996). School education has generally been seen as the most important means for the generation of cultural motivation and attaining well-being. At least two features are highly relevant in relation to issues of governance: the political culture, and the type of state. Culture is constructing shared world views, visions and meaning systems, and the political culture defines, for example, what is the appropriate role for the state in society, the extent to which state interventions are seen as legitimate and common people are expected to participate in public decision-making (Almond & Verba, 1965; Inglehart, 1997). For instance, state interventions and state initiatives are more legitimate in several European countries than in the USA. The legitimacy and preparedness of the grassroots initiative and participation, and local interventions in school affairs may be more or less expected and accepted. For example, in parts of Eastern Nigeria there is a culture supporting local involvement (Kemmerer, 1994), while “Mongolia ... has almost no comparable tradition”(Bray, 1997, p. 197). Also, cultures vary in their degree of individual orientation and collective orientation 3.

3.

Shweder and LeVine (1984) make a distinction between socio-centric cultures and egocentric cultures. In the former cultures the individual is not autonomous but is regulated by strict rules set by the clan, the kinship group, and so on. In the latter cultures, the individual is an autonomous, abstract entity existing free of society but at the same time living in a society.

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3.2 State and National Society In order to fulfil its tasks, the state has to arrange certain relationships with its surrounding society, and to coordinate relations and activities in society. Traditionally, the following principal modes of state intervention have been employed: (i) regulation; (ii) economic measures, and (iii) ideological measures. Regulation means to establish pro-actively and more or less in detail the frame of action for different bodies and actors. It has often been used for the sake of equality and equalization. However, the use of regulation is likely to be costly and to affect state legitimacy because it tends to be characterized by standardization and insensitivity to multi-cultural values and different life styles. It might also provoke resistance and produce its own problems that in their turn require new solutions (Offe, 1984). The second mode, economic measures, includes state allocation of subsidies and services as well as extraction of resources. In addition to the modes mentioned, ideological measures have been used, and within the educational domain, they include the definition and selection of knowledge to be handled in schools through the curriculum, syllabi, teacher guidelines, etc. (Lundgren, 1990). Some of the modes of intervention overlap or combine when applied in practical policy.All measures of intervention require a certain capability of the central state. Where this capability has been weak, like in many low income countries, coercion and force or laissez-faire/neglect have been alternatives. Globalization has in different ways changed the conditions for the traditional modes of state intervention and, therefore, some of the key features in globalization and the resulting restructuring of national policies will be described in the next section.

4. National Policies in the Context of Globalization

4.1 World System and Globalization Two sets of theories deal with the phenomena discussed here: (a) world system theories, and (b) globalization theories. The world system (WS) is the structure and relationships between different interdependent components (nations, companies, organizations, etc.), while globalization is the processes and flows that take place between the components of the WS.When the links between these components become more extensive and form chains, networks, exchanges and transactions, these processes may be seen as globalization (Henderson, 1996)4. This 4.

This does not necessarily imply a teleological and deterministic view of the ‘hyper-globalist’ type, according to which globalization is something unavoidable and, maybe, desirable.

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system is predominantly capitalistic; people are encouraged or compelled to enter into commodified, monetized and priced exchanges as producers and consumers and to become competitive. In the capitalist system there are “balanced” and “differentiated” markets as well as oligopolistic sections and informal sectors (Hoerner, 1995; Offe, 1996). Contradictory and complementary processes of competition and marginalization take place; more countries than ever before are affected by or involved in global economic processes. The frame of action of countries – even those situated “outside” the most intensive flows – are conditioned by their position in the world system. Some countries have been able to conquer space in the global market, while others have been more or less “driven”into marginal positions (Griffith-Jones and Campo, 1999). The type of world system theory proposed by the institutionalists (Meyer & Kamens, 1992; Meyer et al. 1987; Meyer et al. 1997) assumes the existence of a world polity, which is not a physical body or institution but a complex of cultural expectations. This theory also assumes that national decision-makers have the ambition or feel compelled to form modern states that fulfill the requirements of the world polity. It is useful for understanding some aspects of the extensive spread of the NG, but it does not say very much about economic processes and therefore has to be combined with approaches dealing with economic structures and processes and the drive for profit and competitiveness (Dale, 2000). As to globalization, a distinction may be made between: (i) general processes of globalization, and (ii) spread of world models (Meyer et al. 1997).As far as globalization is concerned, there is a growing global interdependency between nations, companies, organizations, individuals, and so on. High technology activities, growth and richness are concentrated in a geographical zone including East and Southeast Asia, Western Europe, parts of Latin America and the USA. Financial transactions have become relatively independent from investments and payment of goods and services exchanged in external trade (Bretherton, 1996), a factor that has “governance consequences”, for example, the flow of finance capital may force governments in smaller countries to change their economic policy. Sectors and branches of economies are being restructured due to the competition on the global market. Economic globalization results in economic growth in some countries or places but also marginalization of other countries and increasing gaps between the North and the South (Griffin, 2003; Lipumba, 2003). Poverty, risk and uncertainty are accumulating in the economically poorest countries (Cox, 2000). The sector of the economy mostly involved in global processes consists of companies that increasingly restructure themselves and demand a flexible labour force (Waters, 1995), but for large sections of the economies, the organization of production and work is not very different from before and their nature varies from one country to another (Carnoy, 1999; Lorenz, Lundvall and Valeyre, 2004).

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While some global processes result from state, company and NGO activities, other processes are driven by large-scale economic actors, such as Transnational Companies and International Governmental Organizations (OECD, Unesco, the World Bank, etc.) and tend to take place rather independently from single country actions and frontiers (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Sklair, 1995). Politically, globalization causes restructuring of the relationships between the national state, companies and international governmental and non-governmental organizations (the “myriad of international institutions ... interact to produce global governance” (Zürn, 2003, p. 341), but also between different levels within a society. Globalization changes the conditions for the functions of the state and its mode of governance. The state now has to handle multiple and sometimes contradictory demands and requirements: the consequences of economic restructuring (e.g. unemployment), increasing complexity and specialization and, at the same time, increasing networking in society and across societies. There is a growing pressure on the state to struggle not only for peoples’ entrance into exchange on markets but also for their will and capacity to become competitive. As a result, states are restructuring themselves but not necessarily shrinking themselves, “the new public management increases some dimensions of central control through budgetary constraints, accounting procedures, and forms of inspection”(Pierre, 2000, p. 20).They establish “policy and funding mechanisms designed at the centre to steer from a distance more autonomous local units” (Blackmore, 2000, p. 134). Factors indicating this are the fact that many states do not spend a lower percentage of their GDP than they did some decades ago (Pierre, 2000, p. 1) but spend less on social welfare as a percentage of GDP (Gilbert, 2004, p. 3). The state attempts to delegate responsibility, uncertainty, risk, funding and accountability to lower levels of society and to private actors. In addition, resources are transferred towards supervising and monitoring functions. Culturally, globalization causes or encompasses standardization and homogenization as well as particularization and heterogenization; secularization as well as de-secularization and revitalization of moral and religious values (Berger, 1999; Norris & Inglehart 2004). The “universalized” aspects of cultures challenge and question local cultures and taken-for-granted aspects, and traditions and religious beliefs are being problematized (Giddens, 1994). Also, culturally, economic imperatives tend to dominate over all others (Saul, 1997). The fact that some countries have started to give more attention to morals and values education in the schools may be interpreted as a response to this (see, for instance, Cummings et al. 1988; Taylor, 1994). The dissemination of world models and “universal cultural aspects” sometimes provokes exaggeration of local ideas and values (cultural particularism). Globalization implies the dissemination of ideas – in particular world models – on the globe as well as dissemination of the perception that different parts of the globe are interconnected. The strongest globalizing forces include the market idea and the spread of a standardized consumer culture. Thus, globalization processes are mainly driven by market forces, which have

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become the most extensive and penetrative forces of governance (Cox, 2000), and have spread to most areas of life, among them education.The “market order”on a global scale is country-wise mediated by national and local history, politics, economies and cultures. For the single nation state, globalization makes governance more complex. The two types of world systems, the economic and the “culturalist/institutionalist”, have somewhat different views on education. The world systems theory formulated by the institutionalists assumes that states structure themselves (including education systems) due to the cultural pressure from the IGOs (proposing the world models). The economic world systems approach argues that education is restructured according to the requirements and demands of the economy (to make people and countries competitive, for example) (Dale, 2000).

4.2 World Models The world polity may be seen to include world models (one for education, for instance). World models consist of “cognitive and ontological models of reality that specify the nature, purposes, technology, sovereignty, control, and resources of nation-states and other actors” (Meyer et al., 1997, p. 144), and they may be seen as “stored” in policy documents in and disseminated from international organizations and national governments of the biggest countries (Dale, 2000; Gill, 2000). The world polity takes for granted or prescribes the existence of a state of the modern type in charge of a certain territory and implementing modern institutions and cultures. The world models inform policy-makers and researchers about the desirable and appropriate educational policies, and prescribe the role of education, research, and so on (Meyer et al. 1997). Also, they signal, among other things, education as an instrument in the struggle for economic competitiveness but also educational efficiency, decentralization, school-based management, privatization, choice, what outcomes to be measured, and indicators of outcomes (Wiseman & Baker, 2005). The elements of the world models are combined in different ways across countries, but most of these combinations make part of the NG. The world polity is a symbolic and discursive entity, but there is no physical or other body that performs the functions of a state – the distribution of collective goods and efforts to implement policies of equalization for example – at the international or world systems level. Griffin (2003) argues that “We have a global economy but not a global polity and hence our ability to “‘govern the market’ and ourselves is weakened” (p. 789). Availability of and enrollment in education at the primary and secondary levels have been globalized, and schooling is assumed to have a large number of effects beneficial to both the individual and society regardless of time and space (Chabbot & Ramirez, 2000; Hannum & Buchmann, 2003). However, its effects and outcomes have been shown to be contingent on national political, economic and cultural characteristics (Pritchett, 2001) and on “a nation’s

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position in the global trade system” (Hannum & Buchmann, 2003, p. 22). Like the state in general, the education system is to a large extent under cross-pressure between local forces, on the one hand, and the globalizing and internationalizing forces, on the other hand. Around the world, education systems experience one or several of the following contradictory pressures: a unitarian vs. diversified system; religious-moral vs. secular curriculum components; local vs. national or international curriculum components; education as an individual good vs. education as a common good; and competition and elitism vs. solidarity and cooperation; focus on tests and performance vs. more holistic considerations; and mother tongue vs. international language(s) (Daun, 2002) (For core elements in the educational world model, see Table 1.1). Although certain relationships between institutional arrangements and economic growth are assumed to exist, there is not always correspondence between these two types of factors. For example,Africa as a continent has low levels of “connectivity in key areas that drive globalization” (finance, production, trade, etc) but at the same time, it has high levels of connectivity in politics Table 1.1 Core Elements of the World Model for Education Consensus perspective. Education contributes to development, economic growth, democracy, rational human beings. Socialization as lifelong learning monitored and assessed by the state. Education system: Extension of compulsory education. Extended pre-school attendance; “pedagogized” methods in pre-school learning contexts. Seven to nine years compulsory. At least secondary education is preferable. Aims, goals: Education for all. Quality education. Effectiveness and efficiency – rational production of multi-skilled, multi-competent and competitive people. Curriculum: A national core curriculum; other parts flexible and adapted to local conditions. Education for global competitiveness, equality, empower-ment, democracy, human rights and citizenship. Gender equality. Values education. Scientific and technological subjects. Environmental education. Sexual education. Mother tongue instruction; English as the second language. Financing: Basic subsidies from the central state but a considerable share from local and medium levels. Private. Organization: National skeleton, national framework. Decentralized bodies for decision-making within this framework. School-based management. Local participation – community participation. Regulation, control: Surveillance and retro-active assessment by the state; choice exerted by parents and pupils. Use of standardized examination and centralized evaluation procedures. Reporting from below. Outcomes-based education. Ownership: Public local. Private. NGOs. Assessment, Measurable (quantitative items). monitoring: View of the role of education:

The content of the table is based on information collected from a large number of policy documents.

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and policy-making (Bangura, 2001, p. 33). That is, the continent has implemented the institutions and modes of policy-making suggested and expected by the international agencies, while it has become marginalized from the global economic flows. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the world models include parts of and carry combinations of contradictory as well as complementary or overlapping ideas such as the market orientation (the autonomous individual as a rational chooser, consumer and utility-maximizing being) and the modern communitarian orientation (the individual as an autonomous but altruistic and solidaristic being).These and some other ideological orientations are described in the next section.

4.3 Ideological Orientations Various forces conditioning the outcome have to be considered, one set of which are philosophical or ideological orientations. They are implied in education decisions and activities, from macro restructuring via formation of local boards/school boards to classroom processes. Thomas (1994) uses two dimensions in his analysis of educational decision-making: (a) locus of intent and (b) locus of decision-making. The former dimension has two categories which are “Self ” (egoism) and “Other” (altruism), and the latter deals with the locus of decision-making which may be centralized or decentralized. When these two dimensions are combined, the result is four ideal types of decision-making: (i) Communal (self/centralism); (ii) Collective (altruism/ centralism); (iii) Market (egoism/decentralism); and (iv) College (altruism/decentralism). The communal type implies that actors make decisions centrally in order to improve their own situation, while in the collective type, decisions are made centrally for the common good. In the market, individuals make decisions for themselves in order to improve or maximize their own utility. College – the fourth type – means that decisions are made at a decentralized level for the collective good at that level. This type corresponds to the decision-making in local communities and non-profit associations. In a similar way, Cooper (1993) analyzes four “policy frameworks”(see Table 1.2). The ideas and driving forces described in this table form part of the NG, and when synthesizing them, we find at least five ideal types of ideological orientations behind educational arrangements (among them decentralization): (a) market, (b) étatist-welfarist, (c) professional-managerial, (d) professional-pedagogical, and (e) communitarian/humanistic orientations (Crowley, 1987; Etzioni, 1995; MacRae, 1969; Miller, 1989; Watt, 1994). a) Market orientation: The basic idea is that human beings are utility-maximizing creatures and act accordingly – regardless of time and place (Gill, 2000). The education system is seen as a market and education as a private (individual) good. Market forces are assumed to improve efficiency, effectiveness and quality of education by adapting supply to the preferences and demands of the parents (Chubb & Moe, 1988; Crowley, 1987). Politicians or professionals

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Table 1.2 Four Educational Frameworks Including Different Ideological Orientations Concept

Arena

Educational examples

Public choice theory. Consumer – producer relationship. Consumer choice. Exit options. Constituent choice theory. Voter choice. Governmental processes. Voice options.

Markets

Vouchers, magnet schools, open enrollment, relocation.

Elections

Local school councils. Community school districts.

Organizational choice and autonomy. Decentralization, loose coupling. Devolution of authority. Theories of organizational design.

School site

Local management, shared decision-making, school site goal setting, local governance of schools.

Professional choice and autonomy. Colleagueship, expert knowledge.

School and professional groups

Teacher leadership, empowerment, reconfigurating schools as places for professional control, practices, career ladders, national advanced teacher certification and rewards.

Based on Cooper (1993).

can never have the knowledge necessary to satisfy the educational desires and needs of the consumers of education (Welsh & McGinn, 1999. pp. 42-43).The individual himself or herself is “responsible for the presentation, reproduction, and reconstruction of one’s own human capital” (Gordon, 1991, p. 44). Privatization is the highest degree of decentralization. The market orientation is an important feature of the NG deriving from the world models. (b) Étatist-welfarist orientation: The pursuit of the common good at the national level may – according to the adherents to this orientation – be seen as one of the principal reasons for the existence of the state and political activities. The more issues are placed for decision-making in the political arena, the higher the degree of democracy (Dow, 1993; Miller, 1989). Therefore, the state/public sector should be used for the common good (such as education). Entitlement is a key concept, associated with basic needs and equality. Education tends to be placed in a larger welfare context (either as a welfare item itself, as a means to attain welfare or both). If decentralization is to take place, this should be done through public sector measures, and choice should be limited to schools in the public sector.The étatist-welfarist orientation does not have any high priority in the world models, although the state is seen to have an important role in guaranteeing education for all individuals. (c) Professional-managerial orientation: There are different definitions of “management” but they share the view that it is about defining the goals of the organization and leading it to

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its goals (Bush, 1995). “The principal designs contracts and incentives so that “teachers and administrators” will be motivated to act in the interest of the principal” (Hannaway and Woodroffe, 2003, p. 3). In this orientation, “other organizational participants (teachers, for instance) are generally viewed as essentially passive recipients of the leader’s vision” (Welsh & McGinn, 1999, p. 37), and the leader should make the participants or members of the organisation adopt his or her vision. School effectiveness research has to a large extent informed this orientation (Angus, 1994; Jansen, 1995), and since the definitions of organizational effectiveness and management have been borrowed from the economic field, this orientation easily combines with the market orientation (Caldwell, 1993; Ozga, 2000). The proponents of the professionalmanagerial orientation see professionalization in such terms (Gurr, 1999), and argue that if school leaders and teachers are liberated from bureaucracy and political interventions, they will be able to make schools improve (Chubb & Moe, 1990). One important purpose of decentralization is, according to this orientation, school autonomy for the reinforcement of the school manager’s power. (d) Professional-pedagogical orientation: This orientation is similar to the professionalmanagerial but focuses on pedagogical (teaching) professionalism. From the extreme professional perspective others (laymen, common people, politicians) should not have any strong influence on the organization of schools and what takes place within them; professionals know best what to do and how to do it in order to attain the goals of their institution (Bush, 1995; Chubb & Moe, 1990). If parents are to be involved, their participation should instrumentally serve the activities of the professionals.Thus, decentralization is principally for creating space for teacher innovations and for teacher empowerment. Both professional orientations form part of the world models. (e) Communitarian/humanistic orientation: Different ideas (from philosophical to practical ones) are embedded in this orientation. For instance, the de-institutionalist (deschooling) and postmodern perspectives are part of or underpin this orientation (Illich, 1971; Usher & Edwards, 1994). The individual is seen as driven by another kind of rationality than the selfish utility maximizing being (Reay and Ball, 1997), and the driving forces are to a large extent idealism and altruism (Doyal and Gough, 1991). Communitarians reject large-scale capitalist or state arrangements (Etzioni, 1995), and they see participation in organizational and political life not only as instrumental for achievement of other purposes but also as a value in itself (Held, 1995; Piven & Cloward, 1995). Basically, a distinction can be made between traditional and modern communitarianism (Barber, 1996; Flacks, 1995). The former is linked to the traditional local community based on residence, kinship, religion or all of them (Wesolowski, 1995)5.The common good applies to the 5.

The traditional communitarianism is sometimes called “populism” or has many features in common with populism, see, for instance, Lauglo, 1995, and MacRae, 1969.

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local community, the clan, the association, or some other unit, intermediary between the central state and the individual (MacRae, 1969). The latter sees society as “atomized”, the individual as autonomous and community as based on some type of “sameness” among the “community members” (Offe, 1996). In the latter case, community does not necessarily imply a geographical area or local group but could quite well consist of cultural minorities or adherents to the same alternative pedagogy, such as Waldorf, scattered around the world. The key role given to NGOs and civil society involvement in the world models corresponds to the modern communitarian orientation, while important elements of the traditional orientation are not included, but rather rejected. Each orientation has its core values, basic assumptions and logics of action. The forces and orientations work at all levels – national, regional, local and school level. They are condensed and articulated in the schools, school boards/councils and classroom – “school site councils are micro political contexts” (Beare, 1993, p. 216). The proportions of adherents to the different orientations and their relative power may differ between countries but also between geographical areas, socioeconomic or cultural groups within one and the same country. Some features of the different orientations are compatible with each other, while other features are contradictory. An example of a contradictory combination at the macro level is China, where an étatist orientation is combined with a market orientation (Hawkins, 2000). At the school level, principals and teachers often act on the basis of combinations of orientations “bridging the educational imperatives, market forces, political hegemony, and managerial complexity” (Robertson, 1998, p. 359). Market relationships (parents seen as consumers) are, according to Angus (1994, p. 18), hostile to reciprocal community relations. Education as a private (individual) good in the market orientation is not compatible with the view of the individual as an organic element of the clan, kinship group, etc (the traditional communitarian orientation). Several researchers find a contradiction between, on the one hand, participation and democratization, and, on the other hand, managerial leadership. Demands for a strong manager (expertise, power) in school may contradict demands for democracy of the participatory type. Also, focus on performance and efficiency in a narrow sense may be incompatible with demands for broad personality development and moral training of pupils (Ball, 1993; Codd, 1994; Cooper, 1993; Grace, 1997; Harold, 1998; Lewis, 1993; Robertson, 1998; Slater, 1993). Underlying most of the orientations there is a linear view of change and development: what is decided and intended at the central level is assumed to be intended and occur at the local level (Hammouda, 1997; Naidoo, 2005). Structural changes, cultural and ideological forces, global, national and local, all contribute to or make part of the new mode of governance.

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5. The New Mode of Governance

5.1 Generally We have seen how the requirements on as well as the conditions for states’ steering of society have changed. In the context of globalization, the market forces, and market ideals are reaching most places on the globe, and to a large extent provide the foundation on which institutions are dependent and life is organized (Cox, 2000; Gill, 2000; Story, 2000). The state deliberately leaves governance to market and idealistic forces, or is compelled to do so. “Governance” is now employed by policy-makers as a concept denoting the diversity of steering instruments and by researchers as a concept for analysis of different types of steering forces and mechanisms. As a research tool, the governance approach focuses not only on what is taking place vertically between the central state and local bodies and actors but also on horizontal interactions between various social systems at the same level (Kooiman, 2000). Generally, the mode of governance has shifted from proactive steering (regulation) to retroactive monitoring, and evaluation, information, persuasion, self-regulation, and efforts to influence the public discourse. A commonly used strategy during the past two decades – not least in the educational domain – has been to de-regulate, to contract-out activities and functions, to shift finance from central to the local level, from the state to the economic and civil spheres, from earmarked subsidies to performance-based and outcomes-based (per student) subsidies, and to use performance indicators. Gilbert (2004, p. 16) develops the concept of “the enabling state”, which means that the state provides support but the individual himself or herself is responsible for getting the welfare items. This argument applies also to education. According to Foucault (1991), governance is a broad concept; it is “conduct of conduct” and may vary from conducting oneself to conduction of political sovereignty, and in his words, “one speaks of ‘governing’ a household, souls, children” (p. 90). Also, in his view, too much attention has been directed towards institutions and too little towards practices (Gordon, 1991). Several other researchers are now using a broader definition: For Zürn (2003) governance “refers to purposive systems of norms and rules...”. Duffield (2002, p. 116) sees governance as “a way of ordering the relationships between people and things”. Dubet (2002) discusses the “decline of institutions” (meaning decline of cores of normative regulation) and the de-linking of national society from the national state. For the state, to govern is “to ensure at the different levels within this division of labour (between different spheres and actors in society) an effective presence of a democratic voice – so that the actions of a body at one level do not systematically negate decisions at another” (Pierre, 2000, p. 25). Hirst (2000, p. 24) argues that political

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governance is “the means by which an activity or ensemble of activities is controlled or directed, such that it delivers an acceptable range of outcomes according to some established social standard”. Governance may thus be seen as the ways in which the relationships between the state, the economy and the civil sphere are structured and monitored, and it now more than ever before implies global, national and local levels. The state leaves – either deliberately or due to pressure from globalization forces – market and civil forces to implement, administer and control educational issues. In many cases, at least in the South, NGOs and INGOs are forming new elites that de facto function as decision-makers or expertise in educational matters (Koimann, 2000; McGinn, 1997). Actions and decisions have different scopes and depths, and, consequently, it makes a difference at what level decisions are made and actions taken, and what scope and depth decisions have. Kooiman (2000, p.154) discusses three levels of governing: first-order, secondorder and meta-order.The relative force of the different ideological orientations and cultural and economic factors may differ from one level to another. First-order governance involves problemsolving in everyday life activities and is to a large extent about practical and pragmatic reason. Second-order governing consists of attempts to influence the conditions under which first-order problem-solving or decision-making takes place. It is the level involving managing, steering and guiding. It may also be assumed to be the level where steering processes in individual schools are most intense. Meta-order is about “who or what governs ultimately the governor” (ibid.), and includes ontological and epistemological assumptions6 . Historically, God and religion have dominated the meta-order and they still do in some Muslim countries. Thus, today the meta-order as it appears in the world models is a hybrid of market ideals, communitarian ideals and étatism. As far as decentralization is concerned, it is from the metaorder that decisions emanate concerning ways of implementation, rules for decision-making at lower levels, and ways of conducting monitoring and assessment. Barroso (2004) summarizes in the following way the principal features of what here is called NG: An increase in transnational regulation (i.e. regulation across countries); a hybridization of national regulation (i.e. mix of market and other forces and mechanisms); and fragmentation of local regulation. The state is thereby confronted with two principal challenges: To manage “multi-regulation” and to assure meta-regulation (p. 3). The first mentioned implies coordination of various steering mechanisms and forces, and the latter steering at the meta-level.

6.

‘Framework decisions’ used by Welsh & McGinn (1997, p. 17) are situated at Kooiman’s second-order level, while world models deal with meta and second-order levels.

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5.2 The State and the New Governance Thus, the NG principally includes a) ideological orientations and ideological means of governance; b) economic “per unit” funding; and c) control of knowledge production. At least in the technologically advanced countries, the state employs ideological measures more than previously. In addition to the classical tools, such as curricula, syllabi, etc. a differentiation and sophistication of the ideological intervention is taking place: scienticization, information, persuasion and self-regulation, efforts to influence the public discourse, and retroactive monitoring with the aid of evaluations and commissioned research. This, on the other hand, requires more information and more effective flows of communication than ever before (Neocleous, 1996; Offe, 1984). Economically, a common strategy in education during the past two decades has been to shift funding from the central to the local level and from the state to the economic and civil spheres and to link this to the metaphor of “ownership”. Also, subsidies are more and more distributed in accordance with performance-based criteria, and schools are supposed to compete for pupils, as they are funded on a per pupil basis.Through this type of governance, individuals and organizations such as schools can be governed at a distance, and risk and “wastage” delegated from the central to lower levels. What counts nationally and internationally as knowledge in the domain of education is increasingly determined from the central level (centralization), while curriculum details and funding are local issues (decentralization). Consequently, there has been a general tendency to link knowledge production and distribution (curriculum) and the measurement of the outcomes (evaluation, assessment and monitoring) more firmly to the central state, while other aspects have been de-linked and left to types and forces of governance other than those deriving from the state sphere. In most cases, the framework for participation established at the central level conditions for the way governance and participation occur at the local level. Several of the chapters in this book illustrate this. A combination of loose coupling in some aspects and strong coupling in others may, in fact, bind schools stronger to the central level and make them less autonomous in certain regards (Angus, 1994; Gurr, 1999). Involved in the NG and conditioning the outcomes are also national and local forces, such as local level, particularistic and de-secularizing forces (Berger, 1999). In addition to this, initiatives from grassroots level has increased the need for flexibility. Demand for home education (which can be seen as the ultimate combination of decentralization and privatization) in the OECD countries seems to be one indicator of initiative from below (Vynnycky, 2004). The NG requires a sophisticated and ICT-based communication network for rapid information flows horizontally and vertically in society, which does not exist in many low income countries. Governments in such countries tend to have a weak ability to shift governance to new forms requiring intense production and flows of information and, therefore, to maintain

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the traditional ways of intervention and steering. This has been a salient feature in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example (Naidoo, 2005). Due to the fact that decision-making has been moved to lower levels, and market mechanisms and freedom of choice have been introduced, allowing other forces (than the state) to affect the processes, we may apply the broader concept of governance. Thus ‘governance’ in education involves a range of actions, from the deliberately control-oriented to forces that condition outcomes more indirectly. The components of the NG are here divided into steering mechanisms (which are deliberate mechanisms or instruments) and steering forces. Deliberate steering mechanisms are: (a) national curriculum (b) accountability requirements (including reporting of student achievement, economic accounts, etc. from lower to higher levels or to boards/councils at the local level), self-evaluation/self-assessment; (c) local arrangements for “site involvement”/participation and decision-making; and (d) market mechanisms (choice possibilities, vouchers, tax reduction, etc.). Steering forces are: Scope of decentralization program (general for all sectors or specific to education); Constitutional status of decentralization (from simple delegation or de-concentration to devolution protected in the Constitution); Socioeconomic and cultural context (economic level, political culture, cultural heterogeneityhomogeneity, etc.); Ideological orientations in society; Gender. The components of governance combine in different ways and at different levels. The steering forces and mechanisms will be described more in detail in Chapter Two.

6. Conclusion After centuries of centralization, the state has experienced (i) problems of coordination; (ii) economic deficits or scarcity; (iii) overload; and (iv) an assumed increasing level of enlightenment among the population. At least the two first features are to a large extent due to globalization processes.The NG, of which decentralization is an important component, may be seen as a way of handling these pressures. Globalization itself does not require or cause decentralization but the discourse on the world models carries a mixture of elements from the market orientation and the communitarian orientation in which decentralization is explicitly pointed out. As part of the NG, decentralization may be seen as an attempt to respond to all the above-mentioned requirements but also as a way to out-contract or relocate “wastage”, uncertainty, risk and finance to local levels in society. There are many types of decentralization but few of them actually relax control from the central level. Instead, actors at the local level have to follow strict parameters established centrally. This is often combined with economic measures which punish or reward local communities or schools in accordance with their performance in relation to the standards expected by higher administrative or political levels. Thus, the changing governance may

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require the central state to coordinate and collect information about and monitor the performance among the decentralized bodies. The final “point”in all the interactions and processes is the single school.The cases in chapters 3–10 describe the organizing and outcomes at the local level. Before that, Chapter 2 deals more in detail with decentralization in the context of other components of the NG included in the world models.

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change). In C. Beck & M. Straume (eds.). Hjemmeundervisning – starten på en ny utdanningsrevolusjon? (pp. 67-92). Vallset: Oplandske Bokforlag. Watt, J. (1994). Political Philosophy of Education. In N. Postlethwaite & T. Husén (Eds). International Encyclopedia of Education, (pp. 4571-4575). Oxford: Pergamon. Welsh, T. & McGinn, N. F. (1999). Decentralization of education: why, when, what and how? Paris: IIEP/Unesco. Wesolowski, W. (1995). The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: Poland After Solidarity. In J. A. Hall (ed.). Civil Society. Theory, History, Comparison, (pp. 110-134). Cambridge: Polity Press. Wiseman, A. W. & Baker, D. P. (2005). The Worldwide Explosition of Internationalized Education Policy. In D. P. Baker & A. W. Wiseman (eds.). Global Trends in Educational Policy. Vol 6: International Perspectives on Education and Society, (pp. 1-22). New York: Elsevier.

Zürn, M. (2003). Globalization and Global Governance: from social to political denationalization. European Review, 11(3): 341-364.

Chapter Two

How Does Educational Decentralization Work and What Has it Achieved?

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1. Introduction Decentralization of provision and finance and centralized control of the content of education has been one of the most common policies since the 1980s. This type of reform can be initiated from above – as in most cases – or from below. Often crucial issues of decision-making have tended to remain at the top. Behind all approaches to decentralization from above, there is a rational, linear and deterministic view; people are assumed to behave rationally in relation to the parameters established by the central state, by market forces or both (Esteva and Prakash, 1998; Hammouda, 1997), but as described in chapter one, different rationalities are in force, not least at the local level. Therefore there is often ambiguity in decentralization processes with regard to responsibility, mandate, and authority. The outcomes are thus heavily conditioned by the local contexts and forces. In the countries where some degree of decentralization already existed (e. g. countries having a federative or other type of “semi-decentralized” political structure, such as Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the US) centralization of certain aspects (mainly curriculum, monitoring and assessment) have been implemented. Re-centralization after a period of decentralization has occurred when decentralization has made an already critical situation still worse. Such examples may be found in, for instance, China and in some areas in Latin America (Arnove et al. 1999; Hanson, 1995; Tsang, 2003). 27 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 27–54. © 2007 Springer.

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This chapter presents reasons for and goals of decentralization and different approaches to relocating decision-making or issues to lower levels and summarizes findings concerning workings and outcomes of decentralization, especially in terms of local participation1. When it comes to research on decentralization, Siddique (1997) makes a distinction between normative theories and descriptive-analytical theories. The former theories more or less take for granted not only that decentralization has a value in itself but also that it leads to improvement of educational processes and quality. According to the latter type of theories, the function and outcomes of decentralization are matters to be empirically studied.

2. Reasons for and Forms of Decentralization

2.1 Goals, Reasons and Causes Decentralization was implemented in a few countries before the 1980s, principally for political reasons (e.g. Tanzania). Why did decentralization then become something of a panacea? Reasons and causes generally found by researchers, and goals, aims or purposes stated by policymakers are, among others: (i) economic decline generally and/or inability of governments to finance the education system, high or increasing educational costs; (ii) cultural factors (iii) weakening legitimacy of the state/public sector; (iv) state overload; (v) declining performance of the education system; and (vi) global and international pressure. Economic decline: States have less resources than before, due first to the economic recession in the 1970s and 1980s and then to liberalizations and competition, and therefore try make education systems more cost effective and efficient (Hawkins, 2000; ILO, 1996). Also, in the South, decentralization has often been part of or corollary to structural adjustment programs, and subsequent shrinking of the public sector (Reimers & Tiburcio, 1993). Inability of governments to finance the education system’s/high or increasing educational costs (ILO, 1996), and declining performance of the education system have been other explanations (Henig, 1993).

1.

Scattered findings from evaluation, assessment and research studies illustrate the different aspects. The selection of sources has been made on two grounds: availability of findings from and on the local level and geographical spread. The latter criterion was used in order to support the argument that world models are applied world wide. Reports from NGOs themselves involved in decentralization projects tend to be positive, while other sources report more mixed results.

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Cultural factors: In many countries, there is a diversity of cultures and centralized systems have tended to respond to them in a standardized way (Beare and Boyd, 1993), while minority cultural demands have become more legitimate than before (Wilson, 1997). Moreover, cultural shifts between generations have taken place in many countries; a culture of participation is emerging, making people demand direct influence over their own situation and in decisions affecting their life situation (Gilbert, 2004; Inglehart, 1997; Norris and Ingelhart, 2004). Weakening legitimacy of the state/public sector is another reason mentioned by researchers (Slater, 1993; Weiler, 1993) and some of them see combinations of centralization and decentralization as attempts by the central state to increase its legitimacy by neutralizing or “atomizing” conflicts in society and to mobilize more resources from society (McGinn and Pereira, 1992; Weiler, 1993). State overload and increasing complexity of society and therefore, problems of steering, have been mentioned ( Johnson, 1987; Pierre, 2000). Globalization and/or international pressure imply an increasing tendency to borrow and imitate educational models for the sake of modernization, improved competitiveness or both or because of pressure from international bodies (Crossley & Watson, 2003; Dale, 1999, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). All these reasons are intertwined to an extent that varies from one country to another. Several of the cases in this book illustrate the international influences (see Greece in chapter 4, for example) and the employment of elements from the world models. Programs of decentralization and centralization vary considerably, at least in the following regards: baseline level from which they start; issues and items relocated; types and forms of decentralization (whether decision-making has been relocated or not); whether the education system makes part of a more general program of decentralization; the legal position of the decentralization program; and the mechanisms or arrangements introduced for participation at the local/school level.

2.2 Baselines When decentralization is to be implemented, schools and districts start from very different baselines. Examples in Spain and Latin America are described by Hanson (1995, 2001), in the USA by Henig (1993) and in China by Hawkins (2000). Decentralization has corresponded to central level expectations in places where (a) the socio-economic situation traditionally has been advantageous; and (b) there is consensus at all levels on the high priority of education and local involvement (Henig, 1993; Shaeffer, 1994). In the case of Nicaragua, Fuller and Rivarola (1998, in Ruiz de Forsberg, 2003) conclude that school autonomy was welcome in those cases where the schools already held “a shared commitment to the school’s values and mission, where most teachers concur with the director’s commitment to raising student performance” (ibid., p. 44). In other cases, decentralization to school level has exacerbated existing problems (Arnove, 1999).

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2.3 Issues or Items (De)centralized What issues or items are generally decentralized/centralized to what level? Countries vary considerably in this regard (Abu-Duhou, 1999; Barro, 1996) and different classifications of the issues of centralization/decentralization have been made (see, for instance, Fiske, 1996; OECD, 1995b). Welsh & McGinn (1999) discuss: Mission (Goals, curriculum, contents); operation (scheduling of time, school maintenance and construction); finance (expenditure, financial and management audit, planning and structures); clients (admission of students); and staff (teacher competence and recruitment, hiring/firing, pay, assigning teaching responsibilities, training). Curriculum details, expenditures, and school buildings, have been the areas most commonly implied in decentralization. Winkler (1993, pp. 107-108) studied decentralization in Australia, the USA, Brazil and Chile in the following dimensions: (a) curriculum and teaching methods; (b) examination and supervision; (c) teacher recruitment and compensation; (d) financing of recurrent expenditures, (e) school construction; and (f ) financial and management audits. He found that (a), (b) and (d) were relatively centralized (to the state level). The most common approach in high income countries has been to delegate fiscal responsibility from central or regional level down to district or school levels and to centralize curriculum and evaluation/assessment, where these have not already been centralized. In the case of the UK, New Zealand and the state of Victoria in Australia, Angus (1994, p. 17) argues that “what is actually devolved to schools... is responsibility for a range of management tasks and control of their budgets”. In Spain, the Ministry of Education determines 65 per cent of the content of the national curriculum, while the remaining part is decided by provincial authorities and, to some extent, by schools (Hanson, 2001, p. 20). In low income countries, operation and finance seem to have been the areas most often decentralized. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa the most common approach has been deconcentration of central state functions and cost-sharing (Naidoo, 2005). In a study of educational decentralization in primary and secondary education in Zimbabwe, India, Tanzania, Chile, and Poland, the two latter countries had decentralized all the items considered in the study (Tikly, 1998)2. Zimbabwe had decentralized all aspects except teacher recruitment, India all except teacher recruitment and secondary school construction, while Tanzania had only primary and secondary school construction decentralized. In the five countries, devolution of financial responsibility has not been complemented by any significant devolution of decision-making power to local authority level. 2.

The aspects compared were: teacher recruitment; salaries of non-teaching staff; provision of learning materials; school construction – primary and secondary education; maintenance and repair of schools; service charge relief exemption; rates relief exemption; provision of school transport; school feeding and sports and recreation.

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2.4 Levels of (De)centralization As to the levels, OECD studies (see, for instance, 1995b) of the distribution of decision-making at different levels in the member countries shows great variety; the extremes were found in NewZealand and Switzerland. In the former country, 70 per cent of all decisions are made at the school level and in the latter, 90 per cent are made at intermediate level. The most radical types of decentralization from above is school-based management (which will be discussed in section 2.7) and some types of charter schools. A charter arrangement is an agreement between the state and a single school. Such arrangements are frequent in Australia and New Zealand but the most extensive plans exist in the USA. In Victoria,Australia, for example, charters should include a plan for the delivery of the eight state mandated curriculum areas, and reporting to communities and the Directorate of School Education. Charter arrangements have increased rapidly especially in the USA, and they include decentralization (site-based decisionmaking) but also a large number of other aspects (Arsen, Plank & Sykes 2000; Rock Kane & Lauricella, 2001; Welsh & McGinn, 1999). These arrangements are very different from one another and school autonomy varies. Some states grant charters that exempt schools from state and local regulations, while such schools tend to receive low per-pupil allocation (Rock Kane & Lauricella (2001), which means that fund-raising is an important activity for many schools. Generally, charter schools are required to establish a board whose members are elected from among and by the parents (Wells & Scott, 2001). Home schooling means that home education takes place at home or somewhere else outside the formal school (Vynnycky, 2004). Such arrangements vary considerably due to different conditions such as the existence of a national curriculum and subsidies (often in the form of school materials). If there is a national curriculum, it has to be applied also in charter schools and home schooling, and consequently, educational processes and outcomes are monitored and evaluated.

2.5 Types and Forms There exists a variety of types and forms of decentralization. First, a distinction is sometimes made between territorial and functional decentralization. The first means that functions, tasks and sometimes decision-making are dispersed on different geographical units, while the latter means that some functions are moved downwards or to parallel bodies. Another distinction is the one between administrative decentralization and political decentralization. Administrative decentralization implies maintenance of power at the central level while shifting responsibility for planning, management, finance and other tasks

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to lower levels of authorities. Political decentralization implies that decision-making power is relocated to lower levels of government or to other and autonomous bodies (Fiske, 1996; Shaeffer, 1994). Due to the terminological mismatch, one term often denotes different phenomena, and the same phenomenon is given different terms. Deconcentration is sometimes called administrative decentralization and involves handing over “more routine authority and decision-making powers from a higher level of the central government to lower levels (regional, district, cluster), still accountable to, and staffed by, the central ministry” (Shaeffer, 1994, p. 19). The central authority establishes branch or local units. In Japan, the provincial councils are appointed from above and members of the prefectural boards of education are appointed by provincial governors (Muta, 2000), and a similar system exists in Greece (see chapter 4) and Mozambique (see chapter 8). Devolution, sometimes called political decentralization, is transfer of authority and considerable decision-making to local political bodies relatively independent of the central government, and requires changes in regulation and laws or even the constitution. In most cases of devolution, local bodies are locally elected. Delegation implies that administrative decision-making is relocated from a higher to a lower level for certain, determined functions and issues and is most often conditional, since decision-making competence can be rapidly and effectively re-centralized. Ultimate responsibility remains with the sovereign authority. Finally, privatisation is seen by some authors as a type of decentralization (Welsh & McGinn, 1999). It could imply several different aspects from out-contracting certain school activities to supporting implementation of private schools. It is evident that deconcentration and delegation do not necessarily lead to more participatory approaches. In practice, countries often employ a mixed approach (Shaeffer, 1994). In Mexico, for example, transfer from federal level to the 31 states started in 1992 and has included a “curious combination of all three types of decentralization” (Ornelas, 2000, p. 426), while in China, there has been a mix of devolution and delegation (Hawkins, 2000). Decentralization initiated from below has been exceptional, but unconditional decisionmaking at the village level is a key feature in Gandhi’s model (Alternative Sud, 1997; Esteva and Prakash, 1998). Every village is an auto-sufficient republic (panchayati raj – local power) that makes its own decisions (Mohannan, 1997). The principle of subsidiarity applies, which means that decisions should be made by and apply to those directly affected or concerned. Aspects of such decentralization have been experimented within India since 1994 ( Jayal & Pai, 2001). In East Europe and several former Soviet republics, local initiatives were taken and local decision-making bodies were established soon after the Soviet collapse and before the laws, constitutions and institutions had been changed (Daun & Sapatoru, 2002; Kanaev & Daun, 2002). Other examples of initiatives from below are: BRAC in Bangladesh, Escuela Nueva

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in some Latin American countries and community schools in Africa (Kitaev, 1998; Naidoo, 2005; Shaeffer, 1994).

2.6 Decentralization and its Scope and Constitutional Position Another aspect of educational decentralization is whether it makes part of a more general decentralization program. This has been the case in many countries (e.g. Ecuador, Spain and Sweden) (Castillo, 2002; Hanson, 2001; Hudson & Lidström, 2001). In such a situation it is likely that local communities have been comparatively strong with authority to levy tax or acquire such an authority and that the members of decision-making bodies are locally elected. Also, decentralization is given different legal status – from being defined and protected in the constitution to being regulated in administrative laws decided upon by the government. Once provided for in the constitution, transfer of powers and functions can be reversed only on the basis of an amendment to the appropriate law. Some countries, such as Bolivia, Ethiopia and Spain, have amended to their constitution the decision-making rights to regional governments (Bolivia-Sida, 2000; Ethiopia-Sida, 2000; Hanson, 2001).

2.7 Arrangements for local participation Since the local body is a strategic body, this will be discussed more in detail. School-based management has different varieties or different names: site-based management (SBM), shared decision-making (SDM), school-based decision-making (SBDM) or school-site decisionmaking (SSDM) (Abu-Duhou, 1999; Papagiannis, Easton & Owens, 1992); and school-based curriculum development (SBCD).These different terms may denote real varieties but may also be different terms for one and the same type of decentralization to the school level. Many other terms and arrangements have appeared during the past decades, such as: autonomous school in Nicaragua (Ruiz de Forsberg, 2003), School Management Committees in Ghana (Pryor, 2003), Village Education Committees in Maharashtra State in western India (Shaeffer, 1994; Leclerq, 2003) and different school associations in Cambodia (see chapter 8). School clusters is another arrangement associated with decentralization; a school cluster movement started in Thailand and Latin America a couple of decades ago (Shaeffer, 1994). School-based management or decision-making have been the most common types of decentralization and, according to Malen, Ogawa and Kranz (1990, p. 1, in Abu-Duhou, 1999, p. 28): School-based management can be viewed conceptually as a formal alternation of governance structures as a form of decentralization that identifies the individual school

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With SBM, school leaders are given more autonomy and more freedom to take initiative, especially in budget matters, in different degrees of cooperation with teachers, students, parents and/or other community members (Levacic, 1995, p. 3). SBM is expected to improve planning, create co-responsibility, increase local participation, mobilize local resources, create greater accountability and lead to better co-ordination (Siddique, 1997). Schools are expected to improve because of democratic control and/or increasing professionalism with regard to leadership and teaching, and, according to David (1990 cited in Abu-Duhou, 1999, p. 33): “the core of SBM is “the idea of participatory decision-making at the school site....” The local arrangements for involvement, decision-making and the way in which the participants have received their mandate seem to be decisive for the role of different stakeholders but also makes a considerable difference in the decision-making powers of various actors (see, for instance, Beare, 1993; Fine, 1993; Whitty, 1996, 1997). Thus, the arrangements for “site involvement” may be of different kinds, and – as Beare (1993, p. 115) argues – each model “has an internal logic of its own, and constitutes the role of teachers, parents, students, and the government in quite different ways”. Is there a school site body or not? Does the body consist of school staff only, local people only or both. How have they become part of the decision-making body and what is their mandate? The mandate of the local decision-making body may vary from being a local body of the central state executing the state’s decisions, to an autonomous and locally elected body with own power and economic resources (extracted locally, unconditionally received from the central state or both). Also, the composition of this body varies considerably from one place to another and from one decentralization arrangement to another. Sometimes professionals are in the majority, sometimes laymen (e.g. parents and/or politically elected members). The number of members varies; the minimum seems to be five while the maximum number is not likely to be more than 20. In New Zealand, the schoolspecific boards consist of five elected parents, the principal and one staff member (Harold, 1998). In some cases, representatives of teacher unions are automatically included – either as full members or as members without vote. The members of the council or board may be nominated or appointed by another authority (above or parallel) or they may be directly elected locally. As to the mandate or decision-making power, in New Zealand, the boards of trustees set key objectives each year, control management, report to community and appoint the principal and the teachers (Fiske & Ladd, 2003; Robertson, 1998). In Victoria, Australia, school councils have gradually been given increased

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responsibility and develop a school charter, the educational policy of the school, appoint the school principal, employ non-teaching staff, report to the school community and the Department of Education and manage school funds. Parent and teacher members are elected for two years, and more than one third of the members should represent the parents (Gurr, 1999, pp. 85-86). The school council in Spain consists of the director, the chief of academic studies and an equal representation of teachers and parents and the director can be fired by two thirds majority. The director is elected from among volunteering teachers and is automatically the chairman of the council meetings. If there is no volunteering teacher, the director is appointed from above (Hanson, 2001, p. 42). In South Africa, all public schools are required to establish governing bodies. Such bodies include the principal and elected representatives of parents, teachers, non-teaching staff, and, in secondary schools, students (see chapter 7). All school site bodies are expected to decide on admissions policy, language policy and making recommendations on teaching and non-teaching appointments, managing the finances of the school, determining school fees and conducting fund raising. Table 2.1 Varieties of School Site Councils or Boards School site body

Composition of the site body

Membership Number of members Power of principal Mandate Areas of decision-making

1) School-site or school-specific body responsible for one school. If not school site, then: 2) local body commanded from the higher level in the state, or 3) locally elected political body (representing a district, municipality, commune, etc.). 2 and 3 responsible for several schools. a) Only members politically elected in general, local elections; b) Politically elected members in majority; c) Professionals (school staff ) in majority; d) Parents/laymen in majority. Or mixed b + c; b+ d; c + d; or all three of these. Nominated, appointed, or elected representatives. 5 – 20 If school site board/council: Chairman of the site council/board. With or without veto. Or hired and fired by the site council/board. Deliberate and controlling or advisory simply being involved. Details – budget, and recruitment of teachers and principal.

Normally, in the devolution approach, the members of the school site decision-making bodies are locally elected in one way or the other. In some countries the decentralization program gives the municipality or the district body autonomy to decide how to organize decision-making within its territory. The type of local community or school arrangement is to a large extent determined by the framework

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established at the central state level. In Sweden, for example, there is large variation in the way municipalities organize decision-making arrangements below the municipality board, while in many other countries there is a rather strict and detailed framework established from the central level.

3. State Governance and Decentralization From the governance perspective (see Chapter 1), it is useful to study (1) deliberate state control and steering; (2) the form and amount of subsidies from higher levels (block grant, per pupil grant or a combination of the two); and (3) choice arrangements.

3.1 Steering and Control With decentralization follows a need for new types of deliberate control and steering and specific bodies for steering, monitoring and assessment have been established where such bodies did not exist before (e.g. England and Sweden). We find, among others, the following bodies, mechanisms or procedures steering or driving educational processes: (a) national curriculum (with or without detailed instructions concerning the distribution of time per subject); (b) national goals or national guidelines; (c) accountability requirements (including reporting of student achievement, economic accounts, etc. from lower to higher levels or to boards/councils at the local level); (d) inspection or monitoring from the central level of attainment of national goals; and (e) market mechanisms (per pupil pay, choice exerted by parents and students, etc.) (Hamilton, 2003; Hannaway & Woodroffe, 2003). In most cases where there is a national curriculum, there is also central assessment and monitoring3. This may take the form of broad evaluation, national testing, reporting, selfevaluation, inspection, and so on. Some countries use inspection as it has traditionally been defined, while others have given it a broader meaning including pedagogical support and development (Riley & Rawles, 1997). Accountability is an important ingredient and goal in decentralization reforms. It “relates to who is required to report to whom – and therefore can ultimately be held responsible for the determination and implementation ... More specifically and realis3.

New Zealand is, however, an important exception, since there is no national curriculum but extensive monitoring and assessment.

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tically, in regard to participation and decentralization, it relates to the extent to which various levels of the administrative hierarchy are responsible to other levels both above and below it and to other ‘parterners’” (Shaeffer, 1994, p. 21). Reporting to higher levels is increasingly used in this context. This reporting normally deals with plans and outcomes and takes the form of self-evaluation/self-assessment, school reports, school reviews, reporting of student achievement and so on. Inspection has traditionally meant control but in many countries, it now includes pedagogical support, advice and competence development of school staff as well (e.g. England and Sweden). Evaluations more and more take a broad view, including school processes. When it comes to funding, schools have traditionally received a certain amount related to their size and catchment area characteristics but increasingly they are now subsidized on a per student basis. Additional funds are often provided in relation to the socio-economic conditions of the geographical area and for children with learning difficulties and children from minority or low income homes. Several examples (e.g. England, France, the Netherlands, Sweden) demonstrate that these supplementary funds are not sufficient as compensation for the economically weak situation of the area or the school district (Daun, 2004, Daun & Arjmand, forthcoming 2006). Decentralization during the past two decades has often been combined with market forces (Wieringen, 1997) (See chapter one)4. If choice exists, the flows of students between schools due to choice determine the resources of the schools. For some schools, to lose even a few students can have far-reaching consequences if this loss implies the most motivated students and if it means that classes have to be merged5. The choices made by parents and students are assumed to be based on information about the schools’ quality (as indicated by performance on tests) (Ladd, 2003, p. 18). In order for these measures to function as information, the results are increasingly disseminated and presented in the form of league tables. In Sweden, for instance, the national authorities collect information about and from schools and presents the value added in student performance per school and in relation to student characteristics (Eurydice, 2003; Skolverket, 2003 ). Since decentralization is supposed to give schools sufficient autonomy to diversify their supply so as to respond to the demands, they are assumed to be informed by the league tables about their performance compared to other schools.

4.

5.

The state of Victoria in Australia combines different features and is often seen as the most advanced program of decentralization and implementation of market forces. Unfortunately, most of the case schools selected in this book are rural schools with long distances in between them so that effects of choice arrangements have not been studied.

