Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study of Selflessness Theories

SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM AND EARLY BUDDHISM

SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM AND EARLY BUDDHISM A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SELFLESSNESS THEORIES

Phra Medhidhammaporn (Prayoon Mererk)

•

~UDDIlADIWIIIIA

1O!JPW.4.TlON BAl'lGIOI 11l\JLIJrID

First Published 1988 in Bangkok Thailand Second Edition 1995 All rights © by the Author ISB~974-7890-43-7

Publishers: Buddhadhamma Foundation, 87f126 Tesabahl Songkroh Rd., Lad Yao, Chatuchak, BANGKOK THAILAND Tel.: (66) (2) 589-9012 Fax: (66) (2) 954·4791

PREFACE

T

he present work is a revised version of my doctoral thesis entitled A Comparative Study of the Non-egologicaf Treatments 0/ COnsciOU51leSS ÜI Sartre's Philosophyalld tarly Buddhism , which was subrnitted at the University of Delhi, India, in September 1985. The purpose of this study is to compare and contrast Sartre's doctrine of non-egology with the theory of selflessness (analta) in Early (Theravlida) Buddhism. Since I embarked on this thesis I have entertained the wish that it would stirnulate more interest in the comparative study of Buddhism and existentialism, and that my thesis would serve as a starting point for further research . This thesis would not have been completed had it not been for the contribution and assistance of innumerable individuals. Although aU of them cannot be acknowledged here, my sincere

appreciation for their part is registered on these pages. I would like to acknowledge with gratitude my indebtedness to Professor Margaret Chatterjee, Director of Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, India, and Professor Mahesh Tiwary, University of Delhi, Delhi, India, for their noble guidance and invaluable suggestions at various stages of preparing the thesis. I take this opportunity of making full acknowledgment of my gratitude to the Most Venerable Phra Thammahaviranuvat, Abbot of Wat Raikhing, Nakhorn Pathom, for granting me the scholarship to carry out this research project. I would also like to thank the Buddhadhamma Foundation for taking on the republication of the work. Phra Medhidhammaporn

Abbreviations A.

Anguttara-Nika.ya Anguttara·Nikaya Althakath3 Abhs. Abhidhammatthasangaha BN. Being and Nothingness BPS. Buddhist Publication Society B",. BrhadaraQyaka <:hand. Ch!ndogya CPR. Crltlque of Pure Reason o. Dtgha-NiklY
M .

M. MA.

MK Mand. Miln. Mund. PEW.

PPR.

PTS. S. SN. Tait.

TE. Ud. Up.

Vism.

Majjhima-Nika:ya Majjhima-Nikaya AUhakatha MOlamadhyamakalariU Mat:I(,iakya Milindapal'tha MU(lQaka PhiJosophy Bast and We-st Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Pali Text Society SamyuUa-Niklya SuttaniplUa TaitirIya The Transcendence oE the Ego Udana Upani~ad

VlSuddhimagga

Contents PREFACE

v

INTRODUCTION XIII Comparative philosophy .............. ,....................... ............................. xv Philosophieal translalum ...................................................... ............ .rvii The methodologie"l attitude ........................................................... , xviii Notes ............................................................................................... xviii PARTONE SELFLESSNESS IN SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL15M

1

I SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO 3 Natorp's inlerprttation of the ego ....................................................... 7 Husser/' s disagreement with Nat orp .................................................... 8 The lran scendentlll turn ....................................................................... 9 The transcendental ego ....................................................................... 11 Kant and HusseTIon the ego .............................................................. 12 Immanent tTanscendence .................................................................... 14 The ego's properties ............................................................................. 16 Transcendental-phenomenological idealism ....................................... 17 54rtre's rejection of the tranSce11dental ego ........................................ 18 Unity of consciousness ...................................................... ............. ... . 20 Retention and protention ............................................................. ....... 22 Pre-refleetive and reflectivt eonsciousness ......................................... 24 The phenomenological reduetion ...... ... ................. ......... ................ .... . 26 Thtee charadtristics of consciausness ................................................ 28 The self-Iove theory ............................................................................. 29 The transcendent ego .......................................................................... 30 Pure and impure ref/eerion ......................................................... ... ..... 31 The constifution of the empiriC41 ego ................................................. 32 The possibility of purt rtf/eetion ......................................................... 34 Notes ................................................................................................... 36 [[ THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 41 Spontaneity ........................................................................................ 42 Absoluteness ....................................................... ................................. 43

Self-a1nsciousness ................... ,................................ ,......................... 43 TTansphenomenal being ...................................................................... 46 TUJO types of being .............................................................................. 47 Nothingness ..................................................................................... ... 48 Temporality ................................ " ............................... " ...................... 54 1. The past .. ....................................................................................... 55 2. The present ...................................................................................... 57 3. The future ............................. ,.......................................................... 58 The ekstatic unity of consciousness .................................................... S9 Freedom ............................................................................................... 61 Cause and mofive ................................................................................ 63 The undetermined choke .................... ............. .................... ............... 65 Facticity of freedom ................ ", .......................................................... 67 A. My Place ...................... ............ .................................... ................... 68

B. My Past ........................................................................................... 69 C. My Environment ........................................................................... 70 D. My Fellowmen .............................................................................. 70 E. My Death ........... ............................................................................. 71 Responsibilify ...................................................................................... 71 Anguish ., ............................................................................................. 72 Bad taith ................................................................. ... ,......................... 73 Good {a;th ............................................................................................ 76 Sartrea" ethics .................................................................................... 77 Dtsire .................................................................................................. 77 A summary ........................................................................................ 79 A review of nothingness ..................................................................... 80 Notes .................................................................................................... 83

PARTTWO SELFLESSNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM IIITHE BUDDH1STS REJECTION OF THE SELF 91 Annihilationism and eternalism ......................................................... 92 Alman in the Upanj~ds ..................................................................... 93 The self is indescribable ....................................................................... 94 Yoga or meditation .............................................................................. 96 Brahma" _ Atman .............................................................................. 97 Atmsm and the transcendental ego ..................................................... 98 The BuddluJ's rejedion of the permanent ego ................................... 100 Froe aggregates ................................................................. ................. 101 Arguments against the self ............................................................... 104 The Buddha and Hume ..................................................................... 105 Three Chtzracteristics ........................................................................ 107

Ckpendmt Originat ion .............................. ..................................... 108 Anatta and NiriJl2lJ.a ...................... ........................ ......................... 112 Wise and unwise attention .............................................................. 11 4 Three kinds o[ desire .......................................................................... 115 The Buddha as an experimtialisf .................................................... 116 Two forms of meditation ................................................................... 117 Vipassand: the Buddhist meditation ................................................. 119 Problems .......................................................................................... 121 Nof es ..... .............................................. ............................... ............ 121

IVTHE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 126 Flfty-two psychic lactors ......................... ....................... 127 Contents o[ cmlsciousness .............................................................. 129 SeI[-conseiousness ............................................................................. 129 The material object ................ ........................................................... 130 Th e pllenomenal world ...................................................................... 131 Momentariness .. ............................................................................ 133 The unity o[ consciousnf"Ss .............................................................. 134 The personnl identity ...................................................................... 135 Th e causlZl relation .......................................................................... 137 WillÜlm James Oll the stream of consciousness ................................. 138 Subcollsciousness .................................................................. ........... 140 Subconsciousness and the transcendental ego ............................... 143 Rebirth of consciousness .......................................................... ........ 144 The doctrine of kRrnw ....................................................................... 146 Freedom ofconsciousness ................................................................. 149 Four spheres of consciousness ........................................... .............. 151 Temporality ..................................................................................... 153 The concept 0/ NiroiJ!la .................................................................... 155 The ontological status 0/ Nirvttl)a .................................................... 158 UlJ.determined questions .. ' ........................................ ...................... 160 A summary ........................................................................................ 161 Sufhiata and Ilothinglless ........................ ....................................... 162 Notes .. ............................................................................................ 165 PARTTHREE REFLECTIONS AND COMPARISONS V REFLECTIONS AND COMPARISONS 171 AtrIUm and the trallscendental ego ................................................. 172 Purposes in rejecting the seI! ........................................................... 172

The empiriml sei! ................................................ ............................. 174 The plJenomenological description and vipassana ............................ 174 Emptiness .................. ........................................................................ 176 Sel!-collsciousness ............................................................................. 177 The being o[ the object ...................................................... ................. 180 Nofhingness and sufliiat/1 ................................................................ 181 MOlnentariness .................................................................................. 181 The unity 0/ consciousness ............................................................... 182 Tempora/ity .............................. .. .............................................. ......... 184 Subconsciousness .............................................................................. 184 Karma and rebirth ............................................................................. 185 Freedom ............................................................................................. 188 Freedom from desire .......................................................................... 189 Freedom from suttering .. ................................................................... 191 The Buddhist and Sartrean ethics .................................................... 192 The radicJll con w rsion ................ ............................................ ......... . 194 COllclusion .. ..... ........ ... .. ........ ....... ............. ......... ... ......... .. ............. 196 Notes .. .......................................... ......... .. ....................................... 196

INDEX

199

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INTRODUCTION

T:

here are at least three possibilities open to the student keen on comparing existentialism with Buddhism: (I) to make a comparative study of the basic concepts of existentialism with those of Buddhism, (2) to compare the basic

concepts of any one existentialist philosopher with those of Buddhism, and (3) to present Buddhism in the existentialist perspective. 1 We are basically interested in the second possibility. The present work is an attempt to explore similarities and

differences between Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy and early Buddhism in regard to their non-egological treatments of coosciousness (vifliftl1;la). Our main task is to compare Sartre's non-egology with the Buddhist theory of selflessness (anattä). Sartre's philosophy is generally known as existentialist and Sartre himself, even after the publication of the Critique 01 Dia-

I

Snrtre's Exislmlialism alld Early Buddhism

lectical Reasotl, prefers the label of existentialist to that of Marxist.2 [n Being and Nothinglle5s Sartre views existenfialism as a philosophy in its own right, whereas in the "Introduction" to the Critique of Dialectical Reason he rega rds existentialism as "a subordinate ideology which, working from within, attempts to influence the future development of Marxism."3 Our investigaHon of Sartre's treatment of consciousness has been limited to his existentiali&m which is developed in Being and Nothingness. The research material is collected from aU the philosophical wodes of Sartre except the Critique 0/ Dialectirul Reason. The earliest available teaching of the Buddha is fOllnd in Pa li literature which belongs to the school of the Theravädins. This schoo l is usually accepted as "lhe most orthodox school oj Buddhism."4 Hence in the present study we use the te rm 'early Buddhism' to refer to Theraväda Buddhism, and in talking of 'the Buddhist: we have the Theravadin in mind. Our discussion on the Buddhist treatment of consciousness is ba sed on the material drawn from the Pali Canon (Tipi!akJ1 ), its commentarles (Al!haka tht1) and th e Pali manual s lik e the Abh idlla 111 ma tt lIasaJ;galla. In this comparative study we try to answer two basic questians: (t) What are the thea ries of self that are rejected by Sartre and the Buddhist? (2) VVhat are the non-egological conceptions of consciousness formulated by Sartre and the Buddhist as the alternatives to the egological conceptions? Ta answer the first question, we consider Sartre's rejection of Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego in Chapter I, and the Buddhist's rejection of the Upani~adic theory of "fman in Chapter IIl. To answer the second question, we examine Sartre's and the Buddhist's conceptions of egoless consciousness in Chapters ß and IV respectively. A thorough examinahon of their treatments of consciousness is undertaken in each chapter because, as is observed by Max Muller, "befo re we cornpare, w e mu st thoroughly know what we compare.ff~ In Chapter V we reflect upon what has already been discussed in the preceding chapters and, in the light of those discussions, compare and contrast Sartre's treatment of consciousness with that of the Buddhist. xiv

INTRODUCTION

COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY Since the present work is within the purview of comparative philosophy, we find it necessary to speIl out our view on comparative philosophy before bringing this "Introduction" to a elose. In Hs loose cannotation, the term "comparative philosophy" refers to a comparison ol phil050phical concepts from two or more different cultures with one another. But in its technical sense, the term refers to a comparative study of Eastern arid Western philosophies. 6 Comparative philosophy, as a distinct subject, belongs to the twentieth century and i5 quite young. The term became papular in the West ooly after the publication in 1923 of P. Masson-Oursel's La Philosophie Cvmpan?e, an English translation of which appeared in 1926 under the title Comparative PIlilosophy.' Since comparative philosophy is a relatively new subject, it is not unusual to find that its aims and methods have not been unanimously accepted by the so-ca lied comparative philosophers. Few of thern take the same approach to comparative philosophy.8 In our opinion, the approach to comparative philosophy is primarily phHosophical and secondarily historical. A historical s urvey of two philosophkai concepts from different cultures may enable the his tori an of philosophy to discover that in the beginning they share the same cultural background. But the aim of comparati ve philosophy is not limited to this sort af historkai interest. According to D.T. Suzuki, the comparative study of philosophies should bring about "more breadth of thought and more penetratitlg insight into reality. " 9 This viewpoint is amplified in the following statements by N.K. Devaraja: "11 should result in the enrichmellt ofhis awareness of altematives al1d in the sharpening ofhis methodological itlsigllt and critical taols. Such uwareness und insights are likely to cOlltribule 10 llie efficjency, depth and comprehensivel1Ess of his philosophising. "10

In order to realize his aim, the comparative philosopher has xv

SRrt,b Exislelztillfism Qnd

c.a"y Buddhism

to pay attention not only to similarities but also to differences between the compared concepts. In comparative philosophy differences are as interesting and valuable as similarities. They are usehl! for self-evaluation and self-critidsm. As John Taber has pointed out: "Even when the categories of the thought of one culture do not fit those of another culture and the considerations of their respective philosophies cannot be brought mutually to bear on each other, still one often realizes thereby more distinctly what one particular philosophical tradition is not getting at, what is beyond its scope, which helps us to understand better what it is getting at and ultimately helps us to evaluate it."l1 Thus the main task of the comparative philosopher consists in comparing and weighing phitosophical concepts from different cultures, with a view to bringing about a more penetrating insight into reality. The only consideration which differentiates the task of the comparative philosopher frorn that of the phi1050pher operating within a single culture is this: that the range and variety of conceptual constructions confronted by the latter i5 relatively less heterogeneous and therefore, probably, more manageable than that to which the former is exposed. This is due to the fact that the comparative philosopher is dealing with phHosophical concepts which are rooted in different rultures and c10thed in different languages. These two factors, Le. cultures and languages, make the task of the comparative philosopher harder. Philosophy does not exist in a varuum; it has a cultural background. Philosophy does not progress in isolation, without any contact with other factors in human rulture. In reality, it is subject to the influence of various "extra-philosophical factors" wh ich indude e<:onomic, sodal and political conditions, also religion and science. 12 For example, philosophy in India is c10sely connected with Indian religion, whereas philosophy in the West since the Renaissance "has been influenced by science both in regard to subjeet-matter and also in regard to method and aims."1J That being so, it is doubtful whether one can have any appreciative understanding of philosophical concepts conxvi

INTRODUCTION

sidered apart frorn their cultueal background. It is, therefore, suggested that in order to accompiish his task, the comparative philosopher should have familiarity with the cultures out of which the candidate concepts have emerged. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSLATION Besides cultures, languages add another difficulty to the task of the comparative philosopher. The philosophical concepts to be compared are expressed in at least two different languages. Unless the comparative philosopher knows them weil he has to resort to translation. In practice, this happens quite often. How many read PlalO, Kanl, Sartre, the Buddha and others in the original? Translation is necessary even for the comparative philasopher who masters all the languages in which the candida te concepts are originally expressed. In the process of comparisan, he can accomplish his task within onIy one of the languages involved. Hence translation is indispensable to the comparative study of philosophies. Translation has always been a difficuIt art, especially when the terms to be translated are philosophical terms. The conceptual frameworks of different languages are so different that one may find it hard to translate one into another exactly. There is 00 precise equivalent in the language of one culture for any phil050phical cancept which has acquired Hs meaning in another.H One always faces difficulty in translating such EngJish terms as "experience," "value," "transcendental," into an Eastern language, and a similar difficulty in rendering "tao." " dharma ," " sarltsllra" into English. Each of these terms has a special connotation which is untranslatablc, and has to be interpreted in the context of the original text as a whole. So there is a question as to how philosophical roncepts can be compared if their exact translation is not possible. The problem of philosophical translation is a difficult, but not insoluble, methodological problem. The Chinese scholars who tried to translate Buddhist cancepts into the Chinese language have faced this problem. To solve it, they emptoyed " a xvii

SlIrtre's f.xistrntia lism lind Early 81iddhism

method of analogy or extending idea (Ko yi)."15 By this method the Chinese scholars extended the Chinese concepts to cover aspects of reality covered by the Buddhist concepts and vice versa. This method may be fruitfully employed by the compara· tive philo so pher to solve the problem of philosophieal translation. Whenever such extension of ideas is not possible or convenient, new concepts may be formed and new words eoined for them or adopted (rom the foreign language itself. Thus we sometimes lcave such Sanskrit terms as " nirva!la ," "mok$Q," "karma," arid "brahman" untranslated. THE METHODOLOGICAL ATTITUDE We shall now bring this "Introduetion" to a elose with a eonsid· eration of what may be called the "methodological attitude" of the comparative philosopher. To accomplish his task, the eom· parative philosopher will have to keep in mind thc attitude of "impartiaHty."16 That i5, he has to remember that each philo· 50phical concept which comes in for comparison has a right to be considered on what merits it can show, with no prejudice either for or against it. The comparative phil050pher can be· terne impartial if he "brackets" or "suspends" his prejudice before the systematic comparison takes place. Keeping the attitude of impartiality in mind, we set out to co mpare Sartre's non·egological treatment of consciousness with that of the Buddhist, with a view to bringing about a more penetrating insight into the inner struclure of consciousness.

NOTES 1

2 3

Oe Silva, P., Tangles and Wehs : Comparlltive Studies in Exis tential· ism, Psycho·analysis Qnd Buddhism, lake House Investments Ud., Colombo, 1976, p.x. "Interview with Jean·Paul Sartre," in P.A. Schilpp (cd.), The Phi· losophy of Jeun·Paul Sarfre. Open Court, 1981, p.22. , Barnes, H.E., " Introduction" to Sattle, J·P., Search for a Method,

xviii

. INTRODu cnON

4

5 6

tra nsla te d by H .E. Barnes, Vintage Books, New York, 1%8, p.viii . 8 apat, P.V. (ed.), 2500 Years of Buddhism, Thc PubLicatio n Divi.

sion. Ministry of [nformation and Broadcasting.. Government of India, 1956. p. 101. Cited in Wach, L The Comparative S fudy of Religions, Columbia University Press, 1958, p.xi. Raju, P.T., Lecttlres on Comparative Philosophy, University of Poona, 1970, p.2.

7 8

9 10 11 12

13 14 15

]6

Translated by v.c.c. ColJUfTl Kegan Paul, London, 1926. R. Swan Liat, }.K., "Methods of Cornpara tive Philoso phy". Philosophy fast and West, Val. J, No. I, 1956, p. 12. Suzuki, O.T., "On PhiJosophical Synthesis", PhilosopllY East Qud West, Val. I, No. 3,1951 , p. 6. Devaraja, N.K., "Philosophy and Comparati ve Philosophy," Phi· losophy East and Wl"st, Vo1.17, No.1·4, 1967, p.57. Taber, J., uReason, Revelation and Idealism in Sankara's Vedllnta," Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol.9, No.3, 1981, p. 2. Copleston, F., Philosophies and Cultures, Oxford University Press, 1980, p.S. Copleston, F., A History ofPhilosophy, Vol. HI, Image Books, New York, 1985, p.275. Burtt, E.A., "The Problem of a World Philosophy,'" in W.R.lnge (ed .), Radhakrishll!J.n, George Allen and Unwin Ud ., 1968, p.36. Fun Yu -lan, HistoryofChinese Philosophy, Val. I1, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953, p. 241. Burtt, E.A., "Basic Problems of Method in Harmonizin g Eastern and Western Philosophy," in C.A. Moore (ed.), Essays in EasfWest Philosophy, University of Hawaii, 1951, p.114.

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PARTONE SELFLESSNESS IN SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM

I SARTRE'S REJECTION OFTHE TRANSCENDENTALEGO

S

artre's existentialist theory of consciousness was a result ofhis challenge to Husserl's egology or "science about the ego."1 For Husserl the ego is the subject of consciousness. [n 1936, SaTtre wrote an essay entitled The Transcendence of the Ego (La Tran scendence de rEgo) in which he held that the ego is an object of consciousness. In 1975, Sartre says in an interview: "I maintained that point of view even 'in L't.tre et le Neont: I would still rnaintain it today. "l Thus Sartre's treatment of consciousness consists of two aspects: the negative and the positive. Negatively it is a rejection ofHusserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego, and positively it is a formulation of Sartre' S own theory of egoless consciousness. In this chapter we 5hall consider the negative aspect otSartre's treatment of consciousness. Husserl's theory of the transcendental ego was not original.

SurfT~'S E:ris' ~nIiQlism

und Early Buddhism

In fact, the conception of the pure ego was originally conceived by Descarlesand Kant. J And it is the Kantian doctrine of the ego that had much more influence on Husser!. Nevertheless Hus· sert particularly with respect to the pure ego, was at first more directly influenced by Natorp than by Kant, for it was through his work that Husserl became aware of the Kantian conception of the pure ego. In order to understand Natorp's view on the ego and Hs influence on Husserl 's thought, we need to review Kant's doctrine of the transcendental ego. According to Kant, all empirical consciousness of represen· tations has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness, i.e. a consciousness of rnyself as original apper· ception.· In other words, consciousness of objects is accompanied by the unity of self-consciousness; that is, a1l empirical consciousness belangs to one and the same transcendental consciousness which is expressed in the proposition '} think.' Hence knowledge of any objectinvolves not only an awareness that 'S is P' but also a judgment that 'I think that 5 is P: We need not be immediately aware of the idea ') think,' but it is involved in, and presupposed by, the ideas of which we are immediately aware. Here the proposition 'I think' expresses self-consciousness. 5 It contains the form of each and every judgment of understanding and accompanies all empirical consciousness. 6 Kant writes: "It must.be possible for the '1 think' to accompany all my representations: for otherwise something WDuld be represented in 71fe which could 710t be thought at all, and that is equivalent to SIlyilfg that the representations would be impossible or at lellSt would be tlofhing to me."7

Thus the 'I think' stands for a single transcendental consciousness which effects the unity of discrete acts of empirical consdousness. This unity is called "the transcendental unity of self-consciousness."8 It is regarded as a "transcendental presupposition"9 because it is not given as a fact of experience, but rather presupposed as the necessary condition for experience. 4

• SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

It functions as the unifying principle which is "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge."lo The transcendental unity of self-consciousness does not in-

volve knowledge of a self. Knowledge is for Kant knowledge of

objects given in intuition. The transcendental consciousness or seH is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject.u Kant points out: "[ am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself nor as I am in myself, hut only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition ... The consciousness of self is thus very jar tram being a

knowledge of the self. "12 The transcendental self, being a thought, is a mere logical function since the existence of the self implied by thought is onIy logicaL "ft is only the formal condition, namely, the logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all objects."13The seH is said to be empty of all positive attributes; it is,

therefore, indescribable. "We can assign no other basis for this teaching than the simple, and in its completely empty, representation '1'; and we cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this I or he or it Ohe thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts =X. "14

The transcendental seIf is thus for Kant not the soul, but only the subject which is indispensable for the possibility of experience. Since the self is indescribable, we can say nothing about it, neither that it is substantial, nor that it is absolute being. According to William James, the transcendental seil, when we abstract all empirical elements, "is simply nothing."15 Kant maintains that the onIy seIf we know anything positive aboutis the empirical me, not the pure I. Thus Kant distinguishes between the transcendental and the empirical self. The transcendental seIf, as described above, stands for the transcendental consciousness by virtue of which the seH neither knows what it is, nor does it appear to itseIf, but is merely aware of the fact that it iso Its true nature is not identical with that of my seIf as known

5

$ßrtres E:xistenlinlism and Early Buddhism

or determined. The transcendental seH, being the ac t of deterrnining, cannot obviously be the same as that which it determines, namely, the empirical seH. The transcendental seil does not come under the 'ca tegory' of existence. This is because "the subject. in which the representation of time has its original ground, cannot thereby determine its own existence in time."16 The empirical seit, on the other hand, is an object among other objects and thus recognized to be a phenornenal thing appearing in the form of time. It is the self which belangs to the natural order of the world and is subject to the !imitations of space and time. We yield knowledge of the empirical self by means of inner sense or inner percepti on and so the knowledge we receive about it is strictly empirical. "Consciousness of self according to the determinations of aur state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding seH can present itself in the flux of inner appeara nces."17 Kant's distinction between the empirical and the transcendental sell is best underslood as a distinction bel ween the contingent, discernible content or matter of our expericnces and their necessary form. When he talks of the empirica l seH he is referring to the contingent cr empirical features of experiences. When he talks of the transcendental self he is reminding us of the principle of unity of experiences. lt should be noted here that the unity of experiences is impossible apart from the empirical contents of experiences, and the contents cannot be unified without the transcendental seit. The seH performs the form-giving activity: it is the source of all unity, for the manifold as given has no unity of its own. The transcendental unity of seH-consciousness is original and not derivative; it is necessary whatev er be the matter given to thought. But it is not self-sufficient; for all thinking is ultimately about a matter given 10 thought. Apart from the matter, the Iranscendental self cannot be thought. Kant writes: "The principle of the necessary unity 0/ apperceptioll is itse/j, illdeed, an identienJ, and there/ore analytic, proposition; tlevertheless it rrveals Ihe necessity 0/ a synlhesis of the manifold givett i" intuition,

6

•

... SARTRE'S REJECTION OFTHE TRANSCENDENTAl EGO

without whieh the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. "18 This view, as we shall see, is accepted by Sartre whosays that

"conscious"ess is aware of itself in so Jar as it is consciousness of a transcendent object."19 That is, self-consciousness is unthinkable without consciousness of something. NATORP'S INTERPRETAnON OF THE EGO

The Kantian doctrine of the transcendental self Of ego was described again by Natorp, who belonged to the neo-Kantian philosophical movement which flourished in Cermany at the time of the original publication of Husserl's Logicallnvestigalions. In his Introduction info Psychology according to tlle Critical Method, Natorp maintains that the pure ego belongs to consciousness "as the other point of reference besides that oftvhich there is corisciousrle5S. " 20 According to hirn, the ego provides the unitary centre of relation, to which all c:onsdous contents are referred in a wholly peculiar fashion. He, therefore, distinguishes betw"een the contents of consciousness and the pure ego to which these contents are related. The ego cannot itself be a content of consaousness. Na torp makes it explicil that the pure ego is totally different {rom the contents of consciousness in that it is conscious of them whereas the latter are not conscious of the

former. For this reason, Natorp does not consider the pure ego to be a phenomenological datum wh ich can manifest itself in a phenornenological enquiry. On the contrary, he, like Kant, accepts the ego as a supposition necessarily posited, not as fact and appearance, but as the ground of all fact and appearing, "as the Itltimate grou.nd of being with regard to the unification and, accordingly, as Ille possibility of Iwily-in Q word, as the ground of fIle unity at large. " 21

7

1 Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism

HUSSERL'S DISAGREEMENT WITH NATORP

Husserl, in the first edition of the Logical Investigations, examines Natorp's view on the pure ego and flatly denies its existence. He says that "I must frankly confess, however, that I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary centre of relations. "22 He claims that all he can find is "the empirical ego and its empirical relations to fts own experience. "23 This empirical ego is the whole person which, if body is stripped off, would result in a "phenomenologically reduced ego." For Husserl, this ego would sufficiently account for the unity of conscious experience, being nothing but the unity of connections between experiences. 24 Hence the 'reduced ego' is at most adependent aspect of the empirical ego. Husserl substantiates this view by saying that in the case of a "straight-forward experience" the ego is not given as part or component of the intentional act. It is onIy on the basis of reflecHon that amental state can come to be characterized as astate of the ego. 25 This is to say that the ego is given through reflection and cannot be given except through reflection. Husserl, furthermore, identifies this phenomenologically reduced ego with the stream of consciousness as the unity of consciousness resulting fram "psychfc states interweaving with one another."26 "Obviously the ego is no special entity floating above the multiplicity of experiences; rather, it is just the unity resultingfrom their connection with one another. "27 The phenomenologically reduced ego, therefore, is nothing other than the unity of consciousness, a complex of mental states. These mental states are united into complexes because of their co-existence and succession and because of the relation the states of consciousness bear to one another, but not by virtue of a special entity distinct from these mental states. In this theory there is obviously no place for the pure ego functioning as a unifying principle of discrete mental states.

"These contents have, as contents generally have, their own lawbound ways of coming together, of losing themse1ves in more 8

p SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

comprehensive unities, and, in so Jar as they thll5 becomeand afeone, the phenomenological ego or unily of C01lSciOU5ne5S is afready cOllstituted, withollt need of Q1I additional, peeu/iar ego-pri1lciple wh ich supports aU content!> und unites thein all onee aga;n. "28 In the second edition of Logicallnvestigations, Husserl abandons this non-egological conception of consciousness and endorses Natorp's conception of the pure ego. In a footnote fall nd in Ihis second edition Husserl rernarks: "I have since managed to find it (the pure ego), Le. have Jearned not to be led astray from a pure grasp of the given through COfeupt farms of rnetaphysic."29 [n another footnote Husserl points out that the empirical ego is as much a case of transcendence as physical things. [f the suspension of all transcendence, through the reducHon, leaves us with no residual pure ego, there can be no real and adequate self-evidence attached to the I am. "But if there is really such an adequate self-evidence, how can one avoid asswning a pure ego? "lO

THETRANSCENDENTALTURN Later on Husserl, in his Ideas, reverses his Qwn position maintained in Logical Investigations. He makes what he calls "the transcendental turn."31 He finds it necessary to introduce the transcendental ego if he wants to characterize the phenomenological sphere. This sphere is characterized by its immanence. Husserl makes it very explicit that the following 'norm' or 'standard' has to be followed by the phenomenologist: "To claim nothing tllat we cantrot make essentially transparent to ourselves by reference to consciousness «nd 0'1 purely immanent line. n32 What Husserl means by the term 'immanence' can be gathered from the following statements:

"Under aets imrnanently direcled, or 10 put it more generally, Ullder illtelltional experjences immatlently related, we incJude those acts which are essrmtially so constituted that their intentional objects, when tllese exist at all, belang to the same stream o[ experience QS

9

• SRrlre's [x;slenliDlism und Ülrly Bllddhism themselvcs. We have an instance of this whenever an act is relafed to ad (a eogitatio to a eogitatio) of fil e same Ego." 33

an

The poinl here is this: in order to make dear what immanently direeted aets are, Husserl must a!ready have the nation of "the same streaffi of experienee." And to make the nation of "the same stream of experience" inteUigible, Husserl falls back on the notion of the transcendenta! ego which effects this seHsa meneS5 of one stream of experience. Thai is, experiences be!ong 10 one and the same slream if and only if they are constituted by thc same transeendental ego. The ego, thcrefore, is one with respect 10 ooe stream of experience. If it is true that phenomenology depends on the notion of "immanent directedness" then it will depend on the notion of the transcendental ego. It should come as no surprise that later Husserl is finally driven to aecept the following with respect 10 transcendental phenomenology: "Appa rently my (the philosoplIer'sJ transcendental ego is, and mus! be,not only its hritial bllt Hs sole Illeme. "34 Thus Husserl's turn to the transcendental ego is not just an interesting hut relatively unimportant 'aside'; it is a turn to the heart of consciousness in order to charaeterize the phenomenological sphere and the notion of immanent directedness which depends on the unity of consciousness. That is why Husserl considers consciousness to be "Ihe basic fjeld ofphenomenology, "35 and makes a complete analysis of its strueture The entire structure of consciousness, when analyzed, appears to consist of three components, namely the transcendental ego, consciousness and the intentional object. Ta express this triad, Husserl uses the phrase "ego-cogito-Cogitatum."36 The expression 'consciousness' is used to include all experiences of the egoY Husserl often uses the Cartesian term 'cogito' to refer to eonsciousness. "As is knoum, Deseartes understood this in a sense so wide as to include every ease 0/,1 perceive, 1 remember, Ifaney, J judge,feel, des ire, will', and all experiences of the Ego. "38 The essential nature of every cogito is to be consciousness of something: l9 that is, the (ogHo is 'intentionally related' to cogitatum or inten-

10

SARTRE'S RE,ECfION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

tional object.

THETRANSCENDENTAlEGO The transccndental ego is not the same as the cagito or consciousness: it is a unity-pole from which all acts af consciousness arise. "Every cogHo, cvery aet in a speeially marked sense, is characterized as act of tlle Ego, 'proceeding fronl the Ego', 'actually fiving' in it ." ~/\ Hence the ego is not an act of consdou sncss, nor is it an aspect of the act. While all conscious acts disappear in time, the ego is constant. It remains self-identical as acts su cceed one another. "1" principfe, at on.1f rate, every cog ito con cha nge, can corne and

go, even thol/gh it may be open to doubt wlletller each is necessarily perishablc, and not merely, as we find it, perishable in point of fa ct. But in contmst the pure Ego appears to be necessary in principle, und as Ihal wllicll remains absofule/y se/f-idetll ical in aft real atld possible change vf experietlce, il can in no sense be reckoned as (1 real part or phase of fh e experiences themseIves. " 41 Sy virlue o f thelr very s tructure, all conscious acts a re necessarily related to the source o f their origin, i.e. the ego. The ego in turn is necessarily present in and fundamentally accompanies every act. The 'ray' or 'glance' of the ego is directed via the act to the intentional object. The ego "belongs to evcry eXlleriellce that comes and slreams past, its 'glallce' goes 'through' every actuaf cogito, and towards the object. Tllis vis uaf ray challges with every cagito, shooting forth afresh with each new one as it comes, and disappearing with it. But ihe Ego remains self-identical."·t" Thus the ego ' lives' in conscious ac ts in the sense that its ray goes thro ugh thern towa rds objects. This is to say that the ego Ji ves in every aet in a speda l sense corresponding to the specific nature of th e act in question: in perreption it is a pure perceivin g ego, in phantasy il is a pure phantasizing ego, in wishing it is a pure wishing ego, e tc. It is, however. a ray of one and the s ame ego w hich lives in respectively varying ' modes of IHe'.

11

$arlre's Existenlia/ism and Early Buddhism

What is called 'living in' is a matter of describing the ways in which the rays of the ego engage in conscious acts. "The attending ray givts itself as radiatingfrom the pure Ego and as terminating in the objectivc, being directed fowards it or deviating jrom H. The shaft 0/ attention is not separate from the Ego, but itself is and remains personal."42

The ego is a free being; it goes out of itself, comes back to itself, acts spontaneously, suffers, and so forth. KANT AND HUSSERL ON THE EGO The transcendental ego which lives in all acts of consciousness effects the unity of these acts. The ego is the necessary ground of one stream of consOousness. A funcHon of the ego is to give the unity to experiences. Thus Husserl establishes the ego as the principle necessary for the unHy of experiences. fn this respect Husserl's conception of the ego is similar to Kant's. That Husser! is in agreement with Kant is obvious from this statement: "All experiences QS belonging to one single stream of experiences, that, namely, wllieh is mine, must permit 0/ being transjormed illto actual cogitationes or of being illWi'lrdly absorbed irlto such; in the words of Knnt, 'The "r think" must be able to accompany alt my presen tations. lII43

However, this agreement between the two thinkers should not make us overlook their differences. The transcendental ego for Kant is a !ogical, formal subject af experience; it is empty apart lrom Hs empirical contents. Since the ego is not self-sufficient it cannat exi st in itself. For Husserl, the ego is not a mere logical condition of experience: it is not "an Ego cOrljured ;!lto beingasan empty logical possibility,"but it is an 'actual Ego' which is "the demon strable unity of its sys tematie experiences. "ok Although it is empty apart from its conscious acts, the ego can exist in itself. "The ego", weites Husser!, His himself existent for him~elf in 12

J

"" SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

contiuuous euideuce; thus, in himseJj. he is continuouslyconsJituting hirnsei! as ex/stinS. "45 The transcendental ego itseH is not ontologically dependent upon anything else; and, therefore, the only real absolute is the transcendental ego, all else being ontologically dependent on it or relative to it. "The result '"' is that only transcendental subjectivity has

ontologically Ihe meaning of Absolute Being, that it only 1S nOIl-relalive, that is relat ive only to itself, whereas fhe Teilt wor/d indeed exists, but in respect to essence is relative 10 trallscendental subjeclivity, mld in such a way that il can have its menning os existing reality only as the inlen/i01wl meaning-prodllct 0/ transcendental subjectivity. "46 Thus the ego for Husserl is not a form-giving subject but a mealli1zg-giving subject. And the meaning-giving activity differentiates the Husserlian ego from the Kantian ego, which provides only a form of unity to experiences. For Husserl the ego itself is the origin or ground of experience, it constitutes the meaning of the world through its conscious acts. The ego is 'actual' because it lives in consciousness. When the ego js actually Iiving in a conscious act, thai act is said to be an 'ope rated act,' and the ego is the 'operative subject: This is the most characteristic role of the ego as treated by Husserl in the ldeas." Another point of discrepancy between Kant and Husserllies in the fact that whereas the former takes the ego to be a 'transcendelltal presuppositiOll'''8 the latter views it a8 a 'phellomenological datum.'''9 Since the ego for Kant is "a thought, not an intuition" I it cannot be contained in the data of experience. We are conscious a prior; of the ego. 50 We cannot renect upon it. Unlike Kant, Husserl thinks that the ego is contained in the da ta as a 'ray' or 'glance: "ft is Jor Husserl the condition oJ the possibility oJ experiences all right but is yef somehow contained in the data-something wllich is ipso facta impossible in Kant's view. "51

Thus the ego for Husserl is available in reflection. The ego,

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Sarlre's Existmtialism und Eurly Buddhism

however, is not grasped by the 'natural reflection' of everyday life; it is grasped by "transcendental-phenomenotogical reflertien" in which "we deli ver ourselves from the footing. by universal epoche, with respect to the being or non-being of the world."s2The ego is accessible to each of us as soon as the phenomenological redu ction, which is reflective by nature, is perforrned . .. By pht nomenological epoche I redllee my naturat f,uman Ego and

my psychic life-Ihe rea/rn of rny psychological experience- to my transctllde'llal-phenomenological Ego, the realrn of transcendental-

phenomenological selj-experience. "5.3

In the Ideas, HusseTI says that when he performs the ph enomenological epoche, the empirical ego and the whole world of the natural attitude are suspended. What remains as residue is "the pure experience as act with Hs own proper essence." And the act is found to be retated to the transcendental ego. "No disconnecting can remove the form of the cogito and cancel the 'pure' subject of the act."S4 Each act of consciou sness "is just something 'from the Ego,' or in the reverse direction 'ta the Ego': and this Ego is the pure Ego, and no reduction can get any grip on it."55 Now it is dear that an apprehension of the ego is an outcome of the operation of the phenomenological reduction. Without the reduction, the apprehension of the ego is not possible. The reducHon, therefore, turns out to be "th e necessary opera tion which renders ' pure' consciousness accessible to us, and subsequently the whole phenomenological region. "S6 lf the phenomenological reduction had not been devised, the whole phenomeno logical region would have been unknownY IMMANENT TRANSCENDENCE The foregoing discussi on enables us to assume th at the transcendental ego is treated as a phenomenological datum in so far as it is rendered accessible to us by means of the phenomenological reduclion. And the ego remains irreducible after the re-

\

14

"" SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

duction because it is characterized by a unique type of transcendence, i.e. immanent transcendence. Husser] writes: "Ilos residuum 0/ the phcl1Omenological suspension of the world and fh e empirical subjectivity tllat belangs to it there remains a pure Ego (0 fundamental different one, then, for each separate sfream 0/ experience), a quite peculiar trallscelldence simultaneously presents itself-a non-constituted transcendence-a transcendence in immanence. "58

Hence the ego is "a transcendent in a totally different sense

from the transcendent in the sense of the world. " 59 To understand transcendence in this peculiar sense, we mu s t first understand the distinction of immanence and transcendence. Acts of consciousness can be intentionally related to other acts in the same stream of consciousness, as in the case of reflection upon past conscious acts. The totality of conscious acts making up a stream of consdousness Husserl ca11s "immanence."60 When one conscious act is the intentional object of another act in the same stream.. it is caUed " immanent object." In contrast to immanently intentive acts, there are acts wh ich are intentive to things beyond the stream, beyond the immanence. Su ch eonscious acts thus have "transcendences" as their intentional objeets, e.g. real objects, ideal objects, ete. But these objeets are transcendent of the immanent stream. When the ego is said to be transcendent, it is said to be in some way beyond the immanent stream. lt may be useful 10 speak of "outward" and "inward" transcendences in order to avoid confusion. That is, the transcendent objecls in general may be called "outwardly tronsctndent" while the transcendental ego may be calted "inwardly tran5cendent. "

The transcendental ego, therefore, is inward transcendence residing within the immanent stream of consciousness. The ego is not apart of the stream: rather it is the ground of the stream. In principle the ego can be distinguished frorn the slream of consciousness. "In this conneetion, " writes Husserl, "we con· tinue to distinguish-d espite the necess ary

1S

SlIrtrt's Existentilllism and Early Buddhism

inter-relationship-the experienee itself from the pure Ego of the experieneing process."61 When it is abstracted from its eonscious aets, the ego is empty of all determinations and hence indescribable. "Apart from its 'way of being related' or 'way of behaving', it is completely empty of essential components, it has no content that cDuld be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable; pure ego and nothing further."62 That is why it is so difficult to give determinations of the ego other than to say that it is permanent, identical and necessary. Gne affirmation alone is possible with regard to it: it is the transcendental subject of its intentionallife. Husse rl even gees so far as to claim that the transcendental ego eaonot be "made into an objeet of inquiry on its own account," in other words, that it cannot be the proper theme of a study.63 In phenomenology this is a surprising result to say the least. THE EGO'S PROPERTIES

However, even if the ego is indescribable, even if in same sense it is nothing, we would be wrong to think. that it has nothing. The ego is empty only in abstraction. In its concreteness, the ego contains same properties; it is not contentless. In Husserl's words, "the Ego constitutes hirnself as identical substrateof Egoproperties, he constitutes himself also as a 'fixed and abiding' personal EgO."64 By this statement Husserl means that every conscious ad emanating frorn the ego possesses the power of sedimenting on the ego itself. Eaeh aet leaves a 'trace' on the ego, adetermination which contributes to the concreteness of the ego. With every act, the ego acquires "a new abiding property." It is in this sense that the ego which has perceived a certain objeet is other than the ego which has perceived any other object. All position-taking likewise sediments on the ego. For exarnple, in an act of judgment, the ego decides for the first time in favour of a being-thus. Then the aet disappears. But from that moment onwards the ego is abidingly the ego who is thus and so decided, "I am of this conviction." This conviction remains abidingly the ego's property up to the time of Hs cancellation.

1

16

SARTRE'S REJECT10N OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

As long as the conviction is accepted by the ego, the ego finds itself "as the ego who is convinced, who, as the persisting ego, is determined by this abiding habitus or s tate."(6 This is true in Ihe case of decisions of every other kind, valu e-decisions, votitional decisionq, ete. The ego decides, the act-process vanishes, but the decision persists, sedimenting on the ego. Thus the ego gradually emerges as a pure ego of a relatively canstant style, since these sedimented determinations are stahle unless ne'" determinations explicitly come to erase them. These intentional sediments thus constitute stable properties of the ego, which Husserl expresses by the ward "habitus." These are properties which the ego passesses and which contribute to giving the pure ego a personal physiognomy. The total collection of habitualitics sedim ented on the ego makes possible a first definition of the ' person:1.t. Husserl distinguishes sharply between a pure ego, a concrete ego constituted by the habitual sediments of Hs own acts, and intentional acts. The pure ego is manifested in intentional acts; this is where the ego "comes and goes." But ",hat persists of these intentional acts contributes to the proper duma in of the concrete ego Of monad. In Hs concreteness, the ego has a history of development in the sense of being dynamic; it is no longer a static, formal subject as Kant's transcend ental ego is. The concreteness of Husserl's ego contributes to giving it the status of a 'living' subject which has development in time. "To speak of the subject as temporal moreovef leads forward to Heidegger rather than back to Kant :'67 TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEALlSM Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego has led hirn to regard his philosophy as a "transcendental-phenornenological idealism."68 The idealistic trend is apparent in his view that the world is no thing other than what the ego is awnrc of and what appears valid in Hs cogitations. "The whole meaning and reality of the world rests exclusively on such cogitations."f>'.l Aga in. "the being of the pure ego and his cogitations, as a being that is prior in itself. is antecedent to the natural being of the world ....

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511" ' ('5 Exis' rn lialism and Eil'!.,! ßuddhism

Natuml being is a realm wh ose existential status is second ary: it continu ously pres u p poses the realm o f transcendental bein g."70 Thus, ha ving been an antipsychologistic ' realist' in Ihe Logical l11vestigations, Hu sserl ended as an idealist in the ldeas and the Cartcsirw Medita tions. He maintains tha i the esse of a noema consists ex clusively in its percipi. 71 The world and Hs objects canno t be thought o f except as bemg "constituted" by the transcenderital ego' s intentional acts.

