RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS Series Editor: Solomon W. Polachek IZA Co-Editor: Konstantinos Tatsiramos Volume 23:
Accounting for Worker Well-Being Edited by Solomon W. Polachek
Volume 24:
The Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity Edited by Solomon W. Polachek, Carmel Chiswick and Hillel Rapoport
Volume 25:
Micro-Simulation in Action Edited by Olivier Bargain
Volume 26:
Aspects of Worker Well-Being Edited by Solomon W. Polachek and Olivier Bargain
Volume 27:
Immigration: Trends, Consequences and Prospects for the United States Edited by Barry R. Chiswick
RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS
VOLUME 28
WORK, EARNINGS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION EDITED BY
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK Department of Economics, State University of New York at Binghamton and IZA
KONSTANTINOS TATSIRAMOS IZA
United Kingdom – North America – Japan India – Malaysia – China
JAI Press is an imprint of Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2008 Copyright r 2008 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permission service Contact:
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Catalina AmuedoDorantes
Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA
Michael Bognanno
Department of Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA; IZA, Bonn, Germany
Hielke Buddelmeyer
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, Melbourne, Australia
Lorenzo Cappellari
Universita` Cattolica, Milano, Italy
Anabela Carneiro
Faculdade de Economia (Faculty of Economics), Universidade do Porto, Porto, Portugal
Lisa Delgado
Department of Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Joseph Deutsch
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
Gil S. Epstein
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel; CReAM, London; IZA, Bonn, Germany
Anders Frederiksen
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA; Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark; IZA, Bonn, Germany
Ebbe Krogh Graversen
The Danish Centre for Studies in Research and Research Policy, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark vii
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Andrew Grodner
Department of Economics, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA
Alan L. Gustman
Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, and NBER, USA
Jorgen Hansen
Department of Economics, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Odelia Heizler (Cohen)
Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Stephen P. Jenkins
Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of Essex, Colchester, UK
Thomas J. Kniesner
Center for Policy Research and Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA
Magnus Lofstrom
Public Policy Institute of California, San Francisco, CA, USA; IZA, Bonn, Germany
Miguel A´. Malo
Department of Economics, Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain
Gilles Mourre
European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, and Free University of Brussels (ULB), Brussels, Belgium
Paul Oyer
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA; NBER, Cambridge, MA, USA
Pedro Portugal
Faculdade de Economia (Faculty of Economics), Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal; Banco de Portugal (Central Bank of Portugal), Lisboa, Portugal
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List of Contributors
Jacques Silber
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
Nina Smith
Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark; IZA, Bonn, Germany
Thomas L. Steinmeier
Department of Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA
John Tyler
Education Department, Brown University, RI, USA; NBER, Cambridge, MA, USA
Roger Wahlberg
Department of Economics, Go¨teborg University, Go¨teborg, Sweden
Melanie Ward
European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Germany; IZA, Bonn, Germany
PREFACE Who works, how much one works, and what one earns are the cornerstones of labor economics. However, determining the answers to these questions can be tricky because many factors are involved in estimating labor supply, explaining the implications of labor demand, and determining the resulting earnings. This volume contains 13 chapters on these components of the labor market. Five deal directly with labor supply; four deal with labor demand, most notably the effect of cyclical demand fluctuations; and the remaining four deal with compensation, particularly wages, wage distributions, and fringe benefits. The usual labor supply function examines work behavior from the perspective of individual characteristics, that is how one’s wage, gender, marital and child status affect employment hours. One often ignored factor is the influence of the behavior of other individuals in one’s own social group. However, frequently individuals do not act alone, but instead in concert with others, patterning their behavior on the conduct of neighbors. In the first chapter, Andrew Grodner and Thomas Kniesner model the influence of neighborhood externalities on individual labor supply decisions. They define neighborhood in two ways: first based on demography, and second based on geography. Their resulting econometric model then allows the data to reveal reference groups that are multidimensional in demographic and geographic closeness with the weights given as estimated regression parameters. They find that regression models that ignore spillovers in labor supply underestimate labor supply wage elasticity measures by about 40%, and that regression models that ignore endogenous social interactions underestimate the wage elasticity by over 60%. Similarly usual labor supply functions rarely include sufficient information on overtime and hours in secondary jobs. Yet omitting these can lead to biased labor supply elasticity estimates because such methods miscalculate wages for marginal hours of work. As a consequence they fail to account for nonlinearities in the wage constraint governing time allocation. To combat these difficulties, Anders Frederiksen, Ebbe Krogh Graversen, and Nina Smith utilize data collected by Statistics Denmark in 1996 containing detailed information on wages and overtime hours worked in primary and xi
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secondary jobs. They find labor supply elasticities to be highly sensitive to specification. Utilizing information on overtime and moonlighting wages increases numerical elasticity values compared to standard models, while allowing for more flexible treatment of wage constraint non-convexities decreases elasticity values. Another aspect of labor supply is how an individual’s type of work changes from one time period to another. Put simply, can individuals easily transition from unemployment to a high-paying job, or are most of the unemployed relegated to a viscous ‘‘low-pay no-pay’’ cycle? Lorenzo Cappellari and Stephen Jenkins answer this question with the British Household Panel Survey by utilizing a general first-order Markov model. They find substantial persistence in being unemployed and in low-paid employment. Low-paid men had about twice the chance of unemployment as high-paid men, and similarly unemployed men had a substantially higher chance of being low-paid rather than high-paid upon finding a new job. Their results also indicate greater turnover in low-paid jobs than in highpaid jobs, and the magnitudes are stronger than in studies not accounting for endogeneity, selection, and sample attrition. Whereas state dependence affects labor market outcomes, so do the business cycle as well as structural and institutional factors. Hielke Buddelmeyer, Gilles Mourre, and Melanie Ward use a cross-country panel analysis to parcel out time-invariant structural and time-varying cyclical phenomena to get at why part-time employment rose so substantially over the 1983–1993 period in the 15 European Union countries. They find that increased female labor force participation is one of the main structural variables to explain the rise in part-time work. Similarly, the relaxation of legislation on part-time work particularly in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands is a factor, as well. On the other hand, these increases in part-time work are mitigated by decreases in fertility. Although part-time work diminishes as the economy strengthens, indicating a counter-cyclical business cycle effect, the overall business cycle effects turn out to be negligible compared to structural effects. Another aspect of labor supply is retirement, the time when one leaves the labor market permanently. At least in the United States, policies prior to 1980 encouraged retirement by age 65, or earlier. However, as a result of population aging, namely the decline in the working age population needed to support the retired, the 1983 Social Security reforms as well as other legislation ensued to encourage work beyond age 65. By and large these policies include eliminating mandatory retirement, requiring that pension benefits give credit for work after normal retirement age, as well as a
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movement to defined contribution retirement plans. Other plans under consideration included the elimination of the Social Security earnings test, an increase in the age of benefit entitlements, and relaxing prohibitions from receiving at least partial pension benefits while still at work. Alan Gustman and Thomas Steiner study the effects of these changes in pension law. They find that despite most of these proposals being actuarially fair, ‘‘contrary to predictions from a simple retirement equations, these policies will nevertheless affect retirement, primarily as a result of a mismatch between certain persons’ rates of time preference and the discount rate implicit in the design of the pension.’’ Using a model that allows one to separate the decision to claim benefits and the decision to retire, they estimate the extent to which individuals fully or partially retire and the extent to which individuals claim benefits. Among their results, they find that the share of married men claiming Social Security benefits would increase 10% if the earnings test were abolished between early and full retirement ages. Abolishing the requirement that individuals need work full-time or not at all would lead to a 10–15% decline in fully retired individuals 62–69 years old. Higher average portfolio returns coming about from voluntary personal accounts would lead to a decline in full-time employment in the fraction of 62 year olds. Employment depends not just on supply, but also on demand. Cognizant of this, Gil Epstein and Odelia Heizler (Cohen) investigate employers’ demand, concentrating on the demand for legal versus illegal immigrants. They show that demand is a function of the effective minimum wage, the pay gap between legal and illegal workers, as well as the penalty for employing illegal workers. In particular, increasing the minimum wage has an ambiguous effect on the number of employed local workers but raises the stock of illegal immigrants working in the host country. Based on their conclusion, they consider various migration policies. Overall, the effect of changes in the minimum wage on the optimal enforcement budget depends on the political strength of the groups. If the workers’ union is strong, then increasing the minimum wage increases the optimal enforcement, and vice versa if the capital owners are the strong group. Cyclical changes in demand can lead to worker job displacement. Job displacement and its effects on worker wages are well studied using United States data. Indeed, in the US, failing firms account for roughly 25% of the total job destruction. However, studying job displacement in Japan might be particularly interesting because the Japanese economy tanked between 1990 and 2003, witnessing a rise in unemployment from 2.1 to 5.3%, while at the same time having a reputation of lifetime employment. Yet there are very few empirical studies of job displacement in Japan. Using more detailed data
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than previously studied, Michael Bognanno and Lisa Delgado analyze the effects of Japanese job displacement. They find that displacement costs to employees increase with their age. For each year older a worker is, displacement costs increase by the equivalent of over $1,000. Clearly, these wage penalties arise when workers change firms, but are even greater when workers change industries, consistent with specific training models. Anabela Carneiro and Pedro Portugal also examine worker displacement arising from demand shocks that raise the risk of plant closings. They employ a longitudinally matched worker-firm data set for Portugal, a country where plant formation and plant failure account for almost a half the total gross employment flows. By utilizing a simultaneous equations model to account for the endogeneity of wages and plant closure, they find that an increase in a firm’s failure rate affects wage changes adversely because workers seek to avoid the risk of displacement. This is an interesting and novel result. First, it explains an empirical result counter to the predictions of a number of compensating wage differential studies which argue that risky jobs should command higher wages. Second, it shows that low-wage firms employing high proportions of minimum wage earners fail more often than other firms because minimum wage restrictions preclude the possibility of wage concessions. Generally the less rigid the degree of labor market regulation, especially with respect to work dismissal, the greater the employer flexibility and the higher the probability of worker displacement. During the decade 1984–1994 employment regulation in Spain changed to permit permanent workers to be hired on short-term fixed-duration contracts. As a result, from the early 1980s to the late 1980s temporary employment there grew from less than 10% of wage and salary workers to over 30%. In the next chapter, Catalina Ameudo-Dorantes and Miguel Malo utilize establishment employment practices by type of work contract from the 1993–2002 Spanish Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral establishment data containing detailed quarterly information on employment stocks and flows. Based on these, they examine how firms respond to changing expectations via creating new fixed-term hires compared to conversions from fixed to permanent contracts. They find evidence that establishments use fixed-term contracts both as a buffer to cushion themselves from short-run demand fluctuations and as a screening device before employing workers permanently. Once in the labor market, education is not the only signal of a worker’s potential earnings. Of late, at least in the US, there has been a growing literature on the beneficial value of the Generalized Education Development (GED) certificate, a credential awarded to roughly a quarter of the half-million
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high school dropouts who pass a test administered by the American Council on Education (ACE). At issue is how GED recipients compare to high school dropouts non-credentialed by the GED. In the next chapter, Magnus Lofstrom and John Tyler seek to answer this question by utilizing data from a natural experiment taking place in Texas after the ACE arbitrarily increased the minimum passing score. Essentially, by comparing labor market performance of those with a high enough score to have passed the exam before the change to those with the same score but who now did not pass, they are able to identify the signaling value of the GED. They find no evidence that the GED credential is positively related to higher earnings. However, they find some evidence that this result might have arisen because Texas’s particularly low passing threshold remained in place for an extended period. Another signal of earnings differentials is occupation. If occupation is exogenous to one’s human capital and other characteristics, then one can achieve a lower wage if assigned to a low-paying occupation. As is well known, men and women have different occupational distributions, and some believe this occupational segregation is responsible for the gender wage gap. Much evidence for the US indicates that occupational segregation is not an important factor. However, Sweden is a country characterized by pro-family government policies promoting women’s abilities to simultaneously raise a family and work. As a consequence, the gender wage gap is small by international standards, but occupational segregation appears to be relatively high. Consistent with the human capital model, Jorgen Hansen and Roger Wahlberg find that women choose occupations in which the penalty for work interruptions is low, but because of greater withinoccupation wage equalization in Sweden as much as 30% of the overall gender wage gap might be ascribable to occupational segregation. The decomposition technique is one approach often used to disentangle the factors related to gender (and race) wage differences. However, not only do males and females differ in wage level, but their entire wage distributions differ, as well. Further, typical decomposition techniques concentrate on analyzing wage differences only between two demographic groups at a point in time. In the next chapter, Joseph Deutsch and Jacques Silber generalize the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique in three ways. First, they extend the approach to account for any number of groups. Second, they extend the approach to allow one to analyze changes in wage gaps over time. Finally, and more importantly, they extend the approach to analyze the determinants of the overall wage distribution differences. They illustrate their innovations by examining wage differences between 1982 and 1998 for new Israeli immigrants, Israeli natives, and older Israeli immigrants.
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Not all pay is in the form of salary. Often both employers and employees find advantages to provide and receive in-kind fringe benefits. Paul Oyer builds and tests a model showing how employee benefits are correlated with firm and worker attributes based on a theoretical model in which firms choose their benefits packages to maximize profits. The model takes account first of firms’ economies of scale in providing certain benefits, second of differences in the way employees evaluate benefits based on their characteristics, and third of labor-saving efficiencies certain benefits have. The model introduces two considerations not currently in the literature, namely that firms provide benefits to increase worker effort, and that firms provide certain benefits to decrease the costs of finding available workers. From the model Oyer derives a number of theorems that he tests using the NLS-Y data. As with past volumes, we aimed to focus on important issues and maintain the highest levels of scholarship. We encourage readers who have prepared manuscripts that meet these stringent standards to submit them to Research in Labor Economics (RLE) via the IZA website (http:// www.iza.org/rle) for possible inclusion in future volumes. For insightful editorial advice in preparing this volume, we thank Paul Althous, Ann Bartel, Andrea Beller, David Blau, Nancy Chau, Karen Smith Conway, Ludo Cuyvers, Andy Dickerson, Debra Dwyer, John Sutherland Earle, Rob Euwals, Gary Fields, Carlo Fiorio, Belton Fleisher, Anders Frederiksen, Eric French, Stefano Gagliarducci, Bernhard Ganglmair, Christopher Hanes, Steinar Holden, Todd Idsen, Ben Kriechel, Anil Kumar, Mark Lino, Lance Lochner, David MacPherson, David Marsden, Alfonso Miranda, Lena Nekby, Luca Nunziata, Andreas Pape, Trond Petersen, Melinda Pitts, Barbara Rossi, Christy Spivey, Arne Uhlendorff, Jose Vareja˜o, Bruce Weinberg, Phani Wunnava, and Ken Yamada. Solomon W. Polachek Konstantinos Tatsiramos Editors
LABOR SUPPLY WITH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS: ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES AND THEIR TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS Andrew Grodner and Thomas J. Kniesner ABSTRACT Our econometric research allows for a possible response of a person’s hours worked to hours typically worked by members of a multidimensional labor market reference group that considers demographics and geographic location. Instrumental variables estimates of the canonical labor supply model expanded to permit social interactions pass a battery of specification checks and indicate positive and economically important spillovers for adult men. Ignoring or incorrectly considering social interactions in male labor supply can misestimate the response to tax reform by as much as 60%.
1. INTRODUCTION Social interactions, the situation where individuals respond to the actions of people with whom they interact, may have a biological basis or stem from
Work, Earnings and other Aspects of the Employment Relation Research in Labor Economics, Volume 28, 1–23 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0147-9121/doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(08)28001-5
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information gathering. Social interactions are a potentially important aspect of economic behavior because interdependencies can affect how people react to the expected and unexpected changes in their environment, including ones caused by public policy. We investigate the econometric nuances and empirical importance of social interactions in labor supply with taxes where the interdependence is a response of the individual to the hours worked by the members of a reference group. We find evidence of a positive spillover effect in hours worked and demonstrate their quantitative importance for tax policy. The presence of social interactions in labor supply means that individuals respond to others’ hours worked by a non-negligible amount. When there is a social interaction, effect is important because the policy affecting the wages or another independent variable of a subgroup will not only affect the individual but also others in the individual’s reference group. We therefore focus on the consequences of interdependence for the estimated effect of wages on labor supply, which economists use widely in examining tax reform proposals. Our research contribution is to implement a tractable labor supply model with spillover effects and then demonstrate the value of econometric estimates of the importance of social interactions in labor supply for tax policy. Theoretical solutions to optimal static or dynamic taxation in the presence of social interactions externalities use the parameters of the utility and attendant consumption and labor supply functions (Kooreman & Schoonbeek, 2004; Abel, 2005). To flesh out briefly the enriched policy implications of a labor supply model with social interactions, consider a basic proportional tax reduction applied to married men in a case with potential social interactions effects. Suppose the proportional tax rate change applied only to families with disabled children. The subpopulation affected would be relatively small and scattered geographically; reference group effects could be ignored safely. Alternatively, suppose we were examining the effect of a proportional state income tax change on the highest earners in a state such as California, where many would live in the same area or interact regularly in professional settings. Now feedback effects would be present. The labor supply elasticity to consider would then include non-negligible social interactions effects. Put simply, the benefits of empirical social interactions research are that, after identifying any interdependencies, the economist can perform a more complete welfare analysis. Identification of social interactions is econometrically complex (Soetevent, 2006; Lee, 2007a, 2007b). The primary challenge a researcher must confront
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is what is the correct reference group (Durlauf, 2004). There is a wideranging belief that people in close proximity can have a significant effect on the individual’s labor supply decisions (Weinberg, Reagan, & Yankow, 2004). Similarly, there is labor supply research where reference points come from others who are demographically similar but need not live near each other (Woittiez & Kapteyn, 1998). Here we synthesize the two possibilities. We explore an econometric model that allows the data to reveal reference groups that are multidimensional in demographic and geographic closeness with the weights left as free parameters to be estimated. In summary, we address many of the practical issues related to identifying the effect of endogenous social interactions on an individual’s actions. We create a flexible measure of the economic distance, approximating the level at which individuals interact among one another. We define the economic distance between individuals as a combination of personal characteristics and physical distance. Our measure reflects the varying costs of interaction as higher economic distance implies higher cost of interaction, which implies a lower level of interaction. We then define the reference groups, each of which consists of persons who are in a close economic proximity, and compute hours worked for each person in the reference group (endogenous social interactions). We create and verify the econometric validity of using the mean of hours worked for persons in the adjacent reference group for the purpose of instrumenting endogenous social interactions. The specification lets us examine the core issue of whether the hours supplied by persons in close economic proximity are related. To frame the importance of social interactions, we purposely use crosssectional data from 1976 so as to anchor our research to the seminal and oft cited cross-sectional studies of male labor supply by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990). Our econometric results suggest positive and non-negligible social interactions in hours worked. Focal results are that US male labor supply data (1) reject a model ignoring social interactions against one with spillovers and (2) reject a model with spillovers treated as exogenous against one with spillovers treated as endogenous. A regression model that ignores spillovers in labor supply underestimates the wage elasticity of labor supply by about 40%; if one uses a social interactions model but ignores endogenous interactions, s/he underestimates the wage elasticity by over 60%. We conclude with a demonstration of how improperly accounting for social interactions can lead to substantial under- or overestimation of the labor supply effects of tax reform.
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL Theories of social interactions have a fairly long history in the economic literature. Becker (1974) fleshes out the consequences when utility of the individual is somehow affected by either utility or choices made by members of a reference group, who are people with whom the individual interacts. More recent theoretical research delves into the details of how information and species survival considerations may be the source of equilibrium social interactions in utility (Samuelson, 2004; Rayo & Becker, 2007a, 2007b) and what differentiates situations where individuals emulate versus deviate from peer behavior (Clark & Oswald, 1998; Grodner & Kniesner, 2006). The utility function that leads to our labor supply-estimating equation is the utility function derived by Hausman (1980, 1981), amended to include social interactions, which yields a linear labor supply function that is linear in the means of the reference group behavior. This anchors our results to Hausman’s and MaCurdy’s influential research, which facilitates judging the economic importance of adding social interactions to labor supply. In the empirical work to follow, we regress individuals’ hours worked on average hours worked in their reference groups, ceteris paribus. A positive coefficient on labor supplied by the reference group indicates the presence of a positive spillover effect in hours worked (Woittiez & Kapteyn, 1998; Aronsson, Blomquist, & Sackle´n, 1999). When econometrically implementing the spillover model of individual labor supply, we estimate the familiar linear in means model, that is, the canonical linear labor supply model with social interactions added (Brock & Durlauf, 2001, 2002; Grodner & Kniesner, 2006). Specifically, for an individual i in a reference group g, hi ¼ y þ aoi þ bui þ gxi þ d1 hðiÞg þ d2 x ðiÞg þ i
(1)
where o is the after-tax real wage, u the after-tax virtual income, x a vector of individual control covariates, hðiÞg the reference group g’s average labor supplied excluding the ith worker, x ðiÞg the vector of control covariate averages for the reference group excluding the ith worker, e the error term, and y, a, b, g, r, d1, and d2 parameters to estimate. From Eq. (1), an increase in average hours worked in the reference group spills over so that the individual also increases hours worked. We now flesh out the econometric details involved with examining possible exogenous and endogenous social interactions in individual labor
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supply and suggest an approach that synthesizes two avenues in the current literature. 2.1. Labor Supply Variables The net wage rate (o) uses a marginal tax rate t provided by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and is o ¼ ð1 tÞw. Virtual income (u) also uses the marginal tax rate from the PSID.1 To control for possible endogeneity when estimating (3), we instrument both the after-tax wage and virtual income using last year’s gross wage and nonlabor income (Ziliak & Kniesner, 1999). The control covariates in labor supply include a number of children less than six years old, family size, an indicator if the person is more than 45 years old, the equity that the family has in their house, and an indicator of a physical or nervous condition that limits the amount of work, which are standard exogenous explanatory variables in labor supply studies. Finally, in some specifications, x includes hours worked in the previous year (h1) to allow for the possibility noted by Rayo and Becker (2007a, 2007b) that the reference point in utility may depend not only on reference group outcomes but also on the individual’s habits. 2.2. Social Interactions Variables The mean labor supplied by the reference group is the sample average of hours worked for other people who are close in the economic distance to the worker. In computing the average, we exclude the individual for whom we are computing a reference group mean outcome. The estimated value of the parameter d1 represents the effect of endogenous social interactions in hours worked. Next, we create a proxy variable summarizing the information in the exogenous covariates. Specifically, we use factor analysis and take the first factor as a proxy variable for exogenous information. The new variable is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance and is highly correlated here with all the exogenous variables as well as the individual’s hours worked. The mean in the reference group for the created (factor analytic) proxy variable uses the same range of the economic distance variables as we use for computing mean hours worked, again excluding the person for whom we are computing the reference group mean. The proxy variable controls the common characteristics of the reference group, and the estimated coefficient d2 will indicate any presence of exogenous social interactions.
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2.3. Identifying Social Interactions The labor supply equation, Eq. (1), can identify the presence of both endogenous (in the dependent variable) and exogenous (in the independent variables) social interactions. If the reference groups are completely separable, then a randomly distributed shock that affects hours worked for some individuals but not others can help identify endogenous social interactions (Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001). When reference groups overlap, there are a variety of empirical approaches, including repeated samples (Aronsson et al., 1999), structural models (Brock & Durlauf, 2002; Kapteyn, van de Geer, van de Stadt, & Wansbeek, 1997; Krauth, 2006), aggregated data (Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002), within versus between variation (Graham & Hahn, 2005), or spatial econometric techniques (Kelejian & Prucha, 1998; Lee, 2007a, 2007b). Alternatively, suppose there are workers who belong to more than one reference group, and we use them to compute the (endogenous) mean for reference group hours worked. Hours worked by people in the adjacent reference group can now be an instrument; this is similar to using past values of the dependent variable in a dynamic panel data model (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Here we use, as an instrument, the mean for workers in the adjacent reference groups, which are defined by a social grid with two social coordinates from factor analysis. The instrument is correlated with mean hours worked in the individual’s reference group (endogenous social interactions) because people in the specific and adjacent reference groups belong to the same economic neighborhood. The instrument should also be uncorrelated with unobservables affecting individual labor supply because the particular individual does not belong to the adjacent reference group.2 In any event, the instrumental variable (IV) approach that we use will be checked in the usual ways for weak instruments and that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied, and if the checks are passed, then we are no less comfortable with our approach than with any other IV application. Fig. 1 illustrates our particular identification strategy. We present the hypothetical two-dimensional social coordinate space with two reference groups: g1 and g2. Suppose that individual h0g1 belongs to the reference group g1 and responds to the outcomes of the members of the reference group, represented by the observations labeled as h1g1 and h2g1 g2 (empty and grayfilled circles). If we use the mean of all h1g1 and h2g1 g2 observations (referred ð0Þ further as h g1 ) as an independent variable in the regression (1) to try to identify endogenous social interaction in h0g1 , the coefficient will be biased.
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Social Coordinate 2
Labor Supply with Social Interactions
Boundary for reference group g2
Boundary for reference group g1 0
h g1
1
h g1 h3g2
2
h g1g2 Inner Boundary for instrument group Outer boundary for instrument group
Social Coordinate 1
Fig. 1.
Demonstration of the Identification Strategy for the Endogenous Social Interactions.
Observations h1g1 and h2g1 g2 are also affected by the outcome h0g1 , which causes endogeneity in h ð0Þ g1 . However, if there are observations in the reference group g1 that also belong to the neighboring reference group g2, then part of h ð0Þ attributed to the outcomes h2g1 g2 can be instrumented by the outcomes g1 of the members of the reference group g2, denoted by h3g2 . If the usual diagnostic checks are passed plus an additional one developed in Lee (2007b) that the reference group size varies, then we can reasonably use IV estimation. The h3g2 are valid instruments because they are correlated with all h2g1 g2 observations since they belong to the same reference group, and h3g2 are not correlated with the error terms associated with either h0g1 or h1g1 observations since they do not belong to the same reference group.3
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In practice, if we instrument observations h2g1 g2 with outcomes h3g2 , there may still be observations h1g1 that are not instrumented and thus will make a part of the h ð0Þ endogenous, which is the case presented in Fig. 1. Instead g1 of using just one reference group, we can imagine using a full set of observations in the adjacent reference groups that form the ring around the particular reference group (represented by the dotted circle).
3. DATA We use data from the University of Michigan’s PSID collected in 1975 and 1976 (PSID Wave IX). One reason for using the PSID is that it is the most frequently used data to study US labor supply (Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999; Ziliak & Kniesner, 1999). We purposely chose the 1976 cross section of the PSID data because we seek to understand the possible importance of social interactions in labor supply by anchoring our estimates to the influential research of Hausman (1980, 1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990), who use the same data to examine how taxes affect labor supply without modeling social interactions.