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4. Outcomes

4.1 General features When the success of decentralization reforms has been evaluated, this has most often been in terms of factors such as degree of restructuring, new structures implemented, frequency of activities and interactions (among stakeholders), generation of local resources (Hanson, 2001; Levacic, 1995), and reinforcement of existing regional and national bodies for monitoring, assessment and evaluation or creation of new ones. Apart from this, it is not very evident in detail to what extent decentralization has led to greater participation, equality, efficiency or improved student performance. Here the forms of local participation, will be in focus. The literature, according to Kemmerer (1994, p. 1414), suggests that four factors are associated with success and failure of decentralization but in order for his set of factors to be complete, economic factors and the scope of reform should be included. The following factors seem to determine the outcomes of decentralization: (a) social, economic, and cultural context; (b) political support from national leaders and local elites; (c) adequate planning and management; local empowerment and (d) the scope of reform. The cultural and economic contexts vary enormously.The geographical area itself where the school is situated or from where the pupils are recruited is a steering factor. Various studies show that the development of equality-inequality is determined both by initial conditions and measures taken from higher levels in order to “steer” the situation (Abu-Duhou, 1999; Hanson, 1990, 2001; Levacic, 1995; Santos Filho, 1993). Ornelas (2000) found in Mexico that some states were more well-off than other states and hence, more “generous” in relation to education. The richest state spent 30 per cent of its total budget on education, while the poorest spent two per cent (p. 14). In low income areas, resources are in general scarce and it is hard for the population to pay fees and for schools to raise funds. In his overview of decentralization in Africa, Naidoo (2005) found that the countries on this continent have tended to move either towards administrative decentralization with limited authority for the local governments or de-concentration and delegation. Also, there is the pressure to introduce market mechanisms in education, even in countries with insufficient public resources and declining quality. Whether school-based management (SBM) reinforces or diminishes existing inequalities between districts or schools seems to depend also upon the formulas for allocation of resources and whether choice-opportunities exist so that flows of pupils between the schools emerge. Schools in low income areas tend to lose students due to economic and demographic factors over which the schools themselves have no influence (Abu-Duhou, 1999; Hanson, 1990; Levacic, 1995; Wylie, 1995). Thus, there are indications that existing inequalities between

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geographical areas and categories of people tend to increase with the implementation of decentralization measures (Arnove, 1999, p. 320). Actors at the central level often establish the parameters for the local boards: mandate, composition of the local bodies. They tend to have a linear view of the whole process: decisions are made, implementation takes place and people at the local level interpret centrally decided policies in the way intended by the central decision-makers, which is not always the case (see Chapter 10 on Nepal, Chapter 6 on Senegal, chapter 7 on South Africa). In the case of South Africa, policy-makers assume that society is atomized and consists of autonomous individuals with equal resources. As South African society does not have these characteristics (see Chapter 7), Sayed (2002) argues that decentralization needs to be accompanied by programs that empower communities in order to make them able to participate. This argument applies to many other countries as well. If the local populations are expected to participate and be active, this – and what form their participation is supposed to take – needs to be made known to them. When it has been up to the schools to decide whether to join the decentralization reform or not, poor areas or schools in several places in Latin America, for example, have been reluctant to join since they had to begin from a relatively weak position, lacking facilities such as appropriate school-buildings, etc. (Hanson, 1995; Ruiz de Forsberg, 2003). In Chicago, schools differed initially and came to differ even more with decentralization and schools with problems were recentralized. With decentralization in China, the disparities became so large that the central government decided in 1994 to re-centralize the levy of tax in some places (Hawkins, 2000). Also, studies in the Sub-Saharan Africa show that the most prosperous or developed areas or schools have tended to be the first or the only ones to join decentralization programs (Naidoo, 2005). With the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s in England, the traditional power of the Local Education Authorities (LEAs) was undermined and these bodies had to find new roles within the new framework established from above. Riley and Rawles (1997, p. 85) found that the LEAs came to have very different approaches in their interaction with the schools within their geographical areas of responsibility: interventionist, interactive, responsive and non-interventionist. In other words, some of them took the initiative and were very active while others reacted to initiatives from single schools. If decentralization leaves “space”for local initiative, it is then a matter of how this is perceived and who exploits the new opportunities. In Bangladesh, there has been a tendency for local elites to become an obstacle to peoples’ empowerment (Schneider, 1997). In some places in Africa, traditional chiefs have occupied the space resulting from decentralization (Hamidou, 1997). China introduced village committees, responsible for local administration in 1982. However, in some places re-centralization has been made, since some groups of farmers whose families and clans traditionally had a low position in the local community continued to be

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reluctant towards participation (Zhenyo, 1997). In Mexico, local elites have, according to Ornelas (2000, p. 21), taken advantage of the powers emanating from decentralization. Examples from Ghana (Pryor, 2003), India (Leclercq, 2003), Cambodia (see chapter 9), Nicaragua (Chapter 5), and Senegal (chapter 6) may be mentioned. Pryor (2003) found in a case study in Ghana that no females were ever elected to the school councils and the majority of the members were teachers, while the remaining ones were more well-off, and better educated people. Another “side of the coin” is the local ability to take over tasks defined at the central level. With decentralization of power from the central level, it is taken for granted that the community is capable and prepared to run schools but in order for decentralization to contribute to equity and equality, there is the need for the state to act so as to guarantee that the space for decisionmaking created at the local level is used for everybody’s participation and that the economic conditions allow them to participate. In places as different as Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Spain, Sweden and Tanzania, the local populations and school staff claim that they were not prepared for their new roles (Hanson, 2001; Mmbaga, 2002; Ornelas, 2000; Ruiz de Forsberg, 2003; Skolverket, 2001a and b).The situation in Victoria, Australia, seems to be an exception to this rule; most likely because the preparation of different actors was scheduled in the reform program at the start (Gurr, 1999). With the implementation of decentralization, new functions and roles emerge and individuals at local level receive more tasks and duties. Decentralization has tended to carry ambiguity with regard to responsibility and authority (Elmore, 1993; Ethiopia-Sida, 2001; Samoff, 1999). Uncertainty as to decision-making competence and different interpretations of the new rules cause confusion and conflicts (Caldwell, 1993; Elmore, 1993; Hannaway, 1993; Odden and Wohlstetter, 1993; Papagiannis, Easton and Owens, 1992; Ruiz de Forsberg, 2003; Skolverket, 1999, 2000). Abu-Duhou (1999, p. 20) argues that the reform efforts have to “balance increased diversification, flexibility and local control, with an orderly delivered quality of education across geographical, socio-economic and ethnic divisions of society”.

4.2 Focus on Participation Decentralization thus takes place in a complex of instances, structures and roles: local communities – boards or councils – schools – school principals – teachers – students – parents. Often “community participation” is intended but it is not always clear from different policy documents and research reports what meanings and phenomena are covered by these terms. The roles and functions of local bodies differ and they give school leaders, teachers and parents varying opportunities to participate.

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Both “community” and “participation” are ambiguous terms. “Community” is often used without definition and specification. Bray (1997) raises some questions in relation to this: Is community a geographical area, an ethnic, racial or religious group, and so on? If community is seen as a geographical area, the situation is that such areas are not homogenous units; communities vary from “organic” units to artificial constructions created for administrative purposes. Municipalities and districts may differ in the way local boards interpret and practice decentralization processes (Daun, 2003; Hanson, 2001; Levacic, 1995; Slater, 1993 – see also chapters 6 and 7). Community tends to become “school community”, i.e. the pupils attending the school in question and their parents. This is especially so when freedom of choice has also been introduced. Community then becomes as an aggregate of individual choosers (Blackmore, 2000) or “only the locale where the market operates” (Angus, 1994, p. 30). When it comes to participation, Beare (1993, p. 200) argues that the vocabulary “needs to be clarified”. Various attempts have been made to define “participation”6. Participatory development is “a process by which people take an active and influential hand in shaping decisions that affect their lives” OECD (1995a, p. 8) or “enhancing people’s capacities as individuals and groups to improve their own lives and to have a greater control over their own destinies” (Ogun, 1982, p. 2, in Shaeffer, 1994, p. 15)7. Participation implies a much more active role than involvement; a role established by right (p. 17). This implies that participants can have their suggestions and views influencing the final decisions. Midgley (1986, p. 36) found in the 1980s that “it is a myth that the poor have an excess of free time” so that they can choose to participate and there are no indications that the situation has changed very much since then. For instance, in Nicaragua, rural women have the principal responsibility for the schooling but due to poverty, they have to find an income in addition to their household and family tasks. With their double work load, they are not very able to participate in school life to any large extent (see chapter 5). Also, as mentioned before, it has been shown in studies in various places around the world that local elites can take advantage of the fact that power is relocated from higher levels

6.

7.

Arnstein (1971) employs eight degrees or types of participation, while Hart (1992, in Shaeffer, 1994, pp3. 16-17) uses seven: (1) the mere use of a service (such as primary health care facility); (2) involvement through the contribution (or extraction) of resources, materials and labour; (3) involvement through ‘attendance’ and the receipt of information (e.g., at parents’ meetings at school), implying passive acceptance of decisions made by others; (4) involvement through consultation (or feedback) on a particular issue; (5) participation in the delivery of a service, often as a partner with other actors; (6) participation as implementors of delegated powers; and (7) most completely, participation “in real decision-making at every stage – identification of problems, the study of feasibility, planning, implementation and evaluation...... This implies the authority to initiate action, a capacity for ‘proactivity’, and the confidence to get going on one’s own”. According to Shaeffer (1994), participatory approaches to development “are not netural or ‘value-free’. Rather, they are based on a number of assumptions, which need to be taken into account. What works in one country may not work in another and such approaches have disadvantages as well as benefits, costs as well as savings”.

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down to the local level, while common people cannot (Alternative Sud, 1997; Hamidou, 1997; Patrinos and Lakshmanan, 1997; Pryor, 2003; Siddique, 1997). On the other hand, traditional chiefs have sometimes been deliberately included in the reform efforts, since they have authority (see, for instance, Chapter 8 on Mozambique). When analyzing the situation in some Sub-Saharan African countries, Durston & Nashire, 1998) found six different models for community participation in educational affairs mainly in terms of material input to the school: a) Pure community self-help (community does everything); b) some measures of community support (coupled with support from NGOs); c) community provides buildings, government provides teachers and some materials; d) community is able to make a contribution in order to elicit outside funding; e) a private individual or company establishes its own school and funds 100 per cent of the costs; f ) major funding agencies are able to provide the majority of capital costs. In most of the cases, participation means contribution. From the above description, it is evident that school site bodies differ considerably and so do the roles and participation of the principals/head teachers, teachers and parents. Therefore, findings will be reported divided on these three different types of stakeholders. Headteachers8: The function of the headteachers in relation to the “site council”varies considerably – even if he or she in most cases chairs the council meetings. At one extreme, practically all power stays with the principal, and the other members are there just to give advice or legitimize the headteacher’s proposals. At the other extreme, the principal is recruited by the site council or board and can be fired if the site board is not satisfied with his or her performance. In Nicaragua, the central office has the right to dismiss the school principal and to suspend members of the school council if they do not adhere to the norms and procedures laid down in the General Regulation for Education (see chapter 5). As far as the scope of the mandate is concerned, it may vary from details within a framework set by an authority higher in the hierarchy to a rather autonomous organ, which decides on economic and staff issues and some of the content of education. In England, local management has, according to Levacic (1995, p. 108) brought about “significant changes in the roles of the key personnel in schools. The role most affected has been that of the headteachers”. They tend to enjoy more power than before and are satisfied with their new role, although it is more demanding. In New Zealand, the UK and the USA, school principals are more satisfied and teachers involve themselves more in decision-making but their stress levels have increased (Whitty, 1996). The headteachers claim that local management increased involvement and improved overall job satisfaction. Similar results have been reported from other countries as well (Abu-Duhou, 1999; Elmore, 1993; Samoff, 1999; Skolverket, 8.

The title and position of the school leaders vary from one level of primary or secondary education to another and from one country to another. Therefore, “head teacher”, “principal” and “director” will be used interchangeable.

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1999, 2000). In the USA, headteachers said, when interviewed, that they were managers of their schools rather than headteachers. They also felt that they had more freedom over budget but also that they were managing somebody else’s agenda (Weindling, 1998). During the first period of decentralization in Spain, many teachers volunteered to be director for the three-year period. In time, teachers became less and less interested in volunteering and the same happened with parent representatives for the councils. In 1985/86, 63 per cent of the directors were elected but in 1997/98 the percentage had decreased to only 29, while the remaining 71 per cent had to be appointed from above (Hanson, 2001, pp. 46-47). This trend made the national authorities change the legislation in order to give directors more power. In some areas in Brazil, common elections of school principals were introduced in the 1980s. Criteria for identifying the candidates were established and one of the most important criteria was the school plan proposed by the candidate.The three best school plans were nominated and the election “of the candidate that had presented the best work plan would be carried out by direct and secret vote” (Shaeffer, 1994, pp. 71-72. The rules have since then been changed; in 2004 head teachers could not be automatically a candidate after one period but had to campaign in the elections for principalship (Boakari, 2004). In several places, there have been tensions, if not to say conflicts, between the school principal/headteacher, on the one hand, and the school council on the other (Codd, 1994; Hanson, 2001; Harold, 1998). Robertson (1998) argues that the principal has to deal with three conflicting roles – that of statesperson (leader of an institution), connoisseur (know the prerequisites for learning), and entrepreneur (initiate change). Grace (1997) found that school leaders – in the pressure between the state and the market – have to keep a balance between three broad ideal types: (i) headteachers-managers; (ii) head teachers-professionals; and (iii) head teachers-resistors.The first category were managers in their professional orientation, while the second were concerned about professional issues and the third category reacted passively to the pressures and tasks. (See also chapter 1 concerning the different ideological orientations). In most cases, administrative tasks take more of the principal’s attention and time then before decentralization and this occurs at the expense of pedagogical leadership. Power and Whitty (1997) report findings from a study of principals in England, Wales, the USA, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand. According to them, the principals are “positioned between the competing demands of the state and the market.. (they) are becoming increasingly isolated from colleagues and classrooms” (p. 342). In a study of 41 public primary schools in Israel, Gaziel (l998) investigated outcomes of school-based management in terms of principals’ and teachers’ perceived degree of autonomy. Both categories of staff felt they had significantly more autonomy in the schools with autonomy than in schools without. However, three variables (among them school size and class size) other than the autonomy status determined most of the variation in the perceptions. The degree of autonomy explained only four per cent of the variation.

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In all, school principals have been pushed into more administrative and management tasks at the expense of pedagogical leadership in a broad sense. This trend seems to be stronger the stronger market mechanisms (choice and vouchers) are applied. Teachers: Teachers are involved or affected to different degrees. In some schools teachers have responded positively to the reforms whereas in other schools they have been less enthusiastic. They tend to become more actively involved in various interactions not directly related to teaching and are less satisfied than the school leaders with their new situation (Abu-Duhou, 1999; Whitty, 1996, 1997). Teachers have to face the different pressures from parents to improve school and as a result their work load has increased (Whitty, 1997). According to Hannaway (1993), teacher autonomy existed in many schools in the US before the wave of decentralization. The teachers in public systems were not over-regulated but ignored. Decentralization measures thus multiplied external demands on the teachers (principally from parents), while at the same time, the amount of support could increase. When decentralization is combined with other restructuring policies, such as freedom of choice and market mechanisms, this increases the pressure on the teachers. When choice is introduced, chosen schools have to handle an increasing number of pupils, while schools not chosen tend to face economic problems. In the USA, according to Daresh (1998, p. 325), teachers “can no longer retain their separate identities as those who are involved only in classroom activities”. Teachers feel that their work has been intensified and that they have to work with a broader area of issues than before, some of which they do not feel competent to deal with (such as administration, financial issues, and so on). Gurr (1999) reports from Victoria in Australia, that teacher and principal workload has increased and that time is spent on new issues such as local fund raising for example. Similar findings are reported from many other places and countries (Abu-Duhou,1999; Southworth,1998).England introduced the whole package of reforms, and there teachers felt that: a) there had been an intensification of work, b) they had to deal with issues of which they had no experience, and c) the reforms had been mandated by others (Southworth, 1998). Similar findings have been reported from New Zealand (Harold, 1998). In Sweden, the role and the work situation of teachers have changed dramatically over the past 10–15 years.For instance,all teachers should,together with the principal, make a plan for the school and they should establish together with the children their individual plans (Daun, Slenning & Waldow, 2004). Another nationally representative study in Sweden shows that the teachers felt they could decide in matters which traditionally belonged to them (pedagogical activities) but they felt a lack of influence when it came to support for pupils needing special support, class size, school environment and the use of school resources. The majority of the teachers felt that there was “space”for them to test innovations in their teaching but they were dissatisfied with the way steering took place from the national as well as the local levels. Many of them were also skeptical towards the pedagogical leadership exerted by the school principals (Skolverket, 2001a). In a study in New Zealand, principals believed that improvement

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in school quality had taken place; teachers had a similar belief but more than half of them also felt that the decentralization and market forces had a negative impact on their job satisfaction (Fiske and Ladd, 2003, p. 59). In all, teachers become more involved in different activities not directly related to their teaching in the classroom but it is not very clear to what extent they can influence the decision-making in their school. Parents: Parental involvement was not a priority in policy-making or research before the mid1990s (Dale, 1997; Lareau, 1987). Opportunities for parental involvement may vary from sporadic school visits to a situation in which parents form the majority in a school-site council with decision-making power. If these arrangements allow strong parental participation, at least theoretically, then what happens is to a large extent due to how much the parents are able to use the new opportunities, which, in turn, tends to mirror societal and community structures and cultural patterns.The studies reviewed show the anticipated pattern: parents with more cultural capital (especially education) are more active and elected to boards more than other parents. Gender is also a crucial factor in that women around the world more then men tend to involved in the daily interactions with the children concerning school matters. However, when it comes to participation in decision-making, the opposite applies. Lareau (1987) in her study of some citities in the USA had principals as the point of departure for the study: What do schools ask parents to do, and how do parents respond to these requests? She found that parent participation varies with: parents’ educational background; their view of appropriate division of labour between the teachers and themselves; the information they had about their children’s lives at school and time available and economic resources in the families. On the basis of a case study in Baltimore, Chicago and Philadelphia, Fine (1993) concludes that parents had ideological power but material power was held by the central administration and the financial elites. Frequency and forms of parental participation varied along ethnic and socioeconomic lines. The patterns mentioned have also been found in other studies. In Nicaragua, a great deal of parental participation takes the form of parents attending school meetings and school fairs and parents helping with school repair and painting (Rivarola and Fuller, 1999, in Ruiz de Forsberg, 2003). In many other places – in countries such as Cambodia, Nepal, India and Ghana – parents are left with the role to come in when called upon by the schools or to share costs with the state (Leclercq, 2003; Pryor, 2003. See also chapter 8 on Cambodia and chapter 9 on Nepal in this book). Teachers in the BRAC schools in Bangladesh are chosen and supervised by the parents, and, according to Shaeffer (1994), improvements had, at least during the first years, been seen in the rates of drop out and repetition, for instance. Almost the opposite is the case in many countries, among them South Africa (chapter 7) and Nepal (chapter 10), where parents participate on conditions formally or informally established by the principal and the teachers. As mentioned previously with reference to Tikly (1998), parents are expected to contribute to school activities

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in various ways. The most common forms of cost-sharing are fees, sponsoring, or that communities pay teacher salaries (Bray, 1998). In several places – principally in low income countries – NGOs have to a varying extent taken advantage of decentralization; they have started school projects and organized in-service training of teachers, for example. Activists from the NGO “World Education” report success in Benin, Guinea, and Mali. Parents take more part in managing their schools, PTAs have been elected and function well, according to the reports (Diallo, 2004; Fofana, 2004). Garnier’s (2004) evaluation of these projects, however, showed some critical aspects such as: tensions between district authorities and local PTAs; the former saw the latter as a consultative body to give advice and be informed but not to make its own decisions. Also, teachers who were parents tended to have positions of influence in the PTAs. In all, the pattern of parent participation tends to mirror the socio-economic and cultural (capital) distribution in the local area of the school. If we use the ladder of participation invented by Arnstein (1971), we find that parent participation tends to take place at the lowest stages (1-4), which imply use of schooling, material contribution, attending meetings for receiving information or involvement in specific issues. In some countries (e.g. France, Sweden and Mexico), teacher unions had, at least until the 1990s, a certain influence on the implementation and outcomes of the reforms. Initially, the unions were reluctant to accept the reforms, partially because they were neither involved in nor informed about the decisions leading to the reforms.This was the case in Sweden,for example,where teacher unions played an important role in the reforms until the end of the 1980s. On the other hand, in Mexico, teacher unions acquired more power through the decentralization (Ornelas, 2004).

5. Conclusion Societies are pressured by economic globalization to become competitive and the countries with the lowest incomes are marginalized from economic flows. However, all types of countries and governments have implemented essential ingredients of the world models. This means that “decentralization”has different meanings and applications. In addition to the arrangements under the label of “decentralization” other measures are taken. When the NG is fully implemented, it includes components that logically hang together. Decentralization can change the supply side in the education market but markets mechanisms have to be introduced in order to change the demand side. At the local level, mechanisms for involvement vary according to the real central intention behind the decentralization program. Local forces (economic level and economic structure, cultural patterns, power constellations) condition the outcome. Together with forces situated

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outside of the domain of education, the mechanisms constitute the mode of governance. For decentralized education systems, the role of the central and regional governments is critical in ensuring equity and protection of minority interests. Governance in high income countries tends to be rather sophisticated and require advanced technology and fluid markets and is directed by a relatively strong central state. The outcomes of decentralization are conditioned by a large number of factors, such as formulated policy, type of decentralization, whether market mechanisms have been included, implemented policy and local cultural, economic and political contexts.The certain outcomes of decentralization reforms are then that they have been successful in the implementation of structures and new types of governance but many such reforms have failed to achieve other important objectives set for them. Parent participation at the highest levels as defined by Arnstein (1971) seems to be rare. However, the fact that there exists a discourse on and policy of decentralization makes it more legitimate than before for local people to use their voice in educational matters. Decentralization might require both careful planning and extensive training and more staff, resources and equipment, rather than less. Since the dimension decentralization – centralization is one aspect of governance and others have been introduced, it is difficult to establish which outcomes are due to what. The chapters that follow are intended to illustrate what may happen in different national and local contexts under the umbrella of “decentralization”. They demonstrate that the countries presented have implemented important ingredients of the world model but also that some hybridization and glocalization occurs when local actors are supposed to implement globally standardized policies.

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ILO (1996). Impact of structural adjustment on the employment and training of teachers. Geneva: ILO, Sectoral Activities Programme. Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Changes in 43 Countries. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Jayal, N. G. & Pai, S. (2001). Introduction. In N. G. Jayal & S. Pai (eds.). Democratic Governance in India. Challenges of Poverty, Development and Identity, (pp. 11-31). New Delhi: Sage Publications. Johnson, N (1987). The Welfare State in Transition. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. Kanaev, A. and Daun, H. (2002). Nationalism and Educational Transition in Central Asia. In H. Daun (ed.). Educational Restructuring in the Context of Globalization and National Policy, (pp. 227-244). New York: RoutledgeFalmer. Kemmerer, F. (1994). Decentralization of Schooling in Developing Nations. In T. Husén & N. Postleithwaite (eds). International Encyclopedia of Education, (pp. 1412-1416). Oxford: Pergamon Press. Kitaev, I. (1999). Private education in sub-Saharan Africa: a re-examination of theories and concepts related to its development and finance. Paris: Unesco – International Institute for Educational Planning. Ladd, H. F. (2003). Introduction. In D. N. Plank & G. Sykes (eds.). Choosing Choice. School Choice in International Perspective (pp. 1-23). New York and London: Teachers College Press. Lareau, A. (1987). Social-Class Differences in Family-School Relationship: The Importance of Cultural Capital. Sociology of Education, 60: 73-85. Leclercq, F. (2003). Decentralisation and Quality of Teaching: A Field Study of Primary Schools in Madhya Pradesh, India. Paper presented at the Paper presented at the conference organized by United Kingdom Forum for International Education and Training, in Oxford, England, September 9-12, 2003. Levacic, R. (1995). Local Management of Schools. Analysis and Practice. Buckingham: Open University Press. McGinn, N. and Pereira, L. (1992).Why States Change the Governance of Education: an historical comparison of Brazil and the United States. Comparative Education Review, 28 (2): 167-180. Midgley, J. (1986). Community Participation: History, Concepts and Controversies. In J. Midgley (ed). Community Participation, Social Development and the State, (pp. 13-47). London: Methuen. Mmbaga, D. R. (2002). The Inclusive Classroom in Tanzania. Dream or Reality? Stockholm: Institute of International Education. Mohannan, B. (1997). La décentralisation en Inde. Alternative Sud, IV (3): 61-73. Muta, H. (2000). Deregulation and decentralization of education in Japan. Journal of Educational Administration, 38 (5): 455-470. Naidoo, J. (2005). Education Decentralization in Africa: Great Expectations and Unfulfilled Promises. In D. P. Baker & A. W. Wiseman (eds.). Global Trends in Educational Policy. Vol 6: International Perspectives on Education and Society, (pp. 99-124). New York: Elsevier. Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Odden, A. and Wohlstetter, P. (1993). Strategies for Making School-Based Management Work. Consortium for Policy Research (CPRE), (pp. 6-10). New Brunswick. OECD (1995a). Participatory Development and Good Governance. Paris: OECD. OECD (1995b). Decision-making in 14 OECD Education Systems. Paris: OECD/CERI. Ornelas, C. (2000). The politics of the educational decentralization in Mexico. Journal of Educational Administration, 38 (5): 426-441. Ornelas, C. (2004). Decentralization in Mexico. Paper presented at the annual conference organized by Comparative and International Education Society, March 9-12, in Salt Lake City, the USA. Papagiannis, G.J., Easton, P. A. & Owens, J. T. (1992). The School Restructuring Movement in the USA: an analysis of major issues and policy implications. Paris: Unesco. Patrinos, H. A. & Lakshmanan, A. (1997). Decentralization of Education, Demand-Side Financing. Washington: World Bank. Pierre, J. (2000). Introduction: Understanding Governance. In J. Pierre (ed.). Debating Governance, (pp. 1-12). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Power, S. & Whitty, G. (1997). Managing the State and the Market:‘New’ Education Management in Five Countries. British Journal of Educational Studies, 45 (4): 342-362. Pryor, J. (2003). ‘Community’ Participation in Rural Schooling: a case study from Ghana. Paper presented at the conference organized by United Kingdom Forum for International Education and Training, in Oxford, England, September 9-12, 2003. Reimers, F. & Tiburcio, L. (1993). Education, Adjustment and Reconstruction: Options for Change. A Unesco Discussion Paper. Paris: Unesco. Riley, K., och D. Rawles (1997). Inspection and School Improvement in England and Wales. In T.Townsend (ed.). Restructuring and Quality: Issues for Tomorrow’s Schools. London: Routledge. Robertson, J. M. (1998). From Managing in question to leadership perspectives. International Journal of Education Research, 29: 359-370. Rock Kane, P. and Lauricella, C. J. (2001). Assessing the Growth and Potential of Charter Schools. In H. M. Levin (ed.). Privatizing Education. Can Marketplace Deliver Choice, Efficiency, Equity and Social Cohesion? (pp. 203-233). Boulder: Westview Press. Ruiz de Forsberg, N. (2003). School Community Voices: Implementation of the Autonomous School Program in Nicaragua. Stockholm: Institute of International Education. Samoff, J. (1999). Institutionalizing International Influence. In R. F. Arnove, & C. A. Torres (eds). Comparative Education. The Dialectic of the Global and the Local, (pp. 51-89). Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Santos Filho dos, C.J. (1993). The Recent Process of Decentralization and Democratic Management of Education in Brazil. International Review of Education, 39 (5). Sayed, Y. (2002). Democratising Education in a Decentralized System: South African Policy and Practice. Compare, 32 (1): 35-46. Schneider, H. (1997). Participatory Governance: The Missing Link for Poverty Reduction. Policy Brief No. 17. Paris: OECD. Shaeffer, S. (1994). Participation for Educational Change: A Synthesis of Experience. UNESCO. Paris.

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Siddique, N. A. (1997). Théories de la d’centralisation de l’État. Alternative Sud, IV (3): 23-40. Skolverket (1999). Nationella kvalitetsgranskningen 1998. (The National Quality Assessment 1998). Stockholm: National Agency for Education. Skolverket (2000). Nationella kvalitetsgranskningen 2000. (The National Quality Assessment 2000) Stockholm: The National Agency for Education. Skolverket (2001a). Fem år av försöksverksamhet med lokala styrelser med föräldramajoritet. (Five years of experimentation with local boards with parental majority). Dnr 2000: 615. Stockholm: National Agency for Education. Skolverket (2001b). Attityder till skolan 2000. (Attitudes towards school). Stockholm: The National Agency for Education. Skolverket (2003). SIRIS, SALSA: http://salsa.artisan.se. Retrieved November 15, 2003. Slater, R.O. (1993). On centralization, decentralization and school restructuring: A sociological perspective. In H. Beare and W. L. Boyd (eds.). Restructuring Schools. An International Perspective on the Movement to Transform the Control and Performance of School, (pp. 174-183). London: The Falmer. Southworth, G. (1998). Change and continuity in the work of primary headteachers in England. International Journal of Educational Research, 29: 311-321. Steiner-Khamsi, G. (ed.) (2004) The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending. New York: Teachers College Press. Tikly, L. (1998). Redefining Community Involvement in the Finance and Governance of Education in Developing Countries: A New Role for Local Governance. Paper presented at the conference organized by the World Comparative Education Societies, July 12-17, in Cape Town, South Africa. Tsang, M. D. (2003). School Choice in the People’s Republic of China. In D. N. Plank & G. Sykes (eds.). Choosing Choice. School Choice in International Perspective, (pp. 164-195). New York and London: Teachers College Press. Vynnycky, C. (2004). Obligatorisk grunnskoleopplaering i Sverige, utenor skolen och hjemmmebasert – tegn på forandring? (Compulsory basic education in Sweden, outside the school or home-based – signs of change). In C. Beck & M. Straume (eds.). Hjemmeundervisning – starten på en ny utdanningsrevolusjon? (pp. 67-92). Vallset: Oplandske Bokforlag. Weiler, H. N. (1993). Control Versus Legitimation: The Politics of Ambivalence. In J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy (eds.). Decentralization and School Improvement. Can We Fulfill the Promise?, (pp. 55-83). San Fransisco: The Jossey-Bass Publishers. Weindling, D. (1998). Reform, restructuring, role and other “R” words: The effects of headteachers in England and Wales. International Journal of Educational Research, 29: 299-310. Wells, A. S. and Scott, J. (2001). Privatization and Charter School Reform: Ecnomic, Political and Soäcial Dimensions. In H. M. Levin (ed.). Privatizing Education. Can Marketplace Deliver Choice, Efficiency, Equity and Social Cohesion? (pp. 234-259). Boulder: Westview Press. Welsh, T. & McGinn, N. F. (1999). Decentralization of education: why, when, what and how? Paris: IIEP/Unesco. Whitty, G. (1996). Creating Quasi-Markets in Education: A Review of Recent Research on Parental Choice and School Autonomy in Three Countries. Oxford Studies in Comparative Education, 8 (1).

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Whitty, G. (1997). Marketization, the State and the Re-formation of the Teaching Profession. In A. H. Halsey, H. Lauder, P. Brown, and A. Stuart Wells (eds). Education. Culture, Economy, Society (pp. 299-310). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wieringen, F. van (1997). School Autonomy: A Framework for European Comparison. In S. Lawton, R. Read & F. Wieringen (eds.). Restructuring Public Schooling: Europe, Canada, America, (pp. 59-74). New York: Waxman. Wilson, R.A. (1997). Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction. In R.A.Wilson (ed.). Human Rights, Culture and Context. Anthropological Perspectives, (pp. 1-27). London: Pluto Press. Winkler, D.R. (1993). Fiscal Decentralization and Accountability in Education: Experiences in Four Countries. In J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy (eds.). Decentralization and School Improvement. Can We Fulfill the Promise? (pp. 102-134). San Fransisco: The Jossey-Bass Publishers . Wylie, C. (1995). School-site Management – Some Lessons from New Zealand. Paper given at the annual AERA meeting, San Fransico, United States, 18-21 April, 1995. Zhenyao, W. (1997). L’autonomie villageoise en Chine: état présent et prospective. Alternative Sud, IV, 3: 102-134.

Chapter Three

The State Gives, the State Takes: Educational Restructuring in Norway

Anne Smehaugen

1. Introduction The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the transfer of decision-making that took place in Norway during the 1990s and some of its outcomes. During this decade comprehensive reforms were accomplished, encompassing both structure and contents of the whole system from primary level to higher education. Most of the elements of the world model have been implemented. The description will mainly be confined to compulsory education (Grunnskolen), although some references to upper secondary education (Videregåendeskole) will be made. Tensions between decentralisation and centralisation in the Norwegian education system will be discussed1. Glimpses of the development in five case schools are then presented. Finally, the reforms of restructuring are discussed in an analytical manner.

1.

Education, schooling and teaching/learning will be used as synonyms. Central political documents increasingly refer to ‘learners’, but here children in primary and lower secondary education will be referred to as pupils, and students.

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2. Background Norway was one of the first countries to introduce universal participation in a unified public system2. The system was centrally governed from the top in all significant matters except curricular issues and it was based on strong democratic and egalitarian ideals. Apart from a few private schools, all social groups have been served in the same system. Before the Norwegian education system was subjected to the restructuring reforms, it was generally considered to be one of the world’s most unified, inclusive and democratic systems. Taking a brief retrospective glance seems important in order to “understand the intentions and implementation of the 1990 reforms” (Karlsen, 2001, p. 27), and to be able to identify a perspective from which the decentralization/centralization may be analyzed. Norwegian education history is characterized by continuous tensions between geo-political and cultural peripheries and the centre, with a gradual power concentration in the centre. The standardising developments initiated and directed from the centre have been met with considerable local resistance to centralised educational expertise. Over time, educational ownership, leadership and control moved from strong local provision and self-definition to a fully centralised state system that was completed by the education acts of the 1970s. The education system was marked by a division until the end of the 1950s ( Jarning 199394). The School Act of 1959 was a common law for rural and urban schools, which implied a centralisation policy aimed to abolish educational disparity. This led to the building of new central schools with unified standards, whereas small local schools were closed down (in particular schools with only one or a few grades). Schools no longer held institutional authority, but had become standardised and part of a centrally controlled system. The ‘post-war spirit’, which favoured standardisation and increasing efficiency, was in particular visible in the decade of experimentation and planning that resulted in the obligatory nine-year basic school in 1969 followed by three-year ‘youth school’ (Ungdomsskolen) (Lauvdal 1996). The end of the 1960s marked a turning point of the centralisation policy (Karlsen 1993a, p. 16), which had become an object of criticism by populist movements in rural peripheries (Lauglo, 1990). Some educational researchers documented great inequalities in the standardised and centralised compulsory education (Hoëm, 1968, 1976; Mellin-Olsen & Rasmussen 1975). Advocacy for local and popular educational decision-making was particularly strong in the 1970s and 1980s.

2.

This has been discussed in Smehaugen (2001).

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3. The Norwegian Welfare State The Norwegian welfare state, developed after the second world war, has been a compound of central policies formulated in the respective ministries and with execution in external directorates (Tranøy & Østerud eds. 2001). Social services have been provided by the state and local provision has been dependent on the central state subsidies and regulation. Universal citizen rights to education, health-care and pensions have not been related to social status of work or family and the individual’s rights have not been formally linked to his/her own contribution to society (Esping-Andersen, 1996 a,b). A basic theme which has been ever present is related to tension between the purpose and the organisation of public services. This tension may be expressed as two questions: Should decentralised decisions be favoured in order to ensure closeness to those who are affected by the decisions and thereby apply local expertise and competence to raise the quality of the decisions? Or: Should decisions be made at central level to ensure national equality and standardisation, and thereby raise the quality of decisions by the use of specialised, professional competence (Grønlie, 2001)? Resistance to centralism grew during the 1970s and the executing directorates were increasingly seen as extensions of central power. Peoples’ right to participate was seen to have an intrinsic democratic value and not only as legitimization of central decisions made by the state bodies at local level. The establishment of the ‘county municipality’ became an intermediary body with expanded tasks, e.g. provision of upper secondary education. The period from 1945 to the 1980s as a whole was marked by a combination of politization of the central state and decentralization of management of central policies. Decentralization was primarily of the deconcentration type, an instrumental way of executing central political decisions (Grønlie 2001). Due to urbanization and political centralization, the peripheries, which were largely autonomous and self-developing until the second world-war, had become dependent on large subsidies from the centre to maintain production, employment and welfare (Rokkan 1987; Rokkan & Urwin 1987). The intention of the social engineering project of the post-war ‘Labour Party State’ (Slagstad 1998, 2000) was to build a school system that was socially levelling and in accordance with the needs of changing times. This precipitated a reform cycle ongoing until the late 1980s (Rust, 1989, p. 203), when market liberalism became predominant (Slagstad, 2000). This approach was introduced by the conservative party Høyre and carried further by the Labour Party (Nilsen & Østerberg, 1998). However, there has been strong consensus between Social Democrats and conservatives on restructuring of the education system in the sense of maintaining central state control of the contents of schooling.

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A committee had been formed in 1972 to review the power structure in Norwegian society (headed by the sociologist Gudmund Hernes 3).The committee delivered its final report in 1982, which stated that responsible planning and control had been gradually weakened while fragmentation and segmentation of the state had grown. It was argued that the division between politics and administration had become unclear due to increased specialization (e.g. expertise in external directorates) and the geographical decentralization of authority from central to local levels. The distribution of responsibility was not easily traceable or controllable (NOU 1982, pp. 30-83). An OECD evaluation report of 1988 argued that the state had gone too far in its ambitious drive for decentralization.It recommended a re-centralization of the control of school quality.In this report, the state’s Rationalization Directorate White Paper no. 37 (1990-91)4 advised the government to take back political steering power to the ministry by abolishing the expert committees that previously had been appointed to develop and revise curricula, and to avoid a further development of the ministry merely into an administrative organ (Aarsnes Baune 1997-98, Blichfeldt et al. 1998, pp. 188-89). The closing down of expert committees started in 1992.This event is important, since it implied that curricula came to be developed by the ministry. The establishment of a central evaluation and information on-line network from school via municipality and county authorities to the ministry was recommended. Furthermore, the OECD report questioned whether the generous transfer of power and resources was compatible with the quality principle, since “equality cannot be made distinct from quality” (OECD, 1988, p. 165). It was recommended that the next reform phase concentrated on equality of the outcome of the system.The ministry should introduce new forms of control linked to knowledge/information (ibid., p. 176). This conclusion points to ideological, symbolic and more indirect forms of authority to be applied to regain central control over the school. Such forms became essential in the reforms of the 1990s. The restructuring was initiated in the 1980s and has since been a continuous process bringing more of the same historical tensions as described above. However, some new features have been added, and the new management system – patterned from private economic life – was applied to the state apparatus. A New Public Management (NPM) as Management By Objectives (MBO) was introduced to the state apparatus and to the education system in the early 1990s. The welfare state had worked for dissemination of its welfare policies, but now the state seemed to narrow its own field of operation through decentralization as economic deregulation and privatization. The response to the de-industrialization has in Norway been a mixture of two main strategies: (i) Neo-liberalism, and (ii) social investment. The first has included 3.

4.

Hernes was to become the Education Minister and designer of the 1990 reform package. Since the millennium shift he has been Director of Unesco’s Institute for Educational Planning in Paris. The Government Rationalisation Directorate (Rasjonaliseringdirektoratet) changed its name to Statskonsult in 1989.

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deregulation of the economic sector and adaptation to market and wage flexibility. The result has been a growing income disparity and inequality of social protection (Esping-Andersen 1996 a,b). Citizens increasingly have become referred to as ‘users’ and ‘clients’ (Nielsen & Østerberg 1998).This adaptation is presented to the population as something impossible to avoid (Tranøy & Østerud, eds. 2001). The main aim of the ‘renewal’ in the 1990s was to make public services more effective, simple and profitable (Eide 1995). Market incentives and a block grant system were introduced in 1986 at both municipality and county levels (Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 1984-85, p. 4). The latter covers all public services within health and care, education and culture. This system implies that allocations of grants are to be based on “fixed, objective criteria”. “As a consequence, municipalities and counties now enjoy greater autonomy as regards educational priorities” (MCER, 2000, p. 8, italics added). A new act on municipalities in 1993 carried the new funding system further and placed a new administrative responsibility at this level, especially in health and education. The decentralization of political decision-making to municipality and county levels went in parallel with the abolishment of committees and other counselling bodies, which previously had brought about professional influence in educational matters. The complicated co-operation between political authorities and market forces has had unforeseen effects.There has been a growing need of new forms of control and new bodies and this has led to a focus on measurable entities (Blichfeldt et al. 1998).An important side effect is that aims not easily measurable are neglected (e.g. care, work satisfaction, interpersonal contact, time and space for reflection etc.).With the focus on result orientation in institutions where unambiguous objectives are difficult to formulate, the institutions have to strategically adopt units that are easily measured.

4. The Tradition of Education Reforms Educational changes have traditionally been negotiated by means of political channelling via hierarchical party structures, where ideas on change have been initiated in a bottom-up direction, beginning within the parties and ending with decisions based on consensus between the parties’ top leadership and the government. Implementation has then been carried out from the top level downwards in the system. This system has given considerable formal protection of groups that otherwise would have limited power to articulate their demands. The national curriculum is one important ideological control instrument in decentralization (Lundgren, 1990). A new national curriculum for compulsory education of 1974 (Mønsterplanen) was implemented during this period. It was a ‘model curriculum’ with less specified prescriptions than the 1939 ‘normal plan’ had been in regard to content, progress and achievement level.

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During the 1960s the number of municipalities was reduced from 750 to 450. In 1974, a new level of political decision-making was established in the counties: the ‘county municipality’ (Fylkeskommune, nineteen in number). The running of upper secondary schools became one of its primary tasks, while basic educational provision remained with the municipality. To compensate for the inequalities related to the large variation in the municipality income due to demographic, geographic and economic variables, the central government provided municipalities with task-specific or earmarked grants for compulsory education. The grants varied from 25 to 85 per cent of the total cost, depending upon the municipalities’ tax revenues and total costs. Some essential disadvantages of this system were pointed out by the national committee in 1974 (NOU 1974:53, pp. 33-44): it was rigid and might be open for exploitation of the transfer system. Moreover, it did not stimulate local self-determination. During the 1970s and 1980s, the central political authorities had been undermined by counter-cultural movements that contested centralised, alienating, impersonal systems and advocated democracy in local, social networks. Decentralization efforts of the 1970s and 1980s had not been fully implemented. Karlsen (1993a) has documented that the geographical/ physical availability of schools had not been changed. He also claims that the reform of the funding system did not lead to any great changes in the schools’ financial situation. On the contrary, decentralised power to the school level in organizational matters decreased from 1970 to 1990. Class size, time and subject distribution were decided at central level, for example. It was primarily the central federation of municipalities (Kommununes Sentralforbund) that had been working for the decentralization of economic matters and administration, while teacher organizations had been negative due to apprehended inequalities. Eide (1983) also points to the minimal real decision-making power in the bodies of the representative school democracy. Those parent representatives who had any influence were mostly well-educated and economically privileged. In 1987, the 1974 curriculum was replaced by revised national guidelines (Mønsterplan for grunnskolen 1987, M 87). The M 87 was more radical than the curriculum of 1974 by its celebration of decentralization, de-standardization and de-specialization (Solstad 1997). Moreover, there was a demand for curricula and working plans adapted to local conditions and a call for local development and innovation: “Local participation in decisions implies that all sectors of the school community share responsibility for deciding what kind of school they are going to have and for taking the initiative and co-operating in the efforts to improve the school” (MCE/MCS 1987). The new obligatory national curriculum implemented during the 1990 reform represented a radical shift.

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5. The Package of Restructuring

5.1 General Features The reforms of the 1990s represented a breakaway from corporatist decision-making in many respects (Blichfeldt et al. 1998; Hovednak, 1998; Slagstad 2000): traditional participants, such as pedagogical professionals, were excluded from the formulation process; elite discussion groups were selected by the minister; the rhythm of the reform process was rapid; the scope of the reforms wide; only fragments of the proposal were open to public discussion at any point of time; teachers were degraded, impact from pedagogic expertise weakened and critical and reflexive public discourse was undermined for the benefit of an adaptive ideology. The ‘social investment route’ as part of the transition of the welfare state to de-industrialization, referred to previously, has helped specific strata from being excluded from education or work. Large-scale privatization of education and social services has so far been avoided and the state has taken a tighter ideological control; education is presented as investment in human capital (Hovednak, 1998; Lauvdal, 1996). The new act on municipalities (Kommuneloven) of 1993 led to more integration of education into the total activity of the municipality. Experimentation conducted in the 1990s with schools organised and governed as enterprises led to professional management and weakened pedagogical leadership and increased emphasis on ‘user’ influence in these schools. Educational priorities have become part of a new administrative unity of children’s total growing-up environment. At the municipality level, the competition between sectors was reinforced. At the school level this led to an upgrading of the responsibility of the principal as representative of the school owner and employer. The teacher assembly at school level, which had functioned as the school’s professional council, was abolished and a representative board was introduced. The reform delegated responsibility to local co-ordination and local solutions to conflicts in the distribution of economic resources (in many municipalities scarce) and organizational measures. Another effect seems to have been a politicization and de-professionalization of decision-making at municipality and school levels. From 1999 both primary and secondary education are regulated by a common act (Education Act, July 1998). This implies that the two levels for the first time were placed under the same principal aims (Stette, 2001, p. 1), carried further in the national core curriculum. The reform of upper secondary education has been part of the ultimate aim of the reform: to create a more flexible work force with great adaptability in a rapidly changing society. This aim also

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has been integrated into government economic programs (Eide 1995), and their impact on reform strategies and changes in the basic school is of interest when autonomy at this level is discussed. The main goal of this new policy is to take people’s capabilities and aptitudes more effectively into use and to raise their competence. It was argued that it is the learning environment more than the students’ different socio-cultural background that determines the development of their skills (NOU 1988:28). The relationship between economy and increased educational equality was overtly articulated. The need for high academic and scientific standards was stressed and a claim was raised that knowledge transformed into competence of action. The ambitious vision of the reform program was to create a unified system “from cradle to disputation” (White Paper no. 40 1990-91). Now the discussion started with critical focus on the top of the educational hierarchy: higher education.The political visions were to adapt higher education to the post-industrial knowledge society and to adopt international standards via economic incentives by which funding became linked to number and pace of streaming through of students (Karlsen 2002). It is therefore quite symptomatic of this new policy of knowledge that the restructuring started with the higher education reform in 1994. Universities and colleges were incorporated into one national network of higher education (Norgesnettet). The previous 98 regional, independent colleges were reduced to a system of 26 state colleges. The reform of higher education was followed by the reform of upper secondary education in the school year 1994/95 (Reform 94, referred to as R 94).This reform had three main elements. Reform of structure. It encompassed structural simplification and new curricula and new didactic approaches. There was a move away from early specialization to a general knowledge base. Reform of rights. All students between the ages of 16 to 19 years have statutory right to three years of post-compulsory education (grades 11-13). Reform of contents. A new general curriculum (which was common to primary, secondary and adult education, hereafter labelled core curriculum) and specific syllabuses in all subjects were introduced in 1994. The reform of 1997 (R 97) extended the basic schooling to ten years. The previous curriculum guidelines (M 87), were substituted by an obligatory curriculum introduced in 1997 (Læreplanen av 1997, further referred to as L 97). Like the upper secondary reform, it was motivated by broad societal changes and needs related to both working life and family life. Management by objectives is from R 94 introduced as management model, the focus has shifted from teaching to learning and from guidelines to learning stages to be attained by all students. This implies a shift of the contents from main essentials to goals to be attained5. 5.

It is an overall point of departure that education shall stimulate the development of the whole human being; “the integrated human being” (MCER 1996: 63, translated from Norwegian). The ministry has taken the right to prescribe the characteristics that are to be part of the whole human being: The spiritual human being; The creative human being; The working human being; The liberally- educated human being; The social human being; The environmentally aware human being; The integrated human being.

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5.2 Levels and Domains of Decision-making and Administration The 1988 revision of the Basic School Act of 1969 implied a decentralising move from central level to municipality level. The 1988 Act thus transferred power from state and county level to the municipality, by making the municipality council autonomous in decisions concerning the running of compulsory education within its area. The Act also implied de-specialization with less emphasis on specialised expert knowledge but at the same time, it weakened the pedagogical/ educational power. As to the specific features, the following is based on Solstad’ s (1997) analysis. School districts and school catchments: In the new system each municipality council (Kommunestyret) is free to determine the number of schools, their catchment areas and to a large extent, how funding is to be allocated to the schools (Solstad 1997). The appointment of teachers, principals, and municipality education chief officers (MCEOs): Traditionally the municipality education committee had the right to appoint teachers, deputy heads, headteachers and the municipality education officer but the decisions had to be approved by the DOS. From 1988, teachers and principals are still appointed by the education committee but approval from DOS is no longer required. It is important to note that the municipality chief education officer (MCEO) is no longer appointed by the education committee but by the municipality council (ibid.). The administration of the education committee: The MCEO “comes under the education committee in questions of school policy, but under the chief municipality executive (rådmann) in matters concerning municipality administration”. Thus education has been integrated into the broad range of municipality services and administration. Based on the 1988 act, the Ministry presented regulations that were implemented from 1990: The principal may decide more regarding the organization of the school day and the total distribution of time spent on each subject over the school year, to make it easier to practice subject integration, project and topic work and excursions; From rules to plans: principals and the municipality chief education officer are responsible for making annual school plans to describe the role the education department is to play within the overall municipality plan concerning the total environment of growing children. The directors of schools are responsible for monitoring the implementation of these plans (ibid.). Decentralization and centralization in education are here taken to have three main dimensions: 1) Geographical deconcentration: Spread and availability of schools in the locality of the student as opposed to big institutions, which are centrally located. In Norway, with a scattered population in a topography with difficult access due to mountains

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Anne Smehaugen and fjords, there has been a strong tradition of maintaining numerous and small schools. 2) Administrative dimension: Transfer of tasks and functions according to common standardised procedures and regulations that are set at central level. 3) Power dimension: This deals with power that is disclaimed and power that is seized (Karlsen 1993b).

With specific reference to education systems, the power dimension is assumed to be regulated by three main types of control tools: ideological, economic and legal (Karlsen 1993b; Lundgren 1990; Solstad 1997). Evaluation may, according to Lundgren (1990), be viewed as a distinct dimension of power: the more decentralised and loose the three other power dimensions are, the more evaluation tends to take the function of indirect rule of conduct. The Education Act of 1998 regulates primary and secondary education (Opplæringslova, last changed August 1st 2003) and carries further the authorization from previous acts to “give binding curricular provisions on subject matters and instructional time, essential work methods and work contents and aims to be fulfilled in primary and secondary education” (MCER, 1998, p. 3). The act states the right of all children to attend a public, free school, closest to their home. Furthermore, all pupils have the right to belong to a school class, even if they are in need of special education. Private schools receiving state grants are regulated by a separate act and private education in state-subsidised schools will continue to be regulated. Table 3.1 below provides an outline of levels and domains of decision-making and administration based on the act and the total curriculum framework regulating basic education: Core Curriculum; Principles and Guidelines, and Subject Syllabus.The liaison committee (consisting of two teacher representatives, two parent representatives and two representatives from the municipality board) has the right to express its opinions in all matters concerning the school. The municipality may appoint this body as an internal school board. All schools (from grade 5 to 7 and from 8 to 10) are required to establish pupil councils with one representative from each class. All classes are to have a class assembly consisting of all pupils of the class and a parents’ assembly, which establishes a working committee which, in its turn, elects the representatives to the co-operative committee. The nation-wide parent association for the basic school is an independent and advisory body for the ministry in cases that concern the co-operation between the school and the home.

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Table 3.1 Decision, Administrative and Operational Levels in Basic Education National level: The Legislative power of the Parliament. The Government decides additional provisions. The Ministry of Education and Research Act on Training with prescriptions: ❐ ❐ ❐ ❐ ❐ ❐ ❐ ❐ ❐

teachers qualifications, financial grant to municipality as block grant, approval of course and textbooks (to be in accordance with goals and contents of the learning plan), maximum size of schools maximum number of students per class, responsible for the development of textbooks and other instructional material for special education, the right to control the school by means of documentation and access to control school buildings in co-operation with the school owner, decide student evaluation forms and procedures, length of the school year

The national learning plan: ❐

❐ ❐

❐ ❐ ❐

main goals, principles and guidelines/prescriptions on methods*, aids and pupils assessment, subjects to be taught*, obligatory subject syllabus with detailed description of what the singular “student shall” work with, learn, know, experience, observe, understand etc., indication of time to be used at each stage as theme and project method work, distribution of teaching hours per subject at the various stages, additional subject choice among alternative options

Municipality level: Local authority as ‘school owner’ and responsible for basic education Act on Training with prescriptions: Responsibility*: Planning, building and running of schools and special educational help. Responsibility for school buildings. That applied textbooks are approved of. Provide pupils with transport if necessary. Establish a “school leisure arrangement” before and after the school day from grades 1-4. Conduct school-based evaluation ❐ ❐

decision on school attendance area, eventual free school choice, distribution of financial resources from the block grant to schools (health and other social services),

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teacher appointment, decide on additional teaching to the minimum standards set by the ministry

School level: Principal leading. School-board representatives of teachers, students, parents & the municipality** The national learning plan: Responsible for: the quality of the learning environment, achievement of national goals, cooperation home and school, school and local community, organization and implementation of national curricula, combination of syllabuses and local exemplification (eventually as substitution) and additional teaching materials, diffe-rentiation at individual student level decide on methods, which are not made obligatory * Regulated both by the act and the learning plan ** This is a board for ‘user participation’ in the school, the principal is an obligatory member. Based on: the Act of Training (decided June 17th 1998, last change June 30, 2000); Regulations of June 28. 1998, last changes January 19. 2001; The Learning Plan Work for the 10-year basic school (MCER, 1996)6.

6. Case Studies. Glimpses from Five Schools in Three Municipalities All decentralised authority has been relocated from the state to the municipal chief executive. Degree and area of delegation from there to the school level may vary from one municipality to another. Formal positions of pedagogical leadership have been weakened or abolished in order to provide the municipality with the necessary freedom to act as ‘school owner’. Due to the increasing degree of diversification, it is impossible to give a generalized picture of the concrete mechanisms for teacher and parent participation available at school level; theoretically there may exist as many models as there are municipalities (434). Information provided by the biggest national teacher association (Utdanningsforbundet) indicates that so far, generalizable knowledge allowing an overall description does not exist. The situation at five case schools will be described: two elementary schools (grades 1-7); two youth schools (grades 8-10); and finally one combined elementary/youth school (grades 1-10). Three municipalities with significantly different administrative and organizational models have been chosen, and principals at the five schools have been interviewed about school autonomy. 6.

The Education Act was changed August 1st 2003, but here this last change has not been implemented.Table 3.1. systematizes what was the legal and curricular framework when principals at five case schools were interviewed in January and February 2003.The major changes brought about by this change is that the maximum number of pupils in each school classes no longer is centrally defined. § 8-2,‘Organization of pupils in group,’ states: “Pupils may be divided into groups according to needs”. (Translated from Norwegian).

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The main focus has been on teacher and parent participation at school level with particular relevance to economic resources, contents of the teaching/learning and pedagogical methods .7 What is common to all cases (and decided at central level) is the fact that the principal at each school has the right to govern in all issues of formal decision-making at his/her school and to eventually, in cases of discord, make decisions that are contrary to the teachers’ opinions. Teachers and parents have no rights of formal decision-making, only the right to express their opinions. Formalised arenas for discussion which are common to all the schools are: Representative board where a representative of the local body of the teachers’ union (with no right of negotiation) and the elected safety deputy takes part; Parent class meetings (to be held at a minimum of twice a year); and Development talks/evaluation between class teacher and individual parents (minimally twice a year).

6.1 A Rural Municipality Situated in a Mountain Area This municipality has been economically weakened after the increased administrative and economic co-ordination between various sectors was introduced to the municipalities in 1993. The small neighbourhood schools (grendeskoler) with the exception of one, have been closed down in this municipality. However, the relationship between the municipality and the case school has until present followed a somewhat traditional model, with no specific accreditation to the school. Appointment of teachers and decision on teacher salaries are maintained at the municipality level. The principals report to the municipality chief education officer. Accumulated finances are made available to the schools, based on schools’ documentation of number of classes and special education needs. The relative number of teaching hours is under the pressure of cost cutting 8. School 1 (grades 1-7) Budget: The principal presents a budget proposal to the liaison committee (which is a counselling body). It is also presented to the elected representatives of the teacher organizations, who then discuss the proposal with all the members. The representatives take part in discussions in the representative board. The principal makes the final decision.

7.

8.