"This world. will! all ils objects, I Stlid, derives its wilDle sense und its existentia l status, which it Iws far me,from me myself,jrom me as flic trmlsCt'nden/al Ego. tlle Ego who comes to tlle fore 1l1lly with Ihe tran sccudental-phnwlllfnological epoche, "72

The constituting fu nction o f the ego means tha t objects arc dependent for variou5 other chara cteristi cs upon the aets of the ego, A mcaning attached to an object is a mere 'prod ud' of the inte ntional acts. As such, the object ca n no longer be investiga ted in Hs own right. The a ffirm ation of the ego seems to reverse Ihe init ia l clai m of phenom enology to return "to the things th emselves" (Zu den sachen selbst),'TJ To many d isciples of Husserl, such a 'tr ansc end ental t u rn' in p hen o menol ogy a mo un ts 10 a be tra ya l o f whal is m os t fruH f ul in the p henomen olog ist' s em phasis u pon the intentionali ty of conscio usn~ss. In ord er 10 reinstate the object of cOIL<;ciousness in its prim acy, they reject Husserl's d octrine o f the tra n~ce nd ent a l ego. An d amon g the dissidents, Jean·Paul SaTtre is outspoken,

SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO Si1rtre's rejection o f Hus!ierl 's doctrine o f the transcendental ego is Ihe mi1in them e of his fir st major philosophical essay. The Trrl1lscendence of file Ego, the point of view of which is continu ed in BeiH,'? and Nothi llgnt5s, In spite of the ir disagreement on the cgo-doctrine, there is a famil y relationship between Husserl' s phenomenology and Sartre" s ex istentia lism. The g rou nd of their rt'lati onship is H usserl's theory o f inten tiona lity o f conscious-

18

SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENT AL EGO

ness. Sartre's existentialism derives from a critique and modification of that Husserlian doctrine. Husserl's theory of intentionality has been modified in Sartre's philosophy. Whereas for Husserl intentionality is one essential feature of any consciousness, for Sartre intentionality is consciousness. Sartre writes: "Indeed, consciouslless is defined by intentionality. By intentionality consciousness transcends itself."74 Consciousness is not self-enclosed; it is intentional. Consciousness aims at things beyond it; it directs itself outwards. In the artide entitled "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology," Sartre clearly says: "To be is to fly out into the world, to spring from the nothingness of the world and of consciousness in order suddenly to burst out as consciousness-in-the-world."75 This bursting out of consciousness into the world makes it impossible that anything should be in consciousness. Thus "The object of consciousness is as a matter of principle outside consciousness (except in the case of reflective consciousness), or is transcendent."76 With this view of intentionality in mind, Sartre rejects Husserl's theory that the ego 1S the transcendental subject living in consciousness. For Sartre, there is only the empirical ego as an object outside consciousness. "The ego was a sort of quasiobject of consciousness and consequently, was exeluded from consciousness."n The ego "is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another."78 Hence consciousness is without the ego: it is egoless. In The Transcendence 01 the Ego Sartre begins his arguments with an attack on what he caUs "the theory of the formal presence of the 1."79 In Sartre's view, this theory, which is held by the neo-Kantians and Husserl, affirms the ego's "formal presence at the heart of Erlebnisse, as an empty principle of unification."oo It proposes that the existence of the transcendental ego is to be justified by the need that consciousness has for unity and individuality. In rejecting this theory, Sartre says that "phenomenology does not need to appeal to any such unifying and individualizing l."Al Sartre, however, does not attack the demand that consciousness must be construed as unified and

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, Sartre's Existe'ltialism and Early Buddhism

individualized, but he attacks the conviction that the transcendental ego has to be introduced to meet such a demand. He even 'concedes' to Kant that the 'I think' must be able to accompany all our representatians.82 Sartre rightly identifies Kant' s ' transcendental I' with ' transcendental consdousness' and remarks that it is "nothing but the set of conditions which are necessary for the existence of an empirical consciousness."1n But SaTtre cannat mean by this ' transcendental !' the unifying principle of consciousness. Sartre asks: "Need we then conc1ude that an 1 in fa ct inhabits all Dur states of consciousness aod actually effects the supreme synthegis of our experience?"S4 He disc1aims the validity of such an inferencc and insi sts that it would vi olate the Kantian view: "Consequently, 10 make into a realily Ihe transcendental E, 10 make it Ihe inscparable companion of each of our 'consciousness', is to pass on fact, nol on vaJidily, and to lake a point of view radically different from thai of Kant. "8S

Jt is precisely this, the "making into a rcality the transcendental I," with which Sartre charges seme neo-Kantians and Hu sserL Th e passage in which Sartre charges Husserl with deviating from Kant is worth quoting here: "lf we reject all the more or less forced inlerpretations of the '1 tl/ü,k' offered by the post-Kantiuns. und nevertheless wish to solve the

problem of the existerlce in fact of the 1 in conscio usness, we meet 0 11 our palh Ih r: phenomenology of Husserl ... . Huss erI, toD, discovers tlte transcelldentul consciollsness oj Kaut , and grasps it by the epoche. But this consciousness is no longer a set of logica l conditions. It is a fact which is absolute."86

UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS Thus Sartre does not agree with Husserl when the latter grants "actual existence" to the transcendental land regards it as the absolute being. As we saw, Husserl introduces the transcenden-

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SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENOENTAL EGO

tal ego in order to justify the self·sameness of the immanent stream of experience. Without the ego, the unHy of conscious· ness cannat be accounted far. Sart"re says that the transcendental ego has no place in phenomenological doctrines since there is no function which il might assume. For Husserl the funelion irnputed to the ego is 10 unify canscious acts. Sartre thinks that this funetion is performcd, not by the ego, but by consdousness itself. [I is important toemphasize here thai forSartreconsciousness is continual. The Bergsonian notion of an 'enduring' consciousness is not acceptable to hirn .1I7 According 10 Bergson, the enduring consciousness is a flowing process, as opposed to a succession of separate events. Bergson writes: "In consciousness we find stales which succeed, without being distinguished from one another ... succession without mutual externality."116 Dur conscious states are not discrete multiplicity. "There is for us nothing that is instantaneous."89 Unlike Bergson, Sarlre accepts Husscrl 's instantaneous conception of consciousness in The Tra/l scendence of Oie Ego. Thus consciousness tor Sartre is instantaneous or momentary.90 Each instant of consciousness is 21 new existence which does not arise out of a prior instant. The rapid succession of instants constitutes one stream of experience. The inslants are unified. What, then, effects the unity of discrete instants of consciousness? Sartre, following Husserl, admits two kinds of unity of consciousness. There is, first,
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Sartre' s Exisfentialism and Early Buddhism

within duration." 92 1t is the unity of eonscious aets in their duration, the unification of aets present and past, so that eonseiousness as a whole becomes endowed with a streamlike eharaeter. This unity is needed if "the eontinual flux of eonsciousness is to be capable of positing transeendent objeets outside the flUX."93 Unity of this kind is effeeted neither by the intentional objeets nor by any eausal relation between conseious aets. Sartre writes elsewhere: "Between two eonsciousnesses there is no cause and effect relationship .... One consciousness is not the eause of another."94 This does not imply that the unity of consciousness is effected by the ego. It is signifieant, Sartre points out, that in accounting for the unity within duration, in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, Husserl never has reeourse to a synthetic power of the ego. The unity of eonsciousness in no way depends upon the ego. "It is consciousness which unifies itselj, concretely, by a play of 'transversal' intentionnlities which are concrete nnd real retentionS of past consciousness. Tltus consciousness refers perpetually to itselj. "95

RETENTION AND PROTENTION Sartre, therefore, maintains that consciousness unifies itself in the manner that has been described by Husserl in The Phenomenology ofInternal Time Consciousness.%In this work Husserl talks of time-consciousness as a fact of experience being constituted in the flux of consciousness. Time-consciousness i5 unity growing out of the inseparable relation between the different phases of consciousness. For Husserl, every present moment of eonsciousness eontains a horizon of the immediate past and a horizon of the anticipated future. This is to say that the actual present is modified by the 'retention' of what has been and the 'protention' of what is about to become a now. The retention of the immediate past i5 called "primary remembranee" and the retention of relatively remote events is called "secondary remembrance." These retentions are what Sartre means by "transversal intentionalities," for he says that transversal

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f SARTRE'S REJECTION üF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

intentionalities "are cancrete and real retentions of past coosciousness."97 Hence in The Transcendence of the Ego, consdousness i8 said to unify itselfby the ad of retention alone. But in The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre contends that coosciousness unifies itselfby acts of retention and protention. Each consciousness i8 said to have intentional reference to its predecessar and successor. "A cunsciousness is through and through a synthesis, completely

withdrawn into Itself: it is only at the very heart oj this internal synthesis that it can join itself to another preceding or succeeding consciousness by an uct o[ retention and protention. "98 SiTIce consciousness unifies itself by acts of retention and protention, the transcendentaI ego is not necessary for the unity of consciousness. Besides, consciousness individualizes itself. This conception of consciousness renders the unifying and individualizing role of the transcendental ego totally useless. flThe transcendental I, therefore has no raison d'etre."'J<J So far we have shown how Sartre attempts to deny that the transcendental ego is necessary for the unity of consciousness. Sartre, however, does not offer a new solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness. To account for such unity, Sartre makes use of Husserl's own notion of temporality of consciousness. In Ideas, Husserl remarks that the term temporality "indicates not onIy samething that belangs in a general way to every single experience, but a necessary form binding experiences with experiences."IOO Thus Sartre is right in saying that Husserl can account for the unity of experience even without having recourse to the synthetic power of the transcendental ego. Nevertheless, Husserl is of the view that the unified stream of experience belangs to the transcendental ego. As Husserl says: "Every experience, as temporal being, is an experience of its pure EgO."101 flThe stream of experience is an infinite unity, and the form of the stream is one that necessarily envelops all the experience of a pure EgO."I02 Why does Husserl insist that a11 experiences belong to the ego?

23

Sarlrf."'S f.xiSlertlialism and fA,ly Buddhism

Beeause his transcendcntal-phenomenological reduction reveals that cvery conscious act is necessarily related to the ego. Henee the ego ean be grasped by phenomenological reflection , This means that the ego is a phenomenological datum. Sarlre is aware of Ihis point of view, for he says thai the ego for Husserl is "aeeessibl e to each of us as soon as the reduc tion is performcd."1 03 Sartre then d enies that the transcendental ego remains as a residue after the reduetio n. Unlike Hu sserl, Sart re thinks that what rcmains after the reduction is not the transccnd ental ego, but the tra nscendental s phere of con sciousness purified of all egological strucrure. 1t)4 Ta und erstand Sartre's position, w e must first understand th e distin ction betwee n pre-ref1ecti ve conscious ness and refl ective conscio usness.

PRE-REFLECTIVE AND REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS lt is crudal that Sartre should have made a dis tinclion between

pre-reflective consciou sness and reflective conscio us ness. The pre-reflective consciousness is intentionally related to objects "different in kind frorn consciousness. "l~ Its obj ect is anything but an act o f consdousness in the same strearn of experience. Thus the object of the pre-reflective consciousness is generall y o utside the immanent stream of consciousness. Fo r example, the perceptual consciousness of a tree is directed towards a tree whieh is by nature external to eonsci ousness. If we want to apprehend the perceprual consciousness of the tree, we have to produce a new consdousness called 'reflective. ' Here the refleclive consciousness is directed to other conscious acts in the same stream of consciousness; it is consciousness "which takes consciousness as an object."lU6 According to Sartre, there is an indissoluble unity of the pre· reflective consciousness and fhe reflective consciousness to the point tha t the reflective consciousness cannot exist without the pre-reflective consciousness to be reflected u pon. lll1 The pre-reflective consciousness, therefore, has ontological priority over the reflecti ve conscio usness, it is considered autonornous. I08

24

r

SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

Having made the distinction between the pre-reflective and the reflective consciousness, Sartre continues to say that the ego does not appear in the pre-reflective consciousness. We da not find the ego through phenomenological reflection upon the prereflective experience. If we take into account only w h at is given immediately to our experience, then we have 10 rejeet the transcendental ego. Ta accept the ego is to allow ourselves to be led astray by "metaphysical and criUcal preoccupations which have nothing 10 da with phenomenology." lO!l In order to prove that the ego does not re main as a residue after the reduction, Sartre describes h is memory of reading as follows: I have just read a story, and I reeall my reading in seeking to aecount for my experience. There was pre-reflective consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel; furthermore, there was an inner awareness ol consciousness of a1l this. This inne r awareness is called "non-pO$itional consciousness of itself" , i.e. self-consciousness. Neither COllSCiOUSlless of objects 110r self-COllsciousness was in allY way experienced as related 10 tlle ego. The latter did not appear at all. As long as an act of consdousness is experieneed, 00 ego will present itself in any mode of givenness whatever. No ac t bears any reference to the ego. So Sartre dedares: "The re was no I in the unreflected consciousness." IIt1 Again, "in non-reflexive thought, I never encounter the ego, my ego; I encounter that of others. Non-reflexive eonsciousness is absolutely rid of the ego."lll-It is, therefore, !ncorreet to describe consciousness of achair as "[ have col1sciousness oj this chair." What we can rightly say is that "there is consciousness oj tllis

chair."112 As we have seen, H ussecl takes the ego to be a phenomenological datum because It IS accessible to each of us by means of phenomenological reduction. The reduction reveals that each actof consciousness bears reference to theego: that 15, consciousness is found to be necessarily related to the ego. Sar tre~ on the a ther hand, contends that the phena menological reduction d oes not lead to a discovery of the ego. After tl1e red uction, only consciousness and self-consciou sness are found, and none of them is the ego or bears reference to the ego. lt should be noted here

25

~-

Sartre' s Existentialism and Early Buddhism

that Husserl talks of consciousness and the ego whereas Sartre talks of consciousness and self-consciousness. As Kant has pointed out, self-consciousness is not knowledge of the self or ego. Sartre says that in self-consciousness there is nb. self as anentity different from consciousness. Consciousness of something and self-consciousness are not two separable activities. Consciousness is self-conscious in the sense that, in being aware of something, it is implicitly aware of itself as being conscious of that thing. From Sartre's viewpoint, Husserl seems to have mistaken self-consciousness for the ray or glance of the ego; the Kantian 'I think' is interpreted by Husserl as the transcendental ego which, he thinks, in principle is something different from consciousness.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION It is interesting to note that although Husserl and Sartre employ

the same method, phenomenological reduction, to enquire into the nature of consciousness, the outcome of their enquiries turns out to be different. Thus it is worth asking whether their methods, in spite of bearing the same name, are really the same. Let us try to answer this question. In Logical Investigations Husserl was mainly concerned with intuiting the essence which could be arrived at only through phenomenological description of the given. ll3 As yet, the phenornenological reduction had not assumed any irnportance. Only when Husserl realized that phenomenological description cannot give us the absolutely evident so long as we remain confined to the naturalistic stand-point, did he introduce the phenomenological reduction or epoche. By the phenomenological reduchon Husserl understands the bracketing of all presuppositions, induding our belief in the existence of the world. Husserl writes: "Everything transcendent that is involved must be bracketed, or be assigned the index of indifference, of epistemological nullity, an index whieh indieates: the existence of all these transcendencies,

26

1

SARTRE'S REfECTION OF TH E TRANSCENDENT Al EGO

whether I believe in thern or not, is not here my concern; this is not the place to make judgments abollt thern, they (Ire entirely irrelevant. "114 After brack.eting. what remains over is "the pure ex perience as act with its own proper essence."llS And the act is found to be related to the transcendental ego. Husserl's ph enomenol ogica l reduction is not accep ted by Sartre in the sense it is und erstood by Husserl. Though Sartre would not object to brack.eting the presuppositions, he think.s that the existence of phenomena cannot be bracketed, for it is the most immediately given. Existence, for Sartre, is co-extensive with phenomcna and hence is regarded as the "sel f- evident irreducible."116 As such, the sus pension of the exislence of the world is not poss ible. Mau rice Merleau-Ponty also points out that a cample te bracketing is impossib le, for exp erience is achieved throu gh a bodily perspective and that cannol be bracketed OUI. 1I7 Hence the bracketing of the existence o f the world is no t acceptable to Sar tre. He acce pts only the phenome nological description whi ch is the main feature of Husserl's reduction. Sartre wants to describe the essellce of phellomena without bracketing the;r existellce. His intention is obviou s when he speaks o f tht! method of phenomenologica l psychology:

"0/ course, the psychologist does not per/orm this epoche, buf re/na;ns on the terrain of file natural attitude. Nevertlleles~ thae are met/IOds avnilable 10 Ihe plletlomellologisl after reduction that would be of use to the psychologist. Phenomell%gy is adescription 0/ the structures 0/ trnnscendental co nsciousness based on intuition 0/ the essences of these structures. T1Jis descript ion takes place, oi course, on the level 0/ reflection. "IlS What folio ws from these statements is that Sartre's method is phenomenological because it rests on intuitions and descriphons of essences. It is not the sa me as Husserl's phenomenological reduction in that it d oes not bracket the existence of the world. In spite of this, Sartre calls his rnethod 27

SlIrt re's Exisfrntill!ism lI"d Enrly Buddltism

phenomenological reduction because it is a 'partial reduction' 119 in the sense that presuppositions are suspended. Sartre's method is weil described as "a phenomenological description of human existellce in its sitllation-ill-the-world. "120 It is quite similar to the phenomenological description which Husserl hirnself em~ ployed for rejecting the pure ego in the Logical Investigatio1ls. Sarire, in The Tran sceudence of the Ego, adopts this method to enquire into the same problem, and the outcome of his enquiry dearly becomes a full vindication of Husserl 's non-egologica l conception of consciousness as maintained in the Logiea! Investigations. THREE CHARACfERISTlCS OF CONSCIOUSNESS So far Sartre has attacked "the theory of the formal presence of the I" by showing that the transcendental I or ego is not present in consciousness, as a principle of unification. The transcendental ego is not only unnecessary for the unity and individuality of consciousness but also counter to the phenomenological conceptian of consciousness. This is to say that not only is the ego uselcss-what is wo.rse, it is destructive. 'This superjluous I wollld be a hindrance. 11 it existed it would fear cotlsciousness front itself; it would divide consciousn ess; it woZild süde inlo every consciousness like an opaque bIade. The transcendental I is ihe death of consnotlsness. " 121

VVhat Sartre means to say is that if the transcendental ego existed, three characteristics of consciousness, namely, absoluteness, transparency and spontaneity, would be destroyed. We shall return to these characteristics in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that consciousness would lose the characteristics of absoluteness, transparency and spontaneity if the transcendental ego existed as an " inhabitant" of consciousness. First of aU, the egoendowed consciousness becomes "loaded down: consciousness has not the charader which rendered it the absolute existent by virtue of non-existence. It is heavy and ponderable."122Further-

28

r .

SARTRE'S REJ ECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENT AL EGO

more, since the ego for Sartre is "opaque" in the sense that it is not adequately given, if one introduces this opacity into coosciousness, one thereby destroys the tran sparency of consaousness. "One congeals consciousness, one darkens it. ... It beaTS within itself the germ of opaqueness."I~J Sartre also thinks that the ego lacks original spontaneity. For hirn, "the ego, being an object, is passive," 124 hence not spontaneous. He cootends that if conscious ness were endowed with the ego, Hs spontaneity wou ld be rest ricted. "Consciousness is then 00 longer a spontaneity." I25 THE SELF-LOVE THEORY

Having rejected Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego, Sartre now turns to attack "the theory of the material presence of the Me." By this theory Sartre means the 'seH-love' theory held by some psychologists like La Rochefoucauld. According 10 thern, the love of seH and consequently the me are concealed within all emotions in a thousand different forms. The me, if it is not present 10 consdousness, is hidden behind consciousness and is the magnetic pole of all our actions and desi res. The unconscious me is therefore held to be the sea t of desire. dissi mu lated in the fa miliar Freudian manner. lu It seeks to procure the object in orde r to satisfy Hs desire. "The essential structure of each of my acts would be a reference to myself. The' return to me' would be constitutive of all consciou sness."127 According to Sartre. the me does not He concea led within consdousncss as the seat of desire, rather "it is ou tside, in the world."12Il In other words, the me is not present in the pre-reflecli ve consciousness; it appears as an object of th e reflective consciousness. The 'self-Iove' psychologists have made a mistake because they confuse " the essential structure of re flective acts with the essential structu re of the unrefleetive acts."l29 To explain his view, Sartre eit'es the foll owing example: 1 pity PeteT and I go to his assistance. At that moment only one thing exists for my consciousness, Le. Peter-having-to-behelped. This quality of "having-to-be-helped" lies in Peter, and

29

SarlTl" s E;u Slen lia/Ism al1d

Enrly BIlddhism

aets on me like a force. Peter's distress confronts me in the world as the color of an inkstand confronts me: it belongs to the intentional co rrelate of the personal consciousness. If I bring help to Peter that is because I perceive immediately and without reflection his need of it, not because the rne is invoked to relieve Peter's distress. At this level, the desire to help Peter i5 given to consciousness as centrifu gal and as impersonal; hellce there is no me. H O That I am in a srate of pity for Peter appears o nly on refledion. Sartre writes: "The me must not be sought in the states of unreflected consciousness, nor behind them. The me appears only wilh the refleetive aet, and as noematic correlate of a reflectiv e intention."13t The aspect of the I which a ppea rs on re flection is passive, acted upon by Pe ter's distress, a nd is therefore to be distinguished from Hs other aspect which aets in the world, pereeives, enquires, and so on. These aspects are what Sa rtre ca ns respeetively the me and the I. "TI/e I is lhe ego os the unity 0/ actiOlls. TJre me is the ego as lhe unity of sta les and of qualities . TI/e dislinction that one makes betweel! these Iwo aspects ofone Qnd the same reality seems to us sinlply ftmclional, /Jo t 10 say gromnlalical. "TJl

THE TRANSCENDENT EGO Sartre thus rectifies HU5seri by stating that the ego i5 neither fo rmall y nor materiallY;1I consdousness. But this does not im~ ply tha t Sartre might have proceeded to claim tha t there is no cogito or the 1 tlJink anywhere. For Sartre the cogito of Desca rtes is the " factual necessily." The cogito is personal as in the I thillk thefe is an I who thinks. The necessity of the I thitlk is asserted by Sarlre: ") can always perfo rm my recoll ection whatsoever in the personal mode, and at once thc l appears ... Thus il seems that th efe is not one of my consciousness which I do not appre"end as provided wit" an L"m Thus the ego of the cogito, the I think, does in fact emerge for Sartre . But this [is not the transcendental ego; it is a transcendwt ego which does not exist on the level of the pre-reflecfiv e consciousness and hence e merges as

30

r, SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENT AL EGO

the object of the reflective consciousness. "If the 1 in the [ think affirms itself as transcendent, this is because the I is not of the same nature as transcendental consciousness."134 It is interesting to note here that Sartre's view is not different from that of Husserl in the LogicaT Investigations. As mentioned earlier, Husserl rejects the Kantian pure ego while accepting the empirical ego which appears through reflection. For Husserl this ego does not appear in straightforward, i.e. pre-reflective experience. In like manner, Sartre rejects the transcendental ego faund in Husserl's later works while accepting the empirical ego as being constituted by reflection. Such an ego does not appear in the pre-reflective consciousness; it does not come into existence until the pre-reflective consciousness has been made the object of reflection. As Sartre has pointed out: "Non-reflective consciousness is absolutely rid of the ego, which appears only in reflective consciousness-or rather in reflected consciousness, because refiected consciousness is already a quasi-object for refiective consciousness. Behind refiected consciousness ... lies an object that we will call ego. "135 As such, there 1S never an ego as the subject but only as the object. "The ego is not the owner of consciousness; it is the object of consciousness."l36

PURE AND IMPURE REFLECTION The pre-reflective consciousness is egoless; the ego appears only when this consciousness i5 made the object of reflection. Hence it is reflection that personalizes the impersonal consciousness. There are two kinds of reflection; one is impure reflection and the other 1S pure reflection. 137 The two reflections apprehend the same data, but impure reflection affirms more than it knows by adding a new element into the reflected consciousness whereas pure reflection "keeps to the given without setting claims for the future."I38 Impure reflection is constitutive in the sense that it constitutes or creates the psyche as weIl as psychic temporal-

31

Surlre'$ f:eistenljalism lind fAr/y Buddhism

ity. By psyche Sartre understands "the Ego, its states, Hs quali. ties, and Hs acts."IJ9 Pure re Oection, on the other hand, is merely descriptive: it limits itself to what is really given. Pure reflec· hon surpasses the psyche because it allows the reflected con· sciousness to be instantaneous rather than reifie d. Although Sartre admits that pure reflection is not necessarily phenom. enological reflecti on. 1.o the latter is possible on the basis of the former; pure reflection is necessary for completing the phenomenological programme. Th at is why Sartre som etimes talks of "the purifying reflection of phenomenological reduction."I41 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRICAL EGO Thus it is impure reflection that constitutes or creates the ego. Thisegooffers itself as a permanent entity, as continuing 1'0 exist beyond the reflected conscious act which is by nature instanta· neous. Thus the ego is not a part of the reflected consciou sness; rathe r it is given through the reflected consci9usness. This is in conformity with the ego's being constituted by irnpure refle ction . We must then enquire into Hs constitution. The ego is not, however, constituted in a direct way. The first constituted syn· thetic unities are states, actions and qualities. We shall survey the constitu tion of these psychicaJ objects before considering that of thc ego. "My love for Peter" Of "my hatred of Peter" is astate; and it appears to the renecti ve consciousness. Lei us suppose that just now I feel a violent repugnance for Peter. What is given to my reflection is "a consciousness of violent repugnance for Peter." lt is an "instantaneous consciousness of repugnance." I42 This instant aneous act of repugnance is itself not hatred, since hatred appears as being something permanent, as something which was in the past. is just now and will be in the future. This relatively permanent hatred is constituted by impure reflection upon the instantaneous acts of repugnance. "It is the transeen· dent unity of this infinity of consc1ousness."loL1 The second kind of psychical objects is action . Actions such as reasoning,. meditating,. doubting. imagining and so on are

32

rr

r SARTRE'S REJECTlON OF THE TRANSCENDENT AL EGO

also conceived as transcendent. They share with states the property of being the unity of an infinity of consciousness.ln addition to this, the action is a concrete realization; it requires time to be acromplished. " It has actualizations; it has moments. Ta tllese moments corresponds cGt/erele , active cOllsciou snfss, und Ihe ref/ect ion which is directed 011 Ihe consciollsness apprehends Ihe total action in an intuition which exhibits it as Ihe tran scendent Imity 0/ the aclive consciousness ."1 44

The idea beh ind this is that an action is continuous in time, while Hs appearances are discrete. This transformation is due to impure reflecti on. Dispositiolls or qualities represent "the ensemble of virtues, latent traits, potentialities wh ich constitute our charader and our habits."145 They are intermediaries between states and actions. "When we have experienced hatred several times toward different persons, or tenacious resentments, or protracted angers, we unify these diverse manifestations by intending a psychic disposition for producing them."l46 The qualities such as being angry, industrious, jealous, or ambitious are conceived as potentialities which are actualized in states. The ego is a synthetic unity of sla fes, actions and qualities; that is, it is a transcendent unity of three transcendent unities. The ego is nothing outside the concrete totality of these psychicalobjecls. "Undoubf edly it is tra"scendent 10 all the s fafes which it unifies, buf not as an abstract whose mission is ollly to !lllify; rather, it is the infinite totality 0/ sta ffs and 0/ aclions wltich is /lever redllcible fo an action or 10 astate. "14]

The ego is to psychicaJ objects what the world is to things. But it is rather rare that the world appea rs in the background of things. The ego, on the contrary, always appea rs at the horizon of psychical objects.

33

l

SArlre's Existenlialism rmd fArly Buddllism

"Euch state, euch act ion is givt1l as incapablc fro m the ego withou t abstraction. "1 48

0/ being separated

How is the constituted ego related to its states, actions and qualities? lt is neither emanation, nor actualization, but crea tion. The ego is conceived as creating ex nihilo states, actions and qualities. "The ego is the ereator of its states and sustains Hs quaJilies in ex istence by a sort of preservingspontaneity ." 149 But how can the ego be spontaneous if it is an obj ect of feflection and hence passive? Sartre's answer is simple: this spontaneity of the ego is only a pseudo-spontoneity.1SO Conseiousness projects ats ow n spontaneity into the constituted ego in order to ronfer on the ego the creativc power which is necessa ry to it. " But this spontaneity, represented and hypostatized in an object, beeomes a degraded and bastard spontaneity."151 THE POSSIBILITY OF PURE REFLECTION Thus the ego for Sartre is no t the transcendentall, but the Me. The ego is not the origin of experience; rather it is derived from experience, that is, it is always constituted o r "made~to-be." It is a product of an objectivisa tion of primary consciou sness, a con ~ slrucl out of primary instantaneousness, invested with mythieal permanence. The ego is an "impure growth" in a pu re Held of consciousness. Why impure? Because it is ego as thing, as objeci of reflection. From the viewpoi nt of pure reflection of con~ sdousness, the ego is degraded . This is beca use impure reflec~ hon, which is responsible for bringing the ego into existence, is in ba d faith .152 Frightened by its own freedorn, consciousness constitutes the ego in order to make the latter "its guardian and its law." ls.l Sy what means is the falseego exposed as such? It is by pure reflection that the ego is exposed as quasi-object of consciousness. This revelation is possible only because the reflecli ve cunsciousness, whose o rdinary state is one of impure refle ction,l54 can purify ilself. Pure reflection, however, is not an ordi nary state of consciousness; it "can onIy be obtained as the resu ltof a modification which il effects on itself ... "l ~ When pure

34

f SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENT AL EGO

reflection is obtained, consciousness apprehends its true ontological structure; it sees itself as incomplete unity in dispersion, with no completed self-identity .15li Sartre claims that this sort of revelation can Dceur to an impersonal consciousness:

"One might ask why the I appears on the accasion of the cogito, since the cagito, correctly performed, is an apprehension of a pure consciousness, without any constitution of states or actions. Ta tell the truth, the I is not necessary here, since it is never a direct unity of consdousness. One can even suppose a consciousness performing a pure rejIective ad which de/ivers consciousness to itself as a non-per-

sonal spontaneity. Only we must realize that phenomenological reduetion is never perfeet. "157 Thus a reflective apprehension of spontaneous consciousness as nonpersonal spontaneity can be accomplished by pure reflection. "This is always possible in principle, but remains very improbable or, at least, extremely rare in our human condition."l58 This difficulty arises out of the fact that most of the time consciousness puts itself in bad faith, and, consequently, its reflection often remains impure. There is a very rare chance for consciousness to escape bad faith. The issue whether anything other than bad faith is possible will be discussed later. By means of pure reflection, Sartre himself purifies consciousness of all egological structure. He takes the ego out of consciousness and puts it into the world. Now one question arises: If the ego has been put outside consciousness, what 1S left of the latter? Sartre's answer is this:

"[n asense, it is nothing, since all physical, psycho-physical, and psychic objects, all trutlls, all va/ues are outside it; since my me has itselj ceased to be any part of it. But this nothing is all since it is consciousness of all these objects. "159 This finding in The Transcendence of Ego leads Sartre to propose his coneeption of consciousness as nothingness (ie neant) in Being and Nothingness. We shall diseuss Sartre's eonception of

35

$a rtre's Existentialisrn and Early Buddhisrn

consciousness in the next chapter.

NOTES 1 2 3

4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32

Husserl, E., "Paris Lectures", in R.C Solomon (ed.), Phenomellolog y and Ex is teu lia/isrn, Harper & Row, 19n, p-52. "An In ter view w ithJean-Paul Sartre", inP.A. Schilp p (ed .), The Phi/050phy (ll Jean-Pa ul Sar Ire, Open Court, 1981, p .l O. Suh le, M ., Comp6ra li~ S lUdies in Plltnomenology, Ma rtinus N ijhoH, 1976, p. 10. Ka nt, 1., Critique 0/ Purt Reasoll , Tr;m slated by Norman Kemp Smi th, the Maem illan Press U d ., 1978, A 11 7 n. CPR. A 399. C PR. A 348. CPR. B 131-2. epR. B 132. e pR. A 107. CPR. B 135. CPR. B 278. CPR. B 157-8. CPR. A 398. CI'R. A 346 = B 404. Jamcs, W., Tht Principles 01 PSycilOlogy, Vol. l, Cover Publ ka tions Ine., Ne w York, 195il, p.365. CPR. B 422. epR. A 107. C r R. B 135. TE. 40. Quoted by Aron Gu rwitsch in StIldies in Phe numeno!ogy an d Ps ych ology, Norlhwc:;te rn Uni vcrsily Press, 1966, p. 216. Ibid . Hus-<>erl, E., Logicnllnvesfig ations, VoL 11, tr. by J.N . Fi ndla y, Routledge &. Kcgan Pau !, London, 1977, p. 549. lbid . Ibid . pp. 54 1, 549. lbid .. p. 542. Ibid ., p . 535. Ibid ., p. 54 1. Ibid ., pp. 541-2. Ibid ., p. 549 n . \. Ibid ., p. 544 n.l . Hu ~se rl, E., Car tcs ian M editat io ns, tr. by Dorion C airns, Martinus N ijhoff, 1977, seclion(s.) 10, p. 23. Husser}, E., Idt'as, tr. by W. R. Boyee Gibson, George Allen and Un win, Landon, 1969, s. 59, pp. 176-7.

36

SARTRE'S REJECTIO N O FTHE TRANSCEN DENTAL EGO

33

34

35 36

37 38 3' 40 41 41 •

.,

.. 43 4S

I

,~ ,,f ,

"

47

48 49

Ibid., s. 38, p. 124. Cartesian M t di tations, s. 13, p. 30. fdeas, s. 50, P 155. Cartesian Medita tions, s . 21. p. SO. Ideas, s. 33, p. 113. Ibid ., s. 34, p. 11 5. Ibid. Ibid., s. 80, p. 232. Ibid., s. 57, p. 172. Ibid. Ibid ., s. 92, p. 270. Ibid ., s. 57, pp 172-73 . lbid., s, 47, p. 148. e artesian Meditations, s. 31. P 66. Ideas, p. 21. Emhree, L.E., ~ An Interp re lation of the Doctri ne o f the Ego in Husserl's Ideas" F. Kerstcn and R. Zaner (eds.), Phenm" enology: Continua lion und eri/icism, 1973, p. 28. CPR. A 107. ldeus, s. 57, p. 173.

50

CPR A 116.

51

Chatterjee, M., " A Phenome nological Approach 10 the Se ICN, in Seif. Knuwltdgeand Frl'edom , edited by ' .N. Mohan ty and S.P. Banerjee, World Press, 1978, p. 189. Carlesia n M edit ations, s . 15, p. 34. Ibid" s, 2, p. 26. fdeas, s . SO, p. 233. Ibid. Ibid., s. 33. p. 11 4 Ibid . Ibid., s. 57. P 173. Ibid., s. 58. P 174. Husserl, E., The fdea of PIIeIl Omell o!ogy, tra nslated b y' W.P. Als to n and G . Nakhnikian, Martinus Nijh off, 1973, p 33. Idtas, s . 80, p. 233. Ibid . Ibid. Cartesiall M edita tions, ~. 32, p. 67. Ibid. Ibid. Chatterjee, M., op. eil., P 189. ldeas, p 18. "Paris Lectu res", p 48. ( artesian M edita tions, s. 8, p. 21. Ideas, s. 98, p. 287. (arltsian M edil<illns, s. 1 1, p. 26. Thevenaz, P, Wh,, 1is Phenomenol/lgy? Quad ra ngJe Books, Chicago, 1962, p.41.

52 53 54 55 56

SI 58

59

60 61 62 63 64 65

66

67 68

69 70 71

" 73

37

...... Sarire' s Exislentialism attd Early Buddhism 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

95 96 97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

Sartre, J-P., The Transcendence of the Ego, tr. by F. Wjlliams and R. Kirkpatrick, Noonday Press, New York, 1959, p. 38. Sartre, J-P., "Une Idee Fondam~ntale de la phenomenologie de Husser!: L'intentionnalite", Situations I, GalLimard, 1947, p 31. Sartre, J-P., Imagination: A Psychological Critique, tr. by F. Williams, The Univcrsity of Michigan Press, 1972, p. 131. "An interview with Jean-Paui Sartre", p. 10. 78. TE. 65. TE. 65. TE. 33. TE.3l. TE. 38. TE. 32. TE. 33; cf. CPR. A 117. n_ TE. 32. TE. 33. TE. 35. Sartre, ]-P., Being and Nothingness, tr. by Hazel E. Barnes, Pocket Books, New York, 1966, p. 194. Bergson, H., Time and Fru Will, Ceorge Allen & Unwin, 1928, p. 227. Bergson, H., Matter and Memory, p. 56. TE. 62-3. TE. 38. TE. 38. TE. 38. Sartre,J-P., The Psychology of Imagination, tr. by B. Frechtman, Methuen, London, 1978 p. 27. TE. 39. Tr. by ]ames S. Churchill, Indiana Univcrsity Press, 1966. TE.39. The Psyclwlogy of Imagination, p. 27. TE. 40. Ideas, s. 81, p. 236. Ibid. Ibid., S 82 p. 238. TE. 35. TE 93, 96. The PsycilOlogy Of Imagination, p. 10. TE. 44. TE.44. TE. 58. TE. 50-51. TE. 47. "An Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre", p. 11. TE. 53-4. Bhadra, MX, A Critiml 5tudy of Sartre's Ontology ofConsciousness, The University of Burdwan, 1978, p. 11. The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 31.

38

SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRA NSCENDE NTAL EGO 11 5

11 6 11 7

11 8 11 9 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141

142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156

ldMs, $ . SO, p. 233. BN. 722. Ed ie. J., "Phe no mcnology as a Rigorous Scie nce", fl1 /i'rmll iol1~ 1 Ph ilosophiea! Qlwrrrrf.'1. MaTch 1951, p. 28. SarIre. J-P., trl/agil/atlo'l. A Psychologie/li Crit iqur, p. 128. Giorg.i, A ., "Sartrc's Systematic Psyehology", P.A. Schilp p (00.). The Philosophy o f Jean-Pa ul SarIre, p. 195 Williams, F. and Ki rk patrick, R, "Tran~la l or' s Inlroduetion" to Thl! Tran sctlldellu of Ihe Ego, p. 25. TE. 40. TE. 42. TE. 41-2. TE. 79. TE.4I. Caws, P., Satire, Rou l lc dge &; Kegan r aul, 1979, p.56. T E. 54. TE. 3 1. TE . 55. T E. 56. TE. 59·60. TE. 60. TE. 43-4 TE. 51. " An Intcrview withJt!a n-Pa u l Satire", p. 11 . T E.69. TE. 64 : BN. 223. TE. 64 . ßN.1 26. TE. 64. Sa rtre, I-P., Sketch je)r Q TheilfY oi Ihe EmvJio" s, Ir. by Ph ilip Ma irel, Methue n & Co. lId ., 1977, p . 91. TE. 62. TE. 63. TE. 69. BN. 226·7. TE. 70. TE. 74. TE. 75. TE. 78. T E. 79. TE. 81 . BN . 225. TE. 101. SN. 233-4. BN . 224. Kenevan, P.ß ., "5elf·conscio usness and the Ego in Ihe Ph ilosop hy of SarIre", P A. Schilp p (cd.), Tlte Philosophy 01 Jean-Paul Sartre. pp .202-3.

39

Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism

157 158 159

TE. 91. TE. 92. TE. 93.

40

11 THESARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

artre's main interest in rejecting Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego 15 to empty consciousness of alt eon tents. Purified of all egological structure, the pure field of consciousness recovers it5 primary transparency. The self-transparency of consdousness excludes the possibility that anything is in.consciousness. Hence the radical consequence of Sartre's rejection of thc transcendental ego i5 that consciousness has no contents; aU content i5 on thc side of thc object. Sartre points out: "There is not a content of consciousness; there is-what is, in my opinion, Husserl's mistake-no subject behind consciousness, that i5, something like a transcendence in immanence,"l Sartre defines consciousness by intentionality.2 All consciousness is consciousness o[ something; consciousness transcends itself towards the objecL Neither the object nor the image has the sta-

S

• $ar/rt"s Erisfm lia/is m and Early Bllddh is m

tus of being a contcnt of conscious ness; they are outside it. All so ~ ca lled 'images,' 'rcpresentations,' 'ideas,' 'phe nomena,' 'scnse-data,' eie., are objects for consciousness, not contents i" consdousness. Sartre, like William }ames, ins is ls that represen· tational theories of knowledge viotate OUT sense of life. When we imagine a tTee, it is a tTee we are imagining, not our image of a tree. Consciousness is present 10 objects. "There are not, and never could be, images in conscious ness. Rather, image is a certain type of cansdousness. An image is an aet, not something.

An image is a conscioll sness ofsomething."3 Emptied cf all contents, consciousness is characlerized by s po ntaneity, absoluteness and transparency.4 Wh at nre these characteristics?

SPONTANEITY Sartre describes consciousness as ,m impersonal spontancity, a sh eer activity transcending towards obje c ts. ~ What h e mean.<; by spontaneity is c1ucidated in these s tatemen ts: "Timt exists spontal1eously wlziclz determilJeS its OW/l existence.lll other words, 10 exist spollfaneousJy is to exisl fo r oneself Qnd through onesefj(exister pour soi cl par soi). Gue reality alalie deserves to be

called 'sponfal1eOlls': C mscious1!ess. "6 This is to say that consciousness is spontaneous because it dctermines its existcnce, without our being able to conceive anything before it. It is generated neither by an ego nor by any other consciousness in the same stream of cxperience. "One consciousness is not the cause of another. "7 "ihus each ins tant of Dur conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence."8 Nothing (rien) is the cause of consciousness; it is consciousness whi ch is the cause of Hs Qwn way of being.9 (n this context, Sa rtre seems to use the lerm spontaneity in the sense of "m! ca used origination" as opposed to "dependent origination." Being spontaneous or self-caused, consciou sness is said 10 be ffee, for it is not subject 10 any causal

42

THE SA RTREAN CONCEPTIÜN O F CONSCIO USNESS

laws. "Consciousness is frigh tencd by its own spontaneity because it senses this spontaneity as beyand freedam." lo ABSOLUTENESS

Furthermare, consciousncss for Sartre is "a non-substantial absolute."l1 Sartre uses the term 'absolute' in the sense of "nonrelative." He, fo llowing Husser!. makes the d istinction between relati ve and absolute existents. Something is a rel ative exi.stent when it is an object for somethi.ng. The world, for ex am pIe, is a relative exi stent because it is the obj ect for consciousness : consciousness, on the contrary, is no t relati ve because it is not für anything; it is a being-for-itself (I'elre-pour-soi). Consciousness is "a revealirlg intuition o[ sometlling." '2It is not revealed by anything other th an itsclf. COl1sciousness is sclf-Iurninous or selftransparent. According to Sartrc, consciousncss, wh ich is absolu te, is non-substa ntial, beca use its "existence pri'cedes essen ce." n Critici zing Descartes' s ubs tantiaLism, Satt re says that Descartes goes wrang because he fail s to see that if the absolute is defined by primacy of existence over essence, it cannot be rcgarded as a substance. "Conscjoll511ess I/IIS uothillg subsltl/ltjal, il js pu re 'nppc/lronce' j" Ihe sense thai ilexists only Ip Ille degrel.' to wilich it appCIIYS. But it is prccise1y berause conscio usness is pure appellYllI1CC, beCfluse it is total cmptiness (sinc e tile cntire wvrld is Ollt siae jt}-it is vec(llIse ofthis idl.'nl ity o[ 1I1'I'ClllaIlCl: (/ud ex isrence ll'itlJiIl It thaf it con be considered as !hl' absufufe."J4

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Since its existence is idcntica l with its appearance, consciousness exis ts on ly to the cxtcnt that it appea rs to itself in the mode of sclf-transparency or self-consciousness. In this respect, selfconsciousness is regarded as the "mode of cxistence" of consci o u s ness;' ~ that is, " the ty pe o f cxistenct' o f consciousness is to be con...ciousness of itsel f."l'" From this it fo llows th at self-cotl -

43

,

r S/lrl rc':; existellfial .sm lind F./Irly ßllddhism

5ciOllsn ess is fil e necr:ssary condifiolt of fil e existence of conscious-

Thus self-consciousness is taken 10 be an essentia l characteristic which enabl es us to differentiate consciousness from a non-conscious being. As Sartre says, "to be other than bein g is to be sclf-conscious." 17 By self-consciousn ess Sartre und erstands an imme diate, noncog ni tivc rel a tio n of conscious ne::>s to ilsclf.l a In the case of sclf-col1sciousness, cnnsciousness does not posit itseH as an objet' l; the s ubj ec t-obje ct duality does not arise he re . The non-positional consciousness arrives at itself without recourse In discu rsive thoughl . Self consciou sncss should not b e confu sed with the refl ccti vc consciousness w hich takes the reflecled consciousness as its obj cct. All consciousness is non -positümal consciousness o f itse lf in the very process o f be ing co nsciOli S of something. That is, it is consciousness of itself as consciou sncss of some thing, oe is aware of bcing aw arc. In this sense, selfconsciousness and consciousness of something ar e mutu a Hy d epend cnt. Apa rt fro m consciou sness of som ething, self-consci ousness is impo~ si blc. "Consciousness is aware of itsel( in so tar as it is consci ousncss of a transcendent objecL"l\J This, howevc r, does nol imply thai consciousness o f something contains self-consciou sness as its qu ality. This is becausc consciousncss is no t a thing which we may quali fy with "self-conscious" as we mi ght q ualify Cl flow cr with "red. " Consciowmess of s(J mething <'Ind self-consciousness constitute "an indivisible, indissoluble bc ing-definitely no t a substance s uppo rting Hs qu alities likc particles o fbeing, but a bein g whi ch is its existence through and th rough."w Accord ing to Sartre, self-consciousness is the necessary and s ufficient condition fo r a knowing consciousness to be kno wled ge of its objecl. 21 Al ain's statement " to kno w is to know that o ne knows" is interpre ted by Sarlrc in these wo rds: "To know is to be consdou s of know ing."21 One may agr~ with Sartre that self-consciousness is the sufficicnl condition because to be conscious that one kno ws Ihat "S is pI' is to know that "S is P." But un c is doubtful whethcr it is the necessary conditi on. So me philosophers d cny that seH-consciousness is the necessary con-

IICSS.

44

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OFCONSCIOUSNESS

dition of know ledge. Spin oza a nd Ihe British phil osophe r Prichard d o so, and the Scandinavian thinker, Jaakko Hinlikka, believes something quite dose 10 this.]) Sarire, howe ver, has offered an a rgument in support of his clai m that self-conscio usness is thc necessary condition. Ht:! says: "1/ my consciousness were not COI1SC;OIlSness of being cOllsciollS-

ness o/Ille table, it would then he cOlIsciOlISIWSS of thai labre witlum l consciQUSlless 0/ being so. In other '(fJords, if wal/ld bc a C01IScit/uslless ignoran t of itself, all unconscious- which ;5 absurd. "24 There is an obvious f1a w in Ihis argument, w hieh consis ts Ül the movc from "eonsciousness ig norant of itself" to "unconsciaus." The more proper conclus ion would rath er be "unself-co nscious". Granted that by "unconscious" Sartre means "unself-conscious," we still fai! to understand why th e cancep! of "unself-consciow; consciousness" is absurd in so far as we deHne cons dousness by intenti onality. I might be consuous of Ihi s table w ilhau! being conscious of being so, and there is nothing absurd abou! this; consciousncss d oes not lose intentionality, which is Hs defining characteristic. Sa rt re views it as being
45

5arlr("~ rxi~ lrl1tialism

and Ear(v Buddhism

TRANSPHENOMENAL BEING Now Wt! arE;! in a position 10 say thai consciousness for Sartre has two d efining characlcristics: intentionality and seH-transparen cy. Consriousness is cOllsrious ness of something n afld consciousncss of something is se!J- co llscious.2~ Self-consciousness presupposes consdousness of something for the reason that consciou sness is aware of itself only when it is consciousness of something. And consciousness of something, in turn, pres upposes thc beiog of the objecL By "consciousness of something" Sartre mea ns "a revealing intuition of samething Le. of a transcendcnt bcing."N And the revealing intuition implies som ething reveaJed, something other than consciousness itself. "A consciou sncss which would be consciousness of nothing would be absolute nOlhing."JO Bul conseiousness is not an absolutE;! nothin g, for il is eom;dousness of something. And in so far as it is cons ciowmess of somelhing, this something must "have areal bcing- Ihat is, a being not relative to consciousne-ss."Jl Consciousness, thereforc, implies "a non· co nscious and transpheno menal being."32 Conscqucntly, the being of the object is diseovered without exception in cvcry aet of consciousness. Consciousness is nt'ver alone; il is never isolated from the being of the objecL This mcans that the being of the object is the "constitutive structure" of consciousness; that is, Ihat consciousness is born supported by the being o f the object. The d emand of eonsciousness for its objcct p ro vcs Ihat Ihefe is the being of Ih e object outside consciousness. This kind of proof is ca lied "ontologieal proof.":n Sartre Ihinks lhal the being of Ihe objeet is ind ependent of eonsciousncss; it is "transphenomenal being" because it transeends its phenomena l condition. "The I/ein>: of thl' plJenomenoll , although coextensive with the phenommo", Cll1lt1ot be subjed 10 Ihe pllenomenal condilion whid, is 10 exist o1l1y in S() far as il revea ls itsel[--and tlw l con sequrntly ir su rpasses Ih r knowledge which we !lave of it and provides the basis for ~mch klZOwledge. ".14

46

, I; c

~

~

;.

, ; )

I.