3.1. Sample We follow the sample selection process described in Eklo¨f and Sackle´n (2000), who compare the studies by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990) to which we anchor our research. Both studies estimate an almost identical linear labor supply model with income taxation. We select observations according to the following criteria: married males 26–55 years old with positive hours worked in 1974 and 1975 (but no higher than 5,096 annual hours), who are heads of households in the crosssectional random subsample; there were no changes in the family composition of the head or wife (others can change) in 1974–1975; the head is not retired or permanently disabled, or a housewife, student, or other; the household resides in the United States; and the head is not self-employed or a farmer. Using our exclusion criteria for the 1976 PSID, we obtain 1,077 observations, which are close to the Hausman sample of 1,084 and the MaCurdy sample of 1,018 as reported by Eklo¨f and Sackle´n (2000).4
Labor Supply with Social Interactions
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3.2. Individual Regression Variables The wage rate comes from a direct question in the PSID, including an imputed value for workers who are not paid by the hour. We also estimate a wage equation to impute hourly wages for observations with unobserved or truncated wages. In particular, we use observations that have positive and not top-coded wage rates (839 observations) to estimate a Tobit regression that uses, as the dependent variable, observed (un)truncated wages on a constant term, age, age squared, years of schooling, years of schooling squared, college degree, and family size. We then use the estimated wage equation to produce a fitted value for all wages. The procedure is similar to that in Hausman (1981), so our mean hourly wage is $6.17, which is nearly identical to the $6.18 reported by Hausman. Hours worked, the dependent variable, also comes from a directly asked question in the PSID. Nonlabor income is a constructed variable that is the difference between the total 1975 taxable income of the husband and the wife and the total 1975 labor earnings of the husband. The hours worked and the nonlabor income measures we use are also those of MaCurdy et al. (1990). Other independent variables include the number of children less than six years old (KIDSU6), family size (FAMSIZ), an indicator variable for individuals more than 45 years old (AGE45), the amount of equity the family had in its house (HOUSEQ), and an indicator of a physical or nervous condition that limited the amount of work the respondent could do (BHLTH). Appendix presents descriptive statistics for all regression variables.
3.3. Reference Group and Economic Distance Specifying the composition of the individual’s reference group is the researcher’s central decision in any study of interdependence (Manski, 1993, 2000). Implementing the reference group concept means acknowledging that people who are in relative economic proximity to each other may interact with one another because the cost of interactions is low. We use the concept of economic distance among individuals as an indicator of the potential significance and magnitude of workers’ interdependencies (Conley, 1999). We take people who are in close economic distance as belonging to the same reference group. Economic distance is a combination of whether the workers are similar demographically and live in close physical proximity. We use a combination
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ANDREW GRODNER AND THOMAS J. KNIESNER
of personal and family characteristics to define demographically similar persons and use the distance between centers of countries in which people reside for their relative geographic locations. There are multiple difficulties involved with selecting from a large variety of characteristics to measure economic distance. Acknowledging that each characteristic measure has a different scale and determining the relative importance of each input variable on economic distance, we use a statistical model of factor analysis (Woittiez & Kapteyn, 1998). The factor analytic model naturally deals with characteristics having different measurement scales; the procedure standardizes individual variables and then fits a linear model to find common latent variables called factors (Bai & Ng, 2002; Bai, 2003). The intuition is that there are unobservable variables (factors) that are orthogonal to one another and strongly correlated with observed variables. We use the factors as social coordinates to establish reference groups. Because the typical variables explaining labor supply can affect whether workers interact with each other by being related to economic distance, our factor analysis inputs all independent variables from the econometric labor supply model (3). We also use physical coordinates indicating the location by the center of the country where the person resides. We use two factors to summarize demographic and physical coordinates because there is usually a much better fit with multiple factors than with only one factor, but using too many factors tends to be uninformative.5 By using two factors, we have the convenient feature that the computed latent variables serve as two social coordinates (SocCoord1, SocCoord2) for where individuals are located on a social interactions grid with economic distance measured by the Euclidean distance between two points.
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: LABOR SUPPLY WITH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS Because there is no clearly defined reference group in our study, we first select persons likely to have interdependent labor supplies by using the two social coordinates to define overlapping neighborhoods. As the reference group is now defined, we then estimate the labor supply model in (1) using instrumental variables for identification. If the appropriate econometric specification checks are satisfied, we then interpret the social interactions effects in terms of endogenous versus exogenous wage effects.
Labor Supply with Social Interactions
11
4.1. Selecting the Reference Group Because we do not have direct information on who belongs to the reference group for a particular person, we use a statistical procedure to infer it from the location and characteristics of the group’s members. We believe that our observations are representative of working married men in terms of their individual characteristics and spatial distribution. We can think of the reference group as a ring of certain radius centered around the individual in two-dimensional social coordinate space (Fig. 1). The problem is then to select the radius best representing the borders of the reference group. The border selection problem is important because we use sample observations to compute the characteristics of close-by individuals. Each observation establishes possible multiple reference groups so that careful selection of borders is critical here for identification. To find borders for the membership groups, we use a result from spatial econometrics that, as the reference group size expands, the coefficient on endogenous social interactions tends to minus infinity (Kelejian & Prucha, 2002).6 In our application, endogenous social interactions are represented by the mean of hours worked by others in the worker’s reference group, AnnHSRG_0_R, where R indicates the radius dimension of the reference group’s circle. If social interactions are present at a certain size of the reference group, then the upward bias because of reference group labor supply endogeneity will overcome the statistical tendency for d^ 1 in (3) to become negative as the neighborhood size increases (Anselin, 2001). The reference group with the most positive d^ 1 in exploratory estimates of (3) then reveals the size of the worker’s reference group. Table 1 presents results from baseline labor supply regressions with a social interactions variable AnnHSRG_0_R. Estimation starts with the radius indicator R=1, which means that the average of hours worked uses nearby workers in the social space within the distance of 0.1 or less. When the indicator R ¼ 1, the reference group has around 13 workers. As the size of the reference group increases in the social space (the radius indicator R increases), the number of persons who are considered to be economically close to a worker increases from 44 to about 271 in Table 1. As expected a priori, the coefficient on average hours worked by neighboring persons is increasingly negative across the columns of Table 1, going from about 0.2 to 1.5 as the reference group size increases. Such a tendency will be observed for any estimator, including the IV regressions of Table 1 (Kelejian & Prucha, 2002). Critical to our research is that the
910 44.53 WageRate75, NLIncome75
879 13.33
WageRate75, NLIncome75
0.0626 (0.1432)
WageRate75, NLIncome75
918 89.19
0.2042 (0.2411)
(35.4610) 0.0040 (0.0058)
(35.9633) 0.0031 (0.0058)
52.5361 (36.3663) 0.0034 (0.0059) 0.1978 (0.0867)
71.6107
68.4734
WageRate75, NLIncome75
922 142.56
0.4982 (0.3231)
(35.8352) 0.0047 (0.0057)
71.8010
Annual Hours
(4)
WageRate75, NLIncome75
922 204.13
0.9685 (0.3566)
(35.6676) 0.0051 (0.0057)
68.8683
Annual Hours
(5)
WageRate75, NLIncome75
1.5021 (0.4709) 922 271.21
68.9533 (35.4563) 0.0055 (0.0057)
Annual Hours
(6)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Endogenous variables’ coefficients in bold. Weak instrument check statistics appear in Table 2. Additional control variables: KIDSU6, FAMSIZ, AGE45, HOUSEQ, BHLTH, constant. Significant at 10%. Significant at 5%. Significant at 1%.
Observations Average observations in reference group Identifying instruments
AnnHSRG_0_6
AnnHSRG_0_5
AnnHSRG_0_4
AnnHSRG_0_3
AnnHSRG_0_2
AnnHSRG_0_1
VirtualInc
AfterTaxWage
Annual Hours
Annual Hours
Annual Hours
(3)
(2)
Selection of the Reference Group Using IV Regression.
(1)
Table 1.
12 ANDREW GRODNER AND THOMAS J. KNIESNER
Labor Supply with Social Interactions
13
reference group labor supply coefficient is most significantly positive at the size of the reference group, where radius indicator R ¼ 2. The importance of Table 1 is that the pattern of regressions reveals the group size with the largest upward bias due to endogeneity of the AnnHSRG variable. The endogeneity caused by labor supply interdependencies is most positive for the range (0,0.2), so we pick 0.2 as the radius most closely capturing the true size of the reference group. Results from a Moran I test (Anselin, 2001, p. 323) support the presence of social interactions in hours worked; the radius we adopt to define the reference group based on the preliminary regression in Table 1 also maximizes the Moran I statistic measure of association. The practical consequence of our specification search is that the average reference group contains about 44 persons, which indicates that the groups are small enough to guarantee sufficient outcome variation across groups but large enough that the computed average hours worked are meaningful and have relatively small error due to aggregation. Our results also satisfy the identification condition for general spatial econometric models established in Lee (2007b) that groups vary in size (standard deviation is 38 and maximum size is 139).7
4.2. Social Interactions Effects The focus of our research is on examining interdependence in hours worked, using the canonical model of labor supply applied to cross-sectional data. This anchors our results for purposes of interpretation to the influential labor supply research by Hausman (1980, 1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990). We first confirm that our estimates for the uncompensated wage and income elasticities are similar to the results of Hausman and MaCurdy et al. The first column of Table 2 presents IV regression wage and income coefficients for their canonical models of labor supply. The uncompensated wage elasticity at the means is 0.14, and the income elasticity at the means is 0.008; both values are typical estimates in the standard econometric labor supply literature that serves as our starting point for judging the importance of social interactions. Our focal regression results are presented in the second column of Table 2, where we include both habits and social interactions. We also use as a regressor, the average of the proxy variable for the exogenous variables constructed via factor analysis (IndVORG_2_6). The estimated social interactions effect is that a 10 h increase in the reference group labor supplied would increase an individual’s hours worked by about 6 h.
14
ANDREW GRODNER AND THOMAS J. KNIESNER Table 2.
Dependent Variable Annual hours worked AfterTaxWage VirtualInc IndVRG_0_2
IV Regressions with Social Interactions.
(1)
(2)
Baseline
Social interactions and habits
Only habits Only social interactions
66.6982 (35.5604) 0.0031 (0.0058) 318.8201 (381.9788)
38.5373 (28.6798) 0.0000 (0.0047) 317.4740 (307.9343) 0.6379 (0.2689) 910 0.212 0.645 WageRate75 NLIncome75 AnnHSORG_2_6 IndVORG_2_6
30.5734 (28.1246) 0.0011 (0.0045) 284.0008 (302.0874)
AnnHSRG_0_2 Observations 910 Sargan test P-value Identifying WageRate75 instruments NLIncome75
(3)
910
WageRate75 NLIncome75
(4)
81.6429 (37.3766) 0.0055 (0.0061) 385.0609 (401.1535) 1.3128 (0.3532) 910 0.081 0.776 WageRate75 NLIncome75 AnnHSORG_2_6 IndVORG_2_6
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Endogenous variables’ coefficients in bold. F(Shea partial R2) ¼ 53.0(0.189), 368.1(0.621), 51.9(0.188). Additional control variables in all equations: KIDSU6, FAMSIZ, AGE45, HOUSEQ, BHLTH, constant. Additional control variable in (2) and (3): AnnualHours75. Significant at 10%. Significant at 5%. Significant at 1%.
Comparing columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 yields the important result that the estimated social interactions effect is significant statistically and economically reasonable in magnitude only when habits in labor supply are part of the specification.8 It is important to reemphasize that the estimated endogenous social interactions effect, d^ 1 , which is the impact of average hours worked by persons in the worker’s reference group (AnnHSRG_0_2), has the expected sign and economically reasonable magnitude only after we instrument for interdependence, which we do in Table 2. Because they suggest the presence of endogenous social interactions, the estimates in Table 1 are statistically inconsistent (Durbin–Wu–Hausman test rejects exogeneity at the 5% level). The difference between the results in Tables 1 and 2 emphasizes that we must be clear about the method we use to construct the instrument for social interactions in labor supply. As noted, there are no obvious variables to provide exogenous variation with which to instrument reference group work effort, so we use the
Labor Supply with Social Interactions
15
structure of the data to construct an instrument for the reference group’s labor supplied. Taking reference groups as overlapping with boundaries as fixed, average hours worked by persons in the adjacent reference groups can be instruments. The outer boundary of the persons for the instrument group will be exactly twice the size of the radius for each neighborhood because there may be workers who are located exactly on the boundary for both the reference group of interest and the adjacent reference group.9 We construct hours worked by individuals in the outside ring in Fig. 1 (0.2, 0.6), which has an average of 226 observations for each instrument group. First-stage goodness of fit and Sargan test results for the regressions in Table 2 confirm that our instruments (for all three right-hand-side endogenous regressors: after-tax wage, virtual income, and reference group average labor supplied) are valid in terms of passing the standard checks for weak instruments and that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. Equivalently, the strength of our identifying instruments, here, means that the potential bias of the IV estimator of the endogenous social interactions effect in Table 2 is small: less than 4% of the potential bias of OLS (Hahn & Hausman, 2003; Stock & Yogo, 2005).
4.3. Additional Econometric Validity Checks of the Reference Group It is instructive to examine how our results may or may not be robust to the sizes of the reference group or adjacent groups comprising the instrument set. How might our results change by (1) shrinking the outer circle boundary in Fig. 1, which leaves the reference group size the same but decreases the number of observations viewed as nearest neighbors for the reference group, or (2) shrinking the inner reference group circle boundary in Fig. 1, which makes the reference group smaller? In the first sensitivity experiment, as the instrument group shrinks, the IVestimated social interactions effect is similar while becoming statistically less precisely estimated. Our interpretation is that the instrument loses power as the size of the instrument set shrinks. In the second sensitivity experiment, we find that when the reference group size shrinks, the estimated social interactions effect is also unchanged, although the statistical efficiency of the estimate again decreases. We interpret the result of the second sensitivity experiment as indicating that the range for the reference group is well chosen because, within the group, there should be a similar level of interactions, and we are just choosing progressively smaller and small subgroups that still interact.
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ANDREW GRODNER AND THOMAS J. KNIESNER
Having discussed the sensitivity results of our instrument construction, we now turn our attention to the economic interpretation and policy implications of our estimated social interactions effects in male labor supply.
4.4. Interpreting the Importance of the Estimated Social Interactions Effect Social interactions in labor supply mean that individuals respond to others’ hours worked by an economically significant amount. A social interactions effect is important because a policy affecting the wages or another independent variable of a subgroup will affect not only the individual but also others in the reference group. We therefore focus on the direct versus the indirect effect of interdependence. In particular, we consider the consequences of interdependence for the estimated effect of wages on labor supply, which economists use widely in welfare effect simulations of tax reform proposals (Kniesner & Ziliak, 2008). Taking the mean values in Eq. (1) and focusing on hours worked and wages, þ d1 h ) h ¼ a h ¼ ao
1 o 1 d1
(2)
where 1=ð1 d1 Þ is known as the global social multiplier because it represents the effect of social interactions at the highest level of aggregation (Glaeser, Sacerdote, & Scheinkman, 2003). The total uncompensated effect of a wage change in the static linear model can be decomposed into @h a ad1 ¼ ¼aþ @o 1 d1 1 d1
(3)
where a is the exogenous effect and ðad1 Þ=ð1 d1 Þ the endogenous effect. Notice that the endogenous effect depends on both the magnitude of the initial exogenous change and the social multiplier. the uncompensated elasticity is h, Multiplying Eq. (3) by o= Zhw; total ¼ Zhw; exogenous þ Zhw; endogenous
(4)
For d1 o0:5, h and Zhw; endogenous ¼ ad1 o=ð1 where Zhw; exogenous ¼ ao= d1 Þ h. the exogenous effect is larger than the endogenous effect, but for d1 40:5, the endogenous effect is larger. As we will later emphasize, the decomposition in Eq. (4) underscores how ignoring labor supply interdependencies may have serious consequences for the elasticity estimates of interest.
Labor Supply with Social Interactions
17
Using the values from the second column of Table 2, the total uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply at the means is 0.22, with an exogenous part of 0.08 and an endogenous part of 0.14. In comparison, the baseline model results from column 1 of Table 2 are an uncompensated net wage elasticity of 0.13. If we purposely ignore social interactions, the estimated exogenous wage effect is about 60% too high; the positive bias in the canonical model happens because the single (wage) coefficient estimate also imbeds the effect of labor supply interdependencies. The twin findings that (1) the wage elasticity has two unequal and sizeable parts in the social interactions model and (2) the wage coefficient of the traditional model has sizeable omitted variable bias have important consequences for evaluating tax policy. 4.5. Implications for Tax Policy Calculations We have noted that numerical solutions to optimal income taxation need appropriate econometric estimates. Further, our core results are that, for US male labor supply, a regression model that ignores spillovers in labor supply underestimates the wage elasticity of labor supply by about 40%; if one uses a social interactions model but ignores the endogenous interactions component, s/he underestimates the wage elasticity by over 60%. It is less obvious how we should apply estimates where the policy-maker considers wage elasticity segments with and without social interactions. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations for the proportional tax rate case are instructive. The preferred model in Table 2, column 2, implies that a 10% comprehensive tax rate cut would raise male labor supply by as much as 2.2% when social interactions are considered; ignoring social interactions would lead to about a 60% underestimate of the labor supply effect of the tax cut (0.8%). How can one use our decomposition of the total wage elasticity into its exogenous component (þ0.08) and its endogenous social interactions component (þ0.14) in policy calculations? Suppose there is a proportional tax rate change applied only to families with disabled children. The subpopulation affected would be relatively small and scattered geographically; the reference group effects could be ignored safely, and the appropriate elasticity to use would be closer to 0.08 than 0.22. Alternatively, suppose we were discussing the effect of a proportional state income tax change on the highest earners in a state, such as California, where many would live in the same area or interact regularly in business. Now feedback effects would be present. The elasticity to use would then include nonnegligible social interactions effects and probably be closer to 0.22 than 0.08.
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ANDREW GRODNER AND THOMAS J. KNIESNER
The importance of gauging what is the correct elasticity in terms of the exogenous and endogenous parts is useful only if we can define whether a particular group will be affected by interactions. If the persons who are affected do not belong to the same reference group, then most likely we would observe only the exogenous effect, and the elasticity would be overestimated if we used an elasticity that contained both exogenous and endogenous components, which was the first example in the previous paragraph. If the tax reform applied to members of a reference group, though, then there would be a full-blown feedback effect, and the elasticity that used only an exogenous component would underestimate the total labor supply effect, which was the second example in the previous paragraph.
5. CONCLUSION Our research uses the canonical (linear-in-means) model of labor supply that adds possible social interactions in hours worked. We flesh out the econometric nuances of testing whether an increase in hours worked by the members of the reference group increases hours worked for the individual (endogenous social effect). The reference group here contains persons in close economic distance to each other. Our measure of economic distance uses factor analysis, which allows mapping multiple economic neighborhood variables into a two-dimensional social space. Our identification strategy builds on the likelihood that some persons belong to more than one reference group, so that their hours worked may be used to instrument for endogenous labor supply of individuals in the worker’s reference group. As in any other IV exercise, we apply checks of instrument strength and that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. In our regression model of married men’s labor supply, if social interactions are treated as exogenous, there is no estimated effect of the reference group behavior on the individual worker’s behavior. When we instrument mean hours worked of the reference group and include individual habits in labor supplied, we find a social interactions effect that is reasonable both statistically and economically. The estimated total wage elasticity of labor is 0.22, where about one-third is due to the exogenous wage change and two-thirds are due to social interactions effects. The policy implications are that if one is to fully understand the labor supply and welfare effects of income taxes, which may be conditioned on demographic and location information, a model including social interactions is best. Equally important is a proper interpretation of the social
Labor Supply with Social Interactions
19
interactions model results. We demonstrate how a mis-specified model or a properly specified model that is misapplied can easily lead to misestimates of the labor supply effects of tax reform by as much as 60%.
NOTES 1. u ¼ [NLIþ(t(TT/(TINLI)) (TINLI))], where NLI is nonlabor income, TT are total taxes, and TI is taxable income (Ziliak & Kniesner, 1999). For a survey of income tax effects on labor supply, including over the life cycle, see Kniesner and Ziliak (2008). 2. Similarly, Case and Katz (1991) instrument for the endogenous effect using the average levels of adjacent neighbors’ characteristics that are supposedly exogenous, and Evans, Oates, & Schwab (1992) instrument school composition with citywide variables for the unemployment rate. 3. In practice, if we instrument observations h2g1 g2 with outcomes h3g2 , there may still be observations h1g1 that are not instrumented and thus will make a part of the ð0Þ hg1 endogenous, which is the case presented in Fig. 1. Instead of using just one reference group, we can imagine using a full set of observations in the adjacent reference groups that form the ring around the particular reference group (represented by the dotted circle). 4. The difference between the number of observations used by MaCurdy et al. (1990) and our study comes from the fact that we dropped two observations because the head’s age was missing and that we did not exclude persons who were selfemployed and farmers in 1975 but not in 1976 (changed employment status). Due to restricting the sample to individuals who also reported hours worked for 1974, we have a final sample of 910 men. 5. The first factor loads primarily on demographics and explains about 75 percent of the total variation in the variables. The second (rotated) factor loads primarily on location and then explains about 15 percent of the information. 6. The intuition behind the result is that as the size of the group used to produce the average grows, it approaches a similar value for everyone and becomes increasingly collinear with the regression constant term. 7. As yet another check on the reasonableness of how our econometric model reveals groups, we examined the intragroup correlation of the members’ characteristics variables and the correlation of the same variables in an identicalsized group selected randomly. In all cases, the model’s groupings had much higher intragroup correlations (typically greater than þ0.90) versus among the members of randomized groups of similar size (typically less than þ0.02). 8. The coefficient on the hours worked for the reference group needs to be less than 1.0; otherwise, a 1 h increase in the mean hours worked for the reference group would induce a worker to increase his labor supply by more than one hour, which would cause a domino effect where, in the limit, all workers choose the maximum feasible hours. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in both columns (2) and (3) is 0.59 with a standard error of 0.03. In a cross-sectional regression, it will
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reflect both habits and additional worker-specific heterogeneity. One needs panel data to separate the two effects. 9. The result stems from symmetric boundaries around each member. We thank Dan Black for that observation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are grateful for financial support from the MacArthur Research Network on Social Interactions and Economic Inequality and thank Gerald Auten, Badi Baltagi, Dan Black, Gary Engelhardt, Bo Honore, Bill Horrace, Will Kniesner, Jeff Kubik, Anil Kumar, Lung-fei Lee, Joseph Marschand, Christian Meghea, Andrew Oswald, Jan Ondrich, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
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Manski, C. F. (2000). Economic analysis of social interactions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 115–136. Moffitt, R. A. (2001). Policy interventions, low-level equilibria and social interactions. In: S. Durlauf & H. P. Young (Eds), Social dynamics (pp. 45–82). Washington, DC: MIT and Brookings Institution Press. Rayo, L., & Becker, G. S. (2007a). Evolutionary efficiency and happiness. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), 302–337. Rayo, L., & Becker, G. S. (2007b). Habits, peers, and happiness: An evolutionary perspective. American Economic Review, 97(2), 487–491. Samuelson, L. (2004). Information-based relative consumption effects. Econometrica, 72(1), 93–118. Soetevent, A. R. (2006). Empirics of the identification of social interactions: An evaluation of the approaches and their results. Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(2), 193–228. Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In: D. W. K. Andrews & J. H. Stock (Eds), Identification and inference for econometric models: Essays in honor of Thomas Rothenberg (pp. 80–108). New York: Cambridge University Press. Weinberg, B. A., Reagan, P. B., & Yankow, J. J. (2004). Do neighborhoods affect hours worked? Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Labor Economics, 22(4), 891–924. Woittiez, I., & Kapteyn, A. (1998). Social interactions and habit formation in a model of female labour supply. Journal of Public Economics, 70(2), 185–205. Ziliak, J. P., & Kniesner, T. J. (1999). Estimating life cycle labor supply tax effects. Journal of Political Economy, 107(2), 326–359.
AnnualHours AnnualHour75 AfterTaxWage WageRate WageRate75 VirtualInc NLIncome NLIncome75 AnnHSRG_0_2 AnnHSORG_2_6 IndVORG_2_6 IndVRG_0_2 KIDSU6 FAMSIZ AGE45 HOUSEQ BHLTH
Variable
910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910
Observations 2236.864000 2247.385000 4.692693 6.272303 5.479915 5138.557000 3710.268000 3298.155000 2210.108000 2214.600000 301892.000000 352303.000000 0.445055 3.873626 1.748352 18511.900000 0.051648
Mean 536.701100 540.086500 1.198573 1.794132 0.636453 4364.210000 4700.172000 3984.506000 134.322300 53.725650 5444115.000000 0.035230 0.696331 3.873626 3.108485 16930.990000 0.221438
Standard Deviation 288.000000 320.000000 0.542700 0.670000 3.655642 965.000000 7900.000000 10000.000000 1180.000000 2009.458000 1.534880 1.760330 0.000000 2.000000 0.000000 5000.000000 0.000000
Minimum
APPENDIX. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
4917.000000 4500.000000 7.488000 9.900000 6.837162 45593.000000 57640.000000 26000.000000 2950.667000 2477.579000 1.369547 1.598270 3.000000 9.000000 11.000000 120000.000000 1.000000
Maximum
Labor Supply with Social Interactions 23
OVERTIME WORK, DUAL JOB HOLDING, AND TAXATION Anders Frederiksen, Ebbe Krogh Graversen and Nina Smith ABSTRACT Labor supply data seldom include detailed information on hours and wages in secondary job or overtime work. Based on survey information on hours and wages in overtime work and second job which is merged to administrative register information on income taxes and deductions we estimate a ‘‘Hausman labor supply model,’’ which allows for a detailed treatment of nonconvexities. Including explicit information on overtime pay and second job wages increase the estimated elasticities compared to a standard labor supply model without this information. However, allowing a more flexible treatment of nonconvexities the estimated elasticities are reduced; even below the estimates of the baseline results. In simulations we show that these findings have significant consequences when evaluating the degree of self-financing of various tax reforms.
1. INTRODUCTION A major criticism of many labor supply models is that hours cannot be varied freely within jobs and that the decision to work overtime or to enter a Work, Earnings and other Aspects of the Employment Relation Research in Labor Economics, Volume 28, 25–55 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0147-9121/doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(08)28002-7
25
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ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
second job is different from the work hours decision in the main occupation.1 In general, overtime wages exceed the wages in main occupation and second jobs typically imply additional fixed costs of work. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role overtime work and duel job holding plays for the labor supply decision of men and women. The use of additional information on overtime and second job gives a more flexible and realistic modeling of the actual labor supply. The explicit modeling of fixed costs of work, overtime payments, and wages in second jobs is expected to be very important when analyzing potential tax reforms. The main reason is that tax reforms that changes the marginal income tax rates potentially changes the budget segment where the individual’s optimal labor supply is positioned. In particular, a tax reform with tax cuts increases the individual’s incentives to work overtime or take a second job. Thus, it is important that the estimated model takes the nonlinearities of the budget constraint related to this decision into account. Despite the vast literature on labor supply models, there are relatively few studies focusing on the implications of overtime work and dual job holding (cf. Hart, 2004). One of the first studies, which explicitly model these aspects of the supply decision, is Ashworth and Ulph (1981). They find numerically larger elasticities when overtime and second job wages are explicitly modeled compared to a model where the budget constraint is linearized around the point of observation. In this paper, we apply a piecewise linear approach, for simplicity denoted a ‘‘Hausman approach,’’ which allows for an explicit treatment of the nonlinearities imposed by the tax system. This approach is known to be sensitive to the specification of functional forms and measurement errors in the hours and wage variables. In addition, the Hausman model is very demanding with respect to the information required to construct the budget constraint (see, for instance, Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999). Introducing information on overtime work and dual job holding requires two extensions of the traditional Hausman approach. First, the number of budget segments is increased to capture variation in wages between main job, overtime work, and second job. Second, we anticipate that some workers will have additional costs associated with working in a second job. The extensions are found to be empirically relevant for both men and women. The estimated model is a generalization of a Tobit model that accounts for the joint participation and hours decision which is especially important when we look at female labor supply where a significant part of the women are nonparticipants.2 In addition, we take measurement errors in the labor supply as well as unobserved heterogeneity in preferences into account.