Schools were selected so as to illustrate what may happen in schools selected along rural – urban division and different levels of compulsory education. Two days after the interview ( January 13th 2003), the Municipality Board decided to close down the very last one of the small neighborhood schools (grendeskoler) as an administrative and professional entity, and subordinate it to the central school. It was also decided that the central schools will be converted to self-governed entities, and the principal will report directly to the chief municipal executive (the municipal chief education officer is to be abolished).

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Contents of Teaching/Learning: The school arranges staff meetings in order to discuss areas and contents of innovative and development work. It is in this forum that teachers enjoy the greatest informal – but real – influence. Furthermore, each team of teachers, organised for each class level, has autonomy to decide on matters concerning methods, co-ordination of projects, etc. in areas which are not regulated by the binding framework (L97); development work initiated by the ministry (mathematics, reading/writing and information technology), or regional or intra-municipality projects co-ordinated by the municipality chief education officers (e.g. to strengthen pupils’ social competence). It should be noted that the school has freedom to define such projects on its own, provided that these are in line with the suggestions of the local education authorities, since the chief education officer controls a certain amount of money for such activities. At this school, the parents participated in a survey in order to decide upon the specific topics most urgent to improve as regards their own children’s social behaviour. 88 per cent of the parents participated. Apart from the collective projects mentioned above, the school has almost no time left for local adaptation of the curriculum at school or class level to complement the fixed national prescriptions of L97, which are found to be very detailed and demanding. Methods of Teaching/Learning: Additional decisions on methods to be obligatory for the whole school (apart from those in L 97) are made at this school. These are based on discussions at staff meetings on how to reach the overall objectives of the school (e.g. in social competence, reading/writing). Every teacher must make a written proposal on how to implement the teaching in the classroom and how to evaluate and document the results. School 2 (grades 8-10) School 2 seemed to be organised in a way quite similar to that of school 1, and both principals explicitly emphasised the importance of making the informal professional autonomy of teachers as extensive as possible, based on confidence in teacher professionalism. Teachers teaching different subjects were involved section-wise in group discussions on budgetary matters at this school. Participation in contents and methodological matters were also here concentrated around special collective projects (e.g. a ‘students activity hour’ in the middle of the school day). Additional funds had been allocated by the state for innovative and pedagogical research activities based on applications written by the principal. The teachers were actively participating in cross-disciplinary teams in order to co-ordinate theme and project-based activities during the school year. The subject-grouped sections had the principals’ sanctioning to ‘damp down’ central prescriptions to the advantage of local teaching content, since fulfilment of both local and central requirements were seen to be impossible.

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6.2. A Neighbour Municipality of the Capital of Oslo School 3 (grades 1-7) In this municipality, each school is an autonomous entity and has received a total economic and administrative mandate from the municipality; e.g. to employ teachers and pay their salaries. The school may apply to the municipality for additional funds to undertake special projects for strengthening basic subjects. The municipality manages parts of the subsidies from the central state and channels them into targeted fields given priority by the municipality. In the academic year of 2002/2003, mathematics, Norwegian and social competence were prioritised. Due to the fact that the municipality chief executive had transferred accreditation to the principal, the latter could make decisions that were contrary to the view of the chief education officer, who had only a counselling function in cases of discord, for instance between the school and parents. The school was a so-called self-governed school, but due to regulations at central and local levels, the researcher could not consider it to be an autonomous school. Like the two previous cases, this school would have to undergo cost cutting, resulting in reduction of the number of teachers. Budget: Money was allocated according to the number of classes; linguistic minorities and additional costs for special education. The amount of funds for special education was based on three components: (i) funds related to documented total needs and not in relation to single student needs; (ii) individual student diagnosis based on expert evaluation, and (iii) ten per cent of the total budget to be available for problems that might arise throughout the year for students without any diagnosis. Within these tight budget frames, teacher and parent influence on the budget was formal rather than real. A formal procedure of discussion was, however, followed in staff meetings, the liaison committee and through the representative board. Contents and Methods of Teaching/Learning: Common innovative areas were decided on the basis of proposals on contents and methods (additional to those prescribed in L 97), put forward in the weekly staff meeting. To give an example: In 2002/2003, mathematics and information technology were prioritised, and a particular project method (‘story-line’) was made compulsory minimally twice a year in all classes. Another factor, which tended to have an influence on the work in the school, were the parent user surveys initiated by the municipality chief executive, but the results were made known neither to the general public nor to the school. Based on this and surveys conducted in other sectors, the chief executive had worked out a steering document that was common to all sectors in the municipality. It contained fixed objectives, general perspectives on how to reach them, and evaluation and documentation of achievements. The role of the school was to operationalise the national and municipality objectives to the school arena and deliver a quantitative outcome report at the end of the school year.

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This school was constructed and organized as an open school without fixed classrooms and traditional classroom teaching. Teaching was based on progressive pedagogical ideas from the 1970s, and project work was the dominant method. The school was in competition with hundreds of other schools elected by the National Learning Centre (Læringssentret) as one of the ‘gratiale schools’ (bonusskoler) in 2002. The school observed and fulfilled the quantitative measurements ordained by the municipality chief executive just like the previous case school, but it also undertook an extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluation over two years with the help of external consultants and peer review. The internal evaluative process included working seminars throughout a period of four months, during which the staff worked out criteria and procedures for self-evaluation. The principal stated that at this school the formal fora for parent and teacher participation were of less use than in a traditional school. At this school, informal and flexible processes of interaction took place all the time. Moreover, the school ran courses for parents in order to provide them with the competence to be actively involved in the school’s project-oriented teaching/learning activities. As far as the budget situation is concerned, this school was also marked by the financial cutbacks.

6.3 The Capital of Oslo School 5 (Grades 1-10) This school was a common elementary and youth school, located in an intermediate position between socio-cultural and economic differences related to a traditional East- and West End of Oslo. Like other basic schools in the capital, it was organized as an independent enterprise, managed by an internal school board (including representatives of teachers, students, parents and the municipality), to which the principal reported. As in the previous municipality, total accreditation was given from municipality to school level. e.g. as to teacher appointments and salaries. The activity of the school was governed by guiding principles set by central and local levels as in the four other schools, but also by the school site board. The principal perceived this management model as a heavy control system marked by extensive outcome report procedures, in particular in the pedagogical field. She also expressed that at this school it was institutionalized but formally non-regulated processes and fora – rather than formalized bodies – that allowed the greatest real participatory democracy for teachers and parents. Examples of such fora were teams, planning groups and staff meetings. Budget: In 2002/2003, funds were for the first time allocated according to the number of students, not according to the number of classes as previously. This favoured economically

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schools which had tried to keep classes small. The result was a decline in the funds by approximately five per cent and it reduced the possibility to keep the size of classes down. Two teachers were likely to be fired due to this decline. Moreover, it was also new that year that allotment to special education was no longer based on documented individual needs, but on a calculation of total socio-economic factors in this particular part of the city. The principal had no information about the criteria used for these estimations. Nevertheless, the transfer of funds was still contingent upon individual diagnoses and obligatory, individual curricular programs. Contents and Methods of Teaching/Learning: No binding decisions concerning methods were made at this school, and teacher autonomy in the classroom was relatively great (within the national curricular framework). Also, teams functioned as quite autonomous entities in these regards, more than in economic matters. Co-ordination at collective school and team levels seemed to give more influence on contents and methods of working. There were extensive, informal contacts with parents, and a parent net-café was being set up. Parents enjoyed greater representative influence than in the two other organizational models discussed previously, since they were represented on the school board.

7. Discussion and Conclusion The following critical viewpoints derive from the sources used for the general description but also from the impressions gained through the interviews at the five case schools. Modernised state paternalism: more demanding – less caring? Much of the centralised governance through soft, ideological power being strongly pursued in the post-war period – presumably with a break in the 1970s and 1980s – seems to be brought further in the reforms of the 1990s. Such power takes the form of procedures of quality control, and authoritarian regulation of peoples’ identity and self-understanding through the expansion of open, social competition and reward. The state was previously more concerned to provide all citizens with equal educational opportunities, as a means to create the planned, democratic society. Simultaneously, the need of the state to get more out of the talents of the people in order to become more competitive has become even more directly formulated in the recent reforms. However, the steering mechanisms of the state have become subtler, and actors at all levels seem to participate in self-regulative processes, which are linked to economic incentives and systemic control mechanisms. It has become more evident that education is not an independent social institution in society: the restructuring of education fits well into the welfare state ‘modernization’ and economic liberalization process that started in the late 1980s, and which primarily has been justified by declining economic resources and claims of greater efficiency in public services.

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The municipality: pseudo-owners of schools? Given that school ownership links funding, control of contents and output of the teaching/learning, it seems that municipalities continue to manage and set into work the politics of the centre. The processes starting in the 1980s have largely continued to strengthen power at central level, since the municipality is totally economically dependent upon the central state. Economic decentralization is intended to improve costefficiency by means of competition between sectors and institutions. Municipalities that, for instance, give priority to maintenance of small schools, may easily become defined by central authorities as incompetent school-owners. Principals and teachers seem to give less time and attention to local adaptation of the contents of the teaching/learning, which would benefit local self-definition and contextual meaning attached to the contents of teaching/learning. Criteria for control of output are set at the national level. Schools as cultural institutions: exposed to bureaucratic sequestration? Schools increasingly seem to be governed through a combination of dependency, scarce resources and social control mechanisms. One of the head teachers expressed that her work and working time are increasingly drawn out and away from the school. She had to participate more and more in intersectorial co-operation and networks imposed by the municipal chief executive, even if she at the same time was constantly requested by the same executive to lead the school in ways that promoted decisions made in direct interaction with the ‘users’ at the school.These contradictory claims seem to be symptomatic of the current situation into a broader sense, as education has become integrated into common municipality services and priorities where the distinctive character of schools are neglected. Outcome measures at municipality level have led to weakening of decisions made in personal, human relations at the school. An increasing number of decisions seem to be made at a collective level and at a distance from the personal teacherstudent relationship. Teacher professionalism: degraded and impaired? Some of the conclusions drawn in the evaluation of Reform 94 of upper secondary education seem to be valid also for the Reform 97 of primary and lower secondary schools. Two forces work simultaneously: deregulation and bureaucratic control of output. Teachers, as other civil servants, have lost prestige, participatory influence and space for pedagogical leadership. The autonomy of teachers apparently has declined. During the 1970s and 1980s, the school seemed to provide teachers with autonomy to take the local community and parents’/pupils’ self-definition seriously. This situation was strongly criticised by the OECD evaluators, and after a period of de-skilling and re-skilling, the 1990 reforms gave less possibility to diversify the teaching/learning in the classroom. At all the five case schools it seems to be the staff meetings and the subject-organised teams that provide the greatest potential for influence, even if this is only obtained through informal discussion and not through formal decision-making. Parent participation: how valuable is ‘user’ influence? Is contemporary decentralization resulting in a more flexible, dynamic and conflict-related substitutive reform model, where

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groups who are dissatisfied with the school set up alternatives that are related to their wishes? The Norwegian reform model – typical of liberal societies – entails weak protection of social groups who are too powerless to initiate and set up alternatives, which would be more beneficial to their special needs. Parents interests and influence are indirectly promoted through standardised surveys and representative (rather than participatory) democracy. Even if all pupils have the right to individually adapted education, parents’ face-to-face interaction with the teachers seems to concern activities in each class, parts of common projects of the school as a whole, rather than matters of the personal teaching/learning processes. Power to influence in abstract, general and systemic manners is unevenly distributed among parents, and old inequalities may be reinforced in new ways. All the advice given in the OECD report to the Norwegian Ministry have little-by-little been implemented – also concerning the publishing of ‘quality’ outcomes of the system. In January 2003, the final grades from all Norwegian youth schools were for the first time published via Internet, and the media immediately started the rankings of schools. In all, Norway has implemented the most important ingredients of the world models and has been very much influenced by the report published by OECD.

8. References Aarsnes Baune, T. (1997-98). Fra Gjøstein til Hernes. In: Jordheim, K. (ed.). Skolen 1997-98. Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie. 16: 62-75. Stiftelsen Skolen. Blichfeldt, J. F., Deichman-Sørensen, T., Lauvdal , T. (1998) Mot et nytt kunnskapsregime? Evaluering av Reform 94. Organisering og samarbeid. Sluttrapport. Oslo: AFI’s Rapportserie nr. 7/98. Eide, K. (1983) Grunnlaget for utdanningspolitikken i 1980- og 90-årene. Oslo: Tiden. Eide, K. (1995) Økonomi og utdanningspolitikk. Økonomisk forskning som premiss for utdanningspolitikken. Oslo: Utredningsinstituttet for forskning av høyere utdanning. Esping-Andersen, G. (1996a) Welfare states without work: The impasse of labour shedding and familialism in continental European social policy. In G. Esping-Andersen, (ed.) (1996) Welfare states in transition. National adaptations in global economies. London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli: Sage Publications. Esping-Andersen, G. (1996b) Positive-sum solutions in a world of trade-offs? In G. Esping-Andersen, (ed.) (1996) Welfare states in transition. National adaptations in global economies. London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli: Sage Publications. Grønlie, T. (2001) Den reformerte sentralforvaltningen. In B. S. Tranøy & Ø. Østerud (eds.) Den fragmenterte staten. Reformer, makt og styring. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk Forlag. Hoëm, A. (1968) Samer, skole og samfunn. Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, 9: 27-41. Hoëm, A. (1976) Makt og kunnskap. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

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Hovednak, S. S. (1998) Pedagogisk diskurs i 90-åras utdanningsreformer. Tromsø Universitet. Jarning, H. (1993-94) Mellom statsmakt og sosialiseringsmakt. Skolen 1993-94. Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie. 12: 12-51. Stiftelsen Skolen. Karlsen, G. E. (1993a) Desentralisering – løsning eller oppløsning? Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal. Karlsen, G. E. (1993b) Desentralisert skoleutvikling. Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal. Karlsen, G. E. (2001) Implementering av utdanningsreformer. In S. Hovdenak and S. Stenersen (ed.). Perspektiver på Reform 97. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk Forlag. Karlsen, G. E. (2002) Utdanning, styring og marked. Norsk utdanningspolitikk i et internasjonalt perspektiv. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Kommunal – og arbeidsdepartementet (1984-85). Om endringer i lover vedrørende inntektssystemet for kommunene og fylkeskommunen. Oslo: Author. Lauglo, J. (1990) A comparative perspective with special reference to Norway. In: M. Granheim, M. Koan, and U. P. Lundgren (eds.) Evaluation as policymaking. London: Jessica Kingsley. Lauvdal, T. (1996) Makt og interesser. Styring og forhandlingssystemer i skolesektoren. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Lundgren, U. P. (1990) Educational policy-making. Decentralisation and evaluation. In M. Granheim, M., Koan, and U. P. Lundgren (eds.) Evaluation as policymaking. London: Jessica Kingsley. MCE/MCS (1974) Ministry of Church and Education/Ministry of Culture and Science. Mønsterplan for grunnskolen 1974. Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. MCE/MCS (1987) Ministry of Church and Education/Ministry of Culture and Science. Mønsterplan for grunnskolen 1987. English version: Curriculum guidelines for compulsory education in Norway. (1990). MCE/MCS (1989) Ministry of Church and Education/Ministry of Culture and Science/ Organisation for Economic and Cultural Co-operation. OECD-vurdering av norsk utdanningspolitikk. Oslo: Author. MCER (1996) Ministry of Church, Education and Research (1996) Læreplanverket for den 10-årige grunnskolen. Oslo: Author. MCER (1998) Ministry of Church, Education and Research (1998) Circular F-52-98. MCER (2000) Ministry of Church, Education and Research (2000) http://odin.net.no/usd/. Retrieved: October 15, 2000. Mellin-Olsen, S. & Rasmussen, R. (1975) Skolens vold. Oslo: Pax. Nielsen, H. & Österberg, D. (1998) Statskvinnen Gro Harlem Brundtland og nyliberalismen. Oslo: Forum, Aschehoug. NOU (1974:53) Mål og retningslinjer for reformer i lokalforvaltningen. Oslo: Kommunal – og arbeidsdepartementet. NOU (1982:3) Maktutredningen. Sluttrapport. Oslo: Kommunal – og arbeidsdepartementet. NOU (1988: 28) Med viten og vilje. Oslo: Kommunal – og arbeidsdepartementet. OECD (1988). Reviews of National Politics for Education. Paris: OECD. Rokkan, S. (1987) Stat, nasjon, klasse. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Rokkan, S. & Urwin, D. W. (1987) Economy-territory-identity. Politics of the West European Peripheries. London: Sage Publications.

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Rust, V. D. (1989) The democratic tradition and the evolution of schooling in Norway. New York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press. Slagstad, R. (1998) De nasjonale strateger. Oslo: Pax Forlag. Slagstad, R. (2000) Kunnskapens hus. Fra Hansteen til Hanseid. Oslo: Pax Forlag AS. Smehaugen, A. (2001). Inclusion & exclusion in culture, learning and education. A European perspective – the cases of Spain and Norway. Studies in Comparative and International Education no. 58. Stockholm: Institute of International Education. Solstad, K. J. (1997) Equity at risk. Planned educational change in Norway: Pitfalls and Progress. Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oxford, Boston: Scandinavian University Press. Stette, Ø. (2001) Opplæringslova med forskrifter. Oslo: Pedlex Norsk Skoleinformasjon. Statskonsult (1989:4) Områdegjennomgang av den statlige undervisningsadministrasjonen. Oslo: Author. Tranøy, B. S. & Ø. Østerud (eds.) (2001). Den fragmenterte staten. Reformer, makt og styring. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk Forlag. White Paper no. 37 (1990-91) Om organisering og styring av utdanningssektoren. Oslo: Ministry of Church and Education. White Paper no. 40 (1990-91) Fra visjon til virke. Om høyere utdanning. Oslo: Ministry of Church and Education.

Chapter Four

Steps of Educational Decentralization in Greece: between Delegation and Deconcentration

Petroula Siminou

1. Introduction This chapter describes the attempts at education decentralization in Greece within the framework of general restructuring of society encouraged by the European Union (EU), and of the type prescribed in the education world model. The system has since 1981 been on constant reforms towards democratization, technological development, curriculum changes and the introduction of lifelong learning (Bouzakis, 1999), but it was with the pressure and support from international organizations that decentralization speeded up and started to take a shape similar to the features suggested in the world model. In order to place Greek decentralization in its context, some national characteristics as well as changes will be described. Some of the changes are associated with globalization processes, while others are not. Stavros (1996) argues that the official ideology of the Greek State has been built almost exclusively around the concept of a single nation, with a common creed and language. A more convincing evidence of Greece’s self-perception as one of the most homogeneous countries in ethnic, religious and linguistic terms may be found in a series of policies concerning the acquisition of Greek citizenship by those who belong to the nation (omogeneis) and its loss by those who do not (allogeneis) and the position of minorities.

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The centralizing tendencies are also evident in the urbanization, occurring rapidly after the 1950s (Legg & Roberts, 1997), has resulted in a demographic and administrative ‘hydrocephalism’ with almost 40 per cent of the country’s population living in the capital city of Athens and the countryside has been left semi-deserted (Capsi, 2000, p. 5). The tradition of the political system in Greece is dominated by ‘state of provisions’,‘state as employer’ and ‘state of clients relations’ (Skandalidis, 1999). Consequently, the question concerning the way the constitutional democracy would secure and guarantee the balance between equality and freedom in the ‘information society’ implies a triple response: Decentralization, autonomy and co-responsibility – actually meaning that the following steps are considered necessary: 1) For the government, decentralization and dissemination of authorities to the representative and social institutions. For the representative legitimate institutions, transparent and autonomous authorities constructively and continuously decentralized. 2) For the social organization of the basis, a continuous expansion of economic, political democracy towards the structure of a decentralized, contemporary and democratic state. 3) For the society, development of self-administration ability (decisions and control).

2. Greece and the European Union Greece entered the European Community in 1981. The Europeanization of Greece is evident in the constant educational changes since its accession in the EU. The impact of the EU membership upon the role of the state fostered a reduction in its economic activities and in the gigantic size of state bureaucracy. It has also altered the regulatory pattern of the Greek economy, from one tightly controlled by the state into one conforming to the EU’s regulatory regime (Ioakimidis, 2001, p. 80). The Greek state, since its access to the EU, has developed at least six new policy functions as a direct response to the need to adjust its performance to the EU’ s policy. These policies are the following ones: Structural policy; Policy for cross border cooperation; Policy for vocational training; Policy for the protection of the environment; Policy for research and technology; Consumer protection. Before its entrance into the EU, the Greek state had pursued certain incoherent activities in the above policy areas, but these activities could hardly be described as ‘policies’ in any meaningful sense. Ioakimidis (2001) argues that without the impact of the EU, the Greek state would not have gone so far as to shape coherent policies in all six areas mentioned above. The Greek experience therefore indicates a downward flow of policy competencies, from the EU to the state. The state is forced in certain cases to assume functions and to shape policies, choices

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and performance which it would not have assumed in the absence of the EU’ s impact. This can be seen as the Europeanization of the policy mix performed by the state, Europeanization that springs from the interactive policy exchanges between the EU and the member states. Moreover, the Europeanization process has in several ways (institutional, financial, etc.) encouraged the formation of an increasing number of social associations, especially non-governmental organizations (ibid. , p. 84). Statistical data show that the number of bodies financed by the European Commission between 1996 and 1998 increased four times. Included in these is the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), which contributes to economic and social policy-making. It must also be pointed out that one of the effects of the Europeanization process is that the Greek state has begun to draw up development plans for concluding the Community Support Framework (CSF) with the Commission. Thus, apart from governmental departments, other social and economic actors (economic associations, universities, etc.) have also been drawn into the process of seeking to influence policy outputs (ibid., p. 89). As in many EU member states, the European Structural Funds (ESFs) support the funding of development and educational strategies and implementations through Operation Programmes of the Community Support Framework in Greece. The Special Service of Programmes implementation at the Ministry of national education, which was established in 2002, is under the auspices of the Minister 1. The EU Commission report (2002) suggests measures to reduce the non-wage labour cost, the offer of greater incentives to encourage part-time employment, and to complete the reform of Public Employment Services. It is also suggested that the economic relevance of education and vocational training could be improved by strengthening links to labour market needs. Further development and implementation of a lifelong education strategy, including promotion of active aging and implementation of labour market reform seem necessary to ensure the modernization of work and a balance between flexibility and security. There is a need to significantly improve female employment from both a quantitative and qualitative point of view in order to reduce the gender gap, especially in terms of both job segregation and pay gaps.

1.

The activities implemented since then include the following: Evaluation of strategies and programmes funded by the ESF; Support of the all-day schools in primary education; Reforcing teaching in lower secondary education; Support of initial vocational training; Establishment of libraries in high schools and in technical vocational schools; Establishment of guidance centres in upper-secondary education units; Information campaigns, production of material in technical vocational schools; ICT infrustructure and equipment and networking support for all schools; Establishment of the “Information Society” programme for ICT educational assisted activities such as technological infrustructure, networking, training and research; Teachers training in ICT for primary, secondary and vocational education (MoE, 2004).

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Through the access to the European Monetary Union (EMU), Greece secured its institutional place within the evolving political system of the EU. It was also considered that accession to the EMU would make Greece an actor in the international economic and financial systems and strengthen its regional role (Ioakeimidis, 2002). Today, Greece is considered integrated into the EU, but, as the union becomes more cohesive, the possibility of a small state like Greece to act independently decreases. Europeanization in the nominalmacroeconomic rather than in the structural sense has been the most pronounced economic objective of Greek governments especially throughout the 1990s (Pagoulatos, 2001, p. 211). The European integration has led to major changes in regulations concerning the management and operation of public institutions, which in turn has given rise to a larger increase in training activities.

3. The Education System and Education Reform

3.1 General Features Basic education in Greece consists of primary and lower secondary education. Preschool education however, can start from the age of 2.5 years in nursery classes, which operate along with the kindergartens. Primary education lasts for six years. Along with the regular kindergartens and primary schools, all-day primary schools are in operation since 1999 with an extended timetable and an enriched curriculum. Post-compulsory secondary education consists of two school types: Unified upper secondary schools and technical vocational schools. The duration of studies in these schools is three years. Vocational education institutes are not classified as an educational level, because they accept both lower and upper secondary school graduates according to the relevant specialization they provide. The establishment of private higher institutions by individuals is not allowed (Eurydice, 2002). There are often political discussions about the four degrees of change regarding the modern central administration, namely, the modernization of the state, the formation of regional prefectures, the self-administration of districts and the strengthening of municipalities. After the 1997, educational reforms have been associated with the EU subsidies. Aspects of globalization are reflected in e.g. the increasing immigration of cheap labour, further education restructuring attributed to the need for new skills in the ‘knowledge society’ of competitive European and world markets. The need for a continuous updating of skills originated by the economic rationale for lifelong learning promotes a more active participation in the process

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of decision-making, increased cultural diversity and social cohesion. Thus, education cannot escape being influenced by the process of globalization. Decentralization, deregulation, democratization and modernization are terms that are used by various actors within the educational system as umbrellas under which the changes are being discussed and introduced. Certain strategies in financial and curriculum matters are being developed by the ministry towards providing school units initiatives for innovation, decisionmaking and accepting new responsibilities (OECD, 2001, p. 77-92).

3.2 The Education Reforms in 1997 The country is divided into thirteen (13) regions and fifty-one (51) prefectures that also include the “Kapodistrian” municipalities. In each prefecture there are decentralized ministerial services headed administratively by a president of prefectural authority who is elected for four years. The initial steps of decentralization of school administration were expressed by government legislation passed during the 1980s. A new framework for education, introduced in a law in 1985 established regional and local authorities, as well as the representation of teacher unions and parent organizations, to participate in decision-making processes regarding the schools. The introductory report of this law emphasized the importance of decentralization, and provision was made for the transferring of funds and responsibilities to prefectures. In addition, ownership and management of school properties were allocated to lower levels of the public sector. The law also extended the participation of key stakeholders, such as parent and teacher unions, in the management, planning and control of schools (MoE 1985, Law 1566). This legislation proved quite difficult to implement. This applied not only to education, but also to all aspects of public administration in Greece; the centralized structures and administrative components were quite resistant to change. Furthermore, centralization was still quite strong in public administration in the early 1990s. While various administrative schemes requiring wider participation were adopted, this did not include the transfer of authority and responsibilities to schools or local authorities to engage in policy making. The role and status of key stakeholders, such as parents, teachers and local communities, remained limited, while the role of the school principal continued to be that of administrator with no substantial authority at the school level (OECD, 2001, p. 74). During the 1990s there were renewed calls for substantial decentralization and transfer of powers. Recent education legislation (1997) attempted to pass some responsibilities to regional and school levels. In particular, recommendations were made regarding self-evaluation of the school work (MoE 1997, Law 2525). The state is still seeking to decentralize education by ensuring the participation of those directly involved in the educational process (MoE, 2002).

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The 1997 reforms were passed by the Parliament during its summer session while all education institutions were closed and with collective bargaining without agreements from teachers and students unions (MoE, 1997). As soon as universities and schools opened in September the reactions against the Law 2525 started with student demonstrations in the streets of Athens and another 43 cities around the country and the occupation of 1,800 schools, mostly in upper secondary education. Despite the collective reactions by students and the teachers’ union, the reforms were gradually applied. The main factors urging the reforms in general and vocational education included technological changes; changes in work organization and the demand for professional qualifications with an increasing number of skills, (e.g. language and communication skills) and capability and creativity to innovate (MoE, 1999). The reform also aimed at solving problems in the education system, more specifically those concerning the examination system in upper secondary schools, the lykeio, but also to broaden the possibilities of access to higher education. Thus, Greek education was expected to respond to the labour market needs and challenges through: the development of lifelong learning, the promotion of multicultural education and the increase of the internal and external efficiency of the Greek educational system (Kassotakis, 2000, p. 549). Although centralization and uniformity are the main characteristics of curriculum practice in Greece, the 1997 reform brought about changes in the curriculum among other educational practices at all levels. For all primary and secondary schools there is a nationally uniform curriculum, the scope and detailed content of which are planned by the Pedagogical Institute and officially decided by the MoE. In secondary school curricula, the major innovations included the introduction of new subjects, such as information technology, political economy, technology and production, as well as the introduction of optional courses and educational activities. The general, technical and vocational national curricula were modified in order to allow 20 per cent for practice with the exception of the history courses. It was recognized that, in the upper secondary school, there was a need to enrich the curriculum through the introduction of new courses and subjects. For each course, textbooks had to be re-written and a new type of examinations was introduced (MoE, 1997, Law 2525/1997). The subjects taught in general secondary education are common and compulsory for all students, including a wide range of subjects (language and humanities, mathematics, science, social science, and religion, as well as art and physical education). Only in the final year of secondary schooling do students select among the four groups of subjects or ‘courses’ in addition to the core subjects (Eurydice, 2002).With these changes there was an effort to adjust education to the new socioeconomic conditions and to reinforce Greek education in order to comply with the European reality (Kassotakis, 1999). For every subject in every grade there is a specific textbook matched with the curriculum. Along with the textbooks there are also centrally developed teacher guides suggesting teaching

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methods. This is aimed at coping with the disparity or lack of training, particularly among secondary school teachers. Syllabuses, textbooks, teacher guides, and other printed educational material are published by a central agency run by the Ministry. Textbooks are disseminated to students and teachers in all public schools and are free of charge. The education reforms since 1997 have been financed both from the national budget and the European Social Fund, justified with the claim that they were necessary due to the need for new skills, which imply the flexibility required by the national and international labour market. These aspects of the world models were manifested in the reform actions and strategies in the following ways: Increasing ICT and foreign languages in the curriculum; Changes in the examination system in order to increase access to higher education; Expansion of vocational training; Introduction of distance education and lifelong learning; Establishing new departments in universities and, Upgrading the technological institutes to university level.

4. Decentralization The administration of primary and secondary education is conducted hierarchically by the MoE, the regional education directorates, the prefectures of education, the education offices by province and the school unit 2. The state administration of the educational system in all its sectors and levels, (except for the universities, which have autonomous administration), consists of central and regional structures. The central level directs, coordinates and controls the regional bodies. The central administration of the MoE consists of general directorates, departments, sections and autonomous offices. At the regional level there are regional directorates of education, while at the prefectural level there are decentralised ministry services headed administratively by the president of prefectural authority of education who is elected for four years. The central government takes full responsibility for all aspects of school staffing. Teaching staff is selected from a list of those having participated in examinations for appointment. School principals are appointed at a prefectural level for a contractual period of four years. In all cases of staffing, the appointment decision has to be approved by the Ministry of Education. Usually, a principal will have been a vice-principal who applies to be included in the prefectural list of potential principals. The responsibilities of principals and vice-principals are mostly administrative with a few hours of teaching per week (OECD, 2001, pp. 77-92). The Directorates of primary and secondary education of every prefecture are responsible for the administration of 2.

Although the general policy in the educational field is decided by the government, there is an ‘All-Party Education Committee’ in which agreement is required from all political parties on the main issues of educational policy (Unesco, 2001). There are different bodies carrying out central tasks of the MoE.

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pre-school institutions, and primary and secondary schools. At the prefectural level, there are specific councils for primary and secondary education, which deal with matters related to the service status of teachers. The administration of local matters belongs to the local authorities, the first tier of which are the municipalities and prefectures. The local authorities are administratively autonomous. The law defines the prefectural government as local authority of the second level whose task is to ensure the financial, social and cultural development of their region (Verney & Papageorgiou, 1993). The municipal or community education committee operates in every town or community and consists of representatives of the municipality or community, the parents’association, school heads, and representatives of the teacher’s unions.The parent associations of schools in the same community or town or municipal district make up a union, in which each association is represented by at least one member representing up to 40 pupils. Parent unions in every prefecture constitute a federation in which each union represents up to 400 pupils. Every school is directed by the principal, the assistant-principal and the teachers’ council. The head of the school, the teacher board, a representative from local government, a representative of each parent association and a representative of the pupils in the case of secondary schools constitute the School Council, which supports the operation of the school. The school council advises on the management of the school’s day-to-day operations, such as communications, hygiene, etc. (Unesco, 2001). Parents are represented at all levels according to structures and levels of education. Each school has a council of teachers with some responsibility for issues related to student discipline and progress. Outside of the school and beyond, the union in every school participates in some limited aspects of school administration such as registering and informing the parents about student absenteeism, their marks, etc. More specifically, a representative of the parent union participates in the school council along with the principal, the deputy-principal and a representative of the student union. The school committee, made up of the principal, a community representative (e.g. the mayor) and representatives from the parent and student unions, is responsible for the budget management and fund-raising. Schools may innovate, but they do so under close scrutiny and regulation.The budget concerns the maintenance of buildings and some student activities.This way, local municipalities are directly involved in school management, controlling financial resources to the school and setting limits on the authority of principals. The budget available for school running costs is the responsibility of the School Committee (ibid). In the context of a highly centralised education system, Greek schools are given more responsibility and authority for certain aspects of their organisation such as the redefinition of the role of the principal. Pilot EU projects conducted in place gave participating principals experience that facilitated the shift from a broadly administrative, system-maintenance role for principals to

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a managerial system-improvement role3. However, in most public schools, problems and difficulties persist, and there are important weaknesses in the area of school building and equipment (OECD, 2001). The most recent legislation (MoE 2000, Law 2817) recognized that there were difficulties in the transfer of funds from prefectures to school units and proposed the grouping of the 54 prefectures into 13 educational prefectures, each headed by a new director. However, in June 2000, the Minister of education decided to abandon the grouping of prefectures. The new plan is to decentralize the whole administrative structure of education, as shown in Table 4.1 below, in order to become more effective. The institution of inspectors was abolished in 1982. Under the system of administering education now in force, directorates and education offices at the prefecture level of government perform increased duties of supervising and coordinating the administration of the educational work of the schools in their region. Subject assistance and pedagogical guidance are provided to teachers by the school counsellors. In primary and secondary education they cooperate with teachers in their field of responsibility whom they support in terms of their subject field and pedagogical work. Also, counsellors write reports on the scientific and teaching proficiency of the teachers in their field of responsibility. The law 2525 includes an article on evaluation of teachers which increases the roles of the Pedagogical Institute and the Centre for Educational Research on the central level and the role of the administrators on the local level, as well as the role of school headmasters on the school level (Eurydice, 2002). However, such an evaluation process was claimed unfair by the teachers’ unions and faced teacher demonstrations and strikes as there had been no satisfactory dialogue and agreement between the unions and the government before the law was decided (OLME, 2003). Choice and privatization in education and the increasing demand for local governance or a certain degree of autonomous decision making in order to reduce bureaucracy and costs are Table 4.1 Administrative Levels of Educational Services in Greece Administrative level Prefectural

District

Community, neighbourhood

Decentralised educational bodies, policies, functions and tasks. Directorates of education; Training centres for teachers; Diagnostic, evaluation and support centres; Centres for educational planning and support; Centres for environmental education. Education authorities; Education offices; Offices for physical exercise arrangements; Centres and offices for career counselling; Laboratory centres for science practice; Centres for ICT and new technologies. School units.

Source: MoE, 2002, Law 2986. 3.

Innovation effectiveness, however, depends also on the way stakeholders are motivated by the principal to pursue a common task to implement in organizational innovations and improvements (MoE, 1997, Law 2525/1997).

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attributed to the process of globalization. Although private education exists in a parallel way as cram schools, mainly at the secondary and upper-secondary levels of education, the establishment of private higher institutions is not yet allowed and the process of decentralization is still slow. In higher education, the universities and technological education institutes are selfadministered legal entities and the MoE monitors the legality of their actions and decisions (MoE, 2002, Law 2986). Regarding higher education institutions, an OECD (2001) report suggests that it is necessary to increase their effective autonomy and financial support according to their numbers of students. Yet, such institutions should be free to decide about their staff according to a more transparent and negotiatiable national scheme that would guarantee the achievement of determined national goals. At the same time, they should be open to complete evaluation. Furthermore, OECD suggests that total autonomy would overcome the obstacles to an effective function of higher institutions. An overview of the historical process of the decentralization strategy calls for several conclusions from which some urgent priorities appear for the years to come: (a) The first priority concerns the necessity of speeding up the decentralization pace. A new way of budget distribution was considered necessary for financial autonomy; central resources for administration including income taxes and a mechanism of resources management at the municipalities and prefectures were considered. (b) A second priority concerns the state strategy for modernization and adaptation of the central administration to a decentralized model, which is probably its weak point. (c) There are three demands requiring national agreement: The change of the administrative structure of the state, the organization of metropolitan centers as administrative units and the strengthening of prefectural administration through merging or through interprefectural cooperation. (d) Finally, an adaptation to the above-mentioned governing model with a flexible governing scheme (Skandalidis, 1999).

5. Teacher and Parent Participation in Decision-Making: Two Case Schools For the purpose of this study, two schools of the secondary level of education in Greece were purposely selected, one in a rural area and one in an urban area, for an open interview with school principals. High school A is situated in a rural mountain area around a hundred kilometres northeast of Athens, a community with 1,500 inhabitants. High school B is located in the centre of the city of Athens. Both schools have a new principal. The interview focused on questions concerning the factors and ways according to which participation of teachers and parents increased during the current school year in comparison to the previous one.

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High school A: The participation of teachers in actions and decisions at school level has increased – compared to the year 2002, in the following way. The school has four permanent full-time teachers and eight substitute teachers working part-time from neighbour schools. Due to their part-time availability, teaching committees met in break times for short meetings. The school principal encouraged the use of computers and the Internet, as well as the introduction of new technical equipment in classrooms and gave the teachers specific assignments such as a program of environmental education and educational excursions. The teachers participated actively in pedagogical and parent consultancy meetings during every term. The participation of parents had also increased due to the principal’s invitations for informative meetings and discussions concerning the lack of teaching staff, open days and activities for the improvement of the school buildings. The principal requested the parents to take part in school cultural and social activities such as visiting museums and theatres and organizing a performance aiming to support the school financially. Parents had responded positively. Both teachers and parents participated in the Unicef Children’s Day activities and as a result, Unicef registered the school in the special list of protected schools. High school B in an urban area: The participation of teachers in actions and decisions at school level had not increased, compared to the year 2002. There was the same active participation of teachers as the school had ten permanent full-time teachers and two substitute teachers. The school was already well equipped with computers, Internet and facsimile, etc. These new technologies helped mostly in the secretarial and organizational school administration. The participation of parents in actions and decisions at school level in 2003 had decreased compared to the previous year. Parents were not actively involved in any decision process of the school as no specific problems had arisen. They participated mostly as guests in the cultural and social activities of the school. As seen from the above, participation of teachers in the decision making process at school level is increasing in the rural area with the school principal as the main actor. In this case the role of the principal had shifted from Master Teacher to Community Developer. In both schools ICT equipment increased communication and improved secretarial administration. Parent participation was higher in the rural area than in the urban area. Yet, in the rural area, parents were more active than teachers in the meetings, due to the fact that the majority of substitute and part-time teachers also worked in other rural schools.

6. Discussion and Conclusion The recent developments in general education and in vocational education and training as well as in higher education in Greece were outcomes of reforms which were considered necessary in

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order to meet the demands of the labour market (such as competiveness, flexibility and the creation of new skills), and in order to increase the quality of this education and training. Furthermore, the implementation of the reforms and developments is supported by the EU with several possibilities of participation in European cooperative initiatives and student mobility for training in other European countries. Social and political expectations also generate curriculum changes such as competencies for members of a democratic society, citizenship responsibilities, taking an interest in political issues, understanding and supporting the legal system and so on. These expectations are similarly expressed as educational imperatives, in the aims of the reforms and the objectives of the new curriculum of upper secondary education in Greece. Nevertheless, the application and effectiveness of the changes in the curriculum depends also on the response and collaboration of all the actors involved in education (e.g. the government, teachers, students, etc.). The pressure from the EU and the processes of globalisation and technological developments is generally appreciated, for example mobility and occupational flexibility. The restructuring of employment creates a special urgency in the minds of young people and of society to restructure education, often through curricular changes and preparation for the development of vocational and flexible skills. The 1997 reforms in general and vocational education in Greece have introduced new ideas, with emphasis on lifelong learning, to change their shape, without fundamentally breaking with their original form. One of the main targets of education is the preparation for work. Centralization and bureaucracy constitute the backbone of the system, especially at compulsory levels of education. The system appears highly bureaucratic even at the very local level, as there are numerous committees and local authorities involved both in the schooling and in training proceedures. Decentralization brought with it a series of opportunities, but also a set of paradoxes. It was expected that the redistribution of power through decentralization of decisions from a single central point to all peripheral points would release a strong individual and collective creativity (Braslavsky, 2002). The opportunities come from the underlying reasons for decentralization as a strategy to redistribute decision-making power. The paradoxes concern the relationship between decentralization and equity in the quality of education provided. In fact, it gradually became obvious that the strategy of decentralization isolated from systemic processes of educational transformation or only associated with regulatory mechanisms through information and control, would not achieve the objectives of quality education for all. It also happens, however, that other jurisdictions given authority as a result of educational decentralization do not feel the need to create another order (Tsoukalis, 1997). An apparent paradox of educational decentralization is the continuation of mediocracy or the maintenance of poor institutional and pedagogical practices learned in previous decades. In fact, decentralization assumes that there are other, more efficient, if not more effective, ways to

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organize educational institutions and apply teaching methods. It also supposes that every place is capable of inventing its own approach (Braslavsky, 2002). Another paradox of educational decentralization is the submission to the will of the community. One of the reasons that groups of parents or teachers want more participation in educational decision-making is the need to find other forms of school organization and to diversify teaching processes. Pyramidal and hierarchical education systems, such as the education system in Greece, customarily set rules for the processes, on the assumption that standardized processes would yield identical results. On the other hand, submitting to diversity by uncritically copying projects designed for very different situations, such as other EU member states, constitutes one more paradox. In this case, the jurisdictions to which decision-making and executive responsibilities are transferred assume new roles as decision-makers look around near and far to import policies, strategies and projects developed by other provinces, municipalities or educational institutions (ibid.). In sum, real decentralization would create a totally different political environment and the expansion and strenghtening of the responsibility of the executives in terms of their professional behaviour. Nevertheless, protection from clientism is also considered necessary regarding recruitments, which should be processed in a more transparent way. In all these, evaluation is considered of vital importance. Such decentralization would be effective only if there were relevant changes in the centre. These changes cannot be made possible without taking into consideration the proposals and suggestions by teacher unions concerning different parts of the system (Endynamei, 1998).

7. References Bouzakis, S. (1999). Contemporary Greek Education. [in Greek]. Athens: Gudemberg. Braslavsky, C. (2002). Reconciling Equity and Decentralization: Education. Federalism. http://www.ekloges.com.cy. Retrieved on 12 Nov. 2002. Capsi, M. (2000). Recent administrative reforms in Greece: Attempts towards decentralization, democratic consolidation and efficiency. Boston: Harvard J.F.K. School of Government. En dynamei (1998). What does the OECD report proposes on decentralization of the education system in Greece. En dynamei, 10, March 1998. [in Greek]. http://www.teikoz.gr/ dynamei/ teuxos10/periex10.html. Retrieved on 29 Sept. 2002. Eurydice (1997). The role of parents in the Education Systems in the European Union. Brussels: Author. Eurydice (2002). The Education System in Greece (2001). Eurybase – Greece. Eurydice.org. Retrieved on 19 Oct. 2002. Ioakimidis, P. (2001). The Europeanization of Greece In K. Featherstone & G. Kazamias (Eds). Europeanization and the Southern Periphery, (pp.73-94). London. Frank Cass.

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Ioakimidis, P. (2002). The political significance of the Euro in Greece. In Koliopoulos, J. & Th. Veremis (2002). Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1831 to the Present (pp. 316-317). London: Hurst & Company. Kassotakis, M.(1999). Greece. In C., Brock, and W.Tulasiewicz (Eds). (1999). Education in a Single Europe. London: Routledge. Kassotakis, M. (2000). Nowadays challenges and the recent reform of Greek education system. In Bouzakis, J., (Ed.) (2000). Historical-Comparative Perspectives: Comparative Education 5. Athens: Gutenberg. Legg, K. & Roberts, J. (1997). Modern Greece, A Civilization on the Periphery. London: Westview Press. Ministry of interior, public administration and decentralization. Official web-site. http://www.ypes.gr MoE (1985). Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs (1985). Law 1566: The structure and function of primary and secondary education. [In Greek]. Athens: Government Gazette 67/30-9-85. MoE (1997). Law 2525/1997: National Council of education, arrangements of research issues and post-graduate education. [In Greek]. Athens: Government Gazette: 156/3-7-95.). MoE (1999). Law 2640/1998: Secondary technical vocational education. [in Greek]. Retrieved on June 5, 1999 on the World Wide Web: http://www.ypepth.gr MoE (2000). Law 2817/2000: Education of individuals with special needs and other arrangements. [In Greek]. Athens: Hellenic Parliament. MoE (2002). Law 2986/2002: Organisation of regional education directorates in primary and secondary education, evaluation of teaching work and teachers, teachers’ training and other decisions. [In Greek]. Athens: Parliament Official Records OH, 30-01-02. MoE, (2004). The Special Service of Community Support Framework Programmes. Law 3027/28-06-02. [In Greek]. Athens: Author. OECD (2001). New School Management Approaches – Greece. Paris: Author. OLME (2003). Proceedings of the actions and activities during the years 2001-2003. [In Greek]. Athens: Author. Pagoulatos, G. (2001). Economic adjustment and financial reform: Greece’s Europeani-zation and the emergence of stabilization state. In K. Featherstone, & G. Kazamias (Eds.), (2001). Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (pp. 210-223). London: Frank Cass. Skandalidis C. (1999). The way to prosperity. [In Greek]. Athens: Dromos. Stavros, S. (1996). Citizenship and the protection of minorities. In K. Featherstone & K. Ifantis (Eds). Greece in a changing Europe: Between European integration and Balkan disintegration? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Tsoukalis, L. (1997). Beyond the Greek Paradox. In T.G. Allison & K. Nikolaidis (Eds.) The Greek Paradox, Promise Vs Performance. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

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UNESCO (2001). Country Dossiers: Greece. International Bureau of Education. http://www.ibe.unesco.org. Retrieved August 17, 2001. Verney, S. & F. Papageorgiou (1993). Prefecture Councils in Greece: Decentralization in the European Community Context. In R. Leonardi (Ed.). The Regions and the European Community. London: Frank Cass.

Repr. of parents.

Municipality or commune Municipal or Number: minority Commu-nal (1 parent repr. with the Education school head, representatives Committee of the municipality or the the commune and of local industry) Term: 2 years

Prefecture or sub-prefecture Education Number: minority Councilof the (1 parent representative Prefecture or out of 16 members). Sub-prefecture Term: 2 years

National level National School Number: minority Council (1 parent repr. out of 97). Term: 2 years

Participation

Elected by the electoral assembly of the Union of Parents; submits proposals to the School Committee on the allocation of funds for operating needs; primary supervision of financial management; consultative role in the running of the School Committee; opinion on all issues relating to school operations within the territory (of the municipality or commune). Decisions taken are recommendations, not binding on the Municipal or Communal Council. However, as a rule, the Municipal Council accepts them.

Elected by the electoral meeting of the Fed. of Parents; opinion on general educational policy issues (e.g. establishment, closure and mergers of schools; creation and abolition of teaching posts). Distribution of funds to local authorities for the opera-ting needs of schools. The decisions taken are recommendations and are not binding on the Prefectural Council, although it generally accepts them

Elected by the electoral meeting of the Confederation of Parents; all aspects including information and submission of proposals to the respective departments of the MoE, on education policy at national level, both within the country and abroad. Decisions are recommendations and are not binding on the Minister.

Powers/roles/Consultation/information and Decision-making powers structures Number/term/coverage

Appendix 4.1 Structures and Levels of Parent Participation in Education in Greece

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Source: Eurydice (1997).

School Council

Parent repr. elected by the school’s general meeting of parents by 1/3 majority of children attending the school; management of allocations for school operations and repairs; decisions on all financial matters. Decisions are binding on the Committee. Parents can participate on condition that their election was held in accordance with Law 1566/85 and ministerial orders. If this is the case, parent representatives have the right to block manage-ment operations if necessary (after considering the degree of priority and the need for the expenditure) and they are sufficiently familiar with the legislation to justify their opinion and can succeed in convincing the other members of the School Committee Number: Minority The governing board is fully entitled to participate if elections were held in accordance with the pro(between 5 and 11 members) visions stipulated in Law 1566/86 and the related ministerial orders.- participation in addressing of the executive board of the issues related to school operations; taking action to ensure good relations between parents, association of parents with teachers and pupils. teacher associations and representatives of the local authorities on the School Committee Term: 2 years.

School level School Number: minority Committee (1 parent repr. per school out of 5 to 15 members). Term: 2 years

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Chapter Five

School Autonomy in Nicaragua: Two Case Studies

Nuzzly Ruiz De Forsberg

1. Introduction In the beginning of the 1990s, Nicaragua started to implement – with pressure from the international community – parts of what may be seen as the world model for education. However, there have been two exceptions from this model: Decentralization was labeled an Autonomous school reform (giving the school level more decision-making power than in many other low income countries) and, although private schools are allowed, market mechanisms have not been introduced. This chapter provides a description of how internationally and nationally initiated reforms, very much in the spirit of the world models, play out at the national and then the local level and how specific participants in the reform process – principals, teachers, and students, but especially female heads of households – are enabled or constrained by their daily circumstances and life histories1. The study gives voice to the administrators, teachers, students and their parents involved in the transfer of certain decision-making powers once the exclusive domain of a highly centralized Ministry of Education (MoE).

1.

The present chapter is based on the findings of the author’s Ph.D. dissertation “School Community Voices: Implementation of the Autonomous School Program in Nicaragua”. Stockholm: Institute of International Education, 2003.

95 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 95–114. © 2007 Springer.

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2. The Country Context

2.1 The National Setting Nicaragua has five million inhabitants and between 1980 and 1992, the urban population grew by 78 per cent, from 1.4 million to 2.5 million, while the rural population increased by 23 per cent (PAHO/WHO, 1994). It is primarily an agricultural country whose economy remains vulnerable to the fluctuations in the prices of its export goods: coffee, bananas, tobacco, sugar and cotton.Almost all industrial products, including petroleum, are imported. Such an economy tends to be rather vulnerable to the demands of foreign markets, with visible effects on the development of the country. The country confronts severe problems of development with an average GDP per capita of only US$ 430, and with a substantial external debt. Thirty-five per cent of its adult population (15 years and older) are illiterate. Only 37 per cent of those who begin first grade of primary school go on to complete sixth grade (Arrién et al. 1998). This problem is accentuated in rural areas, where 10 to 12 per cent of the students complete sixth grade. The explanation for this lies in part in Nicaragua’s recent history: a decade of revolution and counter-revolution in the 1980s and a decade of structural adjustment in the 1990s. After almost a decade of structural adjustment, economic improvement has not materialized. Instead, unemployment and poverty have increased and social services, such as health care and education dwindled. In 1993, it was estimated that slightly more than half of Nicaragua’s population (about 75 per cent of rural dwellers) was living below the poverty line2 (Government of Nicaragua, 1998; World Bank, 1994). The role of women in society is defined mostly in terms of their reproductive functions and they are expected to bear the responsibility for raising the family. The division of gender roles is also maintained whereby domestic work is left entirely to women. Women, as primary care givers, bear a double burden of work outside and inside home and this affects their interaction with schools and the roles they are expected to play in the decentralization process. This double workload often demands working days of 14 to 16 hours, which leaves women with little, or no time for rest and other activities (Ruchwarger, 1989).

2.

The poverty line is defined as the level of total per capita monthly (30 days) expenditures by which an individual obtains the minimum daily calorie requirement.

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2.2 Short Historical Overview For nearly half a century (1932-1979), Nicaragua was ruled by a single family, the Somozas, with the support of the United States and Nicaragua’s model of development displayed many of the characteristics of a dependent economy closely linked to the United States (Arnove, 1986). The dependency status of Nicaragua was also reflected in the education system, where the United States played a major role “in the areas of curriculum development and implementation, textbooks provision, teacher training, and education planning” (ibid. p. 5). Education became instrumental in the preparation of elite groups for leadership while denying basic knowledge and skills to the great majority. One can distinguish two different periods of economic and social development since 1979. The first period lasted between 1979-1989.The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the Somoza regime and came to power in July 1979. The political, economic and social structures were transformed according to the priorities set by the revolutionary government. The level of production had regressed to those of 1960s (Ruchwarger, 1989). The Sandinista state directed resources towards the reconstruction of a war-torn economy, nationalization of all of the Somozas holdings, land reform, the establishment of a mixed economy and the expansion of social programs in areas of education, health and housing as well as more direct forms of income redistribution (Kraft, 1983; Ruchwarger, 1989; Utting, 1991). Despite the interventionist type of state, the role assumed by mass or grass roots organizations was significant, in terms of impact on the public at large (Arnove, 1986; Polakoff and La Ramée, 1997). One of the major accomplishments in education was the 1980-National Literacy Crusade (NLC). The crusade’s goals were both educational and political and a central part of a political process of social change and liberation. However, the U.S. started a destabilization campaign against the revolutionary government, which included the severance of economic aid, a trade embargo, diplomatic pressure and support for the civil war that lasted until the end of the decade. Due to the war, the economic and social conditions at the end of the 1980s resembled the levels that existed under the previous regime. Roughly more than three per cent of the population were killed (Brentlinger, 1995). In the first multi-party elections in 1990, Chamorro was elected as the new president.

2.3 The Contemporary Situation The second period extends from 1990 until the present. It includes three successive civilian governments. The Chamorro administration (1990-1996) initiated a different course of development, establishing contacts with the major international financial institutions; the implementation of structural reforms and the return to a market-oriented economy. This new

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government gave priority to two fundamental tasks: (i) bringing inflation down; and (ii) beginning the restructuring of the economy (Government of Nicaragua, 1990). Many of the new funds from the international lending institutions, such as the World Bank, were conditional on the adoption of an adjustment and stabilization package while the country was progressively incorporated into the international economy. The government stressed the need to privatize state enterprises and embarked on liberalization and opening up of the economy (Chavez, 2000). Nicaragua received the largest aid per capita of all Latin America countries (Dye et al. 1995 in Chavez, 2000, p. 77). The adjustment policies implemented during the 1990s substantially altered the role of state. In this context of structural reforms, a process of decentralizing the management of hospitals, state clinics and public schools was initiated. The decentralization reform is seen as a long-term process and includes the delegation of competencies from the central government to local level. The shift requires private households to assume responsibility for a greater share of the social services now that the state has withdrawn funding for such services. The levels of unemployment and underemployment are extremely high (Arana, 1997, p. 84). As the formal sector of the economy continues to contract, thousands of people have no other choice but to enter the informal sector (Chavez, 2000). Women try to generate some income by making and selling food, washing and ironing, running small stores located in the home (pulperias), and so on. Another major concern is Nicaragua’s population growth, still one of the highest in Latin America. For a balanced picture of the six years of the Chamorro administration (1990-1996), it is necessary to consider the relative peace in the country after a decade of civil war, the bases for democracy and governability. In parallel to the changing role of the state and economic transformation there has been the revival of a conservative ideology that tends to define women primarily as housewives, in contrast to the status of women during the revolution brought about through their participation in societal transformations and thus for possible modifications of gender relations (ibid.).