THE SARTREAN CONCErTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

It should be noted here that HusseTl takes the being of th e .

known obJect 10 be wholly de pendent on the acts of the knowing subject, Le., the transcendenta l ego. According to hirn, the esse of a noema consists exclusive ly in Hs percipi,:li ,"'rom Sartre's viewpoint, Husserl has red uced thc being of the object 10 a series of meanings. 3to In contras t with Husserl's pos ition, Sarlre maintains thai "thc esse of th c phenomenon cannot be its percipi."l1 By asserting that the beiog of the übjec! is not subjcct to the phenomena J condition, Sarl'rc has prop(}sed an approa ch not just different from but diametrically opposed 10 Husscrl's. Instead of reducing beiog to Cl series of meanings, Sarlre explains knowledge and meanings in terms of being, insisling th at being i5 "the seH-evident irreduci ble" and thcrefore any attempt at reducing it to something el~, and thus tryin g to go beyond it, is impossible.'8 TWO TYPES OF BEING

Sartre, therefore, makcs the distinction between consciousness and its object. He insis ts that these are two different types of being. "That there are two types of cx b ten ce, as thing-in-thcworld and as consciousness, is an ontological law."l" The being of thc object i5 ca lled being-in-itscij (l 'etre-ell-soi), and the being of consciousness is ca lled beillg-j or-iiseJj (J'eire-pour-soi).~ Since the being of the object is revea led through the phenom enologi cal description of consdou sness, Sartre's ontology is ca ll ed "phenomenologicalontology."41 Being -in-ilse/fis the non-conscious being of the object of consciousness .~l It is pure exishmce as such, existentia. It cannot be a thing or an ensemble o f th ings. Neither cao il bc hidd cn behind things in thc manner of the noumcnon . lt i5 the being of phenomena; that is, the pure "aUlt it is" ofthings. This is SClrtrc's reappropriation of Heidcgger' s assertion that " Being is the transcendens pu re and simpl e. "u The in-itself is plenitude cr fullness characterized by impermeability an d infinit e density. lt is so fu ll of itself that it d oes not admit any change or beco ming. "Transition, becoming, any-

47

l Sflrlre's Existetltiaiism find Early Bllddhism

thing which permits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not-all Ih at is forbidden on principle." u Thc in-itself is also ' uncreated/ ' no t s ubject to tempürality,' and ' undifferentia ted.' I! is neith er possible nor necessary, but rather 'contingent.' It is wholly independent or Se[bständ(~. 1t is thus absolutely non-referenti aL Lacking differentiating predicates, it can only be said to be. "Heing iso Being is in-itself. Being is what it is ." ·~ BeinK-for-itself is Ihe being o f conscious ness whieh is a ' revea ling intuition ' of the being-in-itse lf . For SaTtre, being-for-it self (relre-paur soi), consciousness (Ta conscience) and human reCllity (La rlialiti humane)- all mean the same and h e u ses them indisc riminately. The for-itself is d efinl'd as "being what it is not, ami not being what il iS."4<J lt is a negation of the in-itself whieh is "what it is." (f the in-itself is il fullness, then the fo ritself is il lack, " total emptiness" (Ulf vide 101al).47 What the for-itself lacks is the being-in-itself.4!I Thc for -itself is thu s the absence of being; "it is a hole in being at the heart of being,"4Q and because uf this hole a trcmendous uphcava l happens to the in-itse lf, and this uphcaval i~ the appearance of the world. 50 Oue 10 the pre~n ce of the for -itself to the in-itself, the worl d is (ons tituled, no t in the sense of idea lis ticall y creating, but in the sense o f organizing or manifcsting. "World liness, spatialit y, quantit y, instrumentality, temporality- all come into being because I am the negation of being."51 Without the for-itself thcre would exist no world but merely "the undifferentiated totality of being." 52 Moreover, Ihe for-itself is not a person; thai is, it is not " the totality of the human being" but rather "the in<;tantancous nucleu s of this being."$.l NOTHINGNESS Thus the for-itsclf or consciousness is the nega tion of being; it introdu ces a fi SSUTC into the being-in-itself. This fissure takes place whenever con<;ciousness directs itself towards the übject. This is to say that when consciousness is conscious of sornething, it is implicitly conscious of itself as not beillg that thing. In

48

I

.. THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

the case of a perceptual consciousness of a chaiT, for instance, there is the apprehension of the chair as the in -ilself which con· sciousncss is not. By sclf-consciousness, consc ious n~s is aware

of itself as not-being-the-chair. " Hs not-being-the-chair is ... in the form of the consciousncss (of) not-being. "~ Hcnce consciousness is nothingness in the sense of not being the in-itself, and it is aware of its own nothingness by means of sc lf-consdousnc!'!'. "Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is 10 be conscious of nothingncss of its being ." '~ Here we find the close connection between twoSartrean nations: lIothinglless and self-corrsciouslIe5s. We may assume thai consciousness for SaTtre is nothingness because it i5 necessarily self-consdous. Unle:;s il were self-consdous, consciOU5ness would not be able to tear itsclf away from its object, it would not be aWelfe of itself as not being the objccL Consciousness which has lapsed into the pas t is not self-conSc10US. As a result, it i5 no lange r nothingness; it bccomes a being-in-itsel f.56 Furthermore consciousness is said 10 be nothingness for the reason that all being is on the side of it.':> objects. Consciousne:;s is a total emptiness, for the entire world is outside itY This. however, should not mislead us into assuming that consciousness is an absolute nothingness ('Iillilum nbsolutum), Lc. the absence of all being. Consciousness is not the nihilation of a grcal complcte whole such as the Parrnenidian Being. Rather, it is the nihilation of the individu al in-itself. Sartre writes: "11 is the lIihilalioll 0/ all individual and partieular in-itselfnlld not of a being in gem:ral. Th e for -i/self is 1101 lIothirJgtless ill general but a partieular privation; it cons!il ules itself flS Ihe privation 0/ thi:; being. ''.58

Consciousness, as the nihilation of a particu lar being, has only "a borrowed exislence: ·&./ "For consciousness therc is no being except for this precise obliga tio n to be a revcaling intu ition of somet hing. "hO Without the in-itsdf to be revealcd. consciousness cannot be self-conscious and thereby ceases 10 exist as "pure a ppearance." From this it folio ws that the in-itself

49

Stlrln:'s Existell tilllism rmd Eor1.v Buddhism

is ont ologic all y prior to cons ciousness and cs tab!ishes the ground for it. Conscious ness without the in-itself is a kind o f abs tra ction; il could not exist any more than a color could exist without form,61 Thi::. does not imply tha t consciousness and the in-itself are mutually de pendent. The in-ilself has no n eed of consciousness in order to be. "The phenomenon of the in-itself is an abstrac lion without consciousness but its bc ing is not an abstra clion ." b2 1t is im po rtanl to cmphasize here tha i Sartre, w he n d escribin g co nscio us ness as nothin gne s s, d ocs not think th at n Olhingncss is a m ere logical concept fo rmulated through spccul ati ve reasoning. Accord ing 10 Sa rire, no thingncss, if it is a can cept al al l, is an experiential con cept for it is de ri ved from oll r expe riencl!. It is not a product o f CI conceptu al nega tion; on the contrary, all the logical or propositional nega tio ns are conditioned and supported by this primordial no thingness . To demons trale this, Sa rt re examines two no tions: interroga tio n and negat ive judgmenl. According to SaTi re, it is in tra cing out the ques li.on ing s ituat ion th a t na thingness is di sc overed . Eve r y qu es ti on presuppo ses a dy ad of beings, viz. the being who qucstions and the being who is questio ned . If Task, fo r ins tance, "is thefe any condu ct which can reveal to me the relation of m an with Ihe world ?", I indica te my ig no rance. Now ignorance or absence of knowledge i5 a non-being. The reply to m y question can be cith er n egati ve or pos itive. lf it is in the negative, new non-bei ng is implied. If the answer is in the affirmative, it invalves a third non-b ~ ing-"th e non-bl~ ing of limitation," for it is in the form o f " it is thus
50

p

TEE SA RTI{EAN CONCEPT10N OF CONScrOU8NESS

ooiy thirteen hundred. This d oes not mean that I discover the non-being of fifteen hund red fran cs but simpl y tha t I have counted thirteen hundred fr ancs. "Negation proper (wc are loId) is unthinkable; it cou ld appear onIy on the level of an act of judgment by which I should es tablish a com pa rison betwcen the result antidpated and thc result obtained."t.! Thus nothingness seems 10 be a result of concrete psychic operations; it is a pure subjeclivity. In this sense, nothingness cannot have thc "slightest trace of reality ." Sa Ti re d oe~ not aceep! the view o f hi s critics. He s lates thai non-being does not come 10 things b y a negative judgmcnt; faiher, it is a negative judgment which i5 conditi oncd and supported by a prejudicative com prehensi on of a non-bcing. In the example cited above, it is a comprehension of the no n-being of two hundred fr ancs that serves as foundation for m aking the negative judgment. Sartre writes: "The necessary cond ition for our saying 'not' is that non-being bc a pcrpetual presence in us and outside, that nothingness haunts being."66 Sartre denies thai the negative judgment a fises when o ur expeetatio ns e nd in failure. H e, howevcr, conccdes th at expeetations h ave something to da with the negative judgment; they lead us to discove r non· being. " It is evident," says Sa rtre, "th ai non-bein g always appears within the limits of a human expeetation. "t\6 Ta s ub· stantiate his view, Sarlre eites the (o llow ing example : I have an appoi ntmcnt with my friend Pierre at a r ertain cafe at four o'cloek. Su ppose l arrive fifteen minutes laie and find that Pierre, who is always pun ctual, is not there. I then m ake a negative judgment that "Pierre is not here." The eafe where I expect to meet hirn is full of bt-ing. The patrons, the tables, the mirrors, the light and everything in the ea fe constitute a ground against which Piefre is about to appea r. This o rganiza tio n of the eafe as the ground for Pierre' s appearance is "an ori ginal nihilation." Eaeh thing in the ca fe first appears to me as a dis· linet object and then fa lls back into the ground by my nihilating aetivity . The grau nd is th e necessary condilion for thc appear· anee of the principal figure, wh ich is here the pe rson o f PieHe. Since Pierre is absent, what appears on the ground is not his

51

I

Sn,lr("~ Eri~/t'n lillli~m

IIl1d Early

Huddhi.~m

prescnce but his absence. "It is rierre ri sing himself as nothingnesl' on the ground of the nihitation of the cafe."1>7 My in tuition o f rie rTe's absence leads me to make the negative judgment that he is not here. And it is my expectation for Pierre's presence that lead s mc to discover his absence. "} myself expected to S('e rierTe, and my expectation has caused the absence of Pierre 10 happen as areal c vent concerning thi s ca(e. 11 is an objective fact at present that r havc di scovercd this absencc."Nl "This examplc," Sa rtre concludes, " is s ufficienlto sho w that non-being dues not come 10 things by a negative judgment; it is thf:' negative judgment, on the contrary, which is conditioned <md s uppo rted by n on-being ."69 Sartre asserts that nothingness is n o t a sl1bjcctivc concep t resu lting from man's psychic opera tions. Nolhingness fo r Sartre is an object ive realit y; thai is, Ihe reality of nothingness is not dependcnt upon the aets of consciou sne...s. According to Sa rire, "there is a transphenom enality of non-bei ng as of being ."70 He contends thai nothingness can bL' given to our intuitio n. "In order for negation to exis t in th e wodd and in order thai we may consequenily raise questions conccrning Bei ng, it i ~ nccessa ry tha t in some way Nolhinglless /Je g iVCI1."71 Sarire, however, docs not specify how nothingncss can bl' given to our intuition. !ust as Husserl ha~ diffi culty in showing how the transcendcnlal ego is given 10 our phenoml'nological rcflec lion, so " Iso Sarlre has difficulty in specify ing how nothingncss is g ivcn to intuition. The main problem is: If c on sc iou ~ ness is consciousne::ls oE somefh ing, how C
52

• THE 5ARTREAN CONCEI'TION OF CONSCIQUSNESS

volves non-exis tence of a thing which o nee existed. Non-being has been introduced info the thing. From where docs non-being corne 10 the thing? The thing cannot gcneratcnon-being because it is a being-in-itself, a what-it-is. "There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the hniest crack through which nothingness might slip in." i4 This means that nothingncss cannol stern fram the in-itseH. Neithe::r Gm nothingness generale Hself. In Sartre's view, nothingness dacs not nihilate itself; not hingness is nihilated. "Il fvUows lherefore timt Il,ere mI/si exisf a Beillg (this cmHlot bt., the lll-itselj) 0/ whicli Ille properly is 10 nihilate Nothillgl1t?SS, 10 support it in ils being, to sl/stuit! it perpetually in its very existen ce, a beillg by which nothingness comes to things, "75

Accordi ng to Sartre, the being which introduces nothingn ess into thin gs is human reality. "Man is thE.' being through whom nothingness com es to the world." 7~ Since the being by which nothingnes...:; comes to the world must bc its own nothingness,n human reality therefore is Hs ow n nothingness.78 This amounts 10 saying that conscio usne~... is nothingness, fur the term 'human reality' is used as a synonym for consciousness. Sartre's dE.'scription of the appearance of nothingness in the world can be summarized in the following statement: Since the in-itself is so full of itself that it does not admit any negative element, nothingness must be brought to things by the being which is not the in-itse1f; and that being is consciousness. Hold · ing this view, Sartre has 10 face same difficulties. If it is tru c that consciousness introduces nothingn~ss into things, then the reality af nothingness sccms to be dependent upan the nihilating activity of consciausness. If this is the case, how can o ne say that nothingness is an abjective reality? And nothingness, the reality of which depends on the acts of consciousncss, cannot be transphenomenal as Sartre believes. Furthermore, it is questionabl e whether one can rightly speak about the "phenomenon" of non-being. How can non-being appear to our intuiti on? Sartre himself maintains that being is coextensive

53

Sartre's f..m lcnlia/ism and Etlr/y S"ddhism

wilh phenomenon. As s uch, there can be only pheno menon of being, no t phcnomenon o f non-being. If Sartre aJlows that there is phenomenon of non-belng, then he has 10 admit, as agajnst his own position, that there is phenomenon which is not coextensive with being. Since SarfTe can never admil this implication, he has to deny that there il' phenomcnon of non-being. As a result, h ~ is not in a position to cl aim, as he actually did, that "there is a trarL.'iphenomenality of non-belng as of bein g."7':1 TEMPORALITY

The in-il s~ lf, as is mentioned ea rlie r, is a full positivity tha t canno t «dmit any change or bcco ming . This mcans that the in-itself is not subject 10 temporality . Sa rtre writes: "The in-itself ca nnot be present any more than jt can be past."BO Now onc qu csti on arises: If the in-itself is not temp oral, from where does temporality curn e 10 things? To this question, Sartre's answcr would be th at it i::i consdousness whjch introduces ternporality ioto things. This is because "consciousness i..s ternpora\, "~ l that is, tc mporali ty is the infra-stru cture o r mode ofbeing of consciousncss.82 In sho rt, conscious ness lempora lizes itself. Acco rding to Sartre, there «rc two temporalities: o riginal ternpora lity which is the infra-:; tru cturc of consciou sness .md psychi c Icmporality which is constituted by impure re fl ec ti o n.8~ Impur ~ reflection, as has been shown in the preceding chapt er, constitutc::i the psychic fa cts, vi z. the ego, its states, Hs aets (lnd its gualiti es . Psychic tempora lity is conslilutcd through th e suecessio n o f these psychic facls. " Illdeed it is their realil y whkh is 11,1' objecl oj psychology. Pme· fiCI/li:; i! is 0 11 tlle level ofpsychit'fncf tim! concrde relntion belwecn

are estllb/islled- cfaims, jea !ousies, grudges, suggest ions, struggles, rules, dc. "114 /li /!/!

For Sa rtre, it is not conceivabl e that the pre-reflcctive eonsciousncss, which temporalizes itself, should be itself th ese states, these aets and these qualities. Since these psychic facts

54

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

are constituled by impure reflection. they cannot appear in the pre-refledive consciousness. Thus psychic tempora lity, w hi eh is the successive order of psychic facts, disappears completely if consciou:mess rcmains on the prc-rcflective level Of if impure refIection purifies itself. In the pre-reflectivc experience Ihere i5 only origina l temporality. The pre-reflective consciou sness i5 aware of original tcmporality, not in the form of reflection, but in the form of non-thetic self-consciousness. Original temporality, for Sarire, is an 'organized structu rc', The thTee dimensions of time, past, rresen! and future, afe no t considered as an infinite series of 'nows' -but rather as " Ihe st.ructurcd moments of an original synthesis."1!5 The pre-rcClcctive consc iousness, being temporal, is an 'eks tatic unity ' which simultaneously exists in the thrcc dimensions of past. prcscnt and future. Now we shall consider how thc three dimensions are related 10 one another in s u ch a way that their unity is form ed. 1. THE PAST

The first dimension is thc pas t. What is thc being of the past? The answer givcn by some th inkers is that sin ce the past 1S 00 langer, it has no being. This view is not acceptablc 10 Sartre because it faUs to account for the passivity of memory in which a remembering consciousness transcends the prcscnt in order to aim at an event in the past. On the other hand, so me thinkers like Bergson and Husserl maintain Ihal thc past has a kind of existence , For Ihern, being past for an event s imply mcans be ing retired, losing its efficacy w ithout 10s ing jts being. Acco rding to Sartre, this view fa ils to explain how the polst can be related 10 the present Since the p ast has been conferred the existcnce of the in-ilself, it is impossible to unitc il to thc present. This i~ because of the fact that the in-itsclf "is isolated in its being and that it does not enter into any connection with what is not itseIf."&6 All bridges between the past and the present h ave been cut down . According to Sattre, whether the past is or is no longer is

55

1

Sml re':; f.:xistl.'ntiQ/is m and fArl y Huddhistn

hardly of any imporlancc in so (ar as il does not enable us to re(onnect it 10 the present. Thc problem of relation arises for those philosophers who considcr tcmporality as primarily separaled instants 10 which they grant a prüJri being-in-itself. "This problem has for a long time been disguised by a conception of thc human being as an in-itself."87 As a result, it is not possible to t't'itablish bctween instants the "slightcst connection of succession ." Hum e, for example, finds in his mind a ,"uccession of im prt!ssions cach ooe of whieh is a "distLnct existence." He faUs to understand how these impressions are reJated to one anolher. Sa rt re, the reforc, writcs: .. Any connection w ith an antecedent or consequent, no matter how constan t it may be, rema ins uninteH igible. "1lS Ta avoid such difficulty Sart rc proposes that instead of considering lemporality as aseparation, one should approach it as a totality.MV In doing so, one will see Ihat the past is first of al1 my pas t. 11 is not nothing, ncither is it th e prescnt, but it is bound to a certa in prcsent and to a certain future, to both of whi ch it belo ngs. Thc pas t has onto logica l relation with the present. " It i5 o rigin ally the pas t of the present ."90 Thc past of a man is ncver cu t off (rom his total being. Suppose we say that Paul was a student in 1940. Who was thc s tudent then? It is Paul, Iiving at the present time, who wa s the student. This is 10 say that Paul has a pas t. The same i5 true for everyone. But one does not have a past CIS one has a car. In the rase of having a car, the relati on betwecn the possessor <md his car is an external relation; he can dissoci
"What separates prior jr01ll subsequent is cxactly Hothing (rien). TJzis lIothin~ is absolutely impnsllilble, just because it is nothing ... The prior eonseiot/sness is always th t!re (though witl! the modijien lion of 'pns lncss'). It eonstantly mllintains a relatioll of interpretation with lire pyt.'senf consciow:"mess, huf Oll I/le basis of this erislential relal ion

56

J

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNE$$

it is put au f of the ga me, Ollt of the eire«;t, between parentheses .... "92

This means that "the prior consciousness" is not a discrete unH but is continuously surpassed. The past is continuously add ed to, without a break. Consciousness which has lapsed into the past is no langer self-consciousness; " it5 being is no longer for itself since it no longer exists as reflection-refiecting."YJ In this sense, the pa st consciousness becomes an in-itself. Thus the past is a solidifi ca tion of thc for-itse lf fro m wh ich all poss ibilit y is excluded . Consciou sness falling into the past becomes a being-in-themid st -of-th~-worl d.94 The pa st is dcsc ribed as a fo r-itse lf inundated by the in-itself. "Li ke the mermaid whose human body is completed in the tail of a fish, the extra-mund ane for itseU is completed behind itself as a thing in the world."'6 The prcsent consciousness is its past, not in the mode of identity, but rather in the mod e of "an internal bond of non-being." "It is not ~y hat it is."% This means that consciousness cannot dissociatc itself from its past; it has tu be i1. But the present consciousness is a for-itself, it can neve r be identical with the past consciousnest> which has already bemme an in·itself. "In so far as it is for-itself, it is never what it iso What it is is behind i t as the perpetual su rpassed."'i7 The past, therefore, haunts the present consciousness or the for-it self as Hs original contingency. Thi s contingency Sartre call s facticity. For Sartre, the expressions "past" and " faeticit y" indi ca te one and the sa me thing. " It is precisely this surpassed facticity which we call the past. The past then is a neccssary st ructure of the for-itself."9Il The past is regarded as the essence of the present consciousness. That is why Sarlre says th at "My essence is in the past."99 The present consdousness exists as a " pure appearance." This present ex istence of cons ci ous ness prece des il s essenc e. Thus in consdousness, "existence precedes essence."IOO 2. THE PRESENT

In contrast 10 the past consciousncss which has become an in-

57

Sartre's

f.xist~,,/illlj$1f1

a"d Early Buddhism

itself, the present consdousness is characterized as the for·itself. The meaning of the present is presence to the being-in· itseif. Sartre defines the present consdousness or for-itsclf as "presence to being."lOl Consciousness i5 presence to something in so far as it is a witness of itsclf as not beiog that thing. That is, when consciousness is conscious of an objcct, it i8 implicitly aware of itself as no t being that objecL " It is consciousness 0 [ - - as the internal negation 0[ - - The structure at the basis of i1Jtentionolity mrd of se1fness is Ihe negation, whicll is the internal relation of the [or-itself to Ihe thing .... It is in the mode of thefor-itse1f; that is, os a separate existence inosnmch as it reveals itself as not being being." 102

The present, therefore, is an escape from being which is "there." It Is a perpetual flight in the face of being. Hcnce the preseot is defined as non-being. As Sartre writes: "Thus we have precisely defined the fundamental meaning of the Present: the Present is ~lOt."lro The present can never be grasped in the form of an instant, for the instant is the moment when the present isoBut the present never is; it has 00 being which coineides with itselL The present consciousness "is not" but is rather a rela tion betw een the past and the future across the chasm that is itself.1t is a "chasm" that divides non-temporal plenitude into a betore and an after, a "detotalized totality ."1O' The present consciousness is the reference point relative to which there is a past and a future "down there, in the distance. " It has being outside of it, before and behind . "Before itself, behind itself; never itseH" 105 is the description of the present. Before itself, 11 has to be its future; and behind itself, it has to be its past. "At present lt is not what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future)."11/6 3. THE FUTURE

The present is a flight out of the past into the future. Whal, then, is the future? According to Sartre, "thc future Is what I have to be in so far as I cannot be it.''107 At pr~e nt the for-itself is a la ck.

58

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

This lack or nothingness is the inner structure of the for-itself. Consciousness does not exis t first in order afterwards to lack this cr that; ir ex is ts first as lack and in immediate connection with what it lacks. llI! What the for-itself lacks is the self-as-being-in-itself Y~ It projects itsclf into the future in order to unite itself with the lacking; that is, with that which, if added to its present, would make it be what it iso Thus the for-itself is by nature the transcendence or "the project o f self beyond." 110 It is its Qwn surpassing towa rds its ideal w hicl1, if realized, would transform th e for-itself into the in-itself-for-itself. This ideal, however, is unrealizable. The future does not allow itself to be rejoined; it sli des into the past as a by-gone future, aod the foritself once again is a lack of a new future. The past is that in which all possibility is mied ou t, whereas the future "is simply my possibility of presence to b eiog beyond being."111 5artre h as defined p ossibility in these words: "What is given as the peculiar lack of each for-itself and what is s trictly defined as lacking to precisely this fo r-itself and nootner is the possibili ty of the for -itself."112 The future is regarded as a project of possibility for the reason that it presents us with a fragility of that which could be and could also not be. And it is due to the freedom of the for-i tself that the future is the possibiJity rather Ihan determination. "The future is what I would be iE I were not free and what I can have 10 be ooly because I am free."1B Thus the future is what I have to be. The relation between my present and my futureis an internat one. The meaning oE my present activities is unders tood in Ihe light of my project. "There is in my consciousness no moment which is not similarly defined by an intern a} relation 10 a future."114 The future forms the attrachon towards which I move. "Thus finality is rightly said to be CQllsality reversed- th at is, the efficacy of the futu re s tate." 115

THE EKSTATIC UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS So far we ha ve shown that the Ihree temporal dimensions, v iz. past, present and future are not discrete moments, but ralher

59

Sarlrc's Existetltialism and farb; Hu ddhism

"structured moment s" of an ori ginal "ekstatic unity." The three dimensions are related to one anothe r in the form o f inte rnal relation . And the point of relati on is the p resent which relates the past with the future. Thus original temporality of consciousness is conceived as a tOlality. For Sa ri re, consciousness is a being which exists simultaneously in all its dimensi ons. " It i5 impossible to conceive of a con sdo usncss w hich would not exist in th ese thrce dimens ion5. " 116 This is to say that consciou sness can at the sa me time fulfill these three requiremenls: (I) 10 no t-be w hat il is, (2) to be what it is not, and (3 ) 10 be wh a! il is not and 10 not-be what il iso It is "nol wha t il is" in the sense that il is not identical w Hh what il was in the pa st; and it "is what itis not" in the sense that it i5 not yel what it will be in the future. In this respect, consciou sness is a being wh ich is itself "out.. ide it5elf"; th at is, it i5 an "ambiguous" being. ll7 In this eks tatic temporality, the question of Ihe unity of conscio usness does not arise. This is b ecau se ekstati c unity is the inner structure of consd ous ness. Consciousness is no t firs t a discrete ins tant which is to be unified afterwards; consciousness is a lways already a uni ty of past, present and future. It should be remembered that, in The Trans cendeflce ofthe Ego, Sarire, following Husserl, concei ves consciousness as a discrete insta nt which is to be unified by acts of retention and protention. ll~ In Be ing arid N othing ness Sartre ha s abandoned this instantancous conce ption of consciousness, saying that this conception fail s to explain how the inst ant::; of consciousness are rel ated to one another. T he instant may be d efined as a n allegedly discrete segm ent of time, wholl y distinct from prior and pos terioI momcnts.119 1t exists in the self-inclusion of identityas a being-in-itself.lnSartre's ontology the in-Hself is an isolated being w hich does not admit any forms of rel ation with what is not itself. Thus the relation between the instants is as inconceivable as the relation between the in-itselfs. Having no relation to prio r and posterior moments, the instant is "non-temporal" and

60

THE SARTREAN CONCEI'TION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

hence eternal. For Sartre, "cternity and the instant are here equ ivalent."120 Being non-temporal, the ins tant cannot give rise to temporaHty which is succession b y nature. For this reason 5artre rejects the ins tant " which is but o ne view of the mind ." Th is view, Stlys 5artre, is held by Hu sser!. He criti ei7.es Husserl for not being able to "fTee himself horn the instantaneous coneepHon of eonsciousness."J21 If Husserl's conscious
"We smv in Ihe preceding clwpll'r IIOIV protenlions /.HIt ler in vain on Ihe window-panes aflhe pr!?sent withoul slwttering tlEcm. The same goes for rdm/ions ... collsciol/sness, as Hu sserl cO flceived it, ca/ mol in reality trallscfml itselj, eUher tOllUlfd the worM or townrd Ihr juture or fownrd tl1(~ past. "122 Having rejectcd the ins tantaneous eoneeption of consdousness, Sartre proposes the conception of co nsciousness as ekstatic unity. And the continuo us e ks tasis of consciou s ness rules out the instant. Conscious ness ca n exis t s imultaneous ly in the three ekstases of past, present and future because at the present it is nothingness. As a lack of being, consciousness is a "perpetual referring" to being outsid e itself. lt refers itself back to what it was in the past and also projects itsel( towa rd what it will be in thC' fu ture . At present consciousness is not. "As Prcsent, Past and Future- all at the same tirne-thc for-itself dispersing its being in threc dimensions is temporal due to the very fact that it nihilates itself."1ll In other words, that consciousness ex ists in the eks tatic unity is poss ible becau se consciousness is freedom. IN FREEDOM So

Dur

inquiry into original temporality leads us to another

61

-Snrtrc's Existmtilllism Qnd Enrfy Buddhism

structure of consci ousness-freedom . According to Sartre, nihilation, temporalization, freedom and choke areone aod the same thing. l 15 We have said earlier th at consciousness conditions the appearance of nothingness in the world. Consciousness, says Sartre, "has appeared to us as frecdom. " Here freedorn is n ot a property subsisting in consciousness, but rather the inner s tru ctu re of consciousness. "What w e call frcedom is impossible to distinguish from the beiog of'human reality: Man d oes not ex ist fi rst in order to be free subsequcntly, there is no difference bctween the being of man and his being free." Freedom is the stuff of the being of man. "Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes tree; he is wholly and forever fr ee or he is not free at all." lu Man is forever free, for " mall;$ condcmned tobe

free."127 Huma n reality is {ree because it can realize a nihila ting rupture with the wortd and w ith itself; and this rupture is the same as fre ed om. "For the for-itself, to be is to nihilate the in-itself whieh it iS." I28 This nihilating activ ity enables thc fo r-itself to perpctually wrench away from itself, to break off with its own past, and to tear ilself away from wh at it will be in the future. Thu s the fo r-itself is free to the exten t that it has 10 bc ils own n othingness in three dimensions: first, by ternporalizing itself, which means that it does not allow itself to be determined by its own pas t; second, by rising up as consciousness of something and of it self, which indicates thai nothing exi sts in conseiousncss; and finall y, by being transcendencc, i.c. a being which is originally a project, which is defined by its end!2'1 Sinee freedorn has no essence, it cannot be defined . "Tt is freedom w h ieh ls the foundation o f all essences." IJU In freed orn existence precedes essence. The past alone can be defined, what is happening in the present can merely bc described. Freedom, tho ugh indefinable, is describablc. Man Iearns his freedorn th rough his action; hence freedorn ean be best understood by dcscribing the s tructure o f hum an actions. The for-itself is the being whieh is defined by action. "Human reality docs notexist first in order to act laler, but for human reality, to be is 10 ad and 10 ccase to ad is 10 cease 10 be."lJl

62

r THE 5ARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Action, as opposeq to mere happening, is defined by intention. J32 The careless smoker who has through negligence caused the explosion oE a powder magazine has not acted. Man is said to be acting only when he has an intention. By intention Sartre understands "a choice oE the end."m This means that action, which entails intention, is a projection oi the for-itself towards what it is not. As Sartre writes: "Ta conceive a project for the future, or form an intention, is to think of something whkh is not yet so, but which may be 50."13-( Action is thus a project towards the end chosen. Freedom is the indispensable and fundamental coodition oE all action. 135 The proponents oE ffee will are concerned to find cases of dedsion for which there exists no prior cause, whereas the determinists contend that there is no action without cause. Sartre finds the two views unacceptable. Rejecting the theory of free will, Sartre says that every action is intentional; e
63

Sarlre's Exislentialism and EarJy Buddlrism

the system of ideal objeets of my projects. This means that eause and motive have meaning only within the ensemble of my projects. What is the difference between cause and motive? By CQlIse (moli[) Sartre understands an objective appreciation of the situation. It is generally the reason for the aet; thai is, the ensemble of rational considerations which justify it. To explain this, Sartre takes an example from history. Jf Clavis, the first king of Franee, was converted 10 Catholicism it is because hc saw an opportunity of getting into the good graces of the all powerful episeopatc whose support would be necessary for the conquest of Gau l. Here the cause of Clavis' conversion is thc politi ca l and religious state of Gaul and the relative strengths of the episcopate. It is an objective appreciation of the situation at that timt,>. Sartre points out tha t this objective appreciation can be made only in the light of a presupposed end and within the limit of a projeet towards the end. In order for the power of the episcopate 10 appear objectively to Clovis as the cause of his conversion it is necessary first for hirn 10 posit as an end hb rule on alJ of Gaul. If he had other ends, he would not see the situation oE the episcopate as a cause; hc would leave it in the state of 'unrevealed,' in a total obscurity. Thus the cause, far from detcrmining an action, appears onIy in the ligh t of a project towards an end. In (ontrast, motive (mob ile) is a subjective fa ct. "11 is the ensemble of the desires, emotions and passions which urge me to accomplish a certain acl."137 The psychologisis believe that motives are contained in thestate of consciousness. They would interpret Clovis' convcrsion as a result of his ambition. And this ambition is regarded ilS a moti ve. Sartrc's view is different trom that oE the psychologists. He says that there is no motive in consciousness beca use, as we saw, consciousness is contentless. For Sartre, "motives are onIy for consciou sness."lM Frorn Sartre's view point, Clavis' ambition is not a quality eontained in consciousness. As it is not distinct from the project of conquering, we sha ll say that this first project of his possibilities in the light of which Clovis discovers a cause for being converted is precisely the motive.'in'! 11

64

F THE SARTR EAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

THE UNDETERMINED CHOICE Now it is clear that für Sartre neither cause nor motive ca n determine action in so far as action is defined by intention, i.e. a choice o f an end. Ca usc and motive h ave mcaning only wi thin the compass of the project towards the end. "As 500n as therc

are cause and motive ... there is already a positing of ends and consequentlya choice." I40 "In fact, it is this o ri ginal choke which origina lly creates a1l causes and m otives which can guide us to parti al actions. " 141 It foll ows that an action is free inasmuch as thc original choiee is free: this is the reallocus of Sart re' s theo ry of freed orn. Hence by freedom he m edns the und etermined choke. "Freedom is th e freedom of choosing but not the freed orn of not chaasing."H2 For the for·itself, to be is to chaose itself. l~~ Sa rtre writes:

Every for ilself is a fTee choke; ('(Ich of its acts-the most illsignijica nt as weil as the most wcighty-exprcsses this clwice and em/lllOll's fTom it . This is what we have calfed OUT fTeedom. "144 I.

The for-itself is a choice because il is defined ontologica lly as a lack. "The for·jtself chooses because it is lack; freedam is reaU y sy nony mous with lack." l"'" What thc for-i tself lacks is the being-in-itself. Thc for·itself never wants la Temain a lack; it desires to unite ilself with the in-itself. The unity, if realized, would be calted the being-in-itself- for.i tsetf. Thc original choke of the fo r-ihielf is the choice of ilseU as being united \Vith thc initself. Thc unity is the id eal of the for-i tself. lts fundamental project aims at realizing this ideal. And the "secondary" projects wh ich aim at rea Hzation of a particular goal of the for- itself are based o n the fundamental project. Thus all acti on expresses a choice of the end . The acti on is not limited to itse1f; it refers immediatety to thc end chosen. And the end lies in the future. lt should be no ted here that Freud, unlikc Sarhe, thinks that the determinants of human actions derive their forces from the past, not from the future. According to Freud, action is symbolic because it expresses an

65

Sartrc's

Exist;m tiali~rn

and Ea rly

Bllddhi~rn

underlying desirewhich itself wou ld manifest a more profound complex. Thc compl ex es are constituted by the subject' s his torical si tuation. Fo rexa mple, it is the child '!; situation in thc family that determines in hirn the birth of the Oedipus complex. Such a complex, retained in thc unconscious, comes out from time to time to m otivate the subjecrs action. In this sense, human actio n canno t be tolaUy free beca use iI is determined by the impulses emanating from the unconscious. Sartre, therefo re, rcgards Freud'g theory as psychic determinism . Sartre critici z.es Freud for giving tao much importance 10 the past dimension of men. "The dimensio n of the future," writes Sartre, "docs not exist for psychoanalysis."l4b Human reality in Ihe Fre ud ian theory loses one of its ekstases and can be interpreted solely by a reg ression tow ard s the past from the stand-point of thc present. Sartre noles thai instead of understanding the action in terms of the past as Freud did, wc can conceive o f il as turning back o f the future towards th e present. Ea ch action m anifests the project towards the end in the future. Thc inferiority complex, for exa mple, is not a produ ci of my past bu t rllther "a project of my own for-ilsclf in thc world in Ihe prescnce of the o ther." w As such it is alwa ys transcendence; it is a way of choosing myself. " It is impossible seriously to cons ider the feeling of inferiority without determining it in terms of the future and of my possib iliti es."l411 Hence every action, no matter how trivial, is not the si mple eHec! of the pri or psychic sta te but rather it "is integra ted as secondary st ructure in globa l struetures and finally in the tot ality which I am." 14'i It may be argucd from the Freudian viewpoint that if it is the case that al1 acti on refers 10 thc original choice, it is possible that a choke whieh has been made in the past still motiva les Ihe adi on in the presenl; and consequently the action expresses the choke made in the past. To this, Sartre would reply thai the orig inal choice i5 always renewed; as such there i5 no question of jts motivating the action from the past. The fundamental projert, sin ce it is perpetually renewed, ü, coextens ive with the enlire life o f consciousness.

66

r

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

"Since freedom is a being-without-support and without-a-spring-

board, the project in order to be ml/st be constantly renewed. I choose myself perpetually and can never be merely by virtue of having-beenchosen; otherwise I slwuld fall info the pure and simple existence oi fhe in-itseij. "150

Since the choice is coextensive with the whole life oE consdousness, consciousness cannot stap choosing; to be conscious is to chaose. Consciousncss and choiee are one and the same thing. 151 Sartre rules out the possibility of the unconscious choice, because choke, being idcntical with consciousness, must of necessity be non-thetic consciousness oE choke. Consciousness, therefore, is free choke. Choke is said to bc absurd, not because it is without reasons, but because it is beyond reasons. It is by choice that "all foundations and all reasons corne into being." 152 This is to say that freedom is a choice of its being but not the foundation of Hs being. If it were its own foundation, it would be necessary that frecdom should decide its being-free; that is, it should be a choice of itself as freedom. If freedom were ta choase its being-free, this wauld suppose that the passibility of being-free and thc possibility of not being free exist equally befare the free choice of freedom. Since to choose between the two alternatives presuppases another prior freedarn which would chaose being-free, this would lead to infinite regress. "In fact, we are a freedom which chooses, but we da not chaase to be free. We are condemned to freedom, as we said earlier, thrown into frcedom or, as Heidegger says, 'abandoned."'153 Human reality is' candernned' to freedom because it does not choose to be free. Nar can it stop choosing. This is because "not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose."I54 Even suicide is a choice and affirmation of being. 155 So human reality "is not free not to exist or not to be free."I56

FACTICITY OF FREEDOM Freedom is "total and infinite." Sartre rejects all farms of deterrninisffi. He then tries to cope with the dassical arguments

67

Sllrtre's Existentinlism nnd E"rly Brflldhism

against absolute freed om. Th c determinists say that man is not free becau se he is subject 10 heredita ry and environme nta l p ressures. Hi s frcedom is limitcd by h is fam ily, nation ality, language, sex, etc. Man secms to encounter resistance <md obsta cle cVl:'rywhere. To these objections, SOl ftre replies, firs t o f all, that frc edom does not m ca n the ability 10 o btain wh a t one has wished. " In ather w ords su ccess is not important 10 freed om."157 T he ph iloso ph ica l not ion of (reed orn, wh ich Sart re accepts, m eans only "the auton omy of choiee." l58 It is true that there is certain g iven d atum which prevents full exerdse o f freedorn . Neverthelcss the resi stance is not a li mit to freedorn but rather CI neccssa ry cond ition fo r Hs appeara nce. "Th ere can be a free for-itself ooly a::; engaged in a res is ling world . Outs ide of this engagem ent th ~ nations af freedam, of determinism, of necessity lose all mea ning.''159 The g iven in itself d oes not restrain free d orn; it is neutral. Just as cause and m otive are cons tituted ilS su ch only wi lhin the comp ass of th e end, so also the given is r~v eal cd as rcs is tan ce u r as a id o nl y in the light o f human proje c t ~. Thc rock, for exam ple, can show its rcsis tance only to the moun taineer wh o ma kes a project o f sca lin g. For the simple tou rist whose project is a pure Oles lhetie appreciation o f thc landscape, th e rock is not revealed eith er OlS scalable or as not-scalable; it is either beautiful or ug ly . The givcn is a pa rt of fa ctici ty of [reed orn. By faeticity Sa rtre means " the given which it (freedorn ) has to be and which it illu mina les by Hs projecl."".o And the synthe tic organizatio n of fac ticity illu m inate d by free dorn constitutes 'situ ation .' Ta en oose is to choose in situation . Man, thereiore, is callcd " being-in-s it uation."lbl Sa rtre w ri tes: "Therc is [reedo rn only in a si tuation and th ere is a s ituation onIy through freed om.'''62There are fi ve s truclural as pects of the s itu ation : my pI ace, m y past, my en vironmen t, m y [elto wmen, and my dea lh.

A. My Place "My pIace" is thc present pla ce I li ve in. It presupposes d ifferen t places in whi eh 1 lived going back 10 Ihe place o f m y birth .

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THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

It is frorn this original place that I shift to other places. The de-

terminist says that the choice of one place exeludes the choice of other places. Sartre points ou t that freedom can ex ist only in restricted form since (reedorn is choke . Every choice implies elimination and selection; that is, every choi ce is a choice of hnitude. "Thus free dom can be truly free only by. constituting facticity as its own restriction. "I6J Same may say that the occupation of a place restricts my freedorn of travelling; [ am not free to go to Chicago because of the fact that [ am a minor government officiaJ at Bangkok. According to Sartre, place in itself is neutral. It is revealed as an obstacle or as a help only in the light of my project towards a certain end. "Thus ou r freedom itself creates the obstac1es from which we suffer."I!>4- It i5 freed orn which causes our place to appea r as a resistance by positing its end. B. My Pa st My past is what I have been. In so far as I exist, I cannot lack having a past. The for-itself "co mes into the world with a past."I~ "Dur 3cls," says the proverb, " foll ow after us." Does this rnean that the past determines my action? It appears to the determinists that man is not free because his present existence is determined and influenced by his past. This view is not acceptable to Sartre. According to hirn, the past is perpetually 'in suspense,' because I can freely give a new meaning to it. And the meaning I give depends upon my present proiect. " By projecting myself towa rds my ends, I preserve the past with me, and by action I decide its meaning." I66 Hence it is my choice of the future goal that deci des the meaning of my past. And it is within the compass of my project that the past is manifested as the motivation of my present action. As Sartre has pointed out: "Thus like place, the paSI is inlegraled will, lI,e sitllQt ;011 when Ihe for-itself by ils choice 01 future conlr.rs on its past facticity a va/ue in terms olwhieh this fa eticity motivates the aet and eonduct of Ihe foritself. "167

69

Snrlre's Existentialism lind ElIrly Bllddhism

C. My Environment

My environments (elltours) are n ot the place which I occu py but the instrumental th ings which surround m e with their coefficients of adversity and utilily. They are tools w hich h .. vc th eir value and resis tance. The syntheti c orga nization of the lools cons titutes the unity of my Umwelt , and this Umwelt ca n bc reveaJ ed onl y within the limits of a fr ee projectY''l A tool is in ilsclf indiffere nt; it offers n ei ther help nor resista nce. It is only within my project thai the tool becomes my ad versily or utiJity. Suppose I wish 10 arrive at the next town as qu ickly as possible und 1 plan to go there by bicycle. Si ncc the bicycle ha s a nat tire, it offen, rcsistan ce. Thi s bicyde is revealed as resistance beeause J havc chosen il for a tide; il is included in my project. This ilIus Inltion sh ows that "the adversity of things and their potentialities in general are illuminated by thc end chosen ."16~ Thu s Sartfc's positi on regarding environments is thc sa m e as that oI place; bOl h are neutral, it is my fr ee project which m akes th em an
11 is no l by me alone that meanings corne to instrum enta l th ings. Living in the world, I encountcr my fellowrnen who also put meanings into things. I find myself engaged in an al read y m ea ningful wo rld wh ich ref(ect!; 10 me m ea nings wh ich my {ree project has n ot given 10 them. I come aeross instruction, direelions, orders, prohibitions which are addres.'icd to m c and which 1 have 10 obey if I do not w ant to take the wron g street, to miss the train, to bea rres ted, ete. My {reedom secms to be limited by thc existcnce of the O ther. Moreover, through the Other arise certain determ inati ons whi eh I am with ou t having ch osen; that i!:', for the Oth er I am Asian, rich, ugly, ete. Thus the true limit o f my freedom lies in the fact that the Other apprehends me as thc O lher- as-object, and that my s ituation becom es for hirn an objective formYo These two characterislic limits represent the boundaries of my freedom. Sa rtre, however, points ou t that by

70

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

rny free recognition of the Other's freedorn Irecover my beingas-object.lf, on the contrary, I consider the Other as pure object, then a11 determinations frorn the Other disappear irnmediately. Since "I can apprehend the Other as a freedorn only within the free project of apprehending hirn as such," it is nothing but rny freedom which allows the Other's freedorn to impose limit on it. Sartre, therefore, admits that there is limit of freedom-the limit which comes frorn freedorn itself. "Just as thought according to Spinoza can bc limited only by thought, so freedom can be limited only by freedom."17l

E.My Death The realists consider death as a door opening upon the nothingness of human reality, as something non-human. This realistic conception of death is not acceptable to Sartre who regards death as a human phenomenon. "It is the phenomenon of my personallife which rnakcs of this Hfe a unique life-that is, a hfe which does not begin aga in, a life in which one never recovers his strake." Heidegger also accepts this humanization of death and defines Dasein as being-towards-death (Sein-ZIIm-Tode).172 "Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost."173 Death is for Dasein the capital possibility from which all other possibilitics dcrive their status. Unlike Heidegger, Sartre does not consider death to be a possibility of the for-itself. Fur hirn death is "the nihilation of all my possibilities."174 Death as the externailimit of life does not make limit of my freedorn. "The freedom which is my freedorn rernains total and infinite. Death is not an obstacle to my projects; it is only a destiny of these prajccts elsewhere." Death is the externailimit which the for-itself will never encounter for when death is there, the for-itself is no longer there.

RESPONSIBILITY It is dear from the foregoing discussion that situation is not a limit to freedom, but rather a necessary condition for the ap71

$artTi" S Existrntia/ism and Ellrly Buddhism

pearance of frcedom. Without limit, freedorn is absolute . What necessarily follows fro m absolute freedorn is rcspon..<;ibility. By responsibility Sartre simply means "consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object." 1 a m rcsponsible for giving meanings to things, Le. for being thc "author" of thc situ ation, the world and the valuc. In fact, I arn responsiblc for all things cxcept fo r my responsibility, because I am not the fuundation of rny being. Sartre writes:

"Therejore everylhing takes "Iace as if f were compelled 10 b{~ responsible. I am abandoned in the world. ill the sense thai 1 filld 11Iyselfsuddell/y alone and without hdp, ellgaged in a world for which 1 bear the wilole resporlsibility withou t being able, wlm tem'r 1 da, to tear myselj away from tllis responsibility for an instant ."175 It is precisely this constant awareness of respons ibility that

plungcs the for-itself into anguish.