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
27
The model is estimated on a survey collected by Statistics Denmark in 1996. The survey information is merged with very detailed information from administrative registers on incomes and taxes. The main feature of the data which is explored extensively in this paper is the detailed information on individual labor supply and wages in a person’s main job, overtime work, and second job. Our results show that the labor supply elasticities are highly sensitive to the inclusion of the information on overtime work and secondary job and to the handling of fixed costs of work. The additional information increases the estimated elasticities as in Ashworth and Ulph (1981). However, the subsequent introduction of flexibility reduces the estimated elasticities considerably compared to traditional labor supply models without explicit information on overtime pay and second job wages. Hence, our new results show that omitting crucial information related to work hours exceeding the hours in the main job may lead to significant overestimates of the labor supply effects and the degree of self-financing of tax reforms. The economic consequences of this shortcoming may be large. The theoretical framework is discussed in the next section. In Section 3 we present the data and show descriptive statistics. The choice of empirical model is motivated in Section 4. We give a detailed discussion of the models assumptions and propose various empirical model specifications in Section 5. The results from the estimations are presented in Section 6. These results are used for simulation of four hypothetical tax reforms in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL We model the individual labor supply decision using a piecewise linear approach which is known as the Hausman model.3 The individuals choose bunches of consumption and hours of work, (C,h), which maximizes their utility function U(C,h), given the piecewise linear budget constraint. The constrained utility maximization implies a labor supply function, which depends on the after-tax wage rate and after-tax income. The traditional Hausman model relies on the assumption that workers face one exogenously given wage rate which is independent of the number of hours supplied. Embedded in this approach is that the individual can vary the number of hours freely at a given wage rate ignoring all institutional settings in the market such as labor laws requiring overtime compensation and limits to the number of hours an individual can supply in a given job. Since these restrictions are important in labor markets, we extend the
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ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
conventional model and explicitly integrate information on overtime and second job into the individual-specific budget constraint. This means that instead of one wage, individuals are now facing three exogenous wage rates in the market; i.e., a wage in the main job, an overtime wage, and a second job wage.4 This results in the following budget constraint: C ¼ ðwm hm FCm Þ þ wo ho þ ws hs þ Y þ V tðIÞ
(1)
where C is annual consumption, wm, wo, and ws are the hourly wage rates in main occupation, overtime work, and second job, respectively, hm, ho, and hs, annual labor supply in main occupation, overtime work, and second job. Y is annual taxable nonlabor income, V, annual nontaxable nonlabor income, including spouse’s after-tax income if married or cohabiting. t(I) is the tax function, where I is annual assessed income, I=SwhþYD, and D is annual deduction. FCm are the fixed money costs of work, e.g., costs of transport and childcare, associated with the job. We consider two specifications for hours.5 First, we apply the ‘‘hours constraints’’ specification outlined in Shisko and Rostker (1976) who assume that hours supplied to different types of jobs have similar disutility, i.e., h ¼ hmþhoþhs. Further, hours constraints and institutional factors in the main occupation is the primary motivation for multiple job holding. Second, we use the ‘‘heterogeneous-job’’ specification discussed in Conway and Kimmel (1998) and Heineck and Schwarze (2004) and explore how variation in the nonpecuniary benefits or unobservable costs associated with different jobs can account for the observed variation in hours. This is implemented by allowing the disutility of work between the main employer (main hours and overtime hours) and work in a second job to differ in the econometric specification. Because these costs are nonmonetary, they do not show up in Eq. (1). The nonlinear budget constraint is characterized by its kinks, the after-tax wage rates and virtual incomes on the linear segments. These can be obtained using a simple iterative procedure as long as nonlabor income, gross wage rates, labor supply, and the tax system are known. Fig. 1 exemplifies a budget constraint for a person who has both overtime work and a second job in addition to the main occupation. The person was subject to the Danish tax system in 1996 which had four tax segments and three kink points. The marginal tax rates on the four segments were 7%, 47.2%, 51.8%, and 65.8% and the distribution of individuals in the sample is shown in Table 1 for men and women, separately. In general, the marginal tax rates in Denmark are high compared to most other OECD countries
29
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation C
Ws(1-t 4) y6 y4 y3 y2 y0
.
y1 O y5
Wo(1-t 4)
Wm(1-t 4)
Wm(1-t 3) Wm(1-t 2) Wm(1-t 1)
H H0 H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
Fig. 1. The Piecewise Linear Budget Constraint with Fixed Costs of Work and Six Linear Segments due to Nonlinear Income Taxes and Different Wages in Main Occupation, Overtime Work, and Second Job. Note: The difference between y1 and y0 in Fig. 1 is the sum of fixed costs of work and reductions in unemployment or social welfare benefit. It is assumed that the unemployment and social welfare benefit disappears when the first hours is worked in accordance with the rules in Denmark in 1996.
Table 1.
Men Women All
Distribution of Men and Women by Marginal Tax Rates.
Marginal Tax Rate r7%
Marginal Tax Rate 47.2%
Marginal Tax Rate 51.8%
Marginal Tax Rate 65.8%
All (%)
1% 3% 2%
10% 34% 23%
58% 54% 56%
31% 9% 19%
100 100 100
(see, for instance, OECD, 1996) and the actual marginal tax rates are considerably higher for men than for women. This reflects the higher level of earnings and nonwage income of men, but it also reflects the Danish tax system which is dominated by a separate taxation of spouses (see Smith, Dex, Vlasblom, & Callan, 2003). Labor supply up to H4 in Fig. 1 represents work in main occupation, excluding overtime work, with an hourly gross wage rate, wm. The person is assumed to have an income in main occupation, excluding overtime work, which passes the three thresholds or kinks of the progressive income tax
30
ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
scheme. If the person works more than standard hours, he is assumed to get an overtime compensation, which exceeds the standard wage in the main occupation. This is represented by the hours range from H4 to H5. Further, the person may have a second job. In Fig. 1, it is assumed that the net wage in second job equals the hourly main job wages. A different budget constraint arises if the person has a relatively low hourly wage rate in main occupation – or a very large tax deduction – which implies that kink points from the tax schedule may lie in the hour ranges for overtime work or second job. There are of course a number of possible combinations of hypothetical budget constraints, depending on the size of Y, V, D, the wage rates and the job opportunities faced by the individual. The after-tax wage rate on segment j is given as wij ¼ wi ð1 tj Þ where tj is the marginal tax rate on segment j, and wi is the hourly wage rate in either main occupation, overtime work, or second job (i ¼ m, s, o). To simplify notation, we drop the subscript i in the following. The virtual income on the first budget segment is given as y1 ¼ VþYt(YD)FCm. The virtual income corresponding to segment j can be found iteratively as yj ¼ yj1 þ ðwj1 wj ÞH j1 ; 8j 2. Given the definition of yj, wj, and Hj above, the individual’s optimization problem becomes the following, where k is the maximum number of segments (k ¼ 6 in Fig. 1). 8 Max UðC; hÞ > > s:t: > > < y1 if h ¼ H 0 (2) C¼ > wj h þ yj if H j1 ohoH j j ¼ 1; . . . ; k > > > : wk H k þ yk if h ¼ H k Hk corresponds to the total time allocation. The solution to the maximization problem is obtained from an algorithm that compares all local optima for the complete budget constraint and returns the global optimum, which is the maximum of all local optimal utilities. The first step of the algorithm is to identify the locally optimal choice of labor supply from the desired hours function, f(wj, yj), for each linear segment of the budget constraint. If the locally optimal solution is calculated to be within the range of hours over which the linear segment is defined, it is said to be ‘‘feasible.’’ If we have a ‘‘convex’’ kink and the locally optimal solution on a segment lies above the feasible range and if the locally optimal solution on the following segment lies below the feasible range, we have a kink between two segments as a feasible solution. An interior ‘‘nonconvex’’ kink can never
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
31
be a feasible solution (while the corner solution at h ¼ 0 may be both optimal and feasible). Hence, this first step yields a vector of information about the segments and kinks where an element takes the value one if the segment is feasible and zero otherwise. Second, after all feasible local optima have been identified, the algorithm finds the global optimum by calculating which is the feasible local optima that generates the maximum utility. When the direct utility function is only implicitly available, the maximum must be calculated using the indirect utility function. It is easily done for all the feasible segments, but no definitive wage rate exists at the kink points. However, we can evaluate the inverse demand function, w ¼ w(h, y), at the hours corresponding to the kink point and find a ‘‘support’’ wage rate and virtual income. By duality, the substitution of the ‘‘support’’ wage rate and income into the indirect utility function at the kink point hours is sufficient to evaluate the level of direct utility at the kink point (cf. Duncan, 1993).
3. DATA The data used in this study are based on a survey of 4,000 Danes collected by Statistics Denmark in 1996. The initial sample covers the age range of 16–74 years. In the present study we restricted the sample to individuals aged 18–59 years to limit the influenced of human capital accumulation and retirement (early retirement schemes are available from age 60). We include married, cohabiting, as well as single individuals in the sample, but exclude individuals with long-term illness, students, self-employed persons, and their spouses. The exclusion of the two latter groups is made because we are unable to calculate their income taxes and hence to construct their budget constraints because the Danish tax rules for self-employed families requires more information than is available in the database. The exclusions result in a sample of 2,441 individuals. The labor supply of unemployed individuals is determined by questions on their search behavior. Unemployed individuals who are on unemployment insurance benefits or social welfare are asked the conventional questions from labor force surveys on search behavior. Based on the answers to these questions, we divide the unemployed into two groups, those who satisfy the ILO conditions of being unemployed (involuntarily unemployed) and those who do not (voluntarily unemployed). The ILO criteria for being categorized as (involuntarily) unemployed are that the person has been seeking for a job actively within the latest month and that
32
ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
he or she is able and willing to start in a new job within the next two weeks. If the person satisfies these conditions, he or she is assumed to have a desired labor supply of 37 h weekly if full-time insured against unemployment and 20 h weekly if part-time insured against unemployment.6 If the person does not satisfy the ILO criteria, he is categorized as voluntarily unemployed with a desired labor supply of 0 h. Euwals and van Soest (1999) and Bingley and Walker (2001) have applied a similar identification procedure using data for the Netherlands and the UK, respectively. The sample includes survey information on weekly normal hours in main occupation, normal working hours in second job, if the person holds a second job, and number of hours in overtime work in the week prior to the survey week.7 Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution on employment states and average weekly hours in main job, overtime work, and second job for the 1,150 men and 1,291 women included in the empirical sample. The majority of the sample has only a main job. More men than women tend to work overtime or have a second job, and a higher proportion of women are nonparticipants. Twelve percent of the individuals in the sample are either unemployed or observed as nonparticipants, 64% have only one job and no overtime hours, and 24% have a second job or work overtime beside their main occupation. Out of these 24%, 18% – points only work overtime, 5% – points only have a second job, while a little more than 1% – point is observed to have overtime hours as well as a second job.8 The weekly number of working hours is relatively low in Denmark compared to other European countries. On average, an employed man works more than an employed woman in all three job types: main job, overtime, or second job (cf. Table 3). Table 2. Distribution of Men and Women in Nonparticipation, Unemployment, and Employment in Main, Overtime, and Second Job Occupation. Nonparticipants Unemployed
Men Women All
0.03 (36) 0.08 (101) 0.06 (137)
0.06 (72) 0.07 (86) 0.06 (158)
Main Main and Occupation Overtimea Only Occupation
0.60 (694) 0.67 (864) 0.64 (1,558)
0.22 (254) 0.14 (187) 0.18 (441)
Main and Main, Second Job Overtimea and Occupation Second Job Occupation 0.06 (72) 0.03 (45) 0.05 (117)
0.02 (22) 0.01 (8) 0.01 (30)
Total
0.99 (1,150) 1.00 (1,291) 1.00 (2,441)
Note: Number of observations in parentheses. a 130 men and 81 women with observed overtime (main hours exceeding 37 per week) did not get any compensation for their overtime work. These observations are included in Column 3 (Main Occupation Only).
33
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation Average Weekly Hours in Main Occupation, Overtime, and Second Job, Conditional on Participation.
Table 3.
Main Occupation (h)
Overtime Work (h)
Second Job (h)
Total (h)
37.9 34.5 36.1
2.1 1.0 1.5
1.0 0.4 0.7
41.0 35.9 38.3
Men Women All
Table 4.
Observed Average Hourly Wages in Main Occupation, Overtime Work, and Second Job. Main Occupation
Men Women
Overtime Work
Second Job
N
Wage, DKK
N
Wage, DKK
N
Wage, DKK
1,042 1,104
133.7 107.0
276 195
170.1 148.6
94 53
140.5 135.9
In the survey we have detailed information on individual wages in each of the three job types: main job, overtime, and second job. Hence, we know for instance if a person working overtime is compensated beyond his main job wage. The compensation or extra payment for overtime work is determined by union-specific collective agreements with Danish employers. Standard working hours is 37 h per week and additional work taking place at the main employer is considered overtime work. Hourly or weekly paid manual workers typically get overtime payments or they are allowed to take time off later on. Monthly paid nonmanual workers seldom get overtime pay. In some cases, they may have the right to take time off later on (see Smith, 1998). The sample values of average observed wage rates (conditional on participation) in main occupation, overtime work, and second job are shown in Table 4. Overtime payments exceed the payments for standard hours in main occupation and second job with a considerable amount, while second job wages on average are higher than main job wages but lower than hourly overtime payments. More detailed cross tabulations show that individuals with low hours in main occupation tend to have relatively low hourly wages in second job, while individuals with a full-time job have higher wages in a second job (see Frederiksen, Graversen, & Smith, 2001). This may reflect that individuals with few hours in main occupation have to supplement their income with a second job in order to
34
ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
work the preferred hours, i.e., they are restricted from having a full-time job in their main occupation (see Trejo, 1993). At the other extreme, for individuals who hold both a full-time and a second job, the jobs often seem to be complements, i.e., professors with complementary consultancy jobs (see Paxson & Sicherman, 1996). In these cases the second job may improve the career opportunities hence they are not accepted only to increase current wage income. This is a point which is discussed further in Section 5. The construction of individual budget constraints requires a specification of income both when the individuals are working and not working. The required information is obtained from different administrative registers (tax, income, social welfare and other income transfers, and UI-benefit registers), which have been merged to the survey information. Thus, we have information on total annual earnings, capital income and income from other sources, tax deductions, UI benefits, social welfare payments, child and housing subsidies. The income when not working (y0) is calculated as follows: For individuals insured against unemployment (about 80% of the employees), we include potential unemployment benefits in the budget constraint. Unemployed individuals who are insured in an UI fund receive an hourly compensation of 90% of prior hourly wages up to a flat rate. The UI compensation in Denmark is independent of other sources of income and independent of the income of a spouse. In contrast to working individuals, we have no information on hourly wage rates for nonworking individuals. Hence, we use the predicted wage rate based on selectivity-corrected wage regressions to construct the budget constraint.9 About 5% of the individuals are observed as involuntarily unemployed, i.e., they are not working but have a desired positive labor supply according to the ILO criteria (cf. Table 2). Another group of the same size does not have a positive labor supply according to the ILO criteria. Both groups do not have an observed wage rate and for these individuals we use predicted hourly wage rates based on estimations of selectivity-corrected wage functions. Similar wage regressions are estimated for the missing wage rates on overtime and second jobs. The sample includes married as well as single individuals. In the estimations, we model the individual labor supply decision, i.e., not a household decision. For married or cohabiting individuals we treat the spouse’s net income after taxes and means-tested income transfers as exogenous nonlabor income. Thus, we only allow for an income effect between spouses’ labor supply behavior and not a cross-substitution effect.
35
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
Other Danish empirical studies find quite low cross substitution and family income effects between spouses (see Smith, 1995, among others).10 An overview of a number of demographic and regional variables used in the estimations is given together with sample means and deviations in Table A1 in the appendix.
4. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION In order to specify the empirical model, we have to select a functional form of the labor supply function and a stochastic structure. In this study, we select a flexible nonlinear specification, which allows for backward bending labor supply as in Duncan (1993). The specification is nonlinear in the wage rates but linear in the nonlabor income. However, the direct utility function does not exist in a closed form, so instead we use the indirect utility function in the algorithm described above to find the desired labor supply.11 Consider the following empirical specification, which is linear in all the parameters to be estimated, y. h ¼ f ðwj ; yj Þ ¼ xj y þ n h^j þ n;
j ¼ 1; . . . ; k
(3)
xj is a vector of explanatory variables. The error component, n, represents heterogeneity in preferences with n Nðmn ; s2n Þ and it is assumed to be uncorrelated with observable variables in xj. The after-tax wage rate and virtual income enter the labor supply function by the nonlinear term bln(wj)þg(yj/wj). This specification allows for a backward bending supply curve for some or all individuals if bo0 and go0. The model is well specified in a utility-maximizing sense as long as the Slutsky condition holds, i.e., (bg(yj/wj))/hg W0 (cf. MaCurdy, Green, & Paarsch, 1990). Heterogeneity of preferences, represented by n, tends to generate clusters of observations around the convex kink points and to disperse observations away from nonconvex kink points (see Moffitt, 1986). The empirical data normally show no bunching or dispersion of individuals at or around the kink points, but usually there is a large concentration of observations at h ¼ 0 and at the standard number of hours in a full-time job (37 h weekly in Denmark in 1996) which may reflect different constraints on labor supply or fixed costs of work in second job, as discussed in Section 2. In order to capture optimization errors or measurement errors, we add an additive random error term to the model. Let the observed labor supply, h, be a function of desired hours, h, and an error component, e, so h ¼ hþe, where
36
ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
e Nð0; s2e Þ and Eðn; Þ ¼ 0. Now the problem is that the observed h is neither sufficient to allocate individuals to their correct budget segment nor sufficient to identify their marginal tax rate. Only the information on h reveals this. Since the individuals’ desired segment choice is not directly observable, one has a discrete-data version of an errors-in-variables problem, and the resulting stochastic model specification becomes the following: 8 H0 þ if h^1 þ n H 0 Lower limit > > > > < h^j þ n þ if H j1 oh^j þ n H j Segment j; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k (4) hn ¼ > Hj þ if h^jþ1 þ noH j oh^j þ n Kink j; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k 1 > > > : Hk þ if h^k þ n H k Upper limit This combines the discrete and continuous parts of the choice in an estimable econometric model. The likelihood function becomes Y Y Y L¼ Gðhni ¼ 0Þ gðhni Þ Gðhni ¼ H k Þ (5) i¼I
i¼J
i¼K
where G( ) is the cumulative density function, and g( ), the derivative of G( ) w.r.t. x, dG( )/dx I, the index set for the nonparticipants (h ¼ 0), J, the index set for the individuals with a positive labor supply less than Hk (0ohoHk), and K measures the individuals who work Hk hours or more (hZHk). The exact expression of the density gðhni Þ and the probability Gðhni ¼ 0Þ is given in the appendix. Maximization of the likelihood, L, provides point estimates of the parameters in the labor supply function.12
5. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND MODEL SPECIFICATIONS In order to estimate the Hausman model, a complete specification of the budget constraint is required. For this reason, we will discuss the underlying assumptions which are necessary to construct the empirical budget constraints. The traditional Hausman model relies on the assumption that workers face one exogenously given wage, which is independent of the number of hours supplied. However, the empirical evidence presented in Tables 3 and 4 contradicts this assumption since a substantial part of the individuals are observed to work more than standard hours at overtime or
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
37
second job wages, which often are different from the wage in the main occupation. First, we propose models which follow the ‘‘hours constraints’’ specification (see models I–III below). These models assume (as discussed in Section 2) that labor supply at the main employer may be constrained and that institutional settings will distinguish hours supplied to the main job from overtime hours. Thus, underemployment in the main occupation and institutions may lead to overtime work and dual job holding. Further, these specifications assume that the disutility of work is similar across job types. These assumptions can be applied directly to the Danish case since collective agreements set standard hours to 37 per week and work beyond that at the main employer is considered overtime. Second, in model IV, we explore the ‘‘heterogeneous-job’’ specification by allowing the disutility of work to vary across jobs. In model I, we estimate a ‘‘standard’’ Hausman model where the labor supply equals the sum of hours in main and second job plus overtime hours, but we ignore information on overtime payments and second job wage rates. This ‘‘baseline model’’ corresponds to the definitions of wage rates and working hours in Blomquist (1983) and Graversen (1998) and resembles many labor supply models estimated which have not explicitly focused on overtime work and second job information. In model II, we add information on wages in second job and overtime payments. Thus, we improve the Hausman approach by allowing for a more realistic modeling of the labor supply decision. This will increase the marginal wage rates for most individuals working overtime and for some individuals in second job. Hence, other things being equal, the wage coefficient will increase together with the corresponding wage elasticity. When including information of second job and overtime work, we have to impose a number of assumptions concerning behavior and outside restrictions in order to construct the budget constraint. First, we introduce the assumptions of ‘‘hours constraints’’: individuals supply overtime and second job hours because they are underemployed in main occupation and because institutions require main job hours to be distinguished from overtime hours. The disutility of work is assumed to be similar across jobs. The budget constraint is easy to construct for employees working overtime but not in a second job. The reason is that collective agreements state that all work beyond 37 h per week at the main employer is overtime. Hence, when an employee works more than 37 h and receives an overtime premium, there will be a nonconvex kink at this point. When there is no overtime premium, the last main job segment is extended linearly as in the traditional Hausman model.
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ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
Individuals working multiple jobs allocate most of their time (typically 37 h or more) to one of the jobs and only a few hours to the other (see Table 3). We use this observation to define an employee’s main occupation as the job with most hours. Of course this assumption may be challenged by the few cases where the wage in the second job exceeds the main job wage but often these lucrative second jobs are only available to the individual conditional on holding the main job, i.e., professors working as consultants. Thus, this ordering of jobs seems natural. Most employees who work more than standard hours have either a second job or they work overtime. However, a small group of individuals (about 1% according to Table 2) work both overtime and have a second job. In order to construct the budget constrains for these individuals we need to specify an ordering between these two types of jobs. We assume that overtime hours are preferred to a second job. There are at least two economic arguments supporting this assumption. First, on average overtime wages are empirically much higher than wages in a second job (see Table 4). Second, working in a second job is very likely to have additional fixed costs, i.e., transportation etc. which does not apply to overtime hours because these hours are an extension to the workday at the current employer. Thus, when an individual is observed to work in a second job, it is assumed that the overtime option has been exhausted. Finally, we assume that individuals who are observed to work only in their main job can vary their labor supply as in the traditional Hausman model. If the individual is observed to have only a main job, there are in principle three alternative interpretations: (i) the individual may not have the option to work overtime or cannot find a second job; or (ii) he may have had, but not used, the option to become compensated for overtime work or the option of a second job where the wage exceeds the compensation in the main job; or (iii) he had the option of overtime work or second job, but at a salary which is too low. In case of (i), there may be institutional regulations preventing him from varying hours freely. In our model, this is captured by the error term e. If (ii) applies, the budget constraint will have a nonconvex kink at observed hours. As a nonconvex kink cannot be an optimal allocation for the individual, it must be the case that the option of a higher compensation for overtime work or in a second job does not exist. Finally, in case (iii) the option of overtime payment at a lower wage level than in the main job can be ruled out because of institutional settings, while we cannot rule out the possibility of a convex kink because of the option of a second job with a lower net wage than in the main job.
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
39
In model III, we introduce a more flexible specification related to the nonconvexity at H0 due to the inclusion of UI benefits and social welfare. The nonconvexity forces the indifference curve to become very flat for individuals who are observed to work for instance in a fulltime job, in spite of the fact that their economic gain is quite low compared to being unemployed and receiving UI benefits, i.e., point [H0,y0] in Fig. 1. This reflects that the economic disincentive problems are quite large in Denmark, see Pedersen and Smith (2002) who show that about 10% of all employees have a lower disposable income when working full time compared to being on UI benefits. In addition, the state as nonparticipant/voluntarily unemployed may imply a stigmatization effect for individuals who are unemployed and receive social welfare or UI benefits. The stigmatization may reflect that there is a negative effect on individual utility from being on public income support because of lower ‘‘reputation among neighbors’’ etc. Or, it may reflect that the individual is aware that being on public income support is a negative signal for a potential future employer. The stigmatization effect may also capture effects from administrative rules concerning availability for the labor market etc. In order to take these potential effects into account, we propose a more flexible specification where an indicator variable is added to the right-hand side of Eq. (3) for individuals who are observed working.13 Finally, in model IV we extend the model by including a ‘‘heterogeneousjob’’ effect. The disutility of work at the main employer may be different from the disutility of work in a second job. We implement this by adding a second indicator on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) for individuals who are observed to work in a second job. The second job dummy is intended to capture the discontinuity effects due to missing information on fixed costs (time and money costs of transportation and equipment) in second job as well as nonpecuniary benefits. We expect that adding this flexibility into the model may decrease the wage elasticity when the nonpecuniary benefits dominate since the number of hours and income in the second job in this case is less important and more likely a participation decision, i.e., a career or income improving action. In sum, four versions of the labor supply model are estimated in order to evaluate how sensitive the estimation results are with respect to additional information on overtime payments and second job wage rates and the assumptions concerning the budget constraint. The strategy is successively to add more survey information and allow the model to be increasingly flexible.
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ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 6.1. The Hausman Model The empirical results are presented separately for men and women in Tables 5a and 5b. The key finding is that the detailed information on overtime payments and second job wages and the added flexibility of the Hausman model specification are important. First, the estimated wage and income coefficients are affected significantly. Second, the associated elasticities are Table 5a.