3. National Education System The component parts of general basic education includes pre-school; primary, secondary, adult education, and teacher training. The general education cycle comprises: one (optional) year of pre-school; six years of compulsory school; three of lower secondary (ciclo básico); and two of upper secondary school, which offers academic and pre-service teacher training. Primary education was prioritized during the 1990s.There are several types of secondary schools in Nicaragua, run under the auspices of the state, churches and private interest groups. The curriculum at primary and secondary education level is structured around a nationwide common

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core of defined subjects. Nicaragua has over the past decade, advanced a system of site-based management with decision-making authority of school councils,conferring upon them substantial authority and new responsibilities, known as the Autonomous School Program (ASP). However, the Nicaraguan model differs from that of many other countries in that no school voucher or choice varieties have accompanied the decentralization reform (Rivarola & Fuller, 1999).

4. Educational Decentralization in the 1980s In the early 1980s, decentralization from a centralized system to the regional level took place. According to Arnove, “[r]egional offices oversaw municipal and district levels administration offices” (1994, p. 102). Decentralization strategies were pursued with the participation of popular organizations and the appointment of regional authorities with administrative and political functions. School plans in regard to substantive, methodological and financial issues were discussed and agreed upon at the periodical meetings between the authorities of the Ministry of Education (MoE), regional delegate officers and popular organizations e.g., the National Student Federation (FES) were held periodically (Arrién, 2002)3.The regional authorities progressively took over decision-making powers concerning pedagogical-technical issues, hiring of the personnel and the negotiation of international development aid for the implementation of specific education projects (Durán and Arrién, 1996). The civil war and the reluctance of the central government to loosen control over national financial resources restricted the evolution of the decentralization process (Landaeta, 1994).

5. Decentralization Reform in the 1990s

5.1 General Overview The reform of the public sector from 1990 consisted in various components, crucial among these was decentralization of basic public services.The state authorities expected this to improve 3.

Juan Bautista Arrién is currently permanent secretary to the Ministry of Education at the National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO in Nicaragua. He is also Director of the Institute of Education of the Central American University (IDEUCA) and one of the country’s best-known education specialists.

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the quality of public services, to achieve greater efficiency in the utilization of resources and to promote community participation in the identification of needs, and finally to place administrative and financial decision-making processes close to the populations (Ministerio de Accion Social – MAS, 1993). The decentralization project was part of an overall effort to putatively democratize the society and de-politicize the education system. The World Bank particularly has played a central role in funding and advising the reform. Concepts such as autonomy, efficiency, coordination, social contract and community participation in the delivery of services began to be associated with decentralization. The concept of social contract refers to “a set of mutually agreed roles and expectations between parents and teachers about the education of children, based on a common culture and common standards of behaviour” (Arcia & Belli, 1998, p. 2). A major parental role in school decision-making and the values of respect, accountability, competition, autonomy and cohesive family-life are related to the discourse of the social contract. Shared decision-making supposedly would contribute to democratization by involving parents and other community members more directly in the education of their children and in decision-making that enables schools to more effectively serve local needs. A further aim was to involve parents in the sharing of the school expenditures rather than having the central government bearing the whole burden of education financing. The decentralization process started in 1993 with initiation of the education decentralization process on a small scale, whereby twenty schools were selected. Two years later the reform was extended to primary schools, and in 1999, further expansion took place. By the end of that year, over 50 per cent of secondary schools were autonomous (MoE, 2000). Finally, in 2002, there was legal provision of the reform by means of the Participation Education Law. The implementation of autonomy starts with an agreement between the MoE and individual schools, after the school staff has agreed on the autonomous petition. The management of resources are decentralized to the school with monthly block transfers made by the central government (C $15 córdobas equivalent to US $ 2.50 per pupil in 1993 plus “compensatory funding tied to student retention”) (Arcia and Belli, 1998, p. 9). This amount is earmarked for the salaries of teachers and other staff. Any resources needed to fund school expenditures have to be sought elsewhere. The transfers were to be complemented both by the compulsory school fees and additional revenues raised by the schools. The school fees were meant to improve teacher salaries. However, after a few years the central state abolished the compulsory school fees and replaced them with the policy of voluntary contributions. The Constitution was modified in 1995 whereby the school fees were made voluntary. All administrative expenses are to be born by the school, whereas the central government assumes responsibility for the maintenance of the school installations. The MoE provides technical support, training, supervision and whatever

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else is needed to increase the quality of education.The shift to voluntary school fees has resulted in reductions in income, with teacher salaries being negatively affected. This has made the teachers less than enthusiastic about the autonomy reform. Normally, major education reforms are promulgated through national laws prior to their implementation. However, the autonomous reform in Nicaragua “was governed for nearly ten years by a series of Ministry internal directives, many of which were not in the public domain” (Gershberg, 2002, p. 9). The Law conferring legal status on the autonomous reform was eventually approved in March 2002. The second approach to education reform was to be the municipalization policy, giving greater responsibility to the municipalities in the provision of educational services and the establishment of a municipal education council. The municipality councils consist of local representatives of major religious organizations, parents and teachers. However, the municipalization policy did not develop as expected. Given the political situation, Arrién argues that the MoE was more interested in contacting the schools directly thus avoiding the municipalities where mayors could belong to the opposition political parties (Arrién, 2002). The central office of the MoE has retained a number of normative, evaluative and financial functions that, in fact, allow them to exert a great deal of control over the education system. These functions include the transfers of funds to the school budgets, the definition of a national curriculum, national examinations and the monitoring of the basic education system. On the other hand, some of the workload and a number of managerial functions have been transferred to schools but within the general guidelines established by the MoE. The central office has the right to dismiss the school principal and to suspend members of the school council if they do not adhere to the norms and procedures laid down in the General Regulation for Education (MoE, 1999, p. 31) . Although decisions can be made concerning elective courses and/or the adaptation of course programs, schools are required to comply with the basic national curriculum. Further, although a school may make decisions regarding the allocation and administration of resources and personnel, such decisions are to be made within the regulatory framework and procedures established centrally. Table 5.1 summarizes the items for decision-making at different levels. The school council consists in the principal and elected members, including representatives of the parents, teachers and students with parents having the largest number of elected members. Each autonomous school is obliged to establish a parent council, a student governing council and a teacher council. These bodies are placed under the auspices of a separate administrative structure established for schools, namely the Ethical and Fiscal Commission (Comisión de Etica y Fiscalización) (MoE, 1999). The school council is also authorized to periodically evaluate the operation of the school and the performance of the school staff, but again this must be based on the norms set by the MoE. It also makes decisions on control, co-management and monitoring school resources and school staff and is expected to meet at least once a month.

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Table 5.1 Mixed Model of Involvement in Decision Making Ministry of Education central office

School Curriculum

Stipulates mandatory basic national curriculum and supervise its implementation

Complies with the mandatory basic national curriculum, but may adapt course programs. Approve adaptation of course program and teaching hours. Approve the elective courses and their academic equivalences. Approve extra-curricular activities. Choose textbooks. Recruitment and Appointment of School Principal

School nominates three candidates. Determines and provides most of the funding for public schools. Guarantees minimum expenditure per student. Fiscal transfers. Finance for most of the infrastructure. Auditing.

Decides on the appointment of the school principal from a list of nominees submitted by the school. Financing Some portions of educational expenditures are funded by local sources. School council decides how to use local revenues. Controls voluntary contributions of parents. Approves the budget and expenses of the school, including the block transfer of the MoE, voluntary fees from parents, donations and other incomes etc. in accordance with the norms and procedures established centrally. Provides periodic and public information (monthly) to the school community and the central level regarding the utilization of the school financial resources.

Evaluation Stipulates the norms for the Periodically evaluates the operation of the schools, principals and evaluation of teacher teachers, according to the established regulations in accordance performance. Defines national with the general guidelines established by the MoE. Approve the standards, norms, regulations, norms for evaluating students prepared by the teachers’ advisory achievement measures and board. Reviews and authorizes the evaluation of teacher’s supervises at local, municipal and performance, according to the methodology established by the national levels. MoE, including attendance and punctuality for the awarding of incentives to teachers. Informs parents on local school performance and on the use of financial resources and budgets executions. Assists in the development of audits carried out centrally. Administration Laid down administrative norms and procedures.

Administrates resources in accordance with the norms laid down by the central office of the Ministry of Education. Assumes the responsibility of an employer to screen, select, hire and fire school personnel in accordance with the labor code and relevant regulations.

Source: MoE (1999). Manual de la Autonomía Escolar. Managua: MoE.

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The council is required to publish a monthly report on income and expenditures and post it in such a manner it is accessible to the school community and parents.

5.2 National Outcomes So Far Nationally, the policy of decentralization proved to be problematic during the implementation phase, according to some early evaluation studies. The development and interpretation of the reforms vary across the schools investigated (Fuller and Rivarola, 1998; King, Ozler and Rawlings, 1999; Lucio, 1996). Some schools exhibit strong parental involvement while it is limited in others. There are a number of explanations for these variations across schools. These include the school’s context, the financial and social circumstances of the families, the institutional history of the school prior to decentralization and the level of communication within and across schools. Fuller and Rivarola (1998) conclude that autonomy is welcome in schools that already “hold a shared commitment to the school’s values and mission, where most teachers concur with the director’s commitment to raising student performance” (ibid. p. 44). In other cases, the reform exacerbates existing problems, for example, where teachers feel that school councils are acting with too much authority. With the absence of unions, the decentralization process lacked any important mechanism for articulating the teacher perspective. Although one of the central aims of the reform was to enhance parental participation and to ensure parents a voting majority in the council, the available evidence suggests that the principal is the one who has the real power. Implementing reforms, however, for principals has meant an increased load of administrative responsibilities (Castro, 1999; Fuller and Rivarola, 1998). Many of the principals report being busy with an ever-growing list of administrative tasks. The resulting limitations on the instructional role of the principals have led teachers to turn to the MoE or the municipal education officer for advice and assistance (Rivarola and Fuller, 1999, p. 508). One indicator of parental participation relates to the amount of assistance provided by parents in social activities organized by the schools, whereby parents also have an opportunity to talk to teachers (Rivarola and Fuller, 1999). Other types of parental participation are: attending school meetings and school fairs, and occasionally helping with school repairs and painting. There are some examples however of parents being more concerned with the quality of school education and disciplinary problems (Asensio, Ruiz and Sequeira, 2001). Parents are also organized in different committees such as those for sports, school projects, academic achievement and school maintenance. The conclusions of the various evaluation studies in Nicaragua do not make any statement that autonomy has improved the quality of education.

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Poverty appears to be the major cause for student dropout or grade repetition, as confirmed by an evaluation conducted in eighteen schools. For example, many of the students abandoned their schooling because they did not have the appropriate clothes and/or because they were needed at home (Castro, 1999). However, some progress is reported concerning educational practices conducive to fostering student achievement and promoting participatory democratic behaviour. Such practices include active learning and student participation in school governance and committees for the maintenance and cleanness of the school building. Gains have also been made in retaining students and improving graduation rates (Asensio, Ruiz and Sequeira, 2001; Lucio, 1996). Also, some progress has been reported in school governance with developing decision-making structures and norms that regulate the functions of the school councils and the operations of the autonomous schools. In view of the low level of public spending on basic education, the financial contributions provided by families has turned out to be an important factor in meeting the cost of education. However, school fees have consistently been reported as a problematic issue in the reform (Lucio, 1996; Rivarola & Fuller, 1999; Ruiz, 1996). While school fees might provide an incentive for winning the support of teachers, parents have opposed school fees on the grounds of lack of adequate family resources. Tensions and obstacles, however, have become apparent. For instance, the introduction of fees endangers the equity aspects of the autonomous reform and creates the basis for opposition to implementation even after user fees became voluntary. Since these fees were to finance supplementary bonuses for the teachers, the shift from compulsory to voluntary fees puts the promises made to teachers regarding salary increases in jeopardy.

6. Two Case Schools The cases are two public secondary schools, one rural and one urban in the municipality of Estelí, north-western Nicaragua, at a distance of 130 km north of the capital, Managua. It should also be mentioned that Estelí has the reputation of being a town with a long tradition of political mobilization and participation (AVANCSO, 1985). Estelí is famous for three insurrections that took place there against the National Army of the Somoza dictatorship: the first in 1978, the second in April 1979, and the final one in June 1979, which resulted in the liberation of Estelí. Because of these significant events, Estelí is known through Nicaragua as Heroic Esteli. The two schools joined the Autonomous School Program (ASP) in May 1995. The schools were studied during a period of several years. The province consists in six municipalities, of which Estelí is one. Its population is estimated to 107,000.The average annual population growth rate of the town, during the period 1971 – 1995, was greater than the average national growth rate (INIFOM-FNUAP, 2000) .

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The province of Estelí is predominantly agricultural, dominated by the production of maize, beans, tobacco, coffee and cattle breeding. Males are primarily engaged in agricultural occupations. Females are for the most part employed in the tobacco industry and in occupations in the social sector (health care and education). Despite the potential of the agricultural resources, Estelí and other major towns in the northern part of Nicaragua are among the poorest areas in the country (World Bank, 1994). The employment rate for females in the formal sector was calculated to 34.5 per cent in 1995, and for males it was 65.5 per cent (INIFOM-FNUAP, 2000. p. 32). As the formal sector continued to contract throughout the1990s, the informal economy began to flourish.The latter type of employment now provides an increasing number of families with the means to obtain an income, particularly for women. In rural areas of this region, the incidence of illiteracy is very high, 36 per cent for the adult population (15 years of age and over). Another major feature of disparities between rural and urban areas is the fact that in rural areas, 73 per cent of adolescents (between 15 and 19 years of age), 28 per cent of children between the ages of 10 and 14 years, and 31 per cent of those between the ages of 5 and 9 years do not attend school (INIFOM-FNUAP, 2000).

6.1 The Schools Case School 1 is a rural secondary school and case School 2 an urban secondary school. School 1 is situated in the rural community of Santa Cruz, some kilometres from the town of Estelí. The total population of Santa Cruz is approximately 6,000 (Valdivia et al. 2000). The school was originally only a small primary school, with 64 students. It then became a secondary school and its number of pupils increased from 461 in 1995 to 600 in 2001. The catchment area of the school consists largely in the immediate surrounding neighbourhood, although it is also open to students from the towns. The people of Santa Cruz are predominantly small farmers. Socially and economically, they share a common rural life, involving agricultural activities, interwoven with traditional cultural practices related to religion. Young people are expected to work on the farms and thereby contribute to the family income. Working in the fields is often of higher priority for these children than attending school, particularly during the harvest season. A general feeling of familiarity appeared in the teacher-students relations among the school staff. This could in large measure be traced back to the stability in the staff group. For example, the principal and some of the teaching staff had remained in the same posts for more than fifteen years. School facilities included a small library, a garden and a canteen. The school owned some acres of land, in close proximity to the school building, where corn and vegetables were cultivated. Nonetheless, over and above these positive aspects, there were a number of problems affecting the functioning of the school. There was a shortage of textbooks; students had access

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to the textbooks on the library premises but were not permitted to borrow them to take away. The rural school was also confronted by financial difficulties. This was reflected, for instance, in the inability to pay for the employment of a substitute teacher when necessary, one of the expenditures that had been transferred to the school through the decentralization policy. The extra teaching duties were assigned to some permanent member of the teaching staff, and the teachers thus have to deal with increases to an already heavy workload. The poverty of this rural community was a concern among the teachers. It had significant negative effects on the lives of the students. For example, many of the students were withheld from school in order to assist their parents in agricultural work. Another problem was that the students lived in eleven different communities and many of them had to walk long distances, sometimes up to seven kilometers each way.A former female principal of the school used to visit parents in their homes to request their collaboration (in the form of donations and/or free labour) in order to finance the construction of the school premises. This strategy for raising supplementary resources had been maintained over the years whenever additional income for the school had been required for a variety of projects. School 2 was established in 1987. In 2001, approximately 2,000 students were enrolled, attending either of two different shifts.The social and economic backgrounds of the students are diverse. Students appeared, in general, to ignore school rules and reject expectations with regard to behaviour. There were students not wearing the uniform at school but appeared to prefer to dress in their regular clothes. They seemed to be strongly influenced by current fashions originating from abroad. There had been a rapid succession of principals at the school, with four principals between 1995 and 2000. Also, there was a high level of teacher absenteeism. Since the school is situated in the center of an urban area, from time to time the activities of gangs and vandalism immediately outside the school interrupted the routines inside the school itself. Lack of discipline was the most prevalent and sensitive difficulty confronting the school. However, such difficulties had been regularly discussed in meetings between the school administration and teachers since 1989. Over the years, some remedial measures had been implemented to impose more discipline but apparently this had been without any significant results since the difficulties continued. The teachers indicated that they considered the overcrowding of the classrooms as the most difficult problem; the average student/teacher ratio was 55:1. They were also dissatisfied with delays in the payment of salaries, which continued to remain low. At the time of fieldwork, the teacher salary covered less than half of the cost of the standard basket of basic staple goods in Estelí. Both schools joined the decentralization reform in May 1995. The principals, in representation of the schools, signed an agreement with the MoE but the way the schools reached such agreement followed different paths. In the rural setting, for instance, several meetings were held to inform the school community and to build consensus about joining the reform. Despite the

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atmosphere of uncertainty, the school leader sought consensus and unity among the teachers and parents towards the reform. A more conflictive initiation process, in contrast, occurred in the urban school. There were more voices questioning and opposing reform initiatives, among them teaching staff that were affiliated to ANDEN (the teacher union created during the Sandinista period). There was a climate of mistrust and opposition towards the reform proposal.This to some extent contributed to the conflictive relations between the school and the regional authorities. The schools were requested to organize the Parent Council (Consejo Padres de Familia) and the student governing council (gobierno estudiantil), which ought to work as mediating and information channels between those whom they represented and the school council. It is noteworthy that almost all parent representatives in the school councils were men. In the urban school one of the parent representatives, a woman, was responsible for secretarial work. Council meetings were held outside normal working hours. The school principals were responsible for opening the meetings and presenting the agendas although these tasks were to be carried out by the president of the school council, the head of the parent representatives. Schools were officially authorized to charge the monthly sum of C$10 córdobas per secondary school student (US$ 1.7) in 1993. The decision to charge school fees opened up other possibilities for the schools to raise additional revenues, such as the sales of tickets for social events, lottery, sales of foods items from the school canteens, etc. In School 1, the decisions at the meetings of the school committee most frequently concerned administrative and personnel management. Decisions were made on different occasions to ask parents for their support with voluntary contributions or voluntary work. In school 2, during the first period of school autonomy, the school council dealt mainly with administrative matters. This school council, however, was more involved in issues of raising additional resources and school fees for exams, emblems and school reports. Teachers were reluctant to persuade students to contribute to the school fees. With fewer revenues, reform promises concerning augmenting teacher salaries could not be fully implemented. This was the reason behind the petition of teachers to renounce the autonomy reform and go back to the old system a year after of reform had been implemented. A request was made to the local education authorities, but apparently without an answer. Still in more recent times, economically-related items were the topics most often discussed at the school council meetings. Some decision-making power is shared between the school principal and the school council. These include the authority to approve the school budget, administrative norms, school regulations, teacher evaluation and extra-curricular activities. This position might prove not to be an easy one for the school principal, who has to handle a double role: On the one hand, as representative of the MoE and, on the other hand, the increasingly diverse communities and pressures arising from demands for raising salary. In seeking ways to forward the work of the school council and decisions acceptable to all parts, the school principal from the rural setting

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had relied on his interpersonal relations with the school community. Also, he had counted on networks of relations with education authorities and different groups in society. The school principal in the urban school was new in the post, but she was an experienced school leader who had worked with autonomy reform for several years. She had tried to introduce some changes in the organization and distribution of schoolwork and had spent some time on establishing contacts and relations with education authorities. In her opinion, one of the dilemmas of being school principal and member of the school council (in the position of executive director) had to do with the firing of the teaching staff.Although this decision-making power had formally been delegated to the school council, she nonetheless felt that the responsibility for dismissing a teacher was hers alone. Teachers and administrators in both schools were very positive about including parents in decision-making. Teachers in the urban school were pleased with the work of the head of the parent representatives. They saw several benefits associated with parent participation such as the strengthening of the democratic process in education, joint solutions to school problems that were relevant to the school community, raising awareness about the conditions of the school, motivating parents to be responsive towards the education of their children, accountability and transparency in the management of resources. The flow of information and feedback appears to be working better in the rural school, where teachers were not only informed about the decisions made in council meetings, but they also were consulted on issues to bring to the meetings. In the urban setting, some teachers expressed concerns about the low level of information (or none) about council decisions. Teachers and the union representative were discontented with the interference of the regional authorities (delegado) at the district level – the link to the central MoE – in decisions made by the school council. This was mostly felt in the urban school. The delegado stated: “We are constantly overseeing what the schools are doing, how they manage their resources and what kind of people the school is hiring”. School 1 had interpreted the decentralization policy to mean the enrolment and retainment of as many students as possible and to guarantee the transfer regardless of teacher workload. In school 2, those teachers who reported that the reform had not influenced their performance as educators indicated that they tried to keep up the quality of work despite the fact that they were badly paid and were confronted with overcrowded classes.

6.2 Stakeholders School Principals: Both school principals argued that autonomy was a “process” rather than a fixed condition. While the school principal in the rural school spoke of decentralization of the

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national education system, the school principal in the urban school related to the creation of the “participation space” where the school community was to be engaged4. Teachers: Based on the information they had on the matters from ministerial presentations, teachers mentioned various reasons for implementing the reform. In the urban school they saw an improvement of teacher salaries as the most salient motive for school decentralization. For teachers in the rural school, the reform was meant to improve school academic achievement and to augment teacher salaries. The lack of in-service training with specialists was another unfulfilled promise mentioned. Instead, the teaching staff attended workshops under the tutoring of experienced teachers from the public schools, organized by the MoE. As to the perceptions of the teacher’s role, in the rural school, teachers took it to mean being active (among those having a seat in the school council) or being positively stimulated and supported by other teachers. Almost half of the teachers in the rural school felt they could influence processes in their school, but most of the remaining ones mentioned no influence or influence in a negative way. In the urban school all except one said they had no influence or influence in a negative way. More “voices”from the urban school claimed the lack of autonomy, and teachers perceived their role as being limited, since the education authorities controlled decisions. As far as the role of the municipal authorities is concerned, a large number of teachers, in particular those from the urban setting, perceived the authority of the municipal education officer to mean interference with the workings of the school council and of the teacher council. With a widened decision-making structure that includes all members of the school community with the faculty for making various types of decisions such as raising additional revenues; hiring and firing teaching staff; and adapting study plans. A conflicting attitude was present in some voices from the urban school claiming that the project of autonomy was meant to decentralize the economic burdens to schools. When asked to indicate three major advantages of reform, the teachers – across the interviews – mentioned governance issues with shared decision-making, parent participation in school council, the role of the mediating governance bodies, e.g., parent council. As disadvantages teachers mentioned the lack of autonomy in implementing decisions of interests to teachers and schools. More teachers in the rural than in the urban school wanted to continue in their profession. In the latter school, more than half wanted to leave the profession. Other issues of disadvantages included: late payment of teacher salaries, lack of communication between school council and parents and lack of time for parents to come to school. Ten per cent of the sample reported that they did not perceive any disadvantage with autonomy reform.

4.

Multiple methods were employed for the collection of data: analysis of school documents; questionnaires to a sample of parents and teachers in each school, interviews with respondents from the same categories.

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The Students: Students provided different sets of answers when they were asked about the meaning of the autonomy reform. Those in the rural school tended to see autonomy as being independent from the MoE in the making of decisions that were of interest to the school. Some others exposed a more controversial view related to the transferring of the educational costs from the state to their parents. In the rural school students were regularly informed about council decisions by means of school meetings often held with the school principal. Students were also informed through informal conversations with student representatives, classmates, teachers or a combination. However, one third of the students reported that they had never been informed about council decisions. In the urban school, the majority of the students reported being informed about council decisions by means of the presidents of sections. Informal talks with classmates and teachers or a combination were also mentioned. The usefulness of the student governing body and performance of its members, however, was widely questioned by students. Very few students recognized the work as being positive and only one student pointed out that the body had tried to do something good, but that they lacked the support from the students. The Parents: Four fifths of the parent respondents in both schools lived in families with more than five members, and the largest families were found in the rural school. Almost all parents in the urban area lived in residences with access to electricity and drinking water, while less than half of the rural parents had such facilities. Generally, the level of education among the parents was relatively low. In the urban setting a little more than one fourth of the parents and in the rural setting more than half had maximally incomplete primary education. The self-employed respondents were usually engaged in the informal sector of the local economy selling products intended for immediate consumption. The reality of women’s everyday lives implies a “double workload”. The parents were asked to estimate the time (in hours per day) they regularly dedicated to housework (unpaid work). Female respondents worked on average twelve hours per day, seven hours on paid work and five hours on unpaid work. Against this background, it seems difficult for women to find the required time for attending school meetings and other activities related to their children’s education. Sixty-four per cent of the parents had a total household income insufficient for buying even one basket of staple goods. Some of these parents, for example, those who were dependent on agriculture for their incomes, told that drought was the major obstacle to earning a reasonable income.As reported by the respondents, the average annual expenditure for each child attending school was $ 590 cordobas (equivalent to US $ 45). This may not appear to be particularly burdensome for some households, but for the households with two or more school-age children, the burden of school expenses might be more than they were able to bear. The “voluntary” nature of school fees could be brought into question since some parents reported, for instance, that pressure or coercion was used to ensure their payment of school fees.

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Still years after implementation, parents were unfamiliar with the vision of education decentralization proclaimed in the policy. As to the meaning of autonomy, about 40 per cent of the parents in the rural school and 30 per cent in the urban school reported they did not know what autonomy reform means.And the same percentages saw it in economic terms. Parents saw advantages of autonomous school in terms of the role of the school council and parent representatives in forging ahead decisions that concerned the interests of the school. Almost one third of the parents pointed out the issue of school fees as the major limitation of the reform. Three fourths of the parents said they had not been informed at all or had received very little or little information about the reform, and four fifths said the same about the functions of the school council (one fourth said they had “not at all been informed”). Nine out of ten parents said that they had been informed “not at all”, “very little” or “a little” about the role of the parent representative in the school council. More than half of the parents interviewed stated that they were not acquainted with the work of their representatives in the school council. This was felt equally in both schools. In this matter it was said that parent participation in decision-making was constrained by the selection of those parent representatives who attended council meetings only on few occasions, alleging lack of time. Among the parents, their involvement was seen as important, but mothers more often than fathers were reported to interact with the school. Parents with well-performing children were the ones who came to school regularly while other parents hardly ever appeared in school. As to collaborating with the school, four out of ten parents said they contributed with money and one third that they did not collaborate at all. In sum, the consensus among teachers and parents indicated that the autonomy reform had its greatest impact in terms of new roles in shared decision-making (governance) – if these roles could be strengthened and sustained by collaborative attitudes and support from the education authorities.

7. Conclusions After the Sandinista (socialist) government and the civil war, the elections in the beginning of the 1990s resulted in the formation of a liberal state that accepted Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and reinforced Catholic influence. The reforms that accompanied the SAPs included several crucial elements of the world models but also features of the Neo-Conservative type (such as the focus on the family and a traditional role for women in society). In education, decentralization to the school level was more radical than in many other Latin American countries. The stated or un-stated reasons for the introduction of school-based decision-making were to improve democracy but also to make the parents cover some of the

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educational costs. There was also privatization in the sense that parents were requested to pay fees. The financial contributions provided by families had turned out to be an important factor in meeting the cost of education. Since these fees were to finance supplementary bonuses for the teachers, in the shift from compulsory to voluntary fees teacher salaries were increasingly jeopardised. These tensions and discontent were also present in the schools specially studied here. Generally, schools have been mixed in their attitudes towards joining the decentralization reform and this is also found in the two case schools – one of them was positive, the other one not. As far as democracy and participation are concerned, one of the central aims of the reform was to enhance parental participation and to ensure parents a voting majority on the council. However, the available evidence and the case studies suggest that the principal was the one who had the real power. In all, the radical decentralization (to school level) suggested in the world models has been implemented but the outcome is not what is stated in the policy documents.

8. References Arana, M. (1997). General Economic Policy. In Walker, T. (Ed.). Nicaragua Without Illusions. Regime Transition and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s (pp. 81-96). Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. Arcia, G. & Belli, H. (1998). Building the Social Contract: School Autonomy in Nicaragua. Washington DC: World Bank, Working Series Paper No. 40, Latin American and the Caribbean Region II. Arnove, R. (1986). Education and Revolution in Nicaragua. London: Prager. Arnove, R. (1994). Education as Contested Terrain. Nicaragua, 1979-1993. Oxford: Westview Press. Arrién, Juan Bautista (2002). Interview, May 2002. Arrién, J., De Castilla, M., Lucio, R. (1998). La Educación en Nicaragua entre Siglos, Dudas y Esperanzas. Managua: Universidad Centroamericana (UCA). Asensio, C., Ruiz, R. & Sequeira, V. (2001). Lecciones Aprendidas De la Autonomía Nicaragüense (Resumen Ejecutivo, Reporte Completo y Anexos). Managua: Centro de Investigaciones SocioEducativas de la Universidad Autónoma de Nicaragua (CISE-UNAN). AVANSCO (1985). (Associación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales). Organización y Movilización. La Propuesta Nicaragüense de los 80s para Centroamérica. Guatemala: Fundación Myrna Mack. Brentlinger, J. (1995). The Best on What We Are. Reflections on the Nicaraguan Revolution. Amherst: The University Massachusetts Press. Castro, V. (1999). Evaluación del Régimen de Autonomía y la Calidad del Servicio Educativo en 18 Escuelas Rurales-Urbanas Nicaragüenses. Managua. Chavez, C. (2000). Women and the State in Post-sandinista Nicaragua. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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Durán, S. & Arrién, J (1996). La Autonomía Escolar en Nicaragua. Análisis Preliminar de una Experiencia en Desarrollo. Managua: Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina (PREAL). Fuller, B. & Rivarola, M. (1998). Nicaragua’s Experiment to Decentralize Schools: Views of Parents, Teachers and Directors. Washington, D. C.: World Bank. Gershberg, A. (2002). Empowering Parents While Making Them Pay: Autonomous Schools and Education Reform Processes in Nicaragua. Paper for presentation to the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Workshop on the Politics of Education and Health Sector Reforms, Washington, DC 4-5 April 2002. Government of Nicaragua (1998). Investing in our Best Resource. A Strategy for The Social Sector (document presented for the Meeting of the Consultative Group of Donor Countries in Geneva, Switzerland, April 1-2, 1998). Managua: Presidency office. Government of Nicaragua (1990). Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program for Nicaragua 1990-1993 (document presented for the Meeting of the Consultative Group of Donor Countries in Paris, December 3-4 1990). Managua: Presidency Office. INIFOM-FNUAP (Instituto Nicaragüense de Fomento Municipal-Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas) (2000). Informe Estadístico Sociodemográfico. Municipio de Estelí. Managua: INIFOM. King, E. Ozler, B. & Rawlings, L. (1999). Nicaragua’s School Autonomy Reform: Fact or Fiction? Nicaragua’s School Autonomy Reform: Fact or Fiction? World Bank, Working Paper Series on Impact Evaluation of Education Reform, Paper No.19. Landaeta, G. (1994). Strategies for Low-Income Housing. A Comparative Study on Nicaragua, Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, Panama, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Lund University: Department of Architecture and Development Studies. Lucio, R. (1996). La Autonomía de los Centros Educativos Desde la Perspectiva de los Consejos Directivos de los Centros y los Consejos Educativos Municipales. Análisis Preliminar del Modelo en Desarrollo. Managua: Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina, PREAL. MAS (Ministerio de Acción Social) (1993). La Agenda Social. Managua: MAS. MoE (1999). Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deportes) (1999). Manual de la Autonomía Escolar. Managua: MoE. MoE (2000). (Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deportes) (2000). Descentralización Educativa y Autonomía Escolar de Nicaragua. Managua: MoE. PAHO/WHO (Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization) (1994). General Health Situation and Trend. Nicaragua. Magazine: PAHO/WHO. Polakoff, E. & La Ramée, P. (1997). Grass-Roots Organizations. In T. Walker (Ed.). Nicaragua without Illusions. Regime Transition and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s (pp.185-201). Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. Rivarola, M. & Fuller, B. (1999). Nicaragua’s Experiment to Decentralize Schools: Contrasting Views of Parents, Teachers, and Directors. In Comparative Education Review, 43 (4): 489-521. Ruchwarger, G. (1989). Struggling for Survival. Workers, Women, and Class on a Nicaraguan State Farm. London:Westview Press.

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Ruiz, N. (1996). Nicaragua: State and Education. A Comparative Study, 1980s and 1990s. Unpublished Master thesis. Stockholm: Institute of International Education, Stockholm University. Ruiz de Forsberg, N. (2003). School Community Voices: Implementation of the Autonomous School Program in Nicaragua. Stockholm: Institute of International Education, Stockholm University. Valdivia, M., Arróliga, M., Valdivia, M. & Acuña, M. (2000). Historial del Instituto Santa Cruz. Estelí: Instituto Santa Cruz. World Bank (1994). Nicaragua. Poverty profile. Preliminary Findings of the 1993 Living Standards Measurement Survey. Washington: Human Resources Operations Division. Country Department II Latin America and the Caribbean.

Chapter Six

Decentralization in Senegal – Ambiguous Agendas for Community Education

Andrea Clemons

1. Introduction The West African nation of Senegal has maintained a centralized educational system since its independence from France in 1960. For the past decade, however, patterns of decentralization pressures in the international environment have shaped Senegalese educational policy. The education decentralization process in Senegalese non-formal education, particularly in the area of community-based schooling, has resulted in varied and often unintended local interpretations and reactions. This chapter describes the tensions and contradictions in the attempts to decentralize basic education and literacy arrangements in the village of Diatafa in southern Senegal1.

1.

This chapter draws on research conducted in Senegal between 2000 and 2001. The research examined national intentions and local interpretations of education in Senegal’s non-formal education sector. Using qualitative methods, archival analysis, and a close examination of one community in the rural village of Diatafa in southern Senegal, this study sought to explain how the case of decentralized community-based schooling is interpreted, reacted to and enacted. I would like to thank Nelly Stromquist and the representatives of the Senegalese Ministry of Education, Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy, UNICEF, and the NGO Aide et Action, who contributed their knowledge and support to this project.

115 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 115–131. © 2007 Springer.

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2. Background

2. 1 Political Decentralization in Senegal In the first two decades following Senegalese independence from France in 1960, the Senegalese government professed allegiance to African socialism, which in practice reaffirmed French colonial methods of heavy state intervention and an economic policy of import substitution. The number of public enterprises expanded and private sector activity was strongly regulated. Although Senegal has experimented with various degrees of political decentralization since independence, it is only very recently that the process has included the transfer of competencies over education. According to Rideout and Bagayoko (1994), Senegalese leaders at independence were stellar students of French political thought and education. The Senegalese elite had extensive administrative experience with “direct rule”, based on a centralized policy and characterized by a lack of transparency. This was equally true in education. Indeed, despite independence, the highly centralized French system of sectoral administration was emulated, enforced, and protected rather than changed. After independence, the first important decentralization policy reform was implemented in 1972 by President Senghor’s government. This first phase of decentralization policy reform created groups of closely linked villages under a popularly elected Rural Council, with a Council Chairman, and endowed a special status for municipalities, or regional capitals. The Rural Council made decisions relevant to different issues including primary schools. Despite its authority, the Rural Council and its Chairman were subordinate to the centrally appointed sub-prefect for the Rural Community, who executed all budget and other major decisions proposed by the Rural Council. In terms of administrative reform, the second phase of decentralization relied on two fundamental laws adopted in 1990. First, deconcentration was achieved with the creation of regional technical and administrative units, establishing field offices for Ministry of Interior representatives who were responsible for overseeing and coordinating the activities of local governments. Technical ministries also established regional and departmental offices in an attempt at more horizontal coordination of ministry affairs. However, as with the first phase, the transfer of authority in the second phase was not linked to the transfer of authority over the financial or technical resources essential to local government and development. The implementation of the decentralization law passed in 1997 marked the beginning of the third phase of decentralization reform. Importantly, the government created the “Fund for the Endowment of Decentralization” to transfer the financial resources needed to support the

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transfer of authority over nine areas deemed essential to local promotion of economic and social development, one of them being education. Since 1997, the regions and rural communities have received additional funds but have simultaneously become more responsible for providing services, such as education, once exclusively the task of the state (Nzouankou, 1995; Rideout & Bagayoko, 1994; Rondinelli & Minis, 1990). Regional governments can obtain funding through central transfers for specific projects, for instance, primarily in the form of investment funds, some of which require a matching share. Regions often resort to ad hoc negotiations with the central government to obtain extraordinary transfers for emergency relief. Moreover, regions are denied access to the major tax bases used by the central government, which then reallocates part of the revenue in one of the above-mentioned manners. This restricted capacity of tax revenue, together with the limited capacity of national officials to collect taxes and the local populations to pay taxes, result in financial dependence of the regions on the central government. In 2000, President Abdoulaye Wade was elected on a platform that leaned heavily on social welfare promises. The new President and his Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) are more inclined toward liberalism and private initiative but after 40 years of socialist governance, the state continues to struggle with the distribution of authority and responsibility to its ten regions. Under Wade, the government structure has become increasingly compartmentalized. It is composed of a growing number of ministries, agencies, departments, bureaus, and institutes that operate with little evidence of coordination and cooperation (Rondinelli & Minis, 1990). The ability of ministries and agencies to act effectively continues to be encumbered by a hierarchical system of controls. Even with the transfer of responsibilities over services, each control function is carried out by different organizational units before, during, and after delegated actions are taken. In no public sector is this more apparent than in education.

3. Educational Decentralization in Senegal

3.1 The Non-Formal System Although much has been written about political and education reform in Senegal, little has been done to examine their intersection outside of the formal system. More than ten years ago Senegal (and many other nations) was called upon to restructure its allocation of resources and competencies to focus on The World Bank and Education for All (EFA) basic education priorities of decentralization and partnership. In this context of international pressures to reform education systems, Senegal’s susceptibility toward international policy trends has

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been demonstrated in the flood of conferences, seminars, and proposals perpetuating globally prescribed basic education reform and administrative restructuring. In response to external pressures from international markets as well as international organizations (i.e. the World Bank), Senegal began the process of liberalizing and privatization in the economy in the 1980s under President Diouf. He sanctioned the 1991 Loi d’Orientation de l’Éducation National (No. 91.22), or National Law of Education Orientation, as part of this broader process of economic, political, and social reform. This law established new learning and teaching objectives, a new academic structure, and new curriculum content oriented toward the EFA mandates established in 1990. In 1997, he passed the Lois de la Décentralisation (No. 96.07), for the first time transferring fiscal and administrative responsibility for pre-schools, primary schools, and non-formal basic education/literacy from the state to the local and community levels.The intent was to extend decentralization in order to transform the local school and community into the principal agents of development and poverty reduction by extending to them certain authorities over school operations (République du Sénégal, MoE & MCEBLN, 1996; Republique du Senegal & Ministere de L’Interieure, 1996). In 1993, Senegal’s Ministry of Education (MoE) began promoting a community-based basic education (BCE) project as key to the country’s educational reforms. The BCE model includes a four-year cycle (instead of the six-year cycle of the formal sector), open to 9–15-year olds who are either not attending or have dropped out of the formal system. The aims of the BCE in the words of the state are: (1) to develop an alternative educational system, (2) to counteract quantitative and qualitative limits of the formal sector, (3) to promote community-oriented schooling, (4) to institutionalize the use of national languages (Wolof, Poulaar, Diola, and Sereere), (5) to disengage the state from local educational efforts, and (6) to motivate untapped support for development activities in the field (République du Sénegal & MoE, 1997). According to the former Minister of Education under Diouf, the BCE project was not only the best example of decentralization in education, but also was the future of Senegalese education (République du Sénégal, 1997). In practice, the policy goals of the BCE experiment are grounded in prior attempts at geographic and functional decentralization of Senegalese public services. The rationale to expand authority over the non-formal sector as the means to adopt EFA propositions and address equity and efficiency in concrete African contexts was explicitly addressed at the 6th Conference of Ministers of Planning of African States (CONFEMEN) in 1995, where it was decided to allocate political commitment and resources to non-formal education, in order to address persistent equity and access problems. In a collective declaration, educational leaders across francophone West Africa defined a “new school” in a document entitled, L’éducation de base: Vers une école nouvelle: “This community school is an educational structure where one makes available to individuals in a historically determined social and linguistic context, a minimum of skills and attitudes that permit him to pursue his

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education and participate effectively in the development of his society” (CONFEMEN, 1995, p. 21). Notably, the specific context for education reform and the provision of non-formal education in Senegal depends on more than such international pressure. Because of a weak schooling rate, a high level of illiteracy among adolescents, and economic difficulties, the Senegalese state deemed it imperative to develop relevant and less expensive alternatives to the formal system for the universalization of basic education (Diarra et al. 2000). Several official reports and policy statements cite access and economic reasons as motivating factors but no specific rational for choosing a non-formal (Diop, 1999; Sow, 2000). It is within this perspective that the government of Senegal decided to experiment with and expand an alternative system of education comprised of literacy and community-based basic education schools. The 1991 law (No. 91.22) was sanctioned, and established new learning and teaching objectives, a new academic structure and new curriculum content, oriented toward the EFA mandates. The 1997 law on decentralization continued this movement, transferring fiscal and administrative responsibility to the local partner and community levels. In the alternative system, this is achieved through an informal but officially acknowledged strategy called “faire faire.” Faire-faire is a partnership strategy intrinsic to decentralization in non-formal education in Senegal. Basically, it is understood as an educational partnership in which the state orients, motivates, and supports initiatives, which are otherwise operated, funded, and controlled by project donors and operating organizations. Parallel, key education reform strategies, including faire faire, were presented in support of the BCE model in the country’s “Decade Plan for Education and Training” (Plan Décénnal d’Éducation et du Formation, PDEF) (Republique du Senegal, 1998). The PDEF advocated the better implication of actors and partners in the strengthening of the education system; the enlargement of the decentralized powers to the local collectivities; the extension of the policy of faire faire and the roles of civil society and education partners. In contrast, the empirical evidence present in the interpretations of decentralization and faire faire by non-governmental partners indicate the popular understanding of the state’s faire faire approach as laissez faire or a “type of liberalization . . .that permits the operators to do the projects without intervention from the government.” According to one NGO representative, “In the case of nonformal education, the state will say that ‘I’m going to faire faire.’That means I ask the operators, like the NGO or the community organizations, to act. And me, I seek only to supervise, to see if it conforms to policy.” Another NGO operator explained the faire faire approach as “a government response to its own limits and lack of mechanisms.” In this case, he added, “the state normally does in terms of resource management, program development, and partnerships. The state acts as facilitator and organizer—that’s all. The rest is up to the others.” The above interpretations, first, suggest there is a difference between official rhetoric and reality when it comes to the state’s approach to decentralization. This perception of the

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government’s “laissez-faire” approach to decentralized education conjures images of liberalization and privatization rather than the official rhetoric of democratization and a transfer of authority. The expressed understanding is of a minimal state involvement, putting no constraints on the free operation of other BCE educational actors. As for the relationship between the state and civil society, specifically, there is limited concrete understanding of the state’s role in the process of social transformation, particularly as an entity to engage disadvantaged groups.

4. Ambiguous Intentions of BCE Policy The ambiguous intentions for decentralized community schooling described in official discourse seems to have increased over the past decade. When the state adopted the BCE model, the national rhetoric embraced education decentralization and the transfer of authority over non-formal education and community schooling not as an end in itself but as a means to reduce national expenditures and create the appropriate educational environment to support the EFA agenda, as well as a larger social transformation process (Diop, 1999). Although the BCE model was put in place in 1993, no precise non-formal education policy or detailed plan of action was instituted until 1995. Additionally, no specific monitoring and coordinating body was created until 1996, when a significant donation from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) allowed for the institutionalization of the Projet d’appui au Plan d’Action (PAPA). Over half of the BCEs are financed through PAPA. The others are financed and operated by NGOs, called “operators.” The operator and the school community are responsible for the design and implementation of BCEs, while MoE personnel are responsible for orientation, motivation, data collection, planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation and technical assistance. How this structure is understood by those involved in BCE functioning, however, reveals the multiple influences, perceptions, and experiences of all actors as they shape ambiguous intentions and contested outcomes of decentralized community schooling. The conception of the appropriate BCE education began as an “alternative” but “equal” basic educational provision. This status gradually changed over the years as the state removed itself further and further from BCE implementation as the following chronological presentation of official correspondence demonstrates. In 1994, in a letter from the Minister of Education addressed to the governors of three regions, the Minister describes the state’s vision of the experiment in the alternative education system as a “partnership with traditional donors,” “a collaboration” to experiment with an alternative to the classical education model as a means to optimize educational means and minimize educational costs” (République du Sénégal et al.

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1994)2. A year later, an official correspondence regarding the opening of “experimental alternative schools” authorized the operation of schools in six departments 3, stating that “the BCEs (alternative schools) hold the same status as public state schools and benefit from the same advantages and prerogatives”(République du Sénégal & MoE, 1995). Ultimately, since the passage of the 1997 National Law of Decentralization, the notion of congruence between the two models seems to have changed significantly in national level discourse. Initially, the BCE “path”was intended to be a true alternative to the formal school: to improve the quality and relevance of learning, strengthen institutions and the mechanisms of coordination and participation. In addition, the BCE “mode of intervention” aimed to validate the relevance of non-formal schooling options and to strengthen the pre-existing partnerships through improved communication, monitoring, and supervision, with the training of central and local structures. In 1999, two years after the Law of Decentralization legislated a new institutional environment based on the principles of a “deeper” decentralization “to privilege participation and partnership, while mobilizing all social actors,” the BCEs were no longer promoted as an “alternative to the classical model” of public state schools. Although national education inspectors were “favorable to the implementation of BCEs,” the perception was now not of a school of alternative but equal status but of a “complementary relationship between the formal and the non-formal model” with BCEs as a “complementary path to EFA” (DAEB, UNICEF, & INEADE, 1999). Finally and most recently, in the Annual EFA Report of National Education, BCEs were characterized as little more than “secondary interventions to eradicate illiteracy, after classical methods” (Sow, 2000). In other words, just three years after their implementation, the aims behind the BCE model had changed from a parallel alternative option to formal schooling to a compensatory literacy program for communities with no access to a more comprehensive education. Actions rooted in these divergent priorities and politics relative to the BCE project have been reported by diverse BCE stakeholders in three regions and validated by observations at the village level. When we look beyond a description of the administrative and fiscal structures in order to address more micro-level features of BCE functioning, we see the varied intentions project participants adopted for participation in a BCE education, and we see how these often contested intentions were manifested in ambiguous actions at the school level. The BCEs’ reported impact and the major actions associated with their implementation produce a grounded picture of how a BCE represents contrasting understandings of the nature of decentralized education in the nonformal sector. In order to illustrate the educational decentralization process, a case study was conducted in the village of Diatafa in the Kolda region in the south of Senegal. Surveys and interviews of 2. 3.

The letter is referenced as Objet: Expérimentation du systeme alternatif en matiere d’éducation. Departement is district.

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representatives of the central government and of decentralized Ministry of Education officials; as well as, interviews and observations of NGO operators, and village residents at regional and district levels provided a grounded understanding of the Diatafa BCE project and the villagers’ experiences with decentralized nonformal education.

5. BCE in Diatafa – A Case Study

5.1 The Setting The 30 schools in Kolda region operated by a local NGO are the largest and longest running group of community-based schools operated by a single NGO; they pursue one of the “national” [i.e. officially accepted] models of community-based basic education, while representing an extremely decentralized form of non-formal basic education in Senegal; and they are the most consistent focus of government and national follow-up and evaluation, as indicated by the growing number of published reports4. Although Diatafa is culturally and ethnically similar to the majority of villages in the largely Pulaar dominated, agro-pastoral region of Kolda, this village school cannot be considered representative of all BCEs. BCEs carry the unique qualities of their immediate socio-economic environments and operator histories. For instance, those BCEs in or near urban areas tend to look more like and even occupy permanent formal school buildings, while those schools in rural areas tend to be constructed of mud or thatched weeds. The religious climate of a BCE community is another factor impacting the character of its experience. In the more tangibly Muslim Northern regions of Senegal, for example, BCEs offer religious instruction to conform to the community and local religious leaders’ expressed desires. The capacity and pressures of urban and Northern BCEs were not evident in Diatafa’s community school experience. The BCE building in Diatafa is a 15x20ft thatched corn-husk structure. The school sits on the periphery of the village, in the middle of a cow pasture and holds 3 long tables and benches. About 10-15 students attended the school, which is down from the 40-50 students attending during the school’s first year of operation. Nearly three fourths of enrolled students are girls. As the setting of a potentially promising and historically established model of non-formal decentralized education, Diatafa is materially, symbolically, and politically capable of supporting 4.

The most recent and thorough of these reports is Diarra et al., Les écoles communautiares de base au Sénégal (Paris: IIEP, 2000). Also see Mamadou Fofana, et al., Experimentation du système alternatif (Dakar: INEADE/UNICEF, 2000) and Aide et Action (2000). Rapport d’evaluation de fin d’annèe des BCE de Mai/juin 2000.

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development projects such as the BCE. The village is economically able and willing to contribute financially to its own development projects. Its approximately 250 residents cultivate cotton and peanuts, are symbolically or religiously open to secular education, and democratically oriented.Villagers ranked school improvements fourth out of five priorities of need. Other items included the basic life needs represented by a health hut (first priority), a pounding machine (second priority), a peanut collection site (third priority), and road construction (fifth priority).

5.2 Ambiguous Interpretations and Actions: Multiple Local Perspectives State and NGO intentions and interpretations of the transfer and transformation of authority over schooling shape action and inaction at the local school site level. In Diatafa, communitybased actors, because they were not familiar with national decentralization policy or even the concept of decentralization, tended to reflect on aspects of the BCE experience that did not denote decentralization directly. The physical, technical, and political aspects of the project they discussed are, however, parts of the BCE implementation process that blend with the elements of administrative and structural change associated with decentralization. As to the impact of BCE activities, in line with the BCE and decentralization agenda, local level decentralized government and NGO agents shared the central government’s support of the BCE effort, providing evidence for the impact of the BCE in their claims. Evidence they cited included, “the economic projects [that] have yielded two gardens for local consumption, nine sheep pens, three community boutiques.” According to another, “The youth have learned many things, like uses for new varieties of peanuts and beans...more drought resistant. Students are really motivated. They want to cultivate the area around the school. They want to buy seed and livestock. The village has become much cleaner.” This kind of support of the BCE relies on physical proof of its successful implementation in terms of increased access, “impact” on and “improvement” of living conditions, and successful project “management.” These actors tended to cite visible and easily measured outcomes and practices in the BCE implementation process as the basis of community support of the project. One parent expressed slightly different expectation of a professional life for her children in the BCE in terms relative to the official professional training objectives of the BCE project. The surrounding group agreed with her statement that “We want our children to be lifted up by other things [than farming]. We want them to be civil servants, NGO trainers or even security guards.” When other members of the Diatafa BCE community spoke of the force of education in the lives of their children, values alternative to those of government and NGO operators continued to surface. Representing the BCE management committee, one villager expressed, for instance,

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that the power of education was transformative for the village and particularly meaningful for girls: “Our main goal is for the children to pass that exam and go on to further schooling. In this way, the school could make something, uh, give something back—like a village health specialist. It [the BCE school] could be very important to improve the lives of girls. They can get up through education. If they have ideas, they can do a lot of things.” Another community member echoed this sentiment and felt that the BCE schools “bring more advantages than the formal school.” In terms of the perceived impact of the BCE and what motivated community participation, community BCE actors cited the preparation of students for achievements beyond the existing institutional and socio-economic structure of the village slightly more than the empowerment of learners and the social change of the community. Elements in the comments of community members and teachers illustrate how the people in the village tended to prioritize the human resource training aims of “trade” and earning money but not over their hope for a formal education and not over the popular education goal, “to be in charge” and “to be lifted up.” One ECB operator blamed the government for the divergent interests between villagers, state and NGO actors. She argued that “The government is big into paradigms. And even after 30 years, they are still trying to force it on everyone. It was certainly not my vision to do a passarelle. They (the state) do know how to prepare a child for formal school, and they’ll perpetuate that paradigm to get kids into formal schools. I’m into breaking paradigms. They’re into getting kids to face it.” Most representatives of the ECB operator in Kolda reported the ECB’s impact in terms of the more explicitly political notion of the political mobilization of participants through “new ways of thinking,” “a participatory approach in resolution of local problems,” and “civic and moral education.” Conflicting views on the impact of education may be at the root of why community and government actors are perceived as “not at the same point” as seen by one MoE official. The evidence of motivation and mobilization around the BCE indicates that any contradiction between BCE intentions and actions most likely begins with the fact that the official rhetoric is not promoted by community members as the cornerstone of their expectations of a BCE education. Comments about the capacity of community actors and the expectations of the state reiterates this assertion and emphasizes an increasingly evident dichotomy between community action and state expectation for decentralized community schooling. An objective of the education transfer and transformation process, according to both central government and NGO operators’ understanding of the laws, is to increase political and administrative participation, including decentralized education inspectors, civil society, and community members. In the case of Diatafa and reports of other villages, the participation of different decentralized actors has increased remarkably for some, usually NGOs, and not at all for others. On the other hand, the lack of participation for some and the overwhelming participation of

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others is largely a result of incongruous assumptions regarding the capacity and expectations of actors in the alternative system. Two national education inspectors at the district level perceived the actual BCE partnership in terms of what community schools represented in the future and in the abstract—as a “hope.”First, according to one Inspector, the BCE “represents a lot of hope to make up for the limits of formal schooling, but we are still in a phase of formulation, conception, and experimentation.”Another Inspector argued more critically that “The actors, as a result of their ignorance and their incapacity for reflection, are not at the same point as the hopeful expectations of the state.”Together, these interview excerpts imply that the state’s hopes have not been met due to the incapacity of the BCE community. A theme of “do nothing” emerged from the descriptions of the activities of operators and government actors – a logical consequence of the discrepant motivation issues seen in the BCE discourse. For instance, actions that impact the discrete expectations of the operator or state are not perceived as significant or essential by the community because such actions do not reflect community-level priorities. So who exactly does “nothing”and who exactly “waits and sees” what will happen in the BCE community is perceived differently by different actors. From the point of view of a BCE supervisor, working for an NGO, “the community waited for outsiders to resolve its problems and instill a community dynamic.” Another operator felt that “The [BCE] beneficiaries are really waiting for the state to sustain the BCE model in the same way as the formal school.”This is complemented by a joint UNESCO/UNICEF report (2000) that explains that “the tendency is to wait and see what the donor or operator will do if the state continues to do nothing” (p. 23). Several government officials interviewed associated inaction on behalf of the BCEs as a sign of “poor community involvement and lack of pooled resources” and put the blame on the shoulders of the community. The lack of local-level motivation to take charge of the school is most often interpreted as a “lack” or “misunderstanding” of expected roles in the alternative education system. For instance, one decentralized government official speaking of BCE management committee members claimed that “Those elected don’t understand the spirit of decentralization.” Policy makers see inertia toward institutionalizing BCEs in a decentralized education system as stemming, at least in part, from both a misunderstanding and inaction across all actors. Decentralized government officials and operators assumed that the proposed educational and administrative structure of BCEs has not been realized in practice because of “wait-and-see” attitudes at the central and community levels. As one MoE official theorized, Decentralization in theory, in some ways, I can tell you, is perfect. But while in practice, the people who should implement decentralization, do they have the same understanding of decentralization? Do they understand the same expectations? Do they accept it in the same way? It is not at all obvious. And...there are interests at play. And at this moment, things are not practiced, and the practice is going to be absolutely

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In certain instances, the “incompetencies” of elected school management committee members were identified more specifically as illiteracy, often cited by international donors, decentralized inspectors, and national operators as the greatest obstacle to decentralization and the BCE implementation process. Although many actors outside the village conceded that illiteracy was a major obstacle to the implementation of the BCE under decentralization, most of them more frequently construed a general “incompetence” or a lack of understanding as the source of the poor community motivation. In a jointly published report, the state Division of Literacy and Basic Education along with the BCE donor claim, In general, communities seem attached to their BCEs and have a lot of hope in them. However, the local management committees do not seem to understand their role. Few efforts have been made to improve the working conditions of the students.... A wait and see trend is very strong. The idea to fund the construction of the BCE school seems to be at the heart of this waiting (DAEB, UNICEF & INEADE, 1999, p. 7). In practice, this vague notion of misunderstanding and incompetence is much more difficult to address than illiteracy. Despite the obvious limited technical capacity based on the level of illiteracy and poverty, it is more aggressively argued by certain actors that the inertia in implementing changes stems from a cultural unpreparedness of the community to accept the changes associated with decentralized community schooling. A BCE résponsable at a national institute said that communities feel it is their right to have a state provided education. This is behind the “wait-and-see” attitude observed in many villages, when it comes to paying for or actually creating their own school system. According to several NGO actors, the community in Diatafa clearly shows its expectations of social protectionism and the responsibility of an outside party to deliver education. Such an attitude is evident to operator and donor actors, despite the historic absence of such service provision in the village prior to the introduction of the BCE. Thus, in contrast to the notions of a transfer of power and empowerment that characterize official discourse about the decentralization movement and the BCE rationale, the notions held of the villagers by the state and the operator imply a sense of social protectionism on the part of the people. For example, villagers had initially planned (with the advice from the NGO) to collect the available raw materials with which to construct a permanent three-room building of brick and cement with a zinc roof to be used by at least 100 students during the school year. These plans suggested a certain ownership of the project. When asked why these plans had not yet been put into action, the villagers replied that their “inaction” was actually a “reaction” to what they perceived as a lack of financial and technical involvement on the part of state and NGO actors. For example, the BCE operator had not encouraged and had, in fact, discouraged community

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action by its own passivity concerning school construction. The operator promised cement and a mason to help the villagers construct a permanent building for the school in the first year of BCE operation. Support for this assertion is found in the lack of evident attitudes, practices, and norms that would encourage participation and shared decision-making. An objective of the education transfer, according to both central government and decentralized BCE operators’ understanding of the laws, is to increase political and administrative participation, including that of community members. In terms of the state’s role in the local BCE effort, all operators seemed to agree that central education officials had no hand at present, neither technically nor financially, and the result was a laissez-faire environment. On the other hand, community members and government officials clearly stated their understanding of the operator’s obligation to sustain the school. Rarely have formal mechanisms for increased participation of decentralized actors been implemented into action at the village level. And, where mechanisms do exist, community participation is rarely actively encouraged and almost never translated into actual practices and norms. Although, in Diatafa, the BCE infrastructure was in place and the BCE management committee was physically maintaining the school, in no way were actors operating collectively in a managerial capacity, sharing in meaningful decision-making and school-level management.