ANGUISH Anguish of thc tor-itself is anxicty resulting from the awareness of itself CIS fre edom. Since it is nothin gness, the for-itseH cannot appeal to any a priori "human nature" for guidance in making a choicc. Finding itself alone and without help, it teels insecure ,md anxious. According to Sartre, angu ish is different from fear. "A situation provokes fear if there is a possibility o f my life being ch anged from without; rny being provokes allg uish to the extent that r distrust myself and my own reactions in that situation. " In other words, fear 1S unreflective a pprehension of the Iranscendcnt object as a danger for me whereas anguish is ref1ecti ve apprehension o f myself as freedoffi . That is why Sa rtre says that "anguish is born as a structure of the reflective consciousness"11io and that "it is in angu ish that man gets the consciousness of his freed om." According to Sartre, there are three kinds of anguish: anguish in the fa ce of the future, anguish in the face of the past and ethical anguish. . Fi rst, anguislt in theface o[ the future is "precisely my conscious-

72

r THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION Oll CONSCIOUSNESS

ness of being my own future, in the mod e of not-being." In this sense I am in anguish becau se ( am awarc that my present being cannot deternüne my action in the future. What I will do is a mere possibility. Anguish arises when I recogn ize a possibility as my possibilily and see myself separaled from the fut ure. FOT example, walking on a narrow path along a precipice, I feel an-

guish at the thought that I may possibly throw myself Qve r the precipice at any time and nothing prevents me frorn doing such a thing. Hcre anguish implies the apprehensionof th rowing my-

seH over the precipice as "my" possibility. Secondly, anguish in the face 0/ the past arises because ·'man is always separated by a nothingness from his essence," 177 Essence is all that human reality apprchends in itself as hav ing been. Man is in anguish bccause he realizes that wha t he was cannot determinc what he is.lnclud ed in this type is the angui sh of the gambier who has freely and sincerely decided not to gamble any more and who, on approaching thc gaming lable, suddenly sees the to tal inefficacy of the past solution. He perceives with anguish that nething prevents hirn from gambling. Finally, everyday morality is not exclusive of ethical anguish. There is ethical anguish when [consider myself in my original relation to va lues. For Sartre, va lues da not have real being. "for every value wh ich would base Hs ideal nature on its being would thereby cease even to be a va\u e." Value is beyond being. l78 I am "a beil1g by whom values exist."t79 And I feel anguish because nothing justifies adopting this or that particular value or sca le of va lues. "My freed orn is anguished at being the foundation of valu es while itscH withaut foundation."lllO BADFAITH Man is hardly in pure anguish because most of the time he nees anguish in bad (alth (mauvaise foi). Thus bad {aith is the attempt to flcl' anguish. It is dl'scribed as sl'lf-deccp tion or a lie to onese1f,181 for it tries to hide freedom from oneself. Bad faith is an attitude of excuscs, i.e. a refusa l to recognize what I am, narnely, a being who is both facticity and transcendence. "These two

73

SartrC'$ ExistcntiaJism lind Early Buddhism

aspects of human reality a re and ought 10 be capable of a valid coordinati on. But bad faüh does not wish either to coordinate them cr to s urmount them in a sy nthesis." These statements indi ca te th at bad faith does not sOlely consi st in the d enial of one's transcendence in order to fl ee ang uish; it also consists in the denial of onc's facticity and overemphasis on one's tran· scendence. In the case of the d enial of transcendences, a man of bad faith looks at himseH as a thing. an in· itself. What Sartre ca lls "tlle spirit 0/ seriousness"l81. may be regarded as a typical example of bad faith o f this kind . Man is serious when he takes himself for a thing, i.e. a being·in· the·midst·of·the-wodd. The serious m an is "of the world" and never imagines the possibility of getting out of it, fo r he has given to himself the type of ex istence of the rock. For Sa rtre the material ists are revolutionaries because they apprehend thernselves in terms of the world which oppresses them and they want 10 change this world . So the revolutionaries are se rio us . "Marx pro posed the origina l dogm a of the serious when he asserted the priority of object over subj ec t. "l~' Sy ta king himself for a thing, the serious man overemphasizes bs facticity while denying his transcendence; he is in bad faith . Man is in another type of bad faith if he overemphasizes h is transcendence and denies his fa cticity; that iso if he looks upon himself as pure {reedorn without commitment and responsibil ily. Hi s freedorn rernains aloof and independent; it is an empty, d etached freedo rn. In contrast with the scrious man who sinks into the warld in seriousness, the man of pure freed om tries to flee from the world. üres tes, the hero in The Flies, is in bad faith of this kin d. He cornmits a crirne withou t guilt or anguish. He asserts that "I am free. Beyond anguish, beyond remorse."It14 Moreover, ü resles spurns Zeus' offer of the throne of Argos in exchange for repudiation o f his crirne; he wants to remain detached even in his new-found situated fre ed orn. His ideal of freedorn appea rs to be self-defeated because, as Sartre says, outside the situation the nation of freedorn loses all meaning. l85 According to Sa rtre, it is no t possible fo r man to flee fro m the world. "We in 110 case get out 0/ a" existing world."Ifi.6 To regard

74

I_~,"",",:::~=o::::;:,.::,== I

faith. That one flees anguish in ba d faith is a fact of life; it is a type of being in the w o rld. It is neither good nor bad in itself. Saftre. however, goes beyond his phenomenologica l description in making a va lue judgement that the being of the man of bad faith is "corrupted."lR7 Sa rtre's evaluative analysis is show n by his blunt condemnation of the "cow ards" who hide frorn them · selves their total freed orn eithcr in thc spirit of seriousness o r by determinis tic excuses. l88 This e va luative a nalysis makes Saftre enter the sphere of what is known as exi stentiali st ethi cs, for his description becomes a "moral description."l!19 [0 Sa rtre'$ ethics, freed o m is regarded as tl1e goal of man's life; it is the end in itself. Saftre says:

"Furthermore r call pronounce a moral judgement. For I declare that freedom, in respect of concretc circumsfances, can have no other end ond oim but itself; tmd wllen once 0 man has seen IIrot valucs depend lipO M himself in that state 0/forsoken ness /IC can will only one thing, und timt is freedom os /oundation 0/ oll va/ues. "1 90 Man wills "free dom for freedom 's sake." As such, m an shou!d Iiberate h imself h orn bad faith in order to re-discover his hidden freedom. But the ques tion is: How can m an escape badfaith? It is said thatmanofbad faith is hiding the truth frorn himself, he is not s incere to himself. Is it possible for m
75

Sartre's

Exislcm tialism al1d Ea rly Bllddhism

is itsclf in bad fait h. Sincerity is not possible beca use man cannot be wh at hc iso lf man could be wh at he is, then bad faith would no t be possible. "Thus in o rder for bad faith to be possible, sineeTity itself must be in bad faith." 19.1 GOODFAITH Man, theTefore, cannot escape bad faith by practising sincerity. Seing in bad faith, man has a very rare chance fo r escape. As SaTire himself has pointed out: "Onee this mode of being has been realized, it is as difficult to get out of il as to wake oneself up; bad faith is a type of being in the world, like w aking or drcaming, which by itself tends to perpetuate ilself."I94 This d oes not mean thai bad faith is inescap able. According 10 Sartre, man can escape bad faith by a "radical conversion." Th e radical conversion supposes "a seH-recovery of being which was previously COTrupted."I95 Thisself-recovery SaTtre call s "n utllell ficily" or "goodfaith." '96 What would good faith be Iike? We have already seen thai bad fa ith is a refusal to recognize that man is both fa cticity and transcendence. As opposed to this, good faith would be a "valid coordination" of fa cticity and transcendence. The man o f good faith is always awarc thai he is a fTeedom-insituation. He neither sinks into the world in seriousness nor fl ees from it through total detachment. He takes freedorn 10 be the goa l of his actions. Sartre writes: "The actions of men of good faith have, as their ultimate significance, the quest of freedorn itself as SUCh."I'Il The man of good faith is aware that he i5 the being by whorn valucs exist. In making a choice, he feels anguish because he knows th ai "nothing, absolutely nothing, juslifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this O f that scale of values."1~8 Sartre portrays a m an of good fai th in several of his litera ry writings. For example, in Tlte Age of ReasoIJ, Sartre says of Mathieu : "He could do what he liked, no one l1ad the right 10 aduise hirn, Illere would be fOT him no CODd Ifor Evif u"less he bTOllght Ihern into being ... He was .. . free and alO1!e, witl10ut assistallce and without

76

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNE55

ereuse, condeff/ned to decide wi/hollt support [rom any qua rter, condemned for ever 10 be free ." 199 And in The Devil (lnd The Good Lord, Coetz. says:

"There was 110 one but myself; I alone decided Oll Evil; and J alone invenfed Cood. [t was 1 WilD cheated, I who worked miracles . I who aCCllsed myse/f today, , alone wllO can absolut' myself; I, man. If God exists, man is nothing; if man exists ... God doesn't exist. "200 SARTREAN ETHICS It is dear frorn the foregoing: discussion that in the sphere of ethics Sartre is a subjectivist becausc he rnaintains that good and evil are invented by man. Sartre rcjects thc existence of fixed, objective va lues and moral principles. According to him, man cannot have recourse to any moral principles for guidance; he has to invent them for himsclf. The suggestion that Sartre can give to a pe rson who is in moral perplexity is that "you are free, therefore choose-that is to say, lnvent." Nothing teils man what to choose. "One can choose anything, but only if it is upon the plane of free commitment." Thus free choke is the foundat10n of morality. Once one makes a free choice, there is no possibility of a moral mistake. Whatever I choosc is right for me. "Whenever a man chooses his purpose and his commitment in a1\ clearness and in all sincerity, wh Atever that purpose may be, il is impossible to preIer another for hirn." This position creates one difficulty. If man can never be wrong in making a free choice, he can ncver be right, since these notions are intcrrelated. And if man ca n bc neither right no r wrong. how can he be praised or blamed, and how can he be responsible?

DESIRE

In Sartre's ethi cs, freedorn is regarded as the goal of all actions. Freedom, however, is not the ideal which man desires to realize. Fundamentally man is the dcsire to be. l O' Desire is defined 77

~ ! Snrtre's Existcntralism ITnd Early Buddh ism

as "A lack of being." (n thi ~ respcct, desire has its root in the nothingncss o f human reality. Being a void or cmptiness, human reality wants to fill itself with the fun positivity of the initself; thai ü;, i( d esires to be the in-itself-fo r-itself. The id eal is to be identified with the in-itself and yet 10 remain as ffee consci ousness. This ideal is unrealizable because a11 identification with thc in-itself requires the disappearancc of consciousness. Hencc human reality has desired 10 realize the unrea li zable ideal: And in eve ry case of desire Ihere is frustr ation. "Ma n is Il seless passiol1."201 This passion is a cause of man's suffering. " Human reality thereforc is by na ture an unhappy consciousneS!i w ith no possibility o f surpassi ng Hs unha ppy sta te." There is no possibility of cessa tion af suffering b ecause desire is neither sa tiable nor destructible. Desire cannat be got rid of for the reason that il is the inner s tructure o f consciousness. Ta be conscious is to d es ire the in-itself. Thus the des truction of desire requires the extinction of co nsciousness. Where there is consciousness, Ihere is desire. Such adesire manife sts itself in seve ral concrete forms s uch as jea lo usy, g reed, courage, love of art, ete., but alt of them afC reducib le to either adesire to be cr a desire to have. "Ultimalely adesire ca n be only the desire 10 be or the desire 10 have."2!lJ The latter expresses itself in the fo rm of an a ppropria tion or possession. It is by the appropriation o f objects that the projecl 10 have aims at realizing the same value as thc desire 10 be. The appropriation "is nothing save the symbol o f the id ea l of th e for-it se lf or value." Th rough th e appropri ation human reality tries to unHe itself with the in-itself. is fl magietli relation; I am tho:;e objects whicll l possess , but ou tside, so to speak, Incing myself, I crente tllem as independent 01 me; whal I possess is mine outside me ... without it I " P OSSl'S$iQfI

um nothing

saVt"

a flothi"xness whieh possesses ... "204

Thus the desire to have and the desire to be have the same gOill, i.e. the id entification of the for·itself with the in-itself. That is why they are inseparable. " It is impossible 10 find a d esire to

78

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION O F CONScrOUSNESS

be wh ich is not accompanied by a desire to have, a nd conversely."2I!S Desiring to be the in-ilsclf-fo r-itself, man performs action. As such, the desire to be seems to be the driving force of human action. Man does no t chaase his idea l, for there is no ather ideal to be chosen except the in-itself-for-itself. Every choice presuppases alternatives, but in the case o f the ideal there are none. Man is not free not to choose his ideal, for he is under the compulsion of the desire to be. ln this respec!, Sartre's liberta ri an ism is logically posterior to the d esire to be: man cltooses, not Ih c 1/[limate end, but l1Ierdy tlle menus thereto. Sa rire, thcrdore, is a libertarian with respect tn th c means, and ad eterminist with respect 10 the end . Nevertheless the end, unlike the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle, docs not exercise av er man an attra ction frorn outside, it is not the externa! cause. Thc relation betwcen man and his ideal is an interna l one. The ideal is wh at man has to be. He projects hirnself towards it in order to fu lfill his desire. Here wc find that the desire i5 the cause of man's search for completeness which is the unrealizable ideal. Since the search is bound 10 en d up in frustration, the desire to be is the cause of man's su ffer ing. Sartre'5 ethi cs offers no re medy foe such a suffe ring. ASUMMARY

So {ar we ha ve cansidered in some detail Sartre's conception of co nsciousness. Now we shall s umrnarize what emerges frorn the fo regoing discussions. Consdousness is defined by intentionality; aU consciousnes.s i5 a rcvea ling intuition of some lhing. Emptied of all egalogical structurc, consciousness is contentlcss; neither object nor image is in consciousness. Sinee a1l being is on the side o f the object, consciousness is a total emptiness or nothingness. The being of consciousncss is ca Hed the for -itself which is described as "being wh at it is not, and not being what it is." lt i5 a negation o f the being of the object o r the in-itself which is "what it is ." Although it Is a lack of being, consciousness 'exists' as a pure appearance

79

-Surlre's

Exi~l tI1 tillli$m

und Enrly Buddhism

to the extent th at it is implicitly conscious of itself whenever it is positionally conscious of the object. This iS to say that consciousness 'is' in the mode of sc lf- conscious ness or se H transparency. Thus, consdousness is necessarily self-conscious. Consdou sness isc tempora l; it has being outside of H, before and behind. Before itself, it has to be its future; and behind itself, it has to bc its past. At present it is not wha t it is (past) and it is what it is not (future). Its being is therefore arnbiguous. Consciousncss is not instantaneous; it is an ekstatic unity of past, present and future. And consciousness can exist simultaneously in the Ihree dimensions beca use it is freedom. Freedom here is uscd in the sense of spontaneity and undetermined choice. Bein g aware of Hs own freedorn, consciousness feels anguish and Iries 10 fl ee it by putling itself in bad faith . As a lack of being, eons eiou sness desires to fill itself with the in-itself. lts ideal isc to be thc in-itself-for-itself. But this ideal is unrealizable. rts d esire becomes a uscless p assion. Being unable to realize its ideal, consciousness is subj ect 10 canstant frustration and suffcring; it is unhappy consciousnescs with no possibiHty of surpassing Hs unhappy sta te. A REVIEW OF NOTHINGNESS In retrospeel, we find that nothingness is one of the most impo rtant coneepts of Sartre' s consciousness. Wilhout referring to no thingness, Sar tre canno t ilccount foe the notions o f freedom, tem porali ty and desire. As we have aJready seen, consciousncss is freedom bccausc it does not belong 10 the causa l order of the world; it is not anything in the world. Consciousness can cxisl simultaneously in the dimensions of past, present and future because at present it is not and has 10 be its pas t and Hs future. And fin ally, consdousness is the desire 10 be sinee it is a lack of being, i.c. nolhingness. Having seen how the notion of nothingness is cJosely tied with the other three nctions, we are not surprised 10 find this sta tement in Beillg nnd Nothi ngness: "Freedom, choke, nihilation, temporalization are all one and the same thing."206 Thus the conception of consciousness as nothingness

80

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

may be regarded as a 'prcmise' which provides justification for the other notions of consciousness. The tHle o( the book, Being and Nothingness, bears testimony of the significanee of this co n ~ cephon. If the n otion of nothingness is rejected, then the other notions related to it w ill lose their ground. Thc question now is: Can the concepbon of consciousness as nothingness be justifi ~ able in Sartre's Qwn fram ework? From Sartre's viewpoint, the reality of nothingness is iu sti~ fied onIy when it can bc described by ph cnomeno logical descriptions, i.c. when it is given to our intuition. Sartre does not explain how nothingness is given to intuition. Wh a t he says is: " It is necessary that in same way Nothingness be given."w But in what wa y? We tend to think th at noth ingness is in no way given to intu ition. If consciousness were nothingness, its non.being would not be given to phenomenological rc fl eetion . This is because con..'iciou sness is consciousness of samething, it cannot be conseiousness of nothing. Hcnce the reality of noth~ ingness canno t be described by phenomenologica l d es<:ription . To do jus tiee to Sartre, one may say that consciousness does not posit nothingness as its object, rather it i5 im plici tly aware of nothingness in the mode of se lf~am sciousness . Being aware of something, eonsciou5ness is a ware of itscH as not being that thing. It 15 in this way tha t eon5ciousness is awa re 01 its own nothingness. In this sense nothingness means " no~thing" er not~ b e ing~thi s ·thin g. It i5 s imil ar to the PI atonie notion of 'otherness.' In the Sophist, Plato says that ' what-is-not' is id en ~ tified with otherness.2!lfI Sa rtre, following Plato, maintains that nothingncss means a "being-othcr~th an~object. " "To be other th an being," writes Sa rtre, "is to be self·conscious in the unity of the temporalizing ckstases .. . For the onIy way in whieh thc other can ex is! as o ther is to be consciousness (of) being other." M This interpretation of nothingness ereates one difficulty . If nothingness simply m ea ns "b ei ng- othe r~th an~ obj ee t, " the n nothingncss is no t a nega tion of being. This IS because o ttlerness does not imply non·being. "That which is not" is said 10 mean "not so mething eontrar y to what exists but only something different. "110 Thc different is s impl y " the n ot

81

Sarlre's Existen!ialism and Early Buddhism

so-and-so" - anything that exists but is defined negatively as different from something else. Thus what is not a book is not a non-being, but merely something else; and just the fact that consciousness is not Hs object does not necessarily imply that consciuusness is a non-being. In The Tragic Firmle,211 WHfrid Desan remarks that in the tabula rasa conception of mind one can s peak of mind as nothingness in the sense of potentiality which by knowing can bccome anything; it is nothingness in thc sense that it is not yet what it will know. lt is not a non-being in its own structu re. Yet, in order 10 grasp what it i5 not, it ought tu be a nature different frorn its ' material' object and may thercfor e be char ~ctc riz ed as immatcrial. In spite of allthis difficulty, Sa rtre maintain s thai consciousncss i~ nothingness in the sense o f non-being. He g ivcs a ll being to the object and c1iminatcs all positi vity from consciousness. By throwing the whole being into thc in-itseH, Sartre makes consciousne:,S empty and vacant. Yet it has severa l activitics to perform; worldliness, spatiality, quantity, values, instrumental· ity, temporality-all come into being through thc activitics of consciousncss. Thus con'iciousness may be dcscribed as activity despite vacuity. In an aptly turned phrase, Wilfrid Desan has remarked that the Sa rtrean consciousness "IJas nofl!ing to be und nlf tu do."212 Thc question now i5: Can a consciousness which is a non-being have energy for performing activities? We think that non-being can neither aet nor think. To think is to be. In order to perform Hs activi ties, consciousness mus t exist. Sartre, howcver, arrivcs at thc conclusion that consdousncss is nothingness after he has removed allthe contents, cspecially the transcendental ego, out of it. Without thc ego, consciousncss i5 contl:!ntlcss and thereby nothingness. It appears to us th at Sartre' s concepti on of consciousness as nothingncss is the ncccssa ry outcome of his rejection of the transcendental ego. Sy taking consciousness to be nothingness, Sar tre is able to differenti atc the being~for-itself from the being.in-itself. In fact, Sartre's phenomenoJog ical ontology can stand only when thc transcendental ego is rejected; that is, when all being is put on the side of the objecl and consci ousness is nothing. Conscious-

82

THE SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSClOUSNESS

ness the n is es tablished as a revealing intuition of being. Through phenomeno logical description of consciousness, Sartre discovers the realm of being. He offen; the phenomcn o logical theory of being as a negated unity-a totality detotalized by the nihilating acti vity o f consciousness. Thu s Sartre's rej ection of thc transccndental ego is a prercquisite condition for the possibility of his ontol ogy_ Ju s t as Husserl fi nds it neccssary 10 introducc the transcendental ego if he wants to characterize the phenom enologica l sphere, so also Sartre finds it necessary to reject the transcend en ta l ego if he wants 10 establish his phenomenological ontology. Sartre's pu rpose in rejecting Ihe ego is different trom thai of the ea rl y Buddhist wh o rejects thc permanent self or tl/man for both theoretical and practica l purposes. HOl\! does the Budd hist reject the self? ls that self the Ramc as Husserl's transcendental ego? We shaJl try to answer these and other questions in thc next chapter.

NOTES

2

3 4

5 6 7 B 9

Sartte, ]-P., "Col"Isciousnes s of Self aod Kn o wledgt! of Self", N. L.lwrence .md 0 O'Connor (cds.), Read;ugs in Existential Phwomrno!ogy, Prentice- Hall, 1967, p. 124. Sartre, J-P., Tlw TrrHlscrnde ncf of Ihr Ego, tr. by F. Williams and R. Kirkpatri ck, Noond ilY Press. 1959, p. 38. Satire, J-P., Imagil/ll/ iO/I: A P!lych% gical Cri/ iquf, Ir, by F. WiIIiilms, The University of Michigan Press, 1972, p. 146. TE. 40-42. TE. 21, 98. SatIn?, J-P., Imaginat ion. A Psyc1w/l!gim l CflliqUf, p. 115. Sarlre,J-P., Thl' P~ycllOloSY (lf lm aginMirm, Ir. by B, frechtman, M ethucn, 19n, p. 27. TE. 98-9. Sart re, J- P., Beil1.~ rind Nofllillglli'sS, Ir. by Hazcl E. Barnes, Pocke t Uooks, N e w Yo r!.;, 1%6,

10 11 12 13

TE . 100. TE. 42; BN . 17. SN. 786.

14

BN. 17.

p. 16n.

BN.725.

83

Sartre's Existclltialism lind Early Buddhism

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37

Ja 39 -10 41

42 43 44 4S 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58

BN 14 . TE. 40. DN 787. BN.12. TE. 40. SN. 15. SN. 11. BN.12. Danto, A.C., Sarfre, Fontana, 1979, p. 59. BN. 11. ßN .12. TE. 47. TE. 44, SN . 11. BN.579. BN. 23, 786. SN. 790. BN.650. ß N. 23-4. SN . 23. BN.9. H usserl B.ldcas, tr. byW.R. 6 oyce Gibson, Georgc Allen & Unwin, 1969, ~. 98, p. 287. SN. 318. SN.21. BN.722. Smt re, J-P., lmllxintllion: 11 Psyd/O/ogictl/ Criliqllc, p. 1 16 . SN. 25. The s ubtitlc o ( L ·Circ "I le N ffa ut is "essai d 'ontologie phcno me no lugiq uc ." BN . 785. Heideggcr, M., Bemg alld Tim", tr. by l o hn Macquilrrie and Edward Robinson, Basil BJackwell, 1978, p. 62. BN.29. RN . 29. BN.28. I3 N.17. SN. 723. SN . 786. BN.786. SN. 217. SN. 252. SN. 11 6. BN.19. BN.86. BN.I72. SN. 17. SN 786.

84

1I i L

TH E SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 59 6[) 6\ 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74 75 76

77 78 79

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

100 101

102 103 ]04 105

SN. 49. SN. 786. SN. 790. SN. 791. SN.36. SN. 37. SN. 43. BN.38. SN.42. ON . 42. SN . 42. SN. 40. SN. 56. SN. 56. SN. 55. SN. 121 . SN . 57. SN. 59. BN. 57-8. SN. 138, 567. BN. 40. BN . 176. SN. 29. SN. 202. SN. 223. BN. 222. SN. 159. SN. 28-9. SN. 203. SN. 190. SN. 159. SN. 163. SN. 168. SN. M. ON. 174.. SN. 172. SN. 207. SN. 179. SN. 197. BN . 197. ON . 175. SN. 725. BN.l77. SN. 179. aN. 179. SN. 221. SN. 201.

85

• SarIre':; Ex;s lenl ;lIlism lind fArly Buddhism

106 107 108 109 110 Ul H2 113

138

BN. 179. BN. IH2. SN. 139. SN .138. BN . 52. BN. I85. BN. 147. BN. ]86. SN . 181-2. SN . 182. BN .197. BN . 196. ßN. 145 n . See above, pp 29-30 Ft:!ll, J.P., Heidrgger and Sarire, C olumbi~ Uni ve rsity Press, New York, 1979, p. 3 1. BN.I90. BN.599. SN. 162. BN .202. Bhadra, M.K., A Critical Study ofSar!re' s OntaJogy of C() IlSdOIlSI!r~S, The Universily of Burdwan, 1976, p. 129. BN. 599. BN. 60. BN.60. BN . 569. SoHlTe, J-P., Existt:J!/ili/iMllllld Hllma nis m. Ir. by r. Mairt'l. Eyrc Methuen, La ndon, 1980, p. 34. S N . 567. SN . 584 . BN.566. BN. 613. BN. 613. BN . 614. Warnock, M., The Philo50phy of SarI re. Hutchinson University Library, 1972, p. 113. SN . 563.

139

SN. 564.

140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

SN. 576. SN. 71. SN. 578-9. BN.594. BN. 598. SN. 618-9. BN .568. SN. 764. SN . 722.

114 115 116

117 11 8 119 ]20 121 122 123 124 125

126 127 128 129 130 131

132 133 134 135 136 137

86

THE SARTREAN CONCEITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157

ISS 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 In 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189

190 191 192 193 194 195

BN . 59O. BN.591 . BN.592. SN. 591 . BN . 617. BN. 595. BN . 616. BN . 623. BN. 619. BN . 616. BN. 625. BN. 621 . BN . 622. BN . 621. BN .629. BN . 701. S N. 629. BN . 636. BN. 635. BN. 197. BN . 640. BN. 647. BN. 648. BN. 652. BN. 672. BN . 674. BN. 673. BN. 682. Heidegger, M., op.cit., p. 277. Ibid. p. 294. BN . 687. BN. 700. BN.7m . BN . 710. BN. 65. BN.78. BN. 65. BN. 68. BN . 72. BN. 76. BN. 143. BN.76. BN. 76. BN. 87. BN .98. BN. 740, 7%. BN .741.

-

87

Sart r~'s

1% 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 2Ot'i 207 208 209 210 211 212 213

214 21 5 21 6 21 7 218 219 22D 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230

Existentialism und Early Buddhism

J- p" Tim'" Plays: Altona, Men With0111 SlIaMws, The Flies, Pcnguin Books, 1981, p. 303. SN. 62I. SN (Philosophical Library, Ncw York, p. 56), p. 3 12. SN. 11 6n, Sarire, J-P., Exis tentialism and Humanism, p. 52. SN. 79fo , Ex istentialis m und Humanism , p. 5 l. SN. 105. SN. 100-101 . SN. 112. BN . 11 3. EIN. 11 6n, SN. 116n. Exis lcnl illiislIl and H umanis lII, p. 5I. BN. 76. $.utre, J-P., The ASI.'!if Rcastm, Ir. by Erle Sutton, Penguln Books, 1982, pp. 242-3. Sarire, J- p; TI1/' Devil and Tht Good Lmd lind Tw!) Ot/lCr Plays, Vintage Book;;, 1960, p.141. F.ris fcntirllism und Hllmunism, p.38. Ibill., p. 54. Ibid., p. 50. SN,722. BN.735. S N. 784. BN. 140. BN.742. SN . 755. SN. 755. SN. 763. SN, 599. SN . 56.. Plalo, So/,Ms!, 257b. ßN. 787. Cornford, F. M., Pl aiD and Parmcn ides, Rouliedge and Kcgan Pau}, 1950, p. 231. DeSoln, W., The Tm:.:i.: Finale-, Harvard Uni wrsily Press, 195<1 . Dcsan, W., op .cit., p. 56.

S~ rtrc,

88

-

PARTTWO SELFLESSNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

111 THE BUDDHIST'S REJECTION OF THE SELF

I

n dirccting our attention to thc field of Indian philosophy,

wc find that thc Buddhist docuine of anatta bears some re semblancc to Sartre's non·egological treatment of consciousness. Thc theory of anattd (San~krit, nairatmyavdda) first appearcd in thc Buddha's second sermo n called Analtalakklta!JaSuffa (Discourse an the Characteristic vf Not -sef{).! This theory is considcred to be onc of thc comerstones upon which the edifice of the Buddh a's teachi ngs is buHt. It is said to be a teaching

specHie to thc Buddha." Buddhism stands unique in the history of Indian thought in denying the existence of the self.l Etymologically, the Pali ward 'anatta' consists cf the negative prefix 'aHa' plus 'afUt' (Sanskrit, atman), meaning not·self, non·ego, no-soul, or non·substantiality.' The term Qllatttl, therefore. refcrs to a noH.elf or non-ego theory which rejects alM oe

Sartr,,'s EristenlialiSI1l and r.nrty Buddhism

self theories. Prior to and during the time of the Buddha there were many theories maintaining the existence of the seH insome form orath er. 11 is in contrast to them that the Buddha preached his new doctrine of not-self. In this context abrief account of these theories is a logical necessity for providing a background for understanding the doctrine of anattrl. ANNIHILATION15M AND ETERNALlSM As many as sixty-two views about the self were menhoned and re futed in the Brahmajala-Slitta,5 which is supposed 10 deal with every possible theory of th e seIL In the Kathavatthu, the Buddha is said 10 have divided self views into two main groups: annihilationism (ucchedavada) and etemalism (sassatavada). ~ They represented the two extreme views which the Buddha tried 10 avoid while teaching the doctrine of the middle path.' A111lihilationism is the view that there exists in man an egocntity as the principlc of all physical and mental activities. But such a principle is only relatively permanent (lasting for a single Iifetime), it does not survive after death.lt is annihilated on the dissolution of the body. Sinee nothing continues to exist after death, rebirth is not possible in this view. Like Sartre, the nihil. ists think that after death life does not begin again, it is "a life in which one never recovers his stroke,"~ to use Sartre's words. Ajita Kesakambala, a contemporary of Ihe Buddha, was one of the outstanding nihilists. He maintained that there is no rebirth; a man consists of the four elements and when he dies, these elements return to their corresponding mass of great elements and he is eompletely annihilated.9 Cärvaka, a materialist school of Indian philosophy, held a similar view. "In fhis view, ,IIe four elt!ments, earth,fire, water, air are the (only) ca tegories . WlJen these are changed into the form ofa body, conscious· ness arises, like the power of intoxicatioll when certain illgredients are mixed; when these elements are destroyed, consciousness ceases immediately. Thus the self (tftman) is only the body with the special characteristic of consciousntss ... "10

92

THE BUDDHIST'S REJECTION OF THE SELF

In opposition to the annihilationist view, there is eternalism. The eternalists believe..[Lot only in the existence of an abiding cgo-entity, but also in Hs immortality. Their view can be weil described in these words: "This the world, this the self; after death I will become permanent, lasting, eternal, not liable to change. I will stand fast like unto the eternal."l1 The seH is considered as something permanent (nicca), blissful (sukha) and not liable to change (avipariramadhamma). The chief proponents of eternalism during the time of the Buddha were the Upani:;;adic thinkers. In fact, it is in the Upanii?ads that we find formulated a doctrine of the permanent self which has remained fundamental in Indian thought and it is this, more than anything else, which needs investigation when dealing with the Buddhist doctrine of anattif.

ÄTMAN IN THE UPANI~ADS The identity of Brahman and atman, of the ultimate reality and thc seIt, forms the fundamental thesis of the entire Upani:;;adic philosaphy. The key subject of investigations in aU the Upani:;;ads can be expressed by the simple equation: Brahman = iftman. J2 What, then, is iftman? The ward atman, which is generally translated into English as seIt, is derived from an 'ta breathe.' It is the breath of lifeY Gradually its meaning is extcnded to cover life, soul or self. According Radhakrishnan, "Atman is the principle of man's life, the soul that pervades his being, his breath, pnlra, his intellect, prajiia., and transcends them. Atman is what remains when everything that is not the seH is eliminated."J4 The seIt, therefore, is a residue which is left after all physical and mental constituents of man's personality are analyzcd. In the Chändogya Upanii?ad, it is stated that the self transcends the bodily self of the materialists and also the seH which cxperiences dreaming and dreamless sleep.J5 The ultimate state of the self cannot be known or explained, and can only be referred to as Turlya. And it is described in this way: "Turiya is not that which is conscious of the internal world, nor

93

Sartre's Existentialism and Early Bl-I.ddlIism

that which is conscious oi the external world, nor that which is conscious oiboth, nor is it a mass oi consciousness. It is not consciousness, nor is it unconsciousness. It is unseen, undescribable, uncomprehensible, unknowable, unthinkable, and unnameable. It is the origin oi the conscious selj and that into which phenomena are again resolved. lt is peace, bliss, and nonduality. This is Turlya, this is atman, and this is to be realized. "16

Hence the seH is independent of the body and on the dissolution of the body the seH is not annihitated. "This body is rnortal and all is subject to death. It is the abode of the seH which is irnrnortal and without body."17 Moreover, the seH is not the same as conscious experience; rather it is their 'origin.' The self 'lives' in mental aets, unifies and controls them. "He who dweils in the mind, yet is within the mind, w/lOm the mind does not know, whose body the mind is, wllo controls the mind irom within, he is your selj, the inner controller, the immortal. "18

The seH is regarded as the subject of all experiences. It is the thinker of thoughts, the feeler of sensations and the doer of dceds. The question that we may raise now is: How does the self know itself? Can the seH which is the subject of experiences be an experience? "What I must presuppose in order to know an object," says Kant, "l cannot know as an object."l~ But so me Upanü;;adic thinkers differ from Kant when they think that the seH is accessible in immediate experiencc in some sense or other. "Verily, the SeIt, Maitreyi, is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon; when, verily, the self is seen, heard, reflected on and known, then all this is known."20 Sailkara, commenting on this passage, said that the self could be known through 'argument and reasoning' (tarkenopapattaya).

THE SELF 15 INDESCRIBABLE Yaji'tavalkya, an Upanh.>adic thinker, does not accept the abovementioned position. He thinks that the self cannot be known by

94

THE BUDDHISrS REJECTION OF THE SELF

any means of knowledge. 21 H is unknowable because in all knowledge the seH is the knowing subject, and consequently can never be the object. He clearly says that "you cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer af hearing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot understand the understander of understanding. He is yaur seH which is in all things. JJ22 As is mentioned earlier, the self is indescribable. One cannat point out what the seH is like. Positive definition of the self is impossible. In tal king abaut the seit, we can only say that it is 'not anything'23 that we find in expericnce. Hence Yajnavalkya says: "That self is not this, not this (netf, neU). He is incomprehensible for He cannot be comprehended." 24Negative characters, however, should not mislead us into thinking that the self is non-being. The self has its own essence which we cannot describe. Hs essential nature is said to be being (sat), consciousness (eit) and bliss (ananda). These are different phrases for the same being. "Selj~being,

selj-consciousness, and self-delight are Ont' . It is absolute being in wh ich there is no nothingness. lt is absolute consciousness in which there is 110 non-consciousness. lt is absolute bliss in which lhere is IIV suflering or negation 01 bliss. "25

lt should be noted hefe that the seIt, like thc Sartrean consciousness or for-itself, is said to be 'neti,' in thc sense of not-being-this-object. The Platanic notion of 'otherness' may be applied here; the seH is 'nefi' because it is a 'being-other-thanobjcct.' But, unlike the for-itseH which is non-being, the seH is being, to use Hegel's phraseology, both in itself and for itseH. It is being in itselfbecause it does not depend on its objects for its existence; it is the ground of thc phenamenal world. And it is being for itself because it is consciousness. Thus thc seH is the unity of being and consciousness. We may liken that self to the Sartrean being-in-itself-for-itself. For Sartre, the unity of being and consciousness as represented in the seH always remains as man's unrealizable ideal. He says that such unity would exist only in God which is however a "non-entity" for Sartre.

95

Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism

We may add here that the Upanh;;adic thinkers are idealists. They think that the fullness of being is on the side of the knowing subject; the objects have no heing-in-itself. For them, the objects "are not the atman, the real 'seH' of things, hut mere mayt7~that is to say, a sheer deceit, illusion."26 In opposition to this stands Sartre's ontology described earlier. According to Sartre, the full positivity of being lies on the side of objects of consciousness, the so-called knowing subject is nothingness.

YOGA OR MEDITA nON Yajnavalkya's contention that the self is unknowable represents opinions prevailing among the thinkers of the Early Upani~ads. In the Middle and Later Upani.?ads we find a new position. There it is said that the seH can be known, not by senses, reason or learning, but by intuitive insight. Thus the seH which is hidden within all things and does not shine forth is said to be seen by the subtle seer with his superior awakened intuitionY Yoga is the method that enables the seer to develop his intuitive insight. "The self as the knowing subject can never become an object. It can bc realized through Yoga."28 One can see the self while in meditative rapture by the purification of knowledge: "By the peace of knowledge, one's nature is purified. In that way, however, by meditation, one does behold Hirn who is without parts."29 Hence intuitive insight developed by practising meditation or Yoga is regarded by some Upani:;;adic thinkers as a means of knowing the seH. The intuition which sees the self is different from ordinary intuition which sees objects. The latter always presupposes the subject-object duality whereas the former does not. The seer's intuition is a kind of 'mystical insight'3ü by which the self knows itself without giving rise to the subject-object duality. According to Radhakrishnan, "Man has the faculty of divine insight or rnystic intuition, by which he transcends the distinction of intellect and solves the riddles of reason."31 In the mystic experience the seH feels itself to be one with what it sees. This point has been explained by Plotinus:

96

•

THE BUDDHIST'S REJECTION OF THE SElF

"In the vision of God, thaI which sees is not reason, but greater than and prior 10 reason, something presllpposed by reason, as is the object of vision. He W}IO then sees himselj, rohen he sees, will see lJimselfas a simple being. will be united tollimsellassucli, will feel himseIf become sucl!. We oughl not even 10 say tlml he will see, but he will be that which he sees, if indeed it is possible Imy langer 10 distingllish seer and seen, (md not boldly /0 affirm that Oze Iwo areone. He bdongs /0 God and is Olle wilh Him like lwo concwlrie eire/es; fhey are 0111: wllen tllcy eoincide attd hllO onfy wllw Urey are separated. "31 BRAHMAN = ÄTMAN To know the self, say the Upani!;>adic thinkers, is to know Brahman. This is because the self or Qtmall is identical with Brahman. Brahman is thc ultimate principle as realized in th e universe, t1tmoll is the same principle as realized in man. The former stands for the transcendent unity, the latter for the immanent unity. In o ther word s, Brahman is the s ubstance of the world, "tman is the substance of the individual. And the two are one. Brahma" is "tmanY "He who is there in the person "nd he who is yonder in the Sun-he is one. "34 This identity of the ultima te reality and the seI! is briefly ex pressed by the famous sayings "That art thou (Tat tvam a5;)" 35 and " I am Brahmall (Aham Brahma asmi)."36 And in the compound word "unity of Brahma" and tltman" is de· scribed the fundamental thesis of the Vedanta system. Thus to know iHman amounts to the realization of BrahmaI!. "ln truth, he who knows the s upreme Bralmtall becomes Brahmall himself. "37 This is to say that the rcalization of Brahmall is the attainmen! Mok$a or liberation. Hence the knowl edge of thc self is callcd Mvk$a. This knowledge does not lead to liberation but is liberation itself: "For delivera llce is 110t effccted by Ihe knvwledge 0/ tlle lHman, but it cOllsists in tlris knowledge: if is /lot a cOlIsequl'nce o/Orl1 know/cdge 01 tlle atman, bllt this kl1 owlt'dge is itseIf already de1iverallce in oll its fullness. "38

97

$ar/re'li Exisl cnliulism und Eo.rly Buddhism

In rea lity, thc true self of man is already and always Brahma1l and as s uch liberated, but its real nature i~ concea!ed by man's ignorance (avidya). So long as man is ignorant he has to undergo a ceaseless series of transmigration. This sequence of reb irth comes to an end only when man knows his self to be Brahman and at onee becomes liberated.

"lI/si as Ihe jlowing rivers disapl'ca r;71 the ocean co:stillg off naml" and form . w en so the knower,freed from name aud form, attajns tlle dil/;ne person. higlter titan tlle high .... He crosses om'r sorrow. He (rosses ova S;J1S. Libemled from tlte knots of tlle secrel plaee (vf lhe I1cnrt), lIe becomes immorlal. "39

Liberation is thus achieved not by a change of anything in the wmld, but by the disappearance of ignorance, a {alse outlook. That is, the change brought about here is only epistemic and Ilot ontological. ÄTMAN AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

So fa r we have considered the doctrine of il tman in the Upani~ads. This doctrine is rejected by the Buddhist. Before tracing his arguments against the self theory, we shall try to compare thc Upani~adic conception of dfman rejected by the Buddhist with thaI of the transcendenta l ego repudiated by 5a rtre. The transcendental ego is said to be the permanent subject of experiences; it transcends thc body and the psychologieal states o f the individual, it is what Hu sse rl ("alls 'a transcendence in immanence: 40 The transcendental egoalways remains the sa me. It is thc continuous background o f changes in the strea m of cxperience. The sense of personal identity and continuity has its sourcc in the transcendental ego which functions as the un1fyin g principle 01 consciousness. It 'Iives' in consciousness and is viewed as its origin. Wh
98

• THE BUDDHISTS REJECTION OF THE SELF

that generates, unifies and controls conscious experiences. Atman also 'dweIls' in consciousness. Like the transcendental ego in Husscrl's sense, atman remains as a 'residue' after the analysis of all physical and mental phenomena. Another feature which makes the transcendental ego and IHman alike is that both of them are 'indescribable,'41 They are empty of all determinations which are necessary for the possibility of positive definition. For the Upanü;;adic thinkers rltman i5 'not this, not this: and for Husserl, the transcendental ego is 'pure ego and nothing further.'42 Furthermore, the transcendental ego is the' Absolute Being'4J in the sense of being the ground of all meaning. Hence all being is given as related to a single core, Lc., the transcendental ego. The phenomenal world derives its meaning as existing reality from the ego. 44 Viewed in this way, the transcendental ego leads Husserl to admit that his philosophy is 'transcendental-phenomenological idealism.'45 The idealistic trend, however, is more obvious in the case of {Hman. The Upani~adic thinkers regard iHman as 'absolute being,'46 and the phenomenal world as maya or illusion. The world has no being in itself; its appearance is effected by ignorance (avidya) of the knowing subject. Thc transcendental ego as the subject of experience can never be known as an object. The ego, however, has an immediate knowledge of itself after phenomenological reduction is performed. This reduction is the 'necessary operation' which enables the ego to know itself. Atman, like the ego, is not included in what is given to our experience for it is its subject. Atman knows itselfby the performanceof Yoga. Thus Yoga is the necessary method that makes self-knowledge possible. Like phenomenological reduction which suspends the natural attitude, Yoga eliminates a11 kinds of hindrances so that the mind is in a position to grasp the object in its primordiality.47In the highest stage of concentration (samt1dhi), the mind bccomes one with its object and therefore attains the mystic state. And it is in this state that thc self knows itself. So far we have attempted to show certain resemblances between the transcendental ego and t1tman. Nevertheless, we do

99

Sartre's Exis tentialism (md En. rly Bl4 ddhism

not m ean 10 say that the Iwo are exactly the same. There are two essentia l characteri.<;tics of I7tnllm w hi ch the transcendental ego seems to lack: immo rtality and id entity w ith the ultimate real· ity. H usserl nowhere claims that the ego can be identified with the ulti mate reaUty. N or does he assert thai theego is immortal. Koesten baum remarks:

"Thr co"ception of bot h the deafh and the birth (i .e., the non-existell c!!) of fhe Tronscende,ttal Ego is impossible. lt reqllires the Transccndeltlal Ego to lhink. imagine, or cO'lcej1le Ihe death und birth vf an ego ... Bir/h and death are properties oj vbjecJs and apply only /0 thr empirica l ego. "48 These statements only im ply that the transcendental ego must necessarily be permanent in ord er that the moments o f aris ing and ccasinß ot mental acts can be observed. h orn this it d oes no\ ioUQW that

th~ \Ian'5cende"~a\

ego can F>ur\l\\lC a iter death .

If the ego were immortal, its immortality wou ld not be proved by phen omen ological rcdu ction . So it i:; s till doubtful whether the transcendental ego is immortal or n ot. Kant says that as far as thc im morta lity o f thc soul is concerned, he has no theoretical proof of it; yet he has to ' postulate' the immortality in o rder 10 ma ke mora lity possibl e. T his kind of p os tula te is avoided by Husserl w ho wanls to do a presuppositi on!ess philosophy. Th e concl u sion that wc ca n draw from the foregoing com· parisons 1S that Mman in the Up ani:?ads 1S something like wh at H usscrl 's transcend ental ego wou ld be if il were endowed w ilh imm o rt a li ty a od id e ntit y w ith the ult im a te reality. Th c Upa n i~adic thinkers ass u me that dtman is immor tal and identi· cal w ith Brah man beca use they want to justify th eir quest for Mok;;a or liberation. Their religious life w ou ld be meaningless without the postulate of immortality of the self. THE BUDDHA'S REJECTION OF THE PERMANENT EGO All kinds of permanent se lf- be they called tltman or transcendental ego-are rejected by the Buddhis t:

100

THE BUDDHIsrs REJECTION OF THE SELF

"Whatever be the theories about the ätman held by the various thinkers during the time of the Buddha and thereafter, the Buddhist doctrine of anatU, as preserved in the Theravada tradition, contradicts them all in all-embracing sweep. "49 We shall now turn to consider the Buddhist's arguments against the self theory. The conception of the permanent seH or tUman described above was known to Buddhism. 50 By the seH the Buddhist understands that permanent, substantial ego-entity which is the principle of thoughts and actions. In brief, the seH is viewed as the subject of experience:

"Whatever is the self for me that speaks, that experiences and knows, that experiences now here, now there, the functian of deeds that are love1y and that are depraved, it is this self far me that is permanent, stable, etemal, not subject to change, that will stand firm like unto the etemal. "51 The seH is said to possess bliss and autonomy. These notions of the self are not acceptable to the Buddhist. The Buddha flatly denies that there exists in man an ego-entity which is permanent, blissful and autonomous. His arguments against the self are analytical because they are based on the analysis of the personality.