Estimation of Labor Supply Functions (Men 1996). I Baseline
0.736 (0.143) ln(wnet)/10 (y/wnet)/100 0.079 (0.029) Controls for Yes demographic variables Stigma effect – Second job dummy – se (measurement, 0.090 (0.002) optimization) su (heterogeneity) 0.055 (0.003) log(L) 904 Number of observations 1,150 Elasticitiesa eucw_net ecw_net ey
0.277 (0.009) 0.358 (0.010) 0.078 (0.002)
II Information on Overtime and Second Job 1.281 (0.142) 0.097 (0.015) Yes
III IIþStigma Effect
IV IIIþSecond Job Dummy
0.333 (0.080) 0.169 (0.039) 0.016 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) Yes Yes
– – 0.097 (0.001)
0.329 (0.009) – 0.046 (0.002)
0.341 (0.008) 0.071 (0.011) 0.024 (0.001)
0.059 (0.003) 877 1,150
0.079 (0.003) 1,034 1,150
0.083 (0.002 1,195 1,150
0.413 (0.022) 0.496 (0.022) 0.143 (0.021)
0.103 (0.065) 0.052 (0.034) 0.119 (0.063) 0.053 (0.034) 0.018 (0.060) 0.006 (0.023)
Note: The elasticities are calculated from the following expressions and evaluated at average sample values:
eucw
a
! xy y 1 ; ey ¼ F pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi b g w h s22 þ s2n ! xy y wh ; and ecw ¼ eucw ey : ¼ F pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi g 2 2 wh y s2 þ sn
Dependent variable is weekly hours. Standard deviations in parentheses.
41
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation Table 5b.
ln(wnet)/10 (y/wnet)/100 Controls for demographic variables Stigma effect Second job dummy se (measurement, optimization) su (heterogeneity) log(L) Number of observations Elasticitiesa eucw_net ecw_net ey
Estimation of Labor Supply Functions (Women 1996). I Baseline
II Information on Overtime and Second Job
III IIþStigma Effect
IV IIIþSecond Job Dummy
1.111 (0.245) 0.022 (0.014) Yes
3.326 (0.175) 0.220 (0.041) Yes
0.363 (0.130) 0.032 (0.022) Yes
0.488 (0.093) 0.004 (0.002) Yes
– – 0.115 (0.002)
– – 0.065 (0.001)
0.071 (0.006) – 0.032 (0.022)
0.074 (0.002) 0.003 (0.025) 0.030 (0.001)
0.059 (0.005) 569 1,291
0.209 (0.007) 445 1,291
0.115 (0.003) 1,247 1,291
0.117 (0.003) 1,247 1,291
0.360 (0.005) 0.381 (0.005) 0.040 (0.001)
0.760 (0.019) 0.907 (0.022) 0.137 (0.005)
0.137 (0.034) 0.169 (0.034) 0.030 (0.025)
0.148 (0.038) 0.152 (0.038) 0.007 (0.053)
Note: See Note in Table 5a. a Dependent variable is weekly hours. Standard deviations in parentheses.
altered substantially. The estimated wage effect is significantly positive in all models while the income effect is negative, but often insignificant. In the baseline model, model I, the estimated average wage elasticity (uncompensated elasticity of substitution) is 0.277 for men and 0.360 for women, while the average income elasticity is estimated to be 0.078 for men and 0.040 for women.14 This is in accordance with earlier Danish studies using the Hausman approach (see, for instance, Graversen, 1998). As expected from the literature, adding information on overtime and second job (model II) implies that the estimated wage elasticities increase considerably. The average uncompensated wage elasticity increases to 0.413 for men and 0.760 for women and the numerical size of the income effect also rises. However, the numerically larger elasticities are reduced when we extend the traditional Hausman approach and allow for a more flexible treatment of nonconvexities in the budget constraint. In model III, we add the stigma effect which is intended to capture negative stigma or signaling effects from receiving public income transfers instead of income from work. This reduces the numerical size of the estimated coefficients and elasticities considerably.
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Adding the second job dummy (model IV) which controls for nonconvexities due to unobserved fixed costs or nonpecuniary benefits of second job reduces the size of the estimated coefficients for men even further. The estimated stigma effect in model III is high and it is quite stable when adding the second job dummy in model IV. Thus, the introduction of the flexibility terms into a traditional Hausman model seems to have large effects on the estimated coefficients and elasticities. For women, nonconvexity due to stigma effects etc. are important, while nonconvexities due to second job only play a minor role. Both the stigma and the estimated second job effects are significant for men. This clearly indicates a career effect among men, but the effect seems to be absent among women. The more flexible specification used here compared to the traditional Hausman approach drives the estimated average wage elasticity for men from 0.41 to 0.10 (model III) and 0. 05 (model IV), while for women the average wage elasticity drops from 0.76 to 0.14 (model III) and 0.15 (model IV). The average estimated income elasticities also reduce to an average close to 0. The size of the average elasticities found in the final model IV is lower than the results found in previous Danish studies using a Hausman approach (see Graversen, 1998). In a recent study using a nonparametric Hausman approach, Blomquist, Eklo¨f, and Newey (2001) have found wage elasticities for Swedish men of about 0.08 which is lower than earlier Swedish studies based on parametric Hausman models (see Blomquist & Hansson-Brusewitz, 1990). In general, the elasticities estimated from model IV are positioned at the lower end of the scale compared to estimates from other studies using the Hausman method (see Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999, for a survey). The variance of both the measurement error and the heterogeneity error is significant in all specifications for both men and women except model III for women. Hence, the inclusion of the two error terms seems to be of importance. The size of the variance of the measurement and optimization error is approximately the double of the heterogeneity error variance in the baseline model I but it decreases the more information on overtime work and second job that is included in the models II, III, and IV, i.e., the more flexible the estimated model becomes.
6.2. Alternative Model Specifications One question of particular interest is if the substantial variation in the parameters due to the inclusion of information on overtime and second job
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
43
is unique to the Hausman model or if it can be observed in other model specifications as well. We explore this by estimating a set of linear regressions. In the first two models we only use wage information from the main job. Thus, we regress weekly hours on income and the wage in the main occupation (the marginal main job wage) ignoring overtime pay and second job wages. In the first model we use the gross wage, and in the second model the net wage. In the third model we include information on overtime and second job, which implies that the marginal net wage may include an overtime premium or be the net wage in a second job. There are other ways to use the additional information and the example provided here is only intended to illustrate the point that the estimated labor supply effects in a linear model are altered significantly when information on wages in overtime and second job is included. We present the results from the linear regressions in Table 6. In the first model we find that the coefficient on the gross main job wage is positive and significant and the coefficient on income is negative for both men and women. Using the net wage instead changes the sign on the wage and reduces the coefficient on income to zero. Including information on overtime and second job alters the coefficient on the net wage significantly but recovers the negative significant sign on income. This implies that both the uncompensated wage elasticity of hours of work and the income effect are negative which resembles the early literature on labor supply reviewed by Pencavel (1986). Important in this context is that the presumption that the point estimates in the linear model are significantly altered when introducing information on overtime and second jobs is supported by the data. Hence, the result found in the Hausman model also applies to the linear framework. Another important question is if the large variation in parameters is driven by the nonconvexities following the introduction of information on overtime and second job. One way to address this issue is to follow the work by MaCurdy et al. (1990) and ‘‘convexify’’ the budget set. Our model IV shows only minor deviations from the original results when the budget constraint is convexified as can be seen when the last two columns of Table 6 are compared with the results of Table 5. This suggests that it is not the treatment of the nonconvexity, i.e., how the applied algorithm allocates individuals to the optimal segment, but instead the introduction of additional information which is driving the results presented in this paper. In the next section we analyze the effect of potential tax reforms using the results obtained from model specification IV since this model represents the most flexible specification and the highest likelihood value is obtained in this model.
Yes
Men
Women
Net wage when information on overtime and second job is included
Yes
Yes
0.000 (0.000) Yes
Yes
Yes
0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000)
1.710 (0.303) 0.049 (0.002) 0.062 (0.002) 0.020 (0.001) 0.044 (0.002)
0.115 (0.043) 0.194 (0.032)
1.194 (0.243)
Note: Dependent variable is weekly hours. Standard deviations in parentheses.
w/10 ln(wnet)/10 y/100 (y/wnet)/100 Controls for demographic variables Stigma effect Second job dummy se (measurement, optimization) su (heterogeneity)
Women
Men
Men
Women
Net main job wage
Linear Regression Models
Alternative Model Specifications.
Gross main job wage
Table 6.
0.372 (0.131)
Women
0.071 (0.006) 0.001 (0.026) 0.032 (0.001) 0.115 (0.003)
0.137 (0.006) 0.066 (0.015) 0.033 (0.003) 0.088 (0.003)
0.001 (0.001) 0.032 (0.022) Yes Yes
0.190 (0.047)
Men
‘‘Convexified’’
Hausman Models Using Specification IV
44 ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
45
7. LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSES TO TAX REFORMS In an analysis of the potential labor supply responses to a tax reform it is important to know the distribution of the substitution and income elasticities because it is the distributions and not the average elasticities which determine the degree of self-financing of a given tax reform. For this reason the sample distributions of the substitution and income elasticities for the preferred model (model IV) are shown in Fig. 2. The distributions of the uncompensated substitution elasticities are unimodal and fairly symmetric around the mean for both men and women, but with long tails and a higher mean for women. The distributions of income elasticities are slightly bimodal and more compressed for men than women (note that the scales on the axes are different for the distributions of income and substitution effects). Four potential tax reforms are simulated. Reform A, B, and C (described below) each have an initial effect on public revenue corresponding to 1% of GDP, whereas reform D only affects initial revenue by 0.5%. The reforms are chosen such that they will target different income brackets. The micro simulations are partial in the sense that they do not include general equilibrium effects and thus, the results from these simulations should be interpreted with care. Further, they are not modeled as budget-neutral reforms.15 In reform A, the upper income tax bracket (the ‘‘top tax’’) is removed (see Fig. 3). For the year 1996, this meant that the highest marginal tax rates were reduced from 65.8% to 51.8% for those with the highest incomes, about 20% of the sample according to Table 1. In reform B, the marginal tax rates in segments three and four are reduced by about 4.5 percentage points (this corresponds to a removal of the so-called medium tax which is relevant for about 75% of the sample, according to Table 1). Reform C reduces the marginal tax rates for tax payers by 1.8 percentage points in segments 2–4, which are relevant for more than 98% of the sample, according to Table 1. Compared to reform A, reform B and especially reform C imply much more moderate reductions of the highest tax rates, but for a much larger proportion of the population. In reform D, the kink point between the third and fourth tax segment is moved upwards, i.e., fewer tax payers face the highest marginal tax rate of 65.8%. The coefficients from the final model IV in Tables 5a and 5b are used in the prediction of labor supply responses.16 The revenue effects of the four tax reforms are described by the rate of self-financing, i.e., the tax revenue from increased labor supply as a percentage of the initial revenue loss due to the reform (see Table 7). These revenues differ substantially across the four reforms due to the large
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ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL. Men
Women
60
40
20
0 -.05
-.1
0
.05
E_y Men
Women
30
20
10
0 0
.1
.2
.3
E_ucw
Fig. 2.
Kernels for the Simulated Income and Substitution Elasticities.
47
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation t%
65.8 51.8 47.2
7.0 income Baseline system Reform A
Reform D
Reform B Reform C
Fig. 3. The Danish Income Tax System in 1996 (‘‘Baseline’’ System and Alternative Tax Reforms). Note: It is assumed that the person lives in a municipality with ‘‘average’’ tax rates, and that he does not have any positive or negative capital income or other income and no allowances beside the zero-rated allowance for local and state taxes.
Table 7.
Public-Sector Revenue Effects Based on Alternative Hypothetical Tax Reformsa. Public-Sector Revenue, Rate of Self-Financing
Reform A: Remove fourth segment (highest marginal tax rates reduced from 65.8% to 51.8%) Reform B: Remove third tax segment and lower marginal tax rates in highest tax segment (reduction of highest marginal tax rates by about 4.5% points in third and fourth tax segments) Reform C: Reduce marginal tax rate in all tax segments by 1.8% Reform D: Shift third tax kink upwards (fewer pay the highest marginal tax rates) a
0.21 0.39
0.12 0.58
Reforms A, B, and C have almost the same initial revenue effect (excl. labor supply effects) on public budgets, while the initial revenue effect of reform D is only about half of this effect. Simulations are based on the results from model IV.
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ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
Table 8. Predicted Labor Supply and Public-Sector Revenue Effects Based on Alternative Model Specifications: Tax Reform A: Highest Marginal Tax Rates Reduced to 51.8% on Average.
Public-sector revenue, rate of self-financing
I Baseline
II Information on Overtime and Second Job
III IIþStigma Effect
IV IIIþSecond Job Dummy
0.65
1.90
0.46
0.21
2.2 0.9
0.7 0.7
Labor supply effects (relative change of weekly hours) (%) Men 2.2 7.0 Women 3.6 6.3
variation in the labor supply responses. The proposed reforms have a rate of self-financing ranging from 12% for reform C to 58% for reform D. A reduction of the marginal tax rates for virtually all tax payers (reform C) will be fairly expensive for the public finances, while the dynamic effects from a moderate reform (D) which reduces the number of tax payers in the highest tax bracket will be relatively large and make this type of reform closer to being self-financing. The predicted effects of the proposed tax reforms are known to be sensitive to the underlying econometric specification (see, for instance, Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999). In order to analyze more closely the consequences for the results presented above, we have calculated the predicted labor supply responses and the rate of self-financing for reform A based on the four econometric specifications presented in Tables 5a and 5b (see Table 8).17 The results show that the rates of self-financing are highly sensitive to the specification of the model. In general, the inclusion of detailed information on hours and wages in overtime work and second job and the added flexibility to the model reduce the labor supply effects of the tax reform compared to the results from a traditional labor supply ‘‘Hausman model.’’
8. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have estimated labor supply functions for men and women in Denmark using a piecewise linear Hausman model to account for nonlinear taxes. We compare the estimated labor supply responses based on budget constraints reflecting detailed information on overtime work and second job with the traditional approach where information on overtime and second job
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
49
wages is not taken into account. Our proposed extensions of the Hausman model give a more flexible and realistic modeling of the actual labor supply decision. A natural further extension would be to allow for joint household or family decisions which are not modeled explicitly in the present study. Our main findings are that the results are highly sensitive to the specification and the flexibility of the labor supply model. The estimated average wage elasticities for men vary from 0.41 to 0.05 depending on specification and for women from 0.76 to 0.14. The variation in estimated income elasticities is also relatively large. As found in previous studies the information on overtime payment and second job wages increases the numerical values of the estimated elasticities relative to a standard model which ignores this information. However, allowing for a more flexible treatment of the nonconvexities in the model specification, the numerical values of the estimated elasticities are reduced. We analyze four hypothetical tax reforms, each targeting different income brackets. Since the estimated labor supply elasticities are fairly moderate, the tax cuts proposed are not fully self-financing through dynamic labor supply effects. The reform, closest to self-financing reduces the marginal tax rate for median income earners. The two reforms reducing the marginal tax rates for high-income earners or reducing the marginal tax rates for low-income earners (and hence for high-income earners too) are relatively expensive. One of the main lessons from this study is that when analyzing the effects of tax reforms based on a Hausman-model approach, it is important to allow for sufficient flexibility at the nonconvex part of the budget constraints and to have as much information on the budget constraints as possible, i.e., information on overtime and second job wages. For the Danish tax system analyzed in this paper, the results indicate that strictly using a traditional Hausman approach may result in much too large estimates of the labor supply effects and hence incorrect predictions of the degrees of self-financing of tax reforms.
NOTES 1. See, for example, Aaberge, Colombino, and Strom (1999), van Soest (1995), and Hart (2004) for a discussion of the free choice of work hours or rather work packages, and Paxson and Sicherman (1996) and Frederiksen, Graversen, and Smith (2005) for a discussion of the dual job holder characteristics. 2. Contrary to papers like Blomquist (1983) and Flood and MaCurdy (1992), our male sample is not restricted to workers with positive hours, but we allow the small group of nonworking men to influence the results.
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ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
3. The ambition in this study is to analyze the sensitivity of the Hausman approach to more flexible specifications and additional information on overtime and second job. An alternative approach to the Hausman model is a choice-based model such as the random utility model (see for instance Aaberge, Colombino, & Strom, 2004). Choice-based models may provide complementary information on how variation in relative wages across different types of jobs affects the composition of labor supply. 4. See Averett and Hotchkiss (1997) for a discussion of the exogeneity of the budget constraint in the context of the part-time/full-time labor supply decision. 5. A third approach is to see dual job holding as an insurance against unemployment. There are two reasons why we ignore this hypothesis. First, the existing empirical evidence based on a study of the British Household Panel provides only weak evidence for the hypothesis (see Bell, Hart, & Wright, 1997). Second, the high unemployment benefits level in Denmark suggests that the insurance argument is unlikely to be the main motivation for dual job holding in the present study. 6. The Danish UI-benefit rules allow a person to insure either as a part-time worker or as a full-time worker. If insured as a part-time worker, the insurance premium and the UI benefits in case of unemployment are lower than if full-time insured. 7. It may be criticized that the time dimension is not the same for overtime work, second job, and work in main occupation. We prefer to use ‘‘the normal work hours’’ as a measure of the labor supply since it gives a smoothed measure of the desired labor supply. Unfortunately, this information for overtime hours is not available in our data set. Instead, we use the ‘‘best’’ approximation available. 8. The incidence of overtime in Denmark seems to be considerably lower than in the UK where overtime incidence (for males) is found to be about 40% (see Kalwij & Gregory, 2005). For the US, Trejo (1993) finds that the dual-job-holding rate is about 6% for both men and women in the 1991 CPS sample which is based on observations in a given survey week. When using annual data, the dual-job-holding rate is considerably higher, 21% for men and 12% for women. Similarly, Paxson and Sicherman (1996) find rates on 20% and 12% based on US PSID data for 1976–1989 for men and women separately. Since our data are based on a question on ‘‘normal weekly hours in second job,’’ the larger figures are probably the relevant figures to compare. 9. Three selectivity-corrected wage regressions are used in this study: main occupation, overtime work, and second job. Similar to Blomquist and HanssonBrusewitz (1990), we estimate a wage rate function on the subgroup with observable wage rates, taking account of sample selection bias by a Heckman procedure. Identification is secured by including additional survey and register information on demographic variables etc. (child variables, information on marriage or cohabitation, and ownership of house) in the participation relation, and information on tenure, occupational level, and regional variables in the wage function. Subsequently, the regression results are used to predict wages. All wage functions are available from the authors upon request. 10. Aaberge et al. (1999, 2004) also find low cross-substitution effects among middle class and especially among rich households. Similarly, van Soest (1995) finds low cross-substitution effects and low family income effects on Dutch data. Thus, we do not expect that this shortcoming of our approach will seriously bias the results.
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation
51
11. As an alternative, we have used the linear labor supply specification, which was also used in Blomquist (1983) and Flood and MaCurdy (1992). It is linear in both wage rates and nonlabor income, and the direct utility function has an explicit closed form. Contrary to the results found in other studies, we do not find, that the results (measured by average elasticities for different demographic groups) are very sensitive to choice of specification (see Sackle´n, 1996). Since the nonlinear specification is the more flexible and since it performs statistically slightly better, we present the results from the nonlinear specification. 12. The sample used is a nonrepresentative sample where unemployed persons are over-sampled. Therefore, the likelihood function in Eq. (5) is weighted by the appropriate weights. 13. Another way to obtain something similar would be to exclude the nonworking individuals. 14. The elasticities are calculated for each individual in the sample according to Note below Table 5a. The average of theses elasticities are presented in the text and tables. 15. It should be mentioned that the analysis is also partial in the sense that we do not include dynamic effects, i.e., potential effects on consumption and indirect tax revenues. If these effects are included, the rate of self-financing of the tax reforms analyzed above will increase, since disposal income will increase for all income groups. The potential effects of taxation on the wage formation process are not included either (see for instance Bingley & Lanot, 2002). 16. The labor supply response to a given tax reform is determined as the difference in predicted pre- and postreform labor supply. 17. We only present the results from reform A since it is exactly the same pattern of variation which appears for all the reforms analyzed in Table 7.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The data set used in this study was created and financed by the Rockwool Research Foundation which has also partly financed the research project. The presented analysis is solely the authors’ responsibility.
REFERENCES Aaberge, R., Colombino, U., & Strom, S. (1999). Labour supply in Italy: An empirical analysis of joint household decisions, with taxes and quantity constraints. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 14, 403–422. Aaberge, R., Colombino, U., & Strom, S. (2004). Do more equal slices shrink the cake? An empirical investigation of tax-transfer reform proposals in Italy. Journal of Population Economics, 17(4), 767–785. Arrufat, J., & Zabalza, A. (1986). Female labor supply with taxation, random preferences, and optimization errors. Econometrica, 54(1), 47–63.
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Ashworth, J., & Ulph, D. (1981). Endogeneity I, estimating labor supply with piecewise linear budget constraints. In: C. V. Brown (Ed.), Taxation and labor supply. London, UK: Allen & Unwin Chap 6. Averett, S. L., & Hotchkiss, J. L. (1997). Female labour supply with a discontinuous, nonconvex budget constraint: incorporation of a part-time/full-time wage differential. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 461–470. Bell, D., Hart, R. A., & Wright, R. E. (1997). Multiple job holding as a ‘hedge’ against unemployment. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1626. Bingley, P., & Lanot, G. (2002). The incidence of income tax on wages and labour supply. Journal of Public Economics, 83(2), 173–194. Bingley, P., & Walker, I. (2001). Household unemployment and the labour supply of married women. Economica, 68(270), 157–185. Blomquist, S. (1983). The effect of income taxation on the labor supply of married men in Sweden. Journal of Public Economics, 22, 169–197. Blomquist, S., Eklo¨f, M., & Newey, W. (2001). Tax reform evaluation using non-parametric methods: Sweden 1980–1991. Journal of Public Economics, 79, 543–568. Blomquist, S., & Hansson-Brusewitz, U. (1990). The effect of taxes on male and female labour supply in Sweden. Journal of Human Resources, 25, 317–357. Blundell, R., & MaCurdy, T. (1999). Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches (Chap. 27). In: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds), Handbook of labor economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Conway, K. S., & Kimmel, J. (1998). Male labor supply estimates and the decision to moonlight. Labour Economics, 5, 135–166. Duncan, A. (1993). Labour supply decisions and non-convex budget sets: The case of National Insurance Contribution in the UK. In: A. Heimler & D. Meulders (Eds), Empirical approaches to fiscal policy. London: Chapman and Hall. Euwals, R., & van Soest, A. (1999). Desired and actual labour supply of unmarried men and women in the Netherlands. Labour Economics, 6(1), 95–118. Flood, L., & MaCurdy, T. (1992). Work disincentive effects of taxes: An empirical analysis of Swedish men. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 37, 239–278. Frederiksen, A., Graversen, E., & Smith, N. (2001). Overtime work, dual job holding and taxation. IZA Discussion Paper No. 323, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Bonn. Frederiksen, A., Graversen, E., & Smith, N. (2005). Tax evasion and work in the underground sector. Labour Economics, 12(5), 613–628. Graversen, E. (1998). Labour supply and work incentives. PhD thesis 1998–2002, University of Aarhus, Aarhus. Hart, R. A. (2004). The economics of overtime working. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Heineck, G. & Schwarze, J. (2004). Fly me to the moon: The determinants of secondary jobholding in Germany and the UK. IZA Discussion Paper. No 1358. Kalwij, A. S., & Gregory, M. (2005). Overtime hours in Great Britain over the period 1975–1999: A panel data analysis. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 168(1), 207–231. MaCurdy, T., Green, D., & Paarsch, H. (1990). Assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply. The Journal of Human Resources, XXV(3), 415–490. Moffitt, R. (1986). The econometrics of piecewise-linear budget constraints. A survey and exposition of the maximum likelihood method. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 4(2), 317–328.
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OECD. (1996). Employment outlook, Paris Paxson, C. H., & Sicherman, N. (1996). The dynamics of dual job holding and job mobility. Journal of Labor Economics, 14(3), 357–393. Pedersen, P., & Smith, N. (2002). Unemployment traps and financial disincentives to work. European Sociological Review, 18(3), 271–288. Pencavel, J. (1986). Labor supply of men: A survey (Chap. 1). In: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (Eds), Handbook of labor economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Sackle´n, H. (1996). Essays on Empirical Models of Labor Supply: Economic Studies (Vol. 27). Uppsala: Department of Economics, Uppsala University. Shisko, R., & Rostker, B. (1976). The economics of multiple job holding. American Economic Review, 66(3), 298–308. Smith, N. (1995). A panel study of labour supply and taxes in Denmark. Applied Economics, 27, 419–429. Smith, N. (1998). Arbejde, incitamenter og ledighed (In Danish). Aarhus: The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit and Aarhus Universitetsforlag. Smith, N., Dex, S., Vlasblom, J. D., & Callan, T. (2003). The effects of taxation on married women’s labour supply across four countries. Oxford Economic Papers, 55(3), 417–439. Trejo, S. J. (1993). Overtime pay, overtime hours, and labor unions. Journal of Labor Economics, 11(2), 253–278. van Soest, A. (1995). Structural models of family labor supply: A discrete choice approach. The Journal of Human Resources, 30(1), 63–88.
APPENDIX The Likelihood Function The probability Gðhni ¼ 0Þ can be written as Gðhni ¼ 0Þ Z H 0i Z ¼
H 0i h^li
j1 ½hni H 0 ; vi dvi di
1 1 k Z h^ji X
Z
H ji h^ji
þ
j¼1
þ
1
k1 Z X j¼1
Z
H ðj1Þi h^ji
H ji
Z
H ki
Z
Segment j; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k
j1 ½hni H ji ; vi dvi di
Kink j; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k 1
1
þ 1
j2 ½hni h^ji ; vi dvi di
H ji h^ðjþ1Þi
H ji h^ji
1
Lower limit
H ki h^ki
j1 ½hni H k ; vi dvi di
Upper limit
54
ANDERS FREDERIKSEN ET AL.
and the density gðhni Þ can be written as Z
n
gðhi Þ ¼ þ
H 0i h^0i
j¼1
þ
n
j1 ½hi 1 k Z H ji h^ji X H ðj1Þi h^ji
k1 Z X j¼1 Z 1
H 0 ; vi dvi
Lower limit
j2 ½hni h^ji ; vi dvi
Segment j; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k
H ji h^ðjþ1Þi
H ji h^ji
þ H ki h^ki
j1 ½hni H ji ; vi dvi
j1 ½hni H k ; vi dvi
Kink j; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k 1
Upper limit
There are no individuals with hni ¼ H k . Hence, Gðhni ¼ H k Þ is not in the likelihood we maximize. Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) give expressions for both G( ) and g( ). F1( , ) and F2( , ) are bivariate normal density functions of (e,v) and (eþv,v) with means, variances, and covariance (0; 0; s2e ; s2v ; 0) and (0; 0; s2e þ s2v ; s2v ; s2v ), respectively. There is no a priori reason to expect the heterogeneity and measurement errors to be correlated. Hence, we assume no correlation as almost all other studies in the area (cf. Moffitt, 1986).