6. Discussion and Conclusion The experiences of local leadership, participation, and intellectual transformation are key components in the Law of Orientation and the Decentralization Law as well as in theories of democratic decentralization which are implied in the world models that are being globalized. What happens in the Senegalese case is that there is a critical disjuncture between these concepts and the views of BCE participants. These multiple perceptions are the foundation upon which seemingly uniform macro-policy intentions are transformed into multiple local policy interpretations. In other words, participants’ lack of mutual understanding indicates that the actions of different partners in non-formal community schools may also be different.Actors’ interpretations of decentralization rhetoric and reality reveal an interest in and identification with a transfer rather than a transformation of education authority over community schooling. It is along these lines that Diatafa’s reaction to the BCE is perceived by other BCE actors as inaction. Although official rhetoric appears to adopt democratic political positions toward community participation, government actors are preoccupied with positions that accommodate only certain goals, namely, compensatory education provision to disadvantaged populations and reducing the cost of non-formal education for the government. In so doing, government actors neglect

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to cultivate the globally and locally advocated right to education prevalent in national education reform rhetoric and demonstrated in the attitudes of the people. Education policy, in this context, distracts or subdues the demands for a state-funded education by allocating the village a BCE and an NGO operator to which the people may tie their hope and criticism in lieu of the state. In a historically centralized state like Senegal, government by an intellectual and urban elite has been a lingering by-product of French colonialism, but it is still the only system of governance recognized by the people (Somerville, 1991). Historically, the political reflection of this type of centralism has been a link between government and society in which regional and local governments tend to have little autonomy and often tend to be little more than mechanisms of central government interests. Despite the state’s adoption of the strategy of “faire-faire”, to recruit and manage personnel more flexibly, control costs and expenses, and to eliminate some limitations of schooling provisions produced, and taking into account the traditions of centralized governmentalism and the state’s inexperience with decentralized organizational capacity building, particularly in nonformal education, it is not surprising that BCE decentralization has become a model of laissez-faire. In this case of community-based education, the central government committed itself to a transfer of authority but not a transformation of organizational capacity at decentralized levels active in the BCE project. Without efforts made by the state to forge strong partnerships with private national and community organizations so as to strengthen democracy and development efforts in the BCE context, the burden on NGO operators to be the essential contributors to a wider process of educational and social transformation was perceived as an unfulfilled contract between the NGO operator and the BCE village. Historically, Diatafa and villages with similar circumstances have been the target of villagebased development activities, for which it has depended on international and national agency assistance. Villagers have benefited from arrangements with various agencies, collaborating on a community garden, irrigation pump, and plans for road construction. On the other hand, a poor, rural community, like Diatafa had never received tangible public assistance for education, influencing community members’ understanding of their BCE experience as a “private” agreement between themselves and the BCE operator. As a result, they based their interpretations and actions on the notion of a private school operated by a private agent. The village did have a larger frame of reference for the state as a social provider, as demonstrated by their hopes for civil employment and a formal (national) education for their children. Their understanding of the BCE orientation as a “complement” or “bridge” to formal schooling also supports this notion. In a geographically and politically marginalized village like Diatafa, community members are not accustomed to participate in partnership with other civil actors. Neither are they

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accustomed to the neo-liberal expectation of private contributions for public services. At the same time, an extension of such responsibility and participation to civil actors, who have a historical understanding of education as a service provided by the state, while providing them no frame of reference for being included in the process is at the base of what challenges the expectations of actors.This is evident in how actors criticize the villagers’ “misunderstanding”of their responsibilities and interpret their inaction as signifying “poor motivation”. Such interpretations of decentralization rhetoric and reality reveal an interest in and identification with a transfer rather than a transformation of educational authority over community schooling. It is along these lines that Diatafa’s reaction to the BCE and other actors’ perceptions of that reaction are driven by the ideological dispositions of the actors toward a BCE education and how they identify it with decentralization constructs and the faire-faire strategy behind decentralization policy. The NGO identity in the BCE context, equally, depends on the collaborative efforts of state and civil society. Even though NGO operators have a well-developed organizational capacity, it is hard to explain the decentralization implementation process in terms of organizational capacity alone. While observations and conversations indicated that NGO operators were functioning because they had sufficient decision-making rights, they also revealed that NGO partners were not functioning adequately because they lacked sufficient budgetary and technical resources. In contrast to the state’s identity of decentralization, NGO operators adopted an identity that was more akin to a model of privatization. The notions of a mission complementary or supplementary to that of the state, of a voluntary public-private association, and of popular participation in administration of the BCE project are more evident in NGO representatives’ expectations than in those of the other actors. However, NGO actors’ commitment to developing an administrative structure to support the project, presupposes the contribution and participation of all actors. This expectation has been displaced by the expectations and behaviors of the state’s “disengagement” beyond the terms of faire faire and its enactment of laissez faire. While a hesitation and lack of mechanism for supervision and technical support had also come with a nearly free reign over community-based schooling for operators, this did not translate into an effort to move away from government prescriptions in Diatafa. For instance, observations did not indicate that an effort was being made by operators to develop community awareness of possible alternatives to the prevailing view that a compensatory school was the best route to improve the challenging circumstances of a poor rural existence. Thus, the process of education decentralization in BCEs has led to a system in which NGO operators were left to their own devices as to how to execute public policy. They also possessed the freedom (if not explicit authority) to make decisions regarding which public policies outcomes were achieved even after they had shown their inability to establish transformative

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activities, to provide adequate technical support, or to sustain the project as outlined in national rhetoric. All in all, the evidence strongly indicates that decentralization in community-based education has helped install relevant programs where the state does not provide. More importantly, however, the consequence of the multiple perceptions of decentralization policy is clearly associated with the disorganization of the alternative education system and the disengagement of the state from its stated commitment to education administration reform, namely in the form of broader social development in which BCEs and their communities could assume a more authoritative identity in educational decision-making.

7. References Aide et Action. (2000). Rapport d’evaluation de fin d’année des BCE de Mai/Juin 2000. Dakar: Aide et Action. CONFEMEN (1995). Conference des Ministres de l’Education Nationale (1995). L’éducation de base: Vers une école nouvelle. Document de reflexion. Dakar: MoE. DEAB, Unicef, INEADE (1999). Aide-memoire pour le suivi des Ècoles Communautaires de Base appuyées par l’UNICEF. Dakar: Direction de l’Alphabetisation et de l’Éducation de Base, Institut Nationale de l’Étude de d’Action pour le Developpement de l’Éducation, & United Nations Children’s Fund. Diarra, D., Fall, M., Gueye, P.M., Mara, M. & Marchand, J. (2000). Les écoles communautaires de base au Sénégal. Paris: Institut International de Planification de l’Éducation. Diop, F. (1999). Les ecoles communautaires de base: Une initiative novatrice dans la voie de l’education pour tous. Dakar: PAPA. Fofana, M., Diop, A., Ndao, M. & Sy, A. (2000). Éxperimentation du système alternatif: Rapport d’evaluation finale. Dakar: INEADE/UNICEF. Nzouankou, J.M. (1995). Decentralization and democracy in Africa. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 60: 213-227. République du Sénégal (1991). Loi d’orientation de l’éducation national, No. 91.22. République du Sénégal. (1998). Plan Décénnal d’Éducation et de la Formation. Dakar: MoE. République du Sénégal, INEADE, & UNICEF. (1994). Termes de reférences de l’éxperimentation du système alternatif. Dakar: INEADE. République du Sénégal, Ministère de l’Éducation National. (1995, March 1). Ordre de Service. Doc. no. 001142. Dakar. République du Sénégal, MoE, & MCEBLN (1996). Cadre de référence pour les éxperimentations des Ecoles Communautaires de Base au Sénégal. No document no. Dakar: MoE. République du Sénégal & Ministere de l’Interieur. (1996). Textes de lois de la decentralisation. Dakar: Groupe SIFNI. République de Sénégal & MoE. (1997). Presentation generale du syteme educatif. Dakar: MoE.

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Rideout, W.M. & Bagayoko, M. (1994). Education policy formation in Senegal. In D.R. Evans (Ed.). Education policy formation in Africa: A comparative study of five countries. Washington, D.C: USAID. Rondinelli, D.A. & Minis, L.T. (1990). Administrative restructuring for economic adjustment: Decentralization policy in Senegal. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 56: 447466. Somerville, C.M. (1991). The impact of the reforms on the urban population: How the Dakarois view the crisis. In C. Delgado and S. Jammeh (eds.). The political economy of Senegal under structural adjustment. New Yourk: Praeger. Sow, M. (2000). Éducation pour tous: Bilan a l’an 2000. Rapport National. Dakar: Ministére de l’Éducation Nationale. UNICEF & UNESCO. (2000). Les non-approches non-conventionnelles en matiere d’education de base au Senegal. Dakar: UNICEF/UNESCO.

Chapter Seven

Technocratic School Governance and South Africa’s Quest for Democratic Participation

Suzanne Grant Lewis & Jordan Naidoo

1. Introduction In 1996 South Africa initiated a national policy to promote broader participation in educational decision-making through local school governance structures in which parents serve as majority members. This model was designed with the expressed aim of contributing to the democratic transformation of South African society. This chapter examines South Africa’s experience to date, utilizing the “theory of action” framework to understand both government policy and school-level actors’ experiences. We argue that while commonly espoused theories are evident in the governance policy and among various actors, in practice the government actions are promoting a narrow understanding of the policy, one which privileges technocratic efficiency over grassroots participation in decision-making. Consequently, government initiatives are serving to reinforce existing patterns of power and privilege in schools and in the broader society. We start with a few introductory comments on why South Africa makes such a compelling case, followed by an overview of our theoretical framework. After an historical overview, we

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present our evidence regarding the espoused theory and theory-in-use of South Africa’s governance policy. In examining the theories of action of different school-level actors, we focus on the three dimensions of participation, representation and decision-making. We conclude with a discussion of the dangers of such a narrow interpretation of school governance and participation and suggest what these findings mean for broader debates regarding participation.

The Relevance of the South African Case South Africa is a valuable case for understanding the connection between educational governance and grassroots participation for reasons of policy design, size and scope of its initiatives. First, South Africa’s policy thrust reflects global policy trajectories. South Africa is committed to a national social transformation project within a decidedly neoliberal ideology. Since 1994 South Africa’s policy agenda has attempted to address a wide range of somewhat contradictory aims. It was expected to address its apartheid past by extending democracy, promoting greater educational participation and putting into place equity and redress strategies, all without alienating the privileged white minority (Sayed, 2001). Its macro-economic policy represents a self-imposed structural adjustment program in an effort to provide the conditions for economic growth1. The policy agenda also aims to restructure the economy in line with globalization requirements. The scale of South Africa also argues for our attention. In a country with 42.8 million people (US Census, 2004), there are 11.7 million students in 27,458 public and independent schools with 354,201 educators (DOE, 2003a). Finally, South Africa is a valuable case in point because it has moved further than any other sub-Saharan African country in introducing, on a national level, school-based governance and financing. While more than 25 subSaharan African countries have implemented one or more major decentralization initiatives (Naidoo, 2001), South Africa’s attention to both financing and governance is unusual.

1.

See Department of Finance, 1996 for the macroeconomic policy. For discussions of structural adjustment in South Africa, see Bond, 2000; Marais, 1998 and Chisholm, et al., 1999.

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2. Using the Theories of Action Framework to Examine School Governance

Policies In viewing education reform as critical to national policy interests, policy makers appear to subscribe to the belief that it is possible to take control of change and to direct it to an alternate future, and when we arrive there, it is not too different from the scenario that was envisioned (O’Neill, 1995, p. 1).Their perspective reflects the continued dominance of a “rationalist”stages model of policy, despite numerous recent explanations that point to the policy process being far more complex, dynamic and interactive than the traditional linear models suggest (Walford, 2001). Alternate models have begun to focus more broadly on the nature of social problems, governance and organizational systems in which policies operate, as well as the will and capacity of people involved in the process (Spillane, et al. 2002). Yet the “rational model” still dominates in many contexts, including South Africa, and policy makers often equate policy intention with policy practice. In turn, they exhibit a simplistic understanding of the motivations of individuals to participate that denies individual agency as it relates to the construction of social structures and practices. In reality conflicts and dilemmas are central to the experience of schooling, and ideology, power, and value-relations shape and pattern school management, governance, and leadership in different historical and cultural settings (Grace, 1995, pp. 2-3). Concepts such as devolved management and local governance are often contested and school governance discourses are likely to be received in very different ways by individual members who constitute the school community, depending on a variety of factors, not least are individuals’ own theories about governance. National policy mandates, such as the South African Schools Act (SASA) are but frameworks or national architecture that provide a rubric within which actors continually design, enact, and reenact policy at all levels. This design, enactment and reenactment, occurs at the level of the school and within the school governing body itself. Individuals in the School Governing Body (SGB) and in the school community, are influenced by their own beliefs about governance. Actors who affect change at different levels of the system engage with the principles that constitute the grammar of the reform—not only the activities or practices associated with it.Therefore, we deem it essential to go beyond an understanding of the policy intent and to view the various school-level stakeholders as active agents in the creation of their changing conceptions of school governance and participation.Their perspectives can be understood by an articulation of “theories of action”. Argyris & Schön (1974) define a theory of action as: “A

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theory of deliberate human behavior, which is for the agent a theory of control but which, when attributed to the agent also serves to explain or predict his behavior” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 6). Such theories may be likened to “cognitive maps” that constitute frameworks used to guide, interpret, and justify their actions. These “theories” affect individuals’ interpretation of the demands made by policies on them in the interplay between policies that attempt to direct local action and the direction that is constructed by local actors (Spillane, et al. 2002).Within a theory of action, one may distinguish between theories that are explicit (espoused) and implicit (theories-in-use): When someone is asked how he would behave under certain circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to others. However the theory that actually governs his actions is his theory-in-use, which may or may not be compatible with his espoused theory (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 6-7). In the context of school governance, espoused theories may be likened to the intentions and functions that policy documents or actors assert are the objectives of school governance bodies, while the theories-in-use are linked to functions that are actually performed. A stated policy objective or intention of governance reform such as promotion of democratic practices may ignore the reality of “activities”in practice. For example, a reason often cited for the establishment of school governing bodies (as in SASA) is to extend democracy. But in reality government activities may be decidedly undemocratic or emphasize a different but implicit hypothesis. School governance and decentralization policies typically are based on theories of action that presume that the institutionalization of local school autonomy will have broad effects on education. A tacit assumption made by most central policy makers involved in formulating and implementing large scale educational governance reform is that a universally applied remedy is received by local schools in uniform ways (Fuller and Rivarola, 1998). Yet, the outcomes of governance policies are far more complex and informed by more than a set of limited stated purposes.

Historical Origins of South Africa’s School Governance Model The SASA and the associated National Norms and Standards for School Funding (NNSSF) were the outcome of a long struggle to democratise the education system by enabling parents, educators, and learners to have a say in the way the education system as a whole and schools in particular are governed.The emergence of SGBs as vehicles for the decentralization of power to schools was an outcome of both the macro-economic policy shifts—and their global influences—as well as the outcome of the contestation between old and new orders in the

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education policy process. Two traditions born of different racial experiences, the democratic movement of the Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs) and the National Party’s Model C2 for white communities set public expectations and framed discussions regarding new school governance structures, particularly the push for democratic participation (Weber, 2002)3. Racial variations existed in school governance structures across five separate education departments under apartheid. The former Department of Education and Training (DET) schools had management “largely advisory and consultative” (McPherson & Dlamini, 1998, p. 4) Parent and community dissatisfaction grew and the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), founded in 1985, called for the establishment of Parent Teacher Associations (PTSAs) with broad-based representative and mobilization structures, including parents, teachers and learners. PTSAs were designed to guide the running of schools as well as coordinate school-based resistance, and numbered as many as 2,500 in 1994 (NEPI, 1992). Experimentation with PTSAs showed that local structures and local participation could play a role in the running of schools. The National Party’s Education Renewal Strategy of 1992 was touted as a management solution and stressed efficiency through decentralization. In management councils in each school, parents were given greater power than teachers, including control over admissions. This strategy was translated into practice for white schools with the Model C design and by 1993 about 96% of the white schools chose this option (Karlsson et al. 1999). This meant receiving a state subsidy and covering the remainder of their costs through school fees that effectively excluded working class and unemployed South Africans. The 1995 White Paper on Education and Training (DOE, 1995a) was the first policy statement of the new government to argue for school governing bodies in all schools, with membership drawn from the school community, with attention to race and gender representation. Following this the a Committee was convened and tasked with reviewing the organization, governance and funding of schools (DOE 1995b). A protracted, contested process followed, which saw expression in two more draft white papers, a debate in the media that focused on the future of white schools, extensive consultations and negotiations and numerous drafts of the South African Schools Bill (Karlsson, et al. 1999, pp. 8-10). In 1997, the year following the passing of the South African Schools Act, the first SGB elections were held, and

2.

3.

The Clase Models (A, B, C and later D) introduced in 1990 by the Apartheid government set a new policy for “White” state schools. Model C (semi-private/semi-state option) was a state-aided school run by the management committee and principal, with the power to appoint teachers, decide on admission policies, and set fees. The use of these racial categories and classification are not supported by the authors, but reflect the racial categories that underpinned Apartheid policies. The terminology endures in the new South Africa.

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by the end of that year most schools in the country had established governing bodies (Asmal, 2000).

3. Theory of Action in School Governance Policy4

Espoused Theory in National Policy Statements The national elections of April 1994 marked the formal end of apartheid rule and a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule in South Africa.The new South African Constitution of 1996 included an unequivocal commitment to representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency, and public involvement (RSA, 1996c). The essential vision is that people should participate, beyond periodic national elections, in shaping their destiny. Participation, it is suggested, does not extend simply to the right to elect representatives but translates into the right to influence decisions.The Constitution thus presents an interesting challenge in declaring that the new democracy is both a representative and a participatory one. The challenge is taken up in education through various legislative efforts, in particular by SASA, which reaffirms government commitment to the principles of equity, quality, efficiency and democratic transformation in a new national education system. The Act’s espoused theory is that these four goals can be achieved by changing the school governance landscape to focus on citizen participation, partnerships between the state, parents, learners, school staff and communities, and the devolution of authority towards the individual school and community. Towards this end, SASA provides a uniform mechanism for stakeholders to interact in the decision-making process, specifies who should participate, and identifies the areas over which particular stakeholders should exert influence. In theory, it grants schools and their constituent communities a significant say in decision-making by devolving power to stakeholders who participate in the “democratic governance” of schools. The Preamble of the SASA defines both the key actors and the focus for government promotion of greater participation. “Whereas this country requires a new national system for schools which will . . . uphold the rights of all learners, parents and educators, and promote their acceptance of responsibility for the organization, governance and funding of schools in partnership with the State. . .” (RSA, 1996b: Preamble) SASA requires the establishment at all public schools of governing bodies with considerable powers. SGBs are comprised of the principal and elected representatives of parents, teachers, non-teaching staff, and, in secondary schools, learners. Parents must be in the majority and 4.

see Appendix 7.1.

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chair the SGB. A basic set of functions is stipulated for all SGBs, including determination of admissions policy, setting language policy, making recommendations on teaching and nonteaching appointments, managing the finances of the school, determining school fees and conducting fundraising. These measures are intended to “advance the democratic transformation of society” (RSA, 1996b). While promoting local democratic processes and parent/community ownership, the government faces the additional challenges of needing to integrate the historically decentralized system, improve the efficiency of the system, and redress apartheid imbalances in access, attainment and quality. The dual expectations of serving democratic transformation and financial efficiency through the capture of local resources are evident in the twinning of decentralization policies for school governance and financing, in both SASA and the 1998 release of new NNSSF (DOE, 1998). SASA establishes the principle that the state is obliged to fund public schools on an equitable basis “in order to ensure the proper exercise of the rights of learners to education and the redress of past inequalities in education provision” (RSA, 1996b: Section 34). At the same time, SASA allows for school fees to be charged and private funds to be raised. Therefore, SASA not only promotes local governance, but it is significant for introducing market forces nationwide in the provision of education The NNSSF, which spells out in detail new rules for school funding, was partly a response to a survey (DOE, 1997b), which highlighted the glaring inequalities in educational opportunities. Disparities across and within provinces are evident in enrolment rates, conditions of schools, learner-teacher ratios, teacher qualifications, and degree of racial integration of schools (DOE, 2003a). Yet despite these recognized inequalities, SASA assumes a uniform structure will yield a uniform response to governance policies as well as uniform outcomes. For example, in the national Department of Education’s own brochure, The SA School Act Made Easy, it states, “the Schools Act builds a unified structure”, and “eliminates racial and ethnic division” (DOE, 1997a, p. 1).

4. Theory-in-Use at the National Level Political and administrative leadership in education in South Africa emanates from the center through national, provincial, and district structures of the DOE. The national Minister of Education is accountable to the President and Cabinet and has to ensure that approved policy is effectively executed. The national Department of Education (DOE), headed by the DirectorGeneral, is responsible for the efficient management and administration of the department, and is accountable to Parliament for the funds voted to the department in the budget, and to the Minister of Education for the execution of policy. In practice the DOE “provides professional

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resources for the development of policy as directed by the Minister” (DOE, 1995a). Appendix 7.1 concerning the Espoused Theory of Action. SASA and other policy pronouncements suggest that the link between the politicaladministrative system and the school and SGB is a simple managerial relationship, amenable to a rational, top-down approach to policy-making and decision-making. Key central policy makers see the formulation and implementation of policy as the responsibility of government. The first post-apartheid Minister of Education, distinguished between policy goals and policy implementation plans, and said, “implementation plans can only really be made by a government” (Bengu, 1998, p. 33). In locating agency only with government, the assumption is that “declared policies” will be translated into practice in an unproblematic, smooth process if there are strong controls to ensure that the bureaucracy faithfully executes directives from the top. With few exceptions, directives to the SGB are passed in a top-down manner from national and provincial levels via the principal. Key individuals, from the Minister and Director-General to lower level officials, interpret stated policies in practice. Such interpretations are affected by their theories of action and by the context of their operations. The national DOE exercises influence and control on provincial, district, school and SGB interpretation of SASA in numerous ways. We will focus on the work of the Education Management and Governance Development Directorate (EMDG), legislative amendments to SASA, and several monitoring and evaluation efforts as evidence of the national level theory-in-use.

The EMGD & Governance-management Relationship In the national DOE, the Education Department Support Unit (EDSU) and EMGD are the critical structures responsible for policy implementation and development.The purpose of these units is not only “about bringing people into a unified system, but also about the development of a shared vision, new values and attitudes, and the creation of capacity and an ethos that can drive achievement of organisational goals” (DOE, 2001). The EMGD, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of governance as well as management policies, assumes a “synergy between governance and management”. It is an interpretation shaped by its Director, who feels that “you cannot do governance without having the bigger context of management”. In pursuance of its “managerial objectives,” the EMGD oversees an inter-provincial network to effect management and governance development programmes across all nine provinces.Thus the EMGD plays a key role in interpreting governance policy directives and passes those interpretations on to provinces in a variety of ways, including quarterly meetings with provincial EMG coordinators, responses to provincial requests for assistance, and training of provincial SGB support personnel and SGBs. This is not to suggest that policy signals are uniformly absorbed by provinces and passed down, even though the national DOE, according to the

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EMGD Director, “tries to make sure that we are all talking the same language when it comes to governance”. Interactions at each level may change the policies both in interpretation and in implementation. Although this is an unavoidable consequence of expanding local participation, it is seen as one of the biggest challenges facing national officials, reflecting continuing official concern with “policy fidelity”. Officials regard the quarterly meetings as vital because the values and assumptions about governance and the role of SGBs are changing and there is a need to ensure a common understanding of “the policy.”

Legislative Amendments to SASA The government assessment that democratic decision-making is operating contrary to the “design” of national policy has generated increasing pressure for more regulation of all schools and has motivated a number of legislative amendments to SASA since 1994.This development provides insight into the theory-in-use that dominates nationally, pointing to a national ideology that frames the practical thinking and action (i.e. the theory-in-use) of actors in the education system around school governance. As a result, there are on-going attempts to adapt the systems of control at the different levels and an insistence on uniformity and more national regulations. Amendments to SASA include the eroding of SGB authority over appointments to teaching and non-teaching posts by reducing the time allowed for sending recommendations to the provincial DOE, and giving provinces authority to appoint, without SGB input, temporary transfers (RSA, 1999), first time educators and educators re-entering the system (RSA, 2000: Section 10). Further limits on SGB discretion were placed on their budgeting functions. Budget guidelines were changed to budget prescriptions (RSA, 2001). Greater attention by central government to accountability mechanisms is evident in some of the amendments. In 2001, Heads of Department were given greater power to intervene when a governing body fails to meet its responsibilities, while at the same time their responsibility to correct the situation through capacity building was increased (RSA, 2001). The same Amendment puts in place mechanisms to better ensure responsible financial accountability. Governing bodies can no longer take out a loan or overdraft without approval of the provincial Executive Council. The establishment of trusts with school funds is also restricted; any existing trust funds must be returned to the school. A code of conduct for SGB members is being introduced to make it easier to deal with cases of misconduct (RSA 2002: Section 6). Several of the legislative amendments are double-edged, bringing to light conflicts between the goals of promoting democratic participation and equity. The official explanation for reducing the authority of SGBs to recommend all educator appointments is an equity one, to “ensure a fair distribution of well-qualified educators” (RSA, 2001, p. 26). The national DOE argues it

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needs the freedom to deploy teachers as needed across the system, especially to rural schools that have difficulty in recruiting teachers. It also appears that the DOE is legislating to rein in the “wayward” former White schools, with an acknowledged cost to local participation. In the view of a senior national DOE official, “The problem with our school governance model is that while it is important for democracy in principle, its effect in implementation is problematic.Wealthy schools are performing well under this model, and have gone beyond their powers.” The sense that some SGBs need to be reined in, perhaps for sound equity reasons, is leading to the limiting of all SGBs’ powers.

Monitoring and Evaluation Efforts An examination of government monitoring efforts and official “stocktaking of implementation” provides some insights into national level theory-in-use. In these efforts, the government has tended to concentrate on policy fidelity to the legal prescriptions and a technical/rationalist view of change. The questions asked in The 2003 Annual Survey for Ordinary Schools for the Department of Education’s Management Information System (EMIS) contains a new section on SGBs that reinforces a preoccupation with compliance. There are 68 Yes/No questions asking if the school is complying with SGB legal requirements. The wording of some of the questions indicates a vision of a singular norm. For example: 3.6.2 The SGB has a proper school development plan based on a properly conducted school audit. (1=yes; 2=no) It is also clear that the central government sees that implementation difficulties can be solved through clarification of assigned roles, as these Yes/No questions in the 2003 Annual EMIS Survey indicate: 3.10.1 The SGB does not understand the role that it should play. 3.10.2 There is general confusion about the roles of the governance and management structures in the school and this confusion has led to tension and conflict. 3.10.3 There is slight confusion about the roles of the governance and management structures in the school that can be rectified by training. Another negatively-phrased Yes/No question suggests a surprising bias against civil society organizations getting involved in the work of the SGB, even though external organizations might include community-based organizations or traditional authorities. 3.6.11 External organizations impact negatively on the functioning of the SGB. These annual survey questions convey to actors at all levels the national theory-in-use regarding SASA. It is a technical/rationalist perspective that favors a single, “proper” and

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centrally defined prescription. This perspective is further evident in the findings of the recent Review of the Financing, Resourcing and Costs of Education in Public Schools (DOE, 2003b), which defined implementation problems as due to policy intentions having, “been misunderstood by managers at the various levels of the departments, or at the school, perhaps because of insufficient explanation and socia-lisation from the DOE and the PEDS [Provincial Education Departments].” (DOE, 2003b, p. 10). It was then suggested, “The remedy may then be awareness campaigns, or a rewording, though not a redesign, of the policy” (ibid.). The 2003 Ministerial Review Committee on School Governance is a third important national monitoring and evaluation initiative. The Terms of Reference focuses on most of the goals of the original SASA when asking for recommendations and pointing towards continuing legislative changes. The goal of equity was noticeably missing, although attention is given in the Terms of Reference, but not as a focus for recommendations. The Terms include: “To make recommendations for possible changes to legislation or policy that will serve to strengthen democratic school governance, enhance effectiveness and efficiency of schools, and improve the quality of teaching and learning and implication for capacity building (RSA, 2003, p. 10). Thus national officials and their policy instruments exert a centralizing influence on efforts to transform education governance. There is clearly a tension between attempts at the center to assert power and control (through legislation and policy prescriptions and interpretations) and simultaneous efforts to reorganize governance and management of education to allow a degree of regional and local participation in educational decision-making. While there appears to be a commitment to decentralization and more local participation in policy statements, in practice there is greater effort going into centralization in pursuit of uniform norms and system efficiency. This reflects the gap between the espoused theory in SASA that emphasizes devolution of local educational decision-making as a key element in transformation of education, and the theory-in-use, which argues that governance changes can come about by proclaiming or legislating new policies. The message communicated through the system down to the SGB itself is the following: if there are sufficient guidelines and controls these will result in actions that will lead to democratic decision-making in the interests of the school. Yet, as experience has shown, governments cannot mandate what matters, because what matters most is local motivation, skill, know-how and commitment (Fullan, 1994). Thus, numerous instruments detailing lines of authority, roles and responsibilities and rules of operations convey a singular sense of how the policy ought to be implemented. They give little consideration to the practice of the policy across diverse, historically-situated contexts that characterize post-apartheid South Africa. Since a single “right practice” is demanded, no attention is given to local “sense-making” or theories of action and the accompanying contestation.

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5. Theory-in-Use at the Provincial and District Levels Although South Africa has a single national education system, it is organized and managed on the basis of nine provincial subsystems. The provincial Minister of Education is responsible for policy issues within national guidelines, while the Provincial DOE has the responsibility for establishing, managing and supporting schools. The provincial perspectives on governance in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN ) (despite some minor differences) are consistent with the message conveyed at national level with the emphasis on efficiency and supporting school management. A senior KZN official in charge of Management described the SGB’s purpose, “The primary function of the SGB is to make the school function effectively. We have always said that there are three things that make a school run effectively— a well functioning, supportive SGB, an effective principal and SMT, and teachers who do their job.” In addition to focusing on ensuring that the SGB contributes to the functionality of the school, according to the Gauteng provincial governance coordinator, one of his key responsibilities is to “get people to understand various policies and to establish a common perspective”. As a result, whatever variations exist across these provinces, the overall trend is towards a formal, centralized form of policy making. While there are some expectations that SGBs will embrace a number of functions, the main policy signals from national and provincial levels are centered on financial management and efficient functioning of the school. While democratic objectives are spoken about, at this stage they are not the prime focus. From national to province, different value positions seem to be subsumed by the predominant efficiency discourse, and there appears to be few cleavages in opinions and much more consensus reflecting a narrow technical/rationalist interpretation of school governance. All nine Provincial DOEs have deconcentrated some functions to regional or district offices and to smaller organizational sub-units (circuits or wards). Some authority has been delegated to districts directly in Gauteng, while in KZN it is to eight regions and 41 districts5. This form of decentralization requires that districts administer and manage on behalf of the provincial ministry of education both “policy implementation” and professional support.

5.

At the time of this research, there were 8 regions in KZN, but in the latest reorganization (2004) the regions were reduced to 4. In Gauteng there are between 75 and 435 schools per district, and 12 to 20 schools per circuit or ward. KZN has approximately 800 schools per district, and 25 to3 5 per circuit/ward (DOE, 2003a). A reason for the different configuration is the difference in the size of the two systems. The KZNDEC has 5,968 schools, distributed over 4 regions (KZNDEC, 2003). The GDE has 2 204 schools, spread over an area that is the smallest of South Africa’s nine provinces (DOE, 2003a).

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While central policy signals are key influences, much depends on local officials with lower-level discretion as a constructive element of policy delivery (Elmore, 1979). One would expect that the district administration would affect the operations of the SGBs through the explicit and implicit messages it sends to schools and communities about the role and functions of SGBs. However, in a review of education districts for the national DOE, Malcolm (1999) found that educational districts in South Africa are largely bureaucratic structures with a hierarchical relationship to schools and a controlling role—passing down policies from Head Office, distributing resources and conducting inspections and audits. Given the severe shortages of qualified personnel and serious overload of existing staff, most district officials have succumbed to the pressure to concentrate narrowly on ensuring that legislation and regulations are followed, with little serious reflection on the justification for official policy statements, let alone any redefinition on policies in practice. Most district officials are adopting a narrow role, as described by a GDE District Institutional Development Support Officer. “We have to implement policy, not formulate it, make sure schools and SGBs are implementing department and government policies, and train parents on how to govern schools according to government policy”. Accordingly, most officials tend to focus on limited technical training and support to ensure that SGBs meet legislative requirements. There is a tendency for officials to concentrate on building the formal structure of the SGB and institutionalize certain procedures to support the management of schools. The relationship between the schools and the district is affected by such factors as administrative procedures, the capacity of the districts, the nature of accountability, historical relationships, experience with governance, channels of contact, and the relative influence of the principal at each school. For most schools the relationship is not a negotiated one in which experiences and capacity are shared. Rather it is all about, in the words of a number of officials, “telling governing bodies how to run your schools”. This is reflective of the general pattern that operates at school level where the principals and other professionals are telling parents and learners what governance is about. Furthermore, district officials leave principals, who are the main intermediaries between the SGB and the district (and all other levels of the administration), a free hand to shape the direction of the SGB, as long as they conform to the law. One provincial official recognized that in “some schools it is a ‘one-man-show’ where the principal does everything”. Clearly within the administrative chain, from national down to districts, there is, in the words of another official, the prevailing view that, “with governance – the law says this and whether you like it or not you have to do it”. Although many policy statements hint at expanding democratic decision-making, in practice the approach is still one where the authorities try to directly influence the work of SGBs and try to shape the nature and substance of school governance.

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6. School Actors’ Theories of Action In the following section we explore the nature of participation in school governance using data from a collective case study of six schools in Gauteng and KZN (Naidoo, 2004)6. We focus on stakeholders’ sense-making or theories of action regarding three dimensions of school governance: participation, representation and decision-making.

SGB Theories of Participation In examining school governance practices in South Africa, initially one gets a picture of increased involvement of parents in school governance, with the ideal situation of all stakeholders working together and making decisions by consensus in pursuit of a common interest. In a study of 24 schools in Gauteng Province, 70% of the stakeholders interviewed felt that the formation of the SGB had led to “greater parti-cipation by parents in school activities, such as meetings, fund-raising, and extra-mural activities.” (GDE, 2001, p. 28) In the Naidoo sample, the principal of one Black school 7 indicated that the different stakeholders in their SGB worked together as “basically there is a complimentary type of scenario where we need one another to advance the best interest of the school.” Most stakeholders seem to deny school politics or diverse and competing constituent interests, values, and demands. Yet there is also much uncertainty about governance and, as a result, at most schools great effort is devoted to ensuring that the SGB is acting appropriately, as defined by the letter of the law. Election procedures are followed strictly, SGBs meet at least quarterly, meeting notices are sent out,

6.

7.

The data on the six schools are from Jordan Naidoo’s dissertation research in fulfillment of the D.Ed. at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. The field visits were over a six-month period in South Africa in 2002. Over 50 interviews were conducted with representatives from stakeholder groups on the SGB – the principal, an SGB educator representative, the SGB Chair and other parent representatives, and a learner representative in each school. Representatives from national, provincial, and district DOE offices, and from teacher bodies and governing body associations were also interviewed. The field visits also involved observation of SGB meetings. The study schools were selected according to level of school and community resources; mix of former apartheid education administrations; and geographical location. The schools were compared by: responses to the new governance policies; interpretation of policies, behavior and attitudes relating to governance; and, organizational governance practices. In the six schools in the study, several former apartheid departments are represented. The Department of Education and Training (DET) was responsible for the governance and management of education for Blacks/Africans outside the so-called “Bantustans” or “Homelands.” The House of Delegates (HOD) refers to the apartheid structure responsible for schools for Indians and the House of Representatives (HOR) was responsible for schools for Coloreds. Schools for Whites were the responsibility of the provincial department of education. Urban Black residential areas are predominantly townships, racially segregated areas established by the apartheid government. All three of the Gauteng schools in the study are township schools. (see Appendix 7.2)

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minutes are kept, meetings are chaired by the parent SGB chairperson, and so on. In effect, the espoused theory at most of the schools reflects the policy signals and dominant governance discourse, which emphasizes the value of participation on efficiency and democratic grounds. Different stakeholders referred to SASA as defining the purpose of the SGB, stressing that the law provided the opportunity for all stakeholders, but especially for parents, to be involved in school governance. The chairperson of one SGB emphasized, “The preamble to SASA gives you the purpose, the rationale, which is bringing the governance of schools into the hands of parents.”The idea that the participation of the governed in their government is fundamental to active democratic citizenship is accepted without question and the discourse of participation has taken on the force of common sense without necessarily critical reflection on its practice. A principal insisted that there could be little opposition to parents being involved. A more in-depth interrogation of specific stakeholders’ theories-in-use regarding parent and learner participation reveals that many stakeholders, particularly principals and educators, do not necessarily value participation in itself or for advancing democratic decision-making in school. In their practices, such participation is often little more than information sharing or limited consultation, promoted by principals and educators for how it can help the school or make their work easier. Some parents did, however, attempt to fashion an expanded role for parents. For example, the Chairperson at Eastern Secondary described the parents’ role in the following all-encompassing terms: As a parent on the governing body, you have to make sure that parents are visiting the school and make sure that the parents know about the kids’ problems in the school.You have to see that teachers are teaching our kids and that the district is delivering. The other part is to address the needs of the community. Clearly there is an expectation on the part of some parents that the SGB has a broader role and should not be limited to supporting efficient management of the school. In general, though, most parent SGB members tended to define the role of the SGB more narrowly, in terms of the support it could provide the school. The expression of parental voice is hindered as parents are obliged to adopt the theory-in-use that efficient management is equivalent to school and community interests. The defining conception of the SGB is echoed by one principal who said, “The community needs to be conscientised about their role.They have to understand that being on the SGB means helping to make sure that the school runs properly.” Some educators were concerned about parents overstepping their boundaries, even if they considered the participation of parents as beneficial. One teacher explained that the SGB should “see to the smooth running of the school’s administration but there are some other grounds where the SGB shouldn’t be in such as managerial matters.” Many teachers clearly felt uncomfortable with SGB involvement in what they defined as professional matters, and

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according to one principal, teachers viewed parent participation “as interference of parents who are not educated.” Tensions between educators and parents are exacerbated by some teachers’ references to the SGB as the “parents’ body,” an act that sidelines the SGB, setting it apart from the “real work” of other, perhaps more legitimate bodies, such as Site Councils and School Management Teams led by teachers. Some teachers were positive about the SGB, viewing it as a necessary mechanism for democracy, but they feared that parent participation was constrained because, “The teachers dictate the terms in the SGB.We have political power.The parents always endorse our position.” This raises questions about what is meant by participation and its connection to spheres of influence in schools. Clearly participation is not dependent on membership of the SGB alone or attending meetings; it also depends on who has power. Despite explicit regulations as to who should participate and how, participation in practice is structured and institutionalized through the actions of principals who define who participates, how they participate, and what decisions are open to participation. Almost all principals felt that the SGB’s purpose was “to run the school in the correct manner according to the rules we have been given by the department”; to ensure that necessary resources are available; and, equally important, to assist in creating a school environment with limited conflict between various stakeholders. This raises the question of whether SGBs are really intended to give parents a voice, or whether they are there simply to serve as a mechanism to contain parental discontent and ensure that additional resources are available to the school. Parents’ participation in particular depends significantly on what they are “allowed” to do by principals. School personnel appear not to want parental involvement beyond token involvement in fund-raising and other support activities, inhibiting parent involvement in decisions about curriculum and school organization. Most stakeholders tend to accept roles defined for them and do not interrogate the prevailing discourse of participation. In many schools, participation often translated to little more than sharing information or consulting parents on issues deemed to be in the school’s interest. Such participation, corresponding with rungs 3 and 4 on Arnstein’s (1969) “Ladder of Citizen Participation,” represents tokenism, although it is above non-participation. It allows the have-nots to hear and to have a voice, but they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217)8 (see also chapter two).

8.

Arnstein’s much-quoted “ladder of public participation”consists of eight rungs, which depict what she considered to be an “elevating” framework of meaningful public interaction with planners. Rung 5 of the ladder is a higherlevel tokenism that allows the have-nots to advise but the power-holders retain the continued right to decide. The top three levels of the ladder (rungs 6, 7, and 8 of partnership, delegated power, and citizen control) mean that the have-nots obtain full managerial power.

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SGB Theories of Representation SASA is committed to representation in governance of stakeholders, defined as groups (parents, learners, and school personnel) who affect or are affected by the goals, policies, practices, actions and decisions of the school. The weighted electoral arrangements in favor of parents is “to involve parents more in school governance, enabling them to actively support schools” (DOE, 1997a, p. 1) with the expectation that the SGB would represent the school community as a whole. There is no expectation that SGBs would constitute microcosms of the school community. SASA’s definition of constituency, which complicates the issue of representation in practice, is reflected in the two intersecting notions identifiable in the way SGB members speak about representation, namely “Idealized School Community as Basis for Representation” and “Stakeholder Group as Basis for Representation.” The notion of a homogeneous community, expressed in all the study schools, denies complex issues of school politics or diverse, competing constituent interests, values, and demands. In reality, the diversity of school communities in South Africa cover the demographics of race (including color and ethnicity), culture, language, socio-economic status, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and location (urban and rural). The diversity of the ex-Model C, HOD and HOR schools is starker in terms of race and language differences, and the spread of where the learners live. Yet the diversity in terms of language, culture, and socio-economic levels are true for all schools. The diversity is further accentuated by the fact that the communities are ever changing with the upwardly mobile moving to those schools that are perceived as providing a higher quality of schooling. Representation is particularly problematic in these privileged schools, where the “school-as-community” is narrowly drawn and is restrictive and exclusionary. For example, the principal of one former Model C School said, “The nice thing, living in a small community, we know the people in the area. We know if a person is applying for fee exemption but is running a ski-boat and that sort of stuff.” This definition of the school community conflicts with the reality that at least 50% of the students (Black, Colored and Indian) come from as far as 15 miles away, many of whom still live in segregated Black townships. In general at the former White, Colored and Indian schools, the dominant groups who play a big role in defining “community”, seek to sustain its historical identity, a definition of the school community that is their idealization. Although the community and common interest metaphor was dominant, some stakeholders are beginning to define representation in terms of their responsibility to a particular constituency, for example parents, learners or educators. Even then, “representing parents” or “representing teachers” raises another issue: stakeholder groups are not homogeneous. The majority of stakeholders, especially principals, felt that the SGB represents “their constituency”because they had an “elected SGB that is there to support the school.” For many, to have held elections and formed an SGB with representatives of each type of stakeholder meant representation had been

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achieved. Among the varied ways that teachers on the SGB define their roles, three common definitions are discernible. Some limit their definition to representation of teachers, others see their responsibility in terms of the efficient functioning of the school, while still others adopt a broader perspective in terms of responsibility to the community. Some teachers see the SGB as a forum to express teacher concerns which otherwise may go unheard. A teacher who felt this way, explained, “As a teacher rep I see the SGB as trying to ease the plight of teachers. I have to voice teachers’ opinions. Not always is management aware of what’s going on at grassroots level. For many of these teachers, their theory of governance is predicated on protecting stakeholder interests and promoting teacher participation in democratic decision-making. Others saw the SGB more specifically as addressing “problems teachers have”.The way teachers view their own role on the SGB, as well as the role of the SGB more broadly, seems to be a product of a complex series of personal, social, structural and cultural factors that inform their theory of action. All student representatives interviewed conceptualized their role as representing students. This includes serving as the link between the SGB and the Representative Council of Learners (RCL), presenting learners’opinions and communicating the problems learners face.The Beach High RCL Chairperson, and SGB learner representative, defined the role of learners as, “to hear what learners’ problems are and give our opinions to the governing body”. In contrast, the learner representative at an ex-HOR school, saw her responsibility as representing students’ opinions and as leading students. Being concerned with “making our school work”, she felt “my purpose is to guide the learners on the suggestions”. This learner, who is also allowed to attend School Management Team meetings, may be influenced by the dominant governance discourse at this school, with its emphasis on ensuring that things run smoothly. The definition of learners or parents as a constituency is so broad and amorphous to be hardly considered a constituency (McDermott, 1999, p. 84). Although some parents see themselves as representing all parents, they may represent particular parent interests. It appears that some SGB members subscribe to a theory of representation based on a genuine belief that parents and learners need special representation to ensure their voices are heard. However, in the context of these schools, the learner or parents as constituency does not necessarily ensure that parents and learners are adequately represented and rather works to the advantage of principals and the school management by hiding actual priorities and interests. While this does not eliminate tensions, it does allow principals to emphasize consensus and the “running of their schools”as the priority. It is not surprising then that most principals equated good governance in their schools with harmony, cooperation and communication between the school and SGB or parent body. Thus we see that the idea of stakeholder groups as the basis for representation intersects with the idea of idealized communities as the basis for representation. Both ideas work to homogenize the parent community even though internal cleavages and stratification remain pronounced (Fakir, 2003). This may be a form of “privileging unity,” which refers to the

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assumption that there always exists the idea of common good involving shared common interests and agreement on principles and policies. This is problematic for three reasons: (1) common good may serve to exclude; (2) it is likely to reflect the interests and perspectives of the historically dominant groups; and, (3) the less privileged may be asked to put aside their identity, experience and goals for the sake of the common good (Young, 2000). Across the schools, the interests of the poor are articulated and defined for them by the middle-class. This is the Black educator middle-class in Black schools and the White, Colored or Indian professional middle-class in mixed schools.

SGB Theories of Decision-Making A key element of the broader espoused theory underpinning the SASA is the idea that the SGB is the key decision-making body in local school governance. Much of the justification for local participation in school governance is the notion that all stakeholders—including politicians, government organizations, the private sector, voluntary organizations, and, especially, ordinary citizens groups—should actively take part in decisions that affect their interests. In this regard, while SGBs have become important structural players in the system of educational governance, participation (especially of parents and learners) in school decisionmaking is less clear, ranging from exclusion to controlled participation. Despite SASA mandates that expect the devolution of most major decisions to the SGB, school personnel did not uniformly believe in this approach. One reason for this is that many school-based stakeholders believe that lay members of the SGB were not capable of making proper decisions. For example, an educator declared, “many decisions cannot be made by the SGB.We have to ensure that correct professional and informed decisions are made.”In the study schools, most educators’ theory of governance indicates a belief in a rational decision-making process. While SASA’s espoused theory assumed equal participation, it too stressed the importance of rational decision-making and required technical ability to participate. Thus while there often appears to be a gap between SASA’s espoused theory that emphasizes wide-scale community participation and the theory-in-use of educators, on closer examination there is some congruence. In schools, previously marginalized groups, such as parents and learners (and to an extent even educators), may only be involved in decision-making in areas that are relatively peripheral to the actual functioning of school. Furthermore, the nature of the decision-making process serves to exclude some stakeholders, especially as according to one parent, “the view of the principal and the educators seem to carry more weight and the parents are usually subservient”. Many parents lack the cultural capital to participate effectively in the decision-making process,

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and accept the professional’s (principals and the teachers) definition of participation in democratic decision-making. A situation is developing where democratic school governance is equated with rational decision-making, minimal conflict, and decision-making by consensus. This conception of decision-making is dominant, with most respondents viewing decision-making like a parent representative at South West High, “Usually decisions are reached on consensus more than a vote. If somebody disagrees with an issue, that is noted, and we give the members an opportunity to go and do further research or rethink on the matter”. “Reaching decisions by consensus” is equated with democracy, resulting in a reluctance to vote on decisions. The principal of Umdoni High claimed they were democratic because, “When an issue is discussed it is thrown open to the meeting – people are allowed to make inputs, and then they take a decision based on consensus”. The Noord High Chairperson explained that they only vote as a last resort, “We seldom go to a vote. If, however, there is great division of opinion, then we call for a vote”. More telling, the South West principal emphasized that they always tried to eliminate dissension, “We overcome questioning of SGB decisions by encouraging teachers to attend parents’ meetings so that they don’t question decisions taken there, later”. In practice, shared decision-making processes usually involve limited consultation that is managed by the principal, where all stakeholders are not equal participants, and consensus is often more apparent than real. The degree of involvement may be conceptualized along a continuum that includes: autocratic decision-making where no advance information is given to participants and the principal makes the decision on his own; information sharing where the principal obtains information from others in the organization, and then makes the decision unilaterally; consultation where the principal shares the problem with others, and then makes the decision which may or may not reflect input obtained from other participants; and, democratic decision-making where the principal reflects on an issue together with other stakeholders, and after joint deliberation they arrive at an acceptable decision (Somech, 2002, p. 345). Across the schools “participatory decision-making” and the empowerment of parents and teachers occurs within clearly defined operational parameters and is often symbolic. For example, the committee structure gives the appearance of wider parti-cipation in decisionmaking, but it may actually limit the participation of parents. At Umdoni Secondary, for example, the principal’s description of how fees are set illustrates this, “The SGB has a role in setting fees. The management and finance committee at school decide on what would be an appropriate fee, then we make the recommendation to the SGB”. Here, as with decision-making strategies across the schools, the reliance on existing organizational routines and standard operating procedures actually serve to limit wider participation. While committees are “representative,” actual decision-making or responsibility for follow-up action (which often involves further decision-making) is often restricted to school personnel.

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At most of the schools, SGB meetings are often information-sharing forums rather than sites of key decisions, as the principal of Noord High said, “unfortunately, it is to give them information. Our meetings is normally information sharing”. In a number of the schools much of the information deals with maintenance issues. This was especially so at Zulu High where the SGB was seen basically as means to fix things up at the school. In the three “Black” schools, and the ex-HOD and ex-HOR schools there appears to be many more decisions taken in informal discussions between the principal and SGB chairperson, or by principals unilaterally, or in concert with educators and the school management. Most parent members have very little to say at meetings, with the principal generally directing the meeting. While, the Chairperson “chaired” the meeting, this mostly involves welcoming SGB members, outlining the agenda, and introducing the meeting. As a parent at South West explained, “there are ground rules in all the meetings of the governing body and the chairperson runs the meeting”. In most instances, after the principal or chairperson outlines an agenda item, the principal and teachers dominate the discussion, and parent interjections are limited to clarification questions. SGBs are officially responsible for a range of functions including: budgeting and setting fees; developing a code of conduct for learners; determining the times of the school day; administering and controlling the school’s property, buildings, and grounds; recommending staff appointments; and, allowing the use of school by the community. Despite the limited role that the SGBs are playing in key decision-making, across all the schools there appears to be greater involvement of the SGB in budget and financial matters, at least in so far as these matters are raised at SGB meetings. The opening of decision-making processes to stakeholders is a powerful means for broadening participation but in the absence of a fair distribution of resources, it serves to empower the already mobilized or advantaged. It is empowering certain sectors of the parent population in some schools, and educators only in others. In ex-Model C schools like Beach High with a tradition of parental participation, the SGB functions relatively well and possesses the ability to deal with financial management and fund-raising. In the other schools there are more problems with SGB functioning, expressed in particular by the lack of parental participation and the dominance of school management.