FIVE AGGREGATES The person (puggala), when analyzed, is found to consist of five aggregates (Pali, Khandha = Sanskrit, Skandha). These aggregates neither singly nor collectively constitute any permanent seIl, nor is there to be found a self apart from them. The live aggregates are those of corporeality (rupa), feeling (vedana), perception (saiifill), mental formations (sankhllra) and consciousness (viftiilll)a).52 The following is abrief description of these aggregates: 1. The aggregate of corporeality comprises the material coo-

101

Sartrr'$ [xiste.,tialism and Early

Buddhi~m

st ilu ents of the individual. The body belongs to this aggregate. In the aggregatcof cOfllOreality a re included the traditional Four Prim ary Elements (mahdbhata -rüpa), namely, solidity, fluidity, heat and motion, and also the Derivatives of the Four Primary Elements (upadaya-riipa ).53 In the Derivatives are included our five material sense-organs, Le., eye, ear, nase, tangue and body, and their corresponding objects in the external world., Le., visible form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible things, and also some physical components of the body . Thus the whole realm of matter, both internal and external, is induded in the aggregate of corporea lity . 2. The aggregate of feeling as one of the four n o nmaterial groups is the affective aspect of mental activities. It has the characteristic of enjoying the "taste" of an object. 54 The Commentary of the Dhammasanganl describes the nature of feeling with a metaphor:

"As regards enjoying file laste o[ al1 object, the remainin8 associatcd states enjoy it only partiafly. Of con/act Illere is Olle fUllctiOtl oft mere touclling, of perceptioll tlle mere lIotillg or perceivillg, of volitiofl I/Je: mere coordinating (the Qssociated stQtes of exerting or beillg active), oj consciouslIess the mere cognizing. But feeling atolle. through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feelil1g is like the king, the remainillg states are like the cook. "55 Th~re

are three kinds of feeling: pleasant, painful
tral. ~

3. The aggregate of perceptioll is the cognitive dimension of experience. Its funclion is to recognize objects, phys ical or menta l. 57 In the Mahävedalla-Sutla it is explained as a relatively simple form of cagnition wh ich consists in the discernment, reca gnition and assimilation of se nsations.~ According to Mrs. Rhys Davids, perccption means that sense-perception which discerns, recognizes and gives da ss·rcference to the impress ions of sense. ~4 There are six classcs of perception: perccpti on of visible forms, sounds, odors, tast es, tangible things, and of mental objecls.«I

102

THE BUDDHISrs REJECTION OF THE SElF

4. The aggregate of mental formatio1ls is a collectiv e term für numerous conative aspects of ment<:!l activity which, in addi~ tion to feelin g and pereep tion, are present in a single moment of conscious ness. In the Abhidhamma, fifty mental forma tions are mentioned. 5. The aggregate of c01lsciousness i5 defincd by Buddhaghosa as "everything taken toget her that has the characteristic of cognizing."t>l Conscio usness is a si mple awa reness of the presence of an object. It does not recognize the object; that i5 a fun elion of perception. "When Ihe eye eame:; in contaet witll a color, for justanee blue, visual eonsciousness arises wllieh simply is aware11fss 01 the prest!1lce 0/ a color; but ir does "ot recogtlize that it is blue. T/J rre is 110 recognition at this stage. It is perception .. . tl/at recognizes thaI it is blue. "62

Hence some scholars re nder vifiiIlllJa as 'cognition' and safifM as ' reeognition.' There are six kinds of consciousness, in rela~ lion to six internal faculti es and correspondin g six extemal objects. &J These aggregates are a fivefold dassification in which the Buddha summl;!d up alt the physical and mental phenomena of ex istence, and in particula r those which appear to the ignorant man as his self or ego. Of the five aggregates, only the firs t grou p rcfers to material eonst ituents, the remaining aggregates are groupings of men tal phenomena. It is w(lrth noting th at the Bud~ dhist analysis of mind (citta) into feeling, perceptio n, mental fo rmations and con<;ciuusness is very similar to the Iripartite di· vision of mind into affecti on, conation and cognition so common in Western psy chology. By comparison, wc find that feeling (vedantl) refers to the catcgory of affection, mental forma tions (sniIkhilra) to conation, and perception (sai/na) and consciousness (villfia'ra) 10 cognition.6-I The tripartite division of mind, however, is viewed by same Western psychoiogists as an art ificial and oversimplified analysis. But, as Flügel says, same such classifica~ lion is probably necessary if we are to ob lain any kind of orde red understanding of the rich facts of mental experience.05

103

Sartre's Existenfirlfism rind &trty Buddhism

It should be emphasized here that the five aggregates merely torm an abstract classitication, none of them has real existence.

For example, the aggregate of mental form ations which co mprises fifty mental fa ctors becomes an empty abstraction if it is considered apart from Hs constituenf parts. Each aggregate cannot exist in complete isolation from the others. They afe mutually dependent and therefore inseparable. In the Abhidhamma, the aggregates of feeling, perception and mental formations are called 'cetasika : meaning 'that which is associated w ith conscious ness.' 66 These three aggregat es form different aspects and properties of consciousness; they naturaHy arise and perish together with consciousness. "They a re to consciousness what redness, softness, sweetness, etc., are to an ap ple and have as Httle separate existence as those qualities."67 This clea rly indicates that consciousness for the Buddhist has inner 'contents' or ' properties: As Saripu tta says: "That whic" is feeling, your reveretlu. thai which is perception and t/tat which is consciousness- these states are associated, not dissociated, and il is not possible 10 [ay down a difference between these stafes, having analyzed then! again and aga in. Your revenmce. whatever olle fee1s, tim! one perceives; whafcver one perceives, of that one is cOllscious. "68

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SElF The Buddha's arguments for the denial of the seH are based on this pancnkkhal1dha analysis. In the AnattalakkhalJa-Sutta the Buddha begins his argument wHh an attack on what may be ca lied the 'autonomou s seIf.' The autonomy of the seH is propounded by the Upani~adic thinkers who say that the self is the 'inner controller' of mind and body.69 The Buddha denies that there 1S such a controller of the five aggregates. Since there is no mastery over thcm, one can very weIl say that they have no owner or controller. The Buddha says: "Body. monks. is not self Now were Illis bodY .self, monks. this "

104

THE BUDDHISTS REJECTION OF THE SELF

body would not tend to sickness, and one might say in regard to the body: 'Let body become thus for me, let body not become thus for me.' And it is because body is not-self that body tends to sickness and one cannot say of it, 'let body become thus for me, let body not become thus fOT me. '''70

The same argument is repeated for the remaining aggregates, namely feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. Buddhaghosa, therefore, concludes: "the mode of unruliness is the characteristic of not-self."71 The Buddha then criticizes the view that there exists in man a permanent and blissful self. He says that the person, when analyzed, is found to consist of five aggregates and nothing else. And the aggregates are impermanent and subject to suffering. The Buddha then asks the monks: "rs it proper to look upon that which is impermanent, subject to suffering and !iable to change as, 'this is mine, this I am, this is my self?" The monks reply, "It is not."72 Thus the five aggregates are not-seH because they lack the permanence and bliss which are regarded as the essential characteristics of the seH. VVhen thc Buddha says that the five aggregates are not seIt, he does not mean to imply that there exists a self which transcends these aggregates. According to the Buddha, the transcendental seH does not exist because it cannot be found either inside or outside the five aggregates. That is why the Buddha asks: "If selJ, monks, and what belangs to se/f are not truly and really found (anupalabbhamane), is it not, monks, a perfectlyfoolish doctrine to hold the point of view, 'This the world, this the seIt after dcath I will become permanent, lasting, eternal, not liable to change, I "lviII stand fast like unto the eternal?"73

THE BUDDHA AND HUME Here we find that the Buddha's attitude towards the problem of the seH iE' different from that of the Upanb;;adic thinkers. In the

105

5ar'rr'.~

Exislenlin/iSIII nlld Early Buddhism

Chl1ndogya Upani$ad , Praji'ipati, assuming the existence of the self. tries 10 loea le it w ithin the personality. Failing 10 identify it with any of the const ituents o f thc person ality, he continues to assume that it must exist wilhin thc personality and is not satis fied wi th the resu lts uf the purely empi rieal investiga tion. 74 Thc Buddha, on the contrary, ass um es neither thc cxistencc or nonexis tcnce o f the self, and when the cmpirical investiga tion fails to reveal it. concludes thai no such self exists b~eau sc there is no ev idence fo r its cxistence. In Ihis respect the Buddh o's attitud e is s imilar 10 Hume's. In rejecling the Cartesian view of the sclf, Hurne maintains thai the seH does not exis t because it cannol be trul y discovered. H e says that on reflecting upon himsel f, he discovers only the s tream of cha ng ing pe rceptions; no self is faund. "f.'or my part, wllell 1en/er most illtimnle1y in to wltal 1call myself 1 alwnys MI/mble 011 some partinilar flercepti on or other, 0/ heat or cold, light or sltade, love or haI red, paill or pieaslire. lI/euer can w ich myse1f at allY time without a pcrception, and neper mn obscrve anythillS but tllc perceplion ."75

Hurne then asserts that it is the composi tion of these p erceptions which forms the seH.

"/ may ven/ure 10 ajfirm ol /he res! of mal/kind, that they are nothbill CI bund le or collee tion of different pcrce ptions. which slIcceed eacl! otller will! an ill conct'ivab/e rapidity, and are i n a pcr-

ing

pe/l/rl/flux t1nd tnovem ent."76

The Buddha, like Hume, reflects upon himself and find s nothin g but the chan ging agg regates o f corporeaJity, feeling, pcrception, mental formations and consciousness. He then conc1udes that th e so-caJl ed person (puggala) is a mere collection of the fi vc aggregates. Th us it is sa id: "Jus t as il is on condinon of vari oliS part,:> that the word ch ariot is uscd, just so is il that when thc agg regates are there we talk of a ' living-being' (satta)."77 This has been expl ained by Buddhaghosa in the Vis uddhimagga:

106

THE BUODHIST'S REJECTION OF THE SELF

"Therelorc juS! us when varfollS parts, sllch as axle, w'red, frame and pole, are pul together ilz a ceftain manner, thc ward' dU/riot' comes

ir/to Ilse, buf when each oj the parts is examined no chario! in the ultimate sense ean he fOtmd ." so 011 condition 0/ the Jive dung -ta aggregates

H/f? word

'being' OY 'perso,t' comes

illto /iSC,

but when each

aflhe aggreglltes is examined 110 such being can be jound. /t is a misconception thai makes olle say '[ am' oy 'I.' in the ultimate seI/sc lhere are only name-Illld-form."78 THREE CHARACTERISTICS In retros pcct, we find that the Buddhist doctrine of a"atft1 is a

neccssary corollary to the teaching of alticca (impermanencc). The fivc aggrega tes are not-self bccause they are fOllnd to bc impcrmanent The Buddha says:

"Thc jive aggregates, monks, are impermanent; whatever is impermllnen!, tlult is sllbject to sujjering; wha tever is subject to suffering, tim! is not-self; wlm /cver is tlOl-sdj. Hmt is not mine, timt 10m not, tllat is 1101 my self. "79 Buddhaghosa explains that the five aggregates
107

Sartre's Exist&ntialism and Ea rly Buddhism

The term saftkllaril denotes conditioned things like the fi ve
DEPENDENT ORIGINATION Thus thc do ctrinc of not-self denies not only the self wHhln the personalit y but also the substance of thc phenomenal world. It is opposcd 10 th e Up ani ~adic view Ih at atman is the s uhs tance of thc person and Bmhmal1 is Ihesubstance of the uni verse . In brief, it rejects the substance vicw of the world. For the Buddhist, everything is empty ofself-reality. Nothi ng exis ts in itself, for each l'xü;tcnce is conditioned by causes out~;ide itsclf. Since all phenomena h ave nothing substantia l or perdurablc in thern, th ey are in a conclitio n not of statlc belng, but of perpetual becoming (bhavfI). Rhys Davids says: "According to th e Buddhist, thcre is 110 Being, thete is only a Becorni ng."8l The phenomenal world, thcrefore. is in asta te of continuou s flux or flow. All things, without exception, are nothing but chains of momentary events, instantaneous 'hits' of existence. In short, they are mo mentary (kll(f~ljka). In the Buddhist view not only are eterna! entities such ilS God , scH, or malter, denied reality, but even thc simple sta-

108

THE BUDDHIST'S REJECTION OF THE SELf

bility of emp irical objects is regarded as imagi nary. Wc can easity sec thai the Upani~adic notion of being (sa l ) and the Sarlrean conceptio n of being-in-itseU (/'etre-en-soi) a re no t acceptable 10 the Buddhis t. A belief t'ither in absolute being or in absolute nothingn ess is considered 10 be an extreme view. The Bud dha says:

"Everything is; fhis, Kaccdna , is one extreme view. Evaything is not; IIIi5 tlle second ext reme vit'W. Avoiding bolh these extremes, the Tathägata fenches a doctrille by the middfe prll" ."83

The doctrine of the middle path is generally known as Oependent Orig ination (pa!iccasamupptlda). Acco rding to th e Buddha, all phenomena are subject 10 the la ws of causation. There is no th ing haphaza rd u r predctermint!d. Every element. though nppearing onl y for a s ingle moment, is a dependentl yoriginatin g element becilu se it depcnds for its arising on what has gone before it. That is the meaning of Dependent Originiltion. Thc law of causation can bc expressed by the followin g formula: "When this is, that is (/masmith sa fi idaril huti ); This arising. that nrises (Jmassuppddä idath uppajjali); Whc n Ihis 15 not, th at is not (lmasmi,fl asati idm;/ na hoti); Thi s ceasing, that censes (lmassa nirodhn idal;1 nirujjhati)."1U This abstract formula sho ws the logic of thc ca usallaw without conten ts.1I.5 The general principle of De pendent Originatlun is describcd by a seri~ of twe lve fa ctors: l. Cond itioned by ignorance (avijja) afe karma- form ations (sn /lklulra). 2. Conditioned by karma-formations i~ consciousn ess (vifIl1n tJa )·

4.

Condi tioned by cl1fiSciuusness is namc-and-form (namarüpa). Conditioned by na me -a nd-form are the s ix faculti es

5.

Conditioned by the six faculties is contact (phassa).

3.

(sn}r1yn tana ).

109

Silr/re's f.xistfntialisrn und Early ßllddhism

6. Conditioned by contact is feeling (vedand). 7. Conditioned by feeling is deSIre (ta~hd). B. Conditioned by deSIre 1:0; grasplng (upaddna). 9. Conditioned by gra:;ping is becoming (bhava). 10. Condltioncd by bccoming is birth (jllti). 11 . Conditioncd by birth are old age, death, grief. Sürrow, suffering, lament ation and despair (jarämara~Ja 50ka ... ) This is how life arises, ex is ts and continues. If we put this formula in It:o; reverse order, we come to thc cessation of the process: Through the ces..<;a tion of ignornnce, karma-formations ccase; throu gh the cessa tion of karma- fo rmations, consciousness ceases ... through the ressation of birth, old age, dcath, grlef, sorrow, suffering, lamenta tion and despair cease. B6 It should bc emphas ized here that each of these Factors is both conditioncd (pa.ti ccaSamtlppmlna) and conditioning (paticcasamuppdda ).1l7 Hence they are a11 relative and interdepend ent; nothing is absolute or exists as independent substance. Thu s no first cau sc is acceptcd. Ignora nce (avijjt'l) should not be vicwed as the first cause of the wholc process because ignoran ee itself is eonditioned by the ca nkers (asava). "From the upri sing of thc cankers is the upri$ing of the ignorance, from thc stopping of the cankers is the stopping of ignoran(.'e."8!1 Thc law of causality in early Buddhlsm is not subjectivc. Not i:o; it a ca tcgory imposed by the mind on phenomena. Its objeetivity is emphasized. "Dependent Originati on is said to have the characteristi c$ of objectivity, necessity, invariabiJity and conditionillity. "~9 That a cilusal sequence occurs independently oE us and that aB we da is to discover this, 1:0; implied In the following description of Dcpe ndent Origination: "What is Dependenl Grigina/jou ? Condificmed by birth are old age Qnd dealh. Wllether Ihe Tathagata arises or not, this order exists, uamcly, 'he fixcd natun' of phenomena, Oll' regular pattern of phenomenll or conditim!afity. Th is Ihe Tath~gata disco vers lind comprelzcnds . .. "90

110

THE BUDDHISTS REJECTION OF THE SELF

The doctrine of Dependent Origination and the analysis of thc five aggregates give-support to the anatta doctrine. The person is analyzed into five constituent parts and these parts are combined to constitute the personality, not by a unifying egoprinciple, but by the causal law. The self is not required for effecting the synthesis of the five aggregates. It is the law of Dependent Origination that unifies them. Moreover, the Iaw ofDependent Origination determines that the five aggregates are dependently originated (paticcasamuppanna). No aggregate arises without causes. The Buddha says: "And also the C/luses nnd conditions of the arising 01 these aggregates are impermnnent, painful and not-self. How could that which has arisen througll samething impermanent, painfll! aJ:d /Jot-self IlS its root, be itself permllnfllt, blissful and a self?"91

The Buddha denies that there exists a permanent self in the collection of these impersonal aggregates. In place of the Upanü;;adic teaching, "Let no man try to find what speech is, let hirn know the speaker; let hirn not try to find what the seenthing is, let hirn know the seer; not what the doing is, but the doer, ete.," the Buddha teaches that there is no doer, onIy doing exists; no scer, only seeing, ete. As Buddhaghosa writes: "In a11 becomings, pIaC(~s of birth, durations and abodes there appears just the name-and-forrn proceeding by way of cause and effect. Beyond the cause he sees not a doer, beyond the procceding of results he sees not anyone to enjoy the results."42 To show the impersonality and utter emptiness of existence, Buddhaghosa quotes the following verse: "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer. The deed is, but no doer. NirvtilJll is, but not he who enters H. Thc path is, but no traveller." 9-' The Upani~adic thinkers, as we saw, agree with the Buddhist in admitting that all phenomena are impermanent and liable to change. The Upani:;;adic thinkers, however, believe that beneath

111

Silrlre's

Exi~lfm lillli5 m

Ilnd En rly Buddhism

changing pheno mena lies an eternal entity identified as Brahman, and that behind the stream of discrete experiences exis ts an a b~din g principle called (Hman. The Buddhist, on the contrary, contends that aU phenomena are in a stnte of flux and nothing is behind them. There is no thinke r behind the thou ght. A::; William James says, "the thought is itself the thinker.""4 If the thought is removed, there is no thi nker to be found. H ere the Buddhist view is diametrically opposed 10 thc Cartesian . cogitoergo sum: "J think, therefore I am ." It 15 father e10se to Sartre's vicw, according to wh ich there is no thinkcr a part from the object thought. 9S By deny ing the exis tence o f the self, the Buddha is said to have avoidcd two extreme views, namcly, eternalism' and annihilationis m. These views are rela ted to the seI{ theory. Those who believe that the seM exists h ave 10 admit that il is perishabl e or impcri shable. lf they admit that the self is perishable, then they are annihil ationists. lf they admit that the self is imp erishabJ e, then they are eternalists. The Buddha rega rds the two ex tremes as ' wrong views' (miccMdiUlti) . "Bo th these extremes, m onks, have been avoided by the Tathagata, and it is a midd le doctrine he tcachcs."!/O>

ANA ITÄ AND NIRVÄt-/A The Buddhist d octrine of anatta ha::; a pra ctical bearing since it "has mora l perfection as its purpose. "9'J' Ju s t as the U pani ~adic conceplion of Mok$a cannot be justified without assuming the exis tence of lHmoll, so also the Buddhist conception of Nirvana cannot be accounted for without admitting thc anaUa doctrine. N yanatiloka writes:

"Without u nderstanding tlie egoless ness 0/ existellee, it is not possible to gain

(l

real Ullderstauding

0/ tllC Buddha-word; alld iI is 1I0t

possible without it to renlize that goal of ema ncipation alld deli verIwce 0/ mind proc/aimed by Ihe Buddha. This doctritle of egolessness 0/ existenee forms the esset/ ce of th e Buddlla's daelrine 0/ emancipatiotl."911

112

THE BUDDHISrS REJECTION OF THE SELF

lf the seH existed, then the religious life proclaimed by the Buddha would have become use[ess for the eessation of suffering. The Buddha onee took up a little pellet of eow dung, and said to a monk: "If the getting of (/ seljl/Ood (attabhava) so small as this, mOl1k, permanent, stable, elemal, by nature unchanging, was possible, {hen the living of the holy life for fhe best destruction of suffering would not be set forth. But inasmuch, monk, as there is no getting of a selfhood even so small as this, unchanging ... therefore the living of the holy life for file best destructJOIl of suffering is set forfh. "99

Aeeording to the Buddha, the idea of the self is a wrong view beeause it has no corresponding reality. YVhat is worse is that the idea itsclf generates suffering. Henee the Buddha says "1 do not see, monks, that grasping of the theory of self, from the grasping of which there would not arise grief, suffering, anguish, lamentation, despair."loo Also, "in brief, thc five aggregates of grasping are suffering."Hll That is the crux of thc Buddhist attitude towards the theory of self. The self is considered as the manifestation of the subtlest form of grasping called attavtldupadana. 102 This grasping of the self is the main origin of suffering. It is similar to 'seH-love' which some Western psychologists believe to be the eentre of all desires and actions. I03 This self-Iove, according to William James, is the cause of selfishness. "A man in whom self-seeking of any sort is largely developed is said to be selfish." H14 1t manifests itself as the sense ofT and 'Mine' (Ahankdramaflkara). We may liken the grasping of the self to 'narcissism' in Freudian psychoanalysis. The similarity between thcm is implied in the words of Erieh Fromm: "It is the goal of man to overcome one's narcissism. Perhaps this principle is nowherc expressed more radieally than in Buddhism."I05 Thus the main purpose of the Buddha's teaching of arwtta is to enable his disciples to shed thc grasping of thc self theory. To attain Nirvatla, one has to get rid of the personality belief (sakktlyaditthi) and the conceit of 'I am' (asmimilna). So long as

113

SlI rlrc's Exislenlialism IIrld Early Buddhism

graspin g of the self in any form persists, there can bc no real emancipation. In the Malapariyt7ya-Slltta, the Buddha emphas izes the need for absolute abando nmen t of the can ceit of ' I am' in all things including Nirva ~Ja.l 06 And it is on account of grasping of the fiv c aggregates that the canceit of ' I am' a rises. " It is by grasping tlllli the conceit of 'l tim ' arises alld noi without grasping. By gmsJling of whai? 11 is by grasping of corporeality . fee/ins. ... pl!rrl!ptiol1 ... mental formations ... consciousness tllai the c01lceit of '111m' arist'S, and noi WilllOllt g mspin,~. "107

Thc co n cCl t of ' I am ' is considercd so detrimentaJ 10 the relig ious quest that it is sin glcd out as one whi ch mu s t be eliminated . With regard to the question, "which one thing is 10 be got rid of" , it is said th at "the conccit of ' { am' is thc ont' thing which is 10 be got rid Of."lOt! It is by eliminatin g th e conccit of'I " m' in the fiv t' agg regates that one attaim; liberation. The Buddha says :

"Wllatever cor~) u rl'ality , Kappa , bc it past, prcsen/ or fut ure .. . you behold thus: 'This is not mine, this I an! /lot, tIJis is /loi my se1/.' So knowing th ings objectiv('{y as tla'y are by perfe,! insisltt , one, Jmving fo rsakcn grasping, is Iree. (5 imi/nrly will! regllrd to the o/ha four aggregates). Tllus blOwing, rJms seeing, Kappa ... tlie mind lIas gone aWflY from nI/ sen st' 01 T alld 'Mille', (ahailkaramam
It is made quite d ea r by the Buddha tha t the idca o f the self is possibl c only in and through the five aggregates. "O f those as· cetics oe Brahmi1!s who variously conceive of the seit all of thern conceivc eithcr one or all of thc five aggregates of g rasping (as thcseIO."IHI It is by unwise attention thatone sees the seH in the impersonal aggregates. In Buddhism there are two kinds of atten tion : wise a ttenti on (yolliso-manasikara) and unwi se atten tion

114

THE BUDDHJSTS REJ ECTION OF THE SELF

(ayoniso-marrasiktlra).lI ! One sees the true nature of thin gs by wise

atte nti on, no t by unw ise a ttentio n . Wisc attention limit!; itself to what is really givcn whereas unwise atten tion asserts more than LI knows. Unwise att ~n ti on th erefore introduces a seH int o th ~ selfless aggregatet>; thai is, it turns the mind agains t thc truth so that one sees "the self in what is n o t-s ~ lf. " m Unwis e attention gives rise to dis tortions (v ipallnsa) o f perception, thought and view. A m an of unwise attention perceives, thin ks an d views pcrmane nl.' e in what is essentially impermanent, bliss in what subject to suffering, self in what i5 not-self, and deligh t in wha! is essenti ally repulsive and disgusting. 1I 1 ln other words, he faUs 10 see things as they really are (yathabhatatfl). Thus the id ea of the seIt is a false idea caused by unwise attention. Th e selftess ness of thin gs is difficult 10 d etect beea use il i.s hidden by comp ac tnc s~.

"The cf/ßracterisl ic oj 1/01-s('// dOt's nol become appnrf'ut beclIllse, when resolution infO file var iollS elements is not give)l att ention , it is hiddell by compaclnr:ss ... Wlle/1 file YI~50I!l 1 io/! 0/ fi,e comt,act (ghanavinibbhoga) is ('! fee t cd by resolving it info its elemeJlts, tlll.'

cllQrackristic 0/ 1Iot-sdf bl.~co m es npf'arwi

j)l it ~

true )ll/ ture. "114

THREE KINDS OF DES IRE Sartre, as w c have seen, m aintains that the self is cons titutcd by impure refl eetion . m In this respeet, his position i5 similar to the Buddh(l's. The Buddha, Iike Sartre, thinks tha t the seH is eons tituted by unwise attention and bec
115

Smtre's Existe ntialism and Early Bllddhism

grasping of the self is caust!d and conditioned by desiIe. Thai is why the Buddha says: "Thc fiv e aggregates o f grasping are rooted in dcsire. " 1111 There are thrce kinds of desire, namely, desire for sensuous pleasure (kaTllataf/ha), d es ire for existence (bhavataIJ/u7 ) and desire for annihilation (vibhavatO/;t1u1).1I9 It is interesting to note that the Buddhist threefold divi sion of desires is comparable to Freu d's conceptions of libido, ego instinct and death ins tinct. 110 Sarlre has also described thc nature of desi res, and conc1ud ed thai aJl of them are reducible 10 either the des ire 10 be o r the desire to ha ve, \21 whkh, in aUf opinion, is equivalent to the d esire for existence in Buddhism. The dcsire fo rexis tence (bhavata~lha) is man's craving for selfpreservation. It drives him to search for somcthing in himself that can s urvi ve after death , The belief in the immortal self (sassata-dillhi) is influ enced by this d es ire. The desire for annihilation (vibhavalar-hrt), on the other hand, is thc craving for st!lf-extinction. The belief in self annihilation (uccheda-di!Jhi) is rooted in this desire. lt m anifests itself in the fo rm of self-disgust and despair. The nihilis t seeks for the extinction of this life because he believes that "as soon as this self i:; annihilated on Ihe dissolution of the bod y, after death, that is peace, that is the supreme goal, that is reality."122

THE BUDDHA AS AN EXPERIENTlALIST In Ihe p rcceding discussion we have cons idered the various arguments which form the denial of the se iL The Buddha's arguments, as we mentioned earHer, are analytical for the reason that they consi:;t in the analysis of the person into the fiv e aggregate!> . Nev erthel ess, the Buddhist analysis is not a logical one; rather it is a phenomenological anal ysis in the sense that it analyzes and describes whal is given to our experience, In Rahula's words, "it is an analytical method based on mindfuln ess, awareness, vigilance, observation,'·12J The Buddha is not a rationali s t; he is an expe rientialist or empiricist.12~ In the Sa rlgara va-Sutta the Buddha c1ass ifies his predecesso rs and contemporarics into three groups:

116

THE BUDDHISTS REJECTION OF THE SELF

([) The traditionalists (anussavika), who derive their knowledge wholly from a scriptural tradition and interpretations based on it; (2) The rationalists and metaphysicians (takkf, vfmamsI), who derive their knowledge from reasoning and speculation, and (3) The experientialists, who depend on personal experience of higher knowledge. The Buddha then says that he belongs to the third group.12S According to hirn, an appeal to experience is necessary for judging the truth of a theory. The teaching of the Buddha is qualified as ehipassika, inviting one to 'come and see,' because it can be tested by experience. Experience here is not a mert' sense experience but also intuition and insight. The Buddha does not regard scriptural tradition and rcasoning based on logic as sufficient criteria of knowledge. "The weight of tradition, the use of logic and reason have their limits and an appeal to experience is necessary."126

TWO FORMS OF MEDITATION Thus the characteristic of not-seIf can be seen by intuitive insight. "What is not-seIt, that is not mine, that I am not, that is not myself. Thus should it be seen by perfeet wisdom as it really is."127 In order to develop insight which sees the true nature of things, one has to practise the Buddhist rnethod called meditation. This practice a1ms at 'knowing and seeing things as they are (yathabhiitanä~ladassana): It reminds us of Husserl's slogan: 'back to the t/lings themselves.' The word meditation is a poor substitute for the original term bhavana which means 'mental development.'J28 The Buddhist h!tilvarta aims at cleansing the mind of all prejudices and distractions, and cultivating such qualities as concentration, awareness and mindfulness, leading final1y to the attainment of perfeet wisdom which sees things as they really are (yathabhüfam). There are two forms of meditation: development of concentration (saII1lltha or sllmadhi) and development of insight (vipassana). Concentration (sllmadhi) is the unwavering state of mind in

117

F Sarlre'fi Existenlinlism and Early Buddllism

which attention is fixcd on a single objed. Buddhaghosa writes: "Thcreforc thi1t state, by the strength of which mind and mental propcrties ilre placed on one objcct fittingly and weil, without wavcring, withou t scatlcring, should be known as concentralion.n m In thc state of conccntration, the mind is freed from five hindrances (Ilivara!w), namely, sensuous d esire (kamadzanda), illwill (vyaptlda), sloth and torpor (tlz11la-middha ), restlessncss and anxie Ly (liddhacca-kukkli cca) and doubt (vicikiccha). Thc elimination of thc hindrances sets the mind in concen tration and this in turn makes il possible for it to have knowl edge and insight of things as they Me. Thi s is to say thilt concentration is CI preparatory stage for the other farn) of meditat ion, i.e., v ipasSflnil Of insight. Th
118

j

THE BUDDH ISTS

"A pers/m wJw knows and

I~EJECTI ON

OF THE SELF

tllt' tJJülg 11$ it is does twt need to mnke " " cffort of will to fee! disilrlrrt'Stetf arid rl'nounCf'. It is ill thl! nnture of thiltgs (dhammilta) that a person wlw knows arid sees /lS it really is feels disinterested Imd renOll1lces. Olle who lias jell disilltrrested nnd hns rcmlUnced does llOt "CI,d /1/1 tf/orf 0/ will to renlize th;: knowlt'dge and illsighl o[ l'mnnci(1!lt ioll. It is 111 the /lature of things that olle wrlO has felt disinterested and renuUflccd m'llizes the knmvledge find jllsiKhI of emancipatiotl. "1 31 St'i'S

Thu s Buddhist meditation has NirvßI)Q or the com plete cessa Hon o f s uffe ring a.s il s ultim a te goal. Hu sse rl 's phenomenologica l redu ction serves a different purpose sin ce it is proposed as a ' logical-epistcmQl ogical d evice'U" for establishing philosophy as a rigorous science.

VIPASSANA, THE BUDDHIST MEDITATION Vipas5alll, -bhavulltl or irl.'.;ight meditation is daimed to be a s pecifically Buddhist meth od; concentration meditation (samatha bllavaml) form s part of almost <'111 indian rcligious practi ce. in the Upanit>adic literatures, conccntration meditation is kn own as Yoga . As m entioned ea rlier, the Upani ~ ildic thinkers regard Yoga as a method which enables them to realize iil/JIlln . lJ.I Cuncentralion con~ i s ts of diff~rent d egrees, the highest of whi ch is a mysti c state, within which a mystic intuition of tif mall takes place. The Budd ha, before his Enlightenmcnt, s tudied Yosa under different tcachers and attaincd th e highes t mystic s tate; but he was not satisfied with it because it did not give completc emancipahon. In the m ys tic stales such as ' the Sphere of N othingness' u r ' the Spherc of Neither -Perccption No r- Non-Perccption,' there is only emptiness; no atman is found . Here is the point where the Huddha departs from the Up ani ~adic thinkers: while the latter consider Yoga as the method fo r d cvelopin g insight whi ch realizes atmmz, the former conside rs lt as the m ethod that en ab les olle to find only emptiness. For the Buddha, YoXa does no t lead us to the attainmcnt of comple le cmancipalion as the Upanit>adic thinkers claim. He considered the mystic sta te

119

Snrlfl"S F.xisll"!fialism und fArly Buddhism

of Yoga only as 'happy living in this existence' or 'peacerulliving' (saulnvihnra) and nothing more. 135 The Buddha later discovered a method that cnablea hirn to attain the complete cessation of s uffering. He call ed it vipassanl1 or insight m editation. It is a mcthod unique to Buddhism. For practising vipassanl1 meditation, a certain degrce of concentration is required. Concentralio n has two degrccs o f development: (J) 'Neighborh ood conccntrati on' (uparllra-samlldhi), which approaches the first 'trance' (jht1ua) w ithoul altaining it; (2 ) 'Att ainment concen lrati on' (appaml -samiidhi), which is the conccntration present in the four 'trances' (jlu7.na), These 'trances' are mental states b eyond the re This rneans that Neighbo rhood conccntration leads 10 vipasSflnil or insighl while Attainment coneentration lead s to the rn ystic s tates of Yoga. This shows how vipassana m editation, as a meth od, differs frorn Yoga. The form er is based on the empiricat concrete faets of expericnee wh ereas the latter goes beyond them. Ar; Pratab Chandra points out: "Tlle Upani$flds se/dom eare fOT actuaf experienees; rlleir aim ;s 10 discover a suprasensuous, supraphenomenal realify, entire1y free from

changt'and the lawsojtheworld ... Psycllologica/ aualys is may 1I0 t be

absenl in file Upani~ads, bul if Iw rdly form s any significa nt part of Illern . Early Bllddhism, Oll the contrary, ullcompromisingly refuses 10 tralls cend fh e empirical ... " l J7

From this it follows that the disagrecment belwccn the thinkers and the Buddha on the problem of the self is partly due 10 the different methods they employ: the former, practising Yoga, propound the dtlr/an theory, while the latter, practising vipassmul meditation, advocales the anattiI thcory.

Upani~adic

120

THE BUDDHISTS REJECTION OF THE SELF

PROBLEMS

In preaching th e anatttl doctrine, the Buddha claims to have avoided the two ex treme views, namely, etcmalism and annihilationis m. Unlike the e terna lists such as thc Upa nil}ad ic thinkers, th c Buddha rejccts the existence of the permanent self. And, unlike th e nihilists, such as Aji ta Kcsakambala, the Buddha accepts the doctrlnc of karma and rebirth . His 'middle' pos ition, howcver, const itutes some major p roblems. How ca n one reconcile th.e anatta doctrine, which den ics the permanent self, with the d octrine of karma and rebirth, which seems to prcsuppose the iden tity and continuity of thc person? Is it possiblc to ta lk of personal idcntity and unity of consciousness withou t having recau rse to the notion of the permanent seH? Since the solu tion of these problems is rclated to thc conception of consciou sness, in thc ncd chapter we sha ll first cons ider the nature of consciousness in Buddhisrn and then return to the solutions of these and athe r problems.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

n

12 13 14 15 16 17

S.XX II . 59. M.J . 380. T.W. Rhys Dilv ids, Dialogues 0/ the Buddha, Part 1, PTS, 1899, p. 242. Nyana tiloka, Buddhist DictWllllry, BPS, Kan dy, 1980, p. 14. 0 .1. Sutta No. 1. Kv u .62. $. Xlil. 35. SN. 682. D.l. 55. Sarva dars.ma -s amgraha, 2. M.J. 136; S. XXII, 8 1. Deussen, I'., TII/: Pllilosoplry of fhc Uparrishads, Orie ntal Books Re print, 1979, p. 39. ~g.ve da. X. 16.3. Radha kri ~hnan. S., 1'h.. Prilrci'fJ'l l Upani$ßds , George Allen ,md Unwin Lid., London, 1974, p. 73. C h:lnd. Up. VII[. 8. 1. M:lI).<;I. Up. Vlil. Ch:lnd. Up. VJJI. 12.1

121

'f Sartn,'s Exis tenlialisl1I and Early Buddhis l1I 18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25

26 27 28 29 30

31

32 33 34 35 36 37

38 39 40

4j 42 43 44

45 46 47 48

49

50 ',)

52 53 54 55

Brh . Up . 111 7. 20. Qua ted by S. Radhakrishnan in Indian Phi/o sophy, Vo\.l, Geo rge Allen a nd Unwin, 1983, p . 159. Brh. Up. IV 5.6. Brh. Up. 11 . 4.14; IV. 5.15. Brh. Up. 111 . 4.2. C"'hand . Up. VI. 12. 1. Bch. Up. IV. 5.15. Radhakris hna n, 5., Thc Principaf U,JOni$Ods, p. 69. Deussen, I'., ap. cit, p. 42. Kat h ~ U p . 1. 3, 12. Radhakrishniln, S. Thr Principo! Uptilli$llds , p. 646. MUI)Q. Up. TII. 2.8. Ja mes, W., The Varieties( )! Religious E.l"~'rie1ll:e. Mod~rn Lihra ry, 1929, p. 391Rad hakrishnan, S., In dian Philosophy, Vol. r, p. 176. rnge, P/CI/inlls, Val. 11, p. 140. Tait. Up . 1. 511 . TaiL U p . H. B.l Ch1lnd. Up. VI. 8. 7f. Brh . Up. J. 4.10. MUI)!;I . Up. 1l1. 2.9. D €u~~en, P. op . cit., p . 346. MUI) t;l.. Up . IIl. 2.8-9. Husser!, E., Idt'lis, Tr. by \-V.R. Boycc Gibson, Ceorgc Allen and Unwi n Ud ., 1969, s. 57, p. 173. Ideus, s. 80. p. 233 a nd Mllnd . Up. VIII. Iden.'!, s . 80, p 233. Ideas, p. 51. Husserl, E.. CQr/esiart MeditQtions, Tr. by Do rio n C ai rns, M;\rtinus Nijhoff, 1977, s. 11, p. 26. Id ea5, p. 18. Rad hakr i ~hnan S., Th/' Principa! Upani$llds, p. 69. Puligilndla, R., "Phenomenologicill Red uction ilnd Yogic Meditation", Philosoph.V f.asl Ll'Jd WeM . Val. Xx. No. I, 1970 p. 22. KOCS!t>n baum, P., NReligion i n Ihe Trad ition of Phc nomenology", in Relig ioll in Philosop lücal lw d ClIlt liral Prrspecliv/', cd. by ]. C. Feaner 3nd W. H oro~;L. D. Van No~tra nd Com pany Ine., 1%7, p . 1B7. Oe Si!va, L. A., The Problem of Ihe Seif irr Bllddhism arjd Chrislia nity, The Stlldy Centrc for Religion and Socicty, 1975, p. 25. Ja Yllt iJI eke, K. N., Eorly ßuddhist T/leory 0/ Knowlcdgr, Motilal ßa na rsida ~:iI, Delhi, 1980 p . 65. M .l. B. D. 11. 307. S. XXII. 56. Vism. e h . XIV, p. % 0. Budd haghosa, Th~ ExposiloT (AllhrN1finf), Ir. by Pe Mau ng Tin, Ox ford

122

THE BUDDHIST'S RE/ECTION OF THE SELF

University P ress, London, 1958, p. 145.

56

S. XXXVI. 1.

57

S. X. 11. Sfl.

58 59

M.1. 2Y3. Rhys D<3vids, C. A. F., A Budd hist Manual of Psychological Eth ics (DJ/IlmlllilSIJIiXall1), Orientili Books Reprint Co rpn., 1975, p.7, n . 2. S. XXII . 56. Vis m. e h. XIV. p. 452. Rahula, W., What Ihe Buddha Ttlusht , Grove Press, Im.'., 1962. p. 23. S. XXII. 56. Oe SiIviI, P., Buddhist and Frl'l/d ia n Psychology , Lil kc I10use I nvt!stment U d., 1973 p. 7. Flügel, J.c. S/udi1!5 ill fL'dillg "'Id Desire, Ou rkworth, London, 1955, p. 49. Nillilda, A Mn mUlI of AbhicIJmmml' , B.P.s., Kandy. 1975, p. 76. Nyanatilo ka, Bllddhist Dicfitmary, p. 100. M.L 293. Brh. Up. 111, 7. 16-22. S. XXIl, 59. Vis m. e h . XXI. p. 640. M.I. 232-233; S. XX II, 79.

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71

n

73

M. L 136.

74 75 76 77 78

C h:l nd. Up. VIlI . 8- 12. !-Iumc. 0 ., A Trt'fllise (" Hllman Nalllft!, Oxfo rd, 1975, p. 252. Ibid . pp. 252-3. S. V. 10. Vis m. e h. XVlII . p. 593-4. S.xXII. 45. Vism . eh. XX. pp. 611 -612.

79

80

81

82 IB 84 85

86 87 Inl 89 90

Dhilmmapada, eh. xx, 271-78-79. ,. 511bbe 5tl likhl1rrl ull ien l .. SlIh/J(' smikhl1ra du kkha .. Sabbe dllllllJ",a 111m1M . ... " Rhys Davids, T. W., Ear/y BruldhiSIrl, Bhnril!iya I'ublishing I Iouse, 1976, p. 56. S. XX II . 90. M. 1Il. 63; S. XII. 21. To put H into Öl modern form : When A is, Bis; 1\ aris ing, B ilri......·s; Vvhen A 'is not, B is not; A (easing. B ce,lscs M. !II. 63-4 ilnd c1sewhcre. Vism. eh. XVII. p. 51 7. M.1. 54, 5. XII. 20. S. XII. 20.

123

, Snrtr,/s ExistClll ialis111 Qlld Erlrly BuddITism !!l 92 93 94

1(Xl 101 102 103 104 lOS 1l"l6 107 108 109 110 111 112

S.XXlI.I8-20. Vi!'m. eh. XIX. p. 513. Vism. eh. XVI., p. 513. Jamcs, W., TIIC Principlrs o[ Psychu/ogy, Val. I Dover P ub lication~ Inc. 1950, p 40l. BN. 246. S. XII . 35. Mi"llalasekcra. G r. The Trutll oj Amilfll, BPS, 1966, P 25. Nya naliloka, Egolessl1es5 (Alll11M), BPS, 1974, p. 3. S. XXI I. 96. M.1. 137. D.Il . 305. ~SlllikhilMlu PIIl1clfpadattnkkhulldhl1 dukkhl1. ~ MJ. 51; S. XXII. 83. Sec abovc. p. 37. Jam c~, W., op. eil., p. 31 7. From m, E., Tht' Hell'! ,l[ Mall, Landon, 1965, p.SS. M .l. 6. S. XXII. RJ . D . !1I. 273S. XXI I. 125. S. XXII. 47. M.l.7. Horner, 1. B., The Midd lr J.ength Sayirtgs. Vol. l, PTS., Land On, 1976. p. 9

113

A[]. 51.

1\-l 115 116 11 7 11S 119 120

Vi~m. eh. XXI. p. 640. See abovt.'. p 40. S.XXII.81.

95 % 97 98

'::19

n. 2.

121

122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129

130 131 132 133

M.IIL 63. MJ . 300. M.1. 48, 299; l1L 250. Oe $ilViI, P., Blldd/uM arid Fmtdillll Psyclw[ogy, p. 73. See above, p. 85. !ti . Ir. 12. Rahula, W. op. ci\. p. 69. Jayal ille ke, K.N., Early lJllddhisl Th,'IJry IJj Kll owkdgr, pp. 169, 451. MJI. 211. Oe Silv
124

THE BUDDHISrS REJECTION OF THE SELF 134 135 136 137

See above, p. 98. M. I. 41. Nyanatiloka, The Ward oflhe Buddha, BPS, 1968, p. 79. Pratab Chandra, "Was Early Buddhism Influenccd by the Upani~ads?", Philosophy East and West, Vol. XXI, No. 3, 1971, p. 323.

125

N THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

havc s~e n in our disrussion on the Buddhist's rejecti on of th e seH that the person (puggafa) consists of fi vc aggregates, viz. corporca lity, feelin g. pen."cption, mental form ations, and consciou sness. Dur attention in this chap te r will bc focused on the agg reg':He of consciousncs5 (vj;'iftd~/Q), which is one of the four nonmnte rial agg rega tes. Thc five aggregates can be divided inta two rnain groups, the material and the nonmalerial. Thc aggregate of corporcality belangs 10 the materi al group called 'rapa ' (form). The term ' ropa ' specifies the bodil y constituent of the p ersonality. "The attabllävo, Of perso nality, minus all mental and mo ral characteri s tics, is rapl11;!."} The rcm ain ing agg regates, i.e. feeling, perccp tion, mental formations, an d consdous ness, belong 10 the n on mate· ria l group ca lled 'mlma' (name). The term 'mfma' is used to refer

W:

r

SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

to a11 mental phenomena. "Thus the aggregate of corporeality," writes Buddhaghosa, "is form (riipa), the four nonmaterial aggregates are name (ntlma),"2 Name and form taken together constitute the psycho-physical complex known as person (puggala). In the Abhidhamma, it should be noted, the term 'nama' is extended to include not only the four nonmaterial aggregates but also Nirvt11Ja. 3 Here the nonmaterial aggregates are considered under two terms: 'citta' (consciowmess) and 'cetasika' (psychic factar). The term 'citta' is said to bc a synonym for two other terms, namely, vif1Fit1lJa (consciousness) and marra (mind)4 whereas the term 'cetasika' is used to fefer to the remaining nonmaterial aggregates, viz. feeling, perception and mental formations. Citta and cetasika are two of the four ultima te categories (paramattha) with wh ich the Abhidhamma ü; concerned, the other two being rüpa (matter) and NirvQ1)a. 5 FIFTY-TWO PSYCHIC FACTORS

The aggregates oE feeling, perception and mental formations are called psychic Eactors (cetl1sika) because they are associ ated with consciousness (citta).6 In the Abhidhammatthasangaha, Anuruddha has given a dear and precise definition of psychic factors: "Psychic factors are those that arise and perish together with consciousness, are associated with consciousness and share the same object and basis with consciousness."7 There are altogether fifty-two psychic factors, two oE which are feeling and perception. The remaining fifty are mental formations (saflkhlIra). The fifty-two psychic factors are distributed under three distinct basic dasses, each dass consisting of two subdasses as follows: 1. General psychic factars: (a) primary and (b) secondary. 2. Unwholesome psychic factors: (a) primary and (b) secondary. 3. Wholesome psychic factars: (a) prirnary and (b) secondary. 1. (a) General psychic factors (sabbacittaslIdhara1)a-cetasika) are

127

1 Sarlre's

Exis telltiali~m

lind ElIrly Bllddhism

seven in number: contact (phassa), feelin g (v edanl1), perception (safind), inten ti on (cetal1l1) one-pointedncss (ekaggafa), psy ch.k vitality (j1uiti1ldriya) and attention (manasiknra). These~even {actors are common to every ae t of consciousness. (b) The seconda ry psychic fadors are s ix in number: initial appli cation (vitakka), sustained applicalion (vicl1ra), d ecision (adhimokkha), eHort (viriya), rapture (pfti) , and activ e urge (chal/da).