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics. Variable
Men Mean
Weekly labor supply, given participation Main occupation 37.9 Overtime work 2.1 Second job 1.0 Hourly gross wage rate, DKK Main occupation 133.7 Overtime work 170.1 Second job 140.5 Weekly nonlabor income, 2,725.4 DKK Marginal tax rate (%) 54.7 Age 39.1 Owner of house (0/1) 0.64
Women
Standard deviation
Mean Standard deviation
5.0 5.1 4.3
34.5 1.0 0.4
6.5 2.8 2.2
53.8 53.3 110.6 1,401.3
107.0 148.6 135.9 3,170.3
26.9 66.1 126.9 1,439.9
13.1 11.1 0.49
48.0 39.1 0.69
15.2 10.4 0.46
55
Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding, and Taxation Table A1. (Continued ) Variable
Men Mean
Region Copenhagen Major cities Country Children 0–2 years (0/1) Children 3–6 years (0/1) Number of children Civil state Single Married Cohabiting Number of observations
Women
Standard deviation
Mean Standard deviation
0.30 0.34 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.75
0.46 0.48 0.49 0.34 0.33 0.96
0.32 0.32 0.36 0.15 0.11 0.85
0.46 0.46 0.47 0.35 0.32 0.95
0.24 0.58 0.18
0.42 0.50 0.39 1,150
0.22 0.62 0.16
0.41 0.48 0.37 1,291
TRANSITIONS BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND LOW PAY Lorenzo Cappellari and Stephen P. Jenkins ABSTRACT We model transitions between unemployment, low-paid and high-paid employment by British men using a first order Markov model with endogenous switching that also takes into account the endogeneity of initial conditions, selection into employment, and sample attrition. Our estimates indicate that all three selectivity issues are non-ignorable. We demonstrate several interrelationships between the dynamics of (un)employment and low-paid work between one year and the next, represented by forms of (cross-)state dependence. Controlling for heterogeneity, the probability of a man having a low-paid job in one year depends not only whether he had a job a year before but also whether that job was low paid. The probability of his being employed at all depends on whether he had a job the previous year.
1. INTRODUCTION There is a great interest in Britain in the extent to which individuals who are employed in a low-paid job are more likely to become unemployed than high-paid individuals are, and the extent to which those who are currently unemployed are more likely to become low-paid employees rather than
Work, Earnings and other Aspects of the Employment Relation Research in Labor Economics, Volume 28, 57–79 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0147-9121/doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(08)28003-9
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LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
high-paid ones when they get a job. In this paper, we provide new evidence about these transitions using a first order Markov model for multi-state labour market dynamics. The emphasis of recent British labour market policy has been on getting unemployed people into a job. These jobs have often been low-paid ones (albeit supplemented with in-work benefits such as the Working Families Tax Credit). If there is a strong ‘low pay no pay cycle’, then most of these jobs do not last very long, and there is churning between the ranks of the unemployed and the low paid. Put another way, there is a form of labour market segmentation, with a division between a primary sector (high-paid jobs) and a secondary sector comprising the individuals churning between unemployment and low-paid employment with little chance of climbing up the pay ladder. We shed light on these issues by modelling the annual rates of transition between being high-paid, low-paid, or being unemployed. A more specific question addressed is whether the individuals who remain in the secondary sector do so because they have poor educational qualifications and other disadvantageous characteristics, or because of the experience of unemployment or of low-paid employment itself. With regard to the latter (state dependence), we are also concerned to explore cross-state effects; whether for example, the chances of unemployment depend not only on past unemployment but also experience of low-paid employment (often work of generally poor ‘quality’). Although there has been much recent research for Britain about earnings mobility on the one hand, and unemployment dynamics on the other hand – see for example Stewart and Swaffield (1999) about the former, and Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) about the latter – the interrelationships between the dynamics of low-paid employment and unemployment have received less attention. Stewart (2007) modelled the probabilities of unemployment and low pay, using dynamic random effects probit regressions for each process controlling for endogenous initial conditions. Using pooled transition data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) waves 1–6, he found that the chances of becoming low paid were significantly more likely for unemployed individuals than for high-paid employees and, among employed individuals, the chances of entering unemployment were larger for individuals who had low-paid rather than high-paid jobs. There was also evidence that low pay acted as a conduit to repeat unemployment: unemployed people who found a low-paid job were more likely to fall back into unemployment than those who had found a high-paid job. In this paper we provide new evidence about labour market transitions for British men. Using BHPS data, we model annual transitions between unemployment and low- and high-paid employment using a first order
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
59
Markov model that allows for interrelationships between the dynamics of low pay and unemployment in a novel manner. In addition, we take account of three potentially endogenous selection processes: initial conditions in lowpaid employment, selection into employment, and panel attrition. Low-pay dynamics have also been modelled using random effects dynamic panel models (cf. Stewart, 2007). In these models, estimation is based on a wave-by-wave sequence of observations starting at the first panel wave, with each followed until panel drop-out, so that individuals joining the panel subsequently are not included, and nor are individuals who return to the panel after one or more non-response waves – this excludes a relatively large number of cases. By contrast, our approach includes panel joiners and those with incomplete panel participation patterns. Panel attrition is typically not modelled in applications of the random effects dynamic panel model (Arulampalam et al., 2000; Stewart, 2007), whereas we model it explicitly. Our approach also differs by allowing regressors to have different impacts on the outcome variable depending upon outcomes in the previous period (endogenous switching). Our results suggest that all three potential sources of endogeneity (initial conditions, selection, attrition) are non-ignorable when estimating rates of transition between unemployment and low- and high-paid jobs. Put another way, estimates of transition probabilities based on models that do not account for these phenomena yield biased estimates. Controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity, we find some evidence of labour market ‘scarring’ effects, but they operate across labour market states as well as within them. For example, the probability of a man having a low-paid job in one year depends not only whether he had a job a year before but also whether that job was low paid. The probability of his being employed at all depends on whether he had a job the previous year.
2. DATA AND OVERALL PATTERNS OF TRANSITIONS BETWEEN LABOUR MARKET STATES Transition rates between labour market states were studied using data from waves 1 to 10 (survey years 1991–2000) of the BHPS.1 We consider transitions between states measured at consecutive annual interviews, call these year t and t1, using a sample that pools transitions (as did Stewart & Swaffield, 1999). The focus is on men in order to avoid addressing issues of endogenous female labour supply. We analyse the experience of men who were aged 16–64 years in year t1 who were either unemployed or employees, and not full-time students. Following Arulampalam et al. (2000)
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and Stewart (2007), we do not model the endogeneity of being economically active or of self-employment. We also exclude from the estimation sample, the 4.7% of cases that were characterised as employees but who did not report valid earnings. A man was defined to be unemployed if he was not working and had been looking for a job during the four weeks prior to the interview. The low pay threshold was defined as 60% of median hourly earnings, in August 2000 prices. Table 1 reports the raw transition rates for our sample.2 The table shows, for example, that the chances of being low paid in one year were four times greater for those who were unemployed rather than high-paid the previous year. On the other hand, the probability of being unemployed in one year was three times more likely among those who were low-paid rather than high-paid in the previous year. Of those who left unemployment, 37% ( ¼ 17.8/(17.8þ29.35)) got a low paid job, which is almost three times the cross-sectional low pay probability (13% in our sample). Overall, the evidence suggests that there is substantial churning between unemployment and low-paid employment. There also appears to be persistence in the experience of low paid work and unemployment. Among those unemployed in year t1, the probability of unemployment in year t was 53%, compared to 6.5% of those who were low-paid and less than 2% for those high-paid. Similarly, the probability of having a low paid job in year t was 52% for those who were low-paid at year t1, but 18% for those who were unemployed, and only 4% for those who were high-paid. Together the evidence of churning and of persistence indicates a strong association between a man’s labour market state this year
Table 1.
Transition Rates between Labour Market States for British Men.
Year t–1 State
Unemployed Low-paid employment High-paid employment
Year t State Unemployed (%)
Low-paid employment (%)
High-paid employment (%)
Dropped out of sample (%)
52.85 (31.91) 6.51 (5.11) 1.95 (1.69)
17.80 (10.74) 51.87 (40.67) 4.14 (3.60)
29.35 (17.72) 41.61 (32.62) 93.91 (81.53)
(39.63) (21.60) (13.18)
Notes: Adult men aged 16–64 years, excluding full-time students and those who were selfemployed. Transitions pooled from British Household Panel Survey, waves 1–10. Numbers in parentheses are transition rates for the case in which sample dropout in included as a fourth destination state. Sample size ¼ 18,372 (22,081). The low-pay threshold is 60% of median contemporary hourly earnings.
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
61
and his state in the previous year. The extent to which such ‘aggregate state dependence’ is due to (observed or unobserved) heterogeneity or to ‘genuine state dependence’ (labour market scarring) is an issue that we address below. Table 1 also shows the transition rates obtained when attrition from the sample was included as a fourth destination state at year t: these are the estimates shown in parentheses. Sample dropout rates were highest among those who were unemployed at year t1 (40%), smaller for those were lowpaid (22%), and lower still among those who were high-paid (13%). This pattern suggests that attrition probabilities depend on labour market state, and hence econometric analysis of transitions between states needs to take account of potential correlations between the unobserved factors affecting attrition and transition probabilities (i.e. endogenous attrition). We do this.
3. A MODEL OF TRANSITIONS BETWEEN LABOUR MARKET STATES In order to estimate an econometric model of transitions between unemployment, low-paid and high-paid employment, several issues need to be addressed. First, the dynamic nature of the model means that unobserved factors affecting transitions between states may be correlated with those determining the origin state – the ‘initial conditions problem’ (Heckman, 1981a). Second, earnings are observed only for individuals who have a job, and it is well known from the labour economics literature that parameter estimates of earnings equations for the population as a whole derived from a sample restricted to workers may be subject to ‘selection biases’ (Heckman, 1974; Keane, Moffitt, & Runkle, 1988). This endogenous selection issue is also relevant to our application: employed men may have propensities for low-paid employment that are systematically higher than the propensities for unemployed men. Third, as Table 1 suggested, sample attrition might not be random. Finally, in order to distinguish between heterogeneity and state dependence as explanations for the persistence in labour market states that is observed, one needs to allow for correlations between the unobserved factors in the relevant processes (Heckman, 1981b). We address all four issues by developing a multivariate probit model with endogenous selection and endogenous switching. We specify a model for labour market transitions between two consecutive years, t1 and t, t ¼ 2, y, T. Consider a man, indexed by i ¼ 1, y, N, observed in either unemployment, low-paid employment, or higher-paid employment in year t1, the base year of a given transition. Transitions between the three states for individual i can be observed only if
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LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
he is also observed in year t. Let the unobserved sample retention propensity between the two waves, rnit , be a linear function of observable attributes at t1, plus a composite error term ait distributed as standard normal: rnit ¼ c0 xit1 þ ait ;
ait Nð0; 1Þ
ait ¼ ai þ xit
(1) (2)
Whenever rnit is greater than some threshold that can be set to zero without loss of generality, individual i is observed at successive waves t1 and t. Let Rit ¼ Iðrnit 40Þ be a dichotomous indicator for that event, where the indicator function I( ) equals one if its argument holds, and zero otherwise. The composite error term is the sum of two orthogonal components: an individual specific effect ai representing time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and a purely idiosyncratic effect xit, each of which is assumed to be independent of xit1. Since rnit is unobserved, the variance of the composite error term is normalised to one. (This is a random effects panel model, except that we do not specify the variances of ai or xit, since, given our pseudo-likelihood estimation approach, discussed below, they are not an argument of the sample likelihood function. See below and also Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004). Assume that employment chances in year t1 can be written in terms of an unobserved latent employment propensity, enit1 , a linear function of observable characteristics plus a composite error term bit1 distributed as standard normal and independent of observable characteristics. We write this as the sum of two orthogonal components, one summarising timeinvariant unobserved heterogeneity (ki) and the other an idiosyncratic effect (eit1): enit1 ¼ b0 zit1 þ bit1 ;
bit1 ; Nð0; 1Þ
bit1 ¼ ki þ it1
(3) (4)
Let E it1 ¼ Iðenit1 40Þ be a variable indicating whether i is employed in year t1 rather than unemployed. If individual i is employed at t1, earnings can be observed, and assume that they can be specified as: f ðwit1 Þ ¼ g0 mit1 þ cit1 ;
cit1 Nð0; 1Þ
cit1 ¼ ui þ uit1
(5) (6)
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
63
where f( ) is a suitable monotonic transformation of earnings such that the composite error term cit1 has a standard normal distribution and is independent of regressors, mit1. (This specification follows that used by Stewart & Swaffield, 1999). Let tt1 be the low pay threshold for year t1. An individual is low-paid whenever wit1ott1 or, equivalently when f(wit1)of(tt1). By subtracting both sides of Eq. (3) from f(tt1), this expression may be rewritten as: l nit1 ¼ d0 mit1 þ d it1
d it1 Nð0; 1Þ
d it1 ¼ vi þ vit1
(50 ) (60 )
where l nit1 f ðtt1 Þ f ðwit1 Þ. The intercept term in parameter vector d is the difference between f(tt1) and the intercept term in vector g. The other parameters in d are the same as the corresponding ones in g, but have the opposite sign: niui and vit1uit1. If the latent variable l nit1 is positive, individual i is low paid. Let the low pay binary indicator Lit1 ¼ Iðl nit1 40Þ characterise that event.3 If individuals do not drop out of the sample, their status in year t can be observed in addition to their status at t1. In order to characterise probabilities of transition between unemployment and low pay and to allow for interrelationships between processes, we condition both year t states on t1 states. Clearly, one cannot do this by including Eit1 and Lit1 among the regressors of the year t equations, since low pay status at t1 is observed only for men who were employed at t1. Because of this, we allow there to be two different specifications for the year t equations depending on the value of Eit1 (i.e. there is endogenous switching), and we include Lit1 among the explanatory variables for the case when Eit1 ¼ 1. For example, we specify year t employment propensities as: enit ¼ E it1 ðl01 h1it1 þ ye Lit1 Þ þ ð1 E it1 Þl02 h2it1 þ git git ¼ mi þ oit
git Nð0; 1Þ (7) (8)
As with the previous equations, the composite error term is assumed to be the sum of two orthogonal components, one representing time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and the other an idiosyncratic error, which are normally distributed and independent of the regressors. Observe that lagged low pay status, Lit1, is included among the regressors for men who were employed in t1. Moreover, the set of explanatory variables, and the effects of any particular variable, are allowed to differ depending on past
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LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
employment. In particular, the vector of observables h1it1 will contain all the variables present in h2it1 plus some job and firm characteristics. A variable like age, included in both h2it1 and h2it1, may have different effects on employment at t depending on employment status at t1. We measure regressors at date t1 in order to avoid simultaneity between changes in employment propensities and changes in regressors. We characterise year t employment status by means of a binary indicator variable, E it ¼ Iðenit 40Þ. Note that Eq. (9) is conditional on Eqs. (1), (3) and (7). The final processes to be specified are those characterising low pay at date t, which are observed only if Rit ¼ 1 and Eit ¼ 1. Moreover, the equations need to be conditioned on the state at t1, whether employed, high- or lowpaid. Arguments similar to the ones we made about the specification of the latent employment propensity enit point to the need to allow for endogenous switching in this case as well. We specify the process determining low pay at t directly in terms of a low pay propensity, l nit , which can be derived from a equation for earnings at t in a fashion similar to the one used to relate l nit1 to earnings at t1: l nit ¼ E it1 ðj01 k1it1 þ y1 Lit1 Þ þ ð1 E it1 Þj02 k2it1 þ nit nit ¼ pi þ Zit
nit Nð0; 1Þ (9) (10)
Our earlier remarks about the impact of regressors differing according to lagged employment status, and about the nature of the error components comprising the composite error, also apply here, suitably modified. The set of regressors k1it1 and k2it1 may differ according to t1 employment status, and a variable that is common to each vector may have a different impact on the outcome. Note too the potential dependence of current low pay status on lagged low pay status for those employed at t1. Let Lit ¼ Iðl nit 40Þ be the binary indicator summarising observed low pay status at t. We assume that the composite errors in the five equations are jointly distributed as five-variate normal with zero means, unit variances, and unrestricted correlations: ðait ; bit1 ; d it1 ; git ; nit Þ N 5 ð0; SÞ
(11)
Because each composite error is the sum of a time-invariant individual component and an idiosyncratic white noise component, the correlation coefficients in S are identically equal to the cross-equation covariances of
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
65
the time-invariant individual components. The distribution of timeinvariant unobserved heterogeneity is therefore parameterised by the correlation coefficients forming the off-diagonal elements of S. Estimation of the cross-equation correlations allows for the endogeneity of panel attrition, of lagged states and selection into employment, and tests of the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the various processes can be performed by testing the statistical significance of the elements of S (see below). In sum, our econometric model is a five-variate probit regression model with an endogenous dummy variable (lagged low pay), endogenous switching (in year t equations), and endogenous selection (of year t equations with respect to attrition, and of pay equations with respect to employment). The likelihood function involves normal integrals of various dimensions, the largest being five. The integrals are evaluated by simulation, employing the GHK simulator. The model is estimated pooling annual transitions from BHPS interview waves 1–10, with t ¼ 1992, y, 2000. There are repeated observations on the same individual for each man who was a respondent at least two interviews. These repeated observations mean that the i.i.d. assumption is violated, since each time-invariant individual-specific effect is correlated with itself over transitions, and we do not model such correlation. To address this issue, we used a pseudo maximum simulated likelihood (PMSL) estimator, as follows. The survey statistics literature has developed methods for adjusting the estimates of the parameter covariance matrix to account for sample clustering, using formulae that allow for arbitrary correlations between observations within the same sample cluster, an individual in our case. See inter alia Huber (1967) and Binder (1983) and, for an independent derivation in the econometrics literature, White (1982). The sample loglikelihood is a ‘pseudo-likelihood’ in this case (Gourieroux & Monfort, 1996), from which can be derived a ‘robust’ variance estimator of the parameter estimates using Taylor-series linearisation. Our estimator is a PMSL estimator because the pseudo-likelihood was evaluated using the GHK simulator. An alternative approach, in principle, would be to model the individual effects and to integrate them out. We eschewed this approach because of the substantial computational complexities implied by it, over and above those implied by addressing the various endogenous selections. Our approach is computationally tractable, at the cost of being unable to identify the variances of the multivariate distribution of time-invariant individual unobserved heterogeneity. However, this is not a problem (in the current context), because we do not use these variances. We are able to identify the
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parameters of interest in the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, namely the covariances: it is these that characterize and induce endogenous selectivity. Exclusion restrictions are required if the model is to be identified by other than its non-linear functional form. Our instrument for attrition is a binary variable summarising whether the year t1 interview was assessed as being problematic by the interviewer on matters such as eyesight, hearing, reading, English, language and interpretation. Our identification strategy assumes that, conditional on educational attainment and health status (indicators used as explanatory variables in every model equation), the occurrence of problems during the year t1 interview shifts the likelihood of sample retention but does not have an independent effect on labour market transitions.4 Stewart (2007) suggested instrumenting employment equations using variables summarising the characteristics of an individual’s first-ever employment spell. In addition, recent papers have reported that wages are less sensitive to unemployment in the United Kingdom than they are elsewhere (see Barth, Bratsberg, Naylor, & Raaum, 2002; Montuenga, Garcy´a, & Fernandez, 2003). This suggests that measures of labour market tightness as the unemployment vacancy ratio in the relevant travel-to-work area could also be used as instruments in employment equations. We found that, whereas these variables worked well as instruments for identifying employment at t1, measures of the characteristics of the first employment spell performed better in equations for employment at t. (The measures were binary indicators of whether the first spell was in full-time work, and whether the information was missing). Finally, as instruments for initial conditions, we used a series of binary indicators summarising parental socio-economic status measured when the respondents were aged 14 (primarily occupation variables, plus variables to indicate no parent or missing information), as a way of proxying factors pre-dating labour market entry that affect the initial conditions but not the transitions (Heckman, 1981a). Because our model controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, it allows assessment of the extent to which the observed persistence in labour market states is due to the experience of adverse states per se, and whether there are cross-state effects. As a benchmark for assessing ‘genuine state dependence’, parameter estimates can be used to compute the equivalent of the raw overall differences in transition rates shown in Table 1. In particular, we generate predicted transition rates for each sample member and then take their averages over the relevant subsamples.
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
67
The absence of genuine state dependence can be investigated by testing whether there is a difference in the parameters associated with the different states at t1, i.e. whether the past has any influence on the probabilities of current states after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. To investigate the effects of lagged low pay, this amounts to testing whether ye and yl are statistically different from zero (see Eqs. (4) and (5)). For lagged employment, according to which the whole set of coefficients (not only the intercept term) switches, we test the equality of the coefficients estimates for the two employment states at t1, i.e. H01: l 1 ¼ l2 and H02: j ¼ j , where a ‘’ denotes vectors deprived of coefficients that have no 1 2 counterparts in the equations for the unemployed of t1. Measures of the degree of genuine state dependence need to quantify the shift in the probabilities of year t states corresponding to changes in year t1 states while abstracting from heterogeneity. To assess the impact of lagged low pay versus lagged higher pay, one can compute the ‘marginal effects (MEs)’ associated with the coefficient on Lit1 in the equations for year t outcomes. This is what is usually done in dynamic random effects models in which state dependence is characterised in terms of the coefficient on a lagged binary dependent variable (see e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2000). In our model, this strategy is infeasible for measures of dependence involving lagged employment since conditioning upon lagged employment is achieved via endogenous switching rather than by inclusion of a lagged employment dummy. An alternative measure of genuine state dependence for such cases was proposed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004). Consider, for example, state dependence in (current) unemployment due to a change of lagged states from, say, low pay to unemployment. Such a probability shift can be computed at the individual level, using the parameter estimates, as Pr(Eit ¼ 0|Eit1 ¼ 0; l2)Pr(Eit ¼ 0|Lit1 ¼ 1; l1 ye), where it is made explicit that these individual probability shifts are a function of model coefficients (i.e. analogously to the ME on lagged low pay, which is a function of the coefficient on the lagged dependent dummy). This difference in probabilities measures state dependence at the individual level and therefore abstracts from heterogeneity. The sample mean of each of these differences over the relevant cases (i.e. non-attrited observations that were either unemployed or low paid in t1) provides a measure of the degree of genuine state dependence. Similarly, measures can be also computed for the other probability shifts of interest, namely: Pr(Eit ¼ 0|Eit1 ¼ 0; l2)Pr(Eit ¼ 0|Lit1 ¼ 0; l1); Pr(Lit ¼ 1|Lit1 ¼ 1; j1, yl)Pr(Lit ¼ 1|Eit1 ¼ 0; j2); Pr(Lit ¼ 1|Eit1 ¼ 0; j2)Pr(Lit ¼ 1|Lit1 ¼ 0; j1).
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LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
4. RESULTS 4.1. Correlations between Unobserved Individual Components, and Tests for Endogenous Selection The estimated correlation structure of the unobserved individual components is shown in Table 2, together with test statistics for the ignorability of the retention, initial conditions and employment processes. Unobserved factors in the retention equation were positively associated with those in the lagged employment equation and negatively associated with the ones in the current low pay equation. This echoes the pattern in Table 1 noted earlier, i.e. that men dropping out of the sample were concentrated among the unemployed and the low paid. The correlation between unobserved factors affecting initial employment and conditional current employment was negative and statistically significant. Given the endogenous switching structure adopted, this parameter measures the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in Table 2.
Correlation Structure of Unobservables, and Tests of the Ignorability of Endogenous Selection Processes.
Correlations in Unobservables Retention and employment at t1 (r1) Retention and employment at t (r2) Retention and low-paid employment at t1 (r3) Retention and low-paid employment at t (r4) Employment at t–1 and employment at t (r5) Employment at t–1 and low-paid employment at t1 (r6) Employment at t–1 and low-paid employment at t (r7) Employment at t and low-paid employment at t1 (r8) Employment t and low-paid employment at t (r9) Low-paid employment at t–1 and at t (r10) Test Ignorability of retention H0: r1 ¼ r2 ¼ r3 ¼ r4 ¼ 0 Ignorability of lagged employment H0: r1 ¼ r5 ¼ r6 ¼ r7 ¼ 0 Ignorability of lagged low-paid employment H0: r3 ¼ r6 ¼ r8 ¼ r10 ¼ 0 Ignorability of unobserved heterogeneity in employment/ low-paid employment H0: r6 ¼ r7 ¼ r8 ¼ r9 ¼ 0
Estimate
|t|
0.349 0.086 0.003 0.314 0.270 0.372 0.363 0.090 –0.269 0.163
(19.70) (0.23) (0.10) (1.86) (2.24) (2.99) (2.58) (1.25) (1.07) (1.57)
w2
p-Value
391.06
0.0000
447.09
0.0000
14.05
0.0071
9.98
0.0408
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
69
initial employment and in current employment conditional on past employment status. The parameter’s negative sign can be interpreted as an example of Galtonian regression towards the mean in employment propensities. (See Stewart & Swaffield, 1999; Cappellari, 2002 for analogous findings in the context of other models of labour market transitions). The correlation between unobserved factors in the lagged employment and lagged low pay equations was positive and precisely estimated, indicating that earnings potential was higher for men who were not employed compared to men who were, other things being equal. This fact might reflect higher reservation wages for unemployed men compared to employed men, or higher hiring probabilities in low-wage industries or workplaces compared to high-wage ones. Alternatively, it might reflect a higher chance of losing jobs during recessions among high-wage workers than among low-wage ones, as Keane et al. (1988) found for the United States. A similar interpretation can be given to the positive correlation estimated between unobserved factors determining lagged employment and current low pay. On the other hand, the correlations between unobserved factors in the current employment and low pay equations were not precisely estimated. Finally, the correlation between unobserved factors in the two low pay equations was positive, although statistically significant only at the 20% level. (Taken at face value, it appears that, after controlling for differences in observed characteristics and in lagged low pay states, there remains some unobserved heterogeneity in low pay). Overall, the data support the proposed estimation strategy. According to the tests reported at the bottom of the table, none of the three endogenous selection processes considered should be ignored in the estimation of low pay/unemployment transitions: the null hypothesis that all the correlation coefficients that ‘load’ a given selection process into the model are jointly equal to zero is rejected at conventional confidence levels.
4.2. Employment Transition Probabilities In Table 3 we provide estimates of the coefficients in the equations for the probability of employment. In the ‘full model’, probabilities differ depending on employment status (and low pay) at t1; hence the two columns of estimates. The table also reports the MEs associated with each variable, evaluated at the sample means of explanatory variables. For comparative purposes, the table also includes the estimates from ‘univariate’ models. These result from the estimation of the employment probability
(1.10) (0.74) (2.14) (0.64) (1.00)
(3.68) (2.49) (2.68)
Number of reported health problems 1 0.003 0.056 2 0.003 0.058 3 0.017 0.262 4þ 0.009 0.151 Lived in South East 0.003 0.054
0.238 0.057 0.001
|t|
(0.86) (1.06) (0.93) (1.79) (2.47)
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.010
0.013 0.005
Coeff.