7. Conclusion South African government efforts to broaden participation in educational governance is serving technocratic, efficiency ends rather than broadening grassroots participation in any authentic

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way. To date SASA is not translating into the empowerment of school communities or stimulating substantial organizational changes. Rather, the initiatives are serving to reinforce existing patterns of power and privilege in schools and in the broader society. Our analysis suggests that one of the main reasons for this is that, at all levels of the system, devolved school governance and participation of the school community in decision-making is being interpreted in a strikingly narrow way. The capacity to influence decision-making has been viewed in a formal, quasi-legalistic sense, restricted to institutional roles defined centrally or re-defined by the most powerful actors at the school. In asking such questions as “what does governance mean?” and “who governs and how?” analysis has generally failed to consider that actual practices of governance emerge out of actors’ theories of action in particular localized struggles. While SASA and such policy prescriptions provide the template of “how governance should work,” the definition of roles in practice is not a simple matter of learning one’s role, mastering technical skills, or following official procedures. It involves conflict, negotiation, and compromise. The lack of authentic participation by parents and learners reinforces the efforts of policy makers, principals, and administrators to equate democratic school governance with rational decision-making, minimal conflict, and decisions by consensus. Any re-definition of roles has to confront established power structures and conventions and their obsession with managerial and organizational efficiency, as these are often antithetical to genuine broad-based participation of local communities. We are deeply concerned about the potential for South Africa’s school-based governance and financing policy to exacerbate inequalities and disempower large segments of the population. We are concerned that the notion of participation evident in South African discourse has become tyrannical rather than emancipatory (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Participation is defined by the state and by principals; it is not open for definition by all stakeholders. At the school level participation is defined in consensus terms and excludes critique and struggle against modernity and neo-liberalism, against uniform prescriptions of roles and responsibilities. But to us, participation in the service of democracy must be about communities changing policy, modifying, challenging, re-defining policy. It must be connected to a different understanding of what policy is. The SASA and NNSSF do not facilitate this notion of participation or policy. We need to look closely and carefully at what is happening in the schools and in the SGBs. We must look for signs of emancipatory participation, where people are creating just this sort of space for themselves. We do not have in place the monitoring and evaluation tools to support the implementation of democratic transformation through educational decentralization. Governments are tracking compliance and using checklists but that is of limited value and tends to focus on policy fidelity, adherence to legal prescriptions and a single “correct” way. This approach reinforces a narrow, technicist understanding of democracy and participation of the type suggested in the world model. It leads to limited “solutions.”

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8. References Argyris, C. and D. Schön (1974). Theory in practice: Increasing professional effectiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35 (4): 216- 224. Asmal, K. (2000). Keynote address by Prof. Kader Asmal, MP, Minister of Education. Presented at the School Governing Body Conference, Midrand, South Africa. [On-line] Available: http://education.pwv.gov.za/Media/Speeches_ 2000/April_2000/SGBC_Conference.htm Bengu, S. (1998). Developments in education since 1994: Our current challenges and plans for the future. In Report of the National Policy Review Conference on Education and Training, October 9-12, 1998 (pp. 29-38). Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand. Bond, P. (2000). Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa. Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press. Chisholm, L., C. Soudien, S. Vally and D. Gilmour (1999). Teachers and Structural Adjustment in South Africa, Educational Policy 13: 347-370. Cooke, B. & Kothari, U. (eds.) (2001). Participation: The new tyranny? London: Zed Books. Department of Education (DOE) (1995a) White Paper on Education and Training in a Democratic South Africa: First Steps to Develop a New System. Government Gazette, 357 (16312), 15 March. Department of Education (DOE). (1995b). Report of the committee to review the organisation, governance and funding of schools. Pretoria: Department of Education. Department of Education (DOE) (1997a). The South African Schools’ Act made easy. Pretoria: The Department of Education. Department of Education (DOE) (1997b). School Register of Needs Survey. Pretoria: The Department of Education. Department of Education (DOE) (1998) National Norms and Standards for School Funding. Government Gazette, Notice No. 19347 of 1998. Pretoria: Government Printers. Department of Education (DOE). (May 2001). Education in South Africa. Achievements since 1994. Pretoria: The Department of Education. Department of Education (DOE) (n.d.). Report on the School Register of Needs 2000 Survey. (Estimated publication. 2001). Pretoria: The Department of Education. Department of Education (2003a). Education Statistics in South Africa at a Glance in 2001. http://education.pwv.gov.za/content/documents/308.pdf Accessed on 11 June 2004. Department of Education (DOE) (2003b) Review of Financing, Resourcing and Costs of Education in Public Schools. Pretoria: Department of Education. Elmore, R. (1979). Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions. Political Science Quarterly, 94 (4): 601-616. Fakir, E. (2003). Political Participation in South Africa. Paper presented at the 5th Conference of the International Network – Education for Democracy, Human Rights and Tolerance, Foreign Ministry, Berlin. http://www.tolerance-net.org/downloads/fakir.pdf [Accessed 2 March 2004]

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Fullan, M. G. (1994). Coordinating top-down and bottom-up strategies for educational reform. Systemic reform: Perspectives on personalizing education. [On-line] Available: http://www.ed.gov/pubs/EdReformStudies/SysReforms/ fullan1.html Fuller, B. and M. Rivarola (1998). Nicaragua’s Experiment to Decentralize Schools: Views of Parents, Teachers, and Directors, Working Paper Series on Impact Evaluation of Education Reforms, Paper No. 5. Washington DC, The Word Bank. Gauteng Department of Education (GDE) (2001) School Governance Policy. Report prepared for the GDE by CASE and the Wits EPU. Johannesburg. Grace, Gerald (1995). School leadership: Beyond education management – An essay in policy scholarship. London: The Falmer Press. Karlsson, J., Mcpherson, G., & Pampallis, J. (1999) A critical examination of the development of school governance policy and its implications for achieving equity. Paper presented at the Kenton Conference, Durban, South Africa. KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and Culture (KZNDEC) (2003).Annual Report – 1st April 2002 to 31st March 2003. Produced by the Directorate Communication and Public Relations, KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and Culture. Malcolm, C. (1999) Districts and the management of educational change. Pretoria: Department of Education. McDermott, K. (1999). Controlling public education: localism versus equity. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. Marais, H. (1998). South Africa: Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. McPherson, G. & Dlamini, M. 1998. Democratic school governing bodies in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal: The first elections. Durban: University of Natal. Naidoo, J. (2001). Education decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A review of the Literature. Unpublished Qualifying Paper for the Harvard Graduate School of Education. Naidoo, J. (2004). Educational Decentralization and School Governance in South Africa: From Policy to Practice.Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University Graduate School of Education. National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) (1992). Governance and administration: Report of the NEPI governance and administration research group. Cape Town: Oxford University Press/NECC. O’Neill, M. (1995). Introduction. In David S.G. Carter & Marnie O’Neill (Eds.), International perspectives on educational reform and policy implementation. London: The Falmer Press. Republic of South Africa (RSA) President’s Office (1996). South African School’s Act No. 84 of 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer. Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1999) National Education Policy (Amendment) Act. Pretoria: Government Printer. Republic of South Africa (RSA) (2000) Education Laws Amendment Act. Act 53 of 2001. Pretoria: Government Printer. Republic of South Africa (RSA) (2001) Education Laws Amendment Act. Act 57 of 2001. Pretoria: Government Printer.

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Republic of South Africa (RSA) (2002) Education Laws Amendment Act. Act 50 of 2002. Pretoria: Government Printer. Republic of South Africa (RSA) (2003). Appointment of a Ministerial Committee. Government Gazette, 30. Pretoria: Government Printer. Sayed, Y. (2001) Post-apartheid educational transformation: policy concerns and approaches. In Y. Sayed and J. Jansen (Eds.) Implementing education policies: The South African experience. Cape Town: UCT Press. Somech, A. (2002). Explicating the complexity of participative management: An investigation of multiple dimensions. Educational Administration Quarterly, 38 (3): 341-371. Spillane, J. P., Reiser, B. J. and T. Reimer (2002). Policy Implementation and Cognition: Reframing and Refocusing Implementation Research. Review of Educational Research, 72 (3): 387-431. U.S. Census (2004). International Data Base Summary Demographic Data for South Africa. http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum?cty=SF. Accessed 11 June 2004. Walford, G. (2001). Introduction: Ethnography and Policy. In G. Walford (Ed.), Ethnography and education policy. Oxford: Elsevier Science. Weber, E. (2002). An ambiguous, contested terrain: governance models for a new South African education system. International Journal of Educational Development, 22 (6): 617-635. Young, I. M. (2000). Inclusion and democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Appendix 7.1 SASA and the Espoused Theory of Action

Elected School Governing Body Devolution of Authority

Promote interests of school and community

Elected School Governing Body

Participation of school community in decision-making

Elected School Governing Body

Play a role in funding

Efficiency/ Equity

Greater Democratization

Quality Education

Appendix 7.2 Summary Description of Selected Schools/Cases* School Name

Province/ District

Type

Ex-Dept

Median Household Income

Noord Sekondêre

Gauteng Johannesburg Northwest

Colored Township

HoR

R25 126

Eastern High Southwest High

Gauteng Johannesburg East Gauteng Johannesburg West

Black Township Black Township

DET

R14 451

DET

R21 000

Beach High

KZN Port Shepstone /Beach/Dawe KZN Port Shepstone

Ex-White Suburb

Ex-NED

R47 653

Ex-Indian Suburb

Ex-HOD

R29 722

Umdoni Secondary

/Umdoni/ Dawe * The names used and specific districts are pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality.

Chapter Eight

Educational Decentralization in Mozambique: A Case Study in the Region of Nampula

Calisto Ribeiro

1. Introduction Mozambique had until the 1990s a heavily decentralized education system, and then due to internal as well as external pressure, decentralization has gradually been implemented. The internal pressure came principally from the armed resistance movement supported by the apartheid regime in South Africa and the external pressure from the World Bank and other international agencies. This chapter examines the present situation of educational decentralization in Mozambique. More specifically, it describes the current situation of education in the region of Nampula and explores local perceptions of the issue of educational decentralization and perspectives advanced by the provincial educational authorities in this region1. It is shown that the abilities and capacities as well as the infrastructure necessary for handling decentralization are still limited at the regional, district and school levels.

1.

The author had the opportunity to participate in some of the discussions involving school principals, teachers, coordinators of the Zones of Pedagogical Influence (ZIPs), and other education staff. Additionally, during the period between November 2000 and February 2001, the author visited the Mozambican region of Nampula and collected documents and interviewed educational authorities including teachers at different levels from both urban and rural areas and local communities. The author would like to thank all (educational authorities, teachers, parents and friends) who provided the information for this paper.

159 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 159–174. © 2007 Springer.

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2. Background Mozambique was a Portuguese colony and became independent in 1974 after more than a decade of armed struggle led by the National Liberation Front (FRELIMO B Frente de Libertacão Nacional de Mocambique). Its surface is 799 380 sq. km and its population is approximately 17 million inhabitants. Until recently Mozambique was one of the most centralised states in Africa (INE, 1999; Hanlon, 1997). After independence in 1975, nearly all institutions (including education) were nationalised and centralised. There was little room for popular involvement in national planning, i.e., all private initiatives were banned (Sotomane, 1995). At that time about 90 per cent of the Mozambican population was illiterate. Until the end of the 1980s, FRELIMO, the only and ruling party, still had strong power in the school curriculum. In the early 1990s, the curriculum started to undergo another change, as the peace talks between FRELIMO and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional de Moçcambique – National Resistence of Mozambique) in Rome in parallel with other economic and political restructuring measures went on within the country 2. With the implementation of the 1992 Rome Treaty, many political parties emerged in the country.As a result, in education, all contents or marks related to the monopoly of FRELIMO were removed. Other factors that have conditioned the change of the school curriculum are: the PRE (Programme for Economic Rehabilitation) implemented in the mid-1980s and the 1990 Revised Constitution, which introduced the establishment of a multiparty system in the country. In 1999 the level of illiteracy was calculated at 75 per cent (DPE, 1999a). Today, there is still a growing number of children not being enrolled in formal education. Every year the Ministry of Education (MoE) reports thousands of children as being without access to the formal education, because of the insufficient school network, shortage of teachers and teaching/learning materials, natural disasters, among other reasons. This constitutes a matter of reflection in the country.The MoE is now implementing educational decentralization on the basis of the argument that most problems will remain unsolved in education, unless departments, provincial and district offices of education, as well as schools are given the power, autonomy and right to take own initiatives and make use of the resources around them. As a social and state sector, education in Mozambique is structured “at national, provincial, district, local and school levels”, with the last four levels still depending much on the central one in terms of decision-making and human and material resource allocation (Ribeiro, 2000).

2.

It is argued that RENAMO (Resistência Nacional de Moçcambique – National Resistence of Mozambique) started a guerilla war against the FRELIMO state in the beginning of the 1980s and was struggling for, among others things, the establishment of a multiparty system in the country. Since the 1994 general elections, RENAMO has been the main opposition party.

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3. The Education System

3.1 Structure Since the 1960s, one of the basic objectives of education in Mozambique has been the eradication of illiteracy by guaranteeing compulsory education for all citizens (Mazula, 1995, p. 171). In reality, this objective has never been reached, in part, due to the lack of economic resources and the poor administrative organization. Political and economic changes through the years have to a large extent influenced the nature of the education system in Mozambique. In 1980, the government presented a new plan “Plano Prospectivo Indicativo”, which aimed to “adjust the economic situation”by taking the country out of the poor situation in which it was (it is still one of the poorest countries in the world) and transforming it into an industrialized society. The plan “designed large economic projects of big industries”, which were expected to create jobs for all Mozambicans in a period of ten years (Mazula, 1995, p. 170). Thus, education was seen as the “capital element” for achieving these objectives. The first major national education reform ever in the history of the country started to be implemented in 1983. The “Old Education System” (i.e., the system functioning during the colonial period) was replaced by the New Education National System (SNE). With the introduction of the Education National System in 1983, primary education comprises two levels: EP1 (Lower Primary Education, Grades 1 to 5, and EP2 (Upper Primary Education Grades 6 to 7). Secondary education (ESG) in turn has two levels: ESG1 (Lower Secondary Education from Grades 8 to 10), and (ESG2) Upper Secondary Education, Grades 11 to 12. Tertiary education includes universities and colleges3. From the beginning of the 1990s, the new constitution allows the establishment of private education in the country. The curricula and the examination system apply nationwide. Some of the private schools whose origin dates decades back, are run parallel with public schools (i.e. they apply the same curricula, academic year and examination system).At the time of the elaboration of this article only public schools were authorized to issue certificates for students from the private schools. After independence much was done in expanding education across the country, but very little attention was paid to the educational administration. The provincial and district offices of education as well as schools at all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) received subsidies from the central state, but primary schools and other institutions at lower levels received only small 3.

Besides, there are also other educational institutions dedicated to professional training, such as teacher training centres known as CPFF (Primary Teacher Training Centres), and IMP (Pedagogical Medium Institute), AEA (Adult Education), and ETP (Technical and Professional Education).

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amounts and could not administrate their budget freely. Their expenditures were administered by other bodies higher up in the administrative and political hierarchy. As a result, the amount of money spent in education did not achieve what was expected. This situation may have given a space for a long debate on decentralisation including the education sector since early 1980s, but the first signs of its implementation started in the beginning of the 1990s, when the Programme of Local Government Reform (PROL) was “elaborated in parallel to the peace talk(s) and the implementation of the Rome treaty (Weimer & Fandrych, 1998, p.271). The MoE introduced measures which included, among others, the reestablishment of the schools destroyed by the civil war, and construction of new schools throughout the country. Political and social changes of various types have led the country to change its education national policy since the beginning of the 1990s. The objectives of the national education policy are to: provide equal opportunity of access at all levels; support the initiatives of groups and associations, religious groups, private organisations and other entities that assist in the expansion of the educational network; guarantee at least basic education for all children; ensure access to and opportunities for an increasing number of people in secondary and high levels, particularly those in difficult circumstances; expand the educational network via distance learning courses; improve the quality of education, and its relevance to the social and economic needs of communities and promote greater access for women. (This will be achieved through sweeping changes in the curricula; improved training for teachers and other personnel; a better supply of textbooks and other basic school materials and improved inspection and supervision systems) (Cabral, 1999, pp. 27-29).

3.2 Curriculum Revision So far, the Mozambican school curriculum has been determined to a large extent by political changes.When the country achieved its independence, certain subjects with colonial traces were immediately removed. Instead, new subjects were introduced, namely Political Education, History of Mozambique, Production, and Cultural Activities. With the implementation of the National Education System in 1983, the grading system and the curriculum underwent another change. Physics was introduced in the upper primary education and Aesthetic Education replaced Drawing. The former was removed in the early 1990s, due to bad results achieved by the majority of students at this level. The present Constitution advocates the use of both Portuguese and Mozambican languages as the medium of instruction, but also representation of the political, socioeconomic, linguistic, regional and cultural diversities and the country’s heritage should be promoted through education.

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In Mozambique, decentralization in education has been the object of discussion for a decade, but so far there is little written information on this subject. The curriculum has also been a matter of debate since the issue of decentralization emerged in Mozambique. With regard to this, the educational authorities argue that opinions collected in different meetings with the civil society support the revision of the current curriculum.

3.3 Gender and Education Since the 1960s, Mozambique has been struggling for the promotion of gender equality in education (Mazula, 1995). In a meeting gathering militants of FRELIMO, education was seen as a significant instrument not only in helping “the Mozambican people to achieve the revolution” seen as “a process of societal change” (Mazula, 1995, p. 143) but also to eradicate inequality between women and men (Guebuza, 1967, p. 7). In 1970, the Second FRELIMO Conference acknowledged the value of both females and males in the national liberation struggle and national development (FRELIMO, 1970).The present strategic plan of education within the process of decentralisation includes gender promotion. The local governments are taking actions that aim to increase gender participation in formal education. According to available statistics, until 1987, the rate of female enrolment increased to 44 per cent in the Lower Primary Education, 36 per cent in Upper Primary education, 30 per cent in Secondary education and 26 per cent in Higher education. However, these enrolment rates declined in the second half of the 1990s, particularly in rural area. It is argued, for example, that premature marriage, is one of the main causes contributing to a decreasing school enrolment of girls.

4. The Origins and Roles of the Zones of Pedagogical Influence In Mozambique, the “Zones of Pedagogical Influence”(ZIPs) are being reintroduced to serve as one of the corner stones of decentralization. The origin of the ZIP idea emerged before 1975. During the colonial period, missionary schools belonging to the Catholic Church were one of the main instrument of the Portuguese domination of the indigenous population (Mondlane, 1977). During the pre-independence period missionary, school teachers were periodically gathered and given pedagogical and methodological support. Apart from pedagogical and methodological assistance, these meetings also provided the teachers with religious, civic and moral knowledge. During the phase of transition to independence in 1974, many teachers of European descent left the country and, as a result, many new teachers had to be recruited and were provided a

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short training so that they could replace those who had left the country. A meeting gathering educators in 1974, acknowledged the necessity of providing pedagogical support to the new primary school teachers who had benefited from short teacher training courses. Therefore, in order to ensure such support, primary schools were organized in ZIPs according to the geographical characteristics of each region. Every ZIP was led by a coordinator who functioned as administrator, inspector, and/or supervisor. In general, these coordinators were selected among those with long experience in teaching matter and they were expected to promote exchange of experience and a cooperative spirit; organise and conduct intensive in-service courses with support of teacher training centres; and guide school sessions according to each school’s and teacher’s needs (MoE, 1995, p. 13). Results from the first eleven years (1975-1986) were seen by the MoE as excellent, i.e. ZIP coordinators managed to serve the educational objectives. Indeed, with transport facilities they were able to visit every school regularly and to give pedagogical support to all teachers. Another important factor contributing to the success of the ZIP at that time was the fact that most of the coordinators volunteered to this task and, therefore, they accepted to do their best to help the country. Finally, they received enough support from the principals of schools, teachers and the civil society. Head teachers and civil society in general welcomed the ZIPs. From the mid-1980s the ZIPs deteriorated acutely, due to the civil war and for political, economic, pedagogical, and administrative reasons. On the one hand, the civil war made the communication between the coordinators of these bodies and schools impossible, and many schools were forced to close. The bad economic situation that Mozambique experienced immediately after independence affected the education sector profoundly. On the other hand, the increasing number of untrained teachers and the lack of competence in administrative issues and work-team management made it difficult for the coordinators of ZIPs to accomplish their task. The absence of certain privileges and the decreasing salary level might have weakened the power of the ZIPs. It is assumed that the best way to achieve the educational objectives is to give power and autonomy to the educational institutions, local communities, private and religious organisations, through decentralisation as the “transfer of power and responsibility away from central government”(Steytler & Mastenbroek, 1998, p. 293). Educational decentralisation includes the transfer of power and responsibility from the MoE to the provincial and district entities of education and to some schools. The ongoing process of decentralisation in education represents a full recognition of the potential role played by local communities (school principals, teachers and parents), religious associations, private organisations and local governments. In Nampula, as in other provinces, education authorities are carrying out actions intended to revitalise the ZIPs, decentralise the administrative sector, reinforce school and local-community linkage, encourage female participation in education, and review the national curriculum of education (DPE, 1999a).

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5. Potential for Educational Decentralization

5.1 Revitalisation and Limitations of ZIPs In Mozambique educators hold that educational decentralisation will reach its objectives if ZIPs are revitalised. The revised policy of the MoE defines ZIPs as powerful forces in the process of teaching and learning activities and suggests revitalisation of them making them capable to provide continuous pedagogical support to primary schools. According to a document, ZIP staffs are expected to act as immediate tutors of trainees, but the main responsibilities of guidance, supervision, evaluation and inspection will lie with the Centro de Formação Regional Regional Training Centre (CFR) staff, in coordination with the Education Provincial Office (EPO) and Education District Offices (EDO) together with pedagogical staff. The 1995 Revised Policy presented in the document “Potentialities of ZIPs in Management and In-Service Teacher Training” suggests that ZIPs be totally autonomous units within education. It is argued that for ZIPs to function fully, they must be redefined as an “independent” branch within the educational field, by attributing a specific position to ZIP coordinators and acknowledging them as potential forces in education.That is, ZIPs are expected to be autonomous in the sense that, as Visser (1995, p. 10) argues, they must “take initiatives in the informal updating of their teaching force, in weekend meetings, thematic workshops and the like, soliciting expert support from the CFR or national level when necessary”. As the debate on this issue has divided critics of educational matters in various forums, some of them arguing that this strategy can keep ZIPs too dependent on the regional and national levels, three alternatives were suggested: (i) ZIPs as a pedagogical support branch; (ii) ZIPs as an administrative/mediator branch between schools and EDOs; or (iii) ZIPs as a pedagogical supervising branch (MoE, 1995, p. 21). However, the question remained: Which of the three alternatives that meets the country’s needs is still a matter of debate. Opinions suggest that the first alternative seems to be the most appropriate in the sense that it demands less investment in terms of building new infrastructures, as these are already available. As for the last two alternatives, i.e. redefining ZIPs as an administrative/mediator branch between schools and EDOs or as a pedagogical supervision branch, will be costly, because the ZIPs will need new infrastructures, recruitment and training of new personnel. As a result of the debate, the new regulation4 guiding ZIP activities was established in September 1997. Accordingly, ZIPs are defined as centres in which local schools will have the opportunity to organize a series of activities related to teaching matters, such as thematic 4.

Regulamento Orgânico das Zonas de Influência Pedagógica.

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workshops and other educational questions aiming to, among other things: promote and stimulate teachers’ pedagogical performance; increase technical and pedagogical knowledge by providing an efficient teaching service; experiment systematically and permanently different teaching methods and techniques that allow teachers to realise their professional performance; adapt teaching programmes to the local reality; ensure gradual and continuous in-service training; and establish and develop cooperation between different schools and ZIPs (MoE, 1997, p. 3). Nevertheless, there are still certain limitations with respect to ZIPs’ work in the future like those related to differences in teachers’ pedagogical background. At least three different groups of teachers are identified: (a) teachers with professional training and with long experience in teaching matter; (b) teachers with professional training but with very little teaching experience, and (c) untrained teachers with a long teaching experience (MoE, 1995). Consequently, some teachers are willing and prepared to follow the current educational shifts, while others do not comply at all. School principals and ZIP coordinators interviewed on this subject are of the opinion that the first two groups are likely to follow the new educational shifts introduced by the MoE, while the last mentioned category will “ignore” it completely, i.e., they will not adapt teaching methods according to the real classroom situation.Another aspect of particular consideration is the persisting lack of means of transport and communication; unless these obstacles are eliminated, ZIPs can be very limited in terms of their function.

5.2 School-Community Linkage and the Role of Local Governments in Education The concept of “School-Community Linkage” dates from the 1960s and its primary objective has been to enhance the link between educational institutions and local communities. In 1970, FRELIMO’s Second Conference discussed this issue arguing that if education is to serve the society concerned, then “the nature of relationship between the education and society need be strengthened” (FRELIMO, 1970, p. 21). It was acknowledged that society, whether traditional or modern represents a source which provides relevant information for the progress of education. However, when the country achieved its independence, one of the central government’s ambitions was to eradicate the so-called “traditional mentality” and construct a “modern mentality” by involving the civil society in education through schooling. In line with this perspective, new bodies established under the umbrella of CLEC (Comissão de Ligação EscolaComunidade B School-Community Linkage Commission) were created throughout the country (Mazula, 1995, p. 144). In practice, however, they played a very small role (Sotomane, 1995). At the heart of the problem was the fact, that the local communities were seen as

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“traditional institutions” with insufficient ingredients to build a modern society. By “modern society”, was meant a society free from traditional mentality, such as obscurantism, superstition, etc. (FRELIMO, 1970). For the time being the School-Community Linkage Commission still exists and is represented by village leaders who function simply as “firemen”in nearly all schools.That is, they are called to intervene when there is a serious conflict involving, for example, pupils and teachers, or these and members of the local community. Rarely do village leaders take part in decisionmaking on other relevant questions related to the school life (DPE, 1999a, p. 13). The reason why schools themselves do not involve community representatives is the fact that most of the school-community linkage representatives lack “social credibility” in the communities where they live (ibid.). Another reason is that the majority of the school-community linkage representatives are illiterate, a fact that makes it difficult for them to give their contribution in terms of pedagogical and administrative support. In 1998, under the Law 2/97, local governments were established in Mozambique, for the first time (Serra et al. 1999). Although it is too early to predict, one can say that local municipalities will play a significant role in education not only in terms of building schools, but also in deciding to what extent and how schools should respond to communities’ expectations. According to the law, every municipality has the obligation to guarantee education for its population (Ministério da Administração Estatal, 1998; Waty, 2000). “The self-governed municipalities have administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy, including the right to collect their own taxes”, and give necessary support to all education and social sector activities (Weimer & Fondrych, 1998, p. 281). Local parliaments are formed by members representing different sectors, including education. Educational administration is gradually getting decentralised, although nearly all primary schools still remain tied up to their EDOs. At present, primary schools have administrative and financial autonomy and the right to manage about 20 per cent of their annual budget, while 80 per cent remain under district administration in coordination with the provincial education office. In part this is due to the fact that most of the primary school administrators have no training in administrative matters. It is argued that, in order to avoid possible mistakes in the future, such as that which happened to ZIPs, at this phase only EDOs will be in charge of administrative issues5.

5.

When ZIPs were established in the country, their coordinators did not benefit from any training in administrative issues, although they also served as administrative assistants within their zones. The MIoE argues that this is one of the reasons why these bodies and school administrators were weakened in their work (MoE, 1995).

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6. The Case of the Nampula Region Nampula is situated in the north of Mozambique and according to the 1997 General Population Census, its population counted approximately three million inhabitants, of which 650,000 (21 per cent) were school-age children. The majority of Nampula’s population are peasants living in the countryside (DPE, 1999b; INE, 1999). With this number of school-age children, it has been a hard task for the regional government to provide education for all of them. The region is average socio-economically among the rural regions. In general, education in the region is facing serious difficulties related to financial, human and material issues. Free textbooks are always delayed or do not reach every primary school in countryside, due to a distribution system which is highly centralized and bureaucratic and the lack of transport. In addition, with the school network increasing rapidly, the number of untrained teachers is growing every year. Most teachers cannot teach properly, unless they have teacher manuals and pupil textbooks. Even with support of NGOs, education is far from reaching its objectives, because, in addition to the problems mentioned above, the EPO and EDOs themselves are also facing numerous difficulties (lack of money, absence of material and qualified staff, and so forth). Especially, EDOs find themselves incapable of responding to every school’s request in time because they lack a good system for communication with their schools, as well as with the EPOs.

6.1 School Network Evolution and Access to Education In 1994, two years after the end of the civil war, the school network in Nampula had been reduced to almost a half of what it was before the war.Thousands of children, teachers and other education staff had taken refuge in urban areas or neighboring countries. Five years later, the primary schools had been rebuilt to some extent and many children got access to basic education, especially in rural areas. Between 1994 and 1999, the number of EP1-schools increased from 725 to 1,169; the number of EP2-schools from 42 to 57 and the number of Adult Education Centers from 15 to 303. On the other hand, the number of secondary schools decreased from 13 to eight. However, about 25 per cent of the children, mostly girls, living in countryside, did not have access to formal education (DPE, 1999a, p. 17). Certain factors contributed to a rapid school expansion in the province of Nampula. Firstly, the return of peace in 1992 allowed the expansion of education, particularly in rural areas, and secondly, from the 1990s, collaboration between the government and local communities and NGO intervention in education increased. So far the support provided by the international NGOs and religious and other private institutions, has to a large extent contributed to the

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expansion of the number of schools, since they started to pay special attention to education sector and have been spending enormous amounts of money for school network expansion in the country in general and in the province of Nampula in particular. Also, there was some progress in the post-primary education (secondary, technical/professional education and teacher training centres) as well. The enrolment doubled, particularly in lower general secondary education, primary teacher training and adult education (which includes both primary and secondary levels), as the Table 8.1 suggests. The existing school network is unable to absorb the increasing number of children. As for secondary education, technical/professional education and teacher training centres, there was no considerable increase in the number of schools, although student enrolment doubled, particularly in ESG1 and CFPP in the same period. In part, the causes of this situation are related to cultural, religious, psychological, pedagogical and economic factors. It seems that parents, whether in rural or urban areas, become demoralised, when they hardly find place for their children in secondary education. There are many primary schools attended by a huge number of pupils, but very few secondary schools are available in the region to absorb them when they have concluded primary level. Moreover, classrooms designed for a certain number of pupils are now taking in more than twice of their capacity. Besides, poor teaching methods combined with linguistic problems do not encourage children to pursue their schooling. Teachers find it difficult to teach properly and only a few pupils do manage to succeed, a fact that results in a phenomenon here coined “school mark commerce”. There are reports about teachers who ask for money, or students who “pay” sums of money in order to pass to the next grade. Drop out and repetition rates are continuously high (DPE, 1999b, pp. 29-44). Like in other regions of the country, education in Nampula is facing serious difficulties related to the financial, human and material resources. In reality, few primary school teachers are able to respond to the recommendations expressed in the Primary Education Programme. The programme, updated in 1996, requests teachers to plan lessons and teach in conformity with the characteristics of their pupils (MoE, 1996).

Table 8.1 Access to Education, 1994 and 1999 1994 1999

EP1

EP2

ESG1

ESG2

AEA

Others

TOTAL

190,691 333,916

11,093 20,541

3,697 6,111

483 613

1,642 7,449

1,261 2,150

208,989 370,779

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5.2 Main Constraints Conditioning Decentralization Some of the main limitations plaguing education in Nampula Province are the lack of communication among educational institutions, lack of money, the absence of a qualified staff and material resources. In rural areas, in particular, the majority of primary schools are isolated from one another and from their respective EDOs. School principals, teachers, parents and local communities in general are cut off from other schools and from educational authorities. In particular, school principals and teachers remain out-of-date, since they cannot accompany the changes and new measures introduced by the MoE. Local communities in general and parents find themselves unable to follow fully plans and recommendations given by the MoE and, consequently, they do not fulfil the objectives expected for them. In two of the ZIPs studied here, rural teachers, school leaders and ZIP coordinators claimed that they received little information on what was going on in education, because their schools were situated very far (about 25-30 km) from the regional capital, and they did not have a permanent contact with their EDO. Certainly, this situation may be extremely serious for many schools situated more than 100 km from their district headquarters. Nearly all rural schools lack telephone connection with the EDOs and the EPO. Head schools do not even have a bicycle with which they could reach their district or ZIP headquarters where they could collect information to update and guide the learning/teaching processes. The lack of telephone connection is not only a rural problem. It also affects the majority of the urban primary schools, district offices of education and some departments at the EPO. Both the provincial and district offices of education are plagued by problems of different types. Moreover, there is almost everywhere a total absence of adequate materials, such as furniture and equipment like computers, printers, photocopying machines, etc., as well as transport. The existing furniture and machines are old and broken-down. Due to an ineffective telephone network, the EPO finds it hard to communicate rapidly and permanently with its EDOs. Also, due to the absence of electricity most of EDOs are working in the dark and they cannot use any electric machines.The majority of the infrastructures are degraded or are still in reparation.The lack of qualified staff, computers and other modern equipments prevents EPOs from establishing a database; the majority of the district/city and provincial office workers lack basic knowledge related to the use of computers. Furthermore, most of the district leaders lack an adequate and professional training in management and administration (DPE, 1999a, p. 19). In summary, the provincial and district offices of education are plagued by the following problems (ibid.): Low academic level of the staff; Total absence of adequate material (furniture), equipment (computers) and transport; Persistent difficulties in communicating, due to an ineffective telephone network and lack of money to cover telephone costs;

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Lack of a database which could provide information necessary for decision-making and the majority of the district/city and provincial office workers are lacking IT knowledge; The district leaders lack an adequate and professional training in management and administration; There is no electricity in educational district offices; Most of the infrastructures were destroyed during the civil war and are still in need of repair. It is also assumed that giving the EDOs a higher degree of administrative power represents a significant step in the process of educational decentralisation. But, as pointed out, district directors, principals and administrators of schools need to have knowledge dealing with administrative work. The fact that most primary schools find the issues of administration difficult creates problems not only for provincial authorities but also for some projects working in education. The UDEBA Project6, one of the contributing partners in the process of educational decentralisation in Nampula, argues that it has failed many proposals from educational authorities regarding financial support to school buildings, because the proposals were badly designed. This fact was confirmed by the provincial authorities of education, which in turn claimed that most primary school leaders are lacking skills in administration, other initiatives, and individual creativity. Aware of these constraints, in the 1999 Master Plan for education in Nampula for the period 1999-04 distributed to local governments in the province, education authorities are expected to create and develop a community-school network, by involving local authorities and communities in education, and by “providing schools with staff capable of promotion” (Visser, 1995, p. 8). With the establishment of self-governed bodies in some villages and cities, local communities and local governments are obligated to contribute maximally to education, by financing school network expansion in their administrative area (Hanlon 1997; Häussler, 1997; Ministério da Administração Estatal, 1998; Waty, 2000).With the law on self-governed municipalities introduced recently in Mozambique, education has representatives in the local parliaments, who function as a “bridge” between education authorities and the local government. Schools are also obligated to respect the local public opinion and the significance of local communities as powerful contributors to the development of the local education. As far as the gender issue is concerned, the first project in Nampula started with a survey in 1994.The first phase of the survey, which ended in 1995, was carried out by the provincial office of education. Including both coastal and interior zones, the study involved groups of teachers who visited nearly all districts. Contacts with schools and local communities allowed them to 6.

UDEBA (União para o Desenvolvimento de Educação Básica) is a project working in basic education in Nampula province. This project supports the school network expansion in rural areas.

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identify the factors causing the low school enrolment of both girls and boys. Such factors are child labour (commerce, shepherd, fishing, difficult living conditions), initiation rites, premature marriages, and enrolment in Quranic schools. These are significant practices of the local people in both coastal and interior zones, where the majority of parents relegate primary education to the second place. In order to improve this situation, the regional educational authorities in Nampula are taking a number of measures, which seem to produce a positive effect. One of the measures consists of giving free access to all girls and reducing school fees for boys in basic as well as secondary education. According to the gender representative at provincial education office, “parents appear to be happy with this measure, and now girls are competing with boys in terms school enrolment”. Another measure was to give the same chance to both female and male teachers to improve their professional training or to continue with education at university level. However, despite the support provided by various NGOs, education seems to be far from reaching its objectives, given that offices find it difficult to respond in time to every school request. The province of Nampula attempts to build a curriculum which takes into account the diversity of the region.Thus, in Nampula the curriculum is expected to take certain aspects into consideration, such as traditional, linguistic, cultural, and socioeconomic conditions of the region and the country. In the process of decentralisation, primary school managers, ZIP coordinators and other education staff are expected to be powerful forces in their zones. To achieve this goal, the master plan for educational decentralisation in Nampula region supports the need to provide training in administration to all education staff at provincial, district and school levels, by giving them access to the teaching centres and universities existing in the region (DPE, 1999a).

7. Conclusion This chapter presented the main features of the current situation of educational decentralisation in Nampula in Mozambique. It examined some of the actors involved in the process of decentralisation: ZIPs, school-community linkage and the role of local governments, gender, and curriculum revision. It is recognised that, on the one hand, in Nampula the school network is growing significantly, but on the other hand education is still plagued by numerous problems of different types. Particular attention was given to ZIPs, described as potential forces in the process of decentralisation and it was found that these bodies are still working in bad conditions and are missing a clear definition of their status in education.

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As for administration and finance, the larger part of the annual budget is still under control of the district education offices in coordination with the provincial education office, due to the lack of competence in administration and management at the ZIP and school levels. Schools find it hard to deal with the administrative issues. School/community linkage has been deteriorating. With the process of decentralisation, education authorities are expected to reinforce the relationship between schools and local communities or self-governed municipalities, which by law, have the obligation to finance social sectors including education in their regions. With respect to gender, education authorities are successfully implementing measures that aim to reinforce children’s school enrolment at all levels. The curriculum, another area involved in the process of decentralisation, has constituted a matter of reflection among educators. So far it is the object of a project at a Teacher Training Centre. Interesting here is that the process of decentralisation contributes to facilitate school planning, encourages local communities’ participation in education. Also, it reduces the high degree of dependence and bureaucracy and increases “negotiations with social partners” (Atchoarena & Caillods, 1999, p. 3). But at the same time, it demands lots of money, qualified staff with greater initiatives, and adequate application of all resources available in the region. Mozambique seems to lack some of these conditions and, therefore, efforts will have to be stronger in the country so that educational decentralisation can be a reality and not a simple “dream”. Nominally, important elements of the educational world model are being implemented, some of them requiring ICT equipment and related skills. However, due to the poverty of the country and the low level of technical and administrative competence, the outcomes have been far from those predicted in the world model.

8. References Atchoarena, D. & Caillods, F. (1999). Decentralizing While Encouraging Autonomy and Partnership. IIEP, XVII, 1. Cabral, Z. (1999). A Study of Access to Basic Education and Health in Mozambique. Final Report. Maputo: Oxfam. DPE (1999a). Plano Estratégico da Educação da Província de Nampula. Combater a Exclusão, Renovar a Escola (Education Strategic Plan for Nampula Province Combatting Exclusion, Renewing Education). Nampula: Provincial Education Office. DPE (1999b). Indicadores Educacionais na Província de Nampula (1994-1998). Educational Indicators in Nampula Province, (1994-1998). Nampula: Provincial Education Office. FRELIMO (1970). II Conferência do DEC Recomendações (II conference of DEC Recomendations). Das es Salaam: FRELIMO. Guebuza, A. (1967). Livro do Estudante (Ano Lectivo 1967). (Student handbook. Academic Year 1967). Dar es Salaam: Instituto Moçambicano.

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Hanlon, J. (1997). Democracia, Descentralisação e Eleições Autárquicas. Manual de Educação Cívica para os Monitores (Democracy, Decentralisation and Local Government Elections. Manual for Civic Education Instructors). Maputo: STAE/AWEPA. Häussler, P. (1997). Autarquias Locais (Municípios e Povoações). (Local Governments of Mozambique. Municipalities and Settlements). Maputo: CEGRAF. INE (1999). II Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação 1997, Resultados definitivos (II General Population and Housing Census 1997). Maputo: National Institute of Statistics. Mazula, B. (1995). Educação, Cultura e Ideologia em Moçambique: 1975-1985 (Education, Culture and Ideology in Mozambique:1975-1985). Maputo: Edições Afrontamento e Fundo Bibliográfico de Língua Portuguese. MoE (1995). Potencialidade da ZIP na Gestão da Formação Contínua de Professores. (ZIP’s Potentiality in Management and In-service Teacher Training). Maputo: Ministry of Education. MoE (1996). Programa do Ensino Primário do 11 Grau (Teaching Programme of Primary Education). Maputo: Ministry of Education. September, 1996. MoE (1997). Guia do Coordenador de ZIP. (ZIP Coordinators’ Guide). Maputo: Ministry of Education. Ministério da Administração Estatal (1998). Pacote Autárquico. Brochura I. (On Local Government). Maputo: Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique. Mondlane, E. (1977). Lutar por Moçambique: Terceiro Mundo (Struggling for Mozambique: Third World). Third Edition. Lisboa: Livraria Sá Costa. Ribeiro, C. (2000). Pre-conditions for Introduction Mother Tongue Education in Mozambique. Unpublished MA thesis. Stockholm: Institute of International Education. Serra, C. (1999). Eleitorado Incapturável. Eleições Municipais de 1998 em Manica, Chimoio, Beira, Dondo, Nampula e Angoche (Difficult Electorate. Local Elections in Manica, Chimoio, Beira, Dondo, Nampula and Angoche). Maputo: Livraria Universitária. Sotomane, C. D. (1995). Achievement in Biology in Secondary Education. Stockholm/Maputo: Institute International Education, Stockholm University/Pedagogical University of Mozambique. Steytler, N. & Mastenbroek, R. (1998). South Africa: the Promise of the New Constitution. In G. Holland & G. Ansell (eds), Civil Society Interaction in the African States (Proceedings of Multilingual Workshops on Good Governments, Sustainable Development and Democracy). Kampala: Australian Development Cooperation. Visser, M. (1995). Pre-and In-service Training for Primary School Teachers in Mozambique. Project Document for Building-up Phase in Nampula Province Written for the Netherlands Embassy in Maputo. Maputo: Instituto Edulandia. Waty, T. A. (2000). Autarquias Locais. Legislação Fundamental (Local Goverments. Fundamental Legislation). Maputo: W & W Editora. Weimer, B & Fandrych, S. (1998). Mozambique: Democratic Decentralisation Obstructed. In G. Holland & G. Ansell (eds), Civil Society Interaction African States (Proceedings of Multilingual Workshops on Good Government, Sustainable Development and Democracy). Kampala: Australian Development Cooperation.

Chapter Nine

Decentralization and Community Participation: School Clusters in Cambodia

Arnaldo Pellini

1. Introduction Globalisation and the support for more localised decision-making and the general pressure for democratisation and participation have been arguments for decentralization and community participation. The important role that world models attribute to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in education is evident in Cambodia, where school clusters are being introduced. The chapter is based on findings from action research with an NGO in community participation in Cambodian schools. The meaning of community in the Cambodian social and historical context and the development of the cluster school policy, which is one of the internationally spread policies, were the main themes of this research1.

1.

With particular attention to the experience and lessons from the GTZ’s (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammarbeit – a German NGO), Rural Development Programme (RDP) in four districts in the province of Kampong Thom A field study was conducted by the author in early 2003 among community based organizations and pagodas in districts of Stoung, Kampong Svay, and Stung Saen of the province of Kampong Thom. In addition, interviews were done in Phnom Penh and in the province of Kampong Cham to learn from the experiences of a local NGO, Kampuchea Action for Primary Education (KAPE).

175 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 175–194. © 2007 Springer.

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2. Background It is hard to imagine what Cambodian people have gone through during the past 50 years. During this period their country went from monarchy to republic, from civil war to communist regime, from socialist republic to today’s young democracy. Each change implied a new constitution, a redesign of the public administration, a new idea of development and ultimately of the idea of society. In the 12th century, the Khmer Empire2 covered the territory which is today Cambodia, South Vietnam, Southern Laos, Thailand, and part of Myanmar. At the top of the social hierarchy was the king. In 1863 Cambodia signed a protectorate treaty with France that already had colonial territories in South Vietnam.The French colonial influence, however, did not change the importance attributed to Cambodian hierarchy with a king at the top (Vickery 1993). While education during the colonial period focused on the urban elite and was based on the French system, teaching in rural areas remained under the traditional responsibility of the wat (pagoda, Buddhist monastery). In 1918 the French administration tried to reach the rural areas though a programme of pagoda school modernisation, but Ayres (2000a) argues that this attempt failed 3. The period from independence in 1953 to the republican coup in 1970, is remembered by most Cambodians with nostalgia. Several Khmer interviewees remember it as a period of peace and security, sufficient food, and good salaries for teachers 4. In the beginning of the 1950s King Norodom Sihanouk decided to take a more active role in Cambodian politics and launched his independence crusade. An education reform was seen as very important; Cambodia urgently needed a qualified workforce, thus the government strategy was to reach the largest share of the population with education by building schools and training teachers. Communities contributed considerably to this expansion by providing cash, labour and materials. In 1955 there were 2,731 primary schools and ten lycées and in 1968 there were 5,857 and 180 respectively. The implementation according to this strategy had serious limitations since it was not conducted according to the financial and human resources available to the government, teacher training lagged behind, and the school syllabus was copied from the French one (though the Khmer language and alphabet were reintroduced) (Vickery 1993).

2.

3.

4.

The word Kambuja comes from Sanskrit. Still today Khmer do not use the modern version (Kampuchea) in casual non-political speeches; they rather speak of the country of Khmer (Srok Khmer) (Thion 1993). In the school year 1932-33 225 pagoda-schools were recorded, in the year 1938-39 they had increased to 908 (Ayres, 2000a). One informant, Mr Srey Kum Chuon, who was working as a primary school teacher in the province of Kampong Thom in the 1950s, told that he was earning 4.800 Riels (Rl.) per month that at an exchange rate of 30 Rl per 1 US$ makes about 150 US$ of today. Today the average salary for a primary school teacher is 20-25 US$. Interview in Kampong Thom, June 2003.

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In the mid-1960s Cambodia started to suffer from the vicinity of the Vietnamese conflict. Its declared neutrality was not respected, either by the North Vietnamese or by the United States troops. Internally the dissatisfaction with the Prince Sihanouk gained momentum. In this period the crisis of education became evident when Sihanouk announced that the public sector could not absorb any new graduates and students became increasingly critical against the policy. In March 1970 he was voted out by the National Assembly while he was on a visit to Moscow. General Lon Nol, Prime Minister of the Sihanouk government, became the leader of the nation. In the meantime Cambodian troops helped by the United States, were fighting on two fronts: against the North Vietnamese and the communist insurgence (Khmer Rouge) that was gaining control of larger parts of the rural areas.This is the period when education suffered most from material and human destruction. While attempts were made to increase the enrolment and quality of education, its content remained linked to the traditional hierarchy of the society. Lon Nol had the chance to break with the past, but did not (Ayres 2000a). In January 1975 the Khmer Rouge launched the final assault on Phnom Penh where over one million refugees had taken shelter. After years of war, the population “turned out in the streets, white flags in hand, to welcome the Khmer Rouge” (Ayres 1999, p. 205) and, “for a moment there was hope” (Swain 1996, p. 133). However, almost immediately came the order to evacuate the capital. A large number of people were forced to leave Phnom Penh and stay in working camps in the countryside. The Khmer Rouge regime during the period 1975-1979 caused the death of one million (or one in seven) people (Duggan, 1996; Unicef, 1996; Vickery, 1993)5. The political agenda of this regime was to rebuild the nation on equity instead of individualism, common property instead of private property, rural life instead of urban corrupted life, abolition of money, self-sufficiency of agricultural production, abolition of religion and families ties, and international isolation (Ayres 2000a, Vickery 1984). Education, as it is described by Geeves (2002), in this period went from crisis to catastrophe. The Western type of school system was eradicated; between 75-80 per cent of the teachers and higher education students fled the country or died. 67 per cent of primary and secondary school students ceased to go to school. The teaching of basic literacy and numeracy was never abolished because of the need to train workers in technical skills and learning because education was also considered a way to acquire political consciousness. Thus basic education was implemented in different ways in different regions6 (Ayres, 2000a; Chandler, 1991; Thion, 1999;Vickery, 1984) Towards the end of 1970s, Khmer Rouge soldiers entered Vietnam.Vietnamese troops then launched an attack and conquered Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge leaders fled and took 5.

6.

The estimations provided by Ben Kiernan (1996) and William Shawcross (1984) are higher, between 1,6 and 1,8 million people (1 in 4 people). The North West, where the conditions were at the worst since most of the people from Phnom Penh had been resettled there, probably never had education in place. But there are testimonies to education taking place in other areas.

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refuge in the forest areas bordering with Thailand. Cambodia received assistance from the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, Vietnam, India and a few NGOs while the war never stopped completely, as the Khmer Rouge did not surrender (Ayres, 2000b). The new government reintroduced freedom of movement and controlled Buddhist religion. A very high priority was given to the eradication of illiteracy and the reconstruction of schools because education was considered the principal means to legitimate the new socialist state. This period is remembered with pride because of the community efforts and contributions to reconstruct schools. However, increased enrolment rates put the system under strain, and soon the demand for education outstripped the capacity of the system (Geeves 2002). Education plans were implemented, trying too achieve too much too fast (Ayres, 2000a). However, the small size of the Ministry of Education forced the delegation of decision-making power to the local level, an historical legacy of decentralisation (Nak et al. 2002). The regime ended in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. A new constitution was drafted to reintroduce private property, market economy and Buddhism the as state religion and put an end to the international isolation of the country. The first democratic elections resulted in an unstable coalition government. However, power sharing does not belong to the Khmer tradition (Personal interview with Samnang, 2001) and the coalition ended in July 1997. In the1998 national elections were won by the Cambodia’s People’s Party.

3. Cambodia Today Since then Cambodia has experienced relative peace and political stability. The government has embraced market economy and has opened its borders. It is a member of the Economic Association of South-East Asias Nations and will become a member of the World Trade Organisation.The government has started institutional reforms based on the principles of good governance. A central element of the good governance reforms is decentralisation. The first Commune Council elections took place in February 2002. The development of a modern education system has been recognised by the present government as a necessary element of sustainable economic development and growth. Therefore the government has defined the following objectives: improvement of the quality of education, improvement and updating of educational material and textbooks, establishment of cluster school system, and improvement of girls’ enrolment (Ayres 2000a). In spite of this, education in Cambodia still suffers from several problems: teaching reinforces pre-colonial and colonial hierarchical values; there is a shortage of trained teachers, particularly in rural areas; drop out rates remain high; resources are scarce; there is insufficient coordination of donors activities; accountability and transparency are implemented with difficulty; education is still a means for political ends; communities are not fully integrated into education governance (Ayres 1999; Duggan 1996; O’Leary and Nee,

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2001). Forty per cent of the adult population are illiterate and belong to the poorest part of the population, among these, 20 per cent of the male population and 40 per cent of the female population (World Bank, 2002). The rates of literacy can be lower, as in the case of the village of Ko Kaek in Sabour commune (Kampong Thom province), where 33 per cent of the males and 46 per cent of the females are illiterate (adults above 15 years of age) (Personal interview with Sean Prum, 2004). Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in Asia and ranks 130 (out of 173) in the UNDP Human Development Index. In 1993, 44 per cent of the population was below 15 years of age, this means that population is growing rapidly.At least 85 per cent of the population lives in rural areas and the majority is engaged in subsistence farming. The average income fell from 280$ to 268$ between 1996 and 1999 (World Bank 2002). More than one-third of the population is struggling below the poverty line. According to Oxfam (2002), the rate of economic growth during the 1990s has been over four per cent; while rural poverty has fallen only by 0.3 per cent, and it is estimated that 85 per cent of the Cambodian population does not benefit from economic growth (ibid.).

4. Educational Development 4.1 General Overview According to UNICEF (1996), “low adult literacy rates, especially among mothers, mean that children receive little encouragement to learn” (p. 109). In Cambodia, as well is in most Table 9.1 Cambodia – Country Profile Population Anticipated population 2015 Population growth GNP per capita People living below the poverty line* Adult literacy Life expectancy at birth Proportion with access to adequate sanitation Proportion with access to clean water Ranking in Human Development Report (of total 173 countries)

13.1 18.6 2.3 1446 36.1 67.8 56.4 18.0 30.0

million million per cent (USD ppp 2000) per cent per cent years per cent per cent

130

* UNDP, Human Development Report, 2002. Source: Redd Barna Cambodia, www.online.com.kh/users/rb.cambodia

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of the developing world, girls suffer from this situation more than boys as they are more likely to drop out of school. Moreover, the UNESCO/FAO conference on education and rural development held in Bangkok in November 2002, concluded that people are caught in a poverty trap where rural poverty is closely linked with illiteracy, and vice versa (UNESCO/IIEP 2002). Poverty in rural areas is widespread. Nevertheless, as we will see in a later section, communities in Cambodia contribute substantially to the education sector. As one example, Venerable Ly Kom, abbot of Vo Yev pagoda, mentioned that for the construction of the pagoda primary school in Vo Yev, the community contribution has been of 4,000,000 Riel (1,000 US$) to a construction budget of 40,000,000 Riel (10,000 US$).Also, families without children at school provided contributions (Personal interview with Ly Kom, 2003). However community involvement in school does not seem to go further, people are busy working in the field and do not have time to come to meetings in the school 7. The leader of the School Association of Botum pagoda confirmed that besides contribution, there is very little communication between parents and teachers. Only occasionally are there meetings to discuss the case of children who drop out from school . The respondents of the Kontroung School Association said that they meet twice a year to discuss the improvement of school facilities and contribution from the community, but they do not discuss teaching, as this is the area of the teacher8.