These factors are no t {ound in all types o f consciousness, thus they are ca lled the "particul ars" (pakh1!laka) . 2. (a) The primary unwholesomc (akllsala ) tactors faund invariably in alt classcs of unwholesamc consciausness are four in number: delusion (m olla), lack of moral shame (nhirika ), lack uf moral dread (arlOttappa) and restlessness (uddllacca). (b) The seconda ry un wholesome fadors are len in number: hatred (dosa), envy (issd), selfishness (maeehariya), worry (hkkucea), greed (loblla), wrong view (di!.thi), conceit (mana), sloth (thITla ), torpor (middha) aod doubt (vicikiccM). These factars da nol occur in a11 unwh ol e~am e classes of consciousness. 3. (a) Thc primary whoJesome (kusala) {actors are common to all cl asses of wholesome consciousness. The wh olcsome is also beautiful. Hence these factors a re ca lled the "bea utiful uni ver· sal" (sobhatUJsadhara1la). These factors are nineteen in number: faith (saddha), mindfulness (sati), shame (llirZ'), moral dread (ot· tappa), non-greed (a[o bha), non-hatred (adosa), equani mity (talramajjllaftafrl), calmn ess of psyehic factor:::; (kayapassaddhi), ealmness of consciousness (dttapassaddlli) , buoyancy of psychic fa cta rs (lalllltd), buoyancy of conscious ncss, pliancy o f psychi..: facto rs (mudl4til), pliancy of conscious ness, fitness of psychic factors (kamma fifiatl1 ), fitness of consciousness, proficiency of psychic {actors (ptlguf1f1atll), proficieney of consciousness, reet[· tude of psychic factors (ujukafa), and reclitud e af consciousness. (b) The secondary wholesome faetors found in some dasses of wholesome consciousness are six in number: right speech (sam md-vI7ea), right actio n (samma-kammanla ), right livelihood (sammd-l1jfva), compa ssion (ka rUl;l1), sympathctic joy (nwdiM), and wi sdom (paiifltl).s

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CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Thc psychi c f(l etors described above accompany consciousness. Thus consciousn ess docs no t m ise in isolatio n; it a lways ariscs together with a number o f psychic fa ctors. Conscio usncss and psychic fa ctors, though external to on~ anothcr in analysis, are in reality intimatcly and inseparably connected with onc an~ other. "Consc iousncss and psychic fa ctors are rcl atcd to onc ano ther by way o f association (sampayuftapaccaya):'9 Hence co n ~ sciommess in its purest form does not function in utter isolatiQn and separation; it is always accompanied by some psychic fa c ~ tors. This means that conscio usncss, in sp ite of bein g egoless, is no t con tentless because it has psychic fac tors as ils contenls. And in so far as il contains something, consciousness canno t bt' rc· garde d a s n o thingness Uwtthitä). 11 is "conscill usnes s ~ and~something ~ more." Consciousncss is "a id to be wholcsome (kusala) or unwholcsome (ak usala) accord ing to its cantents, l.C . psychic fa ctors. Conscious ncss is defincd by intenli a nality; that is, consciausne~s is consciousness of an object. lO Th e rela tion bctween subject (tlram lJlIl~ljka) aod object (aram ma~Ja) is called phassn (contact), which i5 similar to the nation of intcnliona lity in pht:!nomenology. Consciousnt'5s, howcver, i5 rcla ted 10 its abject with the help of six scnsc~organs (dvil ra or äyat(ma), viz. cye, ear, nos(', langue, body and mind. "Wha tevcr one sees throu gh the eye, hears throu gh the car, smells through the nase, touch es through the body, recognizes through the mind-a ll these une knows by consciousness." ll Thus the triad of COIlSciOI1SfICSS, scHse-organ and object is accepted in earl y Buddhism. "The coming tagether of the three is contact (phll ssa)."12

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS It should be notcd here that thc carly Buddhist accepts mind ~ door (man odvara) as the "sixth" sense, in additiun to thc fiv e physical sense orga nsof which visible objcct, sound, odor, taste, and tangible thing are theirobjects. The s ixth sense has all men-

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tal phenomena as ÜS objects,n and it is through this sixth inner sense that consdousness can reflect upon itself and its psychic factors. Without the mind-door, consdousness cannot know itseH, just as a person without eye-door (cakkhudvlIra) cannot see visible objects. Through this mind-door, consciousness knows itseH as an object, not as a subject. That is, consdousness by nature is not sclf-conscious; it is not implicitly aware of itself when it is aware of an object. 14 Consciousness can only bc aware of one object at one time. "\tVhen we attend to present things, we are not able at the present moment to attend to the consciousness by which they arise."15 This is because consdousness "cannot be subject and object at once."lfl Just as one cannot cut a sword with that very same sword, an axe with that axe, and a knife with that knife, so also one cannot know consdousness with that very same consciousnessY lt is interesting to note he re that the Vijfülnavadin of Mahayana Buddhism holds a different view from the Theravadin. According to the Vijnanavadin, "every consciousness and every mental phenomenon is self conscious."l~ Knowledge is self-luminous (svayam-prakI1 9a). Just as a lamp illumines the neighboring objects and its own seH at the same time, so also consciousness is aware of its object and itself at one and the same moment. Neverthelcss the Mädhyamika docs not agree with the VijM.Davadin. The former says that consciousncss, being empty, cannot know itseH. "Even the sharpest sword cannot cut itself; the fingertips cannot be touched by thc same fingertips. Consdousness does not know itself."19 In this respect the Madhyamika's position is not different from the Theravadin's. THE MATERIAL OBJECT

Now we have seen that consciousness in early Buddhism is defined as that which is conscious of an object (arammalJa). Here the term 'arammatw' (object) is to be understood in the sense of 'lIlambitabba,' which means that which is hung upon by consciousness.2t1 Without an object to be 'hung upon,' consdousness

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cannot ar ise. H e nce object is one of thc necessa ry conditiuns for the aris in g uf consciousness. Buddhagh osa writes: " Eyt'-con scioHSlZess arises du c 10 t-ye,

visible objcct, light , und atnnd attention ... Mind-CiJIIsciuusness arises duc 10 subconsciollSneS$, ItunIClltiQII ., . Ear -COIISciOUSI/CSS arises dill' tu ear, sOl/nd, apert u re,

tal objf'c t , (llId attention , "11

Since it is born supported or conditioncd by the object, consciousness cannot cxist without an objecL From the fa ct thai greater promine nce is given !o the object, Buddhis m canno! be classed as idcalism. "Early Buddhisffi," writes Ja ya tilleke, "is realistic in that it held matter (rfipa) to no n-mental (acetasikam) and inde pendent of thought (citta -vippa.llutta}:'n Un like Berkeley, the ßuddhisl think.., that the existence of the material object does not depend on ils being p crceived . The material object, however, exists in the s tate of perpetual flux Of becoming. It IS imperm ancnt (anicca) . Rfipa (matter) in Buddhism is not ddined as thc cxtendcd thing (res extensa), but as "the changeable thing" (rupl'aW; nlpmi1).lJ The material object, as we s h .. U sec, .. rises and p crishes l~ve ry moment. It is mom ~ ntary (kha~ likt1 ). The object, howevcr, appears as rclatively permanent due to the meaning-giving activ ity of consciousness. Consciollsncss is called ' name' (nt1 ma ) bcca use il hru-; a tendency to "name" the objcct, 2 ~ Lc. to constitule Ihe m ean ing of the world .

THE PHENOMENAL WORLD According to Buddhism, the objects of our senso ry impress io n (paJiglla -sa ml"rassa ) are momcnlary and non-substantial , but thcir true nature is distorted wh en they a re conccptualized by our consdousncss influcnced by lust (rdga), hatred (dosa) and dcl usion (molm).25 And due to conceptu ali zation by consciousness, Ihe phenomenal world is constiluted. The psychological process wh ich co nstitutes the world has been describt:>d in the

MadhupiD-<;lika-Sutta:

131

Sartrr's Existentialism and Early Buddhism "Whatever man perceives (sanjanati) that he conceives (vitakketU; whatever he conceives that he differentiates (papaftceti); and what he differentiales, by reason t!tereof ideas and considerations of differential ion (papanca-saMa-sailkha) arise in hirn. "26

In this statement the term 'papanca' refers to the differentiation or manifoldness of the world.27 The opposite term 'nippapanca' is a name for Nirva~a or the end of the world. The Arahant is the person whose concept of the world disappears: "Mankind delights in the manifoldness of the world, the Perfect Ones are free from such manifoldness."28 This is because the Arahant's consciousness limits itself to what is 'given'; it does not impose meaning on the thing perceived. The Buddha says: "In the seen, there will be just the seen; in the heard, just the heard; in thc sensed, just the sensed; in the cognized, just the cognized."29 Again, "Regard the world as empty (sunna), Mogharaja, and be always mindful: thus will you be able to overcome death!"30 But unlike the Arahant, the ordinary person (puthujjana) constitutes the phenomcnal world and dings to it. He has distortions (vipal/asa) of perception, thought and view. Rcferring to this "constituted" phcnomenal world, the Buddha says: "/n this body of six foot heighl with its perception and its eonsciOllsness, is eontained fhe world, the arising of fhe world, tlle end 01 the world, and tlJC way thai leads to fhe end of fhe world. ".H

We should make it dear that when we say that consciousness constitutes the world, we do not mean that consciousness idealistically creates the material world; what we want to say is that consciousncss constitutcs the meaning of the phenomenal world. And the meaning thus constituted is rcgarded as conventional truth (sammuti-sacca), whereas the true nature of things prior to constitution reprcsents thc ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca). Accordingly, the Buddha makes two kinds of statements, viz. conventional and· absolute. "A conventional statement is true because of convention and an absolute statement is true as (dis-

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closing) the true characteristics of things."J2 Such terms as 'person' (pllggala), ' Ii ving being' (satta) and 'self' (a/lll) form parts of the conventio nal s tatement, and s uch terms as ' impermanent' (ankea), 'suffering' (dukkha) and 'selflessness' (anattd) form parts of the absolute statement, 33 MOMENTARINESS The consciousness which gives mea ning to the wo rld is by nature momentary (kllU~ika); it arises and pcrishes in cach and every moment. Consciousness can never remain the same for any two consccutive moments. Each moment of consciousness

is extremely short. The Buddha says: "I consider. monks, that there is no phenomenon that comes and goes so quickly as consciousness. It is not easy to find a simile to show how quickly consdousness comes and goes.":H In the Samyutta ~ Nikäya , the Buddha compares the phenomenon of consciousness with the quick movements of a monkey:

"Just as a fIlonkey, monks,Jaring through the dellse forest C(jtches one bol/Sh (llld , I('Hing it go, catches at/other, (md tllelt allotlJer; ('ur" so, monks, tllOt w hicll we caff mit/d (ei lta), tlloug"l (mano), con-

sciousness (viMäJ)a), tllat ariscs as olle thing, eeases as QlIotller, bot/I by llight (md by day. "35 Every moment of consciousness is subdivided into three sub- moments, namely, genes is (uppdda), development (fhiti) and dissolution (bhmiga),36 Each o f these s ub-moments occupies an infinitesim31 division of tim e so that to every separate act of cansdausness (cittup pada ) there are three phases, in which successively it Clrises, dcv elop s and disapp ears. These three sub-mom ents tagether form ane consciaus moment (cittakkha~la), the period occupied by any single aet of con<;ciouSness. According to the Commenfators of the Pali Canon, there are more than onc billion such conscious moment<; i.n the time that would be occu pied by the shortest flash of lightning. 37 Momcnts of consciousness, sho rt-lived as they are, succecd

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l

one another so rapidly that they appear to be 'the stream of consciousness' (viflfla~Ja-sota)38 which perpetually flows "like the current of a river" (nadfsoto viya)J9 The current of a river maintains one constant form, one seerning identity, though not a single drop of water remains today of a1l the volume that composed that river yesterday.40 In like manner, the stream of consciousness appears to be selfsame, though not a single act of consciousness remains the same for any two consecutive moments. THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS Now some questions arise: Since acts of consciousness last for a very short time, how can they form a stream of consciousness? What combines these conscious acts in such a way that there arises the selfsame stream of experience? In other words, what is the unifying principle of consciousness? The Buddhist, having rcjcctcd the permanent self, cannot accept that there exists in consciousness a permanent entity which functions as the unifying prindple of consciousness. He has to admit, as Sartre does, that consciousness unifies itself. According to the Buddhist, acts of consciousness are causally related to one another according to the natural uniformity of consciousness (cittaniytIma). Each conscious ad has causa I relation with its predecessor. Twenty-fnur modes of causal relation (paccaya) are enumerated and explained in the Pa!!hana, the last book of the Abhidhamma-Pi!aka. Of these twenty-four, four modes of conditionality are applied to the relation between two conscious acts. As Anuruddha points out in the Abhidhamma tthasaiJgaha: "ConsciOllsncss and psyclJic factars that immediate/I{ cease, relate lhemselves to present consciousness and psychic factors by way of contiguity (anantara), immediacy (samanantara), absence (natthiJ, and disappearallce (vigata). "41

By way of contiguity and immediacy, one conseinu::; moment

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5ARTRE'S REJE(."TION OF THE TRAN5CE NlJE NT AL EGO

peris hes immed iatcl y giving birth to another. The s ucceeding consdOlls m oment inh crits all the potentialiti e~ of its immediate predeccssor. The present conscio us moment is abo related 10 Ihe p receding momen t in the müdes of abse nce and d isa ppearance. ThaI is, with the a bsence aod disappearance of the predeccssor, the Sllcccssor appears. FOT instan ce, the visual consciOllsness (dassa llII) is cam;ally related to the immed iatcly füllow ing receiv ing cünscious ness (snmpa!iccllana) b y way o l absence and di sappearance. 5.2. Aung writes: "This fVl/rlold forrdatjoll is unders tood to /lien/! timt each ('xpired stall' reIJders sem;ce (upakara) 10 file next. 111 ot/Ii:r words, ~'acl!, 01/ "assiflg aWilY, gives up fhe wllOle vf fh e energy (paccaya-sa tti) to its s/lccessor. Each slIccessor, Iherefore, lias all lh c potcntialities 01 its prcdecessors, (wd morl'. "42

It is these four causal rela tions that make the unity and contin uity of conscious aets possibl e. Although the stream of consdousness remains the sa me, conscious act~ wh ich su ccecd olle ano ther in that s trt'am are no t identica l. The present consciou s act is not ab sol utely th e same as its imm ed iate predecesso r because the for mer arises immediately after the disappearance o f the la tter. No r is the present conscious act entirely different from its immediate predt:'cessor becau!'e the form er inherits all the potentialities of thc latter. Thus in the same s tream of consciousness there is co ntinuity (santnti), but no iden tity (ekaltl). Any two consecuti ve mo ments of consciousn ('SS are, in Nägasena's words, "neithe r the S
THE PERSONAL IDENTITY One q uestion may be raised here: If it is true that there is no absolu te ide ntity in the s trea m o f consciousness, how does the Buddhis t explain the sense of personal id entity? Wh.i\t exactly enables me to say that I am the same man that I was yesterday? Thc Buddhist wOllld say that thefe is no permanent self under-

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lying the ever-changing stream of experience. For the Buddhist, it is nothing but the continuity of memory that gives rise to the sense of personal identity. By inheriting aU the potentialities from its predccessors, consciousness is accumulative; nothing is really forgotten. 44 With aU its hcritage of the past, consciousness recognizes an object in the image reproduced, or the idea revived, of the original object by the very marks which were observed by its predecessors in a certain perception or reflection. Thus the remembering consciousness "has come to regard the image as thc copy, and the idea as the counterpart, of the original object intuited or reflected upon."4~ A. J. Ayer, like the Buddhist, thinks that "some continuity of memory is necessary" for the possibility of personal identity.46 Given aseries of experiences, we must thread them together by assuming that latcr expericnces consist partly in recollections of their predecessors. Ayer writes: "If we want to enlist every member of the series, we shall have to assume that each of them is related to at least one of the others either actively or passively with respect to memory."47 But this would mean that every expericnce is related to previous memories. The question now is: What is the relation between two items of experiencc? Ayer then condudes that memory i5 not sufficient for maintaining selfidentity because it needs to be backed by some other relation of which "nothing more illuminating can be said than that it is the relation that holds bctween experiences."48 Thus his difficulty is due to thc fact that he has not succeeded in discovering the relation between two items of experience. Hume has had the same problem. He holds the view that thc seH is "a bundle of perceptions." Hume, however, has not been able to show adequately what it is that integrates or orders the bundle. His difficulty has its root in two principles which he accepted and could neither renaunce nor reconcile-"that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences" and "that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences."49 Oistinct perceptions are distinct existences inasmuch as any one of thern can exist even though the others have no existence. In this sense, Humean perception.appears to be a being-in-itself, in

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Sartre's term inology. For Sartre, the relation between two per· ceptions is uns uccessfully accounted for in Hume's a tomistic framewo rk. "Any connection with an antecedent or a consequ e nt, no m a tte r how co nstant it ma y bei re m a ins unintelli gible."50 TH E CAUSAL RELATION

The Buddhist admits that there is a d ifficulty in app rehending the causal relation. The Buddha says: "Deep is thi s doctrine of ca usal arisin g, and it looks deep tOO." 51 As is mentioned earlier, tht:! causa1 relation in Bu ddhism is not subjective and it is not a category imposed by consciousness on its objects. The causal relation is "objective rea lity" (tathafl1)52 and is d eno ted by the term 'dhamm afif,' which literally means "the nature of things. " Thus it is sa id: " lt is in lire nature uf things (dhammata) that fhe absence of remorsc is presen f in a virfuoLis person. A person who has n() (feeling oj) remMse Ileed not determ ine in his mind that joy s}lOuld arfse i/1 hll1l. It is of Ille nature of things thaI joy arises i/1 a person who lacks remorsc. A person who is joyful tleed not delermine in his mind that d cli ght sholild arise in Irim. lt is ol llte nature of tlli ,rgs that deflghf ar lses i n (I joyJu l person. "53

This passage d earl y shows how moments of co nsciousness succced one another. Tha t is, with the absence (natt" i ) and dis· ap p ear ance (viga f a~pa ccaya ) o f re mo rse· conscio u s ncss, joy·consci ousness arises. And joy-consciousness, on passing away, transm its all the potentialities to d elight·consciousness wh ich immedia tely follows it (ananl ara -, samanatltara-paccaya). This causal relation is in the nature o f things (dlmmmata ). Here the term ' th e nature of th ings' (dhammaM) refers to the causa! psychologica l processes.34 Now we can see a difference betwecn the Buddhist and Hume on the ontologica l status of ca usal relatio n. Thc Bud d hist thinks (hat causal re lation is objecti vely real whe rea.. Hu me ho lds the view that the causal relatio n is s ubjec·

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tive and based on habit. According to Hurne, our rnind is in the habit of experiencing certain effects from certain causes. Thc external events are related by this operation of mind, which trusts in the uniforrnity of nature. Furthermore, the Buddhist differs from Hume in that the former does not regard conscious acts, or perceptions in the Humean sense, as "distinct existences." For the Buddhist each act of consciousness cannot exist without relation to some causes: "Apart from conditions there is no arising ofconsciousness."55 Consciousness is not a substantial, static entity. It is not a beingin-itself; rather it is a becoming (bhava). Each conscious moment is by nature causally related to its predecessor and successor. AB we have already seen, the present moment of consciousness is subdivided into three sub-moments, namely, genesis, development and dissolution. At the instant of genesis, consciousness is generated by the potentialities of the perishing consciousness; it is born an owner of a11 the contents of the predecessor. In other words, it is a 'retention' of the past. Then comes the submoment of development. At this instant, consciousness is not influenced by the past, but by the external object (i1.ramma!Ja-paccaya) and the internal force of intention (cetani1.). The two factars produce karma-energy. At the instant of dissolution, the present consciousness, on passing away, transmits karma-energy and other potentialities to its immediate successor; it is a 'projection' into the future. Here we find that the submoments of genesis and dissolution are analogous to the Husserlian acts of 'retention' and 'protention.'

WILLIAM JAMES ON THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS It is interesting to note that the Buddhist theory of the causal relation between two conscious moments can be likened to William James' theary of the relation between thought-moments. Like the Buddhist, James uses the words "strearn of consciousness" to refer to the continuous flow of mental phenornena. Explaining why he calls it such, James writes:

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SARTRE'S REJEcrlON OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

"Such words as 'chain' or 'train ' da not descrihe it fi tly

IIS

it pre-

senfs itseif in the first instanee. It is nothing joincd; it flows. A 'river' atld a 'stream ' are metaplwrs by which it is mos t lIatumlly d{·scribed. In fa/king of it lIereafter, let us call it the strenm of tJ/Ought, of C07l sciousness, or

of subjective life. "56

Aga in, like the Buddhist, James rejects the ex istcnce of the s ubstantial sclf oe sou J.57 Thc postulate of the seil is not necessary for the unity o f consciousness.

"The unity, fhe iden tity, the individuillity, and fh e immaterialit y timt appenr in the psychic Ilfe are thus fl ccounted Jor as phenomenal and temporal facts excfllsively, nnd witl! //1) need of refereuce 10 allY more simple or Sl/bstan fin f agent than I he prescnt thollglrl or 'sectiOfI ' of the strcam. "58 At any givcn moment, the active sourcc of u nification is "the real, present o nlooking, eeme mbering, ' judging thou ghl' ... "59 The judging thought, as a 'seetion' of the stream, is momentary. This thou ght- moment is counted as conscious moment (ci ttakhaly.a) in Buddhist tcrminology . James then ex plains hmv thought mo ments are united . His exp la nation, it s hould be no ted, is no t different from the Budd hi st version dcscribed above. According to James, the preceding thought, on passing away, transmits Hs whole energy to its succcssor. The contents are passed on fro m one thought to the next in a continuous succcssion. James writes:

"Each pllise oj cognitive cOl!sciousnes:;, each Th vught, dies away and is rep/aced by tm otJwr. Tile other, atnollg thc things it knows, k"ows its Gron predecessor, Qud Jilldiflg it 'wa rm, ' in the way ({Je haue

described, grcefs it, sayi7lg, 'Tholl art minc, lind part vf fhe samc self with me. '''6()

Each thought, know ing and appropriating Hs predecessors, is thc final owncr. Each thou ght is thu s born an owner, and dies

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owned, transmitting its properties to its own later proprietors. "As Kaut says, it is as if elastie balls were to have not only motion but knowlcdgc of it, and a first ball were 10 trallsmit both its motion !lnd its consciOllsness to a second, which look bolh up info its C01lsciousness and passed Illern to a third, Ulltil Ihe last ball held all that the ot/ler balls flad held, and realized as its own. "61

James' description gives us an insight into the Buddhist theory of the unity and continuity of consciousness. It shows how egoless consciousness unifies itself: The permanent self is rcndered useless for the unity and continuity of the stream of consciousness. We have already seen that consciousness in Buddhism is momentary and moments of consciousness are causally related to one another. The unity and continuity of consciousness are effected, not by the permanent seH (atta), but by the causa I relations of contiguity, immediacy, absence and disappearance. Moments of consciousness, thus relatecl, succeed one another with inconceivable rapidity and thereby constitute the stream of consciousness (viilfla1;1a-sota). The stream of consciousness flows on uninterruptedly like the current of a river until the moment of death. 62 SUBCONSCIOUSNESS Here one question arises: If the flow of consciousness never stops, what happens to consciousness when man is in deep, dreamless sleep? According to Radhakrishnan, su:;;upti or deep sleep is anormal occurrence of man's life. "In it the mind and the sense are both said to be inactive."63 Does it mean that the stream of consciousness stops flowing during dreamless sleep? Thc Buddhist's answer is in the negative. According to hirn, the consciousness of someone in dreamless sleep continues to flow in the state of bhavanga. As Nagasena has pointecl out in the Milindapailhi1:

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"When someone i5 in deep sleep, his mind is in the bhavaJiga state; a mind in thr bhavanga state does not function, and a rnind inactive knows not the evil und the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it is when a mind is aetive that dreams are dreamt."64 What, then, is this bhavanga? By bhavanga is meant "the cause, reaSOTI, indispensable conditioTI, of aur being regarded subjectively as continuous; the sine qua non of our existence, that without which one cannot subsist or exist."65 Bhavanga is a function of our being; it makes the passive side of our existence possible. It denotes a functional state of subconsciousness. "As such it is the subconscious state of mind-'below the threshold' of consciousness-by which we conceive continuous subjective existence as possible."66 In this sense, bhavariga is nothing but consciousness (viFiFiäI;W) wh ich has no possibility of knowing itself. As is mentioned earlier, consciousness is not self-conscious. But consciousness can know itself as an object through the mind-door (manodvara) or the inner sense; that is, it can be known by reflection or introspecHon onIy. And consciousness can be reflected upon only when it is active in the sense oE coming into contact with external Of interna! objects through any one of the six doors (dvara) or channels (apatha), namely, cye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. The aetive consciousness is called 'proeessed consciousness' (vUhicitta) as it functions through the proecss which we will consider rater on. It is this processed consciousness that ean be the object of reflection. But the passive 'process-freed consciousness' (vfthi-mutta) can never be reflected upon because it is below the mind-door or 'threshold oE consciousness' (manodvara). Since it cannot be known by reflection, the process-frccd consciousness is called bhavanxa or subconsciousness. And the dividing-line between subconsciousness and processed consciousncss (vIthi-citta) is the threshold of consdousness (rnanodvara).67

Thus consciousness does not stop during the period oE dreamless sleep; the subconscious state of consdousness flows on without interruption. This subconscious stream is arrested

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when the proccss-freed consciousness m akes eontact (phassa) wHh an objcet through the sense doors. When a material objec t ( rupilramma~Ja) is presented 10 eonseio us ness through one o f thc fi ve sense-doors, a processed consciou ::;ness (vflhicifta) arises, consisting of aseries of sepilrate conscious moments succeeding one Ilnother in a particu lar uniform order. This order is known as psyehic order (citta-lIiydma).6Il In o rder 10 have a eomplete perception of the material object, consciousness must have passed through seventeen consecutive m oments. lf the series for same reason is incomplcte, the perception d oes not a ttai n c1earness. For this rea son, a moment of material object is said to correspond to seventeen conscious moments. 6Y These seventeen consciou s moments are as fallows: 1. past subeonsciousness (atlta-bhavanga), 2. dist urbance of subconsciousness (bhavOIiga -caltma), 3. ::;ubconscious ness cut off (bhava,iga-upaccheda), 4. advertence through one of the five sense-doo rs (pal1cadvilrtfVajja na ),

5. co n scio usness through one of the five senses (paf! cavifll1a~a ),

6. rcception (sampa!icchalll1), 7. examina tio n (sautJra!,a), 8. determining (vo!!/lapal1a), 9-15. impulsions (java"a), 16-17. registering (tadll ramm al;la). 70 Sinee our main cancern here is to understand the nature of subconsc iousness (bhavQ1iga - v jiIt1tl~a), we s hall not go into detail s about these seventeen m ome nts. For the present purpose, the series may be div ided into four sect io ns. Firstly, moments one to three represent the initial entry of th e perceptual object into the receptive medium of consciousness, and the disturbance as weIl as the arrest of subconscious stream ca used by that cntry. Second, moments tOllr to eight represent a gradually increasing a ttention 10 the object, in wh ich Hs particular nature a nd qualities a re recei ved, cxami.ned and determined. Third, moments nille to tifteeIl represent the full cognition of the object Lastly, moments sixteen to seventeen represent a 'registering' of

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the perception as a whole; they may be viewed as the transition from a perception to a primary memory. After the last two moments perish, there is "the subsidence into the subconscious state" (bhavanga-pato).7 1

SUBCONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO Out of these seventeen conscious moments, the first is subconsciousness or process-freed consciousness. The remaining sixteen moments represent the processed consciousness. This processed consciousness appears to have subconsciousness or bhavanga as its origin. "Bhavanga is that from which all thought processes emerge when necessary conditions are present."72 And for this reason, Buddhaghosa regards subconsciousness as "the condition of achve consciousness."73In this sense, subconsciousness (bhavariga) is similar to the transcendental ego which, according to Husserl, is the origin of conscious acts. Thus subconsciousness may be viewed as a functional substitute for the transcendental ego as weH as the substantial self (l1tman) in Buddhist thought.74 The Buddhist, however, would not accept the view that subcon<;ciousness is a seH in disguise. The self or ego is not liable to change, but subconsciousness changes every moment.

"Uke any other eonsciousness it (bhavanga) also consists of three aspects-genesis (uppada), statie (thitiJ and cessation (bhanga). Arising and perishing every moment it fiows on like a stream not remaining the same for two conseeutive moments. "75 Hence subconsciousness is a type of consciousness (vifiiia11a) which is passive or process-freed; it is conscious of its object without passing through the process (vUhi). The object of the process-freed consciousness is the former object of the processed consciousness; it is taken along when the latter subsides into the subconscious state. Thus subconsciousness is not objectless or contentless. It inherits all the contents of the processed con-

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sciousness. From the foregoin g discussion it is d eM that con sciousness does not stop flowin g during dreamless sleep; it jus t subsides in to the subcons cious s tate. And it is subconscious ness that makes cunlinuity of consciou s ncss pORi ibl c during d ee p s Leep . The theory of subconsciousness (/!hava1iga - vj ff11a~la) is important, 110t only fo r understanding the continuity of consciousness, but also for cxplaining karma and re birth . Accord ing to Nyanatilo ka, " this l;o-eal led 'subconscious lifes tream' o r undercurrent of li fe is that by whl ch might be cx plained the facult y of memo ry, p ara nor mal psychi c phenome na, mental and physica l grow th, Kanlla a nd Rebirth, e ie.":;/> Now we sh all consider h ow Ihe theory of subconsciousness is rclated to the theories of karma and rcbirth. REBIRTH OF CONSCIOUSNESS '[tlwards the end of the preced ing chapt er we re marked that on(' of thc ma in problems for the Bud d his t is to reconcile thc d octrine uf armtll1 with thc beliefs in kanna and re bi rth. They have to answer this ques tion: If there is no "elf, wh a t is it that is rcborI1 and expericnces the rcsults oE karma? A s T. W. Rhys Davids has po intcd o ul : " Wc ha ve thus ar rived at i't d cadloek: 10 savc what it hords to bc a psycbologieal truth Buddh ism rejects the notion (l f a soul; tu save wh at it hold s 10 be the n ecessity oE jus lice, it rctains the be lief in trans migration ."Tl The word transmi g ra tion is mi s lea d ing. The Buddhis t d oc trinc o f rebirlh shllUld be distingu ished from th e U pani ~a di c theo ry of a transrnigrating se lf Of soul. In Buddhism there is no permanent self which trans migrates fro m one Ii fc 10 another. In Bud d haghosa's word s, " there is no entit y, no self, no elements of be ing transmig mted frorn thc last existcnce inl o the prescnt one. "7S lf there is no trans migrating selE, what is reborn into the next cx istence (b/Ulva)? To this question, the Buddhis t replies that co,,:-cious fless (v i iiiidtla ) is rebon!. 79 In the M aJu1niddlla - Su tta , the Buddha sa ys that w ere consci ou sness not to descend into th e m other's w o mb, nam e-and-form of a new life would not ca me

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to birth .!j(J Thus "the effective medium of rebirth is vjFii!a~za , consciou sness."tll N everthclcss this should no t mi slcad u s ioto thinking thaI il is onc and the same conscio usness that trans migrates fro m onc cxis tenctc' 10 another. A mo nk ca lied Säti is said to havc belit'ved that anc ;md the same conscio usness is feborn into the nex t existcnce. Sa ti, when asked by the Buddha 10 explain what he understands by consciousness, gives this answ er: Hit is this, Lo rd, that s pea ks, that fee ls, tha t t:xperiences now here, now the re, the function o f dceds thai a re lovely and thai are d eprived ." lI2 lt ShOllld be noted here tba l S~ li ' s definition o f con sc i ousnt' s ~ is similar 10 the Upani$a d ic d efinition of scH (t1fman ) . H e is, therefore, accu scd by the Buddha or distorti ng the Mas ler's tcaching. Thc Buddha says: " Bllf to wl/Om,jool islJ mall , d0 .l/0ll utUJerslal/d tllr: dhamma wns tnught by me tlII/S? Has not consciuuslIc'SS gellemlcd by co f/tlitiolls been sl'okerz of in ma lly a figurc by me, sayillg: Apa rt f rom condiliCIH lhere is 110 originatioll of cO ll sciou s ness? "/I·~

A s m en tioncd earlier, consciousness is mo mcntary; it never remains the sa me for any two consecutive mo ments. The s trea m o f cons cious ncss nows on because of the rapid su ccession o f consciou s mo ments. When one conscious cio us mo me nL"1I4 The proccss of death and rcbirth in d aily life is app lied to the di ssolution of bod y and rebirth into the next life. Just as thc presenl eonscious m oment is the result of the preccd ing conscious m om ent, so also Ih e eonsciousness of il newborn child is the resutt of the eonsciousness of the dead m an. The last mo ment of consci ous ness in the previo us Hfe is caUed "death-conscious ness" (cu ti-citla ), and the firs t moment of con· s cious ness in the present life is called " rebi rth ·consciou:mess" (pa!isan dhi-citla). "Immed ill tely after that dea lh-consciou sness has ceascd , a rebirth-consciou sness arises and is cstablished in

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the subsequent existence."85 The rebirth-consciousness is called "patisandhi" because it links together two consecutive existences. And it is the death-consciousness that originates the rebirthconsciousness and is its immediate cause. At the moment of death, the death-consciousness in the preceding life perishes, immediately giving birth to the rebirth-consciousness in the succeeding life. It is to be understood here that the death-consciousness does not transmigrate from one life to another; it is only the cause of the appearance of the rebirth-consciousness in a new Iife. The two consciousnesses are neither the same nor different. As it is said in the Visuddhirnagga: "Because the series is continuous, there is neither identity (ekata) nor diversity (nanafa)."86

Death-consciousness and rebirth-consciousness are essentially of the nature of subconsciousness (bhavanga-vifjfjt7f/o)ß7 Thus Buddhaghosa says that the last subconsciousnes5 in one existcnce is death consciousness and thc first subconsciou5ness of another existence is rebirth consciousnessß~ The latter is followed upon by subconsciousness proper. Thereupon an innumerable series of subconsciousness flows on uninterruptedly, for as long as there is no processed consciousness to interfere with the course of thc streamß'i THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA According to Buddhism, it is consciousness that i5 reborn. Its rebirth is due to the potentialities transmitted by the death-consciousness in the previous life.ln the potentialities are ineluded "karma that i5 enveloped by latent ignorance (avijjilnusaya) and rooted in latent desire (taf/.hanusaya)."90 Therefore the rebirthconsciousness is conditioned by a past good or bad karma which predominates at the moment of death. The karma that conditions the rebirth-consciousness is called Reproductive Karma (janaka-kamma).n Here we find a elose relation between the Buddhist view on rebirth and the doctrine of knrma. As Poussin has pointed out:

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"The doctrine of karma presupposes the belief in transmigration nnd is primarily a rationalistic and moral explanation ofthe variety of

the conditions 01 living beings through many consecutivc exist-

ences. "92 The theory of karma means all the speculations concerned with actions, and especially the belief in retribution of action. It is a theory of cause and effect, of action and reaction. According to this theöry, action (kamma) produces its effect or result (vipaka). A good action produces good effect and a bad action bad effect. As it is said in the Samyutta-Nikaya: "According to the seed that's sown

So is the fruit ye reap therefrom. The doer of good (will gather) good, The doer of evil evil (reaps)."93 The Sanskrit word 'karma'(Pali, kamma) literally means action or deed. But in Buddhisrn it means only 'intentional' or 'volitional' action, not all action. The Buddha, like Sartre, defines action or karma by intention or will (eefant7): "Intention, monks, is what I caU action. Having intended, one performs action by body, speech or mind."94 Here intention is all important. Action without intention is a mere happening. As it has not been intended or willed the action is as if it were not done. It will bear no fruit (vipt7ka), for it is not accumulated or stored up (upacifa). According to Sartre, action, as intention, is a choice of an end. And the choice gives rise to the sense of responsibility. For the Buddhist, intentional or volitional action necessarily implies moral responsibility in the sense that the doer of action will experience its result. Man's present existence is said to be conditioned by his action in the past. The Buddha says: "Owners of their action are living beings, heirs to their action; action is the womb frorn which they are born, their action is their friend, their refuge."95 One may ask whether the theory of karma is compatible with the doctrine of anattt7. If there is no self as an agent, what is it that performs action and accumulates and experiences the result of action? According to the Buddhist, intentional

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consdousness performs action. Consdousness also accumulates the rcsult of action-"if a person even unknowingly performs a meritorious action, consdousness acquires mcrit."% When action produces result, it is consciousness that experiences it. But consciousness which performs action is not identical with consciousncss which experiences the result.ln fact, they are "neither the same nor different." To say that the docr of action and the experiencer of the result are absolutely the same is to hold the eternalistic view, and to say that the two are entirely different is to hold the annihilationistic view.97 Avoiding the two extreme views, the Buddhist says that the doer of action and the experiencer of the result are neither the same nor different (na ca so, IJa ca anno). Wc havc already explained this when discussing the continuity of consciousness. 98 Although karma is defined by intention, not all intentional action is called karma. The Buddha and Arahants perform intentional action, but their action docs not produee effect.1t is a mere 'doing' (kiriya) without result to be aceumulated by consciousness. The Buddha and Arahants do not aeeumulate fresh Jmrma bceaw;e they have eradieated greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (mohn) which are regarded as the roots of karma. Henee action wh ich is performed out of the threefold defilement produces result. "This action ripens whenever one is reborn, and wherever this action ripens, there one experienees the fruits of this action, be it in this tife, or the next life, or in some future life."'N Action which is done through the complete absence of greed, hatred and delusion does not produce result. Thus it is said:

'Tor fhe actians whiclz are not done out oj greed, hat red and delusio/J, which have IlOt sprung fram thern, which have not their source

or origill in tlzem; such actions, through the absence oj greed, hatred lind dc/usion, are abandoncd, rooted out, like a palm-tree tom out of the soU, destroyed, arid not able to spring up again. "WO This statement dearly shows that the theory of karma cannot be regarded as astriet determinism (niyatavada) because it does

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not state that evcry action must produce result. To say that all action prod uces ft:!sult would be a wrang interpre tation of the Buddhi:;t thcory of karma, for the Buddha says:

"1/. monks, fllIyone says tllat a man musf reap according /0 his actiolls, in Ihat case, monks, there is MO retigiaus life, nOT is any opportunity nfforded fOT the eIltire extinctiolJ of sl/ffeTing. But if (/ny one says, monks, that fhe Tcwurd Q man reaps Qccords with his actions, in tliat case, monks, there is a religious lifc, find opportunity is afforded fOT the en lire extinction 0/ suffering." l(JJ This is to say that the religio us !lfe wou ld be futile unless man cculd change the course of karma by religious practice. If the human condition were the exclusive resu!t of past actions, then pr~ent actions would all bc predetermined and human effort, espccia ll y religious practice, would be fruitless.

FREEDOM OF CONSClOUSNESS Now we can see that the Buddhist is not fatalist because he accepts the possibility of changing thc result of karma by human eHort. Thc present cxistence is not only the effect o f past karma but also the acti ve ca use of existence in the future. Man's future depen ds on his action at th e present. By his own effort, man can eradicate the roots of karma, and theeeby prevent karma frorn ripening in thc future. This efficacy of human effort implies a certain degree of human freedorn. The evidence of freedom is from the fact that man fecis free to act and exercise his effort, called 'initiative' (drabbhadhdtu), in various situations. 102 As is rnentioned carlier, it is intention (crtana) that the Buddha ca lls karma. This intention implies a choke, aselection ofwha t 10 do. One m ay ask whether the choke is free. In other würds, 1S intention oe will (cdaua) in Bu ddh ism feee? Does the Buddhist share Sartre's view that consciousness is freedom? Before we answer these questions, it is necessary 10 find out what these thinkers mean by freedom. As we ha ve already seen, consciousness is viewed by Sa rtre

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as free, partly because il is uncaused or spontaneous; that is, it is not genera ted by external causes. Consciousness is the cause of itse)f. The preceding consciousness, on passing away, does nol give rise to its immediate succeS50r. Sartre says: "Between two consciousnesses there i5 00 cause aod effect relationship ... One consciousness is not the cause of another."103 Each coosciou sness, therefore, is not the consequence of aotecedent causes; it is uncaused, original, spontaneous. Henee consciousneS5 is free hecause it does not belang 10 the caus al order of the wo rld; it is nothingncss. lfby freedom is meanl "uncaused origination" or "spontaneity" as described above, Ihen consciousness in Buddhism is not freedorn. In Buddhism everything is "dependently originated" (plltic casa l1luppanna), nothing is uncaused. Even consciousness belangs to the causal order of the world. Each consciousness has causa l rela tion w ith its predecessor. It is not self-caused or spontaneous. Thus consciousness and it5 psychic factors (cetasika) are not free. From !his it follows that will or intention (cefmlll), which is one of the psychic factor s, is /lot free in the Sel/se 0/ being spontaneous. But whE'n Sartre talks of free choke of consciousness h~ contcnd s that thc choke is free if it is not determincd by causes and motives. He then denies Ihat causes and motives can determine rnan's choice. 104 Here Sartre uses the term freedorn in the sense of "undeterrnined choi re." And if by freedorn we rnean, not "uncauscd origination," but rather "undelermined ehoice," then we Cil n say that Ihere i5 the notion of free choice in Buddhism. The choke i5 free if it is no t dctermined by desire (ta~df(f) which is rega rded as the major moti ve of action The ordinary man (puthujjmm) always has Ihis motive; therefoTe he i5 not free. His freed om i~ present in inverse proportion to the motive; file less !ll'sire he ltas, Ihe more freedom he gains. As it i5 said: "It is due to desire that man is bound and it i5 by surmounting desire that he is free. Sy the des truction o f desire or cravirig all bonds are cut off." Ul5 The Aralrant, therefore, has absolute freedom beca use he has eradicated desire. "Destroyi ng desire al its root, frce from hunger, on e attains NirVI1~a."l06 Here we find that in Buddhism

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the term freedom (vimutti) 1S a synonym for Nirvtl1Ja. As it is said in the Samyutta-Niktlya: "Freedom meaos Nirval).a."107 It should be noted here that in Buddhism the consdousness of the ordinary person (puthujjana) 1S not said to be inherently free, because it is under the influence of desires. To obtain freedom, consciousness must be purified of all desires. The entire process of purification 1S like a straight line between two points, namely, the point of consciousness with impurities and defilements (kilesa) at one end, and the point ofconsciousness with purity (visuddhi) at the other. In between the two there are gradual stages of purification of consciousness. Thus consciousness is classified into various levels in accordance with the degrees of freedom which it obtains. In Buddhism there are a1together four levels or spheres (bhiimi) of consciousness. They are Ki1mtlvacara-citta (consciousness pertaining to the sensuous sphere), Riipavacara-citta {consciousness pertaining to the formsphere}, Ariiptlvacara-citta (consciousness pertaining to the form1ess sphere), and Lokuttara-citta (supramundane consciousness)YlR FOUR SPHERES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Kt/mt/vacam-citta 1S consciousness which moves under the iofluence of desire. Consciousness of this level lacks freedom because it is influenced and controlJed by desire. It is this desire, manifesting itself in the forms of various defilements, that gives rise to suffering. Hence this type of consciousness is subject to suffering, and it is regarded as consciousness of an ordinary person. The psychic factors which are the special contents of this type of consciousness are called hindrances (Yljvara~za). They are sensuous desire (kamllchanda), ill will (vyapada), sloth and torpor (thfna-middha), restlessness and anxiety (uddhacca-kukkucca), and doubt (vicikiccha). By practising concentration meditation (samatha-bhavallat one can purify consciousness of these hindrances and thereby attain consciousness of the second level. 2. Rupavacara-citta is consciousness arising from concentra-

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tion on an object associa ted with form and color, It is in as tate of t rance (jhalla). This type o f consciousness has five psychic factors w hich are ca lied the constituents o f trance (jlu'IlIatiga). The y are initial appli ca ti on (vitakka), s ustained appli cation (vicara), rapture (pft O, joy (sukha) and one-pointooness (ekaggaUl). By these five factors, the five hindrances are suppressed. There are fiv e stages of trances. Reaching the fifth stage, consciousness is purified of major dcfilements. If directed rightly, it makes endeavor to develop subtle states of concentration un the form· less objccts and consequently move to the third level. 3. Arfiplfvacara-citta is consdousness arising Erom concentration on formless objects. fts psychic factors are the same as those of consciousness which reaches the fifth stage of trance. Hs objects, however, are different. [t concentrates on formless objects such as infinite space, infinite consciousness and nothing ness. Concentrating on these objects, conscious ness posscsses four sta ges of progress known as Arilpa-samddhi. With the atta inment of the fourth stage, consciousness becomes immenselypure and subtle. All the major defilin g factars are rcndered functi onless cxcept the ten (etters (samyojalla) existing as the seeds of d efHements. Having attained full concentrati on, consciousness is read y ( 0 develop in...;ight in to the Ime nature of things b y mea ns of insight meditation (vipa ssanil-bhtlvalllf). By this insight, the tcn fetters are cut off emd consciousness rca ches the fourth and 6nallevel. 4. In contrast with the first three levels of co nsciousness which are mund ane (lokiya), uJkll.ttara-citta is su pramundane (lokutt ara). The fo rmer are accumulating states w hereas the latte r is an climinaling one. In supra mundanc consciousncss, the tcn fetters are uprooted. Th ey are personality belief (sakkaya-di!!hi), doubt (vicikiccht7), clingin g 10 mere rules and rituals (sflabbata . panlmilsa), scnsuous desire (kt1milraga) , ill-will (vyapada), d esire for fine-material existence (rapa-raga), desi re for immate rial existcnce (arnpa-raga ), cancelt (tnllna), cestlessness (Ilddha cca), and ignora nce (avijja). These ten feUers are no t destroyed at o ne time . Their d es tructi on varies in four stages of sainth ood, namely, stream-winner (sotaptmna), once retumer (sakadt1gl7ml)

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never-returner (anagamr) and liberated being (arahanfa). The liberated person or Arahant alone destroys all the fetters. The total destruction of the fetters, which are the last residue of defiling factars, liberates consciousness from aU motives. Thus the consciousness of the Arahant obtains absolute freedom. It is important to emphasize here that the consciousness o[ the Arahant is [ree in the sense o[ being undetermined by motives, not in the sense of spontaneity. His consciousness is still dependently originated. Each conscious moment is caused by the preceding moment. lt is not self-caused or spontaneous. The idea oE spontaneous consciousness is not acceptable to the Buddhist because it is incompatible with the law of Dependent Origination, according to which a11 things arise out of causes. That is why the Buddhist rejects the indeterministic (adhicca-samuppanna) theory which proposes that everything arises without cause or conditi on (ahetu-appaccaya). The Buddhist theory of Dependent Origination is the middle path. lt "stands midway between Indetermini~m (adhicca-samuppanna) and the Strict Determinism of niyafavMa."IQ9 TEMPORALITY Arising out of causes and conditions, consdousness i5 a conditioncd thing (saflkhata-dhamma). Since a11 conditioned things are impermanent, consciousness is also impermanent. Ta say that consciousness is impermanent is to say that it is temporal (kalika). Here the term temporality is used to connote the fact of change as weIl as the subjective experience of temporal continuity.1l0 According to the Buddhist, not only is consciousness momentary, but also the material object, which changes every moment. Unlike Sartre, the Buddhist thinks that impermanence is thc characteristic of the material object. It is impermanent, and hence temporal. The Buddhist does not regard time (kala) as an all-pervading prindple which governs everything. Universal time is a mere concept (pmlfiatti) and has no objective existence. "Time is eventuation or happening, there being no such thing as time

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exernpt frorn events."lll Thus we cannot be aware of time apart from the succession of events. In the Kathavatthu it is said that the division of time into past, present, and future is only conventional without any basis of reality; there is no ontological basis for the time-distinctions. 1l2 The past and the future have no existence since "what is past is got rid of and the future has not come."ll3 Only the present has existence. If we grant existence to the past and the future then we have to admit that a thing has existence all the time, i.e. its existence is extended to both the past and the future. This would arnount to admitting that the thing is eternal. Such a position would be inconsistent with the Buddha's statement that "impermanent are all conditioned things; their nature is to arise and perish."lH Hence thc Buddhist would say that the present iso This is opposed tu Sartre's statement that the present is not. 115 For the Buddhist, the present exists, not in the sense of Sartre's beingin-itself, but in the sense of becoming (bhava). For the Buddhist, the present alune is real, the past and the future are unreaL As it is said: "Now only the present existence is real, unreal the past and the future existence."116 Thus the Arahant lives fully in the prescnt. J17 lt is necessary to mention here that by the term "present" (paccuppanna) we rnean the "momentary present" (kha1:1apaccuppanna). The moment of consciousness "which reaches genesis, developmcnt and dissolution is the momentary present."lJH Each conscious moment, as we saw, is cxtrcmcly short. And the life-moment of living beings is as short as a single moment of their consciousness. It is said in the Visud· dhimagga:

"Just as a ehariot wheel, when it is roI/ing, rolls only on one point of Uhe ci reumferenee of) its tyre, and, when it is at rest, rests only on one point, so too the life of living beings lasts only fOT a single conscious moment. When that eonsciousness has eeased, the being is said 10 have ceased, as it is said: 'in a past conscious moment "he did live," not "he does live," not "he will live. " In a future consdous moment, not "he did live," not "he does live," but "he will live. " In the present

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conscious moment, not "he did live, " bllt "he does live," not "he will live"."'I19 Although the prescnt consdous moment alone exists, the rapid su cccssion of consci ous moments givcs rl se 10 thc reflective experi en ce of temporal continuity. Th e moments do not have "dis tinct cxistence," for cach of thern is conditioned by its immediate su cccssor. They are not completely separated fro m each othe r. They appea r to be discrete only when wc analyze thern b y logical analysis. Otherwisc they cons titute a continuous stream . "Each mom entary state or upri sing of mind (ekakkha~lika-cjtfuppllda) is logically complex and analyzable, but psycholog ically, actually, a simple indivisible process."120 We have alread y seen that each conscious moment is by nature related 10 Hs predecessor and s ucccssor. The prescnt moment of consciou s ncss is a ' whoie' cons is ting of three s ubrnoments, namely, genesis, development, and dissolution . The genesis is thc submoment when the present consciou sness arises out of the karma-energy transmittcd by the past consciousness. This is the point which connects the present with the past. The dissolution is thc s ubmoment w hen the present consciousncss, on passing away, transmits Hs karma-energy to the futu re conscious ness. And this is the point which connecls the present with the future. In this way, conscious moments su cceed one another. And the reflective experience of temporal continuity is duc to the reflectio n upon the rapid s uccession of co nscious moments. "They prcsent il continuous s pectrum of consc ious ness in which one s tate shad cs off into ano lhc r, laterally and lineally, so thai it is hard 10 say where or when one ends and anothec begins ." 121 THE CONCEPT OF NIRVÄNA Fcom the forego ing discussion it is dcar that the present is not

cut uff frorn the pas t and the future. The prcscnt exists as the eHect of the pas t and a .. the cause of the future. The present, as a 'whole' consisting of three submoments, has to be its past and future, not in the mode of identity, but in the mode of "neither

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identity nor diversity." The temporal continuity flows on till Nirva~Ja is realized, as the consciousness of one who has attained Nirvllrw is not reborn. 122 Consciousness in Buddhism is not always a "useless passion." There is time when passion or desire is climinated from consciousness and thereby ceases to be the cause of suffering. Desire is destroyed when NirvaJ;1a is realizcd. Thc Buddha says: "The extinction of desire is NirvalJ-a."123 Again, "he who destroys desire overcomes all suffering."124 Desire is not an inherent component of consciousness; it is one of the psychic factars. Desire, according to the law of Dependent ürigination, is conditioned by feeling (vedana), and this feeling is threefold-pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent, which respcctively tend to produee greed, hatred and delusion. As it is pointed out in thc Majjhima-Nikäya: "Friend Visa:kha, a tendeney to greed lies latent in pleasant feeling, a tendency to repugnanee lies latent in unpleasant feeling, a tendeney to deJusion lies latent in indifferent feeling."125 Thus we can say that grecd, hatred and delusion are three forms in which desire manifests itself. This explains why at times Nirva1Ja is deseribed in terms of the destruction of the threefold defiJement: "That which is the destruetion of greed, hatred and delusion is called NirvalJ-a."12~ When eonsciousness is freed from greed, hatred and delusion, which are the roots of karma, consciousness beeomes "karmieally inoperative" (kiriytt-citta).lt no longer aecumulates fresh karma-energy. And eonsciousness whose karma-energy is exhausted will not be reborn after death. When an Arahant dies, his "body is broken, perception is stopped, all feelings are cooled, mental formations are ealmed down, consciousness has rome to an end."127 His conseiousness is not reborn because the muse of Hs rebirth has been destroyed. "Through the cessation of ignorance, kanna-formations eease; through the cessation of karma-formations, consciousness ceases; through the cessation of consciousness, name-and-form ceases ... "128 Sinee consdousnes.'! is the effective medium of rebirth, the cessation of consciousness is the cessation of Sarilsttra, Le. the series of rebirths. NirvtllJa, therefore, is said to be "the cessation of cxistence" (bhavanirodha).129 Having attained NirvälJa, the Ara-

156

SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

hant knows that "finished is birth, lived is the religious life, what

should be done js done, nothing more is Ieft to be done."l30 Now one question arises: If consciousness is not-seIt, then who realizes Nirva(la? We have shown earlier that there is no seH as thinker behind the thought, it is the thought that thinks. In like manner, there is no selfbehind the realization of Nirva~Ja; it is wisdom (puf/na) that realizes Nirvrl1:w. When wisdom, which is one of the psychic factors, is developed by means of insight meditation it sees the reality of things. When the reality is seen, the concept of the phenomenal world (papafiea) 1S destroyed.1.l1 19norance (avijja) is eradicated and in its place arises wisdom. Then aB Eorces which produce the series of rebirths in ignorance become calmed and are unable to generate any more karma-energy, because there is no more illusion, no more desire for existence. As such, Nirvilfla is regarded as the realization of things as they are. lt is just a change of our attitude towards things. The change follows the elimination of ignorance wh ich is responsible for thc appearance of the phenomenal world: "Not constituting, not thinking out for being or for nonbeing, he grasps after nothing in the world; not grasping, he is not troubled; being untroubled, he hirnself attains NirVtlfla."n2 It 1S interesting to note that this conception of Nirvtltw as the realization oE the true na ture oE things has been developed in Mahäyäna Buddhisffi. According to Nagarjuna, "things" are phenomena or Sanisara, and their "true nature" is NirV{1lJa. In essence Salnsi1ra is not different from Nirvtltw. Nagarjuna writes: "Samsara has no difference whatever from NirvrllJa and Nirvtl1:Ja has no difference whatever from Samstlra."l.1J Hence the reality is one; it becomes different on the basis of our viewpoint. Nirvil(la when looked at from the standpoint of thought-construction (vikalpa) is the phenomenal world; and phenomena devoid of superimposed thought-construction (nirvikalpa) are NirVil1:/a. The difference between the two is epistemic, and not ontological. J34 According to Nagarjuna, NirvtllJa i5 the Absolute Reality or Ultimate Truth (paramartha-satya) whereas the phenomenal world is the Conventional Truth (samvrti-satya). We find, in early Buddhism, the germ of Nagarjuna's two-truth

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Sartrc's Existmtialism and Early BJlddhism

theory in the Majjhima-Nikaya, where it is said: "Assured is freedom (vimutti) whieh rests 011 Truth. Monk, that whieh is unreality (mosadhamma) is ja/se; that whieh is reality, Nirva1)a, is Trllth (sacca). Therefore, monk, a person so endowed is endowed with this Ultimate Truth. For the U/timate Noble Trllth (paramam ariyasaccarn) is Nirva1)a, whieh is reality. "135

THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF NIRVÄNA Since Nirvt11}a is regarded as the "cessation of existence" (bhavanirodha)136 or the end of SarhSl1ra, it is viewed as annihilation by same thinkers. The Buddha himself was accused of preaching annihilation. To clarify his position, thc Buddha says: "In Ihis respect one may rightly say of me that J feach annihilation, thai I propound my doctrine jor the purpose of annihilation, and timt I herein train my disciples: for eertainly I do feach annihilation-Ihe annihilation, namely, 01 grad, hatred and delilsion, as welf as of the manifo/d cvil and unwllolesome Ihings. "137

What we can say here is that Nirvt1/Ja is not self-annihilation, for there is no self to annihilate.lf at all, it is the annihilation of the ignorance (avijjt1), of the false idea of selE. Followers of the Buddha, however, hold different views on the ontological status of Nirvt1/Ja. The Sautrantika, for exampte, contends that Nirvt1ua does not have a positive reality; it is nothingnes!> (abMva). lust as space (t1kt1sa) is the absence of asolid body or anything tangible, so also Njrva~Ja is the absence of causes that are responsible for rebirth. The Sautrantika's position appears to be nihilistic. 138 Unlike the Sautrantika, thc Vijilat:tavadin maintains that Njrvll~la has a positive reality. Thc realization of Nirv!lflQ eliminatcs the unreality of the phenomenal world. What remains after the realization is Store-consciousness or AlayavijFit1l.1a. The Store-consciousness is the absolute, the ultimate source of the phenomenal wortd. The realization of NirvuJ:1a is nothing but the rediscovery of the Store-

158

SARTRE'S REJELIION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

consciousness. "Nirvll~/a is the Alayavijnllf/a where a revulsion takes place by seIf-realization."139 Here the conception of Nirvllt/a as self-realization is analogous to the Upani:?adic conC(~ptian af Mokfia as the realization of atman. Rejecting the nihilistic conception of Nirvilfla, the early Buddhist maintains that NirvaIJa is not a nonexistence. That is, Nirvi1f1a is not annihilation, though no Stare-consciousness remains in the state of Nirvilfla. The Abhidhamma considers Nirvllf/a to be a transcendental entity, independently existent. The Kathllvatthu conceives Nirvt1f1a as an external, unchangeab!e state which exists by itself. J40 In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa rejects the view that NirVI1/Ja is nonexistent. According to hirn, the mere fact that Nirvll~/a is not apprehended by an ordinary man does not prove that Nirvflfla does not exist. "That 15 not so, because it is apprehensible by the (right) means. For it 1S apprehensible by some, by the right means, in other words, by the way that is appropriate to it (the way of virtue, concentration
The Commentary of the Visuddhimagga explains that, with these statements from the Udana, the Buddha proclaims the actual existence of NirvrllJ-a in the ultimate sense. If the unconditioned, i.e. Nirvrlfla, were nonexistent, then no escape from the conditioned, i.e. the five aggregates, would be possible. 144

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Sartrr's Existrnlialism and Early BlIddhism

Thus NirvalJ-a as conceived in early Buddhism is not nonexistence or utter annihilation. It is the realm of being which transcends the phenomenal world (lokuttam). NirvalJ-a is the unconditioned (asaflkhata), as opposed to the conditioncd (sankhata), i.e. phenomena. Negative terms like "unconditioned" and "uncreated" da not connote nonexistence. NirvalJ-a is described in negative terms because it cannot be described in positive terms. NirVtl1Ja is indescribablc and uncharacterizable. It is not like anything we find in our experience of the phenom" enal world. In order to describe thc nature of NirvalJ-a, the Buddha had to usc negative statements likc the following: "Monks, there exists the sphere wherein is ndther earth nor water nor fire nor air; wherein is neither the sphere of infinite space nor of infinite conSc!Ol1sness nOf of 110thingness nor of neither-perception" nor"non"perception; where there is neüher this world nor a world beyond nor moon-and-sun; this, monks, I say, Is 110 eomil1g and go" ing; there is no duration, 110 falling, /Jor arlsl/Jg. There is neither foot hold /Jor development nor a/JY basis. That i/Jdeed is the end of suffering. "145

As we saw, negative statements like nneti, /Jeti" (not this, not this) were employed by the Upani.7adic thinkers to describe the reality of iHman. UNDETERMINED QUESTIONS Not only is the reality of NirvalJ-a indescribablc but also the desbny of the liberated person. The question as to whethcr the person who has attained NirvalJ-a continues to exist after death cannot be answered either positively or negatively. Such a queslion belongs to thc group of ten questions known as undetermined questions (avyakata-panha). There are four undetcrmined qucstions about the destiny of the liberated person: 1. The liberated one (Tathagata) exists after death. 2. The liberated one does not exist after death. 3. The liberated one exists and does not exist after death.

160

'"" SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

4. The liberated one neithcr exists nor does not exist after death. 146 Thc Buddha gave no specific ans wer to any of these questions. One of the reasons for the 'silence' of the Buddha 1S that the phrases 'exists,' 'does not exist,' ete., are rnisleading because they have a spatioternporal connotation and hencc are inapplicable to Nirvl11;1a which i5 beyond space and time and cannot be located (na katthaci, na kuhifici). It thercfore, escapes thc conceptual framework necessary for our expression in languages. The mystery of the libcrated person lies in thc fact that he is no Ion ger identified with any of thc five aggregates by which thc ordinary person i5 known. The descriptions of his destiny in terms of the four alternatives mentioned above are out of place. That explains why it is said in the Sutta-Nipata: "The person who has attained the goal is beyond measure (na pamanalil atthi); he docs not have that with which one ean speak of him."147 Seeing that nothing ean be spoken about the destiny of the liberatcd person, the Buddha kceps silent. The Buddha's approach, in this respcct, is similar to that of Wittgenstein who ends his Tractatus with this famous statement: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."148 f

ASUMMARY So far the Buddhist eonception of consciousness has been discussed in some detail. We shall now summarize what we have discovcred in the course of the discussions. Consciousness is without seH or ego. It is defined by intentionality; that is, consciousness is consciousness of something. When consdousness is aware of an object, it is not aware of itself; this is to say that consciousness is /lot self-consdous or self-transparent. Devoid of the seIt, consciousness is non-substantial and impermanent.1t arises and perishes every moment. Thus consdousness is momentary or instantaneous. Each moment of consdousness is subdivided into threc instant5, namely, genesis, deveIopment and dissolution. Every conscious moment i5 not being-in-itself; it does not have a "distinct existence." It is

161

l I $llrtrl"S

Existl'ntilllism and Early Bllddhism

a becoming (bhava). Consciousness is by nature dependently originated; hence it is not spontaneous or self-caused. Moments of consciousness are causally related by way of contiguity, immediacy, absence and disappearance. The past moment of consciousness, on passing away, transmits all its contents to the present moment. Thus the present conscious moment was born an owner of the contents, induding karma-energy, of its predecessor. The past and the present moments of consciousness are neither the same nor dIfferent. Causal relations, therefore, effect the unity and continuity of consciousness. The rapid succession of conscious moments constitutes the stream of consciousness. The subjective experience of temporal continuity arises out of reflection upon fleeting conscious moments. The stream of consciousness flows on without interruption. When man is in deep, dreamless sleep, his consciousness subsides into the subconscious state or bhavanga. It is this bhavanga-viiii"jt7f/a or subconsciousness that accumulates the results of karma and is reborn after death. The sequence of rebirths or Samsl1ra is cut off when consciousness realizes Nirvu~Ja. Before realizing Nirvl1fla, consciousness is not free because its intention (cetatlt7) is determined by desire (taflhu). It is free when des ire is eradicated in the state of Nirvt7fta. Thus consciousness is not a "useless passion." When an Arahant dies, his consciousness is not reborn; therefore, Nirvufla i5 the cessation of Sarilstlric existence (bhavaflirodha ).

SUNNATÄ AND NOTHINGNESS From this summary it is dear that consciousness in Buddhism is not nothingness (natthitu).lts egolessness does not imply nothingness. In spite of being emptied of the substantial ego, consciousness is not contentless. Consciousness has something as its contents. Feeling (vedafll1), perception (safii'ia) and mental formations (saflkhtlra) are contents of consciousness. Arising and perishing tagether with consciousness, they are called cetasika or psychic factors. Consciousness in its purest form does not arise in utter separation from cetasika; it is always accompanied

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SARTRE'S REJECTlüN O r: THE TRANSCENDENT AL EGO

by some facto rs. Even the Amhant's consciousness is not devoid o f psychic fa clors. At his dea lh conscio usnes..<; and its tactors disa ppea r together. Thai explains w hy w hen an Ara }um f ca lled Dabba Mallaputta died, it w as sa id Ihal his "body i5 broken, percep ti on is "topped, a11 feelin gs are cooled, mental formati on s are calm ed down, consciousness has corne to an end."H9 Furtherm ore, consciousness ca nnot be regarded as n othingness for the reason that it is what it is at the present m om en t. Consciousness, as we saw, is not selt-eonselou::;. When it is awa re of an o bjcet, it is no t implicitly awa re of itself as no t being tha t objecl; th ai is, a t that very mo ment, eonsciousness is o Be ing unself-eonscious, consciousness is no t able to tea r itself away from its object. Nor can it withdraw it ~1f from the cau sa l o rd er of $Innslf ra. Consciousness i5 CI part of the causal process as indicated in the law uf Depend ent O ri gination: "Conditio ned by ign oranee are karma-formations; conditioned by karma - form ation s is eonse iousness; condi t io ned by consdousness is name-and -fo rm ... " 1',0 When Njrvtl~Ja is reaHzed, the ca uses of rebirth o f co nsciousness are d estroyed and consdous nes.... comes to an end at the d eath of the A mhan!. Th is indicates that con s ciou s ness is not no th ing n ess, fo r if con s cio us n ess we rc noth in gness il w ould be rneaningless 10 talk of its end . It is said that conscious ness is 'void' or ' empty' (s uiilia) .15! H ere emptiness (suffiiaM) of consciou sness should n o t be un ders tood in the sense of nothingness, for the term 'sur1fia' i5 used as a sy m mym for 'anattif.' Thus consc iousness is empty b eeaust'! it is "empty o[ a self and allything be/o nging to a se/f."151 It may be add ed he re thai e ven the co nce pt of ' emptiness' (Sans krit, siil1yatiJ ) in Ma häy äna Buddhis m d oes not refer 10 nothing ness in the Sa rtrean se nse. The te rms 's ilnya' (empt y) and 's ü //yatlf ' (empti ness ) a re a pplied to bo th the phenomenal wo rld and NirvdVa. Ph enomena are sUl1ya as th ey are empty of th in g-h ood (Ilih svabhava); for they are d ep end ent on each other (pratrtyasamllt pa lllla) . As Nagarjuna has p ointed out: "Since the re is no elem ent (d ltarma) which comes into ex is tence without cond itions, the re is no element which is not 's ilnya'." 1.'i1 In this sense sunyata s im ply means conditionality o f all pheno mt!na. lt is a

163

Sarire' s Exislentialism and Early Buddhism

synonym for Prantyasamutpt7da or the Principle of Dependent Origination. l54 In this sense, sünyata is not nothingness. "Therefore, 'emptiness, ' according to the Buddhists, signifies negatively Ihe absence of particularity, the nonexistence of individuals as such, and positive/y the ever-changing state of the phenomenal worId, a constant flux of becoming, an eternal series 0/ causes and effects. It must not be understood in fhe sense of annihilation or absolute nothingness. "1.05

The term 'sünyata' is also applied to the Absolute or Nirvt7lJa, "though in different sense."l56 The Absolute is sunya as it is utterly devoid oi the conceptual distinctions of existence and nonexistencc, free fram all subjectivity (nirvika!pa, nisprapanca). Hence both affirmative predicates (saf, bhava) and negative predicatcs (asaf, abhava) are equally denied of the Absolute. This absence of predicates, however, only shows that the Absolute is indcscribable, not that it is a lack of Being. As T.R. V. Murti has pointed out: "We are expressly warned not to take sunyatä as abhävadrsti (Negation). Tattava (the Real) is accepted explicitly; but we are forbidden to chamcterize and eIolhe it in empirical terms ... The Absolute is taken as the reality of things (dharmänarn dharmatä), as their true nature (bhuta-koti) and suchness (tathata). It i5 identified with the Perfect Being-Tathagata. "157

Thus 'emptiness' (Pali, sufifiata; Sanskrit, sünyata) in Buddhism docs not signify nothingness, at least in the Sartrean sense of the term. Consciousness is said to be empty because it is devoid of a self and anything belonging to a seIf, not because it is lack ofbeing. Hence consciousness in Buddhism is not nothingness. In this respect, the Buddhist conception oi consciousness is different horn the Sartrean conception of consciousness as nothingness. In the next chapter, we shall compare these two conceptions of consciousness and try to find out how they are similar to, and different fram, each other.

164

5ARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

NOTES

2 3

4 5 (j

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 3S 36 37

C A. F. Rhys Davids, Introduction 10 Buddhisl Psych%gy (DlwmmasanganO, Oriental Books Reprint Co., 1975, p. LX. Vism. XVIII, 590. Tiwary, M., "Pari-Nibb3na", in B()bhi-Ra.~mi, ed. by M. Tiwary, First Intern.üional Confercnce on Buddhism and National Culturcs, Ncw Dclhi, 1984, p. 92. D. Il!. 103; S. XII. 61. Abhs. I. 1. Dhs. Section 1191 Abhs. II. 1, Abhs . TI. 2. Abhs. VIII. 9. DhsA. 63. "Arammauam cinlt'trti ciltmiJ" Miln. 62; DhsA., 112. MI. 1Il. "TinnmiJ silligati plwsso". 5tchcrbatsky, Th., Buäähist Logic, Vol. 1, Dover Publications, 1962, p. 166. Kvu_ XVI. 4. KVll. A. quotcd in 5.2. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, PTS, 1915, p. 305. Ibid. Ibid., p. 183. NyClyabindu, I, 10, p. 1l. Cmdrakirti, M3dhyamikakarika-vrtti, (Prasannapada), p. 61. Ledi 5ayadaw, The Manuals of Buäähism, Mahamakut Press, Bangkok, 1978, p. 67. Vism. XV. 488-489. Jayatilleke, K. N., The Contemporary ReievlIl1ce of BI/ädhist Philosophy, 8PS, 1969, p. 15. S. XXII. 79; Vism. XVIII. 587. Vism_ XVIII. 587. M. I. 298. M. I. 111. Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionury, BPS, 1972, p. 123. Ohp.254. Ud. 8. SN. 1119. A. II. 48. AA. I. 95. AA. I. 94; Cf. K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Kl1owkdge, pp_ 361-368. A. 1. 10. S. XII. 61DhsA. 420; Abhs. IV. 3. Aung., 5.2., 1l1trodllctioll 10 Compeudillm of Pliilosoplry, PTS., 1956, p. 26.

165

Sartre's Existm/ia/ism lind Eurly Buddhism 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 4R 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 .59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

73 74

75 76 77

D. III. 105. Abhs. V. 15. Cf. thc famaus statement ai Heraclitus: "You eannot stcp twice inta the same river, for fresh waters are ever flowing in upan you." Abhs. VIII. 9. Aung, S. Z. , op. eit., p. 42. Miln., p. 40. Johansson, R., The Psychology ofNirVi1nll, Gcorge Allen and Vnwin, 1969, p.7l. Aung, S. Z., op. eit., p. 41. Ayer, A. L The Problem ()f Kllowlcdge, Penguin Books, 1976, pp. 198-199. Ibid., p. 195. Jbid., p. 199. Hume, D., A TrClltise 01 Human Nilture, Oxfard, 1975, p. 636. BN.190. D. II. 55. S. XII. 20. A.V. 2, 3, 312. JayatiIIeke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory 01 Knowledge, p. 448. M. 1. 257. James, W., The Principles 01 Psyc/wlogy, Vol, 1, Dover Publications, 1950, p.239. Ibid., pp. 342-350. Ibid., p. 344 . Ibid., p. 338. Ibid. Ibid. Abhs. V. 15. Radhakrishnan, S., /ndilln Phi/osophlj, Val. 1, 1983, p. 258. Miln.299. . Aung. S. Z., Compmdium ()I Phi/osophy, pp. 265-266 Ibid., p. 266. Ibid. Narada, A MI/IIIU11 01 IIbhidhamml/, BI'S., 1975, p. 211. Abhs. IV. 3. Ibid. Ibid. Malalilsekera, G. P., (ed.), Encyc/opedia 01 Bllddhism, vol. ] 11,1971, p. "17. Vism. XIX. 600. Ibo, K. R., "Early Buddhistic Psychology of TrallScendcnce," paper presentcd at thc First International Confcrence on Buddhism and National Cultures, New Delhi, 1984, p. 4. Narada, op. eit., p. 164. Nyanatiloka, op. eit., p. 33. T. W. Rhys Davids, "On Nirvana, and on Buddhist Doctrines of the Group, thc Sari.kharas, Karma and thc Paths", The COlllemporary /?et,jew, XXIX, ]877, p. 249.

166

SARTRE'S REJEl."TION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO 78 79 80 81 82 83 1\4 85

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 H)"J

102 103 104 105 106 107 lOB

109 11 0

111 112 113 114 115 116 1"J7 11 8 11 9 !2()

121

Vism. XVII. 553-4. Vü;m . XVII, 554; Abhs. V. 12. D. n. 63. Jo hansson, R., o p. eil., P 3'::1. M. 1. 258. Ibid . Vism . VI II. 238. Abhs. V. 12. Vism . XV1I1. 554. Aung. S. Z., op. d t., p. 267. Vis m. XIV. 460. Vis m. XIV. 458; Abhs. V. 15 . Abhs. V. 12. Vism. XIX. 601. Poussin, Louis La. Va.lIee, Th ~ Way fo N irvlllla, Sri 5.ltguru Publka tiol\S, 19R2, p. 58. S. XI. 1. 10. A. V.1. 63. M. 111. 203. S. XII. 6.51. S. Xil. 2.18. & ....-
167

Sartre's Existe11tilllism and Early Bl
137 138 139 140 141 142 143

144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156

157

S.N.734. S. XXII!. 2. Dhp. 354. M,l. 303, S. XXXVIII. 1 Ud 93, M. lll. 68. S. XI!. 68M. []l. 224, See above, pp 132-3. M, BI. 244. MK. XXV. 19. Murti, 1". R. V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 1980, p. 141. M. III. 245. S, XII. 68. A III. 12. Cf. Chandrakaew, c., Nibbanll, Mahachula Buddhist University, Bangkok, 1982; pp. 95-97. Laitk.'ivatara Sutra, p. 62. Kvu. I. 6.8. Vism. XVI. 508. Cf. M.L 510. Ud. 80-81. Paramattha-mai'tjusa. Pali-Thai, voL VI, Bhumibalo Bhikkhu Foundation, 1990, p. 113. Ud. 80. Cu!a-MJ!mi.kaya Sutta, M. L 427; Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta, M.L 484, Sutta·Nipilta, verse 1076. Wittgenstein, L, Tracfatus Lo:;:ico-philosophicw;, tr. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, 6. 54. Ud. 93. M. IIL 163-4. Patisambhidilmagga, VoL 11, p. 177; S, XXXV. 85. lbid. MK. XXIV. 19. MK. XXIV. 18. "Yah PratuYllsamlltpadah SfinyaMm Mm pracaksamahe" SUZllki, 0, T., Outlines of Mahayana BlIddhism, 1963, p. 173. Radhakrishnan, S., ap. cit., p. 702. MUTti, T. R. V., op. eil., pp. 312-313.

168

PARTTHREE REFLECTIONS AND COMPARISONS

v REFLECTIONS AND COMPARISONS

I

n the prcceding four chapters we have followcd the course of Sartre's and thc Buddhist's thou ght in detail in an effort to unders tand their non-egological trea tments of consciousnt.'ss. We ha ve re marked , in passing.. some points o f similarity and differen ce. In this ch apter we sh all reflect u pon what ha s already bccn discussed and, in the li ght of those discussions, compare and contrast Sa rtre's treatment of conscio us ness with that of the Buddhist. At firnt gl a nce we find that Sartrc's and thc Buddhist's treatments of consciousness are similar in that they are characterized as non-egological. In formul ating their own thearies of consciousness, Sartre and the Buddhist alike h ave attacked the egology or attaoodn propoundcd by the ir predecessors and contemporar· ies. Sartre thu s rejects Hu sserl's doctri ne of the transcendental

SlIrlr("!l Exislelllia/is m aml Early

B uddh;~m

ego whereas the Buddhis t re pudiates thedtman theory, thechief proponents of which are the Upani$
ATMAN AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO We have shown in Chapter

m that

the Husserlian ego is not quitc the same as thc Upanisadic dt lt/an .' It may be added here that thc difference is due 10 the fa ct that the forme r is establi shed on cpistemological grounds whereas the latter is foundcd on lllcta physical and ethical grounds. As we saw, the transcendental ego is introduced by Hussert for the purpose of unifying thc strl;'i1 m of cxperience, it is the subjcct-pole of experience. ln this sense thc ego may be regarded as thc epistemologicnl self. The U pani ~a dic tUman , on ~h e ath er hand , is conceived as a perman e nt e ntity undcrl y ing th e ever-changin g m e nt a l phtmo mcna; it is the subs tance of the person. In this respect " tman is kll owrl as file metaphysicol seIt. Apart horn this, the cx is tence o f tJtman is presupposed in order to give a justification for the pur~:;uit o f Mok?a or self-realization. On this ethical g ro und, IUmall is endowed with immort ality and identity with the ultimate rea lily Of Brahman. Hus sc rl's transcendental ego is different from mman mainly because it lacks immortality and id entity with ultimate reality. Nevertheless the transcend ental ego and rltman are onalogou s in that they reier to someth ing permanent residittg ;11 the stream of ever-ehang ing conscious aets. And this permanent thing in consciousness- be it ca lIed transcend e ntal ego or tltmarl-is rejected by Sartre and the Buddhis t.

PURPOSES IN REJECTING THE SELF Sartre and thc Buddhist have different purposes in rejecting the permanent seiL Sartre's interest in denying the transcend ental ega is purely theoretical in that his airn , as pronounccd in Th e

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REFLECTIONS AND COMP ARlSONS

Transcendence o[ the Ego, is to purge phenomenology of ideal~ ism. Sartre believes that phenomenology is realistic but it is reproached for being an idealism owing to Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego. To defend phenomenology against this reproach, Sartre finds it necessary to reject the transcenden~ tal ego. In Being and Nothingness Sartr.e repudiates the ego because he wants to establish his phenomenological ontology. Sartre's ontology can stand only when the transcendental ego is rejected; that is, when all being is on the side of the object and the egoless consciousness is nothingness. Hence Sartre's rejecHon of thc transcendental ego is aprerequisite of the possibility of his phenomenological ontology. The Buddhist's theoretical aim in rejecting the self theory is to dissociate himself from the two extreme views, namely, anni~ hilaHonism (ucchedavrlda) and eternalism (sassatavada) which in his view are both defined in one way or another by the self theory. Those who believe in the existence of the self have to admit that it is perishable or imperishable. For the annihilation~ ist the seH is perishable whereas fm the eternalist it is imperishable. The Buddhist regards the two views as 'wrang views' (micchaditthi). The Buddhist is neither annihilation ist nor eternalist because he believes that there is no self to annihilate or persist. He claims that "all dhammas are not-self" (sabbe dhamma anafta). With this statement the Buddhist rejects the Upani.;;adic thinkers' substance view of the world, maintaining that nothing exists in itself for everything is dependently originated (paticcasamuppannaJ. Thus the important theory of Dependcnt Origination (pa!iccasamupprlda) can stand only when the self theory is rejected. Moreover, unlike Sartre, the Buddhist has a practical purpose in rejecting the self theory. Like the other teachings of the Buddha, the anattt1 doctrine has NirvalJ-a or the cessation of suffering aS its purpose. 2 The idea of self is considered as the manifestation of the grasping called attavadupadana. This grasp~ ing is similar to what the Western psychologists call1.lself-love.''J The Buddhist thinks that the grasping of the self is the main origin of suffering. To bring suffering to an end, one has to get

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rid of its cause, Le. the grasping of the self. So long as the grasping persists, there can be no complete cessation of suffering. Thus the practical purpose of the Buddhist's doctrine of anatta i5 to enable one to shed the grasping of the self.

THE EMPIRICAL SELF Here one question arises: H the five aggregates are by nature not-seH as the Buddhist claims, whence does the idea of the self come? What is this self which is the object of grasping (upadana)? The Buddhist's answer is that the idea of the self is amental construct produced by unwise attention (ayonisu-manasikara). This constituted self is the object of grasping. Since the grasping of the self gives rise to suffering, one has to get rid of the idea of the self. This practical bearing i5 not found in Sartre's challenge to Husserl's egology. Although Sartre rejects the transcendental ego, he admits that there is an empirical ego constituted or 'made-ta-be' by impure reflection. Here we find another similarity in Sartre's and the Buddhist's treatments of consciousness. Both ul therlt reject the permanent ego and yet accept the empirical une. But the similarity ends here. Unlike the Buddhist, Sartre does not think that the empirical ego can give rise to suffering. Such an ego which is outside consciousness cannot be the cause of the suffering of consciousness because consciousness is without cause. The ego can appear as the motive of action and thereby as a cause of suffering only in the light of a project of consdousness. Otherwise the ego is neutral. The Buddhist differs from Sartre in this respect because the former thinks that consciousness is not without cause and that the empirical ego, which is a psychic factor (cetasika) within consciousness, can affect the condition of consciousness.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION AND VIPASSANA Sartre and the Buddhist, however, give similar reasons for re-

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jecting the permanent seiL They deny the existence o f the self because they ca nnot find it amo ng Ihe data given immedi ately to thcir ex pe rience. Employing the method called phenomeno· logicat dcscription, Sartre discovers only consciousness and self·consciousness and none of them is the transcendental ego or bears reference to it. 4 The Buddhist, using the method caltcd vipassal1l1 meditation, find s only five selfless aggregates; there is no self inside or outside thern. 5 In this respect, Sartre and the Buddhist a re empiricists for th e reason that they depcnd on the empirica l in vestigation for proving the existence of the perma· ne nt se iL When their in vcsti ga tio n fails 10 revea l it, they ronclud e that 00 s uch self ex ists beca use there is no evidence for its cx is tenee. They reaeh the same eondusion beeause the ir method s of investi gation are ali ke. Just as Sartre's phenomeno· logical descri ption aims at 'returning to things themselves,' so the Buddhist's vipassana meditati on enables one to ' see things as th ey are' (yatha bhutam pajamUi). The two methods hav e their foun dation in reflective expericnce; that is, whereas phenom· enologica l descripti on is possible on the basisof pure reflection, v ipas5ßwJ meditation is possible on the basis of wise a ttention (yoniso -munasikilru).6 Pure reflection and wise attention are jus t different names of the same aetiv ity, for they refer to a kind of refleetion which limits itself to what is reaUy given. Pure reflechon and wise attention are antithetieal to impure reflection and unwi se attention (ayon;so -mallQsikl1ra) respectively. Sartre and thc Buddhist share the view thai the empirical seH is consti· tutcd by impure reflection or unwi se attention whieh tends 10 asscrt mo re than it knows. They then maintain that onee one practises phe nomenological d escription or vipassatltl meditation, o lle sees only imperso nal conseiousness; thc constitutcd ego disa ppears. Anothcr similar feature in Sartrc's and the Buddhist's methods li es in the fact that they are bolh regressiv e methods. Pheno menological description, when applied to the person, passes from the psychie life 10 the free impersonal conscious· ness rind ends u p in nothingness. In like manner, vipassQmf meditation, when used for in vestigating the person, passes from

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Sar'r,,'s E:n5fentialism afld Early Bllddhism

the psychic life 10 mom entary acts of consciousness and stops there. Howcver, it does no t reach nothingness. One question arises here: If the two methads are regressive, why da the final o utcomes of their investigation differ? From the Sar trean view· point, the Buddhist does no t regress far enou gh . Ta this. the Bud dhist would say th at Sartre has gone tao far.

EMI'TINESS Thus Sartre and the Buddh is t hold different views on the inner structure of wnsciousness. According to Sartre, consciousness which is emptied of a11 cgological structure is contentlcss; neither object nor image nor desire is in eonsciousn ess. Image for Sa rtre is a n Jet o f consciousness, it is conseiousness of something. VVhen we imagine a tree, it is a tree that we are imagining, no t our im age of a tree. In the same way, desire is not a psychi c entity dwelling in consciousness; rather it IS consciousness of s a mething as desi rable. Hence nothing is cOlltailled in consciousness. Since all being is o n the side of the object, consciousness is a total empt iness or noth ingness. Although the Buddhist maintains that consciousness is n ot· self, hc would not accept Sartre's view that co nsc.iousness is contentless. For the Buddhist. an image o f the abjecl is rctained in consciousness and reproduced later by the act of recognition (sall i1tI). Furthermore, consciousness can never fun etion in utter isolation; it always arises together with a number of psychie fac tors (ceta!;ika). Desir€', for example, is a psychic factaTdweil · ing in cansciousness. Conscious ncss desires an object because it contains desire. Thc Arahallt has no desire far any object as his consciousncss is emptied of desire. Thus consciousness in Bud· d hism is not contentJess beca use it contains images and psychic factars. And in so fa r as it contains these psychic entities, consc iou s n es s canno t be regarded as a total em ptiness or nothingness . It i5 "consciousness-and -something-mo rc."

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I

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS In spite o ( this disagreement, the Buddhis t would agree with Sartre's view that consciousness is consciou sness of something. Thc Buddhist says that cansciousness is consciousness of the object (tlramma1;lam cintetrti cittam). In Buddhisrn the relation between consciousness and its object is called phassa (cantact). This phassa is Iikened 10 the notion of intentionality in phenomenology. Thc Buddhist thinks that conscious ness has contact wHh its object through one of six sense organs (dvd m ), viz. eye, ear, nose, la ngue, body and mind. Here mind -door ( mallodvrlm) is the "sixth" sense which has all mental phenomena as its objects. Consciousness can refl ect upon itself and Hs psych ic factar s throu gh this sixth se nse. Without the mind-door, consciolls ness ca nnot know ilself, jus! as a pe rson without eye-door (cakklllldvnra) cannol ~ a vis ible object. Through the mind-door consciousncss knows itself as an object, not as a s ubject. Th ai IS consci OU5ne5S by nature is not ~elf-consci ou s, it is not impli ci tl y aware of itsclf as awarenes:; of the object. Thi s mcans that consciousness in Buddhis m lac ks self-tr an s p a rency wh ich b regarded as thecssential cha ractcristic of the Sartrcan conscio usncss. In Ihis respect, the Buddhis t's view point is diamclrkally opposed 10 Sarlre's. According 10 Sarire, self- consciousness i5 th e "mode of cx istence" of consciousness; th ai is, consciousness exists onIy In lh e extent thai it appears to itself in the mode o f self-consciollsness. Frorn Ihis it fo llows that self-consciousness is the nccessary condilion o f th e e xis lence of co ns ciou s ness. Co ns ciou s ness, therefo re. is necessarily sclf-conscious; that is, conscious ness is implicitl y aware of itself as awareness of th c object. Thi !> selfconsciou sness prccludes an unconscious eonsciousness. Henee the Buddhis t nation of sub consciousncss (bhtlV(lIiga -viFiii. a ~Ja) has no p1ace in Sa rtre' s mode l of consciou snes.s. Thus the point on wh ich Ihere is a major dbcrepancy between Sarlre and the BuddhL'it on thc inner s lructu re of consciou sness is this: wh ereas for Sartre cons ciousness is consciousness of something plus self-consciousness, for the Buddhist consciou s-

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ness is consciousness of something sallS self-eonsciousness, Since the Iwo views are eontrades, they canno! both be true. Whose view i5 right ? lt is not easy to decidewhether consciousness i5 setf-conscious. In Western phUosophy some thinkers like Descartcs and Kant think thai consciousness is self-conscious wherei1s Spinoza, Prichard and Jaakko Hintikka think 01 herwise. In Indian philosophy the Advaita Vedanta, the Prabhakara school of Pürva Mimi1msa and also Ihe Si1nkhya-Yoga school advocatc the view thai eonsciou sness i5 self-conscious or selflumino us (svaprakaiia). This view i5 rcjected by the Nyäya .7 Even the Buddhists cannot find agreement among themselvcs on this issue, Whereas the early Buddhist and the Mädhyamika maintain that consciousness is not self-conscious, the Viji'tä1;lavadin hold s tht! view that consciousne5s i5 self-conscious. All this shows that the problem of self-consciousness is indeed a perennial philosophical problem. The nation of consciousness as !'elf-conscious is a vital onc for Sartre's ontology, for if consciousness is not accepted as nec· cssaril y self-conscious, then it wou ld follow thatconsciousness ca nno t be implicilly aware of itsclf as not beillg the object, which wotlld imply that conscious ness is no l nothingness. For Sartre consciousness is a negation of being because, when it is aware of somcthing, consciousness is aware of itself as not-bcing-thisthing. Ta support his view, Sartre eiles an example: s I coun t the cigaretl es which are in the cal'e: Ih ey are a dozen. It is ver}' possiblc that J have no positional consciousness of counting them. If anyone should ask me, "what are you doing there?" I should rcp ly al onee thai I am counling. This reply, says Sartre, ahn.. no t on ly .. I the immediately preceding consciousness which J can know by reflec tion but al so at those f1eeting consciousncsscs which ha vc pasBed without belng reflected on, The fact that I can recall my counting cigarettes proves that I hilve continuous nonpositionat awareness of counting. From this it follaws that con!;eiousness is self-conscious. Thc ea rly Buddhist would argue that the fact of recolleetion here does not necessarily confirm the existenee of sclf-consciousness. From thc Buddhist view· point. e a ch consciousness, on passing away, Iransmits Hs

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potentialities to its immediate s uccessor. The present consciousness is b o rn a n owner o ( potentialities belonging to al l predccessors. And this cxplains how we ..'an reca ll our conscious acts of counting cigarettt's, Each counting consciou s ncss, on passing awa y, trans mits Hs p Olen tialities to its successor. Recollection is poss ible on th e basis of thi s con tinuity. N o self-consciou sness is involved here. Thc Buddhist's argumen t sou nds philoso phically tenable to those w ho bclicve in the causal rela tions between two consciousneSSe5. But it would bt' unacceptable to Sartre w ho rejects such causal rc\ations. lt may be added here that th e Buddhist differs {rom Sartre on the issue of self-consciousness because the form er believes in the ex istence of the sixth sense, i .~. mind-door. As wc have seen, the Buddhist mai ntains that conscio usness knows itself only through the mind -d oor. As su ch, consciou s ness can know itself always as an objecl, never as a subjcct. S ince o ne con.<;dou sness can never know two objects at onc time, it is impossibl e for consciousness to be consciou s of itself whcn it is consciou:-; of an object. From Sartre's viewp oint, the Buddhist seems to have confused self-co nsciousness with the reflcctive consciou snt'ss. in reflectio n, consciousncss is awa re of its p redecessor as an o bject. Thc re fl ectivc consciousness, thercfore, posits an object, but in its case the object is another act of consc iousncss. Here reflcction is knowledge because therc is fl ccrtain subjcct-object divi sion. But self-consciousness is not knowledge, f(lr consciousness is a ware of itself as a subject. Selfawarcness, s a ys Sartre, is "an immedi ate, non-cognitiv e rel a tio n" of consciousness to itsclf. Thus self-conscious ness and knowlcdgc of th e reflected consciousness a re " two radicall y different phenomena."9 Sartre would agree with thc Buddhist vicw that one consciousness can posit one object at one time. Sartre, however, would add that when conscio usness posits an object, it always has n on-positional awareness of itself as being aware of the object. Each consciou sness has this basic s tructure: awarCllCSS of a n object emd i mpficit awarerle55 of heitlg aware of the object. Ta OUT mind, Sartre's eluci dation sounds plaus ible. However, the early Buddhist would find it difficult to accept th e

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5arlre's Existenrilllism IImi Ellrly Buddhism

Sartrean viewpoint because he believes in the existence of the mind-door. Brushing away the notion of the mind-door, the Vijfl;:inavädin of Mahayana Buddhism regards consciousness as self-conscious.

THE BEING OF THE OBJECT According to Sartre, consciousness is consciousness of something. If consciousness had nothing to be posited as its object, then it would become absolute nothingness; it would not exist as a "pure appearance." Thus thc appearance of consciousness presupposes the existence of the object. This indicates that the existenee of the objeet is the "constitutive structure" of consciousness; that is, eonsciousness is born supported by the nbject whieh exists in itseH. Since Sartre holds the view that the object has existence independent of consdousness, he may be regarded as arealist. That Sartre's philosophy is realist can be gathered frorn the following statement by Sartre: "What was very important to me was realism, in other words, the idea that the world existed as I saw it and that objeets I perecived were real."l0 Like Sartre, thc Buddhist thinks that consciousness is consciousness of an objecL Consciousness cannot arise without eauscs. Since the object is a neecssary cause for the arising of consciousness, eonsciousness cannot arise without the objecL Consciousness in Buddhisrn is born supported by thc existenee of th(' object. The Buddhist is also arealist because he holds that the material object (rapa) is non-mental and independent of consciousness. The Buddhist, however, differs from Sartre on the question of the existenee of the objeeL For Sartre the existenee of th(' objcet or being-in-it5elf i5 wholly independent or Sc//Jstli'ndig, it is a full positivity which is permanent and nontemporal. For the Buddhist the existenee of objcets is interdependent (paticcasamuppanna); nothing exists in itself. The object is in astate of perpetual flux or flow (santati); henee it is impermanent and temporal. This means that there i5 no beingin-itself in Buddhism. The objeet has neither being nor non-being; rather it is a beeoming (bhava). The Buddhist thinks

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that to accept either being or non-being amounts to holding an extreme view: "Everything is; this, Kaccana, is one extreme view. Everything is not; this the second extreme view. Avoiding both these extremes, the Tathtlgata tcaches a doctrinc by the middle path."ll And what is accepted as the middle path in this connection is thc concept of becoming which, according to Heget, is a synthesis of being and non-being. Thus we agrec with T.W. Rhys Davids' remarks: "According to the Buddhist, there is no Being, there is only a Becoming."12

NOTHINGNESS AND SUNNATÄ In Sartre's philosophy consdousness or being-for-itself is described as a lack or total emptiness. What consciousness lacks is the being of thc object. Consciousness, therefore, is nothingness. In Buddhism, on the contrary, consciousness is not nothingness. When consdousness is described as 'void' or 'empty' (sunna), the term 'sunna' is used as a synonym for anatta (not-seH). Hence consciousness is ernpty because it is "empty of a :-;elf and anything belonging to a self," not because it is a lack of thc being of the object. Consciousness and the object have the same type of existence, i.e. instantaneous being. They arise and perish in every moment; in brief, they are momentary (kha1)ika). A moment of consciousness, however, is much shorter than that of the object as seventeen conscious moments are equal to one moment of an object. The rapid succession of moments of consciousness constitutes the 'strearn of consciousness' (vinntllJasota) which flows on uninterruptedly.

MOMENTARINESS Although Sartre would reject the Buddhist's contention that the being of the object is instantaneous, he would agree with the latter's view that consciousness is momentary. In fact, Sartre advocated the instantaneous conception of consdousness in The Transcendence of the Ego, in which he maintains that consdousness is instantaneous or momentary and that the instants of

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consciousness succeed one another, forming the "stream of consciousncss." It should be noted that Sa rire, Iike the Buddhist, uscs the term 'stream of consciousness' to describe the continual flux of conscious acts. He th en faces thc same problem which the BuddhiRt tries to solve: If consciousness is momentary or instantaneous, what unifies the discrete moments of consciousncss in such a way that they constitute the self-same stream of expcricnce? Having rejeeted the permanent seIt, Sartre and the Buddhist ca n never admit thai the unification is effected by a permanent entity dwel1ing in consdousness. They ca tegorical ly asse rt that it i5 consciousness thai unifies itself. -How can consdousness unify itself? To this question, Sarlre and the Buddhist give different answers.

THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS In Tht! Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre says that consciousness uni fies itsclf "by a play of transve rsal intentionalities." By this he means that each instant ot consciousness has intentional reference to Hs predecessor and s ucccssor by acts of retention and protention . This is tosay that the present consciousness is modified by the retention of the ' just past' consciousness and the prot ention of the anticipated consciousness.13 Sartre, how ever, docs not think that the aets of retention and protention can bc taken as causal relations. For Sartrc, cach instant of conscio usness is spontaneous or self-caused; there is no causa I relation between any two instants. As Sartre hirnself says: "Between two con:-;ciousnesses therc is no cause and eifect relationship .. . O ne conscious ness is not the cause of another."14 In this respect, Sartrc's position is diametrica lly opposed to that of the Buddhist w ho says that "apart trom conditions, there is no arising of consciousness."IS The Buddhist maintains that the unity of consciousness is effected by causa! relations; that is, two consecutive moments of consciousness are causally related by way of contiguity (anantara-), immediacy (samanantara-) absence (lIaffhi-) and disappearance (vigata-paccaya).16 The eifect of the four causal relations is similar to that of Sartre's trans ve r sa l 182

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REFLECTIONS AND COMPARlSONS

infwtiona/ities . In Buddhism each moment of consciousness is subdivided into three submoments, namely, genesis (lIppc1da), development {fhitiJ and dissolution (bhmi~a). At thesubmoment o f genes is, consciousness is genera ted by potentialities beIanging to th e "just past" consciousncss; this is a 'retention' of th e past. At the sub-moment of dissolution, th e prcsent consciousness, on passing away, transmits all the potentialities to its immediate s uccessor; this is a 'protention' into the future. Thc Buddhis t regards the aet of transmission as a ca usa l relation . This v iew would be unacceptable to Sa rIre. Havi ng rejected cau sal relations betwccn consciollsncsses, Sartre, in Being and NotllillgllCSS, Einds it im possible to establi sh even the 'slightest connection' between two instants oE consciousness. In his opinion, an instant exists in the self-inclusion of identity as a being-in-itself. In Sartre's ontology the in-itself is an isolated being wh ich does no t admil any forms of relation . As such, the relation between instants wh ich are in-itse lfs is inconceivable. Facing this difficulty, Sartre, in Beillg alld Nothingnes s, abandons the instantaneous co nception of consciou sness, substituting for it the conception of consciousness as I!k stat ic unity. Cn th at work consciou s ness is not instantaneous: ra ther it is continuous. "There has bee n nu break in continuity within the Hu x o f the tempora l d evelopmenl." 17 Here th e question as to what uni fies consciousness does not arise. Thi s is because the ekstatic unity is th c inner structure of consciousness. Consciousncss does not exist firs t as a discrete instant in orde r to be unifi~d a fterwards; consciousness is always alread y an ekstatie unity whieh simultaneous ly exis ts in Ihe thrce dimensions of past, present and futu re. It is interesting to note here that the Buddhist who adheres to thc theory oE momentariness docs not fa cc the difficulty th at makes Sari re disown thc theory of instantaneousness of co nsciousness. Why i5 it so? This is beeause Sartr~ and the Buddhist hold different views on the ontologieal status 01 the instant o f conseiollsness. Sartre, fo llowing Hurne, thinks thai caeh instan t of consci ou sness is a "d istinct existence"; it is a being-in-itself. He, thercforc, faBs to establish the relation betwecn the instants.

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The Buddhist, on the contrary, does not grant the status of' dislind t'xistence' to an instan t of consciousness. Each instant of con<>cious ness is "dependentl y o riginalcd"; Ihereforc, il cannol exist in itsclf. Having no inde penden t existence, the instan t is not a being-in-itself, to use Sartre's term inology; rather lt IS a becoming. Thus, in its fundamental stru clure, the instant of consciousness ca nnot exist in isolation; it is ca usa lly related to its predecessor and successor. Each instant is apa rt of a whole process. Considered outside the process, the instant is a mere abs lractio n; it has no existence in its own right. TEMPORALlTY As mcntio ned above, the 5artrean consciousness IS an ekstat ic unity of the past, present and future. This mea ns that consciousness is te mpo ral ; tha i is, temporaLity is the infra-structure uf consciousnf;'ss. Consciousness is aware of Hg original temporality in th e mode of se lf-c ons ciousn ess. 1R In Buddhi sm consciousness is said to be temporal in the sense of being impermanent «(111;cca) . For the Buddhist, time is not the original structure of consc iousness; rather it is a concept (pal1ita lt i) which is constituted by Dur awareness of Ihe rapid s uccession o f event sY' rhus it is on the basis of reflection upon the rapid su ccession of conscious moments that temporality arises. This temporality in Buddhism may be likened 10 Sartre's psy chic temporality.2° SUBCONSCIOUSNESS So far we have considered how Sartre and the Buddhist account for the unity and continuity o f consciousness. But their explanations cover only the waking state of consciousness. The re rcmains the problem o f the conhnui ty of co nsciousness during dreamless sJeep o r smjupti. Does the strea m of conscious ness stop flowin g whcn man is in deep sleep? This question canno l be an'iwered in5artre's framework. Sartre's method ofphenom. enological description is based on reflective experience. Sincc

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there is no experience to be reflected upon in dreamless sleep, Sartre's method does not entitle hirn to deal with the question as to what becomes of consciousness when man is in deep sleep. The Buddhist's method of vipassantl meditation cannot do better, for it has the same limitation. The Buddhist, however, tries to ans wer the above question, though he cannot provide empirical evidence. He says that consciousness of a man who is in dreamless sleep continues to flow in the state of bhavariga. The Buddhist thus develops the theory of bhavanga-viihläl;1a or subconsciousness. Subconsciousness is the 'process-freed' (vIthimutta) consclousness which cannot be known by reflection because it is under the "threshold of consclousness."21 Although its existence cannot be proved by experience, it is postulated by the Buddhist in order to justify the continuity of consciousness during dreamless sleep. Sartre would reject the Buddhist's notion of subconsciousness for the same reason that makes hirn reject Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego; that 1S, subconsciousness cannot be found among the da ta of reflective experience. Taking into account onIy what is given immediately to his experience, Sartre would have to reject the Buddhist's notion of subconsciousness. The Buddhist, however, finds it necessary to introduce the conception of subconsciousness ifhe wants to justify not only the continuity of consciousness during dreamless sleep but also the theory of karma and rebirth.

KARMA AND REBIRTH According to the Upani~adic thinkers, Iltman is immortal; it is reborn into a new life after the dissolution of the body. In spite of rejecting atman, the Buddhist retains the Upani~adic theory of rebirth. If there is no immortal seIt, what then is reborn into the next life? Far the Buddhist, it is consclousness which is reborn in the subconscious state. He makes it dear that it 1S not one and the same consclousness that transmigrates from one life to another life. The death-consciousness (cuti-citta) in the preceding life perishes, immediately giving birth to the rebirthconsciousness (patisandhi-citta) in the succeeding hfe. The two

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consdousnesses are "neither the same nor different," though they are essential1y of the nature of subconsciousness.l2 In this way, the Buddhist claims to have avoided the two extremes, namely, eternalism and annihilationism. The Buddhist 1S not eternaIist because he rejects the permanent seIL Neither i5 he annihilationist because he believes in rebirth. Having rejected the permanent self, Sartre is not an eternalist. But from th2 Buddhist's viewpoint Sartre is annihilationist because he does not believe in rebirth. Death for Sartre is "the nihilation of a11 my possibilities,"23 hence rebirth of consdousness after death is impossible. Each life is complete in itself; it is "a unique life-that is, a life which does not begin again, a life in which one never recovers his stroke."24 Sartre assumes that there is no rebirth because he cannot find a reason for it. He writes: "Tt is absurd that we are born; it is absurd that we die."25 According to Sartre, how consdousness is born from a particular embryo 1S a metaphysical problem; "and this problem is perhaps insoluble."26 Here the Buddhist would disagree with Sartre. For the Buddhist, man is born owing to his karma; that is the rebirth-consciousness is caused and conditioned by the Reproductive karma (]anaka-kamma). The Arahant whose karma-energy 1S exhausted 1S not reborn after death. This suggests that the Buddhist theory of rebirth is closely connected with the doctrine of karma. In Buddhism karma or action is defined by celantl or intention. By intention the Buddhist understands the self-centred, goaJ-directed and result-oriented volitional disposition of the ordinary person (puthuJJana). The Buddhist takes intention to bc the determinant of human actions, espedally bodily and verbal actions: "Having intended, one does action by body, speech and mind."Z7 This statement clearly establishes that there is a temporal distinction or time lapse between intention and action. Action 1S not free because it is causally produced by intention which is determ1ned by greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (muha)-the threefold root (miila) of unwholesome action. The action which is done out of the threefold defilement 1S storcd up in subconsciousncss and produces result in the

186

REFLECfIONS AND COMPARlSONS

future. "Threefold, howevc r, is the result of karma: ripening du ring this life·time, ripcning in the next pi rth, ripening in late r births."23 Hence man's present conditioh is d cte rmined by his past karma. YJhat he i5 acco rd s with wh at he did ; that is, man is 'heir to hi s acti on' (kamma-dayllda). Like the Buddhist, Sartr€ defines action by intention. Wh at h~ means by intention is "a ch oice of the end,"29 Sartre seems to deny any time lapse betwee n forrning an intention and actualty acling. Thus to make a choice o f the end is to act. As s uch, intention is not a cau se of action; it is action itself. Fo r Sartre action is free becau sc the end that one chooses is in the future; hcnce it cannot be thought of as an occurrencc that precedes and rausaUy brings about thc action. Now it i8 dear that Sartre's action theory 1S different from that o f thc Buddhis t. VVhereas the Budd hist holds that human action is to bc understood as eausally produced by anteeedent eonditions in the agent's conseiousness, Sartre thinks that human action can be explilined only in CI teleologiea! fashion, that i8, by appeal to the agent's end or goal whieh cannot be regardcd as causally related to action. In Buddhism actio n is not free beca use it is determined and motivated by the th ree motives, namely, g reed, hatred and dclusion, but in Sa rtre's philosophy action is free beeause the so-called motives are outside consdousness and have mcaning only withi n the compass of the project towards the end ,w Sartre, ho wever, would ag ree with the Buddhist view th at man is what hc makes of himself. For Sartre man is defined by his action: "he is therefore nothing else but the surn of his aeHons."]1 What man has done in the past is his "essencc"; it is what it i5 . Here we come across another difference behveen the Buddhist (l nd Sartre. According to the Buddhist, essence precedes exis tence; that is, man's past karma d etermines .. nd conditions his present existence. But, for Sartre, existence precedes essen ce; that is, man's past actio n is s urpassed by his present ex istence, at the present human reality is not what it iso This means that for Sartre the past action, belng cut off from the present by self- consciou sncss, does not determinc man's presenl conclition, What man has done lapses into the past without the

187

Sartre's Existrnlialism and Early Buddhism

possibility of producing a result in the future. Hence the Buddhist's view on the retribution oi action is unacceptable to Sartre. The Buddhist holds that human action is accumulated by consciousness and transmitted to its successor through causal relations. And by this process karma-energy is transmitted from one consciousness to another. The present consciousness is born an owner of the past karma and experiences its fruit which ripens at that moment. This retribution of karma presupposes the cause-eifect relationship between consciousnesses. Since Sartre has rejected such relationship, he has ruled out the possibility of the retribution of action in his philosophy. FREEDOM

Sartre would not accept the Buddhist view about the cause-effeet relationship between consdousnesses because this view is against his own notion of freedom. According to Sartre, consdousness is free as it is spontaneous or self-caused. That each consciousness has causal independence is proved by the fact that when consciousness posits its immediate predecessor as Hs object, it is aware of itself as not being the reflected consciousness. For Sartre this reflective separation entails the suspension of causality. Here Sartre's position is not tenable as he seems to confuse psychologicaI negation with causal independence. Psychological negation is an insuffident premise frorn which one can drawa conclusion for causal independence. The mere fact that consciousness is implicitly aware of itself as not being its immediate predecessor does not prove that the two consciousnesses have no causal relation. Sartre's phenomenological description entitles hirn to describe an aspect of consciousness as it appears to reflection. As such, the method excludes the notion of "cause" which is in principle "prior" to the appearance of consciousness. Since the method is a descripti on of "what appears," a causal investigation is apriori impossible. Nevertheless the view that consciousness is self-caused or

188

REFLECTIONS AND COMPARISONS

spontaneous is vital für Sartre's notion of freedom. Consciousncss is free because it is not causally related to anything. This causal independcncc enables consciousness to wrench itself away from the object, tü break off with its own past and tü tear itself away from what it will be in the future. Here Sartre uses the term 'freedom' as a synonym for spontaneity or uncaused origination. This type of freedüm is the inner structure of consciousness and may be characterized as ontological freedom. In this respcct, the Buddhist view is rather different from Sartre's. For the Buddhist, consciousness is dependently originated; it ls not spontaneous or self-caused. The conception of spüntaneous consciousncss is not acceptable to the Buddhist because it is incompatible with the law of Dependent Origination (paticcasamuppada). Thus if by freedom one means uncaused origination, then consciousness in Buddhism is not free.

FREEDOM FROM DESIRE Sartre also uses the term freedom in the sense of 'undetermined choiee.' For Sartre consclousness and choice are one and the same thing. Consciousness is free as its intention or choice of the end is determined neither by causes nor by motives. Sartre says that causes emd motives, far from determining the choiee, appeiH only in the light of the project towards the end. 32 Here freedom of choiee may be characterized as psychologicnl freedom. As we have seen, in Buddhism the ordinary person (puthujjana) has no such freedom because his intention (cetana) is determined by desire (ta~Jha) which manifests itself in the forms of the threefold root of action, namely, greed, hatred and delusion. The ordinary person, however, can gradually liberate himselfby getting rid of desire. And his freedom is present in inverse proportion to desire; the less desire he has in his consciousness, thc more freedom he obtains. Man has absolute freedom only when he attains Nirvafla which is described as "freedom [rom desire. "33 For the Buddhist, only the consciousness of a liberated person (Arahant) i5 free because it is totally emptied of desire. It is worth noting that the Buddhist, unlike Sartre, does not

189

Sar frc 's Existell tia lism and En rly Buddhism

look upon frccdom as the inner s tructure of consdous ness. In contrast w ith Sartre's statement that eonsciousness is frcedom, Ihe Buddhis t would rather s ay that eonsciousness u; bo rn with ~ out freedorn, but it can become fTee. In Buddhisrn consci ou sness bccom es free only when it reali zes Nirvt1l;la, This view is diIfer. ent fr om thai of Sartre who says thilt "man does not exist firs t in ord er 10 be free subsequently, there i5 no diffcrence between the being of man and his being free."34 For the Buddhist, m a n is born w itho ut freedom because a t thai moment his conscious· ness is full of desire. Man can obtain freedom when d esire is elimina ted from his consciousness. Henec freedom is incompatibl e w ith d esi re. There is no s uch incompatibility in Sa rtre's nati on o f frced om. Aecording to Sartre, consciousness is free as H5 ori gi nal choke is fcee. Con scio usncss chaoses becau se il is a desire to be Ihe in-itscH whi ch il la cks. Withaut desire, consci o u s n ess would stap cho os ing and freedom woul d h e m eaning less . For frcedam to he m ea ningful, conscious ncss h as to exe rcise its choiee, and to m ake a choice, consdousness m ust h avt' the desire to be. From this it follows that t reedom cm lll ot be sCJlnralcd t rom desire. Since Sa rtre d efines desüe as Na lack o E being".15 a nd takes frecdom to be "sy nonymous with lack,"36 it is quit e Jegitimate to assume th at d esire and freed orn Me one and th e sam e thing. Thu s, unlikc Sartre who hold s the view that freedom is not incom pa tible with desirc, the Buddhist maintains thai [reedam is treedom fra m desire. From the Buddhis t viewpoint the Sa rt rea n conscio usncss is not absolutel y free for the reason that it is d ete rmin ed, by desire, to ch o os e the ideal , i. e. the being-in.itself-for-itself. Eve ry free cho ke presupposes alte rn" · tives, but in the case of the ideal there is no alternati ve. He nce consdousness is not free not 10 choose its ultimate gOill, thou gh it is free to ch oose the means th ereto. The Buddhist thi n ks that so far CI S man has to choase und er compulsion oE desire, he is doom ed to frustration and suffering. Desire, therefore, is the cau se o f s uffering. As stated in the Mahasatipatthana- Sutta : "What, no w, is the Noble Truth of the Origin of Suffering? lt is des ire (tn!lh17) which gives rise to fr esh rebirth, and, b ound up

190

REFLECTIONS AND COMPARlSONS

with pleasure and lust, now here, now there, finds ever fresh delight."37 Ta overcome suffering, one has to destroy its cause, i.e., desire. Once desire is eliminated from consdousness, one realizes Nirvl1lJ.a which is sometimes described as "freedom from all suffering" (sabbadukkhapamocana).38

FREEDOM FROM SUFFERING Sartre would agree with the Buddhist view that desire gives risc to suffcring. Consdousness, as the desire to be, has a permanent attention towards an identification with the being of the object. Such an identification is impossible bccause a11 identification with the being-in-itself requires the disappearance of consciousness.39 As such, it is an ideal that can never be realized by consciousness. As consciousness always desirl~s to realize this unrealizable ideal, it is regarded as a "useless passion." And this passion is a constant cause of frustration and suffering.1t is not possible for man to overcome this suffering because his desire for the ideal is neither satiable nor destructible. For Sartre desire cannot be eliminated from consciousness because it is the inner structure of consciousness. The elimination of desire would require the disappearance of consciousness. Since consciousness always has desire, it is subject to suffering for ever. Tl1e complete cessation of suffering is impossible i/1 Sartre's pl1iIosopl1y. That is why Sartre says that so long as consciousness appears in the world, it is "by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state."40 Hefe the Buddhist is rather different. He believes that it i5 possible for consciousness to surpass its unhappy state. Consciousness will be ffee from a11 suffering if desife is eliminated: "What, monks, is the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering? It is the complete fading away and extinction of this desire."41 In this respect, the Buddhist's difference from Sartre is due to the fact that for the former desire i5 destructible whereas for the latter it is not. In Buddhism desire is regarded, not as the inner structure of consciousnes5, but as one of the unwholesome psychic factofs (akusala-cetasika) wh ich can be found only in

191

..., Sartre's fxistl!l!t;lIlism arid Early Buddhism

unwho lesome consciousness. Since desire is not present in a ll kinds o f consdou sness, it is legitimatc to assume that some con· sciOu sness exis ls w ithouf d esire. For ins tancc, the Arflhont's consciousness is emptied of desire. It follows that the climin a· lion of desire does not require the disapp earancc o f consci ousness. Only suffering is ovcrcome when its causc, desire, Is d es troyed. Thus Nirvtl/JQ or freedom frorn suffering is a f(~a 1izabl e ideal in Buddhism. The ultimate goal of the Buddhist religi ous (lfe is the attainrnent of Nirvil/Jo. "The purpose of fhe religioll s fife does lIot c01lsist in acquiring alms, h01l0ur, or fante, nor in gaining morality, concent ratio/l , or tlle ('ye of

kllowledge. Tlwt which is ufl slmkeable frl'f.'dom of mi"J, this is Ille goal oj Ihe re/igious fife, this tllf! pitll, this Ihe cu {minatioll. 'In THE BUDDHIST AND SARTREAN ETHICS According to the Buddhist, Nirvtl!lU is attainable not only in theory but also in practice. To attai n N irW!ta, one has to follow th e way o f life conducive to t he cessa ti o n of ~ uffcr in g (dukklumirodllagamiulpaJipadtl). This way of life is govcrned by the sta ndards of moral conduct genera lly regarded as Buddhist ethics. lt is known as the "M iddl e Path" (Majjhima-patipadtl) because it avoids two extremeS: indulgence in sensual pl easure (kamasukhallikanuyoga) and self ~ mo rtification (attu kilamu thanll yoga).4.1 This Middl e Path is referred to as the Nob le Eightfold Path (Ariya-a,tthangikamaggCl) because it i5 composed o f eight lac tors, namcly: 1. Right Understanding SammtJ-di!!hi 2. Right Thought SammtJ-saukapptl 3. Right Speech Sammd-vdm 4. Right Action Sartl1na-kammal1ta 5. Right Livelihood Samma-ajiva 6. Right Effort Samma-vaytlma 7. Right Mindfulness Sa mmd-saU 8. Rig ht Concentration Sa mmtl-samadhi Tne figurative expression 'pa tn ' (magga) should not mislead

192

i

I

f

REFLECTIONS AND COMPARISONS

us into thinking that the single factars have to be followed and practised one after the other in numerical order as in thc list above. In practiee, factors three to five, whieh form the seetion of 'morality' (sIla), have to be perfected first. Morality is the intention present in one who abstains from killing, stcaling, ete., or in one who fulfils the observanees. 44 To develop moral habit, one has to observe various rules of conduct prescribed by the Buddha. Having acquired moral habit, one 1S capable of practising factors six to eight, which constitute the seetion of 'concentration' (samadhi). The three factars form parts of the Buddhist method known as 'coneentration meditation' (samathabht7vant7). After that preparation, one is eapable of practising the first two factars forming the section of 'wisdom' (pal/na). This Buddhist method called 'insight meditation' (vipassawl-bhavana) aims at developing Right Understanding and Right Thought. Now it is dear that in the Buddhistethics NirvalJa or freedom (vimutti) is the ultimate goal and the Middle Path, consisting of morality, concentration and wisdom, the means for reaching the goal. Prescribed mIes of conduet have to be observed by the aspirant for freedom. The rules bid one perform action conducive to freedom. Onee freedom is obtained, the rules may be disearded. Just as a man abandons a raft after using it to cross a river, so also the liberatcd person givcs up dhamma after attaining Nirvt7~Ia; he is beyond good and evil: "lltavc tal/ght a doctrine similar to a raft-it is jär erossing over, not for earrying. You, monks, who understand timt the teaching is similar to a raft, should give up even good things (dhamma); how nil/eh more so then SilOUld YOIl give IIp rvil things (adhalllnlll)." 45

In the Sartrean ethics, frccdom is the goal of human action; it i5 the end in itself, for Sartre declares that "freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other end and aim but itself."4h The actions of a man of good faith have the quest of freedom as their ultimate significance. In Sartre's ethics, however, there i5 no prescribed means ar magga for bringing about thc end. This is because Sartre, unlike the Buddhist, takes free-

193

Sartr("~ Exi~l('IJti(llism

arId Early Buddhism

dom to be the inner structure of consdousness. Although man is always already free, he hides freedom from himself by putting hirnself in bad faith. To liberate his being, man need not observe any rules of eonduct. What is required for escaping bad faith is the realization that one is free. For Sartre, to follow any prescribed rules of conduet involves bad faith, for they enable man to escape the existential burden of free choice. Hence the so-ealled 'prescribed morality' (paiiiiatti-sIla) in the Buddhist cthics has no place in Sartre's ethics. THE RADICAL CONVERSION In spite of aU this, we find what is similar to the last section of the Buddhist 'Path' in Sartre's ethies. That is, the Buddhist thinks that wisdom (pafifla) which realizes Nirval:!a has to be developed by practising insight meditation. Sartre likewise maintain'j that man can es cape bad faith by purifying reflection. 47 A man of bad faith refuses to recognize what he really is, namely, a being who i5 lJoth facticity and transcendence. 48 He tries to forget that his past or factidty is always already surpassed by his future-oriented choke, seeking either to maintain or revive the past. His impure reflection which is in bad faith constitutes the empirieal self out of past conscious acts and mistakes it for his true being. Identifying his being with the ernpirical seit the man of bad faith takes root in the world. "He does nol even imaginl' any longer the possibility of getting out of the world, jilr he lias given to himsdf fhe type vf exhdence o[ the rock, lile col1sistency, the inertia, tlle capacity of beil1g-in-the-midstof-the-world. "49

He thus has a 'wrong view' (micchaditfhi), to use Buddhist terminology. His "deliverance and salvation" ean be aehieved only after a "radical conversion."5(j Since bad faith is a refusal to recognize one's true being, deliveranee frorn bad faith requires the recognition of that being. This recognition would result in "a self-recovery of being which was previously eorrupted."51

194

REFLECTIONS AND COMP ARlSONS

The self-recovery Sartre calls authenticity or good [aith. How can man recognize his true being? It is through pure reflection that man recognizes what he really iso Through it he realizes that the meaning of the world and values have their origin in his own intentionality. Having realized th1S, he lives in the world with the spirit of play. Sartre, therefore, says that "play ... releases subjectivity." Through it man himself sets the value and rules for his acts and consents to play only according to the rules which he hirnself has established and defined. "As a result, there is in a sense 'littie reality' in the world."52 Through the spirit of ptay man approaches the world as a playground, having no attachment to it; he, therefore, "could not be concerned with possessing a being in theworld."53 He takes the world symbolically and playfully, not appropriately and seriously. He lets the earth support hirn, but does not succumb to the illusion that he can acquire its pennanence. Consequently he liberates himself from the motive of the desire to be the being-in-itself-for-itself. According to I.P. Fell, "this will mean, to those familiar with L't.tre elle NC(lIlt, that Sartre is calling for a radicll/ conversion timt delivers one [rom the metaphysical quest for an ideal being."s.J Thus the radical conversion consists in a change from a life in bad faith to a life of authentidty. This radica! change affects not only man's attitude towards the world but also his way of life. He lives in the world with thespirit o[detachmcllt. We find something similar to Sartre's notion of radical conversion in Buddhism where the ordinary person (puthujjana) is said to be transformed into the Arahllnt or liberated person. Seeing the true nature of things, the Arahant has a new attitude towards life; his picture of the world (papafica) has been destroyed. Finding no "reality" in the world, he has no desire to possess anything. Thc Arahant, like Sarfre's mall of good faith, /ivcs iH thc world with fhe spirit of detac/lInellf: "Not cOl1stituting, not thinking out j(Jr being orf(Jr /lon-being, flc grasps after nothing in the world; not grasping, he is not troubled; being untroubied, hc himsclj IIttains NirVdl;1a. "55

195

... Surtre's ExistetrlüJ/jsm Qtld EDrty Bllddhism

CONCLUSION The conclusion which we can draw from the foregoing com· pa risons is that for both Sartre and the Buddhist con sciousness is emp tied of the permanent seif. Being aware of its emptiness, consciousncss has the desire 10 be somcthing that it is not. To fuHUl its des ire (fll~Jha), consciousness constitutes the empirical :; elf through impure reflcctinn or unwise attention (nyonisDmauasikflm).

According 10 Sarire, consciousness identifies its true beLng w.ilh the empir ical seH ilnd thercby takes root in the world . Forgetting thai it is by nature an impersonal sp(mtaneity, consciousncss is in bad faith (mallva;se joi), ConsL;ousncss, howcver, can liberale itscLf from bad faith and tc's tablish itself in good faith through pure renection and the spirit of play. According 10 the Buddhis t consci(lus ness dings to the em· pirical self (attavadupadifl1a) and thereby loses itself Ln the world; i l i5 in the s tate oE ignorance (avijja) . Neverthel~s conscious· ness can fr ee itself from ignorance through the wi se attention (yolliso-maI1C1sikltra) of in5ight medit ation (vipa ssClI'II'1-lJhavarul). Hence the Buddhist, likc Sarire, grants the highest va lue to frel'· d om of consci ou5ncss. The life which is worth living i5 the life of frccdorn ofp;mutti. Man can li ve with frccdorn a fter a radical conversion. Thus Sartre and the Buddhist alike believe in the possibility o f the radi ca l conversion that results in thc deliverance of consciollsncss (rom thc pheno mcnal world (pa/mi/ca), the mcaning of w hich is constitutcd by consciousncs.':-i itsclf. And i/ is this beIie! i 11 thc radica l c011Vcrsiol1 thai lJrings Sart rc' 5 existent ialism closesl to early Burldhism.

NOTES 1

2

3

See abOVl~. pp. 100-103. Cf. S. IV. 384 : "Both fllrmc rly and nllW also. Anurlld ha, it is just suHcring .md the Cl'ssalion of s ufft'ring thill I procl.lim." Sf..'C abo\'l', pp. 37, 11 6.

196

REFLECTIONS AND COMP ARISONS 4

5 6 7

8 9

10 11 12

13

14 15 16 17

I' I'20 21 22

23 24

2S 26 27

28 29 30 31

32 33

"

35

36 37 38

39 40 41

42 43

Sec above, pp. 32-33. Seeabovt!, pp. 107-111. See abovc, pp. 11 7-119. Sakse n .. , S.K., Na/ure 0/ CunSclCIIISI/rss ill Hi"du Philosophy, MOlilai Banars idass, Oelhi, 1971, pp. n, 77. BN.1 3. Sarire, J-P., "Consciou snt!ss o r Self and Kn llw ledge of Self, " In N . Lawrence and D. O'Connor (cd .), Reading~ Irl Existential Phenoml!nul· (lgy, Pre ntice-Hall Inc., 1967, p. 122. NIntervil'.w with Jean-Paui Sa rtre", in P.A . Schilpp (w .), Thl:! Phi/(lsophy (I/ JI:!/ll/-Paul Sm/re, O pt"n Cou rt, 1981, p. 10. S .XXII . 5 .9O. Rh ys Oav ids, T .W., Early B.lddh i~m, Bharatiya Pub lish ing House, 1976, p.56. S. XXXV. 85; See abovc, pp. 164-167. TE. 69. TE. 39. See above, p. JO-31. Sartre, J- P.. The Psychology 0/ Imus illatioll, MClhue n, Lond on, 1978, p.

27 M. I. 257. See abovc, pp. 135-136. I3N. 63. Sec abow, pp. 58-59. See above, pp. 155-157. Sec above, p p. 155-157. St.-e abovc, p p. 141-143. See above, pp. 145-147. BN.687. BN. 674. BN. 699. BN.1 98. A. V!. 63: "Celayitva kamma rh karoti k:lyena v:lc3ya manas:i". Ibid. BN . 614. Sec abeve, pp. MI-70. Sartre, J-P .. Er istl.'lllifllisrn flntl Hrmmrrism , Ir. by Phi lip Mairet, EYn! Methuen, London, 1980, p . 41. See above pp. 69-70. MA. I. 236. BN .60. BN . 735. BN . 722. 0 . 11. 308. S. XX I. 4. &.-e ab oVl:.' p. 84. BN.140.

197

Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism

44 45 46 47

D. IL 310. M.I. 197. M.I.197.

48

Vism. 1. 6. M. I. 134-5.

49 50

Sartre, J-P., Existcnlialism and Humanism, p. 51.

51

See above, pp. 82-83.

52

llN.741.

53

BN.534n. BN.llon. BN.741. Jbid. Ibid. Fell, J.P., llcidcgger and Sartre, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, p. 152. M. III. 244.

54 55 56 57

58

59

BN.742.

198

Index

sOnya 163

snnyata 163, 164 Sankara 94

A Atthakath1i xiv Abhidhamma 104, 134, 159 Abhidhammatthasangaha 127 absence (natthiopaccaya) 134, 135, 137, 140, 162, 182 Absolute 164 Absolute Seing 13 absoluteness 28, 42. 43 absurdity 67, 186 action 63, 65, 66 Advaita Veda nta 178

affection 103 akusala 129 Alain 44 Ä layav ijMl)a. See store-consciousness a natta 91, 92, 93, 101, 107, 111, 112114, 121, 133, 144, 147, 163, 172, 173, 174, 181 Anattalakkh
B bad faith 34, 35, 73-76, 80, 115, becoming (bhava) 108, 110. 131, being.. lack of 80 being- for-itself 43, 47, 48, 57, 58, 59, 62, 65, being-in-itself 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58,

194, 195, 196 138, 154, 162, 164, 180, 181, 184

68,

n,

78, 79, 82, 181

59, 60, 62, 65, 75, 78, 79,-

~ 1 ~1~ IKl~I . I ~ I ~ I ~

being-in-itself-fo r-itself 59. 65, 78, 79, 80, 190 being-in-situation 68

Hergson, Henri 21 Berk~l ey, George 131 bhanga. See dissolution (bhanga) bhava. St.'L' bemming bhavanga 140, 141, 142, 143, 185. 5eealsocansciousne ss: process. freed. See also subconsciousness bhl'lvanä. Sec development (bhavanä) bliss 95, 101, 105, 115 br3cketing 26-27, 118 Brahmaj:'iJa·Sutta 92 Brahman 93, 97-98, 98, 100, 108, 112, 172 Buddhaghosa 105, 111 , 11 8, 131, 143, 144, 145, 146, 159

C cankers. See :l.sava Cärvruc:a 92 causal relation 135, 137-138, 140, 162, 179, 182, 183 modes of 134 causality 109, 110, 111, 188 cause 63--6:;, 68 cause and effcct 111, 188 cauws 150 cetanl5 138, 147, 149, 186. See
Sartre' s Existentialism and Early Buddhism

conditioned 155, 160 conditioned things (sailkhata) 153 conscious moments 133, 137, 139, 140, 142, 145, 153, 154, 161 seventeen 142 consciousness active. See consciousness: processed acts of 52 causeless 42 contentless 41, 42, 79, 176 contents of 7, 8 continuity of 148, 184 egoless 3 enduring 21 four spheres of 151 instantaneous 21, 61 intentionality of 18, 19. See also intentionality non-causal 22, 80, 150 non-positional 25, 44, 45, 178 pre-reflective 24-26, 29, 30, 31, 54 process-freed 141, 142, 143, 185 processed 141, 142, 143 pure 35 reflected 32 reflective 24-26, 29, 31, 44, 179 spontaneous 189 stream of. See stream of consciousness three characteristics of 28-29 three components of 10 threefold division 103 threshold of 141, 185 time- 22 transcendental 4, 5, 20, 31 unity of 8, 9, 20-23, 134-135, 139, 140, 182, 182-184, consciousness (viflM.l).a) 101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 110, 126, 132, 133, 134, 141, 143, 144, 156 constitution 18, 31, 32, 48, 132, 174, 195, 196 contact (phassa) 102, 103, 109, 128, 129, 141, 142, 177 contiguity (anantara) 134, 140, 162, 182 continuity 135, 136, 140, 155 continuity of consciousness. See consciousness: continuity of conventional truth 132, 157

202

INDEX

corporea lity (l1lpa) 101- 104, 126 cuti-ciUa. See death-consciousness

D death 71--88 death-consoousness 145, 146, 185 defilement 151, 156 dependence, mutual 104 Dependent Origination 108- 112, ISO, 153, 156, 163, 164, 173, 189 dependently originated 162, 184, 189 Descartes 178 desire 77- 79, 80. 110, 115, ISO, 151, 162. 176, 189. 190, 196 cessation of 78, 150, 156, 190 Ireedom from 190 latent 146 three kinds 115-116 to be 80 detachment 195 determinism 63, 67, 68, 69, 75, 79, 148, 153 development (thiti) 133, 138, 143, 154. 155, 161, 183 development (bha.van:i.) 117, 120 dhamma 107 Dhammasangani 102 disappearance (vigata-paccaya) 140, 162, 182 dissolution (bhanga) 133, 138, 143. 155, 161, 183 distortions (vipallasa) 115, 118, 132 diversity 146. 156 dosa 131, 148, 186 dreamless sleep 144, 162, 184, 185. Seealsosu~upti duality 96

E

cgo acts of 18. 32-33, 34, 54 apprehension of 14 as object of consciousness 3, 19, 31 I\S phenomenological datum 13 as supposition 7 concrete 17 empirical 8, 9, 14, 19, 31, 100, 174

203

$artre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism

ego, (contd.) empirical (contd.) constitution of 32-34 glance of 11-12, 26 indescribable 16 permanent 174 phenomenologically reduced 8 properties of 16-17 pure 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 23 qualities of 33, 34, 54 ray of. See ego: glance of self-identical 11 states of 32, 34, 54 transcendent 15, 30-31 transcendental 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 27, 28, 29, 41, .47, 82, 83, 98-100, 118, ]43~144, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 185 as phenomenological datum 14 rejection of 18 transcendental-phenomenological 14 ego-cogito-Cogitatum 10 ekatä. See identity ekstasis 61, 66, 81 ekstatic unity 55, 59-61, 80, 183, 184 elements, four 92, ] 02 emandpation 119 empirical investigation 106 emptiness 119, 163, 164, 176, 181. Seealso sOnya; snnyatä; sunnata: environment 70 epoche 14, 18, 26, 27 eternalism 92-93, 112, 116, 121, 148, 173, 186 ethics 77 Buddhist 193, 194 existentialist 75 Sartrean 75, 192-194 existence, cessation of 156, 158, 162 experientialism 117

204

INDEX

F facticity 67-71, 74, 76, 194 feeling (vedana) 101, 102, 103, 104, 110, 126, 156, 162 Fell,}. P. 195 fellowmen 70-71 fetters 152 first cause 110 five aggregates 101-104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 126, 159, 161, 174, 175 Flügel 103 flux 106, 108, 112, 131, 164, 180, 182, 183 for-itself. See being-for-itself fTee will 63, 149 freedarn 59, 61--63, 65,67-71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 149, 153, 158, 162, 187, 188-189, 190, 193, 196 Freud,Sigmund 29, 65-66, 113 Fromm, Erich 113 fuhlre 58-59, 62, 66, 69, 72, 80, 154, 155, 183, 184

G genesis (uppada) 133, 138, 143, 154, 155, 161, 183 glance. See ego: glance of God 77, 95, 97, 108 good and evil 76, 77 gaod faith 76-77, 193, 195, 196 grasping 113, 114, 115, 173, 174, 196 greed, hatred and dclusion 156 ground, of expeTience 13

H habitus 17 Hegel, Georg 95, 181 Heidegger, Martin 67, 71 hindrances 99, 118, 151, 152 Hintikka, }aakko 45, 178 Hume, David 56, 105-107, 136, 137, 183 Husserl, Edmund xiv, 3, 4,. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 2'), 26, 28, 31, 43, 47, 52, 55, 60, 61, 83, 88, 98, 99, 100, 117, 118, 119, 138, 143, 171, 172, 173, 174, 185

205

Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism

Husserl, Edmund (contd.) rejection by Sartre 18, 19, 20, 27, 30, 41

I idealism 17, 173 identity 135, 136, 139, 146, 155 ignorance 98, 99, 109, 110, 152, 156, 157, 158, 196 latent 146 illusion 96, 99, 157 immanence 9, 10, 15, 41, 98 immanent object 15 stream 15 transcendence 15 immediacy (samanantara) 134, 140, 162, 182 immortality 93, 94, 98, 100, 172, 185 impermanence 105, 107, 111, 115, 11B, 131, 153, 184 in-itself. See being-in-itself indescribable 99 indeterminism 153 infinite regress 45, 67 initiative 149 insight 96,114,117,118,119,120,152,174-176. SeealsomeditaHon: insight instantaneousness 34, BO intention 63, 162, 186, 187, 189 intentional acts 17 intentional object 10 intentionality 19, 41, 45, 46, 79, 129, 147, 161. Seealsoconsciousness: intentionality of interdependence 110, 180 intuition 5, 6, 13, 27, 33, 43, 46, 4B, 49, 52, 53, 79, 81, 83

J James, William 113, 138-140 ]ayatilleke, K. N. 131 jhäna. See trance K kamavacara-citta 151

206

INDEX

kamma. See karma Kant, Immanuel xvii, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 17, 20, 26, 31, 94, 140, 178 karma 121, 138, 144, 146-149, 155, 162, 185-188 reproductive 146, 186 roots of 148 karma-energy 162, 188 karma-formations 110, 156, 163 Kathavatthu 92, 154, 159 Kesakambala, Ajita 92, 121 khal)ika 108. See also momentariness khandhas. See five aggregates kilesa. See defilements kiriya 148 knowledge, purification of 96 Koestenbaum 100 kusala 129

L La Rochefoucauld 29 lack 48, 59, 65, 78, 80, 100, 181, 190 liberation 97, 100 lobha 148, 186 lokuttara 160 lokuttara-citta 152

M MUlapariyaya-Sutta 114 MadhupilJ.c;iika-Sutta 131 Madhyamika 130, 178 maha:bhota-TOpa. See elements, four Mahasatipatthana-Sutta 190 Mahayana 108, 130, 163, 180 Majjhima-Nikaya 156, 158 mano 133 manodvara. See mind-door Marx, Kar! 74 Marxism xiv maya. See illusion meditation 96, 117, 118, 119, 175

207

Sartrr's Existrntialism and Early Bllddhism

meditation (contd'.) concentration 151, 193 insight 118, 119-121, 152, 157, 175, 185, 193, 194, 196 mental formations (sailkhära) 101, 102, 103, 115, 126, 162 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 27 middle doctrine 112 middle path 92, 109, 153, 181, 192 mind-door 129, 141, 179 moha 131, 148, 186 Mok;;a 97, 100, 159, 172 moment of consciousness, See conscious moments momentariness 21, 108, 131, 133-134, 140, 145, 154, 161, 181-182 monad 17 moral judgement 75 morality 73, 75, 77, 193 prescribed 194 motive 63-64, 65, 68, 150 Murti, T. R. V, 164

N Nagarjuna 157, 163 Nägasena 135, 140 nairatmyaväda 91 name-and-form (namarupa) 107, 109, 111, 127, 144, 156 Natorp 4, 7, 8-9 negatites 52 neither-perception-nor-non-perception sphere of 119, 160 neh, neh 95, 160 never-returner 153 Nibbana, See Nirval).a nicca 93 nihilahon 51, 71, 80, 186 nihiJism 92 Nirväl).a 108, 118, 119, 127, 132, 150, 155-160, 162, 163, 164, 173, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195 Noble Eightfold Path 192 Noble Truth 190, 191 non-being 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 75, 81, 82, 157, 180 not-self 105,107,111,115,117,118,157,173, SeeaJsoanatta

208

INDEX

nothingness 5, 16, 35, 42, 46, 48-54, 56, 72, 73, 78, 79, 80-83, 96, 150, 158, 162-164, 173, 175, 176, 178, 180, 181 sphere of 119 Nyanatiloka 112

o objective reality 137 anee returner 152 ontologieal praof 46 ontology 60, 83, 96, 178, 183 phenomenological 47, 82, 83, 173

p Patthana 134 paticcasamuppada. See Dependent Origination patisandhi-citta. See rebirth-consciousness paMa. Sec wisdom pancakkhandha. See five aggregates Pali Canon xiv papai'l.ca 132, 157, 195, 196 paramattha 127. Sce also ultimate truth passive consciousness. See consciousness: process-freed past 55-57, 62, 66, 69, 73, 80, 136, 154, 155, 183, 184 perception (saflft...'l) 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, ]26, 132, 162 personality belief 113 phassa. See contact phenomenological datum 7, 24, 25 description 26, 28, 75, 81, 83, 174-176, 184 enquiry 7 idealism 99 ontology. See ontology: phenomenological psychology 27 reduction 8, 9, 14, 24, 25, 26-28, 35, 99, 118, 119 reflection 24, 25, 45, 52, 81 standard 9 phenomenology 10, 25, 27, 173 transcendental 10 place 68--69 Poussin, Louis La Vallee 146

209

Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism

present 57-58, 66, 80, 154, ISS, 183, 184 Prichard 45, 178 protention 22-24, 60, 138, 182, 183 psychic factors 127128, 129, 134, ISO, 151, 156, 157, 162, 174, 176, 177, 191 psychoanalysis 66, 113 psychology 54, 64, 113, 120, 155 puthujjana 132, 150, 151, 186, 189, 195

R rnpa:vacara-dtta 151 radical conversion 76, 194-196 raft, simile of 193 raga 131 realism 180 reality 157 human 62, 66, 67, 78 ultimate 100, 172 rebirth 121, 144-146, 156, 157, 162, 163, 185-188 rebirth-consdousness 145, 146, 185, 186 reduction. See phenomenological reduction reflection 8, 30, 31 impure 55, 115, 175, 196 pure 34-36, 175, 194, 196 pure and impure 31-32 transcendental-phenomenological 14 responsibility 71-72, 74 retention 22-24, 60, 61, 138, 182 revolutionaries 74 Rhys Davids, T. W. 144, 181

s Sarhsara 156, 157, 158, 162, 163 Samyutta-Nikaya 133, 147 Sangarava-Sutta 116 sankha:ra. See mental formations (sankhara) sankhara (karma formations) 107, 109 SälÜ
210

INDEX

santati. See continuity Sariputta 104 sassataväda. See eternalism sat (being) 109, 164. sat, cH, ananda 95, 101 Säti 145 Sautrantika 158 self 91, 92, 93, 94-96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120, 126, 134, 136, 139, 143, 147, 157, 158, 161, 163, 164, 172, 173, 174 autonomous 104 consdous 94 empirical 5-6, 174, 175, 194, 196 epistemological 172 fixed and abiding 6 grasping of 113 indescribable 5 permanent 93, 101, 105, 116, 121, 135, 140, 144, 172, 175, 182, 185, 186, 196 transcendental 5-7, 105 true 98 selfconsciousness 4, 25, 26, 43-45, 46, 49, 57, 80, 129-130, 141, 175, 177, 178, 179, 187 deception 73 love 29-30, 113, 173 realization 172 sense doors 141, 142, 177 sense-organs, six 129. See also sense doors seriousness 74, 76 sincerity 75, 76 sixth sense 179 skandhas. See five aggregates soulS, 100, 139, 144. Seealsoself space 158 Spinoza 45, 178 spirit of play 195, 196 spontaneity 28, 42--43, 80, 150, 153, 162, 182, 196 store-consciousness 158, 159 stream

211

Sartre's Existentialism and Early Bllddhism

of consciousness 8, 15, 134, 135, 139-140, 145, 155, 162, 181, 182, 184 of experience 9, 10, 12, 21, 24, 134, 172 s tream·winner 152 suN',.:tta 162- 164, 181 SeeaJsoSCinya; stlnyata; emptiness sutx:onsciousness 140-144, 146, 162, 177, 184-185 submoments 133, 138, 155, 161, 183 suffering 78, 79, 80, 105, 107, 111, 113, 115, 118, 151, 173, 174, 191 cause of ]74, 190 cessation of 78, 113, 11 9, 174 freedom from 191-192 sUlcide 67 sukha 93 supramundane 152. See also lokuttara-citta SU$Upti 140, 184. See also d reamless sleep Sutta-Nipäta 161

T Tathagatil 160 temporality 54-55, 80, 153- 155, 180, 184 thought-moment 139 Three Characteristics 107-108, 111, 118 threshold of consciousness. See conscious ness: threshold of Time 153 time-consciousness. See consdousness: timeTipitaka, See Pali Canon trance 120, 152 transcendence 15, 41, 66, 74, 76, 98, 194 transcendental being 18 turn, the 9 transmigration 98, 144, 147 transparency 28, 41, 42. 43, 46, 80, 177 transversal intentionalities 182 Turlya 93, 94

u ucchedava:da. See annihilationis m ultimate truth 132, 157, 158. SeeaJsoparamattha

212

f

INDEX

unconditioned 160 unconscious 45 undetermined questions 160 unity of consciousness. See consciousness: unity of of experiences 6, 12 unreality 158 unwholesome 129 ußwise attention. See attention: unwise upädäya-rupa 102 Upani~ds

93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 108, 109,

111, 112, 119, 120, 121, 144, 145, 159, 160, 172, 173, 185 useless passion 78, 80, 156, 162, 191

v values 73, 75, 76, 82 VijMI,lav.ldin 130, 158, 178, 180 vipäka 147 vipassani!. See insight Visuddhimagga 106, 146, 154, 159

w wholesome 129 wisdom 157, 159, 193 wise attention. See attention: wise Wittgenstein, Ludwig 161 wrang view 112, 113, 173, 194

y Yäjnavalkya 94 yathabhotam 115, 117 yathabhutaMI)adassana 117, 175 Yoga 96, 99, 119, 120 yoniso-manasikara. See attention: wise

213