0.085 0.087 0.078 0.149 0.240
Education Other qualification O-level A-level Other higher degree First degree or higher
Married Age Age squared
ME
Pr(Et ¼ 1|Et–1 ¼ 1) Coeff.
|t|
0.220 0.402 0.666 0.517 0.654
0.011 0.032 0.072 0.229 0.065 0.209 0.161 0.439 0.012 0.035
0.076 0.141 0.245 0.187 0.242 (0.39) (1.67) (0.92) (1.19) (0.35)
(1.67) (3.03) (4.53) (3.78) (3.77)
0.063 0.193 (1.68) 0.069 0.012 (0.38) 0.00005 (0.12)
ME
Pr(Et ¼ 1|Et–1 ¼ 0)
0.003 0.004 0.017 0.009 0.002
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.010
0.013 0.006
ME
0.058 0.072 0.260 0.150 0.051
0.083 0.098 0.092 0.158 0.237
0.245 0.048 0.001
Coeff.
(1.15) (0.96) (2.18) (0.67) (0.91)
(0.89) (1.24) (1.11) (2.03) (2.47)
(4.52) (3.53) (3.92)
|t|
Pr(Et ¼ 1|Et–1 ¼ 1)
0.021 0.104 0.105 0.152 0.020
0.110 0.209 0.312 0.259 0.308
0.058 0.024
ME
|t|
0.054 0.267 0.268 0.386 0.050
0.276 0.533 0.825 0.671 0.822
(0.64) (1.88) (1.16) (1.04) (0.46)
(2.01) (4.04) (5.74) (5.00) (4.65)
0.146 (1.32) 0.003 (0.13) 0.00003 (0.09)
Coeff.
Pr(Et ¼ 1|Et–1 ¼ 0)
(2) Univariate Models
Estimates of Employment Transition Probabilities.
(1) Full-Joint Model
Table 3.
70 LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
21,935
28,035
0.042 0.125
[192]
0.760
0.126 0.365
0.031 0.097
0.000 0.002 0.005
0.0000
(1.18) 0.008 (3.06) 0.003 0.020 (1.16)
(0.71)
17,074
1,873
0.152 0.054 0.316 0.539
0.000 0.044 0.119
[27]
(2.35) (0.72) (5.04) (2.10)
(0.00) (0.39) (0.95)
0.0000
0.074 0.155
0.043
1,298
824
0.544
0.185 0.391
0.108
[24]
(1.32)
(1.62) (3.07)
(0.72)
Notes: ME: marginal effect. The GHK simulator for the full-joint model (1) used 150 random draws. MEs were computed at the means of explanatory variables over the relevant subsamples. For example, in the Pr(Et ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 1) column, means were computed over non-attrited cases in employment at t1. For dummy variables, MEs show the change in the relevant probability when the variable changes from 0 to 1. For age, the ME is the change in probability when age changes from 26 to 45 (the sample 25th and 75th percentiles). |t|: robust asymptotic t-ratio for estimated coefficient. The reference man was not married, had no educational qualifications, did not report any health problems, lived outside the South East or London areas, and worked in a small firm in an unskilled occupation. His first labour market spell was not fulltime employment, and he was high-paid at t1. All regressions include controls for survey year.
0.0000
(2.23) (0.72) (1.45) (0.62)
First labour market spell Full-time employment 0.007 0.140 Missing information 0.003 0.054 Low paid at t1 0.011 0.194 Constant 0.371
Log likelihood Model p-value [df] Number of observations
(0.08) (0.51) (0.95)
0.0003 0.003 0.005
0.006 0.057 0.118
Lived in London Firm size W 100 Skilled occupation
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay 71
72
LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
equations without controlling for endogenous attrition, selection into employment, or initial conditions.5 Looking first at the full model estimates, we find that the probability of unemployment is about one percentage point higher for a man who was low-paid in t1 rather than high-paid, other things being equal. As this ME is calculated holding observed and unobserved personal attributes fixed, it is an indication of the extent of genuine state dependence in employment with respect to low-paid work. Taking the probability of unemployment for men who were high-paid at t1 as a benchmark (1.95%, see Table 1), our estimates imply that, by itself, having a low-paid job raises unemployment probabilities by about a half. The corresponding ME in the univariate model is twice the size of that in the full model (2%), suggesting that not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, in this case, would lead to an overstatement of the impact of lagged low pay on the probability of employment by nearly 100%. Also the relevant coefficient in the univariate model is precisely estimated (with a p-value less than 0.05, compared to the one in the full model, for which the p-value is 0.147). Being married was associated with higher employment probabilities if one was already employed, and with a lower probability for the previously – unemployed. In the first case the effect may reflect the presence of family responsibilities that favour employment stability; in the second case, it might reflect the presence of the partner’s incomes that lengthen job search duration, other things being equal. Employment probabilities had an inverse-U relationship with age, but life-cycle variation was limited: the probability was 0.5% higher for a man aged 45 rather 26 years (these are the third and first quartiles of the sample age distribution). Having better educational qualifications had a positive impact on employment probabilities, especially for those who were previously unemployed. For example, the probability of getting a job was about 25% higher for an unemployed man with a university degree compared to an unemployed man with no educational qualifications. It is noteworthy that these effects would have been estimated to be even larger – by approximately 5% – if (wrongly) endogeneity issues had been ignored. (See the univariate model estimates). The presence of health problems, on the other hand, seems to be associated with higher probabilities of becoming unemployed. 4.3. The Probabilities of Low-Paid Employment Estimates of the models of the probabilities of low-paid employment are reported in Table 4. The first two columns of numbers show the full model,
(2.88) (4.12) (5.97) (7.19) (8.09) (2.12) (2.47) (4.41) (2.69) (3.18) (3.68)
Number of reported health problems 1 0.010 0.080 2 0.021 0.149 3 0.063 0.384 4þ 0.079 0.454 Lived in South East 0.017 0.142 Lived in London 0.028 0.262
0.023 0.028 0.041 0.052 0.061
Education Other qualification O-level A-level Other higher degree First degree or higher
(3.50) (9.81) (9.62)
|t|
0.203 0.251 0.406 0.482 0.692
0.024 0.182 0.007 0.142 0.002
Coeff.
Married Age Age squared
ME
0.088 0.097 0.042 0.073 0.087 0.063
0.105 0.062 0.120 0.073 0.253
0.058 0.203
ME
0.284 0.334 0.125 0.245 0.257 0.186
0.304 0.188 0.349 0.218 0.695
0.184 0.168 0.002
Coeff.
ME
0.018 0.025 0.036 0.043 0.051
(2.52) 0.009 (1.58) 0.018 (0.27) 0.052 (0.53) 0.062 (1.84) 0.015 (1.11) 0.024
(1.42) (0.98) (1.60) (1.06) (2.68)
0.079 0.154 0.368 0.418 0.143 0.260
0.191 0.260 0.420 0.477 0.699
0.162 0.123 0.001
Coeff.
(2.06) (2.56) (4.20) (2.53) (3.26) (3.87)
(2.80) (4.49) (6.59) (7.62) (8.75)
(3.39) (12.15) (11.24)
|t|
0.132 0.168 0.061 0.130 0.117 0.084
0.125 0.098 0.163 0.124 0.271
0.059 0.020
ME
0.349 0.432 0.169 0.336 0.328 0.234
0.361 0.270 0.476 0.351 0.895
0.156 0.200 0.002
Coeff.
(2.84) (1.86) (0.33) (0.66) (2.06) (1.27)
(1.54) (1.40) (2.26) (1.74) (3.35)
(0.87) (6.56) (5.58)
|t|
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 0)
(2) Univariate Models Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 1)
(1.14) 0.018 (4.84) 0.008 (4.57)
|t|
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 0)
(1) Full-Joint Model
Estimates of Probabilities of Low-Paid Employment.
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 1)
Table 4.
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay 73
0.0000 21,935
0.042 0.436 0.037 0.362 0.254 1.139 2.124
Coeff.
28,035
(4.14) (3.26) (6.21) (6.17)
|t|
ME
[192]
3.406
Coeff.
(6.50)
|t|
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 0)
0.0000
0.034 0.031 0.327
ME
16,644
3,591
0.426 0.370 1.443 1.599
Coeff.
[25]
(4.07) (3.24) (28.31) (7.57)
|t|
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 1)
0.0000
ME
612
338
3.004
Coeff.
[22]
(5.74)
|t|
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 0)
(2) Univariate Models
Notes: ME: marginal effect. The GHK simulator for the full-joint model (1) used 150 random draws. MEs were computed at the means of explanatory variables over the relevant subsamples. For example, in the Pr(Et ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 1) column, means were computed over non-attrited cases in employment at t1. For dummy variables, MEs show the change in the relevant probability when the variable changes from 0 to 1. For age, the ME is the change in probability when age changes from 26 to 45 (the sample 25th and 75th percentiles). |t|: robust asymptotic t-ratio for estimated coefficient. The reference man was not married, had no educational qualifications, did not report any health problems, lived outside the South East or London areas, and worked in a small firm in an unskilled occupation. His first labour market spell was not fulltime employment, and he was high-paid at t1. All regressions include controls for survey year.
Log likelihood Model p-value [df] Number of observations
Firm size W 100 Skilled occupation Low paid at t1 Constant
ME
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 1)
(1) Full-Joint Model
Table 4. (Continued )
74 LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
75
with coefficients varying with lagged employment status and, for those previously employed, whether the job was low-paid or not. The ‘univariate model’ estimates are those derived from models that did not control for any endogenous selections. The ME associated with having been low-paid at t1 indicates that the probability of low-paid employment would be about 25 percentage points higher for a man who was low-paid at year t1 rather than high-paid. Given that the average low-pay probability in year t among men who were highpaid at t1 is 4%, the large ME indicates that the chances of being low-paid are closely associated with the experience of low pay in the past. This association can be interpreted as causal in the sense that both observed and unobserved heterogeneity have been taken into account. Had unobserved heterogeneity been overlooked (univariate models), the resulting ME would have been 33% (and the associated t-ratio would have changed from 6.2 to 28.3). These results suggest that probability of being low-paid is influenced by sizeable genuine state dependence effects. Being married was associated with lower low pay probabilities for formerly employed men, whereas among formerly unemployed men, the effect was positive but imprecisely estimated. Low pay probabilities had a U-shaped relationship with age. A man aged 45 rather than 26 had a slightly lower probability of low pay if they were employed at t1, but the effect was much larger (20%) if they were unemployed at t1. The corresponding ME in the model that did not control for endogenous selection was only 2%. Since coefficients associated with age are rather stable across columns, part of the change must be attributable to changes in the other coefficients, which enter the computation of the baseline probabilities. Having better educational qualifications was associated with lower chances of being in low-paid employment, and the two points already made about employment probabilities also apply in this case. First, the MEs associated with having educational qualifications are larger for men who were unemployed rather than employed at t1. Second, for the previously unemployed, controlling for the endogenous selections reduces the estimated impact of having educational qualifications. There were also statistically significant associations between low pay probabilities and region, firm size, and occupation. Probabilities were lower for men living in London and the South East, for men who worked in large firms, and for those who worked in a skilled occupation. Variations in the parameter estimates associated with the two alternative states at t1 are consistent with existence of genuine state dependence effects. The hypothesis of an absence of a genuine state dependence effect
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LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
from having low-paid employment at the previous interview is overwhelmingly rejected in the equation for low-paid employment in year t, whereas rejection is more marginal in the equation for year t employment ( p ¼ 0.15): see the estimates associated with lagged low pay dummies in Tables 3 and 4. Tests of equality of coefficients across the two employment states at t1 (see Section 3) overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis of no differences (results, not reported, are available upon request).
4.4. Predicted Transition Rates and State Dependence Table 5, rows 1–6, reports transition rates computed from the model estimates, and the predicted rates correspond well with the raw transition rates reported in Table 1.6 Measures of aggregate state dependence were calculated as differences in transition rates for men with different initial labour market states (as explained earlier): see rows 7–12. The estimates of genuine state dependence are the MEs associated with lagged low pay indicators or the alternative measure presented in Section 3. The estimates indicate that genuine state dependence is a non-trivial share of aggregate state dependence. In particular, when looking at unemployment probabilities (rows 10–12), genuine state dependence accounts for almost all of the Table 5.
Predicted Transition Rates and State-Dependence Effects. Predicted Transition Rates
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Lt1 ¼ 1) Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Lt1 ¼ 0) Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 0) Pr(Et ¼ 0|Lt1 ¼ 1) Pr(Et ¼ 0|Lt1 ¼ 0) Pr(Et ¼ 0|Et1 ¼ 0)
51.19 4.82 16.12 3.71 1.79 57.72
State Dependence
7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Lt1 ¼ 1)Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Lt1 ¼ 0) Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Lt1 ¼ 1)Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 0) Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Et1 ¼ 0)Pr(Lt ¼ 1|Lt1 ¼ 0) Pr(Et ¼ 0|Et1 ¼ 0)Pr(Et ¼ 0|Lt1 ¼ 1) Pr(Et ¼ 0|Et1 ¼ 0)Pr(Et ¼ 0|Lt1 ¼ 0) Pr(Et ¼ 0|Lt1 ¼ 1)Pr(Et ¼ 0|Lt1 ¼ 0)
Aggregate
Genuine
46.36 35.07 11.29 54.01 55.93 1.91
25.40 29.09 3.76 48.86 52.92 1.11
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
77
observed state dependence, indicating that human capital depreciation or negative signalling may be important in those cases. The effects computed conditional on what the labour market state was at t1 are informative about interrelationships between transitions. For example, the estimates indicate that differences in the probability of lowpaid employment at year t between men who were low-paid at t1 rather than unemployed at t1 were largely due to state dependence, whereas heterogeneity drives the differential in the low-paid employment probability between men who were unemployed rather than in a higher-paid job. (The fraction of state dependence that is genuine in line 8 is larger than the corresponding fraction in line 9). This finding is consistent with the arguments in the Section 1 about the labour market having a primary and a secondary sector (unemployment or low-paid work), as there appear to be few heterogeneity effects differentiating the chances of those who were unemployed rather than low paid. This suggests a common set of policies for this relatively homogenous group.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS There is substantial persistence in the chances of being unemployed and being in low-paid employment. More than one half of the men who were in either of these two states were in the same states a year earlier. Unemployment and low-paid employment are also labour market states that are closely linked. Becoming unemployed in one year was more likely for men with a low-paid job in the previous year and, among unemployed men who got a job, the chances of that job being a low-paid one were about three times the unconditional low pay probability. To gain greater understanding of these patterns, this paper has modelled transitions between unemployment and low pay versus high pay using data for men from the BHPS, with particular attention given to controlling for the endogeneity of associated processes, in initial conditions, selection into employment, and in attrition from the panel. None of the three processes was found to be exogenous in the estimation of the transitions of principal interest. The interrelationship between the chances of being unemployed and the chances of being low paid remained strong, even after controlling for the three endogenous selections and for observed characteristics. Men who had been in low-paid employment had higher probabilities of unemployment than high-paid men, and men who had been unemployed had higher chances
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LORENZO CAPPELLARI AND STEPHEN P. JENKINS
of being low-paid rather than high-paid were they to get a job. The first finding suggests that low-paid jobs are characterised by greater turnover than high-paid jobs. The second finding suggests that the experience of unemployment leads to lower quality jobs. This would be consistent with the idea that an individual’s human capital depreciates the longer he is unemployed or, alternatively, employers use unemployment duration as a signal of poor quality workers. In general, there appear to be genuine state dependence effects helping to determine men’s chances of being low-paid or unemployed. Hence policies targeted on unemployed men may reduce the chances of being low-paid once they get a job, and measures designed to raise the earnings potential of the low-paid may also reduce their chances of becoming unemployed in future.
NOTES 1. The BHPS is documented at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/ 2. Stewart (2007) pooled data for men and women, and reported higher low pay transition rates and lower unemployment transition rates than those show in Table 1 below. When we pooled data for men and women, we found transition rates to be close to the rates reported by Stewart. 3. One advantage of working with the dichotomous low pay indicator rather than with a continuous earnings variable in the multivariate normal context of this paper is that we avoid having to assume that earnings or log-earnings are normally distributed. Instead, normality is assumed only up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation of earnings (Stewart & Swaffield, 1999). 4. In addition to health and education, another variable that may be related with interview problems, particularly language problems, is ethnicity. We experimented with specifications that included indicators of ethnic group membership and found their effects on labour market transitions to be very imprecisely estimated. We therefore decided not to report the estimates for these models. 5. We also estimated the model excluding the sample retention process only. The estimates (available from the authors) were similar to the ones presented here, with some exceptions. First, some of the cross-process correlation coefficients – namely, the ones that were statistically significant at conventional levels of confidence in Table 2 – were estimated to be larger in absolute value, possibly a consequence of using information over a smaller parameter space. Second, the restricted model tended to underestimate transitions into unemployment from low pay, which suggests that attrited cases include low-paid workers who would have had a large propensity to become unemployed had they remained in the sample. 6. Predictions were derived for each man, and then averaged over the relevant subsamples. For example, predicted low pay persistence is the predicted probability of low pay at t conditional on low pay at t–1 and retention, averaged over those who were low paid at t–1 and did not drop out of the sample during the transition.
Transitions between Unemployment and Low Pay
79
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Research supported by a Nuffield Foundation New Career Development Fellowship and by ISER’s core funding from the University of Essex and the UK Economic and Social Research Council for the Research Centre on Micro-Social Change and the United Kingdom Longitudinal Studies Centre. We are grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees.
REFERENCES Arulampalam, W., Booth, A. L., & Taylor, M. P. (2000). Unemployment persistence. Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 24–50. Barth, E., Bratsberg, B., Naylor, R. A., & Raaum, O. (2002). How wage curves differ: Theory and evidence for the US, UK and Norway. Unpublished manuscript, University of Oslo, February. Binder, D. A. (1983). On the variances of aymptotically normal estimators from complex surveys. International Statistical Review, 51, 279–292. Cappellari, L. (2002). Do the ‘working poor’ stay poor? An analysis of low pay transitions in Italy. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 64, 87–110. Cappellari, L., & Jenkins, S. P. (2004). Modelling low income transitions. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19, 593–610. Gourieroux, C., & Monfort, A. (1996). Simulation based econometric methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heckman, J. J. (1974). Shadow prices, market wages, and labor supply. Econometrica, 42, 679–694. Heckman, J. J. (1981a). The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial conditions in estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process. In: C. F. Manski & D. McFadden (Eds), Structural analysis of discrete data with econometric applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heckman, J. J. (1981b). Statistical models for discrete panel data. In: C. F. Manski & D. McFadden (Eds), Structural analysis of discrete data with econometric applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Huber, P.J. (1967). The behaviour of maximum likelihood estimators under non-standard conditions. In: Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium in Mathematical Statistics and Probability, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Keane, M., Moffitt, R., & Runkle, D. (1988). Real wages over the business cycle: Estimating the impact of heterogeneity with micro-data. The Journal of Political Economy, 96, 1232–1266. Montuenga, V., Garcy´a, I., & Fernandez, M. (2003). Wage flexibility: Evidence from five EU countries based on the wage curve. Economics Letters, 78, 169–174. Stewart, M. B. (2007). The inter-related dynamics of unemployment and low-wage employment. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22, 511–531. Stewart, M. B., & Swaffield, J. K. (1999). Low pay dynamics and transition probabilities. Economica, 66, 23–42. White, H. (1982). Maximum likelihood estimation of misspecified models. Econometrica, 50, 1–25.
WHY EUROPEANS WORK PART-TIME? A CROSS-COUNTRY PANEL ANALYSIS Hielke Buddelmeyer, Gilles Mourre and Melanie Ward ABSTRACT This paper aims to identify the relative contribution of the business cycle and structural factors to the development of part-time employment in the 15 Member States of the European Union before the 2004 enlargement (EU-15) over the 1980s and 1990s. To do so, it exploits both crosssectional and time series variations in available data over the past two decades. Key results include the business cycle that is found to exert a short-term negative effect on part-time employment developments, although this effect fades away over the two-decade period considered. This finding is consistent with firms utilising part-time employment as a means of adjusting their labour force to economic conditions. Correspondingly, involuntary part-time employment is found to be counter-cyclical, being higher in troughs of economic activity. Splitting our sample reveals a very significant effect of the business cycle on the rate of part-time work for young and male prime-age workers. Conversely, the effect is very weak for women and insignificant for older workers. Work, Earnings and other Aspects of the Employment Relation Research in Labor Economics, Volume 28, 81–139 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0147-9121/doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(08)28004-0
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Institutions and other structural factors are also found to be significant, longer run determinants of the rate of part-time employment. Changes in legislation affecting part-time employment are found to have a strong and positive impact on part-time employment developments. Moreover, employment protection legislation is positively correlated with the parttime employment rate (PTR), which is consistent with the use of parttime work as a tool for enhancing flexibility in the presence of rigid labour markets. Less robust evidence suggests the presence of unemployment traps for some potential part-time workers. Cross-country evidence also indicates that the lower labour costs borne by firms when employing part-time workers have a large and positive influence on the PTR. Overall, a contribution analysis shows that the main structural and institutional variables generally explain the development in the part-time rate in the EU countries fairly well, while this is obviously not the case in the United States.
1. INTRODUCTION A growing part-time employment share has been a main feature of a number of industrialised countries over the past two decades. While the United States experienced a slight fall in the share of part-time employment in total employment during the late 1980s and 1990s, the latter increased strongly in the 15 Member States of the European Union before the 2004 enlargement (EU-15),1 Japan and Canada in the same period (see Annex A for the trends in part-time employment). From a macroeconomic standpoint, the increase in the share of part-time work may have a dampening effect on aggregate wage growth,2 and some recent papers have shown that the total employment growth (in terms of persons employed) in the 1990s benefited from the development of part-time employment in the European countries (Garibaldi & Mauro, 2002; Mourre, 2006). Furthermore, from an economic policy perspective, the promotion of part-time work may be an important measure through which the flexibility of labour markets can be increased. On the labour demand side, it may allow employers to adjust hours worked to cyclical conditions more easily, facilitating adjustment of production and labour costs. On the labour supply side, part-time work may increase the labour market choices open to individuals and may draw people who were previously unwilling or unable to work into the labour market. Part-time employment may therefore increase potential output in the EU (see the economic strategy
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and the targets for the EU employment rates set by the European Councils held in Lisbon in 2000 and Stockholm in 2001). At the same time, part-time work may have its drawbacks. Part-time workers may be subject to lower wages, be less likely to receive fringe benefits and face reduced chances for promotion (for a discussion, see OECD, 1999). For employers, part-time work may be connected with higher fixed costs, such as recruitment and training costs. Furthermore, part-time jobs may crowd out full-time positions. Broadly speaking, the literature on part-time job developments to date can be divided into two main vintages. A first branch relies on microeconometric analysis based on firm surveys. The purpose of this work is to identify the microeconomic and individual determinants of part-time work (Haskel, Kersley, & Martin, 1997; Houseman, 2001), to illustrate the role of part-time work as a flexible work arrangement (Haskel et al., 1997; Farber, 1999; Barrett & Doiron, 2001) or to explain the transition between part-time jobs and other labour market states (Blank, 1994; O’Reilly & Bothfeld, 2002; Buddelmeyer, Mourre, & Ward, 2005a). The second vintage deals with the comprehensive description of part-time employment developments based on macro-data and includes sociological and institutional qualitative evidence (Smith, Fagan, & Rubery, 1998; Delsen, 1998; OECD, 1999; Walwei, 1998). In this vein, some papers focus on international comparison (Lemaıˆ tre, Marianna, & Van Bastelaer, 1997) and attempt to understand the reason why part-time work is so low in some countries such as Spain and Portugal (Ruivo, Gonzalez, & Varejao, 1998) or so different across countries (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). This paper belongs to the second vintage of the literature, while extending it through the use of a country panel of time-varying institutions and structural variables covering most EU-15 Member States. This latter methodological approach can be associated with another branch of the labour market literature (initiated by Scarpetta, 1996 and extended by Belot & van Ours, 2000; Blanchard & Wolfers, 2000; Nickell, Nunziata, & Ochel, 2002) that uses cross-sectional or pooled-time-series data on indicators of labour market performance and labour market institutions to account for unemployment differentials across countries. This paper therefore fills a gap in the literature by analysing the cause of part-time job developments systematically in a Europe-wide perspective, including the ex post impact of changes in legislation regarding part-time employment.3 This paper also considers the effect of the business cycle on part-time employment. Although the counter-cyclicality of the relative growth of part-time employment compared to full-time employment has often been mentioned
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in the literature (Delsen, 1998; Lester, 1999) and tackled indirectly through the cyclicality of hours worked (Millard, Scott, & Sensier, 1999), no systematic econometric investigation has been carried out using macroeconomic data. Thus the purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it reviews the determinants of part-time employment as identified by the economic literature. Second, it aims to identify the role of the business cycle and structural factors in the development of part-time employment in the EU-15 countries by exploiting both cross-sectional and time series variations. This may enable us to comment on whether part-time jobs have been used as a flexible work arrangement by firms in the EU-15, as has been shown for some specific countries and sectors within the micro-econometric literature. Third, the main payoff of this paper is to measure the relative weight of each determinant of part-time employment over time. This justifies the macroperspective of this paper and its comprehensive approach (encompassing a large set of determinants) since the relative contribution of the relevant macroeconomic, policy and institutional factors could not have been obtained with a micro-analysis or study focusing on a specific factor of parttime employment. This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 surveys the determinants of part-time work offered by theory. Section 3 introduces the simple econometric setting to be utilised in the remainder of this paper and describes our data sources. Section 4 analyses the impact of the business cycle on part-time employment developments and involuntary part-time work. Section 5 considers the role of part-time legislation, labour market institutions and other structural features (of demographic, sociological or economic nature) on the rate of part-time work within EU-15 countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. SOME THEORY: THE FACTORS INFLUENCING PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT This subsection reviews the various determinants of part-time work offered by a theory that will be consequently important for our econometric analysis in the following sections. The determinants can be grouped under sections (i) Business Cycles, (ii) Labour Market Institutions and (iii) Other Structural Factors. While the economic literature generally suggests that the business cycle plays some role in the short-to-medium run, it also stresses the
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importance of various institutions and policies as well as other structural factors of sociological, demographic or economic nature in the longer run.