4.2 School clustering policy in Cambodia In the beginning of the 1990s several assessment reports were written by INGOs and donors about the state of education in Cambodia. A report by Redd Barna (Save the Children Norway), for example, described primary education as having “regional variations but all in all [being] fairly organized all over the country and with high community participation” (Galasso 1990, p. 7). However, the old problems appeared again: low level of training of teachers, limited human and material resources at central and local level, and centralized decision-making. Based on this picture, the government chose to adopt a school clustering policy. The origins of school clustering go back to the 1950s when it was piloted in Thailand. During the 1970s and 1980s this became a popular approach to improve enrolment rates with scarce resources in developing countries affected by economic recession and high population growth, such as those in Latin America and East Asia. This first wave of school clustering lasted

7.

8.

Interview with members of Wate Botum School Associations, Stoung district, Kampong Thom province, February 2003. Interveiw with members of Kontroung School Associations, Stoun district, Kampong Thomg province, February 2003.

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until the end of the 1980s when particularly the Asian economies achieved high economic growth and had the financial resources to support education (Bredenberg and Dahal, 2000). During the 1990s several factors have contributed to the second wave of school clustering in former socialist countries like Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam: globalisation and the support for more localised decision-making, the collapse of the Soviet Union showing the inefficiencies of centralised systems, and the general pressure for democratisation, good governance, and participation (Braun, 2003; Bredenberg and Dahal, 2000; Fiske 1996; Litvack and Seddon, 1999; Manor, 1999; Welch and McGinn, 1999). A school cluster can be defined as “the process of organizing geographically contiguous schools into a mutual support network” (Bredenberg and Dahal 2000, p. 1). According to the Ministry of Education Youth and Sport (MoE) guidelines, a cluster consists of five to six schools 9. At the centre there is a core school responsible for the administration of cluster activities. The core school is linked to satellite schools. In more remote areas, satellite schools can be further linked to annex schools. A cluster is led by a Local Cluster School Committee (LCSC); the principal of the core school is also the chairperson of the LCSC (MoE, 2000). Redd Barna and UNICEF first piloted school clustering in few provinces between 1992 and 1995 10. In 1993 the MoE established the National Cluster School Committee (NCSC) and adopted school clustering as a national policy in 1995. All Provincial Offices of Education were required to group primary schools into clusters. Typical interventions consisted in the creation of the LCSC, a library, or a resource centre. The implementation of this initial step was highly centralised, thus clusters did not achieve a high degree of local ownership. The phase until 1998 is described by Bredenberg (2002) as a period of rapid expansion and stalled evolution. Donors changed the form of support from direct funding to grants disbursed after proposals were prepared in the schools and clusters. The third phase (1999-2001) has been characterized by convergence of project designs to fit the current educational reform oriented to the provision of operational budget directly to individual schools and deconcentration of the public administration. In 2003 there were 760 clusters in Cambodia. 325 (43 per cent) of them received direct support from donors11. The remaining 435 clusters struggle behind as a result of the too rapid implementation of the policy after 1995. The form of support differs from agency to agency. Donor coordination has improved during the last years and is now moving towards a Sector Wide Approach.

9. 10.

11.

Turner (2002) mentions in his report that he also found clusters with 11 schools. UNICEF in Battambang, Takeo, Bantey Meanchay, Stung Treng, and Redd Barna (Norway) in Phnom Penh, Kampong Cham and Siem Reap. Interview with Nebendra Dahal, Phnom Penh, July 2002. This figure does not include the clusters that have received support in the past and have been now phased out.

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4.3 Characteristics of school clustering When it started, school clustering was considered the way to solve most of the problems affecting education in Cambodia. The rapid nationwide expansion of this policy did not (and still does not) match with some of these conditions: population density in many rural areas is low, cooperative culture has been shattered by years of war, communications are difficult, administrative and teaching skills are low, and there is not enough consensus about the purpose of clusters. In addition, as suggested also by Ayres (2000a), the system has remained too centralized, with the effect that we observe “the paradox of a centralized implementation of a decentralized development strategy to support education” (Bredenberg and Dahal 2000, p. 13). The school cluster guidelines of the MoE define the objectives of this policy as improvement of education quality, resource utilization, capacity building, and decentralized management, but do not specify in detail how this can be achieved and the roles of the various stakeholders, especially at local level. In 2003, the MoE and donors agreed that clusters in Cambodia are at a turning point. Six crucial themes have been identified for their future in Cambodia (Bredenberg, 2002; Nak et al. 2002; Turner, 2002;): Strengthening of Sector Wide Approach; Definition of the linkage between Commune Councils and School Clusters; Strengthening of staff training at all levels; Reduction of rural/urban disparities; Increased access generally and especially for children of the poorest families; and Improvement of community engagements. We turn now to this last point concerning community participation in cluster schools.

5. Evidence of Community Participation in Cluster Schools Cluster schools are seen by the MoE as “open and democratic forums _ [that] allow also a deeper involvement of communities as an important party as teacher and school principals” (MoE 2000, p. 5). However the MoE assessment is that “over the past year the RGC (the Government of Cambodia) has tried its utmost to achieve the goal of guaranteeing every child access to education and quality learning. However hard the Government has tried, it has not been able to reach this goal. This is due to the inadequate participation of the community” (ibid.). According to Bredenberg (2002), in the early stages of cluster school development, communities were successfully involved as a source of local contributions (cash, labour, materials) for construction and maintenance of school buildings. All respondents have in fact mentioned material contributions as the main way villagers contribute to schools. This is confirmed also by Bray’s (1999) study concluding that in Cambodia households provide in various forms about 60 per cent of the financial resources in primary public education.

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So if contributions are so high, why is the participation of community not considered satisfactory? The answer is that in most cases material contributions are the only way communities participate in education. In the year 2000, the local NGO KAPE conducted a study of the use of resources effectively in fourteen clusters in the province of Kampong Cham (KAPE 2001). Though community participation was an important variable in the study, it proved to be difficult to go beyond the questions of what kind of additional support, besides material contributions, the communities do provide to the clusters (Personal interview with Bredenberg and Loinsigh, 2003). The MoE is aware of the role that community can play but has so far not clarified enough the possible roles of communities in the cluster system, besides contributions.There are guidelines to improve the outreach activities of schools, disseminate information about school plans, and mobilize communities financially and spiritually under the slogan “schools are for the community, the community is for schools”(MoE 2000, p. 15).The MoE has also developed guidelines for the formation of committees and subcommittees to improve education governance, mobilize children to go to school,encourage teachers to perform their jobs well,construct and repair school buildings and collect budgets12. However, several interviewees doubt that these committees are all operational. The cluster school guidelines have been revised several times, thus making it problematic to develop the abilities of the cluster school committee members. Interestingly, the Khmer respondents showed a more positive attitude. One respondent in Kampong Thom mentioned that today the general situation of schools has greatly improved since the Khmer Rouge time and schools, contrary to the past, have materials and textbooks for teaching. He also judged community involvement positively, though limited to material contributions (Personal interview with Oich Sorn, 2003). A foreign advisor working with school animators in the province of Kandal, remembered one occasion when, coming out from a school meeting, she thought went dreadfully, her counterpart said: “I did not know this day would come, sitting here eating this lunch, the school there behind us and we have just been there discussing the lessons, doing this work to improve education. I’m just so happy. I did not know this would happen” (Personal interview with Chara Richards, 2003). Another example comes from the respondents of the school association of Botum pagoda in the district of Stoung (Kampong Thom province).They seemed happy with the way their association was supporting the village school and managing the contributions collected in the community. They also added that teaching was the responsibility of the teacher or headmaster, not of the association members.This limited awareness of school activities appeared from a baseline survey conducted 12.

The MoE guidelines define for each cluster various committees: Local Cluster School Committee, Cluster School Council, Administrative Subcommittee, Technical subcommittee, Community subcommittee, Cluster School Resource Centre, District Cluster School Council, District Cluster School Committee, Provincial Cluster School Council (MoE 2000).

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by local NGOs among the members of “village networks”in three communes. Only 20 per cent of the respondents (total 82) knew whether school association members or school staff participated in the commune council monthly meetings 13. Despite this evidence, there are also NGO projects which, with the support of international donors, are developing new ways of community participation in schools. The Life Skills Programme implemented by KAPE and funded by UNICEF/Sida in selected clusters in Kampong Cham “seeks to empower children to choose what they wish to learn with the objective to provide an opportunity for the community to participate in the learning of children” (KAPE, 2002, p. 1). The project helps the children to select a skill they want to learn among a list of available skills in the community and to nominate a community teacher they wish to teach them14. Another example from KAPE refers to the School Associations started in 2003. These School Associations are formed by fifteen children elected among the students of a school, who, under the supervision of a volunteer teacher and a community member, will try to make the school more child friendly (Personal interview with Molendijk, 2003). The School Ecoclub of Mlup Baitong in the province of Kampong Speu and Kampong Thom, represents another example where schools can be linked with communities through extra curricula activities.The objective of the programme is to improves the school’s eco-system and to increase the environmental awareness of the community and other stakeholders. School Ecoclubs are students groups (about 30) that meet at least once a week to learn about environmental conservation and to address environmental problems in and around their school with activities such as: tree planting, composting, waste collection, etc. (Personal interview with Keat Bun Than, 2003). It is difficult to generalize the reasons behind the limited community participation in school activity because conditions are not homogenous across Cambodia and among clusters. Recent studies and researches have identified the following main factors (Bredenberg, 2000; Geeves, 2002; Turner, 2002): Limited understanding of the needs for parents to follow up children’s education. The economic survival of many families in rural areas depends on subsistence farming. Unclear definitions of roles and responsibilities of communities results in nominal participation.

13.

14.

The survey was conducted in June 2003 by three local NGOs and supported by GTZ RDP and belonging to the Working Group on Local Governance. This working group received technical assistance and support from the civil society component of GTZ RDP to set up and implement village networks (each network five people) and act as the link between commune councils and village community. List of skills selected by children: bicycle repair, vegetable growing, market trading, baking bread and cakes, makeup for wedding guests, sugar-making, teaching, first aid, tailoring, playing music, chicken raising, hair-dressing, etc. (KAPE 2002).

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School associations have limited management, planning, and administration skills. Limited community representation: often the community members in committees and associations are not elected and occupy this position because of their status in the community. The last point is linked to the social dynamics at the village level and the meaning of community in the Khmer context. Various practitioners (e.g. Geeves, 2002; Turner, 2002) have in fact expressed the need to study more deeply the critical elements and themes that characterize Khmer communities and can have a direct influence on projects and programs. In the next section we explore these themes.

6. Defining Khmer Community and Participation

6.1 Social hierarchy and traditions in villages The origin of the hierarchical structure in the Khmer society goes back to the sixth century, when Indian traders arrived in South East Asia. Ayres (2000a) argues that the influence of Indian traditions has been strong. Although a real caste system was never established, a complex social hierarchical structure remained in place. Cambodian society has traditionally been divided into three classes: peasants, officials, and royalty. Only very few Khmers were merchants. The national wealth was produced by the peasants and collected by officials who channelled it to the court and religious apparatus. Each of these classes had an essential function for the wellbeing of the society, and for the large part of the population it would have been unthinkable to rise above the class into which one was born (Vickery, 1993). The villagers where divided into neak mean (the ones who have) and the neak kro (the ones who do not have). For their economic survival the neak kro needed the protection of the neak mean based on strong patronclient relationships. In this setting, the notion of mutual obligations did not exist and “those on the top governed, and the ones at the bottom existed to be governed” (Ayres 2000a, p. 11). Buddhism and the pagodas kept the system together by legitimising the status of the king on top of the hierarchy and the patronage within the society by stressing the “imperfection and need of guidance of human beings” and that “individuals alone are essentially helpless” (ibid.). According to O’Leary and Meas (2001), social stratification in Cambodia remains extremely important. They quote Ovensen et al. who conclude that “all-pervasive principle of Khmer social life is the notion of hierarchy. All social relationships are hierarchically ordered.The hierarchy is primarily expressed in terms of age, then comes gender, wealth, knowledge, reputation of the family, political position,

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The hierarchical organisation influences the composition of the committees and associations that represent the community interests towards the government and NGOs and donors. The experience of the GTZ RDP in Kampong Thom province and of UNICEF with 17 cluster schools highlights that the members of the local associations are either village leaders, laymen (achar), or people with some literacy skills and who are better off. The achar, in charge of the school association of Botum pagoda, mentioned that he had kept the post since the association was set up in the 1960s. After the Khmer Rouge, the association was re-established and he took his position again. When asked why he had been so long in charge of the association, he answered that people just continued to ask him to lead the association. Leadership seems to be the one elements that makes the difference between dynamic and static associations.This can be observed in the monthly cluster school meetings at the Provincial Office of Education in Kampong Thom, where representatives of supported and nonsupported clusters and school associations meet to report about the activities that have been implemented and to prepare new plans. The achars with a stronger personality are also the ones who have more to report15. They are the ones who know better how to mobilise the communities and who are likely to receive training from NGOs and donors, which makes their positions inside the associations even stronger. Bray (1999), with regard to this problem, mentions that in the Khmer context “in most circumstance the personality of the individuals are more important than their occupation” (p. 68). From their observations, O’Leary and Meas (2001) noted that at the village level the chief is often called father, while the achar, who in many cases previously has been a monk, has authority as a result of being a good and honest man. Educated people and the ones who control resources are placed high in the village hierarchy and are expected to behave as leaders. The correct behavior is taught first in the family and then in schools. Within the family, children are taught not to challenge their parents and their authority, to be polite and respect elders. In schools the traditional system is reinforced through the respect granted to the teachers and by learning by heart what the teachers teach. Students are generally not given the opportunity to think independently or to ask questions, and they must follow what the teacher says even if it is wrong. This is reflected in the society as a general discouragement to try something new, in the belief that things have to be done in the way they have always been done, and in the lack of honesty in relations at different levels of the hierarchy (O’Leary and Meas, 2001; Watts, 1999). The same

15.

Observations and meetings with UNICEF staff at POE (Provincial Office of Education) in Kampong Thom, 2003.

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conclusion can be derived from the GTZ RDP. The Pagoda Coordination Committee (PCC) representing the 95 village and pagoda associations in the district of Stoung is formed by seven members (three women) and is elected every three years. Today’s PCC members have been elected for several terms because of the successes in increasing the number of associations in the district, the knowledge they have acquired though trainings, and, more importantly, because of their leadership position in their village as chief of the local village or pagoda association16. The risk linked to this traditional way of identifying community leaders is that they do not always have the necessary understanding or skill required for the tasks they need to perform (Bredenberg, 2003). During the observation of the yearly planning workshop in a school in the province of Kandal, the community members who had been invited to participate, were achar who spoke very little during the three-day workshop. They were probably elected in the school committee because of their role in the community, but did not have the skills to actively participate in a planning exercise. An additional problem observed in Kampong Thom was that the leaders tended to be nominated for a whole range of village committees in various community development projects set up by NGOs and international organisations, thus making it difficult for them to attend several meetings a month (besides their normal jobs) and forcing them to prioritise which community meetings to attend and which not. Religious precepts taught in the pagodas also exert an influence. In the past the chbabs (poems) served as “guidance to the people to learn about the appropriate behaviours within the established social structures and legitimised the top-down system of relationship and dependency”(Ayres 2000a, p. 17).Today these elements are linked to fatalism and the Buddhist principle of karma, and contribute to perpetuate people acceptance of their situation, with the effect of limited empathy among those in power to do something for the ones who lack opportunities (Watts, 1999). Today the traditional hierarchy of the society is challenged by the development of ideas such as participation, empowerment, good governance and democratization coming with development organizations and projects17. The government commitment to decentralization represents an additional challenge to the traditions of the past and has the potential to break the long legacy of authoritarianism and rigid top-down structure of the Khmer society, though

16.

17.

It is interesting to note that among the three women who are members of PCC, two have been members for several years and are also leaders of cash and rice associations in their village, they are both single women (one widow and one whose husband just left). They both have children and have had to struggle, being single women. The word empowerment needs to be used carefully in Cambodia. Power (omnach) has negative connotations since it automatically implies aggression and abuse. Cambodians prefer to use aethapuol which can be translated as influence.

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Bray warns that that “the experience in other countries shows that local decision makers are not necessarily sympathetic to the poor and other disadvantaged groups” (Bray 1999, p. 84).

6.2 Searching for a definition of Khmer community In 1999, the Working Group on Social Organisation in Cambodia Organised a two days conference in Phnom Penh to discuss the “Meaning of Community in Cambodia”. Serge Thion who took part as keynote speaker summarised the participant’s discussion and identified among the participants three main definitions of Khmer community: The larger group of those, like Meas (1999) and Watts (1999), who distinguish between a pre-Pol Pot community characterised by a network of mutual relationships between individuals, and a post-Pol Pot community where relationships and networks had been destroyed by promoting a sense of individualism. Those who argue that the community feeling never died in Cambodia and today it is possible to observe two types of communities: the geographical community where people are living in a specific geographical area (e.g. the village) sharing common institutions, and the functional community where people join together to share problems and act together to solve them. Others who argue that traditionally, the Khmer society has been individualistic and that the relationship that matters at community level are the ones among family or kinship members and that cooperation has rarely existed beyond these limits. This difficulty in reaching a consensus is also highlighted by the problem to translate into the Khmer language the word community.The Khmer word sahakum can in fact be used indifferently for community, society, and union (Thion 1999)18. In the Khmer context the community refers to a group of families that have shared interests rather then a village, which is basically an administrative unit (Rao, 1999). In the past, according to Tevi (1999), people used to do farming together and at village level there was strong unity. Communities were based on extended family and neighbour networks and families maintained close links with the village. Each village was linked together with other villages to a pagoda considered the social, cultural, and religious centre (Aschmoneit et al. 1997).The French colonial period until 1953 introduced important changes to this structure by, for example, relocating people and villages along roads, thus contributing to a loss of unity in the communities. The Buddhist Socialism of the 1950s and 1960s revitalised communities as people put resources and labour together to support the poorest, improve agricultural production and improve general and educational infrastructures. This is the period when many pagoda and village associations 18.

Thion argues that the English word is not so clear either and prefers to make the distinction used by German sociologists between Gesellschaft (society) and Gemeinschaft (community) (Thion 1999).

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were set up to organise and manage contributions, as in the majority of the 95 pagoda and village associations set up in the district of Stoung (Kampong Thom province). These associations traditionally collected contributions in cash or kind to construct or renovate the pagoda, they could be set up to perform specific tasks and dissolved after completion or continue (UNICEF, 1996). The work of the associations came to a halt during the Khmer Rouge regime. They were then re-established by the next regime under government control in the name of Solidarity Groups (Krom Samaki). Each solidarity group consisted of 10-15 families working together (Tevi, 1999) and, as one informant mentioned, in his villages there were several krom samaki involved in agriculture, school reconstruction, womens groups, etc. The members of the krom samaki were appointed by district or provincial authorities, therefore people’s participation in the group work was not high (Personal interview with Srey Kum Chuon, 2003).With the end of the Socialist regime, the solidarity groups disappeared and the traditional pagoda associations were re-established by community members who were already involved during the 1960s and who had survived the Pol Pot years, as in the case of Stoung district. Today some associations receive technical assistance from NGOs and international organizations. GTZ in Kampong Thom, for example, is since 1996 implementing community development activities to improve the management and planning capacity and to help them to diversify their activities. A survey conducted in 1998 discovered that in the province of Kampong Thom, 29 different types of associations existed, ranging from cash and credit associations, to funeral associations, pots association, dam constructions groups, school associations, etc. (Sovann, 1998). Today’s associations do not differ much from the associations of the 1950s. They represent the continuity of the community spirit in the rural areas. But the events of the past have left deep scars among the people. Khmer communities once composed of extended family networks, have been shattered by forced population movements and displacements (UNICEF, 1996). Oppressive military structures have created a sense of passivity among the population, resulting in reduction of the active participation in decision-making, unless this is allowed (or requested) from above (Meas, 1999). The trauma of the past often results in conflicts, domestic violence, decreased independence, emotional disturbances, and physical and psychological stress (UNICEF, 1996). A study conducted by de Monchy in 1990 shows (Table 9.2) how behaviours and attitudes of people have changed after the war and Khmer Regime period and that trust is now missing among individuals. A more recent research study by Sedara (2001) also concluded that relationships in the community have changed from the pre-war period, due as well to the influence of modern development processes, cash economy, and rural-urban migrations. According to Sedara (2001), what did not change is the notion of patronage and the traditional hierarchical structure of the society.

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Table 9.2 Changes in Rural Cultural and Social Characteristics in Cambodia Before 1970s

Characteristics

After 1970s

Kind, gentle, honest, peace loving, strong and brave, hard-working Respect for cultural traditions, Buddhism and elders. Love for the country, use of traditional medicine. Solidarity, respect for others, support those with problems, dislike exploitation. High moral standard, greater respect but fewer opportunities for women. Strong family unity, loyalty within marital relationships. Love of power, some exploitation by officials. Respect for law. Freedom of movements, good security. Respect for human rights. Decent standard of living. Decent government.

Personal character, Attitude towards culture

Hardworking, selfish, greedy, jealous, lack of confidence and trust Respect for cultural tradition and Buddhism. Interest in new things and overseas culture. Lack of samaki, interest in helping only those whom you know. Lack of trust in others. Breakdown of family relationships, people having to move to find work. Low moral standards. Increased gender equity. Love for power, corruption and violence. Lack of security. Restricted freedom of movement. Lack of respect for laws. Sense of anarchy, no respect for human rights. Poverty, hardship and suffering. Run down economy.

Samaki (solidarity) Family

Power/ Security/ Law

Social Conditions

Source: Margaret de Monchy (1990, in UNICEF, 1996).

7. Conclusion Some INGO (International Non-Governmental Organization) and NGO projects, like the one from KAPE and Mlup Baitong briefly presented in this chapter, represent interesting experiences that help to define new ways of participation derived from the world model. In the medium term, the decentralisation policy and the Commune Councils represent also an opportunity to get village and pagoda associations more involved in local decision-making processes. However, in the case of cluster schools in Cambodia, community participation has not achieved the expected results. Apart from the traditional material contributions from local communities, school and pagoda associations have so far failed to enter into the substance of

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education. The main reasons for this are that the policy guidelines have designed participatory forums, such as committees and working groups, without taking fully into consideration the meaning of the hierarchical structure of Khmer communities, the influence of poverty and illiteracy, and the competition between community development projects for grassroots participation. Community development projects have the potential to support, in the presence of local leadership, these initiatives and establish participatory linkages between commune councils, village/pagoda associations and schools outreach activities. Such experiences will help not only the community to become more involved in essential education governance, but also schools to adjust to the conditions of Khmer communities.

8. References Aschmoneit, W, Chan, S., Narak, S., Top, T., Lean, K. & Kao, K. (1997). Pagoda Committees and Community Life in Kampong Thom Province Cambodia. Kampong Thom, Cambodia: GTZ Provincial Development Program. Ayres, M. D. (1999). Policy Making and Policies of Education in Cambodia. In D. Sloper (eds.). Higher Education in Cambodia: the Social and Educational Context for Reconstruction, (p. 5165). Bangkok: UNESCO. Ayres, M. D. (2000a). Anatomy of a Crisis. Education, Development, and the State in Cambodia, 1953-1998. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Ayres, M. D. (2000b). Tradition, Modernity and the Development of Education in Cambodia. Comparative Education Review, 44 (4): 440-463. Braun, G. (2003). Participation as a Process. A Success Story of the Education System in Yemen. D+C Development and Cooperation, 30 (5): 188-191. Bray, M. (1999). The Private Costs of Public Schooling: Household and Community Financing of Primary Education in Cambodia. Paris: UNESCO/IIEP. Bray, M. (2000). Government-Community Partnership in Education: Lessons from Experiences. Education and Communities, 3 (3): 4-7. Bredenberg, K. (2002). Cluster School Development in Cambodia: Analysis of Process and Outcomes. Phnom Penh: SIDA. Bredenberg, K. & Dahal, N. (2000). Can School Clustering Enhance Educational Effectiveness? Promises and Pitfalls. Phnom Penh (unpublished). Cambodia, Royal Government (1998) Cambodia Population Census 1998. Phnom Penh. Chandler, D. P. (1991). The Tragedy of Cambodian History. Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945. Bangkok: Silkworm Book. Duggan, S. J. (1996). Education, Teacher Training and Prospects for Economic Recovery in Cambodia. Comparative Education, 32 (3): 361-377.

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Fiotán Ó Loisingh (2001). Cluster School Survey in Kampong Cham Province. A Study of 14 Clusters in Terms of their Potential to Use Resources Effectively. Kampong Cham, Cambodia: KAPE. Fiske, E. (1996). Decentralization of Education: Gaining Consensus. Washington: The World Bank. Galasso, E. (1990). Education in Cambodia. Notes and Suggestions. Phnom Penh: Redd Barna. Geeves, R. (2002). Speaker’s Notes. Sihanoukville, Cambodia: proceedings of VSO Cambodia Annual Conference 2002. KAPE – Kampuchea Action for Primary Education (2001). A Service Menu Outlining a Plan of Activities to Facilitate the Development of Child-Friendly and Gender Sensitive School ion Cambodian Primary School. Kampong Cham, Cambodia. KAPE – Kampuchea Action for Primary Education (2002). Life Skills Program: Guidelines to Establish the Program and SessioN Plan to Facilitate and Initial Orientation of the Life Skills Program. Kampong Cham, Cambodia. Kiernan, B. (1996). The Pol Pot Régime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979. New Heaven: Yale University Press. Litvack & Seddon J. (1999). Decentralization Briefing Notes. Washington: The World Bank. Manor J. (1999). The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington: The World Bank. Meas, N. (1999). The Concept of Community. Cnference on the Meaning of Community in Cambodia, Pnom Penh, 7-8 June. MoE - Ministry of Education (2000). Cluster School Guidelines. Phnom Penh. Nak, S., Jongsma, D. M. and M. Ratcliffe (2002). Evolving Sector-wide Approach to Education in Cambodia and the Role of Strategic Planning Processes. Paris: UNESCO/IIEP Seminar 4-6 December. O’Leary, M. & Meas, N. (2001). Learning for Transformation. Phnom Penh: Krom Aphivuoat Phum. Oxfam (2002). Rigged Rules and Double Standards. Oxford: Oxfam. Rao, J. (1999) Panellist presentation. Phnom Penh: conference on the Meaning of Community in Cambodia, 7-8 June. Redd Barna - Cambodia, www.online.com.kh/users/rb.cambodia. Retrieved on July 15, 2003. Sedara, K. (2001). Reciprocity: Informal Patterns of Social Interaction in a Cambodian Village Near Angkor Park. (Unpublished MA. Thesis). Dekalb: Northern Illinois University. Shawcross, W. (1984). Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. London: Hogarth Press. Sovann, N. (1998). Historical Rooted Organisations in the Traditional Rural Community Stung District, Kampong Thom Province Cambodia. Kampong Thom: GTZ Provincial Development Program. Swain, J. (1996). River of Time. London: Random House. Tevi, P. (1999). An Examination of Khmer Literature on the Content of the Term of Community in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: conference on the Meaning of Community in Cambodia, 7-8 June. Thion, S. (1993). Watching Cambodia. Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle, Bangkok: White Lotus.

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Thion, S. (1999). What is the Meaning of Community. Cambodia Development Review, 3 (3): 12-13. Turner, M. (2002). Decentralization Facilitation. A Study of Decentralization in Cambodia with Specific Reference to Education. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education. UNDP (2002). Human Development Report 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNESCO/IIEP (2002). Education for Rural Development in Asia. Experiences and Policy Lessons. Paris: UNESCO/IIEP. UNICEF (1996). Towards a Better Future: An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Cambodia. Phnom Penh. Vickery, M. (1984). Cambodia 1975-1982. Chiang May, Thailand: Silkworm Books. Vickery, M. (1993). Cambodia 1981: Background and Issues. In S. Thion (ed.). Watching Cambodia. Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle, (pp. 95-118). Bangkok: White Lotus. Watts, E. M. (1999). The Meaning of Community in Cambodia. English Literature Review. Phnom Penh: conference on the Meaning of Community in Cambodia, 7-8 June. Welch, T. & McGinn, N. (1999). Decentralization of Education: Why, When, What and How? Paris: UNESCO/IIEP. World Bank (2002). World Development Indicators Database, http://www.worldbank.org/data/data query.html. Retrieved on July 15, 2003).

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Interviews

Chara Richards,Volunteer Service Overseas (VSO) – EQIP programme, Prek Anchan, Kandal, August 2003. Keat Bun Than, Mlup Baitong, Phnom Penh, May 2003. Kurt Bredenberg and Fiotán “Loinsigh, Kampong Cham, March 2003. Oich Sorn, Voy Yev pagoda, Kampong Svay district, Kampong Thom province, June 2003. Sam Samnang, Interview with Sam Samnang, Berlin, July 2001. Sean Prum, Interview with Commune chief of Sabour in 2004 Simon Molendijk, Kampuchea Action for Primary Education (KAPE), Kampong Cham, March 2003. Srey Kum Chuon, Cambodian Organisation for Development and Economic Cooperation (CODEC), Kampong Thom, June 2003. Venerable Ly Kom, Voy Yey pagoda, Kampong Svay district, Kampong Thom, May 2003. Group Interviews

Kontroung School Association, Kontroung village, Stoung district, Kampong Thom, February 2003. School Association of Wat Botum, Botum pagoda, Stoung district, Kampong Thom, June 2003.

Chapter Ten

People’s Participation in School Governance? Realities of Educational Decentralization in Nepal

Mahesh Nath Parajuli

1. Introduction Schools in Nepal were effectively governed by the community until 1971, when they were nationalized and placed under the central state. Later the Nepali state started to translate the hegemonic international targets and elements from the world models into the national and then the local programmes: Decentralization and local involvement. The Nepali state has repeatedly claimed that decentralization has led to people’s participation in the governance of the school at the local level. However, the argument in this chapter is that the state policy is to seek decentralization and participation according to the state’s agenda and not in accordance with people’s agenda. Analyzing people’s knowledge about and participation in decentralization and school governance and making a critical assessment of state policies in this regard, we find that the state policies and practices do not promote participation of local people in the governance of the school in their locality. At the district level it is shown that the district planning process is very much committed to transforming the national programmes or fulfilling the national targets and least concerned with the context at the district or at the local level. Hence the process has remained a centralized practice. The state project of decentralization is not in accordance with the local practices and 195 Daun (ed.), School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International Comparison of Grassroots Responses, 195–211. © 2007 Springer.

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knowledge base and thus ignores the agency of the local people. Moreover, the hierarchical structure of society does not allow a meaningful participation of the people in school governance, because existing structural forces prohibit power sharing among educational stakeholders on the basis of equality, a basic prerequisite for the successful implementation of decentralization and participation. This chapter, beginning with a brief country context, analyses state policies towards decentralization in the governance of schools at the local level. How these state policies are practiced at the district level, mainly in the context of preparing district educational plans, is then examined. The chapter discusses the realities of educational decentralization and participation at the grassroots level. People’s knowledge about the state sanctioned provisions for governing schools, their thinking about their own role in it and the way they are participating in the process of school governance are some of the main issues that will be discussed. Hence, this chapter examines the issue of educational decentralization at three levels – national, district and village.

2. Nepal – the Country Context Nepal is a small country, rich in socio-cultural and natural resources. Being the home of numerous language, ethnic, caste, religious and cultural groups, and rich in biodiversity, the country possesses high potential development resources. The Human Poverty Index (HPI) was 41.9 for the year 2001, and Nepal ranked 70th among 94 developing countries (UNDP, 2003, p. 246)1. With 38 per cent of the total population living on just one dollar or less a day, income poverty is pervasive, and there is large disparity in the spatial and social distribution of the income. About 80 per cent of the total population derive their living from agriculture, which is carried out on small and rain-fed family farms and has shown stagnating growth over the past several years. The reasons for socioeconomic disparity are often identified as the elitist structure of society, which has resulted in the “lack of broad policy ownership and citizen participation in determining the allocation of public resources” (UNDP, 2002). These have further resulted in misuse and exploitation of national resources for personal benefits among high caste/class

1.

Human Poverty Index (HPI) measures human deprivation and the Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of human development. Nepal’s HDI for the year 2001 is calculated as 0.499 and is categorized as ‘low human development’. For definition and methods of calculation of these indices, see, UNDP, 2003.

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people in power, while the large majorities are deprived of even the basic needs of life. The majority are mainly poor and people of ‘other’ castes, and those who live in remote and rural areas. Ethnic and caste dimensions have been key characteristics of Nepali society, which is hierarchically segregated into various ethnic and caste groups. This system, introduced historically in Nepal as an effort of the ruling elites to differentiate themselves from other people and based on the idea of purity-impurity and inclusion-exclusion by birth, was implemented in such a strict manner that it became a key aspect of social relationships. Traditionally, the caste system is tied to the occupational system. Under this scheme, not only a person’s caste but also occupation is defined by birth. That is, children are required to carry on their parental occupation. In a practical sense, caste is a context-dependent day-to-day reality, framing and re-framing the relationship at the societal and individual levels. Caste relationship is often expressed in a number of forms like denying the access of low caste people not only to personal houses but also in social places like temples, shops, public water taps, etc. A demarcation line is often drawn between ‘us’, the high caste, and ‘them’, the low caste. Though much loosened now as a result of the increasing impact of modernization and globalization, caste still dominates the social relationships and a few high caste groups control all social, political and economic resources in the country. The high caste people are blamed for having the intention to maintain the control over society and its destiny, rather than in reducing poverty that is gripping the Nepali society (Mishra, 1997, p. 7). All this makes them the logical subject of envy and critics from other ethnic groups, and therefore, an appropriate basis for fermenting inter-ethnic intolerance (Shrestha, 1996, p. 53). Gender relationship is also an important social dimension in Nepal, where an individual’s roles and responsibilities are defined on the basis of gender. Women are allocated only the secondary role both in households and society, and their presence at the decision-making level in politics, local as well as national, and in bureaucracy is negligible. Their contribution to the farm and household is not given due importance, because by working in these areas they do not earn cash money directly. Many of them are deprived even of a basic right like schooling. As women’s role is seen as limited to managing daily household chores and rearing children, educating them is thought not necessary. Instead, parents involve them in household works from very early childhood as a form of training, so that later they can prove a good wife and a good mother. Moreover, investing money in a daughters’ education is seen as a waste because one day they will be married and sent to another household. However, as a result of increasing modernization, more and more girls are now getting opportunities for schooling, but still parents send them to school with the main objective of preparing them for their future as wife and mother. Gender relationship is often combined with caste relationship. The low caste women have to bear the burden of double subordination.

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In the last 50 years, schooling has become one important social dimension contributing to framing social relationships between and among individuals and groups of people. A schooled person is able to create a different space in society, that is generally respected. People also see schooling as a means to raise the socioeconomic status through employment opportunities in government bureaucracy or in some other sector (Parajuli, 2002). Hence, their participation in and contribution to schooling has been significant. However, about half of the total adult population in the country still are not able to read and write, and about 20 per cent of total primary (grades 1-5) age group children are out of school. Gender disparity in educational access and participation is striking. The education sector is receiving an increasing share of public investment: 15 per cent of the total public expenditure and 2.9 per cent of GNP. However, the internal efficiency of the system has remained quite low. The Nepali school system, consisting of 25,000 schools, 5.4 million students and 142,0000 teachers, suffers from some critical problems like low learning achievements, declining quality, management inefficiency, weak governance, etc. (Bista, 1999; Bista and Carney, 2001 Panth, 1998, 1999; World Bank, 2001). Politically, Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with executive power in the hands of the Prime minister and the King as the head of the state. However, in October 2002 the King dissolved the Parliament, removed the government and took all the executive power in his own hands moving the country into a state of confusion and uncertainty.The Maoist insurgents have been staging a bloody campaign against the system and have already caused the death of about ten thousand people in the last seven years, and it has been claimed that large parts of the country are in fact under their effective control. Political parties or any other civil forces have been unable to present meaningful opposition against such undemocratic moves. Presently, there are no democratically elected local bodies, creating a void in the practice of decentralization and in local governance and public service delivery.All these have resulted in an uncertain future direction for the country.

3. Educational Decentralization in Nepal 3.1 Overview The issue of educational decentralization is related to the question of control in education. The questions of power and representation are among the most contentious issues of the decentralization or control (Therkildsen, 2000). However, the process of decentralization is a very complex one because it involves several issues of political, historical, social and economic aspects of the country in question. The complexity of decentralization in education management is problematic also in Nepal.

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All those involved in educational processes – people, system, government – understand and interpret decentralization in their own way. In Nepal, there has been no consensus on what decentralization is, what its objectives and rationale are, what to decentralize, to whom, when and how. People understand and interpret its meaning from their own perception2. The history of governance in education has shown swings, both rhetorically and actually, between centralization and decentralization (MoE, 1997, p. 147). There are confusing, contradictory and dilemmatic acts, regulations, policy statements and plans and programmes of decentralization. It seems that in the name of decentralization, Nepal has been heading in different directions at one time.The Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA),in 1999 is on the line of political decentralization; even imagining a day when there will be no presence of central government development offices at the district level. Following the concept of district ‘government’, the Act has envisaged the District Development Committee (DDC), a district level political body, as an apex body in district development. Contrary to such provision, efforts toward decentralization have taken the form of administrative decentralization and the policy or programme documents in education have given emphasis to that direction, emphasizing the need for strengthening the district education offices (MoE, 1997, p. 147; MoE, 1999). However, the ministries themselves have not known or practiced anything other than central control of programmes, resources and personnel.

3.2 False promises The tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07) has made important commitments to decentralization by stating that the responsibility for school management will be handed over to the community in order to assure people’s participation in policy development, plan formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of education as well as to carry administrative and educational decentralization together (NPC, 2003, p. 382). Accordingly, the Plan has adopted the strategy of devolving school management responsibility to the local level. Similarly, it has also been claimed that a ‘demand-driven model with the implementation of bottom-up planning will replace the existing supply model of education’ (my emphasis) (DOE, 2003, p. 4). However, there is confusion about whether the government wants to devolve the school management responsibility to the local bodies or to the school itself or to any other agency. Such confusion is 2.

As was revealed during my discussion with some of the officials in the Ministry of Education, both at the centre and at the decentralized levels, many think that decentralization is strengthening the District Education Office by providing some additional authorities and budget allocation to it. Some favoured powerful headteachers while some others wanted more authorities to the School Management Committees. Similarly, in a training programme conducted recently for education officials, participants expressed their opinion in favour of decentralization, but at the same time they also wanted central control in aspects like policy development, teacher training, supervision and monitoring, curriculum, etc.

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largely deliberate because this helps to do nothing or little in the name of decentralization. This is actually what is happening in Nepal. Beginning from the First Educational Plan in 1956, strong commitments have been made in favour of decentralization but each succeeding Plan sees the ‘continuation of centralized practices’ as one of the reasons for the failure of achieving the Plan objectives. The Ninth Plan, considering the continuation of the state control in planning, management, financial liability and different activities for education system (NPC, 1998, p. 611) has stated that ‘arrangements will be made to involve guardians, locally elected bodies and people in programme formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation’ (ibid., p. 620). The Tenth Plan has renewed these commitments with new promises. The failure of the previous plans and policies, particularly the nationalization of schools in 1971, and as a result of that, fast deteriorating quality of education and eroding sense of accountability of educational personnel at all levels, are the main reasons that forced the government to opt for decentralization. Decentralization has also been one of the slogans of the rulers in order to divert the attention of the public from more critical issues like their legitimacy in power, corruption, etc. and thus has been used to woo the opponents and diffuse the pressure. The futility of decentralization efforts of the past were accepted in the Ninth Plan, “the participation and the role of community and those directly interested in the planning education sector have become secondary matters due to the state control in planning, organization, management, financial liability and different activities for the education system” (NPC, 1998, p. 611). Moreover, these policy documents of the government often blame the local people for the failure of decentralization in this country. According to the Tenth Plan, the reason why educational management practices are not decentralized are ‘lack of people’s participation in bringing about quality improvement in primary education, parental lack of interest in their children’s learning achievement and lack of active role by the local bodies and other agencies’ (NPC, 2003, p. 383). With this, the government has accepted that decentralization in educational governance is not yet a reality and the reason for this is people and not the government.

3.3 New Education Act, 2002 Despite commitments made in policy documents, the present Education Act (Seventh Amendment, 2058) (HMG, 2002), has not given any substantial authority to any other agencies – local bodies, School Management Committees (SMCs), and civil society. Hence, even after the new Act, the schools will continue to be controlled by the government or by the District Education Office (DEO), leaving very little room for the local stakeholders to act. The new act, however, has introduced some important changes. One such change is in the membership and forming procedure of SMCs.

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As against the previous system when the DEO would form the SMCs, the new act has made provision for parents to elect the Chairperson and some other members. It can be expected that the SMC will now have a more independent identity and would be freed from interference from the district education office as majority of its members are to be elected by the parents. Moreover, under the new provision, the head teacher is to be appointed according to some set criteria that include capability to take leadership and capability to maintain a good relationship with the community. These capabilities are to be judged by the SMC. However, it is difficult to anticipate that these changes would bring any substantial improvement in the roles and functioning of this committee because the committee has little additional powers to influence the process of school governance in a meaningful manner. Similarly, no meaningful authority is given to the head teacher. According to the new act, there will be a new educational agency – the Village Education Committee (VEC) – in all Village Development Committees (VDCs)3 in order to ‘supervise and manage the schools in the VDC area and also to coordinate among schools.’This statement in itself is a very powerful one and gives the hint of a powerful VEC. However, this sort of generalized statement might be very misleading and actually in practice, the VEC might not be given any specific authority. In the absence of specific authorities, this committee may just turn out as an agency with little utility in expanding and strengthening educational provisions in the locality and thus, might remain a financial and administrative burden for the system. Therefore, it is yet to be seen how this appointed committee, led by the VDC chairperson with membership of teacher, parents, government officer and others, actually functions. Moreover, it may be a case that illustrates the government intention to control the educational processes at the local level by undermining the roles of elected political bodies like DDC and VDC (See, Table 10.1). These are people’s representative bodies and appointed committees like DEC (District Education Committee) and VEC cannot take their place. These committees will always remain under government control. Moreover, doubt will always remain that local power groups might utilize this committee for their benefit and thus, instead of serving poor people, they might just remain a power tool in the hands of elites of the society. During the past two or three years, the government has been implementing a programme of ‘handing over the management responsibility of public school to the community’ in a campaignlike manner, described as the government’s commitment to decentralize school management and to promote the participation of the local people in this task. This might be so, but a government directive prepared to guide the handing-over procedure has not given any meaningful authority to any local agency – neither to the SMC nor to the VDC – regarding the 3.

VDC or Village Development Committee is the lowest level politico-administrative unit constituted in rural areas.VDCs are thus clustering of one or several villages. Municipalities are constituted in urban areas. Local SelfGovernance Act, 1999 sees VDC as a key development and service delivery agency at the village level.

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Table 10.1 Educational Agencies at the District and Village Level Agency Formation Level DDC Democrati District cally elected

DEC Officiating

and appointed members

DEO Govern-

ment office

VDC Democrati

District Formulate district education plan and educational programme of schools and implement them through SMCs, allocate teacher quotas to school, mobilize resources, assist in implementing NFE related programmes

selected

In practice, DEC’s role is limited to endorsing decisions made by the DEO, particularly in approving district education plan and in allocating teacher quotas to public schools.

Village

Establish or give permission to establish pre-primary schools, supervise and manage schools, develop non-formal education programmes and implement them

None of the VDCs carry out these functions, though there might be some exceptions. Many VDCs show support for additional teacher(s) in local school(s).

Village

Supervision, monitoring and coordination of schools in the VDC area, allocate available resources to schools, formulate and implement village educational plan, recommend the establishment of schools.

Presently non-functioning

School

Supervise and manage the school, teacher monitoring, evaluation and administration, work as per the directives of the DEO.

In practice, school and teacher management, supervision, monitoring and administration is carried out by the DEO.

and appointed members

SMC Parents

Observation None of the DDCs are directly involved in carrying out these tasks, though there might be some exceptions. Limited role in endorsing DEO prepared (actually centrally developed) annual educational programme

District Manage and administer schools in the As required, DEOs have been carrying out these programmes district, develop and implement education development programmes, in the district obtaint approval of district education programme from the District Council

cally elected

VEC Officiating

Education related functions (legal provision) Recommends the establishment of school, assist in the operation and management of school, supervise and monitor them, formulate policies and programs on non-formal education

DDC – District Development Committee, DEC – District Education Committee, DEO – District Education Office, VDC – Village Development Committee, VEC – Village Education Committee, SMC – School Management Committee. As mentioned above, presently there are no elected DDCs and VDCs in the country. Their functions are being carried out by the government appointed DDCs and VDCs.

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governance of handed-over schools. It is interesting to note that the Annual Strategic Implementation Plan for 2003/04, the document that spells out policies, programmes, activities and budget for the year, does not mention anything about this programme (DOE, 2003) However, there are some very positive impacts of all these activities. Increased awareness among educational bureaucrats of the need for decentralizing the educational planning process is one such impact. Accordingly, space is being created for the participation of wider groups of stakeholders in the educational process at the local level. However, it is yet to be seen whether such participation is going to take the form of real participation that could influence the decision-making process or would just remain a symbolic participation without any meaningful role. Awareness is also being noticed among parents about the need for showing interest and taking part in the process of schooling in their locality. Following the legal and institutional provisions as described above, parents in some places have shown the feeling of empowerment and responsibility to do something to improve educational accountability, quality, relevance, etc. Such enthusiasm and expectation go beyond legal provisions and is the result of increasing globalization, democratization, and of historical legacy. Before the nationalization of schools in 1971, schools were effectively governed by the community. The question now is whether the state elites promote such enthusiasm or rather ignore it. One conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis is that education decentralization in Nepal is not the result of concerted efforts of a well-articulated strategy developed out of national consensus and neither according to socio-cultural reality of the country, nor on future vision. It is developed out of present-day world fashion and donor pressure and is the result of uncoordinated personal interests, perceptions and understandings of the issue. However, there are positive trends as well and an increasing pressure from and active role for the civil society.

4. The Workings of Decentralization

4.1 Planning at the district level The existing Education Act demands that the DEO prepares and implements the district level educational development plan. However, in practice, it has little to do in the name of planning and its role is limited to implementing centrally developed plans and policies.The ‘DEO staff felt largely detached from the plans and programmes that were devised and disseminated from the centre. The sense of isolation at the DEO is both physical and symbolic, with local administrators viewing themselves as poor cousins to their colleagues at the centre’ (Bista & Carney, 2001, p. 62). Each year DEO receives some specified programmes and the estimated budget

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required to implement these programmes. This budget is specified by programme. As such, it has no authority and no funds to spend on its own. Thus, what it has been doing in the name of planning is to decide in which locality to implement these programmes. According to a DE Officer (District A, interviewed January 2000), “if the present practice is to continue we do not need to develop planning expertise. In my long experience of DE Officer I have never done any planning work.” A similar field reality was also expressed by another officer in the district (District A, interviewed January 2000), “in a way our work is easy, we just have to carry out orders. There is no need to worry about the fact that in the district so many children are out of school, quality of education is going down and teachers are not accountable towards their duty and are politicized.” This implies that the DEO, the field office of the government, does not have any authority in making planning decisions. Their activity is thus limited in implementing centrally developed programmes and the only decision they have to take is where, within the district, to locate or implement the programme. This reality is illustrated by the comment made by one education officer in district B (interviewed January 2000), “What is there to make in the name of planning decisions? We just have to distribute the available quota. Of course, sometimes we do so based upon local demand and our own judgement on the reality of the need but most of the time we do so because some leader has asked us to do so”. Thus, like in many places in Africa, the decisions are made not to satisfy the local need but to satisfy the political or bureaucratic leader because ‘demands from central government are much stronger than those from the local population and the field officer is constantly concerned to satisfy his political masters’ (Mawhood, 1993, p. 3). A process of preparing the District Educational Plan has been initiated since the past few years as a part of the decentralization of education management at the local level. Under this process, staff at the district education office, after some consultation with some other stakeholders that might include parents, teachers, NGOs, etc., prepare their periodic education development plans for the district. The plan is then approved by the DEC and then finally by the DD Committee. What happens then? This is a comment made recently by a DE Officer (District C, interviewed in Kathmandu, May 2003): Each year we revise the same document again and again because we are asked to do so and budget is made available for that. We revise the DEP as per the norms and specifications given to us and we cannot go beyond BPEP4 components. After getting approval from the district, we send the plan to the Department and that ends the whole story. Except for having similarities in programmes I do not see any linkage between the DEP

4.

Basic and Primary Education Programme (BPEP) is a major multi-donor programme being implemented in the country to improve basic and primary education systems.

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and annual programme of the district. Thus, we do not prepare the plan to guide our future course. We do so because that has to be done. This tells us the whole story of the state decentralization programme in Nepal. It is clear that the DEP has remained nothing but rhetoric, carried out to satisfy the central demand and not to address the local problems and issues. Moreover, the centre has seen the DEP as a mechanism to achieve its own targets and objectives like achieving the goal of education for all. This also illustrates the hegemonic way of translating international targets into the national and then the local programmes. This is something like practicing decentralization according to the state agenda and not according to the needs of the local level. Restricting districts to go beyond the components of BPEP and then forcing them to stay within the central programme is an example of this fact. The practice does not allow the local discourses to obtain space in the standard state system and thus is against the basic principles of decentralization. The same thing is true about preparing the annual programme of the district education office. This process begins with the district preparing its annual programme based on the past years’ programme and budget but it is not necessarily so that the same amount of budget and programmes are accepted by the centre or the Department of Education. Generally, what happens is that if districts stay within the budget and programme limits of the Department, their requests are normally accepted but if they propose some new programmes and go beyond the budget limits then they are not accepted. According to an official in one of the districts (District C, interviewed in Kathmandu, May 2003), “this year we had proposed three new programmes, installing email and Internet facilities in the office, teacher exchange programme within the schools of district and providing some extra reading materials to selected schools but none of these proposals were accepted.” A study (Parajuli, 2002) found many instances that have made district education staff unhappy because “the centre treats us as if we know nothing”(field note, 12/99). In that attitude of ‘they know nothing and we know everything’ and also in the name of maintaining uniformity and standards “they send us their programmes with detailed work guidance and directives but they tend to forget that Nepal is a country of high socioeconomic and physiographic diversity and in many instances, their directions cannot be applied in local situations” (field note, 12/99). Thus, instead of making space for local discourses as would be expected under the theoretical premises, the state programme of decentralization is reinforcing the objectives and targets of the centre. There is nothing or little local in the present practices and this illustrates that the much claimed commitments towards decentralization is not the real intention of the state. Decentralization is power sharing. However, whatever objective there might be in claiming to adopt the policy of decentralization, power sharing is not the intention. Deepening the analysis further, the next section describes how people perceive and participate in decentralization in the context of school governance.

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5. Local Views of and Responses Concerning Participation in School Management5 People’s knowledge of and participation in school management helps in understanding their response to the state initiatives of decentralization regarding school governance. Such understanding would also help in realizing expected impacts that could be created by such participation. Moreover, such participation can also be interpreted as people’s interest in participating and thus their pressure for the development of more actor-oriented processes of decentralization. One of the objectives of decentralization in education is to bring school management nearer to the people it serves so that its quality, efficiency and effectiveness can be improved by encouraging parental and community participation (Adams & Chapman, 1998; Chapman, 1998). To take such an objective is to assume that the community people and the parents are most concerned as well as best informed about the problems in school and how those problems can be addressed (Welsh & McGinn, 1999). Thus, the assumption is that people’s knowledge or local knowledge can be used successfully to manage the school. People are not much informed about who runs or manages the school or they think that teachers run or manage it. Each school in the studied villages has a school management committee (SMC), but in many cases, people, particularly women and low castes, do not know about the existence of the SMC. Even among those who have heard about the SMC, many do not have much idea about it. Such findings illustrate the distance between the school and the parents or people in general. Most people think their expected role is to provide a labour contribution to the school, if asked, and send children for study. Jetha Damai (male, age 42, low caste, with grade five) of Uchchakot finds it difficult to answer my query about who manages the school, What should I say? (smile)... I don’t know much about who runs the school. ...I think teachers run the school. They ask to send our children to the school, to help in the construction of school buildings, to donate to the school, etc. That is all. Not only he but also many others referred to the teachers as the managers of the school in the village. Referring back to the 1970s when schools were nationalized, Bimal Dutta Panta from the same village (male, 56, high caste, higher education) noted, “later, when the NESP failed, the government was forced to delegate some of the management responsibilities to the people,through the SMC.” However, in practice still, “the school is owned and governed by the government.” 5.

The presentation in this section is based upon a field study, conducted largely using qualitative research methods and carried out in four villages of Nepal in 1999 and 2000. These villages are Uchchakot and Kalena in Doti District in the far western part of the country and Atrahatti and Mejhi in Nawalparasi District in the south central part.

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People do not know about the financial situation of the school in their village and they do not know whether they have right to ask the school about its financial situation. Ganga Damai from Uchchakot (female, 17, low caste, with grade five) expressed a surprised tone when asked about what she knows about the school’s financial situation, (with wide eyes): “Why should I know these things? How could I know such things?” Most people were of the opinion that the government bears the school expenses and most of them expressed their ignorance on how the money they pay to the school is utilized.They think they have no rights to enquire about the financial situation of the school. People had little information on the problems of school. Some of them responded saying, “there are schoolteachers and the SMC to take care of these things.” However, poor physical facilities and lack of good teachers were the most commonly felt problems of school. Some respondents also mentioned ‘over-politicization of teachers’and their ‘lack of commitment in their work’as main school problems. Different ideas were expressed on how the school problems could be solved.While agreeing on the need for their own role, people expressed that it is the duty of the government to come forward to improve schools.Thus, people are little informed about who and how schools are managed, what roles and rights they can have in school management and what are the school problems. People were alike in all four study villages in these matters. Centrally controlled structure and practices have made the schools more impersonal and objective, taking them away from the local knowledge-base and practices and thus creating little space for people’s participation. Moreover, school managers often assume that people lack both interest and knowledge about school (see, Abraham & Platteau, 2001; Hanafin & Lynch, 2002) and thus do not work toward developing a participatory school environment. These are the results of implicitly followed state policies and school practices that keep people out of school which, in turn, shows that decentralization in school management in Nepal is nothing but rhetoric. However, people expressed their readiness to take part in school management. When expressing their sentiments6 toward the school, some respondents showed their readiness to take part in school management, if asked. However, one teacher in village C said that given the present social and economic reality of the people, it would be too much to expect their continuous attention toward the school. According to her, “people have many other things to worry about and school and education cannot be their priority all the time. In many instances they just want to be free after they send their children to the school.”Nevertheless, many people, male and female, young and adult, rich and poor, high caste and low caste expressed their readiness to take part in school management.According to one old woman in Mejhi village, who never attended the school but later acquired literacy by attending a non-formal class, 6.