2.1. Business Cycles Business cycles affect movements in the part-time employment rate (PTR)4 in the short-to-medium term. This implies that the rate of part-time work may respond differently to business cycle effects relative to full-time employment. The literature has identified a number of ways in which the business cycle affects the share of part-time employment (OECD, 1995; Delsen, 1998). On the demand side, two effects may be at play. First, there is a compositional effect. As noted by Lester (1999), shifts between sectors arise because sectors with a higher share of full-time employees, such as manufacturing and construction, are generally affected earlier and more strongly by the cycle than other sectors. Therefore, part-time employment may be less responsive to business cycle effects than total employment and may show a counter-cyclical pattern. Second, shifts within sectors may boost part-time employment during downturns as employers offer part-time employment as a way to adjust hours worked over the cycle, while continuing to hoard labour (Delsen, 1998). This enables employees in place to avoid dismissal and job seekers to avoid long-term unemployment. Thus, during a downturn, employers may reduce the number of hours worked by their current workforce or hire new workers in part-time jobs. However, as suggested by Lester (1999) for Australia, and Farber (1999) for the United States, it seems that a nonnegligible proportion of full-timers moving to part-time work does not stay in their current firm, going through a period of unemployment.5 Moreover, as some employers use part-time jobs to screen workers for full-time positions (Houseman, 2001) and firms may be more demanding and more risk averse before hiring new staff in bad times, they may prefer to systematically recruit part-timers rather than full-timers in periods of economic slowdown. In an upswing, employers may offer full-time contracts to their part-time workers (so called ‘‘tap effects’’) in order to increase their total stock of labour resources, as this was the case in Sweden in the 1980s (Sundstro¨m, 1991). We will label the use of part-time work by employers as a means to regulate the size of their workforce in response to the economic cycle as the ‘‘flexibility effect’’. We would therefore expect the flexibility
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effect to exert a counter-cyclical impact on the rate of part-time employment.6 On the supply side, in an environment of falling economic activity and/or rising unemployment, workers may be more willing to consider part-time work as an alternative to their preferred labour supply choice of full-time employment. This third effect can also be viewed as a consequence of the ‘‘flexibility effect’’, as it also reflects the mismatch between job seekers, preferably looking for a full-time job, and firms mainly offering a part-time job. Conversely, in a period of expanding output and/or falling unemployment, workers with a preference for full-time work may be less willing to work part-time. This ‘‘involuntary part-time work effect’’ is expected to be negatively related to the part-time rate. An additional labour supply effect is the ‘‘added worker effect’’. Here, the unemployment of a household member leads to an increase in the labour supply of other household members (Mincer, 1962; Layard, Barton, & Zabalza, 1980; Maloney, 1991). Typically, a recession causes job losses in single-breadwinner household, urging the other partner (often female) to work part-time so as to limit the income loss. The empirical evidence to date, however, suggests that this effect is small. A fifth effect, also of labour supply, is known as the ‘‘discouraged worker effect’’ (Long, 1953). A lasting period of unemployment reduces the probability of finding a job and may induce groups of disadvantaged groups not to enter in the labour market, awaiting better opportunities, given that searching for a job is a costly activity. A large set of empirical studies reports evidence supporting the discouraged worker hypothesis (Clark & Summers, 1982; Blundell, Ham, & Meghir, 1998; Darby, Hart, & Vecchi, 2001). During a period of economic contraction or slowdown, labour supply from low-skilled or initially inactive females, who are more likely to look for parttime jobs, may be reduced, given the lesser prospect of finding a job. Thus, the discouraged worker effect is likely to be negatively related to the parttime rate. Thus, the effect of the cycle on the rate of part-time work will be positive or negative depending on the relative importance of these five effects (Table 1). The finding of a significant counter-cyclical effect could suggest that (i) labour demand is one of the main driving forces behind developments in part-time employment and (ii) employers use these types of jobs to adjust to the general economic situation. Indeed, the labour supply effects going in the same direction are supposed to be weak (‘‘added worker effect’’) or the mirror of cyclical labour demand conditions (‘‘involuntary part-time effect’’). In contrast, the finding of no or weak cyclical patterns of part-time
Why Europeans Work Part-Time? A Cross-Country Panel Analysis Table 1.
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Five Effects of Business Cycle on Part-Time Employment Rate.
Labour demand () Compositional effect (concentration in less cyclical sectors) () Flexibility effect (adjustment of hours worked along the cycle) Labour supply () Involuntary part-time effect (enhanced willingness to work part-time to avoid unemployment) () Added worker effect (unemployment of a household member causing an increase in labour supply of another household member) (þ) Discouraged worker effect (withdrawal from the labour market of part-time job seekers) - Overall effect uncertain, but likely negative correlation between output gap and part-time increase Notes: Reading: () means countercyclical effects; (þ) means procyclical effects.
work relative to total employment may indicate that developments in part-time jobs rather reflect structural factors, such as the design of labour market institutions. 2.2. Labour Market Institutions While the business cycle affects the short-to-medium term, developments in part-time employment, institutional and sociological factors are likely to influence the longer-term level of the part-time rate. Smith et al. (1998) survey the factors affecting the growth of part-time work in Europe. Some of these factors are not mutually exclusive and might reinforce each other. Specific regulations on part-time work (statutory or collectively bargained) can affect part-time employment developments through three mechanisms, as described by Smith et al. (1998). First, some regulations directly affect the working-time system by restricting the use of part-time work. Second, some regulations indirectly influence part-time employment through wage regulation, the social protection system or the tax and benefit systems. For example, in some countries (e.g. Portugal), hourly wages for part-time and full-time work are restricted by law to be equal (pro rata clause). Such legislation may change the structure of non-wage costs for employers, such as hours or earnings thresholds for social insurance contributions or special subsidies or tax rebates for firms hiring part-time staff.7 Lower pension entitlements can also restrict the labour supply of part-time jobs (Ginn & Arber, 1998). A third type of regulation facilitates the conversion of full-time jobs into voluntary part-time employment in
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order to reconcile personal and professional lives (Genre, Gomez-Salvador, Leiner-Killinger, & Mourre, 2003). Employment protection legislation (EPL) has become a more and more important reason for hiring part-time employees. In the late 1990s, in a context of increasing competition and uncertainty, firms realised the advantages of ‘‘atypical jobs’’, which were considered to be more flexible and less expensive. Part-time employment was quickly acknowledged as offering such a job type, together with temporary jobs, help agency employment, shift work, on-call jobs and atypical working hours (nights and weekends). Bentolila and Dolado (1994) call this new search for flexible staffing arrangements the ‘‘new reasons’’ for hiring part-time workers. The stringency of job protection legislation may have two conflicting effects. First, it can encourage the use of part-time work so as to circumvent highly rigid employment legislation affecting full-time jobs. Second, EPL in some countries can directly and adversely affect part-time employment by strictly limiting its use. In any case, as part-time employment in the EU-15 mostly corresponds to permanent contracts (above 80% in the late 1990s), EPL for regular contracts seems more relevant for understanding the level of parttime work over time and across countries. However, the small proportion of fixed-term part-time employment can be affected by EPL for temporary contracts.8 The effect of child benefits on part-time work is ambiguous. In general, the provision of child benefits can create an ‘‘unemployment trap’’, if benefits are only granted below a certain level of income.9 Moreover, some child benefits grant additional income to parents who renounce to work in order to take care of their young children. These can have a strong adverse effect on female participation (Laroque & Salanie´, 2003). On the other hand, the lack of childcare benefits or a subsidised childcare system is a major disincentive to taking up employment. Therefore, the overall effect may depend on the shape and the composition of child benefit systems. Unemployment benefit systems (together with other benefits) may create an ‘‘unemployment trap’’ through high net replacement rates and long benefit durations. As stated by Doudeijns (1998), this financial disincentive to take up a job has a significant impact on the decision to work part-time since part-time jobs are not likely to yield high earnings. Conversely, ‘‘in-work benefits’’, the tightening of eligibility criteria and enhanced controls of their implementation may help alleviate such a disincentive. The tax system and, in particular, high income tax rates may deter parttime work. Where the income tax is computed on the basis of a couple’s earnings rather than on an individual basis, the second earner in the couple
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may be taxed at a relatively high marginal rate, creating an ‘‘unemployment trap’’. Moreover, the existence of a dependent partner’s allowance may create disincentives for the second earner to take up a job, especially lowpaid part-time jobs (Jaumotte, 2003). Trade unions have generally fought against part-time work – seen as a threat to full-time standards. Houseman (2001) found some econometric evidence of a negative relationship between trade union density and parttime employment for the United States, although reverse causation cannot be ruled out.10 This can also explain the low part-time rate in highly unionised sectors such as manufacturing, while the services sector, which is less unionised, is more part-time intensive. However, high unemployment has started to change trade unions’ attitude. In this context, a high level of co-ordination between unions may facilitate the conclusion of tripartite agreements, involving the government, that aim at reducing unemployment via some ‘‘work sharing’’ or improving working conditions by encouraging voluntary part-time employment (Genre et al., 2003). The share of temporary jobs (short-term contracts help agency employment) could exert a crowding-out effect on part-time employment. In Portugal and Spain (until 1994), the favourable legislation on fixed-term contracts and the sharp development in this type of job have led to a weak development in part-time employment. Nonetheless, in many cases, the development in part-time jobs goes hand in hand with that of fixed-term contracts as complementary flexible staffing arrangements.11
2.3. Other Structural Variables The rise in female participation has occurred hand in hand with an increase in the part-time rate in many countries. Part-time employment has been the main way of integrating women in the labour market in countries where the participation rate was low in the 1960s and 1970s. Sociological and cultural reasons, such as the separation of tasks within the household and the family model, combined with institutional reasons (e.g. the lack of childcare facilities), explain in part why women are more inclined to work part-time than men. For instance, a ‘‘male breadwinner’’ model of family encourages women to work part-time rather than full-time (Fagan & O’Reilly, 1998). Likewise, an increase in the fertility rate and the number of children per family may increase the need for working part-time instead of working fulltime so as to reconcile professional and family life, especially when the childcare system is insufficient. However, in some countries, such as
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Finland, the male breadwinner model was never dominant, and the rise in female participation was mainly due to the increase in full-time employment (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). However, these variables may suffer from endogeneity problems. The share of employment in services is also an important determinant of part-time work in the literature to date. Traditionally, employers hire parttime workers in order to deal with regular and predictable peaks of demand (‘‘rush hours’’) or to extend opening hours on evenings or weekends, beyond what the hours worked by a full-timer in a single shift would allow.12 This situation particularly concerns some service sectors, where part-time work is concentrated (retail trade, hotels and restaurant, personal services). Conversely, mass-production and capital-intensive industries rely far more on full-time workers. Part-time work may also be used to substitute for absent employees (on maternity or sick leave) or to meet unexpected orders. Part-time staff therefore acts as a backup for full-time employees (Delsen, 1995). In addition, as mentioned by Delsen (1998), the issue of ‘‘gender flexibility’’ plays a role. Many services rely predominantly on female employees, who are more prone to accept working part-time, while maledominated sectors (industry, construction) have been more reluctant. The schooling rate of the population aged 15–24 is likely to positively influence the PTR, as the latter is currently highest for those aged 15–24 within the EU. From the labour demand side, students offer relatively cheap and flexible labour.13 From the labour supply side, students are mainly looking for part-time jobs to finance their studies. Moreover, some newly graduated students may be ready to accept working part-time in bad times in order to build up professional experience and avoid unemployment spells, which might be stigmatising. The differential in wages and non-wage costs between part-time and fulltime employment may make part-time work advantageous to firms. OECD (1999) showed that both the hourly wage rate and the benefits received by part-time workers were lower than that of full-time workers in most OECD countries.14 This remains true even after controlling occupational characteristics of part- and full-time jobs. The gap between part-time and fulltime earnings is 10% on average. One reason for this may be that part-time workers tend to receive less job-related training than full-timers. As suggested by Houseman (2001), a second reason might be that part-timers belong to a ‘‘secondary’’ labour market and might not have as strong a bargaining position as full-time workers. Likewise, part-timers are less likely to benefit from an ‘‘efficient wage’’ policy, given their lower contribution in terms of the number of hours to the firm.15
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3. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS This section explains the estimation strategy and the data used to show empirically how important the factors mentioned in the previous section are in the determination of the rate of part-time work in EU-15 countries.
3.1. Estimation Strategy The part-time employment rate follows a clear positive trend over time in Europe, and the presence of a unit root is confirmed in most countries by running the augmented Dickey–Fuller test and Phillips–Perron test. We first use the annual change in the PTR (DPT) as the dependent variable in order to address the issue of non-stationarity. As this variable offers a limited time series dimension by country (i.e. 18-time observations at most), we pool annual data across EU-15 countries. Therefore, for our analysis of the effect of the business cycle on the PTR, we first use the following simple fixedeffect specification (1), where OG denotes a measure of the cyclical position of the economy and ai are i country dummies:16 DPT it ¼ ai þ bOGit þ it
(1)
Under this model (1), the business cycle OG is proxied by (i) estimates of the output gap and (ii) real GDP growth. The former is preferred since it offers a better measure of the cyclical fluctuation of economic activity, while real GDP growth also encases variation in potential output growth across countries. The output gap is defined as the difference between actual GDP and potential GDP as a percentage of potential GDP. The latter, also called potential output and calculated using the production function method, corresponds to the productive capacity of the economy, that is, the level of sustainable output, compatible with a stable inflation rate. However, since output gaps are derived from model-based estimates of potential output and are consequently ‘‘non-observable’’ variables, real GDP growth is used to check the robustness of the results. In this model, we also include lagged independent variables. According to a Wald test, two period lags are found to be sufficient for our model, as the removal of further lags (three and four) does not affect the results significantly. Since the effect of the business cycle on the part-time rate may be asymmetric, we also regress the output gap (with lags) interacted with a
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dummy variable, which indicates whether the output gap is positive or negative. Finally, one may conjecture that the ‘‘flexibility effect’’ mentioned earlier would be more acute for countries experiencing strong structural rigidities. In these countries, which are likely characterised by a high unemployment rate, firms would use part-time work as a means of circumventing structural rigidities and adapting resources according to fluctuations in economic activity. Moreover, in the case of very high unemployment, workers may be more willing to accept a part-time job, enhancing the involuntary part-time work effect. Therefore, we also use the output gap interacted with a dummy reflecting a high unemployment country to investigate whether the countries hit by high unemployment witness a more pronounced cyclical pattern. Model (1) is straightforward, breaking down the PTR into a cyclical component and a linear country-specific trend.17 It easily resolves the problems arising from the use of non-stationary variables. However, the results are constrained by the absence of quarterly data for part-time employment, which would have been more suitable to investigate its cyclical behaviour. Annual data are by definition less frequent; tend to smooth out quarterly pattern and lose information about the start of upturns and downturns. For sake of robustness, we also complement this model in first differences with a more comprehensive model in levels. The structural changes brought out by reforms in the regulatory or legal framework of part-time employment may cause acceleration in part-time developments, which is not captured by the linear trend of model (1). This may disturb, somewhat, the empirical estimation of the cyclical component of part-time employment. Thus, our model (1) considers the level of the PTR across countries and over time as well as the impact of structural factors and institutions. It also allows us to check the robustness of the cyclical effect and the control for possible omitted variable bias by taking into account additional explanatory variables. It is expressed as follows: PT it ¼ ai þ at þ bOGit þ
K X k¼1
ak X k it þ
J X
bj X j it þ it
(2)
j¼1
where ai are i country dummies and at t time dummies. Xk are k variables representing institutions and Xj j variables capturing structural factors (of societal, demographic or economic nature). This specification is close to that used by Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel, and Quintini (2001) to explain OECD unemployment, but the variables for
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short-term macroeconomic shocks (labour demand shock, real import price shock, real interest rate, etc.) are replaced by the output gap. Moreover, the lagged dependent variable is dropped as its presence introduces correlation between the errors and the regressors, which can bias the GLS estimate of parameters.18 As most variables are not stationary, it is crucial to check that they are linked together in the long run through a cointegrating relationship and thus that the residuals of the equation are stationary. In order to test for unit roots in the residuals, we use the Fisher–Maddala–Wu test, which was suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999) on the basis of previous work by Fisher (1932). This non-parametric test is used here since it does not require a balanced panel. It is also easy to run as it combines the observed significance levels of any type of unit-root test performed individually on N countries. If Pi denotes P the p-value from the unit test on the ith country time series, then 2 ln Pi follows a w2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom. However, this test assumes the absence of cross-sectional correlation, that is, the observations are generated independently across countries. When this assumption is violated, which is often the case in practice, the standard test may suffer from a large size distortion, as evidenced by Maddala and Wu (1999), who have computed the exact distribution of the test and corrected the critical value by bootstrapping. Here, following Nunziata (2005), we control cross-country correlation using time dummies (which capture cross-sectional dependency caused by common time-specific components), and then we utilise the standard distribution of the test. Under the Fisher–Maddala–Wu test and using Phillips–Perron tests for individual countries, the null of no cointegration (non-stationarity of the residual) is strongly rejected for all equations in Table C1.19 For instance, using equation 1 of Table C1, the test statistics is w2(40) ¼ 79.2, with a p-value of 0.02%. The test clearly rejects the hypothesis of the residuals having a unit root and points to the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the regressors.20 As some heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation are detected in both models (1) and (2), all equations are estimated by feasible generalised least squares (Nickell et al., 2001; Nunziata, 2001).21 To tackle possible endogeneity problems, we also use an instrumental variable method, namely, the two-stage feasible generalised least squares. Although the causality may mainly run from GDP/output gaps to part-time employment, the growth rate of fixed capital investments (along with its lagged values) and the growth rate of trade and services exports are used as instruments in specification (1). Indeed, whereas employment developments
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directly influence output growth through household disposable income and consumption, trade and services exports and fixed capital investments are not driven by national employment, at least in the short run. Instead, they are strongly correlated with the output, and Table C3 shows that the two variables are important explanatory factors of the output gap.22 This suggests that the two-stage least squares estimate should not suffer from the weak-instrument problem. In order to further gauge the robustness of the results to the possible endogeneity of regressors, we also run Granger-causality type of equations (1u), where the business cycle variable is lagged by one year. The estimate (1u) confirms the significance and the sign of the output gap coefficient, although its magnitude is lower than in estimates (1) (Table C4). DPT it ¼ ai þ bOGi t1 þ it
(10 )
In specification (2), the issue of endogeneity is very likely to particularly affect the relationship between the PTR and participation. Moreover, a growing share of part-time jobs might make policy makers more responsive to part-time worker preferences. In this respect, the EU directive on parttime work could be seen as an EU-wide response to the growing importance of part-time workings.23 Therefore, we instrument the structural and institutional variables by their values lagged by two years. One-year lag does not suffice because of the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the residuals.
3.2. Data The data used in this paper are presented more in detail in Annex B. The PTR is defined as the percentage of workers working part-time relative to total employment. The PTR, as well as the share of involuntary part-time employment, is derived for each country from the European Community Labour Force Survey, which has been conducted every year in the spring since 1983 and compiled by Eurostat. The definition of ‘‘part-time’’ is based on individuals’ declarations of working status (part-timer versus full-timer), rather than on a precise measure of hours worked. Data on business cycle (output gap, GDP growth) come from OECD Economic Outlook. The output gap is measured as the percentage difference between actual GDP in constant prices and potential GDP estimated by the OECD.24
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Data on labour market institutions and structural variables are taken from various sources, in particular the recent macroeconomic literature on labour markets. Most of these data on national labour market institutions were available only until 1997–1998 when the study was carried out. It should be noted that the empirical models are estimated with annual data, which may underestimate the full effect of the business cycle by not taking into account intra-annual cyclical variations. Indeed, the annual indicator of output tends to smooth out the real cyclical fluctuations. The choice of annual data relates to statistical limitations. While cyclical indicators can be available on a quarterly basis, part-time employment series are available only on an annual basis and as data on labour market institutions and structural variables. The use of panel data approach, however, increases the number of observations and circumvents this lack of time length.25 The series capturing the effect of part-time regulation on the part-time rate deserve particular attention. This is a vector of country-specific trends that start from the year in which regulations of part-time employment were relaxed in each country.26 The motivation for the creation of this variable is that we wish to capture the additional annual increase in the PTR that follows the change in part-time regulation.27 The latter is identified using information provided by EIRO and OECD (1999). The starting date of each trend therefore varies by country. For the countries where part-time regulation has not changed (Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the value of the variable is set at zero for the complete period 1983–2001. To avoid an ‘‘outlier’’ bias, we have also constructed the ‘‘policy’’ variable excluding the trend for the Netherlands, which experienced a much sharper increase in part-time employment than other EU countries did (Euwals & Hogerbrugge, 2004).28
4. THE EFFECT OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT IN THE SHORT-TO-MEDIUM RUN Results derived from model (1) are presented in Table C2. Noteworthy results include, first, that the output gap is found to significantly and negatively affect the increase in the PTR – see column 1. When the economy operates above its potential, the PTR tends to decline, or in other words, part-time employment grows to a lesser extent than full-time employment. Conversely, the PTR tends to increase when the economy operates below its potential.29
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The negative effect of the economic cycle on the PTR is also shown when running country-by-country OLS equations, as seen in Table C5. The coefficient of the output gap (either contemporaneous or one year lagged) is negative for all countries except for Denmark, although of different magnitude across countries. Given the very small size of the sample for each country, the statistical inference is problematic and the value of the t-test might not be reliable. Therefore, we formally test the poolability of the country results. A standard Chow test does not reject the hypothesis of common-output-gap coefficient across countries. Panel data analysis, also called pooled-time-series estimation, increases the number of observations and degrees of freedom, allowing for better inference and providing more efficient estimators. The negative effect of the economic cycle on the PTR is consistent with the flexibility effect outlined in Section 2.1. The counter-cyclical pattern of the PTR is less marked in periods of strong economic activity than in periods of weak activity, as shown by column 7. Indeed, this would indicate that part-time employment enables employers to react flexibly in the presence of increasing economic uncertainty, for example, in the event of recession or the very start of economic recovery. Moreover, as most parttime jobs are created in the services sector, it is not surprising that the counter-cyclical relationship is highly significant when the cycle is measured by the value-added growth in the services sector (column 6). This result is fully consistent with the aforementioned compositional effect. Table C6 (first row) shows a highly significant and negative impact of the business cycle on the share of involuntary part-time employment. This would confirm the existence of a flexibility effect and involuntary part-time effect. The bulk of the effect of the cycle on the involuntary PTR seems to occur within the same year. This contemporaneous effect of the business cycle holds for both the total and involuntary share of part-time work. Therefore, the expansion of economic activity recorded in the late 1990s likely reduced involuntary part-time employment, which continuously declined from 21.8% of total part-time employment in 1997 to 16.4% in 2001, as displayed by Annex A. Our results generally indicate that, although strongly significant, the effect of the economic cycle on the part-time share appears limited in magnitude. The use of an annual model, for statistical reasons, may slightly underestimate the impact of the business cycle, as the intra-annual cyclical variations are not taken into account, although this measurement effect should not be overstated, given that the output gap is smoothed out over a relatively short period of four quarters. A negative output gap of 1% is
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associated with an increase in the total PTR of around 0.06 percentage points at most. Regarding the period 1992–1999, which was characterised by continuously negative output gaps, the cycle explained less than one-fifth (17%) of the total increase in the PTR recorded in the EU as a whole.30 This result is likely to be related to the fact that involuntary part-time work represented less than 20% of total part-time jobs in the EU in the 1990s. This also gives some support to the idea that other factors of structural nature, which are considered in Section 5, have been far more important in the explanation for the upward trend in part-time employment developments. The remainder of this section separately considers the importance of the business cycle on the development of part-time work for four different groups of workers: young workers, prime-age males, prime-age females and older workers. As displayed in Table C4, the findings for each group are broadly confirmed by the Granger-causality approach, which is used to check the robustness of the estimates to possible endogeneity issues. Table C7 presents results for model (1) for the PTR of young workers. The effect of the economic cycle, captured either by the output gap or real GDP movements, is found to be highly significant. The coefficient of the output gap lies between 0.15 and 0.21 across regressions. Taking a median elasticity of 0.18, the cycle would have accounted for around 25% of the total increase in the youth PTR recorded in the EU in the period 1992–1999, which is clearly stronger than the impact of the cycle on the total PTR. The more acute cyclical pattern in countries displaying high unemployment might suggest that the need for higher flexibility for youth is larger in the presence of strong structural rigidities. Moreover, the effect of the cycle on the share of involuntary youth part-time employment is statistically significant, but smaller compared to other groups. This would suggest that firms’ labour demand generally matches the desire of young people who are mainly looking for part-time jobs to finance their studies. The second group we consider is prime-age males. Table C8 suggests that the effect of the economic cycle on the PTR for this group is again highly significant, with an elasticity of around 0.26 on the output gap (column 3). Thus the cycle would have explained around 20% of the total increase in the PTR recorded in the EU in the period 1992–1999, which is slightly stronger than the impact of the cycle on the total PTR.31 This is consistent with the fact that the share of prime-age male involuntary part-timers appears highly cyclical with a negative output gap of 1% increasing the proportion of involuntary part-timers by 0.34 percentage points (Table C6). For prime-age females, the effect of the cycle on the PTR is unclear and in any case very weak, as seen in Table C9. Although the effect of the
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contemporaneous output gap appears highly significant and relatively high in magnitude (columns 1 and 3), it does not turn out to be significant anymore once instrumented by fixed capital investment and total exports (column 4). When regressing the female PTR on the output gap lagged by one year so as to examine the Granger causality, the coefficient is significant only at 10% and its magnitude almost halved (Table C4). Moreover, an alternative indicator of the business cycle, such as real GDP growth, is not significant (column 2). The cycle could only explain between 8% and 15% of the total increase in the female PTR recorded in the EU in the period 1992–1999. This impact is very small and lower than the impact of the cycle on the total PTR.32 Thus, the upward trend in the female PTR in the 1990s, as seen in Annex A, is likely to have mainly been the result of structural factors considered in the next section. An alternative explanation could be related to the fact that most female part-timers are working in the services sector, which is much less cyclical than industry. However, when considering specifically an indicator of cyclicality in the services sector (value-added growth), the effect on female part-time work remains insignificant. Finally, we consider workers aged 50 and over. Table C10 reveals no clear effect of the cycle on the PTR for this group; neither real GDP growth nor the output gap is significant.33 This result suggests that either part-time work is particularly unattractive for this group or employers do not typically use older workers in their attempts to increase the flexibility of their workforce through part-time work.
5. THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER STRUCTURAL VARIABLES ON THE PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT RATE IN THE LONGER RUN In addition to the impact of the business cycle, macro-panel data analysis (model 2) allows us to shed some light on the effect of the institutional and structural factors described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 on part-time employment.
5.1. Using a Panel of OECD Countries with General Labour Market Institutions Covering the main OECD countries, Table C1 shows the impact of general labour market institutions on the rate of part-time employment. As most of institutional data are available only until 1998 and display low time series
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variations, we first include non-EU OECD countries into the sample in order to better exploit the cross-sectional dimension of institutions.34 The findings in columns 1–3 do not include instrumental variables. Correcting for possible reverse-causality issues (columns 4–6), the instrumental variable technique (two-stage GLS) broadly confirms the significance of labour market institutions in influencing the PTR.35 The output gap is found to be negatively correlated with the PTR and appears highly significant in all equations, confirming the results displayed in Section 4. The labour market participation rate is found to be positively related to the PTR in equations 1, 2, 3 and 6, in line with the predictions in Section 2.36 While the measure of EPL for temporary contracts is not found to be statistically significant in the explanation for the PTR, EPL for regular jobs is found to be significantly and positively related to the PTR (columns 2, 3, 5 and 6). This is consistent with very stringent EPL for regular jobs, making it necessary for firms to develop flexible staffing arrangements. This is also in line with the fact that most part-time jobs are permanent. Unionisation is found to be negatively related to the PTR, possibly reflecting the reluctance of some trade unions towards the introduction of flexible work arrangements. Likewise, the unemployment benefit replacement ratio is negatively linked to the PTR, signalling the possible existence of ‘‘unemployment traps’’, which may particularly affect part-timers, given their relatively low level of earnings compared to full-timers. The labour tax rate is also negatively and highly significantly correlated with the PTR. A plausible interpretation of this finding could refer to the high marginal rate of taxation borne by the second earner of a couple.