Particularly in case of schools in Uchchakot and Atrahatti, people had greatly contributed in establishing and managing schools before their nationalization in 1970s. Due to this reason, many people in these villages have sentimental feelings towards the village school.

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Mahesh Nath Parajuli I know how important school is for our children and I also know it should be in good shape. I remember, while in the hills7, my husband contributed a lot to the development of school in the village. If the society asks, I am willing to go to school to watch students and teachers.

As noted earlier, the present system is not designed to enhance feelings that promote people’s participation in schooling. Rather, any such effort is not taken positively. Comments like “I don’t know anyone there”, “probably no woman has ever visited the village school”, “parents are afraid of harsh words from teachers for not taking care of the children’s study”, etc. but a few examples indicate that parents do not feel well received in school. Moreover, comments like “teachers are not responsible towards their duty” and “parents do not take care of their children’s study” show that the relationship between teachers and parents is not cordial.These facts clearly indicate that despite commitments, the system does not encourage parental participation in the processes of school. However, it is not that people do not participate at all in the schooling process. Some people in the studied villages mentioned that although they do not go to the school, they sometimes talk with teachers in the village. The majority of school teachers in the four villages were local and among the few non-local teachers, many were staying in the village and were of the same socioeconomic background as village people, hence, they were local-like. Thus, except some women and low castes, the majority of village people knew the village schoolteachers and thus, interacted with them outside the school on many occasions. The importance given by the people to the identity of the place should also be noted here. They preferred interacting with teachers, and hence with the school, in the village. This was because if they went to the school, they would feel the school structure in the foreground making them uneasy. But by interacting with teachers in the village, their own domain, they avoided the structure of the school and this made them comfortable to express their opinions and complaints. This is the actors’ strategy to cope with structural forces (Long, 2001). Thus, the centrally managed structure of schooling and the hierarchical social structures and practices are some factors that prohibit people’s participation and keep them away from the village social processes. Due to these reasons, the village schools were unable to make a place for themselves in village social space. It should be noted here that although schools have failed to make a meaningful space in village social life, it does not mean that the villagers are unaware or non-participating in schooling processes. In spite of lack of support from the system, they participate in it on their own.This is necessary for them because schooling is part of the strategy families adopt to raise their socioeconomic status. They evaluate the schooling processes closely and continuously so that decisions could be taken regarding accepting, rejecting or seeking

7.

Her family was a migrant family from the hills.

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alternative ways (Parajuli, 2002; see also Boyle, Brock, Mace, & Sibbons, 2002). Thus, though ignored by the state system, the people’s agency is active in strategizing their own way of participating in the schooling process.

6. Conclusion The state has adopted the policy of decentralization not because it is willing to do so but because of international pressures. It also adopted this policy to distract people from other more critical issues. Moreover, the state is utilizing decentralization not to give space to local discourses but to reinforce its own objectives and targets. Whereas planning documents blame people for showing no interest in participation, everything in the name of the decentralized planning exercise is being carried out within the framework of the centre’s norms and specifications. Due to gaps between stated policy objectives and actual practices, decentralization has been a problematic concept in Nepal. There are contradictory acts, policy statements and programmes regarding decentralization – some leading towards de-concentration – but in practice, things are still highly centralized. This is so because decentralization is not the real intention of the state, due to the elitist social structure. People lack knowledge about the management practice of school. Hence, their participation in school management is very limited.The centrally organized and controlled school system and a social structure that is traditionally designed on the basis of the patron-client relationship are mainly responsible for such a low level of participation. Moreover, its structural form has made the school an institution external to the village; people do not see it as a part of village social life, they see it as a state representative. It is not that people are unaware about the school processes; they express their readiness to take part in school management, if asked for. However, during the past few decades, schooling has become one important strategy for people to improve their socioeconomic situation. This indicates that people’s participation in and contribution to the governance of the local schools can be enhanced considerably, provided that space is created in which they can act. Present state programmes of decentralization and participation do not provide such space for the people.

7. References Abraham, A. and J-P. Platteau (2001). Participatory Development in the Presence of Endogenous Community Imperfections. Paper presented at the Symposium Managing Common Resources – What is the Solution? University of Lund, Sweden. 10 September 2001.

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Adams, D. and D. W. Chapman (1998). Educational and National Development In Asia: Trends and Issues. International Journal of Educational Research, 29 (7): 583-602. Bista, M. and S. Carney (2001) Capacity Building for Educational Improvement: An Institutional Analysis of the Ministry of Education and Sports of Nepal, Kathmandu: Danish University of Education, Study and Resource Centre. Bista, M. B. (1999). Some Issues Confronting School Reform in Nepal. Education and Development, 90-98. Boyle, S., A. Brock, J. Mace and M. Sibbons (2002). Reaching the Poor: The ‘Costs’ of Sending Children to School. A Six Country Comparative Study. London: Department for International Development (DFID) Education Papers, 47. Chapman, D. W. (1998). The Management and Administration of Education across Asia: Changing Challenges. International Journal of Educational Research, 29 (7): 603-626. DOE (2003). Annual Strategic Implementation Plan for School Level Education 2003/04. Kathmandu: Department of Education. Hanafin, J. and A. Lynch (2002). Peripheral Voices: Parental Involvement, Social Class, and Educational Disadvantage. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 23 (1): 35-49. HMG (2002). His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (2058, Magh 25 [2002, January 7]). The Education (Seventh Amendment) Act, 2058 [2002]. Nepal Gazette, 51, Additional Issue 67. Long, N. (2001). Development Sociology: Actor Perspective. London: Routledge. Mawhood, P. (1993). Local Government in the Third World: Experience of Decentralization in Tropical Africa (2nd ed.). Cape Town: Africa Institute of South Africa. Mishra, C. (1997). Developmental Practice in Nepal: An Overview. In K. B. Bhattachan and C. Mishra (Eds.). Developmental Practices in Nepal, (pp. 1-15). Kathmandu: Central Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tribhuvan University. MoE (1997). The Basic and Primary Education Master Plan 1997-2002. Kathmandu: Ministry of Education. MoE (1999). Basic and Primary Education Program (BPEP II) 1999-2004 Program Implementation Plan (Main Report). Kathmandu: Ministry of Education. NPC (1998). The Ninth Plan 1997-2002. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. NPC (2003). The Tenth Plan 2002-2007. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. Panth, B. (1998). Implications for Primary Education Development in Nepal. Education and Development, 134-160. Panth, B. (1999). Quality Driven School Reform. Education and Development, 51-59. Parajuli, M. N. (2002). The State, The School and the Society: Dilemmas and Crises in Education in Nepal. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Copenhagen: The Danish University of Education. Shrestha, B. K. (1996). Local Development Strategy in Nepal: Insensitive Government, Conflicting Donor Agenda, and Emergent NGO Initiatives at the Grassroots. In M. K. Dahal and H. Mund (Eds.). Social Economy and National Development: Lessons from Nepalese Experience, (pp. 49-84). Kathmandu: Nepal Foundation for Advanced Studies. Therkildsen, O. (2000). Contextual Issues in Decentralization of Primary Education in Tanzania. International Journal of Educational Development, 20: 407-421.

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Tracy, M. (1997). To Transfer Power or to Transfer Responsibility: Educational Decentralization in Venezuela. International Journal of Educational Development, 17(2): 145-162. UNDP (2002). Nepal Human Development Report 2001: Poverty Reduction and Governance. Kathmandu: United Nations Development Programme. UNDP (2003). Human Development Report 2003. Millennium Development Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Human Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Welsh, T. And McGinn (1999). Decentralization of Education: Why, When, What and How? (Fundamentals of Educational Planning N 64). Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning. World Bank. (2001). Nepal: Priorities and Strategies for Education Reform. Kathmandu: World Bank.

Chapter Eleven

Educational Governance: Comparison of Some Aspects

Holger Daun

1. Introduction Previous chapters have shown the variety of approaches and outcomes that exist under the label of decentralization: Everything from relocation of administrative tasks from the Ministry of Education to lower levels in the state administration ---- to moving decision making to relatively autonomous (elected) school councils. Comparisons across countries or even across regions in one and the same country have to take into consideration that: (i) the baselines differed when the implementation of decentralization started; (ii) the levels, forms, types and issues of decentralization vary; and (iii) several countries have combined decentralization with introduction of market forces (choice arrangements, per student subsidy, etc.), while others have not. Whatever the causes and reasons are and the mechanisms (imitation, borrowing, imposition, etc.) through which it occurs, all the countries presented in this book have introduced essential elements similar to or of the same type as those suggested in the world model for education (see chapter 1).

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2. World System, Globalization and Education National societies are embedded in the world system and their position in this system and general globalization forces (economic, cultural, and so on) condition their frame of action. Economically, the position these societies have in the world system may vary from economic marginalization to strong incorporation into (competitive) world markets. From the “culturalist” world systems theory we derive the world models (one for education) for the way of structuring the modern state. (I)NGOs and IGOs play an important role in spreading the world models around the world. The countries covered in this book began from very different baselines when they started to formulate or implement decentralization from the beginning of the 1990s. Seven of the eight countries (Norway is the exception) do not belong to the category of the most globalized countries, according to the index presented by Foreign Policy (2004). Senegal, for example, is in the 40th place among the 62 countries surveyed. However, elements of the world models (not included in this index) are adopted by the national governments almost everywhere. Some baseline indicators from UNDPs Human Development Report are presented in Table 11.11. Five of the six low income countries had improving HDI during the 1990s, while that of South Africa declined from a relatively high level. However, most of them rank lower than one decade ago. Table 11.1 Some Indicators of Development for the Eight Countries

Norway Greece Nicaragua Senegal South Africa Cambodia Nepal Mozambique

Human Development Index 1990 1992 1994 2002 .934 .907 .943 .956 .938 .932 .923 .902 .612 .611 .530 .667 .189 .34 .326 .437 .766 .705 .716 .666 .175 .337 .348 .568 .158 .343 .347 .504 .155 .246 .281 .354

World position 1991-2002* 6->1 24 ->24 85->118 135 ->157 57 ->119 140->130 145 ->140 146->171

Mean years of schooling, M/F, 1980 9.6** 6.5** n.d. 1.1/0.3 3.7** 2.3/1.7 2.7/0.9 n.d.

GDP per capita in 1994 21346 11265 1580 1596 4291 1084 1137 986

Sources: UNDP (1991, 1995, 1997). * Position in 1991 (among 160 countries in the UNDP list) and position in 2002 (among 177 countries). Since 17 countries more are on the list in 2002 than in 1991, only a change of more than 18 positions is a certain change. ** Average (males and females). N.d. = no data.

1.

In an indirect way, this index indicates a degree of neo-liberal policies, since many of the indicators, such as gender, geographical and socio-economic equalities, and access to welfare items, are negatively affected by such policies.

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Norway is highly involved in the global flows (Foreign Policy, 2004). It has always had a high position on the HDI, and it has introduced essential elements of the world models for education: market mechanisms, move of decision-making from national to school level, and so on. On the other hand, Greece has been more reluctant to international forces, although it became a member of the European Union at the beginning of the 1980s. Its position on the HDI list (low among high level countries) did not changed during the 1990s. The country has been reluctant to appropriate elements from the worlds models as well and has mostly deconcentrated and delegated from the national to regional and prefectural levels. All the six countries with the lower index share three features that are highly relevant here. First, they have of strong national/local cultures based on traditional communitarianism, whether they are relatively egalitarian or highly stratified along caste, clan or purely socioeconomic lines.These cultures do not accept all the ingredients of modernity (e.g. individualism, profit-making). Thus, the project of modernity disseminated through the world models and general processes of globalization – if not filtered through national policy making – encounter the local realities, and something of glocalization and hybridization occurs (Nederveen, 1995; Robertson, 1995). This means that universal features are translated and adapted to local cultures and the universal and the local are more or less merged. At the school level, the outcomes are conditioned by the encounter between the world models (as interpreted and decided upon nationally and handled through the administrative system) and national and local economic structures, cultures and ideological orientations. Second, all of these countries are more and more becoming the object of (I)NGO interventions. Since the (I)NGOs carry modern communitarianism, the encounter with traditional communitarianism (pagoda associations in Cambodia, for example) results in contradictions or hybridization and glocalization. In Cambodia, (I)NGOs make efforts to implement specific structures for local decision-making and to use traditional pagoda associations for modernization purposes. Third, these countries (with the exception of South Africa) are among the poorest countries in the world and do not have the sophisticated infrastructures and networks for highly efficient and rapid communication. The result is that the central state can neither give the schools the necessary support for handling decentralized tasks nor monitor and assess the outcomes of the school processes. Nicaragua is in some economic aspects highly incorporated into the world system (as a provider of primary sector products), while it is marginalized in others. It is (together with Mozambique, Cambodia and Nepal) among the poorest in the world. The shift in the state in the beginning of the 1990s has not resulted in any improvement in the HDI, on the contrary: the country has fallen from the 85th position in the world to the 118th. In the area of education, the shift implied a great deal of devolution of decision-making but also of funding from the national level to schools.

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Senegal, like Nicaragua, is incorporated into the world system but not highly globalized. The country has improved its HDI but relative to other countries, it has lost position. Its central state was pressured from international agents to increase enrolment in the world-wide endeavour to create Education for All, but it was internationally legitimate for the state to leave the complete responsibility for the new type of basic community schools to local communities and (I)NGOs. (The idea of such schools is itself an international product). The only role taken by the state is monitoring and supervision from the district (prefecture) level. South Africa, in some aspects incorporated into the world system, has had a deteriorating HDI – from a medium to a low position. Without acting too much for changes in the unequal structures inherited from the apartheid period, the state has introduced a great deal of the world model; decision-making has been moved from national to provincial level but in particular to school level; some resource generation has been placed at local/school level; market mechanisms and outcomes-based performance tests have been introduced. The items of this test focus more and more on easily measurable items. Mozambique has a position in the HDI world list similar to that of Nicaragua but has had a considerable improvement during the 1990s. However, relatively, it has fallen behind some other countries. In education, it has not introduced market forces to any large extent and decentralization has been made mainly to the regional and district levels, even if schools will be required to take more responsibility than before. Cambodia has improved its HDI and probably also its position on the world list. Although the country is among the poorest in the world, its population contributes significantly to the direct funding of education (not via the tax system). Efforts are made to decentralize some of the formal and “modern”types of decision-making, but these efforts seem not to have been successful in linking to the traditional pagoda associations, which are handling a great deal of school matters at the local level. Nepal had an improvement in its HDI but has not changed its relative position significantly and is among the poorest countries in the world. Schools were run by local communities until the end of the 1960s and were then taken over by the central state. With the pressure from international community, decentralization is being implemented since the 1990s, principally deconcentration to state bodies at the district level.

3. The New Mode of Educational Governance 3.1 Mechanisms and forces At least the following features of the world model appear in most of the countries studied (see Appendix 11.1). Mode of financing education: Basically, public funding from the central state but

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also some share is expected to come from local or medium levels in the form of private funding (fees, sponsoring). Administration, regulation, steering: There is a national administrative structure or framework and then decentralized bodies for decision-making within this framework. The framework is weak in low income countries, and the state has often weak capabilities, and this results in weak support to the local levels and problems for information going in both directions – upwards and downwards. Within the national framework, local or community people are expected to be involved, but this involvement most often takes the form of economic contribution and rarely of genuine participation at the highest level of Arnstein’s (1971) ladder (see chapter 2). Apart from the traditional regulative and steering mechanisms, retroactive assessments conducted by the state; choice exerted by parents and pupils; and per pupil funding are steering mechanisms suggested in the world model. This is of course most elaborated in Norway, where the levels of technology and competence are sufficiently high and infrastructure exists for using such mechanisms. Assessment, evaluation, monitoring and accountability are more frequent and increasingly include quantitative (easily measurable) items. Nationally defined and standardized examination tests is another approach that is spreading to more and more countries, often pushed by donors and IGOs. National testing is practised in several of the countries, but due to limited resources, the results are not easily and rapidly systematized and disseminated. Also, policies of school accountability have to a large extent been introduced; schools have to report their activity, budgets and student achievement, often upwards in the hierarchy as well as horizontally to school boards/councils.

3.2 Types and Levels Seven of the eight countries are similar to many other countries in that moves have been made from higher levels to school level (see chapter 2). To the extent that information is available, deconcentration and delegation have been most common or at least decided upon in the case countries as well as in several of the cases reviewed in chapter 2. In all countries except Norway, the district level deals with primary and secondary education Figure 11.1 shows levels (of decision-making or administration) before and after decentralization has been implemented and approximations of the relative importance of the change from one level to another. However, the figure shows only the levels as such and not what mandates, issues, items or tasks have been relocated. Most countries formerly had no bodies at the school but in the best case a PTA. With the worldwide drive for decentralization, all the countries studied have introduced a decision-making or advisory body at the school. The most radical or comprehensive decentralization programs have been introduced in Norway, Nicaragua, South Africa and (in community-based education – CBE) Senegal.

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Figure 11.1 Approximations of the Degree of Decentralization National Norway

Greece

Nicaragua

Senegal

Mozambique

South Africa

Cambodia

Nepal

Regional

District

Municipality

School

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All these programs imply devolution of decision-making and tasks from the central level to the schools. This is combined with the application of national tests and, at least in the cases of Nicaragua and South Africa, rather detailed instructions from above concerning mandates and composition of the school-site body. In Norway, the districts lost the educational tasks in the beginning of the 1990s. It has been left to the municipalities to organize its own internal administrative and decision-making bodies and functions, and therefore, it is difficult to give a general national picture. The school-site body in the case schools studied in chapter 3 have an advisory role and most power stays with the principal. South Africa has both provincial and regional levels, and moves (mostly deconcentration) have been made from the national to the provincial level. The provinces differ in regard to how much and what they have decentralized to districts and schools. However, the general trend is devolution of decision-making to the school-site body (see chapter 7). The country had schoolsite bodies before the shift to democracy, but these bodies were organized along “racial” lines so in practice only “white” schools had such bodies. Nowadays, parents should have a strong voice, but it was found in the case study schools that in practice, the principal decides. Nicaragua has one of the most radical types of de-centralization in that a great deal of decision-making has been devolved to the schools. According to the regulations, parents are in the majority in the school council but in reality (at least in the two case schools presented in chapter 5), the principal decides in most matters. Senegal: The CBE schools introduced during the 1990s have a position different from that of the general primary schools in that the state is not involved in more than overall monitoring.The position of the CBE schools is not quite clear, since they have been seen by the central state as formal as well as non-formal. In general primary education the degree of decentralization is much lower than among the CBE schools. The school-site body is new and exists in the CBE schools. In practice, most decisions are made by NGO representatives. Decentralization efforts (mainly de-concentration) have been weakest in Greece, and Mozambique, where most of the decision-making power has stayed at the regional or district levels. In Greece, most of the decision-making takes place in de-concentrated state bodies, but in parallel to these, there are at school level (and other levels) “cells” of the parent’s association with an advisory role. The schools have council and committees with an advisory role, and the real power stays with the principal. Mozambique has decided on a policy implying the establishment of school-site councils including local people, but implementation had not yet started when the field study was conducted in this country. Cambodia and Nepal have also de-concentrated but more so to the levels above the school level. In Nepal, most decisions are made by officers in the de-concentrated district office. In Cambodia, there are local pagoda associations but they are staffed by people who participate by tradition.

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The composition of the school-site bodies tend to reflect the socioeconomic, gender and other inequalities in the local community.The countries differ in involvement of parents or other local people in the school-site bodies, and whether these bodies have decision-making power or not. As far as market mechanisms are concerned, they are most extensively used in Norway and South Africa. In Norway, there are per student subsidies and almost unlimited choice. South Africa is similar in these regards but schools also have to spend time on fund raising. Nicaragua has both per student subsidies and fund raising and school fees, compulsory in the beginning, but later voluntary, contributions from the parents. In some of the other countries, there is choice (at least theoretically) in that children can choose a private school, and fund raising is also common, especially in Cambodia. Table 11.2 makes an overview of the schools studied in the eight countries and Appendix 11.1 summarizes the principal features of governance in these countries.

4. Conclusion Most countries in the world have implemented elements that appear in the world model for education, although not all of them are economically incorporated into the world economy.This means that the countries are conditioned by their position in the world economic system and by the globalization forces (whether they are incorporated or not) but also by the pressure to implement features from the world model. Governance should not be seen merely as that which is done from the national level in order to get policies implemented but also as the forces that condition or determine the outcomes (see chapter 1). It includes: (a) steering mechanisms (forms of funding, accountability, school choice, etc.), and (b) steering forces (socioeconomic conditions, cultural patterns, ideological orientations, etc.), which combine and condition the outcomes. Hybridization or glocalization seem to occur in the encounter between the world model and local perspectives, beliefs and ideological orientations (See chapter 2). In many cases, the new type of governance has not been demanded by local and national people and it does not always respond to local or national needs and demands. Finally, the country reports and the findings reported in chapter two of this book indicate that the decentralization programs have been successful in that they have changed existing administrative and decision-making structures and installed new ones but they seem to be less successful in terms of real local participation.

Appendix 11.1 Some Forces and Mechanisms of Governance and Decentralization Governnance

Type of Decentralization

Some Outcomes

Forces working at school level

Norway Mixed etatist, market and Mainly communitarian (participa-tory). devolution. National curriculum; some aspects at local level. Municipality. Block grants from national to municipality. Principally funds per student. School committee. Report test results and activity upwards.

More “schoool” (principal) power. New structures established.

Market forces (choice and per student funding), professional- managerial, professional-pedagogical. Socio-economic and geographical inequalities.

Greece

Etatist. National (funding, national curriculum). Deconcentration to different levels. School committee. Parallel: Public sector instances – parental representative bodies. Reporting upwards and horizontally.

More “school” (principal) participation. Some new structures established.

Professional-managerial, professional-pedagogical. Socio-economic and geographical inequalities.

Nicaragua

Devolution, Mixed etatist, market, and communitarian (participatory). delegation National curriculum, periodical evaluations, districts, school (school board): Evaluation of school activities. Reporting vertically and horizontally. Most funding from national level. Locally: Fund-raising, fee. Generally étatist but non-étatist in relation to community schools in the new program.

More “school” participation (principals, teachers, parents and students). New structures established.

Shortage of resources Market mechanisms (per student funding); fund raising. Professionalmanagerial. Socioeconomic and geographical inequalities. Weak communication network and know-how. Culture of low participation in the project of “modernity”. Com-munitarian, professional-managerial.

Senegal

From national level to civil society (INGOs). Theoretically: Participatory. upwards.

More NGO activities. New structures established.

Socio-economic and geographical inequalities. Weak communication network and know-how. Shortage of resources. Market mechanisms (fund raising). Inherited socio-economic, sociocultural and geographical inequalities.

Mainly deconcentration, some devolution

Mainly devolution; deconcentration

(Continued)

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Appendix 11.1 Some Forces and Mechanisms of Governance and Decentralization Governnance

Type of Decentralization

Some Outcomes

Forces working at school level

South Africa

Mixed etatist, market, communitarian (participatory). Per pupil funding. Private sponsoring. Fund-raising. National: National curriculum; some details at local level. Outcomes-based assessment. Reporting activity and test results upwards in standardized forms.

Devolution; deconcentration, some recentralization

More to “school” (principals) participation, some to parents. New structures established.

Culture of low participation in the project of “modernity”. Shortage of resources. Shortage of communication. Socio-economic and geographical inequalities.

Mozambique

Etatist, communitarian (participatory). National. Regional. District. Village – school. Reporting upwards.

Mainly deconcentration; delegation.

More activity in district offices and in schools. New structures established.

Weak national capacity to interact with local level. Culture of low participation in in the project of “modernity”. Shortage of resources. Socio-economic and geographical inequalities. Weak national capacity to interact with local level.

Cambodia Communitarian. National, clusters, village – pagoda associations. Traditional krom saki (solidarity groups). INGOs.

Devolution.

More to traditional civil society representatives as well as NGOs Some new structures established.

Shortage of resources. Culture of hierarchy and non-participation in the modern project. Socio-economic and geographical inequalities. Weak national capacity to interact with local level.

Nepal

Mainly deconcentration to district; delegation

More activities at district offices and schools. New structures established. Recentalization of some structures.

Etatist. National, district, village, school. Parallel system: state bodies at different levels, elected bodies at district, village and school levels (school management committee). Reporting upwards.

222

Comparison of Some Aspects

223

5. References Arnstein, S. R. (1971). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the Royal Town Planning Institute. http://www.aiatsis.gov/au/rsrch/ntru/ifamp/pratice/pdfs/Arstein. Retrieved August 14, 2004. Foreign Policy (2004). The fourth annual A. T. Karney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index, pp. 5469. Foreign Policy, 2004. Nederveen Pieterse, J. N. (1995). Glocalization as Hybridization. In Featherstone, M., S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds.). Global Modernities. London: Sage Publications. Robertson, R. (1995) Globalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In M. Featherstone, S.Lash and R.Robertson (eds.) Global Modernities. London: Sage Publications. UNDP (1991). Human Development Report 1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP (1995). Human Development Report 1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP (1997). Human Development Report 1997. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP (2004). Human Development Report 2004. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Author Index Abraham, A., 207, 209 Abu-Duhou, I., 30, 34, 38, 40, 42, 44, 47 Acuña, M., 114 Adams, D., 206, 210 Almond, G. A., 7, 21 Angus, J., 15, 16, 19, 21, 30, 41, 47 Arana, M., 98, 112 Arcia, G., 100, 112 Argyris, C., 135, 136, 155 Arjmand, R., 37, 49 Arnove, R., 27, 29, 39, 47, 52, 97, 99,112 Arnstein, S., R., 41, 46, 47, 148, 155, 217, 223 Arrién, J. B., 96, 99, 101, 112, 113 Arróliga, M., 114 Arsen, D. L., 31 Aschmoneit, W., 188, 191 Asensio, C., 103, 104, 112 Atchoarena, D., 173 Ayres, M. D., 177, 178, 182, 185, 187, 191 Bagayoko, M., 116, 117, 131 Baker, D. P., 11, 25, 26, 51 Ball, S., 15, 16, 21, 25 Bangura, Y., 13, 21 Barber, B. R., 15, 21 Barroso, J., 18, 21 Beare, H., 16, 21, 22, 25, 29, 34, 41, 48, 53 Belli, H., 100, 112 Berger, P. L., 10, 19, 21 Bista, M., 198, 203, 210 Blackmore, J., 10, 21, 41, 48 Blichfeldt, J. F., 58, 59, 61, 73 Boli, J., 21, 24 Bouzakis, S., 77, 89, 90 Boyd, W. L., 21, 22, 25, 29, 48, 53 Braslavsky, C., 88, 89

Braun, G., 181, 191 Bray, M., 7, 21, 41, 46, 48, 182, 186, 188, 191 Bredenberg, K., 181, 182, 183, 184, 187, 191, 194 Brentlinger, J., 97, 112 Buchmann, C., 11, 12, 23 Bush, T., 15, 21 Cabral, Z., 162, 173 Caillods, F., 173 Caldwell, J. B., 15, 22, 40, 48 Capsi, M., 78, 89 Carney, S., 198, 203, 210 Carnoy, M., 9, 22, 23, 24, 49, 50, 53, 54 Castillo, J. B., 33, 48 Castro, V., 103, 104, 112 Chabbot, C., 11, 22 Chan, S., 191 Chandler, D. P., 177, 191 Chapman, W. D., 21, 206, 210 Chavez, C., 98, 112 Chisholm, L., 155 Chubb, J. E., 22 Cloward, R. A., 25 Codd, J. A., 22, 48 Colclough, C., 21, 48 Cooke, B., 154, 155 Cooper, M. B. S., 13, 16, 22 Cox, R. W., 9, 11, 17, 22 Crossley, M., 29, 48 Crowley, B. L., 13, 22 Cummings, W.K., 10, 22 Dale, R., 7, 9, 11, 22, 29, 45, 48, 49 Daresh, J. C., 44, 49 Daun, H., 5, 12, 22, 27, 32, 37, 41, 44, 49, 51, 213 De Castilla, M., 112

225

226 Deichman-Sørensen, T., 73 Diarra, D., 119, 130 Diop, A., 119, 120, 130 Dow, G., 14, 22 Doyal, L., 15, 22 Dubet, F., 17, 22 Duffield, M., 17, 22 Duggan, S. J., 177, 178, 191 Durán, S., 99, 113 Easton, P. A., 33, 40, 52 Edwards, R., 15, 25 Eide, K., 59, 60, 62, 73 Elmore, R. F., 40, 42, 49, 145, 155 Esping-Andersen, G., 57, 59, 73 Esteva, G., 27, 32, 49 Etzioni, A., 13, 15, 22 Eurydice, 37, 49, 80, 82, 85, 89, 93 Fall, M., 130 Fandrych, S., 162, 174 Fine, M., 34, 45, 49 Fiske, E. B., 30, 32, 34, 45, 49, 50, 181, 192 Flacks, R., 15, 22, 24, 25 Fofana, M., 46, 50, 130 de Forsberg, N. R., 29, 33, 39, 40, 45, 95 Foucault, M., 17, 23 Fullan, M. G., 143, 156 Fuller, B., 29, 45, 99, 103, 104, 113, 136, 156 Gaziel, H., 43, 50 Gershberg, A., 101, 113 Giddens, A., 10, 23 Gilbert, N., 10, 17, 23, 29, 50 Gill, S., 11, 13, 17, 23 Gilmour, D., 155 Gopinathan, G., 22 Gordon, C., 14, 17, 23 Gough, I., 15, 22 Grace, G., 16, 23, 43, 50, 135, 156 Griffin, K., 9, 11, 23 Griffith-Jones, S., 9, 23 Grønlie, T., 57, 73 Gueye, P. M., 130 Gurr, D., 15, 19, 23, 35, 40, 44, 50 Habermas, J., 7, 23 Halsey, A. H., 23, 48, 49, 50, 54

Author Index Hamidou, M., 39, 42, 50 Hamilton, L., 23, 36, 50 Hammouda, H. B., 16, 23, 27, 50 Hanafin, J., 207, 210 Hanlon, J., 160, 171, 174 Hannum, E., 11, 12, 23 Hanson, E. M., 27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 40, 41, 43, 50 Harold, B., 16, 23, 34, 43, 44, 50 Hawkins, J. N., 16, 23, 28, 29, 32, 39, 50 Held, D., 15, 23, 29, 36, 45, 56, 67, 93, 99, 106, 107, 110, 126, 137, 149, 180 Henderson, J., 8, 23 Henig, J. R., 28, 29, 50 Hirst, P., 17, 23 Hoëm, A., 56, 73 Hoerner, J-M., 9 Hovdenak, S. S., 74 Hudson, C., 33, 50 Häussler, P., 171, 174 Illich, I. D., 15, 23 Inglehart, R., 7, 10, 24, 25, 29, 51 Ioakimidis, P., 78, 89, 90 Jansen, J. D., 15, 24, 157 Jarning, H., 56, 74 Jayal, N. G., 24, 32, 51 Johnson, N., 29, 51 Kamens, D. H., 9, 24 Kanaev, A., 32, 51 Kao, K., 191 Karlsen, G. E., 56, 60, 62, 64, 74 Karlsson, J., 137, 156 Kassotakis, M., 82, 90 Kemmerer, F., 7, 24, 38, 51 Kiernan, B., 192 King, E., 4, 103, 113, 176, 185, 198 Kitaev, I., 33, 51 Kooiman, J., 17, 18, 24 Kothari, U., 154, 155 Kraft, R., 97 La Ramée, P., 97, 113 Ladd, H. F., 34, 37, 45, 50, 51 Lakshmanan, A., 42, 52 Landaeta, G., 99, 113

Author Index Lareau, A., 45, 51 Lauder, H., 23, 48, 49, 50, 54 Lauglo, J., 24, 56, 74 Lauricella, C. J., 31, 52 Lauvdal, T., 56, 61, 73, 74 Lean, K., 191 Levacic, R., 34, 38, 41, 42, 51 Lewis, D. A., 24, 133 Lidström, A., 33, 50 Lingard, B., 24 Long, N., 208, 210 Lucio, R., 103, 104, 112, 113 Lundgren, U. P., 8, 24, 59, 64, 74 Lynch, A., 207, 210 MacRae, D., 13, 16, 24 Malcolm, C., 145, 156 Manor J., 181, 192 Mara, M., 130 Marchand, J., 130 Mastenbroek, R., 164, 174 Mawhood, P., 204, 210 Mayer, R., 24 Mazula, B., 161, 163, 166, 174 McDermott, K., 150, 156 McGinn, N. F., 15, 18, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 51, 53, 181, 193, 206, 211 Mcpherson, G., 137, 156 Meas, N., 185, 186, 188, 189, 192 Mellin-Olsen, S., 56, 74 Messner, D., 24 Meyer, J. W., 9, 11, 24 Midgley, J., 41, 51 Miller, D., 13, 14, 21, 25 Minis, L.T., 117, 131 Mishra, C., 197, 210 Mmbaga, D. R., 40, 51 Moe, T. M., 13, 15, 22 Mohannan, B., 32, 51 Muta, H., 32, 51 Naidoo, J., 16, 20, 25, 30, 38, 39, 51, 133, 134, 146, 156 Narak, S., 191 Ndao, M., 130 Nederveen Pieterse, J. N., 223 Neocleous, M., 19, 25 Nielsen, H., 59, 74

Norris, P., 10, 25, 29, 51 Nzouankou, J. M., 117, 130 O’Leary, M., 192 O’Neill, M. S., 135, 156 Ocampo, J. A., 23 Odden, A., 40, 52 Offe, C., 7, 8, 9, 16, 25 Ornelas, C., 32, 38, 40, 46, 52 Österberg, D., 74 Østerud, Ø., 57, 59, 75 Owens, J. T., 33, 40, 52 Oxfam, 173, 179, 192 Ozga, J., 15, 25 Ozler, B., 103, 113 Pai, S., 24, 32, 51 Pampallis, J., 156 Panth, B., 198, 210 Papageorgiou, F., 84, 91 Patrinos, H. A., 42, 52 Pereira, L., 29, 51 Pierre, J., 10, 17, 23, 24, 25, 29, 52 Piven, F. F., 15, 25 Plank, D., 31, 49, 50, 51, 53 Polakoff, E., 97, 113 Power, S., 22, 25, 35, 43, 49, 52, 64, 73, 92, 190, 211 Prakash, M., S., 27, 32, 49 Pritchett, L., 11, 25 Rasmussen, R., 56, 74 Ramirez, F. O., 11, 22, 24 Rawles, D., 36, 39, 52 Rawlings, L., 103, 113 Reay, D., 15, 25 Reimer, T., 52, 157 Reimers, F., 28 Reiser, B. J., 157 Rideout Jr, W. W., 116, 117, 131 Rideout, W. M., 116, 117, 131 Riley, K., 36, 39, 52 Rivarola, M., 29, 45, 99, 103, 104, 113, 136, 156 Roberts, J., 78, 90 Robertson, J. M., 16, 34, 43, 52 Robertson, R., 215, 223 Rock Kane, P., 31, 52 Rokkan, S., 57, 74

227

228 Rondinelli, D. A., 117, 131 Roth, R., 24 Ruchwarger, G., 96, 97, 113 Rust, V. D., 57, 75 Samoff, J., 40, 42, 52 Santos Filho dos, C. J., 52 Sapatoru, D., 32, 49 Saul, J. R., 10, 25 Sayed, Y., 39, 52, 134, 157 Schneider, H., 39, 52 Schön, D., 135, 136, 155 Scott, J., 31, 53 Sequeira, V., 103, 104, 112 Serra, C., 167, 174 Shaeffer, S., 29, 32, 33, 37, 41, 43, 45, 52 Shawcross, W., 192 Shrestha, B. K., 197, 210 Siddique, N. A., 28, 34, 42, 53 Skandalidis C., 78, 86, 90 Sklair, L., 10, 25 Slagstad, R., 57, 61, 75 Slater, R.O., 16, 25, 29, 41, 53 Slenning, K., 44, 49 Smehaugen, A., 55, 75 Solstad, K. J., 60, 63, 64, 75 Somech, A., 152, 157 Somerville, C. M., 128, 131 Soudien, C., 155 Southworth, G., 44, 53 Sovann, N., 189, 192 Spillane, J. P., 135, 136, 157 Stavros, S., 77, 90 Stette, Ø., 61, 75 Steytler, N., 164, 174 Story, J., 17, 25 Stuart Wells, A., 23, 48, 49, 50, 54 Swain, J., 177, 192 Sy, A., 130 Sykes, G., 31 Taylor, M., 10, 25 Therkildsen, O., 198, 210 Thion, S., 177, 188, 192, 193 Thomas, G. M., 10, 13, 21, 24, 25

Author Index Tiburcio, L., 28, 52 Tomoda, Y., 22 Top, T., 191 Torres, C. A., 47 Tracy, M., 211 Tranøy, B. S., 57, 59, 75 Tsang, M. D., 27, 53 Tsoukalis, L., 88, 90 Turner, M., 182, 184, 185, 193 Usher, R., 15, 25 Utting, P., 97 Valdivia, M., 105, 114 Verba, S., 7, 21 Verney, S., 84, 91 Vickery, M., 176, 177, 185, 193 Visser, M., 165, 171, 174 Vynnycky, C., 19, 25, 31, 53 Waldow, F., 44, 49 Walford, G., 135, 157 Walker, T., 112, 113 Vally, S., 155 Waters, M., 9 Watson, K., 29, 48 Watt, J., 13, 26 Watts, E. M., 186, 187, 188, 193 Waty, T. A., 167, 171, 174 Weber, E., 137, 157 Weiler, H. N., 29, 53 Weimer, B, 162, 167, 174 Weindling, D., 43, 53 Wells, A. S., 31, 53 Wesolowski, W., 15, 26 Whitty, G., 34, 42, 44, 52, 53, 54 Wieringen, F. van., 37, 54 Wilson, R. A., 29, 54 Winkler, D. R., 30, 54 Wiseman, A. W., 11, 26 Wohlstetter, P., 40, 52 Woodroffe, N., 15, 23, 36, 50 Zhenyao, W., 54

Subject Index Accountability, 10, 20, 34, 36–37, 54, 100, 108, 138, 141, 145, 178, 200, 203, 217, 220 structural, SAP, 28, 96, 111–112, 134 Assessment, 5, 12, 18–19, 23, 27–28, 30, 36, 38, 50, 53, 65, 141, 180, 182, 195, 217, 222 Australia, 2, 23, 27, 30–31, 34, 37, 40, 43–44, 50 Autonomy School Program, 99, 104 Bangladesh, 32, 39, 45 BCE, basic community school, 118–130, 216 Bolivia, 33, 48 Brazil, 2, 30, 43, 51–52 Cambodia, 4, 33, 40, 45, 175–193, 214–216, 218–220, 222 Capital Human, 14, 61 Social, 58, 61, 69, 78–79, 196, 210 Centralization, 5–6, 19–20, 23, 25, 27, 29–31, 47, 50, 53, 56–57, 63–64, 81–82, 88, 143, 199 Charter school, 31, 52–53 Chile, 30 China, 2, 16, 23–24, 27, 29, 32, 39, 50, 53 Choice, 3, 5, 11–12, 14, 20–22, 36–38, 41, 44, 49–53, 65, 78–79, 85, 98–99, 213, 217, 220–221 Communitarianism, 15, 215 Community-based basic education, 118–119, 122 Community-based, 115, 118–119, 122, 128–130, 142, 217 Community, 3–4, 7, 12, 14–16, 21–22, 25, 33–35, 39, 40–42, 45, 48–53, 60, 66, 72, 78–79, 84–87, 89, 90–91, 95, 100, 102–103, 105–106, 108–109, 114–116, 118–120, 122–130, 135, 137–139, 146–147, 149–151, 153–154, 158, 166–167, 177–178, 180, 182, 193, 195, 199–201, 203, 206, 209, 216–217, 220, 221

definition, 41, 149–150, 154, 184, 188, 189 participation, 4, 12, 15–16, 39–42, 45, 48–52, 60, 81, 87, 100, 108, 124, 127, 137–138, 151, 154, 158, 164, 173, 175, 180, 182–185, 190–191, 199–201, 206 Competition, competitiveness, 9, 11–12, 23–24, 28–29, 61, 70–72, 100, 101, 191 Constitution, 20, 32–33, 100, 138, 160–162, 174, 176, 178 Consumerism, consumerist, 9, 10, 13–14 Control, 10–12, 14, 18–22, 25, 27, 30, 34, 36–37, 40–41, 48, 53, 56–59, 61, 64–65, 68, 70–72, 78, 81, 83, 88, 99, 101–102, 117, 128, 135–137, 140–141, 143, 148, 173, 177, 186, 189, 197–201 Curriculum National, 20, 30–31, 36, 59–61, 82, 101–102, 164, 221–222 Czech Republic, 2 De-institutionalization, 15, 24 Decentralization, 1–5, 11, 13–15, 18, 21, 23–41, 43–60, 72, 77–81, 83, 86, 88–91, 95–96, 99–100, 103, 106, 108–109, 111–112, 115–121, 123, 125–137, 143–144, 154, 156, 159–175, 187, 192–193, 195–222 administrative, 31–33, 37, 38, 43, 81, 83, 99, 100, 116, 119, 123–125, 127, 130–131, 164, 171, 199, 213, 217, 220 functional, 31, 118 generally, 30 political, 1, 27–28, 31–32, 38, 47, 89, 99, 116–117, 124, 192, 198–199 territorial, 31 Decision-making, 2–4, 7, 12–14, 18, 20, 27–36, 40–42, 45, 52, 55, 56, 59–61, 63–64, 67, 72, 81, 86, 88–89, 92, 95, 99–101, 104, 107–109, 111,

229

230

Subject Index

127, 129–130, 133–134, 138, 140–141, 143, 145–147, 150–154, 158, 160, 171, 175, 178, 180–181, 189–190, 197, 203, 215–217, 219–220 Deconcentration, 30, 32, 57, 63, 77, 116, 181, 216–217, 219, 221–222 Delegation, 20, 32, 38, 66, 77, 98, 178, 217, 221–222 Democracy, democratic, 3, 12, 14, 16–17, 21–24, 34, 50–52, 56–57, 60, 70–71, 73, 75, 78, 98, 104, 106, 108, 111–112, 127–128, 130, 133–157, 174, 178, 181–182, 192, 198, 203, 219 Department of Education (South Africa), 35, 137, 139, 142, 146, 155–156, 205 Deregulation, 51, 58–59, 72, 81 Devolution, 14, 20, 30, 32, 35, 138, 143, 151, 158, 215, 219, 221–222 District Development Committee (Nepal), 199, 201–202 District Education Committee (Nepal), 201–202, 204 District Education Office (Cambodia), 4 Drop out, 45, 104, 169, 178, 180 Ecuador, 33, 48 Education District Office (Mozambique), 165–168, 170–171 Education Provincial Office, 165, 168, 170 EFA, Education for all, 12, 14, 88, 117–121, 161–162, 168, 205, 216 England, 2, 36–37, 39, 42–44, 49, 51–53 Escuela Nueva, 32–33 Ethiopia, 33, 40, 49 EU, European Union, 2, 77–80, 84, 88, 89, 215 Evaluation, 2, 5, 12, 17, 19–20, 24, 28, 30, 36–38, 41, 46, 58, 64–67, 69–70, 72, 74, 79, 85–86, 89, 102–104, 107, 113, 120, 122, 140–143, 154, 156, 165, 199–200, 202, 217, 221 national, 36, 102, 215–217, 219–222 Examination, 12, 30, 51, 82, 83, 101, 115, 142, 151, 156, 161, 192, 217 Fair-faire, 119, 128–129 Fees, 3, 35, 38, 46, 100–102, 104, 107, 110–112, 137, 139, 152–153, 172, 217, 220 Female, 40, 79, 95, 105–106, 110, 163–164, 172, 179, 207 Finance, 2–3, 6, 9, 12, 17, 20, 27–28, 30–31, 35, 51, 53, 67, 102, 104, 106, 112, 134, 152, 173 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 9

Fragmentation, 18, 58 France, 37, 46, 49, 115–116, 176 Germany, 27, 49 Ghana, 33, 40, 45, 52 Globalization, 1, 5–26, 29, 46, 48–49, 80–81, 86, 134, 214–215, 220, 223 culturally, 10 economically, 9, 19, 214, 220 generally, 17, 88 politically, 10, 22 Globalization, 1, 5–26, 29, 46, 48–49, 80–81, 86, 134, 214–215, 220, 223 Cultural, 5, 10–11, 22, 80–81, 214 Economic, 5, 9–13, 17, 19, 20, 23–24, 46, 214, 220 General, 9, 17, 88, 214 Political, 11, 14–15, 17, 20 Technological, 9, 19, 88 Goal(s), 2, 5, 12, 14–15, 28–30, 36, 62, 65–66, 86, 97, 118, 124, 127, 138, 140–141, 143, 149, 151, 172, 182, 205, 211 Governance, 1–2, 5–7, 9–11, 13–27, 36–37, 47–55, 71, 77, 85, 95, 104, 109, 111, 115, 117, 128, 133–157, 175, 178, 181–185, 191, 195, 200–201, 203, 209, 211, 213, 216–221 educational governance, 1–2, 134, 136, 151, 153–154, 200, 213, 216 generally, 7, 15, 17 new (mode of ) governance, 1, 6, 16–17 Grassroots, 1, 5, 7, 19, 27, 49, 55, 77, 95, 115, 133, 134, 150, 153, 159, 175, 191, 195, 196, 210, 213 Greece, 2, 29, 32, 77–93, 205, 214–215, 219, 221 Head teachers, 42–43, 72, 164, 201 participation, 42 Home education, home schooling, 31 Human Development Index, 179, 196, 214–216 Human rights, 12, 54, 155, 190 ICT, information and communication technology, 19, 83, 85, 87, 117, 173 Ideological orientations Communitarian-humanistic orientation, 13, 15 Etatist-welfarist orientation, 14 Market orientation, 13–16, 20 Professional-managerial orientation, 14–15 Professional-pedagogical orientation, 15 Implementation, 3, 18, 32, 36–37, 39–40, 46–47, 52, 56, 59, 63, 66, 79, 88, 97–100, 101–104, 111,

Subject Index 114, 116, 120–121, 123, 126, 129, 140–144, 154–157, 160, 162, 176, 181–182, 196, 199–200, 203, 210, 213, 219 India, 24, 30, 32–33, 40, 45, 51, 146, 149, 151, 158, 178, 185 International non-governmental organization (INGO), 18, 21, 180, 190, 221–222 Involvement, 7, 16, 20, 29, 34, 41–42, 45–46, 49, 53, 102–103, 111, 120, 125–126, 138, 146–148, 152–153, 160, 180, 182–183, 195, 210, 217, 220 Iran, 6 IT (Information technology), 68–69, 82, 171 Japan, 32, 51 Laissez-faire, 8, 119–120, 127–129 Latin America, 1–2, 9, 27–29, 33, 39, 47, 98, 111–115, 180 LEA, Local Education Authority (England), 39 Legitimacy, 7–8, 28, 29, 200 Management, 2, 10–12, 14–15, 21, 25, 30–31, 33–34, 38, 42–44, 47, 50–54, 57–58, 61–62, 70, 80–81, 84, 86, 90, 92–93, 98–101, 107–108, 119, 123, 125–127, 135, 137, 139–140, 142–145, 146, 147–148, 150, 152–153, 156–157, 164–165, 170–171, 173–174, 182, 185, 189, 198–202, 204, 206–207, 209–210, 222 Marginalization, 9, 24, 214 Market Forces, 3, 10, 13, 16–18, 27, 37, 45, 49, 59, 139, 213, 216, 221 Mechanisms, 20, 36, 38, 44, 47, 95, 215–216, 220–221 Principles, 7 Marketization, 54 Mexico, 32, 38, 40, 46, 52, 113 Mission, 29, 30, 103, 129 Monitoring, 5, 10, 12, 17–19, 27, 36, 38, 63, 101, 120–121, 140, 142–143, 153–154, 199, 200, 202, 216–217, 219 Mozambique, 2–3, 32, 40, 159–165, 167–169, 171–174, 214–216, 219, 222 National Education Crisis Committee (South Africa), 137 Neoliberal, neoliberalism, 134, 155 Nepal, 4, 39, 45, 195–201, 203, 205–206, 207, 209, 210–211, 214–216, 218–219, 222 Netherlands, 37, 174

231

New Public Management, 10, 58 New Zealand, 2, 22–23, 30–31, 34, 36, 42–44, 48, 50, 54 Nicaragua, 2, 29, 33, 40–42, 45, 52, 95–99, 101, 103–105, 107, 109, 111–114, 156, 219–220 Norway, 2, 24, 51, 55–58, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73–75, 180–181, 214, 215, 217, 219–221 OECD, 1, 2, 10, 19, 30–31, 41, 49, 52, 56, 58, 72–74, 81, 83, 86, 89–90 Operation, 30, 58–59, 64, 79–80, 84, 101–102, 120–122, 202 Outcome, 2–4, 11–13, 17–21, 24, 27–28, 31, 37–46, 58, 69–70, 72–73, 87, 103–104, 120, 123, 129, 136, 139, 173, 191, 213, 215–216, 220–222 Parents participation, 45–47, 66–67, 72–73, 86–87, 92, 103, 108, 109, 111–112, 148, 153 Participation community, 4, 12, 40–42, 100, 124, 127, 151, 175, 180, 182–184, 190, 206 head teachers, 42 local, 2–4, 28, 33–34, 38, 127, 137, 141–143, 151, 220 parents, 15, 42, 45, 68, 70, 72, 81, 84, 86–87, 89, 103, 112, 133, 138, 147–148, 152, 154, 208 teachers, 70, 150 Performance, 12, 16–17, 19, 21, 25, 28–29, 37–38, 42, 48, 53, 78–79, 87, 90, 101–103, 108, 110, 166, 216 Peru, 2, 39, 98, 111 Poland, 26, 30 Policy Educational, 24–26, 35, 51, 74, 83, 92, 115 Portugal, 3, 160, 162–163 Post-modern, Post-modernism, 15, 24–25, 49, 51 Principal(s), 8, 14–16, 18, 34–35, 41–45, 61, 63, 66–72, 81, 83–87, 95, 101–103, 105–110, 112, 118, 138, 140, 144, 146–154, 164, 166, 170, 178, 181, 182, 219–222 Private (education), privatization (of education), 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 32, 49, 56, 58, 61, 64, 85–86, 112, 118, 129, 161–162, 168 PTA, parent-teacher association, 46, 217 Quality, educational, 13–14, 62, 88, 101, 103, 162, 182, 200, 204

232

Subject Index

Rational(e), Rationality, Rationalization, 6, 12–13, 15, 21, 23–24, 27, 48, 58, 80–81, 118–119, 126, 135, 140, 142, 144, 147, 151–152, 154, 199 Recentralization, 23, 27, 39, 50, 58, 222 Reform economic, political, social, 2, 36–40, 47, 56–58, 97–103, 106–110 educational, 5, 22–23, 44–46, 59–62, 80–83, 101, 117–119, 128, 156 Reform education, 50, 59–62, 80–83, 100–101, 117–119, 128, 135, 161, 176, 211 Reporting, 12, 20, 31, 36–37, 221–222 Restructuring, 1, 5–6, 8, 10, 13, 21–22, 25, 38, 44, 48–49, 51–54, 55–71, 77, 80, 88, 98, 113, 118, 160 Revitalization, 10, 165–166 Revival, 22, 98 School-(site) based management, 11–12, 31, 33–34, 38, 43, 47, 50, 72, 99 School-based curriculum development, 33 School-based decision-making, 33, 111 School-based management, 11–12, 31, 33–34, 38, 43, 47, 50, 52 School-site decision-making, 35 School board, 13, 16, 64, 66, 70–71, 217, 221 councils, 16, 217 School committee, 84, 92–93, 107, 181, 183, 187, 221 School council, 14, 34–35, 40, 42–43, 84, 99, 101–104, 107–109, 111, 183, 213, 219 School fees, 3, 35, 100–101, 104, 107, 110–111, 137, 139, 172, 220 School Governing Body, 135, 155, 158 School Management Committee, 33, 126, 199–202, 206–207, 222 Secularization, 10 Self-administration, 78, 80 Self-evaluation, 20, 37, 70, 81 Senegal, 2, 3, 39, 40, 115–131, 214, 216–219, 221 Shared decision-making, 14, 33, 100, 109, 111, 127, 152 South Africa, 2–3, 35, 39, 45, 53, 133–159, 174, 210, 214, 215–217, 219–220, 222 Soviet Union, 178, 181 Spain, 29–30, 33, 35, 40, 43, 50, 75

Stakeholders, 34, 38, 42, 81, 85, 108–111, 121, 135, 138, 146–154, 182, 184, 196, 200, 203–204 Steering, 2, 4, 17–18, 20, 29, 36–38, 44, 58, 69, 71, 217, 220 Structural adjustment (SAP), 28, 51, 96, 111–113, 131, 134, 155 Subsidies, 8, 12, 17, 19, 31, 36, 57, 69, 80, 161, 220 Supervision, 23, 30, 50, 92, 100, 121, 129, 162, 165, 184, 199, 202, 216 Sweden, 2, 24–25, 33, 36–37, 40, 43–44, 46, 49–50, 53, 209 Switzerland, 31, 113 Tanzania, 28, 30, 40, 51, 210 Teacher, 2–3, 8, 14–16, 30, 34–35, 40, 42–46, 60–61, 64, 66–71, 72, 81–87, 89, 93, 97–98, 100–102, 103–104, 106–109, 112, 124, 137, 139, 146–147, 150, 152, 161, 163–165, 168–171, 173–174, 176–178, 180, 182–186, 198, 201–202, 205–207 Participation, 70, 86–87, 150 UK, 21, 27, 30, 42 UNESCO, 2, 10, 21, 23, 25–26, 47, 50–53, 83–84, 91, 99, 125, 131, 180, 191–193 UNICEF, 87, 115, 121–122, 125, 127, 130–131, 179, 181, 184, 186, 189, 193 Universalization, 119 USA, 2, 7, 9, 21, 29–31, 42–45, 48–52 Victoria, Australia, 23, 30–31, 34–35, 37, 40, 44, 50 Village Development Committee, 201–202 Village Education Committee, 33, 201–202 Voucher, 14, 20, 44, 99 Welfare, 10, 14, 17, 23, 25, 50, 51, 57–58, 61, 71, 73, 117, 214 Woman, women, 41, 45, 96, 98, 105, 107, 110–113, 162–163, 187, 190, 197, 206–208 World Bank, 2, 10, 25, 49, 52, 96, 98, 100, 105, 112–114, 117–118, 159, 179, 192–193, 198 World model, 2, 4–5, 9–16, 18, 29, 46–47, 55, 73, 77, 83, 95, 111–112, 127, 154, 173, 175, 190, 195, 211, 213, 214–217, 220 World system, 6, 8–11, 214–216 Zimbabwe, 30