5.2. Employing a Panel of EU Countries with Additional Institutional and Structural Variables The recent literature on the effect of labour market institutions on unemployment has argued that the institutions in Europe may be different from those in other OECD countries and significantly more rigid and affect labour market output variables, such as unemployment, in significantly different ways than in the United States (see Nickell et al., 2001 for the impact on overall employment and unemployment). This final subsection therefore restricts our analysis to a consideration of European countries. Furthermore, we deepen our analysis of the determinants of part-time work through the collection of other structural and institutional variables,
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which are expected to specifically influence part-time employment. Indeed, a further critique of the analysis in the previous specification could be, for example, that the general labour market institutions affect the labour market as a whole rather than the market for part-time work. Table C11 shows the results for this focus on EU-15 countries. Some findings emerge from equations 1 to 9, which are broadly confirmed when using instrumental variable techniques (column 10).37 First, the negative influence of output gap is confirmed. Its significance is very strong in equations 1 and 9, where there are no time dummies. Indeed, time dummies, used in other equations, tend to capture the common component of the output gap across the EU-15, which is fairly important, given the degree of synchronisation of European business cycles. Thus, the output gap coefficient in equations with time dummies mostly points to the country-specific component of the business cycle. As regards the magnitude of the business cycle influence, the output gap coefficient ranges from 0.07 to 0.11, which is in line with the results of Section 4, albeit slightly higher. Second, some institutions and policies appear to have a clear influence on the PTR as expected by the economic theory. The change in part-time regulation turns out to have a very significant impact on the part-time employment developments (column 4). This still holds true when excluding the Netherlands (columns 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9), although the magnitude of the effect decreases somewhat. Another noteworthy result is the strong, negative and highly significant effect of child benefits on the PTR, which acts as a disincentive to working part-time and makes it less attractive for individuals to (re-)enter the labour market. The reasoning behind this phenomenon may be that the benefit alters the trade-off between work and leisure towards a more family-oriented life. Broadly confirming the results of Section 5.1, EPL on regular jobs is found to be highly significant, while overall EPL is significant only at a 10% level. The temporary employment rate is found to be positively correlated with the PTR (columns 7, 8 and 10), which suggests that the absence of substitution between part-time employment and temporary employment and these two flexibility schemes are complementary in circumventing the rigidity of European labour markets. Lastly, as in Section 5.1, unemployment benefit replacement ratios are found to be negatively correlated with the PTR, but the statistical significance of this variable and the magnitude of its effect are not robust across equations. Third, some institutions do not seem to drive the PTR. The unemployment benefit duration is not significant. Reflecting the theoretical uncertainty concerning its overall impact (e.g. income versus substitution effects), total labour taxes do not seem to be significant. The total labour tax rate probably
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remains too aggregated to identify the relative tax burden borne by part-timers compared to full-timers. In particular, it does not take into account the difference between the tax rate borne by the second earner in a household and that undergone by a single-wage-earner household. Likewise, union density is not found to be significant (see column 6), which may mirror the changing attitude of trade unions toward part-time work in the EU countries in the 1990s. Fourth, some structural factors of sociological, demographic or economic nature are also found to be an important determinant of the PTR. The lagged female-participation rate is positively related to the PTR. This is fully consistent with the fact that, since the 1970s, part-time employment has been allowing numerous cohorts of women willing to work to access the labour market massively in many countries where female participation was initially low. Part-time jobs can indeed be seen as a way for women to reconcile family and professional lives, especially after their childbirth. Likewise, an alternative regression using the female share of employment instead of female participation also shows a clear positive relationship with the PTR. The fertility rate is found to be strongly and positively correlated with the PTR, which suggests that part-time work creates an opportunity for women to combine taking care of their children with market work. Similarly, the schooling rate of the population aged 15–25 and the share of employment in the services sector are also found to positively affect the PTR. The relative hourly wage of part-time workers vis-a`-vis full-time workers exerts a strong and highly significant effect on the PTR; therefore, the use of part-time work may be partly accounted for a reduction of hourly labour costs borne by firms (equation 11). Looking further, the cross-sectional relationship between the PTR and the relative wage seems to be stronger for men than women (Figs. C1–C3). Lastly, the two types of models reviewed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 seem to well explain part-time developments over time and across countries. The fitted value for OECD countries is broadly close to the actual series, with the exception of Denmark and the United States (Fig. C4). The fitted value for European countries derived from Table C11 yields even better results, as shown by Fig. C5.38 5.3. The Relative Importance of the Business Cycle and Institutional and Structural Variables: A Contribution Analysis The contribution analysis is one important value added to this paper, as it measures the relative weight of each relevant factor over time. This justifies the macroeconomic perspective and the comprehensive approach of this
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paper (encompassing a large set of determinants) since the contribution of relevant factors could not have been obtained with a micro-analysis or study focusing on one specific factor of part-time employment. The contribution analysis is carried out using the baseline version of the model (model 1 in Table C11). As the model is static, the contribution of each variable to the development in the PTR is the product of the regression coefficient and the change in the variable at stake over the period considered. In Fig. C6, the contribution of the main structural and institutional variables generally explains the development in the part-time rate in the EU countries rather well over the full period 1983–1998. This is especially true for Belgium, Germany, Spain, France and Italy, while other (unobserved) factors have also contributed to increasing the PTR in the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. By contrast, the main structural and institutional factors do not explain the decline in the US PTR.39 As we might expect, female participation appears to be the main driving force behind the development in part-time employment. The countries experiencing the strongest increase in their PTR were those recording a surging female-participation rate. However, part-time job dynamism was slightly dragged down by declining fertility, especially in Ireland and Spain and to a lower extent in Italy. On the institutional side, the relaxation of the legislation on part-time jobs in Belgium, Spain and France played a major role in the rising rate of part-time work, explaining some 2 percentage points of the rise. Other institutions played a more marginal role, except in Spain and Portugal, where the reduction in EPL stringency significantly weighed upon part-time job developments, and the Netherlands, where the cut in child benefits further boosted part-time employment. It should be noted that the (negative) effect of the business cycle was quite negligible over the full period 1983–1998, not even reaching half a percentage point, which stresses the principally structural nature of the upward trend in part-time employment. Indeed, cyclical movements in different directions offset each other over the full period, as EU economies experienced broadly similar positions in the business cycle at the start and the end of the time sample. In order to better identify the cyclical factors, we split the period into two sub-periods – 1983–1990 (Fig. C7) and 1990–1998 (Fig. C8). While the contribution of output gap was negative (between half and one percentage points) in most countries in the 1980s, it was slightly positive (of around onefourth percentage point) in the 1990s, when EU economies were running slightly below their potential. Therefore, the business cycle has contributed to explaining the generally stronger developments in part-time employment in the 1990s compared with the 1980s, albeit to a modest extent.
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As regards structural and institutional indicators, their individual roles in the 1980s and 1990s differ across countries. However, some general features emerge. The (either positive or negative) effect of the fertility rate was stronger in the 1980s. Child benefits had an unambiguously positive contribution in 1980s, while their impact was weaker or negative in the 1990s. Conversely, the change in part-time employment laws and in EPL for regular contracts only played a real role in the 1990s.
6. CONCLUSION The analysis of pooled data for EU-15 countries has considered to what extent the business cycle and structural variables have influenced the rate of part-time work in the EU over the past two decades. Indirectly, it allows us to see the extent to which part-time work may offer a means of increasing the flexibility of labour markets. The business cycle, as measured by both the output gap and the real GDP growth, is found to exert a negative effect on part-time employment developments, when using panel data techniques. This counter-cyclical effect is consistent with firms utilising part-time employment as a way to adjust their labour force (in terms of hours worked) to economic conditions. We hypothesise that, during economic downturns, employers reduce the number of hours worked by current staff and/or hire new workers in parttime jobs. In an upswing, net employment creation consists mostly full-time jobs in order to meet the increased demand for labour resources by firms. We find that, consistent with this hypothesis, involuntary part-time employment is cyclical, being higher in troughs of economic activity. Splitting our sample by age and gender groups reveals a very significant effect of the cycle on young and male prime-age workers. Conversely, the effect is unclear for women and clearly insignificant for older workers. This paper also considers the role of structural factors and institutions in explaining the rate of part-time employment. Looking at institutions, changes in legislation favourable to part-time employment are found to be effective, having a strong impact on actual part-time employment developments. Moreover, while overall EPL has no clear-cut effect, EPL for permanent contracts is found to be positively related to the PTR, which is consistent with the use of part-time work as a tool for enhancing flexibility in the case of rigid labour markets. Given the negative impact of child benefits and, to a much lesser extent, unemployment benefits, the econometric results support an ‘‘unemployment trap’’ story affecting part-time employment.
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Turning to other structural variables, societal and demographic, the fertility rate is found to be strongly and positively correlated with the PTR. This result suggests that part-time work creates an opportunity for women to combine taking care of their children with market work. In line with conventional stylised facts, the share of the services sector in the economy and the proportion of youth in tertiary education are also significant predictors of the part-time employment rate. Besides, a cross-sectional analysis underscores the positive impact of the differential in hourly wages between part-timers and full-timers on the PTR. This suggests that relative hiring in part-time employment compared to fulltime employment seems to be fairly sensitive to relative wages. This also reflects that part-time work is often used as a ‘‘precarious’’ form of employment, in line with the ‘‘insider/outsider’’ theory. Finally, a contribution analysis shows that the main structural and institutional variables generally explain the development in the part-time rate in the EU countries fairly well over the full period 1983–1998, while this is obviously not the case in the United States. Moreover, in some EU countries, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal, other factors not captured by the analysis have also contributed to increasing the PTR. While female participation, not surprisingly, appears to be the main driver of the development in part-time employment, declining fertility rates exert a dampening effect in some countries. Looking at labour market institutions, the relaxation of the legislation on part-time jobs in Belgium, Spain and France played a major role. Other institutions also played some part in Spain and Portugal (easing of EPL for permanent jobs) and in the Netherlands (the cut in child benefits). Lastly, while the effect of the business cycle was quite negligible over the full period, it has contributed, albeit to a limited extent, to explaining the generally stronger developments in part-time employment seen in the 1990s compared with the 1980s.
NOTES 1. That is, the European Union, before its enlargement in May 2004, comprising 15 member states. 2. This is because, first, the increase in the part-time employment rate mechanically decreases the average hours worked per individual, reducing total average compensation per employee, ceteris paribus. This is a pure measurement effect. Second, some studies have shown that the hourly wage rate received by parttime workers is lower than that of full-time workers (OECD, 1999). Both of these two dampening effects on aggregate wage growth may increase with a rise in parttime employment.
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3. It should be noted that the vast economic literature on European employment laws tends to focus primarily on the distinction between permanent versus short-time contracts, rather than full-time and part-time contracts. 4. The percentage of those working part-time relative to total employment. 5. Farber (1999) for the United States found that job losers are significantly more likely than non-losers to get an involuntary part-time job, which may suggest that workers, formally in full-time jobs, go through an (short) unemployment spell before occupying a part-time job. 6. In other words, the flexibility effect reduces the negative cyclical responsiveness of the number of those working part-time compared to those working full-time, thereby causing a counter-cyclical effect on the share of part-time employment in total employment. 7. For instance, in 1993–2000, a specific social security contribution rebate was granted to firms in France for recruitment in part-time work, in addition to some additional social security contribution cut for the recruitment of low-paid parttimers. This coincided with a boom in part-time employment over the same period. As reported by Ruivo et al. (1998), the legislation on part-time work underwent important changes in Spain in 1994 (relaxation of the maximum daily and weekly working hours, reduction in social security contribution). This resulted in a strong increase in the part-time employment rate between 1994 and 1995. 8. A low level of EPL for temporary contracts may also make the use of part-time contracts less necessary as temporary employment can meet the need for more flexible staffing arrangements. 9. If child benefits are means tested, this increases the marginal rate of taxation around the income threshold above which the incumbents are not eligible to these benefits. This might deter one member of the couple to take up a job because this may mean the loss of child benefits. However, if the eligibility threshold is high, this could encourage taking a part-time job rather than a full-time job. 10. Firms or sectors with a high proportion of part-timers are generally considered to be harder to unionise. 11. In France, part-time jobs increased strongly in the services sector in the 1980s and 1990s, while temporary jobs and particularly agency employment flourished in manufacturing. 12. Therefore, employers avoid underemployment of staff in off-peak times and overtime payment in busy periods. 13. Young workers may be considered as ‘‘outsiders’’, allowing firms to make them bear a higher proportion of adjustment costs in terms of wages and working conditions. Youth labour may often consider their part-time job as temporary, limiting the risk to the firm of recruiting an inefficient worker. 14. See OECD Employment Outlook, June 1999. 15. More tentatively, another reason for an increase in part-time employment might be the demographic ageing, as the elderly may need more care, often provided by part-timers, and young generations may find part-time jobs more appealing. However, given the slow nature of demographic changes, these effects, playing in different directions, are likely to be of second order. Likewise, the substantial immigration observed in some EU countries might influence part-time employment, although the theoretical bond is unclear. 16. In specification (1), we do not use time dummies because they would bias the estimation of the effect of the economic cycle. Indeed, they would capture the
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component of the business cycles that is common across countries, and the coefficient of the output gap would only take into account the country-specific component instead of the full cyclical effect. 17. The linear country-specific trends correspond to country-fixed effects (i.e. country-specific intercept), as model (1) is written in first differences. 18. Given the fairly short time series dimension of the data, this bias may not be negligible. 19. The results are confirmed when using Dickey–Fuller test as country-bycountry unit-root test. 20. Under the Fisher–Maddala–Wu test and using Phillips–Perron tests for individual countries, the null of no cointegration (non-stationarity of the residual) is strongly rejected for all equations in Table C1. For instance, using equation 1 of Table C1, the test statistics is w2(40) ¼ 79.2, with a p-value of 0.02%. This test relies on no cross-country correlation. The introduction of time dummies in specification (2) is likely to capture much of the cross-correlation in the data. 21. For instance, on the basis of regression 1 in Table C2, the hypothesis of homoskedastic residuals is strongly rejected by an LR test (w2(13) ¼ 72.8), while the hypothesis of non-serially correlated residuals is clearly rejected by an LM test (w2(1) ¼ 94.2). 22. The instruments are selected from equation 1, which contains the largest number of highly significant variables. 23. Possible endogeneity with other policy variables is less obvious. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the developments in labour market institutions and policies in EU countries have been influenced by the general situation of the labour market in each country (as reflected by the unemployment rate), and the causation from part-time employment rate to institutions seems to be fairly unlikely. Moreover, as pointed out by Nunziata (2001), the reasons behind institutional and policy changes are far from evident. The pattern of political decision making in each country would tend to indicate that other important factors such as the timing of election, the policy makers’ agenda and the average voters’ preference may have played a crucial role in shaping the institutional and policy changes. 24. For further details, see Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995). 25. A panel data analysis appears adequate. A cross section study only exploiting the time average of each variable would face the problem of the relatively limited cross-sectional dimension (21 OECD countries and 14 EU countries) and will lose some time series information. Table B1 shows that the time variation (‘‘within’’) is relatively important for some structural variables (female participation, fertility rate, schooling rate) and not negligible for some labour market institutions such as total tax rate, EPL and bargaining co-ordination. The section on contribution analysis (Section 5.3) will more intuitively confirm that the importance of institutions in each country varies between the 1980s (Fig. C7) and the 1990s (Fig. C8). 26. Technically, this vector corresponds to ‘‘pooled after-reform country trends’’. We have stacked the observations country by country to compose the vector. Within each block, we have a trend that is 0 before any policy change and 1 after the first year, following the easing of part-time regulations, 2 the second year, n the nth year,
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etc. In principle, we could have separately estimated each country block. However, given the relatively limited time series dimension, we stacked them and restricted the coefficients to be the same across countries in order to increase the efficiency of the estimate and capture the overall effect of reforms. 27. The rise in PTR induced by the regulatory change is likely to disappear in the long run, as it corresponds to the dynamics towards the new steady state implied by the reform of part-time regulation. 28. More technically, as the change in the regulatory framework for part-time jobs in the Netherlands occurred before the start of the sample (i.e. 1982), the ‘‘policy’’ variable for the Netherlands cannot really measure the effect of the change in regulation. It would instead simply capture the trend of increase in PTR. 29. Other ancillary results suggest the robustness of the findings mentioned above (Table C2). The counter-cyclical pattern still holds when taking real GDP growth as our measure of the cycle in column 2. The cyclicality appears even stronger when using instrumental variables for the output gap to treat possible problems of endogeneity between the output gap and the PTR (column 5). Column 8 suggests that the cyclical effect on part-time work is not very different between countries with high unemployment and other countries. 30. In this period, the cycle explained 0.09 p.p. only out of the 0.51 p.p. increase in PTR recorded on average each year in the EU-15 as a whole. In the period 1992–1997, the cyclical effect reached its maximum, that is, 23% of the total increase in PTR. 31. The effect of negative output gaps on the PTR of prime-age males is found to be stronger when lagged by one year, while that of positive output gaps is strongest when contemporaneous. The negative output gap effect outweighs the positive output gap effect. One interpretation of these results again follows our flexibility effect argument: Firms prefer to hire staff on flexible contracts when the economic outlook is uncertain (recession or very start of economic recovery). When the economy recovers, firms’ need for part-time contracts decreases, as the uncertainty concerning future economic activity fades away gradually. 32. The relatively small impact of the output gap on involuntary female part-time work, compared to prime-age men (Table C6), further illustrates the unclear effect of the business cycle on prime-age female part-time employment. 33. The only exception to this result is for relatively high unemployment countries (Spain, France, Italy and Finland), where the cycle is found to have a modest negative impact on changes in PTR. 34. Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. 35. The effect of EPL for regular work on the rate of part-time work is clearly positive and significant, while the coefficient for EPL on temporary jobs displays a smaller magnitude. The negative effect of unionisation and the labour tax rate are also confirmed. However, the total participation rate changes sign, and the coefficient of unionisation, benefit replacement ratio, unemployment benefit duration and labour tax rate appear extremely strong compared to the results shown in columns 2 and 3, likely reflecting statistical artefacts. The latter results are not intuitive and should be interpreted with caution, as the instruments used (lagged exogenous variables) are imperfect, albeit widespread in the literature.
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36. The surprising results found in equations 4 and 5 could be explained by the high degree of colinearity between the participation rate and some institutional variables in the context of instrumental variable estimations. This can be seen through the very high value of some coefficients. 37. Results for EU-15 displayed in Table C11 show that the impact of the output gap is negative, supporting our previous findings. It is clearly significant when the equation is estimated without time dummies (columns 1 and 9). Indeed, these dummies take out the component of the cycle common across countries. 38. Equation 2 in Table C1 and equation 2 in Table C11 have been chosen to make simulations because they are comparable to each other and use EPL indicators broken down by types of contracts (regular and temporary) that provide better results than using simply the overall EPL indicator. 39. This is possibly due to the flexibility of permanent contracts in the United States, which makes the use of part-time jobs less necessary for firms. Even more importantly, the already high rate of female participation and the culture of much longer working hours compared with Europe could explain the stalling part-time employment rate in the United States. 40. The concept stricto sensus refers to employment, that is, the number of jobs rather than the number of people employed. As a result, two part-time jobs held by the same individual are not counted as a full-time job but as two different jobs. Moreover, full-time and part-time employment can either correspond to selfemployment or wage-earning jobs and, alternately, to fixed-term contracts or permanent positions. 41. A detailed description of the sampling methods and adjustment procedures used to compile these data can be found in the latest Labour Force Survey – Methods and definitions, 1998. Part-time employment series are available only on an annual basis. Some quarterly series of part-time employment rate exist for some countries but remain rather short and display a very strong seasonal pattern, which is risky to correct, given the poor time series dimension of the data. 42. Data have been made available for 2002. The estimations in this chapter used data until 2001. 43. This split corresponds to the main age categories presented by Eurostat for the LFS. 44. The correlation coefficient between the two measures of output gap is 0.96. 45. Also called union density. This is the percentage of reported union members between wage and salaried employees. 46. For the most recent observations, see also Nickell, S., Nunziata, L., & Ochel, W. (2002, May). Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. What do we know? Bank of England. 47. The wage differential for the United States used in Section 6 comes from OECD (1999).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank particularly two anonymous referees, Willi Semmler, Rob Euwals, Salvador Barrios, Giuseppe Carone, Ve´ronique
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Genre, J.J. Dolado, J. van Ours and G. Laroque and other participants of the 4th ECB/CEPR Labour Market Workshop and the 2005 ASSA annual conference in Philadelphia for their helpful comments or suggestions on a preliminary version of this paper.
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Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., & Boylaud, O. (2000). Summary indicators of product market regulation with an extension to employment protection legislation. OCDE Working Paper no. 266. Nunziata, L. (2001, December). Institutions and wage determination: A multi-country approach. Nuffield College Working Papers in Economics (2001-W29). Nunziata, L. (2005). Institutions and wage determination: A multi-country approach. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 67(4), 435–466. OECD. (1995, July). Employment outlook. Paris: OECD. OECD. (1999, June). Focus on part-time work. Employment Outlook. O’Reilly, J., & Bothfeld, S. (2002). What happens after working part-time? Integration, maintenance or exclusionary transitions in Britain and western Germany. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26, 409–439. Pfau-Effinger, B. (1998). Culture or structure as explanations for differences in part-time work in Germany, Finland and the Netherlands. In: J. O’Reilly & C. Fagan (Eds), Part-time prospects: An international comparison of part-time work in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. London: Routledge. Ruivo, M., Gonzalez, M. P., & Varejao, J. M. (1998). Why is part-time work so low in Portugal and Spain? In: J. O’Reilly & C. Fagan (Eds), Part-time prospects: An international comparison of part-time work in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. London: Routledge. Scarpetta, S. (1996). Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional settings on unemployment: A cross-country study. OECD Economic Studies no. 26, pp. 43–82. Smith, L., Fagan, C., & Rubery, J. (1998). Where and why is part-time work growing in Europe? In: J. O’Reilly & C. Fagan (Eds), Part-time prospects: An international comparison of part-time work in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. London: Routledge. Sundstro¨m, M. (1991). Part-time work in Sweden: Trends and equity effects. Journal of Economic Issues, 25(1), 167–178. Turner, D., Richardson, P., & Rauffet, S. (1996). Modelling the supply side of the seven major OECD economies. OECD Economics Department Working Paper no.167. Walwei, U. (1998). Part-time work: A threat to labour standards? In: J. O’Reilly & C. Fagan (Eds), Part-time prospects: An international comparison of part-time work in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. London: Routledge.
ANNEX A. TRENDS IN PART-TIME WORK IN EU-15 COUNTRIES A thorough description of the trends in part-time work in EU-15 countries can be found in Buddelmeyer, Mourre, and Ward (2005b). A growing part-time employment share has been a main feature of a number of industrialised countries over the past two decades. Fig. A1 shows a significant increase in the share of part-time employment in total employment in the EU-15, Japan and Canada during the late 1980s and 1990s, while the United States experienced a slight fall in the part-time employment
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share. Fig. A2 plots the proportion of part-time work across EU-15 countries in 2001, which varies considerably by country, ranging from 4.5% to 42%, with the EU-15 average at 18%. As shown by Fig. A3, the Netherlands exhibits the highest rate of part-time work, with 42% of its workers working part-time. Relatively low rates of part-time work are found in Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal (at around 11%), in Italy and Spain (at 8%) and in particular in Greece (at 4.5%). The broad stylised facts for part-time employment in the EU-15 countries in 2001 by age group and gender can be summarised as follows: EU
Euro area
USA
Japan
Canada
25
20
15
10
19 83 19 84 19 85 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01
5
Fig. A1.
Part-Time Employment Rate (%). Source: OECD, Eurostat (Labour Force 7Surveys).
Fig. A2.
L N
JP N AU S
E H
U K
N ZL
C
L
SE
E D
IS
R
D K
BE
O N
un io n C AN
IE
FR
AT
Eu ro pe an
FI U Eu SA ro ar ea
LU
IT
PT
ES
R TU R
KO
G R
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Part-Time Employment Rate in 2001 (%). Source: OECD, Eurostat (Labour Force Surveys).
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45 40 35 30 25
Medium Belgium France Sweden
Ireland Denmark United Kingdom
Austria Germany
30 25 20 15 10
85 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02
84
19
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83
5
Low Finland Italy
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Part-Time Employment Rate (%).
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Fig. A3.
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0
2002
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20 15 10
0
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
5
Fig. A4.
Part time employment
The part-time employment share is currently highest for 15- to 24-yearolds, at nearly 23% on average within the EU-15, and lowest for prime-age workers (i.e. those aged 25–49), at just over 16%. Older workers have a parttime employment share of 21%. Young workers experienced the fastest rate of growth in part-time work during the 1990s in the EU-15 as a whole, although the growth rate has flattened out more recently. Part-time workers are much more likely to be women, with the female PTR standing at 34% and the male rate at 6.2% in 2001 in the EU-15. This pattern of a significantly higher rate of female part-time employment holds across time and for all EU-15 countries. Since the early 1990s, growth in part-time work has also generally been strongest among female workers. The majority of part-time work is voluntary. Nonetheless, 14.2% of parttime workers were involuntarily working part-time in the EU-15 in 1992, with this rate rising to 19.1% in 1997, before falling back to 14.4% in 2001 (Figs. A4 and A5). The rate of involuntary part-time work within the EU-15 stood at 20% for men in 2001 but at a significantly lower 13% for women. Rates of involuntary part-time employment tend to be lower among young and older age groups.
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
y = -0.53x + 27.008 R 2 = 0.4631
0
5
10
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25
30
35
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45
50
Share of involuntary part time in 2001
Share of Involuntary Part-Time – EU 12 and Relation with Part-Time Employment Rate.
Why Europeans Work Part-Time? A Cross-Country Panel Analysis
Fig. A5.
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Share of Involuntary Part-Time as Percent of the Total Part-Time Employment (%).
ANNEX B. DATA Part-Time Employment The PTR is defined as the percentage of part-time employment relative to total employment.40 The annual PTR, as well as the share of involuntary
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part-time employment, is derived for each country from the annual European Community Labour Force Survey, which has been conducted every year in the spring since 1983 and compiled by Eurostat.41 Although data on part-time employment are generally available from 1983, no information is available for countries before they joined the EU (i.e. for Spain and Portugal, prior to 1986; for Austria, Sweden and Finland, prior to 1995).42 Thus, for some countries, such as Finland and Sweden, data have been back cast using OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics, when available. These data are considered the most harmonised existing data source on part-time work. Moreover, data are available by age groups and gender. For this study, four age/gender categories have been considered: those aged 15–24, men aged 25–49, women aged 25–49 and those aged 50 and over.43
Business Cycle Indicators We mainly focus on annual output gaps stemming from the OECD Economic Outlook database. The use of the output gaps computed by the European Commission (DG-ECFIN-AMECO database) leads to very sim